

**The Role of Fetishisation in Genocide:
Considering genocide propulsion via a religious studies methodology**

Breann Fallon

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
School of Literature, Art, and Media
Department of Studies in Religion

University of Sydney

2020

Statement of Originality

This is to certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

Signed

Breann Fallon

Authorship Attribution Statement

This thesis contains material published in:

Breann Fallon, "The Fetishization Effect: The Manipulation Power of the Machete in the Rwandan Genocide," *Implicit Religion* 20:4 (2017), pp. 319–333.

Breann Fallon, "Violence of Mind, Body, and Spirit: Spiritual and Religions Responses Triggered by Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide," in Caroline Blyth, Emily Colgan, and Katie B. Edwards eds., *Rape Culture, Gender Violence, and Religion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), pp. 71-86.

Table of Contents

Dedication	i
Acknowledgments	i
List of Figures	ii
Introduction: “I didn’t do this, it was God”	iii
Chapter 1: “Genocide”: A Terminological Conundrum	1
Chapter 2: Current Explanations of Genocide Propulsion and Project Methodology	32
Chapter 3: Rwanda: The Lead up to 1994	65
Chapter 4: Case Study: Fetishism in the Rwandan Genocide	94
Conclusion	133
Reference List	141

Dedication

For Nanna

Acknowledgments

To Carole, the impact of your knowledge and unreserved support has been integral to this project. You have been there since the start of my time in the department and have fundamentally shaped who I am as a researcher and a person. I am glad to have worked with you, to keep working with you, and to have grown a lifelong friendship during this time.

To Jay, thank you for your constant support over the course of this project and my time in the department as a whole. Your calmness and expertise has been foundational for this project.

To the home front, Nate, you are my rock. Without you this project would have died long ago. You comforted me when the testimonies were just too much, put up with a wife who was in pyjamas 90% of the time, and cleaned the house for the last 6 months straight. You deserve a medal.

To Mum and Dad, thank you for always being there for a phone call during the hard times, and during the not-so-hard times. I always know that you are there for me.

To Ray, the beacon of calm. You always believed I could do it, but it could not have been done without you cheering from the sidelines.

To my SJM family — Rebecca, Sandy, Sharon, Ilana H., Naomi, Lee, Ilana M., Simon, Jillian, Jeanette, Morgan, Norman, Aviva — you have been “colossal.”

To Monica, thank you for your keen eye and diligent work in copy-editing this thesis.

To the fur-children, Jemima and George, thank you for all the comforting fur-cuddle breaks and calming walks.

List of Figures

Figure 1

John Houk, “Why is Darfur Allowed to Continue,” *Slanted Right Blog*, September 25, 2001, 16:05, (accessed October 2015),
www.slantedright.blogspot.com.au/2006/11/why-is-darfur-genocide-. 1

Figure 2

Ed Stein, “Untitled,” *Rocky Mountain News*, Saturday, October 7, 2006, (accessed October 2015),
génocidaire.editorialcartoonists.com/cartoon/display.cfm/25044/. 32

Figure 3

Mike Keefe, “Untitled,” *Albuquerque Journal*, 29 May 1994, p. 23. 65

Figure 4

Stanislaus “Stano” Olonde, “The Editorial Cartoon of the Day,” *The New Times*, February 18, 2014, <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/73195>. 94

Figure 5

“Which weapons are we going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?”
Kangura, no. 26, 1991. Image courtesy of the Virginia Holocaust Museum. 100

Figure 6

Pat Chapette, “Rwanda: 20 Years After,” *Les Temps*, April 7, 2014,
<https://www.chappatte.com/en/images/rwanda20-years-after/>. 133

Introduction

“I didn’t do this, it was God.”¹

Sitting in a hotel room in Melbourne, late, watching the Australian Open tennis tournament that I would be attending the next day, my mobile phone buzzed with the sound of an email. Thinking nothing much of the message, I unlocked it and read the subject. *Records Identified: Wladyslaw Szczepanik*. It was from Arolsen Archives: International Centre on Nazi Persecution. From a young age, I was well aware that my paternal grandparents had suffered in World War II. My grandfather, Wladyslaw, passed before I was born. My Nanna, Maria, I knew until I was fourteen. We were born on the same date and, for some reason, that alone meant we were close. She tried to teach me Polish and how to cook the dishes she ate in Szczawnica. She had enough English for us to communicate. However, when my father and she would sit up late at the table speaking fluent Polish together, I knew there was much I did not know. I remember Nanna once saying something about being “a slave under Mr Hitler,” but I did not think to press her about it at the time. Neither Wladyslaw nor Maria were Jewish, so that made finding anything out about their experience difficult. Indeed, after submitting the initial forms, it was over a year before I heard back from Arolsen, and there was actually more material in the National Archive of Australia with their refugee records. Realising they were both taken from Poland for forced labour in 1941 was not ground-breaking, as it fitted with the historical narrative. Still, when the documents arrived, it certainly did force me to take a step back. Seeing a prisoner number and the words “forced labour: *Ostarbeiter* 1941-1945” reframes the person you knew, the things they said. It is difficult knowing they had siblings and parents whose fate I have no knowledge of. Family members never to be seen again. These questions force you to think about humanity, the world, and where you fit in it.

The twentieth century took butchery to a new level.² The Greek Genocide, the Armenian Genocide, the Assyrian Genocide, the Holodomor, the Holocaust, the Serbian Genocide, the Cambodian Genocide, the Bosnian Genocide, the Genocide

¹ Joseph Désiré Bitero in Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak*, translated by Linda Coverdale (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 144.

² Neil J. Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror* (New York: Westview Press, 2002), p. 1.

Against Tutsi in Rwanda; it is grim litany. This list is not exhaustive nor without controversy. One could certainly add Australia's Stolen Generations to this list if we accept the United Nations definition of the term "genocide." If one were to look at the history of humanity and their ability to consistently resort to the act of such specified slaughter, it is certainly a bleak image. Genocide scholar Dirk Moses is frank in describing the current state when it comes to such cases of specified mass murder: "the fact is that states do not engage in 'costly international moral actions' unless it is in their perceived interests to do so."³ Still today, the world is slow to act as innocents from targeted groups are murdered and are displaced *en masse* in Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Iraq, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. Many of these twenty-first century cases are not acknowledged for what they are. Ringing of the genocidal knell is always a last resort, as we tend to favour other (less weighty) words instead; terms such as ethnic cleansing, targeted violent regime, mass slaughter. We couch the reality of specified slaughter in such terms to prevent major players from having to intervene. Despite the reluctance of such major players in halting current cases of genocide, the academy has committed countless articles, chapters, books, and courses to the study of genocide. This is not only in an effort to understand the cases that have gone by, but hopefully to start moving towards the prevention of future cases.

In contemplating the aforementioned list of twentieth century genocides, there are sundry commonalities between cases, one of which is many of these cases are inherently connected to religion. The most well-known example of genocide is, arguably, the Holocaust: the systematic extermination of six million Jewish people as well as five million people from other targeted groups at the hands of the Third Reich and their collaborators. The industrialised killing manufactured by the Nazi regime is difficult to come to terms with. As all genocides do, this left an indelible mark on humanity. Of course, Nazi ideology was undoubtedly anti-Semitic, but the extermination of *unttermenschen*, inferior people such as the Jewish population, Sinti, Roma, and people with disabilities, was fundamentally based on a flawed concept of "race" rather than religion.⁴ Nevertheless, the religious is seen in this case in sundry ways; the extermination of Jehovah's Witnesses and Catholic clergy, the influence of

³ Dirk Moses, "Why the Discipline of 'Genocide Studies' Has Trouble Explaining How Genocides End," *How Genocides End*, <http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/Moses/>, accessed November 12, 2017.

⁴ Laurence Rees, *The Holocaust: A New History* (London, UK: Penguin, 2017).

the Reich Church, and Ian Kershaw's "Hitler Myth" are just some of the examples that come quickly to mind.⁵ The 1995 Bosnian Genocide is another case intimately linked to religion. It is perhaps better known as the Srebrenica Massacre, although this massacre was but the apex event in a much larger campaign. During this genocide, Serbian forces murdered approximately 10,000 civilians, mostly Bosnian Muslims.⁶ Genocide goes beyond the act of murder, and in the case of Bosnia 50,000 women were subject to sexual violence and further two million Bosnian civilians were purposefully displaced from the area in an example of ethnic cleansing.⁷ Just fifteen months prior to the case in Bosnia, the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda is infamously remembered as the genocide that the world sat by and watched. It is also remembered for the active complicity of the church and clergy in the murder of one million Tutsi.⁸ Indeed, on 12 April, 1994, 3,000 Tutsi sought refuge in a Catholic church in Nyange.⁹ With help from the church priest, the genocidal *Interahamwe* militia employed bulldozers to level the building, using machete and rifles to kill anyone that emerged from the rubble. In 2002, Athanase Seromba, a Rwandan priest surrendered himself to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda where he was found guilty of genocide and ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment. He was smuggled out of Rwanda in July 1994 to Florence in Italy with the help of Catholic monks, who facilitated his work as a priest under an assumed identity. Athanase Sermoba was the priest of the Catholic church in Nyange that guided the bulldozers. In addition to faith as part of the perpetration of this genocide, the study of the role of the victim's faith has seen some scholarly attention.¹⁰

⁵ Robert P. Ericksen, *Complicity in the Holocaust: Churches and University in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Ian Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987).

⁶ Paul R. Bartrop "Introduction," in Paul R. Bartrop ed. *Bosnian Genocide* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2016), p. xvii.

⁷ Bartrop ed. *Bosnian Genocide*, p. xvii.

⁸ Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (New York, NY: Verso, 2004), p. 252.

⁹ Elisée Rutagambwa, "The Rwandan Church: The Challenge of Reconciliation" in Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon, and Clyde Wilcox eds. *The Catholic Church and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives*, p. 179.

¹⁰ Breann Fallon, "'Violence of Mind, Body, and Spirit: Spiritual and Religions Responses Triggered by Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide,'" in Caroline Blyth, Emily Colgan, and Katie B. Edwards eds. *Rape Culture, Gender Violence, and Religion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), pp. 71-86; Timothy Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Anne-Marie de Brouer and Sandra Chur, *The Men Who Killed Me: Rwandan Survivors of Sexual Violence* (Vancouver, Canada, Toronto, Canada and Berkeley, CA: Douglas and McIntyre, 2009).

These examples encompass a miniscule portion of the nexuses between religion and genocide in the twentieth century. Yet, Kate Temoney argues that the study of religion as a factor in genocide has been somewhat overlooked, “presumably, because religion is not historically understood as a single discipline among the social sciences, [thus] it is often marginalized.”¹¹ However, the field of religious studies is uniquely placed to study such cases of mass slaughter. The field of religious studies is, by its nature, an interdisciplinary one. It encompasses many of the social sciences in its remit, and in the case of this project, this field allows us to answer social studies questions through a humanities lens. As Temoney states, “Religious Studies is well equipped to bring together disparate attempts at genocide research.”¹²

As this project approaches the study of genocide from a religious studies angle, it is prudent to define this project’s understanding of the term “religion.” “Religion” is a term that seems straightforward; we usually associate religion with the notion of a supernatural god(s), sacred texts, prophets, rituals, and so on. However, when one starts to truly contemplate what this term should encapsulate, and what it should not, it becomes more complex. Indeed, much like the term “genocide,” religion is nigh impossible to fully capture as a neat terminological definition. I do not want to dwell on this particular term, rather dedicating the semantic discussion of the project to the term “genocide.”¹³ As such, when this project refers to “religion” in a general sense, this project’s understanding of that term aligns with that of Clifford Geertz.¹⁴ Geertz’s anthropological delineation of religion as a cultural system, although in an updated gender-neutral form, has been chosen due to its breadth of understanding:

Religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in [people] by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these in conceptions in such an order of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.¹⁵

¹¹ Kate Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side: Genocide and religion” in Cathie Carmichael, Richard C. Maguire eds. *The Routledge History of Genocide* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 230.

¹² Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side: Genocide and religion,” p. 230.

¹³ The definition of genocide, including the United Nations definition, will be discussed at length in Chapter One.

¹⁴ Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Michael Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (London, UK: Tavistock, 1966), p. 4.

¹⁵ Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, p. 4.

Geertz speaks of religion as a “system of symbols” that influence the actions of those who ascribe to a formulated narrative due to its perception of factuality and realism.¹⁶ This speaks to the notion of religion as a worldview or lifestyle by which the adherent conducts themselves. By focusing on the relationship of the person to the “system of symbols,” Geertz does not fixate on the forms these symbols must take in order for a “religion” to be a “religion.”¹⁷ This is useful in two ways. Firstly, it does not narrow the definition by including a commonly thought prime element of a religion: the supernatural. Thus, Geertz avoids the exclusion of widely accepted “religions,” such as Theravada Buddhism, that do not have supernatural elements. Secondly, by leaving the “system of symbols” open to interpretation, Geertz allows for the consideration of more controversial “system[s] of symbols” that stem from political thought, such as communism, fascism, or even democracy.¹⁸ Plainly, rather than pinpointing a checklist of elements that constitute a “religion,” this definition is focused on the influence on the adherent – Geertz defines religion by what it does, rather than by what it has.¹⁹ As this project seeks to understand the role of religion in the creation and propulsion of genocide, Geertz’s definition is aptly placed due to its anthropological focus. As such, when the reader comes across the term “religion” in this project, particularly in passing, it is Geertz’s definition behind the use of the term.²⁰

Having clarified this project’s understanding of the term “religion” in a broad sense, it is also important to note that this project will be working closely with a more specific theory of religion, this being civil religion. Robert Bellah’s work on civil religion will be utilised due to its focus on the interplay of religion and politics, as well as its connection to the use of religion in the justification of violent acts, both of which are key to the genocidal context.²¹ Bellah’s work is critical in understanding how and why a genocidal regime utilises a “system of symbols” influence over the

¹⁶ Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, p. 4.

¹⁷ Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, p. 4.

¹⁸ Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, p. 4.

¹⁹ Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, p. 4.

²⁰ Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, p. 4.

²¹ Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” *Daedalus* 96:1 (1967), pp. 1-21.

adherent.²² Bellah's work is instituted in his seeking to further comprehend the creation and contemporary form of the American socio-cultural milieu. He turns to the notion of "civil religion," noting that the origin of the term lies in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *A Treatise on the Social Contract*.²³ For Bellah, Rousseau's "civil religion" is simple: it is "the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious in tolerance."²⁴ However, Bellah's work does not simply apply Rousseau to his American case study, rather he argues that there is much more complexity to the nexus between religion and the genesis of the American socio-cultural milieu:

The words and acts of the founding fathers, especially the first few presidents, shaped the form and tone of the civil religion as is has been maintained ever since. Though much is selectively derived from Christianity, this religion is not itself Christianity... [b]ehind the civil religion at every point lie Biblical archetypes: Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, Sacrificial Death and Rebirth. But it is also genuinely American and genuinely new. It has its own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols. It is concerned that America be a society as perfectly in accord with the will of God as men can make it, and a light to all nations. It has often been used and is being used today as a cloak for petty interests and ugly passions.²⁵

Civil religion is not simply an established religion (for example, Christianity) that is endorsed by the state; rather Bellah highlights the manipulation of religion by American structural powers in order to achieve nefarious goals. In fact, Bellah argues that Christianity and the secular military have been hybridised "in such a way that the average American saw no conflict between the two."²⁶ Indeed, this American civil religion has been used to attack "non-conformist and liberal ideas and groups of all kinds."²⁷ It is Bellah's notion of the manipulation of a "system of symbols" by state structural powers in order to influence a population to take part in violent acts that renders the notion of civil religion central to this project.²⁸ As such, while this project understands "religion" in a broad sense via Geertz, it is Bellah's notion of civil

²² Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, p. 4.

²³ Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," p. 5; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Treatise on the Social Contract or the Principles of Political Law* (London, UK: T. Becket and P. A. de Hondt, 1764 [1762]).

²⁴ Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," p. 5.

²⁵ Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," pp. 7. 18.

²⁶ Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," p. 13.

²⁷ Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," p. 14.

²⁸ Bellah, "Civil Religion in America"; Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, p. 4.

religion that will play a more central role in this project's assessment of the nexus between religion and genocide.

It is important for the reader to note, that in coming from a religious studies angle, this project is not suggesting that scholarship tackling this topic from a sociological, anthropological, or historical lens has completely neglected the notion of religion; rather, it has become fixated on the axiomatic manifestation of this nexus. The research lacuna is in the *deep* examination of the role religion plays in creating and propelling genocide. In addition, perhaps most critically, what influence it has on the perpetrators who carry out the slaughter at a ground level. Religious studies, as both a specific lens and an interdisciplinary field has much to contribute in understanding what role the religious plays in the minds of perpetrators as they take life and in creating and enhancing genocidal fervour. This is recapitulated in Steven L. Jacob's work *Confronting Genocide*, where he states: "'religion' is all too often overlooked as an important factor in contributing to either the implementation and perpetuation of genocide, or as a foundational underpinning and rationalisation for such collective acts."²⁹ It is the aim of this project to answer these questions.

Approach

This project will take an empirical case study approach that aims to provide both idiographic and nomothetic, as well as micro and macro, outputs.³⁰ Utilising a case study approach is particularly advantageous for this project due to its designed intensive focus. As Alan Bryman notes, in aiming to provide an "in-depth elucidation" of a specific case, a case study allows for an "intensive examination of a setting."³¹ The narrow focus of the case study is symptomatic of their typical idiographic form, that is, the ability of a case study to highlight the unique features of one case.³² This is advantageous for this project, as aforementioned, a lacuna in current literature is close examination of religion in the implementing and perpetuation genocide. Therefore, the idiographic form of the case study approach

²⁹ Steven L. Jacobs ed. *Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam* (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2009), p. ix.

³⁰ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 4th edition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014 [2001]), p. 69; Nicholas Walliman, *Social Research Methods* (London, UK: SAGE, 2006), pp. 45-46.

³¹ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 69.

³² Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 69.

allows this project to make a functional contribution in this area.³³ It must be raised that, for some, the idiographic form of the case study approach is a significant impediment. The idiographic focus of the case study limits a nomothetic serviceability.³⁴ As Nicholas Walliman states, “commonly, in case study design, no claim is made for generalizability. It is rather about the quality of theoretical analysis that is allowed by intensive investigation.”³⁵ While such intensity can be a hindrance to the case study approach, this can be avoided in the scholar aiming to be simultaneously idiographic and nomothetic, the latter referring to the “creation of statements that apply regardless of time and place.”³⁶ Both Bryman and Walliman note that case studies can produce both outputs if the case chosen is an “exemplifying” or “critical” case: a cases that “epitomises a broader category of cases.”³⁷ Such an approach is well-suited to the topic at hand. By selecting one exemplifying case of genocide and studying it in-depth, this project will not only more fully comprehend that case but will also begin to elucidate the role of religion in implementing and perpetuating genocide more broadly.

In approaching this case study with both idiographic and nomothetic outputs in mind, this project is also seeking to provide a micro/macro level analysis. The micro/macro dualism is often paired with a qualitative (micro) versus quantitative (macro) binary.³⁸ However, from a sociological point-of-view, micro/macro refers to the individual (micro) and society (macro).³⁹ Of course, this dualistic view of the individual and society is somewhat reductive. Bryan Turner suggests that this sort of semantic dualism is mere methodological distraction, and rather argues that the micro and macro should be understood as “forces” exerting upon each other.⁴⁰ Interestingly, the notion of the micro and macro, the individual and society, as forces exerting upon each other is reflected in numerous works seminal to the religious studies field, such as that of Émile Durkheim, Erving Goffman, Peter L. Berger and Thomas

³³ Jacobs ed. *Confronting Genocide*, p. ix.

³⁴ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 71.

³⁵ Walliman, *Social Research Methods*, pp. 45-46.

³⁶ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 69.

³⁷ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 70; Walliman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 46.

³⁸ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 408.

³⁹ Craig Calhoun, Chris Rojek and Bryan Turner, *The SAGE Handbook of Sociology* (London, UK: SAGE, 2005), p. 407.

⁴⁰ Bryan Turner in Calhoun, Rojek and Turner, *The SAGE Handbook of Sociology*, p. 407.

Luckmann,⁴¹ In a religious studies context, the very concept of religion falls onto the macro side of the equation, a societal force that influences the individual. However, “we know there is no religion without an individual aspect.”⁴² As such, within a religious studies context, the notion of the micro and macro enables the analysis of the relationships between these two forces. This is particularly useful as this project aims to understand how religion impacts on the ground in the creation of genocide by delving into the actions of genocide perpetrators (micro) and examining the role of religion (macro) within them – the macro influence on the micro. This will also lead to an investigation on the other side of the equation, elucidating how individuals wield and manipulate religion in their favour, justifying their actions – the micro influence on the macro. It is by working on an exemplifying case as well as amongst the dualisms of the idiographic/nomothetic and micro/macro that this project seeks to begin filling the research lacuna that currently exists in the study of religion and genocide.

In order to achieve the above aims, the project must find a way to “get down” onto the micro-level of the genocide perpetrator. Without this, there will be no analysis of the macro, and thus little nomothetic output. This micro-level is most easily accessed through first-hand perpetrator testimony. There are many cases of genocide which could be selected as the exemplifying case for this project; however, this selection is reduced somewhat due to the accessibility of perpetrator testimony. In the aftermath of such slaughter, a focus is rightfully placed on the rehabilitation of survivors and the rebuilding of physical sites. Hearing from perpetrators often comes later, usually in the courtroom at criminal tribunals. Courtroom testimony is usually limited to those who played a significant role in the organisation of the genocide. There are some examples of courtroom testimony from base-level perpetrators, the rank-and-file actors. One particularly famous example of such material can be found in Christopher Browning’s *Ordinary Men*.⁴³ Here, Browning considers the courtroom testimony from 201 former members of Reserve Police Battalion 101, a German *Ordnungspolizei* (Order Police) unit. The battalion originally numbered 500

⁴¹ E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, [1915] 2008); Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Doubleday, 1959); P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, UK and New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1991 [1966]).

⁴² Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, p. 179.

⁴³ Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (London, UK: Penguin Group, 2001 [1992]).

and had an average age of 39 in 1942.⁴⁴ Only 25% of the battalion were members of the Nazi party, which seems low considering the battalion is held responsible for the murder of at least 83,000 Jewish people. This extermination involved either killing them directly (usually by gunshot) or by deporting them to labour, concentration, and extermination camps.⁴⁵ Of the 500 men, 101 were ultimately convicted of war crimes. Browning's work is critical in examining the motivations of perpetrators during genocide. However, the findings in *Ordinary Men* are founded upon courtroom confessions, which are serving a particular purpose and therefore lack candour and spontaneity.

Candid perpetrator interviews are uncommon, and it is in these that we will be able to access a more *bone fide* sense of the nexus between religion and the actions of perpetrators. The case of genocide that presents the greatest array of candid perpetrator interviews, and thus the exemplifying case selected for this project, is the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Occurring well within the purview of the international community, scholars were quick to interview the Rwandans who enacted the violence against their neighbours. In the 2000s, interviews were conducted with Rwanda's Hutu *génocidaire* by a number of scholars and journalists.⁴⁶ Some of the interviews were conducted in prison, others after the perpetrator had served their sentence. Of course, due to the sheer number of *génocidaire*, some were never sentenced to imprisonment. This testimony outside of the courtroom provides a

⁴⁴ Edward B. Westermann, *Hitler's Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), p. 220

⁴⁵ Ian Rich, *Holocaust Perpetrators of the German Police Battalions: The Mass Murder of Jewish Civilians, 1940-1942* (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018); Glenn Kurtz, *Three Minutes in Poland: Discovering a Lost World in a 1938 Family Film* (New York, NY: Farrer, Straus, and Giroux, 2014), p. 240.

⁴⁶ "Génocidaire" is a term used frequently in this project. French for "those who commit genocide," it is the common term used in Rwanda to refer to those who took part in the 1994 Genocide. It is used interchangeably with "perpetrator" and "genocidal actors," although the latter is employed less often. As Fujii notes, when researching genocide, we "generally rely on the categories 'perpetrator,' 'victim,' 'bystander,' and 'rescuer.' Membership in these categories is assumed to be exclusive and stable. In this scheme, a perpetrator cannot also be a rescuer; and once a perpetrator, always a perpetrator." Yet, in reality, the individual is not usually consistent in their actions. There are accounts, albeit a rarity, of Hutu *génocidaire* hiding and saving Tutsi they knew. Other perpetrators were more interested in looting than murdering, and some were more interested in sexually humiliating their victims. As can be understood, the term "perpetrator" is a homogenising term that does not account for the full range of human actions within a genocidal context, or within any violent context. Thus, the reader should be aware that when the word perpetrator, *génocidaire*, genocidal actor, or any other term to describe those that participated in the violence of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, it is with this understanding of the fluctuating nature of this participation. Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 8.

rare insight into the *bone fide* actions of these individuals within their genocidal context. The most well-known interviews were conducted by Lee Ann Fujii, Scott Straus, and Jean Hatzfeld.⁴⁷ The work conducted by Fujii, Straus, and Hatzfeld is critically important in understanding this case of mass slaughter. However, there is not an in-depth examination in these interviews of perpetrators religion, or what role this played in engaging, propelling, and justifying them killing their Tutsi neighbours. Of the three works mentioned above, it is the non-scholarly work, that of journalist Jean Hatzfeld, that allocates the most time to the influence of religion on *génocidaire*.

Before continuing, pause must be taken to discuss the implications of utilising Hatzfeld's work. The reader may wonder why I did not undertake my own interviews with perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. The reasons are two-fold. Firstly, a lack of funding withheld me from international travel. Secondly, and more importantly, in the earlier stages of this project during which data collection would have taken place, there was a concern for the researcher's safety from the home institution due to the spilling over of genocidal violence in neighbouring Burundi from 2015-2017. While Hatzfeld's work does provide a workable solution, there are a number of points to raise in relation to the use of this work.

Firstly, without becoming white-tower and exclusive of non-scholarly work, it is important to note that these interviews were not conducted as part of a scholarly venture, rather being part of Hatzfeld's expansive journalistic work. Hatzfeld presents the interviews for the reader without any significant analysis, largely letting the accounts speak for themselves. As Hatzfeld was not interviewing from a scholarly viewpoint, these interviews lack formal methodology, and are certainly without the methodology of this project. Therefore, some questions I would have asked the interviewees are left unanswered. However, Hatzfeld's lack of methodology can be understood an asset. The interviewees were in no sense being "led" to speak or think about the religion in a particular way. As such, these interviews provide fresh insight into the role religion plays in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour, as well as in the actions and minds of *génocidaire*. Secondly, the reader will note that, as Hatzfeld has approached these *génocidaire* from a journalistic point-of-view, there is an

⁴⁷ Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*; Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2006); Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak*, translated by Linda Coverdale (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003); Jean, Hatzfeld, *The Strategy of Antelopes: Living in Rwanda After the Genocide*, translated by Linda Coverdale (London, UK: Serpent's Tail, 2009).

intensive focus on a very small sample. Of the 175,000 to 210,000 total perpetrators, 90 percent were “non-hardcore civilian perpetrators,” and it is these rank-and-file genocidal actors that Hatzfeld focuses on.⁴⁸ Yet, Hatzfeld’s interviews just ten of these rank-and-file perpetrators,⁴⁹ and it is unclear how these ten men were selected. In addition, all the interviewees were male, so we are restricted to the male narrative in Hatzfeld’s interviews. Both Leila Fielding and Sara E. Brown highlight the role of women in the genocide, particularly in relation to subsidiary roles such as espionage and looting.⁵⁰ Yet, women also participated in the genocide through more direct roles, such as former Minister of Family Welfare and Women’s Affairs, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko. Nyiramasuhuko was the first woman convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). On 24 June, 2011, Nyiramasuhuko was convicted on seven counts, including conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity.⁵¹ Thus, while Hatzfeld does provide in-depth interviews, the experiences here are not a complete representation of the hundreds of thousands of perpetrators that contributed to this crime. Plainly, these interviews provide depth but lack breadth. Thirdly, the interviews were originally conducted in French, and we are working with a translation into English. In working with a translation, we must acknowledge that certain cultural specificities may have become lost in the process of creation for an international audience.⁵² Indeed, in this sense, these are not the *bone fide* words of perpetrators, but rather words that have been transmitted to us. Finally, Hatzfeld has segmented the interviews and presented them thematically, the testimonies not being presented as whole, chronological units. Therefore, in most cases, strings of thought have been pieced back together by the author in order to gain a more complete image of the *génocidaire* relationship to religion. As such, in utilising Hatzfeld, we must take a methodological pause and understand that while this material is useful in answering this project’s key questions, there are impediments in using these interviews. While we will see insight into the role religion played in the actions of the perpetrators, it

⁴⁸ Scott Straus, “How Many Perpetrators were here in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 6:1 (2004), pp. 94-95.

⁴⁹ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

⁵⁰ Leila Fielding, *Female Génocidaires During the Rwandan Genocide: When Women Kill* (Hamburg, Germany: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2014); Sara E. Brown, *Gender and Genocide in Rwanda: Women as Rescuers and Perpetrators* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).

⁵¹ Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was found guilty on 24 June 2011 on seven counts; including conspiracy to commit genocide and rape. Fielding, *Female Génocidaires During the Rwandan Genocide*; pp. 26-31.

⁵² Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 74.

serves as but a *first-look* into where such analysis of perpetrator accounts may ultimately lead the study of the nexus between religion genocide.

It is also important to note, that this project aims to answer (what are truly) social science questions. This project is interested in answering questions that will serve a greater purpose; aiding the comprehension of genocide is as much about the past as the future, and even a small contribution to halting future cases of genocide would be a superior outcome. However, this project's use of textual analysis in answering these questions is a humanistic approach. The humanistic approach of textual analysis, together with social science questions, does create a hybridised element to this thesis. While this border-crossing was not by design, it does lend itself more easily to producing both idiographic and nomothetic, as well as micro and macro, outputs; the text focuses on the idiographic/micro while our questions push us towards the nomothetic/macro. As such, this accidental hybridisation allows the project to make a range of contributions.

Returning to Hatzfeld, in terms of direct reference to religion in *Machete Season*, one of the chapters is entitled "And God in all This?"⁵³ This chapter converges on the sections of perpetrator testimony describing where and how they saw religion in the genocide. Responses range from "I didn't do this, it was God," to "it was as if God and Satan had agreed to cloud our eyes" and "God kept silent."⁵⁴ It is the presence of this unscrutinised material collected by Hatzfeld that has led to the choice of the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda as primary case study for this project. Through Hatzfeld's interviews we are able to gain access to the candid retellings of genocidal actors and their understanding of how religion affected them on a ground level. It is the analysis of these interviews that is at the heart of this project. These voices, albeit hard to listen to, will start to fill the research lacuna of what role religion plays in creating and propelling genocide and, critically, what influence it has on the perpetrators who carry out the slaughter at a ground level. The reader should be aware that as this project employs primary perpetrator accounts as its key source material, there is disturbing material within it.

Rwanda has also been chosen as the exemplifying case for an additional impetus. Although perhaps contentious to argue, the investigation into the role of

⁵³ "And God in All This?" in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 140-147.

⁵⁴ Joseph Désiré Bitero, Élie Mizinge, and Ignace Rukiramacumu in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 140-147.

religion in creating and propelling the 1994 genocide has, to some degree, been held back by an overt focus on the role of the clergy in current literature. Moreover, religion as a motivating factor has been overlooked to some extent, with the prevailing sentiment that it was “Catholics killing Catholics, Protestants killing Protestants,” therefore the slaughter is characterised as being motivated by ethnic hatred.⁵⁵ The place of religion in the actions and minds of *génocidaire* as they take life, and what role religion has in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour, has not been widely considered. Scholars who do confront the notion of religion as a motivating factor in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda include Timothy Longman, Christopher C. Taylor, and Kate Temoney, and their work is critical to this project and to the understanding of religion in creating this case of slaughter.⁵⁶ These scholars highlight the importance of religious rhetoric in othering, justifying and authorising the genocide, while also recognising it as central to the overarching social milieu that normalised such violent actions. However, there is not a targeted consideration of the micro-level influence of religion on this genocide in these works, these studies being focussed on religion at a macro-level. The question as to what role the religious plays in the minds of perpetrators as they take life, or what role religion has in creating and enhancing genocidal fervour, is largely left unanswered. This is where this project sits.

Overview of Methodology

In seeking to more comprehensively understand what role religion plays in the actions and minds of *génocidaire*, and what role, if any, religion has in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour, this project will act on a suggestion from Sonia Silva.⁵⁷ In a 2013 article, Silva suggested that the methodological lens of fetishism could be expedient in the study of religion and genocide, particularly in relation to the influence of the

⁵⁵ Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 18.

⁵⁶ Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*; Christopher C. Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence*, eds. Mark Juergensmeyer et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 268-279; Kate Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” *Genocide Studies & Prevention* 10:3 (2016), pp. 3-24.

⁵⁷ Sonia Silva, “Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 30:1 (2013), pp. 79–98; Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide* (London: Hurst and Company, 1995).

religious on perpetrators.⁵⁸ This methodology is suggested by Silva, largely in passing.⁵⁹ It is a grand suggestion that this project thought worthy of further exploration, particularly as this methodology was born of religious studies. This methodology is both unique and controversial, although the recent scholarly interest in fetishism, seen in the publication of major works on the concept, perhaps renders it increasingly less provocative.⁶⁰ However, it remains to be a problematic suggestion as this methodology has been, for many decades, regarded as dead. This methodology in its original form, “objects that stand in the place of a god,” had been largely laid to rest in the field of religious studies due to its problematic baggage.⁶¹ Utilised in the eighteenth century by scholars as a category of the “savage” and ultimately rendered as the most “primitive” form of religion, it was Charles de Brosses who brought the concept to a short-lived fame.⁶² It is the degrading undertones of fetishism, attributed by de Brosses, among others, that play a central role in battering and beating fetishism out of the category of serviceable methodologies.⁶³ It is picked up by Karl Marx then Sigmund Freud, and is reformed into an understanding of capitalism and phallic symbolism that had little resemblance of the original conceptualisation.⁶⁴ It is not until the late twentieth century that the term begins its emergence from the grave. Scholars such as Roy Ellen, Bruno Latour, Hartmut Böhme, Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, and J. Lorand Matory dispensed with the theory’s colonial shackles and

⁵⁸ Silva, “Reification and Fetishism,” p. 79.

⁵⁹ Silva, “Reification and Fetishism,” p. 79.

⁶⁰ Bruno Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, translated by Catherine Porter and Heather MacLean (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010); Hartmut Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture: A Different Theory of Modernity* (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2014); Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, translated by Viktoria Tchernichova, Monica Boria and Elizabeth MacDonald (London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), p. 3; Alan Bass, *Fetishism, Psychoanalysis and Philosophy: The Iridescent Thing* (London and New York: Routledge, 2018); J. Lorand Matory, *The Fetish Revisited: Marx, Freud, and the Gods Black People Make* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018).

⁶¹ Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 3.

⁶² Charles de Brosses, *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiche: Ou parallèle de l'ancienne religion de l'Égypte avec la religion actuelle de la Nigritie* (Lyon, France: Lyon Public Library, 1760); J. Lubbock, *The Origins of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man: Mental and Social Conditions of Savages*, (London: Longmans, 1870).

⁶³ Silva, “Reification and Fetishism,” p. 79.

⁶⁴ Karl Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen ökonomie*, volumes 1 and 2 (Harvard, USA: O. Meissner, 1872); Sigmund Freud, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (Leipzig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1905);

breathed new life into the fetish and fetishism.⁶⁵ The fetish also saw traction in the fields of material culture and symbolic interactionism, marking complete resuscitation of the troubled theory, although we must always acknowledge its troubled past and the damage it did.

Considering the history of the methodology, this project settles on a broad Ellenian understanding with a Böhmean bent. This choice was made due to the clarity of Ellen in both concept and process. For Ellen, the fetish is an object that functions “over and above its appearance.”⁶⁶ Acting beyond their basic remit, Ellenian fetishes are “machines of power,” manipulating the people who come into contact with them.⁶⁷ This process of fetishisation occurs when “abstract ideas become associated with a single object.”⁶⁸ A choice was made to combine Ellenian fetishism with Böhme’s understanding of the fetish as a political plaything, a “practice of power.”⁶⁹ This was done in order to fully encapsulate the way a fetish may be utilised by the powers at be to achieve nefarious goals.⁷⁰ In addition, Böhme’s study clearly connects Robert Bellah’s final observations of civil religion as an overarching religious system, within which the notion of fetishism can sit.⁷¹ Böhme thus highlights the potential “murderousness” in the fetishistic manoeuvring of civil religion. As such, the fetishistic methodology of this project is of a broad Ellenian understanding with a Böhmean bent, that is: an object, concept, or thing believed acting as a machine of power, either produced organically or purposefully as political plaything. This discussion and examination of the project’s methodology is given in full in Chapter Two.

Even though the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda is considered to be a short case of such slaughter, there are still many options for potential fetishes influencing on the actions of *génocidaire*. As such, the complete examination of this suggestion from Silva is a laborious one. However, in early stages of research, I came across the work Gérard Prunier who provides some indication of what should be

⁶⁵ Roy Ellen, “Fetishism,” *Man* 23:2 (1988), pp. 213-235; Bruno Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*; Hartmut Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*; Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*; J. Lorand Matory, *The Fetish Revisited*.

⁶⁶ Ellen, “Fetishism,” pp. 228, 231.

⁶⁷ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

⁶⁸ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 221.

⁶⁹ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

⁷⁰ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

⁷¹ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” pp. 18-19.

considered in regards to a fetish.⁷² Prunier remarks that the machete was the “great weapon of the genocide,” pointing a finger at the complicit role of weapon at the heart of the genocide in perpetrator actions.⁷³ As such, an examination of the machete within perpetrator testimony will occur in this project in order to ascertain if this weapon was fetishised. Indeed, bringing together Silva and Prunier, in this project I found that the machete appeared as a fetishised object. However, this weapon’s fetishisation is not as simple as perhaps I expected it to be. The machete acts as both a “machine of power” and “political plaything” in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, exhibiting a tangible impact on the creation of the genocide and the actions of perpetrators.⁷⁴ The influence of this weapon begins in the place of the machete at the centre of coalescing efforts; it is a rallying icon, demarcation tool of exclusive community boundaries, and a point of transferral to a new violent, pro-genocidal reality. Thus, the machete is manifest as an icon of Hutu nationalism, becoming conflated with this “abstract idea.”⁷⁵ Yet, within perpetrator testimonies we also see the conflation of the machete with a second “abstract idea,”⁷⁶ the will of the Rwandan God. Indeed, it is the dualistic manifestation of the fetish that renders it powerful; whatever the impetus the perpetrator requires to push forward with murder, the machete provides. Considering the influence of this fetishised object in a broader context, it was additionally found that the machete-fetish was a critical part of a larger religious system, a manufactured Hutu civil religion, particular to Bellah’s delineation of this concept.⁷⁷ This civil religion overarches the genocide as a whole, creating a unifying narrative for perpetrators to adhere to and carry out; this being an additional example of the influence of religion on the genocide. As such, via an investigation of the fetishised machete, readers will witness complex delineation of the influence of religion in this case of slaughter, namely, a dualistic machete-fetish with an additional place in a greater civil religion framework. Both the machete-fetish, and the Hutu civil religion framework it is a part of, are key examples of religious influence on the actions and minds of *génocidaire* as they took life in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

⁷² Silva, “Reification and Fetishism;” Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide* (London: Hurst and Company, 1995), p. 403.

⁷³ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 403.

⁷⁴ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228; Hartmut Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

⁷⁵ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 221.

⁷⁶ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 221.

⁷⁷ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America.”

Structure

This project is segmented into four chapters, each playing a specific role in the delineation of religion as a factor in perpetrator motivations and in the manufacturing of genocidal fervour. I begin at a macro-level of analysis and gradually converge to the micro-level examination of perpetrator testimony. The reader will find each chapter commences with a newspaper editorial cartoon. These cartoons pictorially analyse the state of genocide in the world today and the international response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The cartoons have been included for two reasons. Firstly, it serves to remind us that the scholarly endeavour of genocide studies sits in a much larger, contemporary political context. Secondly, these cartoons are a reminder of past and current failings to protect the vulnerable, this being a driving force behind this project.

Chapter One discusses the elephant in the room, the highly-contested term “genocide.” This term is unpacked and presented to the reader through the current scholarly take on how this phenomenon is terminologically demarcated. Chapter Two analyses current academic explanations of genocide propulsion. Based on these current understandings of genocide propulsion, Chapter Two also presents this project’s methodology of fetishism. The reader should be aware that explanations considering genocide propulsion in the 1994 Rwandan case specifically are held back from Chapter Two and actually presented in Chapter Three. Chapter Three presents the historical context of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda and current scholarly understanding of the role religion played in the genocide, and what motivated the actions of the ordinary people who carried it out. Explanations specific to the propulsion of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda are discussed immediately after the delineation of the genocide’s historical context. This is in order that the reader can situate these theories amongst the context of the event. This leads onto the main case study, and the largest chapter of this project. Chapter Four presents the Rwandan case study, focused on the analysis of perpetrator testimony from the Genocide in order to ascertain the influence of religion on their motivations and the creation, or enhancing of, genocidal fervour. Due to the length of this case study, this chapter is further divided into a number of sections. Firstly, in the introductory paragraphs the nature of Hatzfeld’s interviews is outlined and a biography of each

perpetrator is provided for the reader. Secondly, in order to ascertain if a fetish is at play here, and if it is influencing on the actions of *génocidaire*, I will seek fetishistic indicators around the object, these having been outlined in Chapter Two.⁷⁸ In searching for fetishistic indicators, we will see the machete become fetishised and the two machete-fetishes appear; the machete as conflated with Hutu nationalism and that machete as conflated with the will of the Rwandan God.⁷⁹ In the fourth section, a discussion of these two fetishes will take place. At this point, it will become clear that the fetish is part of a greater religious system, Hutu civil religion. The fifth section will situate the findings of this project in the current literature, particularly in relation to the nomothetical findings of this project, that is, the broader comprehension of the nexus between religion and genocide.

The conclusion of this project outlines the overall findings of this project, the expedience of the methodology, and next steps to be taken. It is important to note that this project is not suggesting that its findings are the single motivator of genocidal actors, nor is it the foremost manner in which religion and genocide are connected. As such, this specific project is not tasked with providing a grand theory of genocide propulsion, there is no one theory that could do that. Rather, this project is tasked with understanding why people are driven to commit such acts of violence, thus presenting additional factors in the understanding of this. These factors must be duly considered and understood in order to more fully comprehend religion's place in case of genocidal violence, and in understanding genocide as a phenomenon more broadly. This project is, at its heart, about humanness. It is about understanding how the religious plays a role in turning ordinary people into murderers.

⁷⁸ Andrew M. Jones and Nicole Bovin, "The Malice of Inanimate Objects: Material Agency," in Dan Hicks and Mary C. Beaudry eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 336; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

⁷⁸ Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

⁷⁹ Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 218.

Chapter 1

“Genocide”: A Terminological Conundrum



Figure 1: John Houk, “Why is Darfur Allowed to Continue,” *Slanted Right Blog*, September 25, 2001, 16:05, (accessed October 2015), www.slantedright.blogspot.com.au/2006/11/why-is-darfur-genocide-allowed-to.html.

...Genocide, Genocide...
 ...Well...
 ...That is such a heavy word...

The script of the above cartoon, from Dutch cartoonist John Houk, portrays the reluctance of international powers to apply the term “genocide” to the violence occurring against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa people in Darfur, Sudan (c. 2004—). In the cartoon, representatives from the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the United States of America (USA) stand amongst the victims debating whether “genocide” is too “heavy” a term for this violent occurrence.¹ To date, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) documents an estimated death toll of between 200,000 and 300,000, and an ongoing count

¹ It is important to note that the USA (via former President George Bush, the United States Congress, then senator Barack Obama and senators Hillary Clinton and John Kerry) and some members of the EU (France and Portugal), have been vocal in the application of the term “genocide” to the conflict in Darfur from 2004 onwards.

of 2.7 million displaced persons due to the conflict in Darfur.² Further, one Darfurian NGO records 9300 cases of rape,³ although, from T. Gingerich and J. Learing's interviews with those present during this ongoing conflict, it is clear that this figure is conservative.⁴ Yet, as Houk illustrates, the term "genocide" is reluctantly applied to the ongoing affliction of the Sudanese: the UN, African Union, Amnesty International, and *Médecins sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders) have all denounced the use of the term "genocide" in relation to Darfur or have actively gone about disproving the occurrence of genocide. The 2004 UN International Criminal Court (ICC) *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur* concluded that

the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. Arguably, two elements of genocide might be deduced from the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their control. These two elements are, first, the *actus reus* consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical destruction; and, second, on the basis of a subjective standard, the existence of a protected group being targeted by the authors of criminal conduct.⁵

Despite the presence of "two elements of 'genocide'," the conflict was, and is, not labelled as such by the UN. However, in 2010 the ICC issued a warrant for the arrest of the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir that included three charges of "genocide." However, these charges have not been laid as Sudan did not ratify the Rome Statute, and as such the ICC does not have jurisdiction in Sudan. Whether charging President Al-Bashir with three counts of "genocide" in the ICC is equivalent to acknowledging all of the violent occurrences of the conflict as "genocide" remains to be seen. What is clear is that the term "genocide," carries such clout, that to label an event as "genocide" is to invoke a supreme weapon of "political combat" on the international stage:⁶

² "Darfur – Overview," UNICEF, (accessed 2 October 2015) http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sudan_darfuroverview.html.

