Ideological Origins of the Australian Antarctic, 1839-1933

Rohan Howitt

Department of History

University of Sydney

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2019
Declaration of Originality

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

Rohan Howitt

17/09/2018
Authorship Attribution Statement

This thesis contains material published in Rohan Howitt, ‘The Japanese Antarctic Expedition and the Idea of White Australia’, *Australian Historical Studies* 49, no. 4 (2018), 510-526. The research for this article was undertaken as part of the research for this thesis. I am the sole author of the article.

Rohan Howitt
17/09/2018

As supervisor for the candidature upon which this thesis is based, I can confirm that the authorship attribution statements above are correct.

Andrew Fitzmaurice
17/09/2018
Acknowledgements

I was fortunate to complete my thesis in a vibrant, active, and supportive scholarly community in the History Department at the University of Sydney. I owe a tremendous intellectual debt to my supervisor, Andrew Fitzmaurice, and to my associate supervisor, Chris Hilliard. I have also received invaluable feedback and advice at various points from Peter Hobbins, Miranda Johnson, Sophie Loy-Wilson, and Mark McKenna.

The research for this thesis was made possible by funding from an Australian Postgraduate Award, University of Sydney Merit Award, John Frazer Travelling Scholarship, Joan Allsopp Travel Bursary, Australasian Pioneers Club Travel Bursary, and the University of Sydney’s Postgraduate Research Support Scheme and Doctoral Research Travel Grant.

A term spent as a visiting student in the History Faculty at the University of Cambridge was formative for my research. I am greatly indebted to the History Faculty at Cambridge, and particularly to my supervisor there, Alison Bashford. I spent much of my time in Cambridge at the Scott Polar Research Institute, and I am greatly indebted to Naomi Bonham, Klaus Dodds, Laura Ibbett, Bryan Lyntott, John Shears, and Hilary Shibata for their assistance during my time there.

I am extremely grateful to the staff of the State Library of Victoria, particularly Lucy Shedden and Andrew McConville, the State Libraries of New South Wales and Tasmania, the Royal Historical Society of Victoria, the National Archives of Australia in Canberra, Sydney, and Melbourne the Australian Museum, particularly Stan Florek, Sydney University Museums, particularly Jan Brazier, the University of Sydney Archives, the University of Melbourne Archives, the Woollahra Local History Centre, the Scott Polar Research Institute Archives, the Caird Library and Archives at the Royal Maritime Museum in Greenwich, the Royal Society Archives, the Royal Geographical Society Archives, and The National Archives of the United Kingdom.

Sections of this thesis have been presented at the University of New South Wales History Seminar, the Sydney Australian and Pacific History Writing Group, the University of Sydney’s Intellectual History Seminar, the 2018 Australian Historical Association Conference, the Humanities and Social Sciences Expert Group of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research’s conference in 2017, and the University of Sydney History Postgraduate Conference in 2016 and 2017. I am deeply grateful for the comments and feedback I received at these seminars and conferences.
Abstract

This thesis examines Australian ideas about the Antarctic in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It seeks to go beyond the dominant diplomatic, geopolitical, legal, and scientific lenses through which Australian engagement with the Antarctic region has been viewed by tracing the genealogy of Australian ideas about the Antarctic. It focuses particularly on the development of the ideas that Australia had a unique interest in the Antarctic based on geographical proximity, that the Antarctic was destined to become an Australian possession, and that it would eventually become a source of enormous wealth for Australia and Australians. These ideas are used to reconstruct late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century visions of an Australian empire stretching “from the equator to the South Pole”, a vision that was substantially fulfilled by the 1930s. The thesis argues that these ideas and visions highlight the significance of expansionism in nineteenth and early-twentieth century Australian thought and suggests that this expansionism can usefully be understood as a form of imperialism. It further argues that analysing Australian engagement with the Antarctic within the framework of empire and imperialism provides a valuable insight into the broader phenomenon of expansion by small, newly-formed, states in this period and into the interrelationship between processes of state formation and imperial expansion.
Table of Contents

Declaration of Originality
Authorship Attribution Statement
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... i
Abstract ......................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents .......................................................................................... iii
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................ iv
Map of the Antarctic Region ........................................................................ vii
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: Early Antarctic Exploration and the Australian Colonies, 1839-41 .......... 12
Chapter 2: The Idea of Antarctica in Australian Discourse, c. 1841-85 ......................... 40
Chapter 3: Antarctic Exploration and the Australian Monroe Doctrine, 1886-90 ........ 63
Chapter 4: Antarctica and Australian State Formation, 1890-1901 .......................... 111
Chapter 5: The Recognition of Australian Interests in the Antarctic, 1901-09 ............. 167
Chapter 6: Australia and the Race for the South Pole, 1910-13 ................................. 216
Chapter 7: Rights and Responsibilities in the Antarctic, 1910-17 ................................. 244
Chapter 8: The Idea of Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, 1918-33 ..................... 283
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 324
Bibliography .................................................................................................... 339
List of Abbreviations

Expeditions:
United States Exploring Expedition, 1838-42 – USEE
National Antarctic Expedition, 1901-04 – NAE
Scottish National Antarctic Expedition, 1902-04 – SNAE
Australasian Antarctic Expedition, 1911-14 – AAE
Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition, 1914-17 – ITAE
British Australian New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition, 1929-31 – BANZARE

Organisations:
Australian Natives’ Association – ANA
Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science – AAAS
Royal Geographical Society – RGS

Places:
Australian Antarctic Territory – AAT

Archives:
Caird Library and Archive, Royal Maritime Museum Greenwich – RMMG
National Archives of Australia – NAA
Royal Geographical Society Archives – RGS
Royal Historical Society of Victoria – RHSV
Royal Society Archives – RSA
Scott Polar Research Institute Archives – SPRI
State Library of Tasmania – SLT
State Library of Victoria – SLV
The National Archives of the United Kingdom – TNA
University of Sydney Archives – USA

Newspapers:

**New South Wales:**

_**Australasian Chronicle** - AC_
_**Australian Star** – AS_
_**Australian Town and Country Journal** - ATCJ_
_**Blue Mountain Echo** – BME_
_**Daily Telegraph** – DT_
_**Evening News** – EN_
_**Freeman’s Journal** – FJ_
_**Goulburn Herald** - GH_
_**Newcastle Morning Herald** – NMH_
_**Queanbeyan Age** – QA_
_**Sunday Times** – ST_
_**Sydney Gazette** - SG_
_**Sydney Herald** - SH_
_**Sydney Mail** – SM_
_**Sydney Morning Herald** – SMH_

**Queensland:**

_**Brisbane Courier** – BC_

**South Australia:**

_**Adelaide Observer** – AO_
_**Evening Journal** – EJ_
_**South Australian Advertiser** – SAA_
South Australian Chronicle - SAC
South Australian Register – SAR

Van Diemen’s Land/Tasmania

Colonial Times – CT
Cornwall Chronicle – CC
(Launceston) Daily Telegraph – LDT
Hobart Town Courier – HTC
Launceston Advertiser – LA
Launceston Examiner – LE
Tasmanian News – TN
True Colonist – TC

Victoria:

Ballarat Star – BS
Bendigo Advertiser – BA
Geelong Advertiser – GA
Mount Alexander Mail – MAM
Weekly Times – WT

Western Australia:

Daily News – DN
West Australian – WA
Western Mail – WM
Map of the Antarctic Region

1 Map 13991: Subantarctic Islands, Australian Antarctic Data Centre (2011), Copyright Commonwealth of Australia, reproduced under Creative Commons Attribution licence.
Introduction

This thesis is a study of Australian ideas about the Antarctic. It is an attempt to go beyond the dominant diplomatic, geopolitical, legal, and scientific lenses through which Australian engagement with the Antarctic region has been viewed by tracing the genealogy of Australian ideas about the Antarctic. It focuses particularly on the development of three broad ideas; that Australia had a unique interest in the Antarctic based on geographical proximity and historical links to Antarctic exploration, that the Antarctic held the promise of being a “golden El Dorado down South” ripe for economic exploitation by Australians, and that the ‘Australian Antarctic’ was destined to become an Australian possession.¹ These ideas are used to reconstruct late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century visions of an Australian empire stretching “from the equator to the South Pole”, a vision that was substantially fulfilled by the 1930s.² The thesis argues that these ideas and visions highlight the significance of expansionism in nineteenth and early-twentieth century Australian thought and suggests that this expansionism can usefully be understood as a form of imperialism. It further argues that analysing Australian engagement with the Antarctic within the framework of empire and imperialism provides a valuable insight into the broader phenomenon of expansion by small, newly-formed states in this period.

The thesis engages with several distinct historiographies and debates, making five broad arguments. First, it seeks to both contribute to and challenge the existing historiography of Australian interest in the Antarctic region and the creation of the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT).³ While it contributes to specific debates in this field, particularly regarding

¹ ‘Mawson Expedition’, *Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH), 14 June 1911, 14.
² ‘Conquest of the Antarctic’, *SMH*, 26 December 1933, 6.
the significance of the idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine to Australian expansionism, it 
seeks more generally to place ideas and mentalities at the centre of accounts of Australian 
activities in the Antarctic by arguing that the ideas that underpinned the assertion of 
Australian sovereignty in the 1930s developed over more than a century of Australian interest 
in the region. In doing so it contributes to a much smaller body of work, most notably that of 
Brigid Hains and Tom Griffiths, that can be considered cultural histories of the Australian 
Antarctic. Secondly, the thesis is a cultural and intellectual history of Australia in the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It suggests that recognising the scale and 
significance of Australian interest in the Antarctic contributes to understandings of Australian 
preoccupations with settlement, occupation, and economic development in the northern and 
 inland parts of the continent in this period, Australian understandings of sovereignty, and 
particularly the place of empire in Australian thought.

The third argument is closely related, suggesting that that the role of expansionism in 
Australian thought has been underestimated. While Australia’s imperial aspirations in the 
Pacific are reasonably well-known, studies of Australian imperialism have overlooked the 
Antarctic and Indian Ocean dimensions of ideas about Australia’s natural sphere of influence 
in the Southern Hemisphere. This thesis argues that Australian expansionism was more

---

4 Hains, The Ice and the Inland; Griffiths, Slicing the Silence.
ambitious, multidirectional, and successful than has hitherto been recognised. It further argues that Australian expansionism can be usefully understood as a form of imperialism, and Australia’s sprawling, thalassocratic sphere of influence as an empire. In doing so, it contributes to the historiography of state formation and empire building and suggests that historians of this field need to shift their gaze from the early-modern period to examine the more prolific links between state formation and empire building at the turn of the twentieth century in the context of small, newly-formed states such as Australia, New Zealand, and Norway. This period, and not the early-modern, marks the highpoint in which empire building and state formation were interwoven. The thesis also argues that incorporating such states into this frame of analysis challenges the assumption that empire building is an extension of state formation, as the Australian case suggests that internal state formation can also be an extension of external expansion.

The thesis’ fourth main argument attempts to explain why ideas about Australian interests in the Antarctic and the region’s enormous economic potential developed into support for the annexation of the AAT. The desire to annex, rather than simply exploit, the Antarctic provides an insight into the ideas and anxieties that underpinned Australia’s expansionist impulses in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The thesis suggests that the best explanation for Australian imperialism is the idea of pre-emptive expansion. In other words, direct annexation of the Antarctic region south of Australia was not innately desirable, but rather was considered necessary to prevent other states from acquiring it. In the words of


Richard Casey during debate over the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Bill (1933), “if we do not take this sector, and claim sovereignty over it, some other country will”.  

Finally, the thesis seeks to contribute to recent historiographical trends. The scholarly field of ‘Antarctic studies’ has traditionally been dominated by the sciences, while the history of human activity in the Antarctic has overwhelmingly taken the form of linear narratives and biographical accounts. In so far as there was an Antarctic historiography, it was an insular subfield impervious to methodological and historiographical changes in the discipline as a whole and overlooked by academic historians. Since the 1990s, however, there has been increasing interest in what has come to be called ‘Antarctic humanities’. Within this field there has been a concerted effort to examine the place of the Antarctic in broader patterns of imperialism, colonialism, nationalism, geopolitics, capitalism, and science. Peder Roberts’ *The European Antarctic*, for example, uses the interrelationship of science, whaling, and geopolitics in Antarctica as a way to examine the culture, values, and politics of Britain, Norway, and Sweden in the twentieth century. Adrian Howkins’ *Frozen Empires* similarly uses the Antarctic sovereignty dispute between Britain, Argentina, and Chile to investigate broader patterns of imperialism, nationalism, and decolonisation in South America and the British Empire, producing what he calls an “environmental history of decolonisation”. Ben Maddison seeks to shift the focus of Antarctic history from the pantheon of polar explorers to the working-class sailors, sealers, and whalers who comprised the majority of those who

---

7 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 21, 26 May 1933, 1956.
lived and worked in Antarctica in the period 1750-1920. Elizabeth Leane and Hanne E.F. Nielsen have examined what they call the “symbolic settler colonialism” of an American expedition’s use of dairy cows in Antarctica in 1935.

There have also been several other significant trends in Antarctic history. Environmental history has expanded and enriched the field. There is an extensive literature focused on whaling and sealing in the Southern Ocean. Scholars such as Tom Griffiths, Brigid Hains, Max Jones, Beau Riffenburgh, and Francis Spufford have demonstrated the rich potential of cultural histories of the Antarctic. There has been a parallel trend in studies of the Arctic region, with cultural, intellectual, and environmental approaches reinvigorating the field and

---

demonstrating the relevance of the polar regions to broader historical concerns. This thesis contributes to these broad trends by applying methods of cultural and intellectual history and incorporating the Antarctic into the histories and historiographies of Australia, empire, and state formation.

These arguments are developed across eight chapters, progressing largely chronologically from the early-nineteenth century to the 1930s. Chapter One examines the American, French, and British Antarctic expeditions that visited Sydney and Hobart in 1839-41. It reconstructs these expeditions’ stays in the Australian colonies and argues that their reception reveals the early development of significant ideas about the Antarctic. In particular, it suggests that popular enthusiasm for Antarctic exploration, the idea of the Antarctic becoming an enormous source of wealth for Australia, and the idea that Antarctic expeditions were worthy of Australian support regardless of their national origin can all be traced to this period.

Chapter Two focuses on how these ideas developed from the 1840s to the 1880s. It reconstructs the ways in which Australians talked about the Antarctic in this period and traces the emergence of an idea that Australia was uniquely interested in the Antarctic, including in Antarctic exploration and economic exploitation. Chapter Three discusses the activities of the Antarctic Exploration Committee established by the Royal Society of Victoria and the Victorian branch of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia to organise and promote Antarctic exploration in Australia. It contributes to existing scholarship on this committee and uses its activities to further examine the idea of Australia having a special relationship

---

with Antarctica.\textsuperscript{18} It particularly focuses on the ways in which this idea became associated with the broader idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine.

Chapter Four continues this focus on the ideological origins of the Australian Antarctic in the 1890s. It examines further efforts to mount an Australian expedition to the Antarctic and Australian reactions to foreign commercial and scientific expeditions. Chapter Five examines the often-overlooked Indian Ocean dimension of the Australian Monroe Doctrine. It also argues that the key shift in Australia’s relationship with the Antarctic came in 1907, when Australia contributed significant funds and personnel to an Antarctic expedition for the first time. It examines both popular and political forms of engagement with this expedition to reconstruct the ways Australians imagined their relationship with the Antarctic.

Chapter 6 examines the reception of three expeditions in Australia, a British expedition under Robert Scott that enjoyed significant Australian financial and in-kind support, a Japanese expedition that spent six months in Sydney at the height of the White Australia Policy, and a Norwegian expedition that arrived in Hobart after forestalling Scott to the South Pole. The reception of these expeditions is used to assess the idea that Australians were willing to set aside other factors and concerns to support any Antarctic expedition.

Chapter 7 firstly examines the Australasian Antarctic Expedition 1911-14, focusing particularly on the ideas and arguments used to justify and rally support for Australia’s first Antarctic expedition. These arguments provide a valuable insight into ideas about Australia’s

\textsuperscript{18} Swan, Australia in Antarctica; Lynette Cole, Proposals for the First Australian Antarctic Expedition: An Appraisal and Reappraisal of the Papers and Efforts of a Joint Committee formed by Two of Melbourne’s Learned Societies during the 1880s (Melbourne: Dept. of Geography and Environmental Science, Monash University, 1990); R.W. Home, Sara Maroske, A.M. Lucas, and P.J. Lucas, “Why Explore Antarctica?” Australian Discussions in the 1880s, Australian Journal of Politics and History 38, no. 3 (1998), 386-413; Andrew Mcconville, ‘Henrik Bull, the Antarctic Exploration Committee and the first confirmed landing on the Antarctic continent, Polar Record 43, no. 2 (April 2007), 143-154.
rights in the Antarctic region, and its perceived destiny to control an Antarctic dependency. The chapter then examines the reaction to Robert Scott’s death in Australia and the Commonwealth’s efforts to rescue a party of men stranded in the Antarctic from 1914-17, using these examples to trace the development of the idea that Australia had unique responsibilities as well as rights in the Antarctic.

Chapter 8 considers how Australian ideas about the Commonwealth’s economic and political rights in the Antarctic influenced the development of a policy of acquiring sovereignty. It argues that the acquisition of the AAT cannot be understood in purely diplomatic terms. It must instead be understood in the context of ideas about Australia’s relationship with Antarctica, particularly concerns about rightfully Australian resources being exploited by other states and a resurgence in the idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine.

This thesis differs methodologically from previous accounts of Australian engagement with the Antarctic. It draws on the methods of cultural and intellectual history, albeit a kind of ‘intellectual history from below’ that examines the ideas and mentalities of ordinary people rather than systematically studying the published texts of canonical thinkers. It focuses principally on the development, invocation, and application of ideas, and uses events and actions to understand the ideas that underpin them. Consequently, the thesis devotes significant attention not just to successful expeditions and momentous events but to plans and proposals that were ill-informed, unviable, or otherwise unsuccessful. While abandoned plans are largely overlooked in, for example, existing political and environmental histories, they provide valuable insights into ideas, interests, and worldviews. Triumph and disaster are therefore treated just the same in this thesis.
The thesis also draws heavily on newspapers, including articles, editorials, letters to the editor, images, and advertisements, and argues that these constitute an underutilised body of sources. Previous studies of Australia’s relationship with Antarctica have tended to use newspapers in largely unsystematic ways, relying principally on relatively small selections of newspapers over short periods of time. As a result, they tend to use newspapers primarily to illustrate and exemplify patterns and phenomena deduced from other sources. This thesis argues that this method overlooks thousands of examples of Australian engagement with the Antarctic region. It therefore attempts to develop a more systematic approach to newspapers as primary sources. To do so, it draws on three years’ work reading and analysing newspapers to reconstruct the ways in which Antarctica, the subantarctic, Antarctic exploration, Antarctic science, and Antarctic industries were thought about, discussed, and engaged with in Australia from 1805 to the mid-1930s. Research on this scale was made possible by the National Library of Australia’s newspaper digitisation project Trove. The 135-year period under study was broken down into smaller sub-periods, ranging from a year to a single day, and a wide range of search term combinations was used. This was a dynamic process that involved constantly refining search terms and manually analysing selected newspapers on specific dates that corresponded with significant events to better assess the accuracy of searches. These techniques were used to systematically examine ideas about the Antarctic in the Australian press throughout this period.

Newspapers are not without problems as sources. They occasionally include erroneous, censored, self-aggrandising, biased, or propagandising information. They also shaped public opinion as much as they reported it, creating difficulties when trying to disentangle the perspectives of the press and the public. Despite these limitations, however, newspapers

19 See for example Swan, *Australia in Antarctica*; Griffiths, *Slicing the Silence*; Kawaja and Griffiths, ‘Our Great Frozen Neighbour’.
provide an unparalleled insight into the development and circulation of ideas about Antarctica. They were essential for setting the parameters of legitimate discourse and are therefore valuable for revealing what was thinkable as much as for reconstructing what occurred. This thesis therefore examines newspapers in this way, while also relying on the scale of research and cross-referencing with published and archival sources to minimise the problems associated with them as primary sources. It draws heavily on archival research from the National Archives of Australia in Canberra, Sydney, and Melbourne, the National Library of Australia, the State Libraries of New South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania, the Royal Historical Society of Victoria, the University of Melbourne and University of Sydney Archives, Sydney University Museums, the Australian Museum, the Woollahra Local History Centre, the Scott Polar Research Institute Archives at the University of Cambridge, the Caird Library and Archives at the British Royal Maritime Museum in Greenwich, the archives of the Royal Society and the Royal Geographical Society, and The National Archives of the United Kingdom. Sources from the State Libraries of Western Australia and South Australia and the National Library of New Zealand were also made available through digitisation. The thesis also draws on a significant body of published material, including parliamentary papers, the papers and proceedings of various scientific societies, books, pamphlets, journals such as the *Geographical Journal*, films, photographs, and works of poetry and fiction.

Finally, this thesis employs some contested terms and concepts, but endeavours to do so in consistent and specific ways. It defines imperialism in its most straightforward sense, as the process of extending a state’s control over external territory. The thesis frequently uses the term expansion or expansionism to avoid implying that ‘imperialism’ was used in primary sources but reverts to imperialism when necessary to emphasise the parallels between Australian expansionism and the patterns and processes of expansion conventionally studied in the field of imperial history. Its use of empire is similar. Empire is understood as a state
exerting control over external territory. The term was only infrequently applied to Australia in primary sources, but it is used at times in this thesis to emphasise the similarities between small, expansionist states like Australia and states that are conventionally referred to as empires. The term ‘state’ is used in what Quentin Skinner refers to as a ‘fictionalist’ understanding, whereby a state is a fictional person separate from both the body politic and the government.²⁰ Helen Irving notes that, according to some definitions, Australia did not become a state at federation because it lacked the “unimpaired sovereignty” required for statehood.²¹ This thesis argues that not only was Australia a state at federation – an event that saw individuals and colonies give up their rights to govern themselves to the federal government as their representative, thereby creating the fictional person of the Australian Commonwealth – but it effectively acted as a state even before 1901.

The term ‘Antarctic’ is also contested. It is commonly defined as the region south of 60° S., though other definitions place the region’s northern limit at the Antarctic Circle, Antarctic Convergence, or southern tree line. It would be anachronistic to employ such strict definitions in this thesis, however. Activities such as whaling and sealing crossed these boundaries, while Australians did not draw any significant distinction between the Antarctic continent, subantarctic islands, and the Southern Ocean throughout the period under study. Indeed, the question of whether the Antarctic was an archipelago or a continent remained in doubt well into the twentieth century. This thesis therefore follows Peder Roberts in adopting a wide definition of the Antarctic Region, one that includes the subantarctic and peri-antarctic in the same frame of analysis as the Antarctic continent, and is thereby consistent with the usage and understanding of Australians in the period in question.²²

²² Roberts, The European Antarctic, 10.
Chapter 1: Antarctic Exploration and the Australian Colonies, 1839-41

Australian interest in exploring the Antarctic originated in a period of intense activity from 1839 to 1841, when three separate expeditions sought to explore and chart the region with the goal of locating the South Magnetic Pole.¹ Two of these, a French expedition commanded by Jules Dumont D’Urville and a British expedition commanded by James Clark Ross, used Hobart as the primary base for their Antarctic voyages. The third, the United States Exploring Expedition (USEE) under the command of Charles Wilkes, was based in Sydney. All three expeditions were highly prominent during their stays in Hobart and Sydney, attracting significant government, popular, and press attention. These expeditions consolidated a pre-existing Australian interest in the Antarctic and subantarctic that can be traced to 1804 and left a legacy of greater and more diverse Australian interest in the exploration and exploitation of the region that resulted in the development of ideas about Australia’s unique relationship with the Antarctic.

The first of the three expeditions to arrive in Australia was the USEE on 30 November 1839. Unlike the French and British expeditions, however, there was little prior knowledge in New South Wales about the American expedition’s specific plans beyond exploring the ‘South Seas’. As a result, its arrival was not particularly anticipated in the colonial press and was reported primarily in shipping lists and brief notices.² As the expedition settled in to Sydney to resupply and undergo repairs, however, it became a subject of intense local fascination. The expedition’s five modern naval vessels were constantly deluged with visitors from “all


² ‘Vessels and Passengers Cleared Out’, Sydney Monitor (Monitor), 2 December 1839, 2; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, Sydney Gazette (SG), 3 December 1839, 2; ‘American Squadron’, Australasian Chronicle (AC), 3 December 1839, 2; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, Colonist, 4 December 1839, 2; ‘Ships in Harbour’, Monitor, 6 December 1839, 3.
classes” of Sydney society. These visitors were, as Wilkes noted, remarkably well-informed
and discerning on matters of Antarctic exploration; they asked Wilkes and his officers
whether the ships were constructed with compartments to prevent them from sinking,
whether they had ice-saws to release the ship from pack ice, what anti-scorbutics they
planned to use, and what cold weather gear they were taking. Many were surprised that the
Americans were attempting an Antarctic voyage in ordinary ships, and were astonished that
they had no serious cold weather clothing, less than twelve months’ worth of supplies, and
sufficient fuel for just seven months. Several visitors stated outright they felt the expedition
was underprepared and Wilkes was unwise to attempt such a dangerous undertaking. Others
compared the Americans’ equipment and preparations unfavourably to what they had heard
of Ross’ preparations for his own imminent Antarctic expedition.

Despite the criticisms, the steady flow of visitors from shore to ship contributed to the
development of a warm relationship between Sydney residents and the expedition members.
The Americans were given free access to Sydney’s peripatetic library and the Australian
Museum during their stay, for which Wilkes was extremely grateful. The Australian Club
held a lavish dinner on 11 December to welcome the expedition. Among those present were
Wilkes, a dozen officers from the expedition’s ships Herald, Vincennes, Porpoise, Peacock,
and Flying Fish, the expedition’s naturalist, artist, herbalist, magnetician, and chaplain,
Governor George Gipps, the colony’s senior military officer Maurice O’Connell, the
esteemed amateur scientist and Australian Club president Alexander Macleay, the American
Consul in New South Wales, the Club’s vice-presidents Commissary Miller and Mr. Fisher,
wealthy colonial landowner and philanthropist John Jamison, “and many other persons of

---

3 Charles Wilkes, Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838, 1839, 1840,
4 Wilkes, Narrative, 274-275.
5 Wilkes, Narrative, 273.
6 ‘Australian Club’, AC, 13 December 1839, 4; Monitor, 13 December 1839, 2; ‘Dinner to the American
The 50th Regiment Band played during the evening, and in the course of after dinner speeches Gipps hailed the “good feeling manifested by all parties towards each other since the arrival of the squadron in port.”

This ‘good feeling’ continued after the Australian Club dinner, with Wilkes accompanying Gipps on a trip to Parramatta by river steamer. Wilkes spent two days in Parramatta, touring the Female Factory, Government House, courthouse, barracks, churches, and bridges of the town together with Gipps and his wife. He also made time to visit the Parramatta Observatory, which he was disappointed to find in a state of considerable disrepair, but was impressed by the quality of the magnetic instruments in use. This excursion was followed by another public reception for the expedition on 20 December 1839, with a luncheon held at Fort Macquarie on Bennelong Point. The event was plagued by heavy rain which prevented “a great number of ladies” from attending, but still attracted a crowd of more than a hundred. Several tents were erected outside the fort, each decorated with intertwined British and American flags. Gipps gave a speech praising the objects of the expedition and the men who were pursuing them, before the Americans passed the afternoon with an “exhilarating dance” with a dozen ladies. The party stayed late into the evening to drink wine and chat in another tent erected for that purpose. In the aftermath of these receptions, the colonial press was self-congratulatory. The Sydney Herald, for example, reported that “we have seldom witnessed a more gratifying scene” than the friendly intercourse between Americans and New South Welshmen at Fort Macquarie, while the Colonist noted that “the officers of the American Squadron will not have room to complain of a want of hospitality on the part of the elite of Sydney.”

---

7 ‘Australian Club’, AC, 13 December 1839, 4.
8 ‘Dinner to the American Squadron’, Australian, 14 December 1839, 2.
10 ‘Domestic Intelligence’, Sydney Herald (SH), 23 December 1839, 2.
After spending Christmas ashore with various friends and supporters, the expedition’s ships departed early in the morning of 26 December.\textsuperscript{12} There was no public farewell due to the earliness of their departure, but the Sydney papers hailed the “gentlemanly conduct” of the Americans and expressed their hope that the expedition would be successful in all of its objects.\textsuperscript{13} The departure of the American ships did not mark the end of Australian engagement with the expedition, however. Two men – thought to be deserting soldiers – stowed away and were not discovered until after the ships cleared Sydney Harbour, ensuring that the expedition had a colonial presence during its southern voyage.\textsuperscript{14} More significantly, Wilkes left a seven-man scientific party behind in Sydney. Naturalists Titian Ramsay Peale and Charles Pickering, botanist William Rich, ethnologist Horatio Hale, geologist James Dwight Dana, and artists Alfred Thomas Agate and James Drayton all accepted Wilkes’ offer to conduct scientific research in New South Wales before meeting the expedition in New Zealand in March 1840, rather than remain with the expedition for the Antarctic voyage.\textsuperscript{15}

During their stay in New South Wales, the scientists made trips to Wollongong, Newcastle, Lake Macquarie, Wellington, Camden, Liverpool, Goulburn, and Newington, and were hosted on each occasion by local officials or prominent landowners. They based themselves at the library and museum in Sydney between trips\textsuperscript{16} It is clear that a range of people in New South Wales were keen to host the explorers, and this continued after Wilkes brought two of his ships, \textit{Vincennes} and \textit{Peacock}, to Sydney for urgent repairs after the southern voyage. The two ships reached Sydney on 22 February 1840, and were immediately granted a free


\textsuperscript{14} Wilkes, \textit{Narrative}, 276-277.

\textsuperscript{15} Wilkes, \textit{Narrative}, 433-435.

\textsuperscript{16} Wilkes, \textit{Narrative}, 242-273.
anchorage at Mosman Cove on the harbour’s North Shore.\textsuperscript{17} They were also provided with a government boat to transfer people and supplies across the harbour and granted access to the government powder store to safely store the expedition’s weapons and ammunition.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite the colonial government’s eagerness to assist the USEE, Wilkes was reluctant to reveal much about the voyage until he had informed his government. The Sydney press reported he had proved the existence of an Antarctic continent and charted it for 1,700 miles, but further details were not forthcoming.\textsuperscript{19} This lack of detail did not affect the Americans’ popularity in Sydney, however, as Wilkes and his officers were again invited to far more social events than they could physically attend.\textsuperscript{20} For example, a Saint Patrick’s Day Ball was held on 17 March for the “chief people in the neighbourhood of Sydney” and the visiting Americans. It was held at the King-street courthouse, where military bands played, people danced, rooms were set aside for playing cards and drinking tea and lemonade, and an “elegant supper” was held, leaving Wilkes impressed that the style of the party was “neither English nor American, but something between the two.”\textsuperscript{21}

Wilkes and the \textit{Vincennes} finally departed Sydney on 19 March, with the \textit{Peacock} following several days later.\textsuperscript{22} Even after his departure, Wilkes’ achievements continued to be celebrated in the colony, and particularly in the colonial press. At a dinner in Sydney, for example, prominent landowner William Oldrey brought up the subject of Wilkes and declared that “on him had fallen the mantle of Cook.”\textsuperscript{23} As more details about the

\textsuperscript{17} ‘Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{SH}, 13 March 1840, 2; ‘Discovery of the Antarctic Continent’, \textit{SH}, 13 March 1840, 2; ‘Ship News’, \textit{AC}, 13 March 1840, 2; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{Monitor}, 13 March 1840, 2; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{Colonist}, 14 March 1840, 2; Wilkes, \textit{Narrative}, 364.
\textsuperscript{18} Wilkes, \textit{Narrative}, 364.
\textsuperscript{19} ‘Discovery of the Antarctic Continent’, \textit{SH}, 13 March 1840, 2.
\textsuperscript{21} Wilkes, \textit{Narrative}, 365.
\textsuperscript{22} ‘Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{Colonist}, 18 March 1840, 2; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{SG}, 21 March 1840, 2; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{Australian}, 21 March 1840, 2; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{Colonist}, 21 March 1840, 2; Wilkes, \textit{Narrative}, 369.
\textsuperscript{23} ‘Discovery’, \textit{Hobart Town Courier} (HTC), 10 April 1840, 4.
expedition’s accomplishments emerged in December 1840, the Sydney Herald wrote that the expedition had “covered itself in glory” by conclusively proving the existence of an Antarctic continent, a sentiment echoed by the Australasian Chronicle.\(^{24}\) The Herald, Colonist, and newspapers in other colonies republished Wilkes’ entire report to his government on the southern voyage, providing the wealth of detail missing from earlier accounts.\(^{25}\) Wilkes’ Antarctic voyage and his expedition’s subsequent activities continued to attract press interest in Australia as late as 1846.\(^{26}\)

At the same time as the Americans were being swamped by enthusiastic Sydneysiders inspecting their ships and inviting them to parties, the French expedition was enjoying a similar reception in Hobart. Unlike Wilkes, D’Urville’s arrival was keenly anticipated. Australian newspapers had erroneously reported in January 1839 that D’Urville had discovered an Antarctic continent south of the South Shetland Islands.\(^{27}\) While these reports were subsequently corrected to say that he had actually discovered a new island, they generated interest in the French expedition.\(^{28}\) The Colonist, for example, predicted that the expedition would “be one of extraordinary interest, having been fitted out for the purpose of discovering a great southern continent, which has been reported to be in existence near the South Pole.”\(^{29}\) The Sydney Herald republished D’Urville’s entire thousand word letter to the French Government recounting his first attempt to reach the South Pole from the South American side of the continent in 1838, while the Sydney Gazette recounted the entire history of the expedition up to its anticipated arrival in Hobart.\(^{30}\)

\(^{24}\) ‘Highly Important Discovery’, SH, 8 December 1840, 2; ‘Antarctic Discovery’, AC, 10 December 1840, 3.
\(^{26}\) ‘A Run Through The Icebergs’, Colonial Times (CT), 19 June 1846.
\(^{27}\) ‘Discovery of a New Continent’, HTC, 25 January 1839, 3; ‘Discovery of a New Continent’, Colonist, 2 February 1839, 3; ‘Discovery of a New Continent’, Australian, 2 February 1839, 2.
\(^{28}\) ‘Sydney’, HTC, 8 March 1839, 4.
\(^{29}\) ‘Domestic Intelligence’, Colonist, 2 February 1839, 2.
\(^{30}\) ‘French Antarctic Voyage’, SH, 10 April 1839, 2; ‘French Expedition to the South Polar Seas’, SG, 18 May 1839, 4.
When the French ships Astrolabe and Zélée did arrive in Hobart on 12 December 1839, their crews did not entirely live up to the image of heroic polar explorers.³¹ Twenty seamen had contracted dysentery during the voyage to Tasmania. Consequently, the expedition was greeted not by cheering crowds or swarms of visitors but by Port Officer William Moriarty, who arranged for the stricken men to be taken ashore. Lieutenant-Governor John Franklin, himself a veteran of three expeditions to the Arctic, was away from Hobart, so D’Urville and his second in command Charles Jacquinot were welcomed by William Elliot, the senior military official in the colony. Elliot immediately arranged for an empty building on Harrington Street to be turned over to the expedition for use as a hospital.³² When Franklin returned on 19 December, he immediately granted the explorers access to fresh fruits and vegetables from his private garden to assist their recovery and preparations for the southern voyage.³³

During the expedition’s first week in Hobart, D’Urville visited the sick in this temporary hospital daily, as did Hobart’s Catholic vicar-general John Therry. Seven men died during this time and were buried in Hobart’s Catholic Cemetery.³⁴ While the deaths cast a pall over the expedition’s time in Hobart, the explorers were nonetheless drawn into the social life of the colony. Franklin and his wife hosted a reception for the expedition’s officers and visited Astrolabe and Zélée in return. Jacquinot attended another reception at the Anglesea Barracks organised by Elliot and the Hobart garrison, while D’Urville visited the Chief Justice of Van Diemen’s Land John Pedder, a friend from his previous visit in 1827, and John Biscoe, a

³¹ HTC, 13 December 1839, 3; ‘Ship News’, SH, 27 December 1839, 2; ‘Van Diemen’s Land’, Australian, 28 December 1839, 2; ‘Vessels Entered Outwards’, Colonist, 28 December 1839, 2.
³⁴ Duyker, Dumont d’Urville, 429-433, 444.
whaling captain who had circumnavigated the Antarctic in 1830-33. The expedition’s officers also attended a public ball hosted by Lady Franklin on New Year’s Eve and held a funeral for the expedition’s popular artist before departing on 2 January. The funeral was well-attended by both explorers and Vandemonians, leading Chief Surgeon Jacques Hombron to write to the press to thank the “Authorities and Public” of Hobart for their support.

As with Wilkes in Sydney, D’Urville’s expedition maintained a presence in Hobart even after the ships’ departure for the southern voyage, as he was forced to leave behind several men still suffering from dysentery. He took on twelve new sailors from Hobart, five Frenchmen and seven Britons. The French expedition also continued to be a subject of interest for the Australian press. The Sydney Herald, for example, zealous in its support of the American expedition, published a lengthy discussion on whether the French expedition had, up to its arrival in Hobart, “entirely failed in its object.” The Herald ultimately argued that, as the French had made so few discoveries and had fallen far short of British sealer James Weddell’s farthest south record, it had indeed been a failure so far.

The Sydney Herald’s criticism of the French expedition was not indicative of the attitude towards it in Van Diemen’s Land. When Astrolabe and Zélée returned to Hobart on 18 February 1840 after an eventful voyage of just over two weeks, the expedition was heralded for its discovery of a hitherto unknown archipelago (Géologie Archipelago) and a vast stretch of coast (Adélie Land). D’Urville was invited to Government House to give a personal

---

37 ‘To the Editor’, TC, 10 January 1840, 7; ‘To the Editor’, CT, 14 January 1840, 7.
39 ‘The French Expedition of Discovery’, SH, 6 January 1840, 1; ‘French Expedition to the South Pole’, SH, 6 January 1840, 1.
40 ‘Local’, HTC, 21 February 1840, 2.
account of the voyage to Franklin and his wife, and taken on a tour of Hobart’s Museum of Natural History. He and Jacquinot were also elected members of the Tasmanian Society, a generalist scientific society inspired by England’s Royal Society established by Franklin in an effort to stimulate the intellectual life of the colony.\textsuperscript{41} The government assisted in refitting, resupplying, and repainting the ships, and moved two men who were too sick to re-join the crew to the government hospital. The expedition’s scientific staff enjoyed an excursion to climb Mount Wellington, where they collected some rare specimens of liverworts, heathers, spotted skinks, and crabs. The officers presented Therry with money to construct a memorial to their dead colleagues, with instructions that any surplus funds be donated to the Catholic poor of Hobart.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, D’Urville wrote a detailed account of the southern voyage for the \textit{Hobart Town Courier}, which concluded with an expression of gratitude to the people of Hobart for their hospitality and “real and sincere sympathy in the work,” which had “materially added to the success of the mission.”\textsuperscript{43}

It would have been easy for D’Urville to be vague and general in his dealings with the Hobart press to ensure his countrymen were the first to learn of his discoveries in detail, just as Wilkes did in Sydney. That he chose to disclose everything to the \textit{Courier} – making its readers the first in the world to learn of the discovery of part of the Antarctic continent – suggests his gratitude towards the people of Hobart was sincere, and that he recognised the depth of Vandemonian interest in his expedition. His account in the \textit{Courier} also had the effect of sparking an interest in the French expedition across the Australian colonies that continued well after the \textit{Astrolabe} and \textit{Zélée} departed Hobart for France, initially via the subantarctic Auckland Islands and New Zealand. D’Urville’s report was referenced,


\textsuperscript{42} Duyker, \textit{Dumont d’Urville}, 444-449.

\textsuperscript{43} ‘Expedition’, \textit{HTC}, 28 February 1840, 3.
syndicated, and summarised in newspapers across the colonies in the following months, generating significant interest in future exploration and the commercial prospects of sealing and whaling in Antarctica.\textsuperscript{44}

It was into this surging interest in Antarctic exploration that the third expedition of 1839-40 sailed. The British expedition under James Clark Ross was the most ambitious and the best-equipped of the three. Its aim was not simply to discover the South Magnetic Pole, but also to make magnetic observations at points across the Antarctic region from the Falklands to Kerguelen and establish permanent magnetic observatories at Saint Helena, Cape Town, and Hobart. Simultaneous observations were to be made at these stations and at observatories in the northern hemisphere on pre-determined days in the hope that, when combined with existing magnetic records and the location of the North Magnetic Pole discovered by Ross himself in 1831, this data would lead to a decisive breakthrough in the science of terrestrial magnetism.\textsuperscript{45} To complete this ambitious task, Ross was given two ships, \textit{Erebus} and \textit{Terror}, that were ideally suited to the task. They were bomb vessels, highly specialised naval warships with reinforced hulls designed to withstand the pressures of a battery of powerful mortars. As such, they were peculiarly suited to an Antarctic voyage and better equipped to push through pack ice than the American and French ships.

As with the American and French expeditions, there was tremendous interest in Ross’ expedition in the Australian colonies, and as with D’Urville this interest began well before \textit{Terror} and \textit{Erebus} arrived in Hobart on 15 and 16 August 1840 respectively.\textsuperscript{46} Ross and his

second-in-command Francis Crozier proceeded immediately to Government House, where they were warmly received by Franklin, an old friend of both men. Ross’ first priority was to begin work on an observatory, so he was delighted that Franklin had already prepared the necessary materials and drawn up a shortlist of possible sites. Ross chose a site near the planned location for a new government house, and Franklin assigned two hundred convicts to begin digging foundations, preparing freestone blocks, and transporting a preassembled timber frame from the government store to the site. Franklin himself superintended construction and applied the colony’s full resources to the project, resulting in the observatory – which Franklin named ‘Rossbank’ – being completed and its instruments fully installed within nine days.47

The people of Hobart, and Franklin in particular, were fully behind the expedition. In addition to providing 200 convicts to build the observatory, the expedition was granted a private anchorage upriver from the town’s crowded main harbour. As the ships underwent repairs at what Franklin renamed ‘Ross Cove’, all the necessary services for repairing and resupplying the ships were freely provided by the various public offices. For example, the colony’s Commissary-General, George McLean, set about the daunting task of providing the expedition with the diverse range and “unusually large” quantity of provisions required for an Antarctic voyage.48 These provisions from the public store were supplemented by daily deliveries of fruits and vegetables from Franklin’s private garden.49

Significantly, it was not only government officials who were eager to help the expedition. Ross paid tribute to the “cheerful enthusiasm” of the convicts involved in the construction of the observatory, pointing to the example of a group that commenced work at 6 o’clock on a

49 Lambert, The Gates of Hell, 115-123.
Saturday morning and continued until 10 o’clock at night. Seeing that a few hours’ work would complete the observatory’s roof, the convicts asked Franklin to let them work until the job was finished. As this would have involved working on the early hours of the Sabbath, however, Franklin denied the request. While Ross may have exaggerated this story, it nonetheless provides an insight into how low-status Vandemonians responded to the expedition’s presence in Hobart.\(^50\) Visiting the ships was another way for ordinary Vandemonians to engage with the expedition. For example, Jane Franklin related the story of “two working men” who visited the ships and were astonished to find a perfect likeness of their governor hanging in Ross’ cabin.\(^51\) Another group of Hobart men volunteered to assist with taking magnetic observations on the pre-arranged term days, when simultaneous observations were made at two-and-a-half minute intervals for twenty-four hours at observatories around the world.\(^52\)

There was also significant social interaction between the expedition and the residents of Hobart. Franklin and his friends and senior officials toured the Erebus and Terror on 12 October.\(^53\) Soon after, on 29 October 1840, a ball was held for the expedition at Hobart’s Customs House. The Courier reported that the town was “disturbed from its uniform aspect of settled dullness” as “all ranks of men turned with a grateful pleasure to the opportunity afforded them of testifying their esteem and regard…towards the distinguished sons of science now amongst them.” The ballroom was “filled to excess” with more than three hundred people; a surprisingly large figure which suggests approximately one in every forty-

\(^50\) Ross, A Voyage of Discovery Vol. 1, 110-111.  
\(^52\) Ross, A Voyage of Discovery Vol. 1, 123-125.  
\(^53\) ‘Local’, Courier, 16 October 1840, 2.
nine residents of Hobart was present.\textsuperscript{54} On other occasions, Ross was a guest of honour at ceremonies to lay the foundation stones of the new Government House and Government College buildings, while strong friendships were formed between expedition members and the soldiers of the 51st Regiment.\textsuperscript{55} The expedition’s young botanist, Joseph Dalton Hooker, befriended Ronald Campbell Gunn, Franklin’s secretary and an enthusiastic botanical collector.\textsuperscript{56} Hooker took every possible opportunity to travel inland during the expedition’s stay, often guided by Gunn, and accepted an offer from Jane Franklin to examine the various plant species in her private gardens.\textsuperscript{57}

While in Hobart, Ross had read D’Urville’s account of the French expedition in the \textit{Courier} and received a letter and rough chart from Wilkes detailing the USEE’s discoveries.\textsuperscript{58} To Ross’ chagrin, both Wilkes and D’Urville had explored the precise area south of Australia he had publicly declared to be his own area of interest. When the expedition departed on 12 November 1840, Ross therefore took a far more easterly route 170° E., determined not to simply retrace American and French steps.\textsuperscript{59} As with the other expeditions, the British retained a presence in Australia during the southern voyage, with Lieutenant Joseph Kay, two officers, and two marines left behind to manage the observatory. These men, initially accommodated in Government House until Franklin constructed a special building for them next to the observatory, were assisted during the expedition’s absence by the team of Hobart volunteers.\textsuperscript{60} This group included Franklin, Gunn, Franklin’s secretary Francis Henslowe, secretary of the Tasmanian Society John Philip Gell, Port Officer William Moriarty,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[54] ‘Ball to Captains Ross and Crozier, and Officers of the H.M.S. “Erebus” and “Terror”’, \textit{Courier}, 30 October 1840, 2. For population of Hobart see ‘An Abstract of the Census for 1842’, \textit{Launceston Advertiser}, 20 April 1843, 3.
\item[55] Ross, \textit{A Voyage of Discovery} Vol. 1, 120-121.
\item[57] Endersby, ‘Joseph Hooker’, 3-7; ‘Letter from Lady Franklin to Mrs. Simpkinson, 8 December 1840’, \textit{Some Private Correspondence}, 107-108.
\item[58] Ross, \textit{A Voyage of Discovery} Vol. 1, 113-116.
\item[59] Ross, \textit{A Voyage of Discovery} Vol. 1, 129.
\item[60] Ross, \textit{A Voyage of Discovery} Vol. 1, 124-126.
\end{footnotes}
Lieutenant George Bagot, Commander of the Royal Navy ship Britomart Owen Stanley, Government Printer James Barnard, and four others identified only as Messrs. Nairne, Leicester, Jeffrey, and Wright. On each term day, the volunteers “zealously devoted themselves to the tedious and laborious work” of checking and recording the magnetometer readings, and in doing so contributed actively and significantly to the expedition’s research.61

The return of Erebus and Terror to Van Diemen’s Land was eagerly anticipated in the colony. When two barques were sighted off the coast Franklin immediately sailed his barge down the Derwent to intercept the ships and escort them to their former moorings at Ross Cove.62 Jane Franklin was in New Zealand when Ross arrived, but her husband wrote immediately to inform her of the expedition’s safe return, adding that Ross had named an Antarctic island in the couple’s honour and gifted them specimens of Antarctic rock.63

The expedition’s second spell in Hobart generated even greater excitement than its first. It was heralded as a “complete success,” having penetrated eleven degrees farther south than either the American or French expeditions, broken Weddell’s farthest south record by four degrees, discovered and charted vast new lands, discovered active volcanoes, calculated the position of the South Magnetic Pole, and discovered a vast “barrier of ice” that was over 150 feet tall in places.64 Hobart’s Courier compared Ross’ achievements to those of Wilkes and D’Urville, noting that Ross had confirmed most of the French discoveries, but that the Americans must have made an “extraordinary mistake” as Ross sailed over positions marked as mountains on Wilkes’ charts. It also contrasted the perfect bill of health aboard Erebus and Terror with the ill-health which had ravaged the French expedition, and, with an eye towards

62 LA, 8 April 1841, 3; Ross, A Voyage of Discovery Vol. 1, 322-323.
63 ‘Letter from John Franklin to Lady Franklin, 13 April 1841’, Some Private Correspondence, 116-117.
64 Courier, 9 April 1841, 2; Courier, 13 April 1841, 2; ‘Launceston’, LA, 15 April 1841, 3; ‘From the Hobart Town Courier’, Cornwall Chronicle (CC), 17 April 1841, 6.
future commercial opportunities, reported that “seals and sperm whales were seen in abundance.” More remarkably, a play about the expedition was written and performed to celebrate Ross’ return to Hobart. This “much talked of and anxiously looked for spectacle of the Antarctic expedition was performed before a densely crowded house of all classes” less than a month after the expedition returned. Hobart’s Courier attempted to review the performance but felt it could not “do justice to this extraordinary production” and instead decided to “recommend all those who are curious on the subject to go and judge for themselves.”

Crozier oversaw the refitting of the ships, which involved lightening them by removing the remaining supplies and storing them in dedicated warehouses provided exclusively for the expedition’s use by Franklin. The officers were preoccupied with hourly magnetic observations, but the surgeons and scientists of the expedition took the opportunity to explore Van Diemen’s Land more fully with a series of excursions into the interior. Ross himself went on a series of trips with Franklin, including to Macquarie Plains to tour a fossilised forest, the Tasman Peninsular to tour the convict facilities there, and an overland journey to Launceston and George Town, where Ross conducted magnetic observations. Various expedition members also became involved in the Tasmanian Society, attending meetings and presenting papers during their time in the colony. Kay, at Franklin’s personal request, presented two papers to the Society on terrestrial magnetism and on the instruments and techniques used at the Rossbank Observatory. Surgeon and geologist Robert McCormick presented two papers on his geological survey of Kerguelen, Campbell, and Auckland Islands

---

65 *Courier*, 9 April 1841, 2; *Courier*, 13 April 1841, 2.
66 ‘Theatre’, *Courier*, 4 May 1841, 2.
and South Victoria Land.\textsuperscript{70} John Robertson presented an account of the southern voyage and the expedition’s geographical discoveries in Antarctica.\textsuperscript{71} Additionally, Ross, Crozier, Hooker, McCormick, and Robertson were, like D’Urville and Jacquinot, elected members of the Society.\textsuperscript{72}

In amongst the excursions, magnetic observations, and refitting, Ross and Crozier found time to repay the hospitality they had received in Hobart in spectacular fashion. On 1 June they invited 300 guests to visit the \textit{Erebus} and \textit{Terror}. The ships’ officers and crews had constructed a path lined with torches and covered with awnings from the road down to Ross Cove. When it reached the river, the path continued over a series of boats tied together, forming a bridge to the \textit{Erebus}. The ship’s main deck had been cleared of virtually everything except the masts to create a vast dance floor, with orchestra pits constructed at the stern and around the main mast. The \textit{Terror} had been similarly cleared and set up for dining, and had been lashed to the \textit{Erebus} to allow guests to move easily between them. Ross had arranged for a local confectioner and the Hobart barracks’ mess-master to prepare a meal that was described as “the most excellent ever prepared for a large party in Hobart Town.” The officers’ cabins on both ships had even been converted into ladies’ dressing rooms for the evening.\textsuperscript{73} Ross and Crozier’s attention to detail was such that the \textit{Courier}’s reporter remarked that “we really remember no instance in which more labour of preparation for the enjoyment of a single evening has been witnessed – a fête of a week’s duration would


\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Tasmanian Journal} 1, 240.

\textsuperscript{73} ‘The Ball on Board the Discovery Ships’, \textit{Courier}, 4 June 1841, 2; Letter from John Franklin to James Ross, 27 May 1841, NS3677/1/1, Box NSS/1, State Library of Tasmania.
scarcely have induced so much painstaking and extensive arrangement as Tuesday night displayed.”

Ross’ sincere gratitude, his ability to host a unique and memorable party, and his wholehearted participation in Hobart life during the expedition’s two stays in Van Diemen’s Land undoubtedly endeared him to Vandemonians. When the expedition left Hobart for Sydney on 7 July 1841, it was farewelled by large crowds and escorted by Franklin’s barge.

Fifty years later, South Australian politician Samuel Davenport recalled arriving in Hobart in 1842 and finding Vandemonians still “all agog as to the expedition”. Ross’ every move was reported in the Vandemonian press long after his departure, including the expedition’s arrival in various ports; Ross, Crozier, and Hooker’s meeting with the King upon their return to Britain; the publication of the scientists’ papers to the Tasmanian Society, Ross’ voyage account, and eventually Hooker’s *Botany of the Antarctic Voyage*; Ross’ involvement in the search for Franklin when his expedition went missing in the Arctic; and, eventually, Ross’ death in 1862.

This obsession with Ross’ career was not the passion of a single newspaper or editor; these stories were followed for more than twenty years by multiple newspapers in both Hobart and, especially, Launceston. Clearly, even twenty years later, Tasmanian memories of Ross remained undimmed. This interest in Ross came to be shared with the other Australian colonies and continued even after his death. The *Sydney Morning Herald* coordinated an intercolonial campaign for Australians to donate to the construction of a memorial to Ross in England, while books and newspaper articles recounted his

---

74 ‘The Ball on Board the Discovery Ships’, *Courier*, 4 June 1841, 2.
achievements throughout the 1860s and 1870s.\textsuperscript{78} Sixty years after Ross’ arrival Norwegian-Australian Antarctic explorer Carsten Borchgrevink was overwhelmed with joy when he was gifted a relic of Antarctic exploration, an Admiralty chart that had once belonged to Ross.\textsuperscript{79}

This widespread and long-lasting public interest in Ross and the British Antarctic expedition is significant. Historians of Van Diemen’s Land have tended to characterise John Franklin and his close circle of family and friends as a bastion of refined civilisation amidst a culturally-stunted, anti-intellectual society. Ann Moyal, for example, argues that “the broader colonial community was unsympathetic to scientific pursuits” such as Franklin’s Tasmanian Society.\textsuperscript{80} Andrew Lambert suggests that Franklin was ill-suited to the daily minutiae of colonial administration and baulked at the ruthlessness of Vandemonian politics, but that the most pleasurable time of his governorship was during Ross’ visits.\textsuperscript{81} Even after Ross had departed for the Antarctic, Lambert suggests that Rossbank became Franklin’s “garden shed”, a place for the governor to “lose himself in the demanding but specific routine of data collection, and dream of future polar travels.”\textsuperscript{82} This echoes Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s view that Franklin was disenchanted by what he perceived as the colonists’ lack of interest in science and education, but that Ross’ visits and the opportunity to participate in useful scientific work at the observatory offered him a brief escape from life in an intellectual backwater.\textsuperscript{83}

While most Vandemonians may not have shared Franklin’s enthusiasm for debating scientific questions such as the shape of platypus blood globules – were they circular or elliptical? – it


\textsuperscript{79} ‘The South Pole Expedition’, \textit{Age}, 24 April 1900, 4; ‘South Pole Expedition’, \textit{Daily Telegraph}, 26 April 1900, 5.

\textsuperscript{80} Ann Moyal, \textit{A Bright & Savage Land}, 72.

\textsuperscript{81} Lambert, \textit{The Gates of Hell}, 93-140.

\textsuperscript{82} Lambert, \textit{The Gates of Hell}, 131.

is unreasonable to suggest that this equates to a lack of broader public interest in science and exploration.\textsuperscript{84} The experiences of the British Antarctic expedition in Hobart suggest that Vandemonians generally had an interest in science, and particularly in the expedition. This interest was not manifested in a flood of new members joining the Tasmanian Society or a rush of convicts presenting scientific papers. Instead, it took the form of a barrage of intense newspaper coverage, of masses of people from all manner of backgrounds descending on Ross’ ships to inspect them, of convicts volunteering to work through the night on the construction of the Rossbank Observatory, of volunteers helping to record magnetic data on term days, of lectures presented at the Hobart Mechanics’ Institute, of discussion topics chosen for self-improvement groups, of social interactions with the expedition and its members, and of a play about the expedition. Vandemonians in 1840 were not the philistines depicted in the orthodox historiography. They were a community eager to engage with science and exploration in the ways they were equipped to do so.

The British Antarctic expedition received as enthusiastic a welcome in Sydney as it had in Hobart when\textit{Erebus} and\textit{Terror} arrived on 14 July 1841. As the ships were piloted into Port Jackson they were met by a boat with a message from New South Wales Governor George Gipps welcoming them to the colony and promising them every assistance in his power. In the event, this assistance consisted of private moorings off Garden Island and exclusive use of the island for magnetic observations.\textsuperscript{85} The expedition’s presence in Sydney excited significant interest and expedition members attended a range of social events. Opportunities to explore the colony beyond Sydney were limited, though Ross enjoyed an excursion to Parramatta with Gipps to visit the Parramatta Observatory.\textsuperscript{86} Before departure, the expedition

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{84} For a discussion of this paper see Moyal, \textit{A Bright & Savage Land}, 198-199. \\
\textsuperscript{85} Ross, \textit{A Voyage of Discovery} Vol. 2, 35-36. \\
\textsuperscript{86} Ross, \textit{A Voyage of Discovery} Vol. 2, 36-47.
\end{flushright}
was, like the USEE, honoured at a “grand public dinner” hosted by the Australian Club.\textsuperscript{87} Once the magnetic observations at Garden Island were completed the ships departed on 5 August 1841, bound first for New Zealand and then a second Antarctic voyage.\textsuperscript{88}

Two key questions emerge from the experiences of the American, French, and British Antarctic expeditions in Australia in 1839-41; why were they subjects of such intense and sustained public interest, and what legacy did they leave in the colonies? A simple explanation for the first question would be that Ross’ intense popularity was rooted in an assertion of British patriotism by colonial subjects inspired by the presence of a renowned hero of British patriotism, while support for both Ross and D’Urville’s expeditions stemmed from Franklin’s personal interest in polar exploration. Yet such an explanation can only account for responses to the British and, to a lesser extent, French expeditions. The question remains, why were Wilkes and D’Urville treated with the same civility and support as Ross when they were not only rivals to the British expedition, but were actively attempting to forestall it by racing to explore Ross’ declared area of interest?

To understand why these expeditions were of such interest in Australia, it is necessary to first consider the specific local contexts that shaped how each group of colonists and explorers interacted. In the case of the USEE in Sydney, a warm relationship was instrumentally valuable for both parties. For the colonists it ensured New South Wales was “brought into notice” in the United States – as it subsequently was when Wilkes devoted seventy-seven pages of his book to an account of the colony – and could potentially stimulate greater trans-Pacific trade.\textsuperscript{89} For the explorers it provided a friendly port relatively close to the Antarctic where they could obtain the supplies and services needed for refitting their vessels. Beyond

\textsuperscript{88} Ross, \textit{A Voyage of Discovery} Vol. 2, 48; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SH}, 10 August 1841, 2.
this mutually beneficial relationship, the Americans were also co-opted into a colonial political campaign. The *Sydney Herald*, which referred to the Americans as “blood relatives,” observed that “the equitable principles maintained by the American people are being carried on the winds all over the civilized world.”90 This remark highlights the links between the American expedition and the colonial reformist movement. At the time of the expedition’s visit, many members of Sydney’s elite were engaged in a campaign to reform the colony’s Legislative Council from a body appointed by the governor to a body elected or partly elected by colonial landowners. These reformers included Alexander Macleay, John Plunkett, and John Blaxland, who were also among the more active supporters of the expedition. For these men, the expedition was the personification of the ‘equitable principles’ espoused and embodied by the United States. A close relationship with the expedition therefore helped to legitimise their campaign, parading the spectacular, lavishly-funded American expedition as an example of the power of responsible government to redeem a society from political tyranny.91

Similar local factors contributed to public enthusiasm for the presence of the French Antarctic expedition in Hobart. Vandemonians stood to benefit from Antarctic discoveries that might lead to the development of industries like whaling or guano mining, while D’Urville gained access to provisions, skilled workers, additional sailors, and medical care for his crew. In addition to this basic covenant of mutual benefit, however, the presence of D’Urville was a significant boost for the intellectual life of Hobart. Franklin had taken a great personal interest in this, establishing the Tasmanian Society and providing Government House for its meetings, publishing the *Tasmanian Journal*, encouraging amateur scholarly

90 ‘The Americans’, *SH*, 30 December 1839, 2.
research, and promoting the development of various educational institutions. D’Urville, a respected explorer and scientist from his earlier Pacific voyages, engaged with the Tasmanian Society and the Hobart press, and in doing so helped to legitimise and stimulate the intellectual culture of the colony. The election of D’Urville and Jacquinot as members of the Tasmanian Society on their final day in Hobart can therefore be read as an attempt to link the fledgling society to the established learned societies of Europe, and thus to confer a degree of legitimacy.

Even by the standards set by Wilkes and D’Urville, public enthusiasm for the British Antarctic expedition reached exceptional levels in 1840-41. This enthusiasm was driven by the confluence of several factors. Ross was already a hero of Arctic exploration, and his discovery of the the north magnetic pole had earned him fame across the British Empire. The visit of such a famous, charismatic figure – and one in command of two imposing Royal Navy warships – was a natural source of interest. In addition, Ross remained in the colonies far longer than either his American or French counterparts, spending twelve weeks in Hobart and Sydney compared to five for Wilkes and four for D’Urville. While the longer duration of his visit was forced on Ross by the need to establish a permanent magnetic observatory in Hobart, it also allowed him to be a more active and visible presence in Hobart, attending social events, laying the foundation stones of public buildings, travelling beyond Hobart, and hosting his own spectacular party aboard Erebus and Terror. The longer visit also allowed expedition members to form stronger friendships with local people, such as those between the explorers and the 51st Regiment and between the professional naturalist Hooker and amateur naturalist Gunn. It also allowed Ross to leave behind a greater physical legacy in the form of

---

92 For Franklin’s role in the creation of the Tasmanian Society see John Lillie, ‘Introductory Paper’, Tasmanian Journal 1, 1-12. For Franklin’s interest in the development of educational institutions in the colony ‘Letter from Lady Franklin to Mrs. Simpkinson, 28 April 1840’, Some Private Correspondence, 93-98.
the observatory, while Ross’ name was inscribed in the geography of Hobart in the form of ‘Rossbank’ and ‘Ross Cove’.

As with D’Urville, Ross and his officers also helped to stimulate and legitimise the intellectual life of Hobart through their involvement in the Tasmanian Society, their publications in the *Tasmanian Journal*, and their open engagement with the Hobart press. This helped to amplify the already significant local enthusiasm. Ross was also able to convince people in both Van Diemen’s Land and New South Wales that he supported them in disputes between the colonies and the home government. For example, he used the term ‘Tasmania’ in preference to ‘Van Diemen’s Land’ in his public correspondence and later in his published account of the expedition. In 1840, this was a self-conscious political statement that implied a rejection of convict transportation and government despotism and a support for a society built on free labour and responsible government. This was how the term was used in the colonial press and in, for example, Franklin’s choice of the name ‘Tasmanian Society’ for his institution. Vandemonians would have understood Ross’ linguistic choice as a sign of sympathy for both the movement to rename the island and the movement to reform its social and political structure. Ross was more overt in his sympathy for local causes in New South Wales, promising to endorse the colony’s push to have a Royal Navy frigate stationed in Sydney when he returned to England.

As Ross’ subtle interventions into colonial affairs indicate, the visits of the three Antarctic expeditions were used by different groups in a range of specific local contexts. These local issues did not, however, exist in isolation. They were part of a broader pattern of Australian interest in Antarctica, centred on an awareness of the commercial possibilities of whaling,

---

95 ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, *SH*, 10 August 1841, 2.
sealing, and guano mining in the subantarctic, a desire to see improvements in the safety of Australian shipping that could only be achieved through a better understanding of Antarctic ice conditions and the science of terrestrial magnetism, and a desire to demystify and explore the unknown region immediately to Australia’s south. While this broader interest in Antarctica is most clearly seen in the period after 1841, when the possibility of further Antarctic exploration or the publication of scientific research connected to the three expeditions continued to elicit enormous enthusiasm in the colonial press, it was already established by 1839.

Colonial firms and vessels had been involved in the subantarctic sealing industry since 1804, when fur sealing began on the Antipodes Islands south-east of New Zealand. Sydney-based sealer Frederick Hasselborough discovered Campbell and Macquarie Islands in 1810, and colonial firms and vessels were heavily involved in the fur sealing and elephant seal oiling booms that occurred on Campbell, Macquarie, the Antipodes, and the Auckland Islands between 1804 and 1829. A Russian Antarctic expedition under the command of Fabian von Bellinghausen had visited Sydney twice in May and September 1820 while searching for an Antarctic continent. The Russian expedition excited considerable interest and was welcomed in similar fashion to Wilkes and Ross two decades later. During the expedition’s first stay in Sydney Governor Lachlan Macquarie visited Bellinghausen’s ship *Vostock*, the “Officers, Civil, Naval, and Military, Merchants, and Gentlemen of Sydney” held a ball in honour of their Russian guests, and the Deputy Commissary-General Frederick Drennan

---

96 Robert McNab, *Murihiku and the Southern Islands: A History of the West Coast Sounds, Foveaux Strait, Stewart Island, the Snares, Bounty, Antipodes, Auckland, Campbell and Macquarie Islands, from 1770 to 1829* (Invercargill: William Smith, 1907), 68-117.

hosted a lavish farewell dinner at Woolloomooloo House for the expedition’s officers.\footnote{36} During their second spell in the colony, the Russians celebrated the anniversary of the coronation of Alexander I on 27 September and attended an extravagant party at John Piper’s recently completed Henrietta Villa at the eponymous Point Piper that stretched into a tour of Port Jackson on a chartered schooner.\footnote{98} In the aftermath of Bellingshausen’s visits, Thomas Raine agreed to conduct some basic scientific observations on Macquarie Island on behalf of the Philosophical Society of Australasia when he sailed his ship \textit{Surry} to Macquarie to deposit a sealing gang.\footnote{99} The short-lived Sydney-based Philosophical Society was the first attempt to establish a learned society in the colonies, and Raine’s report on Macquarie Island’s geology, flora, and fauna was the first report commissioned by a scientific society in Australia, further demonstrating that colonial scientific interest in the Antarctic predated Franklin’s arrival.\footnote{100} The colonial press also consistently reported on the discovery of new subantarctic islands, the success of sealing expeditions, and the possibility of developing a colonial whaling industry in Antarctic waters in 1829.\footnote{102} This pre-existing pattern of interest in and engagement with the Antarctic region therefore suggests that colonial enthusiasm for the expeditions of 1839-41 cannot be explained away as simple expressions of patriotic sentiment or a natural consequence of Franklin’s personal interest in polar exploration.

It could perhaps be argued that public engagement with the Antarctic expeditions of 1839-41 was no different to public engagement with any visiting naval officer or warship. This suggestion is not, however, supported by evidence. For example, the intense public

enthusiasm for Ross’ presence in Hobart can be compared to public interest in British naval Lieutenant Owen Stanley and his ship Britomart, which spent two months in Hobart in 1840-41. Like Ross, Stanley was a naval officer engaged on a voyage of science and exploration – where Ross had the repetitive task of magnetic data collection, Stanley had the equally mundane duty of surveying Australasian waters – and like Ross he was in command of a modern Royal Navy warship. Unlike Ross, however, Stanley generated little press interest. Before arriving in Hobart, Stanley was mentioned in an extremely critical article about Whig patronage in the navy as an example of the “young persons, in command of vessels, who are notorious for nothing but relationship to Whig partisans”.

Britomart’s arrival in Hobart in December 1840 was reported in the Vandemonian press, as was its departure for New Zealand in January 1841. Stanley attracted no other press attention during his stay. Indeed, the most notable event of his time in Hobart was when he became embroiled in the spirit of enthusiasm for Ross’ Antarctic expedition, volunteering to assist with recording magnetic observations every two-and-a-half minutes at Rossbank on a term day. There was a brief flurry of interest in Stanley after his departure when he successfully forestalled a possible French attempt at annexing the South Island of New Zealand and conducted surveying work in northern Australia, but this interest was brief and unremarkable.

The earlier example of Captain William Hobson and Rattlesnake, an imposing twenty-eight-gun Royal Navy warship which visited Hobart and Sydney in 1836, also suggests that interest in Ross and the British Antarctic expedition was exceptional. Unlike Stanley, Hobson did not have to compete directly with Ross for public, press, and government attention, while the corvette Rattlesnake was newer and more imposing than Britomart. Despite these advantages, Hobson also failed to attract anywhere near Ross’ level of attention and support. His

104 ‘Shipping Intelligence’, Courier, 22 December 1840, 2.
105 Ross, A Voyage of Discovery Vol. 1, 124-126.
movements in Australia were noted in shipping lists and his mission to survey parts of Port Phillip Bay was welcomed, but Hobson remained a largely anonymous figure in colonial discourse until he re-emerged in 1840 as Lieutenant-Governor of New Zealand.\textsuperscript{107} The one exception was a report of a farewell party held for the \textit{Rattlesnake’s} officers by settlers in Port Phillip Bay.\textsuperscript{108}

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess public enthusiasm for the visit of every warship or exploring vessel in Australia in the first half of the nineteenth century, the examples of Stanley and Hobson suggest that enthusiasm for the Antarctic expeditions of 1839-41 was exceptional. It therefore cannot be explained away as the replication of existing patterns of relations between colonial subjects and visiting naval vessels. Instead, the enthusiasm for the Antarctic expeditions evident in contemporary press reports and in the actions of convicts and colonial officials alike should be understood as the result of a broader, pre-existing colonial interest in the Antarctic that was compounded by local factors.

When colonial enthusiasm for Wilkes, D’Urville, and Ross’ expeditions is understood in this way, it raises a second question; what was the legacy of this brief period of intense public engagement with Antarctic exploration? While Australian interest in Antarctica predated 1839, the three expeditions had the effect of focusing and intensifying this interest. There was an unsurprising drop in the intensity of press coverage after the expeditions left Australia, but public interest in the period after 1841 was still significantly greater than it had been before 1839. Interest after 1841 was also more wide-ranging in scope, encompassing amateur and professional scholarship, lectures, rumours of new expeditions, criticism of various scientific

\textsuperscript{107} See for example `Trade and Shipping’, \textit{HTC}, 19 August 1836, 3; `Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{Monitor}, 24 August 1836, 2; `Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{SH}, 25 August 1836, 2; `Shipping Intelligence’, \textit{Monitor}, 24 September 1836, 2; `Important’, \textit{Australian}, 6 September 1836, 2; `To The Editor’, \textit{CC}, 5 November 1836, 2; `Port Phillip’, \textit{Sydney Herald}, 17 November 1836, 2.

\textsuperscript{108} `Splendid Dinner at Port Phillip’, \textit{CC}, 17 December 1836, 2.
theories, popular fiction, and proposals for commercial speculation. It also expanded from the ports that had hosted the three expeditions to engage people and the press in both urban and regional areas across New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Queensland, and Western Australia, as well as New Zealand. This legacy of sustained interest in Antarctica ultimately resulted in a renewed surge of interest in the possibility of the colonies taking the lead in further Antarctic exploration themselves from the 1870s.
Chapter 2: The Idea of Antarctica in Australian Discourse, c. 1841-1885

In the immediate aftermath of the French and British expeditions’ visits to Hobart, there was a burst of scientific interest in Antarctica and Antarctic exploration. The journal of Governor John Franklin’s Tasmanian Society published a series of articles on Antarctica between 1842-48. These included papers presented to the Society by members of the British expedition and papers presented to European societies and republished for the interest of a Vandemonian audience.¹ The *Tasmanian Journal* also published its own report on the accomplishments of the French expedition, Ross’ report to the Admiralty, an overview of the British expedition’s scientific reports, and a review of Hooker’s *The Botany of the Antarctic Expedition*.² Each issue of the journal was promoted in the Vandemonian press, with the articles on Antarctica particularly prominent in the descriptions.³ The *Courier*, for example, republished McCormick’s paper on the geology and ornithology of the Antarctic regions to promote the journal.⁴ A public lecture at the Hobart Mechanics’ Institute by public servant Adam Turnbull in 1850, in which Turnbull argued that the origins of the world’s tides were to be found in the Antarctic and southern Indian oceans, was attended by “upwards of four hundred persons.”⁵ In the same year the Mutual Improvement Class at Hobart School of Arts debated whether there was land at the South Pole.⁶

---


⁴ ‘Sketch of the Antarctic Regions’, *Courier*, 22 July 1842, 4.

⁵ ‘Mechanics’ Institute Public Lecture’, *Colonial Times* (CT), 11 June 1850, 2; ‘The Sources of the Tides’, *LE*, 15 June 1850, 6.

⁶ ‘School of Arts’, *CT*, 9 July 1850, 2.
This scientific interest in Antarctica continued throughout the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s. In an anonymous paper on terrestrial magnetism published in the *Illustrated Journal of Australasia*, the author resoundingly rejected a proposal by the fledgling Philosophical Institute of Victoria to construct a magnetic and astronomical observatory in Melbourne, arguing that a hundred magnetic observatories in Victoria would contribute far less to the science of magnetism than a single observation taken near the South Pole or in Central Asia. While the author wanted to see Victoria take a leading position in the scientific world, they believed it would be foolish to attempt to compete with the “old nations of the northern hemisphere in branches of science peculiarly their own”. Instead, if Victorians wished to “advance the cause of pure theoretical science”, then they needed to do so in a field of science suited to them; they should abandon plans for an insignificant observatory and instead “fit out an expedition to the south pole”. As early as 1857, then, the idea that the Antarctic was a sphere of investigation uniquely suited to the Australian colonies was in evidence.

Ferdinand von Mueller, director of Melbourne’s Royal Botanic Gardens, was the colonies’ leading professional scientist working on Antarctic topics in this period, publishing studies of subantarctic plants that sparked calls for them to be cultivated in Australia. Von Mueller was also a member of the Acclimatisation Society of Victoria. This society saw the subantarctic as part of its purview, sending a pigs, goats, rabbits, and chickens to be released on the Auckland and Campbell Islands in 1865. Antarctica also attracted the attention of amateur scientists in the 1860s and 1870s. Newspapers were the medium of choice for amateur

---

7 ‘Magnetic Observations: Are They As Useful As Necessary?’, *Illustrated Journal of Australasia* III (July-December 1857), 145-155.
scientific discussion, publishing letters and articles on topics such as the Antarctic causes of
droughts in Victoria, the low barometer measurements recorded by Ross during his southern
voyages, the importance of Antarctic data for the science of terrestrial magnetism, and the
nature of the South Pole. Most notably, refrigeration pioneer and newspaper editor James
Harrison published a weekly ‘Scientific Gossip’ column in Melbourne’s Leader under the
pen name ‘Oedipus’, and frequently discussed Antarctic questions, such as whether there was
an Antarctic continent or an archipelago. Scientific discussion also not limited to major
metropolitan newspapers, however. For example, the Mount Gambier-based Border Watch
hosted a discussion between farmers on a theory that unseasonably cool temperatures in
South Australia were caused by the northerly drift of Antarctic icebergs.

