

THE UNIVERSITY OF  
**SYDNEY**

**State-Civil Society Relationships in the  
Implementation of UNSCR 2242**

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A thesis submitted to fulfil requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy

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December 2022

## Statement of originality

*This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work.*

*This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.*

*I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.*

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Doris Asante

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# Abstract

This thesis examines the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242 in Nigeria, the United Kingdom (UK), and Spain, and explores the relationship between the state and CSOs during the process. It builds on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) scholarships and contributes original insights into the activities, methods, and tensions that inform the relationships between state and CSOs during efforts to implement WPS resolutions at the domestic level. It does so by conceptualising the WPS Agenda as a series of international norms reproduced as domestic policies, which must align with existing domestic policies, including, in the case of resolution 2242, measures to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The thesis applies Matland's (1995) policy framework Ambiguity Conflict Model (ACM) to explore the levels of ambiguity and conflict that shape the state's engagement with CSOs in activities to implement UNSCR 2242 in the three case study countries. The thesis shows that accounting for the levels of ambiguity and conflict provides some insights into the use of coercive and bargaining measures to encourage compliance from CSOs during activities to implement UNSCR 2242, early intervention measures, and community programs in the Nigerian and UK contexts. It also highlights the use of problem-resolution measures to promote collaboration between CSOs and state governments to implement the UNSCR 2242 as community programs and measures in Spain. However, the model does not provide insights into how the state maintains power and influence over the overall policy implementation process and the outcome. To address this, the thesis accounts for control to gain an in-depth understanding of the relationship between the state and CSOs, the methods adopted, the factors that shape decisions around the initiatives deemed appropriate, and how the state addresses tensions to ensure that it achieves its desired implementation outcome. The thesis begins by introducing the origins of the WPS Agenda, the integration of terrorism and violent extremism with the adoption of UNSCR 2242, and analyses CSOs' role as key implementing agents in the domestic context. It introduces WPS as a policy framework, deploys qualitative methods, and applies Matland's (1995) ACM in the analysis of interviews and surveys conducted with state and civil society actors in Nigeria, the UK, and Spain to understand the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in these contexts. Ultimately, the thesis reveals that despite the high level of

conflict that informs WPS implementation in states like Nigeria, low control measures are sufficient to achieve compliance, and in countries where the state aims to minimise conflict, the government utilises low control initiatives. However, in countries with high conflict and high ambiguity, such as the UK, high control measures are adopted by the state to maintain control and power over the outcome of policy implementation. The thesis argues that there is a need to account for the levels of ambiguity, conflict, and control in the relationship between state actors and CSOs to obtain an in-depth understanding of the implementation of WPS resolutions in specific domestic contexts.

## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CT/CVE	Counter-Terrorism/Counter Violent Extremism
NAP	National Action Plan
NG	Nigeria
SC	Security Council
SP	Spain
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WPS	Women Peace and Security

## Acknowledgements

I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to the people, who participated in my research. I am grateful to the civil society organisations and the government representatives in Nigeria, the UK, and Spain, who generously gave their time, shared their knowledge, experiences, and expertise – and for supporting me to navigate the complexities of WPS implementation. I am incredibly blessed to have an amazing supervisory team – Laura J. Shepherd and Megan Mackenzie- thank you for the mentoring, guidance, and care throughout this journey. My profound gratitude to Laura J. Shepherd, for her unwavering support, words of encouragement, thoughtful feedback, generosity, for always providing new opportunities and challenging me along this journey. I am grateful to Megan Mackenzie, for always providing generous and thoughtful feedback, for the support, and for her unwavering commitment to this project. Thank you both for being a constant source of inspiration. I am a better researcher because of their guidance.

I am fortunate to have been surrounded by the incredible and generous faculty members of the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, whose ideas, suggestions of literature, employment opportunities, mentoring, and feedback, contributed to my ability to complete this thesis. In particular, I am thankful to Allan McConnell, Caitlin Hamilton, Nicole Wegner, Sarah Cameron, and my fellow PhD cohort for their support in navigating this journey. I am also grateful to my friends Alba Boer Cueva, Caitlin Biddolph, Christina Rama, and Emma Kakami for always listening, providing support, and in particular Lenka Olejníková for her unwavering encouragement.

Further, I want to thank my family, who without their support and guidance through my educational pursuits, I would not have been able to undertake my PhD. I am incredibly grateful to my sisters, and brother for always listening and providing words of encouragement, and to my uncle Afico for his unwavering support and generosity. I am especially grateful to my mother and grandmother, whose prayers, grace, perseverance, and words of encouragement, were a constant source of inspiration. Finally, I am so grateful to Jonathan Asante, for encouraging me to take this journey and for listening to the highs and lows.

## Associated Publications

Sections of this thesis were previously published by the author in the following outlets:

Asante, D. (2022) 'Civil society and counter-terrorism governance: implementing the WPS Agenda in Nigeria', *Global Society*, DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2022.2123306

Rothermel, A., and Asante, D. (2022) 'From victims to activists: women's engagement and participation in P/CVE', *Australian Outlook*,

<https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/from-victims-to-activists-womens-engagement-and-participation-in-p-cve/>

# Chapter One: Introduction

Women are both victims and agents in conflict. As conflict disrupts daily life and minimises access to essentials, it affects women's capacity to meet their daily and safety needs (Martinez 2002: 16), and it increases women's caring responsibilities, as it requires them to develop new strategies to access health services and provide for their families. For instance, in situations of high food insecurity due to conflict, women have historically prioritised the needs of their children and husbands, who are the 'workers', by limiting their intake of available resources (Manchanda 2005: 4738). Further, as existing legal systems cease to function effectively during conflict, women are at greater risk of exploitation and physical and conflict-related sexual violence (Manchanda 2005: 4738; Swaine 2018: 68). Likewise, women continue to experience significant vulnerabilities post-conflict. Although women, like other groups in society, may reside in refugee and humanitarian camps due to displacement during the conflict, women are likely to experience exploitation within these settings. For example, in post-conflict Liberia, humanitarian workers exploited women living in refugee camps by physically and sexually abusing women in exchange for necessities such as food (Swaine 2018: 124). Additionally, women are also agents in conflict. During conflict, women often engage in support roles as fundraisers and recruiters (Henshaw 2016: 213). Many women, such as those involved with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, engaged in combatant roles by perpetrating violence to gain respect and authority within their organisation (Gonzalez-Perez 2008: 62). Although some women are initially coerced to participate in the conflict, some willingly contribute to violent activities perpetrated by their organisations due to the belief that participation will provide them with physical, social, and food security (Bigio and Vogelstein 2019: 13). Women engage in combat roles when there are limited men to occupy these roles and for the same reasons as men; revenge, economic incentives, and leadership positions (Henshaw 2017: 11).

Although they are agents in conflict, women are often excluded from, or given tokenistic roles within, peace processes. As a significant number of post-conflict peace-building processes do not integrate gender perspectives within adopted measures, the unique impact

that conflict has on women and their participation in the peace process becomes an afterthought as opposed to a primary concern (Manchanda 2005: 4744). When women participate in peace processes, this often occurs in informal local settings and as a result of campaigns led by women's organisations (Jama 2010: 13). For instance, Somali women elders utilised their positions and authority within local communities to promote peace and acted as mediators to bring an end to conflict during the 1980 Siyad Barre regime (Jama 2010: 13). However, in informal peace processes, women are either excluded, given tokenistic roles, or denied access to roles that give them decision-making powers. For example, in 31 major global peace processes which occurred between 1992 and 2011, women represented 4% of signatories and less than 10% of peace actors (UN Women 2012: 4). Some scholars argue that the patriarchal nature of societies contributes to the exclusion of women from peace processes, with this influencing perception of women as victims as opposed to actors with agency (Karam 2000: 19). A notable example is the Congolese government's justification for excluding women within its peace process as necessary since "war and peace are exclusively the business of men" (Mpoumou 2004: 122). Women's limited participation in combatant roles during the conflict, limited legal authority prior to the conflict, and their lack of access to funding to participate in meetings were also reported as justification to deny them their right to peace-building (Mpoumou 2004: 123).). These restrictions occurred, although the inclusion of women as key actors within peace processes increases the likelihood of conflict ending within five years by 25% and contributes to a nation's ability to achieve sustainable peace (Stone 2014: 28).

In response to the disproportionate impact of conflict-related violence on women and their exclusion from peace processes, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1325 in 2000. UNSCR 1325 and nine subsequent resolutions collectively form the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. Resolution 1325, as the Agenda-setting resolution, 'stresses the importance of [women's] equal participation and full involvement in... the maintenance and promotion of peace and security' (UNSC 2000: 1) and performs three main functions. The Resolution affirms that the WPS Agenda is under the UN Security Council's authority, and it acts as an international policy framework that requires states to both prioritise women's safety and ensure their equal and full participation in all levels of security governance (Shepherd 2019: 102). As the WPS Agenda addresses "both the issues that women face in conflict and post-conflict situations and the gendered dynamics of peace

and security" (Shepherd 2019: 99), four main pillars inform the Agenda; *protection, participation, prevention, relief, and recovery*. The first of the four pillars, reinforced in five resolutions (UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888, UNSCR 1960, UNSCR 2106, and UNSCR 2467), stresses women's right to *protection* from rape and other forms of sexual violence (Shepherd 2019: 102). Dönges and Kullenber (2019: 163) argues that for these *protection* resolutions to be effective in practice, the Agenda needs to emphasise the type of protection and services required of states to meet women's safety needs. The *participation* resolutions (UNSCR 1889, UNSCR 2122, and UNSCR 2493) recognise women's right to equal participation and full involvement in peace promotion and conflict prevention (Paffenholz 2019: 149). As the Agenda links women's participation to peaceful outcomes, Paffenholz (2019: 152) emphasises that women's meaningful inclusion within peace processes should not be exclusive to representation but should involve equal and meaningful participation in decision-making if states are to fulfill recommendations proposed by the pillar.

The third pillar, *prevention*, which is evident across all WPS resolutions, encourages member states to prevent conflict, acknowledges women's agency to participate in conflict prevention, and through UNSCR 2242 promotes women's role in the prevention of 'emerging' security threats such as terrorism and violent extremism (Shepherd 2019: 105). The *prevention* of conflict requires member states to implement short-term measures, including women as central actors in monitoring and preparing for the onset of violence (Kapur and Rees 2019: 137). This pillar also encourages long-term structural prevention measures to address underlying social and political factors, such as gendered structural violence, which encourages conflict (Kapur and Rees 2019: 137). The final pillar, *relief, and recovery*, is evident across many resolutions. This pillar encourages states to integrate gender perspectives within measures to achieve economic recovery post-conflict, adopt gendered measures when supporting survivors of sexual and gender-based violence and implement initiatives that promote women's political empowerment (True and Hewitt 2019: 178). UNSCR 1888, UNSCR 1889, UNSCR 2467, and more specifically, the UN Secretary-General's Seven-Point Action plan on gender and peace-building and the UN Strategic Results Framework articulate the significance of this pillar. These policies and documents emphasise that states should address women-specific recovery needs and recognise their capacity as relief agents (True and Hewitt 2019: 178). Although each pillar addresses a fundamental component of WPS, they intersect at *participation*. For instance, O'Reilly (2019: 202) argues that women's equal

and meaningful involvement within peace processes significantly influences the prevention of violence and the development of measures that protect women's security needs and recognizes their agency as relief and recovery actors.

This is the context of the study presented here. In this introductory chapter, I discuss the aim, central argument, and the structure of the thesis. I first discuss the adoption of UNSCR 2242, the values and principles that underpin the resolution, its limitations, and the role of CSOs as articulated in the resolution. This is followed by a discussion of national action plans (NAPs) as a tool to translate UNSCR 2242 to the national context. In the second section, I explore existing studies and the limited understanding of CSOs' role and relationship with the state in implementing UNSCR 2242. I then explain the interviews and surveys conducted to understand the experiences of CSOs in Nigeria, the UK, and Spain. I define CSOs as organisations that advocate for citizens' rights, provide direct support, and represent and negotiate on their behalf at the political level. As co-developers of UNSCR 2242, the UK and Spanish governments played a central role in advocating for the Resolution, which contributed to its formal adoption during Spain's presidency of the Security Council. Since its adoption, these states, and Nigeria as one of the first African state to integrate UNSCR 2242 domestically, have implemented the Resolution at the national, regional, and local levels through the introduction of policies, initiatives, and programs to reduce women's risks to extremist violence, provide financial support to women-led CSOs and develop their capacity to engage in activities to achieve implementation. These factors influenced the selection of these case-studies and the application of Matland's (1995) Ambiguity Conflict Model (ACM), to analyse interviews and focus groups conducted in these contexts. The model provides a framework to interpret the levels of ambiguity and conflict that informs the state and CSOs' relationship during the implementation process. However, there are unique implementation factors that are not accounted for when the model was applied. To understand these factors, in the next section, I present the argument that informs this thesis. I argue that to understand all factors which inform the state and CSOs relationship during the implementation of the resolution, in addition to understanding the levels of ambiguity and conflict, there is a need to explore the levels of *control* in the ACM that shapes the state's decision regarding the spaces made accessible to CSOs, those that are closed off, and the methods used to engage these actors. Accounting for these three concepts, I highlight that analysing control provides a comprehensive understanding of the role of CSOs, the initiatives

proposed by these organisations, and their relationship with the state during the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in the domestic context. In the last section, I outline the structure of the thesis and explain the content addressed in each of the seven chapters.

## **Background**

In recognition of women's agency as effective actors in conflict prevention and peace-building and to address the increasing evidence of extremist violence perpetrated by extremist organisations such as Daesh, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 2242 in 2015. Although international policies focused on CT/CVE existed prior to the adoption of the Resolution, UNSCR 2242 is the first of these international CT/CVE frameworks to focus on and recognise gender mainstreaming as a key component of the development of a holistic CT/CVE measure (UNSC 2014, 2015). The Resolution places an additional obligation on UN agencies and member states to engage in research to understand the everyday experiences of extremist violence and ensure women's empowerment and leadership within processes to address extremism (UNSC 2015: para 12). It further calls for research into women's everyday experience of violent extremism, gendered dynamics within families, and structural powers within communities, to understand how extremist organisations utilize these inequalities to promote radicalization (True and Eddyono 2017: 3). Such understanding is crucial for developing measures to "prevent extremism well before it becomes violent and leads to acts of terrorism" (True and Eddyono 2017: 3), it aids in the development of long-term effective gender-specific CT/CVE strategies. Likewise, UNSCR 2242 promotes women's role within senior leadership positions in national and international agencies and calls for states to fund and collaborate with women-led civil society organisations (CSOs) to develop and implement national strategies to address extremist threats (UNSC 2015: para 13). As local women and women's groups are, in some states, the first responders to extremist violence within their community, and their domestic roles situate them in a position to identify and address extremist ideologies within their families, the Resolution encourages states to fund women's CT/CVE initiatives, as it is crucial to the effectiveness of states' CT/CVE prevention measures (UNSC 2015; True and Eddyono 2017: 5). Although the Resolution promotes the inclusion of women within CT/CVE processes and encourages states to develop policies and initiatives in alignment with the Resolution, there are no universal guidelines on the content

or the initiatives that states should develop; it is therefore down to states to determine when and how they engage women in CT/CVE activities. Aly et al (2015: 7) propose that CT/CVE refers to measures aimed at eliminating extremism and terrorism, the impact of extremist violence, and preventing its escalation. However, as the conceptualisation of CT/CVE varies, the definitions adopted by states and the measures proposed to inform the extent to which governments and international institutions create opportunities for women and CSOs' participation during its implementation processes. Garnor (2011: 25) argues that despite the variations in definition, there are three common characteristics of CT/CVE measures: elimination; damage minimization; and prevention. Elimination strategies focus on eradicating terrorist organisations, radicalisation incentives, and extremist violence that targets citizens and the state (Ganor 2011: 25). Damage minimisation measures aim to reduce the impact of extremist violence on civilians and infrastructure through initiatives that reduce the opportunities available for extremists to engage in violence that can cause high casualties (Ganor 2011: 25). The last of the three characteristics, prevention, targets the spread of extremist violence by intercepting and impeding the growth, development, and existence of groups supporting extremist organisations (Ganor 2011: 25). To promote women's agency and ongoing inclusion in activities to eliminate, minimise damage and prevent extremist violence, regardless of the definition of CT/CVE adopted by a state, UNSCR 2242 encourages states to ensure women's representation and meaningful participation in formal responses to terrorism and violent extremism (UNSC 2015).

However, the Resolution is not without criticism. As the Resolution assumes a binary gender structure, there is a lack of recognition of the impact that extremist violence has on individuals who do not conform to conventional gender identities (Ní Aoláin 2016: 282), and it promotes women's role as front-line CT/CVE agents but fails to acknowledge and address the risks of engaging women as CT/CVE actors (Ní Aoláin 2016: 284). Although UNSCR 2242 recognises women's agency, it significantly focuses on measures to protect women, thus positioning them as vulnerable local actors, and, further, neglects to address their marginalisation in society, and their lack of representation in national CT/CVE activities (Asante and Shepherd 2020: 11; Ní Aoláin 2016: 278). Likewise, Rothermel (2020: 730) highlights that the Resolution references poor governance, gendered and human rights violations as factors contributing to extremist violence. As poor governance and human rights violations are predominantly associated with Global South nations, it situates these states as sites of insecurity (Rothermel 2020: 730). This finding is reinforced elsewhere, with related

research suggesting that references to Global South states as insecure provide states in the Global North an opportunity to disguise political interventions within these countries as measures to secure women's security from extremist groups (Asante et al. 2021: 399).

Further, state CT/CVE initiatives often position women as peaceful actors and disregard their agency and experiences (Patel and Westermann 2018: 76; Asante and Shepherd 2020: 12). Positioned as non-violent and nurturing, states engage women within CT/CVE processes through their nurturing roles, as their perceived peaceful nature can be co-opted within measures as the first line of defence to deradicalize men (Brown 2016: 2). For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK), the government engages CSOs led by Muslim women to facilitate community-based CT/CVE programs and workshops (Brown 2013: 42). This inclusion approach fails to recognise women's capability to commit violence, promote extremist ideology and recruit for extremist organisations. Patel and Westermann (2018: 76) argue that engaging women within CT/CVE measures through nurturing roles are tokenistic, as opposed to meaningful engagement as required in UNSCR 2242. As these measures exclude women's experiences of extremist violence and disregard their right to participation in all stages of the development of CT/CVE measures, it increases risks for women and affects states' ability to prevent their radicalisation (Brown 2013: 41; Patel and Westermann 2018: 80).

Similarly, despite the effectiveness of CSOs as CT/CVE actors, state measures often limit opportunities for participation. Although perceived by some government actors as unprepared to participate in CT/CVE measures, the participation of CSOs increases the likelihood that states prioritise human rights when developing CT/CVE measures (Gervasoni 2017: 43). UNSCR 2242 encourages states to collaborate with CSOs to enhance the effectiveness of CT/CVE measures and their alignment with international human rights laws (UNSC 2015: 3). As radicalization occurs within local contexts and states are unable to investigate and respond to all individuals suspected of supporting extremist ideologies or actions, the location of CSOs within communities where extremist activities are likely to occur makes them effective CT/CVE partners (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2018: 26). For instance, the experiences of these organizations, their existing relationships with community members, and their knowledge of local contexts increase the likelihood that CT/CVE measures address extremist threats without threatening human rights (Organisation for

Security and Co-operation in Europe 2018: 26). Likewise, as some states receive criticism for generalizing and targeting minority groups such as Muslim women through CT/CVE measures, collaboration with CSOs increases the likelihood that measures adopted promote social harmony and inclusion (Gervasoni 2017: 42). Despite this, state initiatives and approaches often restrict the ability of CSOs to engage in CT/CVE activities. The state's adoption of broad counter-terrorism definitions and policies often results in prosecuting CSOs who engage in activities that contradict ideologies and values underpinning CT/CVE initiatives (Charbord and Ní Aoláin 2018: 19). For instance, financial restrictions adopted as part of the Nigerian government's CT/CVE measures coerce small CSOs to close or combine with larger organisations to survive (Njoku 2022: 198).

WPS National Action Plans (NAPs) often govern the role of CSOs in state WPS-related CT/CVE efforts. In 2004, the then-President of the Security Council recommended NAPs as a tool for states to translate the WPS Agenda to the domestic context (Jacevic 2019: 274). Jacevic (2019: 274) defines WPS NAPs as an "official government policy" which outlines the international and national dimensions of the WPS framework, outlines the WPS obligations of government, and articulates the actions that government departments and institutions have agreed to fulfill as part of their commitment to the Agenda. NAPs also outline the specific roles and responsibilities of government departments, institutions, and CSOs, and provide in-depth details about coordination, monitoring, and evaluation processes to be undertaken by states to ensure the success of implemented measures (Jacevic 2019: 276).

UNSCR 2242 calls for states to outline the financial and technical measures to be provided to women-led CSOs to develop their capacity to participate in CT/CVE policy development and implement community-based measures (UNSC 2015: para 1). This support is particularly relevant to conflict-affected nations, with states required to articulate the aid and technical supports that CSOs and conflict-affected nations will receive to promote women's empowerment and gender equality post incidents of conflict (UNSC 2015; para 3). States are encouraged to articulate the strategies that will foster collaboration with civil society organisations, encourage their full and meaningful participation in peace-building processes, and allocate budgets to assist these organisations in building women's capacity to address terrorism and other forms of conflict-related violence (UNSC 2015: para 1, 13). UNSCR

2242 also encourages states to support research by UN Women to understand the implications of terrorism and violent extremism on women-led civil society organisations (UNSC 2015: para 12). Government departments are encouraged to collaborate with CSOs to develop CT/CVE strategies that address terrorism, radicalisation, while also empowering women (UNSC 2015: para 13).

Some existing studies have explored the implementation of UNSCR 2242. Previous research has explored the participation of CSOs in national WPS governance (Mundkur and Shepherd 2018), the role of CSOs in institutionalizing the WPS Agenda (Naraghi Anderlini 2019), the primary role of states in the adoption of UNSCR 2242 (O'Rourke 2018), and the significance of the role of CSOs in CT/CVE processes (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019). However, studies have not explored the initiatives adopted by states to align their NAPs with UNSCR 2242 and the strategies and methods used to engage and limit opportunities for CSOs to participate in the implementation of gendered CT/CVE initiatives. Likewise, as terrorism affects international security, there has been an increase in research on national CT/CVE initiatives. However, only a few studies have explored national CT/CVE initiatives within the context of the WPS Agenda, or the implementation of UNSCR 2242, though some preliminary global studies exist (Asante and Shepherd 2020; Aroussi 2021; Asante et al. 2021; Mesok 2022). Research has explored the relationship between CSOs and the state, the role of CSOs in countering national terrorist threats, and the implications that state financial CT/CVE measures have for CSOs' ability to practice, though not explicitly in relation to the WPS Agenda (Njoku 2022; Njoku 2018). Research has not yet explored the relationships between CSOs and state governments in implementing CT/CVE measures in alignment with the WPS Agenda and the measures adopted by states to enable CSOs to contribute as implementing actors, as proposed in UNSCR 2242. There is also a lack of theoretical insights into the approaches adopted by states to maintain influence over the implementation process and the interactions between norms and policies in the domestic contexts (research on this subject tends to focus on norm diffusion or legal frameworks; see Asante et al. 2021; True 2016; Lukatela 2016; Shawki 2017).

## Research question and research design

To address the research gaps identified above, the central question guiding the study is: *In what ways, and with what effects, are civil society organisations engaged in the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria, the UK and Spain?* To address the core question, I conducted focused interviews with WPS policymakers and civil society actors in management positions in Nigeria, the UK, and Spain to understand: the initiatives adopted to implement UNSCR 2242; the experience of these actors during the policy development and implementation process; and the methods used to engage and exclude CSOs from some policy spaces. The use of focused interviews enabled an in-depth understanding of research participants' experiences and perceptions of policy translation and implementation (Grindsted 2005). Interviews with these actors were conducted virtually (via Zoom, WhatsApp, and Skype) over eleven months (June 2020 to April 2021). Once consent was obtained from participants, questions were adapted to reflect the experiences and employment positions of participants (Fielding and Thomas 2001). Surveys were also conducted to explore the roles of front-line civil society program officers within implementation activities. Surveys provided a versatile way of distributing questions and obtaining in-depth responses from actors in various locations of the case study countries. The surveys aimed to explore CSOs' understanding of the implementation of UNSCR 2242 within the country, their perceptions of their roles, their estimation of the opportunities provided to engage in this policy area, and the extent to which the expertise of these actors informed the development and implementation of CT/CVE measures. Civil society and state actors from various organisations and departments were invited to participate in the survey or interview. Adopting these qualitative methods, 63 state and civil society actors were interviewed and surveyed for this research.

To analyse data collected from the interviews and surveys, the WPS Agenda was first conceptualised as a policy framework as opposed to a normative framework. Although the WPS Agenda is frequently referred to as a normative framework in WPS scholarship, the Agenda and its Resolutions are conceptualised as a policy framework in this thesis. As norms are reproduced through policies in the domestic context (Kirby and Shepherd 2021), conceptualising the Agenda as a policy framework provides a set of analytical tools from policy and administration studies to understand and explore the factors that influence

decisions around the methods adopted and those excluded during activities to implement CT/CVE initiatives. The study applies Matland's (1995) Ambiguity Conflict Model (ACM), which provides a framework for evaluating policy implementation and the relationship between state and non-state actors during the process. The framework is applied in this thesis to examine the initiatives adopted and those implemented to protect women from extremist violence, promote their agency through participation in CT/CVE activities, measures implemented to prevent violence towards women, and support their relief and recovery needs. More importantly, this thesis examines the relationship between CSOs and the state. Using the ACM, it explores the levels of ambiguity and conflict that inform the relationship between the state and CSOs during activities to translate, develop and implement gendered CT/CVE initiatives in the three case study contexts. Matland's (1995) model highlights that policies can change from their initial form over a period and thus it is important in policy evaluations.

### **Argument and contribution**

I argue that conceptualising the WPS Agenda as a policy framework and accounting for the levels of ambiguity and conflict that shape the relationship between state actors and CSOs provides an understanding of how Resolution 2242 has been implemented and reveals the measures utilised by state actors to engage CSOs. However, my research also shows that an important dimension of the relationship between state and non-state actors during the implementation process is the strategies utilised to manage tensions and promote collaboration and related initiatives adopted by the state to maintain influence and power over all stages of the implementation process. Thus, I further argue that there is also a need to account for the levels of *control* in the state-civil society relationship, in addition to ambiguity and conflict. Accounting for the levels of ambiguity, conflict, and further exploring control, indicates that the ACM generates a holistic understanding of the relationship between the state and CSOs and the measures adopted by the states to ensure their overall influence over all activities to implement WPS Resolutions at the domestic context.

As there is little understanding of the methods used to engage civil society actors and the opportunities available to these actors within WPS and CT/CVE national implementation activities, further exploring control in the ACM provides theoretical insights into these factors. The thesis shows that despite the high levels of conflict that shape WPS implementation in states like Nigeria, as historically CSOs are denied access to political spaces, low control measures are sufficient to achieve compliance in implementing community programs and early intervention initiatives. However, in countries such as the UK, where high ambiguity and conflict inform implementation activities, high control measures aid the government in achieving compliance from CSOs to implement CT/CVE initiatives and programs. The model also highlights that problem-resolution measures are sufficient to promote collaboration between CSOs and state governments to implement UNSCR 2242 as community programs in states such as Spain, where low ambiguity and conflict are present. Further exploring control in the ACM can be used to predict the type of implementation occurring in other countries where state governments are implementing WPS Resolutions in the domestic context and to predict the level to which the state will engage CSOs, the opportunities that will be closed to these actors, and the initiatives that states will adopt to implement WPS related initiatives at the domestic context In the following section, I explain how I develop this argument.

## **Thesis structure**

The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter Two explores existing literature and academic debates on the role of CSOs in WPS. The chapter discusses the ability of CSOs to utilise their relationship with state actors at the local, national, transnational, and international levels to encourage the adoption of the WPS Agenda. It further explores the ability of these organisations to promote gender mainstreaming within international institutions and encourage greater international awareness of the need for measures to address the implications of conflict on women. The chapter also explores the factors that influenced the international adoption of UNSCR 2242 and the principles and values which underpin calls for gender mainstreaming within state and international responses to terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter Three focuses on the research design, the method, and the theoretical framework which informed the study. It outlines the qualitative methods adopted in the study

and the procedure for conducting interviews and surveys with state and CSOs in the three case-study contexts: Nigeria, the UK, and Spain. This chapter explores debates surrounding the conceptualisation of WPS, its framing as a policy framework as opposed to a normative framework in this study, and how Matland's (1995) Ambiguity Conflict Model was applied to analyse data collected to understand the approaches adopted by states to implement Resolution 2242 and the relationship between these actors and CSOs during the process. The chapter also addresses the ethical dimensions of the study.

The core empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters Four, Five, and Six) follow the same structure. Each chapter explores the findings obtained from the case study sites, examining implementation activities in these countries to evaluate the levels of ambiguity and conflict in the policy process in each case. Each chapter begins with an overview of terrorism and violent extremist activities in the case-study site, the implications of such violence for women, the state measures adopted to counter and prevent such violence, and how CSOs are engaged and excluded during this process. The levels of ambiguity and conflict in the policy process are then explored through thematic analysis of interviews and surveys, and a discussion is provided of the factors unaccounted for by the model. As discussed in Chapter Four, the application of the ACM suggests that *political implementation* occurs in the Nigerian context as low ambiguity and high conflict inform the implementation process. Similarly, Chapter Five discusses the relationship between civil society and state actors in implementing Resolution 2242 in the UK. The application of the ACM to explore the implementation process suggests that *symbolic implementation* is occurring in the UK. Informed by high ambiguity and high conflict, the model provides an understanding that there is significant tension between state and CSOs during the implementation process, contributing to few opportunities available for CSOs' to utilise their knowledge and skills to shape the implementation process. Chapter Six explores the implementation process in the Spanish context. The model suggests that *administrative implementation* is occurring in the Spanish context, which is informed by low ambiguity and conflict levels. Application of the ACM to each case-study provides some accounts of implementation occurring in each context. In Chapter Seven, I revisit the model and propose that there is a need to place greater emphasis on control in the ACM, as this provides insights into how states maintain control and influence over implementation, including in circumstances where it is reliant on the expertise and resources of non-governmental actors.

Finally, the concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, summarises findings from the interviews conducted in Nigeria, the UK, and Spain. It summarises the research journey, including a reflection on the theoretical and methodological approach that informed the study. I draw three main conclusions from the study's findings. First, my research shows that there is a significant difference in how states are implementing the same policy (UNSCR 2242), and although the Resolution encourages collaboration between the state and CSOs, the engagement of CSOs varies across contexts. These findings reinforce the need to explore how international norms interact with policies in the local context to influence the implementation of WPS Resolutions, and how these norms are interpreted in specific local contexts. Secondly, to understand the measures adopted, those neglected by states, and whether the implementation of Resolutions in the domestic context aligns with WPS requirements, findings from the thesis show that the provisions of WPS Resolutions must be articulated and analysed as domestic policy frameworks to understand implementation and how states are reinforcing, monitoring, and evaluating implementation activities. Finally, to account for all implementation factors and obtain an in-depth understanding of how states engage civil society and the spaces closed for these actors, there is a need to account for the levels of ambiguity, conflict and further explore the extent of control that informs the process. Matland (1995) encourages the synthesizing of implementation variables to reduce the number of frameworks. Further exploring control in the ACM provides knowledge about when states are likely to adopt coercive and bargaining measures to achieve compliance from non-state actors and the circumstances which contribute to states using collaborative measures to achieve compliance to ensure the realisation of the WPS Agenda. To begin this study, the following chapter examines literature on civil society, the WPS Agenda, and UNSCR 2242 and its implementation.

## Chapter Two: Literature Review

Civil society's role within state initiatives to address women's needs through the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda is a hotly debated topic. The chapter first explores the conceptualisation of civil society within the political sector. I conceptualise civil society as a heterogenous collective of individuals and organisations that defend the rights of citizens against political intrusion, through advocacy, direct support and collaboration with the state to encourage governments to prioritise the needs of citizens. Civil society achieves this objective by promoting citizens' rights and negotiating within the political sphere. The second section outlines conceptualisations of civil society within WPS scholarship and debates surrounding these actors' advocacy and activities to institutionalise the WPS Agenda at the national and international level, which contributed to the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. To understand the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in countering terrorism and countering violent extremism (CT/CVE), I discuss state actors' primary role in advocating for the adoption of UNSCR 2242, influenced by a reported increase in extremist threats. This section further examines the state's perception of CSOs as CT/CVE service delivers and the effectiveness of CSOs' CT/CVE measures at the domestic level. Although the resolution aims to improve outcomes for women and recognise CSOs as partners in responding to the impact of extremist violence on women, it is not without limitations. The third section examines debates surrounding the limitations of the resolution in empowering and reinforcing women's human rights and the risks for CSOs in responding to an issue that the state has historically addressed. The chapter highlights that despite extensive knowledge of UNSCR 2242, existing research provides little insight into the methods used by the state to engage CSOs at the political level during processes to implement CT/CVE initiatives in alignment with UNSCR 2242, the spaces provided to these actors and those closed. As there is also little understanding of the levels of ambiguity, conflict, and control that inform the state and CSOs' relationship during the policy development and implementation process, this chapter emphasises these gaps in current WPS scholarship.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter draws on material previously published as Rothermel, A., Asante, D. (2022) 'From victims to activists: women's engagement and participation in P/CVE', Australian Outlook,

## Conceptualising Civil Society

Modern conceptualisations of civil society associate it with the state, democratic rule, and as a defender of potential violations of political power by those in power (Bratton 1994; Keane 1988; Kumar 1993). Separate from the state, I conceptualise civil society as a defender of citizens' rights against that state, achieved through articulation and negotiation with those in the political sphere. As an organised society, civil society represents and promotes individuals' objectives through a collective Agenda (Parekh 2004). However, as it co-exists within the political realm (Pierobon 2019; Seligman 2002), it adapts to reflect the diverse relationships between three main actors: the state, the society, and the individual. Although conflict exists within this relationship, I emphasise that civil society acts as a space for cooperation and collaboration, as these organisations empower and provide agencies with opportunities to pursue their goals and a platform for participatory democracy (Pierobon 2019; Talani 2017; Natil 2019). Civil society develops a mutually dependent relationship with the state, preventing it from dominating and encroaching on citizens' rights (Muller 2006). For instance, Gellner (1994: 5) states that civil society is a

set of institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, can, nevertheless prevent the state from...atomising the rest of society.

This informs the role of civil society adopted in this study as the key actor that promotes peace and accountability in the political sector while bringing the perspectives of those in the local context to the political realm.

A mutually dependent relationship exists between the state and civil society through formal and informal arrangements between these institutions. These arrangements provide CSOs opportunities to advocate for citizens' perspectives to inform policy development, political decision-making, and its outcomes (Moloney 2013; Islam 2013). Peter and Saeed (2017) proposed that the likelihood that collaboration will occur and succeed depends on the

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<https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/from-victims-to-activists-womens-engagement-and-participation-in-p-cve/>

incentives for collaboration, states willingness to engage, and create opportunities for civil society actors to participate in political processes without interference. This study builds on this knowledge as I explore how CSOs are engaged and the factors that influence opportunities created to enable these actors to participate in political processes to develop CT/CVE measures.

As earlier highlighted in this chapter, collaborative interactions between the state and CSOs contributes to an accountability relationship between the two institutions. Through collaboration, CSOs gain a greater sense of the responsibility of the state and thus can advocate for the state to meet its obligations (Fourie and Kakumba 2011). Scholte (2004) proposed that there are four main approaches to ensure that states are accountable for their actions: encouraging transparency of political decisions; monitoring and reviewing state policies and programs; advocating and obtaining reparations for victims of state actions; and implementing accountability measures. Civil society can encourage transparency by advocating for the state to release information and annual reports on political reforms and actions, the process for decision-making within government institutions, and the resources utilised to implement decisions (Scholte 2004). To ensure transparency, CSOs must advocate for the state to share information in a manner that is accessible to the public (Busscher et al. 2019). This creates opportunities for CSOs to evaluate the governments' current and proposed future actions, highlight potential limitations, and seek reform.

Scholte (2004) highlights that accountability creates opportunities for redress, proposing that redress should occur through lobbying for reform, seeking reparations for victims, replacing state representatives who breach policies, or reconstructing democratic institutions. For instance, civil society report cards on WPS National Action Plans (NAPs) act as an accountability tool for CSOs to report limitations within states' WPS practices and provide recommendations on best practice approaches (Dixon et al. 2018). Although there is some understanding of the methods and approaches utilised by CSOs to promote accountability and encourage states to adopt policies that align with the needs of the public, there is little knowledge of this in relation to processes to implement UNSCR 2242. I explore these dynamics in this thesis by examining the opportunities provided to CSOs to propose initiatives informed by their experience and expertise during the policy development process

and the level of flexibility provided to these actors to reform proposed initiatives to reflect the changing security needs of women. To understand how CSOs' knowledge and experience have informed new and gendered approaches to violence, below I explore the role of these actors in the adoption of the WPS Agenda.

### Civil Society in the WPS Agenda

As discussed in Chapter One, the WPS Agenda is comprised of ten related UNSC resolutions, which are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Women, Peace and Security Resolutions

<b>Resolution</b>	<b>Agenda</b>
1325 (2000)	Recognises the value of women's participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding; emphasises the protection of women's bodies and rights during and post-conflict.
1820 (2008)	Identifies sexual violence as a tactic and war weapon that women require protection from; condemns sexual abuse and exploitation perpetrated by peacekeeping personnel; endorses women's participation in peacekeeping operations; encourages the representation and meaningful participation of civil society groups in addressing gender issues.
1888 (2009)	Reinforces that sexual violence intensifies conflict and hinders peace and security; establishment of the UN Action as the main body responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); establishment of the Office of Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); encourages the assignment of Women's Protection Advisors (WPAs) on operations; reaffirms civil society's role in states responses to address conflict-related sexual violence
1889 (2009)	Emphasises the development of global indicators to measure nations' implementation of UNSCR 1325; reaffirms the need for civil society groups and women's contribution in all levels of peace and security governance.

1960 (2010)	Promotes the establishment of CRSV evaluation and reporting procedures; calls for collaboration between Gender Advisors and WPA field operations.
2106 (2013)	Encourages the adoption and implementation of existing resolutions; promotes language which highlights women's participation in eradicating sexual violence.
2122 (2013)	Establishes specific measures to ensure women's participation; UN Women identified as the key body guiding women's participation in peace and security discourse; civil- society participation in peace and security discourse; evaluation of the national implementation of UNSCR 1325 scheduled for 2015.
2242 (2015)	Creation of expert groups to advise on WPS; reaffirms the significance of civil society's contribution to peace and security. Promotes the application of WPS to all circumstances in nations; establishes a connection between WPS and counter-terrorism/countering violent extremism.
2467 (2019)	Identifies sexual violence during conflict as an ongoing threat to women and girls' security and safety; reaffirms national responsibility to address gender inequality and discrimination as the underlying causes of sexual violence; calls for survivors needs and the prioritisation of access to services; identifies the need for reparation to victims and justice processes to be strengthened.
2493 (2019)	Calls member states to implement previously adopted WPS Resolutions; calls for approaches to promote women's inclusion in UN peace processes; reaffirms that UN member states must support women's full and meaningful involvement in activities to develop, implement and monitor peace processes.

Source: Kirby and Shepherd (2016: 251); PeaceWomen 2022a

In the realm of WPS work, civil society is a space for social and political collaboration, consisting of grassroots, national, transnational, and international networks with parallel goals (Martin de la Rosa and Lazaro 2019). As discussed above, civil society acts as a zone of politics between the state and its citizens, which ideally ensures a balance of power

(Mundkur and Shepherd 2018; Anderlini 2019). Bjorkdahl and Selimovic (2019: 430) portray it as the "social glue that holds societies together", as it promotes partnership between the state, the international community, and its constituents. For example, as a bottom-up approach to political and social development, Boonpunth and Saheem (2022) highlight that civil society advocates, monitors, articulates, and negotiates the political interest of those in society while managing a relationship with the state to encourage positive change. As this includes providing expert opinion and engaging in activities to implement WPS-related matters in the domestic context, civil society is a space for knowledge, advocacy, Agenda-setting, and partnership building (Boonpunth and Saheem 2022; Hall 2021; O'Reilly 2015).

Despite this, civil society lacks the political authority to develop and enforce policies, which positions it under state authority within WPS discourse (Hamilton et al. 2021; Anderlini 2019). For example, although civil society organisations drafted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and are implementing actors at the regional, national, and local levels, CSOs are reliant on states to adopt WPS resolutions and are to some extent reliant on state resources to engage in WPS implementation activities (Davies and True 2022; Hamilton et al. 2021; Hamilton 2020; Naraghi Anderlini 2019; Shepherd and True 2014;). Civil society also risks persecution for engaging in activities beyond their role. Likewise, in other contexts, although the state consults some CSOs and women groups during NAP development, they are often excluded from WPS decision-making processes (Muehlenhoff 2022; Sengul et al. 2022; Aroussi 2020; Mundkur and Shepherd 2018; Shepherd 2015). These measures, which situate CSOs as implementing actors, are further explored in this study to understand the activities engaged by these actors during the implementation of UNSCR 2242.

However, in recent years, there has been a shift in perceptions of the role of CSOs within WPS discourse. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), through various WPS resolutions, reaffirmed that CSOs are entitled to participate in all stages of WPS development (see table 1) through roles as key actors within working groups and committees and as monitors and evaluators of governments WPS activities (UNSC 2015c; Coomaraswamy 2015). This has contributed to the perception of CSOs as active subjects and political actors (Castillejo and Domingo 2022; Coomaraswamy 2015). To illustrate, women's CSOs in

Nigeria have engaged in advocacy to raise awareness of the impact of terrorism and violent extremism on women in Northern Nigeria and have held governments accountable for their actions through their participation in the country's WPS Technical Monitoring and Evaluation Task Force (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019). Likewise, as women's CSOs directly implement WPS policies within practice through service delivery, such as support and training to empower and improve outcomes for women affected by extremist violence, they are perceived as capacity builders (Praxl-Tabuchi and Rosand 2022; Mukhlis et al. 2022; Ibanga 2015). For example, CSOs such as the Women's Interfaith Council have been at the forefront of conflict zones in Nigeria to develop women's skills, their capacity to defend their homes, support their families and address environmental factors which promote radicalisation and terrorism (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019). These actions have increased women's agency, making them an invaluable source of non-military community security actors within state efforts to prevent conflict and extremism.

Additionally, CSOs' activism has contributed to the international recognition of gendered differences in experiences of conflict. Their efforts to ensure the realisation and effective implementation of WPS NAPs further enforce their identity as nurturers and maintainers of the WPS resolutions (Mundkur and Shepherd 2018). This indicates that the conceptualisation of CSOs in WPS discourse has developed from subjects and advocates of the Agenda to encompass multidimensional identities and functions, such as formal political actors, monitoring bodies, and local facilitators of WPS activities (Hamilton et al. 2021). For example, Shepherd (2017: 144) conceptualises the role of CSOs in WPS work as "providers of valuable knowledge, capable of raising awareness, fighting against corruption, struggling against political manipulation, with capacities and expertise". This research builds on existing knowledge of the perceptions of CSOs, by examining the roles allocated to these actors, those restricted, and how these actions reflect state policy developers' perceptions of civil society. This contributes to developing a framework to examine the relationship between the state and CSOs.

## Advocacy and Agenda Setting

As discussed above, CSOs' advocacy and Agenda-setting initiatives played a significant role in the international adoption of the WPS Agenda. The 1995 Beijing UN Fourth World Conference concluded with the creation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (PfA), within which Chapter E recommended that gender perspectives should inform international, regional, and state security policies and programs (Hudson 2010; Barnes 2010). Although initially adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, this recommendation received little acknowledgment from other United Nations (UN) organisations and governments (Barnes 2010). However, the International Alert's *Women Building Peace: From the Village Council to the Negotiation Table* campaign to raise awareness of gender issues within conflict, supported by 200 CSOs, and Anwarul Chowdhury's March 2000's International Women's Day statement on women's agency in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, promoted discussions for a Security Council resolution on WPS (Bjorkdahl and Selimovic 2019; Anderlini 2019; Barnes 2010). These actions and the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus's advocacy for the inclusion of women's issues on the Agenda for the fifth Beijing Declaration conference further highlight CSO's advocacy for creating a WPS Agenda (Menocal 2022; Castillejo 2020; Anderlini 2019; Barnes 2010). Additionally, CSOs' collaboration to create the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGOWG) to strengthen their campaign for the UN Security Council to adopt a WPS resolution, reinforces their role in the establishment of the Agenda (Jonjić-Beitter et al. 2020; Anderlini 2019; Barnes 2010).

As actors capable of bringing to the forefront issues yet to be recognised by the state, CSOs' advocacy, and ability to empower women affected by conflict to express their experiences contributed to debates on the need for a WPS Agenda (Chinkin 2019; Taylor 2019). These activities and regional organisations' success in collecting data from local and national groups to establish WPS as an international issue and mobilise support for its inclusion in the UNSC's Agenda, reinforces the significance of civil society's role in the adoption of UNSCR 1325. As a result, WPS scholars position CSOs as WPS experts, as through direct practice with women affected by conflict, they can advocate and speak on their behalf (Hamilton et al. 2021; Mundkur and Shepherd 2018). In contrast, other scholars have argued against the perception of CSOs as 'experts' on WPS issues. Manji (1998) argues that advocacy engaged

in by some CSOs aims to serve their interests as opposed to those whom they represent. Martín de Almagro (2018a) reinforces this perception, as through interviews with women CSOs in Congo, Burundi, and Liberia, reported that the operation of these organisations by middle and upper-class women, who do not experience the same level of marginalisation as rural women, disconnects these groups.

