ANY PERSON, HAVING FACILITATED, OR ATTEMPTED TO FACILITATE, THROUGH DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE, THE ENTRY, MOVEMENT OR RESIDENCE OF IRREGULAR STATUS FOREIGNERS IN FRANCE WILL BE PUNISHED [...] 

— FRENCH GOVERNMENT DECREE, 1938.
Statement of Originality

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work. All assistance received and sources used have been acknowledged.

Abigail Taylor
22 March 2019
Acknowledgements

The journey of a PhD dissertation is, at times, a solitary and an isolating one, but it is never travelled alone. I am profoundly grateful for the wonderful people that have been part of it. First, I must acknowledge and thank the courageous and compassionate French “solidarity delinquents” who generously entrusted me with their sensitive stories and personal experiences of hospitality.

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Abstract

This project interrogates how hospitality operates as a concept and a political practice. Since the concept’s first sustained appearance as an object of social and political thought some thirty years ago, scholarship has centred almost entirely on the figure of the migrant and a critique of sovereign states and their often inhospitable attitudes and practices. This dissertation breaks with this tradition in two crucial respects. First, I attend to the governmental aspect of hospitality. I show how hospitality is being (re)conceptualised, indeed problematised, as a concern for security in our era of global flows and mobility. This dissertation thus contributes to current debates on governmentality through an extended analysis into the power relations of hospitality. Second, I focus on hosts rather than migrants, and in particular, on French citizens who host migrants today in defiance of laws forbidding it (and named “solidarity delinquents” as a result). Drawing on in-depth interviews, I show that France’s “solidarity delinquents” are savvy to the state’s instrumentalisation and politicisation of hospitality. Yet they too have a use for politicising both hospitality and themselves. My central claim is that defiant acts of hospitality constitute ways of “becoming political”. Specifically, the citizen-hosts are trying to reimagine what it means to be a French citizen and to recuperate and revive the French republican legacy of fraternity and equality. The crimes that they commit hold the state to account; yet at the same time, these help the citizens to care for themselves by reclaiming their own national and political identity. The historical and empirical analysis in this thesis captures the crucial yet undertheorised role that hospitality plays—as sometimes ally of the state and at other times of dissenting citizens—in shaping competing conceptions of what citizenship and identity can and does mean at certain times and places.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Cour d’Appel (Appeal Court)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADA</td>
<td>Centre d’accueil de demandeurs d’asile (Asylum Seekers Reception centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCNDH</td>
<td>Commission Consultative Nationale des Droits de l’Homme (National Consultative Commission on Human Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESEDA</td>
<td>Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Right to Asylum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRS</td>
<td>Centre national de la recherche scientifique (National Centre for Scientific Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Centre d’orientation et d’accueil (Orientation and Reception centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURODAC</td>
<td>European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Border and Coast Guard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GISTI</td>
<td>Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés (Information and Support Group for Migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDH</td>
<td>Ligue des droits de l’homme (Human Rights League)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFII</td>
<td>Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration (French Office for Immigration and Integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFPRA</td>
<td>Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACA</td>
<td>Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (French Administrative Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESF</td>
<td>Réseau Education Sans Frontières (Education without Borders Network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Schengen Implementation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Tribunal Correctionnel (Criminal Court)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGI</td>
<td>Tribunal de Grande Instance (Regional Court)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

On 4 January 2017, Cédric Herrou, a farmer from the Franco-Italian Valley of the Roya (a key crossing point for migrants into France from Italy), was placed on trial for assisting some 200 irregular-status foreigners (étranger en situation irrégulière) to enter and pass through France, providing many of them with shelter first in his home and later at a disused national railway building. He was sentenced in February 10 of that year and handed down a suspended fine of 3,000 Euros. The public prosecutor appealed for a harsher verdict. On 8 August, Cédric was sentenced in the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal to four-months imprisonment with suspension of penalty and strict judicial supervision.¹ Since his first 2017 arrest, he has been brought into police custody for questioning a total of nine times (Le Point 2018). The French League of Human Rights (LDH) has publicly denounced the degree of harassment levelled at Herrou, notably his many arrests following police searches of his home and the violent deployments of gendarme forces equipped with bullet-proof vests and helmets. A journalist at the scene of one such deployment was tackled to the ground in scenes more evocative of the nation’s ongoing battle against terrorist extremism (LDH 2017).

On 17 October 2016, Pierre-Alain Mannoni, a 45-year-old researcher for the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Geography and Marine Ecology professor at Nice University, was arrested whilst driving three badly-injured young Eritrean girls to seek medical attention, for which the prosecutor of the Nice Criminal Court demanded a six-month suspended prison sentence (Le Monde 2017). Notwithstanding his 6 January 2017 acquittal on humanitarian grounds, the prosecution appealed the decision and pressed for imprisonment. Later that year he was given a two-month prison sentence with suspension in the same appellate court as Herrou.² At the time of writing, both men await a verdict appealing their sentencing in the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation).

¹ CA Aix-en-Provence, August 8, 2017, no. 2017/568
² CA Aix-en-Provence, September, 11, 2017, no. 2017/628
French citizens working with non-governmental humanitarian organizations have suffered similar fates. For example, a 73-year-old Amnesty International volunteer, Martine Landry, has faced a similar set of circumstances throughout 2017-18: arrest-trial-acquittal-appeal. She currently awaits an appeal verdict for her punishable “crime” of transporting two unaccompanied Guinean minors to a police station to ensure their protection by the state (Gonzalès 2018). And Denis Lambert, an Education Without Borders (RESF) volunteer, was prosecuted for lodging a family of undocumented Armenians at his Perpignan home between January 2014 and June 2015 following their failed asylum claim. He was arrested for receiving direct “compensation” for his assistance in the form of domestic chores, thus infringing the conditions under articles L.622 1-4 of the French penal Code that regulates the Entry and Sojourn of Foreigners and of Right to Asylum (abbreviated CESEDA). The Code stipulates one must receive no compensatory benefit (contrepartie) for the provision of assistance to irregular-status foreigners. Article L.622-1 of the CESEDA penalises any individual found guilty of “directly or indirectly assisting or attempting to assist the entry, movement or residence of an irregular-status foreigner in France”, and carries with it a maximum five-year prison sentence and 30,000 Euro fine.

The above-cited cases are but four of the many recent examples of applying L.622-1 to prosecute and convict concerned citizens and humanitarian volunteers for supporting migrants and asylum seekers. GISTI (Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés), one of France’s most respected immigrant information and support groups, has been documenting cases of citizen intimidation, arrest and prosecution for “crimes of solidarity” for over thirty years. In February 2017, GISTI condemned the “outbreak” of such cases in recent months as it lent support to a nationwide “solidarity with solidarity” campaign launched by Délinquants Solidaires—a collective incorporating upwards of 650 national and regional associations under its manifesto of denouncing the repression and criminalisation of solidarity (GISTI 2017, 2018b). The February 2017 solidarity movement in France was the largest since 2009, which saw demonstrators take to the streets in 92 cities to express

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3 TGI Nice, 13 July 2018, n° 2124/2018
4 TC Perpignan, 15 July 2015
5 « ...l’acte reproché [ne doit donner] lieu à aucune contrepartie directe ou indirecte. » Article L622-4, CESEDA.
6 Article L622-1, CESEDA.
solidarity with those facing heavy fines and jail sentences for refusing to obey laws heralded as unjust (Délinquants Solidaires 2009, 7).

This dissertation takes its inspiration from the recent criminalisation of solidarity that is taking place in the French Republic. On the one hand, and taking this phenomenon as my point of departure, I research the ways and motivations through which the state acts “as host”. On the other, my goal is to elucidate the conditions and motivations through which citizens challenge statist conceptions and practices of hospitality, and the effects that these produce. This critical analysis enables me to reflect more generally and theoretically on questions of hospitality, citizenship and identity, and the complex relation that exists between all three.

Yet as my opening epigraph attests, there is nothing novel about the French “crimes of solidarity” phenomenon. The law criminalising assistance for irregular-status foreigners in France was first legislated as Article 4 of the 2 May 1938 “Daladier” décret-loi (decree) on the policing of foreigners (Ferran 2010). The timing of this decree is indicative of its sentiment. Adopted in a climate of aggravated xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the prelude to WW2, it was the first in a series in which several relied on the construction of a “good” and “bad” immigrant to restrict the rights of foreigners (Slama 2009). In the wake of France’s liberation, the decree was promulgated verbatim into law as Article 21 of the Ordonnance of 2 November 1945. Only half a century later was it subject to minor revisions, such as those of 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2003, mainly to bring French law into line with the Schengen Agreement and European Union (EU) Directives (Allsopp 2012, 13). While the legislated amendments of 1991 appeared to have in mind only organised networks (smugglers, traffickers and employers)—being those who stood to profit financially from the plight of foreigners as opposed to persons providing disinterested assistance to strangers in need—1994 marked the real turning point in the law’s history.

The 1994 amendments were introduced to bring the French legislation into line with the 1990 Schengen Implementation Agreement (SIA). Crucially, however, legislators refused to incorporate an all-important condition of Article 27 under the SIA. This article mandates the imposition of “appropriate penalties for any person who assists, or tries to assist, an alien to enter or reside within the territory of one of the [EU] Contracting Parties” and who do so “for financial gain”. While the offense provided for by Article 27 explicitly and exclusively targets behaviour motivated for profit-making purposes, the French Government
refused to introduce this clarification into French law. The omission of this clause drew the ire of several French parliamentarians for its broad expansion in the law’s scope; several amendments were thus necessary to appease a hostile senate. These principally entailed legal immunities for certain “facilitators” of irregular residence: ascendants, descendants and spouse of the foreigner (in 1996), and later expanded to include siblings, the spouse of a person already under immunity, and any person living in a *de facto* relationship with the foreigner (in 1998). But these only paved the way for those not covered by the immunities to be subject to legal proceedings and punishment by law.

Modifications in 2003 cemented this reality. For meanwhile, the EU had legislated clear provisions to exempt “humanitarian” and “not-for-profit” assistance under its Council Directive of 28 November 2002 which defines the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. The EU Directive, which requires ratification into the domestic laws of Member States, *exempts* from penalty those helpers who do not act for financial gain. It further stipulates that Member States each hold the discretionary right to decide *against* the imposition of sanctions for the assistance of irregular migrants intended as humanitarian.

French legislators incorporated the EU “humanitarian” directive as required on 26 November 2003. Curiously, they omitted to include the clearly-defined exemptions above of the EU Directive. Its adoption into French law would therefore continue to blur the distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit by neglecting to exempt the latter from penalty (Slama 2009, 2010). Whether intentionally or otherwise, the ambiguous ratification of the 2003 legislation did little to alleviate the conflation between ordinary citizens and humanitarian organisations on the one hand, and professional (often networked) smugglers on the other. So although intended to combat organised networks of illegal immigration or potential terrorists, the law’s ambiguity is arguably geared to deter concerned citizens from helping foreigners who seek to enter the country or move about once inside its borders. The provision of legal immunities seen in this light is at best tenuous, if not non-existent, given the ongoing prosecution and imprisonment sentences for citizens intent on extending aid and welcome to migrants.

It is noteworthy that the notion “crime of solidarity” has no juridical validity. It is a phrase that was coined by a large civil society movement in voicing its opposition to French

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laws. What thus began as a militant catchcry in the 1990s was then popularised with the drafting and signing of the Délinquants Solidaires Manifesto in 2003 and the intense public debate of early 2009 instigated by humanitarian and migrant organisations who called attention to the number of people increasingly falling foul of the police and judicial systems (GISTI 2009). Protestors in the April 2009 nationwide demonstrations demanded the abolition of L.622-1 and thus an end to the criminalisation of private citizens giving not-for-profit aid and shelter to needy migrants. Buoyed by the groundswell of outrage towards the repression and criminalisation of solidarity, what simply began as a militant notion in French civil society, took firm hold in the political arena with the introduction of a “Crimes of Solidarity” legislative bill in 2009 by left-leaning members of parliament. The Bill intended to “decriminalise” solidarity by contending that disinterested humanitarian help offered to refugees and asylum seekers was but “a display of the Republican triptych in recalling its third term: fraternité” (Assemblée Nationale 2009). In entreaty their fellow parliamentarians to live up to the Republic’s principles and echoing much of the Délinquants Solidaires’ demand to halt the crackdown of fraternity, the Bill’s authors sought to abolish a law whose manifest ambiguities enabled public prosecutors to launch legal proceedings against well-meaning citizens. The Bill was defeated in parliament by 326 votes to 225, reflecting partisan divisions over best approaches to combat irregular immigration.

Finally, the 2012 change in presidency and government brought with it promises of sweeping changes to the “crime of solidarity” legislation. Yet the modifications swiftly introduced by President Hollande’s new interior minister, Manuel Valls, did not abrogate the law in the way that civil society had been calling for. For the changes in the law concerned, again, only the exemptions listed under Art. L.622-4: that is, the close relatives of those assisted could not be prosecuted, neither could any person helping a foreigner in “real or imminent danger”, so long as the humanitarian act came with no “benefit” to the well-intentioned citizen. This did not deter Valls from hailing the move as the “abolishment of the ‘crime’ of solidarity”; specifically, the legislative ambiguity that facilitated the punishment of disinterested assistance afforded to irregular immigrants (Attia 2017). The
infamous L.622-1 law remained untouched; instead, extended immunities would now protect acts that:

Have not given rise to any direct or indirect compensation and consist in the provision of legal advice, meals, accommodation or medical care to ensure the foreigner with dignified and decent living conditions, or any other assistance intended to preserve the dignity or physical integrity of that person.

Significantly, the revisions (in italics) make mention of the residence of irregular migrants, but nothing of their entry or movement. Further, “helpers” would need to satisfy the double condition of receiving no “compensation” and of providing only a very limited set of acts with ever more restrictive intentions. While the latest revisions go some way to establishing a distinction between people smuggling networks on the one hand, and volunteers of humanitarian and other associations and ordinary citizens on the other hand, Parliament appears to have merely sidestepped rather than addressed the issue of transporting vulnerable migrants in need, including border crossings. That more than thirteen people stood trial under Hollande’s presidency, and a further fourteen since Emmanuel Macron took office in mid-2017, reveals the gap between the position of the public prosecutor’s office and the legislature’s (and executive’s) desire to end “crimes of solidarity”. Cosmetic reforms such as these, which tinker with formulations rather than offer substantive change, facilitate precisely the kind of ongoing intimidation, prosecution and conviction of French citizens that I presented in the opening lines of this dissertation.

Research Paradigm

My interest in the crimes of solidarity phenomenon in France was sparked during a fieldwork trip to investigate citizenship subjectivities of the sans-papiers (literally: undocumented) in the southern city of Marseille. There I met several locals who had undertaken to host migrants in defiance of laws forbidding it (and named “solidarity delinquents” by the state). Through them I became acquainted with the Reseau Hospitalité (Hospitality Network): a civil society group borne of an earlier experiment—the Sanctuaire network. Sanctuaire grouped under its banner a host of French towns that offered asylum
and refuge in the manner of the Sanctuary Movement that began in the United States (1985) before taking hold in the United Kingdom (2005). Significantly, Sanctuary Movement members are historically known to act in defiance of state laws to expose governmental failures on the asylum provision of foreigners in need (Chinchilla, Hamilton, and Loucky 2009). The expression “Sanctuary” network aligns itself all-too-uncomfortably with religious connotation in staunchly secular France, it was thus re-baptised the Hospitality Network.

But this noteworthy distinction aside, what piqued my interest—and is pivotal to the research orientation of this dissertation—is the predominantly *political dimension* attributed to the notion of hospitality by the Network. *Hospitalité*, as they state in their Charter,

must be understood as moving beyond the act of generosity which consists of opening up one’s door and welcoming [others] into the home. Understood as assuming *le vivre ensemble* [the revered French republican ideal that engages the difficult project of *living together* with plural others], *hospitalité* offers the movement a “political” dimension in the broad and primary sense of the term. (Réseau Hospitalité 2017)

With this fateful pairing of state “crimes of solidarity”, citizenly acts of disobedience, and an unmistakable “political” dimension ascribed to the seemingly ethical concept and practice of hospitality, this research project was initiated. It is motivated by a desire to understand why French citizens choose to defy the state by carrying out acts of disobedient—political—hospitality.

The French Republic, on the strength of its founding principles of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, has a long history of claiming itself as the land of asylum and hospitality (as *France terre d’asile* and *la France hospitalière*) as well as the patrie (home) of human rights. That it actively pursues the criminalisation of its citizens for acts of solidarity and fraternity towards vulnerable refugees is, at best, confounding. The situation is even more so when citizens refer to their acts of civil disobedience as re-staking a claim on these very same French republican values, rooted in their own specific understanding of what it means to be a citizen of France. This perplexity and the glaring tensions that it associates, mark out a key motivation for why I chose a focus on France to communicate broader lessons on
hospitality. Further, its political history, as we will see, provides a fruitful site of study given its elevation of fraternity to a key ethical and political principle, as this only dramatises tensions between hospitality and closure.

This dissertation is animated by a series of research questions. The first three concern the French citizens who offer hospitality to irregular migrants and are thus guilty of so-called “crimes of solidarity”:

1. **What are these citizens acting against, and why?**
2. **What is the relationship between the citizens’ process of becoming political, namely through acts of civil disobedience, and hospitality?**
3. **What do the “citizen-hosts” hope to gain from their acts, at both a collective and personal level?**

My next two research questions approach the same issue but from the perspective of the French state. Here, I ask:

4. **What are the state’s motivations for prosecuting its citizens?**
5. **What connections does the state draw between hospitality and citizenship?**

In sum, the central thrust of these research questions taken as a whole is to deepen and re-theorise our understanding of hospitality; and crucially, the relationship that it bears, the role that hospitality plays even, in shaping both state and citizen conceptions of citizenship and identity.

**Theoretical Framework and Argument**

My work is one of political theory, in which I draw on a handful of theorists. Since the concept’s first sustained appearance as an object of social and political thought some thirty years ago, scholarship on hospitality has almost entirely centred on the figure of the migrant and a critique of sovereign states and their often inhospitable attitudes and practices. This critique routinely entreats states, and similarly its citizens, to act more “ethically” in their dealings with the foreigner in his or her demand for hospitality (Bessone 2015). A major consequence of this research orientation is that exploration of how hospitality is conceived and practiced is all too often narrowed to a hierarchical privileging of its ethical dimensions.
and relations. This has occluded sustained thought and analysis into how hospitality might be imagined or practiced in the political realm. That is, when hospitality is a matter of how states allow foreigners and strangers access to their political community. In answering the research questions, this dissertation breaks with this tradition in two crucial respects.

First, I attend to the governmental aspect of hospitality. Accordingly, Foucault’s work on the governmental state is one of the main concepts of this dissertation. Through it I contend that hospitality must be seen in terms of governmentality. In particular, in this dissertation I claim that hospitality is today being (re)conceptualised, indeed problematised, as a concern for security in our era of global flows and mobility. What I am concerned to identify and understand is how and why hospitality comes to be developed (and deployed) as a series of security measures of the state—*rationalised*, to use the language of Foucault—in the name of a certain conception of the national home and host. To be clear, my focus is not on the question of whether in general the state has a right to control its borders. Of greater interest and import is the instrumental role that hospitality plays in achieving this particular state aim. Thus, a focus on governmentality enables me to spotlight and analyse the problematic situation of the state in which public hospitality (in terms of both immigration and humanitarianism) is used in order to define the state’s insiders and outsiders, citizenship and identity. Indeed, this focus on how hospitality is claimed and practiced by the state as a means to identify and classify foreigners and to regulate their access into and out of the national “home”—what, adapting Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, we might call its ambition for a monopoly over the decision of hospitality and hence a monopoly on its identity—acutely raises the broader questions and stakes of the relationship between hospitality, citizenship, and identity.

Second, I break with tradition in the hospitality literature by focusing on dissident French citizens who take it upon themselves the role of host and benefactor of hospitality. The novelty of my research approach is thus that it is not geared towards outsiders and the needy as the beneficiaries of hospitality (and main focus of scholarship): it lies strictly with the hosts themselves. The reason for this is simple. My goal is to show how (and why) hospitality as it is claimed, practiced and politicised by citizens who commit “crimes of solidarity”, is not done simply for the sake of “the other”, but also for the sake of “saving” their own country from a populist and nativist path that these citizens see it headed in. Moreover, it is claimed also for the sake of themselves, through their reimagining and
staking their own national and political identity through the hospitable act of openness, fraternity and welcome.

The above sets out the broader problems and questions of my dissertation. In order to substantiate the claims made and to demonstrate the fluidity of hospitality as a technique and ally that historically has served both state and citizen, my theoretical framework incorporates the writing of key theorists and thinkers such as Michel Foucault (on governmentality and “care of the self”) and Jacques Derrida (on hospitality). I also draw on the work of William Walters on *domopolitics*: a form of “government of the state” that employs constructions and the rhetoric of the nation as a *home* to legitimate security measures directed at both citizens and disparate inflows of migrants (Walters 2004). Engin Isin’s (2008) conceptual frame of “acts of citizenship” was also especially fruitful to make sense of the motivations and meanings of political hospitality (as enacted in conditions of civil disobedience) and its relation to citizenship.

This thesis rubs against the grain of much that is written and theorised on hospitality, which, as we will see, is strongly influenced by the work of Jacques Derrida. The central thrust of my argument is that Derrida envisions hospitality in terms of private acts of hospitality. In a nutshell, this form of hospitality speaks to the act of inviting people into one’s personal home. No doubt, Derrida’s work on hospitality is valuable: it offers an insightful characterisation into the relations between sovereignty and hospitality. But where things go wrong, as I show, is when we move to generalise in the abstract, and to stretch the notion of private hospitality to the level of the state, all the while presuming that it works in the same way without acknowledgement of the concrete difficulties of doing so or making the necessary adjustments to such a reading. Why do I argue that this is problematic? For the simple reason that we become blind to key features of the uses and dimensions of hospitality that are not present in domestic, private situations but which hold a crucial role in the political realm and extension of hospitality. My contention is that Derrida’s argument leads us to think through the problem of hospitality and how it is offered or denied according to an inappropriate model (i.e., that of the domestic home). As a result, it misunderstands what hospitality can mean in certain places and why hospitality is being deployed. And with respect to my particular case, it cannot make sense of the kind of hospitality practiced by French citizens in response to statist conceptions of it.
In this dissertation I make three contributions to political theory and the study of hospitality and citizenship. The first is to broaden our understanding of hospitality. Hospitality, as conceived of and practiced by the state today, is a form of governmentality. Governmental hospitality, I show, is operationalised through a series of tactics and rationalities that serve to identify and classify, facilitate or circumscribe, the mobility of foreigners found within the home. What is significant in my account, is that not only does it provide a vantage point to observe a mode of power that extends beyond the state-as-sovereignty. We also become alert to how the modern state works and crafts its role as host. Further, through this process, the state is strengthened in its aims of retaining a monopoly of control over its home and hence its identity.

The research makes its second contribution in broadening understandings of citizenship. Through a focus on France’s “solidarity delinquents”, I show how and why citizens act against statist practices of inhospitality by hosting migrants in defiance of laws that forbid it. Not only are these citizens savvy to the state’s instrumentalisation and politicisation of hospitality, I have shown that their acts of defiant hospitality in response to the state, and for which they seek answerability and justiciability, are distinct ways of “becoming political”. In defying the state, these indignant subjects have found the means to constitute themselves as citizens. The work in this dissertation demonstrates the crucial role that hospitality plays in such a process.

While the above two contributions are made to the fields of hospitality and citizenship, the third contribution I make is substantive. I claim that French citizens who defy the state through their acts of hospitality do so for a range of reasons and motivations. Of course, a key motivation is to care for and provide sustenance, accommodation, and shelter for vulnerable migrants. But their hospitality is also a means to reclaim their own patrie and its founding ideas and ideals. The citizen-hosts believe that the way the state perceives and enacts hospitality is damaging to their self-perception of what it means to be a French citizen. Through their actions, the citizen-hosts claim themselves the true heirs of the universalist republican tradition: they declare their home, and hence their identity, as a place of welcome, universal fraternity, hospitality and equality. My research brings to light the ways in which delinquent hosts seek to revive and recuperate republican universalism in the sense that they want to see it honoured at home. Their story is one of reclaiming the mantle of French republicanism. Hospitality is their strategic means to achieve that and to
contest state power (domopolitical) rule, which makes hospitality from below a friend and tactic for dissident citizens.

Yet not all defiant acts of hospitality were extended towards foreigners with such political motivations or effects. I found that for some citizen-hosts, the need to help and offer hospitality was motivated by ethical concerns and for ethical ends that were directed inwards: helping others provided a valuable and therapeutic resource to help the citizens to care for themselves—*primarily for the sake of themselves*—in a world that had come to signify alienation, disillusionment, chaos and duplicity. This inward-looking and ethical aspect to hospitality is certainly surprising and not something that we expect to find in a language and tradition that is so centred on care for others. It discloses a whole other realm of hospitality and the motivations for it that is unrecognised in the literature. My central argument is that to properly understand how hospitality is practiced today, we need to bring these different motivations and effects clearly in view.

**Dissertation Map**

This dissertation is divided into two parts. In Part One I overview the concept of hospitality. I then outline the contours of its governmental aspect that furnishes a foundation for the interpretive analysis of the state on the question of migrancy and citizenship. I integrate these analyses on the state into an historical and theoretical study of the French state’s conception and practice of hospitality. This sets up a vision of the state that comes to be contested by its citizens. Part Two introduces the voices of the “solidarity delinquents” with the aim of interpreting and analysing politicising practices that defy the state as a way to reclaim and revive the republican legacy of fraternity and hospitality; and also, to care their themselves. I establish that hospitality is a strategic means for citizens to achieve their aim of reviving and reclaiming the mantle of French republicanism.

**Part One**

In Chapter Two I provide an historical overview of the concept of hospitality and set out its ethical and political aspects. I then move to introduce Derrida’s theorisation on hospitality, which he essentially sets out as a paradox or aporia. I lay out the insufficiency of this reading, not because it is impractical or doesn’t take on considerations of the real
world. Rather Derrida’s argument is based on a misconception of the political that leads him to misread the sovereign/state host as homogenous—as one agent or sovereign who decides upon entry or not into the home. I make the argument to go “beyond Derrida” at the risk of failing to understand how hospitality is being practiced today by state and citizens alike.

Chapter Three introduces Foucault’s conceptual framework of governmentality. I argue that hospitality should be seen as a governmentality of the contemporary state. More specifically, through the dual lens of domopolitics and ethopolitics, I explore the technologies and political rationalities that are deployed through a series of security measures. The operation of domopolitical hospitality is shown as a convergence of home-security-territory that serves to make determinations about access to the political community, and thus citizenship and national identity.

In Chapter Four I build on the above by applying my findings to the concrete case of the French state. This work is grounded in the historical analysis of hospitality in modern France and its relation to citizenship, and pays particular attention to the revolutionary period before examining the present-day dialectic of humanité/fermeté. In this history of the present, I show hospitality as briefly an ally of the citizen and of citizenship ideals, before it undergoes “statification” in post-revolutionary France to become an ally of state power and governmentality. This sets out the tension buried deep within the French republican tradition between a universalist understanding of republican citizenship on the one hand, and on the other, a conception and practice of hospitality in the service of state control, security and identity formation.

Part Two

My goal in Part Two is to present the voices of the French citizens—the “solidarity delinquents”—who host migrants in defiance of state laws. In Chapter Five I begin by addressing the research questions that relate to the citizens’ actions: namely, what they seek to gain at a collective level, and the connections they draw between hospitality and citizenship. Engin Isin’s (2008) theory of “acts of citizenship” is the interpretive tool used to access the insights drawn from the citizen-hosts’ testimonies. From this basis I examine how, through civil disobedience, concerned individuals break with deep-rooted patterns and
practices of state inhospitality and so actualise their understanding of what it means to be a French citizen today. Crucially, I show that in a mirror image of how we saw the state practice hospitality in Chapter Two, citizens use hospitality as a technique to realise their self-constitution as citizens and, effectively, to redeem their own country and its political and republican ideals.

In Chapter Six I turn to consider a minority of solidarity delinquents whose description of their acts and motivations differ from those of the previous chapter. I document how, in their case, the motivation for hosting in conditions of disobedience was neither primarily a case of helping vulnerable migrants, nor was it one of steering France onto a more hospitable path on the question of its governance of migrancy and citizenship. Drawing on Foucault’s analytic frame of “the care of the self”, in this chapter I contend that political hospitality is understood and practiced by certain solidarity delinquents as a valuable resource to care for themselves. The value of drawing attention to this therapeutic aspect of hospitality, is that it encapsulates features that we do not expect to find in the hospitality literature, nor in the tradition as a whole, given a central preoccupation of hospitality is the care of precarious others.

In Chapter Seven I conclude this dissertation with a summary and discussion of the key findings and contributions of this study, and a reflection on directions for future research on the broader question of republicanism that this dissertation raises.
Definition of Terms: Migrant, foreigner, asylum seeker or refugee?

The use of language is critically important to understand the meanings, intentions and perception of acts. Word choice also contributes to the way that different subject-positions, values and ideas are constructed and conveyed. I explain some of the terms that I choose to use here.

In this dissertation I use the terms asylum seeker and refugee infrequently, even though the individuals who are the subject of care and hospitality at the hands of French citizens are most likely either one or the other at any stage of their journey that has taken them to France. A refugee, according to the Refugee Convention (1951) is:

A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Article 1)

An asylum seeker is a person who awaits a determination on their application for protection and refuge from the government of a country that is not their own. Not only is this term loaded with layers of suspicion, threat and claims to “illegality” (not least in my own country Australia), in France, as the country here under investigation but similarly in countless others, potential asylum seekers, and thus potential refugees, are daily prevented from lodging claims for protection through the actions of (essentially Western) governments. While certainly moving and important, this aspect of the migrant experience is not the central focus of this thesis, and so although I use these terms, I do so sparingly and in keeping with the specificities of individual/situational context.

My preference is to use the word “migrant”. I consider this term to be more representative of the person at any given time or particular stage of their journey of displacement from home. A migrant is a person on the move. But one’s (forced) displacement neither necessarily nor automatically indicates an intention to formally apply
for protection from the country in which they temporarily reside. The current migrant situation in Calais is a clear testament to this. There is a further and rather straightforward reason for this word choice. In a similar vein to Thomas Nail’s *The Figure of the Migrant* (2015), I wish to draw out the importance of this figure for nation-states from the perspective (and politics) of movement and mobility. For as I document in this dissertation, it is largely the *mobility* of the migrant that becomes circumscribed, governed and restricted in our contemporary era. It is the migrant’s mobility that repeatedly makes this figure a target of governmental intervention and regulation.

I also frequently use the word *foreigner*. It accurately describes the figure of the migrant who is not native to (or naturalised in) the country under consideration. Yet, the term “foreigner” can be slippery. This was made apparent early on in my particular case given the scholarly literature and other sources consulted in French for this dissertation. For the “foreigner” (*l’étranger* in French) also translates as the “stranger”. More to the point, *l’étranger* translates many English words. A recent anecdote vividly shows its polysemy.

When compiling an information sheet on my project for the Solidarity Delinquent Collective to assist with the sourcing of interviewees, I included the link to a book chapter in English on the topic of French “crimes of solidarity”. Out of curiosity, I ran the title through a translation app to see how a computer would render all of these different terms. To my surprise the translated book title read: “*Faire des étrangers, des étrangers, des étrangers et des étrangers*”! This one French term would convey all of the different terms in English. In using the terms *foreigner* and *stranger* (and to a lesser extent, outsider) interchangeably in this dissertation, I wish to draw attention to this term *étranger* and how French thinking, and my own in its wake, is structured along the lines of a term that combines foreignness and strangeness.
PART ONE

THE STATE
Chapter 2

ON HOSPITALITY

Introduction

As a virtue, an attitude and a code for conducting relations with others in the world (McNevin and Missbach 2018), hospitality is a notion we all know something of. Whether we offer a friend, relative or colleague a meal, a bed for the night, an afternoon or evening of entertainment, these gestures of hospitality that we call “everyday experience” denote that our door is open to invited guests (Still 2010, 1). To think of hospitality is to conjure up notions of openness and the welcoming of others, of generosity and attentiveness, of responsibility as well as uncertainty; for there are no hard and fast rules as to either its precise form, duration, or when and even if an offer of hospitality might be reciprocated.

That hospitality entails sharing our homes with invited guests inevitably prompts consideration of receiving those outside one’s circle of friendship, family or colleagues. That is, to think beyond the “everyday” of hospitality and engage with the age-old question of the stranger-guest: the uninvited, unknown and possibly unwelcome Other. The arrival of such a guest is much more complicated than the already-known acquaintance; it imbues hospitality with ethical, cultural, and political undertones. Under what conditions might a hospitable encounter take place? Who can be admitted as a guest? Those invited and awaited, certainly; but what about those uninvited or unannounced to the host? How might receiving (or not) the other define the way we self-identify—individually, as a community, or even a nation?

These questions testify to the contingent and uncertain nature of how subjects are constructed and positioned through hospitality—whether as guests, hosts, strangers and outsiders. They are not, however, new questions. Hospitality is as old as human movement itself. With its long tradition in the Abrahamic faiths (Reaves 2016), in the mythologies and civilisations of the ancient, classical and medieval worlds (Gauthier 1973, Pancaroğlu 2013), in nomadic and Bedouin societies (Shryock 2008, 2012), or in the Kantian approach to achieving cosmopolitan peace (Deleixhe 2014), hospitality is one of the oldest “themes” in human civilisation (Germann Molz and Gibson 2007, 3, McNevin and Missbach 2018).
Indeed, in our contemporary era of mass migration and refugee and citizenship crises, the concept has only gained in relevance and importance. A clear indication is the recent resurgence of hospitality as a critical lens across multiple disciplines to understand the manner in which states and political communities respond to the influx of displaced persons (see, e.g., Shryock 2012, Manzanas Calvo 2013, Tataryn 2013, Dahlberg 2014, Topak 2016, Boudou 2017, McNevin and Missbach 2018).

My interest in hospitality is linked to a central aim of this thesis: to interpret the “becoming political” of citizens. Becoming political is, of course, a broad theme and can take many forms. The particular form that interests me is civil disobedience. More specifically still, I am interested in the contemporary case of French citizens who defy the state under the banner of “crimes of solidarity”—a dissident movement that challenges the way the state perceives and practices hospitality. When I therefore ask what it means for citizens to “host” in defiance of the state, I seek to understand this particular form of citizenly politicisation and its relation to hospitality. I ask: what do these citizens act against when they defy the state and host the nation’s uninvited, unwelcomed, outside “other”?

An adequate answer to this question requires that we firmly establish what hospitality as a practice, code and virtue can and does mean: in our world today, but also with an eye to its tradition in ancient, religious or tribal societies. Given these wide-ranging characteristics, it is no surprise that hospitality is saturated with meaning and comprises distinctive ethical and political dimensions. In this chapter I survey and analyse the different practices and dimensions of hospitality with an aim to drawing out its ambivalences, entanglements, paradoxes and relationships: namely, how these engage the spaces of hospitality (home and identity), the boundaries that delimit these, and the connection to sovereignty. These investigations will provide anchor points for the work of later chapters.

Importantly, in this chapter I introduce the reader to Jacques Derrida’s (1999, 2000b, 2001b, 2002a) writings on hospitality. I do so for two reasons. First, Derrida’s account is undoubtedly the most widely-drawn on in scholarship on hospitality. He offers, we will see, valuable insights into the characterisation of the relations between sovereignty and hospitality; namely in terms of representing the power dynamic of hospitality and the paradox of hospitality itself.

Second, I believe that key features of Derrida’s reading of hospitality are problematic; and in my particular case, fail to make sense of the kind of hospitality practiced by French
citizens in response to statist conceptions of it. My central claim in this chapter is that Derrida’s theorising misunderstands what hospitality can mean in certain places and why hospitality is being deployed (by both state and dissident citizens).

This chapter has four sections. First, I survey the contours and history of the concept of hospitality. I then move to outline and provide an analysis of the ethical (Section Two) and the political (Section Three) aspects and domains of hospitality. Specifically, in these sections I introduce some of the key spatial and relational elements of hospitality: home, identity and otherness, and their relation to risk and uncertainty. In Section Three I introduce Derrida’s work on hospitality since it provides an anchor for my account and analysis into its complex interplay of ethics, politics and the spaces called “home”. Section Four outlines the limitations of Derrida’s account of hospitality. The work in this chapter will set the groundwork for the key concepts examined in this thesis: hospitality (its power relations, politicisation and instrumentalisation), how the state functions as “host” (Part One), and how citizens work as “counter-hosts” (Part Two). And perhaps most important, the relationship, the complicated game being played, between all three phenomena: hospitality – the state – the citizen.

A History of Hospitality: negotiating home, identity and otherness

Historically, hospitality is associated with religious and ethical imperatives that stem from “two foundational sources that were eventually brought together”: Abrahamic faith and classical antiquity (Shryock 2012, S21). To illustrate the first of these legacies, Kevin O’Gorman (2007), in working through the origins of hospitality, gives an account of the Biblical references in the Old and New Testaments that depict hospitality shown to strangers. Here hospitality is consistently represented and exhorted as a sacred duty, that is, as a commandment to generosity and as a call for respect and charity to protect and attend to the needs of the stranger as “unknown identity” through the provision of food, rest and shelter (ibid., 19-20). The tale of Abraham welcoming the three strangers who pass by his home and to whom he offers his best provisions is paradigmatic of Judeo-Christian teachings on the ethical treatment of strangers (Akins 2004, 47).

Similarly, hospitality in the Qur’an is described “as a virtue that lies at the very basis of the Islamic ethical system, a concept rooted in the pre-Islamic Bedouin virtues of welcome
and generosity in the harsh desert environment” (Siddiqui 2017), virtues that Andrew Shryock suggests combine pious obligation and “nobility of character” (2008, 406). Mona Siddiqui further stresses the reduced importance of the idea of the stranger as “unknown identity” in Islamic thought in comparison with other Abrahamic faiths: Muslim traditions of hospitality focus largely on “the host/guest relationship and host/traveller rather than that of host/stranger” Siddiqui (2017). Here, the ethical imperative of hospitality (to generously give and share food and water, solidarity and sociality) is conceived in relation to one’s place of dwelling (desert) and the peoples (nomadic) that pass through it; this demonstrates the importance of place and dwelling one identifies with to the ethos of hospitality.

In the second of hospitality’s foundational sources—classical antiquity—the notion of the stranger’s identity is more ambivalent. Hospitality narratives in Greek mythology prescribe granting generous and liberal assistance and protection to strangers as a way of honouring the gods, the latter being foundational to civilised life (O’Gorman 2007, 20). Theoxenia (divine visitation in the home of mortals) was not uncommon. Homeric poems often told of the suppliant stranger who later revealed himself as a God or hero disguised, nourishing the idea that with true hospitality, a stranger’s identity mattered little to the host (Akins 2004, 15). Indeed, irrespective of identity, one was bound in sacred duty to freely give hospitality and any dereliction would incur the wrath of the gods. A similar motif of the stranger/beggar is found in the texts of Ovid. In Metamorphoses, he narrates the story of the gods Jupiter and Mercury who descended upon earth under the guise of beggars. Among a thousand villagers, only Philemon and Baucis opened their doors to share with them what little they had: their hospitality (and moral upstanding) thusly tested was handsomely rewarded (O’Gorman 2007, 21).

Through its multiple historical manifestations, we can observe a commonality: the ethical commandment to hospitality. This commandment is aided by encounters that take place in the realms of the holy, the secret or the indeterminate, and which appear to harbour something of the sacred and noble. The indeterminacy and sacredness of the hospitable encounter plays out in the ambivalence of the stranger/guest and the unsettled question of their knowability. Lastly, I note that the legacy of classical antiquity extends equally to the intellectual sphere. For beyond historical meanings of hospitality as a religious virtue, Plato himself saw in its practice one of the “first and foremost obligations of the citizen” (Manzanas Calvo 2013, 109). And here we have an early connection between
hospitality and citizenship that I wish to flag and will revisit at length when, in Chapter Four, we examine the concrete case of France.

**The Ethical Dimension of Hospitality**

As we have seen, the ancient religious, cultural and intellectual traditions characteristically depict the notion of hospitality as a virtue, whose ethical foundation lies in the opening of one’s home or dwelling to another. In this section I want to focus on the ethical dimension of hospitality. I will then follow with that of the political. To say that hospitality engages fundamental questions of ethics and politics is by no means ground-breaking. Numerous excellent works pay attention to these questions in their examination of current conceptions and practices of hospitality (see, e.g., Laachir 2007, Wilson 2010, Claviez 2013, Weber 2013, Bessone 2015, Doty 2015). Yet none provide an adequate frame to capture the ways that hospitality can and is being conceived of and practiced, not just by citizens today, but also the state.

What do I mean by the “ethical” and “political” dimensions of hospitality? In a nutshell, the *ethical* in hospitality entails the requirements of recognising difference and otherness in our encounters with others, particularly when we welcome into our homes guests who are unfamiliar or foreign (*étranger*, to use the French word). The *political*, in contrast, speaks to a polity’s decision-making processes, principally through its public institutions and representative agents, on the question of attending to outsiders who make demands on its hospitality. It typically involves rules and regulations, mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and demarcation of boundaries relating to (the national) home and identity, being the spaces of hospitality. To anchor the ensuing discussion, I draw out some of the tensions and risks inherent to hospitality. I do so because these points illuminate the key themes of mastery, home and identity that we find in citizenship, hospitality, and republicanism.

*Home, the boundary, and the ethical requirement of openness*

The writer Tahar Ben Jelloun describes the opening up of one’s home as the “attitude” inherent to hospitality: essential to its ritual but which nonetheless perturbs the familiarity of our space and habits (1999, 1-3). Echoing its ancient mythological iterations, he sees in hospitality something of a “test”: the guest being the “outsider” who can “teach me what I
am” (1999, 3). The ethical requirement of opening our homes to the unfamiliar therefore commands us also to confront ourselves. In a similar vein, anthropologist Andrew Shryock claims that the “figure of the ‘outsider’ is essential to talk of hospitality” (2008, 410). This being the case, then so too is the threshold (boundary) of the space that we call home essential to hospitality: that once crossed, generates the condition of its possibility.

Boundary crossings are inherent to any attitude or act of welcome. A significant consequence of which is that they inevitably generate tensions between alterity and belonging, membership and exclusion, identity and difference. Locating the source of these tensions requires close examination of the notions of home, mastery and (self)identity. For implicit in talk on the commandment to openness, is that one indeed has a space to welcome others into: that of the home. In fact, without such a space, offering hospitality by all accounts would be extremely difficult (indeed, as we will see with Derrida, logically or grammatically impossible). Yet, there is something about “home” that at once enables, yet can similarly jeopardise, the offer of hospitality. What is it about home and the spatial imagery that home infers—expressed, for example, in descriptives such as openness/closure, home/elsewhere, inclusion/exclusion, boundary crossings and border controls—that is central to ethical formulations of hospitality?

