



WORKING PAPER

ITLS-WP-11-24

**The impact of discontinuity in
governance: How transport
planning went off the rails in
Sydney.**

By

Rhonda Daniels

December 2011

ISSN 1832-570X

**INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and
LOGISTICS STUDIES**

The Australian Key Centre in
Transport and Logistics Management

The University of Sydney

Established under the Australian Research Council's Key Centre Program.

NUMBER: Working Paper ITLS-WP-11-24

TITLE: **The impact of discontinuity in governance:
How transport planning went off the rails in Sydney.**

ABSTRACT: The impacts on transport planning of discontinuity in governance within the same political administration are illustrated through a case study of NSW, Australia. The Labor government in power in NSW for 16 years from 1995 to 2011 was committed to public transport in its strategic plans. But from 2003, unprecedented changes in the premier, ministers, and departments responsible for transport planning, disrupted public transport planning and delivery. The impacts of discontinuity included delays to public transport projects, waste of scarce funds, and loss of trust and confidence amongst stakeholders including the community, planning professionals, and the federal government. The impact is best seen with the North West Rail Link project for a major growth area: originally identified in 1998 for delivery in 2010, it was in 2010 proposed for completion in 2024. Conflict over funding of transport contributed to the changes in premiers and ministers and the subsequent impacts on transport planning with compounding effects over time. The NSW experience shows that a strategic commitment to public transport must be accompanied by long-term funding sources to ensure the public transport goals articulated in strategic plans are delivered. Given the long-term nature of transport planning and infrastructure delivery, the impacts of transport planning going off the rails in Sydney will take years to overcome.

KEY WORDS: *Governance; institutions; transport planning; public transport.*

AUTHORS: Rhonda Daniels.

CONTACT: INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and LOGISTICS STUDIES (C37)
The Australian Key Centre in Transport and Logistics Management

The University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia

Telephone: +612 9351 0071
Facsimile: +612 9351 0088
E-mail: business.itlsinfo@sydney.edu.au
Internet: <http://sydney.edu.au/business/itls>

DATE: December 2011

1. Introduction

Stable governance and institutional arrangements are important for long-term transport planning and delivery. There are different arrangements across the world aiming to achieve three related elements of good planning: integrating land use and transport planning, integrating planning across transport modes, and integrating planning and operations in transport. For instance, Legacy et al. (2009) reviewed governance for land use-transport integration policy in Melbourne and Perth, while Stone (2009) contrasted the role of planners in transport policy in Melbourne and Vancouver in the last four decades. The difficulties of integrated transport in Great Britain, including the lack of will of politicians, civil servants and the public, have been discussed by Preston (2010). More broadly, Fuller (2010, p. 1134) suggested “the processes of institutional change in urban governance are multidimensional, characterised by tensions produced through interaction of inherited and emergent arrangements”.

Within public transport, Ponnaluri (2011) identified the important role of decisive leadership and strong institutions, characterised by accountability, commitment and strong political will, in delivering bus rapid transit in India. Mees (2010) reviewed the recent planning process for major rail projects in Victoria, the Melbourne Metro and Regional Rail Link, which involved federal government funding. In the search for better structures for transport, there are cycles of aggregation and disaggregation of both planning and operational units to improve transport outcomes. For instance, Meligrana (1999) discusses the evolving institutional structure and governance of transportation planning, policy development and transit delivery in the Greater Vancouver area, moving towards full regional integration. On the scale of operational units, Viton (1993) found many public urban transit providers in the San Francisco Bay Area could realise cost economies by consolidating into larger systems.

But while the importance of governance and institutional arrangements is recognised, there has been less attention on the impact of political discontinuity in governance. Some change is expected when government changes from one political party to another, and in transport plans when circumstances change. NSW in Australia provides a case study of the impacts of discontinuity in governance within the same political administration. There was continuity of government with a Labor government in power from 1995 to 2011 winning four consecutive four-year terms, and a commitment to public transport as a strategic objective in the government’s strategic transport and land use plans. But an unprecedented period of change since 2003 in terms of premiers, ministers for transport, and institutional changes disrupted public transport planning and had significant impacts on long-term strategic transport planning, best seen in the delayed implementation of public transport projects. Conflicts over funding of transport contributed to the changes in premiers and ministers, and the subsequent impact on projects. Legacy et al. (2009) identified that common governance issues included the lack of funding and resources for sustainable transport. The discontinuity in NSW is all the more remarkable due to the longevity of the same political party in power.

The paper is organised as follows. Firstly, section 2 identifies and discusses significant governance changes in NSW since 2003 using a timeline approach, identifying changes in premiers, ministers and departments responsible for transport planning, the reasons for these changes, and the associated significant announcements in transport planning including changes to transport projects and strategic plans. Section 3 analyses the contribution of funding conflicts to the discontinuity and section 4 analyses the impacts of discontinuity including delays to transport projects, particularly the North West Rail Link, and loss of trust and confidence amongst stakeholders including the community, planning professionals and federal government. Rather than a public transport legacy, discontinuity in governance has left a legacy for NSW of a poor transport reputation with stakeholders: the community, federal and local government, and the private sector.

2. Discontinuity in governance and transport

Major points of discontinuity in governance in NSW from 2003 onwards, and the subsequent impacts on transport planning, are identified using a timeline approach. Figure 1 summarises the relationship between the timing of key events.




Figure 1: Relationship between changes in governance in NSW (January 2003 to June 2011)

See Appendix A for Tables of supporting information.

2.1 Premier Carr – new ministers and transport institutions

The first two four-year terms of the NSW Labor Government from April 1995 to 2003 were defined by stability in both the Premier Bob Carr, Transport Minister, and Department of Transport. The government's transport strategy *Action for Transport Sydney 2010* (NSW Department of Transport 1998), released in November 1998 shortly before the March 1999 state election, was committed to public transport. It included the Parramatta Rail Link by 2006, the North West Rail Link by 2010, and a network of Transitways for western Sydney, as well as other rail and road projects.

Following the March 2003 state election when the NSW Labor government was returned for its third term, there was a major portfolio restructure amongst transport and planning agencies with new Ministers. A new mega-department, the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR), was created for land use and transport planning, combining most of the branches of the former Department of Planning, the transport planning function from the Department of Transport, the infrastructure coordination function from Premiers Department, and the Department of Natural Resources. DIPNR had over 5,000 staff, with most in natural resources.

To reflect the policy focus of the new smaller department, the former Department of Transport was renamed the Ministry of Transport, with a Minister for Transport Services. The portfolio title “Transport Services” rather than “Transport” reflected that transport infrastructure planning was now part of the new DIPNR. The Ministry of Transport’s new role was providing policy advice and strategic support to the Minister, while also focusing on operational transport services (NSW Ministry of Transport 2003).

