Continuity and Change in Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Leaders, and the Weight of History

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Certificate

This is to certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

Marilyn Kwan Kharkongor

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Acronyms

ABVP	Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AISF	All-India Students Federation
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association for Southeast Asian Nations
BJP	Bharatiya Janata party
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CEATO	Central Treaty Organisation
CPI	Communist Party of India
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EAS	East Asia Summit
GSRTC	Gujarat State Road Transportation Corporation
ICSSR	Indian Council for Social Science Research
IFP	Indian Foreign Policy
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Indian National Congress
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
LEP	Look East Policy
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LOC	Line of Control

MP-IDSA	Manohar Parrikar- Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses
NAP	Non-Alignment Policy
NAM	Non-alignment Movement
NCM	Non-Cooperation Movement
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSSP	Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PII	Post Imperial Ideology
PLA	People’s Liberation Army
PRC	People’s Republic of China
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
RSS	Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Abstract

This thesis explores the role of prime ministers in shaping Indian foreign policy, focusing on the weight of shared historical experiences that influence ideological development and state identity. In particular, the thesis illuminates the relationship between continuity and change in Indian foreign policy and examines how India's ongoing colonial history has influenced the foreign policy of Indian prime ministers since 1947. This gives rise to three distinct understandings of the Indian state identity: the strategic, postcolonial, and Hindu nationalist identities; shifts in leadership exemplify these identities. Furthermore, four themes in Indian foreign policy are developed that provide a framework for advancing the understanding that ideas play in foreign policy analysis: Nehruvian Idealist, Nehruvian Pragmatist, Pragmatic Liberalist, and Strategist Multilateralist. The thesis employs a qualitative interpretative methodology and a broadly defined constructivist approach using a Skinnerian method and Post-Imperial Ideology. The research aims to develop a theoretical description of the role of ideas in Indian foreign policy, exploring the ongoing impact of ideational continuity on Indian foreign policy, particularly in the context of changing political landscapes. The study contributes significantly to the field of Indian Foreign Policy by providing a detailed historical analysis of the role of ideas, particularly emphasizing the long-standing effects of colonialism. It illuminates the persistence of ideational continuity and its resulting impact on the evolution of Indian foreign policy. The research underscores the need for a more expansive appreciation of Indian foreign policy, considering the influential interplay between leaders' ideologies, historical legacy, and current global circumstances.

INTRODUCTION

India is a 'rising'[1], 'emerging'[2], and 'leading'[3] power amid major geopolitical repositioning. India is part of several regional and global forums, indicating that 'India has arrived on the world stage' as a significant power of the twenty-first century.[4] When comprehending India's regional and global importance, the complex influences of internal (domestic) and external (regional and global) factors are apparent. Understanding where there is continuity and change in Indian foreign policy is crucial. Hence, in this thesis, an examination of India's position in South Asia, about its neighbours Pakistan and China, as well as India's nuclear drive is analysed through the foreign policy choices taken from independent India's first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1947 until the first tenure of the current Narendra Modi administration.

In this research project, the deconstruction of knowledge on Indian foreign policy outcomes stems from the growth of India's role, both regionally and globally. Hence, it is important to briefly discuss why the study of Indian foreign policy warrants discussion in the current geopolitical landscape. India is an emerging power-driven country with a decade of economic growth.[5] As the fifth-largest economic power, it is projected to become the world's

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[1] Harsh V. Pant, *Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World* (Taylor & Francis, 2009), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367817787.

[2] Alyssa Ayres, "India at Seventy: An Emerging World Power With Unfinished Business at Home," Council on Foreign Relations, August 15, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/india-seventy-emerging-world-power-unfinished-business-home.

[3] Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, "IISS Fullerton Lecture by Dr. S. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary in Singapore," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 20, 2015, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25493/IISS_Fullerton_Lecture_by_Foreign_Secretary_in_Singapore.

[4] Pant, *Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World*.

[5] ET Bureau, "India Displaces Japan to Become Third-Largest World Economy in Terms of PPP: World Bank," *Economic Times*, April 30, 2014, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/india-displaces-japan-to-become-third-largest-world-economy-in-terms-of-ppp-world-bank/articleshow/34392694.cms?from=mdr.

fourth-largest economy by 2025 and the third-largest by 2027.[6] With a population of 1,425,775,50 in 2023, India has surpassed China as the most populous country.[7] In 2016, India commissioned the nuclear-powered ballistic missile INS Arihant, joining the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China in operating ballistic missile nuclear submarines. [8] India's landing of its lunar rover on the moon's South Pole is another significant milestone highlighting its technical expertise, cementing and strengthening its global position.[9] India's regional and international role has been further cemented through its presidency of the G-20 and by positioning itself as the voice of the Global South.

With India's growing position in the region of South Asia and even in the extended Indo-Pacific region, what holds significance is the need to understand the foreign policy choices taken by Indian prime ministers towards its challenging neighbours- Pakistan and China. This allows us to explain why India is a pivotal player in the broader geopolitical power competition between the USA and China. Hence, this displays how the South Asian region is an integral part of the broader Indo-Pacific maritime area, where major power competition is increasing.[10] In light of this, both China and the United States of America have been eager to

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[6] IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 2023, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx.
Surabhi, "India May Well Be on Track to Becoming World's Third Largest Economy," *Business Today*, August 16, 2023, https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy/story/india-may-well-be-on-track-to-becoming-third-largest-economy-394327-2023-08-16.

[7] Sara Hertog et al., "UN DESA Policy Brief No. 153: India Overtakes China as the World's Most Populous Country," United Nations | Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Economic Analysis, April 23, 2023, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-no-153-india-overtakes-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/.
Hannah Ellis-Petersen, "India Overtakes China to Become World's Most Populous Country," *The Guardian*, April 24, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/24/india-overtakes-china-to-become-worlds-most-populous-country.

[8] Franz-Stefan Gady, "India Quietly Commissions Deadliest Sub," *The Diplomat*, October 19, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/india-quietly-commissions-deadliest-sub/.

[9] Shashi Tharoor, "India's Space Triumph," The Strategist, September 5, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indias-space-triumph/.

[10] Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, "As Turbulence Looms in South Asia, India Emerges as an Anchor," *Observational Research Foundation*, August 17, 2022,

establish their presence in South Asia. China's interest in the region is focused on limiting India's influence.[11]

So, with India's historically tumultuous relationship with Pakistan on the one hand and India's conflict with China post-independence on the other, the bilateral, regional strategic conflicts have gotten further complicated with China's consistent support for Pakistan. The complication goes beyond the region as the competition between India and China is part of the larger global competition between China and the USA. The role of the USA in South Asia has grown with the rise of China, leading the USA to ensure its presence in the wider Indo-Pacific region. As the USA's relations with Pakistan deteriorated and ties with India strengthened amid strategic competition with China, South Asia has become a focal point for global power competition.[12]

Therefore, with this background on India being a focal point in the region, the need to study Indian foreign policy from various angles re-surfaces. And, since structural approaches to apprehending Indian foreign policy have been made frequently, this research project is designed to study India's foreign policy choices with emphasis on the agential approach, understanding how ideas influence Indian prime ministers and how that impacts their foreign policy choices. Through this, the research displays the causal relationship between ideational continuity and paradigm shifts in Indian foreign policy.

Research Question

The literature on Indian foreign policy is often analysed through a structural approach, focusing on the role of institutions, especially with the analysis of policy outcomes,

https://www.orfonline.org/research/as-turbulence-looms-in-south-asia-india-emerges-as-an-anchor/.

[11] Derek Grossman, "What China Wants in South Asia," *Observational Research Foundation*, June 11, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/research/what-china-wants-in-south-asia-67665/.

[12] Tanvi Madan, *Major Power Rivalry in South Asia*.

overshadowing the need to understand the role of individual actors in shaping foreign policy decisions and outcomes. This is not to say that there is no mention or acknowledgement of the role of Indian prime ministers and the ministries working to formulate India's foreign policy. Most studies that have looked at the role of Indian prime ministers on Indian foreign policy have more than often been done through a structural approach, with little account of the role of the prime ministers from an agential analysis. Therefore, while acknowledging the role of institutions in foreign policy outcomes, understanding how Indian prime ministers influence foreign policy outcomes is needed by delving into the ideological factors that influence their foreign policy choices. Hence, there is a need to expand on the role that Indian prime ministers have in foreign policy decision-making to understand the continuity and change in foreign policy decision-making. Therefore, while the historical structural approach to understanding Indian foreign policy prevails, the influence of domestic politics and India's relationships with its neighbours are essential factors to consider. It is equally imperative to examine the role of Indian prime ministers in shaping foreign policy decisions and outcomes. This thesis aims to add to the study of Indian foreign policy by undertaking an agential approach that studies the historical evolution of the ideologies of Indian prime ministers and how their personal beliefs intertwine with foreign policy decisions.

Hence, to deconstruct the knowledge of Indian foreign policy outcomes, comprehending the ideas that influence Indian leaders is necessary for this research, as it allows for a more nuanced understanding of the decision-making process and the factors that shape Indian foreign policy. Thus, with this endeavour, the overarching research question for this thesis is: *Why has India's foreign policy taken the form it has since 1947, and why do we see evidence of both continuity (in ultimate aims) and change (in strategies for achieving those aims)?* In seeking to answer this question, what emerges is the need to look at the extent to which ideas of the colonial past influence a leader, thereby allowing for the deconstruction of

ideas in India's colonial history as factors that influence the prime ministers, reflected in their foreign policy decisions. This will establish the continuity of Indian foreign policy's ultimate goals of territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy with changes in strategies undertaken by different prime ministers.

Argument in Brief

In recognising the ideational attributions of Indian prime ministers to Indian foreign policy choices, this thesis argues that the weight of India's colonial history continues to shape foreign policy decisions, which can be seen in the continuity of foreign policy goals of territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy with change witnessed in the strategies undertaken to achieve the goals. Therefore, it allows for determining the relationship between ideational continuity and paradigm shift in Indian foreign policy. In simple terms, this thesis puts forward two points. One, Indian prime ministers play a significant role in foreign policy choices; thus, an agential approach towards understanding the determination of foreign policy choices alongside the structural factors that drive foreign policy decisions cannot be ignored. Two, the legacy of India's colonial history is evident in the ideas that guide Indian prime ministers' foreign policy choices even today. Therefore, this intertwined relationship between India's colonial history and the foreign policy choices made by Indian leaders[13] is significant towards recognising the role India sets out for itself, regionally and globally.

The interwoven relationship between India's historical colonial experience and foreign policy choices is found in the germination of ideas in the national freedom movement. In this thesis, I argue that India's territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy goals germinated through the traumatic colonial experience and continue to be present in all foreign policy choices. So, even if the prime ministers follow different political ideologies, India's foreign

[13] In this thesis, leaders are used for Indian prime ministers interchangeably.

policy's ultimate goals remain the same- displaying the continuity of foreign policy aims. To this effect, the change or shift found is in the strategies or policy implementations undertaken, which are most often based upon the political ideology of the respective prime minister.

This research project undertakes an agential approach, allowing a close analysis of the ideas that influence Indian prime ministers, which is visible in their foreign policy choices. This is done deliberately in this research as most of the literature on Indian foreign policy has been conducted, bearing the structural approach to institutional influences on India's foreign policy decision-making. While there is literature on Indian prime ministers and their contributions towards foreign policy outcomes, the study has always been through a structural approach, keeping aside the ideational influence on foreign policy outcomes. Therefore, the lack of an agency approach towards Indian foreign policy is the gap this thesis aims to fill.

Comprehending the historical impact of colonialism on Indian foreign policy allows this research project to investigate the development of ideas that influence the Indian prime ministers and their foreign policy choices. Examining the ideational influence on the Indian prime ministers allows for a deeper study of the evolution of the ideas stemming from the national freedom movement, even if opposing ideologies developed. Consequently, the objective of all the prime ministers has been to present India to the world in a way that aligns with India's view of itself. Therefore, bringing together the thesis argument, the research studies the relationship between continuity and change in Indian foreign policy under Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64), Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66), Indira Gandhi (1966-77 & 1980-84), Rajeev Gandhi (1984-89), Narasimha Rao (1991-96), Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998-2004), Manmohan Singh (2004-2014), and Narendra Modi (2014-2019).

This research delves into the foreign policy decisions made by leaders in relation to India's nuclear drive, as well as India's relations with Pakistan and China. It aims to shed light on how the decisions taken contribute towards the continuity of foreign policy goals of

territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy, with change in foreign policy strategies and implementation. The three case studies undertaken in this research project are because India has a shared colonial and partition history with Pakistan, which also happens to be India's most contentious neighbour in the South Asian Region (SAR). Regarding China, both India and China have witnessed colonialism, and the growth of China, regionally and globally, keeps India and China relations under the radar of analysis.

Along with India's bilateral relations with Pakistan and China, the broader geopolitical dynamics between India, Pakistan, and China in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region bring about the need to understand the possible elements of continuity and change in India's foreign policy towards Pakistan and China. Therefore, future policies can be predicted and determined by understanding India's evolutionary, past, and present policy choices by the different prime ministers towards these challenging nation-states.

The third case study of India's nuclear drive has been undertaken to analyse India's view of itself from independence until now, how India wanted to develop as an important power, maximising status and thereby creating the kind of self-perception of itself which would also become the way India wanted the international political system to view her. In these multifaceted aspects, understanding how the Indian prime ministers have made foreign policy choices towards Pakistan, China, and India's nuclear drive enabled a clearer understanding of continuity in Indian foreign policy goals and the realisation of the changing strategies to achieve these goals.

Thus, the significance of this thesis lies in its contribution to establishing a theoretical framework for analysing India's foreign policy through the ideational influence on Indian leaders and their foreign policy choices. Through the causal relation between ideas and leadership in Indian foreign policy decision-making, this thesis aims to add to the growing literature on Indian foreign policy that recognises the constructivist ideological influence on

foreign policy. The original contribution of this research project lies in the attempt to delve into the ideological factors that influence the choices made by the prime ministers, looking into their worldviews, childhood experiences, education, and the process of political socialisation that needs to be considered. While structural institutional factors exist, this thesis highlights the importance of the socio-political contexts of individual leaders, which shape their ideologies, weigh into their foreign policy choices, and should not be neglected. Most notably, the study asserts that colonial historical memory significantly influences leaders and should not be overlooked.

Theorising Indian Foreign Policy

This section outlines the literature on Indian foreign policy and identifies the gap in the literature that this research project fills.

Since India gained its independence, scholars, beginning with Bandhopadyaya[14] and Rana,[15] have attempted to understand Indian foreign policy based on the structural approach, focusing on the role of the state and policy outcomes. The existing literature on Indian foreign policy is limited to structural state interests in its relations with regional and global powers. This brings about the need to understand the conceptual influence on leaders' (mainly Indian prime ministers for this research project) foreign policy decision-making, even though Indian foreign policy decision-making has been concentrated in the prime minister's office.[16] To understand the gap in the literature, the study of Indian foreign policy can be divided into three distinct phases.

The first phase of Indian foreign policy spanned from 1947, when India attained independence, until the end of the Cold War, where the structural approach to foreign policy

[14] Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*.
[15] Rana, *The Imperatives of Nonalignment*.
[16] Pant, *New Directions in India's Foreign Policy*.

decision-making is found in the scholarly work of Bandhopadyaya[17] and Rana,[18] along with Sumit Ganguly's application of Kenneth Waltz's structural realism[19] focuses on three levels of Indian foreign policy decision-making (decision-making, systemic/global, and national/domestic),[20] while acknowledging the agency of prime ministers but within the structural approaches. Meanwhile, C. Rajamohan utilises a realist approach to examine India's relationship with the USA, Russia, China and Pakistan.[21] Kanti Bajpai's *Indian Strategic Culture* provided the six schools of thought that created India's strategic thinking. Therefore, it is worth noting that the works of Rana, Bandhoyapadyay, Ganguly, Rajamohan, Bajpai, Tanhem, and Subramanyam consistently prioritise a structural approach over agency when it comes to understanding India's foreign policy and strategic thinking.

The second phase of Indian foreign policy literature emerged after the Cold War, shifting towards a liberal yet structural approach towards foreign policy decision-making. Scholars like Rajiv Sikri,[22] Itty Abraham,[23] and Sanjay Baru[24] highlight the opening of the Indian economy and India's attempts to improve relations with neighbours and beyond. However, what is present in their writings is the prevalence of the structural and institutional approach towards foreign policy goals. Hence, the structural economic calculations were paramount for Indian foreign policy development.

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[17] Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*.
[18] Rana, *The Imperatives of Nonalignment*.
[19] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 2001).
[20] Sumit Ganguly, *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010).
[21] C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (Viking Adult, 2003).
[22] Rajiv Sikri, "India's 'Look East' Policy," *Asia-Pacific Review* 16, no. 1 (May 2009): 131–45.
[23] Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State* (London: Zed Books, 1998)
[24]Sanjaya Baru, *India and the World: Essays on Geoeconomics and Foreign Policy* (Routledge, 2016).

In the third phase of Indian foreign policy, Through the exploration of the 'social construction of foreign policy interests', [25] What emerges is the fact that understanding Indian foreign policy requires an analysis of both the structural and the agential factors that drive foreign policy choices. Hence, there is a need to also analyse the evolution of Indian foreign policy through an agent approach that investigates understanding ideas and their influence on foreign policy decision-making in India since independence arises from this frame of reference undertaken in this thesis. Thus, Vineet Thakur's analysis that foreign policy does "not only narrate state identity but also constructs it"[26] is inspired by Partha Chatterjee's study on colonialism towards the construct of the identity of India internationally.[27] Thakur's writings encourage this research project to undertake a historical analysis to trace how ideas influence Indian foreign policy through the leaders.

Thus, examining the role of ideas in Indian foreign policy allows constructivism to study India's identity and how it is intertwined with foreign policy decisions. Here, postcolonial theorists play a vital role, shedding light on India's 'glorious past' and the influence of its colonial discourse on foreign policy.[28] A genealogical analysis of India's postcolonial identity, presented by Priya Chacko, gives rise to the power-knowledge formation of this identity and foreign policy.[29] Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland's examination of the core of India's security policy establishes India's worldview through the influence of 'ideas' that emerge from the Indian policymaking elites.[30] Shibashis Chatterjee and Udayan Das discuss the way Indian

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[25] Chacko, *Constructivism and Indian Foreign Policy*, p. 48.
[26] Vineet Thakur, "The Colonial Origins of Indian Foreign Policymaking," *Economic & Political Weekly* 49, no. 32 (August 9, 2014): 58–64.
B. S. Chimni and Siddharth Mallavarapu, *International Relations: Perspectives for the Global South* (New Delhi: Pearson, 2012). pp. 2-3.
[27]Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discours*e (Zed Books, 1986).
[28] Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*
[29] Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004.*
[30] Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, "Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy," *India Review* 11, no. 2 (April 2012): 76–94,

foreign policymakers make selective use of India's history to construct the narrative of the postcolonial state.[31] Similarly, Ian Hall analyses how India's identity drives foreign policy choices, centred on its 'national destiny and civilisational mission'[32] that directs India towards its global role. Ian Hall adds to the conversation on India's rise to power by analysing the theoretical perspectives on Indian foreign policy, where ideas would eventually drive Indian foreign policy despite the consistently applied realist approach.[33]

Therefore, scholars like Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan[34] have attempted to outline the ideological underpinnings of foreign policy choices. Similarly, Mischel Hansel, Raphaelle Khan and Melissa Levaillant's *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy* attempts to provide a theoretical lens encompassing the understudied approaches that identify as a shift away from the structural underpinnings of Indian foreign policy study.[35] Maya Chadda,[36] Chris Alden & Klaus Brummer,[37] Nicolas Blarel and Avinash Paliwal,[38] to name, attempt to conceptualise the behaviour of the Indian state through theoretical explorations to derive the ideational influences on Indian foreign policy. While acknowledging the colonial influence, Atul Kumar stresses the need for policymakers to distance themselves from the past and make decisions based on the

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[31] Shibashis Chatterjee and Udayan Das, "Indian Foreign Policy as Public History: Globalist, Pragmatist and Hindutva Imaginations," *India Review* 20, no. 5 (October 20, 2021): 565–88,
[32] Ian Hall, 'India's Foreign Policy: Nationalist Aspirations and Enduring Constraints,' *The Round Table* 111, no. 3 (May 4, 2022): 321–32,
[33] Ian Hall, "The Other Exception? India as a Rising Power," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 64, no. 5 (November 2010): 601–11,
[34] Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, "India: Foreign Policy Perspectives of an Ambiguous Power," in *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia*, ed. Henry R. Nau and Deepa Ollapally (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 73–113,
[35] Mischa Hansel, Raphaëlle Khan, and Mélissa Levaillant, *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy* (Taylor & Francis, 2017).
[36] Maya Chadda, "Explaining India's Foreign Policy: Theoretical Explorations," *India Review* 18, no. 5 (October 20, 2019): 485–502.
[37] Chris Alden and Klaus Brummer, "Foreign Policy Analysis and the Study of Indian Foreign Policy: A Pathway for Theoretical Innovation?," *India Review* 18, no. 5 (October 20, 2019): 471–84.
[38] Nicolas Blarel and Avinash Paliwal, "Opening the Black Box – The Making of India's Foreign Policy," *India Review* 18, no. 5 (October 20, 2019): 457–70,

state's present needs.[39] This demonstrates the intertwined agent-structure relationship in the historical analysis of foreign policy decision-making.

The following section will further highlight the gap in the literature and the need for undertaking this study to comprehend the ideational influence on Indian foreign policy choices.

Gap in Literature

While there is growth in literature on Indian foreign policy, the dominant perspective has been a structural realist or liberalist lens were institutional factors of national interests and economic development drive foreign policy choices. However, neither perspective has investigated the influence of ideas on foreign policy decisions. What emerges is the fact that understanding Indian foreign policy requires an analysis of both the structural and the agential factors that drive foreign policy choices. This research project undertakes an agency-focused approach looking at the agency of ideas and leaders towards foreign policy decision-making geared towards strategic autonomy and territorial sovereignty. And it is in this need that Walter Carlsnaes' analysis of the agent-structure debate is considered, allowing for the use of his dynamic synthesis of the interplay of structural and agential factors towards India's foreign policy analysis as he explains that "actions is always a combination of purposive behaviour, cognitive-psychological factors and the various structural phenomena characterising societies and their environment."[40] The continuous analysis of Indian foreign policy analysis from the structural approach brings about the need to undertake an agent approach of analysing the role of individuals (the case of prime ministers in this thesis) and their ideologies towards foreign policy choices. While aware that the ideologies and leaders that are studied in this thesis are agential factors that are part of the broader societal structure, what cannot be denied is that the

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[39] Atul Kumar, "An Historical Perspective on Indian Foreign Policy," *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 14, no. 1 (2010): 102–11.

[40] Walter Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Walter , Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002), 342.

ideas, while stemming from society, also form the society as Colin Wight rightly places human agents to be "deeply embedded within and constituted by the structural contexts they inhabit."[41]

This agency approach towards Indian foreign policy analysis is undertaken with the awareness of the limitations of the agency approach. Like the structural approach, the reduction of one element towards the other is present. Other structural factors get overshadowed when looking at the role of ideas and individuals. The need to address the agent-structure problem that Wendt addressed, whether both agent and structure always play an equal role in influencing results or whether there is a variation based upon time and the need for analysis.[42] In addressing this limitation, this research looks closely at the agency approach to explain foreign policy decisions made by Indian prime ministers while understanding the structural conditions that shape and limit their choices. As Colin Wight encourages research to be accessible to focus on any one component that is deemed fit for the analysis, as long the researcher bears in mind, and it is reflected in the research, that all components are "bound together in the ongoing flux of social life"[43] displaying the use of this interconnectedness between the role of ideas in shaping the behaviour of the individual agent and the state.

Furthermore, the academic community around Indian foreign policy has been expanding with the need to investigate Indian foreign policy from a range of perspectives. As a result, it has become important to utilise other thematic frameworks to understand whether the continuity and changes in Indian foreign policy are reciprocated or if the rise of India is causing changes in Indian foreign policy that are not solely driven by realist interpretations of state power. Therefore, constructivist approaches to Indian foreign policy and recent literature examine the social construction of interests through Indian foreign policy. Constructivist

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[41] Colin Wight, "Agency, Structure, International Relations and Foreign Policy," in *Rethinking Foreign Policy* (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; Routledge, 2013), 37.
[42] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[43] Wight, *Agency, Structure, International Relations and Foreign Policy*, 40.

writings by scholars like Partha Chatterjee, Harsh V. Pant, Priya Chacko, Vineet Thakur, Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, Nicolas Blarel and Avinash Paliwal, Stephen Cohen, Manjari Chatterjee-Miller, as compared to the straitjacket view of realists and liberalists, look to the social construction of interests that India aims to meet through its foreign policy. In doing so, constructivists study India's uniqueness as a state that adds to its identity.

The primary use of ideas in Indian foreign policy analysis is the political language employed to generate the Indian state identity, highlighting the postcolonial narrative. Subsequently, it facilitates the need to study the mechanisms through which ideas are developed and influence the prime ministers, thereby influencing foreign policy decisions. This is present in Priya Chacko's genealogical study of Indian foreign policy and Vineet Thakur's discussions on India's colonial legacy being a fundamental part of Indian foreign policy. Manjari Chatterjee-Miller's argument on colonial trauma through historical memory influences foreign policy formulation, adding to Thakur's argument that Indian foreign policy does not only find its foundations in the foreign policy devised in 1947. As a result, scholars have begun to present different aspects of the colonial history narrative to trace the influence of India's colonial legacy on Indian foreign policy, which in this research looks at the agency of India's colonial history influencing foreign policy outcomes as the Indian prime ministers use the ideas to establish the choices they make.

Consequently, understanding how ideas influence and create the Indian identity through foreign policy decisions. In understanding how ideas influence decision-making, attempts have been made to examine the role of Indian prime ministers. Harsh Pant and Avinash Paliwal highlight the various levels of policymaking analysis to explain Indian foreign policy. In this

literature, the authors acknowledge the liberating role of prime ministers in shaping foreign policy while insisting on their limited ability to shape policy outcomes.[44]

Similarly, the work of Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland focuses on the strategic core of Indian foreign policy and how ideas influence it, and the writings of David Mitchell study leadership styles to understand Indian foreign policy. Harish Kapur, J.N Dixit, and Rajiv Dogra have examined prime ministers and their foreign policy decisions. Hence, there is still a need to comprehend how ideas influence different prime ministers to create India's regional and global identity and their choices about Indian foreign policy at certain junctures in the history of Indian foreign policy. This establishes that there is an already existing structural approach towards Indian foreign policy analysis and that there is a need to undertake an agent-centred approach. Thus, explaining how the ideas influence the prime ministers when making foreign policy decisions requires elaboration.

Thus, the literature reveals three aspects of the gap. The first is developing a theoretical frame for Indian foreign policy that departs from the traditional structural underpinning. The second is the need to expand academic scholarship on the agency of ideas and leaders as essential drivers of Indian foreign policy, and the third is the need to extend the study on the dialectical interaction between Indian prime ministers and their social context in foreign policy analysis. In finding these gaps and the need for expansion, this thesis adds to the literature, aiming to construct theoretical underpinnings of Indian foreign policy through further studies on the influence of ideas on Indian prime ministers in foreign policy decision-making. This thesis contributes to the growing literature on Indian foreign policy analysis by turning attention away from the established structural drivers of institutions and policy outcomes (still important factors in Indian foreign policy) and towards the agency of prime ministers to explain

[44] Harsh V. Pant and Avinash Paliwal, "Foreign Policy Analysis and Indian Foreign Policy" in *New Directions In Indian Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis*, ed. Harsh V Pant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 106–24.

how India views itself and how it wants to be seen by the world. In this, the thesis aims to make a significant contribution to the literature on Indian foreign policy by exploring the individual in the seat of the driver of Indian foreign policy, not putting aside aspects of life that are considered secondary, but rather acknowledging that childhood experiences, education, socio-economic and political backgrounds, and the process of political socialisation play as important a role in foreign policy decision making as catering to the domestic and external politics around. Therefore, the research project's primary aim is to analyse the influence of ideas rooted in India's colonial trauma that shapes the socio-political context of the Indian state, creating the Indian identity and also influencing the way India conducts its relations with neighbouring Pakistan and China, and pushes for increasing its power status through its nuclear drive- to attain its goals of 'strategic autonomy' and 'territorial sovereignty' in foreign policy decisions from 1947 to 2018.

Theoretical Frame and Methodology

This section outlines the theoretical approach of Post-Imperial Ideology and the Skinnerian methodological framework for the research project.

Post-Imperial Ideology

The growing literature on Indian foreign policy, propelled by India's rising profile, presents challenges and opportunities. The emerging scholarship on Indian foreign policy is focused on ideas, aspirations, and norms reflect the shift from the traditional drivers of Indian foreign policy. This thesis contributes to this body of literature by utilising the Skinnerian methodology and the constructivist theoretical approach of Post-Imperial Ideology (PII)[45] to analyse the impact of ideas on Indian prime ministers' foreign policy decision-making. This allows for a better understanding of the continuity and changes in Indian foreign policy.

[45] Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*.

Manjari Chatterjee Miller's Post-Imperial Ideology is a constructivist approach that uses two theoretical standpoints of trauma theory and post-imperial theory that delves into India's historical experiences and colonial memory to comprehend India's foreign policy decisions. Chatterjee-Miller illustrates the impact of colonialism on foreign policy behaviour beyond the economic and social consequences. As a result of collective trauma and historical memory, post-imperial ideology has two principles: maximising territorial sovereignty and maximising status. Both principles are met through the sense of victimhood exhibited by countries freed from colonialism. Chatterjee-Miller explains that the collective trauma and victimhood[46] from the traumatic colonial experience are deeply rooted in countries like India and China that have experienced extractive colonialism. Thereby explaining how colonialism traumatised the nations, creating collective trauma and how this trauma creates a sense of victimhood in the postcolonial period, influencing state behaviour.

In this research project, historical collective trauma is used as the causal variable, with the dependent variable focusing on the foreign policy decisions of India's prime ministers to create a theoretical framework for understanding Indian foreign policy. To achieve this aim, PII is applied to the foreign policies of selected prime ministers to understand how leadership is shaped by ideas and how this understanding can help shed light on the continuity and changes in foreign policy decision-making. In this study, the Indian state identity can be explained in terms of the foreign policy aims of strategic autonomy and territorial integrity.

Methodology: Skinnerian Model

This thesis employs a qualitative historical analysis to elucidate the thematic and ideational foundations of Indian foreign policy. To achieve this objective, the research examines Indian prime ministers and their foreign policy decisions with Pakistan, China, and nuclear power through the lens of the Skinnerian method within the Post-Imperial Ideology

[46] Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*.

frame. Using the Skinnerian[47] method allowed for an in-depth analysis of each leader's socio-political background and the contextual background analysis of decisions taken at a particular time. Using the Skinnerian model, the research project uncovered recurring themes as the research design delves into the context of situations or events by examining primary and secondary sources to comprehend their context. In analysing the primary sources, patterns and themes were found, providing an understanding of the causal relationship between a decision and an event. I examined many secondary sources about a prime minister at a particular juncture, the decisions made on important occasions, and the endorsed ideology.

Hence, in conjunction with each other in this research design, the theoretical approach of Post-Imperial Ideology and the Skinnerian methodology allow for establishing the causal relationship between a decision and the idea that drove it, thus illustrating how the immediate repercussions of colonial trauma and the education of the leaders manifest a generational divide and the evolution of perspectives on foreign. The next chapter presents a detailed explanation of the theoretical framework and methodology.

Research Contribution and Limitations

Research Contributions

The principal objective of this study is to make noteworthy contributions to the ongoing discussions on the formulation of Indian foreign policy. Despite a substantial body of work in this domain, there is a noticeable gap in the role of ideas in shaping India's foreign policy through the prime ministers. While historical analysis has explored the impact of leaders' personalities and behaviours on state decisions, what is absent is a comprehensive theoretical

[47] The Skinnerian methodology is adopted for this thesis as it suits the research design of looking into the socio-political contextualisation of the Indian prime ministers where the political language analysed is a means to an end, the end being the need to comprehend the socio-political background that allows for framing the ideational development, and then influence on foreign policy choices. However, there are alternative methodologies for contextualisation that can be undertaken to conduct a study of this nature.

framework that elucidates the influence of leadership. Considering this, the present dissertation enriches the literature on Indian foreign policy decision-making by incorporating perspectives from non-Western international relations theory.

This dissertation adds insights to the discourse surrounding Indian foreign policy decision-making by examining leaders who have made significant contributions during specific periods. Studying foreign policy analysis is essential in enhancing the theoretical and empirical understanding of a country. Foreign policy analysis is crucial for scholars analysing India's regional and global positions. Foreign policy, defined as 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations'[48], looks at a state's interest in pursuing a policy with another state. Based on the theoretical approaches elucidated in this chapter and in the next chapter, the analysis of Indian foreign policy has the potential to be subjected to a theoretical formulation that allows pragmatic implementation through the interpretation of patterns because of these frameworks. The thesis seeks to contribute significantly by revealing the causal connection between the ideas that shape leaders' decisions and their foreign policy choices. The thematic frames presented in the next chapter facilitate an understanding of the uniqueness of the Indian state and the Indian state identity.

While there is an increase in Indian foreign policy scholarship with diverse themes and perspectives, most of it has been concerned with its formation, evolution, and implementation. David Malone,[49] Sumit Ganguly,[50] and Rajeev Sikri have authored the most representative

[48] Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (Palgrave MacMillian, 2003).
[49] David Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2011).
[50] Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions.*

works.[51] Stephen Cohen,[52] Gordon,[53] Nayar and Paul,[54] and Basrur and Sullivan de Estrada[55] are well known for their excellent analyses of the relationship between India's rise and its relationship with foreign policy. Much work has also been done on how and why India's relations with Pakistan, China, and regional neighbours have affected its foreign policy.[56]

This ideational framing stems from analysing the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the principal architect of Indian foreign policy. Specialists in Indian foreign policy are interested in its evolution and development themes by studying the role of institutions or other domestic drivers. For example, Rajiv Sikri explores how India's foreign relations were best served through India's traditional manner of conducting relations.[57] However, India's transformations as a nation necessitate a more thorough comprehension of how Indian foreign policy will continue to assert its influence among the major world powers. Consequently, while numerous endeavours have been made to foster informed discussions on India's global role within the context of Indian foreign policy, there remains a requirement to formulate theoretical frameworks surrounding Indian foreign policy.

The attempts to comprehend the evolution of patterns in decisions made by the Indian Foreign Policy have led scholars to concentrate on Nehru. In addition, the contemporary literature discusses how Modi's appointment has signified a shift in the direction of Indian

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[51] Sikri, *Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy*.
[52] Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
[53] Sandy Gordon, "South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers," *Asian Survey* 35, no. 10 (October 1, 1995): 879–95.
[54] Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[55] Basrur and Kate Sullivan, *Rising India: Status and Power*.
[56] Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State* (London: Zed Books, 1998).
Ashley J. Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal," RAND, January 1, 2001, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1127;
S.M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (U of Minnesota Press, 1974).
[57] Sikri, *Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy*.

foreign policy. Moreover, these investigations have probed the ideas and other elements that drive and influence India's foreign policy.

There has been an increase in the need to examine Indian foreign policy through the Global South perspective, shifting away from the Westphalian analysis. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan study the absence and lack of a non-Western perspective on international relations theoretical approaches.[58] This establishes the framework of the Global South theory, in which the non-Western/Global South states are to be analysed on their terms. Indian foreign policy is now evaluated from a non-Western theory of international relations, which accommodates the exceptionality of the Indian state and its foreign relations. As James Rosenau has stated, 'to think theoretically one must be predisposed to ask about every event, every situation, or every observed phenomenon, 'of what is it an instance?'[59] Therefore, this research project investigates the history of India's foreign policy and examines the causal relation between ideas and leadership in Indian foreign policy decision-making.

Research Limitations

This research project is one of the first to examine the history, psychology, and politics of Indian foreign policy decision-making. While this project has increased my knowledge, I encountered several unexpected challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a delay in fieldwork, so I had to redesign the project as a qualitative historical analysis to complete my degree on schedule. This is why I decided not to conduct interviews as part of my research. Instead, I concentrated on archival records, which proved immensely valuable when I applied the Skinnerian method to textual analysis.

Another limitation of this thesis is the vastness of the topic. It would have been impractical to analyse all fourteen of India's prime ministers in one dissertation. For this reason,

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[58] Acharya and Buzan, *Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?*
[59] James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York : Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), 19-31.

I limited my scope to a few prime ministers who contributed to India's foreign policy. This limitation made it possible for me to trace the creation of the Indian state identity.

Finally, despite extensive research on Indian foreign policy, analysing the influence of ideas is highly subjective. With this in mind, I have turned a constructive agent approach to each prime minister and event. The limitations of this research project provide more opportunities for further research into this extensive area. My future research will continue to explore Indian foreign policy decision-making.

Thesis Chapter Structure

The thesis comprises eight chapters, which present evidence in support of the theoretical framework for Indian foreign policy. The objective is to trace the ideas that impacted India's prime ministers. This thesis is structured chronologically, incorporating the conceptual framework of Post-Imperial Ideology and a historical analysis of Indian foreign policy. It, therefore, sheds light on the thematic expression evident in the ideas that affected the foreign policy decisions made since independence. A generation of leaders (all prime ministers of India) was part of India's national freedom movement. To achieve this objective, the thesis is divided into chapters illustrating how the post-imperial ideology explains the role of ideas on Indian prime ministers to demonstrate the relationship between continuity and change in Indian foreign policy.

Chapter One, 'Theoretical Framework and Methodology', elucidates this research project's theoretical approach and methods. This project offers an exhaustive review of existing literature to identify gaps or deficiencies in Indian foreign policy analysis. Additionally, it presents an overview of the critical principles related to the research. It explains how the qualitative lens of historical analysis is used to investigate the application of Post-Imperial Ideology to the decision-making processes within Indian foreign policy. The chapter begins by emphasising the significance of ideas, foreign policy analysis, leadership, decision-making,

and the legacy of colonialism. It then formulates the theoretical framework based on Post-Imperial Ideology. It establishes how historical recollection and narrative have been prevalent in Indian foreign policy since independence. Lastly, the chapter lays the groundwork for subsequent chapters where the cohort of leaders, regardless of their party affiliation and individual ideologies, are shaped by comparable objectives that arise from the consequences of colonialism and the Indian national movement.

Chapter Two, 'Pre-Independence Political Ideologies,' explores the political thoughts of Kautilya, Damodar Savarkar, and Mahatma Gandhi. By examining their intellectual contributions, I gained insight into the foreign policy ideologies of post-independence Indian leaders. Furthermore, the contributions of these thinkers towards shaping the identity of the Indian state. This chapter describes the three schools of thought on Indian identity: strategic, Hindu nationalist, and postcolonial identity of the Indian state. These schools of thought will be applied to the analysis of the leaders.

Chapter Three, 'Jawaharlal Nehru and Indian Foreign Policy, is divided into two sections. The first section describes the establishment of the Indian postcolonial identity in relation to Nehru's formative years and education and, especially, the profound influence of Nehru's father, Motilal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi on Nehru's idealism. The second segment applies Post-Imperial Ideology to Nehru's foreign policy, facilitating an exploration of the Nehruvian Idealist School of Ideas. Nehru's foreign policy is critically assessed with his views of Pakistan, China, and the utilisation of nuclear power. This comprehensive analysis results in a perspective of Nehru's vision of the Indian state identity.

Chapter Four, 'Indian Foreign Policy: Shifting from Idealism to Pragmatism? Leadership under Shastri, Indira Gandhi and Rajeev Gandhi' looks at the tenures of three prime ministers who played significant roles after the death of Nehru in 1964. This chapter analyses the impact of historical memory on the development of ideology. The argument presented in this chapter

will analyse the relationship between ideas, continuity, and change in Indian foreign policy. The chapter consists of three sections, one for each prime minister. Each section is divided into two subsections: the first analyses the socio-political background of each prime minister, and the second section analyses the application of the prime minister's ideologies in their foreign policy decisions to explain how Indian foreign policy evolved from the idealist to a more pragmatic school of ideas while protecting the goals of territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

Chapter Five, 'Post-Cold War India: Rao and Vajpayee's Pragmatic Liberalism in Indian Foreign Policy', highlights a shift in Indian foreign policy with the end of the Cold War. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first analyses the prime ministership of Narasimha Rao (1991-96). It begins with his ideological development and applying his ideas to foreign policy. The following section studies India's foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998-2004). Both leaders contributed significantly to Indian foreign policy and are analysed through Post-imperial II to understand India's pragmatic liberalist approach towards the South and Southeast Asian regions and the international political system. The chapter explains how shifts in foreign policies reflect the relationship between continuity and change in decision-making.

Chapter Six, 'Engaging Era of Indian Foreign Policy: The Leadership of Singh and Modi', highlights the influence of ideas on leaders, their ideology and their foreign policy. This chapter studies the terms of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004-2014) and the first term of Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2014-2019). Despite their different foreign policies, their underlying ideas enabled both Singh and Modi to push Indian foreign policy toward making India a significant power in the international political system. Singh's policies towards Pakistan, China, and nuclear power, especially in responding to cross-border terrorism, are analysed to establish how India's strategic identity was created and furthered under Modi. In

his first term, Modi set forth a foreign policy focused on Pakistan, China and nuclear power. Modi was born after independence; like him, India's future leaders will not display colonial trauma.

Chapter Seven, 'Final Analysis: The Continuity and Change in Indian Foreign Policy', highlights the study's findings. It explains the similarities and differences among the prime ministers and their foreign policy decisions, clarifying the relationship between continuity and change in Indian foreign policy. It explains the ideas that have given India its identity and the different aspects of leadership.

The *'Conclusion'* summarises the case studies of the prime ministers and the thematic divisions in Indian foreign policy and the Indian state identity. This chapter also brings together the empirical analysis of the main argument. Finally, the chapter presents the findings and implications of the influence of ideas on leaders, leading to the nexus of state identity and foreign policy in the development of non-Western theories of international relations.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Frame and Methodology

This chapter presents an overview of the theoretical framework and methodology used in this research project. The objective of this chapter is to emphasise the necessity of considering the role of ideas in conjunction with the other drivers of Indian foreign policy. It highlights the themes used and stresses the importance of formulating themes specific to the Indian context. This framework facilitates an exploration of the multifaceted influences of colonialism on Indian foreign policy. It examines the literature to identify gaps in the research. Furthermore, it enables the development of concepts and themes tailored explicitly to India's unique circumstances. The framework also allows examination of how Indian leaders have responded to colonialism and its foreign policy repercussions by integrating historical analysis to combine all aspects.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a literature review of Indian foreign policy. The second section presents the theoretical framework of post-imperial ideology that explains the impact of colonialism on Indian foreign policy. The final section expands upon the methodology adopted, the Skinnerian method of interpretation that allows for the historical analysis in this thesis.

1.1. Literature on Indian Foreign Policy

The literature on Indian foreign policy has grown significantly over the past few decades. Practitioners and academics have extensively documented the evolution of Indian foreign policy. This section studies the theoretical approaches to Indian foreign policy to derive the overarching themes of Indian foreign policy, including its historical development, strategic goals, regional dynamics, and global objectives. This literature review reflects a theoretical approach to classifying the literature, explaining what literature on Indian foreign policy is

often analysed, locating the gaps, and presenting how this research project adds to the emerging new dimensions of Indian foreign policy analysis.

India's rise as a significant global power has attracted scholarly consideration, leading to various attempts to find a theoretical frame for Indian foreign policy. However, the need to re-evaluate the literature has brought the re-emergence of the 'submerged "theoretical base".'[1] While the traditional approaches of realism, neorealism, liberalism, and neoliberalism have been used to analyse Indian foreign policy, what remains is the need for theorising Indian foreign policy. The academic field of foreign policy analysis emerged after the Second World War. Cohen outlined two significant implications: governmental and institutional responsibility for formulation and implementation and the ideological thrust that would exhibit public values and interest.[2] The traditional approach to Indian foreign policy demonstrates 'how governmental institutions are responsible for formulating and implementing foreign policy'.[3] With the traditional approaches highlighting the evolution of Indian foreign policy since India gained independence in 1947, the focus has always been on the structure and neglected agency influence towards the development of Indian foreign policy. Thus, the emerging literature on Indian foreign policy encapsulates a possible theoretical shift. This shift is visible in the recent attempts to examine the conceptual influence on Indian foreign policy. This ideational thrust is the second aspect of Cohen's foreign policy analysis. Harsh Pant's book describes the evolutionary and transformative nature of new dimensions influencing

[1] A. P. Rana and Kamla P. Misra, "Communicative Discourse and Community in International Relations Studies in India: A Critique," in *International Relations in India: Bringing Theory Back Home* (Orient Blackswan, 2005), 71–122.; Siddharth Mallavarapu, "Development of International Relations Theory in India," *International Studies* 46, no. 1–2 (January 2009): 165–83, https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171004600211.
[2] Bernard C Cohen, "Foreign Policy," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L Sills (New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1968).
[3] Cohen, "Foreign Policy".

Indian foreign policy.[4] Thorsten Worjczewski's post-structural discursive theory explains the power shifts of Indian foreign policy that construct and reconstruct the Indian state identity and its view of the international order.[5] Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland trace the role of the policymaking elite in India's foreign and security policy.[6] However, there remains a need for further theoretical analyses of Indian foreign policy. Through this literature review, this thesis highlights how traditional approaches analyse the evolution and structural influences on Indian foreign policy, leading to the need to increase examination of the role of agency in Indian foreign policy,[7] which is nascent in writings on Indian foreign policy. Studying the theoretical frameworks employed in analysing Indian foreign policy is vital to grasp the connection between continuity and change in this policy. Colin Wight's work enables the research project to scrutinise how Indian foreign policy has evolved by providing an exposition of continuity, change, and continuity in change.[8] As a result, it is imperative to comprehend the characteristics of Indian foreign policy continuity to grasp the modifications in Indian foreign policy. In this context, the notions of agency and structure occupy a crucial position in analysing Indian foreign policy.

A close examination of the literature on Indian foreign policy reveals several prominent themes, including its historical evolution and India's strategic interests, regional engagements, and global aspirations. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister and the architect of its

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[4] Harsh V. Pant, *India's Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis* (Cambridge University Press, 2019).
[5] Thorsten Wojczewski, *India's Foreign Policy Discourse and Its Conceptions of World Order: The Quest for Power and Identity* (Routledge, 2018).
[6] Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, "Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy," *India Review* 11, no. 2 (April 2012): 76–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2012.674818.
[7] More work on ideational influence on theorising Indian foreign policy will be highlighted in the section on Constructivism and Indian foreign policy.
[8] Colin Wight, "The Continuity of Change, or a Change in Continuity?," *International Studies Review* 3, no. 1 (June 2001): 81–89, https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.00226.

foreign policy, inherited an independent state needing a foreign policy to establish its identity and worldview. Since 1947, India has had 14 prime ministers who have faced different challenges. Researchers have identified three periods of Indian foreign policy: the Cold War (1947-1990, the post-Cold War (1990 onwards), and the present period, which is taken from the 2000s forward. This section examines three theoretical approaches to Indian foreign policy: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

1.1.1. Realism and Indian Foreign Policy: Evolution and National Interest

This section explains the structural, historical evolution and national interests of Indian foreign policy regarding realism and neorealism, establishing India's two dual goals of territorial integrity and strategic autonomy.

Realists and neorealists say the world is lawless, and power maximisation is in a state's national interest.[9] State power and the national interest are the driving forces in foreign policy decision-making. Relations between states are thus shaped by the drive to survive the international anarchic political system, meaning states aim to expand their power and defend their interests.[10] Cohen's realist explanation of power-seeking state behaviour describes how governmental institutions are responsible for formulating and implementing foreign policy.[11]

The historical development of Indian foreign policy began in 1947 when India became an independent state. India had to deal with the global challenges of the Cold War, internal unrest, and growing hostility with neighbouring Pakistan and China. Consequently, decisions and policies were influenced by the strategies India adopted in response to these 'circumstances. A.P. Rana observed, 'A state's behaviour in foreign affairs is broadly governed

[9] Steve Smith, "Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview," *Review of International Studies* 12, no. 1 (January 1986): 13–29, https://doi.org/10.1017/s026021050011410x.
[10] Hans J Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th ed. (McGraw Hill, 2005), 23–26.
[11] Cohen, "Foreign Policy".

by its foreign policy strategy'[12] when analysing the internal and external influences upon Nehru's non-alignment policy, which reflected a realist view of India's foreign policy decision-making.

Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau emphasised alliances and arms build-ups to ensure state security.[13] Smith claimed, 'that the inherent and immutable self-interested nature of human beings, when faced with a structure of international anarchy, results in states maximising one thing, power'.[14] The linkage of power and national interest could explain state behaviour without incorporating the motives and ideological perspectives of the decision-makers. As a result, applying realism to the study of Indian foreign policy facilitates an understanding of how the power of a state lies in the fulfilment of national interest. Nehru's non-alignment policy stipulated that India's national interests were strategic autonomy and territorial integrity.[15] Rana applied the neorealist theory of the balance of power to Indian foreign policy and traced Nehru's non-alignment policy back to the work of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant.[16] Rana deduced that the balance of power is an abstraction from reality drawn from historical experience.[17] The history and tradition of India's colonisation significantly influenced Nehru's foreign policy. Rana believed Nehru's non-alignment strategy would help keep Indian foreign policy free from geopolitical pressure while forming beneficial diplomatic ties. India would then enjoy greater security and stability in its foreign policy.[18] This seems to

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[12] A. P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period* (Delhi : Macmillan Company of India, 1976), 2.
[13] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 23–26.
[14] Smith, "Theories of Foreign Policy," 13–29.
[15] Rana, *The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period*.
[16] Rana, *The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period*.
[17] A. P. Rana, "The Nature of India's Foreign Policy," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 22, no. 2 (April 1966): 101–39, https://doi.org/10.1177/097492846602200201.
[18] Rana, "The Nature of India's Foreign Policy," 101-39.

be an element that establishes continuity of non-alignment as a hallmark of Indian foreign policy. According to Kennedy, Nehru's 'idealism often had a realist edge'.[19] What it lacked, however, was the force of ideas over the leader, making choices based upon the ideology that influenced him, which he used to serve the national interest of the nation he led.

Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyay identified the drivers of Indian foreign policy decisions: national interests, geography, economic development, international politics, military strength, and India's political tradition.[20] At the same time, Bandyopadhyaya noted the importance of a prime minister's personality. Malone, C Raja Mohan and Raghavan added the effect of the prime minister's presence, force, or absence on foreign policy.[21] Nehru's non-alignment policy was the cornerstone of India's Cold War foreign policy because Nehru believed that 'the very process of marshalling the world into two hostile camps precipitates the conflict which it has sought to avoid'.[22] Consequently, Bandyopadhyaya believes that the realist and idealist views characterised Indian foreign policy until the end of the Cold War. Hence, Bandyopadhyaya[23] and Rana[24] highlighted India's internal and external insecurities during the Cold War. India's national interest was based on its need for strategic autonomy. Realists say India was a rational actor reacting to a security dilemma.[25]

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[19] Andrew Kennedy, "Nehru's Foreign Policy: Realism and Idealism Conjoined," in *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 93.
[20] Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes, and Personalities* (Bombay : Allied Publishers, 1970).
[21] David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, "India and the World," in *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 3–20. pp7.
[22] Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. Second Series. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984.
[23] Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes, and Personalities*.
[24] Rana, *The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period*.
[25] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 144–72, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100007814.

Shankar Mahesh and T.V. Paul apply structural realism to Indian foreign policy, using the necessity of state power and the categorisation of regional and global interests[26] to explain Indian foreign policy interests through the anarchical international political system framework.[27] In contrast, Rajesh Rajagopalan finds that structural realism took a long time to become an influential theoretical framework.[28] T.N. Kaul explains that if India had had the historical experience of colonialism, it would most likely have rejected non-alignment.[29] Kaul asserted that Indian foreign policy is based on similar principles as its national movement.[30] "To understand a nation's foreign policy, one has to bear in mind the history, geography, the people and their problems – social, economic, political, and even their cultures and traditions'.[31] Although the influence of colonialism on Indian foreign policy has been recognised, there is also a structural view of foreign policy driven by national interests. An analysis was lacking that the national interests established through the non-alignment policy resulted from the prime minister's ideology.

Sumit Ganguly's comprehensive systemic framework for analysing Indian foreign policy incorporated Kenneth Waltz's structural realism and J. David Singer's definitions of decision-making, national/domestic and system/global level.[32] The framework explains why certain decisions are taken and how the international system affects foreign policy initiatives.

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[26] Shankar, Mahesh, and T. V. Paul, "Foreign Policy Making in India: Looking for Theoretical Explanations," in *Shaping India's Foreign Policy: People, Politics, and Places* (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2012), 49.
[27] K. N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
[28] Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Neorealist Theory and the India-Pakistan Conflict," in *International Relations in India: Theorising the Region and Nation* (Orient Blackswan, 2005), 142–67.
[29] Triloki Nath Kaul, *Ambassadors Need Not Lie: Some Aspects of India's Foreign Policy* (Lancaster International, 1988).
[30] Kaul, *Ambassadors Need Not Lie*.
[31] Walter Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy," in *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE, 2013), 1–42.
[32] Sumit Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy (Revised Edition): Oxford India Short Introductions* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2019).; Sumit Ganguly, *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010).

Ganguly focused on how Indian foreign policy had progressed through different themes in the six decades since independence. Ganguly, like Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, argued that Indian foreign policy cannot be placed in a straitjacket, even when viewed from a neorealist perspective.[33] India's early foreign policy reflects the country's colonial legacy.

Consequently, it provides the historical, organisational, and structural influences as reasons for India's pragmatic Indian foreign policy. Nonetheless, their systemic arguments failed to explain foreign policy behaviour. Similarly, David Malone's history of Indian foreign policy shows the Indian cultural impact on the conceptual underpinnings of India's view of itself and the world.[34] While providing a thematic understanding of Indian foreign policy, Malone did not incorporate the role of the other constituent factors in foreign policy.

Harsh V. Pant, while presenting the structural framework that India developed after the Cold War, analyses the development of a more assertive and aggressive diplomacy.[35] Pant studies the significant influences on India's interaction with the global powers and the need for regional engagement. Pant's writings bring together scholarship on India's defence and security policy over the last sixty years.[36] In discussing critical debates in Indian foreign policy, this book lays a foundation for the discourse based on Indian defence planning. The book elucidates India's perspective on regional security and its institutional framework for national security. In this context, a closer examination of Indian foreign policy discourse can lead to a better understanding of the Indian defence perspective.