³ T. Gingerich and Je. Learing, "The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict of Darfur Sudan," *Program on Humanitarian Crises and Human Rights, François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights* (Boston, MA: Harvard School for Public Health, 2004), p. 16.

⁴ Gingerich and Learing, "The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict of Darfur Sudan," p. 16.

⁵ United Nations, "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 18 September 2004," (accessed October 2, 2015) www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.

⁶ Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007); Donald W. Beachler, *The Genocide Debate: Politicians, Academics, and Victims* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 9; Mahmood Mamdani, "The Politics of

[G]enocide has become a label to be stuck on your worst enemy, a perverse version of the Nobel Prize, part of a rhetorical arsenal that helps you vilify your adversaries while ensuring impunity for your allies.⁷

“Genocide” is the ultimate crime, the worst betrayal of international law.⁸ Moreover, to label an event as “genocide” is to mark onlookers as failed allies of humanity. As Louis Rene Beres bluntly states, “genocides can take place because ‘good’ states have more pressing concerns.”⁹ To invoke the term “genocide” is to call out the supposed solidarity that combines human beings, a solidarity that renders each person co-responsible for crimes committed in their presence or with their knowledge.¹⁰ In his cartoon, Houk epitomises this loaded nature of the term central to this project: “genocide.” It is not a mere word; it carries notions of legality, responsibility, punishment, politics, and failure.

Scholarly debate over the classification of “genocide” commenced shortly after its creation; and while an authoritarian definition may exist for juridical purposes, the international community and the academy remain unsettled as its true designation. Difficulties in separating the term from “ethnic cleansing” and “massacre,” in addition to questions of “intent,” “grouping,” and “context” plague the contestation surrounding “genocide” as a useable term. As such, in order to elucidate the term “genocide” as employed in this project; this chapter will delineate the origins of the term “genocide,” prior to reviewing scholarly arguments on the use and designation of the term. This shall result in an explication of the preferred definition of “genocide” for this particular project. It is important for the reader to note that this chapter is by no means an exhaustive take on the debate around this term; there are many elements of this debate into which I could not venture in this particular instance.

Naming Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,” *London Review of Books*, 29:5 (March 2007), pp. 5-8.

⁷ Mamdani, “The Politics of Naming Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,” p. 7.

⁸ Power, *A Problem from Hell*.

⁹ Louis Rene Beres, “Perspectives on Public Policy: Genocide,” *Policy Studies Review* 4:3 (February 1985), p. 400.

¹⁰ Jaspers in Louis Rene Beres, “Perspectives on Public Policy: Genocide,” p. 404.

“Genocide”: A Terminological Origin Story

While the acts it describes are age-old, the word “genocide” belongs to recent times. Prior to World War II, intervening on behalf of specifically persecuted populations was considered to be part of the law of nations, a duty to humanity; however, no legal description of such acts or according punishment existed, and legal obligation to intervene remained to be seen. Due to fear that the International Military Tribunal (IMT) was primarily concerned with war-time genocide, and ignoring peace-time genocide in their examination of the violent acts of the Third Reich, Professor Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in an attempt to mark out the atrocities of the Holocaust.¹¹ Lemkin’s term is an amalgamation of the Greek *geno* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (to kill).¹² As such, his own definition is thus: “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”¹³ The intention behind the creation of the term “genocide” was in the separating out of the Holocaust as an international crime distinct from World War II itself. Lemkin’s notion of “genocide” was adopted by the Allied Forces in the formulation of the “Crimes Against Humanity” portion of the *Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis* (hereafter *London Charter*).¹⁴ The *London Charter* designates “Crimes Against Humanity” as such:

Article 6 (c) Crimes against humanity - namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.¹⁵

¹¹ Henry T. King Jr., “Genocide and Nuremberg” in Ralph J. Henham and Paul Behrens eds., *The Criminal Law of Genocide: International, Comparative and Contextual Aspects* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), p. 29.

¹² Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (New Jersey, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2008), p. 79.

¹³ Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, p. 79.

¹⁴ King Jr., “Genocide and Nuremberg,” p. 30.

¹⁵ International Military Tribunal, “Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London, 8 August 1945,” *International Committee of the Red Cross Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries* (accessed February 20, 2016), www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/350?OpenDocument.

This designation places emphasis on persecution based upon “political, racial or religious grounds,” and is the first legal document of its kind to do so. However, this persecution remains to be only punishable when “in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”. In other words, the “genocide” must also fall beneath the categories of Crimes Against Peace or Crimes of War for it to be an actionable offence. Plainly, the *London Charter* still only recognises “genocide” as enacted within a wartime setting.¹⁶ Lemkin’s “genocide” was thus not recognised as a stand-alone international crime.

Building upon Lemkin’s work and the *London Charter*, the *1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide* (hereafter, *1948 Convention*) pioneered an understanding of “genocide” that seceded the shackles of the *London Charter*. The *1948 Convention* rendered “genocide” a distinct international crime:

Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law, which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.¹⁷

¹⁶ King Jr., “Genocide and Nuremberg,” p. 31.

¹⁷ UN General Assembly, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 9 December 1948,” p. 280.

This UN definition of “genocide” looms large in the mind of international powers for the *1948 Convention* was the first to clearly stipulate illegal acts of “genocide” (Article II), later being adopted into municipal law by 80 countries.¹⁸ Further, Article III rendered any association with “genocide” as illegal, broadening the scope from punishment directed solely towards those who enacted the violence. Nevertheless, a number of influential members of the UN did not sign or ratify the document until well after it became international law in 1951— the United Kingdom (UK) signed in 1970, the People’s Republic of China in 1983, and the USA in 1988. Prosecutions via the *1948 Convention* did not begin until 1993 with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In addition, an International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) commenced in 1994 and an Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was instigated in 2003.

Regardless of these prosecutions, the *1948 Convention* has been a constant recipient of critique. While entitled the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,” the document provides little insight into how genocide should be prevented. No resources, tact, or information are afforded via the *1948 Convention* to aid in the halting or averting of genocide. As such, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn render the document as “symbolic” due to the limited practical use of the document in the prevention of genocide.¹⁹ Moreover, the document is riddled with definitional ambiguities and political predicaments. Hence, the punishment of genocide via the 1948 Convention is a challenging and biased process. In a late 1948 UN General Assembly the UK delegate stated the following:

...it was a complete delusion to suppose that the adoption of a convention of the type proposed, even if generally adhered to,

¹⁸ Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Estonia, Fiji, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of the Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.

¹⁹ Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 11.

would give people a greater sense of security or would diminish existing dangers.²⁰

While not an expert in the area of international criminal law, I shall provide a brief précis of the quandaries that plague this preeminent document, as these are the provisions combated in the definitions of “genocide” formulated by scholars from the 1950s onward.

Hinton notes that the Holocaust acts as a “certain manifestation of the genocidal process,” a manifestation that has shaped the *1948 Convention* clouding the definition of cases of specified slaughter.²¹ As such, “intent,” specific “groups,” and the designation of destruction “in whole or in part” are seen as requisite parts of “genocide” and its prosecution. However, all three of these elements are problematic. Firstly, to groups. The *1948 Convention* restricts victimised groups to those that can be easily categorised as “national, ethnical, racial or religious,”²² the document aligning with Lemkin who “erred in assuming that types of groups...are straightforwardly defined.”²³ In limiting victims to “national, ethnical, racial or religious” groups, the plight of other communities is negated.²⁴ For example, during the Korean war, the 1950 Bodo League Massacre saw 100,000-200,000 men, women, and children killed who were Communist, or simply suspected to be. This massacre does not fall within the category of “genocide” as those murdered were targeted as a “political” group.²⁵ The limitation on groups in the *1948 Convention* suggests that the destruction of easily identifiable groups with firm membership is “more heinous

²⁰ Sir Hartley Shawcross in Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1981), p. 19.

²¹ Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7:1 (Spring 2012), p. 11.

²² UN General Assembly, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 9 December 1948,” *United Nations Treaty Series*, (accessed 18 February 2016) https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en.

²³ John K. Roth, “Easy to Remember? Genocide and the Philosophy of Religion,” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 68:1 (December 2010), note 12.

²⁴ UN General Assembly, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 9 December 1948, p. 280.

²⁵ It is worthy to note that political groups were due to be named in the 1948 Convention. However, both Poland and United Soviet Socialist Republic (hereafter USSR, not to be confused with the Ukrainian SSR also a member of the UN at the time, signing the 1948 convention separately), objected to the inclusion of such a group. For the USSR “genocide” was inherently tied to Nazi ideology of racial/national hatred and thus to groups that are “easily distinguishable”. As such, inclusion of political groups would “blur” and “distort the perspective in which the crime should be viewed”. The United States of America also expressed concern at the inclusion of political groups, fearing non-ratification of the 1948 Convention if they were included. Political groups were officially expunged in a vote on November 9, 1948. See Kuper, *Genocide*, pp. 25-29.

in the light of the conscience of humanity” than the devastation of groups whose membership may be more fluid, such as the Communists of the Bodo League Massacre.²⁶ In fact, it is fair to argue that the *1948 Convention* is fundamentally “groupist” in its understanding of human groups as permanent, homogenous entities.²⁷

To combat the “groupist” manifestation of the *1948 Convention*, Jack Nusan Porter marks out victim groups as either a “racial, sexual, religious, tribal or political minority.”²⁸ Expanding the list ensures that the plight of groups other than those named in the *1948 Convention* are considered. Conversely, for Alex Alvarez the specification of any group, regardless of the breadth of inclusion, is a “significant weakness” in a definition of “genocide.”²⁹ For Alvarez the specification of groups may offer semantic protection to perpetrators — it is possible for the victimiser to argue that the victims were not targeted as members of a *specific* group. As such, the removal of hard categories in totality is a position favoured by Alvarez, as well as Huttenbach, Drost, Dadrian, Fein, Charny, Shaw, Chalk, and Jonassohn.³⁰ These scholars favour an open interpretation of groups, creating a definition that acknowledges violence committed against any “group.” Peter Drost’s take is exemplary: “[g]enocide is the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any human collectivity as such.”³¹ Such a stance acknowledges violence targeted at any group, this even-handedness creating a definition in which no case of specified slaughter is more heinous than another case. Creating such breadth of inclusion, as is not seen in the *1948 Convention*

²⁶ United Nations, *Legal Committee*, Session 3, § 1, 14 October 1948, (accessed February 25, 2016), <http://research.un.org/en/undhr/ga/thirdcommittee>.

²⁷ Lars Cederman, ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity’, in Walte Carlnaes, Thomes Risse, and Beth A. Simmons eds, *Handbook of International Relations* (London, UK: Sage, 2002), p. 412.

²⁸ Jack Nusan Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights: A Global Anthology* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America: 1989), p. 12.

²⁹ Alex Alvarez, *Governments, Citizens, and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 37.

³⁰ Henry R. Huttenbach, “Locating Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum: Towards a Methodology of Definition and Categorisation,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 3:3 (1988), p. 294; Peter Drost, *The Crime of State: Genocide*, vol. 2. (Leiden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff, 1959), p. 125; Vahakn Dadrian, “A Typology of Genocide,” *International Review of Modern Sociology* 5:2 (Fall 1974), pp. 201, 204; Helen Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 24; Martin Shaw, *What is Genocide?* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), p. 154; Israel Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide” in G. A. Andreopoulos ed., *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p. 75; Chalk and Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, p. 23.

³¹ Drost, *The Crime of State*, p. 125.

or similar categorical definitions, acknowledges the plight of peoples, regardless of the impetus behind their affliction. Further, such even-handedness recognises the complex creation of victim groups in genocidal situations. As Steven Katz argues, in many cases of genocide the victimised collective is frequently defined by the perpetrator, rather than by the group themselves.³² Drost's definition alludes to this notion in the statement "by reason of their membership of any human collectivity *as such*."³³ The phrasing here infers that the membership may be attributed to the individuals of the collectivity themselves *or* by the perpetrator in spite of the victim's sense of self-identification. Hence, a definition with an open understanding of groups not only removes provisional bias and unnecessary rejection of victimised communities, it highlights the complexity of the victim-perpetrator relationship and negates external categorisation. Regardless of this acquiescent understanding of groups, the *1948 Convention* remains categorical for fear of blurring the confines of the document.

Next we turn to the notion of "intent," as implemented in Article II.³⁴ Referring to culpability, the provision of "intent" or *mens rea* in the *1948 Convention* renders "genocide" a deliberate act. While seemingly clear, "intent" is commonly referred to as the "Achilles heel" of the *1948 convention* as "intent" is difficult to confirm or measure.³⁵ As Herbert Hirsch highlights, "Serbs are, for example, able to argue that their intent was not to commit 'genocide' but to acquire territory...or to protect themselves from threat" and that they did not infer that their actions would cause harm.³⁶ It is possible to work around the notion of explicit "intent" through an understanding of the different forms of "intent."³⁷ "General intent" refers to the most basic designation of the term, the known objective to commit a certain act. "Constructive intent" refers to the inferred understanding that one's actions have

³² Steven T. Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and Mass Death Before the Modern Age* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 131.

³³ Drost, *The Crime of State*, p. 125, emphasis added.

³⁴ Regardless of "intent," Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, the US, Vietnam, Yemen and the former USSR communicated reservation in relation to Article IX, only signing the 1948 Convention with the provision they could not be called in front of an International Court or Tribunal without their consent. "Intent" thus becomes null and void in relation to these signatories.

³⁵ John Quigley, "Genocide: A Useful Legal Category?," *International Criminal Justice Review* 19:2 (June 2009), p. 117.

³⁶ Herbert Hirsch in Alvarez, *Governments, Citizens, and Genocide*, p. 51.

³⁷ Alvarez, *Governments, Citizens, and Genocide*, p. 52.

the ability to cause harm. Both “general” and “constructive” intent can be employed in an international court. For example, in relation to the above comment from Herbert Hirsch; the ICTY noted that “intent” could be inferred in the constructive sense through the systematic nature of “genocide,” despite a lack of explicit evidence for general intent.³⁸

Despite the ability of the ICT to work around the need for explicit evidence of general intent, several scholars, such as Israel Charny, Leo Kuper, and Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowi, argue for an inspection into the notion of “intent.” For Charny, as well as Wallimann and Dobkowski, “intent” creates hierarchical criteria, excluding people from the justice they deserve,³⁹ particularly those who are victims of “genocide” that occurs via recognised social processes. Wallimann and Dobkowski argue that the “intent” hierarchy manifests in

[t]he neglect of those processes of destruction which, although massive, are so systematic and systemic, and that therefore appear so “normal” that most individuals involved at some level of the process of destruction may never see the need to make an ethical decision or even reflect upon the consequences of their action.⁴⁰

An example of Wallimann and Dobkowski’s concern is the assault on African Americans throughout US history, particularly during the Reconstruction Period of the Civil Rights movement. Despite horrific targeted violence that falls within the demarcations of Article II, neither general nor constructive “intent” to destroy African American people as a group or a culture, in whole or in part, can be proven as the objective of the violence. “Intent” thus allows “inadvertent” acts of “genocide” to pass as not “genocidal.”⁴¹ It is arguable, however, that striking “intent” from the *1948 Convention* may cause more problems than it solves. Kuper considers the Allied bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as acts that fall within the parameters of the UN definition of “genocide.”⁴² While there was considerable loss of Japanese life here, the question remains; were “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” dropped for political purposes or in hope of the destruction

³⁸ Caroline Fournet, *Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: Misconceptions and Confusion in French Law and Practice* (Oxford, UK and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2013), p. 100.

³⁹ Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide”.

⁴⁰ Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski eds., *Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. xxii.

⁴¹ Kuper, *Genocide*, pp. 31-32.

⁴² Leo Kuper in Meghna Manaktala, “Defining Genocide,” *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 24:2 (2012), p. 182.

of the Japanese people? “Intent” remains blurred in this particular case; hence, via a plain reading of the *1948 Convention*, there is (arguably) no case of “genocide.”

The designation of destruction “in whole or in part” in Article II is a further point of critique, as it is unclear as to what “in part” is referring to. Prior to ratification of the *1948 Convention*, the United States clarified their understanding of “in part” as enough of the group as to cause the destruction of the group as a “viable entity.”⁴³ However, this specification remains to have a clear meaning, and returns to the notion of *mens rea*. Expanding “in part” to “a viable entity” creates space to debate any genocidal case, for the “minimum deaths” can be raised indefinitely. The question of the perpetrator’s “intent” to destroy the group as a *viable* entity can also be called into question. For Benjamin Valentino, “in part” is not about a vague “viability,” but is to be defined simply and clearly “as at least fifty thousand intentional deaths over the course of five or fewer years.”⁴⁴ Valentino’s specification appears ill thought through, as fifty thousand deaths in one group is not comparable to fifty thousand deaths in other. In reporting to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Ben Whitaker clarified “in part” as “a reasonably significant number, relative to the group as a whole,”⁴⁵ indicating that “in part” is a mystery population percentile. Whitaker’s take on “in part” is supported by the designation of “in part” upheld by the ICTY, where “in part” was evaluated by individual deaths not only as an absolute entity, but in relation to the entire targeted group.⁴⁶

As Caroline Fournet purports, the issue with the Article II “in part” provision may not be in the hazy (at best) specification of a minimum number of deaths or proportion of the targeted population, nor in the potential loophole in arguing that there were not enough deaths to constitute significant destruction of a group.⁴⁷ Rather, it is in the misunderstanding that the destruction of an *important* part of a group may only be via a significant loss of life. As such, it is

⁴³ John Quigley, *The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), p. 141.

⁴⁴ Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 11-12.

⁴⁵ Ben Whitaker in Quigley, *The Genocide Convention*, p. 141.

⁴⁶ International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), *Prosecutor v. Krstic*, Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, § 12, (accessed February 18, 2016), <http://icr.icty.org>.

⁴⁷ Fournet, *Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 101.

arguable that “in part” does not have to refer to a numbers game and places too much emphasis on Article II (a) of the *1948 Convention*. As John K. Roth states,

[W]hen one tries to calculate genocide’s death toll, calculations of the incalculable are unavoidably involved. How much Armenian life did the Turk’s destroy? How vast was the destruction of the European Jews? How expensive was the damage to Tutsi existence as Hutu machetes did their worst? What losses are accumulating for tribes in Darfur as the catastrophe inflicted by Khartoum and the Janjaweed continues to unfold?⁴⁸

Fournet and Roth raise the critical point that it is impossible to measure how much of a culture is destroyed via systemic violence. Regardless of the critiques presented here, the *1948 Convention* remains unamended and legally authoritative.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, as demonstrated in the above comic, the hazy nature of “genocide” renders international powers reluctant in tolling the genocidal knell, even in the most straightforward cases; often, what is being delineated is not a one-dimensional destruction of a people.

“Genocide”: Scholarly Debate on Accurate Use and Terminological Designation

Due to the complex nature of the above elements in the designation of the term “genocide,” scholarly definitions of the term abound. Many directly combat the ambiguity of the *1948 Convention*. While, as Roth notes, it is impossible to define “genocide” to “everyone’s satisfaction,”⁵⁰ Adam Jones does make note of a divide in academic definitions of “genocide.”⁵¹ This division is between “soft” and “hard” positions: “hard” positions are “guided by concerns that ‘genocide’ will be rendered banal or meaningless by careless use,” while “soft” positions “reflect concerns that excessively rigid framings...rule out too many actions that, logically and morally, demand to be included.”⁵² It is most useful to consider Jones’ “hard” and “soft” schema as a spectrum rather than as a binary, as some definitions feature both “hard” and “soft” elements. As such, the following review will commence with definitions that fall clearly on the “hard” end of the spectrum, working towards the most open, “soft” definitions. This

⁴⁸ Roth, “Easy to Remember,” pp. 35-36.

⁴⁹ Berel Lang, *Genocide: The Act as Idea* (Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), p. 2.

⁵⁰ Roth, “Easy to Remember?,” p. 38.

⁵¹ Adam Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (New York, NY: Routledge 2006), p. 19.

⁵² Jones, *Genocide*, p. 19.

review will analyse several prominent “genocide” definitions, before offering the definition that will be utilised for this project.

Perhaps the most-firm of the definitions considered here is that of Holocaust scholar Yehuda Bauer. While more elaborate than Lemkin, the influence of Lemkin on Bauer’s definition is clear. Like Lemkin, Bauer’s definition is “hard” in terms of groups, intent, genocidal actions, and additionally, time period:

[Genocide is] the planned destruction, since the mid-nineteenth century, of a racial, national, or ethnic group as such, by the following means: (a) selective mass murder of elites or parts of the populations; (b) elimination of national (racial, ethnic) culture and religious life with the intent of ‘denationalisation’; (c) enslavement, with the same intent; (d) destruction of national (racial, ethnic) economic life, with the same intent; (e) biological decimation through the kidnapping of children, or the prevention of normal family life with the same intent.⁵³

To commence with Bauer’s take on groups; in his recent publication, *Rethinking the Holocaust*, Bauer explains that despite the desire of other scholars to include groups beyond the racial, national, or ethnic (namely religious and political) “neither of these...additions make sense.”⁵⁴ For Bauer, religious and political groups should not be included because “people persecuted because of their religious beliefs can...go over to the persecutor’s faith and save themselves...[t]he same applies to political persecutees.”⁵⁵ Bauer uses the example of Jehovah’s Witnesses who were persecuted in the Holocaust but who yielded to the Nazi regime by taking up arms or who were eventually released from concentration camps as a reason not to include religious groups in the definition of “genocide.”⁵⁶ While there is some sense here from Bauer that these Jehovah’s Witnesses are receiving “special treatment,” these individuals were not truly freed, rather being given another option than death. To give a mere snapshot of the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses during the Third Reich; in May 1938, 12 percent of prisoners in Buchenwald and 18 percent of prisoners in the women’s camp at Lichtenberg were Jehovah’s Witnesses.⁵⁷ It is

⁵³ Yehuda Bauer in Adam Jones, *Genocide*, pp. 16-17.

⁵⁴ Yehuda Bauer, *Rethinking the Holocaust* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 11.

⁵⁵ Bauer, *Rethinking the Holocaust*, p. 11.

⁵⁶ Bauer, *Rethinking the Holocaust*, p. 11.

⁵⁷ Jack R. Fischel, *Historical Dictionary of the Holocaust*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD, Toronto, Canada, and Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2010), p. 133.

conservatively estimated that 35 percent Jehovah's Witnesses interred during the Third Reich perished.⁵⁸ Despite this overt persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses, Bauer only acknowledges groups in which membership "is not a matter of choice."⁵⁹ Imbedded into this definition is thus a problematic understanding that violence inflicted upon a group whose membership is firm is worse than that inflicted upon a group whose membership is considered to be optional. Further, there is lack of understanding that despite self-identification, in most (if not all) cases it is the perpetrator who defines the target group, not the individuals within the group.

In terms of intent and genocidal actions, Bauer specifies "genocide" as cases that are distinctly "planned" to bring about "destruction," a theme that will be seen throughout several other definitions of "genocide."⁶⁰ However, this seemingly "hard" notion of intent here is ambiguous as the acts included by Bauer pertain to overt genocidal acts, as well as more haphazard attempts, and less obvious violent systematic social processes. However, it is important to note that within the acts outlined, in part (e) there is a lack of clarity surrounding the use of sexual violence as a genocidal act due to the particular stipulation of "the kidnapping of children or prevention of normal family life" in relation to "biological decimation."⁶¹ Interestingly, Bauer restricts "genocide" to acts from "the mid-nineteenth century," a trait not seen in any of the definitions considered below.⁶² It is not clear why this period has been selected as a marker for the beginning of the genocidal epoch, nor why cases of specified slaughter prior to this period would not warrant use of the term "genocide."

Finally, it is important to note that Bauer does not make note of an amount of destruction, ignoring any notion of "in whole or in part" in his definition. This is due to Bauer's position that "genocide" should refer to the partial destruction of a group, while "Holocaust" should refer to the complete destruction of a people.⁶³ Bauer specifies that in his view, the destruction of the

⁵⁸ Rüdiger Lautman, "The Pink Triangle: Homosexuals as Enemies of State" in Michael Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck eds., *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed, and the Reexamined* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 348.

⁵⁹ Bauer, *Rethinking the Holocaust*, p. 11.

⁶⁰ Bauer in Adam Jones, *Genocide*, pp. 16-17.

⁶¹ Bauer in Adam Jones, *Genocide*, pp. 16-17.

⁶² Bauer in Adam Jones, *Genocide*, pp. 16-17.

⁶³ Bauer, *Rethinking the Holocaust*, pp. 10-11.

Czechs, Poles, and “Gypsies” by the Nazis as well as the Soviet policies towards the Chechens, Volga Germans, and Tartars are “genocide”.⁶⁴ Bauer is also willing to include the destruction of native American tribes by American settlers, the “cases of the Hutus, the Biharis and the Ibos;” but the only “Holocaust” is that of Jewry under the Third Reich.⁶⁵ While it is critical to create a definition of “genocide” that is concrete enough so as not to water-down the term, Bauer’s viewpoint is perhaps excessively exclusive, and, it is certainly hierarchical. In this sense, the practicality of Bauer’s definition gets tangled in its implication of a genocidal pecking order; that is, one group’s plight is more worthy of a particular title than another simply because of the type of group membership or due to the vastness of the destruction.

While the definitions of Wallimann and Dobkowski as well as that of Porter have been referenced previously in this chapter for their particular stance on controversial elements included in the *1948 Convention*, the definitions created by these scholars still fall towards the “hard” end of Jones’ schema.⁶⁶ These scholars favour specific groups, name particular genocidal acts, employ the phrase “in whole or in part,” and both imply that the perpetrators actions must be deliberate. Wallimann and Dobkowski build upon Porter’s 1982 definition, thinning it down to create a seemingly similar, yet significantly altered definition. To begin with Porter:

Genocide is the deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, by a government or its agents, of a racial, sexual, religious, tribal or political minority. It can involve not only mass murder, but also starvation, forced deportation, and political, economic and biological subjugation. Genocide involves three major components: ideology, technology, and bureaucracy/organisation.⁶⁷

Porter’s definition stresses a bureaucratic nature to “genocide.” Here, a government or its agents always enact “genocide”.⁶⁸ While this may be in the majority of cases, particularly in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this definition closes itself off to cases in which a non-ruling group commits a genocidal act. Thus, a non-ruling group could not be prosecuted here. However,

⁶⁴ Yehuda Bauer, “The Place of the Holocaust in Contemporary History” in Jonathan Frankel ed. *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 1 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 213.

⁶⁵ Bauer, “The Place of the Holocaust in Contemporary History,” p. 214.

⁶⁶ Wallimann and Dobkowski eds., *Genocide and the Modern Age*; Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights*.

⁶⁷ Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights*, p. 12.

⁶⁸ Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights*, p. 12.

Porter backtracks from this in the last line of his definition where he states that “genocide” has three components: “ideology, technology, and bureaucracy/organisation.”⁶⁹ The either-or nature of “bureaucracy/organisation” on the latter most point implies that “genocide” can be either organised by a ruling force or a non-ruling force.⁷⁰ It is feasible to suggest, however, that Porter is firm on the bureaucratic nature of “genocide.”

While Porter is definitive in terms of the intentionality of “genocide” and the groups “genocide” involves he broadens the groups “genocide” may impact from those that Bauer incorporates. Porter’s definition includes racial, sexual, religious, tribal, and political groups, listing most categorical factions. Porter has chosen not to include ethnic or national groups. This may be due to the understanding that the inclusion tribal groups may cover peoples that would be otherwise included in either ethnic or national groups, although this is not necessarily the case. Despite the breadth of categories included, Porter’s definition stipulates that regardless of group type, the group must be a “minority.”⁷¹ The specification of a “minority” is particularly problematic in the case of the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda.⁷² Following the 1994 Genocide, Tutsi (particularly those of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)) targeted the original perpetrators of the genocide, and the tribal majority, the Hutu, in three waves of systematic revenge killings. The first wave, perhaps the most fervent, lasted from April 1994 to mid-1995; the second wave from began shortly after and continued until the end of 1995; and the final wave commenced in March 1996.⁷³ Prunier notes that while each wave was inspired by a different catalyst, the Hutu target remained, with the estimated death toll varying from 5,000 to 100,000.⁷⁴ Yet, the term “genocide” has never been applied to this particular case, arguably because Hutu were not an innocent people off the back of 1994, nor were they a minority group. In fact, Prunier argues that the term should not be applied because the Tutsi could never have “eradicated” the Hutu

⁶⁹ Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights*, p. 12.

⁷⁰ Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights*, p. 12.

⁷¹ Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights*, p. 12.

⁷² Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights*, p. 12.

⁷³ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 4th edition (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 2002), p. 361.

⁷⁴ Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On” in Michael J. Boyle, *Violence After War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), p. 147; Jones, *Genocide*, p. 244; Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pp. 361-362.

as they were the majority tribe, as such it was simply not possible to “even out the score.”⁷⁵ Hence, despite the death toll inflicted on the Hutu tribe, as they are the majority and were only destroyed “in part,” this is not a “genocide” by Porter’s definition.

Porter alludes to the *1948 Convention* in the acts he has included in his definition, although this definition does suffer from a lack of clarity and even-handedness in regard to the included acts. The categorical nature of the definition, particularly in relation to “political, economic and biological subjugation,”⁷⁶ is deliberately broad as to include numerous acts. However, this ambiguity results in categories that are difficult to practically apply. For example, in regard to political and economic subjugation; there is an understanding in this definition that this subjugation is coming via government agents but it is unclear exactly what form this subjugation can take to be “genocide.” How does one measure political and economic subjugation in terms of “destruction, in whole or in part?” Is the political subjugation via the removal of voting rights from a particular group, which may destroy the living conditions and broader rights of a people grounds for “genocide?” The ambiguity here, while well intended, thus leaves this definition open to numerous acts that are both bureaucratically deliberate and destructive with no measure as to what these acts could be. This is both a positive and negative attribution of the definition, depending on the case at hand. Further, as with Bauer’s definition, the term “biological subjugation” here lends itself more to the notion of starvation or germ warfare (toxins or infectious agents like viruses, bacteria, or fungi with the intent to kill and/or incapacitate humans), thus leaving the use of sexual violence as a weapon of “genocide” somewhat unaccounted for, an omission Wallimann and Dobkowski attend to in their take on this definition. Yet, as political, economic, and biological subjugation are indefinite as genocidal categories, it is not out of the question that sexual violence could be counted within “biological subjugation.” On a final point, it is unclear why the specific notion of “starvation” has been set apart as a genocidal act by Porter. “Starvation,” as a *technique* of destruction rather than a category, falls beneath both “mass murder” and “biological subjugation,” as these broad categories

⁷⁵ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 361.

⁷⁶ Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights*, p. 12.

encompass techniques by which these acts are carried out. By separating out “starvation,” this definition erroneously elevates starvation as a stand-alone category alongside mass murder, forced deportation, and so on. Starvation is thus seemingly hierarchically more grievous than the techniques that fall beneath other categorical headings.

Porter’s definition attempts inclusivity of all groups and all scenarios while remaining on the “hard” end of the spectrum. It is thus exceedingly firm in some areas and overtly ambiguous in others, walking a fragile definitional-middle-ground. This particular take on “genocide” is therefore difficult to apply practically. Published just five years after Porter’s, Wallimann and Dobkowski use much of Porter’s language in their definition; however their adjustments remove the ambiguity that hinders the useful application of Porter’s definition:

Genocide is the deliberate, organised destruction, in whole or in large part, of a racial or ethnic group by a government or its agents, it can involve not only mass murder, but also forced deportation (ethnic cleansing), systematic rape, and economic and biological subjugation.⁷⁷

Wallimann and Dobkowski retain Porter’s emphasis on bureaucracy, honing in on this notion via the removal of any implications surrounding “genocide” as enacted by non-ruling forces. As aforementioned, Wallimann and Dobkowski are wary of cases of “genocide” that go unnoticed due to a place in an established bureaucratic system:

[t]he neglect of those processes of destruction which, although massive, are so systematic and systemic, and that therefore appear so “normal” that most individuals involved at some level of the process of destruction may never see the need to make an ethical decision or even reflect upon the consequences of their action.⁷⁸

The definition created by Wallimann and Dobkowski thus places the actions of all government agencies under the microscope. To further the scrutiny of the actions of ruling-forces, the removal of term “minority” aids in the protection of all groups attacked by well-established processes of destruction. However, in honing Porter’s definition completely on ruling-forces, Wallimann and Dobkowski’s definition may negate the destruction of peoples who are targeted by non-ruling forces.

Wallimann and Dobkowski’s list of groups is significantly shorter than that of Porter, echoing Bauer’s definition in only acknowledging the plight of

⁷⁷ Wallimann and Dobkowski eds., *Genocide and the Modern Age*, p. x.

⁷⁸ Wallimann and Dobkowski eds., *Genocide and the Modern Age*, p. xxii.

racial and ethnic groups. In streamlining the groups included in their definition, Wallimann and Dobkowski reduce the cases that can fall under the “genocide” umbrella considerably, and as aforementioned, this can be problematic. Hence, not only is “genocide” exclusively enacted by ruling-forces here, the people those ruling-forces are supposedly targeting by in this definition are minute. This appears as somewhat paradoxical as Wallimann and Dobkowski are particularly concerned about systematic destruction, yet the definition they have created is so exceedingly stringent as to negate cases of genocide that are currently recognised, such as that of the Jehovah’s Witnesses under the Third Reich.⁷⁹ A question is thus raised as to the usefulness of this definition in aiding in their scrutiny of bureaucratic forces.

To continue, Wallimann and Dobkowski retain many of the genocidal acts outlined by Porter, preserving mass murder, forced deportation, and the somewhat ambiguous categories of economic and biological subjugation. While there is no attempt to clear-up uncertainty around the acts that could fall within the categories of economic and biological subjugation, Wallimann and Dobkowski do clarify this section removing the particular stipulations of “starvation” and “political subjugation.” The removal of “starvation” as a set-apart deed leaves the included acts as broad categories rather than a mixture of categories and techniques. As this particular definition does not acknowledge political groups as part of the peoples targeted by genocidal acts, the elimination of “political subjugation” may be explained by the removal of this group. However, it is important to note that racial or ethnic groups could be politically subjugated in a manner that causes them significant harm. This section of the definition also sees some expansion in the inclusion of “systematic rape” as separate from biological subjugation. While this clarification sees rape clearly as a genocidal act, “systematic rape” is, like “starvation,” a technique not a category. Just as Porter combines categories of genocidal acts and techniques of destruction, so too have Wallimann and Dobkowski. There are many sexually violent acts that occur amidst “genocide” that are technically not “rape” but contribute to the destruction of a people. As such the category of “sexual violence” or, to use terms at hand, “sexual subjugation,” may be more fitting of the crimes that have been and are seen in cases of “genocide.” As such, while

⁷⁹ Wallimann and Dobkowski eds., *Genocide and the Modern Age*, p. xxii.

Wallimann and Dobkowski iron out some of the issues in Porter's definition in terms of clarity, the definition given here possesses many of the same hindrances. Wallimann and Dobkowski's definition is rendered "harder" than Porter's, particularly in terms of groups and perpetrating agents; hence, while it is clearer and may be more easily applied, it is restrictive in terms of whose plight it acknowledges.

Before continuing, it is important to discuss Wallimann and Dobkowski's decision to define "forced deportation" as "ethnic cleansing." In this way, the removal of a people from land is simultaneously "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing," and it is fair to assume by this definition that in the process of "ethnic cleansing" other genocidal acts may be involved, for example, mass murder. This is of particular interest in relation to Ronald Grigor Suny's 2011 definition of "genocide:"

In my own definition mass killing is central to what I would label 'genocide'. However, mass killing in and of itself is not genocide...there is utility in restricting the term 'genocide' to what might more accurately be referred to as 'ethnocide', that is the deliberate attempt to eliminate a designated group defined by the cultural characteristics – language, imagined biological origins, religion – that have historically bound them together as a community. Genocide, thus, is 'ethnically inspired violence', but should be distinguished from ethnic cleansing, which may entail killing but more immediately involves displacement and deportation, the physical moving of a distinct population. Ethnic cleansing, whether of American Indians, Australian aborigines [*sic*], Palestinians or Kurds, is accompanied by loss of life, and killing if often an instrument to force people to move. The physical removal of people because you want the land but not the people on the land is closely related to genocide but does not require mass murder... First, in ethnic conflicts peoples may clash, but the state is either not involved or a relatively passive party. State absence or passivity rather than ambition and initiation in ethnic conflict contrasts with the active, instigating, and directing role of the state, even a weak or threatened state, in genocide. Second, ethnic conflict can be local – an urban riot or an anti-Semitic pogrom, for example – and can flare up and peter out quite quickly. Genocide involves the state as an actor able to mobilize hatreds and resentments for its own purposes in a co-ordinated way over great expanses. Third, the aim of the actors in ethnic conflict is not in most cases the total elimination of the rival group but more often its punishment, subordination, or evisceration. The more an ethnic conflict involves a goal of eliminating the other, the closer it is to genocide.⁸⁰

Suny aligns with Wallimann and Dobkowski in terms of emphasis on bureaucracy, intent and groups; however Suny views "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" as distinct events, aligning with the *1948 Convention* in that removal

⁸⁰ Ronald Grigor Suny, "Historicizing Genocide," *History Workshop Journal* 71 (Spring 2011), pp. 260, 262.

of people from land alone is not a genocidal act. For Suny, the peoples being moved must be subject to elimination for “ethnic cleansing” to cross over to “genocide.” In fact, Suny draws a line between different types of intent, implying that “genocide” is characterised by “hatred and resentments,” whereas “ethnic cleansing” is motivated by the desire for land without a specific people on it, which is not necessarily “hatred and resentment.”⁸¹ While the attribution of emotional motive to these terms is not something that this project favours, the separation of the terms “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” can prove useful in clearing the term “genocide” for practical use. However, as ethnic cleansing all too often involves genocidal acts as part of the process, this project understands that “ethnic cleansing” can be a symptom and technique of “genocide.” As such, “ethnic cleansing” is understood here as a stand-alone non-genocidal occurrence *and* as a possible symptom and technique of “genocide.”

Continuing on Jones’ spectrum,⁸² Irving Louis Horowitz hovers in the middle of the spectrum with a mix of “hard” and “soft” elements.⁸³ The initial definition provided by Horowitz is as follows: “Genocide is herein defined as a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus.”⁸⁴ Horowitz builds upon this definition in his work, stipulating that “genocide” must be a “systematic effort over a period of time to liquidate a national population, usually a minority,”⁸⁵ and that it must be a “political policy to assure conformity and participation by citizenry.”⁸⁶ Horowitz’s work continues along the same line as that of Porter, Wallimann and Dobkowski, as he overtly endorses both the need for intentionality and bureaucratic perpetrators of “genocide.” Additionally, Horowitz suggests that the effort by the bureaucratic powers must be sustained, the “genocide” occurring over a period of time, not as a lone instance. This stipulation is not included in the *1948 Convention* nor do Bauer, Porter, or Wallimann and Dobkowski raise it. The notion of sustained effort as included by Horowitz is important in setting apart “genocide” from “massacre,” something that previously discussed definitions, including the *1948*

⁸¹ Suny, “Historicizing Genocide,” pp. 260, 262.

⁸² Jones, *Genocide*, p. 19.

⁸³ Irving Louis Horowitz, *Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder* (New Brunswick, NY and New Jersey, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), p. 18.

⁸⁴ Horowitz, *Genocide*, p. 18.

⁸⁵ Horowitz, *Genocide*, p. 18.

⁸⁶ Horowitz, *Genocide*, p. 18.

Convention, fail to do clearly. This is also something that plagues the definitions below. However, how can “sustained” be defined? While a useful inclusion, it still fails to bring the academy closer to a universal definition.

Horowitz’s definition is particularly “soft” on groups. Horowitz specifies only “innocent people” rather than categorical groups defined by a cultural, ethnical, or biological features.⁸⁷ While the notion of “innocence” can, of course, be debated, the implication here is that the attacked people are so attacked for a reason out of their control. This is a more ambiguous take on groups than seen above, Horowitz being seemingly inclusive of any people consistently systematically attacked by a bureaucratic power. This does, however, leave the plight of these “innocent people” up to external categorisation, which may not necessarily be the most correct identification of the targeted people. On a final point, this definition does appear caught up on the “physical” destruction of a collectivity. The loss of a culture or language is not considered “genocide” here, despite the ability of this to destroy the existence of a specific group of people. In this sense, the definition is restrictive and “hard.”

Helen Fein’s most recent 1993 definition also features a mixture of “hard” and “soft” elements, much like that of Horowitz:

Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.⁸⁸

Fein is astute in the formulation of inclusion of genocidal acts. Rather than listing acts, inevitably leaving an act out or getting caught up in categories versus techniques, Fein goes about this from a new perspective. This definition understands genocidal acts by what prevents the group from surviving, that being the inability to pass on the point of membership of the group. As such, numerous acts could be included that prevent the biological and social reproduction of group members, whether this is the death of group members or otherwise.⁸⁹ However, Fein, like Horowitz, espouses the “physical” destruction of a collectivity in her definition. Continuing, Fein converges on the intentionality of the perpetrator to physically destroy a “collectivity,” this

⁸⁷ Horowitz, *Genocide*, p. 18.

⁸⁸ Fein, *Genocide*, p. 24.

⁸⁹ Fein, *Genocide*, p. 24.

“collectivity” not being defined. This definition thus lacks specificity in terms of groups, as a “collectivity” is an exceedingly vague term. It appears as though the perpetrator is able to attack any assembled group of people, but Fein does stipulate that the group has “membership” that is either socially or biologically produced. As such, there is an implication that the groups included by Fein are the national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender, and economic. Not including these hard categories is a deliberate attempt to allow each group to be defined as the case arises. Hence, Fein’s “soft” take on groups removes provisional bias and unnecessary rejection of victimised communities, it does however leave these groups at the mercy of external categorisation.

Another middle ground definition is the 2016 take of John Cox,⁹⁰ who like Horowitz and Fein, is “softer” in terms of the groups that “genocide” may impact:

Genocide is the attempt to destroy any recognized, stable, and permanent group as it is defined by the perpetrator: [It] is a concerted effort to eliminate its individual members and to destroy the group’s ability to maintain its social and cultural cohesion and, thus, its existence as a group. The perpetrators’ genocidal goals -- i.e., intent, which is central to the 1948 UN definition but is often analyzed too legalistically and narrowly -- can be uncovered by examining policies, actions, and outcomes.⁹¹

The understanding of groups here is critical not only in its deconstruction of categories, but also in the removal of groups from external identification. Cox rightfully notes that “genocides” occur because the perpetrator identifies a target group. This group may also self-identify just as the perpetrator has defined them, but it is foremost the perpetrator who sets those parameters. This stipulation is key. It removes the lens of previous cases of “genocide” through which new cases may be viewed, removing prejudice towards the plight of particular groups that have been targeted regardless of the nature of external categories. It is interesting, however, that Cox has included the terms “recognized, stable and permanent” in regards to his perpetrator centered understanding of groups.⁹² At first this seems contradictory as if one is to take the group as the perpetrator has defined it, there does not seem to be the need for such a stipulation – particularly if this overrides the perpetrator’s understanding of the group. For example, some

⁹⁰ John Cox, *To Kill a People: Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (London, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 17.

⁹¹ Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

⁹² Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

scholars purport that the included stipulation of “recognized, stable, and permanent” would negate the plight of some political groups.⁹³ However, the inclusion of “recognized, stable, and permanent” adds the specification that this definition would otherwise lack if it were merely “a group defined by a perpetrator.”⁹⁴ This stipulation thus aids in separating this particular comprehension of “genocide” from terms such as “massacre.” This understanding of groups is also included in the work of Chalk and Jonassohn, who define “genocide” as “a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”⁹⁵ Chalk and Jonassohn’s definition aligns with Cox’s through an understanding of groups as defined by the perpetrator, this definition allowing each case to bring forward the specific targeted group. In order to bring a sense of permanency to the group of their definition, Chalk and Jonassohn do not stipulate the need for groups to be “recognized, stable, and permanent,”⁹⁶ rather using the term “membership” to indicate an ongoing affiliation.⁹⁷

To return to Cox’s definition, this particular understanding of “genocide” is “soft” in the understanding of intent. The initial phrase used is “a concerted effort,” and Cox avoids other favoured terms such as “deliberate,” “organised,” “structured,” and “systematic.”⁹⁸ The notion of “a concerted effort” implies intentionally without the necessary intensity of a bureaucratic or ruling force behind the effort; suggesting that as long as there is determined effort, there is intent. Cox comments on the notion of intent in the final lines of his definition, suggesting that to be caught up in a legalistic or narrow definition blinds one to the clear intent that can be seen “by examining policies, actions, and outcomes.”⁹⁹ As such, intent by Cox is something that can be assessed from looking at the roots of “genocide,” *or* at the result of “genocide.”

⁹³ Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

⁹⁴ Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

⁹⁵ Chalk and Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, p. 23.

⁹⁶ Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

⁹⁷ Chalk and Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, p. 23.