There was also a more practical concern with Antarctic exploration evident in the colonial
press. Greater exploration and commercial speculation in the subantarctic was identified as a
panacea to Tasmania’s economic woes in the late-1840s. For example, a Colonial Times
editorial suggested Tasmania could end its economic depression by developing an Antarctic
whaling industry. Not only could Tasmania take advantage of “a mine of inexhaustible
wealth” on its doorstep, but whalers using Hobart as a base would create a new market for
Tasmanian agricultural produce. A failed attempt at Antarctic whaling by the Franklin in
1850 dissuaded others from attempting to realise this vision, however.

11 ‘Notes and Queries’, Australasian, 3 December 1864, 9; ‘The Low Barometer of the Antarctic Temperate
Zone’, Australasian, 7 September 1867, 6; ‘The Low Barometer of the Antarctic Temperate Zone’,
Australasian, 21 September 1867, 8; ‘To the Editor’, Ballarat Star (BS), 5 August 1871, 3; ‘The Earth A
Magnet’, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 28 August 1828, 3; ‘The Mystery at the South Pole’, Evening News
(EN), 27 May 1871, 3; ‘The Mystery at the South Pole’, Empire, 31 May 1871, 4; ‘The Mystery at the South
12 ‘Science’, Leader, 31 July 1869, 5. See also ‘Science’, Leader, 14 August 1869, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 21
August 1869, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 31 July 1869, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 15 March 1873, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 12
April 1873, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 10 May 1873, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 24 May 1873, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 3
August 1878, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 20 November 1880, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 29 January 1881, 5; ‘Science’,
Leader, 26 February 1881, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 12 March 1881, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 7 May 1881, 5.
13 ‘Why Is The Weather Wintry?’, Border Watch, 18 January 1868, 2; ‘Meteorology’, Border Watch, 22 January
1868, 2.
14 ‘Hobart Town’, CT, 19 December 1848, 2.
15 ‘Nautical Occurrences’, LE, 2 March 1850, 4.
From 1849-53 there was also intense interest in the fortunes of the British Empire’s newest, smallest, and most remote colony, the Auckland Islands. Officially a crown colony administered by a Lieutenant-Governor, the Auckland Islands was effectively a private settlement organised by the London-based Southern Whale Fishery Company. This company was founded by Charles Enderby, third-generation director of British whaling firm Enderby & Sons, which had pioneered whaling in the South Pacific and Southern Oceans in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. The firm’s captains – who were actively encouraged to explore new regions for future exploitation – were responsible for the discovery of the Auckland and Balleny Islands, the rediscovery of Bouvet Island, and the discovery of Graham Land on the Antarctic Peninsula. These discoveries were heralded in geographical circles but were a drain on the company’s finances at a time when the British southern whaling industry was already in decline. In an attempt to boost his company’s flagging fortunes, Charles Enderby developed a proposal for a whaling settlement in the heart of the subantarctic whale fisheries, seizing on positives reports by Wilkes and Ross for evidence of the Aucklands’ suitability for agriculture, colonisation, and whaling. He formed a chartered company, obtained dual-appointments as the company’s commissioner and Lieutenant-Governor, and sailed for the islands with three ships overladen with settlers, building materials, livestock, and whaling gear in 1849.

The Sydney Morning Herald was sceptical of the company’s plan to combine commercial whaling with the colonisation of the islands and questioned the islands’ suitability for either

---

17 Proceedings at a Public Dinner given to C. Enderby, Esq., F.R.S., at the London Tavern, Bishopsgate Street, on Wednesday, the 18th of April, 1849 (London: Pelham Richardson, 1849); Charles Enderby, A Statement of Facts Connected with the Fair of the Southern Whale Fishery Company at the Auckland Islands (London: Richardson Brothers, 1854), 61-66.
While sceptical, Australians were keenly interested in the new colony, and Enderby’s preparations were widely reported. An extensive trade was expected to develop between Sydney and the islands, and the company appointed Robert Towns as its Sydney agent. Notices were published warning that only company-owned ships could use the Aucklands for whaling and sealing, but offering every assistance to “vessels which may visit these Islands for Trade, Repairs, Stores, or Refreshment”. Early reports on the colonies’ development were positive, though it was noted that fresh supplies were needed from Sydney and that Enderby’s dual position as chief lawmaker and chief magistrate was problematic. Further positive reports came when Enderby visited New Zealand and Sydney, and when New Zealand governor George Grey visited the new colony. News of marriages in the colony were reported, as were the comings and goings of ships.

Despite Enderby’s ambitious plans to transform the Aucklands into a flourishing agricultural settlement provisioning passing ships with the produce of market gardens and employing sober, industrious men and their families in a profitable Antarctic whaling industry, the settlement imploded rapidly. Crops failed in the hostile climate, whaling operations were unremunerative, seal populations were too depleted to be profitable, the colonists were reliant on supplies from Australia and New Zealand, and the islands were too remote to attract passing ships. Enderby found himself hamstrung by decisions made in England by the

---

20 ‘Auckland Islands’, SMH, 15 January 1850, 2; Courier, 2 February 1850, 3.
21 ‘Auckland Islands’, Britannia and Trades’ Advocate, 26 September 1850, 3.
22 ‘Auckland Islands’, SMH, 25 March 1851, 3; ‘The Havannah and Fly at the Aucklands’, SMH, 12 April 1850, 2; ‘Auckland Islands’, Courier, 27 April 1850, 3; ‘New Zealand and the Auckland Isles’, South Australian Register (SAR), 17 May 1850, 2.
23 ‘Auckland Islands’, SMH, 2 October 1851, 2; ‘Auckland Islands’, Argus, 9 October 1851, 4; ‘Auckland Islands’, Courier, 15 October 1851, 3; ‘Auckland Isles’, Courier, 19 October 1850, 2; ‘Multum in Parvo’, SMH, 22 January 1851, 2.
24 ‘Clearances’, SMH, 30 November 1850, 2; ‘Family Notices’, SMH, 3 February 1851, 3; ‘Vessels Expected in Sydney’, SMH, 18 January 1851, 4; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, SMH, 2 February 1852, 2; ‘Projected Departures’, SMH, 3 February 1852, 2.
company’s board of directors, such as a decision to include women and children in the first fleet of pioneers rather than whalers and craftsmen alone, while the board grew frustrated with Enderby’s governance. 

After three years of enormous expenses, dire returns, and complaints about Enderby’s leadership, the Southern Whale Fishery Company’s board of directors despatched two special commissioners to the Aucklands in 1852. The commissioners, who were authorised to order the abandonment of the settlement if necessary, clashed with Enderby, resulting in a farcical situation whereby Enderby resigned from the company but retained his commission as lieutenant-governor. With everything on the island company property – including Government House – and every colonist a company employee, this situation was untenable. The settlement was abandoned, Enderby launched legal action against the directors, and the company was wound up. These developments were widely discussed in the Australian press, which was generally critical of the special commissioners’ treatment of Enderby but agreed the Aucklands was a poor choice for the whaling colony.

After this disastrous attempt to exploit the Antarctic from Britain, there were sporadic suggestions for colonial entrepreneurs to investigate it as a site for Australian commercial activity. In 1864, for example, a letter to the Australasian called for investigations into subantarctic guano mining, quoting Ross’ observation that guano-rich Possession Island

---

27 Enderby, A Statement of Facts.
28 ‘Auckland Islands’, Empire, 26 April 1852, 2; ‘Auckland Islands’, Courier, 28 April 1853, 2-3; Auckland Islands’, Argus, 5 May 1852, 4; SMH, 10 May 1852, 2; ‘Auckland Islands’, Argus, 20 May 1852, 4; ‘Southern Whale Fishery Company’, Courier, 2 June 1853, 3; ‘Auckland Islands’, Argus, 2 June 1853, 3; ‘Auckland Islands’, SMH, 27 June 1853, 2.
might prove “valuable to the agriculturists of our Australasian colonies”. There were proposals for an Australian Antarctic whaling company in 1866, and when it failed to eventuate there were warnings in 1874 that New Zealanders would forestall Australia in commencing Antarctic whaling. The memory of the failed Auckland Islands venture and difficulties recruiting seamen for the arduous, dangerous, unpleasant, and poorly remunerated work of Antarctic whaling at a time when the gold fields were a far more attractive proposition for maritime workers ensured these schemes did not come to fruition.

Beyond commercial concerns there was also widespread interest in the prospect of further geographical exploration in the Antarctic. There were regular outbreaks of rumours about plans for new Antarctic expeditions. Enderby & Sons were rumoured to be planning an exploring expedition in 1840 to follow up Wilkes and D’Urville’s discoveries. A South African voyage to make magnetic observations in areas overlooked by Ross’ magnetic survey of the Antarctic Circle attracted attention in the same period.

By the late-1850s, public interest in Antarctic matters had expanded beyond Sydney, Hobart, and Launceston, where it had been concentrated since the 1820s, to become a regular fixture of press reports across the colonies, including in regional newspapers. This shift can be clearly seen in Australian reports on the theories and activities of American naval officer and oceanographer Matthew Maury. Maury outlined a theory that the Antarctic continent had a temperate climate with conditions no more severe in winter than those encountered by Ross,

---

30 See for example ‘Notes and Queries’, Australasian, 24 December 1864, 9; Australasian, 6 January 1866, 8; Tasmanian Morning Herald, 26 January 1866, 2; ‘Whale Fishery’, SAR, 3 May 1866, 3; ‘Whale Fishery’, AO, 5 May 1866, 4; Brisbane Courier (BC), 10 August 1874, 2.
32 ‘Miscellaneous Shipping’, LE, 5 February 1845, 6; ‘Shipping Intelligence’, Courier, 8 February 1840, 2; ‘Expedition to the Antarctic Regions’, LA, 23 May 1840, 2; ‘Expedition to the Antarctic Regions’, CT, 27 May 1845, 2; ‘The Late Expedition’, CT, 19 May 1846, 3.
Wilkes, and D'Urville in summer, and suggested that the continent was habitable and possibly even inhabited by an indigenous people. Maury also called for Britain or America to take the lead in Antarctic exploration by organising an expedition immediately.\textsuperscript{33} This scheme excited particular interest in Australia, as Maury recommended Melbourne as the expedition’s base. The plan was heartily endorsed by Melbourne’s \textit{Age}, which felt that Britain – and its Australasian colonies in particular – should take the lead in exploring a continent “immediately opposite our own shores.”\textsuperscript{34} The \textit{Age}’s endorsement was syndicated in Hobart’s \textit{Mercury} and, three months later, Perth’s \textit{Gazette}.\textsuperscript{35} Launceston’s \textit{Cornwall Chronicle} ridiculed the proposal, reserving particular mockery for the idea of a race of “Southpolians” residing in Antarctica.\textsuperscript{36} Melbourne’s \textit{Argus}, Ballarat’s \textit{Star}, and Adelaide’s \textit{Advertiser} all reported on Maury’s proposal, but did not editorialise on its merits.\textsuperscript{37} Even the minor regional Victorian paper the \textit{Mount Alexander Mail} reported on the proposal for an Antarctic expedition based in Melbourne.\textsuperscript{38}

Nothing ultimately came of Maury’s flawed proposal. It was vague, totally uncosted, and gained little traction beyond the Australian colonies let alone endorsement by the British or American governments. When Maury resigned his position in the United States Naval Office to take up a position with the Confederacy during the American Civil War he no longer had even a government position to lend gravitas to his proposal, and what little momentum it had

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Age}, 20 November 1860, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{36} ‘Terra Incognita’, \textit{Cornwall Chronicle}, 5 December 1860, 5.
\textsuperscript{38} ‘Miscellaneous News’, \textit{Mount Alexander Mail}, 16 November 1860, 5.
\end{flushright}
faded away. Maury’s poorly planned proposal for the recommencement of Antarctic exploration was, in the context of Antarctic exploration itself, something of an eccentric curiosity, significant only insofar as it constituted a plea for international cooperation in Antarctic research two decades earlier than is conventionally presumed. In the context of Australian history, however, Maury’s proposal was one of a long line of occurrences to provide a focal point for Australian interest in Antarctica, and was, with the earlier colonisation of the Auckland Islands, one of the first of these focal issues to significantly capture the imagination of people outside of Sydney, Hobart, and Launceston. It was also in response to Maury’s proposal that the idea that Australia should take a leading role in exploring the Antarctic because of its proximity to the region was first articulated by the Age.

There continued to be widespread public interest in Antarctica throughout the colonies, even after Maury’s proposal lapsed into obscurity. The scope and drift of Antarctic pack ice was unusually severe in the 1860s, resulting in icebergs drifting into the Southern Ocean shipping lanes that connected Australia to the rest of the world. A series of narrow escapes by ships sailing to or from Australian ports, most notably the Marco Polo and Royal Standard, which both suffered serious damage after striking icebergs in 1861 and 1864 respectively, and the George Thompson, which was trapped in an icefield for four days in 1868, precipitated a frenzy of Australian press interest in Antarctic ice conditions. This press interest was further fuelled by of a sixty mile long iceberg seen by Australian-bound ships, a memorandum from the British Hydrographic Office cautioning all navigators operating in the

---

39 Bulkeley, ‘To unbar the gates of the South’, 322-325.
40 For a discussion of this idea see Bulkeley, ‘To unbar the gates of the South’, 310-326.
Southern Ocean, and the captivating story of the *Grafton*, a sealing ship which was wrecked on Auckland Island in 1864 forcing its crew to seek safety in New Zealand in a makeshift boat. While the wreck of the *Grafton* was not caused by ice conditions, it fitted into contemporary concerns about the safety of subantarctic shipping. These concerns culminated in calls for an oceanographic survey of the South Pacific from Australia to South America to improve the safety of navigation at high southern latitudes by correcting inconsistencies between charts. While this campaign focused on a British-organised, British-financed expedition with practical rather than financial support from the Australasian colonies, it was a significant precursor to later campaigns for Australian involvement in Antarctic exploration. It recognised that the colonies had shared interests in Antarctica that demanded greater exploration of the region, while stopping short of suggesting that these interests might require the colonies to take a leading role in this exploration.

*Antarctic Exploration as an Australian Responsibility*

The most significant single event in the escalation of Australian interest in Antarctica in the post-1841 period was the Transit of Venus in 1874. As early as 1864, Australian newspapers were reporting that the twin transits of December 1874 and 1883 would provide the last opportunity to measure the distance of the earth from the sun until 2004, and that a network of observatories around the world would need to be established to observe the transits. To provide the best chance of successfully calculating the distance of the earth from the sun, this network would need to include observatories as close to the north and south poles as possible. While establishing an Arctic station was relatively straightforward, the lack of knowledge

---

about Antarctic geography and meteorology posed serious challenges for a south polar observatory. To overcome these, a series of expeditions was proposed to explore the Antarctic and lay the groundwork for an observatory by 1873. Despite a lack of significant developments, this proposal was widely discussed in Australian newspapers from Ovens to the Darling Downs for over eight years, sparking a near decade long debate as to whether the colonies were obliged to contribute financially or materially to the proposed expeditions.44

This debate did not progress until 1873, when various Australian newspapers cited an article in Britain’s *Spectator* reporting that, due to a series of major errors, Britain would not be able to despatch the essential expedition to Antarctica in time for the 1874 transit. According to the *Spectator*, the only hope for the enterprise was if an expedition could be mounted by the Australasian colonies.45 The suggestion of an Australian expedition to fill the void was enthusiastically taken up by the local press. The *Age*, for example, declared that a failure to establish an observatory in Antarctica would leave “the scientific honour of our country at stake”, and concluded that “an Australian (Victorian if possible) Antarctic expedition should be organised without delay.”46 James Harrison used his ‘Scientific Gossip’ column in Melbourne’s *Leader* to lambast Britain for its failures, but also suggested that “we Victorians should seriously ask ourselves whether these words do not apply to us as to the mother-country.”47

---

44 See for example: ‘Distance of the Sun from the Earth’, *SMH*, 8 July 1864, 3; ‘Distance of the Sun from the Earth’, *SM*, 30 July 1864, 4; ‘News by the Mail’, *Bendigo Advertiser*, 16 April 1869, 1; ‘News by the February Mails’, *Mercury*, 19 April 1869, 2; ‘Transit of Venus’, *LE*, 1 May 1869, 2; ‘The Transit of Venus Across the Sun’s Disc’, *SMH*, 2 June 1869, 3; ‘Science’, *Leader*, 21 August 1869, 5; ‘The Secret of the North Pole’, *MAM*, 17 September 1869, 3; ‘The British Association’, *SMH*, 24 November 1869, 6; ‘Transit of Venus’, *Leader*, 1 October 1870, 5; *SMH*, 22 August 1872, 4-5.


46 *Age*, 8 April 1873, 2.

47 ‘Science’, *Leader*, 10 May 1873, 5.
The calls for an Australian or Victorian Antarctic expedition to come to the rescue in Britain’s hour of astronomical need also convinced the Liberal opposition members of Victoria’s Legislative Assembly, most notably the Member for Avoca James Macpherson Grant. In May 1873, Grant asked the Premier whether the government was prepared to “take any steps, either separately or conjointly with the other colonies, to fit out an expedition to Possession Island”.48 The Argus, which strongly backed Grant’s stance, declared it would be “a lasting disgrace to the whole of the Australian colonies, and to Victoria in particular” if the expedition did not go ahead.49 Conservative Premier James Francis responded that the expedition was a worthy cause, but that the government had already provided £30,000 for a permanent observatory at Williamstown, £3000-£4,000 a year to maintain it, and £800 for instruments specifically to observe the Transit of Venus from there. He also noted that the Director of the Williamstown Observatory, Robert Ellery, had advised that government funds could best be used to observe the transit from points in Victoria. As such, Francis decided that “the Government did not feel called upon to undertake an obligation which did not come within the radius of their duty.”50 Francis’ decision was decried in newspapers across the colony.51 So outraged were the editors of the Argus that they continued a press campaign for colonial action even after Francis had ruled it out.52 The decision attracted even more vehement criticism in South Australia, where the South Australian Register erroneously reported that New South Wales had committed £1,000 to an intercolonial Australian Antarctic expedition, so that if South Australians “may be induced to do our part” then the

49 Argus, 21 May 1873, 5.
50 Victoria Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, Vol. 16 (1873), 122-123.
52 Argus, 21 May 1873, 5.
expedition could yet be despatched in time.\textsuperscript{53} Evidently, many Australians felt that Antarctic exploration \textit{did} fall within the colonial governments’ “radius of … duty”.

In contrast to the chorus of outrage that mostly greeted Francis’ decision to withhold government funding for the proposed expedition, two dissenting voices welcomed the decision. The \textit{Australasian} agreed on the basis that any expedition sent from Australia would require astronomical instruments to be sent from England, eroding any time savings and rendering it an unjustifiable expense for Victoria.\textsuperscript{54} The Royal Society of Victoria also backed Francis – understandably so, as his decision was based on expert advice from the Society’s President, Ellery. The Society recognised the importance of observing the transit from Possession Island but argued that the practical difficulties of landing a party with stores and equipment to overwinter in the Antarctic with little time to prepare outweighed the probable scientific gains. It was, from their perspective, too great a risk.\textsuperscript{55}

The 1873 expedition was never likely to succeed. There was too little time – around eight months – for an expedition to be organised, and in spite of the enthusiasm evident in the colonial press and amongst the Liberal opposition, there was no individual or body capable of organising it. The only comparable Victorian exploring expedition – the disastrous Burke and Wills Expedition of 1860 organised by the Royal Society of Victoria – had taken more than three years to finance and organise, cost £57,840, and resulted in the deaths of seven members in largely preventable circumstances.\textsuperscript{56} It left a problematic legacy for anyone advocating the organisation of another exploring expedition in Victoria.

\textsuperscript{53} ‘Victoria’, \textit{SAR}, 7 June 1873, 6.
\textsuperscript{54} ‘Topics of the Week’, \textit{Australasian}, 31 May 1873, 18.
\textsuperscript{55} ‘Royal Society of Victoria’, \textit{Argus}, 12 August 1873, 6.
While the campaign for Australia to assist with observing the Transit of Venus constituted the first coherent calls for Australian involvement in Antarctic exploration, it was soon followed by more ambitious calls for Australian leadership in its recommencement. In 1866, the Melbourne-based *Australasian* argued that, with Britain staunchly ignoring the need to fill the vast gaps that existed in charts of the Antarctic in favour of repeated expeditions to the Arctic and Africa, Australians “must, in one form or another, and before much more time elapses, do it for ourselves.”

The best way for Australians to do it themselves was, it suggested, through an Australian whaling and sealing company based in Tasmania. These whalers and sealers could, in the course of their work, systematically explore the Antarctic, so that “scraps of intelligence, voyage after voyage, would fill up the measure of information.” This plan for exploration was not particularly ambitious compared to the elaborately-equipped, multi-vessel expeditions of twenty-five years earlier, but the idea of Australia taking responsibility for investigating the largest blank space on the map was a radical assertion of colonial confidence and competence. The idea was endorsed by other colonial newspapers, including the *Brisbane Courier* and *Tasmanian Morning Herald*, although the latter missed the spirit of the proposal somewhat by recommending it drop the exploring component to focus on whaling.

The most enthusiastic advocate was the *South Australian Register*, which responded with its own vision of a joint stock company based in Williamstown, Victoria, with initial intercolonial investment of £50,000, ships built and maintained at Williamstown, a depot on a suitable subantarctic island, and smaller ships employed to ferry supplies and oil back and forth between the whaling fleet and Williamstown, so that “employment would be given to an immense number of hands afloat and ashore”. The *Register* even declared that an Australian Whaling Company would be “as

---

57 *Australasian*, 6 January 1866, 8.
58 ‘Antarctic Sea Discoveries’, *BC*, 18 January 1866, 4; *Tasmanian Morning Herald*, 26 January 1866, 2.
safe a source of profit as a Bank or an Insurance Company, and a far safer and .... more profitable investment than four fifths of mines in Victoria."\(^{59}\)

The *Leader* issued its own call for Australian leadership in Antarctic exploration two years later, offering three reasons for an Australian expedition or expeditions; the prospect of scientific discoveries, the “healthy spirit of mere adventure”, and the possibility of great commercial rewards from whaling, guano industries, and more novel enterprises such as harvesting ice from icebergs.\(^{60}\) To help raise funds for its proposal, the *Leader* suggested a number of Melbourne elites “club together” to hire a steamer to escape the hot summer with a “pleasure trip” to the cooler subantarctic regions, with the funds raised going to the expedition.\(^{61}\) The *Leader* followed this article up three weeks later, noting that its suggestions had “excited more attention that we had hoped for; though certainly not more than the subject deserves” and reiterating that great discoveries were there to be made in Antarctica, including the possible discovery of unknown animals and perhaps even an undiscovered race of men.\(^{62}\)

The *Leader* continued to agitate for Antarctic exploration, revisiting the topic in 1869 and 1873.\(^{63}\) Reports that the Antarctic comprised a sixth of the world’s surface area triggered fresh calls for Australia to solve some of the mysteries of the region in 1873.\(^{64}\)

In 1875, German hydrographer August Petermann “expressed a hope that Australia and New Zealand will do something for Antarctic exploration” in a letter to Australian Museum curator Gerard Krefft. In a letter to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, Krefft endorsed Petermann’s

\(^{59}\) ‘Whale Fishery’, SAR, 3 May 1866, 3. See also ‘Whale Fishery’, AO, 5 May 1866, 4; Argus, 16 July 1866, 5.

\(^{60}\) ‘Proposal for a New Scheme of Exploration’, Leader, 4 January 1868, 16-17.

\(^{61}\) Proposal for a New Scheme of Exploration’, Leader, 4 January 1868, 16-17.


\(^{63}\) ‘Science’, Leader, 2 January 1869, 5; ‘Science’, Leader, 15 March 1873, 5.

view that there were great discoveries to be made in the south polar region and that Australia should be involved in discovering them. The idea of a series of Australian expeditions to “accumulate as many geographical facts as might be attainable” and lay the ground for an Antarctic observatory to observe the second Transit of Venus was briefly resurrected in the pages of the *Lismore Star* in 1877. In 1880, C.W. Purnell of Ashburton, New Zealand published an article in the *Melbourne Review* that lambasted “the want of curiosity of geographical enthusiasm, and of exploratory enterprise, exhibited by the people of these colonies with respect to the vast antarctic region” and called for an expedition to be equipped “at the joint expense of the Australian and New Zealand governments”. Purnell’s argument won support in the Sydney and Melbourne press, although the *Argus* – still stung by its unsuccessful 1873 campaign – commented acerbically that “Mr. Purnell must be a very sanguine gentleman if he imagines that professional politicians here or elsewhere care two straws about geographical or any other science”. James Harrison argued in 1881 that “if the Australians deserve the character for enterprise with which they are credited, they will soon follow the example of Aberdeen and Dundee in sending out a fleet of steam whalers and sealers” to explore and exploit the Antarctic ocean. Harrison’s brother Daniel wrote his own article for the *Leader*, welcoming reports that Swedish explorer Adolf Nordenskiöld was attempting to win Russian backing for an Antarctic expedition and predicting that any fundraising appeal directed to Australia would “be liberally responded to.” Yet while Harrison believed that Australians should support Nordenskiöld’s plan, he considered that this alone would be insufficient. Lamenting that virtually all knowledge of the Antarctic came from voyages over forty years earlier, Harrison declared that “Australians must bestir

---

66 ‘The South Pole’, *Northern Star*, 9 July 1877, 2.
69 ‘Science’, *Leader*, 7 May 1881, 5.
70 ‘Proposed Exploration of Antarctic Regions’, *Leader*, 10 January 1885, 16.
themselves. It is part of their destiny to explore these southern solitudes.” The Leader subsequently celebrated the news that the British Association for the Advancement of Science had appointed a committee to investigate the possibility of an Antarctic expedition, noting that a British expedition would mean that “the Australian colonies have had here a splendid field of enterprise opened up to them. At a comparatively trifling expenditure an expedition might be fitted out representing colonial capital and enterprise for the exploration of these remote regions, rich in marine, botanical, and it might be in mineral treasures.”

Alongside sporadic calls for Australia to recommence the project of Antarctic exploration begun by Wilkes, D’Urville, and Ross, the Australian press avidly reported rumours of other proposed expeditions. One funded by the Austrian government and organised by Georg von Neumayer, formerly director of the Melbourne Observatory, was discussed in 1870. The voyage of the Challenger, a wide-ranging five-year expedition organised by Britain’s Royal Society and dedicated primarily to oceanography, including subantarctic oceanography, was chronicled in the Australian press, with particular enthusiasm reserved for its visits to Melbourne and Sydney in 1874. The expedition’s scientific findings, meanwhile, were discussed in depth by the Royal Society of New South Wales. Melbourne’s Leader reported in 1878 that a rumour was circulating in Britain that George Nares, an Arctic veteran and Challenger’s commander, was to lead an expedition to Antarctica. The Leader was sceptical

72 ‘New Insolvents’, Argus, 9 July 1870, 6; BC, 27 August 1870, 6; ‘Dr. Neumayer’, Queenslander, 27 August 1870, 8; Argus, 7 December 1870, 5; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Empire, 13 December 1870, 2; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, EN, 13 December 1870, 2; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, ATCI, 17 December 1870, 15; ‘Proposed Expedition to the South Pole’, SAR, 15 July 1871, 5.
of the rumour’s veracity, but hoped that the rumours themselves might lead to “something being done towards increasing our knowledge of a region which never received much attention.”75 There were suggestions in 1880 that Sweden was experiencing its own burst of interest in Antarctic exploration in the wake of Nordenskiöld’s discovery of the Northeast Passage.76 The prospect of a Swedish expedition was welcomed, although the Age noted disparagingly that the “learned men of Sweden persist in believing that a vast mass of land encircles the … Southern Pole”, reflecting a certain confidence in the superiority of Australian knowledge of the Antarctic region.77 At the same time, fresh rumours of another British expedition emerged, with the Age reporting it would cost £24,000 and spend two winters “as close as possible to the South Pole.”78 This rumour resurfaced the following year with reports that Arctic veteran Allen Young was to take command and depart in 1881.79

This barrage of rumours and pleas for Australian participation reached its zenith with a sustained burst of public interest in a proposed Italian Antarctic expedition in 1880-81.80

Rumours of an Italian expedition costing 600,000 lira, departing in May 1881, and visiting Australia after two winters in the Antarctic were first reported in the Argus in June.81 More detailed reports followed a fortnight later, with an extract from an Italian periodical forwarded to the Argus revealing that the expedition was the joint-project of Giacomo Bove, formerly a member of Nordenskiöld’s Vega expedition, and Cristoforo Negri, president of the

75 ‘Science’, Leader, 3 August 1878, 5.
77 ‘Miscellaneous’, Age, 18 May 1880, 3.
78 ‘General Summary’, Age, 27 May 1880, 3.
81 ‘Miscellaneous Notes’, Argus, 3 June 1880, 6.
Italian Geographical Society, and that it had published a detailed programme of research.\textsuperscript{82} Once these details were made public in Australia the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} pronounced the expedition’s program “practicable,” while the \textit{Sydney Mail} explained that the expedition’s 600,000 lire budget was to be raised by public subscription.\textsuperscript{83}

In November 1880, the \textit{Leader}’s ‘Scientific Gossip’ column was the first to report that the Italian expedition had experienced difficulties in raising funds, forcing Bove to delay departure by a year. While Harrison regarded the postponement as a good decision, he argued that if the Italian expedition was to proceed “there should be some co-operation on the part of the Australian colonies.”\textsuperscript{84} He observed that “people never tire of talking about this unknown land”, speculated that the Italian expedition may “inaugurate a new era of activity” in Antarctica, and suggested that the colonies would be wise to begin their involvement now rather than wait for others to take the lead. As further incentive to do so, he pointed out, the discovery of mineral resources in Antarctica would be commercially advantageous to Australia.

The expedition’s postponement did not affect interest or enthusiasm for it in Australia. Effusive articles from overseas were republished throughout the colonies.\textsuperscript{85} F.E. Du Faur applauded the Italian expedition and lamented the lack of a dedicated geographical institute in New South Wales to provide support to such enterprises.\textsuperscript{86} Harrison labelled the anticipated Italian and British expeditions “a repetition of the great effort made forty years

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[83] \textit{SMH}, 15 September 1880, 4; ‘Foreign Shipping’, \textit{SM}, 18 September 1880, 566.
\item[84] ‘Science’, \textit{Leader}, 20 November 1880, 5.
\item[86] ‘Expedition to the South Pole’, \textit{SMH}, 7 February 1881, 6.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
ago.\textsuperscript{87} Even when it emerged that the Italian expedition’s departure had been postponed for another year, and Harrison predicted an imminent “announcement that the whole scheme has broken down,” positive articles about the expedition continued to be published as late as July 1881.\textsuperscript{88}

The depth of Australian interest in the Italian Antarctic expedition is symptomatic of a broader Australian interest in Antarctica. While most of this interest was positive, there were occasional bursts of resistance to wholehearted Australian engagement with south polar exploration. In response to growing support for Australian involvement in Antarctic exploration the Riverine Grazier argued in 1881 that “it is well nigh impossible to see what practical advantage an expedition within the Antarctic Circle can possibly be”, and called for any funds allocated to Antarctic exploration to be redirected to exploring the Australian continent instead.\textsuperscript{89} The Australasian republished a New York Times article in 1881 that ridiculed the Italian expedition by suggesting that its organisers had overlooked the propensity of the Antarctic continent to go “wandering” soon after its discovery. Pointing to the examples of Wilkes and Ross, who had charted continents that no other navigators had since been able to locate, the article warned that “either the Italians must take heavy anchors and chains with them, so that in case they discover a continent they can anchor it firmly to the bottom, or they must be prepared for the humiliation of having their new continent called a myth, and its non-existence rigidly demonstrated by jealous commanders of rival expeditions.”\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{87} ‘Science’, Leader, 29 January 1881, 5.
\textsuperscript{88} ‘Science’, Leader, 26 February 1881, 5; ‘The Week’, SM, 19 February 1881, 303; ‘A South Pole Expedition’, Armidale Express, 11 March 1881, 2; ‘Miscellaneous’ Armidale Express, 8 July 1881, 7.
\textsuperscript{89} ‘Telegrams From “The Age”’, Riverine Grazier, 22 January 1881, 4.
\textsuperscript{90} ‘Antarctic Discovery’, Australasian, 16 July 1881, 7.
In addition to scientific and commercial interest in Antarctica and Antarctic exploration, the Antarctic also became increasingly visible in colonial popular culture. For example, the Antarctic became a recurring motif and setting in poetry and fiction. A play was written and performed in tribute to Ross’ expedition in Hobart in 1841, while Emily Matilda Manning published an Antarctic poem, ‘An Ice-Berg’, in the *Sydney Morning Herald* in 1843.91 The first *Australian Annual*, a compilation of Australian writing published by Ballarat publishers W. H Williams and H. J. Summerscales in 1868, included a short story called ‘Treasure Trove’, which the *Ballarat Star* described as “a weird, sensational, impossible narrative of an expedition to the South Pole, for the gold in a ship wrecked among the icebergs of the antarctic circle twelve years before.”92 An anonymous poem published in the *Leader* in 1866 entitled ‘In the Botanic’ centred on an Antarctic motif, while Henry Kendall published a poem entitled ‘Mount Erebus’ in 1871 and ‘Beyond Kerguelen’ in 1880.93 Kendall was apparently an Antarctic enthusiast, writing articles for Sydney newspapers on the Antarctic theories of Scottish geologist Roderick Murchison and on the role of Antarctic exploration in observing the Transit of Venus in addition to his imaginative treatment of Mount Erebus.94 In 1888, Launceston police clerk Christopher Spotswood, who had helped to oversee construction of Rossbank Observatory in 1840, published an imaginative novella recounting a seaman’s voyage to an inhabited Antarctic continent, which was well received and widely read in Tasmania.95 The Antarctic was also a popular feature of imported literature in this period. For example, a story entitled ‘Adrift in the Antarctic Ocean’ in *Temple Bar* magazine was widely discussed in 1867.96 The Antarctic and subantarctic remained staples of popular

92 ‘News and Notes’, *BS*, 15 January 1869, 2.
95 Christopher Spotswood, *Voyage of Will Rogers to the South Pole* (Launceston: Examiner and Tasmanian Office, 1888); ‘Current Topics’, *Tasmanian*, 7 July 1888, 28; ‘Obituary’, *Tasmanian*, 3 May 1890, 15.
fiction well into the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{97} Works of popular non-fiction about Antarctica were also widely-advertised in Australia, such as a work in English by the German writer Georg Hartwig entitled \textit{The Polar World: A Popular Description of Man and Nature in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions of the Globe}.\textsuperscript{98} The visibility of Antarctica in both locally-produced and imported literature circulating in the colonies highlights Australia’s continued engagement with Antarctica in the nineteenth century.

The period between the departure of Wilkes, D’Urville, and Ross in 1841 and the resurgence of international interest in Antarctic exploration in the mid-1880s has normally been treated as something of a lull in Australian interest in the Antarctic. R.W. Home, for example, suggests that “in the 1870s … expeditions to the Antarctic, scientific or otherwise, were on scarcely anybody’s agenda”.\textsuperscript{99} Yet it was in this period that fundamental ideas about Australia’s relationship with Antarctica and Antarctic exploration developed. Far from lapsing after 1841, Australian interest in Antarctic expanded beyond the towns physically visited by Wilkes, D’Urville, and Ross so that events such as the proposed Transit of Venus expedition were discussed throughout the colonies. The idea developed that the colonies were especially interested in Antarctic exploration and should therefore support foreign expeditions or even outfit an expedition themselves. Closely related to this was the idea that the Antarctic contained a vast, untapped source of wealth in the form of whales, seals, and

\begin{itemize}
\item For example John C. Hutcheson, \textit{The Wreck of the Nancy Bell; or, Cast Away on Kerguelen Land} (London: Black and Son, 1885); Harold E. Gorst, \textit{Farthest South: An Account of the Startling Discovery Made by the Wise Antarctic Expedition} (London: Greening & Co. Ltd., 1900); Frank Savile, \textit{Beyond the Great South Wall, Being Some Surprising Details of the Voyage of the S.Y. Racoon, As Reported by her Owner, John, Viscount Heatherslie, to Frank Saville}, (London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Company Limited, c. 1901); Wilbur Lawton (John Henry Goldfrap), \textit{The Boy Aviators’ Polar Dash, or Facing Death in the Antarctic} (New York: Hurst & Co., 1910); G. Warren Payne, \textit{Three Boys in Antarctica} (London: Charles H. Kelly, 1912); John Mackie, \textit{The Great Antarctic: A Record of Strange Adventures} (London: Jarrolds, 1913).
\end{itemize}
guano on Australia’s doorstep, leading to proposals for Australian companies to exploit it. Even without actual expeditions to support, Australians were deeply engaged with the Antarctic throughout this period.

Yet despite this sustained engagement and the sincere calls for Australia to take the lead, no concrete steps were taken in the colonies to explore Antarctica. The popular campaign for an Australian expedition to observe the Transit of Venus from Possession Island was rejected by the Victorian government, and no funds were ever raised for the rumoured British, Swedish, or Italian expeditions in the colonies. Australia lacked a centralised, intercolonial government, navy, or scientific society that could transform the widespread interest in recommencing Antarctic exploration into a concrete proposal and coordinate an Australian expedition. When similar patterns of interest had developed in Britain, France, and the United States in the 1830s this crucial coordinating role had been filled by the state, and polar exploration was still largely understood as an activity for states in the second half of the nineteenth century. In an 1890 paper to the Royal Society of Tasmania on the possibility of Antarctic exploration, for example, Alexander Morton quoted the English Arctic explorer Sherard Osborne as saying “an exploration of the Polar area should always be sent under naval auspices and naval discipline. I have no faith in purely private expeditions”.100 In the absence of an Australian state, Antarctic enthusiasts required an organisational body that could fulfil the role of a state to capitalise on Australia’s Antarctic interests.

Chapter 3: Antarctic Exploration and the Australian Monroe Doctrine, c. 1886-90

The constant discussion of Antarctic exploration in the Australian press in the 1870s and 1880s captured the interest of a wide range of individuals and institutions. In Victoria’s Legislative Assembly, for example, J. Gavan Duffy became a champion of Australian Antarctic exploration, attempting to table a motion in the Assembly’s final sitting of 1885 declaring that “the time has arrived when the colony of Victoria, in consideration of its important position in the Southern hemisphere, in the interest of science and for the advancement of commerce, should undertake the task of exploration and discovery in the Antarctic regions.”

While Duffy’s ambitiously-worded proposal drew on the idea that the colonies should take responsibility for reinvigorating the project of Antarctic exploration, its impact was minimal. It was tabled so late in the parliamentary year that debate on it was postponed until the next session and then lapsed entirely when Duffy lost his seat in the 1886 election. Even supporters of Antarctic exploration in the Melbourne press showed little interest in the proposal. The only detailed discussion of it was a critical comment in the Australasian, which argued that an expensive polar expedition was unnecessary when the science of the polar regions could be easily studied by climbing a high mountain instead.

Duffy did, however, find allies amongst his fellow members of the Victorian branch of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia. The Society’s secretary, Melbourne accountant A.C. Macdonald, became interested in the possibility of a colonial Antarctic expedition around the same time as Duffy, his interest sparked by a meeting with a woman who had toured Erebus and Terror in Hobart as a young girl in 1841. Macdonald told the Argus that the Geographical Society hoped Australia would undertake the task of exploring the

---

1 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, Vol. 50 (1885), 2344-2345; Legislative Assembly, Herald, 19 November 1885, 1; Advocate, 21 November 1885, 11.
2 ‘Topics of the Week’, Australasian, 12 December 1885, 26.
3 A.C. Macdonald, ‘Section E: Geography, Address by the President’, Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (1894), 131.
Antarctic regions, as geographical research in these regions would “fulfil the cherished dream of some of the more prominent members of the society” and would be “of the very highest interest, both scientific and practical.” In the same year, the Society’s president, Ferdinand von Mueller, used his annual address to suggest that expeditions should be sent to establish observatories on subantarctic islands like Macquarie, Auckland, and Campbell. These observatories could then be used as a base of operations for both geographical research and valuable new industries like whaling and guano mining.

Geographical societies were a relative latecomer to the network of scientific societies in the Australian colonies. The earliest forms of these societies - agricultural societies, mechanics’ institutes, libraries, and museums - were established in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land in the 1820s. After earlier attempts in Sydney and Hobart collapsed due to political differences, onerous membership requirements, and public apathy, generalist scientific societies were established in Tasmania (1843), New South Wales (1850), South Australia (1853), and Victoria (1854). These generalist societies existed alongside other, often short-lived institutions dedicated to specific fields such as acclimatisation, engineering, geology, entomology, and medicine, or were themselves divided into sections dedicated to such fields.

The Royal Society of New South Wales briefly included a geographical section from 1876-79. Chaired by an enthusiastic advocate of an intercolonial Australian Antarctic expedition, Sydney draftsman F.E. du Faur, the section lasted for less than four years of irregular, sparsely attended meetings, and was abandoned when the active membership dwindled to

---

4 Argus, 2 January 1886, 6.
two. Despite the geographical section’s failure, du Faur, the section’s former secretary Francis Gerard, and French expatriate Edmond Marin le Meslée organised a public meeting in April 1883 to discuss the establishment of a new, intercolonial ‘Federal Geographical Society of Australasia’ that would promote, support, and systematise the geographical exploration of Australia, New Guinea, Polynesia, and Antarctica. The founders rejected the strict membership qualifications of the Royal Society that had limited interest in the earlier section, with the new Geographical Society to be open to anyone with the “patriotic desire of seeing the natural resources of this great country brought to light and developed”, including women.

The institution that emerged from these meetings, the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, was a remarkable experiment in federalism. The possibility of establishing an Australian branch of London’s Royal Geographical Society, itself established in 1830, was resoundingly rejected in favour of a fully independent institution. The society was to be officially intercolonial, with autonomous branches in each colony operating under the auspices of the federal society. A Victorian branch was established in August 1883, with von Mueller as Vice-President and Macdonald as secretary. Representatives of the New South Wales and Victorian branches held a ‘Federal Council’ meeting in 1884. South Australian and Queensland branches were established in 1885 and a second intercolonial meeting was

---

11 ‘Geographical Exploration of Australia’, SMH, 4 April 1883, 7.
held in 1887. The Society subsequently joined the federal Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) when it was established in 1888, and its members became the core of the AAAS’ Geographical Section.\textsuperscript{13}

The significance of the Geographical Society’s federal experiment, occurring seventeen years before Federation and six years before the Tenterfield Oration, has been largely overlooked. At the same time as the Federal Council of Australasia constituted the first experiment in political federation, the Geographical Society constituted the first experiment in a type of cultural federation. In discussions of the reasons for Australian federation it is seldom recognised that federal structures were already in existence prior to the debates and conventions of the 1890s.\textsuperscript{14} Separate colonial scientific and exploratory activities had already been subsumed within the federal institutions of the Geographical Society and AAAS. As New Zealand scientist James Hector observed at the 1891 AAAS meeting, the Association was “the first truly effective step towards Federation which has yet been achieved”.\textsuperscript{15} Hector saw the AAAS as an extension of the federal principles of the New Zealand Institute, which comprised the Auckland and Otago Institutes, Canterbury Philosophical Institute, and Wellington Philosophical Society, and argued that the Australian and New Zealand colonies needed “to apply the principle still further, and to federate”.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition to the Geographical Society’s precocious federalism, it is also significant for the expansive and expansionist understanding of ‘Australasia’ it articulated. The Society’s founders agreed that its activities should be limited to Australasia, but its constitution defined

\textsuperscript{15} James Hector, ‘Inaugural Address’, \textit{Report of the Third Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science} (1891), 4.
\textsuperscript{16} Hector, ‘Inaugural Address’, 21.
the Society’s first objective as the exploration of Australia, its adjacent seas and islands, and the Antarctic region. In line with this broad understanding of the Society’s sphere of interest, the first project embarked on by the New South Wales branch was an expedition to traverse New Guinea, followed by proposals for the establishment of a permanent Australian settlement in central New Guinea to develop its resources. Likewise, the Victorian branch’s first significant project was to attempt to organise an Australian Antarctic expedition. The Society’s sphere of interest stretched from the Equator to the South Pole, providing a valuable insight into how Australian’s viewed their sphere of interest in the late-nineteenth century.

The fledgling Geographical Society, and in particular its Victorian branch, provided an ideal forum for Antarctic enthusiasts. For those particularly interested in exploration, the Society’s federal structure offered hope for more coherent intercolonial action, while its modest membership requirements and tripartite interests in exploration, commercial geography, and geographical education made it a more accessible alternative to the generalist Royal Society of Victoria. Many enthusiasts, including Von Mueller and Macdonald, were members of both.

*The Antarctic Exploration Committee*

In the aftermath of Duffy’s poorly-timed motion calling on Victoria to explore Antarctica, the Geographical Society began discussing the issue in earnest. George Samuel Griffiths, a Collins Street stockbroker, council member of both societies, and perhaps the most enthusiastic of Antarctic enthusiasts, presented a paper on the subject of ‘South Polar

---


Problems’ at the Society’s January meeting.\textsuperscript{19} Griffiths’ paper provided a succinct summary of the unexplained scientific questions that could be addressed by an Antarctic expedition, from using geological samples “to recover the past history of the Southern Hemisphere” to using meteorological data to better forecast Australian weather.\textsuperscript{20} The paper was enthusiastically received by his fellow amateur geographers. Daniel Harrison suggested that an expedition could not only address the questions raised by Griffiths, but could also make a substantial profit while doing so. A small steamer could reach the Antarctic Circle “in about five or seven days from Melbourne” and collect guano and hunt whales while conducting scientific research.\textsuperscript{21} Macdonald noted that the idea of an Antarctic expedition had recently been discussed by a committee of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, as well as by the Berlin Geographical Society and other European institutions, “with the view to united action being taken”.\textsuperscript{22} As far as Macdonald was concerned, “Australia could not afford to be left out of such an enterprise”. He believed an expedition might not be as profitable as Harrison envisaged, but added that “individuals and nations could not, and ought not, to gauge such a question … by a merely commercial standard.”\textsuperscript{23} Duffy promised to again call on the government to fund an Antarctic expedition that if he was returned to parliament.\textsuperscript{24} Griffiths’ arguments were also widely reported in the Melbourne press.\textsuperscript{25} It is significant that this group felt that Australia, still a lose collection of self-governing colonies, could not afford to be left out of a movement by imperial powers to explore Antarctica at a time when scientific exploration was intimately bound up with sovereignty, geopolitics, and ‘new


\textsuperscript{20} Griffiths, ‘South Polar Problems’, 126.

\textsuperscript{21} Griffiths, ‘South Polar Problems’, 131.

\textsuperscript{22} Griffiths, ‘South Polar Problems’, 132.

\textsuperscript{23} Griffiths, ‘South Polar Problems’, 132.

\textsuperscript{24} Griffiths, ‘South Polar Problems’, 133;

imperialism’. 26 Placing Australia, which still had vast tracts of unexplored land in its interior, alongside Britain and Germany as communities with a particular interest in Antarctic exploration was a remarkably precocious assertion, particularly as Victoria itself had been a colony for just thirty-five years.

Griffiths followed up his initial call for Antarctic exploration with a second paper on Kerguelen Island at a meeting of the Royal Society of Victoria on 13 May 1886. 27 This paper again sparked an animated discussion. The society’s President, Melbourne University engineering professor W.C. Kernot, suggested that, given the rich potential for Antarctic exploration evident from Griffiths’ paper, this project “must sooner or later become a matter of interest to us, considering how much has been done in the Arctic Seas and how little in the Antarctic.” 28 This idea was eagerly taken up by E.L. Marks, who suggested that a contingent of Victorian scientists could be appointed to the imperial or international expedition that was being contemplated in Europe. Von Mueller took Marks’ suggestion a step further, arguing that while a large expedition would require imperial support, valuable exploration could nonetheless be undertaken on a smaller scale suitable “to the energies available in this Colony.” While acknowledging the limits of his own knowledge, he reiterated his earlier suggestion that an observatory be established on Macquarie or another subantarctic island. By such means the Royal Society could, in concert with the Geographical Society, “open up” the Antarctic region for science and “practical purposes” such as guano mining. Macdonald, endorsed this proposal and suggested that a joint committee of the Royal and Geographical societies be appointed to compile proposals for Antarctic exploration. Kernot welcomed this

28 'Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria, 13 May 1886', MS 11663, Box 1/4, State Library of Victoria (SLV).
idea, adding that “if Antarctic exploration is in the air, it is certainly desirable that we should be in the front in this matter.”

Macdonald’s proposal for a joint committee was passed unanimously, and it was left to the councils of the two societies to appoint their representatives. Within a week the Geographical Society announced it had appointed Von Mueller, Macdonald, Melbourne’s Public Librarian Thomas Bride, and former Royal Navy Captain Crawford Pasco. The Royal Society in turn appointed Griffiths, Kernot, Director of the Melbourne Observatory Robert Ellery, accountant H.K. Rusden, and the Society’s secretary George Selby.

As with the Transit of Venus and the Italian expedition in the 1870s and early-1880s, the announcement of an Antarctic Exploration Committee immediately captured the attention of the Australian press. A range of correspondents speculated about the Committee’s likely findings, ranging from the possibility of self-recording meteorological instruments being deposited on subantarctic islands, to inviting scientific societies in Britain, France, and Germany to cooperate with Australia in sending two expeditions to either side of the Antarctic, to a full-scale Australian or Victorian expedition. Melbourne’s Herald published an interview with Kernot, who raised the possibility that, given a voyage to Antarctica would only be twice the length of a voyage to New Zealand, he might go with the ‘Victorian expedition’ himself to “stop for a few weeks in these unknown regions”.

---

29 'Proceedings of 13 May 1886', MS 11663, Box 1/4, SLV.
31 ‘Minutes of Council Meeting, 3 June 1886’, MS 11663 Box 1, SLV; ‘Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria, 10th June 1886’, MS 11663, Box 1/4, SLV.
opportunities an expedition could lead to, including trades in whale oil, whalebone, seal skins, walrus oil and ivory, guano, and coal. It warned, however, that separate commercial and scientific expeditions should be despatched. While the commercial expedition examined the various possibilities for new industries, the scientific expedition could survey the Antarctic coastline, establish an astronomical observatory, and make sledge journeys across the ‘Great Ice Barrier’ discovered by Ross to reach the South Pole. It even raised the possibility that it may “be reserved for some Australian pioneer to do what Sir James was unable then to accomplish” by reaching the South Magnetic Pole.34

In response to this article, Swiss-born, Melbourne-based former Challenger expedition artist J.J. Wild wrote a letter to the Age outlining his own vision for an Antarctic expedition.35 Wild suggested a more modest preliminary expedition consisting of “a party of enterprising Victorian explorers” deposited on Kerguelen Island for three months to explore and survey the unknown west coast of the island and conduct meteorological and geological research. At the same time, the expedition’s ship would sail south from Kerguelen through a known gap in the pack ice that encircled Antarctica to attempt to sail to the South Pole, before returning to collect the men from Kerguelen. After Wild’s letter was published he was promptly invited to join the Committee as an additional expert member, alongside the considerably less expert J. Gavan Duffy.36

The Committee was preoccupied at its first two meetings with preparing a ‘Memorandum of the Objects to be Served by Antarctic Research’.37 This fourteen-point memorandum, which was sent to governments, scientific societies, and major newspapers of the Australasian

34 ‘The Regions of the South Pole’, Age, 22 May 1886, 13.
35 ‘Southward Ho!’, Age, 25 May 1866, 6.
colonies, reiterated Griffiths’ arguments about the scientific value of Antarctic research.38 It further declared that a colonial expedition could “confirm the existence of an abundant supply of sperm whales, and fur seals, and of shores elastic with guano”. If these resources were confirmed, Antarctic and subantarctic islands could be “stocked” with plants, animals, and birds, or even settled permanently, to provide reliable bases for the development of new Antarctic industries. The memorandum concluded by calling on the press and other scientific societies to “arouse a general and genuine interest in the undertaking” so that the Committee would be justified in asking for funds from each of the colonial governments to support an expedition.39 Alongside the memorandum, the Committee also issued a request for copies of logbooks of vessels that had travelled south of the Antarctic Circle, as well as any other information relevant to Antarctic exploration.40

The Committee’s aim of generating public interest in Australian Antarctic exploration was extremely successful. The Memorandum was published, republished, and discussed throughout the colonies. Several newspapers published it in full, while leading articles were broadly positive.41 Sydney’s Daily Telegraph, for example, welcomed the idea that “Australia secure the glory and trade” that would stem from an Antarctic expedition, though it doubted whether enough funds could be raised in the colonies due to the “prevailing monetary depression”.42 In Melbourne, the July meeting of the Royal Society was largely preoccupied with Antarctic affairs, most notably discussing the price of whalebone and

39 ‘Memorandum of the Objects to be Served by Antarctic Research’, 282-290.
41 For example ‘The Antarctic Exploration Project’, Daily Telegraph (DT), 2 July 1886, 3; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, SMH, 6 July 1886, 3; ‘The Antarctic Exploration Project’, Telegraph, 7 July 1886, 2; ‘A Memorandum of the Objects to be Served by Antarctic Research’, Brisbane Courier (BC), 8 July 1886, 3; ‘Royal Society of Victoria’, Argus, 9 July 1886, 6.
42 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, DT, 3 July 1886, 4
Kernot’s suggestion to use tourism to fund a preliminary polar voyage. Kernot and another member, E.J. White, believed that “no difficulty would be experienced in obtaining a couple of hundred people to go on an excursion to the South Polar Seas”, and recommended the Committee open negotiations with a steamship company to organise a summer trip.

Kernot’s idea attracted enthusiasm and scepticism in equal in measure. The Argus believed a tourist trip to the Antarctic would be “very enticing in the middle of summer”, but feared that the prospect of polar bear attacks and being frozen into the ice would make it less popular than the Committee believed. The Daily Telegraph agreed that a pleasure cruise could make a valuable contribution by demonstrating the viability of whaling and fishing in Antarctic waters, and suggested that the recent collapse of New Zealand’s White and Pink Terraces had created an opening for an Antarctic trip. A column in the Leader used Kernot’s odd proposal to lambast the British Government’s approach to protecting Australian interests in its surrounding regions. In a transparent attack on the British handling of the 1883 New Guinea crisis, ‘Atticus’ argued that, rather than bothering with an expedition or a tourist trip, the Antarctic could be opened up simply by announcing that the colonies intended to claim it. This would spark “a rush of other maritime nations to forestall us”, and the British government would not make any effort to interfere with these nations’ efforts. The regional Ovens and Murray Advertiser was more critical of the tourist idea itself, decrying the idea of exploration “conducted on the Cook excursion lines”.

The Antarctic Committee held a public meeting at Melbourne Town Hall a week later. Two visitors, Captain Sunman from the Russian Navy and a fellow of the Scottish and Royal

---

44 ‘Royal Society of Victoria’, Argus, 9 July 1886, 6.
45 ‘Notes and Comments’, Argus, 5 August 1886, 7.
48 ‘Our Melbourne Letter’, Oven and Murray Advertiser, 14 August 1886, 1.
Geographical societies called Mr. Coutts Trotter, were invited as special guests, with the former presenting a paper on ice navigation and the latter writing an account of the meeting and the Committee for the *Scottish Geographical Magazine*. After much discussion, the Committee concluded that a full-scale expedition would require two ships, a naval crew, a large professional scientific staff, and a plan of action drawn up by experienced polar explorers. It also concluded such venture was beyond the funding, personnel, and experience available in the colonies. Instead, they would approach the British Association with an offer to cooperate in any planned British Antarctic expedition, while also endeavouring to outfit a small colonial expedition as a precursor. They envisaged this preliminary expedition as an experimental whaling voyage undertaken in a ship provided by a Scottish Arctic whaling firm. A subsidy paid by the colonies would insure the firm against the risk of an unsuccessful voyage and purchase passage for two scientists on board, while a convoluted system of bonuses would encourage geographical exploration, surveying, and the collection of useful data and specimens. The colonial governments would, the Committee hoped, fund the subsidy and bonuses.

With a plan of action in place, the Committee formed a ten-man deputation to meet with Victorian Premier Duncan Gillies. Pasco and Kernot restated the memorandum’s arguments about the value of the “neglected” Antarctic continent, while Von Mueller and Duffy added their own idiosyncratic arguments. Von Mueller, evidently forgetting the failed settlement of the Aucklands, suggested that subantarctic islands such as Campbell Island “might become valuable for colonising” due to what he considered their similar climate to the northern

---

49 ‘Geographical Notes’, *Scottish Geographical Magazine* 2, no. 10 (1886), 622.
islands of Scotland. Adding the idea of control to the idea of exploration, Duffy declared that it was “the duty of Victoria to take possession of the islands in the Southern seas, otherwise some other Power would do it, and we should realize their importance when too late.”

Griffiths outlined the Committee’s proposal, suggesting that the government could pay a whaling ship to bring a cargo of gunpowder to Melbourne to cover the cost of bringing the ship to the southern hemisphere, as well as provide a small grant to pay the bonuses.

Early in the Committee’s planning, some supporters such as Kernot and Duffy had been interested in the idea of a purely Victorian or Victorian-British expedition. For example, Kernot alluded to the rivalry with New South Wales when endorsing the proposal for an Antarctic Exploration Committee by saying “if New South Wales could send troops to assist in the Soudan, perhaps Victoria could send people of a more peaceful disposition to aid the old country in the Antarctic circle.” For the majority of Antarctic enthusiasts, however, Antarctic exploration was understood as a collective Australian responsibility, and any expedition should therefore be intercolonial in nature. This was confirmed by Gillies, who gave his wholehearted endorsement to the proposal but felt no colony could be expected to fund the expedition alone. This stipulation firmly established Antarctic exploration as a federal enterprise. Gillies agreed to enlist Victoria’s agent-general in London, Graham Berry, to act as the Committee’s agent in negotiations with Scottish whaling firms, and offered to write to the other Australasian premiers, but made it clear that a grant would only be forthcoming if it were matched by the other colonies.

---

53 ‘Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria, 13 May 1886’, MS 11663, Box 1/4, SLV.
54 ‘Minutes of Council Meeting of Royal Society of Victoria, 7th April 1887’, MS 11663, SLV; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *Herald*, 4 August 1886, 3.
The Committee’s deputation to the premier, its letter to the British Association for the
Advancement of Science, and Gillies’ letters to Berry and the colonial premiers ensured the
idea of an Antarctic expedition remained in public view, with the press enthusiastically
covering every development.\textsuperscript{55} Letters and editorials were broadly positive, though it became
clear that even supporters of an Antarctic expedition were divided over how it should be
organised and funded. For example, the \textit{Argus} welcomed the proposal but argued that science
and whaling were incompatible and that private enterprise should be allowed to open up the
Antarctic to exploration and exploitation without government involvement.\textsuperscript{56} Similarly, the
\textit{Leader} suggested that the Committee’s proposal “marks an epoch in the history of a young
nation” and that, if successful, “the country would gain a degree of consideration in Europe
which it has never yet enjoyed”, but added that “it would be much more creditable to our
communities if the work could be done by means of private subscription.”\textsuperscript{57} Venerable
Australian explorer A.C. Gregory, best known for four expeditions in central and western
Australia, welcomed the proposal and urged the committee to investigate the impact of
Antarctic conditions on Australian meteorology, while a former Victorian whaler wrote to the
\textit{Age} to suggest the Committee turn its attention towards a coastal whaling industry off
Victoria rather than pelagic whaling so far south.\textsuperscript{58} A local newspaper in Victoria’s former
whaling town of Portland was more supportive of the idea of an Antarctic whaling industry,
seeing it as a possible source of wealth for the town.\textsuperscript{59} Approval also came from overseas.

\textsuperscript{55} For example \textit{Argus}, 4 August 1886, 5; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{Herald}, 4 August 1886, 3; \textit{Argus}, 5 August
1886, 5; ‘The Proposed Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{DT}, 5 August 1886, 5; ‘Intercolonial’, \textit{Daily News (DN)}, 6
August 1886, 3; \textit{Argus}, 7 August 1886, 9; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{Evening Journal (EJ)}, 14 August 1886, 3;
\textit{South Australian Advertiser (SAA)}, 26 August 1886, 5; \textit{Argus}, 24 August 1886, 5; ‘Antarctic Exploration’,
\textit{SMH}, 26 August 1886 8; ‘Antarctic Explorations’, \textit{SAA}, 11 August 1886, 5; ‘The Icy South’, \textit{Evening News
(EN)}, 11 August 1886, 4; ‘The Proposed Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{DT}, 11 August 1886, 5; ‘Town news’,
\textit{Australasian}, 14 August 1886, 27; \textit{Weekly Times}, 14 August 1886, 11; ‘Antarctic Explorations’, \textit{SAA}, 14 August
1886, 5; ‘The Proposed Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{DT}, 14 August 1886, 5; \textit{Argus}, 14 August 1886, 9; ‘Tasmanian
Expedition’, \textit{Australian Town and Country Journal (ATCJ)}, 28 August 1886, 12.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Argus}, 7 August 1886, 9.

\textsuperscript{57} ‘The Week’, \textit{Leader}, 14 August 1886, 25.

\textsuperscript{58} ‘News of the Day’, \textit{DN}, 9 August 1886, 3. Gregory had previously endorsed von Mueller and Macdonald’s
1886, 13.

London’s Observer, for example, urged the Royal Navy to loan the colonies a suitable ship to allow them to despatch an expedition.\footnote{60}{‘Colonial Items’, Australasian, 28 August 1886, 28; ‘Miscellaneous Cable News’, Sydney Mail (SM), 28 August 1886, 430.}

At the same time, the Committee was extremely active in its own right. After the meeting with Gillies the Committee wrote to the Geographical, Royal, and Linnean Societies of New South Wales to ask them to petition their government to provide a grant to the expedition.\footnote{61}{‘Minutes of Council Meeting of Royal Society of Victoria, 7 April 1887’, MS 11663, Royal Society of Victoria Vol. 1, SLV.} The council of the Geographical Society immediately agreed, declaring itself “anxious to assist in every way possible” in bringing the Antarctic expedition to fruition.\footnote{62}{‘News of the Day’, SMH, 12 July 1886, 9; ‘General News’, DT, 12 July 1886, 4.} Though the cause itself was uncontroversial, the council’s lack of consultation with ordinary members caused some consternation. Whilst fully endorsing the “Federal Antarctic Expedition” and its “glorious task”, one anonymous member wrote to the Sydney Morning Herald to argue that the Committee should cooperate with the Geographical Society of Paris.\footnote{63}{‘Geographical’, SMH, 28 July 1886, 11.} A French-Australian expedition would, they suggested, be a tribute to the Parisian Society’s role in founding its Australasian counterpart, and more importantly would be a starting point for developing a strong diplomatic relationship between France and the Australian colonies.\footnote{64}{The idea of establishing an independent Federal Geographical Society of Australasia was made by members of the Geographical Society of Paris to French expatriate Edmond Marin le Meslée, who was instrumental in founding the society in 1883.} They argued that embracing such a relationship, rather than continuing to press for direct Australian control of the South Pacific Islands in the form of an Australian ‘Monroe Doctrine’, would prove vital for maintaining peace and security in the region. This geographer’s idea that Antarctic exploration could be used to develop an independent Australian foreign policy – fifteen years before there was an Australian state and fifty-six
years before the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act – highlights the surprising independence of Australian political thought in the 1880s.

The Royal and Linnean Societies were slower to give their support to the Antarctic Committee, but after consultation with their members and each other both agreed to petition the government. The South Australian branch of the Geographical Society endorsed the idea of an Antarctic expedition but was unable to make any financial contribution. The Society’s president Thomas Elder, however, promised to use his connections with the American Geographical Society to request copies of the logbooks of American whaling and sealing ships that had operated in the Southern Ocean. The Queensland branch of the Society was open to supporting the expedition, but like its South Australian counterpart offered nothing in the way of a financial contribution. Approval also came from the Otago Institute and the Scottish Geographical Society, with the latter expressing a desire to facilitate cooperation between the Australian Committee and those in Britain who supported an expedition.

The most enthusiastic response came from the Royal Society of Tasmania, a generalist institution that loosely traced its origins to the Tasmanian Society. After receiving Gillies’ circular letter and the Antarctic Committee’s memorandum, Tasmanian Premier James Agnew announced his government would follow the Society’s advice on whether the


67 ‘Geographical Society’, *Telegraph*, 7 July 1886, 5;

68 ‘Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria, 14th October 1886’, MS 11663, Box 1/4, SLV; ‘Letter from H. R. Rusden to F. R. Chapman, 16 April 1887’, MS 13020, Box 5/2, SLV.
proposal deserved government support. Agnew’s confidence in outsourcing this decision to the Royal Society was no doubt helped by the fact he was its secretary. The matter was due to be decided at a meeting on 13 September 1886, with the colony’s deputy surveyor-general Charles Sprent presenting a paper to sixty-two fellows.

While Sprent’s paper summarised the history of Antarctic exploration, it was far from a scholarly and detached analysis of the proposal. Instead, Sprent launched an impassioned plea for Tasmania to support Antarctic exploration. He reminded his audience of Tasmanians’ unique relationship with polar exploration, and pointed out that the Society’s Vice-President, James Barnard, had been a member of the Tasmanian Society with Franklin, Ross, and Crozier. He rebuked those who thought that such an expedition had little value, highlighting both the potential for lucrative new industries and the fact that the future applications of scientific knowledge were impossible to predict. Finally, he argued that Antarctic exploration must be undertaken by Australia and not be left to other countries. Australians, he argued “aspire to be the leading power in these Southern Seas” and were “gradually setting up a Monroe Doctrine of our own”. Yet while Australians considered a vast region in the Pacific and Southern Oceans to be “our preserves”, they now had to “act as well as talk” and demonstrate their influence if they wanted to see their claims recognised. While an Australian navy would help to safeguard claims in the Pacific, the colonies now had before them an opportunity to demonstrate their position and influence through science. Given that the “scientific world” was desperate to see Antarctic exploration renewed,

---

69 ‘Royal Society of Tasmania’, *Mercury*, 11 August 1886, 3; ‘Local and General’, *Tasmanian News* (TN), 20 August 1886, 2; *Mercury*, 20 August 1886, 2; ‘Tasmanian Intelligence’, *Launceston Examiner* (LE), 20 August 1886, 3.

“No time is more opportune for such a demonstration than the present, when the Colonies are so prominently before the public of the world. We have shown the rapid progress of our commerce and the vastness of our resources. We have proved that in manly sports we can hold our own with all comers; now let us show that the old Anglo-Saxon love of adventure is strong within us, and that although during our infancy we were content to share the benefits of scientific work, in our manhood we are ready to share the toil.”

Sprent concluded his paper by warning that it would be “a standing disgrace to Australia if she took no part in the exploration of the seas that wash her own coasts”. His argument met with unanimous support the Royal Society. J.B. Walker proposed a resolution affirming the Society’s support for the Committee’s proposal and recommended that copies of it be sent to every Australasian premier. Alexander Morton suggested that the return of the expedition would be an apt celebration of Australia’s centenary in 1888 and volunteered to join the expedition as Tasmania’s representative. Alfred Mault observed that Federation would require a federal navy, and Antarctic exploration would be the ideal training ground for Australia’s future naval men. G. Clark declared “it would be to its unspeakable and everlasting disgrace” if Tasmania held back from supporting the proposed expedition. In the aftermath of the paper, Agnew, Barnard, Morton, R.M. Johnston, and the Bishop of Tasmania formed a deputation to Agnew’s newly installed successor as Premier, Philip Fysh, to suggest that the Tasmanian government contribute £500 to the Antarctic expedition. Fysh agreed that the expedition was worthy of support but offered to instead subscribe £1 or £2 for every £1 donated by Tasmanians.

---

The Australian Monroe Doctrine

Sprent’s paper, and his conception of an Australian Monroe Doctrine stretching from the Pacific to the Antarctic, has been discussed by several scholars, including R.A. Swan, Gillian Triggs, Tom Griffiths, and Marie Kawaja. Yet none of these accounts interrogate the idea further, treating it primarily as an interesting but ultimately insignificant assertion. Indeed, Kawaja goes so far as to insist that, while there was talk of an Australian Monroe Doctrine in the 1880s, “such talk, however, was just that, and a doctrine that laid down how Australia would protect its northern and southern approaches was not introduced.” This assertion is not borne out by evidence. The Australian Monroe Doctrine was one of the most significant ideas in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Australian thought and it is impossible to understand Australian activities in the Antarctic without understanding its influence.

Sprent’s paper provides a unique insight into contemporary understandings of what constituted Australia, its rightful sphere of influence, its future, and its place in the world at a time when the Federation movement was gathering momentum and Australian relations with the Colonial Office were at breaking point over the colonies’ desire to annexe islands in the South Pacific. The term ‘Australian Monroe Doctrine’ was a direct reference to the American Monroe Doctrine, a policy first articulated in 1823 that declared the western hemisphere to be an American sphere of influence, free from the corruptive forces of the Old World. Significantly, the doctrine stated that the United States would consider any attempt by

---


European imperial powers “to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” The idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine was therefore an assertion of the existence of a similar sphere of Australian influence free from European colonisation and aggression. The genealogy of this idea can be traced to the beginnings of European settlement in Australia, and is evident in the instructions given to the first governor of New South Wales, Arthur Phillip, which placed “all the islands adjacent in the Pacific Ocean” between the latitudes of Cape York (10° 37’ S.) and Tasmania’s South East Cape (43° 39’ S.) under his control, and instructed him to investigate the potential of New Zealand flax to form a staple export for the new colony. From the colony’s conception it was understood to have a sphere of interest and influence that extended well beyond the boundaries of the continent, with New Zealand and the Pacific Islands conceived as auxiliary dependencies to provide New South Wales with labour and resources.

This idea of Australia having a distinct sphere of interest in its surrounding region became identified with the more specific idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine in the 1880s, when it also enjoyed its widest circulation. It emerged from the New Guinea annexation crisis, when the Premier of Queensland, Thomas McIlwraith, responded to reports of Germany’s intention to claim eastern New Guinea by unilaterally annexing it in 1883. The annexation enjoyed widespread support in the Australian colonies but was repudiated by the Colonial Secretary. The first intercolonial Australasian Convention was held in Sydney that year to

80 The term was also applied to the White Australia Policy in reference to its status as a cornerstone of foreign policy. See for example F.A.W. Gisborne, The Munroe Doctrine of Australia (London: W. & R. Chambers, 1907). This alternative usage is beyond the scope of this analysis.
81 For a summary of the campaign for the annexation of New Guinea see George A. Bicknell, ‘The Annexation of New Guinea’, Victoria Review vol. VIII, no. 43 (1 May 1883), 90-98. For studies of the annexation crisis see Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era, 1820-1920 (Melbourne:
discuss the annexation crisis and the idea of federation, and led to a resolution that the
“further acquisition of dominion in the Western Pacific, south of the Equator, by any Foreign
Power would be highly detrimental to the safety and well being of the British possessions in
Australasia, and injurious to the interests of the Empire.”

After Germany subsequently claimed north-east New Guinea, through the form of a chartered company, in November 1884, the term Australian or Pacific Monroe Doctrine became widely used to express this idea. For example, a debate about the nature, extent, and merits of an Australian doctrine played out in the Sydney press in the early months of 1885.

The idea continued to circulate throughout the 1880s and 1890s, and was often closely linked
to the call for an independent, federated Australia. A Sydney Trade and Labor Council
special commissioner, John Norton, told the Pall Mall Gazette while in England that
“Australasia wishes to place itself in the position of the United States - it wishes to observe
the Monroe doctrine”.

In the discussion of a paper on “the mutual duties of England and Australia in time of war” at the London Chamber of Commerce, former Victorian politician Andrew Clarke remarked that the Australian colonies had adopted “the Monroe doctrine, of
neither entangling in the broils of Europe nor suffering the powers of the old world to
interfere with their affairs.” Similar sentiments were expressed in a leading article in
Sydney’s Arrow disdaining the possibility of imperial federation. This article avowed that
Australian patriotism would “lift the Newer World out of the ruck of Old World wars and

82 National Archives of Australia (NAA): A981, ANT 4 PART 1, 1920-1921, Confidential Memorandum on the
Spheres of Interest of Australia and New Zealand, 6 November 1920.
83 See for example ‘German Policy in the Pacific’, SMH, 3 January 1885, 7; ‘Foreign Annexation in the Pacific’,
SMH 4; ‘In the South Pacific’, Evening News, 13 January 1885, 3; ‘Correspondence’, DT, 14 January 1885, 3;
‘New Guinea Annexation’, EN, 5 February 1885, 3; ‘Sir John Robertson on Annexation’, DT, 11 February
1885, 4; SMH, 16 February 1885, 7; ‘German Annexations’, SMH, 18 February 1885, 7; ‘Mr. Froude on
Colonial Affairs’, DT, 20 February 1885, 4; ‘Mr. Froude on Australia’, DT, 23 February 1886, 3; ‘England’s
Unsleeping Enemy’, DT, 2 May 1885, 9.
84 ‘English Problems and Australasian Policy’, EN, 6 November 1886, 5.
miseries for ever, and the sooner this great Monroe Doctrine is applied to Australia the better it will be for our country and the future of our children.”86 Pro-federation Congregationalist minister Llewellyn D. Bevan declared it “was high time the Australian people should have some sort of Monroe doctrine”, whereby “aggressive acts in the Southern Hemisphere ought to be held as an unfriendly action towards Australia.”87 The South Australian Chronicle summarised the spirit behind the Pacific Monroe Doctrine as “Australia for the Australians”, while the South Australian Register declared in 1890 that “Australia is rightly enamoured of the Monroe Doctrine”, adding that “naturally the Pacific belongs to Australasia, and the great and growing Australian States will not readily admit any claim to a share in the spoils”.88 The first draft of a federal constitution for Australia, written at the 1891 Constitutional Convention, reflected the belief that the Pacific was an Australian sphere of influence. It granted the future Commonwealth the power to make laws for the government and administration of “any territory in the Pacific placed by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth”.89 When rumours emerged in 1895 that the United States and Germany were both interested in annexing Samoa, J.G. Kelly wrote to the Sydney Morning Herald to insist that “these islands are all within the natural sphere of Australian influence” and urged the colonies to join together to give their rivals “a taste of a South Pacific Monroe doctrine”.90 On the eve of federation, the Age claimed that Australia “must naturally have the greatest influence upon the future of the islands dotting the Pacific” and added that “the time is fully ripe for the clear

89 NAA: R18, 1, Draft of a Bill to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, 9 April 1891-29 June 1891, Chapter VI, Clause 3, 24.
90 ‘The Monroe Doctrine’, SMH, 7 December 1895, 10.
enunciation by Australia of a ‘Monroe doctrine’ of her own, so far as the islands within 3000 miles of her shores are concerned.”

