

The Conservatism of Australian Foreign Policy

Australia, China, the United States, and the Hegemonic Crisis

University of Sydney

Bachelor of Arts/Advanced Studies (Honours): Department of Government and
International Relations

Word Count: 19742

By: William Gregory

SID: 500497076

Declaration

This thesis has been submitted to fulfill requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts/Advanced Studies (Honours) in Politics and International Relations. This work is substantially my own, and where any part of this work is not my own, I have indicated this by acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of the work.

Abstract

This thesis analyses the impact of historical and structural forces on the Australia-China relationship since 2011. After a steady period of deepening ties since the 1970s, largely driven by economic complementarities, Australia-China relations have markedly declined in recent years. Applying a neo-Marxist study of the historical development of Australia-China relations and the underlying structures that shape world order, the thesis finds that Australia's relations with the United States and the changing dynamics of Indo-Pacific power distribution are the key factors guiding the formulation of Australian foreign policy regarding China. Australia's historic position within a strategic and economic system guaranteed by a foreign hegemonic power has established a 'sub-imperial' norm in its foreign policy, which has granted these hegemonic powers significant influence over the formulation of Australian foreign policy. Australia's deteriorating relationship with China is a direct response to the new demands of the United States to oppose China's rise, and so preserve American hegemony in Asia.

Contents

1.0 Introduction	8
2.0 Literature Review	12
3.0 Theory and Methodology	17
3.1 The Neo-Marxist Concepts of Imperialism and Hegemony	17
3.2 Methodology	20
4.0 Australia, China, and the American Empire	23
4.1 Imperialism with American Characteristics.....	23
4.2 Reluctant Republicans and Desired Dependence	25
4.2.1 An Alliance Born of Blood.....	26
4.2.2 Following the Money	28
4.2.3 Doubling Down on the US	30
4.2.4 The ‘Pivot to Asia’	33
4.3 China and the Powershift.....	35
4.3.1 Exploitation to Self-Determination, Containment to Engagement	36
4.3.2 China and the Pivot	39
5.0 Defending Hegemony: Australia-China Relations 2011-2023	44
5.1 The History of Australia-China Relations.....	45
5.1.1 Opposition to an Asian Australia.....	45
5.1.2 Asian Intervention	47
5.1.3 Opening Up and Engagement	48
5.1.4 Chinese Goods and American Guns.....	49
5.2 The Development of Australia’s China Policy Since 2011	53
5.2.1 Pivot and Engagement: The Best of Both Worlds, 2011-2015.....	54
5.2.2 Changing Tides: The Pivot as a Way of Life, 2016-2019	59
5.2.3 Loyalty to Hegemony: COVID-19, Economic Warfare, and AUKUS, 2020-2023	66
6.0 Conclusion	75
7.0 Appendix	78
7.1 Foreign Ownership of Australia’s ‘Big Four’ Banks	78
8.0 Bibliography	81

List of Figures

Figure 1 Australian merchandise trade with the United States of America 2000-2020 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022, 2023b)	32
Figure 2 Foreign investment flows from the United States of America into Australia 2001-2020 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023a, 2023d)	32
Figure 3 Australia's top ten exports by value in AUD\$ millions in January 2000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022).....	51
Figure 4 Australia's top ten exports by value in AUD\$ millions in January 2011 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022).....	51
Figure 5 Value of Australian exports to the United States of America, China (excluding SARS and Taiwan), and Japan from 2000-2020 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023b).....	52
Figure 6 Value of Australian imports from the United States of America, China (excluding SARS and Taiwan), and Japan from 2000-2020 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023c).....	52
Figure 7 Australian merchandise trade with China (excludes SARs and Taiwan) 2000-2022 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023b).....	58
Figure 8 Two-Way FDI flows between Australia and China 2011-2021 in USD\$ millions (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2022a; National Bureau of Statistics of China et al., 2022).....	59
Figure 9 Export value of Australian coal and coke to China from 2011 to 2021 in USD\$ billions (China Customs, 2022a)	70
Figure 10 Australia's top ten exports by value in AUD\$ millions in January 2021 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022).....	71

Abbreviations

A2/AD	Antiaccess, area denial
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ALP	Australian Labor Party
ANZUS	The Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
ASX	Australian Stock Exchange
AUD	Australian Dollar
AUKUS	The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, UK, and US
AUSFTA	Australia-United State Free Trade Agreement
B3W	Build Back Better World
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CPC	Communist Party of China
CHAFTA	China-Australia Free Trade Agreement
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
FIRB	Foreign Investment Review Board
FoN	Freedom of Navigation
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GVC	Global Value Chain

IO	International Organisation
NSS	National Security Strategy
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RBIO	Rules-Based International Order
SAR	Special Administrative Region
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
USD	United States Dollar
WTO	World Trade Organization

1.0 Introduction

"Today, as free nations again hear the beating drums and watch worryingly the militarisation of issues that we had, until recent years, thought unlikely to be catalysts for war, let us continue to search unceasingly for the chance for peace while bracing again, yet again, for the curse of war,"

Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs of Australia, Michael Pezzullo (in Karp, 2021)

Tensions between Australia and China in recent years have been higher than at any point since formal diplomatic relations were established in 1972. While the commercial links that have been key to the deepening of these relations have continued to grow in the last decade, this period has also been characterised by diplomatic reproachment and increasingly oppositional military policies. Commentators such as former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2022) and academic Clive Hamilton (2022) have identified Chinese covert influence operations and expansionist policies as the root cause of this decline. Former Prime Minister Scott Morrison (in Hurst, 2023) went as far as to liken Australia's historic treatment of China to Britain's policy of "appeasement" of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. These analyses fail to account for such a drastic reversion in the decades long trend of deepening relations. Australia has pivoted from declaring a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' and signing a free trade agreement (FTA) with China to discussion of coming war in a matter of years. While individual events can act as catalysts that spark change, large-scale change in international relations are always spurred by a variety of structural and historical factors. The 'pivot to Asia' announced by President Barack Obama in his 2011 visit to Australia has been the catalyst in highlighting a major contradiction that had developed in Australian foreign policy in the last fifty years.

David Harvey (2014, p. 1) defines a contradiction, in the Marxist sense, as "when two seemingly opposed forces are simultaneously present within a particular situation, an entity, a process or an event". Marxist dialectical understanding of a contradiction is between a thesis and

antithesis which are ultimately subsumed into a synthesis of the competing trends. The politics of the Indo-Pacific are currently defined by the contradictory nature of American regional leadership. The stability and economic engagement in Asia enabled by American hegemony in the last half century has also developed the means by which American hegemony can be effectively challenged by ascendant Asian states such as China. This contradiction has also manifested within Australia, with the country's largest trading partner and key security partner increasingly at odds. Australia's diplomatic and economic engagement in Asia, which has been key to ensuring continual economic growth and prosperity within the last half century, has occurred alongside Canberra's deepening commitment to American regional hegemony. Australian state-managers initially attempted to construct a synthesis by maintaining a close economic relationship with China within a system of American hegemony that was becoming increasingly focused on opposing the rise of China. Unable to achieve this lofty goal, Australian state-managers have instead made a conservative appeal to historic trends within Australian foreign policy, pledging support to the grand strategic plans of its major power ally. Having approached the last hegemonic crisis by switching allegiance from the waning British system to the ascendant American hegemonic world order, contemporary Australian state-managers are instead confronting the coming hegemonic crisis through unwavering support for the old.

This thesis will engage in a study of Australian foreign policy using neo-Marxist theory to examine the effect of a variety of factors in affecting Australia-China relations from 2011 to 2023. The first chapter will provide a short literature review summarising the scholarship on Australia-China relations. While highlighting the benefits of popular approaches, this chapter will serve to demonstrate how a neglect for a historical and structural study of Australian foreign policy limits the validity and usefulness of these analyses. This will be followed by a chapter setting out the theoretical and methodological approaches used in this thesis. The neo-Marxist concepts of 'imperialism' and 'hegemony' provide the theoretical base of this analysis. This

approach understands international relations as driven by historical, materialist development, with the agents and structures governing political and economic power acting as the primary objects of analysis. A mixed-methods methodology which unites a variety of data and methods of study within this theoretical framework will also be explained in this chapter.

The body of this thesis will begin with a chapter detailing the development of American hegemony, analysing its effects on both Australia and China. The construction of the American-led hegemonic world order following the end of the Second World War has been the driving force in defining the norms and structures that contemporary international relations function within. The US has also been the most important state in defining Australian foreign policy since 1942. The development of the American-led hegemonic world order and the US's hegemonic position in Asia enabled Australia to transfer from operation as a dominion within the political and economic structures of the British Empire, to what Clinton Fernandes (2022) defines as a "subimperial power" within the 'American Empire'. The US has also been key in shaping modern China. Governed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) since 1949 as the People's Republic of China (PRC), China operated as an ideological and strategic rival of the US. A period of diplomatic and economic rapprochement beginning in the 1970s suspended this rivalry and allowed for a degree of mutual regional security cooperation, geared towards Soviet containment, alongside mutually beneficial economic development. This relationship has enabled China to develop into an economic and military power that is increasingly independent from the system of American hegemony. China's intentions for the development of a competing hegemonic world order appear mild in their implementation and alterations to norms of international engagement, but nonetheless pose a direct threat to American regional and global leadership. Australia's position as an American ally, and China's evolution into a counter-hegemonic superpower define the context of Australia-China relations.

This will be followed by a chapter analysing the development of Australia-China relations. A section examining the historical development of Australia-China relations from the late 19th century will demonstrate how a changing international context motivated actors in each state to initiate a period of primarily economic engagement beginning in the 1970s. Early Australia-China relations were dually defined by European imperialist conceptions and domestic fears of Asian military and demographic invasions of the 'British' Australia. While the post-war period was marked by an anti-communist interventionist policy alongside the US, Australia also developed a strong economic relationship with China from the 1970s onwards. This development paired well with Australia's American security alliance into the 2000s. The 'pivot to Asia' announced in 2011 began the process of forcing Australian state-managers to reconcile Australia's economic connections to China with its alliance with the US. An analysis of the changing nature of Australia's China policy from 2011 to 2023 will demonstrate the importance of protecting American hegemony in the formulation of Australian foreign policy. This conservative appeal to the support that has enabled the development of Australia into a prosperous state since colonisation will be shown to be crucial in understanding dominant elite approaches to foreign policy.

Australian state-managers possess the agency to guide this country in a variety of different ways, but the structural power of American state-managers and capital-managers, the historical trends that have developed the Australian state, economy, and population, and the dynamics of global power are key in shaping the context that these decisions are made within. Today, as global power shifts away from the American-led system, Australian state-managers are not adapting their core foreign policy conceptions and approaches. As Asian states develop and the US and China increasingly move towards conflict, Australian state-managers have continued to craft their foreign policy exclusively through the prism of American hegemony rather than advocate for increased independence or regionalism.

2.0 Literature Review

Studies of contemporary Australia-China relations have applied a variety of approaches to analysing the reasons behind recent rising tensions. This chapter will provide a brief review of a selection of this literature. This review will demonstrate the issues that limit existing studies while identifying promising trends within them. While studies of single factors such as contemporary changes in state behaviour or the role of identity correctly identify and analyse phenomena, their neglect for other factors limit their usefulness. The effect of historical trends of development and the underlying structures guiding global political and economic engagement is the key factor omitted from most existing works. This review identifies critical studies that unite the analysis of a variety of factors as the best example of analysis Australian foreign policy, limited only by the neglect of this case. The identification of this gap in the literature paired with the necessity for the synthesis of a variety of methods and data within a united theoretical framework will be demonstrated in this chapter.

The most popular theoretical framework within Australian International Relations scholarship is ‘middle power theory’. While not always explicitly referenced, this liberal conception of international relations and Australia’s place within it guides most studies of Australian foreign policy. Australia is identified by academic Gabrielle Abbondanza (2021, p. 182) as a middle power, stating it fits the definition of a state geographically positioned between major powers, respectful of international law, relatively positionally powerful, and active in multilateral forums. Scholars Carl Ungerer (2007) and Thomas Wilkins (2017) assert that this conception is popular academically and within government. Critics of this approach argue it fundamentally misunderstands the power dynamics of international relations, with Randall Doyle (2022, p. 68) arguing “Australia is only identified as a “middle power” due to its “ANZUS” alliance with the United States”. This theory usefully defines the key role that power differentials

play in effecting individual state power to achieve foreign policy goals. However, this focus on contemporary actions and interactions between states within the arena of formal politics leads to a neglect for the effect of history on the modern day and of how underlying international structures constrain state action. This approach is poorly positioned to analyse the strong influence of the historical developments and the structures of regional political and economic governance on Australia-China relations.

This focus on studying contemporary developments in Australia-China relations in isolation permeates many realist and liberal studies, limiting their ability to understand the influence of long-running trends. This limited perspective can lead scholars to incorrectly understand contemporary phenomena that are strongly influenced by historical trends. Scholars have thus honed in on recent changes in Chinese foreign policy as the instigator for the rapid deterioration in Australia-China relations. Charles Miller (2022) offers “China's strategy of implicit economic coercion” as the driving force behind declining relations, arguing that Beijing attempted to undermine opposition in Australia to increasingly expansionist Chinese foreign policy through an economic war of attrition. Rory Medcalf (2019) and Baogang He (2021) similarly identify malicious efforts by the Chinese Government to undermine democratic norms in Australia as having caused the increasing animus between the two states. Under analysis none of these alleged actions appear serious enough to have initiated such large-scale changes in Australia-China relations. While Chinese foreign policy approaches have undoubtedly changed in the last decade, Australia’s China policy has seen an almost complete reversal in course in the same period.

Constructivist approaches provide a partial answer to this problem of cause and effect by identifying underlying tensions and causes that have supplemented observed actions. Both Simon Hewes & David Hundt’s (2022) and Jon Fraenkel & Graeme Smith’s (2022) articles on Australia-China relations in the Pacific frame increased Chinese activity in the region as having

been perceived in Australia as a challenge to its regional leadership. Simone van Nieuwenhuizen (2019) argues that fundamentally different conceptions of self and the international system have exacerbated tensions between Australia and China as regional powershifts affect decades-long continuity of American hegemony. The expansion of Chinese power is in these studies framed as a threat to Australian identity. This is exemplified in Chengxin Pan and Linus Hagström's (2021) and Guangyi Pan and Alexander Korolev's (2021) application of the concept of "ontological insecurity", arguing that China's promise of a regional powershift implicitly threatens Australian conceptions of security. Constructivism provides an analysis of the structures and norms of world politics, but this focus on identity leads to a neglect for material analysis.

Studies of Australia-China relations within the discipline of History demonstrate the value that analysis of trends over time adds. Nicholas Thomas's (2004) *Re-orienting Australia-China Relations* and James Reilly & Jing Dong Yuan's (2012) edited work *Australia and China at 40*, both contextualise modern Australia-China relations through a study of their development since the 1970s. While valuable works, their release before the diplomatic nadir of 2020 limits their usefulness in this study. More recent publications by James Curran (2022) and David Fitzsimmons (2023) contrast the upward trajectory in economic and diplomatic relations from the 1970s to the mid-2010s with their subsequent reversal. The economic cost to Australia of pursuing policies of Chinese containment and the dangers of provoking the military might of China are identified by both authors as a departure from decades of growing positive links between the two states. However as works within the discipline of History these books study the period as a whole rather than analysing the effect of historical trends on the period since 2011. Additionally, these analyses are historical, but they are not structural. The synthesis of the study of historical developments with a focus on the effect of the underlying structures of global politics would provide a clearer understanding of why Australia-China relations have deteriorated.

Progressive critiques of Australian foreign policy provide the best existing materialist analyses that synthesise historical and structural approaches. These works often focus their study on Australia-US relations, relegating analysis of Australia-China relations to relatively short sections that do not align with real-world importance of this relationship. Realists Clinton Fernandes (2018, 2022) and Erik Paul (2014, 2018, 2021) apply similar non-Marxist imperialist approaches to the study of Australian foreign policy. Fernandes's books '*Island off the Coast of Asia*' and '*Subimperial Power*' demonstrate his belief that Australian foreign policy is defined by its close alignment with the US and its historical alienation from its regional neighbours. He argues that participation in the American-led world order since the end of the Second World War paired with the deep penetration of the Australian economy by American capital has over decades strengthened influence and power of the US over Australia. This influence has led contemporary Australian politicians to increasingly act to appease the economic interests of Wall Street and the security interests of Washington rather than domestic ones. Paul applies a similar – if less well executed – approach, with a greater focus on the concept of the “Anglosphere”. He argues that alongside economic integration and formal support for American security and diplomatic endeavours, the Anglo-Saxon settler-colonial heritage of Australia continues to define its alliance with western states and opposition to movements that empower states from the Global South. These realist studies represent a small but growing strand of materially grounded critiques of Australian foreign policy. Tess Lea and Stuart Rollo (2016, pp. 25-26) and Rollo (2020, p. 244) apply a critical theory approach that unites Australia-China and Australia-US relations as one. They argue that the historically persistent fear within Australia of invasion by the poorer and more numerous Asian populations to its north have motivated security alliances that maintain a system of economic exploitation of this region while providing a security guarantee against the “Asia threat”. Materialist analysis with a focus on the underlying structures

of international relations and an understanding of the importance of a historical study provides a synthesised approach through which a variety of factors can be considered.

This chapter has briefly summarised a variety of approaches to the study of Australia-China relations. Most existing works are flawed in their approach, neglecting key factors that have affected the sudden change in Australia-China relations in recent years. The necessity of an approach that synthesises the study of a variety of factors, such as changes in state behaviour, the underlying structures of international relations, the importance of identity, and the role of historical trends in shaping contemporary events among other factors is clear. Critiques of Australian foreign policy provide a good indication of how such an approach can be applied to this case, but the general neglect for studies of contemporary Australia-China relations by these scholars leaves open a clear gap in the literature.

