CHAPTER ONE

MODELS OF CONVERSION

The recesses of feeling, the darker blinder strata of character,
are the only places in the world where we catch real fact in the making.

William James

1. CONVERSION TO RELIGION: PANACEA OR OPIATE?

From its earliest beginnings, the psychology of religion has been concerned with conversion; the moment of certainty said to characterise the direct, almost mystical apprehension of the divine. A spiritualist himself, William James (1902) emphasised the 'fruits' of conversion in the benefits derived by the individual, rather than the origin of the experience. He viewed ontological questions as beyond the scope of psychological enquiry. Freud (1927) was not so chary. For him the 'outside agency' was a projection of early parental relations, and religion, an illusory alliance with a powerful deity deriving from wo/man's need to understand and be protected from the superior and crushing forces of nature. Religion was assumed to have an explanatory and consolatory function. It was a compensation for the renunciation of instinctual gratification required by civilized life. Like Marx, he asserted that the god(s) we create and use have their drawbacks. In so far as religion is a fantasy solution to
stress, it can be seen as promoting the conservatism of adaption to the status quo, rather than taking action on one’s dissatisfactions to bring about a new social order (Marx and Engels, 1964). To Marx, religion was an opiate; to Freud, an illusion with a limited future.

Illusion or otherwise, religion has not had the limited future Freud suggested. Nietzsche’s (1882) proclamation of the death of god and the secularisation literature of the 1960’s notwithstanding (Shiner, 1967), religion has a virulent new growth in what have been termed religious cults. New Religious Movements [NRM], as I shall term them, provide unusual challenges to these historical perspectives on religion. Yet certain issues endure. Modern research is still concerned with the explanatory and consolatory function of religion and conversion. Conversion is still a special issue: it forms the major avenue of recruitment as, by dint of cults’ "deviant" status, few are born into them. It is perhaps testimony to the importance of the issues NRMs raise, that not all accounts of conversion to them have been dispassionate and scholarly. Accounts vary from those who see it as an instance of brainwashing, to a perspective increasing in acceptance recently which views conversion to NRMs as an alternative to secular problem-solving agencies (Kilbourne and Richardson, 1984), such as therapies and the flourishing natural health agencies, to those who regard it as a product of a spiritual calling.

1.1 The Challenge Of New Religious Movements

Eister (1972) describes cults as "deviant but non-schismatic bodies" meaning that they do not derive from any parent religion within the community. They are deviant due to
doctrinal innovation or importation. If innovative (like the Jesus Movement, or Pentecostalism), their heresies may be subsequently incorporated into the orthodoxy. If their cult status derives from their importation from countries of Eastern religious traditions, (like the Nichiren Shoshu, Rajneeshism, and the Divine Light Mission) then they are likely to continue to be regarded as cults despite length of history in the new culture. As non-normative ‘alternative’ systems of belief and devotion, cults are characterised by Yinger (1970:279) as "religious mutants, extreme variations on the dominant themes by which [wo]men struggle with their problems." The ‘deviance’ implicit in the definitions of cults has come to have connotations richer than mere non-normative status; the term cult is quite pejorative in America (Beckford, 1979). For this reason, they will be referred to as New Religious Movements in this study.

In contrast to Marx’s characterisation of religion, far from endorsing the status quo, cults are often quite millenarian western or mystical eastern belief systems. There are a number of features of NRMs which have led to their being viewed as threats. Some of the following characterise some groups:

- An unconventional belief system

- Visible changes evident at joining (e.g. in name and attire)

- Communal lifestyles and the removal of people from their past social ties (termed encapsulation)

- Experimental sexual mores

- Followers labour without receiving individual remuneration
• The 'spiritual master' may wield excessive power (viz Jonestown), or stand to gain (e.g. Bhagwan's 100 or so Rolls Royces)

Differences in organisational structure, recruiting practices and beliefs of the various cults, are often overlooked in the portrayal of the groups in media and some research. Such a blurring of distinctions hinders accurate understanding of the groups. It is an example of the mechanism of prejudice where, through stereotyping, gross similarities are emphasised to the exclusion of disconfirming diversities.

Beckford (1979) notes that there has been a strategic or political use of language regarding cults. The Goelter Report (cited in Richardson, 1980) provides a telling example of this. It sets out a typology entitled: "Youth in Destructive Groups". The conclusions that the groups are destructive are only as sound as the evidence, which in this case is methodologically flawed. The scientific core of Goelter's report is an opinion poll where only 4% of the participants had ever attended a sect meeting, and only 25% of whom could actually name a sect. Such evocative language on so slender a scientific base makes it difficult to sort the sensational from the actual.

The construction of cults as dangerous stems from a number of alleged practices, like deceptive recruitment techniques and brainwashing. The analysis hinges on a number of philosophical assumptions regarding free-will and personal responsibility. These assumptions touch the tacit beliefs shared by researchers, laymen and the legal profession alike (Beckford, 1979). The threat they pose may derive from the challenge Beckford (1979) suggests they present to "deeply rooted values of moderation, balance and responsibility". The communal ideologies and lifestyles of some NRM s, he
suggests threaten an assumption that in Western democracies society is "a reasonably cohesive federation of tolerant collectivities and institutions" (p.177). They also threaten what he terms the "implicit sociology" of the layman that a "normally socialised individual is resistant to pressures towards collective thought, sentiment and action" (p.179). Psychological research on social influence shows how tenuous is such an assumption (Festinger, 1954; Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1974).

The concern that 'normal resistance' may be undermined by NRMs may contribute to the fact that of the numerous attempts to explain conversion to NRMs, the most popular in the press is that of coercive persuasion. Delgado (1977) is a representative voice of those highlighting the resemblance of conversion to brainwashing: "The recruit never has full capacity and full knowledge at any given time. One or other is always impaired, to some degree, by cult design." The Lasher Amendment 2 and the rise of what by many was deemed to be a new cult - deprogramming (the empire strikes back) reveal the influence of this framework on how NRMs have been viewed. However, the differences among NRMs have been blurred and there is a dearth of empirical, comparative data on the applicability of features of coercive persuasion at least as brainwashing has been outlined by Schein (1957) and Somit (1968). Systematically documented and methodologically rigorous evidence establishing the use of these techniques in "cult" recruitment is lacking. There is suggestive evidence that deceptive recruitment occurs and that emotionally taxing techniques are used by some groups, (Heftman, 1982; Conway & Siegelman, 1978) but the adequacy of the data base and the statistical conclusions are questionable (Kilbourne, 1983, 1986).
There is also a failure to use the field experimenter's equivalent of control groups, by considering the extent to which such techniques may characterise a number of accepted social groups. In the absence of such considerations, few conclusions can be drawn. Further, there is some evidence (which does not rely on a single case study: cf. Heftman, 1982) regarding the absence of brainwashing techniques (Galanter, 1980), techniques which, for the purposes of this study, include: physical restraint, information control and social pressure. There is also evidence establishing the absence of allegedly adverse outcomes of participation in activities purported to produce the symptoms of brainwashing (Kilbourne, 1983, 1986).