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[33] Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, "The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 145–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2011.562430.; Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy*.; Sumit Ganguly and Rahul Mukherji, *India Since 1980* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[34] David M. Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy* (OUP Oxford, 2011).
[35] Harsh V. Pant, *Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World* (Taylor & Francis, 2020).
[36] Harsh V. Pant, *The Routledge Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines* (Taylor & Francis, 2020).

Similarly, Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone[37] examined the evolution of Indian foreign policy in three periods- the years 1950-1960 are the 'unified idealism' period; the 1970s-1980s are the intermittent realism period when Indira Gandhi and Lal Bahadur Shastri adding a strong realist undertone to Nehru's foreign policy. Lastly, pragmatics was born in the 1990s was the birth of pragmatism.

Rajiv Sikri explains the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional approach to Indian foreign policy. He illustrates that India's foreign policy interests and goals interests originated from India's historical experiences. Therefore, while the work of Pant, Mukherjee, David Malone, and Rajiv Sikri provides the historical structural understanding of Indian foreign policy, they focus on state interest and state behaviour driven by the need for security without incorporating individual ideas.

The structural historical evolution of Indian foreign policy with its territorial integrity and strategic autonomy goals was established by adopting the non-alignment policy. During the Cold War, realism allowed a non-alignment policy to meet India's security needs and serve the national interests. Subrahmanyam argues that the non-alignment policy was Nehru's attempt to create a third bloc.[38] At the same time, Nayar and Paul found the systemic realist expectation of India's international status challenging due to Nehru's non-alignment policy. They thought India should constantly be involved in global issues, not sporadically.[39] Paul's eclectic systemic approach to India's nuclear policy illustrates India's quest for 'major power status' to be structurally driven within Indian foreign policy, using classical or structural realist

[37] Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, "Indian Foreign Policy and Contemporary Security Challenges," *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (January 2011): 87–104, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00961.x.

[38] K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962," in *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, ed. Bal Ram Nanda (New Delhi: Delhi : Vikas Publishing House Pbt. Limited, 1976).

[39] Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 263.

literature to explain Indian foreign policy.[40] Mukherjee and Sagar's argument highlights 'power status' as a driver of India's national and international interests.[41] Kanti Bajpai's work on strategy in India describes the Nehruvian, liberal and hyperrealist schools of thought. This creates a structural realist view that fills the gap in India's strategic thinking that George Tanham[42] observed.

Therefore, traditional realism highlights the structural orientation of foreign policy analysis. It discusses the development of India's national interests through non-alignment policy, which is less conceptual and more a matter of state interest, which is partially correct. What needs to be added is an analysis of how ideational and structural influences work together. Nehru's leadership is acknowledged in formulating Indian foreign policy, but the emphasis has been on fulfilling the state's interests of maintaining its power status. The rationale behind specific foreign policy decisions has yet to be analysed. While realism has been the dominant theoretical framework for explaining Indian foreign policy, it may not be the most effective approach for deconstructing and reconstructing its decision-making processes. Hence, in this phase of Indian foreign policy, setting goals through Nehru's non-alignment policy, which put his idealist perspective against his realist desire to establish India as a significant power, sets the tone for decades of Indian foreign policy analysis.

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[40] T.V. Paul, "The Systemic Bases of India's Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order," *The Nonproliferation Review* 6, no. 1 (December 1998): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709808436731.

[41] Rohan Mukherjee and Rahul Sagar, "Pragmatism in Indian Strategic Thought: Evidence from the Nuclear Weapons Debate of the 1960s," *India Review* 17, no. 1 (January 2018): 12–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415272.

[42] George Kilpatrick Tanham, Rand Corporation, and National Defense Research Institute (U.S.), *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay* (Rand Corporation, 1992).

1.1.2. Liberalism and Indian Foreign Policy: Post-Cold War and Policy Approach Changes

This section examines Indian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. At that time, Indian foreign policy adopted a more liberalist perspective in response to the new requirements of the international global order. India opened its economy and enhanced regional engagement through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. This section highlights this change in the goals of Indian foreign policy that were established shortly after independence.

In the previous section, the realist structural institutional approach analysed the national interest for establishing the goals of Indian foreign policy. The pessimistic, power-driven realist school of thought accompanied the emergence of the liberalist school after the Cold War. Liberalists accept the anarchical political world order of realism but argue that states are not necessarily in competition and can and do cooperate to achieve common goals. The post-Cold War period required India to work towards its foreign policy goals. Hence, this phase required India to respond to the changing domestic and international environment.

Consequently, India's domestic economic reforms, the opening of its economy and the expansion of regional cooperation displayed India's move away from Nehru's non-alignment policy. India's close relations with the USA, especially after India's nuclear weapons capability became overt, were decisive in changing its position in international relations[43] and the emerging challenges of the Pakistan and China nexus before Indian foreign policy was analysed. However, despite these changes, territorial integrity and strategic autonomy goals prevailed.

Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit wrote in his memoirs that Indian foreign policy was "to fashion an economic foreign policy responsive to the requirements of globalisation and to those

[43] Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India: Status and Power* (Taylor & Francis, 2017), 83-84.

of the mainstream free market economic trends."[44] C. Raja Mohan highlighted that the changes in Indian foreign policy indicated a transition from the idealist non-alignment of the Nehru period as India 'crossed the Rubicon'[45] and focused on external liberalisation. Subsequently, globalisation created the need for improved relations with Southeast Asia through a combination of 'economic, strategic, and domestic considerations'.[46]

Mohan mentioned five transformations in Indian foreign policy during the 1990s: from a socialist to a modern capitalist society; from political to economic matters; from third worldism to the promotion of self-interests; the rejection of anti-western sentiment; and finally, from idealism to pragmatism.[47] Mohan also highlights the lack of articulation of the logic and purpose of the changes in India's foreign policy orientation after the Cold War.[48] Though the Indian leadership did not disown the inherited political legacy and moved cautiously in conducting foreign policy, changes were found under Indira Gandhi and Rajeev Gandhi in the 1980s. Therefore, Mohan's work illustrates that the prime ministers who followed Rajiv Gandhi did not hold a parliamentary majority in parliament; because they had been forced into the position of coalition leaders, they could change the approach to but not the goals of foreign policy. Therefore, while India could change its foreign policy direction, its territorial integrity and strategic autonomy goals remained unchanged.

At the same time, the threats from Pakistan and China intensified. However, relations between India and the USA improved despite the USA's condemnation of India's nuclear tests

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[44] Jyotindra Nath Dixit, *My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary* (UBS Publishers' Distributors, Limited, 1996), 51.
[45] Raja C. Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (Penguin Books, 2005).
[46] Rajiv Sikri, "India's 'Look East' Policy," *Asia-Pacific Review* 16, no. 1 (May 2009): 131–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/13439000902957624.
[47] Raja C. Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*.
[48] C. Raja Mohan, "Foreign Policy after 1990: Transformation through Incremental Adaptation," in *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (OUP Oxford, 2015), 131.

in 1998. The two countries grew closer with the looming war on terrorism and India's nuclear program.

India's multilateral engagements have stimulated economic growth and remain a foreign policy imperative. The first steps were under the Look East Policy in 1994. According to Pant,[49] the economic initiatives under P.V. Narasimha Rao's government altered the approach to Indian foreign policy by opening the economy and encouraging regional cooperation. The Look East Policy, which encouraged bilateral and multilateral cooperation with India's neighbours, was followed by the Act East Policy, which consisted of overtures to East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific countries to counter the security threat posed by China.[50] The Vajpayee and Singh governments' alignment with Africa and Central Asia also contributed to economic advancement.

The multialignment policy by the Modi government is an extension of cooperation between India and its immediate and extended neighbourhoods. Rao established relations with the Gulf states and the newly independent nations of Central Asia in 1991. India is an energy-starved nation, so relations with the oil-rich Gulf states were important. India's Prime Ministers, Vajpayee (1998-2004) and Singh (2004-2014) worked to strengthen India's relations with the oil-rich Gulf states. They focused on economic engagements with strategically important areas in East Asia, Gulf states, Africa, and West Asia. After 2000, however, India's support for the war on terrorism strained its relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan. India nonetheless persisted in forging stronger economic ties with the Middle East.[51] According to Kingshuk

[49] Harsh V. Pant, *Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).
[50] Mohan, "Foreign Policy after 1990," 133.
[51] Anil Wadhwa, "Keynote Address at the 6th IIS-MEA Dialogue on India's Extended Neighbourhood: Prospects and Challenges" (6th IISS-MEA Dialogue on India's Extended Neighbourhood: Prospects and Challenges, March 4, 2014), https://www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/6thIISSMEADialogue_secretaryeast.

Chatterjee,[52] India's courting of the Middle East was a deliberate attempt to counter Pakistan's influence.

Accordingly, the "open, rules-based relations system" constructed around "expanding forms of institutionalised cooperation"[53] drew Indian foreign policy towards the liberal order. Sanjay Baru,[54] Sandy Gordon,[55] B.S. Chimni[56] and Sunila Kale[57] describe the Look East policy as the primary application in India's economic bilateral and multilateral relations pursuit. In addition, Baru stated that Indian foreign policy in the twenty-first century is influenced by private businesses, trade, and the national and regional media[58] – through the flow of capital and people between India and other states. Subsequently, it aligns with Amitav Acharya's view that India needed to expand its economic relations with neighbouring countries to attain 'economic, strategic and institutional'[59] goals. This was practised through India's multilateral engagement in ASEAN, BRICS, SAARC, and BIMSTEC, in regional cooperation with Africa, and the founding of the IOR-ARC. These activities exemplify India's post-Cold War objective of seeking new trade and commercial partnerships, attracting foreign investment, and

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[52] Kingshuk Chatterjee, "India's Reltionships with Gulf Region: Prospects and Possibilities in the Twenty-First Century," in *India's Foreign Policy* (Pearson Education India, 2009), 374.
[53] G. John Ikenberry, "The Liberal International Order and Its Discontents," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 38, no. 3 (May 2010): 511, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829810366477.
[54] Sanjaya Baru, *India and the World: Essays on Geoeconomics and Foreign Policy* (Routledge, 2016).
[55] Sandy Gordon, "Globalisation and Economic Reform in India," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 51, no. 1 (April 1997): 73–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357719708445199.
[56] B.S. Chimni, "Mapping Indian Foreign Economic Policy," *International Studies* 47, no. 2–4 (April 2010): 163–85, https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171104700407.
[57] Sunila S. Kale, "Inside Out: India's Global Reorientation," *India Review* 8, no. 1 (February 10, 2009): 43–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480802665188.
[58] Sanjaya Baru, "The Influence of Business and Media on Indian Foreign Policy," *India Review* 8, no. 3 (August 6, 2009): 270, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480903116792.
[59] Amitav Acharya, *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, ed. David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (Oxford University Press, 2010), 457-458. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743538.001.0001.

discovering alternative energy sources.[60] However, the literature fails to mention the synchronous relationship between the ideas that advance economic bilateral or multilateral connections by Indian foreign policy.

Purusottam Bhattacharya analysed the challenges that emerged with the shift in the external international milieu and the interplay of the domestic economic reforms as factors that demonstrate continuity and change in foreign policy.[61] In the face of challenges posed by Pakistan and a rising China, India became a nuclear power and improved its relationship with the USA. After the Cold War, India aspired to great power status.[62] This aspiration can be seen in the Pokhran tests in 1998 and the signing of the 123 Agreement between India and the USA for civilian nuclear energy, which brought India into the nuclear group. According to Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan, India was driven by the status-seeking that came with post-Cold War politics.[63] Thus, India's drive for nuclear power through the Indo-US civil nuclear deal received the endorsement of the nuclear suppliers group. Despite some early setbacks, the nuclear tests increased the engagement between India and the USA.[64] In a similar light, Talbott argued that India's nuclear tests provided the base for intensive engagement and opportunity for dispute resolution that emerged over the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1970 and the negative international responses to the peaceful nuclear tests that India had conducted in 1974.[65]

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[60] Arijit Mazumdar, "FROM 'LOOK EAST' TO 'ACT EAST': INDIA'S EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION," *Asian Affairs* 52, no. 2 (March 15, 2021): 359–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2021.1912467.

[61] Purusottam Bhattacharya, "India's Foreign Policy In The Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Major Power Status," *World Affairs* 22, no. 3 (2018): 38–59. Pp. 39.

[62] Kamal Mitra Chenoy, and Anuradha M. Chenoy. "India's Foreign Policy Shifts and the Calculus of Power." *Economic and Political Weekly* 42, no. 35 (2007): 3547–54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40276500.

[63] Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India*, 86.

[64] James Chiriyankandath, "Realigning India: Indian Foreign Policy after the Cold War," *The Round Table* 93, no. 374 (April 2004): 199–211, https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530410001679567.

[65] Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb* (Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

Nonetheless, what is absent in the literature is the need to comprehend the reasons for India's drive for nuclear power, apart from the realist perspective of a state's national interest in power towards continuing India's goal of strategic autonomy through its nuclear programme.

China's opposition delayed India's entry into the nuclear group. Becoming a legitimate partner in international nuclear trade ended India's status as a global nuclear pariah due to its refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and its nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998.[66] India's quest for a nuclear program requires an ideological explanation of its foreign policy decision-making. Hence, while the literature describes India's response to challenges and its pursuit of power, there remains a need to explain why the ideas of territorial integrity and strategic autonomy continued to drive Indian foreign policy.

In comprehending the continuity of foreign policy goals of territorial integrity and strategic autonomy- India's relations with Pakistan and China are essential in India's interest in greater regional cooperation and growth as a power. India's contentious relations with Pakistan in the post-Cold War period were governed by India's rise as a nuclear power, the Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998, the Kargil tests in 1999, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai of 2008, and the decades-old conflict over Kashmir. Consequently, India's nuclear power acquisition was India's way of establishing its essential position in South Asia. This is present in Arijit Mazumdar's acknowledgment of Rajiv Sikri's claim that India lacked a grand strategy, especially in its dealings with Pakistan and China, because of which there was continuity in its foreign policy choice.[67] Arijit Mazumdar considers the demands of coalition domestic politics and weak foreign policy institutions to be the reasons for this lack of grand strategy and

[66] S. Paul Kapur, "India and the United States from World War Two to the Present A Relationship Transformed," in *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), 226.
[67] Arijit Mazumdar, "India's Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 67, no. 2 (June 2011): 165–82, https://doi.org/10.1177/097492841006700205.

emphasises the need for Indian leadership to find reconciliation with Pakistan to develop its grand strategy.[68] What is missing is an examination of the ideational elements in the tension between India and Pakistan.

The Pakistan-China challenge for India is apparent in India's relations with Pakistan. While the end of India's nuclear isolation brought India closer to the USA, the South Asian region also witnessed a growing closeness between Pakistan and China. The post-Cold War years brought the simultaneous rise of India and China as competing Asian powers. Furthermore, China's announcement of its support for a negotiated solution in Kashmir was evidence of its long-standing support for Pakistan.[69] As China's Belt-Road Initiative created a transport corridor through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, India refused to participate.[70]

The contention over Aksai Chin and the Line of Actual Control remains unresolved, as seen through the most stand-offs of 2017, 2020 and 2022. Purushottam Bhattacharya has described India-China relations as 'competitive cooperation,'[71] while Alka Acharya describes it as yin and yang. The paradox lies in how India and China can strengthen their ties through multilateral engagements and increased bilateral trade despite continued mistrust.[72]

Because China is a rival to India, Vajpayee and Singh increased India's military power. They deepened security regional cooperation, making India a net security provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Hence, India assisted in stabilising its extended neighbourhood.[73] The encirclement of India by China and the Sino-Pak nexus ensured that India had to be ready for

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[68] Mazumdar, "India's Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," 166.
[69] Partha Pratim Basu, "India's Foreign Policy: Foundational Principles," *Politicus* 1, no. 1 (2009): 56.
[70] Geethanjali Nataraj and Richa Sekhani, "China's One Belt One Road: An Indian Perspective," *Economic & Political Weekly* 50, no. 49 (2015): 67–71.
[71] Purusottam Bhattacharya, "India's Foreign Policy In The Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Major Power Status," *World Affairs* 22, no. 3 (2018): 47.
[72]Alka Acharya, "China," in *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, ed. David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (Oxford University Press, 2015), 356–69.
[73] Rory Medcalf, *Incoming Government Brief: Australia's Relations with India,* (2007; repr., Lowly Institute, Interpreter, 2007).

the next phase of its foreign policy, which needed to be more pragmatic and defensive. The initial years saw a more liberal cooperative foreign policy towards Pakistan and China. Rajiv Sikri has described it as a neoliberal phase where economics is central to Indian strategy.[74]

Overall, the literature has failed to study the ideas that drive the need for continuity and change in India's foreign policy after the Cold War. What began with Rao's government was the building of the National Democratic Alliance led by the BJP under Vajpayee from 1999 to 2004. 'This crossing of the Rubicon continued by the United Progressive Alliance under Singh from 2004 to 2014. Modi's BJP-led majority government shows the influence of ideas on foreign policy decisions.

1.1.3. Constructivism and Indian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change

The previous two sections presented the most used theoretical approaches to the thematic understanding of Indian foreign policy during and immediately after the Cold War. These frameworks have emphasised the significance of continuity with some change in the Indian foreign policy stance. The constructivist approach is, therefore, a critical tool in grasping the intricacies of Indian foreign policy. Hence, this section discusses the growing body of literature that seeks to comprehend the role of ideas in Indian foreign policy and the contribution that this research project will make to the literature.

Constructivism originated in the 1980s and gained prominence in the 1990s. Constructivist theory demonstrates the importance of understanding ideas, norms, beliefs, identities, and their capacity to transform foreign policy interests. It is also a critique of the liberal and realist view of the anarchical international system; constructivists emphasise that the anarchical nature of the world is socially constructed and that the world we speak of is what

[74] Rajiv Sikri, *Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy* (SAGE Publications India, 2009).

we want it to be.[75] So, in this light, the behaviour of a state in the international political system is driven by what constructivists like Alexander Wendt[76] stress: the ideas, identities, beliefs, and norms that can transform foreign policy interests. The use of constructivism in studying Indian foreign policy can reveal the reasons behind foreign policy choices.

The two previous sections highlighted the historical evolution and establishment of India's foreign policy goals and approaches since independence. They then explained the application of foreign policy in the post-Cold War years that led to changes in approach but not in goals. While the traditional realist and liberalist perspectives explain the establishment, continuity and changes in Indian foreign policy primarily as structural requirements, they fail to present a rationale for foreign policy choices. Such reasoning requires understanding what Wendt considers a state's security and economic interests. The goals of territorial integrity and strategic autonomy are primary drivers of India's foreign policy choices.

Today, a growing body of literature uses constructivist frameworks or methodologies to analyse Indian foreign policy. The Indian state identity is an imperative of constructivist Indian foreign policy. The germination of the ideas that influenced the Indian state identity is traceable to colonial India, according to Partha Chatterjee.[77] Chatterjee has identified three moments of colonial nationalist thought:

A) Departure: defining the independence of thought in the East as morally and culturally superior.

B) Manoeuvre: Gandhian nationalism that challenges civil society and brings about the need for consensus democracy, where the ruler earns the trust of his people to exercise his authority, expressing and representing the collective will.

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[75] Nicholas G. Onuf, *World of Our Making* (Columbia: University of South California, 1989).
[76] Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217.
[77] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (Zed Books, 1986), 131-133.

C) Arrival: Nehru's idea of the modern, powerful nation-state was based upon more realist ideas as compared to the Gandhian utopian consensus democracy[78]

These moments underpin India's post-colonial identity and ideas. Himadeep Muddipi introduced the concept of 'security imaginary'[79] based on India's colonial history. Muddipi considers India's 'self-understanding' when analysing its relations with the USA. To this extent, Vineet Thankur illustrates that the continuity of Indian foreign policy goals is best understood through the colonial narrative, that the foundation of Indian foreign policy is found in colonial India as Nehru's foreign policy for independent India revolved around bringing in changes to the foreign policy interests that prevailed earlier.[80]

Vineet Thakur's[81] scholarship on Indian foreign policy falls within the broader discourse of Indian identity, enabling the construction of national identity through foreign policy. As a result, this research adopts a historical analysis to explore the influence of ideas on Indian foreign policy through leaders, as traced in Thakur's work. This study analyses India's colonial history to understand why prime ministers from the same generation make similar foreign policy choices. The objective is to uncover the factors that shape the identity of the Indian state through the analysis of Vineet Thakur's work on national identity and foreign policy.

Similarly, Dipesh Chakraborty's[82] work offers an alternative narrative of Indian history rooted in colonialism and contributes to subaltern studies. A European perspective has

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[78] Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial* World, 131-133.
[79] Himadeep Muddipi, "Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity: The Persistent Puzzle of U.S. - Indian Relations," in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, ed. Jutta Weldes (University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 120.
[80] Vineet Thakur, "The Colonial Origins of Indian Foreign Policymaking," *Economic & Political Weekly* 49, no. 32 (2014): 58–64.
[81] Vineet Thakur, "Indian Foreign Policy: The Discourse of Civilization Pacifism," in *Postscripts on Independence: Foreign Policy Ideas, Identity, and Institutions in India and South Africa*, ed. Vineet Thakur et al. (Oxford University Press, 2018).
[82] Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Pasts?," *Representations* 37 (January 1, 1992): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.2307/2928652.

traditionally dominated the writing of history, and Chakraborty's work challenges this dominance by examining the experiences of the inferior classes in India.[83] Stephen Cohen,[84] Tarun Dalmia, and David Malone[85] have explored how history has informed the development of Indian political and strategic policy. Their works show the coexistence of pragmatism, realism, and idealism in Indian foreign policy, reflecting India's approach to international relations. *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy* by Mischel Hansel, Raphaelle Khan, and Melissa Levaillant aims to offer a theoretical perspective that covers the less researched methods that characterize a departure from the fundamental foundations of Indian foreign policy analysis.[86] Similarly, the special issue by *India Review 18(5)* in 2019 edited by Nicola Blarel and Avinash Paliwal has within it articles by Maya Chadda,[87] Chris Alden & Klaus Brummer,[88] Nicolas Blarel and Avinash Paliwal[89] highlighting the need to look towards different socio-political and ideational underpinnings that drive Indian foreign policy choices. Even Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan[90] have worked towards the ideological underpinnings of India's foreign policy choices. Even However, in seeking the influences of ideas, these sources have

[83] Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History," 1–26.
[84] Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
[85] Taru Dalmia and David M. Malone, "Historical Influences on India's Foreign Policy," *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 67, no. 4 (December 2012): 1029–49.
[86] Mischa Hansel, Raphaëlle Khan, and Mélissa Levaillant, *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy* (Taylor & Francis, 2017).
[87] Maya Chadda, "Explaining India's Foreign Policy: Theoretical Explorations," *India Review* 18, no. 5 (October 20, 2019): 485–502.
[88] Chris Alden and Klaus Brummer, "Foreign Policy Analysis and the Study of Indian Foreign Policy: A Pathway for Theoretical Innovation?," *India Review* 18, no. 5 (October 20, 2019): 471–84.
[89] Nicolas Blarel and Avinash Paliwal, "Opening the Black Box – The Making of India's Foreign Policy," *India Review* 18, no. 5 (October 20, 2019): 457–70.
[90] Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, "India: Foreign Policy Perspectives of an Ambiguous Power," in *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia*, ed. Henry R. Nau and Deepa Ollapally (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 73–113,

not looked at the ideational influence of individual leaders through their political socialisation or from analysing the historical development of the ideational influences.

Therefore, Indian foreign policy, through the influence of its colonial history, displays its foreign policy goals, influenced by pre-independence ideas, and the continuity of such ideas in contemporary foreign policy choices. Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan de Estrada[91] cite India's ascendancy while acquiring nuclear weapons and responding to security challenges revolves around how Indian foreign policy wields power and aspires to great power status. Their research examines the prevailing difficulties and the importance of studying the structural dimension of Indian foreign policy. Basrur argues that realist explanations cannot explain India's failure to secure nuclear deterrence. He proposes understanding India's 'social dimension' and 'collective perceptions'[92] to comprehend its desire for material power and 'global status' that realism cannot explain.

Sullivan's edited volume *Competing Visions of India in World Politics: India's Rise Beyond the West* looks at India's growing influence by analysing the global and regional challenges from a non-Western perspective.[93] What are the external perceptions of India? Do they follow India's view of itself as a growing global power? Constructivism explains how India wants to be viewed and how social dimensions and collective perceptions contribute to creating the Indian state's identity inside and outside India.

The constructivist study of Indian foreign policy enables the analysis of how identity intertwines with foreign policy decision-making. Priya Chacko's[94] examination of the effect of India's post-colonial identity on its foreign policy displays India's struggle against its colonial

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[91] Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India*.
[92] Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan de Estrada. *Rising India*.
[93] Kate Sullivan, ed., *Competing Visions of India in World Politics*, 1st ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015).
[94] Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004* (Routledge, 2013).

rulers and its impact on foreign policy determined post-independence. Departing from traditional idealist and realist foreign-policy approaches, this study uses a constructivist lens to understand what drives India's foreign policy. Chacko's work examines the role of ideas and identities in Indian foreign policy, especially in the Modi government's decisions regarding Pakistan, Kashmir, and cross-border terrorism.[95]

Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland[96] examine the core elements of India's security policy and worldview through the Indian policymaking elites. It studies the confluence of domestic politics and foreign policy by examining the ideas in India's domestic political context. While they concentrate on the effect of leaders' thoughts on behavioural outcomes in democracy, they do not analyse the interplay between the ideas and the leaders. Hence, while their research presents a conceptual range of Indian foreign policy over time and across parties, this is merely a preliminary analysis. Therefore, this thesis studies constructivist analyses of the evolution of Indian foreign policy, stressing the role of ideas through the generation of knowledge about India's colonial identity.

What emerges from the understanding of the colonial legacy on Indian foreign policy choices is the continuity of foreign policy goals, and prime ministers continue to have similar foreign policy decisions. However, what cannot be denied is the change in the foreign policy approach of different leaders, especially after the Cold War. For instance, Rajesh Basrur[97] sees similarities in the relationship between India and Pakistan and between the US and the USSR. Basrur emphasises that the ideational clash between India and Pakistan is part of the legacy of the partition in South Asia. Therefore, India's foreign policy choices represent its past and

[95] Priya Chacko, "Constructivism and Indian Foreign Policy," in *New Directions in India's Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis* (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 48–66.
[96] Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, "Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy," 76–94.
[97] Rajesh M. Basrur, *South Asia's Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective* (Routledge, 2008).

failed to respond appropriately under Vajpayee and Singh.[98] This indicates the need to understand the ideas that drive foreign policy choices to analyse the areas of change and continuity in policy approaches.

Shibashis Chatterjee and Surupa Gupta,[99] in their analysis of India's foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, highlighted the continuity and change in policy choices. The authors emphasise the importance of ideas in determining why India has made multilateralism an essential foreign policy choice, aiming to achieve its goal of strategic autonomy. Similarly, Shibashis Chatterjee and Shreya Mitra[100] emphasise ideational forces' interplay with structural changes in determining foreign policy choices. In this connection, Chris Ogden's[101] normative analysis of India's foreign and security policy under the BJP government from 1998-2004 examines how the ideological critique of Hindutva has affected India's security identity.

In this respect, according to Ian Hall[102] and Rajesh Basrur,[103] the trajectory change in Modi's foreign policy has been characterised by some fundamental shifts. For Hall and Basrur, continuity in foreign policy choices is prevalent through the emphasis on domestic economic development and multilateral engagement with major powers' hegemonic status regionally and being a significant power globally. An aspect of Hall's argument that influences this project is the analysis of ideological influence on leadership. Hall presents a glimpse into how a leader's ideological belief system is influential in foreign policy decision-making and how leadership

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[98] Basrur, *South Asia's Cold War*.
[99] Shibashis Chatterjee and Surupa Gupta, "Indian Foreign Policy and Coexistence: Continuity and Change in the Post-Cold War Era," in *The BRICS and Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order* (Routledge, 2014), 100–124.
[100] Shibashis Chatterjee and Sreya Maitra, "Identifying Levels, Structures and Agency in Post-Cold War Indian Foreign Policy," *UNISCI Journal* 17, no. 49 (January 2019): 15–28, https://doi.org/10.31439/unisci-31.
[101] Chris Ogden, *Hindu Nationalism and the Evolution of Contemporary Indian Security: Portents of Power* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2014).
[102] Hall Ian, *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy* (Bristol University Press, 2019).
[103] Rajesh Basrur, "Modi's Foreign Policy Fundamentals: A Trajectory Unchanged," *International Affairs* 93, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 7–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiw006.

influences the view of the state and the surrounding international political system when grounded in an ideology. Hence, decisions taken by Modi, according to Hall, were not based on pragmatic or realist approaches but on Hindu nationalist ideology.[104]

David Mitchell analyses how leaders' style affects foreign policy decision-making[105] but not how ideas influence leaders. Recent work has examined prime ministers and their influence on Indian foreign policy. The primary objective is to investigate the influence of the prime ministers on foreign policy choices, as seen in the work of Rajiv Dogra[106] and J. N. Dixit.[107] However, Dixit analyses the influence of India's pre-independence thinkers on India's continuing struggle for freedom and on contemporary leaders.

Aparna Pande's[108] work presents the evolution of India's view of the world and the institutions, ideas and attitudes that have shaped it. Harsh Pant's book adds a new theoretical framework for Indian foreign policy while acknowledging the traditional theoretical paradigms. This leads to understanding how ideas germinate and affect India's contemporary foreign policy trajectory. It presents a post-colonial and post-structural deconstruction of knowledge production of Indian foreign policy by the contributors to this edited volume. Manjari Chatterjee-Miller concludes that most of the work on Indian foreign policy rejects the role of historical memory.[109] A small but developing body of literature examines the influence

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[104] Hall, *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy*.
[105] David Mitchell, "Determining Indian Foreign Policy: An Examination of Prime Ministerial Leadership Styles," *India Review* 6, no. 4 (November 19, 2007): 253, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480701677995.
[106] Rajiv Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy* (Rupa Publications India Pvt Limited, 2020).
[107] Jyotindra Nath Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha* (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India a joint venture with India Today Group, 2004).
[108] Aparna Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy* (HarperCollins, 2020).
[109] Manjari Chatterjee-Miller, "Exploring Historical Memory and Indian Foreign Policy," in *India's Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis*, ed. Harsh V. Pant (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 67–84.

of India's colonial history on foreign policy choices. Chatterjee-Miller cites the effect of historical memory in explaining how the collective memory of the past influences decision-making in the present. She asserts that historical memory requires further research into the impact of historical ideas on foreign policy decision-making. Drawing on this new body of literature, this thesis explains how ideas matter and have been institutionalised by India's prime ministers.

The following section elaborates on the constructivist approach to understanding the role of ideas on India's prime ministers. India's colonial legacy through historical memory enables the development of ideas that permeate India's strategic autonomy and territorial integrity goals. The theoretical framework will establish how this research project adds to the literature that attempts to create the theoretical underpinnings of Indian foreign policy.

1.2. Theoretical Framework: Post-Imperial Ideology

This section outlines why the study of leaders in foreign policy is essential. It is followed by the theoretical explanation of post-imperial ideology.

1.2.1. Leaders in Indian Foreign Policy

The constructivist analysis of foreign policy describes how ideas, identities, beliefs, and norms transform foreign policy interests.[110] To grasp the correlation between ideas and foreign policy decisions regarding continuity and change in Indian foreign policy, a blend of conventional and critical constructivism is necessary.

Both conventional and critical constructivism are derived from critical social theories, and both place equal importance on language to reveal the social construct of practices,

[110] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027764.

identities, and institutions.[111] Combining both constructivist approaches to Indian foreign policy can identify state behaviour by uncovering the real reasons behind foreign policy decisions.[112] Through this combination, the relationship between ideas and foreign policy decision-making can be analysed. So, when studying India's foreign policy choices, understanding how ideas influence leaders is important.

To understand the role of leaders in foreign policy decision-making, a knowledge of political psychology is valuable.[113] The shift in India's global position has placed its foreign policy under greater scrutiny. Hence, in analysing Indian foreign policy choices, one must understand how ideas influence leaders. Studying India's prime ministers in shaping Indian foreign policy is essential. Domestic and international institutional pressures affect prime ministers' behaviour and foreign policy choices.[114] Although the literature says little about the role of leaders in shaping foreign policy choices, there is a growing need to study an individual leader's policy preferences and the psychological foundations of their beliefs.[115] In studying the role of leaders in foreign policy decision-making, a leader's personality is instrumental in how they react to a situation.[116]

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[111] Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (July 1998): 171–200, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.171.
[112] Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (September 1993): 297, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600810.
[113] Frank Mols and Paul 'T Hart, "Political Psychology," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh, and Gerry Stoker (UK: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., 2018), 142–43.
[114] Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (March 1980): 7, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600126.
[115] Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., "Psychological Factors Affecting Foreign Policy Decisions," in *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 97–120.
[116] David Winter, "Personality and Political Behaviour," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology: Second Edition*, ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 115–16.

However, the personality source of nature and nurture has yet to be examined.[117] David Winter presents four influences on someone's personality: temperament (energy levels and neuroses); cognition (beliefs, values, and attitudes); social context (gender, class, race, ethnicity, generation); and motives (goals and defence mechanisms).[118] Consequently, the elements derive from an individual's environment. However, it does not mean that all events exert equal power on an individual's personality, but they matter. Andrew Kennedy stipulates that leaders base their beliefs on past experiences and that these experiences shape their future foreign policy behaviours.[119] This research project studies India's prime ministers' early environment and experiences to understand their foreign policy choices.

1.2.2. Post-Imperial Ideology

In this section, I outline the relevance of post-imperial ideology to this research project.

Manjari Chatterjee-Miller proposed post-imperial ideology in her book *Wrong by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy of India and China.* In this extraordinary work, she describes the psychological impact of colonialism on the foreign policy of India and China. She makes two arguments: 1) the study of 'international relations is incomplete if it does not account systemically for colonialism and its legacy'; and 2) 'states have undergone the traumatic transformative historical event of extractive colonialism maintain an emphasis on victimhood and entitlement that dominates their decision calculus even today'.[120] Post-imperial ideology explains the international behaviour of the states – 'a sense of victimisation',[121] meaning that the states want to be recognised and empathised with as victims

[117] Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis, "How Leaders Matter," in *Why Leaders Fight* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 25–57.
[118] Winter, "Personality and Political Behaviour," 117.
[119] Andrew Kennedy, *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[120] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China* (Stanford University Press, 2013), 2.
[121] Chatterjee-Miller, *Wronged by Empire, 2.*

of the international system, but also that of 'victimhood',[122] which means that they want acknowledgment of their victimhood. Still, they also will ensure that they do not get victimised again.

The primary purpose of victimhood is to gain recognition and empathy in the international system, and its secondary objective is to maximise territorial sovereignty and status.[123] These two goals drive state behaviour in the international political environment. The goals of victimhood originate in colonialism, which inflicted collective historical trauma. Chatterjee-Miller explains colonialism and trauma theory in her book.

Chatterjee-Miller treats colonialism as a transformative historical event, 'an event which can either lead to the creation of a new state or reshape an existing state by altering key political and military institutions and the ideology thereof that are intrinsic to the state'.[124] This is seen in how the decolonised states of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s transformed into modern states with no similarities to their pre-colonial form. India is a classic example. Extractive colonialism[125] is the transformative historical event that traumatised colonised states' social, cultural, and political relations.[126] Therefore, historical trauma and the collective memory are interconnected, resulting in collective trauma. This collective trauma is passed down through generations, as seen in the consciousness of the colonial legacies by the Congress- and Bharatiya Janta Party-led governments.

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[122] Chatterjee-Miller, *Wronged by Empire, 2.*
[123] Chatterjee-Miller, *Wronged by Empire,* 8.
[124] Chatterjee-Miller, *Wronged by Empire,* 8-9.
[125] There are two kinds of colonialism: settler and extractive. Settler colonialism displaces an existing population and brings new populations from other places to reside. Extractive colonialism is the colonising power's takeover of the state and the aspects of life, often accompanied by violence against the native population.
[126] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, *The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation* (Cambridge: National Bureau of economic Research, 2000).

1.2.3. Post-Imperial Ideology and Research Project

This research project uses post-imperial ideology to explore the impact of India's colonial past on the foreign policy decisions of its prime ministers, as it will allow for understanding if there is continuity or change in foreign policy choices.

The incorporation of post-imperial ideology into this research project facilitates the examination of prime ministers and their foreign policy choices. When studying the impact of colonialism on foreign policy, the post-imperial ideology principle draws a connection between memory and trauma. This connection manifests in foreign policy choices, collectively leading to the same goal.

The goals of India's foreign policy are territorial integrity and strategic autonomy. These are close to the post-imperial ideology goals of maximising territory and status. This enables individual and collective investigation of continuity or change in foreign policy goals. Post-imperial ideology is conducive to understanding the impact of colonial trauma on states and how it continues to define decisions. It also leads to a robust historical analysis of the decisions taken by selected prime ministers of India to understand the source of the ideas and beliefs influencing their choices individually and collectively.

This is not to say that there is no literature analysing the influence of Indian prime ministers on Indian foreign policy choices. What is needed is an understanding of how prime ministers' past experiences shape their future foreign policy behaviours. This project, therefore, incorporates political psychology to comprehend the direct connection between beliefs and choices with the sense of victimhood that post-imperial ideology posits, allowing for delving deeper into the ideas that influence foreign policy choices.

Chatterjee-Miller brings a contemporary perspective on colonialism's collective trauma to India. Hence, incorporating post-imperial ideology allows this thesis to contribute to the growing post-colonial literature and the theoretical foundations of Indian foreign policy

analysis. Post-imperial ideology enables the research project to look closely at the continuity of the colonial trauma on Indian foreign policy to understand the changes and the degree of transition.

1.3. Methodology: Skinnerian Methodology

This section outlines the Skinnerian method,[127] its challenges, and how relevant this qualitative methodology is to the research project.

1.3.1 Skinnerian Contextualism Method

Quentin Skinner is a renowned British intellectual historian and political theorist. He has revolutionised our understanding of how ideas shape societies. Through his contextualist approach, Skinner emphasises the importance of comprehending the historical and cultural influences on the development of ideas. The Skinnerian model has two rules: 1) to 'focus not just on the text to be interpreted but on the prevailing conventions governing the treatment of the issues or themes with which the text is concerned', and 2) to 'focus on the writer's mental world, the world of his empirical beliefs. This rule derives from the logical connection between our capacity to ascribe intentions to agents and our knowledge of their beliefs.'[128]

Consequently, Skinner's method of textual analysis emphasises the 'author's intentions in writing…is not merely relevant to, but is actually equivalent to, a knowledge of the (meaning) of what he writes.'[129] Therefore, insisting on the "autonomy of the text as the sole

[127] The Skinnerian methodology is adopted for this thesis as it suits the research design of looking into the socio-political contextualisation of the Indian prime ministers where the political language analysed is a means to an end, the end being the need to comprehend the socio-political background that allows for framing the ideational development, and then influence on foreign policy choices. However, there are alternative methodologies for contextualisation that can be undertaken to conduct a study of this nature. Mark Bevir's *The Contextual Approach* in George Klosko (ed) *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosphy* (2011) *The Logic of the History of Ideas* (1999) and *The Role of Contexts in Understanding and Explanation˜(2000)* provides an alternate methodology.

[128] Quentin Skinner, "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts," *New Literary History* 3, no. 2 (1972): 393.

[129] Skinner, "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts," 75-76.

necessary key to its own meaning" or conceiving an idea is "itself as an appropriate unit of historical investigation".[130] Skinner implied that the explanatory power of the writer's intentions will provide a correct display of what the writer intends to convey. Therefore, the historical identity of a text is identical to the author's intentions in writing it.[131]

Skinner's method necessitates understanding the historical background and language in the writing. By this he means that the aim is to excavate the intention behind the text, which means that the political language used is a means to understand the context within which the writing is carried out. This means that the aim is to understand and situate the political language within the circumstance of its production – implying that the use of political language reveals the social constructs of practices, identities and institutions. Therefore, ideas need to be understood within their ideological context. In understanding that context, Skinner notes the need to understand the prevailing concepts or debates of the time.[132] This understanding can link intentions to beliefs. In this regard, Skinner's historical analysis method is the epistemological basis of my research project. Jonardon Ganeri uses Skinner's contextualism model to delve into premodern India's rich literary and intellectual Sanskrit culture.[133] This study is a prime example of using Skinnerian methodology to analyse the influence of ideas in India. This model will, therefore, be applied to the study of the selected India's prime ministers. And, in the application of the Skinnerian methodology to this thesis, the use of political language is analysed to interpret the text in order to find the germination of ideas that when traced back to the context allowed for studying the pre-independent thinkers that have been analysed in Chapter 3.

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[130] Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," in *Meaning and Context*, ed. Tully J (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 29–32.
[131] Michael Goodhart, "Theory in Practice: Quentin Skinner's Hobbes, Reconsidered," *The Review of Politics* 62, no. 3 (2000): 531–62, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500041681.
[132] Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," p.77.
[133] Jonardon Ganeri, "Contextualism in the Study of Indian Intellectual Cultures," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 36, no. 5–6 (June 20, 2008): 551–62.

However, the challenges to incorporating the Skinnerian methodology model of studying political thought and history have hindered this thesis. According to Skinner's model, interpreting historical texts requires understanding their context. However, this interpretation may be influenced by the researcher's biases and perspectives, thus affecting the validity and reliability of the analysis. For Skinner to develop an effective political model, he must thoroughly understand political concepts and their linguistic and semantic nuances. It can, therefore, take time to interpret and analyse political language accurately. In addition, an analysis of historical documents or materials may be limited by incompleteness, loss, or difficulty accessing them. Skinner's model focuses on texts and ideas that might not provide an in-depth understanding of historical events and phenomena. One might lack a comprehensive understanding of history. Some scholars have criticised Skinner's focus on linguistic analysis, claiming that it may emphasise the role of language at the expense of other factors that affect political behaviour and thought.

Despite the difficulties in incorporating the Skinnerian method, Skinner's suggestion to view a proposition as constituting a 'move in argument'[134] has proven profound. It offers valuable insights and depth to my research project, enhancing its coherence and analytical framework. The idea of authors engaging in the move-in argument stems from the premise that authors were confronted by perceived problems while writing their texts. This encourages us to comprehend the concepts and arguments that the writers employed.[135]

I relied on primary and secondary sources to incorporate the Skinnerian method into this research project. To study the selected prime ministers' historical experience and the context of their adopted ideologies, I consulted archival records available on government portals. I have also used leaders' documents, biographies, and archival newspapers for content

[134] Quentin Skinner, "A Reply to My Critics," in *Meaning and Context*, ed. Tully J (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 274.
[135] Stefan Collini et al., "What Is Intellectual History?," *History Today*, 1985, 51.

analysis. I used the Skinnerian method to apply the post-imperial ideology to the development of ideas and leaders' foreign policy choices. I also extensively used the many secondary sources that study Indian foreign policy from different theoretical perspectives.

This process determines the thematic and conceptual foundations of Indian foreign policy. The qualitative historical analysis is appropriate for this research project because it allows a close examination of primary and secondary sources. As a result of the Skinnerian method, a text is interpreted considering its context. Analysing the source's socio-political context made elucidating the ideas influencing leaders' foreign policy decisions possible. Applying Skinnerian models to this research project resulted in identifying recurrent themes in post-imperial ideology and its application to understanding the causal relationship between a decision and its driving idea. This allows the post-imperial ideology to answer the research question about the impact of colonial trauma on leaders.

1.3.2. Research Data Collection and Analysis

The narrative inquiry of this research project required in-depth document analysis to understand the influence of the social context on the ideas that influenced the Indian prime ministers. Due to the constraint of duration in the research project, eight prominent prime ministers were undertaken out of the fifteen prime ministers. This decision was made through the first content analysis of secondary sources on Indian foreign policy. It enabled the determination of the prime ministers who made significant contributions towards foreign policy outcomes but required further study to demonstrate that apart from the structural factors that influenced or constrained them, the agency of their ideas no longer should be kept in the subconscious realms of contributions towards foreign policy analysis. Through the extensive document analysis of secondary sources, the selection of leaders and understanding of the primary sources that need to be studied were developed. Initially, I used NVivo to derive the critical concepts used in the secondary sources that allowed for understanding the structural

approaches present and the need for an agent-centric approach. However, while the software allowed for initial document analysis, it was unsuitable for studying the primary sources.

Applying the Skinnerian methodology of contextualisation to interpret the writings of an author can only be best used through thorough reading, primarily keeping aside all biases as a researcher, which was difficult at the time. However, aiming only to pick up factual information about the social structures during which the writers wrote allowed me to take what I would call an unbiased approach as much as I could, especially when reading the biographies and autobiographies of all the prime ministers and even when reading their speeches at different events and occasions to comprehend the possible trends and themes that are underlining in Indian foreign policy, with the aim of understanding if there is continuity and change, or if the undertaken hypothesis of continuity and very little change would be proven wrong. Hence, the objective of remaining as unbiased as possible was an arduous challenge, but one I was determined to undertake to develop a trustworthy outcome through this research project.

Therefore, data collection of primary sources was obtained from the University of Sydney Library database, Macquarie University database, the Government of India websites, Newspaper archives, and the digital portals established by specific research organisations and institutions to make the digitised writings of some of the leaders available will be elaborated upon in this section. To comprehend the contributions made by the three selected pre-independent thinkers, a document analysis of the primary sources written by the thinkers was undertaken. Therein, the document analysis of *Kautilya's Arthashastra,* which was translated into English by R. Shamsastry (2016), Vinod Damodar Savarkar's *Hindutva (1938),* and my proficiency in the Hindi language aided in reading *1857 Ka Swatantraya Samar (1907)*. I am indebted to the Abhinav Bharat Mandir Trust, Nashik and Swatantryaveer Savarkar Rashtriya Smarak, Mumbai, who directed me towards the website Savarkar.org and provided me access to Savarkar's writings *Essentials of Hindutva.* The Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal & Gandhi

Research Foundation runs the Gandhian Public Charitable Trust and played an instrumental role in gaining access to R.L. Khipple's completed and edited *Famous Letters of Mahatma Gandhi* (1947) and *An Autobiography or the Story of My Experiments with Truth* (1948) to study closely and use the Skinnerian methodology to analyse the development of Gandhi's ideology that drove the freedom movement. Gandhi's *Quit India* speech of 8 August 1942, the address at the *Prayer Meeting* on 4 January 1948 and Gandhi's speech before *His Final Fast* on 12 January 1948 were selected to understand the Gandhian principles applied towards independent India and seen in the foreign policy decisions, especially by Nehru and in the creation of the post-colonial identity of the Indian state.

For the study of the prime ministers, the biographies and speeches of the selected prime ministers that were studied closely allowed for comprehension of the social-political context where the agency of ideas developed. The underpinnings of Nehru's ideological development were first understood through Walter Crocker's *Nehru: A Contemporary Estimate* (1966) and Michael Brecher's *Nehru: A Political Biography* (1961). To gain insight into Nehru's thoughts, his writings *Glimpses of World History,* a volume of his letters, were analysed to understand Nehru's views of the world and the way he presented it to his daughter, from which the letter *The Quest of Man,* allows for comprehending how Nehru comprehends the world around him, and how it forms his ideology and aims to influence Indira Gandhi's view of the world. Similarly, Nehru's *30 January 1948* speech at Mahatma Gandhi's funeral demonstrates the relationship between the mentor and his student. Even the interview conducted by Rustom Khurshedji Karanjia with Nehru reflected Gandhi's influence on Nehru, published in *The Mind of Mr. Nehru. An Interview by R. K. Karanjia* (1960). To analyse Nehru and the presence of the post-colonial identity through Indian foreign policy choices, Nehru's speeches were accessed from the Ministry of Information, and broadcasting was enabled. Towards Nehru's Non-Alignment Policy (NAP), his first speech broadcast on All India Radio on *7 September*

1946, the *speech on 13 December 1946* and the speech at the Bandung Conference of 1955 were accessed from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting publications and at the closing speech by Premier Zhou Enlai of the 1955 Bandung Conference accessed from the digital archives of the Wilson Center, were analysed to gain a clear insight into the adoption of the NAP.

Concerning Nehru's perceptions of the partition and relations with Pakistan, Nehru's two letters, one dated *15 October 1947* and the other *17 October 1948,* allowed for gauging the way forward in Nehru's dealings and the colonial trauma prevailing. Similarly, Nehru's speech to Parliament on 3 February *1950, 28 March 1951* and his speech at the Island Grounds in Madras on *31 January 1957* over Kashmir was analysed to understand Nehru's idealism in India's foreign policy towards Pakistan, all accessed from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting publications and also from the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund digital library archives. In the analysis of Nehru's dealings with China, Nehru's published article *Changing India* in the Foreign Affairs published in 1963, accessed through the database of Macquarie University Library, was analysed to look into Nehru's perceptions on dealing with China while also dealing with the United Nations on the matter of Kashmir. The Government documentation on the meeting between Nehru and Premier Chou on *23 April 1960* was accessed from the Wilson Center Digital Archive. The documented conversation between Nehru and Bulganin, prime minister of the Soviet Union in *1955* was taken from *Selected Words of Jawaharlal Nehru: Second Series, Volume 29: 1 June-31 August 1955* compiled by H.Y. Sharada Prasad, and documentation of Nehru's conversation with Eisenhower in *1956* taken from the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, South Asia Volume VII digital archives made available by the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute of the United States Department of State that have created available memorandums of correspondence with South Asia. Nehru's speeches to Parliament on *4 September 1959* about

China and his views on India's pursuit of nuclear power presented in his speeches to Parliament on 13 November 1945 and 2 April 1954, respectively, were accessed from the Indian Cultural Portal, which is part of the National Virtual Library of the India Project, funded by the Ministry of Culture, Government of India, and also from the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund digital library archives. These speeches and documentation allowed for gaining insight into Nehru's foreign policy dealings and diplomacy with his counterparts of the different states.

The application of the Skinnerian method of contextualism towards the foreign policy of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri during his short duration as India's second Prime Minister, especially in his dealings with the 1965 war with Pakistan and the Tashkent meetings, can best be understood through the biographies written of two civil servants who worked closely with Shastri- Rajeshwar Prasad's *Days with Lal Bahadur Shastri: Glimpses of the Last Severn Years* (1991) and CP Srivastava's *Lal Bahadur Shastri Prime Minister of India 1964-1966: A life of Truth in Politics* (1995). Even the very recent writings of Sandeep *Shastri's Lal Bahadur Shastri: Politics and Beyond* (2019) allow for an analysis of Shastri's leadership in the war against Pakistan and the negotiations at Tashkent. In addition to the biographies that provided insight into Shastri's ideological underpinning were his speeches, the speech on *11 June 1964*, where Shastri highlighted the measures he aimed to undertake towards Pakistan, followed by his address on *6 May 1965* at a dinner given in honour of Lord Mountbatten at Rashtrapath Bhavan displaying his focus on the mutual need for peace, and the *11 May 1965* Speech to Parliament on the settlement through negotiations with Pakistan at Tashkent. These speeches were accessed through the digital documentation of Shastri's speeches from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Similarly, Shastri's positive approach towards India's drive for nuclear power and its tests is visible in his speech at the opening of the Plutonium Plant of the Atomic Energy Department on *22 October 1964* and later in his address at the *Press Conference on 20 January 1965* where he addressed India's nuclear and Pakistan

policies. Finally, to understand Shastri's policies as a continuation of Nehru's underpinnings and Gandhi's mentorship were found in his speeches on *9 November 1964* and *21 February 1965* at the laying of the foundation-stone ceremony of the Gandhi Stupa at Vijayawada and the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi at Trivandrum, respectively, and also his speech on *14 November 1964 marking the 75th birth anniversary of Nehru*, and *14 November 1965, celebrating the 76th birth anniversary of Nehru*, accessed from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India Publications Division.

Regarding Shastri's work towards India and China relations, Shastri's letter dated *27 November 1964* to the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai and Shastri's statements to Parliament on *17 September 1965* and *20 September 1965* display his perspective of dealing with China's growth and desire to dominate Asia. Finally, Shastri's adherence to the non-alignment policy is visible in his speech at the *Non-Aligned Nations' Conference in Cairo on 7 October 1964* and his interview with Yugoslavia correspondents in New Delhi before his State visit to Yugoslavia in June 1950, which are accessed from the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.

For the analysis of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Katherine Frank's biography *Indra: The Life of Indra Nehru Gandhi* (2001) and Indira's writings compiled by the Indira Gandhi Memorial Trust and titled *Remembered Moments: Some Autobiographical Writings of Indira Gandhi* (1989) that provided a vital insight into Indira's ideological perspectives. It is through Indira's biographies that Nehru's influence was indicative as Indira's exposure to world history and politics apart from her education came from the letters that Nehru wrote to his daughter, which were later compiled to be titled *Letters from a Father to His Daughter* and *Glimpses of History,* where Nehru encouraged his daughter to understand not only politics but to think about life itself. Indira Gandhi's foreign policy and aims as the Prime Minister of India were first found in her speech that was broadcasted on India's Republic Day, *26 January 1966,*

where Indira highlighted the guiding principles of Indian foreign policy, displaying the continuation of the Nehruvian and Gandhian principles. Additionally, Indira's policy towards Pakistan concerning the formation of Bangladesh was analysed through Indira Gandhi's speeches to the Parliament on *24 May 1971* regarding the situation in Bangladesh, 4 December 1971, regarding the attacks made by Pakistan, and 6 December 1971 in recognition of Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi's speeches on 9 November 1968 and 22 July 1974 highlighted the underground nuclear explosions of May 1974 and the policy that Indira Gandhi had developed towards India's nuclear endeavours. The speeches of Indira Gandhi were accessed from the Digital Library of the Lok Sabha, Parliament of India archives. Indira Gandhi's policies towards Afghanistan and Sri Lanka were understood through the document analysis of Indira's speeches to Parliament on 21 January 1980 in her address to the leaders of the Opposition in Parliament where Indira Gandhi reiterated India's non-alignment stance, accessed from the digital archive of the *Indian Express*, and *5 August 1983, 12 August 1983* and *18 August 1983* on Sri Lanka where Indira expressed that India was not a threat to Sri Lanka, but that India decided to mediate due to the historical, cultural and close ties between the people of India and Sri Lanka. The official Shimla Agreement of 1972 to analyse the foreign policy approach undertaken towards Pakistan and the Speech by Indira Gandhi at the Thirty-Eight Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 28 September 1983, where India's non-alignment was expanded upon, were obtained from the Digital Archives of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India The application of the Skinnerian interpretation method to the speeches and biography of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi allowed for a close interpretation and analysis of the political ideology towards Indian foreign policy, and analysing the post-colonial identity present in her foreign policy.