Institutional changes of creating and merging departments on the scale of DIPNR and the rebuilding of the Ministry of Transport require much time and energy from both management and staff. Much of the short life of DIPNR was occupied in structuring and restructuring the Department to meet its new objectives, and determining the division of responsibility for transport planning and policy issues between DIPNR and the new Ministry of Transport.

An early transport casualty of the institutional split between transport policy and planning was in mid 2003 when the Minister for Transport Services announced that the Epping-Parramatta western half of the Parramatta Rail Link would be deferred, due to forecast low patronage and increasing construction costs. There was considerable uncertainty about what the deferral meant in practice.

In January 2005, less than two years after the March 2003 election, there were new Ministers for Transport and Roads, following the unexpected resignation of the Treasurer, leading to a Ministerial reshuffle.

In June 2005, Premier Carr made a major transport announcement of the \$8 billion Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program made up of three new links: North West Rail Link in 2017, South West Rail Link in 2012 and the CBD (or Harbour) Rail Link in 2017, with north west and south west extensions from 2020 (NSW Government 2005). The North West and South West Rail Links were publicly known and planning was underway for both. While the South West Rail Link was to be funded 75% by infrastructure contributions from development of the South West Growth Centre and 25% by the state government, the larger and more expensive North West Rail Link was not funded as part of the North West Growth Centre infrastructure package. The CBD Rail Link had not been previously publicly announced, but the need for increased rail capacity through the CBD and across the harbour had been recognised within rail agencies and planning was underway (DIPNR et al. 2003).

2.2 *Premier Iemma – new ministers, transport institutions and plans*

After 10 years as Premier, Premier Carr announced his resignation in July 2005 which triggered a chain of events with major implications for transport planning. In August 2005, Morris Iemma became Premier. The Minister for Infrastructure and Planning, a potential candidate for Premier, resigned from Parliament, as did the long-standing Deputy Premier. This resulted in a number of ministerial and departmental changes, as departments were restructured to align with the new ministerial hierarchy. The integrated transport and land use planning department DIPNR was disbanded, with the re-establishment of the former Department of Planning under a new Minister for Planning. With the restructure, senior staff left including the Director-General of DIPNR and the Deputy Director-General (Office of the Metropolitan Region). The Executive Director Transport Planning had already left as part of an earlier restructure of DIPNR.

The government’s 25 year strategic plan for Sydney, the Metropolitan Strategy – *City of Cities: A Plan for Sydney’s Future* (NSW Government 2005b), released in December 2005, set principles for the location of new housing and jobs, based on integrating transport and land use, and had a stated commitment to public transport. The Transport Chapter supported the previously announced Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program.

In 2006, there were further ministerial changes with a new Minister for Roads in February 2006, and for six months from October 2006 to March 2007, the Minister for Roads was also Minister Assisting the Minister for Transport (Buses and Ferries).

Less than a year after the Metropolitan Strategy, a new strategic transport plan was released in November 2006, shortly before the state election in March 2007. The *Urban Transport Statement* (NSW Government 2006) was prepared by the Premiers Department rather than the Ministry of Transport and was significant both for its governance and transport impacts. In terms of institutional change, the Urban Transport Statement recommended the creation of a Centre for Transport Planning and Product Development in the Ministry of Transport and the transfer of the transport planning function from the Department of Planning back to the Ministry of Transport. In terms of transport, the Urban Transport Statement continued the government's commitment to public transport and announced the acceleration of the North West Rail Link, with Stage 1 from Epping to Hills Centre to be delivered by 2015, two years early, and a commitment to plan for metro rail lines.

The NSW government's *State Plan: A New Direction for NSW* to set priorities and targets for government agencies (NSW Government 2006b), also released in November 2006, included several targets committed to public transport including increasing the share of peak hour journeys on a safe and reliable public transport system, and cleaner air and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as well as road efficiency and safer roads.

At the March 2007 state election, the Labor government was returned for its fourth four-year term. Compared to the aftermath of the previous state election in 2003, there was a period of relative stability. The Premier and Minister for Transport (also the Deputy Premier) continued in their positions, and the Ministry of Transport and the Department of Planning continued implementing the Urban Transport Statement and the Metropolitan Strategy.

2.3 Premier Rees – new ministers and transport projects

In 2008 there were remarkable events in both governance and transport. Throughout 2007, planning had progressed on the three components of the Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program and the NSW 2007/08 Budget included funding for land acquisition for the North West Rail Corridor. But in late 2007, Treasury was pushing for a major reassessment of the North West Rail Link and a review of cheaper alternatives (Besser 2007), and commissioned a UK expert to report and kill off the project. There were media reports of ongoing tension between the Minister for Transport from the Left faction of Labor and the Treasurer from the Right faction.

In March 2008, Premier Iemma cancelled the North West Rail Link and announced its replacement with the North West Metro in the SydneyLink package (NSW Government 2008). The North West Metro was a 40 km line from the CBD north-west to Epping, then continuing along the old North West Rail Link alignment to Rouse Hill. It was costed at \$12 billion in May 2008 (NSW Government 2008b). There were several perceived cost advantages of the metro rail strategy. With single deck carriages, the mostly underground metro rail would require smaller diameter tunnels than heavy rail, reducing construction costs and rollingstock costs. With a new operating model involving the private sector and separate industrial relations from the existing government heavy rail operator RailCorp, operating costs could be lower.

The tension over the North West Metro decision and funding issues, discussed further in section 3, led to further changes in governance and transport. In September 2008, the Minister for Transport (and Deputy Premier) John Watkins announced his retirement. Premier Iemma wanted to use the opportunity to reshuffle Cabinet, and replace the publicly unpopular Treasurer. But the shock result was that on 5 September 2008 Premier Iemma resigned as Premier and a member of parliament when it became clear that the Labor Caucus would not support his ministerial choices. Nathan Rees from the Left faction, who had only been in Parliament since the March 2007 election, was elected Premier by Caucus. The new Premier appointed a new Treasurer and new Ministers for Transport, Roads, Planning, and Infrastructure.

A month later in October 2008, the new Premier announced the cancellation of the North West Metro and its replacement with the CBD Metro, a 7 km truncated form of the North West Metro from the CBD to Rozelle in the inner west already well-served by public transport. At that time,

the CBD Metro had never appeared in any public plan or strategy, very little if any planning had been done, and few details were immediately available. The Premier justified the very high cost of \$4.8 billion for 7 km as the project would form the spine of a future metro rail network yet to be announced. Premier Iemma's North West Metro lasted only six months as a project. In November 2008, the new Treasurer released a mini-budget, necessary due to an economic downturn, which delayed (if not cancelled) the South West Rail Link and CBD Rail Link to save costs.