⁹⁸ Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

⁹⁹ Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

Steven T. Katz's definition is also of interest in terms of a "soft" understanding of intent:

[Genocide is] the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.¹⁰⁰

Katz labels "genocide" as the intent to murder at any "national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group," "however successful," "by whatever means."¹⁰¹ Like Cox, Katz allows for any means of destruction by which a group is attacked. Additionally, Katz's definition allows for any success rate, meaning that it is the notion of "actualization of the intent" that truly lies at the heart of this definition. It is not the success of the "genocide;" it is the fact that it was attempted. Katz here alludes to not only Article II of the *1948 Convention* but also Article III, in which attempting to commit "genocide" is also punishable. Both Cox and Katz suggest that if some resembling "genocide" occurs, intent is surely there and can be found beyond technical legal definitions. Neither Cox, nor Katz, is caught on the notion of physical destruction of the group, suggestion the "genocide" goes beyond this one act and that it is the on-looker's duty to help prosecute any wrong-doing.

To return to Cox once more, his take on included genocidal acts is also on the "softer" end of the spectrum. Cox stipulates "genocide" is "to eliminate individual members and to destroy the group's ability to maintain its social and cultural cohesion and, thus, its existence as a group."¹⁰² This two-fold approach is critical as it acknowledges both the attack on the individuals of the group and the group itself. This is of particular importance when it comes to prosecution of perpetrators for their acts against specific individuals that have contributed to the destruction of the group as a whole. Further, this stipulation speaks to not only to the destruction of the group in terms of murder, but it references the loss a people via the elimination of their culture, whether that be religious, tribal or otherwise.¹⁰³ This is a broad take, similar to other definitions previously considered that leave the stipulation of particular genocidal acts completely

¹⁰⁰ Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context*, p. 131.

¹⁰¹ Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context*, p. 131.

¹⁰² Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

¹⁰³ Cox, *To Kill a People*, p. 17.

open. This is both a positive and problematic aspect of this definition, depending largely on the case at hand.

Israel Charny's definition does not stipulate any particular specificity to the "mass killing," rather the conditions of "genocide" being "killing of substantial numbers of human beings" when not in military action, when the victim is defenseless.¹⁰⁴ Despite being caught on the physical destruction of a group of people, the definition given by Charny is "soft" in all other areas:

Genocide in the generic sense means the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness of the victim.¹⁰⁵

Charny sought to create a term that did not exclude any case of mass murder,¹⁰⁶ this definition achieving the outlined goal in not to creating a hierarchy in relation to particular cases of violence. However, the self-termed "generic" definition of Charny is problematic due to the watering down of the term "genocide." This is a problem that pervades the "soft" end of the spectrum as the "softer" definitions become, the more cases they include that fall within other categories of violence. This understanding of "genocide" fails to separate out the act as distinct from other cases of mass violence as there is no understanding of a loss of a specific people or elements that define them specifically (whether that be religious, tribal, and so on). This definition could as easily refer to "massacre" as "genocide."

To combat total openness, Charny suggests subsections within this initial definition. The first subsection is "genocidal massacre," this term denoting violence by which less people are killed than would be counted in the generic definition.¹⁰⁷ This is followed by "intentional genocide" which is the explicit intention to destroy a specific victim group.¹⁰⁸ "Intentional genocide" is split into a three further categories: (1) "specific," intentional genocide against a specific group; (2) "multiple," intentional genocide against more than one specific victim group at the same time or in close related or contagious actions; and (3) "omnicide," simultaneous intentional genocide against numerous

¹⁰⁴ Charny, "Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide," p. 75.

¹⁰⁵ Charny, "Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide," p. 75.

¹⁰⁶ Charny, "Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide," p. 76.

¹⁰⁷ Charny, "Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide," p. 76.

¹⁰⁸ Charny, "Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide," p. 76.

specific groups.¹⁰⁹ The third subsection is that of “genocide in the course of colonization or consolidation of power” meaning genocide undertaken or allowed in the course of colonisation including killing for land.¹¹⁰ The fourth sub-section is “genocide in the course of aggressive war,” which is understood as genocide undertaken in the course of military actions.¹¹¹ The fifth subsection is “war crimes against humanity,” this being crimes committed in the course of military actions against military targets, war prisoners, or civilian populations in which involve cruel or inhuman treatment occurs.¹¹² The final subsection is “genocide as a result of ecological destruction and abuse,” this subsection referring to genocide that takes place due to abuse of the environment.¹¹³

The introduction of subsections of genocide does reduce the openness of Charny’s definition, and can be useful in moving scholars away from a focus on physical destruction specifically. However, a number of Charny’s subsections appear to confuse “motive” and intent,” Charny’s language in subsections three-six in relation to motive suggesting that intent is set aside. Moreover, the fifth subsection contradicts the opening definition. As such, Charny is simultaneously attempting to provide an overtly “soft” and “hard” definition, the initial “soft” definition being more of an umbrella term, while the subsections are to be employed for specific cases. The practicality of this definition is questionable due to its concurrent opposing takes on the term at hand.

Alexander Laban Hinton’s 2012 definition of “genocide” is somewhat non-committal in its language. This definition is open to “genocide” beyond physical destruction and treats intent astutely: “[a]s the more or less coordinated attempt to destroy a dehumanized and excluded group of people because of who they are.”¹¹⁴ The definition, at first look, appears as open as Charny’s initial umbrella definition. Edward B. Westermann draws issue with Hinton’s treatment of intent, arguing intent is completely disregarded.¹¹⁵ This is not the case. Hinton has been astute in his treatment of intent through the phrase, “more or less

¹⁰⁹ Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,” p. 76.

¹¹⁰ Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,” p. 76.

¹¹¹ Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,” p. 76.

¹¹² Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,” p. 76.

¹¹³ Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,” p. 76.

¹¹⁴ Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” p. 10.

¹¹⁵ Edward B. Westermann, *Hitler's Ostkrieg and the Indian Wars: Comparing Genocide and Conquest* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), p. 8.

coordinated attempt.”¹¹⁶ This could refer to genocidal acts as enacted by either a ruling authority, or to more haphazard cases. In this way, this definition suggests that intentionality can be found beyond legal understanding of the term as it can be found beyond easily proven structured and systematic cases. Intentionality is thus broadened here; it is not disregarded. The presentation of groups here may also seem exceedingly loose. Hinton does not list any categorical factions but he does place the definition of the group in the hands of the perpetrator, just not in so many words. Hinton’s group is, firstly, “dehumanized and excluded,” which may not be referring to a particular group, but the stipulation of “because of who they are” suggests that the group under attack are a particular collectivity defined by an attacker. Like Cox and Chalk and Jonassohn, Hinton suggests that each case will have a unique victim, defined by a unique perpetrator. To be “genocide” this victim must be identifiable as a collective group, but it should be defined from within the case itself.

This definition is particularly unclear as to what the term “destroy” refers too. It could be specifically referring to the physical destruction of a people, or it could refer to the destruction of a people via the loss of specific elements that define them – language, religion and so on. Further, there is no size related to the destruction. While this cannot be understood from the definition itself, Hinton stipulates explicitly in his 2013 piece that he designed his definition to be open to all cases (cultural, non-state, political and so on) and levels of “genocide” (in whole or in part, or attempted).¹¹⁷ The drawback of this definition is the need to work through it, it is not as clear as other scholarly definitions which are more obvious in their take on “genocide.”

To end with the “softest” definition, John K. Roth argues that Henry R. Huttenbach’s one line definition of “genocide” is perhaps the most broad of the recognised academic definitions of the term at hand.¹¹⁸ Like Charny, Huttenbach minimises intentionality and specific genocidal acts in favour of danger and loss: “[g]enocide is any act that puts the very existence of a group in jeopardy.”¹¹⁹ Huttenbach’s definition is “soft” in that it does not necessarily have to be applied solely to the physical destruction of people; the loss of a language, culture, or

¹¹⁶ Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” p. 10.

¹¹⁷ Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” p. 51.

¹¹⁸ Roth, “Easy to Remember?: Genocide and the Philosophy of Religion,” p. 36.

¹¹⁹ Huttenbach, “Locating Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum,” p. 294.

religion due to its interdiction could here mean the loss of a group, and “genocide.” Further, any group may be targeted, as there is no stipulation of membership or group stability. No specific genocidal acts are listed and intentionality is not implied, however the stipulation of “act” suggests that “genocide” must be a human action, ruling out natural disaster. Due to the lack of specificity, Huttenbach’s definition could be applied to almost every violent event one can call to memory that involves a group of people.¹²⁰ The usefulness of the definition in identifying “genocide” specifically is thus questionable, as it does not separate “genocide” as an identifiable act from other occurrences of mass casualty violence.

Conclusion

This present delineation of the term “genocide” highlights the controversy of the term. Indeed, numerous scholars who research in the area simply work with the UN definition. This is understandable as it is the legal definition that cases would be prosecuted by, and internationally defined by. While there is no fundamentally correct definition of the term “genocide” this project will be employing the definition as laid out by Hinton in his 2012 Article:

The more or less coordinated attempt to destroy a dehumanized and excluded group of people because of who they are.¹²¹

This definition has been selected due to the author’s own understanding of “genocide,” which is multi-faceted. Firstly, commonly recognised cases appear as usually co-ordinated when one considers both the roots and/or outcomes of the event. Moreover, Hinton’s broad take on groups defines them specifically, but not as a minority, nor is any particular group overlooked. Further, Hinton’s definition speaks to the comprehension of this project that “genocide” is more than the physical destruction of a group of people, the term “destroy” being particularly broad. While this can be controversial, it the author’s opinion that the acts that will be understood in this project as “genocidal” go beyond that of categorical murder, and extend to those that have the power to destroy the victimised group’s existence as an entity in, and of, itself.

¹²⁰ Kuper in Manaktala, “Defining Genocide,” p. 182.

¹²¹ Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” p. 10.

This project seeks to more comprehensively understand what role religion plays in the actions and minds of *génocidaire* as they take life and what role, if any, religion has in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour. As aforementioned, the case that will be considered here is the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. There was a reluctance at the time of the slaughter in 1994 to use the term “genocide” to describe what was quite a clear-cut case.¹²² This was most likely due to a lack of enthusiasm to intervene.¹²³ Still, with the founding of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November 1994, just months after the end of the genocide, the recognition of the event for what is truly was, was swift.¹²⁴ While the case of genocide chosen in this project has not been under particular scrutiny in regards to definition, unlike Cambodia or Darfur, time has been spent on the definition of the term “genocide” for several reasons. Firstly, the findings of this case study are not solely relevant to the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda but the study of genocide as a whole. As such, it is key that the concept central to this project is fully unpacked. Secondly, this project is seeking to understand perpetrator motivations and the impact of religion on them. In almost every definition of “genocide” outlined here, there is a notion of intent, groups, and in some cases, the nature of the killing. These definitions intimate the manner in which genocide will be carried out, this having an impact on how genocide is studied and understood. However, this has had a negative impact, often holding research in this area back. As Lee Ann Fujii writes:

Genocide, I came to realize, implicates ethnic identity by definition, not theoretical axiom. By definition, genocide requires a target group, often but not always constructed in ethnic terms. This definitional requirement, however, does not necessarily make ethnicity a cause of genocide. It makes ethnicity an organizing principle. How and why people join in such violence is a question for empirical investigation. For while leaders and politicians can frame any conflict in ethnic terms, “the actual purpose of the violence may lie elsewhere.”¹²⁵

¹²² Romeo Dallaire and Brent Beasley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (London, UK: Arrow Books, 2004), p. 516.

¹²³ Dallaire and Beasley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, p. 516.

¹²⁴ The full title of the tribunal is the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States.

¹²⁵ Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 180.

As such, in comprehending the impact of religion on these specific notions it is critical to understand current scholarship, and how perpetrators fit into the very definitions of the event under consideration in this project. Without the due consideration given the term “genocide,” here the findings of this project would not be stably located for the reader. The next chapter shall consider current explanations of genocide propulsion, both with a religious focus and without, in order to contribute further to the readers understanding of where this project’s findings will ultimately be situated.

Chapter 2

Current Explanations of Genocide Propulsion and Project Methodology



Figure 2: Ed Stein, “Untitled,” *Rocky Mountain News*, Saturday, October 7, 2006, (accessed October 2015), genocidaire.editorialcartoonists.com/cartoon/display.cfm/25044/.

Ed Stein’s 2006 political cartoon encapsulates one of the core motivations fuelling this project. Genocide is a recurrent phenomenon, and despite a cacophony of voices shouting “never again,” progress towards true prevention is slow. It has been over a decade since Stein authored the above, and his emblematic graveyard has become ever more populous. Indeed, scholarly research into genocidal propulsion and perpetrator behaviour is part of an attempt to impede or halt future cases of such violence, and by approaching the topic from a religious studies angle, this project hopes to do the same. Such work, as historian and Holocaust survivor Saul Friedländer notes, is faced with the difficulty of confronting both the “how” and the “why” in attempting to offer a “full perspective” of genocidal actions.¹ In delving into this concept of “why,” one must confront both external and internal factors on the perpetrator, the latter being somewhat difficult to reconcile. This chapter shall consider a selection of scholarly theories on genocide propulsion and perpetrator behaviour in order to contextually situate the

¹ Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution: 1933-1939* (London, UK: Hachette, 2004), p. 2.

contribution of this project and clearly formulate the subsequent methodology. As this project is coming from a religious studies perspective, particular attention shall be paid to any current theories as to the role religion plays in current comprehension of genocidal behaviour. Moreover, a religious studies lens will be a prime factor in the methodology of this project.

Current Explanations of Genocide Propulsion: Politics, Personality, and Place

Paul A. Roth apportions scholarly explanations of genocide propulsion and perpetrator behaviour into three categories: intentional, situational, and structural.² The “intentional” category pertains to explanations insisting that genocide can be understood as a deliberate outcome of the socio-cultural structure of a particular society.³ “Situational” explanations are perpetrator focused, suggesting that these violent actions are part of a behavioural reaction to one’s surrounding environment.⁴ Finally, structural explanations of genocide are those “in which no single individual or choice accounts for the course of events.”⁵ In subsequent paragraphs, key examples of each of Roth’s categories will be discussed.

Roth’s category “intentional” includes theories that insist genocide can be explained as a deliberate outcome of the socio-cultural structure of a particular society. For example, Martin Shaw argues that “genocide is a recurring pattern of social conflict...it is deeply connected to other structures of conflict as well a more fundamental structure of power in modern society.”⁶ Shaw places “genocide” in the same category as “war,” these being “chameleon concepts” that always show great variation.⁷ Despite this, Shaw explicitly notes that “ethnicity” cannot be blamed, rather ethnic wars arise as part of political contestations.⁸ In a similar vein, Jean-Paul Sartre states: “in any case, genocide is a product of history and it bears the mark of the society from which it comes.”⁹ Indeed, the work of numerous other scholars could be raised

² Paul A. Roth, “Heart of Darkness: ‘Perpetrator history’ and why there is no why,” *History of Human Sciences* 17:2 (August 2004), pp. 211-251.

³ Roth, “Heart of Darkness,” p. 211.

⁴ Roth, “Heart of Darkness,” p. 211.

⁵ Roth, “Heart of Darkness,” p. 211.

⁶ Martin Shaw, *What is Genocide?* 2nd ed., (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), p. 287.

⁷ Shaw, *What is Genocide?* 2nd ed., p. 287.

⁸ Shaw, *What is Genocide?* 2nd ed., p. 290.

⁹ Jean-Paul Sartre, “Genocide,” *New Left Review* 1:48 (March-April 1968), p. 13.

here: Barbara Harff, Helen Fein, and Mark Levene are some the most eminent examples.¹⁰ However, attention will be drawn here to a key example of a conservative “intentionalist” explanation for genocide propulsion, from Raphael Lemkin himself. In the same work as that in which he coined the term “genocide,” Lemkin scrutinised the case contemporaneously unfolding as he wrote — the Holocaust. He explained the propulsion of genocide and *génocidaire*, as such:

Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the populations and the *colonization* of the area by the oppressors’ own nationals....¹¹

The focus on nationalism in Lemkin’s assessment of the Holocaust lends itself to Roth’s “intentionalist” category; a deliberate socio-cultural action. Moreover, if one considers Lemkin’s understanding of genocidal happenings through Bellah’s concept of civil religion, this definition falls clearly into the “intentionalist” category, with Nazism being the national faith of Germany.¹² The connection Lemkin draws between genocide and nationalism is distinctive of conservative “internationalist” understandings of genocide propulsion. Leo Kuper’s seminal work *Genocide* is usually characterised as “intentionalist,” although it is somewhat less conservative than the work of Lemkin. Kuper focuses his understanding of genocide propulsion on the pluralist society, this being the “structural base” for genocide.¹³ For Kuper, the connection between pluralist societies and outbreaks of targeted violence is foundational to the cases of Rwanda, Burundi, Bangladesh, and India upon Partition.¹⁴ At first glance, it appears as though Kuper is suggesting that pluralist societies are fundamentally defective and thus prone to inexorable groupist violence. However, Kuper makes a clear and critical statement to the readers of “intentionalist” elucidations: “[g]enocide is not an inevitable

¹⁰ Barbara Harff, “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and measurement of cases since 1945,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37:3 (September 1993), pp. 359-371; Helen Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1993); Mark Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide* (London, UK and New York, NY: I. B. Tauris, 2005).

¹¹ Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (New Jersey, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2008), p. 79.

¹² Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” *Daedalus* 96:1 (1967), pp. 1-21.

¹³ Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twenty-First Century* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 57.

¹⁴ Kuper, *Genocide*, p. 57.

consequence of certain social conditions with a society...human actors make choices and decisions, and carry out actions which constitute, or lead to, genocide.”¹⁵ Kuper illuminates the potential danger of an “intentionalist” explication of genocide: a distancing of humans from the violence in favour of laying blame on a precarious social fabric. As Kent L. Sandstorm, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine argue:

Because people possess minds, they can invent, discover, initiate, and construct new realities and lines of action. They do not simply “react” to stimulus or biological impulses; rather, they are active and self-conscious agents who use symbols to create objects, designate meanings, define situations, and plan lines of action. In so doing, they actively construct the reality of their environment and exercise a measure of control over it.¹⁶

Kuper is quick, and correct, in highlighting that socio-cultural factors may be prime in the momentum of genocide, but these factors are not formed in a vacuum, rather they are “invented, discovered, initiated, and constructed” by human choice and action.¹⁷

Considering this, situational and intentionalist explanations are often difficult to separate, as both focus on societal factors. The prime difference is thus; the above intentionalist definitions place culpability on society as crafted by a select few human actors. Here, the perpetrators merely find themselves among a dysfunctional social fabric. In contrast, situational experiences lay blame directly on the perpetrator, suggesting that these violent actions are part of a behavioural reaction to one’s surrounding environment.¹⁸ Separating the two categories can be difficult, depending largely on whether one chooses to consider genocide from the top-down (intentional), or bottom-up (situational) perspectives. Indeed, both explanations display a pragmatist bent in the inference that actors “acquire knowledge through our ongoing experiences, which consist of active exchanges with[in] our physical and social environment.”¹⁹ In *Mass Hate*, Neil J. Kressel presents a strong situational explanation of mass violence: “it is important to remember that virtually all perpetrators of great evil in this world...believed that they were victims of some longstanding prior outrage that justified their militancy.”²⁰ For many readers, such definitions, which champion the

¹⁵ Kuper, *Genocide*, p. 56.

¹⁶ Kent L. Sandstorm, Daniel D. Martin and Gary Alan Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology and Sociology* (New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 6.

¹⁷ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 6.

¹⁸ Roth, “Heart of Darkness,” p. 211.

¹⁹ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 3.

²⁰ Neil J. Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror* (New York, NY: Westview Press, 2002), p. 28

actions of the individual, would have immediately brought to mind a particular study; the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE). Indeed, Roth himself draws a connection between genocide and the SPE.²¹ Held over six days in 1971, the SPE sought to ascertain the true impact of the “situation” on actions of an individual and a group when placed in a demanding setting. The experiment proposed twenty-four white, middle-class, psychologically stable men with no criminal record be housed in a fabricated prison on Stanford’s campus for two weeks. Twelve participants were assigned the role of prisoner and twelve the role of guard, with three additional participants in each category being held out of the experiment as reserves. After six days, the experiment was concluded due to ethical concerns raised by a visiting graduate student.

In a short period of time, the participants’ actions adjusted to the roles they were given, particularly those in the role of guard. Philip Zimbardo, author of the SPE, noted that the “guards feel their role is to ensure prisoners lose their identity”, and that a connection to weaponry was forged quickly:²²

It is evident that they love their nightsticks. They are constantly holding the billy clubs close to their chests, banging them against the bars and the doors or on the table to loudly make their presence known. Some analysts might claim that they are using their weapons to compensate for their smaller stature. But whatever psychological dynamic involved, it is clear that they are becoming the meanest of the guards.²³

Of particular importance in Zimbardo’s observations of the immediate uptake of assigned roles was the notion of situational anonymity. For example, he states “conditions that make us feel anonymous...can foster anti-social, self-interested behaviours...any setting that cloaks people in anonymity reduces their sense of personal accountability and civic responsibility for their actions.”²⁴ In opposition to this notion of anonymity, we must also consider the social context. Indeed, it is the action of individuals “their observable behaviours...internal conduct, such as thinking, assessing, and planning...is rarely disconnected from the behaviour of others.”²⁵ Conclusions drawn from the project focused on the power of situation and its impact

²¹ Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (New York, NY: Random House, 2008); John K. Roth, “Social Psychology and Genocide” in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 205.

²² Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, p. 53.

²³ Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, p. 81.

²⁴ Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, p. 25-26.

²⁵ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 6.

on cognitive dissonance,²⁶ as Zimbardo himself concludes: “people are both products of their different environments and producers of the environments they encounter.”²⁷ Although the SPE was not designed to provide an explanation for the behaviour of genocide perpetrators, it does provide an important insight into the ability for individuals to be swayed by situational dynamics as well as their power to create them. Critically, Zimbardo himself draws a direct connection to genocide through the work of Hannah Arendt, he states, “Arendt’s analysis was the first to [observe] the fluidity with which social forces can prompt normal people to perform horrific acts.”²⁸ Here, Zimbardo employs Arendt in order to combine the “intentional” and “situational” categories, highlighting the purposeful alteration of “social force” in an attempt to influence the behaviour of the individual. As Charles Horton Cooley observed, society and the individual are not distinct things, but instead are “flip sides of the same coin”.²⁹

The congruence of situational and intentional definitions may lead one to conclude that the third of Roth’s categories, the “structural”, is perhaps the most cogent, as such theories champion multiple factors in the propulsion of genocide. Structural definitions are top-down, yet they are also bottom-up, while simultaneously including additional considerations. One particularly well-known example of a “structural” definition is Gregory Stanton’s “Ten Stages of Genocide,” originally written in 1996 as the “Eight Stages of Genocide” for the United States Senate.³⁰ Stanton’s ten stages are as follows:

1. Classification: All cultures have categories to distinguish people into “us and them” by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality.
2. Symbolization: We give names or other symbols to the classifications.
3. Discrimination: A dominant group uses law, custom, and political power to deny the rights of other groups. The powerless group may not be accorded full civil rights, voting rights, or even citizenship.
4. Dehumanization: One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases.
5. Organization: Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility.
6. Polarization: Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda. Motivations for targeting a group are

²⁶ Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).

²⁷ Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, p. 319.

²⁸ Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, p. 289; Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2006 [1963]).

²⁹ Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, NY: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1964), pp. 36-37.

³⁰ Gregory H. Stanton, “Ten Stages of Genocide”, *Genocide Watch*, <http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/8-stages-of-genocide/>, accessed November 12, 2017.

indoctrinated through mass media. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction

7. Preparation: Plans are made for genocidal killings.
8. Persecution: Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up.
9. Extermination begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called “genocide.”
10. Denial is the final stage that lasts throughout and always follows genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres.³¹

Stanton’s schema purports that multiple factors are responsible for the propulsion of genocide. These include both intentional and situational factors in conditioning perpetrators to commit genocide. Problematically, the chosen list-like structure of the ten stages does suggest that genocides propel in this specific order, and that one stage leads directly to another. In truth, genocide propulsion is far more chaotic than Stanton’s stages suggest. Moreover, if one were to look at this schema from a definitional standpoint, it is unclear if a genocide must have all of these stages to be classified as such, or if a selection of the ten is enough to warrant the application of the fraught term.

Perhaps the most vocal critic of Stanton’s stages is genocide studies scholar Dirk Moses. Moses argues that the ten stages are problematically moralistic in their understanding of genocide propulsion. For Moses, the ten stages paint a specific trajectory of genocide, one which has the ability to be prevented by moral actions of the international community, when “the fact is that states do not engage in ‘costly international moral actions’ unless it is in their perceived interests to do so.”³² Indeed, many examples of such international dormancy spring to mind. In addition to Moses’ reservations, S. Reinharz suggests that Stanton’s stages require further expansion.³³ For Reinharz, three additional stages are worthy of a place as recognisable stages of genocide, these being: (1) silencing dissent, (2) forming alliances, and (3) apologising publicly.³⁴ Including these three stages is in the name of attributing more “targets of

³¹ Stanton’s explication of each stage has been abridged for brevity, for the unabridged version see: Gregory H. Stanton, “Ten Stages of Genocide”, *Genocide Watch*, <http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/8-stages-of-genocide/>, accessed November 12, 2017.

³² Dirk Moses, “Why the Discipline of ‘Genocide Studies’ Has Trouble Explaining How Genocides End,” *How Genocides End*, <http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/Moses/>, accessed November 12, 2017.

³³ S. Reinharz, “Jewish Social Memory and the Augmented Stages of Genocide” in Lutta Lindert and Armen T. Marsoobian eds. *Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Genocide and Memory* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018), pp. 49-63.

³⁴ Reinharz, “Jewish Social Memory and the Augmented Stages of Genocide,” p. 57.

intervention,” all in the name of mitigating specified violence.³⁵ However, the third of Reinharz’s additional stages, apologising publicly, appears to be chronologically post-genocide and, as such, it not a factor that enhances the chance of halting genocide. This is unlike Stanton’s tenth stage of “denial” that “lasts throughout and always follows genocide.”³⁶ Notwithstanding the critiques presently directed at Stanton’s stages, the complex nature and varied examples of such violence does cogently lend itself to a multiplicity of establishing and driving factors.

Roth’s three categories, structural, intentional, and situational, provide a useful framework for considering theories of genocide propulsion.³⁷ However, the boundaries between these categories are problematically porous. For example, in the work of Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn they argue that genocide has four key drivers: (1) “to eliminate a real or potential threat,” (2) “to spread terror among real or potential enemies,” (3) “to acquire economic wealth,” or (4) “to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology.”³⁸ Chalk and Jonassohn’s multi-pronged understanding of genocide focuses primarily on the state as the main contributor in the creation and momentum of genocide. In this way, Chalk and Jonassohn’s work blurs Roth’s categories, as it is a “structuralist” definition with an “intentionalist” bent. Indeed, Chalk and Jonassohn’s work does not stand alone in this regard. Kjell Anderson’s work on genocide propulsion is another example of a “structuralist” definition that somewhat straddles Roth’s categories. Anderson argues that genocides can be split into “hot” and “cold” cases, Anderson considering the role of *génocidaire* more readily than Chalk and Jonassohn. Anderson’s understanding of genocide propulsion argues for five key factors: “(1) emotion, (perpetrator) perceptions of the victim, (2) the intention of the perpetrator, (3) the speed at which genocide occurs, (4) the tools utilised, and (5) the primacy of instrumental motivations.”³⁹ As such, with its strong focus on a variety of factors whilst still converging on the perpetrator, Anderson’s is a “structuralist” definition with a “situational” bent.

³⁵ Reinharz, “Jewish Social Memory and the Augmented Stages of Genocide,” p. 60.

³⁶ Stanton, “Ten Stages of Genocide.”

³⁷ Roth, “Heart of Darkness,” pp. 211-251.

³⁸ Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 29.

³⁹ Kjell Anderson, “Colonialism and Cold Genocide: The Case of West Papua,” *Genocide Studies & Prevention* 9:2 (2015), p. 19.

In furthering this point, it is expedient to revisit Lemkin's theory of genocide propulsion. Dependent upon the viewpoint one takes, this definition may not clearly be defined as conservatively "intentional:"

Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the populations and the *colonization* of the area by the oppressors' own nationals....⁴⁰

While there is a clear focus on the apparatus of the state here, if one refocuses on the *génocidaire* within the setting Lemkin lays out here, the definition could also be considered "situational." Perhaps, the "situational" undertaking here is simply considering the perpetrators response to an "intentionalist" ideology, this ultimately rendering the definition as "structural." This bridging of Roth's categories warrants inspection, as it suggests that classifying theories for genocide propulsion is a problematic exercise. This categorisation is dependent upon which genocidal cases one is considering, which moment of each case is being examined, and from whose viewpoint one is considering the case.

Current Explanations of Genocide Propulsion: Religion, Spirituality, Faith, and the Sacred

At the beginning of this chapter, it was noted that attention would be drawn to any explanations of genocide propulsion that highlight religion, spirituality, faith, or the sacred as key factors. While "society" or "situation" are often blamed, wherein religious influence may be implied, there is little direct consideration of religious elements in the work above. In their edited volume, Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack suggest that "not many scholars have looked at either the religious aspects of modern genocide, or at the manner in which religion has taken a position on mass killing."⁴¹ Kate Temoney argues this lack of focus on religion in comprehending the propulsion of genocide is "due to general agreement amongst scholars that religion is often a *necessary* but not a

⁴⁰ Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, p. 79.

⁴¹ Omer Bartov, and Phyllis Mack eds. *In God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century* (New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 2001), p. 1.

sufficient cause of genocide.”⁴² On the other hand, Doris Bergen suggests that scholars hesitate to consider the role of religion in genocide as no one wants to delve into that violent part of their own faith, let alone the belief system of somebody else.⁴³ However, as Henry R. Huttenbach notes, considering the role of religion in cases of specified slaughter is key:

[R]eligion – meaning the faithful, the doctrine, the clergy and their institutions – can easily be prompted to buttress genocidal thought and action in a wide array of capacities. The religion–genocide nexus needs to be carefully studied in general, and, in particular, must be carefully monitored in times of social crisis. The worst-case scenario would be to continue underestimating, or even denying, that the nexus exists. It is the task of scholars to expose and explore it, and for policy makers to dismantle the religion–genocide connection.⁴⁴

Rising to the task, in their 2001 monograph *In God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century* Bartov, and Mack turn their attention to the role religion played in the Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust, the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, and the Bosnian Genocide.⁴⁵ Subsequently, three connections are made: religion as used to legitimate and motivate genocide, religion as inspiration for resistance, and religion during the aftermath as a means to come to terms with genocidal legacy.⁴⁶ In highlighting these three key points, Bartov, and Mack do give due attention to this understudied area, however, these three particular points of connection are not surprising, particularly within the context of the four genocidal case studies considered in the work.

Kate Temoney's 2015 article “Those who have the sin...over to this side” highlights the notion of “theological warrants and frameworks, which make genocide not only thinkable but permissible,” this being congruent with the first of Bartov, and Mack's three connections above.⁴⁷ Yet, Temoney moves boldly beyond the patent notion of religion as legitimator of genocide in her second, third, and fourth nexuses.⁴⁸

⁴² Kate Temoney, “Those who have sin...over to this side: Genocide and religion” in Cathie Carmichael and Richard C. Maguire eds. *The Routledge History of Genocide* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 231.

⁴³ Doris L. Bergen, ‘Religion and Genocide: A Historiographical Survey,’ in Dan Stone ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 198.

⁴⁴ Henry R. Huttenbach in Steven L. Jacobs ed. *Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam* (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2009), p. x.

⁴⁵ Bartov and Mack eds. *In God's Name*.

⁴⁶ Bartov and Mack eds. *In God's Name*, p. 2.

⁴⁷ Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side,” p. 232; Bartov and Mack eds. *In God's Name*.

⁴⁸ Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side,” p. 232.

In the second nexus, Temoney focuses on the notion of “religious alterity,” or the way in which

religion may functionally reinforce alterity by amplifying existing national and ethnic distinctiveness, essentializing religious difference by branding enemies as irredeemably evil, and situating victims in the context of an antagonistic religious narrative.⁴⁹

Of critical import is the notion of narrative here, as not only does this narrative convey religious alterity, but it also promotes othering and dehumanisation, highlighting to the perpetrator that the threat is not only to the “group’s existence but to the divine order itself.”⁵⁰ Hence, the narrative is infused with eschatological flavour, driving the *génocidaire* to “save” their community in an act of “god’s work.” This interpretation is supported by Bruce Lincoln who argues “certain kinds of religious discourse can assist in [justifying]...otherwise problematic acts as righteous deeds, sacred duties, or the like, as when killing is defined as sacrifice, destruction as purification, or war as Crusade.”⁵¹ Temoney’s third nexus continues this notion: “the technique of usurping religion’s potency through rhetoric, which simultaneously appropriates religious authority and crushes potential religious opposition.”⁵² In this third nexus, Temoney suggests that the use of religious language is prime in co-opting the authority of religion onto genocidal actions, giving “divine approval” to *génocidaire*.⁵³ This is key in maintaining the fervour of genocide as it enhances the eschatological element of nexus two through divine authorisation. This links clearly to Temoney’s final nexus, which converges on “the role of religious figures and institutions in genocide perpetration, which symbolizes divine endorsement and diffuses the responsibility of perpetrators.”⁵⁴ In other words, this new narrative is given divine certification from earthly messengers, overtly supporting the manipulated rhetoric formed during the previous nexuses.

Temoney’s focus on religion, faith, spirituality, and the sacred as used to justify violent actions has seen traction in previous works, particularly in René Girard’s 1972 *Violence and the Sacred*.⁵⁵ While not considering genocide specifically, Girard

⁴⁹ Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side,” p. 233.

⁵⁰ Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side,” p. 233.

⁵¹ Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 94.

⁵² Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side,” p. 233.

⁵³ Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side,” p. 234.

⁵⁴ Temoney, “Those who have the sin...over to this side,” p. 233.

⁵⁵ René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, translated by Patrick Gregory (London, UK and New York, NY: Continuum, 2005 [1972]).

considers the function of both violence and faith in the creating and moulding of an accepted social milieu, arguing that “violence and the sacred are inseparable.”⁵⁶ It is feasible to suggest that the violence and its vindicating religious narrative is not merely shaping the accepted social milieu but is a key “structuring structure” in the creation of a Bordieusian “habitus” or an Andersonian “imagined community.”⁵⁷ Girard’s theory functions as such. In order to protect the entire community, particularly from “its own violence,” a sacred sacrifice is made.⁵⁸ This surrogate scapegoat [sacrifice] is offered up, not as “a substitute for a particularly endangered individual...rather it is a substitute for the whole community, offered up by the members themselves.”⁵⁹ Here the religious and moral authorities of a community seek to instil nonviolence, manifest social cohesion, and formulate social practice, by enacting violence through the sacred sacrifice.⁶⁰ It is a seemingly paradoxical form of social unity and protection, using violence to protect from violence. However, as we shall see below, this is a recurrent theme in the works of many scholars. Critically, we must note the nuance here, as Girard intimates that the religious belief itself is not *inherently* violent; rather the notion of the sacred is employed as a manipulative force in manifesting social cohesion, and in driving violent societal action. Congruent to Girard’s work, but focussing more specifically on mass slaughter, both George L. Mosse and Mark Juergensmeyer highlight the manipulative use of religious narratives by political powers in order to recruit and drive laypeople to enact reprehensible and violence political goals.⁶¹ Mosse closely examines the Third Reich as a genocidal example of such political manipulation of faith, whereas Juergensmeyer’s work converges on the contemporaneous global rise in terrorism.⁶² Religion is far from an innocent player for Juergensmeyer, yet he notes that “it [religion] does not ordinarily lead to violence...that happens only with the

⁵⁶ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p. 19.

⁵⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, UK: Verso, 1983).

⁵⁸ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p. 24.

⁵⁹ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p. 8.

⁶⁰ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p. 21.

⁶¹ George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York, NY: Fertig Press, 1975); Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, third edition, (Los Angeles, CA and London, UK: University of California Press, 2003).

⁶² Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*; Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*.

coalescence of a peculiar set of circumstances – political, social, and ideological.”⁶³ As in the case of the Roth’s structural explanations of genocide,⁶⁴ it is only when religion converges with other elements of “violent expression and social aspirations, personal pride and movements for political change” that it can be employed as a tool to foster violence.⁶⁵

In accenting the connection between religion and broader violent political aims, attention must again be drawn to the aforementioned work of Bellah and the notion of civil religion.⁶⁶ In his pivotal 1967 article “Civil Religion in America,” Bellah argues for an emerging faith of the American nation, one that is a “genuinely new” fusion of nationalistic and Christian elements, it has its own “prophets, and its own martyrs. Its own sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols.”⁶⁷ This faith is not the worship of the nation itself, but rather a curated “American experience” of reality.⁶⁸ This reality is infused with a Judeo-Christian godhead, one whom the President must serve, as well as biblical archetypes of a chosen people and promised land.⁶⁹ This narrative of the “American experience” is used to justify sending soldiers to their deaths, Memorial Day serving as a pseudo-ritualistic national day to mourn those “sacrificed for the American vision.”⁷⁰ Of critical import is one of Bellah’s final observations in regards to this hybridised civil religion, he states: “it is used today as a cloak for petty interests and ugly passions.”⁷¹ It is the powerful combination of faith and the political that comes to the fore here, mirroring the work of Temoney, Mosse, and Juergensmeyer. Critically, social cognition theorists argue that people’s actions can rarely be explained as a simply conditioned and unreflective response to stimuli. Rather, behaviour emerges out of selective interpretations of the stimuli we encounter.⁷² This is an important point as it must be made clear that the soldiers mourned on Memorial Day do not blindly run to their deaths; they run as a response to their understood role in the “American experience” of reality.⁷³ As such, this research presents religion as a

⁶³ Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, p. 10.

⁶⁴ Roth, “Heart of Darkness,” p. 211.

⁶⁵ Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, p. 10.

⁶⁶ Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” *Daedalus* 96:1 (1967), pp. 1-21.

⁶⁷ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” p. 18.

⁶⁸ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” p. 18.

⁶⁹ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” p. 18.

⁷⁰ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” p. 11.

⁷¹ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” pp. 18-19.

⁷² Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 34.

⁷³ Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” p. 18.

tool to be nefariously wielded, harnessing an ability to enlist laypeople in order to achieve grand political goals, many of which are often violent. However, in the connection between religion and violence made in the above works, there is little explanation of *how* this occurs at a ground level, particularly in relation to genocide. This is where we now turn

What role does religion play in the actions and minds of *génocidaire* as they take life? What role, if any, does religion have in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour? There are the main questions this project seeks to answer, and Sonia Silva suggests an answer to these quandaries.⁷⁴ In her 2013 article “Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation,” Silva brings to the fore two underutilised methodologies, reification and fetishism, both of which were originally formulated in order to more fully comprehend religious practice. While Silva’s article focuses mostly on the potentially positive examples seen through the resurrecting of these methodologies, due consideration is given to the notion that reifacts and fetishes have been, and still can be, used for nefarious ends. She states:

...objectification, commoditization and even trafficking of human beings, processes in which people are shamelessly belittled, degraded, silenced and exploited. And we all know of reified concepts that have led to personal and collective suffering, if not horror. Think of the portrayal of Tutsis as ‘cockroaches’ by the Hutus prior to the Rwandan genocide... We may say that degrading reifacts are mere distortions that say and reveal nothing. We may say that they are mere illusions or self-aggrandizing delusions... such distortions are very serious and very real, that negative reification does things, from injuring the victims and empowering the perpetrators to reproducing the conditions under which such acts become possible.⁷⁵

Here, Silva places a spotlight on reifacts, fetishes, and the role they play in the process of narrative building in genocidal socio-cultural settings, specifically in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Although Silva does not fully consider this suggestion, this renewed interest in the fetish and fetishism as a viable methodology for understanding the contemporary world is of critical importance. Bruno Latour, Hartmut Böhme, Alfonso Iacono, Alan Bass, and J. Lorand Matory have all recently published monographs focused on fetishism.⁷⁶ Hartmut Böhme’s 2014 work *Fetishism and*

⁷⁴ Sonia Silva, “Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 30:1 (2013), pp. 79–98.

⁷⁵ Silva, “Reification and Fetishism,” p. 90.

⁷⁶ Bruno Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, translated by Catherine Porter and Heather MacLean (Durham, NC and London, UK: Duke University Press, 2010); Hartmut Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture: A Different Theory of Modernity* (Berlin, Germany and Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2014); Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, translated by Viktoria

Culture is critical to this project, specifically his argument in the chapter “Political Idolatry: Fetishes, Idol, and Power.”⁷⁷ Here Böhme highlights the architectural campaigns of both Hitler and Stalin as the infrastructure of the fetish.⁷⁸ The architecture plays an “performative role in securing power”.⁷⁹ Böhme places fetishism at the heart of genocide, this being congruent to the suggestion made by Silva.⁸⁰ As such, due consideration shall be given to Böhme’s work below in the forthcoming delineation of fetishism.⁸¹ Moreover, J. Lorand Matory draws upon the work of Böhme, in order to expand the conceptualisation of the fetish from an enhanced material object to a process employed in order to “conjure collective imaginations and relationships.”⁸² Evident in the work of Silva, Böhme, and Matory (and as we shall see in both Ellen and Latour) is the reworking of the fetish as a “machine of power.”⁸³ Such work unfurls the fetish from its formative links to the African continent, rather highlighting the notion of the fetish as a universal, manipulative social symbol; whether material or abstract, the fetish has the power to draw “tens of thousands of pilgrims to the Church.”⁸⁴

The next chapter shall fully examine this suggestion of the fetish as a means to understand genocide propulsion through a religious studies lens, the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda being the primary case study. However, as intimated above, the fetish and fetishism are both “of sinister pedigree.”⁸⁵ Truthfully, Silva’s suggestion that it is ripe for revival is provocative. The fetish and fetishism, William Pietz argues, is “discursively promiscuous and theoretically suggestive, it has always been a word with a past, forever... ‘an embarrassment’ to disciplines in the human sciences that seek to contain and control its sense.”⁸⁶ Silva herself notes that this theory has been “battered and beaten” out of the category of serviceable methodologies, both within religious

Tchernichova, Monica Boria and Elizabeth MacDonald (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 3; Alan Bass, *Fetishism, Psychoanalysis and Philosophy: The Iridescent Thing* (London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge, 2018); J. Lorand Matory, *The Fetish Revisited: Marx, Freud, and the Gods Black People Make* (Durham, NC and London, UK: Duke University Press, 2018).

⁷⁷ Hartmut Böhme, “Political Idolatry: Fetishes, Idol, and Power” in *Fetishism and Culture: A Different Theory of Modernity* (Berlin, Germany and Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2014), pp. 203-222.

⁷⁸ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 204.

⁷⁹ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*. p. 204.

⁸⁰ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, pp. 203-222.

⁸¹ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, pp. 203-222;

⁸² Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, pp. 203-222; Matory, *The Fetish Revisited*, p. 23.

⁸³ Roy Ellen, “Fetishism,” *Man* 23:2 (1988), pp. 213–235, p. 228.

⁸⁴ Matory, *The Fetish Revisited*, p. 23.

⁸⁵ William Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish I,” *Anthropology and Aesthetics* 9:1 (Spring, 1985), p. 5.

⁸⁶ Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish I,” p. 5.

studies and the academy more broadly.⁸⁷ This is particularly due to its association with religious alterity as promoted by Enlightenment thinking, principally evident in the work of scholars such as Charles de Brosses and John Lubbock who employ the “fetish” as a degrading conceptualisation of previously under-encountered religious cultures, especially on the African continent.⁸⁸ Indeed, at the height of the theory’s popularity, Marcel Mauss accused his contemporaries of “methodological sleights-of-hand.”⁸⁹ As such, for many readers, the notion of employing fetishism as a methodology at all, let alone to understand the fraught topic of the role of religion in genocide propulsion, is questionable. In order to assuage any concern at the use of this methodology, the remainder of this chapter shall unpack this term from its coining, following through to the most recent work that has sought to release the term from its colonial shackles.

Fetishism: A Methodology Weighed Down by its Past

Alfonso Iacono’s monograph *The History and Theory of Fetishism* provides an in-depth history of “discursively promiscuous” concept of the “fetish” and fetishism.⁹⁰ The word stems from the Latin *facticius*, meaning artificial.⁹¹ This term is commonly understood to have been coined by the Portuguese in order “to refer to the African cult objects they noticed along the West Coast of Africa.”⁹² In this sense, a fetish refers to “...objects endowed with qualities pertaining to human relationships. Despite their familiar appearance, it is precisely by virtue of these qualities that they take on a different aura.”⁹³ These are “objects that stand in the place of a god,” and the manner by which they come to stand in the place of a deity, deities or even a more general sacred concept is the process of “fetishisation.”⁹⁴ Iacono suggests that fetishisation is not a mere act of replacement, “but the production of a whole new world.”⁹⁵ The object itself ceases to

⁸⁷ Silva, “Reification and Fetishism,” p. 79.

⁸⁸ Charles de Brosses, *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiche: Ou parallèle de l'ancienne religion de l'Égypte avec la religion actuelle de la Nigritie* (Lyon, France: Lyon Public Library, 1760); J. Lubbock, *The Origins of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man: Mental and Social Conditions of Savages*, (London, UK: Longmans, 1870).

⁸⁹ Marcel Mauss in Rosalind C. Morris and Daniel Leonard, *The Returns of Fetishism: Charles de Brosses and the Afterlives of an Idea* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017), p. ix.

⁹⁰ Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 3; Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish I,” p. 5.

⁹¹ Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 3.

⁹² Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 3.

⁹³ Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 1.

⁹⁴ Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 1.