For the document analysis of Rajiv Gandhi's Prime Ministership through the Skinnerian interpretation method, Meena Agarwal's biography of Rajiv Gandhi titled *Rajiv*

Gandhi and Padmini Harish Chander's *Rajiv Gandhi, Many Facets: interview-based* book (1994) provided in-depth analysis of the ideological influences of Indira Gandhi on Rajiv, allowing for the understanding of the continuity in the post-colonial identity with strategic shifts as demanded by the international political environment in which Rajiv Gandhi found himself leading the Indian state. Despite Rajiv Gandhi's short tenure, he made many contributions, especially towards regional cooperation, through his efforts in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Rajiv Gandhi's opening statement at the first SAARC Summit in 1985 highlighted the need for regional peace and prosperity, further emphasised in his speech the following year at the second SAARC Summit held by India in Bangalore in 1986. The speeches at the SAARC Summits were derived from the digital library of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. The Digital Library of the Lok Sabha, Parliament of India was highly resourceful as I was able to access several of Rajiv Gandhi's statements to the Parliament on matters like the Sri Lanka Civil War through the speeches of *25 April 1985, 9 November 1987,* and notably the statement on the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement on *30 July 1987*. Rajiv Gandhi's speech at the *Fifteenth Special Session General Assembly Provisional Verbatim Record Of The Fourteenth Meeting* on *8 June 1988* displayed his action plan concerning nuclear power as a country leader. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan was analysed through the archival news reports by The Washington Post on 17 July 1989 titled *Gandhi visit to Pakistan Signals Thaw* and the New York Times *Gandhi visit to Pakistan: Hope for a New Era* of 29 December 1988, and Rajiv Gandhi's address to Parliament in his speech after his visit from USA and also from Pakistan in his speech of 11 November 1987, allowing for a close analysis of the winds of change that were being ushered in by Rajiv Gandhi, who promoted regional cooperation. Rajiv Gandhi undertook travels to China and the Soviet Union, which were closely studied through his speeches as he reported back to Parliament on *21*

November 1988 regarding the Soviet Union, accessed from the Digital Library, Lok Sabha, Parliament of India.

Regarding the Skinnerian interpretative methodology applied to the study of Narasimha Rao's leadership comprehending the ideological perspectives through the analysis of the social context of Rao's early childhood, early political years, and then his term in office as the Prime Minister of India in the immediate years after the end of the Cold War are crucial, to comprehend the shifts in Indian foreign policy. To begin with this study, the biographies by Ādirāju Veṅkaṭēśvararāvu's *The Right Prime Minister: A Political Biography of P.V. Narsimha Rao* (1993) and Vinay Sitapati's *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao* (2018) P.V. Narendra Reddy, *P.V. Narasimha Rao, Years of Power* (1993) allowed for a close study of the influences on Rao. Rao's contributions towards the developments in India, especially its economic changes, were visible initially through Rao's speech in New Delhi on 29 September 1991, highlighting the reorientations of the policies India would adopt to incorporate economic changes. Similarly, in his inaugural speech addressing taking office as Prime Minister on 22 June 1991 and then his speech on 9 July 1991, Rao highlighted the plight of the Indian economy and the need for reform. While establishing domestic economic reforms, Rao opened the Indian economy with its first step being that of the Look East Policy that was introduced through his speech, *India, and the Asia-Pacific: Forging a New Relationship* at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, on *8 September 1994*, accessed from the digital library of the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. When assessing Rao's policy towards Pakistan, Rao's *Independence Day speech on 15 August 1994* establishes the assertive stance that Rao promoted towards Pakistan, especially after Rao's 22 February 1994speech when the Parliament passed the resolution seeking Pakistan to deal with the acts of terror that were stemming from its nation., Rao's push for positive relations between India and China, which

resulted in the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Agreement signing along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China border areas, can be analysed through his speech at the dinner hosted in honour of Premier Li Peng of China and Madame Zhu Lin in New Delhi on 11 December 1991 and Rao's statement on the visit of the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 11-16 December 1991., Rao's statement at the United Nations Security Council Summit on 31 January 1992 highlighted the need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, acknowledging the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The speeches were accessed primarily from the Publications Divisions, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.

The leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee was studied through the Skinnerian interpretation method to comprehend the social context in which the ideological perspective was developed, importantly since Vajpayee was a Prime Minister heading a coalition government belonging to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). For this purpose, the biographies of Vajpayee were essential to study to understand the development of his ideological perspective, as Vajpayee played an instrumental role in forming the BJP in 1980. Kingshuk Nag's *Atal Bihari Vajpayee A Man For All Seasons* (2016) provides a very close examination of the influence that Savarkar and Narayano Tarte had on the development of his Hindutva ideology while he became part of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Even NP Ullekh's *The Untold Vajpayee: Politician and Paradox* (2018) closely studies Vajpayee's role in founding the Jana Sangha in 1951. Vajpayee was a poet and, through several of his poems, portrayed the influences that created his strong Hindutva identity as seen in *Hindu Tan-Man', and 'Hindu Jeevan* and his article *The Sangh is my Soul*, expressing the influential role of Tarte, which was accessed through the digitised archives of the Organiser, Voice of the nation which was previously a circulated weekly since 1947, and has been digitised for further reach. Vajpayee's contributions towards Indian foreign policy are best examined through India's

milestone of the Nuclear tests at Pokhran in his announcement on *11 May 1998,* and also the speech that Vajpayee delivered on *29 May 1998,* which were accessed from the Digital Library of the Lok Sabha, Parliament of India. Also, Vajpayee's statement to *India Today* in *March 1998* in conversation with Prabhu Chawla was accessed from the India Today archives, and Vajpayee's *State to Parliament on Nuclear Tests in Pokhran* at the Twelfth Lok Sabha Session on *27 May 1998* and the Independence Day Speech of 1998 was sourced through the Lok Sabha Debate digital archives. The USA's response with sanctions on India for the Pokhran tests was analysed through the CNN digital archives, and the transcript of Clinton's Remarks on the Nuclear testing of 3 June 1998 was accessed through the U.S Newswire archives through the University of Sydney database. The Kargil War of 1999 was crucial in the relations between India and Pakistan. Vajpayee's take on the border clash was analysed through his *7 June 1999* speech, followed by his speech at the *Agra Summit* on *7 August 2001* and *at the New Year's 2001* speech that displayed a strong sense of his idealism towards the Kashmir issue. Vajpayee's address to the Parliament on *19 December 2001* highlighted Vajpayee's perspective on the 13 December attacks on the Indian Parliament, which was an assertive position to undertake aggressive measures towards Pakistan were accessed from the digital library of the Lok Sabha, Parliament of India. Concerning Vajpayee's policy towards China, the *Summary of the Press Briefing by the Official Spokesman of the MEA on 8 March 2000* was analysed along with Vajpayee's keynote address at the seminar on China-India economic cooperation and development on *24 June 2003*, where Vajpayee highlighted the financial profit of improving ties between the two nations.

The study of the coalition government led by Manmohan Singh of the Indian National Congress Party, Sanjay Baru's *The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh* (2015) and K. Bhushan and G. Katyal, *Manmohan Singh: Visionary to Certainty* (2004) to explain the development of Singh's ideology and the perspectives on

undertaken by Singh towards the foreign policy choices. Singh's address to the nation *on 24 June 2004* highlighted the need for expansion and cooperation between India and the USA through their Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) that was finally signed in *September 2004* and was analysed through the *United States - India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership of 17 September 2004* accessed from the digital archives of the US Department of State and the Media Briefing on the *Indo-US High Technology Cooperation Group review meeting of 11 October 2004.* In 2005, at his Convocation of Oxford University address, Singh highlighted the importance of India's relations with the West. The Defence Partnership through the *18 July 2005 Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh* studied. The historic 2008 USA-India Civilian Nuclear Accord as the 123 Agreement was analysed through the *Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States* of Singh's statement to the Parliament of *13 August 2007,* all of which was accessed through the Digital Library, Lok Sabha, Parliament of India. Singh's take on Pakistan was evident through the transcript of his interview with American journalist Jonathan Power on 20 May 2004, which was retrieved from The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research archives. Singh's passive approach in dealings with Pakistan, especially after the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, was analysed through Singh's 11 December 2008 session of replies to the Question-and-Answer session at the Parliament, which were accessed through the Digital Library, Lok Sabha, Parliament of India and the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.

Singh's relations with China were analysed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs *A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India* of 14 January 2008 and 2005 *The Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Solving the Boundary Question* that allowed for comprehending the growing relationship between the two nations. However, the border clashes of 2013 and 2014 were examined through the archives of

The Hindu digital archive on Manmohan Singh's speech on *India-China relations at the Central Party School*, Beijing on 24 October 2013, and *Joint Statement- A Vision for future development of India-China strategic and cooperative partnership* of 23 October 2013, accessed from the archives of the Ministry of External Affairs.

The leadership of Narendra Modi, the current prime minister of India, was examined during his first term in office. The study of Modi is significant as it allows for analysing whether there will be a transformational fundamental or paradigmatic shift in India's foreign policy, especially with Modi winning a majority after a long period of coalition governments ruling in India. The strong ideological influence of Hindutva on Modi is best understood through the writings of his biography thus far, which was examined in the writings of Andy Marino, *Narendra Modi: A Political Biography* (2014), Kingshuk Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life (2013)* and Modi's *Vakil Saheb Lakshmanrao Inamdar (2021)*. Modi's speeches about relations with China at the BRICS Summit 2015 were taken from the archives of the NDTV digital library titled Full Text of PM Narendra Modi's Speech at BRICS Leaders' Plenary Session of 16 October 2016. the BRICS meet: Under the shadow of Dokhlam, PM Modi pitches for robust 'people-to-people exchanges' between nations, newspaper article by The Times of India 4 September 2017, allows for analysis of Modi's policy towards China, as Modi promoted peoples-to-people exchange with China to encourage economic and cultural cooperation, allowing for examining how China's link to Pakistan and it's terrorist support towards the borders impacts India's foreign policy choices, while ideologies are essential facts that cannot be ignored. Modi's policy towards Pakistan displays a more assertive outlook. The Hindutva nationalist approach influences it, and this was analysed through Modi's speeches on the Release of a separatist leader by the Jammu and Kashmir Government on *9 March 2015,* India's response to the grant of bail in Pakistan to accused conspirator in the Mumbai Attack of *19 December 2014*. Attempts to display normalcy of relations were seen through the Prime

Minister's Speech at the 18th SAARC Summit, accessed from the Ministry of External Affairs digital archives. Modi's stance against terrorism is seen in Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century of 7 June 2016, which was accessed from the digital archives of the Office of the Press Secretary, the White House.

Therefore, the collection of secondary sources was not always accessible, as some sources were not available in the digital libraries of the university I study, and research being conducted during the pandemic ordering books overseas led to delays in delivery, pushing back analysis. However, when it came to availing primary sources like biographies of the prime ministers, there was a high availability of digital versions. Even speeches were accessible through the Government of India's archival records on the speeches of Indian prime ministers, and even books that collated speeches of Indian prime ministers were available. The digital archival records of the various newspaper establishments in India that I used through the university library database made the document analysis of primary sources easier than some of the secondary sources I used. For the content analysis of primary sources, I did not use NVivo as my research required close reading and scrutiny of every statement in the text to understand the social context and find the themes and specific underpinnings of the writings, which I aimed to do in the most unbiased manner, hoping that it would bring forward the trustworthiness of my work. Therefore, for this historical narrative inquiry, I first conducted content analysis on the secondary sources to find the gap in the literature that allowed me to develop my research question and research design, leading me towards the required primary sources that I studied closely applying the Skinnerian contextualism, which meant that while I studied the biography or speech of a particular prime minister, I had also to examine the socio-political environment of that time. This I did to base my analysis on a more factual interpretation of policy choices, keeping aside researcher biases that could impair the quality of research. Hence, I used the

Skinnerian method to apply the post-imperial ideology to the development of ideas and leaders' foreign policy choices.

This process determined the thematic and conceptual foundations of Indian foreign policy. Therefore, the qualitative historical analysis is appropriate for this research project because it allows a close examination of primary and secondary sources. As a result of the Skinnerian method, a text is interpreted considering its context. Analysing the source's socio-political context made elucidating the ideas influencing leaders' foreign policy decisions possible. Applying Skinnerian models to this research project resulted in identifying recurrent themes in post-imperial ideology and its application to understanding the causal relationship between a decision and its driving idea. This allows the post-imperial ideology to answer the research question about the impact of colonial trauma on leaders.

1.3.3. Methodology and Research Challenges

Incorporating the Skinnerian contextualism methodology of studying political thought and history has brought some challenges towards this thesis. According to Skinner's model, interpreting historical texts requires understanding their context. However, while effort has been undertaken to ensure an unbiased study is conducted, there is the possibility of the researcher's individual biases and perspectives, thus affecting the validity and reliability of the analysis.

Applying the Skinnerian methodology is time-consuming as it requires close analysis to accurately interpret and examine the political language. In addition, an analysis of historical documents or materials may be limited by incompleteness, loss, or difficulty accessing them. Thus, there is a possibility of the interpretation not being complete. I ensured to look at secondary literature revolving around the same period simultaneously when analysing a particular prime minister, intending to make my analysis as accurate and unbiased as possible.

Despite the difficulties in incorporating the Skinnerian method, Skinner's suggestion to view a proposition as constituting a 'move in argument' has proven profound. It offers valuable insights and depth to my research project, enhancing its coherence and analytical framework. The idea of authors engaging in the move-in argument stems from the premise that authors were confronted by perceived problems while writing their texts. This encourages us to comprehend the concepts and discussions that the writers employed. Alternatively, there are other methodologies, like that of Mark Bevir who's work offers the method of interpreting texts to comprehend the intentions and the actions of the agents in discussion in his work. While the research project could have undertaken a mixed approach of Skinner and Bevir, the limitation of wordcount for the project and the need to accommodate the timeline of completion for this project did not permit so. Nevertheless, this methodology will be integrated into the next expansions of this research.

While the methodological challenges presented themselves towards the research project, some challenges emerged during the research project that impaired the project's original design. The adverse impacts of the pandemic at the height of this research project led to the redesign of much of the project. Like any higher-degree research, this project had a time limitation and minimal funding, which had to be catered to for field research design. However, the pandemic put a halt to the field research. So, I shifted the project from undertaking interviews to a purely qualitative historical narrative inquiry, which I hope contributes significantly to the literature on Indian foreign policy analysis.

The shift to a purely qualitative research design also led to several challenges, essentially acquiring secondary sources for the literature review. While a plethora of digital literature is available, there was a need for some secondary sources that were not digitised yet, and overseas delivery during the pandemic meant delivery delays. I resorted to ordering some books online, willing to wait for them to arrive; I had friends scan books and share them with

me on the shared drive. I even had a relative who was permitted to travel overseas, a healthcare worker, bring books my parents purchased for me. These challenges emerged and made the research project even more exciting. The need to overcome all obstacles and continue research was a motivation throughout the pandemic. While being an international student unable to return home and having my entire family hospitalised during the second wave of COVID-19, teaching and working on the research project was my only motivation during those times. And, so with the need to complete the research project, the use of the Skinnerian contextualism method allowed for the interpretation of the social context, its impact on the leaders, the historical experiences, and the germination of the ideas to understand that there existed a continuity in the foreign policy goals of territorial integrity and strategic autonomy of India and that the prime ministers were influenced by ideas that were rooted in the freedom national movement that gained momentum in the 1920s as Gandhi took centre stage, and with most of the leaders being born in that generation, facing the colonial plight of India that turned into its historical legacy aligned with the research question of this thesis that sought to understand if the ideologies of Indian prime ministers influenced Indian foreign policy decision-making, and the extent to which the colonial past influenced the leaders during foreign policymaking. This allows the argument of this thesis to emphasise that the weight of India's colonial history continues to play an influential role in foreign policy decisions made by the prime ministers of India and that the shifts in Indian foreign policy are those of foreign policy implementation.

Chapter 2: Pre-Independence Political Ideologies

This chapter examines the influence of the ideas of prominent Indian intellectuals on Indian foreign policy (IFP) by applying the Skinnerian approach of interpretation – it explores how they have influenced Indian strategic thought and especially India's foreign policy. Examining the Indian intellectuals allows for the development of the thematic underpinnings of this thesis. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section describes India's civilisation narrative and the development of the strategic identity of the Indian state through the work of Kautilya (375 – 283 BCE), the originator of pragmatic strategic thinking. The second section explains the role of Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966) in establishing the concept of *Hindutva*, thereby giving rise to the Hindu Nationalist Identity championed by the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) government. The third section studies the role of Mohan Das Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948), affectionately known as Bapu,[1] the father of the nation, whose philosophy helped lead India to independence and informed the Post-Colonial identity. Therefore, three schools of identity are developed- Strategic Identity, Hindu Nationalist Identity and Post-Colonial Identity.

Political thinkers like Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920), Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-1928), and Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) have made noteworthy contributions to India's freedom movement and lent strategic guidance to the country's government after independence. For this research, it would be impractical to analyse all the political thinkers who participated in India's national movement; three of its most significant political thinkers are, therefore, singled out for examination. The three sections of this chapter are expounded by applying the Skinnerian method to each political thinker. The first part applies historical analysis to strategic thinking in ancient Indian civilisation before turning to Kautilya's contributions to India's strategic

[1] Bapu is the same as the English word Papa; used affectionately for Gandhiji by his followers, as he is the father of the nation.

thinking and the discipline of international relations. The second part will examine Damodar Savarkar's role in conceptualising the idea of *Hindutva* ideology and Hinduism itself. The aim is to comprehend the enduring impact of his views on contemporary leadership in India. The concluding segment shines a spotlight on Gandhi's leadership of India's independence movement to gain insight into the foreign policy that Nehru would implement as prime minister.

2.1. Kautilya and the Strategic Identity of the Indian State

Literature on IFP most often outlines the rich history of the Indian civilisation and the vast expanses of territory that India occupied until it was conquered first by the Mughals and then by the British.[2] This chapter begins with Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, or the science of politics,[3] highlighting India's intellectual heritage in governance and strategic thinking. Kautilya, a Brahmin minister to Chandragupta Maurya, wrote the *Arthashashtra* as a guide for the Maurya monarch, Chandragupta (r. 317 – 293 BCE), to govern his realm and manage diplomatic affairs with neighbouring allies and adversaries.[4]

India has a rich 5000-year-old civilisation with a notable emphasis on strategic thinking. Taken as its starting point for statecraft, Aparna Pande,[5] Shyam Saran,[6] Shivshankar Menon[7] and David Malone[8] are some of the current writings that analyse India's inheritance based on

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[2] Shyam Saran, *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century* (Juggernaut Books, 2017); Aparna Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy* (HarperCollins, 2017); Sumit Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy (Revised Edition): Oxford India Short Introductions* (Oxford University Press, 2019); David Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2011).
[3] R. Shamsastry, *Kautilya's Arthashastra* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016).
[4] Roger Boesche, The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra (Lexington Books, 2002).
[5] Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi*.
[6] Saran, How India Sees the World.
[7] Shivshankar Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present* (Brookings Institution Press, 2021).
[8] Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?

this ancient history. Their research has identified India's strategic geographical location as a significant factor in its openness to the outside world. Saran disagrees with the post-modernist perspective. He believes that the narrative of India's history is "what you make of it"[9], in other words, what we tell ourselves. Saran highlights that India's rich heritage does not stem from its "mixed religious persuasion and origins" but from India's assimilation and social mobility.[10] The Indian subcontinent is strategically located at the crossroads of trade routes linking South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.[11] The ancient Indian kingdoms benefited greatly from this position, establishing diplomatic ties with Mesopotamia, Greece, China, and Rome. Hence, statecraft and strategic policy were fundamental to the foreign relations of the ancient Indian empires.

The makers of modern India drew much inspiration from India's philosophical heritage. According to K. Satchidananda Murty, two schools of thought from ancient India prevailed in India's contemporary foreign policy: realist and idealist (moralist).[12] The realist perspective was present in works like the *Arthashastra*, *Dharmasastras* and *Nitisastras.*[13] The idealist or moralist perspectives are found in the teachings of Buddhism and Jainism, from which Alison Quinn claims that India was influenced by its cultural and religious[14] leaders. Under Ashoka, the preeminent ruler of the Maurya dynasty (dates of reign?), there was a belief in the necessity

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[9] Saran, *How India Sees the* World, 23.
[10] Saran, How India Sees the World.
[11] Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyay, The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities (Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1984), 32.
[12] K. Satchidananda Murty, *Indian Foreign Policy* (Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1964), 172.
[13] Shounak Set, "Ancient Wisdom for the Modern World: Revisiting Kautilya and his Arthashastrain the Third Millennium," *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 6 (October 22, 2015): 710–14.
[14] Alison Quinn, "How History Shapes India's Foreign Policy Goals," E-International Relations, August 4, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/08/04/how-history-shapes-indias-foreign-policy-goals/.

of peaceful relations among states.[15] Similar idealist principles are apparent in Nehru's initial policies towards Pakistan and China, which are the next chapter's subject.

2.1.1. *Arthashashtra*: Strategic Thought

Kautilya's renowned manual on statecraft, *Arthashashtra*, written for Chandragupta Maurya, is the first step in understanding the influence of ancient Indian thought and practice on modern India.[16] The *Arthashastra,* written in 4 BCC, is Kautilya's compilation of ideas from numerous texts such as the *Manusmriti* and the *Brahmanas*.[17] Most scholars cite the Arthashastra to understand the principles of governance.[18] Kautilya's experiences as a minister in the court of Chandragupta Maurya and his study of various *sastras* informed his writing in the *Arthashastra*. In the opening of his work, Kautilya acknowledges that the science of politics he presents in his text is not his thinking but rather a summary of knowledge he has compiled for his king.[19] In this setting, the Skinnerian contextualism, when carried out through content analysis, demonstrates that the interpretation of the text allows for understanding the political climate during the compilation of the *Arthashastra.* Kautilya's advice was at a time when the Greek invasion was increasing after the death of Alexander in 323 BCE. The need was to prevent Alexander the Great's successors and to consolidate India into one unified empire, which Chandragupta accomplished with Kautilya's support, establishing the Mauryan empire that continued by Chandragupta's son Bindusara (293-268BCE) – whom Kautilya also advised, and then Chandragupta's grandson Ashoka (268-232 BCE).[20] This political environment is evident in Radha Kumud Mookerji's writings, where she highlights that the advice given by

[15] Quinn, "How History Shapes India's Foreign Policy Goals".
[16] Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi*.
[17] Rashed Uz Zaman, "Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 25, no. 3 (June 2006): 231–47.
[18] Zaman, "Kautilya".
[19] Tridib Chakraborti, "Contemporary Relevance of Kautilya's Mandala Theory and Diplomacy," 2016; Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist*.
[20] Roger Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India," *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 1 (2003): 10-11.

Kautilya to the monarch on dealings with one's enemy was practised through the assassination of the Greek governors – Nicanor and Philip.[21]

The *Arthashashtra* has fifteen books and 150 chapters on governance, justice, diplomacy, and foreign policy.[22] This chapter focuses on the section on diplomacy and foreign policy. Kautilya's advice to the ruler of the Mauryan empire begins with his explanation of the qualities a ruler should possess to govern and conduct diplomatic relations. Kautilya provides tools for war and diplomacy to the monarch through the *Mandala* theory and *Shadgunas* (Six-Fold Policy). According to the *Mandala* theory, the *Vijigishu* (king) is a *chakravartin* (universal monarch) at the centre of the *Mandala*, a ring of concentric circles.[23] Therefore, to understand Kautilya's philosophy of diplomacy, it is imperative to comprehend the *Mandala* theory, the *Shadgunyas*, the *Chatur-Upayas* (modes of diplomacy),[24] and the three conditions and powers of the state. The *Mandala* theory is best depicted in a diagram.



[21] Radhakumud Mookerji, *Chandragupta Maurya and His Times* (Motilal Banarsidass, 2016).
[22] Tridib Chakraborti, "Contemporary Relevance of Kautilya's Mandala Theory and Diplomacy," *Politico* 5, no. 2 (2016): 83–115.
[23] Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthashastra.
[24] Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthashastra.

The conqueror, *Vijigisha* (monarch/conqueror), is at the core of the *Mandala*, surrounded by groups of kings.[25] The kings at the bottom of the diagram are the *Ari* (enemy) and *Mitra* (allies or friends). The king next to the *Vijigisha's Mitra* is the *Arimitra* (friend of the enemy).[26] The king, called *Mitra Mitra* (friend of a friend), is next to the *Ariimitra Mitra* (a friend to the conqueror's ally), making him a friend to the conqueror. The *Avimitra mitra* is the partner to the enemy's ally.[27]

Now, above the *Vijigisha* (monarch/conqueror) in the diagram are the *Parshnigraaha* (enemy and immediate neighbour to the king), the *Akranda* (the conqueror's ally located next to the conqueror's enemy), the *Parshnigrahasara* (an ally to the enemy located behind the conqueror), and the *Akrandasara* (an ally to the friend of the *Vijigisha* behind the conqueror).[28] Apart from these are the four *Madhyamas* (neutral kings), two on each side of the *Vijigisha*. This king is near the *Vijigisha* and his *Ari* (enemy) and can help either of the kings. Kautilya says that the primary role of a *Madhyama* is to be a neutral intermediary between the two kings.[29] The *Udasina* is also a neutral king but stands outside the realms of any kings within the *Mandala*. He is mighty enough to resist pressure from other kings.[30] The *Madhyama* and the *Udasina* are the two essential kings in the Mandala that the *Vijigisha* must work alongside unless they threaten his ambitions.[31] This is primarily due to the geographical location of the *Udasina*, which is beyond the *Vijigisha* and his *Ari*. The *Udasina* can support the *Vijigisha*, the *Ari*, or/and the *Madhyama,* either together or individually.

According to Kautilya, the twelve primary kings in the Mandala form the Circles of States called the *Rajaprakriti*. Each state comprises the five elements of sovereignty, creating

[25] Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthashastra.
[26] Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthashastra.
[27] Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthashastra.
[28] Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthashastra.
[29] Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthashastra.
[30] Shamsastry, Kautilya's Arthashastra.
[31] Shamsastry, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*.

sixty elements of sovereignty (*Dravyaprakriti)*: the twelve *Rajaprakriti* and the sixty *Dravyaprakriti* include the 72 elements of the statal circle.[32] In shaping a state's foreign policy, the Mandala balances power while emphasising the importance of resource availability and forming alliances. Hence, it is evident that the geographic proximity of states is crucial to their diplomatic relations.[33] As Shounak Set has pointed out, the Mandala has frequently been misinterpreted as a concentric system of states, with the most important kingdom, the *Vijigisha,* in the centre.[34] Each state, with its alliances and rivalries, is a *Vijigisha at* the centre of its Mandala.[35]

The Six-fold Policy is based on *Sandhi* (peace), *Vigraha* (war), *Asana* (neutrality), *Yana* (march), *Samshraya* (alliance/shelter), and *Dvaidhibhava* (double policy). According to Kautilya, the *Vijigisha* can only succeed by combining the Shadgunyas with the four [36] *Upayas* (modes of diplomacy), which are *Sama* (conciliation), *Dama* (rewards), *Bheda* (divide-and-rule policy), and *Danda* (the use of force).

2.1.2. Skinnerian Contextualisation of Kautilya's Strategic Thought

The contextualisation of the creation of this guide allows for comprehending the "author's intentions in writing…is not merely relevant to, but is actually equivalent to, a knowledge of the (meaning) of what he writes."[37] As a result, the pragmatic nature of Kautilya's writings will be examined to demonstrate their value as practical advice given to monarchs.[38] This analysis will also establish the realist framework inherent in his theoretical guidelines,

[32] Shamsastry, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, 291.
[33] Shamsastry, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, 26; Prithwindra Mukherjee, *The Intellectual Roots of India's Freedom Struggle (1893-1918)* (Routledge, 2017).
[34] Set, "Ancient Wisdom for the Modern World," 710-714.
[35] Set, "Ancient Wisdom for the Modern World," 711-712.
[36] George Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," *The Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (March 1992): 129–42.
[37] Quentin Skinner, "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts," in *Visions of Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 75–76.
[38] Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture".

which set the foundation for India's strategic culture and identity in foreign policy. For this reason, Kautilya has been compared to Machiavelli. For example, Roger Boesche contrasted Machiavelli's *The Prince* with the *Arthashastra* and found Machiavelli's ideas to be more moderate. He also agreed rightly with Max Weber, who observed that Kautilya expressed radical Machiavellianism in its most classical manner.[39] The Skinnerian interpretation allows for comprehending that the political environment was different, during which Machiavelli and Kautilya wrote their pieces of advice to their respective monarchs. Therefore, Indians embraced Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as a political treatise just as Greeks accepted the ideas of Plato and Aristotle;[40] as Kosambi stated, "The Greeks make excellent reading; the Indian treatise worked infinitely better in practice for its own time and place."[41]

Scholars such as Michael Liebig and Dany Shoham have regarded Kautilya's perspectives on war and diplomacy as fundamental to intelligence studies and have emphasised Kautilya's significance to statecraft and diplomacy.[42] This research defines Kautilya's contribution to strategic political thinking in India, developing a school of thought to understand South Asian realism, given India's primary role in the region. Hence, Kautilya's *Mandala* Theory, the Six-Fold Policy, and the four modes of diplomacy are essential to realising the kind of diplomacy Kautilya promotes. Kautilya's views of diplomacy and foreign policy advocacy are more concerned with protecting the king's and his kingdom's interests. A

[39] Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India," 254; Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *Max Weber: Selections in Translation*, ed. W. G. Runciman, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 212–25, 220.
[40] Damodar Dharmanand Kosambi, *An Introduction to the Study of History* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1956).
[41] Kosambi, *An Introduction to the Study of History,* 141.
[42] Michael Liebig, "Statecraft and Intelligence Analysis in the Kautilya-Arthaaestra," in *Indigenous Historical Knowledge: Kautilya and His Vocabulary*, ed. Pradeep Kumar Gautam, Arvind Gupta, and Saurabh Misra (Research assistant) (Pentagon Press, 2016); Dany Shoham and Michael Liebig, "The Intelligence Dimension of Kautilyan Statecraft and Its Implications for the Present," *Journal of Intelligence History* 15, no. 2 (January 13, 2016): 119–38.

king is assumed to be either waging war or preparing to do so.[43] Hence, the king was to use the *Chaturupayas* and *Sadhgunyas* to increase power and become a world hegemon.[44]

Kautilya's ideas have been implemented by Indian leaders, establishing India's strategic identity. In *The Discovery of India*, Jawaharlal Nehru called Kautilya' the Indian Machiavelli' and a great scholar of the science of polity. [45] In 2013, Shivshankar Menon, India's National Security Advisor, highlighted the importance of understanding the *Arthashastra* to gain insight into India's statecraft and international relations.[46] Thereby proving Skinner's argument that the author's intentions in writing…is not merely relevant to, but is equivalent to, a knowledge of the (meaning) of what he writes."[47] And, Kautilya intended to mobilise the monarch towards expanding his kingdom to "conquer the world", as the time when Kautilya wrote his guidelines was one where establishing Chandragupta Maurya was important, especially as it came from Kautilya's primary intent to overthrow the entire Nanda Dynasty. Dhananda, the King of Magadha of the Nanda dynasty, had not only insulted but also removed Kautilya from his post as the monarch disapproved of Kautilya's advice when dealing with the continuous Greek invasions in northwest India.[48] Thus, the historical identity of a text aligns with the author's original intentions in composing it.[49]

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[43] Pravin Chandrasekaran, "Kautilya: Politics, Ethics and Statecraft," *Munich Personal RePEc Archive* (Harvard University / Harvard Kennedy School, May 5, 2006); K. Kamal, "Kautilya's Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences," *Journal of Defence Studies* 12, no. 3 (2018): 27–54.

[44] Kamal, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 27-54; Dany Shoham and Michael Liebig, "The Intelligence Dimension of Kautilyan Statecraft and Its Implications for the Present," 119–38.

[45] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1981), 123.

[46] Shivshankar Menon, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," Key Speech (Developing Indigenous Concepts and Vocabulary, October 8, 2013),

[47] Skinner, "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts," 75-76.

[48] Mookerji, *Chandragupta Maurya and His Times*, 28-33.

[49] Michael Goodhart, "Theory in Practice: Quentin Skinner's Hobbes, Reconsidered," *The Review of Politics* 62, no. 3 (2000): 531–62.

Subsequently, scholars have compared Kautilya with Machiavelli, as both scholars wrote works advising their kings on governance and diplomacy. Scholars who have worked to comprehend and develop India's strategic culture have considered the *Arthashastra* to be the foundational basis of India's strategic thinking. While George K. Tanham underscored the lack of Indian strategic thought,[50] scholars like WWWPidhu,[51] Rodney W. Jones,[52] Marcus Kim, Manjeet Singh Pardesi,[53] Bharat Karnad[54] and Rashed Uz Zaman[55] point out that India's strategic tradition finds its foundations in Kautilya's *Arthashastra.* Thereby reiterating Skinner's contextualisation of text, as the strategic culture of a state is shaped by its history, identity, and geopolitics in that "the *Arthashastra*, a crucial part of India's classical political heritage, constitutes the normative reservoir that underpins modern India's political identity".[56] Therefore, in the IFP, what becomes apparent is the strategic identity that the Indian state developed. State identity develops through foreign policy based on state national interest. The following chapters will lay out where Kautilya's strategic identity is present in the foreign policy decisions of selected Indian prime ministers.

Amit Acharya suggested that the Westphalian nature of theories in international relations is a fallacy because many of those theories are rooted in classical Mediterranean

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[50] George Kilpatrick Tanham, Rand Corporation, and National Defense Research Institute (U.S.), *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1992), 67-69.
[51] Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Of Oral Traditions and Ethnocentric Judgements," in *Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice*, ed. Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 174–90.
[52] Rodney W. Jones, "India's Strategic Culture" (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, October 31, 2006).
[53] Manjeet Singh Pardesi and Nanyang Technological University. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, *Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives* (2005; repr., Singapore: The Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2005), 1-63.
[54] Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2005).
[55] Zaman, "Kautilya".
[56] Kamal, "Kautilya's Arthashastra," 34.

concepts and are not conducive to non-Westphalian states.[57] Acharya also astutely pointed out that Kautilya is called 'the Indian Machiavelli', similar to what Nehru stated in his writings, even though he lived centuries before Machiavelli; Machiavelli is not called 'the Euro-Mediterranean Kautilya'.[58] Thus, this conversation helps both to comprehend how Indian strategic thinking operates today and international relations theory in South Asia, thereby contributing to its post-imperial ideology that Indian political thought by Kautilya was a strategic thought for all ages, as Kautilya's writing while being for one ruler in particular, aimed to present itself as a guidebook for a strategic world.[59] And, to this, it expounds the strategic identity that the Indian state possesses.

2.2. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and the Hindu Nationalist Identity of the Indian State

This section analyses Savarkar and the Hindutva ideology adopted and prominent in the different BJP-led governments over time. It explains Savarkar's definition of 'Hindu', the Hindutva ideology upon which Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and how the Hindutva ideology was the alternative ideology towards the Freedom National Movement. This thesis is also concerned with how the development of the doctrine gave the Hindutva nationalist identity of the Indian state a role in the BJP-led governments of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Narendra Modi (as these two prominent BJP Prime Ministers are analysed in this thesis).

[57] Amitav Acharya, "Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (April 27, 2011): 619–37.
[58] Acharya, "Dialogue and Discovery," 619-637.
[59] Zaman, "Kautilya," 99.

Vinayak Damodar Savarkar was born into a politically active family in Nasik in 1883.[60] His brother, Babarao, was an anti-British revolutionary.[61] Hence, Savarkar grew up in a family with revolutionary sentiments against the British. In 1902, Savarkar entered Ferguson College in Pune, where he participated in protests against colonial rule.[62] In 1906, Savarkar went to London to study law. While there, he was charged with conspiracy against the government, deported to India for trial, convicted and sentenced to two life terms on the Andaman Islands. While incarcerated, he wrote *Essentials of Hindutva* (1921).[63]

2.2.1. Development of the Hindu Nationalist Ideology

The *Essentials of Hindutva* presents Savarkar's ideology and the creation of a Hindu nationalist identity for India. Savarkar argued that nationalism had been present on the Indian subcontinent[64] for more than five centuries, an idea drawn from Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai, and Bipin Chandra Pal, who were part of the radical[65] wing of the Indian National Congress and called for all those who believed in the Hindu religion to come together to free India from the British. Savarkar believed that revitalising the Hindu civilisation would bring freedom from British rule.[66] Influenced by Herbert Spencer's evolutionary sociology that focused on natural law,[67] Savarkar described the natural progression of a Hindu India. Savarkar

[60] Rajnikant Puranik, Revealing Facts about India's Freedom Struggle: Notable Personalities and Interesting Timelines (Independently Published, 2017), 32.
[61] Janaki Bakhle, "Country First? Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966) and the Writing of Essentials of Hindutva," *Public Culture* 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 149–86.
[62] Bakhle, "Country first?", 150-151.
[63] Manisha Basu, "A Power over Life and Rebirth: V. D. Savarkar and the Essentials of Hindutva," in *The Rhetoric of Hindu India* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 101–32.
[64] Savarkar, *Hindutva*, 101-102.
[65] The Indian National Congress split into two factions at the Surat Session in 1907, and two groups were formed- the moderates and the radicals. The moderates believed in using prayer, petition, and plea to deal with the British, while the radicals on the other hand believed in agitations, strikes and violent outbursts.
[66] Chetan Bhatt, *Hindu Nationalism Origins, Ideologies, and Modern Myths* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2001), 78.
[67] Bakhle, "Country first?"

also followed the work of the Italian republican Guiseppe Mazzini[68] and drew from his ideas on nationalism to build his ideology of Hindu nationalism. The identity of the nation-state thus required Indian civilisation to be defined as Hindu.

As a prominent member of the radical wing of the national movement, Tilak advocated utilising Hindu culture to foster unity and resistance against the partition of Bengal in 1905.[69] However, Tilak did not endorse a Hindu India. Instead, he envisaged India as a state comprising diverse religious communities.[70] Savarkar proposed a full-fledged religious nationalism as a source of India's unity.[71] In his earlier book, *1857 Ka Swatantraya Samar* (India's War of Independence in 1857), Savarkar analysed the revolution regarding nationalism. However, he did not mention religious nationalism and supported Hindu-Muslim unity. [72] *Essentials of Hindutva* established his views on religious nationalism. The Hindutva ideology promotes three criteria for membership to the Hindu nation: territorial descent, membership in a bloodline traceable to the ancient Vedic nation, and a common culture. When these three criteria are met, the result is a common race and civilisation that are the basis of Hindutva.[73]

Savarkar's understanding of Hindutva focused on the shared history, heroes, literature, rites and rituals, ceremonies, and sacraments articulated through the 'common classic language - Sanskrit'.[74] For Hindus, India would be their fatherland and holy land; therefore, Christians and Muslims could never claim India as theirs.[75] Savarkar made it clear that Muslims and

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[68] Bhatt, *Hindu Nationalism Origins, Ideologies, and Modern Myths*; Bakhle, "Country first?", 90.
[69] Tara Chand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Publications Divisions, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1966).
[70] Thomas Blom Hansen, *The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 76.
[71] Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2012), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203147733, 58.
[72] V. D. Savarkar, *Hindutva* (1938: The Central Hindu Yuvak Sabha., 1938); Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, *1857 Ka Swatantraya Samar* (o. Verl, 1907), 10.
[73] Savarkar, *Hindutva*. 147.
[74] Savarkar, *Hindutva*. 126, 147-8.
[75] Savarkar, *Hindutva* 144.

Christians could not be regarded as Hindu 'since their adoption of a new cult, they had ceased to own Hindu *sanskriti* (civilisation) as a whole. They belong, or feel they belong, to a cultural unit different from the Hindu one'.[76] According to this argument, during the national movement, the RSS and BJP developed a belief reflected in the governments of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Narendra Modi. The Hindutva nationalist identity drove and still drives foreign policy, solidifying it as a significant conceptual framework of the Indian state.

Bakhle started a conversation on the modern intellectual history of Indian nationalism.[77] Bakhle highlights that while Savarkar acquired his understanding of nationalism from European nationalism, he derived much from Tilak and the Indian historian, philologist and essayist V.K. Rajwade, who relied on scientific methodology to explain Maratha history.[78] Savarkar used a scientific or system perspective to create and define the Hindutva ideology, drawing a roadmap to explain the connection between 'who is a Hindu' (the people) and 'what is Hindustan' (the place). Savarkar believed that 'Hindutva is not a word but a history'.[79] While the ideology of Hindutva drives Savarkar and explains the connection between being a Hindu and living in Hindustan, what needs to be understood is that Hindutva does not follow a conventional literary form.[80] In other words, it is not supported by a clear chronological narrative. However, given the political climate during which Savarkar espoused his Hindutva ideology, his writings display two important aspects of Skinnerian contextualism- the writer's intent and the text's context. This will be expounded upon further in the chapters that analyse

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[76] Savarkar, *Hindutva,*127.
[77] Bakhle, "Country first?", 156.
[78] The Maratha Empire was established by Shivaji Maharaj in the Deccan region (1627-80); the Maratha Empire was removed and defeated by the British East India Company. The end of the Maratha Empire established the anticolonial nationalist rhetoric. Deshpande, Creative Pasts, esp. chap. 5, "Region, Nation, and Maratha History" (135–44); Milind Wakankar, "System and History in Rajwade's Grammar," in *History in the Vernacular*, ed. Raziuddin Aquil and Partha Chatterjee (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2008), 209–50; Bakhle, "Country first?".
[79] Savarkar, *Hindutva,* 460.
[80] Bakhle, "Country first?", 159.

the different BJP Prime Ministers. So, Savarkar's idea of 'common blood' constructs India's contemporary race theory, where a single race produces the geography that makes the race.[81]

Sharma (2003) explains that a Hindu did not have to practice Hinduism since Hinduism was 'only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva' or Hindu-ness.[82] Hall says that, in principle, anyone who lived in British India but was not British was considered a Hindu.[83] Therefore, by Hall's logical explanation for being a Hindu, and expounded by Jaffrelot, there was a need to fulfil two criteria to be called a Hindu- firstly, you should be residing on the Indian subcontinent, and secondly, possessing the racial characteristics and culture that made up the *Sanskriti* (civilisation). It is imperative to acknowledge that, following the definition provided, individuals who meet the criteria specified, regardless of their religious affiliation or ancestry, would be considered Hindus. This includes individuals who identify as Christians, Muslims, or members of other religious communities, as well as those whose ancestors may have belonged to a different religion or who may have migrated to the region in the past.[84] Savarkar stated:

> Are you a monist—a monotheist—a pantheist—an atheist—an agnostic? Here is ample room, oh soul! Whatever thou art, to love and grow to thy fullest height and satisfaction in this temple of Temples. . . . Ye, who by race, by blood, by culture, by nationality possess almost all the essentials of Hindutva. . . . ye have only to render wholehearted love to our common Mother and recognise her not only as Pitrabhu but even as a Punyabhu and ye would be most welcome to the Hindu-fold. This is a choice which our

[81] Bakhle, "Country first?", 160-162.
[82] Jyotirmaya Sharma, *Hindutva: Exploring the Idea of Hindu Nationalism* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2003), 124.
[83] Hall Ian, *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy* (Bristol University Press, 2019), 48.
[84] Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 28-29.

> country-men and our old kith and kin, the Bohras, Khojas, Mamons, and other Mohamedan and Christian communities are free to make—a choice again which must be a choice of love.[85]

Savarkar's support of Hindu-Muslim unity during the 1857 War of Independence accompanied a dramatic change in the definition of Hindus as full citizens of India and the relegation of 'non-Hindus' to second-class status.[86] The presence of Hindu-Muslim unity as a sentiment is apparent in Savarkar's earlier writings. There was a significant shift after the establishment of his ideology of Hindutva. While Savarkar came to be known as the 'father of Hindu nationalism and Hindu unity', his writings and those of the Hindu Mahasabha became tools of the British policy of divide and rule.[87] Moreover, this ideology was the hallmark of the RSS, and BJP drives today's populist government in India. In this way, it perpetuates Britain's British divide-and-rule policy. The thesis further analyses Savarkar's Hindutva and the Hindutva nationalist identity, especially in chapter 6 on the leadership of Narendra Modi.

Although several scholars have analysed India's political thinkers affiliated with the freedom movement, there is still a need to study Savarkar's intellectual influences and contributions to the freedom movement and India's foreign policy today. There are many biographies, plays, and political analyses of his work. Still, there is a need for a more thorough understanding of his intellectual contributions to Indian nationalism as promoted through Hindutva. Furthermore, Savarkar's Hindutva ideology must be analysed with Gandhi's thought, as Savarkar presented an alternative to the Gandhian national movement. It adds to the analysis of the three identities of the Indian state and its foreign policy.

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[85] Savarkar, *Essentials of Hindutva*, 535–36.
[86] Keer, Dhananjay. *Veer Savarkar*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966.
[87] M.K. Jain (April - June 2012), *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 269-270.

2.3. Mahatma Gandhi and the Post-Colonial Identity of the Indian State

Mahatma Gandhi's contribution to the development of independent India consists of his commitment to fighting for freedom, his emphasis on tolerance and non-violence (*Ahimsa*), religious pluralism, and his insistence on poverty relief by building an Indian economy. Gandhi devised his vision for India and the world's view of India during India's struggle for independence. It is, therefore, essential to study Gandhi's influence on IFP in addition to his role in the freedom movement.

In *Makers of Indian Foreign Policy*, J. N. Dixit examines Gandhi's contributions to IFP immediately after independence. Jawaharlal Nehru, a student of Gandhi,[88] was the architect of India's foreign policy that reflected Gandhi's ideas. Nehru himself stated, "the policies and philosophy which we seek to implement are the policies and philosophy taught to us by Gandhiji."[89] It is, therefore, imperative to understand Gandhi's ideas, such as *Satyagraha* and *Ahimsa*, which introduced religion and ethics into politics.

To better understand Mohan Das Gandhi, examining the influences of India and the West on his life is necessary. Gandhi was born in 1869 to a Hindu family in Gujarat and later studied law at the Inner Temple in London. After his stay in South Africa for 21 years, Gandhi returned to India in 1914.[90] Gandhi's Western education and his time in South Africa familiarised him with the writings of Western intellectuals such as Henry Thoreau, John Ruskin, Leo Tolstoy (with whom he corresponded),[91] Sir Edwin Arnold, and Thomas Carlyle. Gandhi studied Jeremy Bentham's

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[88] Jyotindra Nath Dixit, Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha (HarperCollins Publishers India, 2004).
[89] Jawaharlal Nehru and Rustom Khurshedji Karanjia, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru. An Interview by R. K. Karanjia, Etc. [With a Portrait.]* (George Allen & Unwin, 1960), 23-25.
[90] Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (London: Granada Publishing Ltd., 1982); M. K. Gandhi, *Gandhi's Autobiography - The Story of My Experiments with the Truth*, trans. Mahadev Desai (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1948).
[91] Stuart Gray and Thomas M. Hughes, "Gandhi's Devotional Political Thought," *Philosophy East and West* 65, no. 2 (2015): 848–49.

utilitarianism and the atheism and theosophy of Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant.[92] He read Tolstoy's *The Kingdom of God is Within You* and Thoreau's *Civil Disobedience*.[93] Gandhi's vehement opposition to industrialisation and capitalism was evident in his thoughts. During the passive resistance and non-cooperation phase of the freedom struggle in the 1920s, Gandhi's *Satyagraha* was based on the idealist principles of Satya (truth), *Ahimsa* (non-violence) and *Swadeshi* ideas of boycotting British goods and buying Indian goods instead.[94]

Gandhi's *Vasihnavite* background gave him an extensive knowledge of the Hindu religious texts that later influenced his thinking. The influence of the *Bhagwad Gita* and the *Manu Smriti* were present in his philosophy and formed what Dixit calls the 'matrix from which his political ideology and campaign emerged'.[95] Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the pioneer of the Bengal Renaissance, upheld the Vedic ideals of *Vasudaika Kutumbam* (the cosmos is one family) and *Sarve Jana Sukhino Bhavantu* (happiness to everyman).[96] However, Indian nationalism was based on the objectives of Sanatana *Dharma*, and it was from this school of thought that Gandhi borrowed the values of *Satya* and *Ahimsa*.[97]

Influenced by both Western and Indian philosophers, Gandhi was able to craft his political ideology. However, the most remarkable influence on Gandhi, which Gandhi himself acknowledged in *Gokhale,* was Gopal Krishan Gokhale, who had invited Gandhi back to India from South Africa in 1914.[98] Gandhi's encounters with racial discrimination under South

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[92] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, 41; Rajmohan Gandhi, *Gandhi: The Man, His People, and the Empire* (Univ of California Press, 2008).
[93] Stuart Gray and Thomas M. Hughes. "Gandhi's Devotional Political Thought.", 848–49.
[94] M. V. Naidu, "Gandhian 'Practical-Idealism' & 'The Transitional State,'" *Peace Research* 20, no. 1 (January 1988): 24.
[95] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, 41.
[96] K. Sreeranjani Subba Rao, "Vedic Ideals and Indian Political Thought," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 68, no. 1 (March 2007): 105–14.
[97] Karan Singh, "Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Gandhi: A Triune Centenary.," *India International Centre Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (1993): 55–63.
[98] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, 45; Bjørn Hettne, "The Vitality of Gandhian Tradition," *Journal of Peace Research* 13, no. 3 (1976): 227–45.

Africa's apartheid regime gave him the chance to experiment with pacifist and nonviolent methods; in India, they produced the philosophies of *satyagraha* and passive resistance. The idea was to adopt peaceful means to persuade the opposition to stop their violence and work towards resolving the conflict fairly. This is precisely what Gandhi did through the Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920 and the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930.

The Quit India Movement of 1940, spearheaded by Gandhi, was founded on the principle of *purna swaraj* or complete independence for India, which was Gandhi's objective. The movement came as Gandhi's response to the British government's declaration of war against the Axis powers in 1939 forced India to send troops. Gandhi did not try to prevent the deployment of Indian soldiers, believing the end of the Second World War would weaken the colonial powers [99] and bring freedom to their colonies. The partition of India in 1947 was not what Gandhi wanted; he would have preferred to see a pluralist India, present in Gandhi's advice to Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel[100] to offer prime ministership of a United India to Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League and advocate of the Two-Nation Theory to create Pakistan. Gandhi advised Nehru to form a 'rational, friendly and cooperative'[101] relationship with the new country when Pakistan was created. Gandhi strongly supported the anticolonial struggles in Indonesia, Myanmar, and Africa. Nehru's anticolonial sentiments, inherited from Gandhi, are evident in his foreign policy decisions during the Cold War.

To sum up, Gandhi's intellectual contributions to IFP and the Post-Colonial identity were based upon *Ahimsa* (non-violence). As T.N. Kaul stated, "Nehru raised his voice against

[99] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, 47-48.
[100] Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister of independent India, had the support of the Congress to be the next President of the Congress in 1946, also Nehru arch competition to become the first Prime Minister of independent India. Patel is known for his major success in unifying the country after independence.
[101] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, 48.

threats to peace and sovereign equality of nations, which is in consonance with the philosophy of Gandhiji."[102]

Gandhi pushed for dispute resolution through negotiations to promote international cooperation. One factor that motivated Nehru to pursue international collaboration with Pakistan over Kashmir was his belief in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This led him to seek the assistance of the United Nations in negotiating with Pakistan. Gandhi opposed colonialism, imperialism, and all other forms of oppression. India supported all national independence movements. Unity is crucial in pluralist societies, and tolerance is the foremost factor in achieving unity. Nehru advocated for a non-alignment policy during the Cold War, which entailed not aligning with either the United States of America or the Soviet Union, and this idea appealed to countries like Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia that were recently liberated from colonialism. The policy aimed to promote global peace and security and oppose imperialism and racism while striving for neutrality in the face of the two superpowers.[103] Therefore, Gandhi provided the substance for Nehru's *Panchsheel*[104] (the five principles for peaceful coexistence with China), the non-alignment policy, and the non-alignment movement.

2.4. School of Ideas in Indian Foreign Policy

The analysis of the ideas espoused by Kautilya, Savarkar and Gandhi towards IFP enables the development of three distinct identities of the Indian state. According to Priya Chacko, comprehending Indian civilisation is crucial for establishing India's post-colonial identity and any study of the intellectual influences behind IFP.[105] Chacko

[102] Triloki Nath Kaul, *Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 2.
[103] Kumar, p. 92.
[104] The concept of *Panchsheel* is explained in the chapter on Nehru and his foreign policy. [you don't need this note.]
[105] Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2012).

borrows Romila Thapar's grouping of Orientalists, Utilitarians, and Romantics[106] to identify three streams of analysis: Post-colonialism through the thought of Nehru, Indian nationalism through Gandhi's, and Hindu nationalism through Savarkar's.[107] Similarly, Aparna Pande uses Russell Mead's classification of USA leadership into four schools of thought – Hamiltonians (concerned with markets and business opportunities), Wilsonians (universal promotion of US values), Jeffersons (protecting US values from the federal government), and Jacksonians (carryout quick actions benevolently towards surrendered enemies). Similarly, Aparna Pande uses this classification to draw up four trends in IFP: imperial, messianic idealism, realism, and isolationism. In keeping with the identities created by Priya Chacko and Aparna Pande, this chapter in the last section demonstrates the thematic divisions that emerge.

I investigate the contributions of these three political thinkers to the creation of India's state identity and foreign policy decision-making. Kautilya laid the groundwork for strategic thinking in ancient India, establishing today's relevant strategic identity. This will be demonstrated in the thesis through the foreign policy choices made towards Pakistan, China, and India's nuclear program, primarily under the leadership of Nehru's successors- Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi in the period till the end of the Cold War. Then, the prime ministership of Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh will also display the strategic identity posited primarily on their foreign policy choices.

Savarkar's ideas on *Hindutva* defined the Hindu national identity, which is present in the foreign policy choices of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Narendra Modi. The BJP-led governments, when analysed, portray Hindu nationalist identity, which allows for

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[106] Romila Thapar, "Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity," *Modern Asian Studies* 23, no. 2 (1989): 209–31.

[107] Priya Chacko, "The Search for a Scientific Temper: Nuclear Technology and the Ambivalence of India's Postcolonial Modernity," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 1 (July 19, 2010): 185–208.

understanding the pragmatic, strategic, yet Hindutva approach present in the changes to foreign policy that their governments bring about.

The Gandhian principles of *Ahimsa* and independence are at the heart of India's post-colonial identity. The principles are strongly present in the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and are explained in detail in the next chapter. The primary reason for the Gandhian principles in Nehru's administration was the mentorship Nehru received from Gandhi during the national freedom movement in India. The commonality of ideas for independence resonated through the sharing of principles Nehru incorporated in his foreign policy, because of which the initial years of India's foreign policy displayed pacifist dealing by Nehru towards Pakistan and China until the need for war could not be avoided.