2.4 Premier Keneally – new transport institution and transport plan

The discontinuity continued in 2009. In June 2009, Premier Rees announced major public sector reform with the creation of 13 super-departments including NSW Transport and Infrastructure. Rees described it as “the most significant shake-up of the delivery of transport services in NSW history”, as “a new super-agency NSW Transport and Infrastructure would take control of all transport and roads coordination, policy and planning functions” (Rees 2009). He stated an immediate priority was developing a Transport Blueprint to integrate urban growth and transport delivery.

The new Department of Transport and Infrastructure reported to four Ministers (Infrastructure, Ports and Waterways, Roads, and Transport) and staff from a number of other transport agencies performing certain transport planning, policy and coordination functions were transferred to the new Department. There had been increasing calls for an integrated transport authority including from the Shadow Minister for Transport Gladys Berejiklian (NSW Liberals/Nationals Coalition 2008). The new super-department of NSW Transport and Infrastructure was supported by ministerial changes in September 2009, when the existing Minister for Transport, David Campbell also became Minister for Roads and a Minister was appointed to assist the Minister for Transport. It was the first time since March 2003 that the portfolios of Transport and Roads had been held by the same Minister.

The announcement of the development of a Transport Blueprint integrating urban growth and transport growth continued the government's commitment to public transport stated in previous plans including the Metropolitan Strategy (December 2005), Draft Subregional Strategies for 10 subregions (2007-June 2008), Urban Transport Statement (November 2006), State Plan (November 2006), SydneyLink plan (March 2008) and the State Infrastructure Strategy (May 2008). In November 2009, Premier Rees announced that the \$1.3 billion Stage 2 of the South West Rail Link, deferred in the November 2008 mini-budget, would proceed in 2010 for completion in 2016.

Throughout the second half of 2009 there had been media speculation about the future of both the CBD Metro and Premier Rees, with Coultan (2009) reporting that the CBD Metro was likely to die with Rees' premiership. Within Labor, there were tensions from Rees' ministerial reshuffle in September 2009 and increasing dissatisfaction with the Premier. In December 2009, Premier Rees resigned as Premier when he lost the support of the Caucus and faced an unwinnable challenge. The Minister for Planning Kristina Keneally, supported by the Right faction, became Premier. *The Sydney Metropolitan Herald* reported extensively on the comprehensive Transport Blueprint Premier Rees had been due to release the day before his resignation (West 2009a, 2009b). With the rise of Premier Keneally, the Rees Transport Blueprint was buried. Once Keneally became Premier, there was pressure for her to cancel the poorly conceived and received CBD Metro project.

In February 2010, two weeks after *The Sydney Morning Herald's* Independent Inquiry into Public Transport released its 450 page preliminary report, the Government released its 45 page 10 year Metropolitan Transport Plan (NSW Government 2010), a rewritten Transport Blueprint which included the cancellation of the CBD Metro project. The North West Rail Link was back in the Plan, but press releases indicated construction was to commence in 2017 for completion in 2024, beyond the 10 years of the Plan. The Plan also included the Western Express City Relief Line to enhance CBD rail capacity as a higher rail priority than the North West Rail Link.

The government's State Plan, updated and reissued by Premier Keneally in March 2010 (NSW Government 2010b), continued the previous commitment to improve public transport and the public transport mode share targets were extended to more centres in addition to the CBD.

In May 2010, the Premier appointed new Ministers for Transport and Roads when the Minister for Transport and Roads resigned suddenly for personal reasons, which split the portfolios again after only five months of being combined. In July 2010, a new transport super-department was created in which the one year old NSW Transport and Infrastructure became Transport NSW. The aim of greater coordination in transport policy and planning appeared to be the same as the previous restructure a year ago, but with a stronger central agency, a single budget, and the independence of the operational agencies reduced with their statutory boards removed. The Minister said "the new agency Transport NSW will integrate the operation and planning of all modes of transport including trains, buses, ferries, cars and bicycles" (Robertson 2010).

2.5 Premier O'Farrell – change of government

At the NSW state election in March 2011, the community voted in a change of government from Labor to the Liberal/Nationals after 16 years. In a landslide result, Labor received its lowest ever primary vote of 25% and won only 20 seats out of 93 in the Legislative Assembly of Parliament (down from 52 seats). The new Premier Barry O'Farrell appointed new ministers. In campaigning for the election, the (then) Opposition emphasised its commitment to build the North West and South West Rail Links the previous government had promised but not delivered. However, the change of government has the potential to cause further disruption and restructuring within transport agencies and changes to transport priorities. After the election, the new Minister for Transport announced a restructure of Transport NSW into Transport for NSW.

3. Causes of discontinuity – funding for transport

This section discusses the contribution of conflicts over transport funding to the discontinuity in governance and transport planning decisions. There were complex, inter-related causes of the changes in premiers and ministers including personality and factional conflicts between members of the same government, and different views on priorities and funding. There were also ministerial changes due to a string of personal scandals. But both governance and transport changes in NSW are strongly related to conflicts over funding transport infrastructure, and the implications of project costs and different sources of funds. The discontinuity also had compounding effects, with each new Premier desperate to address the previous lack of progress, and leave a legacy as the public transport premier.

Funding for transport is a source of conflict as transport infrastructure is expensive, and costs usually increase over time as projects progress through the planning, development, assessment and construction phases. The many stakeholders have conflicting views on appropriate funding sources for transport, with different views from existing residents, new residents, local government, transport workers, workers in other unions, developers, and the private sector. In Sydney, each potential source of funds for transport has generated conflict whether it is infrastructure levies on new housing in growth areas, electricity privatisation with threats to electricity jobs, industrial relations reform with threats to rail jobs, private sector involvement such as toll roads, an aversion to debt in order to maintain a "triple A" credit rating, sales of public assets, and conditions attached to funds from the federal government. The government had recognised the importance of funding in transport, with the Minister for Transport Services (later the Treasurer) commissioning a ministerial inquiry on the financial sustainability of public transport in 2003 (NSW Ministry of Transport 2003b).

In terms of government changes, a major factor in the destabilisation and resignation of Premier Iemma and Treasurer Costa in 2008 was their support for privatisation of the electricity sector to generate funds for major infrastructure projects, in the face of very strong opposition from the Labor Party and unions. At the Labor Party NSW state conference in May 2008, 85% of

delegates opposed privatisation after Premier Iemma and other Ministers spoke in favour. At the time, it was reported that “Mr Iemma’s leadership is now under serious threat” (Carty and Gilmore 2008). Iemma and Costa’s failure to privatise the electricity sector and the conflict with the unions at the conference is analysed by Benson (2010).

