Antisemitic Memes and Naïve Teens:

Qualitative and Quantitative Impacts of the Internet on Antisemitism, the Evolution of Antisemitism 2.0, and Developing Adaptable Research Methodologies into Online Hate, Abuse, and Misinformation

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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2020
Statement of originality

This is to certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, I received appropriate ethics approval for research undertaken in this thesis.

William Allington
Abstract

This thesis posits that the advent of the internet has resulted in qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism, particularly in the period since web 2.0. Comparing online antisemitism with other forms of online abuse, this thesis demonstrates limits in the research on broader manifestations of online discrimination due to inconsistent methodologies and quantities of research. A key consideration is how online antisemitism both differs and intersects with broader manifestations, including cyberbullying, cyber-racism, and abusive conspiracy movements. Through consideration of these intersections, the broader history of antisemitism, and the functions of internet technology, profiles of major online sources for antisemitism are presented. Beyond illustrating how the internet has changed antisemitism alongside other manifestations of abuse and discrimination, this thesis also develops and tests a research model that can be adapted to different fields and disciplines. Simulated online conversations between young adults and a Holocaust denier evaluate how effective young adult web users are at recognising, researching, responding to and refuting antisemitism online, and what tools can be designed to assist them. Antisemitism has undergone significant qualitative and quantitative change due to the internet and now reaches more young people who are ill-equipped to resist its online manifestations. While expertise in the specific nature of antisemitism is needed to tackle this problem, the response can involve adaptable methodologies of benefit to the study of online hate more broadly. There is benefit in collaboration across researchers, fields, and disciplines to provide holistic explanations and solutions to some common aspects of online hate, abuse, and misinformation.
Acknowledgements

First, I acknowledge the traditional custodians of the land whereupon I have lived and studied, the Gadigal people of the Eora Nation, and pay my respects to elders past, present, and emerging. Sovereignty was never ceded, and the wounds of atrocities still linger. I hope that the research in this thesis will contribute towards the dismantling of structures that continue the impact of these atrocities to this day.

Thanks to my wonderful supervisors. First, Dr Avril Alba, who has guided me through this entire process with boundless encouragement and support. Second, Dr Andre Oboler, who has assisted me with his unparalleled expertise in this field.

I extend this thanks to the department of Hebrew, Biblical and Jewish Studies at the University of Sydney. This department has provided me with incredible education and employment opportunities, and it has been a joy to work with the department’s broader academic staff. A special thanks must be extended to Emerita Professor Suzanne Rutland, who guided me since my first year as an undergraduate, and Emeritus Professor Konrad Kwiet, who supervised my Honours project. I also extend thanks to the late John Rector and the Jewish Fund for Higher Education for their financial support of my research.

I must acknowledge the support of my friends and family. Thanks to my wonderful Dungeons and Dragons groups for reminding me that wonderful worlds exist beyond my computer desk. James, Maura, and Sophie Allington, as a family of teachers you know the value of a strong education, and I thank you for always supporting and encouraging my continued studies. Tony Blower and
Christine Simmons, thank you for providing a whole extra family of support and encouragement. I feel very lucky to have so many supporting figures in my life.

Thank you to the staff of Martin Place Chambers, especially the clerk, Michele Kearns, for providing the best possible place of employment for someone undertaking their PhD thesis.

A particular thanks to Sophie Allington, Emma Balfour, Lizzy Blower, Camille Nurka, and Christine Simmons for their wonderful editorial assistance and feedback.

Finally, the greatest thanks to my partner, Lizzy, who has supported, encouraged and loved me through the hardest task of my life. We moved in together in trendy Newtown at the end of 2015 to prepare for this new chapter in our lives. This chapter is now finally ending, and I cannot wait for the next to begin in Canberra. You have helped me become the best version of myself I could be and constantly serve as a source of inspiration. Thank you for everything.
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Chapter 1

Introduction: Approaching an Ancient Hatred in the Information Age

On May 19th 2016, journalist Rebecca Shabad tweeted about her experience of online antisemitic harassment: “Another reporter and I received a photo on Twitter recently of Jews at a concentration camp, telling us to move to Israel.”¹ In response to her tweet, pseudonymous user @HelloRaspberry tweeted a picture of a Jewish caricature drinking a water tank of red liquid labelled “Goyim Blood” (appendix A, figure 1.1).² This picture originally depicted a man drinking a large tank of water (appendix A, figure 1.2), crudely altered to allude to the antisemitic ‘blood libel’ trope, which accuses Jews of drinking the blood of Christians. The alterations included a grotesquely extended nose, kippah, and payot, along with colouring and labelling the water. The modified image was sent in the context of a wave of antisemitic harassment towards Jewish journalists on social media during the 2016 election in the United States.³ This antisemitic image makes use of long-running historical antisemitic tropes that some may assume are no longer relevant in today’s society. Nonetheless, this particular image, as part of the larger antisemitic harassment campaign, is indicative of the large qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism brought about by the medium of the internet.

¹ Rebecca Shabad (@Rebecca Shabad, 19 May 2016), ‘@jonathanweisman Another reporter and I received a photo on Twitter recently of Jews at a concentration camp, telling us to move to Israel’ (tweet), <https://twitter.com/rebeccashabad/status/733294420628504576> [accessed 21 October 2019].
² Naughty Raspberry (@HelloRaspberry, 19 May 2016), (tweet).
Despite debates about possible precursors, the blood libel trope is generally understood to have originated with the death of a boy, William of Norwich, in 1144. The Jewish community of Norwich were accused of ritually murdering the boy to fulfil a prophecy that would allow them to return to Israel. Similar accusations spread elsewhere in England and across Europe, eventually manifesting into a general myth accusing Jews of using the blood of Christian children in various rituals. This antisemitic myth can be described as ‘chimeric antisemitism’, a term coined by Gavin Langmuir that describes a fantastical manifestation of antisemitism not rooted in any observable fact or truth. The blood libel trope has regularly resurfaced throughout history, with over 150 recorded cases resulting in the persecution and killing of Jews. The majority of these cases occurred in the Middle Ages, however instances have extended into the 19th century and accusations continue even today in majority Muslim societies. The pervasive use of this fantastical myth, even beyond the relevance of its original Medieval Christian context, represents a unique quality of antisemitism as a form of discrimination, as opposed to discriminatory beliefs typically born from more relevant contemporary contexts (e.g. immigration or employment issues).

It is vital to understand manifestations such as the altered image used by @HelloRaspberry to understand how antisemitism presents itself in the Information Age. The image used by @HelloRaspberry is an example of an internet ‘meme’, a term referring to online content such as jokes, videos, images, texts, websites, and ideas that are propagated from person to person via the internet.

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internet, often featuring user-created derivations through parodies, remixes, mashups or photoshops.\(^9\) Limor Shifman describes the cultural role of internet memes as “(post)modern folklore, in which shared norms and values are constructed through cultural artifacts such as Photoshopped images or urban legends.”\(^{10}\) The original template of @HelloRaspberry’s meme was intended to represent gleeful celebration of an ideological opponent’s distress through the “drinking of tears” (appendix A, figure 1.3), and has been co-opted for a range of antisemitic purposes (appendix A, figure 1.4).

The internet has provided the broader population with tools to easily edit, modify, save and upload images in this way, allowing them to be very easily weaponised in a campaign of harassment, like that perpetrated against Jewish journalists in 2016. Furthermore, the ability to act anonymously online and/or hide one’s identity behind a pseudonym provides unprecedented ease for the harassment of public figures online, while drawing no risk upon harassers’ offline social capital. This ease of modifying and sharing content, combined with the anonymity and pseudonymity of online spaces, has led to changes in the online manifestation of bullying (‘cyberbullying’), and challenges in stemming the tide of broader cyber-discrimination. While the “goyim blood” manifestation is typical of an internet meme in that it modifies an existing template, its modification goes further than other examples, which typically are associated with tears (as in the original). Instead, it also relies on the pre-existing memetic idea of blood libel, understanding that it will be recognised by Jewish targets, thereby both antagonising these Jews and fulfilling the typical purpose of internet memes of entertaining other like-minded users.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 14.
The use of the historical blood libel trope in this targeted cyberbullying context represents a concerning intersection of existing antisemitism with new communicative features of the internet, cyberbullying, and cyber-discrimination. In addition, the fantastical and bygone nature of this trope indicates a further unique quality to antisemitism brought about by the internet. Its jocular use in a targeted campaign of harassment by sardonically named pseudonymous social media accounts towards recognisable Jews represents an evolution of strategy by dedicated antisemites. This strategy serves to broaden the appeal of antisemitism online with little to no risk or cost to its perpetrators.

**Purpose and Intent**

This thesis explores the impact of the internet on the manifestation and distribution of antisemitism, while concurrently investigating solutions for diminishing its impact online. Specifically, the aim is to understand the extent of quantitative change to antisemitism brought about by the internet, and whether and how the internet has resulted in qualitative changes to antisemitism more broadly. Beyond this main purpose, this thesis also explores how antisemitism online compares to, contrasts with, and intersects with other forms of online abuse and discrimination. This additional step determines whether any qualitative changes to antisemitism brought about by the internet are shared with other forms of abuse and discrimination, or how they

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1. The use of the unhyphenated version of antisemitism is explained in an April 2015 memo from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance entitled *Spelling of Antisemitism*. It explains that an unhyphenated version indicates there is thing called ‘Semitism’ which ‘anti-Semitism’ is opposed to. This opposition to ‘Semitism’ was the purpose of Wilhelm Marr’s original definition of ‘anti-Semitism’ and was grounded in racialist nineteenth century pseudo-science. However, ‘antisemitism’ is a still well-recognised generic term for Jew-hatred. The use of an unhyphenated version of antisemitism is because of this recognition, but also to avoid legitimising the idea of an entity of ‘Semitism’.

are further distinguished from one another, providing extra scope to the qualitative analysis of antisemitism online. Furthermore, by exploring how these forms of online abuse relate and contribute to each other, this thesis reaffirms the need for interdisciplinary and inter-field approaches to online racism and abuse.\textsuperscript{12} For the purpose of this thesis, ‘interdisciplinary and inter-field approaches’ refers to two practices: firstly, combining methodologies from different major disciplines such as sociology, statistics and law; and secondly, creating research approaches applicable to fields similar to online antisemitism, such as online racism, online sexism, and cyberbullying. The promotion of interdisciplinary approaches is also supported by a research study into reducing the impact of antisemitism online, as the study’s design serves to be easily adaptable to research on other forms of online abuse and discrimination. Ultimately, this thesis’ original contributions go beyond identifying and analysing the issue of online antisemitism and will also contribute towards finding solutions and aiding broader research into analogous phenomena.

**Overview of Thesis**

The purpose of this introduction is to lay out this research project and to provide a justification for the focus on the issue of antisemitism online. It provides an outline of each major chapter, a description of its content, aims, and importance to the thesis, and major sections within. Following these outlines, this introduction affords justification for the research by providing an overall background to the current understanding of antisemitism, discrimination, and public health.

The second chapter identifies and explores key sociological concepts relevant to this thesis, and then critically examines research on relevant forms of cyber abuse and discrimination. This

comparative approach highlights the impact of the internet on the spread of broader cyber abuse and discrimination, including the ease of distribution and reproduction of existing material, accessibility to new audiences, and the inability to apply existing countermeasures. The examination of intersecting fields of research covers methods of quantifying abuse and discrimination online, problems with defining online manifestations of abuse and discrimination, and other issues that have arisen in research in these areas. The main forms of cyber abuse explored in the chapter are cyberbullying and online racism, as they are the two largest and most relevant analogous fields of research. However, online sexism is also examined through a case example of the GamerGate movement, which explores the intersection of cyberbullying and cyber-discrimination in the form of target-based harassment. By critically examining the research into these phenomena, this chapter identifies key lessons and issues that can be applied to research into online antisemitism.

The third chapter features a literature review into the scholarship on antisemitism, presenting a brief historiography of the field since World War II. This historiography serves to provide a ‘big picture’ overview of the field, tracing the evolution of scholarship on antisemitism throughout the twentieth century, which contextualises the major questions central in current antisemitism scholarship. The review also analyses the qualitative changes in antisemitism made in reaction to this scholarship. The review traces the considerable growth of the field following the Holocaust, including some of its major debates surrounding Nazi antisemitism, through to subsequent manifestations of antisemitism that evolved in the latter half of the twentieth century, namely ‘new’ antisemitism and Holocaust denial. ‘New’ antisemitism serves as a nexus for the debate over what qualifies as qualitative change to antisemitism, and so this section serves the overall thesis by examining these qualifications while also identifying the issues that complicate
the debate. Beyond Holocaust denial’s importance as a recent manifestation of antisemitism that bridges the pre-internet and internet spheres, it illuminates the fundamental adaptability of antisemitism, suggestive of qualitative change. This adaptability includes the growth of Holocaust denial as a reaction to the growth of scholarship on both the Holocaust and broader antisemitism. The breadth of the historiographical review is justified, as it highlights what makes Holocaust denial a qualitatively distinct manifestation of antisemitism and how the historical record of antisemitism contributed to this particular manifestation. In identifying adaptability as a key quality of modern antisemitism, the thesis demonstrates the need for continued research.

The fourth chapter provides a design for a methodological approach for research on online antisemitism. This design draws upon the key sociological concepts of the internet and applies lessons from the fields of cyberbullying and cyber-racism research and the preceding literature review. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the GamerGate case study with antisemitism, and then a detailed construction of research frameworks to be applied to antisemitic websites and social media platforms in chapter five. Comparative analysis of antisemitism online with other forms of online abuse addresses the purposes of this thesis in two ways. Firstly, it allows for analysis of which changes to antisemitism seen in online spaces are shared with other types of online abuse (and can thereby be attributed to the medium of the internet), and which are distinct qualitative changes particular to antisemitism. Secondly, it serves to inform and justify the creation of interdisciplinary approaches to abuse and discrimination online, including facilitating the design of standard methodologies that will allow for more accurate comparison and cooperation across fields. The construction of research frameworks in the final section of this chapter is informed by both the critical analysis of analogous fields, as well as the literature review of antisemitism.
The fifth chapter applies the frameworks constructed in chapter four to a specific selection of antisemitic websites and social media platforms, creating profiles that represent archetypes of antisemitic spaces online. The frameworks facilitate analyses of these spaces by providing criteria for which websites to analyse, streamlining the analyses, and making it possible to compare the websites and their content. In addition, the frameworks enable a comparison of pre-internet or offline manifestations of antisemitism, thereby more clearly contrasting the qualitative and quantitative changes between these different manifestations. While this chapter primarily serves to create profiles for these different websites and platforms, it also identifies key trends and qualities, thereby indicating how certain websites influence each other and why. This analysis paves the way for a comprehensive understanding of the nature of antisemitism in these spaces, including how they compare with or influence antisemitism offline. This suggests a more nuanced approach to the main question of this thesis, extending beyond how existing manifestations of antisemitism are qualitatively distinct when expressed online, to whether and how the internet changed the nature of antisemitism more broadly.

The sixth chapter features a research study conducted to measure young peoples’ abilities to recognise, research, respond to, and refute antisemitism encountered in online spaces. The study serves to advance the main purposes of the thesis: determining quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism due to the internet (in observing its effects on participant reaction) and promoting interdisciplinary approaches to online abuse and discrimination. The chapter details and justifies the design for the study, particularly in how it simulates an online encounter with an antisemite. The design uses deception to simulate the key aspects of online interaction that are overviewed in the second chapter. By providing existing resources refuting antisemitism, the study helps determine the usefulness of existing resources to young people. Both the conversations with the
antisemites and participant survey responses are analysed, thereby helping identify how the participants’ emotional response, prior knowledge of antisemitism, and general attitudes towards antisemitism affected their responses. Through this study, the chapter illustrates the qualities of the online medium that affect antisemitism’s portrayal, reception and understanding from others in shared spaces. Holocaust denial was chosen as the main antisemitic trope presented to participants in the study, as it is a qualitatively distinct pre-online manifestation of antisemitism that nonetheless can be commonly encountered online. By presenting this trope in an online medium, this study allows for analysis of whether qualitative changes to antisemitism are caused by the medium of the internet. The chapter also details and evaluates the adaptive design of the study for other forms of online abuse and discrimination, and even for other forms of pseudo-intellectualism and misinformation online. Ultimately, this chapter furthers the purpose and arguments of this thesis by putting them into practice, while also providing additional contributions to combat antisemitism online in the form of valuable data.

The seventh and final chapter takes the form of a combined discussion and conclusion. This chapter compares the findings of each chapter to provide an expanded answer to the main question of the thesis: the degree of change to antisemitism as it manifests online. Through this discussion, this chapter can evaluate antisemitism’s qualitative change compared to pre-internet forms of antisemitism. Comparing these qualitative changes with those observed within other forms of online abuse and cyber-discrimination determines online antisemitism’s qualitative distinctiveness in a broader context. The analyses of antisemitic websites and antisemitism on social media platforms in chapter five is compared with the data from chapter six’s study, further contextualising this distinctiveness and informing recommendations to combat antisemitism. These recommendations include tools, resources, and strategies for the digital age, both online and
offline. In conclusion, these tools, resources, and strategies are considered within the scope of an interdisciplinary approach to online abuse, discrimination, and misinformation, recommending methods of collaboration between fields and disciplines and to tackle these overlapping problems despite their differences. Taken together, these findings deepen our knowledge of contemporary antisemitism, discrimination, and broader internet studies.

**Justification for Research**

***Racism and Public Health***

An overarching justification for this thesis is that it helps improve public health in modern societies by contributing to the body of scholarship on the spread, levels, and removal of discrimination, particularly racism. Over the last century, racist forms of governance have been dismantled all over the globe, leaving few nations officially promoting racism. The removal of systemic and institutional racism is a boon for not only the victims of racist policy, but also for the public health of the broader society.\(^\text{13}\) For example, in the United States, segregation has long been proven to be a factor associated with increases in inter-racial violence and crime,\(^\text{14}\) as well as higher poverty rates and their related health risks.\(^\text{15}\) However, research into this phenomenon has shown that while segregation is no longer institutionally enforced, it persists in myriad forms,\(^\text{16}\) indicating that


ending the negative impacts of racism requires action beyond the removal of racist policy and institutions.

Although crime rates declined in the English-speaking ‘West’ at the end of the twentieth century, crime nonetheless remains a major public health concern. One area of particular concern is hate crime, which is crime motivated by prejudice against a member of a perceived social group or race. While overall crime rates continued to drop throughout the early twenty-first century, hate crime rates have remained stable, and in recent years have begun to rise. In the United States, data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) between 2003 and 2012 showed a slight rise in violent hate crime but at the same time featured a decrease in the reporting of violent hate crime to the police. In addition, there was no significant change in property hate crime victimisation between 2005 and 2012. These statistics indicate a rise in violent hate crime and suggest a lack of faith in law enforcement’s ability to halt its escalation and perpetration. Separately, the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) has been collecting data on reported hate crime since 1996 (appendix A, figures 3-5), which shows a drop in reported hate crime incidents in the late 1990s. However, these data have not significantly changed since the

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17 The term ‘West’ has a fraught and inconsistent history and can even be used for idealistic purposes. Nonetheless, the term does serve a heuristic purpose to refer to the interwoven history of Christianity, imperialism, and the Enlightenment within Western and Central Europe. For this thesis, the English-speaking ‘West’ refers to the countries of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, and the United States.
21 Tonry, p. 4.
23 Ibid., p. 71.
late-2000s, and these drops are far smaller compared to the overall violent and property crime rates. In Australia, there is a lack of clear hate crime statistics, despite the problems of hate crime being identified as a significant issue as early as 1989. The persistence of hate crimes signifies a persistence of racism within ‘Western’ societies, a problem that has been identified as a major public health issue by academics, including the American College of Physicians.

Research of hate crimes has found additional problems and concerns beyond the disparity between overall crime and hate crimes rates. Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland identify that racist hate crimes are the most numerically common form of hate crime (as opposed to sexist or homophobic hate crimes, for example), while also being the most familiar to political, public, and academic groups. Despite this attention, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) argues that most countries are significantly falling short in fighting hate crimes, with insufficiently aggregated data and a lack of significant penalties for discriminatory motivations in crime. However, Chakraborti and Garland argue that the data that does exist on racism suffer from an over-reliance on “incidents”, which “detaches the lived experience from its wider context of racist exclusion and

29 Jakubowicz and others, p. 31.
fails to appreciate the impact of racism on victims’ lives beyond the actual incident itself”.

This is especially important when considering high profile hate crimes, such as notorious mass shootings against minorities, with recent examples being African-American churchgoers in Charleston in 2015, LGBT people at Pulse Nightclub Orlando in 2016, Jews at the 2018 Pittsburgh Synagogue of Life shooting, and Muslims at the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooting. The cumulative effect of racism can significantly affect minorities’ overall quality of life, and is recognised to have a significant impact on mental and physical health. High profile hate crimes exacerbate this effect among the broader population, indicating that quantification by incidents alone does not capture the full picture of the effects of racism on public health. Therefore, racism clearly has a problematic impact on public health, and despite the attention raised to it thus far, it is still persistently causing problems in terms of crime and broader health concerns. This warrants further research into racism, especially beyond that of hate crime incidents, which are often a result of underlying racist sentiment. The internet, particularly social media, represents new, efficient avenues for the propagation of these underlying sentiments.

Antisemitism Rising Across the Spectrum

Considering the ongoing link between racism and public health, it is necessary for this thesis to consider the broader context in which antisemitism is increasing in the English-speaking West. This thesis focuses largely on the English-speaking West, predominately Australia and the United States, for two reasons. Firstly, there is more than enough English-language antisemitic content

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online to justify such a scope. Secondly, while antisemitism is particularly noteworthy in other languages and countries, such as those in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, expanding the scope to include them would come at the expense of other in-depth analysis. Nonetheless, this thesis does not completely ignore these regions, and explores how the internet contributes to antisemitism’s ‘globalisation’. Another key aspect of antisemitism’s ‘globalisation’ is its rise across the political spectrum, permeating through a wide range of ideologies in a variety of nations.

One factor behind increased antisemitic activity has been the global rise of far-right parties and politicians, which have given oxygen to racist ideologies and groups that harbour antisemitic views. Most notable have been groups and individuals who achieved various levels of electoral success, which represents both approval within the broader populaces as well as greater potential for the spread of antisemitism. One of the earliest post-war European far-right groups with antisemitic links to achieve electoral success was the French Front National (now known as Rassemblement National), who, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, achieved electoral breakthrough in the 1983 municipal elections, and shortly afterwards won 10 seats in the 1984 European Parliament election. Le Pen earned notoriety for statements promoting Holocaust denial and trivialisation, for which he was prosecuted under the Gayssot Act. In the United States, former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke won 38.8% of the vote in the 1991 Louisiana Gubernatorial election run in the United States. While Duke did not win the election, he managed to become the Republican Party candidate for the election, and still won over 671,000 votes. In

the United Kingdom, The British National Party (founded 1982)\(^{38}\) won seats in the European Parliament in 2009, including the party chairman, Nick Griffin.\(^{39}\) Nick Griffin was even more explicit in his Holocaust denial than Le Pen, referring to it as a “Holohoax”.\(^{40}\) In Greece, the Golden Dawn, (founded 1980) uses extensive Nazi symbolism, and in 2012 succeeded in winning twenty-one seats of the Hellenic Parliament, which they used as a platform to praise figures of Nazi Germany and to promote Holocaust denial.\(^{41}\) In 2016, right-wing antisemites were emboldened by the election of Donald Trump as US President, who has repeatedly promoted antisemitic tropes\(^{42}\) and ‘dog-whistles’.\(^{43}\) The rise in prominent far-right political parties and politicians with antisemitic ties suggests that antisemitism is resurging despite the assumed post-WWII discrediting of antisemitism and dismantling of institutional racist structures in these countries (appendix A, figure 2).

While it is important to consider both left- and right-wing antisemitism, a distinction must be made between them regarding the use of violence. There has been a noticeable increase in deadly violence used by the far-right against Jews and Jewish property, particularly since the mobilisation of the alt-right following the 2016 US election. The high-profile attacks on the


\(^{43}\) The term ‘dog-whistle’ refers to coded language that has a specific, targeted meaning for a particular group. It is often used to advance discrimination while maintaining plausible deniability. Grant Barrett, *The Official Dictionary of Unofficial English* (United States: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2006), p. 90.
Pittsburgh Tree of Life synagogue in 2018, and the San Diego Poway synagogue and Halle synagogue in 2019 were all perpetrated by far-right terrorists. These occurred in the same context as far-right attacks against other targets, such as the 2018 Christchurch mosque shooting by Brenton Tarrant. While antisemitism was not a significant factor in the ideology or attack by Tarrant, his modus operandi was adopted by the suspects in both 2019 attacks. In a letter posted to the website 8chan, John Earnest (the Poway Synagogue attacker) cited both Tarrant and Robert Bowers (the Tree of Life synagogue shooter). Earnest’s manifesto was similarly structured to Tarrant’s, which was also posted on 8chan. Stephan Balliet, the Halle shooter, livestreamed his attack on the video game streaming website Twitch, emulating Tarrant’s Facebook livestream and use of gamer-culture slang and references. In addition to significantly higher prominence of violence in right-wing antisemitism, these attacks demonstrate an intersection between far-right movements and aspects of internet culture, even with seemingly unrelated subcultures like online gaming. These intentional and often sardonic intersections are an important aspect of the new strategy of antisemites in online spaces.

47 Andre Oboler, William Allington and Patrick Scolyer-Gray, Hate and Violent Extremism from an Online Sub-Culture: The Yom Kippur Terrorist Attack in Halle, Germany (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2019).
48 Ibid.
While the topics, themes, and trajectories of right-wing antisemitism are relatively straightforward, the concurrent rise of antisemitism in left-wing groups needs to be considered more carefully to fully understand the broad picture of antisemitism in the twenty-first century, particularly surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) draws the line between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of Israel where criticism engages in double standards not demanded of other democratic nations, uses classically antisemitic symbols and images, compares Israeli policy to that of the Nazis, and denies Israel’s right to exist.\(^5\) While these distinctions might seem straightforward, controversy arises when categorising specific statements and activities as antisemitic, due to the ambiguity of language and complex history of antisemitism. Furthermore, this definition of antisemitism is either contested or ignored by a portion of the left that maintains opposition to the existence of Israel itself. This split in the left, and the antisemitic portions of it, are rooted in the recasting of Jews from oppressed to oppressors.

The exclusion of Jews from the framework of intersectionality – the framework used to identify and understand how connected and interlocking power systems are established and affect a broad range of marginalised groups\(^5\) – is emblematic of the problem of antisemitism in the West. Through a conception of Israel as a colonial oppressor, intersectionality is distorted to cast the Jews in a lens of ‘whiteness’, connecting them (especially Ashkenazi Jews) within an interlinked system of dominance headed by whites in the United States exhibiting imperialism and

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capitalism.\textsuperscript{52} When intersectionality was adopted into feminist thought in the late 1980s and 1990s,\textsuperscript{53} Jewish women faced resistance when trying to participate in intersectional discourse of “gender, race, and class”.\textsuperscript{54} This resistance and the ensuing recasting of Jews as an oppressor is rooted in a Manichean approach to anti-racism that arose in left-wing thought in the 1980s, framed as the category of ‘black’, or ‘colour’, against ‘whiteness’.\textsuperscript{55} This trend created, as David Hirsh describes, “fertile conditions for the splitting off of Israel and Jews from the community of the oppressed and for conceiving of them as white, imperialist and the enemy of the oppressed.”\textsuperscript{56} This led to Israel being associated with the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia in the 1970s, their policies being branded as an outcome of being a ‘white’ colonial settler-state.\textsuperscript{57} The anti-apartheid movement against South Africa being replicated against Israel is an extension of this Manichean anti-racism.\textsuperscript{58} It is important to remember that with the creation of Israel, Jews became cast as white European colonisers by Arab nationalists and some international left-wing movements a mere three years after the conclusion of the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{59} This rapid recasting from oppressed to oppressor still persists within left-wing circles today, excluding Jews from intersectional and anti-racist discourse, thereby laying the groundwork for left-wing antisemitism.

\textsuperscript{52} Balázs Berkovits, ‘Critical Whiteness Studies and the “Jewish Problem”’, \textit{Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie}, 5.1 (2018), 86-102 (pp. 87-88).
\textsuperscript{54} Jessica Greenebaum, ‘Placing Jewish Women into the Intersectionality of Race, Class and Gender’, \textit{Race, Class & Gender}, 6.4 (1999), 41-60 (p. 44).
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Robert S. Wistrich, \textit{From Ambivalence to Betrayal: The Left, the Jews, and Israel} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), p. 510.
\textsuperscript{58} Hirsch, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 3.
It is important to examine why recently liberated Jews were so swiftly cast as oppressors, and why this perception persists today, so that the historical roots of left-wing antisemitism after the Holocaust may be understood. Much of the post-war left-wing antisemitism, and the anti-Zionist flair it adopts, was established by Stalin’s antisemitic campaigns, exacerbated by Israel’s alignment with the West in the escalating Cold War. The Stalinist regime feared Jewish nationalists as a potential fifth column within the Soviet Union and had begun to portray Zionists as “rootless cosmopolitans”, a variance on the antisemitic trope of the ‘wandering Jew’.\textsuperscript{60} As Israel shifted towards the West, the regime’s antisemitic campaign escalated, resulting in a wave of persecution against Jewish intellectuals in the Soviet Union under the charge of “bourgeois nationalism”.\textsuperscript{61}

Due to the contexts of the Cold War and Israel’s alignment towards the West after 1948, this antisemitism became integrated with a broad anti-Western campaign,\textsuperscript{62} laying the groundwork for the association of Israel with other typical Marxist enemies of Western capitalism and imperialism. This would go so far as being codified in a pseudo-academic doctrine called ‘Zionology’; ideological propaganda posing as a study of Zionism.\textsuperscript{63}

One key example of left-wing antisemitism takes the form of associating Zionism with Nazism, casting Israel as a genocidal state like the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{64} Robert Wistrich claims that this concept was fabricated by Stalin, and was linked again with imperialism and international financiers,\textsuperscript{65} thus still maintaining an anti-Western angle. Yet while this explains the historical roots of Soviet antisemitism, it does not explain its persistence following the fall of the Soviet


\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{64} Wistrich, p. 448.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
Union. Wistrich argues that the fall of the Soviet Union and the “bankruptcy of Marxism” in 1989 left an “ideological vacuum” in the left, thereby allowing various leftist ideas to be co-opted and distorted by other ideologies and leaving the post-Cold War left vulnerable to antisemitic influences.\(^{66}\) Even though the Soviet Union fell, aspects of its legacy were still preserved through institutions such as the United Nations. Soviet propaganda culminated in the United Nations General Assembly passing Resolution 3379 in 1975, which defined Zionism as a form of racism. While it was repealed in 1991, the influence of the decision remained, leading to a push to define Zionism as a form of racism again at the UN World Conference against Racism held in Durban in 2001.\(^{67}\) In addition, the relative exclusion of Jews from intersectionality and the ‘whiteness’ versus ‘blackness’ framework of anti-racist movements laid the groundwork for the preservation of neo-Stalinist antisemitic ideas within left-wing circles. It is important to mention that not all leftist and Marxist opposition to Israel is antisemitic, just that this context explains the historical roots of post-World War II left-wing antisemitism.

The rise of antisemitism on the left and right occurs at a time where knowledge and memory of the Holocaust is fading, and Holocaust survivor populations are dwindling. A survey carried out in 2018 on behalf of The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany found that increasing numbers of Americans had particularly poor knowledge of basic facts about the Holocaust, with higher proportions of errors and lack of knowledge among millennials.\(^{68}\) 66% of


millennials were unable to identify what Auschwitz was,69 25% higher than all US adults overall, and 41% of millennials believe two million Jews or fewer were killed in the Holocaust, 10% higher than all US adults overall.70 This was despite millennials’ very positive attitudes towards Holocaust education, although with an indication that pedagogy could have been improved.71 Hence, even with positive attitudes towards Holocaust education and commemoration, these statistics portray a population increasingly vulnerable to racist misinformation, especially that of Holocaust denial, which often cloaks itself within pseudo-academic language. The intersection of this fading knowledge with rising rates of antisemitism is not necessarily causational, but still represents an opportunity for dedicated antisemites to normalise and spread antisemitic beliefs among young people, especially online. Considering the adaptability of antisemitism, it is important to examine how antisemitic beliefs and movements might spread on the internet, which has dramatically shifted the nature of human communication and the exchange of ideas.

Antisemitism and the Social Internet

The adaptability of antisemitism has been a common factor throughout history, changing and evolving to align with contemporary viewpoints, societal structures, and technologies. The rise of the internet and social media has proven no exception to this precedent, as antisemites face a reality where their discrimination can be spread with unparalleled ease under the protection of anonymity, here defined as a continuum ranging from “the totally anonymous to the thoroughly named”.72 The latter end of this range includes pseudonymity, the practise of obscuring one’s identity behind

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69 Ibid., p. 4.
70 Ibid., p. 2
71 Ibid., p.6.
pseudonyms. Online pseudonymous identities have greater durability and connectedness compared to total anonymity, as users can be recognised within communities and formulate followings while still obscuring offline identities.\textsuperscript{73} The anonymity continuum has played a central role in the development of online antisemitism as a new phenomenon. Nonetheless, online antisemitism is only relatively new to the extent that the internet itself is a relatively new phenomenon and has evolved parallel to the internet’s own development.

What has popularly become known as ‘web 2.0’, a concept popularised by Tim O’Reilly and Dale Dougherty in 2004,\textsuperscript{74} introduced platforms that emphasised user-generated content and co-development, ease of usability, and broad participation.\textsuperscript{75} This differed from the retronym ‘web 1.0’, which was distinguished by its largely static websites, lack of user interactivity and limited number of content creators.\textsuperscript{76} Social interaction underwent a significant change through some of these web 2.0 platforms, referred to as social media. Facebook, Myspace, and Friendster moulded casual social interaction into an accessible and efficient digital format, while Twitter streamlined the communication of ideas so efficiently that it changed the way ideas are exchanged in the public sphere, even within less likely forums such as higher education.\textsuperscript{77} Platforms such as Reddit have gone a step further to act as aggregate websites for information produced elsewhere online, serving as hubs for trending ideas. The educational and ideological potential of these changes requires researchers to re-examine every assumption made about the nature and spread of discrimination


\textsuperscript{74} Specifically, at the Web 2.0 Conference, 5-7 October 2004.


and misinformation. Published content and social interactions can now have a permanent record: digital imprints of virtually all online content and interactions will not get lost in archives, nor destroyed unless intentionally done so, and even if intentionally destroyed, the internet has streamlined and automated the mass replication of content, continuously republishing material to further prevent loss of content.\textsuperscript{78} Through these technologies, antisemitism cannot be erased on the internet – web 2.0 will not lose or forget it.

There have been difficulties trying to clearly quantify antisemitism in the transition between the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries, which can be partially attributed to the rise of the social internet. On one hand, some studies clearly point to a discrediting of antisemitism in the West since the fall of Nazism, partially contributing to a decline in antisemitic views. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb use data from the American Jewish Committee to show that antisemitic prejudice in Germany was in a long-term decline from the 1950s through to German reunification, and that despite spikes in antisemitic activity in the 1990s, there was no “positive echo” towards these attacks in the broader population.\textsuperscript{79} In the United States, a regular series of Anti-Defamation League (ADL) surveys demonstrated that population harbouring antisemitic views had declined to a low of 12\% in 1998, from a high of 29\% in 1964 and 20\% in 1992.\textsuperscript{80} Since 1998 and 2016, this number has hovered between 12\% and 17\%. Nonetheless, despite the apparent decline in the popularity of antisemitic views, this had been contrasted by an increase in antisemitic activity. While it is difficult to compare accurate rates of antisemitism in Australia between the 20\textsuperscript{th} and

\textsuperscript{78} Swaminathan Sivasubramanian and others, ‘Replication for web hosting systems’, \textit{ACM computing surveys}, 36.3 (September 2004), 291-334.
21st centuries, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry have collected data on rates of antisemitism since 2013.81 These reports show that antisemitic attack rates have stayed stable at around approximately 150 attacks per year, while rates of antisemitic threats are more varied, typically tied to flare-ups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since 2015, however, the quantity of antisemitic threats has exponentially increased despite the lack of any flare-up comparable to the 2014 Gaza war,82 with a notable 364% increase in online and email threats in 2018 compared to 2017.83 A Kantor centre report on major antisemitic incidents worldwide between 1989-2018 shows that antisemitic violence is significantly higher in the 21st century compared to the last decade of the 20th century.84 Within America, the ADL reported that the number of antisemitic incidents rose 57% from 2016 to 2017, the largest single-year jump on record, and second highest number since 1979,85 indicating both a rapid rise and large quantity of antisemitism in the age of social media.

While the perceived contrast between antisemitism’s popularity and activity might appear contradictory, evidence suggests otherwise. The historical record shows that small groups can conduct extensive antisemitic activity that broadly affects Jewish communities. For example, the Nazi Einsatzgruppen numbered 3000 men during the invasion of the Soviet Union,86 and were the

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82 Ibid., p. 24.
83 Ibid.
key force in the execution of over a million Soviet Jews.\textsuperscript{87} While antisemites on the internet are not threatening populations with guns, ammunition, and the backing of a major state, they have previously unparalleled networks of communication. These technological advancements in communication can be used to target large numbers of Jews with antisemitic rhetoric and cyber-attacks with unprecedented ease.

It is difficult to determine the extent the internet has played in the rise of antisemitic activity in the twenty-first century. Regardless, the relationship needs to be examined, as the rise of social media and increased internet participation has provided new avenues for the distribution of antisemitic material and recruitment into antisemitic movements, especially towards younger populations with diminishing Holocaust knowledge. In 2017, a survey of the Australian Jewish community found that younger generations were encountering a significantly higher proportion of antisemitism, particularly online. Of the 18-29 age bracket, 80% had seen antisemitic content on Facebook and 56% on other online discussion and comment forums, compared to 53% and 43% respectively for the 50-59 age bracket.\textsuperscript{88} This younger exposure of antisemitism is also reflected in real world experiences, as 14% of the 18-39 age bracket reported experiencing verbal antisemitism insults or harassment compared to 10% among the 40-59 age bracket, and 5% among the 60-79 age bracket.\textsuperscript{89} The higher exposure to antisemitism among young people may be linked to their higher internet usage and even targeting by antisemitic movements, but there are other factors to consider as well. While older generations have lower rates of internet use, they are also

\textsuperscript{87} The Einsatzgruppen was primarily made up of the SS, as well as some others from auxiliary units and police. While they worked closely with the Wehrmacht and other groups in their murder of Jews, they did form the key apparatus of this extermination, and were able to carry out much of their activities on their own. Gerry van Tonder, \textit{SS Einsatzgruppen: Nazi Death Squads, 1939-1945} (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2018), p. i.


\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 71.
likely to limit their connections to their families and a few friends, thereby reducing the chance of exposure to antisemitism. This behaviour also carries over to real world experiences, as younger people are more able to engage with broader society.

The disparity between age and antisemitism exposure raises the question of how online and offline manifestations of antisemitism affect one another. Does one tend to inspire the other, do they feed off each other, or are they largely separate realms? The rising levels of antisemitic activity and high levels of young people’s exposure to antisemitism stresses the need to investigate these questions, thereby helping determine whether the internet has caused significant quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism.

Need for Interdisciplinary Approaches and Inter-Field Research

The final major justification for the foci of this thesis is its contribution to interdisciplinary approaches to the study of online discrimination. This thesis answers the call made by Jakubowicz and colleagues to apply an interdisciplinary approach to the study of online antisemitism as one example of ‘cyber-racism’. In *Cyber Racism and Community Resilience: Strategies for Combating Online Race Hate*, Jakubowicz et al. provide an overview of how individual disciplines such as sociology, political science, psychology, cultural studies, and information technology apply overlapping but ultimately differing methodologies towards questions regarding cyber-racism. The research study in chapter six builds upon these efforts by using an integrated

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90 Jakubowicz and others, pp. 60-61.
91 Ibid., pp. 50-51, 58.
methodology that combines approaches of statistic, thematic, and content analyses extracted from victims, perpetrators, and bystanders.92

The research study in chapter six incorporates a combined methodology, both to provide valuable data on how to combat antisemitism online, but also to serve as a potential template for the study of other forms of abuse and discrimination online. The study consisted of groups of participants engaging in online discussion with a researcher posing as a holocaust denier (who is then revealed as fake at the conclusion). Statistical analyses of survey responses identify ranges and averages of emotional responses to the discussion, and a thematic analysis points out major common factors between participants and how they handled the circumstance of the study. These surveys are complemented with thematic and content analyses of the online conversations, examining the efficacy, quantity, and content of participants’ research whilst in the conversation, common themes between different groups, and how participants express their responses to the pseudo-intellectual discourse of Holocaust denial. While the study is small and qualitatively focused, its key components can potentially be expanded into larger scale quantitative research projects as well.

The research study is also designed to be adapted to research on other forms of cyber-discrimination, abuse and even misinformation. The study’s design can be adjusted to any analogous field by having the discussion regard any other notion of cyber-discrimination, abuse, or misinformation and have a researcher pose as a proponent of that belief or practice. The survey questions and data analysis are designed to measure the resistance of real participants to whatever discriminatory or problematic claim is the focus of the study, particularly their ability to recognise,

92 Ibid., p. 46
research, respond to, and refute the claim. With this adaptable design, future research can evaluate different groups’ capability to resist different forms of discrimination, abuse, and misinformation online. The results of such research can inform what areas are more difficult for particular groups.

Outside of this research study, the research of this thesis is primarily qualitative; however, it does include some quantitative considerations. Chapter four examines existing studies that attempt to quantify antisemitism online, and the issues faced in attempts to quantify cyberbullying and other forms of online discrimination. The difficulties in quantifying hate online are acknowledged by scholars, and so this thesis takes a cautious approach in its use of statistics, critically examining the methodologies previously used. This approach supports the promotion of an interdisciplinary approach to online hate, avoiding the issues already exhibited and identifying the best existing methods for statistical analyses. This thesis extends even further than merely implementing an interdisciplinary methodology by promoting an ‘inter-field’ approach to online abuse and discrimination, broadening the focus on cyber-racism analysed by Jakubowicz et al. The comparison with other forms of online abuse and discrimination and their intersections, as well as the adaptable design of the research study, promotes a broad-focus style of research, applicable to scholars from different disciplines and fields. This thesis thus aims to provide pathways to compare data on all forms of online abuse, discrimination, and potentially even misinformation.

Ultimately, this thesis is a comprehensive examination of online antisemitism using an integrated approach that goes beyond simply identifying problems, providing data that can be used in the construction and implementation of solutions. The highly adaptable nature of antisemitism and its rise over the turn of the century highlights the urgent need for this research, especially

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considering the significant effect the internet has had on human communication and the exchange of ideas. The problems presented by antisemitism online are also represented by other forms of abuse and discrimination, which continue to pose significant risks to public health globally. This thesis’ combined methodology and broad analyses therefore provides data and methodological approaches that can contribute to efforts combating all forms of abuse, discrimination, and misinformation, particularly as they spread further on the internet.
Chapter 2

Parallel Revolutions: Information and Abuse

There is a need to examine how the internet itself shapes abuse, including manifestations of abuse which are overlapping, intersecting, or analogous with antisemitism. This chapter first provides an overview of the key aspects of the internet mediums that shape user engagement, then considers how this shapes online discrimination. For the purpose of this chapter, ‘media’\(^1\) refers to the collective content produced by a particular ‘medium’, while medium refers to the means by which content is spread. A central aspect is the changing relationship between the production and consumption of content, which is significantly affected by differences in cost and ease of distribution and reproduction of content. Further considerations towards the structure of online space include manifestations of online identity and the design and spread of content online, both which relate to the production and consumption of content. Following this overview, the chapter moves on to critically examine the ways in which the medium is taken up by individuals and groups as a platform for hate speech. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the GamerGate phenomenon – a widespread misogynistic cyberbullying campaign – which serves to illustrate how online prejudice works in practice. Exploring the relationship between internet technologies and social prejudice provides a broad background for the more specific studies of antisemitism offline and online in chapters three and four. This chapter intends to demonstrate the value of

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\(^1\) For the purpose of this thesis, media’ is used in the singular form, as this thesis compares multiple ‘medias’, such as traditional and social media.
implementing an interdisciplinary research methodology that is able both to pose the kinds of questions that need to be asked, and to answer them.²

‘Prosumption’ and the Dynamics of Online Communication

As information has shifted from print media to online spaces, the means and modes of communication have broadened correspondingly. Print media was and is primarily restricted in the public sphere to news outlets, published books, pamphlets, and journals. Some of these empower the reader – for example, ‘letters to the editor’ printed in newspapers and journals – but these have limited visibility and are subject to editorial selection. Comparatively, online media – especially since the rise of ‘web 2.0’ and social media – is increasingly focused around dialogues between publisher and reader, and between readers themselves. Social media websites provide an intangible space where any number of participants can comment on an issue, each participant can see the contributions of the other, and non-participants can view others’ contributions without making their presence known. Furthermore, the role of information consumers has broadened, now involving them in the production of information. This principle is known as ‘prosumption’, or production by consumers, coined by futurist Alvin Toffler,³ and can been increasingly used to describe the nature of social media websites. For websites such as Facebook and Twitter, which rely on user-generated content, it is necessary for the consumer to provide information for others to consume, with these consumers in turn producing information of their own. This shift in information sharing has resulted in a corresponding shift in the spread of antisemitic content, which

can make it difficult to recognise and respond to the sources of such material. These issues present a new imperative for researchers to observe the reactions of antisemites to antisemitic material, as these reactions provide insight into the both popularity of the material and the motivations of antisemites themselves.

Cost, Distribution, and Reproduction

The internet’s technological capability to streamline and minimise costs of content creation and distribution speaks for itself. The digital distribution of written content via electronic signals eliminates the need for regular supplies of printing materials and large-scale manual labour for the physical distribution of offline written content, such as newspapers. Even visual and auditory content, which was distributed through electronic signals before the internet in the form of television and radio, are streamlined to the point where individuals can produce content that previously required dedicated studios. The advancement of personal computing technology, including smartphone technology, enables individuals to participate in the distribution of all types of content virtually anywhere, with the costs largely being limited to devices and data. Widespread access to personal computer technologies, such as cameras, recording devices and editing software, also encourages digital literacy. With the collective engagement of the broader global population in the participatory web 2.0, there is communal pressure to engage in the creation and distribution of this content, including a pressure to learn and use the capabilities of these technologies. This interconnected population means there is unprecedented audience accessibility for individual content creators. With the cost of content distribution online being marginal and the processes of distribution being streamlined due to personal computing technology, the internet – and more
specifically, web 2.0 – has led to a significant change in the sharing of content and information between a global interconnected audience of ‘prosumers’.

Beyond low cost and ease of distributing original content, information communication technology has also significantly streamlined the reproduction of content. Reproduction is a key factor in maximising the distribution of content; a key example of technology affecting the world is through streamlining content reproduction, and the capabilities of the internet represent the next major step in this process. Reproduction of content online is as easy as right clicking an image, piece of text, audio, or video, saving or copying it, and pressing a few buttons to reproduce it in another space online. On some social media platforms, this is streamlined even further through the implementation of ‘share’ buttons, allowing users to share content within and between social media platforms with as few as two clicks. This represents a significant decrease in time and effort involved in the reproduction of content between platforms. Virtual reproduction also eliminates the need for materials, significantly reducing both cost and time. The efficiency of reproduction has a flow-on effect to content creators; if the content they create is popular enough, they can rely on the broader online audience to reproduce elsewhere online, thereby further reducing the cost, time, and effort required to distribute their content. This gives rise to the phenomenon of internet ‘virality’, which refers to content that spreads like a virus as individual users continuously share it to more online spaces.

This thesis argues that the shifts in content production, consumption, and distribution brought about by social networking and media sites have caused antisemitism to undergo the most significant qualitative and quantitative changes since the rise of Holocaust denial. These changes have occurred not as a result of recent events in Jewish history or the creation of new antisemitic ideas but are primarily due to the transformation of communication and information sharing
introduced by the internet. If prosumption, as George Ritzer and Nathan Jurgenson suggest, is the basic model for contemporary modes of internet sociality, then it also underpins the manifestation of abuse and discrimination online. The ease of production, reception, and reproduction of content between prosumers affects both the quantity and quality of online antisemitism.

Aside from its patterns of production and reproduction, there are other distinctive features of the internet that also contribute to the expression and distribution of antisemitism. These include ‘cyberspace’, the online spaces provided by the infrastructure of websites, social media platforms, and other electronic communications. Next is online anonymity, introduced in chapter one, referring to the internet’s enablement of pseudonymised identities and complete anonymity as forms of identity protection. Additionally, the attention economy (the competition for online attention as a commodity) results in more confronting, quickly consumed manifestations of content. The combination of these phenomena can result in manifestations of content unique to the internet. One example of these forms is the internet meme, which is designed to be produced with minimal cost and time, and to be consumed quickly. Online anonymity protects the user from public exposure and censure for sharing memes that may be abusive or discriminatory, and thus facilitates the use of more controversial and dark humour. Another minor concept to consider, although it does not have a dedicated section here, is ‘trolling’, the popular practice of deliberately antagonising someone on the internet for entertainment. With the use of dark internet humour and trolling, abusive and discriminatory memes can potentially appeal to a broader crowd than just those with similar discriminatory beliefs.

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Cyberspace

‘Cyberspace’ here refers to the intangible shared electronic space in which online communication occurs. The word has evolved from the term ‘cybernetics’, penned by Norbert Wiener in 1948, which referred to the scientific study of ‘control and communication in the animal and the machine’. The technology of the internet allows individuals from all over the world to communicate instantaneously in a shared space, where all messages from all participants can potentially be read by anyone with access to them. A good example of this is a Facebook post: ‘friends’ of the poster can see the post and comment on it, with each ‘friend’ able to see other people’s comments. This has resulted in a massive increase in the efficiency of communication between like-minded individuals. The sharing of images and video footage now occurs in a matter of seconds when, prior to the internet, it would have taken hours, or even days, depending on the financial reach of an organisation. Robert Lifton and Joseph A. Paradiso distinguish cyberspace from other communicative technologies on the basis of its role in enabling the sharing of content, in contrast to television and radio, which are primarily geared towards mass consumption. Where radio and television are largely passive media technologies requiring minimal action on the part of the viewer, whereas the internet allows the active sharing of content with the click of a button. In their 2009 article, Lifton and Paradiso suggested that the creation of media was difficult, specialised and limited to a small population. However, in the time since that article was published, mobile and information technology has advanced significantly to allow ordinary users to create photo, video, and text content with ease. The practice of creating and distributing media

7 Ibid.
is no longer limited to a specialist population, although it should be mentioned that expert skills can still make a considerable difference in the quality of the content (for example, in graphics or animations). These capabilities have contributed to a merging of ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ realities as the immediacy of textual communication in digital spaces replicates the immediacy of personal conversation in physical space.\(^8\)

*Online Anonymity*

The online anonymity continuum is propagated in two main ways: first, through the specific feature of certain websites that keep the identities of contributors anonymous (e.g. Reddit, 4chan), and second, through the ability of contributors to stay unknown in additional online spaces (e.g. the ability to make a Facebook profile with a false identity). These two features allow contributors to reach a far broader audience than with print media, and for a fraction of the cost, while keeping their identities secret. The dominant models of online anonymity identified by Ya-Ching Lee are libertarian and private enterprise; both of which advocate that online communities and anonymity are better self-managed than government controlled.\(^9\) However, since information technology allows content creators to create their own online spaces with relative ease, communities will self-regulate based on their own standards rather than any general broad standard, often in ways that frustrate national laws.\(^10\) In this manner, the internet is an extension of globalisation, where spaces can be created where distance and national boundaries matter little, and identity is fluid. However,


\(^{9}\) Ya-Ching Lee, ‘Internet and Anonymity’, *Society*, 43.4 (2007), 5-7 (p. 5).

\(^{10}\) A key example of this is Facebook’s reluctance to ban Holocaust denial on its platform, despite banning other forms of hate speech, and Holocaust denial being contrary to the laws of many nations with a heavy Facebook population, e.g. Germany, Australia, Israel and France. This will be further explored in chapter five.
this feature furthers the attitude of the internet being immune to or outside of the law due to the breadth of its reach, potentially resulting in the establishment of echo chambers that significantly diverge from public standards established offline. This soloing of communities and diminished risk to social capital from anonymity can potentially lead to the normalisation of abusive, discriminatory, or misinforming content within isolated cyberspaces. The views expressed in this content are then reinforced by a cycle of prosumption, which circulates the same views in similar content.

*Internet Memes*

The term memetics, or ‘meme’, was coined by biologist Richard Dawkins in the final chapter of his 1976 book, *The Selfish Gene*, to describe a “unit of cultural transmission”, a behaviour or idea that was replicated and reproduced in the minds of individuals, comparable to (but explicitly not) a gene in biological evolution. The concept of an internet meme is somewhat different in that it refers to what is often a short-lived fad, but fundamentally follows the same evolutionary concept. In an offline space, a cultural greeting would only be met by members of the local culture and possibly visitors, but in virtual space, behaviours and ideas can be shared across borders, languages and cultures. Limor Shifman writes that the “scale, scope, and global visibility in contemporary digital environments are unprecedented” for internet memes, which represent a major part of communicative and social currency in cyberspace.

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Internet memes can take the form of a single piece of content shared under particular circumstances. This is well demonstrated by the early phenomenon of ‘Rickrolling’, where users are baited to click an internet link portrayed as something relevant or interesting, only to be directed to the YouTube video of Rick Astley’s pop song *Never Gonna Give You Up*.13 Another example is a unit that is replicated and adapted for a different purpose, such as the anachronistic ‘Hitler Downfall Parodies’, where a scene featuring Hitler yelling at his generals from the 2004 German film *Der Untergang* is given new subtitles to depict Hitler’s distress about topical events.14 While memes can take the form of videos or audio shared online, they predominantly take shape in ‘image macros’, an easily shareable image with text superimposed over it. Often the chosen image signifies a sentiment such as patronising sarcasm, realisation, anger, or glee. Internet memes are an efficient way to spread ideas and claims, and engage attention within the constraints of the ‘attention economy’.15 The attention economy refers to human attention as a scarcity, and considering the enormity of information on the internet, content that can be quickly consumed is often most successful, or ‘viral’, online.

Just like audio, video, and images, text can also manifest as an internet meme, either as a singular instance, or a modified reproduction. Text memes can come in the form of ‘copypasta’; copypasta refers to blocks of text that are copied and pasted repeatedly in different spaces, with occasional modifications that change the subject but retain an overall recognisable text pattern for online audiences.16 Aside from copypasta, smaller text-based ideas like sentences, short-phrases

or even singular words can also become ‘memeified’, allowing them to be more seamlessly implemented in regular conversation compared to image macros or audio and visual links that take one out of the discussion space. This is particularly relevant to considerations of online abuse, especially antisemitism, as it potentially enables the development of new ‘dog-whistles’ and coded discriminatory signals that users outside of discriminatory spaces are unaware of.

Internet memes show how several crucial elements in online communication – low cost and high distribution, ease of sharing, online anonymity, and the attention economy – contribute to the relational dynamics of prosumption. The minimal cost and effort required to create memes makes them ideal for sustaining prosumption-dependent cyberspaces, ensuring a self-iterating flow of content that encourages users to return and participate. Unlike other forms of media creation, creators and replicators of memes often do not expect recognition, credit, or fame for their meme creations, resulting in an expectation that users create memes solely for their own and others’ enjoyment. The benefits of online anonymity support the benefits of memes in promoting the creation and sharing of controversial content; users do not need to risk social capital by attaching their reputation to abusive or offensive material designed to be easily consumed and shared in online spaces. Online users also have ready access to meme generators (dedicated websites that streamline the modification of widely recognised templates),17 which make it easy to reproduce and alter digital content. Ultimately, internet memes represent a key qualitative change to communication and information sharing brought about by the internet and are therefore used as key objects of analysis throughout this thesis.

The way the internet has changed the production and consumption of content informs how the internet shapes abuse and discrimination. The following sections engage with scholarly research on cyberbullying and cyber-racism in order to situate antisemitism in the context of other forms of abuse and discrimination online. This approach draws on disciplinary insights from communications studies to outline the generic features of discriminatory speech online and reveal the specificities of contemporary antisemitism. This critical examination of cyberbullying and cyber-racism contributes to the overarching objective of the thesis to show how antisemitism today is qualitatively distinct from both other forms of online discrimination and pre-internet antisemitism. The following sections draw on literature from other areas of online discrimination to support a case for increased research into structural discrimination against Jewish people online.

Cyberbullying

An examination of cyberbullying is helpful in determining whether qualitative changes to antisemitism online are shared with this phenomenon. This will indicate whether these qualitative changes are determined by the change in technology, or if there are aspects unique to each phenomenon to consider. Due to the expansive nature of cyberbullying, which touches on all forms of discrimination, it serves as a central focal point to answer this question before examining other comparable forms of online discrimination.

The study of cyberbullying has grown considerably in the last fifteen years to become a major field of social research, even though online social networking itself is a relatively recent
development. Cyberbullying was not the first aspect of online harassment to be studied;\textsuperscript{18} work into online antisemitism was taking place as early as 1985 by the Anti-Defamation League,\textsuperscript{19} followed in 1995 by the Simon Wiesenthal Center.\textsuperscript{20} According to Waqas et al., online hate research spiked dramatically from 2005, coinciding with “the proliferation of social media platforms and the Internet becoming a central arena for public and private discourse”;\textsuperscript{21} This spike is supported by findings from Kowalski et al.\textsuperscript{22} This may suggest a link between growth in cyberbullying and growth in cyberbullying research.\textsuperscript{23} However, much of the growth of research interest is largely due to increased public concern over cyberbullying in schools, driving funding for research and initiatives for the prevention of cyberbullying by government departments and other bodies with a civic interest in keeping children safe. This is particularly the case in relation to a rise in incidents of youth suicide resulting from cyberbullying; some of the early studies of cyberbullying came from researchers at the Crimes Against Children Research Center.\textsuperscript{24} The heightened social awareness towards cyberbullying and online abuse of children has since served as a gateway to research into further forms of online abuse. For example, on 9 October 2015, the

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Culture of the Internet} contained a variety of early cultural and social perspectives on the internet from social science academics, marking a shift from the domination of the field by STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics). \textit{Culture of the Internet}, ed. by Sara Kiesler (Lawrence Erlbaum: Hillsdale, 1997).


\textsuperscript{20} Simon Wiesenthal Center, \textit{Racism, mayhem, & terrorism: a special review of online web sites} (Los Angeles: The Center, 1997) [on CD].


Australian government launched the Office of the Children’s eSafety Commissioner\(^{25}\) (renamed the Office of eSafety Commissioner on 23 June 2017\(^{26}\)) as the office broadened its approach to online safety. The significant rise of interest in cyberbullying and resulting research has also prompted legislative action, most recently in March 2018 with an inquiry into the adequacy of existing laws to combat cyberbullying. This inquiry recommended broadening the services offered by the eSafety Commissioner to be used by adults.\(^{27}\) While this broadening trend is a recent development, it provides an imperative for researchers into online antisemitism to produce more research, collaborate with interdisciplinary researchers and to help formulate legislation to combat online antisemitism.

**Defining Cyberbullying**

The popularisation of the term ‘cyberbullying’ is attributed to Bill Belsey, who started a website in 1999 in response to young people’s experiences of being bullied online.\(^{28}\) From its origins, research into cyberbullying has consistently derived from an interest in school bullying. For this reason, the most commonly used definitions of cyberbullying in present research have been gleaned from three elements of schoolyard bullying: intention to harm, repetition, and power.


\(^{27}\) Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, *Adequacy of existing offences in the Commonwealth Criminal Code and of state and territory criminal laws to capture cyberbullying* (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 2018), p. viii.


imbalance. However, Elizabeth Englander et al. explain that there is “no general consensus on a definition, although different versions usually include the use of digital technology to inflict harm repeatedly or to bully.” Peter K. Smith et al. have acknowledged a “growing consensus” that “[traditional] bullying is defined as repeated aggressive acts against a specific target … who cannot easily defend him- or her- self.” However, not all researchers agree that repetition ought to be a necessary component of cyberbullying; some definitions exclude actions and materials that could still have a bullying effect on the victim. Nancy Willard from the Center for Safe and Responsible Use of the Internet sought to rectify this oversight, proposing that “cyberbullying is being cruel to others by sending or posting harmful material or engaging in other forms of social aggression using the Internet or other digital technologies”. Willard then applies her definition to several specific forms of cyberbullying, such as ‘flaming’, ‘outing’, and ‘cyberstalking’. She further distinguishes between cyberbullying activities that do utilise repetition (e.g. harassment and cyberstalking) and those that can occur in a single instance (e.g. impersonation, outing, and denigration). Some of these single instance examples are significant because they can only happen once but can result in an atmosphere similar to bullying, and result in subsequent bullying from other perpetrators. For example, one singular act of making private information public, aka ‘doxxing’ a target, can invite further cyberbullying.

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33 Ibid.
34 Willard, p. 2.
In their attempts to describe the general form of cyberbullying, researchers have sought to map out key differences and overlaps between traditional bullying and cyberbullying. The main aspects of cyberbullying that distinguish it from traditional bullying include: potential anonymity/pseudonymity; the potential increased range and scope of a single bullying incident (e.g. a single email being read by a much larger cohort, or an embarrassing video being shared continuously); diminished empathy from being unable to see the perpetrator/victim as clearly as in offline space; and, continuing from the last point, the increased difficulty to judge what activities count as bullying.\(^{35}\) Additionally, research has been done into the phenomenon of disinhibition, referring to the way in which anonymity/pseudonymity encourages people to do and say things they would not otherwise.\(^{36}\) One study noted anonymity as a criterion unique to cyberbullying: while traditional bullying could potentially be done in secret, it generally could not be done anonymously.\(^{37}\)

Unlike most of the definitions for traditional bullying, cyberbullying research is noticeably split over the issue of repetition. Australian legislation, primarily the Enhancing Online Safety Act (2015), does not require repetition for material to be considered cyberbullying of a child.\(^{38}\) In a cross-cultural study spanning six European countries analysing adolescent opinions on cyberbullying, most of the adolescent participants agreed that the definition of traditional bullying applied to cyberbullying, with the notable exception of repetition.\(^{39}\) The problem with the insistence on repetition is that it implies an active and intentional desire to harm through repeated

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\(^{36}\) Kowalski and others, p. 86.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 460.


targeting of a victim by the same perpetrator. However, targeted bullying in the online space is produced less by repeated acts than by the scale of the abuse: the internet offers far more opportunity for complicity in bullying – whether intentional or not – by large numbers of people. As opposed to traditional bullying, a single (non-repetitive) cyberbullying incident can be exacerbated by passive viewing of the harmful electronic content, even if there is no intention to bully, or even to cause harm at all. One example of a non-repetitive incident could be 1,000 people each sending a different hateful message to a target. This cannot occur in traditional bullying, as the technology allows large numbers people to engage in the same space without necessarily being aware of similar messages. Collusive bullying online may also extend traditional forms of bullying that rely on exclusion and isolation through, for example, the sharing of material in group messages that embarrasses the victim, who may also be excluded from the messaging itself. Again, the element of harm is not found in repetition, but in the capacity of a group to exclude and isolate an individual.

Technology has also enabled greater access to personal information that may be used to humiliate a victim publicly and made it easier to circulate harmful material. A cyberbully’s ability to steal and share harmful information about a person, as well as utilise a large following to perpetrate abuse, can significantly increase the impact of cyberbullying. These abilities can manifest through technical skills or through social pressure and influence seen in traditional bullying. Some authors such as Daniele Law suggest that the internet has radically changed the power dynamics between victims and perpetrators by allowing room for reciprocal bullying, or reactive aggression, in which the victim of cyberbullying strikes back at the perpetrator (e.g.
through humiliating the perpetrator anonymously).\textsuperscript{40} Others offer suggestions for making sense of new expressions of power imbalance that are made available by internet technology. Dooley et al. propose that distinguishing features may include advanced technological skills (e.g. the ability to manipulate and modify images) and greater access to technology (e.g. using multiple mobile phones).\textsuperscript{41}

This exploration of debates on the definition of cyberbullying demonstrates a need to reconsider the main criteria of traditional bullying – intentionality, repetition, and power imbalance – given some of the qualitative differences between traditional and cyberbullying. Evidently, a ‘gold standard’ definition of cyberbullying, or at least working definition accepted by the majority of researchers is required. Without such a definition, countermeasures against cyberbullying will be limited, as their development will suffer from the same methodological issues as cyberbullying research. The later comparison in chapter four explores how the issues in defining and understanding cyberbullying apply to antisemitism, even though efforts to establish a common definition of antisemitism are more advanced. Issues of definition and understanding are especially necessary to consider regarding how non-researchers, particularly adolescents and young adults, may struggle to understand antisemitism due to it being a highly adaptable and insidious form of hate used for varying purposes. Comparison of cyberbullying and online antisemitism also provides opportunities for antisemitism scholars to adapt their own work according to the insights gleaned from cyberbullying research. The development of this interdisciplinary research strategy


is necessary for intervening in existing cyberbullying research, so to encourage urgently needed action to counter antisemitic forms (and other discriminatory forms) of cyberbullying.

**Media Attention, Public Concern, and the Rise of Cyberbullying Research**

According to the state-of-the-field literature, cyberbullying research rose significantly in the mid-2000s. Robin Kowalski, Susan Limber, and Patricia Agatston carried out a search of cyberbullying mentions in global media between 2003 and 2010, which showed that the number of mentions hovered between ten and twenty-five between 2003 and 2005, before jumping to over eighty in 2006, over 180 in 2007, and finally over 3500 in 2010.\(^\text{42}\) Kowalski, Limber, and Agatston attribute this rapid growth to several prominent youth suicides linked to cyberbullying. Data on cyberbullying media-mentions using Google News’ search function roughly follows this trajectory, with a steadier rise up until 2010, at which the number plateaus over the next eight years (appendix B, figure 3). Factors behind the disparity in raw numbers may be the algorithm used by Google News, the focus on exclusively online newspaper mentions, and whether duplicates were included or not (they are not included in the Google News search). Nonetheless, both methods do demonstrate a significant rise in public attention and concern over cyberbullying.

A key driver of increased public concern over cyberbullying – and the concomitant rise in media coverage and scholarly interest – is its reported connection to youth suicide. In an analysis of reporting of cyberbullying-associated suicides in the media,\(^\text{43}\) Rachel Young and others indicate the breadth of media coverage on these deaths. They searched the media coverage between 2009

\(^{42}\) Kowalski, Limber and Agatston, p. 58.  
and 2013 of six cases of youths who died by suicide due to cyberbullying, and their search yielded 818 US newspaper articles, an average of over 136 articles per child.\textsuperscript{44} If media coverage loosely reflects public concern towards cyberbullying, then these data suggest that there is an awareness, in the public sphere, of a connection between cyberbullying and child mortality. This awareness can partially explain why a December 2017 survey of parents in Australia ranked social media and technology as a greater concern (43\%) to parents than other potential threats to youth mortality such as drugs, alcohol and smoking (25\%).\textsuperscript{45} Importantly, the same survey saw parents rank cyberbullying as the biggest negative issue associated with social media use.\textsuperscript{46}

A key reason for public concern over cyberbullying is that its public visibility on social media complements its attention by traditional media. One major case that attracted widespread public interest was that of Canadian student Amanda Todd, who committed suicide on 10 October 2012, shortly after posting a video on YouTube about her experiences of being cyberbullied.\textsuperscript{47} Todd’s case demonstrated the inescapability of cyberbullying, as she continued to be stalked, harassed, and mocked for her previous suicide attempt despite moving schools multiple times. Todd’s death received global media attention, even motivating tips to the police about her harassers to the Canadian police from all around the globe.\textsuperscript{48} One key reason for the high public profile of this case was the video she made shortly before her death, which was able to be easily spread via traditional and social media. The attention from Todd’s suicide motivated several anti-

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 1085
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
cyberbullying measures in Canadian legislature, directly instigating an anti-bullying motion in 2012\textsuperscript{49} and the creation and passage of Bill C-13 in 2013.\textsuperscript{50} Amanda Todd’s case captures both how cyberbullying-related youth suicide is represented in the global media, and the enhanced virality of the news due to the online spaces within which the harassment and reaction take place. It also demonstrates the motivating factor of cyberbullying-related youth suicide on official action, including both legislation and research on cyberbullying.

In Australia, public awareness of the suicide of fourteen-year-old Dolly Everett in 2018 was also driven by social media in addition to coverage in online media sources such as \textit{ABC News}, \textit{The Guardian}, \textit{The Australian}, and \textit{The Sydney Morning Herald}, as well as non-traditional news sites like feminist website \textit{Mamamia}.\textsuperscript{51} Dolly Everett, known for being the face of Australian hat company Akubra, committed suicide on 3 January 2018 after being cyberbullied.\textsuperscript{52} Following her death, Everett’s parents started a social media campaign to fight bullying, launching a foundation

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called the Dolly’s Dream Foundation and promoting it using the hashtag #DoItForDolly. The hashtag prompted a nationwide conversation in Australia, and an online GoFundMe page created for the foundation raised over $106,000 in three months, with a total of $177,125 by the campaign’s completion. The complementing influence of traditional and social media was also demonstrated by the former helping circulate grassroots activism on social media. A 2019 short film about the dangers of cyberbullying directed by then 15-year-old Charlotte McLaverty and posted on YouTube was prominently shared by traditional media. Social media therefore allowed for the effective distribution of grassroots activism against cyberbullying, while traditional media enhanced this distribution by directing public attention towards it.

These cases demonstrate how public concern over cyberbullying and its perceived threat to youth wellbeing are enhanced by the complementing mediums of traditional and social media. It is important to note that matters of public concern are determined by an unequal political context. While members of some groups may be seen as vulnerable and their welfare intrinsically valuable, attracting significant public concern, those on the margins may not have the same access to public outrage and demands for social reform. For instance, as Gerry Georgatos has shown, the role of social inequity in shaping public concern can be seen in the disparity between the heightened attention towards Everett’s death and the indifference towards the high youth-suicide rates among Aboriginal Australians, particularly in the Northern Territory, where Everett was from. This

disparity demonstrates that concern over cyberbullying is not necessarily driven by an actual statistical rise in incidence but may be due instead to the perception of cyberbullying as a new prominent threat. That is, the media framing of cyberbullying enhances a prominent social concern that the phenomenon presents a mortality crisis for children, thus eliciting a ‘sense of priority’, or duty, to protect them.