One line of answer opens up in examining the notion of being “at home”. For it is the feeling of being-at-home (chez soi in French) in one’s place of dwelling, beyond the simple fact of having a place to welcome people into, that is fundamental to the practice of hospitality. Being chez soi connotes a certain sense of belonging, comfort, and intimacy, of feeling secure, settled, and at ease inside the space of home. So much so, in fact, that the chez soi of home is what saturates this space with meaning (Blunt & Dowling 2006, Dowling & Mee 2007). Moreover, because home is constituted by boundaries that establish its inside and outside, belonging and non-belonging, we can take its structural aspects as co-mingling with its affective ones (the emotions and feelings linked to home). It is through this spatial-relational-affective connection to home that we develop both our sense of self and the relation to otherness. Hence home, the familiar place of dwelling and the hospitality we choose to extend others through it, crucially inform our broader ethos and way of being in the world, that is, our spirit and character, attitudes and aspirations, and to recall the original meaning of the word, our ethic. As we will see, this relationship between hospitality and ethos is key to understanding how the state, through hospitality, (re)claims a certain
conception of national ethos, and just as importantly how dissident citizen-hosts develop their sense of self by (re)claiming their national home, ethos and identity.

For now, it is important to consider how this feeling of being chez soi might empower an individual to bring the outside in, while simultaneously setting out the limits of shared space/home. Put differently, equally bound up in the idea of being chez soi is the notion of power and mastery over home. Power and mastery in and over one’s own home is what enables and delimits—a condition of possibility of—the hospitality that we choose to offer. After all, you could not offer hospitality in a space or place that does not, in some respect, belong to you. The notion of being-at-home is thus more complex than it might first seem. For the simple matter of beingchez soi additionally calls forth that of identity. And more pointedly, when “home” is opened up to its unfamiliar and outside, chez soi, mastery and identity have the potential to become disrupted and a source of anxiety, tension and fear—exposing the risk that is inherent to the ethic of hospitality.

To unpack these ideas, it is helpful to turn to the two strands of linguistic roots that converge in what today we call “hospitality”: hostis and pet or pot. I explore these roots to the extent that they help situate the relation between home, hospitality, chez soi and (self)identity. These linguistic roots are meticulously explored by the French linguist Émile Benveniste (1973). He traces the Latin hospes (from which we derive the modern usage: hospitality) to the assemblage “hosti-pet-s”. Taking the first of the derivative nouns of this structure—hostis and potis—Benveniste shows the hostis to mean at once guest or host. This linguistic ambivalence originates in complex understandings and practices of hospitality in ancient Rome, whereby hostis evoked the notion of reciprocity or equality “through equivalence in rights” between the foreigner and the citizen of the Roman city (Benveniste 1973, Gauthier 1973, 2-3). It is on account of this reciprocity that hostis comes to specify both “host” and “guest”: the subject-position of each being in effect mutable because of the reciprocal ties of obligation that unite them.

On the other hand, pet or pot (whence the filiation potis) invoke dual understandings of “master” and “personal identity”. At first glance, these appear to contradict the idea of reciprocity. Yet, what is relevant here in this dual sense of potis, is how mastery relates to identity. For crucial to our aims in this section, is that this will inform not just who is able to offer hospitality, but the conditions, risks, and tensions that such hospitality then entails.
To tease out the significance of the mastery/identity relation, I first note that the Latin *potis* designates the lawmaker: that is, master of the home and all dependents that comprise his household and property (servants, slaves, dependent women, livestock etc.) (McNulty 2007, ix). Yet, its original roots *pet*, *pot*, and *-pt*, (Latin -pte, ipse), all of which connote the signification “personal identity”, indicate that prior to having subjects to govern, *potis* is originally his own subject, “a subject properly speaking” (ibid.). Additionally, all further derivatives of the above roots “qualify” this sense of mastery in *potis*. That is, they emphasise that *potis* isn’t merely the master-in-charge, but the master who is “eminently, precisely himself”, as the representation or incarnation of personal, indeed self-, identity (ibid., see also Gauthier 1973, 16).

To speak plainly, while the master is uncontestably the lawmaker at home, his power or mastery is *sourced* from his place of personal identity rather than those he rules over. And, as I have sought to establish, “home” is not merely the place one inhabits constructed from bricks and mortar and over which one establishes rules and regulations. It is also, and crucially so, that particular interiority where one feels at home and eminently in one’s *place* (chez soi, in French). This, therefore, is the sense given to the master who is eminently himself [*pot*], as McNulty rightly highlights: as the one who “offers hospitality from the place where he is ‘at home’, from a position of ipseity as self-identity” (2007, x). In sum, to be able to offer hospitality and welcome others, one must first possess an identity: this being the condition of mastery and linked to the place one calls, and feels, “at home”.

With this linguistic background in place, I hope it is clear that the “condition of mastery as self-identity” encoded into the very word “hospitality” stands in tension with the ethical requirement of openness to the stranger (ibid.). For as seen in our earlier discussion of the sacred traditions of hospitality, welcoming in strangers *irrespective* of their identity is the very foundation of an ethics of hospitality. Which means, in other words, opening of our own familiar space to the unfamiliar, the foreign or unknown. In this act, we recognise our mastery as the self-identifying host, but so too the guest’s alterity. An ethic of hospitality requires that we let go of rather than maintain our ipseity as host. In this ethical act, we recognise the stranger and make a place for him or her inside the familiarity of our identity.

Understood this way, an unavoidable risk of an ethic of hospitality is the potential threat posed to the host’s self-identity: it may remain intact, but is equally open to challenge, disruption and dissolution. Crucially, such potential disruption occurs when
“home”, and thus one’s mastery or power over identity, is deemed under threat of contamination, or worse, usurpation, as a result of introducing the foreign, different, or unknown element. Hence on the question of welcoming in others, attitudes of openness come into play and can even risk succumbing to fear, reserve and closure. Bonnie Honig captures this ambivalence perfectly: “hospitality harbors a trace of its double—hostility” (2008, 111).

I will revisit both the ambivalence of hospitality and hospitality’s relation to home and ethos later in the chapter. What I want to emphasise here at this point is that the ethical in hospitality is inseparable from questions of (self)identity, difference and otherness. Particularly, it is a matter of how difference and alterity are perceived, recognised and negotiated, and crucially, the potential and problematic altering of one’s own subject position. Judith Still’s assertion that hospitality is inevitably a question of ethics because it touches on “boundaries of the human and how we set these up” is a timely reminder that boundaries and the question of our identity are subject to endless negotiations, as guests and hosts seek to achieve or keep in check greater familiarity (2010, 4). In sum, hospitality is a moral virtue inseparable from risk and uncertainty, for in extending welcome to strangers we expose ourselves “to the hazards (and delights) of stepping over and overstepping human boundaries” (Shryock 2008, 419).

The Political Dimension of Hospitality

Thus far I have introduced the ethical element of hospitality. But hospitality is not simply a matter of negotiating the moral requirements of opening our homes and selves to strangers. This is what makes the concept of hospitality so tricky: alongside its ethical facet—admittedly uneasily—sits that of the political. Viewing hospitality as private or individual acts of virtue is complicated by the fact that hospitality can and does apply to the manner in which states allow foreigners and strangers to access their political community. That is, the political aspect of hospitality denotes our relations with the state (or between states) as mediated through the rules, borders, thresholds and mechanisms of integration and exclusion that are established as a means to respond to the coming of migrants and foreigners. Hospitality, in the political sense then, applies to the way states and their public institutions open their borders to strangers. Yet, the rules determining how a state
welcomes outsiders are seen less as the subject of ethical concerns than political ones. This is because hospitality, through and through, is implicated in the tracing of the boundaries of the political community and making decisions on their degree of openness (Boudou 2017). Considered under its political aspect, all of the previous key terms of ethical hospitality are transformed: the host/guest relationship becomes that of the migrant/national, and the host is no longer an individual but a polity with pressing interests in managing openness and trespass of the national home. Several key aspects of political hospitality will thus require dedicated attention: home, identity, sovereignty and risk. Leaving aside for the moment the aspect of risk, let us first turn to the other aspects.

As with the ethical, in its political form hospitality is an act that is constitutive of identity. Recalling Tracy McNulty, “it is the act through which the home—and the homeland—constitutes itself in the gesture of turning to address its outside” (2007, viii emphasis added). In the political aspect of hospitality, the kind of identity alluded to is that of a group, or a culture, a nation even, in whose name the host speaks and acts (ibid.). Most important, is that feelings of belonging to or being “at home” within the familiarity of the group/cultural/national identity, with others like “us”, are constituted by and through, we have seen, the relation to difference and alterity. Both rely on the boundary as a means to shore up and preserve all that is contained within. It is once safe and secure in the sanctity of the home(land) that we can turn to welcome its outside.

Thus, along with identity and otherness, the political dimension of hospitality is fundamentally concerned with the question of “home” and its boundary. Once again, home is advanced as a familiar idiom and fundamental spatial relation for thinking about hospitality, both in the idea of being at home (chez soi) in the nation, and the national host’s associated sense of mastery over home. For it is through this spatialised relationship between national home, host and newcomer that we can draw out the power element already latent in relations of hospitality. These relations are exemplified most frequently in the state as host who, having to contend with demands for hospitality from necessitous others, is empowered to decide the composition of its population and thus the conditions of access to its territory.

For the most part, the power relation at the heart of hospitality can be captured in the idea that hospitality is an assertion of sovereignty. Hospitality-as-sovereignty, in fact, aligns itself with the notion of mastery over home and identity. For when the political community
claims itself sovereign over the national home, it exerts mastery not only over its (bounded) political order (and with all that this connotes in terms of administering borders, exclusive membership and rights), but over the space of its national identity—as a space of familiarity with an imagined national sameness. This space of identity and familiarity as the self-same is formed to stand in opposition to the strangeness of outside others.

At this point in our discussion I would like to bring in the work of Jacques Derrida. For while in the next section I devote considerable space to a critique of his conception of hospitality, I introduce him here with a valuable insight that he makes about the relations of sovereignty, political decision (here as the decision to grant access or not into the political community), and hospitality. Derrida’s characterisation of these relations is important to us, both in terms of representing the power dynamic of hospitality, and also, the nature of hospitality itself—as contained, in Derrida’s reading, in the aporia (paradox) of closure and openness.

The most effective way to present Derrida’s reading of hospitality is to start as he does: with Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*. In *Of Hospitality*, Derrida (2000b) uses the tale of Oedipus to reflect on the institution of hospitality in ancient societies and its relation to the foreigner and that of foreignness in general. Oedipus, who is exiled from his home city of Thebes for his unwitting double crime of parricide and incest, is granted refuge as a foreigner in the city of Colonus. There, he (the Foreigner) is offered a home, indeed a final resting place, since this is where he is granted hospitality in death and a burial. With this short tale, Derrida sets out the parameters for his thinking hospitality: as a question of the foreigner, of supplicant (and at times, resident) strangers, and of un/knowability and mastery over the home. His thinking in fact leads him to posit hospitality as something of a paradox or aporia between two laws that simultaneously command openness and closure.

At risk of oversimplification, let me briefly sketch the aporia before moving on to examine it in detail. It goes like this: Abi wants to be hospitable. She welcomes in Jacques. That would seem like openness. But to be able to welcome in Jacques, she needs to be able to say no (not just to Jacques, but to all other newcomers) and restrict entry. If not, Abi may well find her home overrun by an infinite number of newcomers, and therefore lose the power to host. Thus, the condition of openness and welcome is the power to exclude. This, in a nutshell, is the aporia of hospitality.
Let us now work through how Derrida advances this argument through his rendering of the law and laws of hospitality, drawn principally from On Hospitality. For Derrida, the paradoxical quality of hospitality is best expressed as a “collision between two laws”: between the law of hospitality and the laws of hospitality that necessarily condition, yet oppose the law (Derrida 2000b, 77, 2001b, 17). Start with the law of hospitality, in its singular and imperative form. According to Derrida, it can impose no condition on openness and commands that one welcome in the other without knowing or asking anything of the new arrival. It is as such absolute, unconditional and imperative and exceeds any qualification by the juridical or political order, by any limitation on the duties of the host or on the rights of the guest (2000: 79, 25). Its absoluteness is such that hospitality demands one “give the new arrival all of one’s home and oneself, to give him or her one’s own, our own, without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfilment of even the smallest condition” (77).

Implicit in the idea of being hospitable, however, is that one has the power to host, which we have seen is bound up in the notion of being master of one’s home. That is why, according to Derrida, when taken to its most extreme and purest form, absolute openness—as the law in Derrida’s reading—annihilates the very condition of hospitality: namely, it undercuts the possibility and position of being master of one’s own home. In other words, the condition of absolute openness becomes self-annihilating. How so? Derrida contends that when we relinquish any form of control or sovereign decision-making over those we host, we undercut the potential to offer hospitality, in that admitting an infinite number of newcomers (and not only those we consider as friends) to one’s home means that we no longer possess a home to welcome people into.

Derrida acknowledges that such an absolute, a law above the law, risks being utopian and illusory without laws in the plural that bind us and render possible our living and organising together in common. But the moment the command to absolute or ethical hospitality is bound by conditions (laws) then it (the law) ceases to exist, undermining its own possibility (25). Let’s look at the problem from another angle. Unconditional hospitality holds itself above laws and limitations, yet it demands and needs these very laws to be made concrete and effective, to be what it is—but at which moment, decisions on who is to be made welcome corrupt and pervert the altruism upon which an ideal of hospitality depends. It is thus the impossible pairing of absolute with restricted hospitality that leads to the aporia.
of hospitality. Which is to say that there can be no effective or concrete hospitality to speak of—the only hospitality that we know—without finitude and conditions; lest in relinquishing all mastery over the home we should find ourselves overtaken or hostage to the “new arrival” (79, l’arrivant, in the French). Thus, an unavoidable by-product of such finitude, of conditional hospitality and its concrete expression in the sovereign or master’s decision to admit or reject the foreign and unfamiliar, is discrimination and exclusion.

This is the first significant insight that Derrida alerts us to: the tension that is found immanent within the concept of hospitality. It leads to his second important insight: the aporia that lies at the very heart of hospitality is what keeps the concept alive. Thus, to him, the importance of the aporia of hospitality cannot be understated. It is, to paraphrase Derrida, its very condition of possibility. Taking Derrida’s claims to signify that offers of hospitality are always already conditioned and conditional brings us to the point that I wish to emphasise here: the only form of hospitality that we know and practice is that in which the host has not surrendered his/her sovereignty. Put differently, for Derrida there can be no unconditional hospitality without relinquishing sovereignty; yet neither is there concrete hospitality without retaining and imposing sovereignty.

The political consequences of his analysis of hospitality are not lost on Derrida. Indeed, he fully acknowledges that hospitality can be seen as—and more to the point, deployed as—an assertion of state sovereignty, since acting out of “necessity”, the state-as-host will exercise its sovereign power and mastery by:

... choosing, electing, filtering, selecting their invitees, visitors, or guests, those to whom they decide to grant asylum, the right of visiting, or hospitality. No hospitality, in the classic sense, without sovereignty of oneself over one’s home, but since there is also no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be

11 It is worthwhile expanding of the importance of the aporia for Derrida. Derrida considers that the aporia can’t, and shouldn’t, be resolved: its two antinomic poles must be held together as they simultaneously imply and exclude each other. Nonetheless, the tension between the two, signifying no less the impossibility of the law, is what founds hospitality’s condition of possibility. This is because all action (i.e., politics, improvements to the laws of hospitality) must necessarily take place in traversing the aporia. Thus, the ethical injunction, when translated into politics, can only appear in the context of its impossibility. Derrida, although repeatedly questioned on the matter in political debates, is rather silent as to the precise nature of such action, if not that “the political task” at hand is to bring about “the best ‘legislative’ transaction, the best ‘juridical’ conditions” we can muster (Derrida 2005, 131).
exercised by filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence. (Derrida 2000b, 55, emphasis added)

In sum, Derrida’s account of sovereignty as power and mastery over the home captures the entanglement of sovereignty and hospitality that is central to the claims I will make in this dissertation. Through the deconstruction of sovereignty, he expertly shows the statist attempt to control the “home”, which the state does by trying to assert its monopoly on the decision to admit or deny admission into the country.

Risk and the power relations (politics) of hospitality

To close out this section, let us turn to the important aspect of risk in the politics of hospitality. I do this because it allows me to spotlight another facet to the operation of power in hospitality, which, in the wider context of this study, is crucial to understand how the state works as “host”, and how citizens work as counter-hosts. That facet is the instrumentalisation of hospitality.

Recall a claim made earlier this chapter: hospitality is not without a hint of its double: hostility. Honig’s (2008) earlier statement to this effect echoes that of Mireille Rosello, a scholar of hospitality whose work on Postcolonial Hospitality (2001) is seminal: “Hostility is part and parcel of the contract between the host and guest, and accepting the possibility of violence endangers both the guest and host” (ibid., 172). McNevin and Missbach (2018), too, spotlight the double-bind of risk for hosts and guests that hospitality is never without. Which is to say, summing up these authors, that because hospitable encounters hold a propensity to collapse into their opposite or double, they will always harbour a trace of risk. Indeed to Shryock’s mind, “without this sense of risk, hospitality loses its moral power” (2008, 215).

But this doesn’t quite capture how I see the relation between hospitality (notably in its political dimension) and the idea of risk. For rather than simply harbouring an element of risk, I want to suggest that the “risk factor” of hospitality, what we might otherwise name the tension between openness and closure, is key to the instrumentalisation or utilisation of hospitality by political communities themselves.

How does such a risk present itself, and in turn become managed, through the politics and power relations of hospitality? Firstly, the risks attached to hospitality are embodied in
the existential threats of “bad hosts” and “bad guests” (Shryock 2012). These materialise, for example, in a guest who becomes a parasite, aggressor or predator, unsettling home as the space of hospitality. Only to a much lesser extent do we speak of “bad hosts”: cases in which the host abuses its power and privilege in regards those it has welcomed. In our global era of mass migrancy, the focus is overwhelmingly (excessively, I would say) directed at “bad guests”. This attention is fuelled by an imaginary of irregular migrants as a horde of non-Western “illegal” freeloaders, intent on exploiting “our” hospitality and generosity with little to no regard for “our” culture and values. Such an imaginary is constructed and perpetuated through public political discourse. In addition, the displaced and undocumented who seek state hospitality are further politicised in the public arena by being presented a danger to social cohesion; or linked, as is increasingly the case, to criminality, delinquency and terrorism (Bourbeau 2011). Such discernible hostility is the manifest counterpart to hospitality. It feeds into a generalised perception that unforeseen and uninvited strangers wanting refuge pose considerable risks to public, social and identity security. To mitigate these (perceived) risks, polities impose rules, regulations and mechanisms to determine the “right” balance between “welcome and trespass in a way that protects both insiders and outsiders” (Shryock 2012, S29).

Benjamin Boudou (2017) offers insightful considerations on the risk mitigation strategies of sovereign hosts and what he names the political “function” of hospitality. What is striking in Boudou’s exhaustive genealogy of hospitality that spans tribal societies, the ancient and classical worlds, Christian ethics, Enlightenment ideology and contemporary philosophy, is that he establishes that political communities throughout history have used hospitality to achieve this balance between welcome and trespass. That is, polities have found in hospitality the means to solve what for them is an essential and ineradicable political problem: balancing openness and closure of the community. In other words, the political function of hospitality materialises because communities have always needed to manage the desire of their members to feel secure and “at home” against the requirement (whether ethically or strategically driven) of openness toward outsiders—both expected and unexpected, invited and uninvited—and they have found in hospitality the means to do so. This “functionalisation” or “instrumentalisation” of hospitality is heavily geared toward the preservation of the group’s social, economic and material resources, and perhaps most markedly, its cultural identity.
We see the above play out in the generosity and openness of hospitality discourses and practices that nonetheless rely on an Other to construct and bolster the identity of the host. A consequence of which is the construction of differences and asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, so that often such talk of hospitality belies its power relations. Further, it is important to underscore that whilst different manifestations of this perennial “problematic” have historically and contextually given rise to different (re)conceptions of political hospitality, the problematic itself remains unchanged (Boudou 2017). The significance of this, and the idea of the utility of hospitality for states to achieve desired ends, will be made patent when, in Chapter Four, we examine how the French state uses this concept today and how the latter weaves and intersects with core themes of republicanism and secularism.

The notions of identity, openness and risk inherent to the concept of hospitality that have been discussed steer us to a deep-seated tension harboured within its political dimension. On the one hand, a political community constitutes itself—that is, the identity of the polity in whose name it acts—through the offer of hospitality to outsiders. Hospitality as a self-constituting act allows communities, states and the like to be considered by members and non-members alike as hospitable and welcoming, irrespective of whether that is really the case. Thus, while expressing generosity, the act cannot therefore be characterised as wholly disinterested. On the other, to protect against the challenges wrought by the introduction of the foreign or unfamiliar, the state must limit its offers of hospitality with the goal of preserving the receiving community—its identity (national ethos), resources and autonomy. Yet, cognisant also of its commitments and moral obligations to open its borders and to extend asylum to strangers in need, the community may undertake to welcome in a select few (primarily those most compatible with the host’s principles, ideals and values) under the mantle of charity and humanitarianism. Such practices absolve the community-as-host of the need to attend to a real or imagined mass of would-be refugees. In so doing, the national host, represented by its agents and intermediaries, is able to maintain its privileged position as welcoming stranger into the body politic—through which act it aims to recognise itself as hospitable (Bessone 2015).

Let us summarise the political aspect of hospitality. In contrast to the ethical, which entails the moral requirements of welcome and recognising otherness and most frequently occurs in the context of private acts of receiving strangers inside our homes (and selves), the
political pertains to the realm of the polity-as-host. It denotes the public institutional and
decision-making processes on the question of managing welcome and trespass of the
national home. That is, the political aspect of hospitality refers to the rules, boundaries, and
mechanisms of admission, incorporation and rejection, introduced to deal with bringing
foreigners (the outside) in. Polities, we know, claim the sovereign right to decide the
composition of their population and thus the conditions of access to their territory. And as
we have seen, this phenomenon generates significant (ethical and political) tensions for the
home country. The latter, in other words, must balance the requirement to open its borders
to vulnerable outsiders with that of providing its citizens with public, social and identity
security—all of which uninvited others are held to jeopardise and endanger. Most
significantly, as Boudou (2017) claims, polities have throughout history turned to hospitality
as a means and instrument to resolve a perennial problem: managing the degree of
openness and closure of a bounded political order in ways that protect insiders and
outsiders.

With this section’s discussion on risk in mind that has served to draw out the power
relations of hospitality, and more broadly, the complex interplay between the ethical and
political aspects of hospitality, we can now return to Derrida, this time with a critical eye, to
appreciate the limitations of his analysis.

**Derrida: On Hospitality and Deconstructed Sovereign Power**

In this section I make the argument that Derrida offers a one-dimensional reading of
politics in relation to hospitality, which then leads him to envisage hospitality only under its
aspect of the decision: the “threshold moment” that pertains to admission or denial into the
political community. The problem with such a reading, and crucially so, is that it obscures
complexity on the question of hospitality practices and relations in two significant ways.
First, it obscures the real heterogeneity of practices and counter-practices of hospitality
(both in admitting people into the space(s) of the national home, but also on how national
identity is being staked and claimed) that define the current situation in France and beyond.
Second, whilst Derrida’s analysis leads him to think in terms of the decisionist state and to
imagine the host through the prism of sovereign power and assertions of monopoly control
over the home, I claim that this analysis can only go so far when the “home” to speak of is no
longer seen as the private dwelling but in the image of the nation-state. I contend that such an analytical reading merely scratches at the surface of the potence of the state and the diversity of its power relations that are mobilised through hospitality. This is because Derrida doesn’t acknowledge the difficulties (nor make the necessary revisions) of shifting his analysis on the aporetic structure of hospitality from the domestic/private realm to the level of the state.

To be clear, the first problem disguises—or better put, leads us—to miss the variation, plurality, and contest that occurs within the state over hospitality. The second problem highlights the need for additional theoretical tools to sufficiently grasp state aims (and practices) in terms of its desire for monopoly control over home, hospitality and national identity. My central contention, therefore, is that whilst helpful to illuminate some forms of hospitality, if we remain fastened to a Derridean analysis to reflect upon broader issues such as borders, citizenship, belonging, or the treatment of strangers, we remain blinded to its other manifestations and possibilities.

To work through and substantiate my criticisms, it is helpful to begin by recalling Derrida’s reading of the aporia of hospitality. Derrida claims that the ethical requirement to open one’s home and self simultaneously leaves both vulnerable to dissolution and destruction. That is, absolute openness brings about the collapse of the home. But this logic only holds, I argue, if “home” is governed by one sovereign (or master, or singular authority) who is able to administer and maintain control over who is allowed inside it. In such a case, negotiations over access to the space of home that help to mitigate the aforementioned risks associated with bringing the outside in can be defined as intersubjective and unmediated—the relation is a direct one, and strictly between individuals: the host and his or her guest(s) (Bessone 2015). That idea of home, and the direct intersubjective relations that regulate access to it, are essentially those found in domestic, private situations. Yet, as we will momentarily see, this idea of home, and similarly the aporetic nature of hospitality that establishes it, are ultimately accepted by Derrida as a general model. Throughout his theoretical work on hospitality, Derrida applies both this model and analysis rather effortlessly and abstractly to a “home” as heterogenous as the nation-state (see, e.g., 1997a, b, 2000b, a, 2001b, a, 2003b). The elasticity of his model, so to speak, poses significant problems when his analyses of hospitality are stretched from domestic, private situations to those of the public, political realm.
To appreciate the implications of this claim, let me first lay out how Derrida connects hospitality to the state-based paradigm, and crucially, to the question of the sovereign decision. It is helpful to return to our earlier discussion on sovereignty, power and mastery. The notions of indivisible sovereign mastery and the assertion of ownership over the home are those which, in Derrida’s view, form the conditions of possibility of hospitality. That is why the notions of indivisible sovereignty, mastery and possession over the home found in much of Derrida’s writing on hospitality connote a specific kind of power and relationship: that of “power over”; signifying, no less, one’s ability to control another through force, threat or coercion (Bulley 2015, 190). Put plainly, Derrida is predominantly concerned with a notion of sovereignty and sovereign desire for power and control over home’s threshold that privileges an aspect of domination, or what we might best call dominion: hospitality depends on dominion; which is to say, sovereignty and control over the place we call home.

These themes of dominion and control are intrinsically connected with Derrida’s understanding of the power relations inherent in hospitality. He derives his understanding largely through his meticulous elaboration of Émile Benveniste’s (1973) linguistic study into the roots of hospitality viz. the Latin hospes (as the contracted assemblage of hosti-pet-s) (see, for example, Derrida’s essay “Hostipitality”, (2000a, 13-14)). As we explored in Section One, the second root of this contraction, pet (cf. potere, ipso, potestas), “unites the semantics of power, mastery and despotic sovereignty” with that of self-assertion and personal identity: the “being oneself in one’s home” (ibid.). Yet Benveniste himself—and this is crucial—in his lengthy descriptions of pet and its derivatives, of which potis, poti-potior-, lends to these the linguistic signification of “hav[ing] power over something … have something at one’s disposal” (Benveniste 1973, 72 & 74, emphasis added). Given how closely Derrida ties his account to Benveniste’s etymology of hospitality, we can thus pinpoint the emergence of a specific kind of power and relationship in Derrida’s thinking on hospitality.

Referring to Benveniste, Derrida indicates that hostis (as the other of the two roots of hospes) historically signified either “guest” or “host.” The entanglement of the two is what evokes the notion of “reciprocity”, which we continue today to associate with hospitality. Importantly, the convergence of hostis with pet cements, for Derrida, the double movement and existential tension of hospitality: in order to be hospitable, the host must be able to

12 It is worth noting that this linguistic ambivalence persists today in the modern French hôte, which signifies at once guest and host.
exact control and impose limits over those s/he wishes to host. If he does not, recalling Derrida earlier, and even as he seeks to act hospitably, there is every chance that the guest may take over his home by force—a situation in which the host becomes the guest of his guest, or what amounts to the complete substitution or reversal of the former’s power and control and ultimately the loss of his power to host (Derrida 2000a, 9). The key point that I wish to draw out in the above discussion is this: Derrida’s aspiration, vividly shown in his neologism ‘hostipitality’, is to “render the hosti-pet tension audible” and thus expose the aporia that lies at the core of hospitality: the ethical injunction of absolute openness that is impossibly paired with the equally violent and exclusionary power of the sovereign (Candea and Da Col 2012, S4).

With this reading of hospitality in mind, as marked by a dominating, controlling sovereign, wherein the logical condition of its gestures of hospitality leads to the assertion power and mastery over home and identity, it is critical to note the frequency and readiness through which Derrida connects hospitality back to the question of the state and the sovereign decision on openness/closure. By this I mean to emphasise that throughout his discourse on hospitality, in painstakingly deconstructing the meaning and structures of sovereignty (as omnipotent power and might) so as to determine the possibility of hospitality, sovereignty “deconstructed” appears nonetheless to take on attributes all-too-frequently aligned with the verticality of the state—be it the state qua sovereign, challenges to the sovereign state’s inhospitality, or the state violating the so called sovereignty of its own citizens as it transgresses the boundaries of private homes (see, e.g., Derrida 2000b, 47–79, 2000a, 5, 2001b, 22–23, 2002b, 17–19, 36, 2003a, 127–9, 2005, 66-69, 121-5). In essence, Derrida traces hospitality to a strong, vertical, and often to his mind absolutist state, concerned with exacting control over not just its borders (read citizenship and membership rights) and the public sphere, but equally that of “the interiority of the home (we are no longer at home!)” (2001b, 53). With respect to the latter, and rather presciently, Derrida cites numerous examples of “techno-scientific possibilities” (i.e., the internet, email and phone-tapping) within the reach of the state that it might abusively use to infringe, indeed violate, the sanctity of our private homes (ibid.). Regretfully he doesn’t pursue this line of thinking and diversity of power more fully, a point I return to below.

The key point I wish to draw out from the above is that Derrida is wholly preoccupied by the sovereignty and rationality of nation-states as taking a particular modality, that of
dominion and the assertion of control. His target, therefore, in the deconstruction of the (assumed) indivisibility of sovereignty—understood in the wider sense, as we have seen, as supreme power and control over the self as self-same and over others—is the statist exercise of such power, namely its abuse and excesses in the form of legitimated violence perpetrated against those it seeks to dominate. As Derrida has himself claimed, “the state’s use of power is originally excessive and abusive . . . it is thus no doubt necessary to erode not only its principle of indivisibility but its right to the exception, its right to suspend rights and law” (2003b, 47-8).

What is significant in this portrayal, is the signification of supreme in its qualification of the power of the sovereign. For as Bruno Gulli argues in his compelling analysis of sovereignty and domination; “what is supreme must be over and beyond, above everything else, which is not supreme” (2011). Thus we can begin to understand Derrida’s impossible pairing of the ethical and the political in his analysis of hospitality: the only logical match for such hyperbolic power and politics occurring along the vertical axis, and which Derrida so actively denounces with regard to immigration and inhospitable state practices, is an analogous absolute and radicalised contrasting axis—to be found in the “pure” event of welcoming any new arrival. That is, only the absolute unknowability and unpredictability of a future coming of the Other can effectively undermine or interrupt the omnipotence of the state with its desire for control, its capacity for calculation, foreseeability, differentiation and stabilising rationale (in terms of hierarchical images and identities, i.e., those of citizens and refugees or the undocumented, inside and outside, friends and enemies). The former—the supreme, hyperbolic command of the sovereign—begs the latter; that of the pure event, the ethical commandment to absolute openness. The problem that this poses is not so much one of the aporetic logics at the core of hospitality: one could indeed ascribe to it a certain internal coherence. The trouble is that, paradoxically, although he calls into question the political through his strident opposition to all claims to verticality, Derrida can only imagine politics through this state-based paradigm. In short, Derrida is concerned with inhospitable decisions on reception and inclusion; and whilst he problematises sovereignty, the latter is nonetheless accepted since through it he underscores the impossible possibility of

13 Several scholars note that the target of nearly all Derrida’s writing on hospitality is the status of (Muslim) immigrants and their inhospitable treatment at the hands of the state; and similarly, his active political engagement against such state practices (see, e.g., Shryock, 2012: S22 and Boudou, 2012: 17)
hospitality: there is no hospitality without sovereignty (Derrida 2001b, 59). Or in other words and echoing Vincent Leitch on Derrida’s “vexing deconstruction of sovereignty”, Derrida projects an ideal hospitality that is nonetheless dependent on sovereignty (2007, 240).

Therefore, the political and any action taking place within this realm by way of approaching the ideal of absolute hospitality—which, for Derrida, must necessarily take place irrespective that its possibility remains conditional on traversing the aporia—is always understood through the paradigm of sovereignty qua dominion and control. Yet in our political and social world, is hospitality ever only of such a kind of politics? Is its critical power only ever associated with the decision of the sovereign? I will make my critique explicit. Derrida’s thinking leads us to think like the state he is criticising. We imagine the host in terms of a homogenous agent who has a monopoly control on hosting and welcome, when in fact different possibilities might be envisaged. My criticism isn’t that the state conceives of itself in terms of monopoly control. It does. Nor is it unsurprising that Derrida sees hospitality in the image of dominion and control over the home; given his analysis of the logic, grammar and aporia of hospitality, I hope to have demonstrated that it has to be this way. The sovereign in his or her singular capacity as master over the home retains supreme power to enact decisions on openness and closure over their domain and provide entry to only those the people that it considers suitable and desirable. Which is to say that the structure of dominion and aporia of hospitality would remain regardless of whether entry is admitted or denied, regardless of the threshold decision on openness or closure made by the host.

My first criticism, to return to the opening paragraph of this section, is that Derrida’s account doesn’t direct our attention towards something significant: the variation within a state, and the plurality or contest over the political aspect of hospitality, between the state itself and its citizenry. While his analysis into hospitality may be well and good in domestic situations of welcome and the host, situations in which private persons open their home to friends and strangers (being the direct intersubjective relation), my claim is that this cannot be correlated to that of the public level, to the state-as-home, without addressing some of the difficulties of doing so. To begin with, in the domestic situation there is no plurality when it comes to the host: you are the host (sovereign or master) of your private domain and you either invite and make decisions on entry, or you don’t. What we don’t have in these situations is a multitude of independent agents, “mini-sovereigns” if you like, all making
different decisions on hospitality and welcome than you do yourself in the space that is your home. When we equate this analysis of private hospitality to the realm of the public and the political, we are thus blinded to the possibility of a plurality of hosts (i.e., France’s dissident citizen counter-hosts) arrogating for themselves powers of mini-sovereigns, all of whom are administering a domain (their home) located inside the boundary of the nation-as-home. We will revisit these ideas at length in Part Two of this dissertation. Derrida’s analysis leads us to miss this heterogeneity, and likewise the tug-of-war over sovereignty and monopoly control of the (national) home and identity. I therefore argue that Derrida makes a fatal flaw in applying his analysis of domestic/private hospitality to the level of the state; and that this analytical flaw should be viewed in terms no other than a category error.

Moreover, what of a politics of hospitality—and I stress the term politics—effected through social ties, solidarity and community that exceeds the state’s borders? What of, in other words, a politics of hospitality that wrestles with the question of co-existing or living in common with otherness, but which necessarily distinguishes itself from claims to sovereignty and its classical markers of territory, national identity, inside and out, and evermore frequently on the question of immigration? Or, to borrow terms that Derrida borrows from Carl Schmitt, what of a politics of hospitality that eschews the logic of the friend/enemy distinction? For as Boudou cautions, Derrida’s reading of the political takes on a decidedly “Schmittian turn” (2017, 198), in that the issue of sovereignty that dominates his discourse on the political relies heavily on Carl Schmitt’s (1996) vision of “the political”, as rooted in the distinction between friend and enemy.

Let us look to the second problem signalled at the outset of this section on a Derridean reading of politics in relation to hospitality. When the decision on welcoming the foreigner becomes one for the state-as-host, the social relation is no longer a direct intersubjective one. Instead it is mediated through a great many public institutions and is essentially carried out by these institutions’ representative agents. The institutions involved, to take France as the example, include the Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII), the Office for the Protection of Refugees and the Stateless (OFPRA), the Asylum Seeker Reception Centres (CADA) the UNHRC, Doctors Without Borders, the Red Cross, along with a host of other administrative bodies and agencies. Among the representative agents of these public institutions, agencies and bodies, we can count civil servants and officials, lawyers, interpreters, health and social workers (doctors, psychologists etc.), immigration agents,
local councillors, mayors and so on and so forth. The direct subject-to-subject relation in this scenario is substituted by a capillary-like array of intermediaries who work on behalf of a collective, unified “us”: the state-as-host. This host makes determinations on access into the territorial space of a *chez nous* (*our* home) that replaces the private and individual *chez soi* (*my* home). In this task, the state’s intermediaries are aided by a multitude of forms and dossiers to complete, documents to be stamped and boxes “ticked”, and most important of all, a raft of categories and statuses that are defined and attributed to the foreigner in need. In this sense, here each and every agent of the state is empowered to make discretionary decisions on categories, identity and status, on desert and worth (or not), and thus on admission or denial into the home.

My argument is that a Derridean analysis that remains wedded to the notion of sovereign control and *power over* can only go so far. It limits alternate understandings of hospitality: as a form of governance, for example, over the national home and the instrumental attempt to manage, accommodate and employ mobility, and to play on the effects of “unhomeliness” in endeavour to secure the national space of home. Should we fasten hospitality and its spatial-relational idiom of home too closely to the question of the state and the decision of the sovereign, as does Derrida and the significant body of hospitality scholarship in his wake, we fail to see and interpret acts of hospitality beyond those captured through the workings of sovereign power alone.\(^\text{14}\) These are the very kinds of acts that in this thesis I am concerned with identifying. Moreover, I claim that when applied to a “home” as heterogeneous as a country, Derrida’s analysis of hospitality ends up not just being simplifying (and flattening out the diversity of practices and agents sketched in the above paragraphs), but inadvertently and unwittingly aligning itself with state aims, insofar as seeing hospitality in terms of a moment of unified decision links up perfectly with the state’s ambition to have a monopoly on the decision of hospitality, hence a monopoly on its identity. Thus, with Bulley (2015, 2017b) and Darling (2011, 2013, 2014), I wish to argue for the existence of a diversity of power relations performed by hospitality that extends beyond the state sovereignty and monopoly border decisions on admission/rejection. One that

\(^{14}\) Notable exceptions are Dan Bulley (2015, 2017b), who investigates hospitality, its power and ethics in the realm of international relations and humanitarianism; and Jonathan Darling (2011, 2013) who examines the workings of hospitality as a form “moral urbanism” in the British city of Sheffield.
incorporates regimes and rationalities of government in its management of asylum, citizenship and the space of home. This idea is the central focus of the following chapter.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have repeatedly called upon the idiom of the open home as the space of hospitality, underscoring its relation to identity and mastery and Derrida’s particular rendering of it which remains all-pervasive in the literature. Yet, the French citizens that I encounter on the ground who are defiantly hosting the undocumented and other displaced, are testament to my claim that the practices and claims of both host and counter-hosts can be more fruitfully examined when we let go of the idea of the host as a single and unified agent or sovereign deciding upon entry or not into the home.

Before I can give an account of the political becoming of dissident citizens through the act of hospitality, we first need a more comprehensive exploration into statist conceptions and practices of hospitality. My goal is to illuminate what cannot be captured through hospitality as solely a question of the self-identity of, and the exercise of sovereign mastery over, home. That is, to paraphrase Dan Bulley, how might the power of hospitality operate once the threshold of the home has been crossed (2015, 191)? Likewise, is the subject-position and identity of host re-imagined or (re)empowered as a result of outsiders finding its way in? Moreover, can home as it pertains to an ethos and our way of being, be managed and controlled to shape a citizenly response to strangers and foreigners? Derridean explanations of sovereign power and mastery can only go so far: they speak to a form of hospitality defined by the particular moment of admission or rejection. Yet unsolicited border crossings and “permissible” transgressions are not infrequent. If we acknowledge that the power of hospitality extends beyond Derrida’s interpretation, then one line of response that opens up is that these “inclusive exclusions and exclusive inclusions” characterise the more critical power of hospitality (Bulley ibid.); one that operates in ways not captured by expressions of state sovereignty alone. Investigating this, however, requires a new lens through which to capture the full breadth of the political function of hospitality: that of Foucault on governmentality.
Chapter 3

HOSPITALITY AND GOVERNMENTALITY

Introduction

In the previous chapter I provided an analysis of Derrida’s reading of hospitality and made two critiques of it. The first is that Derrida’s work into how we might tackle one of the most urgent dilemmas of our time (that is, how to hospitably welcome masses of undocumented and displaced peoples) ultimately leads us to think like the very state that, on the whole, he overtly criticises. In following Derrida’s thinking on hospitality, we are led to imagine the host in terms of sovereignty, particularly in its assertion of control over the home. In other words, Derrida comes to view the state in terms of dominion over its home, which it does by trying to assert its monopoly on the decision to admit or deny admission into the country. And the consequence is that he ends up conceiving of the host—here the sovereign state—as homogenous, as one agent or sovereign deciding upon entry or not. My argument is that while this may well and good be the case when it comes to private people opening their homes to friends and strangers, there are other possibilities for how hospitality might be imagined in the political realm, but which a Derridean account blinds us to. As I will show in Chapter Five, in adopting Derrida’s perspective we miss variation within a state and contestation over the political aspect of hospitality between the state itself and its citizenry.

The second critique is the object of the present chapter. My objection to Derrida is that he offers a one-dimensional reading of politics in relation to hospitality because he envisages politics strictly in terms of a decisionist state that either grants or denies hospitality at a particular and punctual moment in time. Whilst I am not denying that such gestures of admission and denial in fact do occur, I argue that there is actually something much more complicated going on. Following the work of Michel Foucault, I call this governance, or “government”, to be precise. Although the governmental aspect of hospitality is not present in domestic, private situations it has a crucial role in the political realm and extension of hospitality. And here the trouble with using Derrida is that, because he bases his analyses of hospitality entirely in domestic situations, he misses this crucial
aspect of its political operation. Demonstrating how and why hospitality might be considered a form of governmentality is the central focus of this present chapter.