The implications of the coercive persuasion paradigm for psychological research is that it assumes no predisposing features of the individual, that anyone is potentially grist for the mill. Conversion is assumed to be the product of elaborate recruitment techniques rather than the product of a religious calling, and predispositions to involvement are displaced from research concern.

This is not the case for Lofland and Stark's (1965) model of cult conversion, which addresses the role of psychological response to disruptive life experiences and a person's seekership or religious orientation, in predisposing a person to NRM contact. While the part of the model dealing with these features has been accorded little credence theoretically and little direct empirical testing, it seemed ambitious to return to a model already two and a half decades in the literature, revive it with some conceptual critique and linkages made to anthropological literature (Van Gennep, 1908/1960) and Schein's (1957) work with prisoners of war, and then take very
seriously the compounding effects of disruptive life events, inadequate social resources and a religious orientation. Would the outcome of having all these things happen to one person at once, to an individual whose psychological substrate may have a vulnerability, a neediness, in part due to inadequate early parental relations, be spiritual affiliation? The conceptual overlap between this model, and the work of Van Gennep and Schein was sufficiently consistent to be inspiring. Research addressing individual parameters of the model revealed data that provided further encouragement. It seemed worthy of empirical testing, given that the outcome might be a step towards systematising a lot of interesting results within a wider deterministic model.
Figure 1. Literature which influenced the development of the Rites de Passage Model
2. CONVERSION TO NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS: LOFLAND AND STARK’S MODEL

2.1 A Descriptive Outline

The seven "necessary and constellationally sufficient" (p.874) features of Lofland and Stark’s (1965) model are as follows:

For conversion a person must:

1. Experience enduring, acutely-felt tensions
2. within a religious problem-solving perspective
3. which leads her [him] to define [her] himself as a religious seeker
4. encountering the cult at a turning point in her [his] life
5. wherein an affective bond is formed (or pre-exists) with one or more converts
6. where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized
7. and where, if [s]he is to become a ‘deployable agent’ [s]he is exposed to ‘intensive interaction’ (Lofland & Stark, 1965: 874).

An advantage of Lofland and Stark’s (1965) model of conversion to New Religious Movements is its emphasis on the unique nature of religious beliefs. Since they accord religious orientation an important role in conversion, this specificity means that they escape the criticism made by Zygmunt (1972) of those motivational analyses which assume the interchangeability or "psychofunctional equivalence of movements" (Zygmunt, 1972:452). While the model covers all phases of involvement, recruitment commitment and conversion, this study focuses on the features of lifestyle and personality which may ‘predispose’ a person to NRM involvement most clearly assessed at the person’s first contact with a NRM.
Loftand (1978) suggests that the model is an example of "qualitative process theorising" and that it is therefore perhaps of limited generality in explaining conversion to NRMs other than the Unification Church on which their series of stages was based, post hoc. Their initial formulation addressed the causal necessity and sufficiency of each of the stages for conversion to occur, and it is viewed in this light for the purposes of this study. More rigorous analysis than merely the qualitative or descriptive level is merited given their model has some prominence in the literature as a post factum ordering schema (Downton, 1980) has historical, conceptual links with Van Gennep's anthropological work and Schein's work with prisoners of war (considered in detail below), and captures the important stages of the process of conversion.

The seven features of the model are incorporated in a value-added form. In keeping with Smelser's (1963, cited in Sampson, 1971:357) original formulation, Loftand and Stark (1965) note that the "ordering principle is activation rather than temporal occurrence alone" (p. 863). However, the temporal sequence is important if one is attempting to ascertain whether certain needs and beliefs pre-dated NRM involvement, or whether they are interactional and emergent.

2.2 The Status of Converts' Accounts of Conversion

Memory is words, we remember what others say and record of ourselves - stones with the runes.
Louis MacNeice Eclogues from Iceland, (1964)
Zygmunt's (1972) remark that most studies addressing the notion of movement appeals do not consult affiliates regarding their perception of movement features requires a reply. There are a number of problematic issues in using members' accounts as data. As he notes, the view of movement ideology as a Problem Solving Perspective [PSP] is the most reductive and therefore the most resisted explanation of movement involvement. Thus there are problems with 'just asking' the convert for his or her account. As Rokeach (1963) notes "There are often compelling reasons, conscious or unconscious, why [s]he will not or cannot tell us."

One important difficulty with a convert's account is its retrospective character: it is difficult to separate the effects of participation from predispositions to participate. The 'motives' for participation may only become evident in hindsight, and may then be conveyed or acknowledged in a highly rationalised form (Beckford, 1979; Mills, 1940), perhaps exaggerating the depravity of pre-conversion life and the salutary effects of participation to reduce cognitive dissonance regarding the decision to join. In short this ideology, or as Mills (1940) terms it, this 'situated vocabulary' of the cult, social desirability (Galanter, 1980) and cognitive dissonance may influence the nature of the motives or reasons avowed, or s/he just may not consciously know.

This is one reason for seriously addressing a theoretical formulation of possible predisposing variables in the form of a model that enables us to make a priori predictions, which, when empirically tested allow us to modify or reject the model. Modification or rejection occurs when predictions are refuted with adequately operationalized measures with appropriate sample groups and controlled empirical
grounds. We will return to consider possible modifications of Lofland & Stark's model after considering some criticisms derived from a theoretical and empirical critique of the model.

3. THEORETICAL ISSUES

There is havoc enough on familiar earth beneath familiar skies, but in a time of discoveries that overturn unquestioned beliefs, then, in small pockets of the everyday world, an inexplicable chaos may reign.

Janet Frame (1988)

3.1 Disruption as Necessary Precedent to Personal Change

Lofland and Stark (1965) specify that the potential convert will have experienced problems which, while not qualitatively different from the general population, are experienced 'more acutely' and for a prolonged period of time. They provide no data in support of this claim, but suggest that their interviews with the formative members of the Unification Church [UC] in America, revealed that the nature of the tension is of 'frustrated aspirations', a concept reminiscent of Glock's (1964) notion of relative deprivation. Within the model the importance of these tensions is in the degree to which they disrupt "old obligations and lines of action" and discredit an individual's normal coping strategies.

Since conversion is the predominant recruitment avenue for NRMs, joining a NRM generally means moving away from the religious status of one's parents, and the religion (if any) into which one was primarily socialised. On a social-psychological level, this is an example of resocialisation (Berger and Luckman, 1967). Theoretically,
it has been argued that for resocialisation to occur, some disintegration in previous lifestyle patterns must occur (McHugh, 1972; Zygmunt, 1972). Zygmunt notes that the "recruitment of adherents is significantly contingent upon the weakening of attachments at least to those arrangements it is trying to change". McHugh (1972) says that as resocialisation involves some unlearning rather than "merely the successive expansion of learned norms on a congruent base" (p.701) typical theories of socialisation will not suffice. He suggests that 'disintegration' is a necessary precedent for resocialisation, "a fission of values making new fusions possible, not inevitable" (p.708). As his concern is with prison rehabilitation, he suggests that, "To the degree that continuing relationships reinforce the old values, the old values can be discontinued only by discontinuing the relationships" (p.704). He suggests that merely introducing new values will not introduce conforming behaviours as "the organised relationships in the inmate social system serve as vehicles for the expression of old values" (p. 704). McHugh (1972) outlines two forms of disintegration which have since emerged, from the consistent support they have received in the literature on movement involvement, as highly influential variables. They are:

- Normatively meaningless events - a disruption in routine

- Subverted interpersonal relationships - the social isolation of individuals.