Similarly, being a government official's wife was the criterion used to appoint women to leadership positions in CSOs and as state employees during the implementation of Nigeria's *Better Life for Rural Women Programme*, as opposed to knowledge and expertise on the experiences of rural women (Pearce 2000). According to Bisi Adeleye-Fayemi (quoted in Pearce 2000: 13), these actions "enforced gender subordination in the disguise of women's activism", despite women's presence within these spaces, their representation was tokenistic as opposed to meaningful. For instance, in Nigeria, women who supported the perspectives of their male partners and colleagues gained promotions, and those opposed to the views of their male colleagues experienced restrictions in opportunities to participate in decision-making around policies and programs (Pearce 2000). These incidents further highlight that advocacy by upper- and middle-class women aims to improve their social status and political influence, as opposed to achieving outcomes for women of low social status. It also highlights the need for an enquiry into the CT/CVE initiatives proposed by CSOs who work directly with women affected by extremist violence, whether proposed measures reflected the needs of local women and the extent to which CSOs' relationship with the state, determined their access to political spaces, the levels of ambiguity conflict and control which informed the implementation process.

Despite this, as CSOs require invitations from international governmental security actors to present evidence of the impact that violence has on women at the Security Council, a subordinate relationship exists between UN agencies and CSOs. Through advocacy and speeches presented before the Council and at other United Nations meetings, CSOs' dialogues constructed meaning regarding the experiences of women, their significance, and the measures that should inform the WPS Agenda (Jusufi et al. 2022; Tindall 2022; Cook 2016). As previously indicated, as this positions CSOs as WPS experts and in greater authority over international agencies, concerning knowledge and the competence to present women's issues,

it denotes that CSOs' consultation and decision-making in WPS is necessary for the formation of effective WPS initiatives (Castillejo 2022; Menocal 2022; Muller 2006). However, as international agencies and UN member states have the power and authority to determine if, how, and when CSOs can present women's issues on international platforms, this highlights CSOs' dependence on states and international institutions to publicise local women's issues as an international human rights crisis, which requires immediate redress (Keane 2010; Hill et al. 2003; Black 2001; Kumar 1993). For instance, prior to presenting before state members and at UN platforms, civil society groups must first be acknowledged by the state for their work with women, be perceived as having acquired the knowledge and skills to address women's issues, and thus meet international institutions and states governments' usefulness criteria, before an invitation to present is offered (Cook 2016; Muller 2006; Hill et al. 2003). Although Shepherd (2021) highlights that the role of CSOs in the adoption of UNSCR 1325 positions them as owners of the Agenda, as these actors require state acknowledgment to participate in WPS activities within the political realm formally, Cook (2016) highlights that this position CSOs as a state resource, as opposed to WPS partners. States adopted measures to restrict CSOs' participation in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, despite their advocacy for its adoption. This highlights the need for an enquiry to understand whether states' primary role in advocating for the adoption of UNSCR 2242 will lead to greater restrictions and control measures to close CSOs access to political spaces and implementation activities.

### Institutionalisation

In addition to advocacy, CSOs Agenda-setting activities in various environments aid the mainstreaming of gender discourse in institutions (Chinkin 2019). These transnational networks' ability to engage in national and international strategic planning and normalise women's security issues were significant in reinforcing to governments the need for the inclusion of gender matters on the political Agenda and contributed to mainstream gender discourse globally (Shepherd 2021; Anderlini 2019). For example, as previously highlighted above, CSOs dialogues constructed meanings regarding women's experiences in conflict, normalised gender issues within the European political Agenda through advocacy, research, and the successful reframing of sexual trafficking as a women's human rights issue, as opposed to an immigration problem (True 2003). Analysis of transnational CSOs in 157

nations also shows that these organisations were responsible for coordinating and facilitating gender mainstreaming approaches to policy within states and the international community (True and Mintrom 2001). CSOs' advocacy has encouraged states to engage in open dialogue on the integration of gender perspectives within their current policies and practices (Kreft 2019; Céspedes-Báez 2016; Bouvier 2016).

In addition, in some contexts, CSOs institutionalised the WPS Agenda through collaboration and cooperation with feminist policymakers. CSOs collaborated with feminist policymakers to normalise gender discourse by providing them access to research data and providing guidance on strategies to integrate gender views within policies (Bjorkdahl and Selimovic 2019; Aharoni 2014). These organisations assisted the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) in creating budgets for women's programs and proposed methods to promote women's participation and leadership in peace discourse (Aharoni 2014). Likewise, the ability of these transitional networks to mainstream gender perspectives in the International Criminal Court (ICC) through their contribution to the Gender Policy Report, advocacy for female victims to testify during trials, and encourage the court to establish a reparation system to support victims of conflict, further reinforces the significance of their role in the implementation of the WPS Agenda (ICC 2014; Koomen 2019; Bjorkdahl and Selimovic 2019).

For instance, these networks successfully provided the ICC insight into the impact of sexual and gender-based violence on women, methods used within direct practice to support female victims, and the approaches used to report and document gender-based violence (Kelly 2022; ICC 2014). CSOs were also instrumental in guiding approaches to integrate gender perspectives within case analysis, with this influencing the court to recognise the need for continuous consultation with transnational CSOs to improve outcomes for women (O'Brien et al. 2022; ICC 2014). Hence, existing literature has explored CSOs' role in institutionalising UNSCR 1325; however, there are limited studies exploring the challenges experienced by these actors, particularly those Global North states such as Spain and the UK, in institutionalising gendered responses to terrorism and violent extremism at the national level. This research contributes to knowledge by exploring the factors limiting CSOs' capability to institutionalise gendered CT/CVE measures in the domestic context.

## Implementation

As discussed above, the lobbying, Agenda-setting, and gender-mainstreaming initiatives of transnational and national CSOs contributed to the Security Council's adoption of UNSCR 1325, the first resolution adopted under the thematic WPS Agenda. Strategic coalition-building with international organisations such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM [now UN Women]), and states supporting gender mainstreaming, reinforced the need for a United Nations resolution on WPS (Chinkin 2019; Barnes 2010). For instance, CSOs utilised their informal contact with Security Council representatives at the 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2000 Arria Formula meeting as a platform to inform and encourage member states to support a resolution under the title of “women and peace and security” that address the ongoing impact of conflict on women, the use of their bodies as weapons of war, and present to council members, the narratives of women with lived experiences in conflict zones (PeaceWomen 2019d; Shepherd 2008; Tryggestad 2009). These actions and strategic information sharing, which occurred after the debate, influenced the Council's decision to include WPS as an Agenda item during its 7533<sup>rd</sup> meeting, which concluded with the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1325 (Anderlini 2019). As the resolution contained elements advocated by women-led CSOs and acknowledges civil society groups as key consultation partners during WPS NAP implementation, these organisations are key WPS actors (Shepherd 2021; Mundkur and Shepherd 2018: 94; Susskind and Duarte 2019; PeaceWomen 2015).

There exist debates amongst CSOs, state governments, legal and feminist scholars about the binding nature of UNSCR 1325. CSOs, feminist scholars, and some legal scholars have argued that as Article 25 of the UN Charter states that UN member states "agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council" (United Nations 2019), UNSCR 1325, its principles and mandates are binding on states (Shepherd 2011; Tryggestad 2009; Greenman and Lavers 2019). Likewise, as UNSCR 1325 references binding international treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and recognition of the International Court of Justice ruling, requiring South Africa to end its

occupation of Namibia as binding, has contributed to debates about the binding nature of (Greenman and Lavers 2019; George and Shepherd 2016; Appiagyei-Atua 2011). Chinkin (2019: 11) further highlights that WPS consists of "strong statements endorsing its principles make it difficult to conclude that all this activity does not represent some form of legal obligation". CSOs, feminists, and some legal scholars have used these factors as evidence to lobby states to meet their international and national obligations by fulfilling the objectives of the WPS Agenda. In contrast, some governments and legal scholars argue that UNSCR 1325's principles and mandates are not binding on states but are simply normative statements. As some state governments and scholars have interpreted resolutions created under Chapter VI as principles that guide national and international practice, UNSCR 1325 is viewed as morally binding, as opposed to legally binding (Otto 2009). This perception and debates surrounding the Security Council's role as an organ to provide states guidance to reach peaceful agreements suggest that UNSCR 1325 and other measures adopted under Chapter VI are non-coercive 'soft' international laws (Otto 2016; Otto 2010). This suggests that although the Security Council recommends that states implement UNSCR 1325, as they are not obliged to develop WPS NAPs, some states have little incentive to uphold the Agenda's principles (Heathcote 2010). However, as the WPS Agenda is acknowledged globally as a significant and unique international policy that recognises women's political agency, within the context of this thesis, I argue that the Agenda is binding on UN member states.

Despite the unanimous adoption of most of the resolutions that form the WPS Agenda, debates surrounding its binding nature have contributed to CSOs' role as the main advocates for the national implementation of UNSCR 1325 in various contexts. Analysis of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in 20 European nations concluded that lobbying by women's CSOs played a critical role in nations' adoption of gendered views in peace and conflict discourse through the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2013). For instance, women-led CSOs consisting of peace researchers and educational groups in Spain advocated for the integration of UNSCR 1325 into the country's national policies (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2013). Likewise, CSOs in the Global South also advocated for the national implementation of UNSCR 1325. For instance, Solidarity for Integrated Peace and Development, a national coalition consisting of 40 women CSOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo which in addition to providing services to women affected by sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), collated evidence from

practice to successfully advocate for the Congolese government to adopt the WPS Agenda (NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security 2015). The capability of CSOs to develop methods to support women affected by conflict, who are stakeholders positions them as key partners in activities to monitor and evaluate WPS initiatives (Wright 2022; Yoon and Liljeström 2022; Beaulieu 2022; Jonjic-Beitter et al. 2019). As earlier mentioned, a monitor and evaluator role denotes that one actor has the ability to advocate for the other to meet their obligations (Day and Klein 1987; Scholte 2004).

This indicates that CSOs as local implementers and service deliverers have the capacity to evaluate WPS implementation using WPS NAPs as evaluation tools, and advocate for the state to meet its responsibilities to women (Beaulieu 2022; Hamilton et al. 2020; Jonjic-Beitter et al. 2019; Day and Klein 1987). Although an actor's accountability role also gives them the authority to impose consequences when those accountable to them are unable to meet their obligations, as CSOs are under the control of the state, these actors lack the authority to call the state to account, although they can advocate for reform (Mulgan 2003; Kilby 2004). As discussed earlier in this chapter, Scholte (2004) proposed that CSOs can request that government institutions make their annual reports accessible to the public, seek reparations for victims, and encourage reform by highlighting policy limitations and providing recommendations through civil society annual reports. However, as some civil society groups rely on state funding to respond to the needs of women affected by conflict, it places a legal obligation on CSOs to produce reports on how they have utilised state funding and resources made accessible to them (Kilby 2004; McDonald 1999; Ferejohn 1999). As such a relationship places the state in a position of power and authority to call CSOs into account, it creates a dependent and subordinate relationship between the state and CSOs (Cabrera-Balleza 2011). Therefore, the wealth of knowledge available on CSOs' relationship with the state and their role in the adoption of the WPS Agenda, provides context to this investigation, which aims to contribute to debates through a close examination of resolution 2242 and the relationship between the state and CSOs during processes to implement gendered CT/CVE initiatives.

## **Civil Society in the Adoption and Implementation of UNSCR 2242**

Terrorist and violent extremist acts, which have their roots in political, religious movements, and social resistance, continue to threaten global security. However, scholarly reports of a 17% global increase in the number of terrorist-related attacks, the spread of terrorism across nations, and violence perpetuated towards women by organisations such as Daesh (ISIL), Boko Haram, and the Taliban, have increased global awareness of the gendered nature of extremism (Institute for Economics and Peace 2022; Bigio and Vogelstein 2019; Usman 2018; Adkins 2016; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015). For instance, it was acknowledged in the *Global Study into the implementation of UNSCR 1325* that terrorism and violent extremism are emerging threats to women's security and safety (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015). This report called for a non-militaristic and international approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism, which recognises women's rights, agency, and the role of CSOs in developing holistic CT/CVE measures (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015). The Security Council further acknowledged in 2014 the gendered nature of terrorism and violent extremism and its impact on global peace and security. However, it was not until Spain's 2015 presidency of the Council and the Spanish government's desire to implement a resolution during its presidency, alongside United Nations member-states increasing fears over the actions of Daesh, that it became an urgency for the Council to adopt a WPS resolution on terrorism and violent extremism (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017; United Nations Security Council 2015a).

However, unlike UNSCR 1325, advocacy and Agenda-setting for the adoption of a WPS resolution on CT/CVE, like UNSCR 1960 and UNSCR 2106, was driven by state governments, as opposed to civil society groups. In alignment with its foreign policies to limit the influence of Al-Qaida and Daesh (ISIL) and through its facilitation of the Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (which consisted of other Security Council members), the Spanish government's decision to invite civil society representatives from the Spanish Association of Victims of Terrorism to share their testimonies with committee members highlights the role of governments in institutionalising and setting the Agenda for the adoption of UNSCR 2242 (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). The Spanish government's collaboration with the United Kingdom government to draft resolution 2242,

with minimal consultation or engagement of CSOs in developing its content, further highlights states' primary role in the international adoption and implementation of UNSCR 2242. Despite this, states acknowledged the role of CSOs in activities to implement the resolution, positioning these actors as services to deliver initiatives for women affected by extremist violence (United Nations Security Council 2015b). However, there was minimal acknowledgement and emphasis placed on developing partnerships with CSOs as key WPS policy actors and implementors. Likewise, during the meeting for the adoption of UNSCR 2242, states utilised their platform to acknowledge CSOs' role in the adoption of UNSCR 1325, their local implementation of the resolution in various contexts as discussed above, and CSOs' community initiatives to support women affected by extremist violence (United Nations Security Council 2015b). However, there was minimal acknowledgment and emphasis placed on engaging CSOs as partners in achieving the principles of the resolution. For example, the representative of the Netherlands stated

Before the end of this year, we will issue our third national action plan, the product of a unique platform on which the government has worked with more than 50 civil society organisations. We are providing €4 million a year to carry out the plan, supporting organisations on the ground that work to protect and politically empower women in conflict situations (stated in United Nations Security Council 2015b: 52).

Positioning CSOs as local actors and service deliverers limits the capability of these actors to contribute their knowledge and expertise to inform CT/CVE processes as key WPS policy actors. Local women are made visible during engagement within CT/CVE activities, which places these actors and the CSOs who deliver these initiatives at risk of violent retaliation from extremist groups in communities (d'Estaing 2017).

Although ideally, the integration of CT/CVE in the WPS Agenda and the engagement of CSOs should improve security outcomes for women, the resolution is not without limitations. The Security Council highlights that the inclusion of CSOs and the integration of CT/CVE with the Agenda will "help ensure gender consideration are integrated in the development, prioritisation, coordination and implementation of policies and programs" (United Nations Security Council 2015b: 3). The Council also encourages states to engage in "broad consultation, including with civil society, in particular women's organisations" (United Nations Security Council 2015b: 3). However, the integration of CT/CVE contributed to the closure of close civic spaces for women's organisations (Asante et al. 2021), particularly

local organisations operating within communities that are directly affected by extremist organisations. For instance, it has contributed to the adoption of policies and initiatives that limits CSOs, particularly those in the local context's ability to access international funding, engage in practice, and hold the state accountable for interventions that contradict the principles of the Agenda (Asante et al. 2021; Njoku 2018; Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic and Women Peacemakers Program 2017; Ibezim-Ohaeri 2017; Geuskens et al. 2015). As there is no agreed international definition of the acts that constitute terrorism, states develop their definitions and criterion for the activities that constitute terrorist acts, with this increasing the risks of states prosecuting CSOs for activities that do not align with their CT/CVE ideology (Aroussi 2021; Ibezim-Ohaeri 2017). As such activities aim to restrict CSOs' capability to hold the state accountable for their inaction, this research explores the initiatives adopted by the state as control measures to limit CSOs' engagement in CT/CVE policy development and implementation activities and further explores the dynamics of the state's relationship with CSOs.

Ongoing evidence of the implementation of a gender-blind perspective also weakens opportunities for CSOs' meaningful participation in implementation tasks, and their ability to effectively monitor and evaluate the CT/CVE initiatives proposed by the state to address insecurities experienced by women (White 2022). This has contributed to the lack of significant improvements in security outcomes for women, despite policy commitments amongst states that have integrated the resolution within their NAPs (White 2022; George et al. 2018). For instance, Asante and Shepherd (2020) highlight that among the states that have taken the initiative to integrate the principles of UNSCR 2242 in their NAPs, only a little over half (52%) of these states recognise the need for meaningful engagement, and collaboration with CSOs. However, these states do not articulate within their NAPs the key activities to engage CSOs and ongoing commitments to promote collaboration with these actors (Asante and Shepherd 2020). Furthermore, UNSCR 2242 encourages states to provide the necessary training for CSOs to effectively engage in political and implementation activities (UNSCR 2015b). For instance, Spain and Namibia reported that they would consult CSOs during the design and evaluation of their WPS NAPs (United Nations Security Council 2015b). However, inadequate support and training require CSOs to self-train and develop the skills to navigate political processes (Asante et al. 2021). This highlights the need to understand whether states engage CSOs at the political level. It also emphasises the need for

knowledge on the methods government use to engage and create barriers to political participation.

Additionally, although UNSCR 2242 reaffirms that CSOs' role within WPS resolution implementation should be meaningful as opposed to tokenistic, CSOs are often provided minimal opportunities to engage in implementation activities, with this increasing their risk of co-option into state responses (O'Rourke 2018; United Nations Security Council 2015c; Heathcote 2018; United Nations Security Council 2015a). Although WPS scholarship recognises CSOs' role as key actors during WPS implementation and the Security Council acknowledges their capability to support the effective implementation of WPS initiatives, as Spain led advocacy for the adoption of UNSCR 2242 with support from the UK (Bjorkdahl and Selimovic 2019; United Nations Security Council 2015b), there is minimal state recognition of CSOs role as key domestic CT/CVE and WPS actors (O'Rourke 2018). This evolution within WPS raises concerns regarding the likelihood that CSOs will be engaged in state activities to translate UNSCR 2242. Civil society's minimal inclusion also creates risks for their co-option into national CT/CVE responses and within some nations, places these actors at risk as opponents of the state (Martín De Almagro 2018; Martín de Almagro 2018b; Human Rights Council 2018; Nesiah 2012; Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic and Women Peacemakers Program 2017). O'Rourke (2018) proposed that there was little involvement of CSOs in the adoption of UNSCR 2242 compared to their role in UNSCR 1325. Hence, available literature provides insight into factors that led to the adoption of UNSCR 2242. This study contributes to growing knowledge on the ways that CSOs are engaged in implementation activities.

#### CSOs in CT/CVE through the WPS Agenda

UNSCR 2242 reiterates that the full participation of CSOs in the implementation of the resolution is significant to developing effective CT/CVE strategies that respond to women's security needs. As discussed above, although the adoption of UNSCR 2242 occurred largely as a result of state action, CSOs' speeches prior to the unanimous vote for UNSCR 2242 emphasised the need for gender mainstreaming in the context of terrorism (United Nations

Security Council 2015b; Heathcote 2018). It also helped reaffirm the resolution's necessity and state collaboration with CSOs during national implementation as a best practice approach (United Nations Security Council 2015b; Heathcote 2018). To illustrate, Yana Mohammed, president, and co-founder of the Iraqi Organisation for Women's Freedom, informed the Security Council that women-led CSOs were present in Iraq to support and document cases of ISIS's abuse and enslavement of women (United Nations Security Council 2015b). In some contexts (primarily in Global South states), as the first-line responders to extremist violence, women's organisations have provided psychosocial support to reduce women's vulnerability to extremist organisations, empowered women through leadership, vocational skills training, and micro-financing schemes (Njoku 2021; Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019; O'Reilly 2015; United Nations Security Council 2015b).

The ability of these organisations to promote mediation and foster trust and collaboration between opposing groups has significantly reduced the risks of extremist threats and ongoing violence (Mukhlis et al. 2022; Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019). In Iraq and other Global South nations such as Pakistan and Libya, CSOs have also trained and empowered women at the forefront of conflict zones and in areas where UN and regional aid staff are unable to visit to defend their homes and communities against terrorism and violent extremism (United Nations Security Council 2015b). For example, in Pakistan, training provided by CSO PAIMAN to over 655 mothers has contributed to the deradicalisation of 1,024 young men, and Women Without Borders' anti-radicalisation program has developed women's capacity to detect the early signs of radicalisation (d'Estaing 2017). Similarly, Alaa Murabit, founder of women-led CSO Voices of Libyan Women, recounted that her organisation had engaged in peace dialogues with extremists, utilising religious scriptures, media, and education, to change attitudes towards violence, negative perceptions of women, and to encourage extremist groups to disengage from terrorist activities (United Nations Security Council 2015b).

Additionally, despite international recognition that CSOs are effective in responding to gender inequality and violence, these organisations are under-represented, excluded from international violence and CT/CVE security efforts, or given tokenistic roles, despite their effectiveness in supporting women affected by extremist violence (Matfess 2017; United

Nations Security Council 2015b). As previously mentioned, UNSCR 2242 encourages states to collaborate with CSOs such as women-led organisations in policy and strategic development to create appropriate interventions and counter-narratives that recognise the gendered nature of terrorism and violent extremism (United Nations Security Council 2015c). To address barriers such as CSOs' lack of technical and policy development skills, which states have utilised to justify their decision to restrict CSOs' participation in the national implementation of UNSCR 1325, UNSCR 2242 urges member states to equip CSOs and develop these actors' capacity to meaningfully engage in policy processes (United Nations Security Council 2015c; see also Coomaraswamy 2015). Heathcote (2018) highlights that this is a development in the WPS Agenda, as calls for the engagement of CSOs extend from national spaces, as emphasised in resolution 1325, to include regional and international CT/CVE processes.

This development in the Agenda reinforced in UNSCR 2242 encourages states to recognise and respond to the diverse needs and experiences of women (Heathcote 2018). Although these language developments act as a tool for CSOs to advocate for inclusion within WPS implementation activities, UNSCR 2242 urges governments to allocate funding and resources to support civil society groups' participation. However, Hamilton et al. (2021) highlight that there are few funds allocated to support CSOs' participation in WPS activities, despite these actors' access to networks that can aid governments and the international community to counteract terrorist and extremist activities (see also: United Nations Security Council 2015c; Coomaraswamy 2015; Williams and Aulin 2019). Hence, existing literature provides an understanding that the participation of CSOs is necessary to develop effective CT/CVE initiatives under the WPS Agenda. However, these studies have not explored whether the integration of CT/CVE into the Agenda, a security issue historically addressed by the state, affects their perception of how CSOs can contribute to implementing WPS provisions and principles to counteract terrorism and violent extremism.

In addition, as regional and international government responses to terrorism and violent extremism have focused on strengthening state's security and reinforcing sovereignty, often at the expense of human rights and civil liberties, this affects the full and meaningful participation of CSOs in the implementation of UNSCR 2242 (Demirsu 2017). WPS scholars

argue that the minimal recognition of human rights in the resolution acts as a barrier to the realisation of women's security needs and undermines as opposed to advocating for women's rights (Ní Aoláin 2016; Henty and Eggleston 2018). Regional and international fear over the spread of extremism and its impact on international security also leads to a disregard for international and regional checks and balances, the implementation of CT/CVE strategies in gender-blind ways, and an increase in civilian surveillance and military intervention (Khan 2018; Matias-Martinsen 2014). These anti-terror approaches undermine human rights, freedom, and further create barriers to civil society's meaningful participation and ability to hold the state accountable for breaches of human rights (Chandhoke 2007; Martín de Almagro 2018b). This contributes to Heathcote's (2018: 375) perception that the "Security Council cannot and does not function as a space for feminist law making" as women's rights and security needs do not underpin Security Council decisions. A minimal focus on human rights in the resolution emphasises the need for an enquiry into the spaces created for CSOs to propose CT/CVE initiatives that empower and reinforce women's human rights.

As some states and international organisations allocate funding to CSOs, this situates these actors in a position of authority to call civil society groups to account and influences some civil society actors to function to meet the objectives of their funding bodies, as opposed to meeting the needs of citizens (Martín de Almagro 2018b). For instance, it was concluded in a survey of civil society actors across 61, that civil society opposition to government strategies (particularly those situated in developing nations that are highly dependent on government funding) affected governments' willingness to collaborate with these organisations (Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic 2017). Vocal opposition to governments' CT/CVE strategies placed these organisations at risk as state targets, limited the extent to which they were included in CT/CVE policy development and their access to funding to develop programs to support women (Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic 2017; Malmberg and Dekker 2019; Human Rights Council 2018). This created tension for CSOs, as it situated them in a position to either relinquish their role as political actors to vocalise their opposition to state responses to extremism or overlook state actions to gain opportunities to participate in all areas of CT/CVE policy development (Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic 2017; Malmberg and Dekker 2019).

Moreover, CSOs' preference for 'soft' preventative approaches to terrorism, which employs community-based strategies to address environmental factors which give rise to terrorism, as opposed to 'hard' military counteractive strategies, which rely on state intelligence mechanisms, makes their role concerning the provisions of UNSCR 2242 significant. Traditional 'hard' approaches to terrorism and violent extremism adopted by states focus on addressing the symptoms of extremism through strategies such as an increase in surveillance, intelligence policing, and military violence (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2018). These approaches, which aim to identify, isolate, exclude, and eradicate extremist groups, provide states with short-term relief from extremist violence (van Deventer 2016). However, as they often result in death, it influences individuals' decisions to partake in violent extremism. For example, through an analysis of terrorist incidents between 1981 to 2003, it was reported that governments' breach of civilians' physical integrity rights was a factor that influenced individuals to perpetuate violent extremism (Piazza and Walsh 2010). Likewise, 71% of 718 former militants of extremist organisations such as Boko Haram and Al-Qaida reported in interviews that state military violence, which caused the death of friends or family members, contributed to their decision to join extremist organisations (United Nations Development Programme 2017). On the contrary, 'soft' strategies adopted by the state enable these organisations to meet the needs of citizens while protecting themselves from state intrusion (Organisations for Security and Co-operation Europe 2018). These preventive approaches focus on addressing the social and economic root causes of terrorism and violent extremism through strategies such as inter-faith dialogue, the promotion of marginalised communities' political participation, and activities to promote gender equality (Organisations for Security and Co-operation Europe 2018).

Informed by extensive knowledge of cultural contexts and local dynamics, 'soft' mechanisms contribute to preventing radicalisation, structural gender inequality, and the growth of terrorist organisations (de Londras 2022; Aly et al. 2015). This long-term approach to CT/CVE involves partnership building, the provision of education, training, and services to communities to identify and address factors such as gender violence, socio-economic deprivation, and extremist religious ideologies, which creates an environment conducive to the growth of terrorism (Shanaah and Heath-Kelly 2022; van Deventer 2016). This mutual ownership approach, which empowers and equips communities to support vulnerable groups and individuals at risk of radicalisation, makes CSOs' participation in implementing UNSCR

2242 significant. For instance, Gervasoni (2017) highlights that CSOs' equal participation in CT/CVE policy development enables 'hard power' and 'soft power' approaches to be combined to create 'smart power' holistic CT/CVE strategies. Therefore, evidence exists of CSOs' effectiveness as implementing actors at the national level; however, there is little understanding of the initiatives that states adopt to enable these actors to participate in political processes to translate and implement CT/CVE initiatives in alignment with UNSCR 2242, which I explore in this study.

## **Conclusion**

Overall, existing research shows that CSOs' advocacy, Agenda-setting, and activities to mainstream gender-perspective within institutions significantly influenced the adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325. These actions, which have contributed to the recognition of CSOs as 'experts' on women's issues and key WPS actors, place these institutions in a position to monitor and evaluate states' WPS actions and hold them accountable for meeting their WPS obligations. Despite this, as CSOs lack legal authority within nations to implement policies and WPS activities on behalf of the state, and some civil society agencies' survival is dependent on state funding and resources, this creates a mutually dependent relationship and, at times, a subordinate relationship between civil society groups and the state. Existing research also provides an understanding that, unlike UNSCR 1325, states were primary actors in the adoption of UNSCR 2242, and the participation of these actors in activities to develop and implement CT/CVE initiatives is critical to ensure that states adopt measures that also address women's security concerns and human rights protections. Although research has explored the limitations of UNSCR 2242 and CSOs' participation in CT/CVE activities, there is little understanding of the relationship between the state and CSOs during the process, the initiatives adopted to integrate the resolution with/as policies in the domestic context, and the ways that different initiatives can exclude civil society from political and implementation activities. To understand these factors, there is a need to examine processes to develop policies in alignment with the resolution, and then examine efforts to implement and enforce these policies in the domestic context. Exploring and applying a relevant framework from policy studies will respond to current gaps in WPS knowledge by providing greater insights into activities to translate the resolution nationally and the levels of ambiguity and conflict

that inform the process. In the following chapter, I introduce the framework that I use in the research and further elaborate on research design.

## Chapter Three: Theory and Methods

This chapter presents the research design used in this study. It discusses the methods of data collection and data analysis used to explore roles and opportunities created for CSOs to participate in the implementation of UNSCR 2242, and strategies adopted by states to engage CSOs in processes to develop initiatives in alignment with UNSCR 2242. In exploring these factors, the study aims to address the primary research question: *In what ways, and with what effects, are civil society organizations engaged in the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria, the UK and Spain?* Firstly, the chapter outlines the conceptual framework underpinning the study. This section explores debates surrounding whether WPS and in particular UNSCR 2242 is a normative framework, an international legal framework, or a policy framework. I focus on the conceptualization of WPS as policy in the framework informing the study, as the concepts adopted in a study shape theoretical understanding and I wish to explore the factors that influence states to adopt the WPS Agenda, how the Agenda is interpreted, and – critically – the measures adopted for implementation in domestic policy. This leads to engagement with debates surrounding policy implementation and the two dominant approaches to policy implementation: top-down and bottom-up. These two perspectives are further discussed in the following section which presents the theoretical framework, the Ambiguity-Conflict Model. This section explores the model and elaborates on how the four variants of implementation it predicts can be applied to understand the various ways in which states implement UNSCR 2242. Secondly, this chapter presents the research methods adopted in the study, which consists of focused interviews and surveys. The chapter outlines the research design, with this consisting of the methods applied, reflections on the data collection process, the process for selecting the sample size, the data analysis process, and the ethical dimensions of this study.

## Conceptualising WPS

### WPS as an International Legal Framework

In contrast, some scholars conceptualize the WPS Agenda as a legal framework as its values reflect principles embedded within legally binding international standards, conventions, and treaties. Humanitarian laws developed by United Nations (UN) institutions are binding on UN member states as under Article 25 of the UN Charter, "members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council" (United Nations 1941). Article 41 of the UN Charter reinforces the binding nature of international legal frameworks and decisions made by the Security Council, by providing the Council with authority to impose sanctions on states for non-compliance (United Nations 1941). As mentioned in Chapter 2, as the Security Council formally adopted the WPS Agenda, some civil society organizations (CSOs), feminist and legal scholars argue that UNSCR 1325 and its resolutions are legal frameworks that are binding on states, and thus states should be sanctioned for refusal to meet their WPS obligations (Hodson and Lavers 2019; Appiagyei-Atua 2011). Likewise, as the values and principles underpinning the Agenda's resolutions are reflective of legal obligations incorporated within international and regional laws, treaties and customs, some scholars argue that the Agenda's resolutions are a body of law (Tryggestad 2009; Greenman and Lavers 2019; Appiagyei-Atua 2011). For instance, the Agenda refers to treaties such as the Geneva Conventions 1949, the 1977 Additional Protocols, and treaties such as the Rome Statute 1998. Lewis et al. (2015) argue that recognizing WPS as an international legal framework and an extension of existing international humanitarian and human rights law, will encourage greater implementation of the Agenda within national contexts and increase states' commitment to addressing the gendered impact of conflict on women. The *prevention* pillar of the Agenda reflects Articles 5(a) and 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which places a legal obligation on states to implement measures to address practices that promotes gender stereotypes and positions women as inferior (True 2016). Women's right to *protection* from sexual and conflict-related sexual violence, a primary principle in UNSCR 1325 also reflects Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which articulates that all individuals are entitled to protection under the law without discrimination (Bechtold et al. 2015).

Despite this, the binding nature of Security Council resolutions and in particular UNSCR 2242 has not been without debate. As some scholars interpret resolutions created under Chapter VI as a set of principles aimed to guide national and international practice, UNSCR 1325 is perceived as a moral imperative as opposed to being legally binding (Otto 2009). This perception and debates surrounding the Security Council's role as an organ to provide states guidance to reach peaceful agreements, suggests that UNSCR 1325 and other measures adopted under Chapter VI are non-coercive 'soft' international laws (Otto 2009). In its 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice raises questions about the binding nature of all resolutions adopted by the Security Council as it states.

"the language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analyzed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In the view of the nature of powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council" (International Court of Justice 1971).

As discussed above, a lack of compliance with legally binding frameworks increases the likelihood that sanctions will be imposed on a state by the Security Council. Although states are encouraged to articulate within their NAPs funds to implement proposed WPS initiatives domestically, for example, "a large percentage of NAPs fail to allocate a specific budget for WPS activities" (Hamilton et al. 2020: 13). Despite this, sanctions are not imposed on states without a NAP or are yet to allocate funding to implement WPS domestically. As the conceptualization of WPS as a binding legal framework within international and national contexts is limited, this raises questions as to whether the Agenda is best conceptualised as a normative framework.

## WPS as a Normative Framework

Norms refer to the ideal realm of political and social reality, outlining standards that are

perceived to be appropriate. As a normative framework, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda aims to promote gender equality for women during times of conflict and peace, as it promotes their agency and situates women as key security actors (Trojanowska 2020; True and Davies 2017). Some scholars conceptualize the Agenda as a set of norms as opposed to a single norm (Björkdahl and Selimovic 2019; Tryggestad 2010; Davies 2016). However, other scholars argue that the WPS Agenda is a “plural, overlapping, and ambiguous set of norms, ideas, principles, deeply held personal beliefs and policy actions” (Kirby and Shepherd 2021: 20). As a set of overlapping norms, the Agenda includes norms such as the protection of women’s rights and bodies in conflict; the prevention of violence and women’s participation in peace and security governance (United Security Council 2020). These norms, which each imply the behavioural standards expected of actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), collectively encourage states to ensure that there is an increase in women’s representation and meaningful participation in all levels of peace and security governance (United Nations Security Council 2000). These norms also encourage states to implement early-intervention measures to protect and prevent gendered-based violence towards women and to reinforce their right to political participation and security (United Nations Security Council 2000).

Norm diffusion models provide insights into adopting and implementing international frames within national contexts. Norm life cycle models suggest that diffusion begins when a norm reaches its ‘tipping point,’ as an increasing number of states adopt a norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This vertical flow of adoption indicates that norm entrepreneurs collaborate to influence states to adopt a norm (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Anderson 2010). For instance, the ‘boomerang pattern’ (Keck and Sikkink 1999) and the ‘spiral model’ (Shahid and Yerbury 2014) suggest that civil society organizations’ (CSOs) ability to collaborate to bring attention to global issues contributes to influencing the national socialization of international norms. For instance, national and transnational CSOs’ ability to bring women’s experiences of conflict to global platforms contributed to the adoption of the WPS Agenda in 2000 (Chinkin 2019; Anderlini 2019; True 2003). At the domestic level, states experience normative change with the development of a National Action Plan (NAP), the creation of policies and procedures, and the proposal and implementation of measures that align with the norm's values, contributing to the legitimization of the norm (Shahid and Yerbury 2014; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

Conceptualising the Agenda as a normative framework within the domestic context provides insight into how the Agenda is reinterpreted at the national level: how meanings are attached to the Agenda; the norms of interest to states; and the diffusion approach adopted (Björkdahl and Selimovic 2019). Similarly, as some WPS norms require states to implement measures and others aim to encourage states to restrict practices, conceptualising the Agenda as a set of norms creates a distinction between these types of norms and knowledge of the factors that may influence states' preference for a particular norm (Aharoni 2014). Despite this, there are limitations to the WPS Agenda's conceptualization as a normative framework within local contexts.

Although norm diffusion models explain why some scholars may perceive the pillars of the Agenda as a normative framework, there are limitations to this conceptualization. As there is no single approach by which international norms are communicated and localized – as norms are “‘processes’ ... works-in-progress, rather than ... finished products” (Krook and True 2012: 9) – the pillars of the Agenda have to be reinterpreted as a set of policies within domestic contexts, to provide a pathway for localization (on norm conceptualisation, see Acharya 2004). As the resolutions comprising the Agenda also require states to monitor and evaluate initiatives proposed within NAPs, the structuring and interpretation of the norms as policies and legislations within national contexts is required to develop measures to specifically monitor and evaluate implementation activities and achieve accountability. Likewise, although the WPS Agenda aims to achieve gender equality and gender-representation, as ‘norms are not power-neutral’, how they are interpreted and implemented may contribute to power imbalances and some groups’ marginalization of women (True 2013). For example, although the WPS Agenda promotes gender-equality, the Rwandan NAP significantly focuses on measures to protect women from violence and positions women as victims as opposed to agential (Björkdahl and Selimovic 2015). Norm theory also provides a limited understanding of the ways that normative change occurs during the diffusion process, why they gain acceptance across certain domestic contexts, and why they fail to achieve their intended purposes within some contexts (Krook and True 2012). Although providing some insights into the principles and standards which inform the Agenda, its conceptualization as a normative framework assumes that the Agenda and processes to accept, transfer and

implement the Agenda within local contexts are seamless. Hence, despite the traditional conceptualization of WPS as a normative framework, this approach fails to capture ongoing tensions between actors involved in the process, its complexities, its multiple reproductions within domestic contexts, and challenges to achieving implementation (Kirby and Shepherd 2021). These limitations highlight that although framing as a norm provides insights into how the Agenda is perceived at the international level, to better understand its domestic implementation, there is a need to consider whether conceptualising it as a policy framework will provide a thorough understanding of its journey in the domestic context.

### WPS as a Policy Framework

In this research, the WPS Agenda is conceptualized as a matter of domestic and international policy. Conceptualising WPS as a policy framework provides knowledge of the meanings that states attach to international norms in domestic policy contexts and enables the application of a clear set of policy-theoretical frameworks to understand the laws, procedures, and measures adopted to implement, evaluate, and reform policies developed. Policy refers to the process of “development, enactment, and implementation of a plan or a course of action carried out through a law, rule or code” (Bogenschneider and Corbett 2010: 3). There are various models for policy development, with each providing a different insight into the lifecycle of policy and its transfer process. However, collectively these models provide an understanding that policy gains legitimacy through adoption by a government (Hahn 1987). Stone (2008: 25) suggests that there are four stages of the policy cycle: “1. Problem definition and Agenda setting; 2. Formal decision-making; 3. Policy implementation; and 4. Monitoring and evaluation”. The process of localizing international norms within national contexts as domestic policies begin at the first stage, as the meaning attached to an issue or an international norm shapes government decision around the circumstances where the proposed policy is to take effect and legislations which enforce the actions proposed within the policy (Woll 1974). Domestic reinterpretation of international resolutions and the actions adopted in alignment with the meaning attached to the resolution also influences procedures developed which articulate the process to operationalize the policy within a society (Gerston 2010). As this procedure outlines specific tasks and responsibilities assigned to individuals and resources allocated to achieve implementation, the WPS Agenda can be conceptualized as a

policy framework within domestic contexts.

As the WPS resolutions articulate that the effective implementation of the Agenda requires the development of national-level policies and procedures, states are encouraged to engage in these activities to show their commitment to the Agenda. UNSCR 1325 also urges states to mainstream gendered perspectives into peace and security processes, develop institutional measures to ensure the protection and participation of women and girls within peace processes, and the implementation of measures to support local women's peacebuilding activities (United Nations Security Council 2000). Similarly, UNSCR 2242 also articulates that there are specific actions and activities to be undertaken by states to implement counterterrorism and counter-violent extremist initiatives domestically. For instance, the resolution urges the national "implementation of policies and programs" (United Nations Security Council 2015: 3) to encourage civil society's representation within counter-terrorism initiative development and measures that ensure access to financial services for local counter-extremist programs. A state's ability to achieve these tasks requires the engagement with WPS resolutions as policy frameworks within national contexts and the allocation of responsibilities and resources to achieve implementation. As states are also required to develop measures to monitor and evaluate WPS initiatives (United Nations Security Council 2015), the reproduction of the Agenda within domestic and local contexts as a policy framework enables accountability measures to be established at each government level.

For the purposes of this study, I conceptualize the WPS Agenda as a policy framework, although WPS scholarship and some feminist and legal scholars conceptualize the Agenda as a normative or an international legal framework. Although WPS resolutions propose activities that states are to undertake as part of their commitment to the Agenda, as states determine when and how they implement the Agenda, conceptualising WPS as a policy framework provides insights into the meanings attached to various aspects of the Agenda in the process of its articulation into the domestic policy environment, and the roles of implementing actors, and measures adopted to localize the Agenda. Conceptualising WPS as a policy framework also enables the application of a flexible policy model to understand how context influences the implementation of UNSCR 2242 domestically. In the next section, I discuss policy implementation debates and explore the theoretical framework adopted in this

study.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Policy Implementation**

Policy implementation refers to the period between decisions to adopt a policy and when it is evaluated. During the process, implementing actors interact to translate actions and guidelines created during the policy development phase into practice, to achieve desired political outcomes (Khan 2016). Despite this, there is a lack of consensus amongst scholars in regard to when policy implementation commences and concludes. Some scholars argue that policy implementation begins immediately after adopting a policy (Joachim 2004; Schneider 1982) and ends before the adoption of procedures to acknowledge the policy (Schneider 1982; Sharpe 2019). Others suggest that the translation of policy decisions into practice does not occur in a streamlined process, as knowledge developed during the implementation phase, can influence new policy development (Birkland 2010).

Similarly, the implementation approach adopted influences definitions of policy implementation and perception of when it commences and concludes. For instance, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983: 20), who adopt a top-down approach, define policy implementation as “the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but can also take the form of important executive order”. Policy implementation is perceived as a linear process that begins when policies are adopted, decisions are made with regards to the actors to participate in the implementation process, and when consensus is achieved between implementing actors with regard to their status, their role, and responsibilities (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983). In contrast, Barrett and Fudge (1981), who adopt a bottom-up perspective, define policy implementation as a continuous interaction and negotiation process between high-level implementers and low-level actors who put policies into action. In both approaches, compliance between high-level and low-level actors enables policies to be implemented, evaluated to identify intended and unintended outcomes, and reformed if required (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983). As this research aims to understand the

state and CSOs' relationship during the implementation of the UNSCR 2242 through the exploration of implementing actors' perceptions and activities, a broad definition of policy implementation is adopted. This study uses Van Meter and Horn's (1975: 447) definition of policy implementation as actions and activities undertaken by public officials and agencies, to achieve policy objectives. The two approaches to policy implementation, top-down and bottom-up, are explored below.

### Top-Down Perspective

A top-down approach to policy implementation is characterized by division within the political sphere. According to this approach, policy design, development, and decision-making occur within one sphere, while implementation is conducted within another (deLeon and deLeon 2002). Based on a hierarchical model, this approach consists of policy designers such as legislators, policymakers, and judicial executives situated within the highest levels of government and are supportive of the policy's objectives (deLeon and deLeon 2002). These actors develop and make decisions in regard to the goals informing policies and their expected outcome (Signe 2017; Sylvester and Ferrara 2003). Agencies and groups situated below this bureaucratic apex are assumed to be subordinate (Signe 2017). Located within the lowest levels of policy administration and civil society groups, these political actors are perceived to be passive receivers who are obliged to implement policies through service delivery and in accordance with procedures developed by higher-level political actors (Cloete and Wissink 2000). Moya (2002: 28) highlights that this "authoritarian neutral Weberian machine bureaucracy" process with clear boundaries regarding the role of actors, and actions required of implementors, is assumed to result in successful policy implementation. This is likely to be evident within the Nigerian context, where the state has historically closed political spaces to CSOs, and within the UK context where CSOs are limited access to government spaces and are often funded to engage in implementation activities at the local levels. Unsuccessful policy implementation is perceived to be due to obstacles affecting the policy implementation process. For instance, a lack of clear communication between actors, or low-level implementors' unwillingness to implement policies in accordance with pre-developed guidelines, decreases the likelihood that policy implementation will succeed (Barret 2004).

However, a top-down approach to policy implementation is not without criticism. This approach assumes that implementing actors have acquired the knowledge and skills required to successfully engage in their implementation activities. The policy approach fails to acknowledge implementors' ability to engage in activities that reflect their political goals instead of the objectives of policies to be implemented (Schofield 2001). As ongoing international pressure and civil society advocacy contributed to influence the integration of UNSCR 2242 in the country's NAP (Asante 2022) and the state has historically limited CSOs CT/CVE activities, it is likely that due to the lack of political willingness, these actors will implement measures in alignment with UNSCR 2242 and their CT/CVE ideology as opposed to the measures proposed by the state. Top-down perspective also assumes that there is a linear "engineering approach" (Rittel and Webbers 1973 cited in Signe 2017: 13), to policy implementation, with high-level actors controlling the implementation process while low-level actors implement policies within communities with "military precision" (Cloete and Wissink 2000: 168). However, as many societies are pluralistic, differences within actors' values and political perspectives create challenges in obtaining consensus and introduce complexity during the policy implementation process (Head and Alford 2013). For instance, this perspective fails to acknowledge the discretion and power exercised by lower-level bureaucrats such as civil society groups, who may modify policies during practice to reflect the needs of those who benefit from its implementation (Carey et al. 2019). Moreover, a top-down perspective focuses on the group developing policies and assumes that there are sufficient resources available for successful implementation. However, it overlooks the social and environmental factors required for policies to be effective within communities (Carey et al. 2019; Cerna 2013).