I begin by introducing Foucault’s framework of the governmental state. I then move to consider hospitality under the lens of governmentality by exploring two articulations within this framework—domopolitics and ethopolitics—that best capture how hospitality comes to be “problematised” and therefore managed, controlled and regulated. In particular, I show how domopolitics, which embodies tactics that deploy a series of security measures in the name of home, casts earlier rationalities of the modern state to securitise in a whole new light. Ethopolitics, on the other hand, is a governmentality that lays claim to and valorises a certain ethos for the nation. From there, I introduce and define the characteristics of governmental technologies and political rationalities that breathe life into the possibility of a domopolitics of the homeland, revealing the inner workings of governmental hospitality as a fateful convergence of home, territory and security that is today reconfiguring relations between nation, citizen and foreigner. Finally, I conclude by showing that an unanticipated, yet explicable, consequence of attempts to safeguard the homeland via the selective logic of a border “membrane” is the resurgence of elements of sovereign power within these governmentalities of domo- and ethopolitics. My aim in this chapter is to give an understanding of hospitality as a specific conception of power (domopolitical governmentality).

One caveat must be noted. Throughout this dissertation I characteristically speak of “the state” to denote a political community unified and organised under one government. In this chapter I draw on Foucault’s work on governmentality to capture the kind of state under which different increasingly rationalised forms of power have risen to prominence within our “society of security” (Foucault 2007). Foucault, as we shall see, both conceptually and methodologically, pushes beyond “the state” and what he considers to be the insufficiencies of a strictly—and traditional—state- or sovereign-centred focus for an analysis of political power. His approach renders a decentred (and diversified) account of power relations that refuses to identify and privilege the state as the sole site of power. While acknowledging the centrality of Foucault’s method and deeply revised definition of (political) power, I maintain that it is meaningful to speak of governmentality alongside a consideration of the state’s intentions; and notably the direction it is embarked on in the particular case study under investigation. What is otherwise lost, is a description of what
(domopolitical) governmentality actually does for the state. The state thus remains a useful and significant category for understanding the contemporary world even if we agree with Foucault, as I do, that the state is not a universal “thing” with essential properties.

**Foucault: On Governmentality**

Foucault coined the neologism “governmentality” by combining “government” with “rationality” or “mentality” during the course of his 1977-8 Collège de France lectures. Governmentality, in his view, denotes a particular “zone of research” for thinking about the practice or arts of government that had emerged in early modern Europe and came to fruition in the nineteenth century, a period that coincided with the emergence of *population* as the central target in the exercise of power (Gordon 1991, 2, Foucault 2007, 108). In Foucault’s conception, “government” holds a broader meaning than that generally referred to in political science and international relations. It implies not the exercise of sovereign power and authority as derived through the constitutions, institutions and laws of a centralised state. Rather, Foucault uses “government” to convey its more capacious meaning of the sixteenth century: “the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed—the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick” (Foucault 2000, 341). Thus, the general meaning Foucault assigns to government is the “conduct of conduct... a form of activity aiming to shape, guide, direct or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon 1991, 2).

This, then, is not the power of the centralised, top-down, repressive state, but characterises its more diffuse forms and exercises that permeate, capillary-style, multiple levels of everyday societal relations, and through which humans are produced as subjects; that is, at once subject to the government of others and to self-government (Merlingen 2003, 3). Thus, we might say that with a broader definition of government—a conduct of conduct practised not solely by institutions of the state but a multifarious range of actors, associations, organisations and not least the market or individuals themselves—comes a broadened definition of power. That is, without denying the existence of sovereignty and its old markers of law, territory and order, Foucault recognises in the exercise of government a form of power or rule that operates in the absence of direct repressive or subtractive
measures of state power: those that effectively seize “a portion of the wealth, a tax on products, goods and services, labor and blood levied on the subjects” (Foucault 1979, 136).

In contrast to the exercise of sovereignty, governmental power—less visible and direct, but certainly more ubiquitous—follows a productive logic given its central concern of fostering a population’s health, welfare, happiness and prosperity. Foucault’s concern, in sketching out his conception of governmentality, is to draw into sharp relief the how of exercising power and governing from a distance. This includes how a given phenomenon, practice or act comes to be constituted as governable; how various organised practices which govern others and ourselves are indicative of as many micro-domains of power relations; and crucially, how “multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects” (Foucault 2003, 28).

The advent of the “population question” brought with it the emergence of techniques of power that essentially became centred around “man-as-species”. That is to say, the human population as a whole and the manifold potentialities that this offers the governmental state in terms of the many variables and phenomena characteristic to this “global mass” (such as birth rate, mortality, marriage statistics, illness) that might be complied and taken into account, politically strategised, with the aim of improving its productive capacity. The state’s central concern thus shifted at this time to that of securing the conditions for the optimisation of its population’s health, vitality and wellbeing (ibid., 242-3). This is this sense in which governmentality requires and becomes sustained through what Foucault calls “apparatuses of security [dispositifs de sécurité]”, being the modus operandi around which an optimal functioning of the population is brought into being. The security apparatus is fundamental to keep in check, limit, or regulate the uncertain and aleatory—the potentially endangering—elements that follow from the “effective reality” of people and things (Foucault 2007, 47, 108).

This focus on the productive force of governmentality and the corresponding, overarching desire (need) for security, provides a vantage point to observe a mode of power that extends beyond that captured in the notion of the state-as-sovereignty. Governmentality is of particular interest to me because how hospitality becomes a “problem” of security and thus might be better “governed”, and how through its governance, certain activities linked to hospitality are “thought” possible, and still how, a
certain politics of hospitality produces and circumscribes a mobile population upon which its power can be deployed, are all crucial to understand how the modern state works and crafts its role as host, and as we shall see in Part Two of the dissertation, how citizens work as counter-hosts. These are the two blind spots revealed by the Derridean exploration into hospitality that I spoke of in Chapter Two.

*Governance, mobility and the contemporary state*

There is a significant body of critical scholarship researching the emergence of varied modes of governance in today’s era of mass migrancy. A smaller subset of this research focuses on how the governance of mobility might be seen as a means to regulate, rather than arrest completely, the influx of mobile populations (Ingram 2008, Darling 2011, Jensen 2011, Nail 2015, Tazzioli 2015, Tazzioli and Walters 2016). Such modes or tactics of governance set about “disentangling” mobile populations via various modes of classification, “tapping” the energies of some flows while circumscribing the movements of others according to whichever benefit or threat they might present (Darling 2011). These studies indicate that in itself, mobility serves as an important governmental tool for the identification, deterrence and prevention of potential security risks or threats (i.e., public, identity and social) that such populations are held to embody (Gill 2009, Tazzioli 2015).

Incorporated within this broad confluence between nation-state security concerns and the phenomenon of migrant mobility, is a concern for governing phenomena, practices or acts whose perceived threat is not generally of a military kind; such as asylum (Darling 2011, 2014), citizenship (Tyler 2010) and public health epidemics (Ingram 2008). Darling (2011, 2014), particularly, investigates asylum politics and practices in the UK to show how such a system produces then subjects bodies at its mercy to modes of power and control through mechanisms of dispersal and accommodation across the nation. Ingram (2008) considers the way that HIV/AIDS, discursively framed as a threat and linked to asylum and immigration, becomes governed in the UK. Namely, that attempts to secure the UK home against this health issue produce an “array of subjectivities”—i.e., the entitled/unentitled, good citizen/enemy within, or innocent victims/predatory deceivers—who are then assigned to “proper locations in space”: the homely nation for the former, and makeshift or state-sponsored detention camps for the latter (Ingram 2008, 890).
What these authors convincingly highlight is that varied forms of governmental power emerge at the point where phenomena such as the above (i.e., asylum, citizenship and public health), at certain moments and given to certain circumstances, become a “‘problem’ for politics” (Tazzioli 2015, 62). That is, the problematisation of phenomenon X (or practice or act etc.) and the solutions “necessitated” by the act of rendering the problem in question intelligible or visible, constitute bodies, things, acts and importantly spaces, as potential threats and objects of risk that call for governmental interventions. This is relevant because my main claim in this chapter is that hospitality and home—as the space of hospitality—are key sites of governmentality precisely because hospitality is in itself a useful problématique for states. That is, hospitality and home are at once tactically configured by the state as both problem and solution. To recall Boudou (2017) from the previous chapter, polities have long used the discourse of hospitality as the means to solve what for them is a political “problem”: the need to balance between openness and closure of the community. And yet as we have seen, hospitality equally raises concerns of an ethical nature—even when the home in question is the nation-state—that can’t be bracketed from political ones. An example of this, as we shall later see, is the turn to the sphere of ethics in the governance of hospitality; namely, configurating the nation-state in terms of a “home” such that ethical concerns aren’t solely directed at the outsider, but equally target the insider, the citizen him/herself.

Given that a central undertaking of this dissertation is to examine the French state’s commitment to a particular conception of hospitality and the reaction of its own citizens to it, the task of this chapter is to understand how hospitality is being (re)conceptualised, indeed problematised, as a concern for security in the context of our era of global flows and mobility. For as Bulley (2017a) and Ingram (2008) respectively demonstrate on the governance of humanitarianism and of disease and asylum, governed spaces and things are produced and controlled according to what Foucault terms “security mechanisms... installed around the random element in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life” (cited in Bulley 2017a, 45).

One such articulation of a politics of mobility and managed welcome from which to draw out the power relations of hospitality brought into play beyond the threshold moment of sovereign admission/rejection—producing moments, rather, of governance within the lives of citizens and non-citizens alike—is that of “domopolitics” (Walters 2004).
Domopolitics, according to William Walters, characterises a form of “government of the state” that increasingly employs constructions and the rhetoric of the nation as a *home* to legitimate security measures directed at both the domestic citizenry and disparate inflows of migrants: the irregular, the uninvited, but equally those that hold potential economic benefits. That I might consider domopolitics as a decentred yet shifting mode of power relations that shapes subjectivities and spatialities as brought into sharp relief once the national home has been penetrated, means with Walters (2004), Darling (2011, 2014), Ingram (2008) and others, to locate domopolitics as a mode of Foucauldian “governmentality”.

*A “society of security”*

Before I can consider domopolitics in any detail, we must first turn to the work of Foucault so that I can spotlight the priority given over to security in early modern political thought and statecraft. Let’s begin as Foucault does, with the late sixteenth century and the emerging notion of *raison d’état*, as that which elaborates an approach to governing that is oriented by reason alone, a rational and secular “art” of government (Foucault 1988, 74). Importantly, this art of government breaks with earlier obsessions of the Machiavellian doctrine of the Prince and his sovereignty, in that its focus markedly departs from the singular, external link that binds the Prince to his principality, and moves toward a plurality of forms (and agents) of government: the multifarious and varied processes and practices taken to be immanent to the state and society itself (Dean 2010, 103, Foucault 2007, 93). Of the central aims of *raison d’état*, noteworthy is the attempt to consolidate the state itself, “its strength, greatness and well-being, by protecting itself from the competition of other states and its own internal weaknesses” (Dean 2010, 104 emphasis added). Foucault argues that this is an art of government that essentially heralds a move towards recognising a plurality of competing states, each with varying histories, and with it, a politics that is newly oriented towards the “holding out” of the state for an “indefinite time” (2007, 355). As such, for Foucault, *raison d’état* is brought into being by the very problem of the security of the state, since security is essential to the state realising its political aims of self-reinforcement and ongoing survival (ibid.).
This earlier state ratio to securitise is extended with the advent of liberalism and a specifically liberal rationality of government. Liberal governmentality must be understood with an eye to liberalism’s celebrated method of *laissez-faire*, as an approach to managing, facilitating, devising forms of regulation, and working with the givens of phenomena in all their “naturalness” (Foucault 2007). Phenomena, in other words, are seen “as a set of processes to be *managed* at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes” (ibid., 20 emphasis added). The underlying principle of the liberal state’s role, and likewise the mode of governmentality it advocates, is to respect rather than prevent or over-regulate these natural processes, “to take them into account, get them to work, or to work with them” within an accepted (rationalised) and optimal bandwidth (ibid., 6, 352).

Population, as we have seen, along with economic processes, becomes one such set of natural processes that is earmarked for governmental management under the modern liberal state. Yet, under such a framework, while the intervening governmentality necessarily calls for limits, these should not constitute a “negative boundary” of sorts (ibid.). For steeped as it is in a logic of productive growth, the objective of liberal governmentality is not to “prevent things as to ensure that the necessary and natural regulations work” (ibid., 353). And the way to go about ensuring that these natural processes intrinsic to population don’t “veer off course” is via an extensive security apparatus (ibid.). That is, the smooth and efficient operation of the government of population demands security. Security becomes thus the fundamental objective of liberal governmentality. Another way to put this might be to say that security becomes a condition of liberty for the governmental state, propelling society within evermore towards a ‘society of security’ (Gordon 1991, 20, following Foucault (2007)). Security in this configuration is henceforth a central function of liberal governments the world over to help realise their ambitions and aspirations. In other words, government-as-security derives its significance as being the condition of possibility for keeping subjects and populations not merely alive, but also happy, healthy and prosperous—their productive capacity harnessed and expertly secured. In this, Foucault’s (2007) key innovation of his security apparatus is less to do with fortification and certainty than it is with calculations, contingencies, and perhaps most crucially, as we shall next see, the matter of organising the best possible circulation of the population: maximising the good, while minimising the bad (ibid., 18).
With this liberty-security nexus, we witness a modified, or re-conceived, rationality of the state to securitise than observed earlier, as sourced in the dual imperative of population management and the respect of freedoms. The break, however, with past forms is perhaps not so clean, given that this extended version of the governmental goal to securitise ultimately serves to reinforce the state. If we now jump forward to a twenty-first century domopolitics, as an instantiation of modern-day governmentality, we will see how domopolitics, which problematises home, land and population (both citizens and non-citizens) in a particular way, casts the security imperative in a whole new light.

**Domopolitics and Hospitality**

Domopolitics is a form of government of the state that rationalises a raft of security measures directed at citizens and non-citizens around the particular image of the nation as home (Walters 2004, 241). In this, the border is a chief instrument of domopolitics. Not the absolutely impregnable border, contrary to some constructions of home that would hasten to consider its space a fortress (the trope of “Fortress Europe” readily comes to mind). But rather the border as a membrane, described by Walters as “a tissue which can filter movements across its threshold” to indicate the desire to promote the mobility flows of some presences while simultaneously controlling and partitioning off others (ibid., 255). The concern for the hospitable state becomes one of determining which mobilities are to be welcomed and which are to be more closely controlled, and so incur the least disruption to the moral and social order of home. It is this threat of disruption that introduces the security element into the question of managing and re-ordering home’s borders and the influx of mobilities.

Walters, in coining the term domopolitics, sought to capture not simply this crucial role for security in the governmental state but all that it sets in motion: its spaces, subjectivities, rationalities and knowledges (2004, 204). Attentive to both the increased porosity of borders and the transference of security concerns from “traditional” threats like terrorism and organised crime networks to the phenomena of asylum and migration, Walters identifies in domopolitics various rationalities and tactics designed to make use of mobile presences that flow into the nation-as-home. These rationalities and tactics, he avers, function to produce and preserve home’s “inside” from the unfamiliar and
threatening “outside”. I suggest that through their joint exercise, both the tactics and rationalities found in domopolitics affirm and reinforce asymmetries between citizens and non-citizens, citizens and foreigners, between who belongs and who doesn’t.

What we get then in domopolitics, is a new technology of power in which citizenship, territory and security relations are re-organised in a “fateful conjunction of home, land and security” (Walters 2004, 241). For what is in need of securing under domopolitics is homeland itself. Not merely in the sense given by the online Oxford English Dictionary, as denoting a person’s or population’s “home country”, its “native land”. But more specifically, all that homeland connotes in terms of the “domestic, not foreign” (ibid.), of the goods associated with home (i.e., citizenship, rights, belonging, security) that make it not an indeterminate space, but a space that is “ours”.

Such a concern for the domestic, for home in contrast to the foreign or unfamiliar, strongly indicates that this space of domestic familiarity, as produced through domopolitics, is imbued with particular values—values that give force to implicit and explicit criteria as to who belongs and is to be welcomed (and who is not) inside this space. Thus, essential to any discussion of domopolitics, as a way of “thinking” the nation as a home and a site for calculated interventions, is an awareness of what home is given to be and mean at a specific time or place: as a product of the spatial, relational and affective dimensions that Dan Bulley (2015) alerts us to. This is no doubt what Walters (2004) has in mind in signalling the performative power of home:

[Homeland] has powerful affinities with family, intimacy, place: the home as hearth, a refuge or a sanctuary in a heartless world; the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and where, by definition, others do not; international order as a space of home . . . Domopolitics embodies a tactic which juxtaposes the ‘warm words’ of community, trust, and citizenship, with the danger words of a chaotic outside - illegals, traffickers, terrorists; a game which configures things as ‘Us vs. Them’ (cited in Tyler 2010, 65).

Here Walters sketches the vision of the world that domopolitics establishes: us/safe/home vs. them/dangerous/outside. This world—or rather, its negative and threatening image—is embodied in the mobile stranger, represented in popular, political
discourse variously as profiteering, clandestine or “illegal” and therefore with a propensity
to try and unlawfully appropriate the advantages of (the national) home for him/herself, or
to collude with terrorists or traffickers. When it comes to state hospitality, determinations
must therefore be made to distinguish who among its hopefuls might be the “better”
(alternately the most qualified, most deserving, most persecuted and so on) recipient.

Before moving to consider hospitality through the lens of domopolitics, I will briefly
address what makes hospitality a key site for governmentality. Or in other words, what
makes hospitality “governable”. We know that in terms of its relational-affective-spatial
dimension, hospitality is constitutive of home’s boundaries, its inside and outside. More
significant, is the question of the manner in which the outside is produced as outside: as the
unfamiliar, the chaotic, dangerous and the like. How might hospitality produce spaces and
subjects in powerful and significant ways? The answer lies in the tactics and rationalities,
the discursive or visual fields that are deployed in the exercise of welcome and control over
the nation-as-home. For these determine how we go about choosing and welcoming those
who demand to share in the space of home, how home’s outside is known, thought, made
visible and brought into coexistence with its inside, and of the (dis)comfort, (un)ease,
(un)homeliness and aligned subjectivities that hospitality produces through its coming-into-
relation with difference and alterity.

Through its varied tactics and rationalities hospitality comes to be framed as an issue
of security, and is deployed by the state as a useful and rational way to tackle insecurities
associated with “outside”: asylum seekers, refugees and other suchlike displaced humans
(Walters 2004). Security needs and uses hospitality for its functioning and preservation. This
is what makes hospitality the perfect site for governmental rationality. As stated in the
introduction, my aim in this chapter is to give an understanding of hospitality as a specific
conception of power (domopolitical governmentality). To do so requires bringing hospitality
under the lens of two key aspects of the exercise of governmental power that until now I
have only gestured towards: political technologies and political rationalities. While the latter
discursively represents the world in a particular way, the former make such discourses
“practicable”—announcing a way of acting upon, of directing action in such a world
(Merlingen 2003, 368). It is to these that I now turn, describing those I consider to be the
key technologies and rationalities associated with constructing and governing the nation as
a “homely” space to be secured. In short, I show that hospitality is a form of
governmentality, a rationality of government, best envisioned through domopolitics.

The contemporary domopolitics of hospitality – a focus on technologies

If we are to investigate domopolitics we must begin with a central “technology”, to
echo Foucault (2007), through which the trajectories of mobile presences are calculated and
assessed, maximised or controlled: processes of classification and identification. Following
Foucault (2007, 19), Walters argues that governmental processes of identifying and
classifying uninvited presences in the home aren’t concerned to “arrest” the mobility of the
outsider (2004, 248). Such a concern is more in line with a strictly decisionistic state whose
power is yielded in exercising threshold, sovereign moments of entry or denial. Rather, the
processes that Walters alerts us to aim “to tame [mobility]; not to build walls, but systems
capable of utilizing mobilities” (ibid.).

Within this system of governance, I want to emphasise two priorities of domopolitics,
each founded in the very etymology of domos. The first is the desire to govern the state as a
home (domos), maintaining within it a sense of familiarity, order and control. The second is
a will to “domesticate” and “subdue” the potentially threatening mobilities who seek refuge
inside it (ibid., 241-2). Classification and identification might therefore be considered
expressions of domopolitical power if we hold them to be strategic mechanisms of security
for “disentangling” safe and trustworthy or desirable mobile presences from those
positioned always already as suspect, and so maintain the familiarity, order and at-
homeliness of the host (ibid., 245). In the case of the former, their circulation is encouraged,
while the latter’s mobilities are subject to regulation, management and control. I shall
return to the notion of domesticity, subdual and order shortly. Before that, however, I wish
to treat the particular modes of classification that function as a key mechanism for
governing hospitality.

Domopolitical classifications are frequently expressed in activities of filtering, sorting,
labelling and categorising mobile and unfamiliar presences. By way of illustration, let us take
the particular case of the European Union (EU): noteworthy due to its central objective of
opening up its “citizens only” area of freedom, security and justice to those who, forced by
circumstances, seek protection in the Union.\textsuperscript{15} Such filtering and sorting can take place at the precise point of EU entry (i.e., along its borderzones, namely the controversial “hotspots”). The 2016 EU/Turkey Refugee Deal, otherwise known as the “one in one out” swap, is as a case in point.\textsuperscript{16} Briefly, these strict border sorting techniques include the reception of migrants at the arrival point into the EU. After recording their “biometrics”, an attempt at identification is made by posing questions about the journey that has led each to the EU. From there, local authorities assisted by EU Frontex (border) police proceed with an on-the-spot triage, which consists of setting apart refugees from alleged economic migrants, who are ineligible for asylum and deported (Rodier 2016). This method has much in common with the absolutism of the sovereign. Therefore, what is more important for our governmentality focus, is the situation of the tens of thousands more who succeed in passing through the border-membrane. For these human mobilities set in motion the lengthier and more complex filtering mechanisms like bureaucratic claims-sorting and gruelling assessment processes for asylum seekers once inside the EU space. In this instance, identification, classification and sorting procedures elicit the involvement and specialised expertise and knowledge of multiple associations, state and non-state actors, all vested in ensuring that hospitality is granted only to those “worthy” and “deserving” of it, and so to uphold the integrity and efficiency of the system itself.

Rejection is the norm. Hospitality in the form of protection and asylum is an increasingly discredited right—77 percent of decisions in the EU-28 in 2017 resulted in a negative determination on refugee status (Eurostat 2018). But only after the individual has been duly catalogued, namely through the ubiquitous collection of their digital fingerprints. There is nothing benign, however, about the practice of collating biometrics (Epstein 2007, Salter 2008). For it enables one such outcome of governmental hospitality geared towards securing home from its threatening outside: fast-tracking through national asylum systems “cases” foreknown as suspicious or fraudulent, leaving its fated “undeserving” hospitality aspirants the choice between voluntary return or enforced deportation.\textsuperscript{17} Such cases being

\textsuperscript{15} I here refer to the EU Regulation No. 604/2013, dated 26 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{16} For more information on this deal, namely its status two years on, see Karakoulaki (2018).
\textsuperscript{17} Technically, there exists an avenue to appeal such decisions, though its probability of success is slim.
those that the state, via its authorities, institutions and agencies, assigns to the “Dublin” category, in reference to the EU Dublin Regulation.\(^\text{18}\)

The Dublin category integrates two types of “failed” asylum seekers. The first are those individuals found to have first entered the EU via a Member State other than the one in which they seek protection, or who have lodged an asylum claim in another Member State; generally, their first port of call in the Union. In either instance, an official order is given for their return to that EU Member State, effected, as required, through detention and deportation measures. The central means to identify and corroborate such cases is, predictably, those same fingerprints taken from these individuals as they entered into EU territory.

Second, are those who seek hospitality and protection from an EU Member State but whose country of origin figures on the State in question’s designated “Safe Country List”. Safe Country Lists are legislated by relevant authorities within each EU Member State. They are enforced in around half of EU countries, with work well underway to legislate a common “EU Safe Country List” and so harmonise asylum policy across the region (European Commission n.d). Considered “safe” are those countries that “ensure respect for the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms” (OFPRA 2018). Such EU Member State lists only have in common the broad discrepancy in regards the number and profile of the countries that populate them; but they generally feature the core group of Albania, Armenia, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Turkey (European Commission n.d).

While the stated aim of establishing Safe Countries is to ensure that “failed” asylum seekers have nothing to fear from being sent home, they are largely aimed at fighting “abuses” within national asylum systems. In other words, they attempt to put an end to putative abuses of intra-European hospitality. The examples given here of a sorting and filtering mechanism at the border that is invested in countless bureaus and administrative centres, and performed by innumerable agents, authorities and experts, across all current

\(^{18}\) The EU Dublin Regulation (Regulation No. 604/2013) outlines the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining the asylum applications of third-country nationals or stateless persons. In short, responsibility essentially lies with the Member State wherein the asylum seeker first entered the EU.
twenty-eight Member States, denotes not only its expansive spatial reach and diffuse nature, but also its highly technologised aspect (recording of digital prints/other biometrics for the shared EURODAC database), the integration of its systems through case and (safe)country profiling, and the complex nature and array of its classificatory and identificatory procedures that coalesce together in the formation of a security apparatus designed to perform calculations and determinations on individual status through collective aggregates, and so minimise the attendant risks that mobile presences present to the nation-as-host. These “technologies” of hospitality are the concrete expression of domopolitical governance. They exemplify Foucault’s (2007) thinking on governance through security and thus situate hospitality as a governmentality as he understands it.

What straightaway emerges from this section’s analysis, is that the classificatory nature of domopolitics calculates, defines and orders a risky population to which its power might be applied (Darling 2011, 266). That is, in differentiating between the claims of those seeking refuge in the host-nation, additional mobilities and mobilisations are imposed upon the various populations categorised by their difference and the degree of insecurity that this invokes. Through its capacity for mobilising in the name of risk, vulnerability and danger, domopolitics represents a mode of power specific to the need and desire for security. As Jonathan Darling argues,

\[d\]omopolitics actively positions subjects in relation to its defined categories of (past and therefore known) circulation and flow and its decisions on entry, status and rights... [It] produces the categories of position which allow calculations to occur, domopolitics assigns positions in the form of ‘case types’ and defined flows of mobility through which decisions on risk, security and future welfare are made. (ibid.)

The mobility of these subjects is therefore ordered and conducted on account of whether the categorised individual is to be governed and fostered (for a lucky few) in ways not dissimilar to its body of citizens; or, further regulated and controlled, in which might follow the allocation of suitable refuge options within the state; or rejected and ordered to return to their or another’s “home”.
Of course, these specific ways of intervening and acting upon or directing the government of hospitality would not be conceivable were it not for the political rationalities that delimit the discursive field within which such activities are made intelligible. These two dimensions—political rationalities and governmental techniques and technologies—are autonomous yet reciprocally conditioning in the practice of government and exercise of power. Indeed political rationalities rely upon governmental techniques for their concrete expression, so that the one cannot be examined in isolation to the other (Dean 2010, 33, 41). In the following section I develop the second of these two crucial dimensions and so cement the contours of domopolitical hospitality.

**Political rationalities of domopolitical hospitality**

So far I have considered how “government” concerns the enactment of various technologies: practices, procedures, mechanisms and programs. Important to my argument that hospitality must be seen as a form of governmentality, is to not consider its technologies as mere empirics of population management, and to then enumerate them accordingly. We need to grasp how such practices are formed in relation to the specific rationalities of varied authorities. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller describe these rationalities as

the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors. (2010, 273)

Political rationalities thus provide authorities with complex knowledges, know-how and expertise. What “rationality” does, in effect, is delimit a discursive field of political intervention within which these tasks or activities come to be “thought”. To see how this is done, it is helpful to turn to Rose and Miller (2010), who ascribe three dimensions to political rationalities: the epistemological, the moral, and the idiomatic. Each of these can be
observed in their intersection with hospitality. I will address each below, beginning with the idiomatic dimension.

Rose and Miller state that “political rationalities are articulated in a distinctive idiom” (2010, 277, original emphasis). The authors caution that this form of political discourse is not simply rhetoric by another name, but a way of utilising language as a “kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations” (ibid.). The idiom of hospitality is, par excellence, that of the home.

Home, we have seen in talk of hospitality, can figure as either the domestic, private abode, or the nation itself; and just like our private homes, the nation-state has doors that open and close. The passage of which, and therefore our coexistence with otherness, is negotiated through hospitality. If we take, then, the reality that is human mobility, “thinking” about this through the semantics of hospitality, namely through the idiom of home and its structural-relational qualities, institutes a discursive field within which binary opposites such as host and guest, home and hostile territory, invited and uninvited, insider and outsider readily emerge. These feed into an imaginary that forms the basis for how we think and categorise cross-bordered difference and otherness. The implications are twofold.

First, these dualisms express oppositions of identity, experience and place, pitting those able to offer refuge against those who seek it. The result is a hierarchical privileging of the former (Akins 2004). That is, the host, as “master of the home”, is made “thinkable” as occupying the privileged position as the provider of hospitality. Empowered, in other words, to welcome in otherness. Evidently, a country, much like a home, is made and occupied by a people who have a right to determine who, when and for how long foreigners might enter it. However, where hospitality-as-security has the potential to veer onto slippery terrain, is when second, its binary suppositions affirming a spatial, structural and relational imaginary of home, serve as the basis for misconstruing all manner of threats that “outside” presents to the at-homeliness of the nation. We might then think of the utilisation of the language of hospitality as a productive force, as is any mode of governmentality, according to Foucault (2007). Here, it produces the domopolitical space as one that inevitably is in need of securing; hence the practices and techniques seen earlier as the appropriate and requisite responses that attempt to do just that. The move articulates a political rationality for thinking how to best manage, tame and control trajectories inside the bounds of home,
thereby producing and reproducing the space of the home itself, here the space of the state.

The second—the epistemological—aspect differs from the idiomatic, in that, rather than making political rationalities “thinkable through language”, it implies that the latter are always grounded in a particular knowledge of the object that is to be governed (Rose and Miller 2010, 277). That is, they are articulated on account of what we “know” of such things (i.e., society, the nation, the population, the economy) and, crucially, of the people who are in need of governing. Fundamentally, the knowledge that informs the activity of governing hospitality builds on articulations of hospitality in the idiom of the home. Namely, its spatial-relational-affective aspects that inflect talk of hospitality with three crucial elements: the figure of the outsider; the desire to preserve home, as a place of familiarity and belonging; and the risk entailed in bringing the outside in. Consequently, a central knowledge concerning hospitality, particularly when the “home” to speak of is the nation, is that, mismanaged, it is the source of all manner of dangers brought on by what Shryock (2012) has called bad hosts and bad guests. Which is to say that on the one hand, failure to provide appropriate hospitality can attract “moral criticism” for the host (ibid. 2012, S20). On the other, the introduction of the wrong kinds of guest (the parasite, aggressor or predator etc.) will unsettle the national home. Contrariwise, well-managed, hospitality can be instrumental in maintaining the social cohesiveness and homeliness of the nation. This underscores the usefulness of hospitality for states, at once problem and solution to the “effective reality” of cross-bordered mobility.

When it comes to problematising state hospitality, it is no surprise that the notion of “bad guests” is more politically salient and available to use than that of the neglectful host. As a result, government that forms around this issue demands that authorities, institutions and agencies all contribute to conceptualising and disseminating forms of knowledge around the figure of the outsider, their motivations for mobility, and generally accepted conceptions of who constitutes a good, responsible individual (or collective), preferably with “citizen” potential, and who does not. These all map out to give an intelligible account of the nature of the persons likely to make demands on the nation-host’s hospitality. I express these schematically here as the stereotypical innocent and suffering victim; the productive and beneficial migrant; the profiteering and abusing parasite; or the illegal and clandestine figure, either the prey of or in cahoots with terrorists/traffickers. On this basis, the former
two categories are considered “worthy” and “deserving” of hospitality, while the latter two are not.

What is crucial to our understanding of governmental hospitality is that it presupposes, and perhaps even tries to bring about, a division of all migrants into two categories: as either good or bad. Moreover, on the basis of this knowledge, and the expertise and practices that go into identifying the attributes and orientations of this presupposed population, hospitality becomes a widely agreed upon and (potentially) positive resource of the body politic. But, to stay that way, it needs to restrict, manage and control those who enter or are found inside the home. Or, to be blunt, if a nation is to preserve this resource and so remain hospitable, that is, capable of hosting well and guaranteeing the societal and political “goods” (a pathway to rights, entitlements and belonging) that hospitality can offer, the-all pervasive rationality grounded in such a proposition is that those seeking to benefit from it must be deserving, and they must be as few as possible. For its execution, such a rationality is elaborated in line with a third dimension ascribed to political rationalities: moral backing (Rose and Miller 2010).

The third dimension that Rose and Miller (2010) ascribe to political rationalities of government is that of moral colour. This dimension of the government of hospitality derives from the way that political rationalities consider just where “government” should be directed to attain and balance certain ideals and principles: freedom, equality, justice, citizenship, secure borders and a homely nation, economic efficiency and the like. This so-defined “moral” characteristic further animates rationalities in their elaboration of appropriate duties for authorities and in ensuring that the tasks and activities of government are “properly” distributed among a varied array of authority types—indeed, if and when such governing activities are to be performed (Rose and Miller 2010, 276-7). This aspect, together with the previous two, marks the discursive contours of what Rose and Miller define as a “domain for the formulation and justification of idealised schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying it” (ibid).

Before moving to giving an account of some of the implications of domopolitical hospitality, namely that it comes to reinstall sovereignty as a key governmental practice, I wish to bring in a different but related form of governmentality that we have yet to consider: ethopolitics. Ethopolitics concerns the self-governing and moral and political character of the state’s own citizenry. It differs from domopolitics in the sense that ethopolitics
connotes a focus on autonomous individuals who are citizens of the state. Yet it operates in tandem with domopolitics, since the self-government of individual citizens is intimately tied up with the problematic of good governance of the state-as-home, and the domopolitical systems of management and security that are introduced to this effect. I bring in this aspect of governmentality to emphasise that the power relations of hospitality are not merely political in nature. They bear equally on the ethical. This aspect of power isn’t simply—or solely—directed at the outsider. Importantly, it invests the insider. To expand on this claim, we need to bring the citizen into our discussion.

**Ethopolitics**

The first thing to note, is that with ethopolitics, the host population becomes problematised (Walters 2004). With domopolitics, much of the subduing, taming and domesticating that takes places refers to modifications in the conduct of the migrant population. Ethopolitics, contrariwise, works on the host’s citizens themselves, on the manner in which they themselves internalise the subjectivities of deserving/desirable and undeserving/undesirable migrant (Darling 2013). With ethopolitics, decisions on desert and worth are made daily by ordinary citizens: the citizen, him or herself, effectively takes on the role of host. Ethopolitics works here to assist the state in the functioning of its domopolitics, strengthening the state in the process.

To elaborate, I again return to Walter’s remark: domopolitics, our homes are at risk. For it strikes me that it is here that Walters introduces an etho-political element into his discussion that is particularly useful to understand the state/citizen/outsider relationship when it comes to the governance of hospitality. Indeed, what could be more of a risk to home, than a citizenry that doesn’t trust in the government’s systems of welcome and asylum? Or that has misgivings that its management of hospitality is working in the proper manner to ensure that the “right” kind of people are being given the refuge they deserve, whilst home is made safe in excluding the “wrong” kinds from its community—or at the very least, from accessing the benefits or goods associated with home and homeland. With ethopolitics, Walters seems to say, following Nikolas Rose (1999), the ethical concerns stemming from the government of hospitality are here directed inwards, at the citizen-host, who might be directed to work on his/her own normative account for the justifications of hospitality (welcome, failure and control):
Etho here is for ‘ethos’—the sentiments, moral nature or guiding beliefs of persons, groups or institutions. By etho-politics I mean to characterize ways in which these features of human individual and collective existence—sentiments, values, beliefs—have come to provide the ‘medium’ within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government. (Rose, 1999 cited in Walters 2004, 254)

It is with this in mind that I wish to consider this additional “governmentality” in relation to state hospitality, and in particular the internalisation of what it means to be hospitable, to show its intersection with domopolitics in two distinct ways (Rose, 1999). As the above quote demonstrates, ethopolitics is a means to shape the values, moralities and beliefs that play out in the “rational” and “responsible” choices that autonomous citizens are able to make when it comes to hospitality and the presence of foreigners inside their home (Darling 2013, 1791). These choices play out in significant ways when held up to the strategic field of visibility, which, as distinct from its discursive counterpart, has its own practices of knowledge.¹⁹

As a first illustration of this point, we might again turn to the situation of “failed” asylum seekers, many of whom have been issued with return orders, but who typically do not vacate the home. It is they who come to inhabit makeshift camps scattered in and around major cities or along the borderzone. These wretched spaces of habitation, which some have called “abject” (Isin and Rygiel 2007), are shown to be produced through domopolitics (Darling 2011). Yet, surprising, or perhaps not, these camps are only very infrequently either dismantled or made “liveable” by improving their conditions of sanitation and safety in the way that non- and intergovernmental agencies call for. I suggest that this is because, as sites of “abjection”, they articulate a deeper rationale that progressively works to create feelings of unease, unfamiliarity, and discomfort over the home. In short, in their abject “reality” made visible for all and sunder, these forms of habitation generate an overall sense of unhomeliness inside the very confines of home. What we in fact appear to have, is a situation in which the state seems to be (indirectly)

¹⁹ On the strategic field of governmental “visibility”, see the excellent recent study by Tazzioli & Walters (2016).
saying to its people: “Behold these failed seekers of asylum: doubly culpable for attempting to defy our system of hospitality and derail the image of the nation as a ‘homely’ space. They can be neither worthy of our compassion nor a place in it.”

The visibility of the destitute and powerless appears here to be strategically organised in such a way that they are held up to the scrutiny and appraisal of the citizenry who keep them in their moral gaze (see, e.g., Tazzioli and Walters 2016). Such government, we have seen, works by taming and subduing bodies held in limbo in the mode of disciplinary power. Such an effect is essential, for should the camp population become unruly, disorderly, and riotous the result would be deleterious. When viewed under the additional lens of ethopolitics, the act (or “non-act” rather) of abandoning them to large encampments or the scores of smaller makeshift tent cities, lends itself to interpretation as an attempt—deployed by the state no less—to direct the citizen into shaping his/her individual beliefs and attitudes towards worth and hospitality. That is, it is only “good” and “right” that hospitality as a prized resource, must be withheld from these failed bodies who bring discomfort and unease to the home, and reserved only for the worthiest and most deserving of victims. Namely, those who can successfully meet rigorous selection criteria on hospitality; and where necessary, filter through the “right” and “good” (i.e., UNHCR- or similarly run) kinds of camps and programs.

The second point of illustration on the concrete workings of ethopolitics, is to suggest it is a governmentality that lays claim to and valorises a certain ethos for the nation. One that vindicates that certain decisions need to be made about hospitality in order to preserve its integrity, so that distinguishing between good and bad guests naturally falls within the prerogative of the nation, exercised jointly by its authorities and its people. Nations, generally, like to be seen as nations that welcome in others. Indeed, I would venture to say that there is significant ethico-political purchase in being recognised a welcoming and generous host nation (or city) on the world stage. Nations, such as the French state for example, frequently and readily invoke a “proud history” of hospitality. But only for the right kinds of foreigners, only for those deemed willing and able of integrating a certain way of life and who, above all, will not take advantage of the state, namely its generous system of rights and privileges. Hospitality signifies this, but not that. This reasoning underpins the moral imperative for making distinctions and determinations of the kinds that I have explored in this chapter. It is the moral price of securing home, the price of rendering the
benevolence of the host less risky, and who is supported in this task by the vast majority of its citizenry-as-host.

_The implications of domopolitical hospitality_

In this section I discuss some of the implications of domopolitics of hospitality; and moreover, exactly what this kind of power _does_ for the state. What should now be clear from the above sections, is that at its most routine level of knowing and representing the reality of cross-bordered mobility (such as the wrong place of origin, the wrong port of arrival, or a form of suffering that defies calculation), domopolitical hospitality can mean exclusion for those found wanting in certain identificatory/classificatory realms. Or, happily, a perfect fit and inclusion for others, by virtue of the rationalities and technologies that delimit and enact government in this domain. For what is at stake with a domopolitics of hospitality, is to constitute the nation-state as a homely space. A place, we have seen, of “community, trust, and citizenship” for insiders who belong that is simultaneously idealised and produced by a threatening, unannounced and uninvited outside that filters through its membrane-like exterior (Walters 2004, 241). Recalling Walters (2004) earlier on the tactics of domopolitics that juxtapose the familiarity of home and its affective links of trust, belonging and citizenship with an exploitative and chaotic outside, this is a system designed to distinguish claim-making subjects into either “trustworthy” or “abusive” cases (Darling, 2011).

However, domopolitics is more than a means to cast order over the space of home in a world of constant flux and dangerous mobilities. It is also more than an instrumental means to impose order upon and subdue aspiring recipients of hospitality by keeping the status of their claims and thus their lives in uncertain limbo. Governing hospitality implies a specific way of managing the risk that lies at the heart of the concept itself. One that brings into play dynamic forms of power commanded by security that are absent in a Derridean model commanded by ethics, wherein the injunction that home be cast open to the “unknown, anonymous other” is placed in impossible tension with the equally valid need to impose restrictions on such indeterminate openness (Derrida 2000b, 25). Domopolitics emphatically demands that otherness in the home be recognised, given over to calculation, measurability and predictions: in a word, made “knowable”. As Walters writes, with
“[d]omopolitics: ‘our’ homes are at risk” (2004, 247): with domopolitical hospitality, our homes and the ongoing possibility of being hospitable—being the power to host and be known a hospitable nation capable of welcoming in the “right” kinds of guests—are, crucially, what is at risk. Tactics of identification and classification hence exemplify the need to govern these problematised aspects of hospitality through risk-mitigation strategies that calculate, isolate and expulse unworthy wrong-doers or strangers from the nation home and “safely” back into their own. In this way, a great many of the risks of hospitality embodied in “bad guests” can be considered as safely averted. Moreover, from this standpoint, state resources as a result are freed up for more useful deployment: the provision of a safe haven for the most deserving of those who demand it, with the effect of increasing overall efficiencies in the operation of the hospitality system.

Further, the mechanism of safeguarding the home via the selective logic of the diffuse, ubiquitous border-membrane—distancing “failed” and therefore unworthy hospitality “cases” while subduing and disciplining liminal cases awaiting determination (Darling 2011)—is crucial to the workings of domo- and ethopolitical hospitality. For here, the power of hospitality continues to work by reassuring the citizenry that the uninvited guests circulating inside their home can be brought into line, disciplined and their compliance with administrative and policing procedures voluntarily consented to for the duration of the claims assessment process.