Significantly, the idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine was not simply a declaration of manifest destiny but like its American antecedent also a broader rejection of the corruptive influence of the Old World in the Australian sphere. While this invocation of the concept appears paradoxical, given all except the minority who favoured an Australian republic had no desire to exclude Britain from this sphere, it was nonetheless influential. For example, an 1885 letter to the Daily Telegraph by Bulletin founder J.F. Archibald rebuked those who argued that the Australian Monroe Doctrine was unnecessary because there was “room-for-all” and Germany was “entitled to a part of the world’s waste lands”. Archibald argued that the Australian Monroe Doctrine would lead to “a composite nation on an English basis, built up out of heterogeneous immigration”, whereas the ‘room-for-all’ doctrine would lead to “a mere reproduction under the Southern Cross of the antagonistic states of Europe - with their armies, navies, war-taxes, and conscriptions.” This element of the Monroe Doctrine idea also notably took the form of intense antagonism towards the French policy of penal transportation to its Pacific territories. It was almost universally held in Australia that the imperial government should make it a condition of France holding territories in the Pacific that it end transportation to the region. In the words of London’s Standard, syndicated in the Australian press, Australians demanded nothing less than “the absolute removal of penal settlements in the Pacific”. This reflects the strength of the idea that the Australian colonies were entitled to reject the most corruptive forces of the Old World within their sphere of

91 ‘Pacific Island Problems’, Age, 1 September 1900, 13.
interest, thereby affirming another idea at the heart of the Monroe Doctrine that the New World was the sphere in which freedom flourished.

The idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine was also recognised and discussed overseas, and these discussions were frequently reproduced in the Australian press. The *Spectator* observed that “the Australian Republic begins its career by proclaiming the ‘Monroe Doctrine’” and demanding “a monopoly of territorial extension in the Antipodean world, a position in the South Pacific identical with that claimed by the United States upon the two American continents.”95 It also warned that, if Britain wanted to keep its colonies, it would have to acquiesce to their demands, as the time was nearing when “Australians will be able to defend their own ideas in arms”. The *Morning Advertiser* commented on the unanimity of thought regarding Australian expansion, saying “it is a very singular and a quite unprecedented thing, that there should not be one public man in any of the Australian colonies or any one newspaper, to oppose the determination of the people to protect themselves at any cost against European aggression in the South Seas.”96 The *Pall Mall Gazette* reported that the colonies had responded to the Colonial Office’s disavowal of the annexation of New Guinea by establishing a Federal Council to deal with their common interests and proclaiming a policy of “hands off the Pacific” for all other nations in the entire ocean south of the equator.97 The *New York Sun* noted similarities between the annexation crisis in Australia and events in North American a century before, warning that “the present British ministers will have read American colonial history in vain, if they do not detect in the firm tone of the resolutions passed by the Australasian conference an imperative admonition - the first rumbling of the storm.”98 The *London Echo* cautioned that the acceptance of the offer of a New South Wales contingent for the Suakin Expedition in Sudan was likely the first part of a

96 ‘Australian Federation’, *GA*, 26 January 1884, 4.
98 ‘An Australian Republic’, *Newcastle Morning Herald*, 16 July 1884, 2.
*quid pro quo,* with the colonists’ price likely to be support for “what must amount to a new Monroe Doctrine” in the Pacific.99 The *Standard* endorsed the Australian policy in 1886, suggesting “it would be all the better for the civilisation of the future if a sort of Monroe doctrine could be enforced in Australia as well as in America.”100

The term ‘Australian Monroe Doctrine’ itself was less used at the start of the twentieth century, but the idea of an Australian sphere of influence continued to be influential. Both Edmund Barton and Alfred Deakin protested against the sidelining of Australia in discussions about the future of the New Hebrides and Tahiti and reminded the British government of Australia’s interests in the Pacific.101 The outbreak of the First World War and Australia’s instructions to seize German possessions in the South Pacific was widely seen as an opportunity for territorial acquisition.102 For example, the *Age* declared that Australians had “long realised that we have a Pacific Ocean destiny” and observed that the war meant “an unexpected path has been opened to the furtherance of our ambition”.103 As the war dragged on, a similar idea developed that Australia was entitled to possession of islands like Nauru as compensation for the costs of the war.104 The influence of the Monroe Doctrine idea in this period culminated in Australia’s post-war vision for the region. Prime Minister W.M. Hughes explicitly invoked the concept in 1918, proclaiming that “we stand committed to a policy of an Australian Monroe doctrine in the South Pacific”.105

---

99 ‘Political Points’, *Bulletin* 2, no. 100 (11 April 1885), 12.
101 NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 1, The Spheres of Interest of Australia and New Zealand.
103 *Age*, 12 August 1914, 8.
This desire for the expansion of Australia’s recognised sphere of influence, either by direct annexation or a more general proclamation of an Australian Monroe Doctrine, to more closely match what Australians already understood as their rightful sphere of interest, was an extremely significant idea in late-nineteenth century Australia. It was a key force in the early development of the federation movement, highlighting both the colonies’ shared interest in Pacific expansion and the disconnect between British and Australian interests in the region. The first steps towards political federation were taken at the Intercolonial Convention arranged in response to the disavowal of Queensland’s annexation of New Guinea in 1883, paving the way for further intercolonial conventions and the creation of a Federal Council. The doctrine could also, given its endorsement by the intercolonial conventions, be considered Australia’s first articulation of a cogent federal foreign policy, a title more commonly bestowed on the White Australia Policy. It is significant that, as suggested by the anonymous member of the Geographical Association who urged an Australian-French Antarctic Expedition to enhance Australia’s relations with France in the Pacific, an Australian foreign policy was developed more than a decade before there was anything remotely recognisable as an Australian state.

Writing in the aftermath of the New Guinea annexation crisis and at a time when the Australian Monroe Doctrine enjoyed its most widespread support, Charles Sprent took the concept a step further by linking it to the idea of an Australian sphere of interest in the Antarctic. While Sprent was the first to explicitly link the idea of a Monroe Doctrine to the Southern Ocean, the idea of Australia’s unique relationship with Antarctica had a similarly long genealogy by 1886. As with the idea of Australian interests in the Pacific, the idea of Australian interests in the Antarctic and subantarctic can be traced to the earliest years of

---

European settlement in Australia, when the subantarctic was intensely exploited for its resources. After the short-term survival of the British colony in New South Wales was assured, the search began for local industries and staple exports that could defray the cost of establishing and maintaining the penal colony. While consistent attempts were made to develop the trade in New Zealand flax and kauri timber with varying success, the first significant local industries were whaling and sealing. Sealing in particular was well-suited to its status as a colonial frontier industry, requiring only minimal capital expenditure, a minimally-skilled workforce, basic equipment, and non-specialised ships. The colonial sealing industry developed in the 1790s, with some sealing taking place in New Zealand from 1792. It expanded significantly in 1798, when large fur seal rookeries were discovered in Bass Strait, and was primarily prosecuted by sealing gangs in the employ of Sydney merchants. Sealing in Bass Strait peaked in 1803-04, after which time the Sydney sealing gangs began the more intensive exploitation of seal rookeries in New Zealand and its surrounding islands.

The colonial sealing industry began expanding into to the subantarctic in 1805. The Antipodes Islands were discovered by Henry Waterhouse in 1800 during a voyage from Sydney in the colonial vessel Reliance. Sealing commenced on the islands in 1804, when they were visited by an American sealing vessel, and continued until 1828. In this period at least 383,287 skins were harvested, including 250,000 in 1806 alone. As seal populations

---

107 For an account of the economic development of early colonial New South Wales see N. G. Butlin, Forming a Colonial Economy: Australia 1810-1850 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
108 Robert McNab, Murihiku and the Southern Islands: A History of the West Coast Sounds, Foveaux Strait, Stewart Island, the Snares, Bounty, Antipodes, Auckland, Campbell and Macquarie Islands, from 1770 to 1829 (Invercargill: William Smith, 1907), 38-48.
109 Iain Stuart, ‘Sea rats, bandits and roistering buccaneers: what were the Bass Strait sealers really like?’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 83, no. 1 (June 1997), 47-58; Brian Plomley and Kristen Anne Henley, ‘The Sealers of Bass Strait and the Cape Barren Island Community’, Papers and Proceedings of the Tasmanian Historical Research Association 37, no. 2-3 (June-September 1990), 37-127.
110 McNab, Murihiku, 78-117.
111 McNab, Murihiku, 68.
declined in the New Zealand and Antipodes sealing grounds, colonial sealers ventured further south in search of untouched rookeries. For example, Frederick Hasselborough, a sealing captain in the employ of Sydney merchant Robert Campbell, discovered Campbell and Macquarie Islands in 1810, naming them after his employer and the Governor of New South Wales respectively. Hasselborough’s discoveries sparked another sealing boom. Between 1810 and 1829, 186,793 seal skins were harvested across ninety-three voyages to Macquarie Island. Campbell Island was the site of a smaller boom, with 15,200 skins obtained in 1810-11. The Auckland Islands were similarly exploited, with 40,050 skins taken in 1806-38.

With subantarctic fur seal populations decimated, sealers turned their attentions to the subantarctic islands’ elephant seal populations. While elephant seals’ pelts were worthless their blubber could be boiled down for oil, and diversifying into the elephant oil industry sustained colonial sealing into the 1830s. For example, approximately 4,428 tons of oil were obtained from Macquarie Island between 1820-30, when the seal population was finally depleted to the point of unprofitability. While colonial, British, and American firms were all engaged in subantarctic sealing in this period, they were all reliant on the use of Australian ports. For example, in 1810-20, forty-three out of forty-seven ships that visited Macquarie Island did so from Sydney, while four sailed from Hobart. In the same period three ships sailed from Macquarie to London, two returned to Hobart, and forty-two returned to Sydney.

---

represent the most accurate account available but are based on shipping records and therefore do not include wastage or unreported cargos. They are therefore likely understated.

118 Ibid, 159-176.
Colonial merchants also invested in the whaling industry, particularly in shore whaling on the south coast of New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land, and New Zealand. Pelagic whaling, however, required specialised ships and equipment, skilled crews, and significant capital expenditure, and was therefore primarily undertaken by English and American firms, such as the London-based Enderby & Sons. Like sealers, these pelagic whalers sailed into the subantarctic to hunt, discovering new islands like the Auckland Islands in the process, before returning to Sydney and Hobart to overhaul, resupply, and recruit. Whalers using Australian ports sailed as far as Campbell Island in the south-east and Kerguelen, 4,200 kilometres south-west of Perth, in the south-west.

Until the development of the pastoral industry in the 1820s, sealing and whaling were the most significant contributors to the colonial economies, and whale products continued to be one of the colonies’ primary exports until 1850. Significantly, the ways in which early colonists exploited the resources of the subantarctic islands were remembered nostalgically in the colonies. Memories of the large former whaling fleets of Sydney, Hobart, and Portland, of the steady employment offered to the armies of craftsmen who maintained them, and of the market the whalers provided for food, livestock, clothing, and other colonial products ensured that the subantarctic was imagined as an economic panacea throughout the nineteenth century. As late as 1912, the Mercury noted that the recent arrival of both whalers and Antarctic expeditions in Hobart would remind “many of the older citizens … of stirring times

---

120 Pearson, ‘Charting the Sealing Islands in the Southern Ocean’, 49.
122 For example ‘Letters to the Editor’, Mercury, 18 January 1887, 4.
for Hobart that were supposed to have passed for ever.”123 The result was that, from Ross’ report of whales and guano, to the short-lived Auckland Islands colony, to von Mueller’s proposal for the acclimatisation and colonisation of the subantarctic islands, to the Antarctic Committee’s pronouncement that an expedition would pave the way for new Australian industries in the subantarctic, Australians saw the Antarctic and subantarctic as, in Sprent’s words, “our preserves”.124

While the memory of the subantarctic as a former source of prosperity was the most influential factor in the development of the idea of Australia’s unique interest in the Antarctic, late-nineteenth century advocates of Antarctica exploration frequently traced Australia’s relationship with the region to an even earlier period, arguing that the destinies of Australia and Antarctica were linked by the foundational figure of James Cook. It is impossible to overstate the significance of Cook to Australians’ understandings of their past in the late-nineteenth century. A description offered by Sydney’s Australian Town and Country Journal is indicative; “What the legendary Æneas was to Rome Captain James Cook is to Eastern Australia.”125 This idolisation of Cook led to the pervasive idea that an Australian Antarctic expedition would complete Cook’s work in the Southern Ocean. For example, the President of the Geographical Society’s South Australian branch, Samuel Davenport, declared in 1887 that an Australian Antarctic Expedition would “close a chapter in our Australian history” by finishing the project embarked on by Cook and advanced by

125 ‘Captain Cook’, ATCJ, 22 February 1879, 17.
Ross, another explorer remembered for his close ties to Australia.\textsuperscript{126} Similarly, Pasco told the AAAS Geographical Section 1892 that it was incumbent on “the Anglo-Saxons located in the Southern Hemisphere to emulate their forefathers in the north by subduing the land lying around the Antarctic pole, and completing a work nobly commenced by James Cook and followed by Weddell, Biscoe, Ross, and Nares”.\textsuperscript{127} A \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} leader drew on a similar idea in 1891, saying “as it was with the object of searching for the great Antarctic continent Captain Cook sailed from England on that memorable voyage which led to his giving Australia to the knowledge of the world, we have a historic connection with Antarctic research; and our proximity to those unknown regions has ever since indicated to scientific men that Australia should take a leading part in any such expedition of discovery.”\textsuperscript{128}

Out of this idea of an Australian interest in Antarctica built on historical links through Cook and Ross and through an earlier era of discovery and economic exploitation by colonists came the idea that the recommencement of Antarctic exploration was peculiarly incumbent on Australia. While this idea was invoked regularly from the 1860s it was ubiquitous in the 1880s and 1890s, when the Antarctic Committee’s activities overlapped with the highpoint of Monroe Doctrine discourse and the burgeoning of the federation movement. For example, Daniel Harrison declared in 1885 that it was Australians’ “destiny to explore these southern solitudes.”\textsuperscript{129} The \textit{Leader} called the exploration of the Antarctic “a duty laid upon us by our geographical position”.\textsuperscript{130} South Australia’s \textit{Bunyip} remarked “it is not to our credit that so large a portion of the earth’s surface and in such proximity to our shores, should remain unknown”, and warned that “we have the Germans and French in our neighbourhood, and


\textsuperscript{127} Crawford Pasco, ‘Address to Section E’, \textit{Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science}(1892), 125-130.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{SMH}, 25 April 1891, 8.

\textsuperscript{129} ‘Proposed Exploration of Antarctic Regions’, \textit{Leader}, 10 January 1885, 16.

\textsuperscript{130} ‘The Week’, \textit{Leader}, 14 August 1886, 25.
stimulated with a thirst for discovery, and a desire to increase their resources, so while we are
dreaming they may be exploring.”.\textsuperscript{131} Davenport proclaimed that “we are the people of the
world on whom the duty of solving Antarctic questions most properly lies” and that an
expedition “would be but consistent with our prestige.”\textsuperscript{132} Melbourne’s \textit{Herald} argued wryly
that an Australian Antarctic expedition deserved complete support from the colonial
governments, but only on the condition that “any territory discovered is not to be handed over
to the Colonial Office, to be given to the first Foreign Power that may be inclined to ask for
it.”\textsuperscript{133} The \textit{Australian Town and Country Journal} forestalled anticipated criticism that
Australians had enough work to do “in subduing the wilderness within our own territory
without seeking new fields of conquest in the unknown waters of the southern pole”, arguing
that “we have hands and hearts capable of both”.\textsuperscript{134} The Committee itself argued that “the
Antarctic is situated so near to us, and it forms so considerable a region that, if its exploration
will serve any valuable purpose, the interest Australasia has in its accomplishment ought to
be greater than that of any other community.”\textsuperscript{135} The \textit{Australasian} reported that “the Germans
are about to start an Antarctic Exploring Expedition, and to occupy the position that ought to
belong to Australia”, adding that Australians were happy to talk about “our manifest destiny”,
but firm action was required to ensure that Germany did not “forestall us in exploration in our
own seas”.\textsuperscript{136} A \textit{Brisbane Courier} leader declared that “the duty (of Antarctic exploration) –
with whatever honour or advantage it involves – naturally belongs to the colonies of
Australasia.”\textsuperscript{137} H.K. Rusden deemed it “a most extraordinary thing that the subject of
Antarctic exploration had not been taken up sooner by Australia, when they considered the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{131} ‘The Antarctic Regions’, \textit{Bunyip}, 27 August 1886, 2.
\textit{Sessions 1886-7 and 1887-8, Vol. II} (1890), xii.
\textsuperscript{134} ‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{ATCJ}, 29 January 1887, 18.
\textsuperscript{135} ‘Memorandum of the Objects to be Served by Antarctic Research’, \textit{Transactions and Proceedings of the
Royal Society of Victoria} 23 (1887), 282-290.
\textsuperscript{136} ‘Talk on Change’, \textit{Australasian}, 9 June 1888, 33.
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{BC}, 18 June 1888, 4.
\end{flushleft}
contiguity of the land they proposed to explore to their own country.”138 The Sydney Morning Herald noted that “if property has its rights, it has its obligations as well. The least that people can do to whom an extensive estate has fallen in fee is to become acquainted with its position, extent, and capabilities.”139 G.S. Griffiths reiterated in 1890 that, while science provided “common cause” between nations, when it came to exploring Antarctica “the work, its profits and its glory ought to be the destiny of the federated colonies of Australia.”140 The following year the Committee gleefully reported that Australians increasingly “looked upon this Expedition as peculiarly the duty of Australia.”141 Philip Fysh, observed in 1898 that “if Britons regarded exploration almost as a duty, we here, as masters of the Southern seas, were bound to be foremost in promoting an expedition of this kind”.142

The same idea continued to circulate even after expeditions began regularly visiting the Antarctic in the early-twentieth century. Prominent federal politician Joseph Cook, for example, noted in 1907 that “we owe a duty to ourselves and to posterity to explore the antarctic regions.”143 Sydney University geology professor Edgeworth David argued in 1911 that it was “the duty of Australasia to take a part and a worthy part in exploring this great sister continent”.144 Douglas Mawson argued the following year that “the Antarctic coastline of the Australian quadrant is likely to be occupied for commercial purposes and it will be well for Australia to take a firm and well defined stand in regard to her rights over it”, and drew an explicit comparison with Canada’s pronouncement that “she would allow no interlopers in the Arctic territory to the north of America”.145 In a speech announcing the

139 SMH, 26 March 1889, 6.
140 ‘Royal Geographical Society of Australasia’, Age, 22 March 1890, 10.
143 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 50, 13 December 1907, 7492.
144 ‘Mawson Expedition’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 July 1911, 15.
decision to despatch a government-organised Australian expedition in 1929, Prime Minister Stanley Bruce referred to the “special interest of the Commonwealth in the Antarctic region lying south of Australia”, the furtherance of “Australian interests in a region that is so close to our shores”, and “the fulfilment of … a national obligation”.146 On his return from that expedition in 1932 Mawson declared that that “a great Antarctic region lying southward of Australia is, by its geographical situation, a heritage for Australians.”147 From this long-held assumption of a unique Australian interest in Antarctica, it was only a short leap to an assertion of sovereignty in subsequent decades. The existence of such a widespread, durable, and coherent conception of Australia’s interest in Antarctica is significant, and suggests that the acquisition and assertion of sovereignty in the twentieth century was far from opportunistic or inadvertent. It was instead a belated attempt to retrospectively formalise Australia’s claim to what amounted to an imperium it already presumed it possessed.

Charles Sprent’s linking of the Monroe Doctrine to the proposal for Antarctic exploration also reveals another key element of contemporary thought. It highlights the widespread and influential idea that science and exploration were the final stage in Australia’s development from uncultured dependent colonies to a modern, civilised, and independent nation. While not specifically referring to Antarctica, Western Australian explorer turned politician John Forrest articulated this idea of an interrelationship between science, exploration, and statehood when he declared in 1888 that “surely the first duty of a State is to find out what its territory consists of, and any government which neglects this duty is not worthy to be entrusted with the care of such territory.”148 The same idea was explicitly invoked by the Leader in its support for the Antarctic Committee’s proposals. For example, it noted that “in new countries science is one of the last matters to engage attention”, so that when “public

146 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 8, 21 February 1929, 461.
148 Report of the First Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (1889), 354.
interest is fairly aroused on such a question it marks an epoch in the history of a young nation.” 149 Invoking the same Old World/New World polarity of the Monroe Doctrine, the same article added that “were an Australian expedition to succeed where exploring ships of the old world have failed, the country would gain a degree of consideration in Europe which is has never yet enjoyed.” 150 The Bunyip similarly observed that “a colonial expedition fitted out solely by local effort and at local expense would tend to increase the respect and esteem in which Australia is held.” 151 The Mercury added that “the position of the Australian Colonies, and the place they are now seeking among the nations of the world should prompt them to find the means and the enterprise” to support an Antarctic expedition. 152 Antarctic Committee member J.J. Wild urged Australians not to “neglect so tempting an opportunity of placing themselves in the front rank with those communities who are able and willing to make sacrifices in the interests of geographical research and for the advancement of human knowledge in general.” 153 Griffiths asserted that “nothing could bring to us greater distinction in the eyes of the whole civilised world than such an expedition, judiciously planned and skilfully carried out.” 154 The Weekly Times lamented that wealthy Australians who had made their fortunes were not doing enough to support an Australian Antarctic expedition when “Australia’s credit is at stake before the world.” 155 British oceanographer John Murray described the possibility of an Antarctic expedition jointly organised by the British and colonial governments as “evidence of high intelligence as well as a marked advance in political development” for the colonies. 156 Royal Geographical Society President Clements Markham, described colonial involvement in an Antarctic expedition as “taking a place

150 Ibid.
152 Mercury, 28 August 1886, 2.
153 ‘Southward Ho!’, Age, 25 May 1866, 6.
155 ‘The Explorer’, WT, 29 November 1890, 14.
among the civilized nations of the earth”.\textsuperscript{157} Brisbane’s \textit{Telegraph} suggested an Australian expedition would “prove to the world that not alone in mercenary motives does she find an outlet for her superfluous cash and courage, but that in the plains of science, as in the feats of strength, she is able and wiling to do and dare.”\textsuperscript{158}

The concept continued to be invoked even after Federation. For example, Melbourne University Professor David Orme Masson informed the Commonwealth Government that “Australia would gain greatly in its national character and position” if it contributed to Mawson’s planned Australasian Antarctic Expedition in 1912.\textsuperscript{159} Dedicating resources to science, exploration, and international scientific cooperation was thus understood as a marker for Australia’s development and its place on the international stage. The colonies could not be recognized as a state until they proved their willingness to act as a state should, a definition that stretched beyond economic and political considerations to include things like a commitment to scientific internationalism at a time when science and exploration were intimately bound up with the expansion of sovereignty.

For Australians in the 1880s statehood was not simply legal or political, it was also performative. Statehood was as much about acting in ways appropriate to a state as it was about the complexities of legal status. The idea of Australia having the exclusive right to control territories within its self-proclaimed sphere of interest and the accompanying right to exclude old world powers from this sphere should therefore be understood as both practical and performative. It was practical in the sense that Australians saw it as a way to protect their interests, and it was performative in the sense that it drew on and replicated previously established patterns of behaviour by states. While it explicitly sought to apply the American

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid, 375-376.
\textsuperscript{158} ‘Antarctic Mysteries’, \textit{Telegraph}, 30 April 1891, 4.
\textsuperscript{159} NAA: A1, 1915/5159, Report of Meeting of W.M. Hughes with a Deputation from the Australasian Science Association.
Monroe Doctrine to Australia, it also drew more generally on the idea that the old world empires were created, in Sprent’s words, by states like England “establishing themselves in the most promising regions and defying all efforts to dislodge them”. In the same way, the long-running campaign for Australia to take the lead in Antarctic exploration was both practical, in that it was expected to lead to benefits for Australia through the development of Antarctic industries like whaling and guano mining, and performative, in that it was a way to demonstrate Australia’s commitment to scientific internationalism and by extension its readiness to join international society. The idea that Australian statehood could only be born on the battlefield was a later construction that developed in the context of the First World War. For Australians at the turn of the twentieth century, federation, territorial expansion, scientific internationalism, industrial development, trade, military and naval development, and even sporting prowess were all interrelated elements in a complex process of state formation that would see Australia admitted into international society.

**Efforts to Organise an Australian Antarctic Expedition**

The Antarctic Committee in Melbourne was predictably delighted with the enthusiasm shown in Tasmania for the idea of an Australian Antarctic expedition. It was further buoyed in October 1886 by news from Graham Berry, Victoria’s Agent-General in London and the Committee’s de facto European agent, that there was interest in their proposal amongst Britain’s Arctic whalers. First came news that one of the most prominent whaling company owners in Scotland, David Gray, had published a pamphlet twelve years earlier outlining the potential for an Antarctic whaling industry. Berry obtained a copy of Gray’s pamphlet, which included vital if slightly dated information about the costs of outfitting a whaling voyage and

---

the likely profits to be derived from it, and forwarded it to the Committee.\textsuperscript{163} This information was used to estimate that a whaling expedition with two ships could be outfitted for £64,800, and could potentially offer a profit of approximately £49,500.\textsuperscript{164}

Then came reports that Arctic explorer Allen Young was willing to take command of the Australian expedition.\textsuperscript{165} Berry met with Young in January 1887 and immediately informed the Committee that a sum of between £8,000 and £10,000 would be sufficient to persuade Young to lead a whaling expedition under the Committee’s auspices. This sum was intended to secure him against losses should the whales reported by Ross prove unsuitable for whaling, and would be reduced in proportion to the total number of whales caught.\textsuperscript{166} The rumour that Young would lead the expedition was a significant boost to the Committee’s efforts to build and maintain public interest in the project. For example, Melbourne’s \textit{Herald} responded to the rumour with a resounding endorsement of the proposal. It argued that even if Gillies could not persuade the other colonies to join the venture, Victoria should provide the entire £10,000 itself given that “larger sums have been squandered with far less hope of any profitable return.”\textsuperscript{167} The \textit{Record} responded to the rumour with an editorial suggesting Young be placed in charge of an expedition that would be “entirely geographical, with a view, however, to reconnoitring for whaling and sealing grounds, so that commercial whalers cold take advantage of the geographical information gained, for the benefit of these colonies.”\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{164} ‘Progress Report of the Antarctic Exploration Committee’ (1887), 295-296.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Record}, 8 January 1887, 2.
News that a commander was virtually secured was followed by a tentative offer of two steamers by Dundee whaling firm David Bruce & Co.\(^{169}\) Another letter from Sandefjord shipowner Christen Christensen was passed to the Committee via Gillies and the Swedish Agent-General in November 1886. Christensen urged the Committee to abandon its plan to combine whaling, sealing, and scientific research, pointing out that whalers required large crews and minimal equipment while scientific voyages required small crews and a vast array of instruments, that whalers had no accommodation for cabin passengers, that the best time for a sealing voyage was different to the best time to sail into high latitudes, and that attempting to sail farther south than the main ice pack severely limited the potential for successful whaling.\(^{170}\) With these reservations stated, Christensen told the Committee that four Sandefjord whalers, ranging in price from £4,000 to £11,000, were available for purchase. If the Committee preferred to charter a ship and a crew with Arctic experience, they were available for between £3,500 and £6,500 for a twelve-month scientific voyage. If the Committee was determined to combine whaling, sealing, and science, Christensen would undertake the voyage on his own account if paid a bonus of £2,500–£4,500, though this could be reduced if the Committee committed to purchasing the ship at the conclusion of the voyage.\(^{171}\)

Christensen’s concerns about combining science and commerce were backed by David Gray, who suggested in a letter to a friend in Victoria that the Committee should instead establish a whaling company of its own.\(^{172}\) Gray also suggested that he “might entertain the idea of coming out with two of our ships and working the fishery for a year or two, if suitable terms were offered.”\(^{173}\) Five months later Gray wrote to the Committee directly, advising them not

\(^{169}\) ‘Progress Report of the Antarctic Exploration Committee’ (1887), 296-297.


\(^{171}\) Progress Report of the Antarctic Exploration Committee (1887), 297-299.

\(^{172}\) Progress Report of the Antarctic Exploration Committee (1887), 304-305.

\(^{173}\) ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 8 January 1887, 10.
to rely on the proposed British expedition, which he doubted would secure the government funding it needed. He instead suggested the Committee “get 100,000 men to subscribe £1 each” and outfit a full-scale Australian expedition with two whaling ships, rather than the modest precursor envisaged.174 Another whaler, H.F. Dessen, offered the use of his ship *Westye Egeberg*, fully outfitted for whaling and sealing and crewed by Arctic veterans, for £6,500 for twelve months plus additional fees if the ship sank or was frozen into the ice.175 Yet another letter came via the Governor of Victoria from James Fairweather, a seventeen year veteran of Arctic whaling, offering his services as captain for either a scientific or whaling expedition.176

In addition to these offers from Arctic whalers, the Committee was inundated with local correspondence.177 Clement L. Wragge, an Adelaide-based meteorologist, applied to join the expedition, as did W.W. Froggatt, a Queensland entomologist and veteran of the Geographical Society’s New Guinea expedition, and F.L. Langdale, a former Royal Navy officer turned Fijian landowner.178 J.B. Greig, master of the New Zealand government schooner *Kekeno*, provided a lengthy report on the Aucklands, Campbell, and Macquarie Island, and recommended the expedition start from a southern New Zealand port and proceed south via Stewart Island and each of the subantarctic islands.179 J.L. Sinclair of Auckland provided suggestions for the expedition’s scientific and commercial aims.180 The New Zealand Marine Department provided a report by Otago University Professor J.H. Scott on

177 ‘Progress Report of the Antarctic Exploration Committee’ (1887), 278-279.
his observations of Auckland and Macquarie Islands.\textsuperscript{181} Georg von Neumayer, the distinguished German scientist who had lived in Melbourne from 1857-64 while completing a magnetic survey of Victoria, sent copies of papers and pamphlets relating to Antarctic exploration from Hamburg.\textsuperscript{182} Others discussed the Committee’s plans in the newspapers. ‘S.W.V.’, for example, wrote to the \textit{Age} to recommend that the Australian expedition experiment with new, more economic processing techniques to ensure that use was made of the entire whale carcass, thereby increasing the profitability of the industry.\textsuperscript{183}

After nearly a year of activity, the Antarctic Committee concluded that chartering a ship for either a scientific or whaling expedition of its own were beyond the colonies’ means. Instead, the Committee committed itself to “a judicious system of payment by bonus, by which owners and crew will be rewarded in proportion to the extent that new ground is broken”.\textsuperscript{184} This system was outlined in a set of twenty-three recommendations that included bonuses for each degree of latitude travelled beyond 70° S., for establishing an observation camp on shore, for every sixty miles traversed inland by a landing party, and for the harvesting of 100 tons of whale oil or the equivalent value of “any merchantable commodity”.\textsuperscript{185} By August 1887, the Committee had refined its plan to suggest that two steam whalers be sent south, with one remaining in the waters north of Victoria Land to hunt whales while the other pushed farther south with a party of Australian scientists.\textsuperscript{186}

Having finally settled on a plan, the Committee set about raising the £10,000 it needed to pay the various bonuses. The early signs were promising as Allen Young agreed to donate £2,000

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Argus}, 1 December 1886, 7.
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Argus}, 1 December 1886, 7.
\textsuperscript{183} ‘Antarctic Researches and Whaling’, \textit{Age}, 25 June 1887, 13.
\textsuperscript{184} ‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{Argus}, 23 July 1887, 5.
\textsuperscript{186} ‘The Royal Geographical Society of Australasia’, \textit{Australasian}, 13 August 1887, 29.
of his own; a London company offered £200, and a Victorian, H.R. Bell, offered £1,000.  
New South Wales Premier Henry Parkes had been lobbied by Gillies, the Committee, and the Linnean and Royal Societies of New South Wales throughout 1887, and his responses were positive enough that the Committee was confident it could count on support from the governments of Victoria, New South Wales, and Tasmania.  
It was hoped that the British government would provide £5,000 if the colonies raised the same sum, so Berry was instructed to apply to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for a grant.  
This application was formally endorsed by the branches of the Australasian Geographical Society at the Second Interprovincial Geographical Conference in Adelaide, while resolutions in favour of the grant were passed by the Royal Geographical Society, Royal Colonial Institute, and Royal Society in London.  
The British Association’s Antarctic Committee similarly urged the government to sanction the grant, while the Admiralty was thought to be willing to support the Australian expedition if it was commanded by a naval officer with Arctic experience.  
A widely syndicated leader in London’s Times also added its voice to the growing chorus of support for the Australian expedition.  
By December 1887, it was apparent that an expedition would not depart that summer, but its longer term outlook was positive, as “public opinion is decidedly in favour of the venture, and in such cases time and persistence always effect the end.”

---

While progress on an Australian Antarctic expedition was relatively slow, Australian interest in the Antarctic continued unabated. G.S. Griffiths reprised his paper on the history of Antarctic exploration for the Royal Society of Victoria’s well-attended annual conversazion. In Hobart, all the talk of Antarctic expeditions and steam whalers spurred a group of shipowners, businessmen, and former whalers to attempt to form a company for whaling in Antarctic waters. A public meeting was held, £500 worth of shares were sold, and attempts were made to purchase and outfit a sailing ship to make a preliminary whaling voyage before the enterprise collapsed. Rumours swept across the colonies that American whalers were contemplating an Antarctic expedition of their own. Similar rumours of an imminent German expedition circulated in 1888. Most prominent, however, were new rumours that Adolf Nordenskiöld, the Swedish aristocrat and scientist best known for leading the 1878-79 Vega expedition through the Northeast Passage, was planning his own expedition to the Antarctic. Some of these rumours held that Nordenskiöld was contemplating a Swedish expedition funded by the King of Sweden and Oscar Dickson, Sweden’s wealthiest businessman and a prolific patron of Arctic exploration. Others suggested that Nordenskiöld could be, or indeed had been, invited to lead a British or Australian expedition. Still others reported that he was still working up the scientific

194 ‘Minutes of the Royal Society of Victoria’s Annual Conversazione, 26 October 1886’, MS 11663 Box 1, SLV; Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria Vol. 24, Part 1 (1887), 85.
196 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, SMH, 8 November 1887, 7; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, EN, 8 November 1887, 5; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Herald, 8 November 1887, 2; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 9 November 1887, 7; ‘Science’, Leader, 29 December 1888, 36.
results of his work in the Arctic and would not contemplate organising an expedition until 1889 at the earliest.\textsuperscript{200} Even the Committee was inspired by these rumours, reportedly inquiring through Gillies whether Nordenskiöld would join forces with the Australian expedition, with Sweden and Australia each supplying a ship for a joint expedition under Nordenskiöld’s supreme command.\textsuperscript{201}

From this high point in December 1887, the Antarctic Exploration Committee’s fortunes declined precipitously. Despite strong support from the Colonial Office, the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused a grant on the grounds that a commercial expedition was not worthy of government support, while a scientific expedition with a budget of just £10,000 could not accomplish anything worthwhile, and would merely be a precursor to a later, costlier expedition.\textsuperscript{202} This rejection was also fatal to that later, costlier purely scientific expedition envisaged by the British Association. Despite boasting the most influential figures in polar exploration among its numbers, including Joseph Hooker, two veterans of the search for John Franklin in Leopold McClintock and Erasmus Ommanney, and Challenger’s captain George Nares and naturalist James Murray, the British Association’s Antarctic Committee failed to attract government support and abandoned the project in 1888.\textsuperscript{203} Given the Australian Committee’s efforts had been entirely directed at a preliminary voyage to pave the way for this full-scale British scientific expedition, this was an equally significant blow for the Australian efforts.

\textsuperscript{201} ‘Proposed Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{ATCJ}, 21 May 1887, 11.
\textsuperscript{203} Report of the Fifty-Fifth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (1886), 1132; Report of the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (1887), 277-278; Report of the Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (1889), 316-319.
This dashing of the Committee’s hopes led to public criticism and recriminations. The President of the Linnean Society of New South Wales, William Stephens, rebuked his colony for being so preoccupied by its centenary celebrations that it had failed to properly support “an enterprise of such importance”, calling its failure to fund the proposed expedition “deplorable”. He argued that one fiftieth of the money the colony had wasted in the last year on statues, celebrations, unemployment relief, and rabbit extermination could have “secured to New South Wales an enduring renown worthy of the completion of her century”. Stephens went on to urge the New South Wales government to take full responsibility for organising its own Antarctic expedition, arguing that if an expedition was to be successful “it must start from one of these Southern States, and must be entirely under the control and direction of the Government of that State.”

The Anglican Bishop of Tasmania Daniel Sandford had a similar response, calling for Tasmania to mount its own expedition before it could be forestalled by Germany. The *Adelaide Observer* preferred to endorse the Chancellor’s decision, criticising the Committee for putting forward such an unambitious proposal. The *Argus* agreed that it was not unreasonable for the Imperial Government to refuse to subsidise “a movement which, on its commercial side, would only benefit the colonies”. It also criticised the Committee for combining the commercial and scientific elements, when “there is no reason why wealthy countries like our own should not carry out both projects” separately. The Committee’s proposal to subsidise a whaling voyage in exchange for giving some attention to science was similarly lambasted in England by former Navy Hydrographer George Henry Richards.

---

204 ‘President’s Address’, *Proceedings of the Linnean Society of New South Wales* (Second Series), II (1888), 1109-1111; ‘The Linnean Society of New South Wales’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 January 1888, 5.
206 ‘Scientific’, *AO*, 25 February 1888, 42.
207 *Argus*, 19 April 1888, 7.
The *Leader* was more positive, saying that “the mooting of the idea has nevertheless raised a widespread interest, which is likely ere long to bear fruit.” The *Brisbane Courier* lamented that “an important geographical and scientific enterprise, which should of right belong to Australia and to the British race by which it is being peopled, is in danger of passing into other hands.” It criticised the “half-heartedness existing on both sides” of the negotiations between the Antarctic Committee and the Imperial Government, and warned that the Committee’s efforts had drawn other countries’ attention to Antarctic exploration so that Australia was now likely to be forestalled. The *Mercury* suggested that both the Antarctic expedition and the failed Tasmanian whaling company had suffered because “those who want to make money want to make it speedily, while those who have already made it, prefer to keep it in the bank” rather than investing in projects for public good. The *Evening Journal* blamed the rejection on the lack of unity between the Australian colonies, arguing that the Treasury could not have rejected an approach from a united Australia. Gillies seemed to agree with this diagnosis, insisting that Victoria would still liberally support an expedition provided it was “an enterprise of all Australia in a truly federal spirit.”

The Committee’s response was simply to instruct Berry to make it known amongst British whalers and shipowners that a more modest bonus would still be available to any who were willing to send two steam whalers to hunt in the Antarctic. In a subsequent progress report to the Geographical Society Pasco was confident that this approach would still bear fruit. Indeed, he believed that a whaling expedition could still be organised in time for a barrel of whale oil to be added to the colony’s displays at the Melbourne Centennial International

---

210 *BC*, 18 June 1888, 4.
211 *Mercury*, 7 May 1888, 2.
Exhibition. 215 Berry’s efforts did lead to an opportunistic final offer from Dessen to send Westye Egeberg to the Antarctic for a payment of £5,000, but this was declined.216 Dessen’s proposed voyage would not depart from Australia, instead sailing directly to the South Atlantic and visiting Melbourne only on its return. There would only be one ship with no scientists or Australians, and the £5,000 would be a premium rather than a bonus contingent on geographical or scientific achievements. Finally, if the expedition resulted in the development of a whaling and sealing trade based in Victoria then all of Dessen’s ships would be entitled to “the same privileges and exemptions as shall be accorded to vessels owned by subjects of the colony” in perpetuity.217 Desperate as they were to sponsor an Antarctic expedition, these conditions were unpalatable for the Committee.

The Antarctic Committee’s failure to successfully organise an Australian expedition after three years of effort can be blamed largely on the decisions to combine the scientific and commercial objectives into a single expedition and to fund this expedition through a convoluted bonus system. The Committee was hamstrung by the fact it could not afford to outfit a purely scientific expedition, while Australia’s governments and scientific societies would not support a purely commercial foreign expedition. The system developed was a creative attempt to circumvent this problem, but bonuses of up to £10,000 were insufficient to persuade any whaling firm to take the risk of combining a whaling voyage with tasks like exploring and surveying that could compromise the attempt at whaling.218

The Committee’s reams of correspondence with Arctic whalers therefore amounted to nothing in the short-term, though it did help to stimulate interest in the potential for Antarctic

---

216 Ibid.
218 For further discussion of the reasons for the Committee’s failure see Swan, Australia in the Antarctic, 59-60.
whaling to the extent that Arctic whalers eventually mounted tentative expeditions in their own right. Christen Christensen despatched the most expensive of the ships he had offered the Committee, Jason, on an experimental whaling voyage to Graham Land in 1892. In the same year Dundee whaler Robert Kinnes, an adviser to the short-lived Tasmanian whaling company, despatched a fleet of four whalers, including one under the command of James Fairweather’s brother Alexander, on a largely unsuccessful whaling expedition to the same region.  

219 For an account of this expedition see Geographical Journal 7, no. 5 (May 1896), 502-521.
Chapter 4: Antarctica and Australian State Formation, c. 1890-1901

Rejection by the Imperial Government and the collapse of the British expedition did not lead to the collapse of the Australian Antarctic Committee. Instead of giving up on the project, the Committee turned its attention to building stronger federal support for an expedition by driving the agenda of the newly formed Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). This association, modelled on its British counterpart, was the brainchild of Sydney University Chemistry Professor Archibald Liversidge. Liversidge pushed for all Australasian scientific societies to send representatives to a meeting in Sydney in 1888 as part of the New South Wales centenary celebrations, with a view to forming a federal association.¹

The Association that emerged from this meeting was divided into eight sections, each dedicated to a different branch of science, engineering, or the arts. The inaugural president of Section E (Geography), was Western Australian explorer turned politician John Forrest, a man who had dedicated much of his life to the exploration and development of the Australian interior. Forrest’s opening address to the section made it clear that he saw the Association’s role as “to begin at once the great national work of scientifically examining the whole of the continent.”² The Antarctic Committee, however, was well-represented in the section, including G.S. Griffiths as vice-president, and these members viewed the Association’s role in the more expansive way articulated by the Geographical Society’s founders, extending throughout the continent and beyond to encompass the entire Australian sphere of interest in the Southern Hemisphere.

¹ For a full account of the formation of the AAAS and its origins in an earlier movement towards intercolonial scientific cooperation see M.E. Hoare, ‘The Intercolonial Science Movement in Australasia, 1870-1890’, Historical Records of Australian Science, 7-28.
² John Forrest, ‘President’s Address’, Report of the First Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (1889), 354.
In an effort to influence the section’s agenda and win support for the Committee’s project, Griffiths reprised his paper on ‘Antarctic Exploration’. He gave his usual overview of the scientific and commercial benefits of Antarctic exploration, before launching into a passionate conclusion that drew heavily on the dual ideas of an Australian sphere of interest in the Antarctic and the necessity of scientific exploration for proving statehood. Griffiths argued that “the exploration of these regions is a task which, by our geographical position and our wealth, is thrown on Australia as a duty which we cannot evade if we have any adequate conception of our great position in the southern seas, and any healthy ambition which transcends producing the best of wool, or the finest of wine, or raising coal, gold, or silver.” The expedition would secure “universal attention, and the approbation of the entire civilised globe” for Australia, but if they did not “move in this matter speedily, Germany will forestall us to our mortification and disgrace.”

Griffiths’ words had the desired effect. The Committee’s staunch ally, James Barnard, the Tasmanian printer who had assisted Ross on term days in 1840, moved in response that an AAAS Antarctic Exploration Committee be appointed. The resolution was approved unanimously. This new federal committee consisted of Forrest, Griffiths, and Barnard, Victorians Ferdinand von Mueller, Robert Ellery, and Baldwin Spencer, and New South Welshman William Stephens. While this committee was officially appointed “to consider the question of Antarctic exploration”, all except Forrest had been deeply involved in advocating the Victorian committee’s plans, and Spencer had been set to join the stillborn Australian

---

5 ‘Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science’, *Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH), 3 September 1888, 4; ‘Australasian Science Association’, *Argus*, 3 September 1888, 8.
expedition as its chief scientist. The result of the AAAS Committee’s ‘considerations’ was never in doubt.

Placing Antarctica on the AAAS agenda was a significant victory for the Committee. It ensured that any future applications for funding from colonial or imperial governments could come from an explicitly federal body, while it also generated publicity. Griffiths’ paper was published in the Proceedings of the Association and in the press, and was widely discussed. The Australasian, for example, resoundingly endorsed Griffiths’ argument. It agreed that Antarctic exploration was “of more importance to Australia than to any other country” and expressed a hope that Australia would undertake the work without aid from Britain or Germany. Significantly, it suggested that “we should like to see the Australian Governments combining for a disinterested and healthy assertion of the Monroe doctrine” by mounting an expedition “carried out by this continent alone”.

With the appointment of a federal counterpart, the Antarctic Committee focused on building grassroots support for its project. It was resolved to work closely with the AAAS Committee, and to approach every “public body” in Victoria to ask them to take an interest in the project on the grounds that “Antarctic exploration is a duty devolving upon Australia”. It was also decided to cultivate popular support by giving more lectures on the subject, with a particular emphasis on addresses to branches of the Australian Natives’ Association (ANA) and the Working Men’s College.

---

6 Report of the First Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, xxxiv.
7 ‘Committee’ henceforth refers to the Melbourne-based Antarctic Exploration Committee, while ‘AAAS Committee’ refers to the committee appointed by the Association.
9 ‘Australia and the Antarctic’, Australasian, 8 September 1888, 32.
The first of this new series of lectures was given by Melbourne lawyer Thomas McInerney, who had recently been added to the Committee’s ranks. McInerney gave a lecture entitled ‘The Seal and Whale Fisheries of the Antarctic Regions’ to the Melbourne Eclectic Society, in which he emphasised Australia’s duty both to explore the Antarctic regions and to regulate the whaling and sealing industries that this exploration would lead to. This was followed soon after by J. Winter’s paper to the Richmond branch of ANA entitled ‘Antarctic Exploration’. Winter noted the practical advantages of Antarctic exploration for Australia, argued that “exploration had always tended to the enterprise and repute of the nations that engaged in it”, and advocated “a little pressure being put on the Federal Council” to take up the project. In the discussion which followed Winter’s lecture, it was unanimously agreed that the branch would “communicate with the Boards of the A.N.A. in the other colonies, impressing upon them the desirability of influencing the Governments of the various colonies of Australasia the necessity of the Federal Council meeting at Hobart in February subsiding an expedition to explore the Antarctic regions.” The ANA subsequently committed itself to supporting the goal of an Australian Antarctic expedition at its Victorian conference in March 1889.

The Committee’s new approach to slowly cultivating public and intercolonial interest in the idea of an Antarctic expedition continued throughout 1889 and 1890. The Committee was well-represented at the second AAAS meeting in Melbourne in 1890, with von Mueller as Association president, Pasco and Ellery as Section E vice-presidents, Griffiths as the

section’s secretary, and Wild giving a paper. The section’s president, W.H. Miskin, declared in his opening address that it “behoves us, as Australasians” to undertake the task of Antarctic exploration. Pasco gave a well-received paper on Antarctic exploration and the progress of his committee, while amateur historian J.J. Shillinglaw gave a paper on ‘Antarctic Whaling in the Old Days’. J.J. Wild argued in his paper ‘On the Distribution of Land and Water on the Terrestrial Globe’ that exploration of Antarctica would “redound to the credit of Australia” and would “fitly close the century.” In a further boost the AAAS Antarctic Committee was reappointed, despite virtually no activity since its creation.

Elsewhere the Sydney School of Arts hosted a lecture on the Arctic and Antarctic regions by H.J. Akerman, while von Mueller unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Norwegian Arctic explorer Fridtjof Nansen, best known for completing the first successful crossing of Greenland, to undertake an Australian lecture tour. The Geographical Society hosted a magic lantern exhibit entitled ‘The Marvels of the Antarctic’. An Australian Antarctic Expedition was used as a plot device in newspaper serials. The history of Antarctic exploration and the scientific and commercial benefits of Australia taking the lead in it were regularly repeated in the press. The Age published an article arguing that now Australia had

---

17 Herald, 11 January 1890, 1.
20 Age, 31 December 1889, 8.
22 For example ‘The Traveller’, Leader, 20 July 1889, 38; ‘What We Know of the South Pole’, SMH, 22 July 1889, 9; ‘What We Know of the South Pole’, Brisbane Courier (BC), 22 July 1889, 7; ‘The South Pole’, Border Watch, 31 May 1890, 2; ‘The Frozen South’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 April 1889, 5; ‘Our Resources and How to Cultivate Them’, Bendigo Advertiser, 4 May 1889, 3.
become “the ‘Greater Britain’ of the south”, it was time for the colonies to undertake an expedition that “would win for Australia the approbation of every civilised country, and prove our claim to rank as a power, moral and material, among the nations of the world”.

All that was needed was for Australia to “rise to a sense of her duty in this matter”, take “the leading part” in any projected Antarctic expedition, and claim honour and prestige that “would endure to all time.”

The press continued to publish rumours and speculation about foreign expeditions; that a Norwegian resident of New Zealand named T.A. Velschow had travelled to Europe to recruit a Norwegian crew and perhaps one or two scientists for a whaling expedition to Victoria Land; that a German-American expedition was likely; that Nordenskiöld was no longer interested in an Antarctic expedition but instead preoccupied with locating old maps to ascertain what was known of the world’s geography in the past; that Nordenskiöld was still planning to lead an Antarctic expedition and would seek to cooperate with Australia; that Nansen was planning his own Norwegian expedition; that Nordenskiöld was still organising an expedition in Sweden but had chosen Nansen to lead it in his stead. It also published occasional criticisms of the Committee’s campaign, primarily but not exclusively reprinted from British newspapers, on the basis that further exploration of the Australian interior was necessary before attention should turn to the Antarctic. The Sydney Catholic weekly *Freeman’s Journal*, for example, suggested that “like charity, exploration should begin at

---

home.”27 Such was the growing ubiquity of the campaign that the name ‘Antarctic’ was bestowed on a middling Victorian race horse.28

In September 1889, the Committee received a new offer from Svend Foyn, the Norwegian whaler responsible for developing explosive harpoons for use in Arctic whaling, to provide two steam whalers for an Australian expedition. Writing via the Consul for Sweden and Norway in Melbourne, Hans Jørgen Gundersen, Foyn offered to conduct whaling in the Antarctic, take on board any scientists chosen by the “Australian government”, and endeavour to make the voyage both commercially and scientifically productive in exchange for a premium of at least £6,000, to be paid regardless of the scale and significance of the geographical discoveries made. Before he could commit to an expedition, however, he needed information about the species of whales observed in the Southern Ocean, because his voyage would only be profitable if it encountered baleen whales that could be easily hunted for whalebone as well as oil. The Committee immediately wrote to a number of experts and made a public request for information to find answers to Foyn’s questions.29

The Swedish-Australian Antarctic Expedition

While the Committee’s research into the species of whales found in the Antarctic proved insufficently promising for Foyn to risk a voyage, the link that was forged with the Swedish Consul, Gundersen, proved invaluable.30 Gundersen forwarded a copy of von Mueller’s most

27 ‘Stray Sparks’, Freeman’s Journal (FJ), 13 September 1890, 10.
30 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 15 August 1890, 6.
recent presidential address to the Geographical Society, in which he discussed the Committee’s efforts to mount an expedition, to the Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Lewenhaupt. Lewenhaupt in turn forwarded the paper to the Secretary of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, who passed it to Nordenskiöld.31 The possibility of £5,000 from Australia convinced Nordenskiöld, his long-term patron Oscar Dickson, and the Academy to announce plans for an Antarctic expedition, and to ask Lewenhaupt to communicate with Australia in the hope that the £5,000 “may not in the meantime be appropriated for other purposes.”32

At a meeting of the Committee on 29 July 1890, it was unanimously resolved to accept Nordenskiöld’s offer to equip and lead a purely scientific Swedish-Australian Antarctic Expedition, with Australia and Sweden each contributing £5,000.33 It was further decided that the Committee would take advantage of the growing public and intercolonial support it had cultivated since the collapse of its previous scheme by seeking private subscriptions before approaching the colonial governments for grants, an approach they now considered would have been “the proper course from the beginning”.34 Griffiths had recently been invited to give the Bankers’ Institute of Australasia’s annual address on the subject of Antarctic exploration, so it was decided to use this opportunity to launch the fundraising campaign.35

31 Correspondence with Sir Thomas Elder and with the Royal Academy of Science Stockholm’, LIB005938za, X 919.45 MAC, Royal Historical Society of Victoria (RHSV), Letter from D.G. Lindhagen to Carl Lewenhaupt, 10 January 1890.
33 ‘Progress Report of the Joint Committee’ Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (Victorian Branch), Series 2, Volume VIII (1891), 76-83.
34 LIB005938za, X 919.45 MAC, RHSV, Cablegram from H. Gundersen to Royal Academy of Science, 15 August 1890, Letter from H.K. Rusden to Royal Academy of Science, 5 October 1890; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 15 August 1890, 6.
With this in mind, Griffiths’ address was shifted from the Bankers’ Institute to a larger venue at the Athenaeum Hall and opened to the public, and the Governor was invited to preside.36 The address restated the various scientific and commercial benefits of Antarctic exploration, though on this occasion Griffiths added that the establishment of an Australian whaling industry would lead to population growth by causing Scottish whalers and their families to migrate to Australian ports.37 He also invoked the idea that science and exploration were essential to being seen as a civilised nation, saying that “nothing could bring to us greater distinction in the eyes of the whole civilised world than such an expedition, judiciously planned and skilfully carried out.”38 Griffiths concluded his address by displaying a series of images of Arctic and Antarctic scenes from his collection. After some discussion a resolution was passed that “this meeting recognises a national duty in the scientific exploration of the Antarctic zone, particularly that potion lying nearest Australia”, and a subscription list was opened.39

The first significant supporters of the Antarctic Committee’s fundraising effort were scientific societies. The Victorian branch of the Geographical Society subscribed £200 from the society’s funds, while the Royal Society of Victoria and W.C. Kernot promised £100 each.40 The Royal Society of Tasmania discussed its support at a general meeting, with Alexander Morton suggesting the Society head a local subscription list with £50. Alfred Mault opposed this on the grounds that “the work was proposed to be done, not by us, but at the instigation, and with the assistance of persons on the other side of the world who do not

40 ‘Progress Report of the Joint Committee’ (1891), 82; ‘Royal Geographical Society’, Age, 23 August 1890, 11; LIB 005938za, X 919.45 MAC, RHSV, Subscription List; Argus, 13 November 1890, 5.
belong to our race or speak our language”. Despite some sympathy for Mault’s argument, a consensus was reached that it was better to support the present expedition, while hoping that it “would be the precursor of one of which Australasia might be proud”. While unable to make direct contributions, the Royal Society of Queensland and the South Australian Branch of the Geographical Society both established committees to oversee the promotion of the expedition, lobbying of governments, and collection of subscriptions in their colonies. The Royal Society of New South Wales and the New South Wales branch of the Geographical Society were initially more hesitant, declining to coordinate a fundraising appeal “until the project was more matured than it is at present”. In November 1890, however, the societies threw their support behind the expedition, appointing their own committee and resolving to schedule a public lecture on the subject of Antarctic exploration for February 1891. By the end of 1891, the Melbourne Committee had succeed in raising £500 for the Antarctic Fund.

A variety of other institutions also responded to the Committee’s appeal. Most notably, the ANA rallied in support. The Association’s Prahran branch invited von Mueller, Wild, Macdonald, and Gundersen to speak at a meeting in September 1890 and subsequently opened a subscription list for members headed by a donation of £2.2.0 from the branch’s

---

46 LIB 005938za, X 919.45 MAC, RHSV, Subscription List.
emergency fund. The ANA’s Board of Directors agreed to create an Association-wide subscription list in December 1890, eventually raising £50 in small individual donations. The Field Naturalists’ Club of Victoria, Melbourne University Science Club, Melbourne Deutsch Turnverein, and Port Melbourne Council also made subscriptions, as did companies such as shipping firm Archibald Currie & Co., Queensland department store Pigott’s, Victorian textiles firm McNaughton, Love & Co., and clothing importers Patterson, Laing & Bruce Co.

Individuals also rallied to support the fundraising campaign. In Tasmania, public librarian Alfred J. Taylor launched a one-man campaign to rally support for the expedition. In a fervent letter to the *Mercury* he declared that “other nations have been born in the strong throes of Revolution and strife … But here in these fair lands of the south, where the baptism of blood has not yet been sprinkled, a peaceful pathway has been marked out along which their children may march to the same end”. Australia, he argued, would be born amidst the “triumphs that come of knowledge attained in the cause of science, and sacrifice in the cause of truth … unstained with blood, and something to hand down to future ages.” He continued his campaign in subsequent letters, urging Tasmanians to contribute their share “towards an enterprise that should be regarded as eminently national in its character.” His fellow Tasmanian George Hawthorn urged the Committee to learn from its previous mistakes and solicit the assistance of wealthy citizens rather than the colonial governments.

---

48 ‘The Proposed Antarctic Expeditions’, *Herald*, 23 September 1890, 4; Antarctic Exploration’, *Herald*, 5 March 1892, 2; ‘Australian Natives Association’, *Herald*, 20 December 1890, 3; LIB005938za, X 919.45 MAC, RHSV, Subscription List.
49 LIB005938za, X 919.45 MAC, RHSV, Subscription List; ‘University Science Club’, *Argus*, 15 August 1891, 6.
50 Antarctic Exploration’, *Mercury*, 18 August 1890, 3.
51 Ibid.
52 ‘Letters to the Editor’, *Mercury*, 3 September 1890, 2; ‘Letters to the Editor’, *Mercury*, 15 September 1890, 3.
53 Antarctic Exploration’, *Age*, 5 April 1890, 4; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *Tasmanian News (TN)*, 4 August 1890, 3.
as Victorian surveyor and geologist James Stirling, applied for positions on the expedition’s scientific staff.54

Other correspondents were similarly passionate. A letter to the Argus printed under the name ‘Humanity’ argued that, in addition to the widely discussed scientific and commercial benefits, the expedition deserved support on humanitarian grounds. Several ships had gone missing south of the Antarctic circle in the last forty years, they explained, and their passengers and crews may have been stranded within a week’s voyage of Melbourne on the Antarctic coastline or unmapped islands “for many years, anxiously hoping and watching for the relief which an Antarctic expedition alone is likely to bring to them”.55 T.H. Hocking argued that the Australian Natives’ Association and the various mutual improvement societies should be particularly active in fundraising for the expedition, as anything that would “enhance the national honor is deserving of their special commendation and support.”56 S. Bradbury wrote to the Argus to start a readers’ fund, instigating the donations with 10 guineas and hoping that a thousand ladies and gentlemen in Victoria might match his contribution.57 When the Argus fund proved disappointing, Bradbury wrote again a year later to reiterate his call for Australians to support the expedition and suggest that the “many ladies with leisure at their disposal” might take up the matter of fundraising.58 He also vented his frustrations to the Sydney Morning Herald, insisting that “there is everything in favour of the expedition; nothing against it.”59 Bradbury’s letters prompted Britton Harvey to write to the Argus with his own suggestion, namely that every member of the ANA donate a shilling to an expedition that would “shed lustre on the land of his birth.”60

56 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 6 September 1890, 15.
57 ‘The Proposed Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 27 November 1890, 9; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 2 December 1890.
58 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 3 September 1891, 5.
60 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 7 September 1891, 7.
J.J. Wild gave an acclaimed lecture under the auspices of the New South Wales branch of the Geographical Society at Sydney Town Hall in April 1891. Wild’s paper was subsequently read at the International Congress of Geographical Science at Berne in August 1891, and persuaded the Congress to pass a resolution expressing “the hope that the expedition for the exploration of the Antarctic Ocean may be organised without further delay in order to solve the scientific questions of the highest import which are attached thereto.” The Geographical Society hosted another public lecture in September 1891, F.E. Du Faur lecturing on Antarctic exploration with a focus on whaling, meteorology, and the study of ice conditions. The Bankers’ Institute invited another Committee member, A.C. Macdonald, to give the Institute’s annual address in 1891. While Macdonald spoke more generally on ‘The Discovery of Australia’, his lecture discussed Antarctic exploration and the Australian-Swedish expedition in great detail.

Bradbury was far from the only individual to subscribe to the fund. While the lack of support for the expedition from the colonies’ pastoralist and gold mining elite was regularly bemoaned, the fund was well supported by the middle-class professionals who also made up the core of the scientific societies. Former Tasmanian Premier James Agnew donated £100, as did Victorian pastoralist J.L. Currie and Melbourne businessmen J.S. Gotch and John Danks. Committee members Kernot, von Mueller, Griffiths, and William Potter all contributed individually, as did the Swedish consul Gundersen. Small donations also came from men like Thomas Musgrave, who had famously survived being shipwrecked on

---

64 ‘News of the Day’, Age, 11 June 1891, 5.
65 ‘Tasmania’, NMH, 23 April 1891, 5; Weekly Times (WT), 29 November 1890, 2.1;

Perhaps the most extravagant of the Committee’s fundraising efforts was a lavish, Antarctic-themed costume ball in December 1890. With Macdonald as its chief organiser, the Melbourne Exhibition building was decorated with paintings and three tonnes of ice formed into bergs, caves, and other polar scenes. The hall was dotted with stuffed seals borrowed from scientific collections, while a group of the organisers roamed the room dressed as ‘Esquimaux’, sweltering beneath several layers of furs. Around 500 guests attended, in costumes that ranged from explorers like Cook and Ross to white gowns and cricketing whites, and from Swedish national dress to an academic gown and white trencher that was, apparently, the academic dress of ‘the University of Enderby’s Land’. Reactions to the Antarctic ball were mixed. While the decorations, and particularly the stuffed seals, were applauded, the social pages generally agreed the Committee had erred by staging the event too late in the year and in too cavernous a venue. Tasmanian newspaper The Colonist aired a different line of criticism, decrying the fact that the Antarctic Committee had been forced

---

66 LIB 005938za, X 919.45 MAC, RHSV, Subscription List.
69 ‘Fancy Dress Ball’, Age, 20 December 1890, 10; ‘The White Ball’, Table Talk, 26 December 1890, 11; ‘Social Notes’, Australasian, 27 December 1890, 38.
into the “undignified medium” of a ball to raise funds for the expedition. They regretted that Australians “should be so oblivious to the claim of duty” as to leave an Antarctic expedition struggling for funds while £3,000 was being offered as the prize for a boxing fight in Sydney.\footnote{\textit{‘South Polar Exploration’}, \textit{Colonist}, 13 December 1890, 16.} In any case, it seems unlikely that the ball was a financial success for the Committee. It was never mentioned in progress reports or included on lists of subscriptions, suggesting that it may have been quietly and deliberately forgotten after the fact.

More successful than the ball was an effort to secure AAAS endorsement. Griffiths, president of Section E for the Association’s third meeting in Christchurch, set the agenda with his presidential address to open the section in January 1891, devoting thirteen pages of a nineteen-page paper to Antarctica.\footnote{G.S. Griffiths, ‘Address by the President’, \textit{Report of the Third Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science} (1891), 232-250.} The Committee’s proposal was not the only one debated, however. C.W. Purnell, who had made one of the first calls for an Australasian Antarctic Expedition in 1878, outlined the value of an expedition – including resolving whether the Antarctic was inhabited by humans – but criticised what he saw as the unambitious scope of the Committee’s proposal. Instead, he called for a renewed attempt to persuade the colonial government to “depart for once from their routine work, and engage in a patriotic enterprise worthy of the traditions of a maritime nation, and which would make the names of Australia and New Zealand respected throughout the civilised world.”\footnote{C.W. Purnell, ‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{Report of the Third Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science} (1891), 253-254.} Another New Zealander, Captain Crutchley, drew on the same ideas that Antarctic exploration was a peculiarly Australasian duty and that it would secure Australasia’s national reputation to win support for his own scheme. While Crutchley’s scheme was a simpler and cheaper proposal to establish an iceberg mapping and warning system for the Southern Ocean, he argued that Antarctic exploration was a task “imposed specially by Nature for the inhabitants of the New World to
accomplish, lying as it does at what may be termed the very doorstep of Australasia”, and that its accomplishment “would win for their new world a peaceful victory which would outshine in splendour many of the warlike achievements of the old.”73

Despite Purnell’s reservations, the AAAS Committee endorsed the Swedish-Australian expedition and the Melbourne committee’s fundraising campaign in its first progress report, presented at the meeting.74 This report reflected the fact that the AAAS Committee was not particularly active and had no role in the organisation of the expedition. Indeed, the only original ideas raised were two eccentric suggestions from von Mueller – that the expedition use homing pigeons to convey updates from the Antarctic back to Australia and that the expedition be equipped with balloons for ascending the Great Ice Barrier that had barred Ross’ way south.75 Despite its largely symbolic status, the AAAS Committee was reappointed, with New Zealand’s surveyor-general Stephenson Percy Smith, Wellington’s Commissioner of Crown Lands J.H. Baker, and Otago lawyer F.R. Chapman joining Barnard, Ellery, and Griffiths.76

With AAAS’ endorsement, the Antarctic Committee decided the time was opportune to send Crawford Pasco and William Potter, who had joined the Committee the previous year, to urge the Federal Convention meeting in Sydney in March to support the expedition.77 Public subscriptions amounted to £1,450 so far, and it was hoped that this evidence of public support

75 Report of the Committee appointed to consider the question of Antarctic Exploration’, 547.
76 Report of the Third Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, xxi.
combined with AAAS approval would be sufficient to persuade each colony to provide a grant. The Committee received a boost in June 1891 when an offer from South Australian wool magnate Thomas Elder – rumoured since the previous year – was confirmed for £5,000.\(^78\) Even this was insufficient to bring the expedition to fruition, however, as news of Elder’s offer coincided with news from Sweden that the Australian contribution would need to be raised to £10,000 if the expedition were to proceed.\(^79\)

Pasco and Potter’s efforts at the Federal Convention convinced Queensland Premier Samuel Griffith to promise a £1,000 grant, Tasmania to confirm a £300 grant, and New South Wales Premier Henry Parkes promised £1,266 if the public of his colony subscribed £634.\(^80\) The South Australian government had already twice rejected applications for a grant, refusing to countenance an expedition they believed would chiefly benefit New Zealand and Tasmania while the former contributed nothing.\(^81\) Victorian Robert Reid donated £1,000 in the hope that the expedition would discover “undeveloped sources of wealth in the southern seas waiting for the Australians”, bringing the promised total to £8,000.\(^82\) An additional urgent
public appeal for the remaining funds was therefore made in the pages of the *Age* and *Argus* in October 1891.  

The Swedish Consul Gundersen, who was by 1891 attending every Committee meeting, acting as a trustee of the Antarctic Fund, and had reportedly submitted an application to join the expedition as photographer and balloonist, wrote to his foreign minister with this positive update on the fundraising and to request a copy of Nordenskiöld’s detailed plans for the expedition. A series of replies from Sweden revealed that Nordenskiöld’s preparations so far amounted to attempting to procure books relating to the Antarctic; he had no plan, no ships, no staff, and would not countenance departing Sweden before the middle of 1893. The Committee, which had hoped for the expedition to leave Australia before the end of 1891, reluctantly accepted this delay, and requested that a formal contract be sent so that they could wire the funds collected so far.

The Committee then suffered further setbacks. Samuel Griffith failed to get the £1,000 grant he had promised through parliament. When Macdonald and von Mueller asked for Elder’s £5,000 subscription, Elder insisted on a series of impossible new conditions for the donation, demanding that the intended scientific expedition now conduct whaling, be in Australia within a year, and visit Adelaide, and insisting the money would be paid only when the expedition arrived in South Australia. Von Mueller’s efforts to convince Elder that these

---

84 ‘Prahran Branch’, *Herald*, 25 September 1890, 4; LIB005938za, X919.45MAC, RHSV, Cablegram from Gundersen to Lewenhaupt, 15 July 1891.
85 LIB005938za, X919.45MAC, RHSV, Cablegram from Lewenhaupt to Gundersen, 21 July 1891, Cablegram from Gundersen to Lewenhaupt, 26 July 1891, Letter from Nordenskiöld to Lindhagen, 7 September 1891, Letter from Nordenskiöld to Lewenhaupt, 23 September 1891.
87 LIB005938za, X919.45MAC, RHSV, Telegram from Gundersen to Lewenhaupt, 16 October 1891; ‘Report of Committee No. 10, Antarctic Exploration’, *Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science* (1892), 236-239.
conditions were impossible, particularly as the money was required in Sweden to purchase ships, were rebuffed.\textsuperscript{88} Despite the Committee’s public insistence that the expedition had simply been delayed until the ideal time, rumours circulated that it was on the verge of collapse.\textsuperscript{89} Further rumours suggested that the Australian-Swedish expedition would be forestalled in their goal by Scottish whaler David Gray, who had finally decided to send his own expedition south.\textsuperscript{90} These rumours were confirmed when Gray offered to undertake some scientific exploration south of the Falkland Islands in exchange for a significant premium.\textsuperscript{91} The Committee, however, insisted in its February 1892 progress report that it was still solely focused on the Swedish-Australian expedition, and that it had £4,210 in the Antarctic Fund.\textsuperscript{92} The project also attracted growing criticism, most notably from a \textit{Times} article reprinted in several colonial papers that declared that the enterprise had been “sadly mismanaged” and that the colonies “occupy a ridiculous position in the matter.”\textsuperscript{93} For an expedition that appealed so explicitly to the idea that exploration would grant Australia the esteem of the nations of the world, the suggestion that it was instead a source of ridicule was crippling. Finally, letters came from Sweden informing the Committee that, as they had not provided the agreed funds to Nordenskiöld by the agreed date of 1 January 1892 – a

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{91} ‘Antarctic Exploration’, ATCJ, 6 February 1892, 12; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, Leader, 6 February 1892, 43.
\textsuperscript{92} ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 20 February 1892, 11; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 20 February 1892, 8.
\textsuperscript{93} For example ‘Antarctic Exploration’, EN, 9 December 1891, 4; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Evening Journal, 9 December 1891, 3; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 10 December 1891, 2; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, ATCJ, 12 December 1891, 11.
\end{flushright}
condition that was never stipulated in any previous correspondence – Dickson’s offer of £5,000 had lapsed and the cooperation between Sweden and Australia was at an end.  

Despite the collapse of the Swedish-Australian Antarctic Expedition, the campaign for Antarctic exploration carried on. G.S. Griffiths wrote to the Argus in June 1892 to respond to criticism of the Committee’s management. He pointed out that the Committee had raised the £5,000 agreed, only to be asked to increase its contribution to £10,000 without any corresponding increase in the Swedish share, that Nordenskiöld had said he was working on a detailed plan for the expedition in 1890 but had still not provided it by 1892, and that Dickson and Nordenskiöld claimed they had withdrawn from the expedition because the money had not been paid, yet had never replied to the Committee’s request for a business contract, which Griffiths said was necessary to ensure “Australia will have a proper position in the undertaking to which she will contribute the larger proportion of the cost.” The Committee still hoped that the expedition could be salvaged, and Pasco had travelled to Stockholm to attempt to smooth over relations with Nordenskiöld and the Swedish Academy. Even if the expedition did not proceed, Griffiths added, “we in Melbourne have the satisfaction of knowing that we have roused the attention of the world to the importance of exploring the Antarctic”. The Leader urged Australians to renew their efforts, arguing that “the Australian colonies are able, if they could only see it, to do all that is requisite without European assistance.”

Perhaps inspired by this optimistic evaluation, the Committee made a final effort in December 1892 to salvage an expedition from the funds already subscribed. The

---

94 LIB005938za, X919.45MAC, RHSV Letter from Gundersen to Potter, 1 June 1892, Letter from Lewenhaupt to Gundersen, 22 April 1892, Letter from Oscar Dickson and A.E. Nordenskiöld to Royal Academy of Science, February 1892, Letter from Dickson and Nordenskiöld to Royal Academy of Science, 13 April 1892.
95 ‘The Swedish-Australian Antarctic Expedition’, Argus, 2 June 1892, 10.
96 Ibid.
97 ‘Scientific Gossip’, Leader, 30 July 1892, 36.
Committee’s secretary, William Potter, went to Sydney to meet with members of the colonial government and Geographical Society to persuade them to put the funds promised in the colony towards an entirely Australian expedition. Premier George Dibbs was willing to do so, but told Potter that the government’s grant of £1,334 needed to be claimed by the end of the year.98 The government had already extended the grant for a second year in 1892, but Dibbs feared it would be voted down if it had to face parliament again in 1893, particularly if news of the Swedish withdrawal was officially received.99 Claiming the grant required evidence that £666 had been subscribed from private sources, so Potter offered to funnel Reid’s £1,000 donation, which had been subscribed but not yet paid, through the New South Wales branch of the Geographical Society to allow the grant to be claimed and the expedition to continue as a purely Australian enterprise. Despite Dibbs’ willingness to go along with this plan, the branch’s treasurer, H.S.W. Crummer, saw this as both deceiving the government and evidence of “Victorian interference”, and the opportunity to claim the grant was lost.100 Griffiths provided another public update early the following year, finally accepting that the Swedish-Australian Expedition had collapsed but explaining that Pasco had gone to Dundee to meet the proprietors of an Antarctic whaling expedition there. This expedition had taken a small group of scientists, so it was expected to yield both scientific and commercial results that could be of value to Australia.101 Macdonald provided a similar defence of the Committee’s activities in his presidential address to AAAS’ Geographical Section in 1893, blaming the failure on the “severe commercial depression” that had struck the colonies.102 Macdonald insisted that the Committee would continue to work towards an Antarctic

100 ‘Letter from Potter to von Mueller, 10 December 1892’, Regardfully Yours, 630-632.
102 A.C. Macdonald, ‘Section E: Geography, Address by the President’, Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (1894), 131.
expedition, likely by returning to the system of bonuses for whalers, and urged the Association to ensure “that the glory of making discovery and explorations in these Southern Seas be not borne from us by others, to our everlasting disgrace.”

Public interest in Antarctic exploration also continued in the wake of the expedition’s collapse. The *Sydney Morning Herald* argued that the Swedish-Australian expedition had been “wrecked on the niggardliness of Australian Governments, which with the stroke of a pen would pass away five times the total required for some miserable bridge or bit of railway whereunto votes were hanging”, and recommended that for an expedition to win support “the love of science has to be spiced with a little utilitarianism, or it is hardly grateful to the modern palate.”