### Bottom-Up Perspective

In contrast, a bottom-up perspective, developed in the 1990s in response to criticism of the top-down approach, views policy implementation from the perspectives of those affected by the policy and street-level policy implementors such as CSOs (Matland 1995). This approach suggests that low-level implementors who rely on higher-level agents to implement policies in

practice are significant actors who ensure policies' success within their intended context (Lipsky 1980). For instance, Lipsky (1980) argues that low-level implementors are the main actors in developing and implementing policies, as these actors are committed to the success of its implementation. As a centralized approach to policy implementation fails to consider local contexts and limits flexibility, policy implementation within a bottom-up approach is perceived as an ongoing environmental process, consisting of negotiation and cooperation between various actors (Signe 2017). Implementors participating in this process rely on local knowledge and their professional experiences to modify policies to reflect communities' values and needs (Cameron 2003). As spaces are created to enable Spanish CSOs to provide feedback to state actors and CT/CVE initiatives proposed to encourage innovation at the local level, CSOs within this context will likely adapt programs to reflect local women's changing needs.

Despite this, there are limitations to the bottom-up perspective's applicability to policy implementation processes. Some scholars highlight that front-line political implementors' role within the policy implementation process is over-emphasized (Signe 2017; Birkland 2010). Although these actors have the discretion to modify policies during practice to reflect civilians' needs, the objectives of policies are pre-determined by higher-level bureaucrats (Signe 2017). To some degree, this limits the extent of collaboration between actors during this policy implementation process. Likewise, the bottom-up perspective overlooks power differences between implementing actors. Although actors engage in negotiations and reach a consensus during policy-decision making, high-level bureaucrats compared to those with a lower status, have greater authority and control over the implementation process (Birkland 2010). For instance, Matland (1995) highlights that as street-level bureaucrats lack political power, they rely on higher-level actors to make political decisions and develop implementation procedures.

Although top-down and bottom-up perspectives provide a framework for understanding how policy implementation may occur within local contexts, their applicability to the translation of international policies such as UNSCR 2242 into the domestic context is limited. The translation of international norms and policies such as UNSCR 2242 to some extent reflects a top-down approach to policy implementation. As discussed in Chapter Two, the adoption of the resolution occurred because of growing international fear over terrorist threats to

international security and Spain and the United Kingdom's (UK) motivation for the resolution, with little input from CSOs. International norms about gender in CT/CVE, women's role in security governance, and actions required of states to address terror threats to women were developed, negotiated, and agreed on by members of the Security Council, through the formal adoption of UNSCR 2242. It involves developing steps and actions required for states to introduce and integrate the international norm into the domestic context to indicate their intention to comply. In the case of UNSCR 2242, states formally recognize and signify their compliance with the resolution by adopting and translating the objectives and principles of the Agenda into their Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) NAPs and other domestic policy documents. These WPS NAPs outline initiatives that states have proposed to implement to acknowledge the policy (Shawki 2017; Jonjic-Beitter et al. 2019). Shawki (2017) suggests that this process reflects a top-down approach. The translation process, which involves transferring the goals, content, and ideologies informing the international policy into a domestic context, requires decisions to be formally made by an actor with legal and political authority. A top-down approach assumes that actors within domestic contexts are submissive to international policies and frameworks and at the national level, lower-level governmental and non-state actors are under the authority of the state government (Cloete and Wissink 2000). This actor has the capability to influence the activities and actions of lower-level actors, and legitimise or impose sanctions that affect other actors' ability to function.

However, states exercise the discretion to operationalise UNSCR 2242 in the domestic context. As governments are not at risk of Security Council sanctions if they are opposed to adopting the resolution or are reluctant to translate it domestically, these perspectives on policy implementation provide little insight into the domestic translation of UNSCR 2242. In contrast, the bottom-up perspective assumes that the translation of international policy into local context occurs because of domestic consideration and interest within the policy area (Betts and Orchard 2014). For instance, pressure from local and civil society activists or a country's perception that a policy aligns with their national and foreign interests influences their policy adoption. This perspective, which is reflected in Keck and Sikkink's work (1999), assumes that CSOs' actions are a significant factor in determining whether states adopt international policies and are primary actors in the policy translation process. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, however, CSOs often lack political power (Cabrera-

Balleza 2011). These organizations' ability to influence government actions is based on the strength of CSOs coalition within states (Matland 1995). As CSOs are also reliant on state actors to create political spaces which create opportunities for their participation in policy processes (Kilby 2004), the degree to which the bottom-up perspective provides an understanding of the domestic translation of UNSCR 2242 is also limited. Therefore, these perspectives provide limited insight into the translation of the resolution.

### Synthesisers

Synthesisers provide a comprehensive understanding of policy implementation processes. As earlier discussed, bottom-up and top-down perspectives contribute some knowledge on policy implementation. However, as both top-down and bottom-up approaches improve insight into policy implementation, neither framework should be exclusive (Brynard 2000; deLeon and deLeon 2002). In response to the limitations of both top-down and bottom-up approaches, some scholars have proposed synthesized approaches, which combine both. Of particular relevance: Elmore (1979, 1985) introduces a forward and backward mapping model, which assumes that policy implementation is a centralised process; Matland (1995) presents the ambiguity-conflict model (ACM) of policy implementation; Sabatier (1986, 1988) argues that advocacy coalitions should form the unit of analysis when studying policy implementation and places greater focus on policy changes as opposed to implementation; and Goggin et al. (1990) introduces a communication model for understanding policy implementation within intergovernmental agencies. The communication model uses communication as the unit of policy analysis as opposed to focusing on all the factors which can influence the policy implementation process (Cline 2000).

Matland's (1995) ACM provides a framework for understanding policy implementation and the role of various actors during the process, making it useful for this research. As this model also provides a matrix for understanding the implementation process, its application in this study will provide insights into the roles performed by CSOs during the national implementation of UNSCR 2242, the implementation factors that are unique to each context, and how the state governs implementation. Similarly, as the case study nations are still in the

process of fulfilling the objectives of the resolution, the model will provide knowledge into the implementation approach adopted by state governments. As the model is applied to understand the integration and implementation of the resolution; this research thus contributes both to an empirical understanding of the role of CSOs in the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria, the UK, and Spain, and theoretical knowledge about approaches to WPS implementation adopted by states.

### **The Ambiguity-Conflict Model (ACM)**

The ACM provides a framework to explore the levels of ambiguity and conflict that shape policy implementation. The levels of ambiguity and conflict inform the policies proposed, the means to policy implementation, the opportunities provided to non-state actors, and the outcomes of policies implemented. The first of the two concepts in the ACM, policy ambiguity, indicates that ambiguity within the policy implementation process develops from two sources: “ambiguity of policy goals and ambiguity of policy means” (Matland 1995: 157). However, the impact that ambiguity has on the implementation process is dependent on the source in focus. Ambiguous policy goals increase the likelihood that implementing agents will misinterpret objectives, creating challenges during implementation (Feldman and March 1981). As ambiguity also decreases implementing actors’ ability to comprehend the negative impact that the proposed policy will have on their role, objectives, and authority, it reduces implementors' likelihood to oppose the policy and improves its likelihood to be implemented (Berman 1978). Similarly, ambiguity also affects the means of policy. A lack of clarity surrounding the strategies to be adopted, the tools required for implementation, the role of implementing actors within the process, and the means to implementation, can create challenges and uncertainty around its impact (Matland 1995). However, the ambiguity of policy means (lack of awareness of technology and resources for implementing, lack of knowledge of the role of different actors, and a poorly-specified environment for implementation) can also create opportunities for developing new policy goals, funding to test the new policy, and the development of new knowledge on policy implementation (Matland 1995). The level of policy ambiguity (of goals and means) affects the implementation process. For instance, Matland (1995: 159) states: “it influences the ability of superiors to monitor activities, the likelihood that the policy is uniformly understood across

the many implementation sites, the probability that local contextual factors play a significant role, and the degree to which relevant actors vary sharply across implementation sites”.

It must be noted at this stage that although this model indicates that ambiguity affects policy goals and means, some scholars argue otherwise. Yanow (1996: 183) suggests that an agency's actions and values with authority to oversee the implementation process are *necessarily* ambiguous because they are symbolic; they reflect existing organisational symbols or add new meanings. For instance, although goals informing policies proposed by state authorities may not be explicit, policy goals and means of implementation are determined from the outset by the agency in authority (Yanow 1996: 183). Policy goals and means to implementation are evident within symbols such as the name given to a policy, the language and metaphors used when proposing the policy, and how it is marketed to low-level implementors (Yanow 1996: 184). For example, states might propose CT/CVE initiatives and implementation opportunities to CSOs, which may appear meaningful, but have ambiguous outcomes, to encourage compliance from these organizations, though these initiatives and opportunities may be ineffective in practice and tokenistic. Historically, the state responds to counter-terrorism and has provided minimal opportunities for these organizations to participate in counter-terrorism activities. States may propose collaborating with CSOs to encourage these organisations to promote a counter-terrorism ideology.<sup>2</sup> This was evident within the Nigerian context, where some spaces for policy engagement were provided to some nationally operating CSOs to participate in the initial consultation process to translate UNSCR 2242, despite the lack of political will to further engage these actors and fulfil the requirements of the resolution as explored in Chapter 4.


The second concept in the ACM, policy conflict, examines differences in opinion between implementing agents regarding the policy's goals and objectives. The concept suggests that as organizations within the bureaucratic political process are interdependent, there is a need for agreement between actors regarding a policy's goal (Matland 1995). Conflict occurs when implementors perceive the policy as essential to achieving their political objectives, but they

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<sup>2</sup> However, there may be little intention by the state to create opportunities for participation, due to differences in values and opinions, which is also explored in relation to policy conflict discussed below.

hold contradictory views regarding the goals and objectives that should inform a policy (Paudel 2009). This conflict sometimes influences actors to adopt a bargaining approach, to achieve consensus and maintain existing relationships (Paudel 2009). However, bargaining does not guarantee that implementors will agree to a policy goal but increases the likelihood that actors agree to the means of implementing a policy (Cerna 2013).

Despite this, as implementors' values, ideologies, and frameworks differ, disagreements can develop over the type of measures adopted when implementing a policy. For instance, conflict can arise over the level of discretion that agents can exercise during the implementation process (Jensen et al. 2018). Conflict between actors is likely to arise when there is an increased interest in the policy and actors perceive it as beneficial and relevant to their political objectives (Jensen et al. 2018). An increase in conflict also increases the likelihood that the policy will be opposed by implementing actors (Jensen et al. 2018). The level of conflict also affects policy implementation. For instance, high conflict levels restrict implementation as it encourages agencies to utilize coercive approaches to obtain desired political outcomes. This to some extent reflects the UK system where significant conflict contributed to the use of coercive measures to limit spaces for CSOs criticism of the state, which is further explored in Chapter Five. Simultaneously, dialogue and problem-resolution measures are adopted when there is low conflict (Matland 1995), as evident in the Spanish context, which is further explored in Chapter Six. Matland (1995) combines the various policy conflict levels and ambiguity to develop a fourfold typology that describes the quality of implementation we would expect to find when analyzing policy implementation processes (*administrative implementation, political implementation, experimental implementation, symbolic implementation*). The four types of implementation are explored below.



*Figure 1: Ambiguity Conflict Model (Matland 1995)*

### Administrative Implementation

Characterized by low ambiguity and low conflict, administrative implementation reflects a top-down approach to policy implementation. Policy goals developed during this process are pre-determined with sufficient resources allocated to achieve the desired implementation outcomes (Hebert 1960). The implementation process begins with clear policy decisions made by a central authority, which are communicated down to lower-level implementing agents (Matland 1995). As this implementation approach is characterized by low ambiguity, the roles, responsibilities, and tasks completed by actors at each implementation stage are clearly defined (deLeon and deLeon 2002). Matland (1995) indicates that defined policy goals, roles, and responsibilities create clarity within the policy implementation process. It provides agents insight into the activities required of them and the type of resources needed for policy implementation. This information aids implementors to secure implementing resources, to accelerate the implementation process (Matland 1995). As this process is characterised by low-conflict and a linear policy implementation process, normative

compliance approaches are utilised by higher authorities to gain compliance from lower-level implementors (Etzioni 1961; Matland 1995).

However, this type of implementation is not without its limitations. Implementation failure within this process occurs due to obstacles affecting implementors' ability to communicate, limited resources, or unexplained deviant behaviour. Communication challenges such as miscommunication between implementors and misinterpretation of information delivered from one actor to the other reduce the clarity of the objectives of policies and awareness of actors' actions to implement the policy (Matland 1995) successfully. The lack of resources necessary to complete the policy implementation process, challenges accessing resources, and limited periods to complete implementation also affect the process's efficiency (Matland 1995). These obstacles, the unavailability of measures to monitor actors' behaviour and address deviance, significantly reduces the likelihood that policy implementation will succeed by more than 50% (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973).

In the context of the domestic implementation of resolution 2242, *administrative implementation* suggests that state governments solely determine when their nation adopts the resolution and govern the process of translating the Agenda's objectives into the domestic context. These state actors inform policy developers and analysts within departments responsible for developing WPS-related initiatives of the policies and measures to be developed and implemented to comply with resolution 2242. This model assumes that high-level state actors determine the individuals and organisations who participate in the implementation and their role within the process. These high-level actors also determine the resources to be allocated to develop CT/CVE initiatives that integrate gendered perspectives and situate women as partners and CT/CVE agents instead of victims. In this model, state WPS policy actors develop policies, programs, and measures based on the objectives of higher-level actors' resolution and expectations. Guidelines outline the role and activities performed by lower-level implementors such as CSOs.

This model implies that civil society agencies selected to implement pre-developed CT/CVE initiatives such as service delivery or promote socially desirable ideologies are those likely to

agree with government ideologies on CT/CVE or share similar values to the state. These agencies are also likely to agree to pre-develop implementation guidelines regardless of whether they are ineffective in practice. Funding, reporting, and monitoring measures imposed by the state are likely to be approved by these actors. However, they may situate women's security needs as secondary to meeting service delivery targets. As service delivery contracts are likely to limit flexibility and close opportunities for agencies to provide feedback on the effectiveness of CT/CVE measures implemented and whether they address women's security needs, dialogue is sufficient to obtain compliance from CSOs. This to some extent reflects the Spanish context, where state actors determined the policies that informed WPS and CT/CVE activities and the measures to be implemented. However, unlike the model, CSOs are provided the spaces to be innovative, provide feedback to the state, and the opportunities to prioritise local women's needs as opposed to the state's CT/CVE ideology, which is further discussed in chapter six.

### Political Implementation

Political implementation is the result of low ambiguity and high conflict. This process reflects a top-down policy implementation approach, as it consists of defined policy goals and a decision-making authority with control over the outcome of the implementation process (Matland 1995). However, as actors have different views of the goals that should inform policies and policy implementation, this framework consists of high conflict (deLeon and deLeon 2002). Conflict within the implementation process is prominent during policy design, as actors with power bargain or coerce those with less power to agree to their decisions (Durant 1984; Matland 1995). However, coercive powers do not correlate to all actors' compliance, as some resources required for policy implementation are controlled by external implementing agencies or internal agencies who may disagree with the proposed policy (Matland 1995; Ingram 1977). This opposition requires actors with authority to utilise significant force or bargaining power to gain access to required implementing resources if policy implementation is to succeed (Ingram 1977). Matland (1995) emphasises that the nature of existing relationships between the implementing agencies and the higher the level of coercion imposed increases the likelihood of both compliance and implementors gaining access to resources required to complete the policy implementation process. The existing

conflict between actors is resolved through mechanisms such as payments, and those that are not addressed are resolved at a later stage (Matland 1995).

Implementation of UNSCR 2242, according to the characteristics of *political implementation*, would indicate that although CSOs have little input in decisions regarding the adoption of the resolution's provisions, they influence the implementation process. As this variant is characterized by low ambiguity, it is unlikely that states will create opportunities for CSO executives to participate in formal meetings to design CT/CVE initiatives or contribute their expert advice on measures appropriate to empower and prevent extremist threats to women. However, as the goals informing CT/CVE policies and initiatives are characterised by low ambiguity, CSOs are likely to be aware of the goals informing policies and initiatives to be implemented. This provides CSOs insight into the implications that proposed CT/CVE would have on their authority and role within the implementation process. This model presumes that CSOs have increased awareness of the threats that proposed policies will have on their authority, which provides agencies opposed to the policy with an opportunity to decline to participate in the implementation process.

According to this model, state WPS actors are likely to adopt bargaining measures, such as increasing resources and funding accessible to CSOs or offering training to these agencies to encourage CSOs to participate in the implementation process and achieve compliance. These measures are likely to convince CSOs dependent on state funding to accept service delivery contracts and agree to state monitoring measures. However, independently funded CSOs who have historically criticised government approaches to CT/CVE and measures proposed to address women's security needs are unlikely to be influenced by these measures. As compliance poses high risks (a decrease in actors' implementation discretion, limited ability to highlight policy limitations, and damage to agencies' reputation), the state may utilize coercive measures that close spaces for CSOs to operate within CT/CVE activities and civic spaces. For instance, the state may threaten to impose legislation restricting CSOs' access to external funding or label agencies' CT/CVE actions as a threat to state interests, to cause reputational disrepute. If these actions result in compliance, it is likely to create challenges and delay the implementation process. For example, CSOs may be opposed to proposed implementation means or delay the implementation process to gain more leverage. As a

significant number of CSOs in the country are funded by international organisations and there is a history of tension between the state and CSOs, it was predicted that this implementation approach would be evident within the Nigerian context. However, as discussed in chapter 4, CSOs were willing to align their CT/CVE measures with that proposed by the state, for access to political spaces.

### Experimental Implementation

Experimental implementation, characterised by high ambiguity and low conflict, reflects a bottom-up approach to policy implementation. This framework indicates that the context for policy implementation significantly impacts the implementation process, as its success depends on the availability of resources and implementors within the microenvironment (Matland 1995). Characterised by high ambiguity, experimental policy implementation processes differ across contexts (deLeon and deLeon 2002). For example, available resources, time constraints, policy objectives, and means to its implementation are dependent on the environment (Mohr 1995). These factors, and the lack of conflict in this form of implementation, create opportunities for high and low implementors to shape the policy implementation process to meet civilians' needs (Matland 1995). Policies may lack clear goals and means, or implementors might disagree on means (Matland 1995). However, the experimental nature of implementation in situations of high ambiguity and low conflict creates opportunities for new implementation knowledge to be developed within various contexts to ensure that policies reflect local needs (Sabatier 1986). As local actors such as CSOs integrate local and professional expertise into their activities when implementing policies, coercion from higher-level actors to conform to strict implementation guidelines reduces the likelihood that new knowledge will be developed (Matland 1995; deLeon and deLeon 2002).

In experimental implementation of UNSCR 2242 we would expect to see significant opportunities for CSOs to participate in the design and development of domestic CT/CVE measures that align with the WPS Agenda. As this implementation process reflects a bottom-up policy implementation approach, CSOs are likely to be provided with opportunities to

participate in the design and development of CT/CVE policies and measures. CSOs' knowledge of local contexts is likely to inform the policy implementation process. Characterised by high ambiguity, it is likely that both state WPS actors and CSOs will propose CT/CVE policies and implementation strategies which is of benefit to them but provides little clarity on the implications that it will have for either group.

However, as there is low conflict, according to the assumptions of the ACM both state WPS actors and CSOs will likely agree on a CT/CVE policy goal and implementation approach, regardless of their understanding of these measures if it is believed that there are sufficient funding and resources to achieve implementation. Despite this, as this process lacks a guideline that informs actors of their role and strategies to implement CT/CVE initiatives, CSOs have significant flexibility during the process to adjust CT/CVE policies' goals to reflect emerging terror threats to women. As this increases the likelihood that CT/CVE measures would empower women and respond to their needs, CSOs have the flexibility to request additional resources and measures that improve outcomes for women. Likewise, the knowledge developed by CSOs through this process further situates these actors in expert positions during periods of CT/CVE policy reform and implementation. As there are limited published reports from civil society actors in the UK context publicly criticising the state's CT/CVE ideology and conflict between the state and civil society, based on these factors and the lack of clarity surrounding the alignment of the UK's CONTEST and PREVENT policies with UNSCR 2242, it was predicted that experimental implementation would be occurring in the UK.

### Symbolic Implementation

The last form of implementation within the ambiguity-conflict model is driven by high ambiguity and high conflict levels. The model indicates that symbolic implementation reinforces existing policy goals, values, and ideologies underpinning policies, and encourages the development of policies that are informed by existing symbols that are supported by state political actors (Matland 1995). Consisting of high ambiguity levels, like experimental implementation, the outcome of policies differs across contexts. It depends on the strength of

street-level bureaucratic coalitions and the amount of resources available to these implementors (Matland 1995). Disagreement between actors over the meaning of policy goals and its implementation creates conflict, thus reducing the likelihood of successful policy implementation (Matland 1995). For instance, coalitions opposed to proposed policies due to fear over its impact on their interests or unfamiliarity with its contents can limit other implementing agents' access to resources required for successful policy implementation (Matland 1995). As a coalition's strength aids them to influence the implementation process, coalitions with greater power can gain compliance from opponents with lower strength through coercive and bargaining methods (Matland 1995; deLeon and deLeon 2002). However, professional groups such as civil society actors and mediators who support policy implementation within local contexts can assist the implementation process by proposing non-coercive approaches to achieve implementation (Matland 1995). These actors can help opposing coalition groups reach an agreement by proposing strategies that aid implementors in resolving conflicts that restrict the implementation process (Matland 1995). However, as conflict can arise between professional groups assisting implementors when proposed problem-resolution approaches differ, they can delay the policy implementation process.

In the context of resolution 2242, *symbolic implementation* would be found where state WPS actors design and develop CT/CVE policies without input from lower-level implementors. As this variant consists of high conflict and ambiguity, it is likely that WPS actors involved in the development of CT/CVE measures may experience opposition from political parties, interest groups, and local actors. These groups are likely to accept the proposed CT/CVE policy as it may reflect that of existing CT/CVE measures. However, they may be reluctant to contribute resources and support integrating gender perspectives into proposed CT/CVE policies, due to uncertainty of its impact on their role. Fears and uncertainty around proposed women-specific CT/CVE policies are likely to slow implementation processes. For instance, state and local political actors and interests' groups required to participate in the implementation process may decline to engage in their allocated tasks or contribute resources. If unsuccessful, according to the model, CSOs are likely to develop coalitions and utilize coercive measures to limit opposing groups' strength. For example, coalitions opposed to the policy may develop campaigns targeted at reducing the credibility of groups favouring the policy and withdrawal of existing financial support to less influential groups to coerce these groups to retract their support for the policy. Although CSOs may experience exclusion

from the policy design and development process, they have significant power to encourage and aid the implementation process. This can be achieved by presenting evidence of threats to local women, and by educating political and interest groups to recognise the policy as a necessity to address the unique impact that extremist threats have on women's security. CSOs are also able to facilitate mediations between opposing groups, encourage these actors to withdraw coercive measures for dialogue, and propose policies and implementation means that benefit each group and women. However, the extent to which CSOs can bring opposing implementors together and succeed with policy implementation is dependent on their ability to collaborate and promote a common Agenda, focused on women's roles and right to protection. As UNSCR 2242 encourages states to outline within their WPS NAPs the measures that they propose to implement in alignment with the resolution and the responsibilities of both state and non-state actors such as women and civil society, it was predicted that it is unlikely that high ambiguity and conflict will inform the implementation of the resolution within the case-study nations.

The ACM, which predicts *administrative, political, experimental, or symbolic implementation* (see summary in table 2), is applied in this study to understand the role of CSOs within the implementation of UNSCR 2242 and the relationship of these organizations with the state during this process. The model provides theoretical insights into the implementation approach adopted by states to translate UNSCR 2242 into domestic contexts. If policy implementation processes within the case study states fit the four variants of the ACM, the framework will provide an understanding of how the interplay between the domestic and international context shapes the meaning attached to the resolution, the measures proposed to implement UNSCR 2242, and the type and amount of resources proposed to achieve implementation. The framework may also explain the roles of actors within the implementation process and the power structures amongst implementing actors. In this way, the research explores the implementation of UNSCR 2242, based on the concepts of ambiguity and conflict, with this yielding broader insights into the role of civil society and their relationship with state actors during WPS domestic implementation.

Table 2: ACM Typology

	<u>High Ambiguity</u>	<u>Low Ambiguity</u>	<u>High Conflict</u>	<u>Low Conflict</u>
<b>Administrative Implementation</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clear policy goals developed by a central authority and communicated to lower-level actors.</li> <li>• clear policies regarding actors' roles, responsibilities and the limits of their role.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Normative mechanisms utilized to achieve compliance from low-level actors.</li> <li>• Lack of opportunity to propose alternative ideas and processes.</li> </ul>
<b>Political Implementation</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defined policies and goals.</li> <li>• A central authority with influence over implementation, however reliant on the resources of low-level actors to achieve desired policy goals.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opposing perspectives of the goals informing policies and the implementation process.</li> <li>• Opposing views regarding policy design.</li> <li>• Bargaining or coercive measures adopted to achieve implementation.</li> <li>• Implementation resources held by external actors who are without central decision-making powers, but attempt to influence policy goals.</li> </ul>	

<b>Experimental Implementation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grassroots approach to policy development, with lower-level actors engaged in determining the policy to be implemented, the desired outcomes and the resources required.</li> <li>• Environmental context as opposed to defined policies inform goals.</li> <li>• Resources, time constraints and implementation means, determined by environmental factors.</li> <li>• Policies proposed and its objectives are unclear and the desired outcome experimental.</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minimal conflict between high level actors and low-level actors.</li> <li>• Collaboration between low and high level actors and the reliance on each actor to achieve implementation.</li> <li>• Flexibility for low-level actors to change their roles and determine their responsibilities (including the influence that they have on policy processes), without opposition from high level actors.</li> </ul>
<b>Symbolic Implementation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policies and its goals developed by a central authority.</li> <li>• Proposed policies reflect those existing within a political context.</li> <li>• Resource for implementation and implementation outcomes are dependent on the environment as opposed to high level actors, pre-determining it.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflicting views regarding policy means and goals.</li> <li>• Resources required for implementation and coercive and bargaining measures used by coalitions to bargain for more power over the implementation process.</li> <li>• Opposing views on the strategies required for implementation.</li> </ul>	

## Research Design

The study aims to explore, and contribute to existing research on, the role of CSOs within the domestic implementation of UNSCR 2242. The integration into the WPS Agenda of CT/CVE, an international security issue legally and formally addressed by state security actors, highlights the need for an enquiry into civil society's role in addressing this security issue (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019). This research provides insights into both the spaces created for CSOs within the national implementation of UNSCR 2242 and CSOs' perception of their role and contribution to the implementation of the resolution. Findings provide information about whether these views align with WPS policy actors' perception and the levels of ambiguity and conflict that inform these actors' relationship with CSOs. This research seeks to understand the goals and means adopted by state and civil society actors to implement UNSCR 2242, evaluating the levels of ambiguity and conflict in each case, and exploring how goals and means are communicated to implementing actors. Ambiguity is particularly visible in the meanings that these actors attach to the implementation process, among other dynamics, and conflict may arise depending on the perceptions of implementing actors with regard to the means to achieve implementation and the consequences of policy implementation on their objectives. Evidence of how the implementation is communicated and insight into the meanings that actors attach to activities to implement the resolution influence the levels of ambiguity and conflict present in the context and thus shape the outcome of the implemented resolution.

As differing and complex relationships exist between state and civil society groups within various contexts, qualitative methods provided an understanding of these relationships. Miles and Huberman (cited in Maxwell and Mittapalli 2008: 324) argue that qualitative approaches are “in fact far better than purely quantitative approaches to developing explanations [of] local causality”. Qualitative research designs provide knowledge of the complexities of these relationships and their impact on the roles and opportunities provided for CSOs to participate in state CT/CVE activities (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren 2012). In order to gather evidence to understand these factors, this study applies a qualitative research design consisting of surveys and in-depth interviews to explore the dynamics of conflict and ambiguity according to the

ACM outlined above. These methods provided an understanding of the areas where conflict exists between actors, the extent of the conflict, and how ambiguity surrounding policy goals and means – as outlined in Matland’s (1995) model – shapes implementation roles and activities. The study used qualitative methods to understand the relationship between the state and civil society actors and each group’s experiences and role during the national CT/CVE policy implementation process. As research participants are provided opportunities to provide clarification and in-depth responses to research questions in qualitative interviewing, this aids to examine consistency within responses (Franklin and Ballan 2011). The ability to compare participants’ responses to alternative and identical questions also increases reliability (Newfield et al. 1996; Franklin and Ballan 2011; Smith 2011). Although a focus on participants’ experiences and meanings, risks the loss of insights into ‘contextual sensitives’ (Atieno 2009; Peticca-Harris et al. 2016) surrounding events, combining surveys and interviews was essential to gain an in-depth understanding of the spaces created for CSOs, those closed, and the methods adopted by states to engage these actors.

## Ethics

Ethics approval was sought from the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) at the University of Sydney prior to its commencement. As previously explained, as the study explores the perceptions of actors engaged in the national implementation of UNSCR 2242, it poses minimal risks to research participants. However, as CT/CVE and state efforts within this area are a sensitive security topic, care was taken when developing interview and survey questions. First, the survey questions were developed to be suitable for individuals employed within front-line service delivery and advocacy roles. Survey questions developed for this group focused on the methods used by the state to engage these actors and the opportunities provided for these actors to contribute their professional and local knowledge during implementation activities (see Appendix 1). While interview questions for civil society leaders focused on the spaces created for their organisations to engage in activities to design, develop and implement UNSCR 2242 (see Appendix 2). In contrast, interview questions for state WPS actors focused on the factors informing decisions to adopt and implement the resolution and how CSOs were engaged by the state (see Appendix 3). Questions focused on the methods used, the spaces and opportunities provided, and the clarity of information given

to implementing actors. These questions aim to explore the levels of conflict and ambiguity that inform the implementation process. Secondly, to minimise risks such as reputational damage to research participants, the Participant Information Statement emphasised that participation is voluntary, participants could decline to answer any questions they do not wish to answer, and all identifiable information would be anonymised. The methods used in this study are explored further below.

## **Data Collection**

### **Focused Interviews**

Focused interviews were conducted to gain insights into WPS policymakers and CSOs' perceptions of UNSCR 2242 implementation practices. Although reported by some scholars as time-consuming and unstructured (Fielding and Thomas 2001; Adams 2015; Mathers et al. 2002; Alshenqueeti 2014), focused interviews are a useful tool to gain an in-depth understanding of research participants' experiences and perceptions of the topic of inquiry (Rabionet 2011; Grindsted 2005). Unlike other data collection tools which only provide insights into research participants' experiences, focused interviews also yield results on developments within institutional cultures, decision making, and collective memories (Blakely 2013; Rabionet 2011; Grindsted 2005). This method also aids in developing rapport between the interviewer and interviewee, and its flexible nature enables the interviewee to determine the amount of information they are willing to provide (Barriball and While 2015; Grindsted 2005).

This data collection tool was used to interview elites virtually (via Zoom, WhatsApp, and Skype) as travel was restricted due to COVID-19 border closures in Australia. I applied Odendahl and Shaw (2011)'s definition of elite as an individual with power, status and privilege within their institutions and fields when selecting 'elites' to be interviewed. Elites within civil society organizations are characterized as individuals who shape organisations' direction and mission through their roles as founders, directors, executive directors, and managers (Ogaliastri and Flores 2008; Medina 2017). These individuals, who may act as

gatekeepers, are likely to represent their organisation during the WPS implementation process, possess unique experiences, and hold expert knowledge, enabling them to provide insider perspectives (Jupp 2006). Individuals received an email invitation to participate in the study if they held an 'elite' position within a CSO that provides either service, advocacy or resources to women who have been affected by terrorism and violent extremism within one of the three case study nations (Nigeria, the UK and Spain). Similarly, I interviewed 'elites' within case study countries, who were currently or previously employed within state departments responsible for developing and implementing their country's WPS NAP. Those interviewed across the three case-studies were a) employed in the department during the period when their department adopted UNSCR 2242 or during the implementation process; or b) employed in a role where they had direct involvement in the development of activities to implement the resolution.

After obtaining approval from the HREC at the University of Sydney, interviews for the three case studies were conducted online over ten months (July 2020 to April 2021). Recruitment occurred via email, with participants who consented to participate in an interview receiving a copy of the interview questions before an interview was scheduled. Counter-terrorism is a contested security issue, thus it was important to develop a rapport with research participants and assure that their anonymity would be maintained. As interview questions and topics are tailored to the interviewee's experience and rank in focused interviews (Fielding and Thomas 2001; Blakely 2013), questions were modified to suit participants' employment positions. However, as perceptions of counter-terrorism, risks associated with discussions on the issue, and extremist violence experiences differ across the three contexts, different approaches were adopted to develop rapport, each with different outcomes. Below I discuss the approach adopted in each case study context.

## Nigeria

As terrorism is a highly contested issue in Nigeria with legal consequences for both civil society and state security actors, great care was taken to ensure the safety of participants. As security actors expressed concerns about how interview data would be used, fears around anonymity, and the potential implications that participation in the study would have on their

career prospects and their family's safety, rapport with participants was established over two months prior to interviews being conducted. Rapport was established through multiple conversations about African politics, political figures, and counter-terrorism incidents in Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region. On multiple occasions, participants asked questions about my background, requested information about my nationality, and often requested that I speak in a local West African dialect familiar to us. My ability to engage in these tasks, meeting requests, and reassurance to participants that they could withdraw from the study at any time and raise concerns about the study's ethical nature with the Ethics Committee, contributed to reducing fears and establishing rapport. Once state actors agreed to an interview date and time, they often requested to see my surroundings before the interview began. Some participants requested that I allocate a number and avoid mentioning their names in the interview. This request was made by some state actors who were currently employed by the state government, who on multiple occasions reiterated the risks associated with participating in the interview. Upon completing the interview, transcripts were emailed to each security actor for approval. Most security actors approved transcripts with minor revisions. However, those currently employed by the government, requested that certain information be removed from the transcript, as it may reveal their identity. Naturally, I complied with these requests.

The risks associated with the study and its potential to influence the level of detail that participants were willing to disclose during the interview, were made evident by one actor employed by the state government. As an initial interview was conducted when the participant was at a government building, the individual reported that the government was effectively implementing UNSCR 2242, engaged in a partnership with CSOs, and had developed various strategies to address the gendered implications of terrorism and violent extremism. Upon reading the transcript for this interview, the participant requested another interview, indicating that due to their location at the time of the initial interview, they could not disclose the truth about the security issue in the country. A second interview was conducted when the participant was on private premises. During this interview, the participant retracted all information provided in the initial interview, indicating that they were concerned about the implications if colleagues overheard them speaking about the reality of WPS in the country. They provided details of cases where legal sanctions had been imposed on some state actors for revealing details about the government's lack of interest in

addressing counter-terrorism and gender issues in the country, and details regarding state actors who contributed to counter-terrorism issues in Nigeria as they benefited financially from ongoing insecurity.

Although some CSOs also raised concerns about participating in the study and anonymity, most were inclined to participate with little concern. Little concern amongst some participants was due to their experience as research participants and their in-depth knowledge of fieldwork and the study's ethical dimensions, based on their experiences conducting counter-terrorism research. Unlike state actors, concerns about the use of data and anonymity expressed by CSOs were based on the implications that information disclosed may have on their organizations' access to ongoing funds from both national and international funders and reputational damage, as opposed to personal safety. These actors determined interview dates and times. Rapport was established quickly with these actors who expressed interest in the study's potential findings, and the opportunity to share and bring awareness to UNSCR 2242, which the majority perceived to be a neglected resolution in the country. Like state actors, interview transcripts were sent to each participant for approval, and upon request, some information was removed to reduce the risk of revealing participants and their organization's identity.

As one of the first African states to integrate UNSCR 2242 into its WPS NAP, Nigeria is one of a few states to develop three domestic action plans that outline Measures proposed by the state to implement UNSCR 2242. Located in the Ministry of Women's Affairs with some participation from the Defence and Foreign Ministry, the government proposes to engage CSOs in activities to develop intervention programs and develop women's capacity to reduce their vulnerability to extremist violence. It proposes a collaborative approach to implementation with CSOs, although in reality (as discussed in later chapters), CSOs are offered limited engagement opportunities. Although a civil society coalition group attempt to continue implementation activities with funding from international organisations, as these organisations are dependent on the state to operate, many avenues of funding and support are closed to Nigerian CSOs. These challenges make Nigeria an illustrative case-study to understand some of the strategies developed to overcome implementation challenges and create greater spaces for CSOs in WPS activities. An understanding of these factors

contributes to greater knowledge of the relationship between the state and CSOs during the implementation process.

## UK

Like Nigeria, some state actors and CSOs in the UK raised concerns about the risks of participating in the study and concerns about their anonymity. Like the other case study contexts, participants consented to participate in the interview. They were given the option to identify a time and date suitable for them to participate in an interview. Rapport was quickly established with CSOs and state actors who reported their interest in the study due to curiosity about how other actors in the WPS space perceived the country's efforts to address the impact that terrorism and violent extremism has on women's security. Upon completion of each interview, transcripts were sent to participants for approval. Although state actors did not request some information to be redacted, most CSOs made requests for certain details to be excluded from analysis or revised, due to concerns about their identity being revealed and the potential impact on their reputation. Some participants made decisions to withdraw from the study after reviewing their transcript, indicating that they were concerned that the information they had shared would make them and their organizations easily identifiable. Decisions to withdraw from the study were prominent amongst CSOs who worked at the local level and reported concerns about the implications that the study's findings would have on their organization's access to future funding based on the information provided. Some CSOs requested to have their transcript redacted and summaries provided for analysis. Others provided consent for their transcripts to be included in the analysis; however, they did not want their response to be quoted in any publications. These various responses further highlighted the extent to which counter-terrorism is a contested political issue in the country.

The UK government adopts a whole of government approach to implementing UNSCR 2242, with key institutions such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence, playing key implementation roles. As one of the key states that played a critical role in advocating for the international adoption of UNSCR 2242, and one of the key Global North states that support implementation activities within Global South nations such as Nigeria, the UK government engages CSOs involved in its civil society network. However,

as the organisations engaged have long-standing relationships with government actors, and receive funding, there is little opposition to the actions proposed by the state, with this contributing to ambiguity and high conflict amongst the state, the organisations engaged, and those excluded. This unique approach to engagement raises questions regarding how effectively the state collaborates with civil society and the factors that contribute to close opportunities for some CSOs. Hence, making the UK context worthy of study.

## Spain

Unlike Nigeria, both state and CSOs actors in Spain expressed little concern about participating in the study or discussing counter-terrorism and WPS. Limited concerns were due to collaboration between CSOs and state actors and counter-terrorism, which is publicly discussed in the country. The limited tension surrounding the country's security issues was evident, as state actors and departments assisted with recruiting CSOs by forwarding information about the study to organizations in the country that engage in activities to address terrorism and gendered issues. Participants were emailed about the study, and upon consent, they also received interview questions tailored to their position. Unlike the other case study contexts, state and CSOs actors did not make a request for information to be redacted from transcripts or raise any concerns about their anonymity, although participants were assured that their anonymity would be maintained in any publications produced from the study.

As president of the Security Council during the adoption of UNSCR 2242, the Spanish government engages and adopts a collaborative approach to implementation, with opportunities provided to CSOs to engage in implementation activities with various government departments and its lead agency, the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Unlike the other states, the Spanish government creates opportunities for CSOs to provide feedback and suggestions for improving implementation outcomes, without fear that criticism may impact their organisations access to future government funding. This transparent approach to engagement makes the Spanish context a valuable site of enquiry to better understand the factors influencing, and the strategies adopted to achieve, implementation from the bottom-up.

## Surveys

Surveys were used to collect similar data from civil society program officers to the data collected from state and civil society leaders during the interviews. The versatility of qualitative surveys (the ability to distribute survey questions through various mediums and gain responses from a large sample of research participants) makes them a useful data collection tool (Check and Schutt 2017; Sue and Ritter 2015). The tool also enabled the survey questions to be self-administered and designed to obtain in-depth responses (Ruel et al. 2018). As program officers of CSOs engage in direct practice with women affected by extremism and thus are likely to have developed knowledge of issues experienced by women during and post-terrorist incidents, and CT/CVE measures and policies which will improve outcomes for women, these WPS actors were surveyed (Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2018). The survey aimed to gain an understanding of the level of conflict and ambiguity which surrounds the implementation of UNSCR 2242, by exploring project officers' perception of their role and whether they have contributed to the implementation process in their nation. These surveys provided knowledge about the opportunities provided to project officers, who are defined as local civil society actors working directly with women affected by violence. Engaging these civil society actors, provided insights into the extent to which local actors' expertise inform the design and development of CT/CVE measures. Toepoel (2019) emphasizes that qualitative surveys do not require population samples, unlike quantitative surveys. CSOs in nations (women and girls focused, youth, faith-based, and human rights organizations) have different relationships with state authorities and national influence levels (OSCE 2018). Although a representative sample was not sought in this study, project officers from various civil society groups were provided with an opportunity to participate in the survey. Like the interview questions developed to understand the experiences of state and civil society leaders, research questions developed for surveys aimed to understand project officers' experiences and perceptions of UNSCR 2242 implementation. These questions were developed prior to the participant recruitment process. When consent was obtained, research participants were given access to an online link to complete the survey on Qualtrics, or they were emailed a PDF copy of the survey to complete and return. Each respondent was given two months to complete the survey and was sent reminders every fortnight to complete the survey.

## Sample Size

As previously discussed, CSOs project officers, leaders, and state WPS actors were approached to participate in the study. Scholarly debates exist in regard to the number of research participants sufficient for a successful qualitative study. Some scholars argue that responses from a sample of 50 to 60 participants are required to gain in-depth insight into an area of research (Ritchie et al. 2003; Britten 1995). However, other scholars highlight that the number required is dependent on the topic, and the theoretical and analytical approach adopted in the study (Sim et al. 2018; Boddy 2016). In deciding the number of research participants for this study, a review of literature on qualitative studies and Malterud et al. (2016)'s concept of 'information power', provided a model for determining the sample size required to obtain sufficient information to achieve the objectives of the survey. The concept suggests that the greater the information and knowledge held by a sample group on the topic of enquiry, the lower the number of participants required for the study (Malterud et al. 2016). A small sample is proposed as suitable if the study: has a narrow aim; focuses on the experiences of groups specific to the topic; is based on a theoretical position; and involves an in-depth explanation of groups' narratives (Malterud et al. 2016). As this study adopts the ACM, has a narrow aim, and focuses on the experiences and perceptions of two key informants who participate in national policy implementation processes, a small sample was used in this study.

Similarly, the concept of data saturation in qualitative studies indicates that the focus of data collection should be on quality as opposed to quantity (Nelson 2017). Guest et al. (2006) suggest that data saturation is reached between 6 to 12 samples in interviews involving homogenous key informants. However, Baker and Edward (2012) indicate that a range of 12 to 60 interviews, with a mean of 30 is required to reach data saturation in a broad sample of key informants. Using these suggestions as a guide, the study initially aimed to adopt a sample size of 30 CSOs leaders and WPS actors and 60 front-line civil society staff. As earlier discussed, as a contested issue with different risks associated with discussions on counter-terrorism within the three case-study contexts, the sample size differed across these sites. In Nigeria, a total of 35 interviews and surveys were conducted, with this consisting of 7 interviews with state actors, 7 with CSOs personnel in management positions, and a survey

of 21 CSOs front-line staff. A smaller sample was obtained in the British and Spanish contexts, with high numbers of withdrawals within these case study sites contributing to a decrease in the overall study sample size. In the UK, a sample size of 13 was obtained, with this consisting of 3 state actors, 4 CSOs managers, and 6 project officers, while in the Spanish context, a sample size of 15 was obtained, with this consisting of 6 CSOs managers, 6 project officers, and 3 state actors. Overall, a total of 63 state and civil society actors were interviewed and surveyed for this research.

A snowball sampling approach was applied to recruit participants to be surveyed and interviewed. As a method for identifying research participants who are challenging to reach such as elites (Oliver 2011; Morgan 2012) and participants who require a high level of trust (Atkinson and Flint 2011) before participating in a study, this method was applied to recruit both CSOs and state actors. In each case study context, initial participants were emailed about participating in the study and requested to refer or assist with making contacts with other potential participants. Some participants referred colleagues and provided details of key contacts within government departments, organizations, and their networks they perceived would know the study context. Although this sampling technique enabled a sample group who possess knowledge and experiences relevant to the study to be reached, the technique is not without limitations. As initial research participants identify and refer potential participants, a limited understanding of the research's key objectives may lead to the referral of individuals who may not be suitable for the study (Oliver 2011). Similarly, as those referred may not have characteristics that are reflective of the study population, it creates a risk of interviewing and surveying a biased subset of the research population as a whole (Morgan 2012).