The effect of failed hospitality cases is, I argue, even more significant. It follows the same organising logic that Imogen Tyler (2010) describes in her analysis of biopolitical citizenship in the UK. As she writes, “British citizenship now describes a legal, political and social field of intelligibility, a biopolitics that produces some bodies and groups as failing, abject or outside of the realm of citizenship altogether” (2010, 71). This is exactly the kind of “reordering and a re-hierarchizing of political priorities” that Walters alerts us to in outlining the concept of domopolitics (2004, 244). Not only are the failed bodies of hospitality forever outside the realm of citizenship because we deny them a home after they have fled theirs, but the whole organising structure of hospitality, as a rationality of government, is geared to hierarchically privilege its citizenry to the exclusion of those it presupposes as unfit, unworthy or downright undesirable. It is, in the words of Ingram, a “rationality that reinstalls sovereignty as a key component of governmental practice” and is coordinated by the security machine (2008, 876).
And this is the central thrust of my argument in this chapter: through the lens of governmentality, we are alerted not just to the more complicated workings of the state as it assesses who can and will be worthy recipients of its hospitality. We are also introduced to the possibility of how such decisions might equally fall to the individual citizen-as-host him or herself (this being the work of Chapter Five). And with this, we witness a resurgent sovereignty that has not entirely disappeared with governmentality. Foucault is explicit that sovereignty is not replaced by governmentality (nor disciplinary power): when the security of populations emerged as a central target of governmental reflection and intervention, both the problem of sovereignty and the importance of discipline were indeed never more sharply posed (2007, 106-7).

Governmentality is thus to be understood as but a different conception of power that Foucault draws our attention to and historicises. Yet it is one whose increasingly rationalised form has led to its pre-eminence (throughout the West) over these other earlier types. For Foucault, this later formation of power is recast by those former (discipline and sovereign power) into a triangle-like formation of sovereignty-discipline-government—different forms of power that are continually at play in different ways. Significantly, such a configuration enables our more enhanced understanding of sovereignty as supplemented by governmental and disciplinary processes (i.e., those that regulate and order individual behaviours) once the threshold of the national home has been crossed. And by this, I mean to say this configuration establishes a political realm in which domopolitics and ethopolitics work hand-in-hand to “reactivate and transform” elements of sovereign power that enable the latter’s resurgence, but through which sovereignty remains nonetheless invested and entwined with governmental impulses, ambitions and pursuits (ibid., 9).

If in this chapter I have devoted time to analysing the technologies of governing hospitality and the political rationalities upon which these are set to work, it is because it is through these technologies that persistent forms of sovereignty (and, for that matter, discipline) are established, maintained and co-exist with governmentality (Foucault 1997, 299)—a process that ultimately produces and further reinforces the state itself, the state-as-security. Thus, the underlying and central goal of the modern state to securitise never wanes, whichever the dominant mode of power. With each change or shift in modality of power, the state’s objective of security simply gets underwritten by this different conception, this altered form, of power.
Here, in the case of the contemporary state and its use of hospitality to achieve desired ends—securing the “homely” nation and its generous goods through the inclusion of some (worthy) to the exclusion of others (unworthy)—the result is a highly productive merging of nationhood, citizenry and homeland, a consequence of the architecture of domopolitics that I have here described, wherein the desire to securitise rationalises a certain set of security measures all in the name of a particular idea of home.

Conclusion

In Chapters Two and Three I have set out two central ideas of this dissertation. First, is the idea of hospitality as a political practice, which, critically, sets up a vision of the state that comes to contested by its own citizens explored in Part Two of the dissertation. The second is to challenge Derrida’s account of hospitality, as too readily conceiving of the state through the notion of sovereign power and mastery. It fails to take into account the complicated technologies of governmental power or their effects on migrant and host populations. This account, nonetheless, is the leading light in the literature on hospitality. In this chapter I have provided a comprehensive account of the relationship between governmentality and hospitality. I extended the analysis of state hospitality to show its operation, and its agents, as multifarious and diffuse. Governmental hospitality is operationalised through a series of tactics and rationalities that serves to identify, classify, and facilitate or circumscribe the mobility of outside presences found within the home, and to achieve its desired ends of security by limiting its hospitality to those calculated or evaluated as the most worthy and desirable. These initial chapters have thus argued for and gone “beyond Derrida” to direct our attention to two crucial realities of hospitality today that the Derridean framework blinds us to: how the state works, which we have just seen; and how citizens work as counter-hosts, which we have yet to see. But most important perhaps, is the relationship, the complicated game being played, between these two phenomena.

In closing, I refer to a question that Walters himself poses in the final remarks of his paper on domopolitics: “does domopolitics provoke resistance?” (2004, 255). Curiously, for an exploration of governmental power, Walters makes no reference made to Foucault’s own thoughts on the matter. Yet, I suspect Foucault’s reply would take the form of one of
his oft-cited remarks: power is everywhere precisely for the reason that resistance to it is everywhere (1979, 93-5). But I am getting ahead of myself. Investigating the resistance provoked by domopolitics, that is, the counter-conducts of indignant French hosts, is the task of subsequent chapters. First, we must turn to the French state, to elucidate the specific stamp it gives to hospitality, as a product of intersecting political rationalities, its long and vexed history with hospitality in practice, and core Republican themes.
Chapter 4

HOSPITALITY AND THE FRENCH STATE

We must welcome refugees: it’s our tradition and our honour.
I call for the greatest humanity in dealing with the migrant question.

Emmanuel Macron, 23 June (Brussels) and 22 June (Paris) 2017.
French President.

Great humanity needs great firmness [fermeté].
There will be no reception centre for migrants in Calais at the risk of creating a “suction” effect. Calais must no longer be a festering focal point [abcès de fixation] for migrants.

Gérard Collomb, 22 June 2017.
French Interior minister.

Introduction

The willingness to embrace and welcome in foreigners fleeing their homes, to enfranchise them even, as citizens, is a revered and central narrative of the French republican tradition. And on many occasions it has certainly held true. As the first of the opening quotes suggests, this esteemed ideal, reiterated most recently in the newly-elected French President’s desire to uphold and assert his nation’s “proud history” of hospitality, shows little sign of waning. Emmanuel Macron might well here be invoking (on the international stage, it must be noted) the celebrated “French exception” on matters relating to hospitality, citizenship and the political integration of plural identities—an attribute recently ascribed to Macron himself on account of his own steely self-belief and unique vision for France en marche.20 The French state sees its exceptionalism in terms of a

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“powerful sense of historical destiny”, and not least for having exported their political, democratic and citizenship ideals to the world during the 1789 revolutionary period (Johnson 1995). This self-understanding as “exceptional” draws from two sources: on the one hand, from a conception of the “social contract” and citizenship inherited from Enlightenment philosophy and the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. And on the other, from a long tradition of immigration that dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, in which France hosted successive waves of migration while other European countries remained mainly emigration countries until the post-war period, and even until the end of the 1980s for the southern states of Europe (Costa-Lascoux, 1999).

I claim, rather, that France is exceptional because of its hypocritical use of the principle of hospitality. By this I mean that the French state has the unique capacity to foreground human rights and hospitality in political and ideological self-representations; but that nonetheless, there exists a sizable disjuncture between its principles and practices. For all its talk of upholding a commitment to republican and revolutionary principles such as liberté, égalité and fraternité, exceptional in nature is France’s manner of evoking while denying the idea of public hospitality.

In this chapter my aim is to investigate what is driving this seemingly vexed relation that France has with the idea of hospitality and how this might feed into, or reciprocate, the way that it enacts or practices hospitality as a result. This is clear not just today, but also when we look back to France’s history, with all of its oscillations between openness and closure. For it is my contention that the interplay of long-standing French republican and revolutionary values, along with certain articulations of (in)security and suspicion determine how the French state conceives and practices hospitality today. Further, this oscillation can only keep happening, given that republican values continue to be the well-spring of national identity, and these cannot but have a fraught relationship with a hospitality policy that favours closure and national (even ethnic) homogeneity. Yet historically, as in the present, insecurities readily surface due to the presence of the “foreigner” and the question of his/her capacity to assimilate the Republican ideal (demands) of citizenship. Thus we witnessed, and continue to do so, denials and withdrawals of hospitality on the grounds of a supposed republican “inassimilability” that is fuelled by fear and suspicion.

This reveals the deep tension that lies at the core of French hospitality and marks out the problematic I wish to deal with in this chapter. How and why is it that the revered ideal
of French hospitality is so contradictory, so at odds with itself? Might explorations into the way that hospitality has been articulated for centuries offer an explanation as to why, today, we see the ongoing intimidation, arrest and conviction of French citizens for the “crime” of being hospitable?

My aim is to chart contemporary France’s long and arduous relation with the notion of hospitality, one that I hold, remarkably, pre-dates the Revolutionary era by centuries, since it is this epoch that is generally accredited with the emergence and subsequent decline of French hospitality. Relevant to my investigations in this chapter are the words of Louis de Jaucourt (2013) who, in 1765 wrote under his entry on “Hospitality” in the celebrated Encyclopedia by Diderot and d’Alembert:

*Hospitality* is the virtue of a great soul that cares for the whole universe through the ties of humanity. The Stoics regarded it as a duty inspired by God himself. One must, they said, do good to people who come to our countries, less for their sake than for our own interest, for the sake of virtue and in order to perfect in our souls human sentiments, which must not be limited to the ties of blood and kinship, but extended to all mortals... We must admit that the times have produced such great changes among peoples... *Hospitality* was naturally lost throughout Europe as all Europeans became travellers and merchants.

With Jaucourt we get a clear statement of the ancient Greek and Roman understandings of hospitality as a virtuous duty associated with transcendental norms. On the eve of revolution in France, Jaucourt stresses that hospitality is a sacred duty set to disappear, rendered incompatible with “the spirit of commerce... [that] has produced ... a love of interest” (ibid.). The question that must be asked, is what happens when a revolution finishes off to set aside the sacred, and in the name of anti-clericalism—later laïcité—aspires to bring hospitality to earth? The importance of this question cannot be overlooked, because the substitute for God (or Gods) is the State, which goes on to define just what hospitality is for people. What Jaucourt effectively alerts the modern world to, is the tension between “disinterested” hospitality and mercantile forms of welcome. This tension is at its most stark in the case of France today. For it underpins the very law that is used to criminalise citizens for their acts of solidarity.
The chapter proceeds in four parts. I begin with a general account of the relation between universalism, the French doctrine of republicanism, and the concept of hospitality. Second, I unpack the “its our tradition and our honour” narrative that France deploys to claim its support for hospitality, which works to obfuscate the long and vexed relation between tolerance and hospitality in modern French history. In this section, I describe the crackdown of hospitality at a key moment of the ancien régime, then move to revolutionary France and show how the universalistic aspirations of the Revolution came to be rapidly replaced by the denunciation and suspicion of the “foreigner”. In the third section I discuss the link between the politics of hospitality and French secularism (laïcité). Concurring with Talal Asad that “laïcité is not blind to religious groups in public, but suspicious of some (Muslims) because of what it imagines they may do”, I contend that French laïcité, at once animating and reciprocating its ethos of hospitality, is deployed as another technique of the state for realising a particular conception of French identity (2006, 102). Finally, drawing all of the above elements together and under the dual lenses of domopolitics and ethopolitics, I give an account of the contemporary French state’s hospitality policy, one centred on the principles of humanité and fermeté and whose underlying imperative is security. This cements the inhospitality of the French state, as a mode of power and authority that evokes and denies welcome, belonging and inclusiveness for manifest tactical ends.

Republicanism and Universalism: France’s Contemporary Malaise

In the opening pages of the Introduction to this dissertation, I presented the cases of four French citizens who were recently prosecuted for infringing French penal code L.622-1 which states that one must not directly or indirectly assist irregular-status foreigners to enter, circulate or reside in France. In popular terms, these citizens were put on trial for “crimes of solidarity”. I began with these events not just because they exemplify a vital challenge facing democratic and pluralistic states in our era of global mobility: how to hospitably welcome the displaced and other irregular migrants (Friese 2010, 324). They also highlight a state of affairs that is deeply puzzling to me: how is it that France, a nation founded upon the principles of liberté, égalité, fraternité, can punish both displaced persons and its own citizens in such a way? This situation is made more complex by the fact that these citizens often envision their acts of defiance as motivated by these same values. How
might we explain this insurgence of inhospitality that is plaguing current-day domestic French politics?

One line of answer begins to open up by examining its universalist model of republicanism, and what it considers—and what modern France has always considered—as the greatest threat to the Republic: the fragmentation of its unity into the competing private interests, attachments and claims of sub-national identity groups. In the section below, I lay out the particular elements inherent to the modern French understanding of the Nation. These indicate a nation defined purely in terms of its political identity and function, namely, its political conception of citizenship as a model for the inclusion or incorporation of difference. However this model frequently belies an altogether different reality of exclusion and non-belonging. I begin by laying out the contours of French republican universalism.

_Inclusion and exclusion: a brief history of French universalism_

In this section I want to draw out three key ideas from French republicanism and demonstrate how they interlock. This will provide a crucial background when I later explore how the French state deploys hospitality to maintain its control over French identity. The three ideas are: universalism, pluralism and visibility in the public sphere.

French universalism, by many accounts, is thought to have emerged alongside the 1789 Revolution (Schor 2001). Yet its history pre-dates the revolutionary period by centuries and begins with its various religious and linguistic aspirations and manifestations. Rather paradoxically, the mission that France set for itself as propagator of a universalist creed originates in the close relationship that it had with the Church, and which harks back to the Middle Ages (Schor 2001, 44). The paradox here being that the very fact of the French Revolution, which set about to destroy the power and privileges of the Church, was equally the source of a “new impetus” for French universalism to grow and spread (ibid.). The significant boost given to France’s “time-honoured” _mission civilisatrice_ is largely attributed to the Enlightenment era and its thinkers, namely Rousseau and Voltaire. This newly-minted version of French universalism was for the modern State “grounded in the belief that human nature, being rational human nature, was a universal impervious to cultural or historical differences” (ibid.).
The French Revolution was instrumental in working these revised and re-shaped principles of universalism into the fledgling Republic’s vision of citizenship, evidenced in its founding statements and the pre-eminence these accord to the universal pursuit of freedom, equality and fraternity. It is this modern version of universalism that undergirds France’s republican conception of democracy. It must be noted that while these three principles are today unproblematically bound together in their slogan form liberté, égalité, fraternité, the relationship between the three is more tense, less given, than might appear. Historically they weren’t always of a kind. Unlike égalité and liberté which were enthusiastically paired together in the rights-based imaginary of the revolutionaries and subsequent thinkers, fraternité belonged to another sphere (Ozouf 1998). That sphere is one of moral duties rather than rights, of community and bonds between individuals rather than individualism. This qualitative distinction also in part explains why forms of contest or polemic surrounding the maverick signifier differ from those of its counterparts; we are less inclined to see this precisely because of the “banality” of the slogan, or our imagination of it (ibid.).

Republican democratic citizenship posits philosophical, juridical and political equality for all within its national political community. It is in part inspired by the Rousseauian “will of the people” to engage the difficult project of living together with diverse others, whether such plurality presents itself as religious, ethnic, historical or familial difference, to name but a few (Lefebvre 2003). This experience of negotiating plural existence is routinely referred to in French and by the French as le vivre ensemble. It is a tenet of republican democratic citizenship born of the determination to reconcile universal reason with plural cultural identities (Touraine 2000, 13).

Importantly, the concept of republican citizenship hinges on the notion of popular sovereignty. That is, each and every individual has an equal say in manifesting the “general will” of the people, understood in the French sense as a single unit. This idea underscores the Republican demand for the active participation and involvement of citizens, as members of a shared French peoplehood. Indeed, the Republic’s claim to universality lies in the offer of equal membership and freedom for those who, through such civic-mindedness, express their willingness to belong to the French nation.

The specificity of the modern French democracy founded upon popular (as national) sovereignty is its firm adherence to a tradition based, not primarily on the rights of the
individual or the negotiation of divergent interests of particular groups, but on the sovereign will of One people—being the abstract political community (Gemie and Majumdar 2009). The French Republic, by virtue of its Constitution, is “one and indivisible, laic, democratic and social.” French democracy, then, calls for what Edwige Lefebvre terms “republican transcendence, through civic principles and the universal horizon of reason, a necessary condition for an equal exchange between men despite their diversity, inequalities, and socioeconomic conditions” (2003, 24).

Equally important is the notion of civic-publicness. This notion incarnates the broader sense of “in public”, and animates French laws and norms, and likewise general sentiment as to what people can or can’t do “in public” (Bowen 2017). It feeds into what might be allowed voice and visibility in the res publica, as an additional expression of le vivre ensemble—the living together in common. These ideas of publicness and visibility are crucial points that I revisit in our discussion on French secularism.

The proposition of republicanism that I therefore wish to emphasise, is that the survival and flourishing of plural existence is achieved through a state that advances universalism and a certain idea of “public space”. Constructed in this way, the French understanding of universalism is expressed in the belief that rational human nature, in accepting the (universal) values of a secular public sphere, of equality, freedom and autonomy, will always prevail in its confrontation with difference, being “particularistic conceptions of the good” that arise in plural societies (Gianni 2013, 395). In other words, universalism demands that individual or group interests and loyalties be neutralised—or abstracted—in the public sphere to allow for reasoned deliberation over the goals and objectives of society as a whole, establishing this shared public space as first and foremost one in which individual interests are subjugated in pursuit of the common interests (the “good”) of the Nation. It is this French notion of abstract universalism that translates, and is integral to, its vision for integrating diverse identities and cultures into its “community of citizens” (Schnapper 1998).

Laïcité, which I mention here but return to in greater detail in Section Three, is the uniquely French interpretation of secularity. As a product of its universalist ideals and applied under this same framework, the republican value of laïcité, like those born of the Revolution, is rooted in Enlightenment philosophy and the latter’s ostensible hostility towards religion (Hannoum 2015). Laïcité, as Jennifer Webster asserts, is a “French solution
to what was originally a French problem” (2007, ii). The problem was that France under the ancient régime, being officially Catholic at the time, faced a situation in which the power and influence of the clerics in the political realm was deemed too great. Clericalism did not sit well with its novel conception of republican citizenship founded on the political equality of French subjects. The anticlerical fervour that gripped revolutionary France found in laïcité the solution that would at once overthrow such a system while actively enabling the political process by which the state privatised, but would no less claim to tolerate, religious belief and thereby “dissociate religion from citizenship” (Fernando 2006, 198).

Today laïcité is arguably France’s most contested societal ideal, not least because of the varying dimensions that it implies. The first is the freedom of conscience for all, ensuring in the name of liberty the statist commitment to individual autonomy. The second is state neutrality towards religious difference in the public sphere, which allows for the cohabitation of all religions, guaranteeing equality. Nonetheless, in not-so-neutral fashion, the French state regularly intervenes to defend its ideal of a secular public sphere, achieved, as Gianni rightly points out, via the “instrument of the law” (2013, 398). Finally, laïcité represents the state’s fostering of civic bonds and allegiance to a particular historical community, being its republican public culture; in other words, a commitment to its republican cultural community (Laborde 2008). This dimension, which Cécile Laborde terms the “laïque civic bond”, in addition to entrenching equality and freedom, works to inspire feelings of French “communitarian” fraternity (ibid., 173).

The principle of abstract universalism, as a legacy of the revolutionary ideals that underpin France’s unique political culture and model of citizenship, is rounded out through the principle of laïcité; at times it has the potential to take on the contours of particularist nationalism. The danger here being that for some, a strong sense of national identity likewise inspires feelings of suspicion towards the politics of religious and cultural diversity. We witness this today in the rise of populism and exploitation of republican and universalist frames in reinterpreting the demands of laïcité or fraternité as a grounds for racialised politics and exclusion.

It is widely acknowledged that there is a tension between universalism and particularism, and furthermore this has been observed in the French case by numerous scholars (see, e.g., Arendt (1976), Silverman (1994), Wahnich (1997a, 81), Joppke (2008)). Both Silverman and Arendt trace these tensions to Enlightenment and French revolutionary
principles and the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen that was shaped in their image. The point I wish to make is this: while by no means isolated to the French case, France represents the most glaring manifestation of this tension. We can make sense of this claim by turning to the notion of popular sovereignty evoked earlier.

The emergence of popular sovereignty effectively marked the rise of the modern nation-state, and the French revolution worked significantly towards *codifying* this novel concept of a sovereign “people” and, consequently, what it meant to be a French citizen. But the nascent idea of popular sovereignty necessitated the construct of national identity. For without it, sovereignty might not be seen to be enjoyed by each and every person living inside the community’s bounds (Rudolph 2005, 5). However, the construction of a national identity in the early days of modern France coincided with the construction of a “foreigner/national dyad” (Wahnich 1997a). The result? A category proclaimed to be universal—being that of identity and citizenship born of revolutionary ideals—just as soon became territorialised and closed, a product of the rising particularism of the French nation. Today the staunchly universalist nation prides itself on being repeatedly claimed the model (in Europe) for the political integration of diverse populations (Gianni 2013, 392). It is on account of this unwavering commitment to its image as the land of asylum and hospitality and home to human rights, while *simultaneously* claiming itself a bastion of societal, cultural and national sovereignty, that France is the most glaring example of the attempt to reconcile universalism with particularism.

*Political implications of abstract universalism*

So far, I have laid out the contours of French republicanism, namely its principle of abstract universalism as a legacy of the revolutionary ideals that underpin France’s unique political culture and model of citizenship. In this section, I want to draw out some of the implications of this political doctrine and highlight its exclusionary tendencies.

Historically, and to this day, it is not arbitrary groups that have been denied access to the public sphere or considered “unassimilable” and deemed to have particular characteristics which render them incapable of integrating the *res publica*. Women, Jews, gays, and more recently Muslims have all been excluded: not as abstract citizens, but on the basis of their difference. In other words, the “content of their abstraction” continues to
resurface, a sign that not everyone’s particular identities—whether gendered, ethnic or religious—can be so easily abstracted (Robcis and Velmet 2017).

One such target of republican universalism is the Islamic headscarf, whose 2004 ban from the explicitly secular realm of the public school alongside other “ostentatious religious insignia”, is rooted in all three abovementioned dimensions of laïcité: individual autonomy, equality and republican culture.21 The move was the Republic’s response (in its view) to Muslim-French schoolgirls’ defiant refusal to abstract their difference so as to participate, unencumbered by communal attachments, in the common project of living together. The French state does not take lightly the presence in its public sphere of a symbolism too-aligned with a broader demand of recognition of cultural and religious difference; and with it, a potential conflict for its (female) bearer, between her private values and those of the secular Republic. Indeed, it is the spectre of private affiliation, loyalty and attachment that offends France’s universalist sensibilities because of its potential for unleashing claims-making and a politics more broadly, that has at its core the recognition of difference and particularist identities. On the basis of this fear and affront to the nation’s republican universalism its exclusionary impulses are set to work. Excluded are those who are considered unequal to the task, or fall short of, the demands of France’s universalist tradition and republican culture.

Catherine Raissiguier (2010) makes such a point in her study of the sans-papiers movement in France. She observes the manner in which France sees fit to define and treat undocumented immigrants who don’t neatly fall within its republican categories because their political identity and rights claims are seen as slated in ways that run afoul of its universalist creed. Such subjects are defined by their “impossibility,” a term that Raissiguier employs to denote the material and discursive constructions of “impossible subjects”: namely, the complex mechanisms and rationalisations that turn “certain immigrants into unthinkable members of the national body .... [and] the practices that locate them in spaces of impossibility” (2010, 3-4).

It is my contention that the constructions of “impossibility” surveyed by Raissiguier—alongside those identified by Wahnich (1997a) on the “necessary” Revolutionary construction of the foreigner/national dyad—are best located on a continuum of attempts

21 Cf. Article L.141-5-1 of the French Education Code, designating the 2004 “Religious Symbols Act in French Public Schools [Loi sur les signes religieux dans les écoles publiques françaises]”
by the (then newly, now traditionally) universalist nation-state to establish and maintain a stronghold on symbolising Frenchness, on the very essence of what it means to be French. I expand on this momentarily. What is crucial here to emphasise, is that on this basis of perceived impossibility or “inassimilability”, the French state can withhold and deny its hospitality. For as stated in the outset of this section, what the Republic fears most, being “One and indivisible, laic, democratic and social,” is the fragmentation of this unity into the competing private interests and claims of minority identity groups. It fears, to reach back to Rousseau, the fracture of the general will into private interests and identities. In this view, it therefore reserves hospitality only for those foreigners who pose no significant threat to its republican identity and culture, and with it, the nation’s social and moral order. In other words, the ideal of hospitality can be withheld from certain would-be recipients on the basis of their a priori impossibility as potential republican subjects.

What of those already living in French society and whose differences are deemed incommensurable with the republican project? Theirs is an existence that historically has been marked by discrimination and exclusion (Wallach Scott 2007a, 2009, Raissiguier 2010, Robcis 2015). Paradoxically, though, under French republican ideology and its political model which produces excluded groups or categories of people, these latter are unable to petition the universalist French state for political recognition or inclusion on the basis of their difference. Where recognition and rights have successfully been achieved, scholars such as Joan Scott, who writes extensively on the subject of women within French universalism, point out that groups have rather had to write themselves into the logic and reach of universalism. In Scott’s (2007a) study of the women’s rights movement, those seeking parity had to succeed in erasing sexual difference from the list of categories that carried weight in French politics.

In the more recent marriage equality movement in France, success there wasn’t attributed to the articulation of activists’ demands for constitutional change in the language of “gay rights” (Robcis and Velmet 2017). This would have been viewed as too particularistic or individualist—not republican enough—and thus espousing a level of difference not amenable to abstraction. Rather, equality was here achieved in strategically petitioning for mariage pour tous, or “marriage for all.” Hence the language of republicanism was used to draw attention to the fact that a universal—the right to marriage—was not truly universal in excluding certain groups.
What is significant in the work of Scott, Robcis, Raissiguier and others researching processes of republican exclusion, is that its alerts us to how the nation’s “impossible subjects” have creatively challenged its gendered, racially or culturally inflected forms of exclusion; and how in so doing, they have succeeded in shattering the hypocrisy of formal equality. Importantly, these scholars’ evidence suggests that forms of exclusion, however isolated, are not an anomaly of the French tradition, but rather are constitutive of it.

My own contribution to this literature is to propose the important work that hospitality does in validating the exclusionary impulses that are constitutive of the French republican tradition. In so doing, along with many political theorists, I recognise that plural nation-states consider a certain level of homogeneity as indispensable to providing the “glue” for societal cohesion—whether this is based on the idea of shared origins or history, or a common language through which a common national culture and identity, however symbolic, can be asserted. Adhering to a conception of “universal” to the point of open borders and indiscriminate entry is not something that the French state—nor any state—would claim for itself. That is, those who are welcome in France are precisely people who can adopt certain attitudes and so preserve universalism. My point is that the state is not prima facie unreasonable in its goal of having some measure of a “homogeneity” ethos for itself, and which extends to those it chooses to admit into its community of citizens. And while I concede a level of expediency for the state on this latter point, the problem is that it is prone to abuse. Returning to the French case, by this I mean that certain foreigners—just as some citizens—are a priori presupposed by the Republic to be “unassimilables” simply by virtue of the level of their (racial, cultural, and/or religious) difference. The subject who is identified in advance as already always unassimilable furthers the idea of a constitutive exclusiveness of republican citizenship: precisely because of their a priori inability to assimilate, he/she has no place in it.

As an example of how Republican thinking tends to be operationalised or instrumentalised, were it not for their veiling on public beaches, or unwillingness to comply with the “pork or nothing” school lunch changes, Muslims would not find themselves excluded from France’s political “community of citizens” (Schnapper 1998). In short, it is

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22 I am here referencing a recent spate of polemics that have taken hold in French society. The first being the case of numerous municipal and regional councils, in a move to “preserve secularity”, passed Acts to ban the
hospitality that performs the initial task of selective inclusion/exclusion, through its implicit recognition and sanctioning of this and not that outsider’s potential for incorporation into the French political community on the grounds of skin colour, country of origin or religion. This, I will further elaborate in the final section of this chapter.

The central thrust of my argument on the exclusionary nature of citizenship is that, in excluding, the state simultaneously forms the identity of its own citizens. The exclusion of so-called unwanted or unworthy foreigners, being in our case the Republic’s impossible citizens, is a strategic move on the part of states that serves as an expression of the sovereign’s ability to decide who will and will not be afforded hospitality within its bounded polity. In other words, the very act of making determinations as to which foreigner should not be offered protection fulfils a sovereign function, and that importantly, the boundaries of membership, of the citizen body, are reified in the process (Nyers 2003). It is in this sense that I suggest that denials of hospitality to “unassimilables” are constitutive of the French republican citizenship that is considered the exclusive preserve of those best able (and willing) to subjugate their individual, private interests (and attachments and affinities) in pursuit of the common interest of the Nation. In the act of denying hospitality, the bounds of this community are demarcated and strengthened.

By the same token, it is just as important for the polity to proudly proclaim success stories of its hospitality. Here I refer to those who, following their careful selection on the above bases, demonstrate their successful acculturation into the shared values and identity of the nation. This “successful acculturation” is what enables subjects to perceive themselves as sufficiently similar (semblable) to their fellow citizens and to subsequently transcend any lingering differences and affiliations. Crucially, then, it is France’s successful hospitality recipients, being the assimilated immigrants and foreigners who have demonstrably embodied the Republic’s values, that stand as testaments to the latter’s

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wearing of the burkini (swimsuit covering the hair and body) on public beaches. In Nice, this resulted in police forces being sent on to its beaches to forcibly and publicly disrobe women of their “offensive” attire. Although taken to the Nice Administrative Court, and upheld, the matter was eventually settled in Constitutional Court of France and the Administrative bans declared unconstitutional. See, for example, Dearden (2016).

The second case, which became particularly prominent in the most recent president election campaign of 2017, centred on numerous public schools that had begun banning the pork meal substitutions that were offered in their cafeterias to cater to those students who, for religious reasons, cannot eat pork. Proponents of the bans consider the meal substitutes “anti-Republican” and “anti-secular”. At present, it is only regional administrative tribunals that have been called to rule on these cases (Feertchak 2017).
“desirability and transferability” for future recipients (Fernando 2009). And indeed, more to the point: proof of these values’ universalist promise.

The crucial point that I wish to make is this: denying or granting hospitality in this way isn’t simply a matter of enacting that particular aspect of French citizenship that is amenable to incorporating outsiders into its “community of citizens” (voluntary and satisfactory assimilation into national culture). Instead, my perception is that the French state is playing a game here, which in the end only highlights the paradoxical imperatives of French hospitality. What are the terms of this game? On the one hand there is the universalist promise of abstract citizenship, which we know is premised on assimilationist imperatives but which tend to reify, for some, particularist (cultural, racial, religious) differences. Reify, to me, ordinarily means something made “real” or concrete. But in this view, it means that for some people, certain categories are reified in the sense that they are made insurmountable. That is, if you are a Muslim woman, you are forever stuck in a certain idiom: your differences are essentialised, so to speak. But on the other hand, the French state insists on overcoming these very differences and points to its citizens who have done so. That is to say, assimilated, non-veiling “secularised” Muslims—all the while it condemns those that don’t. Such a mean-spirited game puts migrants in an impossible (paradoxical) position. The paradox being that the singled-out criterion to their successful assimilation—triumph over particularism and essentialised (reified) difference—is the exact same difference or particular affiliation that they must erase and overcome. It is thus something they must but are never fully permitted to transcend. There is nothing new in this: France has long evoked and denied the hospitality of foreigners and others that it considers do not belong. In what follows, I demonstrate this claim by proposing an examination of France’s long and vexed relation with hospitality.

“It’s Our Tradition and Our Honour”

To begin, I wish to briefly return to the case of one of the “solidarity delinquents” outlined in the Introduction of this thesis. In early January of 2017, Jean-Michel Prêtre, the Republic’s Public Prosecutor who was given the responsibility of examining Cédric Herrou’s case, reproached Mr Herrou for the act of having gone into Ventimiglia (an Italian border town) to collect foreigners and help them cross into France. Prêtre declared at the time: “As
the law currently stands, such disregard for borders is contrary to the law”. To which the accused responded following his release from a three-day police custody stint: “Let it be known, Honourable Prosecutor, that I will continue to remain faithful to my convictions, and that my France, our France, will continue to defend the rights of the men, women, and children present on French soil in the name of the founding values of the French Republic” (Flandrin 2017).

In the above-stated quotations are two seemingly irreconcilable conceptions. On the one hand, that of the sovereign state which, in the name of securitarian imperatives, punishes those who facilitate the movement of undocumented foreigners; on the other, that of the duty of hospitality, a secular tradition of the French nation. This clash is nothing new. From century to century, edicts, decrees, and ordinances have repressed the assistance, help and hospitality shown to persecuted individuals because of either their faith or their country of origin.

In this section I will shed light on some of these moments from France’s history. I am particularly interested in making three key points about the hospitality principle and its precise relationship to the revolutionary moment, and to conceptions of citizenship and belonging more generally. First, is the way in which hospitality becomes couched in the language and practices of the French Revolution, implicitly serving to enact the universalising potential of the latter for the new Nation. That is, there is a moment in the infancy of the Revolution where the foreigner is welcomed to make plain for all that France’s Revolution is a revolution for the world. Second, is that this moment is fleeting, and the spirit, the grand narrative of revolutionary hospitality is just as soon crushed. In its place transpires a security imperative that unleashes an increased suspicion of foreigners who rapidly become reviled as spies and even counter-revolutionaries. Third, is to claim that French hospitality exists on a continuum of both extremely high and low moments. These points indicate a continuous dualisation of people into those who belong and those who don’t. Although this history of dualisation was in a sense codified by the Revolution, its founding documents, and the production for the first time of a grand vision of the citizen, it has an older history that began in earnest in sixteenth-century France and is alive and well today.

There are few studies that treat French hospitality with an eye to its historical context. I should say that my aim here is not to give a detailed treatment of this history. That said,
when its history is examined, the focus is often on France’s postcolonial past (Ben Jelloun 1999, Rosello 2001); or it appears in lesser detail, as a backdrop to discussions on broader topics (Laachir 2003, Still 2006, Raissiguier 2010, Allsopp 2012). Sophie Wahnich (1997a, b) with her tremendous account of the history of French hospitality and its constructions of the foreigner as l’impossible citoyen (the impossible citizen) is a notable exception. Indeed, more often than not, it is Wahnich’s work that is referenced in the above and similar scholarship. Yet, in both her work and that of two other eminent historians of French asylum (the precise term used by these authors, as distinct from hospitality) Gérard Noiriel and Greg Burgess, the central claim is that in rhetoric and practice, hospitality (and asylum) played a key role in the French Revolution: namely, to substantiate the universal dimension of the revolutionary struggles for liberty. I will return to this shortly. What is here noteworthy is that French hospitality, being as much a tale of its inhospitality (e.g. Fassin, Morice, and Quimal 1997), appears only in scholarship from the Revolution onwards. This is surprising given that, as I argue, its troubled history began long before, with the crackdown of hospitality that occurred during France’s sixteenth-century Protestant reformation under the ancien regime.

The moment of ancien regime history that interests us here begins with the “Affair of the Placards” in 1534. This is roughly two decades after Martin Luther had questioned the teachings and practices of the Catholic Church in 1517 with his “95 Theses”. This work, and with it, a rising dissatisfaction with the Catholic Church, made their appearance soon after in France. France’s king François I was generally sympathetic towards the minority Protestant reformists during this time, so long as their movement didn’t give over to heresy; something he was quite averse to for its potential to undermine royal authority (Roelker 1996, 191). There was most likely an ulterior political motive to his tolerating the Protestant movement: it was leading many German princes to create trouble for his enemy the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, whose empire surrounded France on all sides and created much anxiety for the French king. Such a state of affairs may have long held, but the preaching and university lectures developed into calls for greater reform and to abstain from persecuting

reformers, signalling a much severer situation. Thus was the religious atmosphere in France at the time the Affair of the Placards erupted.

In the night of 17 October 1534, a series of large anti-Catholic posters (placards) appeared in the public areas of Paris and five other cities across the French kingdom. These denounced elements of the Catholic tradition and ventured arguments in favour of the Protestant Reformation. One of these posters is held to have been affixed to the door of the king’s private apartments in his castle of Amboise; this breach of security and insult sparked his outrage and immediately marked the end of his encouragement and conciliatory stance towards the Protestants (Roelker 1996, 204). A reward was posted for information leading to the perpetrators’ arrest, who were to be burned at the stake; and indeed, in what followed, such was the fate of many protestants across France. Consequently, many Protestant sympathisers began to secretly harbour these hunted reformists, openly considered as heretics. The reaction of the king to such expressions of solidarity is crucial, for I suggest it is this which marks the first signs of an official stance towards the repression of hospitality in France’s history.

Immediately following a large procession and public expiation for the “Placard” offences led by the King through the streets of Paris, wherein he approvingly bore witness to the atrocious torture of reformists, François I promulgated an edict on 29 January 1535 that called for the “extirpation and extermination of the Lutheran sect and other heresies” (Simonde de Sismondi 1847, 168). By no means did the king’s edict spare those who had or would harbour or help the “heretics”. Harbouring a heretic (recel des hérétiques), as per the same decree, would incur the same punishment meted out to heretics themselves, save for denouncing their whereabouts to authorities (ibid.; Carbonnier-Burkard and Baubérot 2016). By order of King François, harbourers would be dealt with by the harshest of punishment, with no consideration to be given, he argued, to their “alliance, lineage or friendship” with the “delinquent” (Simonde de Sismondi ibid., emphasis added). With these, the words of the king, we witness not just the beginnings of the repression of hospitality shown towards those deemed no longer to be tolerated inside the community. Those who would “help” them become France’s first solidarity delinquents.
From one excess to another

Very different from this harsh first episode during the Reformation are the early stages of the French Revolution, in which we witness a complete shift in the emphasis on hospitality: foreigners can automatically become French citizens without even having to ask. It is in its relation to citizenship that hospitality takes on greater political significance. From its earliest years, this new Republic held the belief that its founding values and the rights contained within its founding documents were “universalisable” beyond its national border. This belief would be helped along by the fact that in its infant stages, the French Revolution had sought to decouple citizenship from nationality, enamoured as it was with the political conception of citizenship. As the historian Pierre Rosanvallon writes, “in the revolutionary conception of nationality, it is the civic and social involvement of individuals, and not their genetic or historical heritage, which is decisive” (1992, 74). It is against such a backdrop that the French Revolutionary and Republican desire to affirm the universality of its values and human rights begins by defending the principle of hospitality. The revolutionary leader Saint-Just expressed just this in his oft-cited demand: "You must make a city, that is to say citizens who are friends, hospitable and brothers" (cited in Wahnich 1997a, 9).

Thus, the France of 1792 set about legally enshrining its revolutionary hospitality in law. Specifically, it did so with a law that welcomed in and granted French citizenship to the most ardent supporters of its revolutionary creed of equality and freedom; being those [men] who, “through their Writings and their Courage, have Served the Cause of liberty and prepared the freedom of the people” (Parliamentary Archives 2018). The purpose of national law here was not so much to identify the frontier, but to act as a guarantor for a universal law, without limits (Wahnich 1997a, 109). Civil rights followed with political rights. Two of the prominent foreign “martyrs of liberty” that took up the offer of French citizenship by domiciling themselves in France, Thomas Paine and Anacharsis Cloots, were immediately elected as members of the National Convention (the first government of the French Revolution) (Keane 1995). Given that this is a period in which France is either on the brink of or at war with many neighbouring countries, it is particularly telling that not even war would call into question the principle of hospitality. Foreign enemy fighters that abandoned the “cohorts of tyrants” at home were guaranteed political hospitality should they defect to live under the rule of freedom. Thus was the message addressed to them by
Condorcet, a central Enlightenment figure who authored a version of the 1793 Constitution, in an impassioned parliamentary speech. The text implicitly underscores that France had no intention of falling prey to narrow-minded nationalism:

The asylum that [France] opens to foreigners will never be closed to the inhabitants of countries whose princes have forced us to attack them, and they will find in its womb a secure refuge. Faithful to the commitments made in its name, [France] hastens to fulfil them with a generous exactitude. The dangers it faces may not permit it to forget that French soil belongs entirely to freedom, and that the law of equality must be universal. It presents to the world the novel spectacle of a nation truly free, subject to the rules of justice despite being caught up in the storms of war, and respecting everywhere and at all times with regard to all people the rights that are the same for all. (cited in Wahnich 1997a, 108)

From the outset of the Revolution, then, the foreigner is implicated in the grand narrative of revolutionary hospitality. Through such gestures, the Nation would be able to assert, and indeed it intended to prove, the unlimited universality of its republican model. Revolutionary hospitality, however, was on borrowed time. Under the Reign of Terror that takes hold in 1793, and with the intensification of France’s revolutionary wars, hospitality gives over to a generalised suspicion towards foreigners. On August 6, 1793, the National Convention decrees that all foreigners of nations at war with France, unless able to prove their civic attachment and loyalty to France, were to be expelled within a week (ibid., 23). What is striking, is the manner in which France chooses to deal with the mounting tension between hospitality and suspicion of those foreigners permitted to stay in the country. A new law stipulates the issuance of a “hospitality certificate” that must be at all times carried; and, for all certificate holders, the requirement to display a tricolour ribbon on their left arm inscribed with the words “Hospitalité” and their country of birth (ibid., 17). The foreigner is thus to be discernible at all times in the public sphere of a community that has henceforth marked out its limits.

Furthermore, the above lois sur les étrangers (Foreigner laws) concerned with policing and surveillance were intended to work in tandem with another law adopted slightly earlier which aimed to prevent all intelligence with “outsider” enemies. This particular decree
dated February 26, 1793, stipulated that “any person who has harboured or concealed, with
or without payment, another person who is subjected to the laws of emigration or
deportation, will be punished by six years of irons” (Flandrin 2017). These series of laws
aimed at expelling or relegating foreigners to the status of a suspicious intruder and which
likewise punish those who would act in solidarity with such foreigners, demonstrate the
extent to which the fledgling Republic passes from one excess to another in such a short
span of time. More pointedly, these rapid changes illustrate just how precarious support for
hospitality could be. And most salient, I suggest, is the significance of demanding that the
foreigner attest at once to his patriotism and commitment to the revolutionary principles of
the new republic. For it is through the instrument of law—the carrying of certificates and
the wearing of armbands—that the state becomes the chief administrator of an a priori
suspicion of l’étranger.

Crucially, what “hospitality in the age of suspicion” (Wahnich 1997a) reveals is the
desire to codify a priori untrustworthy elements circulating within France’s “womb”, to
paraphrase Condorcet. Before these recent laws the foreigner is only marked out insofar as
s/he has transgressed the law. Now it’s different. The new laws enable the nation to
identify—merely—“the foreigner”. That is, the figure of the foreigner as standalone and
distinct from any act he might have carried out. The greater significance of this fleeting
hospitality that was crushed almost as soon as it appeared, is that it brings to light just how
much citizenship had become coextensive with nationality. Contrary to the early period of
the Revolution, belonging to the national community now had less to do with the political
aspects of civic patriotism and loyalty than with not being identifiably “a foreigner”. Clearly,
in the newly-established hierarchy between hospitality, nationality and citizenship,
hospitality had come out the worse. Indeed, the Foreigner laws that laid the groundwork for
the construction of the dyad foreigner/national—being a construct of the Revolution
(Wahnich 1997a)—announce just as ominously how much hospitality and universality are at
odds. They are not, however, at odds purely at the level of principle. Rather, the serious
undermining of hospitality’s task of realising the revolutionary aims of universal freedom
and equality points to how much the French conception of universality has become a
diminished and manipulated version of itself.