As discussed in detail in Chapter Two (sections 6.1 and 6.2), there is reason to suppose that social bonds do not merely act as buffers from stress, but have a positive and independent contribution to an individual’s wellbeing, robustness and resilience, to the extent that they affirm and sustain personal identity, and provide an interactional
basis through which personal difficulties or troubles are identified and reacted to (Emerson & Messinger, 1977). Duck & Lea (1983) reject the notion "that personal relationships are formed only from affective roots and that the disruption or breakdown of relationships is merely an affective disturbance" (p.53). The incidence of anxiety and depression at the breakdown of relationships suggests to these researchers that they act as the "vehicle for the fulfilment of some deep human need" (p.55). Duck and Lea suggest that relationship breakdown acts to threaten identity. It is suggested therefore that the confluence of the two disruptive variables outlined by McHugh, namely, a disruption in routine experienced in isolation, (especially if part of the disruption is a recent rupture in significant relations likely to have provided support, relations which were difficult to find or will be to replace) may commence a rite of passage for the person as new ways of coping, and interpreting the events are sought. Emerson and Messinger (1977) suggest that if denial or withdrawal are not possible responses, there is an increased likelihood that a person will seek an outside agency in times of trouble, and suggest that "an initially ambiguous trouble crystallizes as new ways of dealing with it are sought and implemented and prior ways are determined to be ineffective and rejected" (p. 127). Examples of such outside agencies are provided by NRM s, or psychotherapy.

3.2 Conversion as Rite of Passage

The possible effects of disruption of relations and in the symbolic status of an individual in producing transitions in identity has a long history, outlined in Van Gennep's classic text *Rites de Passage* (1908/1960). He addresses various
communities' orchestration and ritual acknowledgement of changes in an individual's social role, contingent on their arrival at maturational or socially-defined thresholds. A rite de passage in fact consists of three rites:

- **Separation** - from a role previously held in society

- **Transition** - a liminal state where one is not what one was nor yet what one will become; a point of great ritual and ceremony

- **Reincorporation** - the reintegration of the person into his/her new role in the community, often with new name, and certainly with a new set of expectations and contingencies operative.

The generality of these stages is suggested by their echo in Schein's analysis (1957, 1973) of the attempted 'brainwashing' of American soldiers by the Chinese in Korean Prisoner of War camps in the 1950's. He specifies a similar three stages:

- **Demolition** - where attitudes and behaviour patterns are rendered 'fluid' by disconfirming an individual's definition of self and situation, or at least by providing a lack of confirmation

- **Transition** - an attempt to achieve a redefinition of an individual's situation via a change in frame of reference, and/or "new standards of value and judgement" where new attitudes and behaviours are acquired from available sources of information and experience

- **Restabilisation** - where new behaviours and attitudes are rendered relatively permanent, integrated into the wider personality pattern and significant ongoing
In Van Gennep's analysis and Schein's initial work, the emphasis is on the element of 'design' by some human agency in disrupting the attitudes and behaviour of an individual. Similarly, research using the brainwashing analogy to explain NRM involvement stresses NRM strategies. In a somewhat similar vein, Zygmunt acknowledges that "many motivational analyses have given insufficient attention to a movement's agitational endeavour as an unrest-defining medium" (p.457). However, Schein (1973:10, cited in Pentony, 1981) in his later work takes a position which informs the present study; "most disconfirmation which precipitates change comes in the ordinary course of living, from those in the immediate social environment". Since the notion that disruption precedes belief and attitude change has some theoretical and empirical support, and it has been suggested that social groups provide support for those attitudes and beliefs, at issue then is how this disruption occurs. A related issue is whether it occurs prior to contact with the NRM as a group, or contact with a NRM member. The significance of the disruption from the point of view of NRM involvement is its discrediting of a person's problem-solving perspective. This disconfirmation can occur when such a perspective no longer seems to deal with the problems an individual encounters in everyday life, or "when significant others upon whom the individual depended for the maintenance of his perspective become unavailable" (Greil, 1977:119).

It is not suggested that the genre of affiliative outcome is predictable from the nature of the disruption. In other words, it is not suggested that only 'spiritual problems'
may result in NRM involvement. Anthony, Robbins, Doucas and Curtis (1977) suggest that the similarity in assumptions of some psychotherapies and eastern mysticism may lead some people to regard them as "alternative methods of changing reality by changing their perceptions of it" (p.863). Certainly a number of their sample had vacillated between the two.

These historical sources provide support for the stages of Lofland and Stark's model which concern predispositions. The research on disruption (specifically Greil (1977) and Berger & Luckman (1967)) establishes that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conversion, a point that is recognized by Lofland and Stark in their emphasis on the value-added form of the model. They suggest that enduring tensions on their own cannot bring about conversion. Disruption alone could lead to any number of problem-solving outcomes. The argument rests on how disruption facilitates subsequent recruitment and conversion to a NRM.

3.3 Disruption - Does Enduring Stress and Tension Promote Affiliation to Social Agencies?

Heirich's (1977) study of conversion to Pentecostalism uses control groups and attempts a more quantitative assessment of the influence of predisposing features. He operationalised stress in terms of stress-producing circumstances such as; major role-shifst, birth order and parental background. A 'yes' to any probe regarding the occurrence of stressful circumstances in the preceding two years was sufficient to credit a respondent with 'actively-felt psychological stress'. While he found that 83% of the Pentecostal converts reported such stress (with 50% having had major role
shifts) two thirds of his (Catholic) control group also reported stress and a higher proportion had been involved in major role-shifts.

Due to the fact that Heirich's (1977) study is not a direct test of Lofland and Stark's model, there are a number of ways in which it fails to test the role of disruptive tensions in predisposing a person to NRM involvement. Firstly, Lofland and Stark do not suggest that the converts' problems are objectively different from those in the general population, but that they were 'acutely' experienced and caused enduring tension. A 'yes' to a probe does not capture the impact of events on the person. The two year time-frame is perhaps broader than optimal for an accurate retrospective assessment of stress (Henderson, Byrne and Duncan-Jones, 1981).

In a direct test of the model, Snow and Phillips (1980) use an even broader time frame. They gathered data on problems experienced, and the number occurring within given categories (e.g. material or characterological problems) at any time prior to cult encounter. Despite the fact that Lofland and Stark (1965) do not suggest that a convert's problems would differ qualitatively from those of the general population, but might merely be felt more acutely in terms of their impact, Snow and Phillips (1980:434) suggest:

Until we know whether the problems experienced by the preconverts are greater in number and qualitatively different from those experienced by the larger population, it is unreasonable to assume a causal linkage between prestructured tension and susceptibility to conversion.