## **Data Analysis**

## Thematic Analysis

I used thematic analysis to analyse data collected from both interviews and surveys. Thematic analysis identifies, organises, analyses, and describes patterns found within datasets (Nowell et al. 2017). The process aims to highlight significant themes within the data set, which are of interest to the research topic, and provide interpretations of these themes, and the meanings that they produce (Floersch et al. 2010). For instance, Boyatzis (1998) refers to thematic analysis as a ‘translator’ of research findings. This analytical approach was applied to organise and analyse themes within both interviews and surveys. This analytical tool provided insights into patterns within processes adopted to implement UNSCR 2242, and the characteristics of the state and CSOs’s relationship during the implementation process. The themes identified provided insights into patterns regarding articulations of conflict and ambiguity, actors’ perceptions of their implementing roles, and the level to which they are engaged.

Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest two levels of data analysis: semantic and latent. At the semantic level, patterns within data are organised, described, and interpreted, however at a latent level, patterns evidence within the data are analysed to identify its underlying conceptions, assumptions, ideas, and the meanings that they produce (Terry et al. 2017). A latent and semantic analysis was applied when analyzing data collected. This recursive process, which requires a researcher to immerse themselves in the data and engage in reflections (Ignatow and Mihalcea 2018), provided an understanding of the factors which led to the state’s adoption of the resolution within the case-study nations. More significant insights were gained through this analysis in regard to the objectives and the factors motivating key drivers of the resolution. Insights were obtained on why actors have developed particular perceptions of one another, and the rationale informing the roles and spaces made accessible to CSOs during the implementation of the resolution.

An understanding of the roles of state actors and CSOs within the implementation process was gained by combining a deductive and inductive approach to analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that there are two approaches to thematic analysis: deductive and inductive. When inductive methods are adopted, the themes identified are those that are observable in

the data set, as opposed to themes coded to fit pre-existing frames or questions utilized during the data collection process (Braun and Clarke 2006; Marks and Yardley 2011). In contrast, a deductive approach to thematic data analysis is influenced by the theoretical position adopted in the study (Braun and Clarke 2006; Marks and Yardley 2011), using pre-existing or pre-determined themes. In this study, the data was first coded according to themes evident in the data, and these themes were then categorised under the concepts of ambiguity and conflict, which inform Matland's (1995) ACM. There are various approaches to, and frameworks for, conducting thematic analysis (Alhojailan 2012; Javadi and Zarea 2016). I applied Braun and Clarke's (2006) six-stage framework, which provides a rigorous data analysis procedure, to analyse the data. The process for applying this framework is explained below.

#### Stage 1: Familiarizing oneself with the research data

The first of the six-stages consists of familiarizing oneself with the data and coding initial patterns identified in the data. The process of familiarization involved deep engagement with the data (Braun and Clarke 2006). Data collected from interviews and surveys were first read and checked for accuracy during this process. For instance, interview transcripts were read and re-read against audio recordings to ensure that transcripts were accurate (Maguire and Delahunt 2017). Once determined to be accurate, initial perceptions and observations of the data were documented, and an analysis was conducted to identify patterns in responses (Terry et al. 2017). Reflections on the data and the meanings and assumptions underpinning patterns identified were also documented (Braun and Clarke 2006). For instance, reflections on questions regarding how CSOs and WPS policy actors view their role, the methods used by the state to engage civil society, the opportunities provided, and the role of other WPS actors within the implementation of the resolution were documented. Terry et al. (2017) suggest that reading, careful analysis, and initial reflections conducted at this stage are significant steps for developing a high-quality thematic analysis (Terry et al. 2017).

#### Stage 2: Generating initial codes

Further coding and interpretation of the data occurred at this stage. Codes identified and those perceived as meaningful and relevant for further analysis reflect an aspect of the data that relates to the research question or reflects a theoretical position adopted in the study (Terry et

al. 2017). For instance, Braun and Clarke (2006) highlight that although the data segments may appear insignificant, the meaning attached to it during the coding process increases its value to the research. Initially, I applied a selective coding approach (Matthew and Price 2010). This process ensured that data that was useful for testing the key aspect of policy implementation as highlighted in the ACM was coded. For instance, the ACM highlights the state's control of the overall implementation process, CSOs' access to resources required for implementation, the opportunity for implementation innovation, and factors such as those proposing a policy, which affects the extent to which it will be supported or declined by implementing actors. These implementation elements provided initial knowledge about the WPS governance practices adopted by states, CSOs' role, and the usefulness of the ACM for understanding implementation processes.

During the coding process, however, I also identified various codes that did not immediately relate to ambiguity or conflict. For instance, any details provided by CSOs regarding their participation in formal meetings, consultations, or their ability to provide written expert advice to state actors during the policy design process were placed under the theme *participation in the policy design process*. This process continued until all interview transcripts, and surveys were coded. Braun and Clarke (2016) and Terry et al. (2017) suggest that it is significant to recognise and code data extracts that do not fit into a specific existing code. These data extracts are likely to provide unique or alternative information about the research topic. As these data extracts can give information on alternative policy implementation approaches adopted by states, or views and experiences expressed by some state and CSO actors, which do not reflect dominant narratives evident in the data set, these extracts were also coded and interpreted to identify their underlying meanings.

### Stage 3: Searching for themes

Phase three of the analytical process consists of developing themes that reflect data coded in the previous step. During this stage, codes with similar information and those which reinforce particular ideas and theoretical frames about WPS implementation were combined to form themes (Terry et al. 2017). For example, statements coded under the themes *top-down implementation, state funding and resources, type of organization involved*, were placed

under the theme *state control of implementation*. Maguire and Delahunt (2017) indicate that this process can occur quickly through the identification of a code that provides insights into various areas of the research topic, or it can be a complex process, requiring multiple similar themes to be combined, for the possibility of a theme to be developed. Central theoretical concepts and ideas informing codes were used to determine whether all coded extracts belong under a particular theme (Terry et al. 2017). Once this process is complete for all available data, the themes developed were crosschecked and compared to identify whether particular themes should be combined, refined, or codes removed (Braun and Clarke 2006). As these themes were liable to change as further analysis was conducted, themes developed at this stage were perceived as ‘provisional’ (Braun and Clarke 2006).

#### Stage 4: Review Themes

Provisional themes developed in the previous step were reviewed, analysed, accepted, or rejected. Themes developed were analysed to determine whether they reflect the data, the research question, and the theory adopted (Braun and Clarke 2006). Data categorized under themes were refined, and re-organised to ensure that central ideas within each theme were reinforced (Terry et al. 2017). As a lack of cohesion between themes and data extracts limits the quality of findings obtained and increases the likelihood of misinterpreting results, themes were refined to improve accuracy (Braun and Clarke 2006). Likewise, the themes were interpreted, and an initial written analysis conducted to determine whether they align with the research question (Terry et al. 2017). Terry et al. (2017) suggests that a lack of coherence between the data and the research question may indicate that questions asked during the analysis process are limited. Each theme was thus further analysed to ensure that there were sufficient data and detail to address the research question. A total of five major themes were developed: *state control of implementation*; *CSOs control of implementation resources*; *future change*; *decision to integrate the resolution*; *additional factors*. Conflict and ambiguity were evident across all five themes, through evidence of the measures imposed by the state to limit CSOs implementation activities, ambiguity surrounding policy goals, and the resources allocated to achieve implementation. Each theme was further analysed and for each case-study context, sub-themes that provided details specifically about ambiguity or conflict were developed and categorised. As Matland (1995) provides an indication of the factors that causes ambiguity and conflict during the implementation process, the themes were

categorised under either ambiguity or conflict, based on the characteristics of each concept as outlined in the model. The themes differed across the case study countries, due to differences within the implementation approach adopted (which are discussed in Chapters Four, Five, and Six). For example, the following sub-themes were developed for Nigeria *ambiguity* (*ambiguous policy goals, clarity of policy means*) and *conflict* (*conflicting reasons for the integration of UNSCR 2242, opposing perceptions of policy goals, different approaches to policy implementation, high level of direct conflict*). However, the sub-themes varied for the other case-study contexts, influenced by the factors which shaped implementation within these contexts (see figure 2).

#### Stages 5 and 6: Defining Themes and Write Up

Themes were further refined and finalized at these stages. Each theme was analysed to identify its ‘essence’, how it enriches the overall findings, and the information that it provides on WPS policy actors and civil society’s relationship during the implementation of UNSCR 2242 (Braun and Clarke 2006). I identified, interpreted, and analysed sub-themes (evident within themes) to determine how they fit within the overall data and add to the study (Terry et al. 2017). Further written analysis of each theme aligned with the research question, and provided greater details about the levels of ambiguity and conflict present in each context. This stage also highlighted some of the implementation characteristics that were unaccounted for within the concepts of ACM (conflict and ambiguity), and which were later used to develop sub-themes.

There are various advantages to adopting this data analysis framework; however, there are also limitations. A flexible data analysis approach is useful for analyzing data obtained through various data collection methods and from large samples (King 2004; Braun and Clarke 2006). This makes these analytical tools practical for this study, which aims to survey CSOs project officers and interview CSOs leaders and state WPS implementors within three states. The method was useful for identifying similarities, differences, and unexpected outcomes within research findings (Nowell et al. 2017). Its procedure maintains an audit trail that enables the process to be peer-reviewed. Marks and Yardley (2011) also emphasise that thematic analysis provides more significant benefits than other data analysis approaches such

as content analysis. It enables further investigation of the significance of code frequencies. However, thematic analysis is not without its limitations. For instance, while thematic analysis is flexible, this flexibility can lead to inconsistency and incoherence when developing themes (Holloway and Todres, 2003).




Figure 2: Thematic Analysis

## Conclusion

Ongoing debates about WPS have led to its conceptualizations as a set of normative frameworks, a legal framework, a policy framework, and a set of overlapping principles by various scholars. However, as the WPS Agenda articulates that states are to develop policies at the national level to implement the Agenda and procedures to monitor and evaluate its effectiveness, as previously discussed, the Agenda is conceptualised as a policy framework in this study. Conceptualising the Agenda as a policy framework (or series of policy frameworks) provides a framework for understanding the measures utilised by the state to engage CSOs, the spaces created and closed for these actors, and the levels of ambiguity and conflict that shape the process. Traditional policy models provide two main frameworks for understanding the policy life cycle, top-down and bottom-up. Although these traditional approaches provide knowledge into the roles of different actors and how the state maintains influence over policy processes, it provides little understanding of the tensions, the levels of control and ambiguity that inform policy processes, and the measures used to engage and excluded non-state actors from policy activities. Synthesisers, which combine top-down and bottom-up policy models, provide a comprehensive understanding of policy activities, the roles of various actors, and insights into obstacles to policy implementation. Matland's (1995) ACM, which combines both a bottom and top-down approach and provides a fourfold typology for understanding policy implementation (*administrative, political, experimental symbolic*), is applied in this study. After obtaining ethics from HREC at the University of Sydney, the ACM was applied through thematic analysis to analyse 63 focused interviews conducted with state actors and civil society leaders, and surveys completed by civil society front-line staff in Nigeria, the UK, and Spain. The interviews and surveys focused on these actors' role, experiences, and their relationship during activities to implement UNSCR 2242. The data provide insights into the levels of ambiguity and conflict that inform the implementation process and reveals the approaches utilised by the state to engage non-state actors such as civil society. In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, the data collected from the surveys and interviews are presented and thematically analysed to identify implementation patterns and to explore whether the ACM reveals the initiatives adopted by the state to maintain its influence and power over all stages of the implementation of the resolution. Chapter Four, which follows, presents an analysis and discussion of the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria.

## Chapter Four: Nigeria

This chapter uses Matland's (1995) ambiguity conflict model (ACM), outlined in Chapter Three, to evaluate the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria, and to address the research question, by exploring the ways and the extent to which the government engages civil society within its implementation activities. This chapter first provides a brief discussion of the historical and contemporary context of terrorism in Nigeria and women's roles as victims and perpetrators of extremist violence. To understand the contributions of civil society organisations (CSOs) to the country's counter-terrorism and counter violent-extremism (CT/CVE) activities, I explore the role of these organisations in the country's CT/CVE activities and existing tension with the state. I follow this discussion with an explanation of the integration of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria's second Women Peace and Security (WPS) National Action Plan (NAP) and the initiatives proposed by the state to engage CSOs in the NAP implementation process. As this chapter explores the applicability of the ACM in explaining UNSCR 2242 policy implementation in Nigeria, section two of this chapter explores the levels of conflict and ambiguity within the policy development and implementation process to understand the relationship between WPS state actors and CSOs. This analysis reveals how the resolution is being implemented in the country, the measures adopted by the government to engage civil society, the spaces provided to these actors, and whether the implementation process reflects one of the four typologies proposed in Matland's (1995) ACM. Findings suggest that there is low ambiguity surrounding policy means and high conflict regarding the goals informing policies developed in alignment with the WPS Agenda in the Nigerian context. These levels of ambiguity and conflict suggest that *political implementation* is occurring in Nigeria, as indicated by Matland's (1995) model.

### Terrorism and Women in Nigeria

Ongoing extremist violence in Nigeria has increased insecurity in the country. Extremist violence perpetrated by organisations such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) has contributed to growing violence in the country, particularly in the North-

East. Although initially targeting government officials and national landmarks, these organisations changed their tactics in 2014 by incorporating women within their extremist activities (Pearson 2018; Ogbonnaya et al. 2014). The first recorded extremist incidents involving women are reported to be the abduction of 41 women and girls between April and May 2014 and reported claims of female suicide bombers in June 2014 (Henshaw 2014). These incidents that brought national attention and condemnation of the organisation contributed to the feminisation of the group's operational strategies, with the kidnapping of over 1000 women and the deployment of over 90 women yearly to conduct suicide missions (Bloom and Matfess 2016).

The organisation received international attention for its women's rights violations by kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno (Markovic 2019). This incident brought global attention to these organisations' activities, highlighted insecurities experienced by women within the Nigerian context, and led to domestic and international advocacy for the Nigerian government to respond to these organisations' threats and secure the girls' safety. International attention garnered through the kidnapping influenced this organisation to incorporate girls and local women within their violent activities, as suicide bombers and within non-combative roles as recruiters (Markovic 2019). Some scholars have questioned some of these women's claims of coercion to participate in extremist activities (Zenn and Pearson 2014; Bloom and Matfess 2016). For example, Bloom and Matfess (2016) reported that women rescued by Nigerian authorities informed government officials of coercive methods used by Boko Haram to encourage them to engage in suicide missions. Despite this, other researchers had reported that women made conscious decisions to join and contribute to extremist violence when there was a belief that participation in the group will provide them social, economic, and food security (Bigio and Volgelstein 2019). Gender inequality and patriarchy within Nigeria's society have also contributed to the ease with which extremist organisations can incorporate women into their extremist activities. For instance, the domination of women and their exploitation by those with authority and power, sustained through religious, cultural, and native law, has contributed to the ease with which extremist groups in the nation can abduct and weaponise women (Nnam et al. 2018; Otu and Nnam 2018).

## **Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism in Nigeria**

In response to extremist threats in the country, the government introduced the Terrorism (Prohibition and Prevention) Bill 2011, and through the guidance of the Office of the Nations Security Advisor, engaged in the United States's CT/CVE capacity-building programs to identify and respond to CT/CVE threats (Shodunke 2021). Responses to CT/CVE have included activities to deradicalize, disarm, and through Operation Safe Corridor, identify and reintegrate ex-offenders and supporters of terrorist organisations (United States Department of State n.d). At the regional and international level, the Nigerian government continues to engage in the Global Counter-terrorism Forum, co-hosts the Global Defeat-ISIS Coalition, and is currently piloting the International Counter-terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Capacity Building Clearinghouse Mechanism, which focuses on identifying and responding to gaps in programs to address CT/CVE (United States Department of State n.d).

Despite these CT/CVE mechanisms, CSOs in Nigerian were the first responders to support women affected by extremism. These organisations have supported women through the provision of services. Nigerian CSOs have responded to the root causes of terrorism and women's rights violations by implementing early intervention measures to reduce the impact of terrorism and violent extremism. These organisations have implemented initiatives that address gendered stereotypes and build women's capacity as CT/CVE agents. These initiatives consist of providing financial education and support to women to establish businesses to reduce their vulnerability to extremist organisations, developing their capacity to establish initiatives to counteract extremist narratives, identify and address extremist threats and radicalisation (Idris and Abdelaziz 2017). These measures have contributed to increasing community knowledge and awareness of early-intervention initiatives to address terrorism and extremism and have encouraged collaboration between opposing religious, cultural, and ethnic groups. Early intervention initiatives also consist of ongoing psychological and educational services to victims and communities affected by extremism. For instance, over 6 million women across the nation have received community and mobile counselling support services to improve their mental health and wellbeing (Bigio and Volgstein 2019; Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019).

In addition to service delivery, CSOs have advocated for national and international governmental responses to extremist threats in Nigeria. These organisations have advocated for federal, national, and local governments to adopt gendered approaches to terrorism and violent extremism (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019). Advocacy has included campaigns for peace dialogues between security actors and local women groups to respond to ongoing extremist threats (Club de Madrid 2017). For instance, women's civil society networks have organised and mediated peace negotiations between representatives of Boko Haram and the Nigerian government, which led to the release of 105 of the 276 kidnapped Chibok girls (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019). CSOs have also been instrumental in bringing national and international awareness to the abduction of women through social media campaigns and advocating for interfaith dialogues, which have resulted in the development of counter-terrorism narratives in various communities in the country's North-East (Mbah et al. 2017; Ikeanyibe et al. 2018). For example, the women-led CSO *Bring Back Our Girls* utilised broadcast and social media campaigns to bring global awareness to the abduction of the Chibok girls, contributing to national and international criticism of the Nigerian government and advocacy to secure the girls' release (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019).

Although CSOs' CT/CVE activities are successful, some scholars have questioned whether these organisations' initiatives target and prioritise local women's security needs (Maxfield 2016; Okenyodo 2016). Maxfield (2016) argues that advocacy by women's organisations helped to reinforced uneven power structures between lower- and upper-class women and increased the organisations' international profile instead of influencing the state to expedite responses to secure the girls' safety. Despite the success of CSOs' CT/CVE activities, which have led to over 5 million women affected by extremist violence gaining access to health, food, and accommodation services (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019), the Nigeria government's implementation of restrictive measures has contributed to tensions between the state and CSOs and placed constraints on these organisations' efforts.

To address terrorist organisations' access to finances and use of online spaces to further develop and plan terrorist acts, the Nigerian government implemented the Cybercrimes Act and in 2017 began processes to implement the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) Bill

(Bill HB585) (Serap 2020). Although intended to curb the growth of extremist organisations and violence, these measures have restricted the freedom of CSOs to operate within the country. The Cybercrimes Act imposes measures that restrict the ability of CSOs to utilise media platforms to critique state actors and raise awareness of insecurities within the state, while the Bill requires civil society to align their security initiatives with the states' CT/VE ideologies to ensure their ongoing operation (Ibezim-Ohaeri 2017). For instance, CSOs have reported that they were required to reform their CT/CVE initiatives and procedures to reflect the state's legislative requirements or cease operation (Njoku 2017). These organisations also report a lack of access to information regarding extremist threats, violence, and victims, with this limiting their ability to provide health and material support to survivors of extremist violence (Njoku 2017). State actors indicate that restrictive measures implemented to reduce CSOs' influence within the security sector are strategic as their initiatives informed by human and civil rights are ineffective in addressing extremism (Njoku 2018). The state prefers restrictive and military-oriented approaches to eradicate terrorism (Njoku 2018). Tension between the state and civil society is also evident with the government's adoption of a vague definition of activities that constitutes security threats. The lack of clear criteria regarding what constitutes a security threat limits CSOs' ability to criticise the state for actions that breach human rights and creates opportunities for the state to encourage public mistrust of CSOs by labelling their initiatives as a threat to security and national interests. The state's exclusionary practices also consist of closing opportunities for CSOs to participate in political processes to develop and design CT/CVE measures, as these actors perceive CSOs as service delivers as opposed to organisations with the agency to contribute to addressing the state's terrorism and extremist violence security threats (Njoku 2018). As earlier discussed in Chapter 2, civil society as a zone of politics and as an independent entity situated between the state and its citizens plays a significant role in ensuring a balance and cooperation between the state and its citizens (Matin de la Rosa and Lazaro 2019). The Nigerian government's CT/CVE measures that close spaces for civil society participation within political processes disrupt balances of power and limit opportunities for social and political collaborations to improve the outcomes of the state's CT/CVE measures.

## **Implementing UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria**

In response to national and international advocacy to improve its security strategies to protect women from terrorist threats, Nigerian implemented UNSCR 2242 in its 2017-2020 NAP under the authority of the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development [FMWASD] 2017). To enable implementation, the government adopts a multi-stakeholder approach to financing the NAP. This consists of financial support from states such as the United Kingdom and the United States, non-governmental organisations, financial institutions, and the private sector (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom).

Although the need for gender mainstreaming was acknowledged in the country's National Framework and National Action Plan for the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, the second WPS NAP outlined the government's strategy to engage women and civil society organisations (CSOs) as CT/CVE agents (Botha 2021; Nigerian Government 2017). The NAP acknowledges terrorism and violent extremism as a "contemporary national issue" (Nigerian Government 2017, 8), recognises its threat to women's security, and proposes to rehabilitate persons suspected of engaging in extremist activities (Nigerian Government 2017). The NAP further recognises the development of violent extremism within the country and acknowledges it as a threat to national security (FMWASD 2017). Through reference to the kidnapping of the Chibok Girls, the NAP highlights the need for psychological and reintegration services for women affected by extremist violence and educational support to address young women's missed education (FMWASD 2017). The NAP proposed that a National Technical Working Group (NTWG) on UNSCR 1325, to include civil society, should be established to develop and review legislation on WPS (FMWASD 2017). The state proposed to develop a State Action Plan to implement the resolution and its associated mandates and create a State Implementation Group (SIG) to manage the implementation process (FMWASD 2017). Although the NAP states that SIG will consult CSOs working on peace and security activities within each state, there is no reference to the permanent inclusion of CSOs within this committee (FMWASD 2017). The NAP also states that although CSOs will participate in the local ratification of the NAP through their implementing roles within the nations' Zonal Monitoring Committees, the

NTWG will determine the CSOs eligible to participate in implementing committees (FMWASD 2017).

CSOs are also reportedly excluded from or provided little opportunities to participate in, the Nigerian government's CT/CVE activities. In one study, 81% of CSOs reported that governments excluded them from CT/CVE legislation and policy development processes (Njoku 2018). Some CSOs indicated that previous advocacy for the government to uphold human rights during the implementation of CT/CVE measures influenced decisions to exclude them from policy development (Njoku 2018; Njoku 2017). Retired government policy developers reinforced this perspective, suggesting that as upholding the human rights of terrorists or extremist individuals undermines the government's CT/CVE efforts, prohibiting CSOs from CT/CVE policy development processes is necessary (Njoku 2018). However, CSOs were selected to contribute to the government's CT/CVE service delivery programs if they supported the state's CT ideology and were willing to abide by strict service delivery guidelines (Njoku 2017; Njoku 2018). This approach to engagement raises questions about the meaningful participation of CSOs in the country's CT/CVE programs and their ability to advocate for the interests of women affected by violent extremism. For instance, in one study 52% of civil society project workers and executives reported that government officials restricted their access to information on terrorist attacks, and 37% indicated that state officials denied them access to some information on victims of terrorism and violent extremism (Njoku 2017). This limited CSOs' access to victims and required some organisations to operate in secrecy (Njoku 2017). These actions, which government officials reported as unpatriotic and a deliberate attempt to destabilise the state's counter-terrorism efforts, further strained CSOs and the state's relationship (Njoku 2017). This has contributed to government decisions to cease its service delivery contracts with some CSOs and restrict these organisations' operational activities through counter-terrorism financing measures (Njoku 2017; Ibezim-Ohaeri 2017). The following section highlights the key themes identified in the data and assesses the levels of ambiguity and conflict that informed the development and implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria. Application of the ACM, predicts that *political implementation* would occur in Nigeria, however as explained in the conclusion, the model does not account for some unique contextual implementation characteristics.

## Findings

As discussed in Chapter Three, five themes were identified across the case study sites: *state control of implementation*; *CSOs control of implementation resources*; *future changes*; *decisions to integrate the resolution*; and *additional factors*. These themes were further analysed and categorised using the concepts of ambiguity and conflict. The themes identified within the Nigerian context that provides insight into ambiguity were *ambiguous policy goals* and *clarity of policy means*. Sub-themes initially categorised under conflict include *conflicting reasons for the integration of UNSCR 2242*, *opposing perceptions of policy goals*, *different approaches to policy implementation*, and *high levels of direct conflict* (see figure 3). Below, I provide an analysis of the findings under each sub-theme.




Figure 3: Themes - Nigeria

## Ambiguity

### Ambiguous policy goals

Some actors were excluded from the process of developing policy goals and received little information about the objectives informing policies developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242. As earlier discussed, the Nigerian government established a three-tiered committee to develop and implement UNSCR 2242 at the national, provincial, and local levels. At the national level, the state engaged two CSOs to translate and adapt the resolution to reflect local needs by establishing an inter-ministerial steering committee. This "inter-ministerial steering committee, [which consisted of] only two civil society organisations" (NG\_120620\_civsoc), provided these organisations with the opportunity to engage in "overall dialogues on this whole idea of the women, peace, and security, and therefore had the opportunity to participate...and make provisions for the Agenda" (NG\_070820\_civsoc). As "enough time was given... for consultations" (NG\_120620\_civsoc), these actors report that "whatever recommendations [they] brought from the field were incorporated into the documents to ensure...a way forward to women's participation" (NG\_120620\_civsoc), goals informing the policy was clear. These actors articulate that they were aware that the policy goals posed little threat to their role within the state's CT/CVE activities and felt they were "not left behind in whatever decisions that were taken and whatever reports that [was] put forward" (NG\_070820\_civsoc).

In contrast, most CSOs at the local levels and some that operate at the provincial levels reported that they were not engaged in the policy design process. This limited these actors' understanding of the goals which informed policies developed and the impact that participation in the implementation process will have on their role within the security sector and their organisations' objectives. For instance, one CSO project officer reported that "as regards to a specific invitation to really work with the Nigerian government on shaping policies for the WPS Agenda, no, my organisation has not had the privilege yet to be invited to directly influence policies on WPS" (NG\_080720\_civsoc). One representative of an organisation operating at the provincial level stated that, although their organisation was given the opportunity to "vet the policy...look at the policies that people have written to critique it" (NG\_300820\_civsoc), they were not engaged in processes to finalise the policy document. Although the initial opportunity to review the policy provided some insights into

the potential threats that“ the policy will have on their CT/CVE activities. The lack of opportunity to provide feedback on the final policy draft limited this organisation’s ability to discern whether the policy contradicts their organisational values and raise concerns about their position as service delivers, as opposed to agencies with the capacity to be engaged as political CT/CVE actors.

Matland (1995) suggests that ambiguity exists when actors are unaware of the policy and its potential threats. As this increases the likelihood that actors will support the policy, this to some extent does not reflect the type of ambiguity occurring in Nigeria. Although some CSOs located at the local and provincial levels indicated that they were refused opportunities to view and provide feedback on the final draft of proposed policies, and thus this limited their understanding of its full implications, these actors continued to oppose the policy based on initial drafts sighted. The model also suggests that increased awareness of policies, their objectives, and their impact will also increase actors’ opposition and reduce the likelihood that implementation will occur (Matland 1995). This is not evident in the Nigerian context, as although some CSOs had little insight into the final policy, there was significant criticism and opposition to its implementation. However, CSOs' opposition had minimal impact, as state representatives’ use of bargaining measures required these actors to comply with policies. Government actors echoed this view reporting that the state did not engage some CSOs as there is a lack of political will to implement the resolution, and clear policy goals will increase local CSOs' criticism of the state's WPS and CT/CVE measures. Although a NAP was developed and articulates some of the goals and objectives that the state aims to achieve through UNSCR 2242, this document provides little detail for some civil society actors to determine the potential impact of the policy. Some government representatives reported that this approach is intentional as the state integrated the resolution without considering its full requirement and the local obstacles, which may create challenges in achieving the set goals. Although Matland (1995) indicates that ambiguity can increase support for a policy, in Nigeria, it has unintended consequences as it functions to reduce accountability. Excluding some CSOs from the goals development process and proposing policies with ambiguous goals within the NAP decreases the likelihood that the government can be held accountable for its inability to meet its responsibilities. For example, one state representative indicated that

so you [ the Nigerian government] adopted a law without looking at your own feet, you know, domestic challenge there is no big deal about adopting a law, make sure you put your house in order...because you are a member in such an organisation [the United Nations]...so if there is anything that is contrary to what that law is stating, then you are to be held responsible (NG\_150820\_stateactor).

Government actors working for the state and local government reported that they had minimal details about the goals informing the objectives, and some were unaware of the state's decision to integrate UNSCR 2242. These actors indicated that although they were engaged in activities that aim to implement the resolution, they were also unaware of the objectives of the policies, how the policies will impact their CT/CVE roles and activities, and whether collaboration with CSOs threatens their role in the security sector. For example, one actor stated, "I mean the government for example are supposed to be driving this Agenda, but it's surprising...there are key government officials that should ordinarily be the ones pushing for this Agenda, but they're not even aware of the Agenda" (NG\_010720\_civsoc).

#### Clarity of policy means

Although the state developed ambiguous policy goals, procedures to achieve implementation were clear. The country's second NAP provides details on some of the activities that the state proposes to develop to implement the resolution. This consists of information on activities to be conducted by government actors, those allocated to CSOs, and the expected outcome of measures to be implemented. For example, to respond to radicalisation, the state proposes to engage CSOs, other government agencies, and community leaders to deliver programs to educate communities on extremism and facilitate programs on "mediation, CVE, and peaceful coexistence" (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development 2017, 29). The NAP also provides details on indicators, milestones, and in some cases, the region where implementation is to occur. Despite this, the NAP does not provide insight into the extent to which each group will be engaged in the activity, the specific tasks allocated to each actor, and the resources and limits to their participation. This contradicts the principles outlined in the state's National Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violence and the objectives outlined in the country's NAP.

CSOs reported that they were made aware of the means of implementation through contracts provided by the state. These contracts provided information on the communities they are to provide services to, the government agencies and community members who are to participate in the process, and the assistance that the state may provide towards their efforts to achieve implementation. For example, a CSOs actor stated, "we are partnering with the government, and they're supposed to provide support as partners" (NG\_080720\_civsoc). As government "funding in terms of financial resources [is] very rare" (NG\_040820\_civsoc), these contracts included detailed information on the resources that some organisations are to allocate to the state as part of the condition to participate in the implementation process. For example, a CSO actor reported that the government required CSOs to allocate some of their funds to the state to secure their position in implementation activities in one of the states.

In fact, like in Borno State, the government has established an agency, which is supposed to coordinate humanitarian activities or development activities in the state. And in fact, the policy required that organisations give, I think, 1% of their funding to the government for monitoring activities (NG\_030820\_civsoc).

Government representatives also ensured that CSOs were aware of the limits to their implementation roles, protocols that they must abide by, and the consequences of breaching their contracts. Government representatives indicate that CSOs were made aware of the activities aligned with their contractual obligations and when their programs were deemed inappropriate or contradicted new CT/CVE measures proposed by the state. For example, state actors reported that when there are increasing threats in communities, access for CSOs is restricted to enable state actors to address immediate threats to communities, and when CSOs' actions contradict the state's CT/CVE ideologies or may pose a threat to the state's ability to implement military measures, these CSOs are required to cease operation. CSOs also reported that the state-imposed policies limit their access to international funding when the state perceived that their actions will aid extremist organisations. To illustrate, a CSO leader reported that the state has a

“theory that these organisations (CSOs) are supporting or they're funding, or they're encouraging terrorist activities through our cash transfer, through our health interventions. So there is this friction between the government and the humanitarian community...the government is saying, ‘No. You're here to serve us, and so you need to work according to our terms’” (NG\_150820\_civsoc).

Although the country's NAP indicates that CSOs will be engaged as partners, the country's NGO Bill and existing CT/CVE policies acted as a barrier to effectively implementing CT/CVE initiatives.

As a consequence of the state's measures, CSOs are aware of the measures in place to monitor their actions, the extent of government checks and balances, and insights into the programs and events they can implement and prohibit. CSOs argue that although they are opposed to the state's monitoring approaches and restrictive practices, they abide by these measures to ensure that interventions implemented support female victims of extremism. To illustrate, a project officer stated,

"for government they have their levels of checks and balances. It gets to this person, it gets to this table, to gets to this department, there is a cut down. So all of those are brought into play, but eventually when...the workable budgets are presented to organisations, and we know which roles we need to play when it comes to implementation. That is the kind of partnership that we have with the government" (NG\_200820\_civsoc).

This evidence indicates that there is low ambiguity surrounding the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria. Policies developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242 were ambiguous for some government representatives who engage in implementation activities and CSOs at the local and provincial levels. However, CSOs operating at the national level and government representatives who work directly for state departments responsible for the development of the country's NAP. Although policies were ambiguous and criticised by CSOs at the local and provincial levels, this had little impact on compliance as procedures developed on the means to implement these policies were clear for all actors engaged in the process. Clear means to policy implementation, high-level monitoring, and coercive measures adopted by the state prevented CSOs' opposition from engaging in their assigned implementation tasks. Matland (1995) suggests that low ambiguity goals influence low levels of ambiguity means and increase state actors' ability to monitor implemented policies. Although overall low ambiguity surrounding policy goals and means of implementation within Nigeria would suggest that the state will increase its monitoring of UNSCR 2242 implementation, this is not evident in the country. CSOs manage the majority of the country's

WPS monitoring and evaluation activities, as the state's monitoring practices focus on limiting CSOs' influence within the CT/CVE space.

## Conflict

### Conflicting reasons for the integration of UNSCR 2242

Perception of the relevance of UNSCR 2242, and interest in its integration into Nigeria's second NAP and its implementation, differs among state and civil society actors in the country. Matland (1995) proposes that policy conflict occurs when one actor perceives the policy as being of interest and relevant to their goals and another actor perceives it as a threat to their social and political objectives. As the integration of resolution 2242 contributes to legitimising the role of CSOs within domestic processes to address women's insecurities, these organisations advocated for its integration within the country's NAP. Campaigns to encourage the government to integrate the resolution consisted of rallies, the publication of research findings on women's experiences of extremism, media releases, written campaigns to heads of government, and an ongoing radio broadcast that educates the public on the WPS Agenda and ongoing insecurities experienced by women. CSOs indicated that although the resolution was of little interest to the government, they continued to campaign as their advocacy had the potential to influence the federal government to adopt a gendered approach to terrorism and violent extremism.

Some state actors acknowledged that CSOs' campaigns and proposed community-based interventions could help the government respond to extremist threats, although it would be ineffective as the only intervention. For instance, a state actor explained

Defence and security issues cannot be penetrated by civil society. That's the truth, not even in America, not anywhere in the world...The truth is that civil society cannot take over the responsibilities of the state, no. But the State [federal government] can engage civil society because civil society are organisations that are closer to the local people (NG\_100720\_stateactor).

However, these campaigns had minimal influence on the federal government's decision to integrate UNSCR 2242, as state security actors report that the government prefers a military

response to extremist violence due to the immediate threats posed by Boko Haram and the immediate benefits the intervention provides.

As the campaigns had minimal impact, some CSOs argue that a combination of events that coincided with reports on the limitations of the country's first WPS NAP shaped the federal government's decision to integrate UNSCR 2242. The "emergence of kidnapping, then the violent extremism in the North-East that were the major challenges during that time" (NG\_010720\_ civsoc); increasing domestic and international awareness of women's ongoing insecurities was another major factor. For instance, a civil society actor recounts that the public was made aware of daily insecurities experienced by women in the North-East, women are killed on a daily basis, and most times, very gruesome deaths where pregnant women are killed and their babies removed from their tummies, and they are raped to death (NG\_310820\_ civsoc).

The weaponisation of women's bodies (Nnam et al. 2018) brought greater media attention to extremist organisations in the country, led to domestic and international criticism of the federal government's inaction, and raised questions regarding its ability to address its security challenges. The majority of CSOs highlight these challenges and argued that a future WPS NAP needs to "accommodate these new emerging issues and how women can be involved to bring about peaceful resolution within their communities" (NG\_310820\_ civsoc), which contributed to the integration of UNSCR 2242 in the second WPS NAP. For instance, a civil actor reported that "the government felt it is necessary to put in place a National Action Plan that will best address the shortcomings of the first National Action Plan" (NG\_250720\_ civsoc).

Matland's (1995) model indicates that conflict is likely to arise when one actor perceives the policy as a threat to its interests, but this type of conflict does not exist in Nigerian with regard to UNSCR 2242, as the implementation of the resolution poses little threats to the federal government's interests. However, conflict exists between CSOs and the state, as factors that influenced the government to integrate the resolution contradict CSOs' objectives for campaigning for its integration and the Security Council's intended purpose for the adoption of UNSCR 2242. For instance, state security actors argue that the resolution was integrated due to the federal government's interest to maintain its regional and international

reputation, as opposed to addressing emerging threats to women's security or responding to the limitations of the first WPS NAP. This indicates that conflict manifests in more forms between implementing actors than predicted by Matland (1995) and a policy does not need to threaten an actor's political interests for conflict to exist between actors.

Internationally, these actors indicated that integration of the resolution was required as it aligned with the federal government's interest to maintain its reputation as a supporter of human rights norms and aligned with an established pattern of political behaviour as signatories to international resolutions. State actors further explained that the government had previously signed UN resolutions, despite awareness that the country's cultural, political, and geographic context may create challenges to achieving their full implementation. For instance, a state actor reported that

The Nigerian government have been adopting and signatory to a lot of the UN resolutions. Because the country has been committed to the UN peace activity since the 1960s, the Congo wars. But the fact is very, very obvious to grasp with most of these things that you bring from the UN or from the EU, is that domesticating them will be extremely difficult. You see, we have different cultural precincts, different cultural geographies globally (NG\_100720\_stateactor).

These actors explained that there is awareness within the political sector that existing structures create challenges for implementing UN resolutions effectively. However, as states are likely to be praised for integrating UN resolutions, and sanctions are not imposed on UN members for the lack of implementation of WPS resolutions, integration helped the federal government to achieve its interests and posed few risks.

At the regional level, the integration of resolution 2242 was within the federal government's interest, as it positions the Nigerian government as proactive in addressing the gendered insecurities that it has contributed to the West African region. State actors reported that the Nigerian government significantly contributed to restoring peace and security to the West African region during the 1990 Liberia and 1997 Sierra Leone conflicts. As initial inaction contributed to the ability of extremist organisations in the country to extend their territories into neighbouring countries, the integration of resolution 2242 was significant for the country to maintain its peace-keeping reputation gained through efforts in these countries.

## Opposing perceptions of policy goals

State actors and most civil society groups have conflicting views about the goals that inform policies developed in alignment with the resolution. Matland (1995) indicates that conflict arises between actors when there are opposing views regarding the policies to be implemented and the goals that should inform policies. Actors are likely to support a policy if they contribute to processes to determine if the goals reflect their ideology, or help advance their objectives (Matland 1995). Some CSOs operating at the national level indicated that they received invitations from a federal government department to participate in the implementation process and were engaged in all aspects of the policy development processes, as they participated in "almost a 12 month period of consultation" (NG\_180720\_civsoc). This process consisted of opportunities to raise concerns about the limitations of policies developed in the country's first WPS NAP and propose gendered-specific CT/CVE measures and policy goals that prioritise women's security and recognises their agency as CT/CVE actors. These actors reported that the state accepted their proposals, and their engagement was collaborative. For instance, one civil society representative stated that

There was a full round of consultations, we have six zones in Nigeria, six geopolitical zones. So there were consultations with civil society organisations and also state actors in this six zones to get their inputs on what the review should look like, to get their inputs on what the emerging threat issues are in their community, to get their input on the way forward with regard to the National Action Plan (NG\_120620\_civsoc).

Although nationally operating CSOs were in support of policy goals as their engagement in the policy design processes provided them with the opportunity to "put forward recommendations for CVE interventions in the North-East" (NG\_170720\_civsoc), most CSOs at the provincial and local levels were in opposition. These actors indicated that they have conflicting views about the goals which inform policies developed. Policy goals positioned these organisations as service deliverers and outlined some resources which may be accessible to assist with implementation, and also limited the CT/CVE programs that their organisations can deliver. These actors argue that limited participation opportunities also led to a minimal commitment to the policy goals amongst government representatives. One CSO

actor explained that the state only displayed a commitment to the policy goals during anniversary periods to celebrate the development of the country's NAP. For instance, this actor stated, "so it's more like, 'Oh, it's time to mark the event'. Everybody, you know, the governments, the communities, or other government agencies conduct activities to mark the events, but most times, it doesn't really go far from after the event" (NG\_030820\_civsoc). Other CSOs at the local and provincial levels further explained that they were opposed to policies that restrict their access to women and communities affected by extremist violence. For instance, a local civil society actor reported that space for her organisations to continue to empower women to become key CT/CVE actors is shrinking as in her state,

Before you go to the deep field, you need to get clearance from the military. And so, it's becoming increasingly difficult for humanitarian workers to implement activities in that context (NG\_030820\_civsoc).

These policies, underpinned by various government goals, thus limit the counter-terrorism efforts of CSOs, creating challenges for the implementation of UNSCR 2242.

CSOs operating at the provincial and local levels' exclusion from the policy goals development process and their position as service delivers, reflects conflict as described by Matland (1995). As previously discussed, actors are likely to support a policy goal and contribute to its development if it advances their interests (Matland 1995). The proposed policy goals restrict the roles of these actors in the implementation process, fail to recognise their role as CT/CVE political actors, and limit their CT/CVE activities. This has contributed to increasing criticism of the government's CT/CVE measures and perception of its WPS activities as ceremonial only, as opposed to being targeted and effective gendered interventions.

Government representatives acknowledged the conflict between CSOs based at the provincial and local levels and their institutions. These actors indicated that it was necessary to exclude these organisations as they are likely to oppose the goals set and propose measures that contradict values informing the government's security and CT measures. Most government actors indicated that as the integration of the resolution was to please the international

community, and there is a lack of political will to implement policies developed, it was not a requirement to ensure that all CSOs support the goals informing policies. This suggests that government representatives recognised the conflict between their institutions and CSOs and the likelihood that policy goals will not be developed if local and provincial civil actors were engaged in the consultation process. Other government actors argue that as CSOs' CT/CVE activities and CT/CVE objectives align with international organisations that fund their activities, it is unlikely that these organisations' perception of the goals that should inform policies would be in the best interests of the country. For instance, one state actor reported that

if the international bodies are...funding an organisation, in funding, the research [ and programs] will be tailored towards the needs of the international organisation, not necessarily the needs of Nigeria or the needs of Africa. Yes, that is the problem”  
(NG\_250820\_stateactor).

#### Different approaches to policy implementation

Perceptions and approaches to implementing policies developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242 differed amongst government representatives and civil society actors. As part of its WPS commitments, the Nigerian government reported allocating funding to support its government departments and CSOs to engage in implementation activities. However, funding was only accessible to a small group of CSOs with existing relationships with key political actors. For instance, one civil society actor reported that their organisation was supported to engage in implementation activities in Plateau State through access to resources allocated to an implementation task force. This actor stated that this CT/CVE initiative

was only specific to Plateau State and it was set up by the executive governor of Plateau State...He kept true to his words by establishing the Plateau State Peace Building Agency...[which] is responsible for the coordination of conflict prevention and peace-building interventions by state and non-state actors. The agency...is the first of its kind in all of Nigeria. He also appointed me despite being a non-indigene to serve as Director of Programs (DP)...in my role as the DP, I support the Director General to develop programs and activities that are in line with the strategic plan of the agency as well as policy of the current administration on peace and security  
(NG\_140820\_civsoc).

However, most civil society organisations reported that they did not receive funding from the government, and further explained that, although it is the responsibility of the state to provide means to achieve implementation as articulated in the resolution, they questioned whether the state and the federal government had sufficient resources to achieve implementation.

These actors reported that they were aware that the government department responsible for developing the country's NAP was dependent on funding from international organisations and their organisations were dependent on financial support from international donors to implement CT/CVE measures. For example, one actor stated

we have not received any money, neither have I seen any of our networks that have received any money from the government. Even the Women Ministry that is implementing and coordinating the national action plan, so when they want to do any of these activities, they depend on international donors for the activities (NG\_220820\_ civsoc).

Some CSOs reported that the lack of resource allocation to implement the resolution reflects a history of political unwillingness to address insecurities that affect women and acts as a strategic approach to limit civil society's ability to hold the government accountable for the misuse of funds. For instance, one CSO project officer stated

budget plan on CT/CVE is not available at the state government level. Gender budgeting has been a huge challenge for policies or programmes in Nigeria. Excluding us as CSOs on developing a budgeting plan is repeating the challenges CSOs have been having with holding government accountable (NG\_250720\_ civsoc).

In contrast, government representatives justified excluding some CSOs from resources available to achieve implementation, indicating that some civil society actors lacked the knowledge and skills to implement appropriate interventions to address extremist threats. One government representative recounted that in multiple government meetings that he had attended with CSOs, these organisations appeared unaware of the extent of insecurities experienced by women and, in his view, lack the knowledge and skills to utilise resources at their disposal to meet the responsibilities of their implementing roles. The actor provided an example, further explaining that at a formal meeting,

one of the ladies that were helping to manage a program came to share some of her stories with me. There is a lack of knowledge of what to do. She had a discussion with

me, and she will need me to be sending her ideas on what to do. And I asked her why you guys don't go and build your capacity rather than you sitting on the project and others will be telling you what to do. And you cannot properly manage peace and security programs without scientific understanding of the problems and how to manage them. So, it is not the kind of job that you just do because you are just interested in doing it, you must have knowledge of how to do it. So, when you go around the Nigerian states, that is what you find people [civil society] doing everywhere (NG\_010720\_stateactor).