David Gray’s proposed whaling expedition was widely reported on until it too collapsed due to disputes between investors. The New South Wales branch of the Geographical Society took it upon itself to campaign for a local whaling expedition, holding a meeting with a group of Sydney businessmen to encourage them to invest in an Antarctic whaling industry with its headquarters in Port Jackson. A decision was made to send two members of the society and two of the businessmen to ask for the Sydney Chamber of Commerce’s support, but this too failed to gain traction. When two whaling expeditions actually did depart for the Antarctic, one organised by the Tay Whaling Company of Dundee and the other by Norwegian Christen Christensen, their preparations and progress were chronicled in great detail by the Australian press. Despite heading to the Graham Land

---

103 Macdonald, ‘Address by the President’, 132.
104 SMH, 20 August 1892, 5.
106 DT, 26 October 1892, 4; ‘Whaling in the Antarctic Regions’, *SMH*, 27 October 1892, 7.
region on the opposite side of the Antarctic continent, there was intense interest in whether these expeditions would open the way for an Australian Antarctic whaling industry.  

**Henrik Johan Bull and the Voyage of the Antarctic**

While public attention focused on the Swedish-Australian Expedition, a Norwegian expatriate living in Melbourne had been working towards his own whaling voyage since 1892. Henrik Johan Bull had worked for Melbourne merchant firm Trapp, Blair & Co. since 1887. Reports on the future prospects of an Antarctic whaling industry were ubiquitous in Melbourne in this period, and these combined with Bull’s own reading of Ross’ account of abundant right whales off the coast of Victoria Land sparked his interest in an expedition. Bull wrote a series of letters to the *Argus* on the topic, discussed it with von Mueller, and attempted to generate sufficient interest and capital to establish a whaling company without success, which he blamed on the commercial depression of the 1890s. He instead returned to Norway in February 1893, and took his plan to eighty-four-year-old Svend Foyn. Foyn immediately agreed to fund Bull’s expedition on the grounds that he was prepared to support any industrial undertaking that was of “national importance.” That the development of Antarctic industries was considered something of national importance in Norway, another dependent polity in the midst of a political independence movement in the 1890s, further reflects the idea that the Antarctic provided a unique opportunity for prospective states to both develop new, independent economic resources, acquire control over new territory, and gain the respect of the international community. Foyn and Bull made a final offer to the Antarctic Committee to undertake some scientific work in exchange for a large bonus, but

---

when this was declined they decided on a purely commercial voyage funded entirely by Foyn, Bull, and a Norwegian firm.112

Departing Norway in September 1893 in a steam whaler renamed *Antarctic*, Bull, who held the poorly defined position of ‘manager’ on board, began the expedition by hunting whales and seals around Kerguelen. After harvesting a reasonable cargo the *Antarctic* continued to Melbourne. During this second leg of the voyage, Bull panicked about the question of Kerguelen’s sovereignty. He was concerned that the whales and seals they had hunted in Kerguelen’s waters might have belonged to Australia, Britain, or France, and worried that his cargo might be confiscated on arrival in Melbourne. Instead of a charge for poaching or the “natural jealousy” he anticipated, however, Bull was met with widespread enthusiasm in Melbourne.113 The ship was granted a berth at Yarraville, where the blubber from Kerguelen could be boiled down for oil.114 The Antarctic Committee and the Royal and Geographical Societies hosted an official welcome for the expedition, and Bull was invited to give a paper to the Geographical Society. In a parallel of the reciprocal receptions of 1839-41, Bull returned the courtesy by inviting members of societies to “an al-fresco entertainment on board the *Antarctic*”, an entertainment that concluded with the firing of an explosive harpoon across Port Phillip Bay.115 One visitors, L.L. Smith, in turn invited Bull and Gundersen to attend a meeting of the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures with him. They provided samples of oil and skins from Kerguelen and recommended that the Chamber work to develop a whaling and sealing industry in the Antarctic and a trading connection with

---

Sweden for the products derived from it.\textsuperscript{116} This connection with the Chamber of Manufactures was likely responsible for an offer from a consortium of Victorian businessmen to buy out Foyn and continue the expedition at their own risk. While Foyn was open to the offer, he set a price of £10,000 – double what the consortium could afford – and the deal fell through.\textsuperscript{117} Despite this, an erroneous claim that the expedition was “an enterprise of Victoria capital combined with Norwegian appliances, experience, and skill” circulated widely.\textsuperscript{118}

While the expedition had a positive start to its time in Melbourne, it soon suffered a series of setbacks. Bull attempted to sell the Kerguelen sealskins in Melbourne but found that no merchant would buy them. Unaware of the sealing seasons for the Southern Ocean, they had harvested them during moulting season, rendering them almost worthless.\textsuperscript{119} To recover this loss, Bull sent the \textit{Antarctic} under the command of its captain, Leonard Kristensen, to try whaling and sealing near the Auckland and Campbell Islands in April 1894 while he tried to sell the Kerguelen cargo in Melbourne.

This voyage proved disastrous. The Tasmanian government had recently begun working with its New Zealand counterpart to conserve seal populations on the subantarctic islands and work towards developing a sustainable sealing industry that would be entirely in colonial hands.\textsuperscript{120} As part of their increasing cooperation, the Tasmanian government warned New Zealand that the \textit{Antarctic} was bound for the Aucklands and Campbell Island, where sealing was strictly regulated by the New Zealand Marine Department, and noted that “Tasmania

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{116}] ‘Chamber of Manufactures’, \textit{Age}, 6 March 1894, 6.
  \item[\textsuperscript{117}] Bull, \textit{The Cruise of the ‘Antarctic’}, 84.
  \item[\textsuperscript{118}] ‘Whaling and Sealing in the South Pacific’, \textit{Age}, 6 January 1894, 12; ‘Whaling and Sealing in the South Pacific’, \textit{LE}, 11 January 1894, 3.
  \item[\textsuperscript{119}] Bull, \textit{The Cruise of the ‘Antarctic’}, 81-83.
  \item[\textsuperscript{120}] See for example ‘Our Letter Home’, \textit{Mercury}, 22 September 1894, 4; New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1894 Session I, H-25 Report on Auckland Campbell and Other Islands and on their Seals and Seal-Rookeries, 1.
\end{itemize}
may be relied upon for any practical cooperation” in preventing poaching.\(^{121}\) The New Zealand government responded by despatching the government steamer Hinemoa to the islands tasked with “warning off the foreigner”.\(^{122}\) Hinemoa encountered the Antarctic at the Auckland Islands, where its captain, John Fairchild, informed Kristensen that sealing was banned until the end of June, and that this ‘closed season’ would likely be extended further. While Bull made no mention of this incident in his account of the expedition, it was widely reported at the time that Kristensen insisted that he would hunt seals until a British man-of-war arrived to stop him.\(^{123}\) With Hinemoa shadowing Antarctic around the Aucklands, Kristensen sailed south-east to Campbell while Fairchild returned to New Zealand.\(^{124}\) His government responded by requesting that one of the naval vessels of the Australia Station, Rapid, be sent to Campbell to post notices of an extension to the sealing closed season and, if the Antarctic was encountered, to “warn her off”.\(^{125}\) This it did, leaving the Antarctic unable to hunt seals on Campbell to complement its meagre catch of one whale and six tons of oil.\(^{126}\) Kristensen subsequently ran his ship aground in a storm causing severe damage. The only other vessel on the island, a ketch carrying a party of gold prospectors, was chartered to go to Melbourne to ask Bull to send new anchors and other urgent supplies.\(^{127}\) After limping back

---

\(^{121}\) TRE1/1/2383, Box TRE1/59, 4640 Correspondence from the Treasurer to the Premier re. the Steam Whaler ‘Antarctic’ Catching Seals in the South Seas, State Library of Tasmania (SLT).

\(^{122}\) New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, H-25 Report on Auckland Campbell and Other Islands.


to Melbourne in August 1894, *Antarctic* underwent £2,000 worth of repairs, a sum that far exceeded the modest proceeds of the Campbell Island and Kerguelen voyages combined.\(^{128}\)

As *Antarctic* underwent repairs, the Antarctic Committee provided all the assistance it could. The expedition was entirely commercial, but Bull had given permission to Scottish oceanographer William Speirs Bruce, just returned from the Dundee whaling expedition, and Norwegian explorer Eivind Astrup to join the ship in Melbourne. When news arrived that neither Bruce nor Astrup would reach Melbourne in time, the Committee hastily attempted to arrange for two Australian scientists to join the expedition. When this proved impossible, they instead supplied books, charts, and scientific instruments in the hope that some useful data could be collected. In the final days before departure, however, a young Norwegian who had worked as a surveyor and teacher in New South Wales since migrating in 1888 asked Bull for permission to join the expedition as a scientist.\(^{129}\) Thirty year old Carsten Borchgrevink had studied natural science in Saxony prior to commencing a peripatetic existence in Australia, and claimed to have developed an interest in Antarctic exploration as a result of the Committee’s efforts to outfit an Australian expedition.\(^{130}\) Borchgrevink’s credentials were insufficient to justify a position as a scientist, but he was permitted to sign ship’s articles as a ‘generally useful hand’ and devote his leisure time to scientific work. While falling well short of the arrangement the Committee had strived towards for eight years, this was the first attempt to explore the Antarctic region closest to Australia since 1840.

The *Antarctic* left Melbourne on 26 September 1894. It sailed first to Hobart, where long-term proponents of whaling and exploration in the Antarctic such as John Bradley, George Hawthorn, H.H. Gill, and Alexander Morton visited the ship.\(^\text{131}\) Despite the failure of the preliminary voyage, Kristensen had reported that whales and seals were abundant at Campbell Island. Bull therefore resolved to collect a cargo from Campbell before pushing further south. Once again, however, the expedition’s sealing activities were curtailed by the presence of a New Zealand ship reminding them that the seals were protected by New Zealand law.\(^\text{132}\) The *Antarctic* therefore pushed south, only to be forced to immediately return north to New Zealand when its propeller was damaged by ice. Another £100 was required for repairs, and nine of the crew deserted on the eve of departure, forcing Bull to hire four Māori seamen at Stewart Island.\(^\text{133}\) With the Norwegians now a minority on board, the *Antarctic* again headed south in November 1894, intending to follow Ross’ route to Victoria Land in search of the right whales reported in 1840.

The voyage was another commercial disaster for Bull and Foyn. The *Antarctic* returned to Melbourne on 12 March 1895 with four tons of sperm oil, six tons of elephant oil, and 150 low-value seal skins, worth around £300 in total.\(^\text{134}\) They saw virtually no right whales, encountering only vast populations of blue whales that they lacked the specialised equipment to hunt. The expedition’s scientific and geographical results were also largely unimpressive. Following in Ross’ tracks, they made no significant discoveries. The expedition’s only geographical contributions were making the first landing on the “dominion” of Victoria Land,


a choice of words that reflected a belief that it was a British possession, giving individual names to some islands charted by Ross, and identifying two island groups marked on Southern Ocean charts, the Royal Company’s Islands and the Emerald Islands, as phantom islands.135 Its scientific contributions were mostly limited to meteorological observations, although Borchgrevink did collect specimens of lichens at Cape Adare that were at the time the southernmost vegetation ever discovered.136 While Borchgrevink and Bull had hoped that Foyn would allow them a second year of whaling to continue their search for right whales, this idea was scuppered by news that Foyn had died and orders had been left for the ship to return to Norway.137

As Bull observed, however, “whatever commercial failure we had to deplore, the colonial enthusiasm for our expedition remained as great as ever.”138 Borchgrevink and Bull were invited to address a meeting of the Geographical Society on 18 March 1895 on the expedition’s scientific results and the future prospects of Antarctic whaling respectively, then repeat these addresses at a public lecture on 9 April.139 The Antarctic’s captain, Leonard Kristensen, was also invited to submit a paper for the Geographical Society’s annual conversazione.140 This enthusiasm in Melbourne helped to ensure the expedition was remembered in the colonies not just as a failed whaling venture, but as a bold pioneering enterprise “largely guided and assisted by the Melbourne branch of the Geographical Society.

137 Bull, The Cruise of the ‘Antarctic’, 210-211.
139 ‘Exploration in the Antarctic’, Age, 20 March 1895, 7; ‘Exploration in the Antarctic’, Advocate, 23 March 1895, 8; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, AO, 6 April 1895, 43; Argus, 10 April 1895, 5; ‘Our Illustrations’, Leader, 30 May 1895, 8.
of Australasia”. Borchgrevink and Bull then proceeded to Sydney, where they repeated their lectures and briefly attempted to raise funds for either a whaling company or a scientific expedition to the Antarctic’s landing site at Cape Adare. Bull met with Lands Minister Joseph Carruthers to discuss these proposals, but the support offered in the colony was insufficient for the ventures Bull envisaged. Both Bull and Borchgrevink were also interviewed by the *Australian Star*, and gave evidence on the commercial prospects of Antarctic whaling and fishing to the New South Wales Royal Commission on Fisheries while in Sydney. After the two men fell out and went their separate ways in Sydney, Bull wrote a series of letters to Australian newspapers telling his story of the voyage, defending the value of his discoveries, and outlining the potential for future whaling and exploration.

Borchgrevink, meanwhile, provided interviews and sketches to the press, emphasised his own contributions, generated interest by suggesting that “the existence of an unknown race in the new continent of Antarctica, or Victoria Land, is a matter for future explorers to decide”, and hurried to London to address the International Geographical Congress on his plans to lead a follow-up expedition.

---

141 James Hector, ‘Section E. Presidential Address’, *Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science* (1898), 666.

142 ‘South Polar Exploration’, *EN*, 25 April 1895, 3; ‘South Polar Exploration’, *DT*, 25 April 1895, 6; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *SMH*, 25 April 1895, 3; ‘South Polar Exploration’, *BC*, 3 May 1895, 2; ‘South Polar Expedition’, *Daily Telegraph*, 4 May 1895, 3; ‘Terra Incognito’, *AS*, 6 May 1895, 2; ‘Special Cables’, *SMH*, 3 August 1895, 7.


The *Antarctic*’s voyage led to renewed calls for an Australian expedition to continue the project of Antarctic exploration. The indefatigable G.S. Griffiths presented yet another paper to the Geographical Society on 2 April, in which he expressed his disappointment that *Antarctic* had returned with such a meagre cargo and without having surpassed Ross’ farthest south mark. Nonetheless, he called for an expedition funded by the colonial governments to continue the expedition’s work, or else a whaling expedition to hunt the blue whales seen by Bull.147 Bull himself declared that “to Australians should belong the honour of making further discoveries in that little-known part of the world” and that “whaling in the southern seas and in the waters immediately adjacent to Australia might be made a great national industry.”148 J.T. Robertson pointed out “the responsibility which rested on Australians to cooperate with the mother country in exploring the mysterious circle around the South Pole” to the South Australian branch of the Geographical Society.149 The *Sunday Times* lauded Borchgrevink, Bull, and Foyn, and asked “why should not Australia despatch an expedition, which will do even greater things than the good men of the whaling steamship *Antarctic* have done”.150 In Tasmania, John Bradley gave a public lecture on the history of Australian whaling, Bull’s expedition, and the future of an Antarctic whaling industry.151 Clement Wragge, now Queensland’s government meteorologist, called for an Australian expedition to establish a meteorological station in Antarctica.152 In London, the combined efforts of Borchgrevink, Georg Neumayer, and John Murray at the Geographical Congress had led to a proposal for a cooperative ‘International Antarctic Expedition’, which immediately won the support of the Geographical Society of Australasia.153

148 ‘Royal Commission on Fisheries’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 May 1895, 3.
149 ‘Annual Meeting’, *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South Australian Branch), Ninth Session* (1895-6), 63.
150 ‘The Silent South’, *Sunday Times*, 28 April 1895, 4.
152 *FJ*, 10 August 1895, 21.
153 *SMH*, 31 July 1895, 4; ‘“Augustan Age” of Antarctic Exploration’, *Age*, 7 September 1895, 9; H.S.W. Crummer, ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 September 1895, 3.
Hans Gundersen, the Consul for Sweden and Norway in Melbourne and a staunch supporter of the Antarctic Committee, took these calls for an expedition a step further by organising his own private commercial venture. He quickly gathered modest capital of £1,500 for a sealing voyage to Kerguelen, with Gundersen and Ceylon tea planter Charles Rowlands as the major partners. Gundersen provided the ship, a sailing brig constructed in Norway in 1805, and a crew was recruited in Melbourne from the community of Norwegian sailors working in Australian waters, including Gundersen’s cousin as second mate. Rowlands arranged for his cousin, Hugh Evans, to join the expedition as his representative, while Gundersen took leave from his consular duties to lead it himself. Melbourne ornithologist Robert Hall was invited to accompany the expedition as its naturalist, so that science and commerce could be combined. The expedition departed in October 1897 and returned in March 1898 with a cargo of 900 skins and 19,000 gallons of unrefined elephant and leopard seal oil. The expedition made at least a modest profit, and Hall and Evans returned with a large collection of geological and botanical specimens. They also managed to capture a live baby sea elephant and sell it to Melbourne Aquarium, where it became a popular tourist attraction. Hall subsequently provided accounts of the expedition to the Age and Leader, and gave the geological samples to Evelyn G. Hogg, who presented an analysis of them to the Royal Society of Victoria in 1898.


Evans donated the largest albatross specimen ever collected to Lionel Walter Rothschild’s private natural history museum in Tring. Gunderson’s expedition was modest in its scope and achievements, and was made by possible by using a ninety-three-year-old ship without an auxiliary engine that Gundersen already owned. It demonstrated, however, that an expedition could, as the Antarctic Committee had repeatedly asserted, do valuable work on a small scale by combining science and commerce, albeit without the Committee’s convoluted bonus system.

**International Interest in Antarctic Exploration**

By 1896, four separate proposals for full-scale scientific expeditions to the Antarctic region were under consideration. One came from those associated with the earlier movement by the British Association for an expedition. Another came from Georg von Neumayer and his German Commission for South Polar Exploration. The third was for a Belgian Antarctic Expedition developed by undistinguished Belgian naval officer Adrien de Gerlache. The fourth was Borchgrevink’s, whose ideas had moved from taking a scientific position on the international expedition proposed by the Geographical Congress to taking command of his own expedition funded primarily by the Australian colonies.

Borchgrevink wrote to Carruthers in September 1895 to raise the possibility of his leading “a purely Australian expedition”. Despite discussing the proposal with the Geographical Society Carruthers took the matter no further, so Borchgrevink cabled a fresh offer to the Premier of New South Wales, George Reid, to lead an expedition if the colony could provide

---

£15,000. When this was declined the Australian press reported that Borchgrevink’s expedition would be delayed until at least 1897. In a final effort to win colonial support, Borchgrevink arrived in Adelaide in January 1897 to embark on an intercolonial lecture tour. In Adelaide he met with the local branch of the Geographical Society, which promised to “use its best endeavours to forward the enterprise” but privately resolved that, with an official British expedition likely to be launched by their sister society in London in the near future, it would be wise not to commit funds to Borchgrevink’s proposal at the present time. He also met the South Australian Premier, F.W. Holder, who again stopped short of any financial commitments but encouraged Borchgrevink to address the Premiers’ Conference to be held in Hobart in February. Borchgrevink therefore proceeded to Hobart, where he gave interviews, met politicians and Royal Society members, and published an article in the *Mercury*. His efforts resulted in a public meeting in Hobart that endorsed his proposal and called on the colonial governments to support it, but no offers of funds were forthcoming. Borchgrevink made a final attempt to rally support with a public lecture in Brisbane under the auspices of the Queensland branch of the Geographical Society, an article in Sydney’s *Daily Telegraph*, and the appointment of the Governor of New South Wales to his expedition’s ‘Honorary Council’. By the end of his tour Borchgrevink had garnered ample goodwill but no offers of funding, the recent experience of the aborted Swedish-Australian expedition, the prospect of an imminent request for funds from an official British

161 ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, Telegraph, 18 December 1895, 5.
165 ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, Argus, 19 January 1897, 5; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, EN, 19 January 1897, 7; ‘*Antarctic Expedition*, SMH, 19 January 1897, 5; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, DN, 19 January 1897, 3; ‘*South Australia*, DT, 19 January 1897, 6; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, DT, 30 January 1897, 8.
166 *Explorer Borchgrevink*, AS, 21 January 1897, 4; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, Mercury, 22 January 1897, 3; C.E. Borchgrevink, ‘*Antarctic and Arctic Exploration*, Mercury, 30 January 1897, 4; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, LE, 3 February 1897, 3.
167 ‘Notes and Notices’, Australasian, 6 February 1897, 32; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, DT, 3 February 1897, 6.
168 ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, Telegraph, 26 March 1897, 4; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, Telegraph, 27 March 1897, 4; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, DT, 10 April 1897, 4; BC, 30 April 1897, 7.
Antarctic Expedition, and the still recent experience of a severe economic depression combining to thwart his hopes.

It is notable that the arguments Borchgrevink made in his meetings, lectures, and newspaper articles drew on all of the key ideas that underpinned Australian interest in the Antarctic. He explicitly and repeatedly invoked the ideas of geographical proximity, national prestige, scientific internationalism, Australia’s pioneering heritage, and the prospect of enormous wealth and economic development. For example, his *Mercury* article declared the expedition was an opportunity for Australians to “show that the country is willing and eager to accomplish a task which its geographical position claims that it ought to do, and add a glorious page to the chronicles of the Commonwealth of Australia.”\(^{169}\) The same article suggested that the expedition provided a chance for Australia to participate in the “friendly rivalry” that existed between the various nations interested in “advancing their respective flags over the threshold of the known region into the interesting and unknown”. His *Daily Telegraph* article drew on similar ideas, insisting that “the time has arrived when the people of the south must no longer leave the surrounding lands blindly to the enterprise of foreigners” and noting that the Geographical Congress in 1895 had recognised Antarctic exploration as “the crowning work of the century, and a work which, owing to its geographical position, Australia ought undoubtedly to undertake.”\(^{170}\) He vowed to staff his expedition with “as many Australians as possible, young men educated at Australian universities” and suggested that he would construct his ship in Hobart entirely from Australian timber.\(^{171}\) He promised to return with samples of whales, seals, and guano to illustrate the commercial prospects of Victoria Land.\(^{172}\) In a speech the following year he noted that his expedition would “take up the work begun by that illustrious Briton, Sir James

\(^{170}\) ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *DT*, 10 April 1897, 4.
C. Ross”. The extent to which Borchgrevink’s invocation of these ideas was cynical or sentimental is indeterminable, but the fact that a Norwegian surveyor-cum-schoolmaster with an interest in Antarctic exploration sustained largely by press reports could recognise the centrality of these ideas to Australian interest in the Antarctic is testament to their ubiquity.

Undaunted by his failure to raise the necessary funds in Australia, Borchgrevink returned to England and convinced newspaper and magazine publisher George Newnes to provide the entire £40,000 required. The Australian press eagerly reported on Borchgrevink’s progress, including his purchase of a ship in Norway, his final plans for the expedition, an exhibition of the stores and equipment, and the ship’s departure in August 1898. When Borchgrevink’s ship, *Southern Cross*, arrived in Hobart in November 1898 it enjoyed the same pattern of intense press and public interest and formal welcomes that had greeted Ross, Wilkes, D’Urville, and Bull in their visits to Australian ports en route to Antarctica. As the *Sydney Mail* noted, “though we have given little towards helping Antarctic exploration, it has a special interest for Australians.” The most notable welcome was a conversazione hosted by the Royal Society of Tasmania at Hobart Town Hall, paid for by the colonial government and attended by 800 people “representing all classes of society”. The hall was decorated with samples of the expedition’s equipment, letters from most of Australia’s scientific societies were read, and addresses were given by the Premier, the Governor, and representatives of the

176 For example ‘To The South Pole’, *Age*, 8 December 1898, 7; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *DN*, 14 December 1898, 3.
177 ‘Notes of the Week’, *SM*, 6 August 1898, 312.
expedition, Royal Society, parliament, government, city council, chamber of commerce, and marine board.\textsuperscript{179} The welcomes even extended beyond Tasmania’s borders. While the Southern Cross was refitted in Hobart, Borchgrevink, his Australian magnetic observer Louis Bernacchi, and medical officer Herlof Klovstad dashed to Melbourne to attend a joint meeting of the Antarctic Committee, Royal Society, and Geographical Society held in their honour.\textsuperscript{180} On return to Hobart, Borchgrevink was presented with a “complete set” of whaling gear by Alderman Robert Snowden, who had observed that the Southern Cross had none.\textsuperscript{181} Another reception for the expedition members was held by the Civil Service Association at Anglesea Barracks, the same building that had hosted a similar reception for members of the French expedition in 1839.\textsuperscript{182} As Bernacchi later noted, “the whole town appeared to us to have but one occupation - entertaining the members of the Expedition.”\textsuperscript{183}

The expedition’s final two days in Hobart were dominated by ad hoc rituals. The memories of Ross and Franklin still loomed large in Hobart, and Borchgrevink led the expedition members on a secular pilgrimage to lay a wreath at the foot of the statue of John Franklin in Franklin Square. They then visited a man who had known Ross, Crozier, and Franklin and visited Erebus and Terror, eighty-three-year-old James Agnew, and attended a farewell at Government House.\textsuperscript{184} When the expedition finally departed on 17 December, a special religious service was held on board – with entry limited to those with tickets – and the


\textsuperscript{180} ‘Royal Geographical Society of Australasia Minute Book, 1897-1913’, MS 000688, Box 228/1, RHSV, Minutes of Council Meeting 21 September 1898, Minutes of a Special Meeting 9 December 1898; ‘Welcome to Mr. Borchgrevink’, Age, 10 December 1898, 9; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 10 December 1898, 10; The Borchgrevink Expedition’, DT, 10 December 1898, 11; Mercury, 15 December 1898, 2.

\textsuperscript{181} ‘Tasmania’, DT, 21 December 1898, 5.

\textsuperscript{182} ‘The British Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 16 December 1898, 3; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 17 December 1898, 10.

\textsuperscript{183} Bernacchi, To the South Polar Regions, 23.

\textsuperscript{184} TN, 16 December 1898, 2; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 17 December 1898, 1; The Late Sir John Franklin’, LDT, 17 December 1898, 5; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 17 December 1898, 10.
wharves were swamped with Hobartians eager to bid farewell to the expedition. A party from Melbourne, including Antarctic Committee member and Geographical Society vice-president J.A. Panton, his daughter, J.J. Shillinglaw, and Hans Gundersen, had travelled to Hobart to be part of the crowd. The Mercury observed that it had been “many years since the departure of a vessel from a Tasmanian harbour, or an Australian one for that matter, has aroused such widespread interest.” The only comparable example the author could recall was the departure of the New South Wales military contingent for Sudan in 1885, but “the interest on that occasion centred more in the departing soldiers than in the cause which drew them forth.” In the case of the Southern Cross, by contrast, “the greater amount of enthusiasm was displayed in the mission upon which the hardy Norsemen were embarked.”

While Borchgrevink’s expedition attracted the most interest in Australia, the other three proposals also attracted significant attention. Gerlache’s plans for his Belgian Antarctic Expedition, which entailed leaving Europe in August 1897, exploring the seas around Graham Land, returning north to spend the 1898 winter in Australia, then undertaking a second Antarctic voyage to Victoria Land, captured Australian attention. Interest in the expedition was sufficient for the Melbourne-based Argus newspaper group to engage Gerlache to provide them with exclusive accounts of the expedition’s progress. The disappearance of Gerlache’s ship Belgica, however, captured even greater attention. Rumours circulated that the ship had been trapped in the ice off Graham Land or had sunk in the ocean south of Cape Horn. The Belgian government was sufficiently concerned to contact the

188 ‘Towards the South Pole’, Argus, 24 May 1898, 5.
Geographical Society in Melbourne looking for information about the overdue ship. That the Belgian government approached the Society, rather than any of the colonial governments, reflects the Antarctic Committee’s success in positioning itself as the representative of Australia’s Antarctic interests throughout the late-nineteenth century. In the event, Gerlache and his multinational crew had endured a torrid time after the Belgica was trapped in sea ice and they became the reluctant holders of the title of first men to winter south of the Antarctic Circle. The Belgica’s fortunate survival, its arrival in Punta Arenas in April 1899, and Gerlache’s decision to abandon the second stage of the expedition were also widely reported in Australia.

The British National Antarctic Expedition (NAE) was the culmination of the efforts of the group of Antarctic enthusiasts centred on Erasmus Ommanney, Joseph Hooker, John Murray, and Clements Markham that had begun in the 1880s. This group made numerous attempts to win government support for a large-scale naval expedition, including the unsuccessful attempt to cooperate with the Australian Antarctic Committee in 1886. When Markham became president of the Royal Geographical Society in 1893, he dedicated the society to a relentless campaign to equip an Antarctic expedition. After four years of unsuccessful fundraising, it joined forces with the Royal Society in 1897. The new joint committee successfully raised £48,000 in private subscriptions and convinced the British government to grant of £45,000, ensuring the expedition would depart in 1901.

---

190 ‘Royal Geographical Society of Australasia Minute Book’, MS000688, Box 228/1, RHSV, Minutes of Council Meeting, 11 October 1898.
191 For detailed accounts of the expedition see ‘The Belgian Antarctic Expedition’, Geographical Journal 13, no. 6 (June 1899), 650-654; Frederick A. Cook, Through the First Antarctic Night 1898-1899 (New York: Doubleday & McClure, 1900); Adrien de Gerlache de Gomery, Maurice Raraty trans., Fifteen Months in the Antarctic (Benham: Erskine Press, 1998).
193 For an account of the origins of this expedition see Clements Markham, Clive Holland ed., Antarctic Obsession: A Personal Narrative of the Origins of the British National Antarctic Expedition, 1901-1904 (Alburgh: Bluntisham Books, 1986); Baughman, Before the Heroes Came, 61-76.
Given the depth of Australian engagement with small scale and aborted Antarctic expeditions, it is unsurprising that the NAE was a source of intense interest. The progress of the fundraising campaign, the appointment of officers and scientists, the construction of the expedition’s ship, and its aims and objectives were all widely reported throughout the colonies.194 The colonies also commented on the expedition’s progress. For example, during the early stages of fundraising the *Mercury* chided the British Government for “the neglectful way in which it treats all proposals for a new Antarctic Expedition”195

Markham attempted to capitalise on this interest by making repeated public and private appeals for funds from the colonies. He approached the Agents-General of all the Australasian colonies as early as 1895, and in the same year asked the AAAS to induce the colonial governments to each provide a grant to the NAE.196 When the colonial premiers descended on London for the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 1897, Markham invited them to attend the grandiloquently titled ‘Anglo-Australasian Antarctic Conference’ to persuade them to fund the RGS’ scheme.197 When this private approach failed, Markham made a public appeal to the colonial governments and scientific societies in 1898.198 The Australian Antarctic Committee, chaired by Ellery after Griffiths’ resignation and the deaths of Pasco and von Mueller, responded to this appeal by subscribing £250 to the NAE fund on

195 *Mercury*, 26 November 1898, 2.
196 ‘Letter from Clements Markham to Secretary of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, 8 January 1895’, *Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science* (1895), 468-469.
its own account. A.C. Macdonald also wrote to the *Age* to call for further Australian subscriptions and urged the AAAS at its 1898 meeting to “see to it that the glory of making discovery and exploration in these southern seas be not borne from us by others, to our everlasting discredit”. While universally expressing approval for the expedition and urging members and governments to support it, other colonial societies were less willing or able to make financial contributions. Markham’s appeals also convinced the Queensland government to provide a grant of £1,000, and the colonies to agree to provide free use of their ports for the expedition.

While its progress was reported in the colonies, the German Antarctic expedition was the least discussed of the four. It had little connection to Australia beyond Neumayer’s involvement, and its organisation coincided with the departure of Brochgrevink and Gerlache’s expeditions and the organisation of the British NAE. The German expedition, led by Berlin University Geography Professor Erich von Drygalski, ultimately departed in 1901, discovered new land at Kaiser Wilhelm II Land, made continuous scientific observations over one year, and collaborated with the British expedition by making meteorological and magnetic observations with identical instruments on prearranged term days.

---

Borchgrevink’s expedition returned to Hobart in April 1900. The expedition provided what were then the most complete set of meteorological, magnetic, and geological data collected in the Antarctic, but its geographical discoveries were modest. Borchgrevink’s choice of Cape Adare for his base camp was a poor one, as the cliffs which surrounded it proved inaccessible and the explorers were unable to penetrate inland at all. Borchgrevink did undertake some sledge journeys over the frozen sea ice surrounding Cape Adare, however, and discovered an island he named after the Duke of York. Intriguingly, he did not claim the island for Britain or Norway, but, echoing the acquisition of private empires in Africa and Asia, “took possession of Duke of York Island for Sir George Newnes, under protection of the Union Jack.” When the Southern Cross returned to Cape Adare to collect the scientific party in January 1900 Borchgrevink took the ship on a brief cruise of the Ross Sea and made a rapid dash a few miles inland from the Great Ice Barrier to narrowly surpass Ross’ farthest south record.

Despite a lack of spectacular results, Borchgrevink was again feted in the colonies. He sent a telegram from Southern Cross’ first landfall at Stewart Island announcing his safe return, the expedition’s success in locating the south magnetic pole and breaking the farthest south record, and the death of the party’s Norwegian zoologist Nicolai Hanson. Borchgrevink travelled ahead to Hobart, and came ashore on 6 April to cheers from the passengers and

---

205 For detailed accounts of Borchgrevink’s expedition see Borchgrevink, First on the Antarctic Continent; Baughman, Before the Heroes Came, 61-113.
207 Borchgrevink, First on the Antarctic Continent, 245-286.
208 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, DT, 2 April 1900, 5; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, EN, 2 April 1900, 4; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, EN, 3 April 1900, 6; ‘To the South Pole’, Age, 3 April 1900, 5; ‘Results of the Expedition’, Age, 3 April 1900, 5.
crew of his steamer, and from a large crowd assembled on the wharf.\textsuperscript{209} The Royal Society and the Tasmanian Government made arrangements for another large civic reception to welcome the expedition once \textit{Southern Cross} arrived. The society’s secretary, Alexander Morton, took charge of the organization, the government agreed to cover the cost and waive all port fees for \textit{Southern Cross}, and the city council offered the use of the Town Hall for free.\textsuperscript{210} While waiting for his ship to arrive, Borchgrevink made social calls to Morton, the mayor and aldermen of Hobart, and Agnew, and was preoccupied with congratulatory messages that were pouring in from across the colonies.\textsuperscript{211} He also agreed to donate sledges, snowshoes, and other equipment from the expedition’s stores to create an exhibit at the Tasmanian Museum.\textsuperscript{212} One Hobart shopkeeper, J.W. Beattie, was inspired to create his own tribute to the expedition during Borchgrevink’s stay, placing images of Cook, Ross, the Franklins, and photographs of Borchgrevink, the scientific staff, and the captain and crew of the \textit{Southern Cross} in his Elizabeth Street shop window.\textsuperscript{213}

The lavish welcome reception took place on 18 April 1900 and was notable both for the praise lavished on the expedition and Borchgrevink’s reticence to describe his results in any meaningful way.\textsuperscript{214} George Newnes’ £40,000 donation had come with the caveat that he had the exclusive right to publish the first account of the expedition. This left Borchgrevink unable to answer most of the questions he was asked in Australia, though he did insist that his expedition would come to be seen as a “bright intellectual landmark in the history of the

\textsuperscript{209} ‘The Southern Cross Expedition’, \textit{Mercury}, 7 April 1900, 4; ‘The Southern Cross Expedition’, \textit{EJ}, 7 April 1900, 7.
\textsuperscript{210} ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Mercury}, 4 April 1900, 2; ‘Welcoming Mr. Borchgrevink at Hobart’ , \textit{LDT}, 5 April 1900, 3.
\textsuperscript{211} ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Mercury}, 10 April 1900, 3; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Mercury}, 13 April 1900, 3; ‘Council Meeting, 30 April 1900’, \textit{Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South Australian Branch)}, Thirteenth Session (1899-1900), 31.
\textsuperscript{212} ‘Departure of Mr Borchgrevink’, \textit{DT}, 21 April 1900, 4.
\textsuperscript{213} ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Mercury}, 13 April 1900, 3.
of the nations of the Southern Hemisphere.”

Borchgrevink’s inability to discuss his results continued after he travelled to Melbourne, where another special meeting of the Royal and Geographical Societies was arranged to welcome him on 23 April. He was more expansive in an interview on the day of his departure for London, but even this was not published until June.

Borchgrevink’s evasiveness did not prevent the Australian press discussing his presumed achievements. He promised that his account would “strike the astonished world like a streak of lightning”, leading some newspapers to conclude that the expedition had found right whales in large numbers, opening the way for the long-awaited Australian Antarctic whaling industry. The *Tasmanian News* dealt with the lack of news by digging up affectionate stories about Borchgrevink’s career as a schoolmaster – when he was nicknamed ‘Borky’ – at Cooerwull Academy in the Blue Mountains, including an account of his admirable enthusiasm but general ineptitude as a footballer. There was a bidding war for the rights to the story, with Melbourne’s *Age*, Adelaide’s *Advertiser*, Sydney’s *Daily Telegraph*, and Hobart’s *Mercury* winning the first publication rights for their respective colonies. When the story was made available in June, the Australian press presented Borchgrevink’s serialised account in eight illustrated instalments. Other newspapers picked up the coverage, and advertisements were placed to promote the inclusion of Borchgrevink’s account in forthcoming issues. Particularly prominent was Borchgrevink’s false assertion that he had

---

216 MS 000688, Box 228/1, RHSV, Minutes of Council Meeting, 23 April 1900, Minutes of General Meeting, 9 May 1900; ‘The South Pole Expedition’, *Age*, 24 April 1900, 4; ‘South Pole Expedition’, *DT*, 26 April 1900, 5; ‘Intercolonial’, *ATCJ*, 28 April 1900, 57; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, *Leader*, 28 April 1900, 23.
219 ‘Mr Borchgrevink’, *TN*, 2 May 1900, 3.
221 For example ‘To the South Pole With Borchgrevink’s Antarctic Expedition’, *Leader*, 30 June 1900, 34, 43-44; ‘Mid Antarctic Ice’, *Leader*, 30 June 1900, 21; ‘The South Pole’, *Advertiser*, 21 June 1900, 4; ‘To the South
discovered valuable minerals on Duke of York Island and that Victoria Land would be “another Klondyke”.222 For example, the Advertiser lauded Borchgrevink’s discovery of valuable resources and declared that this made the Antarctic “annexable and exploitable”.223

When Borchgrevink’s account was subsequently published as a book, First on the Antarctic Continent, it was widely advertised, discussed, and reviewed in the Australian press.224 The Brisbane Courier, for example, emphasised the book’s relevance and importance for Australians and hoped that it would surpass the local popularity of Nansen’s Farthest North. It noted that the expedition “began really in Australia”, included information about the prospect of mining gold at Duke of York Island, and suggested that “to Australians the importance of a knowledge of the great Antarctic continent is assuredly much more manifest than to those on the other side of the equator, and for that reason if for no other Mr. Brochgrevink’s account of his voyage of exploration … should be widely read on this continent.”225 Finally, the press continued to report Borchgrevink’s post-expedition activities, including his papers to the British Association for the Advancement of Science and the Royal Geographical Society.226 Borchgrevink’s idea to lead an Australian Antarctic Expedition in 1908, another planned expedition in 1909, his advice to other Antarctic explorers about the use of reindeer in sledge travel, his belated receipt of the Royal Geographical Society’s Patron’s Medal in 1930, and his death in 1934 - when tributes declared that he “overcame the greatest obstacle to Antarctic research” - were all reported long after Borchgrevink’s meagre

---

222 Advertiser, 23 June 1900, 6; Age, 25 June 1900, 4; Age, 26 June 1900, 4; ‘At the South Pole’, Age, 30 June 1900, 8.
223 Advertiser, 25 June 1900, 4; ‘Amid Antarctic Ice’, Advertiser, 29 June 1900, 5.
224 For example Age, 28 March 1903, 4; Mercury, 13 April 1901, 2; ‘First on the Antarctic Continent’, TN, 18 April 1901, 3; ‘Current Literature’, SMH, 20 April 1901, 4; ‘Our London Letter’, Mercury, 7 May 1901, 6; ‘The Bookworm’s Corner’, FJ, 1 June 1901, 24.
results were announced. While there were criticisms of Borchgrevink in Australia – Tasmanian newspaper *The Clipper*, for example, published a scathing review of *First on the Antarctic Continent* – the overwhelming response was laudatory. This was in stark contrast to his reception in England. Borchgrevink had alienated influential figures such as Clements Markham by outfitting a private expedition that was viewed as diverting funds away from the NAE, and this ensured that his leadership, competence, and results were publicly and privately excoriated.

This difference in treatment has been explained in various ways. The *Daily Telegraph* believed that Borchgrevink should have been celebrated on his return to England in the same way that Nansen had been honoured in Norway, but suggested that the outbreak of the second Boer War “relegated Antarctic experiences and inconveniences to the position of a very third-rate sensation”. T. H. Baughman argues that Borchgrevink’s blend of bravado and incompetence left him open to justified criticisms of his leadership, but that he was also the victim of “national and linguistic prejudice”. Markham’s personal vendetta against Borchgrevink was undoubtedly another factor. All of these explanations rely on contextual factors in Britain, however, and ignore the Australian context.

*Antarctica and Australian State Formation*

Australian interest in the Antarctic and subantarctic regions can be traced to the early-nineteenth century, when sealing ships outfitted by New South Wales-based merchant houses discovered subantarctic islands like Campbell and Macquarie. The subantarctic sealing

---

228  ‘Books and Bookishness’, *The Clipper*, 20 April 1901, 3.
231  Baughman, *Before the Heroes Came*, 112-113.
booms that followed, alongside the development of subantarctic whale and elephant seal oil industries, provided some of the first economic staples of the Australian colonies. These maritime industries, and the myriad trades and suppliers who supported them on land, were remembered throughout the rest of the century as a source of prosperity. Their decline, which was linked to the unsustainable nature of unregulated frontier industries and disruption to the maritime labour force by the Australasian gold rushes, was bitterly lamented, and proposals and efforts to revive them were made throughout the nineteenth century.

When a British, a French, and an American naval expedition arrived in 1839 and 1840 to use Australian ports as a base from which to explore the Antarctic, this pre-existing interest expanded into something approaching an obsession. Coupled with the emergence of generalist scientific societies in the 1840s, these early experiences fuelled colonial interest in the Antarctic region, its commercial prospects, its scientific value, and its further exploration throughout the century. While European and American interest in the Antarctic largely disappeared in the period from the 1840s to the 1890s, Australian interest continued unabated.

In this period, several ideas about the unique nature of Australia’s relationship with the Antarctic were reified. Foremost was the idea that the colonies had a unique interest in Antarctica. This idea was based primarily on Australia’s geographical proximity to the Antarctic region and on historical factors that were thought to link the Antarctic and Australian continents through the pioneering voyages of James Cook and James Ross.232 The second key idea that emerged was that the Antarctic could provide a panacea to the colonies’ economic woes, reviving former industries like whaling and opening up new ones like guano.

232 For example ‘The Regions of the South Pole’, Age, 22 May 1886, 13; ‘Royal Society of Victoria’, Argus, 9 July 1886, 6; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, SAR, 9 August 1886, 7.
and mining. The third was the idea that undertaking so ambitious and important a scientific project as Antarctic exploration would see Australia recognised by the international community as a nation. These ideas contributed to a widespread conviction that the further exploration of the Antarctic region was uniquely incumbent on Australia and that allowing other states to take the lead in this matter would shame the nation.

In the 1880s, these ideas were the key factor in the emergence of a movement in support of Australia taking the lead in further Antarctic exploration. This movement led to the creation of an Antarctic Exploration Committee which oversaw various attempts to outfit an Australian expedition, initially in concert with the British government and later by cooperating with Scottish and Norwegian whaling companies and with the Swedish government and Royal Academy of Sciences. When these efforts failed, the Committee also worked to generate support for Bull’s whaling voyage and Borchgrevink’s scientific expedition to Cape Adare. Beyond these efforts to outfit an Australian Antarctic expedition, there was significant public interest in foreign scientific and whaling expeditions to the Antarctic and in the development of commercial industries in the region.

Perhaps the most surprising feature of this movement was its reflexively Australian character. Australian interests were confidently asserted and vigorously pursued. At the same time as the colonies were clashing with the Colonial Office over their vision for an Australian Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific they were also frustrated by metropolitan intransigence over funding for Australian commercial and scientific exploration in what was clearly understood in the colonies as a particularly Australian sphere of interest. Just as the Colonial Office’s attitude towards the colonies’ expansionist proclivities in the Pacific contributed to the rejection of the idea of an imperial federation in favour of an independent Australian federation, so too did the colonies reject the prospect of simply assisting Britain in the project
of Antarctic exploration. As A.C. Macdonald declared in the discussions that culminated in the establishment of the Antarctic Committee, if Britain and Germany were considering outfitting Antarctic expeditions then “Australia could not afford to be left out of such an enterprise.” Macdonald’s proclamation and the Committee’s subsequent efforts to organise an Australian expedition made it clear that Australia was to be a partner in the international project of Antarctic research. They would cooperate with other states and accept being the smaller partner, but Australian interests could not be wholly subsumed by the agendas of other states, including Britain. While Australian interests were often best served by acting within imperial frameworks, the Committee was willing to go outside the Empire to achieve its aim of an Australian expedition that would open the Antarctic to new Australian industries and enhance the aspiring nation’s international prestige. It is telling that more funds were subscribed in the colonies for the Swedish-Australian Antarctic Expedition, a cooperative venture with a foreign state which would only guarantee two positions for Australian scientists and the use of one Australian port, than were subscribed to the British National Antarctic Expedition. Indeed, more was pledged by colonial governments for the Antarctic Committee’s first proposal for a subsidised whaling expedition and by private businessmen to buy out Svend Foyn’s stake in the Antarctic’s whaling voyage and continue it as an Australian venture than was subscribed to the NAE. Such was the Australian character of the movement that even when the colonies were forestalled in their efforts to take the lead in recommencing Antarctic exploration, supporters were able to take pride in the fact that, as they saw it, the movement originated in Australia.

In addition to this confident assertion of Australian interests, the movement was also notable for its internationalism. This can be seen in two ways. Firstly, the movement highlights the

---

234 See for example ‘Augustan Age’ of Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 7 September 1895, 9; ‘Swedish-Australian Antarctic Expedition’, Argus, 2 June 1892, 10.
depth of the Australian desire to join the international community. The idea that Australian leadership in Antarctic exploration would demonstrate the colonies’ coming of age as a nation was regularly repeated. In the words of the Leader, the development of a project like Antarctic exploration “marks an epoch in the history of a young nation”.235 Antarctic exploration was seen as a way for Australia to enhance its prestige and claim the position in the international community it aspired to. The British disavowal of Queensland’s annexation of New Guinea and rejection of the colonies’ united policy on imperial expansion in the Pacific had demonstrated the importance of statehood for Australia. If it was to have its spheres of interest respected, Australia needed international recognition, and leading the way in the opening up of the Antarctic was understood as a way to gain such recognition.

Secondly, the Committee and its supporters were committed to an ideal of scientific internationalism, whereby Antarctic exploration was seen as a project for international cooperation and collaboration. Macdonald, for example, declared that science was “cosmopolitan”, and so “all local feeling and prejudice should be cast away” and Australians should embrace international cooperation in Antarctic exploration.236 Melbourne newspaper the Weekly Times similarly criticised the “petty jealousy” of those who objected to assisting the Swedish-Australian expedition on the grounds that it was not exclusively Australian by noting that “a man once he benefits any cause, or art, science, or literature, becomes cosmopolitan. He is of all nationalities”.237 While this scientific internationalism is most evident in the unsuccessful Swedish-Australian Antarctic Expedition, this was part of a broader pattern. For example, the possibility of separate Australian and German expeditions collaborating on a program of research was discussed by Neumayer, Pasco, and von Mueller prior in 1888.238 For Australia’s Antarctic enthusiasts, this internationalism was entirely

---

236 Macdonald, ‘Section E: Geography, Address by the President’, 132.
237 ‘The Explorer’, WT, 29 November 1890, 14.
238 See for example ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 3 November 1888, 7.
consistent with the nationalism evident in their assertion of Australian interests. They saw no contradiction between Macdonald’s cosmopolitan understanding of science and the insistence that an Antarctic expedition contribute to the development of Australian industries. G.S. Griffiths encapsulated this dual understanding, arguing that “while science claimed a common cause amongst the nations … its profits and its glory, ought to be the destiny of the federated colonies of Australia.”

Even more significant than the internationalism of the middle-class amateur scientists who dominated the Antarctic Committee and colonial scientific societies more generally is the popular internationalism revealed by a close study of Australian interest in the Antarctic in this period. The reception of Borchgrevink, a pariah in Britain due to the perception that his fundraising harmed the prospects of the NAE, during his 1897 lecture tour, his stopover in 1898, and his return in 1900 reflect the fact that Australians were essentially interested in and willing to support any venture that would shed further light on the Antarctic region. While these ventures would ideally be Australian or at least British, this was not essential for them to receive a warm welcome and liberal assistance. As the Mercury explicitly stated in 1898, “the people of Tasmania will give a hearty welcome to every Antarctic Expedition.” This echoed a similar point made in 1891 by F.E. Du Faur in a lecture at the Sydney Town Hall when he observed “that you will cordially welcome any vessel arriving in our port, on such an errand no matter what her nationality, there is no question of doubt.” The same could be said of virtually any Australian or New Zealand port in this period. This pattern continued into the twentieth century, when Australian, Norwegian, Japanese, and both government-sanctioned and private British expeditions all received enormously positive receptions, in-

---

239 ‘Royal Geographical Society of Australasia’, Age, 22 March 1890, 10.
240 Mercury, 26 November 1898, 2.
kind support, and in several cases significant financial support from governments and individuals.

The movement in favour of Australian Antarctic exploration in the late-nineteenth century also highlights what may be termed the precociousness of the Australian state. Reflecting the legal assumption that actions in international spaces could only be conducted by states, exploration, and particularly polar exploration, was widely considered a responsibility of states in this period. It was accepted that private ventures, such as Enderby & Sons’ whaling voyages, could make significant geographical discoveries, but true exploration was the domain of state enterprises. Private expeditions such as Borchgrevink’s were viewed with suspicion, particularly in Britain. This point was explicitly made by influential Arctic explorer Sherard Osborne, who declared in 1865 that “an exploration of the Polar area should always be sent under naval auspices and naval discipline. I have no faith in purely private expeditions”.242 This idea was also evident in the Antarctic Committee’s efforts to organise an Australian Antarctic expedition in the 1880s and 1890s. For example, Britain’s Royal Society publicly rejected the Committee’s first proposal for a small Australian reconnoitring expedition in preparation for a full-scale British one, arguing that it would better for the Imperial Government to take control of any expedition. The Australian colonies could supply some men and “liberally contribute to the expenses” of an expedition organised by the British Government, “and thus gain experience necessary to conduct any future similar enterprise”, but they could not despatch an expedition in their own right.243 The idea that exploration should be the realm of the state was similarly evident in the reaction to the British government’s persistent refusal to undertake the project of Antarctic exploration. For example, when discussing Borchgrevink’s expedition in 1898 the Mercury noted that “it is

gratifying to find that when the British Government shirks the task of providing for a South Polar expedition … there are private individuals to be found who take the matter in hand”.244

The work of the Antarctic Committee jarred with this notion. The Committee was entirely private and exclusively Victorian, yet it was treated as public, semi-official, and Australian. Despite being created by two Victorian scientific societies, it quickly came to represent Australia’s interests in the Antarctic. As was noted at the time, this private body had “a sort of semi-official status”.245 Furthermore, the Committee’s representative in Europe was Victoria’s Agent-General Graham Berry. While the Agent-General was Victoria’s representative in Britain, it was noted that “in this case Sir Graham Berry is virtually the representative of the whole of the Australian colonies.”246 The frequent use of the name ‘Australian Antarctic Exploration Committee’ further reflects its anomalous position.247 The pervasive idea that Antarctic exploration was peculiarly incumbent on Australia was in tension with the idea that true exploration was rightfully a project of the state. The result was a non-state, perhaps more appropriately called a proto-state, attempting to enter into the presumed realm of states by organising an Antarctic expedition and negotiating with other states and their representatives to do so.

The Antarctic Committee therefore provides an insight into the process of state formation in Australia in the 1880s and 1890s. It suggests that this process was drawn-out, tentative, and took place both within and beyond the confines of the parliaments and intercolonial conventions. Various functions of the future Australian state were federalised in the decades before formal federation in 1901 as colonies, individuals, and institutions sublimated their

244 ‘The Borchgrevink-Newnes Expedition to the South Pole’, Mercury, 4 October 1898, 4.
245 Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 21 December 1887, 9.
246 ‘Australia and Antarctic Exploration’, DT, 30 December 1887, 5.
247 See for example ‘Letter from H. R. Rusden to F. R. Chapman, 16 April 1887’, MS 13020, Box 5/2, SLV; ‘Expedition to the South Pole’, SMH, 24 December 1889, 8.
rights to individual action to federal representatives. At its most obvious, coherent, and reflexive level this process involved the creation of a Federal Council of Australasia empowered to legislate on matters of general Australasian interest, such as its relations with the Pacific islands, fisheries, and intercolonial extraditions.\footnote{248} The same federalisation of specific activities and functions can be seen in, for example, the intercolonial conventions of the 1880s and 1890s, the articulation of an Australian Monroe Doctrine, the development of an intercolonial labour movement through the Trade Union Congresses of 1879 to 1898 and the accompanying development of intercolonial employers unions like the Federal Pastoralists’ Council, the colonies’ collective admission to the Universal Postal Union in 1881, and the creation of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science in 1888. It can also be seen the Antarctic Exploration Committee in Melbourne being treated as a semi-official entity empowered to advance Australia’s interests in the region to its south, a responsibility that was subsequently absorbed by the Department of External Affairs after 1901. The legal and political creation of an Australian state in 1901 did not, therefore, conjure a state out of nothing. Political federation was a recognition and reconstitution of a proto-state that had already developed.

Finally, this history of Australian interests in the Antarctic region contributes to a broader understanding of the relationship between state formation and empire building. David Armitage has argued that these processes are interlinked, suggesting that an understanding of a British state emerged out of England’s colonial expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\footnote{249} Alexander Etkind has identified a similar link between colonial expansion and


the process of state building in the case of the Russian Empire. The same relationship is evident in the early-modern histories of other European empires, such as Spain and the Netherlands. Significantly, the same phenomenon of territorial expansion, be it through plantations, the fur trade, or the assertion of a sphere of influence, driving the process of state formation at home can be seen in the articulation of a naturally Australian sphere of influence in the Antarctic and the Pacific.

The idea of Australia having an external sphere of interest ripe for exploitation and stretching from the islands of the Pacific to the islands of the subantarctic can be traced to the beginnings of European settlement in Australia, a period when the prospect of an independent Australian state was unimaginable. From the mid-nineteenth century, there were colonial campaigns for the annexation of territories within this imagined sphere such as New Zealand, New Guinea, Samoa, New Caledonia, Fiji, the New Hebrides, the Cook Islands, the Chatham Islands, the Auckland Islands, Campbell Island, Macquarie Island, and Kerguelen. Just as early-modern states such as England were ideologically and administratively constituted through expansion, the first concrete steps towards the federation of the Australian colonies were a direct response to the metropolitan disavowal of the colonies’ expansionist ambitions during the 1883 New Guinea crisis. While race, railways, and tariffs may have kept the candle of federation burning in the 1890s, it was the desire for expansion that lit the flame. Australia’s external gaze, its presumed sphere of interest, and its attempts to project its influence overseas were central to the emergence of concrete efforts to create a centralised, unified Australian state.

This link between expansionism and federation in Australia suggests that the same relationship between state formation and empire building that has been implicated in the

process of early-modern European empire building was similarly influential in Australia at the turn of the twentieth century. This raises new possibilities for the historiography of state formation and empire building to be extended both temporally and spatially. It suggests firstly that scholars in this field should look beyond the early-modern period to examine these processes at the turn of the twentieth century, when new states and new forms of empire proliferated in unprecedented numbers. Secondly, it suggests that the field must also look beyond the classic examples of empire to consider the imperialism of small and newly-formed states. The historiography of state formation and expansion will be greatly enriched by examining cases such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Norway, Belgium, Japan, Argentina, Chile, and the United States within the same framework as Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands.
Chapter 5: The Recognition of Australian Interests in the Antarctic, 1901-09

The patterns of Australian interest in the Antarctic, Antarctic exploration, and economic development established in the nineteenth century continued throughout the first two decades of the twentieth. While these ideas about Australia’s unique interest in the Antarctic region remained largely consistent, the federation of the Australian colonies and creation of the Commonwealth Government in 1901 was seen as a significant development for those seeking to transform these ideas into concrete actions. The need to win the support of multiple colonial governments with disparate ideologies, policies, revenues, agendas, and local pressures had contributed to the failure of the various proposals for an Australian Antarctic expedition in the nineteenth century. Federation offered hope that the Commonwealth could act to advance Australia’s interests by supporting projects of national importance.

At the time of federation in 1901, there was significant Australian interest in the imminent departure of the British National Antarctic Expedition (NAE). News of the construction of the expedition’s ship Discovery, the appointment of officers and staff, an ugly feud between members of the organising committee, and Discovery’s voyage from Britain to New Zealand were all avidly reported in the Australian press.1 There was particular local interest in Tasmanian-born, Melbourne-based astronomer Louis Bernacchi’s appointment as physicist and Melbourne University geologist J.W. Gregory’s brief tenure as scientific chief-of-staff.2 Gregory resigned in protest at the expedition’s scientific work being placed under the control of a naval officer with no scientific training before the NAE’s departure.3

---


The NAE was an enormously expensive undertaking. The £51,000 cost of constructing the purpose-built *Discovery* quickly depleted its initial £90,000 budget. The NAE’s organising committee therefore began soliciting a further £29,000 for additional expenses, such as a second ship to ferry supplies and provide relief in case of disaster.\(^4\) Believing that Australia would benefit most from the expedition’s work, the committee wrote to Prime Minister Edmund Barton in May 1910 to request a Commonwealth grant, and enlisted A.C. Macdonald, secretary of the Victorian branch of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, to lobby the government personally. Barton admitted that he supported the expedition but doubted the constitutionality of a federal grant.\(^5\) In-kind support was plentiful in Australia – Australian firms provided provisions and a prefabricated wooden hut, for example – but confusion about the role of the new federal government limited financial support to £1,000 from Queensland and £250 from the Antarctic Committee in Melbourne.\(^6\)

The NAE Committee raised sufficient funds to outfit a second ship to ferry supplies for a second season’s work to the expedition’s base, even without a Commonwealth grant. When this relief ship, *Morning*, returned in 1903, however, it brought news that *Discovery* was resolutely frozen into sea ice, generating concerns that the entire expedition would need to be evacuated and *Discovery* abandoned if it could not be freed by the following year. The committee failed to raise funds for a second relief expedition, forcing the Admiralty to take


\(^5\) National Archives of Australia (NAA): A6, 1901/1585, Telegram from William Higgins and Clements Markham to Edmund Barton, 15 May 1901, Letter from A.C. Macdonald to John Forrest, 22 January 1902, Letter from Forrest to Barton, 29 January 1902, Letter from Prime Minister’s Secretary to Macdonald, 19 February 1902; ‘Exploring the Antarctic’, *Age*, 12 November 1901, 7.

over the operation. William Colbeck, a naval reservist and veteran of Borchgrevink’s expedition, was placed in command of the *Morning* and another Arctic whaler, *Terra Nova*.7

*Terra Nova* and *Morning* arrived in Hobart in November 1903, generating a wave of enthusiasm tinged with nostalgia.8 The *Mercury* noted approvingly that two ships bound for the Antarctic would be in Hobart for the sixty-third anniversary of the departure of *Erebus* and *Terror* on 12 November.9 The mayor of Hobart arranged to celebrate the occasion, inviting Colbeck and his officers to a picnic at Risdon Cove, where they cruised the Derwent, went fishing, and attended a lunch reception.10 The Royal Society made plans for its own reception on 23 November, though this attracted criticism from one Tasmanian who had attended the welcomes to Borchgrevink and hoped the relief expedition members would not be subjected to the excruciatingly longwinded speeches that dominated those occasions. Such extensive speechmaking “may be pleasant for the speakers,” he noted, “but is very wearisome to an audience that only went to hear what our visitors can tell us about their work, and to have some friendly chat with them.”11 This critique seemed to have the desired effect; only the governor, premier, and Colbeck gave speeches at the event, while there was ample time for viewing the exhibits and the desired “friendly chat”.12 As the expedition prepared to depart, the commander of the Royal Navy’s Australia station, Arthur Fanshawe, visited Hobart to inspect the two relief ships and provide them with eighty-nine cases of guncotton for use in blasting the ice entrapping *Discovery*.13 Colbeck expressed his gratitude to

---

10 The Antarctic Relief Ships *Morning* and *Terra Nova*, *Mercury*, 9 November 1903, 4; ‘The Antarctic Relief Ships’, *Mercury*, 13 November 1903, 5.
11 ‘Welcome to the Antarctic Ships’, *Mercury*, 20 November 1903, 3.
Hobart’s Marine and Customs Boards for providing every service the expedition required without charge, and promised some Antarctic specimens to the Tasmanian museum. When the two ships departed on 5 December 1903, they were farewelled by the now customary crowd of several hundred, and were joined by the son of a prominent Tasmanian shipowner, James Spaulding, who managed to talk his way into a position on Terra Nova’s crew.\footnote{Antarctic Exploration’, TN, 19 November 1903, 4; ‘Departure of the Morning and Terra Nova’, Mercury, 7 December 1903, 4.}

The relief expedition succeeded in freeing Discovery through a combination of ramming, blasting, and sawing the ice and waiting long enough for a storm to break it apart.\footnote{Robert Scott, The Voyage of the Discovery Vol. II (London: Smith Elder, 1905), 330-353; Albert Armitage, Two Years in the Antarctic: Being a Narrative of the British National Antarctic Expedition (London: Edward Arnold, 1905),271-294.} When the three ships returned to New Zealand in April 1904, their experiences were a source of significant interest in Australia. Lauchlan Charles Mackinnon, owner of the Melbourne-based Argus and Australasian newspapers, acquired the first publication rights for Australia and New Zealand.\footnote{‘Uncatalogued Material’, MSS 80/044, RMMG, Letter from Wilson & Mackinnon to R. Scott, 3 October 1902.} Detailed accounts of the NAE’s results were widely reported in Australia, and congratulatory messages were despatched to Scott in Christchurch.\footnote{For example ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 2 April 1904, 13; ‘Expeditions towards the South Pole’, SMH, 2 April 1904, 9; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, DT, 4 April 1904, 5; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Argus, 4 April 1904, 5; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, SMH, 5 April 1904, 4; ‘Letter from Captain Colbeck’, TN, 16 April 1904, 5; MS 1177/3, Scott Collection, Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI), Letter from Scott to J.F. Mann, 21 April 1904; ‘Antarctic Records’, Argus, 11 March 1905, 6; ‘The Glittering South’, Mercury, 21 March 1905, 6; ‘The Lone Antarctic’, Argus, 9 December 1905, 6.} Press interest continued after the expedition’s return to England, with reports on Scott’s lectures, the awarding of medals and honours to expedition members, and the creation of a temporary ‘Discovery Museum’ in London to display expedition artefacts ranging from crampons to the teeth of the last dog killed and eaten during the sledge journey that set a new farthest south record.\footnote{For example ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Telegraph, 21 September 1904, 4; ’Mid Snow and Ice’, AS, 9 November 1904, 2; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Brisbane Courier (BC), 9 November 1904, 5; ‘Wonders of Antarctic Regions’, Leader, 29 April 1905, 27; ‘Geographical Society Awards’, SMH, 29 March 1904, 5; ‘Explorers Rewarded’, AS, 29 March 1904, 3; ‘Great Britain’, BC, 4 November 1904, 5; ‘The Discovery’s Museum’, Leader, 17 December 1904, 7.}
With Scott’s Royal Navy service preventing him from lecturing in Australia, Macdonald arranged for Charles Reginald Ford, a steward on *Discovery* and Scott’s post-expedition secretary, to undertake an Australasian lecture tour. Ford’s lectures were extremely popular, and free or discounted tickets made available to schoolboys, university students, and apprentice sailors in each city to expose a new generation of young Australians to the moral example provided by the expedition.\(^{19}\) The story of the expedition was also made available through two books, Scott’s official account and a popular narrative by second-in-command Albert Armitage. Both books received laudatory reviews in Australia. Scott’s, for example, was deemed the second-best account of polar exploration ever published by the *Australasian* and described as rivalling “the best adventure of fiction” by the *Leader*.\(^{20}\) The *Leader* and *Argus* both published lengthy extracts from the book, and its availability was widely advertised by prominent booksellers such as Dymock’s, Angus and Robertson, and Melville and Mullens.\(^ {21}\) Armitage’s was similarly well-received and welcomed as an ideal alternative for those unable to afford the two volume official account.\(^ {22}\) Scott also made arrangements with his English publishers Smith, Elder & Co. to produce a facsimile edition of the *South Polar Times*, the newspaper published in the Antarctic by expedition members.\(^ {23}\) The publication of this reproduction was celebrated in Australia – the *Evening Journal* described

---


\(^{23}\) MS 366/16/36, Scott Collection, SPRI, Cambridge, The South Polar Times Prospectus.
it as a “national heirloom” – and its availability reported on, though it was acknowledged that the run of only 250 copies would make it difficult to obtain.24

While the NAE dominated Australian interest in the Antarctic from 1901 to 1906, Swedish, French, Scottish, and German, expeditions also attracted attention in this period. Australians were, as the Argus observed, most interested in the expedition that visited the “portion of the southern polar regions which lies nearest to our own country” and whose research “seemed to offer the best advantages” to Australia, but they also acknowledged that the value of NAE was amplified by its cooperation with others.25 The Swedish expedition organised by Adolf Nordenskiöld’s nephew, Otto, was the least discussed in Australia, but its geographical discoveries in Graham Land and its dramatic tale of a shipwreck and a daring rescue by the Argentine navy did capture popular interest.26 The French expedition under Jean-Baptise Charcot similarly generated most interest when it was reported overdue.27

There was more consistent and sustained interest in the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition (SNAE), despite its base being Laurie Island in the South Orkneys on the South American side of Antarctica. As with Borchgrevink, the Scottish expedition’s leader, William Speirs Bruce, had fallen foul of the influential Clements Markham because of fears he would divert funds away from the NAE. Bruce, an oceanographer with extensive Arctic experience.

25 ‘Towards the South Pole’, Argus, 9 September 1904, 7.
and familiarity with the Antarctic as one of the token scientists with the Dundee Whaling Expedition, applied for a position on the NAE’s scientific staff. Receiving little encouragement from Markham, Bruce made plans for his own expedition. Markham decried Bruce’s actions as “mischievous rivalry” and rejected his attempts to cooperate with the NAE and German expedition. Despite Markham’s opposition Bruce succeeded in raising £35,000 in Scotland and departed in November 1902. The expedition conducted valuable oceanographic research, explored the eastern limits of the Weddell Sea, and established the first permanent meteorological station in the Antarctic, which the Argentine Government agreed to maintain indefinitely after the expedition departed in May 1904. These achievements were widely reported in Australia.

The SNAE provides an intriguing parallel to the link between Antarctic exploration, statehood, and nationalism in Australia in the same period. It was an explicitly nationalist enterprise led by an avowed Scottish nationalist. Its funds were raised exclusively in Scotland. Contrary to Markham’s fear that it would cannibalise the funds available to the NAE, the Scottish expedition was principally funded by £30,000 from James and Andrew

28 MS 441/16, Letter from W.S. Bruce to Clements Markham, 15 April 1899, Bruce Collection, Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI), Cambridge.
29 MS 441/16, Letter from Markham to Bruce, 17 April 1899, Letter from Bruce to Markham, 21 March 1900, Letter from Bruce to Markham, 24 March 1900, Letter from Bruce to Markham, 26 March 1900, Letter from Bruce to Markham, 30 May 1900, Bruce Collection, SPRI.
30 MS 441/16, Letter from Markham to Bruce, 23 March 1900, Letter from Markham to Bruce, 27 March 1900, Letter from Markham to Bruce, 16 May 1900, Bruce Collection, SPRI.
Coats, who insisted that their donations would not have been available to a non-Scottish expedition. Indeed, James Coats refunded Bruce’s sole American donor so that the expedition would be “purely Scottish.”\(^{34}\) Another subscriber was W.G. Burn Murdoch, Bruce’s companion on the Dundee Whaling Expedition and an active supporter of the National Party of Scotland who would later publish a pamphlet calling for a Scottish parliament.\(^{35}\) Bruce’s scientific staff and crew were exclusively Scottish or Scottish-educated.\(^{36}\) The expedition’s Norwegian-built ship was renamed Scotia. Its logo consisted of the Scottish flag with the initials NSAE.\(^{37}\) The explorers flew the Royal Banner of Scotland above their hut on Laurie Island, and later lamented that there had been no way to legally claim the South Orkneys for Scotland.\(^{38}\) Even the expedition’s official title asserted the existence of a distinct Scottish nation. That the title was a deliberate statement is evidenced by Bruce’s comment on a draft of *The Siege of the South Pole*, the first substantial history of Antarctic exploration written by Royal Geographical Society (RGS) secretary H.R. Mill: “please note the official title of the expedition ‘SCOTTISH NATIONAL ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION’ not Scottish Antarctic Expedition.”\(^{39}\) As with Australia, Antarctic exploration and participation in an international program of scientific research were seen as a way for a non-state, in Australia’s case the colonies and in Scotland’s a constituent part of the United Kingdom, to receive international recognition as a state or a nation by acting as a state should. As Bruce said in the preface to the popular account of the expedition, “while ‘Science’ was the talisman of the Expedition, ‘Scotland’ was emblazoned on its flag; and it may be that, in endeavouring to serve humanity

\(^{34}\) MS441/7;D, Bruce Collection, SPRI, Letter from W.S. Bruce to Charles E. Price, 24 August 1917. Original emphasis.


\(^{37}\) See for example MS 100/13/11, Letter from Bruce to H.R. Mill, 21 November 1902’, Bruce Collection, SPRI; MS 100/13/12, Letter from Bruce to Mill, 17 December 1902’, Bruce Collection, SPRI.

\(^{38}\) ‘Three of the Staff’, *The Voyage of the Scotia*, 79.

\(^{39}\) MS 100/13/14, Letter from W.S. Bruce to H.R. Mill, 18 July 1905, Bruce Collection, SPRI.
by adding another link to the golden chain of science, we have also shown that the nationality of Scotland is a power that must be reckoned with.”

The Australian Monroe Doctrine and the Southern Indian Ocean

There was also significant Australian interest in the German expedition, and particularly its use of Kerguelen Island as a meteorological and magnetic station. Supplies and equipment for this station were shipped to Sydney or purchased there, then taken to Kerguelen in October 1901 by the German-owned, Chinese-crewed steamer Tanglin. The Tanglin’s captain was interviewed shortly after his return to Sydney in January 1902, providing a vivid account of a sparse subantarctic island overrun by rabbits introduced by the Challenger three decades earlier. Subsequent reports covered the movements of the German expedition’s ship Gauss and the plans made for the German steamer Sassfurt to divert from the normal route between Cape Town and Sydney to take supplies and mail to the men on Kerguelen. There was another surge of interest in the expedition, its work, and Kerguelen when an ambulance wagon was summoned to meet the Sassfurt at its anchorage in Woolloomooloo and it emerged that the five expedition members had evacuated the station due to the death of one scientist and the life-threatening illness of another. The Australian press also avidly followed reports of the Gauss being overdue, the German government preparing its own relief expedition, and finally the Gauss’ arrival in South Africa.

Australian interest in the German expedition’s work on Kerguelen was unsurprising because Kerguelen loomed large in the Australian imagination. Along with the Crozet Islands to its

---

40 ‘Three of the Staff’, The Voyage of the Scotia, viii.
42 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, EN, 22 April 1902, 5; ‘German Antarctic Expedition’, DT, April 1903, 6.
43 ‘German Antarctic Expedition’, DT, 17 April 1903, 6; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 18 April 1903, 11; ‘Kerguelen Scientific Station’, SMH, 20 April 1903, 5.
44 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, EN, 2 June 1903, 4; ‘German Antarctic Expedition’, SMH, 3 June 1903, 7; ‘From the Antarctic’, DT, 24 July 1903, 3.
west, Kerguelen was well-known in the nineteenth century as one of the few islands in the southern Indian Ocean. It was not unusual for ships to pass within sight of these islands. The *Echuca* passed close enough to Kerguelen for its passengers to sketch the island in 1892, for example, while the islands were listed as a landmark in emigration guidebooks and calling at the Crozets to search for castaways became the signature route of Aberdeen White Star Line Commodore Alexander Simpson.\(^45\) Occasional shipwrecks and near misses also earned the islands a grim reputation. The *Ralph Waller*, for example, struck an iceberg off Kerguelen in 1855. Fifteen feet of water flooded the hold, forcing the crew to jettison 200 tons of cargo and the passengers to work the pumps night and day to drag the crippled vessel to Melbourne.\(^46\) The *Strathmore* struck the Crozets in heavy fog in 1876, killing forty-four passengers and leaving the survivors to subsist on the islands for six months until rescued.\(^47\)

The plight of the crew of the *Tamaris*, shipwrecked on the Crozets, caused a sensation in 1887 when a message pleading for help was found stabbed into a tin band around the neck of a dead albatross on Fremantle Beach.\(^48\)

It was in response to the *Strathmore* disaster that Shoalhaven landowner David Berry had sparked a public debate by calling for the Australasian colonies to occupy the islands of the southern Indian Ocean and man lighthouses, introduce plants and animals, and develop

---


46 ‘Ships’ Mails’, *SMH*, 11 April 1855, 4; ‘Melbourne’, *SMH*, 14 April 1855, 4.

47 ‘Wreck of the Strathmore’, *SMH*, 5 May 1876, 4; ‘Wreck of the Strathmore’, *SMH*, 19 April 1876, 4.

coaling depots for steamers. The colonial governments distanced themselves from Berry’s ambitious proposal, but urged the Admiralty to establish and maintain castaway depots on the islands. This was rejected due to cost, but proposals to construct lighthouses, maintain castaway depots, or use naval vessels to periodically search the subantarctic islands of the Indian Ocean for shipwrecked were made regularly into the early-twentieth century.

While Kerguelen and the other subantarctic Indian Ocean islands were primarily discussed in relation to maritime safety, their potential scientific, economic, and strategic value was also recognised. International expeditions to Kerguelen for the Transit of Venus in 1874, the Challenger’s visit to the island, and J.J. Wild’s suggestion that Victoria mount an expedition to explore its west coast in 1886 were all reported in the colonial press, ensuring Australians were aware of its scientific value. Islands to Australia’s south-west, including Kerguelen, Heard, and the King Edward, Crozet, and McDonald Islands, were all exploited during the same sealing booms that decimated the populations of the subantarctic islands to the south-east. There were occasional attempts in Australia to exploit the southern Indian Ocean after

---


50 See for example Victorian Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, Session 1875-76, Vol. XXIII, 2331-2332; New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1877 Session I, ‘A-01 Despatches from the Governor of New Zealand to the Secretary of State’, 2; New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1877 Session I, ‘A-02b Further Despatches from the Secretary of State to the Governor of New Zealand’, 5-9; ‘Crozet Islands’, Argus, 27 July 1877, 6.