3.0 Theory and Methodology

This chapter will set out the theoretical and methodological framework to perform an analysis of the historical and structural factors affecting Australia-China relations since 2011. The most cogent historical and materialist approach to analyse the underlying structures of international relations is provided by neo-Marxist theory. The first section of this chapter will present a synthesis of neo-Marxist concepts of ‘imperialism’ and ‘hegemony’ suited to the study of Australia-China relations. These approaches unite understandings of the effect of capitalist markets and corporations on the formation of foreign policy and the systems of international power distribution that have risen alongside the development of the global capitalist economy. This will be followed by a section setting out a mixed-methods approach through which this theoretical framework will be applied in this study. United under a clear theoretical framework, this approach utilises a variety of data and methods to analyse the effect of multiple factors in shaping Australia-China relations. The application of this theoretical and methodological framework to this case addresses the significant gap in the literature identified in the previous chapter.

3.1 The Neo-Marxist Concepts of Imperialism and Hegemony

Neo-Marxist International Relations scholarship adapts the findings and methods of Karl Marx by engaging in materialist analysis of the structures, agents, and interests of world politics. Neo-Marxist theories of imperialism focus primarily on the effect capitalism has had on the formation of state foreign policy and the actions of capitalists beyond the borders of a single state. Neo-Marxist theories of hegemony are closely related to world-systems theory scholarship, analysing the power dynamics and structures of international relations. These concepts will be synthesised

in this thesis to pair analysis of domestic power struggles between various interest groups over foreign policy and the study of the structures of world politics and economics.

Neo-Marxist theories of imperialism derive from the works of liberal scholar John A. Hobson at the turn of the 20th century, and the later adaptation of his findings into the Marxist canon by Bolshevik revolutionary Vladimir Lenin. Hobson's *Imperialism: A Study* (1938, p. 73), originally published in 1902, found that "underconsumption" within the advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe, which led to a falling rate of profit, motivated capitalists to seek new sources of investment for their surplus capital. Hobson argued that these capitalists used their connections with and influence over politicians to advocate for better access to foreign markets. For the liberal Hobson this reflected poorly on the governance of western capitalist states. For Lenin, imperialism was a defining characteristic of a developed capitalist state. Writing during the First World War, Lenin (1934, p. 45) stated imperialism was a contradiction that could not be addressed by reforming capitalism but only through socialist revolution. Lenin argued that not only did imperialism drive capitalist states to exploit less economically developed states, but that this inevitably led to competition between imperialist states over access areas to exploit which caused inter-imperialist wars (Lenin, 1934, p. 83). Lenin's non-scholarly theory provided the foundation for later scholarly neo-Marxist studies.

Neo-Marxist International Relations scholarship has adapted the work of Lenin to the broader study of global inequality and the interwoven dynamics of political and economic power. Key to these works has been the avoidance of what Antonio Gramsci (2003, p. 159) deemed "economism", an undue focus on the base and disregard for superstructural factors. Gramsci proposed a reciprocal relationship between the Marxist concepts of 'base' and 'superstructure'. His approach maintained the central role of the mode of production in analysis while advocating for more consideration of the influence of culture and government in guiding historical development (Gramsci, 2003, p. 366). Neo-Marxist theories of imperialism apply a more

nanced understanding of the networked nature of power and the influence of actors beyond capitalists and the mode of production over state policy.

Zeno Leoni (2021, pp. 33-34) uses the terms ‘capital-managers’ and ‘state-managers’ to differentiate between the two dominant elite groups in capitalist society. Leoni defines the modern capitalist logic of imperialism as capital-managers attempting to capture state-power to aid in achieving their goals, acting to further empower the state to best realise its ability to aid their interests. This does not mean capital-managers are synonymous with state-managers. Despite hundreds of years of capitalist development these two elite classes remain distinct but closely interlinked. The ultimate interest of capital-managers is increasing their accumulation of capital – an often-short-term focus – while state-managers seek the long-term maintenance of power and sovereignty. Where these interests diverge friction between these elite classes can emerge. This disconnection is made more complicated by the variance in interests and values among state-managers – largely ideological – and capital-managers – best exemplified in this case between national and transnational capital-managers. While national capital-managers in western states have increasingly advocated protectionist neo-mercantilist policies, transnational capital-managers – a class created by imperialism – by definition are strong advocates of global free trade (Leoni, 2021, p. 203). Bipartisan support for the continued development of free trade in Australia despite rising trends of economic nationalism in the US demonstrates the oversized influence transnational capital holds in this state.

The neo-Marxist concept of hegemony provides a useful partner to theories of imperialism, analysing the nature and development of the global structures of economic and political power. Robert W. Cox’s concept of “hegemonic world orders” usefully defines ‘hegemony’ within neo-Marxist International Relations scholarship. Closely aligned with world-systems theory set out in the historical works of Immanuel Wallerstein (1980) and Giovanni Arrighi (2010), Cox (1993, p. 50) adapted Gramsci’s analysis of Italian politics, economics, and

history for International Relations scholarship. Cox (1987, p. 212) defines a hegemonic world order as the system by which the dominant capitalist state establishes and maintains a global network of control that promotes its economic and security interests through structural and ideological power. The current hegemonic world order was established in the wake of the Second World War by the US with the support of its allies (Cox, 1987, p. 109). Alongside the economic domination of American capital in the wake of the Second World War, the US created a host of international organisations (IOs) and promoted norms of international behaviour and governance that benefited the economic and strategic interests of this ‘core’ of hegemonic states. Rather than claiming that the US exercises domination over the rest of the world through instrumental power, Cox establishes the networked nature of structural and ideological power that underpins the current world system.

By pairing these theoretical understandings Australia-China relations can be studied in a more holistic manner. The key influence of capitalism in motivating foreign policy decisions and in defining the global structures of political and economic governance can be simultaneously understood. This theoretical framework allows for a focused study of Australia-China relations since 2011 that greatly differs in approach from any previously published work and provides novel analysis and findings.

3.2 Methodology

This section will briefly explain the methodological approach utilised in this thesis to apply the theoretical framework set out above. This thesis utilises a mixed-methods approach to unify a variety of methodologies and data within this theoretical framework. Mixed-methods is defined by its deliberate pairing of a variety of methodologies within a singular study (McNabb, 2021, p. 364). Marxist theories have a critical realist epistemology, positing that human society is

influenced by deep structural relations which cannot be directly observed (Lowndes et al., 2018, p. 184). This predisposes Marxist studies to the analysis of a variety of primary and secondary sources to elucidate these unclear processes rather than engaging in traditionally scientific observation of a small and specific set of phenomena. The ‘Marxist analysis’ which guides this mixed-methods approach applies a dialectical logic to the study of the production of inequality by the structures of human society, understanding antagonistic aspects of these structures as the key to their dissolution and ultimate synthesis into a new structure (Sharma, 1985, p. 278).

Historical analysis, archival research, content analysis, and quantitative methods will all be used to analyse a variety of data through this theoretical approach. This mirrors the approach of similar Marxist International Relations analyses such as David Harvey’s (2003) ‘*The New Imperialism*’ and Zeno Leoni’s (2021) ‘*American Grand Strategy from Obama to Trump*’. Historical analysis in International Relations scholarship uses primary and secondary sources to assess the importance of historic factors in the development of contemporary events (M. Ripsman, 2022, p. 82). Archival research is particularly useful in developing an understanding of the changing conceptions of and intentions behind policies pursued by elite actors (Moore et al., 2017, p. 54). Content analysis is the process of making informed inferences about the meaning and intentions of texts will be useful in this thesis for the study of primary and secondary sources (Drisko & Maschi, 2015, p. 2). Quantitative analysis of changing trends of economic and state activity provides a simplistic but important means of investigating changing patterns of state and corporate behaviour (Lowndes et al., 2018, p. 255). United by a process of Marxist analysis, these methods will combine the study of a variety of data to gain an understanding of the case that is multifaceted.

These differing methods, united under a singular approach, allow for the multifaceted analysis of Australia-China relations since 2011. Informed strongly by historical development, historical analysis and archival research pair primary and secondary sources to provide a clear

understanding of how Australia-China relations have developed within the wider context of world history. Data from existing scholarly analyses are paired with novel primary research. This mixed-methods approach allows this thesis to pair large-scale economic analysis with small-scale analysis of changing trends in political rhetoric. Underlying structural processes are hard to identify and analyse, but this mixed-methods approach provides the best opportunity to understand their effects in this case.

4.0 Australia, China, and the American Empire

The American-led hegemonic world order has defined international political and economic relations since the end of the Second World War. This chapter will examine the development of this system and analyse its influences on Australia and China. The first section will explain how this world order formed through symbiotic economic and political developments within the US. The second section will then detail Australia's relationship with this America-led order, identifying an ease of transfer from the waning British hegemonic order and into the ascendant American order enabled by a high degree of shared qualities as crucial in forming an enduring close bond between Australia and the US. The final section will track China's changing relations with the US and explain how current US-China relations are defined by a hegemonic struggle. American hegemony has defined most of world history for over half 70 years. Its development and enduring impact are crucial to understanding the nature of contemporary Australia-China relations.

4.1 Imperialism with American Characteristics

American imperialism, the unity of state and private political and economic power, enabled the rise of the US into a powerful hegemonic state. The US was founded as a western state outside of Europe, coming into existence within a global capitalist economic system that was designed to its benefits. Alongside this, the US's geographical distance and distinct culture from Europe enabled it to rise in power as intra-European competition undercut British hegemony through the 19th and 20th centuries (Arrighi, 2010, p. 279).

Famed American revisionist historian, William Appleman Williams, identifies the "Open Door Policy" as the defining policy of American imperialism. In the 1898 'open door notes'

Secretary of State, John Hay, called to dissolve the 'sphere of influence' system in China, requesting European states end interference in the operation of foreign ships in Chinese ports and apply equal tariffs and levies on traders regardless of nationality (Hay, 1968). This pursuit of access to global markets characterised a period of commercial expansion from the late 19th to early 20th centuries where American exporters and the US government worked together to increase American power (Arrighi, 2010, p. 95). Multiple scholars who have applied Williams's method to the post-Cold War era have affirmed the continued centrality of the 'open door' in driving American foreign policy (Bacevich, 2002, p. 83; McCoy, 2017, p. 29). The maintenance of this symbiotic relationship between state and private power enabled the development of a strong and expansive American bloc.

Intra-European conflict during this same period weakened European powers economically, politically, and militarily while strengthening the US (Cox, 1987, p. 212). As the British hegemonic world order was challenged strategically by Germany, the US threatened its economic predominance (Arrighi, 2010, pp. 60-62). Separation from the feudal traditions of Europe, access to large amounts of capital, resources, labour, and land, and the possession of an ongoing technological advantage enabled the development of a large, fast-growing, and efficient capitalist economy in the US (Mandel, 1970, p. 30). The US was distanced from European warfare and traditions, allowing the development of a unique foreign policy approach.

The stability of American hegemony has been enabled by a radical global redistribution of power, capital, and technology. While generally maintaining existing structures of state organisation and global systems of capital accumulation, the US promoted an anti-colonial system of self-determination and formalised norms of political and economic interaction through participative multilateral bodies (Arrighi, 2010, p. 64; Cox, 1987, p. 212). A group of 'core state' allies have aided the US in preserving this world order in exchange for preferential position within the emergent economic and strategic systems of the post-war era (Cox, 1987, p. 216).

This extension of benefits has not however been limited to the hegemonic core. The transfer of capital from waning hegemonic cores to emerging ones is a universal attribute of global powershifts in the capitalist era (Arrighi, 2010, p. 15), but the scale and speed of capital and technological transfer from the core to periphery under American hegemony is unprecedented (Arrighi, 2007, p. 381). Cox (1987, p. 299) argues that while the US has maintained relative global stability through this transfer, ultimately the enrichment of future rivals will lead to the end of its hegemonic rule.

Through a confluence of factors, the US emerged at the end of the Second World War as the most powerful political and economic bloc in the world. Entrenching this power and laying the foundations for further expansion, American state-managers and capital-managers constructed systems of political and economic governance and promoted norms of engagement that benefitted their interests. With this system's endurance reliant on the extension of a degree of independence and development to previously colonised areas of the world and supported by a selection of close allies, the US progressively redefined the international system while promoting its own interests. As this relative power imbalance begins to shift in due to the internal contradictions of this world order, the world-system is likely to change. With China's rise posing a major challenge to American hegemony in Asia the relations between it and the US are likely to define regional affairs for the foreseeable future.

4.2 Reluctant Republicans and Desired Dependence

“The appointment of Mr Casey as Minister to the United States, has been made because, as a British community, we feel we have a great deal in common with America [...] The United States and the Empire have the same general ideas of Government.”

The Daily Telegraph on the appointment of the first Australian minister to a country outside the British Empire (Daily Telegraph, 1940, in Crowley, 1973b, p. 15)

Australia's relations with the US in the post-war era have been described many ways, as a "willing satellite" (Churchward, 1979, p. 165), a "dependent ally" (Bell, 1988), a "client state" (Crough & Wheelwright, 1982; Paul, 2014), a "subimperial power" (Fernandes, 2022), and a "hound dog, not lapdog" (Cox & O'Connor, 2012), with former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser characterising the two as "dangerous allies" (Fraser & Roberts, 2014). As the ability of the British Empire to ensure Australia's security and promote its economic interests diminished through the 1940s, the US was able to provide a guarantee of Australian security and establish stability in the global capitalist economy. While this commitment has been tested by occasional displays of Australian independence, Australia has generally remained a key ally in promoting American strategic and economic interests since 1942. Canberra's commitment to the US's military and economic policy of Chinese containment since 2011 has made clear that Australian state-managers continue to identify the interests of the US as synonymous with those of Australia. Australia is a sovereign state with the ability to create and implement policy autonomously, however it has consistently chosen instead to interweave its prospects with that of the American-led hegemonic world order.

4.2.1 An Alliance Born of Blood

"Australia's strategic culture has long been based on a major power alliance. Every Australian Government since Federation has assessed our strategic circumstances and reaffirmed the centrality of an alliance partnership in relationship to our strategic interests".

National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, Department of Defence (2023b, p. 46)

Australian military strategy has been defined since the colonial era by "loyalty to the protector" (Grant, 1972), wagering Australian security on major-power allies rather than pursuing an independent defence policy. Australia pivoted from operation within the British system of Imperial defence to the burgeoning American system during the Second World War as the

former's ability to protect its eastern possessions was demonstrated (Day, 1989, p. 25 & 265). The threat posed by Japanese forces in the Second World War reinforced a perception of Asia as an inherently dangerous region that had developed simultaneously in Australia and the US since the mid-19th century (Rollo, 2020, p. 229). Minister for External Affairs, H. V. Evatt (1942, p. 48) stated in February 1942 "It is now evident that Japanese gains in the Pacific, though temporary in character, have transformed the entire strategy of the war," but "we should not underestimate the titanic strength of our American partner in the war against, the Axis". Their common enemy, culture, economies, politics, and perceptions of Asia paired with the US's growing military power in the Pacific made Canberra and Washington natural allies in opposing Japan's revisionist plans for a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'.

With strong relations forged during the Second World War, Australia proved itself a committed ally in asserting American hegemony in Asia. The 1951 'ANZUS' treaty formalised Australia's post-war security alliance with the US. This alliance was framed by Australian state-managers as an anti-communist, with Australia's Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, seeing ANZUS as protection against "the general Communist threat to world peace" (Casey, 1951, as cited in Ward & Robertson, 1986, p. 406). Anti-communist interventions alongside British forces in Malaya, alongside American forces in Korea and Vietnam, and through intelligence operations in Indonesia established the Australia-US alliance as one centred on establishing American hegemony in Asia (Fernandes, 2022, p. 16). Mirroring the language of anti-communism deployed in the US to justify multiple Asian interventions, and with the Japanese threat in recent memory, the American alliance allowed Australian state-managers to engage in a system of forward defence in Asia that was centred on minimising security risks to the US and its allies.

With the failure to prevent a communist takeover in Vietnam and the subsequent lack of an Asian 'domino effect', Australia paired down its commitment to its alliance with the US. The

‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine reduced the size of Australia’s military and limited involvement in American operations, preparing to independently ward off the small threat of an attack by Indonesia (White, 2019, p. 52). The relative stability conferred by American hegemony reduced threats to Australian security in Asia and led to an explosion in economic activity and trade in the region (White, 2019, p. 55). The stability and security enjoyed by Australia and the US had been achieved through their operations to establish American hegemony in Asia, enforcing western political and economic norms while maintaining the economic and military primacy of core hegemonic states.

4.2.2 Following the Money

Alongside their military alliance, Australia-US economic relations rapidly developed in the post-war era. Australia sacrificed greater exertion of policy autonomy in exchange for the continued benefits of economic operation within a hegemonic system. Just as similar cultural and historical conceptions of the self and other had united the two states in their security perceptions of Asia, economic similarities aided fast-growing commercial and financial connections.

As a collection of British colonies, Australia economically developed with strong trade and investment ties to Britain. Operating as a dependent economy within the Empire’s changing systems of mercantilism, free trade, and imperial monopolies through the 19th century, Australia existed primarily as a source for commodities and site of investment for the British (Dunn, 1984, p. 9). In this same period the US was developing an efficient and fast-growing capitalist economy that increasingly looked outwards to find markets for its excess goods and capital (Williams, 1972, p. 52). By the end of the Second World War, with the US possessing by far the largest share of global capital and industrial capacity, Australia, its closest Pacific ally and the possessor of an economy positioned towards the import of foreign capital, presented itself as a

welcoming site for investment (Churchward, 1979, p. 174). Attempting to navigate the demise of the system of imperial tariff preferences following the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, Liberal Senator Neill O'Sullivan (1950, p. 3783) stated “The overall policy of the Government is to give the utmost encouragement to the investment of American capital here to provide commodities and articles that are in short supply in this country at present”. The US came to rival Britain as the primary source of imported capital in Australia in this period (Crough & Wheelwright, 1982, p. 2). Australian state-managers embraced the ascendant American-led global capitalist economy in the post-war era.