This highlights some of the tensions between implementing actors, as some research participants questioned the expertise of CSOs and their ability to design and execute appropriate interventions.

Other government actors also questioned whether civil society actors were aware of the level of effort required to implement CT/CVE programs successfully and had adequate knowledge of the environmental context that they intend to implement their measures. These actors reported that civil society organisations with significant resources to support local women were unwilling to visit communities affected by extremism to understand the environmental context, how best to allocate resources, and address challenges to policy implementation. For instance, one actor stated

the Office of the National Security Advisor, that is only in Abuja...so you cannot be sitting in Abuja and be telling government about the things that are happening in the Northeast. Between Abuja and the Northeast is two hours in a plane. So, most of them will not really go to the field where these things are happening. And then you now want to bring up blueprints developed by Western nations (NG\_100720\_stateactor).

Local civil society organisations questioned government security actors' perception of CSOs' lack of knowledge of the environmental context and defend their claim to have the skills and knowledge to engage in implementation activities. This is a facet of conflict in the implementation of UNSCR 2242. These actors indicated that due to their location in communities where radicalisation and extremist violence occur, their experience working with local women, and their experience implementing early intervention CT/CVE measures,

they have developed the knowledge and skills to implement policies developed effectively. However, due to a lack of resources, their means of implementation are limited, which is a source of conflict. These actors stated that they “don't trust them [state-actors]. They are not serious. It was there that we formed the group PAVE. PAVE is Partnership Against Violent Extremism. It is a nation-wide coalition of CSOs" (NG\_140820\_civsoc). CSOs created this inter-agency network to promote their greater inclusion within the government's CT/CVE processes and advocate for resources to respond to the gendered nature of extremism. As some local organisations also perceived the government's exclusion practices as intentional, these organisations took the initiative to develop and implement local action plans on WPS and CT/CVE with funding support from international organisations such as the UN Women and UNDP, without consultation or engagement of state political actors. The lack of willingness by government departments to support implementation activities of CSOs reinforces Matland's (1995) explanation of the factors that contribute to conflict between actors during policy implementation. The model suggests that high conflict exists when actors have different perspectives on policy means (Matland 1995). This is evident within the Nigerian context as government actors' perceptions of some CSOs' inability to achieve implementation and CSOs' perceptions of the government as incapable of providing sufficient funds to support its implementation activities have contributed to conflict between these actors. High conflict between these actors is further evident with CSOs reporting a lack of trust in government representatives and these actors establishing a coalition group to increase their influence over the policy implementation process.

#### High level of direct conflict

All CSOs reported that the government adopted measures that made it challenging for them to support women affected by extremism. This is evidence of high levels of conflict in the context. Civil society actors predominantly implement and evaluate policies in alignment with the UNSCR 2242 through community-based interventions. However, as high conflict exists between government and civil society actors, government representatives use bargaining measures to create implementation challenges for CSOs. For instance, the government requires CSOs to contribute some of their funds to gain access to communities at risk, modify their CT/CVE practices to align with the federal government's measures, or cease criticism of their CT/CVE approach to continue their operation. These organisations

engage in early warning and early response activities across the country to detect and respond to extremist threats, radicalisation, and ethnic and cultural conflict, which may escalate national security issues. Responses to these potential threats consist of "advocating for peaceful co-existence among different religions, communities, tribes, groups and race" (NG\_300820\_civsoc).

CSOs also facilitated community projects which encourage collaboration between community groups with opposing beliefs and those likely to engage in conflict. Other organisations reported that their implemented initiatives focused solely on empowering local women to become CT/CVE actors. These activities consisted of training "women on the different signs of violence, domestic violence, gender-based violence, sexual violence [and] training women on conflict resolutions and early warning" (NG\_240820\_civsoc). As young women are also targeted by extremist organisations, these organisations indicated that it was necessary to empower mothers to train young females from the age of five to equip them to respond to extremist threats during adulthood. One civil society actor reported that her organisations have

set up networks in schools for an all-girl school where women are taught from age five. Now, we've realised over the years that some of the women are victims, and some are also perpetrators. We trained some women, specifically influential women, to do a disarmament training for young people even the girls who would want to go into violent extremism (NG\_150820\_civsoc).

Others indicated that their activities focused on women's empowerment, as equipping women with skills to become community and political leaders at the local level increases their ability to implement deradicalisation measures and decreases the likelihood that communities will adopt violent measures to respond to extremist threats. For instance, one CSO leader stated

Then we have Women Political Participation where we train women to be involved in the peace process over the years, especially in Northern Nigeria. If you follow the trends, down south, it is easier for women. Women are seen and heard, but in the north, women are only seen but not heard. So, we came up with a women economic empowerment program where women will not only be taught financial skills, they

were taught confidence skills. They were taught conflict resolution. They were taught peacebuilding, and they were also taught counter-terrorism in fragile societies. Yeah, these are some of the trainings that we have specifically for women (NG\_030820\_civsoc).

As CSOs lead the country's non-military interventions due to a lack of political willingness, these organisations have also taken the initiative to monitor, evaluate and respond to emerging CT/CVE issues. Some civil society actors (particularly those at the national level) indicated that they engaged in processes that consisted of "state and non-state actors [to] outline monitoring and evaluation measures that will be used in assessing the CVE initiatives" (NG\_230820\_civsoc), and measures which commit states to engage in an ongoing collaboration with civil society. However, the government is reluctant to commit to these activities, which some CSOs perceived would occur, as they questioned whether civil society in the country would be capable of holding the state accountable, with one respondent stating, "how do we hold the government accountable? Accountability is already hindered without CSOs [being] given an opportunity to participate" (NG\_210720\_civsoc). The government's lack of commitment to support CSOs to evaluate and monitor implemented CT/CVE community interventions has led to unintended consequences, as CSOs are required to develop new measures to replace ineffective measures initially proposed by government representatives and respond to emerging CT/CVE issues such as the integration of extremist into communities. For instance, one CSOs reported that their organisation give some strategic communications for people to understand radicalisation and how they can counter it, and things that we can do on forgiveness and reconciliation. We started working with victims and survivors of Boko Haram insurgency, and we know that there are lot of issues and tensions that are imminent within the community. So, we supported in developing that training, forgiveness and reconciliation for victims and survivors, so we did that (NG\_150820\_civsoc).

Government representatives echoed CSOs' views, indicating that WPS and counter-terrorism issues are not an immediate concern for the current administration, as there are other issues such as corruption that are perceived to be of greater threat to security and stability in the country. For instance, a state actor reported that he is aware of monitoring and evaluation

tools developed as part of the WPS framework "we have it as a policy on paper, very beautiful, but we are not seeing it in real time...as in Nigeria we are not too serious about the management of the problem" (NG\_010720\_stateactor).

The state's reluctance to acknowledge the significance of the resolution or appreciate the role of CSOs in peace-building also extended to the use of bargaining measures which creates challenges for these organisations to participate in implementation activities. Some government actors harassed and intimidated project officers at the front-line and questioned their motives for criticising the state for casualties from military interventions. For instance, one CSO actor stated

so most times we become the victims and we are also incessantly harassed. We're also threatened and intimidated so much so when they know that you're engaged, you're in the frontline, you're trying to do everything to ensure that they're following the rules of engagement and following the laid down resolutions and are following it as a guiding principle. Most time they come after you and want to intimidate you, especially if you're a woman leading that organisation or leading that group or leading that movement. So, they want to come after you and intimidate you (NG\_150820\_civsoc).

Some CSOs at the provincial level and most operating at the local level indicated that they experienced unique implementation challenges. The state's intimidation efforts consisted of adopting policies that required their organisations to forfeit some funds obtained from international funders to the state and requirements to obtain clearance to visit female victims of extremist violence. For instance, one local actor reported that the space for their organisation to continue to empower women to become key CT/CVE actors is shrinking. The organisation is required to provide 1% of its funding to the state to monitor WPS and CT/CVE activities, although there is little evidence of the state utilising the funds for its intended purpose. The government also required this organisation to obtain clearance from the state military to access communities to implement programs.

Others also reported criticism from government representatives, who questioned their motives and often interrupt their implementation activities to direct their organisations to implement measures according to their policies. Organisations that were opposed to this request were at risk of coercion to suspend operation. The state-imposed challenges also consist of adopting measures that required CSOs to navigate various government policies and protocols before accessing funds from international organisations. CSOs reported that this process made it increasingly difficult for their organisations to manage ongoing projects and support women to the extent required to address the level of insecurities that they experienced in the local context. To illustrate, a manager of a CSO stated:

And so there's been some friction. So discussions are still ongoing. For example, there's even restriction of cash movement to the deep field. There are organisations that need that physical cash to pay workers or for other reasons. And so before you move the cash to the field, you have to be cleared by the Economy and Financial Crime Commission, and it's such a long process. And considering the context, it's very difficult to concentrate on the work you're doing and also trying to ensure that you abide by the regulations of the government (NG\_150820\_civsoc).

These actors explained that the government's intimidating tactics are bargaining tools to coerce their organisations to follow the government's CT/CVE ideology and potentially reduce their influence within the security sectors. One civil society actor reported that when their organisation "try to stand by their principle of neutrality for example, the government says 'no you are here to service us, and so you need to work according to our terms' and we the humanitarian community will say 'no, no, no, no, this is how we work'" (NG\_310820\_civsoc). Another CSO leader reported that they were aware of an organisation that was suspended by the government, as their CT/CVE activities contradicted the government's CT/CVE ideology. This occurred, although the state was aware that the suspension of this organisations' community programs would contribute to an escalation in extremist threats and violence in the region. This civil society stated

For example, there was this time... I think early this year or last year, there was some conflict between NGOs and the military, and the activities of some NGOs in a particular local government was suspended. Following the suspension, there was a small assessment on the impact of the absence of organisations or civil society

organisations in the location and we saw that it impacted on social cohesion. We had a lot of people who were even recovering from trauma, relapsing. We had high cases of violence and theft (NG\_030820\_civsoc).

These organisations argue that their access to the local communities, existing trusting relationships with local women, and their access to international funding, as opposed to their dependence on state funding, made them "competitors...and so they [the state] are thinking we want to take the space" (NG\_080720\_civsoc).

Government actors acknowledged CSOs' perception that the state perceives them as a threat. These actors explained that these organisations' growing influence in the country's security activities, particularly due to their access to international funders' resources, contributed to the government's use of bargaining measures. Access to resources and support from transnational CSOs made them an increasing threat to the state and its reputation in the international community. Some of these actors indicated that the government's tactics were justified, as there is a need to question the motives of international organisations that fund CSOs and these funders' interest in the country's WPS and CT/CVE issues. For example, one actor stated that CSOs' internationally funded program

itself is not flexible... but If you go there telling them 'you need to do this, you need to include this', they say 'no no no'. That is not what funders of the projects are telling them. That is not what these countries are telling us to do, because those given the funding also want to show their partners that they are good, and we run into this problem because our government is not ready to do anything (NG\_010720\_stateactor).

Other state representatives supported this view arguing that there was a need for CSOs to access funding from other African organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS instead of Western states to prove to the Nigerian government that their activities are in the best interest of the state as opposed to western funders. Some actors proposed that the government's bargaining measures are likely to decrease if CSOs' are willing to collaborate with the state to adjust their funding and program structures to reflect community needs as opposed to prioritising outcomes proposed by those funding their organisations.

The measures adopted by government representatives of the Nigerian government, the methods adopted to engage CSOs, and the spaces closed to these organisations reflect what Matland (1995) describes as conflict. Government and civil society actors have conflicting views about the need to integrate UNSCR 2242, opposing views about the goals that should inform policies developed in alignment with the resolution, and the means to achieve implementation. As government actors also use bargaining measures to coerce CSOs to comply with the state's CT/CVE ideology or risk sanctions, this reflects high conflict as described in Matland's (1995) ambiguity-conflict model. The remainder of the chapter reports on the levels of policy ambiguity evident in Nigeria before evaluating implementation.

### Political implementation in Nigeria

Processes to implement UNSCR 2242 within the Nigerian context reflects Matland's (1995) construct of *political implementation*. My analysis indicates that low ambiguity and high conflict inform the implementation process, reflecting a top-down approach to policy implementation, as it consists of defined policy goals and decision-making authority with control over the outcome of the implementation process (Matland 1995). Low ambiguity indicates that low-level actors such as CSOs had a clear understanding of their roles, the state's CT/CVE objectives, and the limitations of their role. While high conflict suggests that there was significant conflict between government and civil society actors with regard to the means to implement, the objectives of CT/CVE measures proposed, and the roles of actors. The model suggests that conflict occurs when one actor perceives the policy as relevant to their interest and another perceives it as contradictory to its objectives (Matland 1995). This applies to the Nigerian context; as shown above, CSOs perceive UNSCR 2242 and policies developed in the local context in alignment with the resolution as relevant to propose non-militarised CT/CVE initiatives and to justify their role in the state's CT/CVE processes. However, the state perceived the integration of the resolution as relevant for its reputation as opposed to the intended purposes of the resolution (to improve security outcomes for women). The model also proposes that conflict arises when implementing actors have conflicting views about the goals which should inform policy development (Matland 1995). Although CSOs based at the national levels indicated that they were in support of policy

goals, CSOs at the local and some at the state levels were in opposition to the policy, indicating that they were excluded from participation and were given little opportunity to critique policy goals although these goals and other measures proposed limits these actors CT/CVE activities.

State and civil society actors have conflicting views regarding the strategies to achieve implementation, the resources required for implementation, and the roles and responsibilities of each actor. CSOs indicated that it was the responsibility of the state to provide resources to achieve implementation; however, the state required CSOs to have access to resources and contribute their resources to aid the state to achieve implementation. Despite this, the state adopted measures that restrict some CSOs from engaging in implementing activities, based on perceptions that these organisations lack the skills, knowledge, and insight into the effort required to achieve implementation, and adequate knowledge of the environment for implementation. Policy means adopted by the Nigerian government increase conflict between state and civil society actors, as the measures adopted by the state close spaces for CSOs to engage in implementation activities. Policies restrict CSOs' participation opportunities, and the implementation of bargaining measures limits access to funding and closes CSOs' access to communities at risk. These factors indicate that there are high levels of conflict between state and civil society organisations.

Similarly, although low ambiguity informed the overall implementation process, due to exclusion from political processes, policy goals were ambiguous for some local CSOs. Although the state proposed a three-tiered implementation process in its NAP and engaged some nationally operating CSOs in the policy development process, there was little information provided to CSOs at the local level and some at the provincial level, until these actors engaged in implementation activities. Through implementation activities, state actors and CSOs acknowledged that restrictive measures adopted by the government affected the extent to which the government could be held accountable for its actions. Some CSOs (particularly those at the local context's) initial lack of awareness of the full details informing policy goals, prevent these implementors' ability to assess the impact that engagement within CT/CVE activities would have on their role, responsibility, and their ability to determine the future implications of policy implementation. Local CSOs restricted the ability to participate

in consultations closed opportunities for these actors to critique and request policy reforms, thus impacting their ability to thoroughly understand the goals informing policies developed. However, the means to policy implementation were clear for both state and civil society actors. The state provided procedures for CSOs that detail the activities they are to engage in, their roles and responsibilities, and the regions for operation and expected outcomes. As this included the adoption of policies and the implementation of measures that reinforced boundaries and activities for implementation, there is low ambiguity surrounding the means of policy implementation. The model highlights and explains some of the key decisions and actions adopted by the government and CSOs that shape the implementation of UNSCR 2242, however, greater emphasis on control is required to better understand the extent to which the state ensures its influence over all aspects of implementation.

## **Conclusion**

Overall, processes to translate and implement UNSCR 2242 from the international to the domestic context in Nigeria are characterised by low ambiguity and high conflict. There is low ambiguity around policies developed by the state that outlines the procedures, guidelines for implementation, and the roles and responsibilities of implementing actors. Although some CSOs operating at the national level had some insights into policy goals, the state excluded these actors from activities to finalise policies and closed participation opportunities for organisations operating at the regional and local levels. To ensure that CSOs' practices were in alignment with the measures proposed by the government, restrictive measures implemented by the government, contributed to the high levels of conflict that informed the implementation process. Conflict between the state and CSOs was prominent during the policy development and implementation process, with implementing actors having differing views about the goals and means of implementation. Closing some CSOs' access to women in need of support and requiring these organisations to contribute some of their funding to support the state's CT/CVE cause to access political spaces also contributed to tensions that predict that *political implementation* is occurring in Nigeria. Matland (1995) states that "the central principle in *political implementation* is that implementation outcomes are decided by power" (Matland 1995: 163). This reflects the Nigerian context, as the government's actions and decisions significantly inform the implementation process. Despite this, the model

provides little explanation for why some CSOs were willing to allocate their funding to the state for political opportunities, despite their opposition to the government's proposed CT/CVE measures and the history of tension between the government and civil society. This evidence reveals the need to further account for the element of *control* to better understand how the state was able to encourage compliance despite CSOs' disapproval.

## Chapter Five: United Kingdom

This chapter explores activities to translate and implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242 within the United Kingdom (UK) and the relationship between state and civil society actors during the implementation process. As explained in Chapters Three, and shown in the previous chapter, Matland's (1995) ambiguity and conflict model (ACM) is applied to analyse the implementation of the Resolution, with a specific focus on the levels of ambiguity and conflict in the process. The chapter first provides an overview of politically motivated violent incidents in the UK, women's contribution to extremist violence, the counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism (CT/CVE) measures adopted by the British government, and the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in this process. Secondly, as the UK government, in collaboration with the Spanish government, advocated for the implementation of UNSCR 2242 at the international level and contributed to the drafting of the Resolution, this chapter discusses its implementation within the UK context. I explore the period of integration and the spaces created for CSOs to participate in activities to implement it domestically. Matland's (1995) ACM is applied in the second section of this chapter to analyse the key themes found in the data to determine whether the model provides insights into the interactions and relationship between the state and CSOs, and an understanding of the method used to engage these actors, the spaces opened, those closed and the factors informing such decisions. Application of the model to analyse the levels of ambiguity and conflict forecasts that there are high levels of ambiguity that informs the state and CSOs' understanding of the goals and means to implement the Resolution; high conflict surrounds the development of implemented measures; and political actors experience significant challenges when accessing resources to achieve implementation. These implementation characteristics indicate that *symbolic implementation* is occurring in the UK context. However, to understand all aspects of the implementation processes, a greater understanding of the control measures utilised by the state is required to understand how the state limits the ability of these organisations to develop effective coalitions.

## **Terrorism and Women in the UK**

Women in the UK, like Spanish and Nigerian women, have been affected by terrorism and violent extremism. Violence perpetrated by groups perceived by some as terrorist organisations and viewed by others as legitimate political actors such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and a series of violent incidents in Manchester and London, have had an impact on women's sense of safety and security within the nation (Dnes and Brownlow 2017; Ben-Ezra et al. 2017; Rubin et al. 2005; Jackson 2005). Further, there have been reports of women's radicalization and their recruitment by extremist organizations. British counter-terrorism police have reported that more than 50 women have fled to the country to support the activities of extremist groups such as ISIS (Reuters 2016). High-profile cases include the radicalisation of young women in London and Manchester, whom British media has labelled 'jihadist brides' (Binetti 2015). Research reports that exposure to extremist Islamic ideologies, online radicalisation, and family involvement in jihadi activities were major factors influencing British women's radicalisation. According to one study, 44% of British women who left the country to join extremist organisations or who became radicalised through online interactions with members of extremist organisations idolised home-grown Jihadist groups (Bryson 2017). Interactions with family members with extremist ideologies also contributed to 61% of British women's decision to engage in jihadist activities (Bryson 2017). This is also evident within far-right movements in the UK, as women have contributed to the English Defence League (EDL) and National Action due both to male influence and individual motivations (Pearson 2019; Odorfer 2015). Like women influenced by extremist Islamic ideologies, women within far-right movements have contributed to hate crimes and violence and have played a significant role in inciting violence using online platforms (Pilkington 2016; Allen 2017; Catherine 2019).

## **Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent-Extremism in the UK**

The UK government addresses terrorism and violent extremism through its main policies CONTEST and PREVENT. Adopted in 2003 in response to growing threats of terrorism and violent extremism within the UK context, the country's counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) aims to address the implications of terrorism and radicalisation on the UK's

foreign interests through activities to *pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare* (House of Commons 2009). These activities consist of *pursuing* potential perpetrators of terrorism, *preventing* radicalisation and addressing support for radical ideologies, *protecting* citizens and the state's domestic and foreign interests from potential terrorist threats, and *preparing* to reduce the implication that terrorist incidents have on citizens' safety (House of Commons 2009). In 2005, growing evidence of domestic radicalisation, 'home-grown' terrorism, and its implications, evident through incidents such as the 2005 London bombing, contributed to a greater focus on PREVENT (HM Government 2018). This strategy prioritises activities that respond to radical ideologies which encourage terrorism and violent extremism, prevent engagement in terrorist related activities through support, and promote a collaborative approach to address extremism (HM Government 2018). Initially praised for its holistic approach, as the policy promotes collaboration between state institutions, the private and public sectors within efforts to address all forms of radicalisation and terrorism, its implementation has highlighted the limitations of the policy (HM Government 2018; Qureshi 2015; Walker and Cawley 2020). As the policy has contributed to increased racial profiling and surveillance of minority communities, particularly Muslim communities (Allen 2017; Qurashi 2018), and created challenges within academic spaces with regard to acts that constitute freedom of speech and duty of care (Haynes and Passy 2017), this has contributed to its criticism. Although the policy was to encourage collaboration, it has contributed to creating tension among community members (Bentley 2018), differences in its interpretation have led to disparities in its outcome across the country, and limited access to funds to support initiatives under the policy has affected the sustainability and effectiveness of implemented measures (O'Toole et al. 2012).

As PREVENT promotes a holistic response to terrorism, CSOs contribute to the strategy as service deliverers. This consists of the management and facilitation of CT/CVE programs in schools and communities, educating, raising awareness of factors that promote radicalisation, and building communities' capacity and resilience to extremist propaganda (Secretary of State for the Home Department 2018). Service delivery also occurs in the form of access to government funding and resources to address social issues such as child abuse and domestic violence and providing families short-term case management to address the root causes of extremism (Combes 2013; Abbas 2019). To ensure that CSOs can reach individuals at risk and to improve their presence within communities, the British government provides these

organisations access to its Information and Communicating Unit, which provides civil society groups digital and communication training (Secretary of State for the Home Department 2018). As activities engaged in by CSOs through PREVENT and CONTEST situates these organisations as service providers as opposed to policy actors (as is also in the case of Spain), Britain's CT/CVE measures, as mentioned above, have received significant criticism (Abbas 2019; O'Toole et al. 2012; Qurashi 2018; Haynes and Passey 2017; Bentley 2018). As civil society groups in the UK, like those in Nigeria and Spain, are unable to gain access to government data and information on terrorist activities, this limits their ability to improve their strategies to engage religious, and cultural groups and communities at high risk of radicalisation (Abbas 2019). Despite this, available research provides little insight into British CSOs' perception of their role in the nation's CT/CVE efforts, initiatives created to engage these organisations within the state's CT/CVE policy development process in the context of WPS, and whether these align with civil society's role as outlined in the state's WPS NAP and the WPS Agenda.

### **Implementing UNSCR 2242 in the UK**

As previously discussed, as a co-developer of UNSCR 2242 and an advocate for its adoption, Britain pursued the implementation of the Resolution in its fourth WPS NAP (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office et al. 2018). However, the UK government referred to the need to protect women from terrorism in its earlier 2014-2017 WPS NAP. This NAP incorporates some of the elements of CONTEST and PREVENT, through it focuses on a holistic approach to addressing terrorism and violent extremism, its focus on prevention and protection, and its emphasis on engaging CSOs within the process. Although similar in their approach to CT/CVE, the country's NAP, and its CT/CVE policies are funded by and implementation is led by different government departments. Although CONTEST and PREVENT are led and funded by the Home Office, various government departments fund and co-manage the implementation of the NAP. For instance, implementation is shared between the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence (HM Government 2018). Similarly, despite the domestic focus of CONTEST and PREVENT, the country's NAP is outward facing, with a focus on the UK's foreign interest states (Hamilton et al. 2020).

Unlike the country's CT/CVE policies which were developed by government departments, the NAP acknowledges the contribution made by CSOs to its development (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office et al. 2018). For example, the NAP reaffirms that the UK government will maintain its partnership with CSOs such as Gender Action for Peace and Security and those participating in the WPS Focal Point Network, to achieve its WPS objectives (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office et al. 2018). The role of CSOs within the NAP's monitoring process is also acknowledged. The government proposes to develop a WPS steering committee consisting of CSOs and senior government officials to improve CSOs' participation in the country's NAP process (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office et al. 2018). The need for continuous consultation and partnership with CSOs within Britain's WPS focus countries is reinforced in the NAP through the commitment to collaborating with CSOs to strengthen their capacity to respond to the needs of local women and address terrorism (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office et al. 2018). Hence, the current UK WPS NAP document highlights the various spaces and initiatives created to encourage CSOs' contribution to fulfilling the nation's WPS objectives; however, there is no systematic evaluation of whether these proposed actions were implemented. The following section explores ambiguity and conflict within the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Britain, the levels of ambiguity and conflict within this process, and its impact on the relationship between the state and civil society. Below, I explain the themes found in the UK context and examine the levels of ambiguity and conflict that shaped CSOs' relationship with the state during the implementation of UNSCR 2242. Although high ambiguity and conflict denote that *symbolic implementation* is occurring in the UK context, as argued in Chapter 1 and in the conclusion of this chapter, the model provides a limited account of how the macro-environment contributes to acting as a barrier to the implementation of the resolution.

## **Findings**

The initial five themes (*state control of implementation; CSOs control of implementation resources; future changes; decisions to integrate the resolution; and additional factors*) identified at the first stage of data analysis (as discussed in Chapter Four) included data coded from the UK data set. Once I categorised these themes using the concepts from the ACM

(*ambiguity* and *conflict*) and analysed the data further, I also identified sub-themes specific to the UK context. Under ambiguity, the sub-themes identified were, *ambiguous policy goals* and *unclear policy means*. I identified sub-themes such as *conflicting views regarding the necessity of UNSCR 2242*, *complementary views of policy goals*, and *high conflict between state and CSOs*, through analysis of data categorised under conflict (see figure 4). Below, I provide an analysis of the findings obtained under these sub-themes.




Figure 4: Theme - UK

## Ambiguity

### Ambiguous policy goals

The state's minimal engagement of some CSOs and exclusion of others has contributed to a limited understanding of CONTEST and PREVENT amongst some political participants within the UK's CT/CVE space. As policy development occurs in a top-down process with the exclusion of low-level actors, these political participants rely on information received from actors that are directly above them within the policy hierarchy (Matland 1995). The model emphasises that a top-down approach to policy development consists of explicit measures accessible to low-level actors to ensure goal clarity (Matland 1995). Although the UK government's policy development approach reflects a top-down process, information made accessible to lower-level actors is ambiguous. As the state primarily engages large CSOs and those with an existing relationship within state departments and agencies within its consultation process, small and locally-based organisations indicate that they were unaware of the measures developed and the goals, which inform CT/CVE measures adopted in alignment with the country's PROTEST and CONTEST policies. For example, one civil society representative stated that the state's consultation process "is still very in the hands of some three, two organisations. It's not something that is open to small organisations that operate [at the] local level. It is not really" (UK\_111220\_civsoc). Other CSOs reported that tension, miscommunication between their organisations and government agencies, and lack of access to funding have contributed to limited opportunities to participate in policy development processes. One civil society actor reiterated their experience, indicating that although their organisation responds to extremism and supports women, there is a lack of policy participation opportunities. Spaces are not created to "effectively place women and young people as the main social actors in the development of strategies to tackle extremism...and although these organisations [are] proliferating, many of them [don't] have funding" (UK\_111220\_civsoc). These findings reflect criticism of the UK's CT/CVE policies, which like the concerns raised by CSOs, are predominantly led by government officials, targets and are exclusionary of some groups and organisations in society, despite its claim to adopt a holistic approach to CT/CVE (Abbas 2019; O'Toole et al. 2012; Qurashi 2018; Haynes and Passey 2017; Bentley 2018).

When questioned whether there are activities that these organisations can engage in to increase their political participation opportunities, and to increase their awareness of policy goals and objectives, these actors indicated that the onus for the engagement should be on the government. These actors further explained that as they have developed expertise in their field, and make their research findings and project information publicly available, "it should be the government that should be trying to engage with these organisations and not in a tokenistic way. For example, ensure that these organisations are not only invited to consultation but that their views inform policy" (UK\_261020\_civsoc). Ambiguity surrounding the accessibility of information and its impact on the policy implementation process, to some extent, contradicts the ACM. The model indicates that ambiguous policy goals are likely to contribute to the willingness of political participants to support a policy, as the lack of clarity limits their ability to discern the impact that the policy will have on their resources, role, power, and their capability to achieve their individual goals (Matland 1995). As ambiguity also affects the ability of political actors to understand the proposed policy change and its potential to disrupt bureaucratic patterns, structures, and the influence of actors within bureaucratic settings, political participants are likely to support proposed measures (Matland 1995). As there are similarities within the approach adopted by the state to implement CONTEST and PREVENT, despite differences in its funding structures and the actors engaged in its implementation process, it is likely that evidence of the contrast between the measures implemented in communities and those proposed in CONTEST and PREVENT, has contributed to some CSOs limited trust and support for the WPS measures proposed by the state.

The ambiguity that characterizes the UK government's policy development process and goals proposed to address the impact of extremist violence on women has contributed to conflict between actors instead of encouraging support for the proposed measures. The majority of small and locally based CSOs who were unaware of the goals informing measures proposed argue that although they work directly with women and communities affected by extremist threats, their exclusion from the consultations process raises questions about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the measures in addressing the needs of women. Some CSOs indicated that as there was a minimal engagement of women from 'at risk' communities and these actors' accounts of their experiences and knowledge do not inform measures, there is a risk of co-opting feminism instead of recognising and creating spaces for

women to exercise their agency. This is reinforced by Spalek and Imtoul (2007), who emphasizes that the state's CT/CVE policies (PREVENT and CONTEST) exclude communities that CT/CVE intends to support. This was also evident in the UK government's approach to WPS, as there is minimal engagement of organisations led by minority groups, particularly Muslim women groups, whose opportunities for consultation, policy engagement, and reflections on the limitations of implemented measures occur after participation in the state's CT/CVE program (Pearson 2020). Exclusion from policy development processes contributes to limiting these actors' sense of agency and ownership of interventions in the local context. Other actors explained that as past CT/CVE measures were stereotyped and created mistrust between some communities at risk of radicalization and government authorities, they were reluctant to support the proposed measures. Similarly, the negative implications of PREVENT and CONTEST have also contributed to tension amongst community members and state authorities (Thomas 2010), as greater surveillance of Muslim communities has disrupted existing trust between communities and state CT/CVE security actors (Qurashi 2018). As this has the potential to alienate a large sector of the Muslim community and women at risk of terrorism and violent extremism, PREVENT and CONTEST may cause greater harm (Spalek and McDonald 2009) if the state excludes these actors during all stages of processes to develop and implement WPS measures.

On the contrary, large CSOs that were engaged in the policy development process and had insights into the impact that proposed measures and goals would have on their role within the bureaucratic process were in support of the measures, although the ACM suggests that awareness would likely influence actors to oppose proposed measures (Matland 1995). These actors were aware that proposed measures would consist of collaboration with state actors to develop and implement measures, and state actors would have input into the approach and strategies adopted to achieve implementation and the environment where implementation occurs. However, these insights did not impact their willingness to support the policy. As these actors have an existing relationship with state actors, have previously participated in state consultation processes, and receive significant funding from the government, these actors directly contributed to the development of proposed measures. For example, one research participant stated that "most of our projects are funded by governments. You know, we have staff members that used to work inside government, and we know that some of our insights sometimes help to inform policy" (UK\_091120\_civsoc). These evidence reflect some

of the criticism of PREVENT and CONTEST, where funding and policy engagement activities are only accessible to selected government departments, actors, and those who have engaged in the country's political sphere (Kundnani and Hayes 2018; Walker 2019). The research participants engaged indicated that although they did not support all proposed measures, the country's overall CT/CVE measures and objectives aligned with UNSCR 2242 and could improve outcomes for women and communities at risk if interventions were well-resourced and appropriately implemented within communities.

State actors recognised the engagement of some CSOs and the exclusion of others within consultation processes, and its potential to affect the awareness of some political actors of the goals informing measures developed and the significance of UNSCR 2242. These actors reported that although the goals informing CT/CVE initiatives were evident, as the ways in which the state has aligned these measures with UNSCR 2242 were unclear and some actors had minimal knowledge of the Resolution, this has the potential to affect its effective implementation within contexts where interventions are greatly needed. For instance, a state actor commented:

in our day-to-day work, one of the things we have found is that people's perspective of the role of gender itself, is in and of itself very gendered. A lot of people assume that women involved, don't like the violent content...lots of people assume that women involved have more humanitarian motives than men (UK\_091120\_stateactor).

This actor further explained that gendered stereotypes and the lack of understanding of the goals informing Women Peace and Security (WPS) focused initiatives have contributed to the development of CT/CVE programs and measures which fail to recognise women's agency and assume that male influence is the main factor for female radicalisation.

Misunderstanding of the Resolution has also contributed to creating challenges for the UK government to achieve its WPS objectives. For example, the same actor quoted above also stated that there were prevalent

old fashioned misconceptions about the nature of female involvement, which are frankly incredibly harmful and lead to the design of programs that are highly likely to be ineffective and also deny the agency of women in the first place. And women are more than capable of making a rational choice to join a terrorist organization. Um,

they don't necessarily have to have been tricked or brainwashed  
(UK\_091120\_stateactor).

As highlighted by state actors, a lack of policy clarity and the implications of actors' misunderstanding of its objectives reflect concerns raised in the ACM. The model indicates that although ambiguity can lead to greater acceptance of measures, it creates challenges for implementation. As it requires actors to interpret policies and assume their meaning, measures that are developed may not reflect the intended aims of policies initially proposed by the state (Matland 1995). This can contribute to disparities across implementation sites, inconsistency regarding the extent to which local contextual factors inform the measures, and the degree to which relevant actors are engaged in implementation activities. Disparities with access to information affect effective communication, increase the likelihood of program duplication, and prevent state authorities from establishing practice standards and clear rules that inform practice (Goldberg et al. 2015; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017). These limits affect states' capabilities to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of measures and determine areas for future improvement. This is consistent with findings from the evaluation of PREVENT and CONTEST, where differences in its interpretation across the nation, in addition to disparities in funding accessible to different regions have contributed to unequal implementation with varying outcomes (O'Toole et al. 2012).

The ACM predicts that ambiguity limits conflict between actors as political participants cannot determine the impact of policies on their political interests (Matland 1995). However, ambiguity has contributed significantly to conflict between political actors within the UK context, as exclusion from policy development processes, along with uncertainty surrounding the measures proposed by the state and the principles of UNSCR 2242 amongst some actors, has contributed to a lack of support for the measures proposed, and actors concerns about the effectiveness of these measures. On the contrary, large CSOs and organisations that participated in policy consultation activities supported the government's CT/CVE ideology despite their awareness of its implications on their interests. High ambiguity, which is evident within the UK context, raises concerns about strategies to implement policies, the likelihood that implementation will be consistent across sites, and whether policy objectives inform measures aligned with UNSCR 2242.

Unclear policy means

Limited knowledge of the environment for implementation, a lack of resources and technology to achieve implementation, and ambiguity regarding the role of actors, have all contributed to the lack of understanding regarding the means to implement UNSCR 2242 amongst both state and CSOs. Large CSOs that reported having established a relationship with government personnel and departments indicated that a "range of different programs...that touch on all sorts of different elements of extremism" (UK\_091120\_civsoc) is funded by state departments. Matland (1995) suggests that ambiguity arises in relation to policy means when there is a lack of technology and procedures to guide the policy implementation process. This is evident within the UK context, as there is ambiguity surrounding the goals developed by the state to implement UNSCR 2242, and a lack of clear state guidelines regarding the measures to be implemented. Although CONTEST, PREVENT and the WPS NAP propose measures to be intended and their intended outcomes, the lack of clear guidelines in the NAP with regards to procedures to integrate gendered perspectives into CT/CVE activities, suggests that CSOs determine if and how to integrate gendered perspectives into their funded CT/CVE activities. One actor stated that, in their organization, the gendered element of terrorism and violent extremism is acknowledged through the analysis of extremist incidents and events from a gendered perspective, as this aids to "debunk some misconceptions that often exist when it comes to the nature of female involvement in violent extremist movement" (UK\_091120\_civsoc). However, this creates inconsistency across the state and challenges for evaluation and monitoring for effectiveness. Despite the access to state funds enjoyed by large organisations, and existing relationships with state agents, these actors questioned the means for policy implementation. CSOs raised concerns about the lack of knowledge of the context for implementation amongst actors, limited access to procedures and guidelines to inform implementation, and the lack of access to secure funding to ensure the long-term effectiveness of implemented measures. These participants explained that there is a disconnect between some government agencies and communities where extremist threats and violence occur, with this contributing to the ambiguity surrounding the means of implementation.<sup>3</sup> This is in line with the presumptions of

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<sup>3</sup> Some participants declined to be quoted, although they gave consent to use general information provided. Their insights suggest that the lack of direct consultation between state actors, women and at-risk groups who reside in communities where extremism occur, has contributed to a lack of understanding of the biopsychosocial factors that contribute to radicalisation and extremism within

the ACM, which proposes that ambiguity is likely to occur when the environment for implementation is complex or not well understood by those who are to engage in implementation activities, as it creates difficulty in determining the tools appropriate for the context and outcomes to be expected (Matland 1995). Knowledge of the environment where counter-terrorism measures are to be implemented is significant in ensuring that interventions reflect and respond to radicalization, extremism, and environmental challenges, as accurate knowledge of communities is critical to the effectiveness of interventions (Phelps 2020).

Although these concerns were also raised by small and community-based organisations and some state actors, there is a lack of consensus on strategies to improve trust between communities and state actors or the strategies that can assist actors to gain greater insight into the factors that contribute to radicalizations and extremist violence. The lack of consensus between actors contributes to the various interpretations of CONTEST and PROTEST and activities to achieve the goals of these policies, as ambiguity has limited opportunities for a uniform understanding of these policies across the various implementation sites. Ambiguity surrounding acts that constitute terrorism, the measures articulated in PREVENT and CONTEST have contributed to confusion and “further problematic issues of interpretation and analysis” (Spiller et al. 2018) amongst CSOs and the general public. Variations in interpretation have led to inconsistent perceptions of the factors which give rise to radical ideologies, create conditions for the abuse of citizens’ rights, and contribute to inconsistency in the strategies implemented to address extremism across the UK context (Spiller et al. 2018; Awan et al. 2019; Fowler and Sen 2010). One research participant recommended that state actors develop a greater relationship with communities at risk of extremism, collaborate with these communities to address misinformation, and hold accountable those who contribute to spreading fear:

Governments need to work closer with communities. They're hoping to counter violent extremism within, but also individuals actively spreading disinformation and lies about the nature of [terrorism and violent extremism], and [governments] also

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particular contexts, the measures which are appropriate for different communities and the obstacles which may impact the success of interventions. Minimal understanding of implementation contexts can contribute to the allocation CT/CVE programs which masks as opposed to address the underlying factors which makes women vulnerable to extremism and inhibit instead of empower and increase women’s agency.

need to be held accountable for deliberately scaring communities and trying to spread fear. I thinking that is something we need to figure out, how we address [these issues], but we should all start with a shared understanding of the facts and then go from there (UK\_091120\_civsoc).

In addition to ambiguity surrounding the technology and knowledge of the environment in which implementation occurs, there is uncertainty surrounding access to finance to fund initiatives. Large CSOs reported that although all their activities are funded, insecure funding allocated by state governments creates challenges for the longer-term success of implemented measures. UK CSOs limited access to funding, reflects the under-resourcing of WPS and humanitarian activities globally. Although large organisations and those with networks are well positioned to obtain funds, sufficient funds to achieve the full implementation is scarce (Basu et al. 2020; Duriesmith 2017; Coalition of Feminists for Social Change 2017).

Hamilton et al. (2021) highlight that insufficient funds have required civil society actors to seek various funding sources from state and non-state institutions and engage in unpaid labour to achieve WPS outcomes, although UNSCR 2242 and the WPS encourage states to fund women-led civil society initiatives. Insecure funding and limited opportunities to develop knowledge of the implementation environment have required CSOs to engage in selective implementation, with decisions about the measures to be implemented and the issues to address being influenced by funds and resources available to these actors. For example, one research participant explained:

I think that's a general problem across the counter extremism space, funding tends to be a little unstable. It's rare to have long-term funding. Its relatively easy to get funding for short-term pilot projects, but it is much more difficult to get sustained funding, which is predictable over many, many years. Um, so that's the case with everything and kind of counter extremism and terrorism is funding is very unpredictable (UK\_091120\_civsoc).

Ambiguity surrounding the means to implement UNSCR 2242 was significant for small organisations and those operating at the community level. One actor based at a large

organisation stated that despite their engagement in the consultation process and access to funding, the process was unpredictable and "it's a lot more unpredictable for smaller organisations compared to large ones" (UK\_091120\_civsoc). This perspective was supported by smaller organisations and those operating only within specific communities, who argue that although they have significant experience within the counter-terrorism sector (with this contributing to their organisations receiving multiple international and domestic awards), they were unable to secure funding from the government and thus relied on donations to fund their CT/CVE initiatives.<sup>4</sup> These actors explained that although their organisations are not prevented or ineligible for government funding, the complex application process, the lack of existing relationships with key government actors and organisations, and the inability to fund staff to manage its application process especially, have contributed to their inability to gain access to resources. One CSO leader stated

They are the ones [large organisations] that were close to the government and all the other ones, there's smaller ones like mine, for example, they don't get access to funding at all, and they don't have any kind of support from the government, even though they have a very global perspective. My organization has no funding at all. And even though we won an award [award name removed] and another award [award name removed], we [also] won another award in the US. We don't have any kind of funding. And it's very difficult to...help in the struggle against terrorism and extremism. But on the other hand, there is a bureaucracy [and] restraints to getting...funding and to even continue with our work. Because when the government opens this calls for grants, for example, there are many levels [and] many phases and then obviously a big organizations...they have a team dedicated to that. They will be prioritized. This is obvious...this bureaucracy is very harmful (UK\_111220\_civsoc).

These actors further elaborated that although the UK's WPS initiative has a foreign focus and their organisations and some staff members have experience implementing CT/CVE initiatives in other countries and on behalf of international governmental organisations, they could not access funding. There are "one or two [small] organisations that are...close to the

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<sup>4</sup> As above, some participants declined to be quoted, although they gave consent to use general information provided.

governments, and they are the ones that work at the local level... [even] they really struggle to have [long-term] funding" (UK\_111220\_civsoc).

In response to insecure funding, the lack of implementation procedures, and limited resources to achieve the objectives of UNSCR 2242, small and community-based CSOs have developed their own initiatives and strategies to overcome some implementation challenges. One participant indicated that although they advocated for legislative responses that make it mandatory for greater collaboration between state agencies and civilians to prevent extremist violence, there was little interest from the state in this initiative. This participant was therefore required to build networks with influential figures, develop and propose legislative measures to various state agencies and utilise media campaigns to highlight the ineffectiveness of government initiatives and its lack of inaction in some counter-terrorism spaces. The civil society actor recounted their experience:

I became very outspoken. I kept saying, look at this face, don't forget it because I am not going to go away. And subsequently then I started [redacted]...initially when I was doing it on my own...the petition gained about 10,000 signatures at first. When a petition reaches 10,000 signatures the government has to reply online. So they sent a reply...and it basically said, thank you for your petition. We already have a solid security legislation in place that is covered by this and this document. We will not be making any changes and that's the answer I got, but the petition carried on. Eventually I was taken more serious. Then I was asked to meet with the others in the Security Minister's office. And the minister asked me, is there anything else you want to add? And I said, yes...I am going to be buzzing around your head, like an irritating fly I'm telling you now, I will not go away with this and I will go very public with this (UK\_051220\_civsoc).

This actor further recounted that although they managed to gain an invitation to "London and had meetings with the Security Minister... and [they have] had several phone calls with both the Home Secretary and the Minister for Security" (UK\_051220\_civsoc), they have been required to negotiate and continuously advocate for their initiative to be included as a

component of the government's CT/CVE initiatives. Despite the challenges experienced by this actor and their network to engage the state, their efforts (such as developing the measures which inform the proposed legislation, engaging in research to ensure that it aligned with the government's CT/CVE ideology, and participating in all requested meetings), they are currently excluded from processes to formalise and implement the legislation. When asked whether there has been ongoing communication and collaboration with the state to ensure the realisation of the initiative, the actor stated, "I would say direct involvement is probably 1%" (UK\_051220\_civsoc). In comparison, larger organisations have reported that they did not experience obstacles in communicating or collaborating with government organisations.

Matland (1995) proposes that policy ambiguity creates uncertainty amongst actors about their role in the policy process, the areas where their contribution will be required, and activities where the state will exclude CSOs. This, to some extent, contradicts evidence from the UK context. As PREVENT promotes a community-based approach to CT/CVE, the government proposes to engage community members as CT/CVE agents; the exclusion of these actors, however, reflects strategies adopted by the state to limit the influence and role of small and local CSOs' in the CT/CVE sector.

