

**The Making of Modern
Indonesian Intellectuals:
The Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and
Democratic Socialist Ideas, 1930s to mid-1970s**

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Sydney

by

Pradipto Niwandhono

**Department of Indonesian Studies,
School of Language and Cultures
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences**

2021

CERTIFICATION

I, Pradipto Niwandhono, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the Department of Indonesian Studies, University of Sydney, is fully my original work. This document does not contain any material previously published or written by any other persons except those acknowledged as references in this study. This thesis has not been submitted for any other degree or other purposes.

Pradipto Niwandhono

September 2021

Abstract

This thesis examines the intellectual aspects of socialism in Indonesia—and democratic socialism in particular—by focusing on three figures in the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI): Sutan Sjahrir, Soedjatmoko and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Through analysing articles and the writings of these key figures, this study shows how democratic socialist thought evolved from the nationalist movement period in the 1930s to the rise of the New Order developmental state in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The origin of Indonesia's democratic socialist movement stemmed from intellectuals and the study-club network connected to Sjahrir; specifically, in the context of the struggle against fascism and colonial conservatism. Rejecting both the mainstream nationalists' obsession with unity and Marxist-Leninist notions of class struggle, the democratic socialists established the democratic transformation of Indonesian society as the ultimate goal of national liberation. They sought to achieve this transformation through anti-feudal modernisation. Some of the most significant contributions of democratic socialism were through establishing parliamentary democracy and the multi-party system in the 1950s, as well as modernising technocratic intellectuals, who played a major role in socioeconomic development planning. While the PSI was short-lived as a party, and its aim of establishing a welfare state based on the principles of economic democracy was hindered by the rise of authoritarian regimes, it created an intellectual tradition that has endured to the present day.

Keywords

Democratic Socialism, Development, Intellectuals, Marxism, Nationalism.

Acknowledgments

My initial idea for this project was based on my perception that the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and its leader, Sutan Sjahrir, while familiar to Western scholars of Indonesia, constituted one of the least-understood streams in the Indonesian intellectual tradition. Making socialism the framework to analyse the intellectual development of the PSI was a challenging task, due to my initial unfamiliarity with Marxist political economy. I am indebted to many people for building my knowledge, and becoming good discussion partners and sources of inspiration. My gratitude is especially dedicated to Professor Adrian Vickers as my principal supervisor, for his great patience in directing my research work and for sharing his enormous reference library.

My access to sources and ability to carry out interviews has, unfortunately, been severely hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic.

I would like to acknowledge the following people who contributed to this research or influenced my thinking. To my proof-reader Jessica Cox for her thoroughness in editing this thesis manuscript. Max Lane, for discussions on leftist topics of Indonesian history; Farabi Fakhri, my long-time friend from Gadjah Mada University, whose Leiden dissertation on the managerial-technocratic state was one of the early inspirations for this study; Klaas Stutje and Olaf Oudhuisden, for sharing some early sources on Hatta and Sjahrir during their time in Holland; Keith Foulcher for the discussion on PSI-related cultural activism; Airlangga Pribadi and Tarli Nugroho, for connecting me to PSI-related individuals in Jakarta; Agustanzil 'Ibong' Sjahroezah and the Pendidikan Sosialis Indonesia (PSI-Pendidikan) community, for their enlightening discussions and relentless efforts to revive democratic socialism in post-authoritarian Indonesia. I thank my closest friends during my study time in Sydney: Dyah Pitaloka, Wayan Jarrah Sastrawan, Iskandar Nugraha, David Reeve, and Siobhan Campbell and her husband Jumaadi. Also, my friends from the LPDP–USyd scholarship community, including Arum Budiastuti, Basiswanto Wiratama and many others. To my colleagues in the Department of History, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya—Prof. Purnawan

Basundoro, Sarkawi Husain, Johny Khusyairi and others—I thank you for your support, which was so helpful.

Last but not least, I thank my family, whose support and encouragement in such a difficult time of was essential in keeping me on track to accomplish my study. For my late parents—Harsono Reksodirdjo and Sri Rukmini Dewi—and for my little family—my beloved wife Retno Hetri, my daughter Akshita and my little son Alfarabi—your presence in my life is a priceless treasure.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgments	ii
Abbreviations and Acronyms	vi
Introduction	1
CHAPTER 1	
Intellectuals and Socialism in Indonesia: A Genealogical Sketch	8
Socialism and Intellectuals	10
Indigenous and Islamic Roots of Indonesian Socialism	16
Western Socialism	20
The Communist Party	27
Marhaenism and Marxist Nationalism	34
Democratic Socialism	43
PART I	
THE PARTY AND THE MOVEMENT	47
CHAPTER 2	
The Intellectual Roots of Indonesian Democratic Socialism: Anticolonialism and Modernism	48
The Rise of the Middle-Class Intelligentsia	48
Anticolonial Political Parties: PI and PNI-Pendidikan	52
Cultural Nationalism vis-a-vis Modernism	65
Dutch Orientalists and Indonesian Collectivism	71
<i>Pudjanga Baru</i> and Modernism	74
Anti-Fascism and Democratic Transformation	77
CHAPTER 3	
The Rise and Fall of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), 1945–1960	85
The Early Socialist Party and Its Disintegration	87
The PSI: Internal Structure and Ideological Orientation	96

The PSI during the Early Constitutional Democracy Period	102
Indonesian and Third World Socialism	109
Election and Early Disintegration	114
Opposition To ‘Guided Democracy’: The PRRI Revolt	119
PART II	
FIGURES AND IDEAS	128
CHAPTER 4	
Sutan Sjahrir: The Ideologue of Indonesian Democratic Socialism	129
Reflections from Exile	136
Between the Struggle and Diplomacy	143
Democratic Socialism for Indonesia	150
Opposing Guided Democracy	159
CHAPTER 5	
Socialist Economic Planning: Sumitro and the Technocrats	165
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo: The Personal Background	167
Breaking Economic Dualism: Sumitro’s Development Plan	171
The Rise of the Technocratic State	179
Towards State Capitalism: Nationalisation and Guided Economy	187
Economic Development and Its Critics	193
CHAPTER 6	
Towards a Humanitarian Development: The Ideas of Soedjatmoko	200
The Making of an Intellectual and Diplomat	201
Soedjatmoko and Cultural Activism	209
Intellectuals and Politics	217
Social Sciences and the Developmental State	222
Conclusion	232
Bibliography	237
Primary Sources	237
Secondary Sources	241

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASC	Asian Socialist Conference
AVB	<i>Algemeene Volkscredietbank</i> (General Bank of People's Credit)
Baperpi	<i>Badan Permusyawaratan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Student Deliberative Body)
Bappenas	<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i> (National Development Planning Board)
<i>Bineksos</i>	Indonesian Society for the Advancement of Economics and Social Sciences
BPM	Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (Batavian Oil Company)
BTI	<i>Barisan Tani Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Peasant Front)
BU	<i>Budi Utomo</i> (Noble Mind)
BUMN	<i>Badan Usaha Milik Negara</i> (State-owned Enterprise)
CCF	Congress for Cultural Freedom
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
Comintern	Communist International
CPN	<i>Communistische Partij Nederland</i> (Netherlands' Communist Party)
CSIS	Centre of Strategic and International Studies
Depernas	<i>Dewan Perancang Nasional</i> (National Planning Council)
FDR	<i>Front Demokrasi Rakyat</i> (People's Democratic Front)
FE-UI	Faculty of Economics, Universitas Indonesia
FNS	<i>Friedrich Naumann Stiftung</i> (Friedrich Naumann Foundation)
GAPI	<i>Gabungan Politik Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Political Union)
Gemsos	<i>Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis</i> (Socialist Student Movement)
Gerindo	<i>Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia</i> (Indonesian People's Movement)

GOC	Good Office Committee
GRR	<i>Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat</i> (People's Revolution Movement)
GTI	<i>Gerakan Tani Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Peasants' Movement)
IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPKI	<i>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> (Association of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence)
ISDV	<i>Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging</i> (Indies Social Democratic Association)
ISEI	<i>Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Economic Scholars' Association)
IVSV	<i>Indonesische Vrouwen Studenten Vereeniging</i> (Indonesian Female Student Association)
KAMI	<i>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Students Action Group)
KBSI	<i>Kongres Buruh Seluruh Indonesia</i> (All-Indonesia Labour Congress)
KLM	Royal Dutch Airlines
KNIP	<i>Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat</i> (Central National Indonesian Committee)
Lekra	<i>Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat</i> (People's Cultural Association)
LP3ES	<i>Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial</i> (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and Information)
LPEM	<i>Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat</i> (Institute of Economics and Social Research)
LSE	London School of Economics
Manipol	<i>Manifesto Politik</i> (Political Manifesto)
Masjumi	<i>Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia</i> (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Munap	<i>Musyawarah Pembangunan Nasional</i> (National Development Congress)
Munas	<i>Musyawarah Nasional</i> (National Congress)
NU	<i>Nahdatul Ulama</i> (The Council of Religious Scholars)
OSP	<i>Onafhankelijke Socialistische Partij</i> (Independent Socialist Party)
PARI	<i>Partai Republik Indonesia</i> (Party of the Republic of Indonesia)
Parindra	<i>Partai Indonesia Raya</i> (Great Indonesia Party)
Partindo	<i>Partai Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Party)
PBI	<i>Partai Bangsa Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Nations' Party)
PBI	<i>Partai Buruh Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Labour Party)
PDRI	Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia
<i>Permesta</i>	<i>Piagam Perjuangan Semesta</i> (Charter of the Common Struggle)
Permi	<i>Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Muslim Union)
PI	Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association)
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Communist Party)
PNI	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Party)
PNI-Pendidikan (or PNI-Baru)	<i>Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Education)
PNI-Staatpartij	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i> (State Party)
PP	<i>Persatuan Perjuangan</i> (Union of Struggle)
PPKI	Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence)
PPPI	<i>Perhimpunan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Students Association)
PPPKI	<i>Pemufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia</i> (Federation of Indonesian National Political Associations)
PRRI	<i>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia</i> (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
PS	Socialist Party (<i>Partai Sosialis</i>)

PSI	<i>Partai Sosialis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Socialist Party)
PSII	<i>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Islamic League Party)
RIS	<i>Republik Indonesia Serikat</i> (Republic of the United States of Indonesia)
Roepi	<i>Roekoen Peladjar Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Student League)
RUSI	Republic of the United States of Indonesia
SDAP	<i>Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij</i> (Social Democratic Workers Party)
SDB	<i>Sociaal-Democratische Bond</i> (Social Democratic League)
SDI	<i>Sarekat Dagang Islam</i> (Islamic Commercial Association)
SDP	<i>Sociaal Democratische Partij</i>
Seskoad	<i>Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat</i> (Army Staff and Command School)
SI	<i>Sarekat Islam</i> (Islamic Association/Islamic League)
SI	Socialist International
Sibar	<i>Sarekat Indonesia Baru</i> (New Indonesia League)
SOBSI	<i>Serikat Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia</i> (All-Indonesia Union of Labour Organisation)
SPD	Social Democratic Party (Germany)
STOVIA	Dutch Indies Medical School
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
UI	Universitas Indonesia
USI	<i>Unitas Studiosorum Indonesiensis</i> (United Indonesian Students Association)
UU	<i>Penanaman Modal Asing</i> (Foreign Capital Investment Bill)
UUPA	<i>Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria</i> (Agrarian Principal Law)
VOC	Dutch East Indian Company
VSTP	<i>Vereniging op Spoor en Tramwegpersoneel</i> (Union of Railway and Tramway Workers)

Introduction

Socialism in Indonesia, as a system of ideas, still occupies a minor position in Indonesian historiography and among Indonesian scholars of history. Anti-communism has prevented us from understanding the true significance of socialism. This study, therefore, will focus on the intellectual aspects of socialism in Indonesia, particularly the democratic socialist current embodied by the Indonesian Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, PSI), and its key figures, from the 1930s until the mid-1970s. The central argument of this thesis is that socialism in Indonesia manifested itself in two distinct forms: as an anti-colonial ideology, through its Marxist critique of imperialism; and as a modernist and progressive ideology represented by the anti-feudal and more democratic and humanitarian interpretations of Marxism. This Marxist anti-colonialism was represented by the Partai Nasionalis Indonesia-Pendidikan and the Partai Sosialis (PS) as progenitors of the PSI. While the PSI was much in common with the Indonesian Communist Party or PKI in their anti-imperialist and anti-feudal character, the two were opposed in their response to Marxian doctrines of class struggle. By and large, the PSI and its related intellectual milieu stood for modernist democratic socialism, divided into the liberal-humanitarian ideas of Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966) and the Fabian-inspired, technocratic approach of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917–2001). The moderate figure of Soedjatmoko (1922–1989) represented the middle path, since he had been a humanist, social thinker and close associate of Sjahrir, while also serving as a development ‘technocrat’ under the Guided Democracy and New Order regimes. Throughout its short history, the party gradually moved away from Marxism to a more reformist and bourgeois-based democratic socialism with little reference to class struggle and a strong anti-communist character.

How should the study of the PSI and democratic socialism be placed within the Indonesian historiographical framework? So far, democratic socialism has been little studied as a distinctive ideological school separate from the major themes of Marxism-Leninism or the history of communism in Indonesia. There are four major works

relating to the PSI and Sjahrir: the dissertation of Robert J. Myers, and the monographs of Jeanne Mintz, John D. Legge and Rudolf Mrázek.¹ Myers's work, a contemporary political study making extensive use of PSI archives and newspapers, is the only one that discusses the PSI's organisational aspects and activities in detail. Because it is relatively inaccessible, this study remains almost unknown. Mintz showed that, as well as class-struggle-based socialism imported from the West, which dominated anti-colonial discourses, ideological stimuli were derived from 'indigenous traditions' of custom-based collectivism and Islamic teachings. Democratic socialist currents remained peripheral to her work, because she aimed to explain the roots of Indonesian socialism as interpreted and propagated under first President Sukarno's (1901–1970) Guided Democracy regime. Despite its limitations, this study was the earliest account to mention the PSI regarding broader socialist movements in Indonesia. Legge's and Mrázek's works are the most accessible Western scholarship on the PSI in Indonesia. However, they do not discuss socialism primarily but, rather, are studies of Indonesian intellectual groups and intellectual biography. Mrázek's biographical work on Sjahrir—which is this study's starting point—presents Sjahrir's extensive contemplation of Western ideas, of which Marxism was one of the most important.

Most studies related to the PSI focus on two broad themes or perspectives: the study of modernising intellectuals in Indonesia, and (more historically specific) the study of Indonesia in the 1950s, during the period of postcolonial democratic transformation. Both are indebted to Herb Feith's study of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, which raised the distinction between 'solidarity maker' (charismatic leaders who brought groups together) politicians and state administrator intellectuals.² His emphasis on the 1950s, as a period dominated politically by state administrators, implies its importance as being formative for the intellectual or technocratic class in Indonesia.


¹ Robert J. Myers, *The Development of the Indonesian Socialist Party*, (PhD Thesis University of Chicago, 1959); Jeanne S. Mintz, *Mohammed, Marx, Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism* (London/Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1965); J.D. Legge, *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the following recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in occupation Jakarta* (New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1988); Rudolf Mrázek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (Ithaca/New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1994).

² Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962) [re-printed Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007].

This period was not only characterised by the implementation of a parliamentary democratic system and competition between political parties, but also by the search for Indonesia's national identity and position among world cultures.³ Ultimately, Indonesian democratic socialists are mostly depicted as modernising intellectuals and democratic socialism is commonly interpreted as the main driving force for political democratisation, rather than an ideal to create a socialist society.

The intellectual aspects of democratic socialism in Indonesia involve several issues. First, how are democratic socialist-related ideas represented by the anti-colonial movement and its earlier figures? Note that not all figures associated with the PSI or democratic socialism in Indonesia generated ideas derived from socialism/Marxism. Second, how did the democratic socialist movement play a role in forming an intellectual network? Here, it is important to understand intellectuals and cadre networks in forming the socialist party. Third, how did democratic socialist-related figures contribute to the diverse—either political-economic or socio-cultural—ideas surrounding postcolonial development? Within these main questions, this thesis divides into six chapters, as described in the following chart.

³ Jennifer Lindsay & Maya H.T. Liem (ed), *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesia 1950-1965* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012). For a shorter discussion on the 1950s, see Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Indonesia in the 1950s: Nation, modernity, and the postcolonial state", *Bijdragen voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* Vol. 167, No. 4 (2011), pp. 386–404.



Chapter 1 explains the intellectual genealogy of Indonesian socialist/Marxist movements, and how they connect to transnational socialist and anticolonial movements. Because this study focuses on the ideas of intellectuals in the socialist movement, this chapter will look at theories of intellectuals according to socialist/Marxist perspectives as well as the role of intellectuals in underdeveloped, colonised nations. Alongside its Western Marxist roots, socialism in Indonesia was inspired from indigenous collectivist traditions living in village communities, as well as Islamic views on social justice. As part of the broader phenomenon of Asian pre-capitalist society, the Marxian concept of class struggle in Indonesia only functioned within an anti-colonial context, which equated the power relationship between the metropole/coloniser and colony/colonised people with bourgeoisie-proletariat relations. This chapter will review variants of Indonesian socialism to clarify the democratic socialist movement's position among other forms of socialism. Hereafter, the thesis will be divided into two parts. The first part will deal with ideological developments that shaped the democratic socialist movement, while the second will focus on the development of ideas from the PSI's main figures.

Chapter 2 discusses the intellectual roots of democratic socialism in the phase of anticolonial struggle, before the Socialist Party was established. It explores the anti-colonial origin of socialism in the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI) and Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (PNI-Pendidikan) movements. This chapter will trace the Marxist influence on Indonesian student activists in the Netherlands, as well as their involvement in anticolonial internationalism. At that time, what shaped the political stance of the future democratic socialist current was their conflict with international communism, on one side, and the cultural nationalist elements of Indonesian nationalism, on the other. This chapter focuses on the earlier phase of Sjahrir's ideas, providing a broad picture of the intellectual debates between the modernist political nationalists and cultural nationalists. The ideological divide between Parindra (*Partai Indonesia Raya*, or the Greater Indonesia Party) and Gerindo (*Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia*) and the polemics of the *Pudjangga Baru* cultural group, more or less represented the trend. The two camps also differed in their attitudes towards the question of fascism. Eventually, a common

anti-fascist stance and commitment to democratic transformation as the main goal of national independence were the determining factors in forming Sjahrir's democratic socialist group.

Chapter 3 provides background to the development of PSI intellectual thoughts, which will be discussed in the later chapters of the thesis. It outlines organisational aspects of the PSI and its predecessor, Partai Sosialis (PS), from December 1945 until the PSI's dissolution in August 1960, due to the PRRI's (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) revolt in Sumatra. The PSI started as an anti-fascist movement that united Marxists and socialists through the alliance of Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin (1907–1948). In the situation of the Cold War, another communist–socialist division resulted in the PSI forming as a separate party. The Cold War changed the party's ideological orientation from Marxist-Leninism to democratic socialism. In 1953, the first Asian Socialist Conference (ASC) brought a shift in the party's inclination towards Third World socialism, and a greater awareness of postcolonial development. In the realm of practical politics, the need for electoral achievement in the 1955 general election also altered the PSI's orientation, from being an elitist cadre party to a more pragmatic one. This could be seen by the party's effort to establish stronger ties with trade unions and underlying social movements.

Chapter 4 is the core chapter of this thesis. It discusses the development of Sjahrir's thinking from the 1930s to the Guided Democracy era in the early 1960s. Sjahrir's thinking did not always represent socialist ideas, but it had a continuous thread in the ideals of human liberation, based on opposing oppression and totalitarianism. There were at least three distinct periods in the progress of his ideas: (1) the movement and exile period, represented by his reflections on Eastern and Western thoughts, as well as his critical views on cultural nationalism; (2) the occupation and Revolutionary era marked by his *Perdjoeangan Kita* pamphlet, which called for the cleansing of revolutionary leadership from its feudal and fascist elements; and (3) the PSI era and its aftermath. During the time, Sjahrir's texts increasingly highlighted the nuances of anti-communism and his opposition to the PKI in particular, which he regarded as an extension of the political interest of totalitarian Stalinist Russia. After the Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) revolt and disbanding of the PSI, his writings

tended to criticise the politics of Sukarno's Guided Democracy, which had led to economic decline, and called for a better planning of national economic development.

Chapter 5 concerns the technocratic approach to economic planning as exemplified by Sumitro and his economic expert followers, such as Mohammad Sadli, Widjojo Nitisastro and Sarbini Sumawinata. This was later established as a distinct stream of thought independent from the inner circle of Sjahrir-ist democratic socialists. This analysis begins with Sumitro's initial concern to overcome economic dualism through accelerated industrialisation. His shift from Dutch administration to American scientific management and developmental thought was important in formulating his economic development plan.

The last chapter, Chapter 6, focuses on Soedjatmoko and his contribution to socio-cultural (non-economic) aspects of Indonesian development planning. As an intellectual, Soedjatmoko occupied a unique position connecting the 'humanitarian' wing of PSI. This was represented by the *Konfrontasi* journal and cultural activism of former members of Pudjangga Baru and Gelanggang groups, as well as the technocratic milieu of Sumitro and his associates. As a moderate figure, however, he was also one of the few PSI intellectuals who survived persecution during the Guided Democracy regime, due to his connections with Sukarno. Soedjatmoko's broader interests in social sciences and his diplomatic activities also contributed to Western scholarship and the intellectual construction of Indonesia as a developing country.

CHAPTER 1

Intellectuals and Socialism in Indonesia: A Genealogical Sketch

Prior to the New Order regime's restriction on any ideas related to Marxism, socialist-related thought was central to Indonesian political discourse. At the peak of its prominence in the early Independence period—from the 1950s to mid-1960s—socialism was an idea on which almost all Indonesians agreed. As the first Indonesian prime minister and founder of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), Sutan Sjahrir, once argued:

[A]mong the many political parties in present day Indonesia, there is not one party that does not express its sympathies for a socialist and collectivist society, nor is there any party today that advocates unlimited free economic enterprise or free competition. We in Indonesia are all socialists, or at least, socialistically inclined.¹

Socialist ideas became prominent during the anti-colonial struggle for national independence, which associated Western imperialism with needing capital to expand and the capitalist economy's exploitative nature. This association was not exclusive to Indonesia, but a postcolonial 'Third World' phenomenon.

Socialism was, by no means, a single homogenous idea; there were various currents of socialism in Indonesia. As Kevin Fogg has shown, socialism in Indonesia has been complex, self-contradictory and lacking in clarity. Particularly, it was one of the pillars of national ideology before being banned after the alleged communist coup attempt in 1965.² Socialism in Indonesia was best represented by economic ideas, either

¹ Sutan Sjahrir, *Indonesian Socialism* (Rangoon: Asian Socialist Publishing House, 1956), pp. 30–31.

² Kevin W. Fogg, "Indonesian Socialism of the 1950s: From Ideology to Rhetoric", *Third World Quarterly* Vol 42 No 3, 2020, pp. 465–466.

expressed in the Constitution of 1945, which prioritised the collectivist principle of economic enterprises (as exemplified by the cooperative movement), or the policy of economic ‘nationalisation’ and development planning during the 1950s. All parties advocated some limitations on free-market capitalism, arguing for economic policies that prioritised social justice. Some socialist economic policies were drawn from Marxist ideas, but Indonesian politicians rarely embraced Marxism outright. The PSI, with its democratic socialist principles, clearly employed the method of analysis used by Marx and Engels on the development and organisation of capitalism. Eventually, however, it abandoned all references to ‘class struggle’ and regarded Marxism ‘not as a political credo, but one of the tools for the solution of many problems.’³ Furthermore, Islamic parties strongly repudiated Marxism due to its materialist and atheistic nature, since they regarded Islamic doctrine as the best manifestation of ‘(religious) socialism’.

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was the only strictly Marxist political group. In spite of its significant mass support, indicated by the 1955 general election, the PKI was temporarily isolated after the 1948 Madiun revolt. The communists advocated abolishing ‘feudalism’ by agrarian reform and land redistribution, but this radical action only sharpened polarisation between sociocultural currents (*aliran*) of Javanese rural communities. As noted by Fogg, many of the more concrete economic and political manifestations of socialism were soon replaced by a more rhetorical ‘Indonesian socialism’ (*sosialisme Indonesia*) co-opted by Sukarno in the Guided Democracy era.⁴ His concept was ‘simultaneously devoid of details and incredibly demanding, calling on all loyal Indonesians to dedicate themselves entirely to a just and prosperous society’.⁵ At that time, one of the most bizarre phenomena in Indonesian politics was the restriction and dissolution of the socialist party by a regime claiming to be based on ‘Indonesian socialism.’

³ Sjahrir (1956), p. 48.

⁴ For Guided Democracy interpretation of socialism in Indonesia, see Roeslan Abdulgani, *Perkembangan Tjita-tjita Sosialisme di Indonesia, Kuliah Umum di Perguruan Tinggi Hukum dan Pengetahuan Masyarakat Malang pada hari Sabtu tanggal 2 Djuli 1960* (Malang: Yayasan Perguruan Tinggi Malang, 1960).

⁵ Fogg (2020), p. 475.

These vague and complicated perceptions on the true meaning of socialism in Indonesia can only be explained by tracing the origin and roots of Indonesian socialist ideology. Indonesia has had an enduring self-contradiction in understanding socialism: on one side, it was used to denote the collectivist nature of Indonesian society—a nativist notion that opposed Western colonial, capitalist penetration and exploitation. Conversely, ‘socialism’ has implied human emancipation from an unequal, hierarchical social order, created not only by economic determinants (such as uneven access to the means of production) but also culturally constructed by imperialism and feudalism. These opposing tendencies of Indonesian socialism are this study’s central issue; it asks how socialism should be regarded as an expression of anticolonialism as well as a driving force of modernisation and rationalisation in society. While the former is associated with Marxism, Leninism or their adaptation to anticolonial or national questions, the latter is more concerned with intellectual aspects of Marxism or socialism, and their relationship to postcolonial development.

Socialism and Intellectuals

While the existence of intellectual people is as old as human civilisation, the concept of the ‘intellectual’ or intelligentsia is relatively new. The term began to be popularly used during the ‘Dreyfus Affair’ in late nineteenth-century France, in which literary activist Emile Zola issued a pamphlet entitled *J’accuse*, later known as the ‘*manifeste des intellectuels*’ (‘the intellectuals’ manifesto’). The document not only polarised French writers, but also advocated for a new awareness of the function, roles and involvement of intellectuals in public affairs. Since then, the category of ‘intellectual’ has referred to a particular self-proclaimed group devoted to defending the common conscience on fundamental social and political issues. Nevertheless, because there is no fixed definition of what an intellectual is, its usages have varied and can be found in many contexts. Generally, however, understandings can be divided into two main categories: the first interprets intellectuals in more personal terms, as ‘those who adopt thinking activities as main occupation as well as for leisure’; the second links intellectuals to

certain social structures and functions.⁶ Theories of intellectuals have located a special role for them in Third World development, as well as regarding class struggle in Marxist traditions.

One comprehensive discussion on the role of intellectuals in Asian nationalism and revolutionary movements was presented by John Kautsky in *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* (1962–1967), which included articles by Edward Shils and Indonesian studies scholar Harry J. Benda.⁷ According to Benda, intellectuals in Western societies did not form a distinct social class because their function was complementary to other classes. Hence, they were defined in terms of ideas rather than having a common economic or social position. In Asian societies, intellectuals achieved elite status and exercised influence simply because of who they were. Benda divided Asian intellectuals into two categories: ‘old’ intellectuals, who performed such traditional roles as philosophers or religious clerics; and ‘new’ intellectuals, who emerged because of Western education. In contrast to the ‘old’ intellectuals, who served as an extension of ruling-class power, ‘new’ intellectuals were agents of change, bringing social transformation into reality. Relative to those in the Western world, writers in the postcolonial period often saw the new type of Eastern intellectuals as being both an alienated class among indigenous society and closely attached to revolutionary political movements.⁸

Edward Shils described factors contributing to the politicisation of Third World intellectuals. First, the collectivist nature of ‘eastern’ societies prevented the new intellectuals from being truly independent and ‘individualistic’, as in the West. The

⁶ A ‘purist’ definition of intellectual as a class was given in Julien Benda’s classic treatise *La Trahison des Clerics* (1927), which described the traditional function of intellectuals as independent, vanguard thinkers of their society and criticised the ‘pragmatist’ inclination of politically involved intellectuals starting with the European Enlightenment, see Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals* (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishing, 2014).

⁷ Articles on the revolutionary politics of the intellectuals in the underdeveloped countries or the Third World compiled in John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped World: Nationalism and Communism* (New York/London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 1967). For Indonesian version of the articles written by Edward Shils and Harry Benda, see Aswab Mahasin and Ismed Natsir (ed), *Cendekiawan dan Politik* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983).

⁸ Benda (1967). Such arguments continued colonial discourse, by which the radicals were not real reflection of ‘native population’ but rather a deracinated group.

more they struggled to break away from traditional collectivity, the more they needed to be incorporated into a new alternative collectivity. Second, what drove most eastern intellectual to political involvement was the scarcity of opportunity for achieving particular skills and the lack of civil tradition within underdeveloped societies.⁹ Their need for alternative collectivity explained how Third World intellectuals were mostly integrated into nationalist movements, as well as more socialistic or populist versions of nationalist movement. According to Kautsky, Marxism and Leninism had a significant impact on Third World nationalist movements, not only as revolutionary forces to remove Western colonialism, but also through their emphasis on intellectuals' role in forming a vanguard party on behalf of the oppressed classes.¹⁰ Leninist theory added a new dimension to Marxian class concepts by considering that the power relations between European imperialist countries and underdeveloped areas as being parallel to the power relations between the capitalist and proletarian classes within industrial countries. Hence, intellectuals and the 'national bourgeoisie' class in the colonial world should be regarded as a revolutionary agency similar to the working class.

Marxist theoretical constructions of the role of intellectuals in politics are important for studying democratic socialist intellectuals in Indonesia. Theories of intellectuals in the tradition of Marxism and Leninism positioned intellectuals as the vanguard of socialist revolution as an extension of class struggle.¹¹ Theories of the 'new (middle) class' in post-revolutionary socialist states included the rise of bureaucratic/technocratic intellectuals, since in the post-Stalin era, the USSR turned to industrial state-capitalism. Most 'new class' theories were derived from Trotskyism and/or anti-Stalinist critiques.¹² One of the most speculative versions¹² argued that

⁹ In respect to the writings of his grandfather, Karl Kautsky, this comment on Leninism is really important in the Cold War context of a US publication trying to understand the appeals of Leftism in the Third World.

¹⁰ Shils (1967), pp. 63–64.

¹¹ David Bates (ed), *Marxism, Intellectuals and Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

¹² Lawrence Peter King & Ivan Szelenyi, *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power* (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

managers or technocratic intellectuals would be the ruling class, replacing finance capitalists, especially after the Great Depression of the 1930s. The PSI intellectuals' role can be explained as being both the vanguard of the anti-colonial struggle for independence and the state planners and administrators of postcolonial development.

One of the earliest critical theories of intellectuals in socialism was that of Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, in about 1870. He criticised latent scientism and elitism within the Marxist project of socialism, arguing that such complexity of knowledge would inevitably lead to the rule of intellectuals. The actual objective of revolutionary Marxism, according to the anarchists, was to bring down capitalist rule by manipulating the working-class movement, and promote the intellectuals' rise to power through the state bureaucracies.

Marx himself had never produced any coherent theoretical discussion of intellectuals; this was provided later by Lenin. The principal assumption of Leninist theory was that the emancipation of labour required a vanguard party led by intellectuals, who had mastered the theoretical grounds of Marxism and were capable of applying it for revolutionary ends. For Lenin, workers lacked class consciousness, except for the non-revolutionary aspiration to improve their wages and welfare through trade unions. Moreover, capitalist could tame the labour movement through the colonial surplus produced by European imperialism—a process that generated a 'labour aristocracy' among the working class.¹³ Class consciousness had to be created from above, through intellectuals and theoreticians of revolution.

The most influential Marxist theory of intellectuals and power was that of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian communist thinker renowned for his concept of hegemony. Gramsci's theory was an amalgamation of the Leninist notion of intellectuals as the revolutionary vanguard and the power-strategic views of Machiavelli. He tried to resolve the question of why a violent revolution in Western Europe seemed unlikely to succeed as it had in Russia. His answer was the idea of 'hegemonic' and 'counter-hegemonic' positions, which represented 'trans-class' or non-sectarian political

¹³ For discussion on the concept of 'labour aristocracy' and its relation to imperialism, see Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey* (London/New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 123–127.

interests through consensus rather than coercion. Because most of the European bourgeoisie had strong democratic institutions embedded in their civil society, a socialist revolution could only be made through class alliance or a ‘historic bloc’ uniting labour, the peasantry and the petit bourgeoisie under a common interest, in which the intellectual class played a major role. Unlike Marx, who regarded the nature of power as a coercive mechanism supported by ideology as ‘false-consciousness’ forcefully set from above by the ruling class upon the passive and unconscious masses, Gramsci considered power relations as a flexible cultural and intellectual mechanism.¹⁴

‘New class’ theory originated from Trotskyist criticism of the Stalinist Soviet Union as being a corruption of Marxist-Leninist notions of proletarian dictatorship. They departed from the Leninist postulate that proletarian revolution implied a ‘society in transition’ by which the state controlled the means of production before entering the socialist stage. Increasingly, the development of Soviet Russia under Stalin indicated features of state-capitalism and corporatism, which strengthened the new bureaucratic-managerial class to administer economic sectors that had been put under state control. For many Trotskyists, Stalin’s policy of ‘socialism in one country’ showed totalitarian inclinations similar to those of fascism and national socialism.

This ‘new class’ theory—influential in the 1950s for Indonesian socialists in the PSI milieu—was invented by Yugoslavian Marxist politician turned democratic socialist Milovan Djilas.¹⁵ According to Djilas, the bureaucratic and managerial elites of a communist state could be distinguished from those of non-communist ones, because the former tended to form a new class, while the latter did not. Most non-communist bureaucrats were submissive to their political masters and the capitalist system. In

¹⁴ Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) was an Italian Marxist thinker and communist activist imprisoned by the Italian Fascist regime. His prison notebooks were only discovered, translated and published into English in early 1970s, hence many of his theories remained unknown prior to the rise of New Left movement in Europe and America. On intellectuals, civil society and hegemony see Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), also King and Szelenyi (2004), op. cit., pp.38–41.

¹⁵ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1957); Djilas (1911-1995) was Yugoslavian vice-president under the national-communist regime of Josip Broz Tito but later broke with Tito, since he opposed the one-state party system and embraced democratic socialism. As a consequence, he was expelled from the Yugoslavian communist party in 1954. Djilas met PSI intellectual and diplomat Soedjatmoko in early 1952 (see chapter six).

contrast, in the Soviet Union, the new (bureaucratic) class was ‘implanted in a special party of the Bolshevik type’. However, ‘the initiators of the new class are not found in the party of the Bolshevik type as a whole, but in the stratum of professional revolutionary who made up its core even before it attained power.’¹⁶ Lenin himself had initiated forming a new class which, subsequently, became the proponent of state-capitalism in the era of Stalin.¹⁷

A non-Marxist theory of the ‘new class’ of technocratic intellectuals emerged from the American ‘New York intellectuals.’¹⁸ This group had a Marxist-Trotskyist background but a liberal orientation. In their view, the emergence of a technocratic class had been a consequence of industrialisation. The rise of a new social order based on techno-scientific expertise would gradually eliminate the division among competing ideologies. Among the proponents of these theories was James Burnham, a former Trotskyist, whose book *The Managerial Revolution* (1941) argued that the rise of a bureaucratic-managerial class to replace capitalists was the consequence of politico-economic crises between the world wars. Burnham envisaged a dystopian future for Western civilisation, equating the progress of New Deal state interventionism with the totalitarian progress of the Stalinist and Nazi regimes. Sociologist Daniel Bell’s famous ‘end of ideology’ thesis of the early 1960s argued that the post-industrial stage of Western capitalist society meant that class structure and power were determined more by access to knowledge than to the means of production.¹⁹

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 39

¹⁷ For discussion of Djilas’ new class theory in the context of Yugoslavian socialism, see Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

¹⁸ Some members had grown up in Jewish enclaves within New York City, coming of age during the Great Depression. This intellectual circle included Sidney Hook, Hannah Arendt, C. Wright Mills, and Daniel Bell. The ‘New York intellectuals’ played a major role in the formation of Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF), an intellectual forum for American cultural diplomacy in the Cold War era which was influential for PSI-related cultural activism in the 1950s; Kevin Mattson, *Intellectuals in Action: The Origin of the New Left and Radical Liberalism 1945-1970* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 24–27.

¹⁹ Malcolm Waters, *Daniel Bell* (London/New York: Routledge, 1996).

Indigenous and Islamic Roots of Indonesian Socialism

Although Western socialism, with its concept of class conflict, had been central in the intellectual discourse of anti-colonialism, it was only one of various sources that shaped the idea of Indonesian socialism. Some ideas resembling socialism, but in a voluntaristic form, already existed among traditional communities in Indonesia. This is important for understanding the dialectical relationship between socialism and cultural nationalism, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Jeanne Mintz identified three main sources of Indonesian socialism and socialist movements.²⁰ The first derived from the innate structure of Indonesian society, particularly from the organisational basis of rural and agricultural society. In the second, socialism came from the Indonesian adaptation of modern Islamic thought, containing elements similar to the ‘religious socialism’ of Christian Socialism in Europe. In the third, socialist concepts derived from Western sources, in which Marxism—and later Marxism-Leninism—became the primary element.²¹ Generally, the indigenous source of Indonesian socialism was closely connected to agrarian unrest and peasant revolts in rural Java, beginning in the ‘Cultivation System’ (*Cultuurstelsel*) in the nineteenth century.²² They emerged as a reaction against Western capital penetration into agrarian society and the forced labour migration to colonial plantations that shook rural social organisation.

One of the best-known cases in Java, essentially a primitive form of ‘communist society’ with anarchist and quasi-religious leanings, was the Samin movement of Rembang region, Central Java, which appeared in the 1890s. It was named after Ki Surentiko Samin (1859–1914), a local charismatic figure who founded a new faith called *agama nabi Adam*, a sort of indigenous monotheism attribute to the figure of the first human—implying a genuine form of monotheism without reference to Islam or Christianity. What drew special attention from the colonial government was the general

²⁰ Jeanne S. Mintz, *Mohammed, Marx, Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism* (London/Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 6–7 [translated as Jeanne S Mintz. *Muhammad, Marx, Marhaen: Akar Sosialisme Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003)].

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² For agrarian unrest and populist or millenarian ideologies see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) [translated as *Ratu Adil* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984)].

attitude of the Samin community towards state authorities, including Javanese traditional rulers. They acknowledged no authorities, considering the land and its natural resources as being common property. Hence, the Samin movement rejected teak exploitation—which was common in the surrounding hills—as well as refusing to pay any taxation to the colonial government. As his followers grew to more than 3,000 households, the government arrested and exiled Ki Surentiko Samin among others in 1907. Samin community resistance continued into the 1920s, however, as they increasingly resembled, or shared common features with, peasant revolts led by communist- or socialist-inspired figures in the Sarekat Islam (SI) organisation during the same period.²³

Sarekat Islam ('the Islamic League') and its most prominent leader, H. Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934), were the main representatives of the Islamic impulse of 'religious socialism.' Founded initially as an association of local Muslim traders, with their objectives limited to protection from Chinese rivals, this organisation soon emerged as the biggest mass movement struggling for the Indonesian Islamic community's emancipation. There are disagreements about the origin of Sarekat Islam: one stream of historiography, widely accepted by older nationalists and the leftist academic community, identified Indonesian journalist pioneer R.M. Tirta Adhi Soerjo (1880–1918) as the founder of the Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) in Buitenzorg (Bogor) in 1909. A second stream emphasises another branch of SDI in Surakarta, founded under the initiative of Haji Samanhoedi in 1911. This was actually a mere trade association of local batik merchants, with no political goals. But when Samanhoedi attempted to contact the Batavia branch of Tirta Adhi Soerjo to advance his association, as well as to gain wider acknowledgment, there was apparently disagreement between them.²⁴ Increasing tension between indigenous and Chinese communities following the Chinese Revolution (1911) and the rise of Chinese nationalism had led to widespread

²³ The classic account of Saminism was Harry J. Benda & Lance Castles, "The Samin movement", *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land, en Volkenkunde* 125, no 2 (1969), pp. 207–240.

²⁴ The principal work on the central role of Tirta Adhi Soerjo in the foundation of Sarekat Dagang Islam was Pramoedya Ananta Toer's *Sang Pemula* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1985) and his famous "Buru Tetralogy" historical novel portraying Tirta's biographical sketch; see Robert Van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1984) and Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912–1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

support for the SDI in almost all urban centres in Java, including Semarang and Surabaya. In September 1912, under the initiative of Tjokroaminoto, leader of the Surabaya branch, the organisation officially changed its name to Sarekat Islam (SI). Tjokroaminoto himself was elected head of SI at its first congress on January 1913.²⁵

Under Tjokroaminoto's leadership, even when it was developing into Indonesia's biggest mass organisation, its Central Committee (*Central Sarekat Islam*, CSI) remained relatively moderate and loyal to the colonial government, especially under the 'ethical' governor-general Idenburg (in office, 1909–1916). Because most SI supporters and members belonged to the lower aristocracy (*priyayi*), merchants or urban middle-class segments of society, the SI evolved as an emancipation movement of the middle and lower classes to overcome socioeconomical inequality and discrimination towards the indigenous population. They also advocated for the right to self-determination and moderate political autonomy of the native Indonesian people under colonial rule. According to colonial scholar and adviser for Islamic and native affairs, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) and his successor D.A. Rinkes, SI was not primarily a religious movement, but used 'Islam' as an adhesive, symbolic identity to distinguish native Indonesians from others.²⁶ Tjokroaminoto and the SI movement not only regarded Islam as a vehicle for solidarity but also as the medium for raising political consciousness among people towards the emancipation of indigenous society from exploitation. The SI movement contained egalitarian and socialistic ideas in an Islamic platform.

Globally, the origins of religious socialism were closely connected to the rise of anti-colonial nationalism in the Middle East and South Asia. It emerged more as a progressive tendency in the wider (pan-)Islamist movement. As with their Christian counterparts in Western countries, Islamic socialists declared themselves to 'have no spiritual connection with Marxist socialism' or revolution.²⁷ In its early years, SI showed strong commitment to egalitarian principles for political reform in the Indies,

²⁵ A.P.E. Korver, *Sarekat Islam: Gerakan Ratu Adil?* (Jakarta: Grafitti Press, 1985), pp. 21–22.

²⁶ Rinkes (1878-1954), a disciple of Snouck Hurgronje, also had close connections to Tjokroaminoto. See Michael Laffan, *Sejarah Islam di Nusantara* (Yogyakarta: Bentang Pustaka, 2015) pp. 228–230.

²⁷ Mintz (1965), p. 87.

and increased this emphasis during World War I. Only when Marxism and communism made a greater impact following the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) did the movement face a serious ideological schism. During the first half of the 1920s, SI reformulated its ideological basis and commitment to an Islamic socialism that was different from Marxist doctrine. Most Islamic politicians who styled themselves as religious socialists were hostile towards Marxism's materialist perspective on economics and history. Marx's premise that religion was the 'opium of the masses' became the justification for their view that religion and communism were incompatible.

After breaking up with the communist-leaning faction among SI members in 1924, Tjokroaminoto published *Islam dan Sosialisme (Islam and Socialism)* as his political manifesto. It contained translations and paraphrased material from the work of Mushir Hosein Kidwai, an Islamic socialist intellectual from India. Only the last chapter contained original material from Tjokroaminoto himself.²⁸ The basic argument of Kidwai, as adopted by Tjokroaminoto, was that socialism included within it the key principles of Islam, such as promoting equal distribution of wealth and alms for the poor through *zakat* obligation, and facilitating social justice. Islamic socialism was essentially the spiritual and moral advancement of the people; thus, unlike modern socialism, which was based on materialism, it was ethical in nature.²⁹ Eventually, Tjokroaminoto's publication of *Islam dan Sosialisme* drove a response among Muslim communists, particularly H. Muhammad Misbach (1876–1926) through his rival manifesto, *Islamisme dan Komunisme*, in the same year. Misbach represented a minor group of devout Muslims, who had adopted Marxist doctrine to Islamic principles to establish economic and social justice.

The religious socialism of Tjokroaminoto, and to a lesser extent of Misbach, had an enormous influence on the next generation of Indonesian political ideologies and figures. Tjokroaminoto became the political mentor of such diverse political figures as the nationalist Sukarno, Islamist Kartosuwirjo and communists such as Semaun, Alimin and Musso. The most obvious impact of Tjokroaminoto's concept of Islamic socialism

²⁸ My discussion here is taken Kevin W. Fogg, "Indonesian Islamic Socialism and Its South Asian Roots", *Journal of Modern Asian Studies*, Vol 53, No 6 (2019), pp. 1736–1761.

²⁹ Fogg makes the important point that the Kidwai's ideas came from British India via the 'heterodox' Ahmadiyyah movement, *ibid*, p. 4.

was found within the political parties of Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII)—the successor of SI—and the Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) party, a federation of mostly modernist Islamic organisations founded during the early Revolutionary era.³⁰

One of the strongest features of Masjumi's religious socialism was the belief in social-economic reform that combined religious belief with social justice. Among Masjumi politicians heavily influenced by Islamic socialism were Mohammad Natsir (1908–1993), Jusuf Wibisono (1909–1982) and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911–1989). In 1949, Wibisono published a series of articles in *Hikmah*, the Masjumi magazine, entitled 'Islam dan Sosialisme', clear referring to Tjokroaminoto and M. Hosein Kidwai. As with his predecessors, Wibisono aimed to highlight socialist principles from Islamic sources and scriptural references that might be compatible with ideas and practices found in European socialism. Hence, he mentioned some twenty variants of socialism, culminating in Islamic socialism as the most perfect model.³¹ Sjafruddin became one of several Masjumi figures heavily influenced by the democratic socialism of Sjahrir's group and was the key figure behind a political alliance between the PSI and Masjumi.³²

Western Socialism

Western socialism had a profound impact on the Marxist-Leninist and democratic socialist currents in Indonesia. Generally, the dynamics of Indonesian socialism have been characterised in terms of opposing both currents. Given the volume of publications

³⁰ The Masjumi Party had its origins in 1937 when the Islamic organisations PSII, Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad and Nahdatul Ulama federated under the name Majelis Islam à'la Indonesia (MIAI). During the Japanese era, it was dissolved by the government. The Japanese promoted a new Islamic federation to replace MIAI, named Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) in 1943. After Indonesian Independence, ased on the government decree on political parties in November 1945, a new Masjumi Party declared it had no direct connection with the party founded by the Japanese military regime, Remy Madinier, *Partai Masjumi: Antara Godaan Demokrasi dan Islam Integral* (Bandung: Mizan, 2013).

³¹ Fogg (2019), pp. 1756–1757.

³² As with many of Sjahrir's followers, Sjafruddin started his early organisational career in the Unitas Studiosorum Indonesiensis (USI), a Western-oriented study club for students during the late colonial period, see M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Ekonomi Neoklasik dan Sosialisme Religius: Pragmatisme Pemikiran Ekonomi Politik Sjafruddin Prawiranegara* (Bandung: Mizan, 2011).

on the basic tenets of Marxism and historical materialism, my discussion will focus on issues related to Asian societies or colonial questions.³³

The democratic socialism of the PSI in Indonesia had several major influences. The first was the Marxist-based Social Democratic movement, which was centred in Germany and the German-speaking world but later spread widely across Europe, including the Netherlands where Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980), Sutan Sjahrir and the first generation of Indonesian democratic socialists first learned of socialism. The second influence was British Fabian socialism, which took its inspiration from pre-Marxist socialism and supported a more statist, technocratic approach to socialism.

While socialism has long historical antecedents, its modern incarnation came only after the Industrial Revolution. It emerged as a working-class movement in 1864 called the International Association of the Working Class, or simply the ‘First International.’ This was a labour federation encompassing almost all socialist movements in continental Europe. However, there were many disputes within this association before it dissolved itself. The fiercest disagreement happened among the followers of Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin, concerning the state’s role in creating socialist society. The latter completely rejected such state intervention. Bakunin’s anarchism started the first schism within the socialist movement.

More essential to this study, a schism occurred within the working-class movement in the period of the ‘Second International’ between 1889 and 1914. International Marxism was split between the orthodox and revisionist camps, as represented by Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein, respectively. In response to Marxism, Bernstein contrasted the ‘Young Marx’ based on Hegelian dialectics with the scientific socialism of the ‘Old Marx.’ He regarded the first phase as the immature form of Marxism. He was critical of Marx and Engels’ *Communist Manifesto* and aspects of historical materialism because he considered the Marxian concept of class struggle and

³³ After the downfall of the New Order regime in Indonesia (1998), there were numerous publications on the subject of Marxism. One of these was by Indonesian Jesuit priest and philosopher, Franz Magnis Suseno, *Pemikiran Karl Marx: Dari Materialisme Dialektis hingga Perselisihan Revisionisme* (Jakarta, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2000). For a general intellectual history of Marxism, its variants and schisms among international working-class movement, see Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution* (3 Vols) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).

its polarising of the bourgeois and proletarian classes as misleading. He argued that the working class was not a homogeneous entity but a diverse one with many influences, including both socialist and non-socialist trade unions. Bernstein was convinced that the widening gap between labour and the capitalist classes could be overcome through economic redistribution. He rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat and supported democratic yet gradual reform to strengthen the social position of the working class.³⁴

An important, but indirect, influence for Indonesian democratic socialism was the Fabian Society, which was founded in England in January 1884. Unlike the working-class-based German Social Democratic party (SPD), the Fabian Society was a mostly middle-class, intellectual group, supporting gradual social reform and rational planning. It was a sort of ‘socialism from above’ which aimed for the extension of public ownership administered by state bureaucracy.³⁵ Sidney and Beatrice Webb were some of the Fabians whose works were read by Indonesian socialists. George Douglas Howard Cole and his guild socialism influenced the ideas of cooperatives and economic democracy in Indonesia. Fabian influence on economic thinking was represented in the formation of the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1895, one of the most prestigious higher-education institutions in Europe. Along with Keynesian economics, the LSE had a major impact on the ideas of the PSI economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo from the 1950s, as chapter five will show.

During the mid-nineteenth century, the European Industrial Revolution began to impact the Netherlands East Indies. In 1870, a series of agricultural laws applied by the Ministry of Colonies abolished the forced cultivation system and opened the colony to private capital investment. The opening of the Suez Canal the previous year and the development of steam navigation encouraged increasing European migration to the

³⁴ See Eduard Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation* (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), and for the revisionist debates see H. Tudor & J.M. Tudor (eds), *Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate 1896–1898* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

³⁵ For general overview of Fabian socialism and its political economy see Noel Thompson, *Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic Socialism 1884–2005* (New York/London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 22-30.

Indies.³⁶ This colonial ‘Liberal Era’ was marked by the rapid growth of private enterprise, agricultural industries and urban centres. The expansion of railway networks was also a major factor contributing to industrialisation and increasing the proletariat. The establishment of plantations in the region of Deli, Sumatra, was followed by forced migration of labour from China and then impoverished rural areas in Java.³⁷ Agriculture and the railway networks were among the most significant sectors attracting a labour force especially in Java and Sumatra. Along with the growth of private industrial capital, labour developments at the end of the nineteenth century also stimulated the rise of working-class movements in the colony, mostly in connection with similar movements in the Netherlands and Europe.

Socialist-oriented and working-class movements began to be active in the Netherlands just after the formation of the First International in 1864. The first major Dutch socialist movement was the Social Democratic League (*Sociaal-Democratische Bond*, SDB) founded in 1881, mostly based on Marxist principles. Under the leadership of general secretary Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis (1846–1918), a former Lutheran minister, the party gained prominence within Dutch politics. Party activities included supporting universal suffrage and promoting socialist workers’ initiatives. Nieuwenhuis’s importance in the Dutch socialist movement was not limited to working-class political activism; he was the first socialist to publish an abridged version of Marx’s *Das Kapital*. His writings contained eclectic influences, from social humanism to ethical idealism with strong reference to Christian doctrines, but he was better known for his more freethinking and utopian ideas. In 1888, Nieuwenhuis was the first socialist elected to the House of Representatives of the Dutch Parliament. Later, he leaned towards anarchist ideology, leading to his withdrawal from parliament. This shift encouraged a schism within the party, especially after the Groningen congress in 1893, in which Nieuwenhuis proposed a resolution to reject all electoral processes.³⁸

³⁶ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c 1200* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) pp. 161–162.

³⁷ See Ann Laura Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt 1870–1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

³⁸ See Philippe Bourrinet, *The Dutch and German Communist Left (1900-68)* (Leiden: Brill, 1999re5).

A reformist faction that included politicians such as Pieter Jelles Troelstra and his associates, called the ‘twelve apostles’, opposed Nieuwenhuis’ political direction. They formed a new party, the Social Democratic Workers Party or *Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij* (SDAP) in 1894. It became the most important socialist party in the Netherlands, influencing policy towards the colonies. Within three years of its foundation, the SDAP had replaced SDB as the Dutch representative of the Second International; as with other parts of Europe, it was soon plunged into controversies between revolutionary Marxists and the faction supporting reformist approaches to socialism. The schism culminated in the revolutionary faction separating from the party in the 1909 Deventer congress, resulting in the formation of the *Sociaal Democratische Partij* (SDP), which later became the Communist Party of Holland. Initially, the SDAP was Eurocentric politically and was little concerned with colonial policy and affairs, except in theoretical debates.³⁹

The central SDAP figure who contributed significantly to Dutch colonial policy in Indonesia was Henri van Kol (1852–1925), who espoused the gradual reform that characterised the subsequent ‘ethical’ policy. He graduated from the Delft Technical School and served as an engineer in the Dutch East Indies colonial bureaucracy. One of the founders of the SDAP, van Kol became its representative in the parliament in 1897. There, van Kol served as the SDAP spokesman on colonial policy, but his demand for reform was more an ethical than social-democratic perspective on the colonial situation. He never expressed opposition to colonial rule and only after World War I did he and some other SDAP figures start supporting the idea of Indonesian independence.

One of the central issues preventing most Dutch socialists from advocating revolutionary socialist reform on the colonies was the lack of a Marxian theoretical basis for socialist revolution in the non-European world. Those societies had evolved in a different socioeconomic trajectory— what later came to be termed as the ‘Asiatic mode of production.’⁴⁰ This required Western intervention through colonialism to

³⁹ Erik Hansen, “The Dutch East Indies and the Reorientation of Dutch Social Democracy 1929–1940”, *Indonesia* 23 (April 1977), pp. 59–85.

⁴⁰ The social and economic condition of precapitalist societies indicated by the absence of private ownership of land, autonomous village communities, and the emergence of despotic centralised states to control public works. To finance and build public infrastructure, the state used coercive powers to extract

establish industrial capitalist development and sufficient conditions for the class-struggle and socialist revolutions. Van Kol represented the mainstream thought of Dutch socialists, considered to be one of the most conservative among members of the Second International. For some social democrats, who held the principle of ‘social-imperialism’, colonialism as a ‘civilising mission’ was a necessary condition for a fully developed capitalist society.⁴¹ Hence, colonial capitalism should encourage the development of indigenous private enterprises to bring about a higher stage of progress. The main problem for Dutch social democrats was not possession of colonies but, rather, how to reduce the impacts of colonial exploitation and support progressive colonial policy.

During the Second International congress of Stuttgart (1907), van Kol proposed a resolution representing the social imperialist faction.⁴² This congress was otherwise dominated by Kautsky, who supported an anti-colonial policy. For the leftist Marxists, European imperialism was simply the consequence of capitalist development which, in its industrial stage, depended increasingly on non-Western underdeveloped regions to find new areas for capital investment. Therefore, the state as well as rising European nationalism were the means of capitalist expansion.⁴³ During this imperialist stage, the upper working class in the metropolis might enjoy colonial profit, thus being more likely to identify themselves with their ‘national’ interest than prioritise the class-struggle question.

Overall, socialism and the social-democratic movement were of minor significance for colonial reform during the early Ethical Policy era of the Netherlands East Indies (beginning 1901), under which the Dutch sought to repay their ‘debt of honour’ to the colony. In the second half of the 1910s, there was a more serious attempt to establish a socialist movement in the Indies, but it had nothing to do with any SDAP

economic surplus from local communities as tributes or corvée labour; Franco Barchiessi, “Asiatic Mode of Production” in William A Darity Jr (ed), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 2nd Edition* (Macmillan Reference, 2008), pp. 187–188.

⁴¹ Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 4–5.

⁴² Bourrinet (1995), pp. 67–68.

⁴³ Expressed in Lenin’s theory of imperialism as the ‘highest stage of capitalism’, see Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey* (London/New York: Routledge, 1990).

initiatives. In November 1908, one of the first labour unions founded in Semarang was the Union of Railway and Tramway Workers (*Vereniging op Spoor en Tramwegpersoneel*, VSTP) supported by European employees and three Semarang-based railway companies. Until 1914, European workers dominated the union and its key positions. Few Dutch-speaking Indonesians were admitted as members with equal rights; there was also no attempt to recruit the mass of lower-class native workers.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the course of working-class movements changed soon after the arrival of an exceptional Dutch socialist, Hendricus Joseph Franciscus Marie Sneevliet. One of the most profound impacts of Marxism within the European labour movement in the colony was the rise of the class question, replacing racial categories as the most significant issue for socialists.

Henk Sneevliet was born in 1883, the same year as the death of Marx. He started his career as a member of the SDAP in 1902, but was more attracted to the left-wing opposition group within it, and its journal, *De Nieuwe Tijd*. This leftist group, later known as ‘the Tribunists’ took a similar position to that of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). As one of the leaders of the leftist faction, Sneevliet joined the SDAP-controlled Dutch Railway and Tram Workers Union, and became its chairman in 1910.⁴⁵ What made Sneevliet stay rather than join the revolutionary SDP was mostly his concern that the new organisation did not have sufficient support among the working class. He left the SDAP after the party refused to support a harbour strike in Amsterdam. The party responded by forcing him to retire from his union position as well.

In February 1913, Sneevliet came to the Indies to join the editorial staff of *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad*, a Surabaya newspaper. Three months later, he moved to Semarang, replacing D.M.G. Koch as the secretary of the *Semarang Handelsvereniging* (‘Semarang Chamber of Commerce’).⁴⁶ Semarang had been an industrial urban area and

⁴⁴ John Ingleson, “Bound Hand and Foot: Railway Workers and the 1923 Strike in Java”, *Indonesia* No 31 (April 1981) pp. 52–53.

⁴⁵ Michael Williams, “Sneevliet and The Birth of Asian Communism”, *New Left Review* I/123, September–October 1980, pp. 81–90.

⁴⁶ Takashi Shiraishi (1990), p. 98.

a centre of the labour movement. Sneevliet immediately took over the railway and tram union (VSTP) leadership, using the union to attract more Indonesian workers. Within a year of his arrival, Sneevliet had succeeded in directing the union along more radical lines, with a main purpose of improving the lives of unskilled and impoverished Indonesian workers. Through his increasing influence in the Indonesian working-class movement and radical journalism, Sneevliet founded the Indies Social Democratic Association (*Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging*, ISDV) on 9 May 1914. This organisation became the precursor of the Indonesian communist movement. It initially consisted of eighty-five members, mostly originating from the SDAP and SDP, besides Indonesian members. As the ISDV's ideological orientation shifted to a more radical leftist orientation, the reformist faction of its membership quit and formed the Indies Social Democratic Party (*Indische Sociaal Democratische Partij*). In 1915, the ISDV started publishing a bi-monthly newspaper in Dutch, called *Het Vrije Woord* ('*The Free Word*') under the direction of Sneevliet and Asser Baars. It later developed a Malay-language section, '*Soeara Mardika*', and recruited Indonesian left-wing figures such as Semaoen and Darsono.⁴⁷

The foundation of the ISDV made Sneevliet and his colleagues, Baars and Bergsma, truly the founding fathers of Indonesian communism, since they were the first to introduce Indonesian leftist activism to Marxist concepts and theoretical frameworks for their movement. It was also through Sneevliet that the early Indonesian communists established their first contact with the Comintern in Moscow. His later withdrawal from the stage of the communist movement due to his opposition to Moscow represented a leap of progress for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), because having a totally Indonesian-based party leadership elevated the party's prestige among the people.⁴⁸

The Communist Party

Communism in Indonesia began on 23 May 1920, when the ISDV changed its name to the Communist Union of the Indies (*Perserikatan Kommunist di Hindia*), later

⁴⁷ M. Williams, (1980), pp. 82–83.

⁴⁸ Mintz, (2003), p. 45.

becoming the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) led by Semaoen as its first chairperson. It evolved to be the biggest Marxist-oriented organisation in a non-communist country. Its development was dominated by troubles arising from the dichotomy between Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy (represented by the Comintern) and its adaptation to the reality of Indonesia. One central issue for the PKI, and a serious obstacle to expanding their influence in grassroots society, was the question of religion and its position in society according to Marxist doctrine.⁴⁹ This issue was raised because the party had developed from a small revolutionary group within Sarekat Islam. Besides pan-Islamism, the potential for class alliance between the proletariat and national bourgeoisie, based on the assumption that, in pre-capitalist countries, the middle class and nationalism were both considered as progressive forces, was a major question within the international communist movement.⁵⁰

The rising political tension involving the leftist branches of SI culminated in a schism of the organisation, beginning with a series of incidents and strikes. Rural areas in Java became the centre for popular dissatisfaction and agrarian unrest. In the Surakarta region, peasant protests against the government's agrarian reform plan broke in early 1919. For the colonial rulers, these affairs placed the Ethical Policy into question for the first time. With the pressure rising on the SI leadership, especially after the arrest of Tjokroaminoto in August 1921, the colonial government was increasingly aware of the threat imposed by communist infiltration. The arrest and trial of Tjokroaminoto saw the decline of SI's populist orientation and the beginning of its more religious orientation. The new Communist Party's affiliation with international communism made this schism inevitable. Just after *Het Vrije Woord* published Lenin's theses, which included denunciations of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asiatic nationalism, the CSI, now under the influence of modernist Islamic figure Haji Agus Salim, decided to apply party disciplinary to the communists. This made it impossible for SI members to belong to another party with different basic principles.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 31–32.

⁵⁰ McVey (2006), p. 56.

⁵¹ Ricklefs (2001), pp. 219–220.

Despite the clear schism within the CSI leadership, the communists made considerable attempts to maintain alliances with Islamic leaders and the rising pan-Islamist movement. This was achieved by Ibrahim Tan Malaka (1897–1949) in the Comintern Congress in 1922 and by spreading ‘Islamic communism’ among rural branches of Sarekat Islam, led by Haji Muhammad Misbach in Central Java and Haji Datuk Batuah in the Minangkabau region.⁵² Along with Mas Marco, Misbach initially joined SI and *Indische Journalisten Bond* (League of Native Journalists) in 1914. In 1919, he achieved notoriety by being accused of instigating a wave of peasant strikes across the Surakarta region.⁵³ His *Islamisme dan Komunisme* contained a series of articles written during his exile in Manokwari, West New Guinea (1925). There, Misbach explained how capitalism had caused the world’s disorder and poverty, because it was ‘a form of knowledge that searched for profit in conjunction with obtaining the rights of ownership for a limited few only’. His arguments combined a Marxist economic critique of capitalism with his awareness of its morally destructive effect. He argued that capitalism tended to produce surplus goods, ultimately resulting in unemployment for hundreds of workers. According to Misbach, this had the consequent effects of worsening humanity’s corruption and encouraging people to violate religious prohibitions.⁵⁴

While religious communism had considerable influence in rural areas of Java and West Sumatra, it remained largely peripheral to the Indonesian communist movement, because the PKI leadership were reluctant to take the revolutionary potential of the peasantry seriously. This was shown in 1924, when the party made the nearly fatal decision to abandon the peasant-based *Sarekat Rakyat* (‘People’s League’) in favour of developing power within the working-class movements. This policy not only reflected the PKI’s interpretation of communist doctrine as ‘the primacy of trade unions’ but also its awkward relationship with the Comintern and its colonial policy.⁵⁵

⁵² Lin Hongxuan “Sickle as Crescent: Islam and Communism in the Netherlands East Indies 1915–1927”, *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies* Vol 25, No 2, 2018.

⁵³ Shiraishi (1990), p. 128.

⁵⁴ Misbach cited in Lin (2018), pp. 333–334.