51 For example ‘Our Missing Ships’, SMH, 18 December 1872, 2; New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1876 Session I, ‘H-32 Her Majesty’s Ships Calling at the Islands Between the Cape of Good Hope and Australia (Correspondence Relative To)’; ‘Crozet Islands’, SMH, 8 March 1877, 4; ‘Crozet Islands’, Argus, 19 March 1880, 7; Argus, 28 April 1880, 5; ‘Crozet Islands’, SMH, 24 March 1880, 7; ‘Latest News’, EJ, 1 May 1880, 2; ‘Those Who Go Down to the Sea in Ships’, SMH, 15 September 1880, 6; ‘Crozet Islands’, Mercury, 10 December 1890, 3; ‘Castaways on the Crozet Islands’, DT, 10 December 1890, 5; ‘Castaways on the Crozet Islands’, Age, 10 December 1890, 5; ‘The Missing Steamer Waikato’, Mercury, 31 July 1899, 3.


these booms. For example, Tasmanian businessman William Crowther fitted out an elephant sealing expedition in 1858, though this was beset by misfortune, with one ship badly damaged off Heard Island and the other returning with only 1,000 barrels of oil.\textsuperscript{54} While Crowther’s venture was commercially disappointing, it did return with mineral specimens that Tasmanian geologist Charles Gould said were usually found “in association with minerals of a more valuable character”, raising the possibility of a mining industry on Kerguelen.\textsuperscript{55} One of Kerguelen’s endemic plants, \textit{Pringlea antiscorbutica} or ‘Kerguelen Cabbage’, also captured attention for its economic potential. The \textit{Australian Town and Country Journal} suggested in 1874 that Kerguelen Cabbage “would be likely to become a first-class fodder plant, if introduced to the pastures of New South Wales” and started a campaign to introduce this “promising gift of Providence” to the colony.\textsuperscript{56} Despite concerted efforts, this campaign did not result in Kerguelen Cabbage becoming the staple fodder crop or “article of utility for the table of both the thrifty and the luxurious” predicted.\textsuperscript{57}

Kerguelen’s strategic importance was commented on sporadically. There was a proposal for the colonisation of Kerguelen as early as 1855, when a letter to the \textit{South Australian Register} drew attention to its potential as a coaling station for steamers on the Suez-Australia route and recommended Australians “occupy Kerguelen’s Land in time, before any other nation should do so”.\textsuperscript{58} Thirty years later, a letter to the \textit{Age} warned that the ownership of Kerguelen needed to be clarified at a time “when every available island as yet uninhabited or unclaimed

\begin{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{55} ‘Royal Society’, \textit{Mercury}, 2 July 1861, 2.


\textsuperscript{57} ‘The Graizer’, \textit{ATCJ}, 14 March 1874, 14.

\textsuperscript{58} ‘The Great Postal Scheme’, \textit{South Australian Register}, 20 January 1855, 2.
\end{flushleft}
by any European power is being snapped up.”\(^{59}\) ‘Mariner’ noted that, despite its remoteness, the island had excellent harbours and “will no doubt be a coaling station for some power in the future, and could be made the base of operations against either these colonies or those at the Cape of Good Hope.”\(^{60}\)

This warning proved prescient. France formally annexed the Kerguelen, the Crozets, and St. Paul’s and Amsterdam Islands in 1892.\(^{61}\) While some took the view that France had succeeded only in acquiring “the most barren spot in either hemisphere”, the announcement did cause concern in the colonies.\(^{62}\) For example, when St Paul’s and Amsterdam had been claimed but news of the annexation of Kerguelen and the Crozets had not yet reached Australia, an *Argus* leader expressed outrage that France had annexed islands presumed to be British and criticised the imperial government for failing to confirm British ownership. Invoking the idea of a sprawling Australian sphere of interest in the Southern Hemisphere, the *Argus* urged the colonies to “look about us and see if there are other possible stations that ought to be secured. If the Prince Edward’s Islands, the Crozets, and Kerguelen Land are not vested in the British Empire - the Empire of the Seas - why, they ought to be. … it would be absurd to have all the islets that dot the vast expanse of the Southern Ocean in alien possession. It is not too much to say that the Southern Ocean between the Cape and Australia should be essentially a British sea.”\(^{63}\) When it became known that France had also annexed Kerguelen and the Crozets, a letter to the *West Australian* warned the annexation was “solely for strategic purposes … against the commerce of Australia.”\(^{64}\) Victoria and Western Australia led the colonies’ political response to the annexations, protesting to the British

\(^{59}\) ‘Kerguelen Island’, *Age*, 4 April 1885, 13.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
\(^{62}\) ‘Kerguelen Land’, *EN*, 1 March 1893, 4; *SMH*, 8 April 1893, 4.
\(^{63}\) *Argus*, 30 November 1892, 4.
\(^{64}\) ‘Kerguelen’s Island’, *WA*, 11 April 1893, 3.
government. These protests earned the colonies a rebuke in the French press for their “surprising piece of impertinence” and were rebuffed by Britain.

Kerguelen and the other southern Indian Ocean islands were clearly understood as of particular interest to the Australian colonies in the nineteenth century because of the threat they posed to Australian shipping and their potential to become economically and strategically important in the future. By the turn of the twentieth century they were understood to fall within the scope of the Australian Monroe Doctrine. In 1899 New South Wales’ politician Henry Copeland published a pamphlet entitled *Kerguelen Island and Australian Commerce*. Copeland argued that Kerguelen was Australia’s “natural half-way house”, an island that would become either a naval station for the protection of Australian shipping or “a den from which sea-wolves could sally forth to prey on our unarmed vessels”. If it fell into foreign hands, he argued, Australia would need to invade the island and seize it at any cost in the event of war between European powers in the future. He therefore proposed to peacefully occupy and colonise the island, suggesting that if France protested Britain could exchange the island for another territory.

Colonisation was central to Copeland’s vision for Kerguelen. While the climate was “cold and boisterous” he deemed it “healthy and suitable for a hardy race”. The island’s environment could also be improved by introducing grasses, herbs, and fodder plants from the Falklands and Bass Strait, and rātā trees from the Auckland Islands, allowing settlers to raise sheep, pigs, and cattle. He recommended a chartered company be charged with

---

67 Henry Copeland, *Kerguelen Island and Australian Commerce* (Sydney: John Sands, 1899).
68 Ibid, 6, 4.
69 Ibid, 27.
colonisation, with instructions to fortify the best harbours for a naval base, develop a coaling depot for steamers on the Anglo-Australian route, establish permanent whaling and sealing stations, and investigate reports of coal, bitumen, petroleum, diamond, and gold deposits. He even envisaged a future tourism industry, suggesting that “if the Polar charms of Spitzbergen offer inducements for excursionists why not include in our Australian summer trips a visit to the glaciers of Kerguelen”. In the near future suggested Copeland, “a cheerful radiance would emanate from the windows of snug little cottages, dotted here and there in the sheltered valleys.”

Copeland was appointed Agent-General for New South Wales soon after the publication of his pamphlet, and immediately put his new position to use to lobby for the acquisition of Kerguelen. He broached the issue with Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, provided copies of his pamphlet to the Admiralty, and wrote to Barton when he was commissioned as Prime Minister in 1901 urging him to confer “an eternal benefit on the Commonwealth” by purchasing Kerguelen. Copeland’s arguments swayed Barton and his caretaker cabinet, and the Governor-General was asked to inform Chamberlain of their desire to acquire the island. It has been suggested that the fact that the federal parliament’s first act of what Barton called “definite and high policy” was the Immigration Restriction Act is symptomatic of the centrality of the ‘white Australia’ ideal to the creation of the Commonwealth. It is notable, then, that a month before elections for that first parliament were even held, Australia’s first federal Cabinet debated whether the Commonwealth should try to expand its formal territory to better align it with its presumed sphere of interest by purchasing

---

71 NAA: A1, 1911/14438, Letter from Henry Copeland to Edmund Barton, 1 February 1901.
72 NAA: A1, 1911/14438, Minute for the Governor-General, 15 April 1901.
Kerguelen. Evidently, expansionism and the idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine were a more significant component of the ideological origins of the Commonwealth than has hitherto been recognised.74

The audacious decision to pursue the acquisition of a subantarctic island from a European power – by an unelected caretaker government no less – was widely discussed in the Australian press.75 Melbourne’s Herald predicted that “a resumption of British control of the island is likely to be the outcome.”76 The Gippsland Times observed that the cabinet had “early had experience of the cares which come with greatness”.77 The Sydney Morning Herald collated political figures’ responses, noting that some thought “Mr. Barton and his colleagues were rather too Imperialistic in their ideas” and should focus on “a kind of Monroe Doctrine” rather than direct territorial acquisition.78 The idea that the decision was too imperialistic was a minority view, however. The mainstream view was encapsulated by New South Wales politician W.H. Wilks, who argued that the Southern Hemisphere should be British and the possession of territories like New Guinea, New Caledonia, and Kerguelen by foreign powers be seen as “a menace to the wellbeing of these States”. Wilks supported the gradual acquisition of these islands until France and Germany were ultimately “bought out of the Southern Hemisphere”.79 The Argus welcomed the Commonwealth’s decision, arguing that “the islands between South Africa and Australia and New Zealand should belong to the Empire”. If these islands were “ever to be utilised it must be by Australia”, it said, and

74 A notable exception is Marilyn Lake, who argues that Australia was “founded in dreams of a Pacific empire”. Marilyn Lake, ‘The Australian Dream of an Island Empire: Race, Reputation and Resistance’, Australian Historical Studies 46, no. 3 (2015), 410.
76 ‘A Strategic Position’, Herald, 13 April 1901, 1.
78 ‘Kerguelen’s Island’, SMH, 16 April 1901, 5.
79 Ibid.
recommended the Commonwealth request the annexation of the unclaimed islands and the transfer of the others.\textsuperscript{80}

Chamberlain considered the Australian request seriously, but the Admiralty advised that French control of Kerguelen posed no threat, particularly as France already had a superior Indian Ocean naval base at Madagascar.\textsuperscript{81} Copeland’s vision of Kerguelen as a Commonwealth dependency collapsed without Colonial Office support, but the subantarctic Indian Ocean islands continued to be treated as part of an Australian sphere of interest. For example, the \textit{West Australian} reported in November 1901 that Australia had accepted control of British New Guinea and set aside £20,000 for its administration. This, it argued, was a turning point in Australian history. The Commonwealth could have chosen to limit its control to the Australian continent and “leave no mark in the history of the world”, but by accepting control of New Guinea it had “now her own Monroe Doctrine”. It was only a matter of time until “unwavering purpose on the part of the Commonwealth” would see Fiji, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, St Paul’s, Amsterdam, and Kerguelen brought “into the Australian fold”. In a grandiose prediction of Australia’s destiny, the article concluded that “what the Aegean was to Greece, the Mediterranean to Rome, the Adriatic to Venice, that the South Pacific is to Australia.”\textsuperscript{82}

Australian interest in the German Antarctic expedition’s use of Kerguelen as a base therefore sat uneasily between Australian interest in and support for the scientific exploration of Antarctica and Australian anxieties over foreign powers’ intrusion into Australia’s sphere of interest. Despite fears expressed in the Sydney press that the expedition’s occupation of the

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Argus}, 23 April 1901, 4.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{WA}, 23 November 1901, 6.
island and raising of the German flag would make Germany the “actual Power in possession”, the base was abandoned within two years and was never used to claim sovereignty.\textsuperscript{83} The Admiralty’s insistence that France had no intention to use the island to cut Australia off from the rest of the British Empire in the event of war also proved correct. The French government had virtually no interest in Kerguelen, annexing it purely at the request of brothers René and Henri Bossière. Like Copeland, the Bossières believed Kerguelen could be developed into a pastoral, whaling, sealing, and mining settlement.\textsuperscript{84} The brothers struggled to raise sufficient capital for their grand scheme, and chose in 1908 to focus on pastoralism while subleasing their exclusive whaling and sealing rights to other companies.\textsuperscript{85} The French government was not involved in these schemes, though it did enforce the exclusive exploitation rights granted to the Bossières. Melbourne businessman J.F. Turnbull’s attempts to prospect for minerals on Kerguelen were blocked, causing him to complain that the island’s commercial exploitation had hitherto “been in the hands of British subjects”, but “now that it is known that minerals exist there, we find foreign powers coming in and claiming Southern and Antarctic Islands.”\textsuperscript{86} When Australians did infringe French rights, the government sent a series of blunt requests to the Commonwealth to prevent its subjects from whaling, sealing, or fishing in Kerguelen and its territorial waters.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{86} ‘Foreign Annexation in the Antarctic’, \textit{Age}, 24 February 1898, 6.
\textsuperscript{87} NAA: A1, 1911/14438, Letter from Paul Cambon to Edward Grey, 23 May 1911, Letter from Acting Consul-General for France to W.M. Hughes, 13 July 1911, Letter from Hughes to Acting Consul-General, 17 July 1911, Letter from Andrew Fisher to Consul-General for France, 17 August 1911, Letter from Fisher to Lord Denman, 19 August 1911 \textit{Argus}, 21 October 1908, 6; ‘French Fishing Rights’, \textit{DT}, 2 September 1911, 12
While there was significant public interest in the four Antarctic expeditions of 1901-05 in Australia, these expeditions nonetheless failed to attract the same level of support as the various failed projects of the 1880s and 1890s. The economic depression of the 1890s, federation, and uncertainty about the legal limits of Commonwealth spending were all contributing factors. It is also apparent, however, that none of the British, Scottish, Swedish, or German expeditions expressly sought to advance Australian interests. The resuscitation of the Southern Ocean whaling industry and the development of new industries like guano and mining were central to Australian interest in Antarctic exploration. While scientific enthusiasts were interested in the Antarctic’s scientific value, the only branch of Antarctic science with general appeal was meteorology, which promised to improve the accuracy of weather forecasts. Australians were also deeply interested in using science and exploration to demonstrate the autonomy and sophistication of the Australian state, and a large-scale expedition organised, funded, and staffed overseas simply had less appeal than a more modest one organised in Australia and staffed by Australians. Finally, a vast swathe of the Antarctic and subantarctic was presumed to be a particularly Australian sphere of interest. Given the Commonwealth had recently attempted to purchase Kerguelen to remove it from a foreign power, it is unsurprising that Australians would be uncomfortable with the sudden intrusion of Old World powers into a region they presumed to be an extension of the New World. It was only when a new generation of expeditions began to address these concerns that Australian governments and individuals began to again more actively support Antarctic exploration.

In the aftermath of the expeditions of 1901-04, Australian interest in Antarctica followed established patterns. Antarctic books were widely read, as popular accounts of the Swedish and Scottish expeditions and a general history of Antarctic exploration joined Scott’s and Borchgrevink’s accounts on the shelves of Australian bookshops, causing the Melbourne
Leader to declare an “Antarctic boom” in the publishing industry.\textsuperscript{88} Ross’ legacy remained evident in Tasmania, where the local press continued to discuss the anniversary of the arrival of Erebus and Terror.\textsuperscript{89} There was an insatiable public appetite for tales of Antarctic wildlife, particularly penguins.\textsuperscript{90} Individual proposals, often eccentric or unrealistic in character, continued to circulate. A letter to the Sydney Morning Herald, for example, reported that an American doctor had outfitted a steamer as a sanatorium to take thirty tuberculosis victims on a restorative cruise in the Arctic. ‘Hopeful’ suggested an Australian steamship company outfit a vessel for a similar trip to Antarctica, as there were few options for tuberculosis sufferers in Sydney.\textsuperscript{91} The Evening News expressed surprised that no steamship company had yet made plans for a summer tourist trip to the Antarctic. Such a trip would certainly be dangerous, but so was “crossing George-street when the trams are running”.\textsuperscript{92} Hobart Museum curator Alexander Morton took such proposals a step further, joining the New Zealand steamer Hinemoa for its regular trip to the subantarctic islands to search for castaways in 1906.\textsuperscript{93} There was ongoing concern about the dangers of ice, particularly after reports emerged of 707 icebergs seen in the Southern Ocean shipping lanes by a single steamer.\textsuperscript{94} The results of the recent expeditions were discussed by scientific and geographical societies.\textsuperscript{95} The idea that the Antarctic formed part of Australia’s destiny continued to circulate. New South Wales politician Ned O’Sullivan, for example, argued that Australia occupied “the most advantageous position in the world” with the Indian Ocean to its west, Asia to its north, the Pacific to its east, and the Antarctic, “with its great possibilities in the

\textsuperscript{89} ‘Events’, \textit{TN}, 6 April 1907, 2.
\textsuperscript{90} For example ‘Haunt of the Penguins’, \textit{ATCJ}, 2 January 1907, 54.
\textsuperscript{91} ‘The Crusade Against Consumption’, \textit{SMH}, 20 July 1905, 10
\textsuperscript{92} ‘Antarctic Tourists’, \textit{EN}, 31 October 1907, 4.
\textsuperscript{93} See for example ‘Trip to the Antarctic Islands’, \textit{Mercury}, 3 February 1906, 5; ‘Trip to the Antarctic Islands’, \textit{DT}, 9 February 1906, 4; ‘Trip to the Antarctic Islands’, \textit{Advertiser}, 13 February 1906, 4.
way of whaling, sealing, fishing, and perhaps another Klondyke near the volcanoes which exist there”, to its south. Citing Edmund Burke’s comments about the formation of the United States being a “great revolution” brought about by “the appearance of a new State, of a new species, in a new part of the globe”, O’Sullivan argued that it was Australia’s destiny to follow America and become the great power of the Southern Hemisphere, controlling all three of its surrounding oceans and becoming “the arbiter of the fate of more than half mankind”. 96

Rumours regarding further international expeditions also circulated. One of the NAE’s officers, Michael Barne, was said to be preparing a British expedition to Graham Land with RGS backing. 97 The Western Mail urged Australians to support Barne’s proposed expedition, arguing that, while Graham Land was on the opposite side of Antarctica, it was nonetheless “far nearer to our shores than it is to any of the great nations of the world”. If these nations “think it worth while sinking men and money in such undertakings,” it said, “should not Australians do the same?” 98 Two veterans of the 1898 Belgica expedition, Henryk Arctowski and Georges Lecointe, were making preparations for another Belgian expedition that would use a motor car to reach the South Pole, a novel suggestion that ensured sustained interest. 99 Frederick Cook, another Belgica veteran and well-known Arctic explorer, was planning an American expedition to the South Pole, also using motor cars, while Charcot was preparing for a second Antarctic voyage immediately after returning from his first. 100 The most notable

98 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, WM, 5 May 1906, 32.
100 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Telegraph, 21 May 1907, 8; ‘Farthest South’, Age, 22 May 1907, 7; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, WA, 22 May 1907, 7; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 13 September 1906, 5.
rumours, however, concerned another former NAE officer, Ernest Shackleton, who was said to be planning a small, privately-funded expedition to claim the South Pole for Britain.

**Ernest Shackleton and the Nimrod Expedition**

Shackleton, *Discovery*’s third officer, had distinguished himself during the early stages of the NAE and was one of two men chosen by Scott to accompany him on an attempt on the pole in November 1902. The party set a new farthest south mark but were stricken by frostbite, snow blindness, and scurvy and forced to return to the ship, with Shackleton invalided home on the *Morning*. On returning to England he acted as expert advisor for the organisation of the second NAE relief voyage and the Argentine navy’s expedition to rescue the Swedish expedition, before standing unsuccessfully for parliament and taking a succession of jobs with the *Royal Magazine*, Royal Scottish Geographical Society, and shipbuilding firm William Beardmore & Co. By 1906 he had begun preparing to return to Antarctica in command of his own expedition, and announced his plans in the *Geographical Journal*. These plans were widely reported and commented on in Australia.

As with Borchgrevink and Bruce before him, Shackleton alienated the RGS by launching an expedition that was seen as a rival, in this case to an as-yet-unannounced follow-up expedition by Scott to finish the NAE’s work in the Ross Sea region. Shackleton was therefore forced to raise funds without government or institutional support in Britain, relying

---

104 MS RFS/4, Royal Geographical Society Archives (RGS), London, Letter from J. Scott Keltie to R. Scott, 2 February 1907, Letter from Keltie to Scott, 18 February 1907, Letter from Scott to Keltie, 20 February 1907, Letter from Keltie to Scott, 25 February 1907, Letter from Keltie to Scott, 1 March 1907, Letter from Scott to Keltie, 3 March 1907, Letter from Keltie to Scott, 8 March 1907, Letter from Scott to Keltie, 16 March 1907, Letter from Keltie to Scott, 27 March 1907, Letter from Leonard Darwin to Scott, 9 November 1909*. 188
on donations and loan guarantees from friends, including his employer William Beardmore, Victorian pastoralist Rupert Clarke, and twenty-year-old aristocrat Phillip Brocklehurst, who obtained a place on the expedition by subscribing £2,000.\footnote{E.H. Shackleton, \textit{The Heart of the Antarctic, Being the Story of the British Antarctic Expedition 1907-1909} (London: Heinemann, 1909), vii-xi, 1-26; Huntford, \textit{Shackleton}, 154-191.} He also relied on donations and discounts offered by firms ranging from McDoddies’ dried potatoes to Spratt’s dog biscuits to C.W. Andrews guns.\footnote{See for example Shackleton, \textit{The Heart of the Antarctic}, 1-26; MS 1613/6:D, British Antarctic Expedition 1907-1909 Collection, SPRI, Programme of the British Antarctic Expedition Exhibition; MS EHS/1/h, RGS, Letter from E. H. Shackleton to Messrs. C.W. Andrews Ltd., 16 May 1907.}

Shackleton’s expedition was a source of intense interest in Australia, as it was not only a British expedition bound for the Australasian side of the continent but also decidedly novel in its preparations. Like Arctowski, Shackleton planned to use a motor car for polar travel.\footnote{See for example ‘Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Age}, 5 February 1907, 7; ‘By Motor Car to the South Pole’, \textit{Advertiser}, 13 February 1907, 7; ‘Motors for the Antarctic’, \textit{Argus}, 16 February 1907, 7; ‘Motors for the Antarctic’, \textit{EJ}, 23 February 1907, 4; ‘By Motor to the Pole’, \textit{Argus}, 10 August 1907, 8; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Mercury}, 6 September 1907, 7; ‘The New Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Leader}, 21 September 1907, 40 \footnote{‘To the Antarctic’, \textit{Argus}, 13 April 1907, 5; ‘An Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SM}, 29 May 1907, 1354; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SM}, 3 July 1907, 7; ‘South Pole Expedition’, \textit{Age}, 10 August 1907, 19.} \footnote{‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{SMH}, 23 May 1907, 7; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{BC}, 23 May 1907, 5; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Mercury}, 6 September 1907, 7; ‘By Motor to the Pole’, \textit{Argus}, 10 August 1907, 8; ‘The New Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Leader}, 21 September 1907, 40; ‘Antarctic Research’, \textit{DT}, 1 August 1907, 7; ‘The Antarctic’, \textit{Age}, 6 August 1907, 5; ‘Antarctic Ship Sails’, \textit{Age}, 9 August 1907, 5; ‘To the Antarctic’, \textit{Argus}, 8 October 1907, 5; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SMH}, 28 October 1907, 7.} He also planned to make the first cinematographic and phonographic recordings of the Antarctic, use Manchurian ponies rather than dogs, and revisit the idea of using homing pigeons to carry messages from the Antarctic.\footnote{See for example ‘To the Antarctic’, \textit{Argus}, 13 April 1907, 5; ‘An Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SM}, 29 May 1907, 1354; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SM}, 3 July 1907, 7; ‘South Pole Expedition’, \textit{Age}, 10 August 1907, 19.} The preparation of stores and equipment, the departure of the expedition’s tiny ship \textit{Nimrod}, its arrival at Cape Town, and the scientific staff’s separate journey to New Zealand by passenger steamer, were also chronicled in the Australian press, following the pattern established by previous expeditions.\footnote{‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{SMH}, 23 May 1907, 7; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{BC}, 23 May 1907, 5; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Mercury}, 6 September 1907, 7; ‘By Motor to the Pole’, \textit{Argus}, 10 August 1907, 8; ‘The New Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{Leader}, 21 September 1907, 40; ‘Antarctic Research’, \textit{DT}, 1 August 1907, 7; ‘The Antarctic’, \textit{Age}, 6 August 1907, 5; ‘Antarctic Ship Sails’, \textit{Age}, 9 August 1907, 5; ‘To the Antarctic’, \textit{Argus}, 8 October 1907, 5; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SMH}, 28 October 1907, 7.} One Queenslander, M.H. Foott, was spurred to suggest that Shackleton’s expedition would provide valuable advertising to those that supported it, noting that New Zealanders had been rewarded for its donations with mentions on no fewer than thirty pages of \textit{The Voyage of the Discovery}. Australians could donate Australian products such as textiles, meat, jams, preserved fruits, and chocolate, said...
Foott, and thereby secure international advertising for Australia when the expedition’s story was told. Foott also argued that “Australia’s destiny, like that of New Zealand, is to be a maritime Power”, and if it was to be a maritime power then research into Antarctic meteorology and magnetism would be vital to its future.

The announcement of the addition of one of New South Wales’ most universally respected public figures to the expedition’s scientific staff, however, transformed Australian interest in Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition into a public obsession. Welsh-born, Oxford-educated T.W. Edgeworth David arrived in New South Wales in 1882 to take up a position as Assistant Geological Surveyor. His surveying work led to the discovery of valuable tin and coal deposits in the Hunter Valley, earning him a distinguished local reputation that secured him the position of Geology Professor at Sydney University in 1891. An expedition to Funafuti produced evidence to support Charles Darwin’s theory on the formation of coral atolls and established David’s reputation internationally, and also sparked a career as a popular and prolific public lecturer. By 1907, he was an internationally renowned expert on glaciation, a beloved geology teacher, and a respected public intellectual. He also had an established interest in the Antarctic. In addition to his research on glaciation, he had taken charge of the analysis of Borchgrevink’s geological samples from the Antarctic’s whaling voyage. It was unsurprising then that David eagerly accepted Shackleton’s offer to join Nimrod to mentor the expedition’s youthful scientific staff and conduct some brief geological work before returning north with the ship in time for the start of the university term.

110 M.H. Foott, ‘Queensland and the Antarctic’, BC, 19 October 1907, 10.
111 ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Argus, 6 September 1907, 7; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, WA, 6 September 1907, 5; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Age, 6 September 1907, 8; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Leader, 7 September 1907, 42; ‘For the South Pole’, EN, 14 September 1907, 14.
The news of David’s involvement was celebrated in Sydney. The *Sydney Morning Herald* declared that “it has always been a reproach to Australia that she has neglected to take practical interest in her extreme southern neighbor”, so it was to be welcomed that someone “so thoroughly competent to represent the State has been asked to accompany an expedition to the great Antarctic continent”. David’s students organised a dinner to congratulate their professor on his appointment and noted that “Shackleton had conferred a great honor on the University of Sydney”. David’s involvement, combined with the enthusiasm and advocacy of the New South Wales Geographical Society’s secretary, H.S.W. Crummer, led to an offer from the City of Sydney for the *Nimrod* to visit on its way to Lyttelton, New Zealand, and collect all the coal it required free of charge. When this proved impracticable, it was arranged for first Alfred Reid, the expedition’s business manager, and subsequently Shackleton himself to give lectures in Sydney during their stopovers in Australia en route to Lyttelton, and for *Nimrod* to visit after the expedition’s return.

When Shackleton arrived in Australia in late-November 1907, the expedition was mired in debt and still £5,000 short of the minimum required to outfit the *Nimrod*. He therefore needed to raise funds quickly, and it was fortunate that his arrival coincided with an outpouring of Australian interest in his venture. He was greeted by a barrage of cablegrams welcoming him to Australia and by a journalist desperate for an interview during a brief stop in Fremantle. During another stopover in Adelaide he was whisked away to a formal welcome by the Mayor, Governor, Premier, various naval and military officers, and the South Australian branch of the Geographical Society. When he disembarked in Melbourne the following day

---

117 ‘The Frozen South’, *DT*, 31 October 1907, 4; ‘The Frozen South’, *SMH*, 31 October 1907, 6; *SMH*, 2 December 1907, 4; ‘British Antarctic Expedition’, *EN*, 4 December 1907, 6.
he was taken immediately to the Town Hall to be officially welcomed by Lord Mayor Henry Weedon.\textsuperscript{120} Shackleton was assured at this reception that Australians were behind him, with state Education Minister A.O. Sachse noting that “Australia had always taken the keenest interest in the Antarctic”.\textsuperscript{121} This was followed by a lengthy interview with the \textit{Age}, in which Shackleton expressed his hope that there might be “ten men in your prosperous Commonwealth who will contribute £500 each” to the expedition.\textsuperscript{122} Shackleton concluded his brief stay in Melbourne by attending a meeting of the Geographical Society in the afternoon and lecturing to a sold-out audience in the evening.\textsuperscript{123} In response to Shackleton’s request for further subscriptions at his lecture, Geographical Society President John Madden orchestrated a public fundraising campaign that raised £66.0.6 in small donations.\textsuperscript{124} J.A. Panton urged “Victorians of all classes and all ages” to support Madden’s appeal, as Victorians had been “the first to initiate the revival of further exploration and research in our little known Antarctic region”.\textsuperscript{125}

Shackleton enjoyed a similar reception in Sydney, going straight from Central Station to the Town Hall to be welcomed by “a large and representative gathering of the citizens of Sydney”.\textsuperscript{126} His lecture the following day was highly anticipated, to the extent that the doors were barred thirty minutes early when the hall filled beyond capacity and the crowd stranded outside “lay siege to the doors” in an attempt to gain entry.\textsuperscript{127} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Antarctic Exploration’}, \textit{Leader}, 7 December 1907, 34.
\textsuperscript{121} ‘\textit{Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{Herald}, 3 December 1907, 3.
\textsuperscript{122} ‘\textit{Antarctic Exploration’}, \textit{Age}, 4 December 1907, 7.
\textsuperscript{123} Box 228/1, Royal Historical Society of Victoria (RHSV), Invitation to Special Meeting of the RGSAVB, 3 December 1907; ‘\textit{The Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{Herald}, 2 December 1907, 3; ‘\textit{Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{Herald}, 3 December 1907, 3; ‘\textit{The Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{Argus}, 4 December 1907, 8; ‘\textit{The Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{Mercury}, 9 December 1907, 3; ‘Entertainments’, \textit{SMH}, 11 December 1907, 5.
\textsuperscript{124} ‘\textit{Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{Herald}, 5 December 1907, 6; ‘\textit{British Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{Argus}, 6 December 1907, 6; ‘\textit{Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{Age}, 16 December 1907, 5.
\textsuperscript{125} ‘\textit{The Antarctic’}, \textit{Herald}, 11 December 1907, 2.
\textsuperscript{126} ‘\textit{To The Frozen South’}, \textit{EN}, 5 December 1907, 7; ‘\textit{The Dash for the Pole’}, \textit{SMH}, 6 December 1907, 7; ‘\textit{The White Continent’}, \textit{DT}, 6 December 1907, 7.
\textsuperscript{127} ‘\textit{The Antarctic Expedition’}, \textit{EN}, 7 December 1907, 2; ‘\textit{Bound For The Pole’}, \textit{DT}, 7 December 1907, 16.
declared that the Town Hall had “never seen a bigger lecture”. Shackleton again explained his precarious financial situation, and a committee was formed on the spot to coordinate fundraising in Sydney. This committee subsequently issued a public call for aid, arguing that Antarctica was Australia’s “great sister continent” in the Southern Hemisphere and that Australia was directly interested in the expedition’s work, firstly, because three of its members, David and his former students Douglas Mawson and Leo Cotton, were Australians and secondly because Australia stood to benefit from the expedition’s research into Antarctic meteorology and its search for valuable minerals.

This idea of Australia having a direct stake in the expedition was repeated in the press, with the anticipated benefits ranging from the discovery of workable gold reefs to solving the problem of meteorological forecasts to Shackleton’s offer to provide Australian museums with collections of biological and geological specimens, and even to obtain some live seals for Sydney’s zoological gardens. The *Sydney Morning Herald* neatly summarised this argument by declaring that Australians “stand to benefit most if the expedition is successful, wherefore it behoves us to do everything in our power to ensure its success.” Reflecting as it did the idea that Australia had a unique interest in the Antarctic region, this argument proved influential. Sydney University and the city’s two largest newspapers, the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Daily Telegraph*, subscribed £100 each, while various businessmen, scientists, politicians, students, and even David’s wife donated smaller amounts that brought the ‘Antarctic Exploration Fund’ to £491.13.0 by 21 December.

---

128 *Frost and Finance*, SMH, 7 December 1907, 13.
131 ‘To The Frozen South’, EN, 5 December 1907, 7; ‘The Nimrod Expedition’, SMH, 5 December 1907, 6; ‘The Dash for the Pole’, SMH, 6 December 1907, 7; ‘Seals for the Zoo’, DT, 9 December 1907, 4.
Realising that the small donations being steadily collected in Melbourne and Sydney were unlikely to raise the £5,000 required in time, David put his personal connections to use and approached the Commonwealth Government to save the expedition. Home Affairs Minister William Lyne and Prime Minister Alfred Deakin agreed to provide the £5,000 needed, but felt they needed at least semi-official approval from Parliament. Deakin accordingly introduced a motion without notice on the final sitting day of the year, asking for approval to advance £5,000 to the expedition. He summarised David’s argument that the expedition’s work would have “special value to Australia” and argued that making the grant was “a course which will be worthy of Australia, will do us credit abroad, and advance the cause of science - which is the cause of humanity - without making any undue demand upon us.”

Deakin’s proposal received bipartisan support. The Anti-Socialist Party’s Joseph Cook declared “we owe a duty to ourselves and to posterity to explore the antarctic regions.” Labor leader Andrew Fisher agreed it was “the duty of this Parliament to provide the requisite funds”, while another Anti-Socialist, Eric Bowden, asserted that “there can be no doubt whatever that the benefits to Australia will be very many morefold than to the rest of the world”. The only dissenter was Labor’s Charles Frazer, who objected not to supporting the expedition but to discussing the proposal to do so without notice. Frazer’s protests were shouted down with cries of “Shame!” by his colleagues, however, and Deakin was able to cable Shackleton to say the grant had been approved. This decision was met with

135 Commonwealth, House of Representatives Hansard no. 50, 1907, 13 December 1907, 7491.
136 Ibid, 7491.
137 Ibid, 7492.
138 Commonwealth, House of Representatives Hansard no. 50, 1907, 13 December 1907, 7492-7493.
139 Ibid, 7493.
widespread press approval. The *Daily Telegraph*, for example, commended the government for supporting an expedition that would “prove an inestimable advantage to the Commonwealth” and suggested that the grant would “be repaid to the country many times over”.¹⁴¹

With the financial question resolved, the expedition completed its preparations in Lyttelton, where the expedition was as much a source of popular interest as it had been in Sydney, leading one expedition member, Frank Wild, to complain that “there was rather too much of the fetering business”.¹⁴² In addition to being feted, the expedition also benefited from practical support. Supplies of New Zealand produce including dried milk, butter, cheese, and thirty-two live sheep were gifted to the expedition, while the New Zealand government granted £1,000.¹⁴³ Beyond this financial contribution, Prime Minister Joseph Ward agreed to resolve a second issue that threatened the expedition’s viability. *Nimrod*, a forty-year-old 334-ton Arctic sealing vessel with a maximum speed of six knots, had not been Shackleton’s first choice. With all of the supplies necessary for the expedition, the ship could not physically carry enough coal for its return voyage to Antarctica. Shackleton’s radical solution was to ask Ward to arrange for a steamer to tow *Nimrod* as far as the ice pack. Ward duly opened negotiations with James Mills, director of New Zealand’s largest steamship company. Mills offered the steamer *Koonya* for the unusual voyage, with the New Zealand government paying half the cost of the charter and the Union Company the other.¹⁴⁴ It was initially hoped that passenger tickets could be sold to intrepid tourists to defray the cost, but this was abandoned due to *Koonya’s* insufficient passenger accommodation.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ ‘Cost of the Polar Expedition’, *DT*, 16 December 1907, 6.
Finally, Ward, in his capacity as both Prime Minister and Postmaster-General, arranged for Shackleton to be sworn in as a New Zealand postmaster so that he could establish a New Zealand post office in Antarctica, and for twenty-four thousand New Zealand one penny stamps to be overprinted with the words ‘King Edward VII Land’, the expedition’s intended destination. Most of these stamps were given to Shackleton, along with the other accoutrements of a fully-functioning post office such as a ‘British Antarctic Expedition’ cancellation mark, mail bags, and registers, except for 448 sent to each member state of the Universal Postal Union and sixty kept as samples at the New Zealand General Post Office to ensure the stamps were accepted as legal issue. Ward’s wife provided Shackleton with a gift of her own, a hand-sewn New Zealand flag for Shackleton to fly from his sledge and take to the South Pole. With these arrangements made, and with messages of encouragement flowing in from Australia, Nimrod departed Lyttleton on New Year’s Day 1908. The farewell was considered “the greatest ever bestowed on any vessel leaving a New Zealand port”, with approximately thirty thousand people descending on the wharves and hills while a flotilla of boats escorted Nimrod out of the harbor and the passengers steamers in port listed heavily as crowds thronged to one side of the ship to watch the departure. While it may be tempting to disregard such dramatic descriptions of public enthusiasm as journalistic embellishments, these descriptions of Nimrod’s departure are corroborated by photographic evidence.

146 ‘New Zealand Short Waybill’, John King Davis Papers, MS 8311, Box 3231/2, State Library of Victoria (SLV), Melbourne; Shackleton, The Heart of the Antarctic, 36.  
150 ‘Off To The Pole’, DT, 8 January 1908, 10; ‘The British Antarctic Expedition’, DT, 23 March 1908, 7; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Argus, 9 March 1908, 7.  
151 HP88.47.03, HP88.47.15, HP88.47.28, Macleay Museum, Sydney University Museums.
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the ideas that underpinned New Zealand’s interest in the Antarctic region, it is clear that similar ideas about a New Zealand sphere of interest in the South Pacific stretching from Samoa and Fiji in the north to Campbell Island in the south circulated in the dominion in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. New Zealand joined with Australia in asserting a South Pacific Monroe Doctrine. Governor George Grey urged the annexation of Tonga and Fiji just eight years after the annexation of New Zealand itself, Julius Vogel recommended the colonisation of Polynesia and suggested “there is much to be said in favour of … leaving to the already established colonies a considerable amount of the work and of the control” in 1873, and New Zealand participated in the 1883 Intercolonial Convention in Sydney that issued a declaration that “further acquisition of dominion in the Western Pacific, south of the Equator, by any Foreign Power would be highly detrimental to the safety and well being of the British possessions in Australasia”.152 The New Zealand government also took practical steps to affirm its control of the subantarctic islands to its south, drawing on an established tradition of expanding sovereignty through humanitarian enterprises. Following the deaths of seventy-three passengers and crew in the wreck of the General Grant on Auckland Island in 1866, the New Zealand government began developing a network of castaway depots across the subantarctic Auckland, Campbell, Bounty, and Antipodes Islands. These depots consisted of all the supplies necessary for castaways to sustain themselves, including shelters, clothing, fuel, and tinned foods, while the government steamer Hinemoa regularly visited the depots to search for castaways, replace missing supplies, and release livestock to provide a source of fresh food.153 At the same time, New Zealand sought to manage the resources of the subantarctic

152 NAA: ANT 4 PART 1, 1920-1921, Confidential Memorandum on the Spheres of Interest of Australia and New Zealand, 6 November 1920.
islands, most notably by imposing and enforcing restrictions on sealing.\textsuperscript{154} The government also promoted settlement on the islands, regularly issuing pastoral leases between the 1870s and 1930s.\textsuperscript{155} Finally, New Zealand took the lead in the exploration and scientific investigation of its subantarctic sphere of interest. Indeed, as \textit{Nimrod} was preparing for departure in Lyttelton a scientific expedition organised by the Philosophical Institute of Canterbury was returning to New Zealand after completing a programme of magnetic, botanical, and zoological research in the subantarctic, having made use of \textit{Hinemoa}’s regular voyages to organise the kind of low-cost expedition the Australian Antarctic Committee had envisaged two decades earlier.\textsuperscript{156}

When viewed in this context, Ward’s appointment of Shackleton as a New Zealand postmaster and his wife’s gift of a New Zealand flag to fly at the South Pole appear less as magnanimous gifts and more as a way of co-opting Shackleton’s private expedition into a New Zealand one. The Treaty of Berne that created the Universal Postal Union in 1874 established a principle that an independent postal administration was sufficient for participation in international law by permitting non-states like Norway, India, and the Australian colonies to sign the treaty independently.\textsuperscript{157} The establishment of a New Zealand post office in the Antarctic was therefore an exercise of New Zealand sovereignty over a portion of the Antarctic continent by a state that had itself only been formally sovereign for a few months. When the \textit{Nimrod} expedition departed England it was an entirely private venture

\textsuperscript{154} See for example Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1894 Session I, H-25 Auckland Campbell and Other Islands (Report On), and on their Seals and Seal-Rookeries.
\textsuperscript{155} See for example ‘Settling the Campbell Islands’, \textit{Age}, 24 April 1895, 6; ‘Southland Land Board’, \textit{Otago Witness}, 19 July 1904, 5.
\textsuperscript{157} This anomalous principle was identified by Benjamin Akzin, ‘Membership in the Universal Postal Union’, \textit{American Journal of International Law} 27, no. 4 (Oct., 1933), 651-674.
with no government support. By the time it left Lyttelton it enjoyed substantial funding from the Commonwealth and Shackleton was technically a low-ranking agent of the New Zealand government. The actions of both governments reflect the idea that both states understood themselves to have unique rights and interests in the Antarctic region that obligated them to assist an expedition that could advance these interests.

The expedition continued to generate intense interest in Australia after its departure from Lyttelton. The first major reports came with the Koonya’s return. The steamer endured a harrowing twenty-three day voyage, towing the overloaded Nimrod 1,500 miles in turbulent conditions and, in doing so, becoming the first iron-hulled ship to cross the Antarctic Circle. The story of the voyage was pieced together from an account provided by Koonya’s captain Frederick Evans, a copy of Shackleton’s diary, and interviews with Ashburton pastoralist and expedition donor George Buckley, who Shackleton had allowed to sail beyond the Antarctic Circle in Nimrod before returning with the Koonya. The story that garnered the most interest, however, was the news that Edgeworth David had agreed to Shackleton’s request that he join the shore party as chief scientist and remain for the duration of the expedition. Reactions to David’s decision were universally positive, and reflected the idea that Antarctic exploration was Australia’s duty. The Daily Telegraph, for example, said that it “gives Australia distinction” as “the exploration of Antarctica is as emphatically Australia’s work as anything can be which is of universal significance, and it is fortunate, indeed, that the Commonwealth has in the expedition a man so rarely qualified scientifically and

159 ‘In The Ice Pack’, DT, 23 January 1908, 7; ‘Toward The Ice’, Argus, 23 January 1908, 8; ‘Among Icebergs’, SMH, 23 January 1908, 7; ‘Off to the Antarctic’, EJ, 23 January 1908, 2; ‘On Board the Koonya’, DT, 29 January 1908, 7; ‘With The Nimrod’, SMH, 5 February 1908, 9; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 5 February 1908, 3.
160 See for example ‘Personal’, DT, 29 January 1908, 9; ‘The Antarctic’, DT, 31 January 1908, 9; ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, Age, 31 January 1908, 6; ‘With The Nimrod’, SMH, 5 February 1908, 9; ‘Professor David’, SM, 5 February 1908, 369; ‘Society Doings in Sydney’, Australasian, 8 February 1908, 47.
temperamentally”. Melbourne’s Table Talk noted that David had been presented with a “most desirable opportunity to acquire knowledge of peculiar interest to an Australian scholar”, while the Sydney University Senate immediately approved David’s brazen application for leave. David’s decision to remain for the duration of the expedition was as unsurprising as it was popular. His wife had foreshadowed it in an interview with the Sydney Morning Herald before the Koonya’s return, revealing that she suspected David was “praying that the Nimrod will be iced in, so that he will have some excuse to stay”.

The interest continued after Nimrod’s return in March 1908. Shackleton’s diary and letters formed the basis of initial reports, followed by interviews with members of Nimrod’s crew including chief engineer Harry Dunlop, doctor W.A.R. Mitchell, luckless second officer Aeneas Mackintosh – a last-minute addition to the shore party who had been struck in the eye by a cargo hook in Antarctica and forced to return to Australia to convalesce – and David’s geology demonstrator Leo Cotton. This succession of interviews was followed by rumours of discord between Shackleton and Nimrod’s captain, Rupert England, that had led to England’s resignation along with nine of the crew. These rumours were refuted by Mackintosh and the expedition’s New Zealand agent, J.J. Kinsey, but continued to circulate. The Australian press also reported on various details of the expedition throughout the year, such as that Koonya’s Australian captain Frederick Evans had been

---

161 ‘Professor David in Antarctica’, DT, 31 January 1908, 6.
162 ‘Personal’, Table Talk, 6 February 1908, 7; University of Sydney Archives (USA): P11:7, Letter from Acting Registrar to Edgeworth David, 3 March 1908.
164 See for example ‘South Pole Expedition’, EN, 6 March 1908, 7; ‘From The Frozen Zone’, DT, 7 March 1908, 9; ‘The Nimrod Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 9 March 1908, 4-5; ‘From Antarctica’, SMH, 9 March 1908, 7-8; ‘In Search Of The Pole’, DT, 9 March 1908, 7-8; ‘The Nimrod’s Achievements’, SMH 10 March 1908, 7; ‘The Nimrod’s Voyage’, Mercury, 12 March 1908, 5; ‘Realm of Silence’, SMH, 14 March 1908, 13; ‘Silent Places’, DT, 10 March 1908, 7; Back From The Silent South’, DT, 18 March 1908, 10; ‘Back From The Nimrod’, SMH, 18 March 1908, 9; ‘Back From The Nimrod’, SMH, 27 March 1908, 3.
166 ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, SMH, 27 April 1908, 8; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, EJ 27 April 1908, 1; ‘Back From The Nimrod’, SMH, 18 March 1908, 9.
asked to take command of *Nimrod* for its second Antarctic voyage after impressing Shackleton during the long tow.\(^{167}\)

Most significantly, the *Daily Telegraph* and *Sydney Morning Herald* published a thirteen-part serialised account of the voyage and the establishment of a base at Cape Royds written by David.\(^{168}\) These articles blended detailed reports of the expedition’s activities, vivid descriptions of the scenery and wildlife, humorous anecdotes, and scientific observations into a coherent popular narrative. They were lauded by the *Daily Telegraph*, which suggested that David’s was the first account of the Antarctic that ensured “the whole world of readers - in so far as they possess the gift of a responsive imagination - shares with him in his impressive experiences”.\(^{169}\) These articles were liberally quoted from by other newspapers, and formed the basis of a parade with the theme ‘Professor David’s Odyssey’ for Sydney University’s ‘Students’ Saturnalia’ celebrations, resulting in a polar bear driving a trolley down George-street bearing replicas of *Nimrod* and Mount Erebus and followed by “the famous motor car” driving to the South Pole.\(^{170}\)

Interest in the expedition’s affairs continued throughout 1908. There was speculation about how the expedition was faring, whether the South Pole had been attained, and the probable value of its scientific work, while Evans’ preparations for the second voyage were also regularly commented on.\(^{171}\) One of Edgeworth David’s university colleagues, James Wilson,
noted that wherever he went in Sydney, someone asked him “how do you think David is getting on?”

The unparalleled nature of Australasian interest in Shackleton’s expedition was particularly evident in the reaction to the expedition’s return in March 1909. When the explorers returned to Lyttelton having reached the South Magnetic Pole, made the first ascent of Mount Erebus, and come within ninety-seven miles of the South Pole before being forced to return by food shortages, they were met by enthusiastic crowds on the wharf, persistently approached by journalists for interviews, and hosted by the Canterbury Philosophical Society.

One of Shackleton’s first acts was to cable Australia’s new Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, to offer the expedition’s meteorological data to the Commonwealth and renew his promise of geological and biological collections for whichever Australian museums Fisher nominated, decisions that met with widespread approval in Australia.

Elsewhere in Australia, letters to the editor called for public receptions for Shackleton and David, who was returning to Sydney by steamer ahead of the Nimrod, to allow people to demonstrate “in a practical manner our appreciation as Australians” for their polar exploits.

At least in David’s case, however, public enthusiasm for his return far exceeded that which could be expressed through a single event. The first to welcome him were over a hundred friends, journalists, students, and admirers who gathered from midnight on 30 March 1909 to

---


173 ‘Welcome Home!’, EN, 30 March 1909, 7.


await his steamer’s arrival in Sydney. His daughter and a university colleague were among this crowd, and bundled David into a waiting motorcar to take him to his second welcome, at the house of his friend Joseph Maiden, then on to a third with the Lord Mayor of Sydney and a fourth with Sydney University Chancellor Normand Maclaurin. By lunchtime he was at a fifth welcome hosted by the University’s staff and students in its Great Hall and described by the Evening News as “one of the heartiest, as it was also one of the noisiest, welcome home … that ever fell to the lot of mortal man.” Nominally a university event, some enthusiasts resorted to subterfuge to gain entry to the reception; Cara David was initially denied entry by an exasperated doorkeeper who explained that she was the seventh Mrs David he had admitted. In the afternoon, David boarded a train to his home in the Blue Mountains, where a sixth welcome was extended at Woodford station. The Woodford welcome was organised by the Blue Mountains Shire Council and consisted of elaborate decorations on the platform, a waiting horse carriage pulled not by horses but by schoolboys from Woodford Academy, and a crowd lining the entire road from the station to David’s house. The official public welcome was arranged for the Town Hall on 1 April, and the Lord Mayor bowed to public pressure by agreeing to offer tickets to those who arrived first rather than by invitation. As with Shackleton’s 1907 lecture, the crowd seeking entry greatly exceeded the seats available, resulting in the doors being locked and leaving a crowd of thousands outside the hall. Indeed, the reception was delayed for thirty minutes when David himself was locked outside. When the pandemonium that greeted David’s arrival subsided, he gave a speech that drew on well-established ideas about Australia’s relationship with Antarctica.

178 ‘The Professor at the Antarctic’, SM, 11 May 1921, 8-9, 33.
179 ‘Welcome Home!’, EN, 30 March 1909, 7; ‘Professor David’, SMH, 31 March 1909, 8; ‘Woodford’, Blue Mountain Echo (BME), 3 April 1909, 10.
180 ‘Welcome to Professor David’, EN, 29 March 1909, 4. ‘Professor David’, SMH, 29 March 1909, 7; ‘Professor David’, SMH, 1 April 1909, 6.
181 ‘From the Frozen Sea’, EN, 2 April 1909, 3.
Antarctica should, said David, “have a special interest to Australia”, particularly as it was Australia’s “sister continent”, it “abounded in economic minerals”, and there would likely be an Australian tourist industry operating Antarctic cruises in the near future.¹⁸²

Following the Town Hall reception, David continued to excite interest in Sydney. He returned to work immediately, but the polar equipment stowed in his office attracted a steady stream of visitors and was “handled with curious awe”.¹⁸³ Curious awe also described the reaction to David going shopping for new clothes in the city – a fattening diet of seal and penguin blubber necessitated a new wardrobe – when assistants and customers “flocked to gaze at him”.¹⁸⁴ He was hosted by the University Club, and in the course of the event expressed his confidence that Australia would support another attempt by Shackleton to reach the South Pole, saying that when the “British Lion planted the British flag there, there would be young Kangaroos to assist him.”¹⁸⁵ A full-page sketch of David graced the cover of the *Sydney Mail*.¹⁸⁶ His public observations about Australia’s “bounden duty” to establish a permanent meteorological station in the Antarctic, the possibility of developing an Antarctic sanatorium, the likelihood of valuable radioactive minerals being mined in the future, and the probability of a lucrative fishing industry in Antarctic waters all attracted attention.¹⁸⁷ A lecture at the Great Hall was arranged for David to recount the full tale of his adventures, and proved so successful that the Sydney University Extension Board arranged for him to teach a course on the subject to around 750 people.¹⁸⁸ Another series of lectures on the expedition

¹⁸³ ‘South Pole Expedition’, *Argus*, 8 April 1909, 6
¹⁸⁵ ‘In The Icy South’, *EN*, 15 April 1909, 6.
¹⁸⁶ ‘Shares Honours With Shackleton, Professor David of Sydney University”, *SM*, 31 March 1909, 1.
¹⁸⁸ ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, *SMH*, 28 May 1909, 4; USA: P11:6.7, Prospectus for One, Two or Three Lectures on the British Antarctic Expedition of 1907-09 by Professor T.W. Edgeworth David; *SMH*, 2 July 1910, 12; *SMH*, 5 July 1910, 9; *SMH*, 8 July 1910, 6; ‘Professor David’s Lectures’, *SMH*, 8 July 1910, 10; ‘Professor David’s Lecture’, *SMH*, 21 July 1910, 8.
commenced in June under the auspices of the Royal Society of New South Wales. This was followed by an exhaustive, albeit intermittent, lecture tour across Australia in 1909 and 1910 to raise funds for the publication of the expedition’s scientific reports, including lectures at Maitland, Singleton, Goulburn, Katoomba, Toowoomba, Brisbane, Hobart, Helensburgh, Rockhampton, Hawthorn, Broken Hill, Ballarat, Kalgoorlie, Boulder, Perth, Bathurst, Wellington, and Maitland again. He was invited to talk about his Antarctic experiences at the Woodford Academy school prize ceremony in December 1909. David’s extraordinary popularity was even the subject of a satirical play by the Royal Comic Opera Company.

David’s return to Sydney was followed by Mawson and five other shore party members on 16 April, Shackleton on 20 April, and the Nimrod later that day. Another civic reception for them was planned, but its size was limited by the unavailability of Sydney Town Hall. A letter to the Daily Telegraph suggested that an outdoor, afternoon reception be organised at the Domain instead, as this would “afford the poorer classes – just as enthusiastic admirers of the Nimrod commander as the wealthier citizens – an opportunity of showing their appreciation of the arduous efforts of Lieutenant Shackleton and his party”.

192 ‘Professor David’s Popularity’, EN, 30 March 1909, 9.
Allen Taylor, however, decided to cram 3,500 people into the Town Hall basement on 22 April for an exuberant celebration of the expedition, though again enthusiasm for the explorers could not be contained to a single evening. Among the various events organised in their honour were welcomes to Mawson by his fellow Fort-street High School alumni and Sydney University, an informal welcome for Shackleton with “30 of the leading citizens of Sydney”, a ‘conversazione’ hosted by the Sydney University Science Society that doubled as an exhibition of Antarctic gear for the curious public, another dinner hosted by the Royal Society of New South Wales, tickets to the play An Englishman’s Home that saw Shackleton usurp the Governor-General’s wife’s usual position as “the most gazed at person in the theatre”, a reception for Shackleton by the Institute of Journalists, and a tourist trip for the expedition members to Wentworth Falls organised by David and the state railway commissioners. Elsewhere portraits were taken by postcard photographer – and future Antarctic explorer – Frank Hurley in his Sydney studio, letters were written to newspapers in praise of various expedition members, and a polite reception for Mawson by his Adelaide University colleagues was interrupted by students carrying him off the train on their shoulders and taking him to a raucous welcome celebration organised by the undergraduates. The most notable events, however, were the lecture tour embarked on by Shackleton and the public exhibition of the Nimrod in Sydney, both of which highlight the depth of local engagement with the expedition and its work.


Shackleton had first been approached by Australian film promoter Edwin Geach, who offered him a sizable guarantee for a lecture tour of Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth before his departure for England.\(^{198}\) Shackleton declined this offer, but was persuaded by his friend H.S.W. Crummer to give a single lecture in Sydney.\(^{199}\) Crummer took on the organisation of this lecture himself, and was inundated with 7,000 applications for tickets.\(^{200}\) Competition for tickets was such that a rancorous debate played out in the letters columns of the \textit{Daily Telegraph}, as some who had applied on the morning the lecture was announced missed out and accused Crummer of favouring elites at the expense of the “plain citizen”, while others leapt to his defence.\(^{201}\) When this first lecture was well-received, Shackleton agreed to another at the Town Hall, which also sold out so rapidly that the council was forced to issue a public plea for those without tickets not to go to the hall.\(^{202}\) With additional seats crammed into spaces beneath the galleries and behind the screen, Shackleton attracted “probably the largest audience that ever attended to hear a lecture in Australia” and raised £512 from ticket sales.\(^{203}\) Despite still being thousands of pounds in debt, Shackleton spontaneously donated the lecture proceeds to a local charity, the Hospital Saturday Fund.\(^{204}\)

He subsequently agreed to lectures in Melbourne and Adelaide, again to raise funds for local charities.\(^{205}\) In Melbourne he was met at Spencer Street Station by a party including Melbourne University biologist Baldwin Spencer, Prime Minister Andrew Fisher, and expedition member Bertram Arnytage, and taken to another series of welcomes organised by


\(^{203}\) ‘Farthest South’, \textit{SMH}, 1 May 1909, 13.

\(^{204}\) ‘Farthest South’, \textit{SMH}, 1 May 1909, 13; ‘Southward Ho!’, \textit{EN}, 1 May 1909, 10.

Shackleton gave his sold-out lecture at Melbourne Town Hall on 3 May, raising another £407 for charity, and gave an additional lecture to local schoolboys at the Glaciarium before departing for Adelaide. On arrival Shackleton received another civic reception, followed by two lectures at Adelaide University’s Elder Hall. Shackleton departed Adelaide for London on 13 May, but was persuaded to take advantage of his steamer’s stopover in Fremantle to deliver another lecture in Western Australia to raise funds for the Children’s Protection Society. A large crowd gathered on the wharf hoping to “gain a glimpse of the intrepid explorer”, before Shackleton was whisked away to his final lecture in Australia. As with his previous lectures, it was overcrowded and exceptionally well-received. The *Western Mail*, for example, declared that no lecture “has made, or ever will make, more of an impression upon an audience here”, while the *Daily News* declined even to describe it, saying that “those who heard it will never forget it – but to offer those who did not hear it a synopsis or a list of slides would be as unsatisfactory as the reading of yesterday’s menu to a hungry man.”

---

The *Nimrod*, now commanded by Australian first officer John King Davis, arrived in Sydney on 20 April 1909. The state government waived all port fees and arranged for the ship to moor at Neutral Bay, where it was immediately deluged with viewers and visitors.  

Richard Poore, Commander of the Australia Station, toured the ship with his wife, as did the children of East St. Leonards Public School and forty students from the University, together with David and his wife.  

Passing steam ferries listed as passengers swarmed to one side to look at the famous little ship, while savvy entrepreneurs chartered a ferry to take passengers to Neutral Bay where it “merely cruised round and round the *Nimrod*.”, The Governor-General and his wife visited the ship while it was undergoing repairs at Cockatoo Island, before it was finally announced that the ship would open to the public for tours in response to the “intense interest … manifested in the notable ship ever since she entered this port”.  

When repairs were completed, *Nimrod* was berthed at Circular Quay and opened to public inspection on 3 and 4 May. Tickets were sold to avoid dangerous overcrowding, with the proceeds going to the Rawson Institute for Seamen. Approximately 2,000 people, including federal Defence Minister George Pearce and Trade Minister Frank Tudor, visited the ship on the first day, and between 5,000 and 6,000 visited on the second day, when ticket costs were reduced. Visitors enjoyed an exhibition of sledging equipment on the quayside and tours of the ship guided by expedition members, who were besieged with requests for autographs and souvenirs. Junior geologist Raymond Priestley later recalled that the

---

demand for souvenirs was so great, and the remuneration for supplying them so lucrative, that “every scrap of spare wood and rope was disposed of; every scrap of penguin skin or sealskin; every penguin and skua egg; every small piece of erratic rock, found their way into the pockets of enthusiastic sightseers.” When the supply of these souvenirs was exhausted, visitors resorted to cutting apart the rigging, while an enterprising sailor came up with the idea of collecting rocks from the quayside to sell as “genuine specimens of Erebus lava” at half-a-crown each.219 Other souvenirs were given freely as personal gifts. Priestley, for example, made an album of photographs of penguins and the expedition’s dogs as a gift for the young daughter of two of David’s former students.220 Housed on the bridge, the expedition’s sledge dogs were a particular attraction. Puppies born in the Antarctic were gifted to prominent supporters, including the wives of the Governor-General and Admiral Poore, the Archbishop of Sydney, and the officer who had overseen Nimrod’s repairs, J.P. Rolleston, while Shackleton’s first and most influential advocate, Edgeworth David, was permitted to adopt his favourite dog, Ambrose.221 Shackleton planned to gift a final puppy to the Queen, but such was the demand for souvenirs that the dog was stolen by a visitor to the Nimrod, sparking an unsuccessful police search and press campaign.222 Dognapping aside, the ship visits were extremely successful, raising over £200 for the Rawson Institute and providing “further evidence of the deep interest taken by the citizens of Sydney in the visit of the Antarctic exploring ship Nimrod to this port”.223

---

219 ‘The Professor at the Antarctic’, SM, 11 May 1921, 8-9, 33.
220 HP83.18, Macleay Museum, Sydney University Museums.
Despite a suggestion that the Commonwealth purchase the *Nimrod* for further meteorological work in the Antarctic, Shackleton instructed Davis to return the ship to England via a circuitous route in the Southern Ocean, departing Sydney on 8 May.\(^{224}\) This final voyage would, said Shackleton, complete the expedition’s work by determining whether reported subantarctic islands such as Dougherty, Emerald, Nimrod, and the Royal Company’s Islands actually existed. This service had been requested by the Australasian Ornithologists’ Union and was also intended to make up for the abandonment of a magnetic survey of the Southern Ocean originally envisaged for the winter of 1908.\(^{225}\) If the islands were found, there was a possibility they might harbour untouched fur seal populations that could be exploited by Australia and New Zealand, while if they proved to be phantom islands the voyage would improve the accuracy of charts and collect valuable oceanographic data.\(^{226}\) In incorporating this work into the *Nimrod*’s homeward voyage and couching it in terms of possible economic benefits and improved maritime safety, Shackleton again demonstrated his understanding of Australia’s interests in the Antarctic region.

It was this linking of Shackleton’s personal interests and objectives with Australia’s that resulted in an unprecedented degree of Australian engagement with the expedition. When it returned, the Australian reaction focused on the expedition’s quasi-Australian character, the various commercial prospects it suggested, and the ways in which it would enhance the reputation of the Commonwealth and its institutions. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, for example, used the subheading ‘Australia at the Pole’ for its account of Mawson and David’s journey to the South Magnetic Pole and described the expedition as “at least a third Australian”, while there were occasional references to the “British-Australian Expedition”

\(^{225}\) ‘Royal Company Islands’, *Argus*, 13 August 1909, 5.
and the “Shackleton-David Expedition”. The degree to which the expedition was reimagined as an Australian one is illustrated by the fact that ‘Shackleton’ was one of the names submitted to a 1909 competition to pick the name of the federal capital. 228 The contribution of the Australian members of the expedition – David, Mawson, Cotton, Armatage, Evans, and Davis – was frequently expounded upon. 229 The *Evening News* welcomed David’s success in “representing Australia on such an historical occasion” and completing work that would prove “of much subsequent value to the country.” 230 Melbourne’s *Punch* emphasised the role of the Commonwealth grant and Australian scientists, concluding that “but for Australia the scientific results of the expedition would have been small”. 231 David raised the possibility that radium, gold, and coal would be found in the “British soil” of Victoria Land, while A.O. Sachse celebrated the “commercial value to Australia” of the expedition’s work, as it had opened the possibility of ivory, coal, and other minerals being exploited by Australians. 232 Even before the expedition returned, the *Daily Telegraph* reported that F.E. Du Faur, who had been advocating Australian Antarctic since 1881, had capitalised on the interest piqued by Shackleton’s expedition and was close to organising a combined scientific and tourist trip. There was interest in the proposal from steamship companies, the Federal Government, the RGS, and Jean-Baptiste Charcot, and it was expected that between eighty and one hundred tickets would be sold at £25 for a three-week cruise in December 1908 that would combine meteorological and other scientific work with photographic excursions, viewing the midnight sun and *aurora australis*, and shooting seals for sport. 233

---

228 ‘Name the Capital’, *Star*, 10 April 1909, 28.
233 ‘The Southern Seas’, *DT*, 13 June 1908, 12.
Finally, the Australian explorers were seen as shedding “lustre” on Australian universities.234 David declared before his departure in 1907 that it was “a high compliment to their state and to their University” that Mawson had been selected for the scientific staff, while his stated rationale for accepting Shackleton’s offer to join the staff himself centred on the fact he would be doing “useful work” and that it would be “creditable to our University.”235 Mawson in particular was an Australian-born graduate of Fort-street High School and Sydney University who had proved himself to be, in David’s words, “an Australian Nansen”.236 Mawson’s achievements were celebrated in similar fashion in South Australia, where the Advertiser noted that he had “brought renown not only to himself, but to the Adelaide University”.237 That Shackleton left the preparation and publication of a majority of the expedition’s scientific results in David’s hands further added to the sense that the expedition had legitimised Australian science and Australian universities. David and Priestley took charge of working up the scientific reports in Sydney and recruited prominent scientists in Australia and New Zealand to contribute, including Sydney-educated geologists Griffith Taylor and W.N. Benson, Sydney biologist E.J. Goddard, Australian Museum conchologist Charles Hedley, Victorian palaeontologist Frederick Chapman, and New Zealand’s government meteorologist Edward Kidson.238 The expedition provided an opportunity for the validation of Australian institutions. Coinciding as it did with the visit of the American ‘Great White Fleet’ in 1908, which Justine Greenwood argues was seen as an opportunity for Australia generally and Sydney particularly to demonstrate its modernity on the international

236 ‘Welcome Home!!’, EN, 30 March 1909, 7.
237 ‘Lieut. Shackleton’, Advertiser, 10 May 1909, 8.
stage, Shackleton provided an opportunity for Australia to demonstrate its statehood through an exuberant commitment to the scientific exploration of Antarctica.\textsuperscript{239}

Shackleton’s *Nimrod* expedition was a transformative moment for Australian interests in the Antarctic. While the expedition fitted into an established pattern of Australian support for any expedition, regardless of its national origin or official status, that promised to explore a region that was known to have been economically productive in the past and was expected to become productive again in the future and which Australians felt they had a special relationship with, it was also unusual in that it was directly supported by the Australian state. The involvement of several Australians, including the esteemed and influential Edgeworth David, and the prospect of direct benefits to the Commonwealth through meteorological, magnetic, and mineralogical research, convinced the Commonwealth government to set aside Edmund Barton’s reservations about the constitutionality of giving grants-in-aid to exploring expeditions. This set a precedent for future expeditions, both those organised in Australia and those intending to use it as a base, and it was noted at the time by Sydney Lord Mayor Allen Taylor that Shackleton’s success “would justify Parliament in being more liberal on future occasions”.\textsuperscript{240} Shackleton made concessions to Australia’s specific interests in meteorological research and economic development, gifting the meteorological data to the Commonwealth and instructing David to formally “take possession” of Victoria Land, the Magnetic Pole, and any area in which valuable minerals were found.\textsuperscript{241} Combined with the fact that the expedition’s largest financial supporter was the Commonwealth government and that Australians made up a quarter of the shore party, these concessions to their interests allowed Australians to essentially co-opt Shackleton’s enterprise into an Australian one, at the same time as he exploited Australian interests to further his own. Furthermore, the

\textsuperscript{240} ‘Furthest South’, *SMH*, 21 April 1909, 9-10.
\textsuperscript{241} USA: P11:7.1, Letter from Shackleton to David, 1907.
expedition captured public interest in a way that none had since Ross’. In part this was due to the literary quality of the descriptions provided, such as David’s evocative account of the *Nimrod*’s voyage to Cape Royds published in the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Daily Telegraph*, but also to the quality of the expedition’s photographic work and to the fact that Australia had a financial and human stake in the expedition. The blanket press coverage, sold-out lectures across Australia, and between 7,000 and 8,000 people who each paid a shilling to step on board the *Nimrod* and subsequently hacked apart its rigging for souvenirs are testament to this new form of interest. This ultimately meant that new donors and supporters came forward to assist the next generation of expeditions. Where the public appeal for the NAE had amounted to £250 raised by the Geographical Society and a £1,000 grant from the Queensland government, the *Nimrod* received £7,000 in donations from the Commonwealth and Australian citizens, a subsequent British expedition in 1910 led by Robert Scott received £5,000 in Australia, and an Australian expedition led by Mawson raised a little over £38,000 in Australian grants and donations.242

---

Chapter 6: Australia and the Race for the Pole, 1910-13

The *Nimrod* expedition both followed an established pattern, primarily that of Australians supporting any expedition bound for the Antarctic regardless of its official status or national origins, and set new precedents, notably the federal government’s active role in supporting Antarctic exploration. In the aftermath of this expedition, the Antarctic continued to be seen as a region of particular economic, scientific, and political interest to Australia. A series of further expeditions followed the *Nimrod*, including another British expedition led by Robert Scott, a Norwegian venture under *Belgica* veteran and Nansen protégé Roald Amundsen, German and Japanese expeditions under Wilhelm Filchner and Nobu Shirase respectively, an Australian expedition organised by Douglas Mawson, and finally another British effort by Shackleton. These expeditions followed the patterns established by the *Nimrod*, and with the exception of the German expedition relied on Australian support to various degrees. Significantly, Australian engagement with these expeditions, and with the proposals for economic exploitation and the extension of political control that emerged from them, provides further insights into the development of the idea of Australian interests in the Antarctic region.

When Ernest Shackleton returned in 1909 he immediately began planning another expedition to the South Pole, departing in 1910 and financed by British newspaper the *Daily Mail*.¹ He was far from the only explorer with designs on the pole, however. In Scotland, William Speirs Bruce was intent on returning to the Weddell Sea, and wrote to the Royal Geographical Society to stress that other explorers should recognise this region as the Scottish sector of the Antarctic.² In March 1910, Bruce formally launched plans for an

---

¹ MS 3231/3, State Library of Victoria (SLV), Letter from E. H. Shackleton to Editor of the Daily Mail, 17 September 1909.
² MS RFS/4 e., Scott Collection, Royal Geographical Society (RGS), London, Letter from J. Scott Keltie to R. Scott, 9 February 1910; MS 101/23/1, Bruce Collection, SPRI, A New Scottish Expedition to the South Polar Region, 1908.
expedition of unparalleled ambition that would involve crossing the Antarctic continent from Weddell Sea to Ross Sea via the South Pole. Bruce’s plans attracted significant attention, both in Scotland and in Australia, but ultimately collapsed due funding shortfalls. In America, the National Geographic Society and Arctic Club began work on plans for an expedition to the South Pole under Robert Peary, just returned from claiming the North Pole. Meanwhile, Shackleton’s former commander Robert Scott had harboured ambitions for another expedition since the return of the NAE. Scott had worked on plans for a follow-up expedition since 1904, but a busy naval career prevented him from realising them before Shackleton announced his Nimrod expedition. When Shackleton returned having fallen ninety-seven miles short of the pole, Scott seized the opportunity to announce a new ‘British Antarctic Expedition’ in October 1909 and began raising funds.

Scott immediately began preparing for his expedition, applying for government grants, ordering supplies, assembling an advisory committee of prominent naval officers and scientists such, and appointing agents to manage his affairs in Christchurch and London. As with previous expeditions, these preparations were widely reported and commented on in

---


4 See for example ‘The South Pole’, Leader, 5 February 1910, 22; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Telegraph, 14 February 1910, 6.


Scott also set about putting together a party with the attributes required to both surpass Shackleton’s farthest south mark and outstrip his scientific achievements. At the top of Scott’s list of candidates was the “Australian Nansen” Douglas Mawson. Mawson had proved himself an exceptional sledger, navigator, and field scientist during the Nimrod expedition, and Scott saw him as the ideal man to ensure his attempt on the pole was successful. Additionally, it could not have escaped Scott’s notice that the appointment of Australian scientists had helped to open the door to £5,000 of Commonwealth funding for Shackleton. When Mawson visited London in January 1910, Scott offered him a place in the final party for the assault on the South Pole and an £800 salary. Mawson, however, nursed his own ambition to explore the region directly south of Australia, which he and David had briefly visited during the Magnetic Pole journey. He told Scott that he would join the expedition if Scott placed him in charge of a four-man party to be deposited at Adélie Land. When Scott insisted he could not, Mawson resolved to organise his own expedition to Adélie Land, and approached Shackleton for assistance in raising the necessary funds. Scott, meanwhile, kept Mawson’s name on the list of expedition members until he reached Australia.