The exclusion of small and minority CSOs within policy development processes across the UK reflects global trends in civil society engagement within political spaces (Abbas 2019; O'Toole et al. 2012; Qurashi 2018), and the minimal engagement of some community groups in efforts to implement the country's PREVENT and CONTEST policies. The adoption of restrictive CT/CVE measures has created conditions where CSOs and other groups which challenge unequal power relations and criticize government responses are excluded from Agenda-setting activities and limited political opportunities to engage in capacity-building (Cortright et al. 2008; van Ginkel et al. 2010; Massoumi 2021; Fowler and Sen 2010; Lind and Howell 2010). Other CSOs proposed measures to address the lack of recognition and application of intersectionality within measures proposed in alignment with UNSCR 2242. These actors argue that the lack of application of the concept of intersectionality has contributed to measures that target, stigmatise, and discriminate against vulnerable and minority groups. The ACM explains that when the government responds immediately to

public demand by developing policies and interventions to address security concerns, there is little consideration of intersectionality or the feasibility of these measures (Jones 1975; Matland 1995). As the country's WPS NAP articulates that community organisations were engaged in consultation processes to develop the document, it consists of proposed outcomes and, in some cases, indicates the amount of funding to be allocated to achieve implementation. This contradicts Matland's (1995) explanation that ambiguity surrounding the means of implementation results from an impulsive political response, in this case to evidence of women's role as both victims and perpetrators of extremist violence. As policy limitations contribute to creating distrust between these communities and state actors and decrease the likelihood that these stakeholders will report evidence of radicalisation or seek state assistance for individuals at risk of radicalisation, some CSOs have developed CT/CVE programs and initiatives which address the limitations of current policies and programs. Some actors have engaged young people from minority communities to develop anti-terrorism online campaigns, movies, and psycho-education programs targeting at-risk groups. Others have developed reintegration programs for former extremists, which incorporate cultural and religious elements.<sup>5</sup> CSOs have experience working directly with communities at risk of extremism. These actors can also leverage their existing relationships with communities, women, and at-risk groups to encourage engagement within CT/CVE programs (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2018).

The ACM suggests that ambiguity surrounding policy means requires actors to determine the tools required for implementation, which provides an opportunity for actors to learn new methods, test existing knowledge, and reach new goals (Matland 1995). This is evident across the various implementation sites. As these programs have been effective, actors report that schools and community groups have commissioned their organisations to design and facilitate programs specifically for targeted groups. Although often excluded in the policy development process, the effectiveness of these actors' interventions has led to some government agencies' interest in collaborating with these actors in future projects. This has occurred through invitations from some government actors and agencies to design and implement targeted interventions. However, these opportunities have not influenced the

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<sup>5</sup> Some participants declined to be quoted, although they gave consent to use general information provided.

opportunity to participate in initial processes and consultations to design and develop the country's overarching CT/CVE policies and measures. For instance, a CSO actor stated

Now, if you take the broad view that somebody who expresses racially motivated attitude and prejudice, there is something missing. And we need to find a way of sort of engaging and exploring ideas to add some things to what may be missing. So that's the holding difficult conversations course. Um, and that's a training package that we we've been doing. And it's often with the Foundation because we have a reputation for doing interactive work...that's got sort of years of history behind it. We will be approached by schools, sometimes local authority [like] prevent coordinators. Sometimes there's a direct commission from the government to ask us as an NGO to design and deliver a piece of work. Just before the lockdown here, I was up in the Northwest, working with police officers and police and community support officers to explore pretty much what we've just been talking about to perpetuate engagement (UK\_221020\_civsoc).

Small and community-based CSOs argue that the lack of an intersectional approach has contributed to the lack of recognition of the significance of culture and religion within counter-terrorism efforts (on the significance of intersectionality within counter-terrorism programs see also Demirsu 2017; Brunner 2007; United Nations 2020; Ní Aoláin 2013). These actors further explained that as adaptations of religious ideologies inform processes to radicalise and motivate individuals to engage in extremist violence, a western approach to radicalisation that focuses on therapeutic interventions and medications was ineffective to deradicalize returnees.<sup>6</sup> These actors proposed that the state integrate cultural and religious approaches within its interventions to address the root causes of extremism, connect and respond to false doctrines that have contributed to radicalisation. It was suggested that increasing the representation of minority groups and women engaged in policy development processes and ensuring the meaningful participation of these actors is essential to understanding diversity within the CT/CVE sector and the integration of cultural and

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<sup>6</sup> Some participants declined to be quoted, although they gave consent to use general information provided. approved for information provided to inform analysis. These actors explained that therapeutic and medication measures were ineffective as they failed to address factors such as social marginalisation, economic disadvantages, lack of opportunities, discrimination, exposure to radical doctrines that contributes to radicalisation.

religious approaches to deradicalization and early interventions (on the integration of cultural and religious elements in deradicalization programs see also Hearne and Laiq 2010; Susilo and Dalimunthe 2019; Rabasa et al. 2010; Angus 2016). Other CSOs proposed that the state engage a range of stakeholders to prevent the development of policies out of echo chambers. These actors explained that a bottom-up approach to policy development would improve the effectiveness of policies. This process should consist of the engagement of state, civil, grassroots actors, community leaders, and groups at risk of radicalisation, as effective policies should be developed based on the knowledge and experiences of citizens that policies intended to support as opposed to the views and experiences of selected elites within a society.

Small and local CSOs questioned the effectiveness of policy development processes and the lack of intersectionality within the policies proposed. These actors indicated that although PREVENT promotes a community-based approach to terrorism and violent extremism, this is not evident across all initiatives under the policy, as communities that these measures intend to assist have reported experiencing racism due to the actions of state actors. For instance, the use of surveillance measures and interventions targeting minority women and communities has contributed to reports of discrimination and tension between at-risk groups and state actors (on the negative implications of PREVENT on communities see also Qurashi 2018; Spalek and McDonald 2009; Thomas 2010).

As the state engages a selected group of large CSOs, as "they are the ones that the government like, they go to these... ten or fifteen groups who do this work for the government" (UK\_181120\_stateactor), engagement of small CSOs is "at a very simple or low level, where they just go along and turn up and that sort of shape the evaluation and assessment" (UK\_181120\_stateactor). This tokenistic approach to engagement was identified as ineffective by these actors, who reported that it has contributed to minority and local community perceptions that they "feel [racism] from the police, the racism from the government" (UK\_181120\_stateactor). This reportedly contributed to whether local and minority communities were willing to engage with state CT/CVE actors and support state interventions. Many research participants supported proposals by CSOs for the government to increase the representation of minority groups across the CT/CVE sector and take into

consideration intersectionality when developing and implementing measures. One actor provided an example of how such reforms will improve the effectiveness of current measures, stating,

Engagement from the government probably engagement from individuals...it's about a charismatic [leader]...somebody who's got the charisma to lead them. So that person doesn't necessarily have to be leading the group. It just needs to be within a group and say, this is a good place for you. You know, a lot of particularly young men [and women] who got involved in this [terrorism and violent terrorism] got involved in it, looking for something. Um, and if you can give them an individual who's charismatic, who has legitimacy. So for instance, [actor name removed] is the charismatic individual. He has a shared journey that he went to Afghanistan to fight the Americans. At one point he's changed his mind. So it's about them believing that individual. They will go and he will lead them through the group [deradicalization program]. There just needs to be somebody that they feel. So he would say, [name removed] is my friend. I know him well, he's this he's that. And they would trust me because he's given his word. So from an engagement point of view, there needs to be somebody [counter-terrorism agent] within that group [deradicalization program] with a legitimate reason to be there with a shared aim, maybe somebody from the same background, same ethnic background, somebody who's maybe lived in the same community and understands (their) depression (UK\_181120\_ stateactor).

This suggests that, although political participants across the UK who support the government to achieve its WPS objectives hold contradictory views regarding the means and strategies to implement UNSCR 2242, state actors and CSOs share similar views on the areas where reform is required.

This evidence suggests high ambiguity characterises policies developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242 and measures proposed to implement the Resolution in the UK. Although large CSOs are engaged in the policy consultation processes and receive funding to implement CT/CVE initiatives across the country, funding is not accessible for a significant number of locally-based and small CSOs. A lack of access to resources and bureaucratic constraints has contributed to these actors' inability to obtain grants, despite evidence of their expertise and capability to design and implement CT/CVE measures if given opportunities. High ambiguity

has also contributed to a lack of clarity regarding the strategies to implement and the tools to achieve implementation. Although state and CSOs actors have proposed measures to limit the impact of ambiguity, there is a lack of consensus amongst actors regarding the strategies to implement, although actors acknowledge that reformed policies should reflect the needs of women and communities within local contexts.

## Conflict

### Conflicting views regarding the necessity of UNSCR 2242

CSOs and state actors recognised the usefulness of UNSCR 2242; however, perceptions of its necessity and the urgency for implementation differ amongst civil and state actors. Civil society actors reported that the Resolution is significant for advancing women's security and well-being. This is particularly evident through women's civil society organisations campaigns, leadership, and advocacy to encourage state actors to implement measures that acknowledge the values and pillar that informs UNSCR 2242 and the WPS Agenda broadly. For instance, one CSO actor stated that “many organisations that work to prevent terrorism in the UK, they are run by women...so they have a strong female presence. Some key civil society entities...one of them, which is very big, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, it has a woman as its founder, as its main voice” (UK\_111220\_civsoc). Women's role and leadership within efforts to address terrorism and violent extremism are encouraged in UNSCR 2242 and the WPS Agenda more broadly, as it contributes to encouraging states to adopt a holistic and gendered approach to address the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism (United Nations 2015; Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2019). State actors also recognised the significance of the Resolution to civil society and minority groups. These actors reported that CSOs' willingness to see the implementation of the Resolution is evident within their actions to seek opportunities to contribute to policy development and implementation processes and through their ongoing efforts despite the challenges they experience gaining access to political spaces.

In contrast, there seemed to be quite minimal awareness of UNSCR 2242 and the broader WPS architecture amongst government actors. Matland (1995) proposes that conflict arises between government participants when one actor perceives a proposed policy as necessary to achieve their objectives, and others view it as inconsistent with their interests. This was evident within the UK context, as civil society argues that some government actors support some of the values that underpin the Resolution, such as gender equality; they may, however, be reluctant to engage with other principles that inform the WPS Agenda. Some government actors recognise the relevance of UNSCR 2242 and show interest in its implementation, while others lack knowledge of the Resolution. The impact of women's presence within political institutions and the adoption of gendered policies is significant. Women's presence and particularly the high numbers of women within leadership positions significantly contribute to greater awareness of the gendered implication of security issues, the adoption of 'women-friendly policies in line with the provisions of WPS resolution, and greater state responses to the needs of female citizens (True and Mintrom 2001; Borchorst and Siim 2008; Kittilson 2008; True 2016). Although some scholars argue that policy adoption will only occur if women represent 30% of government institutions, others argue otherwise (Childs and Krook 2007). Htun and Weldon (2010) argue that women's access to significant political power and position within the highest levels of government institutions is likely to influence the adoption of gendered policies instead of the percentage of women present in government institutions.

However, there is minimal acknowledgment of the significance of the Resolution, and of gender-based violence more broadly, across all governments, which some civil society actors argue has contributed to the "lack of strategies in terms of femicide" (UK\_111220\_civsoc). State actors shared the same sentiment, indicating that a pattern of government behaviour globally influenced the UK government's decision to integrate UNSCR 2242. As the integration of UNSCR 2242 and other WPS resolutions contributed to depicting a state as a supporter of gender norms, the integration of the Resolution reflects a trend in government behaviour to maintain its international reputation. For example, one actor states "the UK government are very much about sound bites. They look at what's current, what the current discussion is about what the current trend is, and they pick that" (UK\_181120\_stateactor). According to these actors, the lack of intention to integrate and implement UNSCR 2242 is

evident in government inaction: in addressing all of the pillars of UNSCR 2242 and WPS; in the limited measures developed to acknowledge the Resolution; and in the minimal engagement of actors such as civil society groups. These actors further argue that as the integration of the Resolution promoted promoting the state's international reputation, the initial goal of integrating the Resolution was achieved, and thus there is little desire to meet all of the requirements.

Matland (1995) states that actors must be interdependent for conflict to be present, which reflects the UK context. Although CSOs engage in activities independent of the state, the extent to which the state recognises these actors' CT/CVE activities as a component of the state's CT/CVE efforts and their access to political spaces are dependent on their relationship with state actors. As the state is also reliant on CSOs to deliver CT/CVE initiatives to hard-to-reach communities and groups, and their ability to access the knowledge and experiences of these actors can significantly influence the effectiveness of measures proposed and implemented, these actors are interdependent. Matland (1995) also proposes that conflict arises when the views and objectives of interdependent actors are incongruent. Although the government integrated UNSCR 2242, a Resolution supported by CSOs, the factors that influenced its integration significantly differ from those that influenced CSOs to support and encourage the integration of the Resolution. The integration of UNSCR 2242 as it aligned with the actions of other states, as opposed to its integration based solely on concerns for the gendered implication of extremist violence within its domestic context and the international community more broadly, reflects Matland (1995) argument that incongruent views give rise to conflict. Differences within the perception of the significance and value of the Resolution also shape views of the goals, which should inform the policies proposed.

#### Complementary views of policy goals

State and civil society actors shared similar views about the goals informing policies developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242. Civil society actors indicated that although they were not engaged in the policy development processes and had minimal understanding of the policies developed and the goals informing these policies, they supported the policies they

knew of, as it reflects an improvement in CT/CVE policies. The ACM proposes that differences within perceptions of policies also increase the likelihood that actors will have different views of the goals, which should inform policy goals (Matland 1995). However, within the UK context, CSOs supported the policy goals proposed, although views of the significance of the Resolution significantly differ amongst CSOs and state actors. These actors argue that past policies were ineffective as there was little understanding of the gendered nature of terrorism and violent extremism, past measures failed to understand the need for specific measures to respond to women's security needs, to address the underlying factors which make women vulnerable to extremist violence and increase their vulnerability to radicalisation. Civil society highlighted that modifications to policies since the integration of UNSCR 2242 are evident as programs "now integrate[] gender" (UK\_091120\_civsoc), although previously, the state neglected the security needs of women within programs. Actors also recognised an increase in "the number of programs that demand greatly [reform] so that gender be integrated into the analysis" (UK\_091120\_civsoc). As UNSCR 2242 encourages states to develop gender-specific CT/CVE measures, the increase in the number of UK CT/CVE programs and initiatives which recognises differences between men's and women's experiences of violence and the drivers for each group reflects the government's effort to meet its WPS requirements (United Nations 2015). Actors emphasised that decisions to modify existing programs since the integration of the Resolution were influenced by an increase in understanding that the effectiveness of CT/CVE policies, programs, and measures is dependent on the acknowledgment that terrorism and violent extremism affects all individuals in society and unique implications on women. For instance, one actor reported that there has been

a steady increase in the recognition that you have to build gender into your programs, if your programs are going to be holistic and effective. I think that's one of the key things that is increasing in the sector, people are seeing that gender perspectives are not some optional...extra gender perspectives are not a woman's issue. Gender perspectives are a security issue (UK\_091120\_civsoc).

These actors further explained that they would continue to support the goals informing policies and measures developed and those reformed if these interventions continue to acknowledge further women's multifaceted role within terrorist activities and organisations. There is a conscious effort made to develop a "deep and enduring appreciation for them [women] and the role that gender plays in radicalisation" (UK\_091120\_civsoc).

State actors, who also acknowledged reforms made to improve policies to address women's security needs, supported these views; they raised concerns, however, about the longevity of these plans and whether the government aimed to achieve all measures proposed. State actors' concerns for the full implementation of the Resolution reflect ongoing concerns regarding gaps in WPS implementation. The Global Study on WPS implementation highlighted the impact of the lack of political will and institutional barriers to the fulfilment of WPS, and despite developments in the last 20 years, funding limitations, lack of accountability measures, limited measures to promote women's agency, continue to act as barriers to the full implementation of the Agenda (Coomaraswamy 2015; Newby and O'Malley 2021; Asante 2020). These actors emphasised that new reforms were necessary to address rising concerns regarding women's increasing participation in violent extremism activities; however, there remained concerns about the extent to which measures implemented will be effective. Concerns were based on perceptions that the state integrated UNSCR 2242 without real consideration for its full operationalisation within the domestic context. For instance, one actor states, "So I think it is very cosmetic and I think that's the nature of politics probably in the UK. The government jump into it and take a stand on it straight away without any real longevity or long-term planning. They just want to play to what is in the newspaper, like makes them look good" (UK\_181120\_ stateactor). These actors further explained that although goals informing policies and programs had improved, there was a necessity to address other local factors which will contribute to the effectiveness of the policies. One actor explained that policy goals need to reflect changing communities' dynamics, consider intersectionalities that contribute to position some groups of women at greater risks and be based on work conducted within local contexts. This actor stated

if you're on the ground doing the work, you understand the dynamics of racism, you understand the dynamics of Islamophobia. You understand the way communities are marginalizing people and females and males and transgender, and these sort of issues are pushed away and under the carpet, and you deal with that on a localized issue.

Localized level of an issue is how I would look at it (UK\_181120\_ stateactor).

Matland (1995) proposes that incongruent views regarding policies would impact views of the goals informing policies. However, this is not evident in the UK context as state and civil society actors all supported proposed policies developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242. Although CSOs had little insight into the goals that informed policies, as ideally the strategies

proposed were presented as being in alignment with the principles of UNSCR 2242, and contributed to support for the policy.

Complementary views regarding policy means

State actors and CSOs supported some of the means proposed to implement the policy, although they recommended that the government reform existing measures and introduce new measures to improve the effectiveness of the state's CT/CVE efforts. The ACM suggests that incongruent perceptions of policies would contribute to conflicting views about the means proposed to achieve implementation (Matland 1995). CSOs and state actors reported that they supported current CT/CVE policies that incorporate gendered policies, strategies, community programs to support those at risk, and legislation that criminalise extremist behaviors. Conflict was evident between actors, however, regarding the resources accessible to achieve implementation. CSOs suggested that there need to be improvements within access to long-term and stable funding to improve implementation efforts and greater integration of intersectional factors when responding to the implications of extremist violence on women. As previously discussed, funding limitations and insufficient access to material to implement WPS initiatives continue to be a barrier to the effective implementation of the WPS Agenda (Basu et al. 2020; Duriesmith 2017; Coalition of Feminists for Social Change 2017; Hamilton et al. 2021). In addition to these measures, actors reported a requirement for new legislation that promotes counter-terrorism training for all community members and ensures that public venues and businesses effectively respond to and support civilians. One participant who proposed new legislation reported that she is currently advocating for the adoption of this legislation; however, the legislation would be insufficient if the government excludes community education as a component of its intervention. State actors and CSOs both acknowledged the significance of education as a primary measure to counter-terrorism.

As education is currently a component of the state's CT/CVE measures, actors reported that this could be improved. In addition to providing education on radicalization and extremism to schools, young people, and community members, actors recommended that education address women's security needs, the various ways women contribute to extremism, and approaches to identifying the signs of radicalization amongst different genders. Actors also highlighted that

CT/CVE intervention should address online radicalization. For instance, one actor stated that “there's a lot of online radicalisation happening...I teach them the signs of how to recognize signs in their friends or siblings” (UK\_051220\_civsoc). Actor reported that online education campaigns should include social media campaigns and short films, which highlight intersectionality, responds to misconceptions about minority groups and gender, and promotes tolerance and community cooperation. One actor stated that as the government is yet to utilise these platforms to provide this level of education, they have taken the initiative to implement this intervention by engaging “students...to effectively develop social media campaigns, produce movies [and] write articles based on academic reports to [make] this information assessable to the wider public. And then from there start tackling different types of extremism, such as homophobia, xenophobia, gender, racism, and religious intolerance” (UK\_111220\_civsoc).

CSOs recommended these initiatives as a replacement for increasing surveillance measures implemented by the state, as education and online campaigns target some of the root causes of extremism and foster trust between communities and government personnel. As a tool to communicate ideas about religious and cultural ideologies, discredit false doctrines, and promote tolerance, education as a CT/CVE tool aids to create community awareness and inform community members of fundamental rights and core social values (Akhter 2016; Ghosh et al. 2017). CSOs also proposed that the government reform deradicalization programs and adopt new approaches to implement existing and new measures to improve the effectiveness of interventions. The ACM suggests that conflict intensifies when actors have opposing views and concerns regarding a policy and its implication on their interests (Matland 1995). This is evident within the UK context as conflicting views regarding the initiatives that will aid the state to implement measures and the impact that surveillance measures would have on CSOs' activities within communities, and its overall impact on the success of the state's community-based interventions, have influenced proposals for new and reformed measures. CSOs questioned the effectiveness of deradicalization programs currently provided and whether these measures adequately address the security needs of women returning from extremist territories and those radicalised.

Actors stated that as gender stereotypes continue to inform perceptions of women's role within extremist organisations and women are increasingly referred to as victims with little to no agency, current deradicalization programs need to recognise women's capability to make informed political and violent decisions. Reforms should include a new design that adopts a case-by-case approach to understanding the motivations, history, experiences, and circumstances that influence women to participate in extremist activities. This knowledge should inform deradicalization interventions provided to women to reduce their risk of future radicalisation and encourage their integration within society. As acceptance by community members contributes to individuals' ability to reintegrate into society successfully, CSOs also encourage the government to engage community members within processes to design and implement deradicalization initiatives as this will reduce stigmatisation, encourage family and community support and encourage successful reintegration (on the impact of community acceptance on reintegration see Ike et al. 2021; Dwyer 2013). To prepare communities to participate in the initiatives, CSOs proposed that the government establish trust with local communities and grass-root actors and engage leaders of minority groups within its leadership teams responsible for designing and implementing these interventions, as the engagement of "more people from minoritized background [will encourage] meaningful change" (UK\_261020\_civsoc). Although CSOs and state actors support the means proposed to implement UNSCR 2242, there is significant conflict surrounding the effectiveness of the measures proposed to achieve implementation. CSOs argue that the lack of sufficient resources to implement existing measures and some current methods (such as surveillance) create challenges in fulfilling the Agenda's objectives. Limitations of deradicalization programs and the measures incorporated into these programs are also sources of conflict between actors. CSOs propose greater inclusion of gendered, cultural, and religious elements and the recognition of individual factors, which creates greater challenges for women to reintegrate into society. Differences within perceptions reflect Matland's (1995) proposal that incompatible values and insufficient access to resources contribute to high conflict amongst political participants.

High conflict between state and CSOs

High conflict exists between government and state actors regarding the accessibility of information, the actors engaged and those excluded, and accountability, although a small

number of state actors support cooperation between civil and government actors. Limited to no access to information and the lack of clarity about the information made accessible to CSOs were identified as a source of conflict. CSOs reported that individuals in communities deliberately “spreading disinformation and lies” (UK\_091120\_civsoc) about the nature of terrorism and violent extremism and government CT/CVE activities and information “scaring communities and trying to spread fear” (UK\_091120\_civsoc) has increased mistrust between their organisations, the state, and the communities which measures intend to support. When high conflict is present, actors can encourage acceptance of the policy and reduce conflict through reforms that reduce the implications of a policy on others (Matland 1995). There was a lack of government consideration of measures to mitigate conflict in the UK; however, measures adopted further contribute to existing tensions between actors. The level of detail provided to CSOs, and the general public is insufficient. State actors reported that it was necessary to withhold some information from civil actors due to the security nature of terrorism and violent extremism, to prevent moral panic, ensure the safety of the wider society, and enable state authorities to perform their duties effectively (on states exclusion of CSOs from accessing information on terrorism and violent extremism, see also Grinde 2017; Ibezim-Ohaeri 2017). However, CSOs argue that as disinformation has led civilians to “say that anybody engaging in any kind of counter-terrorism is inherently racist or is Islamophobic [and this]...creates distance between communities of different kinds on counter extremist program” (UK\_091120\_civsoc), it deteriorates trust in society and affects the willingness of communities to cooperate and engage in CT/CVE programs.

As there are limited measures to hold state and non-state actors accountable for misinformation, CSOs propose that states “start with a shared understanding of the facts [terrorist threats] and then go from there” (UK\_091120\_civsoc) to prevent misinformation and promote a collaborative effort to address terrorism. A small number of state actors supporting CSOs’ views acknowledged how the government contributes to misinformation and called for reform. These actors identified differing political ideologies, speeches, and demonisation of the Islamic faith to create disinformation and a societal divide and called for measures to prevent marginalisation. One state actor supported this perspective stating,

what we need other government to move away from [is] this idea of you’re left-wing or right-wing or Islam issue...and actually just start to work with people, work with communities...and support those communities. Stop marginalizing people. So stop

the very low level drivers and triggers that get people in [to terrorism and violent extremism]... when I come to these people [they] ... are already radicalized, already in that mindset (UK\_181120\_ stateactor).

These actors supported CSOs' proposal for a collaborative approach to CT/CVE as a measure to address misinformation, emphasising that "PREVENT is a perfect tool" (UK\_181120\_ stateactor). However, there is a need for greater engagement of communities, women, and NGOs affected by extremism, as it has "become very much run by academics, by researchers, by people who are pontificating and talking about what needs to be done and using people within the government to do it" (UK\_181120\_ stateactor) as opposed to working with "NGOs out there supporting and funding them...[to] do the work" (UK\_181120\_ stateactor). These actors further explained that positioning CSOs as primary actors to implement CT/CVE measures and providing accurate information would help foster trust and prevent the spread of disinformation. This actor proposed that academics, state actors, and researchers can support these actors by supporting them and their initiatives, providing technical support to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions, conducting assessments of people, and providing sufficient resources.

Tension surrounding the engagement of some CSOs and the exclusion of others also disrupted CSOs' relationship with state actors. As previously discussed, the state engaged large CSOs and existing relationships with government agencies and excluded small organisations and those that had yet to be engaged. One state actor indicated that as the state engages "people [organisations] who say they can do the job and not all of them can, and not all of them have the evidence and they [are] employed as...interventionalist" (UK\_181120\_ stateactor), as opposed to employing organisations which have extensive experience working in communities, developing and implementing CT/CVE initiatives domestically and in foreign states. This view was supported by CSOs, with one actor arguing that although "local ones (organisations) may be developing a very nice work, they don't get the chance to speak to the government...so they are not taken into account. We have some organisations that have been tackling these issues locally...but they remain stuck because they don't have the power to speak up to the government" (UK\_111220\_civsoc). CSOs argue that some government departments' disregard for their knowledge and expertise was evident when selecting organisations to receive funds, those who participate in consultations, and those provided platforms to share their perspectives on CT/CVE. One actor explained that tension

amongst CSOs and government agencies and small organisations was particularly evident during consultations processes, as “it was very clear to me that there were like two or three organisations that were the main one...with the authoritative voice to speak to the government. The other ones, remained in another level, trying to get any kind of attention, competing [for] grants, competition to have a voice, competing to be heard” (UK\_111220\_civsoc). These actors further explained that they had adopted various measures to engage the state; state responses, however, have consisted of “we will get back to you later. We will discuss these and [they] never really discuss it” (UK\_111220\_civsoc).

As competition for funds has contributed to creating tension between CSOs engaged by the state and those excluded, CSOs interviewed argue that the onus is on the state to address conflict and promote cooperation between large and small civil society groups, as “there is a lot (funding and opportunities) to go around” (UK\_111220\_civsoc). Cooperation was also identified as essential to address emerging issues that can create further strain within society. As there are differing perspectives concerning how the state should respond to both women and men returning from extremist-held territories and government responses are secretive, CSOs argue that promoting equitable access to funding, information, and political opportunities is essential to address such emerging threats effectively. These actors emphasised that because of past and ongoing tensions, small CSOs indicate that they are likely to be marginalised from consultation activities and access to funding. As exclusion limits CSOs' ability to understand the measures proposed by the state to address emerging issues, this contributes to further tension as it limits these actors' capability to “ask difficult questions that challenge policy and demand accountability...[as] critical perspectives...are inconvenient and therefore unwelcomed” (UK\_261020\_civsoc).

Matland (1995) suggests that high-level authorities adopt coercive measures to gain compliance from lower-level actors, as opposed to adopting a bargaining mechanism to reach an agreement when high conflict is present. In response to high conflict, the state adopts bargaining measures to encourage compliance. This occurs in the form of access to funding and political opportunities. CSOs reported that maintaining positive relationships with state actors and governments can increase their access to political spaces, implementation opportunities, and access to funding; this has restricted their willingness to criticize the

government's CT/CVE approaches publicly. The implications of publicly critiquing policy responses can also limit opportunities for political spaces and access to funding, which restricts CSOs' likelihood to raise concerns. Although the state does not utilize these measures to obtain compliance from civil actors, concerns that non-compliance may lead to closing political spaces and limited practice opportunities have restricted CSOs' ability to critique the state and raise their concerns on public forums.

The measures adopted are specifically selected by high-level actors, based on their analysis of the methods which will discourage dissent, and criticism of the state and encourage agreement to achieve political implementation from lower-level actors, despite the impact that implementation will have on lower-level actors' political interests (Matland 1995). In the UK, this is evident in the form of funding and access to political spaces. As UK CSOs' access to political spaces and funding is shaped by their relationships with state actors and government departments, this has contributed to preventing public dissent. This is evident with CSOs' unwillingness to publicly criticize the government due to concerns that it may close funding, and civic and political opportunities. The effectiveness of measures adopted to achieve compliance is also evident, with some CSOs and state actors declining to be quoted in publications. There is also high ambiguity surrounding CSOs' access to information about the goals informing policy goals, the selective engagement of actors within political spaces, the lack of clarity around the technology to be used, and the knowledge of the environment where implementation occurs. Based on the ACM, high ambiguity and high conflict would predict that only symbolic implementation is occurring in the UK context.

### Symbolic Implementation

The combination of high conflict and high ambiguity indicates that *symbolic implementation* informs processes to implement UNSCR 2242 in the UK, as proposed in the ACM. Although the model provides some insights into the tensions between state and civil society actors, it is not without limitations. Symbolic implementation suggests that symbolic policies reaffirm existing goals and confirm new policies, goals, and values (Matland 1995). This reflects the UK context to an extent, as the adoption of UNSCR 2242 further reinforced the state's

commitment to addressing terrorism, and the introduction of new programs and measures to recognise the gendered impact of extremist violence reflects a commitment to new approaches to CT/CVE and reaffirms the state's value of gender-equality principles. The model proposes that high ambiguity surrounding policy goals and means contributes to variations within implementation outcomes across implementation sites (Matland 1995). Only some of these elements are evident within the UK. The lack of goal clarity encouraged CSOs to assume the meaning of policy goals and support implementation. As the state controls implementation across sites, however, and determines the actors engaged and those excluded from this process, implementation across sites is strictly controlled and reflects intended outcomes.

Local-level coalition actors play a central role in symbolic implementation; however, few opportunities are provided to low-level CSOs within the UK context. The model states that the coalition strength of local actors' shapes implementation outcomes, as these actors control the resources to achieve implementation (Matland 1995). Low-level actors within the UK have some access to implementation means, with this evident in their existing trusting relationships with at-risk women and communities and their ability to access hard-to-reach groups. These actors' experience within the local context, their extensive knowledge of the context where implementation occurs, and the interventions that will be effective in different contexts, reaffirm their capabilities as implementation actors. However, the tension between various CSOs due to competition for funding has weakened the ability of these actors to develop a coalition that can withstand pressure and state influence. These factors and the lack of access to the technology required, updated information on extremist threats and radicalisation, and funding to implement interventions have significantly limited these actors' capability to determine implementation outcomes. This is evident as although some CSOs have proposed evidence-based interventions that can improve CT/CVE outcomes for women within communities, the lack of political will to engage and support these actors' initiatives has acted as a barrier to implementation.

Professional groups with significant implementation experience are key mediators during the policy development and implementation process. Symbolic implementations suggest that professional actors aid policy participants by providing training that reinforces policy norms

and legitimises interventions proposed while presenting measures to address conflict that may arise (Matland 1995). However, conflict will arise between actors if there are differences within the interventions proposed (Matland 1995). The UK civil society sector consists of actors from various professional groups (such as academics, social workers, former state security actors, and community development workers), each with their ideas about the measures that will limit the impact of extremism on women. However, opposing views about the CT/CVE measures appropriate to address CT/CVE is not the source of conflict between these actors. As these actors apply for the same funding and seek similar political opportunities, they do not act as mediators as Matland (1995) proposed, but their activities to seek resources contribute to high conflict within the UK CT/CVE sector.

The model identifies coalition strength as a determining factor to achieve implementation. Symbolic implementation suggests that if problem-resolution measures proposed by professional groups are unsuccessful, actors with coalition strength adopt coercive measures to achieve compliance from other actors (Matland 1995). As previously discussed, the model suggests that as local actors determine implementation outcomes with significant access to resources required for implementation, coercive measures proposed by these actors would influence higher-level participants to comply with interventions (Matland 1995). As conflict exists amongst CSOs within the UK context and these actors have little access to funds and technology required to achieve implementation, they lack the coalition strength to encourage the state to comply with the measures proposed. The model also states that “identifying the competing factions at the local level, along with the micro-level contextual factors that affect the strength of competing factions” (Matland 1995: 170) is significant for determining policy outcomes. However, as political will, access to political spaces, CT/CVE knowledge, technology, and funding determines implementation outcomes as opposed to coalition strength and environmental factors, this further highlights the limitation of the model in providing insight into the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in the UK, and the need to further account for control in the ACM.

## Conclusion

High ambiguity and high conflict characterise interventions adopted by the UK government as part of the process to translate and implement UNSCR 2242. High conflict is evident within the context, as significant ambiguity informs policy goals and policy means. This has impacted CSOs' understanding of the goals that inform the implementation framework, the strategies proposed as interventions to achieve implementation, and the resources that will assist actors during the process. The lack of opportunities provided to CSOs to propose interventions, the requirement for these actors to compete for political participation, and the use of access to funding as a coercive measure to encourage these organisations to comply with the state's CT/CVE interventions contribute to high conflict. Based on the high levels of ambiguity and conflict present in the UK environment, this should result in *symbolic implementation* occurring in the UK context. Matland (1995: 168) proposes that "the central principle [informing symbolic implementation] is that local level coalition strength determines the outcome". As high competition and intense peer scrutiny exist between CSOs, these actors have limited capability to develop coalition groups. The model places emphasis on the need to address competing factors at the local level that contributes to competition and act as barriers to successful policy implementation. However, evidence from the UK context suggests that there is greater state influence over the implementation process than described in Matland's model, as the state can influence and disrupt CSOs' capability to develop a coalition. Furthermore, political will, access to political spaces, CT/CVE knowledge, technology, and predominantly funding significantly affect the likelihood that the implementation of the resolution will be successful. This indicates that the macro level as opposed to the micro context acts as a barrier to successful implementation in the UK, and suggests that there is a need to further account for the power and control that states have over the implementation process in Matland's model. As highlighted in Chapter One and further explained in Chapter Seven, to account for this limitation, there is a need to further account for *control* in the ACM.

## Chapter Six: Spain

Like the preceding chapters, this chapter applies Matland's (1995) ambiguity conflict model (ACM) to explore the process of implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242, this time in the case of Spain. Firstly, this chapter provides an overview of acts labelled terrorism and political violence and the implications of these for gender-sensitive responses to such violence in Spain. This section also discusses counter-terrorism and countering-violent extremism (CT/CVE) measures adopted by the Spanish government to respond to extremist violence, and the insecurities these create for women, to understand the measures deemed appropriate by the Spanish government to address terrorism, radicalization, and extremist violence. Secondly, and more specifically, the chapter explores the implementation of the UNSCR 2242 in Spain and assesses whether Matland's (1995) ACM provides a thorough explanation of the relationship between the state and CSOs, the opportunities provided and those closed to these organisations, and the methods utilised by the state to engage these actors. Application of the model predicts that *administrative implementation* is occurring in the Spanish context, as the process is informed by low levels of ambiguity and conflict. There is a low level of ambiguity informing political participants' perspectives of policy goals and means and a lack of conflict surrounding policies developed in alignment with the Agenda; further, resources are allocated at each implementation stage to encourage the fulfilment of the Agenda. Although the model assumes that sufficient resources are key to implementation success, evidence from the Spanish context suggests that resources act as a minor factor in successful policy outcomes. This highlights the need to account for other contextual factors that have contributed to the successful implementation of the resolution in Spain and to understand how the state has navigated its relationship with CSOs to promote collaboration, and limit tensions and barriers to policy implementation. In the conclusion of this chapter, I again highlight the need to further account for *control*, as this provides insights into the unique contextual factors that are unaccounted for in the ACM's articulation of administrative implementation.

## **Terrorism and Women in Spain**

As in other contexts, Spanish women are both victims of and contributors to, terrorism and violent extremism. Since 1960, *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) actions have contributed to violence which has resulted in the death of 829 Spanish nationals (Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger 2016; Counter Extremism Project 2019). Although perceived by some as legitimate political actors whose violent actions are justified as part of its efforts to gain Basque independence, others perceive this group as a left-wing nationalist organisation whose activities destabilise peace in Spain (Opotow, 1990b; Van den Broek, 2004; Martín-Peña and Opotow 2011). However, there was a change in the CT/CVE landscape in the early 2000s, with al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated Jihadi groups claiming responsibility for terrorist incidents such as the 2004 Madrid train bombing and the 2017 vehicle attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, which resulted in over 1,700 injuries and the death of over 200 adults and children (Lahnait 2018; Howell and Lind 2010). Although Spanish women have not explicitly and exclusively been the targets of extremist violence, as has been seen in Nigeria, for example, they have been the targets of extremist organisations recruitment strategies. For instance, in 2014, Spanish and Moroccan government security institutions reported that 12 Spanish women had been recruited online to support ISIS fighters, and in 2015 ISIS launched another social network recruitment campaign encouraging Spanish women to travel to occupied territories to repopulate the organisation (Counter Extremism Project 2019).

## **Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism in Spain**

In response to terrorism and violent extremist threats in the country, Spain developed a *National Strategy Against Terrorism*. This policy which aligns the country's CT/CVE measures with those proposed by the European Union and the United Nations, aims to *prevent, protect, pursue, and prepare* the country and its citizens to respond to terrorist threats (Lahnait 2018). In addition to this, the Spanish government has adopted various domestic legislations which criminalises terrorism and violent extremist acts. For instance, the Spanish Criminal Code Articles 571 to 589, classifies acts such as terrorism and support

for terrorist organisations a criminal offence (Ramos 2005; Counter Extremism Project 2019). Although these initiatives have enabled the state to prevent eight attempts by extremist groups to terrorise the Spanish population and to detect and detain individuals with extremist affiliations, there have been minimal opportunities for CSOs to participate in the state's CT/CVE initiatives (Aiello et al. 2018).

When they are included, CSOs are funded to deliver the state's CT/CVE community programmes as part of its community campaigns to discourage extremist behaviours. These programs support and build community capacity and resilience against radicalisation, through workshops targeted at religious institutions, schools, youths, and leisure centres (Lahnait 2018; Counter Extremism Project 2019). For instance, CSOs in Spain's Malaga City educate the community, encourage information sharing, and empower residents to develop practices to identify, prevent and report potential terrorist threats to authorities (Counter Extremism Project 2019). The state's minimal inclusion of CSOs, women, and minority groups within its design and implementation of CT/CVE initiatives has led academics and activists to criticise and label the measures as stigmatising (Aiello et al. 2018). This criticism contributed to the state's decision to make greater efforts to collaborate with CSOs in the development and implementation of culturally sensitive CT/CVE measures in its 2019 state security strategic document (General State Administration of Spain 2019). However, this document does not provide insight into state perceptions of CSOs, the role of CSOs within this proposed partnership, and the flexibility with which these organisations can utilise their local knowledge of communities and radicalisation within this collaboration. There is therefore a need for further exploration of the involvement of CSOs in CT/CVE, specifically in relation to gender; I present the findings of my related research in the sections that follow.

### **Implementing UNSCR 2242 in Spain**

As mentioned above, UNSCR 2242, which was co-drafted by Spain and adopted during the country's presidency of the Security Council, was implemented nationally in 2017, through the inclusion of the resolution in the country's 2017-2022 Women, Peace and Security (WPS) National Action Plan (NAP) (General State Administration of Spain 2019). The NAP is

funded by and located under the authority of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, although it is implemented with support from all government departments (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). As the pillars informing the WPS Agenda align with the pillars informing the country's CT/CVE measures, the measures proposed in the country's CT/CVE policies reflect the measures proposed in its WPS NAP. The NAP recognises terrorism and violent extremism as an emerging threat to Spain's security, acknowledges the need for government partnership with CSOs, and calls for the leadership of CSOs in addressing the underlying causes of violent extremism (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). Acknowledged as stakeholders and facilitators of government CT/CVE programs, the NAP recognises CSOs as being effective in educating citizens about the implications of extremism, and supporting and empowering women at risk of radicalisation (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). The state's consultations with CSOs prior to the development of the current NAP and its strategic plan to improve CSOs' participation in the implementation and evaluation of WPS CT/CVE initiatives are also acknowledged (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). For instance, the NAP emphasizes that to ensure transparency and the use of best practice approaches, three CSOs will be included within the nation's consultation and working groups, to enable Spain to fulfil its WPS objectives, and effectively address current and emerging issues which affect women's security (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017).

In contrast, Spanish CSOs, such as the Spanish branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (SWILPF), have publicly criticised the Spanish government for its minimal and tokenistic inclusion of civil society groups within the development of the country's current NAP. To illustrate, Forcada (2017) recounts that SWILPF were encouraged by Spain's government to evaluate the country's first NAP, they were invited to initial consultation meetings for the development of the current NAP, and upon the state's request, produced reports on methods to improve the effectiveness of the NAP in practice. However, through an analysis of the current NAP, it is evident that the state disregarded recommendations proposed by CSOs (Forcada 2017). Hence, this highlights a need for research into the spaces created to encourage the meaningful participation of CSOs within processes to develop and implement CT/CVE measures in relation to the WPS Agenda.

As discussed in Chapter Three, Matland's (1995) ACM suggests that ambiguity and conflict inform policy development and implementation processes. Ambiguity affects the capability of political participants to understand a policy and its characteristics, and thus discern its impact on their social and political objectives (Matland 1995). Policy ambiguity arises from two main sources: policy goals and policy means. Ambiguous policy goals increase the likelihood that political participants will misunderstand the aims of the policy (Matland 1995). Although ambiguity can influence actors to support a policy due to their inability to assess its potential threats, ambiguous policy means can contribute to implementation failure (Matland 1995). A lack of understanding of policy means creates uncertainty about the resources allocated for policy implementation, the environment where implementation is to occur, and the tasks to be performed by each implementing actor (Matland 1995). The ACM also suggests that conflict informs policy development and implementation processes, as political participants are interdependent during the process (Matland 1995; Dahrendorf 1968). The model suggests that conflict arises within bureaucratic processes when one actor perceives a policy as relevant, and another perceives it as a threat, and actors develop conflicting views with regard to the means to achieve policies (Matland 1995). The following section highlights the themes identified in the data and assesses the levels of ambiguity and conflict within processes to develop and implement UNSCR 2242 in the Spanish context. Based on the levels of conflict and ambiguity present in the Spanish context, the ACM predicts *administrative implementation* would occur in Spain. The chapter concludes with a discussion of implementation factors unaccounted for in the model.

## Findings

Data collected from the Spanish context were initially thematically categorised with data from the Nigerian and UK context under the themes, *state control of implementation*; *CSOs control of implementation resources*; *future changes*; *decisions to integrate the resolution*; and *additional factors* (as discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Five). These themes were further analysed and categorised based on the concepts of the ACM, *ambiguity* and *conflict*. Through a separate analysis of the Spanish data set categorised under *ambiguity*, two sub-themes were identified – *clear policy goals* and *clear policy means*. Under the theme of *conflict*, I identified several additional themes (see figure 5): *support for the integration of*

UNSCR 2242, similar views regarding policy goals, cooperation and harmony between state and CSOs, and implementation of problem-resolution strategies to promote cooperation. An analysis of the findings under each sub-theme is explored below.




Figure 5: Theme - Spain

## Ambiguity

### Clear policy goals

Effective communication between state and civil society actors has influenced awareness of the goals related to the WPS Agenda, which informs CT/CVE policies developed by the Spanish government in alignment with UNSCR 2242. Matland (1995) argues that where a

top-down approach shapes processes to develop policies, there is likely to be ambiguity with regard to its objectives amongst actors not involved in the goals development process. However, this is not evident within the Spanish context. The majority of civil society actors reported that they were not informed of the adoption of UNSCR 2242 or engaged in processes to develop CT/CVE policies and initiatives. Although some CSOs were informed and engaged in initial consultations to develop Spain's first WPS NAP and their activism and participation in political processes influenced policies against sexual slavery in Spain, the state's minimal engagement and exclusion of CSOs from some political processes relating to terrorism and violent extremism reflects a pattern of political behaviour (Forcada 2017; Merodio and Duque 2021). Despite this, these actors have developed awareness of the goals informing policies based on funding contracts and CT/CVE activities conducted upon the state's request. For instance, a civil society actor reported that as part of their organization's CT/CVE activities, they "collaborate with the Interior Ministry [and] the department to deliver educational programs" (SP\_031120\_civsoc) developed by the department. CSOs reported that, through these interactions, they developed knowledge about the goals informing policies, their organization's responsibilities, and they had the opportunity to provide feedback to the state through program reports and evaluations. This approach to engaging CSOs reflects the collective approach to preventing terrorism and violent extremism as outlined in the country's National Strategy Against Terrorism. Some civil society representatives argued that the party governing the country at a specific time, and that party's ideology, informs whether CSOs are informed about policies. For instance, one CSO actor reported that

there are some governments that allow more activities, some they take care of what we are saying or what we are trying to do...sometimes they care, sometimes they don't, it depends on the moment because I think politics, sometimes no matter what the people want to hear, they do what they want to do and not what is for you" (SP\_031120\_civsoc).