Snow and Phillips (1980) did find that preconverts had had problematic lives. Sixty-nine per cent of the sample indicated that prior to, or at the time of encountering the
Nichiren Shoshu of America [NSA] they were experiencing one or more spiritual problems and 50% claimed to have had interpersonal, characterological and material problems. They suggest that it is only an *uncritical* look at these findings which lends support to the suggestion that acutely-felt tension is an important precipitant of conversion (Lofland and Stark, 1965; Richardson & Stewart, 1977). However, they suggest that a control group is required before any conclusions can be drawn. In lieu of a control group they used a 1957 survey of how American adults view their mental health, and 1976 survey data. Neither of these alludes to the presence of uniquely ‘spiritual problems’. Snow and Phillips had suggested that the nature of the problems related importantly to the nature of the solutions sought, but waived this consideration in regard to their control group. Those problems which were qualitatively similar in survey data and spiritual groups occurred with much less frequency in the survey data. There was a higher incidence of problems in those drawn to the NRM, yet Snow and Phillips (1980) conclude that "our data do not indicate a state of acutely-felt prolonged tension to be a necessary precipitating condition". The importance of a control group is not contested, but the nature of their control group and the logic underlying its use are both problematic. They do not assess the duration of problems or the associated psychological impact, which leaves those details of their conclusion unsubstantiated. Further, Lofland and Stark suggest that enduring, acutely-felt tensions are only necessary conditions. Finding that a control group had problems of a similar nature does not refute its role in precipitating conversion. The question is not how much variance this feature accounts for (as Heirich, 1977 attempted to assess) but *how* it influences conversion.\(^5\) The *form* of the value-added model is important. As Lofland
and Stark note, problems can be resolved in any of a number of ways. It is only when such tension occurs in an individual who is open to a religious interpretation of events that such disruption will result in religious affiliation. Snow and Phillips (1980) have adequate grounds to suggest that disruptive life events are not a sufficient feature of conversion, but they do not establish that they are not necessary features. To do that they would have to find converts who had not experienced acutely-felt tensions, which Lofland and Stark (1965) suggest refer to "frustrated aspirations" and which may span all of the categories of problems outlined by Snow and Phillips (1980:434). Snow and Phillips suggest that despite the high percentage who did claim to have problems, "many others were not aware of having had any severe problems prior to conversion" (p.435). However, they provide only sample testimonies from the movement's newspaper rather than quantitative data as to how representative these were from the samples they took. The nature of such data is problematic. The letters may not be representative and may have been selected for the newspaper to maximize movement appeal, attempting to reach even those not aware of having problems or of needing movement help.

Other studies attempting to test Lofland and Stark's model by addressing the occurrence of disruptive life events in the pre-contact phase of affiliates lives vary in their psychometric adequacy. On a small sample of Christians (an inappropriate group to explore conversion to new religious movements) Austin (1977) found (from an open interview without specific probes as to the duration of problems and their psychological impact) that 5 out of 9 subjects 'fitted the tension condition'. Austin
gives specific details as to ‘why they could not continue to live as they did before’ which addresses the disruptive nature of the tension. However, sample size, the free-form data and the orthodox nature of the group makes this at best a suggestive contribution to empirical testing of the model.

Seggar and Kunz (1972) also used an inappropriately orthodox group in their test of the model. They questioned subjects on life crises experienced two years prior to joining. In assessing the psychological impact of such events, they asked the question ‘how did you feel about it at the time?’. This evoked colourful responses as to how they felt which included: disgusted, elated, discouraged (p.180), none of which is amenable to precise interpretation regarding the degree of disruption attendant on its occurrence.

To assess the impact of problematic life events in terms of enduring psychological distress requires a study with a narrower time focus and psychometrically more precise measures. Galanter, Rabkin, Rabkin and Deutsch (1979) used a questionnaire which they composed and refined with a sample of Unification Church [UC] members. They developed ‘general wellbeing’ and ‘neurotic distress’ scales and retrospectively assessed members’ scores for four time periods:

- The period deemed ‘most symptomatic’ (by the subject) prior to NRM contact
- Immediately before contact
- Right after conversion
Distortion due to social desirability influences was minimised by carrying out research under the auspices of the church - the leaders gave specific instructions for frankness. It was found that members had experienced serious psychological difficulties prior to joining: 39% felt they had serious emotional problems: (30% had sought professional help and 6% has been hospitalized) whilst 23% had had serious drug problems. Their responses yielded neurotic distress scores that were significantly higher before joining than at the time of the study, though scores on the General Wellbeing Schedule were still lower than a matched comparison group. In conclusion, Galanter et al (1979:169) wrote that prior to joining:

many were apparently experiencing considerable emotional distress, leaving them open to an alternative perspective that would provide relief.

The tighter time focus of this study is admirable. Problems still remain as with any retrospective accounts. Use of Galanter's scales with affiliates contacting a movement for the first time would mean that accounts would be minimally influenced by the 'situated vocabulary' of the NRM or the possible need-arousing and problem-finding function of NRM involvement (Zygmunt, 1972; Gerlach and Hine, 1970; Beckford, 1978; Snow and Phillips, 1980). It would permit assessment of those who discontinue involvement prior to conversion. This was an avenue of research noted as lacking by Galanter et al. (1979) and remedied by Galanter, (1980). Such measurement is attempted within this study.
3.4 Stress and Tension - Definitions and Techniques of Assessment

Broadly, stress can be said to arise out of the occurrence of discrete events; due in part to the period of readjustment imposed on an individual.Thoits (1982) notes that the presence of continuous problematic life events might be referred to as strains. In assessing potentially stress-producing life events, the objective character of an event must be assessed independently of the response to the event. To this end, life events are typically operationally defined as experiences that cause a person to substantially readjust her or his behaviour patterns, (Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1981; Holmes and Rahe, 1967.) One of the assumptions made in positing life events as productive of stress is that "the organism is fundamentally intolerant of change" (Perlman and Peplau, 1981), which in the case of people who might be termed 'sensations seekers' might not be the case, (Smith, Johnson & Sarason, 1978). Within the 'life events as stressors' paradigm, change is seen as imposing a period of readjustment during which the system attempts to achieve homeostasis. The adverse consequences depend not only on the number of life events, and the magnitude of change imposed, but on the quality of life events as well. The quality of life events refers to such attributes as: their desirability, the degree of control people have (or feel they have) over them, and whether they are scheduled life cycle transitions. The stressing effects of negative, or culturally undesirable life events seem to be the primary influences on the positive relationship found between major life events and psychological distress, as desirable events tend to produce only a slight increase in distress. The relationship between the number of events and later disturbance is only moderate: ranging from correlation values of .17 to .35, (cf. Mueller et al., 1977; Rabkin and Struening, 1976, in Thoits,
1982:145). In short, some individuals who experience many events do not become distressed, while others who experience few events become highly distressed. (Hinkle, 1974 in Thoits, 1982:145). These anomalies require explanation. Pearlin, Lieberman, Menaghan and Mullan (1981) suggest that life events may lead to stress by dint of their "adversely altering the meaning of life strains", or by creating new strains or intensifying pre-existing strains. They suggest that this interaction of stresses and strains may influence one's self-esteem or sense of mastery, and in this mediate way influence psychological distress. From this point of view, enduring strains are both a product of life events and a channel through which life events have a damaging effect on psychological well-being. In summary, they suggest that persistent hardships may diminish self-esteem and mastery and may be important in the causal process leading to psychological distress. The evidence they present to support these postulated mediator variables will be considered below. It seems evident then that the intensity of stress cannot be gauged from the intensity of its sources, as certain mediators are viewed in the literature as relevant to the stress process. Two most frequently cited are social supports and coping styles.