Therefore, through this chapter, the three schools of ideas emerge – Strategic Identity, Hindu Nationalist Identity, and Post-Colonial identity. These three identities are analysed throughout this thesis by the different Prime Ministers, and this is done through the Post-Imperial Ideology (PII) as it enables the study to unearth the presence of these identities in foreign policy choices. This chapter demonstrates how ancient India's political philosophers and the national movement under British colonial rule shaped the identity of the Indian state and, thus, its foreign policy through thematic representation from independence to the present.

Conclusion

The chapter examines the intellectual foundations that form the basis of the Indian state identity. Kautilya's strategic vision has been a significant force behind India's foreign policy approach. The incorporation of Kautilya's strategic vision into India's foreign policy approach reflects the recognition of the importance of a pragmatic and *realpolitik* stance. This approach allows India to adapt to changing global dynamics and prioritise its national interests. Savarkar's concept of Hindutva has shaped the Hindu nationalist identity, particularly evident in Modi's foreign policy. The Hindutva nationalist identity is present in BJP governments,

which have sought to promote India's image and interests in a manner aligned with their ideological framework. Gandhi has also contributed to India's post-colonial identity and influenced its foreign policy outlook. As present strongly in Nehru's foreign policy choices, Gandhi's principles of non-violence, peaceful coexistence, and moral diplomacy have guided India's approach to international relations. Overall, the intellectual foundations of India's foreign policy reflect a complex blend of strategic realism, Hindutva nationalism, and post-colonial ideals. Therefore, India's foreign policy encompasses various perspectives and priorities by incorporating Kautilya's strategic vision, Savarkar's Hindutva concept, and Gandhian non-violence principles. These sources shed light on the evolution of India's foreign policy and the various influences that have shaped its direction.

The themes in the IFP demonstrate that the Indian state identity is shaped by a desire to maintain territorial integrity and strategic autonomy, a vital driver of the country's foreign policy goals. The analysis of the prime ministers provides further support for the argument that state identity and foreign policy are inextricably linked and that intellectual influences on leaders play a critical role in the development of state identity.

Chapter 3: Jawaharlal Nehru and Indian Foreign Policy

This chapter on Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, draws attention to two distinct endeavours. The first section of the chapter, through the Skinnerian method, examines the factors of Nehru's personal life to comprehend the development of his ideology. It looks at his educational and social background and his mentorship from his biological father, Motilal Nehru, and his political mentor, Mahatma Gandhi, who prepared Nehru to lead an independent India. The analysis of Gandhi's influence on Nehru illuminates the development of the Indian state's post-colonial identity. The growth of the Nehruvian idealist philosophy may be understood by examining Nehru's foreign policy decisions. Using post-imperial ideology (PII), this is accomplished in the second section. The goal is to demonstrate the impact and basis of Nehruvian concepts in Indian foreign policy and expound the agency's approach to foreign policy analysis by studying ideas that affect leaders making foreign policy decisions.

This study will identify the factors that influenced Nehru's decisions and examine the consequences of those choices. The historical Skinnerian interpretation approach allows for determining the influence of several factors, including his family background and education, India under colonial rule, and the international situation during his lifetime. This allows us to examine themes that have not been covered but are crucial to understanding why and how ideologies were created and embedded in IFP. What was the role of these ideologies in creating a foreign policy framework? Are there new factors? As prime minister from 1947 until he died in 1964, Nehru constructed a normative and institutional framework[1] for India's post-colonial identity based on Gandhian principles. Accordingly, it displays how the Nehruvian leadership

[1] Sunil Purushotham, "World History in the Atomic Age: Past, Present and Future in the Political Thought of Jawaharlal Nehru," *Modern Intellectual History* 14, no. 3 (March 16, 2016): 838.

changed the outlook for independent India, which differed from British India. Nehru's ideological evolution during his seventeen-year tenure as prime minister is deduced from an analysis of his childhood, especially his father's influence. He was educated at Harrow and Cambridge.[2] As a young politician and future national leader, he was mentored by Gandhi and his father.

It is essential to apply Skinner's method and Manjari Chatterjee Miller's concept of post-imperial ideology (PII) to developing Jawaharlal Nehru's thoughts and actions pertaining to IFP.[3] The PII describes the traumatic effect of colonialism on leadership, explaining choices made and directions taken when making foreign policy decisions. Thus, PII allows for the development of an understanding of colonialism's impact and continuity at the subconscious level of IFP choices. Examining Nehru's childhood and education is essential to analysing his intellectual impact.

3.1. Influences: Motilal Nehru, Western Education and Gandhi

On 14 November 1889, Nehru was born into a Kashmiri Brahman family in Allahabad, India.[4] Nehru's father was Motilal Nehru, and his mother was Swarup Rani. Nehru was their only child until his two sisters, Vijay Laxmi and Krishna Hutheesing, were born after 1900.[5] Nehru's father both nurtured and mentored him. Their dynamic would be mirrored in Nehru's relationship with his daughter, Indira, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

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[2]Michael Brecher, Vengalil Krishnan, and Krishna Menon, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World* (United Kingdom: Praeger, 1968).
[3] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, "Exploring Historical Memory and Indian Foreign Policy," in *New Directions in India's Foreign Policy*, ed. Harsh V Pant (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 67–84.
[4] Walter Russell Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966); Rafiq Zakaria, *A Study of Nehru* (The Times of India, 1960), 349.
[5]Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*.

Walter Crocker's biography of Nehru contains an entire chapter on the social and political environment in which Nehru was born and raised. Nehru was born around the time that Indian nationalism emerged. Crocker states that 'Hinduism gave them some sense of unity, but not enough to triumph over regional and linguistic and caste loyalties and prejudices'[6]; therefore, the spread of western education in colonial India encouraged a sense of nationalism to take root. Learning about the French and American revolutions inspired India's future political thinkers to demand self-determination. However, as a loyal supporter of the British crown, Motilal Nehru had confidence in the colonial plan for British India. He wanted his children to reap all the benefits that the West had to offer, giving them a privileged Western upbringing and a Western education from British tutors.[7] However, when the national movement gained traction, Motilal Nehru joined the Indian National Congress Party and worked alongside Gandhi and Nehru in the struggle for freedom.

Nehru's Irish tutor, Ferdinand T. Brooks, was a theosophist and a follower of Annie Besant, the founder of the Theosophical Society.[8] Brooks introduced Nehru to the sciences and to Theosophy, and perhaps even to anti-imperialism.[9] Brooks encouraged Nehru to study Hindu mythology.[10] Notably, Annie Besant introduced the 13-year-old Jawaharlal Nehru to the Theosophical Society. Brooks impressed upon Nehru the importance of scientific methodology, which became a cornerstone of Nehru's political philosophy.[11] However, Brooks stopped teaching Nehru as his father, Motilal Nehru, sent him to Harrow in 1905, where he struggled to fit in.[12] At the time, the Boer War (1899-1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1905)

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[6]Crocker, *Nehru : A Contemporary's Estimate*. 46.
[7]Crocker, *Nehru : A Contemporary's Estimate*.
[8] Zakria, *A Study of Nehru*; Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*.
[9] Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*.
[10] Zakria, *A Study of Nehru*
[11]L. S. Rathore, "Special Issue on the Indian National Congress: A Century in Perspective," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (1985): 451–73.
[12] Zakria, *A Study of Nehru*. 6. Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*. 61.

nurtured the spirit of nationalism in the works of thinkers like G.B Shaw, H.G Wells and, prominently, *Asia and Europe* by Meredith, Lowse Dickinson and Townsend.[13] Therefore, Nehru's education in the natural sciences gave him an appreciation of the scientific approach, which he incorporated into his political ideology. This training was later apparent in Nehru's non-alignment policy and his *Panchsheel* with China.

During his two years at Harrow, Nehru acquired a sense of Indian nationalism.[14] Reading about Garibaldi influenced his desire to emancipate India. As he wrote in his autobiography, "Visions of similar deeds in India came before me, of a gallant fighter for freedom, and in my mind, India and Italy got strangely mixed together".[15]

Two years after his time at Harrow, in 1907, Nehru went to Trinity College, Cambridge, the training ground for British prime ministers.[16] At Cambridge, Nehru seemed to find his bearings and love for literature and politics while he studied the sciences.[17] Nehru read Nietzsche, Havelock Ellis, George Bernard Shaw, Oscar Wilde, and Walter Patter during his two years at Cambridge. These writers wrote about themes concerning society and the necessity to change the status quo.[18] At Cambridge, Nehru oscillated between Fabianism and Marxism, as Parihar put it.[19] Based on Nehru's political thinking, what can be derived is that he did not imbibe the Fabianism's endorsement of violence into his ideology. He preferred the long democratic process encouraged by humanist liberal thought. Marx's theory of economic determinism also shaped Nehru's ideological framework.[20]

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[13] R.R. Parihar, (1962). Western Influence on Nehru's Political Ideas. *Indian Journal of Political Science*, *23*(1/4), p. 84.
[14] Brecher, Krishnan, *India and world politics: Krishna Menon's view of the world*. .
[15]Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobiography* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1989).266.
[16] Zakria, *A Study of Nehru,* 7.
[17]Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*, 61.
[18] Rathore, "Special Issue on the Indian National Congress," 454.
[19] Parihar, "Western Influence on Nehru's Political Ideas."
[20] R.R. Parihar, (1962). Western Influence on Nehru's Political Ideas. *Indian Journal of Political Science*, *23*(1/4), 86.

Nehru's affinity for socialist democracy, Fabianism, and Marxism was of utmost importance in constructing his notion of idealism and in the implementation of socialist policies in post-colonial India. He also spoke openly about the profound influence of Marx and Lenin on his perception of history.[21] Consequently, Nehru recognised the importance of comprehending the past and present in relation to the future. Moreover, he found the Marxist-Leninist critiques of capitalism and imperialism essential in discussing world-historical change, particularly decolonisation and national liberation.[22] In Nehru's political ideology, Marxism remained a vital reference point, even after he abandoned communism in the 1930s. His historical writings, public statements, and official correspondence reflect his understanding of himself and his political-historical position, which is strongly critical of Marxism. In 1958, Nehru discusses three themes in an essay, 'The Basic Approach', published in the *Economic Review* in 1958: economic determinism, political primacy, and scientific and ideological aspects of Marxism.[23] Hegel also influenced Nehru's views on history.

In *The Discovery of India* (1960)[24] and *Glimpses of World History,* Nehru demonstrated the West's role as a primary driver of world history. Nehru, influenced by Hegel, spoke of the spirit of the age (Zeitgeist) as it moved from its original position of the East to the West.[25] Nehru observed that India had too much history in attempts to create new ideas of Indian

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[21] C. A. Bayly, "The Ends of Liberalism and the Political Thought of Nehru's India," *Modern Intellectual History* 12, no. 3 (January 23, 2015): 605–26, https://doi.org/10.1017/s1479244314000754.

[22] Purushotham, "World History in the Atomic Age," 837-867.

[23]Jawahar Lal Nehru, "The Basic Approach," *A.I.C.C. Economic Review: Fortnightly Journal of the Economic & Political Research Department of the All India Congress Committee* 10, no. 8–9 (1958): 2–6. Also reprinted in a slightly altered form in Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, vol. 4, September 1957–April 1963 (Delhi, 1964), 114–23.

[24]Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (London, Meridian, 1960; first published 1946), Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History: Being Further Letters to His Daughter, Written in Prison, and Containing a Rambling Account of History for Young People* (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1982).

[25] Nehru, *The Discovery of India*. 490–91.; Purushotham, "World History in the Atomic Age," 847.

civilisation and that the past must necessarily have a relationship with the future, but, importantly, a recognition that this relationship was uncertain, unstable and incomprehensible.[26] Despite this opinion, Nehru's leadership as prime minister, discussed in the next section, displays the incorporation of new ideas and efforts to change foreign relations and the daily governance of the newly independent Indian state.

Nehru moved to study at the Inner Temple after his time at Cambridge, where he spent two years studying for the Bar before returning to India in 1912 and joining his father's firm.[27] By then, the Indian National Congress (INC) had split into moderates and radical wings. Nehru's father and Gandhi were moderates.[28] In 1919, when Gandhi took over leadership of the Congress and the nationalist movement, the younger Nehru joined the nationalist movement. Therefore, the ideas Nehru read about as a student influenced his belief system and the development of the ideologies he espoused as prime minister of India, which are best analysed through his writings, speeches, and foreign policy choices.

3.1a Nehru's Return to India

Nehru returned to India in 1912 as a complete Englishman in his thinking and way of life. He wrote about his first permanent impression of England:

> "Personally, I owe too much to England in my mental make-up ever to feel wholly alien to her. And do what I will, I cannot get rid of the habits of mind, and the standards and ways of judging other countries as well as life generally, which I acquired at school and college in England."[29]

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[26] Purushotham, "World History in the Atomic Age,"
[27] Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*. 61. Zakria, *A Study of Nehru*. 7.
[28] Ramachandra Guha, "Jawaharlal Nehru: A Romantic in Politics," in *Makers of Modern Asia*, ed. Ramachandra Guha (Harvard University Press, 2014), 117–46,
[29] Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, 266.

In this statement, Nehru acknowledges the influence of Western culture in his life, education, and lifestyle, which enabled him to see himself as an English gentleman. There were two other instances where Nehru openly spoke about his Western inheritance of thought and mannerisms- at his second trial in Allahabad in 1922,[30] Nehru stated that he 'had inherited most of the prejudices of Harrow and Cambridge' and 'looked upon the world almost from an Englishman's standpoint.'[31] In his writings on Nehru's political ideas, L.S. Rathore quoted Ganesh Prasad, who stated that Nehru was 'a bourgeois humanist liberal and not an Indian liberal.'[32] This is true for Nehru, who considered himself a mix of the East and West but was 'out of place everywhere, at home nowhere.'[33]

In an address at the 1955 Cambridge Union, Nehru said that he found it easier to travel to England 'because a part of me, a fairly important part of me, has been made by England, by Cambridge.'[34] Nehru also instilled similar beliefs in his daughter. In his letters to Indira, Nehru introduced her to world history, philosophy, and his worldview. This will be addressed in the chapter on Indira Gandhi, India's first female Prime Minister who succeeded her father.

Consequently, examining Nehru's educational background offers valuable insights into the various ideas that influenced his political thinking and shaped his approach to foreign policy decision-making. This will be further explored in the second part of this chapter. It is important to note that Nehru's affinity for Western ideas can be attributed to his father's loyalty to British values. Despite his Western education, Nehru was a central figure in India's struggle for independence. He joined Indian clubs and societies in London that discussed the country's

[30] The Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920 led by Gandhi resulted in the imprisonment of the participants of the movement, where Gandhi and Nehru were imprisoned on charges of sedition, and this statement was made by Nehru at the Trial held at the Allahabad Court.
[31] Ram Gopal, *Trials of Jawaharlal Nehru* (Michigan: Book Centre, 1962). 14.
[32] Rathore, "Special Issue on the Indian National Congress," 455.
[33] Nehru, *The Discovery of India,* 268.
[34] Manchester Guardian, February 1955, quoted in Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). 31.

plight under colonial rule and the desire for emancipation. [35] Hence, the development of Nehru's outlook towards the world and the creation of the post-colonial identity of the Indian state, through the Skinnerian contextualisation, brings to the forefront how a political thinker's social surroundings influence the germination of ideas. And, to add to the post-colonial identity Nehru formulated, the motivations are designed to change the image of the Indian state, which will be expanded upon in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

The following section will examine Gandhi's influence on Nehru's political career. It will then discuss Nehru's idealism and socialism to understand his decision-making. This can be achieved by analysing the prime minister's decisions that shaped India's strategic and foreign policies. The core attributes of Nehruvian ideology, such as secularism, centralised economic planning, non-alignment, and statist socialism, reveal a preoccupation with balancing the challenge of historical transformation with the demands of the past, present, and future.

3.1b The Influence of Gandhi on Nehru

Nehru's father, Motilal, raised Nehru to be Westernised. He wanted his son to enjoy the privileges associated with British influence. Consequently, Motilal's endorsement of Western education and the West itself enabled his son to contemplate India's liberation from colonialism. In addition to the influence exerted by his father during his formative years and schooling, Nehru's engagement in Indian politics is attributable to Gandhi, which eventually shaped him into the inaugural Prime Minister of India. This section will now delve into Mahatma Gandhi's mentoring of Nehru, which influenced the building of the post-colonial identity of independent India.

[35] Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography.*

Nehru returned to India in 1912 and entered his father's law practice in Allahabad.[36] Nehru' met Mohandas Gandhi in 1916. Nehru was impressed by Gandhi's tireless activism against apartheid in South Africa.[37] Although he did not enjoy practising law, Nehru worked for his father, while he increased his political participation until 1918 when he became the Secretary of the Home Rule League.[38] Motilal was surprised by his son's shift in career and was even more taken aback when Nehru became the President of the Kisan Sabha (Farmers Movement) in 1918.[39] In 1919, Nehru joined the Satyagraha Movement that Gandhi had begun against the Rowlatt Act of 1919.[40] In this movement, Nehru encountered peasants for the first time and learned of their plight. Motilal encouraged his involvement in the movement, but he did not identify with it himself.[41] After the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy in 1919,[42] Motilal began to participate in the national freedom movement, particularly following the appointment of Gandhi as its President.[43]

Nehru described Gandhi as a 'powerful and revolutionary personality' who could convince even the stubborn Motilal to join the freedom movement and acknowledge the harm that the British rule had caused.[44] Nehru also spoke of Gandhi's persuasive ways through the Indian National Congress's policy of appeasement to ensure he got his way through his strategy

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[36] Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*; Zakaria, *A Study of Nehru*
[37] Rathore, "Special Issue on the Indian National Congress," 465.
[38] Zakaria, *A Study of Nehru.* The Home Rule League was the moderate movement founded by Mrs Annie Besant in 1916, designed to a similar movement in Ireland, the Home Rule League aimed to achieve self-rule from the British Indian government.
[39] Zakaria, *A Study of Nehru.* 11.
[40] Guha, "Jawaharlal Nehru: A Romantic in Politics."
[41] Zakaria, *A Study of Nehru.*12.
[42] The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre was an incident where British troops fired a large crowd of unarmed Indians at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, killing hundreds of people. This left a permanent scare on Indo-British relations and was the prelude of Gandhi's total commitment towards gaining Purna Swaraj (complete independence) from the British.
[43]Zakaria, *A Study of Nehru.*
[44] Jawaharlal Nehru and Rustom Khurshedji Karanjia, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru. An Interview by R. K. Karanjia, Etc. [With a Portrait.]* (George Allen & Unwin, 1960), 19

of 'winning over opposition'[45] among the masses and even the British Empire. Nehru acknowledged their disagreements but always accentuated their shared commitment to India's independence.[46] Nehru described Gandhi as:

> 'Much more than the nationalist, pure and simple and atavistic, as you call him. He was a great man and a mighty leader. He had a deep social conscience, not in the socialist or class-struggle sense, but as reflected in the almost continuous struggle he waged against inequality for the underdog, the Harijans, and the peasantry, for example.'[47]

The Gandhi-Nehru relationship exemplifies an effective mentoring relationship, as Gandhi mentored Nehru and helped to shape his ideas and ideologies. This is evident in their shared goal of achieving independence from the British Empire. However, despite their shared objectives, instances of disagreement did arise between the two, such as during the 1921 Non-Cooperation Movement (NCM), where Nehru played a prominent role under the guidance of Gandhi. Nehru agreed that:

> '…England holds India in bondage because Indians cooperate with the Englishmen and thereby strengthen British rule. Withdraw that cooperation and the fabric of foreign rule collapses.'[48]

[45] Nehru and Karanjia, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru*, 20.
[46] Brecher, Menon, and Krishnan, *India, and World Politics.*
[47] Nehru and Karanjia, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru*, 21.
[48] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Before and After Independence* (Indian Printing Works, 1952), 39.

However, Nehru was displeased with Gandhi's policy of non-violence after the Chauri-Chaura incident in 1922.[49] In Nehru's estimation, Gandhi's Satyagraha was morally and ethically appealing. Although Nehru did not consider *Ahimsa* (non-violence) absolute, he came to believe it was the right policy for India at the time.[50] The violence of the Chauri-Chaura incident resulted in the imprisonment of Nehru and the radicals in the Indian National Congress who carried out the violence. So, Gandhi terminated the Non-Cooperation Movement owing to a shift in the movement's principles. While Nehru took a more assertive stance against the British at first, later, he embraced the philosophy of *Ahimsa*,[51] as evidenced by his pacifist approach to Pakistan and China during the early stages of their diplomatic relations, as well as his adoption of a realpolitik strategy in the 1960s.

Despite their differences over the NCM and India's future economic path, Gandhi saw Nehru as his political heir.[52] However, the Congress recognised Vallabhbhai Patel as the mastermind behind the unification and integration of the Indian Republic. He was nominated for the presidency of the Congress, which positioned him to become prime minister.[53] At the April 1946 party election, all ballots were cast for Patel, indicating that Nehru was not the party's choice for the leadership of Independent India. However, Gandhi convinced Patel to withdraw his bid and support Nehru. Gandhi's argument was based on the year's significance for India because the President of the Congress at the time was expected to be the country's first prime minister. If Nehru were chosen, it would demonstrate that the Congress Party aimed to represent and unite individuals of all ages, social strata, and religious affiliations, especially

[49]The Chauri Chaura incident occurred on February 4, 1922, in Chauri Chaura, India, during Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent civil disobedience movement. After several demonstrators set a police station on fire, Gandhi suspended the Non-Cooperation Movement.
[50] Rathore, "Special Issue on the Indian National Congress," 456-457.
[51] Rathore, *Political Ideas of Jawaharlal Nehru: Some Reflections,* 555.
[52] Guha, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Romantic in Politics*,124.
[53] Dogra. *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*.

since Nehru belonged to the younger generation in contrast to Vallabhbhai Patel who was fifteen years older than Nehru.[54]

A prominent indication of Gandhi's influence on Nehru was that he personally mourned Gandhi's assassination in 1948 and often mentioned him in his speeches. Nehru honoured Gandhi's contributions to India and acknowledged the nation's grievous loss in his radio address for the national broadcast on the day of Gandhi's assassination from All India Radio on 30 January 1948:

> '…The light has gone out, I said, and yet I was wrong. For the light that shone in this country was no ordinary light. The light that has illumined this country for these many years will illumine this country for many more years, and a thousand years later, that light will be seen in this country, and the world will see it, giving solace to innumerable hearts. For that light represented something more than the immediate past; it represented the living, the eternal truths, reminding us of the right path, drawing us from error, taking this ancient country to freedom.'[55]

Thus, Nehru called Gandhi the 'light' and 'father of our nation',[56] whose life was of 'supreme value to humanity'.[57] Nehru described Gandhi as a 'great internationalist',[58] and

[54] Guha, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Romantic in Politics,* 124.
[55] Nehru's Speech at Gandhi's funeral, 30th January 1948; Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961).
[56] Nehru Speech, 30 January 1948.
[57] 2nd February 1948, Gazette Extraordinary where Nehru presented two resolutions; Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961).
[58] Broadcasted from Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum & Library (NMML) (All India Radio, February 14, 1948).

aspired to take an 'internationalist' approach to world affairs.[59] Subsequently, the incorporation of Gandhian thoughts into his worldview is examined in the following section.

After Gandhi's death, Nehru often regretted not being able to 'run to him for counsel'[60] or 'run to him for advice'.[61] To him, Gandhi was the light in a dark tunnel. Gandhi's enduring influence on Nehru is apparent in Nehru's governance of India and his development of its foreign policy strategy:

> 'It is a truism of history that no great king of a country has been followed by an equally able son, no great leader of a nation has left a worthy disciple to fulfil his ideals. Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander the Great afford an exception to this in the past while the case of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru is another in recent times.'[62]

In summary, Motilal Nehru, the father of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Westernisation of Nehru is largely responsible for the skills Nehru used to challenge and guide a newly independent India during the Cold War. Furthermore, looking at Gandhi's influence on Nehru's political life, Gandhi encouraged Nehru's work in the Indian National Congress and mentored him in leading India. The impact of a paternal figure and a political guide produced a robust political leader. The following section analyses Prime Minister Nehru's handling of foreign policy challenges and his application of Western and Gandhian principles.

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[59] Kanti P. Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa, eds., *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases*, 1st ed. (Routledge India, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315733975.
[60]Nehru Memorial Museum & Library (NMML) (All India Radio, February 14, 1948).
[61] Nehru's Speech at Gandhi's funeral, 30th January 1948; Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961).
[62] Jawaharlal Nehru and K.T. Narasimha Char, *The Quintessence of Nehru. Selected and with Introd. by K.T. Narasimha Char* (Allen & Unwin, 1961). 31.

3.2. Nehru's Ideology and Indian Foreign Policy Choices

Nehru's seventeen years as prime minister shed light on his ideological mix of idealism,[63] realism,[64] liberalism, empiricism[65] and his support for socialist economic development for India. This section examines Nehru's foreign policy decisions to study the Western and Gandhian ideals that would shape his decisions as prime minister. Closely examining India's foreign policy under Nehru demonstrates a striking balance of idealism and realism. To what extent did India's colonial past influence Nehru's foreign policy decisions?

This section analyses Nehru's prime minister role, non-alignment policy, and actions regarding Pakistan, China, and nuclear energy. The PII will be applied to comprehend the changes that Nehru brought to India's foreign policy and the creation of its post-colonial identity.

3.2a Nehru as Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru became the prime minister of India in 1947. Krishna Menon, Nehru's confidant, and close friend, worked alongside him from 1947 to 1962. Menon played a role in several of Nehru's foreign policy initiatives.[66] It is vital to mention Krishna Menon and his contributions to Nehru's tenure. Krishna Menon, a future adviser to Nehru, was initiated into the Theosophical Society in Madras a few years after Nehru joined. However, Nehru and Menon first met in London in the late 1920s while Menon was studying under Harold Laski at the London School of Economics.[67] Their similar British education led them to agree on most

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[63] B. R. Nanda, "Nehru and Non-Alignment," in *Jawaharlal Nehru* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 222–49.

[64] Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyay, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities* (Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1984), 290-291.

[65] Rathore, "Special Issue on The Indian National Congress: A Century in Perspective," 451-473.

[66]Brecher, Krishnan, and Menon, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*, 6-7.

[67]Jyotindra Nath Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha* (HarperCollins Publishers India, 2004), 152; Paul M. McGarr, *The Cold War in South*

matters of foreign policy.[68] Nehru also turned to Minister of Home Affairs Sardar Vallabhai Patel and Minister of Education Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, especially when dealing with the Arab world.[69] Two diplomats also worked closely with Nehru: KM Panikkar and Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai.[70] The newly independent India was led by Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first prime minister, who was also responsible for establishing India's customary role in foreign policymaking[71] whose ideas and policies popularly known as 'Nehruvian' remained unchanged until the 1990s.

Looking at the Non-alignment Policy, Indo-Pak relations, Sino-Indo relations and India's dealing with nuclear energy during Nehru's time as PM is vital to comprehend foreign policy decisions through PII.

An analysis of Nehru's decisions reveals the conceptual influences shaping his foreign policy approach. Applying the PII helps demonstrate how Nehru navigated challenges during his tenure. Most importantly, PII's dual principles of maximising territory and maximising status are assessed through the foreign policy choices towards Pakistan, China, and nuclear power.

The Cold War began two years before India emerged from the shackles of two centuries of colonial rule. Until India gained independence, the INC leaders opined that there were no significant external military threats to India. Furthermore, the only security risk was India being drawn into the conflicts of other nations. This fear of choosing between the USA and the USSR

Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 240.

[68] Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*; Brecher, Krishnan, and Menon, *India and World Politics*; Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*.

[69]Sumit Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy (Revised Edition): Oxford India Short Introductions* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2019), 21-22.

[70] Ganguly. *Indian Foreign Policy*. 22.

[71] A. P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period* (Delhi : Macmillan Company of India, 1976).

and the possibility of being subordinated again to Western powers drew Nehru to the 'Non-alignment Policy' (NAP), which will be analysed in the following section.

3.2b Non-alignment Policy

There are the dominant themes of *Panchsheel*, non-alignment, anti-colonialism, and institutionalism in Nehru's foreign policy,[72] and these themes will be discussed in Nehru's foreign policy choices as prime minister. Nehru's first foreign policy initiative was his non-alignment policy (NAP), which allowed India to keep itself at a distance from both ideological power blocs. When analysing the historical political environment under which Nehru decided to adopt NAP, Shyam Saran,[73] in *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century* and Aparna Pande, in *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy,* analysed the circumstances that the newly independent India faced and concluded that it was unprepared to take a side in the Cold War. Nehru's fear of sacrificing India's freshly acquired autonomy to either superpower blocs led to his policy of non-alignment. The two centuries of colonialism is India's most compelling reason to protect its territorial autonomy.[74] This forms the analysis provided by PII, which defends the maximisation of territorial sovereignty.[75]

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[72]Raja Qaiser Ahmed, *Pakistan Factor, and the Competing Perspectives in India: Party Centric View* (Springer Nature, 2021), 37-51.

[73] Former diplomat who played an important role in the formation and execution of IFP.

[74] Shyam Saran, *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century* (Juggernaut Books, 2017); Aparna Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy* (HarperCollins, 2017).

[75] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China* (Stanford University Press, 2013), 1–6.

The non-alignment policy is defined in Nehru's first speech on All India Radio on 7 September 1946:

> 'Keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars, and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale.'[76]

Non-alignment was a moral and practical imperative for Nehru.[77] It protected Indian territory from foreign intervention, thus preserving India's independence. The NAP was vastly different from neutrality,[78] which means not joining any side, as Switzerland and Sweden did during the world wars.[79] Non-alignment, in contrast, means not joining either bloc but enabling India to get whatever support it needed from the U.S. and the Soviet Union while allowing India to speak out against any state.[80] Nehru refused to join the Commonwealth in the early days of independence, despite Krishna Menon's optimistic advocacy; it was Nehru's fear that history would repeat itself and force India back into a subordinate role.[81] While this displays Nehru's desire to keep the British Empire at bay, the apprehension of subordination through alignment with either power bloc in the Cold War led Nehru to non-alignment. In this way, the trauma of colonial rule contributed to India's understanding of autonomy. What is also apparent is that post-independent policymakers were mindful of the colonial experience. So, the NAP

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[76] All India speech broadcast, 7th September 1946; Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), vol. 1, 2.
[77] Guha, "*Jawharlala Nehru*," 135
[78] Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*, 88; Pande, *From Chanakya to* Modi, 8; Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy," *India Review* 8, no. 1 (February 10, 2009): 4–19.
[79] Nanda, "Nehru and Non-Alignment,", 229.
[80] Shivshankar Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present* (Brookings Institution Press, 2021), 414.
[81] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, 11.

was India's way of 'keeping the Cold War out of South Asia.'[82] Allowing India to be in a position where her territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy are protected, synchronous to PII's maximising territory and maximising status, would not bring India any closer to subordination by any Western power through the application of PII, which emphasises memory as a continuous process that links the past and the present.[83]

Nehru played a significant role in India's national struggle for independence, and his knowledge of Gandhi's principle of *Ahimsa* influenced his preference for a pacifist approach to global affairs. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, India prioritised stability in its domestic economic, social, and political environment before engaging with external actors, thereby safeguarding its strategic autonomy. As Parihar has rightly pointed out, '…political ideas do not and cannot evolve in a social vacuum. They are inspired by and can germinate, sprout and blossom generally in the socioeconomic soil of a given epoch of human history.'[84] Thus, Nehru's non-alignment policy reflects the culmination of the Fabian and Marxist philosophies he learned as a student at Harrow and Cambridge.

Nehru's political philosophy explains his understanding of how 'time' impacts the past, present and future.[85] Nehruvian philosophy of secularism, centralised economic planning, nonalignment and statist socialism present the need for addressing and mediating the past, present and future,[86] thereby displaying the influences exerted by the past and the demands of the unforeseen future on the present.[87] His political philosophy reflects the impact of colonialism on his decisions during his time in office, decisions that continued to shape Indian

[82] Pande, *From Chanakya to* Modi, 8.
[83] Chatterjee-Miller, "Exploring Historical Memory," 67–84.
[84] Parihar, "Western Influence on Nehru's Political Ideas."
[85] C.A.Bayly, "The Ends of Liberalism and the Political Thought of Nehru's India," *Modern Intellectual History* (2015), 605–26.
[86] Bayly, "The Ends of Liberalism," 605–26.
[87] Purushotham, "World History in the Atomic Age," 839.

foreign policy even decades after his death. This is apparent in Nehru's adoption of the *Panchsheel* with Pakistan and his Pakistan policy, especially in the 1962 War.

Menon, who coined the term 'non-alignment', gave it a positive connotation.[88] Nehru's idealism shone through the NAP as it helped focus on catering to India's 'national interest' of 'territorial autonomy' as a newly independent nation. The NAP also reflected Nehru's pacifist ideals; being non-aligned encouraged India not to put all its foreign policy ambitions into the same basket. While Nehru's idealism was practised through NAP, he did state that NAP found roots in Indian history, where Emperor Asoka adopted a similar policy.[89] Hall describes it as a mixture of 'idealistic hope with realistic calculations'[90] about the inherent risks of siding with either of the power blocs. Nehru promoted the NAP based on its practical outcomes instead of institutionalising it.

The NAP was enshrined at the Bandung Conference in 1955, where the Non-alignment Movement (NAM)was established. In this conference, Nehru joined Egypt's President Gamel Abdul Nasser, Indonesia's President Sukarno, and China's Premier Chou En-Lai to lay the foundations for African and Asian cooperation. The movement was launched after Nehru met with Josip Tito of Yugoslavia in Belgrade in 1961 and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt at Brione in 1956.[91] The purpose of the NAM was to unite the decolonised nations of Asia and Africa.[92] Nehru's commitment to international peace and national independence was on display in the

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[88] Brecher, Krishnan, and Menon, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*, 6.

[89] Nehru's speech on 13th December 1946; Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961).

[90]Ian Hall, "The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India's Strategic Culture," in *Strategic Asia 2016-17*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills ((Seattle and Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 23.

[91] Mithi Mukherjee, "A World Illusion: The Legacy of Empire in India's Foreign Relations, 1947-62," *The International History Review* 32, no. 2 (2010): 254.

[92] Bhaskarla Surya Narayana Murti, *Nehru's Foreign Policy* (Beacon Information & Publications (India), 1953), 7.

movement, which A. Appadurai and E. Malcolm Hause describe as 'the legacy of Gandhian non-violence'.[93]

Nehru's NAP was criticised by some of his party colleagues and his cabinet; for example, Acharya J.B. Kripalani, the President of the Indian National Congress at the time of India's independence, later went on to become a harsh critic of Nehru and complained that India had no friends left in the world.[94] Similarly, Shyam Prasad Mookerjee, leader of the opposition Hindutva party- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), called Nehru's foreign policy 'unrealistic' for not aligning with the USA.[95] This criticism can be traced back to the U.S. assistance to Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. This support by the US to Pakistan was triggered by India's censure of the United States' involvement in the Korean War (1950-1953), during which India supported the U.S. resolution that identified North Korea as the aggressor state but did not align with the U.S. against the Communist bloc. This did not sit well with the USA. The harshest criticism came from Sardar Patel, India's deputy prime minister, who opposed Nehru's leaning towards the Soviets and wanted India to align with the USA.[96]

Despite criticism from home and abroad, Henry Kissinger commended Nehru's non-alignment policy in his work *The World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*. He drew an interesting parallel to the USA's isolationism in the 1930s:

> 'Emerging into a world of established powers and the Cold War, independent India, like the early United States, skilfully elevated freedom of manoeuvre from a bargaining tactic into an ethical principle. Blending righteous moralism with the intelligent

[93]A. Appadorai, "India's Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 25, no. 1 (January 1949): 37–46. E. Malcolm Hause, "India: Noncommitted and Nonaligned," *Western Political Quarterly* 13, no. 1 (March 1960): 70–82.
[94] BR Nanda, "12 Nehru and Non-Alignment," in *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 229.
[95] Nanda, "*12 Nehru and Non-Alignment*." 229-230.
[96] Patel's letter of 7 November 1950.

assessment of the balance of forces and the major powers' psychologies, Nehru announced India to be a global power that would chart a course manoeuvring between the major blocs.[97]

Kissinger's comparison shows his appreciation of NAP. Kissinger acknowledged that 'with a then nascent military establishment and underdeveloped economy, India would have been a respected but secondary ally. As a free agent, it could exercise a much wider-reaching influence.'[98] Pant and Super note the repercussions that India faced in 1955 when Khrushchev made overtures to India and supported reciprocal official visits. However, India's position contributed to the USA offering Pakistan a seat in the Central Treaty Organisation (CEATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955.[99]

A.P. Rana's work, like Henry Kissinger, proposed that non-alignment was a strategic policy.[100] He argued that non-alignment was an attempt to create a space for India to remain equidistant from both the US and the USSR so that it would be in the most advantageous bargaining position.[101] Subrahmanyam saw non-alignment as Nehru's way of constructing a third bloc.[102] Nonetheless, Rana provides a more nuanced evaluation of non-alignment, opposing most studies that treated non-alignment as a reactive policy. With his keen understanding of international affairs, Rana claimed that Nehru pre-empted the regression of a

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[97] Henry Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* (Penguin UK, 2014). 439-440.
[98]Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History.*
[99] Harsh V. Pant and Julie M. Super, "Non-Alignment and Beyond," in *New Directions in Indian Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis*, ed. Harsh V Pant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 130.
[100] Rana, *The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period.*
[101] C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (Viking Adult, 2003); Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy* (New Delhi: MacMillan, 2002).
[102] K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962," in *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, ed. B. R. Nanda (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1976).

bipolar world into a bi-global polity that would encapsulate new nations and strangle their manoeuvring space.[103] As a result, these states would lose their hard-won foreign policy independence. In short, non-alignment functions as a pioneering, pre-emptive voice against such eventualities.[104] Alternatively, critics like Pant (2009) portray non-alignment as an idealist's fantasy without a grasp of world affairs governed by a balance of power logic. Hall describes the NAP in IFP as a mixture of 'idealistic hope with realistic calculations'[105] .

In analysing Nehru's adoption of the NAP, PII explains the significance of the trauma of the 1947 partition and the need to keep external interference away from India. The development of the NAP is built upon the Gandhian principle of *Ahimsa* and the 'Kautilyan brand of realism',[106] enabling India to amass internal resources without being drawn into entanglements. It also helped India maintain its strategic autonomy.

Additionally, Nehru's foreign policy reflects the colonial experiences of India's pre-independence foreign policy, where Nehru assisted in establishing and organising India's relations with its neighbours. In 1921, the Indian National Congress undertook a foreign policy resolution to establish friendly ties with neighbours, as British colonial interests had traditionally been the top foreign policy priority. Consequently, the foreign relations department was set up under Nehru in 1928. His mission was to establish and organise anti-imperialist struggles.[107]

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[103] A. P. Rana, "Nehruvian Tradition in World Affairs: Its Evolution and Relevance to Post-Cold War World Order," in *Nehru's Foreign Policy: Fifty Years On*, ed. Surjit Mansingh (New Delhi: Mosaic Books, 1998).

[104] A.P. Rana (1998) "*Nehruvian Tradition in World Affairs: Its Evolution and Relevance to Post- Cold War World Order: in Surjit Mansingh* (ed.) Nehru's Foreign Policy: Fifty Years On, New Delhi: Mosaic Books. 48-49.

[105] Ian Hall, "The persistence of Nehruvianism in India's strategic culture." *Strategic Asia* 17 (2016): 141-167. 23.

[106] Rashed Uz Zaman, *Strategic Culture, and the Rise of the Indian Navy* (University of Reading, Department of Sociology, Politics and International Relations (School of Politics and International Relations), 2007), 109.

[107] Bimal Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and*

At the Tripura session of the 1939 Indian National Congress (INC), the Congress registered its 'entire disapproval of British foreign policy'. It urged that India' direct her foreign policy as an independent nation' to keep 'aloof from both imperialism and fascism'.[108] Even before India became independent, Nehru envisioned a non-aligned India. He saw the need for change in India's foreign policy outlook and to stop serving the foreign policy interests of the colonisers. Hence, through India's historical memory of colonial rule, Nehru's foreign policy reflected a change in India's idea of itself as a newly independent nation. The PII argument of victimhood is present, as it explains Nehru's adoption of non-alignment as a policy to keep the colonial trauma, and in the Cold War, it means western imperialism at a distance to enable independent India to meet its own needs.

India's foreign policy evolved in response to the partition of India in 1947, resulting in the creation of Pakistan and the conflict with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir. Another development was China's annexation of Tibet in 1950, which terminated the short border connecting Xinjiang province and India's Jammu and Kashmir state and had a direct impact on India's strategic position. Nehru's idealism and later realist approach created an idealistic and pragmatic Indian strategic and foreign security policy.

Nehru's political thought culminated in his inclination to tie the effect of time on the past, present and future.[109] Nehru believed that the political action to be taken in the present was determined by the influences of the past and the demands of the future.[110] His political

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World Affairs, 1885–1947 (New Delhi: Bookland Private, 1960), 35.

[108] R. Dwivedi, ed. Life and speeches of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Allahabad National 1929.p 50-51.

[109] C. A. Bayly, *Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire* (Cambridge, 2011); and Bayly, "The Ends of Liberalism and the Political Thought of Nehru's India," Modern Intellectual History (2015), 605–26. Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity.*
Majeed, *Autobiography*, p.175. Frederic Jameson, "The End of Temporality," *Critical Inquiry,* 29/4 (2003), pp. 697.

[110] S. Purushotham, 2017, World History in the Atomic Age: Past, Present and Future in the Political Thought of Jawaharlal Nehru, *Modern Intellectual History,* vol.14. no.3, pp.837-867.

thought displays the impact of colonialism on his decisions during and even after his time in office. This also applies to Nehru's adoption of *Panchsheel* and his Pakistan policy, especially in the 1962 war.

3.2c India and Pakistan

The partition of India led to the creation of Pakistan, which Nehru did not support; he had a vision of a single secular India.[111] Pakistan's Muslim League, led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, pushed for the creation of Pakistan when the 1942 Quit India movement began under Gandhi. Although Indian leaders opposed the partition, Lord Mountbatten argued in favour of partition and the formation of Pakistan to avoid civil war after the colonial powers left.[112] The Partition did away with the pre-independence foreign policy ideal of an 'undivided South Asia'.[113] Mukherjee rightly pointed out that the rivalry between India and Pakistan is best understood in four categories: 'identity (ideology), territory, geopolitics and domestic politics'.[114] Though religion was the basis for the formation of Pakistan, it was troubling for Nehru, who had hoped for a secular India. The partition left a scar on Nehru, which affected Nehru's later dealings with Pakistan.

Despite the traumatic creation of Pakistan, Nehru saw a future in which both states might cohabit peacefully and contribute to regional stability. His approach to Pakistan was distinguished by efforts to resolve past grievances and lay the groundwork for peaceful coexistence. Nehru was guided by PII in calling for non-interference in other nations' internal affairs and encouraging diplomatic solutions. This was made apparent in two letters to the heads of provincial governments:

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[111] Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*, 90
[112] Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*, 91.
[113] Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India," *India Review* 8, no. 3 (August 6, 2009): 216.
[114]Rohan Mukherjee, "India–Pakistan Relations," in *The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy* (Sage, 2021), 1022.

The first letter was dated 15 October 1947:

> We have a Muslim minority who are so large in numbers that they cannot, even if they want to, go anywhere else. They have got to live in India. This is a basic fact about which there can be no argument. Whatever the provocation from Pakistan and whatever the indignities and horrors inflicted on non- Muslims there, we have got to deal with this minority in a civilised manner. We must give them security and the rights of citizens in a democratic State. If we fail to do so, we shall have a festering sore which will eventually poison the whole body politic and probably destroy it.[115]

The second letter was dated 17 October 1948:

> We are faced, particularly in East Punjab and Delhi, with the psychological problem created by the events of the last few months. These have created in the minds of people, not merely among the refugees but also among others, a bitterness, a sense of desperation and a desire for retaliation— in short, a serious spiritual malaise... The difficulties have been partly due to our inability effectively to tackle the problem of rehabilitation . . . and partly due to the continuing evidence of hostility and barbaric conduct towards the minorities in Pakistan. The result has been that sections of the Hindu community are not in tune with and do not understand Gandhiji's approach to the Muslim problem in India. They resent his approach and think that it is somehow or other inimical to their own interests. And yet any person with vision can see that Gandhiji's approach is not only morally correct, it is also essentially practical. Indeed,

[115] Jawaharlal Nehru and G. Parthasarathi, *Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964: 1947-1949* (Oxford University Press, 1985).

> it is the only possible approach if we think in terms of the nation's good, both from the short and long-distance points of view. Any other approach means perpetuating conflict and postponing all notions of national consolidation and progress.[116]

India-Pakistan relations have been strained by the conflict over Kashmir since 1947, following the partition of India. This part explores Nehru's dealings with Pakistan over Kashmir in terms of his idealist philosophy.

The communal tensions began with the Pakistani tribal invasion of Jammu Kashmir in 1947, later supported by most of the Pakistan army. The war ended with the UN-mandated ceasefire in 1949 and the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. The UN established the Line of Control (LOC), with Pakistan occupying one-third of Kashmir, marking the end of the first Indo-Pak war in 1947.[117] Nehru's request for U.N. intervention in the Kashmir issue was roundly criticised. Nehru supporters[118] claim that Nehru, under the influence of Governor General Mountbatten, referred the Kashmir issue to the U.N.[119] The plebiscite that Mountbatten proposed was a nod to Nehru's idealism; Nehru believed that the people of Kashmir had the right to choose the state they wanted to live in, especially since he expected the plebiscite to go in India's favour. Shiv Shankar, in *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present*, highlights how India's and Pakistan's first commanders-in-chief were British and reported to their diplomats more extensively than their political leaders.[120] Menon also spoke of India's

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[116] Nehru and Parthasarathi, *Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964: 1947-1949*.
[117] Harsh V. Pant, *Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 103-104.
[118] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 20.
[119] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 6.
[120] Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present*, 66.

mistake in allowing a 'Boundary force' as it was the 'imperial power on the boundary, and very much inclined towards one side'.[121]

Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, a realist, did not favour the matter being referred to an international body as his advice was for India to carry out a full-scale military operation. Patel was also against India stopping its military operations halfway, allowing Pakistan to control one-third of Kashmir. Patel insisted that the U.N.'s decision would not be based upon catering to Indian interests but to the security interests of the U.K. and the USA. He was sure that the U.K. would side with Pakistan based on their two-nation theory and their support for a Muslim homeland in the subcontinent that would continue to expose communal differences.[122] The inability of the U.N. to solve the Kashmir conflict ended Nehru's confidence in the world body. He expressed his disappointment in his 28 March 1951 speech to Parliament:

> The accession of Kashmir to India is entirely in conformity with the Indian Independence Act… it is also fully in accord with all that has happened in the case of other princely States which acceded to India… We did not ask the U.N. to adjudge the validity of Kashmir's accession or to determine where the sovereignty lay. We did not seek arbitration, but we went to them to complain about aggression by Pakistan which we thought might jeopardise world peace. The U.N. took advantage of our initiative in our referring the matter to them and thus enlarged the scope go their enquiry… Until now neither the U.N. Commission nor the Security Council has suggested that the accession was open to question.[123]

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[121] Brecher, Krishnan, and Menon, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*, 199.
[122] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, 65.
[123] Nehru's speech to the Parliament on 28th March 1951. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961).

Dogra claims that Nehru's idealism had led him to the U.N. Having dealt with the British for decades and knowing their devious intentions to ensure the Hindu-Muslim divide, Nehru ignored them and turned to the world body for help.[124] I agree that Nehru's confidence in the world body was based on his idealistic belief that the U.N. was an international organisation that took the need to ensure international peace and security seriously. Nehru's idealism stemmed from Gandhi's belief in *Ahimsa*.

Krishna Menon's role in the Kashmir issue is significant. While both Nehru and Menon admitted that going to the U.N. had been a mistake, Menon made a convincing point when he said that Kashmir was an excuse for Pakistan to continue making demands of India based on the English doctrine 'take what you can and fight for more'.[125] Furthermore, as long as Pakistan did not control Kashmir, the conflict will continue to exploit communal differences.

Bhattacharya stated that the fact that Sheikh Abdullah, President of the Kashmir National Conference, supported the Maharaja and the idea of unconditional accession was purposeful enough to bring Kashmir entirely into India, which would have been a realist step in the execution of foreign policy, and the best way forward for the Indian government.[126] By taking the issue to the UN, Nehru considered the Kashmir issue as an international one, not an internal one, which several critics believe Nehru should not have done. In comparison, Nehru's idealism resulted in having the U.N. resolve the issue, thinking that a resolution would be most apt if mediated.

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[124] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*.
[125] Brecher, Krishnan, and Menon, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*; Krishna Menon interview, p. 197.
[126] Brecher, Krishnan, and Menon, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*; Krishna menon interview, p. 197; Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (I.B. Tauris, 2000), 110-112.

The resistance to the interference of the USA and USSR over India's territorial sovereignty was also a significant factor that made turning to the U.N. a safer choice. When seen through the application of Kautilyan principles, the need to appease the people lay at the centre of governance. Thus, the U.N. plebiscite was the logical consequence. Nehru's speech on 31 January 1957 at Island Grounds in Madras highlighted why India went to the UN regarding Kashmir, stating that India did not want to go to war and turned to the UN, keeping in mind the people of Kashmir.[127] Nehru's friendly approach to the Kashmir dispute and turning to the U.N. display the adoption and support of Gandhi's belief in *Ahimsa*. Nehru had described India's relations with Pakistan as 'a policy of firmness and adequate preparation but always to maintain a friendly approach.'[128] When the Pakistani raiders entered Kashmir, Nehru initially declined, and Patel and Abdulla persuaded Nehru to agree. At the Defence Committee meeting a few days after this attack, Mountbatten's objection to flying troops to Kashmir was overruled by Nehru, the Cabinet, and even Gandhi.[129] This stemmed from the need to protect territorial sovereignty, especially after the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession and joined the Dominion of India.[130] Therefore, through the Kautilyan principle, the ruler would protect all territory within the state.

Nehru's idealism caused him to believe that India would build excellent ties with Pakistan, that the Kashmir conflict would be settled, and that collaboration with China was possible. This would prove that Nehru's foreign policy did not promote aggression. Bringing forward the historical memory of the colonial past to the fore, the post-imperial ideology allows the preservation of friendly ties with the two neighbouring nations, intending to maximise

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[127] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, 133, Speech at Island Grounds, Madras, January 31, 1957.
[128] Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, 133, Reply to debate on the President's Address in Parliament, New Delhi, February 3, 1950.
[129] Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins Of War In South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947, Second Edition* (Westview Press, 1994), 14.
[130] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 13.

territory. However, Nehru did not make his decisions alone. He sought advice from his trusted friend V.R Krishna Menon, whom J.N. Dixit highlighted in *Makers of Indian Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohan Roy to Yashwant Since,* Sardar Swaran Singh, Pannikar and Girja Shankar.

While India was grabbling with Pakistan over Kashmir, India also had to deal with China over Tibet, and the unity of both Pakistan and China against India was seen in China being Pakistan's principal arms supplier in 1965, as China and India were not in the best of terms. The following section analyses relations between India and China under Nehru's leadership to further understand the establishment of India's blueprint for foreign and strategic policy.

3.2d China and India

Initially, Congress did not expect China to be a security threat, despite Vallabhai Patel's doubts.[131] This was because China was recovering from civil war and offered little reason to Nehru in the early 1950s for any dispute over their shared border or other grounds for hostilities.[132] Nehru had considered that the friendly relations between India and China would lead to an Asian resurgence in the international political system.[133]

To analyse Nehru's decisions on the People's Republic of China (PRC), it is imperative to understand his idealism. China and India have a twofold dispute. One is China's claim to Tibet. The other is a border dispute; the contested border areas expand over the territories of the eastern sector near Burma (Myanmar), which is about 90,000 square kilometres which today constitutes most of Arunachal Pradesh. Towards the western sector of the end of the India-Sino border lies the 33,000 square kilometre Aksai Chin plateau bordering Ladakh. India

[131] Ramachandra Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy* (Pan, 2007), 168–9.
[132] Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," *Foreign Affairs* 41, no. 3 (1963): 457.
[133] Jyotindra Nath Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), 35-36.

claims that the easter area has been settled by treaty and the western by custom and tradition.[134] However, Beijing insists that the territories in the eastern sector had never been demarcated and that the West recognised it. This dispute remained dormant despite Ganguly highlighting the beginning of China's threat to India in 1950 when the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet and ended the autonomous status it had had since 1914.[135] As early as 1950, Home Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel warned Nehru about the possible security threat to India posed by China.[136]

Between 1949 and 1954, relations between India and China warmed, giving rise to the slogan 'Hindi Chini, Bhai Bhai'.[137] Nehru made a state visit to Beijing in 1954. Nehru believed his Chinese counterpart, Chou En-Lai, who assured Nehru that a new series of maps by the Chinese that showed certain parts of British India as Chinese land were old Kuomintang maps that had not been studied yet.[138] Menon spoke of how the maps did not convince Nehru and wrote to the Secretary-General N.R. Pillai in the Ministry of External Affairs, saying that he did not trust China and that their relations' might worsen'.[139]

Nehru's overtures to China, his attempts to maintain good relations, and his expectations of reciprocation by China have been critiqued. Sardar Patel had tried to warn Nehru in a letter highlighting the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry of China and K.M. Pannikar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing. Sardar Patel emphasised the deceptive attempts made by the Chinese government to convey to India their intentions for a

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[134] Mahesh Shankar, "Showing Character: Nehru, Reputation, and the Sino-Indian Dispute, 1957–1962," *Asian Security* 11, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 101.
[135] Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions*, 34.
[136] Suranjan Das, "The Nehru Years in Indian Politics," *Edinburgh Papers In South Asian Studies* 16 (2001): 2–35.
[137] Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, 35.
[138] Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, 40.
[139] Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics*, p 102.

peaceful settlement over Tibet.[140] Patel spoke of the trust that the people of Tibet placed in India and that India's ongoing efforts to engage in peaceful negotiations with China may lead to disappointment among Tibetans. However, Nehru trusted China's peaceful intentions, as observed by U.S. President Eisenhower in 1956 as Nehru negotiated for China to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Nehru reasoned that it would be best if India focused on developing friendly ties with China.[141]

The *Panchsheel,* the five principles of peaceful coexistence, was signed in 1954 to strengthen bilateral relations between India and China. It focused on mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, and non-interference in internal affairs.[142] Nehru's *Panchsheel* was not only a definitional expression of NAP. Still, it was also based upon Kautilya's *Sadhgunyas* (Six-fold Policy) to develop closer ties with a neighbour and a possible rival. Implementing the *Mandala* theory ensures that neighbouring states are befriended and appeased.