The conclusion that I draw is consequential. The dualisation of people into the
“citizen” and the “foreigner” is nothing more than a categorisation of those “who belong”
and those “who don’t” by a nation-state faced with the predicament of achieving some kind of national and social cohesion. While somewhat already codified by the Revolution through its founding documents and vision of citizenship, the move to codify the foreigner as an *always already suspicious element* brings this split to full fruition. And this move cements an idea that prevails to the present day. Its pre-history, I have shown, dates back several centuries prior to the Revolution, as marked by the repression of hospitality towards Protestant reformers since the latter were no longer considered worthy of a place in the community. It may well be that the fate of the persecuted Protestants gives additional grist to Tocqueville’s methodological thesis in *The Ancien Régime and the Revolution*: keep an eye not on the breaks, but on the continuities. For France’s history of hospitality, while enjoying periods of great openness, particularly in the post-World War economic boom era, is a vexed one that falls on a continuum whose underlying logic is security and suspicion.

**Republican Secularism and the Hospitable State**

There is one final aspect to take into consideration for a complete picture of what animates the French ethos of hospitality: the principle of *laïcité*. In this section I discuss the relationship between the politics of hospitality and that of the core republican doctrine of *laïcité*, the French variant of secularism. Discussions of *laïcité* are many and vast, with public, political debate animated by the many contested meanings attributed to *laïcité* in French society today. Not least because recent attacks on French soil were done in the name of a “fundamentalist Islam” (*islamisme*), committed not by “outside” terrorists, but by individuals born and bred, or more precisely, educated in the explicitly secular realm of France’s public schools. I therefore limit myself to this idea of public space in France that we touched on in the Chapter’s introduction—as necessarily neutral and maintained as such through *laïcité*—and some of the unintended logics born of this, namely on account of the Islamic headscarf law introduced in 2004. My aim is to show how the domain of *laïcité* works to define who is and who is not a Republican citizen.

*Laïcité – republican and democratic?*  

It’s a choice between one or the other: “*une République ou une démocratie* [a Republic or democracy]”—or so declared a group of prominent French philosophers led by
Régis Debray, Alain Finkielkraut and Elisabeth Badminter during the heated debates of the so-called “Islamic veil affair” that mobilised France some fifteen years ago (Le Nouvel Observateur 2015). These authors vehemently opposed its being worn in the explicitly secular realm of the public school and sought thereby to give favour to French republican principles in contrast to liberal democratic ones. While the 2004 law banning “conspicuous religious insignia” is long-settled, its various contours, contradictions and implications hold ongoing relevance today.

The disjunctive declaration above was intended to draw attention to what its commentators saw as an attack on Republican values of liberté and (particularly) égalité; both of which are considered to be secured or held up by the principle of laïcité. The “attack” came from the more Anglo-Saxon expressions of liberal democracy which, in their eyes, vindicated a pernicious form of individualism that had no place in a Republic defined as One and indivisible.

There is nothing new in this debate, if not that it is indeed democratic logic, no less, that is under challenge by a form of "republican laïcité" that managed to reinvent and reformulate itself in the years during and since the “Veil affair”. To elaborate this point, I want to focus on one particular aspect of the discourse advanced by proponents of the anti-veiling law: that of the necessary “neutrality of public space”. Indeed, the idea of a "neutral public space" can be understood in several ways. Leaving aside the tricky problem of the distinction between what is public and what is not public, there remains two fundamentally different—perhaps even antinomic—ways of conceiving this "space" and its "neutrality". This focus is crucial for my argument on hospitality because the discourse mobilised around laïcité during the Veil affair generated a seismic shift in its associated and foundational meaning of neutrality. Laïcité, as a consequence, becomes a means to define what is or what is not French; and crucially, who is worthy or not, of the state’s hospitality.

One conception of laïcité consists in saying that what must remain neutral is the organisation of "public space": that is, we can say that this space is “neutral” when the right to freedom of expression is the same for everyone, without privilege or discrimination, and that authorities all work to ensure this. More concretely, its "neutrality" lies in the fact that no majority, or no social force in a position of domination, monopolises speech in (or occupation of) the public space. Contrariwise, nothing prevents minorities from expressing themselves in this space. According to this conception, what must be neutral in the public
space is space, not the public. We can even say that space must be neutral precisely so that the public, being all publics, has the capacity of not being neutral. By “the public” I mean all the members of the population in their public capacity. A woman, in this case, can wear her headscarf without the “neutrality of the public space” being called into question. Indeed, the neutrality of this space resides in the very fact that she can wear the headscarf should she so wish, and that other women may not wear it, should that be their choice. What would undermine the neutrality of the public space is state bias or social pressure that forces all women to meet a single standard or norm: to wear the headscarf or not.

The other conception, which was more readily and frequently advanced during the "headscarf debates", consists in imposing neutrality on “the public”. That is, on the body of the individual him- (or especially) herself the moment s/he appears in the public space. Viewed from this perspective, the Muslim woman who stands out by wearing a headscarf undermines the "neutrality of the public space". This conception of the "neutral public space" is just as coherent as the first, but what must be grasped is that, in essence, it suppresses freedom of expression. I would venture to say that a public space in which the body of the individual is required to "remain neutral" and freedom suppressed is, in the strictest sense of the word, a totalitarian space. Thus perhaps another way of putting it, echoing Tahar Ben Jelloun, is that the discrimination or violence committed is “not only against freedom of expression, but freedom tout court” (cited in Hannoum 2015, 22).

This, of course, is not to claim that the anti-veiling law has transformed France into a totalitarian society. Yet, it is clear that this particular version of the necessary “neutrality of public space" that became prominent largely as a result of the veil debates follows a totalitarian logic. French legislators, fortunately, gave no such legal force to the notion of neutrality understood here as neutrality of the public (the individual body). The significance for us is that in debates over whether to ban the headscarf from public schools, this totalitarian conception was often able to take hold and spread well beyond the extremist circles where it might otherwise have been contained. It gave force to a discourse that, however one might characterise it, to my mind is decidedly undemocratic. Nonetheless, in the name of preserving laïcité, it has become sayable.

What is most significant, is that the innumerable statements made about the necessary "neutrality of public space" as neutrality of the public have neither been called out as unacceptable, nor raised cause for concern, nor compelled anyone to point to the
potentially strong totalitarian current that is traversing French society (or at least some of its public intellectuals or political class). Why it is this so? My suggestion is because most people felt, even if but in a vague or remote way, that the "duty of neutrality" fell only upon veiled women. That is, there was never really a question of applying such a totalitarian-like conception of "neutrality of public space" to the majority population. For as Joan Wallach Scott (2007b) notes, from the outset of the Veil affair, the right to publicly express one's beliefs—a right taken very seriously by the French—was never seriously called into question. It was space and space alone which was to remain neutral. What the revamped, reformulated vision of republican laïcité was effectively implying, is that the only public required to make any effort in terms of neutrality is the Muslim public. Specifically, the practicing Muslim public: the Muslim scarf-wearing, beard-sporting public. The public symbolism (or so it was interpreted) of their Islamic faith and culture had become far too much for the neutrality of this space to bear. This caused neutrality itself, as the laic Republic’s mechanism for expunging religiosity from public sphere, to undergo a major correction.

To qualify my earlier claim, the doctrine that took shape among those in favour of banning the headscarf might better be viewed as only "partially totalitarian": it recognises that the majority of the population has the right to enjoy their democratic rights as set out in the French Constitution. Which said differently, is the right to benefit from a "neutral public space" in the first sense of the term: a space that is sufficiently neutral so that the public (i.e., individuals themselves), doesn’t have to be. On the other hand, and to reach back to the second sense of the term, the doctrine subjects a minority with differing characteristics to the "neutrality of public space" by forcing it to become "neutral"; that is, invisible and silent from the moment it enters the public space. From there we might envision democracy and totalitarianism as no longer two types of regime or two types of societies that are poles apart from each other; here they coexist in the same society—or

24 See Asad (2006) for an excellent discussion on the French state’s (through its authorities and agencies) attribution of certain aspects of Islamic symbolism to the headscarf.

25 The minority in question being those who choose to wear the headscarf or display other “conspicuous signs of religiosity” (being the stated terminology of the 2004 law). It is moreover important to highlight that the Muslim headscarf featured almost as the sole subject of pro-law arguments, notwithstanding that these ultimately resulted in calls for a ban on—the more generic—"all religious insignia".
rather in the same *project* for society: totalitarianism for Muslims (or at least the "wrong kind" of the Republic’s Muslims) and democracy for others.

The major claim that I want to make is that this particular form of unequal treatment, being but a form of discrimination or violence against Muslims, from the moment that it becomes systemic, serves to divide society into two. The division runs between those who have their rightful place in it, and those who don’t in denying some the democratic rights that are granted to others. And it is why I want to argue that the so-called anti-headscarf law—known officially in France as the “Religious Symbols Act in French Public Schools, 2004 (Loi sur les signes religieux dans les écoles publiques françaises)”—qualifies as thoroughly racist. Not because it *openly* discriminates against Muslims, or Sikhs for that matter; but, as John Bowen (2007) points out, the debates leading up to the law’s formulation and enactment centred largely on giving constant assurances and reminders to Muslims of their ability to express their faith as much as they wanted "chez eux [at home]", being the private sphere. But in the public space, it is they Muslims who must at all times remain “neutral”, in keeping with the “*laïque*” character of this space. It is this more restrictive republican *laïcité* which crystallised and came to form the basis for the "anti-headscarf" campaign that raises the question of racism. For if, following Salman Sayyid (2014), racism is defined as a system of discriminatory thinking and practices based on "race", "origin", "ethnicity" or "culture", then the anti-headscarf law is indisputably racist. Indeed, this law establishes an inequality by imposing a ban that exerts violence on some students (in particular veiled Muslims and Sikhs, the latter more by collateral damage than by design) more than others: Christians, if they so feel obliged to wear one, can keep their cross tucked inside their clothing. This discrimination is not a coincidence: it is a law that, I aver, was developed as a means to a distinct end. The promotion of a racially-inflected *laïcité*, as that which has lost sight of its finality of equality and freedom, serves as the means for protecting French national identity.

In claiming such a law as racist, what I really want to call attention is this reactionary form of Republicanism. Through its restrictive vision and reworking of neutrality to come to mean *that of the person/body*, the concept of *laïcité* has shifted from its 1880s and 1905 meaning—as that which simply separates religion from public life—towards one that has
embraced the “identitarian” cause. By this I mean that French contemporary secularism has all the allures of an *identitarian laïcité*, firmly weighing into the identitarian politics that has gripped the nation, and indeed Europe on a grand scale. For it has enabled the state, as neutrality arbiter-in-chief, to play a key role in the construction of identities which determine who (that it, which bodies) belongs where.

Driving this debate in France, undoubtedly on account of its having the largest Muslim population in Europe, is the question of what it means to be French, and by extension, who belongs in the French nation, and who doesn’t. Now the first part of that claim is, in a sense, largely uncontroversial. I have previously stated that one would be hard-pressed to find a nation that isn’t concerned in some way with similar questioning. But what is controversial, is that it has found in *laïcité* the means to able to define what is not or what is French, and it does so without having to resort to making explicit statements or arguments as to just what kind of identity it is that is *not* French. A law banning “conspicuous religious insignia” does not explicitly single out any one religion. Yet the central thrust of my argument is that *laïcité*, as core to the French identity, is one technique used tactically by the state to define insiders and outsiders. It does so by exerting its power to define and monopolise the nature of the public sphere and who can properly inhabit it and how. No longer content to view this space as simply one of deliberation, the terrain of *laïcité* has shifted to occupy that of the individual body. In other words, what I have here described is another aspect of sovereignty, enacting and exacting its power through various techniques as a means to define and control who is a citizen and who is not: who belongs and who does not. Moreover, these determinations made on French identity are not new, but have their roots, we have seen, in a particular exclusive tradition of republicanism.

**Humanité and Fermeté: Securing “Home”, Hospitality and French Republican Identity.**

Having thus far analysed how the desire to maintain and protect the republican creed, its identity, ideals, values and principles, has played out historically, I now want to consider

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26 The 9 December 1905 law officially separated church and state in France. Public education in France has been secular since laws passed on March 28, 1882 and October 30, 1886. These introduced the requirement for secular education (a ban on religious instruction in public school programs) and the “secularity” of all staff and programs (French National Education Ministry 2015).
these elements in light of the contemporary politics of French hospitality. What connections might we draw from the way that the state conceives and enacts the notion of hospitality today and the desire to preserve or realise what it means to be a French citizen? One answer lies in looking to its immigration and asylum policy, which in recent years has been articulated through the dual principles of humanité and fermeté (firmness/closure).

These two principles, which the state never omits to present as “complementary”, are here understood as France’s approach to governing hospitality. This approach enjoys support from either side of the political divide. Together they are intended to enable the nation to “defend its republican values and tradition of welcome whilst combatting irregular immigration and criminal networks [of smugglers/traffickers/terrorists]” (Executive Office of the President 2016). That is, an appropriate dose of fermeté is what enables the French nation to pursue generous offers of humanité. If we pause a moment to consider what the state through its official communication above claims to defend, it is evident that this threat is not solely of the criminal kind. There is an equivalent, and arguably greater, perceived threat facing the Republic: its values and tradition of hospitality (accueil). For despite the fact that for a brief moment hospitality was key to the revolutionary spirit yet almost immediately crushed and challenged—despite the veracity of this short-lived moment—its memory lives strong in the present as a defining characteristic of republican culture and identity. Through the above, state policy discloses itself as the vehicle for invoking one of the Republic’s “most prized modern political values”: that of la France hospitalière (Scullion 1995, 30, Ben Jelloun 1999).

As a political value or ideal, la France hospitalière translates the nation’s proud history of bestowing hospitality to foreigners and the strong belief that it remains a land of asylum and human rights. It is a tradition and history that France has long-sacralised in political and ideological self-representations (Tiberghien 1994, 2005). But what is the broader significance of securing this ideal? For on my reading of the humanité-fermeté policy, it is evident that the republican tradition of welcome, expressed in the notion of la France hospitalière, is very much in need of securing. More precisely, in order to ensure the ongoing (discursive and material) possibility of French hospitality, the “goods” of hospitality—namely sustenance and shelter, but also republican citizenship and principles, and the promise of universality that these entail—must be made secure. My central claim is that securing “la France hospitalière”, as a defining characteristic of the French political
community, becomes itself the necessary precondition for extending *humanité* to outsiders. For what would become of the national home, as the *space* of such hospitality, lest “home” first become overrun by dangerous and threatening outside/foreign elements?

Significantly, then, at stake in the case of France and what is framed as endangered, is the *continuance* of what it considers a key and defining characteristic of its post-revolutionary culture and identity. This trait is grounded in the universalist commitment to fraternity and the right to equality and freedom. Invocations in official immigration policy of a proud history of Republican welcome *qua humanité* alongside a necessary *fermeté* on the question of migrancy and asylum denote two things. First, the importance of securing this political ideal of hospitality because it stands as testament to the desirability of the Republic’s values and proof of their universalist promise. And second, the complex, antinomic logic that lies at the heart of French hospitality.

We might thus argue that hidden in talk of French hospitality is a power dynamic of sovereign control that operates on a conflicting if not irreconcilable logic: safe haven can only be afforded to those facing persecution on the basis of first securing the national home from mobile figures that threaten it. That is, humanity is predicated on the need for firmness and closure. And with this claim, we return to the Derridean aporia: one needs to show absolute openness in welcoming in the Other, but doing so undermines the condition of hospitality, which is to be the sovereign/master of the home, because absolute openness brings with it the loss of the potential to “host”, in that without restrictions of some kind, one would no longer have a home to welcome people into.

I suggest that the power dynamic is trickier. Through the securitising logic of *fermeté* (which, importantly, in French translates as both firmness and closure) the power of hospitality plays out in the domopolitical impulses that I described in detail in the previous chapter. Which is to say that *fermeté* distinguishes itself as a technique that is operationalised both at and inside the border for the purpose of distinguishing and filtering out the “bad” unacceptable migrant, namely those regarded as a material and existential danger to the territory, unity, political values, and identity of the host. *Fermeté* is thus the manner in which the French state is able to tightly regulate its hospitality such that the “Frenchness” of its citizens may be preserved. *Fermeté*, as underscoring the polity’s flagship policy for identifying and excluding unwanted or unworthy subjects, in this sense, is constitutive of the citizenship that is reserved for its normative community of members.
(Nyers 2003). Thus talk of hospitality belies a strange dialectic: on the one hand it promises universal citizenship and is therefore a language to deal with the world’s stateless. On the other it diminishes this universality by marginalising all-too-often this and similar populations on the grounds of racial, cultural or religious “inassimilability”.

We must not, however, neglect the second of the dualising imperatives of French hospitality. For to the extent that the threats endangering the host have been identified and duly neutralised, the nation-as-host is free to pursue its venerable tradition of humanité. To conclude, I want to give a particular example of how this tension of French hospitality is played out with respect to the sick and suffering.

Humanité, just as fermeté, is operationalised through domopolitical (identificatory and classificatory) processes. Here it is used to make determinations on “good” refugees, who are then allowed to flow through the host’s border membrane. The “good” being those few identified and validated as having a morally legitimate claim for “saving” (Ticktin 2008, 2011). What Miriam Ticktin has called “regimes” of care and benevolence are in fact the multiple agents, actors and governmental practices and rationalities that are grounded in the need to objectively recognise, apprehend and relieve embodied suffering (2011, 5). Thus we might say that a governmental focus on domopolitical humanité helps to fashion and enact a politics of care and compassion centred on the humanitarian relief of these forms of suffering. Importantly, they are considered to be exceptional measures, “rare exceptions” to the repressive immigration policy arm of fermeté (ibid., 2).

According to Ticktin, the affective and practical dimensions of care and compassion work on the belief that human suffering is universal and is therefore measurable and capable of objective recognition (ibid., 3). It is on this basis that I suggest that the domopolitics of French hospitality, in its policy manifestation as humanité, is in part geared towards the welcome of acutely and recognisably sick and violated bodies. The emphasis on “recognisable” infers the development of medical and scientific expertise and techniques, such as clinical examinations, to increase the efficacy of capturing and quantifying the degree of embodied suffering.

The more unhappy consequence of domopolitical humanité, unintended or otherwise, is that all-too-frequently neither the rights nor recognition afforded to successful (i.e., the “sick” and “violated”) hospitality cases result in conferring the status of “equal citizen” (ibid., 4). Theirs is a lesser status—enacted through humanité no less—that ironically
dispenses them from having to integrate the demands of republican universalism. The normative community of citizens, once again, is left intact.

My contention, therefore, is that French hospitality, a prized yet scarce resource, is represented as a generous gift on the part of the state: a virtuous act given its primary function is to safeguard the community’s precondition of closure and to manage transgressions by strangers. That is to say, it is through the very attempt to inoculate itself from existential threats—being those that go to the core of French identity—while striving to maintain a commitment to French and revolutionary ideals, that the state continues (fictitiously) to view itself as a most generous and hospitable nation.

Thus not only does the state assert its right to control its borders in order to define what is or what is not French. It continues to encode hospitality into this status of citizenship, albeit in a much-diminished sense. There is little today that remains of its truly revolutionary, universalist spirit. This spirit defied hitherto received understandings of the citizen (such as the Roman and Greek) in which there is always a dualism between the citizen and the foreigner—and for that brief moment in time, that was held up to challenge.

Conclusion: Criminalising Solidarity

The impossible pairing of humanité and fermeté in the governance of state hospitality may be seen as the logical outcome of the “securitarian frenzy” and associated attempts to “repair” the Republican integration that marked Nicholas Sarkozy’s time as interior minister from 2002 before continuing into his presidency in 2007 and those of his successors (Slama 2008). In this chapter I have argued that the current inhospitality of the French state reflects long-standing tensions between its universalist vision of French republicanism and that of particularist nationalism. The arrival of the migrant at the threshold of France’s “community of citizens” is uniquely placed to expose this tension since s/he draws attention to the concrete workings of the Republic’s desire to predicate humanité on the need for an equal, if not greater, dose of fermeté. This dissymmetry not only denotes the systematisation of a logic of suspicion towards all foreigners and indeed those no longer considered to belong or tolerated. We might call this an unhappy continuum that began under the ancien régime and the warring factions of the Protestant reformation, before its short-lived challenge in the revolutionary era and desire to universalise its founding values through the principle of
hospitality. Rather, in undertaking to show the intersection of hospitality with key moments in French history, its political thought and other core themes of republicanism and laïcité, I have argued that at the heart of French inhospitality is the desire to maintain a monopoly on Frenchness, on what it means to be a French citizen, and therefore who belongs, and who doesn’t. Hospitality, enacted through France’s immigration and border control policy today, and in its earlier historical applications (whether evoked or denied), along with laïcité as equally core to the notion of French identity, have been the justifiable means, in its view, to realise this end.

Crucially, these key insights into how the French state uses hospitality today allow me to postulate why France needs to criminalise the solidarity shown by its citizens towards would-be recipients of French hospitality. My central claim is that the French state does not take lightly any act that would undermine its monopoly control over the capacity to determine Frenchness. With its dissenting citizens, whose personal motivations and understandings of Frenchness form the subject of the following chapters, the state doesn’t just see a bunch of citizens flouting its hospitality/migration policy. Rather, in the acts of its citizens-as-hosts, it is faced with a contest over the political aspect of hospitality—a contest between the state itself and its citizenry. This contest directly undermines its monopoly control for defining what is, and what is not, French. And in drawing this kind of connection between hospitality and the state, the direction that it sees justified to take in order to regain a monopoly on hospitality, is to criminalise the solidarity of its citizens.

And if in concluding this chapter, and Part One of this thesis, I may reach back to Derrida on hospitality, he directs us to see the state strictly in terms of sovereign control and as one homogenous agent in the assertion of that control. But such an account blinds us to two crucial aspects of hospitality’s political operation: how hospitality becomes a controversial and governmental technique for defining insiders and outsiders. The second significant blind spot is the variation and contest occurring within the state over hospitality. We have seen the direction this takes on the part of the state. It is time to see the connections that the citizen “hosts” draw between themselves, the state and hospitality, and the directions in which these head.
PART TWO

THE CITIZEN
Chapter 5

INTRODUCING FRANCE’S “SOLIDARITY DELINQUENTS”

Let it be known, Honourable Prosecutor, that I will continue to remain faithful to my convictions, and that my France, our France, will continue to defend the rights of the men, women, and children present on French soil in the name of the founding values of the French Republic.

Cédric Herrou, in address to the Nice Public Prosecutor, 18 January 2017.

Introduction

In the Introduction to this thesis, I briefly outlined the cases of four citizens that have been prosecuted for breaching Article L.622-1 of the French Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Right to Asylum (CESEDA). The Code states one must not facilitate the irregular entry, residence or movement of a foreigner in France. In 2018 there have been dozens more arrests, court hearings, (suspended) prison sentences, and referrals to numerous Courts of Appeal by the public prosecutor when the District Court ruling has presumably not favoured the state’s interest.27 If anything, this fierce determination on the part of French public authorities attests to the fact that the phenomenon that popularly goes by the name of “crimes of solidarity” shows no sign of waning. Indeed, it is intensifying. The aim of this chapter, and the next, is to capture how and why French citizens defy and act against the state in extending hospitality to the undocumented and exiled. I am thus concerned with elucidating acts of hospitality carried out by citizens in the form of civil

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27 Of note are Laurent Caffier who lost his appeal on 15th March, 2018 and was handed a (suspended) six-month prison sentence; Martine Landry, whose initial acquittal was overturned on 14 July 2018 and now faces the Appeals Court on charges for driving two undocumented Guineans in her car; and Théo, Bastien et Eleonora, three activists who will face the High Court in Gap in late 2018 on “aggravated charges” for the “organised group entry” of irregular migrants (this carries much higher penalties: up to 10 years imprisonment and a 750,000 euro fine).
disobedience. More specifically, I examine the meanings, motivations, and understandings of France’s *délinquants solidaires* (solidarity delinquents, that is, the term given to the hosts defying the French state) attribute to their acts and to the effects that these produce.

In this chapter I begin from the standpoint that these acts are political. They are political not because most *délinquants solidaires* claim them as such. This indeed they do, notwithstanding that the desire to help often originates in humanitarian principles such as attending to fellow humans in distress. I claim that acts of dissident hospitality are political because in creating the scene for interaction with others in the *polis*, they intend to disrupt the everyday politics of immigration and state’s “welcome” of strangers, outsiders and aliens.

That such acts of hospitality are political speaks to the idea raised by Engin Isin in his analysis of what makes acts “political” (2008). Namely, that they actualise a break or rupture with a given state of affairs, and with its habitus and socio-historical processes, and work to create scenes, actors and the political order anew. In this chapter I shed light on how, through civil disobedience, concerned individuals break with deep-rooted patterns and practices of state inhospitality and so actualise their understanding of what it means to be a French citizen today. This understanding directly challenges the state’s understanding of citizenship and French identity, one that is increasingly rooted in an exclusive tradition: nationality, race and origins. The citizens’ defiant hospitality embodies an alternate understanding of French identity that has its basis, as we shall see, in the commitment to a set of French republican ideas and ideals such as universalism, freedom, equality, and fraternity.

In a mirror image of how we saw the state practice hospitality in Chapter Three, we will thus observe how citizens too use hospitality as a technique to realise what they understand that it means to be a French citizen—and indeed, to be French, *tout court*. My goal is to show that hospitality, as the specific terrain upon which the French citizen-delinquents chose to enact their solidarity with foreigners in difficulty, constitutes an “act of citizenship” (Isin 2008). More precisely, hospitality, as a principle that in Chapter Four we saw promises universality (in the sense that the hospitality extended by the newly-formed French state to foreign defenders of liberty and equality helped to universalise its democratic ideals beyond French borders), is the medium through which French hosts
reclaim their country and republican tradition. Hospitality, in a word, has become the selected terrain to define and claim French civil, ethical, and political identity.

**Acts of Disobedience are “Acts of Citizenship”**

During a two-month field trip to France in mid-2016 I witnessed the French “Crimes of Solidarity” movement. I had not heard of it prior to then. A local contact who ran a specialised shelter for the accommodation of asylum seekers during the examination of their application (*Centre d'accueil de demandeurs d'asile* or CADA) told me that she frequently lodged “irregular” migrants in her home during the process of claiming asylum and refuge. This often came about because her shelter was full. Through her, I was introduced to a much larger and active network of French citizens who extended hospitality to such migrants in this and in other ways. I left the field soon after and began researching the phenomenon and its criminalisation in earnest. I subscribed to blogs and e-mailouts of multiple collectives within the movement, surveyed the media for updates on new or ongoing court cases, and monitored parliamentary, political and (much rarer) academic debate on the contentious legislation that had given rise to criminalising solidarity with undocumented migrants.

My focus lay firmly with the protagonists of the movement—the defiant “citizen-hosts” and the self-description of their acts. This represents a departure from mainstream studies of hospitality, where attention is mainly paid to the guests. But I do so in order to illuminate three themes central to citizenship, hospitality, and republicanism: first, participation in public life; second, the universality of principles such as freedom, equality and fraternity (and whether these can be put in question by the border); and third, who counts as a political subject. By assisting undocumented migrants, I maintain that France’s *délinquants solidaires* are reclaiming the French virtue of fraternity. But they are also publicly claiming their home—that is to say, their country—as a place and an ideal of fraternity, as a place of welcome and of hospitality. In short, their story is one of reclaiming the mantle of French republicanism: as duty-bound to protect *liberté, égalité, and fraternité*, part of which includes protecting migrants and stateless people without a home. The significance of this is to suggest that they see no antinomy between the homeless and those who enjoy a home as citizens. To the contrary, not only is such a notion integral to their
understanding of citizenship, but they believe that the future of French citizenship and identity—its integrity, survival, and flourishing—depends upon defending hospitality (along with its corresponding value of fraternity) at home in order to protect the vulnerable other.

The three themes of participation, universal principles, and political subjectivity feature prominently in the interviews I carried out with délinquants solidaires. They likewise inform three principles—political solidarity, visibility and voice, and answerability—that I argue best capture why acts of delinquent hospitality must be seen as acts of citizenship. The first is political solidarity. Solidarity in its political form coalesces around a common project (Blum 2007, Scholz 2008). The interviews reveal, in surprising ways, the extent of that common project. It is to these and analyses of these that we now turn.

Political Solidarity

Perhaps surprisingly, the term “delinquency” is simultaneously ascribed to and claimed by citizen-hosts. But my question is: what drives an otherwise law-abiding citizen to “delinquency” on the particular issue of solidarity? That is, what pushes them over the line into uncharted waters of “unlawfulness” when it comes to helping the undocumented? Addressing these questions is vital to elaborate the motivations and effects of their political practice of hospitality. Further, what the research and interviews have made apparent, is that “delinquent” solidarity towards strangers exceeds individual practice; it cannot therefore be attributed to the efforts of a single actor. By “individual practice” I mean that, while geographically and ideologically diverse, the delinquents with whom I became acquainted were performing individual acts of hospitality that were not done in isolation but in collective awareness, in solidaristic association, with a vast number of fellow citizens. Solidarity, and its collective element, is thus the first theme I examine in the citizen-hosts’ political struggles against state inhospitality.

For this dissertation I interviewed eighteen individuals whose assistance of irregular-status foreigners had subjected them to intimidations, legal proceedings and criminal sentences. I was aided in this endeavour by the informative GISTI website (Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés), one of France’s most trusted immigrant information and support organisations, which for the past four decades, has documented each and every case of repression, prosecution and sentencing.
What drives citizen-hosts to act in mutual solidarity? A main reason lies in each detecting in the other similar feelings of moral indignation over state policy and practice regarding undocumented migrants and their plight at the margins of French territory and society. This associative awareness is in part the simple achievement of coining the umbrella catchcry “crime of solidarity” in the 1990s to rally support for those whose acts of hospitality were judged in contravention of the law. Nonetheless, there was no available explanation for what sets collective solidarity in motion on issues and in such ways as this. What sustains or holds it together?

It was in the course of my discussions with the délincuants solidaires that a distinct form of solidarity came into view. Helping outsiders, strangers and aliens denoted a solidarity provoked by the condition of vulnerability and precariousness of the forcibly displaced and exiled. I suggest that solidarity based in an appreciation of vulnerability can also be traced to the question of French identity, since solidarity constitutes an essential pillar of the French republican ethos and associates the constitutional principle of fraternité. The foreigner’s precarity is compounded by factors that either complicate, or altogether prevent, their access to fundamental rights. First, migrant inflows are increasingly linked through public political discourse to criminality, delinquency and terrorism (Bourbeau 2011). Second, they suffer blatant infringements of the right to claim asylum. On the latter point, the reintroduction of French borders in the wake of the 2015 terrorist attacks has produced manifest and institutionalised breaches of the rights to asylum and non-refoulement. These have occurred at the Franco-Italian border and for which the state has been twice indicted in recent judicial proceedings (CCNDH 2018). As one interviewee, Marc, an activist film director and long-term inhabitant of this border region, puts it:

What we want, first up, is that the law be respected. Because at the préfecture [in Nice, where the Asylum Seeker Reception Bureau is located] asylum seekers are prevented from lodging their asylum claim and are being sent illegally back to Italy ... They [state authorities] have put back the border, but for all the wrong reasons. It’s a pretty subtle ruse - it’s [framed as] an “anti-terrorist measure” (scoffs) – so we now have a borderzone inside French territory. There are checkpoints everywhere

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28 All names of interviewees have been changed to preserve anonymity.
manned by soldiers and policemen - the migrants who enter this area aren’t considered to have entered France. And that’s how we can send them back to Italy.

Every migrant becomes a de facto potential terrorist, since they are all expelled.
(interview, 31/7/18)

While it may doubtfully be the case that all asylum seekers presenting at this and nearby Alpine borderzones are expelled without due process, the numbers are significant enough to warrant several prosecutions of the state and the ongoing condemnation of France’s principal human rights watchdog, the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (NCCHR). The Commission tabled scores of these kinds of rights’ infractions in the French parliament in July of 2018 (CCNDH 2018). What statements such as Marc’s disclose is the moral indignation provoked by what he, and many others like him, hold to be the state’s involvement (being both action and inaction) in furthering the precarity of the already vulnerable and oppressed.

From the interviews I conducted it was clear that a collective awareness of the predicament of the forcibly displaced provokes the solidaristic response with the migrants. And that response takes the form of an act of hospitality: hospitality in the form of providing accommodation and shelter, meals, legal, social or linguistic assistance, medical care, or transportation so that care and assistance can be delivered by more competent others. Citizens described feeling confronted with an “intolerable” and “incoherent” situation, wherein indifference or not responding at all would be morally “indefensible” or “reprehensible”.

Many of those I interviewed indicated that the need to obey their conscience and moral convictions both incited and grounded their initial decision to help. Yet there was more to their hospitality than an overwhelming ethical imperative that would outweigh the potential risk and consequences of their violating the law. Yes, this constituted civil disobedience; but as Marc emphatically put it in a sentiment echoed by nearly all others I spoke with: “If the act of helping [refugees] is likened to the idea of disobedience, it’s because the state has ensured that these acts become acts of disobedience” (interview, 31/7/18). Helping thus had the undertones of political struggle. And it is a struggle that is brought to the fore because Marc (and others like him) can no longer abide a state that is intent on defining illegal acts in an immoral way.
Moreover, the citizen-hosts instinctively understood that what drove them to act had driven others as well. Their indignation connected them with others who shared similar sentiments over the treatment of foreigners and had acted upon it. More precisely, the treatment of foreigners, coalesces into an object matter of mutual concern that unites citizens who decide to act in solidarity against the injustices of others. This was eloquently put to me by Jeanne who, with her partner, for the past year has hosted an undocumented Chadian refugee in their Paris apartment:

This is the first time I’ve chosen to really disobey and thus place my family on the “wrong side” of the law [hors-la-loi] because it has become intolerable for us to continue on our way and to close our eyes or put blinders on regarding the situation of these migrants... We live at a time when a large part of the population lives in great precariousness, and I think it was just simply unbearable for us to continue to live a normal life. For quite a while now we’ve struggled to live with what’s going on. And we had to act, we didn’t know how to act, so we acted for this young migrant. In fact, it was a matter of urgency, and [the need] almost physical. In any case, we were no longer in accord with our conscience and had to act, and that necessarily meant resorting to disobedience. It was an imperative for us. In front of us there’s this person who is hungry and thirsty... there’s why citizens are providing help, because they are confronted with individuals in distress. We quickly raised the question of our disobeying the law, but very quickly. For us it was necessary to act. Just like all the others considered "delinquents"—which is what we are now too.

(interview, 28/7/18)

Jeanne’s words exemplify the kind of solidarity that is formed of a shared object of concern over a status quo no longer tolerable or conscionable. The specific object of concern may be different from person to person yet underlying the acts of hospitality, we see direct confrontation and response to any number of the many instances of oppression and injustice that the undocumented face. By this I mean that of the individuals that I spoke with, none purposefully sought out instances in which they might help irregular migrants; they “acted” when and where the occasion presented itself. What brought this group of people into being was simply an individual attentiveness to (overcoming) adversity that was
channelled into a singular, collective project: that of solidarity through the provision of hospitality.

This characterisation of solidarity is akin to Lawrence Blum’s (2007) description of solidarity. Blum, whose research focuses largely on distinguishing forms and bases of solidarity, distinguishes “solidarity” from “community” since the former necessarily responds or is a reaction to adversity (perceived or otherwise) (2007, 53). Solidarity for Blum is political if it designates the “pulling together of a group in the face of perceived adversity” (ibid.). Crucially then, what sets apart this—the political—from other forms of solidarity is the collective response to another’s adversity, so that it defines a group composed of people who are actively committed to resisting injustice or oppression (ibid., 74). We see this reflected in the words of Jeanne who is no longer willing to tolerate the plight of the undocumented and commits to resisting it through defiance of the law; an act that she acknowledges places her in the company of other solidarity “delinquents”.

Blum’s (2007) reading is valuable because it places the political aspect of solidarity within a dynamic perspective. From the moment it emerges organically in relation to a contentious matter, political solidarity is always in movement. It is never an established or settled fact. In the French case under examination, solidarity brings to the fore problematic presuppositions, norms and practices embedded within the state’s institutions such as citizenship and border control that make it impossible for some migrants to access rights, even the rights that they supposedly do have. It thus compels action directed towards a finality of non-domination. Solidarity of this kind is therefore genuinely political insofar as it rests on a shared commitment to a political cause, principle or value (ibid., 62).

One clarification is crucial. The solidaristic “groups” that come together in reaction to adverse conditions do not solely involve those directly experiencing the form of injustice or oppression in question. Blum is clear that not all oppressed groups will actively seek to improve their lot as a group, just as those who—in my case, France’s délinquants solidaire—do not experience oppression, remain committed to shared values that resist it (2007, 74). This last point offers some explanation as to why among the citizen-hosts there is great variation as to the kinds of response that each sought to enact, the motivating decisions underpinning these, and the framing of the response to different publics.

Political solidarity, therefore, is not formed out of a commonality of shared experience or identity, but out of a common project. Susan Scholz (2008) expresses a similar viewpoint.
In the Introduction to her monograph of the same name, “political solidarity” distinguishes itself from other forms of solidarity (such as the social, which is based on shared characteristics and identities) in that it denotes a “moral relation that marks a social movement wherein individuals have committed to positive duties in response to a perceived injustice” (Scholz 2008, 6). Key to Scholz’s thinking, is that solidarity takes on political contours when one feels compelled to act against a negative experience (not necessarily one’s own) in endeavour to generate change. This reading is crucial for how I understand the hosts and their self-described acts. For while those in the movement stand in support of the undocumented and the exiled, they clearly act in solidarity against conditions of vulnerability, marginalisation, precariousness, social injustice and so forth. What is remarkable about the French délinquants solidaires is that acting against injustice principally involves non-oppressed people banding together in shared, public commitment to transform the political practices of state hospitality. These practices extend to both the state’s treatment of undocumented migrants, in terms of denying many of their rights, as well as the repression and criminalisation of its citizen-hosts for helping them.

It is this latter point that amplifies the concerned citizens’ sense of solidarity with one another, in addition to the undocumented themselves, as they each try to figure out their response to the situation at hand. It is also a reminder that there is nothing purely symbolic in defying the state in this way. The solidarity among individuals formed of a shared object of concern helped to foster strong bonds and connections among those who help refugees, despite the potential consequences of doing so, that is of great comfort and importance to participants in the movement. And it was so in unexpected ways that revealed much about their French identity, both in terms of how they felt it was under threat and also how it could be redeemed.

When I questioned the délinquants solidaires on the importance of knowing that other people were partaking in similar dissident forms of hospitality, in similar “grey area” circumstances in relation to the law, I anticipated that their answers would emphasise the value of being connected through solidarity. I was unprepared, however, for just how important feelings of connectedness to the wider community—to “those out there” who likewise condemned both the state’s vision and practice of hospitality, including the criminalisation of citizens—were. This kind of connection entailed the simple but vital fact of knowing that they were not alone in acting but in the company of other like-minded people.
Moreover, it presented a clear indication of the high-risk stakes, personal costs and potential for isolation that accompanied placing oneself beyond the pale of the law to oppose injustice in ways not readily understood or accepted by the great majority. It would ease the costs of both politicising oneself and the more rigid institutional structures like borders and citizenship. But at the same time, it gave a sense and cohesiveness to their struggle. As Sylvain, who is awaiting trial for extending hospitality to family members not covered by the law’s indemnity guarantees, expressed:

What we’re seeing, not just in my case, but in others of “criminalised solidarity”, [is] suddenly a lot of people in our network. Even if today we remain a minority, there’s many people around us acting in terms of solidarity. France has an organised system of repression that is meant to scare you off—especially when you have a family, you are a father, you have a house and children … and you want to help foreigners, but you know that there can be police summons, criminal prosecutions that can result in fines, and one day, in going to prison. We can’t put our family in danger … [so] of course the support is important. At first, as in every movement, there are personal, individual initiatives. Knowing that we are surrounded provides strength and coherence to all that— that we do see, and that the movement is winning over more and more people. (interview, 31/7/18)

Marc too, the border-activist in the Nice area we heard from before, reflected on the emotional support provided by the solidarity movement:

Knowing one is surrounded by this solidarity means that we’re not alone in thinking the same thing… that there are other people who are on the same wavelength, on an ideological, human and political level. We’re in close contact with each other - with the people from Briançon, from Calais, and in Nice … This [display of] solidarity—the more far-reaching, the better it is. (interview, 31/7/18)

Marc’s words suggest that the support and connections garnered from within the wider “solidarity” movement were essential recognition that one wasn’t “going it alone” but as part of a collective whose members held a similar vision. This wider group connectivity
helped stave off the potential alienating or isolating effects of the demands of acting upon one’s non-negotiable convictions on issues like asylum seekers and migration. This concern over isolation, though, didn’t materialise so much for Marc as it did for several other *délignants solidaires*, for whom the isolating effects of acting counter to much mainstream thinking on the welcome of refugees prompted a Foucauldian “care of the self” (Foucault 1986). I examine the few distinct cases of this more fully in Chapter Six.

This recognition of being part of something bigger than oneself had other benefits, in that the growing movement and its publicness conferred a sense of legitimacy upon the civil disobedient’s acts. Thus, if the latter’s aim was to disrupt the existing political order in terms of the rigid- or givenness of the political community and who was considered worthy a member of it, it was essential (and key to the movement’s success) that their claims be recognised as legitimate. Such recognition also, I suspect, furnished the means to thoroughly verse newer actors of the movement as to the full gamut of the state’s inhospitable practices. This ripple effect of “solidarity with solidarity” and the recognition it afforded proved a valuable tool for the *délignants solidaires* for cultivating the political aspect of dissident hospitality. Consider the following from as Brigitte, a resident of the Brittany region who has long history of public (“citizen”, is her exact word) engagement in favour of the rights of foreigners and against repressive government migration policy. She explained:

> The [solidarity] entourage is fundamental because it gives meaning to the legitimacy of our action. In my view, a citizen movement, when it flies in the face *[va à l’endroit]* of the law today, if it’s legitimate, will prepare the legality of tomorrow. It was true for abortion, it’s true for women’s rights, it’s true for the rights of foreigners, for the protection of children. It’s citizen movements that announce and create the legitimacy of something that later will be recognized in law. When that moment is legitimate … disobedience is “just”.