Both are pertinent to this study, as the rite of passage focus is on the role of disruption in setting a process of transition into play, defined above in Greil's succinct analysis as disruptive events experienced in isolation. Further, it is suggested that a religious problem-solving perspective may be seen as a cognitive coping style. This will be discussed in detail below, but in brief, an eastern spiritual perspective might permit the (re)interpretation of life events in a manner which gives troublesome, and perhaps
‘normatively meaningless’ events a place in the wider scheme of life, since, from this perspective, transience and change are expected rather than stasis and security. Further, troublesome life events, whether they are seen as a part of suffering that inevitably arose due to a past lack of awareness, or as a sign that one is working through ‘bad karma’, they are at least no longer without any form of explanation, rhyme or reason. A comparison will be made below regarding Kobasa, Maddi and Kahn’s (1982) concept of ‘hardiness’ and how the defining features of hardiness relate to the style of interpretation of events promoted by many eastern spiritual worldviews.

For the moment, discussion will concern the early phases of the rite of passage towards movement contact, considering the literature which debates whether psychological or structural variables give the most full account of differential recruitment. It will be suggested that the two dimensions of explanation concern variables which are rarely empirically separate, and, in the cases of concepts seen as predispositions to movement involvement, like ‘appeal’ and loneliness, both structural circumstances and individual appraisal of them are indispensable features of such predispositions.

4. STRUCTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENTIAL RECRUITMENT: A CRITIQUE

The channels of recruitment vary according to the degree to which life-style and belief system render possible or permit the continuance of affiliative networks outside of those provided by the NRM. Groups like the Hare Krishna, which Wallis (1979) terms ‘world-rejecting’ seem to discourage the maintenance of pre-existing bonds, and
their rural and communal lifestyle renders such bonds less likely (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olsen, 1980). In contrast the Nichiren Shoshu value attachments outside the group as a means of facilitating movement growth. The relative ‘encapsulation’ of group members (that is, to what extent social networks are restricted to uniquely movement-related relationships), influences the importance of active recruitment techniques such as public proselytizing to strangers, compared with the role of pre-existing social networks as avenues of recruitment.

4.1 Active Recruitment Techniques: Direct and Deceptive

Recruitment refers to the means by which a NRM attempts to make contact with and secure potential participants. Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olsen (1980) outline the general outreach and engagement options for passing on movement information and promoting movement aims. They distinguish the mediate or face to face, public or private nature of these channels.

The recruitment techniques most akin to brainwashing are those which resemble capture, in that they are highly deceptive. Lofland (1978), (see also Robbins, Anthony, Doucas and Curtis, 1976), outlines techniques of public and personal confrontation which involve ‘picking up’ the ‘prospect’ (potential convert) and ‘hooking’ him or her by engaging him/her in issues of concern to them, making them indebted to a cult member, and obtaining their consent to a meal or weekend away. In these ways prospects are removed from their normal social environment. The techniques are more reminiscent of seduction rather than capture however. Galanter (1980) notes that people attending a workshop reported no overt coercion or physical deprivation during
that period, and 97% said there was no more than disapproval expressed at any point to discourage them from leaving the church. It is unlikely that those attending a two-day workshop were already brainwashed into protecting the Unification Church’s reputation. However, the large percentage reporting no strong discouragement of attempts to leave may be misleading, as not everyone can be assumed to have made such attempts. Evidence that fully 90% reported some prior commitment to Eastern or Fundamentalist Christian groups (53% acknowledged a moderate prior commitment) supports the portrayal of recruitment as seduction of the willing rather than capture. In spite of this evidence, this group is perhaps the most widely acknowledged as using elaborate and deceptive recruitment techniques. It seems that their tactics fall short of the ‘capture’ phase of Schein’s initial formulation of brainwashing. From the high degree of prior spiritual involvement it seems more likely that the participants were interested and consenting.

For the Nichiren Shoshu NRM, active proselytizing (called shakubuku) such as telling people about the sacred scroll, and the group’s mantra believed to unlock its powers is incorporated within the belief system of the group as an act of mercy. As Kanter (1968:499) appositely notes, such "an intersection of organisational requisites and personal experience" or the linking of self interests to organisational requirements is a primary mechanism for ensuring continued commitment. Further, such a witnessing may reduce a convert’s own dissonance (Festinger, Rieken, and Schachter, 1956).

Regarding deceptive recruitment, a number of researchers note that during the early phases of commitment, NRMs may avoid initial proselytising (Lofland, 1977; Stark
and Bainbridge, 1981). They suggest that people do not join a NRM per se, but begin by taking part in its activities. However, research on these 'activities' (discussed below) reveals that they are quite explicitly religious in theme. This suggestion that people do not join a movement but merely take part in activities raises the interesting question of how deeper commitment arises. Commitment refers to the processes of aligning self-interests with the interests of the movement. For an individual to maintain involvement after first contact, "predispositions must be ordered, put into the service of the movement [and] linked with its values" Zygmunt (1972: 462). It involves the investment of personal resources and a progressive decline in competing options, through a process which Becker (1960) terms "making side-bets". That commitment often occurs without conscious knowledge does not necessarily imply that brainwashing has occurred, or that a movement orchestrated commitment independently of the particular needs and beliefs of the individual. The notion of side-bets refers to the fact that a given level of involvement can constrain an individual's future by involving other interests originally extraneous to the direct lines of action (Becker, 1960). Commitment may arise piecemeal, "the person becomes aware that [s]he is committed only at some point of change, and seems to have made the commitment without realizing it." (Becker, 1960: 38).