Nehru dismissed any issue raised about China. He even rejected a proposal by the Ministry of External Affairs to strengthen the borders by offering military training to border inhabitants.[143] India had agreed and placed trust in China that Chinese troops would be stationed as road builders in Tibet and Chengdu and would be withdrawn upon completion of the construction. This was an example of Nehru's idealism in relations with China. For example, a treaty over Tibet was signed in 1951 where China agreed not to interfere in the religious practices of the Tibetans and to respect the Tibetan culture and language. However,

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[140] Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London, Allen, 1955).
[141] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 26.
[142] Pant and Super, "Non-Alignment and Beyond," 131.
[143] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy,* 26.In fact during Nehru's visit to China in 1954, the Indian Ambassador to Beijing had trust in China's intentions towards Tibet, because of which when Mao informed Nehru and Raghavan, the Indian ambassador on the large number of troops located at Tibet and Chengdu, Raghavan stated 'What China does in Tibet is China's own business. India trusts China."

the Dalai Lama's visit to India to commemorate the 2500th anniversary of the Buddha's birth in 1956 caused Chinese disapproval. The Chinese government feared that the Dalai Lama would establish a 'government-in-exile' and not return to Tibet. At the same time, Nehru refused a permanent offer to India by the USA and the USSR to not 'create trouble with China' by having India take China's place.[144] Nehru has been criticised for his unilateral decision without consultation with his ministers. While India supported China and expected similar reciprocity, India did not know that Chinese intentions in Tibet and with India were not honourable. Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China visited India amidst the troubles between Tibet and China. Under Chinese pressure, Nehru urged the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet after Chou promised socioeconomic changes in Tibet in compliance with the principles of the signed treaty. However, once the Dalai Lama returned, it became apparent that the Chinese had no intentions of keeping their word.

China announced the construction of a road linking Tibet to Xinjiang, which interfered with India's regional strategic interests. Nehru knew of China's plan, but India's limited military capabilities precluded any action against China.[145] The Chinese claimed control over Aksai Chin only after India protested China's plans,[146] commencing the deterioration of Sino-India relations. The crisis intensified after Nehru granted asylum to the Dalai Lama, who came to India after China's People's Liberation Army attacked his residence. However, at the same time, Nehru made it clear that India would not bring the issue of Tibet to the UN Security Council.[147] Nehru did not want to defy China by becoming the global voice for Tibet.

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[144]Jawaharlal Nehru and Nikolai Bulganin, "Record of Talks between P.M. [Jawaharlal Nehru] and Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin 1955," from Jawaharlal Nehru, edited by H.Y. Shrada Prasad "Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Second Seried," Volume 29:1 June-31 August 1955, OUP India.

[145] Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy,* 37.

[146] Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy,* 37.

[147] Mahesh Shankar, "Showing Character: Nehru, Reputation, and the Sino-Indian Dispute, 1957–1962," *Asian Security* 11, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 99–115,.

However, regarding India's territorial integrity, the PII principle of maximising territory explains Nehru's insistence on holding Aksai Chin, even though that area had no geopolitical significance to India.[148] While Nehru's idealist principles were often visible in his dealings with China, India's stance after the 1959 border clash at Longju displayed a more pragmatic command of strategic policy.[149] Chatterjee Miller cites the 'post-colonial victimhood' perspective behind many of Nehru's decisions, which is still significant in Indian foreign policy. In the Sino-India dispute, Nehru's idealist policy of maintaining friendship changed only after Chou's proposal in 1960 that called for both two sides to consider a swap of territory in the eastern and western sectors (Northeast Frontier Agency, now Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin) as seen in the discussion between Nehru and Chou.[150] India rejected Chou's proposal, and a year later, Nehru introduced the Forward Policy. This strategy was to send a small, lightly armed army into areas that China claimed, intending to demonstrate resolve by deterring Chinese advances in the Western sector. In the mid-1960s, India's leaders pushed for aggressive border patrols and the establishment of military posts. However, Chinese troops began approaching in 1962 with a five-to-one ratio against the Indian forces and superior firepower.[151] Henderson Brooks's Report on the 1962 Indo-China War expanded on the two armies' military strengths and highlighted the Chinese army's superiority.[152]

Rajeev Sikhri states that India's approach to its relations with China was poorly thought out.[153] Nehru made many concessions to China over the Tibet issue in 1954, and both sides

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[148] Shankar "Showing Character: Nehru, Reputation, and the Sino-Indian Dispute, 1957–1962," 100.
[149]Pant and Super, "Non-Alignment and Beyond," 131.
[150] Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-Lai, "Record of Talks between P.M. [Jawaharlal Nehru] and Premier Chou En-Lai [Zhou Enlai] Held on 23rd April, 1960, from 4.30 p.m. 7.45 p.m.
[151]Shankar "Showing Character: Nehru, Reputation, and the Sino-Indian Dispute, 1957–1962,"
[152] Sameer Suryakant Patil, "India's China Policy in the 1950s," South Asian Survey 14, no. 2 (December 2007): 283–301.
[153] Rajiv Sikri, *Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy* (SAGE Publications India, 2009), 95.

declared their aim of allowing *Panchsheel* to guide their relationship. Despite the attempts at friendly relations, Nehru was wary of Chinese aggression and wanted to present an unyielding stance to China. Nehru's words show the need to be respected and how he expected to be treated. In a meeting with the leader of Burma (Myanmar), U Nu, who tried to mediate between India and China, he said, 'Friendship cannot exist between the weak and the strong, between a country that is trying to bully and the other who accepts to be bullied.'[154] Nehru was not alone in wanting to take a firm stance against China.

Subimal Dutta, an Indian diplomat, claimed, 'if we let the Chinese get away with the impression that they can unilaterally assert their authority without any regard to past discussion, they may try the same method in dealing with other border disputes also.'[155] This argument illustrates the presence of the post-imperial ideology of territorial sovereignty in every Indian diplomat who served under Nehru. Nehru's dealings with China thus demonstrate a vigorous exercise of realpolitik backed by the post-imperial ideology. If India gave in to China this one time, China would demand even more territory, infringing upon India's sovereignty. For these reasons, Nehru favoured the forward policy, endorsed by some military personnel, because allowing China to attack without responding would convey weakness, which Nehru did not want China to consider India soft. Shankar's reputational imperative framework[156] can be used to analyse Nehru's dealings with China.

This also demonstrates Nehru's idealism in retaining great friendships despite difficulty and shifting to a more realistic attitude as the situation required. At the same time, although the

[154] Speech in Parliament (September 4, 1959); Jawaharlal Nehru, *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations*, 1961, 117.
[155] Subimal Dutt to Prime Minister (June 12, 58), Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 32, p. 186. Cited in Amit Das Gupta, Serving India. A Political Biography of Subimal Dutt (1903–1992), India's Longest Serving Foreign Secretary, New Delhi: Manohar, 2017.
[156] Shankar, "Showing Character," 99-115.

approach lacked 'good military judgment,' it was effective. Today, China believes India would only submit to its foes in war.

Jawaharlal Nehru faced threats from Pakistan and China. However, Nehru adhered to his idealistic principles of promoting peaceful coexistence, even in the face of conflicts. This commitment is evident in Nehru's interview with Karanjia, in which he was questioned about his policy towards Pakistan and China. Nehru replied:

> Obviously, we of India or any country cannot live in a climate of permanent hostility or unfriendliness in terms of history. If one looks at these disputes with Pakistan or China from any kind of perspective, it is natural that we must be, and want to be, friends with all neighbouring countries. It has always been our policy- and mind you, a policy inspired by no momentary whim but dictated by our history and geography and culture- to be friendly with Pakistan and China and develop closer and more cooperative relations with all neighbouring and, indeed, with the whole world for that matter. It is unfortunate that certain conflicts and difficulties have arisen, but it would be very foolish to look forward to a state of permanent hostility with any country. We certainly don't do so.[157]

The final years of Nehru's leadership saw Chinese aggression towards India and the six rounds of talk with Pakistan that the U.S. had encouraged. In this scenario, the role of Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh needs to be mentioned. Though Swaran Singh's role in Indian foreign policy will be analysed in the chapter on Lal Bahadur Shastri, his contribution to the six rounds of talk is important to understand India's relationship with Pakistan. Sardar Swaran

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[157] Jawaharlal Nehru and Rustom Khurshedji Karanjia, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru* (Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp.82.

Singh was a cabinet minister, and Nehru appointed him to represent India at the six rounds of Indo-Pak table discussions in 1962.[158] It is imperative to comprehend the rationale behind Nehru's selection of Liaquat Ali Khan, considering his legal training, affiliation with the Akali Dal in Punjab, and membership in the Indian National Congress. Given his educational and social background, it is reasonable to assume that Singh would not relinquish Pakistan's demands.

3.2e Nehru and Nuclear Power Program

India's nuclear programme predates India's independence. Homi J. Bhabha, regarded as the founder of India's nuclear weapons programme, partnered with the Tata business family in 1944 to establish the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research to study nuclear physics. In 1948, the Atomic Energy Commission was established to lay the groundwork for a nuclear programme. Bhabha's scientific beliefs persuaded Nehru and dominated the Indian atomic energy system. As the first director of the Department of Atomic Energy, Bhabha fought tirelessly to safeguard the organisational autonomy of India's nuclear energy sector. The Atomic Energy Commission, under Bhabha, had a free hand in developing India's nuclear weapons infrastructure.

Nehru's approach to pursuing India's atomic future was not motivated by military considerations but rather by the nation's interests.[159] In line with India's objective of economic self-sufficiency, a concerted but ultimately unsuccessful effort was undertaken to maintain the programme. Even though India needed some early assistance in reactor design from the United Kingdom and Canada, the Department of Atomic Energy worked fast to establish its scientific capability for complete independence.[160] Through the PII principle of maximising status,

[158] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy* 159.
[159] Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Post-Colonial State* (London: Zed Books, 1998).
[160] Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (April 1999): 150,

Nehru's interpretation of nuclear energy would resolve the developmental insecurities India faced from China and Pakistan, with whom a colonial history and the urgency of creating a post-colonial state identity prevailed.

In his public capacity, Jawaharlal opposed the development of nuclear weapons. This stance aligned with his long-standing rejection of using force to resolve international disputes. This perspective was shaped, in part, by the Gandhian principle of *Ahimsa* in the Indian nationalist movement. Nehru's refusal to embrace nuclear weapons stemmed from his deep-seated fear of the militarisation of Indian society. Furthermore, his opposition to nuclear weapons was grounded in his strong belief about the limited role of military force in world affairs. Nehru considered military spending to be, at best, a necessary evil. He believed gaining support for measures to stop or slow the arms race was easier than for arms reduction.[161] Under Nehru, India attempted to end nuclear testing, as seen in his proposal to Parliament for a standstill agreement on 2 April 1954,[162] resulting in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Treaty reflected India's moral stance against nuclear weapons and its support for global nuclear disarmament. Although Nehru publicly advocated against the use of nuclear weapons, he also supported India's nuclear program. Therefore, allowing for the PII to explain how Nehru's successors began India's nuclear program explains the principle of maximising status to make India a regional and global power.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's policies paved the way for India's rise to global status. The Nehruvian ideology that guided Indian foreign policy during his seventeen years in office was influenced by his intellectual development, his education during the British Raj in

[161] N. M. Ghatate, "Disarmament Logic: Learning from Nehru's Nuclear Vision," *The Times of India (1861 - 2010)*, September 18, 1998.
[162] S. Duarte. The future of the CTBT, UN Chronical, 2009. 1-2:30-5.

London, his training under his father, and his mentorship under Gandhi during the freedom struggle.

Western leaders disliked Menon's abrasive personality and open endorsement of Soviet and Communist China. Menon was described as 'violently anti-American', 'a tough poisonous bastard',[163] 'a Machiavelli with a swollen head',[164] 'India's Rasputin', and 'insufferably arrogant'.[165] Several British officers felt the same about Menon. Menon was a trusted adviser who carried out Nehru's policies. Menon himself agreed that Nehru had the final say in foreign policy decisions. This was not the view that the West had of Menon. In the West he was considered an originator for policies and decisions that seemed to be 'anti-western'; McGarr (2011) found British and American archival records that described the Western view of Menon's influence on Indian foreign policy. Menon's affiliation with British socialism and his strong bond with Nehru facilitated his appointment as a cabinet minister without a portfolio in the Indian government. This position conferred upon him substantial influence in formulating foreign policy directives and the authority to enforce them. Although his intellectual superiority caused friction in his dealings with Western nations and even within India, his contributions to the country's advancement cannot be disregarded.

Nehru, with Menon, steered India's foreign policy. The Kashmir issue was taken to the U.N., with Menon leading the delegation. Thus, the speculation that Nehru acted upon Menon's influence instead of adhering to his decision is baseless.

Nehru was a strong leader and only invited those who would execute his policies to work with him. This was apparent at the Bandung Conference, where Menon worked to establish Asian Collectivity with decolonised nations of Asia would come together, that led to

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[163] Arthur, W. Hummel, Jr. 'Oral History Interview'. Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Library of Congress, Washington cited in McGarr pp. 241.
[164] Harold Robert Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: America Images of China and India* (New York: J. Day Company, 1958), 313-314.
[165] Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: America Images of China and India*, 314.

the establishment of the Non-alignment Movement in 1961. Menon's presence in the execution of India's relations with the world through his strong stance against West imperialism displays the application of the post-imperial ideology principle of maximising status as a victim of colonialism. While Menon's position on Kashmir as a bilateral issue was met with resistance from the United States and the United Kingdom, the West maintained a pro-Pakistan stance. Additionally, with Nehru, Menon misjudged the threat posed by China during the 1962 aggression, highlighting the presence of PII and the dominance of the idealist principle that viewed threats emanating from the West.

In conclusion, Nehru's non-alignment policy kept India at a distance from the imperial West during the Cold War but aligned with the Soviets when expedient. The question that emerged is whether Nehru's policy was idealistic, realistic, or both. India's first prime minister had been trained in Western ideologies by his Westernised father, Motilal Nehru, and then mentored by Mahatma Gandhi. This combination of Western education with the environment of imperialism gave Nehru a strong anti-imperial sentiment. From childhood, Neheru was familiar with the ideas of Western nationalism and liberalism.

Similarly, the ministers who worked alongside Nehru shared his anti-imperialist or anti-colonialist sentiments. This shared ideology and historical experience of the national movement allowed Nehru and like-minded ministers to collaborate. Chatterjee Miller's post-imperial ideology is seen in the historical analysis of the decisions taken by Nehru and the advice given to him by his cabinet. This is why Nehru welcomed Menon into his government.

While India's new independence dealt with a broken domestic system that required reconstruction from within, which Nehru worked extensively towards, this chapter has only focused on Nehru and India's foreign policy with the primary challenges posed by Pakistan and China. The intellectual contributions by Nehru in building IFP, therefore, are best examined through the PII perspective through the lens of historical analysis that highlights how Nehru's

foreign policy began on idealist principles based upon how Nehru wanted India to be treated, followed by the incorporation of pragmatic realpolitik once he realised the need to respond to the way that other countries threatened India's its territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Therefore, the challenges that lay before Nehru when he took office as an inexperienced head of state, to a newly independent nation, dealing with the consequences of 200 years of colonial rule developed an idealistic foreign policy, and then began to craft it according to the needs that emerged, learning from mistakes to derive more pragmatic decisions as seen in the Forward Policy and the six rounds of discussion with Pakistan towards the end of Nehru's administration, the longest of any of India's prime ministers. All his decisions were geared to 'territorial sovereignty' and 'strategic autonomy' goals. The post-imperial ideology was the intellectual framework the prime minister and his advisers adhered to because of their shared post-imperial trauma.

Chapter 4: Continuity in Indian Foreign Policy: Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi

This chapter examines the leadership of Nehru's successors, Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-1966), Indira Gandhi (1966-1977, 1980-1984), and Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989), to understand the impact of Nehru's idealism on Indian politics during the Cold War. The chapter consists of three sections, one focusing on each of the three prime ministers.

This chapter uses PII to examine the foreign policy objectives of territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy by analysing the colonial historical memory of India's prime ministers. The study also answers the following sub-questions: What is the impact of historical memory on ideology? What influences did childhood memories have on prime ministers' decisions? What led to their ideological transition? The extent to which ideas from the colonial past influence leaders and their foreign policy choices is examined. In addition, this analysis helps to understand the continuity and change in Indian foreign policy.

The research explores the contributing factors to the shift in Indian foreign policy away from Nehru's idealism and towards a more pragmatic perspective, as embodied by Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira, and Rajiv Gandhi. This study will also explore the decision-making of Rajiv Gandhi, the last prime minister of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, and the subsequent move to a more liberal foreign policy. This research deepens an understanding of the interplay of historical memory, leadership, and foreign policy decision-making in India.

4.1. The steel leadership of Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66)

The death of Nehru in 1964 created a leadership vacuum in India, and the self-effacing Shastri did not seem like a suitable replacement.[1] During his two years as prime minister, he had to contend with a struggling economy, the aftermath of the Indo-China War of 1962, and

[1] David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 2011), 160.

the ongoing need to establish India as a global power. This section analyses Shastri's early life, followed by his adherence to Nehru's nonalignment policy (NAP), role in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, and approach to the nuclear programme.

During the national freedom movement and upon gaining independence in 1947, India was led by two of its most charismatic figures: Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. No other politician in India had comparable stature in the international community, so Nehru's death left a great void.

Morarji Desai, Minister for Commerce and Industry of Nehru's cabinet and a respected political figure believed he was the best candidate to succeed Nehru. However, K. Kamaraj played a crucial role in ensuring Shastri's election by the Indian Parliament by using his influence and lobbying skills.[2] J.N. Dixit explains that Shastri was not chosen as the successor to the dynamic Nehru due to his soft demeanour as the Syndicate of the Congress party thought that they would be able to use Shastri as their political puppet.[3] However, to understand if the motivations of the Syndicate of the Congress Party worked in their favour or that of India, it is crucial to study Shastri's early life and political career before he assumed the office of the prime minister of India.

4.1.1. Shastri: Early Life and Political Background

Lal Bahadur Shastri was born in Varanasi, in the Southern part of Uttar Pradesh, in 1904. His father, an impoverished Brahmin teacher, passed away when Shastri was only a year and a half year old. His mother and maternal uncle then assumed responsibility for his upbringing. Unlike Jawaharlal Nehru, who received a Western education, Shastri earned his

[2] Sandeep Shastri, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: Politics and Beyond* (Rupa Publications India Pvt Limited, 2019); Y. V. Kumardoss, "Kamaraj Remembered," *Economic Weekly* 39, no. 17 (2004): 1655–57.
[3] Jyotindra Nath Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha* (Harper Collins Publishers, 2004).

bachelor's degree in philosophy from Gurukul University in Varanasi[4] -- Shastri's formative years coincided with the early stages of the national movement. He was undoubtedly exposed to the ideas of Indian political thinkers. Shastri's introduction to nationalism can be attributed to his firsthand experience of the freedom struggle. Shastri was eleven years old when Gandhi denounced the Indian princes for supporting British rule.[5] Therefore, post-imperial ideology would attribute Shastri's ideological development to the national movement.

Shastri's early *Guru* (teacher), Nishkameshwar Prasad Misra, was influential in moulding Shastri's character and personality.[6] He welcomed the child into his home and told him stories about Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai, Gokhale and Gandhi. Shastri was an avid reader and read every book that came his way, especially biographies of the heroes of India's freedom movement.[7] As a child in colonial India, Shastri saw the strong pro-Gandhi sentiment. Post-Imperial Ideology explains that Shastri's childhood was spent in colonial India. Like Nehru, Shastri was a first-generation leader of independent India who had lived under colonial rule. Therefore, colonialism was the transformative event in Shastri's life that influenced his understanding of self-determination and the national movement.

Shastri first saw and heard Gandhi in 1915, when Gandhi placed the foundation-stone of Banaras Hindu University.[8] After this event, Shastri decided to enter politics. Although his mother wanted him to continue his education, she did not prevent Shastri from joining the national movement. Shastri eventually resumed his education at the Kashi Vidyapath school to

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[4] Chandrika Prasad Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 9 June 1964-11 January 1966: A Life of Truth in Politics* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9.
[5] Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 9 June 1964-11 January 1966: A Life of Truth in Politics*, 18.
[6] Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 9 June 1964-11 January 1966: A Life of Truth in Politics*.
[7] Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 9 June 1964-11 January 1966: A Life of Truth in Politics*.
[8] Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 9 June 1964-11 January 1966: A Life of Truth in Politics*.

defy the British government. Kashi Vidyapath was one of the institutions that taught the ideas of India's political intellectuals.[9] He was also part of the Dandi March and led several campaigns in the freedom movement, even serving nine years in jail.[10] Thus, although he did not receive Nehru's Western education, Shastri gained knowledge and expertise from working closely with Gandhi. Shastri had a sense of Indian nationalism from a very early age, placing him at the forefront of the national movement.

Dixit described Shastri as 'diminutive in stature, mild in nature, soft-spoken and reticent, and the more articulate and aggressive Congress leaders from other parts of the country felt that he would be a pliable prime minister who could be manoeuvred by the power structure of the senior party leadership.'[11] What the party leaders seem to have forgotten was that Gandhi and Shastri were similar in temperament, and Gandhi had driven the British Raj out of India. This miscalculation—the idea that Shastri could be manipulated—is what brought Shastri to the prime ministership.[12]

4.2. Shastri and Foreign Policy Choices: 1964-66

> 'I am a layman but sometimes I feel that a layman holding a political office, is not much of a risk…because an expert if he gets to power thinks that he knows everything.'[13]

The Skinnerian interpretation of Shastri's speeches reflects the political climate and the demands of post-colonial India. Shastri inherited an India that was mired in an economic depression that necessitated restructuring, that had been dealt a severe blow by the 1962 Indo-

[9] Harish Kapur, *Foreign Policies of India's Prime Ministers* (Lancer Publishers LLC, 2013).
[10] Kapur, *Foreign Policies of India's Prime Ministers*.
[11] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*,103.
[12] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 104.
[13] 23 November 1964, addressing the Indian Institute of Public Administration on its tenth anniversary; Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 9 June 1964-11 January 1966: A Life of Truth in Politics*, 593.

Sino War and continued to be plagued by concerns over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Furthermore, the People's Republic of China had emerged as a significant geopolitical force in the region. 1964 following his election as prime minister, Shastri implemented Gandhian principles and the Green Revolution, focusing on agriculture rather than industry, to revitalise the Indian economy.[14] Shastri continued Nehru's NAP in foreign policy before implementing his *realpolitik* approach to foreign affairs and moving away from the idealism that characterised much of Nehru's tenure.

Before becoming prime minister, Shastri served as Nehru's Minister of Transport and Home Affairs in Uttar Pradesh from 1947 to 1950. At the time of Nehru's death, he was Minister without Portfolio.[15] Shastri did not have experience with international affairs apart from the lessons he learned from Nehru.[16]Believing that moral principles had to govern international politics, Shastri recognised that international politics and state relations were vital.[17] Shastri's dealings with Kashmir reflected his understanding of the need to be pragmatic. India was recovering from the loss of territory to China during the 1962 Indo-China war. At the same time, Pakistan's charismatic Field Marshal Ayub Khan was making overtures to the USA, and Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a more understated personality, was fostering relations with China, taking advantage of the Sino-India animosity. However, as the USA became involved in the Vietnam War, its attention turned away from India and Pakistan.

4.2.1. Shastri Furthering the Non-Alignment Policy

In 1965, Sino-Pak relations were raised to formal defence and strategic cooperation status. Bhutto ceded the northern and north-western parts of Jammu and Kashmir to China; this

[14] Rakesh Ankit, "Lal Bahadur Shastri, 1964–1966: Leader at a Glance," *Studies in Indian Politics* 8, no. 1 (April 26, 2020): 39–57.
[15] Rajeshwar Prasad, *Days with Lal Bahadur Shastri: Glimpses from the Last Seven Years* (Allied Publishers, 1991), 285.
[16] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy : Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha,* 101.
[17] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha,* 104.

improved China's strategic geopolitical position concerning India. Shastri released Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah from jail in 1964 so that Shaikh Abdullah could carry out his Hajj. However, the Sheikh met with Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai in Algiers, which India considered 'making propaganda abroad.'[18] Shastri clarified that if the Sheikh visited China, the Indian government would cancel his passport and revoke his Indian citizenship. As soon as the sheik returned to India, he was arrested.[19]

While India was grappling with the Kashmir issue and its increasing closeness to China, Pakistan's President Ayub Khan was invited by the newly elected President of the United States, Lyndon Johnson, to visit Washington in 1967. However, during this time, Ayub also visited China and Moscow, leading President Johnson to cancel his state visit to Pakistan. Shastri perceived the cancellation of visitation by President Johnson as an insult and a cause for concern, as Pakistan was not only strengthening its ties with China but was also being given preferential treatment over India by the United States.[20]

Shastri continued Nehru's policy of nonalignment and directed his efforts towards making India economically self-reliant. Shastri's lack of response to Japan's Asia-Pacific initiative was perceived as a potential danger to nonalignment.[21] PII allowed for a more profound comprehension of Shastri continuing the nonalignment policy. In 1964, Shastri debuted on the international political stage by attending the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Cairo, where he strengthened India's relations with other decolonised states, such as Nepal,

[18] Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*.
[19] Ankit, "Lal Bahadur Shastri," 47.
[20] Rajiv Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy* (Rupa Publications India Pvt Limited, 2020), 38-39.
[21] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*.

by focusing on Indo-Nepal relations with China. Shastri also developed close ties with Egypt's Nasser, Yugoslavia's Tito, and Indonesia's Sukarno.[22]

Initially, Shastri did not authorise the nuclear weapons program; however, he came around to supporting the nuclear program while maintaining nonalignment. However, in November 1964, he approved a subterranean nuclear explosion project for peaceful purposes.[23] It marked a departure from Nehru's idealism and became the basis for India's nuclear weapons program. Shastri's agreement to nuclear testing led to Indira Gandhi's quest to form nuclear partnerships with the major powers. Hence, Shastri's actions on nuclear power illustrate his desire to maintain nonalignment while pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy, demonstrating the PII goal of victimhood by depicting the collective trauma's impact on the leaders, thereby driving the goal of maximising status.

4.2.2. Shastri's Dealings with Pakistan

An analysis of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 requires a comprehension of its origins. The Rann of Kutch, a seasonal salt marsh located in the Thar desert of Kutch district in India and Sindh province in Pakistan, had a crucial role.[24] The dispute began when Pakistan established a security post in Kanjarkot, an area belonging to India, in January 1965.[25] Tensions increased when India objected to Pakistan's intrusion. Pakistan rejected India's objections, citing its own occupation of the territory. India established forward military posts in March and April and deployed heavy forces to the region. In a speech on 11 June 1964, Shastri said, 'We

[22] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*; Ankit, "Lal Bahadur Shastri," 39-57; Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*.
[23] Sumit Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 50.
[24] Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions*, 51.
[25] Chris Ogden, *Indian Foreign Policy* (Germany: Polity Press, 2014).

equal and honourable basis.'[26] Skinnerian interpretation allows for understanding the political climate before India and that the first idea was a pacifist means of negotiation, like Nehru's initial approaches towards Pakistan. However, the need for change in the foreign policy approach is understood through the PII goal of maximising territorial sovereignty. Shastri was prepared to use military force to secure India's interests, reflecting his commitment to realism. The skirmishes between the two armies moved away from Nehru's idealism and toward *realpolitik*.

Pakistan's strategic location caused the loss of territory to India. The ceasefire resulted from international pressure to add an arbitration tribunal under UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson.[27] The invasion of the Rann of Kuchh foreshadowed what was to come. The clearest example is Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir as Operation Gibraltar in August 1965, conceived by Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.[28] Although Bhutto initially pushed for the operation, President Ayub Khan carried it out. Operation Gibraltar was based upon several predictions: (a) that India would not be able to control the Pakistani guerrillas if they infiltrated Jammu and Kashmir; (b) the Pakistani forces would capture the territories before India could counterattack; (c) that the people of Jammu and Kashmir would support Pakistan; and (d) that India would defend Jammu and Kashmir but attack East Pakistan. Pakistan would then use the offensive to persuade China to attack India.[29] However, the leaders of Pakistan had underestimated Shastri,

[26]Lal Bahadur Shastri, "Speeches of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri," 11 June 1964, Parliament Library archives
[27] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 40.
[28] Shivshankar Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present* (Brookings Institution Press, 2021), 123
[29] Jyotindra Nath Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy* (Picus Books, 1998), 81-82.

who launched a direct attack on West Pakistan. Dixit,[30] Ganguly[31] and Menon[32] highlight how Shastri's leadership spun Operation Gibraltar into a resounding victory for India.

Despite the failure of Operation Gibraltar, Ayub Khan proceeded with the face-saving 'Operation Grand Slam' in September 1965.[33] Pakistan captured Akhnoor and the Chicken's Neck, cutting off Jammu and Kashmir. Shastri ordered direct attacks on West Pakistan across all international frontiers— Indian forces were ordered to aim for Lahore and Sialkot, Pakistani cities. Pakistan was forced to withdraw from Jammu and Kashmir and reroute troops to the threatened territories; that PII victimhood argument explains the need to prevent Pakistan from taking over Indian territory. Shastri did not attack East Pakistan to avoid Chinese intervention but succeeded in removing Pakistani forces from Kashmir. Consequently, a ceasefire was declared, with India and Pakistan having captured territories. And, Shastri, in his address to the Parliament, discussed the upcoming Tashkent Summit and the idea he had in mind regarding Kashmir:

> '…I sent a reply on 22nd September to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in which I agreed to his proposal for a meeting between President Ayub Khan and myself in Tashkent to discuss the question of restoration of peaceful relations between India and Pakistan…'
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> '…At the same time, I made it clear that so far as the Kashmir question was concerned it was not possible for us to deviate from the position that Kashmir was a part of India and that there was no question of parting with our territories…'[34]

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[30] Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy; Dixit, Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha.
[31] Ganguly, Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions, 48-49.
[32] Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present*.
[33] Menon, *India and Asian geopolitics: The past, present,* 123; Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, 83.
[34] Lal Bahadur Shastri, "Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri: Proposed Meeting of the Prime Minister with President Ayub Khan at Tashkent and Other Matters," Parliament of India, Lok Sabha, Digital Library.

Shastri's leadership was that of a man who 'wore no ideological blinkers; he saw facts as they were in all their starkness'.[35] Another essential aspect of Shastri's decision-making was that it was based on 'collective thinking'; Shastri consulted with Kamaraj, the Congress president and senior colleagues of the cabinet, unlike Nehru, who often disregarded the advice given to him.[36] Shastri had learned how to handle Pakistan from observing Nehru's dealings with Pakistan over Kashmir. The twenty-two-day skirmish ended in a stalemate barring some Indian strategic gains in Kashmir and the capture of Haji Pir Pass, which was returned to Pakistan.[37] The war ended with the Soviet Union brokering a peace settlement at Tashkent.

4.2.2.1. Tashkent Meeting

The meeting at Tashkent was held from 4-10 January 1966 and was presided over by Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin. It was an attempt by the Soviet Union and the USA to display their superpower status and influence by mediating the settlement of a regional conflict. By then, the USA was engaged in Vietnam; because of this, the Soviets came into this position of mediator, encouraged by the USA.[38]

It was not an entirely peaceful negotiation. Ayub Khan refused to shake hands with Shastri, fearing that for fear that the Pakistani media would report 'a Muslim leader shaking hands with a Hindu'.[39] Ayub Khan had two demands. India had to withdraw from the captured Pakistani territories of West Punjab and Sindh. In addition, Jammu and Kashmir had to be

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[35] P. N. Dhar, *Indira Gandhi, the "Emergency", and Indian Democracy* (Oxford University Press, 2000); Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 39.
[36] J. N. Chaudhury, *Aims, Arms and Aspects* (Bombay: Manaktales Publishers, 1966), 265–270.
[37] Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (New York: Pall Mall, 1968); Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions*, 48; Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 110.
[38] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 43.
[39] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*; "Syed Badrul Ahsan," *The Daily Star*, February 22, 2015.

returned to Pakistani control.[40] Shastri agreed to the first demand but not to the second. After several rounds of bargaining, Shastri agreed to pull Indian forces out of the strategic Haji Pir Pass – a consideration to restore normalcy to relations between India and Pakistan. The Indian defence establishment was not pleased with the decision, and Vajpayee stated that 'Haji Pir, Kargil and Tithwal are part of India legally and constitutionally. Why should we vacate it?'.[41]

The significance of the Tashkent agreement lies in Shastri's contribution to Indian foreign policy. While the normalisation of relations and peace was temporary, it established the 'international image of reasonableness for India'.[42] It also brought to the forefront the dividing line in Pakistan's fate, because of which the division of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 was traced to Bhutto and Tashkent.[43] It marked the beginning of India's *realpolitik*, advanced by Indira Gandhi, who took the reins after Shastri's untimely death in 1966.

4.3. Indira Gandhi: 1966-1977 and 1980-1984

This section examines the reign of the *Goongi Gudiya* (mute doll)[44] Indira Gandhi, elected by the Congress party stalwarts known as the Congress syndicate.[45] Nehru's daughter held office from 1966 to 1977, then from 1980 to 1984. The purpose of analysing her prime ministership is to understand the role of ideas in her foreign policy choices. Therefore, Indira's early life is studied, followed by marked events during her tenure in executing her foreign policy based upon what became known as the 'Indira Doctrine' in relation to post-imperial ideology (PII).

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[40] Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy, 85.
[41] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 44; N. M. Ghatate, ed., *Atal Bihari Vajpayee; Four Decades in Parliament*, vol. 3 (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 1966).
[42] Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, 115.
[43] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 45; Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, 86.
[44] Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present*, 125.
[45] Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present*, 125; Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 46.

4.3.1. Indira Gandhi's Early, Pre-Political Life

Indira Gandhi was born to Jawaharlal Nehru and Kamala Gandhi in 1917.[46] Her father and paternal grandfather were crucial figures in the national freedom movement. Other members of her family were also involved. Indira's childhood was a 'politicised' one.[47] Katherine Frank's biography, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi,* details her childhood, young adulthood, and finally, her political career. She has been compared to Margaret Thatcher and even Napoleon for her grit in handling the position that seemed destined for her. Indira Gandhi was fortunate to have known Mahatma Gandhi as a child, unlike Nehru, who did not meet him until 1916. After Motilal Nehru joined the Satyagraha movement in 1919, the Gandhian ideology influenced the entire Nehru family.[48]

Growing up amidst the national movement, Indira remembered her first political encounter as a child. In September 1920, Gandhi launched the Non-Cooperation Movement, and the call for *Swaraj* was held at a special session of Congress.[49] Indira was brought to the session by her parents and grandfather. She later described watching her family burn English apparel on Gandhi's instructions: 'I still feel the excitement of the day and see the large terrace covered with piles of clothes.'[50] After much contemplation, Indira decided to burn her favourite doll, a foreign product, as part of her patriotic duty.

Consequently, Indira had a fever that made her hate lighting matches as an adult.[51] The vivid childhood memory of Indira displays the influence of the political life of her family members upon her. The active participation of her family members in the national movement

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[46] Kathrine Frank, *Indra: The Life of Indra Nehru Gandhi* (United Kingdom: HarperCollins, 2001), 5.
[47] Pupul Jayakar, *Indira Gandhi: A Biography* (India: Penguin Group, 1992), 3
[48] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 17.
[49] Indira Gandhi, *Remembered Moments: Some Autobiographical Writings of Indira Gandhi* (Indira Gandhi Memorial Trust, 1989); as cited in Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 11.
[50] Indira Gandhi, *My Truth*, ed. Emmanuel Pouchpadass (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1982), 12.
[51] Frank, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi, 12.

made her see less of her father and grandfather. Nehru wrote many letters to his daughter, continuing a practice that Motilal Nehru had begun while his son was studying in England. Hence, through PII victimhood, the explanation of colonialism as a transformative event displays the influence of the historical memories on Nehru and his daughter.

Indira Gandhi's intellectual development is more diverse than her father's, primarily due to her family's political involvement. Her grandfather, Motilal Nehru, initially enrolled her at St. Cecilia's, a western-oriented missionary school.[52] Nehru withdrew her because the staff at the school was entirely British; her attendance violated the boycott of foreign affairs by the Indian National Congress, to which Nehru belonged.[53] Indira Gandhi had Indian tutors at home, and in 1926, her family relocated to Geneva, Switzerland, where her mother was receiving medical treatment. Indira attended the École Internationale in Geneva for a year until the family returned to India.[54]

Back in India, Indira was enrolled at St. Mary's Convent, where she began receiving a Western education.[55] She then attended the Pupil's Own School in Poona, which she did not like. She was also grieving the loss of her grandfather, Motilal Nehru, who passed away in 1931. Nehru continued writing to her, hoping to limit the effects of her Western education.[56] Nehru's collected letters, published as *Letters from a Father to His Daughter'* advised Indira to look beyond India's political turmoil and appreciate life. He also shared his anxiety about the movement, especially when he and Gandhi were imprisoned in 1932. Gandhi had announced his 'fast unto death' to protest the British government's announcement of 'separate electorates'

[52] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 29.
[53] Frank, Indira: *The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*.49
[54] Frank, Indira: *The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 49-50.
[55] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 50.
[56] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 43.

to divide Indian society. Nehru said, 'I am shaken up completely and I know not what to do. News has come, terrible news that Bapu has determined to starve himself to death.'[57]

Although Nehru and Indira corresponded during his imprisonment, Indira also spent time with her mother, who had moved to Calcutta for further treatment for her health.[58] Here, Indira met Rabindranath Tagore, a writer renowned for his writings on nationalism and the national movement.[59] When Indira applied to the school in Shantiniketan, Nehru added a note to her application:

> From her earliest childhood Indira has had to put up with national political troubles and domestic upheavals caused by them. Her education has suffered because of these and there has been no continuity in it. For long periods there has been no peace or quiet in her home atmosphere owing to her parents and other relatives' preoccupation with public affairs and often because of their absence in prison. These events naturally left a strong impression on her growing mind…[60]

Nehru's acknowledgment of the national movement's impact on Indira's life brought to the fore the essence of what PII presents as victimhood, to which I add the generational transmission of victimhood. Skinnerian contextualisation creates the space to discuss how social background and learning influence one's ideological structure, thereby playing a role in influencing the decisions that Indira Gandhi would make as prime minister.

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[57] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 77.
[58] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi,* 78-79.
[59] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*.
[60] "Nehru Papers, Nehru Library."

Indira found peace at the Shantiniketan school.[61] It was her haven and refuge, like when she went to Kashmir in 1934 and found bliss before moving to Shantiniketan to study.[62] Indira did exceptionally well in her history, civics, Hindi, and English studies. She learned French from a German Buddhist monk, Lama Govinda (born Ernst Hoffman).[63] Several visiting professors from Europe taught there. Indira was also introduced to the arts, particularly the classical Indian dance of the Manipuri school. Indira also learned about classical Indian and European music and other arts and crafts, something her family did not encourage.[64]

At age nineteen in 1937, Indira, like her father, entered Somerville College, Oxford. She read the work of Sidney Beatrice Webb and Harold Laski, who influenced Indira's political and economic thoughts. She read her father's *Glimpses of History*, and Nehru pressed Indira to read the works of H.G. Wells and Garibaldi, which she did reluctantly, as she preferred fiction.[65]

Indira said that as a single child, she was surrounded by 'love and energy'. She never described it as traumatic.[66] In one interview, she mentioned not seeing her mother often and that the whole house seemed to be 'in a state of tension that nobody had a normal life'.[67]

> I did not see enough of anybody…We hardly saw each other because people in the house left early in the morning on some sort of work or other in different directions. Sometimes we met for meals. Mostly we did not... [68]

Indira's loneliness stemmed from the in her home. Through PII, the colonial trauma influenced the national movement and the political participation of her family members. As a

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[61] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 128
[62] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 123.
[63] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 129.
[64] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 130.
[65] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 100-101.
[66] "Gandhi, Indira, My Truth, p.12." Excerpt From: Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 39.
[67] Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi,* 50
[68] "Kalhan, Promilla, Kamala Nehru, p. 143." Excerpt From: Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 39.

child, she moved throughout India, lived abroad, and developed a sense of self-reliance. She knew many people and remained close to her parents but had few friends. In 1930, Indira met Feroze Gandhi at Allahabad, where her mother was receiving treatment for her illness, and married him against her parents' wishes.[69]

What becomes apparent is that Indira's childhood is a prime example of how the impact and influence of historical memory, when analysed through PII, explains the kind of decision-making undertaken during her reign. The following section analyses the decisions taken by Indira as prime minister and contrasts her with her father. Through PII, decision-making influence through the ideological perspectives developed and taught to the leaders emerged during their tenure.

4.3.2. The *Goongi Gudiya's* Prime Ministership

Indira Gandhi became prime minister in 1966 and was assassinated in 1984. She served twice for a total of 15 years. Her first term was from 1966 to 1977, and her second from 1980 to 1984. Indira was brought to power by the 'syndicate':[70] the party's stalwarts who expected her to do their bidding on similar grounds as Lal Bahadur Shastri, thinking they could control both.[71]

Indira Gandhi was nicknamed *Goongi Gudiya*, Hindi for 'mute doll' in Hindi, by the socialist leader Ram Manohar Lohia.[72] The syndicate chose Indira because she was Nehru's daughter and believed her family name would attract votes. As it had with Shastri, they miscalculated; Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proved to be a 'confident, assertive, and decisive prime minister'.[73] On the domestic front, Indira's government devalued the rupee, nationalised the banks and continued Shastri's Green Revolution to bring about food security and make

[69] Jayakar, *Indira Gandhi: A Biography*, 137.
[70] Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present*, 125.
[71] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha.*
[72] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 48.
[73] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 48.

India self-reliant, as Nehru had. However, the Emergency of 1975[74] was unpopular, and she was voted out of office.

Although she was the daughter of India's first prime minister, Indira Gandhi had her ideas and vision for India's foreign policy. Nehru kept the foreign minister portfolio as prime minister because of his desire to control India's foreign policy. Unlike him, Indira believed in delegating authority.[75] She controlled foreign policy decision-making but appointed M.C. Chagla, Swaran Singh, and Narasimha Rao (who became prime minister in 1990) as her prime ministers.

When applied to the analysis of Indira Gandhi's foreign policy, PII's collective colonial trauma extrapolates how her upbringing shaped her foreign policy. The influential roles of her paternal grandfather Motilal, her father Jawaharlal Nehru, and even her mother Kamala in the national movement instilled in her 'a deep sense of nationalism and collective Indian identity'[76] and trained Indira her for her role as 'the new empress of India'.[77]

Indira Gandhi entered politics in 1955 as a member of the Congress Working Committee and Central Election of the party; in 1958, she was appointed as a member of the Central Parliamentary Board of Congress and finally became the president of the Congress Party and a member of UNESCO's executive board in 1959. She had been her father's confidante since the mid-1950s and represented India on the UNESCO executive board.[78] In the following sections, PII is used to evaluate Indira's ideas. As a result, when Indira took over as prime minister of India, she determined the best decision that the circumstances dictated.

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[74] Indira called for a national emergency that suspended the fundamental rights of the people for 21 months, this also suspended the elections. During this period most of Gandhi's political opponents were imprisoned and the press were censored.
[75] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 119.
[76] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 119.
[77] "Economist, quoted in Malhotra, Inder, Indira Gandhi," p. 141. Excerpt From: Frank, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*, 342.
[78] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 121.

The following section will focus on decisions made from 1966 to 1977 when India was striving for regional stability, fighting the 1971 war with Pakistan, continuing the nonalignment policy, and conducting nuclear tests. Her second term as prime minister, from 1980 to 1984, saw the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in Sri Lanka.

4.3.3. Indira Gandhi's First Term, 1966-77

Indira had to conduct India's foreign policy at the peak of the Cold War. These years were marked by a strong Soviet presence towards India, good ties between China and Pakistan, and tension between India and China. The rapid growth of China's nuclear power potential was also significant. India had to rebuild its military forces after the 1965 war and resist international pressure to enhance its nuclear and technological capabilities. When Indira rose to power, she transformed India from an 'idealistic player into … a force to be reckoned with'.[79] In a speech on 26 January 1966, she claimed that the guiding principles of Indian foreign policy were 'national interest, honour and dignity.' [80] Apart from acknowledging the need for international peace and cooperation, Indira expressed India's commitment to maintaining friendly relations with all nations following Mahatma Gandhi's and Nehru's principles.

4.3.3.1. Nonalignment and Regional Stability

Indira Gandhi considered Jawaharlal Nehru's idealism inadequate in the age of power politics in the global arena. She had seen the devastating consequences of the 1962 India-China conflict on her father, convincing her that his idealism needed to be tempered with political realism. She also felt betrayed by the major powers of the UN regarding the Kashmir issue, further solidifying her belief in the importance of India's regional security.[81] For this reason, Indira pushed for Indian self-reliance. She concentrated on creating a clear, precise. She was

[79] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 119.
[80] Indira Gandhi, *The Years of Challenge: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi (January 1966-August 1969)* (New Delhi: Publication Division, 1971),.
[81] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 122.

involved in Indian foreign policy that would serve India's economic, political, and security interests—putting self-preservation first—after learning valuable lessons from the traumatic experiences of colonial national struggle, as evidenced by PII.

Surajit Mansingh examined how Indira's childhood and youth affected her views on foreign and domestic politics. Her insecure childhood made her see the global environment as treating India with either hostility or indifference.[82] Therefore, India needed an independent foreign policy focused on territorial integrity. Her vision was for India to be a self-reliant nation with strong economic and security policies tied to Nehru's NAP. She cultivated ties with newly independent African states, seeing their political and economic importance to India and strengthening the nonalignment movement. India developed friendships with Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Cuba.[83] This was seen through Indira's address to the United Nations on its thirty-eight session on 28 September 1983, where she highlighted the recommitment made by the nonaligned nations 'to work for a world that would not be riven by distrust and hatred and for a truly international community where nations would grasp hands of friendship across geographical frontiers.'[84]

For Indira, nonalignment was not the 'avoidance of entanglement' with either of the superpower blocs. It meant 'preserving independence despite close relations with one or both of them'.[85] The formation of close ties between Pakistan and China prompted a pragmatic India to develop ties with other states instead of extending a hand of friendship to them. This demonstrated Indira's efforts to improve India's relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union.[86] As expressed in her speech:

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[82] Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982* (SAGE Publications Pvt. Limited, 1984), 1-2.
[83] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 124-125.
[84] Indira Gandhi, *Address to thirty-eight session of the United Nations*, 28 September 1983.
[85] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 118-125.
[86] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 125.

> '…We are friends today with the United States and the USSR, as well as with a lot of other countries. We are helped by many of these countries and we have tried not to be dependent on any one of these countries..'

Due to the Cold War and the fear of China and the US coming to Pakistan's aid in the event of war, Indira drew closer to the Soviet Union. From 1966 to 1970, the Soviet Union and India intensified their defence and technological cooperation. The Soviet Union's inability to influence Pakistan seemed to work in India's favour. After the 1971 conflict, the Soviet Union and India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in August 1971, sending a strong signal to the US and China. While the treaty marked a significant departure from nonalignment, it outlined the measures to be taken if either country were attacked. This was a much-needed morale boost for India when the United States 'was doing everything it could to destabilise India'.[87] The treaty was also a strong move by India to secure its position as a 'regional powerbroker'[88] and its role in the creation of Bangladesh.

4.3.3.2. Regional Stability

Indira prioritised security and defence for India in South Asia and the world so that India could present itself as a strong, united nation that could stand against other states[89] when needed. This culminated in the 'Indira Doctrine' of 1970, introduced by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the 1970 Congress Party Seminar. The focus was to ensure that 'no foreign power should be allowed to cross the Crest of the Himalayas.' The second principle stated that 'India

[87] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 49.
[88] Harsh V. Pant and Julie M. Super, "7 - Non-Alignment and Beyond," in *New Directions in India's Foreign Policy Theory and Praxis*, ed. Harsh V. Pant (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 134.
[89] Aparna Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy* (HarperCollins, 2017), 67.

would consider the presence or influence of an external power in the region as adverse to its interests unless for power recognised Indian predominance'.[90] In 1971, the Indira Doctrine was applied in Pakistan's war to liberate East Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Indira's overarching concern was regional stability in South Asia. She was sceptical of both superpowers and worked to maintain a healthy distance from both, training her global outlook on India's immediate neighbourhood.[91] Her government upgraded India's defence capacity to withstand military mishaps with Pakistan or China. From 1966 to 1970, she also strengthened ties with Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. She also worked closely with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike to improve relations and balance citizenship for people of Tamil origin in both countries.[92]

4.3.3.3. Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and the Creation of Bangladesh

In 1971, India was at the centre of political unrest between East and West Pakistan and closer to the Soviet Union, despite Indira Gandhi's view of nonalignment as a practical path to maintain independence as she explained:

> '…Alignment might bring more aid but it does not strengthen the self- reliant foundations of freedom. Also, it inhibits people from making their own economic decisions. Hence non-alignment helped us to become more technologically self-reliant. Non-alignment is a policy but not an objective by itself. The objective is freedom of judgement and of action so as to safeguard the nation's true strength and.'[93]

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90 Indira Gandhi's Speech at the A.I.C.C. Seminar on "Some Aspects of Our Foreign Policy," New Delhi, 31 August 1970. Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 137-38.

91 Aparna Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy* (HarperCollins, 2017), 67.

92 Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 123-124.

93 Indira Gandhi, *Inaugural speech at the Silver Jubilee Celebrations of the School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University,* New Delhi (30 October 1980).

However, India's relationship with Pakistan did not improve under Indira Gandhi, and the development of relations between Pakistan and China pushed India towards the Soviet Union. The political unrest arising from West Pakistan's exploitation of East Pakistan led to the 1970 general elections, where the Awami League of East Pakistan won by an overwhelming majority. Between 1970 and 1974, the Indian government developed robust strategic and foreign policy responses to Pakistan's fragmentation and Bangladesh's liberation movement.[94] The 1971 military crackdown displaced East Pakistani residents who fled to India. Sardar Swaran Singh, a senior member of the Indian government, believed India needed to generate international pressure to return these refugees to East Pakistan.[95]

K. Subrahmanyam, the director of the Ministry of Defences think tank, the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA), wrote a policy paper, 'Bangladesh and Our Policy Options', arguing for India's intervention in East Pakistan.[96] India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) began to train covertly and arm defectors from the east with Pakistan rifles and the Mukti Bahini.[97] Indira Gandhi sought diplomatic solutions, seeking support from foreign capitals like Moscow, Paris, Bonn, and Washington, DC. While India gained support for East Pakistan, the Yahya regime and Bhutto campaigned against India, arguing for the break-up of Pakistan. India believed extending support to Bangladesh would create a pro-India state and eliminate the Pakistani threat. This was exemplified in her statement to the Lok Sabha on 24 May 1971:

[94] Kapur, Foreign Policies of India's Prime Ministers, 88-89.
[95] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 129-130.
[96] K. Subrahmanyam, "Bangla Desh and Our Policy Options," *Strategic Analysis* 46, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 128–36.
[97] Surjit Mansingh, *Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2010), 108.

> '…we have never tried to interfere with the internal affairs of Pakistan, even though they have not exercised similar restraint. And even now we do not seek to interfere in any way. But what has actually happened? What was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan, has also become an internal problem for India…'[98]

However, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Indira Gandhi in 1971 to discourage India's support and allow Pakistan to resolve its problem domestically.[99] In December 1971, tensions escalated when Yahya Khan ordered a pre-emptive strike west of the Indian border, leading to a 13-day war between India and Pakistan. Pakistani troops were defeated, and India captured 93,000 soldiers and land in West Pakistan.[100] The creation of Bangladesh ended Pakistan's two-nation theory, which was based on religious beliefs and national identity. Indira's support for the Bangladesh liberation movement reflected the post-imperial ideology goal of maximising status by establishing a strong presence in South Asia.

When Indira travelled to Dhaka in March 1972, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between India and Bangladesh was signed based on the 'Indira Doctrine'.[101] Consequently, in July 1972, Indira Gandhi and Bhutto signed the Shimla Agreement, which restored the area India had gained during the war to Pakistan and freed the prisoners of war. This was accomplished in response to India's requests for a bilateral, amicable resolution of all disputes with Pakistan to rationalise the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir. Although Bhutto had no intention of converting LOC into an international boundary, he had

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[98] Indira Gandhi, *Statement at the Lok Sabha*, (24 May 1971).
[99] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 132-133; Mansingh, *Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy*, 107.
[100] Mansingh, *Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy*, 108; Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 130-131.
[101] Carsten Rauch, "Phases of Indian Foreign Policy since Independence." *Farewell Non-Alignment?: Constancy and Change of Foreign Policy in Post-Colonial India*. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (2008),

verbally promised to do so.[102] Therefore, it was not legally necessary for the future Pakistani leader to keep this pledge if it had not been included in the Shimla Agreement.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi negotiated the Shimla Accord. Bhutto persuaded her that Jammu and Kashmir could only be settled bilaterally or by mutual consent, a statement that has drawn much criticism. India was also criticised for not sending soldiers into West Pakistan during the conflict, given that the Pakistani army was already defeated and without a commander. The main reason the war did not spread into West Pakistan, as considered by Indira and her leading adviser, P.N. Haskar, was that trying to appease the hostile populace would have been disastrous.[103]

4.3.3.4. Indira advocating for Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The nuclear programme that began by Shastri in 1964 gained momentum as Indira established India's first Department of Atomic Energy and Department of Space. This department continued research on making India self-reliant in nuclear weapons and missiles, especially after China's increased nuclear capacity and deployment of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean Region.[104] China detonated its first nuclear explosion in 1964, encouraging India to work towards its nuclear development. Nehru did not publicly support nuclear development, but Indira did and entrusted the project to three senior atomic scientists—Vikram Sarabhai, Homi Sethna, and Raja Ramanna — to develop India's nuclear and space potential.

Through the PII goal of maximising status, India’s nuclear programme is best understood, and the need for a change in India’s strategic calculus is seen through India’s need to look beyond Pakistan and see the posed by China:

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[102] Mansingh, *India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy 1966-1982*, 40-45.
[103] Avtar Singh Bhasin, *India-Pakistan Relations, 1947-2007: A Documentary Study*, vol. I–X (Public Diplomacy Division MEA, 2012).
[104] Dixit, *Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 128.