⁹⁵ Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 7.

exist in its pure form at the moment of fetishisation, the fetish's role is now to fulfil interests and needs of a person or community through its representation of an idea, concept or thing. Charles de Brosses' 1760 work *De Culte des Dieux Fetiches* is often linked explicitly with the notion of the fetish, as it was the first widespread academic work on the topic.⁹⁶ It is important to note that de Brosses' understanding of the fetish represents the "final phase" of eighteenth century conceptualisation of the fetish through many works including that of Balthazar Bekker, Willem Bosman, Pierre Bayle, Joseph-François Latifau and David Hume.⁹⁷ De Brosses' definition of the fetish is:

...the cult objects are animals or inanimate beings that have been deified, even in speaking sometimes of certain peoples for whom objects of this sort are less gods, properly speaking, than things endowed with a divine virtue, oracles, amulets, and preservational talismans.⁹⁸

The fetish, for de Brosses, is concerned with the power of the material to embody, and this is largely a tool of the "savage" in bridging cognitive distance. In this work de Brosses does not seek to simply give the decisive definition of the fetish, but is concerned with actively transforming the Portuguese notion of the singular "fetish" into "fetishism;" a unique form of primordial religion that functions as the precursor to polytheism and monotheism. Drawing connections between ancient and contemporary faiths, he suggests that fetishism is a universal stage of human development, the final piece in the socio-evolutionary continuum that ethnographers have been seeking:

The factual evidence that shows us an Egypt worshipping animals and vegetation, what I call, in short, Fetishism, is not less abundant than precise. And since the customs, cult and actions of the Egyptians were almost the same as those of the Negroes and the American, is it not natural to conclude that they have all acted by virtue of an almost uniform way of thinking and therefore conclude that there lies precisely the mystery of an enigma for which we have long sought a word?⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Charles de Brosses, *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiche*.

⁹⁷ Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 1; Balthazar Bekker, *The World Bewitched; Or, An Examination of the Common Opinions Concerning Spirits: Their Nature, Power, Administration, and Operations*, translated by B. Bekker for R. Baldwin (1695); Willem Bosman, *A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea: Divided into the Gold, the Slave, and the Ivory Coasts* (London, UK: J. Knapton, A. Fell, R. Smith, D. Midwinter, Haws, Davis, G. Strahan, B. Lintott, J. Round, and J. Wale, 1705 [1704]); P. Bayle, *Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet*, translated by Robert C. Barlett (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000); Joseph-François Latifau, *Moeurs des sauvages américains, comparées aux mœurs des premiers* (Paris, France: Charles Estienne Hochereau, 1724); David Hume, *Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding* (London: Millar 1748); David Hume, *Natural History of Religion* (London, UK: A and H Brandlugh Bonner, 1889 [1757]).

⁹⁸ de Brosses, *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiche*, pp. 10-11.

⁹⁹ de Brosses in Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 60.

For de Brosses, fetishism is a “ridiculous cult [that] can easily come into the mind of coarse persons.”¹⁰⁰ Fetishism is seen as the starting point from which more complex beliefs, societies, and humans emerge. Indeed, de Brosses states in his work that “a part of mankind has remained until this day in that unformed state...their practices are those of children.”¹⁰¹ It is the degrading undertones of fetishism that play a central role in battering and beating fetishism out of the category of serviceable methodologies.¹⁰² It is a methodology that suffers from a colonial observer-observation point of view and an outmoded understanding of societal evolution from the concrete to the abstract. It is important to note that Morris and Leonard suggest that de Brosses should step away from this separatist mindset to apply his notion fetishism to his contemporaries, specifically identifying the relationship between Spanish conquistadors and their guns as fetishistic.¹⁰³ This is critical on two fronts. Firstly, it is a small indicator of where the theory of fetishism will travel, that is, it has the potential to become a methodological concept to be applied to human interactions more broadly, outside of the Western, colonial, ethnocentric worldview the theory was formed within. Secondly, de Brosses himself connects fetishism with the creation of violent acts, as Silva suggests.

Despite the problematic nature of fetishism, the term sees relative popularity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Lubbock places it after Atheism in his continuum of religious evolution, Kant mentions the popularity of the theory in his 1793 work, and Hegel refers to fetishism as characteristic solely of the peoples of Africa.¹⁰⁴ By the latter half of the nineteenth century, fetishes and fetishism had little to do with the religious practices seen by European colonials on the African continent, and more to do with a re-envisioning of the European psyche itself.¹⁰⁵ Consider for example the fetish in the hands of Karl Marx, for whom commodities “involved a misattribution of the power and creativity of human labor [sic] to mere things.”¹⁰⁶ As

¹⁰⁰ de Brosses in Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 60.

¹⁰¹ de Brosses in Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 58.

¹⁰² Silva, “Reification and Fetishism,” p. 79.

¹⁰³ Morris and Leonard, *The Returns of Fetishism*, p. 153.

¹⁰⁴ Lubbock, *The Origins of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man*; Immanuel Kant, *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, translated by Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1793]); Georg Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York, NY: Cosimo Inc., 2007 [1899]).

¹⁰⁵ Donald L. Donham, “The Concept of the Fetish,” *The Erotics of History: An African Atlantic Example* (Los Angeles, CA and London, UK: University of California Press, 2018), p. 28.

¹⁰⁶ Karl Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen ökonomie*, volumes 1 and 2 (Harvard, USA: O. Meissner, 1872); Donham, “The Concept of the Fetish,” p. 29.

such, in Marx's work *Capital*, the fetish is used to describe what occurs when "men and women produce an ever-expanding array of wealth, but ironically, they experience the very things they create as having power over them...consequently, they bow down and worship the fetish (capital)."¹⁰⁷ Here we can see, for Marx "the term [fetish] was useful as a name for the power of a singular historical institution to fix personal consciousness in an objective illusion."¹⁰⁸ This reworking of the fetish does not solely exist in the work of Marx. One cannot ignore the work of Alfred Binet, Auguste Comte, and Richard von Krafft-Ebbing in propagating the notion of the sexual fetish.¹⁰⁹ Binet wrote actively of reworking the term "fetish," moving it away from the notion of spiritual practice and towards the notion of sexual perversion:

The term fetishism suits quite well, we think, this type of sexual perversion. The adoration, in these illnesses, for inanimate objects such as night caps or high heels corresponds in every respect to the adoration of the savage or Negro for fish bones or shiny pebbles, with the fundamental difference, that in the first case religious adoration is replaced by sexual appetite.¹¹⁰

Here, Binet's alignment of the sexual fetishist with "the savage" is a continuing of past usage of the "fetish" to categorise degeneracy.¹¹¹ Whether this degeneracy be based upon religious, cultural, or sexual practices, the notion of the "fetish" as characteristic of lesser creatures is consistent. It is Freud's expansion of Binet's work that is perhaps the most famously known reworking of the fetish; the alleged "universal human tendency to privilege phallic symbolism."¹¹² Hence, prior to tackling Silva's suggestion in the next chapter, the concept of the fetish, and fetishism, must be discussed in order to ascertain if it is a viable methodology for this project. Considering the vast use of the term by anthropologists, ethnographers, sociologists, and psychoanalysts, much time could be spent on examining this concept and its methodological feasibility. Due to the nature of this specific project in its endeavour to understanding how religion and

¹⁰⁷ Marx, *Das Kapital*; Donham, "The Concept of the Fetish," p. 29.

¹⁰⁸ Pietz, "The Problem of the Fetish I," p. 9.

¹⁰⁹ Alfred Binet, "Le fétichisme dans l'amour," *Études de psychologie expérimentale* (Paris, France: Octave Doin, éditeur, 1888), pp. 1–131; A. Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, translated by Martineau (London, UK: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1893); Richard von Krafft-Ebbing, *Psychopathia Sexualis: With Especial Reference to the Antipathic Sexual Instinct*, translated by Franklin S. Klaf (New York, NY: Arcade Publishing, 1998 [1886]).

¹¹⁰ Alfred Binet in Alan Bass, "On the History of Fetishism: De Brosses and Comte," *The Undecidable Unconscious: A Journal of Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis* 2:1 (2015), p. 19.

¹¹¹ Bass, "On the History of Fetishism: De Brosses and Comte," p. 20.

¹¹² Sigmund Freud, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (Leipzig, Germany and Vienna, Austria: Franz Deuticke, 1905); Pietz, "The Problem of the Fetish I," p. 6.

genocide are connected, focus will be placed on the anthropological and ethnographic understanding of the term, leaving the Marxist and Freudian understandings aside.

Postmodern Fetishism: Ellen, Latour, Böhme and Interdisciplinary Understandings of Materialism

Considering its fraught foundation, a targeted campaign was required to resurrect fetishism as a viable methodology. In his 1988 article “Fetishism” Roy Ellen reframes the notion of “fetishism” as “fetishisation.” In his effort to reframe the term, Ellen clearly states in this article that “fetishisation” is not a primitive concept, rather arguing that fetishes exist amongst all peoples, and are not a marker of an under-developed mind or culture; this is a position this thesis upholds. Not only does Ellen face the problematic colonial assumptions of fetishism, he redefines the term, broadening its scope. He describes the process of fetishisation as “abstract ideas becoming associated with a single object.”¹¹³ Ellen goes on to argue that in this process of conflating ideas with objects, these objects can have a spirit (e.g., capitalism, nationalism, a religious ethos) projected into them thus act “over and above [their] appearance.”¹¹⁴ This inspirited object has an ability to influence individuals and communities:

What is similar [to the original concept of fetishism] is only a certain arrangement of elements in the various objects studied, or, to be more precise, it is a process of substitution in the fetish thing, which from being a representative of something else (a strange and unusual natural phenomenon, people’s reactions, the normal sexual object) becomes the very objects and point of arrival of symbolic human activity.¹¹⁵

Plainly, Ellen fetishism renders fetishes as “machines of power,” manipulating the people who come into contact with them.¹¹⁶

For many readers, fetishism will appear akin to Durkheimian “totemism.”¹¹⁷ Interestingly, Böhme notes that Durkheim actively distanced himself from the concept of fetishism, rejecting it as the first form of religion and replacing it with his own totemism.¹¹⁸ Of course, Max Müller refused to recognise both as primordial forms of religion.¹¹⁹ Ellen himself acknowledges the likeness of fetishism and totemism,

¹¹³ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 221.

¹¹⁴ Ellen, “Fetishism,” pp. 228, 231.

¹¹⁵ Iacono, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, p. 89.

¹¹⁶ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

¹¹⁷ E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, [1915] 2008).

¹¹⁸ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 171.

¹¹⁹ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 171.

suggesting that separating the terms is just an overly complex “hydra” of semantics.¹²⁰ However, while the concepts do appear to be similar, they are not entirely congruent. From this author’s understanding, there is a different emphasis at the heart of Durkheimian “totemism” and Ellenian “fetishism.” Ellen is clear in his understanding of fetishism “an abstraction represented as a material thing.”¹²¹ Ellen’s understanding of totemism, while condensed, is perhaps not too far from Durkheim’s overall argument, for Durkheim renders the totem as a badge or emblem representing a people.¹²² Durkheimian totemism allows religious forces to become hypostasized, and therefore is a methodology that emphasises the comprehension of social discourse. On the other hand, fetishism involves an object operating beyond its associated use, so that cognitive ambiguities arise.¹²³ Anthropologist Peter Pels’ post-Ellen work in *The Spirit of Matter* is quite clear in distinguishing fetishism as a concept of material agency; “fetishism posits an assumption of the spirit of matter: objects have spirit and are able to act of their own volition to attract or repel people.”¹²⁴ Ellenian fetishism places emphasis on the ability for an object to actively influence those whom it comes into contact, as such, there is a sense of complicity in Ellenian fetishism that separates it from Durkheimian totemism. Ellen’s attempt to rework genocide is for many, convincing. However, some will remain sceptical as to the proposed resurrection of fetishism. The notion of attributing objects with agency, is for some, “absurd.” In order to attend to this sense of absurdity, it is perhaps useful to highlight these ideas as raised in different fields of study, namely anthropological material culture studies and sociological symbolic interactionism.

Since the late 1980s, the realm of academic literature discussing material culture has increased rapidly, particularly in the realms of anthropology and archaeology. Material culture and materiality has also seen significant attention in the field of religious studies including the work of S. Brent Plate, David Chidester, Alexandra K. Grieser, Dick Houtman, Bruno Latour, Birgit Meyer, Jay Johnston, and Crispin Paine;

¹²⁰ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 220.

¹²¹ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 231.

¹²² W. S. F. Pickering, *Durkheim’s Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories*, (Cambridge, UK: James Clark and Co. Publishing, 1984), p. 80.

¹²³ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 231.

¹²⁴ Peter Pels in Andrew M. Jones and Nicole Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects: Material Agency,” in Dan Hicks and Mary C. Beaudry eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 345.

amongst many others who have made strong contributions.¹²⁵ In terms of this project, it is the work of Andrew M. Jones and Nicole Bovin, in their chapter “The Malice of Inanimate Objects: Material Agency,” that will be considered fully.¹²⁶ Beginning the chapter with a Victorian anecdote portraying longhand the common phrase “a watched pot will never boil,” Jones and Bovin highlight the readiness with which humans will ascribe agency to material things. Yet Jones and Bovin suggest that the concept of objects as having agency is often treated “as a step too far or as employed mainly for its shock value rather than for any higher intellectual purpose,” scholars often becoming transfixed by the supposed “absurdity of imputing agency to inanimate objects.”¹²⁷ Bjørnar Olsen highlights a pressing need for scholars “to relearn to ascribe...agency...to many more agents than the human subject, as well as to ballast epistemology—and ontology—with a new and unknown actor; the silent thing.”¹²⁸ In breaking down the subject-object relationship, Jones and Bovin begin with the notion of language, noting that it “was increasingly understood less as a neutral medium for representing and understanding the world, and more as a key way through which the world is constructed.”¹²⁹ This “linguistic turn” was key in the reshaping of both anthropological and archaeological thinking, as “it led to an interest in meaning and, in particular, the representational qualities of material culture.”¹³⁰ This language-centred take on material culture suggested that material culture needed to be understood as “meaningful” and “symbolic,” asserting that material culture was not “passive and simply *reflective* of social realities” but rather active players in the construction of reality.¹³¹

¹²⁵ S. Brent Plate, *A History of Religion in 5 ½ Object: Bringing Spirituality to its Senses* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2014); S. Brent Plate, eds., *Key Terms in Material Religion* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2010); David Chidester, *Religion: Material Dynamics* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018); Dick Houtman and Birgit Meyer, eds., *Things: Religion and the Question of Materiality* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2012); Bruno Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*; Alexandra K. Grieser and Jay Johnston, eds., *Aesthetics of Religion: A Connective Concept* (Berlin, Germany and Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2017); Crispin Paine, *Religious Objects in Museums: Private Lives and Public Deities* (London, UK and New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013).

¹²⁶ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” pp. 334-351.

¹²⁷ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 334.

¹²⁸ Bjørnar Olsen, “Material Culture After Text: Re-membering things,” *Norwegian Archaeological Review* 36:2 (2003), p. 88.

¹²⁹ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

¹³⁰ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

¹³¹ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

However, it is important to note the nuance of material culture studies in the work of scholars such as that of Alfred Gell.¹³² Gell states that the material culture understanding of objects with agency is treating things as “person-like,” but not *as* persons.¹³³ In other words, material culture is not ascribing fundamental personhood to things, rather it is highlighting their active role in the construction of reality and in the happenings of human relationships. This is similar to the work of Ellen above in his description “abstract ideas becoming associated with a single object” so that the object acts “over and above [their] appearance” as a “machine of power.”¹³⁴ Interestingly, and in contrast to Ellen, Michel Callon’s work in this field chooses to who move beyond the notion of the traditionally material.¹³⁵ Callon argues that whether we are looking at “texts, technical artefacts or abstract values or concepts, such as money or law”, each has a part as an “intermediar[y] for human action.”¹³⁶ This is a stance taken up by Bruno Latour in his work, as discussed below.¹³⁷ A material culture perspective, such as that of Jones, Bovin, Callon, and Gell, “enables us to begin to build models of social action” and more fully comprehend that “causality does not lie with human agents” alone.¹³⁸ Rather, causality must be understood through the many factors within and contributing to the construction of our social reality.¹³⁹

Within sociology, objects as agents of impact have received due consideration in the area of symbolic interactionism. The foremost work in this area is Kent L. Sandstorm, Daniel D. Martin and Gary Alan Fine’s *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*.¹⁴⁰ Sandstorm, Martin, and Fine begin by highlighting the malleable nature of objects; “things do not have an inherent or unvarying meaning,” it is possible for “an object [to] take on new and different meanings as people encounter and interact with it

¹³² Alfred Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1998).

¹³³ Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory*; Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 341.

¹³⁴ Ellen, “Fetishism,” pp. 221, 231.

¹³⁵ Michel Callon, “Techno-economic networks and irreversibility” in J. Law ed., *A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on power, technology and domination* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 152-153.

¹³⁶ Callon, “Techno-economic networks and irreversibility,” pp. 152-153.

¹³⁷ Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, translated by Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Bruno Latour, *Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies* (London, UK and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*.

¹³⁸ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” pp. 350-351.

¹³⁹ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” pp. 350-351.

¹⁴⁰ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*.

in new ways.”¹⁴¹ The ability for the material thing to exist beyond a physical state is critical in breaking down “the worlds of mind and matter, [they] are not distinct: instead they are vitally linked through human action.”¹⁴² In essence, people are symbolic creatures, acting on the basis of the meanings they give to things in their world.¹⁴³ Here we have the fetish. The fetish is here rendered physical, the notion of the transformed object being most commonly referenced. However, Sandstorm, Martin, and Fine do note that “various groups use metaphorical images and rhetorical strategies to define certain behaviours or issues as problematic and to build consensus that action needs to be taken to constrain the actions of others.”¹⁴⁴ As such the fetish can be both object and concept, its form and function being relative to the needs and interests of particular individuals or groups.¹⁴⁵

However, Sandstorm, Martin, and Fine raise a critical point; we are not born knowing the meanings of things or the ability to decide what action we should take, and we do not learn this solely through our individual lived experience. Instead, “we learn what things mean through our interactions with other people.”¹⁴⁶ Whenever we orient ourselves to others and their actions, regardless of whether we are trying “to hurt them, help them, convert them, or destroy them, we are engaging in a social act.”¹⁴⁷ It is through these interactions we acquire the ability to interpret and use significant symbols.¹⁴⁸ We learn how to define and act toward the objects, events, and experiences that make up our environment, as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann posit, these realities are socially constructed.¹⁴⁹ Outlined here is the notion that we are not born knowing of a fetish, it is through our interactions with other people that we learn of them, why they exist, and how to use them. Congruent to this, Cerulo and Zerubavel demonstrate how cultural beliefs and social structure systematically pattern our perceptions of “objects, events, time, places, and other people; particularly our opinions of racial, ethnic, and gender groups.”¹⁵⁰ Yet, it is important to note that while we are

¹⁴¹ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, pp. 2-8.

¹⁴² Peirce and Dewey in Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 3.

¹⁴³ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁴ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 39.

¹⁴⁵ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁶ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 8.

¹⁴⁷ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 11.

¹⁴⁸ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, UK and New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1991 [1966]).

¹⁵⁰ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 35.

born into a pre-existing society that will have largely set the frameworks for our actions, we do not have to reproduce the society or social meanings we inherit. These rules are not fixed, and the need to adjust them most often arises when we encounter a problem (or felt difficulty) that interferes with our ongoing actions.¹⁵¹ The fetish is most useful in transforming society, of dealing with a problem, As we see in Böhme's above case study of Stalinist Russia, "the fetish inverts the origin of the action, it dissimulates the human work of manipulation, and it transforms a creator into a creature."¹⁵² The fetish has the power to silence us with its "choreographies of power," we know what is being altered, and how it must be altered, and yet...we take part.¹⁵³ Here, allusion is made to numerous examples, particularly genocidal, where we can see new meanings given to things, including humans, in order to reshape or transform society.¹⁵⁴

Considering fetishism from the angle of material culture and symbolic interactions is useful in comprehending the base function of the notion and the potential use of the theory when it is not tied to the hindering semblance of the de Brossean conceptualisation. However, no review of fetishism is complete without due consideration of the contribution made by Bruno Latour whose work has made momentous progress in releasing the term from its historical baggage.¹⁵⁵ In Latour's early works, he does not begin with the fetish; rather he commences by examining the concept of human interaction, and he makes the clear statement: "humans are no longer by themselves."¹⁵⁶ As Böhme notes, this seemingly simple statement reframes the place of the human, their place, and what they do.¹⁵⁷ In terms of the fetish, this has two main repercussions. Firstly, in this statement Latour places the human amongst a network of influences and, in essence, breaks down the subject-object relationship. Secondly, in breaking down this relationship, the human is no longer master of themselves, rather being influenced by numerous external factors. Enter the fetish. In *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, Latour openly tackles the concept of the fetish.¹⁵⁸ As in Ellen's work, Latour notes the discriminatory origin of the term and aptly states, "there have

¹⁵¹ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 3.

¹⁵² Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, p. 9.

¹⁵³ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹⁵⁴ Sandstorm, Martin and Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, p. 9.

¹⁵⁵ Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*; Latour, *Pandora's Hope*; Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*.

¹⁵⁶ Latour, *Pandora's Hope*, p. 190.

¹⁵⁷ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, pp. 49-50

¹⁵⁸ Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*.

never been any Barbarians; we have never been Modern, even in our dreams – especially in our dreams!”¹⁵⁹ He notes that the fetish pops up wherever colonials “drop anchor,” the “Moderns” manufacturing a system that functions as an explanation for “a strangeness of worship that cannot” otherwise be identified objectively.¹⁶⁰ The fetish, in its original de Brossean form, functions as the distinguishing category between what is barbaric and what is modern, between what is “belief” and “truth,” what is fabricated and what is real, what is fetish and what is fact. Latour argues that what we are seeing here is a construction of the “Modern,” by defining the “other;” all in order to more clearly understand themselves.¹⁶¹ This is a classic example of understanding oneself by what one is not. Fetishes in this form are, in truth, characteristic of the existence of the “Modern,” not those they force the fetish upon. The application of the fetish, in its original form, marks a line between “us” and “them.”

Critically, Latour notes the fetish is “nothing but what a human makes of it, it nevertheless adds a little something: it inverts the origin of the action, it dissimulates the human work of manipulation, and it transforms a creator into a creature.”¹⁶² Here, Latour does not simply seek to debunk the notion of the fetish as a marker of the degenerate human in order that the term has wider application. Instead, he seeks to rework the term linguistically. No longer is the term “fetish,” but rather “factish.” This term harks back to the original root of the term *facitius*, meaning artificial or made, in an attempt to acknowledge the true form of the factish/fetish – a humanly conceived of thing that “dissimulates the human work of manipulation – and it transforms a creator into a creature.”¹⁶³ Moreover, the notion of “belief” versus “fact” is central to Latour’s delineation of the de Brossean fetish, and his renaming of the concept is, in part, pointing to the notion that all fetishes are created; they are all real even though they are all manufactured. As such, they are objectively “truth,” for someone, and therefore, fact. The renaming of the term highlights the historical, colonial misconceptions about the nature of the fetish, breaking down this problematic foundation to the term, while still acknowledging the past troubles it created. Latour’s new “factish” is thus a usable form of the “fetish.” Importantly, this new “factish” acknowledges, but is not lauded over by, its own methodological baggage. As Böhme notes, “Latour does not just want

¹⁵⁹ Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁰ Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, p. 2.

¹⁶¹ Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, p. 16.

¹⁶² Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, p. 9.

¹⁶³ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 66; Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, p. 9.

to dialectically resolve the oppositions and paradoxical transpositions between fact and fetish, which are the basis for the modern campaign against fetishes...but definitively put an end to it.”¹⁶⁴

Latour’s work is foundational for Hartmut Böhme’s work *Fetishism and Culture: A Different Theory of Modernity*.¹⁶⁵ The work seeks to examine “our premodern and modern relationship to things, in particular those slightly peculiar things that – possibly – have some sort of inherent power, power over us.”¹⁶⁶ As is the case in many of the above works, Böhme highlights the problematic history of the fetish stating, “it has always been the other who is the fetishist – it has always been this way. But that is not how things really are.”¹⁶⁷ Of greatest interest within Böhme’s work is his chapter “Fetishism in Religion and Ethnography,” where due time is dedicated to “Political Idolatry: Fetishes, Idols, and Power.”¹⁶⁸ The main case study in this section is of two genocidal dictators, Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler, and their architectural campaigns.¹⁶⁹ This case study is predicated on the notion that “politics cannot function without cults” and subsequently “cults cannot function without idols and fetishes.”¹⁷⁰ Interestingly, Böhme distinguishes between an “idol” and a “fetish,” the first being anthropomorphic (i.e., Stalin or Hitler themselves), whereas the fetish is a thing (i.e., Stalin’s buildings).¹⁷¹ The fetish or idol, for Böhme, is critical in its ability to create unity through its performance of power. It is this public performance of power that “grips its audience, absorb[ing] them, bring[ing] them together to form a communal group.”¹⁷²

Let us consider Böhme’s main case study of Stalin and his architecture. The case study begins with an examination of Stalin as idol, Stalin “as power itself – reified...Stalin’s public appearance is an event, in which the individual is obliterated and becomes part of the collective body.”¹⁷³ Böhme suggests that for many the experience of seeing, meeting, or pleasing Stalin was akin to a “religious awakening,”

¹⁶⁴ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 66.

¹⁶⁵ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*.

¹⁶⁶ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 2.

¹⁶⁷ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 4.

¹⁶⁸ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, pp. 200-222.

¹⁶⁹ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, pp. 200-222.

¹⁷⁰ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 200.

¹⁷¹ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 200.

¹⁷² Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 201.

¹⁷³ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, pp. 208, 210.

an epiphany that gave direction and purpose to life.¹⁷⁴ To cement this, Böhme draws upon Max Weber's concept of charismatic domination, the ability of a ruler to have people emotionally surrender based upon their perceived "magical capabilities, prophecies or heroism, spiritual power or oratorical power."¹⁷⁵ The Stalinist idol is portrayed as interminably strong in this work, so much so that one might question the need for fetishised architecture. In order to prove the importance of fetishises in conjunction with idols, Böhme writes, "the palaces of the Soviet Union are huge energy-boosters and dynamos of the collective body."¹⁷⁶ The prime example of this in Böhme's work is the Palace of the Soviets, which was never built. Nonetheless, propagandistic images of the proposed building show thousands of ant-like people at its feet, and as Böhme explains;

the meaning of the palace and the parade square consists of nothing else than the people utterly subjecting itself to a will and preparing itself for the sacrifice in order to ensure the realisation of the claim to eternity by the regime embodied in the stone.¹⁷⁷

The fetishisation of architecture is a political manoeuvre, it is part of the "practice of power."¹⁷⁸ The mammoth structure of stone renders the ideology in the forefront, a display of prowess and strength but also a reminder of the opposite, "fear and death, powerlessness and weakness."¹⁷⁹ Placing these concerns front and centre in the lives of the collective body, raises energy, an energy of protection; protection of one's self, the community, and that strength. So much so that the moral compass may become skewed in the action one takes, as Böhme so poignantly states;

Fetishism, far from still being merely a model of superstition or perversion, has here taken on the task of silencing our shared knowledge of the murderousness of the regime by bewitching us with the choreographies of power. *We know, and yet...we take part.*¹⁸⁰

Böhme so clearly exemplifies the Stalinist case study for the reader, that one can see the deliberate use of idols and fetishes in a political play to assuage and enlist the masses. In fact, Böhme's study of Stalinism here is reminiscent of Bellah's final observations in regard to the place of civil religion in the contemporary world, "it

¹⁷⁴ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 221.

¹⁷⁵ Max Weber in Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 213.

¹⁷⁶ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 217.

¹⁷⁷ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 220.

¹⁷⁸ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹⁷⁹ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 217.

¹⁸⁰ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

[being] used today as a cloak for petty interests and ugly passions.”¹⁸¹ As such, Böhme highlights the potential “murderousness” in the fetishistic manoeuvring of civil religion. Indeed, it cannot be said any clearer than by Böhme himself; “the Palace of the Soviets and the gulags belong together, just at the grounds of the Nuremberg Rallies belong to Auschwitz.”¹⁸² Hence, we circle back to Silva’s original suggestion; the fetish and fetishism is a useful methodological avenue down which we could travel to more fully comprehend the creation and propulsion of genocide. For a “battered and beaten” methodology, fetishism has seen much attention in the last two decades.¹⁸³ Perhaps this reappearing is due to the concept continually rearing its head in the field, even though it grew from problematic stock. The re-imaginings of the fetish/fetishism burgeon a new era for the theory, one that provides due acknowledgement to its colonial past, without being stifled by this.

Conclusion: The Chosen Methodology

As aforementioned, the next chapter of this project shall fully examine this suggestion of the fetish as a means to understand genocide propulsion, the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda being the primary case study. Prior to this, it is important to clearly delineate this project’s understanding of the fetish and fetishism, and how this methodology will be employed in analysing this case study. Indeed, just how will this methodology be utilised in answering this projects questions: what role is religion plays in the actions and minds of *génocidaire* as they take life? What role, if any, does religion have in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour?

Perhaps the most enticing of the above demarcations are Ellen’s fetishisation and Latour’s factish.¹⁸⁴ Both scholars adjust the term in order to create a universal and serviceable form of the “fetish,” and equally acknowledge but are not lauded over by the methodological baggage of the de Brossean era fetish. Both also sit within the conceptualisation of objects with agency as propagated within the area of material culture. With both scholars in mind, this project has chosen to draw the foundation of its understanding of fetishism from the Ellenian notion. This choice has been made for what the Ellenian fetishisation provides in terms of clarity and concept as well as

¹⁸¹ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” pp. 18-19.

¹⁸² Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 221.

¹⁸³ Silva, “Reification and Fetishism,” p. 79.

¹⁸⁴ Ellen, “Fetishism;” Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*.

process. For Ellen, the fetish is an object that functions “over and above its appearance.”¹⁸⁵ Acting beyond their basic remit, Ellenian fetishes are “machines of power,” manipulating the people who come into contact with them.¹⁸⁶ This process of fetishisation occurs when “abstract ideas become associated with a single object.”¹⁸⁷ This object can thus influence individuals and communities to act beyond regular circumstance. Ellenian fetishism thus places emphasis on the transformation of the object and the ability for that object to actively influence those with whom it comes into contact. This aligns neatly with the material culture understanding of objects as “meaningful” and “symbolic,” not “passive and simply *reflective* of social realities” but rather active players in the construction of reality.¹⁸⁸

However, there are some important caveats to note, as the Ellenian fetish/fetishisation is not the sole element of this project’s methodology. Firstly, this project aligns Callon and Latour in their understanding that a fetish may or may not be a material object; it may be a fetishised idea, concept, or thing.¹⁸⁹ Although we may most often see fetishes represented as material things, this project’s understanding the fetish beyond the material object, this being somewhat broader than Ellen’s original remit. Furthermore, Ellen’s work is perhaps lacking in an understanding of just how deliberate fetishes may be. Although some occur organically, in the case of politically motivated event there may be a greater influence from political powers. As in the words of Pietz, “[t]he fetish is always a meaningful fixation of a singular event; it is above all a ‘historical’ object, the enduring form and force of a singular event.”¹⁹⁰ As such, it is expedient to combine Ellenian fetishism with Böhme’s understanding of the fetish as a political plaything, a “practice of power.”¹⁹¹ Drawing on Böhme provides due attention to the fetish as either created by the people, or for the people by a greater power. Böhme’s study clearly connects Robert Bellah’s final observations of civil religion with the notion of fetishism, Böhme highlighting the potential “murderousness” in the fetishistic manoeuvring of civil religion.¹⁹² This is critical in understanding what role,

¹⁸⁵ Ellen, “Fetishism,” pp. 228, 231.

¹⁸⁶ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

¹⁸⁷ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 221.

¹⁸⁸ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

¹⁸⁹ Latour, *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*; Callon, “Techno-economic networks and irreversibility.”

¹⁹⁰ Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish I,” p. 12.

¹⁹¹ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹⁹² Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” pp. 18-19.

if any, religion has in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour through deliberate championing of national civil religion by genocidal authorities. As such, the fetishistic methodology of this project is a of a broad Ellenian understanding with a Böhmean bent, that is, an object, concept, or thing believed acting as a machine of power, either produced organically or purposefully as political plaything.

A problem arises in searching for fetishes. While fetishes are “always a meaningful fixation of a singular event,” they do not usually appear extemporaneously.¹⁹³ As such, fetishes are often hard to recognise. One must first look signs of “abstract ideas become associated with a single object,” in order to truly see if an object/concept/thing is “machine of power.”¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, it is important to ascertain if this is occurring organically or as a “practice of power.”¹⁹⁵ As such, in order to ascertain if there is fetish, and if so, is it shaping the actions of *génocidaire* in the case of Rwanda in 1994, this project shall be observing for two key indicators of fetishism. Particular attention will be paid to the use of language in the lead up to the genocide, drawing on the realm of material culture and its focus on the role of language in assigning things meaning.¹⁹⁶ This linguistic turn is key in reshaping material culture as “meaningful” and “symbolic.”¹⁹⁷ Is the object/concept/thing referred to in a new way, it is newly associated with a particular concept, or are any other linguistic alterations based around the object? In addition to language, the role of the object/concept/thing as an active player in the construction of reality is key.¹⁹⁸ Does the object/concept/thing impact on the understood social milieu, the nature of community construction, or other elements of reality? These two markers of fetishism, alterations in language and social reality, are key indicators that an object/concept/thing is fetishised. In assessing impact of the fetish on social reality and community, this project’s understanding of these concepts is informed by the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s *The Social Construction of Reality* and Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*.¹⁹⁹ In addition to searching for these distinct signals of elements

¹⁹³ Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish I,” p. 12.

¹⁹⁴ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228

¹⁹⁵ Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹⁹⁶ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

¹⁹⁷ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

¹⁹⁸ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

¹⁹⁹ Berger and Luckmann’s understanding of the construction of reality is useful here as reality and social order are understood as “a human product, or more precisely, an ongoing human production.” Our reality is rendered “subjectively meaningful” through chosen human “thoughts and actions.” In this theory, our

fetishism, this project will examine if the fetishistic “machine of power” is influencing the actions of *génocidaire* through an assessment of perpetrator testimony.²⁰⁰ It is a combination of a unique fetishistic methodological approach with analysis of perpetrator testimony that will shed light on the main questions of this project.

Even with these fetishistic markers, Olsen highlights that when seeking a fetish, we are looking for “a new and unknown actor; the silent thing.”²⁰¹ As such, in any case where a fetish is being sought, there are numerous possibilities as to what it may be, particularly if one considers both material objects and abstract concepts. In the case of Rwanda, in order to explain the role of religion in the fervour of the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*, scholars have considered the role of the Belgian colonisation, the Church, and the power of deep-seated tribal tensions. Indeed, all of these factors are connected to the sacred in some way, and played a key role in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, this project is not suggesting otherwise. But it is Gérard Prunier, the foremost historian of this particular case of specified slaughter, that provides some indication of what we should consider in regards to a fetish. Prunier remarks that the machete was the “great weapon of the genocide.”²⁰² This somewhat sits in contrast with the opinions of other scholars who argue that the machete was a mere convenience.²⁰³ This is in part correct. In 1984, 83% of households already had one or more machete.²⁰⁴ Yet, in the Rwandan zeitgeist, the machete is more than just a weapon; it is also a

social world is created through language, conversations, objects, and actions; this aligning clearly with an Ellenian understanding of what a fetish achieves. In understanding community construction, Anderson’s work removes stringent terminological demarcations and external delineations from the idea of “community.” Anderson suggests that “community” is in fact a psychological, symbolic, and envisioned “imagining” drawn around a people, created by people, in order to form “deep, horizontal comradeship”. This loose definition is paramount as in observing for fetishism of the machete, we must ascertain if the machete is playing a role in the creation of this psychological, symbolic, envisioned boundary. See: Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, UK and New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1991 [1966]), p. 52; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, UK: Verso, 1983), pp. 6-7.

²⁰⁰ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

²⁰¹ Bjonar Olsen, “Material Culture After Text: Re-membering things,” p. 88.

²⁰² Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide* (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 1995), p. 403.

²⁰³ Alison Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story:” *Genocide in Rwanda*. (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Philip Verwimp, “Machetes and Firearms: The Organization of Massacres in Rwanda.” *Journal of Peace Research* 43:1 (2006), pp. 5–22, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343306059576>.

²⁰⁴ Verwimp, “Machetes and Firearms,” p. 7.

culturally important object and has often been considered a totem of the Hutu tribe.²⁰⁵ And when it came to it, 37.9% were murdered using machete, the largest death toll of any of the weapons employed in the 1994 genocide.²⁰⁶ Thus, Prunier has, maybe unwittingly so, provided a keen candidate for the fetish in this case of genocide. Perhaps the machete is an overlooked fetish: an object, concept, or thing acting as a machine of power, either produced organically or purposefully as political plaything.

This shall be fully examined in the next two chapters. Chapter three shall examine the history of Rwanda, the machete and the Hutu-Tutsi divide in the lead up to the 1994 genocide. Due time shall be given to this as it impacts the formulation of the machete-fetish in this case of specified slaughter. Also, in Chapter Three, current scholarly explanations for the motivation of Rwanda's *génocidaire* will be presented for the reader. Chapter Four shall present the heart of this case study, examining the machete's role in the genocide through the methodological lens of fetishism. It is via this methodology that we can more fully comprehend the role of religious phenomena in cases of specified slaughter. Moreover, within Chapter Four the implications from this study shall be presented for the reader, including future directions for research. I shall now turn to the case in 1994 Rwanda.

²⁰⁵ For a full delineation of this notion, see chapter three.

²⁰⁶ Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 253.

Chapter 3

Rwanda: The Lead up to 1994



Figure 3: Mike Keefe, “Untitled,” *Albuquerque Journal*, 29 May 1994, p. 23.

There is a peculiar contrast between the deafening silence and the devastating screams that engulfed the 1994 rainy season of Rwanda. Haunting tableaux of hushed, bloodied wetland clash in the mind with images of clamouring blades waving high in the air over dusty streets. The international community turned a blind eye to the Hutu militia (*Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*), which remains the most efficient killing-machine of the twentieth century. A modest estimate suggests six Tutsi were killed per minute over the 100 days of the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. These numbers are based on the most commonly recorded death toll of 800,000 people, which stands as the official United Nations count. Indeed, Benjamin Neuberger states that 800,000 of the 930,000 Tutsi living in Rwanda at the time of the genocide were murdered.¹ However, a report published by the Rwandan Ministry of Local Government in December 2001, backed by the Rwandan National Government, produced a list of 951,018 names of the deceased through the use of census data.² Yet, the report notes

¹ Benjamin Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994: Genocide in the “Land of A Thousand Hills”* (Sheffield and Bristol, UK: Equinox Publishing, 2017), p. 3.

² Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (New York, NY: Verso, 2004), p. 252.

that in some cases where entire families were wiped out, or where data was missing, the number is most likely close to one million.³ Wherever the death toll stands, one question remains: how did this violent zeal engulf so many of the Hutu tribe and dig its claws in so deep?

In order to explain the fervour of the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*,⁴ scholars have considered the role of the Belgian colonisation, the Church, and deep-seated tribal tensions. Indeed, all of these factors played a key role in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda; this project is not suggesting otherwise. However, there is little scholarly understanding of *how* religion works at a ground level in cases of genocide, Rwanda among them. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, considering genocide and the actions of *génocidaire* through the lens of Ellenian/Böhmean fetishism is a new avenue down which we can travel in order to, perhaps, more fully comprehend the role of religion in creating and propelling such cases of specified slaughter. It is expedient to return to the scholar who originally drew our attention to a potential connection between fetishism and genocide, Sonia Silva, and the article “Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation.”⁵ Silva states:

...objectification, commoditization and even trafficking of human beings, processes in which people are shamelessly belittled, degraded, silenced and exploited. And we all know of reified concepts that have led to personal and collective suffering, if not horror. Think of the portrayal of Tutsis as ‘cockroaches’ by the Hutus prior to the Rwandan genocide... We may say that degrading reifacts are mere distortions that say and reveal nothing. We may say that they are mere illusions or self-aggrandizing delusions... such distortions are very serious and very real, that negative reification does things, from injuring the victims and empowering the perpetrators to reproducing the conditions under which such acts become possible.⁶

Silva suggests that the dehumanising portrayal of Tutsi as *inyenzi* (cockroaches) is prime evidence for some level of fetishism occurring in the creation of the Genocide

³ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 252.

⁴ The *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* were two key militia groups in the 1994 genocide. *Interahamwe* translates to “those who work together” or “those who fight together,” and this group essentially began as a youth arm of President Juvénal Habyarima’s National Revolutionary Movement for Development (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour le Développement*, MRND). At the time of writing, the *Interahamwe* are still active, outside Rwanda, and are considered by most governments as a terrorist organisation. The *Impuzamugambi* was supported by the Coalition of the Defence of the Republic (*Coalition pour la Défense de la République*, CDR), founded in 1992. The group also drew many members from the CDR youth wing.

⁵ Sonia Silva, Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 30:1 (2013), pp. 79–98.

⁶ Silva, “Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation,” p. 90.

Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Indeed, this dehumanising language and othering narrative is a key factor, and does play a part in the fetishism that occurs during the genocide. However, while such propagandistic language does aligns with Böhme's notion of the fetish as a political plaything, a "practice of power,"⁷ this idea lacks an Ellenian understanding of the fetish as an object that functions "over and above [their] appearance,"⁸ of an "abstract idea becoming associated with a single object."⁹ Gérard Prunier, whose work on the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda is considered the leading history of the event, mentions the "great weapon of the genocide," the machete.¹⁰ For Alison Des Forges, Mahmood Mamdani, and Philip Verwimp, the machete has previously been considered to be a mere convenience.¹¹ Critics of the importance of the machete often point out that most homes had a machete. These scholars are correct, in part. The machete was, and is, used in Rwanda as an expedient harvesting tool, the primary crops for self-consumption being banana and cassava.¹² In 1984, a decade prior to the genocide, 83% of households owned one or more machetes, hence it was a conveniently placed when genocide erupted in 1994.¹³ In addition to the machete already in Rwandan homes, Linda Melvern highlights the mass import of machete from China in 1993, the government importing approximately 581,175 kilograms of machete (worth approximately US\$725,669), enough for a new machete for every third male.¹⁴ Further, a 1996 National Trauma Survey of child survivors established that over 57.7% witnessed injury or death by machete.¹⁵ The central propagandistic radio station of the genocide, *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*

⁷ Hartmut Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture, A Different Theory of Modernity* (Berlin, Germany and Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2014), p. 222.

⁸ Roy Ellen, "Fetishism," *Man* 23:2 (1988), p. 228.

⁹ Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 221.

¹⁰ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide* (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 1995), p. 403.

¹¹ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism: Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Philip Verwimp, "Machetes and Firearms: The Organization of Massacres in Rwanda." *Journal of Peace Research* 43:1 (2006), pp. 5–22.

¹² Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 4.

¹³ Verwimp, "Machetes and Firearms," p. 7.

¹⁴ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, pp. 56-60.

¹⁵ L. Gupta, *Exposure to War Related Violence Among Rwanda Children and Adolescents: A Brief Report on the National Baseline Trauma* (UNICEF Trauma Recovery Programme: Kigali, Rwanda, Typescript Report, 1996).

(RTL), was nicknamed amongst Hutu, “Radio Machete.”¹⁶ One need only look at the many issues of the pro-Hutu propagandistic magazine *Kangura* (sponsored by the *Mouvement Républicain National Pour la Démocratie et le Développement*, National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development) to ascertain that the machete was omnipresent. Of course, the centrality of the machete in the murders taking place during the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda does not fundamentally result, with any certainty, in a fetishisation of this object. We must delve deeper into this case study in order to see if a fetish was taking place, that the machete itself was fetishised, and whether this fetish propelled the actions of *génocidaire*.

This chapter will begin by outlining the history of Rwanda pre-genocide, including Rwanda’s pre-colonial history, colonial history, independence, and the historical relationship between Rwanda and the machete. Due attention shall be given to this history, as much of the happenings of the 1994 genocide, and the fetish that forms within it, are born of this history. Following, we will consider current scholarly explanations on what propelled *génocidaire*.

The Land of a Thousand Hills: Rwanda before the 1994 Genocide

There is no local or scholarly consensus as to the origins of the Hutu or Tutsi tribes. There are two main schools of thought. Early assertions argue that the Hutu and Tutsi arrived in Rwanda as separate groups. Historians of this persuasion suggest that Bantu-speaking groups (Hutu tribes) arrived in Rwanda around 1100 AD.¹⁷ For Tutsi, the estimated arrival is later, placed after 1100 and up to 1650 AD.¹⁸ Gérard Prunier posits this Tutsi migration as beginning in Southern Ethiopia; however, he does not have consensus on this location.¹⁹ The second school of thought is that both Hutu and Tutsi arrived as part of the Bantu migration in 1100, and the divide between the two groups occurred post-migration. This second hypothesis is predicated on the notion of the

¹⁶ C. P. Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002); K. Somerville, *Radio Propaganda and the Broadcasting of Hatred: Historical Development and Definitions* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).

¹⁷ J. J. Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 10.

¹⁸ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 10.