Commitment is a matter of degree, encompassing instrumental, affective and moral commitment. Kanter (1968: 501) notes the relevance to analyses of commitment of the distinctions Kelman (1958) draws between compliance, identification and internalization. Internalization is where commitment is sustained by an individual's
beliefs and attitudes and is conceptually akin to conversion. It must be noted that
dependence on a charismatic leader may produce commitment which strongly
resembles conversion but may in fact be based on identification, that is, commitment
may be a result of a desire to please the leader rather than as a result of a belief in the
‘rightness’ of his/her message. This is perhaps a precursor to the introjection of
movement values, but, more likely, may continue to co-determine involvement in some
cases. Moscovici (1980) reiterates the distinction between conversion (private
acceptance) from mere public agreement (or compliance) when the ‘agent of change’ is
still present. The importance of a change in cognitive orientation as the hallmark of
conversion is evident in Schein’s original work with Prisoners of War. In the situation
of coercive persuasion some American prisoners did not collaborate, and some actively
resisted acceptance of any part of the communist ideology. Very few chose to remain
behind when repatriation was possible. Pure contact, however continued or constant,
does not ensure that an individual will accept a collection of people as a reference
group. Even where collaboration and isolation were used to break down informal
group structures, there were few true ‘conversions’. As a term, brainwashing was first
coined by Lifton (1963), as a rough translation for a term used by a Chinese person to
refer to re-education. It is hard to see why the brainwashing metaphor has had such
explanatory currency, for Schein’s (1957) meticulous accounts of techniques used on
American prisoners of war in North Korea, portray them as unsuccessful in achieving
anything more than behavioural compliance. The "participants" had been physically
captured, and the captors had the power of torture and life or death over them. Yet,
even then compliance was only achieved when guards had complete social and
physical control. This entailed an uneconomic output of manhours for the resulting twenty-one "brainwashees" who chose to stay behind when repatriation was possible. Schein notes that some of these may have been motivated to avoid the severe repercussions feared on their return to the US for their conspicuous collaboration. It seems that capture and sheer pressure does not lead to a change in beliefs and values in most cases. The captors did not succeed in truly becoming a "reference group" by which means values, attitudes and beliefs are supported or changed. They remained a group expediently formed: a mere physical assemblage. Mere contact with a group does not entail their necessarily having "referent power." For most men it seemed that the rewards for collaboration were high enough to justify to themselves the actions taken. Lifton (1963) notes the case of one young man who needlessly offered information potentially leading to the detection of a young resistance worker, and was unable to rationalise his behaviour to himself other than as a gesture of sincerity to his captors. This case closely resembles true conversion in that it is an attitude change towards the Chinese perspective maintained without direct coercion. Schein (1957) suggests that those most prone to truly identifying with their captors had had dissatisfactions with their way of life in the United States. This individual difference in terms of psychological predisposition was beyond the control of the captors, and worked serendipitously in their favour. Such individual differences may determine to whom "self-transformation" agencies appeal. These differences may hinge on psychological traits or the complexity of a person's recent life experience. Those liable to be attracted to a change of belief system and lifestyle may be those who have had a "rough lot in life" for whom stress, frustrated aspirations, and a sense of
loneliness and meaninglessness have become the hallmarks of their lifestyle and mental life. This entails the notion of a selection effect, or differential recruitment rather than the paradigmatic capture of the first phase of brainwashing. However, it could be alleged that such needs could have been aroused in those making contact with the groups, rather than being a pre-existing factor influencing the group’s appeal. Greil (1977) suggests that it is "orientation to a group and not membership in that group that leads to conversion" (p.121). He notes that an individual’s cognitive orientation will influence his or her selection of a new perspective and a new reference group, even at the recruitment stage. The efficacy of the capture and force paradigm for achieving conversion or long-term commitment is highly questionable.

Recent evidence from Barker (1981, 1986) and Galanter (1989) suggests that new participants could not have mistaken the spiritual focus of even the most introductory activities of a number of NRMs. Galanter (1980) notes of an introductory two-day workshop put on by the Unification Church that:

The principle activity is a series of six one and a half hour lectures, which convey the most salient points of the ‘Divine Principle’ - the religious doctrine of the Unification Church ... The discussions and some other sharing experiences are more oriented toward intellectual exploration of religious concepts than emotional catharsis (p.1575).

Barker (1981) notes that those turning up to a UC workshop without realising in advance the religious content "left rather hurriedly" when it began. The Unification Church is a strongly western millenarian group. In the less familiar eastern groups, inability to recognise activities as spiritual may be a factor promoting the suggestion that these groups use deceptive recruitment. However, those whose conception of
religion does not necessarily centre on the worship of a deity, the religiosity of even the most introductory activities of eastern groups is quite apparent. The introductory lecture of the former Rajneesh group conveyed the miraculous abilities of Rajneesh, his uniqueness, and the possibilities of self-discovery and inner peace afforded by following him. The introductory workshop entails a series of meditational techniques, terminating with satsang; literally, the company of truth, where Bhagwan is greeted through ritual chanting. The introductory meeting of the Nichiren Shoshu involves chanting a mantra to the sacred scroll. All these activities are quite overtly religious.

4.2 Pre-Existing Social Networks As Recruitment Avenues

Aside from recruitment techniques specifically orchestrated to swell the numbers of an organisation, pre-existing social networks and group ideology can function as "recruitment catalysts" (Zurcher & Snow, 1976). Zurcher & Snow (1976) claim that a growing number of sociological studies suggest "the important role of pre-existing social relations in the structuring and channelling of movement recruitment" (p.455). They suggest that:

The potential participant, whatever his or her interests, socioeconomic status, cognitive state or motives, has to be informed about, and introduced to a particular movement (p.454).

The importance of social networks as a recruitment avenue to NRMs has been established by a number of researchers (Lofland & Stark, 1965; Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Heirich, 1977; Galanter, 1980; Snow & Phillips, 1980; Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olsen, 1980; Stark & Bainbridge, 1980; Downton, 1980; Seggar & Kunz, 1972). Their bridging function in bringing together potential recruits and a particular
movement was demonstrated, in Pentecostal groups, by Gerlach and Hine (1970). They note that 51/67 of their sample were recruited by personal contact with familiar others. They also note that further questioning of the 16 who indicated they were "drawn into the movement by the direct action of God" revealed significant relationships with relatives and friends to have been involved (Gerlach and Hine, 1970:79-80). That social networks form a recruitment avenue is both undeniable and unsurprising for those NRMs which do not require the severing of personal bonds with those outside the group.

However, analysis of NRM recruitment solely in terms of structural features like social networks is less than fully explanatory, one readily apparent example being the wide range of affiliative options they present. Richardson and Stewart (1977) suggest our social environment is a virtual 'supermarket of ideas' characterized as "a large and differentiated opportunity structure of possible ways to interpret and resolve felt problems" (p.827). Given that the web of an individual's social networks may be a smaller and less differentiated opportunity structure, it is still likely to contain more than one option. Social networks are likely to have little predictive validity regarding in which generic option of change one is likely to become involved. They have been shown to be important in recruiting new members to any number and form of communal activities: agrarian radicalism (Petras and Zeitlin, 1972), the peace movement (Bolton, 1972), riot participation (Wallis, 1979), and (if it can be deemed a 'communal activity') hysterical contagion (Kerckhoff and Back, 1968). Pre-existing social networks may not merely function as sources of information but also as sources
of social influence. This difference has not been addressed in the sociological literature. Influence may take the form of social pressure, or vicarious modelling of desirable changes possible with commitment and conversion (Zeitlin, 1985) or testimonies as to the efficacy of the belief system and the community of followers for reinterpreting and resolving felt problems.