Public concern about youth online safety following the rapid rise of social media and the almost universal access to the internet certainly appears to be a strong driver of increased cyberbullying research. As mobile technology becomes more accessible, cyberbullying is no longer limited to computer use at home but can be perpetrated at any time during the day. Around the emergence of cyberbullying research in 2006–2007, a Pew Internet Project study demonstrated that the proportion of active online users in the United States had increased from 66 per cent in 2005 to 73 per cent in 2006, with 42 per cent of users having broadband internet at home.\(^5^8\) Then another Pew study in 2008 revealed that 94 per cent of American teenagers were internet users, 66 per cent had broadband access, 71 per cent owned mobile phones and 58 per cent had a social media profile.\(^5^9\) It is worth noting that the teenager classification ranges from ages twelve to seventeen, and that social media use was concentrated in the higher ages of that bracket. Statistics presented by the Australian Communications and Media Authority demonstrate a correlating increase of internet use in Australia, with the proportion of heavy or medium internet use among fourteen to seventeen-year-olds rising from 56 per cent in 2005 to 73 per cent in 2010.\(^6^0\) A 2016


\(^{6^0}\) Australian Communications and Media Authority, *2009-10 Communications report series Report 1- Australia in the digital economy: the shift to the online environment* (Canberra: ACMA, 2010) <https://docplayer.net/14368615-
report titled *Cyberbullying of Children* presented by the New South Wales Research Service drew a direct link between the rising use of mobile technology among millennial and Generation Z youth and the risk of being cyberbullied. The rise of access to the internet and mobile communications technology can also impact the power imbalance in cyberbullying compared to traditional bullying. While some power imbalances can still exist, technology changes the power levels for different people, potentially providing an outlet for retribution by victims (e.g. through anonymous messaging and social media profile creation), encouraging cycles of reciprocal bullying.

The statistics linking mobile technology and internet use with cyberbullying are consistent across developed nations, which has pushed international growth of cyberbullying research. Across Europe in 2008, three-quarters of parents indicated their children aged 6-17 were frequently online, with internet use more common in the older children. A 2015 study by Brian O’Neill and Thuy Dinh compared the rates of online and offline bullying in European Union nations, and showed that while overall bullying rates had risen marginally from 21 per cent to 23 per cent between 2010 and 2014, cyberbullying had nearly doubled from 7 per cent to 12 per cent. O’Neill and Dinh demonstrate that youth cyberbullying rates in Europe have risen rapidly in conjunction with youth access to mobile technology. The explosive growth in internet and mobile technology growth among children correlates with both a comparatively dramatic rise in cyberbullying among children, and the growth of societal concern over the impact of this new technology. The visibility

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and virality of cyberbullying on social and traditional media also contribute to the sense of a youth crisis, and the push to prioritise cyberbullying research.

The research emphasis on the effects of online harassment on youth can be contrasted with the comparative lack of research on online antisemitism, especially considering the diminishing rates of Holocaust knowledge. Where research does consider structural discrimination, it is usually subsumed under the broader, universalising, ‘youth’ category. Since public concern is a significant driver of research quantity, diminished concern over online antisemitism indicates the acute need for effective research, aiming to both provide crucial support for youth vulnerable to antisemitism and enhance public awareness of online antisemitism’s dangers.

**Cyberbullying Prevalence**

While cyberbullying rates are represented somewhat inconsistently, the consensus is that it is increasing. An ongoing meta-analysis by the Cyberbullying Research Center provides evidence of increasing cyberbullying rates over the last five years, although the rates it cites vary erratically from study to study. This points towards an inconsistent methodology between cyberbullying studies, which is not entirely unexpected considering the youth of the field. The most successful studies are those which compare cyberbullying rates over periods of time, such as the EU study based on Net Children Go Mobile and the replicated studies in the US carried out by the Cyberbullying Research Center. While an academic consensus on cyberbullying research

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64 Cook, para. 1 of 27.
methodology has not been reached, these longitudinal studies still have the advantage of using standard methodologies over a period of time, acquiring a far more accurate picture of cyberbullying trends than individual studies that capture only a single point in time.

One of the key questions posed by researchers is how the rate of cyberbullying compares to the rates of traditional bullying and overall bullying. Research into this question has sought to determine whether cyberbullying is simply replacing traditional ‘schoolyard’ bullying, whether cyberbullying exists alongside traditional bullying (allowing the abuse to continue at home), or whether it is a largely independent phenomenon.68 Research on traditional bullying provides a clearer picture of bullying rates over time due to the longitudinal use of standard methodologies. According to research conducted in twenty-one countries in 1997–1998 and twenty-seven countries in 1997–1998, 2001–2002, and 2005–2006, there has been an overall decrease in reported bullying rates in the majority of the participating countries.69 When taken with research indicating increasing cyberbullying rates, this may indicate a stark difference or pattern of replacement between traditional bullying and cyberbullying. However, the overall decrease was reported in a majority of the countries in the study, not all countries,70 whereas research on cyberbullying has found increased rates of victimisation in all reporting countries (although the data is not as substantial). Therefore, the compared rates of traditional bullying and cyberbullying suggest, but do not prove, a degree of distinction between the forms of bullying.

Even with a distinction between traditional bullying and cyberbullying, studies that directly compare rates of both traditional bullying and cyberbullying in the same data group have shown

70 Kowalski and others, pp. 24-25.
there is a degree of overlap in terms of involvement. A study by Kowalski and Limber demonstrates that nearly half of all cyberbullying victims are also victimised by traditional bullying. However, in comparison, the vast majority of traditional bullying victims are not victims of cyberbullying.\textsuperscript{71} The overlap in bullying behaviours was corroborated by a study by Tracy E. Waasdorp and Catherine P. Bradshaw, who found that ‘most victims of cyberbullying also reported that they experienced at least one form of traditional bullying. A small minority (<5%) only experienced cyberbullying’.\textsuperscript{72} The data indicates that while traditional bullying is decreasing, cyberbullying is rising, but cyberbullying without a traditional counterpart is relatively rare. Since cyberbullying rates have consistently been lower overall than traditional bullying, this indicates that while fewer adolescents are being bullied, existing victims are increasingly targeted through cyberbullying.

Many of cyberbullying’s distinguishing factors are linked to the ‘invisibility’ of both its victims and perpetrators, which explains both its increase and the inefficacy of traditional anti-bullying measures to counter it. Waasdorp and Bradshaw found that most cyberbullied youth did not report the bullying to an adult further contributed to this perception of ‘invisibility’. Reasons for low rates of reporting to an adult (as opposed to traditional bullying) included fear of a device being confiscated, the fear of infringement of the bullies’ privacy, and the perception that adults are less technologically adept and could not help.\textsuperscript{73} The phenomenon of ‘invisibility’ makes it evident why traditional bullying countermeasures are not as effective against cyberbullying, as traditional ‘schoolyard’ bullying is far more likely to be perceived and therefore countered. This also explains why victims of traditional bullying are being increasingly cyberbullied, as

\textsuperscript{71} Kowalski and Limber, p. S15.
\textsuperscript{72} Tracy E. Waasdorp and Catherine P. Bradshaw, ‘The Overlap between Cyberbullying and Traditional Bullying’, \textit{Journal of Adolescent Health}, 56.5 (May 2015), 483-488 (p. 487).
\textsuperscript{73} Waasdorp and Bradshaw, p. 487.
cyberbullying allows an avenue to continue bullying the victim outside of the gaze of bullying countermeasures.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the overlap and differences between traditional bullying and cyberbullying, both regarding bullying itself and broader discrimination and abuse online. First, while countermeasures to traditional bullying have achieved a degree of success, they appear to have less impact on the rates of cyberbullying. Second, since a significant proportion of cyberbullying victims are also victims of traditional bullying, this suggests that bullies are adapting to technology to continue bullying outside of traditional spaces. Third, cyberbullying manifestations are often linked to traditional, or offline, manifestations. Fourth, while traditional bullying and cyberbullying are often concurrent, this does not necessarily mean that cyberbullying is simply an extension of traditional bullying, as it has several qualitatively distinct features. Therefore, cyberbullying and traditional bullying overlap, and while this overlap is not comprehensive, it demonstrates that an accurate picture of bullying cannot be captured by a narrow focus on just one variant. The existence of qualitative distinctions between online and offline variants of bullying suggests similar qualitative distinctions exist between online and offline variants of other forms of online abuse, including antisemitism. Nonetheless consideration must be made to whether these distinctions are commonly derived from the new technology or from unique aspects of the abuse.

Race and Racism in Early Internet Studies

Of the major areas of online abuse and discrimination, research into online racism is the most relevant to the study of online antisemitism. While there have been inquiries into race and racism
in online communication and culture, this scholarship is comparatively scarce compared to that on cyberbullying, even though both fields emerged at around the same time. This section introduces research on online racism to show how structural discrimination has shaped the field of knowledge on cyberbullying itself, creating a ‘colour-blind’ theoretical framework. Examinations of racism and sexism online serve to correct the lack of attention to structural discrimination in existing cyberbullying research through showing how forms of discrimination and cyberbullying intersect. The example of GamerGate, a phenomenon that has become synonymous with sexist cyberbullying, demonstrates how the intersection of varying forms of online abuse and discrimination can further distinguish their manifestations from offline variants. The comparative approach in this chapter, showing how the basic elements of cyberbullying are manifested in online discrimination, serves to contextualise the analyses of online antisemitism in chapters four and five.

State of Research

Studies exploring race and racism online started appearing shortly before the rise of cyberbullying research, during the late 1990s and early 2000s. This was several years after internet access

75 Vincent J. Llorent, Rosario Ortega-Ruiz and Izabela Zych, ‘Bullying and Cyberbullying in Minorities: Are They More Vulnerable than the Majority Group?’ Frontiers in Psychology, 7 (2016), 1-9 (p. 3).
entered the mainstream markets in Western countries such as America and Australia, shifting from
an early pioneering phase around 1995. The term ‘cyber-racism’ itself was coined in 2002 by
Les Back, and is primarily rooted in the study of the white power movement, and how white
power narratives positioned whites against Jews, blacks, and other “mongrelised races”. Thus,
even in the early stages, studies into broader cyber-racism were relevant to research into
antisemitism and were able to situate online abuse as a problem of structural inequality, rather than
the product of a generic relationship between perpetrators and victims unmarked by social identity.

Unlike the research on cyberbullying, research on online discrimination explicitly
addressed the question of how social identities are constructed and negotiated online. For example,
human-technology research pioneer Sherry Turkle explored how cyberspace allows users to
explore new perspectives on gender and race, due to the ability to “pose” as multiple identities.
Similarly, Lisa Nakamura explained how the dissociation from the body allowed by cyberspace
led to a form of “identity tourism”, through which users in online spaces can adopt racial personas,
often based on stereotypes when role-played by someone not of that race. Many of these studies

J. Glaser, J. Dixit and D.P. Green, ‘Studying hate crime with the Internet: what makes racists advocate racial
E. Lee and L. Leets, ‘Persuasive storytelling by hate groups online: examining its effects on adolescents’, American
August 2019].
Roger Clarke, ‘The Emergence of the Internet in Australia: From Researcher's Tool to Public Infrastructure’, in
Virtual Nation: The Internet in Australia, ed. by Gerald Goggin (Sydney: UNSW Press 2004), pp. 30-43 (p. 40).
Andrew Jakubowicz and others, p. 4.
80 Lisa Nakamura, ‘Race In/For Cyberspace: Identity Tourism and Racial Passing on the Internet’ Works and Days,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3531/da9329d2b7158bd697e1aa8ef073f78de6fb.pdf> [accessed 5 December
2019].
provided early warning signs, pointing towards the increased organisation of white supremacist networks\textsuperscript{82} and the targeting of adolescents by hate groups online.\textsuperscript{83} Conversely, some early studies suggested that cyberspace could avoid most iterations of real-world racism.\textsuperscript{84} This was not to say that racism would not be a factor in online communities, but rather that text-based forms of communications would lead to ‘racial anonymity’. However, even these optimistic predictions came with the anticipation of that some technology would allow racial distinction, as well as observations that race may still be identifiable through speech patterns and other factors.\textsuperscript{85}

In the years since these studies, race and racism have fallen to an auxiliary role in broader internet studies, and the internet has failed to provide the anticipated escape from race and racism. Jessie Daniels has suggested that the lack of research may be due to research into race online being a burden that often falls exclusively on researchers of colour:

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\ldots\text{the excellent work on racial identity is marked as outside the central theoretical concerns of the field, and it is left to ‘minority participants’ to give voice to their experience of racial identity in cyberspace. In other words, they are asked to perform the spectacle of the Other}\textsuperscript{86} \text{about the experience of people of color online and off.}\textsuperscript{87}
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\textsuperscript{82} Burris, Smith and Strahm, p. 232.
\textsuperscript{83} Lee and Leets, p. 951.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p. 1156.
However, there are indications that the tide is shifting in internet studies to recognise the importance of research on cyber-racism and broader discrimination. Some of the most relevant research for this thesis appears in the book by Andrew Jakubowicz and others, *Cyber Racism and Community Resilience: Strategies for Combating Online Race Hate*, published in 2017 as part of the Palgrave hate studies series. The book analyses how users respond to racism online, how the internet benefits racists, and the formulation of racist narratives online. By providing comprehensive context for the problem of cyber-racism in the early chapters, the authors establish the need and ability to address cyber-racism through enhancing community resilience. This thesis is similarly invested in using an interdisciplinary approach to study user responses to cyber-racism and develop community resilience to antisemitism. To this end, chapter six aims to develop a standard research methodology to evaluate the ability of young people to recognise, research, respond to, and refute discrimination and misinformation when encountered online.

The ‘Colour-Blind’ Internet and Capacity for Research

It is necessary to reflect on the history of research into cyber-racism in order to anticipate the problems and obstacles faced by researchers in intersecting and analogous fields (as done with cyberbullying earlier in this chapter). While the importance of race and racism online are yet to be fully examined in internet studies research (counter to the expectations of early researchers into virtual communities), early researchers made some notable observations regarding race and the internet prior to social media. The first, which has been touched on, was the expectation that the

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88 Jakubowicz and others.
89 Ibid., p. x-xii.
90 In other words, a methodology that can be replicated with different forms of discrimination, misinformation and abusive behaviours.
91 Daniels, p. 695.
depersonalised qualities of online communications could be an important tool for reducing racial discrimination. While this view had some support, it still garnered controversy even before the rise of social media. During the late 1990s, MIT media professor Henry Jenkins placed a slogan on an advertisement for an MIT public forum that read: ‘In Cyberspace, nobody knows your race unless you tell them. Do you tell?’\textsuperscript{92} Jenkins later admitted in 2002 that he had shared this hope of achieving a truly colour-blind society because online anonymity, along with a predominantly text-based form of communication, appeared to offer freedom from the racial indicators that were present in real-life interaction. Following a public forum and controversy, Jenkins later re-evaluated his initial views, which he attributed to a mix of naivety and discomfort of white ‘Netizens’ to discuss race:

Perhaps when early white Netizens were arguing that cyberspace was ‘color-blind’, what they really meant was that they desperately wanted a place where they didn’t have to think about, look at or talk about racial differences.\textsuperscript{93}

This early research provided valuable lessons for the developing field of online race and racism research. Firstly, in order to determine the qualitative changes the internet has on race and racism, researchers need to consider its effects not just on obvious perpetrators and victims, but also on bystanders – the assumed majority who do not explicitly engage in racist rhetoric or behaviour, but wish for it to become a non-issue. Secondly, it is important to be critical of how utopian views of the internet as an equal space would remove the capacity to effectively discuss the operation of

\textsuperscript{92} Jenkins, para. 1 of 10.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
race and racism online. It is this utopian vision of a colour-blind internet that harms research into cyber-racism, as it pushes scholarship on race and racism online to the margins (compared to the centrality of cyberbullying), delegitimising and burdening researchers of colour.  

Sociologists such as Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Gianpaolo Baiocchi have noted that sociology researchers often limit the significance of racism in their writings or avoid discussion of it. This has resulted in the persistent reluctance, on the part of researchers and the broader population, to consider racism as a fundamental social problem. Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi remark that this attitude has been growing since the 1960s, especially regarding racism against African Americans. They point to the post-civil rights era as a climate in which racially based discussions have been delegitimised:

Because the normative climate in [the] post-civil rights era has delegitimized the public expression of racially based feelings and viewpoints, … surveys on racial attitudes have become less meaningful to assess racial practices and have become like multiple choice exams where respondents work hard to choose the ‘right’ answers.

Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi link post-civil rights attitudes to a reluctance to consider institutional problems of racism. These attitudes also apply to discourse, both in how people discuss racism and how racist discourse is recognised by researchers and the broader population. The use of outdated

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94 Daniels, p. 708.
96 Ibid., p. 127.
97 Ibid., p. 119.
models based on measuring self-perception and personal beliefs around race has erroneously suggested that racism (especially against African Americans) decreased in the white American population. In actuality, the declining significance of these issues in research, alongside the public expression of racially based viewpoints being denormalised, has resulted in a large proportion of white people viewing issues of race and racism as unimportant. This has happened despite long-standing structural obstacles to equality continuing to exist, and newer racist ideas evolving as others have fallen out of vogue. These methodological issues have resulted in an artificial vision of progress, especially for those white researchers and ‘Netizens’ who envisioned a raceless society, and have even been attributed as a partial reason for the limited state of research into cyber-racism. Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi explained that due to bias in self-perception, researchers must instead look to ‘communicative interaction’ to identify racial ideology, because that is the place where racism is ‘produced and reproduced’.

While Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi’s thesis applies largely to offline racism and efforts to ignore institutional aspects of racism, it still applies to online communicative interaction, especially in how interactions can affect the racial viewpoints of bystanders. Their thesis explains why online users can exhibit behaviours such as resistance to recognising racism in online posts,

98 Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi, pp. 119–120.
99 There is a seemingly contradictory relationship between positive views on race relations and resistance to policies addressing racial inequality. A study by Seth Goldman and Diana Mutz in their book on “The Obama Effect”, they find that whites who rate race relations as positive high will often present significant opposition to race-based policies, because this group will view racism as less present or damaging in society. This seems to result in a virtual asymptote of racial equality, as when a society approaches equality, members of the majority begin to resist further measures addressing inequality.
100 Jenkins, para 1 of 10.
101 Ana-Maria Bliuc and others, p. 75.
102 “Communicative interaction” refers to the broader interactions that happen during communication, and in this case reflect that racism is not quantified by belief, but how it spreads in communication.
Ibid., p.120.
giving racist users benefit of the doubt, and avoiding discussions of racism online. Kevin Durrheim, Ross Greener, and Kevin A. Whitehead’s analysis of an online discussion regarding violent student protests over the ‘Africanisation’ of a South African university, in which students were described as ‘savages’, demonstrated the lengths to which posters went to avoid accusations or direct discussions of racism. The authors observed that participants avoided making accusations of racism and criticised other accusations of racism, due to the perception that such racialised dialogue would shut down discussion. This extended to denying racism on behalf of others and carefully formulating language to be deracialised, despite the context. Durrheim, Greener, and Whitehead suggest that future research should analyse ‘race trouble’, referring not to racist dialogue itself, but to how the issues of race and racism ‘trouble’ people, concurrently informing dialogue about race and racism. This example demonstrates how an ‘anything but racism’ mentality can be reinforced through online communication. Aspects like online anonymity can remove key contextual cues, such as association with racist groups or prior racist comments, thereby making it easier for majority bystanders to excuse the actions of racists. Online communication thus pushes these bystanders more towards defending racists than their victims, which can make both them and others more likely to adopt the racist viewpoints of those they defend. This demonstrates that the ‘anything but racism’ mentality can be more of a contributor to racism, than a tool against it, and that bystanders must be considered in the research of racism online.

This pattern of downplaying and ignoring racism is also present in research into race and racism online and is attributed as a partial reason for the limited state of research in this field.

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104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., p. 97.
reflecting poor conceptualisations of online racism in research. Daniels even critiques Jenkins’ own admission of ignorance about the ‘colour-blind’ internet in 2002. In his article, Jenkins uses an example of an Asian American being sent a racist email by a white colleague (who did not know the recipient’s race) to represent “misstep[s]” that can occur in the internet’s “multiracial context”.

Daniels remarks how Jenkins handwaves a racist email as a “misstep” resulting from “obliviousness”, rather than “overt racism”, and comments that this response is an example of the pattern of downplaying and reluctance explored by Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi. Even self-reflective white researchers such as Jenkins, who were coming to terms with their own naivety, were still subject to the habit of diminishing racism and race. This downplaying suggests a conceptual distinction being made between this “misstep” and explicit racists online, which risks limiting the picture of racism online.

The credibility of a ‘colour-blind’ internet has been further diminished by the rise of social media, where people interact with others as themselves and post profile pictures. Virtual and real identities became intertwined on social media, and personal identifiers allowed web users to be targeted on the basis of race or other discriminating factors. Alternatively, these identifies allow perpetrators to implement racism in cyberbullying campaigns while hiding behind anonymity. What this means is that the naivety of this ‘anything but racism’ attitude has persisted as the internet has changed, creating an online environment where both researchers and regular users may be ignorant of real issues of discrimination in an environment that can actively facilitate them. This ignorance highlights the need to broaden the conceptualisation of racism online, as research measuring online racism only through tracking hate groups and surveying self-identifying racist

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106 Jenkins, para. 3 of 10.
107 Daniels, p. 709.
viewpoints will miss the breadth and nuance of the phenomenon. Racism online must be considered in everyday communicative interactions, including how bystanders may excuse racist viewpoints, and how racists may abuse the ‘anything but racism’ mentality of many bystanders online, specifically targeting them with covert racist viewpoints hidden behind online anonymity.

Race and Racism in the Social Media Era

Despite controversy surrounding the belief that the internet could lead to a decrease in racism, this belief did have some traction leading into the social media era, resulting in observations worth considering for research into online antisemitism. Kahn et al. hypothesised in 2005 that the internet ‘had the possibility to increase prejudice (or at least expressions of it) but decrease discrimination’. In 2013, they claimed that their research had upheld their thesis. They argued that the social media trends to reduce anonymity could increase the risk of a user being targeted for discrimination as racial cues become more visible, but reduce expressions of prejudice due to the risk of perpetrators being recognised and tied to their comments. This hypothetical model ties in appropriately with the phenomenon of disinhibition and disassociation within the context of cyberbullying, representing a qualitative change where bullying can risk being further normalised and spread due to the qualities of online communication. Importantly, Kahn et al. suggest that if the current trend of reducing anonymity continues (particularly on social media platforms, where user profiles feature names, photographs, and other identifying information), online forms of racism may more closely resemble offline variants. In this way, real and virtual

109 Ibid.
identities can become intertwined. However, Kahn et al. concede that even with diminished anonymity, users can still ‘strategically’ seek out and utilise anonymity (on Twitter, for example, anyone can make an anonymous profile with the click of a button).\footnote{Ibid., p. 216.}

Kahn et al.’s theory calls attention to real-world parallels like the Ku Klux Klan obscuring their faces, anonymous vandalism, and sending of hate mail, yet the technological qualities of the internet make online anonymity far more accessible and pervasive with lower risk and time commitments than such offline variants. Furthermore, reduced anonymity does not necessarily result in reduced disassociation that comes with the predominantly text-based communications online. The technological qualities of online discussion contribute to the pervasiveness of heated exchanges online, colloquially known as ‘flame wars’ or ‘flaming’,\footnote{P.J. Moor, A. Heuvelman and R. Verleur, ‘Flaming on YouTube’, \textit{Computers in Human Behaviour}, 26.6 (November 2010), 1536-1546 (p. 1536).} in which insulting and offensive messages can be easily and hastily posted in a protected space dissociated from the recipient’s reactions. Decreased anonymity may reduce disinhibition caused by a lack of social risks, which would otherwise lead to increases of racist rhetoric or abusive behaviour; however, diminished social risk is not the only factor involved in an increase of these behaviours online.

The main question to consider, in relation to reduced anonymity online, is whether the effects of easier identification of victims are outweighed by fear of consequences for perpetrators. There are reasons to doubt this, as it is unlikely that degrees of anonymity are the sole contributor to disinhibition online. Indeed, online anonymity has likely contributed to an environment where lack of consequences for expressing discrimination is considered normal, even among those publicly identifiable online. The success of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign supports a perceived lack of consequences online, particularly due to Trump’s heavy Twitter presence and
his (and broader conservatives’) opposition to ‘political correctness’. While discriminatory individuals may still be successfully shamed online, the success of public figures such as Trump dissuades inhibition. While it could be hypothesised that online anonymity created an environment in which figures like Trump can thrive, this environment has been normalised to an extent that it seems unlikely that reducing anonymity alone will have a significant effect on inhibiting expressions of discrimination on social media. The enabling of ‘consequence-free’ speech through figures such as Trump can even create powerful peripheral spaces in which attempts to call out discrimination are more likely silenced than vice versa. The impact of these spaces on disinhibiting expressions of discrimination is then exacerbated by the accompanied disassociation that comes from online communication.

In concluding her 2012 review of race and racism in Internet Studies, Daniels comments that while 8 per cent of the United States population use Twitter (which, at the time, was more popular among blacks and Latinos than whites), there was no peer-reviewed literature about race and racism on Twitter. She did predict that this would change, and while it did, a significant factor to that change can be linked to the prominent racist behaviour, rhetoric and racial tensions surrounding the 2016 United States election. Most notable of this peer-reviewed literature is a themed section of the Ethnic and Racial Studies journal focusing on the evolution of #BlackLivesMatter on Twitter, published in mid-2017. This issue drew attention to the evolution of black identity and intersectionality on Twitter in the wake of high profile killings of

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blacks by American police and others, and also looked at the critical response to #BlackLivesMatter on Twitter.

One of the articles in this issue focused on the way social media users responded to the rise of the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag and found that as the hashtag increased its reach, it led to the rise of counter-movement hashtags, which attempted to shift the focus away from the events motivating #BlackLivesMatter (the Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown shootings), to the tactics used by the Black Lives Matter movement.114 The authors suggested that future research could investigate how racial grievances are framed using social media, and how these framings impact the evolution of counter-movements, which may be influenced by feelings of ‘race trouble’ and general discomfort about racial issues. This research can further inform understanding of how racists and their enablers continue the normalisation of structural racism through use of social media, which can be compared to the offline tactics of racists and their enablers.

In their article, Ray et al. examined the rise of counter-movement hashtags, including #AllLivesMatter and #TCOT (Top Conservatives on Twitter).115 The authors found that it was #TCOT and not #AllLivesMatter that evolved to be the primary counter-narrative to #BlackLivesMatter, especially during events linked to the Brown shooting. Although #TCOT did not receive significant media attention, it did generate a large following on Twitter. The authors hypothesised that because #TCOT was linked to an existing infrastructure of conservative commentary, it was more effectively ingrained in the conservative echo chambers that pushed

‘anything but racism’ narratives in the wake of #BlackLivesMatter.\textsuperscript{116} This research provides insight into how social media platforms like Twitter can allow groups to create their own narratives on racism, shifting Overton’s ‘window of discourse’ (which refers to the range of ideas that may be regarded as politically acceptable to the mainstream) within these groups and the broader platform.\textsuperscript{117} The research also provides insight into how such platforms can be effectively used to counter action against racism, through methods such as repainting activists as thugs and terrorists,\textsuperscript{118} and downplaying white-on-black violence by publicising black-on-white violence.\textsuperscript{119} These methods work to normalise racism by presenting a different set of ‘facts’, which are used to justify racist violence and to invalidate the testimonies and reality of racial inequality.

Counter-narrative hashtags like #TCOT embedded themselves in the American Republican Party through the Tea Party, the alt-right, and President Trump’s administration.\textsuperscript{120} The term alt-right refers to a loose far-right movement known for its younger membership, irreverent use of online culture, and centrality of white identity.\textsuperscript{121} However, the loose movement is better defined by that which it opposes, including multiculturalism, feminism, ‘establishment’ politics, a vague concept of ‘globalism’, and ‘political correctness’.\textsuperscript{122} It is this last aspect that most significantly links the movement to Trump, who himself served as a vehicle for normalising racism on Twitter

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\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 1807.
\textsuperscript{117} Overton’s ‘window of discourse’, or ‘Overton’s Window’, refers to the window of discourse that can be deemed to be acceptable by the audience, and efforts to shift that window. The term was coined in 2003 by Joseph P. Overton, former VP of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy.


\textsuperscript{118} Rashawn Ray and others., p. 1805.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 1805.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 1807.

Mike Wendling, \textit{Alt-Right: From 4chan to the White House} (London: Pluto Press, 2018), p. 3.
through his promotion of ‘political incorrectness’. Jessica Gantt Shafer has argued that Trump’s ‘political incorrectness’ “became a signifier allowing for backstage, or overt, racist sentiments to become steadily normalised as logical in the public frontstage of political discourse and social media.” Shafer explains that ‘political incorrectness’ as “truth-telling” allows racist discourse to flourish, particularly in relation to issues such as immigration and counter-terrorism, and works to silence dissent by suggesting that ‘political correctness’ jeopardises national security. It follows that such an ideology being endorsed by a national leader reduces the social risk (both perceived and real) associated with promoting ideas that could be construed as racist. Due to the design of Twitter, Trump and his followers collectively share a virtual space together, in which they can reinforce and consolidate their rhetorical sway. Twitter allows voters to express their support for Trump publicly and provides a sense of direct engagement with him, closing the traditional distance between citizens and the head of state. Users can also see the evidence of political consensus by scrolling through tweets that express the same views.

These phenomena illuminate how organised antisemites online can strategise to bring other users into these virtual spaces that promote a parallel reality in which antisemitism seems normal, while using anonymity to both protect their own identity and encourage the participation of new users. Once these communities are well established, they can use the structure of social media to reinforce their ideas and can appear to link ideas to public figures to further support their parallel

123 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump, 8 August 2015) ‘So many “politically correct” fools in our country. We have to all get back to work and stop wasting time and energy on nonsense!’ (tweet) <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/629992743788523520> [accessed 5 December 2019]. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump, 5 July 2016) ‘With Hillary and Obama, the terrorist attacks will only get worse. Politically correct fools, won't even call it what it is - RADICAL ISLAM!’ (tweet) <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/749989709275885568> [accessed 14 December 2018].
124 Jessica Gantt Shafer, ‘Donald Trump’s “Political Incorrectness”: Neoliberalism as Frontstage Racism on Social Media’, Social Media + Society, 3.3 (2017), 1-10 (p. 1).
125 Ibid., p. 5.
126 Ibid., p. 7.
realities. Ultimately, the adaptability of discriminatory movements is enhanced by social media functionality, which is especially concerning when considering the historical adaptability and varied manifestations of antisemitism.

**Likes, Dislikes, and the Positivity Bias**

There are technological aspects of platforms like Twitter that can reinforce ideological isolation and the formation of echo chambers. Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández carried out a study on how the social media platforms of Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube affected the mediation and circulation of the racial controversy surrounding the booing of Australian Football League Indigenous player Adam Goodes. In her study, Matamoros-Fernández identified how the presence or absence of ‘like’ and ‘dislike’ buttons between platforms contributes to the distribution of racism. She explained that Facebook and Twitter have a “bias towards positivity”, which includes not providing an explicit dislike button that can be used to express distaste towards racist views online (this is no longer the case for Facebook, which now has a range of emoji reactions). Comparatively, YouTube does have a dislike button, but the mere inclusion of such a button may not be effective in inhibiting racist remarks. In fact, M. Laeeq Khan notes that YouTube has virtually no control over user-generated content in the form of comments (beyond turning them off completely), resulting in a high frequency of ‘flaming’ and extreme content, such as explicit discrimination and abuse. While Facebook and Twitter are not inclined towards the expression of distaste due to the positivity bias, YouTube’s contrasting negativity bias actively enables

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128 Ibid., p. 935.
abusive and discriminatory content with few user controls for moderation. This can result in aggressive behaviours ranging from cyberbullying individual users with abusive comments and dislikes, to full-fledged campaigns to delegitimise videos through mass dislikes. Hypothetically, a platform without a strict positivity bias, combined with less anonymity and more stringent comment controls and moderation, could result in less abusive and discriminatory content, and the means to counter it more easily when it does appear.

Matamoros-Fernández’s analysis of the Adam Goodes incident preceded the introduction of Facebook emoji ‘reactions’, which dislodged the positivity bias. Reactions allow users to react differently to posts, rather than just liking them, with examples such as the ‘crying face’ emoji for reactions to sad news, or the ‘laughing face’ for reacting to funny or ridiculous things. This feature could hypothetically be used like a dislike button, as abusive or discriminatory comments could be responded to with ‘angry face’ or ‘laughing face’ emojis, expressing a user’s distaste, dislike, or disdain. However, the current Facebook algorithm weighs reactions of any kind higher than likes, enhancing the visibility of potentially controversial comments that draw a large quantity of reactions. While such buttons could hypothetically be used on social media platforms to combat racism, poor implementation can lead to greater visibility of racist content, contributing to the normalisation or promotion of racist views. In addition, Matamoros-Fernández has demonstrated that emojis are also commonly used to amplify racism along with likes and dislikes, thereby

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130 For example, a trailer for a 2019 movie, Cuck, which specifically relates to far-right radicalisation online, received massive amounts of dislikes, with over 10,000 dislikes versus 1,400 likes as of 23 October 2019. The official movie channel was able to mitigate this effect on its own video of the trailer by disabling like counters. (Movie Trailers Source, 5 September 2019), ‘Cuck Official Trailer (2019) Crime, Drama Movie’, (YouTube video) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpOWaT31wKY> [accessed 23 October 2019].
indicating that poor implementation does not just give visibility to racist content, it can actively support it.

Technological features of social media platforms such as like buttons can also function to exacerbate ideological division over racial issues in online spaces and further entrench virtual echo chambers. Such entrenchment encourages users to participate more commonly in spaces with like-minded individuals that reinforce extreme views. By manipulating like counts, groups can attempt to promote certain views. Alternatively, they can create networks that reinforce analogous spaces through reliably liking each other’s content. This strategy can potentially normalise abusive or discriminatory content within these spaces and even normalise the existence of these spaces to the users of the broader platforms.

This phenomenon of like manipulation also plays into a theory unique to the internet called ‘information laundering’, coined by Adam Klein in his 2017 book Fanaticism, Racism, and Rage Online: Corrupting the Digital Sphere.133 Klein shows how one source of information can inadvertently or directly lend its credibility to another by being linked to websites through the network of search engines, news outlets, blogs and social media platforms.134 This is complemented by the overwhelming scope of information provided by the internet, thereby resulting in users having a greater willingness to accept information provided on websites, even those previously unvisited. By using likes in social media echo chambers, users can take advantage of ideological isolation to promote a more radical website that may now fall within the echo chamber’s shifted Overton window, thereby leading to normalisation and indoctrination. These

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technological aspects of social media platforms and their effects represent one of the clearest examples of qualitative change to abusive, discriminatory, and misinformative content online.

Finally, Matamoros-Fernández also remarks how inconsistent rule implementation and monitoring of standards by the platform operators can benefit users promoting racist views. Matamoros-Fernández argues that the previously mentioned ‘bias towards positivity’ often results in a pass being given to racism in the form of humour, which is protected by the policies of Facebook without an appropriate definition of what quantifies humour.\(^\text{135}\) Further, the policies that platforms like Facebook and Twitter have in place to identify and respond to offensive material may often not be flexible enough to accommodate hate-speech complaints. For instance, Twitter’s policy forbids harassment, but when users sent through screenshots of racist content directed towards Adam Goodes as evidence, Twitter ignored them, as its policy dictated that only links would be accepted as proof of harassment.\(^\text{136}\) Going even further, black activists have claimed that Facebook’s moderation policies have been repeatedly used on the accounts of black people who call out racism, thereby stifling voices attempting to challenge discrimination online.\(^\text{137}\) At worst, social media platforms’ policing of community standards may even do more harm to vulnerable communities than good.

The poor implementation of rules, and apparent ignorance of platform operators as to how racists take advantage of their policies and technology highlights how social media can lead to a quantitative increase in racism, including antisemitism. The normalisation of discrimination


\(^{136}\) Ibid., p. 940.

through information laundering is a key qualitative change of concern, especially considering the varied manifestations of antisemitism, which can provide multiple avenues of entry into the hatred. Nonetheless, further investigation is required to evaluate whether information laundering of antisemitic views online is distinct from the laundering of other discriminatory and abusive content. Combining well-informed moderation policies with elements balancing inhibition and positivity/negativity biases may help discourage the online distribution of both explicit and discreet forms of discriminatory and abusive content.

Quantifying Racism Online and Interdisciplinary Methodologies

Another lesson to be learned from research into online racism is how researchers quantify expressions of racism online, and what the statistics indicate about the relationship between racism and the internet. Researchers have historically had difficulty with quantifying racism, a difficulty Phillip Atiba Goff links to the ‘measurement problem’, understood through the two separate components of causality and data.138 The causality problem refers to the difficulty in determining whether racial disparities stem from racial discrimination, or vice versa. In other words: does socio-economic inequality cause minorities to be discriminated against (e.g. a stereotype of a ‘dumb’ minority due to lack of access to quality education), or does discrimination of minorities cause socio-economic inequality (e.g. people charging higher prices to minorities they do not like). In the case of the latter, it can be difficult to determine the root of the original discriminatory trope that causes inequality (e.g. why does the person charging higher prices to a certain minority group

not like this group?). The data component refers to the difficulty in procuring data that demonstrates racism, as it often must be mined from sources that may be responsible for said racism, and therefore are reluctant to make it available (for example, a police agency wanting to hide the fact they are racially profiling could impede access to the demographic information of people stopped by police). In comparison, quantitative approaches to bullying have been more effective, even if definitional or methodological issues continue to cause inconsistent statistics between studies.

This difference between cyberbullying and racism quantification can be partially explained by the ecological problems caused by carrying out surveys for racism. While bullying perpetrators may be willing to admit to their bullying in an anonymous survey, perpetrators of racism may not, due to their unwillingness to consider themselves as racist.139 Out of a sample of 2,141 Australians who had posted about race, culture, or religion online, 38 respondents indicated that the content they had posted was considered racist by themselves or by others, with 24 out of the 38 considering the content racist themselves.140 This result suggests a noticeable proportion (approximately 37%) of cyber-racism posters did not consider themselves as racist, or the material they shared as racist, even after being called out. This issue is further complicated in situations where users (especially online) promote racist views while not necessarily believing in them – such as engaging in controversial humour.141 Attempting to quantify racism by examining perpetrators can therefore

139 This may be due to admitting to a racist incident may be seen as admitting to one have a racist nature, which is a significant social faux pas. Comparatively, admitting to participating in a bullying incident(s) might not encourage survey respondents to identify themselves as having a bullying ‘nature’.
140 Jakubowicz and others, p. 81.
141 For example, cartoonist Ben Garrison has had a number of his cartoons edited to contain explicit racist and antisemitic tropes by internet trolls. The Online Hate Prevention institute reported on a Facebook page that distributed these images, wherein the page described its purpose as ‘just for fun’. Nonetheless, this would lead to a normalisation of antisemitism. Andre Oboler, The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2014) <https://www.scribd.com/document/205092520/The-Antisemitic-Meme-of-the-Jew#fullscreen&from_embed> [accessed 12 December 2018] (p. 27).
be problematic, though it also provides opportunity to approach the matter of individual belief systems differently; researchers may revise their methodological tools to examine factors such as intent and awareness of discriminatory discourse.

There can also be issues in quantifying racism through examining victims. One common method for quantifying racism has been the surveying of victims, which led to the development of tools that attempt to measure perceptions of racism. One example of these tools is the Perception of Racism Scale, developed by M. McNeilly and validated by various studies during the 1990s,\textsuperscript{142} and later adapted by Sandra Moody-Ayers et al.\textsuperscript{143} The relative success of this scale resulted in its later evolution online in 2016–2017 by Brian TaeHyuk Keum and Matthew J. Miller as the Perceived Online Racism Scale (PORS v1.0).\textsuperscript{144} The PORS was successfully developed to measure more blatant examples of online racism, however, and Keum and Miller acknowledge its limitations in its ability to measure examples of subtle racism.\textsuperscript{145}

As suggested by Keum and Miller’s results, subtle racism may be harder to detect in quantitative research. For social media, anonymity is often limited, and moderation may be stricter, so subtle racism is used to give users plausible deniability (for example, saying they were ‘only joking’), to provide signals to others, and to get around platform regulations. Another issue with the perception of blatant racism online is Poe’s Law, which states that without an obvious indicator of authorial intent, a joke or parody of extreme views may be viewed as serious, especially online,

\textsuperscript{142} Nancy L. Green, ‘Development of the Perceptions of Racism Scale’, \textit{Journal of Nursing Scholarship}, 27.2 (Summer 1995), 141-146 (p. 145).
\textsuperscript{144} Brian TaeHyuk Keum and Matthew J. Miller, ‘Racism in Digital Era: Development and Initial Validation of the Perceived Online Racism Scale (PORS v1.0)’, \textit{Journal of Counseling Psychology}, 64.3 (2017), 310-324.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 321.
due to a lack of direct personal interaction. On one level, this creates a legitimate problem of false positives for the PORS system, but also opens a larger debate: how should misinterpretations of parodies of racism be treated by researchers into cyber-racism? The PORS system would also have limited value for spaces in which racism is highly normalised: in such cases, it would be difficult to find participants who would not already be originators or promoters, rather than victims, of racist discourses (given that PORS measures people’s experiences of racism). PORS faces limitations in accurately quantifying levels of racism online alone. However, by acknowledging its issues, researchers can investigate other factors relating to cyber-racism online, such as participation and withdrawal from spaces, and the locales of more blatant expressions of racism online.

Prior to PORS there were few other attempts to quantify racism online; however, one attempt is worth considering here. Most notably, Brendesha Tynes and Eleanor Seaton examined perceived levels of racial discrimination among a population of adolescents of colour between 2010 and 2013. While the study was conducted prior to PORS and therefore without a standard methodology used in other quantitative studies of online racism, the practice of analysing the same population over three years with a standard methodology provides an important element of consistency. Tynes and Seaton found that direct racial discrimination (in which the participant was targeted for their race) was rarer than indirect racial discrimination (in which the participant

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146 Scott F. Aikin, ‘Poe’s Law, group polarization, and argumentative failure in religious and political discourse’, Social Semiotics, 23.3 (01 June 2013), 301-317 (p. 301).
148 It is worth considering that despite the comparatively broader research on cyberbullying, the lack of standard methodologies resulted in highly variable rates of victimisation and perpetration, with longitudinal studies producing the most reliable data on cyberbullying rates and trends.
was not personally targeted, but witnessed examples of racism).\textsuperscript{149} However, over the three years, the rates of indirect racial discrimination stayed largely stable, while the rates of direct racial discrimination increased.\textsuperscript{150} While this is only a single study, and conducted only over three years, it may serve as a warning to keep watch for rising rates of more antagonistic racial discrimination. While the adoption of PORS as a standard methodology is an important step for research into online racism, Tynes and Seaton’s research notably does attempt to record the subtler examples of racism that Keum and Miller acknowledge are limited by PORS.\textsuperscript{151} Tynes and Seaton’s study also provides further indication that the culture of anonymity as well as a growing lack of accountability in online spaces is enabling and normalising more direct manifestations of racism.

Jakubowicz et al. include a much-needed analysis of methodologies studying cyber-racism across multiple disciplines.\textsuperscript{152} They examine approaches in sociology, political science, criminology, cultural studies and anthropology, communication science, psychology, and information science, demonstrating the breadth of fields that examine the phenomenon. They also suggest that cross-disciplinary incoherence results in ‘complex, but often fragmented conceptualisations’ of cyber-racism, leading to ‘difficulties in integrating the research findings from those various disciplines’.\textsuperscript{153} They propose a framework in which individual disciplines can still offer conceptualisations unique to their fields, but also allow them to integrate results more broadly.\textsuperscript{154} Compared to cyberbullying, which still struggles with methodological inconsistencies despite being limited to a singular field, this is a significant research development that would benefit all tangential fields if adopted. As established in this chapter, phenomena like cyber-racism,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[149] Ibid., para. 5 of 13.
\item[150] Ibid., para 6 of 13.
\item[151] Keum and Miller, p. 312.
\item[152] Jakubowicz and others, pp. 45-64.
\item[153] Ibid., pp. 48-49.
\item[154] Ibid., p. 61.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
cyberbullying, and antisemitism online do not exist in a vacuum, and because of the internet, increasingly overlap with each other and broader discriminatory and abusive behaviour.

While Daniels lamented in 2012 that the study of race and racism online was “undertheorized”, more studies have appeared since that have assessed racism online in political context. These studies link the racial tensions following high-profile white-on-black shootings in the United States to the rise of right-wing populism and violence in various Western nations. While the new consideration of this political context has brought greater sophistication to research into online racism, the frameworks, tools, methodologies, and observations made by this research are still new and underutilised. Therefore, when applying this to research on online antisemitism, it is important utilise these lessons and tools with a level of caution. Nonetheless, as the examination of cyberbullying literature demonstrated, it is especially important to develop common methodologies to produce a consistent picture of racism online across the research. Furthermore, while antisemitism has distinguishing factors that are different to the racism examined in this research, there are enough overlaps to warrant its consideration and application within this thesis.

**Group-based Cyberbullying: #Gamergate**

One of the key arguments of this thesis is for research to acknowledge how different forms of abuse and discrimination online intersect. To focus exclusively on one form of online abuse and discrimination is to limit our understanding of the broader field. One way to carry out research with an inter-field approach is to examine a particular online phenomenon or movement with a view to how it manifests intersecting and analogous forms of abuse and discrimination. GamerGate

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155 Daniels, p. 708.
has been selected as an example of this kind of approach, as it demonstrates a key intersection of cyberbullying and online discrimination. However, it has also been chosen because it is more widely associated with misogyny rather than cyber-racism. An examination of this movement thus further demonstrates how types of discrimination online relate to one another. This examination of GamerGate primarily concerns the intersection of cyberbullying and discrimination in the form of misogyny. The broader implications of this intersection are considered later, in chapter four, when the movement is compared more directly with antisemitism.

The GamerGate movement purportedly advocated for “ethics in video game journalism”, but was functionally a harassment campaign conducted in reaction to feminist critiques of sexism in video games and the video game industry. The dishonesty of its claim to be calling for journalistic integrity is evident from the clear debunking of many GamerGate press criticisms, most particularly the founding myth of the movement itself. The movement (and, tangentially, the hashtag #GamerGate) originated in August 2014 with an online harassment campaign against independent female game developer Zoe Quinn, after her ex-boyfriend, Eron Gjoni, wrote a blog post accusing her of having sex with game reviewers in exchange for positive reviews of her game, *Depression Quest*. The blog post was distributed among the Something Awful forums and 4chan imageboard, resulting in an intense cyberbullying campaign against

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159 Cherie Todd, ‘Commentary: GamerGate and the resistance to the diversification of gaming culture’, *Women’s Studies Journal*, 29.1 (2015), 64-67 (p. 64).
Quinn. Despite none of these reviews existing, and Gjoni’s accusations proven to be unfounded, the movement grew and manifested as a broad cyberbullying and harassment campaign against those seen to be threatening the gaming industry as part of a broader ‘culture war’ between progressive intersectional feminists and traditional spaces.

Beyond being one of the most prominent discriminatory and abusive movements in the history of the internet, the GamerGate movement also warrants study due to its manifestations of cyberbullying, which shifted from harassment of specific individual targets on a personal basis, to a broader campaign of harassment on the basis of (female) group membership. The inciting act of the GamerGate movement, Gjoni’s defamatory blog post against his ex-girlfriend, resembles a straightforward example of cyberbullying an individual on a personally motivated basis. Yet, as the movement grew, it steadily shifted away from this individually targeted cyberbullying to a broader cyberbullying campaign, mobilising against individuals associated with the target group, as well as promoting a more general misogyny. The initial cyberbullying campaign perpetrated against Quinn, which manifested largely through doxing and rape/death threats, spread to other analogous targets such as game developer Brianna Wu and feminist critic Anita Sarkeesian.

As the online aggression digressed from the personal relationship between Gjoni and Quinn, the broadening of harassment targets set the stage for group-based cyberbullying. The evolution to group-based cyberbullying manifested in the increase in hate messages against

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161 Todd, p. 64.
163 The act of sharing personal information (such as phone numbers, personal email addresses and home addresses) of another person publicly on the internet.
164 Anita Sarkeesian had been a target of online misogyny and cyberbullying as early as 2012 (before GamerGate), but the volume of abuse against increased once targeted by the GamerGate membership. Torill Elvira Mortensen, ‘Anger, Fear, and Games: The Long Event of #GamerGate’, Games and Culture, 13.8 (2018), 787-806 (p. 793). Todd, p. 65.
journalists behind a series of articles questioning ‘gamer’ identity and declaring that ‘gamers are
dead’.\textsuperscript{165} The ‘death of the gamer’ implied that the traditional ‘gamer’ identity – which was
inseparable from normative masculine gender and sexuality – had become a misogynistic
anachronism as videogame culture became more progressive. The ensuing outrage facilitated the
growth of membership and activity in the GamerGate movement, and in turn drew the attention of
journalists and researchers critiquing the movement. This resulted in the drawing of perceived
virtual battle lines in the imagined ‘culture war’ by the movement’s proponents. This invocation
of a ‘culture war’ shares significant characteristics with antisemitism, as similar ideas are key in
the conceptualisation of antisemitic conspiracy theories, as explored in chapters three and four.

Beyond journalists, GamerGate also targeted the video gaming research community with
accusations of conspiracy, surprising many researchers,\textsuperscript{166} and, ironically, attracting greater
scholarly analysis of the movement.\textsuperscript{167} The ‘us versus them’ framing of the GamerGate movement
expressed a paranoid conspiracy theory mentality which exaggerating the unity between targets of
harassment. In order to validate coordinated harassment, the GamerGate movement depicted their
victims as a coordinated, aggressive unit, rather than a series of individual, loosely connected
journalists, critics, and researchers with broadly overlapping aims and perspectives. These aims
ranged from publishing feminist criticism on video games (particularly Anita Sarkeesian), to
exposing harassment in the video game industry, to pushing for more gender, sexual, racial, and
bodily diversity in video games and the video game industry, and even to broadening market share
by game developers. GamerGate therefore positioned a swarm of anonymous online users, all

\textsuperscript{165} Mortensen, p. 790.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p. 788.
\textsuperscript{167} Carl Straumsheim, ‘#Gamergate and Games Research’, Inside Higher Ed, 11 November 2014,
association> [accessed 5 December 2019] (para. 2 of 29).
perceiving a common enemy, against identifiable and recognisable public targets who themselves had comparatively few methods to identify their harassers. The phenomenon of GamerGate therefore represents an example of proactive, rather than reactive, cyberbullying.

The transition from individual to group-based cyberbullying represents its intersection with discrimination, namely misogyny, in the GamerGate movement. More broadly, this has raised questions as to why such an outpouring of misogyny happened over the video game industry. As Cherie Todd suggests, male-dominated institutions, like that of the gaming industry, are also inherently sexist:

Women experience sexism and misogyny in various cultural arenas, especially in fields where the majority of participants are men, such as sports. Yet, in comparison, the level of hatred and abuse that is being directed at women like Sarkeesian and Wu from certain people in the gaming community is unparalleled.\textsuperscript{168}

Some researchers have argued that the discrimination has long been rooted in the culture surrounding video games. Todd points towards the \#1reasonwhy phenomenon in 2012, which asked women on Twitter why there were so few female game developers. Thousands of women tweeted about shared experiences of sexism, exclusion and harassment within the industry. Many of these tweets faced cold, unsupportive and misogynistic responses from male gamers.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{168} Todd, p. 65.  
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
Salter draws on Herbert Marcuse’s theory of technological rationality to explain how social relations and hierarchies participate in the development and implementation of technology. Salter argues that the long-held association of masculinity with technology, and video games as an extension of ‘technological culture’, resulted in the embedding of misogyny and sexism within the video game industry. This can be considered alongside Adrienne Massanari’s conception of ‘toxic technocultures’, toxic cultures enabled and spread by technological social networks such as social media or video gaming. The association of technology with masculinity thus embeds misogyny in video game industry and culture and within cultures surrounding the technological marvel of the internet itself. This latter aspect is demonstrated by the meme ‘There are No Girls on the Internet’, assuming women do not participate significantly on the internet due to its technological nature. This may also lead to further forms of discrimination being embedded in these communities, such as racism against minorities, as these communities tend to react against perceived invasions by groups that the internet previously enabled them to ignore.

GamerGate represented a transition from individual/personal-based bullying to group-based bullying and continued to perpetrate their harassment and discrimination on the basis of a perceived threat, rather than reacting to a prior attack. In a sense, GamerGate constructed a fictional enemy to stabilise a deeply insecure identity felt to be under attack. Hence, the theory of reactivity elaborated in the cyberbullying literature is unable to account for more complex dynamics of

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171 Salter, p. 259.
172 Massanari, p. 342.
173 This assumption is also reinforced by online anonymity, which can enable the illusion that only men are participating in anonymous/pseudonymous online cultures.
174 For example, how online anonymity allowed majority users to ignore issues of race and racism in online spaces, giving rise to the idea of the ‘colour-blind’ internet.
online aggression that arise from the broader politics of identity. GamerGate represents a qualitative change in bullying, discrimination, and misinformation enabled by the technology of the internet and social media. A study by Despoina Chatzakou et al. of 1.6 million tweets demonstrated that the success of various online harassment campaigns was enabled by GamerGate members’ savvy use of Twitter and Reddit.175 This savvy platform use, combined with widespread anonymity and the ability to easily organise176 via the #GamerGate hashtag and /r/kotakuinaction ‘subreddit’, enabled a ‘swarm-like’ behaviour of harassment, often manifesting in a stream of messages sent by many different aggressors. This behaviour allowed the movement to cyberbully targets en masse, despite the lack of a leader and despite any varying views and motivations by movement proponents.177 In addition, the reluctance of website administrators to intervene in their anonymous spaces further supported the entrenchment of the GamerGate movement alongside other toxic ‘technocultures’.178 The GamerGate movement therefore serves as an example of how the internet has caused qualitative changes to bullying, how isolated incidents of cyberbullying can become mobilised in much larger campaigns of discrimination against target groups, and how misogyny intersects with cyberbullying and other forms of abuse.

**Conclusion**

As seen with GamerGate, various forms of cyber abuse and discrimination intersect, and such intersections cannot be ignored when applying research to any individual example of online abuse.

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176 Ibid.
177 This may include views about the main goals of the movement, who the enemies of the movement were, etc. Mortensen, pp. 793-94.
or discrimination. Furthermore, the ways in which types of abuse and discrimination intersect can result in qualitative changes. In the case of GamerGate, the movement’s reactionary misogyny resulted in a shift from individual cyberbullying to group-based cyberbullying, a manifestation significantly distinct from traditional bullying. This intersection justifies this chapter’s focus on the phenomena of cyberbullying and cyber-racism, as they, and the fields that research them, are key to contextualising other discriminatory phenomena on the internet, such as antisemitism.

Aspects of the internet and social media have fundamentally shifted the distribution, consumption and redistribution of content, warranting a significant re-examination of the impacts of communication on online phenomena. These shifts highlight the need to further examine discrimination through communicative interactions, rather than through the traditional approach of surveying viewpoints and beliefs. The inability of majority groups to recognise issues of structural inequality can be further exacerbated online, as features like online anonymity enable further ignorance towards issues of race and racism, even to the point of defending racists over their victims. This opposition to engaging in ‘race trouble’ is one of the key factors to consider in future research on online discrimination. The potential manipulation of these bystanders by racists reflects the relative ease for discriminatory actors, even individuals, to propagate savvy propaganda.

The changes to distribution, consumption, and redistribution of content online reflect fundamental temporal and spatial changes to abuse online, particularly cyberbullying. The internet has created new spatial relations that mean victims can no longer easily escape cyberbullying and feel the immediacy of communication. This represents a potential ‘weaponisation’ of abuse online, supporting savvy propaganda efforts of online racists who hide behind anonymity. This can give rise to a new form of structural inequality online, as minorities can be abused and forced offline
while perpetrators face no significant costs or dangers, and other members of majority groups can remain unaware of this public online abuse faced by minorities. This emphasises the demand for broader research and efforts to counter abuse and discrimination online, but also highlights the need to consider structural inequality in online abuse and discrimination. This applies even in well-researched fields like cyberbullying, which already suffers from a narrow focus on children, and struggles to identify the link between structural inequality and online abuse. This new structural inequality and weaponisation of abuse potentially represents a common set of qualitative and quantitative changes to all forms of discrimination online. It is in-depth examinations of specific forms of online discrimination, like antisemitism in this thesis, that can evaluate what quantitative and qualitative changes are unique, so long that such examinations properly consider any intersections with broader discrimination and abuse.

The size of cyberbullying research reflects a heightened public awareness of the threat of online abuse and the need to re-evaluate strategies to it. Efforts to re-evaluate these strategies have been aided by the complementing efforts of traditional and social medias: raising awareness and running campaigns to educate and encourage legislative action and research. However, the heightened public awareness of cyberbullying further highlights the comparative lack of awareness of cyber-discrimination and its dangers. Ultimately, both research and public awareness need to be broadened to consider all forms of abuse and discrimination online, including structural discrimination, in order to properly counter these phenomena.

Anonymity, dissociation, and disinhibition are key factors to consider in research on online abuse and discrimination. Views on the relation of anonymity to discrimination online have ranged from predicting a utopian ‘colour-blind’ society, to hypothesising increasing expressions of racist viewpoints. Ultimately the relationship between these factors and discrimination online is more
complex and cannot be distanced from contemporary events, particularly the election and prominent social media use of Donald Trump. While these factors are key in any qualitative and quantitative changes to discrimination online, they themselves may result in the creation and influence of cultures and realities that no longer rely on anonymity to normalise and spread discrimination. Further consideration must be applied to ‘anonymity gaps’ (i.e. where victims are visible online and perpetrators are anonymous) as this phenomenon can contribute to changes in abusive behaviours online, such as the shift in cyberbullying behaviours demonstrated by the GamerGate movement. This shift further emphasises the need to consider how broader forms of online abuse and discrimination intersect, even when focusing on a singular phenomenon, such as antisemitism.

Ultimately, research into online antisemitism needs to consider its intersections with other forms of abuse and discrimination, while avoiding the issues already present in research on these intersecting phenomena. Most important is the development of standard research methodologies that can capture broader trends of antisemitism online, and potentially other forms of discrimination and abuse. However, in doing so, issues relating to defining phenomena must also be considered in order to effectively develop these methodologies while also evaluating qualitative and quantitative changes. In order to apply the lessons learned from this chapter to online antisemitism, a review of the literature on antisemitism itself is also required to ensure this thesis is well placed to carry out a comprehensive analysis of antisemitism online and its intersections with other forms of abuse and discrimination online.
Chapter 3

Antisemitism Scholarship Literature Review: Reacting to Reactionaryism

A careful consideration of the history and current state of research on antisemitism is essential to understanding the nature and scope of antisemitism online. As seen in chapter two with sociological research on racism against African Americans, researchers lacking familiarity with the forms of discrimination they research can cause systemic problems within their fields. The following review covers both the seminal and most recent academic work on the history of antisemitism, from its ancient manifestations up to the twenty-first century. Through examining the historiography of antisemitism, this review demonstrates the changing natures of both antisemitism and the scholarship on antisemitism. This review demonstrates a reactive relationship between antisemitism and scholarship following the Holocaust, especially in the manifestation of Holocaust denial. This reactive relationship is key to this thesis’ examination of online antisemitism, as it highlights both the increasingly adaptive nature of antisemitism and the ongoing need for scholarship to adapt. An overview of research on broader antisemitism after World War II is provided, ranging from religious to state manifestations, so as to contrast the later manifestation of Holocaust denial and trace the adaptive nature of antisemitism. Finally, the review concludes with an overview of the research on ‘new’ antisemitism, particularly regarding the debate on whether ‘new’ antisemitism is qualitatively distinct from past antisemitism, thereby enabling this thesis to appropriately consider whether antisemitism has undergone qualitative changes due to the internet.
The reactive relationship between antisemitism and research thereof is contextualised by a focus on the post-World War II historiography of antisemitism. This review begins by covering post-war scholarship on state-based antisemitism, which predominately focuses on German state antisemitism. State antisemitism here refers to manifestations of antisemitism that are promoted or caused by the ‘state’ – the governments of various nations – and/or are linked to the broader nationalisms of these nations. The broader historiography of antisemitism following World War II then highlights common causes and manifestations of antisemitism between nations, pointing towards antisemitism’s ‘globalisation’, which is later exacerbated by the globalising forces of the internet. Early and contemporary efforts to globalise antisemitism are further considered in the following section on religious antisemitism, covering both pre-World War II Christian antisemitism and recent manifestations of Islamic antisemitism. Following these analyses, the review covers the literature on several specific manifestations of antisemitism that have risen since the conclusion of World War II, namely Holocaust denial and ‘new’ antisemitism. This review thus provides both a broad overview of the research into antisemitism itself, along with investigating specific qualitative changes in antisemitism that are relevant to any qualitative changes to antisemitism on the internet.

The section on religious antisemitism investigates how manifestations of Christian antisemitism and Islamic antisemitism interplay, providing insight into how older manifestations influence contemporary manifestations linked to the state of Israel. For this purpose, the term Islamic antisemitism is used to refer to both that which is promoted by Muslim nations, and traditional religious, Islam-inspired antisemitism.¹ In addition, this section explores the concept of

¹ Esther Webman writes that the antisemitism expressed by Arabs and Arab states has a significant “Islamic character”, but notes that antisemitism is not static and “metamorphoses in accordance with issues and
‘anti-Judaism’, distinguished from antisemitism by specific opposition to ‘Jewishness’. The religious antisemitism section therefore covers Christian antisemitism, Islamic antisemitism, and anti-Judaism in order to compare qualitative distinctions between these and other manifestations of antisemitism. In addition, this section highlights the adaptability, globalisation, and interplay of antisemitic manifestations, all of which are enhanced by the internet.

Distinct from other manifestations of antisemitism, this review highlights the role of Holocaust denial in the shifting landscape of post-war antisemitism, and the ensuing scholarly response to it. The section on Holocaust denial is a core focus of this review, as Holocaust denial exhibits a significantly qualitatively distinct form of antisemitism. Holocaust denial also represents the most recent pre-internet example of antisemitism’s adaptability, demonstrating the reciprocal need for antisemitism research to adapt. When considering the changes to academic discourse on antisemitism post-World War II, Holocaust denial demonstrates how antisemitism responded to these new discourses through adopting a veneer of academic discourse itself. This pseudo-academic discourse was weaponised to counter the moral discrediting of antisemitism after the Holocaust, charging academics, such as Deborah Lipstadt, to defend antisemitism research itself. Holocaust denial emphasises the need for antisemitism research to adapt to changes in the field, as it represents antisemitism’s reactive relationship with both academia and other efforts to combat antisemitism. If academia does not adapt as antisemitism has, then efforts to combat antisemitism will be outpaced. This adaptability is also relevant when determining how antisemitism has changed on the internet, as the height of the Holocaust denial movement coincided with the rise of the internet, with Holocaust deniers quickly adapting to the new technology. While Holocaust

circumstances”. For this reason, this review is including Arab, majority Muslim State, and Islamic religious antisemitism under a single banner, as the religious character interweaves each manifestation. Esther Webman, ‘The Challenge of Assessing Arab/Islamic Antisemitism’, Middle Eastern Studies, 46.5 (2010), 677-697 (p. 680).
denial on the internet is covered in greater depth in chapters four and five, the section in this review focuses on the evolution of Holocaust denial as a pseudo-academic movement, the major texts published by Holocaust deniers, the works on Holocaust denial published by historians, and the interplay between historians and deniers.

While Holocaust denial represents a qualitatively distinct manifestation of antisemitism, the qualitative changes to antisemitism caused by the internet cannot be fully contextualised solely through analysis of Holocaust denial. For this reason, this review dedicates a section to the scholarship and debates surrounding ‘new’ antisemitism. The development of the post-World War II historiography of antisemitism coincided with the appearance of forms of antisemitism specifically focusing on the state of Israel, which some academics theorised as a ‘new’ antisemitism. Proponents of the theory of ‘new’ antisemitism argue that it represents a significantly qualitatively distinct manifestation of antisemitism compared to pre-Holocaust forms, which were typically more concerned with Jewish assimilation into nation-states. This debate provides context with which to determine whether online manifestations of antisemitism are distinct from offline forms, or whether the internet has caused qualitative changes to antisemitism more broadly.

This review demonstrates that while the size of the body of literature on antisemitism is extensive, further study is still warranted, for if antisemitism can adapt to this scholarship and grow, scholarship too must grow to counter antisemitism’s adaptability. While antisemitism is a phenomenon stretching back millennia, research on antisemitism has significantly increased since the events of World War II and the Holocaust. This was supported by the broader study of minority groups and racism that grew out of the history of the twentieth century, as discrimination issues

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2 References to the defined ‘new’ antisemitism will be distinguished by ‘new’ within inverted commas, as opposed to broader new manifestations of antisemitism, which shall not feature inverted commas.
became prominent political matters. World War II and the Holocaust were key events in this history, which shook the foundations of ‘Western’ liberalism and resulted in the establishment of a new international moral order. This moral order, represented by the Allies’ adoption of the Four Freedoms, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the study of human rights, was rooted in the discovery of Nazi Germany’s atrocities. But while scholarship reacts to this history, so does discrimination, especially significantly adaptable forms of discrimination like antisemitism. This is particularly demonstrated by the interactions between Holocaust deniers and Holocaust historians, especially the evolution of methods used by deniers to try and outmanoeuvre mainstream historians. Furthermore, as antisemitism has manifested in a broad variety of ways throughout history, research also needs to consider the interlinking causes and relationships between different manifestations, so to understand how antisemitism adapts and to develop effective efforts to combat antisemitism. Since the internet serves as a vehicle for the interplay between different manifestations of antisemitism, and is even responsible for newer manifestations, this review justifies further study of online antisemitism and provides the necessary scholarly background for such study.

Historiography of Antisemitism following World War II

Origins of the Field

While the history of antisemitism goes back as far as the Hellenistic era, during which a distinct Jewish Diaspora emerged outside of ancient Israel, historiography of antisemitism as it is known

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3 The ‘Four Freedoms’ included Freedom of speech, Freedom of worship, Freedom from want and Freedom from fear, and were articulated by US President Franklin in an address on 6 January 1941.
today\textsuperscript{5} grew out of the events of World War II and Nazi Germany, particularly the Holocaust. This is the first reason to base a review of the historiography of antisemitism in the period after World War II. The second reason is because the period of history following the Holocaust saw the rise of brand-new manifestations of antisemitism, such as Holocaust denial and arguably ‘new’ antisemitism, parallel to the evolution of antisemitism scholarship. As scholars began to examine and compare different manifestations of antisemitism, both historical and contemporary, the scholarly understanding of antisemitism became more sophisticated. The study of antisemitism categorised different manifestations, such as state antisemitism and religious antisemitism (both Christian and Islamic), and then in turn some scholars defined a category of ‘new’ antisemitism. Scholarship should focus on exploring the different manifestations of antisemitism, how they compare and interplay, and how antisemitism continuously undergoes qualitative changes. This broader exploration will further the sophistication of the field and facilitate the development of strategies to effectively combat continuously new and adapting manifestations of antisemitism.

Gavin Langmuir provides a justification for focusing on the historiography of antisemitism after World War II in his work on defining antisemitism,\textsuperscript{6} explaining why the field was only organised post-War. Through two chapters, Langmuir explains the lack of worthy material on the history of Jews in Europe from non-Jewish authors preceding World War II: “the root of the distortion of the history of the Jews at the hand of the majority goes back to the Christian appropriation and reinterpretation of Hebrew scripture in the first century”.\textsuperscript{7} Langmuir takes the reader through the path of hypothetical students interested in the postbiblical history of the Jewish People. He notes examples such as David Hume’s 18\textsuperscript{th} century \textit{History of England}, which criticised

\textsuperscript{5} That is research and writing on antisemitism outside of exclusively Jewish scholarship.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 25.
the majority’s treatment of the Jews, but comments on how these did not mark a change in Jewish historiography. Langmuir also comments on the difficulty of finding references to the Jews in historiography, compounding this problem further when attempting to understand the trends in Jewish historiography prior to World War II. He gives an example as recent as 1950, where Heinrich von Srbik, one of Austria’s most influential 20th century historians, demonstrates no awareness of the historiography of Jews and Germanic history outside racist ideologies. Langmuir demonstrates the lack of a general academic canon on antisemitism before World War II. It can be stated that the impact of the Holocaust, an event that occurred in the cultural centre of Europe and threatened the destruction of European Jewish society, emphasised a need to re-examine the assumptions of Western scholarship on assimilation, minorities and discrimination. This re-examination was required for broader society, provoking a desire for intellectual introspection on these issues so to prevent the rise of similar circumstances surrounding World War II and the Holocaust. This re-examination was a key reason why scholarship on antisemitism (and other human rights issues) grew after World War II, and why this review starts its analysis at this point.

Most pre-World War II writings on antisemitism came predominately from Jewish authors facing contemporary issues. The Wissenschaft des Judentums was an intellectual movement headed by German Jews in the nineteenth century, which sought to introduce critical examination to Jewish literature to put it on par with Western scholarship. Amon Elon identifies the context of this movement within antisemitic riots in Germany in 1819, thereby painting it as an intellectual examination of, and response to, antisemitism. However much of this intellectual work could be

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 24.
10 This refers to both assimilated communities, as well as the established shtetl culture.
described as ‘thinking for the sake of thinking’, which contrasts with the writings of Jewish communities trying to survive.\textsuperscript{13} Michael Marrus wrote in 1971 about how the Jewish community in France reacted to the Dreyfus affair, which was divided over the effectiveness of Jewish assimilation to counter to French antisemitism.\textsuperscript{14} Bundism was a Jewish socialist movement that evolved partially due to the antisemitic pogroms of Tsarist Russia, and its members wrote about the Kishinev pogrom in the light of the contemporary intellectualism of early twentieth century Europe.\textsuperscript{15} When considered alongside Langmuir’s analysis, these examples demonstrate how the study of antisemitism evolved following World War II from being predominately bound to Jewish intellectuals or communities trying to survive, into an interdisciplinary field of study within global academia. The goals of the Wissenschaft movement were potentially fulfilled, as in 1966 Hebrew scholar Arnold Band identified the “spread of Jewish studies as an accepted academic discipline in the American liberal arts colleges and universities since the Second World War”.\textsuperscript{16} This shift into global academia represents the impact the Holocaust and World War II had on Western scholarship, especially the perceived need to adapt scholarship to inform how the West could avoid similar atrocities in the future.