> …the making of nuclear arms in the shape of medium-range missiles (2000-3000 miles) capable, from sites within India's frontiers, of striking with success not only a few chosen targets in Tibet but of ranging as far afield as the industrial heart of China in Manchuria and in the great river valleys south of it which include some of her principal industries and urban centres of population.[105]

India's pursuit of nuclear development, spearheaded by Indira Gandhi, aimed to secure and expand the country's defence options. The first nuclear test was conducted on 18 May 1974 at Pokhran in the Rajasthan Desert, marking the beginning of India's nuclear weapons program.[106] The nuclear test was a milestone as India was the only non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to have conducted a nuclear test. The West and the USA did not take this well, and Canada ended all nuclear cooperation with India.[107] Indira did not order another test due to the imposition of external sanctions, which India could not economically tolerate. The government that followed under Morarji Desai adopted strong Gandhian principles[108] and was morally opposed to nuclear weapons, suspending India's nuclear development until nuclear tests resumed in 1998 under Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Nuclear weapons displayed India's strength in South Asia and an attempt to balance China's threat to India post-1962 war. India had become a strong player in regional and world politics and a force to reckon with.

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[105] Vivek Prahladan, "The National Interest," The National Interest, December 9, 2016,
[106] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 139; Sumit Ganguly, "Why India Joined the Nuclear Club," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 39, no. 4 (April 1983): 30–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1983.11458979.
[107] Ganguly, "Why India Joined the Nuclear Club," 35-36.
[108] Ganguly, "Why India Joined the Nuclear Club," 38; Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions*, 65; J Singh (ed). *Nuclear India.* New Delhi: Knowledge World as cited in Sumit Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions*.

4.3.4. Indira Gandhi's Second Tenure: 1980-1984

Indira Gandhi was removed from power following the 1975 Emergency.[109] Morarji Desai and Charan Singh served as prime ministers from 1977 to 1980. However, their short terms in office precluded significant progress. When Indira returned to office, she appointed Narasimha Rao as her principal policy adviser and later as foreign minister. Gopalaswami Parthasarathy chaired the Policy Planning Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs.[110] Both advisers were selected for expertise in domestic and diplomatic governance. They worked with Indira on two key issues: the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan and the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Indira's actions during this period illustrate the PII's goal of maximising status, as she sought to make India the hegemon of South Asia.

During the 1980s, Indira Gandhi's leadership collapsed under the traumas of the colonial past and the Janata government's persecutions. A Skinnerian interpretation is, 'She was once again prime minister of India, but her years in the wilderness had left deep scars inhibiting her actions. Suspicion of people, a sense of betrayal and a lack of trust were to journey with her for the rest of her life.'[111] This shines a spotlight on the change in Indira's dealings and her determination to make India a regional hegemon, allowing post-imperial ideology to determine how victimhood and entitlement emerge to attain the goal of maximising status.

4.3.4.1. Indira with Afghanistan and Sri Lanka

The Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 was a response to Afghanistan's establishment as a republic with a presidential form of government in 1973. For

[109] The Emergency was a 21-month long state of emergency declared across India, from 1975 to 77. Constitutional rights were suspended, and a very brutal campaign of coercion and intimidation was launched across India. This brought a lot of criticism to Indira Gandhi and her thirst for power, leading to her being voted out of power in the following elections.
[110] Kapur, Foreign Policies of India's Prime Ministers, 118-119.
[111] Jayakar, *Indira Gandhi: A Biography*, 399.

India, Afghanistan was an important ally and a foil to Pakistan, and the Soviet Union was working to establish a modern, secular, and democratic Afghanistan. Indira carried out Kautilya's strategic policy of befriending an 'enemy's enemy'. India needed to weigh the choices of its political, strategic, and economic interests with the Soviet Union while the two countries had positive relations. India established a policy for raising bilateral objections to the Soviet Union's military engagement. India opposed the involvement at international forums and stood by Afghanistan and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). This changed when India declined to support the resolution denouncing the Soviet invasion, which led to the non-aligned countries' condemnation of the Indira Gandhi administration.[112] Therefore, in the need to maximise status, Indira's second tenure as prime minister exhibited the development of a more Kautilyan strategic identity. Indira Gandhi also interfered in the ethnic war in Sri Lanka between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority. The anti-Tamil riots in 1983 were a result of the ethnic conflicts that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This is visible in the response that Indira Gandhi gave to the Parliament on 5 August 1983 regarding the occurrences in Sri Lanka, where Indira highlighted that the reasons for intervening in Sri Lanka stemmed from the need to restore peace and unity as it impacted India as well:

> '… India does not pose any threat to Sri Lanka, nor do we want to interfere in their internal affairs. I reassured the President on this. We want the unity and national integrity of Sri Lanka to be preserved. At the same time, I pointed out to the President that developments in Sri Lanka affect us also…'[113]

[112] Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past Present*, 179.
[113] Indira Gandhi, *Address to Parliament 5 August 1983*, Parliament Digital Archives.

Approximately 3,000 Tamil refugees fled to India. In addition to her role as a mediator, Indira pressured the Sri Lankan government to find a solution. Special envoys led by External Affairs Ministers P.V. Narasimha Rao and G. Parthasarathy were dispatched to meet with President J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka.[114] The PII goal of maximising status to bring India to a position of being the hegemon of South Asia can be why Indira catered to the domestic needs of the Tamil community in India.[115] Moreover, Sri Lanka was developing close ties with the USA, Pakistan, and Israel, which, according to the PII, goes against the maximising status goal, thereby causing Indira's government to prevent the emergence of another regional adversary alongside Pakistan and China.

4.4. Rajiv Gandhi: The Reluctant Prime Minister (1984-89)

Rajiv Gandhi was born on August 20, 1944, in Bombay (Mumbai), India. On the day of his birth, his maternal grandfather, Jawaharlal Nehru, was serving a prison sentence in Ahmedabad. Rajiv Gandhi's parents were significant Indian politicians: his mother, Indira Gandhi, would become India's first female prime minister, and his father, Feroze Gandhi, was a member of Parliament known for his diligent efforts in legislative matters.[116]

In 1951, Rajiv Gandhi and his brother Sanjay were enrolled at Shiv Niketan school. The teachers described Rajiv as shy, reserved, and interested in painting and drawing. In 1954, Rajiv enrolled at Welham Boys' School and attended the Doon School in Dehradun. Sanjay followed him to both schools.[117] Rajiv Gandhi attended Trinity College, Cambridge, and Imperial College in London, where he took mechanical design courses and earned a mechanical

[114] Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past Present*, 207.
[115] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 143-144.
[116] Meena Agrawal, *Rajiv Gandhi* (Diamond Pocket Books (P) Ltd., 2004).
[117] Aryan D'rozario, "'Young Rajiv' - A Diplomat's Diary," *Outlook India*, February 18, 2023, https://www.outlookindia.com/culture-society/-young-rajiv-a-diplomat-s-diary-weekender_story-263096.

engineering degree. After returning to India in 1966, Rajiv Gandhi sought no further academic degrees.[118]

Rajiv returned to India in the year that his mother became prime minister. He travelled to Delhi and joined the esteemed Flying Club, where he earned his pilot's licence. In 1970, Rajiv was hired by Indian Airlines.[119] Unlike his younger Sanjay, he was not interested in a political career. His friends said he cared more about music, science, and engineering than philosophy, politics, or history.[120] In 1968, after a three-year courtship, Rajiv Gandhi married Edvige Antonia Albina Màino from Italy, who took the name Sonia Gandhi and established India as her residence.

4.4.1. Rajiv Gandhi: The Prime Minister

On 23 June 1980, Sanjay Gandhi, a politician, was active in the Lok Sabha and was considered to be the likely successor to Indira Gandhi; he was killed in an aeroplane accident. Following Sanjay's demise, seventy Congress party members passed a proposal to engage Rajiv Gandhi in politics, so they approached Indira Gandhi with the proposal. However, Indira Gandhi wanted Rajiv Gandhi's decision to step into politics and not coerce him. Rajiv, still working for Indian Airlines, entered politics on 16 February 1981, delivering a speech to a nationwide gathering of farmers in Delhi.[121]

In 1981, Indira Gandhi presided over the All-India Congress Committee, where Vasantdada Patil proposed Rajiv as a candidate to stand for elections for the Amethi constituency in Uttar Pradesh. Rajiv Gandhi won the seat, defeating Lok Dal candidate Sharad

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[118] Agrawal, *Rajiv Gandhi*.
[119] Agrwal, *Rajiv Gandhi*.
[120] David Remnick, "Rajiv Gandhi and the Mantle Unsought," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 1987, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1987/10/20/rajiv-gandhi-and-the-mantle-unsought/779cee82-b666-4248-8116-278d6134a002/.
[121] Krishna V. Ananth, India Since Independence: Making Sense of Indian Politics (Pearson Education India, 2009).

Yadav. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984, the party elected Rajiv Gandhi to assume the presidency of the Congress party, which in turn brought him to secure the largest majority in the history of the Indian Parliament.[122] This outcome granted Rajiv Gandhi complete governmental authority. He also benefited from his reputation of not being corrupt.

The Nehru-Gandhi family played a significant role in Indian politics for four generations. Motilal Nehru, the great-grandfather of Rajiv Gandhi, was a trailblazer in the Indian independence movement. Jawaharlal Nehru's tenure as the prime minister of India spanned seventeen years, beginning on the day India achieved independence from British colonial rule in 1947. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter and Rajiv Gandhi's mother, demonstrated a populist leadership style. Sanjay had been expected to succeed her, even more so since he displayed an inclination towards politics.[123] On the other hand, Rajiv Gandhi had always avoided the political arena and lacked the charisma of both Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

At first, it appeared that Rajiv would emulate his mother and cultivate a charismatic persona. During the 1984 elections, Rajiv Gandhi experienced a significant electoral triumph, which was anticipated by his family's political tradition. However, his popularity proved fleeting.[124]

4.4.2 Rajiv Gandhi's Foreign Policy

Under Rajiv Gandhi, India's foreign policy remained consistent with the policies of Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Rajiv reiterated his commitment to the principles they

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[122] James Manor, "Rajiv Gandhi and Post-Election India: Opportunities and Risks," *The World Today* 41, no. 3 (March 1985): 51–54.
[123] Harish Kapur, "India's Foreign Policy under Rajiv Gandhi," *The Round Table* 76, no. 304 (October 1987): 469–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/00358538708453838.
[124] Kathleen Seip, "Charismatic Leadership in India: A Study of Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi" (Master of Arts dissertation, Graduate College of the Oklahoma State University, 1984).

had outlined: the importance of the United Nations, the non-aligned movement, anti-colonial sentiment, the narrowing of international disparities, and closer relations with neighbours. He proclaimed his faith in many institutions his mother and grandfather established. While in office, he maintained friendly relations with the USSR and the US through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Additionally, India followed a policy of non-intervention with Pakistan and Sri Lanka.[125] Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy was a continuation of the policies established by his mother and grandfather. However, his Western-influenced ideologies were also evident in his liberalisation policies, the modernisation of higher education, and increased government support for science and technology. Such changes initiated by Rajiv Gandhi marked the beginning of change in IFP, which was further undertaken and established by the Narasimha Rao government immediately at the end of the Cold War, catering to the needs of the international system and that of India.

According to Rejaul Karim Laskar, Rajiv Gandhi pushed for a more significant regional role for India as part of his new world vision. Therefore, his foreign policy encompassed a range of strategies to position India as a strong, independent, self-reliant member of the global community.[126] Rajiv Gandhi's diplomacy was conciliatory when necessary and assertive when the situation called for it.

4.4.2.1. India's Neighbourhood

Rajiv Gandhi had a two-dimensional view of India's neighbours. Initially, he supported them whenever they required aid, maintaining a harmonious relationship with their countries

[125] Rafi Tajamul, Shrivastava Usha, and Akhtar Nasreena, "India's Foreign Policy-Retrospect and Prospect," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 9, no. 6 (June 30, 2015): 212–16.
[126] Rejaul Karim Laskar, "Rajiv Gandhi's Diplomacy Historic Significance and Contemporary Relevance," Archive.org, September 21, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20180221161446/http://www.diplomatist.com/dipom09y2014/article015.html.

while safeguarding India's interests.[127] He made a lasting contribution to peace and cooperation with India's South Asian neighbours by establishing SAARC in December 1985. This was seen in Rajiv's statement to the Lok Sabha on 25 April 1985, highlighting how India was determined to intervene in Sri Lanka.

> '…the situation is causing grave concern…I assure the delegation that the Government of India was following the developments in Sri Lanka and their repercussions on India with concern. They have been in continuous touch with the Sri Lankan Government, both through the normal channels and through special visits…'[128]

He also hosted the second SAARC Summit in Bangalore in 1986.[129] He emphasised India's diplomatic approach to its neighbours, especially Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Rajiv Gandhi intervened in the Sri Lankan Civil War of 1986 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attempted to establish an autonomous Tamil state. Gandhi discussed the issue with Sri Lanka's prime minister during the SAARC conference.[130] In response, Sri Lanka imposed a blockade on Jaffna, causing Rajiv Gandhi to order air relief supplies. Sri Lanka viewed this as violating its sovereignty. The India-Sri Lanka Accord, signed in August 1987, aimed to dismantle the LTTE and establish peace in Sri Lanka, which Rajiv expounded in his address to Parliament on 9 November 1987:

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[127] Antony Vigilious Clement, "Rajiv Gandhi's Foreign Policy: Diplomacy in Tough Times," *Modern Diplomacy*, August 9, 2018, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/08/09/rajiv-gandhis-foreign-policy-diplomacy-in-tough-times/.
[128] Rajiv Gandhi, *Address to Parliament 25 April 1985*, Parliament of India, Lok Sabha, Digital Library
[129] Deepak Tripathi, "India's Foreign Policy: The Rajiv Factor," *The World Today* 44, no. 7 (July 1988): 112–14.
[130] Devin T. Hagerty, "India's Regional Security Doctrine," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 4 (April 1, 1991): 351–63.

> '…The Agreement has been acclaimed internationally. There is a widespread consensus that the full implementation of the Agreement will be of universal benefit. Tamil aspirations would be met, the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka preserved, and peace and stability restored to the region. Some of our important security concerns would also be met. Therefore, the Government of India are committed to the full implementation of this Agreement. We believe that this resolve is shared by the Government of Sri Lanka...'[131]

However, Sinhalese nationalists were hesitant to comply while Indian military forces were on their territory. The withdrawal of Indian troops led to the LTTE reclaiming territories, and the Sri Lankan government's failure to disarm the LTTE led to Rajiv Gandhi's death.

4.4.2.2. India-Pakistan Relations

Full diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan were restored in 1986 after the Pakistan War in 1971. The government of Rajiv Gandhi launched the *Aman Ki Asha* (Hope for Peace) initiative to promote dialogue, understanding, and peace between India and Pakistan through media and cultural exchanges. He also advocated using cricket as a diplomatic instrument to enhance relations with Pakistan.[132]

In February 1987, the president of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, met with Gandhi in Delhi. The purpose of their meeting was to discuss the routine military exercises of the Indian army that were taking place on the borders of Rajasthan and Punjab. Rajiv Gandhi and Zia-ul-Haq met in Islamabad in 1988 for another round of discussions. The Islamabad-Murree Agreement resulted from a bilateral agreement to strengthen relations between the two

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[131] Rajiv Gandhi, *Address to Parliament 9 November 1987*, Parliament of India, Lok Sabha, Digital Library.

[132] Shivaji Ganguly, "India's Foreign Policy Initiatives," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 41, no. 3–4 (July 1985): 390–400,

nations and reduce tensions. As a result of Rajiv Gandhi's efforts, India and Pakistan restored diplomatic relations in 1986.

In December 1988, Gandhi again visited Islamabad and met with the newly appointed prime minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, to reaffirm the Shimla agreement of 1972.[133] He was the first Indian prime minister to visit Pakistan after Jawaharlal Nehru. A sense of optimism in India and Pakistan relations characterised the Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto era. The two leaders signed the Non-Nuclear Attack Agreement during this visit, and the parliaments of India and Pakistan ratified it on 27 January 1991. The treaty prohibited its signatories from conducting surprise attacks or aiding a foreign power in attacking each other's nuclear installations and facilities.[134] Through post-imperial ideology, the goal of maximising status and territorial sovereignty is how Rajiv Gandhi protected India's interests.

4.4.2.3. India- China Relations

Official ties between India and China were severed after the Sino-Indian War of 1962. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian prime minister to visit China in 26 years. During this visit, the two parties agreed to reopen their embassies, a milestone in normalising bilateral relations. The rapprochement eased tensions on the India-China border. The military investment on the border was reduced, and the Indian Army regularly redirected its mountain divisions, initially intended for China-related operations, to counter-insurgency efforts. Rajiv Gandhi reiterated India's dedication to the five *Panchsheel* principles for peaceful coexistence jointly articulated by India and China in 1954.[135] He initiated a dialogue with China to resolve the long-standing border disputes between the two countries but could not conclude them

[133] Tripathi, "India's Foreign Policy: The Rajiv Factor,"
[134] B. M. Jain, "Indo-Pakistan Relations under the Rajiv-Benazir Leadership," *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 1, no. 2 (December 1988): 58–64.
[135] Dilip Bobb, "Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Visit to China Marks a New Beginning in Bilateral Relations," *India Today*, January 15, 1989, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19890115-prime-minister-rajiv-gandhi-visit-to-china-marks-a-new-beginning-in-bilateral-relations-815628-1989-01-14.

during his tenure. Rajiv Gandhi had earlier continued certain foreign policy choices based on the situation. At the same time, post-imperial ideology can be applied to understand the maximising status goal of victimhood.

4.4.2.4. Rajiv Gandhi and Non-Alignment

Rajiv Gandhi believed securing India's national interest required the cooperation of all the world's major powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union. He established cooperation with technologically advanced countries such as the US to support India's economic and technological modernisation. In June 1985, six months after becoming prime minister, he visited the US. Rajiv Gandhi and President Ronald Reagan established good relations during this visit.[136] He also strengthened India's warm relationship with the USSR, which he inherited from his mother. He enjoyed a personal connection with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Under Rajiv Gandhi, the Indo-Soviet friendship became ingrained in the public mind. The Soviet Union benefited from this development, as it allowed the nation to counter the attempts of Western powers to isolate it. Rajiv Gandhi's first state visit as prime minister was to Moscow in May 1985. This visit reflected the robust and amicable relationship between India and the Soviet Union.[137] The Delhi Declaration, a collaborative statement issued by Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi, was made during Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1986. It supported the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence as a fundamental principle of international relations.[138] India and the USSR had recently entered into new economic and technical cooperation agreements. The focus of these collaborations revolved around nuclear

[136] Devendra Kaushik, "India, USSR and East Europe: Emerging Trends Under Rajiv Gandhi," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 41, no. 1 (January 1985): 6–16.
[137] 'Rajiv as PM Initiated an Activist Foreign Policy Complemented by Aggressive Military Posture,' *India Today*, August 15, 1989, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/editors-note/story/19890815-rajiv-as-pm-initiated-an-activist-foreign-policy-complemented-by-aggressive-military-posture-816425-1989-08-14.
[138] Kaushik, "*India, USSR and East Europe*."

power technology, space technology, and high-temperature physics, all the while promoting the NAP.

4.4.2.5. Nuclear Disarmament

Rajiv Gandhi's aspiration for a nuclear-weapon-free world culminated in the inaugural summit meeting of the Six Nations Five Continent Initiative for nuclear disarmament in January 1985. This significant event occurred only three months after he had become prime minister.[139] However, his most significant contribution to global nuclear disarmament was the Action Plan he presented during his address to the third special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 June 1988. Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan was the most equitable, realistic, and practical proposition for a world without nuclear weapons ever put forth by a government leader.[140] In his words:

> Alas, nuclear weapons are not the only weapons of mass destruction. New knowledge is being generated in the life sciences. Military applications of these developments could rapidly undermine the existing convention against the military use of biological weapons. The ambit of our concern must extend to all means of mass annihilation.[141]

Rajiv Gandhi's approach to nuclear strategy aligned with that of Indira Gandhi, and he remained committed to maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. Rajiv Gandhi initiated the revival of the nuclear programme in response to reports of Pakistan's affluent and restrained nuclear programme. Therefore, post-imperial ideology explains that the need to defend India's status and territorial sovereignty would best explain why Rajiv Gandhi revived

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[139] Bibhuti Bhusan Biswas, "India and Nuclear Disarmament: The Relevance of Rajiv Gandhi's Disarmament Action Plan in 21st Century," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 72, no. 1 (March 2011): 293–301.

[140] Sandeep Dikshit, "Rajiv Gandhi Plan: A Valuable Solution," *The Hindu*, August 9, 2010, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Rajiv-Gandhi-Plan-a-valuable-solution/article16124741.ece.

[141] "Fifteenth Special Session General Assembly Provisional Verbatim Record of The Fourteenth Meeting," *UNITED NATIONS General Assembly*, June 1988.

the nuclear programme. With the help of General Krishnaswami Sundarji, chief of the Indian Army, and Arun Singh, his minister of state for defence, Rajiv Gandhi modernised the armed forces. He provided government assistance to the Department of Atomic Energy.[142]

Conclusion

This conclusion offers a brief analysis of three of India's prime ministers. The findings will be expanded in Chapter Seven to demonstrate the relationship between ideas, continuity and change in Indian foreign policy.

This chapter examines the growth of the post-colonial identity of the Indian state, which Gandhi advocated through his principle of *Ahimsa*. The three prime ministers featured in this chapter embraced these principles but added a hint of pragmatism.

Through the Skinnerian method of contextualisation, an analysis of the biographies of the leaders explored their socio-political background before becoming prime ministers. What emerged is the historical experience of colonialism and the national freedom movement. For example, Shastri and Indira Gandhi had participated in the freedom movement. They had observed Mahatma Gandhi's leadership of the *Swadeshi* movement and the factionalism within the Indian National Congress. As a teenager, Shastri admired Gandhi and participated in the freedom movement. Indira Gandhi, in contrast, had been brought into the movement by her family.

What emerges is that despite having different educational backgrounds— Indira Gandhi, like her father and her son, had received a Western education; Shastri had been educated entirely in India. The influence of the ideas of Gandhi and Nehru was so ingrained in them that it was reflected in their foreign policy choices.

[142] "Restraint and Affluence," n.d.

Through PII, the goals of maximising territorial integrity and status were prevalent in the foreign policy choices of all three leaders. The nonalignment policy that Nehru began continued under his successors. All three made overtures to the USSR based upon the pragmatic interests of the Indian state. However, publicly, the overarching foreign policy continued to espouse nonalignment. This supports my argument that these three leaders represented the Nehruvian pragmatist school of ideas.

Nehru's idealism, a result of *Ahimsa*, was initially continued by Shastri, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi in their dealings with Pakistan and China. The change is based upon circumstances that require them to be pragmatic. For example, in his brief tenure as prime minister, Shastri resorted to *realpolitik*, especially during the negotiations at Tashkent. Similarly, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi's relationship with Pakistan demonstrates the post-imperial ideology goal of maximising status, as both leaders aspired to make India the regional hegemon of South Asia. This is apparent in Indira's involvement in the war with Pakistan in 1971, leading to the creation of Bangladesh, and later in Rajiv Gandhi's intervention in Sri Lanka's civil war. It was also seen in Indira Gandhi's involvement in the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan, which illustrates the maximising status goal of making India the hegemon of South Asia.

Additionally, India's nuclear test conducted under Shastri enabled Indira Gandhi to commence establishing India as a nuclear power. While Indira and Rajiv Gandhi pushed for nuclear non-proliferation, they did not end India's nuclear development programme, which, through post-imperial ideology, demonstrates the goal of maximising status and territorial sovereignty. Therefore, by applying the PII to the foreign policy choices of Shastri, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, the Gandhian post-colonial identity of the Indian state appears, explaining the continuity of foreign policy goals of territorial integrity and strategic autonomy.

Chapter 5: Post-Cold War Indian Foreign Policy: Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee's Pragmatic Liberalism

This chapter examines the prime ministerships of P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) and Atal Bihari Vajpayee (13 days in 1996 and from 1998-2004), while glimpses of pragmatism were seen in the policies undertaken by Shastri and Indira, two leaders who introduced pragmatic liberalist changes into Indian foreign policy after the Cold War. The first section uses the Skinnerian interpretation method to examine Rao's formative years, followed by applying post-imperial ideology (PII) to his foreign policy choices. In this way, it is possible to understand the nexus between the continuity and change in India's foreign policy. The second section applies the Skinnerian method to Vajpayee's leadership to trace his ideological development. PII is then applied to his foreign policy decisions. This chapter aims to understand the pragmatic liberalist perspective in Indian foreign policy.

5.1. Narasimha Rao (1991-97)

This section analyses the life of Narasimha Rao, beginning with his childhood and education, to understand the formation of his ideology. It then describes his early political career as he climbed the ladder to becoming prime minister.

5.1.1 The Developing Years of Narasimha Rao: Childhood and Education

P.V. Narasimha Rao was born on 28 June 1921[1] to a Brahmin family in Vangara, a rice field settlement in the Karimanaga,[2] part of the princely state of Hyderabad. The princely states were a world unto themselves under British colonial rule. The princely state of Hyderabad is the size of England, Scotland and Wales combined.[3] However, the British used their treaties

[1] This was the time of Gandhi's 'Non-Cooperation' Movement that was launched in 1920.
[2] Vinay Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 12.
[3] Ādirāju Veṅkaṭēśvararāvu, *The Right Prime Minister: A Political Biography of P.V. Narsimha Rao* (Satya Publications: Sole Distributors Book Links Corp, 1993), 23.

with the Nizam of Hyderabad to inflame religious divisions, as the state had a Muslim rule with a sizeable Hindu population. This was done through land ownership— the *zamindari* system[4] that encouraged further exploitation. In 1921, the spread of nationalism in Hyderabad challenged the exploitations of the *zamindari*.

At the age of four, Rao was adopted by his rich, heirless Brahmin neighbours to prevent his family's land from getting seized by the Nizam of Hyderabad. Rao was sent to a school in the nearest village; thus, he was kept away from his birth parents, whom he visited once every five months.[5] This separation from his family at the age of seven had a lasting impact on Rao and haunted him for his entire life.[6] Rao was ten years old when he married his adoptive mother's relative in 1931 to retain ownership of family lands and keep the lands within the family line[7]. Rao lost his biological father at fourteen. Despite being adopted, Rao ensured he looked after his family.[8] Hence, Rao's education took him from the village to the city and eventually into politics. Thus, Rao was a victim of the exploits of colonial rule in India on a personal level. The post-imperial ideology used to analyse his early life displays the victimisation of colonialism as a transformative event.

Vinay Sitapati's biography of Rao presents a sad image of the young Rao: 'by the age of ten, Rao had experienced adoption, separation and marriage— all thrust on him without his

[4] Information gained through Sitapati's interview with P.V Prabhakara Rao for the biography in 2016 as cited in Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*, 13; N. Purendra Prasad, "Agrarian Class and Caste Relations in the United Andhra 1956-2014," *Economic & Political Weekly* 50, no. 16 (April 18, 2015): 78.
[5] Sitapati, The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao, 14.
[6] Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*, 15.
[7] Narendra Reddy, *P.V. Narasimha Rao, Years of Power* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1993), 36-37.
[8] Information gained through Sitapati's interview with P.V. Prabhakara Rao as cited in Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*.

choice.'[9] This is what Sitapati wrote as an analysis of how Rao viewed himself— as someone who was going through life finding that 'less and less of his self-determined his actions.'[10]

Rao's choices were made for him by his family; the only decision he made was his education. Rao's exceptional academic achievements earned him the distinction of being in the top ranks in the entire state of Hyderabad in 1937, inspiring him to pursue further studies. Rao's time at university is what got him involved in the political campaigns and the *Satyagraha* movement launched by the Indian National Congress, eventually commencing his political career at the age of seventeen in 1938.[11] At this time, Rao joined a protest with other students, leading to their expulsion, because of which Rao had to complete his degree from Nagpur University.[12]

After completing his degree, Rao moved to Pune to study astronomy. Here, Rao was introduced to the writings of Savarkar and P.C. Joshi, who spoke of Karl Marx and the misfortunes of the Indian peasants. Rao even read the works of Gopal Krishna Gokhale.[13] Moreover, while in school, he read Nehru's autobiography, Nehru's letters titled *From a Father to a Daughter* and *Glimpses of World History*. Moreover, it was in such readings that Rao was introduced towards discovering what he believed in — an ideology; he wanted to find 'an idea, an idea he believed in,'[14] which is what Rao describes in his autobiography about how he began to think. Therefore, Rao's opinions were shaped by the pre-independence politicians he read about and followed. Rao's upbringing as a Southern Brahmin in a Muslim princely state, who was adopted and then educated in several villages, affected his thinking. Hence, the application of the Skinnerian method to Rao's life, and later in combination with post-imperial ideology,

[9] Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*, 16.
[10] P V Narasimha Rao, *The Insider* (Penguin UK, 2000).
[11] Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*, 16-17.
[12] Reddy, *P.V. Narasimha Rao, Years of Power*, 37.
[13] Sitapati, The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao, 15.
[14] Reddy, *P.V. Narasimha Rao, Years of Power*, 40.

allows for an understanding of the victimhood Rao felt from colonial rule, which is present in his foreign policy choices, even as he brought about changes to Indian foreign policy.

5.1.2. The Early Political Life of Narasimha Rao

Having moved away from home, Rao completed his education in Pune, Maharashtra. He had hoped to study astronomy in the U.K. but had to join the family business. He later earned a law degree in Nagpur, Maharashtra. In 1938, Rao attended a meeting of the Indian National Congress in Gujarat, where *Purna Swaraj* (Complete Independence) was declared. From that point, he was active in Andhra's section of the Quit India Movement, formed in 1942.[15]

Rao's childhood, education and political beliefs contributed to his strong sense of nationalism. Post-independence, Rao served as Andhra Pradesh's Chief Minister from 1971-73. Rao moved into national politics in the late 1970s, gaining foreign policy expertise as a member of the All-India Congress Committee and later as India Gandhi's General Secretary. Sitapati, in his analysis of Rao's complex childhood traumas and adoption, separation from family, leaving home, and early child marriage, expressed how the impacts of it all 'had made him solitary.'[16] Rao's tendency to isolate himself carried over into his political career; he had few friends and enemies.[17] However, despite his quiet demeanour, Rao led the education, health, law and endowments and was compared to a lion. Having personally encountered the inequities of the feudal system, he continued Nehru's attempts to end them. As prime minister, Indira Gandhi devoted considerable effort towards instituting reforms, and Rao implemented reforms. The Skinnerian interpretation used to carry out the historical analysis of Rao's upbringing sheds light on the socio-economic conditions in which Rao was raised, and that shaped his way of thinking and his early political career. Therefore, Rao's understanding of economic reforms is visible in his foreign policy.

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[15] Sitapati, The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao, 28.
[16] Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*, 31.
[17] Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*, 31.

Being brought up as a Southern Brahmin in a Muslim princely state, who was adopted and then pursued his education in different villages, undoubtedly impacted his way of thinking and influenced his outlook, distinguishing Rao's mindset from the other ministers in Congress governments in the 1970s and 1980s. However, his politics were untainted by religion and caste biases.[18] Rao was a lawyer and a linguist who spoke at least five languages: Telugu, Hindi, Marathi, Kannada, and Urdu. His maternal and paternal ancestors hailed from villages that were 'geographically… a bridge between the North and the South'.[19] He also studied English and Spanish. His intellectual interests centred on literature, philosophy, law, and politics.[20] Rao did not need a Western education to be well versed in global affairs, even though he lacked the kind of global exposure that Nehru and Indira had through their personal experiences of education in the West.

Rao served in the Ministry of Defence (1980) and later the Ministry of Home Affairs (1982) under Indira Gandhi, and later became Minister of External Affairs in the Rajiv Gandhi government (1988-89). Rao gained much global exposure while working closely on the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan. Rao also tried to resolve the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka. These initiatives gave Rao firsthand experience in the formulation and execution of India's foreign policy.

5.1.3. Taking Charge of Post-Cold War India

This chapter section uses the Skinnerian interpretation and the post-imperial ideology to examine Prime Minister Rao's foreign policy choices.

Before becoming prime minister, Rao served as a minister to Indira Gandhi (1980-84) and Rajiv Gandhi (1988-89). Narasimha Rao, often called India's 'forgotten prime minister,' as his contributions get overlooked chiefly since he was not entirely accepted by his party

[18] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 228.
[19] Reddy, P.V. Narasimha Rao, Years of Power, 232.
[20] Sitapati, The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao, 14.

people,[21] assumed office in June 1991. Rao steered India in a new domestic and international direction as prime minister.[22] Before Rao came to power, there had been two weak successions to Rajiv Gandhi's government- V.P Singh, PM for 343 days before he became the first PM to step down after a vote of no confidence (November 1989- December 1990) and Chandra Shekar, member of the Samajwadi Janata Party who resigned due to loss of party support, served for only 223 days (November 1990- June 1991). The domestic political arena presented Rao with the challenge of being able to deal with party politics and remain in power for a full term.[23] India's changing geopolitical environment was first signalled by P. V. Narasimha Rao on 29 September 1991, characteristically without much fanfare:

> 'Now, the Cold War is over', he observed, 'there is an element of cooperation instead of confrontation. It is a new situation. And we have to respond to that also. So, certain policy reorientations will take place to ensure that our national interest does not suffer.'[24]

Subsequently, the new leadership post-1990 turned its attention to economic liberalisation through India's need to form close ties with other countries. Rao's Look East Policy (LEP) of 1991 became the cornerstone[25] of India's foreign policy, creating the space for his successors to engage in South and Southeast Asia.[26] Rao, an unlikely candidate for prime

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[21] Shekhar Gupta, "Why Narasimha Rao Is India's Most Vilified, Deliberately Misunderstood and Forgotten PM," *Theprint,* December 23, 2018, https://theprint.in/opinion/why-narasimha-rao-is-indias-most-vilified-deliberately-misunderstood-and-forgotten-pm/24463/.
[22] Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy," *India Review* 8, no. 1 (February 10, 2009): 12.
[23] Sitapati, The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao, 260-265.
[24] Narasimha Rao, Speech in New Delhi on September 29, 1991. Cited in Chan-Wahn Kim, *Economic Liberalization and India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2006), 175.
[25] Harsh V. Pant, "India in East and Southeast Asia: 'Acting East with an Eye on China,'" in *Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview*, ed. Harsh V. Pant (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 179.
[26] Arijit Mazumdar, "From 'Look East' to 'Act East': India's Evolving Engagement with the Asia-Pacific Region," *Asian Affairs* 52, no. 2 (March 15, 2021): 358.

minister, on the verge of retirement due to the denial of a party ticket in the 1991 general elections, emerged as one of the most influential and creative influences on Indian foreign policy after Nehru.[27] To understand Rao's foreign policy and its ideological implications, studying his life, education, and role in the national movement is necessary. Rao's Look East Policy, India's relations with China and Pakistan during his tenure as prime minister, and India's nuclear energy policy are the topics of the succeeding sections.

5.1.3 (a) Liberalisation of the Indian Economy: Rao's Look East Policy

In his analysis of India's prime ministers, Rajiv Dogra describes Rao as 'the sphinx-like enigma' who rose to power. As prime minister, Rao saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of independent states in Central Europe, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Gulf Wars. At the same time, India's economy was weak, and sentiments for Punjab separatism and Kashmir secessionism were rising:

> 'The economy is in a crisis. The balance of payments situation is exceedingly tricky. Inflationary pressure on the price level is considerable. There is no time to lose. The government and the country cannot keep living beyond their means and there are no soft options left. We must tighten our belts and be prepared to make the necessary sacrifice to preserve our economic independence which is an integral part of our vision for a strong nation.'[28]

Rao addressed the nation on 22 June 1991, after taking office as Prime Minister, to report on the plight of the Indian economy and his agenda for economic reform. His first

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[27] Jyotindra Nath Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha* (HarperCollins, 2004), 225.

[28] Narasimha Rao, "*Towards Wiping Every Tear from Every Eye*," Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India. (22 June 1991).

initiative, in collaboration with Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, was bold economic reform— increased private enterprise, devaluation, delicensing, and trade liberalisation.[29] Rao's solution to the balance of payments crisis marked a departure from Nehru's 'socialist pattern of society' and the Industrial Policy Resolution 1956.[30] Rao's pragmatic shift away from Nehruvian idealism was not based on an ideological belief but on the 'need of the hour'.[31] What had begun as pragmatic policy, a departure from Nehru idealism, took root under Indira Gandhi and Shastri but sprouted under Rao. Rao's economic reforms received much criticism from the opposition led by the BJP. However, his policies bore fruit within two years— by 1994, India's GDP had increased to 6.7% a year, with private companies reporting a nearly 84% increase in profits.[32]

While Nehru and Indira Gandhi had also prioritised economic development, their approach was based on self-reliance, resulting from India's colonial trauma. Rao's economic policies did not abandon the Nehruvian principles entirely; the Look East policy was rooted in Nehru's *Panchsheel* principles of territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Despite this, Rao's economic reforms set the stage for his successors to complete India's economic recovery, which is the goal of PII, the aim to become a victim again. This was achieved by Rao's linkage of the economy to foreign policy, serving as the necessary fulcrum for India's economic linkages with foreign policy.[33]

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[29] Shashi Bhushan Kumar, "P.V. Narasimha Rao: The Precursor of the Era of Economic Reforms in India," *Indian Journal of Public Administration* 63, no. 4 (November 22, 2017): 616–30; Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*, 141.
[30] Sitapati, *The Man Who Remade India: A Biography of P.V. Narasimha Rao*, 617.
[31] Rajiv Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy* (Rupa Publications India Pvt Limited, 2020), 85.
[32] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 87.
[33] Aparna Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy* (HarperCollins, 2017), 83.

Look East Policy (LEP)

J.N Dixit, who served as an Indian High Commissioner to several nations before becoming the Foreign Secretary from 1991-1994, described Rao's foreign policy as 'one of the most effective and creative' after Nehru's.[34] The transition from idealistic and liberal internationalism to pragmatism commenced under Indira Gandhi (at that time, Rao was minister of External Affairs) and Rajiv Gandhi and was continued by Rao.[35] Rao's Look East Policy focused on re-engagement with East Asia.[36] Rao introduced the LEP in his Speech "India and the Asia-Pacific: Forging a New Relationship" at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, on 8 September 1994, where he highlighted the need for regional cooperation and integration:

> '… We cannot ignore the fact that while the world has become a smaller place, thanks largely to the technologies of travel and telecommunications, the hiatus between regions, nations and even communities, may be said to have increased in one sense…'
>
> '…While India has been observing the Asia-Pacific drama objectively, we cannot ignore the fact that our civilisations are organically linked to those which have founded so many of the nation-states of East and Southeast Asia…'[37]

India's economic development would be fulfilled through its foreign policy. India's economic liberalisation shifted from Indira Gandhi's policy of self-reliance to economic

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[34] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 224.
[35] M.S. Rajan, "Pragmatism in India's Foreign Policy," *South Asian Survey* 1, no. 1 (March 1994): 87–100, https://doi.org/10.1177/097152319400100106, 87.
[36] Harsh V. Pant, *Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).
[37] Narasimha Rao, "India and the Asia-Pacific: Forging a New Relationship," PV Narasimha Rao: Selected Speeches, Vol. 4, 1994-95, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India (September 8, 1994).

interdependence through globalisation. The need to remain nonaligned with Western powers was part of Rao's Look East Policy that sought to tie India to the booming economies of Southeast and East Asia.[38] The LEP intensified India's economic engagement, making India an integral part of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as its sectorial (1992) and then full dialogue partner (1995). India also joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)in 1996. In this sense, the LEP paved the way for India's Act East policy under the Singh and Modi governments.

Rao's economic reforms and the opening of foreign policy to the world reflected Nehru's perspective that security without economic strength was futile. Hence, as Aparna Pande emphasises, Rao's ability was 'to weave in economic means into foreign policy priorities'[39] , which was what India needed at the time. The LEP allowed India to assume a more proactive role in the region, furthering more robust engagement. However, it was not an entire shift from nonalignment, as the primary idea was to establish India as a regional partner in its extended neighbourhood. Rao's LEP, when examined under the lens of PII, exhibits the Gandhian principles that Nehru, Shastri, and Indira incorporated to maximise India's regional status through cooperation. However, Kautilya's strong strategic ideas ensured the maintenance of good relations with countries close to the core (India) while befriending countries that are or may come to be in opposition to India, joining forces with the enemy.

Thus, the PII victimisation goals of maximising status through India's LEP displayed India as a cooperative liberal state looking to conduct economic relations with its extended neighbours.

[38] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 88.
[39] Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy*, 83-84.

5.1.3 (b) India and China Relations

While Pakistan was a significant bone of contention for the Rao government, the LEP provided India the opportunity to develop a sort of détente with China. The step up for the détente was evident with the drive to develop friendly relations through Rao's speech at the dinner hosted in honour of Premier Li Peng of China and Madame Zhu Lin in New Delhi on 11 December 1991. Rao highlighted their staggering friendship, the ancient religious connection through Buddhism, and the coexistence principles of *Panchsheel* and highlighted the need to develop friendly ties, especially since both countries are neighbours:

> "…we are neighbours. Geographical inevitability is the elemental factor in our relations regardless of the ups and downs in them. Our thoughts and our cultures have intermingled with each other through history. This confluence of influences, of art and culture enriched our civilisations. There is a lesson to be learnt from these, our ancient interaction, for it conveys the imperatives of good neighbourliness, of fruitful dialogue, of peace and of progress which should characterise our relations…"[40]

Rao commented on the need for the development of better ties as he continued in his speech:

> '… The government and people of India sincerely desire to strengthen our understanding and co-operation with China. We wish to nurture our relationship as two countries which stand for peace and development…'[41]

[40] Narasimha Rao, "*Let Us Come Together in the Unity That Is Living*," Selected Speeches, Vol.1, 1991-92, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India. (dinner hosted in honour of Premier Li Peng of China and Madame Zhu Lin, December 11, 1991).
[41] Rao, Let Us Come Together in the Unity That Is Living. 344.

Rao's state visit to China in 1993 reciprocated Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to India in December 1991; his visit produced the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Agreement.[42] This landmark agreement permitted India and China to mute their border tensions and focus on developing bilateral economic relations.[43] The treaty extended the five principles of 'mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence'[44] that constituted Nehru's *Panchsheel* with China. The efforts of friendly relations with China are evident in Rao's speech during

India established friendly ties with China and reaped the economic advantages. Nevertheless, the Rao administration did not perceive China as a significant source of apprehension, the kind of threat that Pakistan was. The Kautilyan *Mandala* theory explains the need to appease one's enemy, especially when threats are low. Therefore, The PII goal of maximising territorial sovereignty appears to have been partially met, with the calming of the border dispute. As the treaty stipulated: 'Neither side will undertake specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones. Each side shall give the other prior notification of military exercises of specified levels near the line of actual control permitted under this Agreement.'[45]

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[42] Shashi Bhushan Kumar, "P.V. Narasimha Rao: A Strategist and Commanding Contributor to Governance," *Indian Journal of Public Administration* 69, no. 1 (July 22, 2022): 229–40,
[43] Kumar, "P.V. Narasimha Rao," 229–40.
[44] Mahesh Shankar, "Showing Character: Nehru, Reputation, and the Sino-Indian Dispute, 1957–1962," *Asian Security* 11, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 99–115,
[45] R. L. Bhatia and Jiaxuan Tang, "Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas," September 7, 1993, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_930907_Agreement%20on%20India-China%20Border%20Areas.pdf.

At the same time, Rao's pragmatic foreign policy aided in establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992.[46] However, Rao remained faithful to Nehru's NAP, aiming not to be 'pulled or pushed around by the big powers or groups of states.'[47] The constant exercise of subconscious victimhood to keep India's territorial autonomy was a safe position that Rao pursued, displaying the PII goal - victimhood will not be revisited. So, Rao concentrated on building relations with the Middle East, becoming the first Indian prime minister to visit Tehran since the 1979 revolution.[48] The cultivation of relations benefited India at a time when Pakistan was bringing the Kashmir issue to the U.N. after the Babri Masjid incident.[49] Rao deftly managed India's alliances and partnerships. The following section will examine India's relations with Pakistan under the Rao government, the Babri Masjid demolition of 1992 and the re-emergence of Jammu and Kashmir.

5.1.3 (c) India and Pakistan

India's prime ministers have been at odds with Pakistan, India's most challenging neighbour. Rao engaged with Pakistan first in the 1980s in response to the rise of separatist organisations in Jammu and Kashmir. Under the Tulbul Navigation Project of the 1980s, he repaired economic and cultural ties and signed a border agreement for the Siachen glacier. This move was intended to defuse tensions and promote peace.[50] Rao's encounter with Pakistan emerged after the Babri Masjid[51] demolition on 6 December 1992. It led to riots in Bombay

[46] Rajan, "Pragmatism in India's Foreign Policy," 87; Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 88; Sumit Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 107.
[47] Kumar, "P.V. Narasimha Rao," 230.
[48] P.R. Kumaraswamy, "India and Israel: Emerging Partnership," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25, no. 4 (December 2002): 192–206, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390412331302915.
[49] Shivshankar Menon, *India, and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present* (Brookings Institution Press, 2021), 219-220.
[50] Menon, India, and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present, 218.
[51] On 6 December 1992, the opposition BJP and its supporters destroyed a 400-year-old mosque that had been built on the site of a temple at a spot that some Hindus consider the birthplace of

(now known as Mumbai) that were ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) supported and Dawood Ibrahim (an Indian criminal) sponsored in 1993, increasing tensions between India's Hindus and Muslims and destabilising India-Pakistan relations.[52]

On 22 February 1994, the Indian government unanimously passed a resolution demanding that Pakistan cease its support for such acts of terror, the riots in Mumbai and increasing tensions between Hindus and Muslims in India. Pakistan, however, refused. Consequently, Narasimha Rao sent a bold message to Pakistan in his Independence Day speech:

> '…With you, without you, in spite of you, Kashmir will remain an integral part of India', and 'It is our firm determination to squarely meet such threats.'[53]

At the same time, India was fighting separatist terrorist groups in Kashmir that Pakistan was supporting. Pakistan then accused India of human rights violations in Kashmir.[54] Nevertheless, India received support from Tehran and China. So, these nations and the USA neutralised their support for cross-border terrorism.[55]

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the god Ram. The resulting riots and communal tensions in India were exploited and fanned by Pakistan.

[52] A. D. D. Gordon, India's Rise as an Asian Power: Nation, Neighbourhood, and Region (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 81.

[53]Narasimha Rao, "Our Commitment: Unity and Uplifting the Poor," Selected Speeches, Vol. 4, 1994-95, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India (Independence Day Speech, August 15, 1994). 22.

[54] Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5–6.

[55] Shivshankar Menon, *India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present* (Brookings Institution Press, 2021), 221-222.

The Gujral Doctrine[56] was an attempt to isolate Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, which damaged India's ties with Pakistan.[57] Therefore, Rao made a final attempt to end cross-border narcotic smuggling and other crimes. Between 1991 and 1993, there were six rounds of summit-level talks between the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan. The attempts made to improve relations and India's view on Indo-Pak relations are prominent in the Annual Report by the Ministry of External Affairs, stating, '…additional confidence-building measures are being put in place gradually. Attempts continued for establishing a working good-neighbourly relationship with Pakistan. In overall terms, however, there has been a distinct negative trend in Pakistan's attitude towards improving Indo-Pak relations. Unless there is a change in Pakistan's behaviour, an adversarial and tense interaction could be the prospect in the foreseeable future. The reason, in India's perception, is Pakistan's continuing domestic political compulsions to interfere in Kashmir and Punjab, Pakistan's perceptions about India's vulnerabilities of which it attempts to take advantage and Pakistan's internal crisis of identity, which necessitates the power of structure of Pakistan nurturing an antagonistic relationship with India based on communal and extremist religious arguments.'[58] Rao was, however, optimistic for relations to improve with new leadership as he highlighted:

> 'Our relations with the neighbouring countries, except Pakistan, are good. We can have good relations with Pakistan too. I have met the Pakistan Prime Minister about half a dozen times. Our personal relations are very cordial but when it comes to matters of policy, it is difficult to say anything. Elections are going to be held shortly

[56] The Gujral Doctrine was initiated by I.K. Gujral, an Indian prime minister (April1997-May1998) before Rao could be brought into office. It was a guide of five principles that were to guide India's relations with its immediate neighbourhood.
[57] Naeem Ahmed, "India's Changing Policy on Kashmir," *Pakistan Horizon* 53, no. 4 (October 2000): 23–38.
[58] "Annual Reports Prior to 1999: Annual Report 1992-93," MEA Library Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, n.d.,.

> in Pakistan and a new leadership will take over. I hope the new leadership will come with greater sense of realism and will have the courage to accept the reality and then alone could there be further and meaningful dialogue between us..'[59]

However, communication broke down when Benazir Bhutto returned to power as prime minister and ended the talks. Rao's Pakistan policy asserted India's sovereignty over Kashmir and adopted a zero-tolerance stance on cross-border terrorism. And this is present in Rao's reply to the President's speech at Lok Sabha on 8 March 1994:

> '...Today, because of what Pakistan has done, the situation has worsened to such an extent that the people of Kashmir are suffering. All the income of the people of Kashmir was mostly dependent on tourism. All that is no more now. This suffering has to be put an end to and this can happen only when, what is happening by way of export of terrorism from Pakistan, ceases. We are determined to see that it ceases…'[60]

The PII goal of maximising territorial sovereignty was essential to Rao's Pakistan and China policies.

5.1.3 (d) India's Nuclear Policy under Rao

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a historic declaration in 1992, declaring the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as a threat to

[59] Narasimha Rao, "Unity and Stability for Sustained Growth, ," Selected Speeches, Vol. 3, 1993-94, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India (Independence Day Speech, August 15, 1993).
[60] Narasimha Rao, "*Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao : Reply on Motion of Thanks to the President's Address* (1994)," Parliament of India, Lok Sabha Digital Library. 392.

international peace and security.[61] At the UNSC Summit, Rao supported the need for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as he highlighted the proposal made by the late Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, at the Third Special Session of the U.N. that was devoted to Disarmament in 1988, where an Action Plan for Disarmament was put forward where the conclusion was for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and that it '…would be linked to corresponding obligations by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals latest by the year 2010…'[62], but supported the ongoing nuclear programme that India was developing. Consequently, the USA wanted a joint conference on nuclear non-proliferation with India, Russia, China, and Pakistan. The Senior George H.W. Bush administration of 1984-1988 had earlier wanted to discuss the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan so that both nations would behave themselves.[63] However, India remained non-committal, preferring a two-track policy with the USA that would allow the nuclear dialogue and nuclear tests. Therefore, India's decisions reflect the PII goal of receiving empathy from other countries while adopting policies that prevent it from becoming a victim again.

By 1995, Rao's nuclear program was ready for testing, but he did not go through with it, and the Pokhran tests were not conducted until 1998 under the Vajpayee leadership. So, with India's desire to establish itself as an essential player in the region, Rao therefore enabled India to continue its research and development of nuclear weapons, which finally got tested under Vajpayee.

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[61] Kapil Komireddi, "PV Narasimha Rao Reinvented India – so Why Is He the Forgotten Man?," *The National*, May 19, 2012, https://www.thenationalnews.com/lifestyle/pv-narasimha-rao-reinvented-india-so-why-is-he-the-forgotten-man-1.455990; UN. Security Council (47th year : 1992). President, "Note / by the President of the Security Council," United Nations Digital Library System, January 31, 1992, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/196971?ln=en.

[62] Narasimha Rao, "Need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," PV Narasimha Rao: Selected Speeches, Vol. 1, 1991-92, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India.

[63] Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*, 25-26.

5.2. Atal Bihari Vajpayee: 1999-2004

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's tenth and the second non-Congress prime minister after Moraji Desai (1977-79), who served a full five-year term (1999-2004). Vajpayee was known for his strong public speaking skills and the development of the Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which originated out of the Jana Sangha.[64] Vajpayee is called the 'ideological father'[65] of the BJP. On taking office, Vajpayee had before him a country moving towards economic development, seeking to make a mark in the nuclear world, and dealing with counterterrorism and Pakistan.

5.2.1. Education and Early Political Life

Vajpayee was born to Krishna Devi and Krishna Bihari Vajpayee of Morena in the princely state of Gwalior on 25 December 1924. In that year, Gandhi became the President of the Indian National Congress. The Vajpayee family were originally from Bateshwar, Gwalior, in Uttar Pradesh.[66] Gwalior was famous for its 'anti-British' crusades as the Rani of Jhansi, from Gwalior, led the First War of Independence of 1857.[67] Hence, this entire princely state was always intensely nationalistic, and the freedom movement came naturally to everyone, and Vajpayee was no exception. Here, we see the application of historical memory and generational trauma passed on through the princely state. It was inherited by Rao, who hailed Hyderabad, where anti-British sentiment made joining the national freedom movement a natural choice.

Vajpayee's father was a poet, teacher, and government school headmaster from 1935 to 37 at Gorkhi, Gwalior, which Vajpayee and his older brother Prem attended. Vajpayee's father

[64] The Jana Sangha was founded in 1951 with Vajpayee as one of the founding members.
[65] N P Ullekh N P, *The Untold Vajpayee: Politician and Paradox* (Penguin Random House India Pvt. Ltd., 2018).
[66] Kingshuk Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons* (Rupa Publications India Pvt Limited, 2016), 61-62.
[67] Nag, Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons, 62.

was the first to teach him the art of oratory.[68] This skill was invaluable during Vajpayee's political career, especially as prime minister.

As a student, Vajpayee enjoyed reading the classics and poetry and gained a reputation as a poet himself. When researching for the biography of Vajpayee, Kingshuk Nag interviewed Vajpayee's sisters, none of whom remembered Vajpayee ever studying even though he always earned good grades.[69] While his father influenced his childhood, Vajpayee entered political life in 1939 at the age of thirteen, when he joined the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)[70]. His parents feared he was getting 'indoctrinated with anti-Muslim sentiment.'[71] Vajpayee was also a member of the All-India Students Federation (AISF), which is affiliated with the Communist Party of India (CPI). The CPI followed the ideas of Karl Marx, and his Marxist ideology influenced several Indian leaders, making Marx an important icon of the freedom movement. Therefore, Vajpayee's parents worried about his association with the RSS, and on the other hand, the RSS was afraid that Vajpayee would fall under communist influence.[72]

At eighteen, Vajpayee joined the Quit India movement and was active. At that time, Vajpayee studied history, Sanskrit and English at Gwalior Victoria College.[73] Later, he earned his master's degree in political science at the Anglo-Vedic College in Kanpur, where he became the general secretary of the youth wing of the Arya Samaj.[74]

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[68] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 52.
[69] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 55.
[70] The RSS was formed in 1889 by Dr. Keshavrao Baliram Hedgewar, promoting Hindutva that later created the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) in 1951 with Vajpayee as one of its founders, both merged to form the Janata Party in 1977, but broke away in 1980 to form the Bharatiya Janata Party. Chandreshwar Prasad Thakur and Devendra P. Sharma, *India Under Atal Behari Vajpayee: The BJP Era* (UBS Publishers, 1999), 14-15.
[71] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee A Man for All Seasons*, 55-56; Ullekh N P, *The Untold Vajpayee: Politician and Paradox*.
[72] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 68-69.
[73] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 70.
[74] The Arya Samaj was founded by Dayananda Saraswat in 1875, and worked for the advancement of Dalits, women, and other marginalised sections in the Indian society and in Hinduism.