Heirich (1977) examines the role of social influence from the point of view of how 'encapsulated' in uniquely NRM-related relationships individuals became prior to conversion to Pentecostalism. On the basis of his data he suggests "it would be erroneous to assume that it is social influence rather than simply social contact that accounts for the conversions that occurred" (p.669, original emphasis). He notes that after encounter with movement members, the seekers, as he terms them, sought the advice of family and friends. Most (70%) remembered only positive or neutral advice, unsurprisingly as 40% sought feedback from friends who were themselves Pentecostals. Heirich seems to imply that advice being positive or neutral debars the encounter from being one of influence. Family and close friends are significant others and it is unlikely that what they say is taken lightly, especially given that the individual selected them as confidantes. The 30% who recall positive responses from non-members perhaps reveal to us the status of this movement within the community. Encapsulation, the tendency to restrict interaction to those who had already been "baptised in the holy spirit" did aid conversion (92% joined) but was not a necessary condition as 70% of those who were not encapsulated joined.

Heirich notes that while immediate social contact could account statistically for half of
the findings regarding who converted, the findings depend on a single measure, that of frequency of previous mass attendance. "Mass attendance was almost twice as powerful an influence as are all others combined" (p.670). Yet he notes that:

Given its lack of relationship to the other social influences measured in the Multiple Comparisons Analysis it is not clear that Mass attendance represents a distinctively social influence in itself (p.670).

Using an Automatic Interaction Detection programme, he concluded that the impact of social networks is 

striking indeed - for those already oriented towards a religious quest ... If one is not already a religious seeker such contact is insufficient in most cases to produce a 'change of heart' (p.673, original emphasis).

The route to conversion which most closely approximates the brainwashing analogy, that is where there is a lack of religious interest which nonetheless results in conversion due to strong social influence, is a possible but infrequently occurring combination according to Heirich (1972:673). Further, the impact of social networks in his study seems to rely on the individuals concerned already having a religious orientation. Heirich’s test of social influence operationally defined as encapsulation is not a definitive test of how social influence operates, but he does reveal that it operates in conjunction with individual beliefs being consonant with those of a social movement, as even though 75% of the people were introduced to the group by "trusted associates and friends" (p.667) the majority (83%) were already oriented towards religion.

An interactional approach to the study of NRM involvement is required (Zygmun, 1972). Participation is the result of psychological features of the individual and the
more structural features of their life environment which bring them within the movement's orbit. To assert the importance of studying psychological predispositions is not to suggest that recruitment is completely specifiable in terms of an intra-psychic focus. To assume that this is a necessary assumption of any consideration of the psychological features of a recruit is to mistake a 'predisposition' for a unicausally efficient feature. Predispositions, for example motives, beliefs, personality traits, loneliness, disruption due to recent life stress, determine involvement only in relation to the features of movement ideology and organisation. Certainly, some theories like Turner and Killian's (1972) "Convergence Theory" focus on the differences in cognitive orientation between joiners and non-joiners. Others like Toch (1965) regard the conjunctions between individual needs and the movement's perceived promises of satisfying them as the "crux of the social psychology of social movements (p.17)". He acknowledges, but does not specify the bridging function of social networks in bringing about contact between the two. In brief, the needs and cognitive orientation of an individual are not suggested as sufficient for conversion, but as contributing to the likelihood of involvement within the conditions specified by a wider model. For example, a religious orientation may influence which options are salient and/or appeal to an individual out of the array of options available in the media or opportunity structure of social networks.

4.3 Beyond An Either/Or Account: Structural Features and Pre-Existing Motivations and Beliefs

The tenability of the distinction between the structural and psychological features
relevant to movement involvement has been laboured in some detail, because misunderstandings have occurred in the literature regarding the assumptions and scope of a psychological focus on predispositions to movement involvement. For instance, Zurcher and Snow (1981) acknowledge that 'cognitive state' might be conducive to, but not sufficient for movement participation (p.454). Yet two pages later, they indulge in the massacre of a straw man when they suggest that to focus on "susceptibilities and predispositions" implies that:

the tenets of a movement's ideology are self-evident given a particular personality, background or set of frustrations and discontents. Such an assumption is sociologically untenable (p.456).

Psychologically it does not hold water either. Neither is it a necessary assumption of such a focus as shown above; substantiated with references which predate their argument. This study is concerned with demonstrating how pivotal is consideration of psychological predispositions in any account of differential recruitment, while Zurcher and Snow (1976) seem concerned to redress an imbalance of what they view as "inordinately exclusive attention" to the "psychological effects of problematic structural conditions or personality variables in differential recruitment to social movements". They make the criticism that:

the social-psychological-motivational approach tends not to consider the role of ideology in relation to movement recruitment and participation... (p.456)

Selectivity of focus may be the case in research practice, yet congruence between individual needs and the promises of a social movement to satisfy them has been shown to be crucial to the social psychology of movement involvement (Toch, 1965).
The agitational function of social movements and NRM’s in particular cannot be bypassed in favour of viewing them as solutions to pre-structured needs and tensions. It is highly likely that NRM’s lend definition to the needs they seek to satisfy. Gerlach and Hine (1970) ignored the issue of predisposing needs and life events and assumed that a refocussing of needs occurred at first contact with the movements. While this refocussing is one of the defined functions of ideology,

It provides a picture of the world as it is and as it should be. It provides a guide for action by which the desired changes can best be achieved. At the same time it underscores what is wrong, attributes blame and responsibility..." (Zurcher and Snow, 1981:456)

it must be noted that some need resulted in contact in the first place. It is impossible to give an account of movement appeal without taking an individual’s motivation and belief into account. The ‘appeal’ of a movement’s ideology as a ‘recruitment catalyst’ derives from its mobilizing function, its role in articulating a pre-existing problem, focusing blame and justifying action. One is rarely motivated to change a satisfying state of affairs, so some disruption or problem is likely to precede action, even if the movement intensifies and clarifies the nature of that problem. As Zygmunt (1972:458) notes:

movement characteristics become ‘appeals’ not merely because they exert direct influence upon the people who are exposed to them, but rather because individuals are motivationally predisposed to perceive, evaluate and respond to them selectively.

In short, appeal is a psychologically conjunctive concept, residing wholly in neither the characteristics of the person nor in movement ideology, but existing as a relation between the two.
4.4 Differential Openness To Involvement

Having argued that psychological features of an individual’s life circumstances, personality and beliefs are important determinants of involvement, a consideration of the complexities of differential recruitment is appropriate. There are two features of differential recruitment which need to be considered:

- Why is one person rather than another recruited into a movement?
- Why does a person become involved in one genre of movement rather than another?