The economic crises of the 1970s initially spared Australia as its export-oriented economy benefitted from a general rise in the price of commodities (Fernandes, 2018, p. 141). However, by the 1980s and 90s the Australian Labor Party (ALP) governments of Bob Hawke and his former treasurer Paul Keating replicated neoliberal reforms adopted in the US, privatising government assets, deregulating finance and welcoming even higher levels of foreign investment (Capling et al., 1998, p. 43). Sheltered since Federation by bipartisan protectionist policies, the greater exposure of the Australian economy to world markets halted the diversification of the Australian economy, heightening reliance on commodity exports while supporting the growth of the financial services industry (Costa & Duffy, 1991, p. vi). While these reforms led to an unprecedented growth in the size of the Australian economy it did not lead to a diversification away from Australia’s reliance on commodity exports. Services only grew from 16% to 17.4% of Australia’s exports from 1970 to 2014 (Anderson, 2014, p. 4). Australia’s economy, while large, today has similar characteristics to that of a developing state, heavily reliant on a few key commodity exports with limited domestic integration of value-adding industries (Fernandes, 2018, p. 136).

Robert Gilpin (1975, p. 11) argued that US foreign investment globally has been characterised by the “shift of managerial controls over substantial sectors of foreign economies

to American nationals”. These trends have further linked Australia’s economy with the US, enabling economic growth that has been dependent on capital exports that limit domestic ownership and influence over the Australian economy. High levels of foreign ownership entrench the interests of transnational capital-managers within Australia. By establishing American corporations, capital, and managers within the Australian corporate community American interests have begun to be identified as Australian. American capital-managers have also been able to build close connections with Australian state-managers. Even within ‘Australian’ companies, high levels of American ownership have granted substantial voting shares to Americans. Alongside the two states’ security relationship, Australia’s economic relationship with the US has represented a commitment by Australian state-managers to upholding the hegemonic world order rather than the articulation of independent policy.

4.2.3 Doubling Down on the US

“If anybody is under any illusions about the human consequences of what happens when we do not have foreign direct investment, they just need to look around the world at places where that opportunity is denied.”

Tim Wilson MP, 20th March, 2017 (p. 2298).

The 2000s saw the return of the American alliance to paramount position in Australian security and economic concerns. Liberal Prime Minister John Howard continued the neoliberal economic governance pioneered by the ALP and put to an end Australia’s pursuit of an independent security strategy. The brief post-Vietnam era of security autonomy embodied in the Defence of Australia doctrine was abandoned by Howard with his commitment to the US’s ‘War on Terror’ (White, 2019, p. 57). Howard (2001) explicitly tied Australia’s commitment to the ‘War on Terror’ to the Australia-US security alliance, stating after the September 11th terrorist attacks “We came very quickly to the view that the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty should be invoked in

relation to the attack upon the United States”. The 2000s also saw the continued courting of American capital by Australian state-managers.

The 2005 ‘Australia-United State Free Trade Agreement’ (AUSFTA) presents a good case study of Canberra’s support for American hegemony at the expense of domestic interests. The agreement widened Australia’s trade deficit with the US and increased levels of foreign ownership in Australia despite no clear need for better access to capital, ultimately promoting the economic interests of US and transnational interests above those of Australians. A free trade agreement between Australia and the US had been considered by the Hawke government but had been assessed as unlikely to benefit the Australian economy (Garnaut, 2002, p. 125). While an agreement that gave Australian agricultural exporters access to American markets could have addressed the trade deficit, the final AUSFTA agreement maintained protectionist barriers over the US’s markets (Garnaut, 2002, p. 132). Instead, AUSFTA required the passing of two tranches of intellectual property legislation that better suited the interests of American capital-managers (Weatherall, 2015, p. 538). The agreement also raised the threshold for American investments that were required to appear before Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) to AUD\$ 800 million (Armstrong, 2015, p. 521). Following the agreement capital inflows from the US and a variety of non-signatory states greatly increased, with these flows acting as a replacement for domestic portfolio investments (Armstrong, 2015, p. 522; Kirchner, 2012, p. 418). As is shown in figure 1, Australia’s trade deficit with the US widened. Simultaneously, as

can be seen in figure 2, foreign investment continued to rise.




Figure 1 Australian merchandise trade with the United States of America 2000-2020 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022, 2023b)




Figure 2 Foreign investment flows from the United States of America into Australia 2001-2020 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023a, 2023d)

The continued process of connecting the Australian and American economies and bringing the former's regulatory system in line with the latter has been key in defining contemporary economic relations between Australia and the US. American investors held the highest valued portfolio of any foreign state in Australia in 2022 at AUD\$ 1.09 trillion, 24.1% of total foreign investment value (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2023). In May 2019 15 of the top 20 companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) were more than 50% owned by American investors (Fernandes, 2019). The nation's 'big four banks' – Commonwealth Bank of Australia, National Australia Bank, Australia New Zealand Bank, and Westpac – were all majority owned by US investors (Fernandes, 2019). Original research into the 2022 annual reports of the 'big four' banks (see Appendix 7.1) shows that just five companies, all of which are headquartered outside Australia, hold a 61.6% stake in Australia's biggest financial institutions. If capital-managers have a significant impact over the formulation of government policy, and many of the managers of Australian capital are American then Australian support for American interests begins to make more sense. The structural power that this high level of American investment grants American capital-managers and state-managers can be hard to quantify, but Australia's continued commitment to its alliance with the US correlate strongly with the large position American capital-managers hold in the Australian economy.

4.2.4 The 'Pivot to Asia'

“As the Prime Minister has said, we must welcome China's economic success. However, as I have previously noted, Australia must not resile from condemning any unilateral actions that jeopardise peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.”

Peter Hendy MP, June 18th, 2014 (p. 6559)

The 'pivot to Asia' was announced by President Barack Obama in 2011 as a program of further engaging with Asian states and economies. The pivot demonstrates American anxieties

surrounding the ongoing feasibility of American hegemony in Asia as China's power continues to grow. Kurt Campbell (2016, p. 13), the American diplomat credited with pioneering the scheme, described the pivot as “the first major step down what remains a long and winding road to significantly reappportion US attention and resources towards Asia [...] a mixture of policies and actions—diplomatic, military, and economic”. From the beginning it has been clear that the military rebalance was the key initiative of the pivot. The US Navy have committed 60% of its capabilities to the Pacific, while the Obama administration ramped up diplomatic efforts to build deeper military and economic relations with Asian states (Leoni, 2021, p. 160 & 164). Alongside this the ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (TPP) was announced, a plan that aimed to maintain American economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific, which received strong support in Australia (Leoni, 2021, p. 166; Ravenhill, 2013, p. 182). Obama explicitly focused on Australia-US economic linkages in his 2011 visit, saying in his address to Parliament “We’re among the most open economies on Earth [...] We’re the leading investor in Australia, and you invest more in America than you do in any other nation, creating good jobs in both countries” (Obama, 2011).

Australian involvement in the pivot has fundamentally changed the Australia-US security agreement by returning to its original Asian focus. Instead of a return to a strategy of intervention, the pivot is chiefly concerned with containing the expansion of Australia's greatest trading partner. Until the last decade Australia operated as an American ally in intelligence gathering and combat operations but not as a geographical site for American military bases (Sandars, 2000, p. 122). Permanent Marine rotations since 2012 and the announcement of plans to deploy nuclear-capable B-52 bombers in purpose-built facilities in the Northern Territory in 2023 now incorporate Australia into the other arm of the US security system (Department of Defence, 2023a; Knott, 2022; Obama & Gillard, 2011). The ‘Force Posture Agreement’ signed in 2014, and the AUKUS treaty announced in 2021, have closer integrated Australian and American security systems and concerns while allowing American forces greater access to Australian

military facilities (Curran, 2022, p. 261). Australia has committed itself to the defence of the hegemonic world order against the rise China, with the inclusion of the UK in the AUKUS agreement solidifying an out-of-region, Anglosphere approach to security (O'Connor et al., 2023, p. 47). The AUKUS agreement specifically has produced mixed reactions among Australia's regional neighbours, presenting Australian policy as framed primarily around US interests rather than an independently derived fear of Chinese expansion (Kurt et al., 2023, p. 10). This heightened concern with China does not reflect the actual development of Chinese capabilities. China will not be able to exert military hegemony in the Western Pacific or East Asia, nor does its force structure, posture, or acquisitions demonstrate its intentions to pursue this capability (Biddle & Oelrich, 2016, p. 12; White, 2013, p. 59).

Australia's support for the pivot has demonstrated the influence of American interests on the development of Australian foreign policy. Australian state-managers' willingness to continue to deepen the Australia-US security alliance as the process of Chinese containment becomes its core goal shows their belief in the importance of alliance over trade. Australia's security interests have persistently been identified as synonymous with the US despite the lack of evidence that China poses a serious threat to Australia. As this strategy of Chinese containment has instead led to an increased chance of conflict with China, the diverging interests of transnational capital and American hegemony from the security and economic interests of Australia increasingly present themselves.

4.3 China and the Powershift

“[T]he tsar of Russia, the emperor of China and Japanese imperialism were all paper tigers. As we know, they were all overthrown. U.S. imperialism has not yet been overthrown and it has the atom bomb. I believe it also will be overthrown. It, too, is a paper tiger.”

Mao Zedong, November 18th, 1957 (1966, p. 34)

China has been a key focus of American foreign policy since the 19th century, understood at different times as an enticing market for trade and investment and an ideological and security threat. This section will summarise historical development of American China policy and the current state of the two countries' declining relations. The normalisation of relations in 1972 between the US and the PRC paired with the economic reforms of the post-Mao era will be shown to have been crucial in developing China to its current power and thus in defining contemporary relations. While benefitting from economic access to China, the enrichment of a state that now threatens American hegemony has led Washington to reformulate its foreign policy. The means by which this emerging superpower rivalry in the Indo-Pacific resolves is likely to be the most important process that will affect Australia in the coming decades.

4.3.1 Exploitation to Self-Determination, Containment to Engagement

From the late 19th century China has been a key focus for American capital-managers and state-managers who framed its expansive markets as a solution to issues of underconsumption and overproduction in the US's economy. Williams (1972, pp. 48-52) makes clear that capital-managers and state-managers acted in synthesis in opposing European colonialism and exclusionary access to Chinese markets, quoting an 1898 State Department's Bureau of Foreign Commerce in a report that stated "the enlargement of foreign consumption of the products of our mills and workshops has, therefore, become a serious problem of statesmanship". As previously noted, the 'open door notes', credited by Williams as the defining moment in the formation of the American Empire, centred on gaining commercial access to China. While Chinese immigrants were often vilified in the US (Rollo, 2020, p. 232), China itself was envisioned by American capital-managers as a source of endless consumption and profit, with state-managers synthesising these views using the language of free trade and the pursuit of increased naval power to grow economic and military power in Asia.

The formation of the PRC in 1949 disrupted American access to Chinese markets. By 1936 the US ranked only behind Great Britain and Japan in the value of its foreign investment in China, valued at USD\$ 298.8 million (Spence, 1990, p. 382). Opposing communist rule that vowed to dispense with markets and private ownership, the US placed a trade embargo on the PRC and supported the Guomindang government in exile in Taipei (Curran, 2022, p. 18). China's support for North Korean forces in the Korean War strategically challenged the US's pursuit of hegemony in Asia. A National Security Council Report produced by the Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall (1951, p. 1) made clear that opposition to Chinese forces in Korea was directly related to the delaying of "a general war with Russia", "the establishment in China of a government friendly to the United States", and the prevention of "the further spread by force of Communism on the mainland of Asia". Despite American support for increased national self-determination the CPC was committed to a more concrete conception of sovereignty that conflicted with American ideals of supranational organisations and the rights of free movement of goods and capital (Boer, 2020, p. 144). The PRC presented a dual strategic and economic threat to the establishment of American hegemony, spreading an ideology that would likely ally states to the Soviet Union and discouraging the spread of American capital and capitalist governance in Asia.

The decreased threat of China as an active anti-American power enabled state-managers in China and the US to pursue a less adversarial relationship. The Sino-Soviet split that occurred during the 1960s calmed American state-manager's concerns that the PRC presented an active challenge to American hegemony (Spence, 1990, p. 588). A National Security Memorandum produced in November 1970 marked a turn from the isolationist China policy of the previous two decades, calling for a reappraisal of "U.S. policy goals as regards China" and coordination "with other countries which have particular interests in China, e.g. Japan, Australia, New Zealand" (National Security Council, 1970, p. 1). President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, with the

two states normalising diplomatic relations in 1978 (Spence, 1990, p. 630). Having established a system of hegemony in East Asia enabled by its wide array of military bases, alliances, and technological advantages, and emboldened by the Sino-Soviet split, American state-managers attempted to reduce the strategic threat and leverage the economic potential of China through engagement rather than isolation.

Mao Zedong's death in 1976 and the rise of Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader of China brought on a new era of economic reforms (Gernet, 1996, p. 678). Deng reformed China's relatively self-sufficient system of socialism in favour of the prioritisation of capital accumulation to build national strength. Agriculture was decollectivized, foreign investment and trade were courted in coastal Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and private industry and markets made partial returns (Harvey, 2007, p. 122). Despite these reforms, the CPC retained a high degree of central economic control through the key role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and strict regulatory frameworks. As American state-managers began a policy of engagement, China again presented itself to capital-managers as a seemingly endlessly profitable source of trade and investment. This policy of engagement was intended to simultaneously benefit American corporate interests by reintroducing economic links between the two states while eliminating China as a security threat by stimulating political liberalisation through capital and technology transfers (Leoni, 2021, p. 77). Partially disrupted by crises such as the CPC's quashing of protests in Tiananmen Square, this geoeconomic strategy of engagement as a path to political liberalisation defined the US's China policy into the 2000s (Bacevich, 2002, p. 65). Through engagement, it was believed, the US could benefit from access to lucrative Chinese markets and decrease the influence of the CPC through a process of political reform that – it was thought – would inevitably follow economic reform.

4.3.2 China and the Pivot

"Which way should Asia-Pacific cooperation be heading? The answer will have a profound impact on the development of our region, the wellbeing of our people, and the future of the world."

Xi Jinping, November 20th, 2020 (2022, p. 488)

"To get rich is glorious," (Harvey, 2007, p. 125) Deng quipped in his 1992 tour of southern China, and for China it has been. China's GDP in 1985 was USD\$ 310.13 billion, but by 2022 it had grown by 5800% to USD\$ 18.1 trillion (International Monetary Fund, 2023b). Nowhere better can Cox's identification of American hegemony as a system that develops its future rivals be seen than China. As the US focused militarily on the Middle East following the September 11th terrorist attacks its policy of engagement aimed at socialising China into a liberal-democratic capitalist state was failing (Leoni, 2021, p. 74). The 'pivot to Asia' represents the US's confrontation of China as a counter-hegemonic threat.

The British and American-led hegemonic world orders both constituted the reformation of the world-system following systemic chaos (Arrighi, 2010, p. 31). The absence of such a crisis currently leads China's pursuit of regional hegemony to manifest in reform rather than revolution. While the U.S. Department of Defense (2022, p. 8) claims the CPC "views core aspects of the current international system as incompatible with its vision for a revised order premised on its "community of common destiny", China generally adheres to international laws and norms. China's Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, Yang Jiechi (2022), defended this position, claiming China followed "the United Nations-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, not what is advocated by a small number of countries of the so-called rules-based international order". Despite its participation in a variety of IOs, China's adherence to international laws and norms is often contested, such as in the cases of its claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea and its commitment to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules (McDonagh, 2022, p. 712; Wirth, 2019,

p. 275). China has committed to defending its claims in the South China Sea properly through the compulsory dispute mechanism of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea – an agreement that the US is not a signatory to – and has consistently complied with decisions made by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (Williams, 2020, p. 4).

These critiques of China, while valid, fail to prove a major disconnect from western governance when the same scrutiny is applied in reverse. Japan’s claims to sovereignty over the island of Okinotorishima, Australia’s treatment of seaborne asylum seekers, or the US’s unjustified military incursions on foreign territory demonstrate that complete commitment to international rules and laws is not a prerequisite to be accepted into the hegemonic core (Abbondanza, 2021, p. 183; Fernandes, 2022, p. 98; Paul, 2018, p. 77). Recent policies enacted by the US point to the opposite of American assertions that China is the rogue actor. Neo-mercantilism made a resurgence in the US under President Donald Trump, specifically wielded to oppose China’s rise. This approach has been continued under President Joe Biden, demonstrating a bipartisan consensus that the military *and* economic pivot proposed by Obama is not capable of containing Chinese power (Leoni, 2021, p. 196). The rhetoric of Xi, in contrast, is far cry from the Marxist-Leninist principles of the Mao era, appearing closer in line with support for the ‘open door’. In 2017 Xi (2017, p. 516) stated “in the face of the current challenges, we need to build an open world economy, and continue to push trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. Protectionism is like treating an ailment with poison”. While norms of governance differ between the US and China their current competition is best characterised by the pursuit of power rather than an ideological contest.

China’s rapid economic accumulation and industrial development has spurred its rise in political power. China in 2022 possessed 18.5% of global economic activity compared to the US’s 15.5% (Drummond & World Bank, 2023), with China’s GDP of USD\$ 18.1 trillion the only economy that comes near the US’s GDP of USD\$ 25.46 trillion (International Monetary

Fund, 2023a). This economic weight is deployed equally by supporters and detractors of China to claim it is challenging western hegemony or that it is an imperialist power. Debates over the classification of China's economy are key to such claims. Harvey (2007, p. 120) identifies the economic reforms of the 1980s and 90s as decidedly capitalist, identifying a convergence with the neoliberal policies of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The CPC defines China as operating a "socialist market economy", characterised by the presence of markets, high levels of state ownership in large corporations, strong regulatory frameworks, and roles for party committees in corporate board meetings (McDonagh, 2022, p. 718). In 2014 Xi (2014b, p. 128) made clear his support for continued departure away from the command economy of the Mao era, saying China "should make good use of the rules of both the market, the "invisible" hand, and the government, the "visible" hand".