⁵⁵ Mintz (2003), p. 37.

In terms of Marxist-Leninist theories dealing with Asia, the Comintern focused more on China than any other country. Most Soviet leaders had little knowledge of, and communication with, colonial Southeast Asia. Besides the Asiatic mode of production, Marx and Engels themselves had little interest in the peasantry as a revolutionary force because they considered it disorganised, backward and too possessed with the ‘petit-bourgeois’ desire to own land. Marx and Engels had argued that the landless peasants belonged in the proletarian category, but they considered this affiliation to be of a subordinate nature with little consequence for revolution. The peasantry did not constitute a distinct class and, therefore, could not be an independent force in the class struggle.⁵⁶ Henceforth, the communist movement’s theoretical basis in the colonial world derived from Lenin. In his view, imperialism paved the way for the global expansion of capitalism. Capitalism itself divided into competitive (or *laissez-faire*) and monopoly capitalism. The first resulted in finance and industrial capitalism, while the second was embedded within the process of capital expansion through imperialism. In Asia, the capitalist monopoly and colonial alliance with traditional feudal rulers obstructed the development of traditional capitalism, including the potential for bourgeois revolution to occur.⁵⁷ In such a situation, the Comintern’s Leninist orthodoxy encouraged class alliance with the ‘national bourgeoisie’ as the main proponent of anti-colonial nationalism, and made national liberation one of the stages of socialist revolution.

The PKI’s inability to formulate a clear political standpoint proved disastrous, especially when the colonial government decided to clamp down on the increasing political agitations by labour unions. As a result of repression by the government, a number of the party’s most competent figures left. Subsequently, a small revolutionary faction under the influence of Musso (1897–1948) and Alimin Prawirodirjo (1889–1964) took the initiative in the party. A rebellion was initiated in the party conference at Kotagede, Yogyakarta, in December 1924. The government thoroughly suppressed what remained of the trade unions and the PKI was driven virtually underground as the

⁵⁶ McVey (2006), pp. 52–53.

⁵⁷ For theoretical consideration of Marxism-Leninism on the colonial world and its implication on Indonesian communism, see Olle Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of The PKI in Indonesia* (London: Zed Books, 1984) p. 14–21; see Brewer, (1990), pp. 116–123.

police broke up its meetings and arrested leaders. In this situation, the PKI leadership in Java encountered sharp criticism by both the Comintern and its own leaders in exile, notably Semaoen and Tan Malaka.⁵⁸ The latter argued that the party should carry out an internal reorganisation instead of a revolution, because the Comintern would never support a plan that was unlikely to be successful.⁵⁹ When the revolt finally broke in Java (November–December 1926) and West Sumatra (January 1927), it was poorly coordinated and had little mass support, and was easily put down. The PKI leadership in Java placed the responsibility for its failure on Tan Malaka, considered to be a ‘Trotskyist’ splinterer.⁶⁰ The communist revolt marked a significant shift within the Indonesian nationalist and socialist movement, as well as with the colonial policy of the Netherlands Indies. Never again did the Dutch tolerate radical anti-colonial movements. Conservatives among the Dutch went largely unchallenged, while the Indonesian Marxist movement experienced its first schism.

Indonesian communists went underground during the times of colonial conservatism and fascism. Many of its activists were exiled to Boven Digul, West New Guinea. Except for Musso’s attempt to revive the Communist Party in 1935, no significant communist activities succeeded. The rise of fascist regimes also loosened the differences between socialists, because the communists were temporarily allied with Western capitalist regimes before they returned to the ‘two-camp doctrine’ of the Cominform after 1947. This new Cold War situation brought a ‘New Way’ of Indonesian communism, as argued by Musso in his *Jalan Baru* pamphlet, which repudiated the Indonesian ‘national bourgeoisie’ and their international diplomatic policy as the machinations of Western imperialists. He called for a social revolution that would eliminate the remnants of colonialism and feudalism.⁶¹ The new orientation,

⁵⁸ Ricklefs (2001), pp. 220–224.

⁵⁹ For analysis of Tan Malaka’s ‘Semangat Moeda’ (1925) and ‘Massa Actie (1926)’ see [McVey](#) (2006), pp. 316–320.

⁶⁰ Mintz (2003), pp. 39–40; see further Robert J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2016), pp. 155–158 on the appeal of Trotsky.

⁶¹ Musso, *Jalan Baru Untuk Republik Indonesia* (The New Way for the Republic of Indonesia), published online in <https://www.marxists.org/indonesia/indones/1948-JalanBaru.htm>, see Anthony Reid, “Marxist

however, which clearly reflected the Stalinist political agenda in the Asian (post)colonial countries, soon led the communists into a bloody clash in the Madiun revolt (September 1948). The Sukiman Cabinet followed this with an anti-communist purge in August 1951. These events were devastating for the PKI; they pushed the new party leadership under Dipa Nusantara Aidit (1923–1965) to change the ideological direction of the Indonesian communist movement.⁶² A recent study by Larisa Efimova showed that Aidit held serious discussions with Stalin when formulating the party's strategy. Stalin advised the Indonesian communists not to take the path of armed struggle as Mao Zedong did in China, due to Indonesia's geographical constraint as an archipelagic state, but to focus on eliminating the remnants of feudalism and colonialism.⁶³ Only later Cold War developments—when the post-Stalin Soviet Union changed course towards industrialisation and state-capitalism—led the PKI to shift its orientation towards China as being the model of communism in the 'Third World' situation. Mao prioritised the peasantry rather than the industrial labouring class as the vanguard of the revolution and advocated for rural-based guerrilla struggle to liberate the cities. The strong appeal of the Maoist approach for Third World communism was situated in its peculiar perspective, by which Mao associated the gap between the rural-agrarian and urban-industrial communities with the exploitative relationship between advanced industrial countries and 'underdeveloped' areas. This analysis was later revived in the dependency theses and New Left movement in the 1960s.⁶⁴

Attitudes to Social Revolution 1946–1948", *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* Vol 8, No 1 (1974).

⁶² Dipa Nusantara Aidit, born Achmad Aidit, first joined the Gerindo of Amir Sjarifuddin and was associated with Asrama Angkatan Baru at Menteng 31, founded by Wikana under the protection of the Japanese. After the Madiun revolt in 1948, he went underground, but later claimed that he had escaped first to China and then Vietnam. He was appointed chair of the PKI in January 1951. Along with M.H Lukman and Njoto, Aidit was the principal young Indonesian communist to advocate a break from the more orthodox, Stalinist orientation of old PKI towards adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to national conditions, Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959–1965* (Jakarta/Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 34–42.

⁶³ Larisa M. Efimova, "Stalin and the New Program for the Communist Party of Indonesia", *Indonesia* No 91 (April 2011).

⁶⁴ Tornquist (1984), pp. 31–33.

Generally, the PKI had to deal with five principal problems in its rapid growth between 1952 and 1965.⁶⁵ First, the strategic alliance with the national bourgeoisie, mostly Sukarno and the Indonesian National Party (PNI), against elements of comprador bourgeoisie, feudalists and imperialists. Their aim was to strengthen national capitalism, either state-managed or belonging to domestic entrepreneurs. interests tended to oppose those of Western powers and their local comprador allies associated with the PSI and Masjumi parties. Second, the PKI and PNI supported economic nationalism and the nationalisation of Dutch private enterprises, which caused domestic capital to be controlled by state apparatus and military bureaucrats. However, such bureaucratic capitalism lacked a distinct class base because, simultaneously, the military-bureaucratic entrepreneurs were acting privately and as state representatives. This was a postcolonial phenomenon that had no reference in any Marxist theory of the time.⁶⁶ Third, the parliamentary democratic system led to a political cul-de-sac. Throughout the 1950s, the PKI had successfully built its mass base among the *abangan* (nominal Muslim) peasantry to become the fourth-biggest party in the 1955 election—even winning the regional election in East Java—but such an achievement brought no significant power to the PKI’s position in government bodies. Many of its political adversaries were excluded from the political scene, but the nationalists and army both hampered the PKI’s way to power by supporting Guided Democracy. Following the application of martial law, planned elections were delayed and Sukarno was appointed as president for life, which ensured that the communists would never dominate the leadership of the state.

The fourth problem facing the communists was the consequence of the political obstacles of Guided Democracy. In line with Maoist doctrine, the PKI determined to mobilise the peasantry against the colonial remnants of agrarian feudalism. According to the PKI’s ground plan, the struggle against neo-colonialism should be consistent with the anti-feudal democratic revolution as manifested in the land-reform campaign and establishment of Agrarian Principal Law (*Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria*, UUPA) in

⁶⁵ Ibid, pp. 84–85.

⁶⁶ Ibid, pp. 107–108.

1960.⁶⁷ There were serious obstacles to mobilising peasants as a class, however; particularly the strength of patron–client bonds among the community combined with solidarity among cultural streams (*aliran*), which were stronger than solidarity among socioeconomic classes.⁶⁸ The fifth problem was the unreliability of working-class struggle because of the small population of Indonesian industrial labourers. The PKI’s alliance with the national bourgeoisie did not allow the communists to organise a straightforward workers’ action, except in terms of moderate reform—similar to that offered by the PSI and PNI trade unions. When martial law was applied and the army took over state enterprises, many independent trade unions were suppressed. Subsequently, top army officers promoted the establishment of ‘functional groups’ to support the military cause in undermining left-wing labour movements.⁶⁹

Marhaenism and Marxist Nationalism

‘Marxist nationalism’, a variant of Indonesian socialism, attempted to adapt Marxist principles to the situation of Asiatic or indigenous society. This adaptation was necessary to form an ideological basis for the anti-colonial movement. In this category, two central figures shared some similar features of ideological approach, but became rivals for national leadership of the Indonesian revolution: Ibrahim Tan Malaka and Sukarno.⁷⁰ Tan Malaka was unique in being a genuine Indonesian Marxist(-Leninist) intellectual and popular leader, who promoted a radical mass movement to fight for independence. During the late Japanese and early Indonesian Revolution period, there were certain divisions among the ‘youth’ (*pemuda*) groups in Java. Some of the more intellectual and moderate social-democracy-oriented groups followed Sjahrir; others

⁶⁷ Mortimer (2006), pp. 276–326.

⁶⁸ Tornquist (1984), pp. 134–137.

⁶⁹ In October 1964, with support from the Army, the functional groups fused into Sekber-Golkar (Sekretarian Bersama Golongan Karya), the progenitor to the New Order’s Golkar; David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).

⁷⁰ See Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1969) and John D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (London: The Penguin Press, 1972).

with communist inclinations went to Amir Sjarifuddin. A third, more diverse and loosely connected group, which mostly supported radical anti-colonial sentiments, became attracted to Tan Malaka. Most figures who identified themselves as the disciples or followers of Tan Malaka joined the Murba Party.⁷¹ They included the romantic nationalist Muhammad Yamin, future vice-prime minister and Sukarno deputy Chaerul Saleh, and the more anti-communist early front man of Suharto's New Order, Adam Malik.

Sukarno was as an intellectual and ideologue, what Feith called a charismatic leader or 'solidarity maker'.⁷² His intellectual development can be divided into three distinct periods. The first (1926–1933) was concerned with left-wing, anticolonial nationalism, as typified by the invention of 'Marhaenism' (the composite worker-peasant) as 'Marxism adopted to Indonesian society'. The second encompassed his exile period under repressive colonial policy in 1934, through the rise of fascism, to the end of national revolution in 1949–1950. In this period, there was an increased need for strategic thinking to survive the struggle for independence. This era produced more reflective, less provocative ideas. Sukarno attempted to establish a dialogue with the modernist Islamic movement, but this had little significant impact, because his secular approach, inspired by Mustafa Kemal of the Young Turks movement, was strongly rejected by most of the Islamists. His most important ideological concept in this period was the *Pancasila* ('Five Principles'), the philosophical foundation for the new nation-state, which later become a sort of civil religion for the Indonesian people. During the last period, from about 1955 until his downfall in 1965–1966, he turned back to the Left to revive his earlier ideas of 'Marhaenism' or 'Indonesian socialism', but placing them into the authoritarian framework of 'Guided Democracy'. In turn, this laid the groundwork for the New Order military regime that later overthrew him.⁷³

⁷¹ The Murba Party was the successor of Tan Malaka's *Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat* (People's Revolutionary Movement), Mintz (2003), pp. 128–130.

⁷² Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007).

⁷³ See Chapter 2 for details.

In 1926, Sukarno's first important political pamphlet, *Nasionalisme, Islamisme, dan Marxisme* ('*Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism*'), his most enduring, was revived during the Guided Democracy of the 1960s. He argued that nationalism, Islamism and Marxism constituted the ideological basis for most anti-colonial movements in Indonesia, and in the broader Asian context. But it was India, particularly Gandhi's approach to the anti-colonial movement, which prioritised the unity of universal humanity, transcending ideological and religious diversity, that became a major inspiration for Sukarno. Despite recognising basic differences between ideologies, he focused on their parallel vision of ending colonial exploitation. Moreover, he stressed the distinction between social development in Asia and the West, which required Marxist doctrines to be reinterpreted to make them applicable to Indonesia. He wrote that Asian Marxism must be different from the European variety and cooperate with petit-bourgeois parties, considering that 'it was not the question of power, but the struggle against feudalism which was the most urgent'.⁷⁴

Many of Sukarno's ideas in *Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme* corresponded to the formation of 'Marhaenism'. According to a story told by Sukarno himself, this idea began after his encounter with a Sundanese villager called 'Marhaen', a representative of the Indonesian peasant class. Because most Indonesian agrarian villages were based on communal ownership rather than European-style feudal landholding, Sukarno dissociated the Indonesian peasantry from the European industrial proletariat. Sukarno was aware of capitalism as being the main driving force of Western imperialism and he firmly associated anti-colonialism with anti-capitalism, but he repudiated Marxist class struggle as being the primary consideration for the Indonesian anti-colonial movement. In his self-defence speech before his trial in Bandung, in August 1930, later published with the title *Indonesia Menggugat! (Indonesia Accuses!)*, Sukarno claimed:

the PNI (Indonesian National Party) is a revolutionary nationalist party and its mass characteristic, its *kromoism* [*kromo* representing the 'little people'] and Marhaenism are not the result of any communistic

⁷⁴ Sukarno, "Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme", in Sukarno, *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi* (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbitan Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), p. 19.

principles, but exist because the Indonesian community makes it necessary for the PNI to subscribe to such a Marhaenism. It is a necessity; just as European society makes it necessary for European socialists to adhere to proletarianism.⁷⁵

Later on, when he acted as the ‘Great Leader of the Revolution’ during Guided Democracy, Sukarno regarded his invention of Marhaenism as ‘socialism á la Indonesia’ or Marxism adopted within the social condition of Indonesia. He thereby condemned people who regarded themselves as socialist with practising Marxism or embracing ‘communist-phobic’ attitudes.⁷⁶

The ‘Marhaen’ principle was a populist expression for resisting anything that constituted Western imperialism and its ideological attributes. Sukarno once described it as ‘socio-nationalism’ and ‘socio-democracy’, containing elements of nationalism, socialism or social welfare, as well as collectivist and deliberative democratic principles. It reflected a strong vision to revive a genuine model of ‘democracy’ to represent Indonesia and reject the individualistic, liberal democratic values of capitalism and colonialism. ‘Socio-democracy’ was a collectivist, political-economic democracy that established social welfare and justice. Sukarno’s ideological formulations contained contradictions, however; while the notion of socio-democracy implied social welfare or socialist-oriented ideas, socio-nationalism resembled the fascist terminology of national socialism (although he described it otherwise) as an amalgamation of nationalism and universal humanitarianism. More recent studies have linked the collectivist, family-state idea of the New Order regime with earlier ‘illiberal’ ideas of Sukarno and Ki Hadjar Dewantara, and the organicist or ‘integralist’ state concept of Soepomo.⁷⁷

The state ideology, *Pancasila* (‘Five Principles’), was introduced in a speech by Sukarno on 1 June 1945, just a few months before the declaration of independence. It

⁷⁵ Quoted in Mintz (1965), p. 57.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p 189.

⁷⁷ See Marsilam Simanjuntak, *Pandangan Negara Integralistik : Sumber, Unsur dan Riwayatnya dalam Persiapan UUD 1945* (Jakarta : Grafiti, 1994); David Bouchier, “Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia (PhD dissertation, Monash University, 1996).

represented a ‘perennial philosophy’ of Indonesian nationalism associated with theosophical-inspired civil religion, the organicist state, and Sukarno’s own ideological synthesis.⁷⁸ The five principles were nationalism, democracy or people’s sovereignty, social justice and welfare, universal humanity or ‘internationalism’, and belief in One Almighty God. Initially, Pancasila was a compromise among three ideological streams dominating contemporary Indonesian politics: the radical nationalism of Sukarno’s PNI, the social democracy of Hatta and Sjahrir, and the Islamic religious socialism of Sarekat Islam and Masjumi.⁷⁹ At the height of his power, Sukarno determined the interpretation and application of Pancasila by his own ideological formulas, especially ‘Marhaenism.’ In his explanation of Pancasila, Sukarno claimed that the five principles could be reduced to three—belief in God, socio-nationalism and socio-democracy—eventually being concentrated in one basic principle: *gotong royong* (‘collectivism’ or ‘mutual assistance’). His emphasis on collectivism and anti-liberal attitude placed Sukarno in opposition to modernist Minangkabau figures, especially Sjahrir, who advocated the importance of individual initiative as a pillar of democratic society. Sukarno’s adoption of ‘universal humanity’ and ‘inter-nationalism’ was a reaction to the rise of fascism and Western imperialism in the 1930s, which were based on ideas of racial superiority and inequality. They linked the Indonesian nationalist struggle for independence with the broader human liberation movement in colonised world.

Conversely to Sukarno, Tan Malaka represented a more consistently Marxist position, although one that, to some extent, shared the similar political modernism of Sjahrir and democratic socialists. Born in Pandan Gadang, Minangkabau region, Tan Malaka acquired Western education during his adolescence and spent most of his lifetime outside Sumatra, either as a student-activist or political exile. At the age of sixteen, he inherited the semi-aristocratic title *datuk* from his matrilineal ancestor. After reading philosophical literature by Nietzsche and Thomas Carlyle, he discovered Marx,

⁷⁸ There were two principal versions of Pancasila: the Pancasila presented in Sukarno’s 1 June 1945 address and the official version in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, as authorised by the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI) on 18 August 1945. While the former is exclusively Sukarnoist, the latter was a compromise between Indonesian nationalists and Islamists who supported the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*), which contained a formulation that advocated the application of sharia for Muslims; see Yudi Latif, *Negara Paripurna: Historisitas, Rasionalitas dan Aktualitas Pancasila* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2012).

⁷⁹ Mintz (1965), pp. 81–82.

Engels, Lenin and Kautsky, which brought him to Marxism. After news of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October–November 1917 spread to Holland, Tan Malaka became increasingly interested in communism and involved himself in meetings of the students' union. His early thought began to take form when he joined a discussion group led by Henk Sneevliet; subsequently, he became a member of Sneevliet's *Indische Inlichtingendienst* ('Indies Information Service'), which provided information on the situation in the Indies to the Dutch communist newspaper.⁸⁰ After he finished his education in the Netherlands, Tan Malaka returned to Sumatra in late 1919 to teach the children of the coolie community at the Tanjung Morawa tea plantation, Deli. His sympathy towards the marginal life of the coolie, as well as awareness of the gap between planters and workers, became his principal political concerns.

In early 1921, Tan Malaka came to Semarang, Central Java, to join the Indies Communist Party. While he considered education as his primary occupation, the party's prioritising of new capable Indonesian leaders took Tan Malaka deeper into politics. At the PKI congress in Semarang in December 1921, Tan Malaka was elected as party chairman to replace Semaoen. As PKI chairman, he tried to maintain a good relationship with other parts of Sarekat Islam before the split. His prominence soon brought the attention of the government, which arrested and exiled him for his role in supporting a major strike. He then chose to be exiled in the Netherlands.⁸¹ There, he joined the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) and stood for election as a member of parliament. Unsuccessful, he travelled east to Berlin and then to Moscow to speak at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in November–December 1922. The Comintern intended to use him as a mediator between Moscow and the fast-growing PKI. The congress itself mostly dealt with the question of the potential for socialist revolution in the colonial world. There, Tan Malaka became famous for his controversial idea of building an alliance between the international

⁸⁰ Harry A. Poeze, *Di Negeri Penjajah: Orang Indonesia di Negeri Belanda 1600-1950* (Jakarta : Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia /KITLV, 2008), p. 136–137.

⁸¹ Oliver Crawford, *The Political Thought of Tan Malaka* (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018) p. 12–13.

communist movement and pan-Islamism. He argued that, in the situation of the Dutch East Indies, political Islam should be considered as a progressive force and unifying element to establish an effective anti-colonial movement. This political stance put him in opposition to other Comintern leaders who, in the previous congress of 1921, had already denounced pan-Islamism and the pan-Asiatic movement as potential dangers for international communism.⁸² Following the failure of the communist revolts of 1926 and 1927, with which he disagreed, he was cut off from the Communist Party and, subsequently, the Comintern. Nevertheless, he had to leave the colony to escape the Dutch colonial authorities. Tan Malaka founded Partai Republik Indonesia (PARI) in Bangkok in June 1927, as an underground movement with a small membership.⁸³

Oliver Crawford's study of the political thought of Tan Malaka showed that previous scholarship had categorised his mode of thought and ideological orientation in different ways. Rudolf Mrázek, who also wrote a biography of Sjahrir, placed Tan Malaka principally as a Minangkabau thinker, while for Helen Jarvis and other scholars such as Ruth McVey, Tan Malaka was mostly a Marxist, even when his interpretation of Marxist theories on Indonesian society was based in comparison to other Asiatic societies.⁸⁴

Tan Malaka represented typical characteristics of Minangkabau intellectuals, such as having a cosmopolitan sojourner (*perantau*) mentality, inclining towards political modernism, and drawing on Islam in a desire for an egalitarian society. The modernist character of Tan Malaka's ideas was reflected in how he treated Marxism as a scientific method rather than simply a political creed, and his extensive use of historical materialism to criticise most Indonesians' 'mystical' way of thought. This led to his

⁸² In the fourth congress of Comintern (1922) there were two dissenters from Comintern policy, M.N Roy from the Indian Communist Party, who argued for a more independent position for the proletariat against bourgeois interests, and Tan Malaka; Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Jakarta/Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 158–162.

⁸³ The co-founders were two former PKI members, Djamaluddin Tamin and Subakat. This party described itself as 'proletarian-revolutionary'. Rather than affiliate to the Comintern, it stated that it was formed for Indonesian interests and gave priority to liberation of the nation of Indonesia. Later on, this underground party included figures as Muhammad Yamin, Iwa Kusumasumantri, Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh.

⁸⁴ Crawford (2018), p. 20–22.

1943 work, *Madilog (Materialism, Dialectic and Logic)*, in which he argued that most Indonesian society was originally based on maritime culture characterised by an adventurous and dynamic, yet egalitarian nature until the coming of Indian Hinduism.⁸⁵ The ‘Hindu colonisers’ introduced a caste system, which transformed Indonesians from travellers to sedentary villagers, in such a way that they became fatalist, submissive and dependent on outsiders. As with Sjahrir, Tan Malaka blamed the Hindu-Javanese for the irrationality and backward mentality of most Indonesian people, which brought them into feudalism and servitude. According to Mrázek, *Madilog* was Tan Malaka’s way of rediscovering the *Indonesia asli* or ‘original Indonesian society’ as a prototype of the socialist and democratic society.⁸⁶ What Tan Malaka added to Indonesian Marxist historiography was his emphasis on the commercial vitality of pre-colonial Indonesia through arguing that the Majapahit Empire had been a proto-capitalist society with an embryonic bourgeois class. Another important aspect of Tan Malaka’s thought was his view of Islam’s relationship to Marxism. Initially, he and most early Indonesian communists were influenced by the religious socialist orientation of Sarekat Islam; they saw Islam as dealing with the question of the Indonesian people’s morality and identity.

To understand Tan Malaka’s opposition to Sukarno and, later, to Sjahrir, after he founded the Persatuan Perjuangan (PP), it is important to focus on his later writings during the Revolutionary era. From November to December 1945, when Tan Malaka was in Surabaya and witnessed the *pemuda* resistance against the British invasion of this harbour city, he wrote three pamphlets: *Politik (Politics)*, *Rentjana Ekonomi (The Economic Plan)* and *Moeslihat (Trick)*. During the later period, while he was imprisoned, Tan Malaka wrote *Thesis* in 1947, his autobiographical *Dari Penjara ke Penjara (From Gaol to Gaol)* in 1948, and *Gerpolek (Guerilla, Politics, Economy)* in 1948.⁸⁷ Tan Malaka’s political stance in the 1920s, as a communist leader and Marxist-Leninist theoretician, contrasted with his later radical nationalism. At the same time, he

⁸⁵ Tan Malaka, *Madilog: Materialisme, Dialektika dan Logika* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Narasi, 2014).

⁸⁶ Rudolf Mrázek argued that ‘Madilog’ by Tan Malaka represented a typically Minangkabau perspective, “Tan Malaka: A Political Personality’s Structure of Experience”, *Indonesia* Vol 14, October 1972, p. 20–32.

⁸⁷ Tan Malaka, *Dari Penjara ke Penjara* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Narasi, 2008); other primary texts by Tan Malaka as well as other documents from the history of the PKI are available at www.marxist.com.

was in conflict with other Indonesian nationalist figures. From his time with the PKI until he wrote *Madilog*, Tan Malaka remained a cautious yet critical observer in the Marxist intellectual tradition, holding the opinion that most Indonesians were unprepared for revolutionary action, because their ‘feudal’ mentality prevented them from organising in their class interest. Instead, he argued that Indonesian people could be made politically aware through a series of mass actions. In 1945, the main vehicle for the revolution was not the Communist Party—which was only a minor political force—but the *pemuda*. Tan Malaka saw two main factors supporting revolutionary action: (1) severe economic crises caused by the war and Japanese occupation, which raised political discontent and radicalised the population; and (2) the revolutionary and semi-military training of the *pemuda* by the occupation regime. According to Malaka, these confirmed Marx’s prediction that capitalism would ‘dig its own grave.’⁸⁸

As with Sjahrir, Tan Malaka initially distrusted the lack of theoretical guidance and organisational discipline within the *pemuda* movement. His three pamphlets were written to address this lack. These texts were constructed through dialogues between various groups within Indonesian society, including labourers, peasants, merchants, nobles and intellectuals. Another aspect of his ideas differed from those of other leading Indonesian Marxist-inspired nationalists, who also created political courses. Inspired by the Leninist idea of world revolution, Tan Malaka was convinced that the future success of an Indonesian revolution lay in its interconnection with a Southeast Asian revolutionary front called ‘Aslia’, rather than with the Anglo-American capitalist bloc, as suggested by Sjahrir.⁸⁹ In contrast, Sjahrir repudiated merging the Indonesian Revolution into a broader socialist revolution.

While Tan Malaka principally supported the idea of socialist (transnational) revolution, he did not intend it to be led exclusively by the communists or a working-class party. Instead, he introduced the term ‘*murba*’ people, which paralleled Sukarno’s ‘*Marhaen*’ and the ‘*kromo*’ of earlier PKI and SI political vocabulary. This was a

⁸⁸ Crawford (2018), pp. 178–180.

⁸⁹ The idea of a transnational Southeast Asian socialist federation as the basis of revolutionary struggle against Western imperialism and capitalism was even more ambitious than Yamin’s idea of ‘greater Indonesia’, raised at the meeting of BPUPKI in July 1945, which included New Guinea and the Malay peninsula; Crawford (2018), pp. 191–192.

popular alliance among the poor and more revolutionary elements of the lower bourgeoisie, which the *pemuda* movement represented. According to Tan Malaka, the Sjahrir government and its minister of foreign affairs, Amir Sjarifuddin, were driven by pessimistic views about the power of ‘*murba*’ people and overestimated the capitalist-imperialist power. As a Marxist, he was convinced that the war and economic depression were obvious indications that world capitalism was declining. The depression was an example of capitalist overproduction, a natural result of the prevailing ‘anarchy of production’ in market (*laissez-faire*) capitalism. In response to such crises, many countries had implemented economic plans, yet only Soviet Russia, with its socialist economic planning, both survived the depression and corresponded to the agricultural basis of Indonesian society.⁹⁰

The logical outcome for Tan Malaka’s ideas was conflict with Sjahrir. When, in 1946, the government of Prime Minister Sjahrir prioritised negotiating (*diplomasi*) with the Dutch and other Western powers, Tan Malaka formed the *Persatuan Perjuangan* (PP, or ‘Union of Struggle’). According to its ‘Minimum Program’, the PP was committed to armed resistance, rather than diplomacy, as the means of securing Indonesian independence. It demanded a radical settlement of independence, including confiscating and nationalising all Dutch properties, and redistributing plantation land. More importantly, negotiation should only be carried out using the principle of *merdeka seratus persen* (‘total independence’).⁹¹

Democratic Socialism

Compared to other variants of socialism already discussed, democratic socialism is a newer school of thought. One peculiar characteristic of Indonesian democratic socialism is that it strove to promote modernisation and rationalisation as the principal ways to establish a democratic and egalitarian society, rather than revolutionary class struggle.

⁹⁰ See Tan Malaka, “Rencana Ekonomi Berjuang”, 28 November 1945, at www.marxist.com.

⁹¹ The opposition of Tan Malaka towards Indonesian government began with the ‘people’s congress’ organized by some *pemuda* figures around Sukarni in Purwokerto, Central Java on 4–5 January 1946, when Tan Malaka made his first appearance in front of Indonesian public after more than twenty years. There he declared his ‘Minimum Program’ for Indonesia based on ‘merdeka 100%’. The *Persatuan Perjuangan* was officially formed on 15 January 1946; see Mrázek (1996), p 552–553.

The democratic socialists put more emphasis on (individual) intellectual freedom, while rejecting irrational thought as obscurantism, chauvinism and personality cults. According to Feith and Castles, the PSI could not be called ‘democratic’ because its proponents lacked mass support and came largely from the modern and educated urban middle class. The term ‘liberal socialism’ might be a more suitable label because, in Indonesian political language, ‘liberalism’ is not linked closely with free market capitalism.⁹² As with communism, Indonesian democratic socialism emerged as an offshoot of the European (Dutch) socialist movement, and then became integral to the anticolonial struggle. The democratic socialists who had championed political independence for Indonesia later established an independent position between European social democracy/Second International on one side, and the Comintern/Third International on the other.⁹³

The movement was founded in the Indonesian nationalist student activism in the Netherlands, especially in the figures of Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir. They developed a form of anticolonial cosmopolitanism that was connected with broader anticolonial struggles in Asian and African countries.⁹⁴ Early democratic socialists established themselves as a group independent from the Dutch social democrats (SDAP), due to the latter’s conservative stance on colonial issues. Initially, they gathered in the Dutch Social Democratic student club; later, they split into different, but still closely associated groups: the Independent Socialist Party (OSP), led by de Kadt; Indonesian National Education (PNI-Pendidikan); and New PNI, led by Sjahrir and

⁹² Herbert Feith & Lance Castles (eds), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945–1965* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 227.

⁹³ More detailed studies on international solidarity of anticolonial struggle see Frederick Patterson’s thesis “We Are Neither Visionaries nor Utopian Dreamers: Will Munzenberg, the League Against Imperialism and the Comintern 1925–1933” (Doctoral Thesis in Division of Arts, Education and Theology, Abo Akademi University, 2013).

⁹⁴ On Indonesian student activism in the Netherlands, see Harry A. Poeze, *In Het Land van de Overheersers I: Indonesiers in Nederland 1600-1950* (Dordrecht: Foris Publication, 1986) [Indonesian version *Di Negeri Penjajah: Orang Indonesia di Negeri Belanda 1600-1950* (Jakarta: KITLV/Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2008)]; Klaas Stutje, “Behind the Banner of Unity: Nationalism and Anticolonialism among Indonesian Students in Europe 1917–1931” (PhD thesis University of Amsterdam, 2014).

Hatta. PNI-Pendidikan represented the first democratic socialist formation in Indonesia. It was both a continuation of Sukarno's nationalist party and a revision of it.

The PNI-Pendidikan and OSP both promoted full independence for Indonesia, but opted for a more intellectually based action program, rather than being a popular mass movement. The PNI-Pendidikan was intended as a study club, not a political organisation; its principal aim was to generate intellectual cadres to lead national liberation and a democratic revolution.⁹⁵ Intellectual cultivation, theoretical coherence and cadre regeneration had been central features emphasised by the early Indonesian democratic socialist movement. This ideological stream also encompassed a broad range of Western modernist-oriented intellectuals and literary figures connected personally to Sjahrir, creating an intellectual network for the future socialist party. This network included some of the most prominent literary activist groups, such as *Pudjangga Baru* ('The New Poets') and the Dutch-Indonesian study club *Kritiek en Opbouw* ('Criticism and Construction'), as well as the 'underground' leftist youth groups and labour activism organised by Sjahrir's nephew, Djohan Sjahroezah (1912–1968). In general, these groups strongly emphasised the European-oriented study club tradition, with discussions ranging from Western philosophical and literary traditions to political economy, history, Marxism and historical materialism.

Anti-fascism was a central feature of the democratic socialist movement, bringing it into alliance with other Marxist-oriented movements such as the underground PKI, Amir Sjarifuddin's Gerindo party and the Tan Malaka group. The most definitive anti-fascist statement of Indonesian democratic socialism was Sjahrir's work of 1945, *Perdjoeangan Kita (Our Struggle)*. In the pamphlet, Sjahrir argued that the objective of revolution was not limited to national liberation or political independence, but was to bring democratic order into reality by eliminating feudal and fascist-like mentalities, such as being submissive to one's superiors.⁹⁶ Although strongly influenced by revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideas, such as advocating for a

⁹⁵ John D. Legge, "Daulat Ra'jat and the Ideas of Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia", *Indonesia* No. 32 (October 1981).

⁹⁶ Sutan Sjahrir, *Perjuangan Kita* (Bandung: Segi Arsy, 2018); see Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Java in A Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944–1946* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

vanguard party, Sjahrir's critique differed from the views of other leftist thinkers. While most orthodox Marxists used a political-economic analytical framework to explain colonial or feudal exploitation, for Sjahrir, exploitation was enabled through mental and cultural constructions.

The membership of the PSI represented two generations of the Indonesian nationalist movement.⁹⁷ Sjahrir and his contemporaries belonged to the '1928 generation'. Most of their democratic socialist ideas were shaped by the anticolonial context and associated with Marxist-leaning social democracy. The second '1945 generation', which included Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Soedjatmoko, was forged by the combination of wartime anti-fascist resistance and diplomatic manoeuvres to promote Indonesia's struggle for independence. As intellectual intermediaries between Indonesia and the West, many post-independence democratic socialists were inspired by technocratic-oriented Fabian socialism, and advocated for rational economic planning and collective ownership/socialisation of the means of production through state intervention.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ See J.D. Legge, *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the following recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in occupation Jakarta* (New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1988) [Indonesian *Kaum Intelektual dan Perjuangan Kemerdekaan: Peranan Kelompok Sjahrir* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 2003)].

⁹⁸ The earliest work to associate the PSI with Fabianism was Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Jakarta/Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007), pp.129–131.

Part I

The Party and the Movement

CHAPTER 2

The Intellectual Roots of Indonesian Democratic Socialism: Anticolonialism and Modernism

The study of democratic socialism in Indonesian historiography is integral to the study of the emergence and evolution of the Indonesian intellectual class. This chapter discusses how the burgeoning intellectual groups in the *pergerakan* era contributed, either directly or indirectly, to the formation of Sjahrir's socialist movement. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Marx posited that intellectuals should play a strategic role as a vanguard group, encouraging class consciousness among workers and peasants, within the framework of the struggle against capitalist/imperialist exploitation. Some Marxist-inspired Indonesian nationalists organised study clubs, considering themselves as leaders in the struggle against both imperialism and feudal elements within Indonesian society, and eventually against fascism, which was perceived as an amalgamation of feudalism and modern rationality.

The Rise of the Middle-Class Intelligentsia

Numerous studies of Indonesian society's modern transformation have focused on the emergence of the middle-class intelligentsia. Most Western scholarship has situated the roots of the Indonesian middle class in the colonial transformation and changing Dutch colonial policies in nineteenth-century bureaucracy. They include the works of Wim Wertheim, Heather Sutherland and Robert van Niel, among others.¹ While some are sceptical about the reality of a native middle class in Indonesia, others argue that the Indonesian middle class only emerged during the New Order period. Much of this

¹ See W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change, 2nd edition* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1964, first published 1956), Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1979) and Robert Van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite* (Leiden: KILTV, 1984, first published 1964).

scepticism was based on the fact that there was no independent entrepreneurial class among Indonesians, other than those linked to and protected by the ruling political elites. In general, the Indonesian middle class has not conformed to the main features of the Western bourgeoisie.²

Recent accounts of the rise of middle-class intellectuals, which contribute principal insights to this study, were made by Yudi Latif and Sony Karsono, along with Adrian Vickers' analysis of cultural aspects of modernity.³ Latif focused on the formation of the Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia during the twentieth century, arguing that the evolution of print capitalism was the principal factor that contributed to the emergence of a 'bourgeoisie public sphere' and an intellectual class. This evolution started with the establishment of a vernacular press and Malay-language literature in the mid-nineteenth century. Extensive use of low Malay (*Melayu pasar*) language was strengthened by the government's dual language policy: Dutch for European schools and the bureaucracy, and local languages—Malay and Javanese—for the native civil service and vernacular schools. The development of print capitalism, alongside accessibility to European education, allowed Indonesian elites to be educated in the Netherlands. This became a main stimulus for intellectual development and the idea of 'progress' (*kemadjoean*) among a proto-middle class.

Sony Karsono's study centred on the evolution of the Indonesian middle class as an unfixed, plural category (thus, he referred it as the 'middling-classes') and its quest for modernity as a vehicle for the developmentalist ideas prevalent in the New Order era. One central argument was that New Order developmentalism was determined by its intellectuals' and technocrats' ideas, rather than being the result of economic (state-capitalist) or political (militarist and bureaucratic-patrimonial) factors.⁴ This study

² For more views about the Indonesian middle-class, see Richard Tanter & Kenneth Young (eds), *Politik Kelas Menengah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996), and for the economic aspects, including the lack of an independent capitalist class, see Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2009).

³ Yudi Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20* (Bandung: Mizan, 2007); Sony Karsono, *Indonesia's New Order 1966-1998: Its Social and Intellectual Origins* (Phd Thesis, College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, 2013); and Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁴ Karsono (2013), pp. 27–29.

connected the rise of developmental planning institutions with the Indonesian nationalists' and intellectual's search of modernity in the late colonial era, an issue that corresponds to the question examined in my study. Karsono identified some principal groups that formed middle-class culture(s): the Javanese 'new-*priyayi*' (new aristocracy), Islamic Minangkabau people, Christian East Indonesians and 'foreign oriental' groups (mostly Chinese and Arab traders). The Minangkabau middle classes, along with the Javanese, provided PSI-linked intellectuals.

The Javanese middle class emerged during the nineteenth century through the modern colonial bureaucracy and Western modern education. An initial attempt to apply European Enlightenment principles of rationalisation and modernity led to a conservative reaction by Javanese aristocrats, culminating in the Java War.⁵ Consequently, between 1830 and 1870, the Cultivation System 're-feudalised' Javanese society, reinstating the old Dutch East Indian Company (VOC) approach of indirect rule and treating Java as a state enterprise and 'cash-crop-producing machine'. It relied heavily on the joint rule of the colonial administration's Dutch wing, the *Binnenlandsch Bestuur*, and its subordinate Javanese wings, the *Pangreh Praja*.⁶ In the long term, the involvement of Javanese traditional elites (*priyayi*) in the Cultivation System resulted in them integrating into and depending on the colonial administration, changing their position from lords to bureaucrats. Yet, they could still maintain their traditional attributes such as appanage benefices, the right of hereditary succession (especially for regents), and personal services from the peasantry. The trend of the *priyayi* becoming bureaucrats detached from the peasantry intensified during the Liberal Era. The changing orientation of the colonial government brought an extension and modernisation of the colonial administration which, in turn, gave rise to the need for the professionalisation of the *priyayi* as *pangreh praja* officials. From 1878 onwards, these native officials were trained at the *hoofdenschool* in Bandung, Magelang or Probolinggo—whose curriculum included welfare-oriented subjects such as agriculture

⁵ 'Enlightenment-inspired' reforms were applied by Daendels and Raffles in the early nineteenth century—Ricklefs regarded the Diponegoro revolt or the Java War (1825–1830) as 'the last stand of the Javanese aristocratic elites', M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 153.

⁶ Sutherland (1979), pp. 11–16.

and ethics. Professionalisation brought at least two kinds of social change. First, it undermined the social privileges of the *priyayi*. Aristocratic status was no longer sufficient to guarantee their entry into the colonial civil service; they needed modern educational qualifications. Second, the schools exposed the sons of the *priyayi* to the core values of a modern public service, which ran counter to traditional attitudes.⁷

Following the end of the Padri War, West Sumatra underwent a similar transformation. From the 1850s onwards, the Dutch established Western-oriented education for local aristocratic and middle classes. According to Elizabeth Graves, most leaders and intellectual elites of early twentieth-century Minangkabau came from the families of school teachers, coffee warehouse clerks or lower-ranking civil servants, who were recruited in the nineteenth century due to the expanding colonial bureaucratic structure. Unlike in Java, where Dutch schools successfully attracted students from aristocratic families, initially, the Minangkabau royal families showed little interest in education and preferred to hire educated clerks. The gap was immediately filled by lower-class people from poor agricultural areas, who were used to ‘wandering’ (*merantau*) as traders or craftsman, but were willing to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by climbing the colonial bureaucratic ladder.⁸ Hence, ‘modernisation’ in Minangkabau relied more on an internal, indigenous initiative towards participation in colonial modernity and gradual reform of traditional foundations, rather than being entirely the effect of the colonial project. Dutch caution regarding the challenge of Islam was a factor here. An exception to this trend was Datuk Sutan Maharadja (1860–1921), who took up an apprenticeship in law that secured him a job in the colonial administration. He then switched careers to Malay-language journalism and, as an editor and writer from an aristocratic background, grappled with the key issues of *adat* (tradition), Islam and modernisation. Maharadja campaigned against the conservative aristocracy and advocated that, for the sake of ‘progress’ (*kemadjoean*), Minangkabau should be returned to its ‘democratic’ *adat* roots.⁹

⁷ Karsono (2013), pp. 60–61.

⁸ Elizabeth E. Graves, *The Minangkabau Response to Dutch Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981), pp. vii–ix.

⁹ Taufik Abdullah, *Indonesia Towards Democracy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), pp. 6–7.

Maharadja's progressivism was continued by other prominent Indonesian journalists, most prominently Abdul Rivai (1871–1937) from Sumatra and Tirta Adhi Soerjo (1880–1918) from Java. Rivai was a Minangkabau scholar, who had graduated from the Dutch Indies Medical School (STOVIA) and worked as a journalist before entering Amsterdam University in 1904. As the pioneer of progressive journalism, Rivai emphasised the key concepts of *bangsawan pikiran* ('nobility in thought') to contrast with old aristocratic elite or *bangsawan oesoel* ('nobility of origin'),¹⁰ and *kaoem moeda* ('youth generation'), not only as a means of self-identification, but to catch up psychologically with the West. Later on, Rivai became the main inspiration for the *kaoem moeda* modernist movement in Minangkabau.¹¹ Tirta was a model modernist-oriented Javanese aristocrat, who made journalism his main vehicle, most notably through a weekly Malay publication, *Medan Priyayi*, in 1907. As with Rivai, Tirta primarily used his journalism to endorse a collective consciousness of being an oppressed indigenous people and 'nation', using Malay as the language of nationalism. He initiated Sarekat Islam and inspired progressive, egalitarian-minded Javanese aristocrats to struggle for the 'commoners' (*kaoem kromo*) against colonial exploitation.¹² They were the first nationalists to cultivate a new consciousness of the nature of colonialism, which was fundamental for the development of socialist ideas.

Anticolonial Political Parties: PI and PNI-Pendidikan

The development of an Indonesian student movement overseas had a significant impact for anticolonial movements. For Indonesian nationalists it created a closer association with broader national liberation movements in Asia, as well as the international socialist and communist movements. In the Netherlands, this student movement was pioneered by Abdul Rivai, R.M. Panji Sosrokartono (the elder brother of Kartini), and R.M. Noto

¹⁰ Yudi Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20* (Bandung: Mizan, 2007) pp. 32 and 151

¹¹ For modernist movement in Minangkabau see the dissertation of Taufik Abdullah, *School and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971).

¹² The first biographical work of Tirta was by Pramoedya Ananta Toer and made famous by his quartet novel series. See Pramoedya Ananta Toer, *Sang Pemula* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1985).

Soeroto. Most supported moderate ideals that accorded with the ‘Ethical’ orientation of the colonial government.¹³ These students of *priyayi* background helped to establish the *Indische Vereeniging* (‘Indies Association’), founded in The Hague in November 1908. This association was dedicated to advancing the interests of all Indies people in the Netherlands. Only in the early 1920s did the *Indische Vereeniging* change its course, under the influence of a new and more politicised generation of students from the colony. These students were no longer predominantly of aristocratic descent, but came more from the urban elite or higher commercial classes.¹⁴

The new direction of the student movement began when the *Indische Vereeniging* transformed into *Perhimpunan Indonesia* (PI) in early 1922, with a new leadership that included Achmad Soebardjo Djojoadisoeerjo, Mohammad Hatta, Darmawan Mangunkusumo and Iwa Kusumasumantri. In 1923, the PI officially formulated its new fundamental aims as Indonesian political independence, ‘self-help’ or non-cooperation, and the struggle for unity. Increasingly, it was radically inclined and looked to further the international anti-colonial solidarity forged by the activities of Comintern participants. During the 1920s, the Netherlands became the base of exiled communists such as Semaoen, Darsono and Tan Malaka.¹⁵

In Holland, the leading figure in the student movement was Mohammad Hatta.¹⁶ Unlike Sukarno, Tan Malaka or Sjahrir—who were ideological thinkers—Hatta was a scholarly intellectual closer to Soedjatmoko and Sumitro. His political and intellectual career consisted of three phases. First was the radical, Marxist/social-democratic nationalist phase, from 1922 until his arrest and exile in early 1934. Unlike Sukarno, who had never been overseas before Independence and only became closely associated

¹³ Harry A. Poeze, *Di Negeri Penjajah: Orang Indonesia di Negeri Belanda 1600–1950* (Jakarta: KITLV/Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2008), see below on Noto Soeroto.

¹⁴ Klaas Stutje ‘Indonesian Identities Abroad: International Engagement of Colonial Students in the Netherlands 1908–1931’, *BGMN/Low Countries Historical Review*, Vol 128, 1 (2013), p. 155.

¹⁵ Poeze (2008), p. 184.

¹⁶ Mavin Rose, *Free Indonesia: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1987) [*Indonesian Indonesia Merdeka: Biografi Politik Mohammad Hatta* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1991)]; for contextualisation of his political ideas, Rikard Bangun (ed), *Bung Hatta* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2003).

with the communists in his later years, Hatta was already in close contact with international anticolonial movements, as well as communists, in his early years. His break with communism in the early 1930s made him anti-communist for the rest of his political life. In the second phase, from 1934 until his retirement as Indonesian vice-president in 1956, Hatta was a moderate intellectual and politician, who was closer to the ‘religious socialist’ tradition of Sarekat Islam and the Masjumi party. Hatta attempted to invent an indigenous version of social democracy, embracing ideas of social organicism integrated with Western rationality and individuality. While Sukarno’s collectivist ideas derived from Javanist or theosophical-inspired cultural nationalism, Hatta’s convictions were based on Minangkabau local customs inspired by Islamic teachings.¹⁷ His central idea was ‘economic democracy’ (*demokrasi ekonomi* or *ekonomi kerakyatan*), closely associated with the cooperative movement. The final phase lasted from 1956 until his death in 1980, during which time Hatta retired from politics and became an intellectual and scholar, mostly in the field of economics. Hatta, who was not affiliated with the PSI, contributed key ideas of the economic aspect of democratic socialism in Indonesia. Comparison with Hatta clarifies Sjahrir and Sumitro’s ideas in relation to democratic socialism.

One of the main motives for nationalist students to be active abroad was their belief that the problems in Indonesia remained unknown to the outside world. The PI began to develop international anti-colonial networks linked to the international labour movement.¹⁸ As discussed in the previous chapter, following Leninist doctrine on the nature of imperialism and class struggle inherent in colonialism, the Comintern concerned itself with initiating anti-colonial revolution in the colonised world. Communist groups regularly organised and funded international conferences. The most significant outcome of Indonesian nationalists’ overseas work was their participation in the first congress of the League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression (simply, the League), which took place in Brussels on 10–15 February 1927. It was organised by International Labour Defence, a communist organisation run by German communist,

¹⁷ Comparable to Soetomo’s Parindra in the 1930s (see below); David Reeve (1985) saw Hatta’s ideas of social organicism and corporatism as one of the bases of the New Order’s Golongan Karya.

¹⁸ Stutje (2013), pp. 160–162.

Willi Munzerberg, and attended by 180 delegates from thirty-four countries spanning five continents. Following this successful inaugural conference, the League, with Jawaharlal Nehru as its honorary president, was established in Berlin with offices in London and Paris.¹⁹ Among the Dutch East Indies delegates were Mohammad Hatta, on behalf of the PI, and Semaoen, the former chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party. Hatta became one of the Executive Committee members, where he worked for the first time with Nehru.²⁰

The first League congress took place after the abortive communist revolt in the Indies. Semaoen had been one of the communist leaders opposed to this premature action. In early December 1926, Semaoen asked Hatta to support his proposal to form a new revolutionary party. This party was to be strictly controlled, focusing on political education and social work until the time was ready to launch an anti-colonial revolution. Initially, Hatta rejected violent revolution, but he agreed that education and emancipation were essential to prepare the masses for political independence. Eventually, the two agreed that Semaoen, on behalf of the Communist Party, and the PI, as the nationalist leadership, would co-direct the anti-colonial movement.²¹ It was against Comintern policy, however, for communists to take the main initiative for anti-colonial struggles in underdeveloped colonised countries. The so-called ‘Hatta-Semaoen Agreement’ soon fell into the hands of the Dutch police, which used it as primary evidence—along with Hatta’s participation in the Comintern-sponsored anti-colonial congress—to take action against the PI leadership. On 10 June 1927, while Hatta and others were away from the Netherlands, the government raided the PI leaders’ residences and seized documents. Along with Ali Sastroamidjojo, Abdulmadjid Djojoaningrat and Pamontjak, Hatta was arrested in September 1927, but only put on trial in March 1928. Hatta’s address before the Dutch court, entitled ‘*Indonesia merdeka*’ (‘Free Indonesia’) was published and distributed in his home country. In his

¹⁹ Fredrik Petersson, “*We Neither Visionaries nor Utopian Dreamer: Willi Munzerberg, the League Against Imperialism and the Comintern 1925–1933*” (PhD Thesis, Division for Arts, Education and Theology, History Department Abo Akademi University, 2013).

²⁰ Stutje (2013), pp. 166–167.

²¹ Poeze (2008), pp. 188–189.

address, he explained the PI's main reason for struggle, as well as some of the political and psychological factors that determined the association's direction. In the end, the court absolved the defendants, and the case became one of Indonesian nationalists' most celebrated victories.²²

The League's attempt to establish a Dutch branch movement was by no means free from obstacles, because it was suspected of being a tactic by Moscow and the Comintern to dominate the global anti-colonial movement. From the beginning, the SDAP declined to participate in the League, while the British Labour Party had withdrawn from the League just months after the Brussels congress. Hence, leftist social democrats within the SDAP who wished to keep their membership in the League were forced to choose between the League and SDAP, with many of them deciding to leave the former.²³ Even though the arrest and trial of Hatta and other PI figures united the PI, SDAP and League representation in Holland in a stand against the government, disharmony between them became increasingly apparent. From the beginning, the SDAP had consistently supported reformist, welfare-oriented colonial policies based on the Marxist interpretation that colonialism was a progressive force to advance fully developed capitalism as the pre-condition for achieving a socialist society. In accordance with the Second International policy, the SDAP's J.A. Stokvis proposed that 'the colonies would acquire independence once they could occupy an independent position within international society.' In a speech before the SDAP, Hatta exclaimed that he wished to distance himself from this position. He was, nevertheless, dissatisfied with League membership, beginning to view it as a Comintern front that no longer represented an equal alliance among communists, socialists and nationalists.²⁴ Hatta responded to Stokvis in the magazine *De Socialist*, repudiating the accusation that PI

²² Ibid, pp. 212–213.

²³ SDAP members who joined the League were a minority who were ideologically closer to independent socialists such as Henriette Roland Holst, Henk Sneevliet and the British Independent Labour Party; Klaas Stutje, "*Behind the Banner of Unity: Nationalism and Anti-colonialism among Indonesian Students in Europe 1917-1931*" (PhD Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2016) p. 200.

²⁴ "The Colonial Resolution of the Second International", in Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings by Mohammad Hatta* (The Hague/Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1972), pp. 361–372.

had been influenced by, or was subordinate to, the communists through its participation in the League.²⁵

The League became a contested arena between the Second International (Labour and Socialist International) and Third International Comintern. The right-wing nationalist (Kuomintang Party) faction's massive suppression of the Chinese Communist Party had brought a major policy change in the international communist movement, particularly after the sixth congress of the Comintern (July–August 1928).²⁶ This soon led to a revision of the Leninist doctrine of alliance between Third World working-class and bourgeoisie parties—nationalist and social democrats—blaming the latter for the suppression of the communist movements in China and the Netherlands East Indies. The result was the 'Bolshevisation' or 'Stalinisation' of all existing anti-colonial umbrella organisations, including the League.²⁷ The conflict of interests between communist and non-communist groups was raised in the Second Congress in Frankfurt in July 1929. The communist faction used the congress to attack the chairman, James Maxton, and other 'reformists', as well as the representatives from the Indian National Congress) and 'fascist' Chinese Kuomintang Party.²⁸ The retirement and expulsion of non-communist members from the League followed soon after.

The rivalry between socialists and communists caught Hatta and other PI leaders between a rock and a hard place. Sjahrir, who had been active in the Bandung youth movement, came to Holland to study law and joined Indonesian student groups there. He developed a close relationship with the Sociaal Democratische Student Club—a student club loosely affiliated with SDAP—and its chairperson, Salomon (Sal) Tas. This study club was, in contrast to the SDAP leadership, ideologically closer to the independent socialist movement that supported the Indonesian nationalist movement. 'I remember the chant we used to raise in the party meeting', wrote Sal Tas, 'Indonesia

²⁵ Poeze (2008), pp. 215–217.

²⁶ Helene Carrere d'Encausse & Stuart R. Schram, *Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings* (London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 232–247.

²⁷ Stutje (2016), p. 208.

²⁸ Frederik Patterson (2013), pp. 319–338.

free from Holland, *now!*²⁹ Against the vague and sentimental Ethical views that dominated Dutch social democracy under the guise of ‘religious socialism’, they supported the clear, courageous and naturally scientific teaching of historical materialism. Sjahrir realised that most Dutch social democrats, despite their democratic commitment, were former colonial officials who thus opposed any revolutionary options.³⁰ The club published its journal, *De Socialist*, and organised ‘socialist weekends’ for students to engage in debates or art performances. During that time, most students could only gain access to knowledge on the Dutch East Indies through the textbooks written by colonial scholars, or *Indologists*, associated with the Leiden School. Nevertheless, as the students went deeper into socialism, they became more critical of colonial policies, including the Ethical Policy.

Under the mentorship of Hatta, Sjahrir joined the PI, becoming its secretary in February 1930.³¹ Hatta stepped down as PI chairperson immediately after the League’s Frankfurt congress, and was replaced by Abdullah Sukur and Roestam Effendi. Both were sympathisers of communism, as was Abdulmadjid.³² There was a decline in radical nationalism within the PI leadership, however, because it lost its leading position within the Indonesian nationalist movement. Sukarno’s PNI movement took over this role through the united front of the Indonesian nationalist movement, called the PPPKI (Pemufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia).³³ Most PI figures who returned to Java after finishing their higher education in the Netherlands joined the PNI/PPPKI. Hatta’s and Sjahrir’s relationship worsened with both the Moscow-oriented communists and the mainstream social democrats, which brought them closer to Sal Tas and his Social Democratic Student Club, as well as other Dutch independent socialists,

²⁹ Sal Tas, “Souvenir of Sjahrir” (translated by Ruth T. McVey), *Indonesia* No 8 (October 1965), p. 138.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 139.

³¹ Rudolf Mrázek, *Sjahrir: Politik dan Pengasingan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1996), pp. 110–111.

³² Poeze (2008), p 213.

³³ PPPKI, formed in Bandung in December 1927, consisted of the PNI, Budi Utomo, Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI), along with other youth associations and study clubs.

including Sneevliet. Both Hatta and Sjahrir wrote for *De Socialist* until they left Holland.³⁴

The PI's withdrawal as the League representative in Holland provoked a negative response from the Dutch Communist Party (*Communistische Partij Holland*, CPH), which had been its main supporter. The most significant shift in PI's ideological orientation took place in early 1931, when Abdulmadjid became chairperson. As the communist faction began to dominate the PI, it soon became a front organisation for the CPH. Pressure on Hatta and his independent stance increased; he was forced to abandon his membership of the League executive committee in May 1931, to be replaced by Abdulmadjid. Other nationalist and leftist socialists were also excluded from the League, accused of having 'betrayed the struggle front and shown themselves to be agents of the imperialists.'³⁵ In November 1931, Hatta was dismissed from the PI altogether. He was charged for going against party discipline by failing to consult with the leadership before expressing a public opinion. Sjahrir had been the only person to openly oppose the resolution; he left the organisation soon afterwards.³⁶

This was a critical period for the Indonesian nationalist movement because the colonial government started to apply a reactionary policy, coinciding with the beginning of the Great Depression. Sukarno and other main PNI figures were arrested in late December 1929, followed by the dissolution of the Nationalist Party and formation of the Indonesian Party, or *Partai Indonesia* (Partindo), in April 1931. The decision, made by the chairperson Sartono, who succeeded Sukarno, was disputed among PNI members. Those who disagreed with Sartono's action formed rival organisations, calling themselves 'independent groups' (*golongan merdeka*) or sometimes 'study

³⁴ Sneevliet supported 'Asian Marxism' within the Dutch communist movement. His growing identification with the left opposition isolated him from the Comintern and forced him to devote his political energies to the Dutch socialist movement. Just before the Sixth Congress he broke up completely from Comintern and the Dutch Communist Party, and two years later formed the Revolutionary Socialist Party, one of the few independent Marxist parties with popular support in Europe in the 1930s; Williams, (1980) p. 89.

³⁵ Poeze (2008), pp. 246–247.

³⁶ Tas (1965), p. 142.

clubs.³⁷ A major factor contributing to this rising opposition towards Sartono was his inclination to accommodate Javanese-aristocratic elites, and thereby turn the PNI towards Javanese cultural nationalism. This disappointed those who were attracted to Sukarno and his progressive, leftist ideology. For them, embracing Javanese ‘feudal’ elements was a betrayal of one the basic ideals of Indonesian nationalism: to free the Indonesian people from exploitation and inequality.

Hatta and Sjahrir had close contact with study clubs opposed to Partindo. Some of their friends, who had returned to the Indies, immediately joined the clubs. In June 1931, Hatta wrote to a friend who was active in the *golongan merdeka* to confirm that he would join their group after returning from the Netherlands, instead of Sartono’s Partindo. Two months later, these study clubs merged to establish a new association called the Indonesian National Education (*Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia*) club, commonly known as the New PNI (PNI-Baru) or PNI-Pendidikan. At Hatta’s suggestion, they named their official magazine *Daulat Ra’jat* (*People’s Sovereignty*), whose debut editorial cited ‘social education’ as fundamental to the movement. Even though they managed it from overseas, Hatta and Sjahrir were the real leaders of the study club. Just after his resignation from PI, Sjahrir left the Netherlands for Java—almost simultaneously, Sukarno was released from prison in Bandung. Sjahrir immediately took over the main initiatives of the PNI-Pendidikan, including *Daulat Ra’jat*.³⁸ The magazine was concerned with exploring colonial subjection and the nature of imperialism. It was not enough merely to struggle against the Dutch, without understanding the character of imperialism in general. Many of the questions raised by the magazine were in tune with those of PI, the ‘old’ PNI and Sukarno’s writings from 1927 to that time.³⁹ Initially, Sukarno intended to unite Sartono’s *Partindo* with the

³⁷ John D. Legge, “Daulat Ra’jat and the Idea of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia”, *Indonesia* 32 (October 1981), p. 151.

³⁸ When Sjahrir arrived in Batavia, the PNI-Pendidikan had just appointed its first official board. In January 1932, he became the chief editor of *Daulat Ra’jat* and was appointed as the chairperson of PNI-Pendidikan in its first congress in June 1932; John D Legge, *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the following recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in occupation Jakarta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1988) p. 35.

³⁹ Legge (1981), p. 156.

PNI-Pendidikan, but he soon realised that there were unbridgeable differences between the two parties. Sjahrir eventually joined *Partindo* in 1932.

John Ingleson's study of Indonesian nationalist movements discussed key differences in ideas between *Partindo* and the PNI-Pendidikan.⁴⁰ *Partindo* adopted Sukarno's ideas of 'Marhaenism', but was more conservative and cautious towards potential government repression, while PNI-Pendidikan was a continuation of Hatta's PI, inclined towards the European social-democratic tradition. *Partindo's* main objective was to create a sense of national unity among Indonesian people. PNI-Pendidikan was dedicated to the 'people's sovereignty' (*kedaulatan rakyat*) based on the people's equal, democratic participation. Sukarno's adoption of Marxist's anti-capitalist terms was subordinated to the ideals of national independence and was not intended to divide Indonesian society into opposing class categories. The PNI-Pendidikan was more consistently Marxist, because its leading intellectuals argued that the class struggle must proceed alongside the struggle for independence. Not only should Western capitalism be rejected, but also its Indonesian variant as 'the instrument of foreign capitalism.' Hatta argued that this should be achieved through 'a complete economic restructuring' based on creating self-sufficient, collectivist-based economic enterprises; that is, cooperatives.⁴¹

In the PNI-Pendidikan's notion of democratic participation, the people must be politically conscious and/or educated. Such participation must have an institutional framework in the form of parliamentary and party systems. A multi-party system, representing multiple ideologies, was essential to create a political climate by which the people became aware of their rights. The parties should compete in developing politically conscious membership, while staying united in the common struggle for national independence.⁴² In contrast, Sukarno opposed the parliamentary and multi-party system, preferring a single state party to represent the people's 'common will'.

⁴⁰ John Ingleson, *Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement 1927-1934* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), pp. 166–167.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 168.

This was manifested in the PPPKI federation. For him, Western parliamentary democracy was nothing other than a ‘tyranny of the majority over the minority.’ Sukarno argued that the Indonesian population’s collectivist nature implied that representative bodies should raise issues and ‘deliberate’ (*musyawarah*) to reach a ‘consensus’ (*mufakat*), rather publicly arguing and competing against each other.⁴³ Sukarno’s intoxication with unity was criticised by Hatta, who insisted that a forced unity without common awareness was nonsense:

What is called *persatuan* is in fact nothing other than *persatean*, buffalo, cow and goat meat prepared so that they become one [*satay* dish]. But, the viewpoint of the (common) people and the bourgeoisie cannot be united, and unity of all these groups means each of them sacrificing their principles.⁴⁴

Despite lacking mass support, the PNI-Pendidikan consistently displayed commitment to political education for the lower classes. As reported by the colonial police agency, the club focused its activities in regions where the Communist Party (PKI) was relatively prominent. Before the coming of Sjahrir, there were some notable leftist activists among the members of the ‘independent clubs.’ The relationship among Sjahrir, Hatta and more radical leftist movements during this period requires further explanation, given that the communist faction caused their exclusion from PI. They were socialists with a strong Marxist reference. Their main inclination during that time, however, as shown by the close connection among Sjahrir, Sal Tas and the social-democratic study club in the Netherlands, was more towards the independent socialist movement. Such ‘independent socialism’—a diverse spectrum of Marxist, socialist and labour movements—was not aligned with the Second or Third Internationals, and their policy on imperialism.⁴⁵ Only independent revolutionary Marxists, such as Henk

⁴³ Sukarno’s critique of Western parliamentary democracy, “Demokrasi Politik dan Demokrasi Ekonomi”, first published in *Fikiran Ra’jat*, 28 October and 4 November 1932, re-published in Sukarno, *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi* Vol 1 (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbitan Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), pp.148–153.