Vajpayee was greatly influenced by RSS, which was grounded in Hinduism. At the RSS, Vajpayee learned about Savarkar, whose *Hindutva* formed the basis of the RSS ideology.[75] This was evident in the poems Vajpayee wrote at the time, such as 'Hindu Tan-Man' and 'Hindu Jeevan,' which describe how Muslim invaders vandalised Hindu temples.[76] Atal Bihari Vajpayee had read *Amar Kirti Vijay Pataka* by Mahatma Ramachandra Veer, a contemporary Hindi activist who had worked to ban cow slaughter. Veer described India's subjugation under Muslim invaders as a humiliation for all Hindus.[77] Thus, Vajpayee began to push for the reinvigoration of Hindu civilisation.

Vajpayee admired the work of Indian writers like Sarat and Premchand and poets like Harivansh Rai Bachchan, Suryakanth Tripathi 'Nirala' and Bal Krishna Sharma Naveen,[78] who championed nationalism. While Vajpayee did study politics and had a keen passion towards it from a young age, reading the work of well-known Indian writers helped shape Vajpayee's own poems and political ideas.

In Vajpayee's article 'The Sangh Is My Soul' originally on 7 May 1995 in the *Varsh Pratipada* of the Organiser, Vajpayee wrote and described the influence of Narayano Tarte on him, crediting Tarte's mentorship with his rise to head of the BJP in 1980.[79] Tarte, who had noticed Vajpayee's 'natural interest' in the RSS, saw him as an asset to the organisation.[80] Tarte persuaded Vajpayee to join the Officers' Training Camp of the RSS in 1941, where Vajpayee got closer to Babasaheb Apte, who also fostered his advancement in the RSS. Vajpayee

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[75] Sinderpal Singh, *India in South Asia* (Routledge, 2013), 86,
[76] Singh, *India in South Asia*, 56.
[77] Singh, *India in South Asia*, 30.
[78] Singh, *India in South Asia*, 45.
[79] Archive Manager, ?"The Sangh Is My Soul': An Article by Atal Bihari Vajpayee from Organiser Archives," *Organiser*, August 16, 2018, https://organiser.org/2018/08/16/121247/bharat/an-article-by-atal-bihari-vajpayee-from-organiser-archives/.
[80] The Rediff Interview/Vajpayee's guru, Narayanrao Tarte, *Rediff*, August 26, 2000, https://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/26inter.htm.

considered the 'RSS was his soul.'[81] Vajpayee was highly influenced by Deen Dayal Upadhaya and later Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, with whom Vajpayee founded the Jana Sangha in 1951. He became Prasad's assistant, studied the Kashmir issue, and led the Jana Sangha after the death of Prasad in 1953.[82]

From 1962 to 1968, Vajpayee had a seat in Parliament and learned about the Indo-Sino War. Although Vajpayee led the parliamentary opposition to Nehru's Congress government, Nehru saw that he met foreign delegates and invited Vajpayee to all gatherings. Nehru believed that Vajpayee could be prime minister.[83] The individual in question expressed support for the independence of Tibet during a session of the Lok Sabha on 8 May 1959; he asked questions about the *Panchsheel*. *Panchsheel* allowed 'democracy and dictatorship to live together',[84] and India's friendship with China should not be at the cost of Tibet's independence. Vajpayee and the BJP supported the Congress in Bangladesh's War for independence in 1971. Vajpayee's political position evolved as he observed Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Rao, and the Congress engage in foreign policy. By the time he became prime minister, India had achieved economic liberalisation.

Vajpayee was the external affairs minister to Moraji Desai in the Janata Party government of 1977 to 79. He led the Jana Sangha until the formation of the BJP in 1980 and became prime minister in 1998. He could not secure a parliamentary majority despite his significant influence in the General Assembly elections. Vajpayee served as Prime Minister of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition from 1998 to 2004.[85] The following

[81] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 30.
[82] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 62.
[83] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 67-68.
[84] Vajpyee address at Lok Sabha excerpt taken from Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 76.
[85] Pande, *From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India's Foreign Policy*, 85.

section investigates the foreign policy decisions taken by Vajpayee through the application of the post-imperial ideology approach.

5.2.2. Indian Foreign Policy under Vajpayee

Vajpayee was known as a moderate in the Hindu nationalist movement. He knew the importance of taking the middle ground.[86] However, Vajpayee had been mentored by several right-wing Hindu national stalwarts, Jana Sangha and RSS. However, Vajpayee's foreign policy accepted some strands of Nehruvianism, especially the belief that India was a great civilisation with an essential role in global politics. The notion of victimhood is present in Vajpayee's foreign policy choices, especially in his opposition to the Indian National Congress throughout the freedom struggle. However, the victimhood of colonial trauma remains the same, and the post-imperial ideology goals of maximising territorial sovereignty and status are clear in Vajpayee's foreign policy.

Vajpayee's foreign policy centred on improving ties with India's neighbours, better relations with the USA, continuing the Look East Policy and building India's military and economic resources. The Vajpayee government continued the NAP but concentrated on the Look East Policy.[87] As a result, from 1998 to 2004, the government had to negotiate with Pakistan during the Kargil War, begin the Pokhran nuclear tests, and improve relations with the West. This section examines how and why Vajpayee made the decisions he did.

In 1999, Vajpayee implemented a framework for managing India's national security. This framework comprised a National Security Council (NSC), a national security advisor to the prime minister, and a national security advisory board. This board is made up of experts

[86] Jyotimaya Sharma as cited in Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 213.
[87] Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*, 36.

outside the government.[88] Other prime ministers had made similar attempts, but Vajpayee brought it to fruition. The first task was negotiating over Kargil, which the National Security Council had done successfully. Vajpayee's first national security advisor was Brajesh Mishra, who was also the executor of Vajpayee's policies regarding the Pokhran nuclear tests and Kargil.

5.2.2 (a) India's Nuclear Testing in Pokhran

The first undertaking by the Vajpayee government was the advanced missile weapons tests from March to May 1998, which led to the nuclear weapons tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. Several scholars have seen these nuclear tests as a realistic approach to India's security dilemma.[89] However, Priya Chacko agrees with the explanation that the Hindu nationalist-led government supported the idea of a 'militaristic Indian state.'[90] This allows the ideas Savarkar presented for the kind of Hindu state through the principles of Hindutva to come to the forefront alongside Kautilyan's strategic thought. When the tests were conducted, India did not feel threatened by its neighbours, China or Pakistan. On the contrary, India had been improving relations with China and Pakistan through economic ties.

Nevertheless, India proceeded with its nuclear tests. Manjari Miller Chatterjee argues that the need to be part of the 'nuclear club' led by the U.S. was the incentive.[91] This seems to make it apparent in the goals behind the tests— for example, the code name of the first test

[88] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 259; Ammar Nainar, "The Evolution and Roles of India's National Security Council — ORF America," *ORF America*, February 24, 2022.
[89]J. Mohan Malik, "India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 20, no. 2 (August 1998): 191–215.; Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (April 1999): 148–77.
[90]Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Ambivalence of Postcolonial Modernity*, 2007, 127.
[91]Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China* (Stanford University Press, 2013), 86.

conducted in 1974 was 'Smiling Buddha' as the tests were Peaceful Nuclear Explosion.[92] However, the 1998 Pokhran II testing had the code name 'Shakti,'[93] meaning 'strength'. India's need to achieve global power status was driven by insecurity, especially with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extended indefinitely in 1995, followed by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. Both were seen as attempts to keep India out of the nuclear club. The goal of PII's victimhood explains India's sense of injury stemming from its colonial history and its insistence on joining the nuclear club.

Alongside India's sense of victimhood, the BJP, in its ideological belief, had the goal of seeing India restored to its glory days of empire before the Muslim invasions. Therefore, as exemplified earlier, the reasoning for nuclear testing, when analysed through the PII, explains the sense of victimhood that estimates entitlement towards the nuclear club. Finally, what emerges is the ideological influence of Vajpayee at that time, along with India's perceived threat from China and Pakistan, that Ganguly highlighted when investigating the proffered explanations on the nuclear tests.[94]

As foreign minister for the Moraji Desai government in 1974, Vajpayee had supported 'peaceful nuclear explosions' by saying that India was 'not a nuclear weapon power and had no intention of being one.'[95] Though Rao had been morally opposed to nuclear testing, despite allowing the nuclear program to continue, it was Vajpayee who eagerly allowed the tests as India had nuclear power since 1995. In a speech delivered in May 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee addressed Parliament regarding the nuclear tests conducted and stated:

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[92]Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II," 150.
[93] Raj Chengappa, *Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to Be a Nuclear Power* (HarperCollins Pub India Pvt Limited, 2000), 58.
[94] Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II," 150.
[95] Prime Minister Vajpayee's announcement of nuclear tests, 11 May 1998. Available online at http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/vajpayee1198.html

> On 11 May, India successfully carried out three underground nuclear tests. Two more underground tests on 13 May completed the planned series of tests. I would like this House to join me in paying fulsome tribute to our scientists, engineers and defence personnel whose singular achievements have given us a renewed sense of national pride and self-confidence. Sir, in addition to the statement I make, I have also taken the opportunity to submit to the House a paper entitled "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy".[96]

Vajpayee's advocacy of nuclear weapons testing established the need for India's post-colonial identity coupled with the Hindu nationalist identity – displaying that India was not a weak power and that it was reclaiming its lost glory. Therefore, the need to restore India to its former glory may be used as a driving force to achieve the PII goal of maximising status. The restoration of Indian civilisation in the transition to becoming a nuclear power added to India's economic and military power and placed it in the league of atomic powers. In a statement to *India Today*, Vajpayee asserted:

> We conducted the series of nuclear tests keeping with our commitment made to people during the elections. It is part of the national agenda for governance. I have been advocating the cause of India going nuclear for the last four decades. My party has been making this demand consistently and forcefully. Now that we are in the government, people expect us to translate this long-standing commitment into action. And we have showed them that we mean business.[97]

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[96]Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee: Discussion on Nuclear Tests in Pokharan.," Parliament of India, Lok Sabha, Digital Library.

[97]Prabhu Chawla, We live in a world where India is surrounded by nuclear weaponry: Atal Bihari Vajpayee, *India Today*, May 25, 1998, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-

U.S. President Bill Clinton called the nuclear testing 'unjustified.'[98] Japan and India's relations began to suffer, and Britain and Germany expressed their 'dismay'.[99] Vajpayee insisted on nuclear testing as 'weapons of self-defence' to protect India from nuclear threats or coercion.[100] He argued that the principle of 'no first use of nuclear weapons' had been applied and continued to assure the international community that India had no intention of destabilising the international non-proliferation order. He declared a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing in 1998. Therefore, through the sense of victimisation and the other goals of post-imperial ideology, India's quest to become a nuclear-powered state displays the presence of victimhood more than five decades after colonialism.

Most importantly, Vajpayee stood firm. The unconditional extension of the 1995 non-proliferation treaty was a U.S. initiative, and India, not a signatory, allowed the tests to continue. When sanctions were imposed on India, the USA got India to commit to tightening its nuclear 'exports' through the CTBT of 1999 in return for substantiative benefits.[101]

5.2.2 (b) Pakistan and Kargil 1999

Indo-Pakistani tensions reached their highest point since the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 between 1998 and 2001.[102] India's nuclear tests resulted in Pakistan and Kargil following suit, followed by Kargil, creating distrust. Vajpayee's bus journey to Lahore to visit

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story/story/19980525-we-live-in-a-world-where-india-is-surrounded-by-nuclear-weaponry-atal-bihari-vajpayee-828210-1998-05-24.

[98] "CNN - U.S. Imposes Sanctions on India," *CNN World News*, May 13, 1998, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/.

[99] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*

[100] Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "Statement by Prime Minister," *Re : Recent Nuclear Tests In Pokhran*, May 27, 1998, https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/808923/1/pms_12_02_27-05-1998.pdf.

[101] Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*, 37-38.

[102] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 259.

Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff of Pakistan in February 1999 was psychological and emotional,[103] indicative of his commitment to improve relations.

Vajpayee's visit produced the Lahore Declaration, where both leaders discussed their intentions to settle the matter of Jammu and Kashmir and 'refrain from intervention in each other's internal affairs.'[104] This visit did not seem to have turned out as India had planned. C. Raja Mohan found it ironic that Vajpayee's attempts to improve relations through the Lahore Declaration coincided with Pakistan gearing up for a major attack in 1971. Nawaz Sharif might have already authorised the Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf, to occupy the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC).[105]

The Indian army, as always, retreated from the peaks of Kargil during the winter of 1998-1999, and the Pakistani army crossed the Line of Control (LOC), the de facto border between India and Pakistan as stipulated in the Simla Agreement. The Indian army, on its return n in May 1999, made this discovery, which resulted in a battle.[106] Vajpayee was shocked, and it was visible in his speech on 7 June 1999, where he highlighted the different diplomatic levels of dialogue that were taking place. He stated:

> 'This step has been taken after a great deal of preparation. It was a pre-planned operation. It is a repudiation of the letter and spirit of the Lahore Declaration.'[107]

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[103] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 260
[104] "Lahore Summit ," Stimson Center, February 21, 1999, https://www.stimson.org/1999/lahore-summit/.
[105] Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*, 205.
[106] Nag, *Atal Bihari Vajpayee: A Man for All Seasons*, 260.
[107] Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "Address To The Nation On The Subject Of Kargil," Prime Minister's Office, Archives, https://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/speech-details.php?nodeid=9168.

The Kargil War dashed any hopes for the Lahore Declaration.[108] To deal with Pakistan's 'duplicity',[109] Vajpayee launched a diplomatic campaign to expose Pakistan, resulting in international condemnation of Pakistan and demands that it withdraw its troops.[110] By naming Pakistan an aggressor when Nawaz Sharif requested American intervention, the Clinton administration opened the door for a breakthrough in Indo-American ties.[111]

Before the leaders of India and Pakistan met at Agra in May 2001, Indian Airlines flight IC814, flying from Kathmandu to Delhi, was hijacked by the Pakistan-based terrorist group Harket-ul-Mujahideen. After seven days, the Vajpayee government released three terrorists.[112] So, when the two leaders met at Agra, Vajpayee wanted to make peace with Pakistan. It was present in Vajpayee's address to Parliament, where he highlighted the desire to make peace with Pakistan through the Summit and the failure of it as well in the excerpts from the address to Parliament below:

> '…After this Summit, a final declaration was issued in which terrorism was denounced. Terrorism of every kind and in any form had been condemned in it. Pakistan was a party to this declaration. Sporadic incidents were taking place at that time…. But the ruf is that we continue to witness ups and downs in our relations with Pakistan. Sometimes we have an atmosphere congenial for friendship, sometimes we are at war

[108] Singh, *India in South Asia*, 114.
[109] Singh, *India in South Asia*, 112.
[110] Dixit, *Makers of India's Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha*, 261; Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*, 174; Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 101-103; Menon, *India, and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present*, 256.
[111] B. Reidel, "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 130–43.
[112] Arifa Akbar, "Trail of Terror: Boarding Card Blunder Allowed Hijackers on Jet Plane Muslim Hijackers Boarded Plane on One Card," *The Independent*, December 27, 1999, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/trail-of-terror-boarding-card-blunder-allowed-hijackers-on-jet-plane-muslim-hijackers-boarded-plane-on-one-card-1134764.html.

> and at other times, we have cease-fire. This has been going on for the last 50 years or so. Our policy has all along been directed towards improving relations with our neighbours, but not out of any weakness.'
>
> '…We had announced confidence building measures. Ongoing through them, you will find that it Is a document covering relations between India and Pakistan. However. Pakistan did not accept It. A point was voiced during the discussion as to why we did not break-off the talks when Pakistan was not prepared to talk according to an agenda. Talks are not initiated or abandoned in this manner.'[113]

This was consistent with Nehru's idealism when the Kashmir issue first emerged. Vajpayee expressed his ideas on the Agra summit in his Kumarakan musings on New Year's Day in 2001, saying:

> 'India is willing and ready to seek a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem…we are prepared to re-commence talks with Pakistan at any level, including the highest level, provided Islamabad gives sufficient proof of its preparedness to create a conducive atmosphere…'[114]

However, the Summit was a 'dismal failure', bringing a lull in Indo-Pak relations.[115] General Musharraf was hostile to the Indian media, focused on Kashmir as the core issue, and

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[113] Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee : Discussion on Nuclear Tests in Pokharan."," Parliament of India, Lok Sabha, Digital Library. (Presented at the Twelfth Lok Sabha, Session: 2, May 29, 1998),

[114] Vajpayee speech from Kumarakan taken from Outlook Web Desk, "Musings From Kumarakom," *Outlook India*, February 3, 2022, https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/musings-from-kumarakom/210627.

[115] Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy*, 118.

refused to address cross-border terrorism.[116] This came after the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attacks on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001— resulting in a military standoff between India and Pakistan on the border.[117] However, India did not allow Operation Parakram to escalate into an all-out war. Operation Parakaram was a full-scale military build-up by India after the 1971 war.[118]

The PII sense of victimhood coated with entitlement explains Vajpayee's view of India as the hegemonic regional leader, and the need to establish India as an essential player at the global level caused Vajpayee's reactions to Pakistan. It explains the need for India to maintain a strong position to maximise its territorial sovereignty. Rajeev Sikri (2009) observed that 'Indian prime ministers from Rajiv Gandhi and I. K. Gujral to Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh had frequently given in to romanticised sentimentalism about Pakistan,'[119] which could stem from Vajpayee's claim that 'you can change friends but not your neighbour'. Trying to create peaceful coexistence was essential, a practice that Kautilya promoted in the Mandala theory.

5.2.2 (c) Relations between India and China under Vajpayee

Under Vajpayee, India's relations with China were much better than with Pakistan. The economic development of their relationship since the Look East Policy made China into India's largest trading partner after 2000. As India's foreign minister, Vajpayee first visited China in 1979, when China attacked Vietnam. Indian Prime Minister Moraji Desai expressed his 'distress' and wanted China to withdraw from Vietnam, causing the foreign minister's trip to

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[116] A. G. Noorani, "The Truth about Agra," *Frontline*, July 29, 2005, https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30205597.ece.
[117] Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy*, 119.
[118] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 106.
[119] Rajiv Sikri, *Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy* (SAGE Publications India, 2009), 61.

be shortened.[120] Vajpayee's next visit to China was in 1982, as part of the delegation of the Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR). Finally, as prime minister in 2003, Vajpayee visited Beijing, where Vajpayee expressed the distancing of relations between the two nations in his speech at Beijing University:

> '…But there were periods in history when our civilisations went into an introspective phase and lost regular touch with each other. In a later era, both countries suffered from colonial invasions and deprivations, which accentuated this trend. The shadow of the Cold War and the consequent distortions of global international relations had its impact also on India and China. From relative isolation from each other, we went into a state of estrangement…'[121]

The agenda to push for economic cooperation was present in Vajpayee's keynote speech during his visit to Beijing on the need for economic cooperation and development stated:

> '…there was a period in the India-China relationship when our preoccupation with our differences prevented a pragmatic understanding of the mutual benefits from cooperation. Our present course of developing all-round bilateral cooperation, while simultaneously addressing our differences, has transformed the quality of our

[120] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 109-110.
[121] Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "PM's Speech at Peking (Beijing) University" (Inauguration for the Centre for Indian Studies, Peking University, June 23, 2003), https://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/speech-details.php?nodeid=9227.

relationship. This has helped to further narrow our differences and to accelerate our cooperation…'[122]

The 1990s witnessed the evolution of relations between India and China since the trauma of 1962. The critical challenges India encountered pertained to establishing a strategic alliance with the United States and stabilising the South Asian subcontinent. Both issues were affected by India's association with China. George Fernandes, the then Defence Minister of India, assessed China as a more significant threat than Pakistan.[123] Therefore, the victimhood of PII is present in the nuclear tests and India's insistence on economic relations with China. At the same time, the narrative for the nuclear testing seemed to revolve around the fear of Pakistan retaliating against India's tests, even C. Raja Mohan contended that China was the more significant threat. The 1962 war trauma remained: the 1964 nuclear tests by China and its support for the development of nuclear power In Pakistan in the 1980s drove India's nuclear development program. Hence, despite China's shift away from Pakistan's development of economic relations with India, the regional security threat between India and China remained.

Attempts to improve ties through the formal annual security dialogue commenced in March 2000 and centred on nuclear concerns, border issues and China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.[124] Relations began to improve through high-level visits in 2000 until Vajpayee

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[122] Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "PM's Keynote Address at the Seminar on ~China-India Economic Cooperation and Development" (Seminar on China-India Economic Cooperation and Development, June 24, 2003).

[123] Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*, 168.

[124] Briefing in New Delhi after the talks, the Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson asserted, *We did convey our concerns that China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programme had an adverse impact on regional stability to which we have been obliged to respond in a responsible and restrained manner.* See "Summary of the Press Briefing by the Official Spokesman of the MEA, 8 March 2000," available at <http://www.meadev.nic.in/news/20000308.htm >

visited China in 2003,[125] which brought significant progress on the border issue. Vajpayee's recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China and China's referral of Sikkim as a state of the Indian Union improved India-China relations. This led to the 2005 Agreement on the Guiding Principles and Political Parameters for a Boundary Settlement. Hence, Vajpayee was one of the Indian leaders who helped settle the border dispute with China.

Conclusion

Through the application of the Post-Imperial Ideology to the study of the two prime ministers, Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee- there is the emergence of a particular thematic explanation towards the influence of ideas on the leaders.

When looking at the role of ideas on the leaders, the Skinnerian interpretation method allowed the analysis of their childhood to lend insights into their ideological development. For example, Rao's childhood was shaped by the *Zamindari* system. The Skinnerian interpretation makes it evident that Rao's socio-economic background added to his sense of victimhood; post-imperial ideology accounts for the presence of childhood influences on his political activism and the mentorship he received from Gandhi and Nehru.

Vajpayee, like Rao, had been educated in India, but Vajpayee was influenced by Savarkar and other writers who promoted Hinduism as an alternative to the Congress-led secular freedom movement. Hence, the Skinnerian method of interpretation of Vajpayee's poems and other writings reveals the influence of restoring India's glorious past. Post-imperial ideology explains how the Hindutva ideology displays a sense of victimhood and the idea of entitlement in Vajpayee's foreign policy choices.

In terms of foreign policy, both leaders were concerned with the liberalisation of India's economy, as seen in the adoption of the cooperative liberalist ideas by both prime ministers,

[125] C.V. Ranganathan, "Sino-Indian Relations in the New Millennium: Challenges and Prospects," *China Report* 37, no. 2 (May 2001): 129–40,

which is displayed through their common belief in an economy empowered by the Indian state. Through the post-imperial goal of maximising status, the Look East Policy shows that having lived through the economic exploitations of the colonial period, Rao understood the need to put India on a path to economic development. Hence, as the post-Cold War period brought about globalisation, the need for economic interdependence led India into economic cooperation with its neighbours. It seemed most certain to ensure maximising its status as a nation working towards its economic development. This was the perspective that Vajpayee brought to the Look East Policy.

Therefore, while both prime ministers continued the policy of engaging with their neighbourhood, the world perceived a move away from Nehru's nonalignment. What needs to be noted is that neither prime minister declared a move away from nonalignment, nor did India join either superpower camp. Thereby displaying change in the continuity of Indian foreign policy as the aim, even under the leadership of post-Cold War India -- that of not being 'pulled or pushed around by the big powers or groups of states.'[126]

The Look East Policy opened India's doors to China. The signing of the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Agreement along the Line of Actual Control encouraged economic cooperation and territorial sovereignty. Through PII, this explains the goal of maximising territorial sovereignty with strong Kautilyan strategic moves. Having similar strategic tendencies, Vajpayee, especially when using Savarkar's Hindutva principle of India being a glorious civilisation that requires restoration, used PII to explain how Vajpayee viewed China as a threat and a natural ally. This was present through the reaffirmation of India and China's dedication to revitalising the Panchsheel principles, together with the initiation of a discussion with diplomats from both nations serving as Special Representatives, led by Vajpayee, is

[126] Kumar, "P.V. Narasimha Rao," 230.

regarded as a noteworthy measure in the direction of addressing the enduring border conflicts between India and China.[127]

Post-imperial ideology's explanation of Rao's treatment of Pakistan is that, like Nehru, Rao believed that if India treated its neighbours well, they would return the favour. However, unlike Nehru, Rao was a pragmatist, dedicated to maximising territorial sovereignty and taking a zero-tolerance position on cross-border terrorism. Vajpayee, however, contended with the escalation of tensions with Pakistan after the nuclear tests of 1998 and the Kargil conflict of 1999. What is explained through the victimhood of post-imperial ideology is the pragmatic and strategic measures undertaken to attain the goals of post-imperial ideology.

Finally, Rao's decisions regarding the nuclear program reflect the post-imperial ideology goal of receiving empathy while preventing re-victimisation and maximising status. Vajpayee's policy toward the nuclear club displayed the strong Hindutva ideology of the greatness of India and the need for the re-emergence of that glory that stems from the goal of status establishment through the sense of victimhood in the post-imperial ideology.

Therefore, the leadership of Rao and Vajpayee in the first decade after the Cold War demonstrates change in India's foreign policy, resulting in a more cooperative liberal economy and pragmatic foreign policy approach to the goals of territorial integrity and strategic autonomy.

[127] Amit Ranjan, "India's Foreign Policy: Shift, Adjustment and Continuity," *The Round Table* 111, no. 3 (May 4, 2022): 381–84.

Chapter 6: The Engagement Era of Indian Foreign Policy: Singh and Modi

This chapter examines the prime ministerships of Manmohan Singh (2004-2014) and the first term of Narendra Modi (2014-2018). The chapter applies Skinnerian interpretation and post-imperial ideology to analyse their foreign policy choices. The first section analyses the early life of Manmohan Singh, his entry into politics and his foreign policy. The second section investigates Narendra Modi's early years. The ultimate objective of this chapter is to understand the strategic multilateralist perspective in Indian foreign policy.

6.1. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2004-2014

Manmohan Singh was India's thirteenth Prime Minister and led the United Progressive Alliance coalition.[1] This section analyses three significant events along with Singh's early life, which will be analysed through the post-imperial ideology.

6.1.1. Early life and political career

Manmohan Singh was born on 26 September 1932 in Gah, now West Punjab in Pakistan. His father was a fruit seller, and his mother raised nine children. He and his family, victims of the 1947 partition, had to flee to Amritsar in Punjab, India. Singh had nine siblings, and at times, the family was destitute.[2] Nishant Uttpal's *Narcissus or Machiavelli? Learning Leadership from Indian Prime Ministers* (2021) found that Singh seemed to have had a difficult childhood. Singh's daughter, Daman Singh, notes that he 'rarely vocally expressed his thoughts, especially the ones related to work'.[3] The trauma Singh endured as a child with the partition and the 'lack of a stable family setup' contributed to his introverted personality.[4] After

[1]Sanjaya Baru, *The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh* (Penguin UK, 2015), 5-6.
[2]Baru, *The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh*, 7.
[3] Nishant Uppal, *Narcissus or Machiavelli?Learning Leadership from Indian Prime Ministers* (Taylor & Francis, 2021), 142.
[4] Uppal, *Narcissus or Machiavelli? Learning Leadership from Indian Prime Ministers*,143-44.

Singh's mother died when he was eleven, his father remarried. As a child, Singh struggled to have a close relationship with his stepmother. During the partition, the entire Singh family had to move, and unfortunately, his father went missing for several months and was feared dead, although he eventually returned.[5] Such trauma, when analysed through PII, explains why Singh focused more on his education to find himself and some stability, and even his foreign policies as prime minister.

According to K. Bhushan and G. Katyal's *Manmohan Singh: Visionary to Certainty, Singh was an outstanding student.* Singh's CV is reproduced in the opening chapter. In 1952, Singh graduated from Punjab University with a bachelor's degree in economics and earned a master's degree in economics in 1954. He then completed a degree in economic tripos from Cambridge University in 1957 and earned a PhD in economics from Nuffield College, Oxford University in 1962.[6] Singh's dissertation titled *India's Export Trends and Prospects for Self-sustained Growth* was published in 1964 by Oxford University Press.[7] His dissertation discussed the need for an integrated trade policy so India could be part of the global economy.

Upon completing his studies, Singh returned to India and taught economics at Punjab University for several years. From 1969 to 1971, he taught international trade at the Delhi School of Economics. Singh then entered politics. From 1970 to 1971, Singh was an economic adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and became Chief Economic Adviser to the Minister of Finance (1972 to 1976).[8] Singh was appointed deputy chairman of the Planning Commission in 1980 and became director of the Reserve Bank from 1982 to 1985. Singh also worked on development projects with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).[9] Singh's most important role, however, was as the minister of finance under

[5]Baru, *The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh*, 5.
[6]K. Bhushan and G. Katyal, *Manmohan Singh: Visionary to Certainty* (APH Publishing, 2004).
[7]Bhushan and Katyal, *Manmohan Singh: Visionary to Certainty*, 10.
[8]Bhushan and Katyal, *Manmohan Singh: Visionary to Certainty*, 11-12
[9]Bhushan and Katyal, *Manmohan Singh: Visionary to Certainty*, 12.

Narasimha Rao from 1991 to 1996, where his work with Rao to liberalise the Indian economy yielded results within two years.

However, what brought Manmohan Singh into the national spotlight was his paper 'What to Do with Victory' that he wrote in 1971, highlighting the controls imposed in the name of socialism under Indira Gandhi. Singh accused these principles of strangling the economic development of the Indian economy.[10] This article by Singh illustrates his liberalist ideology, which later saw light in his economic reforms as finance minister to the Narasimha Rao government.

Singh's 1991 interview with Paranjoy Guha Thakurta was where Singh spoke about the need for transition in India, and this provides insight into his understanding of India.[11] In his analysis, Rajiv Dogra concludes that Singh made liberalisation acceptable. This is the best way to characterise Singh's views on liberalisation and his ideology, which is not associated with traditional policies.[12]

6.1.2. Singh and India's Foreign Policy

Manmohan Singh came to power as the hand-picked choice of Sonia Gandhi, president of the Congress party. It has been assumed that she made all the decisions and was kept posted on all prime ministerial issues.[13] One example was Pulok Chatterjee's appointment as the prime minister's principal secretary in 2011.[14] Chatterjee had worked earlier as a joint secretary to Rajiv Gandhi and personally with Sonia Gandhi after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination.[15] When

[10] Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, “Illusion of Consensus,” *India-Seminar*, accessed November 15, 2023.
[11] Thakurta, “Illusion of Consensus.”
[12] Rajiv Dogra, *India’s World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy* (Rupa Publications India Pvt Limited, 2020).
[13] Dogra, *India’s World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 117.
[14] TNN, “Pulok Chatterji Is Principal Secretary to PM, Nair Adviser,” *Times Of India,* July 29, 2011.
[15] Baru, *Accidental Prime Minister*, 110.

Singh was prime minister, he had three key associates: National Security Adviser J.N. Dixit, Principal Secretary T.K.A. Nair, and M.K. Narayanan, his Special Adviser for Internal Security.[16] The National Security Adviser was established under the Vajpayee administration, increasing the number of foreign policy advisers to the prime minister.

J.N. Dixit, the National Security Advisor to Manmohan Singh, came to play a significant role under Singh. Dixit had been part of the Vajpayee Multidisciplinary Advisory Group under Brajesh Mishra, National Security Advisor to the Vajpayee government during the Kargil War, where Dixit is said to have displayed his strategic genius. Dixit had the reputation of an 'ideas man,' but was also interested in policy execution.[17] A brilliant strategist, Dixit picked up where the earlier Brajesh Mishra left off by opening talks with the USA and Pakistan to improve relations over Kashmir and China over their border.[18]

6.1.3. India-USA Nuclear Deal

The nuclear issue in 1974 was a matter of distance between the USA and India, followed by the 1998 nuclear tests that brought significant criticism from the Clinton administration and imposed sanctions. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Vajpayee stood firm on India's nuclear program. This led to high-level security dialogue on the nuclear issue with India. These talks that began under Vajpayee continued under Singh; this made the 2008 India-USA Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement or 123 Agreement possible.[19] They also facilitated the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exemption of 2008 that allowed countries to come into cooperation with India, even though India possesses nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

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[16] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*.
[17] Baru, *Accidental Prime Minister*, 142.
[18] Baru, Accidental Prime Minister, 153.
[19] Shivshankar Menon, *Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution, 2016), 37-39.

India's 1974 Pokhran nuclear test and its refusal to sign the NPT led to several sanctions that the USA imposed on the export of dual use and high technology used by India for civilian, military, and strategic purposes. In his biography of Singh, Sanjay Baru observes that India bore the brunt of the NPT, unlike China, which became a nuclear power and carried out tests before the signing of the NPT. Furthermore, the 1998 test India carried out at Pokhran brought another round of sanctions. However, India did manage to water down the 1998 sanctions. Nonetheless, the 1974 prohibition on the India-USA nuclear trade was still in place.[20] Lifting this sanction for India's benefit could only come about by amending U.S. law.[21]

President George W. Bush acknowledged unfair discrimination towards India, because the U.S. had business with China, which did not face restrictions.[22] In 2000, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor to Bush, reiterated India's importance to the USA and its potential role in Asia's regional balance.[23] What later came about was the launch of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), enabling cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, space programs, and high-technology trade. In Singh's 2004 address to India, he promised to:

> '… The transformation of our relations with USA has been supported by the expansion of economic links and people to people ties, including the presence of almost a million people of Indian origin in that country. We will welcome the expansion of cooperation between the two Governments to include new and mutually beneficial areas, particularly high technology…'[24]

[20] Sumit Ganguly and Dinshaw Mistry, "The Case for the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement," *World Policy Journal* 23, no. 2 (June 2006): 11–19.
[21] Baru, *Accidental Prime Minister*, 53.
[22] Ganguly and Mistry, "The Case for the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement."
[23] Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (2000): 45.
[24] Manmohan Singh, "Prime Minister's Address to the Nation: Speech: Prime Minister of India - Dr. Manmohan Singh Archivepmo, June 24, 2004.

The success of the Indo-US nuclear deal indeed goes to the effort that was put in by S. Jaishankar, who travelled to Washington with Ronen Sen, India's ambassador to the USA—their joint effort culminated in an agreement on the NSSP in September 2004.[25] In a meeting between U.S. President George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh during UNGA sessions in New York that month, the U.S. government announced Phase 1 of the NSSP, focusing on closer cooperation between the USA and India.[26] A press release was made that provided the details of the three specific areas of cooperation:

> '…the United States and India agreed to expand cooperation in three specific areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade. In addition, the two countries agreed to expand our dialogue on missile defence. These areas of cooperation are designed to progress through a series of reciprocal steps that build on each other…'[27]

However, PII contributes to explaining the ongoing mistrust between India and the USA. Victimhood defines India's distance from the USA since independence, which contributes to India's nonalignment with the West. Additionally, the USA's support for Pakistan and its involvement in China's nuclear development program fuelled India's apprehensions.

In March 2005, Condoleezza Rice, now U.S. Secretary of State, visited Delhi and introduced a new agenda for bilateral cooperation with India on defence and energy. However, the scepticism towards the USA, as India's past mistrust towards the USA, seemed to be a

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[25] Ganguly and Mistry, "The Case for the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement."
[26]Ganguly and Mistry, "The Case for the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement"; Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "India's Foreign Policy: With Landmark Deals, Manmohan Singh Government Promised Much, Delivered Little," *Economic Times*, February 23, 2014,
[27] Adam Ereli, "United States," India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (US Department of State, September 17, 2004).

hindrance to Singh's dream of making India a responsible nuclear power. Sanjay Baru, in his biography on Singh, commented that Singh was ‘aware of the wariness, not just towards America, but the West as a whole…’[28] thereby displaying the colonial trauma that India continues to face despite its independence seems to become an impediment towards India's move to higher global status. To address India’s insecurity and wariness, Singh described the significance of India’s relationship with the West in his memorable convocation speech at Oxford University in 2005.[29] In the speech, he quoted Rabindra Nath Tagore's poem ‘Gitanjali’, speaking of the treasures the West had to offer India and how India should take those treasures:

> The West has today opened its door.
> There are treasures for us to take.
> We will take and we will also give,
> From the open shores of India's immense humanity.[30]

Singh stressed the beneficial relationship to move forward and accommodate the requirements of the globalised, interdependent world. Singh's statement that India had a 'give-and-take' relationship with its British colonisers was misinterpreted, drawing criticism from the BJP-led opposition.[31] However, it was intended to convey his appreciation for what the West offered India. Post-imperial trauma survives in the Indian psyche, and the backlash against Singh’s comment demonstrates that India was still very wary of the West's intentions regarding Indian sovereignty. So, PII explains how the foreign policy goal of strategic autonomy emerges by looking at cooperation with the USA as a means of India coming under the control of a Western power. And that it would result in an infringement on India's strategic

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[28] Baru, *Accidental Prime Minister*.
[29] Dr. Manmohan Singh, “*Convocation Speech at Oxford University*” (Acceptance of Honorary Degree from Oxford University, July 8, 2005),
[30] Singh, “*Convocation Speech at Oxford University*.”
[31] Ankit Katyal, “The Tribune, Chandigarh, India,” *Tribune India*, July 10, 2005,

autonomy. However, Singh persisted in negotiating with the USA for nuclear development; his primary goal was to 'undo the nuclear apartheid against India' of the NPT,[32] which could only be achieved through Indo-US cooperation on nuclear energy.

The result was the Defence Framework Agreement between the USA and India, signed in July 2005. The joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh brought the USA to recognise India as *'*a nuclear weapons power' and 'a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology.'[33] The final milestone came in 2008 with the conclusion of the USA-India Civilian Nuclear Accord, popularly known as the 123 Agreement. The aim of the civilian deal between the two nations was highlighted by Singh before Parliament at the eleventh Lok Sabha session on 13 August 2007:

> '…Sir, the Agreement is about civil nuclear energy cooperation. It is an Agreement between two States possessing advanced nuclear technologies, both parties having the same benefits and advantages. The significance of the Agreement lies in the fact that when brought into effect, it will open the way for full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States. We have negotiated this Agreement as an equal partner, precisely because of the achievements of our scientists and technologists in overcoming the barriers placed around us in the past. This is an Agreement based on the principle of mutual benefit…'[34]

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[32] Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 5 (1998): 49.
[33] "Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh," The White House, July 18, 2005; Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 126.
[34] Manmohan Singh, "The Prime Minister Made a Statement Regarding Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with United States.," Parliament of India, Lok Sabha Digital Library Archives (Lok Sabha no.16, session XI, August 13, 2007).

The nuclear deal was a personal triumph for Manmohan Singh, who had pushed for it despite criticism in India and the USA. Upon completing the deal, the world now recognised India as a nuclear power and a powerful global player, demonstrating the post-imperial ideology goal of returning India to the glorious position it had enjoyed before colonisation. Pant claims that the Indo-US nuclear deal had rewritten the 'global nuclear regime' rules[35] to include India.

6.1.4. Terrorist attacks on Pakistan and Mumbai

While Singh strove to improve relations with the USA, India-Pakistan relations remained tense in the wake of the failed Agra summit of 2001, the continuing conflict over Kashmir, and terrorism. After meeting Musharraf at the 2004 UNGA meeting, Singh focused on border issues with Pakistan. His intentions were evident in an interview with American journalist Jonathan Power on 20 May 2004, where he stated his commitment to ending Pakistan's involvement in terrorism. The Skinnerian interpretation makes Singh's intentions towards Pakistan very clear:

> '…Short of succession short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything. Meanwhile, we need soft borders- when borders are not so important. People on both sides of the border should be able to move freely…'[36]

Singh hoped to use soft power to improve relations between India and Pakistan by easing visa regimes for Pakistani academics, businesspeople, and the elderly and opening back-

[35] Harsh V. Pant, *Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).
[36] Jonathan Power, "Jonathan Power, Talking to Manmohan Singh," TFF: The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, May 24, 2004.

channel discussions between September 2004 and February 2005.[37] In April 2005, Musharraf visited India to watch the Indo-Pak cricket match, leading to discussions between Singh and Musharraf about border disputes, allowing trade and free movement across the control line. It was at the banquet that Singh addressed the need to improve relations. It highlighted the inauguration of the bus route between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad as one of the measures to improve relations:

> '…The confidence-building measures introduced have generated widespread enthusiasm. The bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad has tapped a latent reservoir of public support for stronger people-to-people contact between the two countries, especially among those living on either side of the Line of Control. The peace process and the composite dialogue need to be carried forward with even greater determination. However, in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, acts of terrorism must be prevented and we must together fight the scourge of terrorism in our region…'[38]

Two more years of deliberations on a road map were followed based on Singh's ideas that 'borders cannot be changed, but they can be made irrelevant'.[39] Based on the famous four-point formula on Kashmir, there were attempts to demilitarise, allow free movement of residents of Jammu and Kashmir, maintain self-governance without independence, and

[37] Steve Coll, "The Back Channel," *The New Yorker*, February 23, 2009.
[38]Manmohan Singh, "PM's Speech at Banquet for President Musharraf of Pakistan," Prime Minister's Office, Digital Library Archive (banquet for President Musharraf of Pakistan, April 16, 2005).
[39] P. R. Chari and Hasan Askari Rizvi, "*Making Borders Irrelevant in Kashmir*," (US Institute of Peace, 2008).

establish joint-supervision.[40] If implemented, what became known as the Musharraf-Manmohan Four-Point Formula would have resulted in Kashmir slowly slipping from India's control.[41]

Rajiv Dogra reveals that Prime Ministers Nehru and Vajpayee approached Pakistan circumspectly, becoming more assertive only after being provoked. Many leaders who had lived through the partition were opposed. This suggests India still perceives Pakistan as part of its territory, resulting in a conciliatory approach to solving problems.[42]

The November 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai prompted Singh to call for immediate action, which Singh emphasised in his Lok Sabha address on 11 December:

> '…Parliament must resolutely reinforce our nation's determination to defeat terrorism and destroy it root and branch. The scourge of terrorism has to be, and will be, fought with determination. All means and measures needed for this purpose will be utilised…'
> '…we have taken up strongly with the Government of Pakistan the use of their territory for launching an attack of this kind and the need for the strongest possible action against the perpetrators of such ghastly acts. The world community must be convinced that action by Pakistan against the brutal perpetrators of these crimes against humanity will be effective and will be sustained over time…'[43]

[40]Baru, *Accidental Prime Minister*; Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*, 119.
[41]Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign*, 119-20.
[42]This section will be further elaborated in Chapter 7 that brings together the entire findings of the thesis.
[43]Manmohan Singh, "PM's Intervention in Lok Sabha during Discussion on the Recent Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai," Prime Minister's Office, Digital Library Archive (Lok Sabha Session, December 11, 2008).

The attacks caught India's internal security forces unprepared.[44] The 72-hour attack left the Indian government wondering if its marine commandos were equipped to defend Mumbai. It also revealed that India lacked the means to make Pakistan pay for its aggression. The fact that Singh spoke about making Pakistan take responsibility and India not responding militarily to the terror attack drew relentless criticism at home.[45] This even caused the Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, and National Security Advisor, MK Narayanan, to resign and continued criticism from the BJP opposition in the government.[46]

What brought even more criticism of Singh and his administration was the last attempt to negotiate with Pakistan at the non-aligned summit at Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt in July 2009.[47] Instead of India taking an aggressive approach towards the terror attacks on India, Singh was in dialogue with the Pakistan Prime Minister, Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani. The two heads of state concluded that:

> '…that terrorism is the main threat to both countries. Both leaders affirmed their resolve to fight terrorism and to cooperate with each other to this end…'
>
> '…Both leaders agreed that the two countries will share real time, credible and actionable information on any future terrorist threats…'[48]

While both nations displayed their willingness to cooperate towards terrorism, what was on display was that the Singh government would not undertake any sort of aggressive

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[44] Sumit Ganguly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 124.
[45] Ganugly, *Indian Foreign Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions*, 25.
[46] Vikram Dodd et al., "Mumbai Terror Attacks: Senior Indian Officials Resign amid Criticism over Siege," *The Guardian,* November 30, 2008.
[47] Varun Vaish, "Negotiating the India-Pakistan Conflict in Relations to Kashmir," *International Journal on World Peace* 28, no. 3 (September 2011): 53–80.
[48] Sharm el Sheikh, "*Joint Statement Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani,*" Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 16, 2009.

measures to deal with the terrorist organisations. Therefore, making the PII goal of victimhood explains how Singh's colonial trauma influenced his conciliatory policy to Pakistan.

6.1.5. Singh and China

Singh's government improved relations with China, building trust and promoting economic development. In 2005, special representatives from India and China collaborated on *The Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Solving the Boundary Question*. The document was adopted during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in 2005.[49] For India, disagreement allowed for 'clearly identifiable geographic features' and the necessary' interest of the settled populations in the borders' protection.'[50] After the declaration, there was not much conversation between the special representatives. Singh and Wen Jiabao issued a joint statement in 2005 advocating a strategic and cooperative partnership that discussed global governance, particularly at the United Nations, and addressing newer global challenges such as climate change and cyber security.[51]

India's decision to cooperate with China was a pragmatic one. As a result, India would distinguish itself from its competitors through cooperation. By achieving the post-imperial ideology goal of maximising status and the foreign policy goal of strategic autonomy, India would maintain its strategic autonomy while advancing towards its overarching goal of international power status. This seemed feasible since India and China had agreed that there

[49] Willem van Kemenade, "Tibet in the 1950s and the Border Issue," *Détente Between China and India The Delicate Balance of Geopolitics in Asia* (Clingendael Institute, 2008); Rajiv Sikri, "The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations," *Journal of International Affairs* 64, no. 2 (2011): 55–71.
[50] "*A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India*," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, January 14, 2008.
[51] "Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 11, 2005.

was enough room for their growth in Asia and the world, most importantly without being threatened by each other.[52]

However, the India-China partnership suffered a significant blow from the military confrontations in April-May 2013 at Despang. The 2013 Depsang standoff between Indian and Chinese forces occurred when a platoon of Chinese soldiers set up camp 10 km into territory claimed by India.[53] The Chinese officials claimed they were patrolling the Chinese side of the border and denied having trespassed. Singh dismissed the disagreement as a 'localised problem'. Even his foreign minister, Salman Khurshid, likened the problem to acne, which could be treated with ointment.[54] However, the standoff continued; only when India agreed to destroy its bunkers at the Chumar sector did the Chinese forces withdraw.[55] However, Singh's approach towards China was like his approach to Pakistan, a very non-aggressive stance. This was visible through the official visit by Singh to Beijing from 22-24 October 2013, where agreements were made regarding the border, rivers, road transportation, and the setup of service centres for electrical equipment maintenance in India.[56] Manmohan Singh, in his address to the media after talks with the Chinese Premier, underscored the border agreement that was signed, displaying Singh's pacifist approach, as he stated:

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[52] Shyam Saran, *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century* (Juggernaut Books, 2017), 146.
[53] Manoj Joshi, "Depsang Incursion: Decoding the Chinese Signal," *Observational Research Foundation*, May 14, 2013; Manoj Joshi, *Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya* (Oxford University Press, 2022); Rathnam Indurthy, "India and China: Conflict, Competition, Cooperation, and Prospects for Peace," *International Journal on World Peace* 33, no. 1 (2016): 43–108.
[54] Rama Lakshmi, "India-China Border Dispute: Both Sides Step Warily with High-Level Visits Due," *The Guardian*, May 7, 2013.
[55] Lakshmi, "India-China Border Dispute."
[56] BBC News, "India and China in Border Defence Agreement," *BBC News*, October 23, 2013.

'…the agreement on Border Defence Cooperation that we have just signed will add to the existing instruments to ensure peace, stability and predictability on our borders…'[57]

Through the PII, the goal of maximising territorial sovereignty is practised through Singh's dealings. India's relations with Pakistan were in turmoil due to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai and because of India's nuclear deal with the USA. Therefore, any real or perceived aggression against China would not be in India's interest. As an ally of Pakistan, China could encourage Pakistan to mobilise its troops towards India, whose military was in no position to repel border attacks on both sides. Therefore, the post-imperial ideology goal of maximising territorial sovereignty can explain how Singh kept India from losing any more of its territory.

6.2. Narendra Modi: 2014-2019

Under Atal Bihari Vajpayee', the Hindu nationalists maintained a stable BJP-led coalition from 1998 to 2004, promoting economic growth and international ties. However, the BJP lost the 2004 elections and was in the opposition for the next ten years. Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014, proposing a 'New India' to dismantle the Nehruvian ideology. Modi's views on changing India's future were evident from his first day in office.

This section applies the PII to Modi's early life, followed by an analysis of his foreign policy from 2014 to 2019.

6.2.1. Early life and early political career

Narendra Modi was born on 17 September 1950 in Vadnagar, a small town in Gujarat.[58] His father, Damodardas, earned his living by selling tea from a stall he set up on the platform of the train station, a stall that is said to be there even today. Modi is the third of five siblings,

[57] Manmohan Singh, "PM's Statement to the Media after Delegation Level Talks with the Chinese Premier," Prime Minister's Office, Digital Library Archives (PM Manmohan SIngh Official Visit to Beijing, October 23, 2013).
[58] Andy Marino, *Narendra Modi: A Political Biography* (Harpercollins, 2014), 27.

with two older brothers, a younger sister, and a younger brother.[59] The *Ghachi* caste, to which Modi's family belongs, traditionally produces vegetable oil. The *Ghachi* caste is believed to transcend religious boundaries because Gujarat is home to a sizeable Muslim population. Although the *Ghachis* were considered lower middle class, Modi's family is said to have improved because of his father's business.[60] So, Modi grew up in mixed communities; his best friend was a Muslim, and he was comfortable celebrating both Muslim and Hindu festivals. In *Narendra Modi: A Political Biography*, Andy Marino speaks of how stories about Modi's childhood and his teenage years as a student mentioned his leadership. Marino adds that Modi narrated his stories as a 'legend' in the making.[61]

In 1967, at age seventeen, Modi ran away after his parents brought home a wife for Modi, whom he had been forced to marry as a child. Modi went to live with his uncle, who ran a canteen for the Gujarat State Road Transportation Corporation (GSRTC).[62] Here, Modi met Ambalal Koshti, an RSS member who introduced Modi to the leadership.[63] Laxmanrao Inamdar, a Maharashtrian Brahmin, and Modi's mentor, was the head of the RSS branch in Ahmedabad.[64] Therefore, after leaving his parental home, Modi's work in the RSS gave him a sense of purpose.[65]

Modi always believed that he was different from others and had to use willpower and self-control.[66] As a child, he stopped consuming salt, oil, and spices. He was an avid reader and a devotee of Swami Vivekananda. When he tried to join the Ram Krishna Mission in Calcutta, he was turned away because he had not completed his graduation from university. In 1966,

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[59] Marino, *Narendra Modi: A Political Biography*. 29.
[60] Marino, *Narendra Modi: A Political Biography*. 33.
[61] Marino, *Narendra Modi: A Political Biography*, 35.
[62] Kingshuk Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life* (India: Lotus Collection, 2013), 118.
[63] Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life*, 118-19.
[64] Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life*, 123-124.
[65] Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life*, 127.
[66] Marino, *Narendra Modi: A Political Biography*, 33.

Swami Atmasthanandaji advised Modi against becoming a monk. This led Modi to join the RSS's youth wing. When he was eight, Modi attended the RSS, where he learned about right-wing nationalism and Hindutva ideology.[67]

Modi worked tirelessly to establish the RSS in Gujarat. In his interview with Andy Marino, Modi remembered Gujarat and other sources on India's domestic politics speak about how turbulent Gujarat is, especially Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat. Modi looked over the work of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP)- the student wing of the RSS. It is believed that during this time frame, Modi earned his master's degree.[68] However, during his early political career, Modi watched the RSS stalwarts opposing the foreign policies of Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Therefore, being on the opposing side to their foreign policies and looking at the negative connotations that came about, PII allows us to explain why Modi, as prime minister, insisted that his foreign policy departed from the Nehruvian tradition. It displays the difference in ideology that Modi developed. To understand Modi's ideological development, one can gain insight from the biography Modi wrote on Lakshmanrao Inamdar titled *Jyoti Punj* in 2001, paying homage to Inamdar,[69] a lawyer affectionately known as 'Vakil Sahab' (Vakil means lawyer, and Sahab means Sir). Modi always likened his relationship with Inamdar to Nehru's relationship with Gandhi. They met in the 1950s when Modi was already an RSS Bal Swayamsevak (junior cadet). Inamdar trained Modi and even ensured his ascent within the party.[70]

In the late 1980s, Modi became general secretary of the Gujarat BJP. The next decade saw a change in his political career, with the BJP taking control of the government and the Congress party being relegated to the opposition. In 1990, President of the BJP, L.K. Advani,

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[67] Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life*, 133-34.
[68] Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life*, 133-34.
[69] Narendra Modi, *Vakil Saheb Lakshmanrao Inamdar* (Prabhat Prakashan, 2021).
[70] Marino, *Narendra Modi: A Political Biography*, 57-58; Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life*; Modi: *Vakil Saheb Lakshmanrao Inamdar*.

was imprisoned during the Ram Rath Yatra, bringing Modi to oversee the party meetings and seeking to reduce tensions within the BJP party.[71] Modi's political career spanned from Chief Minister of Gujarat to Prime Minister of India in 2014. The following section expands upon Modi's foreign policy in his first tenure as Prime Minister.

6.2.2. Modi's Foreign Policy 2014-2018

Upon becoming Prime Minister, Modi took the world head-on despite having no experience with foreign policy. He could walk the same path set by his predecessors or change the course of Indian foreign policy. Modi chose the latter with his idea of New India. However, whether Modi has changed the direction of Indian foreign policy remains open to debate.

6.2.3. From Nonalignment to Multialignment

Dogra mentions Modi's goal to be a great statesman and to establish India as a global force.[72] In this way, Modi was in the tradition of India's previous prime ministers; however, Modi disagrees with Nehru's nonalignment policy, considering it safe, neutral, and passive. Modi, like Singh, wanted India to be more assertive and to take more risks. He aimed for a multi-aligned India like the Manmohan Singh doctrine, which would quietly move away from nonalignment.[73] Therefore, applying PII and its goals of maximising territorial sovereignty and status explains Modi's strategy for establishing India as a world power by developing a foreign policy that served its national interests, just like the foreign policies of Rao, Vajpayee, and Singh. The beginnings of Modi's plan for India were presented in his inaugural speech:

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[71] Nag, *The NaMo Story: A Political Life*; Ian Hall, *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy* (Bristol University Press, 2019).
[72] Dogra, *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*.
[73] Hall, *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy*, 35.