Internationally, China's economic activity does not greatly differ from western states, but current trends imply this may be changing. A large volume of Chinese capital still flows through the traditional homes of western finance. Excluding the Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of Hong Kong and Macau, the countries with the highest amount of Chinese direct investment stock in 2022 were the UK, the US, Singapore, Australia, the Netherlands, and Indonesia (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2022b). The top sites for new Chinese foreign investment in 2021 were (excluding SARs) the UK, Singapore, the US, Indonesia, and Germany (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2022c). China is undeniably building economic relationships in the Global South, but these activities are yet to fundamentally affect most Chinese investment. China does differ from western states in its commercial activities. China has incorporated itself into a variety of global value chains (GVCs) making it a key site for a global economic activity. Protectionism and re-industrialisation in western states attempting to decrease Chinese influence over global production has led for China to further push principles of free trade (Zhang & Dai, 2018, p. 121). In November 2018 Xi (2020, p. 236) stated "All around the

world people of vision would agree that economic globalization, as an irreversible trend of history, has greatly boosted global growth”. China is attempting to leverage its expanding commercial and financial power to achieve geoeconomic and geopolitical goals through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The ‘Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative’ published in 2015 makes clear the intention of the BRI is to “fully leverage the comparative advantages of its various regions, adopt a proactive strategy of further opening-up, strengthen interaction and cooperation among the eastern, western and central regions,” (National Development and Reform Commission et al., 2015). With the G7’s Build Back Better World (B3W), a counter to BRI, failing to raise enough capital to provide a true alternative to Chinese investment, President Joe Biden in 2021 proclaimed the US was engaged in “long-term strategic competition” with China (Zhao, 2021, p. 248). China, having rapidly developed through the import of western capital and technology, is using its vast accumulation of wealth to reshape power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. China does not present a fundamental threat to the norms of international political and economic engagement but is instead challenging American hegemony through competition in existing and emerging markets and centres of political power.

China-US military competition is confined almost entirely to the Western Pacific and China’s immediate waters. Chinese force posture, structure, and capabilities are primarily focused on denying the US the ability to project power into China’s immediate oceans. The US Department of Defense identifies the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) main strategic objective as projecting naval power into the Philippine Sea and further into the Pacific Ocean (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022, p. 81). The US has constructed a physical arc of containment that extends from Japan to Australia composed of military bases, security partners, and intelligence posts designed to deny China naval control over its immediate waters and threaten its ability to procure essential resources in the case of conflict (Leoni, 2021, p. 112). In response, China has focused its defence procurements in the last two decades on antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD)

capabilities aimed at denying the US the ability to project naval power in China's immediate waters (Biddle & Oelrich, 2016, p. 7). These capabilities currently enable successful sea denial within the "first island chain" – an area extending from Japan through Taiwan and down to the Philippines and Indonesia – with the possibility of a future ability to extend further into the Western Pacific. Amounting to an arms race in Asia, the defensive posture of Chinese defence and its obvious response to US containment demonstrate a seemingly one-sided provocation. Hugh White (2013, p. 59) contends that the concept of Asian military hegemony is likely to dissipate with the decline of the US's ability to project power across the Pacific, arguing trends of multipolarity and the immense cost of a land war in Asia make it unlikely China could pursue regional domination even if it wanted to.

China has evolved in American strategic and economic understandings as a challenger to its hegemonic position. This hegemonic challenge has naturally arisen from the internal contradictions within the American-led hegemonic world order. The pivot, and the level of competition between the US and China that has arisen since its announcement, have marked the beginning of an active struggle for Asian dominance. As Australia's closest security partner and trading partner respectively, US-China tensions will be key in defining Australia's future regardless of the policies pursued by Australian state-managers.

5.0 Defending Hegemony: Australia-China Relations 2011-2023

The degradation of Australia-China relations since 2011 has been the result of Australian state-managers attempts to reconcile the contradictory nature of Australian foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. Eventually deciding that the preservation of American regional hegemony was more valuable than developing economic and diplomatic ties with China, Australian state-managers have gradually brought Australia's security policy and diplomacy in line with the system of Chinese containment embodied by the pivot. This process has strongly relied on a conservative appeal to historic foreign policy conceptions and actions that distanced Australia from Asia in support of the interests of its hegemonic allies.

This chapter will begin by examining the development of Australia's China policy up to 2011. From Federation into the post-war era Australia's China policy was informed by a conception of Australian security that framed Asian and communist states as inherent threats. A reform of Chinese and Australian economic and foreign policies beginning in the 1970s led to a new period of engagement. Australian interventionism and engagement, while separate policies, were equally informed by strong commitment to operation within the American hegemonic system. From the late 20th century into the 2000s Australian state-managers recast China as an economic opportunity rather than strategic threat.

This will be followed by an analysis of the rapid change in Australia-China relations since 2011. Closely informed by historical developments and the underlying structures of global politics, Australia's China policy can be understood in this period to adapt to the changing demands of its alliance with the US. Australian state-managers since the pivot have attempted to reconcile Australia's contradictory economic relationship with China and security alliance with the US. This section will be split into subsections that track three periods of change in Australia-China relations: 2011-2015, 2016-2019, and 2020-2023. Initially attempting to balance growing

economic ties with China and security ties with the US, Australian state-managers gradually committed to the latter. Australian state-managers since 2011 have increasingly identified the preservation of American hegemony as the key goal of Australian foreign policy. This has led to a conservative turn in Australian politics that has reaffirmed the importance of the interests of Australia's major-power allies ahead of independent development amongst Australian state-managers.

5.1 The History of Australia-China Relations

Australia's China policy has largely been crafted in accordance with that of its hegemonic allies, with Australia's Asian geography leading to slight deviations. Australia's historic engagement with China was guided by British imperialist conceptions augmented by a distinctly Australian Sinophobia. With this conception seemingly vindicated by Japanese aggression, Australia made interventionism a key part of its engagement with Asia, aiding the establishment of American regional hegemony. Since the establishment of formal relations with the PRC in 1972 Australia has articulated a more independent China policy – albeit strongly influenced by neoliberal economic reforms aimed at maintaining the US hegemonic system. While Australia increasingly engaged with Asian states from the 1970s onwards this was not to promote a multipolar Asia, but to reap the benefits of stability and development enabled by American hegemony.

5.1.1 Opposition to an Asian Australia

Australian conceptions of China in the 19th and early 20th century were influenced by a combination of European and uniquely Australian factors. Australia was influenced by British conceptions of China which framed it as site for imperialist enrichment that equally would pose a threat to western interests if it were united under strong central leadership (Rollo, 2020, p. 229).

But, operating as a colony located at the Southern tip of Asia, Australian understandings of China differed from those held in the imperial core. Geographically distanced from their British homeland, Australian Britons defined their identity against Aboriginal and Asian populations. A British observer in 1881 commented on this distinctly Australian Sinophobia, saying New South Wales's ban on Chinese immigrants would "succeed in its process of self-abnegation" ("The Times" on the Chinese Question in New South Wales," 1881, p. 7). The first act passed by Australia's Parliament in 1901 expanded on colonial bans on Chinese migration, with Attorney General and later Prime Minister Alfred Deakin claiming "if we keep the race pure, and build up a national character, we shall become a highly progressive people of whom the British Government will be prouder the longer we live and the stronger we grow," (Deakin, 1901, in Crowley, 1973a, p. 15). Australia's cultural distancing from Asia was enabled by the lack of a substantial economic relationship with Asian states. By 1913 64% of Australia's two way trade was with Britain or other parts of the Empire, with the US and Germany its next two largest trading partners (Macintyre, 1986, p. 127). Economically, politically, and culturally tied to distant Britain, the Australian colonies defined themselves in opposition to geographically closer Asian populations, particularly China.

The centrality of China in Australian conceptions of Asia was challenged by Japan's rise to major-power status in the first half of the 20th century. While Chinese immigrants were vilified as "barbaric" and beneath Anglo-Saxon Australians (Rollo, 2020, p. 229) Japan was characterised by Deakin as "our most formidable competitors" (Fernandes, 2018, p. 21). Japanese aggression in the Second World War acted to further entrench this understanding of Asia amongst Australian state-managers. Even after the Japanese surrender in 1945 while the western allies turned their attention to the Soviet Union, Australia contributed a significant occupation force to ensure against the resurgence of Japan (Curran, 2022, p. 6; Fernandes, 2018, p. 39). Australian state-managers fear of future Japanese threats in the post-war era presented as

a dual concern of a strong Asian military and economic power. Liberal representative Frederick Osborne (1950, p. 1056) told the House of Representatives in March 1950 that while “We recognize that Japan cannot be held down forever,” that it “should remain disarmed,” with its “merchant fleet,” “industry,” and “foreign trade” monitored and never allowed to grow to pre-war size. Still mostly economically disconnected from Asia and having been attacked by the only great Asian power, Australia became an active participant in the American system of anti-communist forward defence in Asia.

5.1.2 Asian Intervention

The goals of American hegemony in the post-war decades closely aligned with Australian state-managers postwar concerns in redeveloping of the Australian state and economy within a stable region (Fernandes, 2018, p. 34). To this end a regional conception of Australian security developed. The immense allied military power of the US and UK enabled Australia to collectively engage in anti-communist intelligence and military interventions in Malaya and Indonesia to realise the security and economic interests of the newly emerging group of core hegemonic states (Bolton, 1990, p. 149; Fernandes, 2018, p. 99). The formation of the PRC in 1949 and the commitment of Chinese troops against UN forces in Korea in 1950 established China as a rival to American regional hegemony.

Australia saw anti-Vietnam War protests in May 1970 across all major cities (Ward & Robertson, 1986, p. 417), with support for Australia’s postwar foreign policy challenged simultaneously with the demise of Federation era bipartisan support for protectionism, the White Australia Policy, and collective bargaining (Kelly, 1992, pp. 1-2). The 1970s saw the birth of a new bipartisan consensus in Australian politics that coincided with the normalising of relations with Beijing in 1972. Forward defence and interventionism had violently established American

hegemony in East Asia. Australian state-managers had actively engaged in this process to support their major power ally and achieve Australian security goals.

5.1.3 Opening Up and Engagement

Domestic changes in Australia and China stimulated renewed international diplomatic and economic engagement by both countries. The neoliberal reforms of Hawke and Keating coincided with liberal economic reforms in China and led to rapid increases in economic linkages between the two states. China's newly opened and rapidly growing markets were identified as unique opportunities for the revitalisation of the Australian economy in the 1980s.

Australian state-managers, recognising the potential that Asian engagement had for enriching Australia, began to frame Asia as an economic opportunity rather than security threat. ALP Senator Peter Cook (1985, p. 480) declared that "China has set itself the goal of increasing by four times the gross output of its industry and agriculture between 1980 and the year 2000 [...] We see for ourselves a particular role in achieving part of that quadrupling of foreign trade,". Iron ore trade in was commenced in 1973, with the Hamersley-China Channar Joint Venture which was agreed in 1987 marking the first foreign direct investment made from China since the formation of the PRC (Raby, 2010, p. 2). Australian exports to China quadrupled during the 1990s, driven primarily by demand for metals and coal (Harvey, 2007, p. 139). The simultaneous processes of economic reform in Australia and China through the 1980s and 90s predicated on increased exposure to global markets stimulated a rapidly growing commercial relationship.

This rapid expansion of the two states' economic linkages was paired with a relative depoliticization of the relationship by Australian state-managers. In 1969, addressing the Government's signalling of a decrease in Australian commitments to the war in Vietnam, the

ALP representative Lance Barnard (1969, p. 327) quipped “it seems to have struck the Minister with the force of revelation that world Communism is not wholly evil.” The Defence policy reforms of the 1970s and 80s decreased Australian military involvement in Asia and led state-managers in Australia and China to cease seeing the other as immediate security threats. Australian state-managers increasingly engaged with Asian states diplomatically during this period of reduced military intervention in the region.

Australian state-managers were key in supporting China’s accession to multilateral forums. Australia helped China join the Asia-pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the Asia Development Bank (ADB), and the GATT, with these actions framed primarily as in the interests of Australian importers and exporters (Curran, 2022, p. 103). A Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) worker speaking to the Estimates Committee in August 1993 explained his department’s support for Chinese accession to the GATT as primarily in the interests of providing Australian exporters improved “market access, tariffs and quota issues” and facilitating “collaborative ventures” with Chinese companies (Grey, 1993). The period of decreased western military intervention in Asia and China’s economic opening from the 1970s coincided with domestic reforms of Australian politics and economics. Australian state-managers, still committed to upholding American hegemony, greatly altered Australia’s China policy, framing China not as an immediate security threat but as an economic boon for Australia.

5.1.4 Chinese Goods and American Guns

By the 2000s Australia-China relations were seemingly detaching from historic conceptions held by state-managers in each country. Mao’s wife Jiang Qing’s (1967, in Andrews, 2001, p. 219) statement that “There cannot be peaceful coexistence in the ideological realm,” embodied the early PRC’s approach to foreign policy. By the turn of the millennium CPC theoretician Zheng

Bijian's (2003, in Zhu, 2007, p. 229) concept of "China's peaceful rise" defined Australia-China relations. Australia's commitment to American-led military interventions in this period were limited to the Middle East, postponing the effect of US-China competition on Australia-China relations. Australia's military alliance with the US and economic ties with China both deepened in this period. American President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao gave speeches to joint sittings of Parliament on concurrent days October 2003. The expanding relationships both countries were developing with Australia, one commercial and one strategic, were portrayed as historical by each president. Hu (2003, p. 21697) referenced the supposed Chinese exploration of Australia by the Ming Dynasty expeditionary fleets of the 1420s while Bush (2003, p. 21689) affirmed the resilience of Australia and the US's 100 years being militarily "at each other's side". Australian state-managers commitment to protecting American hegemony was strengthening in a way that was seemingly entirely disconnected from Australia-China relations.

The 'mining boom' that began in the mid-2000s redefined Australia's trade relationship with China. The 2008 Annual Report of the Government of Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources (2008, p. 35) made clear that growing Chinese demand for Australian commodities was directly tied to "manufacturing growth in China," and a "massive push to urbanise China's population,". While in 2000 Australia operated a trade deficit of AUD\$ 3.063 billion with China, by 2010 it ran a trade surplus of AUD\$ 19.2 billion (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022, 2023b). As can be seen in figures 5 and 6, by 2010 China outpaced the US and Japan as Australia's leading import and export partner (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023b, 2023c). The rise in value of total exports to China rapidly outpaced the rise in the value of imports. Figures 3 and 4 show Australia's increased reliance on commodity exports from 2000 to 2011.




Figure 3 Australia's top ten exports by value in AUD\$ millions in January 2000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022)




Figure 4 Australia's top ten exports by value in AUD\$ millions in January 2011 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022)




Figure 5 Value of Australian exports to the United States of America, China (excluding SARS and Taiwan), and Japan from 2000-2020 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023b)




Figure 6 Value of Australian imports from the United States of America, China (excluding SARS and Taiwan), and Japan from 2000-2020 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023c)

Australia's economic growth was becoming increasingly contingent on commodity exports to China. The absence of major US-China rivalry in this period meant the US had little

direct effect on Australia-China relations in this period. Despite this seeming disconnection Australia was providing the commodities that was enabling China's rise as a challenger to American regional hegemony. This contradiction between Australia economic and security ties was yet to be formally acknowledged but was accelerating during the 2000s.

5.2 The Development of Australia's China Policy Since 2011

Australia-China relations have deteriorated dramatically since 2011, with China's challenge to American hegemony causing Australia's relationships with the US and China to be at odds. Economically tied to China, Australian state-managers have given preference to their historic commitment to upholding American hegemony. Rhetorically framing China as a direct threat to Australian security, deeper analysis reveals that Australian state-managers have increasingly identified China as a threat due to the conflation of American and Australian interests. Australian state-managers, strongly influenced by American state-managers and capital-managers, and historically committed to upholding a system of international political and economic engagement underpinned by western hegemony, have aligned Australian foreign policy with that of the US despite stark differences between the countries.

This chapter will be split into three sections that each embody a different stage of the development of Australia-China relations from 2011 to 2023. Confronted by an emerging contradiction in Australia's economic and security relationships, 2011 to 2015 was characterised by Australian state-managers' attempts to preserve Australia-China economic ties within an American-led system that was becoming increasingly antagonistic to China. Australia's trade and diplomatic ties with China grew despite Australia's commitment to a system that was aimed at containing the rise of China's power. As this balancing act showed itself to be untenable, successive Liberal governments from 2016 to 2019 decided to better support the pivot despite

the effects this may have on Australia-China relations. Critiques of China by Australian state-managers grew coinciding with the transformation of the pivot from an implicit hedge to an explicit system of containment and competition by the US. Catalysed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the period from 2020-2023 saw the greatest degradation in Australia-China relations. Critiques of China by Australian state-managers initially continued while Chinese state-managers employed economic and diplomatic tools to provoke popular discontent with Australia's China policy. The relative failure of these Chinese actions to change Australian foreign policy and the cooling of anti-China rhetoric by the new ALP government have enshrined a new bipartisan consensus on Chinese containment within Australian politics.

5.2.1 Pivot and Engagement: The Best of Both Worlds, 2011-2015

“Fear and greed.”

Prime Minister Tony Abbott to German Chancellor Angela Merkel on what inspired Australia's China policy (Curran, 2022, p. 191)

Australia's commitment to supporting the US's pivot transformed the complementary development of Australia-China and Australia-US relations and realised their contradictory nature. This is not to say that the repercussions of the US's strategic rebalance to counter the rise of China could not have been pre-empted. As early as 2003 in an article published in the *Australian Journal of Political Sciences*, Mark Beeson (2003, p. 390 & 395) identified that Australia's deepening relationship with the US was hampering its attempts to economically engage with Asian states and was likely to commit Australia to future regional conflict. Formal relations with China continued to develop in this era and economic ties continued to grow. As China continued to grow in power without committing itself to upholding American hegemony, the years immediately following 2011 were characterised by Australian state-managers' attempts to balance economic and strategic interests.