Although CSOs had some knowledge of the goals informing policies, there was sometimes little understanding of the goals developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242 amongst some state actors, and others had developed knowledge of the goals through their employment roles. As the country's WPS NAP, reflects the National Strategy Against Terrorism, there

was some confusion as to the difference between this policy and the country's NAP. One state actor reported that they had no knowledge of the resolution, or of policies developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242 and that there was little evidence of its implementation within their organization, however, they had knowledge of the National Strategy Against Terrorism and the Spanish Criminal Code. In contrast, state actors with knowledge of the resolution and its goals reported that the UNSCR 2242 informed their CT/CVE activities; it was embedded within various state policies and had experience collaborating with some civil society actors to develop and implement goals (SP\_201120\_stateactor). One state actor provided the following reflection:

So when the acts are going to be implemented...there are always reflection periods, and here it is a very little country. So they always have meetings to be heard and to give their opinion about things. Here when it is discussed, it is not only the parliament, civil society is quite active, especially when it has to be with human rights (SP\_201120\_stateactor).

Although some CSOs report that the extent to which they are engaged by the state and informed of CT/CVE goals is dependent on the governing party's interest in the resolution and its willingness to engage their organizations, this participant did not believe that was the case. They went on to explain that CSOs are likely to be engaged by the state within initial processes to translate and develop goals in alignment with the resolution if they are organised, make an effort to engage state actors, and they actively participate in political issues, particularly those relating to human rights. However, Spanish CSOs have actively advocated and developed initiatives to engage state actors to develop political responses to human rights and gender issues which affect Spanish citizens (Feenstra 2015), and related issues which affect other European states (Feliu 2003), despite state initiatives that restrict some actors, access to political spaces (Verge 2012). To illustrate, they commented: "normally they have very good contact with the government. So when the acts are going to be implemented, or there are always reflection periods...they always have meetings to be heard and to give their opinion about things" (SP\_201120\_stateactor).

Matland (1995) argues that when policy goals are clear as opposed to ambiguous, it provides actors with a clear understanding of its objectives, implications, and insight into how it may affect their role and authority within the policy implementation process. A clear understanding of these factors increases the likelihood that government actors will oppose proposed policies and advocate for reforms that reflect their political interests (Matland 1995; Berman 1978). Although the model suggests that there should be some level of conflict between political participants when goals are clear, this is not the case within the Spanish context. Despite CSOs' awareness that the policies position them as service deliverers and limit opportunities to participate as political agents, there appears to be little conflict and opposition to their allocated roles. Although some CSOs reported that some political actors limit their access to information regarding goals, these were not perceived as factors that threaten their overall understanding of policies developed or a justification to oppose the goals developed by the state. It is likely that the similarities between the NAP and the National Strategy Against Terrorism provided CSOs with some insights into the measures proposed and the ways that they are to be engaged by the state, with this contributing to the lack of opposition.

#### Clear policy means

CSOs and state actors reported that there are clear means to achieve the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in the Spanish context through the NAP. Funding for implementation is available, CSOs and state actors are aware of their implementation responsibilities, there are clear processes to engage in collaboration, and each has an understanding of the environment where implementation is to occur (on factors for successful policy implementation, see Williams 2012; Ilott et al. 2016; Ansell et al. 2017; Tereza 2019). The majority of CSOs reported that the state contracted them to participate in the policy implementation process, either through access to funding to implement education and psychosocial services that state departments have designed or through opportunities to access funding to develop and implement CT/CVE initiatives. This approach to engagement is similar to the approach adopted by the state to engage non-state actors in the National Strategy Against Terrorism. Organisations contracted to implement initiatives designed by the state indicated that they were aware of their responsibilities, as they were provided outlines of the programs to be implemented, program contents, procedures to implement initiatives, and information about

the communities where implementation is to occur. Procedures provided also included details about expected program outcomes.

One civil society actor reported that the state provides their organisation with a contract to implement education programs at schools located in communities with evidence of radicalisation or past terrorist incidents. As the initiative is an early intervention program that aims to inform young people about terrorism and violent extremism, radicalisation, its implications, and the gendered implications of terrorism and violent extremism, the organisation is required to conduct a series of speeches and workshops at targeted schools to compliment education about terrorism incorporated in schools' curriculum. This actor stated,

“The Ministry of Interior, they have developed an educational program for me. This program, they make agreements with schools. So the schools have to do some classes about what was the terrorism in Spain. And then we are like a group of big teams [civil society actors and victims of terrorism groups] that do different speech in the schools. So our main labour is to give different speeches to different schools...telling what happened to us, what are the consequences of the terrorist attack” (SP\_031120\_civsoc).

As clear implementation guidelines inform the parameters of political participants' CT/CVE, this limits opportunities for actors to engage in activities that contradict the state's objectives and aids the country in efforts to achieve its allocated implementation tasks.

Organisations that are given the opportunity to design and implement their own CT/CVE initiatives reported that, although they did not receive specific procedures about the measures to be implemented or program objectives, as recipients of funding from the state, they are required to provide feedback. These actors also engage in workshops to promote collaboration between CSOs, government, and academics as part of their contractual obligations. For instance, one civil society actor stated

we are implementing some projects about violet extremism and we are doing some civilisation and education [programs], but not directly with them [government], but they fund us so we can do some projects...they have started a very interested program about building community, and doing some workshops between local civil society organisations, government, and academia (SP\_150920\_civsoc).

Although these actors, unlike some CSOs, are not provided specific guidelines to achieve implementation, as their expertise and community CT/CVE projects aligned with the state's

proposed plans to implement UNSCR 2242, this contributed to decisions to provide these civil society actors with a level of autonomy. This also highlights the state's trust in the capability of some CSOs to assist in achieving the state's WPS commitments.

The state funds CSOs to deliver ongoing psychosocial services to victims of terrorism and their family members. As these initiatives involve collaboration with professional staff who are formally employed by the state (psychologist, lawyers, and social workers), there are clear boundaries regarding the activities to be implemented by each actor and the limitations to their implementation roles. This also consists of criteria and directories that outline the CSOs that are eligible to participate as experts in national CT/CVE activities and those selected to represent the state as CT/CVE experts at the international level. One CSO leader stated

they tend to work very much together - the civil society groups and the government administration groups. So there's a lot of back and forth conversation about all the first issues [terrorism and violent extremism], also because they [civil society] get funded, but also because the government is very much interested in supporting that process. So they have a lot of meetings and events together...people from civil society and in particular social workers who work in that space are put on this list as experts in case there is an international event where they need to sort of intervene (SP\_141020\_civsoc).

This suggests that, although the state relied on the expertise of some CSOs during the implementation process and some actors were given some level of autonomy to develop their initiatives, the state ensured control of the implementation process as these activities were required to be within boundaries established by the government and in alignment with its existing national CT/CVE strategy.

Clarity of policy means, often reinforced through collaboration between the state and CSOs, was confirmed by state actors. Government representatives explained that these opportunities provided state actors greater understanding of the environment where implementation is to occur, the type of initiatives to be implemented, the potential challenges that may affect implementation, and strategies to limit these challenges. One actor recounted an experience where victims engaged in the civil society sector was provided with opportunities to articulate their own needs, and the needs of their communities, and in some cases were given

opportunities to lead strategic processes to determine implementation activities. As state measures have historically silenced various actors, limited civil society's agency, and declined these actors' opportunities for political engagement, the level of autonomy provided for some actors to participate in political activities reflects the government's intention to commit to the principles outlined within UNSCR 2242 (Encarnación 2001; Threlfall 2008; Verge 2012). For instance, one state actor reported that the "Ministry of Justice did some work with victims, just to give the space to hear them and their needs regarding the justice system. So it was like some working groups and not only testimonies, and guiding the Ministry of Justice. I took part, she was a women...and it was really good when you give the space to individual victims too" (SP\_201120\_stateactor).

The ACM suggests that clear policy means – the planned means of implementation, including actions – provide each stakeholder with knowledge and understanding of their role, as well as clarity about the context of policies, and the resources to achieve implementation; this creates the conditions for the creation of new goals and new implementation processes (Matland 1995). In the Spanish context, although clear means have contributed to limiting conflict and creating new implementation knowledge, it has not led to the development of new goals. Providing CSOs with clear implementation responsibilities and enabling these organisations to access funds to develop their own CT/CVE initiatives has created conditions where local women and victims' experiences of extremist violence and knowledge of the local context can shape implementation activities. However, as the extent to which CSOs are engaged by state actors and the opportunities to contribute new knowledge is defined within goals, there is little opportunity to develop new policies. For instance, although the state provided some autonomy to encourage civil political participation and collaboration between civil and state actors, these opportunities were only provided as they aligned with pre-determined goals developed by the state. Proposed activities that did not align with goals informing the country's National CT/CVE strategy and the Criminal Code were restricted.

This evidence suggests that there is low ambiguity in policies developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242 and measures adopted to implement the Resolution in Spain. Although some state actors had little knowledge of the resolution and policies developed, and CSOs were

excluded from processes to develop policies, most stakeholders had developed knowledge of the goals informing the policies. This occurred through access to procedures informing CT/CVE responsibilities allocated to organizations, and policies which inform funding allocated to these actors to develop and implement CT/CVE initiatives. As these actors are provided opportunities to collaborate with some state actors, there are spaces created to better understand the goals informing policies. Low ambiguity of means has contributed to good levels of understanding among CSOs and state actors regarding: the technology and tools required for implementations; monitoring and evaluation measures to determine the effectiveness of implemented initiatives; and processes to access funding to achieve implementation. Although some CSOs are engaged in strategic planning processes to determine the initiatives to be implemented, as policies and guidelines define the roles and responsibilities of these actors within these working committees, and organizations provided access to funding through contracts are informed about the limits of their CT/CVE activities.

The ACM suggests that low ambiguity is an indication that implementation is hierarchical, with orders and resources provided to actors by a central authority, and thus outside perspectives and factors are unable to influence the implementation process (Matland 1995). Although most of the characteristics that suggest that low ambiguity is present within the environment can be found within the Spanish context, there are also some characteristics that the model cannot explain. For instance, the model suggests that as all aspects of implementation, including those engaged in the implementation process, are pre-determined by the state, there is a lack of outside influence. However, some CSOs collaborated and engaged in consultations with women and local community members - groups that the state has not contracted to participate in the implementation process. As this provided these stakeholders with the opportunity to contribute, the policy process is not without outside influence. As previously discussed, despite the exclusion of CSOs from CT/CVE goal development processes, these actors' knowledge of the local context, and their established relationships with communities affected by terrorism and violent extremism, play a crucial role in the implementation process. These actors' experiences and the ability of some CSOs to access funding to develop CT/CVE initiatives specifically for selected communities indicate that the perspectives of actors that are not engaged by the state significantly shape the implementation process, and thus the type of implementation occurring in Spain does not reflect the ideal hierarchical approach articulated in the ACM.

## Conflict

### Support for the integration of UNSCR 2242

CSOs and state actors perceived UNSCR 2242 as relevant to their interests. State actors indicated that increasing terrorist incidents in the European states in the last decade and Spain experiencing “the biggest European attack” (SP\_071120\_stateactor) in 2017 contributed to the state’s decision to integrate Resolution 2242. This factor, the increasing role that women are playing in extremist organizations as “groomers for recruiting different women, very young girls” (SP\_071120\_stateactor), and the need to “control all the gender issues for radicalization and jihadist terrorism” (SP\_071120\_stateactor), contributed to influence the government’s decision to integrate UNSCR 2242. This view was supported by CSOs who indicated that the resolution aligned with their objective to encourage the Spanish government to integrate women's rights in peace, security, and defence matters and encourage the recognition of “women in their dual role, this being that of victims and contributors to the development or support of radical ideologies and groups and organizations linked to terrorism” (SP\_180321\_civsoc).

CSOs further explained that as they encouraged the development of policies and strategies that integrated gender issues, this has influenced their decisions to actively pursue strategies to ensure that their perspectives shape policies and measures adopted to address the impact of extremism on women. This interest and support for the values that underpin the resolution have motivated CSOs to accept “different kinds of support from lawyers...psychologist, and [accept] public money to support victims [of terrorism and violent extremism]” (SP\_201120\_stateactor). Although the extent to which CSOs’ perspectives are acknowledged “depends on which government is in at the moment, [as] there are some government that they don’t care about them” (SP\_031120\_civsoc), CSOs reported that they were optimistic that opportunities would improve with future governments, and greater opportunities will be created to implement the values of the resolution. For instance, one civil society actor indicated that there is a “great number of women currently leading the Ministries” (SP\_150920\_civsoc). Increasing women’s participation in politics contributes to creating

greater awareness of women's issues amongst political actors (Flammang 1985; Bratton 2005); it increases both the likelihood that government agencies will prioritise gender issues (Carroll 2001; Schwindt-Bayer 2006) and their willingness to adopt feminist policies (Carroll 2001; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Thus, greater engagement of women within Spanish politics will likely aid the state in efforts to meet the objectives of the WPS Agenda.

The ACM proposes that conflict is likely to occur when one actor perceives a policy and its goals as relevant to its political and social objectives and other actors perceive it as an obstacle to achieving their goals (Matland 1995). This reflects the Spanish context, as recognition by both state actors and CSOs of the significance of the resolution and the need to prevent the impact of terrorism and violent extremism on women has influenced support for the resolution and for policies developed to achieve its values. The aim of both sets of actors to improve outcomes for women who become victims of extremist violence has also influenced support for collaboration and has influenced each actors' willingness to share resources at their disposal to ensure the full implementation of UNSCR 2242 and the National CT/CVE strategy more broadly.

Despite this, aspects of the model do not apply to the Spanish context. Matland (1995) proposed that as civil society relies on the state for its legitimacy and the state is reliant on civil society as a link between the government and its citizens, these actors are interdependent. Interdependence between political participants increases the likelihood that conflict arises between parties. Although CSOs are dependent on the government to fund their CT/CVE initiatives and to legitimize their role within the state's CT/CVE processes, and state actors are reliant on CSOs' knowledge of the context for implementation and their existing relationships with women and communities affected by extremist violence, there appears to be a lack of conflict between these actors. State actors recognise the expertise of CSOs and the significance of these actors' knowledge in improving the effectiveness of the Criminal Code and the National CT/CVE strategy, and CSOs acknowledge the state's responsibility to fund security measures. This has contributed to high levels of satisfaction among CSOs regarding their role as service deliverers as opposed to political actors. Hence, although applicable to some degree, there are aspects of the model that fail to explain some of the interactions between political and non-political actors within the Spanish context.

Similar views regarding policy goals

Despite the exclusion of CSOs from the policy development process, and these actors gaining awareness of the Criminal Code and the National CT/CVE strategy in alignment with UNSCR 2242 through funding policies and program procedures, CSO representatives largely supported goals developed in alignment with the resolution. Although the ACM suggests that situational constraints, such as an actor's exclusion from political processes, promote conflict (Matland 1995), this is not evident within the Spanish context. CSOs indicate that they were pleased that the "Ministry of Home Affairs is focused on direct interventions, [in its] counter-terrorism policies" (SP\_150920\_civsoc) and recognized the need for national initiatives that target "local communities" (CSO Actors 2). Others indicated that they were pleased with the efforts of the state in recent years to implement policies that aligned with the resolution. One actor stated the "Spanish government has been making moves to recognize gender equality and that sort of thing" for quite a few years (SP\_031120\_civsoc).

CSO participants did not raise concerns about their exclusion from policy development activities and perceived it as the state's responsibility as opposed to civil society organisations' responsibility. When CSO representatives raised concerns, it was in regard to the lack of recognition of some intersecting power dynamics within the NAP. One actor argued that national and local interventions need to recognise the impact that age, culture, social groups, and socio-economic factors impact people's experiences of radicalisation and terrorism and ensure that proposed interventions also address the factors which create conditions for the rise of extremist ideologies. As the lack of recognition of intersectionality within WPS contributes to normalise counterterrorist violence against minority women and creates assumptions that responses to gender issues are sufficient to address the factors which make women vulnerable to extremist violence, this limits the effectiveness of implemented WPS initiatives (Ní Aoláin 2007; Pratt 2013; Hagen 2016; Henry 2021). This participant proposed that the state increase its collaboration with grassroots CSOs to better recognise these intersections of power and respond to them as part of Spanish CT/CVE processes. Others raised concerns about the lack of urgency to implement policies. One actor reported that in her community, "there's clearly a big difference between what is being said and what is actually happening and what is actually happening is not very much" (SP\_031120\_civsoc).

The lack of political will to implement the WPS Agenda is well documented, with studies indicating that although states propose within their NAPs the initiatives to be implemented and in some cases, the budget allocated to achieve implementation, there is little evidence of commitment to implementation (Shepherd and True 2014; George and Shepherd 2016; Davies and True 2019).

When states make effort to commit to the measures proposed, governments often adopt a selective approach to implementation, by integrating some measures within the local context and failing to provide strategies or allocate funding to integrate other measures (Lee-Koo 2014). For instance, Hamilton et al. (2020: 16) argue that “there certainly seems to be a rise in rhetorical commitments by states. Questions remain, however, about whether these commitments can be considered a positive step in the face of a continued lack of meaningful funding”. One civil society actor raised concerns about the sole focus on women, arguing that although women experience unique challenges, as these policies increasingly focus on women as a vulnerable group, and like the National CT/CVE strategy focuses on males as the perpetrators, it may lead to a disregard for men’s vulnerabilities to extremism and thus a lack of policies to respond to their security needs. Gender narratives reinforced through violent extremist myths contribute to shaping identities for extremist organisations (Kirby 2016; Brown et al. 2020). As experiences of sexual violence perpetrated against men and boys impact one’s sense of masculine identity (Wright 2020), and a gender-relational approach is encouraged as a strategy to encourage policymakers to recognise the significance of WPS (Wright 2020; Duriesmith 2020), this has raised questions about the need for greater recognition of the impact of conflict-related violence on men. For instance, some actors suggest that a ‘Men, Peace and Security’ (MPS) Agenda will create opportunities for the inclusion of and policy responses to harmful masculinity (United States Institute of Peace 2013; Watson 2015; Kirby and Shepherd 2016). However, others argue that an MPS approach may lead to unintended consequences such as a disregard or minimalization of women’s experiences of conflict and reinforcing gender binaries (Vess et al. 2013; Duriesmith 2020; Wright 2015).

In addition, some state actors indicated that although they supported goals informing the policies, and this is reflected in the feedback that they provided government departments that

directly fund their CT/CVE initiatives, they would appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback to other government departments. One actor emphasized that as there are departments that play major roles within the policy development processes and significantly influence the outcome of policies, opportunities to provide direct feedback will ensure that they are also in support of goals informing future policies developed. For instance, the actor stated it “is not easy to write a brief and provide [it] to the Home Affairs Department, but it’s easy to do political incidents with some progressive political parties” (SP\_150920\_civsoc). State actors welcomed these proposals, suggesting that they recognised the need to further engage in collaborations with CSOs, particularly women’s groups operating within local contexts and victims of terrorism, to improve their knowledge and the effectiveness of proposed policies.

Conflict between political actors arises when there are differences between political participants regarding goals informing policies, the activities proposed to achieve the policy objectives, and opposing perspectives about the means to achieve implementation (Matland 1995). Although CSOs identified approaches to improve policies developed by the state, such as recognising intersecting power dynamics that contribute to creating “risky subjects” (on risky subjects Vaughan-Williams 2008; Amoore 2007), and advocated for recognizing men’s vulnerability to extremism within policies, this did not cause evident conflict between the state and CSOs. Likewise, although CSOs highlight limitations within the state’s proposed policies and raised concerns about the implementation process within some contexts, this did not affect these organizations’ support for the state, or the means proposed by the state to achieve implementation. These criticisms offered by these organizations seemed to affect neither the state’s perception of their role within the implementation process nor the spaces or opportunities for participation provided to them. Although the model indicates that criticism should contribute to conflict between these actors (Matland 1995), it led to further support for CSOs and reinforced their role as experts who should be engaged in future processes. This contributed to some discourse amongst some state actors in regard to whether there are greater opportunities for CSOs to contribute to the national CT/CVE and the implementation of the Criminal Code. The government’s encouragement of CSOs despite their criticism of the state’s CT/CVE approach and CSOs’ willingness to continue to collaborate with state actors is unique to the WPS space, as historically, the government has limited political opportunities to CSOs after criticism of the state’s actions (Encarnación 2001; Threlfall 2008;

Verge 2012). This further reinforces the Spanish government's willingness to pursue the objectives of the WPS Agenda.

#### Cooperation and harmony between state and CSOs

There is a lack of conflict between state and civil society actors within the CT/CVE sector and through processes to implement UNSCR 2242, although both sets of actors recognise the need for development, such as greater collaboration and opportunities for CSOs to engage in political processes. State actors acknowledge the significance of CSOs in implementing the resolution, indicating that these actors' knowledge of the local context is significant and their proximity to communities at risk of extremism is pivotal to ensure that interventions are targeted for communities in need. However, these actors also acknowledged the need for improvements in how CSOs are engaged in CT/CVE policies and WPS implementation to improve intervention outcomes. One actor reported that they were optimistic about the future of the resolution in the country and indicated that these were activities that the new Spanish government would be open to address, to improve outcomes for all women. This actor stated

so, I think that there are so many new strategies to reintegration...we have a new government at the beginning of this year to allow not only radicalized women, but in general all the female population in the civil society [sector] to control all of these limits that they can feel...they can decide to unite to [stop] some kind of radicalization groups. I am positive. I can even notice that in terms of gender issues in my country, in Spain, we are growing up very quickly. We are receiving so many positive feedback and new inputs to be applied in the next years”  
(SP\_071120\_stateactor).

This was acknowledged by other CSO research participants, who indicated that, although developments were still required, they appreciated the efforts that the state has made to improve outcomes in the future. One state actor reported that they understood that the state has to respect and be open to understanding the perspectives of various interest groups, however, they recognised that “the last decision is always on the government [as], this is democracy” (SP\_031120\_civsoc5). Despite this, these civil society stakeholders are open to discussing their perspective with the government, as there are no risks or sanctions to be imposed for publicly criticizing the state or emphasizing areas for improvement (on CSOs

role and freedom within democratic societies, see Hudáková 2021; Boje 2021). Other CSOs also acknowledged the government's efforts and recognise the inability to implement all aspects of the resolution. One state actor reported that "there are some exceptions to implement everything due to some limitations, and particularly because, from a pragmatic point of view, not everything, all the points of the resolution can't be applied" (SP\_41120\_civsoc). In contrast to other CSOs, this actor further indicated that achieving implementation and improving future implementation outcomes should be recognised as the responsibility of all. For instance, this actor stated, "I think that through collaboration...different organizations need to collaborate to implement all these aspects in real life. For this reason, the association is really important" (SP\_41120\_civsoc).

Cooperation between political participants in Spain has contributed to cooperation and political willingness to further engage CSOs in future implementation activities. This reflects the ACM, which indicates that low levels of conflict create the conditions for entry for low-level actors within political processes and contribute to the ease with which implementation occurs (Matland 1995). The lack of conflict between these actors and political will is evident within the context, as state actors acknowledged CSOs' advocacy for the state to improve its implementation process and along with their organisations, further engage communities and women affected by extremism. Although it is expected that limitations within policies and the implementation process will promote conflict, CSOs also acknowledged the challenges experienced by the government in efforts to balance the interests of various parties with what it perceives to be the best outcome for the country. The ability of CSOs to recognise these challenges further prevented conflict between these actors.

Implementation of problem-resolution strategies to promote cooperation

As there is a cooperation between CSOs and state actors within processes to implement UNSCR 2242, and little evidence of conflict between these actors, problem-solving approaches have been sufficient to achieve compliance from political participants involved in the policy implementation process. In contexts where there is low ambiguity and low conflict between political participants, a lack of sufficient resources, and environmental challenges, affect the success of policy implementation. State actors indicated that as the government is

conscious to avoid mistakes, including the repetition of ineffective security policies that have contributed to creating conditions for radicalization and extremist violence in the country, collaboration with CSOs, women groups, and youth organisations is paramount. For instance, a state actor indicated that “civil society is taken into account very deeply because what we want to do is not to repeat the same things for our new generation and all the things that have been done here to the victims, and mainly women. The new generations – they don’t want them to suffer that kind of violence we have suffered” (SP\_201120\_stateactor). To ensure the peaceful co-existence of these actors during political and social processes, the state has strategically adopted problem-resolution measures to promote cooperation and prevent conflict. This has consisted of developing measures to enable some CSOs to develop their own CT/CVE initiatives, developing channels of communication that enable these actors to provide feedback, propose new strategies, and highlight ineffective policies and practices adopted by the government without fear of persecution. It appears that the government will likely continue to adopt a problem-resolution approach to prevent conflict between its actors and civil society groups, as it recognized the need for ongoing and improved collaboration. As there is also awareness of the “need to change policy system...and civil movements are pushing for those changes and [they] are very involved, and near to the places for decision” (State Actor), CSOs activism will likely continue to have some impact on how the state responds to terrorism and violent extremism and its particular impact on women.

The extent to which CSOs’ ongoing activism will continue to influence political processes and the extent to which the state is likely to continue to adopt problem-resolution approaches to ensure that the interests of both parties are achieved is evident within the discussion which is currently occurring in the state with regards to funding. As some CSOs have requested additional funds and long-term funding to improve implementation and evaluate the effectiveness of implemented measures, state actors have recognised the need for such interventions. Government representatives vocalized their support for increasing budgeting for gender and CT/CVE policies and supported CSOs' request for additional funds. For instance, one actor stated

“I will say to make policies work, you need funding. Its is essential that [if we are to] have a very active civil society, you need funding and you [need to] give a space [where] people can get organised easily. So I think that funding is important, [it] gives

visibility to, especially women's movements. And I think for that, we need to involve them, especially strong feminists" (SP\_201120\_stateactor).

As successful policy implementation requires adequate resources to be allocated at each stage of the process to fund implementation activities and address challenges that arise, sufficient funding is critical to the effective implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Spain. However, the lack of adequate funds to implement WPS initiatives is not unique to the Spanish context. As there is a lack of sustainable funding to implement initiatives proposed within WPS NAPs and future funding is unpredictable, limited resources act as a barrier to implementing WPS initiatives (Desmidt and Davis 2019; Duncanson 2019; Hamilton et al. 2020; Hamilton et al. 2021). For instance, it has led to "disparity between policy commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment" (UN Women 2015: 372) and the lack of allocation of funds to address women's security needs in peacebuilding budgets (True 2013).

The ACM indicates that to achieve compliance from political participants, governments are likely to reform proposed policies to reduce the harmful implications that it has on other actors' interests or provide incentives to encourage cooperation (Matland 1995). If ineffective, governments will adopt bargaining or problem-resolution approaches to promote cooperation (Matland 1995). The lack of conflict between state representatives and civil society actors in the Spanish context, the adoption of policies supported by both state and non-state actors, and the willingness of CSOs to participate in the implementation process have prevented the need for the government to reform policies to achieve compliance. Similarly, the lack of conflict has reduced the need for incentives, or the adoption of bargaining measures, to achieve cooperation. Although problem resolution is promoted in the model to address low levels of conflict between actors (Matland 1995), this approach is adopted to prevent conflict in the Spanish context. As the state has adopted tools to enable communication from top-down and bottom-up and acknowledges CSOs' feedback through recognition of proposals to reform future policies to integrate the initiatives and strategies proposed by these actors, problem resolution also acts as a tool to promote cooperation. Clear goals and means informing policies and the lack of conflict between CSOs and state actors suggest that low conflict and low ambiguity inform activities to implement UNSCR 2242 in Spain, and thus the implementation process should reflect *administrative implementation*.

## Administrative Implementation

Low ambiguity and low conflict as outlined in the ACM suggest that *administrative implementation* is occurring in Spain. However, as there are unique contextual implementation characteristics into which the model provides little insight, the extent to which *administrative implementation* as a model provides a full explanation of the implementation of UNSCR 2242 is limited. Administrative implementation indicates that policy development and implementation occur in a top-down mode, as policy goals and resources sufficient to achieve implementation are pre-determined by a central authority (Matland 1995). This type of implementation can be conceptualized as a “machine”, wherein a central authority controls access to information, allocates resources to each implementing actor and determines the sanctions imposed on actors that do not comply with implementation instructions. This reflects policy development processes in Spain, like the Criminal Code and the National Strategy Against Terrorism, the WPS NAP, and the resources allocated to achieve implementation are pre-determined by the government without consultation with CSOs and other organisations engaged in the implementation process. Although the model indicates that a central authority determines all decisions regarding a policy (Matland 1995), various government departments are engaged in the policy development process in Spain. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, with support from other departments such as the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior, contributes to the development of measures in alignment with the NAP, and these actors play a central role in delivering information about the country’s WPS initiatives (its objectives and means) to lower-level actors participating in the implementation process.

*Administrative implementation* also suggests that information flows from the top down, as one political actor receives orders from the actor directly above them within the political hierarchy (Matland 1995). The model proposes that clear procedures are provided at each implementation level regarding the responsibilities and tasks to be performed by each actor and associated reporting requirements (Matland 1995). Although this applies to organisations contracted by the state to deliver CT/CVE workshops to schools and communities as part of its CT/CVE education initiatives, this does not apply to organisations that were given the flexibility to design their own CT/CVE initiatives. Funding contracts provided to these organisations outlined reporting requirements, policies, and procedures that should inform

their activities; however, these CSOs had the discretion to develop programs and determine the delivery mode. The model suggests that as implementing actors are informed of their roles, and expected outcomes and allocated sufficient resources to achieve implementation, this aids in preventing outside influences and expedites implementation (Matland 1995). This reflects the experiences of CSOs contracted by the state to deliver educational programs as part of the state's overall initiative to inform communities about terrorism, radicalization, and its implications. However, for organisations provided funding to develop their own CT/CVE initiatives for selected communities, as this process required these actors to engage in consultations with academics, individuals, and community members that the state did not initially engage, the extent to which implementation is closed to outside influences is limited.

Moreover, as the ACM is concerned with achieving desired outcomes, compliance dominates the implementation process (Matland 1995). Normative mechanisms, such as a legitimate authority giving orders, are sufficient to achieve compliance (Matland 1995). This is not applicable to the Spanish context. Normative compliance mechanisms suggest that as a central authority provides directions, CSOs will not criticize or highlight the limitations of measures proposed by the state and will accept policies and measures as presented by the state. It would also suggest that the state would not acknowledge CSOs' feedback or make efforts to engage these organisations in future activities to reform measures proposed, as its authority would be sufficient to achieve compliance from civil society without responding to feedback provided or making efforts to improve collaboration. However, the state has adopted problem-resolution measures to prevent conflict with CSOs, recognizes these actors' experiences and expertise, and acknowledges the necessity to improve its relationship with civil society, as part of its effort to improve its CT/CVE activities. These findings suggest that normative mechanisms have little impact on compliance in Spain, as conflict between CSOs and the state in regard to WPS is minimal in this context. Hence, although *administrative implementation* provides some insights into how UNSCR 2242 is being implemented in Spain and the relationship between the state and CSOs, it is insufficient to understand all dimensions of the implementation process.

Administrative implementation indicates that adequate resources lead to successful policy implementation in contexts where there is low conflict and low ambiguity (Matland 1995);

however, processes to implement UNSCR 2242 in Spain highlight that resources alone are insufficient to achieve implementation. As earlier discussed, the model suggests that as implementation reflects a top-down process, activities, roles, and responsibilities are pre-determined and adequate resources are allocated to each stage of the implementation process to guarantee its overall success (Matland 1995). Actors engaged in the implementation process are provided clear communication of their responsibilities and selected by the central authority based on their skills and capability to execute their implementation activities (Matland 1995). As this guarantee at least a 90% implementation accuracy, the likelihood that the policy will fail is limited (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Matland 1995).

Evidence from the Spanish context indicates that adequate resources are an important component of successful policy implementation. Although resources contribute to achieving implementation activities, it is insufficient if proposed policies do not respond to the needs of those that it is intended, there is a lack of flexibility within the implementation process to adjust initiatives to respond to issues that arise during the implementation process, and implementing actors are unwilling to perform their allocated activities. To successfully implement a policy, there must be political participants willing to follow implementation guidelines. This is evident within the Spanish context, as state actors' willingness to engage with CSOs to implement CT/CVE measures, despite terrorism and violent extremism being historically perceived as a security issue to be addressed by the state, and CSOs' willingness to follow their allocated tasks contributed to Spain capability to achieve some of the requirement of UNSCR 2242.

In addition, evidence from the Spanish context also highlights that flexibility is significant during implementation. The Spanish government's capability to provide flexibility within the implementation process (contracting some CSOs as experts to develop CT/CVE measures for specific contexts and providing these actors time and support to engage in consultations with women affected by extremist violence and other community members) ensured that initiatives proposed aligned with community needs. The Spanish government's adoption of a targeted approach to implementation by proposing a specific context and engaging CSOs to develop community-based interventions for selected communities contributed to ensuring that policies targeted and addressed security issues that make women in particular

communities vulnerable to extremist violence. As this also contributes to creating a sense of ownership of the initiatives proposed amongst both state and non-state actors, this increases the motivation of non-state actors to see the success of their implementation activities.

## Conclusion

Measures adopted by the Spanish government to translate and implemented UNSCR 2242 are characterized by low conflict and low ambiguity. There are low levels of conflict in the implementation process, as CSOs are in support of the measures proposed by the state, some actors are provided opportunities to engage in political processes, and spaces are created for these actors to provide feedback to state actors. To prevent conflict from arising, the Spanish government adopts problem resolution measures. These strategies, which consist of spaces for CSOs to provide feedback on the limitations of initiatives proposed and the measures to improve future collaboration with CSOs, aid the state to prevent conflict. As clear implementation guidelines are provided to CSOs and resources to support implementation activities are made accessible, despite the exclusion of CSOs during activities to translate the Resolution to the domestic context, these actors had a clear understanding of their allocated roles. According to Matland's (1995) model, low ambiguity and low conflict would predict that *administrative implementation* is occurring in Spain. The central principle in administrative implementation is "outcomes are determined by resources" (Matland 1995: 160). Evidence from the Spanish context indicates that outcomes are not solely dependent on resources, as commitment from state and civil society actors alike and flexibility during the implementation process are key factors contributing to the achievement of desired outcomes. This highlights the need to understand the levels of influence held by the state and the measures utilized to promote a collaborative approach to implementation. In the following chapter, I argue that there is a need to further explore control held by the state in guiding CSOs and shaping their activities throughout the implementation process.

## Chapter Seven: Discussion

This chapter explores the application of the ACM in providing an understanding of the implementation of UNSCR 2242 across the UK, Nigeria, and the US. I also argue that there needs to be greater account for control to understand the extent to which the state influences the implementation process and the relationship between the state and CSOs during this process, and to address the main research questions: *In what ways, and with what effects, are civil society organisations engaged in the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria, the UK and Spain?* Firstly, the chapter revisits the framing of WPS as a policy framework and the benefits of conceptualising the Agenda as a policy within the domestic context. This is followed by a discussion of the ACM as a theoretical framework and a brief recap of the four modes of implementation proposed by the model. The third section outlines the knowledge gained through applying the ACM to results obtained from the three case-study contexts (Nigeria, Spain, and the UK). This section also discusses implementation factors unaccounted for when the ACM is applied and examines characteristics of implementation that the model does not address. This analysis provides further insights into gaps in understanding of the relationship between the state and civil society organisations (CSOs) during the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2242) in the three case-study contexts.

The final section emphasises that there is a need to further account for control in policy implementation. As explained below, control in the context of this thesis is defined as the power to shape the actions and activities of others through actual or threatened penalties for nonconformity with proposed measures, policies, and conditions. This section provides a discussion about control and how it informs state and CSOs' relationship. Findings suggest that although the ACM provides some insights into the implementation of the WPS Agenda as a policy framework within the domestic context, to gain a thorough understanding of the implementation process and to account for all characteristics of the state's relationship and engagement with non-state actors, scholars, and practitioners must further explore control and the incentives adopted by state actors to manage this relationship. Focusing on control shows

that the state utilises high control measures to engage CSOs in the UK context, and in circumstances where the government aims to achieve a collaborative policy process, or access to political spaces is sufficient for non-state actors to comply with its objectives, adopts low control measures as evident in the Nigerian and Spanish political environments. This indicates that, as the relationship between CSOs and the state differs across nation-states, the level of control measures utilised by the state to create or close opportunities for participation in activities to implement WPS resolutions is significant. Accounting for control can contribute to determine whether the state will engage CSOs and local women to develop CT/CVE initiatives that align with UNSCR 2242 and effectively addresses the current and emerging security needs of women and their communities.

### **Revisiting WPS as a Policy Framework**

As previously discussed in depth in Chapter Three, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda is conceptualized as a political framework in this study. In this section, I revisit this argument to outline why conceptualising the Agenda as a policy framework provides a better framework for understanding how the implementation of UNSCR 2242 is occurring in Nigeria, the UK and Spain. This is followed by an overview of why Matland's (1995) ACM was an appropriate tool to examine the relationship between the state and CSOs, and the four frameworks proposed in the model. Much WPS scholarship refers to the Agenda as an international norm that promotes women's role in peace and security governance (Kirby and Shepherd 2021) and sets standards of behavior for UN member states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, as the Agenda and its principles are non-binding, as argued in Chapter Three, compliance is based on states' discretion. It is useful as a framework to understand the emergence of international norms, its tipping point, and the factors that contributes to state decisions to integrate and neglect norms in the domestic context (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1999; Anderson 2010; Shahid and Yerbury 2014). As the model consists of various international norms, principles, and ideas, the normative framework provides little insight into the reproduction of the Agenda domestically (Kirby and Shepherd 2021). As earlier highlighted in Chapter Three, to better understands processes to integrate and reinforce the WPS locally, the roles of implementing actors, and the relationship between the state and CSOs during the process, a policy framework is

required. Conceptualising WPS as a policy framework domestically provides an analytical tool to examine the factors informing decisions to integrate a resolution domestically, the actors engaged and the strategies utilized to engage these actors.

As discussed in Chapter Three, examining WPS as a policy framework (or series of policy frameworks) highlights how international resolutions are interpreted domestically and illuminates the political and contextual factors that inform government decisions. A policy framework also highlights procedures, resources, and actors called upon by the state to fulfil its international commitments, and provides clarity around negotiations between various actors and the journey of WPS resolutions domestically. As WPS encourages states to develop tools to review and evaluate the outcome of resolutions implemented domestically, these tools which promote accountability better align with the characteristics of policies as opposed to non-binding normative frameworks. Framing WPS as a policy in the domestic context in this thesis (as discussed in Chapter Three) enables the application of concepts and frameworks from policy studies to better understand how WPS is being implemented as a policy framework in the domestic context (Asante et al. 2021; Deiana and McDonagh 2018). The application of a policy theory such as the ACM, reveals how international norms and domestic policies interact, the unique contextual factors that affect the implementation of WPS resolutions in nation-states such as Nigeria, the UK, and Spain, the role of non-political actors such as CSOs, and the outcome of implemented measures. As emphasised throughout this thesis, a policy framework also creates opportunities for redeveloping theoretical models to account for all unique implementation characteristics.

## **Literature on the ACM**

This section revisits Matland's (1995) ACM (thoroughly explored in Chapter Three) to highlight the key components of the theory and to outline the types of implementations predicted as occurring in the Nigerian, UK, and Spanish contexts as examined in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. This is followed by a discussion of the limitations of the model in accounting for all implementation activities and the relationship between the state and CSOs within these nations. Developed by Richard Matland (1995), the model is widely applied in

policy studies to understand policy development and practice and determine how implementation will occur across a policy's life (Green et al. 2020). As a tool for predicting how implementation may occur, and the factors that contribute to its success and failure, the model can be used to understand implementation challenges and develop interventions to improve the success of political measures (Jensen et al. 2015). The model also provides insights into the intersection of political and social contexts and identifies the environmental factors shaping policy success (Garashi et al. 2021). Matland (1995) proposes that the objectives of those tasked with developing policy goals (which may be more or less ambiguous), and the extent to which community values and needs inform the goals and the implementation process (which may conflict more or less with other values and needs), influence policy success (Arnaboldi and Lapsley 2009). Characterised by the two variables of ambiguity and conflict, which act as predictors for determining policy implementation outcomes, the ACM also provides insights regarding measures required in future policies to account for implementation contexts (Hopskins et al. 2009).

As discussed in Chapter Three, the model proposes four modes of policy implementation (*administrative, political, experimental, symbolic*), based on the degrees of conflict and ambiguity that inform all policy processes. Characterised by low ambiguity and low *conflict*, *administrative* implementation assumes that policy implementation occurs in a top-down process, with high-level actors (e.g., government actors) determining the goals, responsibilities of actors, and means of policy implementation (Matland 1995; Hebert 1960). Shaped by low ambiguity and high conflict, *political* implementation consists of a high-level authority that determines policy goals and controls the implementation process (Matland 1995). High conflict exists within this process as actors have differing perspectives regarding policy goals and the means to policy implementation, and those with power adopt measures that coerce those with less power to support proposed policy measures (Ingram 1977; Matland 1995).

In contrast, *experimental* implementation reflects a bottom-up approach to policy implementation. Informed by high ambiguity and low conflict, as this process lacks clear policy goals and means, successful implementation is highly dependent on the availability of sufficient resources in the implementation context (Mohr 1995). The lack of clarity surrounding policy goals and means, creates opportunities for new knowledge development, as policy implementation differs across contexts to reflect the needs of those that it is intended to support (Sabatier 1986). The fourth mode proposed by Matland (1995), *symbolic implementation*, consists of high ambiguity and conflict. Like the *experimental mode*, implementation in this mode reflects a bottom-up approach, as policy goals and means are ambiguous and shaped by existing policies, values, and symbols within a society (Matland 1995). As resources and local actors' coalition strength influence the success of policies, actors' opposition to policy goals and means creates significant conflict amongst actors (Matland 1995). Professional actors (including civil society organisations) can respond to conflict by proposing non-coercive measures to encourage collaboration (Matland 1995). Below, I explained the findings obtained when the ACM was applied to predict the type of implementation occurring in Nigeria, the UK, and Spain, and the relationship between the state and CSOs during the process.

### **ACM and UNSCR 2242 implementation in Nigeria, Spain, the UK**

#### **Nigeria**

Based on the levels of ambiguity and conflict I identify in Nigeria, Matland's (1995) model predicts that *political* implementation would occur in this context, and this is in line with my findings. Characterised by high conflict and low ambiguity, the model suggests that political power and influence significantly determine the outcomes of policy implementation. This is evident in Nigeria as actors with power determine the initiatives developed in alignment with UNSCR 2242 and develop guidelines that shape the policy implementation process. Power is centralised at the federal and national levels, with state political actors making the majority of decisions surrounding activities to translate the norms of the Resolution and the Agenda

broadly into programs and initiatives supported by policies. This has contributed to high conflict within the Nigerian context as the goals that informed policies and initiatives developed in alignment with the state's intention to maintain its international reputation by acknowledging and responding to the gendered implications of extremist violence, a space in which it has historically received significant international criticism. The goals and the values underpinning these CT/CVE policies, programs, and measures contradict CSOs' aims to improve gendered outcomes for women affected by terrorism and violent extremism.

Due to high conflict, the ways in which the state engaged some CSOs in national activities were limited. The state engaged some CSOs operating at the national level to translate, develop policies, and implement proposed initiatives. Existing tensions between the state and civil society (particularly those operating at the local level) contributed to the government only providing opportunities to organisations with an existing relationship with the state and international funds. As these actors were required to fund their participation in policy processes, this significantly affected their ability to effectively engage in all meetings, and some of the effects of this consisted of limited opportunities for CSOs to critique the interventions proposed by the state and to bring to the political forefront, marginalized women's experiences. As some of the civil society, actors engaged had little experience working directly with women affected by extremist violence and belong to the elite of the society, decisions were made by these actors based on assumptions of reports of the activities taking place within local contexts, as opposed to making decisions informed by consultations with local women. This has contributed to the high levels of conflict between local and higher-level CSOs. As Matland observes, under conditions of political implementation, "dissension [and conflict] occurs because...goals are incompatible" (1995: 163). It is "precisely in the designing of the implementation policy that conflict develop and vigorous battles erupt" (Matland 1995: 163), and this is certainly the case in Nigeria, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Conflict also informed perceptions around the strategies required for successful policy implementation. Although some CSOs had access to funding and resources to implement initiatives proposed by the state which aligned with their values, some of the effects of conflict between these actors is a requirement for CSOs to engage in practice in alignment with the state's guidelines and a requirement to forfeit organisation funds and resources to support the state. The effects of high conflict and low ambiguity between the state and CSOs contributed to the government assigning roles and responsibilities to some CSOs, and closing political spaces for some to encourage compliance. CSOs, particularly those operating in the local contexts, raised these concerns, indicating an awareness that failure to comply with measures would limit future engagement opportunities and restrict current and future access to information on terrorist threats, and women and communities at risk. Despite the applicability of the model in explaining some of the ways that the state engages CSOs in processes to implement UNSCR 2242, the tensions between these actors, and its effects such as limited opportunities to advocate for, and support women affected by extremist violence, the model has its limitations. Below I explore the implementation factors unaccounted for when the ACM is applied.