¹⁹ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 16.

shared Kinyarwanda language, the Banyarwanda being the people of this language. As Mahmood Mamdani states:

The cultural community of Kinyarwanda speakers predated the political community framed by the state of Rwanda. Thus, we come to the point that the people called Tutsi, and those who came to be called Hutu, spoke the same language, lived on the same hills, and had more or less the same culture.²⁰

These two schools of thought, distinct people or one people, need not be exclusive. Migration is not a fixed moment, as Catherine Newbury points out in her study of Kinyaga in southwestern Rwanda, where Hutu only settled in the final quarter of the nineteenth century.²¹ This grappling for understanding as to the nature of this difference is illuminated in the discussion by J. J. Carney of two common Banyarwandan myths as to the origins of these groupings.²² These myths are key as they explicate a localised understanding of any distinctions between the Hutu, Tutsi, Twa.²³ In the first myth, Kigwa, the son of the heavenly king Nkuba has three sons: Gatutsi, Gahutu, and Gatwa. These three sons are deprived of social faculties. The first son, Gatutsi, suggested that they petition the high god, Imana, for new faculties. Imana subsequently bestowed Gatutsi with the quality of anger, Gahutu with the quality of disobedience and labour, and Gatwa with gluttony. In the second version of the myth, Kigwa tested his three sons by entrusting each of them with a calabash of milk. The next morning, Gatutsi has preserved his milk, Gahutu had spilled his milk, and Gatwa has drunk his milk. For his conservation, Kigwa rewards Gatutsi with command over the Gatwa and Gahutu. Benjamin Neuberger recounts a third narrative as found in the work of Jan Vansina.²⁴ In this third iteration, Imana creates Kazikamuntu, forefather of all humanity, three of his sons being Gatwa, Gahutu, and Gatutsi. Gatwa kills one of his siblings, and is cursed to be forever inferior to Gatutsi and Gahutu. Gahutu

²⁰ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 52.

²¹ Catharine Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988).

²² Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 10.

²³ Twa (also Batwa or Mutwa) are believed to be descendent from the indigenous peoples of the mountainous forest regions in Rwanda, Burundi, and around Lake Kivu. A hunter-gatherer peoples, they were characterised by colonial anthropologists as “pygmies” due to an observation that this group were shorter in stature than Tutsi and Hutu. In addition, Mamdani notes that they were seen to be less “socially developed” than their Hutu counterparts due to their hunter-gatherer survival system. Constituting a significant minority of the Rwandan population (at the time of the 1994 Genocide Against Tutsi in Rwanda, they constituted approximately 1% of the population) Twa faced regular marginalisation and discrimination under both the Tutsi monarchy and Hutu government. In the 1994 genocide, Twa were both perpetrators and victims of the violence that ensued. See: Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 44.

²⁴ Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 14

completes only some of the tasks assigned to him by Kazikamuntu, and is subsequently punished with inferiority to Gatutsi. While none of the three myths suggests a different geographical origin of the tribes, both reinforce ethnic stereotypes and impart upon the Tutsi a higher foothold in the social hierarchy. Moreover, the presence of high god Imana in this narrative provides an “air of divine sanction to Rwanda’s traditional social hierarchy.”²⁵ Of particular import here is the notion of milk, as the connection between Tutsi, bovine ownership, pastoralism, and milk will appear multiple times in the proceeding scholarly understandings. Julius Adekunle notes that an understood “relationship existed” in which “the Hutu produced the food crops [and] the Tutsi provided cattle and milk.”²⁶ As such, both Adekunle and John Gilbin suggest that with Tutsi designated as bovine pastoralists, Hutu were allotted the responsibility of the harvest.²⁷ Taking into account the divine character in the above Banyarwanda myths, this segregation of task appears to be set by the heavens.

Interestingly, the machete also plays a role in local understanding of Hutu-Tutsi separation. Julius Adekunle makes note of an eminent Kinyarwandan proverb, “*aho ubuhoro buri umuhoro urogosha*” (where there is peace, a machete could cut the hair).²⁸ This proverb renders an image of Rwanda in which the machete can be used to give haircuts in times of peace between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. Going further, the centrality of the machete here cannot be ignored. The imagery of the blade slicing through a handful of hair, so close to the neck, feels as though the proverb insinuates that Rwandan society balances on the blade of the machete. At just a moment’s notice the machete could slip from peacefully cutting hair to severing the neck. Conversely, the machete also appears to fill an important space in material culture, not as a symbol of either Tutsi or Hutu, but as Rwandan. Jean-Baptiste Murangira’s testimony ties the machete to notions of Rwandan culture.²⁹ Murangira describes the place of the machete in Rwandan life as such:

²⁵ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 11.

²⁶ J. Adekunle, *Culture and Customs of Rwanda* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), p. 9.

²⁷ Adekunle, *Culture and Customs of Rwanda*; J. Gilbin, “Political and Theoretical Problems for the Archaeological Identification of Pre-colonial Twa, Tutsi, and Hutu in Rwanda,” in *Ethnic Ambiguity and the African Past: Materiality, History, and the Shaping of Cultural Identities*, edited by F. G. Richard and K. C. MacDonald (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2015), pp. 217–244.

²⁸ Adekunle, *Culture and Customs of Rwanda*, p. 6.

²⁹ Jean-Baptiste Murangira, a convicted genocide perpetrator, was 38 and a farmer at the time of the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. He pleaded guilty to certain murders and was sentenced in 1997

It is a Rwandan custom that little boys imitate their fathers and big brothers, by getting behind them to copy. That is how they learn the agriculture...I saw papas teaching their boys how to cut. They made them imitate machete blows.³⁰

Murangira highlights the didactic role of the machete in educating future generations for the vocation of harvest, seemingly placing the object at the centre of father-son performative custom and “Rwandan custom” more broadly.³¹ The machete appears to play a pivotal role in moving youth into manhood, but also in identifying as Banyarwandan. This relocates the machete from the category of tool and moves it to the category of symbol, or icon. These initial examples suggest that the machete is conflated with ideas of traditional custom, social narrative, the Kinyarwandan language, and Banyarwandan identity. These two examples, of the machete unifying or separating, are congruent with the two major schools of thought, either the Hutu and Tutsi as distinct people or one people. While the machete is an important element of material culture pre-genocide, it is therefore important to note, by this project’s definition of a fetish — as an object, concept, acting as a “machine of power,” either produced organically or purposefully as political plaything — that at this stage, no fetishisation of the machete has yet taken place. However, this pre-existing relationship with the machete in Rwandan culture will prove critical in the utilised of the weapon in the 1994 genocide.

Continuing onto scholarly work on these groupings, where the notion of pasture versus harvest will reappear, there are a variety of understandings to consider. From distinct “racial” or ethnic groups,³² to use of the term “caste,”³³ there is much to unpack here. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, the notion of Hutu-Tutsi-Twa as race, ethnicity,

to fifteen years in prison. He was released in 2003 after serving eight years and underwent re-education in Bicumbi. He lives with his Tutsi wife who was spared during the genocide. Jean-Baptiste Murangira in Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak*, translated by Linda Coverdale (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), pp. 39-40, 250.

³⁰ Jean-Baptiste Murangira in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 39-40.

³¹ Jean-Baptiste Murangira in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 39-40.

³² Bernard Lugan, *Rwanda: Gencoide, l’Eglise, et la Democratie* (Paris, France: Editions du Rocher, 2004).

³³ Jacques J. Marquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda: A Study of Political Relations in a Central African Kingdom* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018 [1961]); Helen Codere, *Biography of an African Society: Rwanda 1900-1960* (Teruvuren, Belgium: Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale, 1973; Bernadin Muzungu, “Le problem des races au Rwanda,” *Cahiers Muiere et Soceite* 42 (2009), pp. 51-69.

or caste is not raised; rather the notion of socio-economic groups was popular.³⁴ For scholars such as Charles Gabriel Seligman, Louis de Lacger and Pierre Nothomb, the Hamitic thesis was prime in understanding the Hutu-Tutsi distinction as racial, as well as in positioning the Tutsi as superior.³⁵ Seligman asserts that Hamites were originally pastoral-Semites who had migrated to the east in an ancient time, bringing with them cultural influence from the Middle East; their offspring eventually resembling the local population as intermingling occurred over time.³⁶ As Wilson Jeremiah Moses notes, Seligman's work is "fundamentally repugnant" as he argues that if culture or civilisation was found in Africa,³⁷ it was due to a local Hamitic population, and while they may seem superficially so, they were not "true Negroes."³⁸ As such, Tutsi, with their pastoral-Semitic-Hamitic roots, were not Negroid, and therefore should be ranked above their Hutu neighbours. Importantly, as Kate Temoney notes,

Although there is no causal link between the Hamitic myth and the 1994 genocide, the myth was certainly a significant and contributing factor in sowing enmity between Hutu and Tutsi that culminated in conditions conducive to genocidal violence.³⁹

This growing enmity is perhaps most clear in the work of Louis de Lacger and Pierre Nothomb. They state: "...brothers of Nubians, the Galla, the Danakil. They have a Caucasian type and have come from Semitic roots in Asia...before being blackened they were bronze."⁴⁰ Belief that the Tutsi were descendent from pastoral-Semitic Hamitic peoples certainly fed into the perception of Tutsi and Hutu presenting physical differences. With their distinct background, Tutsi were thought of as taller, fairer, and in possession of slimmer features than their Hutu neighbours who were likened to "true Africans."⁴¹ Twa were likened, commonly, to an ape.⁴² Both Lemarchand and Prunier

³⁴ Claudine Vidal, "Colonisation et décolonisation du Rwanda: A question tutsi-hutu," *Revue française d'études politiques africaines* 91 (1973), pp. 32-47; Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York, NY: Picador, 1998).

³⁵ Charles Gabriel Seligman, *Races of Africa* (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1930); Louis de Lacger and Pierre Nothomb, *Rwanda* (Kabgayi, Rwanda: *sine nomine*, 1961).

³⁶ Wilson Jeremiah Moses, *Afrotopia: The Roots of African American Popular History* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 89.

³⁷ Moses, *Afrotopia*, p. 89.

³⁸ Seligman in Moses, *Afrotopia*, p. 89.

³⁹ Kate Temoney, "The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies," *Genocide Studies & Prevention*, 10:3 (2016), p. 7.

⁴⁰ de Lacger and Nothomb, *Rwanda*, p. 56.

⁴¹ Erin Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda: The Politics of History* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 6.

⁴² Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 6.

draws attention to the colonial gaze in this stage of Rwanda's history, Prunier quoting a ministerial report from 1925 as such: "[t]he Mututsi of good race have nothing of the negro...his features are very fine...gifted with a vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi display a refinement in feelings which is rare amongst a primitive peoples."⁴³ Smitten with the Tutsi "superiority," we can ascertain where the racially-obsessed nineteenth century Europeans' discussions began to turn.

Yet, Carney notes that this racial way of thinking was somewhat ignored, rightfully so, in the 1950s and 1960s, as the concept of a Hutu-Tutsi "caste" came into fashion.⁴⁴ The notion of caste stems from the notable problem in the above racially-based discourse; the integrated nature of Rwandan society. These groups frequently intermarried, shared language and culture, and as such J. J. Marquet employs the term "caste" in order to more accurately describe the lived nature of the Hutu-Tutsi social framework.⁴⁵ Marquet outlines several elements to this caste system (such as education and kinship lineage) although no connotation in regards to maintenance of caste purity.⁴⁶ This is surprising when this is what one might consider central to a traditional understanding of "caste." Rather, Marquet draws attention to the notion of *buhake* in the creation and maintenance of this "caste" system.⁴⁷ *Buhake*, also *ubuhake* the notion of "cattle contract," is highlighted by Marquet as the manner in which the Tutsi group were able to display caste distinction.⁴⁸ A man who owned a few head of cattle was able to keep a life leisure, abstaining from the labour of manual production. More critically, the *buhake* system connected the welfare of the Hutu to the Tutsi, with the Hutu providing services in exchange for protection, and sometimes advocacy. Jean Pierre Chrétien points to *buhake* as an important concept in xssolidifying Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa clans into kingdoms around the 15th century, with eight distinct kingdoms being clear by 1700.⁴⁹ One of these eight kingdoms was that of Rwanda, ruled by the Tutsi clan. One particular ruler, Mwami Rwabugiri (1860-1895), is notable, as his

⁴³ René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (New York, NY, Washington, WA London, UK: Prager 1970); Ministère des Colonies, *Rapport sur l'administration belge du Ruanda-Urundi* (1925) in Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 6.

⁴⁴ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 12.

⁴⁵ Marquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda*, pp. 143-159.

⁴⁶ Marquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda*, p. 148.

⁴⁷ Marquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda*, p. 148.

⁴⁸ Marquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda*, p. 148.

⁴⁹ Jean Pierre Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, translated by Scott Straus (New York, NY: Zone Books, 2006 [2000]).

program of kingdom expansion via military conquest saw the quashing of independent Hutu strongholds in the north and west. Following, *buhake* became a more oppressive practice of social stratification, and an *uburetwa* system of unpaid state labour was enforced on Hutu. In essence, the royal ideology equated the Tutsi with political, economic, and social power; a critical moment in the equation of “Hutu-Tutsi labels with ideological overtones.”⁵⁰

However, it is important to note the fluidity of Rwandan society pre-colonisation, evident in numerous forms. Firstly, Rwandan peasantry under Twabugiri’s rule included thousands of “petit Tutsi,” and as such the idea of the Tutsi upper-caste and the Hutu under-caste, was but political fodder.⁵¹ Further, intermarriage was common between Hutu and Tutsi, as it was in the decades leading up to the 1994 genocide. Finally, of particular note, is the conceptualisation of kingship. While the king was normally drawn from the Nyiginya, a Tutsi clan, he was understood as the sacred incarnation of the kingdom, representing physically Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.⁵² While perhaps not the traditional understanding of a “caste” system that focuses on the maintenance of purity, this delineation of the Hutu-Tutsi caste is certainly more accurate than a racial notion of difference.

As aforementioned, the 1960s and 1970s saw a movement away from race, ethnicity, and caste, replacing these concepts with a notion of socio-economic status as the point of differentiation.⁵³ Drawing upon Marquet’s work on *buhake*,⁵⁴ we can see the foundations of status based on wealth. Indeed, this divide is predicated on the notion of Tutsi as land-owning (primarily for cattle raising) and the Hutu as landless.⁵⁵ This understanding is useful in its distance from biological understandings, which are fundamentally problematic in their conceptualisation of Hutu-Tutsi-Twa, and moves toward a more socially constructed and fluid notion of society. However, scholars do not agree as to whether this was a true social fluidity or not. Carney argues that the socio-economic delineation of Hutu-Tutsi groupings falls down, as no wealthy Hutu

⁵⁰ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 13.

⁵¹ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 12.

⁵² Aimable Twagilimana, *The Historical Dictionary of Rwanda* (New York and London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), p. 5.

⁵³ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 12.

⁵⁴ Marquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda*, pp. 143-159.

⁵⁵ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 12.

was ever re-grouped as a Tutsi.⁵⁶ However, Aimable Twagilimana draws attention to a pre-colonial transformative practice of *kwi hutura*, a process by which a Hutu could “shed his Hutuness” if he possessed enough cattle.⁵⁷ This *kwi hutura* process is also highlighted by Christian P. Scherrer, and Mahmood Mamdani, although Mamdani states the process was rare.⁵⁸ Mamdani also draws attention to the loss of status *gucupira*, this occurring with a loss of property.⁵⁹ Highlighting this fluidity is key in the understanding of Hutu-Tutsi groupings, as a willingness for transferral suggests that pre-colonisation there was perhaps no local understanding of biological difference. Mahmood Mamdani provides a clear critique of the socio-economic Hutu-Tutsi division, stating:

The simple notion that Hutu were agriculturalists and Tutsi pastoralists is no longer sustainable...more and more evidence has come to light that the predecessor of the Hutu had cattle long before the Tutsi appears on the scene...Agricultural and pastoral activities were hardly exclusive they tended to be carried out jointly in most regions. Many Hutu had cattle, and many Tutsi farmed the land...[t]hese identifications – of Tutsi with cattle and Hutu with land – need to be understood less as mere facts unrelated to power than as historical artefacts created alongside the institutionalised power of the Rwandan state.⁶⁰

Kwi hutura and *gucupira* ended during the process of Belgian colonisation, although Rwanda was first assigned to Germany after the Berlin Conference of 1884. The kingdom was formally absorbed in German East Africa together with Burundi as Ruanda-Urundi. Germany was “amazed” by the organisational hierarchy of the monarchy, and did not interfere, following a policy of indirect rule.⁶¹ However, it is important to note that the colonial support, via indirect rule, of the Tutsi monarchy reinforced the power of this group. The Belgians took a more active liking to the Tutsi — Belgium gaining control of Rwanda during World War I — in 1916, although it took a decade before their policy of colonisation really came into force. Chiefdoms were reduced in number, and these positions were either maintained, or redistributed amongst Tutsi. As Grünfeld and Huijboom put it, there was a systematic removal of

⁵⁶ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide*, p. 12.

⁵⁷ Twagilimana, *The Historical Dictionary of Rwanda*, p. 5.

⁵⁸ Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War*, p. 25; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 70.

⁵⁹ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 70.

⁶⁰ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 51.

⁶¹ Frederik Grünfeld and Anke Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders* (Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), p. 27.

Hutu from positions of power.⁶² The state took power over Hutu landholdings, which were usually redistributed amongst Tutsi leaders and Hutu were regularly subjected to forced labour, particularly during the two World Wars.⁶³ Moreover, a process of privatisation saw Hutu excluded from administrative positions and higher education, apart from religious seminary.⁶⁴ This latter most point regarding admittance to religious seminaries did lead to a higher conversion rate than would normally be seen during periods of colonisation, as it was a legal means by which Hutu could gain social and cultural capital.

In 1933, Belgian colonisers formally categorised Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa based largely on physical appearance. This resulted in the dissemination of an identification card declaring the holder Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, or naturalised. With the high rate of intermarriages, as aforementioned, as well as the problematic notions of any differing physical appearance between the groups, dissemination of identification cards based on appearance became difficult. Wealth (possession of a minimum of ten cows) and status were often key factors in obtaining a particular categorisation.⁶⁵ Using Stanton's Ten Stages of Genocide, one could argue that the genocide commenced at this moment, in 1933. Indeed, such widespread identification would play directly into the hands of perpetrators in the 1994 genocide. At this point, it is sufficient to understand that, despite the numerous scholarly arguments above as to the origin and distinction of Hutu-Tutsi-Twa, in this action, colonisers conflated ethnicity and socio-economic status as the prime factors in the delineation of these groups, fundamentally creating a racially framed caste system. Neither German nor Belgian colonisation created the Hutu-Tutsi framework, but it is fair to say that it exacerbated it and formalised divisions between the two.

With the end of World War II, following the creation of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Belgium found itself on the end of five visiting missions from the UN between 1946 and 1962, largely due to its preference for the Tutsi population. In an effort to recreate balance during the 1950s, Belgian authorities slowly released positions of public authority to Hutu, more Hutu

⁶² Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 28.

⁶³ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pp. 27-28.

⁶⁴ Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, p. 35.

⁶⁵ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 28; Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 25.

were admitted into higher education, and talks of instituting measures for elections took place.⁶⁶ However, in 1957 a document signed by nine former seminarians including Grégoire Kayibanda (who would become president of the so-called First Republic of Rwanda from 1961-1972) was published entitled the *Bahutu Manifesto*. The document was a radical call for social and cultural change, demanding a return of democratic rule (with a Hutu majority), an end to racist-colonial agendas, the placement of Hutu in high positions of administration, proper maintenance of identity cards, and the return of the “Hamites” (i.e. Tutsi foreigners) from the north to their former home.⁶⁷ Critically, as Melvern notes, the manifesto places blame on the Tutsi monopoly for Rwanda’s ills, and states that Tutsi are not really Rwandan but had in fact “overrun the country in the years before.”⁶⁸ Therefore, restoration of Rwanda was linked with being free from Tutsi rule, influence, and presence. A series of political parties appeared as a result of the manifesto. In central as well as northwest Rwanda we see Joseph Gitera’s moderate Hutu party known as the Social Advancement of the Masses (*Association pour la Promotion Sociale des la Masse*, APROSOMA). In addition, the more extreme Hutu Social Movement (*Mouvement Social Muhutu*, MSM) is founded by Grégoire Kayibanda. This party would come to be the Democratic Republican Movement, the Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu (*Mouvement Démocratique Républicain – Parti du Mouvement de L’émancipation Hutu*) in 1959, commonly referred to by historians as MDR-Parmehutu. On the Tutsi side of the equation, the Rwandan National Union (*Union Nationale Rwandaise*, UNAR) was established as a pro-monarchy, anti-Belgian group. In response to this, the Belgians backed the establishment of the Democratic Assembly of Rwanda (*Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais*, RADER), a Tutsi centrist party.

The king of Rwanda, Mutara III Rudahingwa, died in 1959 after being treated by a Belgian doctor, and foul play is often suggested here.⁶⁹ Without consulting Belgian officials, Rudahingwa’s brother was instituted as his successor. The Belgians retaliated with communal elections, despite warnings that such a shift in organisational procedure would act as a catalyst for Hutu-Tutsi violence.⁷⁰ Indeed a group of UNAR attacked a

⁶⁶ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pp. 48-49; Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 13.

⁶⁷ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 103; Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p. 149.

⁶⁸ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 6.

⁶⁹ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 6; Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 7; Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 28.

⁷⁰ Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 7.

prominent MDR-Parmehutu activist triggering the *muyaga*, the “strong and erratic wind” of the Rwandan Revolution (1959-1962). The Belgians threw their support behind the Hutu majority, resulting in 20,000 Tutsi murders, with another 120,000 fleeing to neighbouring Uganda, Tanganyika, Congo, and Burundi between 1959 and 1961.⁷¹ The numbers here are somewhat problematic. A UN mission returned from Rwanda in 1962 speaking of “Nazism against Tutsi minorities...artificially engineered hostility between the ethnic groups that led to the murder of around 2,000 people.”⁷² The discrepancy between the UN’s 2,000 and Neuberger’s 20,000 should not be ignored. However, it is the fundamental notion of the outbreak of violence here that is key.

Hutu parties dominated elections in both 1960 and 1961, with a significant lean towards the extreme MDR-Parmehutu party. The monarchy was abolished in the Kamarampake referendum (80% “yes”) on 25 September 1961.⁷³ Assuming the presidency in 1962, Grégoire Kayibanda, leader of the MDR-Parmehutu, became the first president of Rwanda as an independent nation. Considered as the founding father of Hutu Nationalism, Kayibanda introduced a quota system for Tutsi, with 9% being the maximum number of Tutsi students in school, civil positions, or any single employment industry.⁷⁴ In 1963, exiles launched an attack from Burundi, which was swiftly quashed by Kayibanda. A wave of terror followed, Kayibanda stating that if the Tutsi ever sought to take power again, “the whole Tutsi race will be wiped out.”⁷⁵ In the year following the 1963 attack, approximately 10,000 Tutsi were murdered, including the execution of any remaining Tutsi politicians.⁷⁶ A report following the attack uses dehumanising language that would become central in the 1994 genocide; *inyenzi*, cockroaches. Kayibanda is perceived as a distant ruler, whose land was one of virtue, with high church attendance, punishment for prostitution, and hard work from underdevelopment was borne with pious dignity.⁷⁷ Prunier notes that by mid-1972,

⁷¹ Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 31.

⁷² “Question of the Future of Ruanda-Burundi, May 30 1962” in Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 30.

⁷³ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 151.

⁷⁴ Grégoire Kayibanda in Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 31; Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 60.

⁷⁵ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 31; Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 60.

⁷⁶ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 56.

⁷⁷ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 59.

Kayibanda was reclusive and his regime was in a state of “suspended animation.”⁷⁸ In an attempt to adjust this state of suspension, Kayibanda rallied himself around the notion of the *inyenzi* threat, and when a massacre of Hutu took place in neighbouring Burundi in May through June of 1972 the atmosphere was ripe with feelings of fear and distrust of the other. Vigilante groups enforced quotas in school and workplaces, triggering another mass migration of Tutsi.

However, these vigilantes also acted on personal vendettas, causing enough disruption for Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana to overthrow Kayibanda on 5 July 1973. The coup is often referred to as “bloodless,” although 65 former officials plus Kayibanda and his wife were dead by 1976.⁷⁹ For Kayibanda and his wife, imprisonment and forced starvation is quoted as the method of execution.⁸⁰ Krysten Sinema notes that starvation was used as Habyarimana held a superstitious belief that murdering his former boss directly would cause him future harm.⁸¹ Perhaps this coup is referred to as “bloodless” as it was met with widespread support from the population who welcomed an end to Hutu-Tutsi violence.⁸² Indeed, although identity cards, education and civil service quotas remained (loosely enforced), life for the Tutsi minority was relatively liveable in comparison to the regime of Kayibanda. This is seen particularly in the church, with three of eight Rwandan bishops being Tutsi in the 1980s.

Habyarimana ran a single-party totalitarian regime, his party the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour le Développement*, MRND) being declared sole party in 1974; this being enshrined in the constitution in 1978. Membership of the MRND was mandatory for all citizens, regardless of age. Rwanda struggled in the late 1980s, with global coffee prices dropping (a chief Rwandan export) and a famine hitting the country in 1989.⁸³ The country was poor, the population was rising, and the government was facing significant economic strife. Foreign aid comprised 11% of NGP in 1986, and by 1991 it had

⁷⁸ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 59.

⁷⁹ Krysten Sinema, *Who Must Die in Rwanda's Genocide? The State of Exception Realized* (New York, NY and London, UK: Lexington Books, 2015), p. 83; Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 8; Twagilimana, *The Historical Dictionary of Rwanda*, p. 133.

⁸⁰ Aimé Muyoboke Kalimunda, “The Death Penalty in Rwanda: Surround politics and the ICTR’s battle for abolition,” in Madoka Futamura and Nadia Bernaz eds. *The Politics of the Death Penalty in Countries in Transition* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), p. 137.

⁸¹ Sinema, *Who Must Die in Rwanda's Genocide? The State of Exception Realized*, p. 83.

⁸² Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 75.

⁸³ Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 9.

doubled to 22%.⁸⁴ With as many as 900,000 Rwandans living in bordering countries,⁸⁵ particularly in Uganda as members of the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA), Habyarimana's relative stability could not hold. Concurrent to this, members of the NRA as well as other Tutsi refugees in Uganda (as well as Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, Cameroon, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, and eventually Belgium, the US, and Germany) joined to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987. In 1986, 4,000 of the 14,000 NRA soldiers who ran on Kampala were Tutsi, many in high ranking positions, this experience in combat being key to the success of the RPF.⁸⁶ The relationship between the NRA and its Tutsi soldiers began to disintegrate in the late 1980s, with Tutsi forbidden for promotion from 1989. This change in relationship led many to the RPF, with 3,000-4,000 members in 1990, growing to 25,000 by 1994.⁸⁷ The RPF espoused an egalitarian ideology. Ghey sang in the RPF song: "It was the white man who has caused us all that...they invented different origins for us...So children of Rwanda, we are called upon to unite our strength to build a Rwanda."⁸⁸

In early 1990, Habyarimana set out some democratising reforms. He amended his party's name to the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (*Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement*, hereafter will remain MRND) and began to transition to a multi-party system in a movement to encourage liberalisation of the country. The Democratic Republican Movement (*Movement Démocratique Républicain*, MDR, heir to Kayibanda's MDR-Parmehutu party), The Social Democratic Party (*Parti Social Démocratique*, PSD), The Liberal Party (*Parti Libéral*, PL), and The Christian Democratic Party (*Parti Démocratique Chrétien*, PDC) all entered the scene. The Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (*Coalition pour la Défense de la République*, CDR), a particularly extremist pro-Hutu group who would come to play a key role in the slaughter of the 1994 genocide, appeared slightly later in February 1992.

⁸⁴ Sinema, *Who Must Die in Rwanda's Genocide?*, p. 90.

⁸⁵ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pp. 70-74.

⁸⁶ Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 45.

⁸⁷ Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 46; Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 32.

⁸⁸ Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 47.

In spite of Habyarimana's liberalising effort, the RPF invaded Rwanda from the north October 1, 1990, catalysing a three-year civil war.⁸⁹ France, Zaire, and Belgium (though the Belgian forces were quickly withdrawn) provided military support to Habyarimana. Prunier notes the oddity of France entering into a civil war between a rebel group and a failing dictatorship.⁹⁰ Grünfeld and Huijboom suggest France's interference was due to a growing fondness for Rwanda as a holder of the French language, France desiring to grow a French family of countries in East Africa. France's attachment to Rwanda would come to play a major role in the 1994 genocide. In the 1990 invasion by the RPF, Habyarimana's government had been calculating in propagating fear of the RPF, releasing propaganda suggesting the RPF mean to kill Hutu. As such, with their invasion from the north, many Hutu families fled, resulting in a large population of displaced people. This is key as the north had been an historic stronghold for Habyarimana, and for pro-Hutu sentiments more generally. This expanded into fear of local Tutsi and moderate Hutu acting as internal RPF informants, and 10,000 arrests were made. Moreover, Grünfeld and Huijboom note that "people were told to burn the houses of *inyenzi* — cockroaches — the Tutsi and kill them."⁹¹ Melvern argues that this is when the "1994 Genocide" truly begun.⁹²

In June 1992, largely due to international pressure, Rwanda and the RPF began peace negotiations. The negotiations stipulated a ceasefire as of July 1992. In addition, there was to be an establishment of a transitional government headed by Habyarimana and the establishment of a transitional parliament. In addition, peace negotiations called for the withdrawal of all French forces from Rwanda as well as the unification of government forces and the RPF into a single army with a dispatch of UN forces to oversee the implementation.⁹³ Further stipulations included the return of any displaced Hutu to their homes, disciplinary action against those who instigated localised violence

⁸⁹ It is important to note, as Mamdani and Reyntjens do, the RPF invasion on October 1, 1990 was not simply responding to the occurrences in Rwanda. Rwandans living in Uganda experienced increasing levels of discrimination, particularly under Milton Obote and Idi Amin. In the 1980s, Obote removed Tutsi from positions in civil administration and engaged in acts of expulsion back to Rwanda. Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 327; Filip Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grandes Lacs en crise: Rwanda and Burundi 1988-1994* (Paris: Karthala, 1994), p. 180.

⁹⁰ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 107; Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 33.

⁹¹ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 33.

⁹² Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 253.

⁹³ This unified army was to reduce the totally military force of Rwanda to 19,000. Of the total number, 40% of soldiers 50% of total officers had to be from the RPF. Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 51

against Tutsi, and a protocol for the return of all Tutsi refugees from Uganda, These agreements were collated into the Arusha Accords, signed in August 1993, just nine months before the 1994 genocide officially commenced.

On October 23, 1993, the MRND, CDR, PL, PSD, PDC and the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* militias formed an extremist coalition, known as Hutu Power. These militias were certainly armed. In fact, Melvern argues that by 1993 the country was “awash” with weapons.⁹⁴ Between October 1990 and 1993, Rwanda was the third largest importer of arms in the world, most of these arms deals being negotiated in the Rwandan embassy in Paris. As aforementioned, Melvern highlights the mass importation of machete from China in 1993, the government importing approximately 581,175 kilograms of machete (worth approximately US\$725,669), enough for a new machete for every third male.⁹⁵ In addition, Egypt, under the suggestion of deputy foreign minister Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who would become the UN General Secretary during the 1994 genocide) sold US\$5.8 million of weapons to Rwanda in October 1990, with additional deals continuing until 1993.⁹⁶ Between 1991 and 1992, France sent US\$6 million worth of weapons to Rwanda, and from 1993, Rwanda was receiving US\$4 million from France.⁹⁷ In addition, in 1993 US\$4.5 million of Rwandan government funds were spent solely on purchasing agricultural tools. In November 1993, Habyarimanda is documented as having chaired a meeting in which he ordered the distribution of grenades, machete and other weapons to the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* in order to “kill Tutsi and other Rwandans...who do not support them.”⁹⁸ It is important to note these weapons were being distributed on top of the extant machetes in homes, with 83% of households owning one or more machetes already.⁹⁹

In January 1994, propaganda magazine *Kangura* printed a poem featuring the line “[t]he masses with rise with the help of the army and the blood will flow freely.”¹⁰⁰ Perhaps most interesting is a radio broadcast from RTLM on 3 April 1994, during

⁹⁴ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, pp. 56-60.

⁹⁵ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, pp. 56-60.

⁹⁶ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, pp. 56-60.

⁹⁷ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, pp. 56-60.

⁹⁸ “Belgian Ad Hoc Group” in Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 87.

⁹⁹ Verwimp, “Machetes and Firearms,” p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ *Kangura* in Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 222.

which is was announced that on “April 6, there will be a respite, but ‘a little thing’ might happen.”¹⁰¹ On April 6, 1994 President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi were killed when their plane was shot down on approach to Kigali. Within a matter of hours, the killing spree of the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda commenced. Although not the purview of this project, scholarly suggestions as to who downed the aircraft are controversial. Until Judi Rever’s *In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front* (2018), it was commonly understood that Hutu Power shot down the plane.¹⁰² The question as to why a Hutu group would shoot down their own president still stands. Perhaps Habyarimana can be seen as either slowing the process of genocide as he was toying with implementing the Arusha Accords, or the Hutu militias needed a sacrificial catalyst. Moreover, due to the speed with which the militia responded to the act plus the RTLM broadcast three days prior, the evidence was convincing. However, Rever’s work controversially suggests that Paul Kagame, as leader of the RPF, called for the plane to be downed in order to advance his war with the Rwandan government.¹⁰³ However, one cannot overlook the assassination of Habyarimana’s prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana the same day as the plane crash, suggesting that the crash was part of a greater *coup d’état* in order to usher in leadership that was more overtly pro-genocide. This left a power vacuum waiting to be filled with pro-Hutu figures condoning genocide.¹⁰⁴

In the following months, an estimated one million victims were murdered.¹⁰⁵ Melvern quotes 93.7% were murdered for being Tutsi, 1% due to an association with a Tutsi (e.g. marriage), 0.8% because of Tutsi features, and 0.8% due to political opposition.¹⁰⁶ 37.9% were murdered using machete, 16.8% with clubs, 14.8% with firearms, 0.5% with sexual violence.¹⁰⁷ Other forms of execution included forced

¹⁰¹ Neuberger, *Rwanda 1994*, p. 56

¹⁰² Judi Rever, *In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front* (Toronto, Canada: Random House, 2018).

¹⁰³ Rever, *In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front*.

¹⁰⁴ Among them Professor Ferdinand Nahimana, Colonel Theonests Bagosora, General Augustin Bizimana, Major Aloys Ntabakuze, Major Protais Mpiranya, Joseph Nzirorera, Jean-Bosco Narayagwiza, Robert Kajuga, George Rutaganda, Félicien Musabe, and Pascal Musabe.

¹⁰⁵ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 252.

¹⁰⁶ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 253.

¹⁰⁷ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 253.

suicide, drowning, immolation, or crushing.¹⁰⁸ Most Tutsi and moderate Hutu victims were killed close to their homes by roving *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* militia groups. Many neighbours and sometimes family members were involved in the murders. Paul Rusesabagina recalls in his autobiography, “Tutsi wives went to sleep next to their Hutu husbands and awoke to find a blade of machete sawing into their neck, and above them, the grimacing face of the man who had sworn to love them and cherish them for life.”¹⁰⁹ Many sought sanctuary in large institutions such as schools, churches, and hotels, the *Hotel des Milles Collines* being one of the most famous examples due to its portrayal Paul Rusesabagina’s humanitarian actions in the film *Hotel Rwanda*. While Rusesabagina was successful in providing sanctuary to over 1,200 Tutsi and Hutu in the *Hotel des Milles Collines*, those hiding in other institutions often did not find such safety. Churches in particular were the site of mass extermination. On April 12, less than a week after the genocidal killings began, 3,000 Tutsi sought refuge in a Catholic church in Nyange.¹¹⁰ With help from the church priest, *Interahamwe*, used bulldozers to level the building, using machete and rifles to kill anyone that emerged from the rubble. Other instances include massacres at Ntarama church and Nymata church. In the case of Ntarama, the local priest warned Tutsi of the *Interahamwe*’s imminent arrival and suggested they find refuge in the church, seeking to gather the victims together for a more efficient slaughter. Trusting their spiritual leader, 5,000 Tutsi gathered in the church to be murdered with machete, grenades, rifles, and bricks. Today Ntarama church has been transformed into a memorial site while Nymata has been museologically preserved as it was on the day 11,000 Tutsi were murdered inside including blood stains and visible human remains.¹¹¹ In addition, sexual violence was utilised as a genocidal weapon. Such violence was used both to inflict “slow, inexorable death” but also to create longevity to the genocide through the spread of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in Tutsi women, shortening lifespans and creating hereditary health problems.¹¹² The RPF halted the genocide when Kigali

¹⁰⁸ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 252.

¹⁰⁹ Paul Rusesabagina and Tom Zoellner, *An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2006), p. 134.

¹¹⁰ Elisé Rutagambwa, “The Rwandan Church: The Challenge of Reconciliation” in Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon, and Clyde Wilcox eds. *The Catholic Church and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2006), p. 179.

¹¹¹ Jesse, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 60

¹¹² For more see Breann Fallon, ““Violence of Mind, Body, and Spirit: Spiritual and Religions Responses Triggered by Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide,” in Caroline Blyth, Emily Colgan, and

was captured on 4 July, although the RPF did not secure the entire country 18 July. Pasteur Bizimungu was named president on 19 July 1994, the MRND was outlawed, and the 4th of July was designated by the new government as a national public holiday, “Liberation Day.” In November 1994, just months after the genocide ended, the UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in order to try key perpetrators.¹¹³ In 1995, the ICTR was stationed in Arusha, Tanzania. The ICTR indicted 93 individuals with 62 being sentenced, 14 acquitted, 13 referred onto other jurisdictions, 2 indictments withdrawn prior to trial, and 2 having died prior to their trial.¹¹⁴ The ICTR was dissolved in 2015.

Current Explanations of Rwandan *Génocidaire* Motivations

This project seeks to ascertain a more intricate picture as to why the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, often referred to as “the preventable genocide,” occurred, via an examination of the role religion played through the methodological lens of fetishisation.¹¹⁵ Prior to the elucidation of this project’s case study, it is prudent to consider current scholarly suggestions as to what motivated *génocidaire* in this particular case. Amongst current scholarship, there are a range of suggestions as to what motivated *génocidaire*. Prunier argues:

The decision to kill was of course made by politicians, for political reasons. But at least part of the reason why it was carried out so thoroughly by the ordinary rank-and-file peasants in their *ingo* was feeling that there were too many people on too little land, and that with a reduction in their numbers, there would be more for survivors.¹¹⁶

The connection of genocide to the land is also raised by Mamdani, although in a more ideological sense. Mamdani argues that this case is to be understood as a “natives” genocide, “it was a genocide by those who saw themselves as sons — and daughters —

Katie B. Edwards eds. *Rape Culture, Gender Violence, and Religion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), pp. 71-86; M. Drumb, “‘She makes me ashamed to be a woman:’ The Genocide Conviction of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 2011”, *Michigan Journal of International Law* 34:3 (2013), pp. 559-604.

¹¹³ For more on the ICTR see Thierry Cruvellier, *Court of Remorse: Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda* translated by Chari Voss (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

¹¹⁴ United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, “The ICTR in Brief,” (accessed 27 October 2018) <https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal>.

¹¹⁵ Organization of African Unity: International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide (sine loco)* (IPEP, 2000).

¹¹⁶ *Ingo* in Kinyarwanda refers to the land around the home. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 4.

of the soils, and their mission as one of clearing.”¹¹⁷ Jessee states that *génocidaire* “were motivated by pure genocidal intent to rid the country of their Tutsi compatriots.”¹¹⁸ When considering female *génocidaire*, Leila Fielding cites three main motivating factors, (1) fear and coercion, (2) jealousy, and (3) ideological rationale.¹¹⁹ For Donald Bloxham, “the Rwandan Genocide was perpetrated was an attempt by radicals to preserve the post-1959 revolutionary order by taking over the state machinery.”¹²⁰ Interestingly, Susan Thomson notes that the “official line” (referring to that proffered by current Kagame led RPF government) on what motivated *génocidaire* is clear: “Hutu killed Tutsi because of deep-seated hatred that was introduced by Belgian colonizers and cultivated by Hutu-led postcolonial governments.”¹²¹ This “easy to swallow” story became “parroted” as an easy to comprehend version of the genocide.¹²² Yet Thomson rightfully notes that this is a revised, one-sided, RPF-approved imagining of this genocide.¹²³ It is a version of this history that ignores the complex historical, structural, economic, cultural, and political factors that contributed to mass slaughter. A significant problem in understanding the propelling factors behind Rwanda’s *génocidaire* is that there are few sources that “allow readers to learn what motivated individual Hutu to kill, why they did, and how it made them feel, in their own words.”¹²⁴ This lack of first-hand insight leads to the struggle in understanding the true cause of this genocide, and it is a recurring problem in other cases of genocide.

The work of Scott Straus in *The Order of Genocide* and Jean Hatzfeld in *Machete Season* provide the most comprehensive research engaging perpetrators of the 1994 genocide.¹²⁵ Scott Straus questioned 210 male perpetrators of the 1994 genocide via a semi-structured interview.¹²⁶ Straus presents his findings mostly statistically.¹²⁷

¹¹⁷ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 14.

¹¹⁸ Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 76.

¹¹⁹ Leila Fielding, *Female Génocidaires During the Rwandan Genocide: When Women Kill* (Hamburg, Germany: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2014), pp. 23-24.

¹²⁰ Donald Bloxham, “Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 22:2 (Fall 2008), p. 208.

¹²¹ Susan Thomson, *Rwanda: From Genocide to Precarious Peace* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2018), p. 23.

¹²² Thomson, *Rwanda: From Genocide to Precarious Peace*, p. 36.

¹²³ Thomson, *Rwanda: From Genocide to Precarious Peace*, p. 36.

¹²⁴ Thomson, *Rwanda: From Genocide to Precarious*, p. 26.

¹²⁵ Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2006); Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

¹²⁶ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*.

¹²⁷ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*.

Hatzfeld's work is much more journalistic, and presents candid interviews with 10 male perpetrators conducted in 2003, these being the core source for the case study that will unfold in the next chapter. Considering Straus' statistical work on the motivation of Rwanda's *génocidaire*, there is much to cogitate. On the affect of the 1990 RPF invasion as well as the 1993 civil war in Burundi in motivating perpetrators, Straus finds that "these events remained distant concerns" and "are not sufficient to explain why ordinary Rwandan became violent."¹²⁸ Questioning perpetrators on their allegiance to Habyarimana, Straus asked "What was your opinion of the Habyarimana government?" to which 48.6% "supported," 32.1% had "no particular opinion," 17.9% were "opposed," and 1.3% were "ambivalent." From these findings, it is fair to argue that "not all perpetrators supported the regime," suggesting that pure nationalism was not the prime motivation in this case.¹²⁹ Frequently quoted reasons for the outbreak of violence in this particular case are socio-economic factors, the Hutu often being labelled jealous of the Tutsi's apparent wealth, although, as attested above, this is a particularly generalised view of this divide. Nonetheless, Straus considers this avenue of motivation and asked his respondents "When you look back at your situation before 1994, how was it?" 61.9% answered "positive," 31.6% selected "fine," and 6.5% stated "negative."¹³⁰ In addition to these findings, Straus states that the Rwandans who become *génocidaire* were "not comparatively poor, undereducated or underemployed, they were also not necessarily angry about their station in life before the genocide."¹³¹

Interestingly, though unsurprisingly, when looking at the connection of the perpetrators to Tutsi, Straus found a high incidence of Hutu-Tutsi proximity. Before 1994, 96% had a Tutsi neighbour, 68.8% had a Tutsi family member, and 98.9% had or would have allowed their child to marry a Tutsi.¹³² Furthermore 86.5% state that their relationships with Tutsi before 1994 were "positive," with a further 11.2% stating they were "not a problem."¹³³ Further, only 64.9% of Straus' respondents thought Tutsi were a different *amoko* (ethnic group) and a small 5.9% thought Rwanda was a country for Hutu exclusively.¹³⁴ As such, Straus argues these statistics suggest that the notion

¹²⁸ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, pp. 124, 126.

¹²⁹ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 125.

¹³⁰ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 126.

¹³¹ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 126.

¹³² Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 128.

¹³³ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 129.

¹³⁴ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 128.

of ethnic hatred was not a motivating factor.¹³⁵ Yet, he raises concerns of these responses, stating that these “answers do not necessarily tell us whether or not perpetrators considered Tutsi a different race.”¹³⁶ Interviewing a number of years after the event, there is certainly a danger of retrospective bias, particularly from the lessons taught to perpetrators during their time in *Ingando* re-education camps.¹³⁷ Indeed, in Jean Hatzfeld’s interviews of perpetrators in *Machete Season* there is evidence of both a lack of and rife ethnic hatred.¹³⁸ One perpetrator states “Actually, Hutu did not detest Tutsi as much as that. Not enough to kill them anyway. Evil spells much worse than stubborn hatred meddled in this ethnic rivalry and sent us into the marshes.”¹³⁹ Another perpetrator states, “we did not see them as wicked enemies.”¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, there is a higher incidence of statements such as “Hutus have always reproached Tutsi for their great height and for trying to use this to rule. Time has never dried up that bitterness” and “The Hutu always suspects that some plans are cooking deep in the Tutsi character...he sees a threat lurking in even the feeblest of Tutsi.”¹⁴¹

When asked outright, Straus’ interviewees stated their motivations, these being greatly varied: 64.1% stated intra-Hutu coercion, 22% combativeness, 15.3% claimed no active participation, 12.9% stated obedience, 6.2% accidental integration, 5.2% acted for material gain, 5.2% wanted to protect their Tutsi family members, 4.8% anger/revenge for Habyarimana’s death, 4.8% were copying others, and 1% cited interpersonal revenge.¹⁴² In addition, Straus questioned if the *génocidaire* thought they were “working for the country” in carrying out the genocide: 57.5% said no, but 42.5% said yes.¹⁴³ Of course, after the fact we would suspect that many perpetrators of such

¹³⁵ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 128.