Neither type of recruitment can be explained without consideration of the individual’s needs and beliefs. The two are distinguishable in terms of the differential salience of needs and beliefs in each. The first type of differential recruitment will be termed **Type One Differential Openness** where individual motivation and personal and social resources determine whether a social agency is contacted in times of strife. The second, **Type Two Differential Openness** to movement involvement concerns how consonance of cognitive orientation determines which genre of movement appeals, or which gives the most meaningful diagnosis of life situation. This simple distinction is important to this study. The different forms of differential recruitment have not been teased apart in the literature, perhaps because it has been assumed that the movement can ignite both need and credulity.

Those who wish to emphasise uniquely the ‘pull’ factors in differential recruitment need to address evidence, such as that presented above, that in most cases involvement
is voluntary or at least consenting. The 'capture by deception' explanation seems of limited relevance to most recruitment experiences. The sociological recruitment emphasis outlined above focuses on social networks as recruitment avenues. Researchers such as Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olsen (1980) explicitly do not consider the role of individual belief and motivation in contributing to movement involvement, either assuming that everyone undergoes a refocussing of needs and beliefs at movement contact, or only addressing reasons people give for not joining. Though pre-existing life circumstances and beliefs are not directly addressed, they are included in an implicit manner. Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olsen, (1980) suggest that an important factor in differential recruitment is structural availability, which for them means being "minimally involved in proximal and demanding social relationships" (p.793). This leaves a person with more 'discretionary time'. Their emphasis derives from a study they conducted with students classified as 'sympathizers' with certain political or religious groups, who nonetheless failed to join. The reasons most frequently given for non-involvement were that they "did not know anyone actively involved" or "did not have enough time", or they "were not invited to join". This suggests that knowledge about and sympathy with a particular movement is not sufficient cause for involvement. Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olsen (1980) conclude:

Had their lines of action not been constrained by competing extra-movement commitments and demands, and had they been asked by a member with whom they were acquainted, then presumably they would have become a participant (p.794).

They suggest that a social bond with a group member is important for differential
recruitment, but not always sufficient. They note that even if movement members are available in social networks, not all friends participate in activities when invited. The reason for this, within their framework, is lack of time. However, their study held constant another potentially important determinant of differential involvement, namely an individual's having beliefs consonant with the language, assumptions and aims of a social movement, which I will call a consonant cognitive orientation. They held this feature constant by selecting subjects on the basis of their being sympathizers, and explicitly acknowledge the importance of ideological consonance when they note that "social action on behalf of non-coercive organisations is unlikely in the absence of instrumental, affective, and ideological alignment" (p.795).

The role of individual motivation they do not consider because they suggest that people do not become involved in movements per se, but merely take part in their activities where they can be provided with the 'motives' for joining and participation, motives which they suggest are "generally emergent and interactional rather than prestructured" (p.795). When Zygmunt (1972) suggested that the mobilizing function of movements in arousing, intensifying and defining needs should not be neglected, he was not suggesting that there were no prior circumstances which might motivate a person to join (Type One Differential Openness as outlined above), and no prior beliefs which might influence the genre of movement deemed acceptable, or meaningful to join (Type Two Differential Openness). Part of the difference of emphasis may result from an eliding of motivation in the causal sense and the 'avowal' of the same (the philosophical issue of causes vs reasons revisited). Avowal
of reasons may be influenced by the local vocabulary and beliefs of the group with which one affiliates: the actual causes effective at the time are not influenced in this way. The former may follow an action, the latter never can, unless some alternative to efficient causality is being suggested, such that the causes of one's behaviour follow after the effect. This is not a position the author finds compelling. It has been suggested that motivation accounts for Type One Differential Openness and consonance of beliefs for Type Two. However, once the broad genre of movement which appeals has been influenced by the orientation of an individual's beliefs, it may well be that interpersonal contacts determine specifically which of a broad array of (say) religious groups is attended. It may well be that the orientation of a person's beliefs is due in part to social influence (the ontogeny of spiritual beliefs is an area beyond the scope of this study). However, the distinction made here is that they are not necessarily aroused by the specific movement with which affiliation occurs. Some aspect of these beliefs has perhaps brought release or satisfaction, and has been retained. In other words, the formation of a spiritual orientation may occur due to a number of encounters with literature, and with impressive others, as a piecemeal sedimentation, of which, like increasing behavioural commitment, the person may not be consciously or self-reflexively aware.

4.5 The Centrality of Psychological Predispositions to an Explanatory Account of Differential Openness

To suggest that such considerations are vital to a complete account of involvement is not to take the position criticised by Snow and Phillips (1980) who suggest that the
study of "prestructured tensions and cognitive orientations.... ignores the fact that movements function as important agitational, problem-defining, need-arousal and motive-producing agencies..." (p.437). This may overstate the importance of movement ideology. Without data from prospective studies, or studies which assess participants at point of first contact with a movement, it cannot simply be alleged that a group 'does it all'. It cannot simply be alleged that the group in every case arouses the very needs it then seeks to satisfy. Neither can it be assumed that we need have no further interest in whether joiners differ from non-joiners in terms of factors which may influence their desire to contact a public agency, such as recent life experiences, personal and social coping resources and cognitive orientation. From Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olsen's (1980) study where sympathizers agreed with movement ideology but did not commit any personal resources, the possibility cannot be excluded that they were not motivated to join, despite the fact that they had sufficient contact with this supposedly 'motive-producing agency' to become sympathetic to its aims. The proximal and demanding social networks which left them with no discretionary time might have had important psychological consequences, perhaps providing them with social contact, support, and enhancing their capacity to cope with problematic life events. These resources might reduce a person's need to seek outside sources of explanation and consolation.

Zygmunt (1972) provides a cogent summary which has implicit the two aspects of differential involvement: both a general motivational readiness (Type One Differential Openness) as rendering one person rather than another 'prone' to recruitment, and a
more specific readiness (Type Two Differential Openness) regarding why a person gets involved in one genre of option rather than another. He suggests that the key feature may be:

The relative meaningfulness of the 'diagnoses' of people's predicaments purveyed by different movements, largely through their ideological presentations. Thus in terms of his[her] general condition of alienation, an individual might be a potential candidate for either religious or political conversion, but undergo one rather than another, mainly because [s]he finds [her]his problems more meaningfully defined in one set of ideological symbols rather than another" (p.460).

In summary, a consideration of the role of psychological predispositions illuminates two elements of differential recruitment, or, to speak in a voice which does not assume 'active agent' strategies of the NRM, two forms of differential openness to the appeal of NRM. These predispositions are not timeless intrapsychic conflicts, though they may be underpinned by enduring, trait-like tendencies of an individual. They refer rather to the manner in which life events are experienced: the acuteness of the suffering endured as a result of them, the origins attributed and solutions sought. They refer to a capacity to adapt to changed circumstances. In their current theoretical form, these predispositions do not preclude consideration of movement ideology, but form a vital component of the source of the differential appeal of the ideology of one movement over another.

Having excavated the notion of predisposition from some slight misrepresentation, the way is perhaps clear for a detailed consideration of those predispositions which render more likely affiliation to NRM.