Therefore, it is appropriate to base this literature review on antisemitism scholarship on the period following World War II and the Holocaust. The shift of the field into global academia at this time accounts for the intense focus following World War II on the history of German

\textsuperscript{13} Examples of this can be seen in the descriptions of activities of the Jewish Bund. Grigorii Aronson, \textit{Revoluiutionnaya iunost’: vospominaniia, 1903–1917} (New York: InterUniversity Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement 1961).


antisemitism, starting with Léon Poliakov’s 1951 text, *Bréviaire de la haine: Le IIIe Reich et les Juifs*, translated to *Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of Jews in Europe* in 1954. The focus on German antisemitism was so intense that as early as 1972 historian Geoffrey Barraclough expressed in *The New York Review of Books*: “[regarding the vast] output on writing on recent German history… we have gotten about as far as we are likely to reach along the road most historians have trodden since 1945, and that the time has come for new directions and new goals.” Nonetheless, historians continue to write and publish material on German antisemitism, which is unsurprising as Nazi Germany utilised a broad range of antisemitic tropes and ideas, demonstrating the interplay between manifestations of antisemitism. Ismar Schorsch identified in 1974 that early twentieth century Germany provided a nexus between the traditional European Christian expression of antisemitism, and the racist and state manifestations of antisemitism in the Holocaust. While this context also connected many more manifestations of antisemitism than just religious and state, Schorsch’s identification of this nexus was an important step towards illuminating the broad picture of antisemitism.

Two of the most renowned scholars of antisemitism in the period following the war, Léon Poliakov and Raul Hilberg, focused on a far broader area than merely Germany. Léon Poliakov was the first historian to write a comprehensive history of the Holocaust (as mentioned above), and then followed up with a multi-volume history of post-biblical antisemitism. Poliakov broke

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21 Poliakov, *Bréviaire de la haine*.
new ground in the historiography of antisemitism, firstly by arguing that the genocide of 5-6 million Jews was logistically possible, in contrast to lower contemporary estimates (such as Gerald Reitlinger’s figure of 4.2-4.5 million Jews23), and secondly by critically analysing Pope Pius XII’s attitude and connections to the Holocaust.24 By doing so, Poliakov set the stage for critically examining the relationship between historical Christian and Nazi-era antisemitism. In a broader sense, Poliakov’s efforts also demonstrated how antisemitism scholarship after the Holocaust began to focus on the interplay and comparisons between different manifestations of antisemitism, an evolution that would eventually produce studies on the varied manifestations of antisemitism in other nations around the world.

Raul Hilberg’s magnum opus on the Holocaust, *The Destruction of the European Jews*,25 was released a decade after Poliakov’s history, and eight years after Gerald Reitlinger’s *The Final Solution* (a more comprehensive and objective analysis of the Holocaust than Poliakov’s26). *The Destruction of the European Jews* partially set a trend for dealing with the historical lead up to and causes of the Final Solution in two chapters called “precedents” and “antecedents”.27 However, Hilberg chose to ignore the changes in antisemitism in interwar Germany and the Weimar Republic, focusing primarily on antecedents to Jewish destruction that occurred during the early reign of Nazism. Nonetheless, he does acknowledge the role Christian and European state-based antisemitism played in the Final Solution, arguing that “The German Nazis, then, did not discard

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27 Hilberg, pp. 3-50.
the past; they built upon it. They did not begin a development; they completed it.” While this stance helps recognise the important link between Christian and modern antisemitism, Schorsch expresses concerns over its simplicity, arguing that the history of religious and modern state-based antisemitism should not be reduced to a dualistic evolution. Schorsch argues that Christian prejudice was not the root cause of Nazi antisemitism, but “one component of a complex matrix.”

This demonstrates how the study of antisemitism changed in reaction to the adaption of antisemitism. The energy once dedicated by antisemites to Christian manifestations of antisemitism was redirected into state antisemitism, and again into post-Holocaust manifestations of antisemitism, intermixing historical antisemitic tropes and ideas with contemporary causes for discrimination. In response, the picture of antisemitism presented by scholarship grew more complex over time, leading to divides in scholarship over how earlier manifestations of antisemitism affected later manifestations.

These dual evolutions demonstrate that the qualitative changes to antisemitism over the early twentieth century are linked with changes in antisemitism scholarship. There was limited mainstream scholarship on antisemitism prior to the Second World War, with most of it primarily dedicated to understanding the “biblical distortion” of the Jews and the contemporary relationship between Jewish and majority populations, without examining the broader causes of antisemitism. The long-term impact of the Holocaust on modern antisemitism scholarship is represented by the increasingly nuanced exploration of Christianity’s role in modern antisemitism alongside other causes. Furthermore, the commitment to the idea of ‘never again’, preventing any replication of the causes behind the Holocaust today, motivated scholarship on antisemitism to focus on the

28 Ibid., p.4.
29 Schorsch, pp. 258-259.
30 Langmuir, p. 25.
31 As opposed to Christian antisemitism being simply designated as the key forerunner to Nazi antisemitism.
broader precedents and antecedents behind the Holocaust. While it may seem obvious that changes in antisemitism impact the study of antisemitism, it is important to critically examine these changes to inform the future direction of the field. Over-simplifications, such as a binary evolution between Christian and Nazi antisemitism, can result in a narrow picture of antisemitism’s adaptability, thereby impairing the ability to understand the full picture of antisemitism. Scholarship has avoided this by reacting to the remanifesting of antisemitism over the twentieth century, producing a more nuanced and complex picture of antisemitism that has informed efforts to combat the hatred. When applied to the subject of this thesis, this review therefore argues for the need for scholarship to adapt to online antisemitism, as the field did in response to antisemitism in the early twentieth century, but to also be aware of the issues present in the origins and history of the field.

*German Antisemitism, the Holocaust and Beyond*

Over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, numerous dedicated studies were published on antisemitism’s significance in Germany immediately prior to Nazism. One of the most famous studies from this period is Daniel Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, published in 1996. Goldhagen argued that German antisemitism was unique, derived from centuries of antisemitism within German history, inspiring an ‘eliminationist’ attitude towards the Jews among ordinary Germans. Goldhagen received significant public attention for his thesis, but also attracted widespread academic criticism. Goldhagen partially wrote *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* as a response to British historian Christopher Browning’s 1992 book, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police*

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Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland,\textsuperscript{33} leading to a debate between the two historians.\textsuperscript{34} Browning’s central thesis opposes Goldhagen’s one-dimensional belief in a distinct German ‘eliminationist’ antisemitism by exploring the structure of autocratic Nazi society and the various pressures and motivations outside of antisemitism that motivated “ordinary men” such as those in Reserve Police Battalion 101.\textsuperscript{35} While Goldhagen received a mostly negative scholarly reaction, his book was recognised for helping spark a debate that heightened public and scholarly attention towards the nature of German antisemitism,\textsuperscript{36} thereby laying the groundwork for comparative analyses between antisemitism in Germany and other European countries.

Dirk Moses comprehensively analysed the broad academic criticism of the Browning-Goldhagen debate in his 1998 paper “Structure and Agency in the Holocaust”.\textsuperscript{37} Moses contributes to the criticism of Goldhagen, particularly for his “zeal” and for conflating too many significant groups involved in the Holocaust as “ordinary Germans”.\textsuperscript{38} However, Moses also criticised Goldhagen’s critics, as he claims their reaction against Goldhagen limited the discussion to a binary debate between the role of agency or structure in the Holocaust:

\textsuperscript{34} Daniel J. Goldhagen, Christopher R. Browning and Leon Wieseltier, \textit{The “Willing Executioners”/ “Ordinary Men” Debate} (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2001).
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 219.
The paradoxes and processes at work in the Holocaust cannot be captured by a one-sided reliance on structure or agency, circumstances or ideology. Such are its enormity and multidimensionality that no aspect of it can be singled out at the expense of others.39

Moses’ criticism alludes to the complexity of antisemitism; antisemitism’s long history means that any analysis needs to consider structure, agency, circumstances, ideology, and further aspects in conjunction with one another. This is important when considering antisemitism’s rise on the internet and social media, as such a shift can affect a multitude of these aspects, thereby requiring a full consideration of online antisemitism’s “multidimensionality”. From Moses’ criticism, it is important to use broad – not purely binary – frameworks in the study of antisemitism online, that interweave this multidimensionality of structure, agency, circumstances and ideology. The internet represents new structures and modes of agency for those engaging in antisemitism, while technological aspects of the internet can also obfuscate antisemites’ circumstances or ideology (e.g. with online anonymity). Such obfuscation can aid antisemitic efforts to collaborate with and recruit others, even with those of contrasting circumstances and ideologies (as seen with GamerGate). Even though Goldhagen’s thesis is rejected by most scholars, critically examining the debate demonstrates the need to be cautious about potentially over-simplifying the nature of antisemitism in academic discourse.

Timothy Snyder’s 2015 book Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning,40 received significant attention for a “radically new explanation” of the Holocaust,41 representing an

39 Ibid.
evolution of ‘binary’ debates about the Holocaust, such as intentionalism versus functionalism. It does not aim to conclusively explain the role of German-specific antisemitism leading to the Holocaust, but rather it attempts to challenge the idea that the Holocaust was ever a ‘modern’ genocide, or that it served as the personification of the modern state. In contrast to these existing views, Snyder illustrates a correlation between the dismantling of pre-war state apparatuses and the number of Jews killed in Nazi satellite states. He compares Denmark, which had little of its state dismantled and a relatively low number of its Jewish population killed, and the Baltic states, which already had their state institutions destroyed by Stalin prior to Nazi occupation. Snyder argues that it was this “statelessness” that allowed the German occupiers to encourage antisemitism among the population, often over reasons as simple as greed.\textsuperscript{42} Richard S. Levy states that Snyder successfully challenges a “fragile” consensus of Holocaust history by devaluing the importance of state planning and bureaucracy in favour of more simple ecological concerns over food, land, and water.\textsuperscript{43} Snyder’s theory evolves past the binary intentionalist versus functionalist debate, indirectly challenging the functionalist assumption that the Holocaust primarily evolved from the lower ranks of Nazi state bureaucracy, while not making a case for intentionalism. Rather than pinning the Holocaust primarily on German-specific antisemitism, Snyder posits that the manipulation of populations in “stateless zones” was relied upon to efficiently destroy local Jewish populations.\textsuperscript{44} This is a historical example of German antisemitism motivating the creation of temporary ‘new’ manifestations of antisemitism to carry out the Holocaust;\textsuperscript{45} Snyder’s research

\textsuperscript{42} This even occurred in places with previously insignificant levels of antisemitism, such as in Salonika, Greece. Snyder, pp. 244-245.
\textsuperscript{43} Richard S. Levy, review of \textit{Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning}, by Timothy Snyder, \textit{Choice}, 53.6 (Feb 2016), 917.
\textsuperscript{44} Snyder, pp. 220-222.
\textsuperscript{45} In some cases, institutions that served tolerance and acceptance of Jews were transformed into temporary means to facilitate the Holocaust, as seen by legal Jewish councils in 1930s Poland morphing under German pressure into the \textit{Judenräte}. Ibid., p. 243.
shows that without these new manifestations, the Holocaust would have been far less effective. This is not to say that local populations did not have their own histories of antisemitism, but the nature of the antisemitism that rose from the exploitation of stateless populations was distinct from its historical iterations. Snyder thus demonstrates how research should consider the broader conditions and populations through which antisemitism grows and adapts, rather than solely on a single central force and ideology. In this vein, online antisemitism is just as much a product of the conditions of online spaces as the beliefs and motivations of antisemites.

The extensive body of literature on Nazi antisemitism has provided useful conceptualisations of antisemitism for the discussions in this thesis, particularly the concepts of ‘redemptive’ antisemitism and ‘chimeric’ antisemitism. Friedländer discussed the concept of redemptive antisemitism in his 1997 book, *Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939*. In particular he defines redemptive antisemitism as when “the struggle against the Jews is the dominant aspect of a worldview in which other racist themes are but secondary appendages”. The term redemptive refers to the view that through antisemitism the world will be ‘redeemed’, by identifying all that is wrong in the world, and folding it into a single antisemitic worldview. Examples of this include the palingenetic ultranationalism – the ideas of national rebirth – inherent in fascism. The concept of chimeric antisemitism can provide a path to this redemptive antisemitism. Langmuir specifically chooses the word chimeric to describe a manifestation of antisemitism not based on any “kernel of truth”, but rather completely fantastical conceptualisations of Jews without any basis in reality. Examples of this include the blood libel

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47 Ibid., p. 87.
49 Langmuir, p. 306.
of Jews ritualistically killing Christian children, and *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*. The historical entrenchment of baseless antisemitic ideas proves that antisemitic ideas can be and are fabricated in order to support broader antisemitic worldviews. It can be expected that both chimeric and redemptive antisemitism benefit from new methods of information manipulations and propaganda online. This thesis also examines how redemptive antisemitism coopts other forms of discrimination online such as misogyny, as seen in the comparison between GamerGate and antisemitism in chapter four.

The central focus of the Holocaust and German antisemitism has caused issues in the scholarship on antisemitism, such as binary debates, which become even more apparent in the later section on ‘new’ antisemitism. Future research should take a cautious approach toward new manifestations of antisemitism, noting the difficulties in establishing an academic consensus on the nature of German antisemitism and the Holocaust, and the broader complexity of antisemitism. Just as it is not enough to study German antisemitism alone to account for the Holocaust, simply examining antisemitism online in isolation is insufficient to determine the extent of the quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism caused by the internet. It must be considered alongside other forms of discrimination and abuse online, such as cyberbullying and cyber-racism, and other manifestations of antisemitism, just as Holocaust scholars did by comparing German antisemitism with antisemitism in other nations.

*Broadening of Antisemitism Scholarship*

While the Holocaust and German antisemitism were central in the evolution of antisemitism scholarship over the latter part of the twentieth century, there were also significant efforts to
broaden the focus of research on antisemitism. Saul Friedländer noted in his 1984 paper, *From Anti-Semitism to Extermination*, that an understanding of German antisemitism required analysis of the growing studies on French antisemitism, indicating a turning point against the disproportionate focus on German antisemitism.\(^{50}\) While Friedländer did not directly inspire this change, and Germany did not stop being the most focused subject of studies on modern antisemitism, the ensuing decades marked a growth in studies of antisemitism in nations besides Germany. One text worth mentioning from this period is Leonard Dinnerstein’s *Antisemitism in America*, published in 1994.\(^{51}\) The reason why this text is of note is because, as Dinnerstein points out in the preface, it is the “first comprehensive scholarly survey of antisemitism in the United States”.\(^{52}\) Dinnerstein’s analysis of the contemporary body of literature demonstrated the disproportionate focus of American scholars studying antisemitism outside of America. While this does not mean that antisemitism within America was not being studied, it took nearly fifty years after the Holocaust to produce a comprehensive scholarly study on antisemitism in the United States, despite it being the birthplace of the Anti-Defamation League and the location of the Leo Frank trial. Antisemitism is ultimately a global phenomenon that cannot be understood without continuously globalising the research of it as well.

The emergence of histories on antisemitism in various nations serves as a globalisation of the study of antisemitism, demonstrating both an expanding scope and body of literature, as well as a shift towards more practically useful histories of antisemitism. Regarding this latter point, histories focusing on antisemitism within a certain societal context, whether state-based or religious, can provide insight into antecedents of present antisemitism, facilitating anticipation of

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\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. i.
future antisemitism’s growth. This utility is not as immediately present in literature on the Holocaust, as the specific circumstances and contexts around the Holocaust (the rise of explicitly anti-democratic fascism, global-scale warfare, pre-war German society) are not especially relevant in many modern contexts today. Comparatively, a broad study of antisemitism throughout a nation’s history allows researchers to identify which of the many causes of antisemitism are present in the current national context, consequently informing methods to combat antisemitism in the present.

A parallel globalisation of antisemitism itself in the late twentieth century has led to complex shifting of the causes of antisemitism. An example of this complexity is the prominence of Holocaust denial and trivialisation in Iran despite the perceived distance between Iran and the Holocaust. On one hand, Liora Hendelman-Baavur identifies that Iranian antisemitism is rooted in the “anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli” propaganda that makes up a prominent component of Ayatollah Khomeini’s legacy, a reason bound to the history of the Islamic Revolution. However, one of the most renowned manifestations of Iranian Holocaust denial and trivialisation is the International Holocaust Cartoon Competition, which Andre Oboler identifies as being reactively tied to the controversy over Danish cartoons of Muhammad. The newspaper that ran the competition, Hamshahri, argued “it wanted to test whether the West would apply the same principles of freedom of speech that were invoked in defence of the Danish cartoons of Muhammad when it came to

This multitude of causes behind manifestations of antisemitism demonstrate the need for nuanced studies on the globalisation of antisemitism to go further than individual national studies, examining how certain antisemitic trends and ideas can take root in a wide range of societies.

One text that focuses specifically on the globalisation of antisemitism is *Globalising Hatred: The New Antisemitism* by former British Labour Party politician Denis MacShane. However, *Globalising Hatred* is too short to be more than an introduction to the phenomenon, which deserves a comprehensive academic study. Indeed, the short length of *Globalising Hatred* leaves MacShane prone to generalisations, oversimplifications and a tendency to overstate its conclusions without the necessary analysis. Brian Klug’s review also points out MacShane’s overreliance on focusing on “Islamism” and anti-Zionism as the driving forces behind this globalised antisemitism. This overreliance limits any analysis of how antisemitism truly globalises – how it permeates spaces beyond any particular ideology. This thesis fills this gap in the field by demonstrating how the internet serves as a medium for globalising antisemitism, also justifying the internet as an appropriate focus for academic study on antisemitism. The effects of the internet on content production, consumption and reproduction indicate how antisemitism can spread into a wide variety of spaces and groups, thereby representing a broader extent of antisemitism’s globalisation than MacShane’s book.

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55 Oboler, pp. 178-179.
58 Ibid.
Religious Antisemitism & Anti-Judaism

Antisemitism in Faith and Worldview

While state and modern forms of antisemitism have already been examined, it is also important to analyse scholarship on religious antisemitism, which remains a continuously relevant form of antisemitism despite its age. There is also a considerable overlap between the debate on ‘new’ antisemitism and the study of religious antisemitism, due to the influence of religiously motivated antisemitism as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, due to academia’s disproportionate focus on the history of Western antisemitism, and the interplay between Christian antisemitic theology with modern Islamic antisemitism, an overview of this area requires starting with Christianity.

Medieval Christianity has a highly significant role in the rise of modern antisemitism. One of the most in-depth explorations of this topic is James Carroll’s 2001 book Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History.59 Although Carroll himself is not a historian, Constantine’s Sword features numerous interviews with academics and broadly covers Christian antisemitism, from passages in the Gospels to Papal politics. Carroll’s text marked an important development in the history of antisemitism as an in-depth analysis of a specific brand of religious antisemitism. While only one building block for a broad understanding of religious antisemitism, Carroll’s text demonstrates how one strain of religious antisemitism grew and shifted throughout history, from antiquity to modernity. This evolution demonstrates the adaptability and versatility of antisemitism, informing approaches to research on online manifestations and contextualising why researchers from other disciplines may struggle to understand antisemitism.

In 2013, David Nirenberg published *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition*, a ground-breaking study on the discrimination against the concept of ‘Judaism’, particularly how opposition to Judaism shaped other worldviews.\(^60\) While Nirenberg’s text does engage with historical prejudice against the Jewish religion, he takes the concept of his study further. Nirenberg indicates that opposition to Judaism is not limited to theological disputes, exploring manifestations of anti-Judaism in works of non-religious thinkers such as Kant and Shakespeare (e.g. the characterisation of Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice*).\(^61\) He also takes care to distinguish his text from studies on antisemitism, which he claims, “captures only a small portion, historically and conceptually” of the historic prejudice towards Judaism.\(^62\) In the broadest sense, Nirenberg engages with what the world conceives as ‘Jewishness’, ranging from religious stereotypes to the conceptualisation of capitalism and moneylending as Jewish practices throughout history. Ultimately, Nirenberg goes beyond the theological grounds for anti-Jewish prejudice and explores how these prejudices influence the conceptualisation of and opposition to ‘Judaism’ between societies. Nirenberg argues that anti-Judaism was often fundamental to the formation of worldviews in the “Western tradition”, and explores the centrality of this anti-Judaism in the manifestations of these worldviews.\(^63\) This helps explain the growth of redemptive antisemitism worldviews, merging the ancient antisemitic ideas embedded in Western traditions with modern concerns. Nirenberg’s framework provides insight into how religious justification for anti-Jewish prejudice fell out of vogue and was supplanted by different forms of prejudice – allowing a path to be drawn between traditional anti-

\[^61^\] Ibid., pp. 269-299, 387-422.
\[^62^\] Ibid., p. 3.
\[^63^\] For example, as early Christianity distinguished itself from Judaism, and struggled to rationalise the place of Judaism and the Jews after Christ, Saint Augustine associated them with Cain after the slaying of Abel with the proclamation “Slay them not”, arguing for them to serve as “relics… inert witnesses… of a transformation in man’s understanding the cosmos”. This theology contributed to the separateness between the Jews and the Christians in Medieval Europe, which over history was manifested in ghettoization, church art and other various laws. Ibid., p. 246
Judaism and modern antisemitism, even though Nirenberg avoids using the latter term. This path illustrates how ancient chimeric antisemitic ideas like blood libel are still being used in modern contexts, such as in the harassment of Jewish journalists on Twitter.

*Islamic Antisemitism and Politicising Research*

While anti-Judaism has a long history with Christianity and European history, Islamic manifestations of antisemitism are also highly relevant due to their prominence surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study of Islamic antisemitism originated on a comparative level between Christian theological antisemitism, and modern racial antisemitism with Islamic treatment of Jewish peoples. Poliakov broke ground again in this field with the second volume of *The History of Antisemitism: From Mohammed to the Marranos* in 1961.64 This was the earliest complete history of early Islamic antisemitism, and by bookending this volume between the rise of Mohammed and the treatment of Jewish people in post-Reconquista Iberia, Poliakov set a precedent of comparing Islamic antisemitism to Christian European antisemitism. This precedent evolved into numerous threads of research, one being historical comparisons of the treatment of Jews between Islamic and Christian society. The most influential text to follow this thread of research is Mark R. Cohen’s 1994 book *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages*.65 Cohen comprehensively argued that Islamic-Jewish relations in the Middle Ages, while imperfect, were far less violent than those in Christian Europe. There are two reasons behind the growth of comparisons between Christian and Islamic antisemitism, the first being the influence of Nazism.

on the historiography of antisemitism. The events of World War II and the Holocaust inspired a surge of historical research on antisemitism, aiming to understand what led to the Final Solution, naturally resulting in a disproportionate focus on Christian antisemitism. Scholars focusing on Islamic antisemitism would then naturally refer to this large body of literature to contextualise their own research. The second reason was the establishment of the state of Israel, and the ensuing anti-Zionism which inspired the theory of ‘new’ antisemitism. Despite a strong link to Islamic opposition to Israel, anti-Zionism often draws upon Christian and Western antisemitic ideas, including blood libel, racial antisemitism and Holocaust denial. This link between Anti-Zionism and other manifestations of antisemitism results in an inability to separate the study of ‘Western antisemitism’ and post-WWII Islamic antisemitism. Furthermore, this link represents the interplay of antisemitic manifestations that is key to understanding broader antisemitism and its globalisation.

The link between the study of Western and Islamic antisemitism has arguably led to a series of assumptions among scholars, firstly that modern hostility to the Jews is non-theological, being primarily motivated by the political affairs surrounding Palestine, and secondly that Jews prospered under Muslim rule. Andrew Bostom, a professor of medicine, argues that these assumptions are false in his 2008 book *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History*. While Bostom lacks training in the field of history, which critics have claimed leads to inconsistency and analytical problems, his text provides the most comprehensive

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66 ‘Western’ in this context refers to the broader encompassing of Christian and non-religious antisemitic ideas popularised in Europe, but also heavily present in other anglosphere nations, such as the United States.


collection of antisemitic documents throughout the history of Islam. His collection and organisation of these documents, ranging between Hadiths, Islamic law and modern speeches, make a strong case for Islamic antisemitism being inherently Islamic and having a theological tradition behind it (as Christian antisemitism does). Nonetheless, by propping up these assumptions as pillars to knock down, Bostom misrepresents the academic consensus and the nature of the debate itself. Furthermore, by providing only a limited context and no alternative explanations, Bostom’s coverage of this issue appears to be unbalanced and politically motivated.

The problems that lie within Bostom’s work are symptomatic of a larger problem within the discourse on Islamic antisemitism. The political divisiveness of the Arab-Israeli conflict can both decontextualise scholarship on Islamic antisemitism and leads to its use in apologetics (both defending Israel and Islam). Islamic historian Gudrun Krämer concisely extrapolates this problem in a critical review of antisemitism in the Muslim world. Krämer draws upon European history for context when commenting on pre-modern dress codes for social inferiors, justifying her criticism of those who compare the Nazi yellow badge and Islamic dress codes, of which Bostom is guilty. Yet Krämer also criticises those who use contextualisation to defend Islam, attempting

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72 Touching on Jews under Islamic rule, Krämer comments on the legal distinction between the two types of infidels: polytheists or pagans versus ‘people of the book’, or dhimmis, which includes Jews, Christians, Sabeans and Zoroastrians. In doing so, she both compares the treatment of protected dhimmis to ostracised pagans, but also points out how some groups that did not qualify as dhimmis were sometimes treated as dhimmis, like Jaina, Hindus and Buddhists in Southeast Asia. Gudrun Krämer, ‘Anti-Semitism in the Muslim World. A Critical Review.’ *Die Welt Des Islam*, 46.3 (2006), 243-276.

to divorce the historical examples of antisemitism from present realities so as to downplay links between Muslims and antisemitism:

One core issue is contextualization which places individual statements and occurrences within a wider political context (first and foremost colonialism and the Arab-Israeli conflict), and the extent to which contextualization is used, or can be used, to downplay the phenomenon rather than to face it and fight against it at all levels.\(^\text{74}\)

Such abuses of context serve to distract academic discourse from the broader picture of antisemitism, as it risks bogging the field down in debates on Islamic antisemitism. This represents the problem similar to the disproportionate focus on binary debates in research on German antisemitism.

Misuse of the contexts of Islamic antisemitism demonstrates how caution needs to be applied in analyses of more recent manifestations of antisemitism. For example, with regards to the importation of European and Christian antisemitic stereotypes, Krämer points out how blood libel in the Muslim world predated the birth of Zionism by over fifty years in the form of the 1840 Damascus affair,\(^\text{75}\) but also points out how antisemitic conspiracies took root primarily after \textit{al-naqba}, with the first Arabic translation of \textit{The Protocols of the Elders of Zion} in Egypt in 1951.\(^\text{76}\) In doing so, Krämer points out that Islamic antisemitism was not uniform across history, but that the contextualisation of each example could be used in misrepresentative apologetics to either

\(^{74}\) Krämer, p. 245.
\(^{75}\) Ibid., p. 255
\(^{76}\) Ibid., p. 265
diminish or exaggerate Islamic antisemitism. This is not a problem limited to Boston, but across scholarship and other resource archives. For example, the Middle-East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), a non-profit organisation dedicated to archiving and translating Middle-Eastern media, has been criticised for selectively focusing on extremist elements in chosen media outlets. This does not at all diminish the value in using such resources, but the abuses of context in the study of Islamic antisemitism demand extra scrutiny even when drawing upon manifestations of Islamic antisemitism in broader research. Researchers should apply extra caution when studying manifestations of antisemitism relevant to contemporary politics, as a careless approach can bog the field down in the sorts of political disputes that inspire misleading apologetics. This is especially relevant when approaching recent manifestations of antisemitism online, as some prominent manifestations are linked to the alt-right and President Trump. Research on online antisemitism should not exist merely as a cudgel against right-wing politics or it will risk entering similar quagmires that have developed surrounding the discourse on Islamic antisemitism.

Similar Tropes between the Secular and Sacred

The role of specific antisemitic tropes, such as blood libel, or specific texts, such as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (hereafter the *Protocols*), represent the unique evolution of Islamic antisemitism post-WWII, and the broader interplay of various forms of antisemitism. Their reinvigorated role can either be interpreted as qualitative change, such as shifting between the secular and sacred, or as old tropes simply remanifesting in a new context. Ultimately, it is case studies, focusing specifically on a particular antisemitic trope or text, that are most helpful in

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understanding these manifestations. Hadassa Ben-Itto’s book *The Lie That Wouldn’t Die: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* is the most comprehensive text on the Protocols. While it does not dedicate a significant portion to the Islamic use of the text, Ben-Itto’s comparison between the initial debates regarding the forgery and the later appropriation of it for Islamic antisemitism highlights a significant change in the Protocols’ use as an antisemitic tool. In the conclusion of her book she lists specific high profile uses of the Protocols in Islamic media, and describes a 2003 Syrian broadcast that displayed the Protocols alongside scenes depicting blood libel.78 This explicit mixing of the secular and the sacred using two largely unrelated antisemitic tropes represents the adaptability of both the Protocols and blood libel. This example is also listed alongside instances where copies of the Protocols appeared during peace accords between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993, demonstrating their elevated use to sabotage political processes.79 Indeed, Ben-Itto concludes the book by bemoaning that the Protocols have advanced away from the fringe in the twenty-first century, becoming a “major item in the public political discourse concerning the conduct of world affairs”80, representing how different contexts can draw different antisemitic tropes to the forefront, even after decades of relative irrelevancy.

The most comprehensive analysis of the Jewish blood libel is Darren O’Brien’s *The Pinnacle of Hatred: The Blood Libel and the Jews*.81 Similarly to Ben-Itto, the book comprehensively traces the history and spread of the idea, leaving commentary on Islamic use to the end of book. Nonetheless, O’Brien signals significant change in the Islamic use of blood libel,

79 Ibid., p. 370.
80 Ibid., p. 377.
firstly by the recent assertion that Palestinian blood is required,\textsuperscript{82} and more definitively by the assertion that the blood of an entire nation is required. Furthermore, O’Brien argues that blood libel has advanced in rhetoric to justify “the necessity for their [Jews’] annihilation”.\textsuperscript{83} The integration of the blood libel trope with secular antisemitic texts, like the Protocols, represents how interplaying antisemitic tropes can strengthen each other, even when coming from different contexts. The religious interplay of various antisemitic tropes continues online, demonstrated by the Radio Islam website, which provides digital access to both the Protocols and broader antisemitic tropes. This interplay represents how religious antisemitism can act as a vehicle to bring historic antisemitic tropes into cyberspace.\textsuperscript{84} Ultimately, religious antisemitism demonstrates two key ways in which antisemitism adapts, firstly by fabricating entire antisemitic tropes like ‘blood libel’, and secondly by adapting historical antisemitic tropes to modern contexts. Nonetheless, the development of new antisemitic tropes is not limited to religious antisemitism, also representing a key aspect of how antisemitism evolved following the Holocaust.

\textbf{Holocaust denial}

Of all the new antisemitic trends that have evolved since World War II, one that deserves special attention is Holocaust denial. Providing an extensive background on other manifestations of antisemitism serves to highlight the distinct nature of Holocaust denial, emphasising the adaptive, changing nature of antisemitism. The Holocaust represents a major shift in the history and

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{84} Ahmed Rami, \textit{The Protocols of the Elders of Zion} (date unknown), <https://www.islam-radio.net/islam/english/index_protocols.htm> [accessed 3 January 2020].
historiography of antisemitism and the Jewish people, and rejecting its existence constitutes an antisemitic backlash and adaption to that shift. This adaption takes the form of Holocaust denial’s self-presentation as an alternative, yet legitimate historical theory in the form of ‘Holocaust Revisionism’. This presentation is especially significant, as no other form of antisemitism has made a comparable attempt to adopt an academic façade, representing a major evolution of antisemitism more broadly. Unlike other forms of antisemitism, Holocaust denial’s pseudo-academic presentation allows its material to be examined in a similar manner to that of legitimate scholarship, partially due to the academic backgrounds of many major figures in the movement. In addition, Holocaust denial requires specific attention in this review due to the focus of this thesis on online antisemitism. As part of their pseudo-academic façade, Holocaust deniers showed initiative in establishing their views on the internet with dedicated platforms and archives, a strategy which is explored further in chapters four and five. It is important to mention that Holocaust denial can also include the Holocaust relativisation and obfuscation perpetrated by Eastern European Nationalistic agendas. However, this section focuses primarily on the pseudo-academic evolution of the organised Holocaust denial movement due to its unique strategy, evolution, and relationship with mainstream academia. For these reasons, this review examines both the history and historiography of Holocaust denial itself, as well as the mainstream academic literature that has covered the evolution of these ideas into a pseudo-academic movement.

While Holocaust denial is renowned for being a masquerade of legitimate scholarship, its origins were not dissimilar to that of other antisemitic movements. This can be a cause for confusion, as the histories of Holocaust denial attempt to pin down the ‘father’ of the movement, as though it is a school of thought or field with founders, such as Karl Marx and Marxism, or Noam Chomsky and linguistics. Two significant figures from this Holocaust denial ‘pre-history’ are
Alexander Ratcliffe and Paul Rassinier. Ratcliffe was the leader of the Scottish Protestant League, a fascist and Teutophile who has been identified by Alex Grobman and Michael Shermer as potentially the “first person to deny the Holocaust,” from his writings for Vanguard magazine in 1945 and 1946.\(^8\) Yet casting Ratcliffe this way is somewhat disingenuous, as the first people to deny the Holocaust were its perpetrators, who kept the Final Solution secret and later denied their complicity. In the same vein, French socialist Paul Rassinier is sometimes described as the ‘father’ of Holocaust denial by scholarly sources.\(^8\) This epithet likely arose due to his relatively early writings in the 1960s, notably The Drama of the European Jews in which he criticises the academic work of Raul Hilberg.\(^8\) While Rassinier can be distinguished from Ratcliffe by his (pre-war) academic credentials and influence as a writer, Rassinier’s writings themselves did not spark a significant growth or formation of Holocaust denial thought (at least when compared to the next generation of deniers). His writings are also not largely circulated today, and were only brought to English-speaking audiences posthumously by Harry Elmer Barnes. Therefore, it seems the basis for naming Rassinier the ‘father’ of Holocaust denial is solely based on him being the earliest ‘academic’ figure to deny the Holocaust, which overstates his influence.

If any figure might deserve to be described as the ‘father’ of Holocaust denial, it would be Arthur Butz, who in 1976 published The Hoax of the Twentieth Century.\(^8\) Butz came to the scene with an academic background (although in electrical engineering), and his well-sourced and academically written text established the commonly accepted definition of Holocaust denial – the

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\(^8\) Alex Grobman and Michael Shermer, Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), p.41.
\(^8\) Paul Bartrop, Steven Jacobs and Samuel Totten, Dictionary of Genocide, 2 vols (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), II, p. 358.
denial of gas chamber existence, the denial of six million dead, and the denial of a ‘Final Solution to the Jewish Problem.’ Furthermore, Butz’s text is still in circulation, being republished in 2003 and 2015, demonstrating the popularity of his text in the field of ‘Holocaust Revisionism’. Yet describing Butz as the ‘father’ of the movement purely on the basis of his academic style and influence may still be problematic. While it is important to highlight the similarities between Holocaust denial and mainstream academia, they must remain clearly distinct, so to not inadvertently lend credibility to Holocaust deniers. One of these major distinctions is Holocaust denial’s origin as a form of antisemitism: conspiratorial, reactionary, and discriminatory in nature and purpose.

Nonetheless, there is still value in highlighting Ratcliffe, Rassinier and Butz’s roles in the Holocaust denial movement, as all helped globalise Holocaust denial to largely non-perpetrator nations such as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. This marks one key step in the transition of Holocaust denial to a pseudo-academic movement, as well as distinguishing Holocaust denial from other forms of genocide denial. Comparatively, other genocide denial movements such as Armenian genocide denialism and Nanking massacre denial are based in nationalistic intent. The Turkish and Azerbaijani governments, and aspects of the Japanese government deny their complicity in genocide to try and preserve their image, while Holocaust denial is largely propagated in countries that were not complicit in the Holocaust, and even fought against the genocide’s perpetrators. This distinction indicates a key aspect of the academic façade of Holocaust denial; by not being propagated by nationalistic elements, Holocaust deniers can portray themselves as ‘impartial’ observers of history.

89 Grobman and Shermer, p. 41.
The evolution of the term ‘revisionism’ serves as an example of how the Holocaust denial movement painted itself as an extension of academia. Following Butz’s publication of *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, moves were made by the Holocaust denial community to formally organise themselves into presentable organisations. The main product of this effort was the Institute for Historical Review and its journal, the *Journal of Historical Review*. The namesake for this institution can be assumed to be inspired by the works of Harry Elmer Barnes, a prominent American historian whose teutophilia eventually led to his claims that the Holocaust never happened. Barnes was part of the school of thought in the 1920s and 1930s that argued Germany was wrongly blamed for the great war, using the term “revisionist” to describe this school in his works on World War I, such as his 1927 *Genesis of the World War*.90 During and following World War II, Barnes was part of the isolationist movement, and became a defender of the Third Reich. He began to repeatedly use the word “revisionism” to frame his argument that the Holocaust was exaggerated or fabricated, especially in regard to the use of gas chambers.91 The use of the term “revisionism” helped establish an air of legitimacy for the movement and its later writings, which, following the example set by Barnes and Butz, were formally presented and sourced.92

The evolution of Holocaust denial into a pseudo-academic movement presents an opportunity to directly compare how an antisemitic movement has interacted with the historiography of antisemitism. The interactions between Holocaust denial and its critics moulded

the way Holocaust denial evolved, and in turn, led to a plan to limit direct academic response to the movement. Prior to the establishment of the Institute of Historical Review, this interaction was limited to primarily national spheres, notably within France with the publications of Paul Rassinier and later Robert Faurisson. Robert Faurisson’s entrance to the scene marked a significant advance in the development of Holocaust denial due to his background as an accredited humanities scholar, filling the void after Barnes and Rassinier passed away in the late 1960s. Faurisson went further in his denial than Barnes, who was primarily focused with the clearing of German war guilt and portrayed the Holocaust as anti-German propaganda. Faurisson instead attempted to engage the international historical community, directly contacting Yad Vashem in 1974 with a treatise claiming to demonstrate the non-existence of the Holocaust. This differed also from Rassinier, whose international contact was limited largely to Barnes, his main works not being translated until a decade after his death. Faurisson propelled Holocaust denial into the mainstream French public sphere by publishing two letters in *Le Monde* in 1978 and 1979. This finally resulted in an academic reaction to Holocaust denial in France in the form of a 1980 essay by Pierre Vidal-Naquet called ‘A Paper Eichmann – Anatomy of a Lie’. Vidal-Naquet makes a point to avoid elevating the legitimacy of Holocaust denial when addressing it, one of the purposes of his text being to demonstrate the need to understand the ‘why’ behind Holocaust denial, rather than just providing a mere refutation. Vidal-Naquet indicates the reasons behind mainstream scholarship’s

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97 Ibid.
delay and reluctance to address Holocaust denial; engaging the movement could be falling into the trap of implying a degree of legitimacy to the idea of ‘Holocaust revisionism’.

Faurisson’s *Le Monde* letters coincided with the publication of more pseudo-academic works, further globalising the Holocaust denial movement. Another prominent text is David Irving’s 1977 book *Hitler’s War*, which serves as an additional example of teutophilia shifting towards Holocaust denial, similar to Barnes. *Hitler’s War* is an interesting text on the history of antisemitism, as its premise is not explicitly antisemitic, being a biography describing World War II from the viewpoint of Hitler. Irving, while never obtaining a PhD, had acquired a reputation as an historian from publications focusing on the V-weapons program and Dresden bombing campaign. Regarding the latter, Irving used inflated death figures that were later republished in standard reference works. *Hitler’s War* was received by a high-profile audience that included accredited historians and scholars, leading to a broad negative reaction from the academic community. Irving attempted to whitewash Hitler, placing the blame of the Holocaust at the feet of Heydrich and Himmler, justified by the lack of a written order by Hitler to exterminate the Jews. *Hitler’s War* also laid the groundwork for another antisemitic theory, claiming Chaim Weizmann’s promise of support to the allied war effort constituted a “Jewish declaration of war” against Germany, justifying the use of concentration camps against European Jews. This idea

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103 Chaim Weizmann served as president of the World Zionist Organization during World War II and as the first president of Israel between 1949 and 1952.
went on to become used by Ernst Nolte in the German *Historikerstreit*, which some in the international community saw as almost justifying the Holocaust.\(^{105}\)

Irving’s attempted justification of German antisemitism and whitewashing of Adolf Hitler securely defines *Hitler’s War* as an antisemitic text, and clearly marks his shift towards becoming one of the forefront advocates of Holocaust denial. Yet *Hitler’s War* is also significant due to its widespread condemnation by historians, including experts on antisemitism such as Walter Laqueur\(^{106}\) and Lucy Dawidowicz.\(^{107}\) Ian Kershaw even argued that *Hitler’s War* serves as a motivation to expand biographical history on Hitler for the purpose of refuting Irving’s claims.\(^{108}\) This contrasts with the limited academic response to other Holocaust denial texts, such as towards *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, to which its strongest academic reaction came only thirty years after its publication, from Butz’s own institution.\(^{109}\) While it could be argued that the reaction to Irving was motivated by his already high profile among the historian community, this argument does not stand up when compared to Robert Faurisson, who was already an academic, but whose texts claiming Anne Frank’s diary was a forgery did not receive so strong an academic reaction. Alternatively, it could be claimed that the difference lies in the different national and linguistic contexts of the publications (with Irving’s being the United Kingdom and Faurisson’s being France), especially due to France’s stronger legal restrictions of Holocaust denial. Yet due to the close temporal proximity of the texts, and Faurisson’s proven willingness to engage with international scholarship, this argument is not especially strong. It stands to reason that there is a

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\(^{108}\) Kershaw, p. 95.
notable difference in mainstream academic responses to antisemitism depending on the specific antisemitic ideas involved.

Another chain of events triggered by Faurisson’s foray into Holocaust denial is the larger focus dedicated to the forensic history of the Holocaust by both Holocaust deniers and, in reaction, mainstream Holocaust scholars. Faurisson’s colleague and fellow Holocaust denier Jean-Claude Pressac went to Auschwitz in 1979, attempting to disprove the depiction of select concentration camps as extermination camps, a claim he states Faurisson was “forced to stake everything on”.110 However, on examination of the site’s archives, Pressac became convinced of the authenticity of the site.111 The apparent imperative to disprove the authenticity of the gas chambers increased over the 1980s as Faurisson, the Institute for Historical Review, and German-Canadian Ernst Zündel became subject to expensive legal trials over their views. One of the most significant texts to arise from the Holocaust during this period was execution technician Fred Leuchter’s 1988 report rejecting the technical feasibility of death camp gas chambers – also known as the Leuchter Report.112 The report was created when Ernst Zündel was on trial in Canada for violating false news laws, and Robert Faurisson advised that they recruit an execution equipment technician to examine the gas chambers directly. The public attention generated by the Zündel trial played a key part in the attention focused towards this text, but the importance of the text itself in the history of Holocaust denying and antisemitic literature goes beyond this reason.

The Leuchter Report represented a further evolution in the ‘intellectualisation’ of Holocaust denial by expanding into the field of forensic science; Leuchter collected samples from

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111 Ibid., p. 551.
the Auschwitz-Birkenau gas chambers himself and attempted to conduct scientific research. While Leuchter was easily dismissed in the trial due to his lack of qualifications, this was not so easy when this trend was continued by German chemist Germar Rudolf from the prestigious Max Planck Institute. Germar Rudolf published his own analysis of the Auschwitz gas chambers in 1993 called *The Rudolf Report*,¹¹³ which attracted less attention than the *Leuchter Report*, but was more extensive in scope and methodology due to his background in chemistry. Outside of the context of a legal battle, and backed up by Rudolf’s appropriate credentials, the *Rudolf Report* represented an antisemitic text heavily based in forensic science. Ultimately, the record left by Pressac, Leuchter, and Rudolf paint a picture of how an antisemitic movement or idea can attempt to expand and evolve its narrative, shifting its focus to entirely new disciplines.

The publications of forensic Holocaust denial texts did result in a response from academics, but primarily those with a scientific background. Firstly, Pressac ended up publishing his findings from his Auschwitz investigations in 1989, named *Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers*.¹¹⁴ Pressac’s background as a chemist resulted in a dense, thorough tome which comprehensively established the forensic evidence for Auschwitz’s role as an extermination camp. There is an irony in that this publication would never have arisen without Faurisson tasking him to prove the denial argument against extermination. Beyond Pressac, there have been other scientific refutations of the works of Leuchter and Rudolf, most prolifically by Richard Green, who wrote three essays on the “chemistry of Auschwitz” between 1998 and 2000.¹¹⁵ These essays,

¹¹⁴ Pressac.
among other academic works that directly refute claims of Holocaust denial, have been compiled online as part of the Holocaust History Project as a free archive. The Holocaust History Project produced a body of literature comparable to an informal journal between the years of 1998 to 2003, but since then the membership became inactive and the site eventually became inaccessible online, only being restored in April 2016 by the French NGO *Pratique de l’histoire et dévoiements négationnistes*.¹¹⁶

The establishment of the Holocaust-History archive and publication of essays represents a significant change in the body of literature on antisemitism, where scientists and engineers can now contribute in a field that is traditionally covered by history and sociology. Green and Jamie McCarthy comment on the intersection of these fields and how they relate to Holocaust deniers’ use of the concepts of evidence and proof.

Historians and (real) scientists share a concept called the convergence of evidence. Absolute proof exists only with the postulates of pure math or logic. In the physical world, the most that we can hope for is a convergence of evidence: to borrow a phrase from the legal world, we might seek proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”¹¹⁷

It cannot be forgotten that this shift in the academic study of antisemitism was directly caused by the evolution of antisemitism itself into new fields and disciplines, firstly into pseudo-historical

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¹¹⁷ Ibid.
scholarship, and then into forensic science. This emphasises the need for antisemitism scholarship to rapidly adapt to evolving manifestations of antisemitism through collaborating with different disciplines and fields, especially those online. Holocaust denial has demonstrated that antisemitism shifts and adapts in reaction to heightened academic and public attention, and the ease of distribution and redistribution of information online makes it easier for antisemitism to receive attention. Therefore, hard academic stances of avoidance and ignorance towards antisemitism, as seen with Holocaust denial, cannot be maintained in the digital age.

Examining the key historical academic texts that focus on Holocaust denial further emphasises the need for scholarship to continuously adapt in order to effectively counter antisemitism. As previously mentioned, French academia was early to the scene with Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s *A Paper Eichmann* and other essays published between 1980 and 1987.\(^{118}\) Vidal-Naquet was joined by Alain Finkelkraut, who was responsible for the first scholarly book on Holocaust denial in his 1982 *The Future of Negation*.\(^{119}\) Gill Seidel was the first to publish a book on Holocaust denial in English, *The Holocaust Denial* in 1986.\(^{120}\) Seidel’s text covered Holocaust denial in an internationalist scope, representing the increasing globalisation of Holocaust denial. The most significant text in the history of Holocaust denial scholarship is Deborah Lipstadt’s 1993 book *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory*.\(^{121}\) Lipstadt argued that the ultimate purpose of Holocaust denial was to ensure “the revival of National Socialism could be a feasible option”.\(^{122}\) Another key argument from Lipstadt was that the wider academic community had unwisely ignored Holocaust denial in the hope that the movement would go

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\(^{118}\) Vidal-Naquet.

\(^{119}\) Finkelkraut.


\(^{121}\) Lipstadt.

\(^{122}\) Ibid., pp. 103-04.
away, however she still clarified that direct engagement on public platforms was important to avoid. Ultimately this latter argument was turned against her, as Holocaust denier David Irving sued Lipstadt for libel in a high-profile case that was covered significantly in both academia and the popular press. The Irving-Lipstadt trial further discredits stances of ignorance and avoidance towards antisemitism. Lipstadt was largely alone in her examination of Holocaust denial, and so when targeted by deniers themselves, she became a virtually isolated figure, solely charged with the defence of Holocaust scholarship. Attempting to ignore Holocaust denial therefore left academia on the back foot as antisemites attacked scholarship itself.

While engaging with antisemitism must be done strategically, as Lipstadt encouraged, antisemitism’s continuing adaptability warrants continuous adaption by scholarship as well. The rise of the internet will continue to globalise Holocaust denial, as well as other forms of antisemitism. In order to respond to this, research should move away from a piecemeal approach of in-depth studies on antisemitic activities in individual countries, and instead explore more comprehensive studies of online antisemitism. As mentioned in the previous section on German antisemitism and the Holocaust, this former approach is no longer an appropriate comparative avenue to examine antisemitism in such a globalised condition. Just as forms of discrimination and abuse intersect online, so too can particular manifestations of antisemitism intersect with and influence each other. This has been seen with Holocaust denial’s role alongside older religious tropes in Islamic antisemitism, united by a ‘newer’ motivation: opposition to the state of Israel.

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123 Ibid., p. 24.
Guttenplan.
The ‘New’ Antisemitism

Despite the growing amount of literature on the history of antisemitism, ranging from the ancient Greco-Roman world to Holocaust denial, there is considerable contention about present and future trends of antisemitism; this can be seen in the debate about the existence of ‘new’ antisemitism. The conceptualisation of this ‘new’ antisemitism appears to be plagued by many of the same problems that have affected the historic study of antisemitism, such as the prominence of binary debates. These debates, often prioritising a dichotomous view of an aspect of antisemitism rather than considering its broader complexities, provide lessons to consider when approaching online antisemitism, and evaluating any qualitative and quantitative changes caused by the internet. While this thesis is concerned with new online manifestations, it is not enough to answer a binary question of whether the online antisemitism is qualitatively new or not. Any qualitative changes must be evaluated within a broader context, taking into consideration the ways in which online antisemitism intersects with other forms of antisemitism, and with other forms of abuse and discrimination. This approach will avoid simplistic compartmentalisations and generalisations represented by the concept of ‘new’ antisemitism.

In May 1974, the magazine Commentary published an article by Earl Raab, titled “Is there a New Anti-Semitism?”125 This question was asked following the publication of The New Anti-Semitism by Anti-Defamation League members Arnold Foster and Benjamin R. Epstein,126 and projected the question to prominence within the academic community. ‘New’ antisemitism was defined as the postmodern evolution of antisemitism that manifested in the form of opposition to Israel, or anti-Zionism, to the level of demonisation. It also was distinguished from other forms of antisemitism.

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antisemitism by its simultaneous emanation from radical Islam, the far-right, and the far-left. The question of whether there was a ‘new’ antisemitism became one of the most prominent issues in the study of antisemitism over the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Even Raab’s article, which was one of the first responses to Foster and Epstein’s book, criticised the pair for conflating any anti-Israel bias, or even a lack of pro-Israel sentiment, as antisemitic. This criticism has been echoed over the decades, with Thomas Weber’s criticism of Wistrich’s stance in A Lethal Obsession, arguing that disproportionate criticism of Israel can also be motivated by the left-wing’s disproportionate distaste for ‘hard power’, or against what appear to be legacies of colonialism.\(^{127}\) It is important to mention that the criticisms by both Raab and Weber come despite them both agreeing on the existence of a ‘new’ antisemitism, and on its manifestation as the demonisation and double standards applied to the state of Israel. Instead, their disagreement indicates that debate exists about what exactly qualifies as ‘new’ antisemitism, even among those who agree on its existence.

The split in scholarship regarding the existence of a ‘new’ antisemitism provides the basis for a major argument in this section of this literature review – that the antisemitism scholarship risks limiting itself over binary arguments. This section demonstrates that ‘new’ antisemitism already groups multiple forms of antisemitic content under a singular umbrella, including forms which come from historical origins (such as religious antisemitism) and relatively new manifestations, such as Holocaust Denial. It also runs into problems when trying to generalise anti-Zionism as the main aim of ‘new’ antisemitism. This is because new manifestations of antisemitism that are exploited by anti-Zionism, such as Holocaust denial, are also promoted for

reasons other than demonising the state of Israel (e.g. the legitimisation of National Socialism as a form of governance, or the promotion of white nationalism). Nonetheless, it is not necessary to entirely dismiss the concept of a ‘new’ antisemitism, as the quantity of research still demonstrates a willingness to explore how antisemitism is continuing to evolve in the post-Holocaust world.

Yehuda Bauer is one of the most prominent scholars disputing the existence of ‘new’ antisemitism. Rather than seeing the growth in antisemitism in response to Israel as a qualitative change, Bauer argues that “[it] is the old pre-Hitler antisemitism that utilises occasions to come to the fore when something triggers [it].” Bauer argues that the link between classical antisemitism and anti-Zionism demonstrate the falseness of ‘new’ antisemitism. The shared use of content, such as blood libel, caricatures of Jews as moneylenders, and controllers of governments as per the Protocols, demonstrate that modern anti-Zionism is not a qualitatively ‘new’ antisemitism. The internet provides evidence to support Bauer’s criticism, as a corpus study covering over 2,000 social media posts during the 2014 Gaza conflict found classical antisemitic stereotypes in 40% of the posts.

Bauer’s criticism serves as a warning when analysing the link between the internet and qualitative changes to antisemitism, warranting a different approach than a simple binary question over whether online antisemitism is merely another ‘new’ antisemitism. Caution must be applied when evaluating the changing role of older antisemitic tropes, especially since the mere appearance of them in new contexts and motivations does not necessarily qualify as qualitative

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change. Rather, scholarship on online antisemitism should consider how older tropes are used, such as how blood libel was used in memes on Twitter to intimidate Jews journalists in 2016.130

Geography is also used to justify the concept of ‘new’ antisemitism, although attempts to do so further emphasise how binary debates over antisemitism limit the field. Dina Porat argues that ‘new’ antisemitism is also defined not only by the geographical shift of antisemitism (rising in Western Europe since 2000, after a previous locus in the USSR and Arab states), but also through its increasing reliance on violence.131 However, Porat’s position contradicts Earl Raab’s definition of new antisemitism from the mid-1970s, splitting the definition further by diminishing the role of the radical left-wing in fostering ‘new’ antisemitism. These differences make it appear that Porat and Raab are describing different iterations of antisemitism entirely, with Porat attempting to outmanoeuvre Bauer’s criticism of Raab and others by focusing less on content and more on geography and expression. While Porat does argue that ‘new’ antisemitism exists, her departure from other academics’ views on the phenomenon actually weakens the already limited support for ‘new’ antisemitism’s existence by further splitting the field. Nonetheless, Porat still demonstrates noteworthy changes in antisemitism, particularly its continual globalisation. Instead of limiting these observed changes to the narrow debate on ‘new’ antisemitism’s existence and definition, scholarship would benefit from expanding the conversation to how a broader range of old and new manifestations of antisemitism spread and adapt in different global contexts. This conversation can concern specific geographical, expressive, and other smaller qualitative and

131 Ibid., para. 4 of 39.
quantitative changes, as well as examining how newer manifestations of antisemitism, such as Holocaust denial, intersect with antisemitism more broadly.

An example of a newer manifestation of antisemitism that intersects with perceived ‘new’ antisemitism is David Hirsh’s identification of the “Livingstone Formulation”. The key elements of the Livingstone Formulation involve refusing to discuss the content of an accusation of antisemitism, instead shifting the focus towards a hidden, purposeful motive behind the accusation. This conspiratorial motive allegedly attempts to coalesce everything in the discussion into antisemitism, and makes accusations of antisemitism in order to shield Israel.\(^\text{132}\) The formulation serves two purposes for antisemites: firstly, as a shield against accusations of antisemitism relating to the state of Israel, and secondly, by promoting a conspiracy theory that associates accusations of antisemitism with a conspiracy to protect Israel from fair criticism.\(^\text{133}\) Hirsh identifies that this formulation can be used both intentionally as a shield by dedicated antisemites, but also by antiracists on the left who fail to consider themselves as antisemitic at all. This latter aspect in particular represents a qualitatively new manifestation of antisemitism, as its permutation from the left is built upon a naivety stemming from the evolution of left-wing antisemitism into the twenty-first century. Hirsh also provides examples that intersect with older manifestations of antisemitism such as Soviet ‘Zionology’, particularly in the Soviet fabrication of a ‘confession’ from Rudolph Slansky alleging he shielded Zionism through accusations of antisemitism.\(^\text{134}\) Hirsh also shows how the Livingstone Formulation intersects the debate over ‘new’ antisemitism, further demonstrating the reactive relationship between antisemitism and antisemitism scholarship, this

\(^{132}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{134}\) Ibid.
time from the left. Hirsh provides examples of the formulation in criticisms of scholars promoting the ‘new’ antisemitism theory, accusing these scholars of a conspiracy to shield Israel from criticism through promotion of this theory.\textsuperscript{135} Close examinations of antisemitic tropes such as the Livingstone Formulation are a better example of how to examine chronologically new manifestations of antisemitism, focusing on the manifestation specifically while drawing on how it intersects other historical and contemporary manifestations of antisemitism.

The lack of consensus over new antisemitism cannot be solved merely by introducing new definitional issues into the debate. Attempting to define online antisemitism as simply a ‘new’ antisemitism risks narrowing scholarship to another binary debate. To avoid this issue, this thesis explores online antisemitism not as a new category of qualitatively distinct antisemitism, but instead considers how the internet affects antisemitism as a whole by both affecting old, and creating new, manifestations. Thus, the question this thesis answers is not whether or not online antisemitism is qualitatively distinct from other forms of antisemitism. Instead, this thesis analyses the extent to which the internet impacts antisemitism overall, including offline manifestations, and if it has played a significant part in the creation of new manifestations themselves.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In January 2015, French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy addressed the United Nations General Assembly on the rise of antisemitic violence worldwide, in which he identified the formulations depended on by modern antisemitism.\textsuperscript{136} These formulations include Jewish support for the

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 6.
“murderous” state of Israel,\textsuperscript{137} with Jews basing their support on the “imaginary” suffering of the Holocaust,\textsuperscript{138} so as to overshadow others’ suffering with their own. In identifying these formulations Lévy does not address the issues of ‘new’ antisemitism by suggesting a new qualitative change in antisemitism. Rather, he points these formulations out as key ingredients for the large-scale, globalised return of antisemitism, through the popularisation of this “portrait of the modern Jew”.\textsuperscript{139} Lévy identifies the intersections of key manifestations of antisemitism – anti-Zionism, Holocaust denial, the Livingstone Formulation – and how they coalesce into broader antisemitism today. He also relates modern antisemitism to past manifestations, using historical examples of worldviews inspired by anti-Judaism as a measuring stick for antisemitism’s rise. Lévy sets an example for how to consider antisemitism today in light of newer manifestations. These newer manifestations cannot be separated from their historical or contemporary counterparts, even if they are qualitatively distinct on their own. Instead, it must be considered how they intersect with older manifestations and affect antisemitism more broadly. This is a key consideration for any analysis of online antisemitism, demonstrating the value of this literature review’s breadth.

This literature review provides an overview of the various manifestations of antisemitism in the twentieth century that, along with the analyses in chapter two, presents the necessary information to determine the levels of quantitative and qualitative change exhibited by online manifestations of antisemitism. By examining the debates over quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism represented by other manifestations, this review serves this thesis’ overall aim to contextualise online antisemitism within the history and scholarship of modern

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., para. 25 of 49.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., para. 26 of 49.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., para. 33 of 49.
antisemitism. Modern antisemitism’s varied manifestations necessitate incorporating analyses of broader fields and disciplines, so as to provide a more complex and nuanced picture of antisemitism. These fields also present key lessons for the broader study of online abuse and discrimination. For example, cyberbullying research has shown the significant qualitative and quantitative changes to bullying brought about by online communication, and also how, despite the quantity of research, definitional and methodological issues can still exist. This also echoes the issues faced by research into racism as a lack of awareness of how discrimination has changed can result in systemic and ongoing issues in research. The long and complex history of antisemitism can be daunting to approach, especially for researchers without a background in the field. However, demonstrating how to do deal with this complexity in research on online antisemitism sets the stage for more holistic and sounder research on broader forms of discrimination and abuse online.

While the size of the field of antisemitism has prevented this review from covering every major topic of antisemitism, this size is not a reason against further research. In fact, the interconnected history and historiography of antisemitism itself is a key reason for further research. The period prior to World War II saw limited study of antisemitism, despite the ancient roots of the prejudice. This prejudice may have discouraged researchers from exploring antisemitism and anti-Judaism. Assimilationist attitudes towards and by Jews in early modern Europe may also have diminished the perception of antisemitism’s significance (excluding notable exceptions, such as the Dreyfus affair). The growth in literature on antisemitism developed out of the history of Holocaust, but naturally much of that literature focused primarily on the Holocaust – an important, yet short period in the long history of antisemitism. The impact of the Holocaust on antisemitism scholarship, both serving as a focus of research and precipitating major growth in the field, in turn
impacted the evolution of antisemitism itself, contributing to the pseudo-academic structure of the Holocaust denial movement. Additionally, the relatively recent growth in scholarship on antisemitism has resulted in many scholarly divides, such as those over the impact of religious antisemitism on modern antisemitism and the Holocaust, the adoption of the concept of ‘new’ antisemitism, and the link between Western and Islamic antisemitism. Therefore, it can be seen that despite the size of the field, its growth both creates divides in the field, and influences the evolution of antisemitism itself. This means that there is no determinable ‘end goal’ for the study of antisemitism; the more that is written about the subject, the more the subject will warrant attention. Until antisemitism is diminished worldwide, these circumstances will continue to impact the growth of scholarship on the hatred.

This review identifies the issues in the field to be avoided in an analysis of online antisemitism, and lessons to be applied in said analysis, both of which can be considered in conjunction with the lessons provided in chapter two. Most significantly, this literature review demonstrates that the Holocaust denial movement represents a qualitative change in antisemitism through its pseudo-academic representation, its evolving relationship with mainstream scholarship, and its adaptability for different goals by various movements and ideologies. This adaptability is an extension of the reinvigorated role of antisemitic tropes, as seen in their reuse by religious antisemitism and the ambiguously defined ‘new’ antisemitism. In addition, Holocaust denial goes further by inventing new antisemitic arguments and being established as a prominent and recognisable trope itself. These attributes are especially important to consider in future examinations of online antisemitism. Increasingly, the rapid nature of communication and information exchange will streamline the sharing of antisemitic concepts between analogous, overlapping and allied discriminatory movements. In addition, online communication will
strengthen the reactive relationship between antisemitism and those who combat it, resulting in swifter adaption by antisemites, including the potential development of new antisemitic ideas and tropes.

Holocaust denial’s most significant qualitative changes to antisemitism are reflected in this closer relationship between antisemites and academics, demonstrating the growing adaptability of antisemitism for various goals and different movements. Holocaust denial can serve both to delegitimise Israel by appearing to remove the need for a Jewish homeland, and to whitewash and re-legitimise National Socialism and fascism as post-war political views. The globalisation of antisemitism means that various antisemitic ideas and movements can be easily co-opted for various purposes according to the needs of the discriminating group. For this reason, this literature review argues that scholarship should focus on both the distinct rise of new manifestations of antisemitism (including chimeric manifestations), and changes in the use of older manifestations, while resisting the temptation to compartmentalise these developments under umbrella terms such as ‘new’ antisemitism. This focus should instead be directed towards how manifestations interact, how they are distinguished from each other qualitatively and quantitatively, and the continuous reactions between antisemitism and antisemitism scholarship.

The debate over ‘new’ antisemitism is one of the key sources of literature on antisemitism following World War II. This focus is understandable, considering it concerns the establishment and survival of the state of Israel, a central event in twentieth century Jewish history. However, a significant amount of literature has been dedicated to the debate over whether there is a ‘new’ antisemitism. In using the term ‘new’, ‘new’ antisemitism attempts to establish itself as one of the three main incarnations of anti-Jewish prejudice, alongside what constitutes ‘old’ manifestations of religious antisemitism, and state-based antisemitism. While aspects of ‘new’ antisemitism are
certainly significant, attempting to group all the major qualitative developments to antisemitism under a single umbrella term has resulted in a divisive debate over its existence, which risked diminishing the scope of scholarship. In a similar vein, Moses also criticised the reaction to Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* for focusing the debate on a dichotomy between agency and structure, rather than expanding and exploring different frameworks, as Timothy Snyder did in *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*. It is necessary to explore new frameworks as antisemitism shifts to online spaces, for the aspects of the new medium may limit the ability to apply the lessons and paradigms of earlier scholarship, as was seen in the case of cyberbullying.

Ultimately, this review points towards the value of a study on online antisemitism. The internet’s role in the preservation of old and creation of new forms of antisemitism has been subject to limited research. This small body of literature is covered in chapter four alongside comparisons between online antisemitism and other forms of online abuse and discrimination. The internet has triggered a new age of international communication, especially on a casual and social level. This means the internet is a significant tool in the globalisation of antisemitism, allowing for the sharing and intersection of various antisemitic and other ideas with unprecedented ease. Finally, since Holocaust denial has demonstrated the reactive relationship between antisemitism itself and the scholarship thereof, new methods for responding to antisemitism need to be continuously investigated. The internet serves as both a space for this increasingly close relationship and as a potential medium to test new strategies for responding to antisemitism. For these reasons, this thesis offers both a comprehensive analysis of antisemitism on the internet and suggests new online-based methodologies to aid efforts combating antisemitism. Combining these two purposes is the best way to utilise the extensive
historiography of antisemitism, aspiring to find solutions to contemporary issues, rather than continuing to observe problems from a distance.
Chapter 4

Methodology: Integrating Broader Fields into Antisemitism Research

By building upon the previous two chapters, this methodology chapter provides a holistic approach to the field of online antisemitism. This is achieved by directly applying the concepts and issues of online discourse explored in chapter two, while simultaneously considering the lessons and issues in antisemitism research explored in chapter three. This chapter begins by applying the key sociological concepts relevant to online abuse and discrimination to antisemitism. The first section of this chapter describes the broader trends represented by the antisemitic spaces analysed in chapter five. The next section critically examines the most relevant research on online antisemitism, predominantly the theory of antisemitism 2.0. Following this examination, the issues identified in cyberbullying and cyber-racism research are applied to research on antisemitism and are further explored through a comparison between the GamerGate movement and online antisemitism. Coalescing the lessons of the chapter, the final section details the construction and evaluation of frameworks, which can be applied to instances of antisemitism seen in the various websites and social media platforms explored in chapter five.

Antisemitism’s Shift Online

Cost and Distribution: Antisemitism

The shift of antisemitism onto the internet echoes the rapid rise of Holocaust denial and modern anti-Jewish worldviews. From the 1960s, antisemitic propaganda was primarily spread through
print media, such as through the pseudo-academic *Journal of Historical Review* and the multiple reprintings of the *Protocols*. While the distribution of these text-based materials continues more efficiently online, they have been joined by new manifestations of antisemitism that take advantage of features unique to online communication. In the pre and early modern eras, antisemitism would be spread via imagery, such as blood libel in church art and sculptures\(^1\) and antisemitic motifs in passion plays.\(^2\) Online antisemitism is shifting back towards image-based manifestations through the recognition of antisemitic imagery and symbolism. Reduced geographic barriers and extremely reduced costs of publishing are the main features that distinguish online antisemitism from the distribution of these previous manifestations. Historic image-based antisemitism would overcome language and literacy barriers, but also required high cost to create and would typically be visible only to those who either lived nearby or who could afford to travel. Any broader distribution of pre-internet antisemitism (both text and image) required expensive quantities of paper, printing, and the creation of infrastructure to promote the ideology globally, such as through groups including the Institute for Historical Review (IHR). On the internet, however, attention is a strongly contested commodity, resulting in lengthy text-based manifestations such as arguments of Holocaust denial being supplanted by simpler image-based antisemitism. This shift represents antisemitism’s adaptability online, which also takes advantage of the elimination of geographic and language-based barriers. In addition, due to reduced distribution costs, there is less immediate need for dedicated infrastructure to promote antisemitism (e.g. international organisations and publishers), as virtually anyone can become a content creator.

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The internet’s changes to the cost and distribution of content mark a change in antisemitism’s tone and strategy. Antisemitic content online can be far more personal and direct, marking a shift from the distant, pseudo-intellectual content of Holocaust deniers. This aggressive content was and is possible offline, such as harassment via mail, but differs online through having a potentially large audience (with harasser potentially trying to influence this audience). The diminished time, cost, and social risk of engaging in this harassment are also potential factors in these manifestations, as are the reactions of harassment targets before this online audience. Older manifestations of antisemitism still exist alongside online antisemitism, but it is important to consider their relationship with the internet. For example, the offline distribution of an antisemitic poster may recommend an antisemitic website, which can contain far more information. The poster’s new primary use in this context is to increase awareness of antisemitic content in spaces where it would otherwise be unseen (e.g. on university campuses), relying on the website to provide the actual information.

*Cyberspace: Antisemitism*

Antisemites further adapt to the internet by creating and controlling online spaces. In these spaces, less dedicated antisemites can also engage in the creation of antisemitic content that they enjoy, as per the principle of prosumption. This represents both a significant quantitative change to antisemitism that goes beyond the streamlining of existing distribution methods, and a qualitative change through the actual purpose, use and design of these spaces and content. The creation of

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3 This is a common feature of Antipodean Resistance posters, representing a Neo-Nazi movement in Australia. These posters feature images and rhetoric associated with online culture, and despite distributing their posters in public spaces, the movement is extremely protective of their offline identities.

shared virtual cyberspaces has led to an almost territorial attitude towards online communication. Cyberspaces that promote antisemitic content can be defended by its users, both content producers and consumers. Large groups of these users can be directed to harass Jews and other minorities with ease both inside and outside cyberspace. Within cyberspace, this behaviour is also known as ‘brigading’, an internet colloquialism that refers to the coordinated mass interference of an online space by users of another.\(^4\) This can take the form of sending a barrage of harassing messages or directing users to manipulate a poll with mass amounts of votes. Users can be directed to engage in pre-internet antisemitic activity outside cyberspace, such as distributing posters, however participants can more effectively hide their identities if organising online. Cyberspace represents both new opportunities for coordinating antisemitic activity, such as target-based antisemitic cyberbullying, and a shift in the content and presentation of antisemitism.

**Online Anonymity: Antisemitism**

Regarding antisemitism, online anonymity means that antisemites can form their own cyberspaces where everyone is protected by degrees of anonymity, and so self-regulation cannot stop those spaces from generating and sharing antisemitic material. Furthermore, some social media websites like Facebook and Reddit allow users to create their own subspaces within the fabric of the website – Facebook groups and ‘subreddits’. If the libertarian model of anonymity\(^5\) is followed too closely in these instances, or the website administrators do not have the resources to fully self-regulate all spaces, antisemites can create propaganda sub-platforms that are easily accessible and promutable

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to millions of other social media users. Research at the University of Stockholm has found that online anonymity is creating freer communication, albeit with less accountability.\(^6\) Less accountability means that antisemites have less risk of losing social capital when spreading bigotry, and do not risk their reputation making dubious claims. This latter aspect may even encourage the fabrication of new ‘chimeric’ manifestations of antisemitism. Furthermore, users can create additional accounts to spread and repeat the same content, promoting an illusion of broader support. Internet technology even enables users to create ‘bot’ accounts (short for robot) that engage in scripted activities, such as retweeting another account, or ‘liking’ a page on Facebook. Since social media spaces often base the visibility of information on its popularity (e.g. likes or retweets), this allows antisemites to artificially promote content with relative ease.\(^7\)

**Internet Memes: Antisemitism**

Internet memes serve as vehicles to make antisemitic ideas and claims accessible to a broader audience.\(^8\) Internet memes can also be used as crude but effective tools for bullying or intimidating Jews on the internet. This use can discourage prominent, and potentially all, Jews from participating in certain online spaces, or may provoke emotional responses in attempts to embarrass victims. This behaviour demonstrates how ‘trolling’\(^9\) can be weaponised by antisemites.

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\(^7\) It is worth mentioning here that while it is possible to spread print antisemitism anonymously, it is more difficult and expensive to do so. There is always the risk of being recognised when handing out pamphlets or putting up posters. One of the reasons why these features are singled out is how they work together; they allow both an inexpensive and risk-free spreading of antisemitism.


Internet memes are very accessible, in terms of both producing and consuming content. This accessible nature has facilitated the creation of online spaces where regular users (many of whom create content) actively encourage the distribution of antisemitic content. These spaces can also encourage the proliferation of antisemitic memes online, either by leading more users back to the antisemitic spaces (who are encouraged to make spread memes themselves), or through the coordinated promotion of the discussion of antisemitic content elsewhere online. Internet memes are considerably important when considering quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism, as they represent both increased efficiency in spreading antisemitism, and significant shifts in intent and style. Rather than attempting to legitimise the antisemitic movement with pseudo-intellectual material, as per Holocaust denial, they are appealing to crassness and direct provocation.

One key example of provocative religious antisemitism is the blood libel sculpturing incorporated into church architecture.\(^{10}\) This use of blood libel can be directly compared to the internet meme manifestation presented in this thesis’ opening, demonstrating the impact of prosumption, and cost and distribution factors, to the design and spread of historic antisemitic tropes. In medieval Europe, the incorporation of blood libel into church architecture would have effectively exposed as large a population as possible to the antisemitic trope. With the majority of the population being non-literate, the sculpture maximises its accessibility, while also enduring due its construction material. These factors maximise its exposure, thereby allowing the population nearby to be continuously exposed to the trope over centuries. However, this manifestation can only exist with the structure itself, is extremely costly, and requires skill to be carved. Furthermore, this manifestation will generally only be found relatable by the population that lives nearby to the

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\(^{10}\) Kamins, para. 6-9 of 12.
structure. The blood libel internet meme promotes accessibility by adapting a pre-existing template, particularly one already used within alt-right circles. While using text, the colouration of the blood in the meme and additions of Jewish stereotypical features make the text non-essential in communicating the idea, and so the meme represents a primarily image-based example of blood libel. The main differences represented by the meme’s manifestation are easier creation and distribution (being made in a matter of minutes with little expertise and no cost) and being distributed globally rather than within a small geographical area. Another key difference is purpose; while the historical example serves to frighten and inform the broader population, the meme serves to intimidate Jews and humour like-minded users. Therefore, while online antisemitism uses historical manifestations, differing design, distribution and purpose all represent qualitative changes.

While the blood libel meme represents how existing antisemitic ideas and tropes are changed by the internet, it is not an especially prominent antisemitic meme. Antisemitic memes that become embedded within broader intent culture must also be considered. These memes represent a broader qualitative change to antisemitism itself, distinct from other forms of online discrimination. A key example of these memes is the colloquially known ‘Happy Merchant’ meme,\(^\text{11}\) arguably the most prominent antisemitic meme online.\(^\text{12}\) The meme manifests as a “cartoon picture depicting a negative stereotype of a Jewish man with a black beard, long hooked nose, a hunched back, crooked teeth, and hands being wrung in glee,” (appendix C, figure 7.1) created by a white supremacist pseudonymously known as A. Wyatt Mann in 2004.\(^\text{13}\) Since then, the meme has appeared in multiple ‘flavours’ that each promote a certain negative stereotype of

\(^\text{13}\) Oboler, The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew, p. 6.
Jews, including: unappealing appearance (appendix C, figure 7.2), comparisons to vermin (appendix C, figure 7.3), conspiracy theories of controlling feminist and LGBT movements (appendix C, figure 7.4), conspiracy theories of controlling the media (appendix C, figure 7.5), an obsession with money (appendix C, figure 7.6), conspiracy theories of controlling banks (appendix C, figure 7.7), conspiracy theories of controlling and destroying other countries (appendix C, figure 7.8), and an association with Satan (appendix C, figure 7.9).

The Merchant meme is directly inspired by historical antisemitic imagery,\textsuperscript{14} taking visual cues from Nazi stereotypes that were similarly reproduced into different ‘flavours’ of antisemitism.\textsuperscript{15} However, a key distinction is how the meme itself acts as a common antisemitic template – a unit of cultural transmission – resulting in a culture surrounding the cartoon. This culture encourages further replication and distribution of the meme to promote a broad variety of antisemitic ideas. This is distinct from the blood libel meme, which represents an antisemitic modification of an existing template, rather than being an antisemitic template itself. The broad applicability of the Merchant template allows it to promote ‘redemptive’ antisemitic worldviews, associating Judaism with broader social movements and phenomena (e.g. LGBT movements and mainstream media) in order to support broader Jewish conspiracy theories. While historical manifestations of redemptive antisemitism would promote broad worldviews through extensive texts, like the Protocols, these memes instead promote it piecemeal through singular images regularly redistributed within common cyberspaces. The use of a common template allows each instance to support further instances through a shared culture, thus spreading the antisemitic views.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 26.
\textsuperscript{15} For example, the Nazi film Der ewige Jew (1940), juxtaposes images of unshaven, starving Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto with images of rats, promoting both a visual comparison and the concept of Jews as vermin.
Tools and environments provided by the social internet have enabled a self-perpetuating culture surrounding the Merchant meme. Before the internet, antisemitic imagery would share certain traits, but would never be based on such a common, and commonly shared, template. The breakdown of geographic and language barriers has allowed a broad userbase to edit and publish these images, resulting in the globalisation of this crude imagery and thus a global culture surrounding it. It is worth mentioning that there is no analogous meme (i.e. a similarly prominent template) for any other ethnic or religious minority, which indicates a distinctiveness to antisemitism online. This is despite the origin of the caricature in a comic strip situated alongside another caricature of a black man (appendix C, figure 8.1), and the meme’s creator creating additional caricatures of black (appendix C, figures 8.2, 8.3) and Mexican (appendix C, figure 8.4) men.16 While some of Mann’s other creations are also used as memes, particularly the “Around Blacks Never Relax” caricature,17 these memes are less prominent, and typically do not advance anti-black hatred, instead applying the template to unrelated phenomena and even other ethnicities.18 Ultimately, it is only the Merchant creation that is as ubiquitously used and recognised as a qualitatively distinct symbol of hate online.

Antisemitism 2.0

Building on the literature on pre-internet antisemitism and the terminology of digital cultures, the next step is to combine these areas in a framework based on the existing academic work on

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17 Ibid., para. 7 of 11.
18 Ibid.
antisemitism online. For this purpose, the framework of “Antisemitism 2.0” is used. Antisemitism 2.0, a term coined by Andre Oboler, describes the way antisemitism was adapted to web 2.0 and social media so as to normalise antisemitism online. This particularly relates to normalisation through the fostering of social acceptability of both long-standing antisemitic tropes, and the methods used by online antisemites. Applying this framework to analyses of antisemitic online content helps explore how antisemitism has qualitatively and quantitatively changed due to the rise of the internet, web 2.0 and social media.

Oboler coined the term “Antisemitism 2.0” in 2008, linking it to the term web 2.0, referring to the technological changes that facilitated greater interaction between users of the internet. Oboler summarises the definition of antisemitism 2.0 in a series of papers written on the matter:

[Antisemitism 2.0 is] the use of online social networking and content collaboration to share demonization, conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, and classical antisemitic motifs with a view to creating social acceptability for such content.

Antisemitism 2.0 involves not just promoting antisemitic ideas, but also conferring on their legitimacy in the broader public sphere, by insidiously mixing them with existing mainstream ideas

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20 Ibid., para. 10 of 70.
21 Ibid.
22 Oboler, ‘Online Antisemitism 2.0’, para. 10 of 70.
and movements. However, Oboler stops short of identifying this mixing as an explicit “aim or side effect” of antisemitism 2.0.\(^{23}\) This chapter and chapter five explore how the normalisation of antisemitism online can be spread despite varying levels of intent behind users and website administrators.

One of the key ways antisemitism 2.0 normalises antisemitic ideas and motifs is through “deep antisemitism”, which Oboler identifies as “an underlying link to classical antisemitic motifs.”\(^{24}\) Deep antisemitism can result in individuals and groups inadvertently promoting antisemitism, due to a failure to recognise classical antisemitic motifs present in sources they rely on. Oboler gives an example of an incident at a student government body at a UK campus circa 2009, during which representatives began forcefully expressing antisemitic views.\(^{25}\) These individuals would not be classified as dedicated antisemites, but rather had taken stock in antisemitic content found in several places online. Oboler suggests that factors such as online repetition (that is, the presence of similar antisemitic lies on multiple websites, and high source-ranking in search engines), could give the false impression of legitimacy to these antisemitic lies.\(^{26}\) The groundwork for this strategy was laid in the Holocaust denial movement of the late twentieth century. The names and design of organisations like the IHR helped deniers to appear legitimate and unbiased, thereby masking the underlying antisemitism in their papers.

Antisemitism 2.0’s normalisation, ensuing spread, and underlying links to classical antisemitism have been confirmed by a ten-year long study by Monika Schwarz-Friesel.\(^{27}\) The

\(^{23}\) Ibid., para. 13 of 70.
\(^{24}\) Oboler, ‘Online Antisemitism: The Internet and the Campus’, p. 333.
\(^{26}\) Oboler, Online Antisemitism 2.0. ‘Social Antisemitism’ on the Social Web’, para. 43, 66 of 70.
corpus study was conducted between 2007 and 2018, drew data from both a growing list of websites and social media platforms, and coded the antisemitic statuses of comments as classical antisemitism, post-Holocaust antisemitism or Israel-centred antisemitism. The data from the corpora is limited to text-based comments, which limits broader analysis on other forms of antisemitism, such as images (particularly memes), videos and audio. However, Schwarz-Friesel acknowledges the “multimodal encoding” of antisemitism on web 2.0, and it is worth considering that data collection methods focusing on text will still sweep up other modes of antisemitism which have drawn antisemitic comments (e.g. comments agreeing with a meme or video). Schwarz-Friesel’s study found high quantities of classical antisemitic stereotypes regardless of context or stylistic differences, demonstrating the continuity of the Western tradition of anti-Judaism. The study also indicates a growing radicalisation over time, suggesting qualitative change to antisemitism due to web 2.0. Finally, the study demonstrates structural similarities in antisemitic encoding between Muslim, right-wing and left-wing antisemitism. The structural similarities can being linked to the interactivity and interconnectivity of web 2.0, allowing community and networks to be infiltrated by more radicalised antisemites (both in-group and out-group due to anonymity), resulting in increasing normalisation of more extreme manifestations of antisemitism.

Compared to web 1.0, the interactive nature of web 2.0 more effectively facilitates the communication and organisation of hate groups, and the quantitative normalisation of

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28 Ibid., p. 11.
29 Ibid., p. 6.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., pp. 8, 11.
33 Schwarz-Friesel, Antisemitism 2.0 and the Cyberculture of Hate, pp. 7-8.
34 Ibid., p. 11.
antisemitism. However, the existence of deep antisemitism and normalisation tactics before the internet may cast doubt on the hypothesis that the internet has caused significant qualitative changes to antisemitism. While changes in technology as significant as the internet represent a major change to antisemitism (along with other forms of discrimination) in itself, technological changes do not necessarily result in qualitative changes to antisemitic content and strategy. For example, the IHR initially used the internet to store materials, which were qualitatively unchanged from before the internet. While the materials are the same, the difference is quantitative; the low cost and ease of distribution providing access to people who would otherwise be either unexposed or incapable of finding the IHR’s material. It is worth considering whether and how technological changes brought by the internet have also resulted in greater degrees of qualitative and quantitative change to the content and strategy of antisemitism. The strongest component examined so far is the technological ability to participate as a creator, although that is limited to web 2.0, rather than the entire internet. The IHR was specialised and exceptional in its creation and distribution of antisemitism, even as it moved online, but the empowerment of user creativity brought about by web 2.0 has led to the development of newer manifestations of antisemitism (e.g. the Merchant meme). In order to properly determine the degree of quantitative and qualitative change to antisemitism brought about by the internet, chapter five analyses a select number of noteworthy antisemitic websites and social media platforms that have advanced antisemitism 2.0.

Normalisation of antisemitism is also a key consideration in the distinction between individual and group-based antisemitic cyberbullying. Individual antisemitic cyberbullying is less likely to normalise antisemitism, but rather be a product of its normalisation (especially in the use of antisemitism jokes). Comparably, targeted group-based cyberbullying of Jews online may result in such harassment becoming normalised to bystanders, including the antisemitic content used
(e.g. slurs, jokes, memes). In addition, normalised antisemitic content within online spaces may encourage Jewish individuals (or people opposed to antisemitism) to leave those spaces, indicating that group-based cyberbullying can have a broader effect than just its direct targets. These intersections of cyberbullying and cyber-racism are key to understanding the broader changes to abuse and discrimination caused by to the internet, as seen in chapter two. Additionally, direct comparisons of these phenomena with antisemitism can determine whether these changes are likely common to all such manifestations of discrimination and harassment, or if there are further qualitative distinctions in the manifestation of antisemitic cyberbullying and cyber-racism. This comparison will also help to determine the extent of qualitative and quantitative changes caused by the technology of the internet itself. Therefore, before applying antisemitism 2.0 and other frameworks to analyses of antisemitic spaces online, this chapter provides a holistic consideration of antisemitism’s relationship to cyberbullying and broader online discrimination. This holistic consideration further informs the construction of additional frameworks applied in the analyses of antisemitic spaces.

Cyberbullying and Online Antisemitism

Targeted harassment of Jews online represents how antisemitism can be a subset of cyberbullying, and how cyberbullying can be a subset of antisemitism. However, the ways in which cyberbullying perpetrators utilise antisemitism to antagonise individual Jews must be distinguished from any broader antisemitic campaigns. Nonetheless, individual cyberbullying using antisemitism still serves to normalise antisemitism online and risks individual users – particularly bullies – being influenced by antisemitic ideas. The relationships between antisemitism, cyberbullying and cyber-hate, and how they intersect are key issues for the following sections (appendix C, figure 9.1).
Comparing the State of the Fields

Cyberbullying research is arguably the most analogous and informative field to research regarding online antisemitism, representing a significantly large body of research on an adjacent phenomenon. Many manifestations of antisemitism online would fall under the umbrella of cyberbullying.\(^{35}\) Cyberbullying and cyber-hate can both take advantage of online anonymity, preventing damage to perpetrators’ reputations. The racist dimension of cyberbullying has been investigated by Kowalski et al. in *Cyberbullying: Bullying in the Digital Age*,\(^{36}\) and is typically considered a factor behind the growing number of studies on cyberbullying.\(^{37}\) While cyberbullying only makes up one aspect of online antisemitism, the correlations between the two fields over definitional issues, statistical trends, and qualitative and quantitative changes necessitate that future antisemitism researchers heed the lessons and issues in cyberbullying research. In addition, cyberbullying represents a harmful online activity that may be considered ‘fun’ by perpetrators. This warrants comparisons with antisemitism online, which has also become a ‘recreational’ activity for some, through the circulation of dark humour and provocative memes.

Both cyberbullying and online antisemitism have roots in traditional/offline variants. In addition, research into both phenomena has roots in decades-old research on these traditional variants. As explored in chapter three, research into antisemitism goes back for potentially centuries, but prominently entered mainstream academia following the Holocaust. The first research studies on bullying emerged in Scandinavia in the 1970s, but the field experienced a

\(^{35}\) These incidents would be cyberbullying of individuals in which antisemitism or racism is used as an attack, which is distinct from abuse coming from people intentionally seeking to abuse Jews or people of other races.


\(^{37}\) Tracy E. Waasdorp and Catherine P. Bradshaw, ‘The Overlap between Cyberbullying and Traditional Bullying’, *Journal of Adolescent Health*, 56.5 (May 2015), 483-488 (p. 486).
similar boom in interest during the 1990s after several highly publicised teenage suicides and the 1998 Columbine school massacre.\textsuperscript{38} Interestingly, while there is arguably a larger volume of research into antisemitism than into bullying, the inverse is true when comparing research on cyberbullying and online antisemitism.

While cyberbullying research has a far smaller body of literature compared to traditional bullying, chapter two demonstrated a recent boom of interest into cyberbullying, leading to a series of broad concurrent international studies. Comparatively, research into online antisemitism has been limited to a small number of researchers. While there are even several scholarly books focusing on cyberbullying, there is comparatively limited material published specifically on online antisemitism. The first dedicated report was an initiative of the Inter-Parliamentary Council Against Antisemitism, \textit{Antisemitism on the Internet: A Legal Analysis and Proposals for Action}, published in 1998.\textsuperscript{39} There was limited material over the next decade, although antisemitism would be explored alongside cyber-racism in texts with a broader focus, such as in \textit{Racism on the Internet}, published in 2009.\textsuperscript{40} Yet, the first book specifically dedicated to online antisemitism, \textit{Viral Hate}, a non-scholarly text written by the directors of the Anti-Defamation League, was only published in 2013.\textsuperscript{41} Nonetheless, new articles investigating online antisemitism are coming out at an increasing rate, including studies spearheaded by the new Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism, founded in 2009.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{38} Shelley Hymel and Susan M. Swearer, ‘Four Decades of Research on School Bullying: An Introduction’, \textit{American Psychologist}, 70.4 (2015), 293-299 (p. 293).
\textsuperscript{39} Nicholas Higham, \textit{Antisemitism on the Internet: A Legal Analysis and Proposals for Action} (United Kingdom: Denton Hall, Inter-Parliamentary Council Against Antisemitism, 1998).
\textsuperscript{40} Yaman Akdeniz, \textit{Racism on the Internet} (Council of Europe, 2009).
\textsuperscript{41} Abraham H. Foxman and Christopher Wolf, \textit{Viral Hate: Containing its Spread on the Internet} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
\textsuperscript{42} Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism, \textit{Best Practises to Combat Antisemitism on Social Media: Research Report to the U.S. Department of State Office of Religion and Global Affairs} (Bloomington: Indiana University, July 2017).
One of the most active sources of new information and publications about online antisemitism is the *Online Hate Prevention Institute* (OHPI), founded by Andre Oboler in 2012.\(^{43}\) The OHPI focuses on a broad range of online discrimination and abuse, although its most groundbreaking research has been on online antisemitism. The institute contributed to the 2015 UNESCO report on countering online hate speech,\(^{44}\) and has been the subject of a successful case study on creating online communities of resistance and solidarity.\(^{45}\) Most notably, Oboler and the OHPI combine research with direct action to reduce the quantity of antisemitism online. In Oboler’s 2016 report *Measuring the Hate: The State of Antisemitism in Social Media*, he recorded quantities of user-reported antisemitic content on social media over time, as well as the response and remove rate of social media platforms to the content.\(^{46}\) The OHPI also hosts informative guides about how to report and combat antisemitism and other forms of discrimination on social media platforms, demonstrating the broad scope of the OHPI’s goals.\(^{47}\)

The reasons behind the (if modest) rise of academic interest in online antisemitism are similar to those behind cyberbullying; being linked to the rise of social media, increased media attention, and public awareness of both offline and online antisemitism. It is important to monitor the perception of antisemitism in the media and public sphere to determine how this affects academic interest in online antisemitism. This is necessary for researchers to avoid the assumption that an increase in either the number of studies or media attention implies a higher rate of


antisemitism. Ultimately, a cursory glance of the quantity of published material on online antisemitism demonstrates that there is a gap in research comparing traditional manifestations with online manifestations. This is especially prominent when compared to the shrinking gap between research on traditional bullying and cyberbullying. While quantity of research does not necessarily reflect quality of research, it does highlight that neither antisemitism researchers nor broader society may yet recognise the importance of research into online manifestations of antisemitism. In addition, many antisemitism researchers may lack the skills, or inclinations to learn new skills, to study online antisemitism. When considering the societal concern towards cyberbullying, people with the skills to research online abuse may be more attracted to areas such as cyberbullying, due to higher public demand, and may be dissuaded from antisemitism research due to high requirements of background study. These issues are worth addressing, and they may be mitigated by greater interdisciplinary collaboration between research on cyberbullying, broader cyber-racism, and specific strains of discrimination online such as antisemitism and misogyny.

The mixed reasons behind the growth of cyberbullying research demonstrate several lessons that are important for online antisemitism research. Firstly, cyberbullying represents a societal issue with potentially larger breadth than traditional bullying, as it is no longer physically and temporally confined to the ‘schoolyard’ – instead, it can be perpetrated anywhere at any time. The technology that enables the spread of bullying beyond the schoolyard also contributes to higher social awareness surrounding cyberbullying, due to factors of virality and ease of access. These effects are also reflected in higher media focus and rates of government and academic action. The pressure behind these actions, including further research, come from a broad-reaching societal concern over the mortality of children. The considerable rise in internet and mobile technology use has resulted in a rise in cyberbullying rates not necessarily linked to overall bullying rates.
This contributes to a perception of cyberbullying as a recently evolved, rapidly growing threat to children. The perceived rapid evolution reflects a disparity with interest in more established issues, such as Aboriginal youth suicide rates, and the persistence of antisemitism – the ‘longest hatred’. Despite the focus on children, cyberbullying also represents the closest thing to a universal threat to all users of electronic communications. The breadth of this threat constitutes another minor reason behind high quantities of cyberbullying research and indicates its value as a central focus in comparing broad forms of online victimisation, harassment, and discrimination. Ultimately, while research into cyberbullying has grown due to rising rates of the phenomenon itself, this growth has been accelerated by significant public attention. This latter point suggests that increasing public awareness of online antisemitism and other forms of online discrimination may have an effect on the growth of research into these phenomena, thereby reducing the research burdens on minority scholars. However, this strategy cannot be easily relied upon, warranting the development of additional strategies to encourage research on online antisemitism and other forms of abuse and discrimination online.

**Rates of Cyberbullying and Antisemitism**

One key method to determine the qualitative and quantitative effects of electronic communication on both bullying and antisemitism is to compare the statistics between offline and online variants for each phenomenon. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider whether any changes are common to both cyberbullying and antisemitism. If changes are common to both, it can be inferred that such changes are caused by the new medium. Conversely, significant differences would reflect that qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism online are due to causes specific to
antisemitism itself. Any inconsistencies in the rates between offline and online variants within each phenomenon would indicate a quantitative change caused by the change in technology.

It is necessary to consider whether technology simply causes quantitative changes by streamlining similar activities, or whether the technology has contributed to actual qualitative changes in each phenomenon. If such qualitative changes exist, they may impede the ability to apply existing knowledge of offline phenomena to the online. The overlap between cyberbullying and online antisemitism here is important, as applicability of existing research can impact the success of countermeasures; cyberbullying’s resistance to countermeasures developed from research on traditional bullying suggests more than a mere quantitative change. The same principle also applies to online antisemitism. While multiple studies have measured rates of cyberbullying, inconsistency between methodologies has made it difficult to draw a clear picture of cyberbullying trends, except in cases where studies have been conducted over time with standard methodologies. Nonetheless, these studies are small in number, and may only be pointing to localised trends (e.g. cyberbullying within a single state or country). While general trends indicate that cyberbullying is on the rise and traditional bullying is in decline, standardised methodologies will be able to more accurately measure trends between studies, helping to ascertain any qualitative differences caused by the technology.

Research into online antisemitism would benefit from considering the issues in quantitative cyberbullying research, especially considering only a small number of statistical analyses have been published on online antisemitism as of present. Parallel to traditional bullying, evidence suggested antisemitism was in decline in ‘Western’ countries towards the latter half of the
However, the recent rise in populism across the West has given new life to antisemitism, especially surrounding the 2016 US Presidential election. Nonetheless, it is important to consider how much this populism directly contributes to a rise in antisemitic incidents. The annual Anti-Defamation Audit on antisemitic incidents in the US recorded a 34% increase in incidents from 2015 to 2016, and an 86% increase in the first quarter of 2017 compared to 2016. However, this is countered by a 2017 report by the Kantor Center, which describes an ongoing decrease of worldwide antisemitic violence throughout 2016 and early 2017, and warns researchers “to check if there is a discrepancy between the feelings and reactions of Jews, and the actual amount of incidents.” While the opposing trends between traditional bullying and cyberbullying are clear indicators of quantitative and possibly qualitative changes, research on online antisemitism must consider whether surges in online antisemitism are correlated to offline surges. This emphasises the need for standard methodologies, for if both offline and online antisemitism are on upwards trends it will prove more difficult to distinguish any clear quantitative differences.

Similar to cyberbullying, rises in online antisemitism cannot be entirely accounted for by changes to technology, as both can be affected by offline events. Conversely, a rise in cyberbullying is still more likely to be strongly affected by technology and online culture than by other factors, as each incident of bullying is typically independent from other incidents (although they may create a culture of bullying in a localised community, such as a school). However, when

antisemitism is utilised in the cyberbullying of individuals, this tendency may be increased by higher rates of offline antisemitism and/or greater normalisation of antisemitism. In addition, climates contributing to higher rates of antisemitism (e.g. during Middle East conflict flare-ups), may result in both offline and online attacks on Jewish groups or individuals that may not have otherwise happened. Both of these examples suggest how higher rates of offline discrimination and abuse may increase the broader cyberbullying of Jews, which contrasts with the relationship between cyberbullying and traditional bullying.

There is further distinction to be made between reactive antisemitic cyberbullying of individuals, and more proactive group-based antisemitic cyberbullying. The former is more typical of common cyberbullying approaches and may involve exploiting a characteristic of a victim (this being antisemitic) who is already being cyberbullied to further harm them. Conversely, the latter represents a more proactive form of cyberbullying, seeking out and targeting Jews specifically because of their identity. The targeting of Jewish journalists on Twitter provides an example of this proactive cyberbullying, targeting a group rather than an individual. The common use of proactive, group-based bullying further distinguishes antisemitism online from more typical cyberbullying, and future research on online antisemitism would benefit from analysing other forms of online discrimination that also use this tactic. A comparison of rates of proactive cyberbullying in various groups could illuminate whether this trait is disproportionately represented by antisemitism (thereby indicating unique qualitative changes to online antisemitism), or if it is a change shared by broader cyber-hate.

Currently, there are few statistical analyses into online antisemitism. Over 2015 and 2016 two major reports on antisemitism on social media were released. The first was Oboler’s
Measuring the Hate report,\(^{51}\) which focused on a sample of antisemitic items from Facebook, Twitter and YouTube between December 2014 and April 2015. The sample was collected from a cloud-based tool that allowed users to report the antisemitic content they encountered on social media.\(^{52}\) The second major report released between 2015 and 2016 was *The Rise of Antisemitism on Social Media: Summary of 2016*,\(^{53}\) by the World Jewish Congress (WJC) in collaboration with Vigo Social Intelligence. The WJC report identified 382,000 antisemitic posts during 2016, but only qualitatively analysed a 2\% sample of the total.\(^{54}\) The WJC then followed up with another report, *Anti-Semitic Symbols and Holocaust Denial in Social Media Posts*, in January 2018.\(^{55}\) The WJC reports covered antisemitic content across most major social media platforms, reporting 83 seconds as the average time between individual antisemitic posts in 2016, and that there was a 30\% higher use of antisemitic symbols on social media posts in January 2018 compared to the monthly average in 2016. In addition to antisemitic symbols, the 2016 report covered expressions of hatred against Jews, calls to hurt Jews, dehumanisation of Jews, and Holocaust denial, and generally followed the definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in May 2016 (excluding some examples regarding Israel).

\(^{51}\) Andre Oboler, *Measuring the Hate*.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp. 3-4.


\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 13.

\(^{55}\) World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, *Anti-Semitic Symbols and Holocaust Denial in Social Media Posts* (Tel Aviv-Yafo: Vigo Social Intelligence, 2018) <https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/download/3KV1Ygi8FNOTxWd5HeFPw?utm_source=PRESS&utm_campaign=3d806F4ab8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_08&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c3b21e69b1-3d806F4ab8&utm_source=WJC+Mailing+Lists&utm_campaign=78bfed156d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_08&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_04292c525e-78bfed156d-318920277> [accessed 10 December 2019].
The other most significant statistical study of online antisemitism is the Network Contagion Research Institute’s (NCRI) 2018 quantitative analysis of antisemitic memes and rhetoric on alt-right spaces, such as 4chan’s /pol/ board and the Twitter clone, Gab. The NCRI report is the most recent study at the time of writing, being carried out between August 2016 and January 2018, and takes the form of a large-scale, quantitative analysis conducted from hundreds of millions of comments and images collected via automated techniques. The NCRI report differs from the Measuring the Hate and WJC reports by focusing specifically on alt-right spaces, rather than broader social media, although it does consider how these spaces spread antisemitic content to mainstream social media. This focus provides different insights into the creation and distribution of antisemitic content online, as it is within these radical spaces that much of this content originates.

The NCRI report demonstrates a significant increase in the discussion and creation of antisemitic content within the study’s timeframe, corresponding to relevant real-world events, such as the election of Donald Trump and the 2017 Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally. The report also finds that the creation of antisemitic content in these spaces is strongly tied to white nationalist ideology and discussion.

The methodologies between the two WJC reports are the same, and bear similarities to the NCRI report, but they are significantly distinct from the Measuring the Hate report. The Measuring the Hate report relies on data reported from the public via an online tool, reflecting the public’s awareness of antisemitism and willingness to report it. Comparatively, the WJC reports utilise an automated system to monitor major social media for pre-determined categories of

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57 Ibid., p. 1.
58 Ibid., p. 10.
59 Ibid., p. 4.
60 Ibid.
antisemitism, producing a large quantity of data before analysing a small sample.\textsuperscript{61} These divergent methodologies produce significantly different results, with the WJC showing a disproportionate amount of antisemitism on Twitter\textsuperscript{62} compared to a more evenly balanced distribution across platforms in the \textit{Measuring the Hate} report, despite the data for both reports being collected during two close time periods.\textsuperscript{63}

The broad application of the WJC 2016 reports’ automated methodology risks distorting the picture of antisemitism on social media. Twitter has well-developed data analysis tools, and limits post lengths through character restrictions. This functionality makes it easier for both automated systems to pick up potential antisemitism, and for false positives to be cleared by an in-person examination. In comparison, the WJC’s automated system would not be able to record antisemitism as accurately on video-sharing sites such as YouTube, due to its reliance on text and an inability to parse the contents of videos. The limitations of the WJC reports’ automated methodology are compensated for by the NCRI report. By focusing on two similar communities, both in their roles as fringe alt-right platforms and in their shared dominance of short-text and specific image-based content online, the NCRI report can present a far more confident projection of the rates of antisemitic discussion and content creation/sharing. Through focusing exclusively on alt-right spaces, the NCRI report also reduces the risk of acquiring false positives; terms like “Jew” and “White” are far more likely to relate to antisemitism and white nationalism on these platforms than on broader social media. While the WJC did follow up on their report with a subsequent 2018 report on antisemitic symbols, the NCRI report conducted a more holistic approach by considering both text and images within the same analyses. A final, if minor, point is

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{61} World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, \textit{The Rise of Antisemitism on Social Media}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{63} Oboler, \textit{Measuring the Hate}, p. 5.
\end{footnotesize}
that the NCRI’s longer time frame of eighteen months, compared to WJC’s one year, provides broader insight into the trends of antisemitism online, particularly their relation to offline events.

Another aspect to compare between the 2016 WJC and the Measuring the Hate reports is the types of antisemitism that are most commonly features. While the methodologies diverges again on the categorisation of antisemitism, it is more closely aligned than on data collection. Both reports include categories of promoting violence and Holocaust denial, which are both represented as small minorities of antisemitism. The Measuring the Hate report’s other two categories are “Israel-related” and “Traditional”. While the WJC report does not have a category for antisemitism relating to Israel, it does include “Dehumanization” and “Expressions of hatred” categories that do appear to roughly align with traditional antisemitism, as suggested in the explanations of those categories. Combining both of these categories in the WJC report would result in a rate of 49%, identical to traditional antisemitism in the Measuring the Hate report. However, complicating the comparison between the two reports, is the WJC’s category of “Use of Symbols”. Depending on context, the use of symbols may fit in any number of categories and does not appear to be ideally suited as a category of antisemitism in its own right. Because of this, it is unknown whether the use of symbols would be proportionally spread among other categories of antisemitism. Relating to this point, it is worth noting that despite Holocaust denial accounting for only 4% of posts in the WJC report, Holocaust references are seen in all of the other categories’ examples, excluding

64 Oboler, Measuring the Hate, p. 6.
World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, The Rise of Antisemitism on Social Media, p. 17.
65 Ibid., pp. 19, 31.
66 Additionally, there is uncertainty over how an “Israel-related” category would skew the proportion of categories if it had been included in the WJC report. Furthermore, despite pledging to leave this category out, references to Israel and Zionism are still seen in some examples, suggesting there is some representation of Israel-related antisemitism within the WJC report’s data.
Ibid., pp. 33, 36.
“dehumanization”.67 This highlights a complex issue when considering rates of types of antisemitism online: many manifestations of antisemitism may fit into more than one category. To solve this issue, future research should consider applying a broader range of multiple codes to each example of antisemitism, so to limit problematic compartmentalisation, provide deeper understanding of antisemitism, and reveal how types of antisemitism intersect and overlap.

Comparing these existing statistical analyses on antisemitism online with research on cyberbullying provides two major insights for future quantitative research into online antisemitism. Firstly, researchers should collaborate to ensure that consistent, if not standard, methodologies are used, thereby preventing confusion over rates of antisemitism online, similar to that seen in cyberbullying research. Due to the smaller number of analyses thus far, this can be easily facilitated by collaboration and greater transparency of data; this is featured in the NCRI report,68 but not the 2016 WJC report. Secondly, despite the very high volume of content online, researchers should be cautious of using automated systems to collect and analyse data. The diverse nature of this content may not be fully captured by automated systems, leading to distorted findings when used improperly. A research focus on the communities responsible for the creation and spread of antisemitism online may help avoid this issue but may be limited when considering the impact on broader social media. Utilising methodologies with self-reported data, such as in the Measuring the Hate report, also avoids distortion, while also potentially providing insight into the perception of and opposition to antisemitism by web users. This second point emphasises another major lesson to be learned generally from cyberbullying research: to consider the perspectives of the victims and witnesses of online abuse. Nonetheless, self-reporting methods prevent proper

67 While Holocaust references are not necessarily Holocaust denial, they do suggest a higher significance of the Holocaust to antisemitism than is suggested by the 4% of Holocaust denial posts.
Ibid., pp. 21, 25, 29
68 Finkelstein and others, p. 1.
quantification of the degree of deep antisemitism on social media, as regular web users are less likely to identify it; therefore, new methodologies are needed to fill this gap. Still, new methodologies should be informed by existing studies, so as to help develop interdisciplinary approaches that support existing research by avoiding inconsistencies and providing answers to gaps in research.

Definitional Issues

While there are methodological differences between the Measuring the Hate and WJC reports, they do avoid a significant problem seen in cyberbullying research by adhering to a single definition of their phenomenon: IHRA’s Working Definition of antisemitism. The Working Definition of antisemitism is a valuable milestone and a useful tool for research into both offline and online antisemitism. Similar to bullying and cyberbullying, antisemitism has had a difficult definitional history, especially considering the term’s problematic origins in German journalist Wilhelm Marr’s 1879 publications. IHRA’s Working Definition states:

Anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish

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69 This is not as relevant for the NCRI report, as it focuses on specific manifestations of antisemitism, such as the ‘Happy Merchant’ meme.
70 Wilhelm Marr, Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum. Vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet (Bern: Rudolf Costenoble, 1879).
or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.  

The definition also provides several examples that are considered part of the definition. Since May 2016, this definition has been adopted by the EU Parliament and within government bodies of 19 IHRA member and observer nations. Despite this broad adoption, there is still significant academic discussion to be had about the issue of defining antisemitism. However, this issue is not to be extensively discussed in this thesis, which is more concerned over how academic definitions are used to benefit research and society, rather than the merits of a particular definition itself. While the study of online antisemitism is relatively new, the establishment of a ‘gold standard’ definition helps it avoid problems caused by definitional issues in cyberbullying research.

While the IHRA definition is significant, it does not preclude online antisemitism manifesting in a way not covered by the definition. For example, antisemites on Twitter started using triple parentheses around a name – e.g. (((Ben Cohen))) – a technique called ‘echoes’, to indicate the Jewishness of a target to other antisemites. After significant attention was raised in 2016, Google removed an antisemitic “Coincidence Detector” browser extension that

72 Ibid., para. 7-17 of 20.
automatically added echoes to self-identified Jews or those with presumed Jewish last names, \(^{75}\) also building a database of Jewish people online. \(^{76}\) Since this browser extension served as a tool to identify Jews online without the observed victims realising this, it may be distinct from a clear “rhetorical or physical manifestation… directed towards Jewish or non-Jewish individuals” of antisemitism as mentioned in the IHRA definition. Echoes are explored further in chapter five, and they indicate how manifestations of antisemitism online are qualitatively distinct from offline manifestations, especially when considering the IHRA definition. Similarly, cyberbullying research has shown that cyberbullying does not cleanly conform to the main criteria of traditional bullying (intentionality, repetition, and imbalance of power), indicating that cyberbullying is qualitatively distinct from traditional bullying. While the IHRA definition may have issues with applicability, it is still important to encourage its broad, if nuanced use in research on both offline and online antisemitism, accounting for any distinctly new manifestations. This will prevent the issues seen in cyberbullying research, with inconsistent use of definitions further adding to methodological inconsistencies.

Ultimately, cyberbullying research demonstrates difficulties inherent in adapting existing research methods to a phenomenon that has changed with new and evolving technologies. While research into online antisemitism avoids some of the problems faced by cyberbullying research, recent growth of antisemitism may make it difficult to identify major quantitative differences and interplay between offline and online antisemitism. Specifically, the 2016 report from the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry stated:


\(^{76}\) Ibid.
…one trend is the continuance of a notable decrease in the number of incidents, especially the violent ones… The other trend is the continuation of the widespread increase, sometimes dramatic, in verbal and visual antisemitism on social media and during demonstrations…

These trends include both offline and online variants of antisemitism, ranging from public and identifiable incidents such as the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville,78 to the anonymous harassment of Jewish journalists on Twitter.79 The temporal proximity of these events counters the assumption that abuse and discrimination are moving exclusively online due to the protection provided by anonymity. This proximity can also cloud the recognition of qualitative changes to antisemitism caused by electronic communications. The fact that not all antisemites online utilise anonymity may even facilitate public antisemitic activity. As antisemitism online becomes increasingly normalised, the perceived need for anonymity will decrease. This decreased anonymity will correlate with a reduced social risk associated with antisemitism (both online and offline), allowing public figures to engage in antisemitism, further encouraging its normalisation.

78 While the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally presents an example of this normalising phenomenon, it was seen as a step back by some on the alt-right, particularly those who see it as undoing the work to normalise their beliefs through the internet (appendix C, figure 14).
Cyber-racism and Online Antisemitism

Comparing the State of the Fields

Despite the large proportion of antisemitism in hate crimes statistics\(^80\) and its broad presence online, it has a significantly smaller quantity of dedicated research compared to broader cyber-racism. One example of this is the significant disparity between research on antisemitism compared to racism against African Americans, especially online. One hypothesis for this disparity is based on two premises, relating to researchers’ familiarity with different forms of racism and fields of study. Firstly, while much research on racism is conducted by minorities, when non-minority researchers wish to examine racism they tend to focus on the most familiar and well-known example of racism to them, typically racism against African Americans. Relative familiarity with this form of racism may diminish any perceived need to collaborate with discrimination experts, thereby streamlining research in this field.\(^81\) In contrast, it is more likely antisemitism research would invoke a perceived need for collaboration due to the multifaceted manifestations, highly adaptable nature and long history of the hatred. The second premise is that existing antisemitism researchers are more likely to be trained in fields such as history, being less likely to have helpful skillsets for research on contemporary antisemitism, especially on the internet. Therefore, internet researchers examining antisemitism online would need to become familiar with antisemitism or collaborate with antisemitism scholars, many of whom are unsuited to conduct research alone. This situation is also exacerbated by other factors, such as


\(^{81}\) This streamlining may not produce quality research or even be ideal. In fact, this assumed capability to research racism against African Americans may contribute to issues in sociology research explored in chapter two.
antisemitism’s difficult history with intersectionality,\textsuperscript{82} which limits the use of frameworks used elsewhere in discrimination research.

The comparable lack of research on online antisemitism may also suggest to researchers and the broader population that antisemitism is not a significant problem. Dealing with this issue may even be an uphill battle, as despite the empirical research that does exist proves an increase in verbal antisemitism, these results are often met by rejection, trivialisation and even a lack of interest in the broader public sphere.\textsuperscript{83} Carrying out comprehensive research into online racism, including online antisemitism, cannot be achieved by simply removing the research burden from minority researchers. Researchers should consider collaborating (even if they focus on different forms of discrimination and abuse), educate researchers from other disciplines, and help develop standard research methodologies that can be broadly applied across their fields and disciplines.

\textit{Capacity for Research}

The false premise of a colour-blind internet, avoidance of ‘race trouble’ in online discourse, and downplaying of racism in sociological research represent important lessons for online antisemitism research. Firstly, researchers must consider the lines drawn distinguishing antisemitism from other conduct online. These include those laid down by the Working Definition on antisemitism by IHRA,\textsuperscript{84} specifically the lines drawn between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of Israel. Secondly, researchers must also consider antisemitic behaviours and rhetoric that may be dismissed or diminished for various reasons, such as “it was a joke”, and unknowing use of Jewish

\textsuperscript{83} Schwarz-Friesel, “‘Antisemitism 2.0’—The Spreading of Jew-hatred on the World Wide Web”, p. 314.
\textsuperscript{84} International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, para. 3 of 20.
stereotypes (e.g. calling someone a ‘Shylock’). Thirdly, researchers must be cautious to not accidently diminish antisemitism, and must avoid assuming that researching antisemitism, or racism more generally, precludes them from doing so. Fourthly, researchers must consider how perpetrators and bystanders perceive antisemitism online, and whether their perceptions contribute to qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism. For example, resistance to treating online antisemitic behaviour seriously, and willingness to dismiss examples of antisemitic rhetoric (especially when aided by anonymity and disinhibition), can lead to a normalisation of antisemitism not possible in an offline context (while ultimately contributing to offline normalisation as well). Considerations of bystanders must also consider ‘race trouble’ – the broader discomfort surrounding racial issues – alongside analyses of racist behaviour, and how users feeling ‘troubled’ by accusations of antisemitism contributes to its normalisation.85

Researchers must also be aware of the rapidly changing, adaptive nature of online antisemitism, especially when drawing on old data. The problem highlighted by Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi about surveys on racist attitudes using outdated questions (those developed in the 1950s and 1960s)86 applies especially to antisemitism in this context. Researchers using outdated ideas of discrimination can significantly underestimate quantities of discrimination in contemporary society, suggesting discrimination is declining when it has instead evolved and shifted. Antisemitism has significantly changed throughout history, and such changes can occur more rapidly online. Therefore, when researchers examine data about antisemitism online, they must

85 This includes controversy and lack of clarity when distinguishing antisemitism from legitimate criticism of Israel, which can be exacerbated by false accusations of antisemitism by others in the discussion. It may also include notions of ‘Holocaust fatigue’ or distaste at the discussion or perceptions of over-representation of the Holocaust in western media.
consider both the age of the data, and any significant shifts in antisemitic discourse since then, especially if comparing rates of antisemitism online over time.

*Race, Racism and Antisemitism in the Social Media Age*

The creation of parallel realities within social media is key for facilitating the distribution and normalisation of antisemitism online. Before social media and the internet, commentators openly considering discriminatory ideas would have been more inhibited in sharing them, as they would not have had guaranteed access to a large audience agreeable to their views. Virtual spaces, comparatively, provide a reduced distance between commentators and their audiences. The breaking down of distance also emboldens the expression of discrimination if public figures are perceived to be allied with discriminatory commentators. This can be seen in online antisemitism, particularly in the increasing influence of antisemitism on debates regarding Israel. Commentators expressing antisemitic views in these debates can be reinforced by the voices of public figures and other commentators, exacerbating confusion over the line between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of Israel. Broader expressed attitudes can also have this effect, as seen with Trump and his denunciation of political correctness emboldening and normalising racism and white nationalism among his Twitter followers. Considering the alt-right overlap of antisemitism and white nationalism (as seen in the NCRI report), this virtual reality around Trump followers can also serve as a fertile ground for the normalisation of antisemitism.

One particular example that elucidates the overlap influence of antisemitism on the alt-right is the ‘White Genocide’ conspiracy theory. This idea, likely first properly codified in 1995 by American Neo-Nazi David Lane, claims a deliberate conspiracy to undermine and destroy the
white race through mass migration and miscegenation of people of colour into white-majority countries. This idea has been reproduced extensively throughout far-right literature in a variety of forms, such as ‘The Great Replacement’ conceptualised by French writer Renaud Camus over 2010-2012. The conspiracy theory often pins Jews as the perpetrators of this plot, notably in Lane’s screed and in Neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce’s novel The Turner Diaries, evoking a conspiratorial lineage starting with the Protocols and leading to cyberspace. However, some proponents of this theory do not evoke Jews as conspirators, most notably Camus and Brenton Tarrant, perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch massacre. Abandoning the antisemitic roots serves to mainstream the conspiracy theory by appealing more generally to white fragility and concerns of immigration, allowing both its attachment to mainstream political figures, such as Donald Trump, and its efficient perpetuation through cyberspace. Despite this ‘sterilising’ of the conspiracy theory, the concurrent influence of the Protocols cannot be ignored, nor can the influence of antisemitism on the structure and conceptualisation of racist narratives within right. If anything, this sterilisation serves to temporarily fit the current Overton’s Window, and will likely shift it towards the further normalisation of antisemitism within right-wing parallel realities.

87 David Lane was also responsible for the infamous “14 words” slogan of white nationalism. Dirk Moses, “White Genocide” and the Ethics of Public Analysis, Journal of Genocide Research, 21.2 (April 2019), 201-213 (pp. 207-208).
88 Ibid., p. 208.
94 Andrew F. Wilson, ‘#whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory: How Secrecy and Suspicion Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate’, Secrecy and Society, 1.2 (2018), 1-47 (pp. 25-36).
95 Bronner, A Rumour about the Jews, pp. 132-133.
The shifting of Overton’s Window and creation of parallel realities online play key roles in antisemitic rhetoric seeping into criticism of Israel, potentially even normalising overtly antisemitic tropes such as blood libel and Jewish influence on the media. Schwarz-Friesel suggests the importance of this avenue for normalising antisemitism is due to a need for many antisemites to find legitimate reasons to justify classical antisemitic feelings in a post-Holocaust world:

Egodystonic hatred of Jews is a phenomenon of the modern age, linked to the processes of reason-based enlightenment and rationalization. The experience of Auschwitz makes it impossible for a humanist, educated person to accept old forms of hatred of Jews as egosyntonic. The need to legitimize Judeophobic feelings among such people gives rise to processes of projection and reinterpretation.94

These phenomena are demonstrated in social media users’ efforts to dismiss, deflect, and complain about Holocaust Memorial Day commemoration. These efforts are represented in seemingly instinctual needs to mention or compare Palestinian suffering in response to posts about the Holocaust,95 responding with Holocaust denial,96 or even making calls for further atrocities.97 These examples demonstrate how platforms like Twitter and Facebook aid such manipulation of conversations, by allowing the creation of discrete spaces and realities where counter-narratives

94 Schwarz-Friesel, *Antisemitism 2.0 and the Cyberculture of Hate*, p. 10.
96 Online Hate Prevention Institute, “‘Antisemitism 2.0’—The Spreading of Jew-hatred on the World Wide Web”, p. 329.
97 Ibid., para. 3 of 13.
that dismiss the need for and value of Holocaust commemoration can flourish. The users that subscribe to these counter-narrative spaces then normalise discriminatory talking points by attempting to establish them as relevant to the conversation. By utilising existing networks and social media infrastructure (for example by hijacking established hashtags), discriminating actors can work to normalise these ideas with unprecedented ease.

The impact of positivity or negativity biases, as discussed in chapter two, is important when considering how social media platforms establish virtual realities wherein antisemitism is normalised. In addition, the function of like buttons can facilitate ‘information laundering’, particularly for manifestations of deep antisemitism, manipulating algorithms to present antisemitic material to a broader audience. Pre-internet manifestations like Holocaust denial are particularly susceptible to information laundering, as they are already built upon an extensive canon of pseudo-academic literature. Holocaust denial represents a more quantitative change to antisemitism, as the strategic aims of this movement can be more effectively facilitated in web 2.0. While the normalisation of views through information laundering may be more distinct in Holocaust denial, this tactic still represents a significant qualitative change to antisemitism more broadly, and to other forms of online discrimination.

*Developing Effective Methodologies for Discrimination Research Online*

Developing methodologies to quantify rates of deep antisemitism may benefit from considering processes that spread deep antisemitism. The inability to quantify subtle manifestations of discrimination is an issue antisemitism research shares with the PORS scale, representing a significant gap in broader cyber-racism research. However, the varied and complex manifestations
of antisemitism may place antisemitism researchers in a better position to develop methodologies quantifying subtle examples of racism. Antisemitism’s adaptability and reactive relationship with scholarship, as seen through Holocaust denial in particular, requires antisemitism scholars to be well-versed with the nuances of subtle and new manifestations. One way to research deep antisemitism online is by attempting to measure the ability of internet users to recognise deep manifestations, such as Holocaust denial, as antisemitism. This is a key part of the research study in chapter six. The findings of this study can then help develop methodologies that may quantify deep antisemitism and other forms of subtle discrimination, for example, by comparing recognition rates of Holocaust denial with self-reported rates of perceived online Holocaust denial. However, the development of further methodologies is dependent on effective collaboration with other fields and disciplines, as suggested by Jakubowicz et al. Such collaboration will avoid the problems that arise from inconsistent methodologies and help develop holistic approaches geared to solve the broader problems of online discrimination.

#GamerGate as an Intersection of Online Abuse

While Jakubowicz et al. argue for transdisciplinarity in studying cyber-racism, this thesis also has demonstrated the need to consider intersecting and analogous fields to properly understand the full dimensions of online abuse and discrimination. GamerGate serves as an example of how cyberbullying and misogyny online intersect, but rarely are manifestations of online abuse and discrimination cleanly limited to such a binary intersection. The ability of discriminatory actors to shape virtual realities that spread and normalise discrimination means that large scale reactionary

98 Jakubowicz and others, pp. 45-64.
movements serve as opportunities for other discriminatory movements, including antisemitic movements. Discriminatory users can use these overlapping movements to influence and even recruit other users from other movements. This section will therefore compare GamerGate to antisemitism, considering how they contrast, overlap, and contribute to each other. The intersection of group-based cyberbullying with misogyny and online antisemitism can be depicted in a three-way Venn diagram (appendix C, figure 9.2).

Salter’s conceptualisation of GamerGate as a “toxic technoculture”\(^9\) justifies portraying GamerGate as a reactionary movement. For the movement’s proponents, the criticism and actions of female and feminist developers, journalistic, game critics, and researchers were perceived as a threat to a traditionally masculine and chauvinistic culture. However, the reactionaryism of GamerGate can be distinguished from antisemitism, for even if the perceived threat to the gamer ‘identity’ and culture was inflated to conspiratorial levels, there does exist a genuine intent to combat misogyny present in the video game industry.\(^{10}\) This contrasts to antisemitism, particularly the chimeric antisemitism that manifests in the form of conspiracy theories, such as in the *Protocols*. GamerGate’s manifestation as a conspiratorial reactionary movement therefore allows for particular comparison and contrast with antisemitic conspiracy theories.

Comparing GamerGate and antisemitism requires examining two key steps in each type of conspiracy theory. The first step is the recognition of real, concerted efforts to promote inclusivity and reduce discrimination. The second is the reaction to these efforts, predominantly by a dominant group, that creates an environment for irrational conspiracy theories to spread. Regarding the first


\(^{10}\) A more recent continuation of this conflict can be seen over the backlash to the inclusion of women as playable multiplayer characters in the World War II-themed first-person shooter *Battlefield V*. 
step for Gamergate, there were developer efforts to increase market share by appealing to the broader population and there were long-existing women and minority fans of video games trying to achieve greater representation. In addition, with the growth of social media, there was greater visibility of female and minority voices in the gaming community, particularly those calling out chauvinism and exclusivity. While for antisemitism it can be said that Jews have been associated with pushes for cultural change to protect minorities, and that this trend may have been used to justify antisemitism in a comparable way, Jewish voices are neither dominant nor alone in broader pushes against discrimination. Furthermore, the manifestations of antisemitic conspiracy theories, like the *Protocols*, feature fantastical ideas not rooted in reality. There is a clearer connection between GamerGate’s targeting of certain internet users, and these targets’ opposition to chauvinism in video game culture; even though this opposition could not be called a coordinated conspiracy. Currently, it is less likely for the first step to occur for antisemitism, which means the prominence of antisemitic conspiracy theories and harassment online cannot be primarily attributed to a straightforward reactionaryism, as per GamerGate. Considering this ‘gap of motive’ alongside the embedding of antisemitism within reactionary movements online reveals unique redemptive and even chimeric qualities to online antisemitism. While this distinction has existed between pre-internet antisemitism and other forms of discrimination, its continuation online represents a different trajectory for online antisemitism compared to other forms of online discrimination.

Another trait to compare between the GamerGate movement and online antisemitism is how the internet makes cyberbullying, harassment, and discrimination ‘fun’ or recreational. The

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creation of antisemitic memes and broad participation in antisemitic humour on spaces like 4chan (as explored in chapter five) demonstrates how the internet has made antisemitism recreational, contributing to the normalisation of antisemitism. Comparatively, although GamerGate was a movement dedicated to combating a perceived threat in a ‘culture war’, elements of abusive behaviour were also considered ‘fun’ by the participants. Mortensen looks at the GamerGate movement through a lens of “leisure-centred aggression”, comparing the proponents to football hooligans, always ready to attack the other team, and motivated more by the thrill rather than actual strategy.\textsuperscript{102} However, unlike football hooliganism, the internet and anonymity utilised by GamerGate removed all comparative risk to real world hooliganism, such as risk of identification, injury, and retaliation by the ‘other team’. This change in risk represents a qualitative distinction from offline aggressive behaviour. However, the strategy of antisemites online to normalise and justify antisemitism through humour is distinct from GamerGate, due to not originating from a leisure-centred origin. GamerGate originated with video games, a pre-existing leisure activity, whereas antisemites online work to create a new form of leisure through the creation and sharing of antisemitic humour and harassment of Jews online. This distinction is further explored in chapter five, predominantly in the profiles of 4chan, Daily Stormer and social media.

GamerGate also represented the evolution of other online harassment tactics, such as doxing. Doxing was often initially used as a prank, ordering victims mass numbers of pizzas or odd magazine subscriptions.\textsuperscript{103} Eventually it would also be used to cause more serious harm, such as destroying the reputation Justine Sacco, a PR executive, causing her to lose her job and face


\textsuperscript{103} Whitney Phillips, This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship Between Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2015), p. 61.
ongoing harassment after making a single racist tweet in 2013.104 Participants in GamerGate attacked victims using doxing and other harassment, targeting a perceived class of people – ‘Social Justice Warriors’ – in retaliation for their perceived conspiracy against gaming culture.105 This indicated a departure from recreational discrimination (contrasting with many manifestations of online antisemitism), with GamerGate discrimination taking on a more intentional, ideological aspect, even if remaining casual and ‘leisure-centred’. This is relevant to recreational manifestations of antisemitism, representing qualitative changes caused by web 2.0. Many of these recreational manifestations are shown in chapter five to have originated with a pre-existing ideological intention among dedicated antissemites like Andrew Anglin. This contrasts GamerGate, which had a more ‘organic’ evolution from being ‘fun’ (particularly during the original harassment of individuals) to developing an actual ideological aspect. On a surface level, GamerGate moved from leisure to ideology, while antisemitism online moved from ideology to leisure. Yet, on a closer examination, the ideological aspects of online antisemitism have always been present, so the shift towards ‘fun’ content reflects an intentional strategic change, as opposed to GamerGate’s more ‘organic’ evolution.

The reactionaryism of the GamerGate movement highlights another shared trait with online antisemitism; each phenomenon perceives their enemies as waging a ‘cultural war’ against a culture manufactured by its adherents.106 In these circumstances the manufactured cultures are either flexible or broad enough to suit the needs of the reactionaries. A core narrative of GamerGate

106 For antisemitism, this may manifest in the defence of ‘white’ culture, or a more generalised ‘Western’ or ‘European’ culture, and this trope goes back centuries, most prominently featured in Nazi propaganda and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
is that video games’ masculine technoculture is being attacked in a ‘cultural war’ by feminists and broader progressives. The general application of this conspiracy framework – that traditional cultures are being attacked by vague progressive or alien forces – led to an overlap between the phenomena. Mortensen highlights the adoption of antisemitic sentiments by members of GamerGate, with claims that Jews were attempting to pacify white men by encouraging politically correct video games. There was also a broader overlap between GamerGate, the ‘Cultural Marxism’ conspiracy theory (itself an antisemitic trope), and other reactionary and discriminatory movements such as men’s rights activists and pick up artists. This represents significant qualitative change to online discrimination and conspiracy theory movements brought about by the internet; features of the technology facilitate the connection and collaboration of like-minded individuals from different movements, even without leaders or united agreement among the individuals. However, the lack of a reactionary ‘gap of motive’ for antisemitic movements means that these overlaps with GamerGate and analogous movements provide essential recruitment opportunities for antisemitic movements. By promoting a broader ‘cultural war’ framework, antisemites can increase the opportunities for recruitment by interweaving with a wider range of reactionary movements.

This ‘gap of motive’ represents a unique quality to online antisemitism when compared to clearer triggers in GamerGate and other reactionary movements. Internet technology enables recruitment between these movements through overlapping communities. While this opportunism exists broadly along these overlapping movements and the alt-right, online antisemitism is unique in that the ‘gap of motive’ has required it to depend heavily on these opportunities for recruitment.

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107 Salter, p. 255.
108 Mortensen, p. 788.
Without taking advantage of these overlaps, antisemitic movements lack a straightforward path to recruitment in a post-Holocaust world, especially in former allied countries. This opportunistic recruitment is especially prominent in online spaces where discriminatory movements overlap, such as 4chan’s /pol/ board, which both is populated by antisemites and hosted so much GamerGate discussion that website owner Christopher Poole chose to completely ban the topic.\textsuperscript{109} The ease of involvement with GamerGate’s leaderless swarm-like movement, comparable thrill/fun-based motivations for abuse, and patterns of harassment, allowed for easy infiltration of GamerGate and overlapping movements by antisemites. Internet technology’s enabling of echo-chambers spaces have facilitated radicalisation and a sense of victimisation, giving rise to comparable ‘cultural war’ narratives and allowing further infiltration of these spaces by antisemites. This recruitment of new antisemites through the exploitation of shared qualities allows both researchers and online antisemites to frame antisemitism as an ‘end point’ to radicalisation online. For antisemites, this ‘end point’ provides a redemptive antisemitic worldview that can explain every aspect of their prior reactionaryism.

**Organisation Scale**

The comparison between antisemitism and other forms of online abuse and discrimination, and between the research on each, has provided the necessary groundwork to conduct a holistic analysis of antisemitic spaces online. This thesis demonstrates why considering these analogous fields is key to contextualising and understanding the place of antisemitism online. Chapter five analyses manifestations of antisemitism online through the lens of their platforms, as it is the

functions of those platforms that ultimately determine how antisemitism is shaped online. Furthermore, examining ‘archetypes’ of particular types of platforms can create profiles that provide a broader picture of antisemitism online. However, before analysing archetypes of platforms that spread antisemitism, it is necessary to construct frameworks that help distinguish these websites from each other, and from antisemitism before the internet.

Beyond comparing the technical aspects of websites (e.g. social media as compared to an online archive or personal website), it is also necessary to compare the motivations behind each website, and/or the users of those websites. Some websites that aid the spread of antisemitism do not do so out of intent. Social media giants such as Facebook, Twitter and Reddit are all used to spread antisemitic materials, primarily because they host large, interconnected audiences. For example, Facebook can connect people based on shared interests as indicated through liking, or being part of, antisemitic pages and groups. These platforms should be distinguished from websites that intentionally create and disproportionately distribute antisemitic content. In addition, those who actively use social media to promote antisemitic agendas should be distinguished from users that spread, or even create, antisemitic content casually in their regular online activity. Finally, users who actively work to normalise antisemitism should be distinguished from followers who merely accept antisemitism as good and accommodate it. An example of this distinction is between those who create antisemitic memes and distribute them to normalise antisemitism in other spaces, compared to those who like or share the memes, either because they see it as ironically participating in controversial humour, or because they believe in the narrative behind the memes.

This thesis will distinguish between ‘organised’, ‘recreational’, and ‘casual’ antisemitism on the internet. An early version of this paradigm has been applied to research on Holocaust denial, particularly examining how the rise of web 2.0 shifted the role of the organised Holocaust denier
movement towards the preservation and sharing of existing material rather than prioritising the creation of new material, thus supporting the activities of casual antisemites.\textsuperscript{110} However, a simple dichotomy between organised and casual antisemites is rooted in the relationships between antisemites before web 1.0, and is not suitable for a broader study of antisemitism in web 2.0. For this reason, a new category in this framework – recreational antisemitism – has been included to demonstrate one of the most significant qualitative changes caused to antisemitism by web 2.0. Anonymity, dissociation, and difficulty in parsing intent on the internet have allowed for the evolution of antisemitic manifestations that do not specifically promote antisemitic agendas, but are instead made to engage in particular online cultures. The terms ‘organised’, ‘recreational’ and ‘casual’ can be used to explore the roles of a website’s producers and/or consumers in spreading antisemitism, and to determine whether and how consumers participate in prosumption. This framework also demonstrates how manifestations of antisemitism have qualitatively changed between web 1.0 and web 2.0. After explaining this and other frameworks, chapter five applies them to prominent archetypes of antisemitic websites and mainstream social media platforms.

\textit{Organised Antisemitism}

Organised online antisemitism refers to three key phenomena. Firstly, it refers to websites created for the purpose of spreading antisemitism.\textsuperscript{111} This phenomenon started in web 1.0, but still extends into web 2.0. These producers can be dedicated antisemites, potentially both part of and responsible for the organisation of antisemitic hate networks through the websites they create and


\textsuperscript{111} This would not be limited to spreading antisemitism exclusively.
run. This phenomenon of organised antisemitism is rooted in pre-internet organisational methods, such as how Holocaust denial organisations mailed imitations of peer-reviewed journals to their subscribers and donors. These originally offline Holocaust denial organisations represented the bulk of organised online antisemitic activity and content during web 1.0. These organisations continue in web 2.0 under a newer generation of pseudo-academic Holocaust deniers: Thomas Graf, Jürgen Graf and Carlo Mattogno.\textsuperscript{112} However, this older model has fallen in relevance compared to newer, more provocative, and simpler websites, such as Andrew Anglin’s Daily Stormer.\textsuperscript{113} While the relationship between antisemitic producers and casual followers is mostly unchanged from a publisher-consumer basis, the content shift represented by the Daily Stormer indicates a notable qualitative change.

Organised online antisemitism secondly refers to networks of antisemites or antisemitic spaces organised through social media and other web 2.0 platforms, which eschew the social risk of offline grassroots organisation in favour of online anonymity/pseudonymity and \textit{laissez-faire} moderation policies. This manifestation of organised antisemitism is a new development under web 2.0 and demonstrates quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism through internet technology. One significant change is lacking the need for ‘credentials’ or reputation to establish these networks or spaces (although the existence of ‘credentials’ can still help). The rise of online anonymity and its role in reducing social risk can result in antisemites accepting the legitimacy of spaces and networks without any knowledge of the users behind them. In addition, some of these networks and spaces can be populated entirely by organised, dedicated antisemites, who no longer need a casual antisemitic support base, monetary or otherwise, to execute their agendas.

Thirdly, organised online antisemitism refers to individual social media users who can essentially replicate the efforts of pre-internet antisemitic networks alone through web 2.0 technology. They achieve this by accruing digital subscribers and establishing virtual discussion spaces for their content. Similar action pre-internet would have required physical printing, distribution of material, and organisation of physical spaces for discussion, all of which require greater resources, often supplied by a larger group and/or monetary resources. Organised online antisemites have the ability to run or disproportionately contribute to free ‘subsites’ (e.g. Facebook pages, YouTube channels, or Reddit subreddits) that can reach a broader audience than pre-internet or web 1.0 antisemitic websites. Through subsites, anonymous/pseudonymous organised users can direct the swarm-logic of other discriminatory movements, like GamerGate, without drawing attention to their deeper antisemitic motives. These antisemites’ ability to run online spaces by themselves makes them distinct from the second subcategory of organised antisemitism, which depends on a broader group producing material and activities in a collaborative effort. The audience responding to this third group are typically reacting to the organised individual’s antisemitic capital or may even act relatively independently in the spaces the individual created. This audience can still produce content themselves, but by being dependent on the spaces provided by the organised antisemite, and without further networking, they fall into the categories of casual or recreational antisemitism.

114 A particular example of an individual doing this is u/soccer on reddit, who established a broad network of Holocaust denying and antisemitic spaces on reddit largely by themselves and was able to ensure their continuity as a “safe space” for antisemites through merely logging on every few weeks. Allington, pp. 54-64.
115 ‘Subsites’ refers to parts of websites within a larger website or platform, often with their own community, culture and rules. Examples of this include Facebook groups and pages, and Reddit subreddits.
Casual Antisemitism

Casual antisemitism refers to antisemites who do not create content but provide financial or moral support to antsemitic content creators (organised and recreational antisemites), and/or spread antisemitism by sharing content and using antisemitism in everyday interactions. This process normalises antisemitism over time, promoting a potentially unconscious assimilation – an osmosis – of antisemitism into society. This osmosis happens due to casual antisemites accepting antisemitism as acceptable and normal, which can range from not understanding the harmfulness of content, to merely assuming antisemitic content is truthful and morally good to share. Casual antisemites typically do not contribute significant time or effort to spreading antisemitism or advancing antisemitic agendas; their engagement primarily happens in their free time and need not affect their broader lifestyles. However, the constant connectivity provided by social media and other web 2.0 platforms can still result in greater exposure time to antisemitism, despite the streamlining of antisemitic content consumption.

Casual online antisemitism in web 1.0 was largely comparable to pre-internet casual antisemites, with only quantitative changes to antisemitism due to easier access and sharing. Publicly accessible websites reduced cost barriers to antisemitic content; casual antisemites no longer needed to pay mailing costs or subscription fees, although subscription fees would aid the creation of new material. These quantitative changes extended into web 2.0 as barriers were further removed. Access could be enhanced by subscribing to antisemitic content creators on multiple platforms and participating in spaces where they participated. Media tools and spaces enhanced the ability of casual antisemites to share the content they consumed, helping antisemitic material to be promoted to broader audiences, rather than being limited to private lists of casual subscribers.
Online anonymity and streamlined electronic communication are the key dimensions that distinguish casual antisemitism between pre-internet/web 1.0 and web 2.0. Before web 2.0, the promotion or sharing of antisemitic content could threaten casual antisemites’ social capital. The ostracisation and damage to prominent organised antisemites such as Holocaust deniers would warn casual antisemites against similar behaviour. Furthermore, casual antisemites would lack the ability and dedication to promote antisemitism to broader society, limiting their distribution to closer networks of friends and family. For these reasons, the spread of casual antisemitism would be limited to private communication, thereby leaving the social risk and onus of spreading antisemitism publicly to the organisers of antisemitic movements. Online anonymity removes this risk, and when combined with social connectivity online, casual antisemites can contribute to the spread and normalisation of antisemitism within broader communities. Features like hash-tagging even allow casual antisemites to reach audiences beyond their own social media echo chambers. On platforms such as Facebook, casual antisemites can provide enough likes on antisemitic content to make it appear in other users’ ‘news feeds’. This broadened reach can manifest even further into direct harassment of Jews on social media. For example, if a casual antisemite is subscribed to a Jewish individual’s account, or an antisemitic content creator shares a Jewish individual’s post, the casual antisemite can post slurs and other antisemitic content on the Jewish person’s profile. Effort and risk-wise, this is little different from using an antisemitic slur when a Jewish individual is mentioned in private conversation, yet on social media its manifestation is distinct due to being promoted to more people, and even directly antagonising people affected by it. Ultimately, casual antisemitism is reactive, but as the internet has evolved, reactions of casual antisemitism can affect a broader range of people in ways not possible before web 2.0.
Recreational Antisemitism

Recreational antisemitism represents one of the most significant changes to antisemitism caused by web 2.0. It refers to those who are deliberately antisemitic and create antisemitic content, but do not do so for any grander purpose. Recreational antisemites say explicit antisemitic statements and create antisemitic memes and jokes. They may deliberately use antisemitic slurs when being antagonistic towards a Jewish person and may even seek out Jews and create antisemitic content to antagonise them. This would typically represent antisemitic cyberbullying of an individual rather than group-based antisemitic cyberbullying, however recreational antisemites may still also participate in group-based antisemitism for recreational reasons. They may even create antisemitic material for their own purposes or spaces, but do not actively work to create an organised network.

Changes brought by web 2.0 provided the spaces, technology and opportunities to engage in this recreational behaviour, which in turn affects the tone, leadership, and strategy of organised antisemites. This category of recreational antisemitism does not imply that organised and casual antisemites do not engage in antisemitic humour or ‘leisure-centred’ antisemitic cultures, but rather that there is a distinct group engaging in antisemitic humour for primarily self-amusement. These individuals represent potential recruits to organised antisemites, thereby encouraging organised antisemites to produce content appealing to them. This change to organised antisemitic strategy further perpetuates and normalises antisemitic humour online, encouraging more naïve users to engage in antisemitism. Members of this category can range from those who do not believe in antisemitic ideas but engage in humour that utilises them, to those who do believe in the antisemitic claims but still only engage in a limited fashion compared to organised antisemites.

There are limited examples of recreational antisemitism before the internet, and those few examples highlight the significance of recreational antisemitism online. One example is the use of
antisemitic jokes in stand-up comedy. Audiences for controversial and provocative humour do exist, and stand-up comics using antisemitic content may not be antisemitic in intent, justifying their ‘edgy’ content using the “it’s just a joke” defence. However, there are significant differences in the perception of this offline content compared to recreational antisemitism online. For the stand-up comic, audiences will recognise the purpose of the material to be a joke, even if it is harmful. Online, there may be no distinction between the antisemitic content created by a recreational antisemite trolling, or seeking to provoke reactions, and the content produced by an organised antisemite in order to advance an agenda. Furthermore, without a specific, clear context for provocative humour, such as a comedy theatre environment, viewers of the content are less likely to understand any intent behind the content, made even more difficult by online disassociation and anonymity. Finally, antisemitic stand-up jokes are intended to remain in the theatre, evident in the need to create a space for that humour. Recreational antisemitism online can be spread outside antisemitic spaces, potentially motivated by the desire to provoke reactions by trolling. This excursion beyond antisemitic spaces is facilitated by the social anonymity and connectivity provided by web 2.0, which provides targets and reduces risk.

Organised, Recreational and Casual Antisemitism in Web 2.0

While the rise of recreational antisemitism is one of the key qualitative changes to antisemitism in web 2.0, the categories of organised and casual antisemitism also have undergone significant change between pre-internet/web 1.0 and web 2.0 (appendix C, figures 10.1-10.4). The

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116 Even in online spaces where this context might exist, say an antisemitic joke creating space, there will be less feedback affirming the harmful nature of the content. A stand-up routine involving antisemitic jokes may result in groans or nervous laughter that possibly affirms the absurd and problematic nature of the content. Such feedback may not exist or be as perceivable through primarily text-based communication online.
greater user interaction brought about by web 2.0 gives casual antisemites an entry-point to the broader public sphere, and access to antisemitic material without the need to actively participate in or subscribe to the infrastructure of an organised group. They may also be attracted to spaces where antisemitism is common, even if that space is not necessarily part of an organised antisemitic network. Even among spaces with agendas to promote antisemitism, such as Stormfront, the technology of web 2.0 allows for direct feedback from casual antisemites, encouraging them to participate (even if they do not need to in order to access content). Agenda-driven websites can also provide ‘safe spaces’ for casual antisemites, virtual spaces where they can interact at virtually anytime, from any place, with little social risk. Finally, agenda-driven spaces also actively encourage the transformation of casual antisemites into recreational or organised antisemites. In the case of conversion to recreational antisemitism, easy content creation online and the cultures facilitated by cyberspaces encourages more active participation in the creation of antisemitic content, particularly memes and other short, jocular content. For conversion to organised antisemitism, web 2.0’s interconnectivity removes the social risk and other barriers that might otherwise limit active involvement in antisemitic movements and provides access to casual audiences that enhances organised antisemitic network recruitment efforts.

The qualities of web 2.0 allow users to produce and spread antisemitism with a greater reach than pre-internet hate networks, without even needing to reveal their identity. This ability enables organised creators of antisemitic content to distribute their content without the infrastructure of a group. While organised antisemites can work individually, this does not mean that they are replacing other organised antisemitic groups; indeed, groups based on web 2.0 technology are far more relevant to the growth and evolution of antisemitism. One key development that is explored through this ‘organisation’ scale is how antisemitism 2.0 has resulted
in shifting relationships between organised antisemitic networks, dedicated antisemitic individuals (both organised and recreational), and casual spreaders of antisemitism. The role of prosumption is important here, especially regarding the rise of recreational antisemitism. Through the sharing of antisemitic memes for recreational purposes, online users can promote spaces that facilitate regular feedback of more antisemitic humour. Those who enjoy antisemitic humour, even if not holding particularly antisemitic views, may be encouraged to create antisemitic memes and content to both support these spaces and receive positive social feedback from participating. The lens of prosumption illustrates how the circulation of antisemitic humour online can push people towards antisemitism. Online interaction allows the creation of spaces where expressions of antisemitism are tolerated, and where organised antisemites can go specifically to recruit others into their networks and ideologies.

**Clarity Framework**

Another factor to consider is how clearly antisemitism manifests to viewers online. Different levels of clarity can be used by organised antisemites to achieve different goals, ranging from pushing Jews out of online spaces, to deceiving viewers into assuming the acceptability of antisemitic beliefs. The clarity framework provides three categories of antisemitism, based on how clear they appear to viewers. The first category is covert antisemitism, which attempts to package or cloak antisemitic beliefs in legitimate sounding language so to encourage people to believe it (appendix C, figure 11.1). The second is overt antisemitism, specifically made to be viewed as antisemitic by the audience (appendix C, figure 11.2). The third is invisible antisemitism, which is the result of antisemitism being normalised. This latter category does not count as covert as the antisemitism is
not actively hidden but is simply accepted as normal by posters and other viewers, especially if
left unchallenged (appendix C, figure 11.3).

Different levels in antisemitism’s clarity online, particularly in intent and explicitness, serve
to achieve different goals for online antisemites. For example, covert antisemitism seeks to
promote antisemitism to immediate viewers, so that antisemitism becomes normalised in the
mainstream over time as per antisemitism 2.0. Covert antisemitism can also serve as signals to
other antisemites online without attracting the attention of the mainstream, helping them establish
and organise antisemitic networks. Through ‘dog-whistling’ and cloaked content, antisemites can
direct audiences from public forums to antisemitic spaces, isolating uninformed viewers from
contrary viewpoints that may point out or refute the antisemitism. If these users ask questions or
look for more information, these new spaces provide answers that may further direct them towards
antisemitic ideas, potentially even explicit ones. Furthermore, covert antisemitism may intimidate
viewers who do perceive it, resulting in them feeling unwelcome in particular spaces. In this
situation, covert antisemites may have degrees of plausible deniability due to the ignorance of the
broader audience, making it more difficult for their antisemitism to be called out.

Overt antisemitism also serves to intimidate online users who are opposed to antisemitism
and can normalise online antisemitism in a different way to covert antisemitism. By exploiting
inconsistent social media moderation and diminished consequences for bigotry online, antisemites
can flood online spaces with explicit antisemitism. Such deluges can serve as projections of
strength; disproportionate amounts of online antisemitism in targeted spaces can make online
antisemites appear more numerous and organised. Overt antisemitism also serves to push Jews and
others opposing antisemitism out of online spaces, limiting the number of users willing to combat
antisemitism. This ‘ceding’ or ‘colonisation’ of virtual territory is implied in the commonly well-
known social media tips “don’t read the comments” or “don’t feed the trolls”,\textsuperscript{117} where the existence of unsavoury elements in certain online spaces, including antisemitism, is considered normal.

Invisible antisemitism represents the impact of covert normalisation efforts, while perpetuating this impact more broadly. Antisemitism is invisible when its adherents and the spaces they inhabit do not conceive the discrimination inherent in the content. This contrasts spaces where overt antisemitism is normalised, as users they likely recognise the discrimination, but accept it as normal for ideological or recreational reasons. Once antisemitism is invisible, attempts to call it out may result in responses promoting the Livingstone Formulation, inadvertently furthering another antisemitic conspiracy theory. Invisible antisemitism advances the goal of antisemitism by both normalising antisemitism and hampering efforts to combat it. By considering the clarity of antisemitic content to the broader online community, and even other antisemites, the profiles in chapter five determine how iterations of antisemitism in different online spaces serve the various goals of antisemites, including the advancement of antisemitism 2.0.

\textbf{Minor Frameworks}

Another minor framework covers the distinction between ‘dormant’ and ‘active’ antisemitism online (appendix C, figures 12.1 and 12.2). Web 1.0 revolutionised the publishing and redistribution of material, allowing high volumes of material to be preserved digitally and easily accessed anywhere. This indicates an evolution of dormant antisemitic material. The preserved

relevance of dormant antisemitism is one of the key qualitative and quantitative changes brought to antisemitism merely through changing technology. For example, it allows Holocaust denial content to be continuously circulated despite the energy of antisemites moving elsewhere. With this concept in mind, online antisemitism resembles more of a growing catalogue of propaganda, rather than a collection of discrete attempts to keep antisemitism relevant. Comparatively, pre-internet dormant antisemitism could contain ideas that may eventually be recycled, but without easy access to their storage and streamlined publishing, these ideas and material would stay unused unless significant resources were dedicated to republishing them - as in the case of the Protocols.\textsuperscript{118}

Active antisemitism, by contrast, refers to new content being actively created, whether web videos, articles or memes. Web 2.0 has resulted in the line between dormant and active antisemitism being narrowed, as dormant antisemitism is commonly reposted by organised antisemites, and active antisemitism can manifest as simply as altering a meme, which may be based on dormant content. The narrowing of this framework highlights further significant qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism caused by web 2.0.

Another useful framework not original to this thesis is the TEMPIS taxonomy used by the Online Antisemitism Working Group in their 2013 report.\textsuperscript{119} The TEMPIS taxonomy distinguishes factors of communication timings, administrator and moderator empowerment, moderation, material publicness, user identity and social impact of different websites. The TEMPIS taxonomy allows researchers to effectively parse the distinguishing factors of these websites, thereby providing context to how and why antisemitism manifests on their platforms. The TEMPIS


\textsuperscript{119} Andre Oboler and David Matas, \textit{Online Antisemitism: A systematic review of the problem, the response and the need for change} (Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, 2013), pp. 5-10.
taxonomy can be used for archetypes of both dedicated antisemitic websites, and mainstream social media platforms (appendix C, figure 13).

Because of individuality and anonymity/pseudonymity online, identifying trends or patterns in antisemitic content can be difficult, especially on a macro level applied to entire websites. Adopting frameworks of organisation, clarity, and dormancy of antisemitism establishes categories for content before accessing the content. This is more practical than attempting to categorise antisemitic incidents and material after collating them, for two reasons. Firstly, it can be difficult and resource intensive to draw connections between large quantities of individual pieces of discriminatory content. While doing so is possible and has been done so before, such as in the OHPI’s 2013 report on anti-Muslim hate,\footnote{Andre Oboler, \textit{Islamophobia on the Internet: The growth of online hate targeting Muslims} (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2013), p. 29.} such methodologies are best done in samples, which becomes increasingly complicated as more websites and types of platforms are investigated. Earlier in the internet history it was possible to do comprehensive overviews of every searchable antisemitic website, as the Simon Wiesenthal Center did in its Digital Hate series, but such methodologies are too outdated for web 2.0.\footnote{Simon Wiesenthal Center, \textit{Digital Hate 2002: Internet Report and Analysis} (Los Angeles: The Simon Wiesenthal Center and Snider Social Action Institute, 2002) [on CD].} Secondly, the frameworks aim to be encompassing enough to draw clear conclusions from most instances of online antisemitism. The design of these frameworks has been based on existing research on antisemitism and structured on the qualities of previously examined antisemitic content. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that cultures and content are constantly evolving on the internet, and the antisemitic content examined in previous research may be considerably different from future content. The frameworks have been
designed with these considerations in mind, being broad enough to allow for the adaptive nature of antisemitism, yet specific enough to allow researchers to draw informative conclusions.

**Conclusion**

Direct comparison of research on cyberbullying and cyber-racism with online antisemitism demonstrates key lessons, which would not be observed with a narrow focus on online antisemitism. These lessons include the need for consistent definitions between studies, while avoiding the temptation to define phenomena differently due to qualitatively distinct manifestations online. In this case, it is better to maintain the original, offline definition and use the new manifestations to demonstrate how the internet results in qualitatively distinct manifestations of online abuse and discrimination. Another lesson is to consider how intersecting forms of abuse and discrimination result in opportunistic recruitment from adjacent discriminatory movements, and how actors from these movements can use social media to shape virtual realities that normalise their ideologies. This opportunism, seen significantly in GamerGate, is one of the strongest arguments for online abuse and discrimination research to incorporate consideration of intersecting and analogous fields of research. However, issues in the research of African American racism, and comparatively lower rates of research into online antisemitism, both demonstrate the need to properly understand intersecting fields of research. This all points towards the need for collaboration in future research on online abuse and discrimination, to both encourage the development of interdisciplinary approaches, and facilitate effective cooperation between fields.

Still, the research and frameworks produced in this chapter demonstrate how effective research can be done individually. This thesis’ individual research serves the broader fields by demonstrating how holistic approaches can be conducted, through developing methodologies that
can be adopted by researchers in different fields - an objective further promoted by the research study in chapter six.

This chapter’s frameworks, being informed by broad research on antisemitism, cyberbullying, and cyber-racism, allow for analysis in chapter five of the interplay between adaptable features of antisemitism and functions of online platforms. With these frameworks, profiles can be made of key websites and social media platforms that contribute to antisemitism’s spread online. These profiles then help determine how the internet, and web 2.0 in particular, has led to quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism, including the extent of these changes and how antisemitism compares to other forms of online discrimination. Regarding antisemitism 2.0, these profiles help determine the degree of social acceptability of antisemitism online, and the continuity of such social acceptability between websites and social media. Ultimately, the research enabled by these frameworks in chapter five can inform the production of tools and strategies to educate and equip newer online generations for encounters with online antisemitism, particularly when combined with the findings from chapter six’s research study.
Chapter 5

Profiles of Hatred: Antisemitism on Websites and Social Media

This chapter analyses archetypal examples of antisemitic websites and manifestations of antisemitism on various social media platforms, applying the frameworks developed in chapter four to create profiles of these websites and platforms. Individual instances of antisemitism are examined with consideration of spaces where they manifest, analysing what qualities of the website or platform enable such content and activity. Furthermore, creating profiles of different, yet archetypal websites, allows this chapter to examine key areas of antisemitic dissemination and activity, producing a synthesised picture of antisemitism on the broader internet. The antisemitic websites examined in this chapter were chosen due to their impact and specific roles in both spreading and promoting the social acceptability of antisemitism online. The Institute for Historical Review, Stormfront, 4chan,¹ and the Daily Stormer websites represent archetypes of different websites specifically used for disseminating antisemitism. The social media platforms examined are Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Reddit, some of the most popular social media platforms, which vary in their functionality, moderation, and use by antisemites. The websites and platforms selected are not exhaustive and do not necessarily represent the most extreme manifestations of antisemitism (e.g. 8chan compared to 4chan, Gab compared to Twitter). Some of these extreme manifestations are discussed briefly alongside other archetypes and platforms.

¹ While 4chan may differ from the others in this category by not being specifically dedicated to antisemitic or adjacent ideologies, the pervasiveness of antisemitism on major boards, like /pol/ and previously /news/ distinguish it from social media platforms, where antisemitism is not centrally prominent. In addition, while the antisemitism is largely centred around these specific boards, its embedding within the website’s broader culture and presence on other boards warrants a profile of the entire site.
Nonetheless, this selection represents a broad picture of online antisemitism, demonstrates how web 2.0 has impacted the manifestation of antisemitism online, and serves as an example of how to examine broader manifestations of abuse and discrimination online.

**Institute for Historical Review**

The Institute for Historical Review (IHR) website represents a web 1.0 archival website made to streamline the cost and efficiency of distributing antisemitic content. During the advent of the internet in the 1990s, many antisemitic groups and individuals established websites to digitally store their material and attract new followers. Due to the quantity of these websites, not all will be analysed here,² so the IHR’s website serves to represent the archetypal websites of this initial shift to online-based antisemitism. This website is a worthwhile example of this shift, as the IHR is one of the most influential post-war antisemitic organisations and demonstrates the role of pseudo-academic antisemitism online. The IHR, founded in 1978, came online in 1998 at ihr.org,³ although associate director Greg Raven had started archiving material on his personal website from 1996.⁴ The website initially served as an online archive for the *Journal of Historical Review* and broader denial material. For the IHR, which previously had grown through donations and circulation of the

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² Some others of note that will not be mentioned in this forum include the Vanguard News Forum, Focal Point Publications, The Zündelsite, Radio Islam, revisionists.com, Vrij Historical Onderzoek, Committee for the Open Debate on the Holocaust, Adelaide Institute, AAARGH.org, and others that included the personal websites of prominent antisemites, such as Arthur Butz and Greg Raven. These websites have been covered in greater depth in a paper on the history of Holocaust denial’s rise online.


(physical) *Journal of Historical Review*, their website represented a technological revolution in the distribution and dissemination of their pseudo-academic antisemitic propaganda.

The IHR, along with the broader global Holocaust denial movement, suffered a series of setbacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s.\(^5\) The organisation split with founder Willis Carto,\(^6\) and numerous prominent Holocaust deniers such as David Irving,\(^7\) Frederick Toben,\(^8\) Robert Faurisson\(^9\) and Ernst Zündel\(^10\) suffered costly legal defeats, public reprisals, and even imprisonment.\(^11\) By 2002, the IHR had to stop publishing the *Journal of Historical Review*. Nonetheless, the creation of the IHR’s website allowed all existing volumes of the journal to be stored online and accessed by anyone with an internet connection. In early 2004, the IHR’s website shifted from an archive to a news-style website, publishing short opinion pieces by director Mark Weber and other Holocaust deniers alongside links from mainstream media and other hate sites.\(^12\) While the IHR has had a diminished impact in the twenty-first century compared to the twentieth century, the website is

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\(^11\) Allington, ‘Holocaust Denial Online’, pp. 41-44.

still active in 2020, and continues to store the entire *Journal of Historical Review* and other antisemitic resources.

Because the IHR and similar websites are rooted in their web 1.0 design, the TEMPIS taxonomy is not particularly applicable here. There are few avenues for the website’s consumers to communicate with content producers and other consumers. The website is also a continuation of the pre-internet and web 1.0 style of organised antisemitism, which distinguishes these organised antisemites from newer web 2.0 organisers. The IHR still serves as a prominent example of covert antisemitism online, sharing content from more mainstream and conservative online sources in order to dilute and legitimise their antisemitism (appendix D, figure 18). The IHR’s evolution over time highlights its differences to newer manifestations of antisemitism on web 2.0.

The online role of the IHR and other older antisemitic organisations is somewhat paradoxical. These organisations have declined as the energy of antisemites has shifted away from pseudo-academia towards alt-right antagonism. However, while Holocaust denial groups diminished significantly in the twenty-first century, the internet has allowed their material to remain accessible, potentially to a greater degree than during the peak of the Holocaust denial movement. Dormant pre-internet materials can still be referenced and spread on more active antisemitic websites such as Stormfront, antisemitic spaces on 4chan, and broader social media. In addition, the cloaked, covert nature of their antisemitic materials risks newer online generations

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being misled into believing pseudo-academic antisemitism is legitimate and socially acceptable, exacerbated by factors such as the innocuous name of the Institute for Historical Review. Ironically, as the Holocaust denial movement declines and becomes less newsworthy, its potential to influence others increases. This relationship would not be viable without the internet, due to the comparatively lower likelihood of coming across Holocaust denial offline.

Quantitatively, the internet first affected antisemitism by removing cost and distribution barriers for propaganda, allowing for greater volumes of content to be published. This in turn further demonstrates the diminished importance of organised antisemitic propaganda outlets such as the IHR. While their materials continue to be shared, the organisations have not regrown or been replaced, for many of their functions relating to the distribution of content have been replaced by streamlined online technology. Qualitatively, the declining importance of the IHR website indicates how changes in the internet have led to a more informal and grassroots spread of antisemitism, utilising the new phenomenon of prosumption. Organisations like the IHR facilitated the emergence of antisemitism 2.0 by trying to legitimise ideas like Holocaust denial and conducting the first major shift of organised antisemitism and their resources online. While such organisations no longer have a significant impact on antisemitism, the internet allows their legacy to remain in perpetuity, with their relative insignificance ironically resulting in young web users being unprepared, and potentially even sympathetic, when encountering their resources.

**Stormfront**

Stormfront represents an early and highly successful attempt to connect fractured networks of racists, including antisemites, through creating an online community space. While other
antisemitic web forums exist, Stormfront’s early success and size warrants its representation as the archetype of these websites. However, despite once being the most renowned and popular racist online forum, Stormfront eventually went into a long period of decline. Website activity, in the form of posts and user registrations, peaked in mid-2007, around the time Obama was nominated as the Democrat candidate for president. The rise in registration was in part caused by his electoral success, however over the eight years of Obama’s presidency, activity declined almost to the same level as when the forum was born in 2001.\(^{16}\) However, this data represents the decline of contributors, not all consumers, and therefore it should not be assumed that there is a causal link between Obama’s presidency and the decline of Stormfront. Rather, it is more likely that this decline was caused by the dispersion of antisemites across social media sites, which are more suitable for contemporary online interaction than the relatively older forum. This dispersion is partially explained by a shift in the online attention economy, as the older style forum sites favour longer threads of text and even long-prose essay-style posts, which take longer time to consume than the ‘bite-sized’ articles of the Daily Stormer, or mixed image and short-text threads of 4chan.

Despite this decline, there has been a significant rise in ‘lurking’ on Stormfront, the online behaviour of browsing a forum without logging in or posting; essentially being an almost invisible presence to others on the website.\(^{17}\) This behaviour has been causally linked with the electoral success of Donald Trump by the website’s founder, former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard Don

\<https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/02/22/waning-storm-once-world%E2%80%99s-most-popular-white-nationalist-website-stormfront-running-out>  
[accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 4-5 of 12).

Black, who reportedly upgraded the website’s servers to accommodate more traffic. This activity was corroborated by the website’s Alexa ranking, which peaked most recently in January 2017, corresponding to Trump’s inauguration; although this quantity has declined through 2018 and 2019 (appendix D, figures 19.1, 19.2). Its ranking plummeted in the latter half of 2019 to the mid-90,000s (appendix D, figure 19.3), which contrasts its 2014 high point in the low 10,000s. In addition, the lead up to the 2016 election featured the rise of the alt-right and mainstream recognition of 4chan-produced meme content (e.g. ‘Pepe the Frog’), and the rise of additional online reactionism to progressive diversity (e.g. GamerGate). This was associated with a shift away from websites like Stormfront, and an increase in activity on social media websites such as Twitter, Gab, and Discord. Concurrently, these shifts motivated the rise of new alt-right media sources, including The Daily Stormer, which produces shorter, more provocative content imbued with 4chan-style humour. However, even if Stormfront has experienced a decline in activity, the content produced over its history is easily accessible and still receives a broad audience, even if the active discussion and use of such content are moving to different spaces. Stormfront has had a significant role in establishing a white nationalist and antisemitic presence on the internet, and is renowned enough to serve as a drawing point for antisemites and other racists online, as evidenced from its continuing, if declining traffic. This analysis also demonstrates that online antisemitism is directly affected by real-world events, and vice versa – it does not exist in its own ‘bubble’, even

if functionally serving as an echo chamber. For these reasons, it is still important to consider the older, well-established websites in surveying online antisemitism, even if they are falling in relevance.

Stormfront was founded by Don Black in 1995, after he took computer programming classes while imprisoned for his role in a planned mercenary invasion of the Dominican Republic. These classes provided him with the ability to create the first major white nationalist website, originally serving as a bulletin board for former Klansman David Duke’s campaign for the Louisiana State Senate. Stormfront originally served as a resource website, with Black singlehandedly providing, sharing and uploading the content for browsers to consume. Yet Black was swift to enhance the communicative abilities of the website, encouraging more users to contribute. In 1997, he started a weekly e-letter system called “Stormwatch”, and a prototype forum called “Stormfront-L”. “Stormfront-L” operated like a newspaper opinion section, where subscribers could email in their opinions, which Black would present in a “Daily Digest”. This allowed consumers to respond to each other, encouraging daily discussion of the “Stormwatch” newsletter and other website material. “Stormfront-L” represented one of the first online developments that allowed casual antisemites and other racists to produce and share content of their own. Black’s developments resulted in considerable growth over the first five years – reaching 7,000 people per day in 2000 according to Black’s own estimates. This growth was

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further accelerated by the airing of an HBO documentary called *Hate.com*, which covered the rise of Stormfront, establishing it as a household name despite the documentary’s negative tone. The rising demand and success of “Stormfront-L” led to Black establishing a web forum, effectively turning Stormfront into the first major prosumption-oriented racist website.

Even on the forum, Black and other leading antisemites took a strong hand in producing and disseminating antisemitic content. Inside the various sub-forums with labels such as “Ideology and Philosophy” and “History & Revisionism”, select discussion threads have been ‘stickied’, a colloquialism meaning that they always appear at the top of the list of discussions, regardless of how much activity those threads receive. This guarantees they are seen by all visitors to those sub-forums. As of November 2019, four out of fifteen stickied threads in the Ideology and Philosophy sub-forum are explicitly antisemitic, promoting National Socialism and discussing the idea of “Jewish Supremacism”.

In the History & Revisionism sub-forum, ten out of the thirteen stickied threads are antisemitic, mainly regarding Holocaust denial. Another instance worth mentioning is the “Opposing Views” sub-forum, meant to allow anti-racist visitors to debate with the website’s regular users. One of the stickied threads there is called “Tales of the Holocaust”, created by a user with the pseudonym “Yehuda_Abraham”, a simplistic caricature of an Orthodox Jew. Between 2006 and 2010, this user would regularly link to “tales of the Holocaust” in the media, mocking what they viewed as the absurdities of these stories. This thread is one of the most popular on Stormfront, receiving over 2.1 million views as of April 2017, and 2.6 million as of September 2019.

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25 This can be attributed by comparing the website’s view counter between 2001-2003, demonstrating a significant spike in the time after the documentary was aired.
2019, continuing well after “Yehuda_Abraham” went inactive in 2010. This represented an increase of approximately 25% in two and a half years, despite the thread originating in 2007, thereby demonstrating how Stormfront is still extensively used as a resource for antisemites despite the decline in broader activity on the website.

On August 28th, 2017, Stormfront was pulled off the ‘open’ web by its domain provider following the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally, during which counter-protestor Heather D. Heyer was intentionally run over by Neo-Nazi James Alex Fields Jr. Stormfront’s temporary removal occurred alongside an online campaign carried out by activist groups, allegedly including the ‘hacktivist’ collective Anonymous, which aimed at taking down as many Neo-Nazi and white supremacist websites as possible. Anonymous described their actions in an online letter alongside the hashtag #OpDomesticTerrorism:

Yesterday we were successfully able to shut down multiple servers that promoted and supported the hatred that happened in Charlottesville, as well as those that did not speak out against the domestic terrorist attack…We also were successful in outing multiple KKK members and white supremacists.

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32 Ibid., #OpDomesticTerrorism (2017), <https://pad.riseup.net/p/r.7cc16bd7f4d3379a9ed6b83e090dea71> [accessed 3 October 2017].
The self-descriptive actions of Anonymous make it difficult to verify how successful these activists were. They were not directly responsible for shutting down Stormfront, but they highlighted the public outrage that allegedly led to Stormfront’s domain provider Network Solutions shutting down the forum. Network Solutions officially stated that Stormfront was violating the provider’s policy against racism and discrimination.\textsuperscript{33} Stormfront was initially blocked from repossessing its domain, but on September 29\textsuperscript{th}, a month later, Black managed to negotiate to have the domain transferred to a different provider, Tucows.\textsuperscript{34} While the website was restored, the temporary instability significantly affected the traffic to their website, as their Alexa ranking has significantly declined since then despite a small increase in January 2018 (appendix D, figures 19.1-19.3).

This series of incidents represents the shrinking gap between offline and online antisemitism, both in regard to antisemitic action and the reactive relationship between real-world events and online communities. Both Black and anti-Stormfront activists pointed out that Stormfront had been violating Network Solutions’ terms of service for over twenty years, but it was only after a highly publicised incident that any action was taken. In addition, Network Solutions initially blocked Stormfront from moving their domain, but later acquiesced when the furore had declined.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, while real world antisemitic events reciprocally affect online antisemitic communities, qualitative differences between events and communities affect this relationship. Online communities like Stormfront are not especially visible, for while they are accessible, finding the community requires a concerted search. Comparatively, real-world

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
antisemitic events can be highly visible, especially in ‘Western’ liberal democracies. When online communities like Stormfront are intertwined with highly publicised real-world events, reactions to these events carry over to online communities. However, due to the comparatively unseen nature of online communities, Stormfront could re-establish its online presence after the furore had died down, while generating little attention to itself. Comparably, a hypothetical chapter of the KKK trying to organise a meeting offline a month after the “Unite the Right” rally may require the hiring of a public space or public advertisements, warranting far more public attention than a website simply reappearing. To summarise, this series of incidents demonstrates that while offline antisemitism and online antisemitic communities are increasingly intertwined, qualitative differences established by the internet allow online communities to persist with less resistance.

Despite its TEMPIS taxonomy staying consistent over the last two decades (appendix D, figure 26.1), Stormfront has evolved from a resource website into an active prosumption-based web forum, and is shifting back into a resource website. Nonetheless, the perseverance and popularity of Stormfront means that its relevance for online antisemitism will likely continue. Stormfront features a mix of organised and casual antisemites, and represents the evolution of their relationship in web 2.0. Technological features such as the “Stormfront-L” prototype shifted the relationship from a pure producer/consumer relationship, into one where casual antisemites can contribute and discuss. Casual antisemites are no longer dependent on organised content output (although they still benefit from it), but rather rely on the sustainability of online spaces. Stormfront set a precedent for the overt nature of its antisemitism with its early use of pseudonymity and interaction from its consumer base. It also represents an environment where casual antisemites can evolve into organised antisemites. Due to the shared space and culture on
the website, casual users may begin creating overt content themselves, encouraged by the broad sense of community otherwise unavailable before the internet.

Quantitatively, Stormfront is a key example of how evolving communication technology has aided the growth of antisemitism. The ease of access and dialogue offered by Stormfront is far more appealing than organising offline antisemitic groups. Comparatively, the Ku Klux Klan, the longest running offline white nationalist antisemitic group in the United States, has been suffering from an extended period of decline.36 Despite the decline in real-world racist infrastructure, Stormfront has allowed these ideologies to persist through the internet, even benefitting from the decline in offline group infrastructure through recruitment of existing offline antisemites. While the Ku Klux Klan is in a long period of decline, the overall number of hate groups in the United States (the main consumers of Stormfront) has generally been on the rise, especially since the start of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign in 2015.37 The decline of the Klan has led to the rise of a broader range of antisemitic groups in the United States. The advent of Stormfront has given independence and support to this broader and more individually tailored range of antisemitic groups, who no longer need to rely on offline grassroots organisation and structure to survive. Stormfront’s early rapid growth established it as a broadly known community for online antisemitism, although the explicitness allowed by its pseudonymity may have also set it as a broadly known benchmark for antisemitism. For many, especially those who watched Hate.com, Stormfront represents what antisemitism on the internet looks like, potentially leading to users

lowering their guard when encountering more implicit manifestations of antisemitism. This benchmark aids the normalisation of implicit antisemitism, thus advancing antisemitism 2.0.

The persistence of antisemitic ideologies in virtual worlds does not remove their impact from the offline world. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) published a report in 2014 documenting nearly 100 murders committed by users of Stormfront, noting a shared pattern of activity on Stormfront or other racist websites and blogs before the killings.38 While the report lacks any clear pattern of coordination between Stormfront and the killers, nor a specific trend towards antisemitic violence, it remains a significant correlation. In addition, the report identifies significant spikes in traffic after high-profile white nationalist terror attacks, such as the 2011 Oslo bombing by Anders Breivik. What Stormfront represents here is an opportunity for white nationalists and antisemites to discuss, commemorate, and learn from examples of right-wing violence, potentially replicating and encouraging more in the future. The anonymity provided by Stormfront allows frank and open discussions of these topics. At the very least, the rise of virtual antisemitism via Stormfront does not represent a decline in real world antisemitic violence; online clandestine antisemitism is not replacing offline antisemitism. This trend contrasts the relationship between traditional bullying and cyberbullying, where electronic communications can be used to avoid detection and circumvent traditional bullying countermeasures. The major qualitative changes represented by Stormfront include the introduction of pseudonymous global discussion of antisemitism, the shift of the antisemitism propagation from highly organised groups to dedicated organised individuals, and the radicalisation of casual antisemites into organisers. This latter aspect in particular is facilitated by users’ broader access and input to the development and spread of

antisemitic content, and the lack of potential social risk posed by related discussions online. The distinction between anonymity and pseudonymity is significant here, as well-recognised pseudonyms, like “Yehuda_Abraham”, can still earn praise of their peers without risking social capital in the real world. While Stormfront is in a general period of decline, it has had an extensive quantitative and qualitative impact on antisemitism in the twenty-first century, enabled by opportunities presented by the internet.

4chan

4chan represents how streamlined methods of contribution and consumption allow antisemitism to be spread anonymously, casually, and to even become ingrained in internet culture. This process is especially facilitated by 4chan’s prominent anonymity and limited moderation. The archetype represented by 4chan covers other websites like 8chan, which featured even more extremist content, however, 4chan was the original iteration and inspiration behind these branch-offs. 4chan is a relatively popular website, ranking fairly consistently on Alexa in the 800s between early 2016 and late 2019 (appendix D, figures 20.1, 20.2). 4chan started in 2003 as an early social media imageboard intended for the discussion of anime related topics, mirroring the popular Japanese imageboard 2channel. 39 However, 4chan quickly grew in popularity, becoming an online space for discussing a wide variety of topics, ranging from video games, 40 to guns and knives, 41 and politics. 42 The board where anonymous users discuss politics, also known as /pol/ or “Politically Incorrect”, is a space regularly used by Neo-Nazis and other antisemites to promote antisemitic

viewpoints, particularly through memes. These users take advantage of the culture of anonymity and hands-off approach to moderation implemented by the website’s founder, Christopher Poole (a.k.a “moot”, his online persona). 4chan’s culture and limited moderation has produced an environment that tolerates and encourages discussion of subjects intended to shock and disgust others. This behaviour has turned 4chan into one of the internet’s most popular spaces for internet ‘trolls’, uniting them to the point where they can organise ‘raids’: rapid influxes into other online spaces to antagonise or cause chaos.\(^4\) 4chan’s troll-friendly environment fosters a significant antisemitic presence, yet also presents difficulties in analysing the intent behind antisemitism on 4chan. Many participants in antisemitic discussions or ‘raids’ may not believe in antisemitic ideology, but merely promote it to provoke ‘entertaining’ responses from others, representing the qualitative evolution of recreational antisemitism.

One incident demonstrating 4chan’s recreational antisemitism was the “Dub the Dew” raid in August 2012, targeting an online vote for the name of a new Mountain Dew soft drink. 4chan users brigaded the poll, making “Hitler Did Nothing Wrong” the most popular option.\(^4\)\(^4\) The coverage of this stunt led to the term “Hitler Did Nothing Wrong” becoming a renowned and repeatedly used internet meme.\(^4\)\(^5\) There were other popular vulgar options resulting from the raid that were not antisemitic (e.g. ‘gushing granny’), however the broader community in the raid supported the antisemitic option. The mix of antisemitism with broader vulgarity suggests that the majority culture of 4chan at this time was not antisemitic. Instead, the antisemitic result was an


extension of the shock culture that permeated the platform. Therefore, while not every antisemitic incident on 4chan is carried out exclusively by dedicated antisemites, other trolls and users are complicit in its normalisation, both on the website itself and elsewhere online. Nonetheless, there is easily recognisable antisemitic propaganda on 4chan that serves to intimidate Jews and radicalise other users, primarily through its political boards. In January 2011, Poole removed the /new/ message board, which was intended for discussing news, but instead hosted racist content paralleling that on Stormfront.

As for /new/, anybody who used it knows exactly why it was removed. When I re-added the board last year, I made a note that if it devolved into /stormfront/, I'd remove it. It did -- ages ago. Now it's gone, as promised.46

Eventually, Poole introduced the /pol/ board to replace /new/, and in 2015 stepped away from the website, however much of the antisemitic presence on the website became ingrained in /pol/ as well.

4chan’s dated design and lack of long-reaching archives makes it difficult to keep tabs on antisemitic trends on /pol/. However, advances in automated quantitative research methods have led to fresh insights into these antisemitic trends, presented in research undertaken by the NCRI.47 The NCRI’s report found high popularity for both the term “jew”, and antisemitic slurs like “kike”.

Both terms increased in use between mid-2016 and late 2018, alongside broader ethnic identity discussion, especially “jew”\(^{48}\). Their data shows a strong correlation between the trends in the use of “jew” and “white”, and a lesser but still significant correlation with “nigger”. Increased trends were strongly linked with offline events, such as Trump’s inauguration and the Charlottesville rally.\(^{49}\) The report’s broader analysis makes a connection between antisemitism and /pol/ and white supremacy, and suggested the use of the term “jew” correlated with classical antisemitic contexts.\(^{50}\) This connection emphasises that antisemitism’s adaptability and interconnectedness with other discriminatory movements is significantly enhanced through the internet, particularly on platforms with low rates of moderation and high rates of anonymity. The broad extent of antisemitism’s adaptability and range of manifestations is indicated through a node graph representing words associated with “jew” on /pol/. This graph categorises these words into “communities” based on their context. Such contexts include Jews as morally corrupt entities, powerful geopolitical conspirators, and a distinct ethnic group, alongside more general discussions of religion and cryptic lore.\(^{51}\) The graph reveals various manifestations of classic antisemitism on 4chan along with a significant quantity of newly invented slurs (e.g. “jewboy”, “((them)))”, and “turbokik” [sic]) demonstrating how the internet both affects pre-internet manifestations of antisemitism and facilitates the creation of new manifestations. The “explosion” of new antisemitic slurs in particular demonstrates the exponential increase in antisemitism’s adaptability and evolution on platforms like /pol/. This trend represents a significant qualitative change to antisemitism alongside the new manifestations themselves.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 4.
\(^{49}\) Ibid.
\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 6.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 7.
The NCRI report also covers the dissemination of the Happy Merchant meme on and beyond /pol/, previously discussed in chapter four. The meme’s dissemination demonstrates both the versatility of the meme as a new manifestation of antisemitism, and the impact /pol/ has on broader online communities. The NCRI used automated systems to collect memes from /pol/ and other online communities, and were even able to collate derivations of the Merchant template, and instances of other memes clearly influenced by the Merchant caricature. The results demonstrated consistent posting of Merchant memes on /pol/, and significant rates of sharing these memes to other online communities.

Our results show that /pol/ is the single most influential community for the spread of memes to all other Web communities. Interestingly, the influence that /pol/ exhibits in the spread of the Happy Merchant surpasses its influence in the spread of other memes.

The spread of antisemitic tropes from the Merchant meme to other meme templates further demonstrates the adaptability of antisemitism through meme culture, and indicates the extreme extent of normalisation of antisemitic tropes within /pol/’s culture. The pervasive spread of antisemitic tropes from the Merchant meme to other templates reveals that exposure to antisemitism on 4chan and satellite spaces is near inescapable, due to the meme’s ubiquity. This ubiquity also suggests how meme culture facilitates the feedback loop of antisemitism within these spaces, as the ‘creative’ use of Merchant tropes in other memes encourages further ‘creativity’.

Before the internet, it would be impossible to spread Jewish caricatures to so many instances of

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52 Ibid., p. 9.
53 Ibid., p. 10.
cultural communication, even during the Third Reich. In addition to this being a quantitative change, the seemingly recreational culture self-perpetuates these tropes; antisemitic manifestations in such varied contexts is a qualitative change enabled by the features of 4chan itself.

Between its toleration of antisemitic stunts, its viral antisemitic content, and the pervasive presence of dedicated antisemites, 4chan serves as a central hub bringing together dedicated antisemites and potential audiences. Since the website was not intended to be specifically antisemitic, and since it caters to a range of users, embedding antisemitism within the culture of the website normalises antisemitism to a far broader audience than just antisemites and their followers. The feedback loop of consistent posting of antisemitic memes and their variations encourages the participation of users not involved in dedicated antisemitic movements, thereby representing their complicity in recreational antisemitism. The popularity of antisemitic stunts like the “Dub the Dew” raid suggests the broader community of 4chan tolerates and engages in antisemitic humour recreationally as an extension of the platform’s shock culture. However, as antisemitism is increasingly normalised on the platform, it will be harder to distinguish between recreational complicity in antisemitism and active participation in spreading antisemitism. Nonetheless, it can be expected that increased normalisation both represents and increases active, intentional antisemitism. These problems may also extend to other spaces influenced by 4chan, as the influential meme culture popularised on the platform increasingly intersects with antisemitism.

4chan’s TEMPIS taxonomy represents the unique functions and qualities of the platform (appendix D, figure 26.2). While messages are stored, they are only stored for a limited amount of time (three days) before disappearing. This motivates users to continuously repost content to ensure discussion on it endures, which is a likely reason for the consistent rate of Merchant meme posts. Moderators are significantly empowered over the users, and can remove individual posts at
will or after being reported. However, there is significant controversy about moderation within 4chan, due its perception as a free-speech space. 4chan’s anonymity and anarchic methods of posting allows anyone to contribute to any thread and to create their own threads, allowing their content to be seen by the entire sub-site board. While 4chan provides no tools for active sharing of the content elsewhere, the site still has a reputation as a driver of viral content.

The impact and popularity of 4chan’s antisemitic stunts demonstrate the enhanced ability of individuals to promote antisemitism online, both organised and recreational. These stunts may be originated by anonymous users who aim to generate attention on the site broadly, rather than specifically reaching out to antisemitic users. Individual antisemites can therefore reliably inspire antisemitic activity that before the internet would typically be coordinated by a group. For casual antisemites, this evolution frees them from relying on group infrastructure for the implementation of large-scale antisemitic activity online. These stunts can also set precedents that may encourage copycat users to spark more antisemitic stunts, expecting similar support on the website. Users also contribute material relating to these stunts as a way of participating in the website’s culture. These individual acts of antisemitism that attract popularity represent the qualitative evolution of recreational antisemitism. The anonymity of 4chan leads to a particularly free space for expression, but also leads to dissociation where motivations are concealed and may be varied between users, including antisemites. One user may create antisemitic memes to promote a particular agenda, while another may do the same to appeal to the culture of provocative humour on 4chan and elsewhere online.

Ultimately, 4chan features primarily overt, active antisemitism, where organised antisemitic individuals and casual antisemites intersect resulting in the major evolution of recreational antisemitism. Recreational antisemites’ participation in the culture is aided by
anonymity, and the ease of content creation and distribution facilitated by web 2.0 technology. 4chan can also be a space for the recycling of dormant antisemitism, where Nazi propaganda and Holocaust denial material are regularly promoted in recycled threads (appendix C, figure 17). 4chan’s culture is a major driving force for both the qualitative evolution and quantitative growth of antisemitism, being a major source of viral online content that is often shared to broader websites and social media platforms. This culture arguably serves as the main reason for the most significant evolution of explicit antisemitism online, inspiring other antisemitic spaces such as the Daily Stormer and 8chan.54

The quantitative changes driven by 4chan are straightforward, yet significant. 4chan’s popularity and renown as a source of internet culture55 has normalised the use of anonymity online for a wide variety of malicious purposes, including harassment and broader ‘trolling’. This provides an outlet for antisemites, where they can promote antisemitic content or activity without any consequences (such as a risk to social capital). Naturally, this normalisation and easy promotion has led to a quantitative rise in online antisemitic content, with no straightforward way to hold content creators or promoters socially accountable. The lack of accountability lays the groundwork for higher quantities of antisemitism on 4chan and similarly influenced spaces, as online users are conditioned to tolerate 4chan’s brand of explicit antisemitism, as exported through stunts, memes, and harassment.

54 8chan in particular evolved after Moot banned discussion of GamerGate on 4chan, resulting in a migration to 8chan. The fact that 8chan then later became associated with far-right terrorist attacks, including the Poway synagogue shooting in April 2019, further suggests the intersection of discriminatory conspiracy movements like GamerGate with the encompassing worldviews offered by ‘redemptive’ antisemitism.
The most significant qualitative change to antisemitism pushed by 4chan is the normalisation of antisemitism through humour, encouraging recreational users who do not necessarily hold antisemitic views to participate in antisemitic activity for leisure and amusement. This antisemitic activity has some slight parallels in history, such as spikes in antisemitism associated with pogroms (at least in terms of engaging in antisemitic activity to fit in with society and to gain some social or material benefit). However, 4chan’s brand of antisemitism is distinct by potentially appearing benign due to being conducted ‘in jest’ and not reflecting a genuine belief or set of values. This relates to the leisure-centred aggression of GamerGate, as the recreational and vulgar culture of 4chan encourages broader participation in antisemitism for thrill and entertainment, not just ideology. Furthermore, this activity is distinct from pre-internet actions, due to the diminished visibility of the activity’s consequences. Actions like pogroms leave explicit evidence of physical violence and property damage, while the virtual nature of online interaction actually obscures potential harm. This harm is most likely psychological, which is also less visible than physical violence, and is enabled by people being disassociated from others online. The diminished visibility of harm in turn helps further normalisation of this antisemitism, as its participants may themselves be convinced that their participation is harmless.\(^{56}\) This attitude is aided by the depersonalisation of the internet, which allows users to remove themselves from the impact of their activity through the removal of any offline connection to those affected or upset. These changes can ultimately result in recreational antisemites transitioning into dedicated organised ones, facilitated by exposure to the sheer quantity of antisemitism on 4chan.

\(^{56}\) Since the pretence behind the antisemitic behaviour is often based on the idea that such actions are controversial, dark and ‘edgy’, it is ironic that such behaviour actually serves to make it less controversial through normalising antisemitism.
The Daily Stormer

The extreme, sardonic Daily Stormer ‘news’ website represents the archetype of online mouthpieces of extreme antisemitism in the age of 4chan and the alt-right, using web 2.0 manifestations of antisemitism to organise antisemitic networks. The Daily Stormer’s impact is strong evidence of the successful impact of 4chan-style antisemitic content. Taking its name from the Nazi-era tabloid *Der Stürmer*, the Daily Stormer presents itself as a twenty-first century replication of the publication, relying on explicit, crude and low-effort antisemitic memes to attract a younger, 4chan-influenced audience. The Daily Stormer is operated by Andrew Anglin, an American Neo-Nazi who was driven towards a fascist ideology by 4chan’s antisemitic content on the /new/ board. This ideology initially motivated him to create the blog-style website Total Fascism.57 Total Fascism’s long-form essay style was ineffective, so Anglin changed his strategy with the creation of the Daily Stormer, adopting provocative language and internet memes. Anglin makes extensive use of the ‘Pepe the Frog’ meme, a cartoon of a frog that is often used on 4chan and by members of the alt-right. The meme was eventually categorised as an antisemitic hate symbol by the ADL due to its large, albeit not complete association with alt-right extremism.58

The SPLC has contrasted the successful design of The Daily Stormer to the increasingly dated appearance of Stormfront:

The Daily Stormer was featuring flamboyant and eye-catching — if grotesquely racist and guttural — headlines that functioned as “click bait.” In effect, Stormfront looked like an

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ancient online version of The New York Times, even as The Daily Stormer increasingly took on the appearance and jazzy language of modern news sites like Buzzfeed.59

Anglin is very explicit with his antisemitism, dedicating an entire section of the website to the “Jewish Problem”,60 making liberal use of antisemitic slurs, and supporting traditional antisemitic conspiracy theories. Anglin also promotes new antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as suggesting that bomb threats against Jewish targets are a conspiracy theory.61 This latter theory was supported by President Trump regarding the surge in bomb threats against Jewish targets in early 2017.62 Anglin’s activities are not just limited to writings on his website, but also include recruiting a ‘troll army’ from his website’s readers, through which he and others direct the harassment and intimidation of Jews and other ideological opponents. For example, in June 2016, Daily Stormer users spread the personal details of Erin Schrode, a Jewish woman running for office in California, resulting in her being bombarded with antisemitic messages such as “fire up the oven”.63 Anglin shares the same explicit antisemitic content as 4chan, yet without the plausible deniability of trolling. What the Daily Stormer represents is the new style of online antisemitic harassment popularised on 4chan being directed by resourceful Neo-Nazi ideologues. While this

60 Daily Stormer, Jewish Problem (2019, [http://www.dailystormer.com/section/jewish-problem] [accessed 15 December 2019]).
style of antisemitism was born in anonymous forums, Anglin’s website has proven that it can be promoted publicly, supporting its material with Anglin’s public reputation. However, the public promotion of this content comes with risks, and Anglin himself has been ruled against in several lawsuits relating to the activity on the Daily Stormer.64 These lawsuits, along with other issues caused by the Daily Stormer’s vulgarity and popularity, have put the website’s future in jeopardy. While the site represents the potential of public organised antisemites on the internet, it also represents limits to that potential.

Anglin has idolised of Donald Trump on his website, and through this idolisation, the Daily Stormer connects with other members of the alt-right, particularly those who populated /pol/ with a significant pro-Trump presence.65 Anglin has since used the election of Trump to the US Presidency in 2016 as an opportunity to promote his website to the broader right wing. This opportunism is reflected through the changing of the website header graphics. For the first three years of the website, starting in 2013, the header largely featured Nazi symbolism (appendix D, figure 21.1). In mid-2016, he started using the slogan “The World’s Most Visited Alt-Right Web Site” (appendix D, figure 21.2). Finally, after Trump’s victory in November 2016, the header’s slogan became “America’s #1 Most- Trusted Republican News Source: First in Facts – First in Integrity!”, flanked by portraits of Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump (appendix D, figure 21.3). Anglin’s attempt to expand the Daily Stormer’s audience appears to have been successful, as the

Alexa ranking of the website on April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017, was 12,898, up by over 4,000 rankings from the previous year, and ten thousand higher than Stormfront. Yet troubles for the Daily Stormer began after its domain was lost following controversy over the website’s content during and following the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally August 2017. Ongoing issues severely impacted the website’s traffic, and began a series of events that threatened its viability as a mouthpiece for explicit antisemitism and intersecting forms of discrimination online.

Preceding Stormfront’s own domain loss in August 2017, the Daily Stormer fell under attacks by hacktivists and its domain was eventually shut down. Following the “Unite the Right” rally, the Daily Stormer described Heather Heyer, the counter-protestor intentionally mowed down by a Neo-Nazi, as a “Fat, Childless 32-Year-Old Slut”. The Daily Stormer’s post-Charlottesville coverage resulted in domain registrar GoDaddy informing them that they had violated the company’s terms of service, giving them 24 hours to find a new registrar. Concurrently, a message appeared on the website’s headline claiming that the hacktivist group Anonymous were now in control of the website. However, Twitter accounts linked to Anonymous claimed there was no evidence of any connection between the hack and Anonymous, suggesting it could be a stunt run by the website itself to garner attention. Nonetheless, the alleged Anonymous message

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68 (@GoDaddy, 13 August 2017), ‘We informed The Daily Stormer that they have 24 hours to move the domain to another provider, as they have violated our terms of service.’ (tweet), <https://twitter.com/GoDaddy/status/896935462622957573> [accessed 15 December 2019].
70 (@YourAnonNews, 13 August 2017), ‘We have no confirmation that “Anonymous” is involved yet. Looks more like a DS stunt. Wonder if they are having issues finding a new host.’ (tweet), <https://twitter.com/YourAnonNews/status/896987338781237248> [accessed 15 December 2019].
disappeared as Anglin posted that he’d “Retaken Control of the Site”, suggesting that it was a legitimate hack, but done by an independent group modelling themselves after Anonymous. This highlights an interesting dynamic: while the internet has empowered individual dedicated antisemites, it has also empowered vigilantes motivated to oppose them. Nonetheless, vigilante action such as hacking a website requires more extensive skills than posting antisemitic content to a website.

Problems did not end for the Daily Stormer, as they attempted to re-establish themselves on several American domain registrars, including Google, but were repeatedly removed. They then attempted to move onto international servers in Albania, Austria, Russia, Iceland, Catalonia, and Hong Kong. The website was then forced to move to non-national domain .red and after losing that and another .top domain, eventually appeared on a Chinese-based company domain of .name in January 2018. The Daily Stormer remained stable on the .name domain for its Alexa ranking to stabilise at 20,717 at the end of May 2018. The Daily Stormer’s rankings stayed mostly stable in the low 20,000s for the rest of 2018, demonstrating that it bounced back compared to Stormfront’s significant decline. Despite losing almost a dozen different domains over the course of six months, the Daily Stormer managed to maintain much of its popularity, and still sat well above the Alexa rankings of other comparable alt-right blog-style websites such as Richard Spencer’s Radix Journal (recorded at 1,611,147 at the end of May 2018). While issues continued

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74 Ibid. [accessed 5 March 2019, 17 August 2019, 29 October 2019].
for the Daily Stormer, it demonstrated the resilience of modern web 2.0 antisemitic platforms, stabilising after repeated setbacks that caused older websites to decline.

The Daily Stormer’s Alexa rating stayed mostly stable over the first three quarters of 2019, as per the last three quarters of 2018, but still featured a slow downwards trajectory through the mid-20,000s (appendix D, figure 22.1). While this could be linked to the previous troubles in 2017, the website had stabilised, and it is more likely that this slower decline was caused by the rise of Gab, a competitive site for alt-right discussion and community (similar to how The Daily Stormer’s rise was associated with Stormfront’s traffic decline). However, the website experienced a steepening decline in traffic in the latter part of the year, beginning to slide in September and bottoming out in the low 60,000s by December (appendix D, figure 22.2). The Southern Poverty Law Center connected this decline to the loss of BitMitigate, a content delivery network that enabled and protected the visibility of the website’s content online. BitMitigate has also ensured the continued visibility of other alt-right content online, such as Infowars and 8chan, however the number of attacks the Daily Stormer attracted ended up warranting higher costs. After not paying these costs, the website went down again. These payment issues coincided with the culmination of the lawsuits against Anglin, which ordered total costs of $18.35 million to be paid to his various victims. It is unlikely Anglin can pay these costs, but it is also uncertain whether he will be compelled to, as during the lawsuits his location was generally unknown, potentially even leaving the United States. Regardless, the Daily Stormer faced continued difficulties, resulting it no

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77 Ibid., para. 19 of 23.

longer appearing in search engines, and experiencing a significant drop in traffic. It returned as of November 2019, but Anglin’s warning that “we’ll have trouble staying online for the future” bodes poorly for the website.\(^{79}\)

Due to the domain changes and the BitMitigate problems, the website also operates on the ‘dark web’, a term describing websites that are not accessible by ordinary search engines such as Google, but rather through tools such as the Tor browser and network. The Daily Stormer’s original domain moved there on August 17\(^{th}\), 2017, and while the Tor project team expressed disgust, they said they could not remove it due to the ethos behind the tools, which provides essential anonymity for human rights activists and journalists (although it can also be used by criminals and paedophiles for distributing illegal products).\(^{80}\) If the Daily Stormer loses their domain again, the dark web will still allow them to operate and be found by regular users. However, the Daily Stormer will not be found through search engines, preventing them from attempting to manipulate search ratings to lead users to the site. In addition, it will prevent them from easily distributing links to their website, as the vast majority of users will not be using the tools required to access the Daily Stormer on the dark web. Stormfront managing to re-establish themselves back online in 2017 demonstrated that the Daily Stormer just needed to find a domain registrar that would tolerate or ignore them, which they have achieved with .name. The ongoing struggle to remain visible online, alongside the ability to keep resources available on the dark web, presents one of the clearest examples of qualitative change in antisemitism caused by the internet. The abilities of electronic communication technology make it almost impossible to completely remove an antisemitic group or media outlet. This contrasts the *Journal of Historical Review* being

\(^{79}\) ‘Daily Stormer Website Goes Dark Amid Chaos’, para. 6.

discontinued in 2002, due to the inability of the IHR to fund its publication after multiple expensive legal battles and infighting. Lobbying domain registrars and hacktivism present new potential strategies for challenging antisemitism in this new online context, although the content put online by antisemites is extremely durable.

The Daily Stormer emulates a web 2.0 news website that allows casual user discussion through commenting on articles, as seen in its TEMPIS taxonomy (appendix D, figure 26.3). While anyone can view these comments, they are administered through a third-party discussion board website that features profiles and moderators. The Daily Stormer is distinct from other organised antisemitic news-style websites like the IHR. One key distinction is the space for discussion by content consumers, also allowing them to share antisemitic content, such as memes, from other spaces like /pol/. This space facilitates communication between casual antisemites, and between casual antisemites and website content creators, and provides a space for variations of recreational antisemitism. These instances of recreational antisemitism differ from 4chan, being more likely to be actual antisemites with limited/self-involved participation in the alt-right, as opposed to 4chan’s broader userbase tolerating antisemitic humour. This discussion space demonstrates how the ease of antisemitic content creation and distribution online facilitates the shift of casual antisemitic followers into recreational antisemites. Another distinction between the Daily Stormer and IHR websites is shareable tools, like that on web 2.0 news websites, allowing users to promote the Daily Stormer’s content to social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Overall, the most significant distinction is that of tone, with the Daily Stormer being extremely overt versus the IHR’s long-standing covertness. Despite the IHR having a long history and recognition by

82 Daily Stormer, This is the The Daily Stormer’s comments section. (2019), <http://bbs.dstormer6em3i4km.onion.ws/c/comments> [accessed 15 December 2019].
antisemites, the Daily Stormer has been significantly more popular. This popularity can be attributed to all these distinguishing factors, especially the tone of the content that evolved due to the internet.

The main qualitative changes established by The Daily Stormer can be characterised as ‘online commercialisation’ of antisemitism: the use of online media strategies to generate more clicks and views. These strategies, such as ‘click bait’, eye-catching graphics, and short, sardonic articles, represent a significant shift from the pseudo-academic antisemitism of Holocaust denial. The difference is most stark when considering the self-identification of antisemites; Irving and other deniers repeatedly dismissed the charge of antisemitism, while Anglin and his ilk bear it proudly. The covert nature of Holocaust ‘revisionism’ was effective in normalising and justifying antisemitic ideas before the internet, whereas the Daily Stormer’s provocative, bite-sized, attention-grabbing diatribes are particularly effective in the web 2.0 attention economy. Both antisemitic camps have the same goal – the normalisation of antisemitism – but have significantly different strategies to achieve it. Holocaust denial aimed to have its claims accepted as legitimate intellectual perspectives, while The Daily Stormer aims to generate enough attention so that outrage against it turns stale, lessening the controversy of antisemitic claims. The Daily Stormer strategy specifically appeals to the younger 4chan generation, indicating that this qualitative change may also be a generational one. Both these strategies have proven to be effective in different social and technological contexts, and their shift over less than fifty years represents the rapid adaptability of antisemitism. The decline of the Daily Stormer echoes the decline of the organised Holocaust movement, but rather than being complacent, researchers should anticipate the next inevitable evolution of organised antisemitism.
While the ‘online commercialisation’ of antisemitism also produces some quantitative change in terms of content and followers, it is not the most notable quantitative change to antisemitism driven by The Daily Stormer. The main change is the increased focused harassment of Jews online, being directed by an infamous online media outlet. This is influenced by the qualitative change to antisemitism generated on 4chan, except with differences in organisation and anonymity (or lack thereof). Anglin and The Daily Stormer are recognised as the origin of these harassment campaigns, which trade higher risk of harmful legal action for broader recognition (and therefore a potential growth in readers) and appeal to younger generations. This relates to Kahn et al.’s theory that lower anonymity online results in lower discrimination rates, due to the social risk of being publicly linked to discrimination. The Daily Stormer has demonstrated this is not true, at least in the short term, as Anglin’s low anonymity in particular supports the high rates of discrimination pushed by the Daily Stormer, including general antisemitic group-based cyberbullying. However, the Daily Stormer distributes less discrimination, due to it attracting more resistance, evidenced by the instability of the website’s domain and reduced traffic in 2019. Considering the troubles faced by Anglin and the Daily Stormer, these practices are likely unsustainable for organised antisemitic networks online in the long term. However, the impact of Anglin’s website and networking can still linger through the social media networks he abused to undertake his harassment and propaganda campaigns.

Social Media - Facebook

Facebook is the largest social media platform on the internet, featuring an active daily userbase of over 1.5 billion people at the end of 2019. This size represents the largest social media audience targetable by the spread of antisemitic content. Being a social media platform, Facebook is a prime example of prosumption; the administrators and website runners produce little content, but rather yield that role to the consumers, who both produce and consume content through communicative interaction. With Facebook’s considerable size, it is not surprising that the platform has had problems with the spread of hate speech, despite such speech being banned according to Facebook’s community standards.

Facebook has been accused of ignoring antisemitism in the past, including for a refusal to categorise Holocaust denial as antisemitism. This refusal was re-affirmed by CEO Mark Zuckerberg in 2018 despite communication with Jewish and anti-hate groups, allowing Holocaust denial pages to stay up after being reported. Documents leaked to The Guardian in May 2017 revealed that Facebook only removed Holocaust denial material in four countries: Israel, Germany, Austria, and France, allegedly due to risk of legal action in those countries where Holocaust denial is illegal. Holocaust denial pages may be removed if hosting more explicit

88 Andre Oboler and David Matas, Online Antisemitism: A systematic review of the problem, the response and the need for change (Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, 2013), pp. 16, 48-53.
antisemitic content, yet pseudo-academic, covert Holocaust denial is still permitted on Facebook in most countries. This inconsistent policy is detailed in a 2019 letter by Facebook VP Joel Kaplan, obtained by *Jewish Insider*.

We take down any content that celebrates, defends, or attempts to justify the Holocaust. The same goes for any content that mocks Holocaust victims, accuses victims of lying about the atrocities, spews hate, or advocates for violence against Jewish people in any way… posts and articles that deny the Holocaust often violate one or more of these standards and are removed from Facebook… [But Facebook will] not remove lies or content that is inaccurate, whether it’s denying the Holocaust, [or other atrocities].

So, despite a consensus among Jewish and anti-hate groups that Holocaust denial is hate speech, Facebook is confident in making its own judgement about what constitutes hate speech on its platform.

Facebook’s inconsistent policy towards hate speech suggests greater concern about its public relations regarding the balancing of free speech, than about actually fighting hate speech. This suggestion is supported by controversy over their pledge to push Holocaust denial results to the bottom of search functions. Such results remained in top search results well after this pledge, and were only removed after *Business Insider* published an article proving Holocaust denial.

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groups’ continued dominance of search results. This controversy demonstrates that Facebook only acted when held accountable by the public. Facebook’s problematic approach to Holocaust denial may be solved by a European Union court decision in October 2019 that may force Facebook to remove hateful posts worldwide when contravening EU country hate speech laws. Nonetheless, this broad-reaching solution perpetuates controversy over the balance of free and hate speech on social media.

Between 2012 and 2013, Oboler and the Online Hate Prevention Institute (OHPI) released a series of reports surveying the presence of antisemitism on Facebook, tracking the removal progress of antisemitic content reported on October 4, 2012. By January 30, 2013, only four of the seventeen explicit items had been removed. The OHPI contacted Facebook and asked for an update at the end of February, at which point Facebook had removed all but three of the items. The OHPI’s actions indicate that Facebook only dealt with reports of antisemitism reactively, and required pressure to remove offending content. Oboler argued that this proved Facebook’s poor capacity to combat antisemitism; its moderators required education about the varied manifestations of antisemitism and other forms of hate speech. However, since Facebook has made its own decisions about what constitutes hate speech, it seems unlikely that moderators will be properly educated about the academic consensus on hate speech. This echoes the problem faced in

sociological research where resistance to considering the evolution of racism can result in faulty research on discrimination, inhibiting broader efforts to combat racism.

By mid-2017, all of the items detailed in the 2013 OHPI report had been removed or blocked, although there still were explicitly antisemitic Facebook pages with over 1,000 followers. By early 2019, many of the more explicitly antisemitic pages were deleted, but antisemitic pages with over 3,000 followers were still able to be found. In particular, the page “Zionism is a Cancer” continued to remain online as of December 2019. Indeed, the pages that remained were overall more likely to be associated with anti-Zionist manifestations of antisemitism. While some of these pages utilise covert antisemitism, some, like “Zionism is a Cancer”, regularly utilise explicit antisemitism (appendix D, figure 23). One reason why these pages endure is because these manifestations have been normalised into becoming invisible antisemitism. Even pages with explicit antisemitic content can be shielded from scrutiny through this invisible antisemitism, using methods as simple as replacing “Jew” with “Zionist”. Even if Facebook improves its antisemitic material removal rates, Facebook’s reactive approach to moderation may result in little being done to prevent organised individuals and networks using Facebook to spread antisemitism. Furthermore, Facebook’s attitude towards moderating only certain manifestations of antisemitism means that the website administrators have likely been affected by the normalisation tactics organised antisemites use to advance their agendas. Ultimately, even if antisemitism scholarship avoids definitional issues, that does not guarantee that...

95 Exposing Judaism (Facebook page), <https://www.facebook.com/Exposing-Judaism-948295368523778> [accessed 5 June 2017].
96 Ibid.
97 Zionism is a Cancer (@DelendaEstZionism), (Facebook page), <https://www.facebook.com/DelendaEstZionism/?ref=br_rs> [accessed 15 December 2019].
98 Ibid.
efforts combating antisemitism benefit from the existence of a ‘gold standard’ definition, as social media platforms may simply choose not to adhere to it.

The *Measuring the Hate* report found that Facebook had the lowest reported rate of antisemitism of the three major platforms, which was attributed to a higher rate of removal compared to Twitter and YouTube. This finding was supported by an increased rate removal of the reported items in the 10 months after the data’s collection, further diminishing antisemitism on the platform (although by this point still 60% of the items were still present on Facebook).\(^9\) Anti-Zionism was the category of antisemitism with the lowest rate of removal on almost all platforms (excluding calls for violence on Twitter), indicating its normalisation and the successful use of covert tropes. Facebook only removed 27% of anti-Zionist antisemitism, compared to 42% of traditional antisemitism, 58% of Holocaust denial,\(^1\) and 75% of calls for violence.\(^1\) The report also argued that platforms encouraging more effective moderation (particularly relevant for Facebook) disincentivises antisemites from posting there. Effective moderation would thus result in lower rates of antisemitism being posted and higher removal of those items, thereby significantly decreasing the quantity of antisemitism present.

While the periods of data collection between the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and *Measuring the Hate* reports do not overlap, they are close enough (late 2014-early 2015 versus 2016) that some comparison can be made. While this paragraph digresses from the current focus on Facebook, it lays the stage for a more comprehensive quantification of antisemitism on social media platforms, including Facebook. The WJC methodology attributes a disproportionate amount

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\(^1\) While Facebook does not have a policy against Holocaust denial specifically, it is likely that these instances were removed for containing more explicit antisemitic tropes and features, rather than more covert Holocaust denial.

\(^1\) Oboler, *Measuring the Hate*, p. 7.
of antisemitic content to Twitter, identifying Twitter as the source of 63% of the total antisemitic posts on social media,\textsuperscript{102} considerably contrasting to the more balanced figures presented in the \textit{Measuring the Hate} report (identifying the highest quantity on YouTube at 41%).\textsuperscript{103} This disparity may not be accounted for by the WJC including foreign language instances, as 82% of all posts were in English.\textsuperscript{104} The methodologies therefore produce significantly different quantifications of antisemitism, which may be due to the WJC report collating data through brand analytics company Talkwalker.\textsuperscript{105} Talkwalker focuses disproportionately on recognisable words, phrases, and images, which does not necessarily reflect what might be perceived as antisemitic by average users, or intended by antisemitic users, particularly regarding covert antisemitism and rapidly evolving antisemitic symbolism. Furthermore, Twitter is a more suitable target for analytics due to the platform’s own pre-existing tools\textsuperscript{106} and a fairly consistent style of content (every post being limited to 280 characters). These problems support the suggestion that quantifying antisemitism on mainstream social media is currently better served using sample collection, rather than automated methodologies that are ill-suited for detecting multifaceted manifestations of antisemitism in such a broad arena. However, interdisciplinary collaboration can help design methodologies that can avoid the problems of the WJC report, and effectively quantify antisemitism on mainstream social media using automated systems. The NCRI report’s approach in particular presents a key method for future researchers. By starting with specific spaces such as

\textsuperscript{103} Oboler, \textit{Measuring the Hate}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{104} World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 11.
\textsuperscript{106} Twitter, \textit{Analytics: Measure and boost your impact on Twitter} (2019, <https://analytics.twitter.com/about>) [accessed 15 December 2019].
/pol/ and Gab, researchers can measure the rate at which instances of antisemitic content are shared to broader platforms.\textsuperscript{107}

While issues exist in the overall rates presented in the WJC report, its data for particular platforms may still be used. Comparing the rate of types of antisemitism found in the WJC report against the removal rates in the \textit{Measuring the Hate} report can produce a rough estimate of how much antisemitism of each category might be viewable by the public. The categories between the two reports do not completely overlap, but the categories of calls for violence and Holocaust denial exist in both. The WJC report detected 1550 antisemitic calls to violence on Facebook in 2016, and the 75\% removal rate of antisemitic calls to violence in the \textit{Measuring the Hate} report results in approximately 387 calls to violence staying visible 10 months after being reported. The 182 instances of Holocaust denial posts on Facebook (as detected in the WJC report) would be removed at a rate of 58\% (as reported in the \textit{Measuring the Hate} report), leaving approximately 106 instances visible. While these statistics only include publicly viewable posts and not content from groups or private messages, they do demonstrate the impact moderation can have on the public spread of antisemitism on Facebook.

The TEMPIS taxonomy has already been applied to Facebook in the original 2013 Online Antisemitism Working Group report and is largely unchanged since then,\textsuperscript{108} although it cannot be summarised in a single application. There are significant differences in functionality between Facebook’s profiles, groups, pages, messages, and apps, particularly in regard to publicness, identity (Facebook page owners can be completely anonymous), and social impact. Therefore, a comparison between the WJC and \textit{Measuring the Hate} reports does not represent a full picture of

\textsuperscript{107} Finkelstein and others, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{108} Oboler and Matas, pp. 9-10.
antisemitism on Facebook, as these reports do not examine private groups and messages. While much of the antisemitism on Facebook may be contained in private groups, this may still be targeted by moderation if users opposing antisemitism gain access to groups, or detect antisemitism in the title. Nonetheless, because these materials are more private, future research needs to consider new approaches to determine the nature of antisemitism in those spaces.

Facebook provides valuable ‘subsites’ to organised antisemites, allowing them to organise networks between themselves and garner followers of casual antisemites. Facebook can also provide outlets for recreational antisemites, ranging from providing a platform for private groups (within which activity is contained), to presenting public targets for recreational antisemitic harassment. Facebook therefore facilitates the group-based antisemitic cyberbullying of public Jewish figures on social media, although the next section shows how these harassment campaigns are more effective on Twitter. Antisemitic content on Facebook can present as explicit, covert, and invisible. However, pressure from moderation can result in diminished visibility of explicit antisemitism, eventually disincentivising its posting on Facebook, resulting in a higher proportion of covert and invisible antisemitism. This is also exacerbated by Facebook’s administrators being manipulated by invisible and covert antisemitism, particularly anti-Zionism and Holocaust denial, seeing them as distinct from the antisemitism banned on the platform.

Facebook has a significant quantitative impact on online antisemitism, as it represents the largest prospective online audience for antisemites. Antisemitic groups, particularly those presenting themselves as anti-Zionist groups, can offer content to audiences of thousands. This content can automatically show up in their ‘news feed’ alongside updates from friends, media outlets, and other pages. Public ignorance over the line between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism can result in large groups unintentionally promoting antisemitism, which is further
legitimised through ‘likes’ and ‘shares’, giving the antisemitism higher visibility. Manifestations of covert and invisible antisemitism thus present a significant danger on Facebook, whose management struggles to even recognise the danger of Holocaust denial. Even if users recognise and report covert and invisible antisemitism, there is no guarantee Facebook moderators will recognise it as antisemitism and agree to remove it. While Facebook’s mixed results of moderation have somewhat inhibited the ability and motivation to share antisemitism, there are few mechanisms preventing removed groups or individuals from creating new pages, or spreading material on a different account. Facebook profiles are usually tied to users’ real-world identity, unlike 4chan, which is completely anonymous. This real-world link somewhat inhibits the spread of antisemitism on Facebook compared to other social media platforms, as there is higher risk of losing social capital from sharing and linking antisemitic content on one’s public profile. Therefore, the quantitative impact of Facebook on antisemitism is derived more from the size of Facebook and its audience, rather than the suitability of the platform for spreading hatred. Facebook’s size means it is often used as a benchmark to determine the social acceptability of antisemitism online, and the current record demonstrates a considerable danger in the rise of antisemitism 2.0 on Facebook.

While Facebook may not necessarily be the most problematic social media platform for spreading antisemitism, its unparalleled size allows it to be easily impacted by antisemitism’s growth elsewhere. Qualitatively, Facebook furthers the impact of other social media platforms, like 4chan, which promotes antisemitism through memes and other swiftly digested content. Since Facebook connects users’ profiles to their friends, groups, hobbies, and virtually any interest, any antisemitic content needs to compete for time and space on a news feed. This results in antisemitic image-based memes being a particularly prevalent form of antisemitism on Facebook, as affirmed
by the WJC’s and *Measuring the Hate* reports, with the former reporting that 67% of antisemitic posts on Facebook take the form of symbols or photos.\(^{109}\) One benefit of this trend is that memes can be easier to regulate, as they can be cross-checked against a growing database of antisemitic memes and images; this approach is possible even with a reactive model of moderation. Nonetheless, such a policy would require swifter reactions than seen previously, so as to counter the rapidly evolving nature of antisemitic memes and symbols online.

**Social Media - Twitter**

While it is necessary to consider antisemitism on Facebook due to the platform’s size, consideration of antisemitism on Twitter is necessitated due to its alleged disproportionate quantity of antisemitism. Twitter is a micro-blogging platform designed around the rapid creation and consumption of content. Originally limiting all posts to 140 characters and 3 images, before expanding the limit to 280 characters in November 2017,\(^{110}\) Twitter represents the increased efficiency of communication caused by social media, and thus the increased efficacy of distributing antisemitism online. Many of Twitter’s functions also apply to the website Gab, which differs from Twitter in its domination by the alt-right. Due to this dominance, this analysis of Twitter dedicates a small section to Gab. Twitter has a mixed stance on anonymity/pseudonymity and real-life identity; while many users use their real-world identity, Twitter allows individuals to create entirely pseudonymous accounts. Renowned and identifiable real-world users can verify their account with a blue tick next to their names. The combination of succinct content and a mix

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\(^{109}\) World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, pp. 9-10.

of pseudonymous and real-world profiles has resulted in Twitter becoming arguably the most prolific social media platform for antisemitism. On Twitter, pseudonymous users can easily and directly target Jews online with a barrage of antisemitic content, while facing virtually zero consequences.

The 2016 WJC report disproportionately recorded 63% of all recorded antisemitic social media posts as being on Twitter – more than Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and blog platforms combined\(^{111}\). In contrast, the *Measuring the Hate* report of late 2014 to early 2015 measured a rate of 36% of reported antisemitic items found on Twitter, reduced to 35% after 10 months.\(^{112}\) False positives have also been detected in the WJC report, which raises further concerns over its methodology, including the qualitative analysis. In one of the three examples of antisemitism on Twitter used in their final report, user SeanLuckettWriter (@SeanCMLuckett) writes:

@mikeloveuk @cloud_swatch YEAH! Gas the Jews! Slaughter the muslim! Kill the gays!

Good old valid opinions…\(^{113}\)

Upon closer analysis, it appears this tweet was a sardonic response to right-wing rhetoric, not reflecting antisemitic views or calling for violence at all. The Twitter user in question is a left-wing media writer, who has shown no indication of actually holding these opinions. He has retweeted other accounts commemorating Anne Frank\(^{114}\) and victims of the Pittsburgh massacre.

\(^{111}\) World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, pp. 19-39.
\(^{112}\) Oboler, *Measuring the Hate*, p. 5.
\(^{113}\) World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, p. 47.
\(^{114}\) (@JonnyGeller, 27 January 2019), ‘The only footage of Anne Frank, from 1941. She would have been 89. #HolocaustMemorialDay’ (tweet), <https://twitter.com/JonnyGeller/status/1089219150835273728> [accessed 15 December 2019].
in October 2018.\textsuperscript{115} Beyond the methodological concerns, the WJC report failed to identify false positives, even promoting one in its final report, distorting any conclusions drawn from the qualitatively analysed 2\% sample. Nonetheless, there are some trends in the WJC report supported by the \textit{Measuring the Hate} report, particularly how higher removal rates are needed to disincentivise antisemites. Twitter had an antisemitism removal rate of 22\%, compared to Facebook’s 37\% and YouTube’s 8\%.\textsuperscript{116} As mentioned above, it is likely that Facebook’s higher removal rate results in disincentivising posting antisemitic content there, while Twitter’s lower rate may not provide enough of a disincentive. Furthermore, since content creation on Twitter is likely to be less time consuming due to limits on the size of posts, it is likely an even higher disincentive would be needed on Twitter.

It is necessary to consider how removal rates will differently affect historic content on various social media platforms (i.e. content posted before the window of the sample’s collection). For example, Twitter content is more immediately relevant, and users are unlikely to encounter past tweets unless they are actively searching for them. Comparatively, searching for a video on YouTube can produce results based on relevancy, regardless of the year they were uploaded. Therefore, the presumably lower rate of removal on YouTube, even before the sample was collected, would have affected the quantity of antisemitic content found on YouTube. The quantity on Twitter, conversely, would be largely limited to content from the sample’s time frame. This ‘historical’ disparity is evident in the examples provided in the report, with every tweet in the report having been posted during the sample’s collection time frame,\textsuperscript{117} as opposed to at least three

\textsuperscript{115} Frank McDonough (@FXMC1957, 29 October 2018), ‘One of the victims of the Pittsburgh massacre was 97-year-old Rose Mallinger, who survived the Second World War and Hitler’s aim to kill all Jews, only to die because America allows ordinary citizens to buy guns, even those filled with murderous hate. When will they ever learn?’ (tweet), <https://twitter.com/FXMC1957/status/1056580498166857736> [accessed 15 December 2019].
\textsuperscript{116} Oboler, \textit{Measuring the Hate.,} p. 7.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., pp. 14, 22-23, 30-31, 39-40.
of the YouTube video examples being posted before 2012. YouTube’s low removal rate would affect the sample during collection, suggesting that Twitter actually has a higher rate of antisemitic content creation, considering the close rates in the initial sample (36% on Twitter against 41% on YouTube). Therefore, as per the WJC’s report general trend, Twitter is likely the most active major social media platform for new antisemitic content posting.

2016 was a noteworthy year for antisemitism on social media, particularly Twitter, due to the controversial United States Presidential election of that year, which potentially skewed the data in the WJC report. The ADL also examined the rise of antisemitism on Twitter between August 2015 and July 2016, particularly focusing on the increasing attacks on Jewish journalists, and published a report in October 2016. Their methodology, utilising a broad set of keywords and key phrases, resulted in a significantly higher quantity of antisemitic tweets than even the WJC report, despite overlapping time frames. The report found over 2.6 million tweets “containing language frequently found in anti-Semitic speech”, compared to 242,000 posts in the WJC report. The disparity in these numbers suggest significant problems still exist when trying to quantify antisemitism on major social media platforms. Until standard methodologies are developed, it is better to use other research methods, such as reported samples in the Measuring

118 The full picture of pre-sample videos is not known as some have been removed and the screenshots do not have dates on them but can be expected to be larger than just these three examples. Ibid., pp. 13, 22, 29. (Clawrr, 30 July 2011), ‘Kill the Jew!’ (YouTube video), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8_lk-0_zpk> [accessed 15 December 2019]. (FourthRepublic, 9 September 2008), ‘The Holocaust Was A Hoax’ (YouTube video), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3X2vUMh9Hr0&bpctr=1551918712> [accessed 7 March 2019]. (iwillspyonyou, 25 August 2011), ‘Israel did 9 11 – All the Proof in the World’ (YouTube video), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ai_/lWjfejc&bpctr=1551918726> [accessed 7 March 2019].


120 Ibid., p. 1.

121 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, p. 45.
the Hate report (especially over multiple time frames), or automated methodologies with smaller scopes, as per the NCRI report.

While not all of the tweets detected by the ADL are specifically antisemitic in intent, their proliferation potentially risks the normalisation of antisemitism. The ADL focused on 19,253 manually reviewed explicit antisemitic tweets targeting over 800 journalists, reduced from an initial sample of 50,000. They found that over 68% of these tweets were generated by just 1,600 accounts, and that the majority were direct replies to tweets by the targeted journalists.\(^\text{122}\) These disproportionate results reveal how a small number of antisemitic users can disproportionately harass a considerable number of prominent Jews on platforms such as Twitter, taking the form of group-based cyberbullying. The imbalance of anonymity is partially responsible for this, as Twitter allows spaces to be shared between pseudonymous users and identifiable public personalities. Twitter thus represents a platform that is difficult to control, for while it forbids hate speech and harassment, and users can block harassing users, it is exceptionally easy for banned users to create new accounts and continue the harassment. Of the 1,600 accounts behind the majority of the harassment, only 21% were banned over the study period (August 2015 – July 2016).\(^\text{123}\) Twitter’s lack of moderation became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the ADL reported that half of the targeted journalists interviewed did not report the tweets, partially due to the lack of faith in Twitter resolving the issue.\(^\text{124}\) This demonstrates that poor moderation both lowers disincentives for antisemites to post, and disincentivises users from reporting antisemitism, compounding the problem of antisemitism on the platform.

\(^{122}\) Anti-Defamation League’s Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, p. 1.  
\(^{123}\) Ibid.  
\(^{124}\) Ibid., p. 9.
While the ADL report did not examine how many journalists left the platform, the effectiveness of online harassment in silencing users is demonstrated by a 2014 study by the Pew Research Center. This study found that 31% of online harassment victims either cease their involvement in online events, change their username, replace their profile, or withdraw entirely from the forum where the harassment occurred. Many of the antisemitic tweets during the 2016 election season were replies to Jewish journalists covering the election, often referring to classic antisemitic motifs rather than to the election itself. This trend demonstrates both that offline events can trigger spikes in antisemitism online, and that these events are used as an excuse to promote general antisemitism. In addition, the patterns of antisemitism on Twitter surrounding the 2016 election demonstrate how antisemitism can have a snowball effect on the platform, creating more antisemitic content over extended periods of time.

Much of the antisemitism on Twitter has been directed by prominent antisemites, such as Andrew Anglin and The Daily Stormer, through both public and clandestine electronic communication. The trolls on Twitter do not only rely exclusively on Twitter’s technology for their antisemitic campaigns, but also develop tools on their own, representing a degree of organised sophistication. The ‘echoes’ tactic mentioned in chapter four utilised a Chrome browser app to identify Jews on Twitter and other social media platforms. With the app installed, users would see the usernames of prominent Jewish social media users surrounded in triple parentheses – e.g. (((username))). This extension allowed antisemites to immediately identify Jews on Twitter.

126 Anti-Defamation League’s Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, p. 8.
128 For example, @benshapiro on Twitter appears with the username “Ben Shapiro” without the extension. With the Chrome extension, it would display as “(((Ben Shapiro)))”.

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without having to research their background, aiding the efficiency of their harassment campaign. Echoes also serve as a prominent example of a text-based meme. Beyond the browser extension, they are often added by antisemites to things deemed to be ‘Jewish’ or ‘Jew-controlled’, as seen with the new slurs in the NCRI report. After *Mic* revealed this phenomenon, many non-Jewish Twitter users placed triple brackets around their own username, so as to diminish the effectiveness of the extension and make it more difficult for users to identify Jews on Twitter. While this use of echoes was defensive, it would further entrench the meme into online culture. Echoes demonstrate how public awareness of a covert antisemitic symbol can transform it into an overt antisemitic meme, which is a qualitatively new evolution of antisemitism enabled by social media. Google did eventually remove the app from its browser, but the app’s brief history still demonstrates the ease with which Jews can be targeted on social media, the evolution of tactics used by antisemites to harass them, and the entrenchment of antisemitism into online cultures.

The TEMPIS taxonomy was applied to Twitter in the original 2013 Global Forum report on online antisemitism, and while Twitter is largely unchanged there are some factors that need to be clarified (appendix D, figure 26.4). When the taxonomy was first applied one of Twitter’s unique qualities was that it was complaint moderated. This meant that only profiles could be reported, not specific tweets, and entire profiles would be disciplined. That rule changed in November 2017, with users becoming able to report specific tweets, although with mixed level of

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129 Finkelstein and others, p. 10.
130 This qualitative change is primarily linked to the original covert nature of the symbols, which on the internet, serve as rapidly evolving signals for antisemites. The qualitative change is then further enabled by web 2.0’s processes that facilitate the creation of memes. Therefore, it is unlikely for such an occurrence to happen offline, as the covert use of the symbols and their transformation into memes are specifically linked to functions of the internet.
131 Oboler and Matas, p. 8.
132 Ibid., p. 6.
administrator and user input over the tweet’s actual deletion. Generally, Twitter does not delete tweets themselves, but can limit a tweet’s visibility and block a user from tweeting until it is removed. As of October 2018, Twitter actively hides rule-breaking tweets until deleted by the user, notifying the user of which rules the tweet broke. Progress is therefore being made on the removal of antisemitic tweets, although additional studies utilising the Measuring the Hate report’s methodology would help to determine the impact of these moderation changes. There are indications that Twitter’s heightened moderation in the last five years is disincentivising antisemites. One key development supporting this indication is the rise of rival platforms such as Gab, which has become a hive for antisemitic tweet-style posting. However, contemporaneous causes for rises in antisemitism, such as the 2016 US election, may present difficulties in determining reasons behind quantitative changes to antisemitism on Twitter. The influence of the offline on the online therefore warrants caution when examining any changes to antisemitism.

The Twitter-clone Gab is a relatively recent addition to the plethora of antisemitic websites, evolving even later than the Daily Stormer. Gab publicly launched in May 2017, and featured over one million users as of July 2019, many of whom are alt-right provocateurs banned from Twitter. Gab is renowned for its extreme alt-right content, and was the other website reviewed in the NCRI

report in its quantitative analysis on antisemitism online.\(^{137}\) Gab’s rise presents issues for efforts combating hate, in particular providing evidence that deplatforming and/or banning discriminatory and abusive users may be ineffective, since said users can migrate to more friendly platforms.\(^{138}\) This phenomenon was already seen with GamerGate, as many users migrated to 8chan after Christopher Poole banned discussion of GamerGate from 4chan, impacting the increasing radicalisation of 8chan. However, recent evidence suggests significant limitations to these alternate platforms, particularly Gab. An upcoming report has found that due to its nature as a micro-blogging platform, Gab “is inherently unsuited to the kind of deliberative processes and sustained cooperation between movement participants that is needed to formulate effective strategy, establish movement goals, or weigh up alternative courses of action”.\(^{139}\) Furthermore, Gab lacks the access to the broader online public sphere that was provided by platforms like Twitter, thereby inhibiting its users’ ability to coordinate and carry out harassment campaigns online. As a result, Gab’s use is limited to developing interpretive ‘frames’ among far-right narratives, rather than mobilising resources and strategising.\(^{140}\) So while the NCRI report shows significant rates of meme sharing between Gab and other spaces, these other spaces represent gateway communities to alt-right content, and tend not to be the result of a broader strategy. Gab’s limits do suggest that deplatforming does have some effect on antisemites’ efforts to distribute content and harass, without being a conclusive approach to eliminating online hate. Ultimately, the differences in Twitter and Gab, primarily their userbase, highlight how the impact of antisemitic activity on the archetype of micro-blogging platforms is affected by access to other users.

\(^{137}\) Finkelstein and others.
\(^{140}\) Ibid., p. 14.
Twitter can be extensively used by organised, recreational, and casual antisemites. Organised antisemites can use it to direct harassment towards Jews, as evidenced by a small number of Twitter accounts accounting for a disproportionate quantity of antisemitic tweets directed towards journalists. These harassment efforts can be compounded through directing casual and recreational antisemites to engage in similar behaviour. Twitter’s promotion of short, single-thought content allows its extensive use by casual antisemites, who can state their antisemitic opinions generally as though in casual conversation, potentially through text-based memes (e.g. putting echoes around things associated with Jews or Judaism). Twitter can thus emulate casual antisemitic conversation, allowing networks to grow between these users and organised antisemites they follow. Twitter also provides an outlet for recreational antisemitism by providing easy targets for harassment and provocation, and antisemites can easily attain publicity for their recreation by jumping onto a prominent hashtag or comment chain. Content wise, the short character limit favours overt and invisible antisemitism. Covert antisemitism can exist, but the character limit inhibits users’ ability to effectively cloak antisemitic content (in contrast to the density of pseudo-academic Holocaust denial). Nonetheless, covert symbols such as echoes, if not highly publicised and exposed, can be used discreetly to identify Jews and signal other antisemites, leaving other users in the dark. Finally, the content on Twitter is significantly slanted towards active antisemitism, as the platform favours more immediate communication compared to Facebook and YouTube.

Quantitatively, Twitter arguably represents the largest spread of antisemitic content on social media. Twitter’s design greatly aids both the generation and visibility of antisemitic content. The ADL report estimated that the 19,253 antisemitic tweets targeting journalists between August 2015 and July 2016 received roughly 45 million views, and that the 2.6 million tweets containing
antisemitic terms would have received 10 billion views – roughly the exposure expected from a $20 million Super Bowl commercial.\footnote{Anti-Defamation League’s Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, pp. 1, 4-5.} In another report released in May 2018, the ADL detected 4.2 million antisemitic tweets between 2017 and 2018, using a similar methodology as the 2016 report, although expanding the set of keywords used to identify antisemitic language.\footnote{Anti-Defamation League, \textit{Quantifying Hate: A Year of Anti-Semitism on Twitter} (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 7 May 2018) \url{https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/quantifying-hate-a-year-of-anti-semitism-on-twitter#methodology} [accessed 15 December 2019] (p. 3).} While the inconsistent methodology precludes confident assertions about antisemitism’s growth on Twitter, the report still indicates the continued prominence of antisemitic content on the platform. Based on the statistics discussed thus far, Twitter appears to lack the ability to control the spread of hate speech (in particular antisemitism) on its platform, which in turn dissuades users from trying to report it themselves. The statistics also indicate how a small number of users, with minimal or no direction, can generate an unprecedented wave of antisemitism through manipulating the ‘swarm logic’ of broader users, as seen in GamerGate. Twitter also represents a behavioural shift towards the direct antagonism of journalists, which while not unprecedented in Jewish history, is exacerbated by higher quantities of harsher harassment facilitated through diminished social risk.

Qualitatively, Twitter has demonstrated how antisemitism can still be effective without strong organisation or monetary resources, in contrast to past examples such as the Nazi party or IHR. Nonetheless, these contrasting online manifestations are dependent on the functions provided by Twitter that allow easy access to Jews online. Furthermore, Twitter can be used as a vehicle for the normalisation of antisemitism, as antisemitic expressions are so easily and swiftly distributed that explicit antisemitism may begin to appear normal, and implicit antisemitism seems comparably uncontroversial. Repeated harassment may force Jews off Twitter, both encouraging the use of harassment on other platforms, and further normalising antisemitism through the
ostracisation of Jews in the public sphere. This ostracisation limits the ability of victims to educate others on the antisemitism they experience and witness, risking Overton’s window shifting beyond normalisation, towards acceptability of antisemitism. Countering this normalisation with increasing moderation may result in the rapid evolution of antisemitic symbolism in order to avoid said moderation. Twitter’s inability to control this wave of hatred has produced a miniature renaissance of antisemitism that may spread to other platforms if not halted.

Social Media – YouTube

YouTube, as an archetype of a video-sharing website, represents different ramifications for the creation and distribution of antisemitic content compared to other social media platforms. YouTube is a video-sharing website, founded in 2005 and purchased by Google in 2006. It is the second most popular social media platform as of October 2019, behind only Facebook. YouTube’s role as a video-sharing website makes it qualitatively distinct from other, largely text and image-based, social media platforms. Because of this role, YouTube did not originally fit into the scope of social media. The design principles of YouTube, being the creation of personal channels to which users upload videos, was more similar in format to a blog. These principles still fit the participatory web 2.0 scope of user-generated content and self-publishing platforms, but YouTube’s design was not necessarily oriented towards the creation of online social networks.

Even as late as 2011, some tech-media outlets still did not consider YouTube to be social media.145 However, this view of YouTube is only based on its design, and ignores the versatility of video as compared to text. Indeed, the popularity of the platform ultimately resulted in the creation of online social networks. Scholars recognised the impact of YouTube as a pop-cultural phenomenon in 2007, particularly how its intended use for amateurs gave rise to both the platform’s popularity and potential for social networking.146 YouTube’s online functions range from the archiving of non-user created content, (e.g. documentaries, film clips) not dissimilar to the functionality of web 1.0, to the development of social networks. These networks can be centred around a single high-profile video-blogger and their commentators, or a broader community of content creators, particularly following the rise of smartphone technology. YouTube’s popularity and versatility as a social media platform suggest that it has significant effects on the shifting manifestations of online antisemitism.

The 2013 Measuring the Hate Report found that YouTube was the source of the highest percentage of reported antisemitic items (41%).147 While YouTube has the highest reported rate of antisemitic content, this is attributed to content being accumulated over time, compounded by a significantly lower rate of removal. In the Measuring the Hate report’s initial findings, YouTube’s ratio of reported antisemitism was 5% higher than Twitter (41% compared to 36%). This difference grew to 12% (47% compared to 35%) after ten months, demonstrating how even a few months of low removal rates (22% compared to 8%) can impact the disparate quantity of antisemitism

147 Oboler, Measuring the Hate, p. 5.
between platforms.\textsuperscript{148} YouTube’s low removal rate resulted in a cumulatively high volume of antisemitic material found, regardless of the contents’ age.\textsuperscript{149} Holocaust denial and traditional antisemitism were the most prominent categories of antisemitism; YouTube accounted for over 50\% of each category on the three major social media platforms ten months after the initial data collection.\textsuperscript{150} YouTube's format suits these well-entrenched categories of antisemitism due to their extensive reservoirs of historical material, such as Nazi propaganda films or pseudo-academic Holocaust denial documentaries. This trend is greatly contrasted in the WJC report, which attributes 1\% of collated Holocaust denial content to YouTube, 11\% to Twitter, and 13\% to Facebook.\textsuperscript{151} However, the WJC report admits that YouTube cannot be as consistently quantified using the WJC report methodology compared to other social media platforms.\textsuperscript{152} While this is partly due to the WJC’s use of a branding analytics company, the overall reasons for this are more complex. The impact of antisemitism on YouTube is not just measured in numbers of posts, but in numbers of views. A highly viewed video promoted by YouTube’s algorithm may have a far greater impact in spreading antisemitism than hundreds of individual tweets or Facebook posts. The \textit{Measuring the Hate} report therefore provides a more accurate estimate of the quantity of antisemitic content on YouTube, due to the reporting-based methodology. However, different approaches are required to further analyse YouTube’s impact in the spread of antisemitism.

The antisemitic material distributed on YouTube can range from pre-internet antisemitic propaganda, such as that produced by Nazism,\textsuperscript{153} to video-based conversations containing explicit

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., pp. 19, 35.
\textsuperscript{151} World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 58.
\textsuperscript{153} While much Nazi propaganda has been stored on YouTube by historical organisations, the top result for a search of “Triumph of the Will” in September 2018 linked to a full copy of the film hosted by an openly National Socialist
antisemitic sentiments. However, YouTube presents ramifications for online antisemitism beyond the nature of uploaded content. In June 2018, an investigation by the *Wall Street Journal* demonstrated how YouTube’s algorithm for video searches and recommendations gave prominence to videos featuring conspiracy theories and inflammatory and fringe discourse:

YouTube’s recommendations often lead users to channels that feature conspiracy theories, partisan viewpoints and misleading videos, even when those users haven’t shown interest in such content. When users show a political bias in what they choose to view, YouTube typically recommends videos that echo those biases, often with more extreme viewpoints.\(^{154}\)

This pattern continued despite efforts by YouTube to change their algorithm in 2017. These changes were intended to recommend more mainstream sources, after YouTube disproportionately promoted conspiracy videos surrounding the 2017 Las Vegas mass shooting.\(^{155}\) Also in 2017, an investigation by *The Times* revealed that YouTube allowed the ‘monetisation’ of videos containing channel. Some of the other Nazi propaganda films on the channel had features disabled, but not *Triumph of the Will*. The copy distributed by this channel came with a video description expressing support towards National Socialism and also had fostered a pro-National Socialist conversation in the comments. The channel and its videos were removed following the June 2019 policy changes, ending the channel’s role as a space to promote and foster antisemitism.

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antisemitic content. Monetisation refers to the generation of revenue (through advertisements) for content creators receiving high numbers of views on their videos. These investigations revealed that regular users were being increasingly exposed to antisemitic content on YouTube for years, and these content creators were potentially making money from distributing antisemitism.

In response to criticism over its poor moderation, YouTube introduced a ‘limited features’ policy in late 2017:

Our Community Guidelines prohibit hate speech… Some borderline videos, such as those containing inflammatory religious or supremacist content without a direct call to violence or a primary purpose of inciting hatred, may not cross these lines for removal. Following user reports, if our review teams determine that a video is borderline under our policies, it may have some features disabled.

This policy would end the ability of certain videos to generate revenue, would hide recommendations provided by the algorithm, and would hide other information about the video, such as comments and total views. Nonetheless, this half-measure further emphasised YouTube’s limitations in effectively moderating its platform from antisemitism and other discriminatory practices.

material. Anywhere between 300-500 hours of video content are uploaded to YouTube every minute, representing a far more difficult and time-costly moderation process compared to text-based platforms. This problem is exacerbated by policies that further complicate the application of rules and require moderators to manually view reported videos when they could simply be removed.

The difficulty for YouTube to moderate content on their own terms means that much of the responsibility falls to the users instead, requiring them to ‘flag’ rule-breaking content. However, videos flagged by users and later removed can potentially be reuploaded on another channel. This potential for preserving antisemitic content online was illustrated by an incident report published by Oboler and the OHPI. The report detailed YouTube user momlvx1, whose account had existed since 2009 without any uploaded videos before suddenly uploading 1,710 over the course of a single day - June 26th, 2012. 87% of the videos contained hateful content, the vast majority of it being antisemitism, especially Holocaust denial. Oboler suggests the reason for this dormant account’s sudden activity was because another account held by the same user may have closed, forcing the user to upload their content to a new channel. While the new videos would have no views, they also would have not been flagged by the community, allowing any videos previously removed or limited to have free reign once again. In response to the report being released, YouTube removed the channel in question, but also adopted a new moderation tool: removed content would be added to a list and new uploads would be compared against this list to

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161 Ibid., p. 1.
block them being reuploaded. While this tool represents a significant step forward in limiting the presence of antisemitism on YouTube, the tool’s value only goes so far as YouTube’s own policies towards forms of antisemitic content. If antisemitic videos are considered acceptable by YouTube, such a database will not prevent their redistribution and spread.

YouTube has previously been reluctant to draw clear lines on acceptable content, including regarding antisemitism. As seen with their limited features policy, they appear to stand closer to a *laissez-faire* position on free speech regarding hateful content, despite such content being against their policies. While the limited features policy warns unsuspecting audiences about controversial content, expanding its use undermines the policy to check uploaded videos against a database of banned videos. The limitations of this policy were particularly demonstrated by the limited and inconsistent moderation exercised against Holocaust denial on YouTube. Before June 2019, only some Holocaust denial material was subject to the limited features policy, particularly explicit content (e.g. through the use of provocative terms, like “Holohoax”), or videos linked together in a large collection (e.g. in video playlists or channels). When one searches “Holohoax” on YouTube, the first results are playlists of videos under that term (appendix D, figure 24.1). In September 2018, many of the videos in these playlists were subject to limited features, although

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162 Ibid., p. 3.

163 The appearance of these playlists has fluctuated over the writing of this thesis. In September 2018, the first two playlists appeared at the top of the search results, but then when searched again in October 2019, the bottom two playlists referenced appeared at the top of the search results. The first playlist was still active as of October 2019, just not appearing in the top search results, while the second was deactivated. As of January 2020, the bottom two playlists still appear at the top of search results.

(Paul Pinard, 15 October 2019) ‘Holohoax’ (YouTube playlist), <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL1YZr2DC3CQjDQd5U9oaZhPHoeKacXjri> [accessed October 2019].


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in inconsistent patterns. Beyond these playlists, accounts that promoted Holocaust denial had some of their denialist videos limited, but others were not limited. This included the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust’s (CODOH) official channel, which was banned later in 2019, although this inconsistent moderation raises questions over why it was not simply banned in the first round of moderating action. These inconsistencies, even with overt antisemitism, demonstrated the problems with a lacklustre moderation policy against hate speech.

In June of 2019, YouTube finally expanded its hate speech policy to explicitly forbid the promotion and glorification of Nazi ideology and the denial of well-documented violent events, including the Holocaust. Following this point, many of the videos in the “Holohoax” playlists were removed, and even through new “Holohoax” playlists continued to be assembled, they have less material to drawn upon. Nonetheless, newer playlists are still more likely to be complete, including one full of David Irving speeches uploaded in 2017, which remains largely intact as of January 2020. It is concerning that YouTube’s increased moderation policy, far harsher on Holocaust denial compared to Facebook, applies only to videos and does not extend to playlists. While YouTube’s expanded hate speech policy has limited the spread of Holocaust denial, the adaptability of antisemites is demonstrated by their use of playlist infrastructure to continue organising and promoting Holocaust denial.

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164 Based on the covert nature of CODOH, it is unlikely that the impetus to ban their channel came from an action on their behalf. (CODOH – Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust), (YouTube Profile), <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCv_oU-0RfVNPPuMwD73Cw/videos?flow=grid&sort=p&view=0> [accessed 16 September 2018].


Before the June 2019 changes, covert antisemitism was particularly resistant to the limited features policy. A September 2018 search of “Holocaust Revisionism” revealed four denialist videos without limited features topping search results (appendix D, figure 24.2). The first result, “Holocaust Revisionist Faurisson”, was an hour-long documentary that had existed on YouTube for over seven years and had over 29,000 views. The first video to have limited features in that search was called “Holocaust Revisionism for Beginners part 1 – 1/5”, which was uploaded in 2007 and had over 47,000 views. The only limited features in this video were a warning screen to click through to watch, and restricted recommendations (although that did not prevent clicking through to the next video in the series). However, after the June 2019 policy changes, a repeated search finds none of the Holocaust denial videos from the September 2018 search. The new results even reflect an understanding of the obfuscation behind the term ‘revisionism’, with top results featuring educational videos about Holocaust denial instead (appendix D, figure 24.3). Covert Holocaust denial’s long persistence on YouTube represents the limitations of limited features moderation policies towards antisemitism on social media. However, the differing search results between 2018 and 2019 indicate the positive potential of stronger policies consistent with the academic consensus on manifestations of antisemitism (which Facebook still lacks). In the months following the June 2019 changes, large quantities of Holocaust denial videos were removed from YouTube. Some of these videos had been on YouTube for over a decade, and ranged from overt to covert in their content. The stronger content policy and database for vetting new uploads against existing banned content prevented organised antisemites from reuploading content as they

167 (YoutresTuve, 21 April 2011), ‘Holocaust Revisionist Faurisson’ (YouTube video), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mt_PKklPg-U> [accessed 16 September 2018].
169 Ibid.
had done in the past. While the use of playlist infrastructure reveals that antisemites are continuing to adapt and that there is still more content to moderate, the post-2019 landscape of YouTube is a far cry from its previous role as a Holocaust denial resource depot.

While those who upload and reupload antisemitic content on YouTube are largely organised antisemites, it is also worthwhile to explore how recreational antisemites normalise discrimination on the platform. A key incident in this category is when user PewDiePie, a famous YouTube personality, uploaded a video on January 11th, 2017, in which he paid a pair of Indian workers $5 to unfurl a banner saying, “DEATH TO ALL JEWS”. PewDiePie, real name Felix Kjellberg, was the most subscribed-to user on YouTube between 15 August 2013 and 27 March 2019 (although still ranked second with over 102 million subscribers as of December 2019), and is known for primarily playing video games and vlogging. PewDiePie apologised in the video after the incident, saying “I am sorry. I didn't think they would actually do it… It was a funny meme, and I didn’t think it would work, okay”. Nonetheless, the video received significant criticism from some of his subscribers and the broader media. PewDiePie made a further statement on his blog, stating, “I am in no way supporting any kind of hateful attitudes”, but criticising the broader coverage of the incident. In the wake of the heightened media attention, the Wall Street Journal reported that since August 2016, PewDiePie had included antisemitic and Nazi content in nine

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(Falcon Fan, 25 February 2017), “DEATH TO ALL JEWS” (Original Video) (YouTube video), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NgaV5z05MH0> [accessed 16 December 2019].
videos, as well as promoting far-right channels.\textsuperscript{174} This incident and its ensuing publicity led to several major donors severing ties with him, including Disney.\textsuperscript{175} Later, in September 2017, PewDiePie faced further controversy when he said “nigger” while live-streaming a game of \textit{PlayerUnknowns Battlegrounds}.\textsuperscript{176}

PewDiePie’s incidents, particularly the “DEATH TO ALL THE JEWS” banner, demonstrate the extent of the normalisation of antisemitism that has happened on the internet. The incidents also indicate how this normalisation can be furthered by high-profile internet celebrities, especially on YouTube. PewDiePie’s reference to the incident as a “funny meme” links to the vulgar humour inspired by 4chan. Despite repeat incidents, PewDiePie’s initial apology during the video itself seems to suggest he does not intend to actively promote antisemitic views. Furthermore, PewDiePie explained the “nigger” incident as “[it] just slipped out”,\textsuperscript{177} and could not be edited out as it was live-streamed. Overall, it seems likely that actively racist intentions are not behind these incidents, although their accidental nature does not preclude him from having discriminatory views. Both PewDiePie’s casual treatment of the “DEATH TO ALL THE JEWS” incident, and the existence of antisemitic content in previous videos demonstrate that antisemitic humour was normalised and popular enough to be exhibited on the most popular channel on YouTube. Significant backlash after the incident did not prevent PewDiePie’s then 52 million subscribers (many being impressionable young people) being exposed to the antisemitic joke, nor

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{177} Felix Kjellberg (PewDiePie, 12 September 2017), ‘My Response’ (YouTube video), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLdxuaxaQwc&feature=emb_logo> [accessed 16 December 2019].
did the backlash diminish his userbase. Ultimately, vulgar 4chan-style antisemitism being promoted by one of the internet’s most popular personalities suggests that antisemitism has been normalised to the point where even popular figures ignore social risks, and engage in it for the amusement of themselves and their audiences.

The broader impact of antisemitism on PewDiePie’s fanbase was revealed by a controversy around his attempt to donate to the ADL in September of 2019. On 10 September, he uploaded a video in which he announced a $50,000 donation to the ADL, which had notably criticised him for his “DEATH TO ALL THE JEWS” stunt. Immediately following this announcement, many followers spread antisemitic conspiracy theories that PewDiePie was being forced into the donation. The next day PewDiePie tweeted that reasons for the donation were linked to the Christchurch shooter saying “subscribe to PewDiePie” in his livestream of the atrocity. In addition, the ADL also stated that they first learned about the donation after PewDiePie’s original video. Nonetheless, there was continued conspiratorial thought and fan backlash over PewDiePie’s donation announcement. This backlash featured multiple manifestations of antisemitism on his fanbase’s Reddit community, as well as efforts from 4chan to brigade and

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179 Jonathan Greenblatt (@JGreenblattADL, 15 February 2017), ‘Thank you, @Disney, for severing ties with #PewDiePie’ (tweet), <https://twitter.com/jgreenblattadl/status/831581445646843906?lang=en> [accessed 31 October 2019].
181 It is also worth considering that PewDiePie’s existing recreational antisemitism had been noticed by far-right actors like Tarrant, and their reference to him in their meme culture served to further associate him with the far-right.
Ibid., para. 8 of 8.
183 (Ovikeat, 11 September 2019) ‘Why is he giving money to the ADL who tried to get him kicked off Disney’ (Reddit post), <https://www.reddit.com/r/PewDiepieSubmissions/comments/d2e8hr/why_is_he_giving_money_to_the_adl_who_tried_to> [accessed 31 October 2019].
support anti-ADL sentiment.\textsuperscript{184} PewDiePie rescinded his donation pledge in a video two days after the initial announcement.\textsuperscript{185} The fan backlash was largely motivated by the perceived prior antagonism toward PewDiePie by the ADL, which was likely amplified by PewDiePie’s own criticism of the coverage over his controversies back in 2017.\textsuperscript{186} This controversy demonstrates that YouTube celebrities being called out for recreational antisemitism can result in their fanbase becoming antagonistic towards efforts to combat antisemitism. The fanbase comes to the celebrity’s defence, likely facilitated by the online echo chambers and parallel realities that form around them. The recreational antisemitism can even spread to the fanbase itself, potentially influencing the creators to diminish their own accountability and curtail attempts to make amends. Furthermore, the normalisation of recreational antisemitism within these celebrity-based communities can result in them becoming recruiting grounds for organised antisemites from other spaces, such as 4chan. This controversy represents the serious risk posed by recreational antisemitism. Once it receives a mainstream audience, calling it out can amplify it, while leaving it alone continues its normalisation.

YouTube’s TEMPIS taxonomy is largely similar to that of the other major social media platforms (appendix D, figure 26.5). Posts are easily shareable to the broader platform and internet, and users do not need a verified ID. Users are empowered to turn off commenting on their video and delist their video from public view. However, these features are not as extensive as Facebook’s. Recent policy changes have resulted in moderation expanding from solely exception

\textsuperscript{184} (LivingstoneInAfrica, 11 September 2019) ‘r/PewdiepieSubmissions reacts to PDP's donation to the ADL’ (Reddit post) <https://www.reddit.com/r/AgainstHateSubreddits/comments/d2kolf/rdiediesubmissions_reacts_to_pbps_donation_to> [accessed 31 October 2019].
\textsuperscript{185} Felix Kjellberg (PewDiePie, 12 September 2019), ‘My 100 Mil Award Broke!’ (YouTube video) <https://youtu.be/PbfX3ZyHLJg> [accessed 31 October 2019].
\textsuperscript{186} Kjellberg, ‘just to clear some things up…’.
moderation to also pre-moderation, which can have increased effectiveness against antisemitism and other forms of hate speech.

Organised antisemites can use YouTube as a cost-effective way to engage a much larger audience than before the internet. For Holocaust denial, the few encounters that compare to a moderately performing Holocaust denial video on YouTube are the occasions where a prominent denier was invited onto a television show. However, these pre-internet actions required heightened publicity and produced social risk, whereas both can be eliminated by the pseudonymity provided by YouTube. YouTube has also provided an outlet for organised antisemites to store older antisemitic material. While this activity has largely diminished following the June 2019 policy changes, such storage is still possible on other video-sharing websites with less stringent hate speech policies. Nonetheless, casual antisemites can more easily consume content on YouTube, and can easily share videos from this platform to broader online spaces. Their support of organisers is streamlined by providing views and subscriber numbers, even resulting in the monetisation of antisemitism on YouTube. However, YouTube policy changes have demonstrated how stronger moderation can significantly reduce the ability both of organised antisemites to distribute antisemitism, and of casual antisemites to consume it. The highest dangers now lie with recreational antisemitism, as seen with example PewDiePie normalising antisemitism to his broader userbase. Measures have been introduced to reduce the risk of exposing large channel audiences to prohibited material. One notable measure is incentivising channels with higher subscriber numbers to have all their videos manually vetted in the Google Preferred program. Once again, policy is only as strong as a platform’s content policy, which on YouTube

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187 As happened with Bradley Smith and David Cole on the show Donahue in 1994.
is now strong enough to effectively mitigate the spread of antisemitism, assuming moderators are educated about its covert and invisible forms.

YouTube has traditionally been a haven for overt, covert and invisible antisemitism. Previously, the platform’s limited removal rates had allowed all types of antisemitic content to remain available. Even now, this history has contributed to an insidious level of normalisation of antisemitism on YouTube. Despite the introduction of new moderation policies in June 2019, it is likely that this normalisation of antisemitism has persisted, especially considering the age of some of the antisemitic content on the platform. The platform’s increasing moderation is now limiting the viability of antisemitism, but the limited features policy serves as an example of the ineffectiveness limited moderation provides, especially for covert forms of antisemitism. This example is especially relevant for other platforms that might take heed of the moderation policies adopted by YouTube. However, some users may reject such policies and form an alt-tech platform, as Gab did in reaction to Twitter’s moderation. In such cases, antisemitic videos can be expected to stay rooted online, although the diminished access to broader audiences will limit their reach (as in the case of Gab) and prevent antisemitism from being effectively monetised. YouTube has been a source of both active and dormant antisemitism, with dormant antisemitism being the most significant. The platform allowed reserves of old antisemitic content to be reuploaded, both as an archive and to recycle it into the public sphere. This trend has resulted in a significant proportion of antisemitism on YouTube manifesting in traditional and Holocaust denial forms. However, this recycling of dormant materials is significantly diminished after being combined with a more stringent prohibition against antisemitic material.

Quantitatively, YouTube represents the digital preservation of antisemitic material, a goal of organised antisemites since web 1.0 in the 1990s. While improvements in technology have
facilitated more efficient archiving of these resources since then, YouTube’s new policies and tools have limited the extent of this storage and redistribution. By implementing a strong content policy and checking uploaded videos against a list of already banned videos, YouTube can play a leading role in the restriction and limitation of antisemitic content online. However, inconsistent enforcement has limited the potential of these tools, enabling organised antisemites to continue using YouTube as a distribution platform. Only dealing with antisemitism on a video-by-video basis (except when an entire channel is banned) allows antisemites to create channels and playlists in which some videos will not be negatively affected. Nonetheless, even with these tools being partially effective, this does mean that organised antisemites on YouTube are far more likely to limit their material to covert antisemitism. Furthermore, users being required to repeatedly upload their content or channel is it is removed makes it likely that the material will remain dormant, or even eliminated for good if checked against a database of banned content. While the partial implementation of these tools has limited the spread of organised antisemitism on the platform, other video sharing sites may still serve the same purpose without similar limitations. This heightens the need for YouTube to effectively implement these tools and policies, so that they can serve as an example for other video sharing websites to follow.

Despite the decline of organised and explicit antisemitism on YouTube, the platform can still be used to potentially increase both casual and recreational incidents, and covert and invisible forms. It is difficult for YouTube and its community to fully moderate video content, especially livestreams. This difficulty makes it more likely that covert or invisible expressions of antisemitism by smaller channels and personalities remain hidden, compared to those on text-based platforms. The culture established around prominent channels and personalities demonstrates how antisemitism has been normalised online, and how social media and internet fame can perpetuate
its normalisation. YouTube’s relatively late adoption of effective moderation has left a legacy of antisemitism’s normalisation. This normalisation results in both a qualitative change in antisemitism, as explicit content becomes more normalised and acceptable, and quantitative change, as it represents a growth in antisemitic incidents across the platform. PewDiePie’s antisemitic incidents demonstrate how far the explicit antisemitism of 4chan has reached. Furthermore, the backlash to PewDiePie’s attempted ADL donation reveals how the concentration of communities around channels with millions of subscribers extends antisemitism’s normalisation, and even provides recruitment opportunities for organised antisemitic networks. As antisemitism is further normalised, there is an increased risk of social media personalities accidentally or recreationally promoting antisemitic content to their audience. While the backlash against PewDiePie may mitigate this normalisation and encourage personalities to be more mindful of what they put into videos, there is always the risk of it “slipping out”. Therefore, despite positive moderation changes, YouTube may continue to serve as a vehicle for the normalisation of antisemitism on the internet, potentially even more so than other social media platforms.

Social Media - Reddit

Reddit distinguishes itself from other social media platforms by significantly encouraging the creation of open online communities and activity therein, and using larger quantities of text in online conversation. For antisemitism, Reddit represents the streamlined formation and recruitment of antisemitic networks on social media, as well as the ability for antisemites to target entire communities based on their identity or content. Reddit is a news aggregate-cum-social media website, that at its peak in 2018 was the 3rd most visited website in the US and 8th most visited in
the world. This rank decreased in 2019, however, it consistently ranked 6th in the US and 18th globally between March and December of 2019. Reddit began as a news aggregate website – a space where various news articles from different outlets can be posted, with users able to ‘upvote’ or ‘downvote’ news articles based on their usefulness, relevance, or information. The most upvoted links are pushed to the top of the website’s list-style format, ensuring they would be viewed first by visitors to the website. Reddit eventually created subsites known as ‘subreddits’, allowing the same list-vote mechanism to be applied to specific areas of interest. Users are pseudonymous, and can create their own subreddits, basically allowing forums to be made about potentially any topic, ranging from television shows, to animals, to web comics. Users’ creation of communities marked a proper transition to social media, as the new style of the website encouraged people to submit their own content. This included the functionality of ‘text-posts’, which emulated the thread-based conversations on web forums, allowing other users to reply to posts with comments. Regarding antisemitism, Reddit’s structure allows antisemites to set up their own subreddits where they can produce/consume content, organise, and potentially spread their material to other corners of the website.

While the owners and administrators of Reddit did not create antisemitic content themselves, they helped foster an environment that would allow it to take root. This was facilitated by their hands-off libertarian-style approach to running the website, exemplified by Reddit’s simplistic content policy’s failure to restrict hate speech. Prohibited “behaviour” (as opposed to content) is limited to manipulating votes, creating additional accounts to avoid punishment, or

trying to sabotage Reddit itself. This policy is a noticeable split from the tacit opposition to
discrimination by Facebook and Twitter, who at least include a rule against “hateful conduct”. Additionally, while 4chan may have an even more laissez-faire attitude towards content, 4chan does not receive as much traffic as Reddit, and has an existing reputation for vulgar content. Furthermore, Reddit administrators have an inconsistent record of enforcing the rules above. In June 2015, Reddit banned a subreddit called /r/fatpeoplehate over the subreddit organising the harassment of overweight people online, particularly in other online spaces. However, from 2016, the pro-Donald Trump subreddit, /r/the_donald, encouraged its large subscriber base to harass various targets online. Instead of removing the subreddit, the administrators would remove only select users, or not take any action at all. For example, no action was taken against a post that encouraged users to flood a Jill Stein Facebook Q&A livestream with attacks and abusive comments. This inconsistency has resulted in a website culture that journalist Adrian Chen, who uncovered one of the most notorious rule-breakers on Reddit, described as “online feudalism”. Reddit’s online feudalism enables ordinary users to wield extraordinary power based on their userbase, regardless of their experience or views, and despite administrators attempting to portray the website as friendly to all communities.

194 (/u/doubbg, 26 November 2016), ‘CENTIPEDES! Jill Stein is about to have a Facebook Q&A Livestream! YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO! GET ON THIS!’ (Reddit post), <https://np.reddit.com/r/The_Donald/comments/5ewh53/centipedes_jill_stein_is_about_to_have_a_facebook> [accessed 16 December 2019].
In June 2019, /r/the_donald was eventually ‘quarantined’ after calls to violence were made in support of Oregon Republicans who had fled the state to obstruct climate change action. Quarantining on Reddit is similar to YouTube’s limited features policy, meaning that any user visiting /r/the_donald for the first time would first be prompted with a warning page, stating:

This community is quarantined: It is restricted due to significant issues with reporting and addressing violations of Reddit's rules against violence and other aspects of the Content Policy. As a visitor or member, you can help moderators maintain the community by reporting and downvoting rule-breaking content.

Users would be required to click through the warning page before accessing the subreddit, and would need an existing email-verified account to continue. Furthermore, while in the subreddit, the same warning would be posted above the subscribe button. Quarantining a subreddit also ensures that no material from said subreddit can make it to Reddit’s ‘front page’, and limits the customisation of that community’s page design. Interestingly, the administrators informed the moderators of /r/the_donald that their quarantine could be later lifted, conditional on good behaviour, but it has not been lifted as of January 2020. It appears that Reddit administrators

196 (/u/thestickystickman, 27 June 2019), ‘The_Donald has been quarantined!!!’ (Reddit post) <https://old.reddit.com/r/AgainstHateSubreddits/comments/c5s9ol/the_donald_has_been_quarantined> [accessed 31 October 2019].
198 (/u/DramaMod, 27 June 2019), ‘/r/The_Donald has been quarantined. Discuss this dramatic happening here!’ (Reddit post), <https://www.reddit.com/r/SubredditDrama/comments/c5safq/r_the_donald_has_been_quarantined_discuss_this> [accessed 31 October 2019].
were concerned about the appearance of cracking down on a large subreddit dedicated to the US President, even if that subreddit had contravened Reddit’s rules to a greater degree than other spaces that were not given second chances to lift quarantines or avoid bans. Fears that banning the community would be ineffective are unfounded, according to a 2017 study on the efficacy of Reddit’s bans of toxic communities in 2015, notably /r/fatpeople hate.\textsuperscript{199} The study found the bans resulted in an overall reduction in hate speech following the ban of abusive and discriminatory communities, resulting in migrations away from Reddit rather than to other spaces in Reddit.\textsuperscript{200} Therefore, by taking away their access to the broader communities, banned discriminatory and abusive subreddits face similar difficulties to the alt-right sections of Gab lacking easy access to the userbase of Twitter.

One way Reddit fosters antisemitism is through linking communities, drawing users to subreddits that relate to, or share similar views to subreddits that they already use. Drifting userbases on Reddit represent ‘information laundering’, which can result in a parallel shift of the Overton’s window for discriminatory content between communities. This practice could be described as ‘gateway antisemitism’, bringing in users from more mainstream communities, and exposing them to further antisemitic material. Over the course of the 2016 United States election, there was a growth in this practice, linking communities around /r/the_donald to more extreme spaces. The Trump campaign was linked to Reddit’s broader alt-right, which featured white nationalism, neo-Nazism, and the ‘manosphere’.\textsuperscript{201} The manosphere, also known as the ‘Red


\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{201} Debbie Ging, ‘Alphas, Betas, and Incels: Theorizing the Masculinities of the Manosphere’, \textit{Men and Masculinities}, 22.4 (2017), 1-20 (p. 3).
Pill’, is a loosely organised misogynistic movement that promotes the concept of ‘alpha’ men. Eventually a subreddit was specifically set up for the broader alt-right, which promoted extreme antisemitic and racist views, including promoting genocide, and fantasising about the execution of Jews. /r/altright specifically targeted subscribers of the /r/the_donald, and attempted to have the two subreddits linked. In a post on 26 August 2017, /r/altright welcomed new subscribers from /r/the_donald, and directly told them that the alt-right was a “racial movement”. Furthermore, the top comment on this post was a user asking, “Why do you hate the Jews”; with the ensuing comment thread of antisemites providing in depth answers to their worldview, including links to antisemitic propaganda.

The effectiveness of gateway antisemitism on Reddit was demonstrated by the positive reception to a meme promoting Holocaust denial, posted on /r/the_donald (appendix D, figure 25.1). The meme depicts the European Union as a hijab-wearing Muslim alongside antisemitic tropes, including the (((echo))) symbol, Star of David badge, and “six million”, (a tongue-in-cheek reference to the approximately six million Jews who died in the Holocaust). The post received a net upvote count of over 3,600, and one comment saying “OMFG “six million” that shit is dank”

202 The terms ‘red pill’ and ‘redpilling’ originate from the 1999 film The Matrix and is associated generally with enlightenment as opposed to ongoing ignorance. This term is commonly used in misogynist communities adjacent to GamerGate, as explored in chapter two and four, and /r/pussypass, as explored in chapter five, although its broader use in the alt-right further indicates the intersections between overlapping forms of discrimination.


204 (/u/HerrFarage88, 1 January 2017), ‘Polish Kebab Removal’ (comment on Reddit post), <https://archive.is/6JkNx> [accessed 16 December 2019].

205 (/u/IdidThatThatsMyFault, 15 January 2017), ‘Jewish academic in Sweden admits that jews are “at the center of” the “multicultural” agenda and says that Europe MUST accept mass non-white immigration. NO BITCH. THE TIDE IS TURNING. WE WILL EXPEL NON-WHITES AND/OR SEGREGATE’ (comment on Reddit post), <https://archive.is/lnF90#selection-2675.0-2675.226> [accessed 16 December 2019].

206 (/u/LetThereBeWhite, 26 August 2016), ‘To the new subscribers coming from /r/The_Donald, The Alt Right is a racial movement and if you've heard otherwise then you've heard wrong.’ (Reddit post) <https://archive.is/8yZkb#selection-2751.0-2751.139> [accessed 16 December 2019].

207 (/u/usa_DJT_usa, 25 June 2016), ‘The salt of the MSM is evident’ (Reddit post), <https://archive.is/SruuC> [accessed 16 December 2019].
received a net of 39 upvotes. No net upvoted comments called out the antisemitic content. This meme is an instance of the broader antisemitic trend noticed in the NCRI’s quantitative analysis of antisemitism on /pol/ and Gab. Their analysis also noted exceptional rates of Merchant meme posts being shared by /r/the_donald. Of all the spaces examined in their study, /r/the_donald was the most efficient in spreading Merchant memes to other web communities (although /pol/ was the source of the largest quantity of merchant memes). This efficiency shows that /r/the_donald’s gateway antisemitism does not just represent a transitioning space to other antisemitic places, but has evolved to also push antisemitism to other spaces as well. However, /r/the_donald accounted for only 19.5% of the total Merchant meme instances detected on Reddit, suggesting the presence of more antisemitic spaces on Reddit. These spaces provide audiences for this content distributed from ‘upstream’ spaces, including /pol/ and even gateway spaces like /r/the_donald. In addition, since /r/the_donald’s Holocaust denial meme did not feature derivations of the Merchant, it is clear that a wide range of antisemitic content is being spread on Reddit through gateway antisemitism, which may be harder to detect through automated quantitative methodologies.

/r/altright was eventually banned, not due to extreme content, but because it engaged in ‘doxxing’, the practice of revealing peoples’ anonymous/pseudonymous identities on the internet and/or posting personal information for the purpose of harassing a target. Nonetheless, other alt-right spaces continue to exist on Reddit, including /r/debatealtright and /r/the_donald, the latter already shown to be vulnerable to alt-right antisemitism. In addition, much antisemitic content


209 Finkelstein and others, pp. 8-10.

210 (/u/WhiteRussianChaser, 2 February 2017), ‘/r/altright has been banned!!!’ (Reddit post) <https://www.reddit.com/r/AgainstHateSubreddits/comments/5ri8cc/raltright_has_been_banned> [accessed 16 December 2019].
came to be featured on /r/pussypass, which was part of a group of misogynistic linked communities on Reddit, including /r/theredpill. ‘Pussy pass’ refers to the concept of women receiving discounted or free services, or immunity from law enforcement due to their gender; the eponymous community was linked to Reddit’s broader alt-right community. Despite the narrow connotations of subreddit’s name, a search of the term “jew” in the subreddit reveals an array of antisemitic content, including Holocaust denial, antisemitic conspiratorial theories and anti-Judaism (appendix D, figure 25.3). This content represents the intersection of online discriminatory movements, as organised antisemites saw an opportunity to influence other communities that feature heavy misogyny. Furthermore, this intersection lays the groundwork for ‘redemptive’ antisemitic worldviews such as the cultural Marxism conspiracy theory, linking these intersecting forms of discrimination in a worldview that places higher blame on a Jewish cabal. The moderators of /r/pussypass eventually banned neo-Nazi content, which did diminish its antisemitism henceforth. While banning communities has been proven to diminish hate-speech on Reddit, there are other factors at play. The NCRI’s report on /pol/ and Gab demonstrated that antisemitism on Reddit is also coming from external sources. Furthermore, through the intersection of discriminatory movements on the alt-right, antisemitism can be spread to a wide variety of linked communities, even after major existing communities are banned.

Reddit’s linking of communities allows the spread of antisemitic material across broader social media, thereby allowing antisemites to reach broader audiences. One key example of this is associated with an infamous Donald Trump tweet of 2 July 2017, which featured a video of Trump’s 2007 WrestleMania appearance, edited so that the CNN logo was superimposed on his

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When subreddits like /r/fatpeople were banned, their dispersed users would “invade” other subreddits, moving rapidly into different spaces. Nonetheless, despite the influx of these users from hate-speech spaces, there was not any detected increase in hate-speech rates within the “invaded” subreddits. Chandrasekharan and others, ‘You Can’t Stay Here’, p. 20.
foe’s head.\textsuperscript{212} It is not exactly clear how Trump came across the video, which was created by a Reddit user /u/HanAssholeSolo.\textsuperscript{213} This user had also posted antisemitic, racist, and Islamophobic memes and comments, which were subsequently projected to international significance. Most prominent was an antisemitic meme made about CNN, posted to /r/the_donald on 13 June 2017 with the title “Something strange about CNN… can’t quite put my finger on it”.\textsuperscript{214} This meme depicted the portraits of 121 CNN employees with stars of David by their faces, along with their names and position within CNN. The meme was sized so all portraits could fit into an image suitable for viewing on a smartphone, along with an antisemitic screed at the bottom:

\begin{quote}
If Jews represent just 2\% of the U.S. population, would it be odd for a media organization (whose parent company has a Jewish president and Jewish-majority of C-level executives) to also have a Jewish President and a Jewish Vice-President, a Jewish-majority of Executive Vice Presidents, and a Lead Political Anchor, Chief Political Correspondent, Chief Political Analyst, Chief Political Director, Chief National Correspondent, and Chief Washington Correspondent – all 6 of its “Chief” anchor positions – who are all Jewish, as well as a majority – at least 13 – of the network’s currently-running shows having Jewish hosts? It’s almost as if…
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{212} Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump, 2 July 2017), ‘#FraudNewsCNN #FNN’ (tweet), <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/881503147168071680> [accessed 16 December 2019].
\textsuperscript{214} (/u/HanAssholeSolo, 13 June 2017), ‘Something strange about CNN… can’t quite put my finger on it’ (Reddit post), <https://i.pcdn.org/pol/1499243723487.jpg> [accessed 16 December 2019].
Trump’s sharing of /u/HanAssholeSolo’s video demonstrated that content made by antisemites can potentially reach audiences as powerful as the President of the United States, who in turn can promote it further. Even though Trump did not share the antisemitic content, his sharing of /u/HanAssholeSolo’s other content allowed this user’s antisemitic material to receive unprecedented attention, including being covered in major news outlets. This publicity affirms the strategy of antisemites elsewhere, specifically on Twitter, demonstrating that the more activity, regardless of the subject, the greater the likelihood that their material will reach a broader audience. This capability extends even to individual organised antisemites like /u/HanAssholeSolo, demonstrating an enhanced ability of individuals to gather followings and expose others to antisemitism online, especially if appealing to sentiments of recreational antisemitism.

Reddit’s subreddit system allows antisemites to create a subreddit on any subject (if the subreddit name is not already in use) and fill it with the content they want. In 2014, a study publicised that the /r/holocaust subreddit was created and run by Holocaust deniers, allowing them to completely design it as a Holocaust denial platform. Despite generating significant attention, Reddit administrators refused to hand the platform over to users who would run it as an informative subreddit about the history of the Holocaust. Furthermore, the study found that the head moderator and creator of the subreddit, /u/soccer, had created many subreddits when the subreddit system was first introduced, and therefore was able to control their content. This most significantly included /r/Iran, the clearest choice for users wanting to discuss and celebrate Iran, and /r/xkcd, a subreddit focusing on the popular webcomic series xkcd. This user was able to control /r/Iran to reflect the country’s antisemitic manifestations to a disproportionate degree, such as the official

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policy of the Iranian government regarding Israel. In /r/xkcd, /u/soccer removed examples of comics that mocked or critiqued antisemites and broader racists. The study also found that /u/soccer was bartering with subreddits and offered to trade ownership of /r/xkcd for ownership of /r/stormfront, which at the time was held by anti-racists who made it into a subreddit about weather. These examples demonstrate the huge potential power antisemites could have on Reddit, being able to take advantage of the website’s structure to influence content, potentially reaching thousands of people every day. In May 2018, /r/holocaust was still under the control of Holocaust deniers, despite /u/soccer being banned from the website. The subreddit’s resources of covert Holocaust denial constituted a risk for users visiting /r/holocaust, potentially becoming influenced by Holocaust denial (appendix D, figure 25.4). /r/holocaust thus demonstrates the threat posed by antisemites controlling social media spaces, especially in ways that promote covert antisemitism.

In June 2018, /r/holocaust was quarantined by Reddit administrators (appendix D, figure 25.4). While this quarantine limited some functions, and provided a customised warning directing people to the United State Holocaust Memorial Museum website, its effect was limited by /r/holocaust’s comparatively smaller subreddit population. There is little value restricting /r/holocaust’s ability to reach the front page of the website if that would not be possible anyway. Nonetheless, users would need to opt-in to view any content from the subreddit, even if they were subscribed to similar subreddits, thereby potentially inoculating uninformed viewers about the subreddit’s covert antisemitic content. Quarantining did have some effect on the traffic to the subreddit, as its subreddit rank had fallen from the low 11,000s to the 50,000s a year after its quarantining (appendix D, figure 25.5). Reddit administrators’ choice to quarantine /r/holocaust in 2018, yet not ban it outright, suggests that they were susceptible to growing public pressure

\footnote{Ibid., p. 59.}
surrounding discrimination on their platform, yet were still committed enough to their *laissez-faire* approach to not remove antisemitism entirely.

In October 2019, r/holocaust was banned permanently, alongside a large number of other discriminatory subreddits including overt and covert antisemitic subreddits.\(^{218}\) The crackdown on these subreddits was linked to changes to the bullying and harassment policy of Reddit, rather than the introduction of policies against hate speech in particular.\(^{219}\) This policy development was positive, yet represented Reddit’s inconsistent application of moderation. r/holocaust’s low subscriber base, decline in traffic, and history of activity indicated that it was not used for the cyberbullying of Jews, but rather as a resource depot for Holocaust denial. It seems that r/holocaust was banned in a general crackdown on abusive and discriminatory subreddits. /r/holocaust being banned, despite no change in Reddit’s policy against hate speech, and in consideration of Reddit’s failure to ban /r/the_donald for far more abusive actions, demonstrates a continuation of Reddit’s attempts to balance its *laissez-faire* approach to free speech with inconsistent and arbitrary moderation. These actions cannot be removed from the broader online context of this period, which also led to changes in moderation on other social media platforms, most notably YouTube’s policy changes in June 2019. When considered in this context, Reddit’s actions may simply be a comparably lesser reaction to steps taken by other social media platforms. Reddit’s inconsistent attempts to maintain this *laissez-faire* approach ironically leaves it open to criticism by the userbase that favours free speech, as demonstrated by the comments reacting to their updated

\(^{218}\) (/u/phedre, 1 October 2019), ‘You get a ban, you get a ban, EVERYONE GETS A BAN! Mass ban wave goes out as admins update their bullying & harassment policy.’ (Reddit post), <https://www.reddit.com/r/SubredditDrama/comments/dbjacc/you_get_a_ban_you_get_a_ban_everyone_gets_a_ban> [accessed 31 October 2019].

\(^{219}\) (/u/landoflobsters, 1 October 2019), ‘Changes to Our Policy Against Bullying and Harassment’ (Reddit post), <https://www.reddit.com/r/announcements/comments/dbf9nj/changes_to_our_policy_against_bullying_and> [accessed 16 December 2019].
bullying and harassment policy.\textsuperscript{220} This backlash to Reddit further emphasises the value of having a consistent anti-hate speech policy, but this change will likely not occur while Reddit still has a largely reactive attitude towards moderation.

It is also worth mentioning the existence of invisible antisemitism on Reddit, primarily within left-wing communities. Relatively far left subreddits like /r/ChapoTrapHouse,\textsuperscript{221} a subreddit dedicated to the left-wing podcast of the same name, regularly feature criticisms of Israel that traverse into antisemitism. These incidents primarily manifest as upvoted posts delegitimising Israel’s existence (appendix D, figure 25.6), equating Zionism with racism,\textsuperscript{222} promoting Zionology-esque associations of Israel with fascism, European imperialism, and violence,\textsuperscript{223} and multiple instances of the Livingstone Formulation (appendix D, figure 25.7). These incidents do occur among broader (and sometimes measured) conversations about Israel and strong criticisms of antisemitism, which nonetheless further the risk of these manifestations becoming normalised and invisible to the community. This development indicates how websites with infrastructure and features like Reddit can facilitate the spread and acceptability of invisible antisemitism. Nonetheless, this development does not pose as significant a risk as the information laundering of alt-right antisemitic meme culture on Reddit.

Reddit shares some features with other major social media platforms, particularly the publicness and shareability of content (appendix D, figure 26.6), but its subreddit system provides an even greater degree of user flexibility than Facebook groups and pages. The ability to have

\textsuperscript{220}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{221}Appendix D, figure 25.6 will show that /r/ChapoTrapHouse is quarantined. The quarantining of the subreddit is unrelated to any antisemitism.

\textsuperscript{222}(/u/Learning_Communism, 25 July 2019), ‘Zionism is racism’ (Reddit post), <https://www.reddit.com/r/ChapoTrapHouse/comments/chag79/zionism_is_racism> [accessed 31 October 2019].

\textsuperscript{223}(u/Phediuk, 8 August 2019), ‘If you support Israel in any way you are promoting violence’ (Reddit post), <https://www.reddit.com/r/ChapoTrapHouse/comments/cne0oy/if_you_support_israel_in_any_way_you_are> [accessed 31 October 2019].
private subreddits allows antisemites to collaborate and organise as per on Facebook, but with reduced risk of their personal identities being unveiled, due to Reddit’s pseudonymous usernames. Subreddits are effective resource centres for antisemitism, enabling users to customise the subreddit design, such as including features like sidebars and top links that allow the archival and recycling of antisemitic content. Publicly, a subreddit named after a particular phenomenon becomes recognised as the definitive space for it, where people go to if they want information or links on that phenomenon. If a subreddit is occupied by organised antisemites, it can be difficult to have that space taken away from them. Subreddit moderators are empowered to have complete control over their subreddits, which presents opportunities for organised antisemites on Reddit to ‘collect’ as many subreddits as possible, allowing antisemitism to be disseminated there as well. While subreddit moderators are notionally meant to have responsibility for ensuring their spaces are consistent with Reddit’s policies, in practice these policies are irregularly enforced. With enough effort, antisemites can create popular enough spaces that result in antisemitic content being broadcast to the wider platform, providing a straightforward path to the distribution and dissemination of antisemitism.

The subreddit system allows for the establishment of community spaces for casual antisemites as well, easily providing them with new antisemitic content, and eventually encouraging them to create content of their own. This also provides a path for recreational antisemitism, both in subreddits that are tailored specifically for antisemites, and in more prominent subreddits that serve as antisemitic recruitment grounds. As the subscriber bases of these communities overlap, it can encourage a broad participation in recreational antisemitism, and the general normalisation of antisemitism in the more mainstream subreddits. While this system does provide avenues for the spreading of overt antisemitism, it primarily benefits the spread of
covert and especially invisible antisemitism. This spread occurs through the gateway antisemitism phenomenon on Reddit, which can result in antisemitism becoming normalised to users of these spaces, potentially leading them to casually engage in it themselves. The platform promotes both dormant and active antisemitism; its upvoting system provides a function to continuously recycle dormant material, while also encouraging the active generation of original antisemitic content. These functions combined can result in users of larger subreddits being exposed to antisemitism from overlapping antisemitic subscriber bases, luring these users into more antisemitic spaces. These increasingly extreme spaces provide them directly with material to support the growth of antisemitic worldviews, and the creation and sharing of new content keeps them continuously involved in the more extreme subreddit.