When Costa resigned from Parliament in October 2008, he expressed concerns about the state of NSW finances: “The state has no choice but to delay the proposed North West Metro project if it is to avoid losing its Triple A credit rating in the coming months” (Robins 2008). Costa was replaced by John Robertson, the Secretary of Unions NSW and leading opponent of electricity privatisation plans, who became Minister for Transport with the challenge of funding major infrastructure.

In terms of transport planning and funding, one of the attractions of metro rail over heavy rail in early 2008 was the potential for a new operational model with private sector involvement. In October 2008, Premier Rees changed from the more expensive North West Metro to the shorter CBD Metro project in an (unsuccessful) attempt to attract federal government infrastructure funding. The conflicting imperatives behind the CBD Metro decision are summarised by Coultan (2009) as firstly “the apparent desire of the Premier to overcome the deeply ingrained public cynicism of cancelled transport projects, by announcing a plan – any plan”, and secondly “to protect the metro against those in his government who, faced with the collapse of state revenues, wanted to scale back big capital works programs” such as the North West Metro.

But the discontinuity in planning contributed to NSW missing out on federal government funding for public transport. When the federal government announced its first round of Nation Building funding for public transport infrastructure in May 2009, assessed by Infrastructure Australia, NSW received only \$91 million for continuing planning of the West Metro from the CBD to Parramatta, while other states received much more – Victoria received \$3.2 billion for Regional Rail Express, Queensland received \$365 million for Gold Coast Light Rail and South Australia received almost \$600 million for rail projects. The media reported that the federal government was not impressed with NSW submissions for funding and NSW was widely criticised for not having an integrated transport plan or strategy, and for poor quality presentations (Clennell et al. 2009). The federal advisory body Infrastructure Australia also had two people in senior positions with experience of transport in NSW: its Co-ordinator-General Michael Deegan was a former NSW Director-General of Transport, while its General Manager Planning, Stephen Alchin, had been Executive Director Transport Planning and Infrastructure in the transport department before the 2005 restructure.

The lack of success with the federal government weakened Premier Rees and contributed to his replacement as Premier. Premier Keneally’s decision in early 2010 to cancel the metro rail and return to heavy rail revealed the high cost of discontinuity. The NSW Audit Office (2010) reported that \$412 million had been spent on metro rail projects at 30 June 2010 with more costs expected in 2010-11, of which \$356 million was expenditure with no future benefit to NSW. This inefficient use of resources meant even less money was available for transport projects.

Stakeholders including economists, public transport experts and the Greens Party have expressed concerns about the high cost of rail projects in Sydney relative to other Australian states, with suspicions that Treasury may have inflated costs to make public transport projects less attractive (West 2010). A NSW Parliamentary inquiry has been initiated into methods used to cost rail projects in NSW.

4. Impacts of discontinuity in governance

The discontinuity in governance and planning has had impacts in several areas including the timing of transport projects, inefficient use of resources, loss of stakeholder trust and confidence, and loss of professional and corporate knowledge.

4.1 *Impacts on public transport*

A major impact of discontinuity and reversal of transport decisions has been delays to delivery of public transport projects, and impacts on public transport use. Table 1 summarises decisions about rail projects. The most serious impact is that the North West Rail Link, originally proposed in 1998 for completion in 2010, was in 2010 due for completion in 2024. The North West Rail Link was planned to serve the North West, a new growth area with high rates of car use (TPDC 2006) and poor public transport access. The North West and South West subregions are the worst performing of the 10 subregions in Sydney on the State Plan measure of households with access within 30 minutes by public transport to a strategic centre. The delay in the delivery of the North West Rail Link has entrenched high levels of car use in the north-west amongst existing and new residents, and limited access to major employment centres by public transport. Many residents purchased in the area with an expectation of the rail line. Public transport to the CBD is being provided by high speed, long distance bus services which struggle to keep up with growth in demand and contribute to congestion in the CBD due to poor facilities.

Even though the new government supports the North West Rail Link, the cancellation and reinstatement of the project mean previous planning, design and consultation work must be reviewed and updated at increased cost. The new government has only committed to starting the NWRL in its first four-year term of government (2011-2015), and a completion date is unclear, but likely to be beyond 2020. A current total cost for the North West Rail Link is not publicly stated, but delays have increased the cost of both land acquisition and construction. Construction costs have increased faster than general inflation due to competition for resources from the booming mining industry in Australia.

The NSW Auditor-General (Audit Office 2010, p. 13) noted that the cost of the metro rail cancellation decision included time delays to other transport priorities as scarce resources are diverted to projects that do not proceed to completion.

As well as impacts on rail projects identified in Table 1, there have also been delays to bus, light rail and road projects, partly due to costs. The seven Transitways identified in *Action for Transport 2010* in 1998 became a network of 43 Strategic Bus Corridors following the Unsworth Review of Bus Services in 2004, with a lower level of physical road priority. Of the seven original Transitways, only two have been constructed: the Liverpool-Parramatta Transitway opened in February 2003 shortly before the March 2003 state election, and the North West Transitway opened in February 2007, shortly before the March 2007 state election. The concept of Strategic Bus Corridors appears to have been replaced in 2010 by the Metrobus concept of high frequency services on fewer corridors. Although new toll roads have been built recently in Sydney (Cross City Tunnel and Westlink M7 in 2005 and Lane Cove Tunnel in 2007), planning for new road projects has been affected by the high turnover of Roads Ministers and lack of continuity, and difficulties in funding expensive tunnel projects through more tolls.

Table 1: Summary of impact of discontinuity in governance on rail projects in Sydney

Date	Announcement (and proposed completion date)	Premier	Minister for Transport
Nov 1998	Parramatta Rail Link (2006) North West Rail Link announced (2010)	Bob Carr	Carl Scully
Mid 2003	Parramatta-Epping Rail Link “deferred”	Bob Carr	Michael Costa
June 2005	Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program announced = NWRL 2017 + SWRL 2012 + CBD Rail Link 2017	Bob Carr	John Watkins
Nov 2006	North West Rail Link accelerated (Stage 1 2015)	Morris Iemma	John Watkins
March 2008	North West Rail Link cancelled North West Metro announced (+West Metro studies)	Morris Iemma	John Watkins
Oct 2008	North West Metro cancelled CBD Metro announced	Nathan Rees	David Campbell
Nov 2008	South West Rail Link and CBD Rail Link staged/delayed	Nathan Rees	David Campbell
May 2009	West Metro planning studies	Nathan Rees	David Campbell
Nov 2009	South West Rail Link-Stage 2 announced (2016)	Nathan Rees	David Campbell
Feb 2010	CBD Metro cancelled North West Rail Link re-instated (2024) Western Express City Relief Line announced (2015-2020)	Kristina Keneally	David Campbell
Aug 2010	Parramatta-Epping Rail Link announced (federal govt)	Kristina Keneally	John Robertson
March 2011	Change of NSW government North West Rail Link prioritised (date TBC)	Barry O’Farrell	Gladys Berejiklian

4.2 Impacts on stakeholder trust and confidence

The discontinuity in NSW has created a loss of stakeholder trust and confidence by a range of stakeholders including the community and planning professionals. The federal government’s loss of confidence in the NSW government and impact on funding was discussed previously. The discontinuity created a perception that Sydney’s transport was not keeping up with population growth and economic demands, and contributed to a lack of confidence in the ability of government to deliver public transport.