UK

Similarly, Matland's (1995) model suggests that symbolic implementation would occur in the UK because both conflict and ambiguity are high in that context according to my estimation. Under conditions of symbolic implementation, "the policy course is determined by the coalition of actors at the local level who control the available resources" (Matland 1995: 168). As previously discussed, the model suggests that the principles and values that underpin existing policies within a specific context inform decisions to engage non-state actors, the policies and initiatives proposed by the state to address policy issues. This is evident in the UK, as the state's commitment to UNSCR 2242, the policies developed, and the initiatives implemented, align with the state's commitment to gender equality and its existing CT/CVE policies PREVENT and CONTEST, as opposed to the principles that underpin UNSCR 2242. Although aspects of the model explain activities occurring in the UK, the ACM does not explain all implementation characteristics. For instance, the model suggests that the lack of clarity surrounding policy goals and means contributes to variations within policy

implementation across various contexts. As mentioned above, the model proposes that local actors hold resources critical to the success of policy implementation, and professional groups act as policy mediators (Matland 1995). This is not the case in the UK context.

Despite high ambiguity surrounding policy goals and strict state control of resources, the state's engagement of CSOs as local implementors of CT/CVE programs and education contributed to its ability to achieve some of its WPS and CT/CVE objectives. As low-level actors play a prominent role in policy implementation, the model assumes that CSOs operating at the local levels will have access to sufficient resources and determine the tools and activities to achieve implementation. However, as high conflict and ambiguity informs the relationship between the state and CSOs, CSOs had limited access to CT/CVE information and there was a minimal engagement of low-level civil society groups within implementation activities. Exclusion of low-level CSOs also consisted of closed opportunities to access state funding and develop civil society coalition groups. Dependence on state funding, a competing civil sector, reliance on state technology, and limited access to CT/CVE information inform implementation activities in the state. This, along with limited access to political spaces, shapes activities in the UK as opposed to coalition strength as proposed in the ACM under conditions of symbolic implementation.

## Spain

Matland's (1995) model suggests that administrative implementation would occur in Spain, based on the levels of ambiguity and conflict evaluated in the course of my research. As earlier discussed, administrative implementation is a product of low conflict and low ambiguity: "The central principle in administrative implementation is outcomes are determined by resources. The desired outcome is virtually assured, given that sufficient resources" are available (Matland 1995: 160). Low ambiguity and conflict are evident through clearly assigned roles and responsibilities and cooperation between actors at all implementation levels. Procedures and outlines which articulate the roles and responsibilities of actors, inform the implementation process, funding allocated, and the limitations of actors'

implementation activities. This is evident in the Spanish context, as high-level actors provide clear implementation guidelines and funding and require lower-level actors such as CSOs to provide reports on achieved implementation activities and those unattained when performing their allocated implementation tasks.

Despite this, the model has its limitations, because the “desired outcome” in Spain is *not* “virtually assured” (Matland 1995: 160). Although the model states that adequate resources can enable the achievement of desired implementation outcomes, autonomy and collaboration between CSOs and state actors are also key factors to successful implementation, as evident in Spain. There are several significant differences in the Spanish context from elements suggested by the ACM: the state engages CSOs to deliver community interventions and offers autonomy to these organisations; there are outreach programs to engage those who do not traditionally participate in policy and program development; and CSOs have opportunity to provide feedback to state actors and influence the desired outcome. For instance, the state provides funding and autonomy to some low-level actors to consult local women and communities as part of its allocated responsibility to develop CT/CVE programs for specific contexts, which creates variability. The effect of these activities is the empowerment of women at risk to contribute to political processes to develop initiatives that reflect and addresses insecurities that make them vulnerable to extremist threats. The model also emphasises that sufficient resources are the key to successful policy implementation. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, resources act as one of many components of effective policy implementation. Evidence from the Spanish context suggests that the effects of collaborative engagement of CSOs in policy processes consist of providing sufficient access to resources and providing CSOs flexibility to adjust policies to reflect the emerging needs of women. These factors collectively contribute to successful implementation.

A comparative analysis of the three-case study contexts by applying the ACM provides insights into the similarities in how some states engage CSOs. For instance, the Nigerian and UK governments predominantly engage with CSOs operating at the national level and those the government has an existing relationship with while excluding or closing spaces for CSOs operating at the local levels. Comparison of the implementation across the case-studies sites

also highlights the lack of adequate funding allocated to ensure the success of policy implementation. For example, the Nigerian government depends on the finances of CSOs, the UK government requires CSOs to compete for funding available, while although the Spanish government provides funding to civil society, it is insufficient to enable actors to re-develop interventions to address emerging security needs. The model also provides an understanding that the strategies utilised by the government to engage CSOs differ across contexts, with actors in Nigeria and the UK, engaged predominantly in implementation activities. In comparison, civil society in Spain participates in various areas of the policy life cycle. Differences in engagement and the relationship between the state and CSOs have differing effects. In Nigeria and Spain, high tensions between these actors have contributed to the development of CT/CVE measures that do not align with or adequately address women's security needs, the state's adoption of restrictive measures, and a shrinking space for civil society participation in WPS activities. In contrast, within the Spanish context, low conflict and a collaborative approach to engagement have contributed to CSOs' ability to consult and engage women whom policies are intended to support in the policy process and encouraged innovative approaches to addressing women's security needs. Below I explore the factors that the ACM does not account for at each implementation site.

### **Limitations of the ACM**

Although the Nigerian context and some activities occurring in the Spanish and UK contexts support the utility of the ACM (Matland 1995) in explaining the implementation of UNSCR 2242, there remain areas that require further explanation. The model does not account for the direct influence of government authorities on the overall policy implementation process across the four modes of implementation. For instance, regardless of the policy implementation approach (bottom-up, top-down), authorities with power (such as state government departments) can shape implementation outcomes, as their decisions to support or negate proposed measures can significantly determine the success of policies (Arnaboldi and Lapsley 2009).

Some scholars also highlight that greater attention needs to be given to resources in all four modes of implementation to understand policy interactions and implementation outcomes better. Chackerian and Mavima (2000) suggest that understanding whether there is synergy, avoidance, and trade-off in policy interactions is significant. For instance, understanding whether there are synergies within policy interactions provides knowledge on the potential for proposed policies to succeed and whether the resources and tools required for implementation reflect those required for other policies in the context and are readily available (Chackerian and Mavima 2000). Trade-off indicates that as resources required to support proposed policies contradict those needed to implement existing policies, competition to prioritise resources for one policy over the other can contribute to avoidance behaviour, as actors avoid interactions and collaboration to compete for the little resources available to achieve their implementation goals (Chackerian and Mavima 2000).

Other scholars highlight that although Matland's (1995) model accounts for power imbalances between key implementing actors, the model fails to address institutional factors and conditions and how these characteristics shape decisions around the accepted policies and those allocated resources and policies neglected. For instance, Hannan and Freeman (1989) and Scott and Meyer (1994) suggest that as institutional conditions, procedures, and expectations place constraints on issues perceived to be significant to a government and implementing actors, institutional factors and conditions can act as barriers to the decision-making process during policy development stages. These standards also shape the tools and measures deemed appropriate to implement policies and the measures proposed as appropriate interventions (Scott and Meyer 1994). Although the ACM theoretical model accounts for most implementation activities occurring in Nigeria, there are some limitations to its applicability in the UK and Spanish context.

Although hypothesised in Chapter Three that one of the four implementation types would be found in each case study context, as discussed above, the ACM is limited in providing a thorough understanding of the implementation activities of the government, its engagement of civil society, and the relationship between these actors. In the following section, I highlight that there is a need to further account for control in the ACM to further explain the

relationship between states and CSOs during WPS implementation and to account for the limitations of the model.

### **Control in policy implementation**

As highlighted in the present research and identified in previous studies, Matland's (1995) model provides little insight into the state government's level of control over all aspects of the policy implementation process, regardless of whether low-level actors hold resources for implementation. The ACM assumes that conflict and ambiguity are the main elements that shape the policy development and implementation process. However, an element of control also shapes this process. I perceive control as the power to shape the actions and activities of others through actual or threats to impose penalties for nonconformity to proposed measures, policies, and conditions. As control informs relationships between state and non-state actors within political spaces, the level of control imposed is dependent on the level of opposition and the extent of measures required to align the actions of other stakeholders with the objectives of the political majority. In contexts with little opposition where the likelihood of dissent is limited, the state imposes low-level control measures. This consists of contractual agreements that outline the activities that actors are to engage in, the amount of funding accessible to these actors to complete allocated tasks, the required outcomes of these actors' activities, and the limits of contractual agreements. Measures also consist of control over actors' access to information, with information made accessible if it aids actors to achieve their allocated tasks. In addition to limitations surrounding information, the state imposes monitoring measures. This consists of a requirement for those contracted to provide updates on tasks completed as part of their performance evaluation and the ability of actors providing contracts to request amendments to ensure that it aligns with the goals and objectives of the political majority.

On the contrary, in high-conflict contexts where there is likely to be opposition, the actions of those contracted may inhibit actors in power's ability to achieve their objectives, or these actors have the capacity to propose ideas that contradict those which inform the objectives of

the majority political power. In addition to limited access to information, control consists of implementing monitoring and metering measures. Monitoring measures include performance-based indicators, the requirement for contracted agents to provide period-based updates on progress made, and a requirement to alter activities that do not align with the contractor's goals to ensure that they are able to retain their contracts and participation in political processes. Metering measures consist of contractual agreements that impose penalties on actors who are unable to achieve their allocated tasks or engage in tasks that contradict the contractor's goals and reward stakeholders whose activities aid to progress the contractor's goal. Likewise, high control measures also consist of peer scrutiny. High competition to access political spaces amongst those contracted encourage stakeholders to scrutinise each other's behaviour and report breachers of political contracts to contractors. As a breach of contract can cause reputational damage and possible exclusion from political spaces, this acts as another form of control.

Further accounting for control with the ACM suggests that a contractual relationship exists between state and civil society actors, with these contracts acting as a form of control. Across these contexts, the state has significant control and influence over the policy development and implementation process, consisting of the decision-making power surrounding the CSOs engaged, the roles and responsibilities of these actors, funding which are accessible, and the required implementation outcomes. Greater emphasis on control indicates that state actors adopt low control measures in the Nigerian and Spanish contexts to encourage CSOs' engagement and compliance towards achieving its WPS objectives. In the Spanish context, low control measures aid in preventing conflict, enable CSOs to have autonomy and encourage collaboration while ensuring that all actors' activities aim to achieve the state's CT/CVE and gender efforts. Similarly, low control measures are sufficient to achieve compliance in the Nigerian context. Historically, the state has excluded CSOs from political participation and actors risk exclusion from political processes if they do not comply with contractual agreements. This factor and normative compliance have led to low control measures being sufficient to encourage compliance from CSOs. In contrast, in the UK context, the state adopts high control measures to encourage actors to comply with its WPS and CT/CVE goals. This level of control is required to prevent opposition, control those with access to political states and ensure that the outcomes of CT/CVE and WPS initiatives are consistent across various contexts.

## Further Accounting for Control and UNSCR 2242 Implementation in Nigeria, UK, and Spain

### Nigeria

The ACM with greater account for control provides a good understanding of the factors which influence the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in the Nigerian context and highlights that low control is occurring in Nigeria. Accounting for control within Nigeria also provides further insights into the relationship between state and civil society actors during the implementation process. Under the conditions of *political implementation*, characterised by high conflict and low ambiguity, the model proposes that conflict will inform implementing actors' perceptions of CT/CVE measures proposed by the state, and as power is centralised at the political level, state actors determine those who have access to political spaces.

Accounting for low control highlights that some Nigerian CSOs comply with the state's proposed measures despite opposition to the government's CT/CVE ideology and proposed initiatives. This and limited access to information about women and communities affected by extremist violence had little impact on these organisations' willingness to continue to participate in CT/CVE activities. As the state has historically declined access to political spaces to these actors, low-level control measures, such as access to political spaces are likely sufficient to encourage compliance, including from CSOs that are opposed to the state's CT/CVE ideology, as public opposition may influence the state to close current and future political opportunities.

Control was also exerted over the finances of CSOs to encourage compliance. Conditions of political implementation propose that the state determines the CT/CVE policies, resources, and training required for successful implementation. However, funding was often made accessible to CSOs through international organizations in the Nigerian context. However, this did not prevent the state from controlling non-state actors and the implementation process. The state required CSOs to forfeit a percentage of their program budget to support the government's CT/CVE program. Control over finances also extended to influence the communities that these organisations could access. For instance, CSOs reported that the

government denied some women and communities at risk of extremist violence access. Although these organisations have historically provided services to women at risk and those who are victims of extremist violence without access to political spaces, some organisations were willing to provide state funding for minimal access to these political spaces, and consequently, the state required low control methods to achieve compliance. These measures further acted as barriers to accountability, as they limited these actors' ability to highlight ineffective policies and practice limitations. Hence, as existing power imbalances and a desire to access political spaces influenced compliance, the state required low control initiatives during the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria.

## UK

Greater emphasis on control reveals that high control shapes the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in the UK. The adoption of high conflict mechanisms indicates that there was some opposition to the state's CT/CVE and WPS ideology, with this requiring the state to adopt harsh measures to prevent opposition. This was evident in the UK context as the state limited access to information concerning CT/CVE threats, communities at risk, CT/CVE operations, and limited information about funding opportunities available for non-state actors. For instance, some CSOs (particularly in the local context) indicated that they were often unaware of funding available through the state and when this information was made accessible to their organisations, these actors lacked the resources to compete with the level of resources that higher national CSOs can allocate to funding application processes. Activities to limit actors' access to information were also prevalent after successfully obtaining funding, with CSOs reporting that there were often unaware of the goals informing policy goals or activities that they were contracted to achieve, and access to information was limited to what was required for them to engage in their allocated tasks. In addition to restrictions surrounding information, monitoring, and metering measures were adopted by the state. Monitoring measures included contractual agreements, which outlined the activities that actors are to complete, expected outcomes, and reporting requirements, limiting these actors' ability to adapt interventions to reflect the needs of the various communities they aim to support. For instance, symbolic implementation proposes that policy implementation outcomes will differ across various contexts and are influenced by implementing actors'

perceptions of the measures required to respond to the needs of specific communities. However, due to high control mechanisms, the implementation outcome was determined and managed by the state, contributing to a similarity in outcomes across all implementation sites, despite differences in communities at-risk needs. Metering measures also informed the implementation process. Although these measures were not directly implemented, they informed practice, and CSOs engaged by the state emphasised that there were consequences for the opposition, criticism of the measures proposed, or the amount of funding allocated. For instance, some CSOs indicated that they were opposed to interventions proposed by the state, and for some CSOs, the level of funding allocated was insufficient, and they would have appreciated the opportunity to develop their own intervention. However, highlighting these issues would have closed opportunities for future engagement within the political spaces, limited their access to future funding, and positioned these actors as incapable of managing the demands of the project. Likewise, although measures to encourage peer scrutiny were not implemented, peer scrutiny also contributed to high competition between actors within the UK context to access political spaces, and funding, and contribute to WPS and CT/CVE initiatives in the country as a mechanism to encourage compliance. CSOs (particularly those at the local levels) highlighted that any public display of opposition to measures proposed by the states or high-level CSOs who had an existing relationship with the state could cause reputational damage.

As discussed more fully in Chapter Three, the symbolic mode of implementation occurs when there is high ambiguity surrounding the policy process and high conflict amongst actors; these conditions with high control contribute to various interpretations of the proposed policies and measures developed by the state to acknowledge UNSCR 2242. Various interpretations of the policy and measures proposed by the state also indicate that across the UK context, there will be differences within the resources allocated, the procedures and measures adopted, and the implementation outcomes. High control measures adopted by the state contributed to similarities across the various implementation sites. Symbolic implementation proposes that low-level CSOs (agents) access to resources, knowledge of the context for implementation, and skills required to prevent conflict during policy development and implementation ensures success. Further accounting for control mechanisms suggests that high control enables the government to achieve its objectives.

Symbolic implementation also assumes that low-level actors such as CSOs shape implementation outcomes, as their central role and access to required resources inform the measures perceived as appropriate and those neglected. Further emphasis on control suggests that state actors are key implementation actors, and these actors required low-level CSOs to compete for funding and access to CT/CVE implementation spaces (Matland 1995: 169). The state's high level of control over policy development contributed to the exclusion of these low-level CSOs and the engagement of nationally operating CSOs, who had an existing relationship with the state. These restrictive controls significantly disrupted the capability of CSOs to develop coalitions, which is suggested in the model as a method to limit the influence of state actors over the implementation process (Matland 1995: 168). The high level of state control positioned CSOs, particularly smaller, community-based organisations, in vulnerable positions. For instance, nationally operating CSOs seemed unwilling to jeopardise their existing relationship with state actors or limit their access to funding by developing coalitions with local CSOs. Local CSOs engaged by the state are also unwilling to jeopardise their access to future funding and access to political spaces by criticising the state's proposed CT/CVE measures or highlighting the likely ineffectiveness of policies if the state excludes groups working directly with women at risk of extremist violence from political processes.

The ACM also reinforces the role of professional groups such as CSOs in aiding the state to legitimise interventions proposed and prevent conflict, particularly in political contexts where there is significant opposition amongst actors towards the interventions proposed. Further exploring control highlights that funding limitations and closing political spaces imposed as control measures by state actors have contributed to conflict and acted as measures that have restricted the ability of CSOs to legitimise proposed policies. The state's measures have also restricted the capability of CSOs to propose problem-resolution initiatives or develop coalitions to influence the government institutions to acknowledge and comply with CT/CVE initiatives that they perceive to be effective as proposed in symbolic implementation. Moreover, as the symbolic implementation framework highlights that coalition strength informs the success of policy implementation, it suggests that coalition groups must address barriers to collaboration to ensure the successful outcome of proposed policies (Matland 1995: 169). Greater account for control highlights that the implementation of UNSCR 2242

in the UK context suggests that barriers to successful policy implementation are located at the macro level as opposed to the micro-level. This indicates that high levels of control exerted by state actors have affected local-level actors' access to political spaces and contributed to their inability to develop coalition groups.

## Spain

Attention to control in the ACM further provides an understanding of the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Spain. ACM reveals that the state adopted low control measures to encourage CSOs to comply with the aims and objectives, which informed policies and initiatives developed to implement UNSCR 2242. Administrative implementation implies that as a central authority makes all decisions regarding implementation and allocates sufficient resources, “the desired [policy implementation] outcome is virtually assured” (Matland 1995: 160). Accounting for control, the government engaged various departments and CSOs in a collaborative manner as opposed to maintaining an authoritative role throughout the implementation process. This was evident through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation’s decision to allow relative freedom to encourage cooperation amongst various departments and CSOs to prevent conflict. As low ambiguity informed policy goals and implementation processes, this also contributed to the lack of conflict between these actors, as both state departments and CSOs were able to assess whether the goals and objectives of the implementation process, aligned with their CT/CVE goals and to determine the implication that participation in the policy implementation process will have on their objectives. This provided CSOs with the opportunity to understand the limits of participation within the political implementation process, with this encouraging organisation in support of the state’s CT/CVE and WPS ideology to apply for contracts for participation. Although some government departments may not believe in all aspects of proposed measures, like CSOs, actors may participate in the effective implementation of a political measure contributes to their actors’ ability to achieve future goals.

A centralised policy implementation process, as seen in administrative implementation, also emphasises that information is made accessible to agents by higher-level actors through contractual agreements that outline procedures, responsibilities, and limitations to their practice. Accounting for low control applied to the Spanish context shows that as some CSOs were engaged in CT/CVE and other activities that aligned with the state's CT/CVE goals, the state had a high level of trust in the capability of these organisations to develop and implement its CT/CVE objectives based on existing programs and initiatives that these agents had implemented. Providing flexibility to low-level CSOs also acted as an incentive for these agents. The state provided access to political spaces, the opportunity to collaborate with key political institutions, and the autonomy to act as principals in consulting community members and women groups (agents) through processes to determine the appropriate measures for women at risk and those who have been victims of extremist violence. Although a level of flexibility was provided to these actors, with this including funding and the autonomy to engage those who can assist these actors to complete their allocated tasks, there were some limits to information. For instance, CSOs were provided access to information, state actors with experience within this sector, and the necessary resources to achieve implementation; however, this did not include access to all information on state security or information about current extremist threats to the state.

Historically, such opportunities have not been readily available to CSOs; this further acted as an incentive for compliance with contractual agreements and monitoring measures. The administrative mode of implementation also highlights that normative mechanisms promoted through social norms are sufficient to achieve compliance and limit agents' criticism and opposition. This further highlights the need to emphasise the state's use of control, as norms established at the political level creates expectations around how CSOs are to behave within the political sector and limit the need for high control measures such as the introduction of metering measures. The state also imposed monitoring measures consisting of reporting requirements and ongoing engagement with state actors to observe the actions of an organisation engaged and provide guidance to further encourage compliance. Further exploration of control within the Spanish context, suggests that it was used by the state as a means to promote collaboration, and accountability and to encourage expertise in the sphere of conflict prevention. For instance, monitoring measures implemented by the state provided

CSOs with an opportunity to obtain feedback from funders and motivate implementors to comply with their contractual agreements.

As the country's policy context around the national action plans for the implementation of the WPS Agenda, specifically UNSCR 2242, consists of low conflict and low ambiguity, this also creates a favourable environment where the use of low control mechanisms aids the state in preventing dissent and opposition. Low ambiguity provided state and CSOs clarity with regard to their role, the means for policy implementation, and the limitations of their activities. Likewise, low conflict and low control measures, achieved through open communication, access to training and resources, and flexible contracts, enabled the state to monitor and support CSOs through their implementation activities and create an environment where these actors could report implementation challenges and proposed strategies to improve CT/CVE and WPS practice, without fear of opposition or a breach of their contractual agreements. The ACM framework indicates that adequate resources are central to implementation success; however, accounting for the levels of control that inform the policy implementation process suggests that resources, autonomy, and access to the state actors (regardless of their monitoring roles), and the engagement of CSOs in support of the state's CT/CVE and WPS objectives, acted as motivation for compliance and significantly contributed to the state's capability to respond to its commitments under UNSCR 2242.

## **Conclusion**

Conceptualising WPS as a policy framework is a way to understand how states engage with norms and to explore the factors that inform the measures proposed and those excluded during processes to align with or enact the international norms embedded in the Agenda. As discussed in Chapter Three and reinforced in this chapter, it also creates opportunities for scholars to apply a variety of theoretical frameworks derived from policy studies and public administration to evaluate its implementation and outcomes. The application of the ACM indicates that it is an effective tool for understanding the implementation of UNSCR 2242 within various political contexts and highlights the unique contextual factors specific to a nation, although it has limitations. The model is particularly useful in understanding how

non-state and state actors may perceive a proposed policy, the tensions that may arise between actors and the measures that are adopted to promote collaboration between these actors despite existing tensions. However, to thoroughly understand the relationship and interactions between the state and CSOs, there is a need to emphasise control in the ACM. Understanding the impact and use of control during implementation provides insights into how the state maintained its power and influence at all stages. It explains the level of incentive or directives required to prevent defiance and encourage compliance amongst CSOs. Accounting for this element predicts that minimal control measures were required by the state to encourage CSOs to comply, due to the existing power and influence that they have over these actors' access to political spaces in Nigeria.

The use of low control measures in Nigeria prevented the opposition from CSOs, although it limited the extent to which these actors can critique the state, hold it accountable and bring to the political forefront the experiences of women affected by terrorism and extremist violence. In contrast, further exploring the low control measures utilised by the state, highlights that this enabled the government to encourage collaboration between the state and CSOs, the engagement of women affected by extremist violence within policy processes, and innovative approaches to implementing CT/CVE initiatives that align with women's changing security needs. A focus on control in the ACM, suggests that the state adopted high-control strategies to prevent opposition and achieve compliance from CSOs, with the effects of this consisting of closing spaces for CSOs, and the implementation of CT/CVE initiatives that do not respond to women's security needs. Although the three case-studies highlight the applicability of the ACM in providing an understanding of WPS domestic implications, there is a need for greater emphasis on control in the model. Exploring state control across the case-study provides a greater understanding of the tensions between the state and CSOs in Nigeria and the UK and the collaborative relationship that exists between these actors in the Spanish context.

## Chapter Eight: Conclusion

My research journey began with an interest in the implications of violence for women and government responses to such violence. My work as a social work practitioner, who has engaged in practice to support women who are victims of violence, witnessing its short- and long-term implications on their wellbeing, their families, and the wider society, contributed to my interest in this area of research. These practice experiences, including exploring with women some of the factors that contributed to increasing their risks of becoming victims of violence, and discussions with women who have witnessed (and sought asylum in Australia as a result of) extremist violence and extremist threats, further contributed to my interest in understanding the gendered nature of violence, including extremist violence. As government departments fund the programs in which I have engaged, interventions and support provided have occurred in alignment with policies and procedures developed predominantly by state policy actors, some of whom have not had direct front-line experience. Some policies and procedures informing these activities are not reformed immediately to reflect women's changing needs and environmental factors that contribute to making them vulnerable to violence and some programs provide few opportunities for social workers to engage in innovative practice. These factors, and the minimal opportunities provided periodically to front-line practitioners to provide input into how programs and interventions can be reformed, contributes to affect the extent to which practice can be adapted to reflect women's needs and achieve outcomes that reduce their risk to both domestic, family and extremist violence.

As UNSCR 2242 encourages states to recognise civil society's practice experiences and engage these actors as experts in policy and national implementation activities, past practice experiences where opportunities for input at the micro-level are closed to social workers contributed to my interest in understanding how states are engaging such actors at the national level to respond to the impact of extremist violence on women. Evidence suggests that terrorist incidents globally increased by 17% in 2021 due to an increase in political instability and violent conflicts globally, with this impacting civilians, and in particular

women's safety and wellbeing (Institute for Economics and Peace 2022). These factors further increased my interest in the ways that implementation of UNSCR 2242 was occurring in different contexts and whether state governments were engaging or excluding civil society using the same methods and strategies.

Existing research into UNSCR 2242 provides some insights into how states are implementing the resolution or frameworks for understanding the relationships between state actors and civil society during the implementation process. There is a large body of research that focuses on the origins of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda (Bjorkdahl and Selimovic 2019; Barnes 2010; Anderlini 2019) and the ability of women's civil society organisations (CSOs) to gather evidence in the local community contexts to promote and advocate for global responses to the implications that conflict-related violence has on women and their security needs (Cook 2016; Muller 2006). Existing research also highlights CSOs' role in promoting gender mainstreaming within international institutions (ICC 2014; Koomen 2019; Bjorkdahl and Selimovic 2019), and these organisations' ability to utilise their existing relationships with key political figures to encourage the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000. Academic scholarship also provided insights into the increasing violence experienced by women as a result of the activities of terrorist organisations (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015; Usman 2018; Adkins 2016; Bigio and Vogelstein 2019), and the factors which influenced the Spanish government (supported by the United Kingdom (UK) government) to propose UNSCR 2242 at the Security Council (PeaceWomen 2019c).

Unlike the adoption of UNSCR 1325, during which CSOs played a significant role in its adoption at the international level, CSOs played a minimal role in the adoption of UNSCR 2242. As discussed in Chapter Two, previous research has explored the implications of the Resolution in the domestic context (Asante and Shepherd 2020; Shepherd 2020; Ní Aoláin 2016; Aroussi 2021; Martín de Almagro 2018; Asante et al. 2022). There was, however, a lack of research, particularly comparative research, on how states engage CSOs in implementing CT/CVE measures in alignment with the Resolution. This research sought to examine these relationships, drawing on theoretical and conceptual tools from policy studies and public administration.

As this study aimed to address gaps in existing WPS scholarship, the main research that guided the study was: *In what ways, and with what effects, are civil society organizations engaged in the implementation of UNSCR 2242 in Nigeria, the UK and Spain?* The study aimed to understand the methods used by states to engage civil society actors in processes to develop and implement UNSCR 2242 as a policy in the domestic context. It explored the opportunities provided to these organisations, those closed off by the state, and the relationship between the state and CSOs during the implementation process. It also aimed to develop theoretical insights into how states are engaging CSOs in activities to implement UNSCR 2242 as a policy domestically.

Qualitative research methods were adopted to conduct the study to address the research question, as explained in Chapter Three. First, the WPS Agenda was conceptualised as a policy as opposed to a normative framework, although WPS scholarship predominantly refers to the Agenda as a norm, or set of norms (Trojanowska 2020; True and Davies 2017) or a legal framework (Tryggestad 2009; Greenman and Lavers 2019; Appiagyeyi-Atua 2011). Conceptualising the Agenda and its resolutions as domestic policy provided an understanding of the meanings that states attach to the resolution, the procedures developed to operationalise it in the domestic context, the specific tasks developed by states, and the responsibilities assigned to both state and non-state actors (Gerston 2010). Treating WPS as a policy agenda also enabled the application of policy frameworks to explore its implementation. As the study aimed to understand the relationship between the state and CSOs during implementation activities, I adopted Matland's (1995) Ambiguity Conflict Model, which provided four different frameworks for exploring policy implementation while interrogating the levels of ambiguity and conflict that shapes the relationship between implementing actors. The model was applied to analyse 63 surveys and interviews conducted online with civil and state actors in Nigeria, the UK and Spain. Application of the model provided insight into the tensions between some CSOs and state actors during the process and whether the relationship between these actors influenced the engagement of CSOs.

As discussed in Chapters Four through Seven, the initial application of Matland's (1995) ACM, provided some understanding of the levels of ambiguity and conflict that shape the

state and CSOs relationship, although it is not without limitations. The model predicted that, as low ambiguity and conflict is present in Nigeria, *political implementation* may be occurring in the context. Similarly, as high conflict and ambiguity informs activities to implement the resolution in the UK, the model predicts that *symbolic implementation* informs the relationship between the state and CSOs when implementing UNSCR 2242. In contrast, low ambiguity and low conflict predict that *administrative implementation* influenced implementation tasks in Spain. *Political implementation* indicates that “power” (Matland 1995: 163) determines policy outcomes. Although this to some extent reflects the Nigerian context, with state actors determining implementation activities, there is a need to further explore control To understand the factors that contributed to CSOs' willingness to allocate some of their funds to the state despite their opposition to the CT/CVE initiatives proposed by the state. Likewise, in the UK context, *symbolic implementation* proposes that tensions in the local context act as a barrier to policy implementation (Matland 1995: 170). However, further exploration of control suggests that the political context and the actions of the state affect the effective engagement of CSOs and the implementation of the resolution. Similarly, *administrative implementation* proposes that adequate resources determine policy success (Matland 1995: 160), and the exploration of the extent of control that shapes CSOs and the state's relationship, suggests that, resources, willing actors, and collaboration is the key to successful implementation.

As this evidence highlights that the state plays a significant role in determining whether a policy is implemented and the extent that CSOs are engaged, to address this limitation, I propose that there is a need to further explore control in the ACM. Control is conceptualised as *the power to shape the actions and activities of others through actual or threats to impose penalties for nonconformity to proposed measures, policies, and conditions*. As explained in Chapter Seven, in contexts where there are low levels of control, the state adopts measures that limit CSOs' access to information that is external to their allocated tasks, with this limiting their ability to engage in innovative practice or implement interventions that do not align with that informing proposed CT/CVE measures. In contrast, during periods of high conflict, the state significantly restricts CSOs' activities, and access to information and increases surveillance, to prevent any opportunities for the opposition. Surveillance also includes peer scrutiny which promotes competition, and mistrust amongst CSOs and limits

the likelihood of a civil society advocacy coalition that can advocate for greater power and influence over the implementation process.

Exploring control in the Nigerian, the UK and Spain, suggest that there are differences in the ways that state governments are engaging with CSOs, with this significantly determining whether implemented initiatives align with the principles and values that inform the WPS Agenda. Some CSOs are engaged as policy and implementation partners, as evident in Spain. Engaging CSOs in this manner creates opportunities to ensure that CT/CVE initiatives developed reflect the needs of women affected and those at risk of extremist violence and ensures that initiatives developed account for future changes in women's needs and the changing dynamics of extremist violence. These approaches to engagement also create spaces for CSOs to articulate the realities for women within the local context, bring to the political forefront the experiences of these groups, and highlight interventions required and the resources that will enable interventions to be effectively implemented. Such approaches to implementation increase the likelihood of accountability for both state and CSOs and create opportunities for the effective implementation of the WPS resolutions locally.

In contrast, some states are creating spaces for CSOs in implementation processes, initially, as policy actors to encourage CSOs to support the state's CT/CVE process and then later restricting the activities of these actors to implementing and service delivery roles as highlighted in the Nigeria case study. This approach to implementation enables CSOs to articulate to policy actors the impact of extremist violence on women and some of the biopsychosocial factors that increase women's risk of becoming victims, with these creating opportunities for discussion around the interventions that are appropriate to respond to women's needs. However, the exclusion of CSOs from other political processes increases the risks of policy actors excluding measures proposed by CSOs and limits opportunities for accountability as evident in Nigeria. This increases the likelihood that CSOs will be unaware of the short- and long-term implications of finalised interventions on their activities and that of women and reduces the spaces created for these actors to advocate for funding or reform of interventions to align with women's needs. As indicated by CSOs and policy actors in the Nigerian context, this significantly limits the effective implementation of WPS resolutions at the domestic level, as it increases CSOs' willingness to accept interventions proposed by the state that do not align with the principles of WPS, due to fear of the repercussions of

opposition, such as the closure of future political and implementation opportunities. Acceptance of limiting interventions prevents the best outcomes for women and can contribute to increasing the exposure of women at risk and local civil society implementors whose interventions contradicts the state's ideology, with this increasing the risks of these stakeholders' becoming victims of extremist violence and state sanctions.

Evidence from the UK context indicates that some states are restricting CSO's capability to engage in the meaningful implementation of the WPS Agenda, by restricting these actors' activities to implementation. Selectively engaging some CSOs within consultation activities, limits opportunities for innovation, and the ability of the state to be presented with evidence of the experiences of women from different parts of the state. As this contributes to a 'one-size fits all' approach to implementation, there is little consideration for the cultural, religious, and environmental factors that contribute to making some groups of women more susceptible to extremist violence and closes opportunities for innovative interventions that responds to and aligns with the unique needs of communities. Engagement of some CSOs and the exclusion of others (particularly those operating at the local levels) contributes to the exclusion of local expertise and as evident in the UK context, contributes to the development of interventions that targets some groups of women, disempower, and fails to adequately respond to the needs of others. As selective engagement of CSOs also limits opportunities for developing innovative interventions, this significantly leads to the development of and implementation of a perceived 'best-practice' CT/CVE model that achieves little outcomes for women and acts as a barrier to the effective domestic implementation of WPS resolutions.

Findings further reinforce the need to account for the level of control imposed by the state when implementing the WPS Agenda, to better understand state-civil society relationships, the measures proposed and excluded, and the factors that contribute to determining whether implemented measures are likely to succeed or fail to achieve its intended purpose. Exploring control when analysing the three case studies suggests that the objectives of the WPS Agenda are likely to be effectively translated to the domestic context successfully implemented under certain conditions only, such as those found in Spain. Characterised by low ambiguity and low conflict, enhanced by further analysis of the element of control, the conditions of implementation in the Spanish context encourage collaboration, accountability, innovation,

adequate resourcing of programs and interventions, and a collective responsibility amongst both state and non-state actors to achieve the best outcome for women at risk of extremist violence. This implementation approach also creates spaces for reform to ensure that programs continue to develop, and aligns with the principles of the WPS Agenda whilst responding to changing needs of women in real-time.

Furthermore, the thesis not only contributes a wealth of empirical evidence that shows how some UN member states are implementing UNSCR 2242 within their domestic policy frameworks, as evident in the case studies, but also provides insights into the different ways that CSOs are engaged and excluded, and thus contributes new knowledge into the relationship between state governments and CSOs during implementation activities. By highlighting that greater exploration of control in the ACM is required to improve scholarly understanding of implementation dynamics, this research enriches analysis of the relationships between civil society and government actors. This in turn provides WPS scholars greater insights into how UNSCR 2242 and other WPS resolutions will be implemented domestically by other UN member states and the barriers to successful implementation. The model also highlights how states are integrating international norms and frameworks as domestic policies, with this contributing to an increased understanding of the localisation of WPS resolutions globally.

These findings have key implications for WPS scholars, practitioners, and policy actors. Conceptualising WPS as a policy provided insights into the specific tasks allocated to actors, the responsibilities, procedures, and initiatives that states adopt to implement UNSCR 2242. This highlights the need for understanding the reproduction of norms in policies in the domestic context to accurately capture the levels of control that inform the translation, reproduction, and implementation of WPS resolutions within a specific context, and the relationship between state and CSOs during the process. Understanding these factors provides insights into the extent to which the state may engage CSOs to ensure that proposed and implemented initiatives prevent violence, protect right, responds to women's recovery needs, and empower them as active stakeholders in reducing their risks of extremist violence. The reproduction of WPS as policy and greater exploration of control further explain how states are reinforcing WPS principles locally and provide a model to measure and evaluate whether

states are meeting their commitments to the Agenda. As further exploring control in the ACM helps to predict implementation outcomes, the model enables WPS scholars, practitioners, and policy actors to forecast some of the barriers to successful implementation. This creates opportunities for the development of strategies to resolve the obstacles to the domestic fulfillment of WPS. Despite this, future research should further account for control in the ACM when applying the framework to explain WPS implementation activities and the relationship between state and non-state actors during the process in other countries. Further exploration of control in the ACM when analysing other WPS contexts will provide greater clarity in understanding the effectiveness of the model in explaining how other UN member states are engaging CSOs and the effects that this has on the outcomes of WPS domestic implementation.

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# Appendix 1: CSOs Survey Questions

## Questionnaire for Civil Society Front-Line Staff

\* Required

1. Please indicate that you have read the information sheet and consent to participation in the study. \*

*Check all that apply.*

I have read the information sheet

Questions about your organization.

2. Which country is your organisation located in?

\_\_\_\_\_

3. Which organisation do you work for?

\_\_\_\_\_

4. What is your organisation size?

*Mark only one oval.*

Under 10 staff

11-30 staff

31-100 staff

Over 100 staff

5. What is your role in your organisation?

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6. Does your organisation receive government funding?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

7. Please list the activities that your organization provides.

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**Adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242**

8. Did you or anyone in your organization engage in activities aimed at encouraging the government to adopt and/ or align its counter-terrorism/counter-violent extremism (CT/CVE) initiatives with the UNSCR 2242 and the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda more broadly?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes.

No

9. If you answered yes to the previous question, please provide details of the activities.

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10. Why do you think your government has adopted the UNSCR 2242 as part of its National WPS plan? Please provide details.

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11. Were you or anyone in your organization formally informed by the state after UNSCR 2242 was adopted as part of the country's NAP?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

12. If you answered 'NO' to the previous question, please explain how you became aware and whether you believe the government should have formally informed your organization.

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Translation and Implementation of UNSCR 2242.

13. Did the government request your organization to provide expert advise on women's security needs in relation to CT/CVE either before or after the adoption of UNSCR 2242?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

14. If you answered 'YES' to the previous question, Please provide details.

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15. Do you believe adequate time was given to provide expert advise?

*Mark only one oval.*

1      2      3      4      5

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Insufficient time      Sufficient time

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16. If the government did not request expert advice from your organization, do you believe they should have? Why? Why not?

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17. Were you or anyone in your organisation given opportunities to participate in the process of aligning national CT/CVE initiatives with the provisions and principles of the WPS agenda?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

18. Please provide details on your response to the previous question?

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19. If you answered 'YES' to your organisation's involvement in processes to align CT/CVE measures with the WPS agenda, do you believe your organisation's level of involvement was adequate?

*Mark only one oval.*

	1	2	3	4	5	
Inadequate	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Adequate

20. If your organisation did not participate, do you believe your organisation should have been involved in the process? Please provide details.

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21. Did you or anyone in your organisation contribute to the development of goals for CT/CVE initiatives which align with the WPS agenda?

*Mark only one oval.*

- Yes
- No

22. Please provide details on your response to the previous question.

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23. If you answered 'YES' to your organisation's involvement in the development of goals, please indicate the level of involvement in the process.

*Mark only one oval.*

	1	2	3	4	5	
Minimal Participation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Full Participation

24. Do you believe your organisation should have been involved in the process, if they did not participate? Please provide details.

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25. Did you or anyone in your organisation participate in the design and development of CT/CVE initiatives which align with the WPS agenda?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

26. Please provide details on your response to the previous question.

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27. If you answered 'YES' to your organisation's involvement in the design process, please indicate the level of involvement in the process.

*Mark only one oval.*

1      2      3      4      5

Minimal involvement      Full involvement

28. Do you believe your organisation should have been involved in the process, if opportunities to participate were not presented? Please provide details.

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29. Did you or anyone in your organisation participate in the government's process to develop a budget plan for CT/CVE measures informed by the WPS agenda?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

30. Please provide details on your response to the previous question.

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31. If your organisation did participate in the budget development process, please indicate the level of involvement.

*Mark only one oval.*

1      2      3      4      5

Minimal Involvement      Full Involvement

32. Do you believe your organisation should have been involved in the process, if they did not participate? Please provide details.

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33. Did you or your organisation participate in decisions regarding the community-based CT/CVE programs and initiatives to be implemented?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

34. Please provide details on your response to the previous question.

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35. If you answered 'YES' to your organisation's involvement in decision making regarding community CT/CVE initiatives, please indicate the level of participation in the process.

*Mark only one oval.*

	1	2	3	4	5	
Minimal Participation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Full Participation

36. If your organisation was not involved in the process, do you believe this opportunity should have been extended to your organisation? Please provide details.

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37. Did you or anyone in your organisation participate in decisions in regards to CT/CVE monitoring measures to be implemented to determine the effectiveness of CT/CVE initiatives in addressing women's security needs?

*Mark only one oval.*

- Yes  
 No

38. Please provide details on your response to the previous question.

*Mark only one oval.*

- Yes  
 No

39. If you answered 'YES' to your organisation's involvement in CT/CVE monitoring activities, please indicate the level of participation in the process.

*Mark only one oval.*

	1	2	3	4	5	
Minimal Involvement	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Full Involvement

40. If your organisation did not participate, do you believe your organisation should have been involved in the process? Please provide details.

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41. Did you or anyone in your organisation participate in the implementation of CT/CVE initiatives informed by the WPS agenda?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

42. Please provide details on your response to the previous question.

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43. If you answered 'YES' to your organisation's involvement in implementation activities, please indicate the level of participation in the process.

*Mark only one oval.*

1      2      3      4      5

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Minimal Involvement      Full Involvement

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44. Do you believe your organisation should have been involved in the process, if they did not participate? Please provide details.

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45. Did you or anyone in your organisation participate in processes to enhance women's role and participation in CT/CVE activities in your country?

*Mark only one oval.*

Yes

No

46. Please provide details on your response to the previous question.

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47. If you answered 'YES' to your organisation's involvement in activities to enhance women's participation in CT/CVE activities, please indicate the level of involvement in the process.

*Mark only one oval.*

1      2      3      4      5

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Minimal Involvement      Full Involvement

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48. Do you believe your organisation should have been involved in the process, if they did not participate? Please provide details.

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49. Do you believe your country's CT/CVE measures adequately recognises and create opportunities for women's leadership in CT/CVE? Please explain?

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50. Do you believe a partnership between the state and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) is required to effectively implement CT/CVE measures informed by WPS principles? Please provide details.

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51. Do you believe the circumstances which led to the alignment of national CT/CVE measures with the WPS agenda, had an impact on your organisation's level of involvement within the implementation process? Please provide details.

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52. Thankyou for your time. Please indicate that you are consenting to the submission of these responses. \*

*Check all that apply.*

I consent.

# Appendix 2: WPS Civil Society Actors Interview Questions



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**National Implementation of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Violent Extremism Initiatives in relation to the Women Peace and Security Agenda.**

## **INTERVIEW: CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS**

### Semi-structured interview

By conducting these interviews, I aim to gain an in-depth insight into civil society organisations' experiences and roles within government processes of adopting and implementing Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Violent Extremism (CT/CVE) initiatives which align with the principles and provision of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.

I will use the following questions to guide the interview:

- What organisation do you work for and what is your role within the organisation?
- What type of activities which relate to women peace and security or counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism does your organisation engage in?
- The Nigerian government adopted the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242 within its 2017-2020 National Women Peace and Security Action Plan. This resolution recognises women and civil society's role as key counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism actors. What is your perception of the factors which led the government to adopt resolution 2242?
- Did you or anyone in your organisation provide the government expert advice on the impact of terrorism and violent extremism on women or how best to align the nation's CT/CVE measures with the principles of resolution 2242?
- Did you or anyone in your organisation participate in the design, development and/or implementation of CT/CVE measures which are informed by resolution 2242 and the WPS agenda more broadly?
- What is your perception of your organisation's level of involvement within state processes to implement CT/CVE measures in alignment with the WPS agenda?

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Any further questions asked during the interview will be based on the responses that you provide. For instance, asking you to elaborate and or provide specific examples.

# Appendix 3: WPS State Actors Interview Questions



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## **SAMPLE INTERVIEW: WPS STATE ACTORS**

### Semi-structured interview

The semi-structured interview questions will be modified to reflect the position held by each individual within their organisation. The aim of the interview is to gain narratives about WPS policy-actors' perception of the role and contribution made by Civil Society Organisations to the process of adopting, translating and implementing WPS principles as outlined in UNSCR 2242 into domestic CT/CVE measures. The following questions will guide the interview:

- What is your role in the organisation and in the process of adopting the principles of UNSCR 2242 domestically?
- What are some of the factors which have contributed to decisions to adopt or align national CT/CVE initiatives with the WPS agenda?
- Are there opportunities and roles available for other stakeholders to be involved in the process of translating and integrating the principles of UNSCR 2242 into CT/CVE initiatives?
- What are the benefits and risks of other stakeholders participating within processes to adopt, translate and implement WPS principles into CT/CVE measures?
- Are there any perceived future changes to how stakeholders are to participate in the implementation of CT/CVE measures informed by the WPS agenda?