⁴⁴ Mohammad Hatta, “Persatuan dicari, persatean jang ada”, *Daulat Ra’jat* No 22, 20 April 1932, quoted in Ingleson (1979), pp. 169–170.

⁴⁵ Philip Bourrinet, *The Dutch and German Communist Left (1900-68)* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), pp. 67–68.

Sneevliet and Henriette Roland Holst, kept advocating total independence for the Indies.⁴⁶

At the same time that Sjahrir took over PNI-Pendidikan, Sal Tas, along with Jacques de Kadt, Edo Fimmen and Piet Schmidt—the editors of *De Socialist*—broke away from the SDAP and formed the Independent Socialist Party (*Onafhankelijke Socialistische Partij*, OSP).⁴⁷ The new party's political manifesto declared its support for Indonesian independence. Its journal, *Fakkkel*, praised the PNI-Pendidikan as the 'revolutionary vanguard' and 'the only radical party in Indonesia.'⁴⁸ In December 1932, J. de Kadt sent a telegram to Hatta, promoting him as an OSP candidate in the upcoming election for the Netherlands State-General's Lower House (*Tweede Kamer*). After consulting with the PNI-Pendidikan executive committee, Hatta declined the offer. However, the (fake) news soon spread that he had accepted the candidacy, which raised strong criticism from the *Partindo* side for abandoning the principle of non-cooperation with the Dutch. Hatta replied that non-cooperation for him was a method rather than a political dogma. He insisted that accepting a seat as an elected member in the Dutch Parliament was totally different from joining the *Volksraad* ('People's Council'). Sukarno's appeal to the Council of Justice after he had been sentenced to prison by Bandung District Court, Hatta said, was on the same level as taking a seat in the Dutch Parliament.⁴⁹

From the beginning, the PNI-Pendidikan had been an association centred in Java, with Batavia and Bandung as its principal headquarters. Unlike other Java-based nationalist parties, however, it rarely represented Javanist issues. Most *Daulat Ra'jat* articles were written in a 'dry political and detached way' and related to Indonesian matters that just happened to have taken place in Java. In contrast, the Sumatran and particularly Minangkabau-related articles impressed readers as being colourful and

⁴⁶ Williams (1980).

⁴⁷ Jacques de Kadt (1897–1988), writer, joined the Dutch Communist Party (CPH) in 1920. He joined the SDAP in 1928, and became a leader of its left wing. The OSP was a typical expression of 'independent socialism'. He supported the mutiny of the battleship *Zeven Provinciën* in February 1933, and was thus imprisoned for three months. He left the OSP in 1934, together with Tas, Bourrinet (2017), p. 274.

⁴⁸ Sal Tas, "Indonesie komt in beweging", quoted in Mrázek (1996), pp. 183–184.

⁴⁹ Ingleson (1979), pp. 198–199.

politically cultural, and having a distinctively regional flavour.⁵⁰ The adoption of Minangkabau-based collectivism by the PNI-Pendidikan began with the return of Hatta from the Netherlands. Hatta's takeover of the PNI-Pendidikan leadership had an impact in the outer islands, especially Sumatra. In Minangkabau, the more puritan Islamic reformism had dominated local education and socio-religious movements; hence, the PNI-Pendidikan's attempt to introduce secular, Western modernism found resistance.⁵¹ The biggest contribution of Hatta to the intellectual element of PNI-Pendidikan and the Indonesian democratic socialist tradition in general, was his emphasis on the more genuine, collectivist 'democracy' of the Minangkabau village as the ideal-type of Indonesian democracy. To counter the negativity of Minangkabau Islamists, the PNI-Pendidikan under Hatta presented their vision of democratic society based on 'people's sovereignty' (*kedaulatan ra'jat*) as a Minangkabau-based concept: 'It should be based on collectivism, which is the foundation of our communal life in the earlier times, before the coming of the capitalist exploitation of Western imperialism'.⁵²

Meanwhile, the new wave of reactionary policy of the colonial state began under the rule of governor-general Jhr. B.C. de Jonge (1931–1936). Considered to be 'the most reactionary and the worst government ever in the Indies',⁵³ he was hostile to the products of the Leiden School and any Ethical approach to colonial policy. A new inclination towards right-wing politics emerged, bolstering 'racial' tension between the European and indigenous populations, as indicated by the rise of the Dutch right-wing *Vaderlandsche Club*.⁵⁴ One aspect of this policy was the restriction of indigenous-based

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 164.

⁵¹ For instance, Permi (Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia), a local Islamic organisation founded in May 1930 from the circle of Sumatra Thawalib, accused the PNI-Pendidikan of being driven by anti-religious sentiments, saying that respect for national symbols was an act of infidelity (*kafir*), see Audrey Kahin (2008), pp. 73–77.

⁵² Cited in Mrázek (1996), pp. 172–173.

⁵³ Marcel Koch, quoted in Mrázek (1994), p. 108.

⁵⁴ *De Vaderlandsche Club* or 'Patriotic Club' (formed 1929) was an ultra-conservative, Dutch nationalist association formed to defend the interest of the European community and 'white' racial supremacy against the rising tide of Indonesian radical nationalism. Its emergence was linked to the phenomenon of ultra-nationalism and fascism in the early 1930s represented by such organisations as the *Nationaal Socialistische Bond* (NSB), the Dutch Nazi Party.

private schools through the ‘wild school’ ordinance of 1932. The mutiny on the battleship *Zeven Provinciën* off the northwest shore of North Sumatra, on 4 February 1933, led to prosecution of radical nationalist movements. Government intelligence discovered a link between the activities of the marine workers’ union and the rising agitation of nationalist parties, including the PNI-Pendidikan.⁵⁵ On 1 August, the government arrested Sukarno for the second time, exiling him to Flores early the next year. This was followed in February 1934 by the arrests of Hatta, Sjahrir and other PNI-Pendidikan leaders such as Burhanuddin, Maskoen and Mohammad Bondan. They were imprisoned in Batavia for nearly one year, before being exiled to Boven Digul. The suppression of the non-cooperative, Marxist-inspired nationalist movement indicated the end of an era, with the nationalist movement shifting to a more moderate direction. However, the opposition between the nationalist movement’s Western-oriented, democratic elements and more conservative cultural nationalism soon began to manifest once again.

Cultural Nationalism vis-a-vis Modernism

The idea of collectivism, as romanticised by European Orientalists, has been a central idea in nationalist and socialist discourses. For some, collectivism was a genuine aspect of Indonesian ‘socialism’; for others, however, it was nothing more than a camouflage for the social inequality inherent within feudal-based agrarian societies. Many Indonesian cultural nationalists regarded collectivism as having great potential as a driving force for nation-building, while the modernists saw it as an obstacle to individual rational thinking and modernisation. Anti-feudalism and anti-colonialism had been adopted as principles of socialist movements in much of the Asian colonial world. Therefore, it is important to review the debates between Indonesians who embraced cultural nationalism and those who advocated Western-oriented modernisation, with the latter constituting most PSI intellectuals. Related issues that

⁵⁵ Ricklefs (2001), p. 239.

emerged in these debates included the awakening of the East, the idea of social organicism and the role of collectivism in developing the cooperative movement.⁵⁶

Two Dutch scholars, sociologist B.J.O. Schrieke, and colonial officer cum-observer of Indonesian indigenous culture and society, Ch. O. Van der Plas, emphasised a dichotomy in the intellectual aspects of Indonesian nationalism, albeit through somewhat different perspectives. Schrieke contrasted social or political nationalism with cultural nationalism. The political nationalists desired assimilation with the European group, while neglecting, or even being hostile to, their own cultures. Conversely, the cultural nationalists exalted traditional cultures and were hostile to anything that might estrange Indonesians from their heritage. Van der Plas drew a line between a ‘truly Indonesian’ nationalism—comparable to Schrieke’s cultural nationalism—and a rather destructive European-styled nationalism. The former was typified by the Taman Siswa teachings of Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Soetomo in the Indonesian Study Club, which in were accord with the Indonesian ideal of harmony. Schrieke and van der Plas made their distinctions based on attitudes to European domination, rather than rejection of European culture. Many of the most radical nationalists were also the most Westernised Indonesians.⁵⁷

The term ‘cultural nationalism’ refers to a variant closely associated with German romantic-era philosophy, which identified the nation as a primordial expression of the individual, possessing a family-like natural solidarity. It sought for ‘moral regeneration and [to] reunite different aspects of the nation by returning to its creative life-principle’.⁵⁸ The rise of cultural nationalism in Indonesia was closely related, and owed a debt, to the intellectual constructions of colonial scholarship on ancient

⁵⁶ See Farabi Fakhri, *Political Java in Modern Times: The political thought of Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Noto Soeroto 1908-1930* (MA thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2009), Karsono (2013), and Tod Jones *Culture, Power and Authoritarianism in the Indonesian State: Cultural Policy Across the Twentieth Century to the Reform Era* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013).

⁵⁷ See B.J.O Schrieke, “Native society in the Transformation Period” (1929), and Ch. O. Van der Plas, “Nationalism in the Netherlands East Indies” (1942), quoted in Heather Sutherland, *Tempo Doeloe and Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Social and Intellectual Life in Twentieth Century Batavia, focusing on the Indonesian Community 1933 to 1942* (MA thesis, School of General Studies Australian National University, 1967), pp. 207–209.

⁵⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London/New York: Routledge, 1998) pp. 177–178.

civilisation in the Indonesian archipelago (*Nusantara*). Following Sir Stamford Raffles' work, *History of Java* (1817), the ancient Indonesian archipelago had been considered as an extension of South Asian/Indian civilisation. The intellectual activities associated with the Indies Theosophical Society gave rise to Javanese-Indian cultural revivalism. In the Javanese-aristocratic milieu, cultural nationalism became a major trend in the 1910s and early 1920s, along with 'East–West association' ideas, as propagated by Dutch theosophists and Ethicist. Most of the proponents of cultural nationalism were closely associated with Budi Utomo and related organisations, principally the Committee for Javanese Nationalism with its periodical, *Wederopbouw*. The main spokespersons of the group were two Javanese aristocrats from the House of Pakualaman: R.M. Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo, a member of Budi Utomo, and R.M. Noto Soeroto, who had chaired the forerunner of PI in the Netherlands.⁵⁹

Noto Soeroto was one of the most significant intellectuals and artists of the cultural nationalists. Inspired by Rabindranath Tagore, he advocated a type of oriental cosmopolitanism, which was opposed to mainstream nationalist ideas of total independence from colonial rule. Both Tagore and Noto idealised an intellectual-cultural rebirth of the Orient, similarly to the West, which could only be achieved by bringing an 'aristo-democratic' order into reality. Noto advocated the role of humanist-intellectuals as the ruling class or 'aristocracy', which would bring Javanese civilisation back into its glorious era. Noto was one of the few Javanese convinced that Dutch imperialism in the Ethical Policy era was truly humanitarian and civilising in nature. Instead of premature independence, therefore, he supported the establishment of a Dutch–Indonesian commonwealth until Indonesians could develop into a nation with a high level of civilisation, still maintaining Eastern characteristics. He was removed from the PI as a consequence of his opposition to its non-cooperative orientation.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Laurie Sears, "Intellectuals, Theosophy, and Failed Narratives of the Nation in Late Colonial Java", in Henry Schwarz & Sangeeta Ray (eds), *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 333–359; see also Pradipto Niwandhono, "Gerakan Teosofi dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Pemikiran Priyayi Nasionalis Jawa 1912–1926", *Lembaran Sejarah* Vol 11, No 1 (2014), pp. 25–36.

⁶⁰ Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, "Noto Soeroto: His Ideas and the Late Colonial Intellectual Climate", *Indonesia* Vol 55 (April 1993); Farabi Fakhri (2009), pp.74–94.

While Noto Soeroto represented a marginal variant of Javanese revivalism, two other figures succeeded in integrating Javan traditionalist ideas into the mainstream of Indonesian nationalism: Soewardi Soerjaningrat, later known as Ki Hadjar Dewantara (1889–1959), founder of the Taman Siswa school and a cousin of Noto Soeroto; and Raden Soetomo (1888–1938), one of the co-founders of Boedi Oetomo.⁶¹ Famous for his straightforward critique of Dutch colonial rule when he was a leading figure in the *Indische Partij*, Soewardi was no longer a radical nationalist after being exiled to the Netherlands during World War I. There, he turned himself into a cultural and educational thinker. Soewardi's insights into Western educational concepts emerged when he attended the colonial education conference, held in The Hague in 1916. ideas, but his central role in the Taman Siswa school enabled him to translate aristocratic concepts into a populist framework. His most important ideological contribution was the idea of 'democracy and leadership' or 'democracy guided by wisdom,'⁶² which inspired Sukarno's idea of Guided Democracy.⁶³

Soetomo is important for understanding how social democracy evolved in Indonesia because of his moderate approach towards reconciling traditional and/or cultural nationalist motives with modernisation. To some extent, his position paralleled that of Hatta, because they shared a vision for education, economic and welfare improvements—particularly those focused on cooperatives and trade unions. Graduating from Javanese medical school (STOVIA) in 1919, Soetomo continued his study in the Netherlands on a government scholarship and was chairperson of *Indische Vereeniging* in 1921–1922. Back in Indonesia in July 1924, he founded the

⁶¹ Savitri P. Scherer, *Harmony and Dissonance: Early Nationalist Thoughts in Java* (1975), translated as Savitri Scherer, *Keselarasan dan Kejanggalan: Pemikiran-Pemikiran Priyayi Nasionalis Jawa Awal Abad XX* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2012). The Javanist roots of Taman Siswa came from the 'Selasa Kliwon' philosophical society founded by Soewardi's relatives, Ki Ageng Soerjomentaram and Soetatmo Soeriokoesomo, Hans van Miert, *Dengan Semangat Berkobar: Nasionalisme dan Gerakan Pemuda di Indonesia 1918–1930* (Jakarta: KITLV/Hasta Mitra, 2003).

⁶² The idea of 'Democracy and Leadership' was Dewantara's idea which had been a principle of Taman Siswa movement since mid-1930s, but only expressed in an article in early 1959. See Kenji Tsuchiya, *Demokrasi dan Kepemimpinan: Kebangkitan Gerakan Taman Siswa* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1992), pp. 258-260.

⁶³ 'Democracy guided by wise terms' (*kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan*) refers to the fourth principle of Pancasila, but the term 'deliberative democracy' (*demokrasi permusyawaratan*) is the more commonly used term among academics, see Yudi Latif, *Negara Paripurna: Historisitas, Rasionalitas dan Aktualitas Pancasila* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2012).

Indonesische Studieclub in Surabaya. In October 1930, this study club turned itself into Partai Bangsa Indonesia (PBI). The club enabled Soetomo to help prepare intellectual cadres for the national liberation movement and improve the life of the lower classes. Although moderate and non-revolutionary in nature, the study club was more progressive than the traditional bureaucratic-based Budi Utomo (BU). At a congress in Solo in December 1935, Soetomo established the Greater Indonesia Party, or *Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra)* as a fusion between the PBI and BU.⁶⁴ David Bouchier saw *Parindra* as the leading Indonesian right-wing party in the 1930s and early 1940s because its Javanese-aristocratic basis inclined it to be sympathetic to fascism and Japanese modernisation.⁶⁵

A major characteristic of Soetomo's ideas that was also influential in directing the ideological orientation of *Parindra* was the principle of conserving existing social order while modernising society. That is, while people should be guided in order towards the modern world, the social formation should be based on traditional world views. Western concepts such as Marxism and liberalism should not be adopted. Instead welfare-supporting institutions must be developed, such as hospitals, the banking system and cooperatives.⁶⁶ In a 1932 article, called '*Kewadajiban lan Gamelan*', Soetomo symbolically described society as a Javanese *gamelan* orchestra, in which everyone had a distinct, specific function, performing tasks in harmony with other 'orchestra' members.⁶⁷ Hence, each person must be aware of their duties regarding their moral obligation to serve the nation, and their choice of task, based on their specific competence, while simultaneously working in harmony with others.

⁶⁴ Scherer (2012), pp. 162–164, Peter Kasenda, et.al, *Dokter Soetomo* (Jakarta: Museum Kebangkitan Nasional Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan RI, 2013).

⁶⁵ David Bouchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State* (London/New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 32-33, Yannick Lengkeek, "Staged Glory: The Impact of Fascism on 'Cooperative' Nationalist Circles in Late Colonial Indonesia, 1935–1942", *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* No. 7 (2018), pp. 109–131.

⁶⁶ Scherer (2012), p.187.

⁶⁷ Savitri Scherer, "Soetomo and Trade Unionism", *Indonesia* Vol 24 (October 1977), pp. 29–31.

These ideas of an ‘organicist’ view of society reflected the political objective of Soetomo as he sought, through *Parindra*, to reconcile aristocratic-based bureaucratic elites with a professional-based middle class. These two social groups, the *priyayi birokratis* and *priyayi profesional/neo-priyayi*, represented the traditionalist and modernist camps of the Indonesian nationalist movement, respectively.⁶⁸ His use of the term *Indonesia mulia* (‘glorious Indonesia’), instead of the non-cooperative notion of *Indonesia merdeka* (‘independent Indonesia’), provided continuity with earlier cultural nationalist ideas on the importance of Eastern cultural revivalism as the basis for Indonesia’s national awakening. Soetomo asserted that, by no means, did *Indonesia mulia* reject independence as a political objective: ‘It signifies an intention to glorify the people materially and spiritually’, since ‘independence does not guarantee the glory of a people and nation; on the other hand, national glory can only result from freedom.’⁶⁹

Perhaps, the more important aspect of *Parindra* regarding the discourse of Indonesian nation-building was its fascination with Japan, which had modernised and rapidly industrialised during the Meiji era (1868–1912), establishing itself as an Asian superpower and imperialist in the early twentieth century. The Japanese were regarded as a role model, in which cultural nationalism created the driving force of modernisation. Inspired by Japan, some Indonesian intellectuals in the 1930s started to consider industrialisation as a fundamental part of Indonesian national development. The main proponent of this view was a *Parindra* leader, Mohammad Husni Thamrin (1894–1941). In his address to the Volksraad on 12 July 1938, Thamrin remarked that the people desired to exercise self-determination and ‘participate in the international contest for progress.’⁷⁰ Since the Great Depression, however, they had been obstructed by the government economic policy that privileged major Dutch enterprises over native entrepreneurs, workers and small farmers. This policy led to people becoming

⁶⁸ The term ‘*priyayi*’ was used to refer to a subculture in Javanese society by Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1960), but the division between traditional bureaucratic *priyayi* and professional *priyayi*, came from Sutherland (1979), and Heather Sutherland, “The Priyayi”, *Indonesia* No 19 (April 1975).

⁶⁹ In Paul W. van der Veur (ed), *Toward a Glorious Indonesia: Reminiscences and Observations of Dr. Soetomo* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1987), p. 273.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Karsono (2013), p. 234.

impoverished while, simultaneously, moving capital surplus from the colony to the metropole. According to Thamrin, the colonial government was obliged to do for native Indonesians what the Meiji government did for the Japanese—produce rapid, planned and large-scale industrialisation led by the state and later transferred to indigenous capitalists. Such state-led industrialisation was important for supporting a growing population, which could not rely on a declining agricultural sector alone.⁷¹ A similar fascination with East Asian industrialisation played a role in Suharto's early New Order economic policy, as will be shown in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

Dutch Orientalists and Indonesian Collectivism

As we have already seen, Indonesian cultural nationalist-related ideas had strong associations with Dutch colonial scholarship. Reactionary colonial policy in the 1930s supported a form of re-traditionalisation of Indonesian politics. Bouchier and Marsilam Simanjuntak have shown that the Leiden School of Law, especially the customary law *adatrecht* scholar, Cornelis van Vollenhoven, and the Indologist, Arnold Dirk Adriaan de Kat Angelino, spread ideas of native collectivism and organic solidarity among Indonesian nationalists. They were deeply fascinated with and influenced by European romantic philosophy, which raised the idea of the organic state as the authentic, fundamental basis for both Eastern and Western societies. De Kat Angelino was convinced that individualism and materialism were anomalies that had brought Western society to disintegration, as described by Oswald Spengler's 'decline of the West.' In a major treatise on Dutch colonial policy, de Kat Angelino advocated changing the West from individualistic and mechanistic conceptions of politics, associated with the parliamentary system and division of power, towards a new Durkheimian 'organic democracy' that accorded with Eastern perceptions of democracy.⁷²

As a law scholar and proponent of the Ethical movement, van Vollenhoven combined liberal-humanism and conservatism; he saw the spread of Western capitalism

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 235.

⁷² Bouchier (2015), pp. 16–21.

and law as destructive, threatening the bonds of tradition that brought indigenous communities together. He was a strong advocate for the *Volksrecht* ('law emerging from the people') as opposed to *Juristenrecht* ('lawyer's law') derived from Roman Law, which eliminated indigenous custom and law. Between 1904 and the late 1920s, debates took place regarding the extent to which Dutch civil law ought to overrule local law and custom in Indonesia. Van Vollenhoven opposed liberal scholars from Utrecht University, who preferred to abolish the old racially stratified legal order and bring the whole Indies population under a unified capitalist-oriented legal system. The Leiden School succeeded in winning its argument through the administrative reforms of governor-general de Graff in 1925, which acknowledged *adat* law before the colonial legal system.⁷³ The Leiden School's intellectual construction of the natives' distinctive social organisation, based on social organicism, had a profound impact on Indonesian students in the Netherlands, including R. Achmad Soebardjo Djojoadisoerjo from PI, and Prof. Raden Soepomo, a law scholar and disciple of van Vollenhoven, who was later associated with the *Parindra* movement. The clearest exposition of Soepomo's theoretical perspectives was his 1941 inaugural address as Professor of Law at the Law School in Batavia, entitled 'The Connection between the Individual and Society in *Adat* Law'. He argued that, from the turn of the century, a new consciousness had emerged among Europeans, which had caused them to view society as an 'organic' whole. Collectivistic ideas and practices that had been experimented with in Europe had deep roots in Indonesian society and were expressed in its customary law.⁷⁴

One central idea of socialism or 'economic democracy'—simultaneously associated with cultural-nationalist notions of the collectivist, 'organic' nature of indigenous society—was the cooperative movement. Both nationalist organisations and colonial government officials promoted cooperatives as economic associations that stimulated self-help and improved welfare. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution stated that 'the economy shall be organised as a common endeavour based on the familyhood principle.' Hatta used this article to advocate for cooperatives as the foundation of the

⁷³ Ibid, pp. 23–25.

⁷⁴ Quoted *ibid*, pp. 28–29.

Indonesian national economy. There were opposing views as to whether cooperatives, as a form of economic enterprise, corresponded to the collectivism propounded by Indonesian nationalists, given that collectivism (or voluntary mutual assistance) was purely social solidarity without economic calculation, rather than economic cooperation.⁷⁵ As noted by one of the earliest advocates for Indonesian cooperatives, Margono Djojohadikusumo, many of the earliest cooperative associations sponsored by Indonesian nationalist movements, such as Boedi Oetomo and Sarekat Islam, quickly disappeared because of ‘inexpert planning, lack of loyalty on the part of the members and maladministration’.⁷⁶ Dutch colonial scholar, J.H. Boeke—who was also adviser to the Credit Service and cooperatives, and theoretician of the idea of a dual economy split between traditional agriculture and modern capitalism—maintained that cooperative and *adat* principles differed fundamentally from each other:

Co-operation is not communal but corporate; it is western, the progeny of capitalism, and based on money economy and exchange. It has no connection with the village economy, with tradition and everyday village life. That which unites villagers co-operatively is the very thing which puts them beyond the pale of the village community.⁷⁷

Hatta saw cooperatives as the Western modern economic form most appropriate to the collectivist character of indigenous society. He conceded that the Indonesian village ‘was not collectivistic enough for modern (socialist) purposes. Even though there was often communal ownership of the means of production, production itself was always based on individual (household) units.’ For Hatta, the voluntary form of social solidarity remained an essential element and had ‘to be complemented with a spirit of individuality before economic cooperation of the type embodied in formal co-operative

⁷⁵ David Henley, “Custom and *Koperasi*: The Co-operative Ideal in Indonesia”, in Jamie S. Davidson & David Henley (eds), *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics* (London/New York: Routledge, 2007).

⁷⁶ R.M. Margono Djojohadikusumo, *Sepuluh Tahun Koperasi (1930–1940)* (Jakarta: Fadli Zon Library, 2013), pp. 20–24.

⁷⁷ Boeke, quoted in Henley (2007), p. 97.

organisations could be successful'.⁷⁸ Hatta's idea of cooperatives was similar to that of Soetomo and the *Parindra*, which sought to adapt traditional values and modify them so as to meet the needs a modernising society.

***Pudjangga Baru* and Modernism**

The earliest and most explicit opposition to cultural nationalism was initiated by Sjahrir and his PNI-Pendidikan movement. This was the modernist cultural and literary group centred around the magazine *Pudjangga Baru* (*The New Poets*), which was active between 1933 and 1942. While its participants came from a broad political spectrum, *Pudjangga Baru* was mostly associated with the three leading figures of its editorial board: Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, Armijn Pane and Tengku Amir Hamzah. Initially, it was a literary study group loosely affiliated with the state publisher, Balai Pustaka, but later, it became part of the intellectual network associated with Sjahrir. Heather Sutherland was the first to trace the sociocultural origin of this literary movement in the urban middle class of colonial Jakarta (Batavia).⁷⁹ Subsequently, Keith Foulcher focused on the relationship between literature and nationalism as a question of national culture.⁸⁰ Balai Pustaka was founded to provide a new educated middle class with reading matter that was 'morally elevating and informative', and to 'stimulate the taste of reading'. It became a powerful influence on Indonesian intellectual life and has been identified as the core of modern Indonesian literature.⁸¹ *Pudjangga Baru* prioritised literature and united writers who were willing to work for the advancement of the Indonesian language. Following the second Indonesian Youth Congress and the 'Youth

⁷⁸ Mohammad Hatta, *The Co-operative Movement in Indonesia* (Ithaca/New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 3–4.

⁷⁹ Heather Sutherland, *Tempo Doeloe and Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Social and Intellectual Life in Twentieth Century Batavia, focusing on the Indonesian Community 1933 to 1942* (MA thesis, School of General Studies Australian National University, 1967).

⁸⁰ Keith Foulcher, *Pujangga Baru: Literature and Nationalism 1933–1942* (Bedford Park: Asian Studies, Flinders University of South Australia, 1980).

⁸¹ Some of the best-known writers and widely read publications associated with 'Balai Pustaka' were Marah Roesli's novel *Sitti Nurbaja*, Raden Adjeng Kartini's letters, and Indonesian translations of works of world literature, Sutherland (1967), pp. 177–178.

Oath' of 28 October 1928, which declared 'one fatherland, one nation and one language', *Pudjangga Baru* expanded its aims to include the search for a single national culture.

Within two years of the debut issue of *Pudjangga Baru*, Alisjahbana emerged as the group's principal advocate for cultural modernism. With his article 'Towards a New Society and Culture' ('*Menuju Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Baru*'), published in *Pujangga Baru* in August 1935, he initiated a cultural polemic. Takdir wanted to 'clean up' understandings about 'Indonesia-ness', arguing that Indonesia-ness was a product of the twentieth century, which was different from the cultures that preceded it, which he labelled as 'pre-Indonesian'.⁸² The Indonesian nation was a modern-day creation and its development was 'born in the dynamic spirit which was also the source of Western progress'. This social transformation would enable the new nation to take an equal position among other nations. For Takdir, Indonesians needed to develop a sense of the rights of the individual over and against the corporate group; to develop their capacity to look at the world objectively and eradicate mystical thoughts.⁸³ Such viewpoints on the nature of Indonesian nation-building provoked strong opposition from cultural nationalists such as Sanusi Pane.

As an intellectual, Sanusi Pane became strongly attracted to Asian philosophy and religion after spending two years living in India. He was interested in theosophy. Like Soetomo, he was seeking for harmony between East and West worldviews, acknowledging Western technology and its achievements, while seeking peace in Asian religion.⁸⁴ Sanusi was one of the leading literary figures opposed to Takdir's argument on the division between Indonesian and pre-Indonesian culture. He insisted that, in pre-Indonesian cultures, the future depended on the past. He further held that common Indonesian cultural characteristics had existed in art and local customs before Indonesians became conscious of their shared identity. Sanusi also opposed Takdir's

⁸² Jones (2013), pp. 52-53.

⁸³ Anthony H. Johns, *Cultural Options and the Role of Tradition: A Collections of Essays on Modern Indonesian and Malaysian Literature* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979), pp. 24–28.

⁸⁴ Sutherland (1967), p. 225.

promotion of Western culture over all others, and rejected Western materialism, individualism and intellectualism which, in his opinion, privileged the material over the spiritual and subjugated nature. He asserted that the material and spiritual should be combined, placing East and West on equal terms in the development of an Indonesian culture.⁸⁵

At the height of its influence during the second half of the 1930s, *Pudjangga Baru* encompassed the writings of various Indonesian and Eurasian figures, who were associated later with humanitarian or socialist streams of thought. Among these were Muhammad Yamin and Amir Sjarifuddin, the leading figures of Gerindo; Roestam Effendi, the writer and one of the Indonesian members of the Dutch Communist Party (CPN); and Sutan Sjahrir, then in exile in Banda. Another intellectual group in close correspondence with *Pudjangga Baru* was that of the journal *Kritiek en Opbouw* (*Critique and Reconstruction*) started by Dutch Eurasian writer, Charles Edgar (Eddy) du Perron, who lived in Indonesia between 1938 and 1939.⁸⁶ The magazine connected Indonesian students to Western literature, philosophy and scientific thought. Du Perron was a liberal-progressive writer who had close connections with the Dutch neo-ethical group *De Stuw* and Indonesian intellectuals, including Abdul Karim Pringgodigdo; Soewarsih Djojopuspito and her husband Soegondo, who all wrote for *Pudjangga Baru* and *Kritiek en Opbouw*; and Soewarsih's sister, Soewarni Pringgodigdo, and brother, Soejitno Mangoenkoesoemo.⁸⁷ The progressive journal *De Stuw* was closely associated with Leiden School people, such as Hubertus van Mook, and social democrats, including Marcel Koch, who supported the gradual development of the Netherlands Indies into an independent Dutch–Indonesian commonwealth.⁸⁸ The magazine was banned by the conservative De Jonge government in December 1933. When Du Perron returned to the Netherlands in 1939, *Kritiek en Opbouw* was taken over by Koch and

⁸⁵ Cited in Tod Jones (2013), loc. cit.

⁸⁶ Eddy Du Perron (1899–1940) was famous for his autobiographical work *Het Land van Herkomst* (The Land of Origin) published in 1935, as well as his biographical work on Multatuli, see Rob Nieuwenhuis, *Mirror of The Indies: A History of Dutch Colonial Literature* (Jakarta/Singapore: Periplus, 1999).

⁸⁷ Sutherland (1967), pp. 210–211.

⁸⁸ Onghokham, *Runtuhnya Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1987), pp.73–76.

his socialist associates, and gravitated towards left-wing and anti-fascist ideas. Among those who joined the group were Amir Sjarifuddin and Jacques de Kadt. It was still active during the World War II.

Anti-Fascism and Democratic Transformation

The Sjahrir group originated from anti-fascist political activism during the second half of the 1930s until the Japanese military occupation. Later, it became the Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis*) then the PSI. Most members came from the ‘1945 generation’, born in about 1918 and the early 1920s, who came of age during the revolutionary period. In the Sjahrir network, the gap between generations seems unclear. Some of those linked to the Socialist Party network had been active since the PNI-Pendidikan era, and thus from the pioneering generation, but they did not experience the long exile of the PNI-Pendidikan movement’s key figures. They included Djohan Sjahroezah and Hamid Algadri, both born in the early 1910s, who were active in the student movement from the early 1930s.⁸⁹ In the 1940s, anti-fascism occupied a central position of Sjahrir’s ideas and it was the principal reason he established a new party, free from elements of fascism and feudalism. In *Perdjoeangan Kita*, Sjahrir wrote that ‘Dutch colonialism acquired its power from the amalgamation between modern rationalism and Indonesian feudalism, finally becoming the world’s first example of fascism. The fascism in the colony long preceded the fascism of Hitler or Mussolini.’ The Dutch rulers who built the exile camps of Boven Digul were the true ‘pioneers’ of fascism.⁹⁰ Sjahrir’s anti-fascism was a logical consequence of the opposition to colonialism and capitalism by the radical nationalists of PNI-Pendidikan and Partindo, as well as a continuation of Sjahrir’s and the Pudjangga Baru’s cultural polemics against ‘feudal’ elements of Indonesian cultural nationalism.

The first explicitly anti-fascist party was the Gerindo (*Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia*, or ‘Indonesian People Movement’) party. It was founded in May 1937 by

⁸⁹ J.D. Legge (1988), pp. 40–41.

⁹⁰ Sutan Sjahrir, *Perjuangan Kita* (Bandung: Segarsy, 2018), p. 104.

former Partindo leaders, notably Adnan Kapau Gani, Muhammad Yamin and Amir Sjarifuddin, following Partindo's dissolution in November 1936. Amir Sjarifuddin was one of the most enigmatic figures—not only for his ideological stance within the Indonesian Marxist/socialist movement, but also for his shift from revolutionary to state-loyalist politician. According to Gerry van Klinken, this shift was associated with his Christian/Protestant convictions.⁹¹ Van Klinken saw Amir as a Christian-inspired charismatic nationalist, who had established a link with the Indonesian underground communist movement, but only converted to communism later in his career.⁹² Amir undertook higher education in the Netherlands before going to Law School (*Rechthoogeschool*) in Batavia in early 1928. Like many of his contemporaries, he was involved in nationalist youth movements, such as Perhimpunan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia (PPPI) and Indonesian Muda, which played the major role in the 'Youth Oath.' In 1931, Amir converted to Christianity and was baptised in the Batak Church in Batavia, just after he became closely connected to the Christian Student Association in Java, which was under the influence of J.M.J. Schepper, a Dutch missionary and Amir's mentor in Law School.⁹³ During this period, he also was involved in Sukarno's PNI, and worked with Muhammad Yamin and other more populist and left-wing youth movement nationalists. At the time, Amir was known as being a nationalist demagogue mixed with the moral sensibility of a Christian missionary. His activities as a young radical ended with his imprisonment in 1933–1935. He was only set free by the government under the guarantee of Schepper and Amir's cousin, Todung Sutan Gunung Mulia—who was also a Christian activist and member of the *Volksraad*.

Amir changed his political course when he was released, turning himself into a middle-class intellectual with modernist and socialist/social-democratic interests. As

⁹¹ Gerry van Klinken, *Minorities, Modernity and the Emerging Nation: Christianity in Indonesia: A Biographical Approach* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003) [Indonesian, *Lima Penggerak Bangsa Yang Terlupa: Nasionalisme Minoritas Kristen* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2010)].

⁹² Many of the primary sources related to Amir Sjarifuddin were destroyed after the 1965-66 anti-communist purge, hence little is certain about his conversion to Marxism-Leninism; van Klinken (2003). See also Jacques Leclerc, "Amir Sjarifuddin: Between the State and Revolution", in Angus McIntyre (ed), *Indonesian Political Biography: In Search of Cross-Cultural Understanding* (Clayton: Monash University Press, 1993).

⁹³ Van Klinken (2003), pp.177–179.

the consequence of Sukarno's arrest and exile, Yamin and Amir became the leaders of Partindo and later Gerindo. Between 1938 and 1941, Yamin, Amir and Sjahrir participated in the intellectual and cultural debates of the Pudjanga Baru group. Unlike other leading figures of the nationalist movement, however, Amir left little in the way of writing during this period to represent his political ideas. As the ideologue of Gerindo, Amir's strategic thinking focused on two main issues: changing international relations and global politics, following the rise of fascism, and the economic crises of the colonial state due to the Great Depression. The fascist threat to Western democracy was linked to similar circumstances in the Netherlands East Indies. Thus, the Dutch needed to negotiate with the Indonesian nationalist movement on the democratic question to address these problems. Because the Indonesian archipelago was the target of Japanese military expansion, just as the Netherlands had to deal with Nazi Germany, a mutual defence against fascism required Indonesians' democratic participation through an elected parliament.⁹⁴ In socialist terms, the fascist dictatorships in Europe and ultranationalist militarism in Japan were the outcome of capitalist development and its crises. Sjahrir, in his exile in Banda Neira, had a similar view—that the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) represented 'a more dangerous threat to Indonesian independence than Dutch colonialism.'⁹⁵

The colonial government completely ignored Gerindo due to Amir's reputation and viewed the conservative *Parindra* as a more reliable partner.⁹⁶ For strategic purposes, Amir and other Gerindo activists had to disregard their ideological opposition and establish a 'people's front' (*Volksfront*) alliance. This led to the formation of Gapi (*Gabungan Politik Indonesia*) in May 1939—a fusion of Gerindo, Parindra and some Islamic parties—to demand a true parliament for the Indonesian people. Gapi had little significant impact on colonial policy, however, not only because of the government's reactionary attitude, but also because of conflict between Gerindo and Parindra.

⁹⁴ Leclerc (1993).

⁹⁵ Legge (1988), pp. 39–40.

⁹⁶ In July 1936, Parindra initiated the first attempt at colonial reform through a petition by Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo, claiming autonomous status instead of independence for the East Indies. This moderate petition was repudiated by the colonial government under the conservative governor-general, Tjarda van Starckenborgh-Stachouwer (1936–1942).

Meanwhile, the colonial government started to suspect a possible connection between Amir and underground communist activism when, in June 1940, shortly after the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands, the police arrested Amir and found a copy of the underground PKI newspaper, *Menara Merah*, in his possession.

There is evidence that Amir and Gerindo worked with the underground PKI and overseas anti-fascists during World War II.⁹⁷ This ‘illegal PKI’ continued to work independently in Java throughout the Japanese occupation. In about July 1935, Musso arrived in Surabaya from Europe, just before the seventh congress of the Comintern, to set up a communist cell. He stayed clandestinely for almost a year. He had been sent by the Netherlands Communist Party (CPN), which included Indonesians living in the Netherlands (such as Rustam Effendi and Abdulmadjid), to form a new communist party and campaign against Tan Malaka’s PARI as a traitorous and illegitimate successor to the old PKI.⁹⁸ There is some evidence that the East Javanese cell of the ‘illegal PKI’, led by Widarta, succeeded in recruiting Amir, Wikana and their Gerindo companions into their underground communist network. According to oral sources, Amir joined Widarta’s underground PKI after the second Gerindo congress in July 1939.⁹⁹

The arrest of Amir (along with Wikana and other Gerindo activists) on charges of communism had a dramatic effect on Gerindo, particularly in its rivalry with Parindra.¹⁰⁰ Amir was forced to retire from Gerindo and Gapi by moderate elements within Gerindo, who preferred A.K. Gani as their leader. At the same time, younger Gerindo figures, such as Wikana and Adam Malik, were replaced or prevented from

⁹⁷ Soe Hok Gie, *Orang-Orang di Persimpangan Kiri Jalan* (Yogyakarta: Bentang Pustaka, 2005).

⁹⁸ Anton Lucas, *Local Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java 1942–1945* (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1986) p. 3–5.

⁹⁹ Leclerc (1993); van Klinken (2010), p. 220.

¹⁰⁰ In June 1940, former youth activist and journalist M. Tabrani, a follower of Amir who headed the newspaper *Pemandangan*, criticised the Parindra leader M.H. Thamrin for letting the arrest of Amir take place without advocacy. Seven months later (January 1941), Thamrin was arrested on a charge of secretly contacting the Japanese—along with Edward Douwes Dekker and Same Ratu Langie—shortly after a sweep on Tabrani’s press by the government. Thamrin died three days after his arrest. Many of Thamrin’s followers blamed Tabrani for the incident, accusing him of treachery, Onghokham, *Runtuhnya Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1987), pp. 149–151.

occupying important positions on similar suspicions. Amir took up a career as a civil servant in the Department of Economic Affairs under the sponsorship of H.J. van Mook, one of the Dutch neo-Ethical politicians and the future lieutenant governor-general. For many of his followers, Amir seemed to betray the principles of the nationalist struggle.¹⁰¹ However, this move allowed him to take a decisive role in the anti-fascist movement during the War. In July 1941, the former governor of East Java, Charles Van der Plas, moved to Batavia to support the anti-fascist cause of the Indonesian nationalist movement, while also promising to accommodate the democratic aspirations of Indonesians. He planned to fund an Indonesian anti-fascist movement, to be led by Amir and Suyitno Mangunkusumo, brother of Tjipto Mangunkusumo. It is not clear exactly when Amir started to work for this project—sometime between December 1941 and February 1942.¹⁰² The outcome of this agreement, under which Amir had been given f25.000, was the formation of the Anti-Fascist People's Movement, or *Gerakan Rakyat Anti-Fasis (Geraf)*. Other leaders were Pamudji, Sukajat, Armunanto and Widarta.¹⁰³

Other groups engaged in anti-fascist resistance during World War II included a group of Digul exiles evacuated to Australia in June 1943. Some were recruited to work in the Melbourne-based Netherlands Indies Government Information Services, under van der Plas. This small group involved Sardjono, a communist, and former PNI-Pendidikan members—including Maskoen, Burhanuddin and Mohammad Bondan—who had been close associates of Sjahrir in Digul. They published the Indonesian-language journal, *Penjoeloeh*, whose mission was to support and maintain contact with the Indonesian national liberation movement and prepare for their return to Indonesia.¹⁰⁴ The PKI members in Australia, led by Sardjono, established the Sarekat Indonesia Baru (Sibar) with branches in Melbourne, Brisbane and Sydney. This group had close

¹⁰¹ Van Klinken (2010), p. 202

¹⁰² Ibid, pp. 206–207.

¹⁰³ Hatta and others were sceptical about whether the underground organisation actually did anything, since the only sources were the writings of Sidik Kertapati. Hatta did not think it was possible that the senior nationalist figure Tjipto Mangunkusumo would have been involved in a left-wing underground movement, Soe Hok Gie (2005), pp. 43–45.

¹⁰⁴ Mrázek (1996), pp. 424–425.

connections with the Australian Communist Party, and was involved in strikes demanding immediate Indonesian independence. Following the surrender of the Japanese, however, the PKI-Sibar dissolved.¹⁰⁵

Perhimpunan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia (PPPI) and Unitas Studiosorum Indonesiensis (USI) were contrasting student groups that later formed links to the PSI. The PPPI was formed in September 1926 by Maroeto Nitimihardjo and Soegondo Djojopuspito in the lead-up to the Youth Congress in Batavia. The PPPI supported radical left-wing nationalism, in line with Partindo and Gerindo, but also established close contact with Tan Malaka's PARI. When the colonial government clamped down on the Indonesian nationalist movement in the early 1930s, the PPPI developed an underground youth activist network, involving individuals such as Pandu Kartawiguna, Adam Malik and Djohan Sjahroezah. This group was also linked to the formation of the Antara news agency, Indonesia's first independent news agency.¹⁰⁶ On the more moderate side was USI, established in 1933. It attracted little attention within the broader youth movements, perhaps because of its intellectual and 'apolitical' stance, and is only recorded historically through its former members' testimonies. Some considered the USI to have been founded with Dutch support to counterbalance the PPPI. According to Legge, most USI members considered themselves as liberals (or 'humanists') and independent thinkers, not merely as nationalists in a narrower sense. This organisation provided a medium for student activity during the Japanese occupation and became part of a broader intellectual network. Prominent USI members included Hamid Algadri, who became the editor of the USI newspaper, the *Usiblad*, in the late 1930s; Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the future Masjumi politician and head of the emergency government of the Republic of Indonesia in Bukittingi during the time of second Dutch military action; and future PSI figures such as Soebadio Sastrosatomo and Soedjatmoko. Other prominent members included Amir Hamzah Siregar; Subianto Djojohadikusumo (the brother of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo); and the future deputy

¹⁰⁵ Soe Hok Gie (2005), pp. 39–40; Harry A. Poeze, "From Foe to Partner to Foe Again: The Strange Alliance of Dutch Authorities and Digoel Exiles in Australia 1943-1945", *Indonesia* No 94 (October 2012), pp. 69–75.

¹⁰⁶ Riadi Ngasiran, *Kesabaran Revolusioner Djohan Sjahroezah: Pejuang Kemerdekaan Bawah Tanah* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2015), pp. 83–87.

prime minister, Soebandrio.¹⁰⁷ In 1941, PPPI and USI, along with the Indonesian Female Student Association (*Indonesische Vrouwen Studenten Vereeniging, IVSV*), formed a joint federation, Baperpi (*Badan Permusyawaratan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia*).

Sjahrir, who along with Hatta returned from exile in early 1942, did not immediately make contact with these student activists. Most of his Dutch friends and contacts in the Indies, including Jacques de Kadt—who came to the Indies after the Nazi occupation of Holland (1940)—and Indo (Eurasian) writer Beb Vuyk, were arrested by the Japanese military. Initially, Sjahrir was approached by Amir Sjarifuddin and his group, who urged him and Hatta to join the anti-fascist resistance. They seemed unenthusiastic about Amir’s plan.¹⁰⁸ Having to face a powerful military regime, which would undoubtedly prosecute anyone who opposed them, they decided to go their separate ways. Hatta’s decision to cooperate with the Japanese had its own logic, given that he was a long-time admirer of the collectivist nature of village society. In this respect, Hatta shared Sukarno’s *gotong royong* (‘mutual assistance’), approach. In July 1942, when Sukarno was taken from exile in Bengkulu to Jakarta, he was welcomed by Hatta and Sjahrir. The two foremost nationalist figures agreed to work under the Japanese government to advance the struggle towards independence in legitimate ways while, at the same time, secretly keeping in contact with and supporting the underground revolutionary struggle.¹⁰⁹ Sjahrir was charged with being a contact person for the other two leaders, who would collaborate with the Japanese.

Under Amir, the prospects for a revolutionary movement were not strong. Sjahrir was cautious of Amir’s emotionally unstable character and had little trust in him beyond their shared anti-Fascism.¹¹⁰ The Japanese authorities soon became suspicious of Amir’s activities, arresting him in January 1943. Sentenced to death, he was saved by the intervention of Sukarno and Hatta. The arrest of Amir was significant to the

¹⁰⁷ Legge (1988), pp. 43–44.

¹⁰⁸ Sjahrir, *Out of Exile* (New York: Greenwood Press Publisher, 1969), pp. 233–235.

¹⁰⁹ Mrázek (1988), pp. 287–390.

¹¹⁰ Sjahrir (1969), loc. cit.

career of Sjahrir because, with Amir off the political stage of the underground movement, Sjahrir began to attract and recruit youth activists for what was later called the *Pemuda Sjahrir* ('Sjahrir group').¹¹¹ Meanwhile, Sjahrir's nephew and close associate, Djohan Sjahroezah, became a bridge between groups of young activists. When Sjahrir and Hatta returned from exile, Djohan worked as Hatta's secretary. Later, in 1943, he moved to Surabaya to work in BPM (Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij), a Dutch oil company taken over by the Japanese. With his new job, Djohan stimulated radical activities among workers and contacted other nationalists, including Ruslan Abdulgani and members of the Komite Angkatan Muda in Surabaya. He also kept in contact with the Asrama Angkatan Baru group at Menteng 31, Jakarta, which was associated with Adam Malik, Chaerul Saleh and other Tan Malaka followers.¹¹²

In general, 'the Sjahrir network' encompassed diverse individuals who were not established as a formal group; rather, they were a network connected by their personal relationship to Sjahrir, sharing a common rational and democratic political vision in spite of their different ideological backgrounds. As he did in the PNI-Pendidikan and his period of exile, Sjahrir treated the network as a medium of education, giving short courses to the students who assembled to listen to his lectures. His recruits soon mastered European leftist social and economic theories for analysing and solving problems within Indonesian society and the struggle for independence, and viewed themselves as socialist intellectuals

¹¹¹ Mrázek (1988), pp. 396–397.

¹¹² Legge (1988), pp. 61–63.

CHAPTER 3

The Rise and Fall of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) 1945–1960

The Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis*, PS)—with its initial incarnations as *Parsi* (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*) and *Paras* (*Partai Rakyat Sosialis*) and subsequent democratic socialist form as the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)—played a key role in the struggle for democratic transformation in Indonesia. As described in the previous chapter, PS's origins lay in the rise of fascism and colonial conservatism during the second half of the 1930s. It came into existence during the Japanese Occupation of 1942–1945, first under Amir Sjarifuddin, followed by Sjahrir.

During the 1940s, 'left-wing' politics in Indonesia was confusing and multifaceted. On one side were the 'international-oriented' Indonesian activists or intellectuals with international careers, who were theoretically stronger but were affected by the changing orientation of left-wing movements internationally. There were the PI members, those associated with Dutch communist groups and the Australian group. On the other side, homegrown leftists took part in the popular radicalism and urban youth (*pemuda*) subculture domestically. The domestic group included the underground PKI, led by Widarta and the PP coalition initiated by Tan Malaka. Most homegrown leftists advocated a 'no compromise' pathway to independence. They became the driving force for social revolution against the traditional bureaucrats and aristocrats, whom they regarded as counter-revolutionary agents. Many international communists/socialists, however, were inclined towards a diplomatic route to attract international support for Indonesian independence. Amir was strategically placed because of his connection to both the domestic and international streams of the leftist movement. This was the position that Sjahrir took over.¹

¹ See further Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944–1946* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Soe Hok Gie, *Orang-orang di Persimpangan Kiri Jalan*

At the end of the World War II, the changing international politics surrounding the establishment of the Republic in August 1945 positioned Sjahrir as the only internationally acceptable Indonesian leader. Because the Allies were determined not to recognise any political regime that had collaborated with the fascist powers, the best way to win international recognition for Indonesian independence was to carry out democratic reforms. A body to establish independence, the *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (KNIP, or ‘Central National Indonesian Committee’) was formed on 23 August 1945, combining it with two other bodies, the BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat) and the PNI-Staatpartij (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, or ‘State Party’) as the continuation of the Djawa Hokokai, or the People’s Loyalty Association of Java.² Vice-President Hatta issued a decree on 16 October that bestowed on KNIP full legislative powers to be held jointly with the president. The next day, KNIP delegated its power to a small representative body known as the Working Committee (*Badan Pekerja*, BP-KNIP), led by Sjahrir and Amir.³ Both subsequently appointed people who were not associated with the Japanese.

Through the establishment of BP-KNIP, Sjahrir (with Amir Sjarifuddin’s help) created a political alliance that became the core of Sjahrir’s upcoming cabinet, as well as the future Socialist Party. This alliance proceeded to change the existing political system into a parliamentary democracy with a multi-party system. This idea, dating to the PNI-Pendidikan era, represented the most effective form of democratic participation for the Indonesian people. The first step, in November 1945, was to issue political manifestos 1 and 3. These covered the formation of political parties and the declaration that the Republic of Indonesia would be run according to democratic principles, respecting the property rights of all nations in the territory of Indonesia. Along with these manifestos, Sjahrir’s pamphlet *Perdjoeangan Kita* was, in the view of Sjahrir’s

(Yogyakarta: Bentang Pustaka, 2005); Anton Lucas, *Radikalisme Lokal: Oposisi dan Perlawanan terhadap Pendudukan Jepang di Jawa 1942–1945* (Yogyakarta: Syarikat, 2010); Gerry van Klinken, *Lima Penggerak Bangsa Yang Terlupa: Nasionalisme Minoritas Kristen* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2010), pp. 287–289.

² David Reeve, *Golkar Sejarah yang Hilang: Akar Pemikiran dan Gagasan* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2013), p. 84

³ George Mc.T.Kahin (1952), pp. 152–153.

group, the ideal foundation for the Indonesian Revolution. It inspired the formation of a new socialist party as a vanguard group, in line with Sjahrir's reading of Lenin's 1918 work, *State and Revolution*.⁴ A vanguard revolutionary party did not require a large membership but, rather, consisted of intellectuals or highly disciplined cadres, who had mastered the theoretical basis for a revolutionary struggle.

The Early Socialist Party and Its Disintegration

Sjahrir wrote his manifesto, *Perdjoeangan Kita* ('Our Struggle') from late October 1945, which was published on 10 November to coincide with the outbreak of the Battle of Surabaya. This was a crucial event in terms of drawing international attention to the Revolution.⁵ *Perdjoeangan Kita*, and the government's manifestos for the formation of political parties, translated Sjahrir's personal ideas on democratic revolution into political consolidation of the Sjahrir group. On 1 November 1945, *Parsi* was established in Yogyakarta, consisting mostly of pre-war Gerindo members and associated labour unions. In its first congress on 12 November, *Parsi* decided on its programs and objectives: work towards the socialisation of key enterprises, promote industrialisation and a cooperative-based economy, and make agricultural improvements. The party urged the formation of a Popular Front (*Front Kerakyatan*) linking workers, peasantry and *pemuda* with the army.⁶

Shortly afterwards, on 19 November, the Socialist People's Party (*Paras*) was established in Cirebon by local members of the PNI-Pendidikan branch. Its leader, Soebadio, stated that *Paras* accorded with the vision of Sjahrir in *Perdjoeangan Kita* for a vanguard party. Sjahrir was not personally involved in formulating the party's statutes, due to his position as prime minister. Among the PNI-Pendidikan members who participated were Djohan Sjahroezah, Sugondo Djojopuspito and Sumitro

⁴ V.I Lenin, *State and Revolution* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014).

⁵ For the revolution in Surabaya, see William H. Frederick, *Pandangan dan Gejolak: Masyarakat Kota dan Lahirnya Revolusi Indonesia (Surabaya, 1926–1946)* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1989). On Sjahrir's "Perdjoeangan Kita" see Anderson (1972) and Mrázek (1994). It has been published in Indonesian (Bandung: Segi Arsy, 2018) along with *Renungan dan Perjuangan* (Jakarta: Djambatan/Dian Rakyat, 1990) which contained his letters and *Out of Exile* (1949).

⁶ Anderson (1972), p. 202.

Reksodipuro. However, *Paras* was also intended to unite the older PNI-Pendidikan with the *pemuda* movement from the ‘1945 generation.’ The party’s declared aims were to oppose capitalistic and feudal attitudes, and eliminate autocracy and bureaucratism, to achieve an egalitarian society, strengthen people’s awareness of democratic principles, and urge the government to cooperate broadly with all organisations at home and abroad to overthrow the capitalist system.⁷ *Parsi* and *Paras* fused when Sjahrir became prime minister, with Amir Sjarifuddin in his cabinet.

The PS was formed at a congress held on 16–17 December 1945. The membership structure of the new party consisted of Sjahrir’s *pemuda* recruits from the occupation era, former PNI-Pendidikan activists (including Digul exiles from Australia), former Gerindo party members, and others from Amir Sjarifuddin’s anti-fascist movement. It involved five distinct clusters centred in Surabaya, Jakarta, Cirebon, Yogyakarta and the Netherlands. The Yogya group included the ‘Patuk group’, a leftist youth group organised by Dayino and connected to the Surabaya group through Djohan Sjahroezah.⁸

Most influential were the PI communist activists returning from Holland, such as Abdulmadjid Djojoadingrat, a former member of the Dutch Communist Party executive. Most had been involved in the anti-Nazi underground movement. Their participation in the resistance had created genuine solidarity between the Dutch and Indonesians, and Abdulmadjid and his associates were inclined to support negotiations with the Netherlands. The Abdulmadjid group, as well as the returning Digul exiles, allowed the PS to identify as part of the international resistance movement against fascism.

Nevertheless, not all Indonesian students in the Netherlands participated in the anti-fascist resistance. Some, such as Mohammad Zairin Zain, a law student at Leiden University, and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, an economics student in the Rotterdam

⁷ Soebadio Sastrosatomo, *Perjuangan Revolusi* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1987), pp. 182–186.

⁸ They became known as one of the most active discussion groups on Marxism and socialist topics. Later, the Yogya *pemuda* network also included the local PNI-Pendidikan branch under Wiyono Suryokusumo and Taman Siswa students including Moch. Tauchid. Sjam Kamaruzzaman, was said to be a member of the group, a fact that became part of controversies about whether Suharto had links to them, Riadi Ngasiran, *Kesabaran Revolusioner Djohan Sjahroezah: Pejuang Kemerdekaan Bawah Tanah* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2015), p. 126–127.

Business School, remained neutral because they felt that, as Indonesians, they had nothing to do with the Dutch–German conflict.⁹ Sumitro became connected to Sjahrir’s network through his brother, Subianto, who was a student at the Medical School (*Ika Daigaku*) in Jakarta. When the Revolution broke out in 1945, Sumitro and Zain were among those Indonesians who worked as representatives in London during the general assembly of the United Nations.

The establishment of Sjahrir’s cabinet, and his broad relationships with Indonesians overseas who participated in the anti-fascist resistance, contributed to the attraction of support from the West. This was particularly so in Britain and the British Commonwealth, where socialist and labour parties were prominent. His cabinet consisted predominantly of Indonesian professionals and high-ranking officials from the pre-war Netherlands East Indies, including some Christians from Eastern Indonesia. No *pemuda* representatives participated.¹⁰ The Sjahrir Cabinet was celebrated by his Dutch socialist associates. In early 1946, a group called *Vereeniging Nederland-Indonesie* (‘Dutch-Indonesian Union’), issued a manifesto in support of Indonesia. It was signed by liberal and progressive professors from Leiden University, including J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong and H. Kraemer, representatives of Indonesian students and the PI, as well as some Dutch socialists and Lambertus Nicodemus (Nico) Palar from the SDAP.¹¹ To these people, Sjahrir was the most capable person for the position. His socialism was characterised by ‘educational socialism’ and, as Professor Wertheim remarked, ‘learned workers’ were Sjahrir’s political base.¹² Sjahrir was described as having the qualities of ‘a cool mind, beyond ... hate and sentiments.’¹³ While he was celebrated internationally, the policies of the Sjahrir Cabinet, as well as the involvement of Dutch-linked Indonesian students (especially, the communist faction of the PI)

⁹ Poeze (2008), p. 329 wrote that Sumitro and Zairin Zain were ‘among those attracted to the form of corporatist state established by Salazar in Portugal’.

¹⁰ See Anderson (1972), pp. 196–197.

¹¹ Poeze (2008), pp. 335–339, Palar (1900–1981), was an Indonesian diplomat who began his career as a member of the Social Democratic Worker Party (SDAP). He became the first Indonesian ambassador to the United Nations (1950–1953).

¹² Wertheim, quoted in Mrázek (1994), p. 292.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 293.

caused the first serious, internal opposition for the government of the Indonesian Republic.

From the beginning, the alliance that constituted the Socialist Party had been fragile. Internal schism within the PS explains the genesis of the PSI and nature of antagonism between the social-democratic and communist factions in Indonesia. There were two major factors that contributed to the discord. First, there had been a shift in the international ideological groupings between 1946 and 1947, during the first stage of the Cold War. Second, while political alliances within the anti-colonial or anti-fascist movements often transcended ideological boundaries, there was intense distrust, especially by Hatta and Sjahrir, of the strategy of the international communist movement. As Hatta's experience as the PI delegate in the League Against Imperialism congresses showed, communists might surreptitiously utilise alliances with non-communist socialists or nationalists for their own political interests, at the expense of their erstwhile allies.¹⁴

Former PI and Dutch Communist Party members, such as Abdulmadjid and Setiadjit, became members of the *Partai Sosialis* and *Partai Buruh Indonesia* respectively. Tan Ling Djie, a leading underground PKI figure recruited by Musso in 1935, also joined the PS. The presence of communist cadres became an important factor in sharpening divisions in the PS. According to Soebadio, differences with Abdulmadjid and the Amir group first emerged in response to Tan Malaka's *PP* movement. Most of Sjahrir's youth followers did not consider *PP* to be in opposition to the Sjahrir government, since Sukarno had given an oral testament to appoint Tan Malaka, Sjahrir and Iwa Kusuma Sumantri as his successors in case of a crisis. Nevertheless, Abdulmadjid, Tan Ling Djie and other communists considered Tan Malaka to be the person responsible for the failure of the communist revolt in 1926, and regarded him as a Trotskyist. Thus, they interpreted Tan Malaka's refusal of a diplomatic settlement as the consequence of his adherence to Trotsky's 'permanent revolution', with its emphasis on the independent position of the proletariat, which should not compromise with opposing class interests. Amir Sjarifuddin viewed Tan Malaka's *PP* as the

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 117.

beginning of opposition to the government and, as minister for defence, ordered Tan Malaka's arrest in March 1946.¹⁵

An early indication of the schism among socialist politicians appeared after the 'Third of July Affair' and the formation of the third Sjahrir Cabinet. In his first cabinet, Sjahrir could choose his deputies but, following the political crisis brought about by the Tan Malaka group's opposition to its diplomatic policy, Sukarno restricted Sjahrir's authority to diplomatic affairs rather than internal politics. When his third cabinet was established, Sjahrir had to compromise with the PNI and Masjumi; and thus, through Sukarno's intervention, include A.K. Gani and Maramis in the cabinet.¹⁶ Moreover, Sjahrir's preoccupation with diplomacy, his isolated position in Jakarta and his distaste for mass meetings allowed Moscow-oriented leftist politicians to assume control of the PS and *Sayap Kiri* (left-wing) coalition. Sjahrir's effective power was declining; hence, he started to consolidate his group. On 4 January 1947, at the initiative of Soedjatmoko and Rosihan Anwar, the Sjahrir group established its independent, critical magazine, entitled *Siasat* (*Strategy*). Its debut issue contained Soedjatmoko's article '*Kedoedoekan Indonesia: Batas Gelanggang Perdjoengan*' ('Indonesia's position: The Limits of the Arena of Struggle').¹⁷

Intensifying factionalism during 1947 culminated in the political crises that followed the Linggajati Agreement and the Dutch proposal for the Republic to accept a provisional Netherlands East Indies government, before the transfer of sovereignty took place. It was obvious that the Agreement's concessions would create controversy among the cabinet and parliament, but the events that followed clearly showed Sjahrir's difficulty in maintaining his position. Immediately after signing the Agreement, Sjahrir sent Abdulmadjid to represent him in the cabinet.¹⁸ Rather than speaking as Sjahrir's

¹⁵ Sastrosatomo (1987), pp. 244–250.

¹⁶ Mrázek (1994), p. 321.

¹⁷ M. Nursam, *Pergumulan Seorang Intelektual: Biografi Soedjatmoko* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2002), p. 67.

¹⁸ Both John D Legge, *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the following recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in occupation Jakarta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1988) and Mrázek (1996) discussed this strange decision by Sjahrir, who surely knew how Abdulmadjid might respond to such a concession. Dr. Halim confessed that he had tried to prevent Sjahrir from sending Abdulmadjid and wondered why Sjahrir had not appointed Soebadio, or any other close associate, including himself.

delegate, however, Abdulmadjid persuaded other members of the *Sayap Kiri* in the cabinet to reject the Agreement. When Sjahrir went to Yogyakarta on 26 June 1947, he was confronted by *Sayap Kiri* figures—including Amir, Abdulmadjid and Wikana from Pesindo—who turned against him.¹⁹ All argued that his diplomacy had compromised the Republic. The next day, Sjahrir resigned as prime minister. This shocked left-wing members but they, as well as Sukarno, subsequently accepted Sjahrir's resignation. The new government led by Amir Sjarifuddin, however, was unable to improve Indonesia's bargaining position against the Dutch claims.

The relatively short Amir Sjarifuddin government (July 1947–January 1948) faced a Dutch military invasion and subsequent diplomatic pressure to legitimise Dutch conquests. These events culminated in the humiliating Renville Agreement of January 1948, which recognised the Republic's territory as limited to Yogyakarta, Solo and its surroundings besides some areas in the outer islands, particularly in Aceh and Minangkabau in Central Sumatra. This Agreement provoked a negative reaction, mostly from the Masjumi party, for whom Amir was unacceptable as prime minister since he was a leftist Marxist and Christian. Some Masjumi ministers in his cabinet resigned on 16 January to protest the Renville Agreement. Two days later, the PNI followed, causing the dissolution of the Amir Cabinet.²⁰

This cabinet had represented the short-term political predominance of the leftist Marxists, which had built considerable influence among the peasantry, working-class movements, and even military and paramilitary units. One of the most significant ideas of the leftist faction under Amir—both as minister of defence and prime minister—was the establishment of the *TNI-Masyarakat* ('People's Army') in August 1947, just after the Dutch military action. This intended to overcome the problem of factionalism among youth militias and paramilitary units, which was an extension of higher-level

Soebadio believed that Sjahrir had actually trusted Abdulmadjid to convince other *Sayap Kiri* members and accept his diplomatic concession; see also George Mc.T Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952) pp. 207–208.