Even without Mawson, Scott’s plans relied on receiving similar support in Australia and New Zealand to Shackleton. Scott invited the Commonwealth’s ‘Official Secretary’ in London, Muirhead Collins, to represent Australia at a meeting of interested parties in October 1909 to discuss funding arrangements. The Fisher government denied Collins’ request to attend

---

9 ‘Welcome Home!’, EN, 30 March 1909, 7.
10 MS 1175:D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log 7 December 1909 to 28 September 1912.
11 MS 1175:D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log; MS 1453/13, British Antarctic Expedition 1910-13 Collection, SPRI, Letter from Edgar Speyer to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 14 December 1909.
officially, feeling it would commit them to making a grant at a time when funding for several other scientific projects was under consideration, but encouraged him to attend in a private capacity and report on the meeting.\footnote{National Archives of Australia (NAA): A1, 1911/177, Cablegram from Muirhead Collins to Atlee Hunt, 7 October 1909, Telegram from Hunt to Collins, 7 October 1909, Memorandum from Collins to Hunt, 8 October 1909, Memorandum from Hunt to Collins, 11 October 1909, Memorandum from Collins to Hunt, 13 October 1909.} Undeterred by this lukewarm reaction, Scott wrote to New South Wales Premier Charles Wade asking him to urge Fisher to provide a grant to the expedition, emphasising Australia’s “practical interest” in Antarctic meteorological and mineralogical research and promising that Australia would be represented by two scientists and visits by the ship to Sydney and Melbourne.\footnote{NAA: British Antarctic Expedition 1909-1913, A1, 1911/177, Letter from R. Scott to Charles Wade, 28 January 1910, Letter from Wade to Andrew Fisher, 15 March 1910.} This request, which essentially asked the Commonwealth to contribute to a venture following the same route to the South Pole as Shackleton while undertaking the same scientific work in the same part of Antarctica, was also declined.\footnote{NAA: British Antarctic Expedition 1909-1913, A1, 1911/177, Letter from Fisher to Wade, 15 June 1910; ‘To The Pole’, \textit{Herald}, 30 August 1910, 1; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{West Australian (WA)}, 31 August 1910, 4; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, \textit{Mercury}, 31 August 1910, 4.} The government did offer in-kind support however, such as arranging an exemption from the Immigration Restriction Act to allow Scott to hire Chinese attendants to care for his dogs and ponies during the journey from Vladivostok to New Zealand via Brisbane.\footnote{NAA: A1, 1911/177, Letter from Collins to Hunt, 21 January 1910, Letter from Hunt to Harry Wollaston, 23 February 1910, Letter from Letter from Hunt to Stephen Mills, 23 February 1910, Letter from Hunt to Collins, 1 March 1910, Letter from Mills to Hunt, 3 March 1910, Letter from Scott to Collins, 9 April 1910, Letter from Hunt to Acting Collector of Customs Sydney, 23 May 1910.} The expedition also relied on discounted goods and in-kind donations from Australasian firms, obtaining, for example, discounted compressed fodder bales from Geelong for the ponies and a hundred tons of free coal from shipping firms Huddert Parker & Co. and Bird & Co. in Melbourne.\footnote{‘Fodder For Antarctic’, \textit{Argus}, 15 August 1910, 9; ‘Captain Scott’s Expedition’, \textit{SMH}, 15 August 1910, 7; MS 761/8/35;D, Kinsey Collection, SPRI, Letter from J.J. Kinsey to Scott, 29 September 1910.} Similarly, when Scott inspected the Sydney Powel Wood Process Co.’s Sydney plant to assess the potential for powellised Australian hardwoods to provide lighter, more durable sledges, the company declared that “the national value of the
work to be attempted by the expedition was of so important a character to Australia” that they would provide the wood required without charge.17

Scott’s ship Terra Nova departed England in June 1910, while the expedition members made their way to Lyttelton by a variety of routes.18 The dogs and ponies attracted attention on arrival in Brisbane, while the expedition’s manager, George Wyatt, travelled to Sydney via New York, collecting two dogs taken by Peary to the North Pole on the way.19 Mechanic Bernard Day and photographer Herbert Ponting arrived by passenger steamer, escorting valuable motor sledges and camera equipment respectively.20 The three geologists, Sydney University graduates T. Griffith Taylor and Frank Debenham and Kalgoorlie-based Otago graduate J. Allan Thompson, made their way to Sydney to consult with David before heading to Christchurch for a two-week field trip to gather data on the glacial geology of New Zealand for comparative purposes.21 Chief scientist Edward Wilson arrived in Australia ahead of the expedition, along with Scott’s wife Kathleen, to organise its affairs in Melbourne.22 Fundraising was foremost among these affairs, as both Wilson and Kathleen Scott made it clear in press interviews that the expedition needed at least £5,000 in Australia.23

19 ‘For The Antarctic’, Sun, 9 September 1910, 7; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Age, 8 September 1910, 9; Peary’s Dogs’, DT, 6 October 1910, 12; ‘The Dash For The Pole’, SMH, 5 October 1910, 12.
20 ‘Antarctic Expedition’, SMH, 29 June 1910, 9; ‘Captain Scott, Monopolist’, Sun, 11 October 1910, 5; ‘To The South Pole’, Age, 12 October 1910, 9; ‘Photographing the Pole’, Argus, 19 October 1910, 12.
23 ‘Straight for the Pole’, SMH, 8 October 1910, 15; ‘The South Pole’, Age, 1 October 1910, 14; ‘Farthest South’, Argus, 4 October 1910, 7; ‘Straight for the Pole’, SMH, 8 October 1910, 15
The *Sydney Morning Herald* commented on this shortfall, noting that the *Nimrod* expedition had been “a splendid advertisement for Australian science” and proved that Australian universities were “producing a type of scientific man who is well able to hold his own with Europe and America.” As with its predecessor, Australian geologists were well-represented amongst Scott’s scientific staff, and the *Herald* argued that, with the whole world of scientists to choose from, “this representation is not a little to our credit”. Furthermore, it argued that “the great practical interest Antarctic research must always have for Australia”, including the possibility of improved weather forecasting, “a southern Klondyke”, and a future tourist industry, made a Commonwealth grant desirable.24 Similar arguments were made by a deputation led by Kathleen Scott and Alfred Deakin to Acting-Prime Minister W.M. Hughes.25 A letter from the Council of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) similarly argued that a grant was justified on the grounds of “national prestige” and the benefits Australia would gain from further meteorological, magnetic, and mineralogical research.26

Scott himself travelled from England to Cape Town, where he campaigned vociferously for private donations and a government grant, eventually raising £1,274 before joining *Terra Nova* for the voyage to Melbourne.27 The ship’s arrival was eagerly anticipated in Melbourne, and Scott was immediately greeted with the same litany of welcomes and events that had greeted Shackleton.28 With Scott continuing to agitate for a grant, Hughes’ cabinet finally

24 ‘*The Scott Expedition*, *SMH*, 10 October 1910, 8.
26 NAA: A1, 1911/177, Letter from J.H. Maiden to W.M. Hughes, 12 October 1910; ‘*British Expedition to the Antarctic*, *DT*, 17 October 1910, 13; ‘*British Expedition to the Antarctic*, *SMH*, 17 October 1910, 4.
27 ‘*For the Antarctic*, *DT*, 3 June 1910, 7; ‘*Antarctic Research*, *DT*, 4 August 1910, 7; ‘*The Antarctic*, *Advertiser*, 29 August 1910, 7; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, *Telegraph*, 29 August 1910, 6; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, *Mercury*, 29 August 1910, 5; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, *Mercury*, 2 September 1910, 5; ‘*Captain Scott’s Expedition*, *Age*, 3 May 1911, 9; ‘*The Scott Expedition*, *SMH*, 3 May 1911, 15.
28 See for example *Argus*, 8 October 1910, 18; ‘*The Antarctic*, *Herald*, 12 October 1910, 4; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, *WA*, 13 October 1910, 7; ‘*Antarctic Exploration*, *Mercury*, 13 October 1910, 5; ‘*Head of the Expedition*, *Argus*, 13 October 1910, 7; ‘*Bound South*, *DT*, 13 October 1910, 4; ‘*On The Terra Nova*, *Argus*, 13 October 1910, 7
agreed to provide £2,500, half of the requested sum.29 This decision generated a “general feeling of disappointment” that a rival state might forestall the British Empire to the South Pole due to “niggardly treatment of a British-Australian expedition” by the Commonwealth.30 The Daily Telegraph was similarly critical, arguing that the Commonwealth should ensure that the South Pole was reached by “by the expedition which sails under the same flag that flies over these dominions.”31 Despite disappointment over the size of the grant, Scott remained on good terms with Hughes and his ministers, dining with them at Parliament House and giving them a private tour of Terra Nova.32

With £2,500 still required, Scott travelled to Sydney on 17 October. He was immediately summoned to a public meeting at the Town Hall, where a committee was formed to lobby Hughes to double the government grant.33 The letter produced by this committee drew on familiar ideas about Australia’s Antarctic interests, urging the government not to “shirk its obvious responsibility” and dwelling on the idea that the economic benefits that would accrue from further exploration in the Antarctic would “most naturally belong” to Australia, and thus “should be secured by the Commonwealth”.34 While some in New South Wales endeavoured to persuade Hughes to reconsider, others set about raising the remaining £2,500 themselves. Well-known soldier William Cope headed a public subscription list with a

30 Argus, 15 October 1910, 18.
34 NAA: A1, 1911/177, Letter from Allen Taylor to W.M. Hughes, 19 October 1910, Letter from W.M. Hughes to Taylor, 22 October 1910.
donation of three guineas. The AAAS invited Scott to give a public lecture to raise money, and booked the largest hall available in Sydney, the Glaciarium, for the purpose. The *Sun* estimated that 5,000 people crammed into the Glaciarium, and the crowd was large enough that, at the request of a “burly working man” who said that those at the back could not hear, Scott was forced to deliver his lecture from atop a table in the middle of the room. The Premier of Victoria even joined in, making it known that his government would make a grant if the other states contributed. Samuel Hordern, fourth-generation owner of Sydney department store Anthony Hordern & Sons, eventually came to the rescue, donating the entire £2,500 required. Hordern explained that the donation was “in memory of his father who owed all he possessed to the Australian public”. Hordern’s rationale is intriguing. It suggests that he interpreted his assisting a British Antarctic expedition as supporting an *Australian* cause, reflecting the idea that Australia stood to uniquely benefit from further Antarctic exploration.

Funding secured, Scott departed for Christchurch on 22 October. Discussing the expedition’s prospects, the *Sydney Morning Herald* declared “if it is humanly possible, Captain Scott will bridge that 100-mile gap which Shackleton left behind him, and annex the Pole for England - and the Commonwealth. For it will be our Pole, too, since part of the cost of the expedition is being borne by Australia.” This comment highlights a fundamental

---

35 ‘Captain Scott’s Lecture’, *EN*, 20 October 1910, 8.
38 ‘Scott Antarctic Expedition’, *DT*, 20 October 1910, 7.
39 NAA: British Antarctic Expedition 1909-1913, A1, 1911/177, Letter from Scott to W.M. Hughes, 1 November 1910; MS 1517/4/2;D, Speyer Collection, SPRI, Letter from Scott to Speyer, 10 December 1910.
41 ‘Off To The Antarctic’, *SMH*, 24 October 1910, 8.
42 ‘To The Pole!’, *SMH*, 19 October 1910, 11.
element of Australian thought about Antarctica. By relying on Australian support or appointing Australian staff, a foreign expedition, be it Wilkes and D’Urville in 1839 or Shackleton and Scott in the 1900s, could be reimagined as at least partly Australian. Even a small stake in an expedition was sufficient for its victories, and as the reaction to Scott’s demise subsequently demonstrated, its failures, to be understood as Australian victories and Australian failures. This helps to explain how the idea of Australia’s special interest in the Antarctic could be sustained and replicated over several decades, even as effort after effort to launch an actual Australian expedition collapsed and Australians were forestalled in the exploration of “our own seas” by Norwegians, Belgians, Swedes, Germans, Scots, Britons, and Frenchmen.43

As with previous expeditions, there was intense interest in anything related to Scott during the long wait for news. The Terra Nova’s departure from New Zealand and its return on 27 March were well covered in the press.44 Reports and letters from expedition members were published.45 Just as David had done, Griffith Taylor provided a popular narrative of voyage to the Sydney Morning Herald.46 Popular interest was also magnified by the controversy that emerged when Norwegian Roald Amundsen unexpectedly entered the race for the South Pole. Amundsen, veteran of the first expedition to overwinter within the Antarctic Circle in Belgica and commander of the first expedition to sail the North-West Passage, had received significant backing from the Norwegian government, King of Norway, and private donors to undertake an expedition to the North Pole. When American explorers Robert Peary and

44 For example ‘For The Antarctic’, SMH, 17 November 1910, 7; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Argus, 17 November 1910, 8; ‘Departure of Captain Scott’s Antarctic Expedition’, Leader, 24 December 1910, 32; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Age, 27 March 1911, 8; ‘Exploring Ship Overdue’, Sun, 27 March 1911, 3; ‘All Well’, Age, 28 March 1911, 7.
46 ‘To The Antarctic’, SMH, 15 April-17 May 1911.
Frederick Cook each claimed to have reached the North Pole in 1909, Amundsen insisted that there was still valuable work to be done in the Arctic and continued his preparations for a five year voyage. He departed Norway in August 1910, but on reaching Madeira in September announced that he intended to make an attempt on the South Pole before commencing his expedition in the Arctic. The secretive nature of Amundsen’s entry into the race for the pole and his decision to establish his base close to Scott’s at the Bay of Whales sparked controversy. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, for example, felt Amundsen’s actions were “bad taste and unsportsmanlike”. The *Evening News*, however, suggested it was “ridiculous to even infer that Amundsen has taken an unfair advantage of his rival”, and hoped that “the rivalry for the great national prize will be one throughout of amicable relations, and, if required, of mutual assistance.” Scott himself resolved to “do exactly as I should have done had Amundsen not been down here”. The commander of the British expedition’s second party, Victor Campbell, however, abandoned his plan to establish a base at King Edward VII Land or the Bay of Whales when he discovered Amundsen’s plans. Campbell instead took his party to Cape Adare, which Mawson had told Scott was to be one the bases for his own expedition, creating further controversy by infringing on the Australian expedition’s sphere of activity. Mawson himself weighed into the public debate, suggesting that both

---

49 For example ‘Antarctic Expedition’, *Argus*, 26 October 1910, 12; ‘Capt. Scott’s Expedition’, *Mercury*, 26 October 1910, 5; ‘Scott’s Expedition’, *SMH*, 26 October 1910, 9; ‘To The South Pole’, *SMH*, 30 November 1910, 9; ‘The Hardest Nut In Norway’, *Age*, 30 March 1911, 7; ‘Race To The Pole’, *DT*, 30 March 1911, 7; ‘Captain Amundsen’s Intentions’, *Age*, 12 April 1911, 9; ‘The Antarctic Race’, *DT*, 27 April 1911, 8.
50 ‘Scott’s Expedition’, *SMH*, 26 October 1910, 9.
51 ‘Scott or Amundsen’, *EN*, 17 April 1911, 6.
52 MS 1453/125; D, Kinsey Collection, SPRI, Letter from Scott to Kinsey, 28 October 1911.

225
Amundsen’s and Scott’s actions were a breach of “polar etiquette” and warning that, in Scott’s case, “some dissatisfaction in the Commonwealth is inevitable.”

For Australians in 1911 and 1912, however, interest in Antarctica went far beyond Scott and his quest for the South Pole. The Mercury insisted in 1898 that “the people of Tasmania will give a hearty welcome to every Antarctic Expedition”. The experience of every expedition that called at an Australian port en route to the Antarctic highlights the legitimacy of this assertion. Even expeditions which were despatched by rival nations, such as those under Wilkes and D’Urville in 1839, thoroughly disinterested in science, such as Bull’s 1895 whaling venture, or which were reviled or ignored in Britain for their lack of official backing, such as Borchgrevink’s in 1898 and Shackleton’s in 1907, enjoyed remarkable levels of support in Australia. The most remarkable example of this phenomenon, however, is the reception of the Japanese Antarctic Expedition in Sydney in 1911.

**The Japanese Antarctic Expedition in Sydney**

The Japanese Antarctic Expedition (JAE) had its origins in the complex and contested politics of post-Meiji Restoration Japan. The expedition’s leader, Nobu Shirase, was a Japanese army lieutenant who had planned to mount an expedition to claim the North Pole for Japan. Like Amundsen, Shirase turned his attention southwards when Cook and Peary claimed the North Pole in 1909. Shirase failed to win government funding for his expedition, but his claims that it would help to prove Japan’s status as a great power, an argument that echoed ideas about proving Australian statehood through Antarctic science, won the support

---

54 ‘To The Pole!’, *DT*, 29 March 1911, 9.
55 *Mercury*, 26 November 1898, 2.
of former Foreign Minister Shigenobu Ōkuma, who agreed to serve as President of an ‘Antarctic Expedition Supporters’ Association’.

Ōkuma was a revered public figure who wielded immense authority due to his role in the Meiji Restoration in 1867, his commitment to moderate reform of Japanese society and politics along Western democratic lines, and his patronage of science and education. Ōkuma exerted his influence to assemble a team of prominent public figures to form Supporters’ Association, while the Association used its influence to generate public interest in the expedition, using the popular Tanken Sekai magazine and Asahi newspaper group to promote the expedition’s aims and solicit donations.

While the Association’s work ensured the expedition raised sufficient funds to go ahead, it also alienated Japan’s political and scientific elite. The expedition’s close links to Ōkuma and the moderate reformist movement irked the government, which was led by Ōkuma’s conservative and militarist political rival Katsura Tarō. It was also backed by the army, ensuring the navy refused to cooperate and actively blocked Shirase’s purchase of a ship. This opposition was due inter-service rivalry magnified by Shirase’s scathing public criticisms of a leading naval officer, Shigetada Gunji, after serving under Gunji in a military expedition to the Kuril Islands in 1893-95. The Association’s populist fundraising pitch and Shirase’s position as leader likewise alienated Japan’s universities and scientific societies. Shirase had no scientific training and no scientific programme, leading institutions such as the Tokyo Geographical Society to lambast the expedition as a missed opportunity and a waste of money. This opposition discouraged reputable scientists from joining the expedition,

57 Shirase, The Japanese South Polar Expedition, 22.
forcing Shirase to appoint Terutarō Takeda, a thirty-three-year-old former secondary school teacher who had not even held a teaching job for eight years, to the misleading position of ‘Chief Scientist’.  

Takeda was, in fact, the only scientist.

Despite sustained criticism the expedition came together quickly. The problem of acquiring a ship was overcome when Ōkuma privately purchased a small Arctic fishing ship, renamed it Kainan-maru (‘Southern Pioneer’), and loaned it to Shirase. Supplies, sledging equipment, and dogs were purchased, Ainu dog-drivers recruited, and the names of every individual donor assiduously recorded and placed in a small copper box to be buried at the South Pole. On the eve of their departure the explorers were farewelled by the Emperor and by a huge crowd of supporters, before Kainan-maru departed Tokyo on 29 November 1910.  

While Shirase enjoyed blanket media coverage in Japan, little was known of the expedition outside his homeland. In Australia, rumours of a Japanese attempt on the pole emerged in June 1910 and continued to circulate throughout the year. Expectations of the Japanese expedition were not high and were typified by the Sydney Morning Herald’s prediction that it was “foredoomed to failure”. There were also fears that the race for the pole that was developing between Scott, Amundsen, Shirase, and, on the other side of the continent, Filchner threatened a repeat of the tawdry Cook-Peary affair. Mawson was particularly critical, criticising Shirase for breaching the “unwritten laws of etiquette regarding scientists making for the same ground” and suggesting that the expedition was actually a sealing

---

63 For example ‘The South Pole’, SMH, 8 June 1910, 9; Japanese Expedition to the South Pole’, ST, 12 June 1910, 12; Argus, 25 June 1910, 18; ‘Japs Will Race Scott’, Sun, 18 July 1910, 1; ‘South Pole’, Age, 8 October 1910, 15; Argus, 15 October 1910, 18; ‘For the Icy South’, Sun, 9 November 1910, 1; ‘The Antarctic’, Age, 1 December 1910, 7; ‘Japanese in Antarctica’, SMH, 8 February 1911, 11; ‘Japs for the South Pole’, Sun, 8 February 1911, 5; ‘Antarctic Research’, Argus, 14 February 1911, 8.
64 ‘Japanese Expedition’, SMH, 1 December 1910, 9
65 For example ‘Japs Will Race Scott’, Sun, 18 July 1910, 1; Argus, 25 June 1910, 18; ‘Japs’ Antarctic Expedition’, Sun, 29 November 1910, 1; Sun, 3 April 1911, 6.
The JAE’s first Antarctic voyage was a failure. *Kainan-maru* came within sight of the Antarctic continent, but ice and storms prevented further progress. On 14 March 1911, the senior expedition members agreed to abandon the attempt to land and sail north to find a safe harbour for the winter, intending to make a second attempt later in the year. Shirase settled on Sydney, and *Kainan-maru* arrived on 1 May after a difficult voyage. The decision to winter in Australia was tinged with concern, as the explorers were aware of the Commonwealth’s reputation as a “country where anti-Japanese sentiments were widespread”. Yet, while Shirase later claimed the *Sun* accused the expedition of being a “military reconnaissance party with designs of some kind on our country”, the expedition’s reception in Sydney was overwhelmingly supportive rather than hostile. Local and federal authorities accommodated Shirase’s desire to spend the winter in Australia before making a second Antarctic voyage, agreeing to treat the privately-owned *Kainan-maru* as a government vessel, granting it an exemption from the terms of the Immigration Restriction Act. Crowds of Sydneysiders flocked to see the ship at anchor in Double Bay and were invited to on board for a tour. A *Sydney Morning Herald* reporter visited *Kainan-maru* on the evening of its arrival and published a 1,500-word account of the harrowing polar voyage and Shirase’s intentions. This article was quoted and syndicated in newspapers throughout Australia.

---


68 Ibid, 83.


70 Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Commonwealth), s 3 (J); NAA Sydney: A1026, WHOLE SERIES; ‘Letter from S. Mills to the Consul-General for Japan, 5 May 1911’, in Shirase, *The Japanese South Polar Expedition*, 83-84.

71 ‘A Remarkable Voyage’, *DT*, 3 May 1911, 10.

72 ‘From the Antarctic’, *SMH*, 2 May 1911, 9.

reports focused on Shirase’s visit to the Japanese consulate in Martin Place and David’s admiration that the expedition had sailed as far south as it did, given it had departed New Zealand later in summer than any previous expedition.\textsuperscript{74} The initial \textit{Sun} report did not label the expedition spies, instead describing it as “a scientific one only”, though it did subsequently observe that “the South Pole is still white… and never a brown foot has been set on the Antarctic continent”.\textsuperscript{75} The only accusation of spying was made by the \textit{Bulletin}, which suggested the expedition’s failure to reach Antarctica was either due to incompetence or because it never actually intended to go there.\textsuperscript{76}

Shirase also received permission to establish a winter camp on shore at a site owned by Vaucluse Council at Parsley Bay.\textsuperscript{77} The camp consisted of a prefabricated wooden hut intended to be the expedition’s base in Antarctica, a smaller toilet hut, two tents for storage, and a third tent for a bathhouse. Bushes, rocks, and tea trees were transplanted to form a perimeter around the camp, with branches fashioned into gates. Flagpoles were erected to fly the rising sun flag of Japan and the southern cross flag of the expedition, while local plants and “interesting and unusual rocks” were repositioned to form a garden within the compound. A stone lantern was placed in the centre of the garden to remind the explorers of home.\textsuperscript{78}

Initial reactions to the camp were mixed. The Mayor of Vaucluse had approved the camp provided it was at Parsley Bay rather than the more densely populated Vaucluse, only the scientific staff lived on shore, and sanitation requirements were met. Despite these conditions, a group of local residents demanded the Council withdraw its approval. This

\textsuperscript{74} ‘Personal’, \textit{SMH}, 3 May 1911, 14.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Bulletin}, 32, no. 1629 (4 May 1911), 11.
\textsuperscript{78} Shirase, \textit{The Japanese South Polar Expedition}, 84-87.
protest was criticised by the *Sydney Morning Herald*, which argued the explorers were “educated men of more than average attainments” who had “no intention of making themselves a nuisance to the neighbourhood”.\textsuperscript{79} The camp was the subject of a special meeting of Vaucluse Council on 12 May, but only two of the Council’s eight aldermen supported the protest.\textsuperscript{80}

A second protest reportedly came from military officials concerned that the Japanese had been allowed to camp on the doorstep of Sydney’s primary defensive fortifications at South Head.\textsuperscript{81} The officers’ alleged decision to implement nightly patrols around the campsite sparked rumours the explorers were spies using the guise of an Antarctic expedition to reconnoitre Sydney’s defences. The spying allegation was never widely accepted, however, and was primarily discussed in the context of ridiculing those who believed it. The *Evening News* and *Sun* ridiculed the idea that the Japanese might be spies, pointing out that spies would not use an Antarctic expedition as cover when such an expedition was guaranteed to “attract the attention not only of Australia but of the whole world”.\textsuperscript{82} The *World’s News* added that such an approach was “quite different from that of the ordinary spy, who generally steals about silently on his own and takes his observations when no one is looking”.\textsuperscript{83} The Japanese consulate declared the idea “too ridiculous to be entertained seriously”, and the federal government denied there had been orders to set patrols around the camp.\textsuperscript{84} While the idea that the explorers were covert spies continued to circulate throughout their time in

\textsuperscript{82} ‘Mysterious Japs’, *Sun*, 15 May 1911; ‘Guards Turn Out’, *EN*, 15 May 1911.
Australia, particularly in regional newspapers, it was never entertained seriously and was regularly rebutted in the press.\(^{85}\)

Despite the protests, Parsley Bay residents quickly warmed to the explorers, and, similar to the intense interest generated by the *Nimrod*, the camp developed into a significant attraction.\(^{86}\) Up to 300 people visited the camp each day on weekends to “have a good look at the explorers, take stock of their camp, and then depart to view the beauties of the district”.\(^{87}\) Groups came from Sydney University, the Royal Society, and Woollahra-Paddington scout troop in addition to families and individuals, visiting in such numbers that Shirase implemented visiting hours and a receiving area.\(^{88}\) Some of these visitors proposed initiating a public fundraising campaign for Australians to support the expedition, but the offer was politely declined by the Japanese Consul-General, who promised that sufficient funds were available in Japan and that the expatriate community would provide any assistance the explorers required in the interim.\(^{89}\) Perhaps the most enthusiastic visitor was twenty-one-year-old actress Dot Miller, who visited six times to collect signatures, messages, and watercolour paintings in her autograph book.\(^{90}\)

While the expedition members were amicable hosts to all their visitors, they forged particularly strong relationships with their neighbours in Parsley Bay. There were only twenty houses at Parsley Bay, and the camp was only a few hundred metres from the suburb’s two streets. Their nearest neighbour was publican Alexander Hilliar, who offered

---

\(^{85}\) For allegations of spying see ‘Give A Dog A Bad Name’, *Tamworth Daily Observer*, 22 July 1911, 10; ‘North Coast News’, *South Coast Times*, 8 September 1911, 6; ‘Danger From Japan’, *Age*, 2 July 1912, 7. For rebuttals, see *SMH*, 1 July 1911, 14; *SMH*, 7 July 1911, 10; ‘The Britain of the East’, *SMH*, 4 October 1911, 17.


\(^{87}\) ‘Guards Turn Out’, *EN*, 15 May 1911, 7.


\(^{89}\) ‘Japanese Pole-Seekers’, *ST*, 18 June 1911, 12.

his services as the explorers’ guide whenever they travelled into the city. Hilliar’s son, Robert, later recorded that he, his two sisters, and the other local children were given a free run of the camp and spoiled with Japanese sweets and biscuits. One of the local children even began learning Japanese.

Other local families also visited the camp regularly. *Sydney Morning Herald* reporter Thomas Duncan, for example, was the expedition’s main press ally, while several local families hosted the explorers at their houses. Police superintendent Abraham Sherwood, for became a staunch supporter of the expedition and hosted members at his house in Botany Bay, despite the expedition openly flouting quarantine regulations by having their sledge dog live in the camp and ignoring the requirement that only the scientific staff live ashore. Even the two Vaucluse aldermen who had voted against allowing the explorers to camp at Parsley Bay, Adam Forsyth and George Read, reversed their positions and became prominent supporters. Forsyth, a surveyor in the state Lands Department and long-time Parsley Bay resident, overcame his initial concerns to both visit the camp regularly with his sons and host the expedition members at his house. Read, a port health officer, underwent an even more dramatic change in opinion. After befriending the explorers, Read told a meeting of Vaucluse Council on 12 June that “rather than becoming a nuisance” the Japanese had proved to be “an acquisition” for the local area. Indeed, he suggested that they were “an example to many of

---

their neighbours” who had failed to improve their land in the way the Japanese had, and whose properties still consisted of tents, humpies, and upturned boats.96

Arguably the most significant relationship was that which developed between Shirase, Takeda, and David, who took a natural interest in the expedition. David took the explorers under his wing, hosting them at the university, visiting the camp, introducing them to his scientific colleagues, arranging for them to discuss Antarctic matters with Mawson, giving advice on ice navigation and polar sledging, and supplying them with charts, books, and scientific instruments. At David’s urging, Shirase also abandoned his quest for the South Pole, recasting the second voyage as a scientific expedition to explore King Edward VII Land, where no previous expedition had managed to land.97 In addition to invaluable private support, David also took on a public role as the expedition’s leading advocate. He gave a detailed description of the JAE at public lectures to raise funds for Mawson’s expedition.98 He publicly decried any who accused the expedition of espionage, and invited the expedition members to be guests of honour at a Town Hall lecture.99

Two events in June 1911 serve to illustrate the positive nature of the JAE’s relationship with the people of Sydney during its stay. First, the expedition hosted a party at the camp to celebrate the coronation of King George V on 22 June. Shirase invited between 250 and 300 local residents, Japanese expatriates, and local officials, while groups of ordinary sightseers also found themselves in attendance. When the guests arrived, they were met with a display

---

98 See for example SMH, 24 June 1911, 2; SMH, 28 June 1911, 2; ‘Mawson Expedition’, SMH, 29 June 1911, 8; ‘Mawson Expedition’, SMH, 1 July 1911, 15.
99 ‘The Mexican Revolution’, SMH, 7 July 1911,10; SMH, 1 July 1911, 14-15; ‘Society Doings in Sydney’, Australasian, 8 July 1911, 52.
of British and Japanese flags, red paper poppies, bamboo, and bunting, while the camp’s entrance was emblazoned with the letters ‘G.R.’ and the word ‘Banzai’. A formal service was held in Japanese and translated by one of the consular staff. Speeches congratulating the King and Queen on their ascension to the throne were made “on behalf of the expedition and the Japanese residents of Sydney”, followed by speeches by Read and other guests.100 Guests were offered an assortment of Japanese foods, while local children were given handfuls of sweets and biscuits and played with miniature British and Japanese flags as they ran around the camp. The explorers spent the afternoon giving tours, before performing a play and giving a demonstration of Japanese martial arts and fencing.101

Secondly, Takeda was invited to address the Vaucluse Debating Society on the subject of ‘Antarctica and Science’. The lecture was extremely well attended, with all of the expedition members present with an array of Japanese expatriates and Vaucluse locals. With an expatriate interpreting, Takeda gave a thorough description of the expedition’s aims and plans. David’s influence was apparent, as Takeda insisted that the expedition was motivated by a desire to “gain knowledge that might be of use to the whole world” and that their desire to reach the pole was “purely for scientific and geological purposes”.102 The lecture was followed by a curious moment of intercultural exchange. A ‘social evening’ was scheduled, and the expedition members, “together with a number of Japanese residents of Sydney, gave exhibitions of dancing as adopted by the Japanese”. The locals responded in kind with a Highland Schottische.103

100 ‘Japan and the Empire’, SMH, 23 June 1911, 11.
101 ‘Japan and the Empire’, SMH, 23 June 1911, 11; ‘Frisky Japs’, Sun, 24 June 1911, 6; Uncatalogued photographs, WLHC; Hilliar, interviewed by Britten, 1993, WLHC.
102 ‘With the Japanese at Parsley Bay’, SMH, 26 June 1911, 8.
The JAE began preparing for its departure in October and November 1911. *Kainan-maru* completed its overhaul and was stocked with fresh supplies, dogs, and equipment as they arrived from Japan. The ship’s captain returned from Tokyo on 18 October, and was joined a month later by two new recruits, Masakichi Ikeda, who held a Bachelor of Agricultural Science and therefore doubled the expedition’s scientific staff to two by joining as biologist, and twenty-two-year-old Yasunao Taizumi, who arrived as cinematographer. Ōkuma had convinced film company Pathe M. Shōkai to make a film of the expedition, providing the funds needed for the second voyage. With the expedition’s departure from Sydney set for 19 November, the explorers’ final task was to deconstruct their hut and clear away all signs of the camp.

These preparations were the subject of intense public interest in Sydney, with the local press publishing a constant stream of updates and interviews. This interest culminated in a series of glowing tributes to the explorers. The *Sydney Morning Herald* described the explorers as having “proved themselves estimable neighbours” and praised the friendship that had developed between them and the people of Vaucluse. Adam Forsyth’s eldest son penned a tribute in the *Evening News*, describing the explorers as “the personification of hospitality and friendship”. This sustained local interest culminated in a send-off for the explorers that echoed those given to previous Antarctic expeditions in Australia, with crowds of people lining the docks at Circular Quay from four hours before *Kainan-maru*’s scheduled departure. Many well-wishers came on board the ship to farewell the explorers personally, including Edgeworth David and a party from Sydney University, the entire staff of the Japanese

---

106 See for example ‘I Think So’, *SMH*, 5 October 1911, 8; ‘A Dash for the Icy South’, *EN*, 28 October 1911, 4; ‘To The Pole’, *SMH*, 19 October 1911, 8; Japs for the South Pole’, *Sun*, 2 November 1911, 2; ‘To the Pole’, *SMH*, 13 November 1911, 7; ‘Bound for Antarctica’, *SMH*, 16 November 1911, 5; ‘Bound South’ *EN*, 15 November 1911, 8; ‘Japanese Explorers’, *SMH*, 16 November 1911, 9.
107 Japanese Strike Camp’, *SMH*, 10 November 1911, 8.
consulate, at least Japanese residents of Sydney, Dot Miller, and others who had been regular visitors to the camp. When the ship departed it was escorted by a flotilla of yachts and rowing boats, while David remained on board as far as the heads, where Shirase presented him with his own sword in thanks for David’s support. This sword, forged in 1644 by one of Japan’s most revered swordsmiths and given to Shirase by a sponsor of the expedition to take to the pole, was a remarkable gift, and was one of the only occasions that such a culturally significant sword was willingly given to an outsider.109

The JAE provides two significant insights into Australian ideas about Antarctica. Firstly, while the expedition was a source of intense interest in Sydney, this interest followed the patterns established by previous expeditions. Camp and ship visits, autograph hunting, photography, press reports, and large-scale events and farewells were a feature of Antarctic expeditions’ visits to Australian ports from Bellinghausen in 1820 and Ross, Wilkes, and D’Urville in 1839-41 to Bull and Borchgrevink in the 1890s and the British expeditions of the early-twentieth century. It is significant, then, that the JAE was not an outlier; despite Mawson’s fears that it might be a precursor to Japanese exploitation of Antarctic resources and the existence of significant anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia, its reception was consistent with those of other Antarctic expeditions.110 This suggests that both Australian officials and Australians more generally were willing to privilege support for an expedition that would contribute to the further exploration of Antarctica over other concerns, such as a rigid interpretation of the White Australia Policy. That the expedition was granted an exemption from the Immigration Restriction Act under Section 3 (J), whereby Kainan-maru

110 There were a number of other local factors that made possible the JAE’s positive reception in Sydney. For a detailed analysis of these factors see Rohan Howitt, ‘The Japanese Antarctic Expedition and the Idea of White Australia’, Australian Historical Studies, forthcoming.
was registered as a diplomatic vessel despite being privately owned and sailing without any form of government approval, highlights this.

Secondly, the expedition’s mere existence suggests that the idea that Antarctic exploration could gain a state recognition by the international community was not unique to Australia. The expedition was seen by its promoters as a way to secure Japan’s status as a great power. Ōkuma, for example, believed that “such an heroic enterprise was unprecedented in the annals of Japan, and it would infinitely elevate the spirit of the Japanese people and influence them in a favourable direction”. In concluding his account of the expedition, Shirase similarly declared that it had “created an opportunity for Japan to take its place as a nation on the stage of world affairs.” Unlike in Australia, however, where this idea of asserting statehood by imitating the practices of European powers such as supporting science and performing feats of exploration circulated from at least the 1880s to the 1910s, the expectation that a successful Antarctic expedition would secure Japan’s position amongst the great states of the world was short-lived. When Takeda wrote to the RGS with a description of the JAE’s modest discoveries in King Edward VII Land and a request for names such as Yamato Yukihara to be added to maps of Antarctica, RGS secretary J. Scott Kel letie was unimpressed, believing the Japanese discoveries had already been mapped by Scott. Furthermore, Shirase’s own government, opposed to the expedition from its conception, refused to affirm his territorial claims. The expedition’s achievements, such as making the first successful landing in King Edward VII Land, went largely unrecognised both internationally and within Japan, and it therefore failed to provide the prestige and international recognition Shirase predicted.

112 Shirase, The Japanese South Polar Expedition, 238.
113 MS RFS/4 c, Royal Geographical Society Archives, Letter from Kel etie to Scott, 19 September 1912.
While the Japanese expedition was, due to the prevalence of anti-Japanese sentiment and commitment to a ‘white Australia’ ideal, arguably the greatest threat to the Mercury’s confident prediction that Australians would welcome any Antarctic expedition, its failure to establish a base in the summer of 1910-11 ensured it was not seen as a threat to Scott’s hopes of claiming the South Pole. The Norwegian expedition led by Roald Amundsen, by contrast, not only entered the race for the pole under a cloud of controversy, but ultimately reached it more than a month before Scott’s party. The expedition’s arrival in Hobart was therefore another test for the Mercury’s prediction.

Amundsen in Hobart

Amundsen’s ship Fram anchored off Sandy Bay in the morning of 7 March 1912. A crowd formed around Hobart’s wharves hoping for news of the pole, and a group of journalists hired a steam launch to take them out to the Fram, only to hastily turn around when they spotted Amundsen in the harbourmaster’s launch heading for shore. Amundsen went about his business, finding a room at Hadley’s Orient Hotel, visiting Norway’s Honorary Consul James Macfarlane, and calling at the post office to send telegrams to Norway, without answering any questions. He was amiable and apologetic, and promised to give a full account of the expedition soon, but both Amundsen and his staff steadfastly refused to reveal anything. This reticence was described as “aggravating” by Perth’s Daily News, which pointed out that “the world is waiting to fall at his feet, and acclaim him a hero.” Silence also generated rumours, such as an erroneous claim that Amundsen had cabled the Norwegian Consul in Sydney to say “Scott discovered Pole.”

115 ‘Scott and the Pole’, DT, 8 March 1912, 9; ‘Back From The Antarctic’, Sun, 7 March 1912, 7; ‘Race to the South Pole’, Age, 8 March 1912, 7; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Mercury, 8 March 1912, 5.
116 ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Mercury, 8 March 1912, 5; ‘From the Antarctic’, SMH, 8 March 1912, 8.
117 ‘Seeking the Antarctic Pole’, DN, 9 March 1912, 7.
118 See for example ‘Race to the South Pole’, Age, 8 March 1912, 7; ‘The Wellington Message’, DT, 9 March 1912, 13; ‘South Pole’, Telegraph, 8 March 1912, 6; ‘Scott Has Discovered The Pole’, WA, 8 March 1912, 7.
It was not until 11 March that Amundsen’s account of his discovery of the South Pole, revealed exclusively by London’s *Daily Chronicle*, was finally published in Australia.\(^{119}\)

There was little resentment in the Australian reaction to the news. For example, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, which had proudly proclaimed that if Scott claimed the Pole it would “be our Pole, too”, showed little bitterness towards the Norwegian interloper for snatching the Pole from Britain and Australia.\(^{120}\) Instead, it observed that Amundsen had scrupulously avoided infringing on Scott’s intended route and forged his own path, meaning that he did not breach the explorer’s “code of honour”.\(^{121}\) Even the more critical responses were mild. The *Brisbane Courier*, for example, suggested somewhat petulantly that while Amundsen had discovered the geographical pole, David had discovered the magnetic pole, “which may prove of even greater importance in future scientific records.”\(^{122}\)

In common with his fellow Antarctic explorers, Amundsen was also feted in Tasmania. He was formally welcomed by Hobart Mayor Alfred Crisp, Tasmanian Premier Elliott Lewis, and the Royal Society of Tasmania, which, in praising his achievement, noted that Amundsen had now completed both the work of Franklin by sailing the north-west passage and the work of Ross by reaching the South Pole.\(^{123}\) There was, however, some discontent in Hobart over the fact that these were private receptions, with no opportunity for the “people at large” to congratulate Amundsen.\(^{124}\) The *Mercury*, Tasmanian Tourist Association, and Frederick V. Sherer all called for a public event, and pointed to the fact that the expedition was not only an “epoch-making event” but had also rendered a great service to Tasmania by making Hobart

---


\(^{120}\) ‘To The Pole!’, *SMH*, 19 October 1910, 11.

\(^{121}\) ‘antarctic Research’, *SMH*, 8 March 1912, 8.

\(^{122}\) ‘The Antarctic Explorers’, *BC*, 3 April 1912, 4.


his first port of call, thus drawing the world’s attention to it. Sherer even recommended a more permanent memorial, suggesting that Murray-street, where the explorer had stayed, be renamed Amundsen Street, and that Fram’s anchorage at Sandy Bay become Fram Cove. Amundsen also struck up a good relationship with members of Mawson’s Australasian Antarctic Expedition (AAE) then in Hobart. The AAE members hosted the Norwegians for lunch and gave them a tour of their own ship Aurora, while Amundsen shared advice about Ross Sea ice conditions and donated twenty-one sledge dogs. The Fram was a popular local attraction, and a cameraman travelled from Sydney to film the ship. Twelve members of the expedition visited the town of Bismarck at the invitation of Tasmania’s Scandinavian community. Amundsen was elected an honorary member of the Derwent Sailing Squadron and attended one of its races. Amundsen was even persuaded by booksellers Propsting & Morris to sign a number of copies of a map of Antarctica “suitable for framing”, which were then sold for 2s. 6d. in aid of the Hobart Consumptive Sanatorium. The maps were available from Propsting & Morris’ Liverpool-street store, advertised by a large window display consisting of equipment and photographs donated by Amundsen and the AAE.

Carlyle Smythe, a lecture agent best known for organising Mark Twain’s Australasian tour, had struck an agreement with Amundsen to conduct a short Australasian lecture tour if he was successful in reaching the pole. The enterprising Smythe had contacted Amundsen’s brother, Leon, in Christiania as soon as he heard Amundsen intended making an attempt on

126 ‘Honour to Amundsen’, Mercury, 30 March 1912, 8.
130 MS 1645;D, Amundsen Collection, SPRI, Letter from Roald Amundsen to Herbert R. Peacock, 13 March 1912.
131 ‘Captain Amundsen and Charity’, Mercury, 19 March 1912, 6; Mercury, 20 March 1912, 4.
the South Pole. Leon Amundsen had negotiated the details for the tour, then sent the contract to Buenos Aires to be taken south with *Fram* when it returned to collect the expedition. Amundsen signed it when he returned from the polar journey, making it the “first contract ever made in the continent of Antarctica”, and agreed to make Hobart his first port of call.\textsuperscript{132} Thus when *Fram* departed for Buenos Aires on 20 March, the “most widely-talked-of man in the world” made his way to the mainland to commence a lecture tour.\textsuperscript{133}

The first audience in the world to hear Amundsen’s account of the polar journey was Adelaide, and the only complaint was that admission fees were too high and would “debar many intending visitors from attending”.\textsuperscript{134} Amundsen also proved a popular figure in Melbourne, giving three well-attended and well-received lectures illustrated with photographs, short films, and colourised images that reportedly held the audience “spellbound”.\textsuperscript{135} He was welcomed by the Geographical Society and by Fisher and a party of state and federal ministers, before heading to Geelong and then Sydney to continue his tour.\textsuperscript{136}

The Governor-General agreed to preside over Amundsen’s first Sydney lecture, and in introducing the explorer alluded to Australia’s Antarctic interests, saying that Amundsen’s story was “of special concern to the people of Australia. Our people are by no means strangers to Antarctic exploration, for only recently the Mawson expedition left these shores. This country contributed generously to the expeditions led by Sir Ernest Shackleton and


\textsuperscript{134} ‘Views and Comments’, *Advertiser*, 20 March 1912, 10; ‘At The Pole’, *Advertiser*, 26 March 1912, 10; ‘The South Pole’, *Age*, 26 March 1912, 7; ‘How They Reached The Pole’, *DT*, 26 March 1912, 14.


\textsuperscript{136} ‘The South Pole’, *Argus*, 30 March 1912, 20; ‘Captain Amundsen’, *Herald*, 1 April 1912, 8; ‘Lecture By Amundsen’, *SMH*, 27 March 1912, 17; ‘Captain Amundsen’s Lectures’, *SMH*, 2 April 1912, 12.
Captain Scott, therefore those present have some claims to a knowledge of the dangers and trials which beset the explorer in the icy regions, even though they might come to them second-hand.”

David presided over the second of Amundsen’s four lectures, and, as he had done for Shirase and Takeda the previous year, commended the Norwegians’ scientific achievements and publicly insisted that there was “nothing unsportsmanlike” in Amundsen’s conduct. These public pronouncements reflected his private opinions, as he told Scott’s agent Kinsey that Amundsen was “a splendid man”. Amundsen concluded the Australian leg of his tour with another two lectures in Sydney and two in Brisbane, though there was an attempt to persuade him to come to Perth. J.G. Hay wrote to the *West Australian* to rally support for his campaign to bring Amundsen to the city, arguing firstly that Western Australians should not be denied the pleasure of hearing his account and secondly that if Amundsen visited and was impressed by the state he would become an ambassador for migration to it. Hays’ campaign was unsuccessful, showing that there was some truth to the refrain that Hobart was closer to Antarctica than it was to Perth, and Amundsen instead continued his tour with four lectures in New Zealand.

---

137 ‘Told By The Hero’, *DT*, 3 April 1912, 19. See also ‘Amundsen’s Lecture’, *SMH*, 3 April 1912, 22; ‘To The South Pole’, *EN*, 3 April 1912, 10.
138 ‘Anybody’s Pole’, *DT*, 4 April 1912, 10; ‘Amundsen at Y.M.C.A. Hall’, *Sun*, 4 April 1912, 6; ‘Amundsen’s Success’, *SMH*, 4 April 1912, 10.
139 MS 1453/125:D, Kinsey Collection, SPRI, Letter from Edgeworth David to Kinsey, 7 April 1912.
141 ‘Captain Amundsen’s Lectures’, *WA*, 27 March 1912, 8.
Chapter 7: Rights and Responsibilities in the Australian Antarctic, 1910-17

While Scott, Shirase, and Amundsen all captured significant interest in Australia, the most significant expedition of this period, as far as Australians were concerned, was Mawson’s Australasian Antarctic Expedition (AAE). Having rejected Scott’s offer to join the Terra Nova, Mawson resolved to lead his own expedition to explore the 2,500 miles of coast between Cape Adare and Gaussberg, and turned to Shackleton for assistance. Shackleton immediately offered to lead the expedition himself, with Mawson as chief scientist, and secured promises for £10,000 in private donations.\(^1\) Despite his initial burst of enthusiasm, however, Shackleton’s interest in the expedition faded as he turned his attention to a series of risky investment schemes. When Mawson left England to return to Australia in May 1910, he did so with an agreement that if Shackleton decided not to command the expedition personally he would give Mawson his full support to lead it instead.\(^2\) Thus when Mawson returned to Sydney he outlined his vision for an Australian expedition to Adélie Land. This region, he explained, “is the nearest part to Australia, and it should be Australia’s special duty and her obligation to contribute to the world at large whatever store of secrets this land holds. Whatever material of economic value - gold and mineral wealth, whale oil, seal oil, or anything else it may contain - will of course be to the advantage of Australia. We should have a station close to the magnetic Pole, and make more definite the magnetic work which Australia already has the credit of achieving.”\(^3\)

Commenting on Mawson’s proposal, the Argus declared that “from an economic, scientific, and ethical point of view, it is surely the duty of Australia to undertake further exploration in this great sister continent that lies so near to our shores.”\(^4\) The Daily Telegraph was similarly

\(^1\) MS 1175;D, Mawson Collection, Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI), Abbreviated log 7 December 1909 to 28 September 1912; ‘To The Antarctic’, Daily Telegraph (DT), 21 March 1910, 7.
\(^2\) MS 1175;D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log.
\(^3\) ‘To The Antarctic’, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 14 June 1910, 7; ‘To The Antarctic’, Argus, 14 June 1910, 7.
positive, and used the intriguing subheading “Chance To Acquire A New Territory”.
The *Sydney Mail* agreed that Mawson’s “plan for a purely Australian expedition to the Antarctic has much to commend it, and makes a special appeal to the imagination of Australians”, but hoped that Australians would also support expeditions to explore the interior of New Guinea. F.E. Du Faur, who had been advocating an Australian Antarctic expedition since the 1880s, also welcomed the announcement, saying that “the time has arrived when the Commonwealth should recognise its duty, and take an active part in Antarctic research.”

While stopping short of making a public appeal for funds to avoid jeopardising Scott’s fundraising, Mawson continued to promote the prospect of an Australian expedition through lectures and interviews in Adelaide. An address to the Commonwealth Club led to the club’s chairman, John Gordon, remarking that “though the Commonwealth Constitution did not contain a declaration that one of Australia’s obligations was to finance a scientific expedition to the Antarctic regions, Dr. Mawson had clearly shown that this was their moral duty.” A public lecture at Adelaide University saw Mawson argue that the Commonwealth’s proximity to Antarctica meant scientific research and the economic exploitation of the land was “obligatory upon them”. He even took to lecturing in his full *Nimrod* sledging outfit to generate interest.

When, in December 1910, Scott departed for Antarctica and Shackleton confirmed that he would not be taking command of the expedition, Mawson began the arduous task of raising

---

8 MS 1175;D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log; ‘The Call of the Icy Regions’, *Advertiser*, 18 June 1910, 15.
£40,000. He travelled to Sydney in January 1911 to formally announce the expedition at the meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and publicised the proposal in a series of interviews en route. In these interviews, Mawson emphasised the political dimensions of his proposal. He explained that he hoped “to take possession of that area between Cape Adare and Gauss Berg, and hoist the Australian flag upon it”, took to calling that area ‘Australian Antarctica’, and warned that if the expedition did not depart in 1911 “the unique object may have to be abandoned to a foreign nation, several of which are already pressing upon the Australasian Antarctic.”

Arguments about territory, sovereignty, economic development, and the performance of statehood were also central to Mawson’s argument in his paper to the AAAS’ Geographical Section, which set a record for the largest attendance for a sectional paper, as every other section postponed its sessions to allow its members to attend. He argued that the region between Cape Adare and Gaussberg should “be cherished by Australians, not only because of a special claim upon Australia on account of its proximity, but for the reason that of the whole coast line of Antarctica no other part held forth such advantages for the collection of scientific data and for industrial pursuits.” He also warned that if Australia did not secure it then “foreign nations will step in and secure this most valuable portion of the Antarctic continent for themselves, and for ever from the control of Australia.” Drawing on the idea that scientific exploration in Antarctica was a way to prove Australia’s modernity and statehood, Mawson proposed to depart in November 1911, spend seventeen months in

12 MS 1175; D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log.
15 ‘Mawson Expedition’, *SMH*, 12 January 1911, 8; ‘Antarctica’, *Sun*, 11 January 1911, 8.
Antarctica, and return in time to present the results of the expedition to the meeting of the peripatetic British Association for the Advancement of Science that, after years of negotiations, was finally due to meet in Australia in 1914. “The importance to Australia of being able to present the results of such an expedition at that meeting”, he argued, “cannot be over-estimated”.17 In a conclusion to his paper that the press dubbed “a stirring appeal to Australians”, Mawson asked “can our scientific societies remain content to allow distant countries to poach on their inherited preserves? Can Australians remain heedless of this land of great potentialities lying at our doors? Can our national conscience remain unshuffled in the face of achievements to be accomplished, achievements such as have ever formed girders in the constitution of nations.”18

The response to Mawson’s proposal was almost universally positive. G.C. Henderson, president of the Geographical Section, said “we are a nation. Here is an opportunity to discharge a great national responsibility … and I think we ought to undertake it.”19 AAAS pledged its support to the expedition, providing an unprecedented grant of £1,000 – a third of its total capital – and appointing a committee to orchestrate fundraising and appoint personnel.20 A Daily Telegraph leader declared that “there may be pecuniary possibilities, but whether they are present or absent the obligation to explore and classify and know is Australia’s.” It further argued that “Antarctica is to us what the Arctic is to the Americans, since we lie next to the great continent and should expect to be the first race to know it … Thus the Mawson venture makes a powerful appeal to Australian sentiment and practical sense, promising new knowledge, a new country, and a new triumph in that indomitable conquest of the farther seas and lands which throughout history has distinguished the British

18 ‘Mawson Expedition’, SMH, 12 January 1911, 8.
19 ‘Antarctica’, Sun, 11 January 1911, 8; ‘Mawson Expedition’, SMH, 12 January 1911, 8.
people.”21 A Mercury leader focused on the fact that “Australia has an opportunity of doing something great in aid of scientific research, and of claiming a position among the nations by virtue of that … An Antarctic expedition sent for scientific purposes, led by Australians, and equipped at the public expense, would alter the impression which exists of the aims and ideals of Australians.”22 The Mercury returned to this theme four months later, declaring that “the name of Australia will be entered on the roll of the nations which have done scientific exploration work.”23

With David, Henderson, and AAAS President Orme Masson forming an influential committee, Mawson set about raising funds. Samuel Hordern, tobacco magnate and Sun owner H.R. Denison, tobacco manufacturer Hugh Dixson, Melbourne philanthropist Roderick Murchison, and South Australian businessman Robert Barr Smith each matched AAAS’ £1,000 donation.24 While not promising to pay half the cost, as the AAAS Committee had hoped, the federal government was also supportive.25 Masson and Mawson met with Defence Minister George Pearce to request financial and moral support from the government, assuring him that important discoveries would be made in a land “practically as near to Melbourne as Perth”, and that commercial development would “make the occupation of this land profitable to Australia”.26 Mawson expanded on this idea of occupation in an interview as he was leaving Melbourne, describing the region as the “Australian Quadrant” and saying that, with whaling and sealing industries expanding into the Antarctic, “it is fairly certain that settlement in a limited way will be made upon this coast during the next few years.”27

21 ‘Australia’s Antarctica’, DT, 12 January 1911, 6.
23 ‘Dr. Mawson’s Expedition’, Mercury, 13 May 1911, 4.
25 MS 1175;D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log.
Mining, tourism, and a sanatorium were also raised as reasons for the future occupation of Australian Antarctica, while in Sydney David emphasised the prospects of coal, gold, and tin mining.²⁸

Leaving further fundraising in the Committee’s hands, Mawson decamped to London to collect Shackleton’s £10,000, approach the wealthy Australians descending on the city for George V’s coronation, and order specialist equipment that could not be acquired in Australia.²⁹ The £10,000 promised to Shackleton the previous year was, without explanation, no longer available to Mawson, but he did succeed in raising over £9,000 in England. The Royal Geographical Society donated £500, while Australian High Commissioner George Reid and Governor-General-designate Thomas Denman persuaded the British government to grant £2,000.³⁰ Aided by these official endorsements, Mawson, Shackleton, Reid, and the expedition’s newly-appointed second-in-command J.K. Davis, formerly Nimrod’s chief officer, secured further private donations from Australians and New Zealanders in London, including mining magnates William Horn and G.P. Doolette, opera singer Nellie Melba, writer Campbell Mackellar, businessman Lionel Robinson, and George Buckley, the Ashburton pastoralist who had impulsively joined the Nimrod for a trip to the Antarctic Circle with nothing but a brief case and a summer suit. Samuel Hordern made a second donation of £1,500, while Canadian High Commissioner to London Lord Strathcona, and Anglo-German bodybuilder Eugen Sandow subscribed £1,000 each.³¹ These funds were sufficient for Mawson to purchase a ship. Unable to afford his first choice, J.B. Charcot’s

²⁹ MS 1175;D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log.
two-and-a-half-year-old purpose-built *Porquois Pas?*, which he had hoped the federal government would help him purchase with a view to it becoming the Commonwealth’s official polar research vessel, or his second choice, Bruce’s *Scotia*, Mawson settled for the rundown thirty-five-year-old Newfoundland steam whaler *Aurora*.32

Mawson’s fundraising activities generated opposition from a group he dubbed “Scottites”, mustered by the irascible Clements Markham.33 When Kathleen Scott had returned to London she had launched an appeal for another £6,000 to “relieve the expedition from financial anxiety”.34 By May 1911 Markham and Scott’s honorary treasurer, Edgar Speyer, were appealing for between £8,000 and £10,000, and by November this had risen to £15,000.35 In a published appeal, Markham and Speyer stated that “it is unfortunate that the claims of more than one Antarctic Expedition should come before the Public for support at the same time, and that it should have the double effect on the fortunes of the oldest of closing to it all further contributions from the Australasian Dominions … and at the same time should give the impression that demands for money for Antarctic purposes have become both frequent and troublesome.”36

After the initial surge of support, fundraising proved more difficult for the AAAS Committee in Australia. The Committee published a public appeal for funds in April, and appointed subcommittees in each state to coordinate local fundraising efforts.37 David augmented this

---

32 MS 1175:D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log; MS996/2, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Letter from Mawson to William Bragg, undated; MS101/61/2-5, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Letter from Mawson to Bruce, 15 March 1911, Letter from Mawson to Bruce, 28 March 1911, Letter from Mawson to Bruce, March 1911, Letter from Mawson to Bruce, 28 April 1911; ‘Antarctic’, *Herald*, 23 May 1911, 1.
33 MS 1175:D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Abbreviated log.
34 ‘Antarctic Expedition’, *SMH*, 27 March 1911, 9.
36 MS 1453/13, BAE 1910-13 Collection, SPRI, Financial Appeal Nov. 1911.
37 See for example ‘Australasian Antarctic Expedition’, *SMH*, 22 April 1911, 9; ‘The Australian Antarctic Expedition’, *Age*, 22 April 1911, 19; ‘Australasian Antarctic Expedition’, *Argus*, 22 April 1911, 8; ‘Antarctic Research’, *Register*, 22 April 1911, 14; ‘Australasian Antarctic Expedition’, *Mercury*, 27 April 1911, 7;
appeal with letters to the Daily Telegraph and Sydney Morning Herald in which he again emphasised the mineral wealth of the “Australian Quadrant” and declared that “Australia as a nation is surely now sufficiently grown up to share with the Mother-country the work of further geographical exploration of our great sister continent of Antarctica.”

Henderson focused on this latter theme in an interview with the Advertiser, noting that “the expedition presents an opportunity for an expression of the rising national feeling which is so marked a characteristic in the Commonwealth to-day. Hitherto Australia has been content to help; now she wishes to have control over an expedition which it is hoped will render valuable service, scientifically and practically, to the whole world.”

David and AAAS secretary J.H. Maiden took charge of a popular fundraising campaign in Sydney. David devoted his presidential address to the Royal Society of New South Wales to the subject, declaring “it is high time Australians took up the work of exploring the great Antarctic continent.” Lord Mayor Allen Taylor organised a public meeting at the Town Hall to launch a subscription campaign, at which David drew attention to the “patriotic and ethical motives that should encourage us to carry out this work. Surely it is due to us to honour our flag by carrying it into this unexplored region of the world.” Yet again, the economic motives were stressed, including the fact that the Australian Antarctic was larger than Alaska and the Yukon – which had produced over $40,000,000 of gold since 1898 – combined. Lieutenant-Governor William Cullen agreed that “the expedition should be an appeal to Australians’ patriotism” and observed that “Professor David has offered you a golden El Dorado down south. Let us see if Australia cannot have some share in it.”

38 ‘To The Editor’, DT, 22 April 1911, 15; ‘To The Editor of the Herald’, SMH, 22 April 1911, 9.
39 ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Advertiser, 22 April 1911, 23.
40 ‘Dr. Mawson and the South’, DT, 5 June 1911, 7.
41 ‘For Antarctica’, DT, 4 May 1911, 7; ‘The Antarctic’, Advertiser, 4 May 1911, 7.
42 ‘Mawson Expedition’, SMH, 14 June 1911, 14.
subscription list was started, heading by donations from Burns, Philp & Co. and Senator James Walker. The *Sydney Morning Herald* opened a list of its own, urging Australians to “respond for patriotic reasons, if for no other”, eventually raising £133 16s. in small donations. A letter to the editor of the *Daily Telegraph* suggested appealing to the school children of Australia for assistance, as he believed that “the children of every school in the State … would each willing give a penny to help this first purely Australian expedition”.

While the AAAS Committee did not take up this suggestion, at least one school did; E.M. Proudfoot of Darkes Forest duly forwarded 6s. 7d. collected by the students of “one of the smallest public schools in the state” to help Mawson. David raised another £100 by giving a public lecture on the history of Antarctic exploration at the Town Hall, concluding it with a stirring declaration that “the great nations of the world had sent expeditions to the South Pole. Surely it is not likely that Australia will not take part in the battle which is raging so close to our gates.”

Melbourne-based Masson took charge of lobbying the Melbourne-based federal government. He held an unpromising meeting with External Affairs Minister Lee Batchelor in March 1911 to request a £20,000 grant. The size of the request shocked the minister, who had anticipated paying no more than half that, and Batchelor insisted that, while the government would support the expedition, most of the funds would need to be subscribed by wealthy Australians who had “made their money here, and should be willing to add something to the prestige of the Commonwealth”. Five weeks later, Masson, Melbourne Lord Mayor Thomas Davey,

---

43 ‘Mawson Expedition’, *SMH*, 14 June 1911, 14.
45 ‘Children and the Mawson Expedition’, *DT*, 7 October 1911, 6.
46 ‘Children and the Mawson Expedition’, *DT*, 12 October 1911, 5.
and Commonwealth Meteorologist H.A. Hunt met with W.M. Hughes, again Acting Prime Minister, to request a grant of £10,000. Once again they emphasised that the expedition would “do work of the highest value to Australia”, particularly meteorology and mineralogy, and convinced Hughes to take the matter to cabinet.49

Mawson returned to Australia in July 1911, and his presence provided an immediate boost to the fundraising campaign. He continued to emphasise Australia’s territorial and economic rights in the region he proposed to investigate, warning that it would “be a matter for continual regret to Australia if foreign nations opened up the coastline so near our own territory.”50 In a letter to the External Affairs department he declared that his plans included raising the British and Australian flags along 2,000 miles of coastline, and hoped that, since France had “foregone any colonial rights over Adélie Land” by failing to occupy it since its discovery, the Commonwealth Government would “take steps to ratify possession of this new land immediately we raise the flag”.51 He also suggested that many of his supporters were willing to contribute capital to the economic exploitation of the Australian Quadrant “provided there is some guarantee that their interests will be guarded by the Commonwealth.”52 Perth’s Daily News employed a slightly strained metaphor to endorse this argument, declaring that the Australian Antarctic was “quite compatible with permanent occupation by man” and lay only 2,000 miles away, “right without our grasp, and already there is a good, big, sinewy Australian hand reaching out for the prize. Dr. Douglas Mawson is the principal knuckle in that digit of investigation”.53 The Argus agreed that one of the key features of the expedition was “to pave the way for an economic future for a land which

49 ‘Mawson Expedition’, SMH, 3 May 1911, 15; ‘For The Antarctic”, DT, 3 May 1911, 10.
53 The Mystic South’, Daily News (DN), 18 July 1911, 4.
should some day become part of the Commonwealth.”54 The Sydney Mail was more circumspect, suggesting that it was doubtful whether Antarctica was “destined to attract colonists” but agreeing that the expedition deserved “the very heartiest encouragement” and that Antarctic tourist trips would soon become reality.55 Mawson also added fish trawling and ice harvesting to the list of possible Antarctic industries, arguing that “natural ice was still a great deal cheaper than artificial ice”, but drew the line at the “wholesale slaughter of penguins … by exceptionally brutal methods, for a trifling profit of 3d. a head”, as had happened at Macquarie Island since it was leased by penguin oil entrepreneur Joseph Hatch.56 Even after the expedition departed its Australian manager, Conrad Eitel, continued to stress Australia’s Antarctic future. For example, Eitel told the West Australian that Antarctica’s proximity to Perth meant it might eventually compete with New South Wales to supply Western Australia with coal, and “the advent of such an industry would mean that Antarctic would very soon be brought under the effective administration of the Australian Commonwealth.”57

On his return to Adelaide in August 1911, Mawson led a deputation to ask South Australian Premier John Verran to provide a £5,000 grant-in-aid. Verran agreed that his state had “a duty to support the venture” and guided the grant through Parliament within a week.58 New South Wales subsequently surpassed expectations with a grant of £7,000.59 Western Australia refused to contribute, declaring it a Commonwealth responsibility, while Queensland also declined, despite intense lobbying from the Geographical Society and the Brisbane Chamber

54 ‘Mawson Expedition’, Argus, 28 August 1911, 7.
56 ‘Australasian Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 3 November 1911, 6.
57 ‘Coal From Antarctica’, WA, 15 October 1912, 7.
59 ‘Dr. Mawson’s Expedition’, EN, 12 September 1911, 4; ‘Mawson Fund’, SMH, 13 September 1911, 17; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, DT, 15 September 1911, 8.
of Commerce. Fisher announced in September that the federal government would contribute £5,000, earning criticism from Liberal opposition leader Joseph Cook, who was dismayed that New South Wales had promised more than the Commonwealth. This spurred Victoria to announce a contribution of £6,000.

In addition to promising Australians possession of a productive new territory, Mawson also drew on one of Shackleton’s strategies to generate publicity, announcing that the AAE would be the first to use an aeroplane. Seeking to capitalise on public interest in the aeroplane, Mawson organised for demonstration flights to be held in Adelaide as a fundraiser. These demonstrations proved disastrous, however. The aeroplane crashed, bits of wreckage were seized by the audience for souvenirs, the pilot was sent home to England, and the fuselage was hastily refashioned into a crude motorised sledge so that the battered craft could be of some use in the Antarctic.

With sufficient funds in place to guarantee departure, Hobart was chosen as the expedition’s base. While the Tasmanian government had been unable to afford a grant, its proximity to the Southern Ocean and offer of free docking, the exclusive use of the Queen’s Pier, and a warehouse for storage swayed the decision in Hobart’s favour. The Aurora arrived on 4 November, and Davis and Frank Wild, an NAE and Nimrod veteran and commander of the

60 ‘Dr. Mawson’s Antarctic Expedition’, *Mercury*, 16 September 1911, 5; ‘Mawson Expedition’, *SMH*, 18 September 1911, 10; ‘Dr. Mawson’s Expedition’, *Telegraph*, 5 October 1911, 2; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, *DT*, 12 October 1911, 11; ‘Mawson Antarctic Expedition’, *Sun*, 13 October 1911, 11.
61 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, No. 37 (13 September 1911) 423-424; ‘Unknown’, *DT*, 14 September 1911, 9; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *Age*, 14 September 1911, 8; ‘Money for Dr. Mawson’, *EN*, 14 September 1911, 8; ‘To Antarctica’, *SMH*, 14 September 1911, 8.
62 ‘State Cabinet’, *Argus*, 19 September 1911, 6.
63 See for example ‘The Antarctic For Tourists’, *SM*, 14 June 111, 7; ‘Aeroplane for Antarctica’, *DT*, 4 April 1911, 8; ‘Mawson Expedition’ *EN*, 14 August 1911, 8; ‘Mawson Expedition’, *Advertiser*, 13 September 1911, 20.
64 ‘Monoplane Flight’, *DT*, 12 September 1911, 6; ‘For The Antarctic’, *DT*, 5 October 1911, 6.
65 ‘Antarctic Monoplane Wrecked’, *Sun*, 5 October 1911, 7; ‘The Antarctic Aeroplane’, *Advertiser*, 1 November 1911, 10; ‘Mawson Expedition’, *Argus*, 1 November 1911, 12.
67 ‘Southward Bound’, *Sun*, 10 November 1911, 5.
AAE’s second base in Adélie Land, took charge of preparations.  

Central to these preparations was the task of soliciting further donations. The Mercury publicised a request for help from fishermen who wanted to assist the expedition, asking them to deposit any inedible fish they caught on the beach at the Quarantine Station. These would be collected and fed to the expedition’s pack of Greenlandic dogs, which were consuming 60lbs of fish a day. Pastoralists were also invited to donate live sheep.

Mawson, meanwhile, was preoccupied with arrangements in Sydney. Sledges were being constructed by the Sydney Powel Wood Process Co., while Lord Mayor Allen Taylor, who owned a construction company, had overseen the manufacture of one of the expedition’s prefabricated timber huts by a consortium of Sydney firms that had agreed to share the cost. While in Sydney, Mawson also visited his parents at Campbelltown, and the local community hastily arranged a valedictory service at St. Peter’s Church. The priest’s sermon for this service included the telling remark that the expedition’s departure “marked an important epoch in the history of their country … Hitherto Australia was the explorers’ objective, and now our nation was casting off its swaddling bands and taking its place amongst the fearless ones.”

Even provincial priests in Campbelltown, it seems, were familiar with the idea that Antarctic exploration was a way for Australia to announce its place amongst the community of nations. A letter to the editor in Hobart made a similar point on the eve of Aurora’s departure, insisting that “the eyes of those in Europe are on this expedition.”

68 ‘Australasian Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 28 October 1911, 8; ‘Australasian Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 6 November 1911, 2.

69 ‘The Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 9 November 1911, 3.

70 ‘Southward Bound’, Sun, 10 November 1911, 5; Antarctic Expedition’, SMH, 18 November 1911, 8; ‘Building the Portable Hut For Dr. Mawson’s Expedition’, EN, 20 November 1911, 10.


72 Homo, ‘Dr. Mawson’s Expedition to the South Pole’, Mercury, 30 November 1911, 8.
Before departing Sydney, Mawson arranged for local construction firm Saxton & Binns to provide the expedition with a wireless mast to be used at Macquarie Island. This was a late addition to the programme. The possibility of establishing wireless contact between Australia and Antarctica for the immediate sharing of meteorological data had been raised by the Home Affairs Department during discussion over the Federal grants for both Shackleton and Scott’s expeditions, but had been deemed impracticable by both. Mawson, however, agreed to establish an additional base at Macquarie Island to serve as both meteorological observatory and wireless relay station. The Macquarie base would serve an important function by connecting Mawson’s main base in Adélie Land with Australia, while the Meteorological Bureau would be able to assess the value of data from Macquarie Island for weather forecasts before deciding whether to maintain the station permanently. It also added £8,000 to the expedition’s expenses, however, and forced Mawson to charter an additional ship, the steamer Toroa, to convey the additional men and equipment to Macquarie. As a result, the Queen’s Pier in Hobart became a hive of activity as the Aurora was unloaded, its stores sorted according to base and ship, and the ships reloaded. In the final days before departure, Mawson lobbied the Postmaster-General to expedite the construction of a wireless receiving station in Hobart to ensure that messages from Macquarie Island were received and gave a lecture at the Hobart Town Hall under the auspices of the Royal Society of Tasmania.

When the expedition finally departed on 2 December, Sydney’s Evening News reported that while it was the first Australian Antarctic expedition, it would “certainly not be the last”. The Australian Antarctic “may contain many possibilities of commercial enterprise, such as

73 ‘Southward Bound’, Sun, 10 November 1911, 5.
mining for gold or other precious metals”, it noted, and could become “a summer resort for jaded Australians”. From first announcement to departure the AAE was imagined as the culmination of Australian interest in the region and was justified on the grounds that it would secure a potentially valuable territory for the Commonwealth, obtain data of practical use to Australian meteorology and trade, and claim a place for Australia amongst the great nations of the world by proving its commitment to science and exploration.

The AAE continued to capture public interest at home while the expedition carried out its work in the Antarctic. Following in the tradition of David and Taylor, Mawson supplied a narrative of the voyage to Macquarie Island to the Daily Telegraph. Davis provided a detailed account of the expedition when Aurora returned from a trying voyage to Macquarie Island and Adélie Land on 12 March 1912, along with some early photographs, while letters from expedition members to friends and family were widely disseminated in the press. Of particular interest to the public was Davis’ remark that he had seen right whales, which he believed were worth up to £2,000 each, during the voyage, and that he would be taking whaling gear when he returned south to secure a whale for further study. Though Davis refused to disclose precisely where he had encountered right whales, the announcement nonetheless sparked a renewed frenzy of interest in the prospect of an Australian whaling company.

---

78 ‘Antarctic Explorers’, EN, 4 December 1911, 6.
79 ‘Southward Ho!’, DT, 27 December 1911, 9-10.
81 ‘Aurora In Dock’, SMH, 18 April 1912, 10.
More generally, *Aurora* generated significant interest when it arrived in Sydney in April 1912 to be refitted ahead of a winter oceanographic cruise in the Southern Ocean. Following Shackleton’s example, the AAE’s manager, Conrad Eitel, invited 200 guests to tour the ship at Circular Quay on 4 April. It was then opened to the public over Easter, with all funds raised going to the Seamen’s Mission, and to groups of school students on 11 April. Eitel’s announcement of an open day for schools noted that “the fact will be impressed upon the children that this is an Australian expedition making investigations for the benefit of Australians, and that they, therefore have a direct interest in its operations.” Australians also became acquainted with the expedition’s work through a film based on the voyage and the establishment of the bases. The film, *Australians to the Antarctic*, was well-received and screened throughout Australia, with David and Davis giving lectures to accompany screenings in Sydney.

The wireless connection between Australia, Macquarie Island, and Adélie Land provided an additional dimension to Australian interest in the AAE. The novelty of messages arriving from the Antarctic generated significant interest and made new forms of engagement with the Antarctic possible. For example, the wireless staff at the Hotel Australia in Sydney managed to make contact with Macquarie Island to exchange New Year’s greetings, while the students and staff of Fort-Street School grouped together to pay for an Empire Day message to Mawson. While the wireless’ main function was to provide meteorological reports, Eitel saw it as a press asset and arranged to sell a series of wireless reports from Mawson about life

---

83 ‘Inspection of the Aurora’, *SMH*, 5 April 1912, 6.
84 ‘Aurora From Antarctica’, *DT*, 6 April 1912, 16; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *DT*, 9 April 1912, 12; ‘Aurora on View’, *DT*, 10 April 1912, 10.
86 See for example ‘Other Entertainments’, *SMH*, 8 May 1912, 9; ‘At The Lyceum’, *Sun*, 14 May 1912, 2; ‘Antarctica’, *DT* 14 May 1912, 15; ‘Dr. Mawson’s Antarctic Expedition’, *Mercury*, 22 June 1912, 6; ‘His Majesty’s Theatre’, *Mercury*, 29 June 1912, 2; ‘His Majesty’s Theatre’, *Mercury*, 1 July 1912, 8; ‘Spencer’s’, *Herald*, 17 August 1912, 7.
in the Antarctic to various newspaper groups for £1,000. While there was regular contact between Macquarie Island and Australia, however, wireless communication with the main base at Commonwealth Bay proved sporadic and unreliable due to the area’s exceptionally strong katabatic winds, magnetic interference, and the limitations of the instruments. Communication ended completely on 13 October when the main base’s wireless mast toppled in a blizzard.

The AAAS Committee was therefore forced to downplay public fears about the lack of communication from Mawson, initially by suggesting that there had been delays in setting up the wireless equipment and later by suggesting there were technical problems with the dynamo or transformer. Eitel panicked at the prospect of losing his deal with the press and seriously considered suing the Australasian Wireless Company, which had provided the wireless equipment, for damages – a peculiar idea given that two of the expedition’s biggest supporters, Hugh Dixson and Samuel Hordern, were the chairman and a director of the company respectively. He resorted to fabricating a message to try to preserve the deal, insisting that a very faint message from Mawson had missed its intended target at Macquarie Island and been received in Hobart.