5.2.1.1 Closer Ties with the United States Armed Forces and Peoples' Liberation Army

Australia continued to develop diplomatic and strategic ties with China following the announcement of the pivot. This was sharply contrasted with a growing fear of China in the Australian national security sphere. The 2009 *'Force 2030'* white paper included a not publicly published section that detailed how a possible conflict alongside the US against China in Taiwan would likely proceed (Curran, 2022, p. 160). The 2013 *'Defence White Paper'* (Department of Defence, p. 7) expanded Australian support for RBIO through an "Indo-Pacific" conception of Australian security. Presented as a progressive regionalism, this reformation of Australian defence policy following the pivot appears an obvious response to the expanding military influence of China. These rising covert military concerns over China were publicly paired with an agreement to promote Australia and China's security relationship to a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' during Xi's visit to Australia in 2014. Xi (2014a, p. 12724) addressed a joint sitting of Parliament, calling for both states to "increase mutual understanding and be sincere and trustworthy partners," arguing relations between Australia and China were "not burdened by historical problems between us, nor do we have any conflict of fundamental interests". The awkwardness of deepening connections between the increasingly oppositional ADF and PLA was best encapsulated by an earlier event when in 2009 when Defence official Michael Pezzulo had been forced to brief senior PLA members on the unpublished white paper section on Taiwan (Curran, 2022, p. 161). Two years following the announcement of this partnership the Department of Defence (2016, p. 44) was already hedging against the obvious contradiction that a high-level consultation with a potential rival military posed, stating in the 2016 *'Defence White Paper'* "The Government will seek to deepen and broaden our important defence relationship with China while recognising that our strategic interests may differ in relation to some regional and global security issues". Committed to the pivot, Australian state-

managers still pursued deeper ties with China. This idealistic belief that Australia could be a close military ally of two antagonistic states demonstrates the contradictory foreign policy approach that Australian state-managers had developed in previous decades and were slow to discard.

5.2.1.2 The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement

Australian state-managers simultaneously committed to the economic hedge against China as part of the pivot while signing a free trade agreement with China. This indecisiveness shows that during this period Australia's conflicting economic and strategic interests were preventing Australian state-managers from fully committing Australia to an anti-China hedge. While demonstrating strong support for American economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific, Australian state-managers attempted to grow Australia-China trade and investment linkages.

Australia committed to the economic aspect of the US's pivot through their support for the negotiation of the TPP. In his November 2011 address to Parliament announcing the pivot, President Obama (2011) framed the TPP as the "most ambitious trade agreement yet, and a potential model for the entire region". Presented as an initiative of greater Asian engagement, the TPP was also a strategic move to counter Chinese plans to form a regional trade agreement with APEC (Capling & Ravenhill, 2013, p. 186). The TPP focused on uniting regulatory frameworks around an American model to promote economic development through trade with the US (Ranald, 2011, p. 85).

The TPP did little to grant Australian corporations better access to lucrative American markets (Ravenhill, 2013, p. 181). Despite this the TPP was popular amongst ALP and Liberal politicians. Susan Harris Rimmer (2016, p. 633) argues that Australia's support for the TPP marked a departure from the pursuit of bilateral FTAs in the 2000s, signalling greater

commitment to supporting American geopolitical priorities than advancing Australian economic interests. Much like AUSFTA, the TPP was an economic initiative supported by Australian state-managers despite forecasts that its positive economic effects in Australia would be limited (Ranald, 2011, p. 88). The anti-China aspect of the TPP was partly contested by Australian state-managers, with Prime Minister Kevin Rudd calling for China's inclusion in 2013 ("Rudd urges China inclusion in TPP talks," 2013). Australia's support for TPP negotiations continued despite China's continued exclusion. Australia's involvement in the TPP negotiations made clear that Australian state-managers were committed to promoting American interests even if they came at the expense of Australian interests and antagonised Australia's greatest trading partner.

This anti-China hedge was paired with the deepening of economic ties with China through the signing of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (CHAFTA) in 2015. When analysed in the context of the TPP, CHAFTA exemplifies the contradictory policies pursued by Australian state-managers in this period. Australia simultaneously supported the establishment of an economic bloc opposed to China's growing influence in Asia while aiding Chinese economic development and increasing Australia's reliance on Chinese trade. CHAFTA improved the flow of goods, services, and capital between Australia and China. By 2015 the initial increase in Australian exports to China precipitated by the mining boom had normalised at AUD\$ 75.236 billion (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023b). The signing of CHAFTA was followed by a second rapid increase, with the value of Australian exports to China peaking in 2019 at AUD\$ 148.374 billion while imports continued to rise steadily – see figure 7. Despite concerns over the influence of China's growing economic weight on the endurance of American hegemony embodied in support for the TPP, direct trade and investment between Australia and China was openly supported by Australian politicians in this period. In 2011 the Liberal opposition accused the ALP Government of disincentivising Chinese investment, a claim which was flatly denied by Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd (Bishop, 2011, p. 4761). CHAFTA raised the screening threshold

for Chinese investment by the FIRB in “non-sensitive areas” from AUD\$ 252 million to AUD\$ 1.094 billion “in line with concessions granted to other countries under previously negotiated FTAs” (Davidson & Tomaras, 2015, p. 17). CHAFTA sparked a brief increase in Chinese direct investment in Australia which rose from USD\$ 3.4 billion in 2015 to USD\$ 4.24 billion in 2017 – see figure 8 (National Bureau of Statistics of China et al., 2022).




Figure 7 Australian merchandise trade with China (excludes SARs and Taiwan) 2000-2022 in AUD\$ millions (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023b)




Figure 8 Two-Way FDI flows between Australia and China 2011-2021 in USD\$ millions (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2022a; National Bureau of Statistics of China et al., 2022)

The China policy of Australian state-managers from 2011 to 2015 was confused. Avoiding addressing the growing contradiction between Australia's relations with China and the US, Australian state-managers attempted to further develop Australia-China relations within the framework of an increasingly anti-China American-led hegemonic system. China was cast simultaneously as a security partner and an ally, an important trade partner whose economic power should be contained.

5.2.2 Changing Tides: The Pivot as a Way of Life, 2016-2019

Australian state-managers' pursuit of improved relations with China faltered in the second half of the 2010s. The approach of deepening but generally depoliticised engagement that had guided Australia's China policy since 1972 was gradually phased out. As the purpose of the pivot as a

military hedge against the rise of China became clearer under President Trump, Australian state-managers began to frame the Chinese state and Chinese private corporations as emerging security threats. Despite these changes economic ties between Australia and China continued to grow. Without introducing major policy changes Australia's commitment to the China-sceptic spirit of the pivot grew rhetorically. Committing Australia to opposing an emerging hegemonic challenge in the Indo-Pacific, Australian state-managers did little to prepare the economy for repercussions that could follow provocation of its larging trading partner. Faced with a choice between pursuing purely domestic economic interests or renewing Australia's historic support for its Anglosphere hegemonic allies, Australian state-managers from 2016-2019 began a push in favour of the latter.

5.2.2.1 Comprehensive Strategic Partner and Strategic Competitor

From 2016 Australian state-managers ceased pursuing closer diplomatic ties with China and instead indulged the national security sphere's framing of China as an emerging threat. A formal update of Australia's changing China policy came in two government documents. The 2016 '*Defence White Paper*' made clear that "our strategic planning is not limited to defending our borders", that "The roles of the United States and China and the relationship between them will continue to be the most strategically important factors in the Indo-Pacific region to 2035" (Department of Defence, p. 15). Despite Australia's geographic distance from China and the deepening relationship that had been established through previous decades, Australian security interests were conflated with those of the US. China's threat to the longevity of American hegemony was recast as a threat to Australia. The equation of American and Australian interests was partly achieved by framing American hegemony as the guarantor of Australian economic success. Concerns over Chinese claims to South China Sea sovereignty – a topic first raised in

the 2013 Defence White Paper – were tied explicitly to economic interests, with the paper stating “Nearly two thirds of Australia’s exports pass through the South China Sea” (Department of Defence, p. 57). Despite a large portion of this trade being directly with China, little reason was given to support the implication that China would threaten Australian shipping. In fact, if Australia’s interests are in protecting its trade through the South China Sea, then forceful opposition to Chinese territorial claims in major shipping lanes could be counterproductive.

This language of hedging against a potential negative shift in Australia-China relations also permeated the 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper*. Implicitly critiquing BRI, the paper stated “Even as growth binds the economies of the Indo–Pacific, trade and investment and infrastructure development are being used as instruments to build strategic influence, as well as to bring commercial advantage” (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, p. 44). Alongside the publishing of this paper, the first National Security Strategy (NSS) published under President Trump, in 2017, characterised China as a “revisionist power” and “strategic competitor” (Zhao, 2021, p. 249). Similar Australian publications did not use as strong language, but their commitment to promoting American interests made clear that Australian state-managers supported this framing of China. Having experienced no disruption to Australian trade and diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific because of changing Chinese policy, these publications made clear that Australian state-managers were primarily concerned with threats to American regional hegemony. Lacking clear threats to Australian commerce or the Australian continent, China was framed as a security threat due to the important role that preservation of American regional hegemony was given within Australian security strategy.

5.2.2.2 Framing Chinese Economic Activity as a Security Threat

Beyond traditional military conceptions of security, Chinese trade and investment began to be framed by Australian state-managers as potential security threats. State-managers drew on a historic aversion to a strong and independent Asian economy to justify their growing concern with Chinese economic power. Despite having made Chinese investment in Australia easier through CHAFTA, discontent with the nature of Chinese investment grew amongst Australian state-managers. The interests of Australian firms seeking foreign investment were subordinated to those of American regional hegemony.

Outflows of Chinese capital that coincided with the expansion of Chinese power led the actions of Chinese corporations to be tied to the Chinese government. This process of negatively framing Chinese capital did not occur overnight. In November 2016 the Minister for Trade, Tourism and Investment, Steven Ciobo still argued that Chinese investment was merely the “latest in successive waves of foreign investment in our history which started with the United Kingdom, then the United States and then Japan” (Ciobo, 2016, p. 4077). However, this statement was sharply contrasted by the passing of the ‘*Register of Foreign Ownership of Agricultural Land Amendment (Water) Bill*’ the following month which addressed rising concerns over the impact of Chinese ownership over crucial Australian resources and infrastructure. This was despite the fact, pointed out by the ALP member for Hunter, Joel Fitzgibbon, that “Chinese investment still ranks a poor fifth” in investment stock in Australian water holdings (Fitzgibbon, 2016, p. 2899). While not a major policy issue, Australian state-managers were beginning to reform the spirit of globalization that had motivated agreements like CHAFTA by securitizing foreign investment.

The scandal involving ALP Senator Sam Dastyari’s acceptance of undisclosed donations from Chinese nationals in the same year was key in driving concerns amongst Australian state-

managers over Chinese economic coercion in Australia. Australian politicians subtly began to differentiate Chinese capital flows into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Liberal Senator Ian MacDonald finished his critique of Dastyari by saying “do not ever suggest to me that I am anti-Chinese investment in proper investment venues within Australia” (MacDonald, 2016, p. 736). Australian state-managers were still somewhat protecting the interests of Australian economic links with China but a securitised conception of anything to do with China was beginning to tarnish aspects of this relationship. The equation of certain Chinese economic activity with espionage and interference was articulated by the ALP member for Melbourne Ports, Michael Danby, who said in September 2017 “We should have a colour-blind attitude to Chinese investment. But we should have a separate and different debate on the various political influence operations in Australia” (Danby, 2017, p. 9108). The passing of the ‘*National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018*’ showed opposition to foreign influence through financial means to be a key policy of the Liberal Government. While China had been a growing economic, diplomatic, and strategic partner up until 2015, Chinese economic activity, alongside the Chinese state, was being discussed in increasingly cautious terms by Australian politicians.

Chinese investment in Australia was discussed by Australian politicians far more than foreign investment from other sources in this period. According to the Commonwealth Hansard, between the 1st of January 2011 and 30th of June 2023 "Chinese investment" was mentioned 179 times in Parliament (*Search results: "Chinese investment"*, 2023). In the same period "American investment" was mentioned 15 times, "investment from America" once, “investment from the United States” seven times, and "investment from the US" five times (*Search results: "American investment"*, 2023; *Search results: "investment from America"*, 2023; *Search results: "investment from the United States"*, 2023; *Search results: "investment from the US"*, 2023). From 2011 to 2022 total Chinese investment stock in Australia rose from AUD\$ 19.675 billion to AUD\$ 85.138 billion (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023a). In the same period total American

investment stock in Australia rose from AUD\$ 527.634 billion to AUD\$ 1.092 trillion (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2023a). Despite being more than 10 times smaller, Chinese investment was mentioned in Parliamentary discussion over 6 times more frequently than American investment. Fears over the influence of Chinese investment in Australia continued despite the trend of reduced Chinese capital outflows to Australia and globally from 2017, a fact acknowledged in the 2018-19 FIRB Report (Foreign Investment Review Board, 2020, p. i). Despite CHAFTA making Australian markets more accessible to Chinese capital-managers, Australian state-managers following the pivot increasingly approached Chinese financial links with the same scepticism that they applied to Chinese military activity.

The securitisation of Chinese private entities was not limited to foreign investment, with involvement of Chinese corporations in Australian infrastructure also securitised. Chinese telecommunication companies Huawei and ZTE were banned from participating in the development of Australia's 5G network out of concern of any company "subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign government that conflict with Australian law" be involved in the construction of Australian infrastructure (Slezak & Bogle, 2018). Despite the involvement of the CPC in Chinese economics being a phenomenon as old as the PRC itself, Australian politicians who had courted Chinese investment through CHAFTA began to demonstrate growing concern over connections between Chinese companies and the CPC. Michael Danby explicitly tied his support for the bans on Huawei and ZTE to the fact they "must report to a Communist Party cell at the top of their organisations" (Danby, 2018, p. 8290). The second half of the 2010s saw a gradual politicisation of Chinese economic links with Australia. Instead of dividing Australian foreign policy into a security alliance with the US and an economic relationship with China, Australian state-managers developed a holistic approach that acknowledged that Australia-China relations had to be carried out in line with the pivot.

5.2.2.3 Politicising the Australia-China Relationship

Australian state-managers in this period abandoned the strategy of generally non-politicised engagement that guided Australian China policy from the 1970s. The move away from this approach asserted the value of preserving American hegemony ahead of protecting independent Australian interests. In March 2018 Australia's extradition treaty with China was suspended, while Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated in a lecture in Singapore that "While nondemocracies such as China can thrive when participating in the present system, an essential pillar of our preferred order is democratic community" (Bishop, 2017, p. 7; Xue, 2023, p. 120). In June Prime Minister Turnbull claimed foreign interference in Australian politics was "a matter of the highest concern", answering a journalist's question on backroom discussions with Chinese officials by saying "China should always respect the sovereignty of other nations including, of course, our own" (Turnbull, 2017, p. 7). Explicit and implicit criticisms of Chinese governance and the increasing projection of Chinese power became commonplace Australian state-managers. In August 2019 Prime Minister Scott Morrison voiced support for pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong (Koslowski, 2019). In September Morrison criticised the WTO's continued classification of China as 'developing nation', telling a group of business leaders in Chicago "China's economic growth is welcomed by Australia and we recognise the economic maturity that it has now realised as a newly developed economy [...] This was the point of the world's economic engagement with China," but that "The world's global institutions must adjust their settings for China, in recognition of this new status" (Crowe, 2019). Rather than courting political liberalisation in China through engagement, Australia state-managers joined the US in critiquing Chinese governance as undemocratic. China was no longer portrayed as a future ally. Instead, Australian state-manager engaged with the emerging reality of the military pivot, legitimising Australian militarisation by framing China as an opponent of Australian interests and values.

This Australian escalation brought the first Chinese retaliation. In February 2019 the Dalian Ports announced that it would ban Australian coal imports as part of a wider policy that limited its yearly coal imports to 12 million tons (Xue, 2023, p. 123). The close connection between Chinese state-managers and private enterprises was deployed to target Australia's perceived weakness: its reliance on Chinese imports and exports. This dependence however was two-way. China's peak as the buyer of Australian exports was in May 2020, when 47% of Australian exports by value flowed to China (Uren, 2021). This complicated system of two-way economic dependency would become a crucial complicating factor in the years to come.

The facts of China as Australia's largest trading partner and the US as its greatest security partner had not changed since 2011, but Australian state-managers were beginning to fundamentally alter their foreign policy approach. What had developed was US-China strategic competition. Having failed to balance relations with both states following this development, Australian state-managers rejected the opportunity to end the American alliance that was now bringing Australia closer to conflict with China and instead made a conservative appeal to historic trends. The key role of a hegemonic partner in Australian foreign policy that had persisted since colonisation was reasserted.

5.2.3 Loyalty to Hegemony: COVID-19, Economic Warfare, and AUKUS, 2020-2023

Catalysed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the period from 2020 to 2023 saw the greatest deterioration in relations between Australia and China since the 1970s. This period saw the first major retaliation by Chinese state-managers, with Australia's exports to China targeted to turn Australian exporters against their government's policy. The general failure of these measures to greatly affect Australia's economy emboldened Australian state-managers to further commit to promoting American hegemony. Most importantly, the reform of Australia's security strategy and

the signing of the AUKUS agreement brought the greatest development of Australia's involvement in the military aspect of the pivot in a decade. The limited position of Australian capital-managers in China, the limited influence of exporters over state-managers, and the entrenchment of Australia's economy within a system dominated by western capital complicated the economic aspect of Australia-China relations. Ultimately Australia's strong commercial relationship with China proved in this period to be resilient to Chinese bans and tariffs, making China's threat to the primacy of western capital in Asia the major economic concern of Australian and American state-managers. Having faced few short-term repercussions for increasingly distancing Australia from China, Australian state-managers further committed Australia to the American strategy of Chinese containment.