¹⁹ Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945–1950* (Melbourne: Longman, 1974), p. 99.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 99–100.

political conflicts.²¹ Amir first formed the *Biro Perjuangan* ('Struggle Bureau') to accommodate the paramilitary outside the military forces. Like Sjahrir, Amir saw the need to control irrational aspects of the Indonesian Revolution. Thus, he advocated for the importance of political (re)indoctrination as a method of military 'detoxification' from fascist-related elements, which were embedded in the former Japanese military recruits who had been incorporated within the Indonesian armed forces. As well, Amir repudiated the more intellectual, elitist nature of former KNIL Indonesian military officials, such as Tahi Bonar Simatupang (1920–1990) and Abdul Haris Nasution (1918–2000), believing that the army should be united with the people.²² This political 'education' for army officers was introduced as the 'Pepolit' (*Pendidikan Politik Tentara*), which had strong Marxist elements. When the TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) was formed, Biro Perjuangan militias refused to join the regular army.

George Kahin has analysed the principal reasons why Indonesian communists moved increasingly towards orthodox Stalinism. First, he argues, the US actions in the Netherlands–Indonesian conflict, particularly after the Renville Agreement, convinced some Indonesians that nationalism alone was not sufficient to win independence. Believing that Western powers were primarily supporting the Dutch, many felt that they had to tie themselves to an alternative great power. Second, international communism had changed its line, following the formation and first meeting of Cominform in September 1947, which resulted in the Zhdanov doctrine with its 'two-camp' and anti-Marshall Plan emphases. A formal change of Indonesian communist policy took place after young Indonesian communists returned from the Southeast Asian Youth Conference, held in Calcutta in February 1948. Similar to the 1920s League Against Imperialism, this Soviet-sponsored conference was organised to support Southeast Asian independence but, in fact, was aimed at promoting the new direction of Soviet

²¹ George Mc. T Kahin, (1952), p. 251.

²² Simatupang and Nasution were the two most prominent reformist, technocratic-oriented military officers of the Revolution and the 1950s. Simatupang was close to Sjahrir and PSI circles, just as Nasution was to Hatta; see C.L. Penders & Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985); Barry Turner, "*Nasution: Total People's Resistance and Organicist Thinking in Indonesia*" (PhD thesis, Faculty of Life and Social Sciences, Swinburne University of Technology Melbourne, 2005).

policy.²³ During the same month, the *Sayap Kiri*, including the PS, PKI, Pesindo and Partai Buruh, declared its opposition to the Hatta government and rejected the Renville Agreement, along with all that it implied.

The Sjahrir group strongly opposed *Sayap Kiri's* decision. At a meeting in Yogyakarta on 12 February 1948, the Sjahrir faction split from the PS and *Sayap Kiri* coalition and formed its own party, the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), declaring its support for the Hatta Cabinet. This new party had strong leadership, including most of the PS representatives in the BP-KNIP, but it had less mass support.²⁴ Meanwhile, the Socialist Party, now dominated by the Amir, Abdulmadjid and Tan Ling Djie factions declared a new federation at a mass meeting in Solo on 26 February. This federation was named the People's Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakyat, FDR*). Its principal programs, which emphasised the interests of labour and the peasantry, were identical with previous *Sayap Kiri* programs. Other policies resembled those of Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan, including the repudiation of negotiation with the Dutch and the Renville Agreement, as well as the nationalisation of Dutch and other foreign properties without compensation.²⁵

The political crises that followed culminated in the 'Madiun Affair.' As a consequence of the Renville Agreement, which reduced the territory of the Indonesian Republic, the government was confronted with severe problems that required economic and military reform. One principal issue of the conflict between the Hatta government and the opposition was the rationalisation aimed at dissolving some of the irregular (para)military units. The retreat of the mostly Sundanese Siliwangi Division to the heartland of the Indonesian Republic in Yogyakarta became a source of conflict connected to this rationalisation. Because most of the irregular units of Amir's TNI-Masyarakat were targeted for rationalisation, the FDR opposition attacked the Hatta Cabinet. The FDR, with the PKI as its main proponent, gained new momentum with the

²³ Kahin (1952), pp. 256–258; Ruth T. McVey, "The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprising" (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph, 1958).

²⁴ The meeting that established the PSI was held in the residence of the Sastrosatomo family and attended by most of Sjahrir's followers including Soebadio, Soepeno and Sjahroezah, but without Sjahrir himself who was in Bukittinggi, Mrázek (1996), pp. 652–653.

²⁵ Kahin (1952), pp. 259–260.

return of Musso from the Soviet Union on 11 August 1948. Two weeks later, the PKI accepted Musso's *Jalan Baru* ('New Way') policy. This policy required that a single working-class party should take a leading role in the national government. The leadership of the national revolution should not be entrusted to the 'national bourgeoisie' because of its connection to imperialist interests. Musso also attacked the 'right-wing' reformist socialism of Sjahrir for collaborating with the imperialist power.²⁶

In response to communist opposition, the Hatta government won support from the PSI and followers of Tan Malaka, who formed the People's Revolution Movement (*Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat*, GRR) in June 1948, leading to the release of Tan Malaka from prison in September.²⁷ Clashes ensued between the pro-FDR militias, supported by local Javanese troops targeted for 'rationalisation', and pro-government troops, including the Siliwangi Division and GRR militias. Fighting broke out in Surakarta after PKI members were kidnapped. On 18 September, the day after this incident, pro-FDR troops staged a local coup in Madiun and proclaimed the new national front government. Musso, Amir, Setiadjit and other communist figures had no other option but to support this premature insurrection. Sukarno immediately called for all Indonesian people to 'choose between the national leadership under he and Hatta or the PKI-Musso', and mobilised the army to crush the rebels. The Madiun Affair, one of the bloodiest political conflicts in the early years of the Republic, has been the subject of different historical interpretations. It did change American attitudes towards Indonesian nationalism and the Revolution, however, towards active support for the decolonisation of Indonesia from the Dutch.²⁸

²⁶ Musso, *Jalan Baru Untuk Republik Indonesia* (The New Way for the Republic of Indonesia), policy plan approved at the PKI fifth congress of 26–27 August 1948, <https://www.marxists.org/indonesia/indones/1948-JalanBaru.htm>

²⁷ In 7 November 1948, just after the Madiun Affair, Tan Malaka's group founded the Murba Party from the amalgamation of political parties which previously made up the GRR: Partai Rakyat (People's Party), Partai Rakyat Djelata (Poor People's Party) and Partai Buruh Indonesia Merdeka (Independent Indonesian Labour Party). Tan Malaka himself was killed near Kediri, East Java on February 1949, by TNI officers during a military clash.

²⁸ See Soe (2005); David Charles Anderson, "The Military Aspects of Madiun Affair", *Indonesia*, No 21 (Cornell University Press, April 1976); Harry A. Poeze, *Madiun 1948: PKI Bergerak* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia/KITLV Press, 2011).

Sjahrir, in his commentary on the schism between the socialists and communists, cautiously avoided any link to Cold War partisanship. In his statement, *Political Conditions in Indonesia*, written in March 1948, Sjahrir remarked that the essential problem was not Amir's turn to communism, but the lack of organisational discipline and theoretical understanding of the real nature of socialism. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and Indonesian communism had little connection to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which was based on the interpretation of political reality and social analysis according to dialectical materialism. Amir's mistake was his inability to distance himself from world 'superpower' interests and 'mainstream' collectivist, nationalism in Indonesia. Sjahrir argued that Amir and his followers were no different from Sukarno's disciples or any other Indonesian parties at the time, since they all expressed similar anti-imperialist and capitalist attitudes and supported collectivism.²⁹ Nationalism was constituted mostly by 'irrational' elements of consciousness, but to oppose nationalism, the dominant ideology in the Third World, was equally 'delusional and utopian'. If the socialists had forced their rule upon the Republic, the result would have been disunity and disturbance of the national struggle. Thus, said Sjahrir, the PSI should hand over its mandate to the nationalists and democrats, as represented by Hatta and Sjahrir, to focus on the development of socialism in the future. The anti-communist purge of Madiun had the potential to discredit socialism. Moreover, the elimination of the PKI did not overcome the danger of totalitarianism, which was rooted in the feudal mentality of Indonesian society.³⁰

The PSI: Internal Structure and Ideological Orientation

Two years after its establishment, the PSI held its first executive council meeting in Yogyakarta, on 4–5 February 1950. After the transfer of sovereignty had taken place, its first task was to complete the delayed organisation of the party.³¹ The meeting had

²⁹ Mrázek (1994), pp. 371–372.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 378–379, see also Sjahrir, *Indonesian Socialism* (Asian Socialist Publishing House, 1956), p. 45.

³¹ This meeting was reported and discussed in the PSI official newspaper, *Suara Sosialis* in its August 1950 edition, Mrázek (1996), pp. 722–723.

several important outcomes. It was agreed that a party congress would resolve problems related to party ideological principles and policy. In its initial phase, lasting approximately two years, the party was to prioritise recruiting new members and give more emphasis to political awareness. It would also work as a closed organisation initially; that is, an exclusive membership of cadres. Subsequently, the congress would evaluate the party's ideological and numerical strength to open itself up as mass organisation.³² Trade unions and other associations might be invited to become collective members of the party. The meeting also decided to move the PSI headquarters from Yogyakarta to Jakarta.

The question of ideology was the most important. The PSI contemplated schisms taking place in the European Left, in which social democrats repudiated Stalinism. Soebadio and Sjahroezah were the most concerned about the party's Marxist principles.³³ They were inclined to maintain Marxism as the primary theoretical base, yet also wanted the Party to be based on democratic and humanitarian principles. Sjahrir cautiously distanced the party from any dogmatic interpretation of Marx and Engels by emphasising its rational character.³⁴ Many of the original PNI-Pendidikan ideas, including its more narrowly nationalist elements, were no longer relevant to post-war politics. For instance, the anti-colonial nature of the national liberation movement, which united nationalism with Marxist class doctrine, needed to be reconciled with respect for Western civilisation. Sjahrir was inclined to avoid any reference to Marxism as an ideology in the party's constitution. The first meeting gave Sjahrir, as the party chairman, the ultimate authority, not only to organise cadre training and establish new party branches, but also to clarify the party's principles and policies.³⁵

From March to May 1951, a series of courses for the elected cadres was held in Jakarta for twenty-seven members from Java, Sumatra, Madura and Sulawesi.

³² Sjahrir (1956), p. 47.

³³ According to Soebadio, Tan Ling Djie had more influence on him, particularly in Marxist and Leninist theory, than Sjahrir, Legge (1988), p. 126.

³⁴ See Sutan Sjahrir, *Sosialisme dan Marxisme: Suatu Kritik terhadap Marxisme* (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1967), first published in the PSI newspaper *Suara Sosialis* No 6-12 (1953) and No 1 (1954).

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 127.

Subsequently, regional conferences of the PSI took place in November in Medan, North Sumatra and West Kalimantan. In response to questions from party branches, in February 1951, the PSI leadership declared that the party still continued in its original form established in the schism with the Amir group of the Partai Sosialis.³⁶ To support the PSI's process of modernisation and renewal, and to make the party vision relevant to the post-war world, Sjahrir appointed younger figures—Soebadio, Sitorus and Ismail—as committee members to prepare the new party constitution. Nevertheless, the survivors from the early 1930s PNI-Pendidikan movement—including Sjahroezah, T.A. Moerad, Hamdani, Soegondo Djojopuspito and Wijono—still formed the majority of the membership of the Executive Council. While holding the supreme authority in most decisions associated with party policy, Sjahrir frequently absented himself from party activities in the two years following the first congress of the Executive Council. He was absent for several months in 1951, due to a trip to Europe, and appointed Sjahroezah as provisional party chairperson. Some of his close associates claimed that Sjahrir tended to act as a teacher and thinker, rather than a real party leader.³⁷

The first national congress of the PSI met in Bandung, 12–17 February 1952. By then, the number of party members had increased to 3,049 full members and 14,480 candidate members, with 147 branches spread over the major islands of Indonesia. The congress elected forty-five members of the party's Executive Council (*Dewan Pimpinan Partai*) and six members of the Politburo: Sjahrir, Sjahroezah, Soebadio, L.M. Sitorus, Sugondo Djojopuspito and T.A. Murad. High on the conference's agenda was to clarify the ideology and new constitution of the party. A key question was whether the party's principal statement should maintain any reference to the doctrine of Marxism.³⁸ Sjahroezah, the major contributor to the PSI's formulation of democratic socialist ideology, considered that there should be reference to Marxism, because most Indonesian leftists believed that Marxist doctrine was essential to socialism. This reference would help to defend the party from accusations from the PKI

³⁶ Mrázek (1996), pp. 723–725.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 739–741.

³⁸ Sjahrir (1956), p. 48–49.

that social democracy was merely an extension of capitalism in a new form, not real socialism.³⁹

The congress finally defined the PSI's ideological position by adopting *sosialisme kerakyatan* as the ideological basis for the party's constitution. According to the party bylaws, the principle of *kerakyatan* (democracy) implied a sense of humanitarianism, that is upholding human dignity by acknowledging equality among humans and each individual.⁴⁰ Marxism was adopted as a theoretical reference for scientific, socio-economic analysis. Furthermore, after the first congress, 'class struggle' was eliminated from the party's general program.⁴¹ The adoption of the term *sosialisme kerakyatan* contained not only a firm rejection of the totalitarian elements of Marxism-Leninism and international communism, but also denoted the independent stance of Indonesian democratic socialism against the Western social-democratic tradition. Unlike most industrial European and North American countries, Asian societies were unique in that socialists did not have to deal primarily with class conflict and crises of capitalism, but had to develop means of production through investment and beneficial entrepreneurship. In Asia, socialism implied not only the socialisation of the means of production, but also the development of levels of production through economic planning.⁴²

Another issue of the first congress was the question of whether the PSI should become an open organisation. While its ideological platform had been formulated to

³⁹ Soebadio Sastrosatomo advocated abandoning Marxism as the party ideology due to its dogmatism, Riadi Ngasiran, *Kesabaran Revolusioner Djohan Sjahren: Pejuang Kemerdekaan Bawah Tanah* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2015), p. 248–251.

⁴⁰ Partai Sosialis Indonesia, “Penjelasan Asas dan Garis Politik Partai Sosialis Indonesia”. The term ‘*kerakyatan*’ applied by Sjahrir’s socialist party was closer to ‘people’s sovereignty’ or ‘democracy’ than ‘populism’, since it emphasised higher-level political consciousness through education and individual independent reasoning rather than mass-action. The equation of ‘democracy’ and ‘*kerakyatan*’ also shown in the formulation of the fourth principle of Pancasila, comparing the Sukarno, Piagam Jakarta and the official (PPKI) versions. See Sutan Sjahrir, “Sosialisme Kerakyatan yang kita perjuangkan”, and “Sosialisme di Eropa Barat”, in Sutan Sjahrir, *Sosialisme Indonesia Pembangunan: Kumpulan tulisan Sutan Sjahrir* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penunjang Pembangunan Nasional, 1982).

⁴¹ Mrázek (1996), pp. 725–726.

⁴² See Partai Sosialis Indonesia, ‘Penjelasan Asas dan Garis Politik Partai Sosialis Indonesia. See also in Jeanne S. Mintz, *Muhammad, Marx, Marhaen: Akar Sosialisme Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003), p. 188.

accelerate the growth of party membership, the party made no fundamental change to its organisational structure, for three major reasons. First, political opposition within the leftist movement meant that there were only two parties applying strict party discipline: the PSI and PKI. However, the PSI was opposed to ‘democratic centralism’ as practised by the communists.⁴³ Because most party members were sceptical about the party’s ideological strength and cohesiveness, they tended to be over-cautious about the potential threat of communist infiltration, which had occurred in the past. Second, most party officers could not easily change the old organisational habits of an exclusive cadre party. The PSI’s opponents used this to denounce it as the party of intellectual snobs, lacking interest in the masses and their struggle for a better life. Third, the democratic principles of Indonesian socialist intellectuals implied tolerance for those who thought differently. There was little enthusiasm for converting non-socialists to democratic socialism. Even when PSI politicians attempted to intensify the party’s activities within the trade union movement, they were inclined to support a trade union movement that was independent from the party’s hierarchical structure.⁴⁴ Therefore, from the First to the Second congress in June 1955, PSI membership remained at approximately 50,000, while the PKI simultaneously claimed a membership of more than 500,000.⁴⁵

The PSI and democratic socialism became influential in the trade union movement through the foundation of the All-Indonesian Labour Congress (*Kongres Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*, KBSI) on 12 May 1953. This grew out of the *Dewan Serikat Buruh Indonesia* (DSBI), a federation of smaller trade unions affiliated with the PNI and PSI. The KBSI aimed to compete with and constrain the influence of the larger, communist-leaning *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia* (SOBSI). Within a year, however, the PSI and PNI clashed following the formation of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet. This cabinet was supported by the PNI, but opposed by the PSI and Masjumi. In December 1953, R. Koesnan resigned as the president of the labour

⁴³ Lenin’s Democratic centralism was an organisational system combining the advantages of democratic procedures with the principles of monolithic authority in order to create strict party discipline, through the control of fellow members, to establish an undisputed and effective leadership. This principle was acknowledged by the Comintern, Iskandar Tedjasukmana, *Watak Politik Gerakan Serikat Buruh Indonesia* (Jakarta: Trade Union Rights Centre, 2008) pp. 103–104.

⁴⁴ Sjahrir (1956), pp. 49–52.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 52–53

federation at the request of his party, the PNI. PNI-oriented member-trade unions followed him in seceding from the KBSI, thereby halving its membership. As a result, KBSI was exclusively controlled by the socialists under its new chair, Kusna Puradireja, along with his deputies, A.H. Siregar and Andi Zaenal Abidin.⁴⁶ Puradiredja was the leader of PBKA (*Persatuan Buruh Kereta Api*), a Netherlands' graduate who, during the Revolution, had been involved in the state administration of the pro-Dutch Pasundan state. As a consequence, he became a target of the communist-oriented unions.⁴⁷ While the other nationalist and Islamic labour federations were member-organisations, formally affiliated with the political parties, both SOBSI and KBSI were defined as independent and non-partisan organisations. Their close relationship to the respective parties was more ideological than institutional. Many leading figures of KBSI did their best to create the labour federation as an independent organisation. Nevertheless, PSI figures attempted to lead the KBSI into the party's sphere of influence through cells inside the federation. This move succeeded after the split, despite internal challenges.⁴⁸

Besides trade unions, the PSI influenced the *Gerakan Tani Indonesia* (GTI, or 'Indonesian Peasant Movement'), a splinter organisation from the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI). GTI was founded in September 1953 by Mochamad Tauchid and his PSI associates. Tauchid was formerly a member of the left-wing 'Pathuk group.' He had participated in the establishment of BTI during the Revolutionary era. When the *Sayap Kiri* coalition broke into communist and socialist wings, Sjahroezah suggested that Tauchid should stay in the BTI and concentrate on developing the peasant association, as well as opposing communist infiltration. However, as communist influence increased, he was marginalised and had to quit the BTI. He was then, along

⁴⁶ During the constitutional democracy era in the 1950s, there were four major labour federations representing different ideological currents: SOBSI, which was affiliated with the PKI; KBSI, affiliated with the PSI; *Serikat Buruh Islam Indonesia* (SBII) affiliated with the Masjumi Party; and *Kesatuan Buruh Kerakyatan Indonesia* (KBKI) affiliated with the PNI. Iskandar Tedjasukmana, (2008), pp. 54–55. Tedjasukmana was a former minister for Manpower.

⁴⁷ Jan Elliott, *United We Stand Divided We Fall: Workers and Unions in Indonesia: Jakarta 1945–1965* (PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 1997), pp. 57–58.

⁴⁸ Tedjasukmana (2008), pp. 175–176.

with his associates, founded the GTI.⁴⁹ The peasant association's branches were founded in eleven out of fifteen provinces of the Republic and numbering some 300.000 members in January 1955.⁵⁰ Following the second congress of the PSI and first general election, the PSI stated that the struggle of the peasant movement was aimed at supporting the rights of the peasants. The congress outlined three main targets: foreign capital controlling most of agricultural industries; the government's obligation to guarantee an increase in the peasants' standard of living; and [inequality] in social life itself as the main source of continuing exploitation and suppression towards the peasants.⁵¹

The PSI during the Early Constitutional Democracy Period

The period of 'constitutional democracy' lasted roughly from the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 until the dissolution of the last parliamentary cabinet in March 1957, following Sukarno's inception of 'Guided Democracy'. In this period, the PSI and individuals associated with it were politically significant in the early phase of constitutional democracy. As a small cadre party, the PSI functioned as a 'brains-trust' with close connections to high-ranking bureaucratic and military figures.⁵² While many of its cadre held governmental positions, the PSI had almost no formal parliamentary representatives due to its low numerical strength.

The PSI belonged to Feith's category of 'administrators.' These were individuals with the administrative, technical, legal and foreign language skills required for running a modern state. They were particularly needed in organisational and policy-making functions in the 1950s, as well as in negotiation and overseas diplomatic

⁴⁹ During the communist revolt in Madiun, Moch. Tauchid was briefly arrested due to his communist connections, and was only set free by the intervention of the PSI, see Ngasiran (2015), p. 234.

⁵⁰ 'Growth of the Party', in *Socialist Bulletin* (1956), Vol 1 No 1, p. 23.

⁵¹ 'News of the Party, in *Socialist Bulletin* (1956), Vol 1 No 2, pp. 30-31.

⁵² Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007); Jeanne S. Mintz, *Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965) p. 139.

activities. Conversely, the Revolution also required leaders with integrative skills, including cultural mediation, symbolic manipulation and mass organisation; that is, ‘solidarity-makers.’⁵³ Feith’s distinction describes the different bases of authority of each group: legal-rational and/or charismatic. He also describes their distinct political cultures, which grew out of different historical experiences.⁵⁴ Most ‘solidarity-makers’ came from the Javanese-aristocratic political culture, while the ‘administrators’ were more closely connected to the Islamic-entrepreneurial cultural milieu. While Javanese-aristocratic political culture originated within agricultural-based inland empires in Java, Islamic-entrepreneurial cultures were the product of the more cosmopolitan, maritime-based commercial towns in coastal Sumatra, north Java, Kalimantan (Borneo) and Sulawesi. Consequently, those who were influenced by Javanese-aristocratic culture were more inclined to gravitate towards nativism or cultural nationalism, whereas the Islamic-entrepreneurial culture was more open to incorporating aspects of Western modernity.⁵⁵ Such differences were also sharpened by socio-economic and religious orientation—as shown in Geertz’s studies on religio-cultural currents (*aliran*) in Java.⁵⁶

Despite being a main source of ‘administrators’, the PSI distanced itself from more practical politics. Even when PSI-connected politicians were appointed to positions in the Hatta Cabinet of the Federal RIS (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*) of 1950, the party itself had no official representation. Dr Abdul Halim, prime minister of the Indonesian Republic (one of the member states of the RIS), was a PSI sympathiser and had their support, but relied on being a non-party figure for acceptance by the political

⁵³ Feith (2007), pp. 24–25.

⁵⁴ Feith’s conception of political culture was taken from Gabriel Almond, whose work ‘*The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*’ was the first systematic study on the subject—see William A. Darity (ed), *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 2nd Edition, vol 6* (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2008), p 300–302.

⁵⁵ Feith (2007), pp. 31–32, argued that Javanese-aristocratic political culture was anti-Western and more open to socialism or leftist ideology. This argument was a product of the Cold War. There were serious incompatibilities between cultural nationalists and ‘priyayi’-oriented nationalism. Islamic groups were definitely more anti-Western than the Javanese nationalists, during the colonial period.

⁵⁶ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976) [translation, *Agama Jawa: Agama, Santri, dan Priyayi dalam Kebudayaan Jawa* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2013)].

factions.⁵⁷ While acknowledging the importance of foreign investment for developing the means of production, the PSI was critical of the Hatta Cabinet and its moderate foreign policy, which they considered as ‘too timid and too much under American influence.’⁵⁸ Some PSI figures, such as Sjahroezah and Soebadio, expressed their discontent about the settlement with the Dutch because it guaranteed the Netherlands’s economic assets and position in Indonesia.⁵⁹

The PSI’s critical attitude towards the pro-American orientation of Indonesian foreign politics in the early 1950s was manifested in its opposition to Indonesian participation in the San Francisco peace treaty with Japan. PSI politicians also criticised the Sukiman Cabinet’s anti-communist ‘Sukiman raids’ of August 1951, which targeted leftist trade unions. The raids were triggered by intensified activity from leftist unions, as well as regional disturbances related to the Islamist Darul Islam movement and the allegedly PKI-organised militias around Mt Merapi and Mt Merbabu in Central Java. On 5 August, an armed gang displaying hammer and sickle symbols attacked a police post in the harbour of Tanjung Priok, Jakarta, killing and wounding a number of police. The Sukiman Cabinet responded to the rumour that a communist coup was about to take place by arresting approximately 15,000 journalists, labour leaders and Chinese community figures.⁶⁰ The PSI saw the raids as indicating that the government conformed with the USA in the Cold War.

The PSI’s critical views of pro-Western politics shifted to bitter opposition of the communists, due to political developments during 1952, particularly after the ‘17 October’ affair of that year. As Feith saw it, by this stage, the PSI ‘contained less

⁵⁷ Halim (1911-1987) was a Minangkabau politician who served as the vice-chairman of KNIP and had close connection to Sjahrir group. In 1948, he had joined Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to establish the emergency government of the Republic of Indonesia, Riadi Ngasiran (2015), pp. 227–231.

⁵⁸ Feith (2007), p. 130, Sjahrir, “Current Problems in Indonesia”, *Pakistan Horizon* Vol 4 No 4 (December 1951), pp. 200–209.

⁵⁹ Sjahroezah and Soebadio’s speech before the BP-KNIP, cited in Rosihan Anwar, *Soebadio Sastrosatomo: Pengemban Misi Politik* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Graffiti, 1995), pp. 163–164.

⁶⁰ Feith (2007), pp. 187–191.

of Marxism than of Fabianism.’⁶¹ This implied that the party was relying on the role of middle-class intelligentsia among bureaucratic ranks rather than the working class as the main agent in establishing a socialist society. According to Fritjof Tichelman’s analysis, the socioeconomic [class] basis of the PSI was vague. As Tichelman suggested, the PSI’s failure to strengthen its position lay in its reluctance to attract the neo-*priyayi* segment of society, which identified with Javanese-aristocratic culture.⁶² Based on its previous experiences, the PSI were unlikely to succeed in gaining neo-*priyayi* support. Sukarno and the PNI were better connected to the neo-*priyayi* and the Javanese-aristocratic political sensibility, meaning that the PSI was merely a ‘cosmopolitan intellectual group who were far removed from the people.’⁶³

From the communist perspective, the PSI’s views on the importance of developing the means of production in Asiatic pre-capitalist societies reflected Second International arguments about the progressive aspects of colonialism and imperialism, because these views supported foreign capital investment as a precondition for creating the capitalism that would lead to a socialist society. To some extent, the PSI and Masjumi parties shared similar views on capital development. Masjumi stood for private capitalism, while the PSI inclined towards state-controlled capitalism in a mixed economy. The communists viewed both as representing a comprador class pursuing foreign interests.⁶⁴ The new PKI chairperson Aidit launched a fierce attack against the PSI, accusing them of having become false, right-wing socialists (*sosialis kanan*). The socialists tried to work against the communists by splitting the trade union movement.

The ‘17 October affair’ of 1952 was a military show of force. Modernist military officers associated with the ‘administrator’ group, including T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution, were involved in the affair. The changing post-revolutionary situation required military reforms to shift the army away from its political, populist role as the

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 130.

⁶² Fritjof Tichelman, *The Social Evolution of Indonesia: The Asiatic Mode of Production and Its Legacy* (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 218–220.

⁶³ Feith (2007), p. 131.

⁶⁴ Olle Tornquist, *The Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia* (London: Zed Books, 1984), p 69.

‘people’s defender’ and towards the performance of civil service–related functions. In mid-1952, the army leadership decided that 80,000 of their 200,000 military personnel should retire by the end of the year. This reorganisation and demobilisation were highly unpopular among the military’s populist camp, which had close connections to the PNI and several smaller oppositional parties.⁶⁵ In July, Col. Bambang Supeno (a distant relative of President Sukarno), who represented the anti-reorganisation group, initiated a petition for the removal of Nasution as the army’s chief of staff. In response, the armed forces chief of staff, Simatupang, suspended Supeno. Support for the petition was already widespread among the ‘solidarity maker’ politicians within the parliament. They accused pro-PSI politicians of planning the reorganisation program to acquire greater control of the army.

On 14 October, the PNI faction, along with PSII and Nahdatul Ulama, initiated the ‘Manai Sophiaan motion’ to investigate the military dispute and remove the controversial leaders. For the ‘administrator’ group within the military, this was a direct intervention in internal military affairs. Hence, on the morning 17 October, a large-scale demonstration and military parade blockaded the presidential palace, demanding for parliament to be dissolved and a general election to be held soon afterwards. Sukarno refused the demonstrators’ demands, saying that he could not dissolve the parliament and did not wish to become a dictator. Following the blockade, the parliament re-assembled and the cabinet announced changes to the army leadership; Nasution was to be dismissed and replaced by Col. Bambang Sugeng, a moderate member of the ‘Peta group’ of officers trained by the Japanese.⁶⁶

This attempted ‘coup’ demonstrated a new trend in the opposition between ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity-makers.’ The PNI became more strongly inclined to cooperate with the PKI and opposition parties, while the ‘religious socialist’ faction, led by Mohammad Natsir, increased the influence of the PSI among Masjumi politicians. On 28 December 1952, the PKI’s Central Committee accused the PSI of aiming to

⁶⁵ Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Feith (2007), pp. 248–249.

⁶⁶ Feith (2007), pp. 258–269.

establish a fascist dictatorship by masterminding the ‘coup attempt’. The Central Committee added that the ‘coup’ had been an attempt to turn Indonesia towards supporting Dutch and British imperialism.

The PSI council responded that the accusation was irrational and groundless since the party was based on principles of democratic socialism. These principles repudiated totalitarian fascism and Stalinism. The PSI was committed to an Asian socialist, independent, non-aligned position between the global superpowers, while the communists were ‘nothing more than the instruments of Soviet Russian interests.’⁶⁷

The mid-1953 downfall of the Wilopo Cabinet led to a long crisis before another cabinet could be established.⁶⁸ Initially, the Masjumi and PSI aspired to another presidential cabinet under Hatta, but the PKI opposed this because it was against the constitution. President Sukarno, who did not want Hatta’s return to the prime ministership, then appointed Wongsonegoro from PIR (*Persatuan Indonesia Raya*) to form a cabinet, in which Ali Sastroamidjojo became prime minister on 1 August 1953.⁶⁹ This cabinet was supported by PNI, NU and PSII, while the PSI and Masjumi were excluded and became opposition parties. Of all the cabinets during the constitutional democracy period, the ‘solidarity-makers’ had most control in the Ali-Wongsonegoro government. Most cabinet members had personal connections to Sukarno or involvement in Tan Malaka’s *Persatuan Perjuangan* group during the Revolution; none had connections with Hatta. The PKI praised the cabinet’s ‘glorious victory of democracy over fascism.’ In contrast, the PSI and Masjumi presses expressed contempt. Intense hostility to the cabinet came from predominantly Muslim areas, Masjumi’s

⁶⁷ Partai Sosialis Indonesia, “Keterangan Sekretariat Dewan Partai Partai Sosialis Indonesia berhubung dengan Statement C.C. PKI tanggal 29 Desember 1952”, (Jakarta, 30 December 1952).

⁶⁸ The Wilopo Cabinet (1952–1953) fell as the result of an agrarian incident in Tandjong Morawa subdistrict near Medan, North Sumatra on 16 March 1953. This incident started when a group of peasants—allegedly organised by the PKI—attempted to take over land owned by the *Deli Planters Vereniging* (DPV). The peasants argued that they had not been adequately compensated under the Round Table Conference agreement for Dutch land they had taken over during the Revolution. This incident revived disputes between the supporters of nationalisation, mostly ‘solidarity makers’, and those who opposed it.

⁶⁹ PIR (*Persatuan Indonesia Raya*) like Parindra, which was a minor nationalist party founded in December 1948, drew on *priyayi* support, Feith (2007), pp. 143–144.

stronghold regions. Just one month after the Ali Cabinet was formed, a major revolt broke out in Aceh under former military governor, Daud Beureueh, when he proclaimed an Islamic state in Aceh and joined Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam movement.⁷⁰

While the economic policies of the four earlier cabinets were directed towards economic restoration and increasing production levels, based on a strong belief in the need for financial stability, the Ali Cabinet aimed to 'indigenise' the economy. Nationalisation to decolonise the economy was not a new policy, but a common ideal expressed across the political spectrum. The Ali Cabinet wanted to diversify production, including industrialisation; prevent dependence on raw-material exports; plan for economic development; and transfer control and management of enterprises from 'foreigners'—Westerners but also Chinese Indonesians—to *pribumi* ('original Indonesians').⁷¹ Due to the lack of capital and political resources to replace the colonial political structure, most previous governments had postponed this step in favour of the more realistic goal of supporting and protecting domestic capital through the 'Benteng Program.' First implemented by the Natsir Cabinet, this policy was carried through by Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, the minister for economic affairs in the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet.⁷² The policy provided credit and protection for indigenous businesses against both Western and Chinese competitors, as well as reserving licences for indigenous importers. However, as the program progressed, import licences were dominated by domestic entrepreneurs associated with powerful figures of the bureaucracy or political parties. In response to this government policy, the PSI argued that the essential problem was the lower level of productivity among Indonesian people. Sjahrir, in his speech of April 1954, remarked that 'the question of how to increase production, and moral

⁷⁰ Teungku Mohammad Daud Beureueh (1899–1987), was the founder of PUSA (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh) which had played a major role in initiating social revolution against the local aristocracy in Aceh during the early Independence era. Cornelis van Dijk, *Darul Islam: Sebuah Pemberontakan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Graffiti, 1983), Remy Madinier, *Partai Masjumi: Antara Godaan Demokrasi dan Islam Integral* (Bandung: Mizan Media Utama, 2013), pp. 151–155.

⁷¹ Feith (2007), pp. 373–374.

⁷² Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Jakarta / Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2009), pp. 44–45, Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo was one of the 1927 founders of the PNI. He was Minister of the Interior in the Sukiman cabinet (1951–1952) and Minister of Economic Affairs in the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (1953–1955).

improvement should have the attention of the state and society in order to stop the spread of poverty and change the indifferent attitude[s] of the people.’ The government’s economic role, according to the PSI, was at the planning level through the National Planning Board (Depernas) and in the large key industries. The initiative for middle and smaller industries should come from individuals or cooperative societies.⁷³

Indonesian and Third World Socialism

One of the central ideological issues of the PSI’s democratic socialism was socialism in its ‘Asiatic’ or ‘Third World’ form. This was essentially different from that of Western European social democracy; it was neither an extension of Western social democracy, nor an immature form of Western socialism. The question of Third World postcolonial development preoccupied most PSI figures. The idea originated within the Marxist-inspired, anticolonial struggle and became increasingly important during the Cold War. The search for a more authentic expression of Asian socialism was the principal aim of the ASC and other PSI international networks.⁷⁴

Between 1953 and 1960, the ASC was a federation of socialist parties in Asia. It was a counterpart of the Socialist International (SI) movement, but in the context of decolonisation.⁷⁵ The idea for cooperation among Asian socialist movements was first raised in the Asian Relations Conference, hosted by Jawaharlal Nehru in Delhi, in March 1947, during which Asian socialists discussed a common program for developing Asia. As Sjahrir remarked, ‘the ideology for a united Asia should have a

⁷³ Quoted in Robert J. Myers, “*The Development of Indonesian Socialist Party*.” Robert J. Myers, PhD Thesis University of Chicago, June 1959, pp. 72–73.

⁷⁴ See the PSI newspaper *Suara Sosialis* especially following the first Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, “*Sosialisme Asia*”, *Suara Sosialis* Year V, No. 3, 31 March 1953.

⁷⁵ Talbot C. Imlay, “International Socialism and Decolonization during the 1950s: Competing Rights and the Postcolonial Order”, *The American Historical Review* Vol 118 No 4 (October 2013), p. 1105; the Socialist International (SI), formed in June 1951, claimed to be the successor organisation of the Second international (1889–1916) and the Labour and Socialist International (LSI, 1923–1940), Ettore Costa, *The Labour Party, Denis Healey and the International Socialist Movement: Rebuilding the Socialist International during the Cold War 1945–1951* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

more integrated content.⁷⁶ They agreed to settle on some common objectives, including the liberation of all Asian people, opposition to feudalism, and economic and political improvement.⁷⁷ The vision for Asian socialist cooperation was powered by emerging solidarity among the socialist parties of India, Burma (Myanmar) and Indonesia, which sought a steadier and well-established position within the polarised and divisive sphere of postcolonial politics. Moreover, socialist parties in Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Burma, shared similar experiences of schism with and opposition to communist parties as a consequence of the Cold War.

After five years, the initiators of the movement, who included Sjahrir, came together in Rangoon (Yangon) in 1952 for the first preliminary meeting to establish a preparatory committee, consisting of a small group of ASC members. Because the Asian socialist movement was relatively marginal compared to mainstream anti-colonial nationalism, they were aware of needing to sustain the spirit of Asian socialism through regular contact and better circulation of information. Hence, they decided to publish periodicals to promote their ideas and goals to wider audiences. Their first three bulletins and newsletters—*Socialist Asia: Fortnightly Bulletin*, *Asian Socialist Conference: Newsletter* and *Asian Socialist Conference Information Bulletin*—were published in Rangoon. The last newsletter, *the Asian Socialist Conference Newsletter*, was published in Jakarta. These publications were distributed internationally to friends of the Asian socialists, and contained articles written by ASC members.⁷⁸ Besides disseminating the idea of democratic socialism among the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, another important agenda item for the ASC was to establish cooperation with European socialists in the Socialist International (SI). Initial attempts to start a dialogue with the SI, however, encountered serious problems due to incompatibilities between those transnational socialist movements. M.S. Gokhale, an ASC delegate to the October 1952 SI conference, reported that the SI had an arrogant

⁷⁶ Quoted in Su Lin Lewis, “Asian Socialism and the Forgotten Architects of Postcolonial Freedom, 1952–1956”, *Journal of World History*, Vol 3 No 1-2, (June 2019), pp. 60–61.

⁷⁷ Titia van der Zande, *A Third World Concept: The Asian Socialist Conference, Ideologies of Neutrality, Development, and Anti-Imperialism in the laboratory of the 1950s* (Leiden: University of Leiden Masters of Thesis, 2017), p. 17.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 14–15.

attitude, based on the assumption that ‘[if] European socialists strengthened themselves and solve[d] their own problem[s] first, the rest will follow and the Far East will be attracted towards the Socialist International.’⁷⁹ Hence, the ASC was independent from SI.

There were two conferences of the Asian socialists: the first was in Rangoon in 1953, and the second was in Bombay (Mumbai) in 1956. The first ASC conference, on 6–15 January 1953, was attended by about 200 delegates, with observers from various socialist parties and freedom movements, including delegates from the SI. The PSI delegation included Sjahrir, Soebadio as the chairperson of PSI parliamentary representation, Sjahroezah as the chairperson of the delegation, Sugondo Djojopuspito and Hamid Algadri. According to Sjahroezah’s notes, three main issues were discussed in the conference: decolonisation; inequality between developed and underdeveloped countries; and the global bipolarity created by global superpowers, in which Asian socialists affirmed their independent position.⁸⁰ In general, the Asian socialists’ purpose was to create a ‘third force’, which prioritised the interests of Asian countries without tying them to one of the opposing superpowers.

Decolonisation, development and the Cold War were interconnected issues because the process of nation-building for the newly independent countries was undermined by the effects of the Cold War. The strongest motivation for establishing the Asian socialist forum was from the common experience of colonial exploitation and the struggle for national liberation.⁸¹ The Asian socialist parties wanted to be the vanguard for a neutralist and independent ‘third camp’, since they had to compete against charismatic national leaders as well as communist parties.⁸² The colonial question also brought the Asian socialists into opposition with European socialists and the SI. In the first place, the SI wanted a global social-democratic movement, which

⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 19.

⁸⁰ Djohan Sjahroezah, “Tentang Konferensi Rangoon”, 1953, quoted in Riadi Ngasiran (2015), pp. 251–253.

⁸¹ Van der Zande (2017), p. 43.

⁸² Lewis (2019), pp. 65–66.

encompassed non-European countries as partners. Due to their connections to colonial bureaucracies, however, most European socialist politicians held cautious and conservative views, because they believed that gradual independence was the best way to address decolonisation. Further, they feared that the ASC, with its strong anti-colonialism, would fall into the communist bloc. Conversely, ASC members considered that the question of decolonisation was fundamental; they wanted independence to be realised as quickly as possible.

Following this conference, the PSI produced an analysis of Western colonialism from the nineteenth century until the world wars. Even though most Asian colonies were independent when the analysis was published (1954), the colonial idea that Westerners had a 'sacred mission' to enlighten and help underdeveloped nations was still widely embraced; it underlay Western political interests during the Cold War.⁸³ The first ASC was also concerned with the question of minority rights in nationalist struggles.⁸⁴ Sjahrir's conference speech, 'Nationalism and Internationalism', outlined problems of nationalism in the Asian context. Unlike European socialist movements, which originated from working-class movements in industrial societies, Asian socialism emerged within the 'framework' of nationalism and the anti-colonial struggle. Sjahrir warned that, in its extreme form, nationalism was 'irrational and will lead to disaster'; hence, it had to be developed into a more mature, rational form of nationalism. Internationalism, while based on political rationality, did not rule out the possible distortion. Marx and Engels, according to Sjahrir:

Envisaged an internationalism without nations, a unity of the workers or proletariat united in a way which would transcend the national boundaries in the face of the capitalist class ... across all national boundaries. Lenin was still thinking in the framework of internationalism, but soon afterwards he gave it up and began with the idea of building socialism in one country. As we have pointed out before, there's nothing left of this

⁸³ Indonesian Socialist Party, "Analysing colonialism", in *Socialist Asia – Fortnightly Bulletin* Vol 3, No 6-7 (Rangoon, October – November 1954) quoted from *ibid*, p. 48.

⁸⁴ Talbot C. Imlay (2013), pp. 1108–1110.

kind of internationalism in Stalin's Russia today.... The proletariat internationalism nowadays is no more than a misleading label for Russian nationalism and for the endeavor to make the workers and nationalist movements in backward countries subservient to Russian nationalism.⁸⁵

Sjahrir said that 'non-alignment' meant not only creating Asian solidarity as an alternative bloc, but having an ideological foundation that was independent from capitalist and communism. The Asian socialists were aware of the defects of narrow-minded nationalism, which meant their outlook was different from the nationalism of the Bandung Conference. Neutrality and the establishment of a 'third force' implied the need for social and economic development. For this, material and technical support was needed from advanced Western countries, but Western aid could hold 'neo-colonial' motives. The socialist parties in Asian countries were also in a weak position as small opposition parties. Therefore, the ASC needed to turn to the Socialist International for help, despite the differences between the two organisations.⁸⁶

In the context of the Cold War, the idea of development became an instrument for both the capitalist and communist blocs, as they made plans to provide aid to the 'underdeveloped' countries. 'Development' also acquired a considerable intellectual underpinning. Since the 1950s, especially in the USA, modernisation and development theories appeared, first with a focus on European post-war recovery then later shifting towards Asia and Africa.⁸⁷ As a representative of the PSI, Sumitro wrote a series of articles about economic development and social progress in Asia. He argued that the principal question was how skills and technology could fundamentally transform Asian socio-economic systems from agrarian-based feudal systems into modern systems. Structural problems were delaying development in Asia which, according to Sumitro,

⁸⁵ Sutan Sjahrir, "Nationalism and Internationalism", address to the Asian Socialist Conference in January 1953, in Herbert Feith & Lance Castles (ed), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965* (London/Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 235–236

⁸⁶ Sjahrir added that a certain 'Asian sentiment', or Asian internationalism might be beneficial for materialising the 'third force', Sutan Sjahrir, "Significance of the Rangoon Conference", *Socialist Asia—Fortnightly Bulletin*, Vol 2 No 10 (Rangoon, 1954), p 5–8; see van der Zande (2017), pp. 41–42, 52–53.

⁸⁷ See Bjorn Hettne, *Development Theories and The Three Worlds* (London: Longman Group, 1990), [translated as, *Teori Pembangunan dan Tiga Dunia* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001)].

could only be solved by balancing the economic development of both the agricultural and industrial sectors; resolving the problem of unemployment by increasing industrial development; improving technical and organisational skills through investment; and changing the distribution of wealth.⁸⁸ He emphasised the importance of modernising and improving the technical and managerial skills of Asians, while still criticising the ‘group of economic elites who controlled the finances and economies of Asia.’⁸⁹

During the 1950s, the Indonesian government was open to foreign investment, while maintaining protectionist policies for domestic capital and industry. In a joint statement in their August 1955 bulletin, the ASC stated that ‘the scarcity of capital and skills has to be addressed through external assistance.’⁹⁰ Unlike later critics of development, Asian socialists supported the idea of modernisation but, because of their negative views of foreign aid, they suggested that all economic and technical assistance should be channelled through the United Nations to ensure transparency.

Election and Early Disintegration

After five years of consolidation, in 1955, the PSI participated in Indonesia’s first general election. It was crucial for the next stage of the PSI and its position within Indonesian politics. As argued by Sjahrir, participation was the logical consequence of the party’s orientation towards parliamentary socialism, following the model of Western European social-democratic parties. For Western socialists committed to parliamentary struggle, the transition from capitalism to socialism was not because of social crises that led to violent revolution but, rather, was achieved by winning elections as the part of the democratic process.⁹¹ The 1952 national program of the party stated that ‘in order for socialism to become the leading principle that guides the political

⁸⁸ Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, “Economic Development and Social Progress in Asia”, in *Socialist Asia—Fortnightly Bulletin*, Vol 2, No 6 (October 1953), pp. 9–12.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 10.

⁹⁰ Quoted in van der Zande (2017), p. 62.

⁹¹ Sutan Sjahrir “Sosialisme di Eropa Barat”, *Suara Sosialis* No 12, year V (November 1952), in Sjahrir (1982), pp. 43–44.

orientation of Indonesia, the Socialist Party must acquire the people's support in the election for all the houses of representatives'.⁹² However, the party remained hesitant to 'open' itself. While some PSI figures enthusiastically supported the new orientation, others such as L.M. Sitorus thought this would involve the party in 'cheap' demagogical politics.⁹³ In an interview with George Kahin in December 1954, Sjahrir stated that the PSI attempted to recruit more local leaders, who were rooted in their region, but there was little indication that they had actually done so. The communist and socialist parties were two of 'the most well-organised parties in Indonesia', but the PKI lacked support from local leaders with strong ideological commitment.⁹⁴ At that stage, Aidit and Lukman were not in complete control of the politburo.

The second congress of the PSI in Jakarta, in 5–12 June 1955, was focused on the issue of party participation and preparation for the upcoming election. Despite the party's awareness of its electoral weaknesses, it had no choice but to participate because of its commitment to democratic progress. In the parliament, the PSI was one of the most capable parties, and one of the five biggest parties in the country.⁹⁵ However, there was internal opposition to participating in the elections. These opponents wanted to concentrate on internal consolidation, rather than interrupting this process by preparing for an election that would demand work of an entirely different nature. Realising that the party could not be half-hearted, its council held a second congress to reach agreement on the party's electoral campaign. The congress was attended by Sukarno and delegates from the ACS, as well as the Socialist Party of Burma. As Sjahrir stated in the PSI's newspaper, *Suara Sosialis*, the congress was conducted with high enthusiasm and satisfaction, and appeared to be more like a political celebration. Some party members questioned whether the result was worth the expense, because the congress functioned more as 'propaganda outwards' rather than 'acting towards its own

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Mrázek (1996) pp 761–762.

⁹⁴ Cited Ibid, p. 765.

⁹⁵ Sjahrir (1956), pp. 53–54.

members'.⁹⁶ Soon after the congress, party activities focused on the campaign. Hundreds of meetings were held all over the country, with most support coming from the party's youth wings, the Gerakan Pemuda Sosialis. Initially, there were high expectations and optimistic predictions that the PSI would acquire a significant vote, because there had been strong audience enthusiasm and attendance at party meetings and rallies compared to those of the larger parties.⁹⁷

Political tension increased during the election campaigns. Just months before election day, in June 1955, Ali Sastroamidjojo resigned because of an ongoing military crisis connected to the '17 October affair'.⁹⁸ As in previous crises, the PSI and Masjumi faction strongly desired for Hatta to establish a new presidential cabinet. The IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia), a new party founded by Nasution, insisted that only a cabinet appointed by the duumvirate of Sukarno and Hatta could overcome the crisis.⁹⁹ The PNI agreed that they would accept Hatta on the condition that he created a parliamentary coalition cabinet. Once established, the new cabinet under Burhanuddin Harahap from Masjumi was almost entirely the opposite to that of the previous cabinet because it excluded the PNI. Along with Masjumi and the PSI—represented by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo as Minister for Finance—the cabinet included the other major Islamic parties (Nahdatul Ulama [NU] and PSII) as well as the smaller nationalist and Christian parties. The cabinet contained mostly 'administrators', including Burhanuddin himself, Sumitro, Anak Agung Gde Agung and I.J. Kasimo—with Sutomo a minor 'solidarity maker' (Bung Tomo)—and thus made economic stabilisation the primary, long-term

⁹⁶ *Suara Sosialis* No 7–8, Year VII (July 1955) pp. 1–5, Mrázek (1994), p. 431.

⁹⁷ Sjahrir (1956), pp. 56–57.

⁹⁸ This '27 June affair' of 1955 was the army's general boycott of the inauguration of Col. Bambang Oetoyo as the new Chief of Staff for the Army. The 'Yogya charter' of February 1955 tried to overcome the division of army officers into supporters and opponents of the '17 October group.' The Ali government appointed Bambang Oetoyo, who was close to the PNI, as chief of staff on 27 June 1955 but the anti-17 October leader, Zulkifli Lubis, the provisional head of army staff, called for a general boycott of the inauguration. Lubis was forced to resign.

⁹⁹ Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence), was formed in May 1954 by Nasution and General Gatot Subroto. The party was considered an 'army front organisation', Barry Turner, *Nasution: Total People's Resistance and Organicist Thinking in Indonesia* (PhD Thesis, Faculty of Life and Social Sciences, University of Melbourne, 2005), pp. 239–242.

priority. Nevertheless, the cabinet itself was intended to be transitional. Its principal mission was to hold the elections, after which it had to return its mandate.¹⁰⁰

The general election was held on 29 September 1955 to vote for the Parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*), and on 15 December to vote for members of the Constituent Assembly (*Majelis Konstituante*).¹⁰¹ In the parliamentary election, the PSI obtained fewer than 800,000 votes—approximately 2 per cent of the entire vote—giving it only 5 of total of 257 seats. More than 8 million people voted for the PNI; slightly less than 8 million for Masjumi; 7 million for NU; and approximately 6 million for the PKI. The PSI acquired fewer votes than relatively minor religious parties, such as the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) and *Partai Katolik* (‘Catholic Party’). This was surprising considering how, prior to the election, the PSI was still regarded as one of Indonesia’s major parties. For many of Sjahrir’s associates, such as T.B. Simatupang and Mochtar Lubis, the PSI’s failure meant Sjahrir would never ‘return to high office.’¹⁰² In his commentary on the election process, Sjahrir remarked that the people voted based on their adherence to leaders, rather than any ideals or higher motives. Sjahrir saw the election as historically significant, nevertheless, because of the people’s participation.¹⁰³

The election result was a great disappointment for the PSI. It led to scepticism about the party’s leaders, particularly Sjahroezah and L.M. Sitorus, who were the main ideologues responsible for the party’s electoral campaign, and who did not demonstrate enthusiasm for the shift away from the PSI’s existence as a cadre party.¹⁰⁴ Because of its lack of penetration into the broad base of society, the party had to develop new

¹⁰⁰ For the composition and purpose of the Burhanuddin Cabinet, see Feith (2007), pp. 418–422.

¹⁰¹ See Herbert Feith, *Pemilihan Umum 1955 di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 1999).

¹⁰² Lubis, quoted in Mrázek (1994), p. 435.

¹⁰³ Sjahrir, “Pemilihan Umum untuk Konstituante”, *Sikap* Th VIII, No 40 (5 Desember 1955), in *ibid*, pp. 436–437.

¹⁰⁴ According to a later interview with his son, Sjahroezah was initially critical of the PSI resolution to participate in the election, as he considered that the party was not ready to or capable of competing in mass politics, since it was a cadre party, Ngasiran (2015), pp. 260–261.

methods to make its programs and aims understood by the general population.¹⁰⁵ While Sjahrir maintained his role as PSI chairperson, his authority was less powerful than before.

At the congress of the PSI's Executive Council, in March–April 1956, Sjahrir's position was in jeopardy, because many party members were rumoured to support Sumitro Djojohadikusumo as the new party leader. As an active politician, economist and government official, Sumitro was considered to have better managerial skills than Sjahrir, who had already retired from politics. Initially, Sjahrir was elected as chairperson by a majority of only one across all party branches. The voting was repeated in a 'better-prepared manner', and Sjahrir won, according to the official party account.¹⁰⁶ Indonesian modern Islamic scholar and economist Dawam Rahardjo, in his intellectual biography of Sumitro, recounted the story differently, however, indicating that Sumitro was elected as chairperson only for this to be annulled due to his absence from the congress.¹⁰⁷ In a moral sense, the party was devastated by its electoral failure and, as Soebadio remarked, it needed 'some twenty years or more for self-recovery.'¹⁰⁸

After the election processes were complete, the Burhanuddin Cabinet was replaced by the second cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo, made up of a coalition among the PNI, Masjumi and NU as the largest political parties emerging from the general election. The coalition did not appear to be solid, however, due to the strong antagonism between the PNI and Masjumi. A more widely held view—particularly among regional PNI leaders—was that this antagonism should be set aside to overcome the threat of the rise of the PKI in the election. Ali Sastroamidjojo decided not to involve individuals from previous cabinets, which meant that the PSI was not represented in the new cabinet. Masjumi demanded that no PKI sympathisers from the first Ali Cabinet should be included. Eventually, and against the President's desire to include representatives from

¹⁰⁵ Sjahrir (1956), pp. 58–59.

¹⁰⁶ Mrázek (1994), p. 439.

¹⁰⁷ Dawam Rahardjo, *Nasionalisme, Sosialisme dan Pragmatisme: Pemikiran Ekonomi Politik Sumitro Djojohadikusumo* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2017), p. 172.

¹⁰⁸ Mrázek (1994), p. 436.

all the four big parties, the cabinet was formed without PKI members or sympathisers.¹⁰⁹ In compensation, Ali agreed to appoint Djuanda Kartawidjaja, a non-partisan technocrat and figure in whom Sukarno placed great personal trust, as minister for planning affairs.¹¹⁰ The second Ali Cabinet resembled Wilopo's; it had 'administrator' features, modified by horse-trading politics. Most of the new ministers were party representatives without previous cabinet experience. For the communists and remaining 'solidarity maker' politicians within the PNI and, to a larger extent, the Murba party, the only hope was President Sukarno himself.

Opposition To 'Guided Democracy': The PRRI Revolt

The establishment of the second Ali Cabinet led to growing opposition from the PSI and Masjumi, which eventually proved fatal for both. They reacted against the increasing power of the 'solidarity maker' group after the first election, and particularly to the idea of Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) that President Sukarno subsequently raised. The political crises involving the PSI and Masjumi originated from military conflicts, which had been compounded by rising anti-Javanese and anti-communist sentiments. Further, the President and cabinet did not agree on economic and political issues. Sukarno, disapproving of the PKI's exclusion from the Ali Cabinet, also disagreed with this cabinet's economic policy.

The initial campaign for an alternative to multi-party-based, parliamentary democracy began in October 1956. In his speech on Youth Oath Day, Sukarno urged Indonesia to 'to bury all parties.' Two days later, the President continued to criticise the parties, stating that 'guided democracy' should replace 'liberal' democracy. Both

¹⁰⁹ Feith (2007), pp. 466–469.

¹¹⁰ Farabi Fakhri, *The Rise of the Managerial State in Indonesia: Institutional Transition during the Early Independence Period 1950–1965* (PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2014), pp. 219–22. Djuanda (1911–1963), came from lower Sundanese nobility, and graduated as a civil engineer from the Technische Hoogeschool of Bandung (now the Bandung Institute of Technology) in 1933. Djuanda never lived in the Netherlands nor actively participated in the nationalist movement. Not being affiliated with any particular ideology, he was the right-hand man of Sukarno, also a Bandung engineering student, during the early period of Guided Democracy, in which he served as prime minister (1957–1959). Rosihan Anwar called Djuanda the pioneer of Indonesian technocracy.

Murba and the PKI supported the idea of guided democracy, provided that it did not mean the dissolution of the parties. Murba called for the formation of a broader organisation supported by all political currents. Masjumi was strongly opposed to the idea; Natsir declared that 'if parties are buried, democracy will automatically be buried.'¹¹¹

Sukarno's campaign against parliamentary democracy coincided with military unrest, which had implications for the regions. The PSI-affiliated military leader, Col. Zulkifli Lubis, had been dismissed from the army leadership in 1955 due to his role in the '27 June' affair, in which he advocated boycotting the PNI-linked new Army Chief of Staff. His opposition to the government was strengthened by the reinstatement of his long-time foe, Nasution, and the formation of a new PNI-dominated cabinet. Among his military allies were Alex Kawilarang and Maludin Simbolon, who had once sided with Nasution but now turned against him. In August 1956, Kawilarang issued an order to arrest foreign minister Roeslan Abdulgani (PNI) on charges of corruption. Roeslan escaped arrest because he was not in Indonesia, and Nasution subsequently annulled the order.¹¹² In the following months, while Sukarno was overseas, Lubis and his followers attempted a military coup by mobilising units to arrest Nasution, but nothing came of it. When accused of treachery, Lubis stated that he would only answer to a new cabinet under Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta.

While the PNI and Masjumi worked together in government, they clashed as a result of these events. For Masjumi, Lubis's actions were a manifestation of the government's failure to maintain moral authority, which led to the army's struggle for greater power over the state. However, the PNI accused Masjumi of being responsible for regionalism and advancing its own political interests by silently supporting Lubis.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Feith (2007), pp. 517–518.

¹¹² PNI politician Roeslan Abdulgani (1914–2005) was one of the most prominent revolutionary youth leaders from Surabaya. During the second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, he was foreign minister. He left Jakarta for London to attend the conference on Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal just as pro-Lubis troops tried to capture him. *Ibid.*, p. 503.

¹¹³ Masjumi had previously been accused of supporting the Islamist Darul Islam movement and was linked with regionalist- and army dissident movements. The PNI was demoralised and internally divided

The PSI response was ambiguous, because it was critical of the parliamentary coalition and Ali Cabinet. The party was also suspicious of Sukarno's idea of 'burying the parties.' Furthermore, the PSI linked Sukarno's desire to abolish the party system with Hatta's decision to retire from the vice-presidency. The duumvirate (*dwi-tunggal*) was now in serious disagreement.¹¹⁴ During various crises throughout the era of constitutional democracy, there had been several attempts to restore Hatta's presidential cabinet, mostly by the PSI, Masjumi and various non-communist opposition groups. Such initiatives were always aborted by Sukarno and his followers, or by the communists. Realising the unbridgeable opposition between him and Sukarno, Hatta had previously said that he would quit his position after the election. On 20 July 1956, Hatta submitted his resignation, which came into effect on 1 December.¹¹⁵

The situation following Hatta's resignation was heated, especially in Sumatra and Sulawesi, where opposition culminated in the formation of regionally based military councils. Many non-Javanese people, especially Sumatrans, had regarded Hatta as their representative, and the duumvirate symbolised national unity between Javanese and non-Javanese. The protest started in Minangkabau, where a reunion of the former Banteng division was taking place.¹¹⁶ There was a local coup in Sumatra, initiated by Col. Achmad Hussein under the name of the *Dewan Banteng* ('Banteng Council'). Natsir, the Masjumi chairperson, asserted that forming a Hatta-led business cabinet was the only possible solution for the problems in Sumatra. Five Masjumi ministers then resigned to persuade the cabinet to return its mandate. Sukarno and Nasution applied a

as the result of the disagreement between Prime Minister Ali and Sukarno over the PKI's potential inclusion in the cabinet, see Madinier (2013), pp. 213–215.

¹¹⁴ For the PSI response to President Sukarno's October addresses, see "Mimpi atau Impian" editorial article in *Sikap*, No. 42, Year X, 5 November 1956.

¹¹⁵ Mavin Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 180–182. An early indication of serious discordance came when Sukarno who was not in Indonesia in 1955 refused to endorse a decree issued by Hatta related to the succession of the air force chief of staff. Furthermore, Hatta was aware that the balance of power after the election had shifted towards the 'solidarity maker' camp which advocated a more authoritarian form of government. This was indicated by a closer alliance between Sukarno and the army chief, Nasution. In his letter to Sukarno before his resignation, Hatta accused Sukarno of behaving like a dictator.

¹¹⁶ For the background on the Banteng Division and its connection to military dissidents in Central Sumatra (including Minangkabau) region see Audrey Kahin, *Dari Pemberontakan hingga Integrasi: Sumatra Barat dan Politik Indonesia 1926–1998* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2008), pp. 275–280.

strategy of partly accommodating the regionalists' demands, while also diminishing solidarity among dissidents.¹¹⁷

Another political high point was reached on 21 February, with the release of Sukarno's long-awaited *konsepsi* ('political concept'); this contained two main points. First, instead of dismantling the party system, Sukarno advocated a cabinet based on what he said were Indonesian values of *gotong royong* ('mutual assistance through deliberation and consensus'), which would incorporate the four main parties. Second, a National Council (*Dewan Nasional*), consisting principally of workers, peasants, intellectuals, national entrepreneurs, religious and youth groups, and women's associations, was to be established. There would also be representatives from the regions. The President himself would lead this council.¹¹⁸ The left-wing of the PNI, Murba and PKI were enthusiastic about Sukarno's plan, mainly because it did not require dismantling the party system. Masjumi firmly repudiated such ideas, with Natsir stating that 'one could not make a dichotomy between Western and Eastern democracy, since there was only democracy or non-democracy.' He alleged that the aim of the concept was to create 'a democracy without opposition.'¹¹⁹ While the PSI thought that the proposal would not radically change the basis of the prevailing constitution, the main question raised by most parties was whether to include the communist party.¹²⁰

On 2 March, in response to the President's concept, Lieutenant Colonel H.N. Ventje Sumual proclaimed the *Piagam Perjuangan Semesta* (*Permesta*, or 'Charter of the Common Struggle') in Makassar. Sumual declared that the whole area was in a state of war and siege, and was under his command. The Charter contained an economic development plan for the regions and political demands, such as having greater regional representation in the National Council and a *gotong royong* cabinet that was presidential

¹¹⁷ Feith (2007), p. 534–536.

¹¹⁸ David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 117–118.

¹¹⁹ Mohammad Natsir, "Reaksi pertama terhadap Konsepsi Presiden", February 1957, quoted in Audrey Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad Natsir* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), pp. 99–100.

¹²⁰ "Facing A Dreadlock", in *Socialist Bulletin* No 2, Vol 1, (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, 1957).

in character and led by Sukarno and Hatta.¹²¹ Realising that the Eastern Indonesian coup had the potential to reunite the rebels, Nasution urged the government to declare martial law.