Impacts on community trust and confidence are shown in several ways. The ultimate expression of community dissatisfaction with the Labor government was the election result in March 2011, which had been foreshadowed by opinion polling for a long time leading up to the election. Quarterly surveys of transport confidence also indicate the community’s dissatisfaction with transport in NSW: NSW residents are the most pessimistic of the states about transport in their local area (Hensher and Daniels 2011). Just as discontinuity had a compounding impact on premiers and ministers, it also had a compounding effect on the community.

The community loss of trust and cynicism about project delivery was highlighted in the response to the federal Labor government’s announcement during the federal election campaign in August 2010 that it would fund the Parramatta-Epping Rail Link with \$2.1 billion funding starting in 2014, but requiring a contribution of \$500 million from the NSW government. The announcement was received with much cynicism, and may even have backfired as an election promise as Labor lost the very marginal federal seat which would have benefited from the rail line. Media reports suggested a lack of consultation with the NSW government over the announcement. Although the rail line was a long planned project, having been identified in 1998 in *Action for Transport 2010* and “deferred” in 2003, its integration into the rail network in 2010 and its relationship with the North West Rail Link at Epping was not clear. The NSW

government's highest priority at the time was the Western Express project to increase capacity on the existing heavy rail network.

The decision in early 2008 to cancel the North West Rail Link and replace it with metro rail attracted much public criticism and opposition from stakeholders usually supportive of public transport such as the Planning Institute of Australia, the peak body representing planning professionals, and community group EcoTransit Sydney (EcoTransit 2008). The decision was inconsistent with the integrated transport and land use principles of the Metropolitan Strategy as the replacement North West Metro did not connect to Macquarie Park, a significant employment centre identified as a Specialised Centre in the Metropolitan Strategy. The North West Rail Link would have provided a direct link between the North West Growth Centre and Macquarie Park, whereas the North West Metro would require users to change from metro to heavy rail at Epping. The Planning Institute noted "The announcement of the North West Metro and its connectivity with Victoria Rd overturns years of careful planning by the State Government to integrate land use and transport planning for Sydney's global city corridor" (Planning Institute of Australia 2008). *The Sydney Morning Herald* reported the concerns on the front page (Besser 2008a) and with an editorial (SMH 2008) noting "The Planning Institute of Australia's warning about the proposed North West Metro should have everyone in the State Government pulling up for a quick rethink."

The subsequent decision to replace the North West Metro with the shorter CBD Metro also attracted public criticism from stakeholders about the high cost, its relationship to other modes and transfers, low patronage forecasts, the lack of planning of the metro rail network, and the equity of prioritising the well-served inner west.

The former NSW Co-ordinator General of Rail was publicly critical of the metro decisions and later agreed to head *The Sydney Morning Herald's* Independent Inquiry in public transport planning, discussed below. The Property Council of Australia's representative resigned from the Transport Blueprint Reference Panel when the replacement Metropolitan Transport Plan fell a long way short of what the industry was seeking.

The failure in government transport planning and widespread concern encouraged the major Sydney newspaper, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, to assume a government role in planning, harnessing a team of frustrated planning professionals. Shortly after the government announced the development of its Transport Blueprint in mid 2009, the newspaper announced in August 2009 that it was establishing its own Independent Public Inquiry to create a Long Term Public Transport Plan for Sydney to inform decisions by future governments on the priorities over the next 30 years. Its editorial on the day of the Inquiry launch was titled "When governments fail, the public must set the agenda" (SMH 2009, p. 10). The Inquiry was filling a policy vacuum created by the government (Daniels et al. 2011).

The Independent Public Inquiry was chaired by a former senior road and rail bureaucrat, assisted by a team of independent experts including academics, public servants and/or consultants who mostly donated their time. The Inquiry set up its own website and conducted an inquiry similar to a government process with public forums and public submissions, a preliminary and final report, and recommendations (Independent Inquiry 2010). It attracted 490 submissions from the community. The Inquiry's 450 page preliminary report on planning, governance and funding in February 2010 was more comprehensive than the government's own 45 page Metropolitan Transport Plan released two weeks later. By committing to such an intensive project, *The Herald* confirmed that public transport planning was an important issue of concern and interest to its readers. Other non-government involvement in transport planning includes transport plans produced by the community group 10,000 Friends of Greater Sydney (2007, 2009).

The breakdown in trust amongst both community, industry and professional stakeholders makes it more difficult for any government to propose new initiatives or new mechanisms to fund transport, as each new announcement is greeted with disbelief, scepticism or simply ignored. Engagement and consultation becomes increasingly more difficult. For instance, Premier Rees'

mini-budget decision in November 2008 to introduce a small parent co-payment towards the School Student Transport Scheme for free travel was overturned following community backlash.

4.3 *Impacts on professional and corporate knowledge*

The changes in Premier and Minister for Transport were accompanied by changes in the management of the central agencies of Premier and Cabinet, and Treasury, and in operational transport agencies with a loss of professional and corporate knowledge. The high rate of change meant loss of continuity within institutions on the history of projects and on strategic issues. Shortly after the change from Premier Iemma to Rees in 2008, the Director-General of Premier and Cabinet resigned. And with the new Premier Keneally in December 2009, there was a new Director-General of Premier and Cabinet. Treasury has been more stable, although the long-term Secretary resigned in November 2008 to join the federal public sector following the poorly received Rees mini-budget.

Changes at the ministerial level were accompanied by turnover of senior staff at the key transport agencies. As early as February 2006, *The Sydney Morning Herald* highlighted the changes in transport chiefs with 17 bosses in 10 years (Baker 2006). The changes have continued since then: between the March 2003 and March 2011 elections, there have been four Ministers for Transport, seven Ministers for Roads and four Director-Generals of Transport, hindering continuity of policy and planning.

In terms of transport planning resources, constant restructuring of departments led to a loss of professional skills, experience and corporate knowledge in the public sector as staff left due to redundancies, uncertainty, and dissatisfaction with lack of direction. The Sydney Metro Authority established in February 2009 with many staff from existing agencies was operational for only a year before the metro rail project was cancelled, the authority disbanded and its staff redistributed. Institutional changes have continued with the new government restructuring the Department of Transport into Transport for NSW and appointing six new Deputy Director-Generals, with only one from within the transport department.