¹³⁶ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 128.

¹³⁷ Ingando camps were run by the Rwandan government between 1999 and 2009 in an attempt to rehabilitate Hutu into Rwandan society. Although they were designed to promote reconciliation and egalitarianism in post-genocide Rwanda, they have been widely criticised as RPF “brainwashing” fronts. For more see: Suzanne Hoeksema, “Re-education the Perpetrators in the Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide,” in Ugur Ümit Üngör ed *Genocide: New Perspectives on its Causes, Course, and Consequences* (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), pp. 195-215; Susan Thomson, “Reeducation for Reconciliation: Participant Observations on *Ingando*,” in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf eds. *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence* (Madison: WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), pp. 331-339.

¹³⁸ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

¹³⁹ Fulgence Bunani in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 217

¹⁴⁰ Pio Mutungirehe in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 217

¹⁴¹ Jean-Baptiste Murangira and Pancrace Hakizamungili in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 217, 219

¹⁴² Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 138.

¹⁴³ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 149.

violence would try to absolve themselves of blame by emphasising coercion. However, through the triangulation of his survey results, Straus notes that “there was a credible threat of sanction for noncompliance” and as such the confessed motivations stand.¹⁴⁴ Interestingly, there is a line drawn by Straus between those who complied and those who were actively aggressive, the latter most having the least ties to Tutsi and being motivated by “rage and revenge, of killing before being killed, of organising society categorically into an ethnic ‘us’ and ‘them.’”¹⁴⁵

Evidently, there is no single propelling factor in the actions of 175,000 – 210,000 individuals who enacted the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, and to propose a single motivator would be an outlandish suggestion.¹⁴⁶ Rather, it is fair to argue that all of the above listed motivations rang true amongst perpetrators. Interestingly, in the work of Prunier, Mamdani, Jessee, Fielding, Bloxham, and Straus, there is little consideration of the impact of religion. Of course, the compliance of the church is considered, but no consideration is given to the personal faith of the active “rank-and-file peasants,” as Prunier would put it.¹⁴⁷ As such, this factor, which may contribute significantly to the propulsion of *génocidaire*, is somewhat overlooked in the current literature in favour of more traditional understandings of the cause of violence.

Scholars who do confront the notion of religion as a motivating factor in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda include Timothy Longman, Christopher C. Taylor, and Kate Temoney.¹⁴⁸ All three of these scholars draw attention to the impact religion had on providing a framework that aided in the justification of problematic violent actions. Longman notes that after the genocide, the world was confronted by the fact that the vast majority of the perpetrators were Christians killing other Christians, with churches often being used as sites of massacre.¹⁴⁹ Most critical for this study is Longman’s view of the role of religion in driving *génocidaire* to raise the

¹⁴⁴ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 151.

¹⁴⁵ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 152.

¹⁴⁶ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 117.

¹⁴⁷ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 4.

¹⁴⁸ Timothy Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Christopher C. Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence*, eds Mark Juergensmeyer et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 268-279; Kate Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies.”

¹⁴⁹ Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 4.

machete. He states: “As Doris Bergen argued about the churches in Nazi Germany, Christianity in Rwanda ‘did play a critical role, not perhaps in motivating the decision makers, but in making their commands comprehensible and tolerable.’”¹⁵⁰ This aligns with much of the work seen in Chapter Two of this paper that considered religion and genocide in totality: religion as justifier. In fact, Longman states that this notion of “religion as justifier” is in part specific to the colonisation of Rwanda, the missioning of the country, and the power struggle that occurred throughout this period. He states, “Christians could kill without obvious qualms of conscience, even in the church, because Christianity as they had always known it had been a religion defined by struggles for power, and ethnicity had always been at the base of those struggles.”¹⁵¹ While Taylor argues that religion is used as a mitigating rhetoric in Rwanda, he takes a different tact in his examination of the role of religion. Taylor examines the notion of the “religious imaginary.”¹⁵² He outlines this concept as follows:

The involved cosmological and ontological notions specific to Rwandan culture and particularly apparent in earlier ritual practices having to do with sacred kingship. These penetrated ideas of leadership and moral personhood and can be discerned in images, such as cartoons, that were published in Rwanda’s popular media in the time leading up to the 1994 genocide.¹⁵³

For Taylor, this “religious imaginary” is communicated to the population through mass media, in this case the *Kangura* and RTLM. Via these propagandistic mediums, an image of Habyarimana as a sacred king destined for ritualistic sacrifice is perpetuated.¹⁵⁴ In a sentiment reminiscent of René Girard’s scapegoat theory in *Violence and the Sacred*, with Habyarimana designated as an outsider, marked for death “it was then possible for Hutu extremists to insist on the externality of others, in this case, all Rwandan Tutsis.”¹⁵⁵ This notion of the religious narrative creating alterity speaks to the work of Temoney on religion-violence nexuses discussed in Chapter Two,

¹⁵⁰ Doris L. Bergen, ‘Religion and Genocide: A Historiographical Survey,’ in Dan Stone ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 194-227; Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 196.

¹⁵¹ Timothy Longman, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda,” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 31:2 (2001), p. 164.

¹⁵² Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” p. 268.

¹⁵³ Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” p. 268.

¹⁵⁴ Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” p. 275.

¹⁵⁵ René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (London, New York: Continuum, 2005 [1972]); Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” p. 278.

and is a potential factor in *génocidaire* motivation appearing in multiple works.¹⁵⁶ Critically, Taylor states that underlying motivators such as this are fundamentally difficult to see and examine, but it behoves us to understand them.¹⁵⁷ While Taylor's argument is convincing, it is important to note that there is little perpetrator testimony referenced in Taylor's work to directly highlight just how this narrative drove perpetrators to murder. This lack of first-hand material from *génocidaire* is a central problem in studying most cases of genocide. Nonetheless, his work remains steadfast and highlights the importance of subtle religious factors in the creation and propulsion of genocide.

The research of Kate Temoney has been discussed previously in Chapter Two. Temoney's 2016 work considers the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda specifically.¹⁵⁸ In regards to this case, Temoney highlights "three possible nexuses of religion and genocide, in its destructive capacity, in othering, justification, and authorization."¹⁵⁹ In a similar vein to that of Taylor, Temoney analyses the role of propaganda in championing such a narrative, she states:

These three nexuses were at play in Hutu propagandists mobilizing the civilian population by revising and exploiting colonial inspired biblical myths as well as indigenous cosmological beliefs in service to dehumanizing Tutsi by characterizing them as a radical, alien other; justifying their elimination due to a threat they posed to the temporal and atemporal order; and authorizing their extirpation as granted by the state as well as clergy and the institutional churches.¹⁶⁰

In evidencing this, Temoney draws attention to the colonisers' use of the Hamitic myth, the presently mentioned work of Taylor on Habyarimana as the sacrificial sacred king, and issue 29 of the *Kangura*, which is discussed at length in the next chapter of this thesis. Additionally, in looking at the sexual violence of the genocide specifically, Temoney argues that the religious rhetoric of perpetrators and religious officials that deliberately "othered" the enemy contributed "to the dehumanization of members of

¹⁵⁶ Kate Temoney, "Those who have sin...over to this side: Genocide and religion" in Cathie Carmichael and Richard C. Maguire eds. *The Routledge History of Genocide* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 233.

¹⁵⁷ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*; Taylor, "Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda," p. 278.

¹⁵⁸ Temoney, "The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies," pp. 3-24.

¹⁵⁹ Temoney, "The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies," p. 5.

¹⁶⁰ Temoney, "The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies," p. 5.

the enemy group, making enemies an acceptable object of sexual violence.”¹⁶¹ In other words, the use of religion in championing a genocidal ideology created a space in morality, where sexual violence and murder could exist without influencing the perpetrators sense of cognitive dissonance. As such, Temoney’s work highlights the use of religious rhetoric as a specific element in propelling *génocidaire* as it absolves the perpetrators of feelings of apprehension and guilt.

The research of Longman, Taylor, and Temoney illuminate the role of religion in the creation and propulsion of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. In this project, I hope to add to the understanding of the role of religion in this case of mass slaughter through a consideration of fetishisation. It is important to note that there are some scholars who argue against the central place of religion in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, these being Saskia Van Hoyweghen and Agatha Radoli.¹⁶² These scholars suggest that the Christian church is not to be blamed for the genocide, or any outbreak of violence. Such mass violence is said to signal to either a base penetration of the faith in that society, or that the espoused version of the faith is a corrupted Christianity. Van Hoywedhen argues that despite high rates of baptism, the omnipresence of the Christian faith in Rwanda has “no meaning as such... scholars have been far too blinded by the power of the Church.”¹⁶³ In a similar vein, Radoli argues that this is evident in an “un-Christian attitude,” meaning that “Christianity has not taken root in Rwanda.”¹⁶⁴ This project does not find credence in the position of either Van Hoywedhen or Radoli, rather finding the work of scholars such as Taylor more convincing. He states:

A reputed exception to this pattern is the 1994 Rwandan genocide, usually attributed to ethnic rather than religious strife, since both the Tutsi victims and Hutu perpetrators tended to be Christian. Yet it is not correct to presume the irrelevance of religion.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” p. 15.

¹⁶² Saskia Van Hoywedhen, “The Disintegration of the Catholic Church in Rwanda: A Study of the Fragmentation of Political Religious Authority,” *African Affairs* 95:380 (July 1996), pp. 379-402; Agatha Radoli, “Preface” in Mario I. Aguliar *The Rwanda Crisis and the Call to Deepen Christianity in Africa* (Nairobi, Kenya: AMECEA Gaba Publications, 1998), p. viii.

¹⁶³ Van Hoywedhen, “The Disintegration of the Catholic Church in Rwanda: A Study of the Fragmentation of Political Religious Authority,” pp. 387, 401.

¹⁶⁴ Radoli, “Preface” in Mario I. Aguliar *The Rwanda Crisis and the Call to Deepen Christianity in Africa*, p. viii; Timothy Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 9.

¹⁶⁵ Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” p. 268.

As aforementioned, facing genocide requires an in-depth study of human ontology. This includes turning a mirror onto one's own self and the ideologies, be they religious, political, or otherwise, that are seen to hold together our worldview — which is fundamentally confronting. Yet, as Temoney notes, we must overcome this for “the overarching goal of all approaches to genocide...should ultimately have a pragmatic application: genocide detection, prevention, and mitigation.”¹⁶⁶

Conclusion

In the next chapter, this project will examine the impact of religion on the motivation of Rwanda's *génocidaire* via a methodology that has not been previously utilised in understanding this event. As outlined in the previous chapter, it has been suggested by Sonia Silva that fetishisation, a previously debunked methodology, is key to understanding the impact of religion on the actions of *génocidaire*.¹⁶⁷ This project's Ellenian-Böhmean fetishistic methodology will consider specifically the role of the fetishised machete in the creation and propulsion of the genocide, this object being highlighted by Prunier as the “great weapon of the genocide.”¹⁶⁸ As outlined in the previous chapter, in order to ascertain if a machete-fetish is at play in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, and if it is influencing on the actions of *génocidaire*, this project will be looking for key fetishistic markers around the object, these being linguistic changes and an impact on the social reality.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, via analysis of perpetrator accounts, it will be possible to ascertain if the machete is truly a “machine of power” shaping the actions of *génocidaire*.¹⁷⁰ In order to gain access to the first-hand testimony from perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, this project will draw upon the ground-breaking work of Jean Hatzfeld, in his piece *Machete Season*.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” p. 22.

¹⁶⁷ Silva, “Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation.”

¹⁶⁸ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222; Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide* (London: Hurst and Company, 1995), p. 403.

¹⁶⁹ Andrew M. Jones and Nicole Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects: Material Agency,” in Dan Hicks and Mary C. Beaudry eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 334-351.

¹⁷⁰ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

¹⁷¹ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

Chapter 4

Case Study: Fetishism in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda¹

Figure 4: Stanislaus “Stano” Olonde, “The Editorial Cartoon of the Day,” *The New Times*, February 18, 2014, <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/73195>.

In *Machete Season*, Hatzfeld interviews Joseph Désiré Bitero, former president of key genocidal militia, the *Interahamwe*.² During this interview, Bitero states, “the one who rushed off with machete in hand...[o]ur arms ruled our heads; in any case our heads no longer had a say...I did not do this, it was God.”³ This is a glimpse of what will be more fully examined in this chapter. Here, the machete appears to be functioning “over and above” its appearance.⁴ In this case, it appears as though the machete has not only influenced the actions of Bitero, but he sees that object as being linked with the will of God. Indeed, for Bitero, we have an object believed to be a “machine of power,” either produced organically or purposefully as a political plaything.⁵ There is much to be

¹ A preliminary version of this case study was published by the author in the peer-reviewed religious studies journal *Implicit Religion*: Breann Fallon, “The Fetishization Effect: The Manipulation Power of the Machete in the Rwandan Genocide,” *Implicit Religion* 20:4 (2017), pp. 319–333. The author has also published further related material to the topic at hand in Breann Fallon, “Violence of Mind, Body, and Spirit: Spiritual and Religions Responses Triggered by Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide,” in Caroline Blyth, Emily Colgan, and Katie B. Edwards eds., *Rape Culture, Gender Violence, and Religion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), pp. 71-86.

² Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak*, translated by Linda Coverdale (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003).

³ Joseph Désiré Bitero in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 50, 144.

⁴ Roy Ellen, “Fetishism,” *Man* 23:2 (1988), pp. 228, 231.

⁵ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture, A Different Theory of Modernity* (Berlin, Germany and Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2014), p. 222.

unpacked here, and full consideration will be given to such perpetrator testimony below.⁶ Critically, if we are able to uncover further congruent testimonies from other perpetrators, the evidence for the machete as a fetishised object may clearly present itself. This example from Bitero has been raised prematurely in order to highlight the importance of assessing the prospective connection between fetishism and genocide, due to the potential it has to highlight just how religion works at a ground level in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. This may lead us to more fully comprehend the role of such phenomena in creating and propelling other such cases of specified mass slaughter.

In order to ascertain if the machete is fetishised, and just how that fetishised object is shaping the actions of *génocidaire*, we must delve into the first-hand testimonies of the perpetrators. In relation to the use of these non-scholarly interviews, the reader is reminded of the discussion had in relation to this in the introduction to this project. These accounts will be key as they provide a glimpse into the perpetrator relationship with the machete. As aforementioned, it is the testimonies of Hatzfeld's ten interviewees in *Machete Season* that are utilised here.⁷ Most of the ten knew each other prior to the genocide, being from three nearby hills, Kibungo, Ntarma, and Kanzenze. At the time of the killings, the interviewees between 20 and 62 years of age, and most of the ten were "working in the fields" in the immediate lead up to the killings.⁸ Of the ten perpetrators interviewed, eight have either served or are serving time in prison. Upon release, seven of the ten spent some months in *Ingando* re-education camps. In order for the reader to gain a clear picture of Hatzfeld's interviewees, included here is a brief biography of each of the ten perpetrators as found in Hatzfeld's work. These abridged biographies are drawn from Hatzfeld's chapter "The Killers" in *Machete Season*, together with more recent information published in Hatzfeld's 2009 work *The Strategy of Antelopes*:⁹

Joseph Désiré Bitero was 31 at the time of the 1994 genocide. A member of the MRND, he was named municipal president of the *Interahamwe* in 1993. Accused of both genocide and crimes against humanity, he was condemned to death on July 3, 1999. Bitero

⁶ The reader should be aware that as this case study employs primary perpetrator accounts, this section does contain disturbing material.

⁷ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

⁸ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

⁹ "The Killers" in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 246-255; Jean Hatzfeld, *The Strategy of Antelopes: Living in Rwanda After the Genocide*, translated by Linda Coverdale (London, UK: Serpent's Tail, 2009).

appealed, however this was rejected. Due to a delay in sentencing, he escaped public execution on April 24, 1998. It is suspected he will face life in prison. His house has been confiscated to pay fines, his wife and children returning to live with family.¹⁰ In 2009, Bitero was waiting on death row in Rilima penitentiary.

Fulgence Bunani was 33 at the time of the genocide. The son of farmers, he was working on the hill of Kibungo at the time of the genocide. A fervent Catholic he had filled in for the local priest who was busy over several parishes. Accused of both genocide and crimes against humanity, he was tried together with Mutungirehe, Hakizamungili, and Munzingura and sentenced to twelve years in prison in 2002. He served six years in prison plus an additional four months in a re-education camp. He was released in 2003 on probation. Together Bunani, Hakizamungili, and Mutungirehe regularly get together to socialise, drink, and swap memories of their “time in the marshes.” Munzingura joins them when visiting from Kigali.

Pancrace Hakizamungili was a farmer, working family land prior to the genocide. By his own admission, his talents run more to chatting with friends than to religion. He was 25 and unmarried in 1994. He pleaded guilty to certain murders, and was tried together with Bunani, Mutungirehe, and Munzingura. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison and was released in 2001, after which he spent some months in re-education. He has been free as of May 5, 2003.

Alphonse Hitiyaremye was a field worker for a Tutsi landowner while also owning his own business at the time of the genocide. He was 39 in 1994. He is a practicing catholic and father to four children. He was released from prison in 2003 without trial, although may face trial by local *gacaca* court, where he risks being sentenced to years of probationary community labour. Hitiyaremye’s wife now presides over a *gacaca* court in Nymata.

Élie Mizinge was 50 at the time of the genocide. A former soldier and policeman, Mizinge worked his own land from 1992. It is suspected that he will be brought before a *gacaca* court and sentence to two or three years’ community service, his sentence being light because of his past career as a soldier and policeman. In 2003 he was in a re-education camp and afterwards will await trial at home. In 2009, it is noted that he spent time in prison, although it is unclear for how long or for what crime.¹¹

Adalbert Munzigura was working the family fields as an unmarried 23-year-old at the time of the genocide. He was a member of the MDR-Parmehutu and accused of leading a death squadron on Kibungo Hill. He was tried together with Mutungirehe, Bunani, and Hakizamungili, being sentenced to 12 years in prison for specific murders. Munzigura was released for re-education in 2003. In 2009, he was living in Kigali and considered by his fellow perpetrators as a member of the bourgeoisie.

Jean-Baptiste Murangira was 38 and a farmer at the time of the Rwandan genocide. He pleaded guilty to certain murders and was sentenced in 1997 to 15 years in prison. He was released in 2003 after serving eight years and underwent re-education in Bicumbi. He lives with his Tutsi wife who was spared during the genocide. In 2009, Hatzfeld visited a sick Muragira who believed he had been poisoned through the soil via local sorcery, he suspects the *gacaca* court.

¹⁰ Bitero’s children have spoken of their father in Hatzfeld’s latest book. Jean Hatzfeld, *Blood Papa: Rwanda’s New Generation*, translated by Joshua David Jordan (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).

¹¹ In Lynne Tirrell’s chapter “Epistemic Aspects of Evil” it is noted that Mizinge is serving time in prison for his part in the Nymata massacre discussed in Chapter Three. Lynne Tirrell, “Epistemic Aspects of Evil,” in Andrea Veltman, and Kathryn J. Norlock eds. *Evil, Political Violence, and Forgiveness: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card* (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2011), p. 43.

Pio Mutungirehe was an unmarried 22-year-old and working the family fields at the time of the genocide. He was tried with Bunani Hakizamungili, and Munzingura. Mutungirehe pleaded guilty to certain murders and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Following, he was sent for re-education and was released without further reprimand from May 5, 2003. In 2005, Mutungirehe was married and in 2009 was expecting a child with his wife, Josiane, a Tutsi survivor. It is rumoured by a friend of Josiane that Mutungirehe hid Josiane for the majority of the genocide after finding her in the marshes, Mutungirehe denies this.

Ignace Rukiramacumu was 62 years old during the 1994 genocide, and had experienced the deposition of the Tutsi monarchy and the founding of Kayibanda's republic. Rukiramacumu worked his own land in Kibungo. After a preliminary investigation, he did not face trial. Following a presidential decree concerning elderly perpetrators in prison (70 and over), he was released without re-education in January 2003 after a presidential communiqué order the release of 25,000 prisoners. He does not talk extensively about his role in the 1994 genocide. In 2009, Hatzfeld notes that Rukiramacumu has a reputation amongst survivors as being "worse" than Bitero. He named his last son Habyarimana.

Léopard Twagirayezu was 22 and was working in the family fields at the time of the genocide. He was a member of the MRND and a fervent Catholic. He was accused of genocide and crimes against humanity, being sentenced in 2001 to 7 years in prison. Having already been in prison since 1995, he was released in 2002 without re-education. Other of Hatzfeld's interviews describe him as fervent and enthusiastic in the 1994 genocide. On September 15, 2004, he was shot in the temple and again in the heart, a professional kill.

Hatzfeld returned to these *génocidaire*, and met with other perpetrators, publishing additional material in the 2009 work *The Strategy of Antelopes*. Additional testimony from this work is also utilised in this case study.¹²

The focus here is to more fully comprehend how this genocide occurred via an investigation into what role religion played in motivating *génocidaire*, with the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda being the selected case study. It is a fetishistic Ellenian-Böhmean methodology that provides a new avenue of discovery in this area. Indeed, it is prudent to revisit this project's Ellenian/Böhmean definition of the fetish: an object, concept, or thing acting as a "machine of power," either produced organically or purposefully as a practice of power.¹³ In this particular case, we will see the machete fetishised as an extension of the will of the Rwandan God and with a narrative of Hutu nationalism. In addition to this, these fetishes play a central role in the formulation of a Hutu civil religion, this being a greater religious structure underpinning the genocide as a whole. In order to display this project's findings, the following case study shall be structured in four sections. Firstly, as outlined in the final paragraphs of the Chapter Two, in order to ascertain if a fetish is at play here, and if it is influencing the actions of *génocidaire*, I am seeking fetishistic indicators around the object, these being

¹² Hatzfeld, *The Strategy of Antelopes*.

¹³ Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

linguistic changes and impact on social reality.¹⁴ In searching for fetishistic indicators, we will see the machete become conflated with Hutu nationalism, the first of the two fetishes that will appear.¹⁵ Secondly, while searching for particularly religious fetishistic indicators the second fetish, the machete as conflated with the will of the Rwandan God, will arise. In the third section, a discussion of these two fetishes will take place. It is at this point that the fetish as part of a greater religious structure, Hutu civil religion, will take place. The fourth section will situation the findings in the current literature and will consider some of the broader implications of these findings, particularly in relation to the academic comprehension of religion and genocide.

¹⁴ Andrew M. Jones and Nicole Bovin, "The Malice of Inanimate Objects: Material Agency," in Dan Hicks and Mary C. Beaudry eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 336.

¹⁴ Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹⁵ Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 218.

Case Study: Machete, Fetishisation and the 1994 Genocide

1. The Machete as Conflated with Hutu Nationalism

To begin, we are searching for fetishistic indicators that signal to the conflation of the machete with “abstract ideas.”¹⁶ The first of the fetishistic markers to be considered here is an alteration in language around the object. As aforementioned, from the work of Melvern and Verwimp, it is clear that Rwanda was “awash” with machete by 1993, with mass importation of the weapon in this particular year.¹⁷ Some critics argue that this is a moot point, that other weapons were imported for the genocide as well, weapons being cheap at the time due to conflict across the African continent.¹⁸ But, as we shall see below, the machete was not just playing a physical role as a weapon, it was a critical symbolic role in the creation and propulsion of the genocide. Indeed, the machete was “awash” in the populations mind well before mass importation of the weapon, the rhetoric around this object being a focus of propaganda. Perhaps the most overt manifestation of this is through the magazine *Kangura*. Meaning “wake others up,” *Kangura* was founded in 1990, sponsored by the MRND and edited by Hassan Ngeze. To instil a “deep, horizontal comradeship” and influence communal “imagining,” copies of *Kangura* were distributed and read to Hutu militia at rallies.¹⁹ With a 66% literacy rate in 1994, written propaganda was effective, but it was further propelled with aural propaganda through RTLM and rally speeches.²⁰

Consider *Kangura* number 29 (Fig. 5), published in 1991, three years prior to the onset of mass violence. This issue depicts Gregoire Kayibanda beneath the heading “Tutsi Race of God.” Beside Kayibanda is a machete with the caption, “which weapons are we going to use to beat the cockroaches for good? [sic].” Beneath Kayibanda is the statement “how about relaunching the 1959 revolution to conquer the Tutsi cockroaches once and for all.” The first question that arises here, is why the machete for this cover? Firstly, one must remember that at least 83% of households already had one or more

¹⁶ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 218; Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

¹⁷ Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (New York, NY: Verso, 2004), pp. 55-60; Philip Verwimp, “Machetes and Firearms: The Organization of Massacres in Rwanda.” *Journal of Peace Research* 43:1 (2006), p. 7.

¹⁸ Barrie Collins, *Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and its Consequences* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 142.

¹⁹ Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 49.

²⁰ Lee Ann Fujii, “Transforming the Moral Landscape: The Diffusion of a Genocidal Norm in Rwanda,” *The Journal of Genocide Research* 6:1 (2004), p. 103.

machete in 1984, so by the time this issue of *Kangura* is published in 1991 we must presume that this is a weapon at the ready, even prior to the greater arms imports of 1993.²¹ Secondly, as aforementioned, the machete is an emblem traditionally conflated with the Hutu tribe, as this tribe has been the custodian of agriculture (as opposed to Tutsi as custodians of bovines). In this sense, this machete is a natural fit. Yet, the imagery here is far more than that of a Hutu totem conveniently lying around. The *Kangura* renders the machete as a nationalistic metallic fix-all: it is the *one* thing




Figure 5: “Which weapons are we going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?” *Kangura*, no. 26, 1991. Image courtesy of the Virginia Holocaust Museum.

needed to “beat the cockroaches for good,” the *one* thing that will bestow freedom on the Hutu majority, ridding Rwanda of its invaders and returning the country to its so-called “rightful owners.” Nkurunziza (a Tutsi survivor) recalls that the Hutu gave out machetes to their own asserting, “[i]t’s yours. Kill.”²² The tone used here aligns with that of the *Kangura* magazine above; the machete is the sole implement required to end the *inyenzi* invasion. Moreover, if we consider the depiction of Kayibanda in this propaganda piece and his role in the deposition of the Tutsi monarchy and the rise of the Hutu majority, there is a coupling here of the machete with the infamous actions of

²¹ Verwimp, “Machetes and Firearms,” p. 7.

²² Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories From Rwanda* (New York, NY: Picador, 1998), p. 23.

Kayibanda. The machete will finish the work he started. Hence, the machete is a natural fit as the symbol of this movement, yet in order for it become central in this new pro-genocidal, Hutu-centred reality, some linguistic reframing had to take place. The narrative shaped around the machete in this issue of *Kangura* goes beyond an attempt to render the machete “meaningful” and “symbolic,” rather the object is beginning to receive agency as a “machine of power.”²³ It has a place, right at the front of the cleansing to come. The machete is a co-liberator.

This deliberate change in rhetoric ascribes a role to this object, but it also serves as part of the psychological, symbolic, and envisioned “imagining” drawn around the Hutu in the solidification of their burgeoning pro-genocidal community.²⁴ The line drawn around this community, designating the “us” and “them,” is being drawn by the machete, yet a dilemma confronts the Hutu power in this regard. The machete has been historically associated with the Hutu, however, as Mamdani notes, in reality, both the Tutsi and Hutu have wielded the object.²⁵ Moreover, the machete was considered to be a Banyarwandan symbol, and as this community is defined by the speaking of the Kinyarwanda language, the object is the therefore tenure of both Hutu *and* Tutsi; an emblem of Rwanda as a whole. As such, the custodianship of this newly-garnered genocidal centrepiece is not completely in Hutu hands. The machete is figuratively tainted, and thus the “linguistic turn” in the rhetorical transformation of this object has further road to travel.²⁶ To fully solidify their community, the Hutu Power need to remove Tutsi association from the machete completely. Rather than separate the Tutsi from the machete by capitalising on the more recognised place of Tutsi with bovine, Hutu authorities seek to remove Tutsi from the category of Banyarwanda. Consider this broadcast on the “Radio Machete” (RTLTM):²⁷

Rwanda rightfully belongs to the Hutu, the true Rwandans, who descended from Banyarwanda. The Tutsi are invaders. Infesting the region to rob Hutu of their rightful home...there is no proof to convince us that Tutsi are Rwandans...[t]hey

²³ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336; Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

²⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 7.

²⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism: Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 51.

²⁶ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

²⁷ For more on the influence on RTLTM see: Amanda Grzyb, and Amy Frier, “The Role of *Radio Télévision des Mille Collines* in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide: Hate Propaganda, Media Effects, and International Intervention,” in Samuel Totten, Henry Theriault and Elisa von Joeden-Forgey eds., *Controversies in the Field of Genocide Studies* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), pp. 45-72.

came to Rwanda to attack our country...the fruit of our labour.²⁸

Here, Hutu are “the true Rwandans, who descended from Banyarwanda,”²⁹ depriving the Tutsi of Rwandan identity. As such, with Tutsi no longer Banyarwanda, they lose any claim to the machete. The symbolic centrepiece thus ceases to be tainted. At this stage, considering the evidence thus far, the unification of “true Rwandans” around the machete has been largely rhetorical. A narrative has been shaped around the machete as a “true Rwandan” co-liberator in the cleansing of the nation of *inyenzi*. In the months immediately preceding the genocide, the machete begins to appear physically in perpetrator accounts. Consider the testimony of Léopold Twagirayezu, he notes that the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* made compulsory the machete for Hutu, stating, “[t]he only strict rule was to show up with a good cutting machete.”³⁰ With its newly exclusive nationalistic narrative, the machete becomes a marker of those chosen to carry out this cleansing. Those without the machete are marked for death.

We turn now to the manifestation of this narrative in the minds of *génocidaire*, that is, how does this narrative alter social reality. In order to comprehend the alterations made to this narrative, we must first understand the social reality that is being altered. Despite Mamdani’s arguments above, the reality that is altered is the historical Hutu agriculturalist narrative.³¹ For a majority Hutu *génocidaire*, working with the machete in harvesting and working the land would be their understanding of the norm. Indeed, all ten of Hatzfeld’s interviewees were working in on family fields at the time of the genocide. In order to transition Hutu from the habitual use of the machete, the Tutsi tribe are actively placed in opposition to the machete. This occurs through dehumanising and pseudospeciating language.³² In addition to *inyenzi*, Tutsi are also

²⁸ M. Armoudian, *Kill the Messenger: The Media’s Role in the Fate of the World* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2011), p. 150.

²⁹ Armoudian, *Kill the Messenger*, p. 150.

³⁰ Léopold Twagirayezu in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 39.

³¹ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 51.

³² The impact of such hate-inducing speech in genocide is certainly not a new concept. In the testament of 62-year-old *génocidaire* Ignace Rukiramacumu, we can see the impact of the dehumanising *inyenzi* rhetoric: “We called them ‘cockroaches,’ an insect that chews up clothing and nests in it, so you have to squash them hard to get rid of them. We didn’t want any more Tutsi on the land. We imagined an existence without them. At first, we favoured getting rid of them without actually killing them. If they had agreed to leave — for Burundi or other likely destinations — they could have gone and saved their lives. And we wouldn’t have piled up the fatalities of the massacres. But they couldn’t imagine living there without their ancient traditions and their herds of cows. That pushed us towards the machetes.” Ignace Rukiramacumu in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 231.

dehumanised as “tall trees,” a traditional recipient of machete swings.³³ The killing of Tutsi was also directly referred to as “bush clearing” and the “pulling out of the roots of the bad weeds.”³⁴ The normalised use of the machete is altered from the harvest of agriculture, to the harvest of Tutsi. In perpetrator testimony, we see an active taking up of this adjustment. Élie Mizinge for example, states that:

The club is more crushing, but the machete is more natural. The Rwandan is accustomed to the machete from childhood. Grab a machete – that is what we do every morning. We cur sorghum, we prune banana trees, hack out vines, we kill chickens. Even women and little girls borrow the machete for small tasks, like chopping firewood. Whatever the job, the same gesture always comes smoothly to our hands...In the end, a man is like an animal: you give him a whack on the head or the neck, and down he goes.³⁵

The convergence on the machete allows for farming and genocide to be placed in direct parallel; thus, the genocidal operation is simply a reworking of a conventional vocation for the “true Rwandans.” As Fulgence Bunani states: “...thanks to our familiarity with the machete in the fields. It’s only natural...For us, the machete was what we knew how to use and sharpen.”³⁶ In Scott Straus’ work with perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, 77.6% of his interviewees identified as farmers specifically, and 86.1% as agriculturalists.³⁷ Straus states that “the most violent persons tended to be trained in firearms use or young farmers.”³⁸

Alphonse Hitiyaremye notes that *génocidaire* referred to the genocide as “the lucky season,”³⁹ the rhetoric here of “season” being of key import as it evidences “true Rwandans” buying into the adjustment of their traditional agricultural roles. Genocide perpetrator Adalbert Munzigura echoes this: “we over- flowed with life for this new job. We were not afraid of wearing ourselves out running around in the swamps. And if we turned lucky at work, we became happy.”⁴⁰ Léopold Twagirayezu, also describes the genocide as if it were a mere twist on his regular vocation: “[w]e returned at three o’clock to have time for pillaging. We fell asleep every evening safe from care.”⁴¹

³³ C. W. Mullins and D. L. Rothe, *Blood, Power, and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal Law in Post-Colonial Africa* (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), p. 79.

³⁴ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 194.

³⁵ Élie Mizinge in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 37.

³⁶ Fulgence Bunani in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 38.

³⁷ Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 105-107.

³⁸ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 113.

³⁹ Alphonse Hitiyaremye in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 65.

⁴⁰ Adalbert Munzigura in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 61.

⁴¹ Léopold Twagirayezu in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 62.

Innocent Rwililiza, a school-teacher, who knew a number of Jean Hatzfeld's interviewees prior to the genocide, exemplifies the unification of the "true Rwandans" in their goal to cleanse the nation via machete. He speaks of his former students:

In the end those boys were no different from the others...they went around together. You saw they shared and shared alike with field work [killing]... [d]uring the genocide I know the gang went out cutting from the first day to the last...[t]hey became relentless.⁴²

Rwililiza's language highlights the effective transition of vocation, "field work" no longer being agricultural.⁴³ This new "imagining" of the "true Rwandan" social reality renders the Tutsi harvesting operation as the norm, as just a part of this community's "state of reality" as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann put it.⁴⁴ It is the machete that is key in this new social reality, as Christopher C. Taylor notes: "when any state implements a campaign of violence, it tries to legitimize its actions according to local moral perceptions and prevailing cultural codes, exploiting ideologies that make destructive acts appear justified for the maintenance of collective well-being."⁴⁵ The readjustment of the "cultural code" around the machete allows for a seamless move from one world view to the next, of course, without too much interrogation of the violence present in the new world view, as it is reminiscent of a past vocation. This is a prime example of the machete as a "machine of power."⁴⁶

In addition to the reframing of the pre-genocide farming vocation of many perpetrators, the "true Rwandans" adjust traditional custom. The machete was depicted as an item of Rwandan culture in Jean-Baptiste Murangira's account, if we recall:

It is a Rwandan custom that little boys imitate their fathers and big brothers, by getting behind them to copy. That is how they learn the agriculture...I saw papas teaching their boys how to cut. They made them imitate machete blows.⁴⁷

Pre-genocide, the machete played a key role in agricultural education, the coming of

⁴² Innocent Rwililiza in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 46.

⁴³ Rwililiza in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 46.

⁴⁴ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7; P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, UK and New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1991 [1966]), p. 27.

⁴⁵ Christopher C. Taylor, "Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda," in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence*, eds Mark Juergensmeyer et al. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 270.

⁴⁶ Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 228.

⁴⁷ Jean-Baptiste Murangira in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 39-40.

age ceremony, and in identification as “Rwandan” generally.⁴⁸ Critically, Murangira notes a modification to this characterisation in the new “true Rwandan” reality:

[a] boy with enough strength in his arms to hold the machete firmly, if his brother or his father brought him along in the group, he imitated and grew used to killing...he saw it as a belonging to an older generation.⁴⁹

Murangira’s testimony provides a glimpse into the manner in which this new “imagining” of Rwandan life had been wholly created around the machete as a weapon against the Tutsi.⁵⁰ The machete is no longer part of agricultural education in the sense of harvesting banana or cassava, it is part of agricultural education in the sense of harvesting the “tall trees.”⁵¹ Work life, tradition, community, custom, and belonging had all come to be reframed around the symbolism of this weapon, as Ian Linden states, we have “propaganda machine that preaches exclusive Hutu identity...and indeed defines being Hutu ultimately as being the killer of Tutsi.”⁵²

In the above examples, the machete is actively reframed by pro-genocidal authorities in order to link the weapon to the concept of Hutu nationalism. This is perhaps encapsulated best in the words of Bernardin Muzungu: “the machete and other instruments of death made the law in Rwanda.”⁵³ We have seen the machete utilised here as a rallying icon, a demarcation tool of exclusive community boundaries, and a point of transferral to a new violent reality. As such, the two fetishistic indicators of linguistic changes and an impact on the social reality are evident.⁵⁴ Furthermore, there is little doubt that the conflation of the machete with a “true Rwandan” national identity encouraged perpetrators to murder their neighbours with zeal. As Pio Mutungirehe states, “at the start of a genocide, there is a cause, a reason, and people who find it worthwhile. The cause does not drift around by accident, it’s even fine-tuned by the intimidators: the desire to win the game for good.”⁵⁵ One of the most striking quotations from Hatzfeld’s interviews is from *génocidaire* Munzigura, who states “it [life]

⁴⁸ Murangira in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 39-40.

⁴⁹ Murangira in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 50.

⁵⁰ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

⁵¹ Mullins and Rothe, *Blood, Power, and Bedlam*, p. 79.

⁵² Ian Linden in Timothy Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 9.

⁵³ Bernard Muzungu in Timothy Longman, *Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 57.

⁵⁴ Jones and Bovin, “The Malice of Inanimate Objects,” p. 336.

⁵⁵ Pio Mutungirehe in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 229.

becomes extraordinary when it is caught on the tips of machete.”⁵⁶ He goes on to say, “the killings...you want more, you strike more, you shed more blood, you take more.”⁵⁷ Here we have a perpetrator who speaks of life balancing on the machete and the drive to kill; there is some sense here of the machete and its nationalistic aura driving Muzingura to murder. The place of the machete as a “machine of power” here is evident.⁵⁸ However, there is another factor yet to be considered, and that is the faith of the perpetrator. Of course, this project is seeking to ascertain how religion, spirituality, faith, and the sacred impacts genocide from an entirely new angle, that of fetishism. Yet, we cannot negate a more straight-forward examination of this religion. In fact, this will provide another instance where the manipulative “machine of power” in the machete-fetish comes to the fore.⁵⁹ As David Patterson argues, “those who commit genocide often endow their actions with some sort of religious meaning, frequently putting forth the assertion that, in destroying entire groups of people, they are doing God’s work.”⁶⁰

2. The Machete as Conflated with the Will of the Rwandan God

A majority Christian country, 90% of the population of Rwanda identified as Christian on the 1991 census.⁶¹ Many religious Rwandans are of the belief that their country is the most favoured by the Judeo-Christian God, and while He may wander elsewhere during the day, His resting place at night is always their country.⁶² It is perhaps unsurprising that Christian motifs appear in both survivor and perpetrator testimony. Genocide survivor Emmanuel Murangira writes of 11 April, when around 300 Hutu attackers with machete descended on a school compound where he was with other Tutsi were finding sanctuary.⁶³ He states they attacked yelling “the God of Tutsi is no longer

⁵⁶ Munzigura in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 228.

⁵⁷ Munzigura in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 228.

⁵⁸ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

⁵⁹ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

⁶⁰ David Patterson, “Getting Rid of the G-d of Abraham: A Prerequisite for Genocide,” in *Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam* ed. Steven D. Leonard Jacobs (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), p. 210.

⁶¹ Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 4.

⁶² J. Martinon, *After “Rwanda”: In Search of a New Ethics* (New York, NY: Rodopi, 2013), p. 56.

⁶³ Emmanuel Murangira in Samuel Totten and Rafiki Ubaldo eds., *We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* (New Brunswick, NY, New Jersey, NY, and London, UK: Rutgers University Press, 2011), p. 83.

around...there is only the God of the Hutu remaining.”⁶⁴ Indeed, prior to, and during the genocide, religious discourse was actively employed as part of propagandistic genocidal doctrine. Perhaps the most well-known example of this is from the December 1990 issue of *Kangura*, where Ngeze printed the Hutu Ten Commandments:⁶⁵

1. Every Muhutu [Hutu male] must know that the Umututsikazi [Tutsi woman], wherever she may be, is working for the Tutsi ethnic cause. In consequence, any Muhutu is a traitor who:
 - Who marries a Umututsikazi;
 - Who takes a Umututsikazi mistress;
 - or who takes her for a secretary or protégée.
2. Every Bahutukazi [Hutu female] must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more conscientious as women, as wives and as mothers. Aren't they lovely, excellent secretaries, and more honest!
3. Bahutukazi, be vigilant and make sure that your husbands, brothers and sons see reason.
4. All Hutu must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is ethnic superiority. We have learned this by experience from experience. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:
 - Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi;
 - Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise;
 - Borrows money from or loans money to a Tusti;
 - Grants favours to Tutsis.
5. Strategic positions such as politics, administration, economics, the military and security must be restricted to the Hutu.
6. A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, scholars, teachers).
7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively Hutu. The war of October 1990 has taught us that. No soldier may marry a Umututsikazi.
8. Hutu must stop taking pity on Tutsi.
9. Hutu wherever they be must stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly search for friends and allies to the Hutu cause, beginning with their Bantu brothers. Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda. Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy: the Tutsi.
10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu Ideology must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word wherever

⁶⁴ Murangira in Totten and Ubaldo eds., *We Cannot Forget*, p. 83.

⁶⁵ A. Thompson, ed., *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide* (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 301.

he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and teaching this ideology is a traitor.⁶⁶

These commandments are often noted as a prime example of overt “anti-Tutsi racism,” and although outside the purview of this project, Christopher Taylor takes a unique approach discussing the focus on gender in the commandments.⁶⁷ What is of particular interest for this project is the calculated use of religious discourse in framing a new “imagining.” Ngeze capitalises on this deep-rooted religiosity of his readers in the publication of these commandments, drawing upon an already understood ethical framework and reframing it to include a rhetoric of “Hutuness.” As Spyridon Loumakis states, “the Hutu Ten Commandments are the Hutu version of the ethical obligations of Hutu Rwandans within their own worldview.”⁶⁸ Reformulating a recognised religious doctrine begins to reframe reality, slowly, altering the understood reality with the bounds of an understood norm. Moreover, utilising the Ten Commandments, intimates a divine ordination to this new “imagining,”⁶⁹ in this case, approval from the Judeo-Christian God to create and uphold a Tutsi-free Rwanda.⁷⁰

Leon Mugesera’s November 1992 rally speech also draws upon biblical rhetoric in order to reframe social norms while maintaining divine validation:⁷¹

It says in the Gospel that if someone strikes you on one cheek, you should turn the other cheek. I tell you that the Gospel has changed in our movement: if

⁶⁶ J. A. Berry, and C. Pott Berry eds., *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1999), pp. 113-115.

⁶⁷ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide* (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 1995), p. 167; Christopher C. Taylor, “Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994,” in Roy Richard Grinker, Stephen C. Lubkemann and Christopher B. Steiner eds., *Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History and Representation* (Oxford, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), p. 567.

⁶⁸ Spyridon Loumakis, “Genocide and Religion in Rwandan in the 1990s” in Andre Gagns Spyridon Loumakis and Calogero A. Miceli eds., *The Global Impact of Religious Violence* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2016), p. 63.

⁶⁹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

⁷⁰ Spyridon Loumakis notes that these Hutu commandments appeared in regional Rwanda in 1959 in a simplified form, akin to the traditional ten commandments. Loumakis, “Genocide and Religion in Rwandan in the 1990s,” p. 63.

⁷¹ Leon Mugesera was a “leading ideologue of genocidal tendency in Hutu power.” Professionally, he was lecturer at the National University of Rwanda as well as a political advisor to the MRND. Additionally, he served as vice-president in the Gisenyi prefecture. As Rwanda was a multi-party government when he gave his speech, a warrant was issued by the Rwandan Minister of Justice for the act of inciting hatred. Mugesera fled to Canada in 1993 where he lectured at the Laval University, Quebec. In May 2006, the Rwandan government issued a list of persons suspected of involvement in the 1994 genocide, this document accused Mugesera of genocide and he was extradited to Rwanda in 2012. Considered as one of the senior figures in the planning of the genocide, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2016. Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 195.

someone strikes you on one cheek, you hit them twice on one cheek and they collapse on the ground and will never be able to recover!⁷²

Although not in the translation presented at Mugesera's trial in Canada, both Philip Gourevitch and Mamdani record Mugesera as also stating in this oration, "we the people are obliged to take responsibilities ourselves to wipe out this scum."⁷³ Gourevitch argues that Mugesera's 1992 speech gave necessary momentum to the anti-Tutsi hysteria that led to the genocide, nothing that Mugesera was one of the first figures to attempt to rally the masses.⁷⁴ While Gourevitch is most probably correct, we cannot overlook the role of religious rhetoric in creating this communal sentiment of fear and hatred. The reworking of the "turn the other cheek" paradigm here removes the potential problem of a traditional ethical Christian framework holding back perpetrators. Rather, the gospel has been adjusted to overtly display violence against the Tutsi enemy.⁷⁵ Indeed, Pancrace Hakizamungili, *génocidaire*, states, "religion adapted to change with these beliefs."⁷⁶ If we consider RTLM broadcasts during the genocide, the consistent message of God's approval of the genocide is clear. Consider this broadcast on April 12, 1994:

The Rwandan God is on our side, He is not far away and I believe He will continue to help us in our misfortune, our serious misfortune which has no parallel in this world... The God of the Rwandans will save us from this.⁷⁷

The RTLM is clearly professing "God's approval and aid for Hutu misfortunes," but more than this, there is a reframing of the notion of "God."⁷⁸ God here is "the Rwandan God," an exclusive deity specific to Rwandans. If we recall the analysis above, Rwandan equals Hutu only. As such, in this particular RTLM broadcast, God has chosen a side. Interestingly, we see the reverberations of this sentiment in perpetrator testimony. For example, Léopard Twagirayezu states in his testimony that "we no longer considered Tutsi as humans or even as creatures of God."⁷⁹ Taking this further,

⁷² Elihu Lauterpacht, C. J. Greenwood, A. G. Oppenheimer and Karen Lee eds., *International Law Reports*, vol. 132 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 328.