The period between April and September 1957 was marked by attempts at negotiation between the new Djuanda government and military dissidents. While the establishment of economic and political decentralisation was the principal goal for individuals such as Ahmad Hussein and Barlian, for anti-communist Simbolon, ideology was more important. Anti-communism grew as a factor in the revolt, as more politicians from Jakarta crossed to the rebels' side. One of the earliest to do so was Sumitro. He had been summonsed for corruption in March. As minister for finance in the Burhanuddin Cabinet, Sumitro had allegedly spent the state financial budget on the PSI's electoral campaign. Since there had been coverage about corruption in the PNI and PKI press, he surmised that the PSI's opponents were defaming him and the party. When he had to face subsequent investigation on 8 May, Sumitro left Jakarta for Sumatra, where he joined the rebels, convinced that he had become a target of the communists.¹²² Sumitro's defection made the dissent movement more firmly anti-communist. Along with Sumitro came PSI-sympathisers, such as St. Mohammad Rasjid and Des Alwi (Sjahrir's adopted son from Banda Neira), who later became the rebels' spokesperson overseas. Sumitro's open support for the Sumatra rebellion made the PSI an easy target. In September 1957, the PSI branch in Minangkabau declared its support for the regional movement under the Dewan Banteng.¹²³ Because of Sumitro's participation, the rebels split into a 'moderate' faction of Hussein, Sumual and Barlian, which was willing to negotiate with the government on the regions' aspirations, and a

¹²¹ Feith (2007), pp. 545–546.

¹²² See Aristides Katoppo, Hendra Esmara, et.al., *Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Jejak Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000).

¹²³ Statement of the general coordinator of the PSI in Central Sumatra, in *Suara Sosialis* Vol 9, Year IX (September 1957). On the implications of Sumitro's involvement in the regionalist movement, see Mrázek (1996), pp. 794–795.

radical anti-communist faction of Sumitro, Simbolon, Zulkifli Lubis and Dahlan Djambek.¹²⁴

There were two important events in September. The first was the meeting of the regional council in Palembang, in which the rebels formulated their principal demands, the most important being the restriction of communism. The other demands were the restoration of the Sukarno-Hatta duumvirate, removal of Nasution as chief of the army, decentralisation and regional autonomy, formation of a senate, and bureaucratic reform.¹²⁵ The second event was the National Congress (*Musyawahar Nasional*, Munas) at which the rebels could present their objectives to the government. However, while the Munas agreed to establish a committee to overcome military conflict between the centre and regions, there was no clear statement regarding restoration of the duumvirate's leadership. Some rebels no longer believed that Hatta's restoration to power was the key to overcoming national problems.¹²⁶

As the radically anti-communist rebel faction started to contact American agents, the rebels became more hostile towards the central government. Sumitro became the key person to connect the Sumatran rebels with US agents in Singapore and Manila. Initial contact by Simbolon with the US secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was made in April 1957. The dissident colonels opened an account in Singapore for donations to help their struggle. Because he was a diplomat and financial expert, Sumitro was able to connect with US agents and raise funds.¹²⁷

The political situation during the last two months of 1957 was exacerbated by two major events. First, Indonesia failed to have its claim on West New Guinea recognised by the United Nations. This failure led to the takeover of Dutch enterprises in Indonesia and the expulsion of Dutch and Eurasians from the country. The second

¹²⁴ Audrey Kahin & George McT. Kahin, *Subversi Sebagai Politik Luar Negeri: Menyingkap Keterlibatan CIA di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1997), pp. 87–88.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 89.

¹²⁶ The radical wing of the regionalist movement was dissatisfied with Hatta's 'neutralist' commentary on Marxism, see Audrey Kahin (2008), pp. 308–309.

¹²⁷ Audrey Kahin & George Mc.T. Kahin (1997), pp. 127–131.

event was a failed assassination attempt on Sukarno in Cikini, Jakarta. The following investigations revealed that extreme Islamists associated with Masjumi, and possibly linked to the Zulkifli Lubis group, were responsible for the attack. Lubis was targeted for arrest. The Masjumi politicians Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara escaped to Sumatra to join the insurgents, after being intimidated over the incident.

In January 1958, civil and military rebels, including the three Masjumi politicians who had just arrived from Java, met together at Sungai Dareh, near Padang, West Sumatra. The meeting decided for an open rebellion if the central government declined the demands of the regions, but not all participants agreed to establish a separate government or wanted civil war. At the last moment, Hatta along with Masjumi and the PSI, tried to contact colleagues in Sumatra to prevent rebellion. This had little success, except that the South Sumatra commander, Barlian, withdrew from the revolt.¹²⁸ Assured of US military and financial aid, the rebels were ready for confrontation and ignored any possible compromise solutions. On 10 February, Ahmad Hussein sent an ultimatum to the central government to dissolve the Djuanda Cabinet and form a new government, led by Hatta and Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX of Yogyakarta. Because the President was not in Indonesia, Nasution took the initiative to dismiss all rebels from the army and prepare for military confrontation. Five days later, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI), a counter-government, was proclaimed with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara as prime minister. The rebels declared that the PRRI was a provisional government, which would be dissolved following the formation of a new anti-communist government. When Sukarno arrived in Jakarta and met up with Hatta, the latter urged him to make concessions to the regionalists' demands to prevent a civil war. Hatta, still wanting to regain political authority, proposed a new cabinet under his

¹²⁸ On 16 January 1958, Hatta and Sjahrir in response to the Sungai Dareh meeting, sent a delegation to the Sumatra rebels, while Mohammad Roem from Masjumi suggested that Djuanda make concessions in order to prevent open rebellion. Among the PSI delegates were Sjahroezah, Djoeir Mohammad and Imam 'Bok' Slamet, who urged Sumitro not to use violence which would be an excuse for foreign powers to divide Indonesia. Sumitro, already sidelined by the PSI politburo election, refused to follow his colleagues' advice, Mrázek (1996), pp. 795–796, and Ngasiran (2015), pp. 282–283.

control. The PSI took a similar compromise position. Sukarno had already allied himself with Nasution, however; he ignored them and chose to crush the rebels immediately.¹²⁹

Both sides prepared for military confrontation. To accentuate their anti-communism for foreign consumption, the rebels imprisoned approximately 200 local 'communists' (although these included non-communists). From early March 1958, the government launched a military campaign to reclaim regions already under the rebels' control. The US Seventh Fleet, stationed in Singapore, had prepared for a landing in Sumatra to protect American citizens and properties in the Sumatran oil fields. The Indonesian government, by swiftly securing the Caltex oil company and moving its military forces, forestalled any further American intervention. Over the next months, PRRI forces were driven out of their central positions in Medan and Padang. A similar situation eventuated in North Sulawesi, in which the Permesta forces were expelled from major cities. US support for the movement, part of regional Cold War strategy, had been made public when, on 18 May 1958, an American pilot was shot down while bombing the city of Ambon. Within two days, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, condemned the PRRI-Permesta in an effort to repair relations with Jakarta.¹³⁰ By mid-1958, the regionalist rebellion was mostly defeated and reduced to guerrilla warfare. Sukarno and many other Indonesian leaders regarded the USA with greater suspicion than ever because of its role. Until his downfall in 1966, Sukarno remained convinced that the USA and its agents had masterminded various attempts to overthrow and even kill him, and that the PSI and Masjumi were involved in these schemes. In September 1958, Nasution issued a decree that restricted those PSI, Masjumi and Parkindo branches that had been involved in the regional revolts, leading to the disbanding of the PSI and Masjumi.

Apart of its complicity in the PRRI-Permesta affair, the key event leading to the disbanding was the formation of Liga Demokrasi (League of Democracy), an anti-communist coalition initiated by Hatta, Nasution's IPKI along with PSI and the

¹²⁹ Hatta's proposals were that all conflicting parties should return to the constitution; that the National Council into be changed into a senate-like institution with a greater proportion of regional representatives; that a new cabinet under Hatta as prime minister be established; and that the counter-government (PRRI) be dissolved and the rebels be given a general amnesty, Kahin & Kahin (1997), pp. 183–184.

¹³⁰ Ricklefs (2001), pp. 318–319.

Masjumi party, to oppose the inclusion of the PKI by Sukarno's Guided Democracy. However, most of army officers in the Liga Demokrasi, unlike the anti-communist parties, did not support either parliamentary democracy or a multiparty system. Nasution and the army eventually distanced themselves from the movement and let Sukarno act against opposition parties.¹³¹ On July 1960, Sukarno summoned the PSI's top leadership to ask for an official party view on the PRRI-Permesta affair and the simplification of the party system. The party's response, delivered by Sjahrir, expressed the PSI's disapproval of its cadres' participation in the revolt, but this did not change Sukarno's decision to dissolve PSI and Masjumi. Both parties were officially banned on 17 August 1960.¹³²

Following the party's failure in the 1955 election, the decline of the PSI was already apparent. To many members, this failure had ruined their only hope of the PSI becoming one of the biggest political powers in Indonesia. It created disunity among the party leaders, in particular Sjahrir and Sumitro. Sjahrir's approach was considered elitist and insufficient to win over strong political competition. As Sjahrir admitted, the major sources of strength for the party were ideological and moral—the party had dissociated itself from the political corruption of the other major parties. The only other party to do so was the PKI. Sjahrir, one of the initiators of the multi-party system after 1945, became one of the major critics of the party system and its corruption of parliamentary democracy. As it turned out, however, the parties were not abolished entirely; rather, their activities were selectively curtailed, and the PSI was among the major casualties. Even after the downfall of Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime, the PSI never revived as a political party, even though its positive and rational approach to economic development found favour with the new regime.¹³³

¹³¹ For Liga Demokrasi, see Ngasiran (2015), pp. 311-313.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

¹³³ Lindsay Rae, "Sutan Sjahrir and the Failure of Indonesian Socialism", in Angus McIntyre (ed.), *Indonesian Political Biography: In Search of Cross-Cultural Understanding* (Melbourne: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).

Part II
Figures and Idea

CHAPTER 4

Sutan Sjahrir: The Ideologue of Indonesian Democratic Socialism

As the founder and leading figure of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), Sutan Sjahrir occupied a central position in democratic socialism in Indonesia. While the previous chapters have discussed the PSI in general, and Sjahrir's role in socialist intellectual networks, this chapter will focus on the personal aspects of Sjahrir's thinking, including his ideas and meditations on various thinkers from the Western intellectual tradition, particularly those related to socialism. For Sjahrir, socialism is primarily understood as human equality and the establishment of socialist society within the framework of a democratic state.¹ In addition, with the lack of development of the capitalist mode of production in Indonesia, the goals of [democratic] socialism were increasing of the means of production and the improvement of social welfare.² Sjahrir became the founder of the political rationale of democratic socialism, while Hatta, who was not affiliated with the PSI, contributed ideas to the economic aspect of democratic socialism in Indonesia. Sjahrir, however, left fewer publicly accessible writings than other national founding fathers of Indonesia.

A Socialist Intellectual

Sjahrir was born on 5 March 1909 in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra. His father, Mohammad Rasad, was a lawyer who served the government first as an attorney then later, from 1913, as chief attorney (*hoofd Jaksa*) in Medan. Sjahrir had thus spent his childhood in a social environment where Western education and skills were highly

¹ Sutan Sjahrir, *Indonesian Socialism* (Asian Socialist Publishing House, 1956), p. 23.

² Partai Sosialis Indonesia, "Peraturann Dasar, Penjelasan Asas dan Garis Politik" (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, 1952)

respected.³ The earliest influence on his political modernism was probably his older stepsister, Rohana Kudus (1884–1972), who was a famous pioneer of women’s education in Minangkabau—paralleling Kartini in Java. Rohana established a small school for girls and helped to initiate scholarship funds to send youths from her hometown of Koto Gadang for schooling. Sjahrir moved with his family to Medan when he was four and, in 1915, enrolled in the *ELS (Europeesche Lagere School)*, the best primary school in town. According to Mrázek’s biography of Sjahrir, the years in Medan were formative, introducing him to Dutch literature on Indonesian colonial history and giving him an awareness of the Dutch Ethical mission for modernity and the advancement of the Indonesian people. He experienced diversity in his early life, because he was brought up in a Minangkabau family, but also lived in the *rantau*, the ‘area of movement’ outside the homeland.⁴

After finishing junior high school, Sjahrir moved to Bandung in 1926 to attend the *Algemene Middelbare School* (‘General High School’), where he had his earliest contact with the nationalist movement in Java. At the time of Sjahrir’s arrival, Bandung was the centre of active study clubs, and youth and nationalist organisations.⁵ In February 1927, Sjahrir joined *Jong Indonesie*, a nationalist youth association. A commonly debated theme within the association was ‘anti-feudalism’, since most students came from a *priyayi* background. He was also in close contact with the Indonesian National Party (PNI), founded by Sukarno in the same year. From the beginning, Sjahrir was critical of Sukarno’s approach, but this criticism was neutralised when the colonial ruler implemented a more reactionary policy. Sjahrir’s departure for study in the Netherlands in June 1929 marked a new stage in his life as a young freedom fighter and intellectual.

³ John D. Legge, *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1988), p. 25.

⁴ Rudolf Mrázek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (Ithaca/New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1994), pp. 23–32.

⁵ Hans van Miert, *Dengan Semangat Berkobar: Nasionalisme dan Gerakan Pemuda di Indonesia 1918-1930* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra / KITLV, 2003).

In the Netherlands, Sjahrir joined the PI. Initially, he was a minor figure in the movement, but he sought to establish his own networks. He lived with his elder sister before moving to the house of Salomon Tas, a leading figure in the Dutch Social Democratic Student Club, who later wrote a personal reflection about Sjahrir, his career and intellectualism.⁶ Tas and his wife, Maria Duchateau, became Sjahrir's closest Dutch companions; it was Tas who introduced him to the Dutch socialist milieu. Tas said about Sjahrir that he was 'one of the very few people who worked tirelessly, in not only speaking about socialism but also going deeply into it.' Among the principal socialist writers of the time were Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky. In their writings, Sjahrir found a compelling diagnosis of the nature of imperialism and its relation to capitalist development.⁷ Tas described Sjahrir as a middle-class youth who was fascinated with socialism 'almost like falling in love at first sight'. Like many contemporary intellectuals, Sjahrir held to the idea that understanding the true nature of socialism and working-class solidarity could only be achieved by participating in the life of workers. He joined the International Transport Workers' Federation, led by Edo Fimmen, a left-wing socialist. The Federation advocated a type of radical Marxism, and Fimmen likely swayed Sjahrir towards proletarianism, although Fimmen's right-hand man, Jaap Oldenbroek, had more of a realist, pragmatic approach. In this environment, Sjahrir experienced the socialist movement of Europe as an organisational system geared to yield practical results, an experience unavailable for most Indonesian students.⁸

Sjahrir's encounter with Dutch socialism/social democracy was important for his career as a political activist and intellectual. Here, his career paralleled that of Amir Sjarifuddin, with his Christian and socialist connections. Sjahrir, however, was worried about the irrational elements of Indonesian secular nationalism, especially its populist

⁶ Sol Tas, "Souvenirs of Sjahrir", *Indonesia* No 8 (1969), pp. 135–154 [Indonesian, "Kenangan pada Sjahrir", in Rosihan Anwar (ed), *Mengenang Sjahrir* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1980)].

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 139.

⁸ *Ibid*, p.140, Fimmen (1883–1942) was Dutch socialist and trade unionist. He initially joined the Christian anarchist magazine 'Vrede' (peace). Encouraged by F. Domela Nieuwenhuis, he chaired the last day of the Conference of International Anti-militarist League (June 1904) where the Christian anarchists advocated for conscientious objection and a general strike in the event of war.

mass-movement wing. Amir was more concerned with the rising influence of political Islam in the nationalist movement—especially its impact on minorities—and sought a secular basis for the coming Indonesian nation-state.⁹ Both linked up with similarly progressive, socialist and anti-fascist Dutch intellectuals who supported the ‘neo-Ethical’ orientation prominent during World War II. This link to anti-fascism explained Sjahrir’s and Amir’s prominent roles in international diplomatic affairs during the Revolutionary era. In the short term, Sjahrir’s experience of Dutch socialism gave him a framework for his new, intellectually based nationalist movement, the Indonesian National Education Club (PNI-Pendidikan), modelled on socialist student clubs in the Netherlands.

Following his return to Indonesia in 1931–32, Sjahrir became a fervent critic of Sukarno—then released from prison—as well as the Partindo (Partai Indonesia), the successor to Sukarno’s old PNI. Sjahrir objected to Partindo’s collaboration with Doctor Soetomo’s Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia (PBI). The latter’s cultural nationalism and belief in a glorious, precolonial Javanese past was complete nonsense to Sjahrir. He wrote, ‘There is no freedom and greatness for oppressed people, and the freedom or greatness of the past did not belong to them’. He criticised not only the aristocracy as a class in Marxian terms, but also the aristocracy’s cultural and ideological impact on the nationalist movement. Sjahrir also criticised the Minangkabau nationalist figure, Muhammad Yamin, for his idea of *pergerakan* (‘nationalist movement’) as an expression of ‘greater Java.’ For Sjahrir, the power of the Indonesian Revolution was founded in labourers, the peasantry, small traders and the petit bourgeoisie. At this stage, he equated the struggle for national liberation with class struggle.¹⁰

The return of Sukarno from imprisonment obstructed Sjahrir’s political manoeuvring to take over and reorganise the radical nationalist movement into one based on cadres. Sjahrir preferred disseminating ideas and influencing people through discussion rather than demagogy. As an ideologue, he created solidarity among students

⁹ Gerry van Klinken, *Lima Penggerak Bangsa yang Terlupa: Nasionalisme Minoritas Kristen* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2010).

¹⁰ Mázek (1996), pp. 122–124.

and intellectuals, just as Sukarno did among the common people. This difference helps to explain the enduring conflict between the two. In accordance with the Javanese worldview, Sukarno was welcomed as the returning *Ratu Adil*, or ‘messiah’. He was invited to address the PNI-Pendidikan congress, chaired by Sjahrir, in June 1932. Sukarno’s attempt to unite the PNI-Pendidikan and Partindo was unsuccessful, however, and he had to choose between the two. As predicted by many of his followers, he opted for Partindo.¹¹ The political circumstances following the return of Sukarno demonstrated the fundamental differences among the competing Indonesian nationalist parties. As a political propagandist, Sukarno was obviously far more effective than Sjahrir, due to Sukarno’s rhetoric and mastery of Javanese cultural insights and vocabulary. Sjahrir was not only unable to speak Javanese, but he was also cautious when addressing rural audiences, avoiding messianic, ‘mystical’ ideas, and Javanese cultural nationalist expressions. As a result, Sjahrir’s PNI-Pendidikan could only attract supporters in regions where Javanese cultural influence was limited. In contrast to Partindo, Sjahrir’s Club never attracted many people to its meetings.¹²

Subsequently, Sjahrir devoted his energies to the trade union movement. His writings and speeches focused increasingly on labour problems. After Hatta’s return from the Netherlands, Sjahrir was essentially a labour specialist, while Hatta dealt mostly with education. Sjahrir retired as editor-in-chief of *Daulat Ra’jat* as well as executive chair of the PNI-Pendidikan.¹³ Sjahrir was invited as one of the main speakers to the Indonesian Labour Congress (*Kongres Buruh Indonesia*) in Surabaya in May 1933, along with Sukarno and Soetomo. Sukarno and Sjahrir agreed that the labour movement had to be more politically involved, but differed about the relationship between unions and political parties. Sjahrir argued that labour should be independent from the party structure, while remaining politically conscious that labour was part of the working class.¹⁴ Soetomo disagreed both with connecting labour to politics and with

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 150–151.

¹² Ibid, p. 153.

¹³ Sjahrir was still mentioned vice-chairperson of and advisor to the association, Ibid, pp. 161–162.

¹⁴ Michele Ford, *NGO as Outside Intellectual: A History of Non-Governmental Organisations’ Role in the Indonesian Labour Movement* (PhD thesis, University of Wollongong, 2003), pp. 133–134.

the concept of class struggle. He thought the sectarian effects of Marxist class doctrine would divide Indonesians and make them more vulnerable to colonial oppression. Nevertheless, the congress, dominated by PNI-Pendidikan and Partindo, decided to form a new labour federation, the CPBI (*Centraal Perhimpunan Buruh Indonesia*) with Sjahrir as chairperson.¹⁵ As Sjahrir shifted his focus to trade unionism, he was increasingly marginalised in the movement but found that his networks had expanded.

The return of Hatta also gave Sjahrir oversight of the PNI-Pendidikan's political education courses. In November 1932, Hatta outlined an educational program that was to be simplified into question-and-answer form and used in the PNI-Pendidikan's daily cadre course. These '150 questions and answers', written by Sjahrir and Soebagio, were based on the Minangkabau ideal of democracy or 'people's sovereignty' (*kedaulatan rakyat*), and the traditional form of collectivism that existed before the coming of colonial, capitalist exploitation. While, for Sjahrir, aristocrats (*ningrat*) and bureaucrats (*ambtenaar*) were always the principal adversaries, he also considered that being anti-aristocratic or progressive was not the same as upholding the principle of individual freedom, as advocated by J.J. Rousseau.¹⁶ Instead, democracy was based on the 'communal meeting and collective voice of the people, and mutual consent.'¹⁷ The PNI-Pendidikan's '150 questions and answers' covered the limiting of individual rights to ownership and the main objective of the PNI-Pendidikan movement, the establishment of a social order made up of independent communities, forming the 'body politic'. Each community should 'govern its own affairs by its own convictions and rules, providing they did not contradict the interests of general government'.¹⁸ These views prompted criticism from both the left and right. The communist-dominated PI repudiated the PNI-Pendidikan concept of social ownership as deviating from true Marxism, while the Minangkabau Islamists of Permi (*Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia*) attacked the

¹⁵ John Ingleson, *Buruh, Serikat, dan Politik: Indonesia Pada 1920an-1930an* (Jakarta: Marjin Kiri, 2015), pp. 348–354.

¹⁶ Among Indonesian nationalists, Rousseau and other thinkers of the French Enlightenment/Revolution, were frequently seen as representing democratic-bourgeois ideas.

¹⁷ Mrázek (1994), p. 101.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Pendidikan's program as being an affront to Minangkabau custom and Islamic law. The PNI-Pendidikan leaders responded vehemently to such accusations, arguing that the program was an extension of family organisation, based on Minangkabau principles of mutual assistance and equality.¹⁹

Although Sjahrir was the co-author of the '150 questions and answers', the PNI-Pendidikan program was more a reflection of Hatta than Sjahrir. The course format, however, aligned with Sjahrir's view of education, which emphasised individual reasoning and participation through dialogue, rather than the explicit explanations favoured by Hatta. Sjahrir and Hatta managed the PNI-Pendidikan as a school-like structure with no intention of transforming it into a political party, because 'politics under colonialism could only mean education.'²⁰ PNI-Pendidikan branches aimed to prepare members to 'pass the examination'; much of the course subject matter was often read aloud and repeated until members knew it by heart.

Sjahrir argued that the real essence of the modern *pergerakan* was 'organisation.' Instead of focusing on outward or pragmatic aspects of the struggle, his notion of 'organisation' was 'self-awareness, awareness of others and the will to participate in the struggle'. The key to achieving such awareness was 'education'.²¹ In another *Daulat Ra'jat* article, Sjahrir stated that education should produce 'the right way of thinking', which was not only revolutionary but also 'realist', matter-of-fact and down-to-earth, based on truth and consciousness. This unity of self and purpose was described by Sal Tas as Sjahrir's 'rationalistic hygiene.'²²

Such rationalism represented 'disenchantment of the world', in Weberian terms.²³ The 'enchanted' world—the world of the mystical thinking of traditional societies with charismatic leadership—could lead, in Sjahrir's terms, to 'ideas on the verge of

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 102.

²⁰ Hatta's argument in *Daulat Ra'jat* Vol 2, No 36 (20 September 1932), in M. Hatta, *Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs* (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981), pp. 117–118.

²¹ Sjahrir, "organisasi", in *Daulat Ra'jat*, 10 November 1932, cited in Mrázek (1994), p. 103.

²² This term coined by Sal Tas (1969), p. 153.

²³ See Basit Bilal Koshul, *The Postmodern Significance of Max Weber's Theory: Disenchanting Disenchantment* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 9–10.

madness, disregarding norms.’ In other words, rational thinking would be polluted by *nafsu*, or ‘passion’.²⁴ ‘Lustful desires’ referred to non-rational psychology, potentially obstructing one’s clear thinking. Sjahrir’s use of the term *nafsu* was similar to its usage in Islam. In many religions, the control of mundane desires has always involved particular types of asceticism. For Islam, however, especially in its modernist forms such as in Minangkabau, the control of *nafsu* is achieved by cultivating *iman* (‘faith’) and *akal* (‘reason’) in a balanced way, in contrast to what happens in mysticism and magic.²⁵

Reflections from Exile

When Sjahrir left the Netherlands at the end of 1931, he had developed strong bonds with the Dutch socialists. He had also become romantically involved with Sal Tas’s wife, Maria Duchateau. The three agreed that Maria would join Sjahrir in Medan, after he returned to the East Indies; although they were not officially divorced, Tas and Duchateau had been separated for some time. In April 1932, Sjahrir married Maria in Medan in an Islamic ceremony; they spent five weeks together before their marriage was annulled by local Islamic officials. The Dutch colonial authorities returned Maria to Holland. At the time, bohemian free love had been common among European progressives. In the increasingly conservative colonial society, however, their marriage was quite scandalous.²⁶ Sjahrir and Maria maintained close correspondence for years, even during his imprisonment and exile between 1934 and 1942. Sjahrir’s letters revealed not only the tragedy of his first marriage, but also his deep contemplation of how colonialism was constructed through racial segregation. He looked at Indonesian culture in terms of the intellectual gap between the West and East. These letters were brought together in 1945 under the title *Indonesische Overpeinzingen (Indonesian*

²⁴ Sjahrir, “organisasi”, cited in Mrázek (1994), p. 104.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ For a brief discussion about interracial marriage among Indonesian nationalists and its consequences, including Sjahrir’s and Maria’s case, see Frances Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Politik Kolonial di Hindia Belanda 1900-1942* (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2007), pp. 298–301.

Contemplations) and later published, together with his writings on fascism and the Japanese military occupation, as *Out of Exile*.²⁷

To conservative governor-general de Jonge (1931–1936), the ‘Ethical’ position of progressive Dutch intellectuals, the ‘Leiden School’ in particular, was a menace to the colonial establishment and produced Indonesian intellectuals who were even more dangerous than their Dutch counterparts. While the real threat was nationalism, it came from ideas brought by Europeans, and ‘if there was to be a revolution, it was not about to come from here in the Indies, but from the opposite direction’.²⁸ Thus, the government targeted the neo-Ethical, progressive social democrats, and their Indonesian connections such as the PNI-Pendidikan, as potential agents of revolution. Hatta’s initial willingness to be nominated as an OSP candidate for the Dutch Parliament did not indicate compromise, but was part of an effective strategy to find a shortcut on the path towards Indonesian independence. Realising the impact of education as a source of political power for the nationalists, the government issued new, repressive regulations for indigenous private schools. From mid-1933 until early in the following year, the de Jonge regime arrested nationalist leaders—including Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir—and sent them into exile. Sjahrir, Hatta and other PNI-Pendidikan leaders arrived at Boven Digul in February 1935.²⁹

As graduates in the Netherlands and public intellectuals, Hatta and Sjahrir were members of a privileged elite. Houses were prepared for them upon their arrival, and the authorities permitted both exiles to earn money by writing articles for Indonesian and Dutch journals of their own choice. Hatta, who brought sixteen trunks of books with him, made good use of the opportunity. Sjahrir regularly wrote letters to the Netherlands, and some of his writing on politics and general issues was read aloud as

²⁷ See Sutan Sjahrir, *Renungan Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Bakung Putih, 2019) and the English version see Sutan Sjahrir, *Out of Exile* (New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1969). The most recent interpretation of Sjahrir’s ‘Indonesian Contemplation’ has focused on human rights and colonial practices, Paul Bijl, “Human Rights and Anticolonial Nationalism in Sjahrir’s *Indonesian Contemplation*”, *Law & Literature* Vol 29, No 2, (2017).

²⁸ B.C. de Jonge, quoted in Rudolf Mrázek (1994), p. 109.

²⁹ Mrázek (1994), pp. 130–140.

lectures for his comrades.³⁰ The contrast between Hatta and Sjahrir was clear. Hatta was a typically disciplined academic, who lived an organised and pure life. Sjahrir, as observed by Sal Tas, ‘was not a man of science; he had neither systematic nor original elements in his generalizing ability, which are what characterizes the scientific man. He was dependent on others for scientific ideas and thought processes.’³¹ For Tas, Sjahrir seemed unable to detach himself from traditional socialism/Marxism and was stuck with the idea that he had held as a youth activist, that to leave Marxism meant having to leave the radical struggle behind. Since Sjahrir found himself at a dead end, he went the other way. In a letter to Maria, Sjahrir admitted that he decided not to publish anything, not only to avoid censorship, but because he had decided to keep silent politically.³²

Sjahrir’s attachment to his original interpretation of Marxism was expressed in a letter criticising the new direction taken by J. de Kadt and Sal Tas, who began to criticise Stalinism. Following his retirement from the OSP— just before the party was dissolved in 1935—de Kadt argued against the leftist Marxist elements in the party, as well as against working-class movements in general. He and Tas felt that the SDAP was ‘a small, extremist splinter party [which] had no justification whatsoever in the Netherlands politics and could only lead to adventures disguised by Marxist verbiage.’³³ For Sjahrir, however, de Kadt’s criticism of the Marxist orthodoxy of class struggle was superficial, and did not contribute anything new to the arguments of revisionists such as Eduard Bernstein and Herman de Man.³⁴

Although detached from politics, Sjahrir’s letters covered a broad range of topics on Western philosophy, literature and psychology, especially on the polarisation between Eastern and Western civilisations. These letters demonstrated his position on

³⁰ Mohammad Hatta (1981), pp. 182–183 and Burhanuddin, “Sjahrir yang saya kenal”, in Rosihan Anwar (1981), pp. 62–63.

³¹ Tas, (1969), p. 147.

³² Sjahrir’s letter to Maria dated 30 May 1935, in Sutan Sjahrir (1969), pp. 64–65.

³³ Tas (1969), pp. 146.

³⁴ See the letters from Sjahrir dated 29 May 1936 and 12 August 1936, in Sutan Sjahrir (2019), *op. cit.*, pp. 114–116, 128–130.

Indonesian nationalism and its relationship to tradition and modernity, the current issues in the 1930s cultural polemics. His criticisms were double-edged. On one side, Sjahrir highlighted the reactionism of colonial practice, as exemplified by his exile. On the other side, he criticised Asian nationalism, particularly its doctrine of non-cooperation, which he saw as ‘a projection of the inferiority complex of colonised people under colonial racial discourse’ rather than an expression of human equality. Sjahrir saw Gandhi—whom he had met at the London Round Table Conference in August 1931—as the embodiment of an Eastern charismatic leader, whose power resided in ethical and quasi-religious qualities. In contrast, the secular political tradition dominant in the Western world since Machiavelli separated *realpolitik* from morality.³⁵

Sjahrir’s writings from exile in Digul and then Banda Neira argued that the phenomenon of the ‘awakening of the East’ underpinned nationalism and the national liberation movements, but was also profoundly influenced by Western thought. At the time, the synthesis of Western science and Eastern ‘spirit’ was a common topic; even the Nazi cult of the ‘Aryan *geist*’ was inspired by an Eastern sense of a higher spiritual and moral authority.³⁶ Sjahrir saw no essential difference between East and West, except for a difference in the stage of development between ‘a feudal culture with its universal-spiritualism and a bourgeois-capitalistic culture with its rationality, materialism and objectivity.’³⁷ There were, however, diverse factors behind the national awakening of Asia. While China and Turkey moved towards Western modernity, India under Gandhi and Tagore sought an Eastern national spirit, or at least Western scientific ideas adapted to an Indian framework of ‘Eastern philosophy.’³⁸

When Hatta and Sjahrir were moved to Banda Neira in January 1936, they joined Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Iwa Kusumasumantri, two senior Indonesian nationalists, who had been in exile since 1928 and 1930, respectively. Tjipto was one

³⁵ Letter from Sjahrir 22 July 1934 in *ibid.*, pp. 16–18.

³⁶ J.J. Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought* (London/New York: Routledge, 1997).

³⁷ Sjahrir (1969), p. 68.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

of the most anti-aristocratic of the older generation of Javanese nationalists.³⁹ His brother, Soejitno Mangoenkoesoemo, had joined the Bandung-based progressive intellectual group and journal publisher, *Kritiek en opbouw* (see Chapter 2). *Kritiek en Opbouw* became a forum for opposing colonial policy under governor-general Tjarda, demanding the release of Indonesian political exiles. This group corresponded with Sjahrir and published his articles. The *Kritiek en Opbouw* circle played an important role in the formation of the anti-fascist movement, led by Amir and Soejitno during the Japanese occupation, and subsequently taken over by Sjahrir.

Sjahrir's articles in *Kritiek en Opbouw* and *Poedjangga Baroe* were on Indonesian nationalism and its search of modernity. Both raised in a similar cosmopolitan atmosphere of Minangkabau culture, Sjahrir and *Poedjangga Baroe*'s Alisjahbana shared beliefs about the universal nature of modern (bourgeois) culture. What had been adopted as the culture of intellectuals in the East was, Sjahrir wrote, Western culture. He added, 'This truth and this reality do not necessarily degrade' Eastern intellectuals. Indonesian culture was 'young', still in its formative stage, continuously absorbing and being intertwined with modern world culture.⁴⁰ As with Alisjahbana's views, Sjahrir's perspective also attracted criticism from cultural nationalists, since they considered these views as misrepresenting Indonesian culture and 'measured Indonesia exclusively by "Western norms."' ⁴¹ There were positive aspects to Eastern culture for Sjahrir, however: its dynamic spirit and optimism, and its view of life as a 'struggle' and 'movement', in contrast to Western civilisation's ageing scepticism. Sjahrir likened Indonesian aristocratic culture, the thing he disliked the most, to its Western medieval counterparts.⁴²

Sjahrir's humanism involved an exploration of instinct and the unconscious, alongside the rational side of human beings. In this analysis, he combined the

³⁹ See Savitri Scherer, *Keselarasan dan Kejanggalan: Pemikiran-Pemikiran Priyayi Nasionalis Jawa Awal Abad XX* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2012).

⁴⁰ Sjahrir, "Kesusatraan dan Rakjat", written in Banda Neira, May 1938, and published in *Poedjangga Baroe* 7, 1 (July 1939), quoted in Mrázek (1994), p. 169–170.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁴² *Ibid.*

Nietzschean ‘will to power’ philosophy with Freudian psychoanalysis.⁴³ Nietzsche’s philosophy of will and concept of the ‘superman’, for instance, influenced nationalists such as Tan Malaka and Sukarno.⁴⁴ Sjahrir’s references to Nietzsche and Freud—along with those to Marxism—did not accord with Eastern philosophy, however, which was based on the denial of individual will and passion. Sjahrir distinguished between ‘universalism’, which resided in the doctrines of Catholicism and the European medieval worldview, and ‘individualism’, which originated from the Renaissance and Protestantism. Individualism began as an abstract philosophical premise based on ‘reason’, but found its principal manifestation in the science of the mind: psychology. The rise of contemporary collectivism in the first two decades of the century, Sjahrir argued, was a response to ‘psychologism’. Individuals in a state of freedom became estranged and thus sought guidance or support, leading to a common will towards a united, ‘organic’ society, as expressed in national socialism.⁴⁵ Sjahrir thus highlighted a principal fallacy in the idea of liberty. He criticised those who ‘deified it as the highest principle behind the world and nature, while the real applicability of this ideal lay rather in the reaction against tyranny.’⁴⁶ Socialism and social sciences had emerged to explain humanity’s interconnection with natural and social laws, and how individuals became constrained by the society in which they lived.⁴⁷

In contrast to the cults of reason and individuality in Western philosophy, Sjahrir argued that Eastern thought was based on self-annihilation and the self’s incorporation into an organic unity, either with society or—in a mystical way—the cosmos. The principal source of Eastern philosophy was India but, for many Sumatran modernists, the Hindu-Javanese inheritance was the origin of Indonesian conservatism and fatalism. Its parallel was medieval Europe, which Sjahrir described as:

⁴³ Ibid, Letters from Sjahrir, 30 October 1934, 21 March 1936 and 9 May 1936, in Sjahrir (2019), pp. 32, 96 and 111.

⁴⁴ Mrázek (1994), p. 173, n.111.

⁴⁵ Letter from Sjahrir 22 September 1934, in Sjahrir (2019), p. 24–26.

⁴⁶ Letter from Sjahrir 22 September and 4 October 1934, in *ibid*, p. 25–31.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

a land of hierarchical relationships ... a feudal society, where a small group seized upon all the material and spiritual riches and kept the majority of poor people in their place through religion and philosophy, instead of feeding them properly.⁴⁸

For Sjahrir, the Eastern qualities of patience and adaptability to life were forged by feudal serfdom and justified by myths and mystical doctrines designed to keep the people passive. Sjahrir's arguments resembled Nietzsche's master-slave concept, in which morality was a way to maintain the suffering of slaves by turning submission, piety and other-worldliness into virtues, and turning worldliness, individualism and ambition into evils.⁴⁹ Indonesian feudal culture was represented in Hindu-Javanese philosophy contained in Hindu epics, Old Javanese chronicles and the works of the last Central Javanese court poet-philosopher, R. Ngabehi Ranggawarsita. Sjahrir expressed distaste for the views of hierarchy found in mystical doctrines, which were based on submission and abandoning worldliness rather than rationality. This Eastern mentality was championed by cultural nationalists as well as Dutch 'Orientalists'. Sjahrir saw Westerners' fascination with the East as like the desire for the 'lost world' of medieval Europe, an antiquarian impulse that was 'no other than an indication of an ageing civilisation'. This Orientalism was also instrumental in maintaining Western intellectual domination over the East.⁵⁰

For Sjahrir, notions of 'East' and 'West' were outmoded, to be replaced by a new phase of humanity.⁵¹ By criticising the narrative of an absolute, eternal division between the West and East, and the confrontation between *sini* ('here') and *sana* ('there')—white colonisers and coloured, colonised people—Sjahrir repudiated the parochial vision of nationalism and imperialism. He saw that the world had been transformed by global interconnectedness and that Indonesia's struggle for

⁴⁸ Letter from Sjahrir 12 March 1937, Sjahrir (1969), p. 160; as translated by Mrázek (1994), p. 171.

⁴⁹ On Nietzsche, see Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), pp. 765–766.

⁵⁰ Mrázek (1994), pp. 170–171, does not develop the implications of Sjahrir's critique of Orientalism.

⁵¹ Sjahrir's letter of 20 June 1935, in Sutan Sjahrir (2019), pp. 72–74; see also Y.B. Mangunwijaya, "'Archetype' Sutan Sjahrir", in Rosihan Anwar (1980), pp. 217, 223.

independence was part of the wider struggle for democratic transformation and an end to human exploitation.

Between the Struggle and Diplomacy

Sjahrir's long exile shifted his focus from political organisation and Marxism to a deep contemplation of Western and Eastern civilisation and human nature. It also developed his involvement in transnational (or, more precisely, Dutch-Indonesian) intellectual networks involved in the struggle for democratic transformation in Indonesia, as well as opposing the global advance of fascism. Such involvement linked him to left-wing anti-fascist internationalism during World War II.

According to Legge, during the Revolution, the Sjahrir group was neither a well-planned underground movement that was subordinate to mainstream nationalist leaders, nor an elitist circle detached from the popular base of the Revolution. Rather, it was a loosely connected network defined by individual, but not exclusive, relationships to Sjahrir. Membership often intersected with youth groups, which had different interests. The growth and continuity of Sjahrir's intellectual network relied on the surviving branches of the PNI-Pendidikan, particularly in Minangkabau and West Java. Minangkabau remained a strong base for PNI-Pendidikan and its branches, while Sjahrir's influence was limited and indirect in Java.⁵² The core of this network included some USI (*Unitas Studiosorum Indonesiensis*) and Medical School (*Ika Daigaku*) students with whom Sjahrir had personally established connections between 1944 and 1945. Among them were Hamid Algadri, the Sastrosatomo brothers (Soebadio and Soedarpo), Andi Zaenal Abidin, Amir Hamzah Siregar and Soedjatmoko.

While often represented as an 'underground' resistance group, Sjahrir and his followers were not connected with clandestine activities, but remained free from Japanese control. Sjahrir maintained connections with 'mainstream' nationalists because his opinions were much in demand. How Sjahrir's main ideas were implemented in his group and how they affected the course of the Indonesian Revolution were more important than the group's political operations, which Legge and

⁵² Legge, 1988, see also Mrázek (1994), pp. 231–233.

Mrázek have dealt with. Tahi Bonar Simatupang, one of Sjahrir's followers in the Indonesian military, summed up Sjahrir's three most important ideas as democratic socialism, parliamentary democracy through a party system, and his vision of global humanity based on the relationship between the West and East. The people's participation in democracy needed to come through a (multi)party system, and a division of power via parliamentary-based, rather than presidential, cabinets. The group wanted the Indonesian Revolution to produce a democratic transformation of society, one that was directed by a vanguard, cadre party cleansed from elements of fascism and feudalism. Indonesia's path to independence depended on its position within global politics, which was dominated by Western capitalist superpowers and broader anticolonial struggles in Asia and Africa.⁵³

Democratic participation through a multi-party system had been a central issue since the PNI-Pendidikan era, which opposed Sukarno's idea of the single-party state system. For Hatta and Sjahrir, parties and parliamentary democracy were effective ways of improving political awareness. The single-party state, supported by most nationalists and military officers, was closely associated with the concept of the integralist state, in which state and society formed an organic whole.⁵⁴ Following the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945, the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI), as the representative body of the Indonesian people, made Sukarno and Hatta the inaugural president and vice-president of the new Republic, respectively. The Constitution of 1945, as passed by the PPKI, strengthened the president's role as head of the state and government. Sukarno proposed that the Indonesian National Party (PNI) should become the state's single party, but the arrival of the Allied Forces in Indonesia led to parliamentary democracy being established. The Allies intended to prosecute those who had supported the Japanese, a potential threat to Sukarno and Hatta. The Dutch refused to acknowledge the new Republican government or negotiate with Japanese collaborators. As Sjahrir observed, however, Sukarno's influence over the Indonesian people and the Revolution was so immense that it was

⁵³ T.B. Simatupang, "Apa arti Sutan Sjahrir bagi kita sekarang ini?", in Rosihan Anwar (1980), pp. 194–195.

⁵⁴ David Bouchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State* (London/NewYork: Routledge, 2015).

nearly impossible to imagine an Indonesian Revolution without him. The solution was to restrict and share power, with Sukarno and Hatta maintained as national leaders of the Revolution, while Sjahrir was responsible for international affairs.

Sjahrir and his followers wanted to alter the structure and functions of state institutions, so they reflected the democratic principle of the separation of powers. The goal was to establish a parliamentary cabinet with Sjahrir as prime minister. The first step was to convert KNIP from an executive subordinate to the president into a legislative assembly.⁵⁵ The government's 1 November 1945 manifesto insisted that the Indonesian nation-state was to be based on universal human rights and the right of self-determination, as mentioned in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter of San Francisco.⁵⁶

Sjahrir's *Perdjoengan Kita* was intended primarily as a political vision for national revolution and the democratic transformation of Indonesian society. It also aimed to be the ideological foundation for his political actions and upcoming parliamentary government. The pamphlet opened with an analysis of the impact of Japanese military occupation and fascist ideology on Indonesian society, and repudiated those in the revolutionary leadership who had been fascist 'collaborators.' According to Sjahrir, the Indonesian Revolution contained two facets: inwardly, it was a social revolution, and outwardly, it was a national revolution. Social groups, including youth (*pemuda*), the working class and peasantry, had roles to play in the upcoming revolution.

The Japanese regime not only caused physical suffering through its exploitation of human labour, but also caused intense frustration and hatred towards groups considered to be 'outsiders', such as Eurasians and Chinese, as well as local bureaucratic elites. Indonesians had been isolated internationally during the war and had been exposed to Japanese propaganda. Sjahrir viewed national leaders as:

men without strong character. Most of them had been too accustomed to kowtowing or running errands for the Dutch and Japanese. Many still

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Soebadio Sastrosatomo (1987), pp. 70–76..

felt morally obliged to the Japanese, who bestowed on them the opportunity to prepare for Indonesian independence.⁵⁷

For Sjahrir, collaboration with the fascist regime was a problem. There was a danger that collectivism, which came from the feudal hierarchy, could be disguised as cultural nationalism which, in turn, could become fascism. That was why, according to Sjahrir, nationalism and national revolution should be secondary to democracy and a democratic, socialist revolution.

Social revolution offered the potential for a radical social transformation that would give material form to a democratic, yet egalitarian, society. Therefore, according to Sjahrir, it was important not to allow feudalism or fascism to remain among the people. While supporting the primacy of a democratic revolution, he distinguished it from the French Revolution, which was most familiar in the Western world. In the French case, the revolution occurred in a pre-industrial society, it was mostly driven by the bourgeoisie, and it took place before a global capitalist system existed through European imperial expansion:

France and the French Revolution were the precursors which opened the way to a capitalist and imperialist world. In contrast, the Indonesian Revolution must be considered as part of a revolution to end the history of Western capitalism and imperialism.⁵⁸

Sjahrir was implicitly criticising the social revolutions targeting the aristocracy, which broke out in parts of Java and Sumatra between October 1945 and July 1946.⁵⁹ They related to the *Zaman Bersiap* ('Period of Vigilance'), when violence broke out against allegedly pro-Dutch supporters, including minorities, and were a spontaneous response to the perceived threat of the return of the Dutch. These social revolutions were specifically the actions of local Islamic militias (especially in Aceh and Banten),

⁵⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944–1946* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 192.

⁵⁸ Sjahrir, *Perjuangan Kita* (Bandung: Segarsy, 2018) p. 105–106.

⁵⁹ See Anton E. Lucas, *One Soul One Struggle: Peristiwa Tiga Daerah dalam Revolusi Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Resist Book, 2004); Anthony Reid, *The Blood of The People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra* (Singapore: NUS Press, 1979); and Audrey Kahin (ed), *Regional Dynamics of Indonesian Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

underground communist cells, or Tan Malaka's followers. They were directed against local aristocratic elites.⁶⁰

Sjahrir was concerned that the near-chaotic situation in Indonesia was damaging to Indonesia's image in international society. He focused on the rising xenophobia among the *pemuda*, which he saw as coming from fascist ideas spread by Japanese propaganda. For non-Indonesian observers, the *pemudas'* actions indicated the fragility of the Indonesian government's sovereignty among the people and its inability to control the situation, which only justified the Dutch claim that the nation-state was merely a Japanese puppet regime and did not actually represent the people. Thus, Sjahrir called for the elimination of 'fascist' and collaborationist elements from the leadership of the national revolution, to be replaced by those sincerely committed to a democratic revolution of the people; one in which the state would be the principal instrument for democratic struggle.⁶¹ Politically educated *pemuda*, who had been cleansed of fascism, along with the working class, would be the main powers of the Indonesian Revolution.

The idea that the fate of the Indonesian Revolution was determined by, and closely related to, the political interests of Western powers in Asia explained the central role of Sjahrir's group in diplomatic affairs during the Revolution. In *Perjuangan Kita*, Sjahrir provided a general overview of the post-war international political order and Indonesia's strategic position in international politics. The Great Depression and World War II had brought economic collapse and national disaster to most Western countries, except the USA, which emerged as a new global power. Sjahrir predicted that the future of global politics would be determined by rivalry between socialism and a renewed form of capitalism-imperialism. Indonesia, however, as the successor state of the Netherlands Indies, came under the influence of Anglo-American capitalism and imperialism.⁶²

⁶⁰ Anderson (1972), pp. 334–335, linked the political style of the social revolution to the features of the *pemuda* movements. The term '*kedaulatan rakyat*' (people's sovereignty) became popular during the Revolution, giving birth to '*mendaulat*' as a set of actions by armed *pemuda* groups in the name of 'people's sovereignty' to humiliate, kidnap, or even murder hated bureaucrats or other representatives of (traditional) authority.

⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 110–111.

⁶² Sjahrir explained this by the fact that the Dutch East Indies had been conquered by the British during the Napoleonic era. In the post-Napoleonic political Treaty of London (1824), the British handed over to the Netherlands its remaining territory in the archipelago, creating the geopolitical entity called the

Despite their initial reluctance, the Dutch negotiated positively following the appointment of Sjahrir as prime minister. Their acceptance of Sjahrir was influenced by his distance from the Japanese regime and his Western education. His emergence into the political limelight during the early post-war years had, to some extent, mollified the intense Dutch hostility towards the new Republic.⁶³ Otherwise, many Dutch observers considered Sjahrir's domestic position to be vulnerable, and he ran his governance hesitantly and under stress. Sjahrir maintained his office in Jakarta even when the Indonesian government, under Sukarno and Hatta, decided to evacuate to Yogyakarta in early January 1946. His office was located near the British headquarters and van Mook's Netherlands Indies government office.⁶⁴

Realising his fragile position, Sjahrir made a diplomatic breakthrough in April 1946 by offering to send 500,000 tons of rice from Java to India, which was suffering from famine. A close associate of Sjahrir, Soedarsono, was entrusted with the project. The largest shipment departed from the coastal town of Cirebon in West Java, where the PNI-Pendidikan was traditionally strong. It was a risky yet very strategic policy, since the economic conditions in Java were far from adequate to provide for its own population. Sjahrir, however, along with Hatta, had decided to re-establish Indonesia's long partnership with India, especially with Nehru. Correspondence between Nehru and Hatta was established through the mediation of two Indians, P.R.S. Mani and T.D. Kundan.⁶⁵ Sjahrir regarded India as an extension of Britain's interests and his action placed the British in an ambiguous position. Lord Louis Mountbatten and Lord Killearn saw that the situation was complicated because it involved Sjahrir and Nehru as leaders of national liberation movements. India happily accepted the rice and ordered those Indian goods be shipped to Java in return.⁶⁶

Netherlands Indies/Indonesia. Therefore, the Netherlands' power over its colonies was based on British imperial policies, Sjahrir (2018), pp. 99–102.

⁶³ Gouda & Zaalberg (2002), p. 130–131.

⁶⁴ Mrázek (1996), pp. 522–525.

⁶⁵ See Heather Goodall, *Beyond Borders: Indians, Australians and the Indonesian Revolution, 1939 to 1950* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019), pp. 295–297.

⁶⁶ Mrázek (1996), pp. 590–592.

Once he had ceased to be Prime Minister, in his later role as foreign minister, Sjahrir and his group continued to play major diplomatic roles. Following on from his ‘rice diplomacy’, Sjahrir visited New Delhi during March–April 1947 to attend the Asian Relations Conference. His main purpose was to attract support and international recognition for Indonesian Independence, particularly from Asian countries.⁶⁷ Haji Agus Salim, Sjahrir’s cousin and Djohan Sjahroezah’s father-in-law, led the Indonesian delegation.⁶⁸ After the conference, Salim travelled the Middle East and established the Indonesian Republic’s official diplomatic mission in Cairo. Thanks to the initiatives of this office, Egypt, Syria and Iraq recognised the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic and, soon thereafter, Egypt and Indonesia signed a treaty of bilateral and commercial cooperation.⁶⁹ According to his personal correspondence with Schermerhorn, Sjahrir was not satisfied with his Indian experience, and his encounter with Nehru and Gandhi only reinforced his negative views about the charismatic, messianic nature of Indian nationalism and national leadership, which reflected what he hated most—the spirit of Eastern aristocracy.⁷⁰ On his return to Indonesia, Sjahrir met with Lord Killearn in Singapore to negotiate further economic cooperation between the Indonesian Republican government and the United Kingdom, at the expense of the Netherlands’ interests.

⁶⁷ I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, “International society: the Social Dimension of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, *The Pacific Review* Vol 29 No 5 (2016), p. 748.

⁶⁸ Haji Agus Salim (1884–1954), was an old Sarekat Islam politician of Tjokroaminoto’s generation and was the greatest Minangkabau leader. Salim was one of the few people in the delegation who were close to the Sjahrir group, as the rest came from other backgrounds, for example Abu Hanifah, from the Masjumi party, Ali Sastroamidjojo from the PNI, and Soeripno, a former Leiden University student who had been the translator of Sjahrir’s *Perdjoengan Kita* but had turned to the faction of Abdulmadjid and Setiadjit.

⁶⁹ For diplomatic missions to Islamic countries in the Middle East, see Kevin W. Fogg, “Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1949”, *Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* Vol 53 No. 2 (2015), pp. 321-322.

⁷⁰ Gandhi told Sjahrir about his conviction that ‘European (Western) domination will fall and that British-India will bring salvation to the world’, Mrázek (1996), pp. 594–597.

Democratic Socialism for Indonesia

In his testimony, Sal Tas recalled his meeting with Sjahrir about the time of the 1955 general election in Indonesia. Tas noted how Sjahrir ‘had lost much of his impatience’, which had been replaced by a calmer decisiveness and reflectiveness, albeit at the expense of some of his dynamism. As a socialist ideologue, Sjahrir was not completely free from the conventional concepts of socialism. Hence, he could neither critically evaluate the historical basis of Western socialism, nor realise how Indonesia lacked the supporting conditions for the rise and spread of Western socialist ideas. In a country like Indonesia, a Marxist/socialist-based party could not be separated from the traditional, populist role that was already well-established in the anticolonial struggle. Sjahrir and his group were thus likely to have more political impact by joining one of the major parties, rather than forming a separate party.⁷¹ Once again, there were characteristics of Sjahrir that prevented him from taking this path; his ‘rationalist hygiene’ was in opposition to popular sentiment. However, Sjahrir was no longer an ‘orthodox’ socialist in Marxian terms, as he had been in the 1930s. From the beginning of the Cold War and the related socialist-communist schism, his writings were increasingly polemical about the threat of Stalinist totalitarianism being inherent within the Indonesian communist movement. This ideological shift, in turn, reoriented the PSI and its associated intellectuals, away from Marxism and towards anti-communist political and cultural activism.

One of the major sources of democratic socialist ideas in 1950s Indonesia was Fabianism, the British socialist movement with deep roots in the professional middle class. The Fabians were intellectuals loosely connected with working-class movements. Because Fabianism was detached from mainstream Marxist social democracy in continental Europe, it was not of interest to Sjahrir in his early career. Fabianism had greater influence on the Indonesian socialists who were associated with the bureaucratic or technocratic sphere—individuals such as Amir Sjarifuddin, during his official career in the Indies Department of Economic Affairs; Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the LSE-oriented economist; and, to a lesser extent, Hatta. The Fabians promoted a state-centred,

⁷¹ Tas, (1969), pp. 152–153.

moderate socialism by which the state managed a sort of social engineering and reform to improve social welfare.

One of the leading Fabians from whom Hatta drew his inspiration for economic democracy was George Douglas Howard Cole. Cole's 'guild socialism' was a communitarian movement inspired by applying the model of medieval guilds to modern working-class communities.⁷² Cole proposed that industrial democracy, and the shift of economic control from capitalists to workers and craftsmen, should come about through the medium of national guilds. Cole also rejected some essential features of Fabianism, however, such as liberal socioeconomic reforms, and technocratic and state-led socialism.⁷³ Another important influence for Hatta was the cooperative movement of Robert Owen (1771–1858), which advocated similar independent, collectivist-based, self-sufficient, socio-economic organisation. Both the guild socialist and cooperative movements proposed establishing independent alternative communities, which were egalitarian in nature but relatively autonomous from state authority. Hatta's adaptation of these ideas, he claimed, was the manifestation of economic democracy based on indigenous collectivist principles.

In contrast to Sjahrir, who was driven by his sceptical views on Eastern cultural and intellectual foundations, Hatta was convinced that democracy had indigenous aspects. 'Eastern Democracy' was reflected within the local tradition of deliberation meetings (*musyawarah*) held to achieve a consensus (*mufakat*), based on the spirit of collectivism and mutual assistance (*gotong royong*).⁷⁴ In his best-known pamphlet, *Demokrasi Kita (Our Democracy)*, from 1960, Hatta named three main sources of Indonesian democracy: Western socialism, with its emphasis on humanitarian ideals; Islam, with its teaching of social justice—equality of humans before God; and

⁷² See Matt Beech & Kevin Hickson, *Labour's Thinkers: The Intellectual Roots of Labour from Tawney to Gordon Brown* (London/New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), pp. 38–57.

⁷³ Noel Thompson, *Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic Socialism 1884–2005* (New York/London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 31–40.

⁷⁴ David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 36–40.

indigenous society in Indonesia, with its collectivist nature.⁷⁵ His admiration of collectivism within Indonesian society explained how Hatta could collaborate closely with Sukarno during the Japanese era, then subsequently position himself ideologically between Sjahrir and Sukarno. Hatta had been one of the few political opponents of Sukarno who, later, when the New Order regime systematically attempted to uproot any association of the state's ideology with Sukarno-related doctrines, explicitly acknowledged Sukarno's contribution to the creation of Pancasila.

Hatta viewed rural Minangkabau as having the democratic, yet egalitarian, characteristics of what he imagined to be part of 'original' Indonesian society. Hatta's treatise, *The Cooperative Movement in Indonesia*, contained a series of articles explaining the origin and position of the cooperative movement within Indonesian society as well as the idea of economic democracy. Hatta argued that, while cooperatives were derived from Western institutions, their social basis came from village societies.⁷⁶ He stressed the communal nature of land ownership in rural Indonesia, and the *gotong royong* tradition embedded within these indigenous communities. In Minangkabau, the autonomous 'village republic' communities (*nagari*) functioned as city-states (*polis* in ancient Greek), where the practice of direct democracy was applied and could be distinguished from the unequal, local aristocratic social order. According to Hatta, there were three main characteristics of village democracy in Indonesia: the tradition of consensual deliberation in village meetings, the common resistance against unjust rulers, and the spirit of collectivism.⁷⁷ The first two characteristics were associated with political democracy, and the final characteristic with economic democracy. Hence, any vital productive units that were socially important should be managed as public property, the use of which had to be supervised by the people's representative bodies. In contrast to Sukarno, who repudiated Western parliamentary democracy and wanted a political system in which the people's will was

⁷⁵ Hatta wrote *Demokrasi Kita* as a response to Sukarno's Guided Democracy. It originally appeared in *Panji Masyarakat* in 1960, Hatta, *Demokrasi Kita* (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1966), p. 24.

⁷⁶ Hatta, *The Cooperative Movement in Indonesia* (New York/Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 1–19.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 25–27.

represented by a strong leadership, Hatta supported parliamentary-based democracy, which would situate power and authority in governmental units.

Hatta's views on cooperatives and their relation to Indonesian economic and social democracy were different from Sjahrir's 'democratic socialism.' Both terms were interconnected. For Hatta, 'social democracy' (*demokrasi sosial*) referred to the indigenous concept, rather than the meaning understood in Western socialist and working-class movements as *sosial demokrasi*.⁷⁸ Sjahrir's concept of 'democratic socialism', *sosialisme kerakyatan*, contained more elements of its Western counterpart. Many of his fellow socialist intellectuals, however, incorporated Hatta's idea of *demokrasi sosial* into their views of *sosialisme kerakyatan* or *ekonomi kerakyatan* (the 'democratic economy').

In Indonesia, cooperatives evolved from local credit banks, which had been founded by the colonial government. While these banks served the interests of government officers, they also protected the peasantry from the bondage of debt, share cropping and usury.⁷⁹ The growth of cooperatives was associated with, and ran alongside, the progress of the nationalist movement. Besides providing economic self-help, cooperatives educated people about collectivist values; hence, there 'was neither class struggle between the labour and employer, nor the question of profit and capital accumulation within the co-operative movement.'⁸⁰ One of the cooperatives' key principles was to counterbalance individual and common interests or, in other words, 'to create an altruistic and just order over human greed'.⁸¹ This principle also encouraged economic development in postcolonial 'underdeveloped' countries through democratic and socialist measures.

One of the main principles unifying Hatta and Sjahrir was their anti-communist—or more precisely, anti-Stalinist—stance, because they considered

⁷⁸ Hatta (1966), p. 24.

⁷⁹ Hatta (1957), pp. 1–19.

⁸⁰ Hatta, "Co-operatives as Education for Auto-activity", speech at a seminar on co-operatives in Bandung on 8 August 1955, *ibid.*, pp. 23–24.

⁸¹ Quoting Bernard Lavergne, *ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

themselves to have been the victims of communist betrayal in the League Against Imperialism and Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI), as well as when communists in the Socialist Party caused a split by withdrawing support for the Sjahrir Cabinet after the Linggadjati Agreement in 1947. Sjahrir considered Marxist class struggle irrelevant for postcolonial conditions. However, Sjahrir's concept of democratic socialism was not the same as his critical interpretation of Marxism, as he argued in articles published in *Suara Sosialis*, the PSI's monthly bulletin, in 1953 and 1954.⁸² They reflected views commonly held among Second International revisionists, such as Eduard Bernstein, with new emphasis on the emergence of skilled labour and the 'managerial class' as a consequence of the 'embourgeoisement' of the working-class movement.⁸³

For Sjahrir, there were two major fallacies of Marxism regarding the progress of capitalism: first, that the increasing misery or impoverishment (*verelendung*) of the working class would lead to class struggle (*klassen-strijd*); and second, that there would be a final crisis leading to the collapse of capitalism. Instead, Sjahrir argued, the function of the state would change, and the welfare state would rise in Europe. Sjahrir claimed that many Marxist predictions of capitalist crises had proven to be false. While initially, labour conditions corresponded to Marx's statements, subsequently, it was evident that conditions had improved along with the industrialisation and imperial expansion of Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century. Welfare improvement was related to the economic surplus extracted from Europe's colonies, as argued by Lenin, Rudolf Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg.⁸⁴ Sjahrir quoted Leninist theory that the accumulation of colonial profits had been used to enhance the wage rate of European labour at the expense of the colony and its indigenous workers. Henceforth,

⁸² Sjahrir, *Sosialisme dan Marxisme : Suatu Kritik Terhadap Marxisme* (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1967).

⁸³ Eduard Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation* (New York: Schocken Book, 1978); referred to Bernstein in Sjahrir's "Internasionalisme dalam ajaran dan gerakan Sosialisme", in *Sosialisme Indonesia Pembangunan* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penunjang Pembangunan Nasional, 1982), pp. 66–67.

⁸⁴ See further Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey* (London/New York: Routledge, 1990).

imperialism had enabled capitalism to prevent a widening gap and opposition between workers and their employers.⁸⁵

Along with imperial expansion of capital, increasing prosperity among workers corresponded with the emergence of skilled labour, making them closer to the culture of the lower bourgeoisie than the proletariat. According to American political thinker James Burnham, what Lenin called the ‘labour aristocracy’ was the basis of a ‘managerial class’ that would eventually replace the capitalist or stockholder in controlling the means of production.⁸⁶ This labour aristocracy explained the altered position of the European working-class movement when the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) supported its national government in World War I, rather than show transnational solidarity with the class struggle. Bernstein also argued against the Marxist notion of an internationalist working class, asserting that labour rights were national and represented politically by labour parties in parliamentary systems. This controversy led to the subsequent schism between the ‘bourgeoisie-oriented’ Second International, supported by social-democratic labour movements, and the Marxist-Leninist-oriented Third International.⁸⁷

Sjahrir explained that this ‘embourgeoisement’ oriented the labour movement towards pro-capitalism.⁸⁸ ‘Embourgeoisement’ also led to the changing role of the state during the early twentieth century, and especially during the Great Depression, as welfare states were established in Western Europe and Scandinavian countries, as well as in the New Deal reforms in the USA. The state was therefore not the vehicle of labour oppression, as Marxist-Leninists saw it. The welfare state would ‘manage for the benefit of the labour, even though society itself had not moved from the capitalist mode of

⁸⁵ Sjahrir (1967), pp. 15–16.

⁸⁶ Sjahrir (1967), pp. 22–23.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

⁸⁸ See David Beetham, “Reformism and ‘Bourgeoisification’ of the Labour Movement”, in Carl Levy (ed), *Socialism and the Intelligentsia 1880–1914* (London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), pp. 106–134.

production'.⁸⁹ The change in the global capitalist system—brought about by the Great Depression, the introduction of the welfare state and post-war decolonisation—changed the global socialist movement. Most people in the 'underdeveloped' world, according to Sjahrir, wanted state-guided plans for socio-economic development and welfare, rather than market-based, free competition. If national governments were unable to improve people's well-being and create bourgeois-liberal states, they would be taken over by communists, as happened in post-war China.⁹⁰

The PSI took a new direction after its February 1952 congress. Sjahrir wrote a series of articles clarifying the concept of *sosialisme kerakyatan* in relation to Western socialism and Marxism-Leninism, and urging the creation of welfare-oriented reform and economic development to curb the rapid expansion of Marxism in 'underdeveloped' postcolonial states. In the August 1956 edition of *Suara Sosialis*, Sjahrir argued against the 'anti-democratic' nature of Stalinist communism, which had become a 'false socialism'. *Kerakyatan* ('democracy'), however, contained within it the true objective of socialism: a recognition of the equal nature of humanity. 'Socialism to us is a way of struggling for human liberty ... that is, liberation from suppression, exploitation and the humiliation of others.'⁹¹

Sjahrir further argued that the Marxist doctrine of revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat did not necessarily mean the dictatorship of a single working-class party. Marx and Engels were likely referring to the direct, popular democracy of the Paris Commune of 1871—a revolutionary, Jacobin-styled government—as the best form of proletarian dictatorship.⁹² Stalin's concept of 'socialism in one country', as formalised by the Comintern in the 1928 congress, was a distortion of Marxism-Leninism. Sjahrir

⁸⁹ Sjahrir (1967), p. 32.