The organisational restructuring in the central transport agency is also apparent in operational rail agencies in NSW. In 1996, as part of national competition policy reform, the NSW rail operator was broken up into several agencies: State Rail Authority, Rail Services Authority (RSA), Rail Access Corporation (RAC), and a freight corporation. In 2001 RSA and RAC merged to become Rail Infrastructure Corporation, and in 2004 the metropolitan functions of Rail Infrastructure Corporation and the State Rail Authority were amalgamated into RailCorp and non-metropolitan freight lines were leased to the Australian Rail Track Corporation.

5. Discussion and conclusion

The NSW experience is not intended to suggest that change in representatives or projects is always negative or to be avoided. There is a tension in determining the appropriate balance between stability and change. Transport planning and project delivery, particularly of large infrastructure projects, occurs over the long-term and stability and continuity is required to implement plans and projects with long time horizons. Long term land use and transport strategic plans are important for the signals they send to all stakeholders – the community, other government agencies and the private sector – which guide many different decisions in other sectors.

But it is also important to recognise when institutional structures must change to meet changing circumstances or priorities or when plans must be changed. Other Australian states have also experimented with different institutional structures to achieve the well-recognised goal of integrated planning including integrating planning and operations within transport, integrating across transport modes, as well as integrating transport planning and land use planning with versions of super-departments involving combinations of transport, planning and infrastructure,

with or without natural resources. Changes in the structure of both departments and operational agencies also reflect cycles of aggregation and disaggregation over time. But in NSW, the dis-establishment of the integrated department was related more to the resignation of the Minister, not the function of the department.

In NSW, eight years of change tipped the balance too far away from stability and continuity towards change and discontinuity. The experience demonstrates three lessons. Firstly, there was cumulatively too much change which had compounding negative impacts. Change might be expected and desired with a change of political party, but in NSW, the same political administration Labor government was in power for 16 years from 1995 to 2011. Within the same administration from 2003 to 2011, there was a high rate discontinuity in governance with changes in Premiers and Ministers and related institutional restructuring of departments, and associated changes in transport plans and projects. The negative impacts of discontinuity included delays to projects, waste of scarce resources, loss of stakeholder trust and confidence, and loss of professional and corporate knowledge. In the worst example of project delays, the North West Rail Link, planned in 1998 for completion in 2010, was planned in 2010 for completion in 2024 after being accelerated, cancelled, replaced and reinstated. The South West Rail Link planned in 2005 for completion in 2012 was now in 2010 planned for 2016. The decision to abandon the CBD Metro rail project less than 18 months after its announcement and return to a heavy rail project wasted over \$400 million of scarce funds.

Secondly, conflict over funding for transport within government contributed to changes in Premiers from 2008, and the associated flow-on impacts on Ministers, institutions, plans and projects. The inability of premiers to generate funds through electricity privatisation, private sector involvement or from the federal government led to their downfall. There was conflict over funding for transport within government including the source of funds and what that involves, whether it is infrastructure levies, electricity privatisation, industrial relations reform, toll roads, or private sector involvement as the many stakeholders in transport have often conflicting views on appropriate funding sources. Each potential source of funds for transport generated conflict. In addition, the government was not able to harness demonstrated community support for public transport improvements to generate funding to deliver public transport.

Thirdly, a stated commitment to improve public transport repeated in a range of strategic planning documents from 1998 to 2010 was not enough to deliver public transport. The government commitment to public transport stated in integrated transport and land use plans was not sufficient as the government was not able to deliver on its policy and planning goal of public transport. Identifying long-term funding sources is clearly important to ensure the goals for public transport articulated in strategic plans are delivered. Many decisions were made by Premiers determined to leave a public transport legacy. Instead, the legacy is of delay, waste and cynicism.

The remarkable discontinuity in transport governance in NSW when transport planning went off the rails will have long-term impacts as it will take time to overcome the backlog in public transport projects, regain Sydney's transport competitiveness with other cities, restore public trust and confidence, and overcome car dependent travel behaviour established in growth areas without public transport. With the change in government following the state election in March 2011, the major transport commitment of the new government is to build the North West Rail Link, a project first promised in 1998, to restore trust and confidence. For the North West Rail Link, the planning accelerations, cancellations and reversals to return to the original project have wasted valuable funds while project costs have increased over time. But transport planning is never wasted as previous work informs future policies and projects.

References

Websites accessed September 2011. Note some government documents became unavailable on government websites following the change of government in March 2011.

10,000 Friends of Greater Sydney (2007) *Updated Sydney Integrated Transport Strategy (SITS 2)*. [http://www.10000friends.org.au/reports/Docs/53/SITS\(2\)_final.pdf](http://www.10000friends.org.au/reports/Docs/53/SITS(2)_final.pdf)

10,000 Friends of Greater Sydney (2009) *Sydney Rail Plan Stage 1 – A Strategy to take advantage of existing rail infrastructure*.

[http://www.10000friends.org.au/reports/Docs/137/FROGS_report_09\(bk3\).pdf](http://www.10000friends.org.au/reports/Docs/137/FROGS_report_09(bk3).pdf)

Audit Office of NSW (2010) *Auditor-General's Report to Parliament 2010 Volume Nine*.

Baker, J. (2006) Blame game: 17 bosses in 10 years, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 February 2006, p. 1.

Benson, S. (2010) *Betrayal: The Underbelly of Australian Labor*, Pantera Press.

Besser, L. (2007) Costa push to derail Hills link, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 September 2007. <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/push-to-derail-hills-link/2007/09/24/1190486226330.html>

Besser, L. (2008a) Metro throws Sydney's big plan on its head, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 May 2008. <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/05/06/1209839649452.html>

Besser, L. (2008b) Metro a \$12b disaster, says buried report, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 July 2008. www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/07/29/1217097241025.html

Carty, L. and Gilmore, H. (2008) Power and passion at ALP conference, *The Sun Herald*, 4 May 2008. <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/power-and-the-passion-at-alp-conference/2008/05/03/1209235234501.html>

Clennell, A., Davis, M. and Coorey, P. (2009) Rudd snubs Rees over metro cash, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 May 2009, p. 1. <http://www.smh.com.au/national/rudd-snubs-rees-over-metro-cash-20090507-awld.html>

Coultan, M. (2009) Electorate waits to punish NSW Labor's incompetence, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 August 2009. <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/electorate-waits-to-punish-nsw-labors-incompetence-20090825-ey3a.html>

Daniels, R., Gordon, C. and Mulley, C. (2011) Mass media and mass transit: a newspaper's campaign on public transport planning in Sydney, *Proceedings of the 34th Australasian Transport Research Forum ATRF 2011*, Adelaide, Australia, 28-30 September. www.patrec.org/atrf.aspx

EcoTransit Sydney (2008) Submission on the proposed North-West Metro Line, April 2008. http://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/northwest_metro_ets_2008.pdf

DIPNR, Office of Co-ordinator General of Rail, Rail Infrastructure Corporation and State Rail (2003) *Long-Term Strategic Plan for Rail*, August 2003. http://www.railcorp.info/_data/assets/pdf_file/0003/6834/2003_Long-Term_Strategic_Plan_For_Rail.pdf

Fuller, C. (2010) Crisis and institutional change in urban governance, *Environment and Planning A* 42, 1121-1137.