⁷³ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, p. 96; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 195.

⁷⁴ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, p. 96.

⁷⁵ Lauterpacht, Greenwood, Oppenheimer and Lee eds., *International Law Reports*, p. 328.

⁷⁶ Pancrace Hakizamungili in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 143.

⁷⁷ Prosecutor V. Nahimana, Barayagwiva and Ngeze, *Trial Chamber I – Prosecution Exhibit P1-3/4B*, ICTR-99-52-T, 2 July 2002 in Loumakis, "Genocide and Religion in Rwandan in the 1990s," p. 66.

⁷⁸ Loumakis, "Genocide and Religion in Rwandan in the 1990s," p. 67.

⁷⁹ Twagirayezu in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 144.

Loumakis highlights a June 13 RTLM broadcast, in which the death of Habyarimana is likened to that of Christ:

...as God has offered his son Jesus who died on the cross for the salvation of all sinners, all humans. The Major-General [i.e. Juvénal Habyarimana] died on the 6th of April at 20:30 in the evening, and his blood saved all Rwandans who were condemned to death and to be killed by the *Inkotanyi* [rebel RPF fighters]. So the MRND accepted to sacrifice this man who was a prominent militant of the MRND, in order that his blood may save a large number of Rwandans.⁸⁰

There is much to unpack here. Firstly, although unsurprising, it is important to note that “Rwandans” here is exclusively Hutu. In this sense, we have an image of the Hutu as needing reprieve from the Tutsi (particularly the RPF) enemy, Habyarimana sacrificing himself for his people. The likening of Habyarimana to Christ achieves two things: (1) it further reinforces the adaptation of the Christian faith to fit within a Hutu ethical framework and (2) it adds to the divine backing of the genocide that has been building in previous examples. In addition to the Habyarimana Christ image, Philip Gourevitch documents various pro-genocidal Marian apparitions.⁸¹ These apparitions include reports of the Virgin Mary “crying for the people with machete” and assuring Hutu that Habyarimana was with her in heaven; both of these being taken as her support for the genocide.⁸² These are prime examples of Temoney’s third nexus as discussed in the previous chapter, that is, the use of religious language in co-opting the authority of religion onto genocidal actions, giving “divine approval” to *génocidaire*.⁸³ This divine approval aids in assuaging feelings of guilt or faith-based ethical quandries, as God as approved the problematic actions.

As Loumakis fittingly argues, the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda was inherently religiously violent, not because of the complicity of the church, but because politicians, journalists, church leaders, killers, and perpetrators manufactured narratives based on Christian motifs.⁸⁴ However, there is more to the use of Christian motifs than the manufacturing of recourses. The reframing of the dominant Christian narrative into a more violent sacred discourse focussed on Hutuness is a key example

⁸⁰ Loumakis, “Genocide and Religion in Rwandan in the 1990s,” p. 68.

⁸¹ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, p. 137.

⁸² Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, p. 137.

⁸³ Kate Temoney, “Those who have sin...over to this side: Genocide and religion” in Cathie Carmichael and Richard C. Maguire eds. *The Routledge History of Genocide* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 234.

⁸⁴ Loumakis, “Genocide and Religion in Rwandan in the 1990s,” p. 77.

of the “ongoing human production” in the construction of social reality.⁸⁵ This new pro-genocidal reality reframes a known an ethical framework in order that perpetrators can easily move from one world view to the next. Of course, perpetrators need not morally confront the violence present in the new world view, as God is supporting this murderous reality. In fact, drawing on the work of Hugh McCallum, Temoney makes an important observation: that “there are many reports of screaming victims being physically dragged to churches before being killed at the entrances, as if to assign sacral, even sacrificial, meaning to the act of killing in front of the church.”⁸⁶ This a key example of perpetrators ascribing to this new reality, believing they are enacting “God’s work” in their murderous actions. Such a drastic change in the manifestation of reality is a key indicator of fetishism.⁸⁷ Even though the machete is not overtly evident in the reframing of the dominant Christian narrative, it is the alteration of reality this is the key point here. Furthermore, the injection of Christian rhetoric into the genocidal ideology provides another candidate for the “abstract ideas become associated with a single object,” so that the machete is acting as a “machine of power”, one that enacts, the voice of the Rwandan God.⁸⁸

In evidencing the conflation of the Rwandan God’s voice with the machete, Hatzfeld dedicates a chapter of *Machete Season* to the perpetrator comments on religion during the killings. The testimonies within this chapter are greatly varied, and are no doubt influenced by the *Ingando* re-education programs most of the men had been through prior to the interviews. Munzigura speaks of his faith as unchanged during the genocide: “we changed from our Sunday best into workaday clothes, we grabbed clubs and machetes, we went straight off to killing...I was steadfast in my love of God.”⁸⁹ Contrastingly, Hitiyaremye is more open about a conflict in faith: “I had been sincerely baptised Catholic, but I felt it preferable not to pray traditionally during the killings. Still, to get to sleep some nights, I could not help bowing down in secret to ease some gloomy fears with a timid ‘sorry.’”⁹⁰ Twagirayezu is perhaps the frankest interviewee,

⁸⁵ Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 59-60.

⁸⁶ Hugh McCullum, *The Angels Have Left Us: The Rwanda Tragedy and the Churches* (Geneva, Switzerland: WCC Publications, 2004), p. 76; Kate Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” *Genocide Studies & Prevention*, 10:3 (2016), p. 10.

⁸⁷ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 218.

⁸⁸ Ellen, “Fetishism,” pp. 218, 228.

⁸⁹ Munzigura in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 140, 252.

⁹⁰ Hitiyaremye in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 141.

he states: “we didn’t even care about the presence of God. Those who say otherwise are half-witted liars.”⁹¹ There is a definitive sense of God failing to admonish *génocidaire*, this being felt through God’s silence.⁹² As Mizinge states: “Did He watch what was happening in the marshes? Why did He not stab our murderous eyes with His wrath?”⁹³ Loumakis, looking at these particular testimonies, argues that God was never too far from the action, and perpetrator statements on a lack of divine intervention or rebuke should be interpreted by us as perpetrators “enjoying God’s approval.”⁹⁴ This is supported by perpetrator Ignace Rukiramacumu who states, “We thought since this job was meeting no opposition, it was because it really had to be done.”⁹⁵ God did not protest, therefore just as the RTLM had spouted, it was perceived by some Hutu that “the Rwandan God is on our side.”⁹⁶

In the testimonies of some of Hatzfeld’s interviewees, several perpetrators speak openly about being influenced by an external force. While this does not manifest to the same extent for all perpetrators, all appear to experience some form of the Rwandan God through their interaction with the machete. This is key testimony attesting to the machete as a fetishised “machine of power”⁹⁷ Consider, for example, the words of Mutungirehe:

[t]he hunt was savage for my part, I offer you an explanation, it is as if I had let another individual take on my own living appearance, and the habits of my heart...the most serious changes in my body were my invisible parts, such as the soul or the feelings that go with it...But perhaps someone outside this situation, like you, cannot have an inkling of that strangeness of mind.⁹⁸

In this initial quotation, this divine will is not expressly linked to the machete by Mutungirehe. Yet, when we piece together his testimony, Mutungirehe’s later testimony speaks of “omen[s] from heaven” that he believes were connected to what he did with machete while out in the marshes.⁹⁹ As such, when piecing his testimony together we can see the “individual tak[ing] on [his] own appearance” is linked to

⁹¹ Twagirayezu in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 147.

⁹² Mizinge in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 149; Joseph Désiré Bitero in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 50, 144.

⁹³ Mizinge in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 145.

⁹⁴ Loumakis, “Genocide and Religion in Rwanda in the 1990s,” p. 72.

⁹⁵ Rukiramacumu in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 231, 251.

⁹⁶ Prosecutor V. Nahimana, Barayagwiva and Ngeze, *Trial Chamber I – Prosecution Exhibit P1-3/4B*, ICTR-99-52-T, 2 July 2002, in Loumakis, “Genocide and Religion in Rwanda in the 1990s,” p. 66.

⁹⁷ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

⁹⁸ Mutungirehe in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 47-48.

⁹⁹ Mutungirehe in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 144.

heavenly omens and actions with the machete. Hatzfeld does not push Mutungirehe on this idea of a divine will taking over the machete and driving his actions, but in a reflective section in *Machete Season*, Mutungirehe seems to directly touch on the divine calling he experienced:

I was there, at home, when the temptation came calling. I'm not saying I was forced by Satan and the like. Though...I found the cause worthwhile, and I ran down to the marshes...Simple people cannot resist a temptation like that, not without biblical rescue, not on the hills anyway. Why? Because of the beautiful words of complete success. They win you over. Afterward the temptation cannot go to prison, so they imprison the people...When someone see what is in his own best interest come right up to him, and his colleagues as well, he loses no more time in waiting and hesitation, he no longer considers feelings, no longer hears please for mercy. He sees Evil in the form of Good and is content with it [sic]...That is what I did. I'm not saying I am not at fault. But I am punished both for my mistake and for my unlucky fate.¹⁰⁰

Mutungirehe appears to contradict himself in this quotation. In the second sentence, he expressly states that he was not forced by Satan. Yet he explains that he saw “Evil in the form of Good,” (his capitalisation). In addition to this, Mutungirehe draws attention to the notion of his culpability. He suggests that he was driven by a divine force, which considering this project’s methodology is akin to being influenced by fetishised “machine of power.”¹⁰¹ It is difficult to say whether he believes it was Satan or God, however as he talks of “omen[s] from heaven” connected to what he did with machete while out in the marshes, it is more likely that he felt influenced by the notion of the Rwandan God.¹⁰²

While Mutungirehe appears to speak of being manipulated by a spiritual force, his connection of this with the machete is not particularly strong. In other interviews within *Machete Season* there is a more overt depiction of the machete as a fetishistic “machine of power.”¹⁰³ For example, take the testimony of Joseph Désiré Bitero, president of the *Interahamwe*.¹⁰⁴ Bitero displays a dangerous willingness to be absolved, rather blaming the machete as a ruler of his actions due to God’s intervention through the object. He states: “It became a madness that went on all by itself...the one who rushed off with machete in hand...our arms ruled our heads; in any case our heads

¹⁰⁰ Mutungirehe in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 229.

¹⁰¹ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

¹⁰² Mutungirehe in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 144.

¹⁰³ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228, 231; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹⁰⁴ Bitero in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 246; Hatzfeld, *Blood Papa*.

no longer had a say...I did not do this, it was God.”¹⁰⁵ Bitero suggests that for him it was machete over mind, and that the object was mechanised by the Rwandan God, rather than himself. With Bitero as the president of the *Interahamwe*, it is perhaps not surprising that he displays the most overt example of machete as saturated with the Rwandan God’s will.

For *génocidaire* lacking the high-ranking of Bitero, what is present is more of an unconscious coupling of the Rwandan God with the machete, this being evident through the descriptive language used. For example, Mizinge says of “God” in the marshes, “hear His silence.”¹⁰⁶ Similarly, in his description of the machete, Mizinge anthropomorphises it through a notion of silence: “[t]he blade, when you use it to cut branch, animal, or man, it has nothing to say.”¹⁰⁷ In the conflation of a silent God with the silent machete Mizinge equates the machete with God’s actions. This idea is cemented in Mizinge’s statement: “the killings were out of our hands, and so is forgiveness.”¹⁰⁸ In exculpating himself from the killing and declaring no agency in the act of forgiveness, Mizinge intimates that both were/are the domain of God. As such, just as his unconscious coupling of the Rwandan God with the machete suggests, there is a sense of giving into the perceived will of God in the machete. There is one final piece of testimony that is useful in this current discussion of fetishism.

In examining the relationship between these perpetrators and the machete, it is important to point out the difference in experience between Mutungirehe, Mizinge, and Bitero. Mutungirehe is the youngest of the perpetrators interviewed being only 20 years old at the time of the 1994 genocide.¹⁰⁹ His testimony appears to be the most overwhelmed by the perceived notion of divine will, as he states “my vision and my thinking had grown clouded.”¹¹⁰ Mizinge is the eldest of these perpetrators (50 years old in 1994), and as a soldier and policeman, he likely had the most experience with weapons prior to the genocide.¹¹¹ In his testimony, he speaks the most directly about the influence of weapons on his actions, which is unsurprising given his prior professional experience. Bitero, 31 at the time of the genocide and president of the

¹⁰⁵ Bitero in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 50, 144.

¹⁰⁶ Mizinge in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 43.

¹⁰⁷ Mizinge in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁸ Mizinge in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 203.

¹⁰⁹ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 249.

¹¹⁰ Mutungirehe in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 24.

¹¹¹ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 247-248.

Interahamwe, is the most highly ranked of the interviewees.¹¹² Having joined the MRND at a young age, Bitero is perhaps the most fervent in his anti-Tutsi stance. Moreover, Bitero was sentenced to death for his role in the genocide, this sentence being converted into life in prison. Due to his standing life sentence, unlike Mizinge and Mutungirehe, Bitero has not been through re-education at an *Ingando* camp. As such, he has nothing to gain from diluting how he experienced the genocide, nor any outside influence affecting his understanding of the Hutu-Tutsi relationship. Indeed, his understanding of God's desire for the Tutsi to be exterminated is fundamentally confronting. However, it would be fair to suggest that Bitero is seeking absolution through the weight he places on the machete and the Rwandan God in his accounts. Scrutinising these accounts highlights the conflation of the machete with the Rwandan god, the object acting as a "machine of power."¹¹³

Discussion

In scrutinising these accounts, there is an important point to make. It appears that while all perpetrators studied here speak of the machete and of their faith during the genocide, not all conflate the machete with will of the Rwandan God. This raises an interesting question: at what point does that conflation occur? There are three avenues of potential explanation to be discussed here: (1) that as the genocide was so swift, lasting only 100 days, that not all *génocidaire* had time to form such a bond to the machete, (2) a God-based fetish is dependent upon the spirituality of the perpetrator pre-genocide, and (3) the influence of the machete-fetish is not constant. With regards to the former of these three options, there is no exact way of knowing if a longer genocide (perish the thought) would have resulted in a greater incidence of fetishising machete-God conflation. If we return to Hatzfeld's journalistic interviews, there is no convincing evidence that suggests a lesser incidence of machete-God fetishisation would have occurred, but there is also no testimony that suggests the opposite.

As for the second option here, it is fair to suggest that the spirituality of the perpetrator pre-genocide would influence their susceptibility to the machete-God fetish. Yet it is not the *génocidaire* who openly espouse their faith that are affected by the fetish. The most overly Christian are Twagirayezu and Hitiyaremye who discuss their

¹¹² Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, p. 246.

¹¹³ Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 228.

baptism and faith openly, as well as Bunani who acted as a lay priest pre-genocide. These three self-identifying Christian perpetrators speak of shutting off their faith, making statements such as “in truth, we thought that from then on we could managed for ourselves without God,” or “there was nothing to be asking of God during that filthy business,” and “I sensed that it was not appropriate to involve Him in that.”¹¹⁴ On the other hand, of the perpetrators who appear affected by the machete-God “machine of power,” Bitero, Mizinge, and Mutungirehe, none mention their personal sense of faith outside of the genocidal context.¹¹⁵ Perhaps it is the opposite of what one might suppose, that those with a fervent faith are the least likely to fetishise God in a genocidal context, and those with some sense of faith are likely to find comfort in a mitigating fetish.

As to the third option, it is the most recent work of Erin Jessee that comes to mind.¹¹⁶ In her 2019 chapter, Jessee notes “the complexity of convicted *génocidaires*’ experiences, most notably in terms of the shifting motivations that often characterized individual perpetrators’ decisions to engage in violence from one day to the next.”¹¹⁷ Moreover, Jessee’s interviewees speak of different kinds of violence they committed, dependent on the impetus behind it, some acts were more political if they involved the RPF directly.¹¹⁸ This raises an important idea in regards to the fetish discussed here. Perhaps Bitero, Mizinge, and Mutungirehe experienced the will of God via the machete most consistently, and thus discuss it most openly and frequently with Hatzfeld. It may also have had relevance in the particular type of killing they were negating in day-to-day. For the other perpetrators interviewed by Hatzfeld, the machete-God fetish may have been a more fluctuating occurrence or perhaps the machete as linked with Hutu nationalism was a more relevant conflation for the impetus they placed behind their kills. This notion of fluctuation raises an important point with regards to responsibility. Prior to this present discussion of wavering influences, there was perhaps a hanging implication that the machete-fetish was “brainwashing,” and thus absolving the perpetrator of responsibility. This may be due to the influence of the machete in terms

¹¹⁴ Twagirayezu, Hitiyaremye, and Bunani in Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*, pp. 140-147.

¹¹⁵ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

¹¹⁶ Erin Jessee, “Beyond Perpetrators” in Alette Smeulers, Maartje Weerdesteijn and Barbora Holá eds. *Perpetrators of International Crimes: Theories, Methods, and Evidence* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 153-172.

¹¹⁷ Jessee, “Beyond Perpetrators,” p 159.

¹¹⁸ Jessee, “Beyond Perpetrators,” p. 171.

of alterations made to social reality and cognitive focus. To be plain, the findings here do not remove the accountability from the perpetrator.

There is another, albeit disquieting, avenue of explanation worth investigating with reference to why the fetish is present in some testimonies and not others, and that relates to the enthusiasm of the killers. Let us consider the evidence as to just how fervently Bitero, Mizinge, and Mutungirehe swung their machete. Of course, Bitero's enthusiasm, with his position high in the *Interahamwe* and his cell on death row, is quite clear. However, this enthusiasm does not necessarily translate into a high personal death-toll; indeed in Hatzfeld's 2009 interview with Bitero, he notes that he "did not wield the machete more than others did."¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, he "accepted his responsibility," and as such it is safe to assume he is responsible for numerous deaths considering his visible power in the genocidal hierarchy.¹²⁰ Mizinge, former policeman and soldier, was originally released to await his trial at home, although eventually served time for his role in the Nymata Church massacre.¹²¹ It is difficult to ascertain how fervent Mizinge was in 1994, although in his 2009 interview with Hatzfeld, he states, "it was the odour we resented, not the death...cutting people with machetes...without asking ourselves what it means to cut so many people like that."¹²² In these quotations, it appears as though he killed mercilessly, by his own admission. Mutungirehe is perhaps the most difficult of the three. The youngest of all the *génocidaire* interviewed by Hatzfeld, at 20 years old, Mutungirehe also arguably shows the most candour. In his testimony above, Mutungirehe appears to be the most willing to explain his ferocious state during the genocide and Hatzfeld describes him as "one of the most enterprising killers" during the genocide: "he made free play with his machete every day for a good five weeks."¹²³ All three of the *génocidaire* who fetishise via a conflation of the machete with God appear to admit their own enthusiasm in utilising the weapon against Tutsi neighbours. However, is this zeal unique to these fetishisers? Certainly not. In that sense, we have correlation, but not causation.

Perhaps separating out those who clearly fetishise via a conflation of the machete with God is a misjudgement. If we return to the Ellenian-Böhmean fetishistic

¹¹⁹ Bitero in Hatzfeld, *The Strategy of Antelopes*, p. 102.

¹²⁰ Bitero in Hatzfeld, *The Strategy of Antelopes*, p. 102.

¹²¹ Tirrell, "Epistemic Aspects of Evil," p. 43.

¹²² Mizinge in Hatzfeld, *The Strategy of Antelopes*, p. 197.

¹²³ Hatzfeld, *The Strategy of Antelopes*, p. 198.

methodology of this project — an object, concept, or thing acting as a machine of power, either produced organically or purposefully as a political plaything — there is perhaps greater occurrence of religion at play here.¹²⁴ As aforementioned, Böhme’s work on fetishism and Stalinism is reminiscent of Bellah’s final observations in regards to the place of civil religion in the contemporary world, “it [civil religion] used today as a cloak for petty interests and ugly passions.”¹²⁵ As such, if we consider that the machete-fetish as part of a greater “practice of power,” this political plaything being pro-genocidal civil religion, perhaps what is manifest here is actually an Ellenian fetish utilised as part of civil religion in order to achieve murderous ends.¹²⁶ To revisit this concept of civil religion, Bellah argues for an emerging faith within the American nation, one that is a “genuinely new” fusion of nationalistic, militaristic, and Christian elements; it has its own “prophets, and its own martyrs [... it’s] own sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols.”¹²⁷ As such, Bellah’s work on civil religion as well as Böhme’s work on fetishism, presents faith/fetishism as a tool to be nefariously wielded, harnessing an ability to enlist laypeople in order achieve grand political goals, many of which are often violent. If this is the case, we have a selection of *génocidaire* displaying a fetishisation of the machete as conflated with the Christian elements of this civil religion, and the other perpetrators conflated it with the nationalistic elements. In a sense, the fetish as a part of a Hutu civil religion has potentially the most impact, as it could wield wider appeal and garner the support of more latent *génocidaire*.

It is prudent to revisit *Kangura* number 29 (Fig. 5), the issue depicting Gregoire Kayibanda beneath the heading “Tutsi Race of God” and beside a machete with the caption, “which weapons are we going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?” [sic].” In addition, beneath Kayibanda is the statement “how about relaunching the 1959 revolution to conquer the Tutsi cockroaches one and for all.” This particular issue of *Kangura* is raised by Kate Temoney, Allan Thompson, and Scott Straus in their work on the genocide, but it is Temoney that summarises the power of this cover most succinctly:¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹²⁵ Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” *Daedalus* 96:1 (1967), pp. 18-19.

¹²⁶ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” pp. 18-19; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹²⁷ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” p. 18.

¹²⁸ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide;” Thompson, ed., *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide*; Straus, *The Order of Genocide*.

In one fell swoop, the cover appeals to a historical grievance, Christian symbols, and dehumanizing vocabulary, all synergistically harnessed for the purpose of imparting a singular message: the rightful obliteration of the dangerous Tutsi other.¹²⁹

To put this against Bellah's necessary elements of civil religion: there is a fusion of nationalistic (Hutu) elements with a Christian framework — *Kangura* itself is the prophet, Kayibanda is rendered a martyr, the 1959 revolution is the sacred event, Rwanda is the sacred place, the murder of Tutsi is the ritual and, although Temoney does not draw attention to it specifically, the machete is the symbol. As Temoney would put it, “in one fell swoop” all the elements of civil religion are present, the machete an inherent part of this nationalistic narrative.¹³⁰ In addition to these elements of the burgeoning Hutu civil religion, we have seen considerable effort placed by Hutu powers into reworking the Christian narrative to suit a Hutu framework, particularly through *Kangura* and the RTLM. To recall some prime examples, Habyarimana appears as a Hutu saviour Christ-like figure, the Ten Commandments reworked as the Hutu Ten Commandments, and biblical rhetoric being present in pro-genocidal propaganda. In Bellah's American civil religion, the nationalistic narrative is used to justify sending soldiers to enact violence, of course this being sometimes a sentence to death.¹³¹ In the case of the Hutu civil religion, the Hutu are at little risk of losing their lives, but the justification of violence is still central.

The question is, does the machete play a greater role in this Hutu civil religion than just being its central symbol? Indeed, the machete-fetish plays multiple roles, and this is where the Ellenian-Böhmean methodology certainly provides some answers. As seen above, the machete is both a fetishised “machine of power” and a “practice of power,” meaning that it is central in signifying the supremacy of the Hutu tribe, harking back to other historical events of such violence, and the reframing of reality via an adjustment of traditional agricultural work thus normalising the “sacred ritual” at the heart of this civil religion.¹³² More critically, the machete impacts on perpetrator choice and actions via its association with either (1) the will of the Rwandan God or (2) Hutu nationalistic zeal. This fetishised weapon provides both mitigation and impetus for

¹²⁹ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide,” p. 7.

¹³⁰ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide,” p. 7.

¹³¹ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” p. 11.

¹³² Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

enacting the narrative of this civil religion. Whether they be encouraged by the will of God or a Hutu nationalistic zeal present in the machete, the fetish is key in recruiting and propelling perpetrators to enact the ritualistic violence preached by the prophets. The machete plays a critical role in bringing the adherents to this Hutu civil religion and encouraging them to practice and bring about its aims. As such, if we consider that the machete-fetish as part of a greater religious narrative, what we see is the fetish utilised as a “political plaything” in order to draw people into a Hutu civil religion, this nationalistic faith desiring to achieve murderous ends.¹³³

By looking beyond the machete-fetish itself, and considering the place of this weapon in the genocide as a whole, a critical observation has been made. This is the role of the fetishised machete in a greater religious framework of Hutu civil religion. As such, what must be stated clearly for the reader is thus: the greatest influence of religion in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda on the minds and actions of the perpetrators studied here, as well as in the creation of a broader, societal genocidal zeal is through manufactured religious frameworks. Unlike other cases of genocide where it is religious beliefs that drive actions, here there is a greater influence via the constructs religiousness provides. As Juergensmeyer states, religion “does not ordinarily lead to violence...that happens only with the coalescence of a peculiar set of circumstances – political, social, and ideological.”¹³⁴ It is the machete that aids in the coalescence of the political, social, and ideological, perhaps most clearly evidenced in issue 29 of *Kangura*. The machete unites the disparate parts of the ideology together into a pro-genocidal narrative that perpetrators could then enact. Of course, religious rhetoric was key in this process, but it is not the tenets of a particular tradition that aided in driving Hutu perpetrators to leave behind one million bodies. Rather it was the fusion narrative that came to the fore. The machete appears in the sources analysed here as a “machine of power”, but it is the weapons place in the macro-level religious framework of Hutu civil religion that renders it a “practice of power.”¹³⁵ It is this religious framework that played a central role in both the actions and minds of *génocidaire* as they took life in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

¹³³ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” pp. 18-19; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹³⁴ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 3rd edition (Los Angeles, CA and London, UK: University of California Press, 2003), p. 10.

¹³⁵ Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” pp. 18-19; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

There is one final point of discussion, which is to raise a question that is not answered in the work of the above scholars. This is a quandary that relates to intent. Did Hutu authorities knowingly employ religious structures to drive this genocide? Was the dual machete-fetish (and the nationalistic Hutu civil religion that utilised it) created purposefully or organically? Considering the fixation of Hutu propaganda on Christian and biblical imagery and rhetoric, as well as the deliberate convergence on the machete as in the construction of a new reality, there appears to be a deliberate manifestation of the fetish and civil religion in order to propel the genocide. Indeed, Temoney notes: “the Hutu Power elite vilified Tutsi by likening them to animals and insects, making them unrecognizably human and therefore not one of “us.” Hutu propagandists then aligned this vilification with potent and familiar religious rhetoric.”¹³⁶ When looking at *Kangura*, there does seem to be a targeted propaganda campaign focused around the combination of Christianity, Hutu, nationalism, and the machete. Moreover, the machete appears to be deliberately emphasised based on historical context within the Hutu people. Does this deliberate propagandistic tactic evidence the purposeful formulation of a fetish or civil religion by Hutu authorities? No. There is little evidence to suggest that any organising, pro-genocidal group sat down in the years leading up to 1994 in order to design how they would champion the machete and what elements would comprise their Hutu civil religion. On the other side of the equation, if we recall the work of William Pietz, “[t]he fetish is always a meaningful fixation of a singular event: it is above all a ‘historical’ object, the enduring form and force of a singular event.”¹³⁷ Pietz’s term “meaningful” appears to lean towards the side of “organic,” as Pietz’ thesis notes that a fetish is tied to a singular event and thus grows from it. There is merit in the notion of the fetish brewing as a direct result of a genocidal ideology fostered by an unstable cultural milieu event. In the above accounts, this group of perpetrators do not seem to foster the machete-fetish actively, rather it appears as part of their need for drive/justification/absolution/sanction/purpose during the killings. In reality, perhaps, considering the outcome, this is not particularly worthy of exploration. Whether or not it was created purposefully by Hutu authorities, or organically as part of an unstable violent milieu, it drove perpetrators together who murdered close to one

¹³⁶ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide,” p. 7.

¹³⁷ William Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish I,” *Anthropology and Aesthetics* 9:1 (Spring, 1985), p. 12.

million people.¹³⁸ Regardless of the origin, it is a genocidal tactic we must be wary of in future cases.

Situating these Findings in the Literature

It is critical to situate these findings amongst the scholarship previously considered in this project. For this I revisit Christopher C. Taylor, Lee Ann Fujii, Omar Bartov, Phyllis Mack, and Mark Juergensmeyer. Taylor's work on religion and the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, is particularly relevant to the findings of this project, most notably Taylor's notion of "religious imaginary."¹³⁹

The involved cosmological and ontological notions specific to Rwandan culture and particularly apparent in earlier ritual practices having to do with sacred kingship. These penetrated ideas of leadership and moral personhood and can be discerned in images, such as cartoons, that were published in Rwanda's popular media in the time leading up to the 1994 genocide.¹⁴⁰

Taylor draws on a particular issue of *Kangura* at the heart of his argument. This issue of the magazine depicts President Juvénal Habyarimana eating taxes (composed of a homogenous Rwandan people), then defecating them out, only to eat them again. The only people getting any scraps are his close followers. Taylor argues that Habyarimana is being depicted as an unworthy sacred king who must be sacrificed. With Habyarimana designated as an outsider, marked for death, "it was then possible for Hutu extremists to insist on the externality of others, in this case, all Rwandan Tutsis."¹⁴¹ This is the configuration of the "religious imaginary" Taylor places at the base of the 1994 genocide. Considering the depiction of religion during the genocide in the previous chapter, it is fair to argue that there is certainly a "religious imaginary" as a driving force in the genocide. However, the "religious imaginary" present in the testimony of perpetrators is not totally akin to Taylor's formulation, but is more closely aligned to a notion of Hutu civil religion.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 252.

¹³⁹ Taylor, "Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda," p. 268.

¹⁴⁰ Taylor, "Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda," p. 268.

¹⁴¹ René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (London, UK and New York, NY: Continuum, 2005 [1972]); Taylor, "Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda," p. 278.

¹⁴² Taylor, "Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda," p. 268.

Temoney raises pro-Hutu propaganda, and *Kangura* number 29 (fig. 5) specifically, as “imparting a singular message.”¹⁴³ She highlights, the “revising and exploiting colonial inspired biblical myths as well as indigenous cosmological beliefs” in order to fuel violence.¹⁴⁴ When considering this “singular message” and its impact, as manifested in the testimonies above, it is noticeably composed of elements characteristic of Bellah’s civil religion typology: a fusion of nationalistic and Christian elements as well as new prophets, martyrs, sacred events sacred places, rituals, and symbols, all utilised to justify sending soldiers to their death for nefarious reasons.¹⁴⁵ The machete is an inherent part of this nationalistic civil religion narrative, functioning as the key symbol. However, it is the machete-fetish that is key, as it impacts on perpetrator choice and actions via its association with either (1) the will of the Rwandan God or (2) Hutu nationalistic zeal. It provides both absolution and impetus for enacting such questionable violence, recruiting and propelling perpetrators to enact the ritualistic violence preached by the prophets. As such, if we consider that the machete-fetish as part of a greater “practice of power,” what we see is a different “religious imaginary” to that of Taylor’s. This present “religious imaginary” is one that converges less on the notion of Habyarimana as the sacred king ritually slaughtered, rather focussing on the unification of the Hutu people in a pro-genocidal reality, ready to carry out a consecrated sacrifice with the tribe’s historic enemy. This does not negate Taylor’s “religious imaginary,” but rather provides a different narrative to this imagining based more wholly on perpetrator accounts. As such, this project provides a more micro-level understanding of the imaginary influencing the “rank-and-file” perpetrators (as Prunier would put it), an examination of religion being key to this.¹⁴⁶

Bartov and Mack’s work is also worth mentioning here. These two scholars argue for three connections between religion and genocide: religion as used to legitimate and motivate genocide, religion as inspiration for resistance, and religion during the aftermath as a means to come to terms with genocidal legacy, the foremost

¹⁴³ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” p. 5.

¹⁴⁴ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” p. 5.

¹⁴⁵ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” p. 5; Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” p. 18.

¹⁴⁶ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 4.

being our main concern.¹⁴⁷ Bartov and Mack argue that religion's influence on genocidal violence is via the "deployment of religious ideas as allied to the deployment of religious structures. Perpetrators...identified...with their membership in religious institutions, or pseudo-religious racial or ethnic orders or castes."¹⁴⁸ Similar to Taylor and Fujii with their notions of "religious imaginary" and "script," Bartov and Mack point to the power of religion in formulating the genocidal milieu in which perpetrators feel justified, absolved and driven to act.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, using the rhetoric of Bartov and Mack, if we consider the case in the previous chapter, it is not particularly Christian beliefs that drive perpetrators, is the "deployment of religious frameworks" that ultimately manifest in the fetish and the Hutu civil religion around it. Just as Bartov and Mack suggest, it is these frameworks that provide community, support, impetus, absolution, and drive. It is the structure of the milieu that is key to understanding this case of genocide. As we have seen, the milieu manifest in Rwanda is certainly religious, not in the sense of espousing the tenets of a particular tradition, but rather as a "genuinely new" fusion of nationalistic and Christian elements, that has its own "prophets, and its own martyrs. Its own sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols."¹⁵⁰

The notion of the Hutu civil religion also speaks to the work of Lee Ann Fujii in *Killing Neighbors*.¹⁵¹ Although Fujii does not consider religion specifically in her work, her thesis is intriguing as it seeks to move past the concept of "ethnicity" as a prime motivating factor, rather arguing for a concept of "script."¹⁵² This term is chosen with a Goffman mindset, that is, "a script is a dramaturgical blueprint for an imagined world, one that is self-contained and populated by specific characters who say and do specific things at specific moments in time."¹⁵³ It is argued that the manner in which someone responds to the genocidal script, and takes up their role in it, is dependent

¹⁴⁷ Omer Bartov, and Phyllis Mack eds. *In God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century* (New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 2001), p. 2.

¹⁴⁸ Bartov, and Mack eds. *In God's Name*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁹ Taylor, "Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda," Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing Neighbors, Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2009).

¹⁵⁰ Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," p. 18.

¹⁵¹ Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*.

¹⁵² Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, p. 17.

¹⁵³ Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, p. 12, Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Doubleday, 1959).

upon previous social ties, the thesis becoming one of “social interaction.”¹⁵⁴ This case study does not stray too far from the thesis of Fujii, although the inclusion of religion makes for a more specific script than that posited in *Killing Neighbors*. The narrative Fujii has driving the genocidal script is as such: “scripted ethnic claims...Most of the time, the targeted person was whatever those in power said she was. It was leaders’ subjective interpretations of who was Tutsi and their determinations of when ethnicity mattered that shaped how the genocide was performed.”¹⁵⁵ This script is broad, perhaps purposefully so, to encapsulate the motivations of the hundreds of thousands of perpetrators and the many actions they undertook. However, it is perhaps too broad, leaving us with little in the way of preventing future cases of such specified slaughter.

Fujii’s “script” thesis speaks directly to this Hutu civil religion, this being the “self-contained,” “imagined world” the perpetrators are performing in. It is the scrutiny of religion in this case of genocide that brings specificity to this “script.” The reframing of the dominant Christian narrative into a more violent sacred discourse focussed on Hutuness, aids in the quick and seamless construction of this new social reality, or Fujii’s “script” if you will.¹⁵⁶ Utilising a known ethical framework (in this case a Christian framework) brings perpetrators more easily onto the stage, of course, without too much interrogation of the violence in this new script, as God is supporting this murderous production. If we consider Fujii’s 2004 article, “Transforming the Moral Landscape: The Diffusion of a Genocidal Norm in Rwanda,” there is an expanded notion of the “script,” and the further impact of this project’s findings can be seen.¹⁵⁷

In her 2004 article, Fujii outlines a multi-step process for creation and motivation of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. This process begins with (1) the genocidal message, before (2) diffusion of this message, this message triggering a (3) re-interpretation of the world, before a (4) rehearsal of the message which includes, turning reality into the message, revolutions, raids, invasions, and assassinations.¹⁵⁸ The Hutu civil religion found in the above study appears to adhere largely to these four stages. The machete signifies the supremacy of the Hutu tribe (stages one and two). It harks back to other historical events of such violence (stage

¹⁵⁴ Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, p. 19.

¹⁵⁵ Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, p. 182.

¹⁵⁶ Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 59-60.

¹⁵⁷ Lee Ann Fujii, “Transforming the Moral Landscape: The Diffusion of a Genocidal Norm in Rwanda,” *The Journal of Genocide Research* 6:1 (2004), pp. 99-114.

¹⁵⁸ Fujii, “Transforming the Moral Landscape,” pp. 99-114.

four; turning reality in the message), and reframes of reality via an adjustment of traditional agricultural work thus normalising the “sacred ritual” at the heart of this civil religion (stage three). The most critical role of the machete in driving perpetrators during the genocide itself is not seen in these four stages. This is most likely due to these stages converging on the creation of the genocidal “script,” not how the script ultimately played out during the slaughter.

However, considering the above study, Fujii’s stages are both reordered and reframed. For example, Fujii’s “rehearsals” appear much earlier in the process, being more a part of stage one. The historical events Fujii references in this stage are seen in propaganda and iconography post 1990, this then being diffused amongst the population. Moreover, stage one has a distinct religious element to the ideology, biblical rhetoric being utilised in the framing of this genocidal message in order to give the ideology eschatological flavour and divine sanction. Such divine approval and feelings of world-ending fear are critical in the easy diffusion of the message. In addition, Fujii’s third stage is fundamentally linked to the machete. The transferral of the machete from harvesting plants to harvesting people is key in transitioning Hutu over to a new interpretation of the role. Without the machete, this re-interpretation may have been less impactful and a more difficult goal. It is the reframing of a widespread agrarian practice amongst Hutu that leads, in major part, to the genocide itself through this easy transition to a new, violent reality. This transferral of traditional roles also plays into stage four as it capitalises on the long-standing use of the machete; the unknown “rehearsal.” This was evidenced in numerous perpetrator accounts above. As such, if we were to consider the above study and include the genocide itself, the stages appear as thus: (1) the genocidal message including historical events and religious rhetoric, (2) diffusion of this message, (3) re-interpretation of the world, and (4) the bringing about of this message.

All three of these theorists speak to each other and their work is congruent with the findings of this project. Taylor’s notion of the “religious imaginary,” Fujii’s two theses of the genocidal “script” and genocidal stages, and Bartov and Mack’s focus on religious structures are all key in comprehending the findings of this project as they converge on the milieu in which perpetrators are placed.¹⁵⁹ By situating the findings of this case study in the context of extant scholarly work, two key points are to be made.

¹⁵⁹ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 117.

Firstly, the findings of this project are supported by the previous work of Taylor, Fujii, Bartov, Mack, and Juergensmeyer. Although, it must be noted it is the scrutiny of religion in this project that provides a more in-depth understanding and a slight reframing of the “religious imaginary,” “script,” and stages perpetrators were faced with. Secondly, this newly found impact of religion is not one of belief *per se*, but rather of religious structures. It is not simply religious rhetoric that is utilised in othering, justifying, authorising, and driving the murderous actions of *génocidaire*, it is the formulation of such rhetoric in a religious framework that provides a narrative come civil religion which potential *génocidaire* could follow and adhere to.¹⁶⁰ This is also supported by Mark Juergensmeyer’s work on the contemporaneous global rise in terrorism.¹⁶¹ He notes that religion coalesces to form “a peculiar set of circumstances – political, social, and ideological.”¹⁶² This is also seen in Roth’s structural explanations of genocide;¹⁶³ religion is co-opted with other elements such as “violent expression and social aspirations, personal pride and movements for political change,” and it is in this that religion is employed as a tool to foster violence.¹⁶⁴ Again this is congruent with the findings of this project. For both Juergensmeyer and Roth, it is seeing the power of the religious structure in creating a narrative that yokes other, potentially problematic elements of a genocidal script into a digestible, unifying, and driving plot. As such, while the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda is usually “attributed to ethnic rather than religious strife,” we cannot overlook the role of religion in this example of specified slaughter.

From this case study, there are further implications that must be discussed, the reminder of this chapter being dedicated to this. Firstly, the repercussions of these findings for the understanding of the role of religion in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, and genocide more broadly shall be discussed, and secondly, the broader impact and application of this study, including consideration of how this study contributes to the prevention of genocide and to the field of religious studies. In this

¹⁶⁰ Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” p. 269.

¹⁶¹ George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York, NY, H. Fertig Press, 1975); Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*.

¹⁶² Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, p. 10.

¹⁶³ Paul A. Roth, “Heart of Darkness: ‘Perpetrator history’ and why there is no why,” *History of Human Sciences*, 17:2 (August 2004), p. 211.

¹⁶⁴ Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, p. 10.

project, the machete appears as a fetishised object, a “machine of power,” exhibiting a tangible level of impact on the creation of the genocide and on the actions of the perpetrators studied.¹⁶⁵ The particular fetish evident amongst the perpetrator testimony gathered by Hatzfeld, presents in a multifaceted way.¹⁶⁶ For some perpetrators there was a conflation between the machete and the will of the Rwandan God and for others there was a conflation between this weapon and Hutu nationalism. It was also posited that the fetish was part of a burgeoning Hutu civil religion, a greater religious structure at work in the genocide as a whole. This weapon was both a “machine of power” and “practice of power” used to draw adherents to this Hutu civil religion, encouraging them to practice and bring about its aims.¹⁶⁷ These findings must be considered in relation to the work of those scholars who examine the motivations of Rwanda’s *génocidaire* without pressing religion as a rousing factor, namely, Gérard Prunier, Mahmood Mamdani, Donald Bloxham, Erin Jessee, Leila Fielding, and Scott Straus.¹⁶⁸ In addition, we must also consider this study relation to those scholars who do focus on religion as a motivating factor: Kate Temoney and Timothy Longman.¹⁶⁹ This section shall also include the macro-level theories on the influence of religion on the creation and propulsion of genocide discussed in Chapter Two. This includes the work of Raoul Wallenberg, Omer Bartov, and Phyllis Mack, Kate Temoney, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Sonia Silva.¹⁷⁰ The scholarship on Rwanda specifically, and genocide broadly, will be considered together for two reasons. Firstly, many of the implications for this project are congruent across both the micro and macro studies. Secondly, Temoney works on both a micro and macro level, and it is her work on Rwanda specifically that will be considered here as it is more recent. As such, with Temoney bridging both the micro and macro, it is expedient to consider them together.

¹⁶⁵ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228.

¹⁶⁶ Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

¹⁶⁷ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 228; Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture*, p. 222.

¹⁶⁸ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*; Erin Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda: The Politics of History* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Jessee, “Beyond Perpetrators;” Leila Fielding, *Female Génocidaires During the Rwandan Genocide: When Women Kill* (Hamburg, Germany: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2014); Donald Bloxham, “Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 22:2 (Fall 2008), pp. 203-245; Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide*.

¹⁶⁹ Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide;” Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*.”

¹⁷⁰ Bartov, and Mack eds. *In God’s Name*; Temoney, “Those who have sin...over to this side: Genocide and religion;” Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*; Sonia Silva, “Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 30:1 (2013), pp. 79–98.

To begin with those who do not present religion as a contributing factor to perpetrator motivations. Prunier's and Mamdani both point to the notion of land, physically and ideologically.¹⁷¹ For Bloxham, perpetrators are motivated by "an attempt by radicals to preserve the post-1959 revolutionary order by taking over the state machinery."¹⁷² Fielding cites three motivating factors, (1) fear and coercion, (2) jealousy, and (3) ideological rationale.¹⁷³ In Straus' interviews with perpetrators, he relays numerous self-ascribed motivators: 64.1% Intra-Hutu coercion, 22% combativeness, 15.3% claimed no active participation, 12.9% obedience, 6.2% accidental integration, 5.2% material gain, 5.2% to protect their Tutsi family members, 4.8% anger/revenge for Habyarimana's death, 4.8% copying others, and 1% interpersonal revenge.¹⁷⁴ There is no doubt that these scholarly understandings are correct. As there are hundreds of thousands of perpetrators to consider, all with a different personal context as to why they acted, there is little doubt that all of these suggestions motivated perpetrators at one point or another. Indeed, Jessee's 2019 work points to the fluctuating nature of motivators, depending on the day and even the time of the genocide.¹⁷⁵ The impact of this project on the understanding of perpetrator motivations in these scholarly works is plain: there is an additional set of motivating factors that present themselves when one looks through the lens of religion, spirituality, faith, and the sacred. More than this, the question of religion as underlying the motivations listed by Prunier, Mamdani, Fielding, Bloxham, Straus and Jessee adds an additional layer of to the motivational palimpsest. Indeed, if we add in the notion of Hutu civil religion discussed in the previous chapter, the impetus behind many of these understood motivations is either altered or expanded. This does not negate the suggestions of these scholars; all of these motivators are valid and drive the genocide as a whole. However, in seeking to understand past cases, halt current cases, and assuage future cases of genocide, we must confront all potential factors.