Unlike what you see in (major city), in places across France like the little village where I live there’s nothing... Within ten days of welcoming an undocumented minor into my home, we had fifty people wanting to help – we ended up setting up a collective! The “network” is very comforting - both for us (for people like me who have been in this movement for a long time) but also those who
participate at first a bit out of simple humanism or without really thinking about the issue of migration policies. When they’re acquainted with the practices of the State - who rejects, who excludes, who abuses, who doesn’t protect minors, and so on - they themselves are appalled and extremely shocked - and so the fight then really becomes much more political. I mean - they think about what equality of rights means, about the place of foreigners in a society that wants to be fraternal, egalitarian: “liberté, égalité fraternité” etc. etc. (interview, 11/8/18)

These portraits of political solidarity and their widespread ripple effect exemplify the republican emphasis on citizen investiture in public affairs. Under republicanism, ideas ought to be routinely contested in the _polis_. Indeed, as political theorist and scholar of republicanism Cécile Laborde argues, for a state not to dominate its citizens, the people ought in some way take an active role in its government (2008, 162). This amounts to voicing, contesting and reaching consensus on ideas as a process of self-government. Today, it is the place of foreigners in the political community, along with proposals and imaginings of what a republican citizenship that values fraternity and equality should look like, that are front and centre of the delinquents’ collective and public contestation. And here is the important point I wish to emphasise: French citizens engaged in this kind of activity are attempting to realise both the kind of (French) citizen and (French) society they want to live in. And they do so in concert with others, as a community to be precise: a political “community of citizens”, to borrow from Schnapper (1998), through which the ideals—and promises—of universality, _liberté, égalité, and fraternité_ can be claimed and realised.

What struck me as particularly noteworthy in Brigitte’s comments is the readiness to evoke parallels with historic protest movements and moments of “becoming political” in the public sphere as the arena for dissent. For while the motives underlying political solidarity vary from individual to individual, one stood out as particularly forceful in terms of directing citizens to act: an overwhelming majority of those interviewed expressed strong feelings towards past injustices committed in their territory. The spectre of the past reveals that solidarity ambitions nested within the dynamic perspective are not just forward looking, but backward looking too. This significance of this is that it reveals a very surprising object of mutual concern: that of the French nation itself.
The spectre of the past that looms largest, not surprisingly, is Vichy France, the regime established in 1940 by Marshal Pétain under German occupation following France’s Second World War capitulation to Germany. The French hosts repeatedly raised the tragedy of Jewish expulsions and the practice, as a form of resistance, of secretly harbouring Jews during this period. Likewise, though to a lesser extent, references were made to France’s colonial past. On this point, one interviewee judged the state’s apparent “amnesia” in dealing with the colonial aftermath “a futile endeavour”, since “just like a boomerang, questions [of colonialism] come back again and again” (Gérard, interview, 2/8/18). Gérard elaborated that successive French administrations “on the Left especially, have never been able to resolve these questions that are essentially African – we’re getting hit full face with the backlash”. Gérard’s understanding touches on just how closely the two are linked—that is, France’s colonial history and the current migration crisis—something that the French state has only ever superficially addressed (see, e.g., Ben Jelloun 1999, Rosello 2001).

With respect to “Occupied France”, numerous délinquants solidaires evoked their deep sense of shame in reference to what one NGO worker interviewed describes as “this very dark moment in our nation’s history”. Yet feelings of shame comingled with those of pride and solidarity on the subject of actors in the Resistance movement. Namely those who had defiantly and at their peril hidden Jewish families or helped to smuggle them out of France. Of today’s disobedients, many openly considered themselves “inheritors” of the “French tradition of resistance”. A few expressed the responsibility they felt towards ensuring that the criminalisation of solidarity occurring today would not take place in silence as it had in the past. These observations were in no way accusatory of past silences. Rather, they signalled a concern for a growing authoritarian state power, and perhaps some solace that today’s penalties for helping undocumented migrants “were not, at least not yet, a question of life or death”, in the pragmatic words of Gérard: an 81-year-old Jewish “solidarity delinquent” who, as a boy in 1943/44, was hidden in the homes of Resistance members during the Holocaust (interview, 2/8/18).

These stories relayed by Gérard and others highlight the similarities between the gestures of fraternity, hospitality, and solidarity of today’s délinquants solidaires and those who had acted to save persecuted Jews during the resistance movement “under Vichy”. Their stories speak to the broader theme of solidarity under investigation in this section because they relate the primacy of acting for a common cause to an understanding of
historical injustices and the expressed need to do collectively better in the present. The common project links a solidaristic feeling for delinquents past, present and undoubtedly, future. It was evident that, for Gérard and others, helping today’s persecuted and “undesirable outsiders” amounted to gestures performed in solidarity with those of other dissidents who had come before them and had paid the price. Today, as in the past, *délinquants solidaires* acted knowing full well that such action could land them in court—or worse. These aspects of their solidarity demonstrate the extent to which their hospitality is also intended as a vital reminder of the horrors of the direction that silence and a lack of citizenly vigilance can take. It is also a reminder that the problem of “undesirable outsiders” that plagued people at a past time and place has strong resonances in the present. Then, as now, French delinquents actualise their understanding of what it means to be a citizen. And this understanding is never decoupled from the ongoing project of realising their constitutional ideals—of which freedom and protecting that freedom: “the freedom to help someone in need without fear of accusation or reprisal” (Morgane, interview, 1/8/18).

Of course, it would be remiss of me not to point out what the majority of those who spoke out on the particular issue of France’s Resistance past hastened to mention. Morgane acknowledged that while the contemporary treatment of foreigners has triggered both a need to help persecuted migrants and fears of being informed on [*dénoncé*] for doing so, today’s “genuine echoes with the past can’t really be compared—not at all” (interview, 1/8/18). Morgane here refers to the complexity and problem with likening today’s migrant refugee crisis in Europe to the horrors of the Holocaust. And yet even in conceding this reality, some, like Morgane who has three young children of mixed race, remained fearful of the potentiality of the contemporary predicament, and especially where it might lead: “Today everything’s fine, but tomorrow, what might happen? What if the confusion [*amalgame*] that we see today where migrants are all Muslims and all Muslims terrorists, unleashes a situation very similar to the ‘40s. I do make that comparison with what happened in the ‘40s and say to myself: “What if I really *was* right? If I was like those Jews who knew to escape before everything changed [*tout dérive*]? … Maybe people think I’m crazy. We act like nothing’s wrong, but it’s there – ticking away in the background and that’s what scares me” (Morgane, interview, 1/8/18).

Terms such as denunciation, informant, Vichy France, and harbouring “clandestines” are loaded terms in French discourse. As an outsider listening to the hospitality delinquents
I sensed that they hung heavy in the air, intermingling with emotions such as guilt, fear, pride and solidarity that in turn intersect with their secular nation’s collective memory and nourish its politics. As I was often reminded, the “crime of solidarity” wasn’t a “new idea” in France. It has existed since the Ordinance of 1938 and is therefore inseparably linked to this bleak period of history. One woman informed me, not without a touch of irony, that many of the migrants being helped today across the borderzone in the treacherous Alpine mountain area near Briançon were treading the same well-worn paths of the Jews who had fled France, albeit in the opposite direction. In a different register, Gérard was struck by the solidarity that had he witnessed during a recent visit to Briançon to attend a fund-raising fête in honour of the three young people on trial for assisting migrants across the Alpine border:29

There were hundreds of people from small mountain villages telling us “we’ve got [undocumented] Blacks staying with us at home”—this number, it’s significant you know. It means that there are no longer any barriers. The difference in a village between hosting a white Jew and a Black (person) is huge - the masks have really come off! And the amount of people at this fête announcing they were hosting [undocumented migrants] … this makes it a really significant phenomenon. Because never before has there been such consideration for Muslims. (interview, 2/8/18)

Regardless that Gérard might be seen here to conflate questions of race and religion, on the strength of his and many other interviewee testimonies, it is evident that for many the ideal of resistance was deeply ingrained in their identity of what it meant to be a French citizen: someone unafraid to vocally and visibly resist injustice. Unafraid in what sense? In this context it means fearless of the consequences: legal, certainly; but also having the courage of one’s convictions to publicly proclaim a position of solidarity with foreigners in an increasingly xenophobic and repressive climate. Numerous respondents disclosed that

29 The “Échelle” Mountain Pass (Col de l’Échelle) in the Briançon area has become one of the major – and most treacherous - thoroughfares for undocumented migrants seeking to cross into France from Italy since the 2015 re-instatement of French borders and disruption down at the Mediterranean entry point at Nice/Vintimille. Many villagers in the Briançon area have been extremely vocal in both their support and their opposition for migrants passing through here. For analysis on the recent and violent stand-off between these two groups, see: “France: Tensions rise as migrants brave the Alps” (Gauriat 2018).
France's Resistance past shaped much of their action and they had faith that “history would prove the crime of solidarity completely justified” (Laetitia, interview, 29/7/18). For Laetitia, the NGO worker mentioned earlier and whose entire professional life has been devoted to the community sector: “[Delinquency] is a choice not without risks, but I feel legitimised to do it because I believe that it’s headed in the direction of history” (interview, 29/7/18). The dissident and political acts of French citizens concerned with the present is decidedly forward-looking, but with an eye to the past.

A salient and unexpected picture thus began to take shape in the course of my discussions. In declaring and displaying their public solidarity with the undocumented and largely unwelcome(d) migrants, the citizen-hosts weren’t preoccupied solely with the precarity of the vulnerable foreigners. Neither did they intend simply for their disobedience to act as a counterweight to state power and the troublesome practices of its institutions. Rather, the citizen-hosts intended to create a an altogether different path for France. This “messy situation that combines racist ideology with a nationalist electorate” that was gathering momentum was happening on their watch, in their country—and they didn’t intend to sit back while “France continued to trash her values” (Virginie, interview, 6/8/18). Instead, they took real action to “contest the xenophobic and racist France [seen] through vulgar images” (Loïc, interview, 29/7/18). What these attitudes of contestation disclose is a concern for the need for vigilance; a citizenly vigilance to be exact, to prevent their country from revisiting a period in history marked by racio-religious hatred and intolerance. Seen in this light, the broader aim of political solidarity runs deeper than saving migrants. The “delinquents” felt (through anger, sadness and shame) that their country was failing miserably on numerous fronts. Solidarity, I discovered, was a way to save what they repeatedly referred to as their own “shitty country [pays merdique].”

Enacting republican citizenship

So far political solidarity has represented a concern with actively resisting conditions of injustice, marginalisation and vulnerability, and likewise the direction in which they see France headed. It is actualised by a collective of individuals who pull together around two common and overlapping projects. At this point I want to consider in more detail precisely what it is about their acts that bring this group into being in a way that we might call them
“acts of citizenship” (Isin 2008). Engin Isin defines such acts as those through which subjects constitute themselves as citizens. These acts are creative of new scenes (or scripts, actors and orders) that associate the idea of rupture. Rupture, says Isin, should be understood in the sense of a break from habitus, or what he names "socio-historical patterns" (2008, 2). In this section, I draw on Isin’s framework to show that when indignant subjects politicise themselves along the lines of their understanding of French republican principles—albeit in defiance of the state—they not only constitute themselves as citizens, they do so within a particular claimed tradition.

If citizens by definition enjoy rights, republican citizens feel duty-bound to active and public-regarding political engagement. I might add that in the French tradition, citizens, right from childhood and primary and secondary school, are brought up on the Rousseauian notion of the general will formation and Social Contract, and a good dose of revolutionary culture and heritage—the ideas of which are captured in the Rights of Man, the principles of liberté, égalité, fraternité, and the insurrection against privilege and state power rule (which is to say the negation of equality and freedom). We will revisit these ideas momentarily. These fundamentals of French citizenship resonated strongly with my citizen-hosts, who spoke of their responsibility to help strangers since the injustices endured by them are occurring in their own territory. Of those I interviewed, none had before sought to place themselves on the wrong side of the law. But on this matter, they felt compelled to defy the state from a place of obligation. While this obligation initially and most frequently turned on ethical and moral concerns for helping one’s fellow human, the conscientious act of defying the state had a distinct ground in civil obligation that, I argue, strongly defines their French identity.

What is the essence of such a civil or “citizen-grounded” obligation? To provide an adequate response it is useful to view citizenship in its close association with democracy (Jensen and Papillon 2001, 4). The citizen effectively distinguishes herself from the subject insofar as she enjoys the freedom and equality that democracy provides for members of a given political community. And to reach back to the previous chapter, under the French republican notion of democracy and in the interest of the general will, a central preoccupation of the post-revolutionary citizen is her participation in democratic sovereignty (Lefebvre 2003). That is, republican citizenship strongly seeks to develop and foster the active participation of the citizen and deliberation over all things considered to be
a matter of public interest (Weinstock 2000, 18). And despite any dreams for a general consensual will, it is clear that any matter of public interest will be contested, so that republicanism consists in public discussion, debate, and action over such matters. Readers should note that it is these ideas of solidarity, active participation, civic responsibility, and fraternity that distinguish “republican” citizenship from its liberal counterpart, whose central premise turns on freedom and equality as applied to individuals rather than in their capacity as members of a specific polity (Honohan 2017). In a vibrant democracy, participation and deliberation thus extends to matters of conflict that surface in the polis, being matters such as those that contest who has the right to be considered capable and worthy of citizenship in the community of citizens. These questions are inevitably entwined with those of liberty, equality and fraternity—being the founding principles of the Republic—so that should citizens consider these principles to be “imperfectly realized or upheld by state institutions”, it is incumbent upon them, since within their sovereign power, “to strive to bring about more just institutions” (Laborde 2008, 13).

Crucially, we must distinguish between an “active citizen” from an “activist” one (Isin 2009). “Activist citizens”, says Isin, contrast with “active citizens who act out already written scripts such as voting, tax paying and enlisting, engage in writing scripts and creating the scene” (ibid., 381). By claiming rights for others and assuming the obligations and virtues of their citizenship as a means to transform their institutions, the délinquants solidaires created a series of scenes through which they enacted their citizenship. These scenes of dissident solidarity brought several fundamental injustices of the French Republic to the fore, including the state’s domopolitical conception of hospitality through which it determines who has a rightful presence in a (racially and religiously inflected) political community. The creative ways in which these subjects sought to transform themselves and their institutions certainly earns them the mantle of “activist citizen”.

Essential to defining enactments of citizenship as creative (of new scenes, scripts, actors and orders) is, as briefly indicated, the idea of the rupture: rupture as a break from habitus or “socio-historical patterns” (Isin 2008, 2). In acting creatively against the state, concerned individuals constitute themselves as citizens, in that they actualise a rupture with the givenness of unequal relations between citizens and their others that governmental hospitality imposes. They do so in the name of a reclaimed national ethos that has consistently prided itself on hospitality, equality and fraternity, even in the full awareness
that France has not always lived up to it. The rupture, then, is with an anaemic model of
citizenship, one that for the délinquants solidaires effectively forfeits France’s own
republican heritage. The hospitality that is today claimed by the délinquants solidaires
involves a more capacious and demanding understanding of citizenship. And by staking this
conception of citizenship these individuals contest the state’s total assertion over her
borders and attempt to endow foreigners with the rights they do have.

To be clear, my claim should not be read as a dismissal of the predicament the state
faces. As I stated earlier, I concede the state’s need for some measure of cultural uniformity
to admit people who can, within a wide latitude, accept its founding principles. My
disagreement, however, lies in how this is being practiced in the French case. What France’s
délinquants solidaires demonstrate, is an awareness that key to the practice of
governmental hospitality is the ethno-religious policing of the boundaries of citizenship and
reasserting the unequal positions of host and guest. The argument I therefore make is that
in drawing connections between the state and hospitality, activist citizens see in their own
political, anti-hierarchical and egalitarian practice of hospitality a terrain for exceeding those
limits to state sovereignty through an alternate (although not altogether new) ideal and
practice of citizenship.

The citizenship that they enact is thus capacious in the sense that it aims to
universalise the principles of freedom, equality and fraternity in demanding that they be
honoured at home. And part of such citizenship is to ensure that these principles safeguard
those who seek protection inside that home. The citizenship enacted today through
hospitality thus departs from the hospitality shown towards foreigners in the revolutionary
period in a singular, remarkable way. Whereas the early stages of the French Revolution
succeeded in associating universalism and hospitality with an eye to exporting France’s
revolution to the world, which is but to signal its expansivist aspirations (realised, we might
add, under Napoleon Bonaparte); that’s not the idea today. France’s dissident citizens today
demand a reinterpretation of that universalism in the very idea that they insist it begins at
home.

To conclude this section, one final aspect of the delinquents’ solidarity that I found
particularly striking was the way that they connected their rights to the rights of others
(Allsopp 2012). As Hélène asks: “What do my rights mean if we take away theirs? Their
rights are worth fighting for, I mean it might sound egotistical, but I don’t want my freedom
of movement hindered or taken away. That hasn’t happened so far – but then again, I’ve got blond hair and blue eyes” (2018). Hélène’s questioning echoes that Francesca Peirotti, a convicted délinquante solidaire with a substantial public profile and the subject of the recent documentary “LOZA”. In the film, she states her public justification for why she broke French law in solidarity against injustice and would continue to do so: “Their freedom is our freedom”. There is a palpable sentiment that some feel that if the rights of others aren’t secure, which is to say the rights of the undocumented, then their own too might be on shaky ground. Exercising one’s rights by mounting a challenge to who and what counts as political is understood as a way of protecting these rights. Moreover, because such challenges take the form of active and public-minded political engagement on the part of citizens in the pursuit of the common good, we can attribute to them the practice of republican political ideals.

Visibility and Voice

As the above section indicates, solidarity born of a shared object of concern entails displaying and enunciating that solidarity. Political solidarity therefore necessitates visibility and voice. In this section I explain why these twin principles are not only effective tools in the délinquants solidaires’ arsenal of calling into question and exposing the inhospitable practices of the state. As a key vehicle for articulating political solidarity, voice and visibility contribute to the creation of a public sphere through which citizens seek answerability for their disobedience. Creating scenes of publicity—being the public arena to voice concerns over a taken-for-granted status quo and to confront the government for its role in the suffering of others—thus grounds the moral and civic duty to act, even if disobediently. It is in this sense that in this section I will argue that drawing on the principle of “making visible” to raise awareness of an object of common concern denotes an act of citizenship.

My understanding of voice develops from Nina Mickwitz’s notion: voice here functions as an extension of visibility, in that it “suggests the possibility of overcoming the compromised status of vision, implicated in practices of surveillance, exploitation and domination” (2016, 118). The voice of the délinquants solidaires is intended to challenge the power relations shaped by state’s “compromised vision”. By compromised vision, I mean to say the state’s capacity to monopolise perceptions of otherness, to conceal or distort the
“reality” of the problem of migrant mobility. Voice, following Mickwitz’s conception, means to render problems “visible” in the way that they, the citizens, perceive them. It is moreover a means to lend validity to their claims and confrontation with the state and its tactical use of imagery that positions and constructs certain people or groups as societal problems. Voice is thus a key way in which the délinquants solidaire convey an altogether different vision and reality on this very question.

In what ways did French délinquants solidaire engage the principle of visibility? First and foremost, the act of hospitality that individuals carry out alongside the wider movement makes visible (i.e., exposes) the state’s deficiencies and its failings. It spotlights the care and generalised assistance in accessing basic fundamental rights that citizens feel dutybound to provide foreigners, in lieu and in place of state action. It similarly enacts the desire to call attention to the fact that the state is flouting international laws and its own on the protection of asylum seekers via their hard-line action against “illegal” or clandestine immigration. Visibility, in my understanding of its practice, is not simply a question of raising inconvenient facts to light, or countering misinformation. “Making visible” is very much about how individuals reframe a certain problem so that new facts, issues, and exigencies come to light. This is precisely what the délinquants solidaire are doing by re-shifting hospitality onto the terrain of what it means to be French: it makes a certain conception of citizenship and identity visible, along with its corresponding obligations and attachments.

There is, thus, a distinct political aim in the aspect of making visible. As Marc explained: “In one sense, the authorities seem quite comfortable with the humanitarian work that we [delinquents] voluntarily do on their behalf. What they’re less comfortable with is that the action that we carry out exposes the government’s policy. The state isn’t coming after us for our “humanitarianism” but for our activism. It’s a political trial – that’s why Cédric [Herrou] and the others have attracted the wrath of the state [les foudres de l’État]. Our response is equally political” (interview, 31/7/18). Laetitia also concedes the “imminently political” nature of the hospitality act as reflecting her duty as a citizen “to report on [faire état] the situation with migrants.” She asks: “Imagine if there were no activists, no mediatisation of our activist activities amid all the misinformation surrounding [the state’s] actions? This is truly political action... a counteraction against state power since we are completely shrouded in misinformation on the treatment of the [undocumented] question. It’s just mind-blowing [hallucinant] to see the gap between reality and national
It is clear that Laetitia’s defence of activist hospitality must not be seen as simply the attempt to bridge this “reality” gap. Rather she marks a strategic attempt at reversibility and rupture with a power differential that permits the state to flout or conceal its immigration politics and the true nature of the predicament of the forcibly displaced.

This principle of visibility and voice that I claim grounds the act of delinquent hospitality is expressed similarly by Isin (2008) in theorising what makes an “act”. Following Reinbach, Isin suggests that “the essence of an act [is] an expression of the need to be heard” (2008, 24). I would argue that at the core of citizenly acts of dissidence is a moral and civic obligation to make visible: to confront and contest what the state does (and does not) on the basis of its own compromised vision. In their informative discussion on the politics of visibility in relation to the governmental state, Martina Tazzioli and William Walters suggest that visibility in the context of governmentality is oriented towards “making reality knowable” (2016, 448-9). Following Foucault, the authors indicate that a regime of visibility is constituted of thresholds both visible and invisible that exceed the sayable (ibid.).

In relation to the délinquants solidaires, it is not hard to picture the deed or act made visible as exceeding the sayable, as was poignantly put to me by Adèle, for whom “words in the current context have lost their meaning. The only way to counter that is through action” (interview, 12/8/18).

What is most relevant to us in Tazzioli and Walters’ work, which holds that “liberal governmentality is characterised by a political rationale that aims to manage reality”, is their suggestion of the usefulness for thinking of visibility as a “strategic field” (2016, 448). For the important point I wish to make here, as do these authors, is that this notion of strategy isn’t contained to the governmental state but signals the possibility that governmental visibility may be strategically countered, resisted or reversed by subjects. That is, through their acts, subjects are capable of articulating an alternative narrative—indeed an alternate reality, that runs counter to the state. Which is to say that their struggles are strategically waged so as to (re)define the reality or “facts” of a problem that would otherwise remain settled, closed off or hidden. This, I argue, is precisely why the state is so intent on criminalising the solidarity of its citizens, in two important ways.

The first is captured by sociologist Manuel Cervera-Marzal who notes that “What the state cannot tolerate, is that such [delinquent] solidarity takes place out in the open, that
those who help migrants assume full responsibility and they assume it publicly, and that
they urge their fellow citizens to do the same. At this point the State is attacked in its
prerogative: that of defining reality, of saying exactly ‘what’ is ‘what’” (2018 emphasis
added). Thus, for all intents and purposes, the state sees itself justified in preventing the
visibility of delinquent hospitality that manifests a collective will by establishing a narrative
to counter that of the state.

The second follows from the above and relates to what many commentators call the
“exemplary behaviour” of the délinquants solidaires. Which, in many ways, is just that: the
visibility of delinquent acts might be seen by others who are similarly outraged (or become
so as a result) as setting an example to follow. The testimony of Brigitte we saw earlier on
the importance of the support network in “educating” newer members on the state’s
failings makes this very clear. Hence my claim that strategic visibility of the kind signalled by
Tazzioli and Walters (2016) and intended as a model to reverse the sovereign state’s
stronghold on determining who or what counts as an insider or outsider (or granted access
to its community of citizens) will undoubtedly draw, as Marc points out, “the wrath of the
state”.

That the state will not stand for (and punish) any prospect that the délinquants’
strategic visibility might act as a “model” for others is borne out in recent criminal sentences
handed down for citizenly acts of solidarity. Consider the Appeal Court’s decision on the
matter of Cédric Herrou, which was categorical in determining that an individual who
“assumes his act, manifested as the strategic will to publicly communicate such action”
cannot benefit from the (humanitarian) exemption clause provided under Article L.622-4.
The magistrate added that “When helping is part of a comprehensive challenge to the law, it
cannot be considered an exception provided for by that law but serves an activist cause that
does not answer to distress. Such a challenge constitutes a benefit for the help provided”
(Leroux 2017, emphasis mine). Receiving no direct or indirect benefit (or compensation,
contrepartie) from the act of assisting foreigners, I remind my readers, is the sine qua non
condition that must be met for any humanitarian exemption to the law to be granted. It
would seem that the politically-motivated trial that Cédric and countless others have been
(and continue to be) subject to is the true contrepartie\textsuperscript{30} for their acts. And it is perhaps inevitable. As Brigitte reminds us, citizen movements such as these have and will prepare the legality of tomorrow.

In a similar vein, French sociologist Eric Fassin (2017) views such acts as a serious “call to order to public authorities who only invoke the law to make us forget that they are flouting it”. Fassin’s claim is basically to charge the state and its representatives of calling out the citizens’ disobedience to the law to detract from the fact that the state itself is disobeying its laws. Cédric and others in the movement like Marc explicitly refer to their actions in such terms: “the idea is for the law to be respected by the state. Why does the state treat us like this? Because we have evidence that the state has gone rogue [hors-la-loi] on its border policy” (Marc, interview, 31/7/18). This would certainly explain why this kind of visibility exasperates the state: although partial to making displays of its power and might, the state prefers discretion when flouting the law, both domestic and international. Whence the condemnation brought against those who bring to light evidence of this fact. And there is no shortage of such evidence if one goes by the amount of footage made publicly visible by members of the movement.

But Fassin’s claim misses the point that the delinquent act is not simply a reminder or “call to order”: the central thrust of my argument is that this act is the attempt on the part of an indignant collective to realise a rupture in the given and status quo political order. Via strategies of visibility the délinquants solidaires reclaim an ethos for themselves through hospitality that ruptures the French state’s ethopolitical goal of shaping the beliefs and values that determine the citizen’s “right” approach to welcoming foreigners. As we saw in Chapter Four, the state implements this goal through its two-pronged policy of humanité/fermeté. In politicising themselves in this way, that is, in their wilful, visible disavowal of state hospitality as it stands, the délinquants solidaires demonstrate their desire to uphold a different French tradition or ethos perhaps not seen since the Revolution. Such an idea of hospitality is not linked to defining who can and cannot be a citizen on the basis of a limited, determinate identity rooted in an exclusive tradition. French identity, as

\textsuperscript{30} The French word contrepartie has the dual meaning in English of a “benefit” or “compensation” received in return for something, as well as a “counterpart”, in the sense of “one of two parts that complement one another”. It is in this second sense of the word that I attribute the punishment meted out to French citizens as the statist response to their solidarity.
self-reported and claimed by the French themselves, is based largely on a set of republican ideas and ideals (Caron 2013). And these ideals closely associate the rights and duties of the citizen. In acting as hosts, the *délinquants solidaires* assert and enact these ideas and ideals—for which many are prepared to pay and are paying with their freedom. If the grand but ultimately short-lived narrative of hospitality in revolutionary times held within it the promise of universality, France’s *délinquants solidaires* today have revived and resurrected that narrative with the intention of making its promise real by expanding the spaces of liberty and equality.

This brings me to my last point in relation to the principle of visibility. It is that the realisation of such acts in concert with likeminded others transforms bonds of citizenship in creative—and visible—ways. Visibility in fact implies the creation of a public realm, through which positions and identities can be collectively claimed. For example, the ripple effect of “solidarity with solidarity” in French civil society (and beyond) is gaining in importance by the day, exemplified in ever-increasing numbers of people who appear in solidarity at the public hearings of those criminally charged with helping the undocumented. In these moments, it is frequent to see supporters voicing the movement’s slogan: “If solidarity with foreigners is a crime then we are all criminals.” These instances actualise what Huub Dijstelbloem has termed a “portable public realm”, which, in Arendtian mode, is created through the act and its visibility (cited in Tazzioli and Walters 2016, 452). Even those subjects who may not have actively sought to defy the state still constitute themselves as citizens since they not only “claim their position in the public sphere, but also [through their] very actions create a public sphere” (ibid.).

By far the most visible instantiation of a “portable public realm” enacted through solidarity occurred in February of 2017. Following the spate of criminalisations that had occurred in the lead up to this moment, the *Délinquants Solidaires* collective (which today incorporates upwards of 650 national and regional associations under its manifesto of denouncing the repression and criminalisation of solidarity) launched a nationwide

31 In French : « Si la solidarité avec les étrangers est un délit, alors nous sommes tous des délinquants ». As noted in the Introduction, what is interesting is that the English translation of « étranger » gives both foreigner and stranger, a vivid display of its polysemy that is representative of broader debates concerning foreigners in France.

32 In so saying, I acknowledge Engin Isin’s remark that “Hannah Arendt often “reduced ‘acts’ to action”’ (2008, 24)
campaign of “solidarity with solidarity” to bolster public visibility. The February 2017 solidarity movement in France, the largest in France since 2009, saw demonstrators take to the streets in ninety-two cities to show solidarity with those facing heavy fines and jail sentences for their defiance of laws considered inadequate, unjust, or simply not respected by the state itself (GIISTI 2017). Creating such public realms that are accessible for all to see, debate and confront the state on issues such as this is borne of a need for citizenly vigilance. At stake is the capacity to preserve this kind of vigilance in the face of reprehensible, covert, misinformed or mere in -action on the part of the state. Publicity and vigilance refer precisely to what Marc claims is the “duty to watch over [veiller sur] the territory in which one lives, and at the same time over the concept of the “Republic”, of the citizen within the Republic, and of the state. We are convinced that to take action in the place where we live, faced with the situation as it is, is a matter for citizens. By that I mean, as a resident of this place and a French citizen, it is our duty to act” (interview, 31/7/18).

To conclude, an “act of hospitality” is an articulation of what citizens take to be their democratic right and duty, and is the means to rupture entrenched patterns of injustice and oppression wrought by state inhospitality. Through its principle of visibility, the dissident act of hospitality explored here is very much an “act of citizenship” in this sense articulated by Engin Isin (2008). Crucially, its “civic” articulation takes place, not outside, but within an institutional and democratic framework, since the act calls for answerability in this setting.

Answerability

We have looked at the principle of political solidarity to explain the kind of solidarity formed of a shared object of concern over a status quo no longer tolerable or conscionable. Visibility, I have suggested, refers to the way in which a problem is reframed so that new facts and realities come to light, principally to counter the state’s control over such facts and realities (or how these might be kept hidden). Which, in other words, is to refer to a “strategic field” of vision (Tazzioli and Walters 2016). A final principle, that of answerability, is integral to understanding what it means when citizens politicise themselves in defiance of the state. This principle, I argue, is implicit in, and anchors, the solidarity delinquent’s decision to act. Key to acts of citizenship, is the idea of people answering for deeds that they have committed and then using that answerability, and the publicity that this attracts in the
media and the courts, to confront the state with the immorality of its policies and politics. As an example, let us turn no further than to Cédric Herrou given that Cédric is no stranger to scenes created in and around French institutions of justice. In these he defends the right, as per the epigraph to this chapter, to protect the rights of foreigners present on French soil on account of his belief that freedom and equality found the values of the Republic, of which he is an invested citizen. My aim in this section is to explain why, in and of itself (that is, independent of a subject’s articulating his/her reasons or intentions for acting) answerability is crucial to recognising the disobedient act as an “act of citizenship”.

In his eloquent discussion of responsibility and answerability in relation to the ethical and political aspects of acts, Isin, borrowing language from Heidegger and Levinas, suggests that answerability is instigated through the decision to act in the presence of others (2008, 36-7). Answerability, we might say then, is generated by a person whose act creates a scene rather than follows a script in our presence with otherness (as one’s kind and one’s others). Linking the question of answerability to the notion of scenes “created” allows us to identify how an ethical act articulates itself as a political act—and by extension an act of citizenship. For we might refer to such otherness as plurality, in the Arendtian sense of the term, of which the capacity to enact something new and to answer and be judged for that creativity in appearing with a spectrum of others. It is thus to this spectrum of others who inescapably enter the scene through the political act that I suggest the solidarity delinquent is answerable for his or her charge of wrong-doing. In other words, the actor constitutes him/herself in their answerability towards the political. This understanding of answerability is absolutely critical since I, like Isin, and indeed Derrida in much of his work, am concerned with identifying what distinguishes the ethical and the political on such concepts as hospitality, sovereignty, or indeed here, the essence of an act. Isin suggests that key to understanding acts of citizenship is to “interpret them through their grounds and consequences” (2009, 381). The question of answerability is all the more relevant in our case, wherein the act in question translates a decision of civil disobedience. Let us examine the answerability of our citizen-hosts with an eye to their grounds and consequences of their acts. To start with, the dissident citizen seeks not to flee from the scene of the act, but rather claims it their right and duty to publicly defend his/her grounds for their act. In a word, these citizens do not seek to excuse, but rather to justify, their
stance and conduct. Answerability in this sense enables the subject to account for the grounds of their act.

Secondly, because of the law-breaking content of the act, political acts are not without consequence—the primary arena for justification and answerability is most often the criminal court of law. Because the political acts investigated here seek a rupture with given or socio-historical patterns of injustice by making visible that which the state would prefer was kept silent and hidden, the consequences of one’s disobedience are significant to say the least. And we see that in and around such settings as the criminal trial, where France’s dissenting hosts overwhelmingly answer for their acts by declaring it their duty as citizens to question and challenge that which the law appears to have settled or closed off.

I might add that answerability in this light establishes the decision to disobey as compatible with a respect both for the law (distinguished from obedience to it) and democratic practice, all the while seeking to the break with a situation in which certain laws are either inadequate, unjust or simply not respected by the state itself. In the moment of answerability that Piero Moraro calls the “communicative exchange between the civil disobedient and the state”, France’s citizen-hosts communicate their commitment to a duty to challenge and rupture with processes of injustice and a duty to answer for their breach of the law (2018, 505). It was made clear to me that in wholly withdrawing their solidarity from the state, the delinquents were not signalling a breakdown in dialogue or communications but their readiness to discuss options in the hope of seeing through change (Marc, interview, 31/7/18).

Yet there is a more profound meaning and significance that I wish to attribute to these acts of delinquent hospitality that I claim are answerable to justice. For to my mind, answerability, on its surface, means staying around to face the inevitable consequences of one’s actions. But what these citizens are in fact doing, is transforming their answerability to the justice of the state into an attack on the state from the standpoint of a different, more demanding, and what they believe is more French, standard of justice. They are, in other words, switching position: from answering the state’s justice, to demand the state be answerable to their truer justice.

This reworked answerability to justice manifests itself in a final crucial way by the délinquants solidaires that goes to the heart of the claims made by them. These claims centre not on the rights of one’s kind or circle of the same but of others. This is made patent
by the two antagonistic conceptions of hospitality between citizens-as-host and the state-as-host. I suggest that these antagonisms be read as two different connections being made between hospitality and the state, and as a result, two antagonistic conceptions—but on the shared terrain—of what it means to be French. On the hand is the salience of state sovereignty in delimiting that citizenship as rooted in territoriality and an exclusive national identity and culture. On the other, the dismantling of those limits in favour of an alternative and expanded citizenship that is redefined as practice or acts and is committed to a common, or community, that offers justice (we might here take inspiration from Arendt’s right to have rights). Citizenship thus redefined is not hindered by questions of exclusive identity because it postulates that there is nothing other than what Étienne Balibar calls the “collective capacity to ‘constitute the state’ or the public space. In other words, it expresses a bond in which the rights and freedoms granted to individuals, and the obligations which are their counterpart, however limited, do not emanate from a transcendent power, but only from the ‘convention’ of citizens [...]” (2001, 251-2). Hence the link between the idea of citizenship and the horizon of equality and fraternity that founds the citizen-hosts’ conception of hospitality.

Conclusion

In this chapter we examined the disobedience enacted by French citizens against the statist conception of hospitality. My central argument is that such disobedience is best understood, first, as a political act that aims to rupture with entrenched socio-historical practices of inhospitality, and second, as acts of citizenship. Delinquent hospitality acts such as these are acts of citizenship because they are best captured through the three principles of political solidarity, visibility and voice, and answerability—all of which enable the subject to realise the standing and vocation of republican citizenship in the French tradition. That is, when indignant subjects politicise themselves through these principles—albeit in defiance of the state—they constitute themselves as citizens within a particular claimed tradition.

The significance of my interpretation of the crimes of solidarity movement is that it draws our attention to the tug-of-war taking place over the political aspect of hospitality: between, on the one hand the citizens’ will to accommodate undocumented migrants by extending their hospitality, and on the other hand, the state’s desire to stop it. In this, the
citizens have sought to wrest away the state’s assertion over its borders, namely insofar as the French policy is judged inhumane; and, in a word, “un-French”. The broader significance of this work is to highlight the ways in which both state and citizens draw a connection between hospitality and the state, only they are taking it in antagonistic directions. Hospitality, for the republican citizen, is crucial to demonstrate that principles such as freedom, equality and fraternity will not simply be suspended at and by the border. Put simply, state and dissident see in hospitality a tool or technique for realising a certain conception Frenchness and citizenship, but in two opposing and perhaps irreconcilable ways.

The statist conception uses nationality and cultural tradition (which as we have seen, can also connote more sinister issues of race) as criteria for Frenchness or citizenship. In the case of French citizens that has been the focus of this chapter, their practices of hospitality underscore a contrasting conception of Frenchness and citizenship. This conception resists that of the state by unsettling the stability or givenness of citizenship qua nationality, and likewise the conditions (of which the border, but not solely) that define its relation of inclusion and exclusion: of “us” that has become hostile to “them”. It embodies an alternative understanding of French identity that has its basis in the commitment to a set of republican ideals such a freedom, equality and fraternity. By commitment to these ideals I don’t mean simply as of right, but of duty also. This is what makes this political project one of citizenship and republicanism through and through. This alternative understanding of citizenship projects a France that is hitherto missing, just like the France imagined by the Resistants at the height of the Second World War and Jewish deportations who refused to close France in on itself and rejected a mythical, ethno-racial foundation for it (Balibar 2014, 292).

The ambition of this more capacious and performative citizenship is the exclusion of the exclusion, to borrow from Balibar (2015). In concrete terms this means a politics that directly engages questions of justice and injustice in its attempt to universalise the commitment to principles of freedom, equality and fraternity beyond the modern boundaries of the state. Such a politics is synonymous with the “crimes of solidarity” movement that harnesses dissent, insurrection, and disobedience to counter laws deemed unjust, inadequate or outright disrespected. Moreover, its actors not only feel legitimised in doing so, but see it as their duty and within their power as citizens to challenge the
governmentality of the sovereign (state) which excludes in their name. As the delinquents make clear they are not prepared to let their country continue down this dangerous and unworthy path. Thus, the hospitality and citizen identity that is being claimed at present by French hosts must be seen in two crucial ways. Hospitality is not claimed solely for the sake of the other vulnerable other. It is claimed also for the sake of (saving) one’s country, namely from the path of intolerance and fermeté that they see France embarked upon. To my mind, it seems that this is the real ethical argument of “becoming political”, and very much the sense of Francesca’s claim when she declares: “their freedom is our freedom”.
Chapter 6
HOSPITALITY AS “CARE OF THE SELF”

Introduction

In the previous chapter we looked at the disobedience enacted by French citizens as a reaction to their state’s understanding and practice of hospitality. My central claim was that their enactment of hospitality is best understood as a political act that aims to rupture with entrenched socio-historical practices of inhospitality. I further argued that such acts must be seen as “acts of citizenship” (Isin 2008), since through this dissident form of hospitality, indignant subjects set about actualising the specificity of the duties and commitments that mark their republican citizenship. In thus politicising both themselves and certain practices or institutional structures of the state that involve the border and citizenship, the délinquants solidaires constituted themselves as citizens.

While this analysis holds true for the majority of the hosts I spoke with, others provided a different description of their acts and motivation. Although they too act in defiance of the state by extending hospitality to vulnerable migrants, their motivation for doing so was not primarily a case of helping vulnerable migrants. Neither was their main concern exactly one of steering France away from the path that it has embarked upon in its governance of migrancy and citizenship. Rather, political hospitality was understood and practiced by certain délinquants solidaires as a valuable resource to care for themselves. In contrast to the formation of political subjectivities I examined in Chapter Five, my aim in this chapter is to show how a small group of citizens craft their ethical and personal selves as a way of living in and coping with a world that, for them, had come to signify alienation, disillusionment, chaos and duplicity.

The term “care of the self” is borrowed from Michel Foucault, who in his late career (1981-84) worked on a conception of ethics and self-transformation prevalent in ancient Greco-Roman culture. In this chapter I will show that the notion of caring for the self is particularly fruitful to capture how, for some, offering hospitality in conditions of civil disobedience is a potentially an act with more than certain political effects or motivations. Rather, certain “things” (i.e., rules, ambitions, institutions, and structures) that seem
political—and certainly defiant acts of hospitality, breaking as they do from convention and the law, are appropriately called political—are being used for ethical ends. Political hospitality, in this sense, constitutes the driver of one’s ethical being.

The value of drawing attention to this rather more therapeutic aspect of hospitality through the analytic frame of “care of the self” is to encapsulate features that we do not expect to find in the hospitality literature, nor in the tradition as a whole, given a central preoccupation of hospitality is the care of precarious others. In my previous chapter I showed that hospitality is not practiced not merely for the sake of the other, but for the sake of (saving) one’s country. In this chapter, I show how hospitality at certain times and places provides a valuable resource of care, for the sake of the self (that is, of the host’s own self).

This chapter has four sections. First, I lay out the contours of what I mean by “care of the self”. To situate this notion in the context of contemporary theoretical debate, I will first sketch what is termed the “ethical turn” in political theory. In a nutshell, the ethical turn enquires into the kind of ethos required to sustain (and, in some instances, rescue) a democratic politics in our contemporary era. While interesting and significant in its own right, this strand of theoretical debate doesn’t quite capture the ethical relation—that is, the relation one has to oneself—that I have identified at work with the délinquants solidaires.

Sections Two to Four draw, respectively, on the interview material with three délinquants solidaires: Loïc, Adèle and Virginie. Each section will serve to amplify and explain the problem of selfhood and subjectivity that each of these individuals is experiencing, and how they use hospitality as a way to respond to and alleviate those problems. I should first make a justificatory note on the relatively small sample size used in this chapter. While the interviewees voiced concerns that were sufficiently different, interesting and full of potential to base a chapter on them, most important, and what I aim to mark out, is that they have exemplary status. They put forward a unique set of motivations that mark out a distinctive way of offering hospitality and conceiving of its effects. Importantly, while these cannot be reduced to those seen in Chapter Five, I want to make clear that the motivations in this chapter and the previous aren’t rival or in

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33 All interviewee names have been changed to preserve anonymity.
competition. They simply establish different outlooks on hospitality. When in this chapter I talk about “Loïc, Adèle and Virginie”, I am in fact talking about three different axes along which care of the self and hospitality are being practiced. And those become exemplary and as disclosing a whole other realm of hospitality and the motivations for it. They are exemplary too because, despite the small sample, they indicate a whole dimension of hospitality that is not just unrecognised in the hospitality literature but, in a real sense, inconceivable to it given how centred it is on care of others.