5.2.3.1 COVID-19 and Human Rights as a Tool to Discredit the CPC

Having originated in China, the COVID-19 pandemic provided the catalyst for increased criticism of China by Australian state-managers. They were able to appeal to historic racist conceptions of China to justify increasingly anti-China policy. Previously guided by a depoliticisation of Australia-China relations to enable a growing commercial relationship, Australian state-managers reversed their approach to garner popular support for Chinese containment.

COVID-19 brought a resurgence of historic conceptions of China, providing a clear example of the conservative lens through which Australia's new China policy was framed. In April 2020 Foreign Minister Marissa Payne called for an inquest into the origins of COVID-19, framing the damaging effects of the virus as closely connected to the failures of CPC governance (Lim & Attrill, 2021, p. 419). The idea of China as a biosecurity threat created a new lens through which the CPC could be criticised while also appealing to historic conceptions of China

as a uniquely dangerous place. This was best demonstrated by Liberal Senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells's claim that "The Black Death, like coronavirus, was made in China. It is no coincidence that the worst outbreaks in the Middle East and Europe have been in Iran and Italy; each is the anchor of the Belt and Road Initiative—the 21st century version of the Silk Road." (Fierravanti-Wells, 2020b, p. 2172).

Alongside these century old stereotypes Australian politicians increasingly appealed to Cold War anti-communist anxieties. Modern China was implicitly related to Australia's communist adversaries of the 20th century. By 2020 members of Australia's three largest parties all specifically used the terms 'communist' or 'CCP' when critiquing China. Liberal Senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells (2020a, p. 2680) claimed economics had blinded previous Australian state-managers, saying "For years, we have been prepared to turn a blind eye to CCP skulduggery because the rivers of gold were flowing". Similarly critiquing previous Liberal governments' treatment of China, ALP representative Graham Perrett (2023, p. 3389) said "I'm sure Australians recall former foreign minister Downer slotting straight into the board of Huawei, former trade minister Andrew Robb walking out of parliament straight into a lucrative job with a billionaire closely linked with the Chinese Communist Party". Even Greens Senator Nicholas McKim (2020, p. 2649) said in June 2020 "I'm not going to mince words here: the CCP is a totalitarian regime that seeks to ruthlessly control every aspect of its citizens' lives.". Despite Xi's continuance of the process of 'opening up' that had enabled the development of a strong trade relationship between Australia and China, Australian politicians increasingly framed China through a historic anti-communist lens. Having willingly depoliticised Australia-China relations while China was believed to be constrained within the system of American hegemony, Australian politicians demonstrated their enduring loyalty to the US by reversing this approach as China developed as a hegemonic challenger.

5.2.3.2 Diplomatic and Economic Freeze: China's Response

The 2010s were characterised by a slow deterioration of Australian state-managers' conceptions and treatment of China as they reconciled the pivot with Australia's deepening relationship with China. China began to retaliate to Australian rhetoric and policies by targeting economic and diplomatic ties between the two states to motivate a change in policy. Bans and tariffs were the primary tool employed by the Chinese government to try and force Australian state-managers to quell their support for the American strategy of Chinese containment. Across 2020 China banned four Australian beef exporters, raised duties on Australian barley, issued a general travel advisory on Australia, advocated for Chinese students to not travel to Australia, banned Australia's largest grain exporter CBH Grain, introduced a 40% tariff for Chinese mills that used Australian materials, led a probe into the quality of Australian wine, implemented a near total ban on Australian coal and coke, and banned Australian lobster and timber (Xue, 2023, p. 123). These actions, following the 'Trade War' between China and the US, showed the Chinese government's identification of Australia-China economic ties as the key contradiction of Australian foreign policy.

While the global economic turbulence of 2020 makes it difficult to calculate the effect of these actions on the Australian economy, it appears overall they had a generally minor effect, punctuated by severe downturns for certain niche industries. The case of coal and coke, shown in figure 9, was one example of the ineffectiveness of these bans on forcing Australian state-managers hands in reforming their China policy. While the value of Chinese imports of Australian coal and coke fell from USD\$ 9.37 billion in 2019 to USD\$ 650 million in 2021, the value of total Australian coal and coke exports remained almost identical, at USD\$ 44.41 billion and USD\$ 43.93 billion respectively (China Customs, 2022a). The globalised nature of modern trade makes transitioning to new purchasers for in-demand products relatively simple. Australian

exporters found new buyers while Chinese importers found new sellers. Chinese importers were punished more than Australian exporters, with the cost per million tonnes of coal used in Chinese steel mills rising to USD\$ 400 million, far above the global average of USD\$ 250 million (Skidmore, 2022). The ineffectiveness of these bans was demonstrated by their silent lifting in March 2023 (Cossins-Smith, 2023). China’s focus on Australian exports likely failed due to China’s relative dependence on Australian commodities. While coal and coke were banned, most other banned products represented were only minor Australian exports – see figure 10. Non-fuel minerals and metal ores, which made up 83% of Australian exports to China by value in 2021 (China Customs, 2022b), were never targeted.




Figure 9 Export value of Australian coal and coke to China from 2011 to 2021 in USD\$ billions (China Customs, 2022a)




Figure 10 Australia's top ten exports by value in AUD\$ millions in January 2021 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2022)

These economic policies were supplemented with diplomatic reproachment. In November 2020 the Chinese embassy issued the Australian government with a list of '14 grievances' with Australian foreign policy (Kearsley, 2020). This document laid out a variety of ways that Beijing alleged Canberra was unfairly treating China ranging from issues over Australia's statement to the UN on the South China Sea, the only non-littoral state to do so, the targeting of Chinese enterprises through foreign interference legislation, the spreading of misinformation regarding COVID-19, and racist characterisations of Chinese people by the Australian media and politicians (Kearsley, 2020). Just as Australian state-managers had used a COVID-19 inquiry to challenge Chinese governance on the world stage, Chinese state-managers now attempted to highlight Australia as an aggressor. The replacement of Morrison's Liberal government by Albanese's ALP government has brought a relative calming in rhetoric by both sides. Xi agreed in a meeting with Albanese in November 2022 that trade restrictions between the two states should be dropped, saying "In the past few years, the China-Australia relationship

has had some difficulties. This is something that we would not like to see,” (Coorey, 2022). While the diplomatic freeze is over, the turbulence of 2020-2022 fundamentally altered the nature of Australia-China relations.

The inability of Chinese economic bans and a diplomatic freeze to elicit a change in Australian foreign policy emboldened Australian state-managers to continue pursuing a strategy of Chinese containment. The continued reliance of Chinese industries on Australian commodities limits the coercive power of Chinese economic bans and tariffs. Chinese importers are likely to court new suppliers as Australia-China trade shows itself to be unpredictable, but Australia will remain a key source of commodities necessary for Chinese development even as it strategically treats China as a rival state.

5.2.3.3 Abandonment of the Defence of Australia Doctrine and AUKUS

The first ten years of the pivot were marked by only a few material improvements of Australian commitment to the system of Chinese containment. The rotation of American Marines through Australia's Northern Territory and continued cooperation through the biennial Operation Talisman Sabre exercises were buffeted through the 2010s the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) commitment to 'freedom of navigation' (FoN) and intelligence operations in China's near waters. The 2020 '*Defence Strategic Update*' (Department of Defence, p. 12) characterised Chinese land reclamation in the South China Sea as "coercive para-military activities" with such action deemed to "challenge sovereignty and habits of cooperation" specifically "to the long established and mutually beneficial security partnerships Australia has with many countries". The RAN contested Chinese sovereignty through FoN manoeuvres and RAAF planes dropped 'sonar buoys' to aid in the identification of Chinese submarines off its coast (Fernandes, 2023). Up until 2021 these exercises, rotations,

FoN manoeuvres, and intelligence gathering operations all demonstrated Australia's rising opposition to China within the much-adapted Defence of Australia doctrine.

In 2021 the AUKUS agreement was announced, a plan that tied Australian security to the US and UK. AUKUS was chiefly concerned with augmenting Australian acquisition and capabilities to make the ADF a more capable partner in potential major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Key to the AUKUS agreement was the plan for the RAN were to acquire nuclear powered submarines (Kurt et al., 2023, p. 3). Under the agreement the Marine rotational force would increase and American and British air and naval assets will be brought to bases in Australia (Department of Defence, 2023a). This development beyond the pivot has demonstrated a military departure from the norms-based liberal internationalism of the previous decades, replaced with an explicit military bloc aimed at dissuading aggression and possibly engaging in large-scale combat in the Indo-Pacific (O'Connor et al., 2023, p. 55). Continued under the new ALP Government in 2022, AUKUS reaffirmed Australian state-managers' commitment to militarily protecting American regional hegemony.

The large-scale changes brought by the AUKUS agreement were supplemented in 2023 by the '*Defence Strategic Review*' (Department of Defence) which brought an end to the Defence of Australia, proposing an alternative doctrine of 'National Defence'. The guiding message of the review was that "Intense China-United States competition is the defining feature of our region and our time. Major power competition in our region has the potential to threaten our interests, including the potential for conflict" (Department of Defence, 2023b, p. 23). While the review's calls for better development of A2/AD capabilities aimed at preventing attacks on Australia through its northern approaches are echoed by critics of Australian security policy (Roggeveen, 2023, p. 167; White, 2019, p. 121), its general focus is in reorienting the ADF to fight in a major Indo-Pacific war. Such a conflict between 'major powers' could only include the US and China, likely to arise in the two main areas the PLA are postured to engage in, the Taiwan Strait and

South China Sea (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022, p. 128). In a 2022 survey 46% of Australians polled said that Australia should send military support alongside the US if China attacked Taiwan (Lyons, 2022), with American General Mark Milley asserting in an interview on ABC's *7:30* that he believed Australia would be "shoulder to shoulder" with the US if such a conflict occurred (Hurst, 2022). Having pursued new acquisitions and posture agreements with the US and UK, this review signalled an overhaul of Australia's defence doctrine. China was the obvious, if not explicitly identified, target of Australia's new security strategy.

With China's threat to Australian shipping not well explained, its contestation of sovereignty far from Australian borders, and its force posture decidedly defensive, Australian state-managers' continued support for the US's military pivot rests on claims of upholding the RBIO. But while the RBIO is framed as a system of American-led rules and norms, Chinese containment is instead primarily driven by American interests. Emboldened by the failure of Chinese bans and tariffs to damage Australian economic interests and strongly influenced by American government and corporate interests, Australian state-managers through the 2020s have committed Australia to future 'major power' Indo-Pacific conflict to prevent rising Chinese influence.

6.0 Conclusion

Australian state-managers since 2011 have committed Australia to the protection of American hegemony in the Indo-Pacific against the potential threat posed by China. Through a neo-Marxist analysis of the historical trends and structures of global politics and economics that have influenced the development of Australia-China relations, the importance of American hegemony in defining this relationship has been shown. The fact that the further development of Australia-China relations has been sacrificed to uphold American interests despite the economic value of China to Australia demonstrates both the power of American agents in the formation of Australian foreign policy and the enduring importance of loyalty to hegemonic allies to Australian state-managers.

Australia pivoted from operation within the British-led hegemonic world order to the emergent American system in the mid-20th century. This process brought Australia's China policy closer in line with its major ally, with both Australia and the US identifying Asia as a source of insecurity. Australia and the US replaced their joint strategy of military intervention with diplomatic realism and economic engagement in the 1970s. With Australian engagement with China firmly rooted within the system of American hegemony, Australia developed an economic relationship that empowered a future American rival. This contradictory development, the maintenance of stability through the undermining of the power dynamics key to preserving American hegemony, has defined in Australian and American relations with China in generally similar ways.

Delayed by Middle Eastern military interventions, the US began to address the coming hegemonic challenge posed by China in 2011. The pivot refocused the American security system to oppose the rise of China. Having also become economically dependent on China and having enabled China's rapid economic growth through the transfer of capital and technology,

the stability of the American hegemonic system was no longer ensured. Key to the pivot was a diplomatic and economic push to bring Indo-Pacific states closer to the US in response to China's increasing regional influence. Australia was a key asset in the eyes of American state-managers in the development of this system of Chinese containment that it was hoped could preserve American regional hegemony.





























Faced with mounting superpower competition between the US and China, Australian state-managers further committed Australia to its alliance with the US. The deterioration of relations between Australia and China in recent years has been a direct result of this decision. While the two-way trade relationship between Australia and China is highly lucrative, the embedded structural power of American state-managers and capital-managers paired with the historic tendency to support the interests of hegemonic allies have led Australian state-managers to willingly jeopardise relations with China. Changes in Chinese foreign policy and the continued rise of Chinese power have also been important in motivating this decision, but the agency of Australian state-managers to address these phenomena outside of the confines of American hegemony remains.

Rather than synthesising the contradictory relation between its historic security ties to the US and growing commercial relationship with China through a new foreign policy approach, Australian state-managers have attempted to eliminate the contradiction by militarily opposing China's rise. A new norm of engagement that maintains economic links between Australia and China despite a decline in formal relations has emerged. This is a tenuous situation. While both states continue to benefit from their trade, any further escalation between China and the US could quickly unravel this relationship. The continuation of the contradiction at the heart of Australian foreign policy means that as the ADF slowly prepares itself for a future conflict with China Australian importers grow more reliant on Chinese markets and Australian exporters continue to profit off the trade of commodities key to China's ongoing development. No

hegemonic system has lasted for ever, and neither will the US's. This does not mean Australia must forge closer ties with the PRC, but it does imply that charting a path forward for Australia that engages with emerging Asian powers rather than waning western ones may prove more peaceful and economically advantageous in the long term.

7.0 Appendix

7.1 Foreign Ownership of Australia's 'Big Four' Banks All Shareholders Named in Annual Reports

Company Name	Commonwealth Bank of Australia		National Australia Bank		Westpac Banking Corporation		Australia and New Zealand		Country of Origin	
	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#		
HSBC CUSTODY NOMINEES (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED	22.27	378,954,475	25.43	801,947,323	21.89	766,538,423	27.04	808,413,840	United Kingdom	
J P MORGAN NOMINEES AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED	14.24	242,237,957	14.75	465,154,750	13.55	474,482,365	14.43	431,466,278	United States	
CITICORP NOMINEES PTY LIMITED	6.01	102,282,340	7.79	245,757,633	5.88	205,721,464	8.45	252,524,808	United States	
BLACKROCK GROUP	6	106,300,321	6.02	177,651,034	6.34	221,964,794	6.07	172,225,527	United States	
STATE STREET CORPORATION	5	86,834,100	5.1	162,401,728	5.12	179,142,252	5.08	142,312,309	United States	
VANGUARD CORP	5	85,093,294	5	162,322,845	5	175,093,754	5.001	139,745,231	United States	
BNP PARIBAS NOMS PTY LTD <DRP>	3.14	53,441,540	2.41	76,026,057	1.95	68,407,474	2.15	64,392,488	France	
NATIONAL NOMINEES LIMITED	2.35	40,051,338	3.51	110,796,788	2.19	76,818,596	2.78	83,083,608	Australia	
AUSTRALIAN FOUNDATION INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED	0.47	7,900,000	0.35	11,154,789	0.44	15,545,00	0.28	8,487,710	Australia	
NETWEALTH INVESTMENTS LIMITED <WRAP SERVICES A/C>	0.35	6,029,534	0.42	13,267,645	0.43	15,107,536	0.46	13,875,105	Australia	
BOND STREET CUSTODIANS LIMITED	0.25	4,226,215							Australia	
AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES LIMITED ,IPS IOOF EMPLOYER SUPER A/C>	0.18	3,108,683	0.11	3,452,320	0.12	4,252,612	0.13	3,790,040	Australia	
ARGO INVESTMENTS LIMITED	0.16	2,753,731	0.19	5,934,685	0.24	8,407,648	0.28	8,265,275	Australia	
NAVIGATOR AUSTRALIA LTD <MLC INVESTMENT SETT A/C>	0.15	2,623,539	0.12	3,672,148	0.12	4,133,814	0.11	3,345,745	Australia	
MILTON CORPORATION LIMITED	0.12	1,940,470							Australia	
INVIA CUSTODIAN PTY LTD	0.11	1,920,744							Australia	
MUTUAL TRUST PTY LTD	0.11	1,858,253	0.08	2,478,175	0.11	3,821,363			Australia	
MR BARRY MARTIN LAMBERT	0.1	1,643,613							Australia	
NULIS NOMINEES (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED <NAVIGATOR MAST PLAN SETT A/C>	0.09	1,609,474	0.11	3,545,025	0.12	4,195,012	0.11	3,329,987	Australia	
MCCUSKER HOLDINGS PTY LTD	0.08	1,370,000							Australia	
CUSTODIAL SERVICES LIMITED <BENEFICIARIES HOLDING A/C>	0.07	1,109,966					0.17	5,137,333	Australia	
BNP PARIBAS NOMS (NZ) LTD <DRP>	0.07	1,145,196	0.19	5,951,486	0.1	3,533,468	0.14	4,292,644	France	
JOY WILMA LAMBERT	0.06	1,068,250							Australia	
BNP PARIBAS NOMINEES PTY LTD <AGENCY LENDING DRP A/C>			1.27	39,958,167	0.98	34,465,879	0.68	20,227,003	France	
CITICORP NOMINEES PTY LIMITED ,COLONIAL FIRST STATE INV A/C>			1.05	33,193,725	0.66	22,951,053	0.38	11,271,404	United States	
HSBC CUSTODY NOMINEES (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED <NT-COMNWLTH SUPER CORP A/C>			0.67	21,200,229	0.65	22,843,218	0.56	16,628,966	United Kingdom	
CPU SHARE PLANS PTY LTD			0.29	9,076,275					Australia	
BNP PARIBAS NOMINEES PTY LTD HUB24 CUSTODIAL SERV LTD <DRP A/C>			0.26	8,070,489	0.32	11,059,025	0.29	8,676,983	France	
BNP PARIBAS NOMINEES PTY LTD ACF CLEARSTREAM			0.15	4,638,250	0.12	4,009,101			France	
WASHINGTON H SOUL PATTINSON AND COMPANY LIMITED			0.13	4,180,441					Australia	
NATIONAL NOMINEES LIMITED <N A/C>					0.12	4,048,217			Australia	
HSBC CUSTODY NOMINEES (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED – A/C 2					0.11	3,751,233	0.12	3,595,926	United Kingdom	
ANZEST PTY LTD <DEA CONTROL A/C>							0.17	5,069,233	Australia	
NEW ZEALAND CENTRAL SECURITIES DEPOSITORY LIMITED							0.11	3,320,075	New Zealand	

Average Percentage Ownership Across the 'Big Four' Banks by Top Five Shareholders

Company Name	Commonwealth Bank of Australia	National Australia Bank	Wespac Banking Corporation	Australia and New Zealand Banking Group	Country of Origin	Average
	%	%	%	%		%
HSBC CUSTODY NOMINEES (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED	22.27	25.43	21.89	27.04	UK	24.1575
J P MORGAN NOMINEES AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED	14.24	14.75	13.55	14.43	US	14.2425
CITICORP NOMINEES PTY LIMITED	6.01	7.79	5.88	8.45	US	7.0325
BLACKROCK GROUP	6	6.02	6.34	6.07	US	6.1075
STATE STREET CORPORATION	5	5.1	5.12	5.08	US	5.075
VANGUARD CORP	5	5	5	5.001	US	5.00025

Information on the top 20 holders of ordinary shares and of all substantial shareholdings in the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2022, p. 283), National Australia Bank (2022, p. 255), Westpac Banking Corporation (2022, p. 298), and Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (2022, p. 244) have been sourced from their respective 2022 annual reports. The table displays the number of shares owned by different actors and the percentage ownership of each bank that these shares represent.