⁹⁰ Ibid, pp. 42–43.

⁹¹ "Sosialisme Kerakyatan yang kita perjuangkan", in Sjahrir (1982), p. 84.

⁹² Sjahrir, "Internasionalisme dalam ajaran dan gerakan Sosialisme", and "Sosialisme Kerakyatan yang Kita Perjuangkan", *ibid*, pp. 63–65, 80–81. The Paris Commune (April-May 1871) was supported by the First International and Marx himself, but control over the commune soon became a struggle between Marxists and anarchists under the influence of Louis Blanqui and Mikhail Bakunin. The First International disintegrated soon after the suppression of the Commune.

regarded it as the outcome of anti-democratic practice implied in Leninist doctrine.⁹³ Stalinism was anti-democratic because of its centralism and the dictatorship of the communist party, in which ‘the hierarchical structure and the strict rule of party discipline were prioritised more than socialist doctrine itself.’ In Leninism, the ‘withering away of the state’ occurs until socialist society was complete, so the socialist revolution required the establishment of a single party and command of revolutionary struggle. In fact, Sjahrir said, communist states such as Stalin’s Soviet Union were getting more and more totalitarian, rather than ‘withering away.’⁹⁴

Sjahrir emphasised the potential danger of international communist movements and associated them with the totalitarian Stalinist regime, which was almost identical to fascism. There was little discussion in his writing of the discord among Marxist-Leninists, such as the Trotskyite Fourth International’s opposition to Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’. Moreover, the appeal of communism in underdeveloped countries was real. It was a consequence of the Leninist ‘world revolution’ agenda and anti-colonialism, combined with the fact that many communist states, such as the Soviet Union and China, shared similar socio-economic backgrounds with the newly independent Asian and African countries. That was why communist propaganda was profoundly effective.

In Sjahrir’s speech before the second ASC in Bombay in November 1956, he spoke about the state of Asian society compared to Western and communist countries, which he saw as a dilemma for the Asian socialist movement. While there was increasing rapprochement between Third World nationalism and Asian communism, Western social democracy was declining in its ability to achieve its objectives, meaning

⁹³ ‘Socialism in one country’ was a concept put forward by Stalin and Nicolai Bukharin after the death of Lenin in 1924. Lenin had argued that the fate of the socialist revolution and the Soviet Union depended on global revolution against capitalism, including the anti-colonial struggle in the underdeveloped world. For Stalin, the fate of world revolution was dependent on the Soviet Union, and therefore the objective of the Comintern was the consolidation of the Soviet Union’s power rather than the promotion of world revolution, Robert J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), p. 150.

⁹⁴ “Sosialisme dan Pimpinan”, speech by Sjahrir at the Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis (Gemsos) anniversary in Bandung on 16 October 1957, Sjahrir (1982), pp. 100–102.

that the international socialist movement was having less impact in the Third World.⁹⁵ Simultaneously, Asian socialists, including the PSI, were caught between their democratic commitment to opposing communist totalitarianism and the need for an immediate solution to underdevelopment, economic dependency and other problems inherited from colonial domination.⁹⁶ Since most Western socialists maintained a conservative position on colonialism and postcolonial development, there was no option for Asian socialists but to accept an independent—albeit isolated and marginal—position. For Sjahrir, the communists’ polemics on the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the socialist working-class movement proved that the main objective of the communist movement was not the same as that of the socialists. Socialists aimed for the emancipation of the working class from exploitation and its liberation based on equality. In contrast, the communists criticised attempts to improve the welfare of workers, showing no serious commitment to their emancipation, preferring their exploitation. Poverty served the communists’ authoritarian political interests. Most of Sjahrir’s writings in this period were devoted to political and economic aspects of Indonesia’s postcolonial development, combined with polemics against communism and the authoritarian turn taking place in the later part of 1950s.

Sjahrir’s influence in cultural and humanitarian issues was mostly indirect, relating to his central position as the ideologue of the Socialist Party. In April 1952, Sjahrir gave a speech in a symposium on Indonesian development problems in the era of transition, held by some of the most prominent cultural and artists’ associations in Indonesia, such as *Gelanggang*, the PKI-affiliated Lekra (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat*, or ‘People’s Culture Institute’) and *Pudjangga Baru*. He focused on socio-cultural problems of the Indonesian modernisation project regarding the predominantly agrarian and pre-capitalist nature of society, to which the only exception was small commercial, trading communities in the coastal areas. Most Indonesian society was

⁹⁵ Sjahrir, “Sosialisme Sekarang”, speech at the second Asian Socialist Conference (16 November 1956), published in the PSI magazine *Sikap*, No 1-5 (January-February 1957), *Ibid*, pp. 13–15.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 22–28.

relatively static, except for social transformation in urban areas.⁹⁷ When old feudal states were eventually conquered and subordinated under colonial rule, this did not give rise to an independent bourgeoisie or entrepreneurial middle class, due to the monopoly of the European colonisers. Because the bourgeoisie was mostly of foreign descent (Eurasian or Chinese), their assimilation was instrumental to strengthening the Indonesian middle class and Indonesian development as a whole. One of the strongest enduring characteristics of the Indonesian people was their collectivism, so the main question was how to transform traditional into modern collectivism through cooperatives and education, which should be carried out through the intellectual class.⁹⁸ Sjahrir's later writings on the humanitarian aspects of modernisation and development were increasingly inseparable from his anti-communist or anti-totalitarian stance.

Opposing Guided Democracy

Sjahrir's criticism of the principles underlying Guided Democracy had been an integral part of his opposition to Sukarno since the 1930s; it was further affected by his anti-communism and awareness of the possibly devastating effects of the Cold War on Indonesia. While a proponent of multi-party-based parliamentary democracy, after the PSI's electoral failure in 1955, Sjahrir was critical of the existing parliamentary system and considered the big parties to be (potentially) corrupt. However, Sjahrir objected to Sukarno's solution of 'burying the parties' through establishing Guided Democracy as an authoritarian turn. Sukarno, he argued, was exploiting a crisis for his own political ends and wanted to reclaim the political power that had eluded his grasp when the parliamentary system was created in 1945.

In his speech on the tenth anniversary of the PSI (February 1958), Sjahrir compared the situation to Java in 1948 and warned that a possible 'new Madiun affair' could break out if the government could not overcome the regional crises. He was

⁹⁷ Sjahrir presentation at *Symposium tentang kesulitan-kesulitan zaman peralihan sekarang*, Jakarta, 26–27 April 1952 (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1953), pp. 13–31.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 33–38.

concerned about ‘the loss of feelings of solidarity and humanity’, and their replacement with ‘distrust and hostility.’⁹⁹ In May 1958, when the PRRI/Permesta seemed to have been defeated, Sjahrir wrote a long article analysing the recent political developments that had led to the regional revolts. In his view, open confrontation had started with the assassination attempt on President Sukarno in Cikini, which led him to reject the return of a Hatta government as a possible solution to the crisis. He condemned the use of violence on both sides but blamed conditions mostly on Sukarno’s political manoeuvres. Sjahrir viewed the root causes of the rebellion as being the deteriorating economy and increasing communist influence at the centre of state power. Sukarno had never opposed corruption in the parties he favoured, but did nothing to defend the leaders of those parties when the army arrested them for corruption. According to Sjahrir, Sukarno did this to ensure that he would continue to retain popular support. For the same reason, he included the PKI—which had just won regional elections in Java—into government ranks.¹⁰⁰ Sukarno’s manoeuvres led towards a totalitarian regime consisting of two opposing powers: the army under Nasution, which aspired to be a militarist and fascist-like state, and the communist party, which was waiting for the opportunity to take over state power. Sukarno himself was its central figure and ‘puppet master’ (*dalang*). Sjahrir compared what seemed to be a temporary alliance between the military and PKI to the pact between Hitler and Stalin before World War II.¹⁰¹

Sjahrir added that two other factors contributed to the political crisis. First was an internal problem within military institutions. One of the root causes was the post-revolutionary military ‘rationalisation’, which made soldiers who had been demobilised disillusioned and inclined to become dissidents, who could be utilised by competing political and/or military factions. This ‘rationalisation’ typified the problems of uneven economic growth and unemployment in the development of the postcolonial state. Second, Indonesia’s geopolitical position meant that it was contested by the opposing sides of the Cold War. Sjahrir argued that Indonesian communists were an extension of

⁹⁹ *Pedoman*, 12 February 1958, see also Mràzek (1996), pp. 799–800.

¹⁰⁰ Sutan Sjahrir, “Peninjauan dan Penilaian Keadaan Dewasa Ini di Negeri Kita” (Mei 1958), in Sjahrir (1982), pp. 141–142.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, pp. 143–144.

the interests of the Soviet Union and/or China. Sukarno's attempt to include the PKI in his anticolonial—or Third-Worldist solidarity—campaigns would only raise suspicion and intervention by the West, which would in turn support anti-communist groups in Indonesia. In such a situation, civil war and political disorder became inevitable. The ultimate solution to the political crisis, and the first step to economic and social development, was to 'exclude the communists so that their influence would no longer matter in Indonesian politics'.¹⁰²

Following the ban of the PSI and Masjumi, many of their leaders became targets of suspicion by the Guided Democracy regime. In August 1961, Sjahrir, Hatta and other PSI and Masjumi figures, including Moh Roem, Soebadio, Hamid Algadri and Sultan Hamid of Pontianak, gathered at the cremation ceremony of Anak Agung Gde Agung's father in Gianyar, Bali. A few weeks afterwards, there was another assassination attempt on Sukarno in Makassar. Sjahrir, along with other PSI and Masjumi leaders, was arrested in January 1962, accused of plotting the assassination at the Bali event.¹⁰³ Sjahrir's friends were suspicious about the grounds for this accusation.¹⁰⁴ Three months later, Sjahrir and other prisoners were moved to Madiun, where he was placed in a local military detention centre. During his imprisonment between 1962 and 1964, he became seriously ill, culminating in his death. Sjahrir wrote diaries—similar to his practice in Boven Digul and Banda Naira. He read social and economic theory, which brought about a change in his writings. Among the books he read were the works of the economist Gunnar Myrdal, the sociology of Weber, and Karl Wittfogel's *Oriental*

¹⁰² Ibid, pp. 179–184.

¹⁰³ According to Anak Agung there was no conspiracy as such, it was merely a 'misunderstanding' and a 'political blunder' because he had invited his close friends and political allies but not Sukarno, making Sukarno suspicious. Sukarno asked Subandrio's intelligence service to investigate. Soon after the assassination attempt, military intelligence discovered a clandestine organisation with the bizarre name of the United Underground Corps or *Vereenigde Ondergrondse Corps* (VOC) under Sultan Hamid II of Pontianak, which had the same initials as the old Dutch East Indies Company, Rosihan Anwar, note dated 31 January 1962 in his *Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961–1965* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1981), pp. 169–170.

¹⁰⁴ Hatta, who was also present in Gianyar but not arrested, wrote a private letter to Sukarno to express his disapproval, but was ignored, Rosihan Anwar, note dated 6 March 1962, *ibid*, p.183. Sal Tas suspected Subandrio's role in the incident, alleging the arrest was personal revenge for humiliation Subandrio had received while serving as Sjahrir's personal assistant on a diplomatic mission to London, Tas (1969), p. 151.

Despotism. Sjahrir also returned to reading Marxist texts, and expressed his irritation at the views of development economists, such as Schumpeter and Walt Rostow.¹⁰⁵ According to Sal Tas, Sjahrir maintained an enduring admiration for Marx and placed him in an almost sacred position for his contribution to human liberation. In addressing Marx's critics, Sjahrir wrote:

From Marx's writing it is clear that most earnestly of all, he was a hero of the working class. Thus, it is easier for us to explain all his shortcomings and weaknesses as a sociologist and economist. Because Marx and Engels, both of them, were first of all heroes who sided with the workers, and were not men who would mainly devote their lives to science Their political articles are more interesting than their theoretical writings, because it is in the former, where there is the sincerity of their souls and their energy.¹⁰⁶

In Sjahrir's 1960s writing, his criticism focused on the economic mismanagement that was a result of Sukarno's preoccupation with the political campaigns to reclaim West New Guinea (Irian Barat) and against the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. Sjahrir's assessment of the role of PKI and their position in Guided Democracy politics had changed. His attitude towards the PKI was a mixture of admiration for the party's discipline—and that it was not tainted by the political corruption that plagued the party system—and a deep suspicion of communists as Stalinist agents.

Between 1956 and 1958, Sjahrir saw the PKI as the main threat, even though it pursued a non-revolutionary parliamentary route to power. By 1963, however, he saw it was no longer the communists who benefited most from the Guided Democracy system, but the army. Army officers were 'placed in a privileged position by the state' and lived 'far more prosperously than average civil servants.'¹⁰⁷ By this stage, the PKI, according to Sjahrir, adhered to the notion of 'peaceful coexistence' with the

¹⁰⁵ My only access to these unpublished writings of Sjahrir was through their quotation in Mràzek (1994) pp. 473–476.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in *ibid*, p. 474.

¹⁰⁷ Sjahrir, "Keadaan dan Tugas Kita", unpublished ms written in 1963, in Sjahrir (1982), p. 208 and p. 210.

bourgeoisie, following post-Stalinist Soviet orientation. They had abandoned the doctrine of class struggle and become nothing more than nationalists bound to the interest of the Sukarno regime. But this, in turn, placed the communists in a weaker position and could lead to potential disintegration because of the split between the Soviet Union and Maoist China which, in Sjahrir's opinion, more held more consistently to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.¹⁰⁸ In 1964, Sjahrir observed that the communists under Aidit, seeing that Guided Democracy gave them no opportunity to gain power through peaceful means, had returned to the doctrine of class struggle with Maoism as their principal model. Ultimately, this change came too late, since the army and other non-communists were aware of the communists' strategy and political goals.¹⁰⁹

Contrary to international views that the PKI was increasing in power, Sjahrir believed that they were in trouble because of the international communist schism. Also, in Sjahrir's calculation, the regime could end up facing a severe political-economic crisis. Thus, he argued, it was pointless to maintain a negative attitude towards Sukarno.¹¹⁰ He urged his followers to focus on improving the deteriorating economy and contribute their ideas to the government whenever needed.¹¹¹ PSI intellectuals, as will be shown in the following chapters, contributed to new regulations in May 1963, aimed at assisting the government's efforts towards economic improvement.

While testimonies from PSI affiliates—that Sjahrir softened his attitude towards Sukarno—might be somewhat exaggerated, he did take account of the potential collapse of the regime at that time. He began to consider the possibility that the army could be at the forefront of improving the situation and be a potential ally of the intellectuals. 'Patriotic' groups among military officers, or those who were targets of PKI attacks, needed to be defended. Sjahrir also expressed his satisfaction with Sukarno's Economic

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, pp. 206–207.

¹⁰⁹ Sjahrir, "Tinjauan Dalam Negeri", unpublished ms written in 1964, *ibid*, pp. 228–232.

¹¹⁰ Rosihan Anwar, note dated 6 June 1962, in Anwar (1981), pp. 225–226.

¹¹¹ Anwar, note dated 28 February 1963, *ibid*, p. 337.

Declaration, which reflected the PSI's ideas.¹¹² Was this a new pragmatic orientation by Sjahrir? While Sjahrir tended to have a less positive view of the army, some officers such as Simatupang and Daan Jahja were close to the PSI. In a conversation between Daan and Rosihan Anwar in 1962, the former argued that the best figure to lead the PSI was not Sjahrir but Sumitro, who had mastered organisational management skills rather than just being an ideologue. According to Daan, the dominance of ideological-oriented figures over managerial-type leaders within the party was the main factor behind the PSI's 1955 election defeat.¹¹³ This was not just the opinion of a PSI supporter, but it also represented views held among the military, which supported the primacy of organisational management and discipline over ideology.

In the last decade of his life, Sjahrir went through a major change in his thinking. While his Marxist-humanism remained a strong element within his democratic socialist ideology, the tone of his writings became less ideological or philosophical, focusing rather on concrete and pragmatic issues. His anti-totalitarianism was replaced with critiques of inefficiency, mismanagement and the fragility of the political structure, which was not conducive to the nation's social and economic development. His ideas were more or less consistent with that of the Fabian-type thinkers of the PSI like Sumitro and Soedjatmoko who were more successful in influencing state policies on social and economic development planning. Their ideas, particularly those of Sumitro and his economist followers barely represented PSI-style democratic socialism and therefore were disregarded by those who perceive themselves to be Sjahrir's ideological heirs.¹¹⁴ Sjahrir's thought and democratic socialism in general remained on the margins of state policy making during the New Order era.

¹¹² Anwar, note dated 28 February 1963, and 5 April 1963 stated that Sjahrir supported Nasution's position, *ibid*, p. 337 and pp. 356–357.

¹¹³ See the dialogue of Daan Jahja and Rosihan Anwar, note dated 14 April 1962, *ibid*, pp. 206–207.

¹¹⁴ According to Imam Yudotomo, the son of Moch. Tauchid, the leader of Gerakan Tani Indonesia (GTI), the ex-PSI network were divided into several groups, namely: 1) The left-wing and Sjahririan oriented democratic socialist, mostly under influence of Soebadio and Djohan Sjahroezah. 2) The Sumitro group, considered as splinters/deserters from the PSI, and 3) The student group from Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis (GEMSOS) of Rahman Tolleng, who still maintain the original ideological orientation of the PSI, but decide to joined the Golkar of New Order. They formed the most successful 'loyal opposition' to the New Order state policy. Yudotomo wrote a historical reflection on the PSI and the movement of the former PSI members, based mostly on oral sources. See Imam Yudotomo, *PSI yang Saya Ketahui* (Yogyakarta: Kasan Ngali, 2021).

CHAPTER 5

Socialist Economic Planning: Sumitro and the Technocrats

This chapter focuses on the impact of socialist ideas on Indonesia's postcolonial political economy and economic planning between the Constitutional Democracy era and the early New Order regime, up to the first half of 1970s. The technocratic-based planned economy was not a product of a Marxian socialist movement but, rather, it was an offshoot of earlier utopian socialism and the 1930s Depression-related turn to statism, which included the New Deal reforms and Keynesian economics. In Indonesia, the leading economic planner was Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.¹ Hatta and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara of the Masjumi party, had been pioneers in Indonesian economics, while Sumitro was the founding father of the study of developmental economics.²

Sumitro was the only figure comparable to Sjahrir in terms of political position and intellectual influence. He established an economic school of thought and, like Sjahrir, had his own intellectual following. While Sjahrir held a humanitarian and democratic socialist position, Sumitro was more of a statist, favouring an industrialised and technocratic state that would intervene more in economic planning. To some extent, the economic nationalist elements in Sumitro's thinking paralleled Sukarno's, rather than Sjahrir's. His American-oriented technocratic approach situated Sumitro on the US side of the Cold War, meaning that his opposition to the communists was even fiercer than Sjahrir's. By allying himself with the rebel military, Sumitro demonstrated his political vision for anti-communist development in postcolonial Indonesia. Sumitro

¹ On Sumitro, see Aristides Katoppo & Hendra Esmara, et.al., *Sumitro Djojohadikusumo: Jejak Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2000), and M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Nasionalisme, Sosialisme dan Pragmatisme: Pemikiran Ekonomi Politik Sumitro Djojohadikusumo* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2016).

² M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Ekonomi Neo-Klasik dan Sosialisme Religius: Pragmatisme Pemikiran Ekonomi Politik Sjafruddin Prawiranegara* (Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka, 2011).

attracted Western support for his anti-communist development project. As Farabi Fakhri has shown, through his international connections, Sumitro also established scientific management training for Indonesian economists, which created a new generation of experts in development planning, including the notorious ‘Berkeley mafia’ of the New Order regime.³ Emphasising the role of these technocrats as part of an anti-communist network involving the US and Indonesian armies, however, obscures their agency as modernising intellectuals. As described later in this chapter, these economist-technocrats often engaged in debates with each other about the ideological orientation of Indonesia’s economic and development policies.

Positioning Sumitro as a representative of democratic socialist thought is problematic. He was a PSI politician, a government official, and a professional economist at the same time. Sumitro admitted that his thoughts and actions as an economist and state administrator did not necessarily reflect the ideological orientation of the party he represented.⁴ As a politician from the socialist party, he was arguably influenced by British Fabians, and Harold Laski from the LSE in particular, while most of PSI figures from Sjahrir’s inner circle were closer to Marxian social democracy of continental Europe. In general, the way Sumitro developed a group of thinkers who profoundly influenced state policy could be categorised as a sort of ‘Fabian strategy.’⁵ Meanwhile, as a professional economist Sumitro’s views were hardly shaped by pragmatic goals rather than ideological considerations. He was a proponent of Keynesian economics widely embraced among European social democratic regimes, but also, in its application to Third World countries more likely to strengthen

³ Farabi Fakhri, *The Rise of the Managerial State in Indonesia: Institutional Transition during the Early Independence Period 1950–1965* (PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2014), see David Ransom, “The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre”, in *Ramparts* Vol 9, No 4, October 1970, Bradley R. Simpson, *Economist with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

⁴ Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, “Tanggung jawab profesional seorang ekonom dari masa ke masa”, in Hendra Esmara (ed), *Teori Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Pembangunan* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1987), pp. 37-40.

⁵ The term ‘Fabian strategy’ derived from the Roman general Fabius and his tactics against Hannibal’s army, by which the Fabians through its middle-class intelligentsia basis, ‘would bring about a classless society through social and policy research, through permeation of political parties’ and ‘in endless lobbying of parliamentarians for socialist legislation’. See Peter Gahan, *Bernard Shaw and Beatrice Webb on Poverty and Equality in the Modern World 1905-1914* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p.3.

authoritarian developmentalist regimes. The discussion on this chapter reveals how the influence of Fabianism on Indonesian socialist intellectuals may have an impact opposite to the intentions of the democratic socialist movement.

Sumitro Djojohadikusumo: The Personal Background

Sumitro came from a Javanese-aristocratic family background, and was born in Kebumen, Central Java, on 29 May 1917. His father, R.M. Margono Djojohadikusumo (1894–1978), was a Javanese bureaucratic official in the colonial government, and an activist for the cooperative movement later associated with Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra). Margono worked as a government official in the People's Credit Agency office in Kebumen. He was twenty-one when he married Siti Katoemi, and they had five children. Two of them, Sumitro and Subianto, were later associated with Sjahrir's *pemuda* and the PSI circle.⁶

In 1935, Sumitro started a Bachelor of Economics degree in Rotterdam. His decision to study overseas brought him into contact with the PI, then under the control of the communist faction of Abdulmadjid and Setiadjit. Sumitro did not join the association because of his distaste for the ideology of its leaders. Subsequently, he associated with the Roepi (*Roekoen Peladjar Indonesia*), which was less political and focused on the social and humanitarian aspects of student activism.⁷ Following the completion of his bachelor's degree in October 1937, Sumitro departed for Paris, where he undertook a one-and-a-half-year diploma in philosophy at Sorbonne University. During his time in Paris, Sumitro came into close contact with leading French thinkers of the time, including Henri Bergson, as well as the Indian nationalist Jawaharlal Nehru. On one occasion, Henri Cartier-Bresson invited Sumitro to attend a student meeting held to raise funds for the anti-fascist movement in Spain—at which he met the novelist and political activist, Andre Malraux, who was active in the Republican resistance

⁶ Aristides Katoppo, et.al (2000), pp. 4–6.

⁷ Harry A. Poeze, *Di Negeri Penjajah: Orang Indonesia di Negeri Belanda 1600–1950* (Jakarta: KITLV/Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2008).

against the Franco regime in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Among Malraux’s seminal works is *Le Condition Humaine (The Human Condition)*, which portrays the failed 1927 communist revolt in Shanghai from a humanist and existentialist perspective.⁸

Sumitro finished his master degree in 1940 in the *Nederlandsche Economische Hoogeschool*; at about the same time, Nazi Germany invaded Holland and the Dutch government escaped to England. He continued his study during wartime, commencing doctoral research under the guidance of colonial economic expert, George Lodewijk Gonggrijp. Simultaneously, Sumitro joined other students in the resistance against Nazi occupation. In March 1943, Sumitro completed his doctoral dissertation, ‘*Het Volkscredietwezen in de Depressie*’ (‘The People’s Credit System in the Depression’), in which he examined the economic impact of the Great Depression and the government’s credit system on peasant communities in Java; it focused on the *Algemeene Volkscredietbank* (AVB, or ‘General Bank of People’s Credit’), founded in 1934.⁹ Sumitro’s choice of research was influenced by his father’s work.

Because the war prevented Sumitro from returning home, he spent his time studying the Indonesian economy. However, Sumitro’s support for Independence put him in opposition to his superiors, including his former supervisor, Professor Gonggrijp. Sumitro first participated in the struggle when he and M. Zairin Zain attended the UN Security Council meeting in London on 7 February 1946, as members of the Dutch delegation. The UN Security Council recommended the withdrawal of British forces from Indonesia after they had accomplished their post-war mission to disarm Japanese troops. The Council further called for negotiations on Indonesia’s decolonisation.¹⁰ Sumitro’s diplomatic participation soon brought him into close contact with prime minister Sjahrir who, at the same time, was struggling for international recognition of

⁸ Aristides Katoppo, et.al (2000), pp. 16–17. Cartier-Bresson remained an ardent socialist. Malraux, who spent time in Cambodia, was critical of colonialism, strongly anti-fascist and opposed the Communist Party of France, which was Stalinist. He was later a government minister under de Gaulle.

⁹ Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, *Kredit Rakyat Pada Masa Depresi* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989); for more on Sumitro’s dissertation, see Rahardjo (2016), pp. 150–156.

¹⁰ Aristides Katoppo, et.al (2000), pp. 43–46.

Indonesia's political sovereignty. Sumitro returned to Indonesia within a month of the UN meeting to serve as one of Sjahrir's assistants, as well as an assistant in the Ministry of Finance under Sjafruddin Prawiranegara.

Sumitro's debut in international diplomacy was as a member of the Indonesian delegation to the UN General Assembly. This mission, led by Sjahrir, included Soedjatmoko, H. Agus Salim and Charles Tambu, one of Sjahrir's staff. It came just after the first Dutch military action.¹¹ The General Assembly formed the Good Office Committee (GOC), leading to the Renville Agreement in December 1947 – January 1948. The government then appointed Sumitro as trade commissioner in New York. A greater contribution to the Revolution came from his position as general secretary of the Deliberating Committee for Economic Strategy (*Panitia Pemikir Siasat Ekonomi*), established by Hatta on 12 April 1947, and his membership of the financial section of that committee, chaired by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Most of the Deliberating Committee's functions were devoted to managing economic decolonisation, including the takeover of vital colonial properties, as well as securing private enterprises to ensure that they stayed in Indonesia and provided strategic roles and employment for Indonesians.¹²

Sumitro's economic expertise, as well as his role in subverting the Dutch economic blockade of the territory of the Indonesian Republic, made him one of the most-trusted people in the Sjahrir government. He was involved in smuggling on a number of occasions, such as when the government needed raw materials to print money for the new national currency. His assignment as trade commissioner to the USA enabled Sumitro to lobby American businessmen and financiers to support Indonesian economic interests and overcome the Dutch blockade. In 1947, Sumitro, as trade commissioner, along with the Minister for Prosperity, A.K. Gani, met with Matthew Fox, an American businessman who was vice-president of Universal Pictures, to create

¹¹ Frances Gouda & Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: U.S. Foreign policy and Indonesian Nationalism 1920-1949* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002).

¹² Documents of Panitia Pemikir Siasat Ekonomi, (Jakarta, 1947), in Aristides Katoppo, et.al (2000), p. 138–139.

an Indonesian-American Corporation. The Sumitro-Fox contract, which was signed in Havana, Cuba, on 3 January 1949, gave the corporation a monopoly over some Indonesian commodities.¹³

One of Sumitro's achievements took place on 20 December 1948, during the Dutch second military action, when he negotiated support from the US Secretary of State, Robert Lovett. Sumitro was one of a number of lobbyists who succeeded in getting the US government to suspend its Marshall Plan aid for the Netherlands' military operations in Indonesia by using the abortive revolt in Madiun to remind the Americans of the threat of communism. The Dutch were thus forced into a compromise.¹⁴

Sumitro's conviction about Indonesia's strategic political-economic position within the Cold War struggle, coupled with his American connections, enabled him to face up to Dutch political demands and diplomatic pressure. These were evident in his arguments with Hatta in the Indonesian delegation at the Hague Round Table Conference (August–November 1949). As a condition for the transfer of sovereignty, the Dutch proposed that the colony's debt to the Netherlands should be transferred to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) as the successor state to the Netherlands East Indies. In contrast to Dutch arguments, that such debt was caused by financing welfare improvements during the Ethical Policy era, Sumitro argued that the Dutch economic surplus extracted from its colonies was actually higher than its expenditure for colonial development, since it had solved the economic deficit of the metropolitan state. Hatta, as the leading figure in the Indonesian delegation, however, accepted the Dutch proposal to shorten the transfer process.¹⁵

During the period of Constitutional Democracy, Sumitro served as Minister for Trade and Industry in the cabinet of Natsir (September 1950 to April 1951). He subsequently served in the cabinets of Wilopo (April 1952 to July 1953) and Burhanuddin Harahap (August 1955 to March 1956), in which he was appointed

¹³ Fakih (2014), p. 135.

¹⁴ Katoppo, et.al (2000), pp. 77–80.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 95–98.

Minister for Finance. Most of his terms in office focused on post-revolutionary economic improvements to break the obstacles arising from the colonial economic legacy. He established and empowered the domestic entrepreneurial sector and laid the groundwork for mixed, state-directed economic development, which was heavily based on industrialisation to stimulate the growth of domestic capital. The first step was the establishment of an Industrialisation Committee (*Panitia Industrialisasi*) in March 1951, which was followed by the launch of the Economic Urgency Program (*Rencana Urgensi Perekonomian*) in April 1951. According to Sumitro, the committee identified three objectives of industrialisation: a balanced economic structure, absorption of population growth and improvement of national income.¹⁶

Breaking Economic Dualism: Sumitro's Development Plan

Sumitro's plan for economic development required a decisive break from the colonial economy, which had been based on the separation between subsistence and commercial economies. The country's urgent needs for technical skills and managerial expertise could only come through maintaining close international links and intellectual exchange between Indonesia and Western countries – especially the USA.

In his PhD dissertation, Sumitro analysed the income levels of rural people affected by the Depression and the extent to which the government's credit system could overcome the crisis. Rather than connecting local crises to global macroeconomics, his study's main contribution was to endorse the cooperative movement as a more effective device for the economic emancipation of rural people from their dependence on the credit system. Sumitro concluded that:

regular and fair credit was the main condition for the certitude of business, but credit provision itself was not an autonomous factor nor a cause that automatically brought higher levels of progress. Therefore, co-operatives played a crucial role in economic transformation by reducing,

¹⁶ Howard Dick "Formation of the Nation State 1930s–1966", in Howard Dick, et.al, *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press/Asian Studies Association of Australia, 2002), pp. 176–177.

and finally eradicating, structural gaps in the balance of power between groups of economic actors.¹⁷

Besides promoting the role of cooperatives, Sumitro's dissertation challenged the colonial socioeconomic policy embedded within the colonial credit system, as advocated by Julius Herman Boeke. This 'dualism' separated the village sector from the modern capitalist world. The colonial credit system of the *Algemeene Volkscredietbank* merely preserved the indigenous economy's pre-capitalist, subsistent nature. Cooperatives potentially elevated local trading and peasant communities into a more independent, entrepreneurial class. Sumitro's approach to postcolonial economic development began with these earlier ideas of undermining the dualism in the colonial economy.

While the theory of the dual economy had been a first systematic effort towards Indonesian socioeconomic development, it had originated from the Ethical Policy and its related 'Indology' scholarship.¹⁸ Among Dutch Indologists, there was a polarity between the culturally oriented 'Leiden school' and the economic-minded 'Rotterdam school', represented respectively by J.H. Boeke and G.L. Gonggrijp, Sumitro's supervisor. Boeke represented a conservative Orientalist view of Asian development; his theory of dual economy and society was based on Orientalism's clear distinction between Western and Eastern cultures. Traditional agrarian society, in this view, lacked the innate potential for economic progress.

Sumitro criticised economic dualism because of its cultural determinism and fatalist attitude to underdevelopment, which were 'not supported by empirical evidence'.¹⁹ His critique was echoed by other political economists, both colonial and postcolonial. The Fabian J.S. Furnivall, in his *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural*

¹⁷ Sumitro's Introduction in his dissertation book, see Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, *Kredit Rakyat pada Masa Depresi* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989), pp. xviii.

¹⁸ On Indology, see Hanneman Samuel, *Genealogi Kekuasaan Ilmu Sosial Indonesia: Dari Kolonialisme Belanda hingga Modernisme Amerika* (Depok: Kepik Ungu, 2010), pp. 11–12.

¹⁹ On Boeke and the influence of economic dualism, see Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, *Perkembangan Pemikiran Ekonomi: Dasar Teori Ekonomi Pertumbuhan dan Ekonomi Pembangunan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994), p 72–73.

Economy, published in 1939, argued from his comparison between colonial Burma and Indonesia that societies were divided into a ‘plural’ form because of colonial rule, which created racially based socio-economic segregation. Positioned above indigenous racial groups was another economic caste, the ‘Foreign Orientals’, which stood between traditional subsistence-based indigenous society and modern Western capitalism.²⁰ Clifford Geertz’s later work, *Agricultural Involution*, suggested that the main obstacle for Indonesian society to achieve modernity and economic development was a product of the colonial system rather than being culturally determined.²¹ In Geertz’s analysis, when agricultural Java and Bali (‘inner Indonesia’) were incorporated into world capitalism through the Cultivation System (1830–1870), most of the peasantry were excluded from commercial activities and domesticated into a subsistence economy, while simultaneously serving the Dutch modern sector of agricultural industry and plantations. The Javanese peasantry’s typical response to capitalist expansion was ‘involution’—continuous inward change indicated by intensified agricultural production and higher social complexity without fundamental progress—rather than ‘evolution’ into a higher stage of development.²² Geertz’s theory explained the main obstacle to the formation of domestic capital and entrepreneurship. While representative of modernisation theories, Geertz’s work stood between the colonial economic dualism and later dependency school in its analysis of underdevelopment.

In his dissertation, Sumitro had opposed the Dutch view that there was no unemployment, which was based on the dualist view that ‘those who lost their wage

²⁰ John Sydenham Furnivall (1878–1960) was a British scholar and official in British colonial administration in Burma (Myanmar), and wrote works on comparative colonial policy in Burma and the Netherlands East Indies. As an intellectual, Furnivall was closely associated with the Fabians, see Adrian Vickers, “The Classics in Indonesian Studies: J.S. Furnivall’s *Netherlands India*”, paper presented on the 15th Biennial conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, in Canberra on 29 June–2 July 2004.

²¹ Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Los Angeles/Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) [Indonesian *Involusi Pertanian: Proses Perubahan Ekologi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2016)]; on Geertz’s ‘involution’ theory in relation to American scholarship and developmental projects, see Benedict Anderson, “Djojo on the Corner” Review of *After the Fact* by Clifford Geertz, *London Reviews of Books*, Vol 17 (19 August 1995).

²² Geertz (1963), pp. 113–115.

jobs were all absorbed by the “traditional”, non-monetised economy.’²³ He resented the writings of Boeke, who had been his father’s mentor, and similar ‘Orientalist’ arguments that Indonesians and other ‘Eastern races’ could never improve themselves because of their different values. Initially, he had accepted the framework of the ‘dual economy’ but objected those who considered it as permanent rather than due to particular historical factors.

As an exponent of development economics, Sumitro was more inclined to the neo-Keynesian school than neo-classical (neoliberal) economics, because he considered that many basic neo-classical assumptions were incompatible with the economic situation of the Third World, which was characterised by monopolies rather than free competitive markets.²⁴ In his memoir as an economic thinker, Sumitro admitted to Ricardo, Marx and Schumpeter influencing his economic ideas and policy. He studied Keynes, but achieved better comprehension from reading his interpreters. Otherwise, Sumitro confirmed more with the ideas associated with ‘modernisation’ theories championed by Walt Rostow.²⁵

Rostow, a contemporary to Sumitro, was an American economist and, arguably, one of the most influential development theorists for his work, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, published in 1960.²⁶ He argued that development was an endogenous process based on a society’s inner potential and proposed that societies evolved in five phases of development, from a traditional, agrarian-based state through ‘take-off’ to maturity indicated by mass consumption. He related the stages of societal growth to war, which

²³ Sumitro Djohadikusumo ‘Recollections of My Career’, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 22, No 3 (December 1986), also in Thee Kian Wie (ed), *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy 1950s–1990s* (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 52–54.

²⁴ Sumitro Djohadikusumo, *Perkembangan Pemikiran Ekonomi: Dasar Teori Ekonomi Pertumbuhan dan Ekonomi Pembangunan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994), p 45–46; on these economic theories more widely, Bjorn Hettne, *Teori Pembangunan dan Tiga Dunia* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), pp. 77–81.

²⁵ Djohadikusumo (1986), p. 55.

²⁶ Walt Whitman Rostow (1916–2003), an MIT economist and political theorist who served as National Security Advisor to US Presidents J.F Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Rostow viewed the Cold War as a global struggle in which the Third World was the most important arena.

occurred as societies or countries were changing from one stage of growth to another.²⁷ For Rostow, seen from the viewpoint of industrial countries, traditional society marked the ‘degree-zero’ of history, due to its ignorance of the modern technology that allows nature to be exploited rationally. Rostow considered European intrusions on non-European traditional societies, through colonisation and its subsequent impacts such as the rise of nationalism, as the pre-condition to ‘take-off’ from tradition to modernity in the development stage. ‘Take-off’ required two important factors: a high level of technology, and a group of organised experts who ran economic modernisation. The last phase, ‘the age of high-mass consumption’, was indicated by American Fordism, in which productivity benefits were distributed to workers to raise consumption, and the welfare state was in place.²⁸ As an anti-communist and US Cold War policy-maker, Rostow considered his theory to be an alternative model to change based on Marxian class-struggle. The development project itself was essentially anti-communist, with its goals of assuring political stability and security, as well as eliminating poverty (viewed as the fertile seedbed for the spread of communism). However, Rostow’s theory of development was a sort of ‘Marxism without Marx’ because both shared a similar evolutionary view of history based on a biological paradigm.²⁹

Sumitro considered Rostow’s approach to be ‘too one-dimensional.’³⁰ Sumitro preferred the ideas of William Arthur Lewis, which were also based on dual economic sectors—subsistence and commercial. Lewis argued that the lower productivity from subsistence and overpopulation in underdeveloped regions generated a nearly unlimited supply of labour and disguised-unemployment, or ‘underemployment’, which should be overcome by channelling labour into modern industrialisation.³¹

²⁷ Peter Watson, *A Terrible Beauty: The Peoples and Ideas that Shaped the Modern Mind* (London: Phoenix, 2001), p. 445.

²⁸ Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* (London/New York: Zed Books, 2008), pp. 94–98.

²⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 100–102.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 55.

³¹ Sir William Arthur Lewis (1915–1991), was a British–Caribbean development economist awarded the Nobel prize in 1979. He studied economics at the LSE. Among his key works was *Economic Development*

Both Lewis and Rostow saw industrialisation as the main pillar of development. The main goals of Sumitro's Economic Urgency Plan were to encourage industrial growth and abolish protection for Dutch economic concerns. Instead, the *Benteng* ('Fortress') Policy, was set up to guarantee the native entrepreneurial class against the Dutch interests. Sumitro saw how the Dutch always spoke of their 'historical interests', as manifested in maintaining the *Javaasche Bank*, while the Ministry of Finance was full of Dutch officials. Sumitro considered that the Dutch were better as administrators than economists, promising a practical solution to developmental problems.³² He turned instead to American scholarship and economic aid for solutions. This explains Sumitro's debates with his former superior, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, whose more conservative stance, in Sumitro's eyes, was similar to those of the old Dutch administrators.³³

As an economist and politician, Sjafruddin combined an Islamic background with Western modern education. He represented the 'religious socialism' of the Islamic Masjumi party and, as a member of the USI and PPPI, was closely associated with the Sjahrir group during the Japanese occupation era.³⁴ Unlike Sumitro, Sjafruddin's formal education was in the School of Law (*Rechtthoogeschool*) in Batavia. He had worked in the Tax Inspectorate in Kediri, a position that made him one of the leading economists and finance officials in the early Republic. Among his most important positions included being head of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) in West Sumatra (1948–1949), Minister of Finance in the Hatta and Natsir Cabinet (1948–1951), and governor of the *Javaasche Bank*, which subsequently became the Bank of Indonesia. As Minister of Finance in March 1950, Sjafruddin implemented

with *Unlimited Supply of Labour* (1954) and *The Theory of Economic Growth* (1955), see Djojohadikusumo (1994) pp. 92–96.

³² Djojohadikusumo (2003), p. 59.

³³ See Thee Kian Wie, "The Debate on Economic Policy in Newly-Independent Indonesia between Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo", *Itinerario* Vol 34 No 1, (2010), pp. 35–56.

³⁴ Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, "Recollections of My Career", in Thee Kian Wie (ed.) (2003), pp. 82–83, see also Rahardjo (2011), pp. 96–101.

devaluation (*gunting Sjafruddin*, or ‘the Sjafruddin cuts’) to establish a single Indonesian currency from the dual currency system.³⁵

The policy and economic thought of Sjafruddin represented an amalgamation of liberalism, neo-classicism and economic conservatism. In opposition to Sumitro’s industrial Urgency Plan, Sjafruddin argued that, since Indonesia was predominantly an agrarian subsistence economy, all economic development plans should prioritise improving agricultural production before industrialisation could take place. Sjafruddin saw a wide gap between levels of economic development in Indonesian society; thus, he advocated for a gradual development that emphasised education to improve human capital above material capital, and in which Islamic values would play a significant role. Sjafruddin considered Sumitro as too Western-minded and detached from the actual reality of Indonesian society. For Sjafruddin, Sumitro was mistaken in using Keynesian economic measures for a pre-industrial country such as Indonesia, because that theory was made for advanced industrial states ‘where production can be changed overnight, according to demand’. Likewise, its deficit spending policy was inclined to cause inflation.³⁶ Sjafruddin opposed the Benteng Policy’s crash industrialisation project, because he saw the need to prioritise technical and managerial education, as well as technological transfer. He was right in assuming that the government could not take a shortcut to create domestic entrepreneurs without educating them first, since the policy only strengthened Chinese middlemen in a system known as ‘Ali-Babas’, in which Chinese (‘Babas’) worked with front men from other ethnic groups (‘Ali’). Besides, he assumed that foreign investment was required, which was a better option for stimulating economic growth than increasing national debt, which contained greater economic risk.³⁷

For Sumitro, most of Sjafruddin’s economic policies, both as minister of finance and as governor of the *Javaasche Bank*, exemplified similar features to or were a continuation of the Dutch colonial administrative approach. He considered that

³⁵ Sjafruddin (2003), pp. 78–79.

³⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 82–84.

³⁷ Rahardjo (2011), pp. 115–116, see also Charles Coppel, *Tionghoa Indonesia dalam Krisis* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994).

Sjafruddin ‘paid too much attention to Dutch civil servants in the *Javaasche Bank*’, who had dubious technical expertise. Sumitro assumed that any ideas and measures by finance minister Sjafruddin were influenced by his experience as a tax official under the Dutch, as well as his legal training, and that Sjafruddin was acting in legal-bureaucratic rather than strictly economic terms.³⁸ Sumitro’s view was that Sjafruddin’s proposal to prioritise agriculture was influenced by Dutch conservatives, who wanted Indonesia to remain a producer of agricultural products and raw materials for the world market. In his 1953 treatise, *Persoalan Ekonomi di Indonesia*, Sumitro explained the main reasons why Indonesia should industrialise. Because he saw an agrarian economy as being insufficient to enhance the productivity and purchasing power of Indonesian people, Sumitro did not consider Sjafruddin’s solutions as valid.³⁹ For Sumitro, industrialisation did not mean that Indonesia’s agrarian foundation could be fully replaced by an industrial one. He wrote that ‘Indonesia should view the industrial sector as an important complement to the agrarian economic base to achieve a more balanced economic structure’. A policy purely focused on agriculture would be irresponsible, because it would maintain economic disparities and cause a steady decline in the standard of living of the Indonesian people.⁴⁰

The difference between Sumitro and Sjafruddin is best illustrated by their attitudes towards capitalism and investment. As a self-styled ‘religious socialist’, Sjafruddin argued that religious socialism ‘does not abolish individualism as well as individual initiative and responsibility’. Competition that arose from private initiatives was beneficial, because it increased production and improved the quality of goods. The government should intervene by nationalising private enterprises only at a critical stage when the liberal economy could not increase production. Sumitro took a more typically Third World socialist and nationalist stance, viewing most Asian countries as being trapped in socioeconomic stagnation. To encourage accelerated development through

³⁸ Djojohadikusumo (2003), pp. 59–60.

³⁹ See the chapter ‘Sekitar Pembangunan Ekonomi: Catatan tentang pandangan Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’ (About Economic Development: Notes on the arguments of Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara”, in Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, *Persoalan Ekonomi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Indira, 1953).

⁴⁰ Thee (2010), pp. 48–49.

the fostering of autonomous investment and technical skills, therefore, the state must order and plan the economy, particularly in its early stage. Leaving economic growth to foreign entrepreneurs was not a desirable type of development for most Asian states.⁴¹

The Rise of the Technocratic State

Australian political scientist Richard Robison, in his 1986 work, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, argued that Indonesia under Suharto's New Order was a technocratic state with military-patrimonial-bureaucratic and comprador capitalist characteristics. His interpretation was based on the fact that a group of economists, largely trained in the USA, made most of the decisions. Their appointments on the National Development Planning Board, or Bappenas (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Negara*) were not political, but based primarily on their expertise. The New Order and its apologists often argued from the fundamental premise that New Order economic policy was the product of economic criteria. Economics was a 'scientific' and 'objective' category, superior to 'politics', which represented ideological positions or the short-term interests of specific groups and classes. Further, Robison claimed, the Indonesian technocrats did not represent a single economic stream or political affiliation; their authority was mainly achieved by being managers of economic policies designed to allow international capital access to Indonesia.⁴² Sumitro played a key role in creating this technocratic approach.

Technocracy is a system of governance in which the decision-makers are chosen based on their scientific or technical expertise—a type of bureaucratic system controlled by managers and experts. The idea of a technocratic society came from the French utopian socialist, Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825),⁴³ but is mostly associated

⁴¹ Bruce Glassburner, "Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia 1950–1957", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol 10 No 2 (January 1962), pp 120–121.

⁴² Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2009), pp. 109–110.

⁴³ M. Dawam Rahardjo "Teknokrasi: Dari Gerakan Sosial ke Dominasi Tekno-Ekonomi", in his, *Ekonomi Politik Pembangunan* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat, 2012), p. 149, see also Richard G. Olson, *Scientism and Technocracy in the Twentieth Century: The Legacy of Scientific Management* (Lanham/London: Lexington Books, 2016).

with American pragmatist thinker Frederick Winslow Taylor and his scientific management idea. Taylor wrote *The Principle of Scientific Management* in 1911, arguing that the management of companies needed to have a scientific basis. To prove his argument, he investigated and improved the efficiency of a large number of companies.⁴⁴ James Burnham's 1941 work, *The Managerial Revolution*, used Weberian ideal types to argue that modern industrial societies were being transformed into a form of advanced capitalism dominated by a new managerial class, which was replacing the capitalist bourgeoisie. Burnham predicted that the class struggle between capitalists and workers would be resolved by the rise of the managerial class, as exemplified by 'technocratic' political regimes in the USSR, Nazi Germany and the New Deal of the USA under Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁴⁵

In the Netherlands and its colonies, industrialisation and the rapid growth of urban areas and infrastructure in the second half of the nineteenth century increasingly demanded the engineering profession, showing many similarities to US developments. A welfare state ideology using technocratic measures had already been practised in the Indies during the Ethical Policy era, which mandated those possessing scientific rationality as bearers of the 'civilising mission' to the colonial world. Dutch politician, Theodore van Deventer, based the Ethical Policy's three foundations in education, irrigation and emigration. He built on the ideas of Henri van Kol, a Delft-graduate irrigation engineer and socialist politician from the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP). Van Kol made a sharp distinction between imperialism and colonialism, opposing imperial expansion as inherently chauvinistic, but supporting colonialism as a development project.⁴⁶ As a consequence of the population gap between Java and the outer islands, most engineering projects in the Indies were directed towards agricultural

⁴⁴ Rahardjo (2012), pp. 152–153.

⁴⁵ To some extent, the views of Burnham, who represented the conservative wing of the US Republican Party, was similar to those of F.A Hayek and Milton Friedman who inspired neo-liberal ideology. For more discussion on the Burnham's arguments see Miguel A. Centeno & Agustin Ferraro, "Notes on Technocracy and Economic Development in the United States and Latin America".

⁴⁶ Jan-Jacob Blusse van Oud-Alblas, *Missionaries of Modernity: Technocratic Ideals of Colonial Engineers in the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines 1900–1920* (MA Thesis, The State University of New Jersey, 2012), pp. 70–71 and 160, Rudolf Mrázek, *Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony* (Princeton University Press, 2002).

irrigation, based on the policy of emigrating inhabitants from the more densely populated areas to the lesser-populated ones.

In the post-war period, technocratic and managerial ideology was furthered through exporting American scientific management and the development discourse targeting newly independent Third World countries. This ideology resulted in the expansion of the US Social Sciences. The discourse of developmentalism was closely connected to the US campaign to rebuild post-war Europe and resist the spread of communism. The Truman Doctrine and European Recovery Program, or the Marshall Plan of 1947, represented the first applications of developmentalism. There were two main features of the Cold War campaign: the emphasis on freedom as a universal principle, with the USA as its principal defender; and the importance of improving economic conditions to prevent support for communism. Only through socio-economic prosperity could the causes of communist support be removed effectively.⁴⁷ Corporatism and technocracy were intended as an ‘apolitical’ political culture for Cold War developmentalism.

US economic and technical assistance in the Indonesian developmental project took place over two distinct periods. The first, during the 1950s, focused on technical assistance, economic development and the expansion of the managerial class. The second began in the early 1960s with the Kennedy Administration, and provided a basis for creating a strong state ruled by a military-managerial elite.⁴⁸ In the 1950s, the main agents that spread US modernist social sciences and developmentalism in Indonesia were the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cornell University and Yale University. The Ford Foundation funded a MIT project on Indonesia; this was carried out by its Center of International Studies, chaired by Canadian economist Benjamin (Ben) Higgins, with a field team led by Rufus Hendon. The field research, which was funded by the Committee for the Comparative Studies of the New Nations and organised by sociologist Edward Shils, was carried out between 1952 and 1958. The

⁴⁷ Gilles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress of Cultural Freedom, the CIA and the Post-war American Hegemony* (London/New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 34.

⁴⁸ Simpson (2008), pp. 47–49.

research examined diverse aspects of Indonesian society, including the rural economy (Robert Jay), administrative organisation (Donald Fagg), Chinese Indonesian communities (Edward Ryan), social organisation of the family (Hildred Geertz), and Javanese religious-cultural communities and their socioeconomic transformations (Clifford Geertz). Many of these researchers continued in Indonesian studies, even when the project itself had finished.⁴⁹ Later, Geertz's research in Java became a classic portrayal of cultural division, albeit a division exacerbated by ideological-political rivalry surrounding the first general election of 1955.⁵⁰

In July 1952, Ben Higgins was appointed as UN adviser to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, under Sumitro and the State Planning Bureau.⁵¹ He had worked with the International Labour Organization during the war and was one of the world's most authoritative experts on developmental economics. In 1952, he was teaching at the University of Melbourne. In 1954, Higgins returned to Indonesia as director of the MIT project. At the time, many UN technical assistance experts were civil administrators who supported Keynesian economics, or the more general Fabian social-democratic ideas also influential in PSI circles. Hence, there was an ideological fit between Higgins's MIT team and Sumitro's outlook. Higgins praised Indonesians' enthusiasm for economic development, writing that 'in Sjafruddin and Sumitro, Indonesia had a duumvirate on economic policy that few underdeveloped countries could match for competence and commitment to national interests.'⁵² Higgins admitted that the transition from colonial scholarship to the US-sponsored modern Indonesia project had created a void, which posed challenges for policy-makers. Neither Indonesian nor foreign scholars had a definite picture of the process of economic development, other than that it was concerned with improving production, income and

⁴⁹ Samuel (2010), pp. 81–82.

⁵⁰ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), Benedict Anderson, "Djojo on the Corner: Review on 'After the Fact' by Clifford Geertz", *London Review of Books*, 24 August 1995, p. 19.

⁵¹ David Webster, "Modern Missionaries: Canadian Post-war Technical Assistance Advisors in Southeast Asia", *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* Vol 20 No 2 (2009), pp. 101–104, Jamie Mackie, "In Memoriam Professor Benjamin Higgins", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* Vol 37 No 2 (2001), pp. 183–188.

⁵² Quoted in Fakhri (2014), pp. 149–150.

welfare.⁵³ Contrary to the assumption that the US involvement was ideological, Higgins asserted that the role of foreign advisers was limited to technical and scientific issues.⁵⁴

Alongside Higgins and the MIT project, the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, under the chairmanship of George McTurnan Kahin and financially support by the Ford Foundation, also played major role in applying US social science to Indonesian studies. Among the Indonesian scholars included in the project was Selo Soemardjan, one of Indonesia's leading sociologists and the right-hand man of Hamengkubuwono IX, the Sultan of Yogyakarta.⁵⁵ Along with Sumitro's protégé, Widjojo Nitisastro, Kahin established a Village Research Project in conjunction with Sumitro's Faculty of Economics in Jakarta, which, according to Kahin, 'consists of students from a middle-class and bureaucratic family background.'⁵⁶ While Kahin was convinced of the continuity of the Ford–Cornell partnership, he was sceptical of the political implications of Indonesian–American relations during this time, and even more so when Sukarno's nationalisation policy had directed Indonesian politics towards the Left.⁵⁷

Foreign technical assistance and national planning institutions were established alongside the expansion of Indonesian universities during the 1950s. One of the main problems that the new Republic faced after the transfer of sovereignty was how to improve expertise in its civil service, following the departure of the Dutch. The

⁵³ Benjamin Higgins, "Thought and Actions: Indonesian Economic Studies and Policies in the 1950s", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* Vol 26 No 1, April 1990, pp. 39-40.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 46.

⁵⁵ Selo Soemardjan, anthropologist Koentjaraningrat, and economists Sarbini Sumawinata and Widjojo Nitisastro were the leading social scientists who contributed to Indonesian development studies. His Cornell dissertation, *Social Change in Yogyakarta* (1962) regarded as one of Indonesian studies classics.

⁵⁶ Quoted in David Ransom (1970), pp. 4–5. Widjojo Nitisastro (1927–2012) was the leading New Order economic technocrat, whose economic ideas later raised the term 'Widjojonomics'. His 1961 PhD thesis in economics and demography at Berkeley was titled "Migration, Population Growth, and Economic Development". His thoughts were an amalgamation of the welfare-oriented, moderate nationalism of Parindra, the PSI social-democratic tradition of Sumitro, and the Keynesian economics he studied at the University of Indonesia and Berkeley, see Sony Karsono, *Indonesia's New Order 1966–1998: Its Social and Intellectual Origins* (PhD dissertation, College of Arts and Sciences Ohio University, 2013), pp. 321–347.

⁵⁷ George Mc.T Kahin, *Southeast Asia: A Testament* (London/New York, 2003), pp. 142–143, George Mc T. Kahin, "Cornell's Modern Indonesia Project", *Indonesia* No. 48 (October 1989), pp. 1–26.

government addressed this by expanding education in Indonesia and giving Indonesians foreign training. Initially, Indonesian administrators preferred Dutch experts, since they knew Indonesia far better than those from any other country, and most higher echelon Indonesian civil servants spoke Dutch. However, using Dutch advisers meant that Indonesian bureaucrats remained dependent on the Dutch. Early Indonesian universities maintained the European liberal schooling system, but this was undermined by a lack of academic facilities, resulting in a relatively small ratio of graduates to drop-outs. Under a 1951 initiative by Sumitro, government officials were sent to the USA and Britain for higher education. The political situation encouraged changing from a Dutch-centred to American-oriented education, but it was also a product of technocratic ideology. US education differed from its European counterparts because of its 'guided study' system, which required an entrance exam, had mandatory courses and was a better-structured learning system.⁵⁸

Among Indonesian universities, the Faculty of Economics, Universitas Indonesia (FE-UI) was the most important higher-educational institution for Sumitro's technocratic project. As the dean, Sumitro developed the faculty to be a centre for developmental economics. Inspired by how Harold Laski implemented socialist ideas at the London School of Economic and Political Sciences (LSE), Sumitro established his faculty as the 'Jakarta School of Economics'.⁵⁹ While European social democrats had been his primary influence, Sumitro's US connections provided access to scholarship funds. In 1951, Sumitro received a grant of US\$400,000 for financing American economic experts to teach at the faculty, including Everett Hawkins from the Economic Cooperation Administration, which provided technical assistance for smaller Asian developing countries.⁶⁰ Sumitro set up the Institute of Economics and Social Research (*Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat*, LPEM) as part of his 'Jakarta School of Economics'. In 1955, Sumitro played major role in forming the

⁵⁸ Fakhri (2014), pp. 120–130.

⁵⁹ Thee Kian Wie, "In Memoriam Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 1917-2001", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* Vol 37 No 2 (2001), p. 176.

⁶⁰ Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was a US government agency formed in 1948 to manage US economic and technical assistance in the framework of the Marshall Plan.

Indonesian Economic Scholars' Association (*Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia*, ISEI), one of the most powerful professional associations for economists, but which was criticised by the Left.

The Ford Foundation opened an office in Jakarta in 1953, marking a further shift from Dutch to US education and technical aid.⁶¹ Many Dutch economists in Indonesian universities, including in the FE-UI, repatriated to Netherlands after Indonesia cut off diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in May 1956, under Sukarno's confrontational policy towards the Dutch. To overcome the lack of staff, at first, Sumitro considered sending his economics students to the LSE. However, the British Council declined to fund the student-exchange plan. He then turned to the Ford Foundation which, in July 1956, agreed to finance the University of Indonesia's scholarship program with the University of California, Berkeley. Sumitro later explained that his agreement to collaborate with the University of California was because the Department of Economics at Berkeley was chaired by the Greek socialist economist and politician, Andreas G. Papandreou, with whom Sumitro already had close connections.⁶² The first Indonesian economic scholar sent to Berkeley was Soemardi Reksopoetranto, followed in 1957 by Widjojo Nitisastro, Julius Ismael, Barli Halim, T. Umar Ali, Mohammad Sadli, Wahyu Sukotjo and Suhadi Mangkusuwondo.

The collaboration between the Ford Foundation and FE-UI continued over the next few years. During their period of complicity in the CIA-supported PRRI/Permesta rebellion in Sumatra, the US connections led the FE-UI economists, especially Widjojo Nitisastro and his colleagues who were labelled as the 'Berkeley Mafia' by their enemies. This term referred not only to economists trained at Berkeley, but those trained in Europe, such as Radius Prawiro and Arifin Siregar, as well as Sumitro himself. Most

⁶¹ Fakih (2014), pp. 151–152.

⁶² Katoppo, et.al (2001), pp. 190–192; Andreas Georgios Papandreou (1919–1996) was a Greek politician and economist. He founded the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), a Greek Social Democratic party in 1974, which he led until his death in June 1996. He was prime minister of Greece 1981–1989 and 1993–1996.

Indonesian economists educated in Europe inclined more towards socialism in their worldview, compared to the pragmatically oriented US-trained economists.⁶³

The PRRI revolt and transition to Guided Democracy also marked the beginning of a more solid anti-communist alliance between intellectuals and military officers. From 1964, the FE-UI group gave economics courses at the Army Staff and Command School (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat*, or Seskoad) in Bandung, under the pro-PSI army officer Lt.-General Suwanto.⁶⁴ At the Seskoad, senior army officers were trained to become social leaders beyond their military roles; hence, they had to study economics, law, political science, sociology and philosophy. These courses later became pivotal for the success of the military–civilian alliance, which overthrew Sukarno’s administration and established the New Order. The technocrats—especially Widjojo, Sadli and their group—gained more influence after the *Tracee Baru* (‘New Path’) seminar in January 1966 and the Second Army Seminar on 25 August 1966. The *Tracee Baru* seminar was organised by the anti-Sukarno Indonesian Students Action Group (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*, KAMI) in cooperation with the FE-UI. It was the first time since the Guided Democracy era that economic development problems were discussed without political pressure from the PKI. At the Second Army Seminar, economists presented a formulation or ‘recipe’ for overcoming economic problems to the army leadership. The seminar brought together views on Indonesian development from the perspectives of politics, economy and security. In the same period, Widjojo and his fellow economists were assigned to the personal staff (*staf pribadi*) of the Presidium, which later appointed a team of economic advisers to President Suharto.⁶⁵

⁶³ Ahmad Helmy Fuady, *Elites and Economic Policies in Indonesia and Nigeria 1966–1998* (PhD Thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2012), p.78.

⁶⁴Fakih (2014). Seskoad, initially named SSKAD was founded in October 1951 to train and supply future army officers with modern skills, including scientific administration, military analysis, and organisational proficiency. After 1953, some 129 officers were sent for training in the Netherlands, others in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and Fort Benning, Georgia. Seskoad was established by modernist-administrator army officers like Nasution and Simatupang to replace the Tjandradimuka military academy associated with nationalist ex-PETA officers.

⁶⁵ Mohammad Sadli, “Recollections of My Career”, in Thee (2003), pp. 126–128.

Toward State Capitalism: Nationalisation and Guided Economy

One major contribution of Sumitro and his following economist-technocrats was to lay the groundwork for the state-centred economic planning that was a key characteristic of the Guided Democracy and New Order regimes. The former, dominated by Sukarno's 'Guided Economy', was a manifestation of the idea of 'Indonesian Socialism'; while the latter was more a representative of state corporatism despite claiming to be based on the so-called the welfare-oriented 'Pancasila economy.'⁶⁶ In practice, almost none of these economic planning ideas led to socialism of any kind. Since they were largely based on American scientific management which was anti-communist in nature, they produced nothing more than state capitalism.

Similar to Herbert Feith's division of politicians into solidarity-makers and administrators, Benjamin Higgins, in his key work on the 1950s, *Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development*, divided Indonesian postcolonial political elites into two camps: the 'economic'- or 'development'-minded managers/technocrats; and 'historically minded' communists and nationalists. While both groups concerned with postcolonial development, they had explicit differences. The former felt that development must follow the Western path; they preferred technical and capital assistance from the West. In contrast, the latter had been shaped by the long struggle against colonial rule; they thus emphasised the importance of abolishing the remnants of foreign influence. Their concern was to convert the colonial economy into a national economy.⁶⁷

The initial path to nationalisation started with the *Benteng* Policy of Sumitro's Urgency Plan. The nationalisation process was largely conducted selectively and in cooperation with former colonial officials. State interventions were only applied to economic activities associated with direct public or national interests, such as the central bank or public transport. One of the areas of voluntary cooperation with the Dutch was

⁶⁶ The term 'Pancasila Economy' had been a subject of serious intellectual debates in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see the discussion in the next sub-chapter)

⁶⁷ Benjamin Higgins, *Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), pp. 103–104.

the founding of Garuda Indonesia in March 1950; this was set up as a Dutch–Indonesian joint venture with KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines), which kept a 51 per cent share. Under parliamentary pressure, the Indonesian government purchased all remaining shares in Garuda with a view to reconsidering its management contract.⁶⁸ Other voluntary nationalisations in 1954 included public utilities, such as gas and electricity companies, as well as public transportation in Jakarta. There was increasing pressure to take over Dutch railway companies in Java and Sumatra.⁶⁹

Increasing political tension regarding the status of West Irian (New Guinea), however, soon led to a wave of nationalisations of Dutch private enterprises and assets. In February 1956, Dutch–Indonesian negotiations were held concerning the status of Dutch businesses in Indonesia. The result was that Indonesia unilaterally broke from the Netherlands–Indonesian Union established by the Round Table Conference.⁷⁰ Following the failure of the Irian vote in the UN, rallies and strikes broke out in early December 1957. Incited by Sukarno, trade unions led the unilateral takeover of Dutch companies. On 13 December, General Nasution, with the agreement of prime minister Djuanda, ordered that all Dutch possessions should be secured under military control. The prime minister declared that they would be returned as soon as the Netherlands agreed to transfer West Irian to Indonesia but, in fact, they were subsequently nationalised.⁷¹ Indonesian cooperation with KLM ceased in December 1957. Nationalisation included the transfer of 90 per cent of plantation output, 60 per cent of foreign trade, some factories and mining enterprises, alongside banks and various service industries. This extraordinary measure was taken in a context where indigenous capitalists were too weak to manage the massive scale of colonial enterprises—they had been enjoying state credit and concessions without proving themselves capable of establishing the basis for a national industrial economy. In April 1958, the seized Dutch

⁶⁸ J. Thomas Lindblad, “The Economic Decolonisation of Indonesia: A Bird’s-eye View”, *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* Vol 4, 2011, pp. 7–8.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 9.

⁷⁰ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007), pp. 452–455.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp. 583–584.

companies were incorporated into six state corporations (*Badan Usaha Milik Negara*, BUMN), which the military controlled.⁷² For months after the takeover, most of these enterprises remained legally Dutch properties, while being managed by Indonesians; it was only in December 1958 that the legislation on the nationalisation was approved by the parliament.⁷³

The nationalisation of Dutch enterprises and their transfer to state-owned corporations created state-directed, bureaucratic capitalism in a 'Guided Economy', an integral part of Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy'. While politically, Sukarno had done this with support from left-wing groups, economically, the impulse for nationalisation came from Sumitro's industrialisation plan, which called for greater state involvement in the economy. Sukarno moved to establish a corporatist state structure in his explanation of the Guided Democracy concept in February 1957. Sukarno enunciated his Political Manifesto (Manipol) in his official address of 17 August 1959. It had five pillars: *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* ('The Constitution of 1945'), *Sosialisme Indonesia* ('Indonesian Socialism'), *Demokrasi Terpimpin* ('Guided Democracy'), *Ekonomi Terpimpin* ('Guided Economy'), and *Kepribadian Nasional* ('National Character'). Guided Economy was the national, planned economy, which gave the state a central role to manage production, distribution, consumption and capital accumulation. Sukarno's political manifesto was intended to establish Indonesian socialism and Indonesian socialist society.⁷⁴

In his Manipol, Sukarno proposed a cooperative cabinet based on the principle of *gotong royong* and a national council with representatives from functional groups, the *Golongan Karya*. The first attempt towards a nationally integrated economic development plan was the National Development Congress (Munap, or *Musyawaharah Pembangunan Nasional*) of 25 November to 3 December 1957. This was attended by

⁷² Robison (2009), pp. 72–73.

⁷³ Lindblad (2011), p. 15.

⁷⁴ Besides Sukarno's Manipol, the concept of Guided Economy (Ekonomi Terpimpin) and its framework stated in the resolution of Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in 1960. For the latest study on Sukarno's Guided Economy, see Amiruddin Al-Rahab, *Ekonomi Berdikari Sukarno* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2014), pp. 32-33.

about 400 delegates—including Sukarno, Hatta and Djuanda—and representatives of the regions, military officials and functional groups. The congress was organised along corporatist lines to forge national consensus for a development plan. It was also part of the attempt to negotiate with the regional military opposition. Its outcomes were inconclusive, but the congress established the National Planning Board, Depernas, as the authority to formulate the Eight-Year Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Delapan Tahun*). The corporatist social and political structure set up by the Depernas was intended to facilitate popular participation in national development. In June 1959, the Depernas appointed Mohammad Yamin as its minister-chair.⁷⁵ The Plan was announced in Sukarno's address before the Depernas on 28 August 1959. Sukarno stated that Guided Economy was the means to accomplish the unfinished Revolution by which Indonesia would achieve 'a socialist society à la Indonesia.'⁷⁶ The inclusion of the communists in the national plan encountered strong opposition from military dissidents, as well as Sumitro and Sjafruddin.

The Eight-Year Development Plan stagnated during the next two years, due to Sukarno's political campaign to free West Irian. Only after that campaign ended did the government return its focus to national development. Prolonged military campaigns against regional insurrectionists and for Irian had worsened economic conditions; thus, Sukarno turned towards the technocrats for economic reforms and foreign aid. In November 1962, Djuanda contacted the US ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Palmer Jones while, at the same time, a Soviet delegation met the minister of foreign affairs, Subandrio, to negotiate a US\$100 million trade credit for Indonesia.⁷⁷

Via Subandrio, Sukarno approached PSI intellectuals, such as Soedjatmoko and UI economist Sarbini Sumawinata, for help in formulating a new economic program. Sarbini and other PSI intellectuals regularly discussed economic problems, so they saw

⁷⁵ Fakih (2014), pp. 229–231.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 35–39.

⁷⁷ Rosihan Anwar, *Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961–1965* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1981), pp. 280–281.

this as a good opportunity to draw the president closer to the technocrats.⁷⁸ The *Deklarasi Ekonomi* (Dekon) of 28 March 1963 was a compromise between Sukarno and the technocrats. The declaration emphasised the need for economic stabilisation and state-controlled development, focused on improving the agricultural and industrial sectors. In line with this compromise, the 26 May Regulation of prime minister Djuanda included reducing subsidies and removing price controls. The regulation was formulated to support Djuanda's negotiations with the USA and International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁷⁹ However, the vagueness of the Dekon and this Regulation was criticised from both the left and right. The PKI attacked the 26 May Regulation as the product of 'false *Manipolists*'—the technocrats and their reliance on foreign capital; the army attacked the Dekon because it implied a military budget cut. The policy ended with the outbreak of Sukarno's confrontation campaign against Malaysia and the withdrawal of the IMF and US economic aid for Indonesia.⁸⁰

The principle of Guided Economy had been the target of criticism from both social democrats and communists. Lance Castles, in an early analysis, argued that the expanding role of the military and bureaucracy during the Guided Economy era led to the emergence of 'bureaucratic capitalism', or 'economic dynasties', among the military officers and bureaucratic elites.⁸¹ As the main proponent of the cooperative movement, Hatta wrote a series of articles on socialist aspects of Guided Economy between 1959 and 1963, notably '*Ekonomi Terpimpin*' ('Guided Economy') and '*Persoalan Ekonomi Sosialis Indonesia*' ('Problems of Indonesia's Socialist Economy'). In the latter treatise, Hatta stated that the understanding of Marxism in Indonesia was limited, and that the material conditions for establishing a socialist society within Indonesian society were

⁷⁸ Sarbini Sumawinata, "Recollections of My Career", in Thee (2003), p. 112.

⁷⁹ For the role of Subandrio and Djuanda in the Dekon, see Fakhri (2014) p. 318, and Al-Rahab (2014), pp. 61–63.

⁸⁰ Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959–1965* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 266–267; Simpson (2008), pp. 109–112.

⁸¹ Lance Castles, "Socialism and Private Business: The Latest Phase", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, I, No 1 (June 1965), pp. 13–45.

connected to collectivism.⁸² Since the colonial period, modern commercial economies had led to ‘individualisation’ as the antithesis of indigenous collectivism. However, colonial capitalism could not, according to Hatta, eliminate the communal nature institutionalised within customary (*adat*) law in traditional societies.⁸³ Hatta claimed that, without strong roots within Indonesian society, national capitalism would be quickly undermined by foreign capital. Hence, the only solution was incorporating and ‘upgrading’ the collectivist ideal within Indonesian society into a higher, modern stage by establishing the Indonesian socialist economy based on the cooperatives as its main pillar. The principle of ‘guided’ or ‘planned’ economy would only work effectively if the state supervised the private sector while utilising foreign capital and managerial skills for improving productivity, rather than nationalising foreign capital and transferring it to state enterprises. The best way for socialism to be achieved was by the people’s active participation, from the ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’.⁸⁴

Some of Hatta’s views represented a more conservative view of democratic socialism, which had more in common with Sjafruddin’s ideas than Sumitro’s. Hatta displayed a stronger conviction about the nature of Indonesian collectivism than the more liberal views of Sjafruddin. In contrast to Hatta’s view, the PKI and its chairman Aidit insisted that nationalisation was the only way to achieve economic independence and a socialist society, because they identified foreign capital with imperialism and its local supporters within the comprador bourgeoisie.⁸⁵ The communists also opposed the option of transferring foreign companies to national private capitalists. The communists and nationalists shared convictions on the threat of neo-colonialism, as represented by foreign aid and investment, which corresponded with the then emerging under-development theory of the ‘dependency’ school.

⁸² Mohammad Hatta, *Persoalan Ekonomi Sosialis Indonesia* (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1963), pp. 15–17.

⁸³ Referred to van Vollenhoven’s and his Indonesian disciple, Soepomo’s view of *adatrecht*, Ibid, pp. 18–20.

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 41–42.

⁸⁵ Al-Rahab (2014), p. 122.

Economic Development and Its Critics

The dramatic events of September–October 1965, which led to the destruction of the Communist Party through the mass killings of more than half a million alleged communist supporters, as well as the downfall of Sukarno’s regime, marked the triumph of capital, the Indonesian bourgeoisie and the integration of the Indonesian economy into the capitalist world system. From the perspective of socialism, the rise of the New Order regime was a counter-revolution, a reversal to what had been achieved by socialism as an anti-colonial force driving Indonesian nationalism.

First measures of the new regime included restoring relations with the UN and Western countries, and making the FE-UI technocrats an economic advisory team for the New Order. After being marginalised and heavily criticised by Sukarno and the PKI between 1963 and 1965, these technocrats occupied a strategic position linking US officials and Indonesian army officers. With the Seskoad, they formulated an emergency plan for securing Indonesian economic growth and stability.⁸⁶ In January 1967, a next step for economic rehabilitation was carried out through the Foreign Capital Investment Bill (*Undang Undang Penanaman Modal Asing*), which stabilised the economy in accordance with the IMF’s advice, and rescheduled Indonesian’s national debt.⁸⁷

The PSI-related intellectuals involved in establishing the New Order state fell into two groups. The first included FE-UI technocrats led by Sumitro and his protégés, such as Widjojo Nitisastro. The second developed a more critical stance towards New Order statist-capitalist developmentalism, with its reliance on foreign investment. This second group was mostly a new generation of PSI-linked intellectuals and student activists. They included Rahman Tolleng, a leading figure of *Gemsos* (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis*, or the ‘Socialist Student Movement’) and Arief Budiman, the founder of the *Mahasiswa Indonesia* student press. Budiman was former leader of the

⁸⁶ Simpson (2008), p. 243.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 323.

‘Cultural Manifesto’ (*Manifes Kebudayaan*) group that opposed the PKI’s cultural programs.⁸⁸ After the PRRI revolt, Sumitro escaped to Europe, the USA and later to Singapore and Bangkok. There, he had been a contact for anti-communist military officers and student activists during Sukarno’s Confrontation action against Malaysia. Following the government ban on PSI and Masjumi, Sumitro supported the establishment in 1961 of the Indonesian Renewal Movement (*Gerakan Pembaharuan Indonesia*). This involved student activists loosely associated with Gemsos, such as Jopie Lasut, Zainal Zakse and Soe Hok Gie (Arief Budiman’s brother).⁸⁹ His complicity in the regionalist revolt in Sumatra, however, estranged Sumitro from his PSI colleagues, since they regarded him as an irresponsible politician whose ventures came at the expense of the Socialist Party and democratic system in Indonesia. Sumitro, along with other PRRI/Permesta exiles, also developed close associations with Indonesian anti-communist army officers, as well as Malaysian, British and American officials. Suharto himself attempted to contact Sumitro through his close associate, intelligence army officer Ali Moertopo, who had been commissioned to undertake diplomatic reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia. They met in early 1967; Sumitro agreed to return to Indonesia and join Suharto’s New Order government as the minister for trade.⁹⁰

Despite his influence as a respected intellectual who built an ‘underground’ international anti-communist network, many Indonesian politicians criticised Sumitro’s return to politics, including his former PSI friends. Following the formation of Suharto’s first *Pembangunan* (‘Development’) cabinet in 1968, Sumitro was appointed as the senior member of the Economic Experts Team (*Tim Ahli Ekonomi*), alongside Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, Ali Wardhana, Emil Salim, Subroto, Radius Prawiro and Frans Seda. The FE-UI/Berkeley Mafia technocrat group dominated the National

⁸⁸ ON student activism and the ‘Mahasiswa Indonesia’ newspaper in particular, see Francois Raillon, *Politik dan Ideologi Mahasiswa Indonesia: Pembentukan dan Konsolidasi Orde Baru 1966–1974* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985).

⁸⁹ Wijaya Herlambang, *Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965* (Jakarta: Marjin Kiri, 2013), p. 80.

⁹⁰ Katoppo, et.al (2000), pp. 252–254.

Development Planning Board, or *Bappenas* (*Badan Perencana Pembangunan Nasional*).

Recent studies have shown the differences among these technocratic economists. Widjojo, who inclined to Western welfare state principles, criticised the inefficiency of cooperatives and local collectivism in overcoming economic and social inequality. He claimed that the cooperatives ‘gave undue weight to the redistribution of income.’ In a 1959 study of economic aspects of Javanese village life, he had argued that the *gotong royong* (‘mutual assistance’) system essentially functioned as a regressive tax. All villagers, regardless to their wealth, contribute the same amount, so the rich gave a smaller percentage than the poor. Widjojo recommended that the government implement a progressive taxation system instead.⁹¹

In contrast, Sadli and Salim advocated for a mixed economic system, more appropriate for Asian societies and Eastern values. Sadli, in a review of Boeke’s dualism theory, argued that individual economic desires were not a prerequisite for modernisation. In the East Asian model, social coherence, which implied harmonisation of traditional and modern values, was more important. He referred to the Japanese, who ‘have a mixture of highly modern business life with a more backward rural life, a feudal pattern of social life, and this mixture seems even to facilitate rapid economic development’.⁹² Emil Salim was among the first to advocate for the principle of the ‘Pancasila Economy’ as a distinctive economic system for Indonesia. This system emphasised the principles of social justice, based on a more equitable distribution of income, and economic democracy.⁹³ Salim’s economic thought was also inspired by his study of the economic development model in Egypt under Nasser. He saw many parallels between Nasser’s

⁹¹ Widjojo, “Raising Per-Capita Income” (1955) and “The Government, Economy and Taxes of a Central Javanese village” (1959), quoted in Barry Thrasher, *The Origin and Contested Legacy of Indonesia’s Berkeley Mafia, 1955–1969* (BA Thesis, Department of History Brown University, 2018), pp. 26–27.

⁹² Mohammad Sadli, “Some Reflections of Professor Boeke’s Theory of Dualistic Economy”, *Economics and Finance in Indonesia* Vol 56 No 1 (2009) [republished from *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia*, Juni 1957], pp. 37–38.

⁹³ “To Create a Pancasila Economic System”, excerpt from Emil Salim, “Sistem Ekonomi Pancasila” [first published in *Kompas*, 30 June 1966], in Ian Chalmers and Vedi R. Hadiz (eds), *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives* (London/New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 40–41.

‘Arab socialism’ in Egypt and economic development in Indonesia, because they were Muslim-majority countries that rejected both capitalism and Marxist class struggle as unsuitable principles for Islamic society.⁹⁴

Increasingly, the Bappenas technocrats became rivals of another technocratic think-tank group, the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This group had been established as part of Special Operation (Opsus) intelligence by Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoemardani, two close associates President Suharto, who became his Special Assistants in the early New Order.⁹⁵ The Bappenas technocrats, who had been responsible for the Foreign Capital Investment Bill, were convinced that the state’s principal role was to provide the fiscal and monetary conditions for capital accumulation, and trusted the market to generate maximum growth and efficiency. They rejected both the paralysing effect of statism and social irresponsibility of ‘free-flight’ liberal capitalism; thus, they preferred what they called ‘economic democracy’ or Pancasila-based economy.⁹⁶ The CSIS group, in contrast, represented a national, state-capitalist orientation in economic policy-making as well as an organicist-corporatist political approach. Inspired by models of development, such as Meiji Japan and Singapore, an economist associated with the group, Jusuf Panglaykim, supported an ‘nationally integrated economic unit’ in which funds and production were coordinated to achieve national planning objectives.⁹⁷ Hoemardani and Moertopo’s organicist-corporatism led to the depoliticisation of Indonesian society through the ‘floating mass’ policy of the early New Order regime, which was applied to domesticate both Islamic and secular non-Islamic nationalist camps.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Thrasher (2018), pp. 29–30.

⁹⁵ The CSIS (Center of Strategic and International Studies) is a think-tank institution initially associated with US/CIA-sponsored anti-communist campaign in Indonesia led by Jesuit priest, Pater Josephus Beek. It was founded in September 1971 by Harry Tjan Silalahi, a Sino-Indonesian Catholic and a disciple of Beek, alongside Jusuf Wanandi (Liem Bian Kie), Sofjan Wanandi (Liem Bian Koen), Daoed Joesoef, and Hadi Soesastro, among others. Moertopo and Hoemardani protected CSIS, and helped its members gain access to and exercise influence on the New Order policymaking; Karsono (2013), pp. 408–411.

⁹⁶ Robison (2009) p. 133–136.

⁹⁷ Ibid, pp. 148–149; Panglaykim quoted in Chalmers & Hadiz (1997), pp. 71–90.

⁹⁸ Karsono (2013), pp. 359–360.

The prominence of Opsus-CSIS in the New Order after 1974 marked a transition to economic nationalism and state-capitalism based on the East Asian model. It encouraged national capital focused on state enterprises (BUMN), furthered through an alliance with the Pertamina director, General Ibnu Sutowo. The CSIS group were convinced that state intervention had been a necessary condition to establish a national industrial economy, and that the state was a ‘developer, stabiliser, and dynamiser’.⁹⁹ Pertamina was the only source of funds, resources and positions outside the control of the Bappenas technocrats. Pertamina’s reliance on Japan for economic aid and investment—rather than the US-dominated World Bank, IMF or IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia)—provided greater prospects for economic nationalists. Dissidents criticised the increasing economic power of Pertamina, however, because it represented crony-based bureaucratic capitalism, with strong connections to the inner circle of Suharto’s government and a tendency to consolidate wealth in the hands of bureaucratic entrepreneurs, who had accesses to political power. Another target of criticism was Madam Tien Suharto; specifically, her initiative to build a Disneyland-like *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* (‘Miniature Garden of Beautiful Indonesia’). The project, which was supposed to represent Indonesia’s cultural diversity, became a symbol of extravagance and carelessness because it was built in the midst of widespread poverty.¹⁰⁰

Critical views of the New Order’s statist/national capitalism and corrupt economic policies came from the ‘1966 generation’ of student activists. The critiques increasingly involved the older, 1950s liberal and social-democrat politicians and intellectuals, who were associated with the PSI and Masjumi. They included such diverse figures as Mohammad Hatta, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, General T.B. Simatupang, Mochtar Lubis, Sarbini Sumawinata and Soedjatmoko. At first, the critiques targeted the wider economic inequality, corruption, and concentration of power and wealth among military-bureaucratic entrepreneurs close to Suharto and his family. The critiques were driven by the moral resentment of the regime’s excesses or

⁹⁹ Robison (2009), p. 151; Pertamina (*Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara*), was a state-owned enterprise (BUMN) which merged two entities under Lieutenant General Ibnu Sutowo, in October 1968. It was the product of the nationalisation of Dutch enterprise in 1957–1958.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pp. 153–158.

abuses of power. However, they began to target broader New Order economic policy; particularly, the role of foreign investment and Chinese business elites. These criticisms were based on an amalgam of populist nationalism, cooperative-based socio-economic democracy, and the increasingly popular Latin American dependency theory.¹⁰¹

The bloody rise of Suharto's New Order and escalation of American military intervention in Vietnam in the second half of the 1960s encouraged critical, New Left-oriented Marxist views among scholars of Southeast Asia in the USA, Australia and UK. These views affected many Indonesian academic and intellectual-activists.¹⁰² In contrast to the modernisation theories of Rostow and Lewis, the reality of the world economy from the 1950s to 1970s demonstrated a widening gap between First and Third World countries. An important contribution of the dependency school to the study of underdevelopment lay in its class-based analysis of global inequality between advanced industrial countries as the 'metropole' and underdeveloped, former colonial states as the 'periphery', in a single capitalist world system.¹⁰³ In Indonesia, the increasing popularity of the New Left and dependency schools was represented by the writings of socialist-leaning secular and Muslim intellectuals, such as sociologist and literary critic Arief Budiman, economist M. Dawam Rahardjo, Sritua Arief, and Adi Sasono. However, the dependency theory remained a minor influence in the academic world of development economics compared the mainstream neoclassical theory.¹⁰⁴ The intellectual basis of these development critics was the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and Information, or LP3ES (*Lembaga Penerangan, Pendidikan dan Penelitian Ekonomi dan Sosial*), founded in Jakarta in August 1971. These intellectuals mostly came from middle-class families who were sympathetic to the

¹⁰¹ Carol Wise "Dependency Theory", in Willam A. Darity Jr (ed), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol 2* (New York/London: Macmillan Reference, 2008), pp. 298–299. This article criticises dependency theory by pointing out that it could not account for East Asian growth.

¹⁰² Mark T. Berger, "Old State and New Empire in Indonesia: debating the rise and decline of Suharto's New Order", *Third World Quarterly* Vol 18, No 2, 1997, p. 326.

¹⁰³ Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey* (London/New York: Routledge, 1990) p. 158.

¹⁰⁴ Thee Kian Wie, "Pendekatan Dependencia dalam Sejarah Perekonomian: Suatu Kritik", in Hendra Esmara (1987), pp. 298-299. See also See Arief Budiman, *Teori Pembangunan Dunia Ketiga* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2000), and Rahardjo, (2012), pp. 227–244.

pragmatic modernism of the PSI and Masjumi.¹⁰⁵ Typically, LP3ES intellectuals were from the post-independence nationalist generation, who advocated for the abandoning of anti-colonial and mass-mobilisation nationalism in favour of economic modernisation that was also human-centred, equitable, balanced and participatory. In their monthly journal, *Prisma*, the LP3ES provided a place for Indonesian intellectuals to critically engage in the development process.¹⁰⁶

The participation of Sumitro's technocratic group as Suharto's economic advisors and New Order officials has created a false, misleading image of the PSI, since the Sumitro group regarded themselves as 'PSI people.' The opponents of the PSI used this to discredit the PSI by accusing it of being the mastermind behind the rise of the New Order. The Sumitro group itself did not contribute to any socialist-related ideas to the policies of the new regime.¹⁰⁷ Even more than Sumitro's technocratic legacy in the Bappenas, the most important intellectual legacy of the PSI and democratic socialism can be found in their critique of the political economy of development. However, it was more related with a more comprehensive, holistic and multidimensional approach to the development process as a social transformation. In this case, Soedjatmoko and those who belong to his circle have a closer association to this critical tradition.

¹⁰⁵ Karsono (2013), pp. 502–504.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Imam Yudotomo, *PSI yang Saya Ketahui* (Yogyakarta: Kasan Ngali, 2021), pp. 156-157

CHAPTER 6

Towards a Humanitarian Development: The Ideas of Soedjatmoko

In the intellectual history of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), Soedjatmoko (1922–1989) occupies a distinct position. He became a key government technocratic and diplomatic adviser in both the Guided Democracy and New Order regimes. Soedjatmoko was one of the best-known figures in the Indonesian intelligentsia for his moderate, social-democratic and humanist leanings, besides he also had a brilliant international career. He has been the subject of intellectual histories and biographies. Typical of Soedjatmoko's ideas was his deep concern for the non-economic and human factors necessary for creating economic and social development projects, which he wanted to further by advancing the study of social sciences and humanities in Indonesia. In contrast to Sumitro and his ambitious technocratic project, which linked him to US-sponsored economic and technical assistance as well as anti-communist politics, Soedjatmoko represented a moderate, loyal opposition to the Sukarno regime. In this last respect, he was more similar to Hatta than Sjahrir.¹ Soedjatmoko occupied a unique position between the developmentalist-technocratic milieu associated with the Faculty of Economics, Universitas Indonesia (FE-UI), and the intellectual and cultural activism associated with the Gelanggang group, and the later PSI-leaning *Konfrontasi* journal.²

While belonging to the inner circle of Sjahrir's recruits—especially after Sjahrir married Soedjatmoko's elder sister—Soedjatmoko distanced himself from more direct political activism and only formally joined the PSI in 1955. This enabled Soedjatmoko

¹ See the obituary by George Mc. T. Kahin and Milton L. Barnett, "In Memoriam Soedjatmoko, 1922–1989", *Indonesia*, No 49 (April 1990), pp. 132–139, and M. Nursam, *Pergumulan Seorang Intelektual: Biografi Soedjatmoko* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2002).

² Keith Foulcher, "Bringing the World Back Home: Cultural Traffic in *Konfrontasi*, 1954–1960", in Jennifer Lindsay & Maya H.T. Liem (ed), *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesia 1950–1965* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), pp. 31–56.

to establish himself as an independent intellectual, diplomat and social thinker. Due to his activities in socialist publications, such as *Pedoman* and *Siasat*, many Western scholars regarded Soedjatmoko as the prototype of the Indonesian socialist thinker.³ In fact, he was more a humanitarian, Third World development thinker, who drew inspiration from democratic socialism and sought to find a harmonious blend between Eastern and Western ideas. Covering many fields and academic disciplines, his writings were profoundly animated by the idea of human liberation.

The Making of an Intellectual and Diplomat

The family of Soedjatmoko, the Mangundiningrat family, belonged to the Javanese professional middle class. His father, Mohammad Saleh Mangundiningrat, was a physician who graduated from the Indies Native Medical School (STOVIA). Soedjatmoko was born in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, on 10 January 1922, when his father was the Head of the Sawahlunto General Hospital. His elder sister, Poppy Saleh, married Sjahrir, while his younger sister Miriam, also active in the PSI and later a prominent academic, married Ali Budiardjo, who was secretary of the Department of Information, and then director of Freeport Indonesia.⁴ Their younger brother Nugroho Wisnumurti was also a diplomat. In 1924, when Soedjatmoko was two years old, his father received a scholarship from the colonial government to study in the Netherlands. Thus, Soedjatmoko experienced Western schooling from an early age. In 1929, Saleh Mangundiningrat obtained his doctoral degree in medical science from the University of Amsterdam. When he returned to Indonesia, Saleh was assigned to Manado General Hospital. He moved to Surabaya in 1934, where he worked in the *Centrale Burgelijke Zieken Inrichting* up until 1937. Eventually, Mangundiningrat settled in Surakarta, where he worked as the personal doctor of Susuhunan Paku Buwono X and Paku

³ John D. Legge, *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project-Monograph Series, 1988), p. 53.

⁴ Miriam Budiardjo (1923–2007), was an Indonesian political scientist and member of the National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) between 1993 and 1998. She was founder of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Indonesia and the first Indonesian female diplomat.

Buwono XI of Surakarta.⁵ He became the professor and rector of Cokroaminoto Islamic University (*Universitas Islam Cokroaminoto*), Surakarta, a position he held until his death.⁶

Like Sjahrir, Koko—Soedjatmoko’s nickname among family and friends—was brought up in a strong intellectual environment, inheriting traditional values but open to Western ideas. While attending high school (HBS) in Surabaya from 1936, he came into contact with nationalist groups such as Indonesia Muda. His father opposed his participation in the *pergerakan*, causing intense disagreement between them. In 1938, his father insisted that Soedjatmoko support young people’s participation in national liberation, but only after they learned how ‘to struggle without resentment.’⁷ This argument profoundly affected Koko’s cautious, discreet manner of political activism. His passion for human liberation led him to a broader intellectual journey into Western ideas. When he went to the Gymnasium in Jakarta, he encountered the thoughts of Spinoza, Descartes, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche; while from his father’s private library, Soedjatmoko learned the Eastern philosophies of Gandhi, Vivekananda and Krishnamurti.

In 1940, Soedjatmoko entered the Medical High School (*Geneeskundige Hoogeschool*), where he became involved in the youth movement and met some of those later associated with Sjahrir’s network. He joined the USI, a moderate and liberal-oriented student association. In the Medical High School, Soedjatmoko met Soedarpo Sastrosatomo and his elder brother, Soebadio Sastrosatomo, as well as the future foreign minister and one of the most powerful politicians of the Guided Democracy regime, Subandrio. Soebadio had also been active in the USI. At first, there was a gap between the more cosmopolitan HBS-Gymnasium graduates and the nationalist-oriented AMS (indigenous high school) graduates among these medical students, with Soedjatmoko belonging to the former group and Soebadio the latter. However, the two shared a concern about the expansion of fascism in Europe, and its perceived danger to

⁵ Aji Dedi Mulawarman, ‘Soft Religiosity Message for Indonesia from Soedjatmoko’, *International Journal of Religious and Cultural Studies*, Vol 1, No 1, April 2019, p. 2.

⁶ M. Nursam (2002), pp. 14–16.

⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 19.

democracy and the future nation-state of Indonesia, particularly after the Nazi occupation of Holland in May 1940. Koko's interest in fascism and democracy was shaped by his readings during his HBS and Gymnasium years. Some of the important literature he read included the works of Dutch historian Jan Romein on fascism, and Jose Ortega y Gasset's *The Revolt of the Masses*.⁸ According to Ortega y Gasset, one of the main features of modernity was mass politics. He analysed the totalitarian politics of Bolshevism, syndicalism and fascism, in terms of the psychology of the masses and its political expression in crowds.

During the Japanese military occupation, medical students participated in the anti-fascist movement led by Amir Sjarifuddin and the returned exiles, including Sjahrir. Afterwards, they associated with the Sjahrir group, which gathered periodically to discuss subjects such as global contemporary politics. In 1943, the Japanese occupation government re-opened the Medical High School under a new name, *Ika Daigaku*; it soon became the centre of dissident activity.⁹ Soedjatmoko and other medical students attracted the attention of some of the Indonesian nationalist movement's leaders in late 1943, when they protested the application of military discipline to medical students, such as shaving their heads and making them carry out ceremonies that included bowing in the direction of Japan. Sukarno and Hatta attempted to appease these students, but Soedjatmoko and Soedarpo insisted on carrying out a strike. The Japanese arrested Soedjatmoko and other students in January 1944, and made the medical school expel them. Those arrested included Soedjatmoko, Soedarpo, Subianto Djojohadikusumo, Daan Jahja and Subandrio. They were released after one month. Soedjatmoko, Soebadio and Soedarpo then went to meet Sukarno, urging him

⁸ Jan Marie Romein (1893–1962) was a Dutch Marxist journalist and academic historian from Leiden University. Inspired by Johan Huizinga and Arnold Joseph Toynbee, he wrote on Western civilization histories. He also a member of Communist Party of Holland (CPH). He was one of the contributors to Soedjatmoko's edited work, *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* (1965). Jose Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) was a Spanish philosopher who started in the pragmatist phenomenological school, and later moved to existentialism. He left Spain for Argentina due to the Spanish Civil War and only returned to Europe after WWII. His 1932 *The Revolt of the Masses* is a key work in modern political sociology, see Gregory Claeys, *Dystopia: A Natural History, A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffraction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 27–28.

⁹ Rosihan Anwar, *Soebadio Sastrosatomo: Pengemban Misi Politik* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1995), pp. 34–35.

to stop collaborating with the Japanese. They warned Sukarno that they would withdraw their support to him.¹⁰ They gained confidence from foreign radio broadcasts that the Japanese could not win the war. ‘We stand for democracy. We don’t mind collaborating with finance capital, but not fascists’, said Koko.¹¹ This argument profoundly impressed Sukarno. Of Sjahrir’s youth recruits, Sukarno favoured Soedjatmoko the most after this meeting, even when the relationship between Sukarno and Sjahrir deteriorated in the post-Revolutionary period.

Soedjatmoko viewed his dismissal from medical school and resulting retirement from political life as a critical period in his intellectual progress, a turning-point towards his self-determination. He read books from humanist and existentialist philosophers such as Henri Bergson, Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger, and met renowned Javanese philosopher and mystic, Ki Ageng Suryomentaram. There was a period of some months when he stopped reading completely. Soedjatmoko came to a new understanding that philosophical insight and scientific knowledge were extensions and manifestations of his own conscience, rather than phenomena that estranged him from his cultural roots. He began to see himself as ‘completely Indonesian and a world citizen at the same time.’¹²

At the end of the Japanese occupation, Soedjatmoko returned to public political life. He became a staff member in Amir’s Department of Information, where he was assigned to liaise with the foreign press. This position brought him into the heart of Indonesian journalism and diplomatic affairs during the Revolutionary era. He also served as an intermediary between Sjahrir’s and Amir’s anti-fascist group and Sukarno. When the socialist group established its parliamentary cabinet in November 1945, Soedjatmoko and Soedarmo were appointed to convince Sukarno to accept the transfer of authority from his presidential cabinet to the new cabinet of Sjahrir and Amir.¹³

¹⁰ John D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1972), p. 167.

¹¹ Rosihan Anwar (1995), pp. 39–41, also M. Nursam (2002), pp 33-37, and J.D. Legge (1988), p. 54.

¹² Aswab Mahasin, “Soedjatmoko dan Dimensi Manusia”, an introduction to a compilation of works by Soedjatmoko, *Dimensi Manusia dalam Pembangunan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983), pp. x–xi.

¹³ Nursam (2002), pp. 63–64.

As a journalist, Soedjatmoko, with Rosihan Anwar and Rinto Alwi, reported on the Malino conference, which was held in July 1946 as part of van Mook's attempt to establish federal states in the outer islands of Indonesia. Soedjatmoko and Anwar had the idea of establishing a revolutionary yet independent and critical journal, *Siasat* (*Strategy*), which later turned into the socialist camp's official magazine. The first edition of the magazine, published in January 1947, contained an article written by Soedjatmoko on Indonesia's struggle for independence in relation to global politics. Heavily influenced by Sjahrir's *Perdjoeangan Kita* as well as Hatta's political manifesto of 1 November 1945, Soedjatmoko asserted that the principal goal of Indonesian national liberation was being acknowledged by the international world, particularly the West. The fate of the Indonesian struggle for decolonisation, similarly to many other former colonised countries, was associated with the interests of the capitalist bloc rather than the Soviet Union, hence the need for diplomacy to win the support of the West against Dutch political interests.¹⁴ *Siasat* soon gained the reputation as an independent and critical journal; being based in Jakarta, it was detached from political rivalries in the Republican capital city of Yogyakarta. Its articles covered diverse issues, including local politics, the progress of Indonesian diplomatic negotiations, and international politics between the Western and communist blocs.¹⁵

After the Linggadjati Agreement, Sjahrir predicted that the Dutch would use their strengthened position in the outer islands—in which van Mook had established a federation of puppet states—to besiege the Republic of Indonesia. In anticipation of Dutch aggression, Sjahrir met Soedjatmoko in February 1947 and asked him to be one of the Indonesian delegates heading to New York to put the Indonesian case before the UN Security Council. This action would counterbalance the Dutch lobbying of the USA. As a correspondent of *Free Press of India*, an Allied accredited press that had headquarters in Singapore, Soedjatmoko could use a Dutch passport. In July 1947, while Soedjatmoko, Sumitro and Charles Tambu were travelling to New York, via the Philippines, they heard the news that Dutch had launched the first military action. They

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 65–67.

¹⁵ Legge (1988), pp. 129–130.

rushed to join the UN Security Council meeting in Lake Success, New York, in which the Dutch aggression was raised by the Australian representatives. The general assembly of the Security Council discussed a formal resolution of the Indonesian case on 14 August 1947. The Indonesian delegation was led by Sjahrir, who had just resigned as prime minister after criticism of his Linggadjadi concessions. Sjahrir urged the Security Council to assign a commission to establish an immediate ceasefire. In October, at the next Security Council meeting, India's representative demonstrated support for Indonesia; he argued that the Republic had complied with the UN ceasefire order, while the Dutch side clearly 'disregarded and circumvented' it.¹⁶ The Security Council established the GOC, consisting of three nations: Australia, Belgium and the USA.

The formation of the GOC in October 1947 led to the Renville Agreement on 17 January 1948. Sjahrir and H. Agus Salim left New York for Europe to consolidate support for Indonesian independence. Sjahrir asked Soedjatmoko and Sumitro to stay in the USA to influence American public opinion. Soedjatmoko and Soedarpo (who had joined him in mid-1948), addressed academics and intellectuals in American universities. L.N. Palar was appointed to lead the Indonesian delegation to the UN.¹⁷ As early as December 1947, however, Soedjatmoko warned his fellow Republicans of the bleak prospects for Indonesia's diplomacy in light of US influence over the UN. The US government under Truman was unlikely to proclaim its pro-Dutch stance explicitly, but there was still a 'possibility that Washington would take sides [with the Dutch] in degrading the Republic to a small territorial and political entity, and in setting up an overall administration based on local administrative units headed by puppets.'¹⁸ Both Soedjatmoko and Ali Sastroamidjojo—another Indonesian delegate—were aware of Dutch influence on American foreign policy. They were convinced that the increasing

¹⁶ Nursam (2002), pp. 70–71.

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 74–75, see Soedarpo Sastrosatomo, "Recollections of My Career", in Thee Kian Wie (ed), *Recollection: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s–1990s* (Singapore: Institute for South East Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 143–162.

¹⁸ Letter from Soedjatmoko to Soebadio (16 December 1947), quoted in Frances Gouda & Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East-Indies / Indonesia: US foreign policy and Indonesian Nationalism 1920–1949* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002) pp. 209–210.

paranoia among American politicians concerning international communism was obstructing their campaign for the legitimacy of Indonesia's independence, based on its right to self-determination. Soedjatmoko wrote to Soebadio about the danger of Indonesia's leftist faction being sucked into the vortex of Cold War struggle. An explicit movement towards socialism in Indonesia's internal politics would have disastrous consequences, since it would aggravate Washington's fears of communism in Southeast Asia and lead them even closer to the Dutch.¹⁹

Political developments in Indonesia followed Soedjatmoko's predictions. Just a month after the Renville Agreement, the Socialist Party experienced a schism between the socialists (including Tan Malaka's followers) and communists. The Madiun revolt profoundly altered the US stance towards Indonesian decolonisation. By this stage, the USA was confident that the communist threat would disappear from Western Europe, because economic support of the Marshall Plan, helped by US manipulation of elections, was reducing the popular appeal of communist parties and their affiliated labour unions.²⁰ The invasion of Yogyakarta at the end of 1948 was a major blunder by the Dutch, since it led to an international backlash from Asian and socialist countries, as well as a warning from the USA that it would suspend Marshall Plan aid. The Dutch were forced to withdraw and negotiate.

As Dutch–Indonesian negotiations in The Hague were leading to the formal acknowledgment of Indonesian sovereignty, Soedjatmoko was accepted into Harvard University. His new positions as deputy permanent Indonesian representative to the UN Security Council, and on the staff at the Indonesian Embassy in Washington DC, led him to suspend his studies.²¹ In 1951, Soedjatmoko sent a letter to Hatta, then the Indonesian foreign minister, expressing a wish to retire from Indonesian diplomatic service and return to Indonesia. His resignation was approved by the Foreign Ministry

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 210–211. US dependence on Dutch economic reconstruction so that the Netherlands could repay Marshall Plan loans and a major Dutch propaganda campaign to portray the Republicans as communists were also important factors. See also Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 115.

²⁰ Gouda and Zaalberg, pp. 250–251.

²¹ Nursam (2002), pp. 76–77.

in February 1952, but was only acted on one year later. In the meantime, on 26 May 1951, Soedjatmoko's elder sister Siti 'Poppy' Wahjunah—who was studying at the LSE—married Sjahrir in Cairo. Soedjatmoko came from New York to represent his father.²² Soon afterwards, the three of them travelled through Western Europe for a number of months. Subsequently, Soedjatmoko travelled alone to Eastern Europe.

Soedjatmoko visited the Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Yugoslavia and Russia to establish contact with their socialist and communist movements; discuss with their leaders; and learn whether European socialists had actually contributed to social improvement by observing the actual conditions in both Western and Eastern European societies. While his encounters and discussions were not well documented, Soedjatmoko expressed dissatisfaction with the results. He saw Western European social democracy as having been co-opted by a European bourgeois parochial vision, which was no longer 'socialist' by his criteria.²³ Soedjatmoko had been fascinated with communism as an agent of social change, and his journey to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was to observe it directly. Together with Adam Malik, Soedjatmoko was a member of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs delegation to the first International Economic Conference, held in Moscow in April 1952. The conference was the Soviet Union's attempt to take the initiative in post-war economic reconstruction from the USA, but it had no significant impact for Third World countries.²⁴

The only socialist in whom Soedjatmoko found a parallel vision was Yugoslavia's vice-president, Milovan Djilas. Djilas expressed his concern to Soedjatmoko and the other Indonesian delegates about the fate of humanity 'being monopolised by both world superpowers.' However, he added that they should learn and overcome this bipolarity. Once an orthodox Marxist, Djilas had become the most

²² Interview with Poppy Sjahrir, in Rudolf Mrázek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) pp. 417–418.

²³ Interview with Soedjatmoko in Legge (1988), p. 130.

²⁴ The International Economic Conference in Moscow (2–12 April 1952) aimed to open opportunities for East-West international trade. It was Nikita Khrushchev's vehicle to peaceful coexistence. For a Third World perspective on the conference, see D.P. Mukerji, "International Economic Conference", *The Economic Weekly*, 12 July 1952.

liberal member of the Yugoslav Politburo, proclaiming that ‘without democracy there is no, and there can be no, socialism.’²⁵ His major work was *The New Class*, a sociological analysis critical of Soviet bureaucratic elites being a new ruling class under Stalinist ‘state-capitalism.’²⁶ Djilas initially supported Tito’s repudiation of Stalinism, but later fell out with Tito because Djilas rejected the one-party state. Djilas’s campaign for the further democratisation of Yugoslavia attracted wide support, leading Tito to dismiss Djilas from the vice-presidency and the Yugoslavian Communist Party in January 1954.²⁷ While Tito’s national communism had been a key foundation of the nonaligned movement in the 1960s, it was Djilas’ democratic socialist revisionism that inspired the PSI group in the 1950s and one of his writings on communism in Eastern Europe was translated and published in the PSI’s bulletin.²⁸ His views on European socialism and communism were pivotal in Soedjatmoko’s orientation as an independent intellectual, who maintained a critical stance on both the revolutionary communism of the USSR and the reformist social democracy of Western Europe.

Soedjatmoko and Cultural Activism

Typical of Soedjatmoko’s intellectual approach was his humanitarian concern with resolving the East and West dichotomy, because it was reflected in the nationalist versus cosmopolitan positions on Indonesian cultural identity. His ‘socialist humanism’ paralleled that of German-American psychoanalyst Erich Fromm, as well as others affiliated with the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research.²⁹ This humanitarianism

²⁵ Nursam (2002), p. 84.

²⁶ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1957), see also Lawrence Peter King & Ivan Szelenyi, *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power* (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), pp. 57–61.

²⁷ Joze Pirjevec, *Tito and His Comrades* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2018), pp. 234–244, Ivo Banac, “Yugoslav Communism and Yugoslav State”, in Norman Naimark, et.al (eds), *The Cambridge History of Communism Vol 2: The Socialist Camp and World Power 1941–1960s* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

²⁸ Milovan Djilas, “Topan di Eropa Timur”, *Sikap* No. 46, Year IX, 3 December 1956

²⁹ See Erich Fromm, ‘Introduction to Socialist Humanism an International Symposium’, in Erich Fromm (ed), *Socialist Humanism an International Symposium* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), in <https://www.marxist.org/archives/fromm/works/1965/introduction.htm>

rejected the totalitarian elements in political ideologies, particularly the idea of forcing ideology as an absolute truth on the public. In his 1959 review of Boris Pasternak's classic novel, *Dr. Zhivago*, written in response to the rising authoritarianism of the Guided Democracy regime, Soedjatmoko wrote:

The life of human beings cannot be fulfilled only by politics and political philosophy, no matter what kind of politics or philosophy it is. Life is always beyond the understanding of human reason. The basis of any political philosophy is a particular understanding of life and not life itself. The life essence cannot be represented by words or concepts. It can only be experienced in 'rasa' [feeling].³⁰ Any intellectual concept and conceptual construction of philosophy is a reduction of life itself. By no means should we avoid politics, instead it leads us so that in our efforts to develop society in a certain direction, we should not forsake the human itself, the concrete humanity whose joy and well-being is our only reason to engage in politics, and our ultimate criterion.³¹

Soedjatmoko's journalistic and diplomatic careers profoundly influenced his humanitarianism. In this respect, he was similar to his fellow PSI journalists such as Mochtar Lubis and Rosihan Anwar, as well as to the *Kritiek en Opbouw* group when it was revived during the Revolutionary era in the *Gelanggang Seniman Merdeka* ('Free Artists Forum'). This *Gelanggang* group, a key part of the '1945 generation' of Indonesian literary and cultural activists, was linked to the Socialist Party's *Siasat*, which had been created by Rosihan and Soedjatmoko. *Gelanggang* was established in November 1946, by the revolutionary poet Chairil Anwar, along with Asrul Sani and Rivai Apin. They distanced themselves from what they saw as a superficial cultural expression of the pre-war by Pudjangga Baru. The editorial board of *Gelanggang* came from *Siasat*. *Gelanggang* declared its position on 18 February 1950 in the *Surat*

³⁰ In Javanist term, 'rasa' denotes a sort of sensibility derived from spiritual and rational contemplation of life. For the discussion of 'rasa' in terms of Javanese spirituality see Paul Stange, *Politik Perhatian: Rasa Dalam Kebudayaan Jawa* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1998).

³¹ Soedjatmoko, "Dr. Zhivago", *Siasat*, February 1959, in his, *Etika Pembebasan: Pilihan Karangan tentang Agama, Kebudayaan, Sejarah dan Ilmu Pengetahuan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1984), pp. 35–42.

kepercayaan Gelanggang ('Gelanggang Testimony'). This asserted that they were 'the legitimate heirs of world culture, and we are furthering this culture in our own way.'³² Indonesian culture, according to them, was 'determined by the amalgamation of diverse stimulating sounds re-expressed with its own unique voice.' While the result might not be original, their innermost endeavour, according to H.B. Jassin, an eminent Indonesian literary critic, was the 'pursuit of (the values of) universal humanity'.³³ Jassin claimed that the Dutch wanted to 'utilise humanitarian values to weaken anticolonial sentiments and to support their aims of restoring colonial rule over Indonesia' after the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty; initially, he viewed Gelanggang as 'an indirect Dutch political instrument.' By December 1951, however, Jassin had begun to use the term 'universal humanism', citing the Gelanggang declaration.³⁴ Jassin's coining of this term inspired its later use by the *Manifes Kebudayaan* ('Cultural Manifesto') group of humanist intellectuals, who aspired for liberation, or the separation of art from politics. Their view was that art should be devoted to humanity, instead of being restricted by narrow ideological aims.

The main PSI-lined vehicle for writers and artists was the bimonthly journal *Konfrontasi*; its editorial board contained a mixture of members of *Pudjangga Baru* (Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana), *Kritiek en Opbouw* (Beb Vuyk), and the PSI (Hazil Tanzil).³⁵ Its first edition, in July–August 1954, had an introduction by Soedjatmoko, entitled, '*Mengapa "Konfrontasi"?*' ('Why "Confrontation"?'). Soedjatmoko argued it was important to 'confront' Indonesia's current condition. National liberation had been challenged by a new crisis because of the national leadership's failure or incompetence in responding the question of 'modernity' in postcolonial societal development. Soedjatmoko identified the problem as deriving from 'the limitations of the Indonesian nationalist vantage point' in comprehending the actual problems faced by post-

³² Jennifer Lindsay, "Heirs to World Culture 1950-1965: An Introduction", in Jennifer Lindsay & Maya H.T. Liem (2012), p. 10.

³³ David T. Hill, *Jurnalisme dan Politik di Indonesia: Biografi Kritis Mochtar Lubis (1922–2004) sebagai pemimpin redaksi dan pengarang* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2011), p. 89.

³⁴ Ibid. o

³⁵ Lindsay, loc. cit.

independence Indonesia. He urged for a ‘dynamic’ and ‘creative’ adaptation to the modern world in its technical, industrial and commercial manifestations, to maintain the independence that it had just achieved. Indonesian intellectual elites, for Soedjatmoko, had to determine new national goals and pursue them in fresh ways.³⁶ Like Sumitro, Soedjatmoko advocated for the importance of scientific and technical expertise, while he also emphasised exploring and reinventing cultural resources from Indonesian past as the basis for ‘creative adaptation’ that was genuinely ‘Indonesian’ in nature.

Soedjatmoko’s argument provoked a critical reply from leftist writer and activist, Bujung Saleh, which was also published in *Siasat*. Saleh questioned Soedjatmoko’s ‘creative adaptation to the modern world’, because he was sceptical of the identification between the ‘modern’ and capitalist worlds. The Indonesian Revolution, according to Bujung, started going in the wrong direction with the November 1945 political manifesto, which allowed Western ‘finance capital’ to exploit Indonesian resources. Any current crisis was caused principally by ‘a wide gap between the people’s objective needs and the present social reality’; the best solution was the completion of the Revolution to give the people real political, economic and socio-cultural freedom. This debate was taken up by others in *Siasat*.³⁷

The activism of the universal humanist camp coincided with the US intellectual campaign against the expansion of communism, the principal aim of which was to disseminate ‘apolitical culture’ among intellectuals. One of the most important intellectual associations in this campaign was the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), which was initiated at a conference in Berlin in June 1950 and supported by the CIA. Those present in Berlin were philosophers, historians, writers, editors, politicians and union leaders, including former communists and members of the anti-fascist

³⁶ In Soedjatmoko (1984), pp. 9–11; for an excerpt, see Soedjatmoko, “The Need for Creative Adaptation” (1954), in Herbert Feith & Lance Castle (eds), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945–1965* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 238–240.

³⁷ M. Nursam (ed.) *Krisis Daya Cipta Indonesia: Polemik Soedjatmoko vs Boejoeng Saleh* (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004); Suparna, “Buyung Saleh: trade unionist and writer”, *Inside Indonesia* No. 22 (March 1990), pp. 11–12. Bujung Saleh, or Saleh Iskandar Poeradisastra (1923–1989) was associated with the communist-affiliated LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat) during the 1950s and 1960s.

resistance.³⁸ They included figures such as Sidney Hook,³⁹ Jean-Paul Sartre and Daniel Bell. At first, the Congress was intended to support an independent position for non-communist American leftist intellectuals, but it was later co-opted by the CIA. According to Shepard Stone from the Ford Foundation, the CCF ‘assumed a mission to oppose the communists’ campaign among European and Asian intellectuals.’ There was a convergence between Ford and the CCF, because both were concerned with the expansion of communism in Asia, and Indonesia was seen as a contested area in the confrontation between totalitarian and open societies.⁴⁰

The CCF played a key role in Indonesian cultural activism in the 1950s by giving Indonesian intellectuals access to US ideas about intellectual and artistic freedom. It published and distributed books and periodicals, as well as organising seminars and conferences. Publications, including Indonesian translations of major works of Western non-communist writers and thinkers, included *Animal Farm* by George Orwell, *The New Class* by Djilas, and *The God that Failed*, an anti-communist compilation of essays.⁴¹ While established as an independent journal, *Konfrontasi* responded positively to the CCF, in line with their Western-oriented cosmopolitanism.

One of the PSI-linked cultural activists to join the CCF formally was Mochtar Lubis, the editor-in-chief of the *Indonesia Raya* newspaper. He joined in 1954, the year before the CCF’s first Asian conference. The CCF’s second Asian conference, on 17–20 February 1955, was held in Rangoon (Yangon). Lubis and Takdir Alisjahbana attended, and Sumitro was awarded the honorary role of chairing the CCF Asian

³⁸ Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress of Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and post-war American hegemony* (London/New York: Routledge, 2002) pp. 3-4.

³⁹ Sidney Hook (1902–1989) was an American philosopher who combined the influence of Marxism and American pragmatism. In May 1939, he formed the Committee for Cultural Freedom to oppose doctrinaire control of intellectual expression either from the Right or the Left. By the mid-1940s Hook’s Committee began to receive governmental patronage, and was the basis of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. *Ibid.*, pp. 94–95;

⁴⁰ Hill (2011), pp. 95.

⁴¹ Bradley R. Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Amerika Serikat, CIA, dan Munculnya Pembangunan Otoriter Rezim Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2008), p. 41.

conference, even though he was absent and only sent a message to the forum.⁴² The conference covered topics such as economic backwardness and relations between nationalism and communism in Asia. In his commentary on the conference Proceedings, Herb Feith noted that the proceedings were ‘not characterized by any facile anti-communism; but, the political objectives of the CCF being what they are, it should not be read as *representative* Asian thinking’.⁴³ The conference impressed Indonesian delegates, however, and encouraged them to elect a CCF ‘provisional committee’ in Jakarta in the following year. The secretary of the CCF Asian Section from India, Prabhakar Padhye, was invited to participate in a small meeting in Jakarta in April 1956 with the theme *Arti Kebebasan dalam Hidup Budaya Masa Kini* (The Meaning of Freedom in Contemporary Cultural Life). Aside from Lubis, other participants in the CCF ‘branch’—including Soedjatmoko, Wiratmo Soekito, and the journalists Rosihan Anwar and P.K. Ojong—associated with *Konfrontasi* and the PSI.⁴⁴ Although no formal CCF organisation could be established in Indonesia under the increasing oppression of the Sukarno regime, these participants continued to put forward CCF ideas. Mochtar Lubis, the most active in CCF forums, was arrested in December 1956, because his newspaper sympathised with the PRRI revolt in Sumatra by supporting Zulkifli Lubis. Mochtar believed that his arrest was a consequence of the rising PKI influence over Sukarno.⁴⁵

The Rangoon conference of the CCF was held two months before the Asian–African Conference in Bandung (April 1955). The *Konfrontasi* editors invited Richard Wright, an African-American writer who had just participated in the Bandung Conference, to a discussion forum and published his article in *Konfrontasi*. Lubis published a summary of the talk in *Indonesia Raya*. Although Wright was a former

⁴² Wijaya Herlambang, *Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965: Bagaimana Orde Baru Melegitimasi Anti-Komunisme Melalui Sastra dan Film* (Jakarta: Marjin Kiri, 2011), pp. 70–71.

⁴³ Herbert Feith, review of “Cultural Freedom in Asia: The Proceedings of a Conference held at Rangoon, Burma, February 17-20, 1955 and Convened by the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Society for the Extension of Democratic Ideals”, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 30, No 3, September 1957, p. 270, see Hill (2011), p. 96.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 97.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 64–66.

communist, whose ideological allegiance was far from unambiguously pro-American, he had contributed to the CCF's *The God that Failed* and his visit to Indonesia was funded by the CCF as part of its cultural diplomatic campaign in Asia. Like Algerian anticolonial activist and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, Wright was heavily influenced by Marxism and Sartrean existentialism. His presence in Bandung was an expression of solidarity with the struggles of 'coloured people' against capitalist/western/white exploitation.⁴⁶ For the *Konfrontasi* group, Wright's position was problematic: 'Wright's insistence on race relations as the fundamental and unbridgeable dividing line between "coloured peoples" and the West was something that sat uncomfortably with the confident internationalism of the *Konfrontasi* outlook.'⁴⁷ Wright pursued concerns of US racial politics, but 'he apparently failed to explain what the American kind of internationalizing humanism meant to [him], or why it was applicable to the Indonesian postcolonial situation in the late 1950s.'⁴⁸

Soedjatmoko, as editor of *Pedoman* and *Siasat*, launched a writing contest on 25 March 1957 to glean Indonesian public opinion on global issues. This was organised in collaboration with Cornell University scholar Claire Holt (who later translated Lubis's novel, *Senja di Jakarta*, for the CCF), and Guy Pauker from the RAND Corporation, a CIA-linked think-tank. There were 355 responses from all over Indonesia and key results were published on 1 January 1958 in *Siasat*. About 10 per cent of the responses had negative things to say about Western influences on Indonesia, while others said positive things about the USA, USSR, China, Eastern Europe, Egypt

⁴⁶ Brian Russell Roberts & Keith Foulcher (eds), *Indonesian Notebook: A Sourcebook on Richard Wright and the Bandung Conference* (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2016), pp. 1–27; Richard Nathaniel Wright (1908–1960) was best known as the writer of *Uncle Tom's Children* (1938), *Native Son* (1940) and the autobiographical work *Black Boy* (1945). For the connection between American Black activism and broader anti-colonial movement and decolonisation, see John Munro, *The Anticolonial Front: The African-American Freedom Struggle and Global Decolonization 1945–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁴⁷ Keith Foulcher, "Bringing the World Back Home: Cultural Traffic in Konfrontasi, 1954–1960", in Lindsay & Liem (2012) p. 34.

⁴⁸ Tony Day, "Honoured Guests: Indonesian-American Cultural Traffic, 1953–1957," in Lindsay & Liem (2012) p. 127.

and Syria. Most seemed to endorse Indonesia's official 'independent foreign policy' and active participation in world affairs:

What seems to be the main characteristic is neither sharp antagonism to foreign nations nor a widespread desire to create permanent ties with other nations, but the desire to see Indonesia play the role of example, teacher, or conciliator to the world—the longing for national glory.⁴⁹

Alongside his primary concern to find a midway between cosmopolitan idealism and rising Third-Worldist anti-Westernism, Soedjatmoko established himself as the most prominent Indonesian thinker on the sociocultural aspects of Indonesian development. In the second edition of *Konfrontasi* (August–September 1954), Soedjatmoko wrote an article, entitled 'Economic Development as a Cultural Problem'. At first, he insisted on the importance of economic growth and welfare as essential elements of independence and self-determination. Realising a lack of awareness on economic issues, Soedjatmoko argued that development was principally concerned with social transformation and largely determined by non-economic factors. For instance, the cooperative movement, as an agency of economic development, was linked to the 'spirit of collectivism' common to feudal and agrarian-subsistence societies.⁵⁰ While overemphasis on collectivism was a problem, a worse obstacle for development was anti-industrialism, which accompanied the anti-capitalism of the anticolonial struggle. In India, anti-industrialisation was represented by Gandhi with his rejection of Western industry. This, according to Gandhi, created a situation of 'infinite need of consumption', which made people 'dependent [on] and enslaved by machines.' Gandhi's doctrine of conservative self-help had been abandoned in postcolonial India, however, as the country followed the modernist and social-democratic ideas of Nehru.⁵¹ Because the Javanese bureaucratic elites who were dominant in Indonesia were profoundly influenced by mystical Hinduism, the repudiation of industrialisation and

⁴⁹ Guy Pauker, "Indonesian images of their national self", *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol 22, No 3, 1958, in *ibid*, pp. 129–130.

⁵⁰ "Pembangunan Ekonomi Sebagai Masalah Kebudayaan", in Soedjatmoko (1983), pp. 1–5.

⁵¹ Soedjatmoko, "On Equivocating about Economic Advancement" (1954), in Herbert Feith & Lance Castles (1970), pp. 390-391.

modernisation was a serious problem. Most politicians paid little attention to development projects, except those directly related to particular interests of one political party or another. Besides expressing distrust of most politicians for their lack of commitment to economic enhancement, Soedjatmoko advocated for re-evaluating the ethical and mental-psychological foundations of society.⁵²

Intellectuals and Politics

Three years after returning to Indonesia and leading *Siasat* and *Konfrontasi*, Soedjatmoko formally joined the PSI. He participated in the first general election in 1955 and, the next year, was appointed as a member of the Constituent Assembly (*Konstituante*).⁵³ While Soedjatmoko was personally closer to Sjahrir than Sumitro, he neither possessed the qualifications of a ‘pragmatic’ nor ‘ideological’ politician. His traumatic experience during the Japanese occupation shaped his scepticism towards ideologies, particularly the manifestation of totalitarianism in mass politics. If Sumitro was more concerned with applying Western knowledge and techniques in the Indonesian context, Soedjatmoko mostly struggled with the socio-cultural transformation from colony to independent nation-state, and how to situate Indonesia within the global political order. Both shared similar scientific views on nation-building. While Soedjatmoko represented a more consistently puritanical intellectualism, however, Sumitro acted more as a politician because he engaged in US-sponsored economic, technical-managerial assistance, and the anti-communist cause in general. Soedjatmoko’s intellectualism not only kept him away from practical politics but also made him relatively moderate among other PSI figures, even when the party took an oppositional role between 1956 and its dissolution in 1960.

Soedjatmoko’s views on postcolonial Indonesian politics focused on modernisation, democratic transformation and the role of political parties. One of his representative works on this issue was his article, entitled ‘The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia’, presented as a part of an international conference on nationalism in Asia

⁵² Soedjatmoko (1983), pp. 11–15.

⁵³ Nursam (2002), p. 106.

held in 1955 in Washington DC and Rangoon in August and October, respectively. This conference, sponsored by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, had two Indonesian participants, Soedjatmoko and Sujono Surjotjondro.⁵⁴ In his paper, Soedjatmoko traced the origin of parliamentary government to the colonial *Volksraad* ('People's Council') and political associations established by Indonesian nationalists.⁵⁵ He reflected on the electoral campaigns prior to the 1955 election, and how they showed that the rural masses were not politically conscious, but were influenced by leaders. Soedjatmoko argued that 'the numerical strength of political parties as shown by the election result not only reflects the acceptance of either ideology or leadership, but also is a reflection of such groups' ability to manipulate the traditional power relationship within the village.'⁵⁶

Indonesian agrarian society, according to Soedjatmoko, was undergoing a transition because of the money economy, modern life and communication, as well as the general dynamisation of villagers caused by the revolutionary struggle for independence. The resulting disintegration of the 'feudal' or traditional hierarchy meant that the new dynamic political force of workers and peasants was in conflict with the old elites. While the nationalist and religious parties relied on traditional authority and power relations, the PKI had more opportunity 'to monopolise a considerable segment of these new dynamic forces with the gradual breakdown of the old social structure, hence enable it to secure a stronger position in the future'. In this respect, Soedjatmoko admitted the failure of the PSI, 'which should have been in the best position to compete with the Communist Party in this field.' Ideological differences had been a less significant factor, considering that most political parties shared similar 'socialist'

⁵⁴ Sujono Surjotjondro's paper, "Policy Choices of South and Southeast Asia" explained how Western secularism and modern thought played a major role in the formation of new intellectual elites and in nation-building processes, Philip W. Thayer and William T. Phillips (eds), *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia* (Baltimore/Cambridge: The John Hopkins Press/Oxford University Press, 1956).

⁵⁵ This included some non-cooperative Indonesian nationalist federation i.e. the Radical Concentration (1918–1922), the Federation of Indonesian Nationalist Organisations or Pemufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Kebangsaan Indonesia or the PPPKI (1927–1929) as well as the cooperative one like the Indonesian Political Union or Gabungan Politik Indonesia/GAPI (1939–1941) and the Indonesian People's Assembly or Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (1941–1942).

⁵⁶ Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia", *ibid*, pp. 129–131.

programs and had been the ‘vehicles of nationalist upsurge’ due to their common emphasis on anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism.⁵⁷ Soedjatmoko noted several reasons why the party system in Indonesia had limited effective power; namely, the relatively decentralised nature of Indonesian politics and power distribution; the low level of organisational efficiency; regional differences; and basic cultural patterns, by which decision-making was based on collective deliberation (*musyawarah*) to reach a consensus (*mufakat*). All these contributed to the slowness of political decision-making. In such a situation, extra-parliamentary political development, particularly military power, would play an important role in the near future.⁵⁸ Soedjatmoko was clearly ambivalent about participating in the PSI.

Soedjatmoko’s actual career as a PSI representative in the Constituent Assembly (*Konstituante*) lasted for three years between 1956 and 1959, when it was disbanded by presidential decree of Sukarno. The legislative body had been established to formulate the new constitution, replacing the Provisional Constitution of 1950, and reformulate the state’s ideological foundation, the Pancasila. Most Islamic parties supported the restoration of the Islamic-leaning Jakarta Charter, while the nationalist and left-wing parties—principally PNI, PKI and the Murba Party—opposed it.⁵⁹ Soedjatmoko spoke at the assembly meeting on 30 November 1957, arguing that the state’s foundation should derive from ‘the different worldviews existing in society’; that is, theocratic and humanistic civil religious values, but that ‘in principle it was impossible to debate’ the differences between these two positions. Nevertheless, in a democratic state, the constitution should embody diversity of opinion among the people; it was a political

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 132–134.