> '…As we devote ourselves to take India's development journey to newer heights, we seek your support, blessings and active participation. Together we will script a glorious future for India…'[74]

Modi's Doctrine presents *Panchamrit* (five pillars) of foreign policy: *Samman* (dignity), *Samvad* (dialogue), *Samriddhi* (shared prosperity), *Suraksha* (regional and global security) and *Sanskriti evam sabhayata* (cultural and civilisational links).[75] These pillars are not far from Nehru's *Panchscheel* and the ideas promoted by the Vajpayee and Singh governments, or even Indira Gandhi. Modi advocated a 'neighbourhood first' policy, exemplified at his swearing ceremony, as he invited the heads of state of the entire South Asian region, displaying an important step towards regional cooperation.[76] Nonetheless, neighbourhood cooperation is not far from Indira Gandhi's 1970s policy that encouraged the establishment of the SAARC.

Consequently, PII's victimhood explains Modi's dismissal of nonalignment in favour of multialignment. They are two sides of the same coin: India does not side with any superpower bloc but benefits from all its relationships to achieve its foreign policy goals. Harsh Pant claims that Modi's foreign policy is moving away from India's decades-long tradition of nonalignment.[77] In comparison, Ian Hall considered Modi's foreign policy not as following a coherent doctrine[78] but rather as a continuation of the policies undertaken by his immediate predecessors. Avinandan Choudhary argues that Modi's foreign policy constitutes a 'unique blend of pragmatism and idealistic cooperation as well as gestures'.[79] Therefore, Modi's

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[74]ABP NEWS, "LIVE: Narendra Modi's Swearing-in Ceremony 26 May 2014," Video, *YouTube*, May 26, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ESIIgYmCOgo.
[75] Our Special Correspondent, "Panchsheel Gives Way to Panchamrit," *Telegraph India*, April 4, 2015.
[76] Shrikant Paranjpe, *India's Strategic Culture: The Making of National Security Policy*, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2020), 122.
[77] Harsh V. Pant, "Out With Non-Alignment, In With a 'Modi Doctrine,'" *The Diplomat*, November 13, 2014.
[78] Ian Hall, "Is a 'Modi Doctrine' Emerging in Indian Foreign Policy?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 3 (February 2, 2015): 247–52.
[79] Avinandan Choudhary, 'Modi Doctrine: An Understanding of PM Modi's Foreign Policy',

approaches to China and Pakistan in his first term as prime minister must be analysed to determine if his multialignment is his way of reinventing India's foreign policy.

6.2.4. Relations with India and China in Modi's First Term

When Modi came to power in 2014, there was no inclination that India and China could cooperate economically to establish regional stability because of the security challenge that described China as 'the one power which impinges directly on India's geographical space.'[80] Nikhil Gokhale suggested in his work that India needed strong partnerships with the USA and other regional powers to hedge against China.[81] Similar to what the Singh government attempted to adopt initially. After becoming prime minister, Modi told China that India would defend its national interests and security. In August 2014, Modi visited Japan and invited government officials from Taiwan and Tibet to his inauguration.[82]

On a visit to China in the autumn of 2014, Modi extended a hand of friendship.[83] At the 2015 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) Summit, Modi re-established bilateral ties with China by informing President Xi Jinping that India did not fear China. During the BRICS Summit, the Chinese Premier invited Modi to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).[84] At these meetings, Modi urged China to review the issues that divided them: borders, visas, water issues, and economic relations.[85] After the summit, Foreign

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India Opines, 2014.

[80] Sunil Khilnani, *Nonalignment 2. 0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century* (Penguin Enterprise, 2014).

[81] Khilnani, *Nonalignment 2. 0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century*, 13.

[82] Nitin A Gokhale, *Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 12.

[83] Ankit Panda, 'Chinese foreign minister makes inroads with Modi government', The Diplomat, 10 June 2014.

[84] AFP, 'New BRICS bank to be based in China, India to have presidency', Economic Times, 16 July 2014.

[85] Tanvi Madan, 'Modi's trip to China: 6 quick takeaways', Brookings, 15 May 2015.

Secretary Jaishankar confirmed that India was not ready to be part of China's One-Belt-One-Road initiative because it meant relinquishing India's claim to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.[86]

In 2016, Modi stood up to China[87] because China had vetoed a U.N. resolution that was for placing JeM leader Masood Azhar on a terrorist list.[88] In response to the veto, the Indian government issued a visa to Isa Dolgun, a Chinese Uighur dissident, to attend a conference on democracy at the Dalai Lama's residence in Dharamshala. Despite China's objections, India's answer to China's veto was revealed[89] as India's attempt to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[90] However, Modi pushed for cooperation among the BRICS countries at the 16th BRICS Summit in 2016, where he highlighted the need for 'an increase in cooperation and convergence at the G-20, WTO and other fora.'[91]

However, India and China had been discussing economic cooperation to manage their trade deficit when the 2016 border clash occurred; the People's Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Demchok, a village military encampment in Leh, at the Line of Actual Control. The PLA entered Demchok and stopped constructing a canal for the village, leading to protests from the villagers. The Indian army remained in place, waiting for the PLA troops to withdraw. In 2017, tensions flared again when a PLA unit began building a road from Dokhlam to Zompelri in Bhutan.[92] Dokhlam is a strategically located area close to the Siliguri corridor. It is 100 square kilometres long, comprising a plateau and a valley between India, Bhutan, and China. A two-month military standoff between India and China ended when both sides withdrew. During this

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[86] Tanvi Madan, 'What India thinks about China's One Belt, One Road initiative', Brookings, 14 March 2016.
[87] Gokhale, Nitin A. Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More. India: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017. Pp111-140.
[88] AP and AFP, "India Protests China's Move to Block UN Blacklisting of Jaish Chief Masood Azhar," *DAWN.COM*, April 2, 2016.
[89] Shubhajit Roy and Sagnik Chowdhury, "Red Faces in Govt, Uighur Leader Dolkun Isa's Visa Cancelled after Chinese Protests," *The Indian Express*, April 26, 2016.
[90] Hall, *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy*, 142.
[91] Narendra Modi, "Prime Minister Address at the BRICS Plenary Session," NDTV archives.
[92] Bajpai, "Narendra Modi's Pakistan and China Policy."

time, Modi's stance seemed assertive as he ensured that troops did not back down, displaying a more aggressive approach than that of the Singh government. However, a few months after the border clash, Modi, at the BRICS Summit, proposed the need for cooperation over competition as he emphasised 'Emphasised on capacity-building engagement in areas of skills, health, infrastructure, manufacturing and connectivity.'[93]

The standoff blocked India's entry into the NSG and put pressure on the United Nations Security Council to resolve the Kashmir issue. Modi and Xi tried to reach an agreement. After their April 2018 meeting, they issued a joint statement citing 'developments in India-China relations from the strategic and long-term perspectives'.[94] Consequently, the post-imperial ideology goals of maximising territorial sovereignty have influenced Modi's assertive stance with China. This attitude is like that of his predecessors, especially Vajpayee and Nehru, who sought strategic autonomy while being friendly to China, only to resort to a 'Forward Policy' to resolve conflicts. However, India's political climate demanded a more aggressive approach.

6.2.5. Indo-Pak Confrontations Under Modi

The Modi government inherited India's fragile relationship with Pakistan. As Modi's foreign policy was steeped in nationalist Hindutva ideology, it is crucial to use post-imperial ideology to analyse Modi's position on Pakistan. In an unprecedented move, Modi invited Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff of Pakistan, along with other SAARC heads of state, to his inauguration.[95] At the inauguration, Modi and Shariff discussed terrorism and resolved to keep their foreign secretaries in touch.[96] However, relations soured after the Pakistani High

[93] Indrani Bagchi, "Modi Pushes for Solar Alliance at BRICS Summit," *Times Of India*, September 4, 2017.
[94] "MEA," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, accessed November 15, 2023.
[95] "*Prime Minister's Speech at the 18th SAARC Summit*," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, accessed November 15, 2023.
[96] Sachin Parashar, 'India, Pakistan foreign secretaries to meet on August 25', *Times of India*, 24 July 2014.

Commissioner invited leaders of the Kashmiri separatist Hurriyat Conference to his home. The Indian government then cancelled the talks. According to Modi, Kashmir separatists had no place in bilateral talks.[97]

Modi blamed terrorism for inflaming the Kashmir issue. Therefore, India and Pakistan preferred to discuss counterterrorism between themselves without bringing forward discussions on Kashmir. The cancellation of talks between the foreign secretaries signalled India's unwillingness to discuss Kashmir.[98] However, during the 2015 Cricket World Cup, the two prime ministers agreed to direct their foreign secretaries to resume their talks.[99] At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Ufa, the foreign secretaries of both India and Pakistan decided that there would be contact and meetings between their national security advisers would be planned.[100] Unfortunately, the scheduled meeting between the national security advisors of India and Pakistan did not materialise, despite Pakistan's attempts to include the Kashmiri separatist leader. India resisted the change in the topic of discussions to terrorism instead of remaining focused on Kashmir and threatened to withdraw from the SCO summit. Pakistan then cancelled the meeting.[101]

Pakistan was insisting on conversations about Kashmir. It seemed that Pakistan hoped to take all of Kashmir from India, which the Modi government did not seem amenable to. Hindutva ideology speaks of the need to restore the 'glorious Indian civilisation,' and the need to restore it to its former glory, which means keeping Kashmir. According to post-imperial ideology, no Indian leader would agree to give Kashmir away. This was evident in Modi's plans

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[97] C. Raja Mohan, *Modi's world: expanding India's sphere of influence* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2015), 77-80.
[98] Bajpai, Kanti. Narendra Modi's Pakistan and China Policy: assertive bilateral diplomacy and active coalition diplomacy. *International Affairs.* 93:1. 2017. Pp.74.
[99] 'Jaishankar arrives in Islamabad, Pak hopes visit will kickstart dialogue', *Hindustan Times*, 3 March 2015.
[100] "Statement Read out by Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan in Ufa, Russia (July 10, 2015)," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 10, 2015,
[101] Baqar Sajad Syed, 'NSAs' talks cancelled over Indian conditions', *Dawn*, 23 Aug. 2015.

towards Kashmir in the form of involving the people of Kashmir directly towards the generation of development through employment and good governance.[102]

Modi paid a surprise birthday visit to Nawaz Shariff in December 2015, but what followed was a three-day terrorist attack led by Jaish-e-Mohammed on the Indian Air Force Station at Pathankot. Pakistani intelligence accused India of staging the attack and refused to allow Indian investigators into Pakistan.[103] India's decision not to cancel talks on the terrorist attacks in Gurdaspur and Udhampur in 2014 may have been Modi's ploy to ensure Pakistan's cooperation in discussing terrorism, a serious security threat. India's decision not to cancel talks on the terrorist attacks in Gurdaspur and Udhampur in 2014 may have been another example of his shrewd diplomacy.[104] Here the idea of India pushing for status as a regional power status is apparent. Kautilya claims that a king must form different kinds of alliances with surrounding kingdoms based upon historical relations and the king's intentions, but what Kautilya advanced in his Mandala Theory was the Machiavellian principle that 'an enemy's enemy is a friend'. This principle is evident in the second part of Modi's Pakistan policy. However, the Hindutva nationalist approach influences are present and visible in Modi's stance towards Pakistan, and this was seen through Modi's speeches on the Release of a separatist leader by the Jammu and Kashmir Government on *9 March 2015,* where Modi displayed his anger and stated:

> '… This house on the issue of terrorism and separatist activities was never divided on party lines earlier, nor it stands divided today nor will it ever be divided in the future.

[102] Jhinuk Chowdhury, "Narendra Modi's Grand Plan for Kashmir," *The Diplomat,* March 12, 2015.
[103] 'Pathankot attack staged by India, believe Pak sleuths', *Times of India*, 5 April 2016; 'Pakistan calls off peace talks with India unilaterally; MEA reminds Pak that JIT visit was on a reciprocal basis'*, DNA Daily News and Analysis*, 8 April 2016.
[104] Bajpai, Kanti. Narendra Modi's Pakistan and China Policy: assertive bilateral diplomacy and active coalition diplomacy. *International Affairs.* 93:1. 2017.

> The house is totally entitled to unanimously express its anger, the way it has done today…'[105]

Similarly, Modi addressed Lok Sabha on 19 December 2014 regarding the grant of bail in Pakistan to Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai Attack. Modi emphasised their disbelief in India regarding the bail granted by Pakistan, especially at a time when they had just faced a similar terror attack. Modi stated:

> '…the Indian government has expressed its feelings in strong words to Pakistan and sent a strong message to them. Despite facing such a horrific incident, themselves, where India shares the same pain and not even an iota less on the recent incident of massacre of innocent school children in Pakistan, they are not bothered.'[106]

In 2016, Prime Minister Modi requested the United Nations to sanction Masood Azhar, leader of the Jaish-e Mohammed terrorist group.[107] Modi also sought support from the United States. This request resulted in the India-US joint statement outlining cooperation within the United Nations to address terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Specifically, both leaders committed to acting against terrorist organisations based in Pakistan and expediting efforts to bring to justice the terrorists responsible for the Mumbai (2008) and Pathankot (2016) attacks.[108]

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[105] Narendra Modi, "Prime Minister Narendra Modi: Release of a Separatist Leader by Jammu and Kashmir Government" (Lok Sabha No.16, Session 4, March 9, 2015).
[106] Narendra Modi, "Prime Minister Narendra Modi: India's Response to Grant of Bail in Pakistan to Accused Conspirator in Mumbai Attack," Parliament of India, Lok Sabha, Digital Library (Lok Sabha no.16, session III, December 19, 2014).
[107] 'India writes to UN to include Masood Azhar on terrorist list', *Times of India*, 26 Feb. 2016,
[108] Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, Washington, DC, 'U.S.–India joint declaration on combatting terrorism', 23 Sept. 2015.

In September 2016, Pakistani terrorists carried out a coordinated attack on a military camp in Uri, India. The Indian government responded with surgical military strikes against the terrorists' bases in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.[109] It was clear that India would not 'hesitate to cross the LoC to administer justice.[110] Modi's decision was applauded in India, as previous governments had responded cautiously to terrorist attacks on the parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008. The rationale had centred on the fear of nuclear escalation.[111] This thereby displays the assertive measures Modi was willing to undertake towards Pakistan.

While India was still reeling from the two terror attacks in 2016, terrorists struck again in 2019. On 14 February 2019, a suicide bomber rammed a vehicle filled with explosives into a convoy of 2500 CRPF personnel travelling from Jammu to Srinagar.[112] On 29 February, another suicide bombing in Pulwama, Kashmir, prompted India to launch airstrikes against the Jaish-e-Mohammed training base in Balakot, Pakistan.[113] Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes in India-administered Kashmir and captured Indian Air Force pilot Abhinandan Varthaman. Pakistan deemed the situation a threat to regional stability and criticised India's aggressive action. While the question around Modi's assertiveness towards Pakistan continues to prevail, what followed the Pulwana pre-emptive attacks, the revoking of the special status from Kashmir under Article 370. Modi justified the actions in his Independence Day speech, where he stated that he was taking a ‘significant step towards fulfilling the dream of Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel’[114] to integrate Jammu and Kashmir into India and emphasised the possibility of

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[109] ET Online, “4 Hours, Choppers and 38 Kills: How India Avenged the Uri Attack,” *Economic Times*, September 29, 2016.
[110] Dogra, Rajeev. *India’s world: How Prime Ministers shaped foreign policy*. Rupa Publication. 2020,141.
[111] Dogra. *India’s world: How Prime Ministers shaped foreign policy*.142.
[112] Bharat Karnad et al., “Responding to the Pulwama Terror Attack - CPR,” *Centre for Policy Research*, December 21, 2021.
[113] BBC News, “Viewpoint: Balakot Air Strikes Raise Stakes in India-Pakistan Stand-Off,” *BBC News*, February 26, 2019.
[114] Narendra Modi, “Prime Minister Independence Day Speech” (73rd Independence Day, August 15, 2019).

development and granting of human rights towards the people of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. Apart from the need to ensure the growth and incorporation of Kashmir into India, Modi's actions seem to have been motivated by his Hindu nationalism. However, post-imperial ideology argues that victimhood and entitlement characterise India's regional power play.

Conclusion

When studying Prime Ministers Singh and Modi,[115] continuities and changes in their foreign policies appear. They are beneficial to further contribute to analyses of India's foreign policy.

Applying post-imperial ideology and Skinnerian interpretations to Singh and Modi can help to understand the political climate in which they were born, raised, and entered politics. For example, looking at Singh's early life and youth through a post-imperial ideology lens explains how Singh's birth during the national movement and his experience of poverty and the partition instilled an appreciation of liberalisation, self-reliance, and the need for economic development. A sense of victimhood is present in his vision for India's economic growth in service to the global economy.

However, Modi was born after the struggle for liberation and grew up in an independent, postcolonial India. Modi, however, did seek an identity and authenticity, which he discovered through the training he received through the RSS and witnessing the leadership of Nehru, which the RSS critiques continuously. The passing down of colonial trauma is visible in the development and application of Modi's ideology when studied in terms of post-imperial ideology, reflecting the sense of victimhood that is characteristic of the *Hindutva* narrative.

[115] Being at the age to vote and understand political underpinnings while studying political science and international relations at the different times of my education making foreign policy even more relevant to witness the changes and provide understanding of why actions were and were not taken.

The foreign policy policies of the two prime ministers were preoccupied with Pakistan and China. The highlight of Singh's administration was the nuclear deal with the USA. Upon the deal's completion, the world recognised India both as a nuclear power and a significant global player, thereby demonstrating the post-imperial ideology goal of maximising India's status. Therefore, an explanation towards the foreign policy goal of strategic autonomy emerges that looks at how cooperation with the USA can benefit India's goal for strategic autonomy while ensuring that India does not fall into the hands of Western exploitation again.

The foreign policy choices that Singh and Modi had towards Pakistan, through post-imperial ideology, reveal a strong sense of victimhood. For instance, in Singh's dealings with Pakistan and the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008, the PII goal of maximising territorial sovereignty is present. The maximising of territorial sovereignty primarily stems from the need to ensure India's territory is safe from attacks from Pakistan or China at its borders, owing to the growth of Pakistan-China relations, which was detrimental to India. Critics more than often attribute India's non-aggressive response toward Pakistan under Singh's tenure to his timidity and lack of assertiveness. However, what emerges is the continuity of longstanding foreign policy goals. Like Singh's predecessors, the aim has been to improve cooperation and push for confidence-building measures with Pakistan. This displays the blend of Gandhian and Kautilyan principles in foreign policy execution, emphasising a non-aggressive approach towards the challenging neighbour to stabilise relations first and that an aggressive approach would only be undertaken as a last resort decision.

Modi's foreign policy approach to Pakistan is not markedly different from that of his predecessors. Since entering office, Modi has worked to maintain amicable relations with Pakistan. However, Modi's stance changed after the terrorist attacks on Pathankot and Uri in 2016. The application of the post-imperial ideology in combination with Savarkar's Hindutva doctrine brings forward the sense of victimhood that drove Modi to retaliate.

Both the Singh and Modi governments sought strategic cooperation with China. Singh made the pragmatic decision to cooperate with China. As a result, India could set itself apart from its competitors. By achieving the post-imperial ideology goal of maximising status, the foreign policy goal of strategic autonomy - India would maintain its strategic autonomy while advancing towards its primary goal of becoming an international power. This seemed feasible since India and China had agreed that Asia and the world were big enough for both. However, in the Dokhlam standoff, the post-imperial ideology of maximising territorial sovereignty influenced Modi's assertiveness. It can be argued that his approach was like that of Vajpayee and Nehru. However, what worked in Modi’s favour was that the political climate was conducive to a more aggressive response.

Modi developed trade relations with the United States and advocated its Neighbourhood First and the Act East policies. Modi executed policies initiated by the Rao and Singh governments. As part of Modi's multialignment efforts, India is a stronger member of BRICS, ASEAN, and EAS. Consequently, the post-imperial ideology goal of victimhood explains Modi's rejection of nonalignment and acceptance of multialignment. Therefore, despite continuity in foreign policy, what seems to have changed is that Modi's foreign policy is guided by showmanship and Hindutva nationalist ideology.

Chapter 7: Research Project Findings and Analysis

This chapter brings together the summation of the key findings in the analysis of the selected Indian prime ministers – Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Narendra Modi to comprehend the relationship between ideas, continuity and change in Indian foreign policy. The Skinnerian method was used to conduct the research and the application of the PII to the analysis of each Indian prime minister to analyse the primary research question: *Why has India's foreign policy taken the form it has since 1947, and why do we see evidence of both continuity (in ultimate aims) and change (in strategies for achieving those aims)?*

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section describes the theoretical framework of PII to explain the development of the Indian state's identity. The second section presents the findings of the analyses of prime ministers towards alignment policies, India-Pakistan relations, India-China relations, and India's drive for nuclear power. The final section presents the implications of the transformative historical event of colonialism and the resultant continuity and change in Indian foreign policy.

7.1. Developing the Indian State Identity

The Skinnerian method of interpretation, when used to study the prime ministers and the ideas that influenced them, the analysis of their biographies, autobiographies, and speeches allowed for understanding that three prominent political thinkers were visible and influential in their thinking, not in a combination for each prime minister, but a common thread was present. This led to the study of the ideas of Kautilya, Savarkar and Gandhi (see Chapter 2).

The primary goal of PII is that of victimhood; victimhood advances the two sub-goals of maximising territorial sovereignty and elevating status. The attempt to comprehend the aftermath of colonial rule is an opportunity to examine the diplomatic strategies pursued by

India's prime ministers, whose objectives were to secure territorial control and ensure independent decision-making in foreign policy. Applying PII helps to understand India's view of itself and how India wants to be viewed internationally.

Attempts at a similar state identity can be seen in Priya Chacko's use of Romila Thapar's grouping of Orientalists, Utilitarians, and Romantics.[1] Chacko identifies three streams of analysis: post-colonialism through Nehru, Indian nationalism through Gandhi, and Hindu nationalism through Savarkar.[2] Aparna Pande uses Russell Mead's classification of four schools of American presidential leadership—Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian—to describe four trends in Indian foreign policy: imperialism, messianic idealism, realism, and isolationism. Therefore, through the analysis of the ideological influences on India's prime ministers, this research project establishes three Indian state identities: strategic, Hindu nationalist, and post-colonial.

The table below illustrates the state identity established through the three political thinkers and the prime ministers influenced by the ideologies present in their foreign policy choices—however, ideological influence overlaps because some leaders are incorporated in more than one state identity developed. However, the common thread between all Prime ministers is the post-colonial identity. While the strategic identity of Kautilya is significant and present in India's foreign policy choices, what cannot be ignored and which comes to be a significant influence that is relevant to Indian foreign policy even today, is the post-colonial identity that Gandhi propagated, driven from the victimhood of colonial trauma; thereby bringing post-colonial identity in the forefront, with strategic identity following suit.

[1] Romila Thapar, "Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity," *Modern Asian Studies* 23, no. 2 (May 1989): 209–31.
[2] Priya Chacko, "The Search for a Scientific Temper: Nuclear Technology and the Ambivalence of India's Postcolonial Modernity," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 1 (July 19, 2010): 185–208.

Therefore, the table represents the influence of the political ideas of Mahatma Gandhi on Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and even Narendra Modi. However, the pragmatic strategic foreign policy choices in Indian foreign policy are present in Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Modi, depicting the influence of Kautilya's strategic ideologies. What needs to be observed is that the foreign policies of Vajpayee and Modi, however, combined Kautilya's strategic identity and Savarkar's Hindu nationalism. Kautilya's strategic identity is also found in the foreign policies of Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh, along with a strong influence on Gandhi's post-independence identity (see table).



With the identity that appears in the foreign policies of the different prime ministers, the timeline in the table below presents the thematic division of Indian foreign policy since independence.



The school of ideas represent the ideas and goals driving the foreign policies of India's prime ministers. Four schools of ideas have been derived through analysing the prime ministers in this research project. The Nehruvian idealist school of ideas is found to be present in the idealist rationale behind Nehru's non-alignment policy and even in his dealings with China and Pakistan. The second school of ideas continues the ideas of the Nehruvian Idealist school of ideas but with a more pragmatic undertone: the Nehruvian Pragmatist school of ideas. This set of ideas is represented through the mix of foreign policy decisions taken by Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi. For example, both prime ministers, in their dealings with the world order by continuing the non-alignment policy and relations with Pakistan and China, first used the idealist foreign policies of Nehru, which were based on more pacifist principles. However, they did not continue with the pacifist manner of dealings and undertook pragmatic assertive steps. What is essential in their policy choices, which sets the tone for the two following schools of ideas, is that the Nehruvian idealist principles are first undertaken and applied. When the consequence demands a firmer hand, the prime ministers take on a

different perspective and deal with foreign policy choices that suit the needs of the hour. Therefore, the third school of ideas represented in the foreign policy choices of Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee are the Pragmatic Liberals school of ideas. This school begins with the need to cater to the post-Cold War period's needs by adopting a more liberalist perspective by opening the Indian economy while continuing with the foreign policy of regional cooperation promoted by Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. The fourth school is the Strategic Multilateralist school of ideas found in the foreign policy choices of Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi; this is present through the most recent ideas of multi-alignment, which are apparent in Modi and Singh's strategic effort to bring India to nuclear global status. Establishing India's identity and the thematic divisions through the application of PII provides a theoretical framework for Indian foreign policy. The following section presents this project's findings through the application of PII to India's foreign policy choices.

7.2. Foreign Policy Choices and Post-Imperial Ideology

This section presents the findings of the analysis conducted on the selected prime ministers regarding alignment policies, India-Pakistan relations, India-China relations, and India's drive for nuclear power. In the different sub-sections, the formation of the Indian state identity and the school of ideas will be explained.

PII views colonialism as a transformative but traumatic historical event. Therefore, colonialism is a causal[3] and explanatory variable.[4] As a causal variable, PII comprises a sense of victimhood (a need to acknowledge and empathise with colonial history) in formerly colonised states. Therefore, applying PII to the foreign policy decisions of the prime ministers can explain the prime minister's political behaviour and the development of state identity.

[3] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post- Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China* (Stanford University Press, 2013). 8.
[4] Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post- Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*, 135.

7.2.1. Alignment Policies

Applying PII to foreign policy choices is seen in Nehru's non-alignment policy. What emerges through PII is the goal of victimhood through the push for a foreign policy that would best serve India as a newly independent nation. The reason for this stems from the fact that Nehru was part of the foreign policy service of the Indian National Congress (INC) in British India and forced to serve the needs of India's colonisers, because of which the need to bring about change in foreign policy goals was given priority. So, as prime minister, Nehru disapproved of British foreign policy for India and wanted India to have a foreign policy that was aloof from both imperialism and fascism[5], as seen in Nehru's interview with the Times of India on 3 May 1939 when he said that "*India as well as the rest of the world certainly stands to suffer greatly if fascism dominates the world. India does not suffer alone, if British imperialism fades away."*[6] Hence, through the historical memory of colonial rule, Nehru's foreign policy reflected a change in India's self-image. It allows for understanding Nehru's non-alignment policy to keep the colonial trauma as far away as possible to enable the development of independent India, thereby displaying the contributions of Gandhi's principles and enabling the development of India's post-colonial identity and the Nehruvian idealist school of ideas.

Applying the same PII argument to non-alignment, Gandhian principles and Nehruvian idealism are present in the use of non-alignment policy by Shastri, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv

[5] R. Dwivedi, ed. *Life and Speeches of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru* (Allahabad National 1929), pp. 50-51.
[6] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Freedom From Fascism*, interview by Times of India, May 3, 1939, from Jawaharlal Nehru, *Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru: Being a Collection of Most Significant Speeches Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru from 1922 to 1946* (Lahore: India Print Works, 1946), p.72.

Gandhi. All three prime ministers pushed the non-alignment policy that Nehru established, the only difference that emerged in their foreign policy was that of implementation, as it was driven by a more Realpolitik approach. However, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, in their foreign policies, displayed some amount of inclination toward the Soviet Union, like Nehru, as seen in their visitations to the Soviet Union and increase in relations, especially the support India received during the 1971 clash with Pakistan over the formation of Bangladesh, the 1971 India and Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which was carried forward by Rajiv Gandhi as well.

The aftermath of the Cold War brought the need to liberalise the Indian economy under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's Look East policy. Atal Bihari Vajpayee continued Rao's foreign policy. However, the non-alignment policy continued as Rao insisted that India not get pulled or pushed around by the big powers or groups of states.[7] The constant exercise of subconscious victimhood to keep India's territorial autonomy was a safe position for Rao and a goal of PII.

As Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh continued the Look East Policy, encouraging the widening of India's alliance with neighbours beyond Southeast Asia and into the broader Indo-Pacific region. PII's goal of victimhood is what can be used to understand the reasons that drove regional cooperation- this was seen as key in Indira Gandhi's foreign policy as it was also seen in Rao's Look East Policy, and even in Singh's extension of the LEP and Modi's Act East Policy towards other regions- thereby ensuring that India was developing into a powerful regional player, fulfilling post-imperial ideology's goal of maximising status. Even though Modi advocates a multialignment policy that focuses on increasing India's engagement with different countries, his multi-alignment has been compared to Nehru's policy of non-

[7] Shashi Bhushan Kumar. PV Narasimha Rao: A strategist and commanding contributor to governance, *Indian Journal of Public Administration.* 2022, p. 230

alignment. The goal of Nehru's non-alignment strategy was not to align with any one power but to benefit from maintaining good relations with all of them.

Hence, PII's goals of maximising status and territorial sovereignty are evident through the alignment policies undertaken by the prime ministers analysed here. Their policies demonstrated continuity in the goals of territorial integrity and strategic autonomy and, most importantly, adherence to India's non-alignment policy.

7.2.2. India-Pakistan Relations and Victimhood

In analysing the foreign policy choices made by the prime ministers towards Pakistan, the argument of maximising territorial sovereignty of PII stands out as a significant goal. The partition of India, a consequence of wanting to be rid of colonialism, inflicted another collective historical trauma.

According to Rajiv Dogra,[8] Nehru and Vajpayee made similar mistakes. India's first few prime ministers tended to take a gentle approach to Pakistan, and it was only after being provoked that they became more assertive. Many Indian leaders who had participated in the national movement and witnessed the partition experienced the trauma associated with colonisation. Therefore, the sense of shared history and colonialism as having belonged to the same British Indian territory before independence stemmed from the historical facts of both newly independent nations belonging to the same Indian empires throughout history, made it increasingly difficult for Indian leaders to deal with Pakistan based on their shared history. This research project allowed for understanding India's victimhood from the sense of the Indian leadership as explained with the help of post-imperial ideology, and it also allowed glimpses into Pakistan's victimhood, making room for future research on Pakistan and post-imperial ideology. Thus, Indian leaders still perceived Pakistan as a part of India, which

[8] Rajiv Dogra. *India's World: How Prime Ministers Shaped Foreign Policy*.

explains their conciliatory approach to problems. Rajeev Sikri observed that 'Indian Prime Ministers from Rajiv Gandhi and I. K. Gujral to Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh had frequently given in to romanticised sentimentalism about Pakistan,'[9] perhaps because Vajpayee had stated that 'you can change friends but not your neighbour'.[10]

Although Modi has an assertive foreign policy approach to Pakistan, most of his foreign policy choices, especially regarding the question of Kashmir. Thereby displaying the influence of a strong Hindutva nationalist approach. However, in general, the application of PII explains that the first attempts at dealing with Pakistan are always conducted through a pacifist-friendly approach and that a more assertive stance was undertaken due to the antagonistic turn of events that occurred at the borders of Kashmir by Pakistan, as seen in the Uri surgical strikes that Modi ordered. This approach towards dealings with Pakistan is present in the foreign policy approach of all prime ministers; the only change is in Modi's actions that are viewed from the Hindu nationalist approach that drives his foreign policy choices.

However, through the post-imperial ideology, there is a need to maximise territorial sovereignty and status, arguing that both victimhood and entitlement reinforce India's position and its regional power play.

7.2.3. India-China Relations

India-China relations, when analysed through the application of PII, use the sense of victimhood to explain how the Indian prime ministers resolve border disputes with China. The PII goal of victimhood, which is shared with Pakistan and China, explains India's non-aggressive policy. For example, Nehru's *Panchsheel* towards China explains the practice of

[9] Rajiv Dogra. *Challenge and strategy: rethinking India's foreign policy* (SAGE Publications India, 2009), p. 61.
[10] Agencies, "'You Can Change Friends, Not Neighbours,'" *Economic Times*, May 9, 2003, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/you-can-change-friends-not-neighbours/articleshow/45796501.cms.

maintaining friendly ties with the two neighbouring nations, intending to maximise territory. This was continued in the cordial approach Rao, Vajpayee, Singh, and Modi undertook towards China- as these leaders dealt with an emerging China in the region and China's growing relations with Pakistan. Therefore, the Kautilyan strategic principles of the Mandala theory were in practice: the need to appease one's enemy in the absence of threats.

However, Indian prime ministers continued the same pacifist approach to China as with Pakistan; India only responded to aggressive actions by China, as seen in the India-China war under Nehru and the 2013 border clash between Indian and Chinese troops. Afterwards, the Singh government decided to continue its economic cooperation with China. What emerges is that by achieving the PII goal of maximising status, the foreign policy goal of strategic autonomy appeared feasible since India and China had agreed that there was enough room for both.[11] Apart from China's regional growth, another reason that kept the Singh government from responding aggressively to China's attacks was the political climate. India's leaders knew that any aggression to China on India's part would be unwise given China's alliance with Pakistan and could surely encourage Pakistan to mobilise its troops towards India. India then was not in a militarily strong position to deal with border attacks from the two countries. Its collective historical trauma prevents India from taking risks and, more importantly, putting itself in a position where it might lose more territory.

7.2.4. India's Nuclear Drive

The PII goal of maximising status is most prominent in India's nuclear drive, as all prime ministers have pushed for the development of India's nuclear programme. Nehru and even Rajiv Gandhi, who believed in non-proliferation, did not stop Indian scientists from carrying out their nuclear programme. Shastri's granting of the nuclear program led to Indira

[11] Shyam Sharan. *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century* (Juggernaut Books, 2017). pp. 146.

Gandhi's nuclear testing, demonstrating the PII goal of victimhood, which depicts the impact of the collective trauma on the leaders and thereby drove the maximising status. Her advocacy for a strong, self-reliant India made sense through economic self-sufficiency and security development. Nuclear weapons displayed India's strength in South Asia, an attempt to balance China's threat to India after the 1962 war, making India a strong player in regional and world politics. In a similar light, Rao's decision to continue advancing India's nuclear programme reflects the PII's victimhood wherein, receiving empathy for its trauma from other states in the international system and ensuring that it does not fall prey to international interference. Hence, the PII goal of maximising status is obtained through the nuclear programme, enabling the 1998 nuclear tests, primarily by the Vajpayee government. This was followed by the nuclear deal between India and the USA, which Singh considered a personal victory.

Therefore, the completion of the US-India nuclear deal was significant as it presented India as a nuclear-powered state to the world, demonstrating the PII goal of maximising status, hence undertaking the measures required to return India to its glorious position before becoming a victim of colonialism. Pant highlights the Indo-US nuclear deal as rewriting the 'global nuclear regime' rules[12] to include India.

7.3. The Weight of History: Continuity and Change

This section is divided into two parts that explain the causal and explanatory variables of colonialism on India's leaders. The first part presents the implications of the transformative historical event of colonialism, and the second part compares the prime ministers to demonstrate continuity and change in their foreign policy choices. While we sometimes look

[12] Harsh Pant, *Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview* (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2016).

at decisions by leaders and point to personality as a cause of action, those traits are learned behaviours conditioned from the past experiences of those leaders.[13]

7.3.1. Transformative impacts of colonialism

This section discusses three strong influences on prime ministers' foreign policy choices.

(a) Colonial Generation

The first and most striking finding was that all leaders were the same generation that grew up during India's national freedom movement. Therefore, the generation born in the 1900s witnessed the strong winds of nationalism for India's freedom from 1920 onwards. As Donald Matthews presents, the behaviour of leaders results from more than just a collection of experiences. Still, experiences matter, and they shape the attitudes and beliefs of the leaders, "[H]uman beings perceive what goes on about them within a frame of reference determined by their total previous experience".[14] Therefore, the generational similarity brings about the experiences that make evident the colonial trauma that these leaders share. Hence, it explains why all the prime ministers focused on 'sovereignty', having experienced the fight for freedom. The partition solidified their concern for territorial sovereignty when dealing with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir and China over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Sharing the turbulent environment filled with the struggle of the national movement during their childhood brings the Prime Ministers together under one large umbrella, irrespective of their personal experiences. All the selected leaders who have been part of the struggle have the same goal: to ensure that India remains free from external pressures and that its sovereignty remains intact.

(b) Political Socialisation:

[13] Goldgeier, James M. 1994. Leadership style and Soviet foreign policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 2&4.
[14] Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Random House, 1954)

The social and political environment of the prime ministers of their childhood plays an essential role in developing the emotional and mental memories that have impacted them throughout their lives. The study finds that all the prime ministers, despite being born and during the national movement, were either participants in that movement- either directly or had family members who were. The analysis presents that the leaders began their political socialisation in their homes as their fathers and brothers and sometimes even their entire families participated in the freedom movement. Research on leadership suggests that the influence of family history is significant in the socialisation and behaviour of a future leader.[15] This is because the family background is critical in determining the view of the world. So, as the family is a child's first socialisation unit. In the context of India, the seeds of nationalism and colonial trauma were planted in future leaders by their families. However, leaders like Narendra Modi learned about the national movement through the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This is because Modi had run away from home, and he made the political party and its members his family. The question that arises here is whether generational colonial trauma will be passed down to future generations of leaders, Indians who were born in Post-independent India. This makes room for future research on leaders born after independence.

(c) Education:

The third finding is their educational experience. While Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, and Manmohan Singh had a Western-style education and might even have been educated in Europe, India's other prime ministers were educated in India. Despite their different educational journeys, all leaders were taught the same political philosophies and learned about nationalism, sovereignty, socialism, and liberalism in colonial India's schools. Moreover, with the freedom movement, these lessons were also taught in colonial India's non-western schools.

[15]JoAnn Danelo Barbour and Michael Harvey, *Global Leadership: Portraits of the Past, Visions for the Future* (MD: International Leadership Association., 2010).

PII makes it apparent that historical analysis of the leaders' childhood and education helps understand the formation of their beliefs. Political psychologists have closely analysed the relationship between leaders and their belief systems, bringing to the forefront the link between moderate policies and higher education.[16]

7.3.2. Continuity and Change

This research project has tended to emphasise the similarities rather than the differences among the Indian prime ministers studied here. This is because each prime minister, regardless of party, has tailored their foreign policy design to India's needs. Therefore, what is seen is that prime ministers have different personalities and ideologies.

The research findings also hold similarities in the foreign policy of the analysed leaders. The shared generational colonial trauma is present in the foreign policies of all prime ministers analysed in this project. For example, like Modi's multi-alignment foreign policy, Nehru's non-alignment policy perpetuates the territorial sovereignty principle. Both leaders want to preserve India's territorial sovereignty. Through their policies, they strive to appease India's neighbours and remain friendly with the states of the international political system without joining any camp.

Similarly, as in Rao's Look East Policy, regional cooperation was key in Indira's foreign policy, ensuring that India was developing itself into a powerful regional player. The nuclear program by Shastri, the nuclear tests by Vajpayee and its culmination in Singh's nuclear deal with the USA promotes India's aspiration for global power status. Therefore, post-imperial ideology's maximising status principle is at the forefront of their foreign policy dealings.

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[16] Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (March 1980): 7.

India's foreign policy approach to Pakistan was initially conciliatory. Since most leaders were part of the freedom struggle and did not support the idea of partition, they promoted a softer policy towards Pakistan and only turned to a more assertive outlook if things did not go as planned. For example, Nehru initially promoted a friendly stance towards Pakistan until the war of 1965; this was a similar approach visible in the foreign policy of Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh towards Pakistan. Only Indira Gandhi and Modi have taken a consistently aggressive stance towards Pakistan. Their similar personalities help explain their disagreement with Nehru's Pakistan policy and view of Pakistan. This allows for the development of the argument regarding Indira Gandhi's support towards the Bangladeshi liberation war and Narendra Modi's policy undertaken towards Pakistan and cross-border terrorism, primarily through Pulwama. However, as Ian Hall points out, Modi's actions arose from his Hindutva right-wing nationalist ideology.[17] I find common ground between the Hindutva ideology and PII victimhood. The common thread was India's status and repositioning India to its former glory. Modi was born after the freedom struggle, so his experience is rooted in generational trauma that is passed down and not the direct experience of colonialism and the freedom movement. The ideology taught to him, and his views on the 1965 Indo-Pak war as a teenager being trained in the RSS distinguishes him from other prime ministers of India who were teenagers or young adults during the freedom struggle.

The sense of shared victimhood supported the development of warm relations with China; however, PII's territorial integrity explains India's firm approach to the border dispute. PII helps to explain how territorial sovereignty works and how Indian leaders were more trusting of non-western states, because of which initial measures were always that of cordial relations, also similar to the strategic tendencies that Kautilya advocated for. This is evident through Nehru's 'forward policy' implementation only after the *Panchsheel* regional

[17] Hall Ian, *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy* (Bristol University Press, 2019).

cooperation policy failed. However, other leaders sought regional cooperation with China and other states. For example, Rao's Look East policy encouraged economic development for India through bilateral economic relations. Even the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which Indira Gandhi promoted, encouraged the states of South Asia to work closely with one another. Regional cooperation under India's guidance would elevate India to the status of a significant regional power, returning it to its heyday before colonisation. Hence, while Rao and Singh adopted liberalisation, strategic regional cooperation was essential. This is reflected in how both leaders worked to create an important position for India through their foreign policy.

While the ideological development of Indian foreign policy was geared toward strategic autonomy and territorial sovereignty supported primarily by victimhood, what emerges is PII's goal of restoring India to its glorious position of being a vital regional empire, as it had been in pre-colonial times. This was pushed by the need to become a nuclear power.

Nehru's incorporation of Gandhian principles into his foreign policy created his brand of idealism that opposed the development of nuclear power due to its destructive tendencies. However, no other Indian prime minister has endorsed Nehruvian idealism. Nehru's opposition to the nuclear power programme was rooted in his Gandhian moralism and commitment to keeping India non-aligned. Non-alignment was Nehru's way of keeping India focused on economic development. Without the resources for nuclear development, India would have had to align with one of the two superpowers. Nehru, therefore, rejected nuclear development in India. By the time Indira Gandhi supported nuclear development, India had been independent for two decades and enjoyed significant economic growth, bringing India to a position of readiness for nuclear development, as shown in the 1974 nuclear tests. In 1998, the Pokhran tests proved that Vajpayee, like Indira Gandhi, had great power aspirations for India. The Rao government continued the nuclear development programme that had begun in Indira Gandhi's

administration, and this continuation allowed the 1998 tests to be carried out. It proved that the Indian prime ministers had the PII goal of making India a great power. This was established through the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear 123 Agreement. India had finally entered the nuclear club.

Therefore, the historical analysis of Indian prime ministers' approach to Pakistan, China and nuclear power development allows India's post-imperial victimhood identity to be comprehendible. The study of Indian foreign policy decisions by the different leaders displays the impact of colonial trauma. The effect is comprehendible through education, political socialisation, and participation of the leaders in the freedom movement. Thereby explaining how intellectual influences help in the understanding of Indian foreign policy. The aim is to clarify how victimhood, as part of the post-imperial identity, allows the goals of strategic autonomy and territorial integrity to be integral parts of Indian foreign policy, even now.

However, while PII explains the intellectual influences on Indian foreign policy and its primary goals, the colonial trauma that the prime ministers subconsciously experienced contributed to their failure to achieve their foreign policy objectives. For example, India's soft approach towards Pakistan and friendly approach to China explain why most Indian prime ministers have never been able to settle their border disputes with Pakistan and China. Like any other trauma, colonial trauma keeps India from taking foreign policy risks by pursuing safe non-alignment and multi-alignment policies. Through PII, India's push for regional cooperation did achieve the required success, primarily via the SAARC in South Asia, owing to Indo-Pak border tensions and the India-Bangladesh water dispute (not analysed in this research project). However, while attempts have been made, there has been little to no progress for stronger regional cooperation, which has played into the hands of other powers, like China. While India was successful with its economic regional cooperation through the Look East

policy, India's role as a regional power in South Asia is growing, especially with India's increase in the wider Indo-Pacific sphere.

However, the foreign policies adopted, whether the 'non-alignment policy' or the 'Indira Doctrine', the 'Look East Policy' or the 'Singh Doctrine', whether the current 'Modi Doctrine' or the pragmatic foreign policy doctrines of Shastri or Vajpayee, IFP through PII have all contributed to the eventual restoration of the glorious Indian empire. The foreign policy goals of territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy are lodestars for Indian prime ministers. Their foreign policies seek to achieve these two aims to remove the sense of victimhood created by colonial trauma.

Conclusion

In this conclusion, the summation of the thesis is presented along with the limitations and future of the research project.

In conclusion, the primary research aim has been to develop a theoretical frame that explains the ongoing impact of ideational continuity and paradigm shift in Indian foreign policy decision-making. To achieve this, the study argues that the ideational attributions of Indian prime ministers in their foreign policy decisions continue to be influenced by the weight of India's colonial history. And that the weight of the colonial impacts is found in the relationship between ideational continuity and paradigm shift. This established that India's foreign policy goals of territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy germinate through the traumatic colonial experience, which has influenced the development of the ideologies of Indian prime ministers. So, the ideational development impacts foreign policy choices, displaying the interwoven relationship between India's colonial history and foreign policy. This leads to the primary research question: *Why has India's foreign policy taken the form it has since 1947, and why do we see evidence of both continuity (in ultimate aims) and change (in strategies for achieving those aims)?*

For this purpose, the constructivist Post-Imperial Ideology (PII) theoretical frame along with the Skinnerian methodology of interpretation was undertaken to investigate India's foreign policies towards Pakistan, China, and India's drive for nuclear power of Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64), Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66), Indira Gandhi (1966-77 & 1980-84), Rajeev Gandhi (1984-89), Narasimha Rao (1991-96), Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998-2004), Manmohan Singh (2004-2014), and Narendra Modi (2014-2019).

This research project enabled an agent-centric analysis of Indian foreign policy, taking the ideas and leaders (Indian prime ministers) as the agents influencing foreign policy choices. While this study has acknowledged the structural influences on Indian leaders, it highlights the

need to undertake an agent-centric approach when looking at the role of leaders in Indian foreign policy. In analysing how leaders make foreign policy choices and the role of ideas on the leaders, the thesis arguing the impact of ideas on leaders acknowledges the intertwined relations between agent and structure that Walter Carlsnaes promotes, and in doing so, puts to practice Colin Wight's agent-structure debate approach on the relationship between the individual agent and their social structure. The agency of ideas in Indian foreign policy is, therefore, rooted in the societal structures created through India's colonial history. In turn, the societal structures are constructed through ideas.

Therefore, through the agent-centric approach undertaken in this research project, analysing the role of ideas allowed for exploring the germination of those ideas and how they impacted the decision-making process. What emerged was the interplay of the agency of ideas with the social structure that it emerged from; to put it in simple terms, it allowed for analysing ideas and their social context. Consequently, the agency of ideas on the leaders is analysed, as it is known that ideas stem from societal construction and can only come into operation when used. The leaders use it, making the agency of ideas come to the forefront. With this understanding, the study delved into the historical analysis of the lives of the selected prime ministers to comprehend the ideas that influenced them and how those ideas came to hold such foundational solid underpinnings in the state's foreign policy. What emerged was the understanding that in this agent-centric individual level of analysis, the leaders who are the primary agents studied are deeply embedded within and constituted by the structural context they inhabit, which is in conjunction with the theoretical underpinnings by Walter Carlsnaes and Colin Wight when addressing the agent-structure problem. The agency of ideas in the Indian prime ministers allowed for exploring varied factors in Indian foreign policymaking. It enabled an interdisciplinary historical approach examining the social context of the germination of the ideas found in India's colonial history.

Consequently, the key findings of this research project can be analysed as, firstly, the examination of the social context of India's colonial history and the freedom national movement is of utmost significance in the setting up of India's foreign policy after independence, facilitated the close analysis of each prime minister's education, personal life, early political career, and any other form of influence that prevailed before they became essential leaders and determined the trajectory of their nation. Hence, for this analysis, the Skinnerian interpretation method and the post-imperial ideology allowed for comprehending the social context, explaining how colonialism as a transformative historical event enabled the germination of ideas that drive Indian prime ministers even today.

Therefore, the study presents the continuation of the foreign policy goals of territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy, and the change that is found is not a foundational shift in foreign policy but that of policy implementation, which is primarily driven by the ideological underpinning of the prime minister at power. However, what is taken into consideration while presenting the ideational continuity and the paradigmatic shift are the other structural influences. The thesis presents that while several solid structural factors impact foreign policy choices, the effect of ideas that prime ministers present in their choices should also be considered and given priority, not merely acknowledged.

In summation, the exploration of ideas over Indian foreign policy through PII allowed for the determination of the Indian state identity, as expounded in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7 of the study, displays Kautilya's strategic, Savarkar's Hindu nationalist, and Gandhi's post-colonial identity that act as links in the creation of the identity of the Indian state. Similarly, through the influence of the ideas of Kautilya, Savarkar and Gandhi over the Prime ministership of the selected leaders undertaken, the school of ideas was presented in the study through the chronological historical analysis- the Nehruvian idealist Nehruvian pragmatic, pragmatic liberalist and the strategic multilateralist schools of ideas. What emerges through the

research is the question as to whether these schools of ideas will continue in the foreign policy choices undertaken by future leaders who are not from the generation of leaders that witnessed direct impacts of India's colonial experience or whether there will emerge a robust narrative shift that will eventually lead to a complete change in India's foreign policy discourse.

However, in the meantime, the study of India's foreign policy towards- alignment, Pakistan, China, and nuclear power continues to be a significant point of analysis, and this thesis has also looked into exhibiting that the colonial victimhood of PII continues to loom in policy choices. Subsequently, regarding India's post-imperial victimhood identity, a historical analysis of the Prime Ministers of India regarding Pakistan, China, and the development of nuclear power. There is a clear impact of colonial trauma on Indian foreign policy decisions made by the different leaders of the country. As a result of education and political participation by the leaders of the freedom movement, it is possible to visualise the impact of that movement. In other words, intellectual influences play an important role in understanding the foreign policy of the Indian government. The purpose of this research is also to explain why, as part of the post-imperial identity, victimhood has enabled both strategic autonomy and territorial integrity to become integral parts of Indian foreign policy at this point.

Finally, the research project aims to further the causal and explanatory variable of colonialism to understand how foreign policy choices are impacted even over seven decades after a state has gained independence from their colonisers and to ask if the transformative historical event of colonialism will continue to affect foreign policy choices. This study brings about the possibility for further research into understanding generational leadership and change in foreign policy and the independent variables, apart from colonialism, that would emerge to understand the foreign policy choices of decolonised nations.

Secondly, this study aims to add to the literature on post-colonial states, contributing towards non-western foreign policy analysis and, very significantly, enabling the analysis of

leaders through a new and different perspective, other than the systemic structural approaches, thereby constructing tailored strategies that would meet the uniqueness of states, would have also undergone transformative historical events, and not limited to colonialism only.

Therefore, while this research project is limited to India and its prime ministers, it develops an analytical framework that allows nations that have undergone transformative historical experiences to shift from the peripheries to the centre of analysis.

Limitations and Future of the Research Project

The limitations of this research project stem from the impacts that COVID-19 had on the expected and final trajectory of this research project, which led to the redesigning of the project to a purely qualitative historical analysis. Secondly, the vastness of the undertaken topic cannot be ignored and is a factor that allowed for only a few prominent prime ministers to be undertaken. Finally, despite the vastness of the research project and the need to examine the history, psychology, and politics of Indian foreign policy decision-making, keeping aside biases in the analysis to understand the ideas, a highly subjective area led to the continuous need to remain unbiased and execute the project as objectively as required by the research.

The future of this research project is seen through the guideline it deems to be created through the study of the selected eight Indian prime ministers whose foreign policies could create a foreign policy guideline for future prime ministers. This was done primarily with their contributions to foreign policy decisions kept in mind. Eight out of a total of fourteen Indian Prime Ministers have been analysed. This project explored India’s relations with Pakistan and China and the evolution of India’s nuclear programme. The chronic tensions with Pakistan, a consistent foreign policy challenge, had to be studied. It also provides the required ground for analysing the application of PII in IFP.

On the other hand, India-China relations were studied due to China’s growing presence in the region. Also, having a similar colonial history and belonging to rich cultural histories,

the India- China relations aid in understanding India's view of the world and of itself through PII. In short, India's relations with Pakistan and China allow an understanding of the PII principle of maximising territorial sovereignty.

Finally, India's drive for nuclear energy, when analysed through the endeavours of different prime ministers, displays the push for the principle of maximising status. At the same time, India received criticism for wanting nuclear energy. However, the nuclear tests, the discussions with the USA on nuclear energy development, and finally, the signing of the 123 Agreement brought India to the forefront of the global stage.

This project examined the significant decisions taken by eight of India's fourteen prime ministers to trace the intellectual influences on their foreign policies, drawing a road map for prime ministers who have not lived through the colonial trauma and the freedom movement. It is crucial to comprehend why the leaders made the decisions they did and why different waves of ideas permeated Indian foreign policy from 1947 to 2018, with the end of the generation of prime ministers with colonial trauma.

The methodological use of the Skinnerian method incorporated in this research project has limitations. Still, due to its applicability in analysing the socio-political backgrounds of the leaders, it worked well with the project. However, other methodologies like Mark Bevir's contextualisation can also be used to interpret the text context. This method has not been applied along with Skinner's method primarily due to the project's word count and timeline limitation. Still, it aims to be incorporated to further the research project.

This research project calls for further analyses of the transitionary phase of Indian foreign policy during the change in generational leadership. The project advances the research to explore IFP through the schools of ideas presented here to explain if those ideas will endure and, if not, how the change is manifested in Indian foreign policy. This project will contribute

to the literature on historical memory through a historical analysis of foreign policy decision-making in India. This is a developing area of research that merits more study.

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Introduction

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