8.0 Bibliography

- Abbondanza, G. (2021). Australia the 'good international citizen'? The limits of a traditional middle power. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 75(2), 178-196.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1831436>
- Anderson, D. (2014). *Fifty Years of Australia's Trade*. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Retrieved from <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/fifty-years-of-Australias-trade.pdf>
- Andrews, R. (2001). *The New Penguin Dictionary of Modern Quotations*. Penguin Books.
- Armstrong, S. (2015). The economic impact of the Australia-US free trade agreement. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 69(5), 513-537. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1048777>
- Arrighi, G. (2007). *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century*. Verso.
- Arrighi, G. (2010). *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times* (New and updated, Ed.). Verso.
- Australia and New Zealand Banking Group. (2022). *ANZ 2022 Annual Report*.
<https://www.anz.com/content/dam/anzcom/shareholder/2022-anz-annual-report.pdf>
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2022). *Table 1. Preliminary merchandise exports, standard international trade classification (1 and 2 digit), FOB value*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-merchandise-trade-preliminary-australia/latest-release>
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2023a). *Table 2. Foreign investment in Australia: level of investment by country and country groups by type of investment and year (\$million)*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-investment-position-australia-supplementary-statistics/latest-release#data-downloads>
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2023b). *Table 3. Preliminary merchandise exports, country and country groups, FOB value*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-merchandise-trade-preliminary-australia/jun-2021#key-statistics>
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2023c). *Table 4. Preliminary merchandise imports, country and country groups, customs value*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-merchandise-trade-preliminary-australia/jun-2021#key-statistics>
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2023d). *Table 5. Australian investment abroad: level of investment by country and country groups by type of investment and year (\$million)*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-investment-position-australia-supplementary-statistics/latest-release#data-downloads>
- Bacevich, A. J. (2002). *American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*. Harvard University Press.
- Barnard, L. (1969). *Question: International Affairs*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/hansard80/hansardr80/1969-08-14/toc_pdf/19690814_reps_26_hor64.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22china%20communism%20war%22
- Beeson, M. (2003). Australia's relationship with the United States: the case for greater independence. *Australian journal of political science*, 38(3), 387-405.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1036114032000133958>
- Bell, C. (1988). *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy* (New ed.). Oxford University Press.
- Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia. *International Security*, 41(1), 7-48. <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/stable/24916870>
- Bishop, J. (2011). *Questions in Writing: Foreign Investment Rules (Question No. 329)*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from

- https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/0eab39c7-66a0-4a26-bb86-4f3c858055b8/toc_pdf/House%20of%20Representatives_2011_05_25_54_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chinese%20investment%22
- Bishop, J. (2017, 13 March). Change and uncertainty in the IndoPacific: Strategic challenges and opportunities. 28th IISS Fullerton Lecture, Singapore.
- Boer, R. (2020). Domenico Losurdo in China: An Insight into the State of Marxist Education and the CPC. *Socialism and democracy*, 34(2-3), 130-152.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/08854300.2020.1820301>
- Bolton, G. (1990). *The Oxford History of Australia: 1942-1988* (Vol. 5). Oxford University Press.
- Bush, G. W. (2003). *Address by the President of the United States of America*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/2003-10-23/toc_pdf/2964-6.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22bush%22
- Campbell, K. M. (2016). *The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia*. Twelve.
- Capling, A., Crozier, M., & Considine, M. (1998). *Australian Politics in the Global Era*. Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Limited.
- Capling, A., & Ravenhill, J. (2013). Symposium: Australia–US Economic Relations and the Regional Balance of Power - Australia, the United States and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Diverging Interests and Unintended Consequences. *Australian journal of political science*, 48(2), 184-196.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2013.786677>
- China Customs. (2022a). *Import value of Australian coal and coke in China from 2011 to 2021 (in billion U.S. dollars)*. Statista. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/1312835/china-import-value-of-coal-from-australia/>
- China Customs. (2022b). *Import value of Australian goods in China in 2021, by product category (in million U.S. dollars)*. Statista. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/1313056/china-import-of-goods-from-australia-by-product-category/>
- Churchward, L. G. (1979). *Australia & America 1788-1972: An Alternative History*. Alternative Publishing Cooperative Ltd.
- Ciobo, S. (2016). *Ministerial Statements: Annual Investment Statement*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/9b169b3b-768b-49e5-aabb-ed05f3ce0ebb/toc_pdf/House%20of%20Representatives_2016_11_23_4599_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chinese%20investment%22
- Commonwealth Bank of Australia. (2022). *2022 Annual Report: A Brighter Future for All*.
https://www.commbank.com.au/content/dam/commbank-assets/about-us/2022-08/2022-annual-report_spreads.pdf
- Cook, P. (1985). *Australia's Trade with China: Text of Ministerial Statement*. Canberra: Senate Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansards/1985-09-11/toc_pdf/S%201985-09-11.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22china%20trade%22
- Coorey, P. (2022, November 15). Xi: China-Australia ties deserve to be cherished. *Financial Review*.
<https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/xi-tells-australia-we-should-cherish-our-relationship-20221115-p5bydk>
- Cossins-Smith, A. (2023). *China lifts remaining restrictions on Australian coal*. Mining Technology. Retrieved September 11 from <https://www.mining-technology.com/news/china-lifts-australia-coal-ban/#:~:text=China%20has%20removed%20all%20remaining,been%20in%20place%20since%202020>.
- Costa, M., & Duffy, M. (1991). *Labor Prosperity and the Nineties: Beyond the Bonsai Economy*. The Federation Press.
- Cox, L., & O'Connor, B. (2012). Australia, the US, and the Vietnam and Iraq Wars: 'Hound Dog, not Lapdog'. *Australian journal of political science*, 47(2), 173-187.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2012.677004>

- Cox, R. W. (1987). *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*. Columbia University Press.
- Cox, R. W. (1993). Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. In S. Gill (Ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (pp. 49-66). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558993.003>
- Crough, G., & Wheelwright, T. (1982). *Australia: A Client State*. Penguin Books Australia Ltd.
- Crowe, D. (2019, September 23). Morrison sharpens attack on China's special 'developing nation' trading status. *Sydney Morning Herald*. <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/morrison-sharpens-attack-on-china-s-special-developing-nation-trading-status-20190923-p52u2e.html>
- Crowley, F. K. (1973a). *Modern Australian Documents: 1901-1939* (Vol. 1). Wren Publishing Pty Ltd.
- Crowley, F. K. (1973b). *Modern Australian Documents: 1939-1970* (Vol. 2). Wren Publishing Pty Ltd.
- Curran, J. (2022). *Australia's China Odyssey: From Euphoria to Fear*. NewSouth Publishing.
- Danby, M. (2017). *Adjournment: Australian Universities and China*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/69b91d74-6ef5-401f-bdb2-ec84d2faa6c9/toc_pdf/House%20of%20Representatives_2017_09_04_5434_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chinese%20investment%22
- Danby, M. (2018). *Constituency Statements: Telecommunications*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/9a883748-1cb6-426d-8d31-5a723e72abdf/toc_pdf/House%20of%20Representatives_2018_08_23_6445_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22huawei%20web%22
- Davidson, P., & Tomaras, J. (2015). *Customs Amendment (China-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation) Bill 2015 [and] Customs Tariff Amendment (China-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation) Bill 2015* (Bills Digest, Issue. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/billsdgs/4129643/upload_binary/4129643.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chinese%20investment%22
- Day, D. (1989). *The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia & the Onset of the Pacific War 1939-42*. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Department of Defence. (2013). *Defence White Paper 2013*. Canberra: Department of Defence Retrieved from https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/WP_2013_web.pdf
- Department of Defence. (2016). *2016 Defence White Paper*. Canberra: Department of Defence Retrieved from <https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>
- Department of Defence. (2020). *Defence Strategic Update*. Canberra: Department of Defence Retrieved from <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update>
- Department of Defence. (2023a, March 22). *Australia welcomes United States Marines back to Darwin* <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-03-22/australia-welcomes-united-states-marines-back-darwin>
- Department of Defence. (2023b). *National Defence: Defence Strategic Review*. Canberra: Department of Defence Retrieved from <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review>
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2017). *Foreign Policy White Paper*. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Retrieved from <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf>
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2023). *Statistics on who invests in Australia*. Australian Government. Retrieved August 22 from <https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/trade-and-investment-data-information-and-publications/foreign-investment-statistics/statistics-on-who-invests-in-australia>
- Doyle, R. J. (2022). *The Tragedy of Australian Foreign Policy: Voices of Dissent and Visions of Independence in the Twenty-First Century*. Lexington Books.
- Drisko, J., & Maschi, T. (2015). *Content Analysis*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190215491.001.0001>
- Drummond, & World Bank. (2023, August 3). *Share of total global economic activity of selected countries and regions across the world as of 2022 [Graph]*. Statista. Retrieved August 24 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/1403678/share-of-world-gdp-by-country/>

- Dunn, M. (1984). *Australia and the Empire: From 1788 to the Present*. Fontana Books.
- Evatt, H. V. (1942). *International Affairs: Review of the War Situation*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/hansard80/hansardr80/1942-02-25/toc_pdf/19420225_reps_16_170.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22japan%22
- Fernandes, C. (2018). *Island Off the Coast of Asia: Instruments of Statecraft in Australian Foreign Policy*. Monash University Publishing.
- Fernandes, C. (2019). *Worried about agents of foreign influence? Just look at who owns Australia's biggest companies*. UNSW Newsroom. Retrieved April 10 from <https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/business-law/worried-about-agents-foreign-influence-just-look-who-owns-australias-biggest>
- Fernandes, C. (2022). *Sub-Imperial Power: Australia in the International Arena*. Melbourne University Press.
- Fernandes, C. (2023). Illusory Imperatives: AUKUS commits us to futile wars; an independent defence is possible. *ARENA Quarterly*, (14), 20-25.
- Fierravanti-Wells, C. (2020a). *Adjournment: China*. Canberra: Senate Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansards/87757ba2-f73a-4683-8e60-ef3796cebef0/toc_pdf/Senate_2020_06_10_7759_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22belt%20and%20road%22
- Fierravanti-Wells, C. (2020b). *Adjournment: COVID-19: China*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansards/e82a8a20-f72d-41d5-90fb-806930fffbba/toc_pdf/Senate_2020_05_12_7702_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22belt%20and%20road%22
- Fitzgibbon, J. (2016). *Bills: Register of Foreign Ownership of Agricultural Land Amendment (Water) Bill 2016 - Second Reading*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/a2ba36f1-ee24-4aec-9f8e-b647c7fc92ce/toc_pdf/House%20of%20Representatives_2016_11_07_4566_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chinese%20investment%22
- Fitzsimmons, D. R. (2023). *Australia's Relations with China: The Illusion of Choice, 1972-2022*. Routledge.
- Foreign Investment Review Board. (2020). *Annual Report 2018-19*. Canberra: Foreign Investment Review Board Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/publications/tailedpapers/2e36c337-b259-437a-a5b7-32b5869135a1/upload_pdf/2018-19%20FIRB%20Annual%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chinese%20investment%22
- Fraenkel, J., & Smith, G. (2022). The Solomons-China 2022 Security Deal: Extraterritoriality and the Perils of Militarisation in the Pacific Islands. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 76(5), 473-485. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2085243>
- Fraser, M., & Roberts, C. (2014). *Dangerous Allies*. Melbourne University Press.
- Garnaut, R. (2002). An Australia-United States free trade agreement. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 56(1), 123-141. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710220120874>
- Gernet, J. (1996). *A History of Chinese Civilization* (Second ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Gilpin, R. (1975). *Power and the Multinational Corporation*. Basic Books.
- Government of Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources. (2008). *Annual Report 07-08*. Perth: Government of Western Australia Department of Industry and Resources Retrieved from http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Documents/About-Us-Careers/AnnualReport_2007-2008.pdf
- Gramsci, A. (2003). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Lawrence & Wishart.
- Grant, B. (1972). *The Crisis of Loyalty*. Angus & Robertson.
- Grey, P. (1993). *Estimates Committee A: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Program 1--International relations, trade and business liaison, Subprogram 1.1--Interests in North Asia*. Canberra: Committee Official Hansard Retrieved from <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=china%20gatt%20Date%3A30%2F08%2F1993%20%3E%3E%2001%2F09%2F1993%20Dataset%3AbroadcastReps.members,practcer,webhothr,ordersr,weblastweek,hansardr,hansar>

dr80.hansardrIndex.noticer.webthisweek.dailyvotes.voteshistorical.journals.journalshistorical.or.derofbusiness.hansards.hansards80.hansardsIndex.notices.sds.senators.practces.orderss.websenguide.procbull.broadcastSen.reportjnt.reportsen.reportrep.estimate.comSen.comJoint.comRep.broadcastComm.broadcastCommReps.broadcastCommJnt.broadcastCommSen;rec=0;resCount=Default

- Harvey, D. (2003). *The New Imperialism* (Hardcover ed.). Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2007). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2014). *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Hay, J. (1968). Commercial Rights in China ("Open Door" Policy): Declarations by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and Russia accepting the United States proposal for "open door" policy in China, September 6, 1899-March 20, 1900. In C. I. Bevans (Ed.), *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949* (Vol. 1, pp. 278-295). Library of Congress.
- He, B. (2021). Taming Chinese Power: Decoding the Dynamics of Australian Foreign Policies Toward the Rise of China. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 75(6), 650-664.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2021.1992143>
- Hendy, P. (2014). *Adjournment Foreign Policy Speech*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/b7c3903c-728e-40bc-91f4-728ffe55978d/0174/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf
- Hewes, S., & Hundt, D. (2022). The Battle of the Coral Sea: Australia's Response to the Belt & Road Initiative in the Pacific. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 76(2), 178-193.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2037510>
- Hobson, J. A. (1938). *Imperialism: A Study* (Third entirely revised and reset, ed.). George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Howard, J. (2001). *ANZUS Treaty; Ansett* <https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-12308>
- Hu, J. (2003). *Address by the President of the People's Republic of China*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/2003-10-24/toc_pdf/2966-4.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22jintao%22
- Hurst, D. (2022, 25 October). Almost half of Australians support sending military to help defend Taiwan, poll suggests. *Guardian Australia*. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/oct/25/almost-half-of-australians-support-sending-military-to-help-defend-taiwan-poll-suggests>
- Hurst, D. (2023, 17 February). Former Australian PM Scott Morrison likens west's 'appeasement' of China to Munich agreement with Hitler. *The Guardian Australia*. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/feb/16/former-australian-pm-scott-morrison-accuses-west-of-appeasing-china>
- International Monetary Fund. (2023a, April 7 2023). *The 20 countries with the largest gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022 (in billion U.S. dollars) [Graph]*. Statista. Retrieved August 24 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/268173/countries-with-the-largest-gross-domestic-product-gdp/>
- International Monetary Fund. (2023b, April 7 2023). *Gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices in China from 1985 to 2022 with forecasts until 2028 (in billion U.S. dollars) [Graph]*. Statista. Retrieved August 24 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/263770/gross-domestic-product-gdp-of-china/>
- Karp, P. (2021, 27 April). Home affairs secretary Mike Pezzullo urged to 'tone it down' after 'drums of war' speech. *The Guardian Australia*. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/apr/27/home-affairs-secretary-mike-pezzullo-says-australia-cant-avoid-drums-of-war-at-cost-to-liberty>
- Kearsley, J. (2020, November 18). China shows official list of reasons for anger with Australia. *Nine News*. <https://www.9news.com.au/national/china-australia-tensions-beijing-government-grievance-list-with-canberra/adc10554-e4e9-4a19-970e-81949501a1ad>
- Kelly, P. (1992). *The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s*. Allen & Unwin.

- Kirchner, S. (2012). Foreign Direct Investment in Australia Following the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement. *Australian Economic Review*, 45(4), 410-421. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8462.2012.00686.x>
- Knott, M. (2022, October 31). US to deploy B-52 bombers to Australia to create ‘unified front’ against China. *Sydney Morning Herald*. <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/us-to-deploy-b-52-bombers-to-australia-to-create-unified-front-against-china-20221031-p5buc7.html>
- Koslowski, M. (2019, August 13). PM disputes Chinese claim that HK protests showing 'signs of terrorism'. *Sydney Morning Herald*. <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/more-flash-mob-protests-expected-dfat-warns-in-hong-kong-travel-advice-20190813-p52ghn.html>
- Kurt, S., Tüysüzoğlu, G., & Özgen, C. (2023). The weakening hegemon's quest for an alliance in the Indo-Pacific: AUKUS. *Journal of Indian Ocean region, ahead-of-print*(ahead-of-print), 1-20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2023.2170512>
- Lea, T., & Rollo, S. (2016). A Servant is Not Greater Than His Master: American Primacy in Australian Security. In M. Chambers (Ed.), *Hearts and Minds: US Cultural Management in 21st Century Foreign Relations* (pp. 17-42). Peter Lang Edition.
- Lenin, V. I. (1934). *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Co-Operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R.
- Leoni, Z. (2021). *American Grand Strategy from Obama to Trump: Imperialism after Bush and China's Hegemonic Challenge*. Springer International Publishing AG. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54742-4>
- Lim, D., & Attrill, N. (2021). Australian Debate of the China Question: The COVID-19 Case. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 75(4), 410-431.
- Lowndes, V., Marsh, D., & Stoker, G. (2018). *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (4th ed.). Palgrave.
- Lyons, J. (2022, 15 August). Will Australia support the US in a war between Taiwan and China? Ask the military chiefs, not our political leaders. *ABC News*. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-15/will-australia-join-the-us-in-a-war-between-taiwan-and-china-/101328658>
- M. Ripsman, N. (2022). Chapter 5: Historical methods. In *Handbook of Research Methods in International Relations* (pp. 74-88). Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839101014.00014>
- MacDonald, I. (2016). *Matters of Public Importance: Donations to Political Parties*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansards/7bf9040b-3855-4d2d-840b-2e051635f1c8/toc_pdf/Senate_2016_09_13_4435_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chinese%20investment%22
- Macintyre, S. (1986). *The Oxford History of Australia: 1901-1942* (Vol. 4). Oxford University Press.
- Mandel, E. (1970). *Europe vs. America: Contradictions of Imperialism*. Monthly Review Press.
- Mao, Z. (1966). *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* (L. Piao, Ed. Second ed.). Foreign Languages Press.
- Marshall, G. C. (1951). *A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea*. Washington D.C.: National Security Council Retrieved from <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/courses-action-relative-communist-china-and-korea-national-security-council?documentid=NA&pagenumber=3>
- McCoy, A. W. (2017). *In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power*. Newworld Publications.
- McDonagh, N. (2022). China’s Socialist Market Economy and Systemic Rivalry in the Multilateral Trade Order. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 76(6), 712-733. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2107170>
- McKim, N. (2020). *Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee: Reference*. Canberra: Senate Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansards/87757ba2-f73a-4683-8e60-ef3796cebef0/toc_pdf/Senate_2020_06_10_7759_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22belt%20and%20road%22
- McNabb, D. E. (2021). *Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Method Approaches* (Third Edition. ed.). Routledge.

- Medcalf, R. (2019). Australia And China: understanding the reality check. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 73(2), 109-118. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2018.1538315>
- Miller, C. (2022). Explaining China's strategy of Implicit Economic Coercion. *Best Left Unsaid? Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 76(5), 507-521. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2061418>
- Moore, N., Salter, A., Stanley, L., & Tamboukou, M. (2017). *The Archive Project: Archival Research in the Social Sciences*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315612577>
- National Australia Bank. (2022). *Annual Report 2022*. <https://www.nab.com.au/content/dam/nab/documents/reports/corporate/2022-annual-report.pdf>
- National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2022a). *Annual inflow of foreign direct investments from Australia to China between 2011 and 2021 (in million U.S. dollars)*. Statista. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/1312590/china-inward-foreign-direct-investment-fdi-flows-from-australia/>
- National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2022b, November 7 2022). *Countries and regions with the highest capital stock of direct investments from China in 2021 (in billion U.S. dollars) [Graph]*. Statista. Retrieved August 24 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/278087/countries-with-the-highest-capital-stock-in-chinese-direct-investments/>
- National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2022c, November 7 2022). *Countries and regions with the highest inflow of Chinese direct investments in 2021 (in billion U.S. dollars) [Graph]*. Statista. Retrieved August 24 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/278079/countries-with-the-highest-cash-flow-from-chinese-direct-investments/>
- National Bureau of Statistics of China, MOFCOM China, & State Administration of Foreign Exchange. (2022). *Annual flow of foreign direct investments from China to Australia between 2011 and 2021 (in billion U.S. dollars)*. Statista. Retrieved September 1 from <https://www-statista-com.ezproxy.library.sydney.edu.au/statistics/720733/china-outward-fdi-flows-to-australia/>
- National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, & Ministry of Commerce. (2015). *Full text: Action plan on the Belt and Road Initiative*. The State Council of the People's Republic of China. Retrieved September 7 from http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm
- National Security Council. (1970). *National Security Study Memorandum 106: China Policy*. Washington D.C.: National Security Council Retrieved from https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_106.pdf
- O'Sullivan, N. (1950). *Question: Dollar Deficits*. Canberra: Senate Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/hansard80/hansards80/1950-06-07/toc_pdf/19500607_senate_19_208.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22american%20investment%22
- O'Connor, B., Cox, L., & Cooper, D. (2023). Australia's AUKUS 'bet' on the United States: nuclear-powered submarines and the future of American democracy. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 77(1), 45-64. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2163977>
- Obama, B. (2011, November 17). *Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament*. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved 21 August from <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>
- Obama, B., & Gillard, J. (2011). *Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard of Australia in Joint Press Conference*. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved 21 August from <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/16/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-gillard-australia-joint-press>
- Osborne, F. (1950). *International Affairs*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/hansard80/hansardr80/1950-03-22/toc_pdf/19500322_reps_19_206.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22asia%20trade%22

- Pan, C., & Hagström, L. (2021). Ontological (In)Security and Neoliberal Governmentality: Explaining Australia's China Emergency. *The Australian journal of politics and history*, 67(3-4), 454-473. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12785>
- Pan, G., & Korolev, A. (2021). The Struggle for Certainty: Ontological Security, the Rise of Nationalism, and Australia-China Tensions after COVID-19. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 26(1), 115-138. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-020-09710-7>
- Paul, E. (2014). *Australia as US Client State: The Geopolitics of De-Democratisation and Insecurity* (First ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137469359>
- Paul, E. (2018). *Australia in the US Empire: A Study in Political Realism*. Palgrave Macmillan US.
- Paul, E. (2021). *Australian Imperialism: The Geopolitical State*. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1916-8>
- Perrett, G. (2023). *Statements by Members: Foreign Affairs*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/26696/toc_pdf/House%20of%20Representatives_2023_05_23_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22ALP%20communist%22
- Raby, G. (2010). 'Australia and China: An Iron Ore Partnership for the Future' Ambassador Dr Geoff Raby Speech at 10th China International Steel & Raw Materials Conference 2010. Beijing: Australian Embassy China Retrieved from https://china.embassy.gov.au/files/bjng/100927_Ambassador%20Speech%20at%20Iron%20Ore%20Conference_Final.pdf
- Ranald, P. (2011). The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Contradictions in Australia and in the Asia Pacific Region. *The economic and labour relations review: ELRR*, 22(1), 81-98. <https://doi.org/10.1177/103530461102200105>
- Ravenhill, J. (2013). Symposium: Australia-US Economic Relations and the Regional Balance of Power: Introduction. *Australian journal of political science*, 48(2), 179-183. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2013.787959>
- Reilly, J., & Yuan, J. D. (2012). *Australia and China at 40*. NewSouth.
- Rimmer, S. H. (2016). Australia's trade diplomacy and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 'you've got to row your own boat'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 70(6), 625-640. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1220492>
- Roggeveen, S. (2023). *The Echidna Strategy: Australia's Search for Power and Peace*. La Trobe University Press, in conjunction with Black Inc.
- Rollo, S. (2020). The 'Asia threat' in the US–Australia Relationship: Then and Now. *International relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 20(2), 225-252. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcy023>
- Rudd, K. (2022). *The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US and Xi Jinping's China*. Hachette Australia.
- Rudd urges China inclusion in TPP talks. (2013, August 29). *The Australian*. <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/rudd-urges-china-inclusion-in-tpp-talks/news-story/766f0194028c9243ad5b695a8af19888>
- Sandars, C. (2000). *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire*. Oxford University Press.
- Search results: "American investment". (2023). Parliament of Australia. Retrieved 27 September from <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=%22American%20investment%22%20Date%3A01%2F01%2F2011%20%3E%3E%2030%2F06%2F2023%20Dataset%3AbroadcastReps,members,practcer,webhothr,ordersr,weblastweek,hansardr,hansardr80,hansardrIndex,noticer,webthisweek,dailyp,votes,voteshistorical,journals,journalshistorical,orderofbusiness,hansards,hansards80,hansardsIndex,notices,sds,senators,practces,orderss,websenguide,procbull,broadcastSen,reportjnt,reportsen,reportrep,estimate,comSen,comJoint,comRep,broadcastComm,broadcastCommReps,broadcastCommJnt,broadcastCommSen;resCount=Default>
- Search results: "Chinese investment". (2023). Parliament of Australia. Retrieved 27 September from <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=%22Chinese%20investment%22%20Date%3A01%2F01%2F2011%20%3E%3E%2030%2F06%2F2023%20Dataset%3AbroadcastReps,members,practcer,webhothr,ordersr,weblastweek,hansardr,hansardr80,hansardrIndex,noticer,webthisweek,dailyp,votes,voteshistorical,jour>

[nals,journalshistorical,orderofbusiness,hansards,hansards80,hansardsIndex,notices,sds,senators,practces,orderss,websenguide,procbull,broadcastSen,reportjnt,reportsen,reportrep,estimate,comSen,comJoint,comRep,broadcastComm,broadcastCommReps,broadcastCommJnt,broadcastCommSen;resCount=Default](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=%22investment%20from%20America%22%20Date%3A01%2F01%2F2011%20%3E%3E%2030%2F06%2F2023%20Dataset%3AbroadcastReps,members,practcer,webhothr,ordersr,weblastweek,hansardr,hansardr80,hansardrIndex,noticer,webthisweek,dailyp,votes,voteshistorical,journals,journalshistorical,orderofbusiness,hansards,hansards80,hansardsIndex,notices,sds,senators,practces,orderss,websenguide,procbull,broadcastSen,reportjnt,reportsen,reportrep,estimate,comSen,comJoint,comRep,broadcastComm,broadcastCommReps,broadcastCommJnt,broadcastCommSen;resCount=Default)

Search results: "investment from America". (2023). Parliament of Australia. Retrieved September 27 from

<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=%22investment%20from%20America%22%20Date%3A01%2F01%2F2011%20%3E%3E%2030%2F06%2F2023%20Dataset%3AbroadcastReps,members,practcer,webhothr,ordersr,weblastweek,hansardr,hansardr80,hansardrIndex,noticer,webthisweek,dailyp,votes,voteshistorical,journals,journalshistorical,orderofbusiness,hansards,hansards80,hansardsIndex,notices,sds,senators,practces,orderss,websenguide,procbull,broadcastSen,reportjnt,reportsen,reportrep,estimate,comSen,comJoint,comRep,broadcastComm,broadcastCommReps,broadcastCommJnt,broadcastCommSen;resCount=Default>

Search results: "investment from the United States". (2023). Parliament of Australia. Retrieved October 17 from

<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=%22investment%20from%20the%20united%20states%22%20Date%3A01%2F01%2F2011%20%3E%3E%2030%2F06%2F2023%20Dataset%3AbroadcastReps,members,practcer,webhothr,ordersr,weblastweek,hansardr,hansardr80,hansardrIndex,noticer,webthisweek,dailyp,votes,voteshistorical,journals,journalshistorical,orderofbusiness,hansards,hansards80,hansardsIndex,notices,sds,senators,practces,orderss,websenguide,procbull,broadcastSen,reportjnt,reportsen,reportrep,estimate,comSen,comJoint,comRep,broadcastComm,broadcastCommReps,broadcastCommJnt,broadcastCommSen;resCount=Default>

Search results: "investment from the US". (2023). Parliament of Australia. Retrieved September 27 from <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=%22investment%20from%20the%20US%22%20Date%3A01%2F01%2F2011%20%3E%3E%2030%2F06%2F2023%20Dataset%3AbroadcastReps,members,practcer,webhothr,ordersr,weblastweek,hansardr,hansardr80,hansardrIndex,noticer,webthisweek,dailyp,votes,voteshistorical,journals,journalshistorical,orderofbusiness,hansards,hansards80,hansardsIndex,notices,sds,senators,practces,orderss,websenguide,procbull,broadcastSen,reportjnt,reportsen,reportrep,estimate,comSen,comJoint,comRep,broadcastComm,broadcastCommReps,broadcastCommJnt,broadcastCommSen;resCount=Default>

Sharma, T. R. (1985). The Marxist Method. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 46(3), 272-286. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855178>

Skidmore, Z. (2022). *Will China continue its ban of Australian coal?* Mining Technology. Retrieved September 11 from <https://www.mining-technology.com/features/australian-coal-china-ban/?cf-view>

Slezak, M., & Bogle, A. (2018, 23 August). Huawei banned from 5G mobile infrastructure rollout in Australia. *ABC News*. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/huawei-banned-from-providing-5g-mobile-technology-australia/10155438>

Spence, J. D. (1990). *The Search for Modern China*. W. W. Norton & Company.

Thomas, N. (2004). *Re-orienting Australia-China Relations: 1972 to the Present*. Ashgate Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315244501>

The "Times" on the Chinese Question in New South Wales. (1881, August 15). *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 7. <https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/13492500?searchTerm=%22Chinese%20immigrant%22>

Turnbull, M. (2017, 6 June). *Press Conference with Mr Michael Phelan APM, Acting Commissioner, Australian Federal Police Parliament House, Canberra* SUBJECTS: Melbourne shooting, London terrorism, Foreign political donations, Espionage, The Finkel Report, Schools, NDIS. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/5320796/upload_binary/5320796.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22turnbull%20china%22

U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). *Military and Security Development Involving the People's Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress*. <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/>

[1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF](#)

- Ungerer, C. (2007). The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy. *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 53(4), 538-551. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00473>.
- Uren, D. (2021, June 23). *What if ...? Economic consequences for Australia of a US–China conflict over Taiwan*. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Retrieved August 31 from <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-if-economic-consequences-for-australia-of-a-us-china-conflict-over-taiwan/>
- van Nieuwenhuizen, S. (2019). Australian and People's Republic of China government conceptions of the international order. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 73(2), 181-197. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1568386>
- Wallerstein, I. (1980). *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1750*. Academic Press, Inc.
- Ward, R., & Robertson, J. (1986). *Such Was Life: Select Documents in Australian Social History, 1914-1983* (Vol. 3). Alternative Publishing Cooperative Limited.
- Weatherall, K. (2015). The Australia-US free trade agreement's impact on Australia's copyright trade policy. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 69(5), 538-558. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1048778>
- Westpac Banking Corporation. (2022). *2022 Annual Report: Westpac Backed*. https://www.westpac.com.au/content/dam/public/wbc/documents/pdf/aw/ic/WBC_FY22AR_INT_ERACTIVE.pdf
- White, H. (2013). *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power*. Oxford University Press.
- White, H. (2019). *How to Defend Australia*. La Trobe University Press, in conjunction with Black Inc.
- Wilkins, T. (2017). Australia and middle power approaches to Asia Pacific regionalism. *Australian journal of political science*, 52(1), 110-125. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2016.1238870>
- Williams, R. D. (2020). International law with Chinese characteristics: Beijing and the “rules-based” global order. *Global China Project*. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201012_international_law_china_williams.pdf
- Williams, W. A. (1972). *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New ed.). W. W. Norton & Company.
- Wilson, T. (2017). *Private Members' Business: Australia-US Relations*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/8f5fce8e-c3b9-4c68-a24f-6a6b51d0b7f9/toc_pdf/House%20of%20Representatives_2017_03_20_4846_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22investment%20from%20the%20united%20states%22
- Wirth, C. (2019). Whose 'Freedom of Navigation'? Australia, China, the United States and the making of order in the 'Indo-Pacific'. *Pacific review*, 32(4), 475-504. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1515788>
- Xi, J. (2014a). *Address by the President of the People's Republic of China*. Canberra: House of Representatives Official Hansard Retrieved from https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/35c9c2cf-9347-4a82-be89-20df5f76529b/toc_pdf/House%20of%20Representatives_2014_11_17_3032_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chamber/hansardr/35c9c2cf-9347-4a82-be89-20df5f76529b/0005%22
- Xi, J. (2014b). *The Governance of China* (Vol. 1). Foreign Languages Press.
- Xi, J. (2017). *The Governance of China* (Vol. 2). Foreign Languages Press.
- Xi, J. (2020). *The Governance of China* (Vol. 3). Foreign Languages Press.
- Xi, J. (2022). *The Governance of China* (Vol. 4). Foreign Languages Press.
- Xue, Y. (2023). Balancing against China with Confidence: Australia's Foreign Policy toward China in 2020–22. *Asia policy*, 30(1), 115-141. <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0010>
- Yang, J. (2022). *Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson: The Speech of Secretary Blinken Is to Spread Disinformation, Play up the So-called “China Threat”, Interfere in China’s Internal Affairs* http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zmgx/zxxx/202205/t20220527_10693847.htm
- Zhang, E., & Dai, X. (2018). Supply-side structural reform and the transformational development of China’s foreign trade. *China Political Economy*, 1(1), 120-129. <https://doi.org/10.1108/CPE-09-2018-002>

- Zhao, M. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and China–US strategic competition. *China International Strategy Review*, 3(2), 248-260. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-021-00087-7>
- Zhu, Z. (2007). Review: China's "Peaceful Rise" in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions [China's "Peaceful Rise" in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions, Sujian Guo]. *The China Journal*(58), 228-230. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20066356>