**Political Theory’s “Turn to Ethics”**

The “ethical turn” is a recent development in political theory. It examines the role of ethics and ethos in sustaining vibrant participatory democracies. Leading political thinkers such as William Connolly, Judith Butler, Simon Critchley, and Ewa Ziarek have made significant contributions to debate within this strand of theory. These authors investigate and propose the kind of ethics they consider best-suited to inspire, guide, and animate a flourishing democratic politics in the context of the many challenges we face today, such as widespread political and civic disengagement, or the multiplicity of values in our pluralist age. These thinkers seek to identify and develop the sensibilities, orientations, affects and habits of feeling among citizens that are favourable to associative and collaborative action and democratic engagement.

These theorists by no means provide a single answer as to what kind of ethos should be pursued. Ideas of what a viable democratic ethics would look like, or what kind of path it should take, are naturally contested. Some formulations incorporate and defend the approach taken by Foucault and his work on care of the self. Others take up a care of the Other approach that draws on Emmanuel Levinas’ ethic of openness, charity, and generosity. Indeed, in terms of theories of hospitality, Levinas-inspired approaches are prevalent and inspire Derrida’s reading of hospitality and the ethical commitment to absolute openness that I discuss in Chapter Two. Finally, there is also a strand of the ethical turn based on Hannah Arendt and her concept of care for the world. But despite this plurality, there is an underlying similarity between all these approaches. All of them treat ethics instrumentally, in the sense that a particular ethical sensibility is advanced to restore the health of our troubled democracies.
The ethical turn in political theory is not without its critics. For our purposes, the critique laid out by Ella Myers (2013) is most relevant. Myers’ criticism isn’t with the ethical turn as such (she is sympathetic to it on the whole), but directed at the shortcomings of prominent models for it, in particular care of the self and care of the other. Since a central aim of mine here is to show that a care of the self can potentially align with practices of hospitality, it is this aspect of Myer’s work that I discuss.

Let us first recall the main preoccupation of political theorists working in the ethical turn field: What kind of ethos is required for a flourishing democracy? A central criticism of Myers’ is that care of the self is an unsuitable ethic for democracy because it is too narrow and inward-looking: “The care for the self is a flawed basis for elaborating a democratic ethics. Although the notion that purposeful work on the self can contribute to collective citizen action is no doubt appealing, an ethics capable of animating associative democratic activity . . . cannot take the self’s relationship to itself as its starting point” (ibid., 24). Why not, we might ask? Because, according to Myers, a democratic sensibility and subjectivity that would favour engagement in democratic life cannot obtain from purposeful work on the self alone. Nor can a concern for democratic activity or relations be presumed to follow from first performing self-caring “work” or “interventions”. A democratic ethos, for Myers, is kick-started into action only when one’s primary or initial concern is directed outward, toward “worldly problems”. That is, only a world-caring orientation can adequately develop the necessary sensibilities to tend our democratic polities today. On her account, then, care for the world, rather than care of the self, must be the primary object of ethical concern to properly realise the democratic project.

Whether readers are sympathetic to Myers’s theorising “worldly ethics” is beyond the scope of the present discussion. However, and this is crucial, in critiquing Foucauldian- and Levinasian-inspired ethics in order to advance worldly ethics as the kind most conducive to a vibrant democracy, Myers assigns a decidedly instrumental character to ethics. Ethics is here at the service of politics. Which is to say that, Myers, as but one important contributor to current debate on the ethical turn, is not overly concerned with an ethical sensibility in and of itself. A particular ethical sensibility is only taken into account insofar as it supports a political project: here, the sustenance for democratic life.

But as we will see, there are limits to this approach. For several of the délinquants solidaires interviewed adopted a distinctly different approach. Their practice of hospitality—
which, on the surface, appears to be strictly undertaken to care for others or for a wider social and political world— was undertaken in the first instance for the sake of themselves. That is, for these citizens, caring for themselves by working on, changing and improving their way of being in the world in the face of tough challenges and times, is a moral end in itself. This different perspective, namely, that the political is being pressed into service of the ethical, rather than the other way around, reverses the standard position of scholarship on the ethical turn in political theory. Yet it is one that be fruitfully explored by aligning hospitality with Foucault’s notion of “care of the self”. We now turn to Foucault to spotlight three key elements to his ethics.

Foucault: Three Elements to Care of The Self.

Readers will recall that Foucauldian ethics refers to a distinctive category nested within morality that in the Greco-Roman tradition establishes the relation we have to ourselves. Which is to say, Foucault is interested in an ethical tradition of the self-self relation. “Ethical” in this chapter, is therefore not to be read as synonymous with “morality”, as commonly occurs. To place my earlier claim on hospitality as the driver of one’s ethical being within Foucault’s construction, France’s citizen-hosts are practicing hospitality to transform the relation they have to themselves. Exactly how this practice unfolds is the focus of Sections Two to Four.

A crucial aspect of the ethical “self-self” relation that Foucault explores is the priority given over to individuals to attend to, or look after, themselves. The “self”, in this reading, is the envisaged object of concern. This attentive concern entails the conscious practice of adopting self-directed “techniques”, to use Foucault’s favoured term, that help the subject to craft or cultivate its ethical self. This distinctive practice of subjectification within Foucault’s conception of ethics is what he terms “care of the self”.

Foucault devoted much attention to defining and outlining this concept in his later years. For the sake of clarity, allow me to jump right in to draw out its three main features. These have particular relevance for the central aim of this chapter: to show that care of the self as practiced by certain délinquants solidaires I spoke with is not merely an extension of, nor is it a preparatory phase, to caring for others or the world.
In his close reading of Foucault’s work on ethics and care, Alexandre Lefebvre describes the three main features that he calls the “purpose, object and mode” of the care of the self (2018, 15-16). Taken together, all three lay out the defining criteria of care of the self. First, Lefebvre writes, the purpose of the care of the self is to transform the self. In other words, the ethical work one does on oneself aims to transform, change, improve, or in some cases to purify the self. Second, the object of the care of the self is the self. Foucault, Lefebvre writes, is emphatic that ethical (self-directed) care can in no way be claimed as preparatory work or a preliminary to caring for others. The self is, and definitively remains, the envisioned object (and agent) of such care. The third main feature of care of the self that Lefebvre spotlights is that its mode is voluntary. The cultivation of the self is a non-prescriptive practice. Foucault, Lefebvre elaborates, insists that one’s engagement in such a practice is not made at the behest of another person, law, or rule. Rather, the allowance for individuals to voluntarily adopt techniques of the self speaks to an understanding of freedom that Foucault describes as a “conscious [réfléchie] practice” (1997, 284). A voluntary and reflexive mode of self-care requires the freedom to undertake an (unending) transformation of ourselves, as we confront daily the changing socio-political and cultural conditions in which we are contingently embedded.

My purpose for outlining the above is to have a clear vision for what care of the self consists of on Foucault’s account. The combination of these three central criteria—that is, its purpose, object and mode—will serve us as a guide to distinguish how, and why, each of the interviewees that I will presently introduce chooses to offer hospitality. Recall that at the outset of this chapter I proposed that the value in drawing on Foucault to explore how these citizens use hospitality: his therapeutic model helps capture an entirely different and as-yet unexplored valance of hospitality. And certainly, we do not expect to find a therapeutic aid for the self in an institution like hospitality that, since time immemorial, has placed care for vulnerable others at its centre. Having laid out the contours of Foucault’s conception of ethics, we are set to tackle the different perspective that I defend here: namely, that the political is being pressed into the service of the ethical, rather than the other way around.

I should first like to say that while my goal is to illustrate a novel approach to studying hospitality, others such as Lefebvre (2018) and Liisa Malkki (2015) in their respective fields of human rights and humanitarianism have advanced similar approaches. Firstly, these
scholars explore how and why individuals practice the care of the self to respond to, and to alleviate, the needs and concerns that arise in the context of their daily lives. Second (and more generally), they both show that “things” (i.e., rules, ambitions, institutions and structures) we might think of as typically political are in fact being used for something different: namely, ethics.

Lefebvre, for example, through his textual interpretation of key authors in the human rights tradition, demonstrates that human rights—an institution devoted to global justice and concern for the other—can be aligned with the care of the self. Lefebvre’s central contention is that the human rights imagination has never been without a priority for caring for the self. This certainly rubs against the grain of most mainstream thinking in the human rights tradition. Yet he draws on the texts of his key authors and thinkers to demonstrate that time and again human rights have been adopted as a tool for people to work on and improve themselves for their own sake. Lefebvre nonetheless cautions that this kind of self-oriented care is not primarily intended as an all-purpose cure to timeless ills. Rather, human rights can help address problems threatening the self that are contextually and historically specific; and as such, they act to cultivate a self that is better equipped to resist and overcome the problematic situations of one’s own time and place.

In a related field and employing an ethnographic approach, Malkki examines the motivations and aims of contemporary Finnish aid workers who engage in humanitarianism, both at home and abroad. Most interesting in her analysis of the aid workers and participants, is that her findings run counter to popular assumptions (and her own expectations) about what attracts people to this kind of work. These assumptions tend to prefigure a “humanitarian sensibility” that Malkki likens to “a selfless, generic calling to help a distant ‘suffering humanity’” (2015, 26). Instead, Malkki finds that Finnish aid workers are drawn to help others because of a pressing and palpable “neediness” of their own. She documents the different ways that distinct groups of humanitarian “helpers” yearn to escape the constraints and pressures specific to Finnish life. For international practitioners in the field, the “need to help” translates a desire for the release from the mundane, the predictable, the emotional coldness even, of society “at home”. While for Red Cross workers at home, helping others through gifting generously of one’s time and labour on small handiwork projects, is instrumental to alleviate a profound loneliness and need for sociality and belonging: these helpers’ imaginaries of a donor public and a “world out there” allowed
them to “be part of something greater than themselves”. Their aid work and efforts directed at imagining themselves as members of an enlivened world align with what Malkki describes “a simultaneously generous and self-interested practice as a self-humanizing practice ... a care of the self” (2015, 162).

Malkki shows that the needs, desires and ideals of Finnish aid workers fuelled the motivation for their ethical self-making and personal transformation. More importantly, her shift in gaze to the humanitarian benefactors (the “helpers”)—a departure from mainstream studies in humanitarianism where attention focuses exclusively on aid recipients—captures the former group’s “neediness” and the individual self-problems that they experienced in their everyday existence as Finnish nationals. And here we come to the two points I wish to emphasise in connection with my own work on hospitality. First, Malkki’s decision to investigate the aid workers rather than its recipients mirrors my own focus on “hosts” (the benefactors of welcome and care) rather than “guests” (the beneficiaries of hospitality and main focus of scholarship). Second, Malkki is explicit that the solution to problems that arise from one’s specific historical and contextual milieu might be found in the appeal to projects found immanent within that milieu. The humanitarian project presents an anchor, or better still, a “technique”, for work directed at the self to overcome and to refuse certain circumstances that are the source of personal and spiritual distress for some. The important contribution that Malkki makes is to expand our awareness of how the seemingly political world (and work) that constitutes the humanitarian milieu—its institutions, ambitions, activities and imagination—can serve to allay one’s own neediness and augment the self’s spiritual well-being. In this respect, her work aligns closely with Lefebvre’s, who showed that appeals to human rights—again, what we typically would see as a political or legal institution, tradition and activity—are used for ethical ends, for cultivating and improving the self. It is to this recent interdisciplinary work on the relationship between ethics and politics that I seek to contribute.

**Hospitality as a Response to Alienation, Suspicion and Hostility**

In this section I present Loïc. Loïc works and lives modestly in the region of Calais, a coastline area to the north of France that borders with the United Kingdom. Calais is perhaps better known as the site of the infamous “Jungle”, Europe’s once-largest makeshift
refugee camp that has housed vast numbers of asylum seekers in shanty homes dotted along this coastline. Numbers in the Jungle today are significantly less than the roughly 10,000 people who made the camps their “home” at the height of the 2015-16 migrant crisis (Baumard 2016). This is because for three days at the end of October 2016 the camps were bulldozed to the ground by French authorities acting on a regional court order. Arrangements were made for about 7,000 of the camp inhabitants (those presumed willing to claim asylum in France) to be “dispatched” into orientation and reception centres or COAs (centre d’orientation et d’accueil) scattered across the French nation. Nonetheless, scores of asylum hopefuls whose heart was set on a future elsewhere shortly returned to the area, thus “resurrecting” the Jungle. They have since been joined by other migrants. Despite a heavy police presence in the area to prevent the area from again descending into what the French interior minister describes a “festering focal point” for migrants (Collomb 2017), numbers there today hover around 2,500 (L’Express.fr and AFP 2018).

What has not subsided, even while migrant numbers have, is the divisive attitude that permeates the atmosphere and society of Calais and neighbouring towns. On the one hand, area locals are distressed and angry over all manner of issues. They deplore, to cite but a few examples, the heightened insecurity (real or perceived) within their homes and surrounds for those who live and work in proximity to the migrants and Jungle area; the next-to-naught value of their property (a consequence of the “reputational damage” that Calais has suffered through the presence of the Jungle and associated incidents and media attention that these attract); and the “hordes” of humanitarian groups that have descended on the town to work on the migrant situation. As one resident laments: “The only people filling our hotels are the media that show up from all over Europe to report on the misery and the eyesore that Calais has become” (‘Bernard’ France Presse interview 2015). In short, locals feel under siege from all directions, and their disarray is relayed by the media as a “distress call” (appel de détresse) or “sounding the alarm” (cri d’alarme) (ibid., Agence LDC News 2016).

On the other hand, amidst this dissatisfaction there are also locals who eagerly support the presence of migrants by donating tarpaulins, clothing and other essentials, by

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34 The 2016 operation was not a first, but merely the most recent in a protracted cycle of state-ordered camp destructions and relocations that began with the highly-publicised closure of the Sangatte camp in the area in 2002.
manning soup kitchens, and simply by offering to recharge phones and the like. The divisions among residents are mirrored at the level of local and regional politics. The staunchly right-wing and anti-migrant mayoress of Calais is on the record for refusing to obey an injunction of the regional (Lille) Administrative Court to supply migrants with drinking water, toilets and showers (Libération 2017). Yet the situation is the reverse in nearby Grande-Synthe: the town’s Greens/Ecologist party (EELV) mayor is set to re-instate accommodations for migrants in the face of state inaction and increased arrivals since the Jungle’s official 2016 destruction (L'Express.fr and AFP 2018).

This is the portrait of present-day Calais and the immediate surrounds. Yet to characterise the situation as delimited between locals who wish to help and those who don’t, or between politicians on opposite sides of the political fence who toe their respective party lines, is not wholly accurate. The fuller picture is a climate of suspicion, rivalry and incivility bordering on hostility that is generated from within the humanitarian milieu itself. This climate manifests itself chiefly in and around the camps, and results from the scores of people who want to have their say and influence in how things are to be run and compete for funds and access to do so.

This more complete picture accurately depicts Loïc’s “Calais”, who is out daily on the camps and is shunned for refusing to work with the established aid channels there. Without doubt, the amount of local, national and international humanitarian associations and their volunteer workers that operate, and often compete, in the region—each with their own goals, expertise, rationalities and material capacities—produces a complex and strained situation. Tensions rise considerably when well-intentioned locals (acting independently) are added to the mix—they too desirous to help in line with their modest know-how and capabilities. The tensions are thus noticeably broadened in scope: from the traditional pro/anti migrant stance to that between locals and “outsiders” working to help the migrants. Similarly, tensions flare between formal or recognised ways of providing humanitarian help through established channels, and ad-hoc, impromptu or less formal gestures of care.

Such tensions are keenly felt and indeed internalised by Loïc, who has crafted a way to live with being shunned, discredited and at times duped by the humanitarian community with respect to his caring for the exiled in Calais. How he has done so is of particular interest to us. For in a conscious bid to overcome the hostilities and the suspicion, the shame and
the alienation that he experiences daily in relation to the Calais context, Loïc extends his hospitality and his welcome of others: it is his way of alleviating the damaging effects. It is the way in which Loïc cares for himself.

During our interview, Loïc and I discussed his activities of helping others at length. At the outset, he was less than forthcoming with details of these. Understandably so. At the time of our interview, Loïc had just been handed down one of the harshest (suspended) prison sentences to date for his “crime of solidarity”. While I explained that I wasn’t another journalist “looking for a story”, Loïc was far from automatically at ease. The reason for his uneasiness was that from the time of his arrest to his subsequent and recent court hearing, Loïc’s strict judicial supervision orders prevented him from speaking out to the media. As he explains, “It [the interdiction] was written down on there in black and white. To me that’s unconstitutional; they took away my freedom of expression.” Deemed a security risk (Loïc’s file bears the mark “S” for state security) these orders likewise prevented his leaving the country, a measure habitually reserved for those awaiting trial on trafficking or (people) smuggling charges. Loïc’s early manifestation of suspicion persisted throughout the course of the interview and would exemplify his experience with the local hospitality milieu. Simply put, Loïc trusted very few people in the Calais community when it came to “helping” the undocumented.

Apart from Doctors Without Borders, because I see a lot of injured people, or Gynaecologists Without Borders, for the (raped and pregnant) women, I don’t work with any of the organisations here. The problem is really with the volunteers. People are arriving here left, right, and centre - they only come for a week, maybe two. Quickly they get a feel for the situation, and then they start telling us [locals] that they don’t like the way we do things. But hey, it’s not like we have no idea what we’re doing - we just do it in the best way we can [avec les moyens du bord]. That’s why I prefer to work alone. I don’t want them saying afterwards ‘he drove that kid, or that man around’, and then report us to the police, which has happened before.”

The fear of police denunciation is real given Loïc’s conditional prison sentence for driving an undocumented youth to a nearby train station. Ironically his gesture was
intended to help the youth leave France, who, like many others, was UK-bound. The threat specifically lies with Loïc’s continued acts of hospitality: another arrest could well nullify the conditions of his suspended sentencing and land him in prison. Loïc is nonetheless in almost daily contact with the migrants. He helps out with their paperwork, invites them back to his home so that they can shower, wash their clothes, eat a meal and rest up. He ferries them back and forth from the Jungle in his small lorry and in the quiet of the night or early morning to avoid detection. When I ask whether he receives any financial support, even if only to offset the costs of his hospitality, Loïc’s response is curt: “No, nothing. And I don’t want it. I only take clothes, food, mobile phones and sim cards, tarpaulins, tents, … and never any money. I don’t want people saying afterwards that I use the money for other things. Everyone knows, with me, its material stuff and equipment only.”

Loïc’s fear that accusations about funds or money arrangements might spread throughout the Calais community disclose the deeper reason for why he chooses to act alone: Calais to him is “spécial”. Special, in one French sense of the word (and in Loïc’s meaning), indicates an aberration, in that the object it qualifies has an odd quality or characteristic that is not to everybody’s liking. The high level of racist sentiment that has seized the greater Calais area might just account for one of its “special” qualities: it was just one of two departments (France has 107) secured by the extreme right-wing Front National party in the last presidential election (BBC News 2017). Loïc certainly considers another source of specialness to be the influx of humanitarian organisations and large numbers of outsider volunteers in the area. Many of the former, he contends, are overly focussed on the business side of things—a trait that to him is “unpalatable [spécial]”. Loïc maintains that “[t]here’s just too much business going on. It’s not my thing, not my idea of what helping means… That’s why I prefer not to work with the NGOs – I just act alone. I take my two boys (14 and 15 years) with me and we head off for the camps. That’s pretty much my approach to going out to the camps. Me and my kids.” When pressed further on the nature of this “business” and where his objection lies, Loïc barely conceals his dismay at the actions of many non-for-profit organisations that regularly utilise migrants to further their own existence. My experience on the ground is that many aren’t even concerned to help migrants move out of the Jungle and find a better situation elsewhere, because that’s their sole purpose
for existing! ... And it’s not helped either by the town council forcing NGOs to compete with each other for resources and access.

So too does Loïc find distressing the fact that numerous “humanitarian volunteers” are known to abuse the power they hold over vulnerable migrants by “trading sexual favours for forms of assistance. In the Jungle you can’t really trust anyone. We don’t even know where half these ‘volunteers’—or so they call themselves—come from. They take photos of us and use them afterward for... who knows what for.” This state of affairs doesn’t evoke in Loïc feelings of indignation or anger as much as it does shame.

I’m ashamed. Frankly, there’s a moment where you just go ‘we’re ashamed to be French’... The principles of ‘liberté, égalité, and fraternité’ don’t mean much anymore. For a long time now in France they’ve no longer had any value. Not for the state. That’s just some kind of sign they’ve put up for themselves [une enseigne qu’ils se sont mis] on our buildings. But they mean something to me. Liberté, égalité, and fraternité - they’ve become my own personal values: they no longer belong to France.

Loïc’s use of “personal” is telling. Confronted with what he believes to be a complete disregard, if not trashing, of these principles by the state and certain sectors of the humanitarian milieu, Loïc expresses his felt need and desire to live in a more coherent, meaningful, and integral way. For the sake of himself: “they mean something to me”. Loïc’s meaning is clear: faced with the cynicism of a state that claims to espouse Republican principles but doesn’t, then these principles must and will start with him. His choice to be personally guided by them is a means to improve on himself and to become a better person, as someone whose life is oriented toward liberté, égalité, and fraternité. This is how Loïc cares for himself.

This self-understanding of the need to observe the principles that one (or a group, or state) claims to stand for, prompts him to assume them for himself. The key motivator for this transformation in himself is the refugee situation in Calais that he endures daily, in the wider context of state inhospitality. In other words, and to reach back to Lefebvre (2018) and Malkki (2015): Loïc reacts to a situation that is the making of his specific milieu. This
motivates him to craft a self that can better contend with the distressing effects he experiences, and which arise as a consequence of that situation and milieu. These effects are the feelings of shame, suspicion and existential alienation that Loïc alerts us to. That these kinds of “spiritual dangers” exist is not isolated to the here and now; but its effects are enervated by France’s contemporary crisis: the rising tide of xenophobia and what the Republic fears most: communalism, or “folding in on oneself rather than participating in the wider public arena” (le repli sur soi, in French) (Bowen 2017, 9). Loïc’s reaction is linked to, and further exacerbated by, what he considers as the state’s disregard for its founding values—and the reason why these latter take on a central role in his own narrative. It’s not just up to the state to observe these values, Loïc appears to warn, but a duty incumbent upon citizens themselves. And if the state (its institutions and/or French humanitarian organisations) falls short in adhering the principles of liberté, égalité, and fraternité, Loïc’s response is to channel them into his spiritual and everyday existence. It is his way to re-fashion his ethical self in line with his beliefs and ideals on the (republican) duty of citizens. Through this move and response, Loïc shows that he has found a means to gain some therapeutic relief from the “self-problem” that arises contextually from his “home-grown” situation, from his own milieu (Malkki 2015, 4).

Returning to Loïc, there is a further motivation that directs him to care for himself. In adopting France’s national motto, Loïc likewise signals his refusal to become the kind of subject or citizen that a state that has forgotten the meaning of its long-standing principles would likely produce. Or worse, he refuses to play along as the citizen of a state for whom liberté, égalité, and fraternité are loftily proclaimed—quite literally, as “just some kind of sign put up on buildings”—but with misguided and self-serving application. Loïc’s hospitality and acts of helping work as “techniques” to actualise their application in line with what he believes makes a good citizen. They are his practical techniques for self-transformation. In short, transforming his ethos underscores the attempt to reimagine and revive his state’s legacy of freedom and equality, and especially fraternity. Only that way will he be able to reclaim his own national, civil, and in a very real sense, personal identity.

Transforming himself into the ethical subject of his desires and needs requires that Loïc perform active work on the self. One key question remains: In what ways does the hospitality that Loïc extends to others provide a resource to care for and work on himself?
Hospitality and self-care: Loïc

The effects of shame, distrust, and alienation compel Loïc to afford hospitality to others as care for the self in two ways. The first is to cultivate a wider hospitality community on Facebook. By “wider” I mean to indicate that Loïc’s active solidarity network primarily comprises individuals who live outside of the Calais area, or “dehors du coin” as he relates. Loïc “posts up” requests via the social media platform for various material goods that are in urgent need and in short supply for the Jungle inhabitants. These he receives from contacts all over France: “sent mainly from people in Paris and many down south, plus the exiles who’ve already left France and pitch in when I need help on the ground”. But support of the material kind is not all that he receives. The online hospitality community is equally vital in affording Loïc much-needed spiritual support of fellow citizens. The Facebook discussion threads reflect exchanges that are uplifting, wholly supportive of the necessitous yet disobedient hospitality that Loïc undertakes, and provides a safe space for him to discuss this “hospitality work” with like-minded others. What’s more, discussion there is respectful, civil, and egalitarian. These effects act as a significant factor to instil and restore trust and sense of republican fraternity, friendship and solidarity on the wider migrant front that Loïc repeatedly laments are lacking. “I don’t care what that community [humanitarian organisations] thinks of me, here [online community] no one judges me or my actions ... I feel free to take care of our brothers and sisters because these guys have my back.”

Loïc’s extended online community is thus key to furnishing both the material requirements and spiritual support and encouragement that his hosting work demands—neither of which are readily forthcoming in Calais. Taken together, the material and the spiritual, these constitute a vital resource toward making his acts of hospitality on the ground possible. The community network and support that I discuss here is not dissimilar to the “ripple effect of solidarity with solidarity” that we saw at work in Chapter Five. Namely, that recounted by the délinquant solidaire “Brigitte”, who described the importance of a support network for educating newer community members on the inhospitable ways and attitudes of the state.

There is however a crucial distinction. Where in the case of Bridget and the others surveyed in Chapter Five the aim was primarily “political”, in that I showed different ways in which acts of hospitality constitute political subjectivities among indignant subjects—here
the aim and motivation are different. The hospitality community I discuss here helps Loïc to care for himself because it works on addressing those perils specific to his milieu. These being the hostility, alienation and suspicion within the hospitality world of Calais, and the state’s disregard for its own values and by extension the hospitable welcome of refugees. Crucially, these perils play a part in undoing his subjective self-image, and that is what causes him harm. We should therefore consider the hospitality community that Loïc has cultivated as a technique of the self that he adopts to enhance his existential way of being in the world. In short, it is his way of administering a kind of self-care that is required here and now, for the sake of himself. As one community contact who has helped Loïc to secure the urgent accommodation of an asylum seeker writes him on his Facebook “wall”: “Thank you very much for all the love and fraternal aid that you provide to those in exile (16/11/18).”

The second, and equally important aspect that I want to spotlight in terms of how Loïc tends to his well-being, relates to the self-described acts of hospitality he extends to transient members of the Jungle. These I specified earlier as offering up his home as a place of welcome to wash clothes, share a meal, and to gain some respite and shelter. And above we saw how he cares for these same people by sourcing the material goods that they are so desperately in need of. What I wish to highlight here, and what is so absolutely vital to Loïc’s sense of self, are the relationships that he establishes with the Jungle inhabitants, and which can only accurately be described as fraternal bonds. Through these, Loïc gives life to the republican (and revolutionary) ideal of fraternity, as one that doesn’t exist solely in its political dimension but combines ethical considerations of universal obligation. These bonds directly enhance his sense of being and living in the world: they are central to helping him to overcome the challenges that this same world throws up at him.

Based on the interview data, it is evident that Loïc takes great care in creating resilient and meaningful relationships with many of the individual migrants that he hosts in defiance of the state. Particularly telling is that he remains in close contact with them, even after they have long left the Jungle, and in many cases the country. Their struggles are his struggles, in the sense that Loïc is and remains devoted to lessening their plight. Loïc describes it best himself: “these people are like my extended family. The youngest ones call me ‘baba’, while to older migrants I am simply ‘brother’ (Loïc uses the English term)”.

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35 “Baba” translates as “Papa” in most of the languages spoken in the camps: Arabic, Pashto, Persian etc.
Throughout our interview and when speaking of those he hosts, Loïc repeatedly refers to the latter as “my friend so-and-so” or “my Pashtun brother”. That Loïc evokes and adopts these terms of familiarity and attachment beyond his circle of kin and nationality, shows the nature of these bonds and relations to be both fraternal, disinterested, and egalitarian. To reach back to France’s revolutionary history, it was the originary alliance of equality and freedom with fraternity in the public sphere that spurred the Revolution’s universal (if short-lived) “fraternal” impulse of that epoch.

What is crucial here, isn’t simply the relations and friendships or bonds created, but the way in which Loïc consciously refers to these same friendships/bonds. For it is in the latter that Loïc discloses the exact kind of citizen that he desires and needs to become: one who will personally claim and enact the values of equality and fraternity when it comes to thinking the place of foreigners in society. And this, significantly, at a time and place in which Loïc fears greatly for the very ideals deemed foundational to republican citizenship. This is what makes the act one of self-care through and through. His enacting hospitality proves just the tool to help Loïc become that kind of citizen, and crucially, to become that kind of citizen for the sake of his own self-image and self-realisation.

Just as one feels an immense responsibility toward family members, so too does Loïc in many ways feel responsible for the migrants that he hosts in the Jungle and at home. Speaking on the topic of deportations, he tells me, “France is no longer a land of welcome [terre d’accueil]; that’s just something that’s said to satisfy a section of the population. Deportations, that’s what France is! They were even going to send back my Iranian brother [name supplied] who is sentenced to death there. They had his plane documents ready and everything. It’s complete madness”.

Apart from the reference to his “brother”, most interesting and revealing to us here on the question of responsibility is the manner in Loïc tells this story: namely, his unusual reflexive use of the pronoun “me”. Consider, for example, the distinct way in which he recounts the situation with his Iranian brother. Loïc indicates that the man’s imminent deportation (had it occurred) would have been a harm inflicted equally upon himself. In French : Ils allaient « me » renvoyer mon frère iranien, alors qu’il est condamné à la mort là-bas. That is, Loïc’s reflexive usage of the pronoun “me” here (grammatically redundant in English) does the work of conveying Loïc’s thinking that the deportation of his Iranian “brother” is something that Loïc himself would literally suffer or endure. Crucially, this kind
of thinking discloses the extent to which Loïc sees in the exiled, people to whom he has a level of care and responsibility. And that care materialises in the provision of hospitality. Through his modest gestures of care and welcome, Loïc is able to enact the solidaristic, fraternal and egalitarian elements of hospitable welcome that are lacking in the contemporary setting and are the source of his despair.

This is how hospitality is usefully employed to help Loïc to care for himself. And to restate my opening remarks, while it is true that Loïc is but one person, his responses are representative of an alternative way of looking at hospitality that we aren’t sufficiently aware of as a possibility. The solidaristic community and existential bonds that he forges through hospitality constitute a means to cultivate the kind of ethical subject capable of living and being in a world that he fears has lost its way in its dealings and relations with vulnerable outsiders. At the heart of Loïc’s transformative work and ethos is the practice of refusal. What he is refusing is the image of a citizen that in no way corresponds to his self-image of what a good citizen is and does. And to reach back to Lefebvre earlier, it is crucial to recall that care of the self must be undertaken voluntarily and for the sake of the self. Loïc, crucially, sees himself as a free and independent agent to effect that personal change and that very personal refusal. Hospitality, in a word, helps Loïc to care for himself by reviving the French legacy of fraternity and equality. Hospitality and care for others and a world is a tool for reclaiming his own national, civic and ethical identity. Moreover, such care, as hospitality offered in conditions of civil disobedience—seemingly political and humanitarian gestures with recognisably political and humanitarian effects and motivations—is an “act of citizenship” used towards ethical ends: self-improvement and transformation for the sake of oneself. Caring for himself is how Loïc becomes a better French citizen, and becoming a better French citizen is how Loïc cares for himself.

Hospitality as a Response to Chaos and Duplicity

Another interviewee, Adèle, also brings up the matter of the French founding principles. Adèle is a thirty-something researcher who lives in Paris with her husband and small children. She describes herself as “brought up a law-abiding, tax-paying, ‘model’ citizen”, and it is only recently that she has begun “hosting” in conditions of civil disobedience. Delinquency, she tells me, was in fact the furthest thing from her mind when
she started acting in solidarity with the migrants. She did, however, consider these actions to be completely legitimate because “what the state is doing is basically severing itself from its own values”. On the face of it, it may seem that Adèle presents a case similar to other délinquants solidaires that I interviewed, in the sense that she claims, like numerous others, that “we never intended to be illegals or delinquents: it’s the state that has pushed us, they have pushed us into this fight”. The crucial difference is that in Adèle’s case, her “fight” and delinquent acts of hospitality aren’t with merely political effects or motivations, but instead have psychological effects and deliver spiritual outcomes.

Let us pick up Adèle with her comment that the state is “disassociating itself from its values”. I asked her to elaborate on the meaning of that particular remark. It is through her explanation of both “disassociation” and “values”—namely: what is at stake for her personal sense of self, identity and well-being—that we can discern that Adèle purposively practices a care of the self through the hospitality that she extends to others.

Adèle describes this disassociation in terms of “words and deeds”. With this seemingly happy pairing, she instead calls out the ways in which the state and its representatives and agents falsely and self-servingly espouse the values of liberté, égalité, fraternité through their words and actions; namely concerning the hospitable welcome of migrants. For what triggers in Adèle much anguish—or more aptly, a profound feeling of loss of identity—is as much the misspoken words as the deeds. She explains:

On the one hand we’ve got the President out there drumming up support for our new hospitality laws,36 who, the whole time talks about France remaining faithful to liberté, égalité, fraternité. With Macron especially, it’s hard to distinguish what words mean because he says one thing, and he wants it to look as though he’s doing that, but then he does the complete opposite.

Then there’s people like Collomb [French interior minister] or Estrosi [Prefect of the Nice (PACA) Region] telling us that too much humanity offered to migrants is no good, that it creates some kind of pull effect [appel d’air] for other migrants. In

36 Adèle refers here to the recent and major overhaul of France’s Asylum and Immigration Code. These laws, dubbed “hospitality laws”, were definitively adopted by the French Assemblée Nationale on 1 August 2018. Their lengthy parliamentary examination took place amid much controversy given the repressive nature of the new measures that were proposed and ultimately voted in (Rescan 2018).
the end it’s fermeté [closure/firmness, in English] that replaces liberté, égalité, etc. That’s why the need to act is visceral - because I grew up with those values, they’re how I’ve always identified and defined myself... now I feel I’ve been knocked for six [suis comme terrassée], I’ve lost all my grounding, like in a schizophrenic sense ...

I’ve started helping [migrants] because I need to feel that words like liberté, égalité, fraternité still mean something. To confirm [m’assurer] that I know who I am ... It’s non-negotiable. It’s that simple.

Adèle’s explanation and motivation are clear. Unlike many of the delinquents that I interviewed who commit acts of delinquent hospitality to answer for them in public and hold the state to account, Adèle’s focus is very much inward-looking and directed at the relation she has to herself. Hosting migrants—which she does in different ways (she coordinates soup kitchens, provides temporary accommodation, and organises public demonstrations: the latter has earned her a several-day-long stint in police custody)—is her way to actualise the above principles that are intrinsic to her self and being. They are intrinsic to her being and living in the world because “growing up” she was taught to abide them; they are how she “identifies and defines” herself. And that identity is a French national identity.

This being the case, one has a better sense of the deep anxiety that I detect in Adèle via her assertion that perhaps the French principles are but hollow signifiers. “Words seem to have lost all meaning” she says. “They [politicians] say what they want, they engage in constant double-speak [double-discours] but their actions betray them – their words ring empty. If I’m to continue to believe in [those] three words, all I can do is act”. First, we must note that Adèle gives here the sense by which the state has “dissociated” itself from its own values. By engaging in talk that is duplicitous, misleading and contradictory, the state is shown to betray itself through its actions (and possibly inactions). In short, it no longer enacts the values that it lays claim to. To reach back to Chapter Four, we saw that the administration’s immigration and asylum policy is couched in the contradictory aims of humanité/fermeté, which provides ample licence to authorise duplicity and hollowed-out claims. Second, and worse, given that “those three words” represent not only the founding values of the French republican state, but are equally intended as those by which each and every of its citizens should live and act, the essence of what Adèle conveys is that the state
has separated itself from its own people. That is what to her, as a republican, has become intolerable. It is intolerable to her belief system and to the “who” and “what” defines her sense of self.

What is Adèle’s response to this existential predicament? If I’m to continue to believe in [those] three words, all I can do is act. In a similar fashion to Loïc, one might interpret her words as a case of: “if the state is going to trample its values, then I will transform my being so that I live up to them myself”. But Adèle provides us with further clues as to how her acts of hospitality and care—as deeds grounded in *liberté*, *égalité* and *fraternité*—are motivated by a care for the self. The state, recall, has “pushed her into illegality and delinquency.” By this I take Adèle to mean that the state, by its words and deeds, has provoked in her a visceral reaction to the loss of self-identity that these have occasioned. Her primary motivation that has the effect of helping others is to alleviate the anxiety, chaos and self-confusion that she experiences. Her enacted hospitality, therefore, is the way in which she attempts to re-establish her sense of personal identity—and a republican one at that. The therapeutic effects for Adèle are psychological and existential. Her actualisation of the very words that have long-defined her being not only speak to a Foucauldian technique of the self, it is how Adèle reclaims her identity as a French citizen. And reclaiming that national and personal identity is how she cares for herself.

**Hospitality as a Response to Disillusionment**

Virginie’s story and experience are altogether different. A filmmaker by trade, for years she has been heavily involved in organised activism on the issue of the treatment and rights of asylum seekers and migrants. Several years ago, she set up a “Solidarity Collective” in a major French city with a fellow local resident. Virginie describes some of the disobedient acts carried out under the banner of the Collective as “occupations of public space”—she led the coordination of three sit-ins at high schools and universities in her city. In addition, the Collective initiated actions at airports to hinder the forced deportations of asylum seekers through various attempts to prevent planes from taking off. Beyond these capacities for mobilisation, her engagement largely consisted of coordinating public relations campaigns that take aim at the state and its institutions. In her words: “I did loads
and loads and loads of comms for the collective. I think I must have written eighty press releases. Lots and lots of public relations ops!”

But things began to sour for Virginie early in 2018 when she came to the realisation that her unrelenting and exhausting efforts in petitioning the state to amend its inhospitable practices and attitudes were gaining no traction or being completely ignored. At that point she thought that perhaps she had exhausted all avenues to reversing the deplorable and inhumane situation of asylum seekers in Paris. Here is how she describes this moment:

I think it really hit me with their ‘cutting off the water’ episode. In the beginning I was always down at the Town Hall petitioning for solutions for the migrants in our area – carrying out, you know, my role as citizen, elector, taxpayer, and all that. And very quickly, in less than ten days, I saw that we [i.e. French state] were capable of cutting off the water supply near the tent cities [campments de rue] in the middle of a heatwave! That’s when I realised there’s no dialogue possible. You know, I’ve drawn up loads of petitions, [featuring] well-known people in show-biz – these have even appeared in the press. I’ve organised meetings with state representatives, and in these meetings, never, ever has anything constructive happened. Never! We’ve never achieved anything through dialogue… So, I’ve stopped. I’ve had to stop giving in that respect because I’ve become a little cynical. I think they [the state and public authorities] know full well what is happening, but they just don’t want to see. That’s a choice, that ignorance. Anyway, I’ve stopped wearing myself out with trying to get the message out there.

What struck me with Virginie’s account was not so much her self-described cynicism but an overwhelming sense of disillusionment. There is little doubt that such a sentiment stems directly from the immense time and effort put into trying to get the state, through its agents and representatives, to enter into dialogue with local residents and provide humane and workable solutions for the thousands of undocumented sleeping rough on the streets.

37 In the summer of 2018, Paris and Nice City Councils made decisions to cut off water supplies in areas where migrants and other displaced peoples were camped out in. These generated a great deal of public outcry before public authorities decided to turn the public access to water back on, often only once migrants had moved on or were forcible evacuated from these areas (Paolini 2018).
But Virginie was also clearly disillusioned and despairing about two other aspects that directly concern the hospitality of vulnerable refugees. Specifically, her despair relates to the délinquants solidaires movement itself. The first aspect concerns much of the movement’s shift, in her view, in different directions that incorporate a strict ideological framework. The examples that Virginie cites in this regard concern the militant “no border” groups, minority emancipation movements, political parties, and even the anti-capitalist fight. Six months ago, Virginie quit the organisation that she had founded because of its deepening ideological and allied interests. She found that with the movement’s increasingly staunch “militant” (activist) agenda and alignment with other socio-political interests, activists, and “even the activists on the left”, seemed to have lost sight of what “helping” means. For Virginie, this should simply be a question of ‘How I would like others to treat me’? She adds:

It’s that basic (English word used). But my most recent experience now is that many [activists] seem to be saying ‘How can this serve my cause?’ What matters to me is that we help [the migrants] equally by all means necessary - not whether what you’re doing conforms to a strict set of ideas... [the activists] seem to have lost all capacity to identify with the person they’re dealing with. That’s why, even in the media, they always need a ‘white’ intermediary.

On the basis of Virginie’s reflection, I propose that the real disenchantment or disillusionment that she expresses lies with the political aspect of things. By “political”, I refer to the ways in which activists challenge the state’s rules, regulations, and mechanisms of exclusion in relation to outsiders who make demands on its hospitality. Consider her remarks thus far: all the activities that she describes and has undertaken to date are done for political effect and with similar motivations. Virginie nonetheless concludes that much of the work carried out by actors in the Solidarity movement, including her own, to be: “politically-speaking, a complete failure.” Yet, it seems clear that Virginie has placed a lot of time and energy into fashioning a self via the political-activist work of her collective. In other words, her political work furnished her a sense of identity and purpose. So much so, in fact, that realising that despite all the time and effort that had gone into it, the result was a dead-end politically, provokes in Virginie something of an existential crisis. That is, the effects of
the political dead-end induce a moment in which she questions her sense of purpose and value.

Consider her own admission: “I’m currently ask[ing] serious questions of myself... I don’t even know what my role anymore is.” With this remark we can capture the sense of self-loss that Virginie is experiencing. It is a self-loss in the sense that it prompts Virginie to call into question her way of being and living in the world. Despite her tremendous efforts to effect positive change through political work and well-honed activism, the state (and its institutions) in that world will not be deterred from their path and practice of inhospitality. Confronted with this irresistible force, Virginie questions her own personal roadmap, and the real possibility that it has led her astray from her self:

For me, little by little I’ve come to understand that this cycle of the fear of outsiders and turning in on ourselves [le repli sur soi] is going from bad to worse ... when it reaches its end, the solidaire [delinquent] - the tiny grain of sand that I am - will be dragged into its fall ... I don’t even know what my role anymore is. That’s what pains me the most after three years, more than the police, more than anything.