Quantitatively, Reddit is not especially significant in the spread of antisemitism online. The platform may encourage individuals to become antisemites and may contribute to the creation and sharing of antisemitic content, however the communities specifically dedicated to antisemitism are small in subscriber base. While spaces like /r/the_donald are targets for the spread of antisemitic material, that quantitative impact is more associated with spaces like /pol/ and Gab, who are creating the material. Even the case of /u/HanAssholeSolo is more of an example of how online pseudonymity in general has led to the qualitative evolution of antisemitism online, which has been better demonstrated by Twitter. Unlike examples such as 4chan, content on Reddit and Twitter that has been made by an individual user will remain linked to their account. Subsequently, if any later content goes viral, their earlier content may be swept up in the viral wave, all while similarly protecting their real-life identity almost as well as with pure anonymity.²²⁴

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²²⁴ It bears mentioning that /u/HanAssholeSolo was tracked down by CNN, who decided to not reveal their identity in the media. Nonetheless, the circumstances surrounding /u/HanAssholeSolo were extraordinary, considering they
Reddit’s structure aids a qualitative change in antisemitism furthered by the trends brought about by the internet. The subreddit system provides a clear pathway for content collaboration between online communities. Such pathways can lead to antisemitism 2.0 through the information laundering of gateway antisemitism, and even demonstrates how social acceptability of implicit antisemitism can evolve into social acceptability of explicit antisemitism. The subreddit system represents another step towards the ease of antisemitic organisation, compared to the early online antisemites’ need to register and design their own websites. Reddit also furthers the normalisation of antisemitism online by attempting to link antisemitic communities and content with more mainstream subreddits, and allowing users to control antisemitic content on various smaller subreddits. The deliberate intersection of antisemitism with other discriminatory movements demonstrates a path towards the formation of redemptive antisemitic worldviews, facilitated by developing recreational antisemites who upvote antisemitic memes into dedicated antisemites.

Reddit demonstrates the elusiveness of antisemites online, particularly how the internet and rise of social media and web 2.0 has created cyber infrastructure allowing antisemites to spread propaganda with virtually no consequences, and with little ability for non-antisemites to fight back. As soon as antisemites are removed or banned in one place, they can show up again elsewhere. Nonetheless, removal and dispersion can still result in them adopting cautious approaches that reduce overall antisemitism rates, or at least shift their activities to covert manifestations. Reddit is distinct due to its subreddit system, which facilitates the streamlined establishment of discrete yet adjacent online groups and spaces, created and run by users themselves. The subreddit system

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involved the President of the United States, and it is unlikely that their identity would have been revealed without said circumstances.

therefore allows antisemitic users to accumulate power and platforms, to control narratives and content. This accumulation is the most straightforward method for establishing antisemitic parallel realities in cyberspace. The almost ‘feudal’ moderators of these spaces have significant ability to acquire, change, and control these spaces to suit their own worldviews, benefiting further from the *laissez-faire* attitude of Reddit administrators. This power has broader influence, as evidenced by /r/kotakuinaction persevering as one of the most prominent GamerGate spaces on mainstream social media.\(^{225}\) Reddit demonstrates a significant power gain for antisemites through the internet, as rather than just trying to promote their information to others, they are gaining the means to control the information intake of others. This power gain can result in a greater normalisation of antisemitism within targeted online spaces, and can potentially be wielded by organised antisemitic groups through the possession and moderation of subreddit-like spaces.

**Conclusion**

Technological changes to media and communication, starting with the evolution of the printing press and mass media, have impacted a broad range of social phenomena, including the role of education, information and public discourse in society. The rise of the internet has already had significant qualitative and quantitative changes on these social phenomena, considerably changing the way individuals interact within the public sphere, and how we consume and produce information. It is logical that the internet could also be expected to have caused significant qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism. The profiles of websites examined in this

chapter (including both dedicated antisemitic platforms and broader social media platforms), demonstrate a number of these changes, and discuss how they were brought about by the internet, especially web 2.0.

The profiles of the IHR, Stormfront, 4chan and the Daily Stormer websites represent an evolution of antisemitism alongside the evolution of the internet, providing insight into the rise of antisemitism 2.0 outside of major mainstream social media platforms. Both the IHR and Stormfront are attempts by pre-internet organised antisemites to take advantage of the rise of the web. Yet while the IHR website floundered into relative obscurity with the decline of its organisation, Stormfront’s community of more casual and recreational antisemites brought their website to global prominence and prolonged its visibility. The prominence of recreational antisemitism on 4chan may suggest that recreational antisemitism is replacing organised antisemitism online as the most significant source of antisemitic content. However, the increasing spread and normalisation of recreational antisemitism can produce dedicated organised antisemites such as Andrew Anglin, who intensify and direct the impact of recreational antisemitism by adapting to its style. The enduring prominence of Anglin’s Daily Stormer indicates that even visible organised antisemites can still rise to prominence and organise hate campaigns with concerning effectiveness. Another concern is that these explicit communities of Stormfront, 4chan and the Daily Stormer are setting themselves up as straw men of antisemitism online. With the visibility of their explicit antisemitism, promoters of implicit antisemitism can potentially deflect criticisms by identifying these spaces as the ‘real’ antisemites. Covert and invisible forms of antisemitism become more effectively normalised due to diminished resemblance to more overt forms. While explicit antisemitism may have limited effectiveness in recruiting people to antisemitic causes, especially if it attracts significant resistance as per the Daily Stormer, its
prolonged visibility online can condition others to its presence and wear down peoples’ opposition to it. These mutually beneficial but differing paths of normalisation for overt, covert, and invisible antisemitism represent a major advancement for antisemitism 2.0.

The profiles of each explored social media platform present different ways they cater to antisemites and facilitate the spread of antisemitism 2.0. Despite the lack of antisemitic intent behind the creation of these platforms, their sheer size and reach presents an even greater risk than the intentionally antisemitic websites explored earlier. Facebook represents the greatest reach of content collaboration resulting in antisemitism 2.0 through its enormous userbase, ease of creating groups, and the promotion of shared content on news feeds. Covert antisemitism is a significant problem for Facebook, as its algorithms are designed to produce content that suits the interests of the user, resulting in the creation of echo chambers and parallel realities. Covert antisemitism can be shrouded in a false sense of legitimacy through these algorithms, enhanced by manipulatable values such as reactions and likes. Facebook’s design encourages consumers to share this content further, turning them into unintentional prosumers of antisemitism. Contrasting with Facebook, Twitter has been a hotbed for overt antisemites; organised, casual, and recreational. The main contributions of Twitter to antisemitism 2.0 are the fast dissemination of content, and the ease of demonising and harassing Jews online through shorter virtual distance - even forcing them off the platform. Twitter’s difficulties in dealing with antisemites on its platform present a risk of this harassment becoming normalised on Twitter, creating a degree of social acceptability for even the most vulgar forms of antisemitism. YouTube originally provided a streamlined space for the organisation of antisemitic video content, both for redistribution and for casual antisemitic consumption. As antisemitism spread online, YouTube served as an entry point to antisemitic beliefs and antisemitism’s normalisation. With YouTube personalities accumulating audiences
akin to high-profile radio stars, even a small ‘slip-up’ or misplaced joke can promote antisemitism to their large subscriber bases. Finally, Reddit, while arguably the least significant quantitatively of the three platforms, demonstrates the potential pathways of antisemitism 2.0: firstly, how users become conditioned to increasingly explicit forms of antisemitism, and secondly, how even loosely organised networks of antisemites on the platform can greatly facilitate the sharing of content, even controlling large spaces, potentially unnoticed by the broader userbase.

All these platforms reflect a generally slow and reactive pattern of adjusting their content and moderation policies to prevent the spread and normalisation of antisemitic content on their platforms. Comparing the previously covered antisemitic and countercultural websites with mainstream social media platforms demonstrates the ease with which the antisemitic content from the former can make their way on the latter. Despite having no antisemitic intentions, the administrators of these platforms have been largely ignorant, ill-equipped or incapable of fully handling the spread and normalisation of antisemitism from dedicated spaces to their platforms. However, as these companies slowly improve on this front, they demonstrate the effectiveness of strong moderation and content policies. Furthermore, challenging social media’s reactive moderation, and encouraging administrators’ collaboration with academics studying abuse and discrimination, will create significant roadblocks against the distribution of antisemitism on social media. These roadblocks will force antisemites away from these platforms to alternatives more suited to their ideologies, but as seen with the example of Gab, the lack of access to broader online userbases significantly limits their ability to strategise.

While antisemitism has historically had access to platforms in the form of various media outlets, said platforms would have almost complete editorial power to determine whether they would or would not promote antisemitism. In contrast, social media outlets like Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and Reddit lack the ability to control completely the content they host, share and promote. Considering over half of Australian adults and over two-thirds of US adults receive their news from social media, the platforms that most commonly distribute news no longer have comprehensive control over what is distributed, allowing potentially any content to be slipped into a news-stream and appear legitimate. Quantitatively, this streamlining results in a higher proportion of antisemitism being viewed, with more individuals from more diverse backgrounds being affected by antisemitic material. This increased quantity begets the creation of more antisemites, networks of antisemites, and new manifestations of antisemitism, while diminishing the visibility and presence of Jews and their allies online.

The distribution of antisemitism is greatly aided by the internet, especially web 2.0 and social media, by significantly reducing the cost, time, and risk of distribution. With social media, a single antisemitic meme can be spread by a few dozen people, to reach multiple thousands of views within a few minutes. This phenomenon can be significantly extended through content’s virality, and the concentration of subscribers on sites such as YouTube. Smaller quantities of antisemitic material can have a larger impact than before, and through this and the structure of social media, antisemites are encouraged to spread small ‘bites’ of content rather than long antisemitic screeds. This ‘less is more’ attitude to antisemitism produces a fundamentally qualitative change (although it has quantitative impact), as it encourages antisemites to tailor their content specifically to this new medium. A prominent example of this tailoring is the development of the Merchant meme. The cartoon can be easily photoshopped into other images, and through its

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wide recognition, facilitated by spaces like 4chan, is recognised as a humorous meme by various online antisemites. This propagates its spread, even in other meme templates. ‘Less is more’ also applies to the number of antisemitic individuals online. As demonstrated by Twitter, even a small number of antisemites can reach and impact a larger audience than ever before, projecting an enhanced illusion of strength.

The most significant qualitative changes to antisemitism brought about by the internet, particularly web 2.0, are firstly the increased ability for individual users to create content, and secondly the rise of anonymity and pseudonymity in the public sphere. When online antisemitism is compared to offline Holocaust denial, one of the most significant antisemitic trends in the post-war West, it is clear that the internet has led to a significant change in tone and style of content used by antisemites in the public sphere. The examples of YouTube, Reddit, 4chan, Daily Stormer, and even Twitter show that there is now less fear, and more willingness to resort to crude, extreme and vulgar examples of antisemitism. There is no longer a need to retain plausible deniability about being antisemitic, as per Holocaust deniers like David Irving. In addition, the connectivity of the internet encourages antisemites to use this new tone, as this harsher content has been used successfully to intimidate and harass Jews enough to force them offline, and out of the public sphere. Furthermore, the example of the Daily Stormer shows that with enough of this activity, antisemites can be encouraged to attach their real-world identity to this kind of activity, as per Andrew Anglin, in an attempt to promote real-world social acceptability to antisemitism. Nonetheless, with the “Unite the Right” rally this real-world publicity resulted in significant backlash to online antisemitism, indicating a close relationship between their manifestations, despite key distinctions.
Finally, the last major qualitative change is the elusiveness of antisemites online. Before the internet, sources of antisemitism could potentially be readily identified (excluding anonymous attacks such as vandalising Jewish graveyards and synagogues), through publishing addresses, public identities, or other sources. The internet, and social media especially, has provided antisemites with unlimited cyberspace to colonise and inhabit. Even if they are shut down in one location, it is exceptionally easy for them to pop up in another, especially when organising from external spaces. Their ability to organise while posing as recreational antisemites also allows them to orient the swarm logic of other reactionary movements. Difficulties in stopping sources of antisemitism (even through extreme measures such as hacktivism) further encourages antisemites to spread their material. Greater quantities of antisemitic content online wears down opposition to antisemitism and normalises its presence, resulting in antisemitism 2.0. From this assessment, it can be confidently stated that the internet, particularly web 2.0 and social media, have revolutionised information sharing and communication in such a way as to cause antisemitism to go through many quantitative and qualitative changes. These changes demand a re-examining of strategies used to counter antisemitism, and consideration of whether they apply to other forms of discrimination and abuse. The former requirement is examined in the following chapter, while the latter is discussed in chapter seven.
Chapter 6

Research Study: Young Adult Capacity to Resist Holocaust Denial Online

Grounds for the Study

Any overlap of the phenomena of cyberbullying and online antisemitism presents a heightened threat to young people. This risk may manifest through antisemites directly targeting Jewish children or teenagers online with hate material, and be exacerbated through the use of readily available antisemitic material. The impact of the antisemitic material also presents a considerable danger to those engaging in cyberbullying. While antisemitic material may be utilised to support instances of cyberbullying, continuous use can lead to messages in that material being absorbed. These perpetrators may be especially susceptible to this risk, given that they already have a negative impression of their Jewish victims. The use of antisemitism in bullying can also potentially influence bystanders. This risk is heightened when considering the phenomenon of reciprocal bullying, which can result in an unyielding cycle of bullying behaviour, aggravated by the disinhibition and anonymity/pseudonymity of online interaction. Therefore, any consideration of the impact of online antisemitic material on cyberbullying must include the impact on perpetrators and bystanders, particularly young people.

The danger of online antisemitic material to young people is not limited to cyberbullying. Prior to the advent on the internet, parents and guardians could hypothetically shield children from antisemitic material by regulating what they read, and monitoring their interactions with other children and adults. Cyberspace and social media have complicated this situation. Not only is it more difficult to continue these measures, but researchers Albert Kienfie Liau, Angeline Khoo and
Peng Hwa Ang argue that parental monitoring needs to be reconceptualised, as former methods (such as looking over a child’s shoulder at their material) are no longer satisfactory. In addition, young people are increasingly using the internet for homework and research, and may be impressionable and inexperienced enough to be convinced by pseudo-intellectual antisemitism.

Bernadette Dwyer states that increased internet use has resulted in students conducting online research in a “consumerist” fashion, using few methods to inquire for information, and rarely evaluating the reliability of information. This consumerist research allows antisemites and other bigots or pseudo-intellectuals to specifically aim their online ‘pitches’ to young people, who are often researching for a school project. One example is the creation of the domain martinlutherking.org by white supremacists, who specifically designed the website to look informative to young people, while actually containing white supremacist propaganda. This technique is an example of a ‘cloaked website’, through which individuals or groups disguise their agenda using web design techniques. In the context of antisemitism, the most renowned website utilising cloaking is most likely that of the Institute for Historical Review, which represents an evolution of the pseudo-academic disguise used in its pre-internet days. Cloaked websites demonstrate how parental monitoring methods, such as looking over the shoulder, are insufficient to properly supervise the content young people are using online. Even dedicating more time and attention to monitoring may still be insufficient, as parents and guardians could potentially also

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fall for cloaking techniques. Ultimately, this demonstrates a need to directly provide young people with the tools and strategies to ‘inoculate’ themselves against discriminatory material online, so that they are able to recognise, research, respond and refute discrimination when encountered.

The need to find solutions to online hate echoes Jakubowicz et al.’s call to adopt new interdisciplinary research methodologies that are problem-driven rather than theory-driven. This call is the driving motivation for this chapter’s research study, which aims to analyse the ability of young people to resist antisemitic claims in an online context, thereby determining what training and resources are required when encountering antisemitism online. This study simulated multi-participant conversations with a (false) Holocaust denier in an online space, although with participants being initially unaware that a Holocaust denier (actually the researcher) would be participating. Due to the ethical concerns involving deception and potentially upsetting content, the study used participants aged 18-19 years old rather than school-age children. The participants were provided with existing online material that could refute the antisemitic claims presented, and they were tasked to use such material and their own research skills to discuss Holocaust denial. Results of the study, including participants’ contributions to the conversations and survey data, were analysed to determine what predictors were most influential in effectively resisting and reacting to the encounter.

The research used an interdisciplinary approach, involving both quantitative and qualitative analysis, based on an inter-field approach with an adaptive design. Testing the viability of this methodology is a major aim of this research, allowing it to be adapted to study other forms of discrimination, abuse, and misinformation online. The concept for this study is adapted from an

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unpublished 2011 study by Robin Kowalski, which simulated a cyberbullying incident between two researchers and placed an unaware participant as a bystander in order to evaluate the willingness of participants to intervene against cyberbullying. The similarity between this study and Kowalski’s demonstrates the applicability of similar methodologies to analogous phenomena of online abuse and discrimination. After adopting the concept of deception-based research on abuse, for which the internet is well-suited, this study applies an interdisciplinary approach involving content, statistical, and thematic analyses, thereby pushing the research in a solution-focused direction. The research model is designed to be easily applied to other forms of online abuse, discrimination, or misinformation through changing the subject matter of the simulated conversation, and/or adding an extra false participant (in the case of cyberbullying as per Kowalski’s study). Future research based on the same methodology will make it possible to compare and contrast the data between studies on different forms of online abuse and discrimination (e.g. whether young people resist antisemitism more or less effectively than other forms of racism online). This study advances the current state of research firstly by providing insight into young adults’ capacity to resist online antisemitism, and secondly, by testing a research methodology that can be adapted to other forms of online abuse.

Methodology – Research Question

There are two sets of research questions for this study: the first regarding the conclusions drawn from the study itself, and the second being the meta-evaluation of the study’s viability in broader

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6 Robin M. Kowalski, ‘Cyberbullying Intervention’ (unpublished manuscript, Clemson University, 2011).
7 Jakubowicz and others, p. 61.
8 Kowalski.
fields and disciplines. The first set of research questions will be the main focus in this section, as
the results lay a foundation for the discussion of the second set.

*Psychological and Inoculative Resistance*

The first focus of this research study is to evaluate the ability of young people to resist antisemitism
in current online contexts. This focus is divided into one central research question supported by
several sub-questions. The central research question is:

> Considering the degree of antisemitism online, what is the ability of young people – often
> the target audience of antisemitism – to resist it when encountered online?

The concept of resistance in scholarship has a variety of meanings, including as an outcome,
process, motivation, and quality.\(^9\) In psychology, resistance is primarily considered as a process
and motivation, ‘process’ referring to mechanisms used to prevent changes to attitudes,
particularly counterarguments, and ‘motivation’ referring to the resistance to change attitudes or
aim to protect existing attitudes.\(^10\) However, this definition only considers individual actors, and
does not consider how manifestations of resistance might help or hinder others resisting the same
material. Social media has made this latter aspect of resistance far more relevant, as there is often
no knowing how many bystanders, or ‘lurkers’, are observing an exchange between users online.\(^11\)

\(^10\) Ibid.
Online exchanges may influence the attitudes of bystanders, regardless of the academic and logical strength of the arguments. For example, if users respond to Holocaust denial with outrage, abuse, and no counterarguments, a bystander may consider that the Holocaust denier is being unfairly treated, and that their arguments are sounder than the resisting users.

A relevant study, ‘Persuasive storytelling by hate groups online’ by Elissa Lee and Laura Leets, examined the effects of online hate narratives on adolescents.\(^\text{12}\) The study measured the level of psychological resistance to various hate narratives by counting the number of counterarguments in thought-listing exercises after reading the narratives.\(^\text{13}\) However, this study was published in 2002, and a thought-listing technique was suitable for measuring degrees of resistance, due to the producer-consumer relationship of web 1.0. In web 2.0, the prominence of prosumption, along with the immediacy of communication, limits the viability of this methodology, requiring new methods and definitions of resistance contemporary online contexts. This study considers psychological resistance using the same metric of counterargument quantity, and adds a new concept of ‘inoculative resistance’ appropriate to this new online environment. Inoculative resistance refers to the public behaviours exhibited by participants as they respond to antisemitic discourse. The behaviour may be successful, unsuccessful or counterproductive in inoculating other users, particularly bystanders, against the antisemitism in question. This study examines the nature of ‘ideal inoculative resistance’, that is, responses which most effectively aid bystanders in resisting persuasion by antisemitic online content. Ideal inoculative resistance addresses the core issue of antisemitism’s spread online, as counterarguments against antisemitic


positions are unlikely to influence dedicated antisemites themselves (who are committed to irrational worldviews), but are important in preventing bystanders from being attracted to antisemitic positions and spaces. While measuring psychological resistance is the most effective approach for determining the extent of a problem, measuring inoculative resistance can help point towards solutions, as it can be linked to predictors that influence productive behaviour in combating online hate.

The sub-questions in this study (appendix E, figure 27) examine how inoculative resistance can be measured in this new online context. Due to the evolution of antisemitic tactics discussed in chapter four, such as cloaked and covert content, two key components to resistance are an ability to recognise antisemitism that others may not have noticed, and to respond to this (a step which is impeded by online spaces’ anonymity and dissociation). These difficulties can be further exacerbated, particularly with respect to covert or invisible antisemitism, by hesitancy to engage in ‘race-trouble’, i.e. hesitancy to accuse others of antisemitism. While counterarguments are the core representation of resistance in the 2002 study, using a thought-listing technique outside of the space containing the hateful narrative precluded consideration of the quality of counterarguments as a factor in determining resistance. This methodology was appropriate within its context, as web 1.0 websites often lacked the means to publicly respond. However, the immediacy of conversation in web 2.0 means that resistance often manifests in a public response,\footnote{While resistance can be experienced without a public response online (e.g. purely psychologically), the nature of participating in a web 2.0 space will push participants towards expressing any resistance they have to offensive material.} which can in turn be responded to, both by the source of the offensive material and by other participants in the conversation. Users arguing more among themselves, rather than countering the arguments of the offensive material, may suggest to bystanders that the offensive material is not significantly
problematic. Since web 2.0 is a dynamic communicative space, the quality of counterarguments to offensive material may have an impact on the ability of other participants to resist the material. For this reason, two other key components of resistance (in addition to recognise and respond) are the ability to research and refute. Researching assists the formation and execution of sound counterarguments to offensive material, strengthening their refutations and helping bystanders discover resources that further counter the offensive material. Finally, high-quality refutations can discredit the offensive material, but poor-quality refutations may inadvertently aid the offensive material’s persuasiveness to bystanders. For this study, inoculative resistance to antisemitism online refers to recognising, researching, responding to, and refuting antisemitism, and these behaviours relate to the sub-questions of this study.

The Nature of Effective Resistance

Consideration of effective resistance to online antisemitism must include whether active resistance is advisable, or whether it may simply “feed the trolls”. The idea of ignoring antisemites, thereby denying them attention, goes back well before web 2.0 and has been extensively critiqued by Deborah Lipstadt. Ignoring antisemites was likely not an effective counter-strategy even before the internet, and now with web 2.0, ignoring antisemitism potentially opens allows the widespread colonisation of online spaces by antisemites, essentially normalising antisemitism in those spaces. This colonisation highlights the need to actively confront and resist antisemites online.

Responding is necessary and is aided by an ability to research information that refutes antisemitic material. Nonetheless, effective responses require further considerations. One key

consideration is the most effective length of a response. A longer response allows for a greater
degree of refutation; however, this may not be suitable for web 2.0 environments, especially those
frequented by young people and where attention is a contested commodity.\textsuperscript{16} There are significant
diminishing returns to be found on the length of a refutation with regards to its impact on observers,
as many will not bother to dedicate time to reading the entirety of the information. This is
compounded by a change in learning style by digital generations, moving towards multitasking
that can bottleneck their ability to write or read a lengthy refutation of antisemitism online.\textsuperscript{17} In
fact, engaging with antisemites for too long – both in terms of time and word count – may be
counterproductive, as it can give them more attention and opportunities to present more arguments
of their own. While antisemitic arguments are often poor in quality, a high quantity of arguments
can have a strong persuasive effect on those who are engaging with the arguments peripherally\textsuperscript{18}
(i.e. those engaging an argument with low motivation to process the message’s content\textsuperscript{19}). Large
quantities of arguments can be taken as a heuristic by less motivated individuals to assume that a
message has persuasive value.\textsuperscript{20} In the case of antisemitism, engaging too long with antisemites in
counterarguments will motivate them to continuously respond, as they will receive both
engagement from the resister, and potentially broader attention due to the quantity of activity.\textsuperscript{21}
Ideal refutations of antisemitism in online contexts should therefore be succinct, balancing the

\textsuperscript{16} Thomas Davenport and J.C. Beck, \textit{The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of
\textsuperscript{17} P.A. Kirschner and A.C. Karpinski, ‘Facebook and academic performance’, \textit{Computers in Human Behaviour}, 26.6
(2010), 1237-45.
\textsuperscript{18} Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, ‘The Effects of Involvement on Responses to Argument Quantity and
69-81 (pp. 77-78).
\textsuperscript{19} Lee and Leets, p. 931.
\textsuperscript{20} Petty and Cacioppo, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{21} Many websites and social media platforms will prioritise attention towards spaces with high levels of activity,
both algorithmically (e.g. posts with more reactions or responses will be more likely to appear on social media
feeds) and organically (e.g. the post will be shared elsewhere by an observer as an example of ‘internet drama’).
need to respond while diminishing the opportunity and motivation for the antisemite to make a higher quantity of arguments. For this reason, measurements of inoculative resistance will not be concerned with the quantity of responses exhibiting resistant behaviours (as opposed to quantity of counterarguments exhibiting psychological resistance), but rather the pattern of resistant behaviours.

Despite a need to confront antisemitism, there is an important point to acknowledge from the “don’t feed the trolls” maxim: the significance of emotion. Responses lacking a refutation or containing a poorly formulated refutation can be counterproductive, as an inability to properly refute an antisemitic point may improve the standing of antisemites among bystanders online even more than a lack of response. Being highly emotional in this context may be viewed by antisemites and bystanders as the resistor being humiliated due to them ‘taking the bait’ offered by the antisemite. In addition, a heightened emotional reaction to cloaked or ‘dog-whistling’ content may be viewed as disproportionate and unfair by bystanders unaware of the antisemitic nature of the content, gaining bystander sympathy for the antisemite. Provoking emotional responses, or ‘trolling’ is an already established tactic among antisemites, as indicated by the success of 4chan and the Daily Stormer. Trolling can even have a psychological reward for those lacking in empathy and displaying high levels of sadism and psychopathy, a group which overlaps with people drawn towards discriminatory viewpoints online. With both a tactical and psychological motivation to provoke emotion in users online, those seeking to refute antisemitic viewpoints online should aim to minimise emotion in their responses. By diminishing both the opportunity to recruit and psychological rewards, responses with low emotionality may discourage antisemites from

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participating in certain spaces. This also supports succinct refutations of antisemitism online, as disproportionately long responses may be perceived as emotional by antisemites or bystanders as emotional.

Ultimately, this study seeks to evaluate the ability of young people to resist antisemitism online by evaluating their ability to recognise, research, respond to and refute online antisemitism. This study goes beyond the 2002 study on hate narratives by categorising elements of quality resistance that influence other participants or bystanders in an online space. By categorising and evaluating the key components of resistance into recognising, researching, responding to and refuting, the results of this study can be compared to survey results about each participant’s background to pinpoint the predictors that help or hinder young peoples’ ability to resist antisemitism online. For example, the results can indicate whether studying certain subjects aids the recognition and refutation of antisemitism, or whether certain ethnic and religious backgrounds might predispose participants to higher or lower emotional responses. In recognising which predictors help or hinder the ability to resist antisemitism online, this study provides insight into what tools and methods are needed to help young people resist antisemitism online (and other forms of discrimination).

**Methodology – Study Design**

This section explains the methodology of the study. It covers the broader theoretical justification for the research model as well as the choices of participants, recruitment, antisemitic material used, use of concealment, use of surveys, and contingencies put in place. This design was chosen to specifically to provide a safe environment in which young people can be confronted by online
antisemitism online, thereby allowing this study to evaluate how they resist. As such, this study has less to do with analysing the nature of antisemitism online, which has already been done in chapters four and five, and instead builds upon that analysis by determining what young people require to effectively resist antisemitism online. While there is a need for further studies on the nature of antisemitism online, the speed of antisemitism’s evolution on the web warrants concurrent studies on resisting antisemitism online.

Background Research

The design and intent behind this study was informed by a number of scholarly texts and existing studies. Most significant was Jakubowicz et al.’s 2017 book Cyber-Racism and Community Resilience, wherein the authors make the case for transdisciplinarity in research approaches to cyber-racism. Transdisciplinarity refers to the adoption of methodologies that integrate different forms of analyses. These analyses are drawn from overlapping disciplines in research on cyber-racism, including sociology, criminology, political science, social psychology and information sciences. These disciplines utilise discourse, content, statistics, thematic, and social network analyses, among others. Jakubwicz et al. make the case that through adopting interdisciplinary approaches to research on cyber-racism, research can provide better explanations to more well-informed questions, and provide research and data that can aid research in complementary disciplines and fields. For these reasons, this study is designed to allow content, thematic, and statistical analysis, and even discourse analysis in future iterations. In addition, the study is designed to allow both self-generated data from the participants in the forum, and researcher-

23 Jakubowicz and others, pp. 45-64.
driven data from surveys, providing answers to a broader range of research questions. This study takes the goal of this interdisciplinary approach further by designing the study to allow adoption by different fields, such as on different iterations of cyber-discrimination, cyberbullying, and misinformation, providing value to broader research fields and disciplines.

Lee and Leets’ study was the first example of research attempting to measure young people’s resistance to cyber-racism. Yet, as previously mentioned, the dynamics of web 2.0 and the rise of phenomena such as cyberbullying and trolling make the design of their study unsuitable for this thesis. Nonetheless, Lee and Leets’ study informs the coding of data for the content analysis of this study’s results, particularly the use of counterarguments as a measure for resistance. Lee and Leets coded responses by adapting a mechanism by Donald Roberts and Nathan Maccoby that measured directionality, intensity, and focus of the messages, which is also used in this study. Beyond this pre-existing coding, this study considers further aspects of resistance through recognition, research, and refutation codes. The racist narratives in the 2002 study varied between high and low narrative, and explicit and implicit discrimination. Due to ethical concerns and the role of deception, this study would be forced to use a low narrative, implicit form of antisemitism. This study builds on the work of Lee and Leets by applying it to the sphere of web 2.0, but also expanding the measurements of resistance helps provide a nuanced picture of what young people need to effectively fight hate and misinformation online.

24 Ibid., p. 58.
25 Lee and Leets.
26 Ibid., p. 938.
27 Ibid.
Finally, the element of deception in the study was adapted from Kowalski’s unpublished cyberbullying study.\(^{28}\) The study, carried out in 2011, involved the use of deception to simulate a real-time experience of cyberbullying for participants. In this design, the researchers would pose as participants in an unrelated research discussion, whereupon one of the researchers would begin to cyberbully the other. The other researcher would react appropriately, leaving the real participant in the middle of the simulated cyberbullying incident, allowing the study to record their reaction. The novel use of deception allowed the study to simulate the experience of reacting to cyberbullying properly, providing unique insights compared to other study models and increasing the validity of the data when applied to real situations. This study adopts the central premise of simulating an encounter with a form of online abuse, that being antisemitism, but differs significantly in having just one false participant, to which up to four real participants are responding. The number of participants provides a more organic encounter, rather than a performative one. This allows more data to be drawn from their interactions, including their influence on others when reacting to antisemitism. The adaption of this initial cyberbullying study demonstrates the inherent versatility of this study model, allowing it to be potentially applied in analogous fields studying other forms of discrimination, abuse, and even misinformation online.

\textit{Online Discussion Approach}

The use of an online discussion to simulate an encounter with antisemitism further distinguishes this study’s design from Kowalski’s unpublished 2011 study.\(^{29}\) These choices both aid the

\(^{28}\) Kowalski.
Kowalski, Limber and Agatston, pp. 90-95.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.
accuracy of the simulation and the collection of data. Unlike the 2011 study, which involved a live chat function, this study took place in an online forum (initially hosted on zetaboards.com and then tapatalk.com). While the design of such forums is somewhat dated, it still functionally resembles interactions on many social media platforms such as Facebook and Reddit, in which discussion participants either refresh a thread to view new comments, or are directed to return to a conversation via notifications. The distinction between the two designs is exhibited in the Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism’s TEMPSIS taxonomy, in which the timing of communications can be split into real-time (i.e. live chat), and stored communications, with the latter having a greater impact on a broader audience.  

The live chat design choice in Kowalski’s study was suitable for cyberbullying, whereas prejudice is more typically encountered in social media posts, making the online forum design choice more suitable for this study. By directing up to four participants to engage in a conversation that stimulates an online encounter with an antisemite, this study captures the environment in which this stored content is created (i.e. the window in which the impact of this stored content is decided). This also increases the validity of this study’s design by more accurately replicating real online behaviour. The use of an online discussion has broader implications for the impact on and reaction of the participants themselves, as their stored interactions are left behind for bystanders to witness. Such stored communications may ultimately determine bystanders’ resistance to antisemitic arguments, and there may be no limit to how many bystanders view the stored content at a later date.

Recruited participants were directed to engage in a discussion in the forum alongside three or four other participants, up to five in total. The participants in fact totalled three or four real

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30 Andre Oboler and David Matas, *Online Antisemitism: A systematic review of the problem, the response and the need for change* (Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, 2013).

31 Indeed, much of the analyses conducted in this thesis thus far are based on observable posts, partially due to the difficulty inherent in examining discrimination in private spaces, groups, and chats.
participants, and one false participant (the researcher) who promoted common Holocaust denial claims. Participants were asked to discuss a response to the question “Why do you think some people claim the Holocaust never happened?”, and were encouraged to draw material from elsewhere on the internet into the discussion. The researcher posing as the false participant would wait either until all other participants had contributed their first comments, or at least ten minutes, to determine whether any real Holocaust deniers had joined the discussion. In addition, the false participant’s initial comments would be cloaked in implicit language, thereby allowing the researcher to redirect away from Holocaust denial if one of the real participants started promoting Holocaust denial later. The false participant would continue to make Holocaust denial arguments, steadily decreasing in implicitness, but never switching to explicit antisemitism, and always maintaining the pseudo-academic façade of “just asking questions”. The discussion would take up to an hour, but would end early if 10 minutes had passed with no further comments from any of the participants. Following the discussion’s conclusions, a researcher would reveal the true nature of the study, provide a refutation to all Holocaust denial arguments made, and remain in the forum to allow any questions to be asked. Prior to starting, participants would be encouraged to withdraw from the study at any point they felt uncomfortable without risking loss of compensation. The study design aimed for four real participants for each discussion, so to ensure the Holocaust denier would always be outnumbered by other participants, and also to continue a majority in case people pulled out. If participants pulled out before the end of the discussion, they would be emailed the debrief and refutation of all Holocaust denial material.

The format of the study cannot exactly emulate online social exchanges, as it is a closed, one-hour encounter where participants are encouraged to contribute. However, this format was chosen to allow measurement of both inoculative resistance and psychological resistance, as the
latter was measured by the quantity of counterarguments, which may not be as effectively assessed in a shorter encounter. This still presented an issue where participants would be encouraged by the format to continuously engage with the antisemite, resulting in longer overall responses, which as mentioned above are not ideal forms of resistance. In order to avoid this issue, the antisemite would introduce new arguments, resulting in between four and six different Holocaust denial arguments in each discussion. Thus, if a similar encounter happened outside of the study, concerns over longer engagement would be outweighed by the value of providing counterarguments to each point. The first argument introduced would always be the same to ensure similarity in the initial trajectory of each discussion.

**Participants**

Youth represent a particularly vulnerable group to online hate, firstly because of their age-limited experience and education regarding hate speech, and also because they are targeted for recruitment by antisemitic hate movements, especially online. Due to ethical concerns surrounding research involving children, this study utilised 18-19-year-old participants, specifically Australian year 12 high school leavers. The participants were limited to Australia exclusively to control for demographic and language differences, and due to time zone considerations in arranging online conversations. The time frame of viable participation was up until the end of the year after they finished high school. These choices have been made so that participants are still appropriately considered youths, and that their research skills will not have significantly changed upon any

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extended period of tertiary education. Nonetheless, there may have been some impact from early tertiary education on the participants’ research methods, which is considered in the discussion.

**Antisemitic Material**

The conversation with an antisemite was simulated through a researcher posing as another participant, but behaving as a Holocaust denier. However, in the case of one of the real participants expressing Holocaust denial themselves, the researcher would pose as an ordinary participant and engage minimally in the discussion. This would ensure that only one participant would be or behave as a Holocaust denier in each discussion group, as the probability of having multiple real Holocaust denier participants was considered negligible. While Holocaust relativisation and banalisation (and other antisemitic ideas) may arguably pose larger problems today, Holocaust denial was chosen as the antisemitic material in the study for several reasons. Firstly, Holocaust denial material is broadly established online, and is often cloaked in pseudo-intellectualism that may appear reasonable to impressionable young people.33 The language and use of personas by deniers online to legitimise their antisemitic claims to uninformed viewers has been analysed in a 2004 master’s thesis by Mark Polger, based on a discourse analysis of Holocaust denial websites.34 Secondly, the large quantity of material online allowed the researcher to pose convincingly as a Holocaust denier, using and quoting existing Holocaust denial material accurately, regardless of the direction of the discussion. Thirdly, the pseudo-intellectual language of Holocaust denial presented less of a risk to participants’ wellbeing than more abusive and explicit forms of

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34 Ibid.
antisemitism. Finally, Holocaust denial can be more clearly distinguished compared to Holocaust relativisation and banalisation, and the use of a text-based online medium could otherwise risk misinterpreting Holocaust relativisation and banalisation. Ultimately, the use of Holocaust denial in this study is largely due to its attributes and history online, rather than its prominence today.

The common approach to cloaking Holocaust denial content facilitated this study’s evaluation of young people’s ability to recognise implicit forms of antisemitism. The websites and material specifically dedicated to refuting the claims of Holocaust denial on the internet are dated and could be difficult for young people to navigate and utilise in an ongoing conversation, further testing their ability to research the Holocaust denial claims with which they were confronted. Two websites with material refuting Holocaust denial were provided to the participants (nizkor.org and The Holocaust History Project), so that their usefulness for young people could be directly analysed. They were framed as informative websites on Holocaust denial at the outset of the discussion, rather than as websites for refuting Holocaust denial, so as to avoid arousing suspicion about the true nature of the study.

As mentioned above, the false participant would continuously introduce new Holocaust denial arguments. The flow of arguments helped prevent the conversation from stagnating, and encouraged further demonstration of resistance without encouraging longer responses, thereby allowing rates of both psychological and inoculative resistance to be observed. The first argument in each discussion was introduced in the same manner each time, alleging conspiratorial exaggerations behind the oft-cited six million death toll. Other Holocaust denial arguments included falsification of the gas chambers, the lack of any ‘final solution’ order, allegations of a conspiracy silencing Holocaust deniers, equivocating of the Allied war crimes to the atrocities of the Nazis, claims that crematoria did not have the capacity to cremate the quantity of victims, and
allegations that the Jews were behind World War II and thus deserving of imprisonment. Other minor tropes invoked included references to soap made from Jewish body fat and socks made from Jewish hair; casting doubt on other Holocaust claims, and framing doubt over mainstream Holocaust narratives as ‘redpilling’. Between four and six common tropes were invoked in each discussion, with death toll falsification being present in each discussion, followed by gas chamber falsification being present in seven out of the nine discussions, and deniers being silenced present in six. This array of tropes was a result of attempting to keep arguments similar, but still needing to respond organically to cues in the discussion.

Concealment

The study’s concealment began at initial recruitment. Potential participants were invited to a study called “Analysing Student Capacities to Discuss and Debate Antisemitism in an Online Space”, in which they would discuss a research question about antisemitism, while being provided with a list of resources to aid the discussion. Participants were advised that due to the subject matter of the study, other participants could potentially harbour antisemitic views. This provided a level of plausibility surrounding the presence of an antisemite within the study. Concealment ended upon the conclusion of the discussion, by means of the researcher explaining the concealment and reasons for concealment in a final post within the forum.

Recruitment concealed the true nature of the study for two purposes. Firstly, engaging with a real antisemite online may induce feelings of anger or revulsion due to the controversial claims being made. These feelings may impact the nature of responses made by young people exposed to these claims, including how long they may be willing to engage with the antisemite. Such feelings could
also impact the quality and quantity of research participants utilise to respond to and refute the antisemitism. Therefore, to simulate the effects of these feelings on participants’ ability to recognise, research, respond to, and refute antisemitic arguments online, a methodology was chosen that encouraged participants to believe that they were engaging with a real Holocaust denier. Secondly, concealment was deemed necessary to prevent participants potentially preparing themselves before engaging in discussion with a Holocaust denier. If they knew Holocaust denial was the specific subject matter being discussed, or they were going to engage with a Holocaust denier online, they might have engaged in research or other preparations beforehand, which would not accurately simulate unexpectedly encountering antisemitism online.

Surveys

The study included two surveys. The initial survey took place before the discussion, to obtain demographic data about the participants including gender, history education, ethnic and religious background, and academic achievement (ATAR level if available\(^\text{35}\)). The second survey followed the discussion, and inquired about the participants’ emotional response to the denier, whether they believed the denier was real, their prior knowledge of Holocaust denial, how effectively they thought they were able to resist Holocaust denial, how helpful the provided materials were, whether they would engage in Holocaust denial online again, and what assistance they thought was needed to help resist Holocaust denial online.

Data Collection process

Time Period of Collection

Data was collected in an 18-month period between May 2018 and October 2019. One discussion group was carried out in 2018 and eight discussion groups were carried out in 2019.

Ethics

Ethical approval for the study was obtained in December 2017 from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Sydney as Project 2017/847 (appendix F, figure 37). Further ethics approval was obtained for modifications of survey questions, compensation, and recruitment strategies and material. The initial survey was modified before any of the discussion groups were carried out.

Recruitment

Both offline and online methods were utilised in recruitment. Offline recruitment involved advertising through posters, posted primarily on university campuses. Online recruitment utilised targeted advertisements on Facebook and Reddit. Facebook advertisements allowed for targeted recruitment of 18-19-year-old participants in Australia. Reddit advertising could target specific subreddits, and so advertising was done on the /r/australia subreddit, and subreddits associated with other Australian cities and communities. Recruitment included a movie voucher as incentive in exchange for participation. Recruited participants were divided into discussion groups of up to four real participants, and one false participant (a researcher).
Contingencies and Safeguards

Due to the use of concealment and the confronting material of the study, several contingencies were applied for the safety of participants. Firstly, participants were warned that there was a risk of another participant promoting antisemitic ideas within the discussion. The warning informed participants of how confronting the discussing would potentially be, thereby preparing them for the true nature of the study despite its concealment. In the case of an actual antisemite being present within the discussion, the researcher posing as a participant posed as an ordinary, ignorant participant with little to offer to the discussion. This ensured that the dynamic of a single antisemite against a majority of detractors would be consistent across all discussions. The researcher also withheld from commenting until after all other participants or for ten minutes, so as to ensure that the viewpoints of other participants would be known before they themselves potentially introduced antisemitic arguments.

Due to the controversial nature of the antisemitic material used, participants were encouraged to withdraw from the study at any point. Doing so would still produce valuable data, as it determined the extent of their willingness to engage with and respond to an antisemite in an online discussion. In the case of a participant not returning to the discussion, they were contacted via email informing them of the true nature of the study. Participants were also provided with links to support services in case of emotional distress, and the researcher remained in the forum to answer any questions about the material or nature of the study. This debrief also included a comprehensive refutation of all the Holocaust denial arguments in the discussion. This refutation was also sent to any participants who withdrew and did not return to the study. If a participant promoted Holocaust denial themselves, the researcher refuted their arguments instead. If an antisemite joined the discussion and promoted significantly explicit and abusive antisemitism
towards other participants, the researcher would make a judgement to lock down the discussion, and arguments refuting the antisemitism would be sent via email to the discussion participants.

**Anticipated Issues**

The originality of the design and the premise of this study meant that there were anticipated issues with its process and outcome. One of the major issues considered was potential participation or even targeting of the study by real antisemites, sabotaging the discussions and potentially harming other participants. For this reason, ethical approval was given under the condition of contingencies and safeguards to ensure the safety of participants within the study. If a singular antisemite joined the discussion and promoted Holocaust denial, the discussion would not be cancelled, for this would still fulfil the study’s aim to simulate an encounter with a Holocaust denier online, and thus would not warrant the waste of participants and resources without additional risk. If more than one antisemite joined, this would require the discussion being discontinued, thus making the study vulnerable to potential targeting from organised antisemites. Another anticipated issue was the risk of participants being persuaded by the Holocaust denial material, therefore requiring they receive a full refutation to the Holocaust denial material in the study.

Unlike Kowalski’s 2011 study, which allowed the discussion to be driven by the researchers posing as cyberbully and cyberbullying victim, the minority status of the researcher within the discussion gave participants far more freedom to shape the discussion. Because of this, it was anticipated that the variation between discussions may impact the reliability of study, as different discussions may lead to different exchanges between the Holocaust denier and the participants. For this reason, the false participant would always open with the same comments and
would attempt to use the same Holocaust denial arguments in all discussions. Nonetheless, it was anticipated that attempting to perfectly emulate each discussion in the same way could seem stilted and provoke suspicion by the participants, thus requiring the researcher to react organically to the other participants.

Sampling bias was anticipated based on the advertising of the study. The study was expected to attract a greater proportion of participants with higher levels of interest and knowledge about antisemitism, even with the offer of compensation. In addition, the strategy to recruit on university campuses (due to the high concentration of 18-19-year-olds) was anticipated to attract a more educated sample compared to the broader population. Furthermore, the impact of forewarning participants about Holocaust denial at the start of the discussion, even within the same one-hour time frame, would potentially strengthen their resistance against Holocaust denial.36 For these reasons, the population tested in this study is expected to exhibit a higher ability to resist antisemitism online, compared to the broader population of young people.

Finally, the study was not able to independently verify whether all participants were within the population sample of first-year Australian high school leavers, and may have attracted participants outside of that sample (e.g. participants lying about their age) due to motivations of receiving compensation, or sabotaging the study (if an antisemite). The impact of these issues is evaluated in the second discussion of the study, regarding the viability of the design’s application to research on other forms of online abuse, discrimination and misinformation.

Study Procedure Summary

The procedure of the study, including within each discussion group, is as follows:

1. Study was advertised.

2. Once potential participants had established contact with the researcher, they were provided with Participant Information Statement and Participant Consent Forms to return.

3. Following the return of Participant Consent Forms, groups of up to four participants were advised on a date and time for their online discussion group. These times were weekday evenings. Participants were provided with a pseudonym, login details for the forum, and a link to the initial survey.

4. On the dates of discussion groups, participants were sent reminders.

5. Once all participants were present and had completed the survey, or only one participant was missing and 15 minutes had passed after the scheduled time, the discussion commenced. If two or more were missing, the discussion was rescheduled.

6. Each discussion continued for an hour, or until 10 minutes since the latest response from any participant.

7. After the conclusion of the study, the researcher revealed the study’s nature and refuted the Holocaust denial used. Participants were advised to ask questions during this debrief.

8. The participants then completed the second survey.

9. After the completion of the second survey, or two days without completion, participants were provided with their compensation.

10. Steps 1-9 were repeated until data was collected.

11. Data was analysed.
Approaches to Data Analysis

To promote the interdisciplinary and inter-field application of this study’s model and results, data analysis in this study takes a variety of forms. These include deductive and inductive content analyses, thematic analysis, and statistical analysis. Combining the findings of these approaches informs suggestions to further assist young adults resisting online hate. They also provide insight in confirming or refuting the hypotheses undertaken before the study was carried out.

Hypotheses

The impact of trolling and harassment have been significant in the evolution and distribution of antisemitism online. One key reasons for this is that such tactics result in highly emotional reactions, which can be mocked and serve to radicalise bystanders who are disassociated from the victims and subject matter. Trolling, in particular, aims to induce these reactions, using victims' high emotionality to discredit the impact of any counterarguments. In addition, by inducing high emotion, these antisemites may influence victims into making errors in their counterarguments, further exacerbating their humiliation. While more explicit forms of trolling cannot be explored here for ethical reasons, Holocaust denial represents how covert antisemitism may be used in the same way. In fact, by presenting antisemitism in a pseudo-intellectual fashion, as is common with Holocaust denial, the effects of these tactics may be enhanced. Highly emotional responses to pseudo-intellectual Holocaust denial may appear even more unreasonable to uninformed bystanders. For these reasons, heightened emotion when responding to Holocaust denial reflects strong psychological resistance, but this does not translate into effective inoculative resistance.
Holocaust denial also represents the adaptability of antisemitism and aspects common across the wide range of its manifestations. The large catalogue of antisemitism makes it less likely for respondents to be able to effectively form sound counterarguments, as a wider range of knowledge is required to be fully prepared. In particular, Holocaust denial’s pseudo-intellectualism and sizeable literature can be especially intimidating and difficult to effectively counter. This phenomenon reflects issues in scholarship, particularly the disparity in broader disciplinary research on antisemitism, likely due to the higher requirements of knowledge. For these reasons, general academic ability is no guarantee of an ability to counter antisemitic arguments. Instead, specialised knowledge is more likely to assist when resisting antisemitism, such as history and other humanities, when resisting Holocaust denial.

These phenomena have been explored throughout this thesis. The impact of trolling culture is particularly demonstrated through the profiles of 4chan, Daily Stormer, and social media platforms in chapter five. The issues presented by antisemitism’s varied manifestations have been analysed in chapter four, and present significant obstacles for the future of research. In order to help develop solutions for these problems, this thesis uses them to formulate the hypotheses for this research study:

*Hypothesis 1: Heightened emotion would be associated with lower levels of effective inoculative resistance to Holocaust denial, but higher levels of psychological resistance in the form of counterarguments.*
Hypothesis 2: ATAR would not have any significant association with either psychological or inoculative resistance, however studying history in year 12, and studying a humanities degree would both be associated with higher psychological and inoculative resistance.

Content Analysis

Deductive content analysis in this study analyses metrics of resistance to hate online, furthering the research undertaken by Lee and Leets. Each individual response in each discussion group is subjectively coded by the researcher according to directionality, focus, and intensity, as per Lee and Leets’ adaption of Roberts and Maccoby’s coding scheme. Each response’s directionality is coded into one or more of the following categories: opposed, neutral, supporting, or irrelevant to Holocaust denial and antisemitism. Focus is also measured, coding whether the response focused on the content of Holocaust denial, idea of Holocaust denial, source of Holocaust denial (either the false participant or other Holocaust denial), or had an irrelevant focus. Intensity codes whether each response is weak, moderate, or strong in intensity. Intensity of responses is distinguished from self-reported emotionality, which is recorded in a separate survey response afterwards. Psychological resistance is coded as the number of counterarguments from all responses made by each participant. Finally, each response is coded according to whether it engaged in a productive or counterproductive form of inoculative resistance; analysed through participants’ ability to recognise, research, respond to, and refute Holocaust denial (Inoculative Resistance Online indices, discussed further below). Recognition is coded as either identifying the Holocaust denial as antisemitism or distinguishing it from antisemitism. Research is coded as either presenting

37 Lee and Leet, p. 938.
research in a response or misrepresenting or misusing a source. Responses are coded as either counterarguments against Holocaust denial or arguments with other participants. Finally, refutations are coded as either quality or poor-quality.

Inductive content analysis is conducted on the responses and open-ended survey questions to determine any other major themes present in the discussion and among participants. Open ended survey questions cover previous experiences with antisemitism, specific emotions felt during the discussion, any external research conducted, what tools and instruction could better equip efforts to combat Holocaust denial, whether or not participants would engage Holocaust deniers in the future and why, and whether they suspected the Holocaust denier to be a false participant. Beyond these areas, any themes supported by more than 25% of participants are considered significant.

Statistical Analysis

Statistical analysis covers data collected from close-ended questions in the surveys and considers them alongside the coded data from content analysis. The first survey asks participants about demographic data, specifically their gender, ethnic and religious backgrounds, ATAR, whether they went to private school, whether they studied history in year 12, whether they were enrolled at university, and what type of degree they did at university. The second survey contains a number of 10-point Likert scales concerning each participant’s prior familiarity with Holocaust denial, perceived persuasiveness of the Holocaust denier, compulsion to respond to Holocaust denial in this discussion and elsewhere, severity of emotional response to Holocaust denial in the discussion, value of the resources provided at the start of the study, and confidence in their ability to refute Holocaust denial. The coding of recognition, research, responses and refutations in the content
analysis are converted into a new metric for statistically analysing inoculative resistance. Statistical analyses are used to identify any relationships between variables measured by the surveys and coded metrics of inoculative resistance.

The IRO Indices

This study introduces new statistical metrics to measure inoculative resistance in the form of the Inoculative Resistance Online indices (IRO). The IRO indices are comprised of four individual indices scoring how successfully participants recognise, research, respond to, and refute discrimination or misinformation online, the results of which are then combined into a final resistance index score. These scores do not necessarily reflect whether or when participants recognised antisemitism, or how much they researched. Instead, the scores reflect whether participants express recognition and refutation of Holocaust denial, and the results of research in their responses, thereby inoculating other users from Holocaust denial. These metrics were chosen as they are observable; it is not possible to observe exactly when participants cognitively recognise antisemitism in an online study, and it is difficult to quantify exactly how much research they undertake.

The four individual indices are divided into three categories evaluating their behavior as counterproductive, unsuccessful or successful. The measurement of these indices is determined by behaviour patterns over the course of an entire interaction, rather than quantities of positive behaviour, as successfully recognising, researching, responding and refuting antisemitism can be
achieved in any quantity of responses. This measurement differs from psychological resistance, which is measured through the quantity of counterarguments. Productive behaviour scores 0.25 on each individual index, unsuccessful behaviour scores 0, and counter-productive behaviour scores -0.25. After scoring each individual index, the scores are tallied together to make the final resistance index. A score of 1 represents successful behaviour in providing inoculative resistance to hate or misinformation online, while a score of -1 represents a proponent of the harmful content. A score of 0 represents unsuccessful behaviour, generally equivalent to leaving the hate or misinformation unchallenged. Scores above 0 represent degrees of productive behaviour, and scores below 0 represent 0 degrees of counterproductive behaviour (appendix E, figure 28).

The quantity of responses featuring each resistant behaviour is less significant in an online context due to the previously discussed importance of succinctness in ideal resistance. The IRO indices measure behaviour through majorities of productive versus counterproductive behaviour. Therefore, participants exhibiting at least one instance of a successful behaviour and no instances of counterproductive behaviour are scored as successful. For further control, statistical analysis is carried out after the scoring, determining whether there is any relationship between resistance index scores and quantities of responses. A failure to establish a statistical relationship between IRO scores and quantities of responses will demonstrate the validity of the IRO measure, showing that it is applicable to online interactions of any length. This is important, as the one-hour discussion study design does not perfectly emulate an online conversation where users may ‘check out’ of a conversation at any given time. Such activity was considered unlikely even despite

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38 Quantity of responses is also made redundant by how individual users split up their responses. One person may provide a comprehensive refutation in a single response, while other may present smaller responses, each presenting a different source or refutation. For these reasons, the coding of responses in this study also considers whether a single response may feature multiple instances of productive or counterproductive behaviour (e.g. refuting a Holocaust denial argument while also distinguishing it from antisemitism).
participants being told that they could leave at any time without risking their compensation, because the act of engaging in a research study likely adds additional motivating factors.

Statistical analysis compares both the quantity of counterarguments and IRO indices against demographic data and responses on the Likert scales. These comparisons provide insight into which predictors have significant relationships with psychological and inoculative resistance to Holocaust denial online. Dividing inoculative resistance into individual indices and a final score allows the study to determine whether particular predictors are more important for specific forms of resistance, and which predictors are most important overall. Finally, comparing the metrics of psychological and inoculative resistance allows this study to determine whether psychological opposition to Holocaust denial translates into effective inoculative resistance, and which predictors contribute to both forms of resistance.

*Thematic Analysis*

The final form of analysis in the study is thematic, which specifically compares the major themes arising from both the inductive and deductive content analyses with the statistical analysis. Induced themes supported by 25% of the participants provide insight into patterns of behaviour that are not explained exclusively by the metrics of psychological and inoculative resistance. Comparing individuals’ resistance scores with their suggestions for tools and instructions, and their willingness to engage, helps inform future strategies that can help young people resist antisemitism online. Finally, these themes and results can be compared back to the broader findings of this thesis, providing further insight into the behaviour, needs, and attitudes of young people exposed to antisemitism online.
Results

Participant Makeup

33 Australian high school graduates participated in the discussion groups. According to self-reported data, four participants had graduated in 2017 and participated in a discussion group in the first half of 2018. The remaining 29 had graduated in 2018 and participated in discussion groups between March and September of 2019, with two-four real, non-Holocaust denying participants per group. 51.5% (17) were male, 36.5% (12) were female, 9% (3) were transgender men and 3% (1) was gender non-conforming. 57.7% (19) reported Anglo-Australian or no ethnic background, 30.3% (10) were of East Asian background and only 9% (3) were of Jewish background. Besides Judaism, religious backgrounds were split between non-religious at 51.5% (17), and Christian at 39.4% (13). 57.6% (19) of participants reported ATARs over 90.00, with 42.4% (14) over 95.00. Only 21.2% (7) had either no ATAR or ATARs below 80.00. Just under a quarter (8) had studied history as a year 12 subject. Just over half (17) had gone to private school. 90.9% (30) participants were enrolled at university, dominated by 39.4% (13) undertaking STEM degrees, and 33.3% (11) undertaking humanities degrees, the rest studying business, medicine, and tertiary access degrees.

Of the 33 participants, two exposed themselves as Holocaust deniers in their first responses of the study, these early responses allowing the false participant to refrain from promoting any Holocaust denial arguments. The first was sophisticated, likely an organised antisemite, promoting arguments remarkably similar to those used by the fake participant in other discussion groups, while also covertly presenting themselves as a moderate. The second appeared to be a casual antisemite, stating the Holocaust was false but only providing vague arguments. The former Holocaust denier thus inadvertently demonstrated the accuracy of the Holocaust denier portrayal in other discussion groups. Neither Holocaust denier was invited to engage in the final survey, and
were allocated IRO resistance index scores of -1, indicating their status as Holocaust deniers. The casual Holocaust denier provided suspect demographic information, saying they were a Uyghur transgender man with an ATAR between 50.00-54.95. While included, their data would not be considered in any evaluation of transgender or East Asian participants. Both Holocaust deniers were considered in ATAR related tests, although additional tests were conducted without the Holocaust deniers. Finally, one participant joined the study and posted one response before logging off and failing to fill out the final survey. It is presumed that this participant provided the minimum participation to procure compensation, and thus they are excluded from any analysis beyond their demographic data and coding of their only response. For these reasons, most of the results in the study (excluding some regarding inoculative resistance) concern the other 30 participants.

Due to the small number of Jewish participants in the study, confident conclusions could not be made about the impact of ethnic and religious background on emotionality and resistance. However, there were some tendencies that are worth mentioning. The only significant emotional outburst in any of the discussions came from a Jewish participant, who specifically invoked their history in justifying their outrage. This was one of only two participants with a plurality of responses with strong intensity. Interestingly, another participant with an equal emotionality score (9), and another Jewish participant with a slightly lower emotionality score (8), did not have similar outbursts. The only other participant with a majority of strong responses had a significantly lower emotional score (3), but they only made one comment in the discussion, which strongly condemned the Holocaust itself, and then only observed the conversation going forwards. This single emotional outburst serves as an example of the successful result of trolling behaviour, and it is likely that the lack of further outbursts came from the more covert nature of the antisemitism used in the study.
Directionality, Intensity and Focus

A total of 295 non-Holocaust denial responses were collected from the discussion groups, a mean of 32.8 per discussion and 9.5 per participant. While all responses were coded for their overall intensity, a small number of comments featured mixed directionality and foci, and received multiple codes in these categories where appropriate. 58.6% of these comments were coded as opposing Holocaust denial and antisemitism, a noticeable majority, and outside of the two real Holocaust deniers there were no participants that had a majority of comments supporting Holocaust denial.\textsuperscript{39} Just over one third (21) of non-Holocaust denying participants had a majority of comments opposed to Holocaust denial and antisemitism, and the remaining (10) had a plurality of neutral comments. It bears mentioning that directionality is not the same as psychological or inoculative resistance. These results suggest that young adults generally think Holocaust denial is wrong, and at least some expressions of doubt over the Holocaust are antisemitic. However, this does not necessarily translate into tendencies or abilities to resist Holocaust denial, especially when antisemites present it covertly so to manoeuvre around this sentiment.

A 73.6% majority of comments were coded as moderate in intensity, as opposed to 16.6% being weak, and only 9.8% being strong. As mentioned above, only two participants had a majority of strong comments, with one accounting for 13 out of the 29 strong comments, resulting from their emotional outburst. The vast majority of other participants (26) had a majority of moderately intense comments, with only three having a majority of weak comments. The predominately opposed directionality and moderate intensity of responses is significant, although it is difficult to draw confident conclusions about the relationships between directionality and intensity. These

\textsuperscript{39} There were a small number of comments that supported various Holocaust denial arguments (9), despite the general opposition to Holocaust denial, which can be explained by participants not identifying the covert antisemitism and finding it reasonable.
conclusions could be reached in future studies with larger sample sizes. Still, these tendencies are significant, and are considered in the discussion.

Just under half of responses, 45.5%, focused on the content of Holocaust denial, predominantly the specifics of the arguments present by the Holocaust denier in each discussion. The next largest focus was the source of antisemitism, accounting for just over a quarter of the responses with 27.5%. However, this code was distinguished between responses focusing on the Holocaust denier in the discussion and Holocaust deniers in general. Out of the 81 source focused responses, 69 regarded Holocaust deniers in general, and only 12 focused on the Holocaust denier in the study. This prevalence may be explained by the discussion question at the start of the study, which considered broader Holocaust deniers. Many initial responses proceeded to answer this question before being distracted by the Holocaust denier. 16.3% of responses focused on the concept of Holocaust denial, 10.2% had an irrelevant focus, and 6.4% focused on other participants, often the result of additional arguments breaking out between them. These findings are generally unsurprising when considering the design of the study, but nonetheless indicate that the Holocaust denier was largely successful at distracting other participants from the discussion question, ensuring a more confident observation of psychological and inoculative resistance rates.

**Psychological Resistance**

Due to the demographic makeup of the participants, the analysis focused on a specific number of predictors when considering their relationship, if any, to both psychological and inoculative resistance rates. These included studying history in year 12, choice of degree (if any), ATAR, familiarity with Holocaust denial, feelings of compulsion to respond to the Holocaust denier,
emotionality, and confidence in their ability to refute Holocaust denial. Future iterations of this study could also consider relationships with ethnic and religious backgrounds, assuming a larger and more diverse sample has been recruited. The private and public schooling were equally distributed in the study, but were otherwise not compared to resistance.

The number of counterarguments was used as the metric for psychological resistance, and was compared to each of the above-mentioned predictors in a Poisson regression, a type of generalised linear analysis. Each analysis was found to be statistically significant (p<0.01). The predictors of higher psychological resistance included participants studying history in year 12 (appendix E, figure 29.1), higher familiarity with Holocaust denial (appendix E, figure 29.2), feelings of compulsion to respond (appendix E, figure 29.3), emotionality (appendix E, figure 29.4), and confidence in refutation ability (appendix E, figure 29.5). Despite the positive relationship between higher familiarity with Holocaust denial and psychological resistance, participants with self-reported familiarity scores of 6 or below (out of 10) had similar quantities of counterarguments. Degree choice and ATAR only had minor association with psychological resistance, only made clear with the removal of notable outliers.\textsuperscript{40} STEM undergraduates produced slightly higher psychological resistance than humanities undergraduates, who were then followed by business and then medicine undergraduates. Higher ATARs only resulted in slightly more counterarguments on average, although it should be mentioned participant ATARs were skewed towards higher ranks. The mean number of counterarguments per participant was 2.13, with a quarter of the responses following the first instance of Holocaust denial.

\textsuperscript{40} For ATAR, the main outlier was one participant with an ATAR between 80.00-84.95 who engaged in the highest number of counterarguments (14), twice more than the second highest quantity. For Holocaust denial familiarity, one participant who recorded 2 on the scale had a higher number of counterarguments that was linked to their background in history. In fact, both outliers were part of the 25\% who did history in year 12, which is shown to be one of the most significant predictors in determining quantities of counterarguments.
It is naturally unsurprising that a compulsion to respond had an association with the quantity of counterarguments. Of the other four noteworthy predictors, undertaking history in year 12 had the clearest relationship with overall numbers of counterarguments, followed by emotion and confidence in ability to refute the arguments. The relationship between Holocaust denial familiarity and counterarguments is more unclear by comparison, but there are some explanations for the unexpected patterns. The high number of counterarguments for point 2 on the familiarity scale is explained by an outlier, where one of the participants who selected 2 studied history in year 12. The relatively low number of counterarguments for those on point 6 of the scale is explained by one participant getting sidetracked by a seemingly personal cause, in which they complained that Islamophobia is not condemned as much as antisemitism. Removing these outliers, Holocaust denial familiarity has a minor association with the number of counterarguments, as seen by the upwards trend between 6 and 9 on the scale, and the lower numbers between 1 and 5. Nonetheless, this relationship is not as noteworthy as the other predictors. Ultimately, studying history, being confident in one’s ability to refute antisemitism, and feeling a compulsion to respond are the most significant predictors in determining psychological resistance to Holocaust denial.

**Inoculative Resistance Scores**

Participants were all scored based on their ability to recognise, research, respond to and refute Holocaust denial through the IRO indices. Through these scores, this study can consider each participant’s ability to engage productively in the four indices of inoculative resistance, and their overall inoculative resistance. Of the four indices, only the respond index had a slim majority of participants engaging in productive behaviour (appendix E, figure 30.1). For the recognition index,
almost half of participants engaged in counterproductive behaviour, distinguishing the Holocaust denial arguments from antisemitism more than identifying it as antisemitic. 43% of participants engaged in overall productive activity, with only one participant achieving a perfect IRO score of 1.00 (appendix E, figure 30.2). 40% of participants engaged in overall counterproductive behaviour, although this includes the Holocaust deniers with scores of -1.00.

*Predictor influence on IRO Indices*

The same predictors that were compared to psychological resistance were also compared to each of the IRO indices. The ordinal nature of the indices meant that differing analyses had to be used for certain predictors. History in year 12 was a demographic predictor with a Boolean response and was thus analysed for each index with an independent sample T-Test. Degree choice was a demographic predictor with multiple responses and was thus analysed for each index with an ANOVA one-way model. All other predictors were Likert-scales and thus were analysed in regression linear models. Unlike the results for psychological resistance, there were far fewer statistically significant results, and null hypotheses were supported in some cases.

The only predictor that had any significant relationship with recognition rates was undertaking history in year 12, such that studying history was associated with higher recognition rates (p<0.05) (appendix E, figure 31.1). It is likely that the skill learned in these classes enabled participants to distinguish between legitimate historical questions and disingenuous gas-lighting about the Holocaust. Undertaking history in year 12 was also the only predictor to have a significant relationship with rates of research being presented in counterarguments and other responses to Holocaust denial. However, this did not predict a higher rate of research presented
for history students, but actually a lower rate (appendix E, figure 31.2). A likely hypothesis for this is that history students were likely more knowledgeable about the Holocaust and did not feel the need to research. Another related factor may be that participants did not appeal to an external authority due to heightened confidence in their own knowledge. Comparatively, those who did not undertake history in year 12 would lack background Holocaust knowledge, and thus may need to engage in research in order to understand and counter the arguments of the Holocaust denier.

Of all the predictors analysed, none were found to have an association with response index scores. This opens the door to more studies investigating other potential predictors, such as average time spent online and common social media sites used, to determine what influences productive or counterproductive behaviour in responding to discrimination and misinformation online.

Two predictors had a positive relationship with refutation index scores: higher compulsion to respond (p<0.02) and higher confidence in ability to refute (p<0.02) (appendix E, figures 32.1, 32.2). While the latter relationship is unsurprising, it is encouraging that a higher compulsion to respond results in better quality refutations. There could be a concern that too high a compulsion to respond could result in poor-quality refutations, due to rushed responses from a perceived need to immediately respond to the antisemite, although this finding allows this notion to be rejected. The rejection of this notion also relates to the lack of an observed relationship between refutation index scores and emotionality, suggesting that even when highly emotional, young adults still have the capacity to refute antisemitism online effectively.

Compulsion to respond (p<0.05) and confidence in ability (p<0.05) to refute were also the only predictors with significant relationships to overall resistance index scores (appendix E, figures 33.1, 33.2). Higher scores on these predictors were associated with higher resistance scores. It is appropriate that these predictors were the most significant, as the only other predictor with any
significant relationship with IRO indices scores was studying history in year 12. However, while studying history in year 12 had a positive association with recognition index scores, it had a negative association with research index scores. Ultimately, three main predictors had a positive association with young adults providing any degree of inoculative resistance against Holocaust denial online. These predictors were studying history in year 12, being compelled to respond to Holocaust denial, and being confident in one’s ability to refute Holocaust denial. The latter two predictors were the only ones with a positive association with overall inoculative resistance.

A regression analysis of the relationship between quantities of responses after Holocaust denial was introduced and overall inoculative resistance was initially found to be statistically significant (p<0.05), with higher quantities of responses being associated with higher inoculative resistance. However, this was affected by a significant outlier, wherein the only participant who received a 1.00 resistance index score made a disproportionate number of responses, almost 50% more than the second highest quantity. Furthermore, this participant achieved a 1.00 resistance index score after making 15 responses (just over half of their overall 29 responses after the introduction of Holocaust denial), the rest of their responses not impacting their overall resistance index score. Removing this outlier and rerunning the test found no significant relationship between the two variables (p>0.25).