⁵⁸ Ibid, pp. 135–140.

⁵⁹ The Jakarta Charter was a draft document of the 1945 Constitutional Preamble which included the obligation to implement the Islamic rule (*sharia*) as the first principle of Pancasila. For the establishment and the progress of the constitutional formulation, see Adnan Buyung Nasution, *Aspirasi Pemerintahan Konstitusional di Indonesia: Studi Sosio-Legal atas Konstituante 1956--1959* (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 2001).

compromise bridging diverse perceptions and opinions within society, ‘always open to be revised in accordance with the progress and needs of the Revolution.’⁶⁰

Soedjatmoko’s presence in the Constituent Assembly coincided with rising antagonism between the PSI and Sukarno, who was becoming increasingly close to both the top army officers and the PKI. The PSI feared this would lead to a reversal of democratic progress in post-independence Indonesia. In this situation, the enduring close relationship between Soedjatmoko and Sukarno is interesting. In his memoir, George Kahin depicted a sort of ‘love–hate relationship’ between them, which had been enhanced by Soedjatmoko’s political affiliation to the PSI. Sukarno had been fascinated with Soedjatmoko’s intelligence from the beginning. He had advised Soedjatmoko not to choose the PSI if he wanted to engage in politics seriously, and disliked his relationship with Sjahrir. Kahin saw Sukarno as showing an ‘avuncular tolerance’ towards Soedjatmoko.⁶¹

While being critical of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, Sjahrir and Soedjatmoko were aware that Sukarno was a major obstacle to both the army officers and PKI taking power.⁶² During the 1950s and early 1960s, many in the PSI saw the army as the greater of these two threats in the development of a plural, democratic political process. They understood Sukarno’s need to balance the army against the PKI to keep himself at the top of the pyramid of power, and they preferred Sukarno to stay in control than either of the others.⁶³ Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and the Presidential Decree of July 1959 eradicated any possibility for the PKI to be ‘the first communist party in the world to dominate politics in one country through electoral, democratic means.’⁶⁴ It was the PSI and Masjumi, however, that were banned by government decree, issued on the

⁶⁰ The speech was published in the PSI newspaper ‘*Suara Sosialis*’ in the editions of November 1957 and Desember/Januari 1958, Nursam (2002), pp. 107–109.

⁶¹ George Mc T. Kahin, *Southeast Asia: A Testament* (London/New York, 2003), p. 153.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Sjahrir’s article “Peninjauan dan Penilaian Kembali Keadaan Dewasa ini di Negeri Kita” (see the previous chapter on Sjahrir).

⁶⁴ Olle Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia* (London: Zed Books, 1984) pp. 116–118, quoting Guy Pauker.

Independence Day of 1960. Both Soedjatmoko and Sjahrir were worried that, as the power of the army grew, the communists' influence on Sukarno and his policies would increase.

This fear was proven correct, as the Sukarno regime started to prosecute PSI and Masjumi politicians. When Sjahrir and others were arrested in 1962, Soedjatmoko was away from Indonesia, as a visiting lecturer at Cornell. He was not connected to the alleged conspiracy, and his long-time friendships with Sukarno and Subandrio obviously played an important role in protecting him from arrest when he returned.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the PSI's oppositional role created profound suspicion by the Sukarno regime towards 'intellectuals' in general. When Sukarno met US President, John F. Kennedy, in April 1961, he was asked whether he had support from intellectuals in his country. Subandrio remarked that most intellectuals in Indonesia were 'reactionary.' Later, Subandrio asked Soedjatmoko why many of the latter's intellectual comrades almost constantly opposed the government. Soedjatmoko replied that, if Sukarno were to embrace the intellectuals based on 'mutual respect and understanding', then most Indonesian intellectuals would surely be willing to help.⁶⁶

The prosecution of the PSI put an end to their direct political activities, shifting them towards intellectual endeavours as the only reliable means of maintaining their influence on the government and its policies. When Soedjatmoko visited Sjahrir in Madiun prison camp, Sjahrir expressed his concerns that the 'power triangle' of the Guided Democracy regime seemed to be heading towards a new political and economic crisis. Hence, he advised Soedjatmoko that he and other PSI intellectuals should 'help Sukarno if there is an open opportunity, since it was the only way to overcome the deteriorating situation'.⁶⁷ The moment came when Subandrio—who was in competition with Djuanda over economic policy—asked Soedjatmoko and his PSI colleagues, Sarbini Sumawinata and Mohammad Sadli, to contribute to formulating the Economic Declaration (Dekon) of March 1963.

⁶⁵ Nursam (2002), p. 120.

⁶⁶ Rosihan Anwar, "Kaum Intelektual di Belakang Anda" (8 July 1961), in Anwar (1981), pp. 74–75.

⁶⁷ Anwar, "Pesan Sjahrir dari Penjara Madiun" (13 November 1962), *ibid.*, pp. 273–276.

Social Sciences and the Developmental State

From the later 1950s, Soedjatmoko established close links with US scholarship on Indonesia, particularly to the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project under George Kahin.⁶⁸ This made him one of the most original and influential Indonesian thinkers in the social sciences and humanities. Soedjatmoko's scepticism of the role of political ideologies in the social transformation of post-independence Indonesia was connected to his nine-month odyssey and search for political inspiration through Western and Eastern Europe. Both experiences made him disillusioned with the disparities between ideologies and their actual performance. The European trip also enhanced his concern with Indonesian historical studies, a subject that he saw most Indonesians had neglected. Soedjatmoko thought this deficiency among Indonesian intellectuals could lead to Indonesian history being used for the political ends of those who could subordinate and distort it to suit national myths and propaganda.⁶⁹

Soedjatmoko's first effort to create a new orientation for Indonesian historical research came in his address to the national seminar on history at Gadjah Mada University Yogyakarta in December 1957. The national seminar was organised to decolonise Indonesian historiography and invent a new national perspective. It was attended by Muhammad Yamin and a new generation of Indonesian history scholars, notably, Sartono Kartodirdjo,⁷⁰

Among the main controversies raised in the seminar was the importance of an ideological and/or philosophical foundation for Indonesian national history. As a

⁶⁸ Herb Feith, 'John Legge and Cornell', in Davis P. Chandler & M.C. Ricklefs, *Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Indonesia: Essays in honour of Professor J.D. Legge* (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1986), pp. 87–88.

⁶⁹ George Mc T. Kahin, (2003), loc. cit.

⁷⁰ Sartono Kartodirdjo (1921–2007) was the pioneer of 'Indonesia-centrism' in historiography. He was profoundly influenced by Weberian sociology as well as the 'Annales' historical school. Sartono did his master's degree at Yale University under Harry Benda, and Sartono's PhD dissertation, 'The Peasant's Revolt in Banten 1883', at the University of Amsterdam, was supervised by Professor Wim Wertheim. For the biographical account of Sartono, see M. Nursam, *Membuka Pintu Bagi Masa Depan: Biografi Sartono Kartodirdjo* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2008).

representative of the nationalist current, Yamin proposed that scientific historical research should lead to a nationalist interpretation and serve to strengthen national consciousness. Inspired by Arab philosopher of history Ibn Khaldun's historical philosophy, concerning the stages of civilisational progress, Yamin applied a five-stage periodisation to Indonesian history because it reflected the genesis of the Indonesian nation and civilisation; namely, prehistoric Indonesia; early Indonesian (proto-)history; the first 'national' phase of the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires; the colonial (international) period; and modern Indonesian history, from the early twentieth century onwards.⁷¹

In response to Yamin, Soedjatmoko rejected a 'national philosophy of history' as being the key principle for historical inquiry. While he agreed that historical writing implied applying theoretical/conceptual frameworks, Yamin's was not a philosophy but an individual perspective, which contained philosophical elements for the selective analysis of facts. Soedjatmoko argued that formulating a uniform national philosophy of history might be dangerous when it was presented as the only way to guide research in history. Historical research would be controlled by political authorities, at the expense of scholars and academic independence.⁷² Besides arguing that the idea of a 'national philosophy of history' was without philosophical grounds in the Indonesian context, Soedjatmoko said that national history should stem from the perspective of Indonesian society—the principal criterion for any 'philosophical' or theoretical construction of Indonesian national history. Intellectual freedom was a necessary condition for any historical inquiry. Soedjatmoko's independent, scientific research on history to reflect the reality of the Indonesian people's social transformation was not compatible with national myths or ideological constructions of history, but would contribute to the self-comprehension of the Indonesian people, as well as their

⁷¹ Henk Schulte-Nordholt, "De-colonising Indonesian Historiography", paper delivered at the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies public lecture series "Focus Asia", 25–27 May, 2004 (Centre for the East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden, 2004), pp. 3–4.

⁷² Ibid. Eka Ningtyas, "Lika-Liku Sejarah Nasional Indonesia", Academia.edu <https://www.academia.edu/10527421/Lika_liku_Sejarah_Nasional_Indonesia>.

awareness of how historical roots shaped their present-day situation and global position.⁷³

Decades after the seminar, Sartono Kartodirdjo succeeded in applying a new multidimensional approach in historical studies. It was Soedjatmoko who first argued for the importance of ‘multiple approaches’; he emphasised ‘historical living consciousness’ in a dialectic between history as an independent academic field and its function as a philosophical foundation for nation-building. As he later confessed to historian Taufik Abdullah, it was not until the seminar that Soedjatmoko started to study history, although his study was more as a scientific problem and mode of thought than for history itself.⁷⁴

In 1961, the Department of History and Southeast Asia Program of Cornell University invited Soedjatmoko to be a visiting lecturer in history for a semester, and give a seminar on modern Indonesian political developments. His collaboration with Cornell scholars resulted in the 1965 anthology on Indonesian history, entitled *An Introduction of Indonesian Historiography*, which he edited along with National Archivist Mohammad Ali, George Kahin and G.J. Resink.⁷⁵ According to Kahin, this project was ‘predominantly Koko’s work’ because, besides his introduction and conclusion, Soedjatmoko provided the scholarly contacts for twenty Indonesian and Western scholars, who wrote the essays.⁷⁶

The articles in the anthology ranged from using traditional chronicle sources and non-Indonesian sources to different approaches to Indonesian historical writings. In his concluding article, ‘The Indonesian Historian and His Time’, Soedjatmoko focused on the main obstacle to realising the new historical consciousness in the construction of

⁷³ Soedjatmoko, “Merintis Hari Depan”, paper presented in the Seminar of National History in Yogyakarta, 14 December 1957, Soedjatmoko (1984), pp. 31–34.

⁷⁴ Soedjatmoko’s confession to Taufik Abdullah cited in Nursam (2002), p. 114.

⁷⁵ Soedjatmoko, Mohammad Ali, G.J Resink, George Mc.T. Kahin (eds), *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* (Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2007) [Indonesian translation, Soedjatmoko, Mohammad Ali, G.J Resink, George Mc.T. Kahin (eds), *Historiografi Indonesia Sebuah Pengantar* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1995)].

⁷⁶ George Mc.T. Kahin (2003), p. 154.

national history; namely, the remnants of ‘ahistorical’ elements in traditional worldviews. The popular appeal of Marxism and Indonesian anti-colonial nationalism represented traditional inclinations towards eschatological and deterministic views of historical progress. While nationalism had been a driving force for modernisation, it did not necessarily break from the worldview of a closed agrarian society. More often, it tended to reinforce and revive the elements of traditional culture. Soedjatmoko produced some possible solutions to overcome this ‘ahistorical’ worldview: a scholar of history should consistently apply critical methods to deal with historical subject matter. More inquiries on Indonesian ‘political cultures’ or the ‘history of mentality’ were needed to better understand ‘ahistorical’ elements within traditional societies, as well as their incarnation in the nationalist movement.⁷⁷

Soedjatmoko’s efforts to establish the academic independence of historical and social-science research influenced a younger generation of (Chinese-)Indonesian historians and humanist intellectuals, such as Onghokham and Soe Hok Gie, both students at the History Department of Universitas Indonesia (UI). As a defender of academic independence, Soe had confronted UI professor Soetjipto, who criticised Indo-Dutch historian G.J. Resink for the latter’s argument that the myth of ‘350 years of Dutch colonisation’ was a colonial construction ‘used to keep Indonesians inferior,’ Soe particularly objected to Soetjipto’s accusation that Resink’s views were contrary to Manipol-Usdek—the official ideology of the Guided Democracy regime.⁷⁸ Onghokham focused on the history of Indonesian political culture, arguing that the nature of power centralisation in the Guided Democracy regime was a contemporary manifestation of Javanese traditional rule. Both Soe Hok Gie and Onghokham dealt with traditional, irrational elements of contemporary political culture.⁷⁹ Loosely affiliated with the PSI student wing, *Gemsos* (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis*) and the Sumitro-initiated *Gerakan Pembaharuan*, Soe Hok Gie established himself as an independent

⁷⁷ Soedjatmoko cited the work of Sartono Kartodirdjo, “Tjatan tentang segi-segi messianistis dalam sejarah Indonesia” (Notes on the messianic aspect of Indonesian history, 1959), see Soedjatmoko “The Indonesian Historian and His Time”, in Soedjatmoko (2007), pp. 404–415.

⁷⁸ Soe Hok Gie’s diary dated 27 January 1962, in Soe Hok Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989), pp. 126–129.

⁷⁹ Soe Hok Gie’s diary dated 16 March 1964, *ibid*, pp. 155–156.

intellectual-activist with a complex, ambiguous relationship to all political factions in the late Sukarno era. On the one hand, he was sympathetic to the role of radical leftists in the Indonesian anti-colonial struggle, and wrote his bachelor degree thesis on the early Indonesian communist movement in Semarang, Central Java.⁸⁰ Yet he also opposed the totalitarian side of the PKI. Although interested in aspects of its radical reform agenda and the moral purity of its leadership, Soe considered the political alliance between the PKI and Sukarno as ‘a cynical political manoeuvre that betrayed all of their ideological principles.’⁸¹ On the other hand, Soe’s views of the PSI were no less critical. Except for respecting a few intellectuals such as Soedjatmoko, Soe viewed many of the PSI as accustomed to displaying a sense of intellectual superiority and arrogance; they made socialism ‘merely a slogan and lip service, without concrete action so that they been politically defeated and disliked by the people.’⁸²

Soe Hok Gie and his fellow students constituted the core of what came to be called the ‘1966 Generation’, of which Soedjatmoko was a major patron. In early February 1963, the Gemsos-based discussion group organised by Soe Hok Gie and Zaenal Zakse invited Soedjatmoko to a meeting in the house of Maruli Silitonga, the chairperson of Gemsos, to speak about the role of intellectuals in Indonesian development and postcolonial modernisation. According to Soedjatmoko, the root problem of intellectuals in Indonesia was their lack of comprehension about the nature of Indonesia’s transformation to modernity, accompanying the decolonisation process. This transformation required not only unifying the people but also administering economic development. Indonesian intellectuals, regardless of their ideological affiliation, lacked an orientation to development. Development was not limited to technical or economic problems, but concerned all humanity’s problems, which were mostly non-economic. ‘Social theory’ should be applied to all aspects of modernisation. Soedjatmoko argued that the inflexible nature of scientific inquiry in development was

⁸⁰ Soe Hok Gie “*Di Bawah Lentera Merah: Riwayat Sarekat Islam Semarang, 1917–1920*” (thesis S1, 1964), and bachelor thesis, “*Simpang Kiri dari Sebuah Jalan: Kisah Pemberontakan Madiun September 1948*” (thesis S2 1969), University of Indonesia, published as *Orang-Orang di Simpang Kiri Jalan* (Yogyakarta: Bentang Pustaka, 2005).

⁸¹ John Maxwell (2001), pp. 130–131.

⁸² Soe Hok Gie’s diary dated 20 March 1964, *ibid.*, pp. 157-158.

rooted in the parochial nature of Indonesia's imported foreign educational system, 'which hinders us from thinking globally'.⁸³ The discussion inspired his paper, 'Towards a Strategy of Modernization', which he presented at a seminar organised by the CCF in Manila in June 1963. In contrast to his previous 1954 paper, which argued for 'creative adaptation' to modernity, Soedjatmoko concluded that the relationship between tradition and modernisation was complex, requiring clearer understanding and rigorous analysis. Factors to be considered included why the bonds of tradition could not be overcome merely by accelerating education improvements, urbanisation or industrialisation. The existence of more than one ideological concept of modernisation made political struggle between different concepts inevitable, and encouraged adherents of modernisation 'to secure some degree of political support from traditional forces.' The recent history of new nations—including what had happened to the PSI in the last election in Indonesia—showed that 'those modernisers who were unwilling to ... compromise with traditional forces soon found themselves on the sidelines of [the] political arena.'⁸⁴

The failure and political persecution of the PSI during the late 1950s and early 1960s, together with his increasingly deep inquiries into Indonesian history and political culture, changed Soedjatmoko's views on modernisation and development. His moderate humanitarian-based modernism, and his willingness to embrace and comprehend Javanese cultural sensibility, corresponded with the political orientation of Suharto's New Order government. Eventually, the political upheaval around the political transition to New Order and the tragic death of Sjahrir led Soedjatmoko to move further from the political scene.

His New Order career started with diplomatic positions. The first was as the Indonesian ambassador to the USA from 1968 to 1971. The Suharto regime made this appointment because Soedjatmoko already had close ties with the USA, so he could build up the reputation of the New Order. His new position enabled Soedjatmoko to

⁸³ Soe Hok Gie's diary dated 19 February 1963, in Soe Hok Gie (1989), pp. 146–148.

⁸⁴ Soedjatmoko, "Towards a Strategy of Modernization", paper presented in the seminar on "Cultural Motivation to Progress in South and Southeast Asia", in Feith & Castles (1970), pp.242.

view Indonesia's New Order from a US perspective. In Soedjatmoko's correspondence with Suharto, he criticised Suharto's handling of those who were accused of the PKI 'coup' attempt or associated with leftist politics. With the rise of the New Left among American intellectuals, US public opinion towards Indonesia in the transition between Sukarno and Suharto became predominantly negative.⁸⁵ News of corruption and the mass killings of communists dominated views of the new regime. Soedjatmoko told Suharto that Indonesia's human rights violations were damaging public opinion of Indonesia's international reputation and hindering economic diplomacy. Several times, Soedjatmoko himself had been a target of left-wing student demonstrations. Left-wing students in the USA and Europe viewed foreign aid for developing countries as strengthening neo-colonialist power relations, in which multinational firms supported Third World political elites, who acted as a comprador bourgeoisie.⁸⁶ The vulnerable position of the new regime encouraged Soedjatmoko to suggest that the Indonesian government should not depend on foreign aid, especially from Western countries.

Soedjatmoko's insights into Third World development in the global world order were well received by American intellectuals. He came to be a member of various international think-tanks, including the International Institute for Environment and Development and the Club of Rome. The latter was, more or less, compatible with his non-partisan views and concerned with global humanitarian and environmentalist issues.⁸⁷ His brilliant international intellectual career reached its peak with his election as the rector of the United Nation University in Tokyo, Japan in the early 1980s.⁸⁸

During this period, in 1967, Soedjatmoko gave a Dyason Memorial Lecture, called 'Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities', which was published in *The Australian*

⁸⁵ Letter from Soedjatmoko to President Suharto dated 10 September 1968 in Soedjatmoko, *Surat-Surat Pribadi Soedjatmoko kepada Presiden (Jenderal) Soeharto (16 Juni 1968 – 26 April 1971)* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2002), pp. 58–59.

⁸⁶ Letters from Soedjatmoko dated 5 January 1971 and 2 March 1971, *ibid.*, pp. 196–197 and p. 212.

⁸⁷ Nursam (2002), pp. 172–173.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp 179-180

Outlook in December 1972.⁸⁹ This treatise incorporated his other studies of postcolonial political and social transformation based on tradition, resulting in a comprehensive historical review of Indonesian political culture(s). Soedjatmoko identified two principal currents of Indonesian political culture being confronted with modernity: Javanese and Islamic traditions. He divided the Javanese traditions into the Hindu-Buddhist ‘great tradition’ of the Javanese court nobility, which was passed down to the newer *priyayi* bureaucratic elites; and the ‘little tradition’ of the rural *abangan* peasantry.⁹⁰ Millenarian (*Ratu Adil*) cults emerged as a response to the colonial exploitation and increasing poverty of the peasantry, which then passed into the nationalist movement. While the Javanese type of political culture was channelled through the bureaucratic Indonesian National Party (PNI), the latter was embodied in the political militancy of the Communist Party (PKI). Both political cultures could potentially be incorporated into modernisation, as long as modern elites could use ‘emotive, traditional symbols for modern ends.’ Soedjatmoko saw the Islamic tradition, which was rooted in urban commercial centres, as having a more troublesome relationship with (secular) modernity than the Javanese traditions. Because Islam, like Judaism, had been a ‘legal religion’, it had more exclusive truth-claims based on a set of legal rules (*sharia*). Under external threats—such as colonialism—it was inclined to react in a ‘fundamentalist’ manner. The suspicious views of some Islamic clerics (*kyai*) towards Islamic intellectuals who tried to become modernists were a greater hindrance to modernisation than any other cultural element.⁹¹

Soedjatmoko stated that both Javanese and Islamic cultural traditions had problems in dealing with modernisation and development. Because of their shared participation in anti-colonial struggle, they had overcome their differences by the integrative power of nationalism. However, nationalism was limited in responding to the post-independence question on how to manage society to achieve development. The

⁸⁹ Soedjatmoko, “Indonesia: Masalah dan Kesempatan”, in Soedjatmoko (1984), English version, “Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities”, *Australian Outlook* 21:3, pp. 263–286; page references here are to the Indonesian version.

⁹⁰ Probably referring to Geertz’s *Religion of Java*. Soedjatmoko mentioned Feith’s *Decline of Constitutional Democracy* in another part of this treatise, *ibid*, pp. 80–82.

⁹¹*Ibid*, pp. 84–85.

failure of Guided Democracy had left at least two important groups to bear the mission of modernisation/development: the military and intellectuals. In the latter category, he referred to the ‘1966 generation’ of student activists as the most important group.⁹² The army’s participation in politics, according to Soedjatmoko, was not by ‘design’ but, rather, was the result of the shortcomings of civilian politicians and the party system. The military applied the effective, modern, organisational and managerial method required for development. Meanwhile, the intellectuals assumed a role as principal agents for cultural dialogue, for instance, between secular modernist minorities and the traditionally minded Muslim majority. They were the guardians of the democratic process, counterbalancing the ruling authority and emancipating society from the limitations of tradition.⁹³

In an address to the Asia Society, later published in its journal and in the Indonesian journal *Budaya Djaya* in 1970, Soedjatmoko argued against Edward Shils’s view of the role of intellectuals in developing countries.⁹⁴ The central issue for Third World intellectuals, according to Soedjatmoko, was their role as a modernising elite. The paradox of this role was that they needed to choose between their desire to obtain political power, which would cause them to sacrifice their ideals, or be trapped in a state of ‘alienation’ between different and confronting worldviews.⁹⁵ For Soedjatmoko, intellectuals and scholars should occupy an independent position between the state and civil society, ‘continuously advocating for different, alternative choices.’ This role implied that intellectuals would be the main cause of division in society, a troublesome role for new nation-states that had reached independence only after violent struggle. The new states required fidelity, solidarity and uniformity, within the context of political cultures unfamiliar with the idea of ‘loyal opposition’. The fragility of national

⁹² See M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Peran Angkatan, Formasi Sosial dan Negara”, in M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Ekonomi Politik Pembangunan* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat, 2012), pp. 449–476.

⁹³ Soedjatmoko (1984) pp. 95–100.

⁹⁴ See Soedjatmoko, “Peranan Intelektual di Negara Sedang Berkembang”, in Aswab Mahasin & Ismed Natsir (eds), *Cendekiawan dan Politik* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983) and Edward Shils, “The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States”, in John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped World* (New York/London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc: 1967).

⁹⁵ Soedjatmoko, “Peranan Intelektual di Negara Sedang Berkembang”, *ibid*, p. 32.

unity in facing political stagnation, revolts and disintegration had made many intellectuals in developing countries realise the need for self-restraint in pursuing their objectives. Every ideal of modernisation and development needed to consider the irrational power behind the nation's formation. Intellectuals had to use existing desires and values living in their societies.⁹⁶ While Soedjatmoko was aware of the dilemma of Indonesian intellectuals, his new position under the New Order regime prompted him to choose a moderate position.

After Soedjatmoko returned from the USA, in September 1971, he became an adviser for socio-cultural affairs at the Bappenas. His relationship to the Suharto government and inner circle of decision-makers was strained because of the regime's rising authoritarianism. His position in the Bappenas under Widjojo Nitisastro was 'practically artificial, without real authority for decision making'.⁹⁷ In any case, the shift in political-economic policy to East Asian-inspired economic nationalism and 'state-capitalism' under the CSIS marginalised the Bappenas technocrats with their US-oriented developmentalism. Despite the moderate nature of his governmental critiques, as a former PSI member, Soedjatmoko was associated with the rising opposition of the new generation of social-democratic activists, the '1966 Generation'. These activists were also suppressed through the New Order's manipulation of the Malari (*Malapetaka Limabelas Januari*, or 'Fifteenth January Disaster') riots in Jakarta in 1974. The New Order government arrested and imprisoned senior PSI figures, such as Soebadio Sastrosatomo and Sarbini Sumawinata. Soedjatmoko was not prosecuted, but was banned from travelling overseas for two and a half years.⁹⁸ Malari marked the practical end of the careers of most PSI intellectuals. While Soedjatmoko and Sumitro had continuing impacts in Indonesian politics and state management, however, as development thinkers who transcended ideological orientation and partisanship

⁹⁶ Ibid, pp. 36–38.

⁹⁷ Nursam (2002), pp. 170–171.

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 173.

Conclusion

For the PSI, socialism primarily meant the struggle to realise human equality, social justice and welfare. Socialism implied the eradication of any sort of exploitative order namely imperialism, feudalism and totalitarianism. Socialism further implied the improvement of social welfare through rational economic planning. Democratic socialism of the PSI, in this respect, could be a driving force for modernisation and development. Sjahrir represented humanitarian and democratic aspects of socialism, while Sumitro and Soedjatmoko represented developmentalist implications of PSI socialism.

The history of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and its intellectual dynamics reflected the dilemma of the relationship between its anti-colonial inheritance—as the successor to the Marxist-inspired Indonesian National Education (PNI-Pendidikan)—and its modernist and technocratic reincarnation in post-independence Indonesia. Most Indonesian socialist intellectuals formed their ideas in the anti-colonial struggle; hence, the socialist movement was inseparable from questions of nationalism and imperialism. Socialist intellectuals from the PSI, however, represented a different kind of socialism from other Marxist-inspired political movements—the PKI, Tan Malaka’s Murba and Sukarno’s Marhaenism of the PNI. The cosmopolitan and modernist nature of Sjahrir’s democratic socialism emerged from an intellectual milieu closer to Western European social democracy, but also as a repudiation of the European Social Democrats’ conservative standpoint on colonialism. For the Sjahrir group, socialism meant creating an egalitarian society through a rational political education, targeting the feudal mentality of Indonesian traditional society as the being main source of inequality, authoritarianism and human exploitation. Colonial capitalism had a major impact in the Indies, but did not create a large urban proletariat. Much of Indonesian society had never actually departed from the precapitalist mode of production, which is why feudalism was the principal enemy.

The PSI ideology represent an Indonesian version of democratic socialism, though not all of intellectuals associated with the party generate any thoughts based on democratic socialism. Hatta, otherwise, was an Indonesian statesman and economist whose ideas more consistently fit to democratic socialist principles, while he was not affiliated with the PSI or any other party. This thesis has shown how there were three types of intellectuals engaged in the PSI: ideological thinkers, technocratic intellectuals and humanist intellectuals. Each embodied a distinct role within the intellectual traditions of Indonesia. In the postcolonial period, there were loosely three groups in the PSI network: party activists, artists and journalists, and academics turned government technocrats. While most of the inner circle of PSI activists-ideologues were persecuted and excluded from politics by either the Guided Democracy or New Order regime, many of the PSI's 'humanist' activists survived to expand the PSI network by involving a younger generation of socialist intellectuals.

As the main ideologue of Indonesian democratic socialism, Sjahrir wrote few treatises on Marxism, except on its basic tenets. His letters from exile represented a broad reflection on Indonesian peoples, their culture and mentality. They were mostly devoted to criticising the enduring 'feudalism' of Indonesian elites—mainly Javanese—who had been more or less preserved by the colonial establishment, especially through its orientalist scholarship. At the heart of Sjahrir's arguments was a strong emphasis on the people's feudal mentality as the root of all existing social formations. The traditional feudalist worldview justified an unequal, hierarchical society as being 'natural' and had been instrumental in legitimising European, capitalist-based colonial exploitation and Asian despotism as the progenitors of fascism and ultranationalism. Sjahrir's *Perdjoeangan Kita* was concerned with these issues, which formed the basis of a political manifesto for establishing the Socialist Party. He envisaged the formation of a vanguard party to lead the Indonesian Revolution onto the democratic path and replace 'fascist' elements of Indonesian nationalism. He also criticised the military-educated youth, who had been the main proponents of the Indonesian Revolution. While resisting the occupation regime, most of these *pemuda* embraced the military-style, patriotic and xenophobic nationalism closely associated with fascism.

From the beginning, the PSI had been—in almost strictly Leninist terms—a vanguard party for postcolonial democratic transformation. In this respect, Sjahrir's democratic socialist party had to compete closely with the Communist Party (PKI). Such antagonism was profoundly influential in determining the party's ideological reorientation between 1950 and 1952, resulting in the adoption of *sosialisme kerakyatan*, the Indonesian version of democratic socialism. This ideological shift abolished most of the Marxist principles that had characterised the socialist party since its establishment in the Revolutionary era.

The PSI's democratic socialism remained in an ambivalent position between its Western social-democratic roots and Third-Worldist nationalism. This position raised misconceptions about the socialist party. Another claim made by one of the most authoritative scholars of Indonesian studies, Herb Feith, associated PSI ideology with British Fabianism. The Fabians were certainly one of the main influences, but there is no hard evidence that the party based its ideology on this type of socialism. There are certain similarities between the two, based on their elitist approach through rational economic planning. The two ideologies had a common belief that the concentration of capital created the natural economic preconditions for socialism. As a Third World socialist party, however, the PSI differed from Fabianism in that they could not completely escape the Marxist and anti-colonial roots that had shaped their character.

Among the more Fabian-oriented PSI intellectuals, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Soedjatmoko represented less ideological types, who fitted in with the rise in developmentalism in the Indonesian state from the early 1950s until the early New Order era. They also shared similar *priyayi* origins with strong modernist inclinations. While they also shared similar convictions about Western democratic institutions, Sumitro was a committed technocrat and politician, which led him into rigorous anti-communism. He adopted a more pragmatic approach than either Sjahrir or Soedjatmoko. In his economic treatises, Sumitro's ideas reflected a more Keynesian or New Deal-oriented state-capitalism within a planned economy—the dominant post-war discourse of development—rather than any sort of socialism. His approach to developmental policy demonstrated his reliance on industrialisation as the driving force for economic growth and modernisation of society as a whole, to overcome what he

perceived to be the economic dualism carried over from colonial rule. For a technocrat like Sumitro, politics had been the means of achieving the higher objective of social improvement through scientific method and management. Accordingly, the state should assume greater power to secure stable and sustainable economic growth by combating potentially destabilising political ideologies.

Soedjatmoko ended up becoming a PSI moderate, mediating between the democratic Sjahrir and technocratic Sumitro—similarly to how Hatta had been the middleman between Sukarno and Sjahrir. After the persecution of the PSI in the early 1960s, most of Sjahrir's closest companions split from Sumitro. When Sumitro and the 'Berkeley Mafia' technocrats, who controlled the Bappenas, advised Suharto that reopening access to the Western and world markets would lead to economic improvements, Soedjatmoko maintained a more critical stance, even when he was Indonesian ambassador to the USA. His personal views of modernisation and development shifted from his early 1950s modernist cosmopolitanism to humanism, by which he argued that more effective development should incorporate elements of traditional political culture, rather than simply eliminating them through forced, state-led modernisation. This humanistic development required the advancement of independent social sciences and humanities research to support the state's policy-making. Intellectuals were not only advisers, but also the 'loyal opposition' to the government, preventing its potential corruption.

If we hold to the postulate that PSI intellectuals were influenced by Fabianism, then Soedjatmoko seems to be the most representative figure. Soedjatmoko was a key figure of state development policy-making, especially on international politics and social-humanities, while he still maintained the character of Sjahrir's humanistic socialism. In contrast, while Sumitro he had been a more successful figure in developing his school of economics and his technocratic circle, his ideas reflected less and less the ideals of socialism, especially after he joined the New Order.

The significance of the PSI as the key body of Indonesian democratic socialism was situated on their enduring opposition to what-so-called as irrational elements of Indonesian political culture. For the PSI, socialism was principally human emancipation from inequality and exploitation through education, resulting in society's democratic

transformation. The PSI's critical stance towards the mainstream of Indonesian political culture was the principal characteristic of its Indonesian 'humanistic' intellectual tradition. This also allowed it to be an intermediary between Western scholarship on Indonesia and the rising developmental state. The PSI intellectuals shared the cosmopolitan nature of Western democratic socialism, but played a role as both technocrats and the 'loyal opposition' to the New Order. It shows how a smaller political party can have an immense impact on the development of a nation-state.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archives, Books and Monographs

Abdulgani, Roeslan, *Perkembangan Tjita-tjita Sosialisme di Indonesia*, Kuliah Umum di Perguruan Tinggi Hukum dan Pengetahuan Masyarakat Malang pada hari Sabtu tanggal 2 Djuli 1960, Malang, Yayasan Perguruan Tinggi Malang, 1960.

Anwar, Rosihan, *Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961–1965*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 1981.

Djojohadikusumo, R.M. Margono, *Sepuluh Tahun Koperasi (1930–1940)*, Jakarta, Fadli Zon Library, 2013.

Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro, *Persoalan Ekonomi di Indonesia*, Jakarta, Indira, 1953.

Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro, *Kredit Rakyat Pada Masa Depresi*, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1989.

Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro, *Perkembangan Pemikiran Ekonomi: Dasar Teori Ekonomi Pertumbuhan dan Ekonomi Pembangunan*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994.

Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro, “Recollections of My Career”, in Thee Kian Wie (ed), *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s—1990s*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 47–66.

Feith, Herbert & Castles, Lance (eds), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945–1965*, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1970.

Hatta, Mohammad, *The Co-operative Movement in Indonesia*, Ithaca/New York, Cornell University Press, 1957.

Hatta, Mohammad, *Persoalan Ekonomi Sosialis Indonesia*, Jakarta, Penerbit Djambatan, 1963.

Hatta, Mohammad, *Demokrasi Kita*, Jakarta, Pustaka Antara, 1966.

Hatta, Mohammad, *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings by Mohammad Hatta*, The Hague/Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1972.

Malaka, Tan, “Rencana Ekonomi Berjuang”, written by Tan Malaka on 28 November 1945, at www.marxist.com.

Malaka, Tan, *Dari Penjara ke Penjara*, Yogyakarta, Penerbit Narasi, 2008.

Malaka, Tan, *Madilog: Materialisme, Dialektika dan Logika*, Yogyakarta: Penerbit Narasi, 2014.

Musso, “*Jalan Baru Untuk Republik Indonesia*” (The New Way for the Republic of Indonesia), policy plan proposed and approved in the PKI fifth congress on 26–27 August 1948, at www.marxist.com.

Nursam, M. (ed.), *Krisis Daya Cipta Indonesia: Polemik Soedjatmoko vs Boejoeng Saleh*. Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004.

Partai Sosialis Indonesia, “Keterangan Sekretariat Dewan Partai Partai Sosialis Indonesia berhubung dengan Statement C.C. PKI tanggal 29 Desember 1952”, (Jakarta, 30 December 1952).

Sadli, Mohammad, “Recollections of My Career”, in Thee Kian Wie (ed), *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s—1990s*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 119–140.

Sastrosatomo, Soedarpo, “Recollections of My Career”, in Thee Kian Wie (ed), *Recollection: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s—1990s* (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 143–162.

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Recollections of My Career”, in Thee Kian Wie (ed), *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s—1990s*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 75–86.

Sjahrir, Soetan, *Out of Exile*, New York, Greenwood Press Publishers, 1949 [translated as Sjahrir, Soetan, *Renungan dan Perjuangan*, Jakarta, Penerbit Djambatan/Dian Rakyat, 1990].

- Sjahrir, Sutan, “Current Problems in Indonesia”, *Pakistan Horizon* Vol 4 No 4 (December 1951), 200–209.
- Sjahrir, Sutan, Alisjahbana, St. Takdir & Ismael, J., “Symposion tentang Kesulitan-Kesulitan Zaman Peralihan Sekarang”, Djakarta, Balai Pustaka, 1952.
- Sjahrir, Sutan, *Indonesian Socialism*, Rangoon, Asian Socialist Publishing House, 1956.
- Sjahrir, Sutan, *Sosialisme dan Marxisme : Suatu Kritik Terhadap Marxisme*, Jakarta, Penerbit Djambatan, 1967.
- Sjahrir, Sutan, *Our Struggle*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968 [translated as Sjahrir, Sutan, *Perjuangan Kita*, Bandung, Segi Arsy, 2018].
- Sjahrir, Sutan, *Sosialisme Indonesia Pembangunan*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penunjang Pembangunan Nasional, 1982.
- Sjahrir, Sutan, *Renungan Indonesia*, Yogyakarta, Bakung Putih, 2019.
- Soedjatmoko, “An Approach to Indonesian History: Towards an Open Future”, An address at the Seminar on Indonesian History, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, December 14. 1957.
- Soedjatmoko, *Etika Pembebasan: Pilihan Karangan tentang Agama, Kebudayaan, Sejarah dan Ilmu Pengetahuan*, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1984.
- Soedjatmoko, *Dimensi Manusia dalam Pembangunan: Pilihan Karangan*, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1983.
- Soedjatmoko, “Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities”, *Australian Outlook* 21:3 (1967), 263–286
- Soedjatmoko, *Transforming Humanity: The Visionary Writings of Soedjatmoko*, West Hartford, Kumarian Press, 1994.
- Soedjatmoko, et.al (eds), *Historiografi Indonesia Sebuah Pengantar*, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1995.

Soedjatmoko, *Surat-surat Pribadi Soedjatmoko kepada Presiden (Jenderal) Soeharto (16 Juni 1968–26 April 1971)*, Jakarta, Yayasan Soedjatmoko/Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2002.

Soedjatmoko, *Kebudayaan Sosialis*, Jakarta, Melibas, 2004.

Soedjatmoko, (ed), *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* (Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2007).

Sukarno, *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi (Djilid Pertama, Cetakan Ketiga)*, Jakarta, Panitia Penerbitan Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964.

Sukarno, *Indonesia Menggugat: Pidato Bung Karno di depan Pengadilan Kolonial Bandung 1930*, Jakarta, Inti Idayu Press – Yayasan Pendidikan Soekarno, 1985.

Sumawinata, Sarbini, “Recollections of My Career”, in Thee Kian Wie (ed), *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s—1990s*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 103–118.

Tas, Sol, “Souvenir of Sjahrir”, *Indonesia* No 8 (1969), 135–154.

Newspapers and Magazines

Suara Sosialis Year V, No. 3, 31 March 1953.

Sikap, No. 42, Year X, 5 November 1956.

Sikap No. 46, Year IX, 3 December 1956.

Socialist Bulletin Vol 1, No. 1 (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, 1956).

Socialist Bulletin Vol 1, No.2 (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, 1956).

Socialist Bulletin Vol 1, No. 2 (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, 1957).

The Economic Weekly, 12 July 1952.

Secondary Sources

Articles

Anderson, Benedict “Djojo on the Corner” Review of ‘After the Fact’ by Clifford Geertz, *London Reviews of Books*, Vol 17 (19 August 1995).

Benda, Harry J. & Castles, Lance, “The Samin movement”, in *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land, en Volkenkunde* Vol 125, No 2 (1969), 207–240.

Berger, Mark T., “Old State and New Empire in Indonesia: debating the rise and decline of Suharto’s New Order”, *Third World Quarterly* Vol 18, No 2 (1997), 321–361.

Bijl, Paul, “Human Rights and Anticolonial Nationalism in Sjahrir’s *Indonesian Contemplation*”, *Law & Literature* Vol 29, No 2, (2017), 247–268

Castles, Lance, “Socialism and Private Business: The Latest Phase”, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, I, No 1 (June 1965), 13–45.

Day, Tony “Honoured Guests: Indonesian-American Cultural Traffic, 1953–1957,” in Jennifer & Liem, Maya H.T. (ed), *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesia 1950–1965*, Leiden, KITLV Press, 2012, 119-142

Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, Madelon, “Noto Soeroto: His Ideas and the Late Colonial Intellectual Climate”, *Indonesia* Vol 55 (April 1993), 41–72.

Efimova, Larisa M., “Stalin and the New Program for the Communist Party of Indonesia,” *Indonesia* Vol 91 (April 2011), 131-163

Feith, Herbert, review of “Cultural Freedom in Asia: The Proceedings of a Conference held at Rangoon, Burma, February 17-20, 1955 and Convened by the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Society for the Extension of Democratic Ideals”, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 30, No 3, September 1957, 269–70.

Fogg, Kevin W., “Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1949”, *Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* Vol 53 No. 2, 2015, 303-335

Fogg, Kevin W., “Indonesian Islamic Socialism and Its South Asian Roots”, *Journal of Modern Asian Studies*, Vol 53 No 6 (2019), 1736–1761.

- Fogg, Kevin W. “Indonesian Socialism of the 1950s: From Ideology to Rhetoric”, *Third World Quarterly* Vol 42, No 3 (2021), 465–482.
- Foulcher, Keith, “Bringing the World Back Home: Cultural Traffic in Konfrontasi, 1954–1960”, in Lindsay, Jennifer & Liem, Maya H.T. (ed), *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesia 1950–1965*, Leiden, KITLV Press, 2012, 31-56
- Fromm, Erich, ‘Introduction to Socialist Humanism an International Symposium’
<https://www.marxist.org/archives/fromm/works/1965/introduction.htm>
- Glassburner, Bruce, “Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia 1950–1957”, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol 10 No 2 (January 1962), 113–133.
- Hansen, Erik, “The Dutch East Indies and the Reorientation of Dutch Social Democracy 1929-1940”, *Indonesia*, Vol 23 (April 1977), 59–85.
- Higgins, Benjamin, “Thought and Actions: Indonesian Economic Studies and Policies in the 1950s”, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol 26 No 1 (April 1990), 37–47.
- Imlay, Talbot C., “International Socialism and Decolonization during the 1950’s: Competing Rights and Postcolonial Order”, *The American Historical Review* Vol 118 No 4 (October 2013), 1105–1132.
- Ingleton, John, “Bound Hand and Foot: Railway Workers and the 1923 Strike in Java”, *Indonesia* No 31 (April 1981), 53–87.
- Kahin, George McT & Barnett, Milton L, “In Memoriam Soedjatmoko, 1922-1989”, *Indonesia*, No 49 (April 1990), 132–139.
- Legge, J.D., “Daulat Ra’jat and the Ideas of Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia”, *Indonesia* No. 32 (October 1981), 151–168.
- Lengkeek, Yannick, “Staged Glory: The Impact of Fascism on ‘Cooperative’ Nationalist Circles in Late Colonial Indonesia, 1935–1942”, *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* No. 7 (2018), 109–131.

Lewis, Su Lin, “Asian Socialism and the Forgotten Architects of Postcolonial Freedom, 1952- 1956”, *Journal of World History*, Vol 3 No 1–2, University of Hawaii Press, June 2019.

Lindblad, J. Thomas, “The Economic Decolonisation of Indonesia: A Bird’s-eye View”, *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* Vol 4, 2011, 1–20.

Lin Hongxuan “Sickle as Crescent: Islam and Communism in the Netherlands East Indies 1915-1927”, *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies* Vol 25, No 2, 2018, 309–350.

Mackie, Jamie, “In Memoriam Professor Benjamin Higgins, 1912–2001”, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* Vol 37 No 2, 2001, 183–188.

Mrázek, Rudolf, “Tan Malaka: A Political Personality’s Structure of Experience”, *Indonesia* Vol 14 (October 1972), 20–32.

Mukerji, D.P. “International Economic Conference”, *The Economic Weekly*, 12 July 1952.

Mulawarman, Aji Dedi, ‘Soft Religiosity Message for Indonesia from Soedjatmoko’, *International Journal of Religious and Cultural Studies*, Vol 1, No 1, April 2019.

Ningtyas Eka, “Liku-Luku Sejarah Nasional Indonesia”, Academia https://www.academia.edu/10527421/Lika_liku_Sejarah_Nasional_Indonesia.

Poeze, Harry A., “From Foe to Partner to Foe Again: The Strange Alliance of the Dutch Authorities and Digoel Exiles in Australia, 1943–1945”, *Indonesia* No 94 (October 2012), 57–84.

Priyonggo, Armedyestu, “The Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) 1950-1959: Political Role and Progress during Liberal Democracy”, *Indonesian Historical Studies*, Vol 2, No 1, 2018, 61–70.

Ransom, David, “The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre”, in *Ramparts* Vol 9, No 4, October 1970, 26–28, 40–49.

Reid, Anthony “Marxist Attitudes to Social Revolution 1946–1948”, *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* Vol 8, No 1 (1974), 45–56.

Sadli, Mohammad, “Some Reflections on Professor Boeke’s Theory of Dualistic Economies”, *Economics and Finance in Indonesia* Vol 56 No 1 (2008), 23–45 [reprinted from *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia*, June 1957 edition].

Scherer, Savitri, “Soetomo and Trade Unionism”, *Indonesia* Vol 24 (October 1977), 27–38.

Schulte-Nordholt, Henk, “De-colonising Indonesian Historiography”, paper delivered at the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies public lecture series “Focus Asia”, 25–27 May, 2004, Centre for the East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden, 2004.

Schulte-Nordholt, Henk, “Indonesia in the 1950’s: Nation, modernity and the postcolonial state”, *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* Vol 167 No 4 (2011), 386–404.

Stutje, Klaas, ‘Indonesian Identities Abroad: International Engagement of Colonial Students in the Netherlands 1908-1931’, *BGMN – Low Countries Historical Review*, Vol 128 –1 (2013), 151–172.

Suparna, “Buyung Saleh: trade unionist and writer”, *Inside Indonesia* No. 22 (March 1990).

Sutherland, Heather, “The Priyayi”, *Indonesia* No 19 (April 1975), 57–77.

Thee Kian Wie, “In Memoriam Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 1917–2001”, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* Vol 37 No 2, 2001, 173–181.

Thee Kian Wie, “The Debate on Economic Policy in Newly-Independent Indonesia between Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo”, *Itinerario* Vol 34 Issue 1, 2010, 35–56.

Vickers, Adrian, “The Classics in Indonesian Studies: J.S. Furnivall’s *Netherlands India*”, paper presented on the 15th Biennial conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, in Canberra on 29 June–2 July 2004.

Webster, David, “Modern Missionaries: Canadian Post-war Technical Assistance Advisers in Southeast Asia”, *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* Vol 20 No 2 (2009), 86–110.

Wicaksana, I Gede Wahyu, “International Society: The Social Dimensions of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, *The Pacific Review* Vol 29 No 5 (2016), 741–759.

Williams, Michael, “Sneevliet and The Birth of Asian Communism”, *New Left Review* I/123, September – October 1980, 81–90.

Theses

Crawford, Oliver, *The Political Thought of Tan Malaka*, PhD thesis, Trinity College University of Cambridge, 2018.

Elliott, Jan, *United We Stand Divided We Fall: Workers and Unions in Indonesia: Jakarta 1945–1965*, PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 1997.

Fakih, Farabi, 2014. *The Rise of the Managerial State in Indonesia: Institutional Transition during the Early Independence Period 1950–1965*, PhD thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2014.

Ford, Michele Therese, *NGO as Outside Intellectual: A History of Non-Governmental Organisations’ Role in the Indonesian Labour Movement*. PhD thesis, School of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 2003.

Fuady, Ahmad Helmy, *Elites and Economic Policies in Indonesia and Nigeria 1966–1998*, PhD Thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2012.

Karsono, Sony, *Indonesia’s New Order 1966-1998: Its Social and Intellectual Origin*, PhD thesis, College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, 2013.

Myers, Robert J., *The Development of the Indonesian Socialist Party*, PhD Thesis University of Chicago, 1959.

Oud-Alblas, Jan-Jacob Blusse van, *Missionaries of Modernity: Technocratic Ideals of Colonial Engineers in the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines 1900–1920*, MA Thesis, The State University of New Jersey, 2012.

Petersson, Fredrik, *We Neither Visionaries nor Utopian Dreamer: Willi Munzerberg, the League Against Imperialism and the Comintern 1925-1933*, PhD Thesis – Division for Arts, Education and Theology, History Department Abo Akademi University, 2013.

Stutje, Klaas, *Behind the Banner of Unity: Nationalism and Anticolonialism among Indonesian Students in Europe 1917–1931*, PhD thesis, Universiteit Amsterdam, 2016.

Sutherland, Heather, *Tempo Doeloe and Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Social and Intellectual Life in Twentieth Century Batavia, focusing on the Indonesian Community 1933 to 1942*, MA thesis, School of General Studies Australian National University, 1967.

Thrasher, Barry, *The Origin and Contested Legacy of Indonesia's Berkeley Mafia, 1955–1969*, BA Thesis, Department of History Brown University, 2018.

Turner, Barry, *Nasution: Total People's Resistance and Organicist Thinking in Indonesia*, PhD Thesis, Faculty of Life and Social Sciences, University of Melbourne, 2005.

Zande, Titia van der, *A Third World Concept-The Asian Socialist Conference: Ideologies of Neutrality, Development, and Anti-Imperialism in the laboratory of the 1950s*, Leiden: University of Leiden Master of Thesis, 2017.

Books and Monographs

Abdullah, Taufik, *School and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971.

Abdullah, Taufik, *Indonesia Towards Democracy*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.

Algardri, Hamid, *Prime Minister Sjahrir as Statesman and Diplomat: How the Allies became friends of Indonesia and opponents of the Dutch (1945–1949)*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1995.

Al-Rahab, Amiruddin, *Ekonomi Berdikari Sukarno*, Jakarta, Komunitas Bambu, 2014.

- Anderson, Benedict R.O.G, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972. [translated as Anderson, Benedict, *Revoloesi Pemoeda: Pendudukan Jepang dan Perlawanan di Jawa 1944-1946*, Tangerang, Marjin Kiri, 2018]
- Anwar, Rosihan (ed), *Mengenang Sjahrir*, Jakarta, Gramedia, 1980.
- Anwar, Rosihan, *Soebadio Sastrosatomo: Pengemban Misi Politik*, Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1995.
- Bangun, Rikard (ed), *Bung Hatta*, Jakarta, Kompas, 2003.
- Beech, Matt & Hickson, Kevin, *Labour's Thinkers: The Intellectual Roots of Labour from Tawney to Gordon Brown*, London/New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007.
- Bernstein, Eduard, *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation*, New York: Schocken Books, 1961.
- Bourchier, David, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, London/New York, Routledge, 2015.
- Bourrinet, Philippe, *The Dutch and German Communist Left (1900–68)*, Leiden, Brill, 1995.
- Brewer, Anthony, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, London/New York, Routledge, 1990.
- Chalmers, Ian & Hadiz, Vedi R (ed), *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives*, London/New York, Routledge, 1997.
- Clarke, J.J., *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought*, London / New York, Routledge, 1997.
- Darity Jr, William (ed), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 2nd Edition*, Macmillan Reference, 2008.
- Davidson, Jamie S. & Henley, David (eds), *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics*, London/New York, Routledge, 2007.

- Dick, Howard, et.al, *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press/Asian Studies Association of Australia, 2002.
- Djilas, Milovan, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, London, Thames & Hudson, 1957.
- Elson, R.E., *The Idea of Indonesia*, Cambridge / New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Esmara, Hendra (ed), *Teori Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Pembangunan: Kumpulan Esei untuk menghormati Sumitro Djojohadikusumo*, Jakarta, Gramedia, 1987
- Feith, Herbert, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Singapore, Equinox Publishing, 2007.
- Finnane, Antonia & McDougall, Derek (eds), *Bandung 1955: Little Histories*, Caulfield, Monash University Press, 2010.
- Foulcher, Keith, *Pujangga Baru: Literature and Nationalism 1933–1942*, Bedford Park: Asian Studies, Flinders University of South Australia, 1980.
- Furnivall, J.S., *Hindia Belanda: Studi Tentang Ekonomi Majemuk*, Jakarta, Freedom Institute, 2009.
- Gahan, Peter, *Bernard Shaw and Beatrice Webb on Poverty and Equality in the Modern World 1905-1914*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017
- Geertz, Clifford, *The Religion of Java*, Chicago / London, University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- Geertz, Clifford, *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia*, Los Angeles/Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.
- Goodall, Heather, *Beyond Borders: Indians, Australians and the Indonesian Revolution, 1939 to 1950*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2019.
- Gouda, Frances, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Praktik Kolonial di Hindia Belanda*, Jakarta, Serambi, 2007.

- Gouda, Frances & Zaalberg, Thijs Brocades, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: U.S. Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2002.
- Gramsci, Antonio, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Graves, Elizabeth H., *The Minangkabau Response to Dutch Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century*, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981.
- Herlambang, Wijaya, *Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965: Bagaimana Orde Baru Melegitimasi Anti-Komunisme Melalui Sastra dan Film*, Tangerang, Marjin Kiri, 2013.
- Hettne, Bjorn, *Teori Pembangunan dan Tiga Dunia*, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001.
- Higgins, Benjamin, *Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development*, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957.
- Hill, David T., *Jurnalisme dan Politik di Indonesia: Biografi kritis Mochtar Lubis (1922–2004) sebagai pemimpin redaksi dan pengarang*, Jakarta, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2011.
- Ingleson, John, *Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement 1927–1934*, Singapore/Kuala Lumpur, Heinemann Educational Books & Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1979.
- Ingleson, John, *Buruh, Serikat, dan Politik: Indonesia pada 1920an–1930an*, Jakarta, Marjin Kiri, 2015.
- Jones, Tod, *Culture, Power and Authoritarianism in the Indonesian State: Cultural Policy Across the Twentieth Century to the Reform Era*, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013.
- Kahin, Audrey (ed), *Regional Dynamics of Indonesian Revolution*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.
- Kahin, Audrey, *Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity 1926–1998*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2000 [translated as Audrey

- Kahin, *Dari Pemberontakan hingga Integrasi: Sumatra Barat dan Politik Indonesia 1926–1998*, Jakarta, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2008].
- Kahin, Audrey, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad Natsir*, Singapore, NUS Press, 2012.
- Kahin, Audrey & Kahin, George McT, *Subversi Sebagai Politik Luar Negeri: Menyingkap Keterlibatan CIA di Indonesia*, Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1997.
- Kahin, George McT, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1969.
- Kahin, George McT., *Southeast Asia: A Testament*, New York/London, Routledge, 2003.
- Kartodirdjo, Sartono, *Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Katoppo, Aristides & Hendra Esmara, *Sumitro Djojohadikusumo: Jejak Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 2000.
- Kautsky, John H. (ed.), *Political Change in Underdevelopment Countries: Nationalism and Communism*, New York/London/Sydney, John Wiley and Sons, 1967.
- King, Lawrence Peter & Szelenyi, Ivan, *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power*, Minneapolis / London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.
- Klinken, Gerry van, *Lima Penggerak Bangsa Yang Terlupa: Nasionalisme Minoritas Kristen*, Yogyakarta, LKiS, 2010.
- Kolakowski, Leszek, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution (3 Vols)*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978.
- A.P.E. Korver, *Sarekat Islam: Gerakan Ratu Adil?*, Jakarta, Grafitti Press, 1985.
- Latif, Yudi, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20*, Jakarta, Mizan, 2007.
- Latif, Yudi, *Negara Paripurna: Historisitas, Rasionalitas, dan Aktualitas Pancasila*, Jakarta, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2012.

- Legge, J. D., *Sukarno: A Political Biography* New York, Praeger Publisher, 1972.
- Legge, J. D., *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project – Monograph Series, 1988 [translated as Legge, J.D., *Kaum Intelektual dan Perjuangan Kemerdekaan: Peranan Kelompok Sjahrir*, Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 2003].
- Lenin, V.I, *State and Revolution* [annotated and introduced by Todd Chretien], Chicago, Haymarket Books, 2014.
- Levy, Carl (ed), *Socialism and the Intelligensia 1880–1914*, London / New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.
- Lindsay, Jennifer & Liem, Maya H.T. (ed), *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesia 1950–1965*, Leiden, KITLV Press, 2012.
- Lucas, Anton, *Local Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java 1942–1945*, Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1986 [translated as Lucas, Anton, *Radikalisme Lokal: Oposisi dan Perlawanan Terhadap Pendudukan Jepang di Jawa (1942–1945)*, Yogyakarta, Syarikat Indonesia, 2012].
- Lucas, Anton, *One Soul One Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia*, Sydney, Allen & Unwin/Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1991.
- Madinier, Remy, *Partai Masjumi: Antara Godaan Demokrasi dan Islam Integral*, Jakarta, Mizan, 2013.
- Mahasin, Aswab & Natsir, Ismed (eds), *Cendekiawan dan Politik*, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1983.
- Mattson, Kevin, *Intellectuals in Action: The Origin of the New Left and Radical Liberalism 1945–1970*, University Park Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
- Maxwell, John, *Soe Hok Gie: Pergulatan Intelektual Muda Melawan Tirani*, Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 2001.

McDougal, Derek & Finnane, Antonia (eds), *Bandung 1955: Little Histories*, Melbourne, Monash University Press, 2010.

McIntyre, Angus (ed.), *Indonesian Political Biography: In Search of Cross-Cultural Understanding*, Melbourne: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.

McVey, Ruth T, *The Calcutta Conference and Southeast Asian Uprising*, Ithaca, Interim Report Series - Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958.

McVey, Ruth T, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, Jakarta/Singapore, Equinox Publishing, 2006.

Miert, Hans van, *Dengan Semangat Berkobar: Nasionalisme dan Gerakan Pemuda di Indonesia 1918–1930*, Jakarta : Hasta Mitra/KITLV, 2003.

Mintz, Jeanne S., *Mohammed, Marx, Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism*, London / Dunmow, Pall Mall Press, 1965 [translated as Mintz, Jeanne S, *Muhammad, Marx, Marhaen: Akar Sosialisme Indonesia*, Yogyakarta, Pustaka Pelajar, 2003].

Mortimer, Rex, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959–1965*, Jakarta/Singapore, Equinox Publishing, 2006.

Mrázek, Rudolf, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia*, New York/Ithaca, Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1994 [translated as Mrázek, Rudolf, *Sjahrir: Politik dan Pengasingan di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1996].

Mrázek, Rudolf, *Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony*, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2002.

Munro, John, *The Anticolonial Front: The African-American Freedom Struggle and Global Decolonization 1945–1960*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Ngasiran, Riadi, *Kesabaran Revolusioner Djohan Sjahroezah, Pejuang Kemerdekaan Bawah Tanah*, Jakarta, Kompas, 2015.

Niel, Robert van, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite*, Leiden, KILTV, 1984.

- Nieuwenhuis, Rob, *Mirror of the Indies: A History of Dutch Colonial Literature* Jakarta/Singapore, Periplus, 1999.
- Nursam, M., *Pergumulan Seorang Intelektual: Biografi Soedjatmoko*, Jakarta, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2002.
- Onghokham, *Runtuhnya Hindia Belanda*, Jakarta, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1987.
- Poeze, Harry A, *Di Negeri Penjajah: Orang Indonesia di Negeri Belanda 1600-1950*, Jakarta, KITLV Press/Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2008.
- Poeze, Harry A, *Madiun 1948: PKI Bergerak*, Jakarta, Yayasan Obor Indonesia / KITLV Press, 2011.
- Porter, Donald J., *Managing Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, London/New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Rahardjo, M. Dawam, *Ekonomi Neoklasik dan Sosialisme Religius : Pragmatisme Pemikiran Ekonomi Politik Sjafruddin Prawiranegara*, Bandung, Mizan, 2011.
- Rahardjo, M. Dawam, *Ekonomi Politik Pembangunan*, Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat, 2012.
- Rahardjo, M. Dawam, *Nasionalisme, Sosialisme dan Pragmatisme: Pemikiran Ekonomi Politik Sumitro Djojohadikusumo*, Jakarta, LP3ES, 2016.
- Raillon, Francois, *Politik dan Ideologi Mahasiswa Indonesia: Pembentukan dan Konsolidasi Orde Baru 1966–1974*, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1985.
- Reeve, David, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985. [translated as Reeve, David, *Golkar Sejarah yang Hilang: Akar Pemikiran dan Dinamika*, Jakarta, Komunitas Bambu, 2013]
- Reid, Anthony, *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945–1950*, Melbourne, Longman, 1974.
- Ricklefs, M.C., *A History of Modern Indonesia since c1200*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

- Rist, Gilbert, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*, London/New York: Zed Books, 2008.
- Robison, Richard, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, Jakarta / Singapore, Equinox Publishing, 2009.
- Rose, Mavin, *Free Indonesia: Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta*, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1987.
- Samuel, Hanneman, *Genealogi Kekuasaan Ilmu Sosial Indonesia*, Depok, Kepik Ungu, 2010.
- Sastrosatomo, Soebadio, *Perjuangan Revolusi*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1987.
- Scherer, Savitri, *Keselarasan dan Kejanggalan: Pemikiran-Pemikiran Priyayi Nasionalis Jawa*, Jakarta, Komunitas Bambu, 2012.
- Schram, Stuart R. & d'Encausse, Helene Carrere, *Marxism and Asia: An Introductory with Readings*, London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1969.
- Schwarz, Henry & Ray, Sangeeta (eds), *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
- Shiraishi, Takashi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912–1926*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990.
- Simanjuntak, Marsilam, *Pandangan Negara Integralistik: Sumber, Unsur dan Riwayatnya dalam Persiapan UUD 1945*, Jakarta, Grafiti, 1994.
- Simpson, Bradley R, *Economist with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S. – Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2008 [translated as Bradley R. Simpson, *Economist with Guns: Amerika Serikat, CIA dan Munculnya Pembangunan Otoriter Rezim Orde Baru*, Jakarta, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2010].
- Smith, Anthony D., *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, London/New York: Routledge, 1998.

- Smith, Giles Scott, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and post-war American hegemony*, London/New York, Routledge, 2002.
- Soe Hok Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demontran*, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1989.
- Soe Hok Gie, *Orang-Orang di Persimpangan Kiri Jalan*, Yogyakarta, Bentang Pustaka, 2005.
- Stoler, Ann Laura, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt 1870–1979*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985.
- Sundhaussen, Ulf, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Suseno, Franz Magnis, *Pemikiran Karl Marx: Dari Materialisme Dialektis hingga Perselisihan Revisionisme*, Jakarta, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2000.
- Sutherland, Heather, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi*, Kuala Lumpur, Heinemann, 1979.
- Tedjasukmana, Iskandar, *Watak Politik Gerakan Serikat Buruh Indonesia*, Jakarta: Trade Union Rights Centre, 2008.
- Thayer, Philip W and Phillips, William T. (eds), *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*, Baltimore/Cambridge: The John Hopkins Press/Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Thee Kian Wie (ed), *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy 1950s–1990s*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
- Thompson, Noel, *Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic Socialism 1884–2005*, London / New York, Routledge, 2006.
- Tichelman, Fritjof, *The Social Evolution of Indonesia: The Asiatic Mode of Production and Its Legacy*, The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1980.
- Torquist, Olle, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia*, London, Zed Books, 1984.

Tsuchiya, Kenji, *Demokrasi dan Kepemimpinan: Kebangkitan Gerakan Taman Siswa*, Jakarta, Balai Pustaka, 1992

Tudor, H & Tudor, J.M (eds), *Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate 1896-1898*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Vickers, Adrian, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Watson, Peter, *A Terrible Beauty: The Peoples and Ideas that Shaped the Modern Mind*, London, Phoenix, 2001.

Wertheim, W.F., *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change*, 2nd edition, The Hague, W. Van Hoeve, 1964.

Young, Robert J.C., *Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016.

Yudotomo, Imam, *PSI yang Saya Ketahui*, Yogyakarta, Kasan Ngali, 2021.