Hensher, D.A. and Daniels, R. (2011) Monitoring community views on transport confidence over time: the quarterly Transport Opinion Survey (TOPS), Proceedings of the *34th Australasian Transport Research Forum ATRF 2011*, Adelaide, Australia, 28 - 30 September. www.patrec.org/atrf.aspx

Independent Public Inquiry, Long-Term Public Transport Plan for Sydney (2010) *Independent Public Inquiry into a Long-Term Public Transport Plan for Sydney: Final Report*, 26 May 2010, Submitted to and published by *The Sydney Morning Herald*. <http://www.transportpublicinquiry.com.au/>

Legacy, C., Sturup, S., Curtis, C. and Wigan, M. (2009) Delivering infrastructure and land-use integration policy: examining good governance issues in Melbourne and Perth, *Papers of the 32nd Australasian Transport Research Forum*, 29 September – 1 October, Auckland. www.patrec.org/atrf.aspx

Mees, P. (2010) Planning for major rail projects: The Melbourne Metro and Regional Rail Link, *Papers of the 33rd Australasian Transport Research Forum*, 29 September – 1 October 2010, Canberra. www.patrec.org/atrf.aspx

Meligrana, J. (1999) Toward regional transportation governance: A case study of Greater Vancouver, *Transportation* 26, 359-380.

NSW Department of Transport (1998) *Action for Transport Sydney 2010*.

NSW Government (2005) *The Government's New Rail Lines for Sydney*, Brochure, June 2005.

NSW Government (2005b) *Metropolitan Strategy City of Cities: A Plan for Sydney's Future*. www.metrostrategy.nsw.gov.au

NSW Government (2006) *Urban Transport Statement: Responding to the Challenges of Travel and Transport within and across Sydney*, November 2006.

NSW Government (2006b) *State Plan: A New Direction for NSW*, NSW Government, November 2006.

NSW Government (2008) *SydneyLink The Future of Sydney's Transport*, March 2008.

NSW Government (2008b) *State Infrastructure Strategy 2008-09 – 2017-18*. www.treasury.nsw.gov.au

NSW Government (2010) *Metropolitan Transport Plan: Connecting the City of Cities*, February 2010.

NSW Government (2010b) *NSW State Plan 2010*.

http://more.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/stateplan/09NSW_State_Plan_Final.pdf

NSW Liberals/Nationals Coalition (2008) *Towards One Network: The need for an Integrated Transport Authority in NSW*, Discussion Paper, February 2008. www.barryofarrell.com.au/documents/transportdiscussion-towards-one-network.pdf

NSW Ministry of Transport (2003) *Ministry of Transport Annual Report 2002-2003*. www.transport.nsw.gov.au

NSW Ministry of Transport (2003b) *Ministerial Inquiry into Sustainable Transport in NSW: Final Report*, prepared by Thomas Parry for NSW Ministry of Transport, Sydney. <http://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/file/inquiries/parry-final-report.pdf>

NSW Ministry of Transport (2004) *Review of Bus Services in NSW: Final Report*, prepared by Barrie Unsworth for NSW Ministry of Transport, Sydney.

http://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/file/inquiries/unsworth-final-bus-report_full.pdf

Planning Institute of Australia, NSW Division (2008) PIA Position Statement on SydneyLink Proposal, April 2008. www.planning.org.au

Ponnaluri, R. (2011) Sustainable Bus Rapid Transit initiative in India: the role of decisive leadership and strong institutions, *Transport Policy* 18, 269-275.

Preston, J. (2010) What's so funny about peace, love and transport integration, *Research in Transportation Economics* 29, 329-338.

Rees, N. (2009) NSW Roads and Transport to be spearheaded by new super-agency, News Release, 11 June 2009, NSW Government.

http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0009/84717/2009.06.11_NSW_ROADS_and_TRANSPORT_TO_BE_CONTROLLED_BY_NEW_SUPER-AGENCY.pdf

Robertson, J. (2010) New transport agency to drive better services, News Release, 2 June 2010, NSW Government.

Robins, B. (2008) Costa dumped, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 September 2008. <http://www.smh.com.au/news/general/costa-dumped/2008/09/05/1220121480254.html>

Stone, J. (2009) The role of planners in contention over transport policy: contrasting behaviour and outcomes in Melbourne and Vancouver since 1970, *Papers of the 32nd Australasian Transport Research Forum*, 29 September – 1 October, Auckland. www.patrec.org/atrf.aspx

Sydney Morning Herald (2008) Mind the gap in Metro plan, *The Sydney Morning Herald* Editorial, 8 May 2008. <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/05/07/1210131059523.html>

Sydney Morning Herald (2009) Editorial: When governments fail, the public must set the agenda, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 August 2009, p. 10.

Transport and Population Data Centre (2006) *TransFigures: Statistics for the Subregional Planning Process*. www.bts.nsw.gov.au

Viton, P. (1993) How big should transit be? Evidence on the benefits of reorganisation from the San Francisco Bay Area, *Transportation* 20, 35-57.

West, A. (2009a) Rail plan for decades ahead now in doubt, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 December 2009. <http://www.smh.com.au/national/rail-plan-for-decades-ahead-now-in-doubt-20091203-k8v6.html>

West, A. (2009b) Keneally's first days: Flawed transport masterplan to cost \$350 billion, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5-6 December 2009. <http://www.smh.com.au/national/flawed-transport-masterplan-to-cost-350-billion-20091204-kaxt.html>

West, A. (2010) Rail link figures are overinflated: economist, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 February 2010, p. 5.