When the *Aurora* returned to Commonwealth Bay to collect Mawson and his party in December 1912, it took with it a new wireless receiver, a new wireless operator called Sydney Jeffryes, and Conrad Eitel, who felt compelled to join the ship personally to talk to Mawson about the “important matter” of the £1,000 press deal. Eitel never got the chance to

---

88 USA: P11:7:3, Letter from Conrad C. Eitel to Edgeworth David, 6 February 1912.
89 Mawson, *The Home of the Blizzard*, 149-150.
91 USA: P11:7:3, Letter from Eitel to David, 6 February 1912.
raise the issue, however, as Mawson and two companions failed to return from a sledging expedition, forcing a five-man party to spend a second winter at Commonwealth Bay in the hope of finding the missing men.\textsuperscript{94} Wireless communication did improve during the second winter, and it was a wireless message from Commonwealth Bay that first announced Mawson’s survival and the deaths of his companions Xavier Mertz and Belgrave Ninnis.\textsuperscript{95} The story captured the attention of the Australian press, and sparked a debate about whether the gains to science that came from Antarctic expeditions justified such a loss of life.\textsuperscript{96}

\textit{Australia and the ‘Scott Appeal’}

The story of Mawson’s survival and the deaths of Ninnis and Mertz touched a nerve in Australia because it emerged only three weeks after it was confirmed that Scott and his four companions had died on their return from the South Pole in March 1912. As with Mawson, Scott had failed to return to his base before \textit{Terra Nova} was forced to return to New Zealand. The ship returned without Scott in April 1912, but it did bring back Scott’s detailed account of the expedition so far, a comprehensive photographic and cinematographic record of the expedition, and enough expedition members to satiate the Australian press’ desire for interviews.\textsuperscript{97} The films in particular, captured by expedition photographer Herbert Ponting and edited into \textit{With Captain Scott to the South Pole} by Gaumont’s Australian office in

\textsuperscript{94} Mawson, \textit{The Home of the Blizzard}, 239-272; Lecture Notes, MS 8311, Box 3262/1, State Library of Victoria (SLV); Antarctic Diary of Robert Bage, November 1911-January 1912, MS 14209, Box 4176/3, SLV.


\textsuperscript{96} ‘The Pitiless Antarctic’, \textit{WA}, 27 February 1913, 7; ‘Is It Worth While?’, \textit{BC}, 27 February 1913, 7.

Sydney, helped to maintain public interest in the expedition even after it became apparent
that Amundsen had won the race for the South Pole. Australians therefore speculated about
whether Scott had reached the South Pole throughout 1912, and news was eagerly awaited
when *Terra Nova* returned from its third and final voyage to Ross Island on 10 February
1913.

*Terra Nova* arrived in Oamaru, a small port between Lyttleton and Port Chalmers chosen to
avoid the waiting crowd of journalists who had attempted to break the story of the expedition
before it could be cabled to the first publication rights-holders the previous year, and two
members – one erroneously identified as Scott - came ashore and caught a train to
Christchurch. The two men, later revealed to be *Terra Nova’s* captain Harry Pennell and
surgeon Edward Atkinson, visited the expedition’s agent, J.J. Kinsey, to submit their report.
While no news had been released, it was felt from Kinsey’s demeanour that Scott had
reached the Pole “and that there has been no death or disaster to mar the success of the
undertaking”. Even as rumours began to circulate that Scott was dead, the *Daily Telegraph*
observed that Australians “are bound by strong ties to the inhospitable coast of that white
continent in the south”, while the *Evening News* declared “Australians are particularly
interested on the exploration of the Antarctic” and noted that “nearly every party which had
gone to explore the South Polar regions has made its last port of call either Australia or New
Zealand.” Even as rumours of disaster spread, the idea of Australia’s special interest in the
Antarctic permeated press reports.

---

98 For example ‘The Grand’, *DT*, 16 March 1912, 10; Coronation Picture Theatre’, *SMH*, 1 April 1912,
4; ‘Cinematograph in the Antarctic’, *Age*, 16 May 1912, 10; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, *Age*, 22 May 1912, 10;
West’s Pictures’, *Herald*, 25 May 1912, 7; ‘Royal Pictures’, *Herald*, 10 June 1912, 7; ‘Snowden Pictures’,
*Herald*, 7 December 1912, 2; ‘With Scott To The South’, *EN*, 13 February 1913, 8.
99 See for example ‘Antarctic Research’, *Argus*, 29 February 1912, 7; ‘Where Is Scott?’*, *DT*, 3 April 1912, 19;
100 For the controversy over publication rights and the choice of Oamaru see MS559/164, Kinsey Collection,
SPRI. For the first Australian report of *Terra Nova’s* return see ‘Captain Scott’, *EN*, 10 February 1913, 7.
101 ‘Back From The Antarctic’, *Argus*, 11 February 1913, 7; ‘Return of the Terranova’, *Sun*, 10 February 1913,
8; ‘From Antarcrica’, *SMH*, 11 February 1913, 9.
A brief statement that Scott and his four companions had perished in a blizzard after reaching the South Pole was published on 11 February, followed by a more detailed account the following day. Further details and accounts of the expedition soon emerged, particularly as expedition members arrived in Australia to begin their journeys home. Condolences were issued on behalf of Australia via the Governor-General. Tributes were sought from those who had known the explorers, including David, Taylor, and Day. Rumours spread blaming the only seaman of the polar party, Edgar Evans, for the disaster, although these were quickly refuted by second-in-command Edward Evans.

Australian reactions to the news were diverse and immediate. Flags were flown at half-mast on all public buildings in New South Wales. A public memorial service was held at St. Andrew’s Cathedral in Sydney, with a crowd of hundreds unable to gain entry. Similar services were also held in churches around the country, including Melbourne, Hobart, Adelaide, Perth, Brisbane, Ballarat, St. Kilda, Bendigo, Benalla, Longreach, Maitland, Young, Lithgow, and Nowra. Sydney schools ceased work at noon on 17

---

104 See for example Scott’s Conquest’, DT, 14 February 1913, 9; ‘Antarctic Heroes’, Advertiser, 14 February 1913, 10; ‘Everlasting Snows’, SMH 26 February 1913, 14; ‘Scott Party’, SMH, 26 February 1913, 13; ‘Back From The Antarctic’, DT, 5 March 1913, 10; ‘Lady Scott in Sydney’, EN, 5 March 1913, 4; ‘Lady Scott in Sydney’, BC, 6 March 1913, 7; ‘Back From The South’, Advertiser, 7 March 1913, 15; ‘Scott Expedition’, Herald, 18 March 1913, 1; ‘Silence Broken’, DT, 19 March 1913, 12.
106 See for example ‘Personal Recollections’, DT, 12 February 1913, 9-10; ‘As Beloved As He Was Brave’, Daily Telegraph, 13 February 1913, 7; ‘Expedition Member’s Eulogy’, WA, 13 February 1913, 7.
107 See for example ‘Baseless Rumours’, EN, 15 February 1913, 5; ‘Scandalous Rumours’, Telegraph, 18 February 1913, 2.
109 ‘Memorial Service in Sydney’, SMH, 13 February 1913, 10; ‘Memorial Service’, Sun, 12 February 1913, 9; ‘In Memory of Scott’, Sun, 14 February 1913, 7.
February, so that an account of Scott’s death and his final ‘message to the public’ could be read to the pupils. Individual schools organised memorials of their own, such as a ceremony at Lithgow District School on 12 February. Work was suspended for five minutes at noon at many workplaces in South Australia on the 15th, to allow workers to reflect on the tragedy. Letters were written to newspapers to express grief. Ernest Davis wrote to the Daily Telegraph to suggest that Australia and New Zealand should pay tribute to Scott by asking Shackleton to take command of Terra Nova to collect the explorers’ remains from Antarctica and return them to London for burial “in the sacred spot of the nation’s heroes in St. Paul’s Cathedral”. ‘Britisher’ of West Maitland agreed, and the proposal was genuinely considered before it was ultimately felt that Scott would prefer to be “buried on the field of battle”. Ernest H. Llewellyn suggested that the ‘Freedom of the City of Sydney’ be created, and that Mrs Scott be made the first recipient. The Australian Town and Country Journal published a memorial issue dedicated to the Antarctic disaster. The Snowden Theatre in Melbourne arranged a ‘memorial picture service’ showing Ponting’s film, with the profits of £7 dedicated to “the cost of erecting a Scott memorial fountain in the Snowden Gardens”. Paddington Superior Public School commissioned a painting of Scott for the school, as Scott “furnished a grand example for the youth of Australia.” The Newcastle Branch of the Naval Forces erected a tablet in memory of Scott in their drill hall. Mawson

Church’, Maitland Daily Mercury, 17 February 1913, 2; ‘Memorial Service’, Young Chronicle, 15 February 1913, 2; ‘Memorial Service at Methodist Church’, Lithgow Mercury, 17 February 1913, 2; ‘Memorial Services’, Nowra Leader, 21 February 1913, 8.

111 ‘Ceremony in Sydney Schools’, Age, 18 February 1913, 7; ‘Antarctic Heroes’, Telegraph, 18 February 1913, 6.


113 ‘The Antarctic Disaster’, Border Watch, 15 February 1913, 2.

114 For example ‘Tennyson’s Lines’, DT, 12 February 1913, 10.


116 ‘St. Paul’s’, DT, 15 February 1913, 14; ‘To Bring Back The Bodies’, Sun, 18 February 1913, 5; ‘Antarctic Explorers’, Argus, 28 February 1913, 7; ‘Captain Scott’s Last Wish’, Advertiser, 28 February 1913, 9.

117 ‘Captain Scott’, SMH, 28 February 1913, 10.

118 ‘Scott Antarctic Expedition’, EN, 19 February 1913, 6; Australian Town and Country Journal, 15 February 1913.


120 ‘The Antarctic Tragedy’, DT, 14 October 1913, 9.

121 ‘Scott Memorial’, DT, 31 March 1913, 8.
sent a telegram from Adélie Land expressing his condolences to Lady Scott.122 There were also peculiar forms of pride expressed through mourning. For example, the *Daily Telegraph* noted that the memorial cross erected for Scott by his companions in the Antarctic was made of Australian jarrah, while the *Mercury* suggested that Tasmania was particularly connected to the expedition, as Mrs Scott had visited the city only two years earlier and the Governor’s wife was Scott’s sister.123

Scott’s final ‘message to the public’, which included an appeal “to see that those who depend on us are properly cared for”, sparked an international movement to raise funds to care for the families of the five explorers, and to construct memorials in their honour.124 Studies of the reaction to Scott’s death have focused on the idea that it was interpreted primarily as an antidote or a counterexample to British civilisational decline.125 While such studies have recognised the global impact of Scott’s death, they have done so from a metropolitan perspective that fails to acknowledge the ways in which reactions were shaped by local factors. This interpretation of Scott’s death as a moral example that countered fears of British decline did circulate in Australia. Defence Minister George Pearce, for example, believed that the deaths of Scott and Lawrence Oates showed that “not only was the race not decadent, but it still possessed men equal to the Britishers of Nelson’s and Blake’s days”, while the *Daily Telegraph* suggested that Scott’s “sacrifice” showed that “British blood has lost none of its quality. It runs as red and as robust in the veins of the race as ever it did.”126 Yet there was also a distinct Australian way of thinking about the disaster that combined the news of Scott’s death with the idea of Australia’s special interest in the Antarctic.

126 ‘Defence Minister’s Tribute’, *DT*, 19 February 1913, 10; ‘The Lesson of the Antarctic Tragedy’, *DT*, 13 February 1913, 6.
Collection funds proliferated in the immediate aftermath of the news of Scott’s death. Andrew Fisher promised that Scott’s final request would “not go unheeded”, while W.M. Hughes, Victorian Attorney-General Drysdale Brown, and Melbourne Lord Mayor D.V. Hennessy agreed that “the responsibility of maintaining the dependents of those who had so heroically died was one that the nation ought not to shirk.”

In Sydney, New South Wales Agriculture Minister John Treflé urged Australian newspapers to “open their columns to subscriptions” and hoped that Australians would “do their duty” to raise funds for the relief of the widows and orphans of the expedition. The *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Daily Telegraph* responded, opening subscription lists that raised £473.0.10 and £293.15.3 respectively, while the Chamber of Commerce raised £774.10.4 from a list of its own.

The *Sun* launched its own subscription list, but argued that “men and women of humble means, as well as the rich, make up the nation to which Scott directed his appeal. Their sympathy is as deep, though their power to aid is less.” The *Sun*’s was therefore a ‘Shilling Subscription List’, accepting donations of no more or less than one shilling, as this would “put it in the power of everybody to help in a great national movement”. Labor Premier James McGowen approved of the idea “from the point of the working man”, and agreed that “the wharf laborer, the boilermaker, and kindred workers – possess as much true sympathy as the more favoured and affluent citizens”. The *Sun*’s shilling fund provides an insight into the ways in which funds were raised in Australia. In addition to individual donations, collections were made in schools, workplaces, streets, hotels, apartment buildings, and town

---

127 ‘She Must Not Suffer’, *Sun*, 13 February 1913, 7; ‘Scott Memorial Fund’, *Age*, 18 February 1913, 7.
130 ‘Surely They Will Care!’, *Sun*, 14 February 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, *Sun*, 16 February 1913, 5.
131 ‘Surely They Will Care!’, *Sun*, 16 February 1913, 5.
132 ‘Surely They Will Care!’, *Sun*, 17 February 1913, 1.
councils. For example, thirty-two residents of the ‘Chatsworth’ apartment building in Potts Point donated a shilling each, as did fourteen boys from 303 Cleveland-street, the kitchen staff of the Hotel Australia, Auburn, Hurstville, and Kogarah Councils, ninety guests of the Surrey Hotel on King-street, staff and patients at Windsor and Kenmore Hospitals, the staff of the Bank of New South Wales, members of Bronte Surf Club, and schools including Chatswood Girls’ High School, Wagga Experimental Farm, and Tarana, Gullen Flat, Morisset, and Elonera Public Schools. Businesses also raised funds for the shilling fund by hosting events. For example, New York Picture Theatre at Circular Quay donated the proceeds from showings of Ponting’s expedition film on 23 February, Bronte Palace Pictures raised 366 shillings with a memorial show, and Sara Collins raised 232 shillings by organising for a play to be performed at Randwick Town Hall. The Sun shilling fund raised 2,783 shillings by the time it closed on 13 March, though late donations eventually brought the total to £143.13s.

The largest of the myriad Sydney funds was the Lord Mayor’s Fund. The smaller collections were eventually consolidated into the Lord Mayor’s Fund, with a view to remitting the whole sum to the committee appointed in London, and by 20 March the total stood at £3,519.1.5. Donations came from an eclectic group of supporters, including the Circular Quay Customs Officers, Civil Ambulance and Transport Corps., 5th Howitzer Battery, Sydney Oddfellows, Women’s Patriotic Club, various businesses, churches, individuals, and dozens of schools.

---

133 ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 17 February 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 18 February 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 22 February 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 25 February 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 27 February 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 28 February 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 3 March 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 7 March 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 12 March 1913, 1; ‘Scott Shilling Fund’, Sun, 19 March 1913, 1.

134 ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 22 February 1913, 1; ‘Entertainment at Randwick’, Sun, 7 March 1913, 1; ‘Surely They Will Care!’, Sun, 12 March 1913, 1; ‘Scott Shilling Fund’, Sun, 13 March 1913, 1.

135 ‘Scott Shilling Fund’, Sun, 13 March 1913, 1; ‘Scott Shilling Fund’, Sun, 19 March 1913, 1.


A range of other proposals, collections, and events were also organised to raise funds for the explorers’ dependants. A letter to the *Daily Telegraph* suggested that the school children of Australia be encouraged to give their pennies to the children of the explorers as “a lesson to them on self-sacrifice”. A letter urged Australian women to provide donations in solidarity with “the wives and families of these gallant men”. Petty Officers from the Rushcutters Bay naval depot organised an appeal to raise funds for the family of their fellow Petty Office Edgar Evans. Sydney’s three largest cinema companies joined together to organise a “monster entertainment” at the Town Hall, raising £234 17s. The Katoomba Amusements Company raised £45 with a charity concert in the Blue Mountains, another concert was held at Chatswood Town Hall, Sydney’s Alhambra Theatre organised a vaudeville show in aid of the Lord Mayor’s fund, and a street collection raised £225.0.9. A ‘Scott Memorial Concert’ was held at Sydney Town Hall on 1 March. The concert raised £107 9s. from ticket sales, while a bulldog called Barry was stationed in the vestibule to collect additional donations. Australia’s largest theatrical agency, J.C. Williamson, organised a series of memorial concerts in Auckland, Christchurch, Sydney, and Melbourne. One of the organisers, Hugh J. Ward, drew on the idea of Australia’s special interest in Antarctica to explain why the company was devoting so much of its resources to the appeal, saying “Australia … is the country that would chiefly benefit by south polar exploration”. Ward was also seemingly aware of the performative aspect of the fundraising campaign in Australia, noting that raising a significant sum quickly would “show the world how Australia feels.” J.C. Williamson eventually donated £3,000 raised from its series of

---

139 ‘Small Givers’, *DT*, 15 February 1913, 12.
140 ‘Petty-Officer Evans’, *Sun*, 25 February 1913, 1.
141 ‘Picture Showmen’s Gift’, *EN*, 26 February 1913, 10.
142 ‘Scott Relief Fund’, *Herald*, 22 February 1913, 6; ‘Scott Fund Concert’, *EN*, 10 April 1913, 12; ‘Benefit at the Alhambra’, *DT*, 17 February 1913, 8.
concerts and a sports fundraiser at Sydney Stadium.\(^{146}\) The sports event, which was organised by a coalition of Sydney sports officials in consultation with J.C. Williamson and Edgeworth David, including boxing, fencing, and a marathon race.\(^{147}\) The town of Dungog in the Hunter Valley hosted a sports fundraiser of its own.\(^{148}\) The Amateur Billiards Association of New South Wales held a tournament in aid of the “Antarctic heroes”.\(^{149}\) The New South Wales bowling association, Royal Prince Alfred Yacht Club, Commercial Travellers Association, Master Builders’ Association, and Dubbo Farmers and Settlers’ Association all opened subscription lists.\(^{150}\) The Department of Public Works started a fund for its employees, raising £209.9.6 from around 400 employee donations.\(^{151}\) By the time Lord Mayor Arthur Cocks remitted the funds to London in June 1913, the people of New South Wales had donated £7,000.\(^{152}\)

Such was the fervour associated with fundraising in New South Wales that there were recriminations against those who were deemed slow to support the appeal. Edgar A. Gornall, for example, demanded to know why the citizens of Bathurst had not started a local collection list, and suggested that the proceeds of the Bathurst picture shows be donated.\(^{153}\) ‘Has-Been’ was similarly critical of cricketers, who he believed had been behind their fellow sportsmen in supporting the fund, and suggested a charity match between twenty-two retired cricketers and eleven young ones be organised to make up for this neglect.\(^{154}\) The *Sun*’s preferred target was the “niggardly English response” to Scott’s appeal, declaring that “the

\(^{146}\) ‘Successful Musical Concert’, *DT*, 3 March 1913, 12.

\(^{147}\) ‘Sports Entertainment’, *SMH*, 20 February 1913, 9; ‘Athletes’ Day’ *SMH*, 24 February 1913, 7; ‘Antarctic Disaster Fund’, *SMH*, 25 February 1913, 10; Successful Musical Concert’, *DT*, 3 March 1913, 12.


\(^{149}\) ‘Billiards’, *SMH*, 28 February 1913, 12.


\(^{151}\) ‘The Scott Fund’, *Sun*, 17 April 1913, 8.

\(^{152}\) ‘The Scott Fund’, *DT*, 3 June 1913, 10; ‘Antarctic Disaster’, *Herald*, 3 June 1913, 1; ‘Scott Memorial Fund’, *Sun*, 15 July 1913, 1; ‘Antarctic Heroes’, *Age*, 4 June 1913, 9.

\(^{153}\) ‘Correspondence’, *Bathurst Times*, 21 February 1913, 2.

\(^{154}\) ‘To The Editor’, *DT*, 26 February 1913, 10.
richest country on the earth has not only surprised, but shocked, its press by a niggardliness which baffles comprehension.”

Other lines of criticism also emerged, however. Cocks’ steadfast refusal to allocate any of the funds to a memorial in Sydney attracted some criticism. Others took exception to the scale of the sum raised. A letter to the *Queanbeyan Age*, for example, complained that the Scott fund had already received four times more than was needed, while the New South Wales Labor Council criticised governments for embracing the Scott fund but neglecting the Mount Lyell Disaster Fund. The *Daily News* criticised the reaction on more abstract lines, arguing that the deaths of the explorers were too great a price to pay for the results the expedition had brought. Such criticisms constituted a small minority of reactions to the disaster and the fundraising, however.

Though New South Wales was the most active fundraiser, the pattern was similar around Australia. For example, the *Brisbane Courier* started a Queensland fund. The Mayor of Toowoomba initiated a fund, which he anticipated being for an Australian memorial to Scott rather than the relief of the dependants. A letter to the *Brisbane Courier* suggested that Scott’s ‘message to the public’ be published and sold in aid of the appeal, as they were certain that thousands of others would like to purchase it as a memento of the expedition. In *Melbourne*, the *Herald* collected donations, the Royal Australian Naval College started a collection, actors and actresses organised a street appeal, churches organised collections, and

---

156 ‘Why Not A Memorial?’, *SMH*, 18 February 1913, 10.
157 ‘Relief Funds’, *Queanbeyan Age* (QA), 15 April 1913, 2; ‘Mount Lyell and the Antarctic’, *DT*, 21 March 1913, 9.
159 ‘The Scott Fund’, *BC*, 18 February 1913, 8
the proprietors of Luna Park donated all the sixpences received for entry fees on the night of 24 February, totalling £97 17s.162 The Lord Mayor of Melbourne, D.V. Hennessy, launched a Lord Mayor’s Fund for a memorial arguing “such heroic deeds as those of Captain Scott and his men need recognition other than relief”.163 In Adelaide, the Register opened another shilling fund, raising £159 3s.164 Passengers on a steamship bound for Fremantle organised a memorial service and collection.165 New Zealand was also active in fundraising and memorialising; within three years there was a memorial oak tree in Oamaru, a memorial boulder in Queenstown, a Scott Memorial Prize for students in North Otago, and a bust of Scott commissioned by the ‘Sportsmen’s Memorial Fund’ in Christchurch.166

There was some discussion about each state contributing to the fund, but it was ultimately agreed that the federal government would donate £2,000 on behalf of Australia as a whole. By way of thanks, Scott’s second-in-command Edward Evans offered to give a complete record of the expedition’s charts, scientific publications, narrative, and photographs to the Commonwealth, copies of these records for Australia’s universities, and a copy of Scott’s narrative to every public library in Australia.167 There were also suggestions to honour Scott at a national level, including a proposal for a monument to be constructed in the new federal capital.168 There were even proposals to name the federal capital in honour of the expedition. A letter to the Brisbane Courier suggested that it be named “after the great man of the present, Captain Scott, our lost hero”, and put forward Scott Land, Scott’s Land, or Scott-
ville for consideration. "Bowes", an acronym for the explorers 'Bowers Oates Wilson Evans Scott', was also suggested.

It total, Australia contributed £10,000 to an international fund that raised £74,509 to support the explorers’ families, settle the expedition’s debts, publish its scientific reports, and construct a memorial. The sense that the expedition had set off to “annex the Pole for England – and the Commonwealth” helps to explain the scale of the Australian contribution. The idea that Australia had a unique interest in Antarctica and Antarctic exploration permeated the discourse of grief, mourning, and celebration that characterised the response to Scott’s death and was a key factor in the enormous fundraising campaigns that emerged from it. If explorers died in the course of investigating Antarctica, work that would benefit Australia more than any other state, then it was felt that Australia had a duty to rally in support of their dependants. The idea of Australia having political and economic rights in the Antarctic had been articulated since the mid-nineteenth century, but the reaction to Scott’s death reflected an understanding of distinctly Australian obligations.

**The Mawson Appeal**

This idea of Australian obligations in the Antarctic was also evident in two further events in this period. Firstly, the ideas of duties and obligations were prominent in discussions of the AAE, as two members had died and six others were stranded at Commonwealth Bay in 1913. The possibility of allocating some of the funds raised for the Scott appeal to the families of Ninnis and Mertz was canvased. A *Sydney Morning Herald* editorial, for example, argued that “Australia particularly will mourn the loss of these two men, for the Mawson expedition

---

170 ‘Federal Territory’, *Herald*, 20 February 1913, 8.
171 MS/594/19, BAE 1910 Papers, Royal Society Archives, Captain Scott Fund; MS/595/9, Scott Fund Papers, Royal Society Archives, Captain Scott Fund; MS 1464/5, Scott Collection, SPRI, Scott Fund Miscellaneous Papers.
172 ‘To The Pole!’, *SMH*, 19 October 1910, 11.
is essentially an Australian expedition. The great majority of its members are Australian, and for the most part it has been financed by Australia … We owe a debt of gratitude to the men who have perished, and to their relatives and friends we tender a nation’s sympathy.”173 A letter to the Daily Telegraph similarly suggested that some of the Scott funds should go to the families of Ninnis and Mertz, as the expedition was “primarily of Australian origin, and as the data obtained will probably be of immense service to the Commonwealth”.174 A Daily Telegraph editorial endorsed this suggestion, arguing that the men’s families deserved support as the AAE was “Australian in origin; its leader and several of its officers are Australian, and much of the data brought back by it will be of greater important to this than to any other country. It was in the service of Australian effort and adventure that Mertz and Ninnis died”.175

No fund was ever created for the families of Mertz and Ninnis, perhaps because they were both young, unmarried men from wealthy families, and perhaps because they left no poignant final messages to inspire the public. There was also the fact that six living and breathing Australians remained at Commonwealth Bay and needed rescue. The AAAS Committee, which might otherwise have devoted its energies to supporting the families of Mertz and Ninnis, was preoccupied throughout 1913 with raising the funds needed to equip Aurora for a third Antarctic voyage that had never been budgeted for. The cost of this additional voyage was estimated at £11,000, forcing the Committee to launch a ‘Mawson Relief Appeal’ that emphasised the value of the AAE’s work and Australians’ duty to their explorers.176

This appeal raised £600 in Sydney and £80 in Melbourne, while Davis secured £1,000 from Anglo-Australian aristocrat Robert Lucas-Tooth in London and George Reid persuaded the

173 SMH, 26 February 1913, 12
175 ‘The Antarctic Fund’, DT, 26 March 1913, 8.
176 USA: P11:7:4, Letter from Eitel to David, 25 August 1913, When Mawson Calls For Aid.
British government to donate another £1,000. Seeing the expedition’s film was promoted as a way to contribute to the relief voyage, while Edward Evans championed the appeal. Evans suggested in April 1913 that, as sufficient funds had already been raised for the Scott appeal, the public could instead contribute to the AAE. He also donated £100 himself and organised a collection amongst Terra Nova’s staff. Prime Minister Joseph Cook agreed to provide the remaining £5,000, saying that “the Government deems it both a duty and a pleasure to assist further”.

This combination of public and private funding was sufficient for Aurora to depart on 11 November 1913 to retrieve the six men, though there remained a £4,000 deficit for Mawson to deal with when he returned in February 1914. The expedition caused some surprise by returning to Adelaide, though Mawson subsequently explained that it was because South Australia had been the first state to offer a grant and South Australians had never seen a polar vessel. While the surprise arrival meant nothing had been planned in Adelaide, a familiar pattern soon emerged; there was a formal welcome at the University, a public reception at the Town Hall that sparked an “unprecedented rush” to gain entry, and the Aurora was opened to inspection by the public for three days. From Adelaide, Mawson travelled directly to Melbourne, though he was required to stop briefly at Ballarat for an official welcome. There

---

178 ‘Dr. Mawson and His Comrades’, DT, 2 August 1913, 13; ‘Dr. Mawson and His Comrades’, Mercury, 9 August 1913, 11.
179 ‘Mawson Expedition’, Telegraph, 5 April 1913, 5.
180 ‘Mawson Relief’, EN, 10 July 1913, 4.
181 USA: P11:7:4, Letter from Cook to David, 11 September 1913; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 40 (2 October 1913), 1794.
182 ‘Back From Antarctic Ice’,Advertiser, 27 February 1914, 15; ‘Welcome Home’, Advertiser, 3 March 1914, 9; ‘Civic Welcome’, Advertiser, 4 March 1914, 16; ‘The Aurora’, Register, 2 March 1914, 7; ‘Aurora Open For Inspection’, Register, 4 March 1914, 12; ‘The Aurora’, Register, 9 March 1914, 6.
was no formal reception in Melbourne, however, “partly because the Adelaide reception was Australian in its character, and party because Dr. Mawson required a rest”. He then travelled to Sydney, where he was greeted by a large crowd at Central Station and whisked away to a formal welcome at the Town Hall. This was followed by other welcomes arranged by the University Union, Royal Society of New South Wales, and University Club. There were also spontaneous celebrations in other parts of the Commonwealth. For example, David was aboard a steamer in Fremantle when news of Mawson’s safe return to Adelaide was received by wireless, and was immediately called upon to give an impromptu address to 800 fellow passengers.

While Mawson’s return was characterised by an outpouring of enthusiasm, enthusiasm alone could not solve the expedition’s financial problems. Mawson therefore hurried to London to arrange publication of a book. Masson and David endeavoured to raise additional funds in Australia, but ran into problems caused by Eitel’s irregular financial management. Masson secured promises from several Melbourne businessmen, but these promises were contingent on a full statement of accounts being published to show why the expedition was £4,000 in debt. Eitel’s accounts were haphazard and included unexplained cheques drawn on the expedition’s account. The Australian fundraising appeal therefore stalled, while the outbreak of the First World War delayed publication of Mawson’s book, leaving him to return to Australia to raise funds by lecturing.

---

184 ‘The Frozen South’, Age, 6 March 1914, 6; ‘Dr. Mawson in Melbourne’, DT, 6 March 1914, 9.
185 ‘Mawson Arrives’, Sun, 12 March 1914, 7; ‘Dr. Mawson’, SMH, 13 March 1914, 9; ‘Arrival of Mawson’, DT, 13 March 1914, 11.
188 ‘Dr. Mawson’, Advertiser, 13 March 1914, 8.
190 For Eitel’s financial irregularities see Phillip Ayres, Mawson: A Life (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press), 84-85.
Throughout this period, and even after the war began to dominate public attention, familiar ideas about the unique value of Antarctic exploration for Australia, the prospect of the Australian Antarctic being incorporated into the Commonwealth, and the status an Antarctic expedition would secure for Australia amongst other nations were invoked. For example, Mawson told the public welcome in Sydney that the expedition had “shown that the Australian cannot only assist British expeditions by funds and men, but that he can do as the mother country has done and carry out the whole work of the expedition”. He told the *Age* that the AAE had now completed the “superficial examination of the Australian quadrant” and added that he saw “no reason why that area should not be under the control of Australia. We are the nearest country, and it is a kind of heritage for us.”

David told the RGS in London that Mawson had discovered one of the largest coal fields in the world and repeated this assessment of the economic value of the “Australian Antarctic” in his impromptu shipboard address in Fremantle. Reviewing a lecture at the Millions Club in Perth, the *West Australian* noted that the expedition “brings Australia in the group of nations that have fathered the heroes of Polar exploration and the Commonwealth may well be proud of its representatives. They have shown that the fine courage, endurance, and enterprise that distinguished the men who braved the difficulties and dangers of exploration in the infant days of Australia have in no way diminished.” A letter to the *Advertiser* noted that the AAE had “helped more to lift Australia to the front rank of science than any other endeavour in the past”, and offered to head an *Advertiser* subscription list to contribute to settling its

---

192 ‘Australia First’, *Sun*, 12 March 1914, 7.
195 *WA*, 9 April 1914, 6.
debts. Mawson even insisted that follow-up work needed to be done in the Australian Antarctic, a region of “special interest to Australia” that “lies at our very door”, and maintained that further investigation was “a duty which fell to Australia”.197

The Ross Sea Party

The second event that highlights the significance of ideas about Australian obligations in the Antarctic was the Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition (ITAE) of 1914-16. Having failed to make his fortune as a businessman, Ernest Shackleton again turned his attention to Antarctic exploration.198 Adopting W.S. Bruce’s abandoned plan for a journey across the Antarctic continent from the Weddell Sea to the Ross Sea via the South Pole, Shackleton began the task of raising £60,000 for his new expedition in December 1913.199 Shackleton’s plans relied on having two parties in two separate ships. He would command the main party to the Weddell Sea and lead the trans-continental journey himself, while one-eyed Nimrod veteran Aeneas Mackintosh would lead a smaller party to Ross Island to lay depots along the Great Ice Barrier. The trans-continental party could not carry sufficient food to survive the entire journey, so failure to place the depots correctly would condemn Shackleton and his companions to certain death.

Despite the importance of the Ross Sea Party to his own survival, Shackleton was remarkably blasé about its preparations. His budget of £60,000 was insufficient for the scale of his plans, so while Shackleton purchased the two-year-old Arctic yacht Polaris for £11,600 for the Weddell Sea Party, the Ross Sea Party was assigned the battered and unreppaired Aurora,

197 ‘Out On The Ice’, DT, 31 August 1914, 8
198 For an account of Shackleton’s wide-ranging career between the Nimrod and ITAE expeditions see Huntford, Shackleton, 304-363.
199 MS 1537/2/33/1;D, ITAE Collection, SPRI, Printed proposal for the Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition.
purchased from Mawson for £1,000. The Ross Sea Party’s personnel was similarly unimpressive. Where Shackleton’s party boasted veteran Antarctic explorers such as Frank Wild, Tom Crean, Alfred Cheetham, George Marston, and Frank Hurley, only two of Mackintosh’s party had Antarctic experience. One was Mackintosh himself, whose experience was limited to a critical eye injury in 1908 and getting lost trying to walk from the ship to Ross Island in 1909, and the other was Ernest Joyce, an NAE and Nimrod veteran with a notoriously difficult personality. Other appointments included bank clerk Victor Hayward as general assistant, schoolteacher turned priest Arnold Spencer-Smith as photographer, twenty-one-year-old Cambridge medical student John Cope as biologist, Belgrave Ninnis’ cousin Aubrey, and Alexander Stevens, an assistant in the Geography Department at the University of Glasgow, as Chief Scientist. Positions such as doctor and physicist were not filled, with Mackintosh left to find volunteers in Australia.

Mackintosh was seemingly expected to rely on gifts and in-kind support to outfit Aurora. To keep expenses down, expedition members subsidised their passage to Australia by giving lectures to their fellow passengers. On arrival in Australia on 8 October 1914, Mackintosh told reporters he hoped that “the generosity Australians had always displayed would enable the expedition to go away with a complete outfit”. He persuaded the Hobart Marine Board to provide free docking for Aurora, and convinced Edgeworth David to ask Prime Minister Andrew Fisher to have the ship overhauled at the Cockatoo Island naval dockyard at a cost to the Commonwealth of approximately £500, according to Mackintosh’s estimate. Fisher agreed to cover repairs up to £500, and the Aurora entered drydock while Mackintosh set

201 SSC/132/1, Aubrey Howard Ninnis Collection, RGS, Menu Card from White Star Line, R.M.S. Ionic, 1914.
202 ‘Antarctica’, SMH, 9 October 1914, 6; ‘Bound South’, EN, 8 October 1914, 3.
about persuading the New South Wales government to donate £100 to install wireless on the ship.\textsuperscript{204} He also recruited four Australians, physicists Richard Richards and Keith Jack, general assistant Irvine Gaze, and wireless operator Lionel Hooke, to fill gaps in the party, though he was unable to find a doctor willing to join.\textsuperscript{205}

Dry docking \textit{Aurora} delayed the party’s departure significantly, as did a strike by workers at Cockatoo Island.\textsuperscript{206} Shackleton had instructed Mackintosh to ensure the depots were laid during the summer of 1914-15 in case he attempted the crossing at the first opportunity, so there were concerns that these delays would place the lives of Shackleton and his men at risk.\textsuperscript{207} These concerns were significant enough that when Mackintosh asked the naval dockyard to provide him with additional stores and equipment, including stores, tools, paint, sails, and even a collapsible wooden hut, First Member of the Naval Board William Creswell authorised the additional expenses, saying that “there is no other course but to accept the position of fitting out and deferring the question of payment for future settlement”\textsuperscript{208} Mackintosh took full advantage of Australia’s sense of obligation to ensure that the expedition departed in time to lay the depots. When \textit{Aurora} finally departed on 15 December 1914, the repairs needed to make it seaworthy had amounted to £3,938.4.1., while Mackintosh had obtained £657 worth of stores and equipment.\textsuperscript{209} An outraged Fisher ordered an investigation into the expenditure, the resulting report blaming the Naval Board for failing to inform the dockyard’s manager of the £500 limit and Mackintosh for taking “unfair advantage of the situation”.\textsuperscript{210}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[204] ‘Antarctica’, \textit{SMH}, 5 December 1914, 13; ‘Wireless For The Aurora’, \textit{DT}, 5 December 1914, 12; ‘Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SMH}, 8 December 1914, 10.
\item[206] ‘Antarctica’, \textit{SMH}, 11 December 1914, 8.
\item[207] ‘Antarctic Expedition’, \textit{SMH}, 30 November 1914, 12.
\item[208] NAA: A2, 1920/656, Report from the Joint Committee of Public Accounts.
\item[209] NAA: A2, 1920/656, Report from the Joint Committee of Public Accounts.
\item[210] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Mackintosh never had to answer to the Federal Government for his actions. Shackleton had instructed Mackintosh to freeze *Aurora* into the ice at Ross Island for the winter to remove the expense of multiple voyages, but the attempt to do so proved disastrous. The ship was torn from its moorings and trapped in the sea ice, suffering extensive damage and drifting in the ice for 312 days before reaching New Zealand in April 1916.\(^{211}\) Mackintosh and nine other members of the party were stranded on Ross Island without most of their sledging equipment, and were forced to seek shelter in Scott’s abandoned hut at Cape Evans. Unaware that Shackleton had abandoned the trans-Antarctic journey when his own ship was crushed by ice, the ten men improvised sledging gear out of supplies left by Scott and Shackleton and set out to establish depots. Mackintosh, Hayward, and Spencer-Smith all died in the attempt.\(^{212}\)

The ITAE had no funds left for a relief voyage, so when *Aurora* reached New Zealand with news of ten men stranded at Ross Island, Shackleton’s wife approached Fisher, now the Australian High Commissioner in London, to enlist his support in asking the Commonwealth to fund a rescue.\(^{213}\) Fisher agreed, and by May 1916 the British, Australian, and New Zealand governments were in discussions over relief expeditions to both the Ross and Weddell Seas.\(^{214}\) Advisory committees, which included Mawson, Masson, Taylor, and Kinsey, were appointed in London, Melbourne, and Dunedin, the badly damaged *Aurora* was requisitioned,

\(^{213}\) MS 1537/2/36/1-2, Emily Shackleton Collection, SPRI, Draft Letter from Emily Shackleton to Andrew Fisher, 17 April 1916, Letter from Fisher to Emily Shackleton, 25 April 1916’.
\(^{214}\) NAA: A2, 1920/656, Cablegram from Colonial secretary to Prime Minister’s Department, 3 May 1916, Minute on Relief Expedition to Antarctic, Memorandum from W.R. Creswell, 5 May 1916, Memorandum from J.H. Starling to Secretary to the Governor-General, 8 May 1916; MS 1537/2/32/17:D, Shackleton Collection, SPRI, Proposals of the Endurance Relief Committee, May 1916; MS1537/2/36/3:D, Mawson Collection, SPRI, Letter from Mawson to Emily Shackleton, 14 June 1916.
and Davis was appointed commander of the Ross Sea relief expedition.\textsuperscript{215} When Shackleton reappeared and managed to rescue the Weddell Sea Party himself with the assistance of the Chilean government, attention focused on the Ross Sea Party. The British government agreed to fund half the cost of the rescue, leaving Australia and New Zealand to fund the other half proportionately according to population, eventually contributing £8,645 6s. 7d. and £1,950 16s. 2d. respectively.\textsuperscript{216} The relief expedition departed on 20 December 1916 and successfully rescued the seven survivors after a largely uneventful voyage.\textsuperscript{217}

While this thesis focuses primarily on the articulation of ideas about Antarctica and Australia’s relationship with it, the rescue of the Ross Sea Party highlights how ideas can be reconstructed from actions as well as pronouncements. The archival record of the Ross Sea relief expedition does not contain any discussion of why the Australian government felt compelled to fund a costly expedition to rescue ten men on a remote Antarctic island at the same time as 23,000 Australians were killed or wounded in the Somme offensive. Yet despite lingering resentment over the \textit{Aurora}’s expensive overhaul at Cockatoo Island, Shackleton’s failure to have contingencies in place, and his poor treatment of the Australian advisory committee, there was no discussion about whether the rescue was truly Australia’s responsibility.\textsuperscript{218} That there was no controversy or hesitancy about the rescue indicates that Australians saw the Antarctic as a particularly Australian sphere of interest. The AAE, which was justified as an opportunity to claim Australia’s rightful Antarctic territory before foreign powers could usurp it, to directly benefit Australia through scientific and industrial research, and to claim Australia’s position as a respected and influential state capable of feats of

\textsuperscript{217} J.K. Davis, Report to the Australian Aurora Relief Committee, 6 December 1916, MS 8311-3234/9, SLV.
\textsuperscript{218} See for example NAA: A1, 1916/28842, Cablegram from External Affairs to Fisher, 6 November 1916.
scientific exploration, showed that ideas about Australia’s rights in the Antarctic were remarkably consistent, durable, and influential. Australian reactions to Scott’s death in 1913 and the crises that embroiled the ITAE in 1914-16 showed that, by the early-twentieth century, Australians also had a coherent conception of their obligations in the Antarctic region.
Chapter 8: The Idea of Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, 1919-33

It is often argued that the First World War fundamentally changed the way the world viewed Antarctic exploration. The war marks the end point of many accounts of the so-called ‘Heroic Era’, the period of intense international interest in Antarctica that resulted in approximately fifteen expeditions to the continent between 1895 and 1917.1 Edward J. Larson argues that the early years of the twentieth century were a time when Europeans found meaning in heroic human struggles against nature and fate, but that the experience of the war “broke the spell”.2 Similarly, Tom Griffiths deems the Heroic Era “Europe’s last gasp before it tore itself apart in the Great War” and suggests that consequently it was Americans, “less traumatised by World War I than Europeans”, who revived Antarctic exploration in the 1920s.3 This emphasis on discontinuity stems from a common-sense assumption that the mass slaughter of the First World War rendered older forms of popular heroism obsolete. Yet, at least in the Australian case, this assumption overlooks significant continuity in patterns of engagement with the Antarctic.

Antarctic exploration retained its fascination for Australians even during the war. There was public speculation about Ernest Shackleton’s whereabouts during his planned trans-Antarctic trek as the war raged in 1915.4 There was public interest in the military careers of Antarctic explorers, particularly Edgeworth David, who enlisted at the age of fifty-seven.5 Shackleton lectured on his Antarctic adventures at the Sydney Town Hall after returning from the Ross Sea Relief Expedition in 1917, just as he had in 1907 and 1909.6 He even became the face of

---

3 Tom Griffiths, Slicing the Silence: Voyaging to Antarctica (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007), 111, 121.
4 For example ‘Shackleton Expedition’, Argus, 29 December 1915, 6; ‘Antarctica’, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 29 December 1915, 9.
5 For example ‘Mawson’s Men at the Front’, Argus, 23 December 1915, 7; ‘Professor David’, Sun, 31 October 1915, 8.
an Australian enlistment campaign, appearing on a poster as “one who has carried the King’s flag in the white warfare of the Antarctic, and who is going now to serve in the red warfare of Europe”. That the New South Wales military recruiting committee used an Antarctic explorer to promote enlistment clearly demonstrates that the war did not simply displace older patterns of interest. Indeed, Wade Davis has argued that three British mountaineering expeditions to Mount Everest in 1921-24 should be understood as part of a revival of popular and individual interest in heroic exploration that was a direct response to the traumatic experience of war. The same could be said for Antarctica.

The post-war period was marked by significant continuity in Australian engagement with Antarctica. For example, Australians continued to consume tales of Antarctic exploration through books. Griffith Taylor’s *With Scott* (1916), Gerald Doorly’s *The Voyages of the Morning*, Shackleton’s *South* (1919), J.K. Davis’ *With the Aurora in the Antarctic* (1919), Herbert Ponting’s *The Great White South* (1921), Edward Evans’ *South With Scott* (1921), Apsley Cherry-Garrard’s *The Worst Journey in the World* (1922), Hugh Robert Mill’s *The Life of Sir Ernest Shackleton* (1923), Frank Hurley’s *Argonauts of the South* (1925), J. Gordon Hayes’ general history *Antarctica* (1928), Taylor’s *Antarctic Adventure and Research* (1930), and Richard E. Byrd’s *Little America* (1930) were all published, reviewed, and read in Australia during or after the First World War. Films remained similarly popular.

---

7 New South Wales State Recruiting Committee, ‘Shackleton's Call to Australia!’ [picture], 1917, 2416960, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales.
Both Hurley’s *South* and Ponting’s *90 Degrees South* were re-released in the early 1930s as talkies, for example, while Hurley’s 1930 film *Siege of the South* was well-received across Australia.¹⁰

Antarctic lectures also retained their popularity in the post-war era. Frank Hurley toured Australia in 1919, giving well-received lectures to accompany his film ‘In the Grip of the Polar Ice Pack’, an account of the ITAE.¹¹ The Newcastle school district gave permission for school children to attend Hurley’s lectures rather than classes, while Brisbane’s *Telegraph* insisted that “there never will be a better picture” and the *Daily Express* deemed the story to be “of untold interest to every Australian”.¹² Douglas Mawson continued to mine his Antarctic experiences for material throughout the 1920s, lecturing on topics such as Macquarie Island, “the great commercial possibilities in the Antarctic Ocean”, and “life and scenery in the Antarctic”.¹³ Most notably, Mawson inaugurated a series of public lectures at Melbourne’s National Museum in 1927.¹⁴ Police were required to prevent hundreds of disappointed people pushing their way into an already over-capacity hall to hear Mawson retell his Antarctic adventures and outline Australia’s right to control the Antarctic.¹⁵

¹⁰ See for example University of Sydney Archives (USA): P11:7:10, Siege of the South Pole Bookings, Letter from Douglas Mawson to F. Strahan, 20 April 1933; MS 964/7/1-37; D, Ponting Collection, Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI), Letter from H. G. Ponting to J. G. Hayes, 16 December 1933; USA: P11:8:2, Mawson Antarctic Film; ‘Siege of the South’, *Sun*, 4 March 1932, 14; ‘With Mawson to Antarctica’, *Education: Journal of the NSW Public School Teachers Federation* 11, no. 10 (15 August 1930), 333.


¹² ‘Antarctic Heroes’, *Newcastle Sun*, 12 December 1919, 4; ‘Shackleton Antarctic Pictures’, *Telegraph*, 5 December 1919, 3; With Shackleton At the Pole’, *Daily Express*, 20 December 1919, 3.


Other AAE members were also in-demand as lecturers. Adelaide geologist Cecil Madigan gave occasional lectures on his Antarctic experiences throughout the 1920s.16 Aurora’s captain J.K. Davis, meteorologist Morton Moyes, and assistant collector J.H. Collinson Close also gave lectures on the expedition.17 Terra Nova veterans similarly found an eager audience for their stories in Australia. Second-in-command Edward Evans gave regular lectures on the expedition during his time as commander of the Royal Australian Navy fleet from 1928-32.18 These lectures were generally in aid of causes such as returned soldiers’ unemployment funds and raised significant sums, including £100 at a single lecture in Melbourne in 1929.19 Griffith Taylor also gave occasional Antarctic lectures.20

“Scores of people were turned away” from lectures by Tasmanian journalist A.J. Villiers on his experiences with a Norwegian whaling expedition to the Ross Sea in 1924.21 Edgeworth David still gave occasional lectures, frequently emphasising the significance of Antarctic meteorology for Australia and the economic value of whales, coal, and gold.22 A new generation of Australian Antarctic explorers, such as Hubert Wilkins and John Rymill, also drew large crowds for lectures in the 1920s and 1930s.23 There was even sufficient public

---

18 For example ‘Scott’s last Expedition’, SMH, 6 December 1929, 14; ‘Lecture on Antarctic Expedition’, BC, 28 July 1930, 8; ‘Antarctic Experiences’, Telegraph, 1 August 1930, 19; ‘Antarctic Expedition’, SMH, 27 November 1930, 16; ‘Capt. Scott’s Expedition’, Mercury, 6 March 1931, 7.
19 ‘Antarctic Expedition’, Age, 11 November 1929, 10.
20 For example ‘Land of Ice and Blizzards’, Kyogle Examiner, 6 September 1924, 1; ‘The Antarctic’, DT, 24 November 1925, 2; ‘University Extension’, Newcastle Morning Herald, 14 July 1926, 8.
23 ‘Arctic and Antarctic’, Telegraph, 19 April 1923, 3; ‘Sir H. Wilkins to Lecture, Herald, 27 May 1933, 10; ‘Explorer’s Tour Postponed’, Herald, 17 August 1933, 25; ‘Rymill’s Polar Work’, Age, 22 June 1938, 8; ‘Boy Scout Association’, Advertiser, 29 June 1938, 12; ‘Antarctic Explorer to Give Free Public Lecture’, Advertiser,
interest for Antarctic stories to be retold by a lecturer with tenuous links to the events. H.W. Harvey, for example, briefly a shipmate of Shackleton’s during the Boer War, retold the story of the ITAE in a 1930 lecture entitled ‘With Shackleton in the Antarctic’.24

Significantly, Australian interest in the Antarctic in the post-war period was not limited to nostalgic tales of past adventures. There continued to be public interest in expeditions, the prospect of economic development, the possibility of polar tourism, the maintenance of subantarctic meteorological stations, and the incorporation of the ‘Australian Antarctic’ into the Commonwealth. A succession of British, Australian, American, and Norwegian expeditions attracted significant attention in the 1920s and 1930s.25 For example, Shackleton launched his third expedition in 1921, outfitting the tiny sealing vessel Quest for a vague programme of oceanographic work that included circumnavigating the Antarctic continent and searching for phantom islands. This proved to be Shackleton’s final expedition, as he died of a heart attack at South Georgia on 5 January 1922.26 Despite the vague and unambitious scope of the Quest expedition and the resentment caused by Shackleton’s actions during the ITAE, the expedition and Shackleton’s death captured public attention in Australia. For example, the Sun purchased the Australian rights to exclusive wireless despatches from the Quest.27 The expedition’s plans and activities were reported on, while news of Shackleton’s death was met with tributes from the likes of David, Hurley, and Victorian ITAE veteran Andrew Jack and memorial sermons in Australian churches.28

24 ‘Gallant Man’, Brisbane Courier, 22 May 1930, 16.
27 For example ‘Shackleton Again’, Sun, 30 June 1921, 1; ‘Shackleton’s Quest’, Sun, 16 September 1921, 1; ‘Sad Ceremony on Poop’, Sun, 2 February 1922, 1; ‘Caught in Ice’, Sun, 6 May 1922, 1; ‘Shackleton’s Memory’, Sun, 29 May 1922, 1; ‘Island of Storm’, Sun, 25 June 1922, 13.
28 For Australian interest in the expedition see ‘Shackleton’s Quest’, Sun, 19 August 1921, 1; ‘Antarctica’, SMH, 24 August 1921, 11; ‘To The South’, BC, 10 September 1921, 12; ‘Into the Ice’, DT, 19 September 1921, 5; ‘Shackleton and the Quest’, Advertiser, 6 February 1922, 6; ‘Antarctic exploration’, Age, 19 June 1922, 9;
In Britain the NAE’s old ship *Discovery*, employed as a cargo vessel by the Hudson’s Bay Company since returning from Antarctica, was purchased by the Colonial Office for use in a long-term biological investigation of the Antarctic.\(^{29}\) The first expedition in 1923 was the start of a series of regular cruises that continued until 1951 to provide the information needed to develop policies for the sustainable management of Antarctic whaling.\(^{30}\) Norwegian whaling magnate Lars Christensen funded his own series of expeditions intended to combine scientific research, geographical discovery, territorial acquisition for Norway, and a hunt for new whaling grounds.\(^{31}\)

American Richard Byrd led three successive expeditions to the Ross Sea in the 1930s.\(^{32}\) These generated particular interest in Australia, both because they were based in the Australasian side of the continent and because Byrd provided a constant stream of wireless updates and radio broadcasts from the Antarctic.\(^{33}\) Byrd’s compatriot Lincoln Ellsworth also

---


\(^{33}\) For example, the *Argus* purchased the Australian rights to the wireless reports from Byrd’s second expedition, see ‘Antarctic Discovery’, *Argus*, 30 May-19 September 1936. See also ‘Byrd Expedition’, *SMH*, 19 September 1933, 11; ‘It Was Station KFV Speaking’, *DT*, 5 February 1934, 6.
led a series of four privately-funded expeditions to explore Antarctica by air in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{34} Ellsworth’s 1935-36 expedition, during which he went missing when his aeroplane ran out of fuel and his wireless failed, highlights another form of continuity in Australian engagement with Antarctica. The Commonwealth Government took the lead in organising a rescue expedition, arranging for the British government-owned \textit{Discovery II} to be diverted from its oceanographic work to search for Ellsworth and his co-pilot.\textsuperscript{35} The £4,484 cost of diverting the ship was shared between the Australian, New Zealand, and British governments, while the Australian Air Force supplied aircraft and pilots to conduct an aerial search at a cost of £1,176 to the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{36} Just as in 1916 when Australia and New Zealand organised the rescue of the Ross Sea Party, the Ellsworth Relief Expedition reflects an understanding that Australia’s unique interest in Antarctica created an obligation to assist those engaged in exploring it. This self-imposed responsibility in the Antarctic predates the codification of Australia’s formal search responsibilities in the Antarctic in the second half of the twentieth century. Ellsworth’s plight and his successful rescue also excited significant interest in Australia, culminating in a formal welcome hosted by the Commonwealth Government and an interview with Ellsworth recorded by Fox News and the Australian Broadcasting Commission when the \textit{Discovery II} arrived back in Melbourne.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{35} National Archives of Australia (NAA): A461, P413/6, Memorandum from Malcolm MacDonald to Commonwealth of Australia.

\textsuperscript{36} NAA: A461, P413/6, Ellsworth Relief Expedition Expenditure for Aircraft and Flying Personnel.

Australians also continued to be well-represented in Antarctic exploration. Hubert Wilkins, a pioneer of aerial photography, was a member of the *Quest* and Ellsworth’s four expeditions, and also led two expeditions to Graham Land in 1928 and 1930 funded jointly by private donations in Australia and American newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst.\(^{38}\) Wilkins’ fellow South Australian John Rymill joined two British expeditions to Greenland before being given command of the British Graham Land Expedition in 1934.\(^{39}\)

A number of schemes aimed to capitalise on the enormous economic potential of Antarctica envisaged by explorers such as Mawson and David. John Cope, biologist and de facto medical officer for Shackleton’s Ross Sea Party, developed an ambitious proposal for a ‘British Imperial Antarctic Expedition’ that was intended “to locate exactly, and claim for the British Empire the vast economic resources already proved to exist in the Antarctic Continent.”\(^{40}\) Cope’s expedition required £150,000 and six years in the Antarctic to establish a network of permanent observatories, prospect for minerals, investigate whale populations, and conduct aerial surveys with a view to collecting all the information required for the commercial development of Antarctica. Despite enthusiasm and endorsements from the likes of RGS secretary J. Scott Keltie, Cope’s grand plan devolved into the most farcical Antarctic expedition of the twentieth century.\(^{41}\) He ultimately led a debt-laden four-man expedition to Graham Land in January 1921 but decided to return home with his disgruntled second-in-command, Wilkins, six weeks later, leaving the other two men to spend a year in Antarctica before being rescued by Norwegian whalers.\(^{42}\)

---


40 SSC/132, Ninnis Collection, Royal Geographical Society Archives (RGS), British Imperial Antarctic Expedition Prospectus.

41 MS 932/9/1:D, Keltie Collection, SPRI, Letter from J. Scott Keltie to H.R. Mill, 2 April 1919.

42 For detailed accounts see Thomas Wyatt Bagshawe, *Two Men in the Antarctic: An Expedition to Graham Land, 1920-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939); David L. Harrowfield, ‘The British Imperial
Unsurprisingly, Cope’s talk of unlocking the economic potential of the Antarctic and securing it for the British Empire attracted significant attention in Australia, where a discourse of Antarctic economic development had been influential since James Ross returned with reports of whales and guano in 1841. Having interviewed Frank Hurley about Cope’s proposal, the *Sydney Morning Herald* remarked “Australians will wake up some day to the immense possibilities that lay to the south of them.” The South Georgia whaling grounds, it said, had produced £1,000,000 of oil in the past year alone, while the subantarctic islands had untouched guano deposits “as rich as any in the world”.43 David reiterated that an expedition like Cope’s would find great mineral wealth in Antarctica, including a vast coal field and probable gold and copper deposits.44 The *Sun* noted that Cope’s proposal differed from previous expeditions by aiming to “mark out a new field for British and Australasian enterprise” in a region with conditions no worse than in Siberia or the Klondike but which offered even greater wealth.45 Griffith Taylor, already building a reputation for his pessimistic views on the future settlement and development of Australia, was a notable dissenter from this view, insisting that any new expedition should be to advance scientific knowledge rather than for commercial gain.46

Further attention came from the role Cope earmarked for Australians. Cope initially appointed Ernest Joyce, now considered an Australian by the local press having lived in Sydney since 1911, as second-in-command and Hubert Wilkins as scientific chief-of-staff

---

45 ‘South Pole’, *Sun*, 12 October 1919, 1; ‘Antarctic Wealth’, *Sun*, 29 December 1919, 6.
and pilot. Hurley was invited to join. Andrew Fisher was persuaded to join the organising committee in London. Reports suggested that “the majority of the scientists are Australians”, and even when Cope’s plans contracted in 1920 Wilkins returned home to recruit seven “Australian experts” for his scientific staff. Despite the collapse of Cope’s original plans, the Australian press continued to report on the expedition’s preparations and activities, focusing particularly on the role of Wilkins. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, for example, noted that Wilkins had drawn on his experience as an Australian to salvage the expedition by developing a new plan to prove that Antarctic explorers could cut costs drastically by “living on the country itself”. The rescue of the two men Cope had left to winter in Antarctica also generated interest.

Cope was not the only Ross Sea Party veteran seeking to leverage his Antarctic experiences into a commercial venture. *Aurora*’s captain, Joseph Stenhouse, launched a proposal for an Antarctic tourist cruise. Stenhouse’s plan to take 200 passengers on a five-month round-the-world cruise capped by a summer tour of the Ross Sea, including visits to Scott, Shackleton, and Amundsen’s bases, dog sledging excursions, a night camping on the Antarctic continent, a demonstration of whales being harpooned and electrocuted, and tours of penguin colonies,

---

47 For example ‘South Pole’, *Sun*, 12 October 1919, 1; ‘Captain Wilkins’, *Sun*, 3 November 1919, 5; ‘Flying to the Pole’, *Sun*, 6 February 1920, 1.
49 ‘Cope’s Polar Expedition’, *Age*, 26 January 1920, 5.
54 MS 964/7/1-37; D, Ponting Collection, SPRI, Letter from H. G. Ponting to J. G. Hayes, 12 August 1930, Letter from Ponting to Hayes, 16 August 1930.
was well-received in Australia. He convinced the Holland-America Line to back the proposal, chartered the Norwegian cruise ship Stella Polaris, and enlisted New Zealander Frank Worsley, captain of Shackleton’s Endurance during the ITAE, to help him lead the cruise. At least one Sydney woman booked a ticket – which started from £500 – and there were rumours Australian cricketer Don Bradman and aviator Charles Kingsford Smith would make the trip. Stenhouse’s planned cruise in the summer of 1930-31 was eventually postponed due to financial difficulties, but he continued to work towards a voyage in 1931-32. The Great Depression foiled this attempt too, and it was not until 1958 that the first Antarctic cruise finally took place.

Aubrey Ninnis, a veteran of Aurora’s ordeal in the ice of the Ross Sea under Stenhouse, developed ambitious plans for an ‘Antarctic Whaling and Development Scheme’ to “develop the Antarctic area into a permanent and important source of production.” Ninnis envisioned a company with capital of £750,000-£1,250,000 raised in Australia and New Zealand to commence whaling in the Antarctic. Whaling would be a guaranteed source of profit, and this profit would initially be used to subsidise survey parties to search for guano and mineral deposits and experiment with other industries, such as fur farming, penguin egg harvesting, and deep-sea fishing. Scientific research would be carried out by scientists attached to the survey parties and based at the whaling stations. An early version of the plan even suggested

---


59 Letter from H. Ninnis to Mawson, 2 April 1928, MS 8311, Box 3251/5, State Library of Victoria (SLV).
establishing an ‘Esquimaux’ colony in the subantarctic. In addition to making the Antarctic productive, Ninnis argued his company would break the Norwegian monopoly on Antarctic whaling and ensure its profits remained in Australia and New Zealand, an argument that reflects a belief that these resources were rightfully Australasian in the first place. He recruited a number of business partners and sought advice from Antarctic experts like Mawson, Davis, and J.J. Kinsey, but eventually abandoned the scheme due to a lack of whaling expertise amongst Australasian seamen, disagreements with his partners, and the announcement of a rival whaling scheme based in New Zealand.

The same interest in economic development was evident in discussions over utilising Tasmania’s most remote dependency. From 1892-1920 Macquarie Island was home to Joseph Hatch’s penguin oil factory, a seasonal operation that attracted criticism for killing 2,000 penguins a day for “a trifling profit of 3d. a head”. Mawson stationed four men on the island from 1911-14 at the request of Commonwealth Meteorologist H.A. Hunt, who was keen for daily meteorological data to be transmitted from Adélie Land to Australia by wireless. The federal government then took over the station in 1913, though difficulties staffing and resupplying it during wartime forced its premature closure in December 1915. During the period of Commonwealth control, however, it was used for agricultural experiments. Meteorological staff were charged with overseeing experiments with chickens,

---

60 Letter from Ninnis to Mawson, 16 March 1928, MS 8311, Box 3251/5, SLV.
61 Letter from Ninnis to Mawson, 2 April 1928, Letter from Ninnis to Mawson, 16 March 1928, Letter from Ninnis to J. K. Davis, 20 April 1928, Letter from Davis to Ninnis, 30 April 1928, Letter from Ninnis to Davis, 24 October 1928, Letter from Ninnis to Davis, 17 February 1929, Letter from Ninnis to Davis, 20 February 1929, MS 8311, Box 3251/5, SLV.
62 LSD177/1/59, 117R/03, State Library of Tasmania Archives (SLT); TRES/1/1236, Correspondence re. Macquarie Island Lease 15 July 1918-26 July 1918, SLT; ‘Australasian Antarctic Expedition’, Mercury, 3 November 1911, 6.
63 USA: P11:7:4, Letter from H.A. Hunt to David, 19 June 1910, Memorandum from Hunt to Home Affairs, 17 October 1910, Letter from David to Hunt, 6 October 1911; Diary kept by L. Blake, 1911-14, MS 9551, Box 471, SLV.
ducks, and sheep, leading to a recommendation that the island could sustain a flock of 18,000 sheep in the future.\textsuperscript{65} Tasmanian governor William Allardyce suggested in 1920 that sheep and fur seal farming could coexist with a “National Reserve for the migratory fauna of the Great Southern Ocean”.\textsuperscript{66} Allardyce’s successor, Ernest Clerk, campaigned for the occupation and utilisation of Macquarie in the 1930s, variously recommending a wildlife sanctuary, elephant sealing industry, meteorology, and a military base.\textsuperscript{67} Mawson made similar arguments throughout the interwar period.\textsuperscript{68} Despite Clerk warning that “a difficult political situation would arise if some other nation took possession of it in the absence of an effective occupation by the Australian government”, however, these plans were ultimately considered too expensive for the returns offered.\textsuperscript{69} While these plans did not eventuate, they highlight the interest in Antarctic development in this period.

It is clear from the continued significance of books, films, lectures, press reports, expeditions, and commercial ventures that Antarctica and Antarctic exploration were as much a source of fascination in Australia after the First World War as they were before it, and that ideas about Antarctica proved remarkably durable. These patterns of continuity are significant. Within fifteen years of the Armistice Australia had formally claimed sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). The acquisition of the AAT has conventionally been seen as the result of a British imperial policy developed and implemented in the metropole. For scholars such as Peter J. Beck Australia was the passive recipient of an Antarctic dependency, not an active partner in its acquisition.\textsuperscript{70} More recently, however, Australian historians such as

\textsuperscript{65} Macquarie Island Weather Bureau Office r’s Report 1916, G093/1/1, SLT.
\textsuperscript{66} Memorandum by W.L. Allardyce, 17 June 1920, in Memorandum for Government House Private Secretary, 25 August 1933, G093/1/1, SLT.
\textsuperscript{67} Letter from Ernest Clerk to Acting Premier, 20 August 1935, Report of Interview between Clerk and Treasurer, 17 December 1937, Letter from Clerk to Premier, 23 December 1937, Letter from Clerk to Treasurer, 19 February 1939, G093/1/1, SLT.
\textsuperscript{68} For example ‘Life and Scenery in the Antarctic’, \textit{Advertiser}, 22 June 1922, 11; ‘Antarctic Continent’, \textit{Argus}, 6 July 1927, 22; Memorandum for Government House Private Secretary, 25 August 1933, G093/1/1, SLT.
\textsuperscript{69} Report of Interview between Clerk and Treasurer, 17 December 1937, G093/1/1, SLT.
\textsuperscript{70} See for example Peter J. Beck, ‘Securing the dominant “Place in the Wan Antarctic Sun” for the British Empire: the policy of extending British control over Antarctica’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 29,
Alessandro Antonello and Marie Kawaja have challenged this interpretation and stressed the role of what Antonello calls Australia’s “long cultural attachment” with Antarctica. This argument recognises that Australia had interests in the Antarctic region from the early-nineteenth century and that it actively sought sovereignty in the twentieth. Yet while Antonello and Kawaja’s work is an important corrective, both take for granted that disparate arguments and events over more than a century constituted a tradition that influenced Australia’s assertion of sovereignty in the 1930s and its obstinate defence of this sovereignty claim in the 1950s. This thesis therefore contributes to and advances this argument by reconstructing the genealogy of Australian ideas about Antarctica in detail. The continuity between pre-war and post-war ways of thinking shows that changes in Australia’s post-war engagement with the Antarctic were primarily an extension of existing ideas, not a departure from them.

The Commonwealth’s policy of acquiring an Antarctic dependency emerged from existing ideas about Australia’s sphere of influence in the Antarctic, the future economic value of the region, and an assumption that ‘Australian Antarctica’ would eventually be brought under Commonwealth control. While these ideas were consistent, the shift from an understanding of Australia having an informal sphere of influence in the Antarctic to a belief that a formal sovereignty claim was necessary was driven by the specific context of the 1920s. In particular, it was driven by changes in the Antarctic whaling industry from shore-based to pelagic whaling, the actions of rival states, and broader support for Australian expansion.

Whaling and Australian Sovereignty


Industrial whaling commenced in the Antarctic in 1904, when Norwegian whaler Carl Anton Larsen established a shore whaling station at Grytviken on South Georgia. Larsen had observed large rorqual whales in subantarctic waters as captain of the Norwegian whaling ship Jason in 1892 and the Swedish Antarctic Expedition’s ship Antarctic in 1901-04. He identified South Georgia as the ideal location for a whaling station and formed a company, Compania Argentina de Pesca (CAP), to begin whaling operations. The CAP proved enormously profitable and sparked an Antarctic whaling boom, as Norwegian, British, Argentine, and Chilean companies commenced whaling using stations at South Georgia and the South Shetlands. In 1911, for example, approximately 1,000 people were living and working on South Georgia across five permanent whaling stations, while 5,500 whales were processed at a value of around £500,000.

While these bases remained in use until the 1960s, Larsen had turned his attention to pelagic or open-sea whaling in the Ross Sea by the 1920s. This was made feasible by the invention of the shipboard slipway, a ramp that allowed whales to be brought on board a factory ship for processing, obviating the need for a shore station. Acting on advice from the Norwegian government, Larsen presumed the Ross Sea was, like South Georgia, claimed by Britain, and applied for a licence to hunt whales there. A five-year licence was granted to Larsen’s Ross Sea Whaling Company in 1922, but the application prompted the British Government to clarify its claim to sovereignty. Having discussed a policy of bringing the entire Antarctic

---

74 MS 1212/1/1, Allardyce Collection, SPRI, Letter from Allardyce to John Anderson, 5 August 1911.
76 Tønnessen and Johnsen, History of Modern Whaling, 347-413; NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 2, Copy of Indenture for Whaling in the Ross Sea, 5 September 1922.
continent under British Imperial control with the Australian and New Zealand governments since 1920, Britain announced in 1923 that the entire region south of 60°S. and between 160°E. and 150°W. constituted the Ross Dependency, and placed it under the administration of the Governor-General of New Zealand.77

After a difficult first season experimenting with the techniques needed to process whales in Antarctic conditions, the Ross Sea Whaling Company enjoyed exceptional success. In 1924-25, for example, a single factory ship produced 31,500 barrels of oil from 427 whales.78 In 1927-28 three factory ships were filled to capacity after just nine weeks of whaling, their combined cargo amounting to 171,311 barrels from 2,012 whales.79 As had occurred in South Georgia, other companies followed Larsen’s lead, and by 1929-30 one British and three Norwegian companies were operating five factory ships in the waters of the Ross Dependency.80

The rapid expansion of Norwegian whaling into a region Australians saw as an Australasian sphere of influence caused consternation in the Commonwealth. When rumours of Larsen’s plans first emerged, J.K. Davis, now Commonwealth Director of Navigation, wrote to J.J. Kinsey to ask him to lobby the New Zealand government to assert its control of the Ross Sea before whaling commenced.81 When whaling did commence, acting Prime Minister Earle Page cabled Prime Minister Stanley Bruce in London to urge him to raise the question of Commonwealth control of the Australian sector with the Colonial Office, as whaling would

---

78 Tønnessen and Johnsen, History of Modern Whaling, 349-351.
79 Tønnessen and Johnsen, History of Modern Whaling, 352-353.
80 Extract from Annual Report of Marine Department, N.Z., for 1929-30, MS 8311, Box 3251/6, SLV.
81 Letter from J. K. Davis to J.J. Kinsey, 23 July, undated, MS 8311, Box 3252/1, SLV.
undoubtedly push into this region if Larsen’s Ross Sea experiments proved successful.\textsuperscript{82} Upon duly raising the matter with the Colonial Office, Bruce was informed that there was “no urgency for Australian action”.\textsuperscript{83} Davis nonetheless predicted that Larsen’s expedition would spark a whaling boom and recommended Bruce reconsider “asserting Australian claims to control Antarctic Seas lying between 160th and 90th East Longitude”.\textsuperscript{84} When Davis’ predictions were borne out by the rapid expansion of the Antarctic pelagic whaling in the 1920s, Morton Moyes warned in a public lecture that Australia was “steadily being pushed out of the Antarctic continent, in which geographically and scientifically it should have so great an interest”, but hoped this could be rectified in the near future by developing an Australian whaling industry.\textsuperscript{85} Mawson was particularly belligerent, claiming in 1929 that, since whales were migratory, others had been “reaping the harvest of the Australian Antarctic” by whaling in the Falklands and Ross Dependencies, and sparking a diplomatic incident by openly criticising Norwegian activities.\textsuperscript{86}

Australians were sufficiently concerned that revenue derived from Antarctic resources was flowing to Norway rather than Australia that attempts to form an Australian whaling company enjoyed significant support. The \textit{Argus} argued in 1920 that it was time to formally claim the Australian sector of the Antarctic and revive “what was once Australia’s greatest industry”, an industry that as late as 1831 was worth more than all other exports combined.\textsuperscript{87} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} bemoaned in 1928 that “Norwegian enterprise has discovered and exploited a field of industry that is Australian by right of proximity and superior natural

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Cablegram from Earle Page to S.M. Bruce 10 December 1923, MS 8311, Box 3252/1, SLV.
\item NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 2, Memorandum on Control of Ross Sea Area.
\item NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 2, Memorandum from Comptroller-General to Prime Minister’s Department, 27 February 1924.
\item ‘Antarctic Whaling’, \textit{Argus}, 28 September 1920, 8.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
advantages.” If Norwegian companies could offer shareholders 45% dividends when its ships had to sail 14,000 miles each way to reach the whaling grounds, could harvest only one cargo each year, and could not process and sell by-products such as ground meat and bone for fertiliser, it argued, then the profits of an Australian company that could harvest three cargoes of oil a year and sell by-products locally would be exceptional. Bruce W. Tilley wrote to the Mercury in 1929 to draw attention to the fact that one Norwegian ship had just returned from the Antarctic with £380,000 of whale oil and to express his frustration that Australia was “making absolutely no attempt to avail herself of the excellent opportunities presented her in this direction, while foreign countries take from the Ross Sea”. Showing that nostalgia for Hobart’s lost whaling industry was still alive in 1930, T. Murdoch told the Mercury that Tasmania had come to “commercial prominence” on the back of Antarctic whaling, and erroneously blamed its decline on federal government interference. When the first Australian government-organised expedition was organised in 1929, both the Sydney Morning Herald and Prime Minister Stanley Bruce suggested it would furnish detailed information about whales in the Australian sector so that the Commonwealth could begin regulating the industry to “preserve it as a permanent source of wealth” for Australian commercial interests. James Rae wrote to Brisbane’s Telegraph in 1930 to declare that “the whaling industry, particularly in Australian and Antarctic waters, is one that rightly belongs to Australia”. ‘Advance Tasmania’ acknowledged in 1931 that the economic crisis meant it was a difficult to start an Australian whaling company, but nonetheless felt it was “very regrettable that so much wealth lies practically at our back door, and no attempt is made to procure it for our own revenue”. He suggested that preparations could be commenced now

89 ‘Letters to the Editor’, Mercury, 8 March 1929, 5.
90 ‘Letters to the Editor’, Mercury, 18 March 1930, 5.
“so as to be able to go right ahead when the depression has lifted”. In the same year Mawson called on Australians to enter “this lucrative field of enterprise, before it is too late”, as he feared that whales might soon be exterminated. Perth’s Daily News returned to the theme in 1933, urging the government to provide “official and speedy backing for Sir Douglas Mawson’s efforts to exploit what is virtually a national industry for Australia.”