For Kate Temoney and Timothy Longman, the consideration of religion in comprehending the occurrence of the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda is central.

¹⁷¹ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 4; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 14; Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 76.

¹⁷² Donald Bloxham, "Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective," p. 208.

¹⁷³ Fielding, *Female Génocidaires During the Rwandan Genocide*, pp. 23-24.

¹⁷⁴ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*, p. 138.

¹⁷⁵ Jessee, "Beyond Perpetrators."

Their work has been seminal to the case study that unfolded in this project and is a platform from which the observations of this case study can propagate. To begin with Temoney's work on Rwandan specifically, as previously discussed, in her work on the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, Temoney highlights "three possible nexuses of religion and genocide...othering, justification, and authorization."¹⁷⁶ Temoney also places emphasis on the role of propaganda in "mobilizing the civilian population; justifying their [Tutsi] elimination due to a threat they posed to the temporal and atemporal order; and authorizing their extirpation as granted by the state."¹⁷⁷ The manufactured pro-genocidal religious rhetoric created a space in morality, a space in which the targeted slaughter of innocents and the Christian faith were not opposing concepts. Similarly, Longman's work in *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda* focuses on the role of religion in making the commands of the greater decision makers "comprehensible and tolerable."¹⁷⁸ He states, "Christians could kill without obvious qualms of conscience, even in the church, because Christianity as they had always known it had been a religion defined by struggles for power, and ethnicity had always been at the base of those struggles."¹⁷⁹ If we focus on the particularly Christian elements of the fetish (those who fetishised the machete with the will of the Rwandan God), in congruence with both Longman and Temoney, there is significant evidence indicating the use of the Christian faith as a mitigating factor. The injection of Christian and biblical rhetoric into the genocidal narrative made for an easy transition over to this new violent worldview, as well as providing some absolution from violent actions. Thus, the rhetoric of Longman and Temoney's work is that religion is a factor that gets *genocidaire* over the line, it gives them comfort in enacting the ideology through divine sanction.

However, while Longman and Temoney highlight religion as an othering, justifying, authorising, and absolving factor, the testimony of perpetrators in the previous chapter also indicates that it is a propelling and driving factor, particularly for those who fetishise the machete via a conflation the weapon with the will of the

¹⁷⁶ Temoney, "The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies," p. 5.

¹⁷⁷ Temoney, "The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies," p. 5.

¹⁷⁸ Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, p. 196.

¹⁷⁹ Timothy Longman, "Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 31:2 (2001), p. 164.

Rwandan God. In the case of these *génocidaire*, the influence of religion is more keenly felt than intimated in the work of Longman and Temoney. For these individuals, it does not just get them over the line; it keeps them there, machete in hand, waiting for the next cockroach to appear. This is an intimate look at what role religion plays during genocide, as the perpetrators take life. In this case, the will of the machete coaxes them along. However, it is important to note that this is not the case for all perpetrators of the 1994 genocide as not all perpetrators utilised a machete-God fetish to drive their actions. In fact, considering the case study here, this is a minority. Regardless, of the number of perpetrators this is affecting, for those perpetrators who did utilise a machete-God fetish, religion is a driving factor in the murdering of their neighbours and this must be acknowledged. As Straus notes, there are numerous motivating factors at play in this particular genocidal context, and this project is simply adding another into the mix.¹⁸⁰

Conclusion

This project sought to more comprehensively understand what role religion plays in the actions and minds of *génocidaire* as they take life and what role, if any, religion has in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour. Sonia Silva's 2013 suggested a consideration of genocide through a methodological lens of fetishism might hold some answers, and it was Prunier who pointed to the potential centrality of the machete.¹⁸¹ This case study set out to examine these suggestions in order to answer the project's key question. Indeed, in the above analysis, the machete appears as a fetishised object, a "machine of power," exhibiting a tangible level of impact on the creation of the genocide and on the actions of perpetrators.¹⁸² This influence begins in the place of the machete as a rallying icon, demarcation tool of exclusive community boundaries, and a point of transferral to a new violent reality. As made clear above, there is little argument as to whether the machete in this sense formulated a nationalistic zeal that helped to create support for widespread murder. Yet, it has been in this latter portion of the case study that we have seen the influence of the machete from within perpetrator testimonies brought to us by Hatzfeld's investigative journalism. In this case, the influence of the machete is

¹⁸⁰ Straus, *The Order of Genocide*.

¹⁸¹ Silva, "Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation;" Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*.

¹⁸² Ellen, "Fetishism," p. 228.

particularly through its conflation with the Rwandan God and Hutu nationalism. It is important to note that all perpetrators studied here experience the manipulative power of this fetishised object in congruence, each wielding the objects as best suited their needs within the genocidal context. Still, it is in these multiple aspects of fetishism that we can see the *bone fide* impact of religion on the ground level of genocide. In addition, we saw the fetish as part of a greater religious structure, a Hutu civil religion. What is evidenced in the case study as a whole is the power of religious structures in the creation and propulsion of genocide. It is not simply religious rhetoric that is utilised in othering, justifying, authorising, and driving the murderous actions of *génocidaire*. It is the formulation of such rhetoric into framework of civil religion which potential *génocidaire* could follow and adhere to.

In considering the role of religion in the creation and propulsion of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda Spyridon Loumakis seeks to fully highlight the role religion has as a culpable actor in this particular case. He states:

Real people create or choose to sustain a religion within their specific historical environment and in as much as these real people are to be blamed for violent episodes in the course of their history, whatever ideology they produce, uphold, and follow, including religious beliefs, is to be blamed as well.¹⁸³

Loumakis is correct; however, the influence of religion in the 1994 Rwandan case is more nuanced than simply laying blame on religious beliefs. In fact, I am concerned that this kind of accusatory rhetoric towards religious beliefs themselves can become that basis of some forms of hatred, which may turn violent. As such, it is important to state clearly for the reader that the case in Rwanda is much more than looking solely at religious beliefs. When we look at the above case study key to the findings are religious discourse and religious frameworks. As Juergensmeyer states, religion “does not ordinarily lead to violence...that happens only with the coalescence of a peculiar set of circumstances – political, social, and ideological.”¹⁸⁴ It is by investigating the fetishised machete that its place in a greater religious framework comes to the fore, a framework that played a central role in both the actions and minds of *génocidaire* studied here as they took life in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

¹⁸³ Loumakis, “Genocide and Religion in Rwandan in the 1990s,” p. 78.

¹⁸⁴ Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, p. 10.

Conclusion




Figure 6: Pat Chappatte, “Rwanda: 20 Years After,” *Les Temps*, April 7, 2014, <https://www.chappatte.com/en/images/rwanda20-years-after/>.

Spending years buried in the words of the perpetrators interviewed by Hatzfeld in order to piece their narratives back together while simultaneously poring over each word and how it is said, it is cliché to say that I feel like I know these men. Of course, I do not. I do not truly know why they murdered their schoolmates and neighbours or how they live with the knowledge that they did. The one thing I am sure of after spending so much time analysing their words — they are all human. There are surprisingly candid moments in their testimonies, like when Pio talks about playing soccer again or when Ignace speaks of going to the market on a Saturday. It is in these vignettes that you can see person these men were before they raised the machete against innocents. Really, it is the candid moments that I find most confronting. That is because it is these moments that makes one realise: there is no separating them from me. This is the reality: humans resorted to genocide. They still do, and perhaps always will. We can all be convinced of genocidal goals no matter how much we would like to believe that is not true.

This project will conclude with three sections. Firstly, a brief discussion of the expedience of the unique (and somewhat controversial) methodology will be presented. This includes the benefits of this methodological choice and quietly announces the complete resurrection of fetishism. This will be followed by an overview of the impact of this project on the research question, recounting the

findings for the reader. Finally, I shall finish with a suggestion of next steps that can be assumed from the contributions of this project.

Revisiting Fetishism: A Methodology Resurrected

Up until recently, the notion of fetishism was dead and buried. Utilising this battered methodology in the investigation of religion and genocide was perhaps an audacious move. The notion of fetishism — “things” with agency — is, for some, still a step too far. Yet in this project this methodology, particularly the utilised hybridised Ellen-Böhmean manifestation, proved particularly expedient in examining the queries of the project. The reasons for this are three-fold. Firstly, the nature of the fetish is that it is found amongst people, at a grassroots level. In this way, seeing how the fetish is perceived and wielded, as well as the impact it has on those using it, forces one to consider things from a fundamental place. In order to get down on this grassroots level, one must consider things from the actor’s point-of-view, that is, the lived experience of the fetish in context. In this case, it was the testimony of perpetrators that helped me to get onto this micro-level. Analysing the motivations of genocidal actors via the fetish thus provided new insight into the micro-level workings of particular religious beliefs and religious systems within the chosen violent context. Secondly, bringing in the work of Böhme requires one to take a step back and question the potential purposeful creation or manipulation of fetishistic beliefs and the systems around them: is this fetish of the people, for the people, or both? In the case of this project, we see the powers at be wilfully manipulating an object of the people into a fetish for the people in order that they can enact nefarious goals. As such, while this methodology causes one to look at a micro-level, it also forces one to look at a macro-level. Finally, while perhaps axiomatic, this particular methodological lens forces one to think from an entirely different perspective. Fetishism breaks down the subject-object perspective and places all actors within a constructed network, a network which in itself can be scrutinised. As such, while considerable foundational work had to be done in resurrecting fetishism from its methodological grave, this lens was particularly useful in this study, and will be in future studies. For by its very nature it asks one to dispel ontological preconceptions and consider a site of study and the systems within it from multiple points of view.

Revisiting the Role of Religion in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda

This project revisited the role of religion in the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. In current literature this investigation has, to some degree, been held back by a focus on the role of the Church in the murdering of its flock. This is indeed a key nexus of religion and violence in this case of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, but there are additional instances to consider. Indeed, Timothy Longman argues that religion as a motivating factor has been overlooked due to the prevailing sentiment that it was “Catholics killing Catholics, Protestants killing Protestants,” therefore the slaughter was motivated by ethnic hatred.¹ The impact of religion on the actions and minds of *génocidaire* as they take life, and what role religion has in creating or enhancing genocidal fervour has not been widely considered. Within this thesis, the work of scholars who confront the notion of religion as a motivating factor in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda was presented for the reader. These included Timothy Longman, Christopher C. Taylor, and Kate Temoney, their work being critical to the findings of this project.² All three scholars highlight the importance of religious rhetoric in othering, justifying, and authorising the genocide, while also being central to the overarching imagining that normalised such violent actions. However, there is not a targeted consideration of perpetrator testimony in these works, these studies being focussed on religion at a macro-level. Furthermore, religion as a motivating factor is overlooked.

This project’s approach to the investigation of religion as a motivating factor for *génocidaire* in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda was one designed to get down on a micro-level. It was through an analysis of Hatzfeld’s perpetrator testimony while looking through the religious studies lens of fetishism, that this project examined whether the machete was a possible harbour of a propelling religious sentiment. Prunier’s inkling of the importance of the machete was certainly founded.³ Indeed, the machete appeared as a fetishised object, a “machine of power” and “political plaything,” exhibiting a tangible level of impact on the creation of the

¹ Timothy Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 18.

² Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*; Christopher C. Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence*, eds. Mark Juergensmeyer et al. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 268-279; Kate Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” *Genocide Studies & Prevention*, 10:3 (2016), pp. 3-24.

³ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide* (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 1995).

genocide and the actions of the perpetrators considered here.⁴ The influence of this weapon begins in the place of the machete at the centre of coalescing efforts: it is a rallying icon, demarcation tool of exclusive community boundaries, and a point of transferral to a new violent, pro-genocidal reality. Thus, the machete is manifest as an icon of Hutu nationalism, becoming conflated with this “abstract idea.”⁵ Yet, within perpetrator testimonies we also see the conflation of the machete with the will of the Rwandan God, a second “abstract idea.”⁶ Indeed, it is the dual associations presented within the object that render the weapon powerful within its genocidal context. The dualistic associations hold ideological appeal across perpetrator demographics: whatever reason needed to murder, sacred or secular, the machete validated that. Looking at the influence of this fetishised object in a broader context, it is also a part of a Hutu civil religion, the machete thus being part of a greater religious system at work during the genocide. The impact of religion highlighted here is not only in religious rhetoric that is utilised in othering, justifying, authorising, and driving the murderous actions of *génocidaire*. It is also the formulation of such rhetoric in a religious framework that provides a script one can follow and adhere to.⁷ To be plain, in the case of the perpetrators of 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda studied here, the killers were not born, but made. Hutu civil religion was a mould that created perpetrators, and while some demoulded themselves, for others it was the machete-fetish that demoulded them.

There is a quotation from one of Hatzfeld’s interviewees that is paramount to raise here. In giving an overview of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda to Hatzfeld, Adalbert Munzigura states:

A convenient idea that need not be named or encouraged, except with malicious outbursts...It can be salvaged by future authorities for another destiny. But how can you kill an idea, used so extraordinarily, if you do not know how to kill its word, which can recall it to life? Killing enemies, killing offenders, killing neighbours — that you can understand. Killing ideas and words — that is beyond intelligence, a farmer’s intelligence, anyway.⁸

⁴ Roy Ellen, “Fetishism,” *Man* 23:2 (1988), p. 228; Hartmut Böhme, *Fetishism and Culture, A Different Theory of Modernity* (Berlin, Germany and Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2014), p. 222.

⁵ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 221.

⁶ Ellen, “Fetishism,” p. 221.

⁷ Taylor, “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” p. 269.

⁸ Adalbert Munzigura in Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak*, translated by Linda Coverdale (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 229.

Here, Munzigura encapsulates the power of religious systems in the 1994 genocide, and perhaps in other cases of specified slaughter. The danger is in the ideas and words that become stuck to things, whether they be objects or something less tangible. These sticky ideas are convenient, extraordinary, and hard to kill. We see this in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda in the fetishes and Hutu civil religion. These religious aspects are actively utilised by pro-genocidal regimes, rendering hate filled ideas as part of the vernacular. Although the 1994 genocide is usually “attributed to ethnic rather than religious strife,” this project has highlighted the integral place of religion in the creation and propulsion of this genocide.⁹ Arguably, one of the greatest influences of religion in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda on the minds and actions of perpetrators, as well as in the creation of genocidal zeal is through religious systems, of which the machete-fetish is an integral part. Of course, the high incidence of Christians in the country played a key role in the effective implementation of pro-genocide religious systems, but it is the influence of the religious system itself where we must focus. In the case of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, it is the very frameworks of religion that play a critical role in convincing perpetrators to raise machete against innocents.

Future Research

If we return to the above quotation from Munzigura, the subtext of his testimony asks the reader to think about the future and the notion of genocide prevention. What have we learned from the case in Rwanda just 26 years ago? Have we made any steps towards an understanding of what fuels the ordinary person to do evil things? As such, it is critical to now turn to such broad stroke queries, specifically, how do these findings contribute to our knowledge of genocide prevention?

This project has highlighted two new key religious factors in the manifestation of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, (1) the role of the fetish and (2) civil religion. Both create, propel, and drive the genocide itself as well as micro-level perpetrator actions. In both cases, the impact is not one of religious beliefs *per se*, but rather of religious systems. It is the formulation of such rhetoric in these religious frameworks that provides a narrative to which potential *génocidaire* could follow and adhere. Of course, the deliberate use of biblical language founded upon the high

⁹ Paul A. Roth, “Heart of Darkness: ‘Perpetrator history’ and why there is no why,” *History of Human Sciences*, 17:2 (August 2004), p. 211.

Christian population of the country was key in the effectiveness of these frameworks, but is not the tenets of the Christian tradition that drives this case of specified mass slaughter. In considering the impact of religious frameworks on the prevention of future cases of genocide it might be useful to consider a new tact for the seeking out of, and prevention of, mass violence. A new approach should examine localised processes of establishing pro-genocidal narratives, including an investigation of grassroots comprehensions of historical context, religious rhetoric, cultural factors, socio-economic circumstances, as well as the ground swell of both fetishes and civil religion frameworks. This is not top-down, nor bottom-up, rather it is structural.

For burgeoning cases, this analysis would involve research into the social, historical, religious, and cultural context of the site of potential violence, as well as fieldwork at the site. Not only is this an arduous task, but in some cases this work would be racing against the clock, although with no set deadline. For past cases, this analysis is perhaps less pressing, but such work would provide additional insight into how religious systems create and drive genocide. This would involve significant archival research in addition to the above. In some instances, there is relevant current literature on other cases of genocide that may aid in this endeavour; Ian Kershaw's *The Hitler Myth* and Jane Plamper's *The Stalin Cult* immediately come to mind.¹⁰ There is no guarantee that this will halt or prevent all future cases as not all genocide manifests in the same way. Nonetheless, any insight into the creation of such violence is critical, not only for scholars, but also for governments, policymakers, non-government organisations, and the international community at large. Yet, considering the progress we are making in halting current cases of genocide — Burundi, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Myanmar, Somalia South Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Yemen — one wonders if this is something international powers are at all interested in ceasing, let alone preventing.

On a final note, considering the imperfect nature of Hatzfeld's interviews (the small sample size, geographic and gender limitation, issue of translation, as well as the non-scholarly approach taken) there is much to be said for continuing this work with less hindered primary material. This is something that I hope to pursue. Of course, the collection of such data in the present day would also be imperfect, most

¹⁰ Ian Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987); Jane Plamper, *The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2012).

notably due to the time that has passed since the event and the malleability of memory. Regardless, this point stands in relation to the study of burgeoning and future cases of genocide, and the need for the accurate collection of primary material by scholars of the field.

Final Remarks

Towards the beginning of this project, in Chapter Two, Henry R. Huttenbach's was quoted:

[R]eligion – meaning the faithful, the doctrine, the clergy and their institutions – can easily be prompted to buttress genocidal thought and action in a wide array of capacities. The religion–genocide nexus needs to be carefully studied in general, and, in particular, must be carefully monitored in times of social crisis. The worst-case scenario would be to continue underestimating, or even denying, that the nexus exists. It is the task of scholars to expose and explore it, and for policy makers to dismantle the religion–genocide connection.¹¹

In the spirit of Huttenbach's call to scholarly action, this project sought to more comprehensively understand what role religion plays in the actions and minds of *génocidaire*. This was chosen in an attempt to impede or halt future cases of such violence by approaching the topic from a religious studies angle. Through a unique fetishistic methodology, this project examined the role of the machete in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda. What is evidenced in this project is the power of religious systems in the creation and propulsion of genocide and its perpetrators. In more fully comprehending the role of religious systems in the workings of genocide and *génocidaire*, this project has fulfilled its research aim. This study is not intended to be a final statement about the nature of the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda; that would be both overly ambitious and supremely naïve. There are multiple elements that contribute to the creation and propulsion of genocide and those who carry it out. Yet, without a full understanding of the factors exerted upon those in a potential site of genocide, including religious factors, there will be little chance to mitigate such targeted violence. While this project cannot thwart genocide on its own, it is my hope that these findings will create a more complete comprehension of what it means to be human in a genocidal context, and that this work can be used to prevent

¹¹ Henry R. Huttenbach in Steven L. Jacobs ed. *Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam* (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2009), p. x.

future cases. If this project makes any contribution to that endeavour, no matter how small, it will have achieved its greater goal.

Reference List

- Adekunle, J. *Culture and Customs of Rwanda* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007).
- Alvarez, Alex, *Governments, Citizens, and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001).
- Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, UK: Verso, 1983).
- Anderson, Kjell, "Colonialism and Cold Genocide: The Case of West Papua," *Genocide Studies & Prevention* 9:2 (2015), pp. 9-26.
- Arendt, Hannah, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2006 [1963]).
- Armoudian, M., *Kill the Messenger: The Media's Role in the Fate of the World* (New York, NY: Prometheus Books, 2011).
- Bartov, Omer, and Phyllis Mack eds. *In God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century* (New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 2001).
- Bartrop, Paul R., ed. *Bosnian Genocide* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2016).
- Bass, Alan, "On the History of Fetishism: De Brosses and Comte," *The Undecidable Unconscious: A Journal of Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis* 2:1 (2015), pp. 19-45.
- *Fetishism, Psychoanalysis and Philosophy: The Iridescent Thing* (London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge, 2018).

- Bauer, Yehuda, "The Place of the Holocaust in Contemporary History" in Jonathan Frankel ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 1 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 201-224.
- *Rethinking the Holocaust* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2002).
- Bayle, Pierre, *Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet*, trans. Robert C. Barlett (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000).
- Beachler, Donald W., *The Genocide Debate: Politicians, Academics, and Victims* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
- Bekker, Balthazar, *The World Bewitched; Or, An Examination of the Common Opinions Concerning Spirits: Their Nature, Power, Administration, and Operations*, translated from French by B. Bekker for R. Baldwin (1695).
- Bellah, Robert, "Civil Religion in America," *Daedulus* 96:1 (1967), pp. 1-21.
- Beres, Louis Rene, "Perspectives on Public Policy: Genocide," *Policy Studies Review* 4:3 (February 1985), pp. 397-406.
- Bergen, Doris L., 'Religion and Genocide: A Historiographical Survey,' in Dan Stone ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 194-227.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, UK and New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1991 [1966]).
- Berry, John A., and Carol Pott Berry eds. *Genocide in Rwanda, A Collective Memory* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1999).

- Binet, Alfred, “Le fétichisme dans l’amour,” *Études de Psychologie Expérimentale* (Paris, France: Octave Doin éditeur, 1888), pp. 1– 13.
- Bloxham, Donald, “Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 22:2 (Fall 2008), pp. 203-245.
- Blumer, Herbert, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
- Böhme, Hartmut, *Fetishism and Culture: A Different Theory of Modernity* (Berlin, Germany and Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2014).
- Bolin, Annalisa, “Imagining Genocide Heritage: Material Modes of Development and Preservation in Rwanda,” *Journal of Material Culture* 24:3 (July 2019), n.p., <https://doi.org/10.1177/1359183519860881>.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, *Outline of Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
- Boyle, Michael J., *Violence After War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2014).
- Bosman, Willem, *A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea: Divided Into the Gold, the Slave, and the Ivory Coasts* (London: J. Knapton, A. Fell, R. Smith, D. Midwinter, W. Haws, W. Davis, G. Strahan, B. Lintott, J. Round, and J. Wale, 1705 [1704]).
- Brown, Sara E., *Gender and Genocide in Rwanda: Women as Rescuers and Perpetrators* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).
- Browning, Christopher R., *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (London, UK: Penguin Group, 2001 [1992]).

- Bryman, Alan *Social Research Methods*, 4th edition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014 [2001]).
- Calhoun, Craig, Chris Rojek and Bryan Turner, *The SAGE Handbook of Sociology* (London, UK: SAGE, 2005).
- Callon, Michel, “Techno-economic Networks and Irreversibility” in J. Law ed., *A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination* (London, UK: Routledge, 1991), pp. 132–164.
- Carlnaes, Walte, Thomes Risse, and Beth A. Cimmmons eds. *Handbook of International Relations* (London, UK: Sage, 2002).
- Carney, J. J., *Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- Cerulo, Karen A., *Culture in Mind: Toward A Sociology of Culture and Cognition* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002).
- Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 1990).
- Charny, Israel, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide” in G. A. Andreopoulous ed., *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 64-94.
- Chaterjee, Partha, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London, UK: Zed, 1983).
- Chrétien, Jean Pierre, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, translated by Scott Straus (New York, NY: Zone Books, 2006 [2000]).
- Chidester, David, *Religion: Material Dynamics* (Oakland, CA: University of

- California Press, 2018).
- Codere, Helen, *Biography of an African Society: Rwanda 1900-1960* (Teruvuren, Belgium: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1973).
- Cohen, A. P., *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (London, UK: Routledge, 1985).
- Collins, Barrie, *Rwanda 1994: The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and its Consequences* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
- Cooley, Charles Horton, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, NY: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1964).
- Comte, A., *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, translated by H. Martineau (London, UK: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1893).
- Cox, John, *To Kill a People: Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (London, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016).
- Cruvellier, Thierry, *Court of Remorse: Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*, translated by Chari Voss (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).
- Dadrian, Vahagn, "A Typology of Genocide," *International Review of Modern Sociology* 5:2 (Fall 1974), pp. 201-212.
- Dallaire, Romeo, and Brent Bearsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (London, UK: Arrow Books, 2004).
- de Brosses, Charles, *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiche: Ou parallèle de l'ancienne religion de l'Égypte avec la religion actuelle de la Nigritie* (Lyon, France: Lyon Public Library, 1760).

de Brouwer, Anne-Marie, and Sanda Ka Hon Chu eds. *Men Who Killed Me: Rwandan Survivors of Sexual Violence* (Vancouver, Canada, Toronto, Canada and Berkeley, CA: Douglas and McIntyre Publishing, 2009).

de Lacger, Louis, and Pierre Nothomb, *Rwanda* (Kabgayi, Rwanda: *sine nomine*, 1961).

Des Forges, Alison, “*Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Destexhe, Alain, *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, translated by Alison Marschner (London, UK and East Haven, CT: Pluto Press, 1995).

Dewey, John, *John Dewey: The Early Works*, vol. 3 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 1969).

Donham, Donald L., “The Concept of the Fetish,” *The Erotics of History: An African Atlantic Example* (Los Angeles, CA and London, UK: University of California Press, 2018), pp. 38-32.

Drost, Peter, *The Crime of State: Genocide*, vol. 2. (Leiden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff, 1959).

Drumbl, M., “‘She makes me ashamed to be a woman:’ The Genocide Conviction of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 2011,” *Michigan Journal of International Law* 34:3 (2013), pp. 559-604.

Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, [1915] 2008).

Ellen, Roy, “Fetishism,” *Man* 23:2 (1988), pp. 213–235.

- Ericksen, Robert P., *Complicity in the Holocaust: Churches and University in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
- Fallon, Breann, “Violence of Mind, Body, and Spirit: Spiritual and Religions Responses Triggered by Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide,” in Caroline Blyth, Emily Colgan, and Katie B. Edwards eds. *Rape Culture, Gender Violence, and Religion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), pp. 71-86.
- “The Fetishization Effect: The Manipulation Power of the Machete in the Rwandan Genocide,” *Implicit Religion* 20:4 (2017), pp. 319–333.
- Fein, Helen, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1993).
- Festinger, Leon, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
- Fielding, Leila, *Female Génocidaires During the Rwandan Genocide: When Women Kill* (Hamburg, Germany: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2014).
- Fischel, Jack R., *Historical Dictionary of the Holocaust*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD, Toronto, Canada, and Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2010).
- Fletcher, Luke, “Turning *Interahamwe*: Individual and Community Choices in the Rwandan Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 9:1 (2007), pp. 25-48.
- Fourmet, Caroline, *Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: Misconceptions and Confusion in French Law and Practice* (Oxford, UK and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2013).
- Fujii, Lee Ann, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2009).

- “Transforming the Moral Landscape: The Diffusion of a Genocidal Norm in Rwanda,” *The Journal of Genocide Research* 6:1 (2004), pp. 99-114.
- Friedländer, Saul, *Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution: 1933-1939* (London, UK: Hachette, 2004).
- Freud, Sigmund, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (Leipzig, Germany and Vienna, Austria: Franz Deuticke, 1905).
- Geertz, Clifford, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Michael Banton ed. *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (London, UK: Tavistock, 1966), pp. 1-46.
- Gell, Alfred, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1998).
- Gilbin, J., “Political and Theoretical Problems for the Archaeological Identification of Pre-colonial Twa, Tutsi, and Hutu in Rwanda,” in *Ethnic Ambiguity and the African Past: Materiality, History, and the Shaping of Cultural Identities*, edited by F. G. Richard and K. C. MacDonald (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2015), pp. 217–244.
- Gingerich, T., and J. Learning, “The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict of Darfur Sudan,” *Program on Humanitarian Crises and Human Rights, François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights* (Boston, MA: Harvard School for Public Health, 2004).
- Girard, René, *Violence and the Sacred*, translated by Patrick Gregory (London, UK and New York, NY: Continuum, 2005 [1972]).
- Goffman, Erving, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1959).
- Gourevitch, Philip, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with*

- Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York, NY: Picador, 1998).
- Grieser, Alexandra K., and Jay Johnston, eds. *Aesthetics of Religion: A Connective Concept* (Berlin, Germany and Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2017).
- Grünfeld, Frederik, and Anke Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders* (Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007).
- Grzyb, Amanda and Amy Frier, “The Role of *Radio Télévision des Milles Collines* in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide: Hate Propaganda, Media Effects, and International Intervention,” in Samuel Totten, Henry Theriault and Elisa von Joeden-Forgey eds. *Controversies in the Field of Genocide Studies* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), pp. 45-72.
- Gupta, L., *Exposure to War Related Violence Among Rwanda Children and Adolescents: A Brief Report on the National Baseline Trauma* (UNICEF Trauma Recovery Programme, Kigali, Rwanda, Typescript Report, 1996).
- Harff, Barbara, “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37:3 (September 1993), pp. 359-371.
- Hatzfeld, Jean, *Machete Season: The Killers of Rwanda Speak*, translated by Linda Coverdale (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003).
- *The Strategy of Antelopes: Living in Rwanda After the Genocide*, translated by Linda Coverdale (London, UK: Serpent’s Tail, 2009).
- *Life Laid Bare: The Killers of Rwanda Speak*, translated by Linda Coverdale (New York, NY: Other Press, 2013).
- *Blood Papa: Rwanda’s New Generation*, translated by Joshua David Jordon (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).

Hegel, Georg, *The Philosophy of History* (New York, NY: Cosimo Inc., 2007 [1899]).

Heilbrunn, Jacob, "Telling the Holocaust Like it Wasn't," *New York Times*, January 11, 2009, (accessed February 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/movies/11heilbrunn.html?_r=0.

Hinton, Alexander Laban, "Critical Genocide Studies," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7:1 (Spring 2012), pp. 4-15.

——— "Critical Genocide Studies" in Joyce Apisel and Ernesto Verdeja eds. *Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues and Emerging Perspectives* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), pp. 42-58.

Hochschild, Arlie, *The Managed Heart* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983).

Hoeksema, Suzanne, "Re-education the Perpetrators in the Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide," in Ugur Ümit Üngör eds. *Genocide: New Perspectives on its Causes, Course, and Consequences* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), pp. 195-215.

Houtman Dick, and Birgit Meyer, eds. *Things: Religion and the Question of Materiality* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2012).

Horowitz, Irving Louis, *Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder* (New Brunswick, NY and New Jersey, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976).

Hoywedhen Van, Saskia, "The Disintegration of the Catholic Church in Rwanda: A Study of the Fragmentation of Political Religious Authority," *African Affairs* 95:380 (July 1996), pp. 379-402.

Hume, David, *Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding* (London, UK: Millar 1748).

- Natural History of Religion (London, UK: A. and H. Brandlugh Bonner 1889 [1757]).
- “Locating Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum: Towards a Methodology of Definition and Categorisation,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 3:3 (1988), pp. 289-303.
- Iacono, Alfonso Maurizio, *The History and Theory of Fetishism*, trans. Viktoria Tchernichova, Monica Boria and Elizabeth MacDonald (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), *Prosecutor v. Krstic*, Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, § 12, (accessed February 18, 2016), <http://icr.icty.org>.
- International Military Tribunal, “Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London, 8 August 1945,” *International Committee of the Red Cross Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries* (accessed February 20, 2016), <https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/350?OpenDocument>.
- Jacobs, Steven L., ed. *Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam* (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2009).
- Jessee, Erin, “Beyond Perpetrators” in Alette Smeulers, Maartje Weerdesteijn and Barbora Holá eds. *Perpetrators of International Crimes: Theories, Methods, and Evidence* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 153-172.
- *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda: The Politics of History* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
- Jones, Adam, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (New York, NY: Routledge

2006).

Jones, Andrew M., and Nicole Bovin, "The Malice of Inanimate Objects: Material Agency," in Dan Hicks and Mary C. Beaudry eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 334-351.

Juergensmeyer, Mark, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 3rd edition (Los Angeles, CA and London, UK: University of California Press, 2003).

Kalimunda, Aimé Muyobokey, "The Death Penalty in Rwanda: Surrounding Politics and the ICTR's Battle for Abolition," in Madoka Futamura and Nadia Bernaz eds. *The Politics of the Death Penalty in Countries in Transition* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), pp. 128-153.

Kant, Immanuel, *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, translated by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1793]).

Katz, Steven T., *The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and Mass Death Before the Modern Age* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Kershaw, Ian, *The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987).

King Jr., Henry T., "Genocide and Nuremberg" in Ralph J. Henham and Paul Behrens eds. *The Criminal Law of Genocide: International, Comparative and Contextual Aspects* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), pp. 29-35.

- Kippenberg, Hans G., *Violence as Worship: Religious Wars in the Age of Globalization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2011).
- Krafft-Ebbing, Richard von, *Psychopathia Sexualis: With Especial Reference to the Antipathic Sexual Instinct*, translated by Franklin S. Klaf (New York, NY: Arcade Publishing, 1998 [1886]).
- Kuper, Leo, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twenty-First Century* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 1981).
- Kurtz, Glenn, *Three Minutes in Poland: Discovering a Lost World in a 1938 Family Film* (New York, NY: Farrer, Straus, and Giroux, 2014).
- Lang, Berel *Genocide: The Act as Idea* (Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).
- Latifau, Joseph-François, *Moeurs des sauvages américains, comparées aux mœurs des premiers* (Paris: Charles Estienne Hochereau, 1724).
- Latour, Bruno, *We Have Never Been Modern*, translated by Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
- *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies* (London, UK and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
- *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, translated by Catherine Porter and Heather MacLean (Durham, NC and London, UK: Duke University Press, 2010).
- Lauterpacht, Elihu, C. J. Greenwood, A. G. Oppenheimer and Karen Lee eds., *International Law Reports*, vol. 132 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- Lautman, Rüdiger, "The Pink Triangle: Homosexuals as Enemies of State" in Michael

- Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck eds. *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed, and the Reexamined* (Bloomington, UK and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 344-357.
- Lemarchand, René, *Rwanda and Burundi* (New York, NY, Washington, WA, London, UK: Prager 1970).
- Lemkin, Raphael, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (New Jersey, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2008).
- Levene, Mark, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide* (London, UK and New York, NY: I. B. Tauris, 2005).
- Lincoln, Bruce, *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2006).
- Longman, Timothy, *Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
- *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda,” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 31:2 (2001), pp. 163-186.
- Loumakis, Spyridon, “Genocide and Religion in Rwandan in the 1990s” in Andre Gagnem, Spyridon Loumakis and Calogero A. Miceli eds. *The Global Impact of Religious Violence* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2016), pp. 47-83.
- Lubbock, J., *The Origins of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man: Mental and Social Conditions of Savages*, (London, UK: Longmans, 1870).
- Lugan, Bernard, *Rwanda: Genocide, l’Eglise, et la Democratie* (Paris, France: Editions du Rocher, 2004).

- Mamdani, Mahmood, *When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism: Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
- “The Politics of Naming Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,” *London Review of Books*, 29:5, (March 2007), pp. 5-8.
- Manaktala, Meghna, “Defining Genocide,” *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 24:2 (2012), pp. 179-186.
- Manning, Peter, *Transitional Justice and Memory in Cambodia: Beyond the Extraordinary Chambers* (London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).
- Marquet, Jacques J., *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda: A Study of Political Relations in a Central African Kingdom* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018 [1961]).
- Martinon, J., *After “Rwanda”: In Search of a New Ethics* (New York, NY: Rodopi, 2013).
- Marx, Karl, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen ökonomie*, vol. 1 and 2 (Harvard, MA: O. Meissner, 1872).
- Matory, J. Lorand, *The Fetish Revisited: Marx, Freud, and the Gods Black People Make* (Durham, NC and London, UK: Duke University Press, 2018).
- McCullum, Hugh, *The Angels Have Left Us: The Rwanda Tragedy and the Churches* (Geneva, Switzerland: WCC Publications, 2004).
- Melvern, Linda, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (New York, NY: Verso, 2004).
- Mettraux, Guenael, *International Crimes: Law and Practice*, vol. 1: Genocide (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019).

- Morris Rosalind C., and Daniel H. Leonard, *The Returns of Fetishism: Charles de Brosses and the Afterlives of an Idea* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017).
- Moses, Dirk, “Why the Discipline of ‘Genocide Studies’ Has Trouble Explaining How Genocides End,” *How Genocides End*, <http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/Moses/>, accessed November 12, 2017.
- Moses, Wilson Jeremiah, *Afrotopia: The Roots of African American Popular History* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- Mosse, George L., *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York, NY, H. Fertig Press, 1975).
- Mullins, C. W., and D. L. Rothe, *Blood, Power, and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal Law in Post-Colonial Africa* (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008).
- Muzungu, Bernadin, “Le problem des races au Rwanda,” *Cahiers Muiere et Socete* 42 (2009), pp. 51-69.
- Neuberger, Benyamin, *Rwanda 1994: Genocide in the “Land of A Thousand Hills,”* (Sheffield, UK and Bristol, UK: Equinox Publishing, 2017).
- Newbury, Catharine, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988).
- O’Brien, Jodi, and Peter Kollock, *The Production of Reality*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press, 1997).
- Olsen, Bjørnar, “Material Culture After Text: Remembering things,” *Norwegian Archaeological Review* 36:2 (2003), pp. 87–104.
- Organization of African Unity: International Panel of Eminent Personalities to

Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events,
Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide (sine loco: IPEP, 2000).

Paine, Crispin, *Religious Objects in Museums: Private Lives and Public Deities*
(London, UK and New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013).

Parker, Andrew, 'Bogeyman: Benedict Anderson's "Derivative" Discourse,'
Diacritics 29:4 (Winter 1999), pp. 40-57.

Patterson, David, "Getting Rid of the G-d of Abraham: A Prerequisite for Genocide,"
in *Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam* ed. Steven D. Leonard
Jacobs (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), pp. 197-208.

Pickering, W. S. F., *Durkheim's Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories*,
(Cambridge, UK: James Clark and Co. Publishing, 1984).

Pietz, William, "The Problem of the Fetish I," *Anthropology and Aesthetics* 9:1
(Spring, 1985), pp. 5-17.

—— "The Problem of the Fetish II: The Origin of the Fetish,"
Anthropology and Aesthetics 13:1 (Spring, 1987), pp. 23-45.

Plamper, Jane, *The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power* (New Haven, CT
and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2012).

Plate, S. Brent, eds. *Key Terms in Material Religion* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury,
2010).

—— *A History of Religion in 5 ½ Objects: Bringing Spirituality to its Senses*
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2014).

Porter, Jack Nusan, *Genocide and Human Rights: A Global Anthology* (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America: 1989).

- Power, Samantha, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2007).
- Prunier, Gérard, *The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide* (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 1995).
- *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Quigley, John, *The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006).
- “Genocide: A Useful Legal Category?,” *International Criminal Justice Review*, 19:2 (June 2009), pp. 115-131.
- Radoli, Agatha, “Preface” in Mario I. Aguliar *The Rwanda Crisis and the Call to Deepen Christianity in Africa* (Nairobi, Kenya: AMECEA Gaba Publications, 1998), pp. 148-150.
- Rees, Laurence, *The Holocaust: A New History* (London, UK: Penguin, 2017).
- Reinharz, S., “Jewish Social Memory and the Augmented Stages of Genocide” in Lutta Lindert and Armen T. Marsoobian eds. *Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Genocide and Memory* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018), pp. 49-63.
- Reyntjens, Filip *L’Afrique des Grandes Lacs en crise: Rwanda and Burundi 1988-1994* (Paris, France: Karthala, 1994).
- Rich, Ian, *Holocaust Perpetrators of the German Police Battalions: The Mass Murder of Jewish Civilians, 1940-1942* (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018).
- Ritzer, G., ed. *Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Social Theory*. vol. 1 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press, 2003).

- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, *A Treatise on the Social Contract or the Principles of Political Law* (London, UK: T. Becket and P. A. de Hondt, 1764 [1762]).
- Roth, John K., “Easy to Remember?: Genocide and the Philosophy of Religion,” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 68:1 (December 2010), pp. 31-42.
- “Social Psychology and Genocide” in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 198-217.
- Roth, Paul A., “Heart of Darkness: ‘Perpetrator history’ and why there is no why,” *History of Human Sciences*, 17:2 (August 2004), pp. 211-251.
- Rusesabagina, Paul, and Tom Zoellner, *An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2006).
- Rutagambwa, Elisée, “The Rwandan Church: The Challenge of Reconciliation” in Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon, and Clyde Wilcox eds. *The Catholic Church and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2006), pp. 173-191.
- Sandstorm, Kent L., Daniel D. Martin and Gary Alan Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology and Sociology* (New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).
- Sartre, Jean-Paul, “Genocide,” *New Left Review*, 1:48 (March-April 1968), pp. 13-25.
- Schrerrer, C. P., *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002).
- Schwalde, Michael, et al., “Generic Processes in the Reproduction of Inequality: An

- Interactionist Theory”, *Social Forces* 79:2 (2000), pp. 419-452.
- Seligman, Charles Gabriel, *Races of Africa* (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1930).
- Shaw, Martin, *What is Genocide?* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015).
- Sinema, Krysten *Who Must Die in Rwanda’s Genocide?: The State of Exception Realized* (New York, NY and London, UK: Lexington Books, 2015).
- Somerville, K., *Radio Propaganda and the Broadcasting of Hatred: Historical Development and Definitions* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).
- Silva, Sonia, “Reification and Fetishism: Processes of Transformation,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 30:1 (2013), pp. 79–98.
- Stanton, Gregory H., “Ten Stages of Genocide”, *Genocide Watch*, <http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/8-stages-of-genocide/>, accessed November 12, 2017.
- Straus, Scott, “How Many Perpetrators were here in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 6:1 (2004), pp. 85–98.
- *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2006).
- Suny, Ronald Grigor, “Historicizing Genocide,” *History Workshop Journal* 71 (Spring 2011), pp. 259-266.
- Taylor, Christopher C., “Genocide and the Religious Imaginary in Rwanda,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence*, eds. Mark Juergensmeyer et al. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 268-279.
- “Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994,” in

Roy Richard Grinker, Stephen C. Lubkemann and Christopher B. Steiner eds. *Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History and Representation* (Oxford, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), pp. 555-568.

Temoney, Kate, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide Studies,” *Genocide Studies & Prevention* 10:3 (2016), pp. 3-24.

——— “Those who have the sin...over to this side: Genocide and religion”
in Cathie Carmichael, Richard C. Maguire eds. *The Routledge History of Genocide* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), pp. 227-240.

Thomson, Susan, *Rwanda: From Genocide to Precarious Peace* (New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2018).

——— “Reeducation for Reconciliation: Participant Observations on *Ingando*,” in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf eds. *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence* (Madison: WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), pp. 331-339.

Thompson, A. ed., *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide* (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2007).

Tirrell, Lynne, “Epistemic Aspects of Evil,” in Andrea Veltman, and Kathryn J. Norlock eds. *Evil, Political Violence, and Forgiveness: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card* (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 35-52.

Totten, Samuel, Henry Theriault and Elisa von Joeden-Forgey eds., *Controversies in the Field of Genocide Studies* (Abingdon, OX and New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).

Totten, Samuel, and Rafiki Ubaldo eds. *We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* (New Brunswick, NY, New Jersey, NY and London, UK: Rutgers University Press, 2011).

Totten, Samuel, ed., *Plight and Fate of Women During and Following Genocide: A Critical Biographical Review*, vol. 7 (New Brunswick, NJ, and London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 2009).

Twagilimana, Aimable, *The Historical Dictionary of Rwanda* (New York, NY and London, UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).

United Nations, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 18 September 2004,” (accessed October 2, 2015) www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.

United Nations, *Legal Committee*, Session 3, § 1, 14 October 1948, (accessed February 25, 2016) <http://research.un.org/en/undhr/ga/thirdcommittee>.

UN General Assembly, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 9 December 1948,” *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 78, pp. 277-322, (accessed 18 February 2016) https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en.

United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, “The ICTR in Brief,” (accessed 27 October 2018) <https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal>.

UNICEF, “Darfur – Overview,” (accessed 2 October 2015) http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sudan_darfuroverview.html.

Valentino, Benjamin A., *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

Verwimp, Philip, “Machetes and Firearms: The Organization of Massacres in Rwanda,” *Journal of Peace Research* 43:1 (2006), pp. 5–22.

Vidal, Claudine, “Colonisation et décolonisation du Rwanda: A question tutsi-hutu,” *Revue française d'études politiques africaines* 91 (1973), pp. 32-47.

Wallimann, Isidor, and Michael N. Dobkowski eds. *Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987).

Walliman, Nicholas, *Social Research Methods* (London, UK: SAGE, 2006).

Westermann, Edward B., *Hitler's Ostkrieg and the Indian Wars: Comparing Genocide and Conquest* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016).

——— *Hitler's Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

Wright, Erik Ohlin, "Explanation and Emancipation in Marxism and Feminism," *Sociological Theory* 11:1 (1993), pp. 39-54.

Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology* (Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press, 1997).

——— *The Elephant in the Room: Silence and Denial in Everyday Life* (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006).