Appendix A – Supporting information for Figure 1

Table A1: NSW Premiers and Ministers in transport, roads and planning portfolios

Current at September 2011

Portfolio	Dates	Name
Premier	Dates	Premier
	4 April 1995 – 3 August 2005	Bob Carr
	3 August 2005 – 5 September 2008	Morris Iemma
	5 September 2008 – 4 December 2009	Nathan Rees
	4 December 2009 – 28 March 2011	Kristina Keneally
	28 March 2011 – current	Barry O’Farrell
Treasurer	Dates	Treasurer
	3 April 1995 – 21 January 2005	Michael Egan
	21 January 2005 – 3 August 2005	Andrew Reshauge
	3 August 2005 – 17 February 2006	Morris Iemma
	17 February 2006 – 5 September 2008	Michael Costa
	8 September 2008 – 28 March 2011	Eric Roozendaal
	28 March 2011 – current	Michael Baird
Transport	Dates	Minister for Transport
	1 December 1997 – 2 April 2003	Carl Scully
	2 April 2003 – 21 January 2005	Michael Costa
	21 January 2005 – 5 September 2008	John Watkins
	8 September 2008 – 4 December 2009	David Campbell
Tr and Roads	8 December 2009 – 21 May 2010	David Campbell
	21 May 2010 – 28 March 2011	John Robertson
	28 March 2011 – current	Gladys Berejiklian
Roads	Dates	Minister for Roads
	28 November 1996 – 21 January 2005	Carl Scully
	21 January 2005 – 3 August 2005	Michael Costa
	3 August 2005 – 17 February 2006	Joe Tripodi
	17 February 2006 – 5 September 2008	Eric Roozendaal
	8 September 2008 – 14 September 2009	Michael Daley
	14 September 2009 – 21 May 2010	David Campbell
	21 May 2010 – 28 March 2011	David Borger
	28 March 2011 – current	Duncan Gay
Planning	Dates	Minister for Planning
	4 April 1995 – 8 April 1999	Craig Knowles
	8 April 1999 – 2 April 2003	Andrew Reshauge
	2 April 2003 – 3 August 2005	Craig Knowles
	3 August 2005 – 5 September 2008	Frank Sartor
	8 September 2008 – 4 December 2009	Kristina Keneally
	8 December 2009 – 28 March 2011	Tony Kelly
	28 March 2011 – current	Brad Hazzard

Source: www.parliament.nsw.gov.au

Note: Ministers Assisting Minister for Transport not shown.

Table A2: Strategic plans in NSW – transport, land use and infrastructure

Release date	Title
November 1998	Action for Transport 2010
December 2005	Metropolitan Strategy: A City of Cities
May 2006	State Infrastructure Strategy 2006-07 to 2015-16
November 2006	Urban Transport Statement
November 2006	State Plan: A New Direction for NSW (Iemma)
March 2008	SydneyLink
May 2008	State Infrastructure Strategy 2008-09 – 2017-18
November 2009	State Plan (Rees)
December 2009 (unreleased)	Transport Blueprint
February 2010	Metropolitan Transport Plan
March 2010	State Plan (Keneally)
December 2010	Metropolitan Plan
September 2011	State Plan: NSW 2021 (O’Farrell)

Table A3: Key dates in NSW

Date	Event
March 1995	State election – Labor government elected for term 1
March 1999	State election – Labor government re-elected for term 2
March 2003	State election – Labor government re-elected for term 3
June 2003	Parramatta Rail Link: Epping-Parramatta stage deferred
July 2003	Structure: Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources
January 2005	New Ministers
June 2005	Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program announced: NWRL, SWL, CBDRL
September 2005	New Premier Iemma and new Ministers, DIPNR disbanded
December 2005	Metropolitan Strategy released
November 2006	New transport plan (Urban Transport Statement) released, NWRL accelerated
March 2007	State election – Labor government re-elected for term 4
November 2007	Federal election – Change of government: Labor government elected
March 2008	North West Metro announced to replace North West Rail Link
September 2008	New Premier Rees and new Ministers
October 2008	North West Metro cancelled, CBD Metro announced
May 2009	Federal budget announced, funding for West Metro planning studies
June 2009	13 super-departments announced inc NSW Transport and Infrastructure
September 2009	Minister for Transport and Roads combined (David Campbell)
December 2009	New Premier Keneally
February 2010	New transport plan released (Metropolitan Transport Plan), CBD Metro cancelled
May 2010	New Minister for Transport (John Robertson)
July 2010	New transport department announced: Transport NSW
August 2010	Federal election – funding for Parramatta-Epping Rail Link announced, Labor government re-elected
March 2011	State election – change of government: Liberal/Nationals government elected, new Premier O’Farrell and new ministers
April, July 2011	New transport department announced: Transport for NSW (and Roads and Maritime Services)

Table A4: Management changes in NSW transport agencies

Current at September 2011

Agency	Dates	Director-General, Transport
Transport (Transport NSW, Ministry of Transport, NSW Transport and Infrastructure, Transport NSW, Transport for NSW)	15 Nov 2000 – March 2003	Michael Deegan
	1 July 2003 – Sept 2004	John Lee
	Oct 2004 – Feb 2005	Michael Duffy (Acting)
	Feb 2005 – Nov 2005	John Lee
	Nov 2005 – Feb 2006	Jim Glasson (Acting)
	Feb 2006 – May 2009	Jim Glasson
	July 2009 – current	Les Wielinga
Roads and Traffic Authority	Dates	CEO, RTA
	Dec 1999 – Oct 2005	Paul Forward
	Oct 2005 – July 2006	Mike Hannon (Acting)
	July 2006 – Feb 2009	Les Wielinga
	Feb 2009 – July 2009	Michael Bushby (Acting)
	July 2009 – current	Michael Bushby
Rail (State Rail/RailCorp)	Dates	CEO, State Rail/RailCorp
	Dec 1997 – Oct 2000	Simon Lane
	Nov 2000 – June 2001	Ron Christie (Acting)
	June 2001 – Dec 2001	Lucio Di Bartolomeo (Acting)
	Dec 2001 – April 2003	Howard Lacy
	April 2003 – Dec 2003	Vince Graham (Acting)
	Dec 2003 – April 2008	Vince Graham
	April 2008 – current	Rob Mason
State Transit Authority	Dates	CEO, State Transit
	May 1996 – Sept 2004	John Stott
	Sept 2004 – Nov 2004	John Lee (Acting)
	Nov 2004 – Feb 2005	John Lee
	Feb 2005 – Feb 2006	Roger Wilson (Acting)
	March 2006 – Aug 2007	John Lee
	Aug 2007 – June 2008	Peter Rowley (Acting)
June 2008 – current	Peter Rowley	
Sydney Ferries Corporation	Dates	CEO, Sydney Ferries
	1 July 2004 – 22 May 2006	Sue Sinclair
	20 Feb 2006 – 24 Aug 2006	Chris Oxenbould
	21 Aug 2006 – 26 May 2009	Rear Admiral Geoff Smith
	18 March 2009 – 10 May 2010	David Callahan (Acting)
	10 May 2010 – current	David Callahan

Source: Annual Reports, www.transport.nsw.gov.au/inquiries/walker-ferry-report.pdf