There was no shortage of Australian investors ready to heed these calls to break the Norwegian monopoly on Antarctic whaling and revive a virtually extinct ‘national industry’. Ninnis’ ambitious, multifaceted plan to use whaling to subsidise a raft of other experimental enterprises collapsed in 1929, but other Australasian companies attracted greater support. A Dunedin Whaling Company was formed to exploit the Ross Dependency in 1930. The Australian Whaling Company (AWC) was formed in Sydney in April 1929 with plans to raise capital of £750,000, acquire a factory ship and five smaller ‘catchers’, and offer employment to thousands of Australians. This company was envisaged as both a nationalist and a commercial enterprise. For example, one of the company’s directors, the New South Wales government’s fisheries adviser D.G. Stead, declared that he “regarded the exploitation of the wealth to the south of Australia as a national responsibility” while also pointing to the fact that a Norwegian company had obtained £1,000,000 of oil in three seasons. These dual imperatives were made clear in the company’s prospectus, released ahead of an initial offer of 415,000 £1 shares for public subscription. While stressing the company’s economic prospects, the prospectus emphasised that this was “a TRULY AUSTRALIAN INVESTMENT” that would “make room” in the Norwegian-dominated industry for “the

95 ‘Whaling Wealth at our Back Door’, DN 18 February 1933, 15.
97 ‘Whales’, Sun, 21 April 1929, 2; ‘Whaling’, SMH, 22 April 1929, 12; ‘Whaling in Antarctic’, Age, 10 May 1929, 11.
VIRILE YOUNG AUSTRALIAN and NEW ZEALANDER”. The company also explained that, while it would undertake pelagic whaling in the Australian Antarctic as soon as possible, in the interim it had purchased a disused shore whaling station at Norwegian Bay near Exmouth in Western Australia with a view to immediately commencing whaling off the northern and western coasts of Australia until a suitable Antarctic whaling fleet could be assembled. As the company prepared to begin operations in 1930, the *Brisbane Courier* commented that “the seas which wash the shores of Antarctica hold a great measure of potential wealth, … but, while Australians have neglected golden opportunities, Norwegians and others have established profitable industries in the products of areas which rightly belong to the Australian continent.” The *Labor Daily* observed that “a rich harvest awaits the first Australian enterprise to exploit the lucrative field in which the Commonwealth has so far failed to concern itself”, and noted that whaling in the Southern Hemisphere had produced revenue of £8,000,000 in the past year. Despite substantial funding and widespread support, however, the AWC never actually commenced whaling. Mawson joined as the company’s “consultant and adviser” and campaigned for federal government support, while Stead continued to insist that the start of whaling operations was imminent until 1933, but the company’s plans failed to progress further.

The Pacific and Ross Sea Whaling Company was also founded in Sydney in 1929, promising to focus exclusively on whaling in Antarctic waters. While the AWC had Mawson as a prominent backer, its rival boasted former AAE committee chairman Orme Masson as a

director and investor.\footnote{University of Melbourne Archives, Masson Collection, 80/80 105/54, Box 1/3, Letter from Flora Masson to Orme Masson, 24 September 1929.} It differed from the AWC in its greater willingness to cooperate with existing Norwegian whaling interests. Magnus Konow, Larsen’s partner in the Ross Sea Whaling Company, was to be in charge of whaling operations, Norwegians would form a significant element of the company’s crews, and 50,000 shares were reserved for Norwegian investors.\footnote{‘Pacific and Ross Sea Whaling’, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 21 August 1929, 17.} The company issued a prospectus, offered 330,000 £1 shares for public subscription, sent its secretary to England to purchase an ocean liner that could be converted into a factory ship, and forecasted a profit of £175,000 for one season’s whaling.\footnote{‘To Enable Australia to Share in the Huge Profits of Whaling’, \textit{Mercury}, 27 August 1929, 6; ‘Big Whaling Company’, \textit{WA}, 15 August 1929, 17; ‘Whaling Companies’, \textit{BC}, 12 August 1930, 14; ‘Pacific and Ross Sea Whaling Company’, \textit{DN}, 28 August 1929, 2.} Despite its Norwegian ties, the company was heralded as “a genuine effort to secure some of the wealth of the Antarctic for Australia”.\footnote{‘Pacific and Ross Sea Whaling Co. Ltd.’, \textit{Mercury}, 27 August 1929, 4.} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} similarly endorsed the scheme, noting that “with our closeness to the Antarctic whaling area, there should be Australian enterprise engaged there.”\footnote{‘Pacific and Ross Sea Whaling’, \textit{SMH}, 21 August 1929, 17.}

\textit{The Australian Monroe Doctrine and the Australian Antarctic}

In addition to concerns that Australia was falling behind in the exploitation of Antarctic resources, the development of a policy of asserting Australian sovereignty in the Antarctic was also shaped by a broader policy of Australian expansion and concerns about territorial acquisition in the Antarctic by rival states. The inter-war period was an expansionist moment for the Commonwealth. Australia’s attitude in discussions over the future of Germany’s former colonies in the Pacific at the Paris Peace Conference and its post-war control of Papua New Guinea and Nauru as Class C mandates have been examined in depth.\footnote{See for example W.J. Hudson ed., \textit{New Guinea Empire: Australia’s Colonial Experience} (Melbourne: Cassell, 1974); W.J. Hudson, \textit{Billy Hughes in Paris: The Birth of Australian Diplomacy} (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1978); T.B. Millar, \textit{Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977} (Canberra: ANU Press, 1978); Roger C. Thompson, \textit{Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era, 1820-1920} (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980); Roger C. Thompson, ‘Making a Mandate: The Formation of
accounts are comprehensive with regard to the legal, diplomatic, and administrative situation, they have tended to overlook the extent to which expansionism was rooted in a popular resurgence of the Australian Monroe Doctrine. For example, W.M. Hughes told a gathering of Australian soldiers in 1919 that Australia and Japan each had their “own natural sphere” divided by the equator, and added “we have set our faces towards the rising sun, and march towards a great destiny. What America is to-day, we shall be some day.”111 The Newcastle Sun quoted Hughes as saying “what a good Rhine frontier is to France … what the Monroe doctrine is to America, the equitable settlement of the islands in question is to Australia.”112 The Prime Minister also told the Sun’s Peace Conference correspondent that “Australia is committed to a Monroe Doctrine of the Southern Pacific, and its integrity must be maintained. Our warning to the Germans is: ‘Hands off the Pacific!’”113

This policy of excluding foreign powers, specifically Germany and Japan, from a self-declared Australian sphere of interest in the South Pacific was a continuation of the Australian Monroe Doctrine espoused in the 1880s and met with significant public approval. For example, the Sydney Morning Herald insisted in 1915, after an Australian expeditionary force had seized German New Guinea, that now the Commonwealth had “captured colonies from Germany which had been won for civilisation by British missionaries and traders in the first place, we are entitled to hold them for good, and that is the summing up of the whole argument.”114 Brisbane’s Daily Mail endorsed Hughes’ Peace Conference policy, agreeing that “Australia and the United States should have the controlling voice in the administration

---

112 ‘Monroe Doctrine of the Commonwealth’, Newcastle Sun, 4 February 1919, 1.
113 ‘Pacific Islands’, Sun, 15 April 1919, 1.
114 ‘Pacific Problems’, SMH, 12 April 1915, 8.
of the Pacific.”115 E. George Marks was also supportive of Hughes’ position, saying “it is imperative that Australia should look to the future; take no risks by allowing islands of great strategic value to eventually pass into the permanent keeping of a powerful Eastern nation … National and strategic reasons must impel Australia to keep the firmest grip on islands which are inevitably linked with her future greatness and expansion.”116 Drawing on the idea that the Australian Monroe Doctrine was a repudiation of Old World imperialism in the Australian sphere the, Daily Telegraph was at pains to explain that Australia was not desperate to “take on an oversea Empire” and had not “come into the war as militant Imperialists”, as some in Europe seemed to believe, but that it wanted only “peace and security. It would not matter to Australia who owned the Pacific islands, so long as we were in no danger from them. All we are concerned to fight for is that they shall not come under the control of any enemy or potential enemy Power.”117

There was also a significant body of criticism of the idea that Australia’s interests were best served by formally occupying or administering the entire South Pacific. For example, Arthur Griffith urged the Labor Party to oppose Hughes’ proposal to annex Germany’s South Pacific colonies and instead support the internationalisation of the entire Pacific instead.118 Queensland Premier T.J. Ryan similarly argued that internationalisation would prevent Japan from fortifying islands in the North Pacific and would therefore be the best way to ensure Australia’s security.119 Yet while there was no consensus on whether Australian interests would be best served by incorporating Germany’s South Pacific colonies into the

116 ‘Monroe Doctrine’, Sun, 8 February 1919, 3. Marks returned to this theme in two subsequent books, E. George Marks, Watch the Pacific: Defenceless Australia (Sydney: Coles Book Arcade, 1924); E. George Marks, Pacific Peril, or Menace of Japan’s Mandated Islands (Sydney: Wynyard Book Arcade, 1933).
119 ‘Pacific Islands’, Sun, 14 October 1919, 7.
Commonwealth or allowing them to be placed under international control, there was general agreement that the South Pacific needed to form a buffer between Australia and rival powers.

While the future of the Pacific Islands dominated the Australian agenda at Paris, Mawson called on the Peace Conference to also “deal definitely with the allocation of the Antarctic lands.” The issue was becoming more urgent as the economic value of the region was becoming more apparent, Mawson argued, and it was important that “the section of the Antarctic between 90deg. and 180deg. east should be under the control of Australia.” This echoed an earlier private suggestion to Hughes that the question of Antarctic sovereignty be dealt with at the end of the war and that Australia should claim the Australian Quadrant. “The Commonwealth would then stretch from Pole to Equator,” said Mawson, “and supply every possible climate for the production of every possible material in the fullest sense.” The Antarctic question ultimately was discussed but not resolved at the Peace Conference, and David Hunter Miller, a legal advisor to the American delegation, recalled that this was ”at the instance (sic) primarily of Australia”. Article 118 of the Treaty of Versailles did, however, require Germany to renounce its rights to all overseas territories, thereby renouncing any claim to an Antarctic territory.

In the absence of a general international agreement on the future of the Antarctic, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand reached an agreement of their own. British Colonial Secretary Viscount Milner, seemingly unaware of the importance already attached to the issue in Australia, concluded in 1919 that the control of the Antarctic continent and the islands and

120 ‘Antarctica’, Argus, 30 April 1919, 9; ‘Antarctic’, SMH, 30 April 1919, 10.
121 NAA: CP359/2, 9, Claim to Antarctic Lands.
122 David Hunter Miller, ‘National Rights in the Antarctic’, Foreign Affairs 5, no. 3 (Apr. 1927), 508.
seas of the subantarctic “might become of serious interest to the British communities in the southern hemisphere” and should therefore be gradually brought under the control of the British Empire.¹²⁴ Milner’s Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Leo Amery, drafted a proposal along these lines in 1920, and invited Australia and New Zealand to cooperate in this plan to bring the Antarctic under the control of the British Empire.¹²⁵ Amery’s proposal added to the existing rationales of geographical proximity and economic development that the Commonwealth may be specially interested in acquiring control of the Antarctic to ensure that islands could not be used as a base for secret raiding operations on Australia by aircraft or submarine. These British-led proposals culminated in a meeting between Amery, Australian Repatriation Minister Edward Miller, and former New Zealand Defence Minister James Allen in London in February 1921, at which it was agreed that Australia and New Zealand should, like the Falklands, each assume control of an Antarctic dependency.¹²⁶ The question of how to assert sovereignty over these new dependencies, and whether a new expedition would be required to specially raise the flag and perform proclamation ceremonies, was deferred until legal advice was received.

The federal government asked David, Mawson, and J.K. Davis to comment on the proposal. David focused on the potential economic value of the Australian sector, suggesting that the coal field discovered by the AAE would be around 5,000 square miles and produce around 3,000,000 tons of coal per square mile, gold was likely to be discovered, and other minerals such as molybdenum might exist in commercial quantities.¹²⁷ He also reminded the government that he and Mawson had formally taken possession of Victoria Land and the Antarctic Plateau during the Nimrod expedition in 1908 and 1909, while the AAE had taken

---

¹²⁵ NAA: A4311, 362/6, Communication of 6/2/1920 from Leo Amery to Ronald Munro Ferguson.
¹²⁶ NAA: MP1185/9, 453/204/938, Memorandum from Edward Millen to Naval Department, 20 May 1921.
possession of Queen Mary Land in 1912.\footnote{NAA: MP1185/9, 453/204/938, Letter from David to Shepherd, 29 November 1920. See also USA: P11:7, Letter from Ernest Shackleton to David, 1907.} Mawson’s report insisted that “ultimately this region will have a great economic value to Australia and your Government should not pass it by lightly.”\footnote{NAA: MP1185/9, 453/204/938, Letter from Mawson re. future policy in Antarctic Regions.} He argued that whaling would be the main source of value in the immediate future, and therefore supported regulations being introduced to preserve whale populations, but coal, copper, molybdenum, lead, and even wind-powered nitrogen fixation plants would add to the economic value of an Antarctic dependency in the future.

Davis heartily endorsed the prospecting of claiming “the Antarctic hinterland south of Australia”.\footnote{Letter from Davis to E.L. Piesse, 20 July, undated, MS 8311, Box 3232/1, SLV.} His use of the term ‘hinterland’ is intriguing, as it suggests that he conceived of the Australian sector of the Antarctic as a continuation of Australian territory. The hinterland principle was a contested idea in international law in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Initially invoked in the context of European colonisation in Africa, it suggested that possession of a coastal territory bestowed a right to possess the corresponding interior territory, even if it had not occupied the interior. This principle was considered necessary to protect the integrity and security of the territory, but was robustly criticised when applied to the polar regions in the 1920s and 1930s.\footnote{M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law: being a treatise on the law and practice relating to colonial expansion (London: Longmans Green, 1926), 4-6. For criticism of the hinterland principle see Gustav Smedal, Chr. Meyer trans, Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar Areas (Oslo: Kommisjon Hos Jacob Dybwad, 1931).} Davis’ description of a stretch of Antarctica as part of Australia’s hinterland was therefore an assertion that Australia’s relationship with the Antarctic was analogous to its relationship with its continental interior; occupation of the Australian coast bestowed a right to control both the hinterland in the interior of the continent and the lands and seas to its south. A similar implicit understanding of the Antarctic as an extension of Australian territory can be seen in the use of the term contiguity. For example, the Sydney Morning Herald observed in 1933 that “the title created
by discovery is reinforced by contiguity. Hobart is nearer to the Antarctic coast than it is to
Albany.”132 The same term had been used by a member of the Antarctic Committee in
Melbourne in 1888 to call on Australians to explore a land contiguous to their own.133 These
invocations of the concepts of hinterland and contiguity to articulate an understanding of
Australia’s territorial rights in the Antarctic highlights the ways in which non-legal specialists
in Australia developed a distinct, vernacular understanding of sovereignty that emphasised
principles such as spheres of influence, contiguity, sectors, and hinterland that were contested
in mainstream legal thought.134

Mawson’s report also raised concerns about rival claims in the Australian sector. While
France seemingly had an inchoate claim due to D’Urville’s discovery of Adélie Land in
1840, Mawson insisted that all of France’s recent work had focused on the opposite side of
the continent, and the only significant exploration in Adélie Land had been undertaken by the
AAE. He recommended that Australia should not only claim Adélie Land, but also seek
control of French-claimed subantarctic islands in the southern Indian Ocean, as these were of
little value to France but could be invaluable to Australia as wireless or naval bases. Mawson
regarded possible claims by Germany, Sweden, Russia, and Norway as weak, and was far
more concerned about New Zealand. He issued a stern warning that “New Zealand will do
her best to get the control”, particularly as Prime Minister Joseph Ward had “for very many
years been in partnership with Mr. Hatch”, the controversial Macquarie Island penguin oil
entrepreneur. Mawson was concerned that the Colonial Office intended “to allocate the best
of the Australasian Quadrant to New Zealand”, and insisted that Hobart was closer to the
Antarctic than Bluff, Macquarie Island was a more suitable base for whaling than any of New
Zealand’s islands, Australia’s claim was far stronger than New Zealand’s on the basis of

132 ‘Australian and the Antarctic’, SMH, 1 June 1933, 10.
134 For a discussion of these principles see Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory.
exploration, and New Zealand could not, given Ward’s personal investments in sealing, be trusted with the administration of Antarctic industries. Davis was more concerned about the prospect of French and American claims within the Australian sector than his former AAE commander, but he agreed that care needed to be taken to ensure New Zealand did not get any territory west of 160° E.

Despite these concerns, New Zealand’s Ross Dependency was created in 1923 with Hughes’ approval. The creation of an Australian dependency was deferred, however, as the Colonial Office resolved to “proceed more cautiously in the case of the Australian sphere” due to the possibility of a rival French claim and a feeling that “the French are notoriously touchy on such questions.” These concerns proved prescient, as France responded to the creation of the Ross Dependency by asserting its claim to Adélie Land, the Crozets, Kerguelen, St Paul, and Amsterdam Island in 1924. Just as the annexation of the southern Indian Ocean islands had caused alarm and consternation in Australia in 1892, so too did this fresh annexation of a territory assumed to be Australian; it was another case of the vernacular Australian understanding of sovereignty that presumed that proximity to the Antarctic bestowed implicit territorial rights clashing with a French understanding that emphasised discovery, proclamation, and nominal administration.

In response to the French annexation the federal government expressed concern to the Colonial Office that the new French territory would “form serious enclave particularly as no boundary appears to be defined to it”. The government also dissented from Milner and

136 Letter from Davis to Piesse, 20 July, undated, MS 8311, Box 3232/1, SLV.
137 TNA: T 161/186/3, Telegram from W.M. Hughes to Winston Churchill, 15 July 1922.
138 TNA: ADM 116/2386, Memorandum on Control of the Antarctic; NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 2, Memorandum on Control of Ross Sea Area.
139 NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 2, Memorandum from V.W. Bradbury to Australian Navy Board, 10 October 1924.
Amery’s policy of quietly and gradually asserting sovereignty, insisting that “it would be advisable to assert rights over these regions at the earliest opportunity”, as “indefinite postponement of the matter will probably be the cause of difficulty in the future.”

Informal discussions at an international conference in Paris in 1925 even suggest that Australia may have implemented an unofficial policy change. British diplomat Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen was forced to write to the Foreign Office to ask if it knew anything about the Australian government having “claimed that the Ross Sea was Australian water”, as the Norwegian government had been told as such by its consul in Melbourne. The Australian press reported on concerns about the implications of the French announcement. Orme Masson led an Australian National Research Council deputation to Prime Minister Stanley Bruce to protest the annexation, saying that France’s claim had “surprised and alarmed those who have the interests of Australia at heart”. The Council worried that “Australia will lose not only Adélie Land, but all that much larger southern region, of which it is a part and which, on geographical and historical grounds, it is thought, should belong to Australia.” Masson handed Bruce a detailed memorandum that sought to provide the information needed for the government to demolish France’s claim, including arguing that the sector principle adopted by Canada with regard to the Arctic should be applied to the Antarctic, noting that D’Urville had completed only the most perfunctory of surveys of at most 150 miles of coastline, suggesting that Australia’s claim was “strongly supported by both geographical and historical considerations”, the fact that it was only 1,467 miles distant from Hobart, and that all of the significant exploration in the region had been undertaken by Australians. Masson concluded his argument by stressing the value of the Antarctic to Australia, pointing to its scientific and

---

140 TNA: ADM 116/2386, Telegram from Henry Forster to Amery, 4 December 1924.
142 See for example ‘Antarctic’, SMH, 11 February 1925, 18; ’Adelie Land’, Herald, 14 February 1925, 9; ’The Value of Adelie Land’, Herald, 5 March 1925, 8; ’Adelie Land’, Argus, 6 March 1925, 12; ’Adelie Land’, Mercury, 6 July 1925, 2; ’Adelie Land’, Argus, 28 August 1925, 11.
143 NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 3, Memorandum on Australian Sector of the Antarctic and Recent French Claim to Administer Adelie Land.
economic value, its role in forecasting Australian weather, and its appeal to “a very proper national sentiment.” This final point drew on the pervasive idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine, as Masson declared that “it seems not unreasonable to hope that Australia, which already extends its government over such a wide range of latitude and climate, will go still further to the south and thus definitely claim control from the Equator to the Pole.”

Bruce sought to assuage the Council’s fears, declaring that his government “had not the slightest intention of allowing any rights accruing to Australia from the splendid exploration work carried on by Australians in the Antarctic to be overlooked.” He subsequently had the memorandum forwarded to Amery, along with a note explaining that the Commonwealth was anxious to prevent “the establishment by any other country of a considerable enclave in the Australian quadrant”. The government recommended that Australian control of the rest of the quadrant should be proclaimed immediately and France’s claim contested.

This request was considered by the British Committee of Imperial Defence at the 1926 Imperial Conference, but it was concluded that the French claim to Adélie Land was “indisputable” and that France was unlikely to agree to an exchange of territory. The British government was also unwilling to consider the Australian proposal to apply a principle that control of the polar regions “should be in the hands of those countries whose territories are situated nearest to them”, as it was feared that this would aid Argentina’s claim to the Falklands Dependencies. A separate Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic, which included Bruce and Nationalist backbencher Arthur Manning, reaffirmed the decision.

---

144 NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 3, Memorandum on Australian Sector of the Antarctic.  
146 NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 3, Despatch from Forster to Amery, 16 September 1925.  
147 TNA: ADM 116/2386, Committee of Imperial Defence – British Policy in the Antarctic, May 1926’.  
148 TNA: ADM 116/2386, Telegram from Amery to Forster, 18 February 1925; NAA: A981, ANT 4 PART 3, Despatch from Forster to Amery, 16 September 1925.
to “steadily follow up and develop” British claims in the Antarctic rather than risking challenges by rival powers by immediately proclaiming sovereignty and creating an Australian Antarctic dependency. It was agreed to proceed in three stages. First, Britain would advise other states of its intentions by publishing a summary of proceedings of the Imperial Conference that mentioned the empire’s special interest in the Antarctic. Secondly, an imperial expedition would be despatched to take possession of parts of the Australian Quadrant that had not been formally claimed at the time of discovery. Finally, Letters Patent would be issued to annex the area and place it under the administration of the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{149} Even after this plan was agreed, however, Australia again unsuccessfully urged the British government to omit the second stage and immediately issue Letters Patent in 1927 to prevent being forestalled by a Norwegian expedition that was seeking to claim territory in the Antarctic.\textsuperscript{150}

There also remained a wider fear of Australian rights in the Antarctic being lost to a rival state. The Queensland Geographical Society passed a resolution calling on the Commonwealth government to immediately take steps to “secure control of the Antarctic quadrant south of the continent”.\textsuperscript{151} The \textit{Daily Telegraph} quoted an anonymous naval officer protesting in 1929 that America’s talk of claiming Wilkes Land was ludicrous, as “Australians have already explored much of this region, and it should belong to Australia!”\textsuperscript{152} Rumours of an American claim based on the work of either Wilkes or Byrd continued to circulate, however, and were of sufficient concern for Walter Nairn to raise the matter in parliament, asking Prime Minister James Scullin whether there were “steps being taken to claim on behalf of Australia those portions of Antarctica, and the valuable whaling grounds

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{TNA: CAB 32/51, Minutes of First Meeting of Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic, 10 November 1926, Minutes of Second Meeting, 17 November 1926, Minutes of the Third Meeting, 18 November 1926, Report of Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic.}
\footnote{NAA: A461, 1413/1, Australia to D.C. letter of 22 December 1927.}
\footnote{‘The Antarctic’, \textit{BC}, 11 February 1928, 18.}
\footnote{‘America’s Claims in Antarctic’, \textit{DT}, 10 Aril 1929, 8.}
\end{footnotes}
adjacent to them, discovered by the Mawson Expedition?″153 Concerns about an American claim continued even after the annexation of the AAT. For example, there was consternation when Ellsworth conducted flights within the AAT in the 1930s without seeking Commonwealth permission, and the Australian embassy in Washington was asked to informally raise the matter with the United States government to confirm it had “no intention of supporting any claims by Ellsworth in well-known and internationally recognised Australian Sector.”154

It is clear that, contrary to the orthodox view that Australia was essentially a passive recipient of its Antarctic territory, the Commonwealth took a leading role in the development of a policy of formally acquiring sovereignty over the Australian sector of the Antarctic. It first raised the question of Antarctic control at the Paris Peace Conference, developed a clear policy of acquisition informed by the advice of David, Mawson, and Davis and in concert with the Colonial Office, called on the British government to immediately place the Australian sector under Australian control and adopt the sector principle when France claimed Adélie Land, and eventually agreed to a policy of steadily shoring up British sovereignty in the Australian sector at the 1926 Imperial Conference. These deliberate actions were informed by existing ideas about Australia’s relationship with the Antarctic. In particular, it was shaped by the expectation that the Australian Antarctic was destined to become an economically valuable Australian dependency, concerns that this destiny was imperilled by the Norwegian dominance of the Antarctic whaling industry, and the idea of an Australian Monroe Doctrine, whereby foreign powers should be excluded from an Australian sphere of influence stretching from the equator to the South Pole.

Despite the three states mentioned in its title, the British-Australian-New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition (BANZARE) was essentially an Australian expedition. It was announced by Bruce in February 1929, who explained that it was motivated by “the special interest of the Commonwealth in the Antarctic region lying south of Australia”. More specifically, its primary objectives were to survey the coast of the Australian sector, “render the region more safe for navigation”, and conduct research into whale populations in the Australian sector to determine the region’s economic value and provide the information needed to develop regulations “to conserve them as a permanent source of wealth”. While this was the public explanation rationale, in private the reasons for the undertaking were described as “firstly, political; secondly economic and commercial; thirdly, scientific”, with the political motive being the proclamation of sovereignty in as many places as possible between 160°E. and 45°E. The British government offered the use of the NAE’s old ship Discovery free of charge, while the New Zealand government offered £2,500. The Commonwealth would provide the remaining budget of £16,000, though Bruce hoped that private donors would subsidise this. Opposition Labor leader James Scullin offered bipartisan support for an expedition he considered “may enable us to plant the Australian flag on new soil” and provide significant economic and scientific benefits.

To bring the expedition to fruition, Bruce appointed an Antarctic Committee consisting of, Nationalist Senator George Pearce, director of the External Affairs Branch of the Prime Minister’s Department Walter Henderson, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research chief executive A.C.D. Rivett, chief of the Australian naval staff William Napier, Treasury

---

155 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 8, (21 February 1929), 461.
156 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 8 (21 February 1929), 462.
157 USA: P11:7:6, Minutes of Antarctic Committee Meeting 12 March 1929.
159 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 12 (22 March 1929) 1747-1749.
secretary H.J. Sheehan, Mawson, Masson, Davis, and David. The Committee’s principal task was developing a programme of work for the expedition that took into account both the need to raise the flag and proclaim sovereignty at as many previously unclaimed parts of the coast as possible and Discovery’s slow speed and small coal capacity. The result was a plan to depart from Cape Town in October 1929, take on coal at the Norwegian whaling station at Port Jeanne d’Arc on Kerguelen, proceed south to explore the largely unknown Enderby Land, then push as far east along the coast as possible before returning to Australia.

Beyond this, the Committee took charge of financial matters, and secured a donation of £10,000 from confectionary magnate Macpherson Robertson, who declared that he simply “wished to promote Australian interests in the Antarctic”. It was also responsible for selecting the expedition’s staff, and settled on a core of Antarctic veterans; Mawson was in overall command, Davis would captain Discovery, Morton Motes was surveyor, Hurley was photographer, and James Slessor Marr, who had won a competition to accompany Shackleton’s Quest expedition as a boy scout and subsequently become a plankton expert with the Discovery Investigations, joined as marine biologist. Most of the practical arrangements, however, such as selling the American press rights to Hearst and outfitting the ship, were handled by Mawson, Davis, and the Commonwealth’s liaison officer in London, Richard Casey.

---

160 Letter from W. Henderson to Davis, 8 March 1929, Agenda of Antarctic Committee Meeting 12 March 1929, MS 8311, Box 3237/9, SLV; USA: P11:7:8, Letter from S.M. Bruce to David, 18 March 1929, Minutes of Antarctic Committee Meeting 27 March 1929.
161 USA: P11:7:8, Minutes of Antarctic Committee 12 March 1929, Minutes of Antarctic Committee 27 March 1929, Letter from Henderson to David, 30 August 1929.
162 USA: P11:7:8, Minutes of Antarctic Committee 12 March 1929, Minutes of Antarctic Committee 27 March 1929, Letter from Rosaline Masson to Orme Masson, 1 May 1929.
163 University of Sydney Archives: P11:7:8, Cablegram from Richard Casey to Henderson, 4 May 1929, Minutes of Antarctic Committee Meeting 13 May 1929, Minutes of Antarctic Committee Meeting 15 June 1929.
164 See for example USA: P11:7:8, Minutes of Antarctic Committee Meeting 27 March 1929, Minutes of Antarctic Committee Meeting 13 May 1929; J. K. Davis, Journal of a Voyage With Discovery 1929-30, MS 8311, Box 3237/1, SLV.
The fact that shoring up Australian sovereignty took precedence over scientific and even practical navigation concerns was repeatedly made apparent. For example, Davis protested that starting the exploration work at Enderby Land was illogical, but was told by Henderson that it was necessary as “the British title to this region was not very strong at present and that it was desirable to assert it before any other parties could get there before our expedition arrived”, particularly as a Norwegian expedition was likely bound for the same region.\textsuperscript{165} Similarly, Mawson’s sailing orders from the Prime Minister included detailed, prescriptive instructions to visit Enderby, Kemp, Queen Mary, and Knox Lands, go ashore and raise the flag “wherever you find it practicable to do so”, read the proclamation form provided, place copies of the proclamation form on the flagstaff, make a complete record of each “act of annexation” in another form provided, and then provide a detailed report of the annexations to the federal government on his return. In terms of scientific work, by contrast, the sailing orders instructed Mawson simply to “carry out to the best of your ability all scientific work and investigations which it is practicable for you to do”, though it did mention that information about whales and seals that “may assist in the future economic exploitation of such fauna” should be collected.\textsuperscript{166}

The first BANZARE voyage in the summer of 1929-30 was plagued by disputes between Davis and Mawson and Discovery’s technical limitations.\textsuperscript{167} Nonetheless, Mawson succeeded in performing two proclamations of sovereignty in January 1930, the first a full proclamation ceremony at Proclamation Island in January 1930 and the second an ad hoc ceremony involving dropping a flag from an aeroplane and declaring sovereignty over Enderby Land.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{165} USA: P11:7:8, Minutes of Antarctic Committee Meeting 12 March 1929.
\textsuperscript{166} USA: P11:7:8, Letter from Henderson to David, 30 August 1929, Form of Proclamation of an Annexation; NAA: A461, N413/1, Sailing Orders, 30 October 1930.
\textsuperscript{168} NAA: A461, A413/4, B.A.N.Z. Antarctic Research Expedition 1929-30; NAA: A461, C413/6, Letter from Mawson to Strahan, 22 November 1930; USA: P11:7:10, Wireless message from Mawson, 20 February 1931,
Despite the difficulties of the first voyage and the fact Australia had been plunged into severe economic depression, Robertson offered an additional £6,000 towards a second voyage in the summer of 1930-31 and new Prime Minister James Scullin matched this donation to ensure it went ahead. It is perhaps surprising that the BANZARE was authorised despite the Bruce government cutting spending in 1928 and 1929 in the face of a ballooning budget deficit, and even more so that the Scullin government approved a second season’s work in the context of the Great Depression. Yet these decisions attracted remarkably little criticism. Scullin faced occasional queries about the cost of the expedition in Parliament, but these did not escalate into criticism, and the press was largely supportive. An *Argus* editorial, for example, insisted that it was “doubtful whether the Commonwealth will ever again be in such a favourable position to discharge an obligation to science, to the Empire, and to itself by exploring the portion of Antarctic territory which lies to the South of Australia”, and urged both the government and private donors to ensure the second voyage went ahead. Arguably the most severe criticism came in the form of a bizarre letter to the *Age* which rebuked the Commonwealth for failing to develop Antarctic coal deposits into coal depots for the use of the BANZARE or any other “enterprising men with capital who may be moved by a pioneering business spirit to open up this great undeveloped continent in the interests of Australia and the British Empire.” The Depression also failed to dent public enthusiasm for the expedition, and *Discovery*’s reception on its return to Australia was substantially the same as previous expeditions, including being “inundated with visitors” and its staff being

---


169 USA: P11:7:10, Letter from Strahan to David, 20 March 1931; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 21 (22 May 1930), 2044.


171 See for example Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 18 (1 May 1930), 1331; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 31 (29 July 1931), 4623.

172 *Argus*, 14 April 1930, 6.

173 ‘Mawson Expedition’, *Age*, 12 December 1930, 3.
welcomed at a range of public and private receptions.\textsuperscript{174} That the expedition was so uncontroversial in spite of the economic context suggests that the value of exploring and claiming the Australian Antarctic was readily acknowledged by Australians. As Scullin stated when announcing the second voyage, the expedition’s work was deemed “of considerable national interest and importance to the Commonwealth from economic, scientific, and other points of view”.\textsuperscript{175}

The second BANZARE voyage involved a cruise of Macquarie Island, Adélie Land, and Queen Mary Land before completing a survey of the newly-discovered Mac.Robertson Land commenced during the first voyage.\textsuperscript{176} Once again Mawson discovered new lands within the Australian sector and performed a series of formal proclamation ceremonies at King George V. Land, Scullin Monolith, and Cape Bruce.\textsuperscript{177} While the scientific and geographical results of the expedition were less spectacular than those of the AAE, and some of Mawson’s discoveries were contested by the rival Norwegian expedition, it successfully consolidated British and Australian claims in the Australian sector and provided the basis for the annexation of the AAT.\textsuperscript{178} The British government issued an Order in Council on 7 February 1933 asserting sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory and placing it under the administration of the Commonwealth. This was affirmed by the Australian Antarctic

\textsuperscript{174} See for example Journal of a Voyage With \textit{Discovery}, 1929-30, MS 8311, Box 3237/1, SLV; Letter from Kenneth McKenzie to Wm. Lodewyk Crowther, 11 April 1931, CRO1/1/464, SLT.
\textsuperscript{175} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 21 (22 May 1930), 2044.
\textsuperscript{176} NAA: A461, N413/1, BANZARE Sailing Orders.
Territory Acceptance Act passed by in June 1933, though it did not come into force until 1936.\textsuperscript{179}

When the Parliament debated this bill in May 1933, the influence of ideas about Australia’s unique interest in the Antarctic, its proximity, its historical association with the region, the need to develop it into a sustainable source of wealth for the Commonwealth, and concerns about rival states impinging on an Australian sphere of influence were readily apparent. Introducing the bill, External Affairs Minister John Latham asserted that the Australian sector of the Antarctic had “considerable actual and potential economic importance”.\textsuperscript{180} The economic development of the Antarctic had already begun with the whaling industry, and would likely expand into the exploitation of other animals and resources. Between 1919 and 1931, 263,000 whales had been hunted in the Antarctic, while in the 1930-31 season thirty-three companies had employed forty-three factory ships and 232 catchers. It was clear, said Latham, that regulations needed to be made and enforced to ensure that economic development could continue without risking the total extinction of Antarctic fauna.

In response, Labor’s Albert Green lamented that Antarctic whaling had hitherto been “left exclusively to Norwegians”, and insisted that “because Australia is the largest body of land close to the antarctic region, we believe that we are entitled to share in the rich whaling industry carried on in those waters.” Green hoped, therefore, that “by taking possession of this piece of coast, we shall be able to interest Australians in the whaling industry, and will develop in them that bold and adventurous maritime spirit which has for so many centuries characterized the people of Great Britain.”\textsuperscript{181} Richard Casey, now Assistant Treasurer, noted


\textsuperscript{181} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 21 (26 May 1933), 1954.
that while serving as Liaison Officer in London he had been constantly approached with proposals “for the exploitation of our sector of the Antarctic in respect of fur, seals, pelagic fishing of the coast, the farming of foxes, and the collection of penguin eggs”. He was therefore confident that “when the world is restored to some sort of economic sanity, we shall probably be able to begin, without any great delay, the exploitation of the Antarctic”.\textsuperscript{182}

Introducing the bill for its second reading in the Senate, George Pearce insisted that it needed to be passed and passed quickly. Regulations needed to be made to prevent over-hunting before the start of the whaling season, and this, he argued, “should be the duty of the Commonwealth Government.” While there may have been a small element of conservationism in this rationale, Pearce’s argument that the Commonwealth needed to assume control of the Australian Antarctic “to prevent the extinction of these valuable animals” suggests that the desire to preserve whaling as a lucrative long-term industry for Australia was paramount.\textsuperscript{183} Outside of parliament, Mawson declared that Antarctic whaling, sealing, fishing, and mining “likely to assist in the future prosperity of Australia if she safeguarded her interests in the south”, and recommended another expedition be despatched to Mac.Robertson and Enderby Land to prospect for minerals and do further exploration work.\textsuperscript{184}

Political ideas about Australia’s presumed rights in the Antarctic were also evident. Latham noted that the French annexation of Adélie Land had “called attention to Australia’s unsatisfactory position with regard to the Antarctic regions south of this continent”, a point reiterated by Pearce in the Senate debates.\textsuperscript{185} He also warned that “embarrassing circumstances would arise if any other power assumed the control and administration of the

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid, 1955-1956.
\textsuperscript{183} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, no. 22 (1 June 1933), 2017-2018.
\textsuperscript{184} ‘Antarctic as Source of Wealth’, \textit{Advertiser}, 31 July 1933, 8.
\textsuperscript{185} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 21 (26 May 1933), 1951-1953; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, no. 22 (1 June 1933), 2017-2018.
area”, pointing to the example of Britain declining to purchase Alaska before it became one of “the Eldorados of the world.” Casey pointed to the role of Australia in Antarctic exploration, suggesting that the annexation was “the culminating point of twenty years of continuous and concerted effort on the part of Australians to consolidate their interest in the Antarctic.” Casey also recalled discussing the prospect of Australia stretching “from the tropics to the pole” with the editor of the London Times six years earlier. It was, he declared, “something to be proud of that this day has now arrived.”

After some debate about whether the Antarctic Territory would be better administered as a League of Nations mandate than an external territory, would bring Australia into conflict with other states, be a drain on Commonwealth funds, or provide opportunities for foreign employers to exploit Australian seamen in substandard working conditions, the bill was passed with bipartisan support. Melbourne’s Herald welcomed the decision, noting that “both on sentimental grounds … and because we do not know what the future may bring forth, there is reason why the Government should take the simple step of proclaiming its interest in these icy lands before other countries supplant us.” The Sydney Morning Herald went further, observing that “it was only fitting” that the Australian sector of the Antarctic had been placed “as a dependency under the control of the Commonwealth of Australia”, and that “the writ of Australia now runs from the equator to the South Pole”.

As this reaction suggests, the annexation of the AAT was the culmination of the Monroeist vision of the 1880s, an Australian imperium stretching from the equator to the South Pole and

---

189 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 21 (26 May 1933), 1949-1958; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, no. 22 (1 June 1933), 2017-2024.
191 ‘Conquest of the Antarctic’, SMH, 26 December 1933, 6.
from Enderby Land at 45°E. in the west to Norfolk Island at 167°E. in the east. By 1933 the Commonwealth controlled a network of dependencies that could enrich the Australian state, from phosphate mining in Nauru to copra planting in New Guinea to whaling in Antarctica. There was a prospect of these dependencies being made still more profitable if the Antarctic could be turned to account through pastoralism, mining, and fur farming. France retained its possessions in the Antarctic, South Pacific, and southern Indian Ocean, but had become an ally of the British Empire. Germany had been driven out of the Southern Hemisphere, and the equator had become the dividing line between the Japanese and Australian spheres of interest in the Pacific.
Conclusion

In 1936, an editorial appeared in the *Argus* commenting on American polar aviator Lincoln Ellsworth’s imminent arrival in Melbourne. The editorial noted that Australians had a special interest in Antarctica due to “the significance of geographical position, the part played by Australians in Antarctic exploration, and the responsibilities connected with territorial holdings”¹. Focusing on the last of these points, the *Argus* acknowledged that the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) was not presently worth much but insisted that there were “many who regard the continent as a kind of treasure chest of the future”. Australia had “a mandate of Empire to supervise and explore the land and water stretching away to the south”, and it was entirely possible that mining and “summer cruises by air to the Antarctic” would become valuable industries in the future. In short, it said, Ellsworth’s visit would “remind us of our privileges and responsibilities in relation to the great Antarctic continent.”

This editorial encapsulated the ideas about Antarctica that had developed over the course of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and closely echoed comments made in newspapers, deputations, letters, public meetings, books, lectures, and papers in the preceding decades. From the mid-nineteenth century to the 1930s, Australians considered themselves to have a special interest in the Antarctic region based on geographical proximity, historical connections to Antarctic exploration, and broad conceptions of Australia’s destiny to be the great power of the Southern Hemisphere. By the turn of the twentieth century, this idea of a unique interest had developed into a more coherent conception of territorial rights. The Antarctic came to be considered not just proximate to Australia but contiguous to it, while the exploratory work of Australians was seen as creating not just a historical connection with the region but the inchoate right to sovereignty bestowed by discovery. In the context of the 1920s and 1930s, an international era of expansion and irredentism, the idea that the

¹ *Argus*, 15 February 1936, 24.
‘Australian Antarctic’ was rightfully Australian reified and informed a policy of acquiring sovereignty over the AAT.

This conception of an Australian sphere of interest in the Antarctic was closely related to the idea that the Antarctic was, in the words of New South Wales Lieutenant-Governor William Cullen, “a golden El Dorado down south”, a region that had been overlooked because of its inhospitable conditions but which would, like the goldfields of Klondike, Alaska, and Siberia, become a source of immeasurable wealth in the future.2 From James Clark Ross’ report of right whales and guano in the Ross Sea in 1841 to proposals for mining, sheep farming, sealing, fur farming, and tourism to concerns that Australia was missing out on a pelagic whaling boom in its own seas, ideas about Antarctica were dominated by an assumption that it was destined to become a valuable, productive dependency of Australia.

The stories of Australia’s long interest in the Antarctic, its involvement in Antarctic exploration, and its acquisition of the AAT have been told to varying degrees.3 These accounts have not, however, attributed any real significance to the role of ideas in Australia’s relationship with the Antarctic region, nor to the Antarctic’s role in shaping the attitudes and worldviews of Australians. These histories of Australia and Antarctica have also had very little impact on broader histories of Australia. The Antarctic remains as peripheral

---

2 ‘Mawson Expedition’, *Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH), 14 June 1911, 14.
intellectually as it is geographically in Australian history. This thesis seeks to address this gap. By using Australia’s engagement with the Antarctic to reconstruct a genealogy of Australian ideas about the region, it contributes to the cultural and intellectual history of Australia. By reconceptualising the acquisition of sovereignty over the AAT in 1933 as the logical outcome of these ideas, it contributes to debates about state formation and expansion, and suggests that the history of the Australian Antarctic reveals a broader process of small state imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century.

This thesis makes five key arguments. First, it seeks to place ideas at the centre of accounts of Australia’s interest in the Antarctic. Australia’s acquisition of the AAT occurred within thirty-two years of federation and at a time when the Commonwealth was crippled by economic depression. Why would a relatively small, newly-formed, politically and economically marginal state provide more than £14,000 for a well-equipped expedition to sail along the Antarctic coastline proclaiming sovereignty and drop flags from an aeroplane at a time of soaring unemployment, cuts to government spending, and a constitutional crisis in New South Wales? Furthermore, why was there no significant backlash to this decision? This thesis argues that Australia’s acquisition of the AAT cannot be understood in purely geopolitical and diplomatic terms. Australian imperialism in the Antarctic, and indeed the polar expansion of other equally unlikely empires, are best explained by complex patterns of sustained cultural, economic, political, and intellectual engagement with the Antarctic region. Diplomatic sources can be used to reconstruct the mechanics of Antarctic expansion, but a systematic study of the ideas that underpin it is necessary to understand it.

4 University of Sydney Archives: P11:7:10, Statement of Receipts and Expenditure for BANZARE Trust Fund to 27 Sep. 1933.
Secondly, this thesis argues that the history of Australia’s Antarctic obsession contributes to the cultural and intellectual history of Australia in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, casting new light on the ideas, preoccupations, and mentalities of Australians. The consistent application of ideas about settlement, occupation, and economic development to the Antarctic highlights the significance of the idea of unlocking the land in Australia. It is no coincidence that Australian proposals to develop the Antarctic from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century overlapped with attempts to encourage closer settlement and economic development in the sparsely settled parts of the Australian continent, such as the selection acts, soldier settlement schemes, closer settlement schemes such the Burnett and Callide Valley schemes in Queensland in the 1920s, and projects such as the Ord River Scheme in the 1930s and 1940s.\(^\text{5}\) The same desire to develop the interior drove the efforts to develop the Australian Antarctic. Indeed, just as a litany of failures did not undermine Australian enthusiasm for northern development schemes, the idea of making use of the subantarctic survived the adoption of environmental conservation policies in the 1960s.\(^\text{6}\) As recently as 1998 there was serious research into the possibility of introducing subantarctic plant species to Australia for food production.\(^\text{7}\) The invocation of concepts such as proximity, contiguity, and hinterland provides an insight into how Australians understood sovereignty. The idea that Australia could claim contiguity with the Antarctic across 3,500 kilometres of ocean indicates a remarkably oceanic understanding of space, one that can perhaps be explained by the fact


that connections between the colonies and with the rest of the British Empire were reliant on maritime networks throughout this period.  

Most significantly, Australian engagement with the Antarctic reveals the complex place of empire in Australian thought. Discussions of Australia’s relationship with empire have often been viewed through the lens of a broader debate about the role of ‘Britishness’ in Australian history. This debate centres on the extent to which Australian politics and culture were shaped and characterised by ‘Britishness’ and British imperial loyalty on the one hand and Australian nationalism on the other. Neville Meaney, for example, argues that Anglo-Australian differences “were merely conflicts over interest”, rather than based in any substantive cultural differences or Australian nationalism. This thesis suggests that ideas about the Australian Monroe Doctrine, Australia’s unique relationship with the Antarctic, and its destiny to control a territory stretching from the equator to the South Pole highlight the limitations of this blunt distinction between culture and political interests. Australians understood the world through a lens of empire, but this did not simply take the form of blind loyalty to the British Empire. Commitment to the British Empire existed alongside a commitment to a future Australian Empire straddling the Pacific, Indian, and Southern Oceans. Australia was understood simultaneously as both an outpost of Britain and as a new

---

10 Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australia’, 121.
Britain, destined not only to perpetuate the British Empire but to replicate it, to follow the mythologised example of Elizabethan England, when explorers “made their way into newly discovered lands, establishing themselves in the most promising regions and defying all efforts to dislodge them.”¹¹ These dual commitments also coexisted with a tendency to conceive of Australia in opposition to empire. The Australian Monroe Doctrine and its application to the Pacific, Indian, and Southern Oceans was fundamentally about the exclusion of Old World empires for fear that their presence would reproduce the wars and corruption of the Old World in the sphere of the New. It was as much a repudiation of Old World imperialism and a statement of New World liberty as a manifesto of Australian expansionism. Yet in spite of the inherent tensions between these ideas, it was only when they came into direct conflict, such as during the New Guinea annexation crisis, that Australians were forced to privilege any one over the other. Thus Australians could declare that there was no place for Old World imperialism in the South Pacific at the same time as they petitioned the British Empire to annex new Pacific territories, or assert sovereignty over the 42% of the Antarctic continent deemed to constitute a specially Australian sphere of influence whilst relying on British legal instruments to do so. Australians’ relationship with empire was based on these multiple, overlapping, and often contradictory understandings and discourses, and cannot be understood by isolating the cultural from the geopolitical. Significantly, this was never a uniquely Australian phenomenon. The concept of imperialism, for example, had similarly contradictory meanings in Britain in the nineteenth century, including as both a critical discourse to describe the expansionism of non-British states and a positive discourse to advocate the maintenance and expansion of the British Empire.¹²

---

The third key argument made by this thesis is that the significance of Australian expansionism has been underestimated in several ways. Histories of Australian expansionism have focused on Australian ambitions and activities in the Pacific in isolation. Even broad studies such as Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward’s collection *Australia’s Empire*, which explicitly set out to examine “how Australia’s Empire was as much the project of the colony as of the metropole” contains just one mention of the Antarctic, and this a remark that royal place names in the AAT are evidence of the British monarchy’s place in the Australian mentality.13 Any account of Australian imperialism that examines only half of the intended empire is necessarily fragmentary. By reconstructing contemporary visions of what may be called Australia’s sphere of interest, sphere of influence, imperium, or empire and recognising the place of the Southern and Indian Oceans in it, this thesis argues that Australian imperialism was more ambitious, multidirectional, and successful than has hitherto been recognised. For example, New South Wales politician Ned O’Sullivan argued in 1905 that Australia occupied the most naturally advantageous position in the world, “with vast oceans all around her. To the east the Pacific, with its myriad of islands, each one to be a centre of trade and commerce in the future; to the west and north the Indian Ocean, the highway to Asia, Africa, Europe, and Western South America; to the south the Antarctic Ocean, with its great possibilities in the way of whaling, sealing, fishing, and perhaps another Klondyke near the volcanoes which exist there… The nation that is paramount on those oceans – and that should be our destiny – will be the nation that will become the arbiter of the fate of more than half mankind.”14 By 1933, Commonwealth control had extended across

much of the region outlined by O’Sullivan; as the *Sydney Morning Herald* noted, “the writ of Australia now runs from the equator to the South Pole”. Australian imperialism in the Pacific was just one part of a long-standing vision of Australia’s destiny that shaped the borders of the Commonwealth.\(^{15}\)

With the notable exception of Marilyn Lake, historians of Australian expansionism have also tended to underestimate and downplay this process linguistically as well as spatially, shying away from the term ‘imperialism’ by adding qualifiers such as ‘mini’ or ‘sub-imperialism’.\(^{16}\) Luke Trainor even adds the term “imperial business partnership” to the hesitant vocabulary of the field.\(^{17}\) While the use of these terms is an attempt to recognise the specific nature of Australian expansionism and its relationship to British imperial expansion, they obscure more than they clarify. They imply that Australian interests were subordinated to British interests in processes of expansion, an implication that does not accurately reflect the ways in which Australians articulated and defended their interests. Terms like sub-imperialism also place the emphasis on the mechanisms by which Australia acquired control of its sphere of influence at the expense of the ideas that articulated, delineated, and justified it. In the case of the AAT, annexation relied on British legal instruments but was the culmination of more than a decade of Australian campaigning informed by coherent ideas about Australia’s rights in the Antarctic.

\(^{15}\) ‘Conquest of the Antarctic’, *SMH*, 26 December 1933, 6.


Finally, these terms obscure international comparisons by emphasising the role of an accepted imperial power in Australian expansion. Australia was far from the only small, expansionist state in this period, and Australian expansion should be understood in its global context. When historians turn their gaze from the obviously desirable portions of the globe to consider empty, remote, peripheral, and hostile spaces a much wider process of imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries becomes visible. While New Zealand’s expansionism in the Pacific and Antarctic could perhaps be considered sub-imperialism, the term’s limitations are readily apparent in the cases of Canadian assertions of sovereignty in the Arctic, Norwegian sovereignty claims in territories such as Svalbard, Jan Mayen, Greenland, Bouvet Island, and Queen Maud Land, and overlapping Chilean and Argentine claims in Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego, the Falkland Islands, South Orkneys, South Shetlands, and Antarctic Peninsula. Australian expansionism should be understood in the context of these and other cases of expansion by small states without any kind of imperial partnership. This thesis therefore argues that Australian expansionism in the Antarctic and the Pacific should be understood as imperialism, albeit a kind of small state imperialism characterised by tentative expansion by relatively new, relatively small states into regions that had been undervalued and overlooked by great powers.

When Australian imperialism is viewed in this way, it supports the view that processes of empire building are fundamentally connected to processes of state formation. Historians of state formation and empire building have examined the interconnection between these processes in the early-modern period. David Armitage, for example, argues that early English empire building was an extension of state formation.\(^{19}\) Little attention has been paid, however, to the same interconnections in modern states, despite the fact that external territorial expansion by new states was more common at the turn of the twentieth century than in the early-modern period. Incorporating the imperialism of states like Australia in regions like the Antarctic into this frame of analysis reveals that the link between state formation and empire building is not unique to early-modern Europe or to archetypical empires. There is potential for considerable further research in this field. The Australian case, for example, where visions of an Australian empire predated the creation of an Australian state and were central to the federation process, suggests that the creation of an empire can itself be a driver of state formation.

In asserting the significance of Australian imperialism, both as an idea in Australian thought and as an expansionist practice, this thesis makes two further claims. First, it suggests that empire was a far more common form of political organisation in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries than is normally recognised. Empire building was not limited to the great powers’ activities in Africa and Asia; the same processes of imperial expansion were actively pursued by smaller states in the peripheral regions of the world. Secondly, it suggests that empire building was fundamentally linked to statehood. J.R. Seeley argued in 1883 that the British Empire was “not an empire at all in the ordinary sense of the word. It does not

consist of a congeries of nations held together by force, but in the main is one nation, as if it were no empire but an ordinary state.20 His contemporary F.W. Maitland described the same polity as “the modern and multicellular British state – often and perhaps harmlessly called an Empire”.21 While both Seeley and Maitland were referring specifically to the British Empire, their conceptions of it provide a useful way of thinking about empire more generally. Imperialism in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was fundamentally a process of extraterritorial expansion by states. It did not require extensive imperial administrations, titles such as ‘empire’ or ‘emperor’, colonies, vast resources, or even human subjects, only basic assertions of sovereignty over territories. Such assertion could range from proclamations, settlement, and taxation to the establishment of post offices, meteorological stations, and castaway depots in the Antarctic. At home this process of extending control over internal regions was called state formation, while abroad it was empire-building, but the process was in many respects the same.

The fourth broad contribution of this thesis is to consider why ideas of an Australian empire stretching from the Antarctic to the Tropics were so durable and influential in Australian thought. Australia’s claims to a Monroe doctrine of its own and an imperium encompassing much of this region have not been taken seriously by most Australian historians. Partly this is because Australia’s claims look absurd in retrospect. The Commonwealth’s possessions were, and are, effectively exclaves, detached from the metropole by vast stretches of international waters. Yet visions of Australian empire should serve as a reminder of the oceanic mentality of nineteenth and early-twentieth century Australia. The colonies’, and later the states’, most important connections were with each other and with Britain and its empire. Despite the growing significance of terrestrial connections such as railways, roads,

and telegraph lines in the early-twentieth century, Australia was still reliant on maritime networks and the sea was still perceived as a bridge, not a barrier. As Ned O'Sullivan argued, it was Australia’s position at the confluence of three great oceans that gave it “the most strategic position in the Southern Hemisphere”.\textsuperscript{22} England was Australia’s exemplar, a small, insular state that expanded to control an empire stretching from Canada to New Zealand through exploration, trade, and maritime supremacy. For Australians, then, there was nothing unusual in the idea of a small state at the edge of the world acquiring an empire of ice, sea, and islands.

In terms of why such an empire was necessary or desirable, the most compelling explanation is one that enjoyed wide circulation for much of the period. Discussing the future of the British ‘world-state’, Seeley observed that that a small state might be an ideal form of polity, but that “a small state among small states is one thing and a small state among large states quite another.”\textsuperscript{23} There was nothing“ more delightful than to read of the bright days of Athens and Florence,” he said, “but those bright days lasted only so long as the states with which Athens and Florence had to do were states on a similar scale of magnitude. Both states sank at once as soon as large country-states of consolidated strength grew up in their neighbourhood.”\textsuperscript{24} For Seeley, then, expansion was not desirable in itself, but was something necessary for a state’s survival. This was not a particularly radical interpretation of imperialism, and similar arguments have been made in a variety of contexts. Niccolò Machiavelli, for example, argued that “it is impossible for a republic to remain in the quiet enjoyment of her liberty and its limited territory; for even if she does not molest others, others will molest her, and from being thus molested will spring the desire and necessity for

\bibliography{\textsuperscript{22} ‘Australian Natives Exhibition’, DT, 13 October 1905, 3. \textsuperscript{23} Seeley, The Expansion of England, 300. \textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 300-301.
conquests.” John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson suggested that the British Empire expanded through formal annexations only when its economic and strategic needs could not be met by informal means of control, rather than because of any positive desire for a colonial empire. The same idea can be seen in the *Daily Telegraph*’s frustrated insistence that Australia did not enter the First World War on a mission of territorial expansion but had reluctantly accepted that controlling external territories was necessary to ensure the security of the fledgling Australian state. For small states coming into existence in an era of new imperialism, expansion was an essential aspect of statehood. It was for this reason that so many discussions about Australia’s future in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century took for granted that Australia’s destiny lay beyond the limits of the continent. Surrounded by the spectre of expansionist rivals, be they France and Germany in the 1880s or Japan, Norway, and (for Mawson at least) New Zealand in the 1920s, following in the expansionist footsteps of England and America and seizing territories before they could be seized was seen as the way to ensure the security of the Australian state. While there were other ideas about how the state could be secured, such as a strain of non-interventionist internationalism that advocated measures such as placing the Pacific Islands under international control, these were less influential in the period under study.

This idea of preventative expansion was evident in Australian discussions about the Antarctic. The *Bunyip* warned in 1886 that “we have the Germans and French in our neighbourhood, and stimulated with a thirst for discovery, and a desire to increase their resources, so while we are dreaming they may be exploring.” In the same year J. Gavan Duffy urged Victoria to “take possession of the islands in the Southern seas, otherwise some

---

other Power would do it, and we should realize their importance when too late.”

Henry Copeland warned in 1899 that Australia needed to gain control of subantarctic Kerguelen Island immediately at a time when “all the Great Powers are so busily employed in acquiring territory, no matter how small or unproductive”. Richard Casey argued in 1933 that the annexation of the AAT was necessary because “if we do not take this sector, and claim sovereignty over it, some other country will, and it is undoubtedly to the benefit of Australia to be in possession of this land surface, with its unknown potentialities, so close to our shores”. The Antarctic was understood as desirable because of ideas about its past, present, and future economic value, its scientific worth for fields such as meteorology and terrestrial magnetism, and Australia’s geographical and historical connections with the region, but annexation was seen as desirable and necessary to prevent it from being occupied, exploited, or over-exploited by other states.

Finally, this thesis seeks to provide a model for incorporating empty, peripheral spaces like the Antarctic into broader historical debates and narratives. In doing so it contributes to a recent movement in histories of the Antarctic region to recognise the role of the Antarctic in broader, often global patterns of imperialism, colonialism, nationalism, geopolitics, capitalism, and science. More broadly, it contributes to recent debates about the scope of global history and particularly about the scope and methods of global intellectual history.

---

29 ‘Minutes of Council Meeting of Royal Society of Victoria, 7 April 1887’, MS 11663, State Library of Victoria; ‘Antarctic Exploration’, Herald, 4 August 1886, 3.
30 Henry Copeland, Kerguelen Island and Australian Commerce (Sydney: John Sands, 1899), 6.
While this thesis deals principally with ideas about the Antarctic within the national context of Australia, it also recognises the global context of these ideas. It argues that the Antarctic was bound up in global circulations of ideas, particularly ideas about the role of science, exploration, and imperialism in demonstrating statehood. In doing so it suggests that this remote, icebound region without permanent human inhabitants, let alone intellectuals, falls within the scope of global history. This field cannot afford to ignore the vast majority of the globe that is uninhabited or uninhabitable, seldom visited or seasonally occupied. The oceans and ice packs, the Arctic and Antarctic regions, the small islands of the subantarctic and coral atolls of the Pacific, the inhospitable mountains and arid interiors may not be permanently occupied, but ideas, empires, and economic systems do not stop at the limits of human settlement.
Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archival Sources

Australian Museum


Caird Library and Archive, Royal Maritime Museum Greenwich
Letters – individual documents, AGC/W/14.


Thomas Henry Tizard Collection, TIZ/49.

Uncataloged Material, MSS 80/044.

Uncatalogued Material, MSS 81/192.

National Archives of Australia


NAA: Sydney Collector of Customs, Correspondence in connection with the Immigration Restriction Act Outward letter book, November 1904 to June 1906, A1026, VOLUME 1, 1904-1906.

NAA: Sydney Collector of Customs, Register of Ships Fees, 3 January 1906-31 December 1912, P1132/9, NN.

NAA: Prime Minister’s Office, Shackleton Antarctic Expedition, 1907-1909, A2, 1909/2497.


NAA: External Affairs, Australian Antarctic Expedition (Dr. Douglas Mawson), 1911-14, A1, 1915/5159.
NAA: Australian High Commission, Correspondence associated with Douglas Mawson's 1911-1914 Australasian Antarctic Expedition: includes applications for the South Polar Medal, 1911-1918, A2911, 1109/1911.


NAA: Navy Office, Report by the Australian Advisory Committee on the Ross Sea Relief Expedition, 1917, MP472/1, 2/17/1182.


NAA: External Affairs, Antarctic Control II - from Imperial Conference 1921 to March 1924, A981, ANT 4 PART 2.

NAA: External Affairs, Antarctic Control III March 1924 to Imperial Conference 1926, A981, ANT 4 PART 3.


NAA: External Affairs, Expeditions - British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition summary of London correspondence 22 December 1927 to 4 April 1929, A461, I413/1.


NAA: External Affairs, Ellsworth flight to the South Pole [Antarctic], 1935-1939, A461, P413/6.

National Library of Australia
Royal Geographical Society Archives
Aubrey Howard Ninnis Collection, SSC/132/1-4.
Ernest Henry Shackleton Collection, MS EHS/1-15.
Robert Falcon Scott Collection, MS RFS/1-4.

Royal Historical Society of Victoria
Correspondence with Sir Thomas Elder and with the Royal Academy of Science Stockholm, L1B005938za, X 919.45 MAC.
Progress Report of the Antarctic Exploration Committee, PAM205, Royal Historical Society of Victoria (RHSV), Melbourne.

Royal Geographical Society of Australasia Minute Books, 1897-1913, MS 000688, Box 228/1.
Royal Geographical Society of Australasia Papers, MS 000142, Box 50B.

Royal Society Archives
British Antarctic Expedition 1910 Papers, MS/594/19.
Captain Scott Fund Papers, MS/595/9.

Scott Polar Research Institute Archives
British Antarctic Expedition 1907-1909 Collection.
British Antarctic Expedition 1910-13 Collection.
Edgar and Leonora Speyer Collection.
Emily Shackleton Collection.
Ernest Henry Shackleton Collection.
H.G. Ponting Collection.
Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition Collection.
John Joseph Kinsey Collection.
John Scott Keltie Collection.
Roald Amundsen Collection.
Robert Falcon Scott Collection.
William Lamard Allardyce Collection.
William Speirs Bruce Collection.
State Library of New South Wales
New South Wales State Recruiting Committee, ‘Shackleton's Call to Australia!’ [picture], 1917, 2416960, Mitchell Library.

State Library of Tasmania
Antarctic Whaling including articles on the Norwegian Ross Sea Whaling Expeditions, 1924-1926, NS21/28/1/2, Box NS21/26/4.

British Australian New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition of 1920-30, CRO1/1/464.

Correspondence re. Macquarie Island Lease (File no. 2575), 15 July 1918-26 July 1918, TRE5/1/1236.

Correspondence from the Treasurer to the Premier re. the Steam Whaler ‘Antarctic’ Catching Seals in the South Seas, TRE1/1/2383, Box TRE1/59.

Joseph Hatch and Co., LSD177/1/59, 117R/03.

Letters Relating to the Voyage of HMS Erebus And Terror 1839-43, Ns3677.

Macquarie Island Files, G093/1/1.

Treasury Department General Correspondence (2) 1869-1902, TRE1/1/1/1966, Box TRE1/50.

State Library of Victoria
Antarctic Diary of Robert Bage, November 1911-January 1912, MS 14209, Box 4176/3.

Australian Antarctic Expedition Diary kept by L. Blake, Geologist & Surveyor, 1911-1914, MS 9551, Box 471.

John King Davis Papers, MS8311.

Royal Society of Victoria, MS 11663.

Autograph Collection, MS 13020, Box 5/2.

State Library of Western Australia

Sydney University Museums
British Antarctic Expedition Photographic Prints, HP88.47.

Photographic Album, HP83.18.

The National Archives of the United Kingdom
Antarctic Continent Question of British Rights, TNA: ADM 1/8565/226.

Antarctic Territorial Claims, TNA: ADM 116/2386,
Australian Expedition to the Antarctic, Loan of *Discovery* to Commonwealth Government, TNA: CO 78/183/7.

Control of Antarctica by Australia and New Zealand, TNA: T 161/186/3.

Imperial Conference 1926 Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic. TNA: CAB 32/51.

**University of Melbourne Archives**
David Orme Masson and Family Collection, 80/80 105/54,

**University of Sydney Archives**
Personal Archives of Tannatt William Edgeworth David (1858-1934), P11, Series 6-8

**Woolahra Local History Centre**
Japanese Antarctic Expedition Box.


Uncatalogued Material.


**Periodicals**

*Adelaide Chronicle*

*Adelaide Observer*

*The Advertiser*

*The Advocate*

*The Age*

*ANZAC Bulletin*

*The Argus*

*Armidale Express*

*The Arrow*

*The Australasian*

*Australasian Chronicle*

*Australasian Sketcher*

*The Australian*

*Australian Star*

*Australian Town and Country Journal*
Ballarat Star
Barrier Miner
Bathurst Times
Benalla Standard
Bendigo Advertiser
Bendigo Independent
Blue Mountain Echo
Border Watch
Brisbane Courier
Britannia and Trades’ Advocate
The Bunyip
Canberra Times
The Clipper
Colonial Times
The Colonist
Cornwall Chronicle
Daily Examiner
Daily Express
Daily News
Daily Pictorial
Daily Post
Daily Telegraph
(Launceston) Daily Telegraph
The Empire
Evening Journal
Evening News
Evening Post
Evening Star
Express and Telegraph
Freeman’s Journal
Geelong Advertiser
Geraldton Express
Gippsland Times
Goulburn Herald
The Herald
Hobart Town Courier/The Courier
Hobart Town Gazette
Illawarra Mercury
Illustrated Australian News
Illustrated Sydney News
Kalgoorlie Miner
Kyogle Examiner
Labor Daily
Launceston Advertiser
Launceston Examiner
The Leader
Lithgow Mercury
Maitland Daily Mercury
Maitland Mercury
The Mercury
Melbourne Punch
Morning Bulletin
Mount Alexander Mail

National Advocate

Newcastle Morning Herald

Newcastle Sun

New Zealand Herald

Northern Star

Nowra Leader

Otago Daily Times

Otago Witness

Ovens and Murray Advertiser

Perth Gazette

Portland Guardian

The Press

Queanbeyan Age

Queensland Times

The Queenslander

The Record

The Register

Riverine Herald

Riverine Grazier

Singleton Argus

South Australian Chronicle

South Australian Register

South Coast Times

Southern Australian

The Star (Sydney)
The Star (New Zealand)
The Sun
Sunday Times
Sydney Gazette
Sydney Herald
Sydney Mail
Sydney Monitor
Sydney Morning Herald
Table Talk
Tamworth Daily Observer
The Tasmanian
Tasmanian Morning Herald
Tasmanian News
The Telegraph
True Colonist
Van Diemen’s Land Chronicle
Wallaroo Times
The Weekly Times
Wellington Times
The West Australian
Western Mail
Young Chronicle

Published Primary Sources
Articles and Journals


‘British-Australian-New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition, 1930-31’, *Polar Record* 1, no. 2 (Jul. 1931), 56-60.


‘Ellsworth Antarctic Expedition, 1938-39’, *Polar Record* 2, no. 16 (Jul. 1938), 120.


‘Ellsworth Antarctic Expedition, 1938-39’, *Polar Record* 3, no. 18 (Jul. 1939), 174-175.


‘Field Notes on the Birds of Kerguelen Island’, *Ibis*, Seventh Series, no. 41 (January 1900), 1-34.
Geographical Journal 7, no. 5 (May 1896).

‘Geographical Notes’, Scottish Geographical Magazine 2, no. 10 (1886), 622.


Holtehald, Olaf, ‘Antarctic Research by the Norvegia Expeditions and Others’, Geographical Journal 78, no. 5 (Nov. 1931), 401-416.


‘Magnetic Observations: Are They As Useful As Necessary?’, Illustrated Journal of Australasia III (July-December 1857), 145-155.
Miller, David Hunter, ‘National Rights in the Antarctic’, *Foreign Affairs* 5, no. 3 (Apr. 1927), 508.


*Papers and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania* (1886).

*Papers and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania* (1890).

*Papers and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania* (1899).

*Papers and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania* (1900).

*Proceedings of the Linnaean Society of New South Wales (Second Series)*, 1 (1887).

*Proceedings of the Linnaean Society of New South Wales (Second Series)*, II (1888).


*Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South Australian Branch), Sixth Session* (1890-91).

*Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South Australian Branch), Ninth Session* (1895-96).

*Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South Australian Branch), Tenth Session* (1897-98).

*Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South Australian Branch), Twelfth Session* (1898-99).

*Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South Australian Branch), Thirteenth Session* (1899-1900), 31.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania (1912).


Report of the First Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, held at Sydney, New South Wales, in August and September, 1888 (1889).

Report of the Second Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science held at Melbourne, Victoria, in January, 1890 (1890).

Report of the Third Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science held at Christchurch, New Zealand, in January 1891 (1891).

Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, held at Hobart, Tasmania, in January 1892 (1892).

Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, held at Adelaide, South Australia, September, 1893 (1894).

Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, held at Brisbane, Queensland, January, 1895 (1895).

Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, held at Sydney, 1898 (1898).

Report of the Meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science held at Sydney, 1911 (1912).

Report of the Thirtieth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science; Held at Oxford in June and July 1860 (1861).

Report of the Fifty-Fifth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science held at Aberdeen in September 1885 (1886).

Report of the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science held at Birmingham in September 1886 (1887).

Report of the Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science held at Bath in September 1888 (1889).


Tasmanian Journal 1 (1842).
Tasmanian Journal 2 (1846).
Tasmanian Journal 3 (1849).


‘The Belgian Antarctic Expedition’, Geographical Journal 13, no. 6 (June 1899), 650-654.


Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria 23 (1887).


Books

Armitage, Albert, Two Years in the Antarctic: Being a Narrative of the British National Antarctic Expedition (London: Edward Arnold, 1905).


Bernacchi, Louis, To the South Polar Regions: Expedition of 1898-1900 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1901).


Bruce, W.S. Polar Exploration (London: Williams and Norgate, 1911);


Burn Murdoch, W.G., The Task of Rebuilding the Scottish Nation (Edinburgh, 1931).


Davis, J.K., With The ‘Aurora’ in the Antarctic (London: A. Melrose, 1919).


du Baty, Raymond Rallier, Fifteen Thousand Miles in a Ketch (London: T. Nelson, 1912);


Hutcheson, John C., The Wreck of the Nancy Bell; or, Cast Away on Kerguelen Land (London: Black and Son, 1885).

Kendall, Henry, *Songs from the Mountains* (Sydney: William Maddock, 1880).


Marks, E. George, *Watch the Pacific: Defenceless Australia* (Sydney: Coles Book Arcade, 1924).

Marks, E. George, *Pacific Peril, or Menace of Japan’s Mandated Islands* (Sydney: Wymyard Book Arcade, 1933).


Spotswood, Christopher, *Voyage of Will Rogers to the South Pole* (Launceston: Examiner and Tasmanian Office, 1888).


‘Three of the Staff’, *The Voyage of the Scotia, Being the Record of a Voyage of Exploration in Antarctic Seas* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1906);


**Documents and Legislation**

Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Commonwealth).


**Pamphlets and Reports**


Copeland, Henry, *Kerguelen Island and Australian Commerce* (Sydney: John Sands, 1899).


Enderby, Charles, *Proposal for Re-Establishing the British Southern Whale Fishery, through the medium of a chartered company, and in combination with the colonisation of the Auckland Islands as the site of the company’s whaling station* (London: E. Wilson, 1847).


*Proceedings at a Public Dinner given to C. Enderby, Esq., F.R.S., at the London Tavern, Bishopsgate Street, on Wednesday, the 18th of April, 1849* (London: Pelham Richardson, 1849).


‘With Mawson to Antarctica’, *Education: Journal of the NSW Public School Teachers Federation* 11, no. 10 (15 August 1930), 333.

**Parliamentary Debates and Papers**


Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 50 (13 December 1907).

Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, No. 37 (13 September 1911).

Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 40 (2 October 1913).
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 12 (22 March 1929).
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 8 (21 February 1929).
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 18 (1 May 1930).
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 21 (22 May 1930).
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 27 (4 July 1930).
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 31 (29 July 1931).
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 21, 26 May 1933.
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, no. 22 (1 June 1933).

New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand, Session I, 1868, ‘Correspondence Relative to the Proposed Establishment of a Depot at the Auckland Islands’.

New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1876 Session I, ‘H-32 Her Majesty’s Ships Calling at the Islands Between the Cape of Good Hope and Australia (Correspondence Relative To)’.

New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1877 Session I, ‘A-01 Despatches from the Governor of New Zealand to the Secretary of State’.

New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1877 Session I, ‘A-02b Further Despatches from the Secretary of State to the Governor of New Zealand’.


New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1894 Session I, ‘H-25 Auckland Campbell and Other Islands (Report On), and on their Seals and Seal-Rookeries’.


Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, Vol. 16 (1873).

Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, Vol. 23, (1876).

Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, Vol. 50 (1885).
**Published Compilations of Primary Sources**


**Secondary Sources**

**Articles**


Barrett, Noel D. ‘Was Australian Antarctica Won Fairly?’, *Polar Record* 45, no. 4 (Oct. 2009), 360-367.


Beck, Peter J. ‘Securing the dominant “Place in the Wan Antarctic Sun” for the British Empire: the policy of extending British control over Antarctica’, *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 29, no. 3 (1983), 448-461.


Dodds, Klaus, *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).


Mcconville, Andrew, ‘Henrik Bull, the Antarctic Exploration Committee and the first confirmed landing on the Antarctic continent, Polar Record 43, no. 2 (April 2007), 143-154.


Plomley, Brian, and Kristen Anne Henley, ‘The Sealers of Bass Strait and the Cape Barren Island Community’, *Papers and Proceedings of the Tasmanian Historical Research Association* 37, no. 2-3 (June-September 1990), 37-127.


Stuart, Iain, ‘Sea rats, bandits and roistering buccaneers: what were the Bass Strait sealers really like?’, *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society* 83, no. 1 (June 1997), 47-58.


Swinney, Geoffrey N., ‘From the Arctic and Antarctic to ‘the back parts of Mull’: The life and career of William Gordon Burn Murdoch (1862–1939)’, *Scottish Geographical Journal* 119, no. 2 (2003), 121-151.

361


Tammiksaar, E., ‘The Russian Antarctic Expedition under the command of Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen and its reception in Russia and the world’, *Polar Record* 52, no. 5 (September 2016), 578-600.

Tate, ‘Merze, The Australasian Monroe Doctrine’, *Political Science Quarterly* 76, no. 2 (June 1961), 264-284.


*Edited Collections:*


**Monographs**


Baughman, T.H., *Before the Heroes Came: Antarctica in the 1890s* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).


Dickinson, A.B., *Seal fisheries of the Falkland Islands and dependencies: An historical review* (St. John’s, NL, 2007).


Griffiths, Tom, *Slicing the Silence; Voyaging to Antarctica* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007).


Smedal, Gustav, Chr. Meyer trans., *Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar Areas* (Oslo: Kommisjon Hos Jacob Dybwad, 1931).


**Unpublished Secondary Sources**


**Unreviewed Secondary Sources**