Thematic Analysis

Beyond the major findings presented in the statistical analysis, there were other significant themes drawn from the discussion groups themselves and the open-ended questions in the second survey. Themes present in discussion groups alone include Holocaust denial being inspired by disbelief at
the Holocaust’s scale, and that the exact death toll of the Holocaust does not matter. Themes present in survey responses alone include engaging Holocaust deniers being a waste of time, only having minor experiences with antisemitism, having experiences with antisemitism on social media, doing external research on Wikipedia, needing more education and tools to resist Holocaust denial, and feelings of anger and frustration. Another theme prominent in both discussion groups and surveys was a favourability towards neutrality (i.e. distaste towards emotional or extreme discussions). These themes were deemed significant due to more than 25% of the non-Holocaust denying participants supporting them in the discussion and/or survey responses (appendix E, figures 34.1-34.3).

Additional Predictor Relationships

Two additional regression analyses were carried out following the initial collation of psychological and inoculative resistance results. These analyses were conducted to better contextualise the results by determine any relationships between potentially related predictors. The first regression analysis found a significant positive association between higher emotionality and higher compulsion to respond to the Holocaust denier (p<0.01) (appendix E, figure 35). The second found a significant positive association between studying in history in year 12 and higher confidence in ability to respond (p<0.01) (appendix E, figure 36).

Discussion

Both hypotheses were partially proven, having some aspects supported by the data, but other aspects disproven. For Hypothesis 1, heightened emotion did have a statistically significant
association with higher quantities of counterarguments, suggesting a relationship between emotion and psychological resistance. Contrastingly, there were no statistically significant relationships between emotionality and any of the IRO indices. This result suggests that even in highly emotional circumstances, young Australians are capable of responding thoughtfully online, potentially providing quality inoculative resistance to other participants. In addition, the positive association between emotionality and compulsion to respond suggests that a moral opposition to Holocaust denial and antisemitism may be important in inducing resistance for young Australians. Both emotionality and compulsion to respond had significant associations with higher psychological resistance, although only the latter had a significant association with higher inoculative resistance. Therefore, raising awareness in young people about the moral problems within Holocaust denial and other forms of antisemitism may be effective in improving rates of resistance, however this should be tempered by messages of caution regarding emotionality.

Young Australians (and potentially young people globally) should be instructed to consider how their responses appear online, who may be watching, and how certain bystanders might benefit from emotional responses. Emotion can be used to motivate resistance to Holocaust denial, but in some cases, it can lead to poor examples of inoculative resistance, as seen in the one discussion group with a significant emotional outburst.

Regarding the second hypothesis, higher ATAR had only a minor association with increased psychological resistance, and no significant relationship with inoculative resistance. These results demonstrate the danger in assuming that general academic ability enables better resistance to discrimination and misinformation online. Studying history in year 12 did have a significant positive association with increases in both psychological and inoculative resistance, but in the latter case the results were mixed. Studying history in year 12 would help young Australians
refute Holocaust denial as antisemitism, but it also appeared to diminish their presentation of research. In addition, it was shown that studying history in year 12 was associated with a higher confidence in ability to respond to Holocaust denial. However, the mixed results between history in year 12 and IRO indices show that this confidence can result in counterproductive behaviours when providing inoculative resistance. Confidence may result in a perceived lack of need to engage in research, increasing the risk of presenting poor-quality refutations. Adopting core educational techniques from year 12 history syllabi into broader education (e.g. expanding critical thinking in English classes) may extend the benefit of these classes to the broader cohort. In addition, since Holocaust denial is an antisemitic trope dealing directly with the misrepresentation of history, engaging in history in year 12 may only aid resistance rates against Holocaust denial, not antisemitism more broadly. This relationship emphasises the need for future implementations of this study model with other forms of discrimination, determining whether experiences in certain streams of high school education provide better resistance against varying forms of discrimination.

Of the major themes observed, the most significant for discussion are favourability to neutrality, considering engaging Holocaust deniers to be a waste of time, and feelings of anger and frustration. Favourability with neutrality correlates with the recognition index results, as the recognition index had the highest proportion of counterproductive behaviour (47%). This result suggests that participants prefer neutral and less emotional discussions online. This sentiment likely extends to them being unwilling to identify the Holocaust denial as antisemitism, as that could potentially cross the line out of neutrality. Indeed, distinguishing Holocaust denial from antisemitism would serve to ensure the neutrality of these discussions. This behaviour relates to the significant issue of ‘race trouble’, wherein users even actively avoid accusations or direct
discussions of racism. The study undertaken by Durrheim et al. also concerned online discussion, and indicated that accusations of racism would shut down otherwise ‘neutral’ discussion. While Durrheim et al.’s study concerned more explicit forms of discrimination, this study demonstrates the pervasiveness of this attitude and fear of ‘race trouble’ towards even covert antisemitism. In fact, the covert nature of Holocaust denial likely presents more of an excuse for participants actively avoiding accusations of racism, resulting in the high proportion of counterproductive behaviour. Explicit accusations of antisemitism were observed in the discussion group with the significant emotional outburst, resulting in multiple other participants accusing the emotional participant of treating the Holocaust denier unfairly. The aversion to ‘race trouble’ among young people indicates vulnerability to covert forms of antisemitism in particular.

Favourability to neutrality also correlates with the other major themes of feeling anger and frustration, and considering engaging Holocaust deniers to be a waste of time. Almost half of all participants supported the latter theme, representing significant danger to the spread of inoculative resistance to Holocaust denial, as compulsion to respond was one of the most significant factors in determining this resistance. While emotionality may also facilitate immediate discussion, for some participants it induces an ongoing aversion to future engagement, as they prefer to avoid emotional discussions in favour of more neutral ones. These results indicate a need for young people to be educated about the value of inoculative resistance; engaging Holocaust deniers and other antisemites is not valuable for the purpose of changing their mind, but for influencing bystanders. These results also discredit the idea that hate speech can simply be countered with higher quantities of speech alone. While education may inform young people of the value of

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42 Ibid., p. 97.
inoculative resistance, it will not remove their desire to avoid emotional discussions, representing a potential limit to their capacity to respond. In addition, while this study focused on a simulated interaction with an antisemite, this represents the last stage where inoculation can be provided. Ideally, young people should receive inoculation through other means beforehand.

The need for education about inoculative resistance also folds into other minor themes prevalent among participants, such as the desire for more instruction. Inoculation to antisemitism can be provided at an earlier stage than during online reactions to manifestations of antisemitism, such as in classrooms. The themes emerging from discussion groups, particularly the idea that at least some Holocaust deniers simply cannot comprehend the quantity of dead, indicate the lack of familiarity with Holocaust denial for some participants, further emphasising their need for instruction. The idea that numbers do not matter in terms of the horror of the Holocaust serves as a flawed defence to Holocaust denial. Such a defence allows them to ignore the implications behind the argument that the death toll was falsified, and can also inadvertently lead to an inability to recognise this argument as antisemitic.

Assessment of Study

This study succeeded in determining relationships between key predictors and psychological resistance with all but one of the IRO indices. The lack of a relationship between any predictor and the response index suggests there may be more complex reasons behind productive, unsuccessful, or counterproductive behaviour when responding to hatred online. Nonetheless, the response index was the only index with a majority of participants engaging in productive behaviour, so the lack of a clear predictor is less concerning than if this ambiguity applied to any
of the other indices. While the study had 30 non-Holocaust denying participants, which is an acceptable range for qualitative research, it is likely that a higher number of participants may have resolved this issue, and reduced the impact of outliers potentially skewing results. Higher numbers of participants would also potentially help to reveal other possible predictors, and allow the testing of these additional predictors. Finally, a higher number of participants would also help to reduce sampling bias, which was an anticipated issue in the study.

The participation of Holocaust deniers in the study was a key anticipated issue and occurred on two occasions. However, neither of the deniers engaged in abusive behaviour towards the other participants and one even echoed the arguments and discourse of the false participants, thereby strengthening evidence for the validity of the study. The casual denial of one participant, however, resulted in a slower discussion, as the denier did little to support their arguments. Nonetheless, both incursions from deniers resulted in between four and six Holocaust denial arguments in each respective discussion, bringing them in line with the other discussion groups.

Interestingly, the real Holocaust deniers were more considered to be false at a far higher proportion than the false Holocaust denier. While confident conclusions cannot be drawn from this phenomenon, as there were only two real deniers, it does pose some interesting suggestions for future iterations of this research model. Both real deniers were more blatant in their denial, dismissing the ‘mainstream narrative’ of the Holocaust in their first responses (although one still presented their arguments in a cloaked manner). Interestingly, one participant even pondered that the more casual Holocaust denier was “just memeing”. Comparatively, this degree of doubt did not extend towards the false Holocaust denier, suggesting that the doubt may be linked to an

43 Such as attendance at university overall, ethnic and religious background, and a greater variation of ATAR scores.
aversion to ‘race trouble’ or unwillingness to face the reality of the encounter. This potential link is further supported by the favourability to neutrality, although once again, this trend is too small to make any confident conclusions. Regardless of the cause, since this doubt did not extend to the false denier, future iterations of this study (either for antisemitism or other phenomena) should also adopt similarly slow and cautious approaches in order to avoid drawing suspicion.

The consistent number of Holocaust denial arguments in each discussion limits concern over the anticipated effects of participants’ freedom to shape discussion. Despite this ability, consistent quantities of Holocaust denial arguments were promoted in each discussion, thereby ensuring that discussions were directly comparable. The main effect of participants’ freedom was the need to introduce arguments organically based on the trajectory of the conversation, resulting in different arguments being presented in each discussion. Nonetheless, each argument still fit the requirements of being a covert manifestation of antisemitism, which did not engage in stereotypes, slurs, or caricatures that would cross the line into explicit manifestations. Ultimately, while participants’ ability to shape the conversation resulted in differences between each discussion, the key elements required for each discussion were still present.

The final anticipated issue in the study was sampling bias. A sampling bias occurred with respect to the vast majority of participants being university students and recipients of relatively high ATARs. While the relationships between ATAR and forms of resistance were either minor or insignificant, it can nonetheless be expected that the resistance scores of this study may be generally higher than the broader population of young Australians. While the study did not attract as many Jewish participants as expected (possibly due to emotional reasons outweighing interest), it is likely that it attracted participants more likely to be interested in antisemitism and thus Holocaust denial. On the 10-point Likert scale measuring familiarity with Holocaust denial before
the study, non-Holocaust denying participants recorded a mean of 5.77. This may demonstrate a degree of sampling bias in terms of interest towards the subject matter in the discussion, although the mean is only marginally higher than an expected moderate score of 5. The extent of this sampling bias would be made clearer through broader quantitative research on familiarity with Holocaust denial among young adults in Australia. Nonetheless, these sampling biases indicate that the resistance scores recorded may be higher than that of the broader cohort. Considering the proportions of participants who engaged in productive and counterproductive inoculative resistance overall was 43% and 41% respectively, this suggests that young Australians are likely to engage in about as much counterproductive behaviour resisting Holocaust denial as productive behaviour.

The other key factor to assess in this study is the new metric of IRO indices. While there was an overall significant relationship between number of responses and inoculative resistance, this was impacted significantly by an outlier. When this outlier was controlled, the relationship was insignificant. This result provides evidence against the notion that better IRO indices scores are derived from higher quantities of responses. Participants could engage in highly productive behaviour even in a small quantity of comments, and continued engagement would present chances of engaging in either productive or counterproductive behaviour, rather than just increasing the likelihood of better resistance scores. Nonetheless, greater confidence in this finding could be achieved by further studies with a higher number of participants with 1.00 resistance index scores, so as to more confidently account for the impact of the outlier in this study. Therefore, it is worthwhile continuing to use IRO indices in future studies, particularly in repeated uses of this study model, but refinement of the concept may be beneficial in ongoing research.
Viability of Research Model for Inter-field Research

The general findings explored above demonstrate how this study’s model can be used to investigate resistance towards various forms of discrimination and misinformation. With enough implementations of this model, resistance rates to different forms of discrimination and misinformation can be compared. These results can indicate the forms of discrimination or misinformation to which particular populations are most susceptible. Nonetheless, caution must be applied when considering whether resistance measured applies to an overall form of discrimination, or merely a single manifestation. In this case, the link between studying history in year 12 and resistance to Holocaust denial is probably due to the nature of Holocaust denial being an antisemitic misrepresentation of history. If Holocaust denial was replaced with anti-Zionist tropes, then studying history in year 12 would be less likely to have a significant relationship with resistance. However, other predictors, especially compulsion to respond, likely do reflect degrees of resistance towards antisemitism in general. It is likely that anyone feeling a compulsion to refute Holocaust denial would also feel similar compulsions to discredit other forms of antisemitism.

Ethical concerns are a key limitation in applying this model to other forms of discrimination. Due to the risk inherent in presenting explicit discrimination to young people, uses of this study model will likely need to also rely on other covert forms of discrimination. While researching covert discrimination opens up a large range of potential research, excluding research on explicit discrimination is particularly limiting, as explicit discrimination is prevalent on the internet due to anonymity. Nonetheless, results from studies examining factors affecting resistance to covert discrimination may also provide insight into more explicit forms of the discrimination. While the ethical implications of explicit content limit research on discrimination, research on non-discriminatory misinformation may utilise this research model without limitation. Such forms of
misinformation may include conspiracy theories and pseudo-intellectual ideas such as anti-vaccination movements and climate change denial. The IRO indices would also translate effectively to these phenomena, with the recognition index determining whether participants identify the misinformation as pseudo-intellectual or treat it as a legitimate theory. In any case, applications of this study to either discrimination or misinformation should endeavor to recruit higher quantities of participants, consider additional predictors relevant to the discrimination or misinformation (e.g. year 12 environmental science when examining climate change denial), and attempt to keep the participant demographics similar to those in other uses of this model. Such measures will allow comparisons between the cohort’s rates of resistance to different phenomena.

**Conclusion**

This study demonstrates the need to develop new tools and strategies to aid young people in resisting antisemitism online. While Holocaust denial is not the foremost trope of antisemitism online today, its broad presence online and ease of recycling makes it a common potential gateway into broader antisemitic networks and movements. While young adults appear to be opposed to Holocaust denial, this opposition does not necessarily translate into either psychological or inoculative resistance. Measuring psychological resistance through quantities of counterarguments cannot measure effective resistance against hate. Instead, the new IRO indices serve to measure the effectiveness of resistance against discrimination, thereby demonstrating whether and how a population needs to improve in resisting hate online. The majority of participants in this study engaged in counterproductive or unsuccessful behaviours for providing inoculative resistance against Holocaust denial online. These behaviours demonstrate that young adults cannot rely on their cohort to help them resist Holocaust denial. It is therefore important to develop new
instructions and tools to support young people, which can both inoculate them against Holocaust denial and other forms of antisemitism, and help them inoculate others online wherever antisemitism appears. These instructions and tools should encourage people to speak out against antisemitism, countering the fear of engaging in ‘race trouble’ online.

The value in building interdisciplinary and inter-field approaches is demonstrated by this study in multiple ways. The very conception of this study was built upon research in multiple fields, including white nationalism and cyberbullying. Bringing fields together when conceiving new methods for research enables these methods to have a broader application. The design of this study allows for interdisciplinary applications, as it involves content, statistical and thematic analysis, which, when combined, helps point towards solutions and further explanations for phenomena in the study. The model even allows broader interdisciplinary applications, as discourse analyses could also be applied, determining whether the online format affects the discourse in a way that also affects resistance to online hate or misinformation. The applicability of the IRO indices present a path to provide a holistic picture of young adult resistance to a variety of hate and misinformation online, and thus every use of this study model will further illuminate the state and needs of young people online. Finally, the design of the study enables individual researchers to use it in their own fields, while at the same time contributing to the broader interdisciplinary and inter-field fight against discrimination, abuse, and misinformation online.
Chapter 7

Discussion and Conclusion: Taking Research from Findings to Fixes

Addressing the issue of antisemitism online in this thesis has required engaging in a number of endeavours. These covered defining and identifying online antisemitism, consulting existing bodies of research, applying frameworks to the phenomenon, comparing it to intersecting and analogous phenomena, and researching the abilities of vulnerable populations to resist it. To provide a comprehensive conclusion on the state of antisemitism online and how to address it further, this final chapter includes both a discussion and a conclusion. The discussion connects the disparate findings of the aforementioned endeavours, suggests potential future research, and considers any limitations that apply to both these findings and future research. The subsequent conclusion section will relate these intersecting conclusions directly back to the main purposes of this thesis, comment on its findings’ implications, and highlight its significance to the bodies of literature, both on antisemitism and in broader fields of discrimination and abuse online.

Discussion

Changes to Antisemitism in the Information Age

This thesis opened with an example of how historic antisemitic tropes can intersect with other forms of abuse through the capabilities of online communication: a blood libel meme tweeted at a
Jewish journalist. Blood libel has had a long, continuous use by various antisemitic movements, often intersecting and complementing other antisemitic tropes, such as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* being referenced in a 2003 Syrian broadcast. Thus, it may not seem entirely surprising to see it co-opted by yet another antisemitic movement within the context of the 2016 United States election in the case of the aforementioned tweet. However, this manifestation in particular is distinguished by its representation, which is not merely repeating the libel, but editing a memetic template so as to enable the multiple purposes of intimidation, entertainment, and signalling antisemitism to others. On a surface glance, this use may not seem so different from historical manifestations of the trope. Blood libel would undoubtedly serve to intimidate Jewish communities in the diaspora, and it had been used within entertainment, even as recently as in the 2002 Egyptian movie *Horsemam Without a Horse*, and the 2003 Syrian television series *The Diaspora*. However, a closer examination reveals the new ease with which blood libel can be spread through the properties of the internet – one would not need to rely on film and television studios to either create this content, or to promote it to a broader audience. The technology of the internet, especially web 2.0, allows for the cost-free, time-effective creation of these manifestations, and the cultures associated with online social media provide both the templates and the audiences for these memes.

These online cultures demonstrate that the changes to antisemitism, as represented in this blood libel meme, are both quantitative and qualitative. The entertainment factor of this meme

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1 Naughtie Raspberry (@HelloRaspberry, 19 May 2016), (tweet).
indicates that it derives from an online culture favouring vulgarity, shock-humour, stunts and harassment, originating from spaces such as 4chan.⁴ Many of these stunts, like the “Dub the Dew” raid, would feature antisemitic tropes,⁵ but were originally attributed more to the value of vulgarity and shock rather than a dedicated antisemitic ideology. This culture contrasts significantly with historical distributors of antisemitism, whether originating in film studios in Egypt and Syria, European governments, or Christian churches. These distributors would be primarily driven by antisemitism, with potentially even entire worldviews being inspired by anti-Judaism.⁶ The lack of a dedicated antisemitic motivation in the culture within spaces such as 4chan, at least initially, set them apart from pre-social media antisemitic spaces online such as Stormfront. It was not long before the opportunity to use this culture for growing antisemitic networks was noticed by dedicated antisemites like Andrew Anglin. This culture was made possible specifically due to the features of the internet, allowing for anonymity and pseudonymity, which in turn contributed to senses of disinhibition and dissociation from the impact of one’s actions online. People cannot be easily punished for spreading discrimination and abuse online anonymously, and within this culture, they can even be rewarded. The potential of social reward, even if anonymous, encouraged a recreational participation in abuse and discrimination online, regardless of one’s attitude towards these beliefs. Nonetheless, enough exposure to and normalisation of antisemitism within these spaces would ultimately result in both dedicated antisemites using this culture for recruitment, and previously non-antisemitic users accepting increasingly more antisemitic beliefs. These trends illuminate the origin and motivations behind the blood libel meme. The grotesque exaggerations

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of a Jewish caricature downing litres of “goyim blood” appeals to this vulgar humour, as well as the shock invoked through sending it directly to a Jewish journalist. The anonymity, dissociation and disinhibition provided through web 2.0 has thus resulted in a new culture, through which antisemitism has qualitatively changed.

Rather than distinguishing antisemitism online as a qualitatively new form of antisemitism, as Earl Raab argued for ‘new’ antisemitism,7 this thesis has shown that the internet changes antisemitism more broadly, for online antisemitism does not exist in a vacuum. Online antisemitism reacts to and affects offline antisemitism as well, as seen by the rise of the alt-right and the growing number of antisemitic mass-shooters inspired by the 4chan culture-infused manifestations of antisemitism.8 By considering how online and offline antisemitism affect each other, not excluding changes to antisemitism that emerge from offline circumstances, this thesis avoids the issues present in the debate over ‘new’ antisemitism. Online antisemitism is not a ‘new’ antisemitism, but represents a significant evolution that affects existing and emerging manifestations of antisemitism. The effect of this evolution is so significant that it requires more research to inform strategies to counter it, including from analogous and intersecting fields.

Antisemitism and Other Forms of Online Abuse and Discrimination

Understanding other forms of online abuse and discrimination, and their distinctions from antisemitism online, provides key contextual considerations when understanding how the internet has changed antisemitism. As suggested in the blood libel meme example, what ultimately

8 Specifically, the Pittsburgh Synagogue of Life shooting in 2018, and the Poway Synagogue and Halle Synagogue mass shootings of 2019.
distinguishes antisemitism from other forms of online discrimination is the vast array of pre-existing narratives, artifacts, imagery and arguments that have built up through the long history of antisemitism. The recycling of ancient and medieval tropes into a format specific to social media is a phenomenon unique to the world’s “longest hatred”. The age of many of these tropes indicate the unique trajectory of antisemitism online, and provide additional implications to consider. Taking the example of blood libel, it is unlikely the average online user would be familiar with the fantastical stories of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children. So, when blood libel is used in this meme, along with the relatively unfamiliar language of “goyim” to many users, the antisemitism may only be clear to the victim, perpetrators, and other antisemites. This not only demonstrates a different challenge in countering this form of discrimination, but also how the large catalogue of antisemitism can be used to covertly manipulate or intimidate others (even if expressed explicitly). This latter point is especially relevant to Holocaust denial, which, as a covert movement attempting to disguise its antisemitism, developed strategies now broadly used in the spread of antisemitism online. The age of this hatred has culminated in long-running and persistent anti-Jewish worldviews, allowing for the online propagation and evolution of discriminatory aspects unique to antisemitism, particularly ‘chimeric’ and ‘redemptive’ antisemitism.

The “fantastic, hallucinatory, deeply obsessive antisemitism” of chimeric antisemitism, a manifestation of antisemitism not rooted in any observable fact or truth, is further facilitated by the internet. Potential anonymity reduces risk of social embarrassment that might occur from others observing such deep obsession, and these fringe views easily grow online where there are

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10 Quoted from Christopher Browning.
multiple spaces catering to different niche audiences. These spaces range from Stormfront to social media echo chambers where parallel realities flourish, all of which can continuously and easily recycle older tropes, ranging in age from Holocaust denial to deicide. These spaces can create and spread newer chimeric antisemitic myths, facilitated by the trust users put into often anonymous or pseudonymous sources in these spaces. By catering to a wider range of discrimination, beyond just antisemitism, these spaces attract a broader audience. The internet thus facilitates the growth and spread of redemptive antisemitism, intersecting antisemitism with other forms of discrimination, and often placing antisemitism at the centre of these intersections.

Examining these intersections has provided insight into the similarities and distinctions between antisemitism and these other forms of abuse and discrimination online. Gamergate was primarily an intersection of misogyny and cyberbullying, but also featured antisemitism through the conceptualisation of a ‘culture war’ by the movement’s proponents.\(^{12}\) While the conspiracy theories that launched GamerGate were unfounded,\(^{13}\) the movement was a clear reaction to real efforts promoting inclusivity and diversity within video games and the video game industry. This contrasted with the more chimeric nature of antisemitic conspiracy theories, like that within the Protocols, which are completely based in fantasy. The long history of anti-Judaism-inspired worldviews encourages these ‘culture war’ conceptions to intersect with antisemitism. Such intersections can be seen in the adoption of antisemitic conspiracy theories by proponents of Gamergate and other analogous movements.\(^{14}\) Antisemitism did not serve as merely another dimension to this ‘culture war’ conception, but rather the natural endpoint of an all-encompassing

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\(^{13}\) Cherie Todd, ‘Commentary: GamerGate and the resistance to the diversification of gaming culture’, *Women’s Studies Journal*, 29.1 (2015), 64-67 (p. 64).

conspiracy theory. Through antisemitism’s long history it has associated Jews with many ‘culture wars’, including crypto-Judaism, Nazi-inspired Judeo-Bolshevism, the Soviet’s ‘rootless cosmopolitan’,¹⁵ and more recently Cultural Marxism. Merely observing the long history of antisemitic conspiracy theories may feed the confirmation biases of those seeking a greater explanation, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. GamerGate joined this long-line of conspiracy theories, with Jews presented as a malevolent force undermining the dominance of white men in ‘Western’ society by promoting diversity in all spheres of society, even video games. Gamergate thus represents how the internet streamlines the injection of antisemitism into reactionary conspiracy movements, moulding them into new strains of redemptive antisemitism. Gamergate’s inclusion of Jews in its group-based cyberbullying demonstrates how the ‘swarm logic’ of online abuse can be weaponised against unsuspecting Jews, particularly when antisemitism becomes the endpoint to online reactionary movements. This ironic ‘inclusivity’ is a product of both the internet and the history of antisemitism, representing a unique quality and trajectory to antisemitism online.

The ‘intersectionality’ of online reactionary hate and abuse with antisemitism at its endpoint results in real-world action against Jews being seen as a potential path to redemption. In other words, the intersections of hate and abuse result in redemptive antisemitic worldviews, leading to globalised action, such as mass-shootings against Muslims and Jews in 2018 and 2019.¹⁶ This demonstrates the opportunism used by dedicated and organised antisemites in spreading antisemitism through the internet and social media to develop this worldview. Brenton Tarrant streamed the 2019 Christchurch mosque shooting from a first-person shooter perspective, and said

“subscribe to PewDiePie” before starting his massacre, directly tying his discriminatory worldview to gaming culture. While Tarrant did not espouse antisemitic views, he inspired the explicitly antisemitic shooting attempt by Stephan Balliet in Halle, Germany, who both attributed inspiration to Tarrant and directly referenced gaming culture in his manifesto’s “achievements list”. While it is difficult to account directly for the influence of Tarrant’s statement on the PewDiePie fanbase, the influence of antisemites within said fanbase was nonetheless significant enough to force PewDiePie to recant a donation to the ADL. At the very least, it can be said that the controversies surrounding PewDiePie’s antisemitic and racist actions, and the ensuing defence of him by his fanbase, demonstrates the opportunities for influence and recruitment by dedicated racists online. In another vein, the link between Anglin’s Daily Stormer and the “Unite the Right” rally of 2017 further demonstrates the growing relationship between online antisemitism and real-world antisemitic action. The vigilante-style action taken against the Daily Stormer and Stormfront also indicate that real-world antisemitism can inspire action against antisemitism online. Nonetheless, these events demonstrate the extent to which online antisemitism ingrains itself in broader online discriminatory movements and inspires real-world action, resulting in an intertwined relationship between online and offline antisemitism, and broader discrimination.

The positive biases, echo chambers, and pseudonymity inherent in social media platforms are key ingredients in the opportunistic influence and recruitment effort by dedicated antisemites within analogous reactionary and discriminatory movements online. The impact of these factors is demonstrated by the influence of antisemitic Happy Merchant memes in Reddit communities like

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17 This list detailed a video-game style set of achievements that could be achieved through various murderous actions against different populations, mostly Jews. Ibid., pp. 2, 22-23.
18 Felix Kjellberg (PewDiePie, 12 September 2019), ‘My 100 Mil Award Broke!’ (YouTube video) <https://youtu.be/PbfX3ZyHLJg> [accessed 31 October 2019].
/r/the_donald, and the role of such spaces to serve as gateways to more discriminatory and antisemitic spaces, such as /r/altright or /pol/. The influence of Merchant memes in gateway communities represents the long-running effort to normalise antisemitic humour, sentiment, and ideas within their spaces, as per the goals of antisemitism 2.0. /pol/’s role as a major distribution point for these memes demonstrates the extent to which normalised recreational antisemitism has had an effect on the growth of organised antisemitic networks. While /r/the_donald’s discrimination is truly ‘intersectional’, featuring broader cyber-racism, misogyny, homophobia and transphobia, the example of GamerGate demonstrates how this opportunistic spread of antisemitic content to online spaces is a reliable recruitment method into organised antisemitic movements. The internet and social media have allowed a cost-free, risk-free, time-reduced method of recruitment. This recruitment is undertaken fairly covertly, even with explicit content, as the echo chambers of social media force opposing viewpoints out of these spaces, preventing potential inoculation.

Strategies for Combating Antisemitism Online

There are additional barriers to young people’s ability to provide inoculative resistance to discrimination more broadly. Despite the research study in chapter six focusing on antisemitism, it highlighted how the general aversion to ‘race trouble’ and emotional topics online present key

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motivational roadblocks to preventing the spread of discrimination online. The unwillingness to call Holocaust denial antisemitism, despite the prevalence of negative sentiment towards it, suggests that young people may be more likely to legitimise covert expressions of discrimination. Even with more blatant examples of discriminatory views, as seen with the two real Holocaust deniers who joined the study, there was a noteworthy lack of belief that these deniers were legitimate. This inherent scepticism towards more blatant expressions of discrimination shows the influence of recreational discrimination online; expressions of discrimination may be considered a ploy to trick people into an emotional response, and thus not worth reacting to. If explicit expressions of antisemitism are seen as not worth responding to, and users are reluctant to call out covert expressions of antisemitism, then there is little preventing antisemitism’s normalisation online beyond the slow improvements in moderation by social media giants. Preventing the spread of antisemitism and other forms of discrimination online require both top-down and grassroots efforts. Increased moderation can restrict the access of discriminatory actors to broader userbases, and spreading inoculative resistance can hinder efforts to influence vulnerable users. The inability of alternate alt-right platforms like Gab to mobilise direct action and recruitment effectively demonstrates the value in social media moderation pushing discriminatory actors out of their platforms.\(^{22}\) In order to encourage young userbases to spread inoculative resistance, these users need to receive education that specifically explains the value of drawing attention to and refuting discrimination online (even if not convincing the discriminatory actor themselves). Effectively motivated users then require tools that provide specific information on both discriminatory and incorrect online content, or otherwise risk engaging in counterproductive behaviour.

Tools like the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism\(^{23}\) explain that particular ideas, tropes and arguments are antisemitic, and these tools can help young people to better identify antisemitism online. The definition also encourages consistent research on antisemitism, which can be contrasted with the inconsistent definitions of cyberbullying research. The definitional problems with cyberbullying can be traced to the lack of a ‘gold standard’ definition of traditional bullying,\(^{24}\) leading to disparate applications of definitions to cyberbullying. These disparate definitions result in an overall inconsistent picture of cyberbullying rates, and uncertainty over whether the problem is worsening. The existence of qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism does not mean that the IHRA Working Definition needs to change, but rather highlights that the list of examples is not complete, limiting its full educational benefit. The fact that the definition itself introduces the examples with the words “Contemporary examples of antisemitism… include, but are not limited to…”\(^{25}\) potentially provides an opening to add new examples. Manifestations unique to the internet, such as ‘echoes’, antisemitic memes, and meme templates’ adoption of coded references to other antisemitic memes,\(^{26}\) often fall outside the list of examples included in the definition. A more complete list, or a companion of online examples, could help more people identify online antisemitism. Even without the newer online-specific references, the IHRA definition provides a succinct explanation of antisemitic tropes to young users, many of which do occur regularly online. By embedding this definition within educational programs alongside expanded online examples, young people can gain a general degree of inoculation to help them identify covert and unfamiliar expressions of


\(^{24}\) V. Sky Wingate, Jessy A. Minney, Rosanna E. Guadagno, ‘Sticks and stones may break your bones, but words will always hurt you: A review of cyberbullying’, Social Influence, 8.2-3 (2013), 87-106 (p. 88).

\(^{25}\) International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, para. 6 of 20.

\(^{26}\) Finkelstein and others, pp. 8-10.
antisemitism. Both expanding the use of the Working Definition and expanding the definition itself are especially important, considering the long and varied expressions of antisemitism online. These varied expressions include the tendency for antisemites online to rapidly co-opt memes (e.g. ‘Pepe the Frog’), and create new antisemitic expressions (e.g. echoes), both which emphasising the rapid need to expand and/or adapt existing tools, such as the definition.

While definitional issues are not as prevalent in antisemitism research, the field does share quantification issues similar to those observed in cyberbullying and cyber-racism research. Attempts to quantify cyberbullying overall have been inconsistent, and measures to quantify covert expressions of cyber-racism with larger metrics such as Perceived Online Racism Scale (PORS) have been limited.\(^{27}\) This latter issue applies to the World Jewish Congress’ (WJC) 2016 report on antisemitism in social media, with its automated system presenting a flawed picture of the rates of antisemitism online. This issue can be mitigated through combining smaller-scale research on self-reported antisemitism, as conducted by the Online Hate Prevention Institute in the *Measuring the Hate* report,\(^{28}\) and automated data collection on more specific antisemitic spaces and memes, as conducted by the Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI).\(^{29}\) While not providing an overall quantification of antisemitism online, the *Measuring the Hate* report’s data also indicates the willingness of internet users to report antisemitism. This willingness to report can be used as a potential indicator of inoculative resistance against certain manifestations of antisemitism on particular platforms. The NCRI provides a larger-scale quantitative analysis on specific antisemitic spaces and tropes, thereby evaluating their influence on other spaces. There are still issues in

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\(^{27}\) Brian TaeHyuk Keum and Matther J. Miller, ‘Racism in Digital Era: Development and Initial Validation of the Perceived Online Racism Scale (PORS v1.0)’, *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 64.3 (2017), 310-324 (p. 321).


\(^{29}\) Finkelstein and others.
effectively quantifying covert antisemitism and discrimination, but quantifications of specific elements, such as self-reporting rates and particular manifestations, contribute to a holistic picture of discrimination online. This thesis’ study on young people’s resistance to online antisemitism adds to this picture, exploring the familiarity of the cohort with particular antisemitic arguments used in Holocaust denial. Through repeated implementation of this research on other covert tropes like anti-Zionism, collated data could be reflected back on research like *Measuring the Hate* in order to estimate what quantities of covert antisemitic expressions are being reported, ignored, or even accepted as legitimate. In addition, research on quantifying specific tropes and their influence can be combined with data on resistance to said tropes, thereby providing a clearer picture of the threat posed by particular antisemitic manifestations online.

*Inter-field and Interdisciplinary Approaches in Research*

While some distinctions set antisemitism online apart from other forms of abusive discrimination online, there are shared properties that point towards the value of inter-field and interdisciplinary approaches to combat all forms of online abuse and discrimination. The evolution of individual cyberbullying into group-based cyberbullying for both misogyny, as seen in GamerGate, and antisemitism, as seen in the harassment of Jewish journalists on Twitter,\(^30\) demonstrates the impact of the internet on bullying and other forms of abuse. GamerGate demonstrated how online reactionaryism can lead to misogyny-centred conspiracy theories that intersect other areas of discrimination. The ‘intersectionality’ of discrimination in spaces such as /r/the_donald involves a broad range of cyber-racism and other forms of online abuse and discrimination. These broader

\(^{30}\) ADL Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, p. 11.
forms of discrimination were also involved in the 4chan inspired culture of shock humour, to the point where the homophobic term ‘fag’ became a general colloquial term on the forum. The impact of this discriminatory culture on the motivation to commit real world atrocities applies to both antisemitism and Islamophobia, as seen with the 2018 Christchurch shooting, 2018 Pittsburgh shooting, and the 2019 Poway and Halle shootings. The intersection of these analogous forms of discrimination and abuse means that research with too narrow a focus on just one form risks misrepresenting the broader intersecting picture of discrimination and abuse online. However, comprehensively understanding all forms of discrimination and abuse before researching any of these phenomena online is not realistic. Alternatively, over-extended research goals also risk significant misrepresentation, as seen with the WJC report’s issues in quantifying antisemitism on social media. Two key solutions to these problems are presented in this thesis. The first is collaboration between fields. This is key to encouraging scholars in broader disciplines to research antisemitism online, as the long and varied history of antisemitism represents an imposing phenomenon to research. The other solution is developing interdisciplinary research methods that can be applied to multiple fields, thereby allowing results from each to be shared and compared, contributing towards a comprehensive picture of discrimination and abuse online.

The cyber-racism research methodology developed by Jakubowicz et al. for their Cyber Racism and Community Resilience project is a model example of both collaboration, and the development of interdisciplinary approaches to research into discrimination online. This example served as one of the key inspirations behind the research study conducted in this thesis. This study builds upon the work carried out by Jakubowicz et al. by demonstrating how individuals focusing

on specific phenomena can develop such methodologies, with broader inter-field applications. This thesis builds upon existing research and utilised statistical analyses of resistance to antisemitism online, despite its otherwise historical and sociological premise. Even with the generally narrow focus of this thesis’ study, the research model and Inoculative Resistance Online (IRO) indices are versatile enough to be applied to other forms of discrimination, abuse, and misinformation.

Using similar population groups, the study model could measure psychological and inoculative resistance to other racist tropes, such as denial of the Stolen Generation of Indigenous Australians. Beyond cyber-racism it could measure resistance to homophobic connections between homosexuality and paedophilia, misogynistic portrayals of women, and transphobic generalisations of transgender people being mentally ill. Each of these ideas need to be recognised and identified as discriminatory, alongside resources providing counterarguments to effectively refute them. Beyond discrimination, this study’s research model and IRO indices could be applied to cyberbullying in the vein of Kowalski’s unpublished study from 2011, utilising two false participants to demonstrate an example of cyberbullying. The IRO indices could be adapted to measure willingness to identify the interactions as abusive, and whether participants intervene on behalf of the victim, bully, or not at all. Beyond abuse and discrimination, the IRO indices would not need to change in order to be applied to non-discriminatory misinformation. They could measure both the population’s willingness to identify beliefs such as climate change denial and anti-vaccination positions as pseudoscientific, and their ability to refute such beliefs. All these results can be collated to measure overall psychological and inoculative resistance among vulnerable populations to a wide range of abuse, discrimination, and misinformation online. The

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internet, particularly web 2.0 and social media, has presented new challenges in the battles against discrimination, abuse, and misinformation. However, the internet can also provide the tools necessary for grassroots resistance to these phenomena, so long as the requirements for such tools and instruction are researched through interdisciplinary approaches with inter-field applications.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to determine how the internet had impacted antisemitism, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and how antisemitism online compared with other forms of online abuse and discrimination. The thesis has also explored how research could contribute to solutions both to online antisemitism, and to broader abuse and discrimination online. Much of the quantitative changes to antisemitism were achieved as early as web 1.0, which provided a new reduction in cost, effort and time for the storage, distribution and recycling of resources, evidenced through websites such as the Institute for Historical Review. Quantitative changes in web 1.0 were achieved through easier communication, as seen on Stormfront. These later evolved into qualitative changes on web 2.0, as the anonymity, disinhibition and disassociation of the participatory web facilitated the evolution of cultures that impacted the nature of antisemitism. Online cultures promoting shocking and vulgar humour, such as 4chan, were made possible through these features of web 2.0. These features encouraged those who had not initially held antisemitic views to recreationally participate in antisemitism, through continuous exposure to normalised antisemitic viewpoints, often promoted opportunistically by dedicated antisemites. Social media represents fertile ground for recruitment by these opportunists, and the success of websites such as Anglin’s Daily Stormer demonstrates the success of these normalisation and recruitment efforts. Many of these changes are shared by other forms of discrimination and abuse.
online, such as how GamerGate’s misogynistic conceptualisation of a reactionary ‘culture war’ produced large-scale group-based cyberbullying. However, the long history of antisemitism has allowed antisemitism to serve as the endpoint of these other discriminatory movements, through ideologies formulated by anti-Judaism continuously adapted into redemptive antisemitic worldviews. Jews could be depicted as responsible for diversity in video games, Muslim immigration, LGBT movements, and more. Social media provided paths to conjoin these more immediately reactionary beliefs, using antisemitism as a cohesive discriminatory glue.

The extensive history of antisemitic material - including the Protocols, Holocaust denial, blood libel, and Judeo-Bolshevism - could all be drawn upon in a cost-free, time-effective manner due to the ease of recycling material in online spaces. The intersections between antisemitism and the myriad forms of online discrimination and abuse indicate the need for broad methodological approaches to hate, abuse and misinformation online. The unwillingness of young people to engage in ‘race trouble’ and confront antisemitism online allows for virtually unopposed colonisation of online spaces, leading to increased normalisation of antisemitism online. Combining inoculative education and instruction on combatting antisemitism online with the demonstrated effectiveness of increased moderation on social media can provide a two-pronged approach to combating discrimination, abuse, and misinformation online. Developing and continuing to use interdisciplinary and inter-field research methods can further illuminate the points of vulnerability in the fight against these phenomena. These interdisciplinary and inter-field research methods are a necessary key, as this thesis has demonstrated that the ever-perpetual adaptability of antisemitism has been only enhanced by the medium of the internet.

The adaptability of antisemitism highlights a key limitation in this thesis. Commenced in 2016 and submitted in 2020, this thesis has been written and rewritten over one of the most
significant periods of evolution for antisemitism since the Holocaust. Indeed, not only has antisemitism changed, but also have responses to it. As antisemitism continue to evolve, some of the findings of this thesis may become outdated or irrelevant in years, if not months. Overreliance on past discrimination research must be resisted, especially in the information age, as relying on outdated conceptions and definitions of discrimination can result in issues being underestimated or even ignored.\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, web 2.0’s functionality will hasten the evolution of discriminatory views, as seen by antisemitism’s increased radicalisation.\textsuperscript{34} Recognising these issues, this thesis has provided key tools that will not be as diminished by time, in the form of the chapter six research study and IRO indices. Inoculation is key to resisting abuse, discrimination, and misinformation online, which as indicated in the name of the Network Contagion Research Institute,\textsuperscript{35} are akin to contagions that must be resisted. While ethical concerns may limit the research model to only covering covert manifestations of these phenomena, it is covert manifestations of discrimination that have been the most difficult to quantify, research and combat online. Therefore, despite their limitations, these tools fill a key role in the research and resistance against discrimination, abuse and misinformation online, particularly those involving antisemitism.

\textit{Further Implications of Research}

The intersections of discrimination and abuse online, combined with the parallel interweaving of online and offline realities, demonstrate the threat that online discrimination and abuse poses to

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\textsuperscript{34} Monika Schwarz-Friesel, \textit{Antisemitism 2.0 and the Cyberculture of Hate: Hostility towards Jews as a cultural constant and collective emotional value in the digital age (short version)} (Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin, 2018) <https://www.linguistik.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg72/Antisemitism_2.0_short_version_final.pdf> [accessed 21 May 2020] (pp. 7-8).

\textsuperscript{35} Network Contagion Research Institute, \textit{About NCRI} (2019), <https://ncri.io/about> [accessed 17 January 2020].
public health. As seen by synagogue mass-shootings inspired by online reactionary and gaming cultures, antisemitism is a key form of discrimination affecting broader public health. The cumulative effect of these atrocities, which continue to inspire even more similar events, combined with the persistent normalisation of antisemitism online, result in an inescapable atmosphere of discrimination. Providing inoculative resistance can help to prevent the normalisation of antisemitism online, and when combined with more effective website moderation, can reduce both the prevalence of these atrocities and the dissemination of antisemitism online. If antisemites are relegated to separate spaces, such as Anglin’s Daily Stormer and Gab, this will reduce the normalisation and spread of antisemitism online, even if it cannot be eliminated completely. Racism is, and always has been, a key concern of public health. However, as suggested in this thesis, racism’s effect on public health can be diminished through methods that specifically target its dissemination, spread and normalisation online.

In addition to the rise and change of antisemitism, this thesis has been written during a time when knowledge of the Holocaust is fading, and many people are unaware of what constitutes antisemitism. Even though the study conducted in chapter six reflected strong sentiment against Holocaust denial, that sentiment does not translate into effective inoculative resistance if knowledge is significantly diminished among young people. While not all antisemitism is tied to the Holocaust, this declining knowledge of the Holocaust indicates a corresponding decline in the understanding of antisemitism and its dangers. Considering the broad variety of antisemitic manifestations, including new manifestations developed online, many internet users are now

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36 Andre Oboler, William Allington and Patrick Scolyer-Gray, p. 34.
unaware that they are participating in antisemitism. The inability of many in the left to conceive of themselves engaging in racism can also result in the growth of new forms of antisemitism, such as the Livingstone Formulation,\textsuperscript{38} which are further reinforced by the echo chambers of social media. While knowledge of the Holocaust and ability to identify antisemitism fades among the broader population, knowledge of antisemitic ideas and narratives does not fade among antisemites. Blood libel, a fantastical medieval conspiracy theory, has been used to harass Jewish journalists on Twitter. ‘Zionology’ continues to perpetuate antisemitism within the left. The constant recycling of antisemitism’s enormous and growing catalogue alongside diminished knowledge of antisemitism risks further normalisation of antisemitism online. This diminished knowledge also can result in situations where previously explicit forms of antisemitism become covert (e.g. blood libel), as they may only be identified by antisemites and Jews themselves. The unwillingness of many to heed Jewish identifications of antisemitism, alongside the reluctance to engage in ‘race trouble’, presents a worrying future in which Jews may find themselves increasingly alone in the fight against antisemitism. This potential future further emphasises the need for inoculation, and for it to take the form of educating young people specifically about antisemitism’s varied manifestations, and the importance of identifying and resisting antisemitism.

\textit{The Future of Research}

This thesis has made an explicit call for future research to develop interdisciplinary and inter-field approaches against discrimination. One particular way to resist the diminished knowledge of

historical antisemitism is to encourage these approaches through collaboration, promoting efforts to build a holistic picture of discrimination online so no field is left under-researched. It is hoped that the methodology and IRO indices developed in this thesis are used in future research to study other manifestations of antisemitism, as well as broader discrimination, abuse, and misinformation. However, critical examination of these tools would also be valuable, further developing them to best suit the needs of broader disciplines. New antisemitic manifestations and spaces continue to evolve, and the relationship between offline and online antisemitism will continue to intersect, as will online antisemitism and other forms of discrimination and abuse online. This thesis provides an examination of online antisemitism and its intersection with analogous phenomena, but also demonstrates the need for continued and higher quantities of research to tackle the damaging problems facing societies in the twenty-first century. These problems include both the broader impacts of discrimination and abuse, and the more specific adaptability of antisemitism. An ever-present critical examination of antisemitism and its continual changes is needed. There was a perceived reduction in antisemitism in the late twentieth century, but in recent years antisemitism has risen again, as it has evolved alongside the growth of social media. Society must avoid complacency when it comes to tackling long-lasting hatred like antisemitism. Ultimately, combating antisemitism requires a two-pronged approach of recognising both the dangers of technology and the unique aspects of antisemitism, while allowing this approach to inform future research into broader abuse, discrimination, and misinformation online.

Final Remarks

In her recent book, *Antisemitism: Here and Now*, Deborah Lipstadt said “[antisemitism] doesn’t go away; it’s not a onetime event. Though its outer form may evolve over time, its essence remains the same.”  

It is worthwhile reflecting that these words come from a scholar most famous for her clash with Holocaust denial. Even despite the hatred’s long history, Holocaust denial was then a new form of antisemitism. Truly original compared to the long line of myths and conspiracy theories, it represented an attempt to deny another manifestation of antisemitism. Yet unlike the attempts to categorise antisemitism surrounding Israel as a ‘new antisemitism’, Lipstadt recognises Holocaust denial as an extension of an antisemitism, the essence of which does not change. Holocaust denial was not distinct from antisemitism, but served as a shield to protect antisemites and allow the broader hatred to flourish. The essence of antisemitism has also not changed with the internet, although its appearance has undergone significant transformations that can make it hard to recognise and combat. These changes include recreational involvement, group-based harassment, and new tools to identify Jews online, all with a reduction in cost, risk and time involved. Yet, as seen with the injection of antisemitism into movements like GamerGate, the co-opting of Brenton Tarrant’s Islamophobic attack to the antisemitic cause, and popularity of Merchant memes in spaces like /r/the_donald, these changes all serve to promote the long running “Western tradition” of hatred against Jews, and the promotion paths to redemption through their removal. The Irving-Lipstadt trial ended less than twenty years ago, and in that time, antisemitism has significantly evolved following this defeat faced by the Holocaust denial movement. This evolution echoes how Holocaust denial reflected another evolution of antisemitism following the

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defeat of Nazi Germany. This thesis provides evidence, research and tools that can be used to combat antisemitism in the age of web 2.0 and beyond. Even if the current manifestations of antisemitism are stopped, the next evolution of antisemitism is always just over the horizon, and society must prepare for it in eternal vigilance.
Appendix A – Chapter 1 Tables and Figures

Figure 1.1 – Blood libel meme.¹

Figure 1.2 – Blood libel meme original template.²

Figure 1.3 – Typical use of meme template.

Figure 1.4 – Other antisemitic use of template.

¹ Naughty Raspberry (@HelloRaspberry, 19 May 2016), (tweet).
² The meme generator website for this meme template has been unavailable since December 2019, although the figure 1 variations of this meme are accessible through Google image searches of meme instances. Meme Generator, Drinking Tears - Caption | Meme Generator (2019) <https://memegenerator.net/Drinking-Tears/caption> [accessed via Google images 20 January 2020].
Figure 2 – Rise of active far-right political groups and individual linked to antisemitism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Germany – Founded 1964; protested</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>moment of silence for Auschwitz liberation 2005.³</td>
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<td></td>
<td>United</td>
<td>National Front – Founded 1967; long running antisemitic party</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kingdom</td>
<td>established by former members of Union of Fascists.⁴</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Nationalist Party of Canada – Founded 1977; promoted</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>antisemitism in Nationalist Report,⁵ supported Holocaust denier</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jim Keegstra.⁶</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>National Front – Founded 1972; founder found guilty of violating</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gayssot Act with Holocaust denial and trivialisation.⁷</td>
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<pre><code>      |             | 8                                                                    |
</code></pre>
|         | Poland      | National Rebirth of Poland – Founded 1981; identified as noteworthy antisemitic organisation by European Commission against Racism and Intolerance.  
          |             | 9                                                                    |
|         | Sweden      | Sweden Democrats – Founded 1988; was infiltrated by members of Neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement.  
          |             | 10                                                                   |
|         | United      | British National Party – Founded 1982; Chairman promoted explicit Holocaust denial.  
          | Kingdom     | 11                                                                   |

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<th>Founded</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Greater Romania Party – Founded 1991; founder promoted Holocaust denial until 2004.¹²</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russian National unity – Founded 1991; paramilitary, neo-Nazi organisation.¹³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Nordic Resistance Movement – Founded 1997; neo-Nazi organisation and has spread to Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland.¹⁴</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>All-Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’ – Founded 1991; electorally successful antisemitic political party.¹⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>David Duke – Runs for Louisiana Gubernatorial Election 1991, wins 38.8% of the vote.¹⁶</td>
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<tr>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</table>
Figure 3 – Rate of hate crimes by religion in the United States

![Rate of hate crimes by religion in the U.S.](image)

Figure 4 – Race hate crimes statistics exclude antisemitism but can be compared to rates of religion hate crimes.
Figure 5 – FBI statistics allow comparisons between religious and race-based hate crimes.\(^{23}\)

Appendix B – Chapter 2 Tables and Figures

Figure 6 – Google News mentions of Cyberbullying 2004-2018.
Appendix C – Chapter 4 Tables and Figures

Figure 7.1 – The ‘Happy Merchant’ meme template.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{happy-merchant-meme.png}
\caption{ Merchant meme altered to exaggerate unappealing features.}
\end{figure}

Figure 7.2 – Merchant meme altered to exaggerate unappealing features.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{happy-merchant-meme-rat.png}
\caption{ Merchant meme altered to associate Jews with rats.}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{happy-merchant-meme-rat.png}
\caption{ Merchant meme altered to associate Jews with rats.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{24} All figure 7 images are sourced from the Know Your Meme gallery for the ‘Happy Merchant’ meme. Know Your Meme, Happy Merchant Images (2018), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/happy-merchant/photos> [accessed 15 December 2019].
Figure 7.4 – Merchant meme altered to imply Jewish control over feminist, anarchist and LGBT movements.

Figure 7.5 – Merchant meme altered to imply Jewish control over the media.

Figure 7.6 – Merchant meme altered to imply Jewish obsession with money.
Figure 7.7 – Bank note altered with Merchant meme features to imply Jewish control over banks.

Figure 7.8 – Merchant meme altered to imply Jewish control and destruction of America.

Figure 7.9 – Merchant meme altered to associate Jews with Satan.
Figure 8.1 – A. Wyatt Mann comic where Merchant meme originated.25

Figure 8.2 – A. Wyatt Mann comic featuring racist “…Around Blacks… Never Relax” meme.

Figure 8.3 – A Wyatt. Mann comic featuring a racist stereotypes of an African American man.

Figure 8.4 – A Wyatt. Mann featuring a racist, homophobic depiction of a Mexican man.

25 All figure 8 images are sourced from the Know Your Meme page for ‘A. Wyatt Mann’.
Figure 9.1 – Intersections of cyberbullying, cyber-hate, and antisemitism.

Figure 9.2 – Intersections of group-based cyberbullying, misogyny, and antisemitism.
Figure 10.1 – Organised, casual and recreational antisemitism pre-internet/web 1.0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Organised</th>
<th>Casual</th>
<th>Recreational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-internet/web 1.0</strong></td>
<td>Creators of content: Journal of Historical Review, books</td>
<td>Providers of moral/financial support: subscribing</td>
<td>Virtually non-existent – lack of distribution tools and social risks make it difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creators of infrastructure: Organisations, e.g. the Institute for Historical Review</td>
<td>Being antisemitic in private conversation because it is seen as normal and OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centralised strategies and leadership; pseudo-academia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 10.2 – Organised, casual and recreational antisemitism on web 2.0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organised</th>
<th>Casual</th>
<th>Recreational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Web 2.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creators of content: ranging from essays to memes</td>
<td>Providers of moral/financial support: clicks, likes, shares, comments</td>
<td>Creators of original antisemitic content: humour and feedback motivated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creators of infrastructure:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online antisemitic spaces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversified strategies;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individualised/small groups;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weaponised humour; directing group-based cyberbullying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being antisemitic in public anonymous conversation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because it is seen as normal and OK; participating in group-based cyberbullying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May create/engage in own spaces, but don’t attempt to organise or network</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberately be antisemitic when anonymous and opponent perceived as Jewish; cyberbullying individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 10.3 – Examples of organised, casual and recreational antisemitic websites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Websites</th>
<th>ORGANISED</th>
<th>CASUAL</th>
<th>RECREATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Producer/Consumer relationship | • Radio Islam  
• Institute for Historical Review  
• Jew Watch  
• The Daily Stormer | • Content readers  
• Commenting on articles + share  
• Donating to websites | • Follow websites for humour  
• Like humorous content and respond |
| Interactive Websites | • Stormfront: Owners and content creators  
• Creators of 4chan antisemitic threads | • ‘Lurkers’/casual Stormfront users  
• Follow 4chan antisemitic threads | • Follow websites for humour  
• Engage in content creation on 4chan |
| ‘Subsites’ | • Creators/Moderators of Facebook pages  
• Create content on YouTube to be shared  
• ‘Supermoderators’ of antisemitic subreddits | • Subscribe to Facebook pages  
• Subscribe/share YouTube content  
• Discuss in created antisemitic spaces | • Create spaces for own individual use  
• Create content for own/shared spaces |
Figure 10.4 - Examples of organised, casual and recreational antisemitism online.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>ORGANISED</th>
<th>CASUAL</th>
<th>RECREATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organising antisemitic harassment on Twitter</td>
<td>• Joining antisemitic harassment</td>
<td>• Harass Jews on Twitter for amusement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Editing Wikipedia pages to include antisemitism</td>
<td>• Sharers of memes</td>
<td>• Creators memes for personal reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Create memes</td>
<td>• General antisemitic comments</td>
<td>• Seek to provoke reactions online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recruitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 11.1 – Covert antisemitism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Cloaked websites’ and pseudo-intellectual antisemitism</td>
<td>One of the leading Holocaust denial organisations, the Institute for Historical Review, has tried to portray Holocaust denial as legitimate history. The archive for their journal is innocuously modelled, yet still features articles referring to gas chamber “myths”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting conspiracy theories that target Jews without making it explicitly clear. 27</td>
<td>Promotion of the conspiracy theories involving George Soros, who, as a prominent Jewish billionaire, is used as a ‘dog-whistle’ for Jewish conspiracy theories (appendix C, figures 15.1, 15.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating new symbols for communication between antisemites</td>
<td>The use of triple parentheses, (((())), or ‘echoes’ were used by antisemites to identify Jews on social media. This included a browser extension that would automatically put echoes around names that sounded Jewish. 28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 If Jewishness is mentioned or identifies figures as Jews, then it is overt antisemitism.
## Figure 11.2 – Overt antisemitism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overt antisemitism</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Stormer</td>
<td>This website’s name is derived from the Nazi-era tabloid <em>Der Stürmer</em>, and has a section dedicated to the “Jewish Problem”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stormfront</td>
<td>This White-Nationalist forum openly supports Nazism and features explicit antisemitic discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisemitic ‘trolling’ – e.g. targeted harassment of Jews online</td>
<td>In October 2014, Jewish UK Labour MP Luciana Berger was targeted with antisemitic messages, encouraged by Andrew Anglin of the Daily Stormer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Figure 11.3 – Invisible antisemitism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invisible antisemitism</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trivializing of the Holocaust through memes and other online content</td>
<td>The ‘Hipster Hitler’ comics and merchandise that lead to the trivialization of the Holocaust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Websites not classifying Holocaust denial as hate speech, or considering it merely free speech</td>
<td>Facebook has continuously refused to ban Holocaust denial despite banning other forms of hate speech.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


Figure 12.1 – Dormant antisemitism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reposting of Holocaust denial</td>
<td>The r/holocaust subreddit on Reddit, which was material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moderated by Holocaust deniers, promoted Holocaust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>denial material in their sidebar and regularly posts it in new posts (appendix C, figure 16).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digitising and sharing Nazi</td>
<td>/pol/ regularly has threads that provide links to viewable propaganda, both in text and video form (appendix C, figure 17).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>propaganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 12.2 – Active antisemitism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Writing and posting antisemitic articles</td>
<td>Regular content on the Daily Stormer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing images to become antisemitic</td>
<td>4chan trolls regularly would deface Ben Garrison’s cartoons to include Nazi and explicit antisemitic imagery.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating new versions of antisemitic memes</td>
<td>The ‘Happy Merchant’ meme is regularly edited to include new contexts and ideas, as per regular memes.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13 – TEMPIS taxonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Publicness</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Social Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Pre-moderated</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Verified real ID</td>
<td>No sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stored</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Private Group</td>
<td>Unverified Consistent ID</td>
<td>Sharing with associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Exception</td>
<td>Associates</td>
<td>Anonymous possible</td>
<td>Public Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complaint</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 14 – Criticism of Charlottesville rally from “identitarian” on 4chan’s /pol/ board.35


I am an identitarian myself. I agree with a lot of what Richard Spencer, Enoch, Taylor, Allsup...say. I know this ‘movement’ isn’t a monolith. Everyone has different ideas or approaches.

But who is the fucking absolute MORON, or collection of MORONS, that thought having this kind of rally right before a very important Mid-term election, was a good idea?

The ONLY politicians that are ‘safe’ for White people right now are Republicans, and barely that. The ONLY ones fighting for a border, or Immigration Laws friendly to White Identity and preservation, are Republicans.

If they LOSE seats, who else is left? We don’t have a Parliament type system with multiple Parties. We have TWO, that’s it. Why would you endanger that with the optics of “the Tiki Torch” guys? Why not WAIT to after the elections? To give any backlash time to die down?

Why have a rally at all? It’s just a giant scream festival. It doesn’t do SHIT. Why is Spencer and Co. NOT coordinating a PAC (Political Action Group)? Or working on getting people on a mailing list instead, under the radar?

I deal with minorities all the time. I smile, make conversation. The people closest to me have NO clue how I really feel. And me being vocal about it does nothing. What matters is how I VOTE...not showing up to a rally. Rallies aren’t ACTION. Rallies are big meetups. Why even risk Republican votes, by doing a fucking RALLY?

This type of shit makes people not want to vote Republican, while simultaneously making people not want to be seen with Identitarian groups. It’s a literal lose/lose option. Who the FUCK thought of this? How could be that so intelligent otherwise, consider this massive fucking misstep??

Figure 15.1 – Jewish billionaire George Soros as ‘bogeyman’ for conspiracy theories.36

Figure 15.2 – George Soros meme listing his alleged actions and methods.

Figure 16 – r/holocaust subreddit page on Reddit.37

Appendix D – Chapter 5 Tables and Figures

Figure 18 – Institute for Historical Review as news/blog website.\(^{39}\)


\(^{39}\)
Figure 19.1 – Stormfront Alexa rankings.\textsuperscript{40}

Figure 19.2 – Stormfront Alexa rankings.\textsuperscript{41}

Figure 19.3 – Stormfront Alexa rankings as of 29 October 2019.\textsuperscript{42}


Figure 20.1 – 4chan Alexa rankings 2016.\textsuperscript{43}

![4chan Alexa rankings 2016 graph](image)

Figure 20.2 – 4chan Alexa rankings third quarter 2019.\textsuperscript{44}

![4chan Alexa rankings third quarter 2019 graph](image)

---


Figure 21.1 – Daily Stormer 2013 header image.\(^{45}\)

Figure 21.2 Daily Stormer 2016 header image.\(^{46}\)

Figure 21.3 Daily Stormer 2016 header image featuring Reagan and Trump.\(^{47}\)

---


Figure 22.1 – Daily Stormer Alex rankings third quarter 2019.

Alexa Rank

This site ranks:

#41,437  In global internet traffic and engagement over the past 90 days

Figure 22.2 – Daily Stormer Alex rankings fourth quarter 2019.

Alexa Rank

This site ranks:

#60,757  In global internet traffic and engagement over the past 90 days

---


Figure 23 – Antisemitism on ‘Zionism Is A Cancer’ Facebook page.50


50 The second image led to an antisemitic YouTube video posted by an account whose account picture is a clown variation of Pepe, linked to the antisemitic ‘Honkler’ meme.
Figure 24.1 – “Holohoax” YouTube search results 15 September 2018.\textsuperscript{51}
Figure 24.2 – “holocaust revisionism” YouTube search 15 September 2018.52


Figure 24.3 – “holocaust revisionism” YouTube search 29 October 2019.\textsuperscript{53}

\begin{quote}
Figure 24.3 – “holocaust revisionism” YouTube search results (2019),
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=holocaust+revisionism [accessed 29 October 2019].
\end{quote}
Figure 25.1 – Antisemitic meme on /r/the_donald.54

Figure 25.2 – /r/the_donald reacts to antisemitic meme.55

54 (/u/usa_DJT_usa, 25 June 2016), ‘The salt of the MSM is evident’ (Reddit post), <https://archive.is/SrmuC> [accessed 16 December 2019].
Figure 25.3 – Antisemitic content on /r/pussypass.⁵⁶

Figure 25.4 – r/holocaust quarantine and content.57

57 Reddit, r/holocaust (2019).
Figure 25.5 – Effect of quarantine on r/holocaust subreddit statistics.\textsuperscript{58}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure255.png}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{58} Quarantining the subreddit made its subreddit statistics disappear, however, the subreddit’s subscriber rank was observable for a few months before the subreddit was permanently banned in September 2019. Subredditstats, \textit{r/holocaust stats} (2019), <https://subredditstats.com/r/holocaust> [accessed 16 December 2019].
Figure 25.6 – Invisible antisemitism on far-left subreddit, r/ChapoTrapHouse.59

Figure 25.7 – Results of a search for “criticising Israel” in /r/ChapoTrapHouse.
Figure 26.1 – Stormfront TEMPIS taxonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Publicness</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Social Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stored</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unverified</td>
<td>Consistent ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exception</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderated</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 26.2 – 4chan TEMPIS taxonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Publicness</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Social Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stored</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

415
Figure 26.3 – Daily Stormer TEMPIS taxonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Publicness</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Social Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stored</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Private Group</td>
<td>Unverified</td>
<td>Consistent ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 26.4 – Twitter TEMPIS taxonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Publicness</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Social Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stored</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unverified</td>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exception</td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complaint</td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

416
Figure 26.5 – YouTube TEMPIS taxonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Publicness</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Social Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real Time(^{61})</td>
<td>Pre-moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stored</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unverified</td>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exception</td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnote 61: Only live videos, which are still later stored.

Figure 26.6 – Reddit TEMPIS taxonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Publicness</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Social Impact</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stored</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private Group</td>
<td>Unverified</td>
<td>Sharing with associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exception</td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        |             |            |            |          |               |
Appendix E – Chapter 6 Tables and Figures

Figure 27 – Inoculative resistance sub-questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Inoculative Resistance</th>
<th>Sub-Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognise</td>
<td>Do they call out subtler aspects of antisemitism, such as cloaked content and ‘dog-whistles’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Do they present resources in counterarguments to antisemitic tropes, and avoid the misinterpretation or misuse of sources?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond</td>
<td>Do they present counterarguments to antisemitism more than arguing with others?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refute</td>
<td>Do they provide sound refutations to the antisemitism in their counterarguments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Is the capacity to resist antisemitism affected by education and attitude to antisemitism? Considering the role of ‘trolling’ in antisemitism online, do they become emotional and does this emotion hinder their resistance?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 28 – Inoculative Resistance Online (IRO) Individual Indices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Successful +0.25</th>
<th>Unsuccessful +0</th>
<th>Counterproductive -0.25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>Called out Holocaust denial as antisemitism</td>
<td>Did not call out more</td>
<td>Distinguished Holocaust denial from antisemitism equal/more than called out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Present research in response</td>
<td>Do not present research in response</td>
<td>Misrepresent source equal/more than presented research in response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Counterargument</td>
<td>No counterarguments</td>
<td>Argue with other participants equal/ more than Holocaust denier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refute</td>
<td>Quality refutations</td>
<td>No refutation</td>
<td>Poor-quality refutation equal/more that quality refutations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 29.1 – Number of counterarguments v whether participants studied history in year 12.

Figure 29.2 – Number of counterarguments v familiarity with Holocaust denial.
Figure 29.3 – Number of counterarguments v compulsion to respond to Holocaust denier.

Figure 29.4 – Number of counterarguments v emotional response to Holocaust denier.
Figure 29.5 – Number of counterarguments v confidence in ability to refute Holocaust denier.
Figure 30.1 – Inoculative Resistance Online indices score proportions among cohort.
Figure 30.2 – Overall Inoculative Resistance Online scores among cohort.
Figure 31.1 – Recognition index scores v whether participants studied history in year 12.

Figure 31.2 – Research index scores v whether participants studied history in year 12.
Figure 32.1 – Refutation index scores v compulsion to respond to Holocaust denier.

Figure 32.2 - Refutation index scores v confidence in ability to refute Holocaust denier.
Figure 33.1 – Overall Inoculative resistance scores v compulsion to respond to Holocaust denier.

![Figure 33.1](image1)

Figure 33.2 – Overall Inoculative resistance scores v confidence in ability to refute Holocaust denier.

![Figure 33.2](image2)
Figure 34.1 – Discussion group themes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Discussions</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denial coming from disbelief at scale</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exact numbers do not matter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 34.2 – Survey themes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engaging with Holocaust deniers is a waste of time</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only had minor experiences with antisemitism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had experiences of antisemitism on social media</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External research done on Wikipedia during study</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education is needed to help resist Holocaust denial</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools are needed to help resist Holocaust denial</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings of anger and/or frustration</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 34.3 – Themes prominent in both discussions and surveys. Represents how many times a theme was expressed in discussions and surveys, and by how many participants in each context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Discussion references</th>
<th>Discussion Participants</th>
<th>Survey references</th>
<th>Survey Participants</th>
<th>Total references</th>
<th>Total participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favourability to neutrality</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 35 – Emotional response to Holocaust denier v compulsion to respond to Holocaust denier.

Figure 36 – Confidence in ability to refute Holocaust denier v whether participants studied history in year 12.
Appendix F – Ethics approval

Figure 37 – Ethics approval letter dated 7 November 2017.

Research Integrity & Ethics Administration
Human Research Ethics Committee

Tuesday, 7 November 2017

Dr Avril Alba
Hebrew Biblical and Jewish Studies; Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
avrill.alba@sydney.edu.au

Dear Avril,

The University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) has considered your application.

After consideration of your response to the comments raised your project has been approved.

Approval is granted for a period of four years from 07/11/2017 to 07/11/2021

Project title: Developing Counter Platforms to Antisemitism Online

Project no.: 2017/847

First Annual Report due: 07/11/2018

Authorised Personnel: Alba Avril; Allington William;

Documents Approved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Uploaded</th>
<th>Version number</th>
<th>Document Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02/11/2017</td>
<td>Version 3</td>
<td>New PIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/11/2017</td>
<td>Version 2</td>
<td>New Debrief Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/10/2017</td>
<td>Version 1</td>
<td>New Consent form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/09/2017</td>
<td>Version 1</td>
<td>Survey questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/09/2017</td>
<td>Version 1</td>
<td>Flyer and Recruitment information for all platforms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Condition/s of Approval

- Research must be conducted according to the approved proposal.
- An annual progress report must be submitted to the Ethics Office on or before the anniversary of approval and on completion of the project.
- You must report as soon as practicable anything that might warrant review of ethical approval of the project including:
  - Serious or unexpected adverse events (which should be reported within 72 hours).
  - Unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project.
- Any changes to the proposal must be approved prior to their implementation (except where an amendment is undertaken to eliminate immediate risk to participants).
- Personnel working on this project must be sufficiently qualified by education, training and experience for their role, or adequately supervised. Changes to personnel must be reported and approved.
- Personnel must disclose any actual or potential conflicts of interest, including any financial or other interest or affiliation, as relevant to this project.
Data and primary materials must be retained and stored in accordance with the relevant legislation and University guidelines.

Ethics approval is dependent upon ongoing compliance of the research with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research, the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research, applicable legal requirements, and with University policies, procedures and governance requirements.

The Ethics Office may conduct audits on approved projects.

The Chief Investigator has ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the research and is responsible for ensuring all others involved will conduct the research in accordance with the above.

This letter constitutes ethical approval only.

Please contact the Ethics Office should you require further information or clarification.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Associate Professor Stephen Assinder
Chair
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC 1)

The University of Sydney HRECs are constituted and operate in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council’s (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) and the NHMRC’s Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2007).
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