Momentarily we shall see how reaching for a different mode of hospitality that involves one-to-one gestures of care on a smaller, interpersonal—in short, a more modest and graspable scale—has tangible effects to help resolve Virginie’s personal and professional crisis. But first I must introduce a separate and distinct aspect to Virginie’s discomfort with the délinquants solidaires movement. Halfway into our interview I asked Virginie for her thoughts on why France continues to criminalise solidarity. Her immediate response was instructive in terms of her personal view of the délinquants solidaires movement and, crucially, what she considers to be its stakes: not just for the citizen-hosts themselves, many of whom enjoy significant visibility and a public profile, but also for those figures who remain quasi-invisible in the movement. I refer to the undocumented that the citizen-hosts speak for, those who are the object of their solidarity. I am not so much signalling here a change in focus from the hosts to the migrants, but simply the attempt to interpret one host’s self-understanding of the damaging effects that politicised hospitality has had on her. This was Virginie’s response:
The "crimes of solidarity" aren't a priority focus of mine at all. I responded to an interview request with only because of [acquaintance “x”, who had heard of the research project], but I think we spend too much time talking about it. People are very receptive to the idea [the criminalisation of solidarity], because it's other whites, other French people that are affected. But it’s not because they care about Cédric Herrou that they care about Eritreans, Afghans, or the Sudanese… I’ve got twenty refugee friends who committed suicide this year and still people call us up about crimes of solidarity. Yet when we speak to them about these suicides, and the deportations to Sudan, there’s never any follow-up. Unless, evidently, if it’s a French person who’s arrested.

But they’re not that serious at all - these convictions of the French. There’s been no convictions for real prison time [la prison ferme]. While those who are sent back to Sudan, within two hours they’re killed by the political police. We don’t talk about that! To be brutally honest, for me the "crime of solidarity" really isn’t a priority concern … Maybe the whole thing is just a decoy [leurre], or maybe it’s a means to ostracise us and ensure there’s no porosity (mixing) between moderate socio-Democrats and the activists. But really, it seems to me a case of “white man’s privilege”.

With these words we get begin to get a sense of Virginie’s torment. While it’s true that until recently she has been heavily invested in the délinquants solidaires movement, what seems deplorable to her is the level of attention that is directed at the helpers. Virginie’s regret isn’t so much that these “white men” are in it for some kind of self-gratification, an argument that often finds favour in scholarship on care-based responses to injustice (Peterie 2017). Nor is it a cut-and-dried case of condemning the focus directed at the hosts while the gravity of the migrants’ predicament is disappeared from the equation. Granted, Virginie’s concern is that we pay more attention to the migrants and less to the hosts. But this is not the essence of her critique, even if, on the face of it, we might understand her claims in that light. Her critique, as I take it, is directed at the fact that while afforded the privilege of being able to work within the system, the privileged and white citizen-hosts appear not to challenge the power structures inherent to that system and which remain
heavily slanted towards citizens. Airing and giving precedence to their stories of hardship and arrest contributes to the erasure and disappearance of the migrants’ own. Importantly, Virginie’s critique of privilege appears directed at herself as much as at the movement, given, we have seen, that she “seriously questions her role” and its “contribution” in perpetuating the inegalitarian and on many counts, repressive, status quo.

Let me elaborate. There is an inordinate amount of media attention directed at the givers of hospitality, the “hosts”, while its beneficiaries are more often than not completely absent. Where they are present, they are at best portrayed as agentless victims, and at worst, an anonymous mass of misery. As Jennifer Telesca rightly observes “... a victim is affected by politics but is perceived to have no real politics of her own” (2013, 342 emphasis added). Virginie would no doubt concur with this kind of observation; it is reflective of the dissymmetry that she draws attention to between the “hosts” and the “hosted”. In her words, “No, they’re not an anonymous mass of misery. No, they’re not victims. What really annoys me is that we never know what they’re thinking when we’re shown images of them. What is their political analysis of the situation? Why we’re selling arms in their country? No, it’s always: ‘My mother is dead’ ... ‘My father is dead’... sob sob sob. You see? Where’s the dialogue [discours]”? This is the essence of the unequal situation that Virginie is calling out, and one her self can no longer abide.

We might say, then, that well-intentioned citizens in solidaristic activity operate within a system that affords them an excessive measure of voice and visibility, while at the same time that it suppresses or denies that voice and visibility to the undocumented. The general premise of this argument is not new and is well canvassed in the literature (see, e.g., Malkki 1996, Zelizer 2001, Calhoun 2004, Chouliaraki 2006, Barnett and Weiss 2008, Telesca 2013). My point, rather, is that Virginia alerts us to a problem of a slightly different order. The problem is that the self-constitution of the citizen-hosts’ political subjectivities comes at the expense of affording the “hosted” a political subjectivity of their own. Virginie makes this discovery through reflection on her involvement and political identity that she has forged in the solidarity-activist movement. And this, I take to be the real crux of her exasperation and disillusionment. This solidarity milieu as it stands produces an ethical situation that doesn’t sit well with her way of being—the way that she desires to be—in the world. For crucially, Valerie considers herself a champion of the principle of equality: Specifically, that of:
egalitarian [voice and visibility] ... equality isn’t a goal we need to reach, it’s the place where we need to start ... The question [of why I help] is really, ‘what kind of country do I want to live in?’ I have a responsibility because I’m from here, and therefore I hold certain values. When I’m told ‘I help people’, I say to them ‘no, not at all. I’m not helping people, I’m defending my values’. [Helping] isn’t for others, it’s for oneself too.

With this last line, Virginie sums up the central point of this chapter: that disregard of values considered foundational to the state and the French citizen, plays a substantial part in the undoing of these citizens’ subjective self-image. And that hospitality extended to others should be considered as a technique of the self that is adopted to enhance these peoples’ way of being in the world. Thus, for Virginie, any ongoing involvement in a system that reproduces that inequity (albeit unthinkingly, which is problematic in itself) is untenable in the end because it is detrimental to her conception of herself. This is the salience of her withdrawal of solidarity from the movement (”se désolidariser”, in her terms). Below we will see how practicing hospitality on a different scale helps Virginie regain an image of the self that is in line with the values that she claims to espouse.

*Hospitality and self-care: Virginie*

While I take Virginie’s observations seriously, it is important to acknowledge that excluded and “abject subjects” can and do enact practices that afford them political subjectivity and equality (though not always of a legal/formal kind), as Nyers (2003, 2008, 2012), Isin (2008, 2007), Darling (2014), and Walters (2008, 2016) have shown. What I want to show—and what is relevant to the care of the self—is that the problems of selfhood and meaning that Virginie experiences, being her disillusionment and its distressing effects linked to both the political dead-end of her solidarity activism, and to the “white and privileged” visibility of the solidarity delinquent movement, arise *in relation* to the specificity of her milieu. Virginie’s need to care for herself is a direct reaction to the disillusionment and distressing effects that are pervasive in the solidarity-activist milieu, in her experience of it. This, importantly, doesn’t lead Virginie to shun hospitality as a practice altogether. For just like Loïc, she modifies the relation that she has to herself in the context of the
hospitality project. No longer are her hospitality practices tied to its public and manifestly political movement; Virginie adopts alternate ways of offering hospitality that open the door to better live the life of her own choosing. The nature of these are revealed when, at one point in our interview, I ask if there is nothing that one might retrieve or recover given the state of affairs she has described:

It’s huge [énorme] what there is to recover! It’s the individuals themselves! It’s the fifty people at least that I’ve helped now. One-by-one. I help them with their asylum claims, find temporary accommodation, sign them up for language classes, locate family members - that kind of thing ... I organise much smaller symposiums where the only ones who talk are the immigrants themselves – so we can see their diversity, hear their different voices, their different points of view, their different ideologies. It’s how I try and encourage [favoriser] their sense of autonomy... That’s the only useful thing that I’ve done. It won’t change anything politically. It’s not collectivised or organised or anything. There’s no political meaning to it, but it does have an ethical meaning.

There are two key observations to be made from this. First, Virginie has been able to achieve some therapeutic relief through her modified approach and practice of hospitality. This does not only derive from the relief and satisfaction that (understandably) comes with helping other people. Rather, in extending her hospitality in the way that she has chosen, Virginie knows that she has been instrumental in affording the undocumented a measure of autonomy, agency and equality—an important first step toward the disruption of asymmetrical and hierarchical relations between (privileged) citizens and non-citizens. This is the “ethical” sense given to her care because it helps her to “defend her values” and defending these values, as she states, is a way to “help oneself” in a world that has come to signify disillusionment and chaos. Significantly, she does so through her hospitality with the aim of ameliorating her own outlook: helping others through hospitality gestures is how she fulfills the need to affirm her strong belief in the equality of all people.

Second, Virginie’s self-reflection on her shift in purpose and motivation—from the political to the ethical, and with a focus on the singular and interpersonal—shows that her ongoing efforts to host and help are motivated by the need to address the self-loss caused
by the profound questioning of her role in her social and political milieu. Practicing hospitality allows Virginie to regain a sense of self in the image of her values: as the ethical (self-constituting) subject of her own behaviour (Foucault 1985). This self-improvement and recovery are not arbitrary decisions but Virginie’s reaction to the contextual and complex problems that are found immanent within the hospitality and solidarity world. To recall Lefebvre (2018) on Foucault, the mode of response is entirely voluntary. We can certainly think of Virginie’s revised enactment of hospitality as a way that she cares for the self, for the sake of herself.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have looked at the different ways that French citizens use hospitality as a resource to care for themselves. I have shown that for some of the citizens who choose to practice and enact hospitality in defiance of the state, their motivation for doing so was not primarily a case of helping vulnerable migrants. Instead, hospitality in these instances functions as an instrument for self-change and personal improvement: it constituted a key driver of these citizens’ ethical being and living well in the world. I draw on Foucault in this chapter because his notion of the care for the self is particularly useful to amplify and explain the problems of selfhood and subjectivity experienced by the three hosts presented here, and similarly their motivations for turning to hospitality as a form of therapeutic relief to the problematic situations of their milieu.

This leads me to the concluding points that I wish to make in this chapter. First, self-care is certainly surprising to find in an age-old tradition and institution that is committed to caring for others. Second, the novel approach taken here to reading acts of hospitality is fruitful not just to understand how hospitality can and is being practiced today, but also to disclose a whole other way in which it can be motivated and advocated. That is, hospitality isn’t simply a way that we care for others, or for one’s country or “worldly things”. Hospitality is a way that we can care for ourselves.
Chapter 7

ON CITIZENSHIP

In addition to its legal status and social roles, citizenship is also defined by values, [of which] solidarity. Since citizens, in a classical conception, are not merely juxtaposed individuals but an association of men and women committed to a common project, solidarity is essential. It corresponds to an attitude of openness to others, illustrating the republican principle of fraternity.

The French Republic

This research was motivated by a desire to identify why French citizens were choosing to defy the state by carrying out acts of disobedient hospitality. I asked, what were they acting against, and why? Similarly, because these citizens had become the subject of arrests and convictions under French law—in what is popularly known as the “crime of solidarity”—I also sought to elucidate the state’s motivations for prosecuting them. That is, how (and why) had hospitality, a seemingly ethical concept and practice, morphed into something so political? For what makes these phenomena so puzzling is France’s long history of claiming itself as the land of asylum and hospitality (as France terre d’asile and la France hospitalière) as well as the patrie (home) of human rights.

To attend to this vexed relationship between hospitality, citizenship, and French identity required that I break from the scholarly literature on hospitality in two crucial respects. The first was to move beyond Derrida’s influential theory by shifting the analytical focus toward the governmental practice of hospitality. Through this shift I was able to elucidate statist conceptions and (domo)political practices of hospitality that remain under-theorised in the literature to date. The second break was to shift my focus away from the migrant and toward the citizen as host in order to posit that their defiant acts of hospitality constitute ways of “becoming political”. In practicing hospitality, citizen-hosts re-imagine

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38 “What are the values attached to [French] citizenship?” Department of Legal and Administrative Information (2018)
what it means to be a French citizen, and more specifically, seek to recuperate and revive the French republican tradition of fraternity and equality.

Hospitality as Tactic

In this chapter I conclude my dissertation with a summary and discussion of the key findings and contributions of this study. I then offer a reflection on directions for future research on the broader question of republicanism and its relation to hospitality.

To present these findings it is best to start with a summary of the dissertation. In Chapter Two we began with the insufficiency of Derrida’s theory of hospitality, whose account has become the leading light in studies on hospitality. No doubt, his work on hospitality is valuable because it offers an insightful characterisation of the relations between sovereignty (as mastery over home and identity) and hospitality. This, namely, is in terms of his representing the power dynamic of hospitality and the paradox of hospitality itself. On the question of the power dynamic, Derrida importantly drew our attention to the question of the relationship between openness and closure; and the related, yet distinct, question of the interplay of ethics and politics. Ethical hospitality, he contends, demands that one remain unconditionally open and welcoming to the Other (as all others). But as Derrida warns, doing so will undercut the condition of hospitality, which is to be sovereign, or master, of one’s own home. The problem Derrida highlights, in other words, is that absolute openness brings with it the loss of the potential to be open—the potential to host—because it results in no longer having a home to welcome people into. Thus, the condition of openness and welcome is the power to exclude. Therein lies, as we’ve seen, the Derridean aporia of hospitality. In a word: there can be no hospitality—the only hospitality that we know—without sovereignty, and to be sovereign translates, unmistakeably, as the power to decide upon admission or denial of admission into the home.

Despite Derrida’s skilful account of hospitality, throughout this dissertation I demonstrated that key features of it remain problematic. With respect to my particular case, it fails to make sense of the kind of hospitality practiced by French citizens in response to statist conceptions of it. The first critique I made of Derrida is that he ultimately leads us to think like the very state that, on the whole, he overtly criticises. Should we follow his thinking on hospitality, we are led to imagine the host in terms of sovereign power,
particular in its assertion of possession over the home. In other words, Derrida comes to view the state in terms of its attempt to control its home, which it does by trying to assert its monopoly on the decision to admit or deny admission into the country. Put simply, Derrida conceives of the host—here the sovereign/state—as a single unified agent or sovereign deciding upon entry or not. In this dissertation I have shown that this conception does not square with what is presently occurring on the ground: in conditions of civil disobedience, French citizen-hosts are opening up their homes to foreigners—a myriad number of homes situated well within “the home” of the state, so to speak. Derrida’s account leads us to miss this variation, what we might call a heterogeneity of sovereigns (the citizen counter-hosts) administering their domain within the country. Without an understanding of the heterogeneity of sovereign counter-hosts we miss how hospitality works as a self-empowering tactic of French citizens and its role in enabling acts of citizenship.

The second problem of a Derridean reading of hospitality is that it offers a reductive reading of politics in relation to hospitality. In Chapter Two I established that for all the painstaking deconstructions (and reconstructions) performed on the meaning and structures of sovereignty, Derrida envisages politics strictly in terms of a decisionist state that either grants or denies hospitality. Such a state-centric paradigm, whilst helpful to illuminate some forms of hospitality, does little to shed light on others brought into play or operationalised once the threshold of the national home is crossed. A Derridean account thus blinds us to capturing the kind of state under which a diversity of power relations mobilised through hospitality is deployed. Yet contemporary thinking on hospitality is dominated by Derrida’s reading of it. It was in this sense that I argued that an adequate exploration into the complexity of how hospitality works as a concept and political practice requires moving “beyond Derrida”—beyond the question of sovereign power and decision alone.

A key contribution of this dissertation is the extended analysis into the power relations of hospitality: namely, the elaboration of the relationship between hospitality and governmentality. In attending to the governmental aspect of hospitality in Chapter Three, I have shown how hospitality is currently being (re)conceptualised, indeed problematised, as a concern for security in our era of global flows and migrant mobility. Michel Foucault, we saw, defines governmentality as a set of technologies of the organisation of power that
operate through political rationalities. The latter represents the world in a particular way, which is often to delimit a field discursively so that its activities can be made thinkable, while the former makes such discourses “practicable”—with the underlying imperative being security.

In this dissertation I represented the governmental discourses and practices surrounding hospitality in terms of domopolitics and ethopolitics. Domopolitics defines a new technology of power in which citizenship, territory and security relations are re-organised in a “fateful conjunction of home, land and security” (Walters 2004, 241). The state’s concern for security is centuries old, but domopolitical hospitality recasts the earlier ratio to securitise in a whole new light. Thus, in Chapter Three, we saw that the state’s desire to securitise rationalises a set of security measures in the name of a particular idea of home. Further, I drew attention to how the workings of domopolitics become enhanced through ethopolitics: a form of governmentality that lays claim to and valorises a certain ethos of the nation. Which is to say its spirit, character and the foundational beliefs that guide its self-representation and functioning. Through this lens, we saw that ethopolitics works on the national host’s citizens, on the manner in which they moralise the subjectivities of deserving/desirable and undeserving/undesirable migrant (Darling 2013). This aspect was key to showing that decisions about desert and worth can and are being made daily by ordinary citizens: the citizen, him or herself, effectively takes on the role of host.

My concern to elaborate a domopolitics of the homeland was to reveal the workings of governmental hospitality as a convergence of home-security-territory (Walters 2004). This study of governmentality, through its exploration of the various technologies and political rationalities put to the service of securing the national home, allowed me to establish hospitality as a political practice. Driving the question of domopolitical hospitality (the deployment of security measures in the name of home) is the question of the state being able to define insiders and outsiders. This, as I’ve argued, is not the state merely asserting its right to control its borders. That, of course, is largely uncontroversial and simply what nation-states do. But a state that asserts its right to control its borders through domopolitics in order to define who is and who is not a citizen, is, I maintain, controversial.

Governmental hospitality works here as a technology – or to reach for Foucault’s favoured word, a tactic – of the state with which it defines insiders and outsiders, citizenship
and identity. Certainly, as we’ve seen, this process is not limited to threshold moments of sovereign power. My goal has been to demonstrate that the nature of the power of hospitality is more ubiquitous and diffuse and is operationalised through a series of tactics and rationalities that identify and classify, facilitate or circumscribe, the mobility of outsiders who have found their way inside the home. As a result of the extended analysis into the power relations of hospitality, I presented a conception of the state that challenges, and is more complex, than Derrida’s reduction of hospitality to sovereign decision.

Central to the overall aim of this dissertation, and to thus understand the “becoming political” of French citizens through acts of defiant hospitality, was to elucidate the specific stamp that the French state gives to hospitality. It is a product of three things: intersecting political rationalities, France’s long and vexed history with the notion of tolerance and hospitality, and core republican and revolutionary themes. The historical analysis of the French state in Chapter Four develops two key insights on the French state’s idea of citizenship and its relationship to hospitality. First, in its revolutionary beginnings, hospitality held within it the promise for the newly-formed French state that its democratic ideals of liberty and equality could be universalised beyond French borders. Through hospitality, France’s Revolution would be a revolution for the world. Hence the reason why I argued that, at this historical moment, hospitality and citizenship were conjoined: to be a French citizen was to be a citizen of the world. Very quickly, however, that grand narrative of revolutionary hospitality was superseded by threat and suspicion, and new laws were introduced to mark out “the foreigner” in the later stages of the Revolution. These developments facilitated the foreigners’ identification as counter-revolutionaries and enemies of the Republic.

My second insight from Chapter Four is that from this historical moment hospitality is no longer the friend of the citizen. A power reversal takes place in the follow-on to the revolutionary moment, and we witness a reversal of the understanding of hospitality as a welcoming principle. Hospitality instead becomes the ally of the state, a crucial tool for nation-building and to define insiders and outsiders, citizens and foreigners. In this revised equation, both hospitality and citizenship undergo something of a change. Hospitality withers and becomes an instrument of state rule: policed and granted only on certain terms, it is merely a temporary privilege. The citizen, correspondingly, transforms and comes under the much closer management (and control) of the state. The state henceforth rules through
citizenship, all the while constricting, constraining and re-defining the principle of hospitality; and it does this from above. The historical analysis in this dissertation thus establishes that the revolutionary period of upheaval ushers in the statification of both hospitality and citizenship.

In short, I have sought to bring to light a tension buried deep within the French republican tradition, between a universalist understanding of republican citizenship on the one hand, and an understanding and practice of hospitality in service of state control, security, and identity formation on the other. It is precisely this tension that resurfaces today in the French state’s concurrent commitment to *humanité* and *fermeté*. At the core of this tension, as we’ve seen, is the state’s desire to maintain a monopoly on Frenchness. This, I have argued, represents a monopoly control over those who belongs in the political community and who doesn’t—over who can be a citizen (worthy, desirable and assimilable) and who cannot. Indeed, it is this ongoing tension that explains why some two hundred and fifty years after the Revolution French citizens are being arrested and convicted for the crime of being hospitable: the state does not take lightly any act that would wrest away its capacity to make determinations on “Frenchness” (as home and identity).

Tensions over hospitality and national identity thus have a long history in the French context. But hospitality can also take on other forms. Yes, it can be defined by the state and feed the notion of citizenship *qua* nationality (based in territorial belonging and origins). Yet hospitality can also take on an anti-state quality, wherein it becomes the ally of the citizen and civil disobedience. In this second form, hospitality is instead used to actualise certain qualities and political virtues of participation, openness, equality and fraternity that citizens feel are under threat in the current context. That second form, given its basis in disobedience, is none other than the re-emergence of the hospitality-citizenship tension but under quite different conditions. It sets the stage for the key arguments and findings of Part Two of this dissertation. But before I summarise this portion of the dissertation, a diagram is warranted. It helps to capture in the diagram the role that hospitality plays—as sometimes ally of the state, and at others, of dissident citizens—in shaping competing conceptions of what citizenship and identity can mean in different times and places.
The “historical moment” (starting from post-1792/3 France) on the left symbolises that hospitality has been an indispensable tactic for both top-down power and the governmental state. On the right and jumping forward to the “present” (“crimes of solidarity”/migration crisis) moment in France, the diagram illustrates a new battle that has erupted over two different understandings of the hospitality/citizenship nexus. This new battle depicts the struggles of citizens who use hospitality to reclaim their own French identity and to enrich their own practice of citizenship, which leads, of course to a confrontation with the state. In this scenario, French citizen-hosts push back against the state’s attempt to define citizenship and identity in a highly exclusive and nativist way.

With this periodisation and variable status of hospitality in mind, I will now summarise Part Two of the dissertation, which is based on a combination of political theory and testimony from solidarity delinquents themselves. Engin Isin’s (2008) notion of “acts of citizenship” was the key tool used to interpret the citizen-hosts’ narratives of their enacting hospitality against the state. Claiming the hosts’ delinquent hospitality as an act of citizenship, I established that French citizens enact hospitality in conditions of civil disobedience to rupture with entrenched socio-historical processes and to create politics anew. Above all, their acts were eminently political: they set out to disrupt the state’s politics of inhospitality (immigration) and its “welcome” of outsiders.
Their reasons for doing so were twofold. First, France’s solidarity delinquents are savvy to the state’s instrumentalisation and politicisation of hospitality. They rightly perceived that hospitality was being claimed and practiced by the state as a means to identify and classify foreigners, and to regulate their access into and out of the political community. Similarly, they were savvy to the state’s attempt to maintain its privileged position as sole welcomer of the stranger into the body politic, all the while (fictitiously) recognising itself as hospitable (Bessone 2015). Hence the ongoing and persistent efforts proclaiming the political myth of *la France hospitalière*.

Second, and most crucially, the statist conception and practice of hospitality is perceived as detrimental to the host’s own self-understanding of what it meant to be a French citizen. Through their actions, the citizen-hosts staked their claim as the true inheritors of the French republican tradition: they proclaimed their home, and hence their identity, as a place of welcome, universal fraternity, hospitality and equality. The delinquent hosts seek a reinterpretation of republican universalism: they want to see it honoured *at home*. In their hands, then, hospitality serves to enact their self-conception as citizens, their nationality—and the nationality of France as they wish it to be—through openness and welcome.

The crucial point is this: the hosts I spoke with deny neither nationality nor national ideals, but instead try to reimagine what it means to be a French citizen and to wrest away the category of race and nationality as the criterion for Frenchness. They are not trying to move to a post-national identity: quite the opposite, they seek to reground their own national identity on its founding values, which they take to be immanent to their tradition yet spurned by its official (that is, state) representatives. This is the essence of their “becoming political” and their self-constitution as citizens. As citizens they have entitlements, and as republicans they are duty-bound to participate in public affairs and to protect *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité*, part of which includes protecting those (stateless) without a home. The significance of this, as I have established in this dissertation, is that they see no necessary antagonism between migrants (both inside and outside their borders) and their own status as citizens. To the contrary, they believe that the future of French citizenship and identity—its survival and flourishing—depends upon defending hospitality and fraternity at home in order to protect vulnerable others. Their story is one of reclaiming the mantle of French republicanism. Hospitality is their strategic means to achieve that and
to contest state power rule, which makes hospitality from below a friend and tactic for
dissident citizens.

For some French citizens, hospitality functioned as a technique for self-change and
improvement. Helping others was primarily a valuable resource of care for the sake of
themselves in a world that had come to signify alienation, disillusionment, chaos and
duplicity. They used hospitality to provide therapeutic relief from the problems of selfhood
and subjectivity that each was experiencing in their milieu. Through the interpretive analysis
of these portraits, I have shown a whole other realm of hospitality and the motivations for it
that thus far have gone unrecognised in the literature.

This dissertation is about competing conceptions of what citizenship and identity can
and do mean at certain times and places. It documents the tug-of-war over hospitality on a
shared terrain of what it means to be French. The state and dissident citizens both see in
hospitality a tactic for realising that “Frenchness” and identity, which in turn serves to
legitimise or exclude the presence of foreigners, strangers and non-citizens at home. This
historical, theoretical and empirical analysis makes its contribution to the literature in
tracing the complex and undertheorised fluidity of hospitality, and its relation to the state
and citizen. In such a role, hospitality, as both concept and practice, can and has been a
great ally of state sovereignty and governmentality, and therefore it is a practice that serves
top-down as well as decentralised power. But in at least two historical periods in the French
case—revolutionary and present day—its fluidity is manifested in the way that it becomes
the ally of confrontation with sovereign (territorial) and governmental power—the ally of
the dissident citizen—and a defence of a different understanding of citizenship and identity.
On Republicanism: future directions

This dissertation has been on the connection between hospitality and citizenship. Yet throughout, though as a minor and persistent theme, is the question of republicanism and its relation to hospitality. Another road for this dissertation, and a direction for future research, would be to investigate this. Why? Because republicanism has certain features that work in fascinating and complex ways with the problem of hospitality as I’ve been outlining.

The theme I have in mind is captured in Montesquieu’s *De l’esprit des lois* (1995 [1758]), of which a central question is the kind of political regime and government best suited to human nature. Montesquieu’s answer is that the most “natural” government is that which best fits the people for whom it is established. A great diversity of peoples brings with it a great diversity in laws, and consequently a certain number of different political regimes. Montesquieu is not looking to examine the best laws from the point of view of ethics, but those most effective (those that allow a political regime to be constituted and maintained as such). These laws are those best “adapted” to the desired political regime (republic/democracy, monarchy, despotism); to the physical attributes of the country (climate, quality of the “terrain” etc.); and to the mores and customs of its peoples (religion, commerce etc.). Together, or rather in their relation to each other, these form the “spirit of the laws” (ibid., 24-5). Importantly, Montesquieu holds that each regime-type cited above and its government are driven by a specific “principle” that acts as a spring [ressort] to stimulate the behaviour of its citizens such that they support and show their commitment to that regime, aiding in its stability, success and functioning. In democratic republics, given this is where our interest lies, that principle is the love of egalitarian virtue. It fosters the willingness of its people to place the needs of the common interest above their private interests (ibid., 32-3).

Returning to the specific case of the French Republic, Montesquieu’s ideas take on their importance when we consider that first, the French nation composes a common body of citizens defined solely in terms of political rights and republican commitments and duties: civic virtue and active participation in public affairs. And second, for the French Republic, “Law is the expression of the general will”—codified as such by the framers of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* of August 1789 (Art. 6). The general will,
we saw in Chapter Four, is a Rousseauian notion linked to his theory of the social contract. Yet where it joins Montesquieu’s thinking on the relations between laws, government and institutions, is that the desire for equality which is implicit in the formation of the general will is cultivated, shaped and given its force by political institutions that must serve and promote justice for all within the community of citizens. Not just any political institutions, but “the most sublime of human institutions”—namely: the institution of the law (Rousseau 1978, 214). The important connection that I wish to make between Montesquieu’s idea of the *Spirit of the Laws* and the French situation today and practices of hospitality centres thus on citizen behaviour and sentiment vis-à-vis their political institutions (as the embodiment of core republican principles, ideals and values)—of which the law and its authoritative source: The Constitution.

*De l’esprit des lois*

My claim is that republics cannot afford to stray from the law—as an expression of the people’s general will—and how that law is administered. That is to say, in its administration of the law, the republican state should remain faithful to the spirit and letter of the law; lest the gap proving too great—that is, between the law and its application—the state alienates itself from its will: the people.

The importance of this claim cannot be overstated for republicans: the institutionalisation of the law that gives force to the “generality” of the general will, and its equitable and just administration, are precisely what *enable* republicans to declare their fidelity and commitment to the general will—right down to the smallest components of society. Yet, this is what I see occurring in present-day France, and which the focus on hospitality in this dissertation has led us to: a vast number of republican citizens feel so acutely that the state has detached itself from their will. In criminalising solidarity under article L.622-1 of the CESEDA and in flouting its other legal commitments on the rights of foreigners, the Republic has strayed far from the spirit and the letter of its laws of hospitality. That is, the state has become alienated from the republican tradition of equality and fraternity that its laws are held to institutionalise.

Recall from the opening chapter: the above CESEDA laws are intended *only* to thwart and punish organised criminal activity that seeks to take advantage of vulnerable migrants.
in return for a benefit (contrepartie). Recall also, then Prime Minister Emmanuel Valls’ 2012 reassurances to the French people and the government amid increased intimidations and prosecutions for humanitarian acts of hospitality: “Our law should not punish those who, in good faith, wish to give a helping hand”. We have seen, nonetheless, that in the aftermath of Valls’ extraordinary claim in Parliament to have “abolished” the crime of solidarity, the number of prosecuted délinquants solidairehs has not declined but steadily risen (Assemblée Nationale 2012, GISTI 2018a). This severance of the link between law and its application, between the state and its will, is symbolised in the délinquants solidairehs’ repeated declaration: “not in my name”.

What I therefore think is a profitable direction for future political theory is to investigate the implications of such a state of affairs for the Republic and republican thinking. The state’s move to criminalise solidarity provokes a citizenly response that exemplifies the idea of republican “duty”, being full commitment and investiture in public affairs. That response is seen in the civil resistance of citizens who—as republicans—feel provoked into action by authoritarian, state power rule. We need look no further for examples of authoritarianism in the Republic than the intensification of measures of intimidation and repression; of arbitrary polices searches and custodies; and of arrests and prison sentences that involve its citizen-hosts (GISTI 2018b); and of the reduction of politics to both governmentality and the hardening of friend and enemy lines. We thus have a situation with the state as if acting outside the will of the people, whom, unremarkably, demonstrates their low tolerance for such behaviour.

What is noteworthy in this scenario, is a phrase that, time and again, surfaced in the course of my interviews, and which now takes on its full significance: citizens claimed to feel locked into a rapport de force (power relationship) between themselves on the one hand and the state on the other. These commentaries have also found their echo in the media. Pierre-Alain Mannoni, one of the four délinquants solidairehs introduced in the dissertation’s opening pages and who currently awaits a verdict on overturning his 2017 prison sentence from France’s highest appellate court, recently opined: “there’s a real power relationship currently unfolding in France with citizens, elected officials, and associations all joining "the solidarity camp" to form a united front against the government” (ARTE TV 2018 emphasis added).
Now to my mind this power play, or power relationship that has taken hold is no basis for a republic. I would go so far as to assert that it is decidedly un-republican. By that I mean that the whole idea of republicanism, or rather, the whole idea of what republicanism is set up to oppose, is state/government power rule. But with such struggles for power occurring in the republican state, all the while that it stands ideologically opposed to state rule, it becomes apparent that what we mean by “the state” requires careful consideration. In signalling, thus, the wider problem of republicanism that a focus on hospitality leads into—who is the state?—I highlight an important area for future research. In the epilogue that follows, I offer a glimpse of what this might look like.
EPILOGUE

In mid-2018, a group of four French citizens (led by convicted délinquants solidaires Cédric Herrou and Pierre-Alain Mannoni) united with a dozen prominent humanitarian and migrant associations to petition France’s preeminent judicial arm, the Constitutional Council (le Conseil Constitutionnel). They did so on behalf of all those, themselves included, who believed that the spirit and letter of the laws and their application had reached an untenable disjuncture. Of particular concern was a founding principle of the Republic: fraternité. They thus petitioned this third arm of the judiciary in France (as quite separate from the judicial and administrative courts system) to rule on a priority question put forward by the people on the constitutionality of its laws, as is their sovereign prerogative (question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, or QPC).39

In this case, their collective argument was that fraternity, as a constitutive principle of the Republic, must be recognised and upheld in all matters and aspects of French law.40 They founded their plea on the basis that the “people” is the ultimate source of authority in the Republic, and the Constitution the expression of the French people’s collective will. They argued that the Constitution was being flouted. It was thus the gap between the Constitution on the one hand, and French legislation and its troubling interpretations, applications and violations on the other, that were scrutinised and deliberated on by the guardians of France’s foundational law. At the bar, defence attorney Patrice Spinosi, cited Jacques Derrida (1997b) on hospitality when he put to the courtroom: “What becomes of a country, what becomes of a culture, a language when one can speak of it as a ‘crime of hospitality?’” Which in other words is to ask: what becomes of our political institutions when we can arrest and convict republicans for the crime of being fraternal? In that most solemn of arenas, the French people took on the politicised legislative, executive and judicial powers. And they won.

For the first time in its almost 230 years of history, on 6 July 2018, the Republic gave full constitutional force and recognition to its will, the principle of fraternité. To be clear,

39 Besides answering questions from citizens regarding the constitutionality of laws, the nine-member French Conseil Constitutionnel has the role of overseeing national elections and oversees the review of French statutes before enactment (Georgetown Law 2018).

40 To be exact, it is in the 1848 Constitution founding the Second Republic, that the triptych in its form “liberté, égalité, fraternité” makes its first appearance. Importantly, fraternité is henceforth defined as a “principle” of the Republic.
this is not a situation of low-grade civil war in the Republic, for there is no new constitutional order being fought for or founded. By claiming their sovereign power and right to collectively petition the keeper of fundamental laws (the “laws of lawmaking” (Michelman 1999, 48)), the citizens as the constituent sovereign (subject) sought merely to rearticulate and revise—in truth, to re-found and re-ground—that pre-existing order (Kalyvas 2005). To will (vouloir), that is, to collectively transform one’s individual desires or wishes into a political will—the “will of all”—is necessarily bound up with the acquired capacity to make that happen: with power (pouvoir) (Rousseau 2009, 308–9).

While the Conseil has ruled on its commitment to consecrating the principle of fraternité in French law, the laws that make up the CESEDA will, yet again, simply be amended to reflect this partial censorship of the crime of solidarity. The law has not been abolished. There remain several high-profile trials and appeals to come in the following months. We must await their outcomes to see how this historic Constitutional Council decision effectively plays out in the legislative, governmental and judicial arenas. In the interim, Rousseau’s Social Contract is instructive: coexisting in freedom, co-subject by equality, co-legislator by independence, by all appearances the citoyen—also called member of the sovereign, the common body—enjoys de facto recognition through his or her constituent character of the State. To the question, then, of the citizen delinquents on “who is the state?” the answer is they are the state. L’état,” to use the French formulation, “c’est eux.”


French Statutes


EU Statutes


## Appendix 1

### Interview Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudo</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Locality (Region of France)</th>
<th>Interview date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virginie</td>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>Paris/Ile de France</td>
<td>6/8/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélène</td>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>Paris/Ile de France</td>
<td>6/8/18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gérard</td>
<td>65+</td>
<td>Provence-Alpes</td>
<td>2/8/18</td>
</tr>
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<td>Didier</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>Paris/Ile de France</td>
<td>28/7/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lionel</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>Limousin</td>
<td>29/7/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeanne</td>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>Paris/Ile de France</td>
<td>28/7/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laetitia</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>Paris/Ile de France</td>
<td>29/7/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>Paris/Ile de France</td>
<td>31/7/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgane</td>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>Provence-Alpes</td>
<td>1/8/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yann</td>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>Normandy</td>
<td>26/7/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigitte</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>11/8/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loïc</td>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>Normandy</td>
<td>1/8/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugues</td>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>Paris/Ile de France</td>
<td>3/8/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adèle</td>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>Paris/Ile de France</td>
<td>12/8/18</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sylvain</td>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>Provence-Alpes</td>
<td>31/7/18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carole</td>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>Provence-Alpes</td>
<td>2/7/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>Provence-Alpes</td>
<td>5/7/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>Provence-Alpes</td>
<td>6/7 &amp; 8/7/18</td>
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The five age groups utilised:

- 25-34
- 35-44
- 45-54
- 55-64
- 65+
Appendix 2

Interview Schedule

1. What are your thoughts on civil disobedience, as a form of mobilisation?

Prompts:

- Why is it necessary to break the law in certain circumstances?
- What do you seek to achieve, for example, by appearing before the courts? What do you expect from the justice system? (Do you trust “justice” to do its job? Why/why not?)
- Is it necessary/a hinderance to be mediatised when defying the state in this way?

2. Describe some of the actions you have undertaken, or sought to undertake, as a way of assisting irregular or undocumented migrants?

3. Are you a member of any “solidarity” support groups?

Prompts:

- This could be either in support of asylum seekers themselves, or in “solidarity” with those committing crimes (i.e., the solidarity delinquents): for example, to raise funds to help with their legal fees/fines, or to raise awareness on the issue?
- Do you feel in any way connected to other people committing similar acts of disobedience that take the form of helping migrants? How important is this to you?

4. In your opinion, why do you think France criminalises the solidarity of its citizens towards undocumented migrants?

Prompts:

- Is to deter potential hosts?
- Does it have anything to do with the current political/economic/social climate in France? In Europe?
- What do you think France stands to gain—or lose—from its action (of criminalisation)?

5. France, whether via its leaders or its authorities, often evokes a “proud history and tradition” as a hospitable nation, the land of human rights and asylum, yet at other times,
both in its rhetoric and acts seems to deny this idea of hospitality. What is going on here in your opinion?

Prompts:

- Do you think that France has lost its way? In terms of either its republican or humanitarian values?
- How does this make you feel?
- How does this effect how you feel as a French citizen?

6. I want to draw out some of the personal motivations that might lead someone help another in need through in defying laws that forbid it. What drives you most to help?

Prompts:

[Respondents’ answers will most likely will focus on the humanity/dignity aspect – probe: helping the self].

- Besides the evident humanitarian focus - what do you personally seek or hope to achieve from your action?
- Do you feel that your act is political? In what ways? Is it possible to achieve your goal, through political gestures such as these?
- Do you feel it makes you a better person by doing something, by extending your welcome to those in need?
- What, if anything is there about being a citizen that inspires you to break the law? How important/necessary is this?
- Is acting out, or joining support groups, a way to maintain a certain vigilance as a citizen... about what you value most in society/democracy/the republic?

7. What, if anything, is there about being French that particularly motivates you to help foreigners in need?

Prompts:

- Is helping in any way linked to aspects of French “culture”, national identity, values, or way of life?
- [LACK]: Is there something lacking in the national identity that pushes you to help? i.e. a spiritual or material ill? (the delinquent act therefore fills a void...)
8. Cedric Herrou has stated publicly on several occasions (press, social media) that: “If in the name of justice, I must finish up in prison, I’ll go without resistance, my head high, and as a free man”.

Further, humanitarian volunteer Francesca Beirotti, in a short film documenting her act of bringing an undocumented minor’s mother from Italy into France, states: “their freedom is our freedom”.

Can you tell me what the words of each inspire in you?

9. Is there any republican value or principle that you feel is particularly diminished when the state criminalises solidarity?

Prompt:

• Is it possible to recover this [principle/value] in defying state laws?

10. Is there anything specifically linking your action to France’s past?

Prompt:

• Is there any element of the past that you consider is ‘vanishing’ and which prompts you to act?
• Do you consider yourself as the inheritor of a tradition of revolution and resistance?

11. What, to your mind, is it about migrants or refugees that so troubles the French identity or imaginary?

Prompt:

• Is it the different in culture, ethnicity, religion?

12. Is there anything, beyond the migrants themselves, that are you looking to safeguard or preserve?
Appendix 3

Human Ethics Committee Approval Letter, University of Sydney
Monday, 2 May 2016

Prof John Keane
Government & International Rel; Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Email: john.keane@sydney.edu.au

Dear Prof John Keane

I am pleased to inform you that the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) has approved your project entitled “We the Citizens? City Subjectivities and the unmaking of irregularity”.

Details of the approval are as follows:

Project No.: 2016/267
Approval Date: 30 April 2016
First Annual Report Due: 30 April 2017
Authorised Personnel: Keane John; Taylor Abigail

Documents Approved:

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<th>Type</th>
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<td>Participant Info Statement</td>
<td>A Taylor - FINAL version of PIS</td>
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<td>18/04/2016</td>
<td>Interview Questions</td>
<td>A Taylor - Schedule of Interview Questions and Topics</td>
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<tr>
<td>18/04/2016</td>
<td>Participant Consent Form</td>
<td>A Taylor - FINAL version of PCF</td>
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HREC approval is valid for four (4) years from the approval date stated in this letter and is granted pending the following conditions being met:

**Condition/s of Approval**

- Continuing compliance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans.
- Provision of an annual report on this research to the Human Research Ethics Committee from the approval date and at the completion of the study. Failure to submit reports will result in withdrawal of ethics approval for the project.
- All serious and unexpected adverse events should be reported to the HREC within 72 hours.
- All unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should be reported to the HREC as soon as possible.
• Any changes to the project including changes to research personnel must be approved by the HREC before the research project can proceed.

• Note that for student research projects, a copy of this letter must be included in the candidate’s thesis.

**Chief Investigator / Supervisor’s responsibilities:**

1. You must retain copies of all signed Consent Forms (if applicable) and provide these to the HREC on request.

2. It is your responsibility to provide a copy of this letter to any internal/external granting agencies if requested.

Please do not hesitate to contact Research Integrity (Human Ethics) should you require further information or clarification.

Yours sincerely

Professor Glen Davis  
Chair  
Human Research Ethics Committee

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This HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council's (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007), NHMRC and Universities Australia Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2007) and the CPMP/ICH Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice.