Part Two
Learning (in) ‘Heidegger’

The poet has learned renunciation. He has undergone an experience... The poet has experienced that only the word makes a thing appear as the thing it is, and thus lets it be present...

Renunciation says: a thing may be only where the word is granted. Renunciation speaks affirmatively. The mere refusal not only does not exhaust the essence of renunciation, it does not even contain it... From now on may the word be: the bethinging of the thing.

Heidegger On the Way to Language'"'

Part One of this thesis suggested that ‘Heidegger’, as a teaching, involves a process in which learners institute the necessity of what is being learned, sustaining the to-be-learned against, yet within, the already-learnt to the point that it becomes the essence of a new ontology. This hypothesis was evidenced by the way Heidegger taught, with reference made to reflexive moments in his teachings when Heidegger appeared to be instructing his learners how to learn from him.

In the last chapters of that part, I attempted to mitigate somewhat the extent to which that institutional essence of learning is a radical constructivism. It was argued that the process of learning which learners are being called upon to perform by Heidegger’s teachings is an act of instituting, of making something be the case. But it was also insisted that this instituting does not capriciously remove itself from what is already the case, that it is thoroughly reflexive both in the sense of maintaining an awareness of itself as an instituting and in the sense of returning to those historico-environmental conditions which make it possible. It is only by way of this reflexivity that it manages to institute; but for the same reason, its ability to institute is necessarily constrained.

However, it needs to be acknowledged that despite these qualifications, the learning process, as described in its essence in Part One following Heidegger’s

* Endnotes for Part Two commence on page 185.
pedagogical strategies and exhortations, is thoroughly anthropocentric. It grants an ontological power to humans. It indicates that someone learned in the ways of ‘Heidegger’ has access to a process that makes what is, both singly (i.e., distinct entities or regions of entities) and as a whole, dependent upon the activities of human being(s). By projecting a certain essence as necessary, a human is able to learn new things into existence. This second part of the thesis strives to take account of the sheer anthropocentrism of what has so far been put forward about learning.

Confronting this issue is required in terms of Heidegger’s teachings themselves. Part One was concerned primarily with the way Heidegger’s teachings functioned. It is perhaps now necessary to turn more squarely to what Heidegger teaches. The currently dominant interpretation of the content of Heidegger would claim that Heidegger, especially after 1936 say, teaches the error and danger of anthropocentrism. Those who claim to have learnt Heidegger, insist that even if Heidegger did initially advocate a certain form of human transcendence, he turned against this possibility in his own teachings over the second half of the ’30s and after. Such Heideggerians claim that throughout his later teachings, Heidegger, in a range of contexts, continually warns against all forms of thinking and acting that make being dependent upon any aspect of human being. Radical constructivism, with its claim that what is essential derives from what humans project as essential, is, to many, a good gloss on what Heidegger means when he claims that the essence of Technology is Gestell, the total accomplishment of metaphysics and the complete abandonment of being. This thesis must now face this way of learning Heidegger: it must deal with the possibility that what it has been learning as the institutional essence of learning is an exemplar of all that Heidegger can be understood to be claiming is the modern corruption and concealment of what is essential (Verwesen).

This second part of the thesis is thus turning to the period in Heidegger’s teachings known as ‘the turn’. The intention is to learn whether what Heidegger is thought to have turned away from in the ’30s is in fact what this thesis has been learning learning to be.

Most significantly, it is in this period that Heidegger offers some of his most sustained engagements with the notion of learning. In other words, throughout the second half of the 1930s, Heidegger takes up ‘learning’ not merely in instructive asides in relation to how his teachings should work, but makes ‘learning’ the very focus of what
he is teaching. In this part then, I will be turning to Heidegger’s most direct discussion of learning in the 1935 Kant lecture course, The Question Concerning the Thing (translated as What is a Thing?). The analysis given there of mathema is summarised in the 1938 lecture “The Age of the World Picture”. This part of the thesis will also examine at length the 1936-46 Nietzsche courses and treatises. Whilst addressing learning less directly, we will see that Heidegger’s way of approaching Nietzsche involves an extended examination of ‘Nietzsche’ as a teaching, as a philosophy that avowedly presents itself as a teaching. It could be claimed that it is Nietzsche’s self-consciously educational project that brings learning before Heidegger, prompting the examinations of mathesis and paideia in the 1940 lecture “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”. In this context, the Nietzsche volumes can be seen to be providing us with some of Heidegger’s most sustained elaborations of the essence of learning.

In fact, given the timing of Heidegger’s most thematic analyses of learning, this thesis is suggesting that the whole of Heidegger’s ‘turn’ can be learned as a prolonged engagement with the question of learning. Since aspects of the 1935 analysis of learning are repeated, at times verbatim in the 1951 course, What is Called Thinking? — one of Heidegger’s last examinations of Nietzsche — it could be said that learning is the topic that marks the beginning and the end of the ‘turn’. This would mean that Heidegger’s turning is not only an act of learning — i.e., self-criticism — but an act of learning concerning learning — i.e., a turn toward learning as a thought-worthy matter.

The question is then: what does Heidegger learn and teach about learning in the ‘turn’? On the one hand, casting the ‘turn’ as a preoccupation with the question of learning would seem to bolster the case that a conventional learner of Heidegger would have against what this thesis is putting forward as the essence of learning according to Heidegger: not only is the ‘turn’ a turn away from the metaphysics of anthropocentrism more generally, but explicitly a turn away from that particular radically constructivist version of metaphysics that is anthropocentric learning.

On the other hand, the first part of this thesis has argued that ‘Heidegger’ can and must be learned as using the same teaching strategy throughout his career. Certainly evidence can be found that Heidegger continues to instruct learners to use the institutional essence of learning in regard to his teachings after the turn. In that case, Heidegger would appear to be caught in a performative contradiction, using the
anthropocentric constructivism of learning to teach against anthropocentric constructivism.

The chapters of this part of the thesis aim to show that ‘Heidegger’ is not hypocritical in this way, because ‘Heidegger’ does not turn against the anthropocentrism that lies at the essence of learning, neither in how ‘Heidegger’ teaches nor in what it teaches. I mean to show that the learning process described in Part One should still be considered an appropriate way to learn (what) how to learn (with) even the post-Kehre ‘Heidegger’ (means) and that consequently the later ‘Heidegger’ continues to do what is being said and say what is being done in an exemplary fashion.

There is a ‘turn’, but in a fashion that is typical of ‘Heidegger’, it is a return, an appropriative turn, in the style of what the last two chapters of Part One partially explicated. I will suggest that ‘Heidegger’ comes to teach in the later half of the ’30s that the essence of Technology concerns its perversion of the essence of learning. Western metaphysics completes itself in a nihilism that must be learned as the withdrawal of learning, the concealment of the necessary anthropocentricity of learning beneath that which is merely taken-as-learnt. Learning is thereby misrepresented as a technical economy. It is this learning, which is in fact not a learning but an unlearning (of learning), that ‘Heidegger’ turns against. The institutional essence of learning, as practised by ‘Heidegger’, is then what Heidegger turns toward. Far from avoiding anthropocentrism, ‘Heidegger’ must be learned as teaching us to re-appropriate the anthropocentrism that is most proper to us and thereby all that is. ‘Heidegger’ is teaching us to relearn the learning by which we (un)learnt our way into our current state of essential refusal, so that we might learn how to learn our way through this situation. ‘Heidegger’ through the turn is teaching us what essential learning essentially is and how to so learn.

The ‘turn’ thus involves a clarification of the nature of the institutional essence of learning. Heidegger’s ‘turn’ is not a shift in position, but an articulation of what he was already doing and will continue to do through his teachings, an explicitation required by the totalisation of modern representational economies. This part of the thesis characterises this clarification — following Heidegger’s own return to the Ancient Greeks in the ’40s to resolve his relation to Nietzsche and metaphysics more generally — as the differentiation of authentic learning as a reflexive praxis from the modern non-learning as a technical poiésis. Where the latter unlimits itself by deceptively denying its
anthropocentrism, the former is finitudinal because of its avowed anthropocentrism. This means that learning is essentially more ambitious and metaphysical than the current instrumentalist accounts of learning allow. But it also means that learning is more thingy, and thus more finitudinal. Where the Technological epoch can be characterised by the withdrawal of things in their thingliness beneath an exponentially abstracting economy of means and ends, essentially relearning learning means relearning the learned thingliness that conditions our being-in-the-world, attesting to the finitude that is the essence of our temporal anthropocentrism.

According to how this thesis is learning the turning ‘Heidegger’, and how it is extrapolating that the learning at work with, and now also in, ‘Heidegger’ is of the much-needed essence of learning, the danger that we western moderns now face lies with the technical concealment of the essence of learning, the misrepresentations that veil the true power of learning, condemning us to essentially unchangeable ways of being. This part of this thesis is thus at pains to show that learning Heidegger’s ‘turn’ as a turn against the anthropocentrism of the institutional essence of learning wills — without being aware that it is still a willing: that is, ignorantly abdicates — us into an eternal recurrence of the same.
Endnotes for Part Two

1 The first paragraph is from the reading of a Stefan George poem in “The Nature of Language” (in On the Way to Language trans. P.Hertz [San Francisco: Harper, 1971]), 65-6, the second from a similar reading of the same poem in “Words”, 151. The first paragraph is a definition of “abdication” which relates it to its affirmative root, “to indicate”. The account of hinting that follows can thus be read as a re-theorisation (or rather a poetizing) of the process of formal indication.

2 The thesis of the turn from ‘Heidegger I’ (resolution toward the meaning of being) to ‘Heidegger II’ (resignation in favour of the clearing of Being) was first outlined in English, though in a suitably nuanced manner (and not as I have charactatured it here), by Father Richardson’s Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. It has been well-disputed though mostly via finding ‘Heidegger II’ already in ‘Heidegger I’, rather than asserting the continued presence of ‘Heidegger I’ in ‘Heidegger II’ as this part of the thesis seeks to show. For a critical reading of the reception of Richardson’s (and Löwith’s) biographical distinction, see L.Hemming “Speaking out of Turn: Heidegger and die Kehre” International Journal of Philosophical Studies v6 n3 (1998).

3 This understudied course was one of the few Heidegger himself chose to publish before the project of the Gesamtausgabe was initiated. The importance to ‘Heidegger’ of this course and in particular the section on learning is perhaps also signaled by the fact that he agreed that exactly the section with which I will be most concerned be included in the English selection of essays put together by David Krell. For Krell’s comments about his discussions with Heidegger about the selection, see “Work Sessions with Martin Heidegger” in Philosophy Today (Summer 1982).

The German title of this lecture series and its subsequent publication in 1962 is Die Frage nach dem Ding. This title is similar to the 1953 lecture, “Die Frage nach der Technik” translated as ‘The Question Concerning Technology”. The translated title, What is a Thing? (trans. W.Barton & V.Deutsch [Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968]), whilst inaccurate does draw on the clearly stated key question of the lecture, and has the added advantage of suggesting the link between this lecture series and the later one entitled What is (Called) Thinking? Since the focus of this chapter concerns a triangulation between the Thing, Thinking and Technology – the link being learning – I will try to preserve these allusions by referring to the lecture in general as The Question Concerning the Thing whilst citing the title of the publication What is a Thing? for quotations.
4 On this, see J.Derrida’s “Otobiographies: The Teaching of Nietzsche and the Politics of the Proper Name” in *The Ear of the Other* [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985] concerning Nietzsche’s declaration “I am the master [Lehrer, the teacher] par excellence.”

5 Richardson’s documentation of courses taught by Heidegger throughout his career (overseen and corrected by Heidegger, though errors have still been noted), also lists a 1941 seminar on Schiller’s *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* which remains unpublished and not even slated for future volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*.

6 The 1955 Jünger epistle “The Question of Being” in *Pathmarks* concerns Nietzsche’s nihilism but does not involve any sustained examinations of any specific texts. The 1953 lecture “Who is Nietzsche’s ‘Zarathustra’” does contain extensive analyses of Nietzsche’s texts but can be considered to be an extension of the analysis given in *What is Called Thinking*? see Krell’s comments, N2 v, 254.

7 Heidegger admits to a type of turning in his teachings in the 1947 “Letter on ‘Humanism’” (LH 250) – though there are numerous recantations – affirming it in his “Preface” to the Nietzsche lectures which “provide a view of the path of thought I followed from 1930 to the “Letter on ‘Humanism’”. “ (N1 xl)
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Yet in the education of those who are reaching out in order to understand, their own lack of understanding, their incomprehension of the thought that has been thought prior to them, may well be a formative obstacle, perhaps even a necessary one. We know little about these processes.

Heidegger Nietzsche 2, 141

The problem for those who seek to dissociate ‘Heidegger’, especially Being & Time, from the public political actions of Heidegger in 1933-4, is that the teachings from at the latest 1928 – i.e., all the qualifications of Being & Time with respect to transcendence – up until 1935, evidence a profound continuity. There are modifications, but mostly of a linearly developmental nature. The 1928 treatise “On the Essence of Ground” establishes the framework by foregrounding the transcendence of Dasein’s worlding, extending beyond Being & Time’s descriptions and actively prescribing the projective application of that essence in order to learn the ontological difference. The 1929-30 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics furthers this proactive account of Dasein in the (counter-de)motivating Stimmung of boredom: “Man as man [as opposed to the animal which is taken by its (thus impoverished) world] is world-forming. This does not mean that the human being running around in the street, as it were, is world-forming, but that the Da-sein in man is world-forming... The Dasein in man forms world: it brings it forth; it gives an image or view of the world, it sets it forth; it constitutes the world, contains and embraces it.” (FCM 285) This is why this course ends with the strong affirmation of the project of projection cited at the end of the Part One. “What is Metaphysics?” which the 1949 preface to this treatise tells us was written at the same time as and in an intimate relation to “The Essence of Ground”, works the Stimmung of anxiety rather than boredom into that which necessitates continual attempts at preserving disclosure. In accounting for his assumption of the rectorate of Freiburg University under the Nazis, Heidegger repeatedly points to the importance of this

* Endnotes for Chapter Six commence on page 205.
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repeatedly given lecture and the fact that it totally informs what was taught in the
Rectoral Address. There, in the 1933-4 lectures on Hölderlin, and in the 1935 An
Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger repeats the 1928-9 exhortations, though now
more boldly put, to practise the essence instituting that is most proper to human ec-
sistence. As this phraseology indicates, this continuity in Heidegger’s teachings
concerns precisely what this thesis would describe as the institutional essence of
learning. All the teachings of this period involve the promotion and enhancement of
the accomplishments of essential knowing, what can perhaps best be described as the
ontological power of learning.6

For those troubled by this philosophical Nazism in ‘Heidegger’, relief comes from
the Nietzsche volumes.7 This mammoth undertaking is made manageable by being
reductively interpreted as a documentation of Heidegger’s self-re-education. The first of
the published volumes (courses 1-3) represents a particularly thorough example of a
philosopher learning about his own excesses as they are repeated by another, the second
volume (course 4 and the treatises) then representing the definitive expunging from his
philosophy of those temptations.8 For this thesis, given what has just been identified —
that Heidegger’s Nazism is the result of advocating and performing the institutional
essence of learning — Nietzsche should contain a decisive refutation. Let us then turn to
this ‘refutation’ and face this possibility head on.

**Poetizing**

‘Heidegger’ teaches us in the first three courses that will to power is the art of knowledge.
With this formula, I am combining the titles of the first (The Will to Power as Art) and
third (The Will to Power as Knowledge) courses to indicate that what is at issue is learning.
‘Heidegger’ wants to access ‘Nietzsche’ as a teaching, which means not just a coherent
doctrine, but a coherent doctrine about teaching, a teaching “by showing” (N2 216) of
the art of knowing. The Eternal Return (the second course) is then an examplar of this
performative teaching “Whatever is taught... recedes before the way it is taught.” (N2
76)9

What becomes apparent however is that Nietzsche’s way of teaching is in fact
Heidegger’s. Will to power, in Heidegger’s teaching of it, in fact emerges as one of the
clearest accounts of Heidegger’s own formal indication process.10 Hence, will to power
is essentially defined as the attempt to “stamp Becoming with character of Being”,11 that
is, as the perspectival manner by which we come to hold onto ‘what is’ with a certain provisional constancy whilst still attesting to the fundamental movement that is how ‘what is’ is. “The horizon, which sets limits and stabilizes, not only fixes chaos in certain respects and thus secures the possible, it also first lets chaos appear as chaos through its transparent stability. The stable as such is only perceptible in the perspective of something becoming and something becoming only reveals itself as such on the transparent basis of something stable.” (N3 88) Will to power is fundamentally the "praxis" of schematising, or projecting the limits into which ‘what is’ comes to be, the Horizontbildung, or limit learning project that is the Lebensvollzug, the fulfilment of life’s Wesen. (N3 85-8) Whether in the form of art or knowledge, will to power thus brings things to a stand, but maintains the dynamism of what results by preserving the relation of the willer to what is thereby powered into presence – and crucially this on-going relation of willing is what ‘Heidegger’ teaches us to call knowing, what this thesis would call the institutional essence of learning: “What is knowable and what knows are each determined in their essence in a unified way from the same essential ground. We may not separate either one, nor wish to encounter them separately. Knowing is not like a bridge that somehow subsequently connects two existent banks of a stream, but is itself a stream that in its flow first creates the banks and turns them toward each other in a more original way than a bridge ever could.” (N3 83)

Given that Nietzsche is employing Heidegger’s ‘secret weapon’, it is understandable why Heidegger would admit, despite some necessary qualifications, that this key aspect of Nietzsche’s (way of) teaching draws on the same ground as “the more original essential configuration [ursprünglicheren Wesengestalt] of human being (in Dasein).” (N3 87) As Arendt notes “Heidegger’s strictly phenomenological analyses of the Will in Volume I of his Nietzsche closely follow his early analyses of the self in Being & Time, except that the Will takes the place ascribed to Care in the earlier work.” Will to power is then another name for the transcendental project of learning that Heidegger had advocated up to that point both as how we necessarily are in-the-world and, because of this, how we should be (reappropriating (human) being). The project of fundamental ontology could thus be considered to be a type of will to power.

What Nietzsche’s will to power contributes to Heidegger’s learning process is a certain emphasis on dynamic figure and form: it brings the drive of the Leibnizian monad and the will of the Jena romantics to the schematism of Kant, in order to teach
the existential analytic to be more avowedly artistic. For instance, Nietzsche deconstructs the principle of identity to a form of poetizing: “Such positing of the ‘same’ is thus a creation and an invention [ein Erdenichen und Ausdichten].” (N3 95, NI 583) “The essence of reason” holds sway for us moderns not because of its ‘rightness’ or even its ‘mightiness’ but because it is a “a ‘formative’, creative ‘force’ [bildenden, dichtenden Kraft].” (N3 96, NI 584) It is this poetic power that ‘Heidegger’ teaches us that ‘Nietzsche’ can teach us to appropriate.

With ‘Nietzsche’ then, we can learn the art of the institutional essence of learning, that is to say, how to be “artist-philosopher[s]” (Künstlerphilosoph), Schaffen und Gestalten, makers and shapers (N1 73) of the anticipated forms in which ‘what is’ genuinely radiates (N1 215), how to set to work the “thinking in the grand style [that] is genuine action, indeed action in its most powerful — though most silent — form.” (N2 11) This is why Nietzsche calls for us “to see science under the optics of art” (N1 218); such a science would be “the preservation of a genuine knowing that is pregnant with decision and helps to create history” (N3 42), “the stance adopted, and the will directed, toward essential knowing... [something like] the passion of a well-grounded mastery over the things that confront us and over our own way of responding to what confronts us.” (N2 20).

It must be recalled however that this mastery, in line with Heidegger’s constant cautioning about the ineluctable finitude of transcendence, is bound to the limited openings it prefigures. Art, grand style and rapture are ec-static without being excessive; they are composed states of discernment or discerning states of composition (N1 113): “Affect: the seizure that blindly agitates us. Passion: the lucidly gathering grip on beings... Great will shares with great passion that serenity of unhurried animation that is slow to answer and react.” (N1 48-9). For all Nietzsche’s Wagnerianism (N1 113), he is in fact much closer to Kant’s “unconstrained favouring... the supreme effort of our essential nature” (N1 111). His teachings are therefore confluent with Heidegger’s teachings about resolution: “Will is, in our terms, resolute openness, in which he who wills stations himself abroad among beings in order to keep them firmly within his field of action.” (N1 48)13

Here then is all that this thesis has been attempting to describe as the institutional essence of learning, the ontological shift that comes from being willing, the necessitating that comes from a concerted anthropocentrism.
Teaching

In this context, where Heidegger’s key teaching of essential learning is the doctrine of ontological difference, Nietzsche’s key teaching of will to power is the doctrine of the Eternal Return. As ‘Heidegger’ makes clear, the Eternal Recurrence of the Same must be learned as a pure teaching, something whose essence lies in and with its mediated presentation through “the figure of the teacher”. (N2 33) It is on the one hand, just a thought, “a thought of a possibility” (N2 129), even a ‘hazarded’ “experiment” (N2 38). However, “such a riddling ventures the truth of beings as a whole (Dieses Raten ist ein Wagen der Wahrheit des Seienden im Ganzen).” (N2 38) It therefore contains “a question and a possibility” that can individuate us into our “loneliest loneliness” demanding that we grasp it in a moment of “authentic appropriation (Vereigentlichung)” (N2 25).

The Eternal Return is then precisely the sort of formal indication that requires a prior essentialising, one that projects the necessity of this possibility: “To think through a possibility truly – that is to say, with all its consequences – means to decide something for ourselves... thinking possibility [is] a kind of thinking that is always creative.” (N2 130) The learned response is thus an affirming decision that is nevertheless reflexive, projecting the to-be-learned into the learnt conditions that currently exist. Hence, in the version given in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the dwarf and the animals fail to be reflexively creative enough in their responses to this teaching, believing it brings the anarchic freedom of determinism (N2 43); they remain “mere spectators, [only] telling what results if everything revolves.” (N2 55) They are “like someone who undertakes to count the number of people who are present but forgets to count himself.” (N2 136) “Here, to be sure... the decisive condition is you yourself.” (N2 138) The thought must “recoil on the thinker because of the way it is to be thought and so compel the thinker” (N2 183) to affirm the appropriat(iv)e response to the question: “Who is the human being into whose gorge all that is heaviest and blackest will creep?” The answer is that it is the one who thinks — in the company of others — the thought of the Eternal Return... [H]e or she is not thinking the thought in its essential domain until the black snake has penetrated the gorge and its head has been bitten off. The thought is only as that bite.” (N2 181) This bite then, is Ereignis, the decisive appropriation of (one’s) history (N2 139). What happens is ontological learning; a new archē is installed (N2 187) causing “beings as a whole to undergo metamorphosis. ’From the very moment this thought exists, all colours change their hue and a new history
begins.’... It is not merely that another series of happenstances unfolds; what is different is the kind of happening, acting and creating. Colour, the very look of things, their *eidos*, presencing, Being — this is what changes.” (N2 131-2)

Though this is not quite right: the thought of the Eternal Return does not deliver a single moment of total relearning. It is something that necessarily tends to withdraw: “even the greatest teaching, the ring of rings, itself must become a ditty for barrel organs, the latter always accompanying its true proclamation.” (N2 60) The correct response is therefore “Incipit Zarathustra” and “Incipit tragœdia” (N3 135). This means that one does not so much learn the ‘will to power’d figure of the Eternal Return as become the learner of the Eternal Return by taking over the task of teaching it, refiguring it, willing it to power.15 One thus learns the ontological meaning of the Eternal Return only by teaching it, by becoming its advocate (Fürsprecher, N2 211), by learning to make the difference, to accomplish the essential transformation that it harbours. “‘We shall teach the teaching — that is the most potent means of incorporating it in ourselves. Our kind of beatitude,16 as teacher of the greatest teaching.'” (N2 75)

Here again is a succinct definition of the formal indication methodology, where fulfilment (*Zeitigung*) or satiation of what is indicated happens through a re-appropriation of the indicated’s facticity, a re-enactment (*Vollzug*) of what it prefigures. Teaching is therefore a project, a project of projecting what is essential about the thought, a longing and promising (N2 216) in which the teacher is the most essential learner (N2 34), learning what it is that they are responsible for. To this extent “the communication of the thought [is] the greatest burden.” (N2 34). One suffers, as the one called to go down and teach it; one is infected by the homeopathic remedy one has been charged to bring to nihilism, “the art of healing for the future’” (N2 160).17 However, “a burden [also] hinders vacillation, renders calm and steadfast, draws all forces to itself, gathers them and gives them definition. A burden exerts a downward pull, compelling us constantly to hold ourselves erect.” (N2 21) Whilst there is “the danger that we will fall down, and stay down” (N2 22), the burden’s necessity or the burden of necessity is also our protection against the nihilistic “experience that all things have lost their weight”. (N2 23)

In short, the Eternal Return converts us into evangelistic believers, taking up the praxis of teaching learning. As such, the essence of the Eternal Return is therefore learning. From it, we learn that all things are *qua* being, learned. We are now truly
teaching, teaching the truth, insofar as “to hold firm in this thought [of the Eternal Return] is essentially to co-constitute its being true” (N2 129). We are being teachers in a way that attests to being’s teacherliness, manifesting a well-configured will-to-power, a resolute holding-to-be-true, “holding it as in being”. (N3 36) We have learned that essences can change (N1 148) by learning, since we are now participating in their re-education. Far from constituting a relativism, this (re)learning of essential learning teaches us the truth of essence: “The objection that essential transformation leads to relativism is possible only on the basis of a deception concerning... the essentiality of essence.” (N1 148)

Turning

This brief account of the first three courses of Heidegger’s Nietzsche has thus indicated that ‘Heidegger’ teaches us to learn ‘Nietzsche’ as a teacher, employing in an exemplary fashion the institutional essence of learning that ‘Heidegger’ himself endorses and uses. Nietzsche not only promotes the project of formal indication, but furthers it by demonstrating the more creative side of this form of projection. The ‘Nietzsche’ that ‘Heidegger’ presents to us can thus be learned as the truth of, or at the least the model for, the ontological power of learning that ‘Heidegger’ seeks to teach us to appropriate.

However, the third lecture course opens with the suggestion that ‘Nietzsche’, unknowingly (N3 5), “anticipates the metaphysics of the modern age as it completes itself in its consummation.” (N3 7) As the course proceeds, ‘Heidegger’ teaches that Nietzsche’s will to power is not so much teaching us about metaphysics as repetitively acting-out (in the Freudian sense) metaphysics, representing consummation of the history of metaphysics. It would thus be more appropriate, according to ‘Heidegger’, to learn (in order to unlearn) ‘Nietzsche’ as teaching us to be metaphysically. Because “Nietzsche indeed affirms the possibility of a positing that determines how beings are to be grasped in essence” (N3 116), ‘Nietzsche’ amounts to “the uttermost unseeing adoption of the very guiding projection of metaphysics.” (N3 166) ‘Nietzsche’ is thus recast as the apotheosis of “the groundless grounding of a ground, in such a way that it grants itself the law of its essence.” (N3 119). Being in ‘Nietzsche’ becomes sheer “malleability” before the ungrounded “projections” of human “machination (Machenschaft).” (N3 175) Anything can be whatever we teach it to be after ‘Nietzsche’.
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It is thus necessary to indict ‘Nietzsche’ for “instituting [the] planetary dominion... [of] an unconditioned anthropomorphism.” (N3 174)

It is important to get the identity of who ‘Heidegger’ is accusing here very explicit; for what is at issue is the extent to which this thesis must stand co-accused in this change in Heidegger’s attitude toward Nietzsche’s teaching(s). Let me then outline the charge that is set out in the 1940 treatise “Nietzsche’s Metaphysics”.

The link there between metaphysics and learning is made explicit in the opening definition of a “fundamental metaphysical position”. This is an ontological teaching, “the rare joining, grounding, communicating and safeguarding of truth in its antecedent existential-ecstatic projection, thus indicating and preparing a place for mankind within the history of truth.” (N3 188) Nietzsche’s way of “utter[ing] the Being of beings” mobilises the fact that “everything comes to bear on the education of those human beings who will ‘themselves undertake the revaluation.’” (N3 189) Hence, Nietzsche’s project is one of essential learning: “‘To reteach in this regard is now always the main concern:— perhaps if metaphysics touched upon this life with the heaviest accent, — according to my teaching!’” (N3 215) And the revaluation that is thereby taught/learned essentially, is the constructivist essence of learning, the power to will new conditions of “preservation/enhancement” (N3 197), that is perspectival punctuations in the process of becoming, “configurations of will to power” known as “complex constructs” (N3 198). As a process of construction, the process of revaluation that is learned “fashions the sort of thing that is not yet, and perhaps never is, simply at hand. To fashion is to erect... The heights ascended in construction assure the clarity of the conditions under which the possibility of command stands. From the clarity of these heights alone can commands be issued in such a way that in the command everything that obeys is transfigured in willing.” (N3 242) This process of constructive revaluation is therefore an avowed process of “humanization”: humans are installed as “the being[s] before whom all beings are brought and through whom they are justified. Thus man comes to be a ground founded on himself, and a measure of the truth concerning being.” (N3 239) As this citation indicates, the whole is finally self-reproducing, since what is constructivistically humanized is also human being, recast as the overman: “The overman is the casting of that mankind which first wills itself as a casting and even casts itself as such a casting.” (N3 233) This “self-shaping of man that takes man himself in
hand” thus has the self-secured, self-driving nature of a “total ‘mechanization’... ‘The machine as instructress.’” (N3 230)

It would therefore seem that the ‘Nietzsche’ that ‘Heidegger’ is now teaching against, does manifest, in a very strong version, the institutional essence of learning that this thesis has been advocating (that ‘Heidegger’ is advocating). This implies that what this thesis is calling the essence of learning harbours, repeats or even reasserts an anthropocentric consummation of metaphysics that reinstutes unlearningly the Technologism that endangers our epoch. Having set out in some of the most explicit terms yet what this thesis believes is the institutional essence of learning, ‘Heidegger’ does appear to turn against it. “‘Fundamental philosophical doctrines’ means what is taught in those doctrines, in the sense of something portrayed in a presentation that interprets beings as a whole with a view to Being. [However] ‘Fundamental philosophical doctrines’ [for the same reason amount to] the essence of self-consummating metaphysics.” (N3 250)

Reconfiguring

However, there are substantial reasons to believe that the situation just outlined is more complex than indicated so far, that there are other issues that need to be aired if this is to be a fair rather than a prejudicial trial of the Nietzscheanism that underlies the thesis’ understanding of learning.

Stepping back for a moment, Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe has noted that these Nietzsche teachings remain fundamentally unread, that is unlearned. By the time they were published, it was as if ‘everybody’ had already learnt what it was that Heidegger had learnt from or about Nietzsche and consequently how and what these courses and treatises taught Nietzsche.18 The conventional account of Heidegger’s turn against (his own) Nietzscheanism, comes from the belief that there is really nothing to learn from these volumes, either about Heidegger, whose philosophy was presumably merely being restated in an overly polemical fashion, or about Nietzsche, who was thus not actually the topic under consideration.

It is important to take note of this last point though. In this most crucial learning encounter, ‘Heidegger’ can clearly be seen to be employing throughout, in a decisive fashion, the process of transcendental projection that this thesis is suggesting is the essence of learning. In describing the learning strategy being brought to Nietzsche’s
teachings, ‘Heidegger’ notes that “Those who properly understand are always the ones who come a long way on their own ground, from their own territory, the ones who bring much with them in order that they may transform much.” (N2 142) What one brings in order to learn (to understand) is not predetermined content, but a certain formal necessity, a certain unity of signature. To learn ‘Nietzsche’, ‘Heidegger’ insists, we must recast this master of plurivocal disguises and contradiction as a ‘thinker’, that is, as one of “those exceptional human beings who are destined to think one single thought, a thought that is always ‘about’ beings as a whole. Each thinker thinks only one single thought... in the direction of a single, supreme decision... Nietzsche is an essential thinker because he thinks ahead in a decisive sense.” (N3 4-5) Here is everything that has been raised in the first chapter of this thesis: this projection-for-learning is of a unified ‘figure’ (Gestalt N2 7), one with intra-relational necessity, the “very character as a work” (N2 35), that “structure [Aufbau] that is prefigured in the doctrine’s proper truth” which alone allows one to get at “more essential matters” (N2 166); and this projection is of a teaching onto ‘Nietzsche’ by the learner in order to learn — the question “Does Nietzsche’s doctrine possess a configuration in this sense?” (N2 166), is answered by learning ‘Nietzsche’ to be such a doctrine.

This method of learning is used by ‘Heidegger’ in all the volumes of Nietzsche. It is used firstly to teach/learn ‘Nietzsche’ affirmatively and then, according to the conventional account of the ‘turn’, negatively. In both cases, ‘Nietzsche’ is ‘reduced’ to a singularly coherent position, a monadological unity. It is this act of projecting onto ‘Nietzsche’, sustained across the whole of Nietzsche despite its apparent shift in disposition, that has discouraged a careful learning of Nietzsche.

There is a second aspect to the way ‘Heidegger’ teaches/learns ‘Nietzsche’, which I would suggest further explains the inhibitions that prevent the learning of these volumes. I refer to the fact that even though it is very apparent throughout all the lectures and treatises that Heidegger brings ‘Heidegger’ to ‘Nietzsche’, this does not mean that it is easy to differentiate ‘Heidegger’ from ‘Nietzsche’. For instance, ‘Heidegger’ observes in the introduction to the treatise “Nietzsche’s Metaphysics”, “of course, every interpretation must not only take things from the text, but must also, without forcing the matter, be able quietly to give something of its own, something of its own concerns. This something extra is what the layman comparing it to what he takes to be the content of the text devoid of all interpretation necessarily deplores as
interpolation and sheer caprice.” (N3 191-2) However, on this occasion, ‘Heidegger’ admits in the sentence before this citation that “in the following text exposition and interpretation are interwoven in such a way that it is not always clear what has been taken from Nietzsche’s words and what has been added to them.” (N3 191) ‘Heidegger’ attests to this self-observation throughout all the lectures and treatises, employing an extensive amount of paraphrasing and in-line citation that results in a mimetically mixed mode of presentation, in which it becomes very difficult to discern what Heidegger is advocating and what ‘Heidegger’ is teaching us that Nietzsche (or ‘Nietzsche’) is advocating, especially since both regularly contradict themselves (let alone each other).

The conventional (non)reading of Heidegger’s Nietzsche deals with this ineluctable ambiguity by narrativising it: Heidegger initially, in the first three courses, immerses himself in Nietzsche, but only in order to provoke or allow a violent extraction in the last course and accompanying treatises. This process is thought to be a strategic resistance to different forms of Nazism, or as moments in a cathartic mimetic rivalry. The early transitivist identification is therefore able to be ignored under the proviso that it is merely pedagogic, that is to say, a merely preliminary and personal aspect of Heidegger’s dis-identifying ‘turn’. ‘We’ learners of ‘Heidegger’ can therefore leap to the last course and treatises where what has been learnt is set out without ambiguity.

These sorts of ellipses and rationalisations however do not characterise the work of learning. In a distinction that will come to be central to this second part of the thesis, we could say that they evidence a projection, a taking-as-learnt, not a project or undertaking to learn. Given Heidegger’s insistence that we learn the multiplicities that are ‘Nietzsche’ as a single teaching, surely the same learning process must be applied to ‘Heidegger’, in this case, all the volumes of Heidegger’s Nietzsche? Here then lie some of the mitigating factors that will allow us to run the defense of mistaken identity, arguing that ‘Heidegger’ does not turn against its own form of Nietzschean learning, but against that which precisely risks concealing that institutional essence of learning.

The Sameness of ‘Heidegger’ and ‘Nietzsche’ is where this defense then begins. For, ‘Heidegger’ can appear to be so like ‘Nietzsche’ at exactly the same moment as being so imposing upon ‘Nietzsche’ because at the heart of both their philosophies lies that mode of philosophising that proceeds by way of strong projects of learning. ‘Nietzsche’, even more than ‘Heidegger’, learned through proactive impositions,
figuring what was to be learned into its learnable necessity. This is why the ‘Heidegger’
of Nietzsche II, that which seems to proceed so violently against ‘Nietzsche’, is, for this
very reason, still a thoroughly Nietzscbean way of proceeding. Whilst Heidegger appears
to be turning against ‘Nietzsche’ and thus against the Nietzscheanism within himself, he
does so in an exemplary Nietzscbean manner. The identificatory miming does not cease
with the fourth course and the treatises. If anything the ambiguity is being dramatically,
i.e., performatively, accentuated. Nietzsche I teaches us what is to be learned about
learning, and Nietzsche II what can be learned with that learning, “preparing for this
decision or decisively bringing it about” (N3 5).

Nilling
If ‘Heidegger’, either side of what is taken to be its turn around with respect to
‘Nietzsche’, can be learned as consistently employing, that is to say, teaching (with), the
institutional essence of learning, then Heidegger’s turn must involve something more
than merely a turn away from Nietzscheanism, or else Nietzsche II is merely hypocritical.
Allow me to further elucidate the ambiguities that I believe must be allowed to
complexify this ‘learning turning’.

The 1939 course ends by explaining what it means to learn ‘Nietzsche’ as the
teaching of “the transformation of the modern thinking of being to its allotted
consummation.” (N3 156) It means that “metaphysics becomes an end.” As such, “this
end is the need for the other commencement. It is up to us and to those coming after
us whether we experience its necessity.” (N3 157) Here, in what comes after the end of
Nietzscheanism, are clear remnants of the project of learning. There is still a decision to
be made, an essential necessity to be re-instituted. The 1939 summary treatise similarly
invokes this “other commencement” which seeks “another sort of permanence. Such
permanence is not defined in terms of the preservation of any given present thing. It
bends to the task of preserving what is to come. What has been in the first
commencement is thereby compelled to rest in the abyss of its heretofore ungrounded
ground. It thus for the first time becomes history... [This] Commencement only is in
commencing.” (N3 182) Again, the same rhetoric is appearing, the same process being
advocated in response to Nietzsche’s consummate teaching.

The 1940 treatise “Nietzsche’s Metaphysics” becomes self-conscious about the
Nietzschean projection required of ‘Heidegger’ to teach Nietzsche’s teaching as
metaphysical: “If what we have attempted here as an indication of the hidden unity of Nietzsche’s metaphysics proceeds to call that metaphysics the absolute and consummate subjectivity of will to power, are we not forcing ourselves into the very things that Nietzsche avoided?” (N3 247) The answer again, despite the fact that we are now supposedly on the other side of the ‘turn’, concerns a decision to learn rather a decision against decisive learning or a learning not to decide: “The way we cope with these questions will have to decide whether such a reflection merely supplies a belated theory about metaphysics, thus remaining gratuitous, or whether this reflection is a meditation and a decision as well.” (N3 247)

What survives throughout the ‘Nietzsche’ teachings is thus the necessity of a projective, decisive leap, one in which we each, as individual learners, decide what is decisive for what this teacher is still teaching us. What powers and delimits this leap of learning is as always for ‘Heidegger’ a certain historiality: this is a historical decision, concerning the destiny that binds this teacher, we the learners, and the history that we share from this point on: “a tradition takes shape as a power of Dasein only where it is sustained by the creative will, and only as long as it is so sustained.” (N2 79) Hence, Nietzsche’s teachings have a Gestalt “only when those who are thinking — are.

Accordingly, those who are thinking are more than, and something other than, mere particular cases of what is thought.... The thinking of this thought has its most proper historical necessity; the thinking itself determines a historical moment.” (N2 169) And that moment is a confrontation with nihilism: it is in deciding what and how to make a project of learning in or as ‘Nietzsche’ that we can each engage nihilism, that is to say, make nihilism historical, give it a history and render it ‘history’ by learning a way through it. For, what is nihilism but a state of unlearning, an inability to learn, first and foremost about nihilism, about the nihilism that pervades all that is despite its empirically progressive appearances? “The essential consequence of this situation is revealed in the fact that historical decisions are now consciously, willfully and totally transferred... into the realm of Weltanschauung... in which there no longer resides any history-making force.” (N4 195)

In the fourth 1940 course, everything comes down to deciding whether Nietzsche’s articulation of the history of metaphysics as nihilism teaches us something essential about nihilism or remains an unlearned part of that history: does ‘Nietzsche’ learn to overcome nihilism or is ‘Nietzsche’ only ever learning from nihilism? However
the issue is always going to be mired in the possibility of relativity, the fact that "we too must observe and interpret past thought within the horizon of a particular thinking; that is to say, our own." (N 4 73) “With this thought we are approaching the circle of genuine decisions.” (N 4 74) In other words, as historical beings, as beings who have our being thrown historically, there is no learning from, only a learning to: “The statement concerning the end of metaphysics is of course a historical decision.” (N 4 149) The sentence “We must grasp Nietzsche’s philosophy as the metaphysics of subjectivity” (N 4 147) must therefore be read as the brief for a project of learning: we must actively project ‘Nietzsche’ as the necessary teacher of nihilism in order to learn the essence of nihilism.

It is thus possible to see that the SeinGeschick that ‘Heidegger’ is teaching for the first time in this course, whilst seeming to represent a more receptive ‘learning from’ as a counter to proactive anthropocentrisms, is nonetheless itself a proactive anthropocentrism, a necessity projected (with which) to learn. The strategy is admittedly less forceful than the Nietzschanism that ‘Heidegger’ had initially endorsed, but it nonetheless still manifests the institutional essence of learning. The necessity that is projected as the learning process is now more messianic, as for instance the 1946 treatise on “Nihilism and the History of Being” indicates: “The essence of metaphysics consists in the fact that it is the history of the secret of the promise of Being itself.” (N 4 227) However, in a carefully reflexive teaching, essential learning is still a project of instituting: “In the era of fulfilled nonessence of nihilism, man might then for the first time learn that what ‘is’ is” through the “doubly compelling… needlessness of need (Braucht)” (N 4 247). Learning happens by teaching oneself to experience nihilism as that which prevents the experience of necessity. Here is (the re’turn’ of) all that Part One of this thesis was putting forward: what seems to the realised and thus concealed metaphysics of our epoch as “nonbeing in the sense of vacuous nothingness” (N 4 247) or “merely a product of human thought or even utterly fantastic” (N 4 232) must be taken as essential “hints”, and almost forced, without any guarantee of certitude (“But how can we be certain of these hints?” (N 4 238)), into a metaphysical neediness: “if needlessness is the most extreme need and is precisely as if it were not, then in order for the need to be compelling in the realm of man’s essence, man’s capacities must first be directed toward the needlessness. To experience needlessness as such is a necessity.” (N 4 250)

Given this continuity in essential learning processes across the turn, it is now understandable why ‘Heidegger’ would at the time of these later Nietzsche courses and
treatises continue to issue the 1929 lecture “What is Metaphysics?” despite its inherently Nietzschean form of teaching/learning. A postscript would be added for its 1943 publication, and an introduction for its 1949 publication, but despite their qualifications these would continue to affirm the need for anxiously projecting essentiality into nothingness.24

Humanizing

We should now be in a position to believe that something other than a sheer turning away from the essentially institutionalising project of learning is going on in this period. 'Heidegger' is clearly turning against something, and something about the learning process, but what in particular? Discerning this will allow us to make a crucial qualification in our identification of the essence of learning ((in/with) 'Heidegger').

I would like to suggest that the heart of Heidegger’s ambiguity toward the (Nietzschean) project of learning lies with the issue of anthropocentrism. Certainly, as indicated in passing above, Heidegger’s main criticism of Nietzscheanism concerns a form of anthropocentrism: “Nietzsche’s doctrine... makes everything that is, and as it is, into the ‘property and product of man’.” (N4 86) What is critical, is that ‘Nietzsche’ not only notices anthropocentrism but actively wills it through his teaching: “Naïveté does not consist in the fact that man posits values and functions as their meaning and as the measure of value. Man remains naïve to the extent that he posits values as an ‘essence of things’ that devolves upon him, without knowing that it is he who posits them and that the positing is a will to power... the fault in naïveté is not the humanization of things, but the fact that the humanization is not consciously carried out.” (N4 80). In the 1940 treatise, ‘Heidegger’ lets ‘Nietzsche’ teach himself: “‘No longer will to preservation, but to power; no longer the meek expression ‘Everything is merely subjective,’ but ‘It is also our work! — Let us be proud of it!’... ‘To ‘humanize’ the world, that is, to feel ourselves more and more masters within it —’”. (N3 228) It is this self-assertion that unconditions modern humanity’s anthropocentrism, allowing man to "establish and prepare himself for absolute domination.” (N4 81)

However, despite being the turning point, Heidegger’s Nietzsche teachings evidence such a profound ambivalence toward the issue of anthropocentrism that it does appear to be the crux of matter. Every one of the Nietzsche courses progresses to a point where
a confrontation with anthropocentrism becomes necessary, resulting in a profound
difficulty that is mostly left unresolved — or rather, demanding resolution.

In the first course, the issue arises in the least direct manner, via a reading of the
Platonic demiurge and the possibility of art as a form of essential revealing. The
ambiguity then concerns what Nietzsche’s reversal of Plato means: ‘Heidegger’
concludes the course by affirming Nietzsche’s affirmation of art as an overcoming of
nihilism: “‘Overman’ is the man who grounds Being anew — in the rigour of knowledge
and in the grand style of creation.” (N1 220)

The issue arises in an extensive fashion in the second course dealing with the
Eternal Return and the way this teaching cannot be separated from its poetizing teacher
and the learner who projects him or herself into the position of being willing to learn
(from/with) it. Eternal return therefore forces us to learn the ineluctability of the fact
that “if a thought related to beings as a whole must at the same time be related to the
human being who is thinking it — indeed must be thought in terms of the human being
pre-eminently and entirely — then this holds true for the thought of Eternal Return...
The essential relation of this thought to the human being who is thinking it; the
essential involvement of the thinker in the thought and what it thinks... The thought of
Eternal Return of the same, spawned by such a temporality [where “future and past are
decisively accomplished and consummated by man himself, insofar as man occupies the
site of their collision and is himself that collision”] and grounded in it, is therefore a
‘human’ thought in a distinctive sense — the supreme sense.” (N2 98-9) The Eternal
Return therefore teaches us in an unavoidable fashion the extent to which “every
conception of the being and especially of beings as a whole, merely by the fact that it is
a conception, is related by human beings to human beings... [We are] compelled to see
that for all their representations, intuitions and definitions of beings human beings are
cornered in the blind alley of their own humanity.” (N2 99) ‘Heidegger’ questions
whether ‘Nietzsche’ is teaching us about this essential thing, or teaching us this thing in
a way that institutes it as essential. Is there only humanization or is ‘Nietzsche’
humanizing? At this point in the lecture series, ‘Heidegger’ again affirms that
Nietzsche’s anthropocentrism is — following the model of the superficial response to the
possibility of eternal recurrence as opposed to the learning response that comes from
projecting its necessity — no “simple” response merely recognizing that all
dehumanizations are still undertaken by humans (N2 99), but an essentially recoiling
confrontation with the issue: “Suspicious concerning humanization, no matter how palpably near they are and no matter how readily everyone can clumsily wield them, remain superfluous and groundless as long as they have not put themselves in question – by asking the question of who man is.” (N2 105)

In the crucial final lectures of the third course, Heidegger’s shift in disposition, explicitly described as a ‘turning’, culminates in indicting ‘Nietzsche’ over the issue of anthropocentrism. However, what must be noticed in this case is that where the second lecture course discussed Nietzsche’s self-consciousness concerning ‘humanization’ (Vermenschlichung), that is to say, the ineluctability of anthropocentrism, this indictment in the third course primarily (though the point is that there is a confusion — something concealed by Stambaugh and Krell’s translation) concerns ‘anthropomorphism’ (Anthropomorphie), the projection of a certain form of human being onto being(s):

[D]oes not the extrapolation of justice to the fundamental power of beings in general and the thoroughgoing interpretation of beings as a whole as will to power amount to an anthropomorphising [Vermenschlichung] of all beings. Is not the world thought according to the paradigm [Bilde] of man? Is not such thinking pure anthropomorphism [Anthropomorphie]. To be sure. It is anthropomorphism [Anthropomorphie] in the grand style, the style that has a sense for what is rare and long in coming. Nor may we think that this anthropomorphism [Vermenschlichung] should be held against Nietzsche as a reproach. He knows about the anthropomorphism [Anthropomorphie] of his metaphysics. He knows about it not simply as a way of thinking that he stumbled upon accidentally and out of which he could no longer find his way. Nietzsche wants this anthropomorphizing [Vermenschlichung] of all beings and wants only that...

Anthropomorphism [Anthropomorphie] pertains to the essence of the history of the end of metaphysics. It determines indirectly the decision of the transition, inasmuch as the transition brings about an ‘overcoming’ of the animal rationale together with the subiectum. Indeed it is the pivoting of a pivotal ‘point’ first attained by means of these notions. The pivoting is: beings—Being; the fulcrum of the pivoting is: the truth of Being. The pivoting is not a turnabout; it is a turning into the other ground, as abyss. The groundlessness of the truth of Being historically becomes the abandonment by Being... The grounds for the positing of man as mere man, the grounds for the anthropomorphising [Vermenschlichung] of beings are primordially to be sought in this realm.
This ruthless and extreme anthropomorphising [Vermenschlichung] of the world tears away the last illusions of the modern fundamental metaphysical position; it takes the positing of man as subiectum seriously. (N3 154-5, NI 653-4)

The fourth and final course similarly denounces Nietzsche’s anthropomorphism: “[The inherent moralism of ‘Nietzsche’] must seek the true and the real in the absolute humanization [bedingten Vermenschlichun] of all beings. Metaphysics is anthropomorphism [Anthropomorphie] – the formation and apprehension of the world according to man’s image [das Gestalten und Anschauen der Welt nach dem Bilde des Menschen].” (N4 83, NII 127). However, it also most explicitly allows the full complexity of the issue of anthropocentrism to return, and this time not only with respect to ‘Nietzsche’ but also Heidegger’s key doctrines. “All metaphysics is grounded [in] the differentiation of Being and beings. Perhaps such a differentiation is the proper core of the disposition of human nature toward metaphysics. But then the differentiation would actually be something human! Why shouldn’t the differentiation be something ‘human’? That would provide the best and ultimate explanation for the possibility and necessity of the demand voiced by Nietzsche – that philosophers finally act on the humanization [Vermenschlichung] of all things.” (N4 183, NII 241) ‘Heidegger’ ends the course by allowing the issue of anthropocentrism, “whether the discordancy of our relation to Being lies in us or in Being itself” (N4 194), to stand as a fundamental question: “We suspect, perhaps, that behind the confusion and noise broadcast by the ‘problem’ of anthropomorphism [Anthropomorphismus] looms the decisive question... we are asking about man’s relation to Being, over which no question can vault, but which nonetheless has yet been questioned in any question.” (N4 184, NII 185)

Here then is the clue that we must follow if we are to find the actual perpetrator of the crime of metaphysics represented by ‘Nietzsche’ in Heidegger’s teachings. By learning the identity of this anthropomorphism, we will learn something essential about the anthropocentricity of learning which Heidegger can therefore be learned as holding to be true.
Endnotes for Chapter Six

1 See s10 and its Appendix of The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, and Part 4 Section C of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, and s70 of Fundamental Concepts.

2 I am following here in particular Jacques Taminiaux’s account of this period especially in the “Epilogue” to Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991) and “The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’” in Poetics, Speculation, Judgement: The Shadow of the Work of Art from Kant to Phenomenology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). Taminiaux’s argument is however that this period begins with a partial reversal of Being & Time and the work of the early ’20s from which it came, moving against its reappropriation of the Greek sense of praxis with a reassertion of tekhé — though the “Epilogue” also points out the extent of the continuities between Being & Time and the Promethianism of the early ’30s. This means that the Kērē in Nietzsche — which for Taminiaux is foreshadowed by the changes Heidegger made to his first 1935 drafts of “The Origin of the Work of Art” in order to get to the 1936 version published in the 1945 Holzwege — involves a partial (though only partial, see The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker: Arendt and Heidegger) retrieval of Being & Time from the slip of the early ’30s into a privileging of poiēsis.

3 For example: “‘Dasein transcends’ means: in the essence of its being it is world-forming, ‘forming’ (bildend) in the multiple sense that it lets world occur, and through the world gives itself an original view (for (Bild)) that is not explicitly grasped, yet functions precisely as a paradigmatic form (Vor-bild) for all manifest beings, among which each respective Dasein itself belongs… Only if this primordial history, namely, transcendence, occurs, i.e., only if beings having the character of beings-in-the-world [i.e., Daseins] irrupt into beings, is there the possibility of beings manifesting themselves.” (E.G., 123) “Yet in its world-projective surpassing of beings, Dasein must surpass itself so as to be able to first of all understand itself as an abyss of ground from out of this elevation… Only through originary distances that he forms for himself in his transcendence with respect to all beings does a true nearness to things begin to arise in him.” (E.G., 134-5).

4 This is a thoroughly performative (or more accurately, apophantic) formal indication in which one fundamentally attunes to the fundamental nature of this attunement: “All we know is that we must proceed from the unitary structure of the ΣδΚΩΖ back into the essence of man. Nothing has been decided concerning this essence. All we have is the thesis: man is world-forming, a thesis we appeal to as a statement of essence.” (FCM 335) For a contemporary translation of the world-making as-structure of human being’s ontological capability, see A.McHoul “Cyberbeing and -space” Postmodern Culture v8 n1 (1997).
Again, this exhortative lecture insists that “those daring ones” to waken their “repressed [and] sleeping anxiety” and project “through [their] own decision and will” their Dasein out into the nothing (Pathmarks 93): “Only in the nothing of Dasein do beings as a whole, in accord with their most proper possibility — that is, finite way — come to themselves... Philosophy gets under way only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence into the fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole.” (95-6)

This is the powerful argument of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in “Transcendence Ends in Politics” in Typography and I defer to his documentation of that fact that “the ‘Rectoral Address’ stands in a direct line with the ‘destruction of the history of ontology’; that is to say, not within the enterprise of a de-limitation (or, even less, of deconstruction) of metaphysics, but within the project of its fundamental instauratio or re-foundation.” (268) Like Taminiaux, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger’s ‘error’ lies in his betrayal of Being & Time’s finitude with the retrograde “unconditional valorization, or if you will, overvalourization of the philosophical” (288), what in the “Rectoral Address” is described as the submission of questioning to knowing (292). Lacoue-Labarthe sees this as an attempt to delimit the mimesis of transcendence with a mimetology (see Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990], esp. Chapter 8), the belief that essential knowing accomplishes “realizations (Verwirklichungen)” through its shaping or stamping (294-8).

For one amongst many see M.Zimmerman’s The Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity [Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981]: “[Heidegger’s] lectures on Nietzsche’s idea of the Will to Power (1936-44) helped to reveal the problem of voluntarism and led him to a deeper understanding of resoluteness as ‘releasement’.” (xxiv)

This is Arendt’s (following Mehta) now canonical account of the Nietzsche-books: Life of the Mind, 176-7.

This is the reverse of what ‘Heidegger’ says in the later courses, which is that ‘will to power’ is ‘what beings are’, their essentia, and ‘eternal recurrence’ is ‘how they are’, their mode of existentia. See for instance “Eternal Recurrence of the Same and Will to Power”, N3 168-171. When Heidegger makes this move in the third course and the subsequent treatises, he is only discussing Nietzsche’s doctrines or metaphysical positions: what withdraws is their mode of presentation. I will suggest that that Nietzschean mode of teaching is no longer discussed because it is being used.

On reflection, this should have been predictable given that Nietzsche’s central concern is of course life qua living.

Krell cites all the places in the Nietzsche courses and elsewhere that Heidegger uses this citation in a note to its first occurrence in N1 19, the whole of its context being cited by Krell in N2 201.
Life of the Mind: Willing v2 176.

Compare with the formulation of the relation between willing and resolution a year earlier in *The Introduction to Metaphysics*, 20-21, and the account of the artwork contemporaneous with this first 'Nietzsche' lecture discussed in Chapter Eleven.

Compare with R.Mugerauer’s reading of *What is Called Thinking?*, which argues that 'Heidegger' is doing a 'Nietzsche', by explicitly presenting himself as teacher, or more accurately an apprentice’s master, demonstrating the craft of thinking: that is to say, Heidegger teaches thinking as gathering by presenting himself as the gathering agent of what is being presented — *Heidegger’s Language and Thinking* [Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1988], 182-4.

Heidegger indicates that the anticipation with which learning relations are initiated is, following the etymology of hermenutics, “a play of thinking more binding than the rigour of science. Hermes is the messenger of the Gods. He brings the announcement of destiny; herméneuein is the manifestation that brings as much by way of knowledge as it is in the proper condition to listen to an announcement.” (DL 29) Significantly, this disposition toward what is being destined by the announcing teaching is best manifested by "carrying the announcement and communicating the knowledge.” (DL 29) On this learning completely (ekmanthanein) by completing the teaching, see J-L.Nancy’s “Sharing Voices” G.Ormiston ed *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context* [Albany: State University of New York, 199?], who describes it in terms of a mimetic movement of a contagious enthusiasm or a sharing.

It is worth noting here that beatitude here translates Seligkeit (NI 330), relating it to another aphorism Heidegger cites in the third course: “"What must I do to become blissful [selig]? I don’t know, but I say unto you: be blissful [selig] and then do what you feel like doing.”” (N3 17, NI 490) This is a very succinct account of the sort of mimetology — miming without a model in order to be(come) the model — that this thesis is suggesting is an essential aspect of learning.

Heidegger in a number of places equates creativity with suffering following Hölderlin’s notion of sobriety, Novalis’ description of philosophy as homelessness, and Nietzsche’s account of Zarathustra as the convalescent. For example, in *Fundamental Concepts*, Heidegger defines creativity as that “which possesses its own intrinsic obligations and requires an appropriate attitude to sustain it. Creative achievement is a free formative activity. Freedom is only to be found where there is a burden to be shouldered. In creative achievement this burden always represents an imperative and a need that weighs heavily upon man’s overall mood, so that he comes to be in a mood of melancholy. All creative action resides in a mood of melancholy (Schwermut)... As a creative and essential activity of human Dasein, philosophy stands in the fundamental attunement of melancholy. This melancholy concerns the form rather than the content of philosophizing, but it necessarily prescribes a fundamental attunement which delimits the substantive content of philosophical questioning.” (FCM 182-3) In the *Basic Questions* course,
contemporaneous with the second Nietzsche course, Heidegger describes the “carrying out” that “sustains” the disposition of “wonder” as “essentially suffering (Lieden)... a creative tolerance for the unconditioned.” (BQP 151)

18 “And the persistence with which... Heidegger had tirelessly recalled the major theses (reversal of Platonism, ‘completion’ or culmination of metaphysics, etc) could very well have led one to think — on the condition, as always, of not looking too closely — that there was nothing more to be expected or learned.” “Obliteration” in The Subject of Philosophy [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993], 58. The exceptions in my mind, other than Lacoue-Labarthe himself, are Christopher Fynsk (see Heidegger: Thought and Historicity [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993]), Randall Havas (Nietzsche’s Genealogy: Nihilism and the Will-to-Knowledge [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995]) and David Krell (whose analyses at the end of each volume of the Nietzsche series draw on his PhD Dissertation concerning Heidegger’s Nietzsche; see also a number of his essays in Intimations of Mortality [University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986]).


20 It is frequently argued, following Heidegger’s lead — see the Spiegel Interview: “All of those who could hear heard that this [lecture course on Nietzsche] was a confrontation with National Socialism”, in G.Neske & E.Kettering eds Martin Heidegger and National Socialism trans. L.Harries [New York: Paragon House, 1990], 51 — that these lectures are not only the personal process Heidegger undertook to unlearn his own Nazism, or at least learn what was wrong with the Nazism that resulted (i.e., its Technologism as opposed to its “inner truth and greatness”), but are even acts of resistance in themselves. Certainly Heidegger claims to have been “constantly under surveillance” (Spiegel Interview 51-2) during and because of these lectures. There is also the claim that as an academic Heidegger resisted Nazi attempts to appropriate Nietzscheanism as a philosophical justification for aggressive racist expansionism, a project that manifested in physical attempts to control the Nietzsche archive. Heidegger’s reading is therefore close to the point of trying to erase his own hermeneutical presence, because he is trying to construct a coherent and forceful image of Nietzsche’s doctrine that can resist redactions of the posthumous fragments.

21 For a reading of the Plato-Nietzsche-Heidegger mimetic rivalry see the work of Lacoue-Labarthe: “Typography” and “Echo of the Subject” in Typography and “Apocryphal Nietzsche” and “Obliteration” in The Subject of Philosophy.
I note that this is exactly what Pöggler argues cannot be done: “The one who attempts to follow Heidegger’s difficult attempt at interpretation encounters the further difficulty that Heidegger himself is still ‘under way’, that the lectures and essays cannot be put on one level and thus be worked out.” (Heidegger’s Path of Thinking [Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989], 86) It is Heidegger however who teaches us that possibility only comes from an encounter with impossibility, that what is beautiful is what is hard.

Nilling is the term Arendt uses to account for the pre-eminence of willing in both affirming and negating: even the suspension of willing, i.e., the choosing of ‘indifference’, is still the result of a volition (Life of the Mind 130-1). Nilling is thus differentiated from Heidegger’s attempt to render thinking as ‘not a willing’, what Arendt sees as being the whole point of the ‘turn’ (172). Arendt is of course deconstructing this attempt to escape the pre-eminence of willing, and does so primarily by calling it “Heidegger’s will-not-to-will”. I am therefore using the title ‘Nilling’ to evoke her analysis which indicates that ‘Heidegger’ is still employing the willed aspects of learning even as, or in order to, insist upon the need to unlearn such willing. On Arendt’s reading of Heidegger see Jacques Taminiaux The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997], 140-167.

Both addenda promote the process of Dasein’s inherent stance (Inständigkeit) which is a type of actively sustained resolution; in other words, Heidegger’s qualifications are down playing the creative world-making aspects of learning, but maintaining its institutional essence. “The essential response [to the question of metaphysics] draws its sustaining power from the inherent stance assumed by questioning... Readiness for anxiety is a Yes to assuming a stance that fulfills the highest claim, a claim that is made upon the human essence alone... Essential thinking [as opposed to calculative thinking] responds to the claim of being, through the human being letting his historical essence be responsible to the simplicity of a singular necessity, one that does not necessitate by way of compulsion, but creates the need that fulfils itself in the freedom of sacrifice...Its accomplishment stems from that Inständigkeit out of which every historical human being through action — and essential thinking is an action — preserves the Dasein he has attained for the preservation of the dignity of being.” (“Postscript”, Pathmarks 232, 234, 236-7) “Granted that the overcoming of metaphysics corresponded to the endeavour to first learn to attend to the oblivion of Being, in order to experience this oblivion and to absorb this experience into the relation of Being to man, and to preserve it there, then in the need belonging to the oblivion of Being, the question ‘What is metaphysics?’ might well remain what is most needed of all that is necessary for thought... What is meant by ‘existence’ [‘Heidegger’ is reappropriating Being & Time’s projection of the essentiality of temporality in the ecstasis of care] in the context of a thinking that is prompted by and directed toward the truth of Being, could be most felicitously designated by the word “in-standing” (Inständigkeit).” (“Introduction”, Pathmarks 282, 284)
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Thus Aristotle suddenly discovers that he has a new
definition for motion, the actualization and bringing to an
end of indivisibly united active and passive capacities. The
example given by him for such passionate action is the
indivisibility of teaching and learning. Teaching means to
speak to an other, to get to (angehen) the other by way of
communicating, so that the other in hearing goes with
(mitgehen) the teaching.

Kisiel, paraphrasing the concluding hour of Heidegger’s
1924 course on Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

To pursue the ‘decisive question’ of anthropocentrism in relation to learning, so that
we might determine what Heidegger’s ‘turn’ in his Nietzsche teachings means for this
thesis, I would like at this point to step back and overview the nature of Heidegger’s
whole project in relation to anthropocentrism. This will give us some conceptual tools
which we can then use to get a handle on this complex issue in particular instances of
Heidegger’s teachings. In this regard, I will enlist the help of two ‘Heidegger’
commentators: Thomas Sheehan and Jacques Taminiaux.

Relating
Thomas Sheehan is a respected teacher of ‘Heidegger’ who works with the demand that
these teachings be learned as if they were all teaching the one thing. Sheehan eschews
all notions of a turn in the fundamental direction of Heidegger’s teachings,
demonstrating in exemplary fashion what can be learned by reading ‘Heidegger I’ and
‘Heidegger II’ as the Same.

Sheehan believes that there is no turning change in Heidegger’s topic or overall
strategy because ‘turning’ is Heidegger’s constant theme:

The much discussed and frequently misunderstood Kehre or ‘turn’ in Heidegger’s
thought refers neither to a shift in Heidegger’s language and style in the ’thirties, nor

* Endnotes for Chapter Seven commence on page 223.
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to the supposed emergence of a new topic (Ereignīs) in this thought, nor to his abandonment of the ‘transcendental’ standpoint of SZ. The turn, rather, is what Heidegger means by the overcoming (Überwendung) or surpassing of metaphysics’ forgetting of appropriation. As early as 1920, in a course on the phenomenology of religion, Heidegger called this die Umwandlung der Philosophie, i.e., the transformation of man’s philosophical awareness into a recognition of the privative dimension of disclosure and of the corresponding structure of human transcendence. This ‘turn’ was the goal of Heidegger’s thought from the early ‘twenties onward.1

Sheehan’s polemic here is against the tendency “found in Heidegger as well as his disciples, to hypostasize ‘being’ (das Sein) into an autonomous ‘other’ that seems to function on its own apart from entities and from man.”3 Sheehan has identified two different types of ‘right Heideggerians’ through which commentators tend to substantialise Being. The first right Heideggerian “emphasizes the presential dimension of being, even if it be a deferred presence, a future ‘new advent’ of being-as-presence after the period of technology.”4 This right Heideggerian, evangelising the utopic return of Being, opposes a ‘leftist’ emphasis on “the absential dimension of being: its receding character, its mysteriousness, the primacy of difference over any form of presential identity — in short the primordiality of the abyss that Heidegger entitled Lethe.”5 Sheehan believes that this dispute between right and left Heideggerians has now been won, and that the victorious left Heideggerians are now forming a second form of right Heideggerian:

The spectrum has shifted. While there are still some fundamentalists out there who think that Heidegger was pointing towards a ‘new dawn’ of the great presence of Being beyond technology, the major voices in Heideggerian scholarship have long since shifted leftward towards the discourse of the lethic character of Being as an ultimately unknowable absence located ‘elsewhere’, beyond the reach of human projection. This is the current Right Heideggerian position, and I believe it represents the establishment, whereas the current Left Heideggerian position, having learned something from Derrida, maintains that the lethe is the untotalizability, inscribed in the correlation of nous and einai, that drives the horizontal, historical project of humanizing the world and naturalizing man.6

Sheehan attempts to clarify the nature of this last mentioned ‘new left Heideggerian’ position (or rather a position no longer on this spectrum), wherein being cannot be substantialised. His key point is to insist upon characterising being in terms
of a fundamental relation to human being, so that there is no way of reasserting its separateness, whether in a positive or negative fashion. This is what he means by “the correlation of nous and einai.”

In short, Heidegger’s topic is not at all some hypostasized ‘being’ but rather movement. When following the Greeks, he speaks of entities as phenomena, he means that their essence lies in autodisclosure (they ‘render themselves intelligible’) and that such autodisclosive movement happens only in conjunction with the disclose movement that is the structure of man [my emphasis]. The correlation between the movement of entities (their being) and the movement of man (his existence) is the heart of Heidegger’s thought.7

Being, according to Sheehan’s teaching, therefore concerns the anthropocentric movement of relating that is always already happening thereby allowing us and things to arise in meaningful and always interrelated ways — something that is partially betrayed in this last citation by Sheehan’s attempt to describe the interrelation in terms of what is being related: the point is that there is no distinct movement of entities or humans; the latter is the former and vice versa.8 The history of metaphysics is an onto-theology that leaps straight to beings as independent entities by assuming a God-like perspective that misses how they come to be(ingness) only through the finitudinal perspectives of human being. “Being in all its historical forms conceals a certain relation to man. The beingness of beings is fundamentally not something ‘out there’ in beings but rather the meaningful relatedness, the intelligible presentness, of things to and for man.”9

‘Heidegger’ is therefore essentially a phenomenology: “To speak of beings as phainomena is to at least imply the locus of their meaningful appearance, the correlative horizon wherein that meaningfulness is articulated. Beings as phainomena are correlative to modes of ‘awareness’ (Vernehmen) in the broadest sense, to a legein or noein that is revelatory of the phainomena as what and how it is. Without logos, no is-ness. The uniqueness of man as ‘the living being who has logos’ is that his essence is the locus of meaning and that he has access to beings only in terms of their ‘appearance as…’ in logos and noein.”10 The task of this phenomenology is therefore to learn the relatedness through which things manifest as things. Phenomenology for ‘Heidegger’ is a way of learning the anthropocentric intentionality by which ‘what is’ is (meaningful — bracketed here since the anthropocentrism means that there cannot be meaningless appearances). “For Heidegger, phenomenology was a method for letting intentionality
show itself (legein as *apophainesthai*) just as it shows itself to be (*phainesthai*). Phenomenology was the ontology of intentionality."

This means that ‘Heidegger’ is essentially a project of recovering our always prior being (in relation to beings). It is the essential transcendence of human being, what Sheehan calls our excess, our way of already being out with or beyond, that nonetheless grants us access to beings: “Man as 'excess' (ahead of himself and already in a world) holds open the area of ‘access’ to (or intelligibility of) beings. As an ‘excess' which makes possible 'access' man is the Da, the ‘there’ or open area of intelligibility, where ‘intelligibility' does not mean ‘theoretical knowability’ but more broadly, the 'accessibility of beings in meaningfulness’. This transcendence is always already the case. Philosophy’s task is therefore to re-enact it, retrieve or relearn it. Throughout ‘Heidegger’ the sole objective is therefore a *Wiederholung* or *Ereignis*, a “retrieving-repeating” of the propriativity that is (human) being. It is a process of re-petition (re-seeking) by which one becomes what one is, an appropriation of the movement of appropriation that *gathers together* Entschlossenheit and Gelassenheit, resolving to release oneself to the projecting that we must do in order for beings to be.

**Relearning**

I have gone to some length here in relation to Sheehan’s way of reteaching what stands to be learned from ‘Heidegger’ because it lucidly and succinctly provides an overview of the essential anthropocentrism of Heidegger’s topic. It teaches us why ‘Heidegger’ cannot and must not be learnt as teaching us to unlearn anthropocentrism. It is precisely teaching us how to recover the anthropocentrism that is always moving within all that is. The task that is given to us in ‘Heidegger’ is to remotivate that anthropocentrism, anthropocentrically relearning the anthropocentrism by which all that is, is.

To make a contribution to this task, I would like to propose that one way to understand Sheehan’s powerful way of learning ‘Heidegger’ is in terms of learning. Learning captures the fundamental anthropocentric of beingness, the relations of intentional intelligibility within which beings always already are. Learning is precisely that form of anthropocentric resolute releasement through which all things come to be (presenced). Learning something therefore means learning that something is, granting something being: the learned becomes presenced as what now is, accessed by a human
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act of excess. There is thus only the learned. And phenomenology in the Heideggerian sense is relearning the ontological learnedness of all that is. The appropriative turn that philosophy teaches us is the relearning of learning.

This addition to Sheehan’s account fits what Sheehan sees as Heidegger’s key statement for explaining the nature of the project of recovery (Wiederholung, Ereignis): namely, Pindar’s ‘become what you are’. The full version reads, “Learn to become what thou art”.14 This is precisely a project, one through which we learn (i.e., essentially learn, appropriate) our throwness, that is, our horizontal finitude within all that we have learned exists. “Anticipatory resolution is the existentiell movement of returning to how you already are, and thus presenting things.”15 By making a project of what we have learned to be (the case), that is to say, by seeking to relearn or learn otherwise all that is (in relation to us), we are turning things around and freeing them up (sich überliefern), “living[1] into one’s becoming”16 by the ontological act of relearning. Philosophising is thus essentially the act of teaching, teaching things in a way that reveals the learning that is at the essence of being human.

Importantly though, these formulations reveal our essential anthropocentrism to be a necessarily contained movement. The redoublings that characterise philosophising give it an essential finitude. In Sheehan’s terms, there is a recessiveness that always accompanies human-access-via-excess.

I need to carefully lay out these limits to the authentic anthropocentrism of human learning, since we will learn that it is here that the key to discerning what ‘Heidegger’ turns away from in ‘Nietzsche’ lies. This will entail following Sheehan in regard to Heidegger’s retrieval of certain Greek terms and clarifying Sheehan’s interpretations with those of Jacques Taminiaux. For this more in depth way of understanding Heidegger’s topic, Sheehan draws on teachings given by Heidegger throughout the 1920s,17 but particularly on lecture courses on Aristotle given in 1931 and 1939. In this sense, the key to ‘turning’ lies in these relearnings of what Greeks stand to teach us.

Phýsis

Sheehan notes that Heidegger learned about the relearning movement of phenomenology from the Aristotelian teaching that the essence of phýsis is kinésis. This teaching is best accessed by thinking about how movement, not being a thing and so
never able to show up as itself, or even at all, only ever appears as the coming-into-presence and going-into-absence of something.\textsuperscript{18} To bring this phenomenon to presence, to teach us it, Sheehan calls it pre-ab-sentiality. A very physical example might be a plant, which does not change place, but as a living entity is always essentially changing. A plant is thus always on the move; which is why a plant at any instant is not just what it currently is, yet it would also be wrong to characterise it only in terms of where it came from or is going. “The presentness in \textit{logos} of the non-appearance of the plant is the condition for the possibility of the presentness in \textit{logos} of the plant as \textit{plant}, that is, as moving/growing — in Aristotelian terms, as \textit{on dynamei}. If \textit{logos} does not ‘see’ the Being-absent of the plant, it does not ‘see’ the plant as what it fundamentally and authentically is, namely a being whose Being is \textit{dynamis}.”\textsuperscript{19} The essence of movement (especially with reference to things that seem to be at rest, a situation that allows us to stop thinking about movement ontically) is therefore able to be learned through the rhetorical trope of \textit{steresis}, or ‘saying away’, that is, “an absencing [that] is not simply absentness; rather, it is a \textit{presencing}, namely that kind in which the \textit{absencing} (but not the absent thing) is present” (EC> 227). This process clearly references the Heraclitean observation concerning \textit{physis}’s cryptophilia which ‘Heidegger’, famously and on several occasions, identifies with the essence of truth as \textit{aletheia}, or disclosure. This means that this movement, this \textit{steresis} performed by the notion of \textit{kinésis}, is a type of \textit{alétheai}, \textit{Wahreit} as Unver/Ent-borgenheit (GA9 301), a revealingly protective concealing.

Before going on, let us remember that, in terms of the proposals made in the previous section, this process of essential revealing could be understood as a form of essential learning. The movement of \textit{phýsis} that we have just set out could thus be understood as (the model for) essential learning.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, \textit{kinésis}, the type of movement or \textit{metabole} that occurs even to those at rest, the complete change that nonetheless does not render improper what was before or after (\textit{en diaphero heauto}, one differing in itself, Heraclitus\textsuperscript{21}), is perhaps best characterised as learning. The crucial point though, would be to take heed of this analogy in the reverse direction: if essential learning is modelled on \textit{phýsis} then learning is not just a form of presencing but also necessarily involves a certain absencing. It is in the name of this finitude that I, following Sheehan, am taking this detour through \textit{phýsis}.

Heidegger’s 1939 lecture on Aristotle’s notion of \textit{phýsis} focuses on the distinction between self-moving things, and things that must be moved by something other than
themselves. This translates as the distinction between natural (⊥ε[ΜΘ δΥ∴Ι) and artificial things (ΞΩΘΩεΤΜΥΙ). The latter, human-made artifacts have their ΔΨ_Φ in the ∴Μ_ΥΦ of the maker; or rather, the point is that such things do not ‘have’,22 as their own, their ΔΨ_Φ; it is instead doubly abstracted by firstly existing in an external maker but then secondly ‘existing’ there only virtually, in the maker’s head, as a projected ∴ΕΣΩΖ. By comparison, ⊥ε[ΘΖ references a movedness whose ΔΨ_Φ “is not like the starting point of a push, which pushes the thing away and leaves it to itself. Rather, something determined by ⊥ε[ΘΖ not only stays with itself in its movedness but precisely goes back into itself even as it unfolds in accordance with the movedness (the change).” (EC> 195) Φύσις is thus a process of de-envelopment whose arché and télos always co-appear, with which there is changing. To capture this, Aristotle invents a term: ΕΥ∴ΜΣΕ_ΜΘΙ. Physēi onta have (echei) themselves (i.e., their arche or essence) in (en) their end (telei). Far from referring to a completed conclusion, ‘entelechy’ in this context means the type of “gathering itself up” (EC> 217) or “appropriateness for” (Eignung und Geeignetheit zu GA9 286) by which the dynamism (for these terms are Heidegger’s translation of ΛεΥΙΤΘΖ) of living things manifests as an energy, an ΕΥΕΨΚΜΘΙ or “being-on-the-way” (EC> 222). “>ε[ΘΖ is a ‘going’ in the sense of a going-forth toward a going-forth, and in this sense it is indeed a going back into itself; i.e.,, the self to which it returns remains a going-forth.” (EC> 224) It is now possible to see that phýsis is the moving that has its ordering origin and its end manifest in its form not as merely present things — as is the case with the maker’s sketch-plan (whereby dynamis has been literally made present and thereby deprived of its agency or appropriative power) — but as pres-abs-entialities. “>ε[ΘΖ is the presencing of the absencing of itself, one that is on-the-way from itself and unto itself.” (EC> 228).

The consequence of import for us at this point is that this entelechial energy of phýsis is in no way an unlimited power. Rather, phýsis, or more accurately each form of physēi onta, derives its power very strictly from being limited, from the peras that harbours the distinctly essential morphe of any living thing.23 Any form of presencing is only possible by way of absencing: “each being that is pro-duced or put forth (excluding artifacts) is also put away, as the blossom is put away by the fruit.” (EC> 227) This is why the whole process is a thoroughly delimited act of appropriation, not in the acquisitive sense of accumulating resources for a construction project, but in the
reflexive sense of returning to oneself — though again, this is no static stable self, but precisely a moving being, a being changed, a being that is always there (Da-sein), never here and now, which means that the whole process is more rigorously an act of de-appropriation.

To take stock then, “We see that making, ΞΩΓΟ[ΘΖ, is one kind of production, whereas ‘growing’ (the going back into itself and emerging out of itself), ⊥ε[ΘΖ, is another. Here ‘to pro-duce’ cannot mean ‘to make’ but rather, to place something into the unhiddenness of its appearance; to let something become present; presencing.”

(EC> 221) The essential difference between poiésis and phýsis does not lie in who does the making, as suggested by the distinction ‘man-made’ as opposed to ‘natural’. If the identity of the maker made the difference, this would imply that the making process is essentially the same. But ‘Heidegger’ emphasises that Aristotle repeatedly emphasises that phýsis is not a self-making. A plant "must not be thought of as a kind of built-in ‘motor’ that drives something, nor as an ‘organizer’ on hand somewhere, directing the thing” (EC> 195), for in the latter case “this would mean an animal could not reproduce itself without mastering the science of its own zoology.” (EC> 222) The difference is therefore not in who does the producing, but between two different types of producing, between an entelechial movement — where the producing and the product as well as its potential for further (re)producing are all the Same — and a movement with a temporally spaced out dynamis, ergos and telos — that is, a work-plan toward a projected end, a working, and then an end manifested as an independent no-longer-moving work. Whilst the external agent of the latter is invariably human, this is not an essential part of the distinction. This is why, obversely, the concept of phýsis can, and indeed must, still be understood from out of the ineluctably anthropocentric relatedness that Sheehan has identified as Heidegger’s topic. We must learn that the essence of phýsis is not opposed to all forms of human-involved meaningful producing. Dynamis, as the essence of phýsis, refers not to some pantheistic-animistic power of the living external to all human activity, but rather to the very relatedness between human being and beings by which anything comes to be (revealed in its being(moved)).

Praxis

As a consequence of acknowledging that the essential process that is phýsis does not preclude but even needs anthropocentrism, it now becomes possible to understand how
there could be an anthropocentric activity that is entelechial like physis. Human agency does not foreclose on the possibility of a movement being physical, or necessitate that it be only technically poietic. These other essential actions, which thus make up the physis or nature of human being, are types of praxis.

Jacques Taminiaux, a student of Arendt, has done a considerable amount of work teaching ‘Heidegger’ in terms of the distinction between poiēsis and praxis. Taminiaux argues that the early ‘Heidegger’ learned the project of fundamental ontology by teaching via Aristotle the properness of praxis to human being (and consequently the fact that phronesis, the praxical excellence, should be what philosophising seeks), the risk of impropriety being represented by poiēsis. Thus Taminiaux cites The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, where ‘Heidegger’ concludes “Dasein was known to antiquity also as authentic action, as praxis.” Taminiaux concurs with the way poiēsis was just described in reference to Heidegger’s 1939 lecture: “Poiēsis is a movement which, each time, has its past and its future outside itself. The production of a product is absolutely not the beginning of its fabrication and this production has an end that falls outside of itself: the product. In contradistinction, praxis, existence itself, is a movement that at each point includes its past and decides on issues regarding the end and time of praxis.” Praxis is thus a gathered and gathering mode of existence: “praxis includes its own goal and, as such, is teleia, or complete. It means that at each moment, praxis unifies what it previously was and what it will be, its past and its futures, whereas the kinesis of which poiēsis is a species, leaves its past and future unrelated to one another.”

As with physis, this in no way means that what is being gathered by praxis is merely made present. These appropriate(d) aspects of praxis, as the togetherness of its dynamis and energeia, are instead only ever presenced negatively as the limits, or positively as the potentialities of the relational situation afforded by it. Presentness is instead the characteristic of poiēsis’ distinct moments — there is the doer, and then the doing, and then the done. Putting it in terms of the previously discussed distinction of poiēsis and physis, it could be said that in poiēsis, the objective is absent but in a substantialised way (like the potentiality that sustains the faith of old-left-now-right Heideggerian); so substantial is it, that the activity of making is seen as being deficient until the objective is reached, after which the action is seen as irrelevant. Significantly, it is in this way that poiēsis manages to get forgotten or concealed, the anthropocentric action of making disappearing beneath the now independently present product.
The process of *praxis* thus has an inherent necessity where that of *poiésis* has only contingencies, a multitude of instrumental means from which one chooses pragmatically, since the end justifies (i.e., erases) the means. Where the whole point of *poiésis* is to deny absence by making some thing present, the aim of *praxis* is to acknowledge the absence that gives presence to what is tempora(ri)ly present. *Praxis* could thus be said to be eschatotological, that is to say, complete and yet finitudinal: complete because of its entelechial gathering; finitudinal, because it is a necessarily limited form of appearance, made possible only at a certain time (*kairos*) and only in a certain way. By comparison, *poiésis* can be characterised by incompleteness and infinitude: because of the separation of the doer, the doing and the done, each is incomplete without the others — even the end-product, which could perhaps be called finished, still requires a user to be what it is; infinitude, because the incompleteness of *poiésis* allows ends to be recycled into means, facilitating the on-going task of completing. In Sheehan’s terms, drawing on a subtle analysis of ‘verbal aspect’ in Greek grammar, *praxis* is perfect where *poiésis* is imperfect.

Taminiaux argues that because of this perfect aspect, *praxis* must be understood to be essentially reflexive, as having a fundamentally “self-referential character.” It gathers all its aspects together, including the agent of the *praxis*: “action aims at letting its agent manifest himself.” For any praxis then, an “‘I exist’ must accompany all representations.” This is why “Heidegger’s famous sentence about Dasein, ‘Das Dasein existiert umwollen seiner’ (Dasein exists for the sake of itself) can be considered a transposition of the Aristotelian theory of *praxis*.”

In line with the physical finitude that is essential to *praxis*, this apperceptive *hou heneka* or *Worumwillen* is not however a self-representing. As Arendt teaches us, the appearance of this ‘who?’ in and through *praxis* — as opposed to the representational appearance of the ‘what-type’, the permanent professional expert defined by what they make, that exists before and after *poiésis* — is fundamentally natal; there is no substantive ‘self’ prior to the *praxis*, no agency outside the relationality that situates every act of *praxis*. Hence, *Dasein*, as *praxical*, is anthropocentric, but in a way that forbids it being reduced to a form of humanist subject. Similarly, the world of such a *praxical* *Dasein* cannot be understood as a collection of objects, whether natural or man-made, but as a relational network of intentions and potentialities.
Dasein thus has the anthropocentric power of praxis only in finitudinal ways, within the situations into which it has been presently thrown — or rather, thrown its self, since praxis is nevertheless always a directional action, a learned appropriation of those situations toward the (never completed) institution of the essential.42

Gathering

If it was instructive to explain the anthropocentrically intentional phenomenology that Sheehan teaches us is at the core of Heidegger’s teachings, in terms of learning, then I would suggest that this can also be extended to praxis. The sort of action that changes things in relational ways, including primarily the person involved in that change, the sort of timely appropriating of a situation toward change that presences without merely (re)presenting, reflexively revealing that it is revealing — and consequently revealing that what it is bringing to presence is not all that is but only what has been brought to presence from the withdrawn at this time and place — all this is also usefully captured by the notion of learning.43

If these interpretations are acceptable, we are now in position to gather together all that has been put forward in this chapter by reversing these identities: phýsis and praxis may be usefully understood by way of learning, in which case, what does this teach us about the essence of learning?

It teaches us, I would suggest that the institutional essence of learning is a finitudinal form of anthropocentrism that must be differentiated from the modern productivist perversion of poiésis. It is a process that takes place pres-abs-entially, via interrelational necessities that on the one hand open it to ec-static possibilities but simultaneously constrain its occurrence. Learning is the self-conscious act of limit setting (peras), creating the Entwurfbereich or projected realm into which things can be gathered into meaningful, that is, learned presence. Learning in its essential anthropocentrism holds onto the absentiality that accompanies all presencing: it has a project, an arche, but the realisation of its telos does not override the movement of that realisation. In this sense, learning is then an energetic end-in-itself (en-tel-echeia), not because anything can be appropriated by it — as is the case in the pluralism of the liberal arts, with its technically passive notion of learning — but because it makes essential whatever it is doing. Such learning will always entail relearning the learning that sustains the realm in which it is working in, deriving its agency from a re-
appropriation of those conditioning relations. This means that such a learning must never have finished learning: it will always have only learned one aspect of what there is to learn.44

By moving through Sheehan’s and Taminiaux’s teachings, we have therefore learned: firstly, that anthropocentrism, in the active intentional sense, is intrinsic to what ‘Heidegger’ is teaching; secondly, that that anthropocentrism manifests authentically as praxis and in a self-denying way as poïesis.

We now have a hypothesis to take to Heidegger’s turn, a differentiation that is perhaps being made by the turn: ‘Heidegger’ at first teaches us Nietzsche’s praxical anthropocentrism but then teaches us that a certain ‘Nietzsche’ allows that anthropocentrism to decline into a type of poïesis. As a techné, this poïetic anthropomorphism or humanism (with the human defined as homo faber) presents itself with object(ive)s, and then through the economic actions of a pre-determined and independent subject, realises those projected abstractions as products available for use. The praxical nature of learning, that which works with relational entelechies that involve the whole of the one undertaking the work and only in this way afford ontological changes, this essential form of learning thus gets misrepresented, allowing modernity to consumate itself in a machinic destiny.
Endnotes for Chapter Seven

4 T.Sheehan “Derrida and Heidegger” in H.Silverman ed., Hermeneutics and Deconstruction [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987], 202. Sheehan developed this heuristic in dialogue with John Caputo: see his Radical Hermeneutics [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987]. Sheehan’s paper uses the analogy of the disputes between left and right Hegelians to read Derrida’s relation to Heidegger. Just as Derrida claims that a certain ‘Nietzsche’ should be given over to Heidegger’s interpretation in order to liberate that other Nietzsche that exceeds Heidegger’s ontologising reductions (see Of Grammatology [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976], 19), so Sheehan claims that ‘Heidegger’ should be given over to Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence in order to make available that other ‘Heidegger’ that exceeds logocentrism.
7 “On Movement”, 536.
8 “We ask what the relation is between man’s nature and the Being of beings. But — as soon as I thoughtfully say ‘man’s nature’, I have already said relatedness to Being. Lifewise, as soon as I say thoughtfully: Being of beings, the relatedness to man’s nature has been named... To speak to the heart of the matter: there is no such thing as members of the relation, nor the relation as such.” (WCT 79) In Fundamental Concepts Heidegger notes that the nature of what is related by a relation can only ever be formally indicated, since the relationality at issue refuses the possibility of understanding the related outside dynamic of the relation (e.g., FCM 293).
11 Sheehan “Heidegger’s Philosophy of Mind”, 292.
12 Sheehan “Heidegger’s Topic”, 630.
13 Sheehan “Heidegger’s Interpretation”, 310.
Chapter Seven: *Anthropocentrically Learning Being*

14 Heidegger frequently uses uncited versions of the phrase, often second-hand from Nietzsche. A full citation is given in *The Introduction to Metaphysics*: “In his regard Pindar coins the saying genoi' hoios esi mathon (Pythian Ode II, 72): ‘Mayest thou by learning come forth as what thou art.’” (101)


16 Sheehan “Heidegger’s New Aspect”, 221.


18 Just as Heidegger focuses on Aristotle’s deconstruction of Antiphonian materialism in the 1939 lecture on ‐εγθ, so too in the course on the 1931 course on ΛεΥΙΤΘΖ, Heidegger focuses on Aristotle’s deconstruction of the Megarian metaphysics of presence. In either case Heidegger is trying to reteach what Aristotle is teaching us about those forms of being which are not merely present. The Megarian thesis is that a capability, such as a learned skill, is only present when it is at work: the Megarian’s in a way that it is the obverse of the Antiphonian materialist position reduce potentiality to mere virtuality. Aristotle refuses this since it fails to distinguish between “not practicing” one’s skill and “being-out-of-practice”. Something learned is precisely what someone always has unless he or she decides to actively be without it. Heidegger appropriates this to reveal the dynamism of being, the way in which all that is, is never mere there, but presencing and absencing in a relational network of forces and resistances; see s17-22

19 Sheehan “Heidegger’s Interpretation of Aristotle”, 301.

20 Without the bracketed phrase, this sentence reads, ‘Phýsis is the process of essential learning.’ This can be understood in two ways. It is firstly an affirmation of an anthropocentric ontology: the nature of things is derived from human learning. But it is secondly, making a claim about the work that the notion of phýsis does. Aristotle never allows those he is teaching to forget that the distinctions he is making are distinctions in, or made possible by, logos. There is a constant apperception of the constructivist education being performed. This is exactly the sort of anthropocentric relatedness that Sheehan teaches us ‘Heidegger’ learned from the Greeks. When ‘Heidegger’ is teaching us moderns about Greek distinctions, the apperception should be even more pronounced. This is no doubt why the 1939 lecture is entitled “On the Essence and Concept of Phýsis” (my emphasis). Thus whenever there is a Greek word in Heidegger’s texts, we
should remind ourselves that it is being mentioned, not just transparently used: ‘Phýsis is the self-placing into the appearance’ does not mean that ‘natural things self-place’, but rather that ‘The Greek concept of phýsis places into appearance natural things as self-placements into appearance’.

21 This is a key citation of Heraclitus by Hölderlin for Lacoue-Labarthe as a way of describing the way mimesis desists any attempt to mimetologise it: there is always a “spacing and division in the Same, the repeated difference-from-itself of the Same”, “The Echo of the Subject” in Typography, 196. “The difficult thing [about thinking how techné and phýsis could share the same origin] is, as ever, to think an originary secondarity — or rather to think the origin as second, as initially divided and deferred, which is to say, in differance. In other words, the difficulty is to think the En diaphero heautô, the Same, without submitting it to the logic of identity.” Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political [Oxford: Blackwell, 1990], 84.

22 In the 1931 course it becomes apparent that there is a fundamental sameness to having (échein), ‘having not’ (steresis), having a capacity or capability (dynamís), having order and direction, that is intention (arché — but also the relational conversance of logos) and being. Thus “échein means having in the sense of governing over…; to be empowered for” (AM 1 109), which is a definition of dynamís (“having [or not] the power for something… being accomplished in something… having in the right way the power to do the task at hand” (AM 1 84)) as the having of a telos, that is to say “not anything like ‘purposeful behaviour,’ but rather: an inner ordering of something toward an end, a conclusion, an accomplishment… being on the way toward something” (AM 1 85), which as an essential kinesis, means that “ΔΕΥΤΘΩΖ is in a pre-eminent sense exposed and bound to […] ΕΨΟ[ΘΖ.” (AM 1 95).

23 Heidegger’s earlier account of dynamis as appropriation in the 1931 course attributes these physical delimitations to the authentic Greek notion of producing (as opposed to modern production) i.e., epistéme poietiké in a succinct way. “The eidos of the ergos is telos. The end which finishes however is in its essence, boundary, péras. To produce something is in itself to forge something into its boundaries, so much so that this being-enclosed is already in view in advance along with all that it includes and excludes. Every work is in its essence ‘exclusive’ (a fact for which we barbarians for a long time now lack the facility).” (AM 1 118) I will come back to this crucial point, since the difference between the properly delimited physical sense of producing and productivism is the Same as the difference between an anthropocentric essential learning and an anthropomorphic one.

24 A large section of the lecture is given to Aristotle’s deconstructive appropriation of Antiphonian materialism. The Antiphon interprets phýsis as the ever present or most constant. Whilst this Greek sense of εΞΩΡΜΓΤΜΥΩΥ refers to the utterly formless, i.e., that which exists in opposition to form (χΣΟ vs ΤΩΨ⊥Φ), when it gets translated into Latin as subjectum, the
always-already-underlying, Antiphon’s Platonism is on its way to hypostatising human being into a subject with a stable identity: in other words, the constancy of the term remains, but its original formlessness is now lost beneath the fixedness of a human form. It is this anthropomorphising that is the danger, as opposed to anthropocentrism which is the ever-renewed attestation to human ec-sistence as being-without-predetermination-and-thus-open-to-determination. I will come back to the Antiphonian issue in the Conclusion.

It is important to acknowledge that the Sameness and difference here is in fact more complex. In some contexts, ‘Heidegger’ teaches that φύσις and ποίεσις should be understood as sharing an authentic form of producing: they both manifest, or at least did manifest in Ancient Greece, the process of manifesting, producing in the sense of Umschlag (change), Ausschlag (breaking out) or Durchschlag (breaking through). (OC 191) What is opposed to the producing that physis is, and that poiesis perhaps used to be, is the modern productivist sense of production, the technically calculative economy of means and ends. The original Sameness of physis and poiesis is why during the early to mid 1930s Heidegger could advocate a certain form of technē as the complement of physis — e.g., The Introduction to Metaphysics — and why in the 1950s Heidegger could advocate a reappropriation of the authentic poiesis concealed within the Construct (Gestell) — e.g., “The Question Concerning Technology”.

This is the whole point of Being & Time’s deconstruction of presentness as derivative. Everything in the world is necessarily related to human producing: as ‘Heidegger’ famously says in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1 1-3 “Where there is world, there is work and vice versa.” (AM 125). But there is authentic, or what this thesis would call learned, producing, and then there is the technically economic mode of producing. Only in the latter are things represented as being independent of their dynamic making; products, despite their name, conceal their anthropocentrism. As a consequence, the notion of thingy independence is derived from a unlearned interpretation of the productivist world. This is why ‘nature’, as an independent entity, especially as a product of itself or something non-human, is in fact a thoroughly intra-worldly phenomenon: see Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 168, and Heidegger’s footnote to “The Essence of Grounds”, Pathmarks, 370.

Concerning this distinction see also D.Villa’s Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996]. Taminiaux’s argument is in fact critical of Heidegger for confusing, from the beginning and increasingly throughout his career, especially in his Nazism of the early 1930s (though Taminiaux suggests that Heidegger’s Promethean technē aimed to oppose “the everyday life of the Nazi regime” (PSJ 159)), the distinction between poiesis and praxis, invariably in favour of a Platonic advocacy of poiesis as the model for essential thinking: see for instance the second half of “The Reappropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics: Poiesis and Praxis in the Articulation of the Fundamental Ontology” in Heidegger and the Project of...
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Fundamental Ontology [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991]. Pre-empting slightly, I should indicate that I do not concur with Taminiaux’s powerful criticisms, and that this thesis’ examination of the role of learning in ‘Heidegger’ can be read as an attempt to show that a praxical way of moving was always Heidegger’s concern. To put it more polemically, I believe that in a situation that satisfies Taminiaux’s overemphasis on the sheer plurality of praxis nothing would ever be learned. Or, from another perspective, if I follow Sheehan’s way of learning Heidegger over Taminiaux’s it is because Heidegger was never a solitary professional as Arendt suggests, but always a professor, a teacher and a learner, something I see no space for in Arendt’s philosophical emphasis on the plurality of appearance, though she herself was clearly one of the best.

28 Taminiaux joins a whole industry here. R.Bernasconi in a second contribution to the debate (“Heidegger’s Destruction of Phronesis” in Southern Journal of Philosophy: The Spindel Conference v28 Supplement (1989) — this supplementary issue is in fact devoted to the issue of praxis in Heidegger) lists the other positions surrounding which of Being & Time’s terms translate phronesis: Bernasconi had previously nominated Umsicht (circumspection), Caputo Verstehen (understanding), Taminiaux Entschlossenheit (resoluteness), Gadamer and Pöggeler Gewissen (conscience), 130.

29 Heidegger and the Project, 126.
30 Heidegger and the Project, 54.
31 Heidegger and the Project, 125.
32 This term must not be understood as referring to a teleological presence, but rather in the more Derridean sense of a messianic doubly affirmed ‘to come’. As Sheehan, notes the term was used by ‘Heidegger’ with exactly this praxical sense in the “Phenomenology of Religion” course in relation to the notion of formal indication: “When I use terms like ‘eschatology’ or ‘the eschatological’ in this section, I am invoking that notion of living into the eschaton, into the ultimately incomprehensible lethe, which I have interpreted as das Geuesene or a priori, the fatedness of the power of being in the asymptotic correlation between Dasein and innerworldly entities in the horizontal project of the humanization of nature and the naturalization of man.” (“Nihilism, Facticity and the Economised Lethe” 61).

33 This way of expressing it follows J-L.Nancy’s argument in “Sovereignty – War, Law, Techné” in V.Conley ed., Rethinking Technologies [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993] which differentially relates the complete incompletion of phýsis, the sovereign finishing of techné, and the never complete, forever finishing off of technology or what Nancy calls ecotechnics, which I am here identifying with the productivist economisation of poiésis. This thesis tries to relate the finitude of the constructivism of learning to thingliness as an attempt to
respond to Nancy’s important (un)work(ing): see “The Heart of Things” in The Birth to Presence [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993].

34 For Arendt, it is the doxastic fragility of *phronesis*, tied as it is to temporally strategic appearances, that demands the sustaining institution of the *polis*. Significantly, in relation to this, Taminiaux argues that “because *phronesis* is an effort to link particulars to universals that are forever potential and never fully given beforehand, it cannot be taught by simply teaching rules or ways of implementing them. Its teaching takes place in the consideration of examples.” (Poetics, Speculation & Judgement 9) This mimetological aspect of *praxis* suggests that *praxis* is therefore precisely an act of the institutional essence of learning, each time instituting a new essence.

35 “*Poiésis* is an activity which instead of having its end within itself, has it outside of itself in a work, such that once in existence, it is nothing but a means to future ends. As such, it is fundamentally semantic, and its telos, its work, unceasingly escapes it in such a way as to be inscribed in an endless cycle of references.” (Heidegger and the Project 63) See also Heidegger’s account of equipment in Fundamental Concepts where Heidegger is distinguishing the readiness (Fertigkeit) with which products are endowed (“has acquired... and *possesses*”, FCM 222), the capacity (Fähigkeit) that animals are (“is in the possession of”, FCM 222), and the possibility (Möglichkeit) that those animals with *logos* have (“having... at one’s disposal”, FCM 337): “The finished production of the equipment makes it ready in a twofold sense. The equipment is ready in so far as it is finished. But this finished state consists precisely in its being ready... readiness implies the process of making something ready in and through production and preparation, a preparation or making-ready (Verfertigen) which procures and produces the ready-made product (das Fertige) as something independently present at hand and present to have for use.” (FCM 220). It should be apparent that it is this component of *poiésis* that prefigures it for “the essence of the modern power-driven machine [that is] one offshoot of the eternal recurrence of the same” (“Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” in N2 233). See D.Schmidt “Economies of Production: Heidegger and Aristotle on *Physis* and Technē” in Dallery ed., Crises of Continental Philosophy [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990], and M.Zimmerman’s Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990], esp. Chapter 12: “Production Cycles of the ‘Labouring Animal’: A Manifestation of the Will to Will.”

36 Sheehan has recourse to the aspect in ancient Greek grammar, something that is covered over by English’s temporally-based tenses. Heidegger explicitly mentions Greek aspect in a marginal note in Being & Time, 79, however it is implicit in Heidegger’s frequent reference to the way in Greek to see or understand is to have already seen and understood. The perfect Greek aspect captures ‘always alreadyness’ without necessarily implying temporal priority or Platonick
essence. I cannot now go into these difficult matters, though this last and next paragraph draw on Sheehan’s work in this area: see “Das Gewesen” in B.Babich ed., *From Phenomenology to Thought, Emancy and Desire* [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1995], and “Heidegger’s New Aspect: On In-Sein, Zeitlichkeit”.

37 *Heidegger and the Project*, 124.


39 *Heidegger and the Project*, xix.

40 *Heidegger and the Project*, 124.

41 See *The Human Condition* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958], especially Chapter Five.

42 This point concerns the role of *proairesis* in *praxis*, that is the prior disposition which makes possible the kairotically *phronesia* judgment about when to act and how. See R.Bernasconi’s “Heidegger’s Destruction of Phronesis” and W.Brogan’s “Heidegger and Aristotle: Dasein and the Question of Practical Life” in *Crises of Continental Philosophy*, who both make the point that this aspect of *praxis* brings it very close to the techne of *poiésis*. As Taminiaux observers, “Praxis in the Aristotelian sense rules over *poiésis*.” (*Heidegger and the Project* 124) In other words, because *praxis* is the authentic mode of being, in ‘truth’ all things depend upon a certain form of *praxis* to be. *Poiésis* then also depends upon a *praxis* that it actively conceals. This has important implications for Technology: that is to say, it is an act of deception which we must refuse by asserting that it is not simply what it appears to be, i.e., technologies, but remains powered by a more fundamental process of manifesting. Nevertheless, despite *praxis*’s superiority, Taminiaux, following Arendt, has documented extensively how the fragility of *praxis* is easily overwhelmed by *poiésis*: see in summary “*Bios politikos* and *bios theoretikos*”. In this context, Heidegger’s account of falling in *Being & Time* discloses that history but, not sufficiently according to Taminiaux, with the result that his own work repeats that overwhelming. As indicated before, I am deliberately seeking to counter that suggestion by arguing that Heidegger in fact retrieves *praxis* in the form of learning via his Nietzschean turn.

43 Understanding *praxis* as learning would explain why *sophia* is the end-point excellence of *praxis* – though only so long as this *sophia* is understood as the wisdom that knows that (and not what) it does not know, that is to say, knows that what it has made *known* is what it has *made* known and that there is thus always more that can be known – and as is apparent, the model for this wisdom is Socrates, who is also the model educator. In this regard see W.Brogan’s essay, co-authored with his educationalist brother “The Socratic Questioner: Teaching and Learning in the Dialogical Classroom” *Educational Forum* v59 (Spring 1995).
Now may perhaps be the time to admit that this argument runs against one of Aristotle's key examples. Aristotle gives as examples of the perfect aspect of praxis seeing, understanding, intuiting, living well; his counter examples — the implication being that these are instances of poiēsis — are building, weaving, thinning, getting well, walking and learning (Metaphysics IX, 6, 1048b and 8, 1050a). So, how to account for the hubris of suggesting that Aristotle is wrong, that learning is an exemplar of praxis. I firstly call on Heidegger’s 1931 Aristotle course which as already mentioned, retrieves learned skills (poiētic skills what’s more) from the metaphysically ontic Megarian thesis. Further, in his translation and discussion of these quotations, Sheehan notes that Aristotle states employs “the present perfect form ΤΜΤΔΙΩΠΙ means ‘I know [insofar as I have learned],’” (“Das Gewesen”, 176) This then makes it clear. It is precisely when learning hypostatises around as knowledge that it has declined into an imperfect technical poiēsis. Or to put it the other way around, translating learning as knowing signals the modern technological loss of the authentic praxis of ontological learning, just as Bildung has become building, living well an exercise regime, understanding the innovation of commercialisable products, etc.
Chapter Eight
Projecting Between Things

As long as man is wholly absorbed in nothing but purposeful self-assertion, not only is he himself unshielded, but so are things, because they have become objects. In this, to be sure, there also lies a transmutation of things into what is inward and invisible. But this transmutation replaces the frailties of things by the thought-contrived fabrications of calculated objects. These objects are produced and used up. The more quickly they are used up, the greater the necessity to replace them ever more quickly and more readily.

The daring that is more venturesome, willing more strongly than any self-assertion, because it is a willing, ‘creates’ a secureness for us in the Open. The more venturesome daring of the willing exercise of the will manufactures nothing. The more venturesome daring accomplishes, but it does not produce. Only a daring that becomes more daring by being willing can accomplish in receiving.

Heidegger “What are Poets for?”

Before returning to the text of Nietzsche with the hypothesis worked out in the last chapter concerning the praxical nature of learning’s anthropocentrism, I would like to take another detour for the next two chapters, through the 1935 lecture course “The Question Concerning the Thing” and then through the related 1938 lecture “The Age of World Picture”. In this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate how the 1935 course evidences Sheehan’s general approach to ‘Heidegger’: it will provide us with some clear examples of the anthropocentrism that ‘Heidegger’ is attempting to teach us to reappropriate. In Chapter Nine, I will show how the 1938 lecture, which takes up the 1935 course in ways that lay out the project for Heidegger’s turn in the following years in relation to ‘Nietzsche’, clarifies the nature of our Taminiauxian hypothesis about the praxical essence of learning which ‘Heidegger’ affirmatively differentiates in that turning: we should then be able to discern the extent to which the modern age is taught to us by ‘Heidegger’ as a productivist representational economy in which learning is abstracted to the point of its withdrawal.
Bethinging

To gain access quickly to what the Question Concerning the Thing is teaching, it suffices to think about why ‘Heidegger’ would have its most extensive examination of the notion and process of learning in a course dedicated to determining the nature of things. We are turning to this course now because the essential relation between learning and the thing is precisely what is at issue in Heidegger’s turning with respect to ‘Nietzsche’.

The course was advertised as and indeed comprises mostly a close reading of Kant’s transcendental account of intuition. Since this represents an explicit move away from the Kantbuch’s privileging of the transcendental imagination, this course is often read as a sign of Heidegger’s turn away from the more proactive project of the existential analytic toward a more direct though more abstract reading of the Being of beings. The way the course is set out would seem to confirm this conventional account of the turn. After an introductory exploration of “Various Ways of Questioning About the Thing” (explored in part in the previous chapter of this thesis in relation to the Thracian derision) in which the historical poverty of responses to this question is made clear, ‘Heidegger’ turns to “Kant’s Manner of Asking About the Thing”. Before turning to details of Kant’s text, ‘Heidegger’ seeks to contextualize the Kantian project with a discussion of “the modern attitude toward knowledge” (WT 66). It is in this section that ‘Heidegger’ discusses the notion of learning as a way of explaining the mathematicism of modern metaphysics. The course thus involves “characterizing the third chapter in the history of the question of the thing [the first being Greek phainomenology, the second Cartesian and Leibnizian axiomatics], i.e., to show how a critique of pure reason could and had to develop from this determination of things out of pure reason.” (WT 108) To first appearances, it would seem therefore that this course is, like the Nietzsche courses, putting the project of learning forward as one of the key features of our errant modern age. However, things are of course much more ambiguous, both with respect to learning and Kant, not least because, again, the course is a very close reading, with no critical attitudes expressed in regard to Kant, and no reference made at the end of the course to the critical contextualisation of the beginning of the course. I will suggest therefore that this course replicates the very

* Endnotes for Chapter Seven commence on page 244.
distinction that I believe to be at work in Nietzsche between authentic learning, in the sense that we have now learned from Sheehan and Taminiaux, and learning as it gets taken up by the modern age, that is, to pre-empt, as the technical method of taking-as-learnt.

The crux of The Question Concerning the Thing involves taking cognizance of being-a-thing (Dingsein WT 19). This means taking account of the being-conditioned (Bedingtsein WT 48) of things; in other words, the thingness within which some thing comes to be a thing. To get at this bethingedness, the course never stops emphasising that things have not always been (things in) the way they are now. Things appear to be naturally what they are “without further ado”, however “the ‘natural’ is always historical.” (WT 39) “The question ‘What is a thing?’ is [thus] a historical question.” (WT 52)

The course is thus struggling against the modern conception of thingness. All current conceptions of the thing, as Jediesheit, “being this one” (WT 15) in a certain Raum-Zeit-Stelle (WT 19), as “the present-at-hand bearer of properties present-at-hand on it” (WT 35), and as material thing (Stoffdinges) (WT 51) — all these determinations cast things as constant entities independent of any historical conditions, that is to say, independent of these determinations. The task of this course is therefore to account for how things come to be independent things in the modern age, that is to say, what they depend upon for their independence. On the one hand, this is a deconstruction, because it means unconcealing the infrastructural bethinging relations that have been concealed. But on the other hand, as always with ‘Heidegger’, there is more at stake than learning the ‘truth’ about things through a kind of “historical reporting (historichen Berichts).” (WT 43) The point is precisely to access the “happening (Geschehen)” (WT 48) that is (moving in) that history, the bethinging that “mediately” (WT 41) prefigures the epochal nature of things: “In truth our historical being-there (Da-sein) is already on the way to a transformation which, if stifled in itself, only experiences this destiny because it does not find its way back to its own self-laid grounds in order to found itself anew out of them.” (my emphasis, WT 49-50) The ontological happening power within the history of things is currently in a “state of quiescence (Ruhe).” (WT 44) The course is therefore an explicit attempt to use the question of the essence of the thing to re-appropriate that “self-contained movement, often more uncanny than movement itself” (WT 44); in other words to wrest out of its inertial rest that which qua ontological
determination “contains the fullness of being and reality which, in the end, essentially surpasses the reality of the real, in the sense of the actual.” (WT 44)²

Here then is a very programmatic example of Sheehan’s thesis now in the context of my additions: ‘Heidegger’ is undertaking a project of essential learning, a relearning of the ontological power of learning, that type of learning that instructs things to be (things in certain ways). “The answer to the question ‘what is a thing?’... is not a proposition but a transformed basic position or, better still and more cautiously, the initial transformation of the hitherto existing position toward things, a change of questioning and evaluation, of seeing and deciding; in short, of the being-there (Da-sein) in the midst of what is (inmitten des Seienden).” (WT 50) This is why, to reiterate what was said about this course in Part One of this thesis, but now from a context more attentive to the content, this course very explicitly employs the institutional essence of learning: it seeks to teach only those who “really ask this question, i.e., ...pose for decision the possibility of the determination of the thing... experience [the question] as [their] own so that it no longer lets go of [them] when [they] have long since had no opportunity to listen to lectures on it.” (WT 52)

We must recognize that this is the whole point of asking after the thing: ‘thing’ is a modern translation for the Greek notion of phýsis as the being of beings as a whole, that is, as phýsis was applied to all beings and not just that section of beings which were self-moving. A ‘thing’ in the same way can refer to all existents; things are anything, natural or man-made. Hence, as was pointed out in the previous chapter in reference to Sheehan, what all things thus in the end have in common is the anthropocentrism through which they are. As with phýsis, this does not mean that every thing is a human artifact, but that every thing is only a thing to, for and thus by humans.³ It is this nature of things — the anthropocentrism that conditions them, the learning that allows them to be what and how they are — that stands to be concealed by things when perceived naturally.

It is in this context that ‘Heidegger’ introduces the etymology of modern mathematics. Mathémata is the last of five categories of things: physiká — self-originating; poioémena — man-made; chrémata — either of the first two disposed for human use; prágmata — “things in so far as we have to do with them at all, whether we work on them, use them, transform them, or we only look at and examine them... práxis is all doing, pursuing, and enduring.” (WT 70) The list is ordered with respect to escalating
anthropocentrism, with *mathémata* being the apotheosis. And this is indeed what
‘Heidegger’ teaches us: “The ΤΠΠΦΤΙ.: I are things insofar as we take cognizance of
them as what we already know them to be in advance, the bodily as the bodily, the
plant-like of the plant, the animal-like of the animal, the thingness of the thing, and so
on.” (WT 73) *Mathémata* therefore refers to the pre-conditions (Vorbedingungen) which
humans bring to things in order for things to be things (*Dinge*). However, in a strange
logic that is only understandable if learning is understood in an essentially pro-active sense as
this thesis is arguing, *mathesis* means learning. The *mathesis* of *mathémata* whilst
referring to what “must be learned” nonetheless means what “must be known in
advance”. (WT 72) What this indicates is that learning, in the essentially Greek sense, is
a way of summarising the fundamental anthropocentricity of being-in-the-world, the
practically projective nature of ec-sistence, such that the ready-to-hand is fundamentally
prior to any present-at-handness: “Learning is therefore a way of taking and
appropriating in which use is appropriated. Such appropriating occurs through the
using itself. We call it practicing... In practicing we take the use of the [thing], i.e., we
take how to handle it [*die Art und Weise des Umgangs mit ihr* — the art and manner of
dealing with it], into our possession [*Besitz*]. We master the way to handle the [thing]...
[through handling it] we become familiar with the thing. Learning is always also
becoming familiar.” (WT 71, FND 55)

Read the other way, essential learning means relearning what must have been
learned in order for a thing to be (meaningfully and useably) what it is: it means
relearning all the relations which we have projected as this thing that allow it to be
something that we have (a capacity for understanding and using) in our world. “When
we come to know [all that is known “in general and in an indefinite way”] in a special
and determined way, we come to know something which we really already know.
Precisely, this ‘taking cognizance of them’ is the genuine essence of learning, the
Τ∆ΠΟ[ΘΖ.” (WT 72, 73) The hermeneutic circle of the existential analytic is therefore
an exercise in essential (re)learning; the question of being stands for an anamnesis of
the project of fundamental ontology, reappropriating “that evident aspect of things
within which we are always already moving and according to which we experience them
as things at all, and as such things” (WT 75). As ‘Heidegger’ indicates, the process is
necessarily reflexive in the manner of all authentic praxical actions: because it involves
learning that “this fundamental position we take toward things by which we take up
things as already given to us” (WT 75) is not “first gotten” out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us” (WT 74), in other words, because it involves learning the institutionality of all that is essential, the ‘mathematical’ refers to “what can be learned... and the manner of learning and the process itself.” (WT 75) Essential learning is therefore relearning the learnedness of all that is; it is a process of perpetually reappropriating the anthropocentrism with which ‘what is’ is; and it is necessarily the (re)activation of that anthropocentrism, a taking of what is always already happening, learning to teach things to be (otherwise).

To complete this account of Heidegger’s most elaborate examination of the notion of learning — one which we should now be able to see as attesting to the validity of recasting the whole of Heidegger’s project as essentially concerned with essential (re)learning — allow me to quote extensively the full context for Heidegger’s most famous statements about learning and teaching, normally only reproduced out of context in their less extensive repeated formulation 16 years later in What is Called Thinking?:

Precisely this ‘taking cognizance’ [zur Kenntnis Nehmen] is the genuine essence [Wesen] of learning, the mathesis. The mathemata are things insofar as we take cognizance of them as what we already know them to be in advance, the body as bodily, the plant-like of the plant, the animal-like of the animal, the thingness of the thing, and so on. This genuine learning is therefore an extremely peculiar taking, a taking where he who takes only takes what he actually already has. Teaching corresponds to this learning. Teaching is a giving, an offering; but what is offered in teaching is not the learnable, for the student is merely instructed [i.e., what the student is given is only an Anweisung] to take for himself what he already has. If the student only takes over something which is offered he does not learn. He comes to learn only when he experiences what he takes as something he himself [properly – eigentlich, left out of the translation] already has. True learning only occurs where the taking of what one already has is a self-giving [Sichselbstgeben – giving-its-self, emphasised by ‘Heidegger’] and is experienced as such. Teaching, therefore, does not mean anything else than to let the others learn, i.e., to bring one another to learning. Learning is more difficult than teaching; for only he who can truly learn — and only as long as he can do it — can truly teach. The genuine teacher differs from the pupil only in that he can learn better and that he more genuinely wants to learn. In all teaching, the teacher learns the most.
Chapter Eight: **Projecting Between Things**

The most difficult learning is to come to know all the way [wirklich und bis zum Grunde as zur Kenntnis nehmen — to take into cognizance really and to the foundation] what we already know [wissen — the translation confuses wissen and Kenntnis nehmen]. Such learning, with which we are solely concerned, demands sticking rather closely to what appears to be nearest at hand; for instance, to the question of what a thing is. We steadfastly ask, considering its usefulness, the same obviously useless [Nutzlosigkeit — emphasised by ‘Heidegger’] question of what a thing is, what tools are, what man is, what a work of art is, what the state and what the world are. (WT 73, FND 56)

**Mathematising**

On a superficial reading, it could seem that through this re-presentation of the fundamental ontology in terms of mathematical learning, ‘Heidegger’ comes to discern the danger inherent in the anthropocentrically relational world sustained by the existential analytic. This course would then be the last account ‘Heidegger’ gives of what he would subsequently turn away from because of its homology with modern Technology.

I would respond by arguing that this would be a retrospective reading that is not merely exegetically wrong, but turns ‘Heidegger’ into a hypocrite and fails to learn what Heidegger’s learning project actually involves. The Question Concerning the Thing in fact shows not only that this essential learning process must be the way in which a historical reappropriation is to occur, but is in fact what must be reappropriated as still occurring, as that which sustains modern Technology despite its concealing self-misrepresentations. This is the whole point of the historical analysis: discerning that something “could and had to develop” from a certain metaphysical configuration means learning it, actively projecting it as a thing that is given to us as a destiny. “We question historically if we ask what is still happening even if it seems past. We ask what is still happening and whether we remain equal to this happening so that it can really develop.” (WT 43) Thus the account of mathemata is provided “not in order to acknowledge how it was before, but to pose for decision how essentially it still is today.” (WT 50)

The course ‘Heidegger’ takes thus proceeds to set out how the modern sciences misappropriate mathematical learning. The modern age arrives by using the ontological power of learning against that learning. The essential process of mathemata, i.e., projecting, is projected as the modern project; mathesis is thus mathematicised, its
formative nature formalised. The key figure here is Descartes, who institutes the essential necessity of method:

In the essence of the mathematical, as the project we delineated, lies a specific will to a new form of knowledge as such. The detachment from revelation as the first source for truth and the rejection of tradition as the authoritative means of knowledge — all these rejections are only the negative consequences of the mathematical project. He who dared to project the mathematical project put himself as the projector of this project upon a base which is first projected only in the project. There is not only a liberation in the mathematical project, but also a new experience and formation of freedom itself, i.e., a binding with obligations which are self-imposed. In the mathematical project develops an obligation to principles demanded by the mathematical itself. According to this inner drive, a liberation to a new freedom, the mathematical strives out of itself to establish its own essence as the ground of itself and thus of all knowledge. (WT 97)

It is important to notice here that the praxical reflexivity that is essential to learning is what is allowing learning to be restructured, i.e., relearnt into a mathematical method. We will come to see that this goes to the heart of what ‘Heidegger’ is teaching, recovering the essential learning that originated and continues to order modern inessential learning (or the modern learning away of/from essentiality).

But to explain the inessentiality of the modern mathematical project, we need to learn that the consequence of this self-(re)producing exponentialised mathematical project is a certain abstraction. Things are quite explicitly deprecated, or more accurately annihilated (de-thveded), by the Platonism that only grants them reality in relation to axiomatic ideals. Instead of the mathematical referring to what is (pre)learned as things, the mathematical is short-circuited into what is merely over things, that is, what is permanently, without having to be learned, before things: “The mathematical is, as mente concipere [mental re-presentation], a project (Entwurf) of thingness (Dingheit) which, as it were, skips over the things... In this projection there is posited that which things are taken as, what and how they are to be evaluated (würdigt) beforehand... The basic blueprint (Grundriss) of the structure of every thing and its relation to every other thing is sketched in advance.” (WT 92)

I will come back to this project of abstraction in the next chapter, but it needs to be reiterated that according to the three stage history ‘Heidegger’ is teaching, as
mentioned above, this is still only stage two. The point of the course is to look at how Kant progresses this modern metaphysics. Certainly Kant is self-consciously mathematicising metaphysics, setting out the “architectonic, the blueprint projected as the essential structure of reason” (WT 121), “the universal, advance illumination of all things according to their thingness.” (WT 111) However, in being the realisation of the next epoch in the nature of things, Kant, as an explicit demonstration of the process of essential learning, reveals something about essential learning. If attempting to learn “the whole of Greek Dasein” is too much for this course (WT 50) and if for converse reasons of proximity, it is not “possible [for this course] to display, in its full context, the precise determination of the thing, which has become pre-eminent through modern science,” (WT 54), then this course “choose[s] a middle section of this way [of things], one in which, in a creative sense, the beginning and a decisive age are joined together in a new manner.” (WT 55) This means then that Kant’s philosophy does not represent an aspect of metaphysics that ‘Heidegger’ is teaching against. It instead accesses very exactly the sort of institutional essence of learning that ‘Heidegger’ is making a project of reappropriating. This is why Kant never fits into Heidegger’s Seinsgeschichte: “Kant has something in common with the great Greek beginning, which at the same time distinguishes him from all German thinkers before and after him.” (WT 56) 10

Letting-Encounter

In summary then, what this course is teaching is that: with Cartesian geometry and Newtonian physics, the project of abstracting things or metaphysicalising was very explicit; our modern experience is however much more concretely thingly, to the point of rejecting all forms of metaphysics; what must be learned therefore is how the first mathematical project ‘domesticated’ itself into what we currently experience (or rather precisely don’t experience (erfährt) in a learning way. As indicated at the outset of this analysis of the course, ‘Heidegger’ is teaching us the relations of dependence by which things appear independent(ly). Kant is the key to discerning this paradoxical situation.11 But significantly, given that we have learned that Kant is furthering the mathematical project of modernity, we will also learn how these bethinging relations can get turned into modes of dethinging. What Kant allows us to learn is the nihilism of our current materialism, the no-thingness of every thing we take, use and construct.
Hence, the second half of the course proceeds by elucidating what ‘Heidegger’ considers the central formula of Kant’s Critique, that “The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.” ‘Heidegger’ understands this to be an explanation of how it is that things are anthropocentrically made into Gegenstanden, that is, made, through human transcendence — through “the passing over (Überstieg)... the over to (Hinüber zu) or way beyond (Überweg)” (176) — to stand (stehen) against (gegen) us with an autonomous constancy (Beständigkeit): “What Kant hit upon and what he constantly tried to grasp anew as the fundamental happening is that we human beings have the power of knowing what is, which we ourselves are not, even though we did not ourselves make this what is. To be in the midst of an open vis-a-vis what is, that is constantly strange. In Kant’s formulation this means to have objects standing against us as they themselves, even though the letting encounter (das Begegnen-lassen) happens through us.” (242) How things come to be for us is therefore via this “letting encounter”, or as it is described on the previous page, a “letting-stand-against” (Gegenstehenlassen, 241). Heidegger’s point is that “perception as pure reception and [perception as] anticipation as reaching and grasping beforehand (entgegen-fassendes Vorgreifen)” (220) are not contradictory, but moments in the same process.

‘Heidegger’ via Kant is clearly describing the noetic relation between humans and beings that I have proposed, in the context of Sheehan’s teachings, we understand as learning. Learning is exactly the process which is capable of holding together these seemingly contradictory moments: there is a mathematically projective act of learning which then results in the institution of the learned as essential, that is, presenced.

Kant’s transcendental deduction however points to a significant danger. ‘Heidegger’ concludes the course by insisting that Kant’s deduction “does not mean that things become a human product (Gemächte).” (244) But we must be careful: the danger here does not lie in things being man-made, but in being man-made; a praxis is at risk of being mis-taken for a poiésis. We humans know about certain things in advance because we make them, like the cobbler knows a shoe (WT 207); but to know things that we have not made requires a very particular type of human doing: “In this showing of what is in its openness, that doing (Tun) has a special task which shows things by creating them in a certain sense, [as in] the creation of a work of art. Work makes world. World within itself first reveals things.” (WT 207) Kant however, “like the
tradition before and after him, skips that sphere of things in which we know ourselves immediately at home, i.e., things as the artist depicts them for us." (WT 211) Instead he takes up the mathematical projection of things and constructs a transcendental process of (p)representation (Vorstellung). In short, he overtakes (übernimmt) rather than taking up in a learned fashion, he mistakes, the reflexivity of the praxis of human perception and turns it into a reflection, a poietic economy of (p)representation.13

The result is that presencing becomes the mere appearance of what is present; things become objects, present to subjects, and the learning relations that sustain these presences get concealed. In other words, ‘lettings-stand’ devolves into its outcome: unchanging self-standings (WT 229). Things, after having been learnt, appear to be mere things, objects independent of how and what we have learned (of) them. This is the condition of ‘products’ which, despite having been made, get alienated from their making, circulating as independent objects. To put it in terms of learning as ‘Heidegger’ defined it in this course, products get taken-over or seized (WT 142) and used by subjects who have no essential relation to those objects. The fact that one is only taking up what one already has (an essential relation to) (WT 91) is concealed: one takes things as if they are simply present and available, displacing the extent to which one is always already partaking in their being; taking becomes an ontic activity rather an ontological action, just as doing is reduced to “busily creating on [in, at or with] things” (Sich-zu-schaffen-machen an den Dingen — my emphasis, WT 82) rather than accomplishing things, bring things into being.14 In short, we unthinkingly use products (up),15 where we should be thoughtfully (re)learning things.

The paradox of modernity’s nihilism is now possible: things are made independently permanent only by being skipped over; they (are) take(n) (a just) stand(ing) but only as Bestand (WT 229); their conditions for appearance ensure their disappearance; materiality becomes essentially a virtual category, which is why it is manipulable; or to put it back in terms of learning, one appears to be learning from objects when one’s experiments are plainly poietic acts calculatively designed to learn objects toward predetermined results. (WT 223)

The significance of Kant’s ‘lettings-stand’, the reason why “whoever understands [Kant’s formula] does not only know one book among the writings of philosophy, but masters a fundamental posture of the history of man, which we can neither avoid, leap over nor deny in any way” (183), lies therefore in the fact that Kant is a switch: he
makes possible modern productivism, that which makes objects through a process that
denies that making; but he can only make this (type of) making possible by
appropriating and revealing the sort of making that is not a modern type of making, but
rather the praxical institutional essence of learning. ‘Kant’ can be (re)learned, can be
projected as, a corrective to being too well instruct(ur)ed, or taken over by the modern
mathematical project. Kant precisely restores an awareness of the anthropocentrism that
sustains all things; his transcendental philosophy allows us to take up again the
anthropocentrism that is most properly our relation to all things. “Kant’s questioning
about the thing asks about intuition and thought, about experience and its principles,
i.e., it asks about man. The question ‘What is a thing?’ is the question ‘Who is man?’”
(244)

Thus, after learning Kant in this way, we are forced to perpetually recognize “1 that
we must always move in the between (Zwischen), between man and thing; 2 that this
between exists only while we move in it; 3 that this between is not like a rope stretching
from the thing to man, but that this between as an anticipation (Vorgriff) reaches beyond
the things and similarly back behind us. Reaching-before (Vorgriff) means thrown back
(Rückwurf).” (243)

This quotation is pivotal, confirming all that Sheehan claims about the kinetic
act of repeated appropriation. It indicates that beyond a mere (Kantian) apperception of
anthropocentrism, what is required is an on-going relearning of anthropocentrism, a
concerted process of anticipation by which to repeatedly throw forth the between. Since
anthropocentrism is the process of learning, this means that the task involves the
constant relearning of learning. This learning-between exists only while it is at-work, so
we must keep on making praxical projections of things in order that we might be
continually thrown back onto the ontological essentiality of that learning. We must
avoid our anthropocentric destiny (Geschick) but instead learn to make a skill (Geschick)
of it, or rather, be skilled in always relearning it.17

It should be noted that although the process being advocated involves the ever-
renewed reassertion of learning anticipations, these projections are thoroughly
finitudinal. Being thrown back is a type of foundering or running aground; it is a
process of shattering against the existent nature of things and historical humanity.18
This is the whole reason why the question of things is exemplary. The ontologicality of
the praxis of learning manifests in the material resistance (gegen) or constancy (standen)
that comprises the essence of things. What learns and is thus relearned is a thoroughly conditional (bedingt) anthropocentrism, a completely worldly, be-thinged anthropocentrism. In comparison, the methodically concealed anthropocentrism of modern productivism symptomatically believes itself to be free from things, without the limits of the world; in its abstract way, it believes that anything is possible, that it can make any thing.

We see then that things are essentially anthropocentric. All things are learned by human being. Because this learning is praxical, that is reflexively contained, it is finitudinal and manifests things in their learned thingliness together with their learners. However, what this process of learning takes, risks an excessive overtaking and a self-concealing mistaking. To relearn the recessiveness by which alone we can access the ontological power of learning, we must learn to resist this poietic misrepresentation of learning things. Finitudinally anthropocentric is what we humans must learn to be, which means, relearn that we are already being(in-the-world).
Endnotes for Chapter Eight


2 Heidegger makes some pertinent comments about institutional education in this regard. On the one hand, the question concerning things is only educational in the conventional institutional sense: “Why for example has the treatment and interpretation of the poets for years been so dreary in our schools? Answer: Because the teachers do not know the difference between a thing and a poem, because they treat poems as things, which they do because they have never gone through the question of what a thing is.” (WT 51-2) However, as opposed to the situation where failing to learn of the danger of “high-power lines” might lead to death, “If a teacher interprets a poem to his students in an impossible manner, ‘nothing further happens’.” (WT 53) There is though, of course, much more at stake — namely, historical things: “By ignoring the question concerning the thing and by insufficiently interpreting a poem, it appears as though nothing further happens. One day, perhaps after fifty or hundred years, nevertheless, something has happened.” (WT 54)

3 Compare the following discussion of the “between — between aisthetós [the perceptable] as such and aisthesis [the act of perceiving] — which in itself brings about the very wonder that, although it is related to self-reliant beings, does not through this relation take their self-reliance away, but precisely makes it possible for such being to secure this self-reliance in the truth,” in the 1931 Aristotle’s Metaphysics course: “The independence of things at hand from humans is not altered through the fact that this very independence as such is possible only if humans exist. The being in themselves of things not only becomes unexplainable without the existence of humans, it becomes utterly meaningless.” (174-5)

4 This ‘having’ here must be understood in the strong sense as mentioned in endnotes to Chapters Five and Seven and as will be clarified shortly by the difference between nehmen and übernehmen. Essential learning is not merely taking what is merely owned; it is rather the decisively active rehaving of what is being taken (to be the case). Mathemata are not possessions (ousia, presents) but the manifestations of ‘having being’ or ‘being having’; that is to say, mathemata teach us the way we have things (i.e., teach ourselves to have things, or learn things as) in ways that make them part of one’s being, that makes them essential to who and how we are.

5 In line with Heidegger’s understanding of ‘correspondence’ (see especially What is Philosophy? — i.e., to correspond is to attune to, to hear the Same in an other way), it is perhaps necessary to read this sentence as not now turning to the distinct activity of teaching, but, as this
thesis has been arguing, turning to the teacherly aspect of learning: ‘Essential learning is a form of teaching’. This is why when Heidegger does turn to teaching shortly, he will say that the teacher is the best learner.

6 See Being & Time s25, where ‘Heidegger’ is discussing the formal indicativeness of ‘I-ness’ and its relation to ‘givenness’ in general. The implication is that Dasein learns to be a self, or is a self insofar as it essentially learns, giving itself what is thereby given. This is thus an oblique reference to Pindar’s ‘become what you be’. Heidegger will later translate Plato’s definition of anamnetic learning in a related way: “bringing up [or out here] and taking up [or in out] — above and beyond the other [or in an other way beyond] — taking the knowledge [or cognizance] itself from out of himself [heraufholen und hinauf — über das andere weg — nehmend die Erkenntnis selbst auf such selbst].” (WT 91, FND 70)

7 It is worth comparing the version in What is called Thinking? which focuses more on teaching and makes no reference to mathesis. In terms of the point being made, it can be seen that this version is very explicit about the reflexivity of essential learning: what is to be learned is learning. I will italicise the repetitions: “True. Teaching is even more difficult than learning. We know that; but we rarely think about it. And why is teaching more difficult than learning? Not because the teacher must have a larger store of information and have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing else be learned than — learning. His conduct therefore, often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from him, if by ‘learning’ we now suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information. The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they – he has to learn to let learn. The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices. The teacher is far less assured of his ground than those who learn are of theirs.” (15) The bolded sentence is a reverse of the formulation in What is a Thing? Even so, it is actually making the same point — one which this thesis has been making by calling learning a form of teaching (often by hyphenating the two terms) —: in the 1935 course, learning, as truly taking over what is already, is the more difficult in that it makes possible teaching; in the 1951 course, teaching is the more difficult because one must learn how to let others learn; i.e., in either case, the teacher is the one doing more learning, a point that occurs in both.

It is also worth noting that the context in What is Called Thinking? is discussing learning as a craft. This makes explicit what is implicit in the What is a Thing? context, where ‘Heidegger’ equates the mathematical qua learning with the Bewandtnis — what is called ‘relatedness’ in What is Called Thinking? — that exceeds mere know-how but it that it is not without being abstractable as information: “but is there much else still to learn? There is: How does such a thing? (Welche Bewandtnis es... hat) but to use the thing... we need not know that. Certainly not. But this does not deny that how it
works belongs to the thing. When a thing we are practicing to use must be produced, in order to provide it so that it can be at one’s disposal, the producer must have become familiar beforehand with how the thing works (Bewandtnis)... This becoming familiar is what makes it possible to produce the thing; and the thing produced, in turn, makes its practice and use possible." (WT 72)

This is Hubert Dreyfus’ provocative suggestion, though without reference to this 1935 lecture. Dreyfus begins by asking, is not the relationality of the work-world confluent with the withdrawal of earthly things before technology? He argues that Heidegger needed to historicise the account of the work-world in Being & Time. Dreyfus accuses Heidegger of not going far enough in this regard, since a true historicisation would entail Heidegger admitting that his own philosophy had been the fundamental metaphysical position that facilitated the installation of modern technological (un)Being. In other words, Dreyfus suggests that Being & Time itself is one of the causes of the totalisation of the work-world into the planetary technology. See “Between Teché and Technology: The Ambiguous Place of Equipment in Being & Time” in Tulane Studies in Philosophy v32 (1984).

This passage leads into an extended analysis of Descartes. As with the "Age of the World Picture", Heidegger relates the ontology of modern science to a particular way of being human. Modern science convinces Dasein to think of itself as a subject (essentially learns by giving-itself-a-self, Sichselbstgeben), as that to and for which all things represent themselves. Each of us is fundamentally alienated, but, as this passage makes clear through its remarkable Foucauldian pre-emptions, in a self(im)posed or self-deluding way (i.e., via the imposition of a deluded sense of self). We only seem to be the agent of modern ways of being: this is why the modern age is essentially a picturing, projecting the mere appearance of there being independent selves. Heidegger insists that we not be mislead by modern “subjectivism and individualism” with its claim of agency: “It remains just as certain that no age before this one has produced a comparable objectivism.” (AWP 128) I will return to this in the next chapter.

Kant is the historical aberration in the otherwise linearly destinal decline away from being. Heidegger always sees Kant’s position as ambivalent, as if a moment occurred in his philosophising in which the Seingsgeschick could have been deflected. For instance, in the first summary account of the history in “Nietzsche’s Metaphysics”, Heidegger observes that after Leibniz, “the essence of subjectivity itself necessarily surges toward absolute subjectivity. Kant’s metaphysics resists this essential thrust of Being — while at the same time laying the ground for its fulfilment. This is because Kant’s metaphysics for the first time subsumes utterly the concealed essence of subjectivity, which is the essence of Being as conceived in metaphysics, under the concept of Being as beingness — in the sense of the condition of the possibility of beings.” (N3 222) This ambivalence is repeated in the fourth course (N4 175-6, 185-6): see also “The Question
of Being”, 304. It is Kant’s anthropocentrism, his transcendental apperception of the question ‘What is man?’ that makes him the most Greek of the moderns.

Heidegger makes this same argument in these exact terms — that being-dependent depends upon a certain independence in the dependent — in the lecture course given in the same year, 1935, on Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom. In the context of pantheism, in which it is being argued that humans can be manifestations of God’s system-design without being denied freedom, ‘Heidegger’ observes, “What depends on God must be made dependent (abhängig) through him and from him in such a way that it comes to itself to stand as something independent. What is dependently independent, the ‘derived absoluteness’ is not contradictory. Rather, this concept captures what constitutes the band between the ground of beings as a whole and beings as a whole... The creative ground must posit something independently dependent of itself. Dependence concerns the ‘that’. The ‘what’ can be of such a nature that what is dependent is posited as in-dependent (Unabhängiges). It even has to be posited as such” (87, 89)

Concerning Tun, see “Science and Reflection”, 159-160, where it is described as a producing-revealing (Her- und Vorbringen) in contrast to mere occulocentric knowing (wissenschaft). I discuss this in Chapter Eleven.

The 1941 “Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics” identifies the key issue in Kant as “Reflexion... the bending-back, putting back, that is, the representation of what is represented which presents itself in advance to itself, in which what is represented is represented as this and that, and is. The ‘what’ itself in its sameness and positedness, constancy.” (60, but see 59-63) Concerning the danger of reflexivity being overwhelmed by the transcendental subjectivity of intellectual reflection, see R.Gasché The Tain of the Mirror [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986].

The nuance I am trying to get at here exists in the phrase ‘taking-in’ which Heidegger uses to describe both the authentically noetic relation to things and the representative economy that Kant institutes: ‘taking-in’ suggests firstly a passive receptivity; but the verbal activism of ‘taking-in’ should not be missed and this is what I am calling the project of learning; however, the modern age over-emphasises the activism of that taking, which is why it spills into violent and random challenging. Following Being & Time’s style of argument, it can be suggested that the first is in fact derivative of the last, both missing the middle ground(ing). Further levels can be added when Heidegger, in Fundamental Concepts, notes that the taking that the animal does, is never really a (learning) taking (Vernehmen) because the animal is always taken (in) (hingenommen) and thus captivated (benommen) by things: see s59-60. The suggestion is then that the modern unlearning of learning means a return to the animals impoverished world where only training is possible.
Chapter Eight: Projecting Between Things

15 On authentic use versus using up, see What is Called Thinking?, 187 and “The Anaximander Fragment”, 53.

16 It is to counter the merely formal recognition by Kant of the question of man that 'Heidegger' is forced to explicate ‘formal indication’ in Fundamental Concepts. In other words, the risk is that Kant(ianism) has made the question concerning human being boring. Thus the question, “How do things stand with us?” (FCM 76) is designed to “find ourselves in such a way that we are thereby given back to ourselves, that is given back to ourselves, so that we are given over to ourselves, given over to the task of becoming what we are.” (FCM 77) “The question concerning what man is, if genuinely put, explicitly delivers the human being over into his or her Dasein.” (FCM 280) This is why what this philosophical issue “deals with only discloses itself at all within and from out of a transformation of human Dasein.” (FCM 292) In short, this course, and ‘Heidegger’ as a formal indication in general, exists to impress upon us learners the imperative to exist, learningly: “What is that [demand that is announced in nihilism]? It is that Dasein as such is demanded of man, that it is given to him — to be there... To what does Dasein have to resolutely disclose itself? To first creating for itself once again a genuine knowing concerning that wherein whatever properly makes Dasein itself possible consists.” (FCM 165)

17 “As is known [though in my case thanks to this note by Lacoue-Labarthe], the word [Geschick] indicates also skill and adroitness, aptitude and talent, in short, savoir-faire: in Greek, technē.” (“Transcendence Ends in Politics”, 286) See Heidegger’s “Logos (Heraclitus Fragment B 50)”: Heidegger is describing the sophos that comes from listening toward the formal indications of logos: “Thus sophós signifies that which can adhere to whatever has been indicated, can devote itself to it, and can dispatch itself toward it (get under way toward it). Because it is appropriate (Schickliches) such behaviour becomes skillful (geschickt). When we want to say that someone is particularly skilled at something we still employ such turns of speech as ‘he has a gift for that and is destined for it.’ In this fashion we hit upon the genuine meaning of sophos, which we translate as ‘fateful’ (geschicklich”). (L 68) We learn a skill by projecting it as a fate.

18 I had intended to add David Farrel Krell’s insightful transversal reading of the 1930s ‘Heidegger’ to the commentary resources of Sheehan and Taminiaux in the previous section, but it would have required too much of a detour. See “Shattering: Heidegger’s Rhetoric in the 1930s” in Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life Philosophy [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992].
Chapter Nine
Overtaking Representations

“An ΩΨΜΡ∴δΥ is something posited in a striving, though the striving as such set forth (Vorgestelltes). Striving is inherently setting-after something and as such already setting-before; this comportment can however, set aside this setting-after and is then only setting-before. Everything we call ‘representing’ (Vorstellen) and ‘intuiting’ is inherently this ‘bare setting before, this bare representing’; it is not, for example, the reverse: first represented then striven after.

This ΩΨΜΡ∴δΥ is however in each case ΔΨ_Φ: that from-out-of-which and that in references back to which all effort is set in motion... The striven after as such is what properly does the moving; it is the ΔΨ_Φ of ΡΓΥΟ[ΘΖ that the soul has. The soul has this ΔΨ_Φ insofar as the soul as essentially striving is related to an ΩΨΜΡ∴δΥ. The having does not simply mean: having in itself, as some sort of property, but having something in the manner of a holding-itself-in-relation-to, of a comportment — whereby that at which the comportment is directed is made known somehow in and through this comportment itself.

Heidegger Aristotle’s Metaphysics

It should now be discernible that ‘Heidegger’ does not turn against the institutional essence of learning per se, but rather attempts to retrieve it from withdrawing into what it makes possible. If The Question Concerning the Thing gives us a positive account of the praxical anthropocentrism of learning, then the related lecture “The Age of the World Picture” will set out for us the nature of the modern mistaken representation of that essential learning process. The analysis in this 1938 lecture explicitly takes up the 1935 course in relation to mathesis in order to explain what has happened to that ‘learning' after Kant. In particular, the whole lecture is concerned to set out what a certain Nietzscheanism does to the mathematical project, though it does not address the texts of Nietzsche in any extended fashion.” By turning to this lecture now, we will have resolved the hypothesis we are taking to the turning in the Nietzsche lectures.

* Endnotes for Chapter Nine commence on page 268.
Chapter Nine: Overtaking Representations

Abstracting

To contextualise this move in a way that is intended to dramatise the differentiation being made by ‘Heidegger’ in regard to essential learning allow me to recall the abstract of this thesis.

Abstracts such as this, which are an obligatory component of doctoral dissertations, are increasingly necessary for all published research. Given the sheer proliferation of learning, the belief that there is now more learning happening, and consequently more to learn, than ‘ever before’, issues arise about the management of learning, about how to learn to learn at such a rate and scale. Abstracts are part of a technological solution. They represent an economisation of learning, an enhancement of its efficiency.

These same volume pressures however are also what make us dismiss abstraction as a conceptual level of thought. There is not much time these days for the abstract, for thinking in the abstract. What the abstract has taken (trahere) away (abs) according to an everyday prejudice, is the instructively real: abstract notions merely accompany things, often distracting us and even detracting from what can and should be learned from them. The abstract is thus an ambiguous entity that points to a certain activism prevalent at this time, an activism that on the one hand will have nothing to do with anything abstract, but then on the other hand will make active use of the process of abstracting.

In some ways the ambiguity is dealt with through the belief that the discursive form of the abstract merely puts forward in an inactive way the learning (substantive) that only comes from actively learning (participle) — e.g., redoing the research documented by the abstract. An abstract in this sense amounts to ‘knowledge’. Knowledge is what is supposed to have been learned; it is the reified result of the activity of learning, the product of active learning; it is dependent upon the process of learning in one sense, coming afterward, but as such remains independent of the learning (activity) which still remains to be done.

However in other ways, this compromise with the abstract in the name of efficiency has the reverse effect. As more and more is learned, to the point that it is no longer feasible for everyone to learn everything by active experience, it becomes necessary for some things to be taken as learnt without having actually been learned. ‘Active’ learning is still affirmed, but an economic rationalization allows a
supplementary learning to take the form of the abstract: “I could actively learn ‘that’, but it is more efficient for me to actively learn what can be learnt by taking ‘that’ as already learnt, in the abstract.” As the amount needing to be learned expands, so does one’s dependence upon this compromised form of learning. For instance, at the moment, when the number of current experiments probably exceeds the accumulation of all previous experiments, learning what to take-as-learnt becomes an increasingly pervasive activity, even for a specialised field of learning. As a result, one finds oneself in the situation of valuing active learning, but spending most of one’s time involved in the activity of learning abstracts, so much so, that when the opportunity for actual learning comes, it has been almost totally interpolated by the abstract(s), by what has been learnt only abstractly.

As the process of learning abstracts, of learning what to abstractly take as already learnt, becomes pervasive, knowledge starts to come not just after, but also before learning. Rather than knowledge depending on learning, learning comes to depend upon knowledge. Knowledge is no longer a mere result of learning, but learning’s major object, its primary preoccupation. What was previously only put forward as what had been learned, and at the most as what could be taken as learned, as if it had been learned, is now increasingly being put forward as what is being learnt. ‘Learning what is known’ rather than ‘learning to know’ makes learning a more and more abstract (non)activity. Hence the standard reaction to the knowledge-based learning upon which our modern educational institutions have been structured: in becoming addicted to knowledge, schools and universities have become abstracted from the realities of everyday life. They now only teach abstract things. Students only ever learn about what has been learnt, learning to know only what is already known, thereby unlearning the ability to learn anything new for themselves.

Abstracting

The situation I have just described is one that can be seen to be underwriting “The Age of the World Picture”. Heidegger’s general point in this lecture is to reveal that what we take to be the overwhelming realism of ‘our time’ is in essence not really ‘real’, but the becoming-real of, or our existence in, our abstract representations. ‘Heidegger’, in the skewing move that is axial to its way of teaching, acknowledges the actual, the activist demand for actuality; but does so in order to learn about that activism, and finds that it
is, in actual fact, inherently abstract. 'Heidegger' teaches us that we have learnt to dwell in an abstract realm, we have been instructed by the explicit learning project or method of mathematics.

The argument proceeds via science as one exemplar of our modern 'actuality' amongst others (machine technology, aesthetics, culture, degodization). \(^8\) 'Heidegger' describes science minimally as a research activity. But the emphasis here falls on 'activity'; science is a Betrieb, an industry, a busyness, a driving pursuit, a will-to-activity. \(^9\) This appears to be a shift for 'Heidegger'. Previously in the '20s and early '30s, science (Wissenschaft), as opposed to modern science, was lauded as a unifyingly fundamental form of active knowing. \(^10\) The danger in Heidegger's view at the time, lay in abstraction, in the belief that things could be and in fact should be known without human activity, that is theoretically in the a priori sense. \(^11\) In comparison, the danger in the second half of the '30s (and from then on) lies precisely in activism. This testifies to the fact that 'Heidegger' is now teaching that our modern age cannot merely be accounted for in terms of Cartesian mathematicism, but requires learning about a third stage in the history of the mathematical project.

What is crucial to recognize is that in this lecture, 'Heidegger' is only describing that third chapter. The Greek "intercourse with things" in terms of their projective ‘ity’s and ‘ness’s is skipped over. This is why no mention is made in this lecture of the etymological meaning of mathesis as learning. \(<\Delta \ ΤΙΠΘΙ\ \>\) is immediately defined as the “already-known.” (my emphasis, AWP 118) The suggestion is that the modern project of mathematics privileges an abstract(ive) version of mathesis, that way in which "the mathematical is [in fact] based on... the application of a determination of the thing, which is not experientially created out of the thing." (WT 89) The mathematical refers to what is merely taken as learnt because learnable, rather than actually learned. \(^12\)

It is what science has learnt, once and for all, what has been phylogenically learnt and therefore does not need to be ontogenically re-experienced. "On-going activity no longer keeps itself open on the basis of an ever-new accomplishing of its projection-plan, but only leaves that plan behind itself as given; never again confirms and verifies its own self-accumulating results and the calculation of them, but simply chases after such results and calculations." (AWP 138) The mathematical plan thus comprises results which merely need to be learnt, never (re)learned. They are what can be learnt in the abstract.
Because it operates in this way, mathematical science is empowered to move beyond a retrospective exercise toward a more prospective determination of all that is and will be. To explain, three interrelated points need to be made:

1 Indoctrination

If the mathematical represents what has been deemed learnable, what can be taken as learnt without having to be relearned, “what can be learnt and thus, at the same time, what can be taught” (WT 69), that is to say, what one can be taught without having been learned, then it can be characterized as doctrine [mathesis]. ‘Heidegger’ is teaching us that science is not separable from its teaching, from the abstract information or scientific knowledge transmitted to institutionalised learners for the purposes of training them for an active life. It is thus educational institutions that deem what it is that is already learnt-and-thus-learnable. They are the authorities that determine what can now be taught in order to accelerate the delivery of science-workers to the forefront of the Betrieb: “research is not ongoing activity because its work is accomplished in institutions, but rather institutions are necessary because science, intrinsically as a research, has the character of ongoing activity.” (AWP 124).

In this institutional context, the mathematical, as the prescribed teaching of a discipline or profession, is put into an abstract form in order to facilitate its efficient transfer. It is recast as a set of axioms, a collection of summaries of a field’s ‘learning’. The university is thus the model institution for collecting and administering these abstracts from the various departments of modern science’s mathesis universalis. In the set-up of this pedagogical archive, a discursive abstract can be seen to be in a certain sense how something learned passes into the learnt: it is the stamp that says, ‘this can now be taught, this is able to be transmitted as ‘part and parcel’ of all that has been sent to us in the present’.

The story that ‘Heidegger’ can be seen to be drawing on, indicates that as the mathematically abstracted, that is, that which has been turned into an instructive abstract, increasingly became the basis for efficient education, it began to delimit what can be (thought to exist) for anyone so educated. For graduates of this way of learning, the ‘alreadiness’ of what has been transmitted to them, takes on the quality of an ‘always’, its priorness becoming a priori. In other words, the ‘learnedness’ of what the institution is teaching gets forgotten or concealed, by for instance the on-going activity
that is thereby made possible; the fact that ‘all this’ is only institutional doctrine, utterly
dependent upon how it has been learned for what it is, is displaced. In this context, the
abstract, a heuristic device for educating, now appears to embody a certain necessity;
what is merely a summary now seems to have the authority of a logic.15 What merely has
been (learned) now appears essential, establishing an axiom that is prefigurative for all
that can be (learnt) subsequently. What has been constructed for instruction now
(pre)structures. The mathematical comes to refer not just to what can be taken-as-learnt-
because-learnable, but to what is learnable in general, that is, to what is. It becomes a
ground-plan (Grundris, AWP 118) that predetermines what is and is not. “Every event
must be seen so as to be fitted into this ground plan of nature. Only within the
perspective of this ground plan does an event in nature become visible as such an
event.” (AWP 119) The result is what we have now been taught by Kuhn to refer to as a
scientific paradigm, in which there is (ontologically) only what is learnable within the
disciplinary structure of the paradigm.16 We learn to see only through ((un)learnt)
scientific abstract(ion)s. More precisely, the process should perhaps be characterized as
one of anti-learning: we learn to unlearn that what we are looking at is only a learnt
version of the world. The learning behind this picture of the world is concealed,
allowing the abstract to seem actively real.

2 Instruction

The account just given perhaps too quickly assumes that what gets learnt as essential
through its priority comes to predetermine what can and will be (learnt to be). Both The
Question Concerning the Thing and “The Age of the World Picture” set out an explicit
scientific mechanism that actively converts the ground-plan into a projective framework
for everything subsequent to that (un)learning. That mechanism is the experiment. The
reality of the world arrives for us scientifically-indoctrinated moderns primarily via what
scientific experiments, applying the mathematical ground-plan, teach us.
Experimentation practically realises what science teaches in the abstract.

And precisely what gives experimentation this power is the process of abstraction,
that is, the ability to undermine and do away with experience. The natural thing as it
manifests on its own is utterly disenfranchised. It is worth recounting at this point
Heidegger’s example in The Question Concerning the Thing, namely a comparison between
how Aristotle and Newton treat motion. Aristotle’s ontology centres around the
essential relation between phýsis, kinésis and eidos. For Aristotle, because motion or change comprises the nature of nature, kinésis lies essentially in each physical thing, manifest in its evident appearance: “What an arche kinésis in this manner is, is phýsis, the primordial mode of emergence [Hervorgehens]... The body moves according to its nature... the capacity for motion, lies in the nature of the body itself... A later Scholastic proposition is in accord with this: Operari (agere) sequitor esse — the kind of motion follows from the kind of being.” (WT 83, 85)17 This is why for Aristotle, throwing a stone, which contains an inherent tendency to move downward, up in the air, is para phýsis, or against (its) nature, to the point of being a bia or violence (WT 83-84).

Newton’s science says the very opposite: motion is essentially meta-physical, something that happens to physical things from outside; further, it is something that can only be learnt in the abstract, the laws of motion being contravened by mere observation of what is (now only seeming to be) real. “Modern science, in contrast to the mere dialectical poetic conception of medieval Scholasticism and science, is supposed to be based upon experience. Instead, it has a law at its apex [that] speaks of a thing [i.e., the abstract notion of a body in pure space] that does not exist. It demands a fundamental representation of things which contradict the ordinary.” (WT 89)

After taking in or being taken in by the institution of science then, experience is no longer possible in any immediate sense, at least not in a way that can be the source for learning.18 Instead, one must ‘mathematicise’ what is to be experienced, installing a set-up, an abstract set of conditions under which the observed will represent itself, measurably, reproducibly, certainly. Something can only be said to exist, that is to say, one will have learnt that something definitely is, only by how it tests against the projections taken from the axiomatic learnt. The real is real only insofar as it appears to react to an abstract presentation of it. So the world becomes picture; which is to say that the world is unhinged from the experiential essence of what is, and can now be (pictured) in an unlimited number of ways.19

In this context, The Question Concerning the Thing provides a useful genealogy for understanding why ‘Heidegger’ privileges the speculative or imaginary aspects of our mathematical Age. ‘Heidegger’ hones in on Galileo’s phrase mente concipio: “This ‘to think in the mind’ (Sich-im-Geiste-denken) is that giving-oneself-a-cognition (Sich-selbst-eine-Kenntnis-geben) about a determination of things.” (WT 91) It is a matter of
Chapter Nine: **Overtaking Representations**

(p)representing things, and then making things be present according to those representations, (re)presenting them to oneself through experimentation.

However, by also focusing on the experiment, ‘Heidegger’ is teaching us the activist side to the process of abstraction, the techné that turns these theoretical propositions into all that is real for us. Thus, the Grundriss can now be understood not merely as flipping over from the past onto the future, but as a much more active evaluation (Würdigen) or taking-for (Dafürhalten) (WT 92). Hence the axiomatic anticipation (Vorausgriff) of the essence of things is now an active “experimenting urge [Drang]” (WT 93, FND 72).

This is made clear in Heidegger’s 1954 lecture “Science and Reflection”. Here Heidegger is attempting to learn what “science is the theory of the real” might mean. In a way that reveals that this lecture is an updating of “The Age of the World Picture”, Heidegger teaches us to hear this phrase as a subjective rather than an objective genitive, from science as one way of theorising the real, to science as the pervasive realisation of its theorising. As in the 1938 lecture, “Science and Reflection” identifies the activism (Wirkende) of science as that which works its abstractions into realities (Wirkliche). But in this later essay, science’s activity is more than research, it is an observing, Betrachtung (SR 166-9). More than a Trieb, this observing is Trachten, a striving, pursuing and entrapping. Betrachten is literally an abs-tracting, the intense action of exhibiting, of cutting up and thrusting forward. It is a “challenging forth [Herausforden]” (SR 167), which is Heidegger’s famous definition of the essence of technology, “a setting upon [Stellen]” (SR 167). In other words, so active is modern technology, that it now turns things into what they are not, turning anything into anything else by passing it through the (re)presentational realm of experimental abstraction where everything is stripped of its thingliness and put on stand-by as a pure means to... whatever.20

### 3 Instrumentalisation

There is a crucial aspect to all this however that must not be forgotten. Even though the process of mathematical learning is actively abstractive, indoctrinating and re-presenting us into an abstract realm, ‘Heidegger’ also indicates that there is a certain materiality at play. The process succeeds to the point that its abstractions become concrete for us representative modern subjects. The ((to-be)-taken-as-)learnt does not merely accumulate
in institutions as indexed, amassed results, but makes the leap from the quantitative to the qualitative, substantialising itself into materialised objects, or more accurately instruments. "With the complex of machinery that is necessary to physics in order to carry out the smashing of the atom lies hidden the whole of physics up to now." (AWP 124)

An institutional education will therefore instate the doctrine of the field into its students in a way that means that it becomes a part of their environment, realising itself concretely in all the instruments that make up their work-world. For the subjects of this institution, this means that the learnt is always already their operating ground, "built into whatever is." (124) This equipment however, whilst being thingy, that is to say, harbouring thingliness, merely gets taken up and used in a way that necessarily betrays its thingliness. This is thus a very instrumental or even consumerist education, in which we are simply taking products, as embodiments of learning, for granted. What has been learned is materialised by the institution into tools, into the technical objects which allow us to experiment, to set-up projects that will teach us about the world in relation to the already-learnt. But in learning how to use these tools, how to install these applications, the learnedness they embody in their materiality is displaced. These things are the infrastructure of modern science’s abstractions-made-real, but as with nearly all infrastructures, they are backgrounded as what merely is, not worthy of being noticed for either their physical or metaphysical (i.e., learned) qualities. Material things just become the support, substrate or resource for the on-going cycle of productivism.

As a result of noticing this two-way phenomenon — i.e., its active abstraction via concealed materiality — Heidegger’s model of the institution is able to be a very dynamic one. This teaching and researching body is no mere passive receptor or administrator of Betrachtungen, but a very organic organization that incorporates research findings into its design in a way that allows it to keep pressing on. Translating experimental results into abstracts for transmission is how the institution "richtet sich selbst...jeweils zu einem neuen Vorgehen ein" (GA5 77), continually adapts or (re)sets itself for new activities. The process is one of introjection and immediate reprojection. The learnt has therefore been secured — to use a militaristic metaphor that will come to characterise Heidegger’s teachings on technology — i.e., mobilised into a station supporting the continued advance.
This paraphrase of “The Age of the World Picture” has attempted to reveal how crucial this lecture is to what there is to learn with ‘Heidegger’ about our modern Technological epoch. By proceeding by way of mathematics, ‘Heidegger’ is able to point for the first time to the mechanism by which science abstracts itself from the finitude of things (though only via a concealed dependence), opening itself to unlimited possibilities. Since mathematics is a form of the institutional essence of learning, these teachings thus offer us a clear demonstration of the ontological power of such a learning. They together indicate that it is by learning that our modern alienated, i.e., pictured, age has come to be. We have learnt to live in a realized metaphysics, projecting ourselves into a projection, learning our way out of a world in which things are learned and into abstract space-time where the real must be experimentally constructed from deceptive appearances.

However, what is most important, is the fact that our modern age completes itself by concealing and moving against that ontological learning. The productivist constructivism of Technology is only possible by taking-things-as-learnt without having (re)learned them. Because it essentially learned to do away with or without essential learning, at least in its own mind, the errancy of the Technological epoch lies in the fact that it is not essentially learning to change: it is very strictly a virtual realm, an abstract space and time that manifests the eternal recurrence of the Same. This is why “if we undertake the effort to think through the inner state of today's natural sciences, non-biological as well as biological, if we also think through the relation of mechanics and technology to our existence, then it becomes clear that knowledge and questioning have here reached limits, that in fact, an original reference to things is missing, that it is only simulated by the progress of discoveries and technical successes.” (WT 41)

The problem thus lies, as with my contextualisation where abstracts abstracted the activity of learning, with the fact that the learnt comes to displace the essence of learning, the learning that sustains the learnt. Learning withdraws, leaving only the learnt (for which this name is consequently no longer suitable). It is as if we have learned learning to be only a restricted type of learning, that is, a poietic technique, and now merely take-as-already-learnt that method of (non)learning, and use it to actively construct our world in what is thus an essentially unlearned way. It is precisely because our world has become a timespace of non-learning that it is a realm without limits, in which things can be economically reconstructed by experimentation. The process of a
subject mentally positing an objective and then technically 'learning' it into reality, proving its existence, is only possible if one has concealed the learning that one is always already bringing to this situation. Only by denying the mathematical project that is at the essence of learning can it seem as though one has learnt anything, that is, discovered something new, or — given that the metaphor 'Heidegger' uses is of a blueprint or a sketch-plan — invented, patented and mass produced something new.24

The relativism that appears to exist in the institutional essence of learning, all that 'Heidegger' finds limitlessly unconditioned in Nietzscheanism, is what we moderns have learnt learning to be, but by unlearning learning as a praxis. Nihilism is the withdrawal of the learnedness of things. Only this explains how things today are not seen as mathematical constructs, are granted a certain objectivity, but can nonetheless be produced, en masse, by modern subjects. To learn the nature of this situation, means relearning learning, relearning the anthropocentrism through which things are (praxical, that is, essentially instituted).

**Apprehending**

In *The Question Concerning the Thing*, this (re)learning of anthropocentrism proceeded by way of Kant’s Between; in the “The Age of the World Picture” this learning of the difference of our proper anthropocentrism and the modern mis-taken re-presentation of that anthropocentrism happens much more explicitly.

The issue arises in relation to two key sayings: Parmenides’ “thinking and being are the same” and Protagorus’ “man is the measure of all things”. ‘Heidegger’ insists that the way these two sayings, especially the latter, were taken up by later Greeks is how we learnt to be modern: “Certainly through Plato’s thinking and through Aristotle’s questioning a decisive change takes place in the interpretation of what is and of men, but it is a change that always remains on the foundation of the Greek fundamental experience of what is. Precisely as a struggle against sophism and therefore in dependency upon it, this changed interpretation is so decisive that it proves to be the end of Greek thought, an end that at the same time indirectly prepares for the possibility of the modern age.” (AWP 143)

However, ‘Heidegger’ insists that since ours is the age of picturing, we must be careful not to project a mirror image of ourselves over what these sayings say. There is an anthropocentrism in these sayings, but it is in fact very distinct from the way we
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currently misunderstand anthropocentrism. Even so, ‘Heidegger’, as a resident of this epoch, albeit a perceptive one, cannot be teaching us about something that is no longer. If it is possible to differentiate Ancient Greek anthropocentrism from modern anthropocentrism it can only be because the former is still operational within our representationalism. I would suggest further that the lecture is attempting to teach us how the modern projection of world-views can only sustain itself as a real way of existence for us moderns because the power of Greek ‘anthropocentrism’ is still with us. The task then is not to learn some foreign way of being which is at a complete historical remove from us these days, which would be the case if Heidegger was advocating that we return to Ancient Greece, but rather to relearn that which is still operative even if concealed in how we learn to live in the modern sophistic world. These sayings contain our fate, but as the sufferers of that fate we continue to miss what is essential about this arche-anthropocentrism. The task is one of essential teaching, or undertaking a project of learning the learning already operational in how ‘what currently is’ came, and continues to come, to be.

With respect to the first saying, everything turns on Heidegger’s translation of *nœin* by *vernehmen*. This term can mean learn. It captures both the proactiveness of taking (*nehmen*) and the receptiveness of hearing (*vernehmen*), indicating a less clumsy way of capturing the ‘letting-encounter’ of the 1935 course. Translating it as ‘to apprehend’ at first privileges a passive perception or understanding, but retains a certain prior (‘pre’) forcefulness (‘hend’) toward (‘a’) what is being learned.²⁵

This second emphasis received some attention in Heidegger’s more thorough account of *vernehmen* in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (also 1935), again in translating Parmenides’ saying and, in line with Sheehan’s teachings, as a way of establishing the anthropocentrism that must accompany *phýsis*. “Vernehmen in this twofold sense means to let something come to one, not merely accepting it however, but taking a receptive attitude toward that which shows itself.” (IM 138) It is therefore a projection of essentiality and necessity such as the first chapter suggested was essential to learning (with) ‘Heidegger’. And in this context, it is reflexive, the sort of project in which one is seeking to learn (to change) the essential relation between oneself and what is being taught: “Vernehmen is not a faculty belonging to a man already defined; vernehmen is rather a process in which man first enters into history as a being, an essent, i.e., (in the literal sense) comes into being.” (IM 141) Vernehmen then is a *praxical* act of ontological
learning. As such, it makes a necessity of itself, even violently (polemos), with all the strangeness (deinon) of one with ontological power (Gewalt), or as this thesis is arguing, the (learning) power to ontologise: “That strangest of all beings is what he is because he harbours such a beginning in which everything all at once burst from superabundance into the overpowering and strove to master it.” (IM 155) Hence vernehmen is a type of vornehmen, a distinguished accomplishment, a resolution. “When troops prepare to receive [as in vernehmen] the enemy, it is in the hope of stopping him at the very least, of bringing him to stand.” (IM 138) In the end, and still in line with Sheehan’s teachings, vernehmen is a type of logos, that pronouncing that brings (meaning)fulness to what it gathers. “To be a [hu]man means to take gathering upon oneself, to undertake a gathering apprehension of the being of the essent, the sapient incorporation of appearing in the work, and so to administer [verwalten, govern] unconcealment, to preserve it against cloaking and concealment.” (IM 174)

The Introduction to Metaphysics is here reiterating the discussion of vernehmen that occurs at the close of the 1929-30 course Fundamental Concepts. As indicated before, Heidegger is using the (i.e., not just one amongst others) ability to vernehmen to distinguish humans from other impoverished beings. Because we are zoon echein logos, we have the power of logos to vernehmen, “the prior apprehending of something as something in forming a unity.” (FCM 314) Bringing Heraclitus, Aristotle and Kant together, Heidegger is able to identify the transcendent world-forming power that is essential to who and how we are. Through vernehmen, as a projection of completion – understood as a double genitive: i.e., vernehmen is the praxis of holding together – we have the ontological power, of instituting ‘as’s as ‘is’s and of relearning all ‘is’s as ‘as’s (FCM 334). This comes with a danger of errancy, but falsity is the condition of the possibility of truth, as finitudinal revealing. (FCM 335)\textsuperscript{26}

In “The Age of the World Picture”, vernehmen is only defined negatively against the oculocentric relation of vorstellen. The latter is a type of anthropocentric (non)learning that succeeds in installing an object that is fundamentally separate from a subject.\textsuperscript{27} The result is the concealment of the very relation that constitutes these two. Things become fixed in a picture and the anthropocentrism that took the picture, the relations between the beings reflexively co-presenced in such a setting forth, withdraws.\textsuperscript{28} This is why the age of the world picture ends up being not anthropocentric but the totalisation of the object(ified).\textsuperscript{29} In this state of total and permanent
“uniformity”, “the modern freedom of subjectivity vanishes totally in the objectivity commensurate with it.” (153)\textsuperscript{30}

Consequently, in this so-called anthropocentric age of perpetual change, that which is most denied the ability to change is \textit{anthropos}. The human is no longer available for relearning through the project of learning things; the Kantian aspects of thingly-Between, that is, the assertive apperception of the \textit{question} of human \textit{being} (though ‘Heidegger’ insists that Kant did not go far enough in projecting human \textit{being} as questionworthy), has been concealed. The human — precisely: \textit{the} human — has thus become a mathematical axiom, an abstract notion that can be taught, that is, taken and used, without being appropriat(iv)ely learned: “all observation of and teaching about the world change into a doctrine of man \textit{wandelt sich die Welt-Betrachtung und Welt-Lehre zu einer Lehre vom Menschen}”. (AWP 133, GA5 93) This unlearned anthropocentrism ‘Heidegger’ calls ‘anthropology’ or ‘humanism’: “Anthropology is that interpretation of man that already knows fundamentally what man is and hence can never ask who he may be. For with this question it would have to confess itself shaken and overcome. But how can this be expected of anthropology when the latter has expressly to achieve nothing less than the securing consequent upon the self-securness of the \textit{subjectum}?” (AWP 153) Hence, after noting at the conclusion of the previous Appendix that “man cannot, of himself, abandon this destining of his modern essence or abolish it by fiat”, ‘Heidegger’ notes that the opportunity for learning, for “think[ing] ahead”, comes from the teaching that “Being subject as humanity has not always been the sole possibility belonging to the essence of historical man... nor will it always be.” (AWP 153)

This project of relearning anthropocentrism, as a necessary project, is something that is emphasised in the relation to the second saying of Protagorus in Appendix 8. The key thing to learn, ‘Heidegger’ teaches us, is the way our age re-presents its own notion of ‘man’ and measure into the saying. We see ‘man’ as the eternally constant against which all is measured, “the \textit{subjectum} (\textit{hypo}keimenon), something lying before from out of itself which as such simultaneously lies at the foundation of its own fixed qualities and changing circumstances.” (AWP 148) The saying should instead be learned as saying that, as with \textit{vernehmen}, the \textit{being} of the learner is reflexively at stake in the \textit{praxis} of learning. In bringing to being things in particular \textit{ways}, we too are brought to being in \textit{particular} ways. Essential change in ‘what is’ only comes with essential change in us. ‘Heidegger’ presents this in terms of human being “belonging to what presences”.

\textsuperscript{30} (153)
This 'belonging' is not a non-anthropocentrism, but precisely what Sheehan identified as the physical finitude that comes with the anthropocentrism that can only presence through delimited forms. Belonging is testimony to the foregrounded anthropocentric relationality that presences all that is:

Through its tarrying [das Verweilen] in company with what presences, the belongingness of the I into the midst of what presences is. This belonging to what presences in the open fixes boundaries between that which presences and that which absents itself. From out of these boundaries man receives and keeps safe the measure of that which presences and that which absents. Through man’s being limited to that which, at any particular time, is unconcealed, there is given to him the measure that always confines a self to this or that. Man does not, from out of some detached I-ness, set forth the measure to which everything that is, in its Being, must accommodate itself. (AWP 145-6)

This saying therefore attests to an anthropocentrism, and to one which is still at work in this age. However, in a hyperbolically mimetological way, this age manages to free itself hubristically by misappropriating these restrictions on anthropocentrism. It teaches itself that what it has now learnt about its anthropos is what always will be, that it has now learnt all that there is to learn about itself, allowing itself to now turn to the infinite possibilities made available to such a mirroring demiurge. “It is one thing to preserve the horizon of unconcealment that is limited at any given time through the apprehending of what presences (man as metron). It is another to proceed into the unlimited sphere of possible objectification, through the reckoning up of the representable that is accessible to every man and binding for all.” (AWP 147) In this state of certified eternally present matter, Mäßigkeit or moderation is exchanged for Massigkeit or massiveness: measure is relaernt as measuring off and out, reckoning up, as the whole domain becomes one of “unconditional transgression (unbedingt Entschränkung).” (AWP 151)

The two Greek guide-statements are therefore being mistaken by our picturing age in the same way. In either case, the essential anthropocentrism of being is being used to fix being into a situation between fixed beings, rather than being allowed to be a dynamic process of relating. The relationally configured praxis of being anthropocentric is being manufactured into a non-relational poiésis. The result is that what the modern age sees as liberation is in fact constraint. Modern man only appears to be free; he is
only ‘virtually’ free in the modern imaginary sense: “Man as representing subject, however, ‘fantasizes’, i.e., he moves in imaginatio, in that his representing imagines, pictures forth, whatever is, as the objective into the world as picture.” (AWP 147) True anthropocentrism entails not a state of certain and thus unlimited freedom, but an uncertain and thus limited freedom that must be won, with at times all the polemos appropriate to a praxis by the most deinon. It is not just a matter of projecting ourselves as free, re-presenting ourselves as liberal individuals for instance; it is rather a matter of making a project of freedom, of learning, finitudinally, to accomplish ‘freeings’.

Modern learning by contrast is no longer (learned as) essential learning, no longer ontological, with the ability to change essences by an integrated process of fundamentally changing human being. This is why the lecture attempts to relearn our age’s anthropocentrism, deliberately taking us through the process by which our age’s distinctive process of age picturing was first projected. It is teaching us the limitations of this age we are now being fixed into, in order to teach us the learning that still lies as a possibility within it.

Hence, the lecture closes, advocating the sort of strong projects that befit vernnehmen, even demanding a type of Gestalten — despite all that had been said about the Gebild of Wissenschaft — and in terms that link directly to the conclusion of What is a Thing? “Know, i.e., carefully safeguard into its truth, shall man [Wissen, d.h. seine Wahrheit verwahren, wird der Mensch] that which is incalculable, only in creative questioning and shaping out of the power of genuine reflection [schöpferischen Fragen und Gestalten aus der Kraft echter Besinnung]. Reflection transports the man of the future into that ‘between’ [Zwischen] in which he belongs to Being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is.” (AWP 136)

**Building**

I hope that this extended discussion of these crucial lectures from the 1930s, in which the learning of the mathematical project is thematically addressed, has confirmed that it is possible, and necessary, to learn ‘Heidegger’ not as teaching us (a way) out of anthropocentrism, but anthropocentrically teaching us to relearn the fundamental anthropocentrism that is how all that is comes to presence. Being is a process of learning, a praxical project of finitudinally learning things. And this essential learning continues to sustain the economy of mathematical education that conceals it.
By way of summary, picking up on the final citation just given, and as a way of indicating how these analyses of the '30s continue on into the later 'Heidegger', allow me to briefly draw attention to what 'Heidegger' teaches about the notion of reflection, that which is often thought to refer in 'Heidegger' to a much more receptive form of meditative thinking. 'Heidegger' again advocates reflection as a response to the mathematical Gestell of theorising science at the end of “Science and Reflection.” There, the nature of what this term references is elaborated. 'Heidegger' explicitly differentiates 'reflection' (Besinnung) from intellectual cultivation (Bildung). This at first seems to suggest that 'Heidegger' is explicitly rejecting the proactive sense of learning that this thesis is advocating. However, a closer examination reveals exactly the point that has been made in the last few chapters, and with a useful extension. 'Heidegger' defines Bildung by noting that

*bilden* means first: to set up a pre-formed model [Vor-bild] and to set forth a pre-established rule [Vorschrift]. It means further to give form to inherent tendencies. Intellectual cultivation brings before man a model in the light of which he shapes and improves all that he does. Cultivating the intellect requires a guiding image rendered secure in advance, as well as a standing-ground fortified on all sides. The putting forward of a common ideal of culture and the rule of that ideal presuppose a situation and bearing of man that is not in question and that is secured in every direction. This presupposition, for its part, must be based on a belief in the invincible power of an immutable reason and its principles. (180)

This is thus a thoroughly anthropological, in the representative, economically humanist sense, account of Bildung.37 Here is a succinct account of what learning has become within our mathematical age. Reflection is therefore freed to refer to the more authentic essential learning, to “the place where, without having experienced it and without having seen penetratingly into it, we have long been sojourning.” (SR 180) Reflection is thus an appropriation of the anthropocentric learning that remains within anthropological sciences, the mathema within mathematics: “we begin to reflect by venturing onto the way already taken by that state of affairs [Sachverhalt] which shows itself to us in the essence of science.” (SR 181)

In a cryptic aside, 'Heidegger' observes, “How and by what means our historical sojourn adds to and enlarges the dwelling proper to it – about this reflection can decide nothing directly.” (SR 181) The immediate implication is that reflection is in no way a
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type of poïësis, with decisive aims and methods. However, Lovitt’s translation note adds something more significant: “like the verb bilden (to form), bauen (to build) has as one of its meanings to cultivate. In using bauen in these compounds (anbaut, ‘adds to’; ausbaut, ‘enlarges’) in the midst of his juxtaposing of intellectual cultivation and reflection, Heidegger undoubtedly intends that bauen point up that contrast.” (181) This suggests that ‘Heidegger’ is looking for a non-representational, non-technical way of accessing the form of learning that reflection accomplishes. He is precisely trying to save ‘cultivation’ as a praxis from consumption by the age of the world picture. And as we know, this reflective form of dwelling is only possible through building.38 The project of essential learning is thus still at the heart of Heidegger’s later work, through the sort of non-representational building that is more physical or gatheringly thingly than technical.
Endnotes for Chapter Nine

1 Heidegger discusses “the determination of man as subjectum and of beings as a whole as a ‘world picture’ [as having] sprung from the history of Being itself”, with a note to the 1938 lecture, “The Grounding of the Modern Picture of the World in Metaphysics” in the 1939 undelivered concluding treatise “Eternal Recurrence and Will to Power” (N3 179).

2 Pertinently for what is being argued here, Heidegger notes, at the beginning of his 1941 Basic Concepts course, under the title “The decay of knowing in the present age: The decision in favour of the useful over what we can do without” — in other words, in a section where Heidegger is insisting upon the fact that our greatest need lies in what we think we least need, such as abstract conceptions of being — that, “The store of knowledge that today’s youth brings with them corresponds neither to the greatness nor to the seriousness of the task. Knowing is equal to the task of the ‘age’ in only one respect; its decay and its task are equally enormous. But these deficiencies will not be eliminated by suddenly beginning to learn more and faster. We must first begin to learn ‘learning’ and to know standards of measure. Cultural dissolution will not be abated by the mere introduction of newer and more convenient ‘textbooks’.” (BC 11)

3 In this belief, we find one of the strongest and most pervasive notions of learning, of actual learning. It is something I am always fighting in this thesis, because it tends to refuse the possibility of even thinking about learning: learning is something done in the doing, sometimes natural, sometimes unconscious, sometimes physical or even metaphysical; but in all cases, something inaccessible except in and as the doing, rendering all attempts at abstracting something about it out of the performance of it, merely that — empty abstractions. Learning in this sense has been co-opted as a support for the activism that is currently prevalent: to get on with things, it is merely necessary to learn how to do so; to learn how to do so, it is merely necessary to get on with things; learning will and does just happen.

This is of course Heidegger’s constant enemy: being too busy to notice being. Here is one version of this that concerns the impoverished notion of learning today: “The mystery [Geheimnis] is lacking in our Dasein, and thereby the inner terror that every mystery carries with it and that gives Dasein its greatness remains absent. The absence of oppressiveness is what fundamentally oppresses and leaves us most profoundly empty, i.e., the fundamental emptiness that bores us. The absence of oppressiveness is only apparently hidden; it is rather attested by the very activities with which we busy ourselves in our contemporary restlessness. For in all the organizing and program-making and trial and error there is ultimately a universal smug contentment in not being endangered. This contentment in the ground of our Dasein, despite all the many needs, makes us believe that we no longer need to be strong in the ground of our essence. We concern ourselves only with learned competencies that can be instilled. The present is full of pedagogical
problems and questions. Strength and power however, can never be replaced by the accumulation of learned competencies, rather if anything is achieved by the latter it is the suffocation of all things.” (FCM 164)

4 Heidegger tells this story on a few occasions in reference to German romanticism. For instance, pertinently for this chapter, by way of excusing Nietzsche’s failure to complete a master work, Heidegger notes that: “One says that the magnitude of material, the variety and scope of individual areas in which will to power would have had to be demonstrated as the fundamental characteristic of beings, could not have been assimilated to a uniform degree by a single thinker. For ever since the middle of the last century, philosophy too cannot evade the specialization of work into one discipline... if it is to contribute more than empty, general phrases about what is already known... In Kant’s time or perhaps even in Hegel’s age uniform mastery in all areas of knowledge might have been just barely possible.” (N3 11) There are two important consequences to note. Firstly, even pragmatically, to think abstractly, that is to say, to think beings as a whole, “a thinker’s thinking must in advance make a leap into [my emphasis] the whole for each step it takes and collect itself in the centre of a circle.” (N3 12) Secondly, a learned person is no longer someone who knows everything, or even a lot, but rather someone who has merely learned how to learn about any field. This thesis is suggesting the former is necessary for the latter.

5 Amongst many references for this — e.g., every popular declaration that this is the ‘Information Age’ — I will quote Ulrich Beck’s version, itself a reference, since his work is pertinent to the conclusion of this thesis: “The growth of science has taken on extreme dimensions. ‘80% of all scientific and technological discoveries hitherto, and over 90% of the total scientific and technological information in the world, was produced in the 20th Century; of this, over 1/3 has emerged since The Second World War. The generation of scientists alive today comprises some 80% of all scientists who have ever lived’ (Kreibich [Die Wissenschaftsgesellschaft] 1986, p126). The latest research findings show particularly high growth figures, according to which scientific and technological information increases by 13% annually, thus doubling every 5.5 years.” Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk trans A. Geisz [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995], p188.

6 Learning as knowing, as coming-to-know is clearly another major notion of learning. We are all familiar with this version of learning through our compulsory institutional education. Learning is the acquisition of knowledge in the preparation for an active life; to know this or that abstract fact; to know how to do this or that abstract thing. Heidegger uses this notion of learning following the citation used as an epigraph to this second part of the thesis, concerning the relation between the word and the thing. Here, Heidegger brings together his various translations of the opening of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (conventionally given as “all men by nature desire to know”), and his way of teaching: “To learn means: to become knowing. In Latin, knowing is qui vidit, one who has seen, has caught sight of something, and who never again loses
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sight of what he has caught sight of. To learn means: to attain such seeing. To this belongs our reaching it; namely on the way, on a journey. To put oneself on a journey, to experience, means to learn." (143) The emphasis on the experience of learning (double genitive) indicates that Heidegger is here far from learning as knowledge accumulation, what he frequently deprecates as mere cleverness: see for instance The Introduction to Metaphysics; “intelligence, or mere cleverness in examining and calculating given things and the possibility of changing them and complementing them to make new things... a tool the manipulation of which can be taught and learned... subject to conscious manipulation and planning.” (IM 46-8) It should be noted that Heidegger is criticising the decline of ‘spirit’ beneath communism, positivism, and urbanism, in a trope that many have seen as veiled anti-Semitism: see Lacoue-Labarthe Heidegger, Art and Politics [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990], e.g., 25, and Derrida Of Spirit [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989], e.g., 45.

7 There is a whole genre of (anti)educational writing about the inadequacy of schooling’s abstractiveness as a preparation for living, from Dewey to Illich. For an example, I quote from Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner’s Teaching as a Subversive Activity [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969], cited in the introduction to this thesis: “There is no such thing as ‘subject matter’ in the abstract... Knowledge, as Kelly [author of Education for What is Real] reminds us, is what we know after we have learned.” (p 97) For all their differences, all these authors end up arguing for what is these days called constructivism, that is pupil-centred learning as a response to the abstraction of the transmission or teacher-centred model of education.

8 Two things need to be pointed out about this list. The first is to reiterate that this essay is steeped in the ‘Nietzsche’ with which ‘Heidegger’ was engaging at the time. Thus each of these concepts is Nietzschean. Working backwards, Heidegger asserts that Nietzsche’s key phrase is ‘God is dead’; Heidegger from early on endorsed Nietzsche’s differentiation of bad culture (stultifying) and good culture (life enhancing); Nietzsche’s biologism is a direct result of his attempt to overcome the end of art symptomised by its mirement in subjective feelings; for Heidegger, Nietzsche’s failure to access the essence of nihilism is evidenced by his non-differentiability from machination. Only science, as Heidegger understands it, that is as methodological, is not an explicit or extended theme in Nietzsche. However, I would suggest that this essay can be read as an attempt to provide a Nietzschean account of science, insofar as the power of science’s method lies in the way it occasions a project of essential learning.

This relates to the second point to be made about this list. Each of these notions speaks about a withdrawal of learning. The fleeing of the gods, and the resulting contraction of religious faith to the subjective experience of a mythology, speaks exactly to our lack of ability to learn ontological change. What culture lacks is precisely the learning power of cultivation or Bildung. Lovitt in a translator’s note to ‘The Age of the World Picture” indicates that Heidegger describes
aesthetics in terms of Erlebnis rather than Erfahrung, the latter meaning a learning experience (116f). What follows is therefore an attempt to describe the phenomenon of science in terms of the current withdrawal of learning.

9 *Trieb*, it must be remembered, is Heidegger’s key to understanding animality: “The behaviour of the animal is... a driven performing (Trieben).” (FCM 237) It is this drive that makes the animal captivated within the encircling struggle (Ringen, FCM 255) of eliminative, that is nihilating, “rejecting things from itself” (FCM 252), behaviour. The implication is that science does not learn about animals and so enrich our world, but teaches us to be animals and so impoverish our world.

10 ‘Heidegger’ always values essential knowing as the highest form of action. As mentioned previously, Taminiaux following Arendt, sees this promotion of *theoria* as betrayal of the plurality and provisionality that is proper to *praxis*. It is important however, especially in Heidegger, never to mistake the word for the thing: ‘Heidegger’ may laud *theoria* in the Rectoral Address “as the highest mode of human ἐνεργεία, of human ‘being-at-work’... theory was to be understood as the highest realisation of genuine practice,” (SGU 7) but this does not mean that what he is praising is the Platonic or even Aristotelian form of *theoria* or theory; we must learn why Heidegger would insist that his understanding of *theoria* is an active practice. In this regard, see W.McNeill’s *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the End of Theory* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999]. What is at issue here in this debate is the type of action that learning is. If learning is neither a naïve activity in the activist sense (experiential learning), nor an abstract non-act (intellectual learning), then what is it? The clue I am pursuing here and will take up in Chapter Eleven is that abstraction is itself an action.

11 See s69b of *Being and Time* trans. J.Macquarie & E.Robinson [Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1962]. This section is demonstrating that scientific *theoria* is not without action, but a type of *praxis*, a making present, envisaging or bringing closer, always involving activities with physical and mental instruments. In this regard Heidegger is a sociologist of laboratory science in Bruno Latour’s sense. Heidegger is pointing out that there is a danger in forgetting this activism and taking the projections that are materialised in these instruments as transparently identical with what is (thus considered to be merely) present-at-hand, that is, neutral matter. An always prior act of projecting that is “the only way in which entities can be discovered” is mis-taken as an *a priori*. We will return to all this, since this is in fact at the core of what is being explained in this chapter. For now, it is enough to register that for Heidegger of the Marburg period, it is not having an *activist enough* version of science that is the problem.

12 The clumsy grammar used here and throughout this thesis is being exploited to assist the crucial distinction that is being made in the following argument. The past participle of learn can be either (even for Fowler!) ‘learned’ or ‘learnt’. Since the latter is used as the substantive (‘the
learnt) I am using 'learnt' as a past participle when referring to the mathematical taking-as-learnt-without-having-actually-learned-(for-onceself) that the institution of science teaches. This means that 'learned' is being used in reference to the authentic process of learning (as it does in the portmanteau-phrase just given to explain institutional science's mathematicism). I have left this explanation till now in the hope that it has staged precisely the sort of reappropriation of learning that is being discussed; in other words, perhaps it was something that was being taken-as-learnt but now can be relearned as a demonstration of the project of learning.

13 It should be noted that I, with Heidegger I believe, am not merely advocating a type of constructivist self-directed of learning in opposition to the nonlearning that happens when taught. This would be the recurrence of the nihilist activism that characterises our subjectivist age. As has been emphasised throughout this thesis, there is something essentially teacherly about the project of learning, something that in the end requires the sort of individuated decisionism that all formal indications need to be fulfilled, but that in the beginning, in order to begin, require the presence (or the presencing) of a teacher, an other who institutes the possibility of the necessity of the learning project. To put it another way, Heidegger is not simply dismissing the mathematical but teaching us (and thus not hypocritically) to retrieve the active power within learning through abstraction.


15 I am making a reference here to Walter Ong’s historical de(con)struction of Cartesian logic by unconcealing its tutelage from Ramus’ method of outlining in the new print medium. The argument that Descartes’ geometrically mathematical project is derived from this initially purely pedagogical form of presentation has also been made by Gregory Ulmer (see Teletheory [New York: Routledge, 1989]) and Michael Heim (see Electric Language [New Haven: Yale University, 1987]).

16 This is Heidegger’s most common point about science. For instance, Being & Time opens by noting the ontologically demarcating (or paradigm changing) philosophy that is at the origin of each of the sciences: “Fundamental concepts are determinations in which the area of knowledge underlying all the thematic objects of a science attain an understanding that precedes and guides all positive investigation... Such laying of foundations is productive logic in the sense that it leaps ahead, so to speak, into a particular realm of being, discloses it for the first time in its constitutive being, and makes the acquired structures available to the positive sciences as lucid directives for inquiry.” (BT 8-9) After such a “real ‘movement’”, all that remains is the “collecting of results and storing them in ‘handbooks’” (BT 7) Significantly, when Heidegger treats these foundational acts thematically in the body of Being & Time, calling them thematisations, i.e., the process by which things are stripped of their worldly relational intentionalities and so allowed to
be encountered as objects, his example is "the mathematical project of nature. This project discovers in advance something constantly objectively present (matter) and opens the horizon for the guiding perspective on its quantitatively definable constitutive moments. Only 'in the light of' a nature thus projected can something like a 'fact' be found and be taken in as a point of departure for an experiment defined and regulated in terms of this project." (BT 331) That this is only an example, rather than the whole topic such as it will be in What is a Thing?, suggests that Heidegger has not yet learned its totalizing exemplarity. Hence the performativity of mathematics etymologically meaning learning, is not exploited.

17 It is worth noting that Heidegger is reading Aristotle's teaching about phýsis as centring around the dual meaning of arche: "Basis (Grund) is arche and has the double meaning: that from which something emerges, and that which governs over what emerges in this way." (83) I will come back to this definition of arche, which I believe can be a characterisation of the project that sustains all learning, but for now, I want to point out that in the ellipses of the citation just given in the main text, Heidegger is exploiting this ambiguity in arche to indicate that how something can move depends upon what it is, which manifests as where it is, its place in the scheme of things. "Each body has its place according to its kind, and it strives toward that place... When a body moves in its place, this motion accords with nature, kata phýsis... How a body moves depends upon its species and the place to which it belongs. The where determines the how of its being, for being is called presence [Anwesenheit]." (83-84) I believe that this essentialism in Heidegger (which could be linked to more Nietzschean notions of rank and nobility) concerns the fact that learning is always relearning, taking up and even taking on where and how one currently is, or has learned to be.

18 This notion of the expropriation of the senses by scientific learning has recently been taken up in the work of Ulrich Beck as it examines our current risk-society, a phenomenon that arises when the world must become the laboratory for the sorts of scientific developments which can no longer be tested in simulated environments, such as nuclear fission and genetic engineering. Beck's argument is that ecological hazards are the sort of phenomena which cannot merely be experienced, but depend for their existence upon expert technical knowledges to become manifest. See especially Ecological Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of the Risk Society [New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995]. See also his comments concerning experimental tests concerning risks: "Nature does not speak to us even in experiments; rather, scientific questions are (more or less) answered... If the experiment says 'no' — thus apparently expressing nature's veto — then the interpretation and consequences of this 'reply' still remain to be decided entirely by the researcher." (Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk [Oxford: Polity, 1991], 40) Beck then discusses science's recourse to 'a mathematical morality' to calculate risks. Beck's way of understanding our current world age needs to be brought together with Hans Jonas’ work on the
morality that must accompany technology’s circumvention of limits. If science has appropriated
the anthropocentric constructivism of learning and thereby managed to free itself of finitude of
earthly things, then we are in a situation of reversed Kantianism: no longer is ‘what can be’
limited by ‘what must be’; now, what can be done must be done, to the point that not only is the
rational made real, but so too is the irrational, something that Jonas teaches us we must learn to
fear rather than celebrate. See The Imperative of Responsibility: Searching for an Ethics for the
Technological Age [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984]. This argument forms the
background for what follows and will be foregrounded in the Conclusion. For a Nietzschean take
on the current reality-test-addiction of our era, see A.Ronell “The Test Drive” in A.Haverkamp

19 As indicated in the introduction to this thesis, constructivism has saved science
education from accusations about being irrelevantly abstract by making use of computers to
simulate the learning experience of scientific experimentation. In terms of the learning project
that is Heidegger’s Seinsgeschick, it is essential to see this as no fortuitous convergence: computers
are the product of the mathematical project of abstract science; it is thus a truism that they would
be perfectly suited to inducting children into the scientific world-view.

20 What is a Thing? offers a remarkably early recognition (perhaps even a premonition) of
what Heidegger later characterises as the nuclear or cybernetic nature of modern technology and
its ability to evaporate the distinctive essence of anything into a neutral source of energy or
information. Speaking of Newton’s recourse to an abstract body in a purely empty space-time
continuum, Heidegger notes, “There is a prior grasping together in this mente concipere of what
should be uniformly determinative of each body as such, i.e., for being bodily. All bodies are
alike. No motion is special. Every place is like every other, each moment like any other. Every
force becomes determinable only by the change of motion which it causes... All determinations
of bodies have one basic blueprint [Grundriss] according to which the natural process is nothing
but the space-time determination of the motion of points of mass. This fundamental design of
nature at the same time circumscribes its realm as everywhere uniform.” (91) All that remains
essential about matter is its measurable quantity – hence the significance of mathematics.
Heidegger then anticipates Lyotard on postmodern performativity by about 50 years:
“Concerning the basic law of motion, the law of inertia, the question arises whether this law is
not to be subordinated under a more general one, i.e., the law of the conservation of energy,
which is now determined in accordance with its expenditure and consumption, as work – a name for
new basic representations which now enter into the study of nature and betray a notable accord
with economics, with the ‘calculation of success’.” (94)

21 This reification of learning into the tools that structure our world from then on has been
well elaborated by Don Ihde’s philosophy of the activities of scientific technology. Ihde calls
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Science’s growing dependence on its instruments for access to its objects of inquiry ‘instrumental realism’. Since these instruments embody a certain amount of learning that is thus taken-for-granted, the realism of the object-to-be-learnt-about-or-from is literally refracted through the abstractions that make it possible. Every scientific instrument is a type of projector, constructed out of the learnt, scaffolding its subject to the point that it not only brings it before us, or even an aspect of it, but actively constitutes how it is and thus what it is. This is why science’s history is the process of developing ever more abstract content, that is, dealing with entities which are less and less experiencable without increasingly complex instrumentation and significantly, increasingly complicated hermeneutics of the data output from these instruments. One can no longer learn science by experience; one must now learn science in the abstract in order to learn to experience scientific things via its instruments. In this sense, not only is the abstract physicalised into instruments, but abstractions themselves become instruments, with theoretical concepts able to function as tools that allow one to experience (if only ‘as if’) what they represent. See for example, *Instrumental Realism* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991].

It should be noted that Ihde is ambiguous about the extent to which science’s ‘instrumentalism’ is a realism or radical constructivism. At times he appears to endorse a type of Kantianism, in which the real is out there, but is only knowable through instruments or more accurately, through a careful interpretation of what can be experienced in those instruments. At others he advocates a type of social constructivism, where the process of learning how to use instruments is a type of praxis in which one is apprenticed to the traditions of the profession. He thus tends to disagree with Heidegger’s assessment of techno-science as the process of mathematically skipping over things-as-manifestations-of-the-learnt: for Ihde, science is still open to the experience of things. See his *Expanding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science* [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999].

What is at stake here is the mimetology that stamps (geprägt, gestellt) becoming into being (or vice versa), that is to say, that which despite being pressed into form and set in place, does so in a manner that gives its object or subject an enhanced dynamism and flexibility. Hence science’s project uses the securing technique of methodology because such a “procedure must be free to view the changeableness in whatever it encounters. Only within the horizon of the incessant-otherwise of change does the plenitude of particularity — of facts — show itself. But the facts must become objective (gegenständlich). Hence the procedure must represent the changeable in its changing, must bring it to a stand and let the motion be a motion nevertheless.” (AWP 120) Similarly, “the decisive development of the modern character of science as on-going activity also forms men of a different stamp. The scholar disappears. He is succeeded by the research man who is engaged in research projects. These, rather than the cultivating of erudition, lend his work its atmosphere of incisiveness. The research man no longer needs a library at home. Moreover,
he is constantly on the move [ständig unterwegs].” (AWP 125, GA 5:85) The same characterisation of the subject and object of science is found of the institution of science: “The excellence demanded of this system is not some contrived and rigid unity of the relationships among objects-spheres, having to do with content, but is rather the greatest possible free, though regulated, flexibility in the shifting about and introducing of research apropos of the leading tasks at any given time.” (AWP 126) This is finally, the whole point of ‘getting into the picture’, a simultaneous fixing in place and getting equipped for a change (AWP 129). I will come back to this pivotal Jungian-Nietzscheanism in the next chapter.

23 These militaristic metaphors have been analysed by S. Weber in reference to the Entbergen in “The Question Concerning Technology” in two essays, “Upsetting the Set Up: Remarks on Heidegger’s ‘Questing After Technics’” MLN v104 n5 (1989) and “The Vaulted Eye: Remarks on Knowledge and Professionalism” in Yale French Studies: Reading the Archive – On Texts and Institutions n77 (1990).

24 I am referring to Heidegger’s argument that the Age of the World Picture is not just a new age but the age of the new, of newness. Our concern for newness belies that all we are doing is imag(in)ing new things. For Heidegger, there is never anything ‘new’. What might be really new would be relearning what essential learning we are acting-out in our drive for the new. This is what I take Heidegger to mean by the other beginning, for instance in Basic Concepts.

25 Sam Weber has exploited this ambiguity in a pertinent essay on the fundamental iterability that destines all cognition (Erkennen) to be recognition (Wiedererkennen) from the very start: in other words, all thinking is essentially a relearning, a process that requires a projective grasping of what is always on the move, a grasping that must therefore be performatively finitudinal before what it grasps. See “It” in Glyph v4 [Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1978], especially 16-17, and also the discussion of Annahme in “The Debts of Deconstruction” in Institution and Interpretation [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987], 124-7.

26 See “On the Essence of Truth”, section 7, “Un-truth as Errancy”, and M. Haar’s analysis of this in relation to technology, culminating in the aphorism that “All necessity is errant and all errancy is necessary” (53) in “The End of Distress: The End of Technology” (Research in Phenomenology, v13 (1983). See also the relation of alētheia and pseudos as lēthe as explained in Parmenides.

27 Concerning Vorstellen see S. Weber “Upsetting the Set Up” on the taking-for-granted that institutionalizes, “Art, Aura and Media in the Work of Walter Benjamin” which begins with an analysis of “The Age of the World Picture” and focuses on Benjamin’s term Aufnehmenden, and “Television: Set and Screen”, all now in Mass Mediauras [Sydney: Power Institute, 1996].

28 For example, Ulrich Beck notes, in the context of current environmentalism’s: “The concept of nature is a self-negating human invention... Recourse to the concept of nature gives
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the appearance of an outer limit, prescribed from within... The concept of nature achieves a kind of self-expropriation in which the image becomes independent of the subject that it mirrors and provides — in reflecting it back — the mirage of a reality for itself, apparently uninvolved in all the mirroring." (Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, 38) Beck’s point is made more systemically though in the same context by N.Luhmann’s Ecological Communication [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989].

27 In “On the Essence and Concept of \[\varepsilon[\ThetaZ\]", Heidegger notes that if ‘being healthy’ was the result of a poiesis, then “life as such [has] become a ‘technically’ producible artifact. However, at that very moment there would also no longer be such a thing as health, any more than there would be birth and death. Sometimes it seems as if modern humanity is rushing headlong toward this goal of producing itself technologically. If humanity achieves this, it will have exploded itself, i.e., its essence qua subjectivity, into thin air, into a region where the absolutely meaningless is valued as the one and only ‘meaning’ and where preserving this value appears as the human ‘domination’ of the globe. ‘Subjectivity’ is not overcome in this way but merely ‘tranquilized’ in the ‘eternal progress’ of a Chinese-like ‘constancy’.” (197)

30 Heidegger qualifies this point in a very important way in “Science and Reflection”. After noting that science, as a mathematicising theory, causes the disappearance of even “the object” “into the constancy of the standing-reserve”, Heidegger adds, with reference to “The Question Concerning Technology”, “The subject-object relation thus reaches, for the first time, its pure ‘relational’ i.e., ordering, character in which both the subject and the object are sucked up as standing-reserves. That does not mean that the subject-object relation vanishes, but rather the opposite: it now attains to its most extreme dominance, which is predetermined from out of Enframing. It becomes a standing-reserve to be commanded and set in order.” (SR 173) There is a therefore a fundamental difference between the (hyper-)relationality that is Gestell and the finitudinal relationality that is learning-being.

31 This notion of tarrying, presencing without making (permanently) present, is an axial component of Sheehan’s account of Heidegger’s advocation of anthropocentrism. Sheehan argues that (be)ständige Anwesung(heit) in ‘Heidegger’ should not be translated as stable (or constant) presentness. Heidegger’s term, according to Sheehan in “Nihilism, Facticity and Economisation of Lethé” in Heidegger: A Centennial Appraisal, is itself a translation of the Greek term aei, as this term is used specifically in the context of Aristotle’s deconstructive appropriation of Antiphonian materialism. Aei (like ‘ever’) can mean ‘eternal’, but it also means ‘currently’ (as in ‘did you ever see so-and-so?’ — note the perfect aspect). (44) Sheehan quotes Heidegger from “On the Essence and Concept of \[\varepsilon[\ThetaZ\]”: “What one has in mind with the word aei is Verweilen (‘staying around for a while’), specifically in the sense of presencing.” (OEC 206) As Sheehan paraphrases, “‘stability’ and ‘constancy’... slide from ‘eternity’ to ‘autonomy’, only to end up as
the 'apriority' of accessibility, here discussed under the temporal guise of the 'always-already-ness' of presence." ("Nihilism" 45) In this way, Heidegger is changing our understanding of phýsis from matter, through the self-made, to a facticity of 'always already appropriated by humans'. Phýsis is thus that which attests to its anthropocentricity in finite ways, that which manifests itself as learned.

32 Lacoue-Labarthe characterises the 'hyperbologic' as one that says 'the more... the less' or vice versa, as in 'the less like the model, the more like the model: see "Hölderlin and the Greeks" in Typography. In this case, I am suggesting that the modern age becomes more inauthentically anthropocentric (poietically constructing (a picture of) all that is) and thereby less authentically and knowingly anthropocentric (in the praxical sense).

33 Heidegger insists upon authentic freedom only ever coming through delimitation in a number of places. For a pertinent example, see the following from Fundamental Concepts: “Yet to question concerning this fundamental attunement does not mean to further justify and continue the contemporary human traits of man, but to liberate the humanity in man, to liberate the humanity of man, to let the Dasein in him become essential. This liberation of the Dasein in man does not mean placing him in some arbitrary position, but loading Dasein upon man as his ownmost burden. Only those who can truly give themselves a burden are free.” (FCM 166) See also “On the Essence of Truth”, where freedom is defined ontologically with reference to 'letting-be' which is not contra this thesis, but a direct affirmation of its thesis:

“Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be... To let be is to engage oneself with beings.” (ET 144) Freedom is thus comportment: the project of learning essentials. Concerning Heidegger's notion of need for freedom to be (learnt through restraint, see Fred Dallmayr's “Ontology of Freedom: Heidegger and Political Philosophy” Political Theory v12 n2 (1984) and L.Thiele Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995].

34 “Yet to question concerning this fundamental attunement does not mean to further justify and continue the contemporary human traits of man, but to liberate the humanity in man, to liberate the humanity of man, i.e., the essence of man, to let the Dasein in him become essential. This liberation of the Dasein in man does not mean placing him in some arbitrary position, but loading Dasein upon man as his ownmost burden.” (FCM 166)

35 R.Mugerauer runs a similar argument to mine here in relation to Heidegger's indication that "originary saying has the character of Bilden" in the 1960 essay "Sprache und Heimat": If we understand this word representationally, it would mean that 'saying' is a picturing or imaging... In contrast, understood according to Heidegger, Saying as Bilden belongs to Gebild. Originally thought, Gebild means pilon, in the Old High German, or 'push' and 'impulse'; that is, a 'first-letting-come-forth (her-vor-bringen)... To ask for the Gebild of a saying then is to ask how the saying goes in, or is unfolded, which suggests rounded out. (In German, one says Her ist gebildet,
meaning, ‘he is well rounded, brilliantly educated and cultured’.” (Heidegger’s Thinking and Language [Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1988], 127) Mugerauer uses figura in place of a translation and uses this term to explain Heidegger’s teaching by performative gathering. For a similar reappropriation of poetic imaging, see the work of K. Maly, for example, “Imaging, Hinting, Saying” in W. Biemel & F. Hermann eds Kunst und Technik [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989], and “Reading and Thinking: Heidegger and the hinting Greeks” in J. Sallis ed., Reading Heidegger [Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1993].

In choosing to use the term schöpferischen for creative, Heidegger could also be confronting the Christianity that he sees as the cause of modern science’s turn away from the self-revealing to certainty, since Schöpfer is the common title for God, the creator. The sort of Gestalten that is being called for is therefore of the sort Nietzsche had in mind with his slogan, "Well-nigh two thousand years and not a single new god", which Heidegger puts as the epigraph to the first Nietzsche course.

Heidegger often criticises Bildung in the same terms. In Basic Questions, Heidegger is explaining how the techné that proceeds against physis in a way that nonetheless completes, that is unconceals, physis, turns toward the danger inherent in such a relation, “the possibility of arbitrariness, of an unbridled positing of goals and thereby the possibility of escape out of the primordial need.” (BQ 155) At this crucial juncture, Heidegger calls up paideia: “If this [possibility] happens, then in place of the basic disposition of wonder, the avidity for learning and calculation enters in. Philosophy becomes one institution amongst others, it becomes subjected to a goal which is all the more insidious the higher it is — e.g., Plato’s paideia, a word we badly translate as ‘education’ [Bildung].” (BQ 155-6) The argument here is exactly as it has been put forward in this chapter: it is when education becomes governed by a preset model of human being, that that human being is paradoxically abandoned to the pluralism of unlearning. I will take this up in the next chapter.

See “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”. As was mentioned at the end of Chapter Seven, Aristotle’s key example for poiesis is building. Heidegger is therefore, just as I am with learning, reappropriating Aristotle’s example for the opposing notion of praxis: “Usually we take production to be an activity whose performance has a result, the finished structure, as its consequence”, but building rather has the perfect aspect of a praxis — “whenever it is [a letting-dwell], building already has responded to the summons of the fourfold.” (BDT 159) Thus Heidegger’s hut is “a dwelling that has been how it was able to build” (BDT 160); in other words, it reflexively manifests its learning and learnability.
Chapter Ten
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In order that man in his essence may become attentive to the essence of technology and in order that there may be founded an essential relationship between technology and man in respect to their essence, modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the space proper to his essence. That essential space of man’s essential being receives the dimension that unites it to something beyond itself solely from out the conjoining relation (Verhältnis) that is the way in which the safekeeping of Being itself is given to belong to the essence of man as the one who is needed and used by Being. Unless man first establishes himself beforehand in the space proper to his essence and there takes up his dwelling, he will not be capable of anything essential within the destining now holding sway.

Heidegger “The Turning”

Having now accessed the way Heidegger teaches us the anthropocentricity of all (physical) things, and having learned how this anthropocentricity is mobilised and then concealed by our modern picturing age to set up the poietical project of representational economies, we are now perhaps ready to return to the Nietzsche teachings. In this chapter, I am thus seeking to apply what has been discerned in the last few chapters to see if we can now understand the change in teaching strategy across the Nietzsche volumes as a return to the institutional essence of learning, rather than as a turn against it. In other words, how can Heidegger’s teachings of ‘Nietzsche’ be learned not as shifting from an endorsement of Nietzsche’s strong project of learning to a strong project of rejecting the form of learning with which ‘Nietzsche’ was working, but as performing the same move of re-appropriating our proper anthropocentrism as can be found within The Question Concerning the Thing and “The Age of the World Picture”?

Re-pre-sentation

To begin, allow me to recall two key things ‘Heidegger’ teaches us about Nietzsche’s key teaching, the Eternal Return, that which we learn only by becoming in turn its teachers, willing it to power. Firstly, as was mentioned at the outset with reference to the will to power in general, all the teachers involved here are at stake in their teaching: “In belief
there lies not only a relation to what is believed but above all to the believer himself. Taking to be true is holding firm in the true, hence holding in a dual sense: having a hold on something and preserving the stance one has." (N2 124) This evangelising is then precisely an Arendtian action, in which a ‘who’ manifests as the sustaining coherency of the action.

The finitude of this sober1° empowering derives primarily from the fact that all willing foregrounds the active role of the willer in the presencing of what is: "It is proper to the essence of willing that what is willed and the one who wills be brought into the willing... Willing is resoluteness toward oneself, but as the one who wills what is possible in the willing as the willed. In each case will itself furnishes thoroughgoing determinateness to its willing." (N1 40-1)

There is no subject(um) to this willing, who chooses to stand now here, now there. Hence Heidegger notes Nietzsche’s qualification: "‘You self-reliant ones — you must learn how to stand on your own, else you’ll be a pushover [umfallen — “a colloquialism for changing one’s mind at every whim” (translator’s note)]’ Whenever a stance is nothing more than a mere consequence of the hold attributed to it, whenever the hold undergirds it, it is no real stance at all... the stance that relies on some particular hold collapses as soon as the support is withdrawn.” (N2 125) This is why this praxical teaching is a creating, an instituting, that is a public action: "Creation as communication — it is important to listen here in the right way. Every creating is a sharing with others. This implies that creation in itself grounds new possibilities of Being — erects them, or as Hölderlin says, founds them [stiftet]." (N2 126, NI 389)2

Secondly, but for the same reason, that is, because its nature is essentially that of a praxis, this re-enacted pre-figuring is in no way economic. That is to say, this teaching is entelechial; it contains its arche and telos in its own being-at-work. “[Such] genuine creation does not need to ask, does not even possess the inner possibility of inquiring, whether and how it might best be practicable and serviceable. Only where every trace of creative force and creative standards are lacking; only where mere mimetic machinery grinds into action [der bloße Betrieb des Nachmachens sich verdängt — my emphasis]; only when nothing can be shared in some creative process, inasmuch as the very creativity is missing; only there do we find some purpose proclaimed and acclaimed — retrospectively,

1° Endnotes for Chapter Ten commence on page 291.
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if need be, but more auspiciously by way of anticipation — which provides the rationale for a whole line of products.” (N2 126-7, NI 389) Exactly what the institutional essence of learning cannot and must not be is a process of production, an abstracted economy of action. Authentic teaching is in-formation, not in the sense of being incomplete before the projected idea(l) of its to-be-completed form, but in the sense of having its being in the process of formation, formatively forming what is being learned. This entelechial aspect in no way means “l’art pour l’art” (N2 127) which would still be a telically economic way of thinking (like a doctor using his techné on himself or thinking of phýsis as compromising self-reproducing machines), one that still privileges the product, divorced from the action of producing: “The outcome of all this is simply the fact that the creation itself and what is created are always extremely difficult to recognize and unravel. And it is good that is so. For it is their best protection, the guarantee that they will be preserved as something that can never be lost.” (N2 127)

However, when ‘Heidegger’ turns against Nietzsche’s teaching, this thorough-going praxical aspect to the will to power, as exemplified in the formal indication of the Eternal Return, is displaced by teaching ‘Nietzsche’ wholly as a poiésis. Heidegger’s accusation turns around the fact that with Nietzsche’s project for total revaluation, “value translates the essentiality of essence into an object of calculation.” (N3 176) The praxical nature of what we learn to be essential becomes something to take as essentially learnt: “To esteem something, to hold it worthwhile, also means to be directed toward it. Such direction toward has already assumed an ‘aim’. Thus the essence of value has an inner relation to the essence of aim.” (N4 16) When meaning has becomes a mere means, to be taken up and used, when it has lost its projective meaningfulness, its ability to be learned, then machination rules: things are only to the extent of their malleability; they have no constancy, no delimited tarrying inertia; all that is permanent is change, becoming has been stamped as being.

Justice then represents the definitive perversion of commanding poetizing into instrumental construction, erecting the independent and thereby annihilating the relations of dependence that sustain all presencings (N3 145). The entelechial dynamis that the notion of will to power relearns, gets retaught merely as “the ordered, planning, calculating introduction of force”, “energies [as] effective points”, “work [as] an effect... to change something at hand into something else.” (N3 146) In a chiasmatic way, this materialistically quantitative productivism loses all the finitude that comes
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from the belonging-learning-between of essential anthropocentrism. In this unbethinged condition(lessness) “the essence of power was determined as the panoramic gaze into the comprehensive vista, as overpowering.” (N3 152)

This is the first of five interrelated charges projected onto ‘Nietzsche’ by ‘Heidegger’ for the purposes, I am arguing, of relearning our essential anthropocentrism. The second is the most crucial and least noticed. It is what gets to the crux of what sort of ‘Nietzsche’ it is that is being indicted. According to ‘Heidegger’, Nietzsche’s error occurs when he decides at a particular point, that he has learnt what the essence of nihilism entails. As the treatise “Nihilism and the History of Being” opens, “When Nietzsche clings to his acknowledgment of will to power in the sense of the ‘ultimate fact’ as his fundamental philosophical insight, he acquiesces in the description of Being as one of those beings that are distinguished according to the genus ‘fact’”. Factuality as such is not pondered. Nietzsche’s adherence to his fundamental insight is precisely what blocks him from the path that leads to thinking Being as such.” (N4 199) The project of learning nihilism is then completed in a way that allows it to be abstracted and summarised as a syllogism. In describing Nietzsche’s programmatic statement for classical nihilism, ‘Heidegger’ notes the abstract form adopted by ‘Nietzsche’ with the latter’s use of the headings; ‘Result’ and ‘Final Result’:

“Therefore, we now read, ‘Granted we realize to what extent… may no longer be interpreted’; we read, ‘We then have to...” (ellipses are Heidegger’s, N4 47) For ‘Heidegger’, this taking-as-fixed-and-secure [Für-fest-und-sicher-nnehmen] (N3 63, NI 547) signals the moment at which ‘Nietzsche’ unlimits his teachings, dehistoricising them. Nietzsche actively turns away from the finitudinal realm of the existing learned, the thingly world, and thereby ‘frees’ himself, though for this very reason, only in a virtual sense. The engaged praxis thus gives way to a disengaged conscious poiésis, the act of goal setting.

To put it another way, becoming is from this point on permanentized, ‘stamped as Being’ as ‘Heidegger’ never stops citing. The Eternal Return is now no longer a project of learning, but projected as a statement of fact, as what ‘Nietzsche’ learnt and taught: things are, have been and always will be this way, once and for all. The act of apprehending (Vernehmen) has been covered over by what has been comprehensively presumed (Annahmen), that is by “committing oneself to a once-and-for-all [endgültig] fixed and decided ‘it is thus’”. (N3 66, NI 549): “Such liberation [of humanity to
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subjectivity is the way in which the transformation of representation — from apprehending as taking in (noein) to apprehending as trial and adjudication (perceptio) — is carried out.” (N3 239) Whilst becoming is the on-going praxical process of fixing, ‘Nietzsche’ takes becoming for a fact, a fixture, something therefore that can now be used, rather than something to continue to learn.

Or to put it conversely, the task is no longer to learn things into a certain constancy, but merely to set up what can then be overcome. ‘Heidegger’ is especially indicting of the way ‘Nietzsche’ can be learnt as, like Kant, making the condition of the appearance of objects, or what ‘Nietzsche’ calls constructs, be their disappearance. According to the now turned ‘Heidegger’, ‘Nietzsche’ literally conceives of the being of the world as the setting up of things in order to be overcome: “What is to be overcome must put up some resistance; hence it must itself be something constant, which maintains and preserves itself. But what overcomes must also take a stand and be stable, otherwise it could not surpass itself; nor could it advance without wavering and be certain of the possibility of advancement. And vice versa, all envisaging of preservation is purely for the sake of enhancement.” (N3 198) When the project of learning things succumbs to a technical poiésis of means and ends, then the unconditioned cybernetics of self-aggrandizement reigns.

In all these cases, it is the unlearning of taking-as-learnt that is the problem. It was as if Nietzsche had learnt nihilism for us (à la Christian redemption) and therefore allowed us to overcome it without having to learn what it was that was being overcome. Which is why, I would suggest, that whilst this accusation can be made of Nietzsche himself, the primary target here is the way ‘Nietzsche’ can be (mis)learnt, the way Nietzsche was being taken up (see N4 59-61), or more accurately, that (modern age) which is instructed by a Nietzscheanism without having ever learned (i.e., even heard of, hearkened obediently to the teachings of) ‘Nietzsche’.

This ill-in-formed Nietzscheanism is apparent when Nietzsche, now a metonym for ‘will to power’ or ‘value-positing’, gets taken as objective fact — whether by Nietzsche himself, contemporary philosophers, our portrait-taking age or even Heidegger — an object available for use without any need to understand its conditioning limits, “a thing with which one can reckon and that therefore has validity.” (N4 62) For this reason, Heidegger’s third accusation concerns the visualism of this way of learning ‘Nietzsche’. Nietzsche’s doctrines in the final Nietzsche lecture course all emerge as visions, non-
Chapter Ten: Unlearning Anthropomorphism

relational pictures of origins, means and ends. “‘Value’ is indeed ‘essentially’ the ‘viewpoint for’... the sort of thing that, once viewed, becomes a gauge for a seeing that has something in view... as a viewpoint, value is always posited by a seeing.” (N4 62) In this sense, Nietzscheanism instructs us into our age of worldviews, actively promoting the positing of the real as ein Gebilde >kamplexer Art< (NII 105). The somewhat misleading translation of Gebilde as construct, here as throughout these Nietzsche courses, is useful inasmuch as it indicates that it is the technicised version of images, the blueprints for building, as opposed to the praxically formative manifestations of Bildung, which are being criticised here. This “age of consummate meaninglessness is therefore the era in which ‘worldviews’ are invented and promulgated... such worldviews drive all calculability of representation and production to the extreme.” (N3 175)

The chief target of this anti-visualism is therefore fourthly, representation, in the German sense of setting-before — i.e., setting away from the anthropocentric being doing the presencing.6 “The Age of the World Picture” says: “This means that the matter stands before us exactly as it stands with it for us. ‘To put oneself in the picture’ with respect to something means to set whatever is, itself, in place before oneself just in the way that it stands with it, and to have it fixedly before oneself as set up in this way.” (AWP 129) The whole of the fourth 1940 course focuses on revealing the representationalism unconsciously at work in ‘Nietzsche’. This is why the central part of the course involves a lengthy interpretation of Descartes cogito, which ‘Heidegger’ goes to much effort to teach us must be translated as ‘I represent’: “That to which everything is referred back as to an unshakable ground [by the Cartesian mathematical project] is the full essence of representation itself.” (N4 114) ‘Heidegger’ is repeatedly critical of Nietzsche’s failure to learn the essence of the Cartesian mathematical project. When Nietzsche thinks that he is opposing Descartes, he is in fact in total agreement, with the position that holds that “Being means ‘representedness’, a being established in thinking, and that truth means ‘certitude’”. (N4 129) The consequence of this ignorance however, is that Nietzsche’s will to power comes to be captured by Cartesian representationalism. The implication is that the insight into the anthropocentricity of seing that ‘Nietzsche’ learned and taught, gets unlearnt when misappropriated as representational. Heidegger’s critique therefore can be learnt as teaching against learning ‘Nietzsche’ as if he were under instruction from Descartes, just as the critique
of visuality in ‘Nietzsche’ is teaching against learning ‘Nietzsche’ platonically. Or to put it the other way around, to learn the extent to which Nietzsche “is thinking the selfsame in the historical fulfillment of its essence” (N4 103) is to learn the danger in Nietzscheanism, as an abstract doctrine for instance, as opposed to the danger of Nietzsche’s way of teaching as a whole. It is Plato-Descartes plus Nietzsche that is “the first resolute step through which modern machine technology, and along with it the modern world and modern mankind, become metaphysically possible for the first time.” (N4 116) This is why learning to reappropriate Nietzsche’s contribution is so important: it restores the anthropocentrism that is concealed by Platonic-Cartesian representation. Only this way of learning what ‘Heidegger’ is doing here can explain why, immediately following this analysis of the Cartesian corruption of ‘Nietzsche’, ‘Heidegger’ inserts into the publication of these lectures his self-critique of Being & Time for its risked subjectivism (N4 140-2). As is the case with ‘Nietzsche’, ‘Heidegger’ is not repudiating the whole of ‘Heidegger’, but teaching away from a Cartesian way of learning ‘Heidegger’.

This last point takes us to the final fifth aspect of Heidegger’s criticism of ‘Nietzsche’: as a representationalism, anthropocentrism is displaced from being an essential project, of questioning and making, into something that can be taken-as-learnt, an unquestioned background, that is to say, as the anthropomorphism of a humanism. In this last Nietzsche lecture course, ‘Heidegger’ is less ambiguous about the issue here: in line with the previous four criticisms, it is precisely the extent to which the nature of human being is fixed in a representative form, that is to say, it is anthropomorphism that perverts the essence of learning’s anthropocentrism. “Metaphysics is anthropomorphism — the formation and displaying of the world according to man’s image (Metaphysik ist Anthropomorphie – das Gestalten und Anschauen der Welt nach dem Bilde des Menschen).” (N4 83, NII 129) ‘Heidegger’ repeats the analysis of Protagorus’ ‘man is the measure’ more succinctly than in “The Age of the World Picture”, drawing more starkly the difference between a finitudinal anthropocentrism, learning beings within limits that attest to concealment, and an anthropomorphism that disjoins the subject from the world by positing it as its own certitude, a “type” (N4 99-100) without limits. It is then precisely this reduction of the praxical existence of Dasein to a predetermined fixture, an independent agent of poiesic products made according to equally
distinct representations in ways that will, in the end, deny any trace of the anthropocentrism by which they are what they are.7

Orthopaedics

By way of summary, allow me to turn now to Heidegger’s “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”, where the relation ‘Heidegger’, 'Nietzsche' and learning is perhaps most clearly set out. Whilst Heidegger notes that this lecture grew out of thinking done in relation to the 1930 “The Essence of Truth” lecture, its completion in 1940 suggests that it is primarily about ‘Nietzsche’; or rather, it is about the Platonic way of mis-taking Nietzscheanism. I would suggest that ‘Nietzsche’ is saved from being the explicit target here because aspects of what it teaches are worth saving from Platonism, and even, it could be ventured, stand to save us from Platonism.

'Heidegger’ makes clear that whilst “The ‘allegory of the cave’ illustrates the essence of 'education’”, by “contrast, the interpretation of the ‘allegory’ that we are now going to attempt means to point out the Platonic ‘doctrine’ of truth.” (PDT 167) 'Heidegger’ justifies the fact that this “reinterpretation threatens to degenerate into a reinterpretation that does violence to the text” by suggesting that, “our interpretation... is made necessary from out of a future need.” (PDT 167) There is thus a tight circling here between the essence of truth and essential learning or the essentialising that ‘truth’ accomplishes — i.e., between an essentialism within ‘truth’ as a metaphysical notion and the ‘learning’ that ‘truthing’ accomplishes — that it is important to unravel.

Heidegger’s argument is simply that, with this allegory, Plato turned truth from disclosure to correctness. When 'Heidegger' discusses translating paideia by Bildung, he notes that Bildung means “forming someone in the sense of impressing on him a character that unfolds” but that it also means that type of forming that happens only “by antecedently taking measures in terms of some paradigmatic image, which for that reason is called a proto-type [Vorbild].” (PDT 166) Plato uses the first form of forming to reform forming into the second form: a praxical form of ‘unfolding’ is turned into a poiesic form of pre-modelled building, a molded form of mass production wherein everything is identical. In Lacoue-Labarthe’s terms, Plato mimetologises a mimesis into imitation.

The result is a metaphysics, or more accurately, as we have learned from The Question Concerning the Thing, a mathematics, where deprecated realities are measured
against a constant abstract idea(l) re-presented in the mind of a theoretised nous: “the highest is the origin, i.e., the original source [Ursache] of all ‘things’ [Sachen] and their thingness [Sachheit].” (PDT 176) This means that the “essential unity” of “education’ and ‘truth’”, that is, the seeing of beings, gets perverted into a hierarchy: true education becomes the process of learning beings according to a pre-set idea; one can only learn the truth, which means that which corresponds representationally with a true idea.

“Truth is no longer, as it was qua unhiddenness, the fundamental trait of being itself. Instead, as a consequence of getting yoked under the idea, truth has become correctness, and henceforth it will be a characteristic of the knowing of beings.” (PDT 179) Post-Plato education is thus normative, and that which is orthopaedically formed according to these mathematical idea(l)s is the humanist human (PDT 181).

As ‘Heidegger’ makes clear in the “Letter on ‘Humanism’”, the roman appropriation of paideia concerned the technical template of “eruditio et institutio in bonas artes [scholarship and training in good conduct].” (LH 244) In “The Question of Being”, the representationalism of Bildung is read as completed in the Jünger’s Nietzschean Gestaltism: “The source that gives meaning, the power that is present in advance and shapes everything [which is consequently either sheer stuff (Antiphonian Nietzscheanism) or the permanently becoming (Hegelian Nietzscheanism)], is Gestalt as the Gestalt of a particular kind of human.” (299) This essentialist Gestalt is explicitly differentiated from “the essence (Wesen in the verbal sense) of the human being, ‘the Dasein in the human being’ [which] is nothing human.” (300)

In all these cases then, now stretching into the later ‘Heidegger’, there is an anthropocentric relationality that is fundamentally different from the anthropomorphism of post-platonic education. The latter is not an authentic anthropocentrism, since it is seeking to mimetologise the ontological power of being-human-without-having-a-model-for-being-a-human by insisting that there is a model for the human, whether derived from divine sources or cosmological reason. The problem with humanism consequently is that it is not anthropocentric enough; it is a thoroughly contained ec-sistence. This is what I take ‘Heidegger’ to mean when he notes in the “Letter on ‘Humanism’” that “the highest determinations of the essence of the human being in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of the human being...
Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of the human being high enough.” (LH 251)

In this context, it is therefore appropriate to learn the obverse of what “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” teaches, that is, the essential non-hierarchised unity of seing, truth and learning. ‘Heidegger’ cannot be teaching that learning is the process of accessing the truth about beings, for this would amount to a reinstalling a platonic prototype that learning follows (though seing would be installed as the model rather than Plato’s idea(l)). To relearn the essential Greek sense of education then, the un-modelled process of forming, we must project ourselves into the situation in which it is by learning that seing becomes or comes to be (true (i.e., revealed)); in other words, where learning is not the disclosure of some permanently pre-existent Being, but being disclosively, what ‘Heidegger’ calls in the “Letter on ’Humanism’”, “accomplishment”.8

‘Heidegger’ is clearly opposed to a certain type of willing. The danger that his teachings teach concerns a poetically constructivist instituting, where man is the manufacturer of all that is. However, in learning this aspect of ‘Heidegger’, this second part of the thesis has attempted to show that willing is not per se the danger. It is only the willing that is controlled by an already delimited form of human subject, present as the technical manipulator of representations which pre-determine the nature of ‘what is’, that is a threat to the continued withdrawal of what is essential. This type of willing is in fact an anti-willing; it attempts as much as possible to deny the ontologicality of its willing. Whilst actively promoting willing, the willing of anything and everything, willing is in the end only a means, imperfect before the objects of its desires.

Willing, as authentically, i.e., avowedly, ontological, is what still sustains this humanistly impoverished technique of willing: there is an ontological willing that is being ontologically (un)willed into a representational type of willing. This is how I have learned Heidegger’s teaching that the danger lies not in ‘willing’, but in the ‘will to will’, the anti-willing form of willing, the over-willing in the sense of that which attempts to overlap the unavoidability of anthropocentric willing.9

‘Heidegger’ is thus teaching us to learn the willing that sustains the ‘over-un-willing’ of our representational age. We must learn to reappropriate willing from the way it is currently represented. Its presencing power, its energetic dynamis, is being rendered virtual, that is, impoverished as a mere technological imagining. We must
learn to relearn the power of learning concealed within our addiction to abstract activism.
Endnotes for Chapter Ten

1 ‘Heidegger’ discusses ‘sobriety’ as that “genuine passion [compared to which] the best optimism is too lame, every pessimism too blind” in Basic Concepts, 34. ‘Heidegger’ is here trying to evade, 14 years before “The Question Concerning Being”, the onto-typo-logical attempt to escape nihilism by a Jungian Nietzscheanism.

2 Stiftung or instituting is the building that the poet does by which the essential comes to dwell. See for example, s26 of Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, entitled “Poetizing founding builds the stairs upon which the heavenly descend”. Relatedly, note that ‘Heidegger’ defines poetizing (Dichtung) as “finding out (Erfinden)” (HHI 119) Here is a clear instance of the institutional essence of learning. Erfinden means to invent. As usual, ‘Heidegger’ warns us against this ontic constructivism in order to teach us a more ontological essentialising: “This supreme finding is therefore not a free inventing (Erfinden) in the sense of willful imagining. This finding stands within a singular necessity.” (120) Erfinden is thus inventing something as found, that is to say, founding (stiften) something through the co-presenced telling of human beings’ ontological capabilities (what is always already, the nearest of the near).

3 Note the distinctly ‘public’ or political emphasis here: this is a very Arendtian account of praxis. Or in terms of this thesis, the constructivism of praxical learning is shown here to be not merely an isolated act of self-directed learning, but the social constructivism of a teaching (in order to learn), an action. This is why ‘Heidegger’ always reads the polis not as a mere (permanent) institution, but as the manifestation of an essential instituting, that is to say, as the founding and preserving what currently is necessary. See Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, 79-87 and Parmenides, 88-94.

4 When Heidegger suggests using technologies with a ‘yes’ and ‘no’, the imperative is to retrieve meaningful relations, that is, the relations by which things are always already meaningful: “Having this comportment [i.e., Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen] we no longer view things only in a technical way. It gives clear vision and we notice that while the production and use of machines demands of us another relation to things, it is not a meaningless relation.” (T 46) Concerning the exacerbating lack of things in objectivity, see S.Weber “Objectivity and its Others” in Mass Mediaunas: Form, Technics, Media [Sydney: Power Publications, 1996], who makes the useful suggestion that objects are always replacements (52). See also R.Mugerauer’s reading of technology as systemically modular, disposable and replaceable in chapter seven of Interpretations on Behalf of Place [Albany: State University of New York, 1994]
and his responses in terms of camouflage and display in the following chapter. For a Freudian reading of the auto-accelerating the withdrawal of objects, see T.Brennan History After Lacan [London: Routledge, 1993].

A number of people have learnt from Heidegger a certain anti-oculocentrism: see for example, D.Levin’s (perhaps reactively corporea-centrist) work XX, and W.Spanos’ Foucauldian interpretations in Heidegger and Criticism [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995] and The End of Education [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993]. However, as has been well-demonstrated by C.Christensen for instance ("Heidegger’s Representationalism” Review in Metaphysics, 51 (1998)), ‘Heidegger’ never amounts to an advocation of blindness: his critique of seeing concerns only a detached form of seeing; what he is reappropriating is precisely the active aspect (in the praxical sense) of seeing (as having always already seen: i.e., learning).

By way of summary, compare Derrida’s paraphrase of An Introduction to Metaphysics: "Conflict (Kampf) is physis inasmuch as it institutes but also inasmuch as it keeps what it institutes. It is institution itself, in the double sense of this word, instituting and instituted. When conflict stops, when one no longer hears what is unheard in the conflict, the being does not disappear, but is no longer kept, affirmed, maintained (behauptet [d.h. als solches gewahrt]), becomes an object (Gegenstand, Vorhandene), an object available the where the world has ceased to become world (keine Welt mehr weltet). It becomes either an object for a gaze (Betrachten, Anblick), or a form or image that faces us, or the object of a calculated production. In this fall of pólemos, in the Verfall, the originary ε[ΘΖ falls from the rank of model (Vorbild) to the rank of reproduction and imitation (Abbilden, Nachmachen). ε[ΘΖ, the instituting institution, becomes the Nature (Natur) that is opposed to Art... falling] to the rank of spectacle, in the quelled visibility of objects that face us.” (“Heidegger’s Ear” in J.Sallis ed., Reading Heidegger [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993], 212.

“We view action only as causing effect. The actuality of the effect is valued according to its utility. But the essence of action is accomplishment. To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this fullness – producere. Therefore only what already is can really be accomplished. Thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest because it concerns the relation of beings to humans.” (239) As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, many, like Taminiaux, see this as reinstatement by Heidegger of Platonic poiēsis, but to do this is not to have the grace to accept what ‘Heidegger’ is trying to teach here by saying that thinking can and does act. The quickest way to counter this reading is to recognize that the sort of thinking that manages to accomplish an action in and as that thinking – as opposed to the sort of thinking that is followed by an
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action (*mente concipio* again) — is learning. Learning is the anthropocentric *non-poietic* think-work that brings about essential change.

9 For instance, I read the following sentence backwards, so that the first half provides a definition for the second: "Modern research, with its different ways of representing beings and its different means of producing them, has assumed the fundamental trait of that truth which characterizes all beings by the will to will." (PWM 231)
Chapter Eleven  
The Work of Learning

In a position to... this means first: he is fit for it. Yet not simply this, but at the same time it also means: he ventures himself, has already become resolved. To actually be capable is the full preparedness of being in a position to, which lacks only the releasement into enactment, such that when this is at hand, when it has imposed itself, this means: when the one who is capable sets himself to work, then the enactment is truly practice.

Heidegger Aristotle’s Metaphysics

In Part Two of the thesis, I have been seeking to defend the hypothesis that the institutional essence of learning is not only at work in the way ‘Heidegger’ teaches, but is advocated by ‘Heidegger’ as the appropriate response to the pervasion of the metaphysics of Technology. This has meant showing that ‘Heidegger’ does not turn away from anthropocentric willing, but rather seeks to clarify the nature of such a project, teaching us its praxical finitude. It has been proposed that this form of finitudinal anthropocentric willing, which accomplishes essential change without being a type of production, is best understood as a process of learning. In this way, the last five chapters should have further clarified the nature of the institutional essence learning, teaching us its limits.

By necessity, Part Two has proceeded in a mostly negative fashion, reading the criticisms ‘Heidegger’ makes counterfactually, as advocations of what thus lies in the background. To complete the substantive sections of this thesis, I would like to give a brief account of what I believe to be Heidegger’s most positive account of the finitudinal willed anthropocentrism that has in this part so far been discernible mainly as a negative Gestalt. This occurs in Heidegger’s 1936 lecture “The Origin of the Work of Art”.

Teaching Art

In overview, the lecture brings together art, truth and things. Here already is all that this thesis has been discussing: anthropocentrism, ontology and finitude.

* Endnotes for Chapter Eleven commence on page 299.
Chapter Eleven: The Work of Learning

I would assert that from the outset this grouping necessitates being understood with respect to learning. The point of the lecture is to show how art is a name for the material making of truths. By this I mean on the one hand that art makes new truths, as opposed to the mere re-presentation of existing truths in artistic forms, and on the other hand, that art makes truths that, as truths, are not merely manufactured artifices. (OWA 37) This happening that is therefore neither reproductive nor productivist is what Heidegger is calling art, though in these most arty of times, we must acknowledge that very little art (in the market) manages to be art in this true sense. This is why I am suggesting that we can most directly access what is at issue in this lecture by learning it as being primarily about the art of learning.

What else, if not learning, is “the becoming and happening of truth”? (OWA 71) When “we have already learned something unwittingly”, something essential about equipment by looking at a painting (i.e., van Gogh’s peasant shoes), does this not tell us that the way a painting “brings [things] to stand” (OWA 36) is a quintessential instance of teaching ‘by showing’, that is, a model form of learning? Does not thinking about art as learning in the strong ontological sense explain “the curious fact... that the work in no way affects hitherto existing entities by causal connections, [but instead ‘works’] a change, happening from out of the work, of the unconcealedness of what is”, “in whose openness everything is other than usual”? (OWA 72) Is it not because the work of the work of art is an institution of essential learning, an “out-standing standing-within the essential” that it involves “a knowing that remains a willing, and a willing that remains a knowing”? (OWA 67) Finally, given all that the whole issue of the anthropocentrism of essential learning has thrown up in this part of the thesis, does this not suggest that if “The Origin of the Work of Art” gives no answer to the question concerning “what art may be” other than pointing to the “essential ambiguity”, the “undecided but decidable... distressing difficulty”, of “the relation of Being and human being... the belonging together of Being and Saying”, that art is thus nothing but essential learning? (OWA 86-7)

To this extent, this lecture becomes Heidegger’s most powerful account of the institutional essence of learning, since the focus of the lecture is on disclosing the essence of art as poetry, where the latter means the “illuminating projection, [the] unfold[ing] of unconcealedness and [the] project[ion] ahead into the design of the figure... in such a way that only now, in the midst of beings, the Open brings beings to shine and ring out.” (OWA 72) The essence of art thus lies in its act of founding-preserving (OWA 75), that is
to say, the essentiality it manages to institute. This is why the lecture is entitled the *Ursprung* of art, that is, the history-making “founding leap” that art accomplishes. (OWA 77-8) As the lecture opens, origin is essence: “Origin means that from and by which something is what it is and as it is. What something is, as it is, we call its essence or nature.” (OWA 17) This is then a lecture about radically constructivist institutionalisation, about essentialising, the fact that what things are depends upon their anthropocentric origination, upon how they are learned (in)to be(ing): “the fact that we never know thingness directly, and if we know it at all, then only vaguely and thus require the work — this fact proves indirectly that in the work’s work-being the happening of truth, the opening up or disclosure of what is, is at work.” (OWA 70)

What then does this lecture teach about this art of learning? It firstly teaches us that it is an explicit project, a project of projecting a system of jointure,

*fix*[ing] in place [as] *figure, shape, Gestalt.* Createdness of the work means: truth’s being fixed in place in the figure. Figure is the structure in whose shape the rift composes and submits itself. This composed rift is the fitting or joining of the shining of truth. What is here called figure, *Gestalt,* is always to be thought in terms of the particular placing (*Stellen*) and framing or framework (*Gestell*) as which the work occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth. (OWA 64)

The art of learning is thus an act of boundary setting that “brings the opposition of measure and boundary into their common outline... drawing together, into a unity [*das einheitliche Gezüge*], of sketch and basic design, breach and outline [*von Aufriß und Grundriß, Durch- und Umriß*].” (OWA 63, GA5 51) It is precisely this binding-bounding that gives art its finding-founding ability, that is, its essential learning power, “a capacity for bringing forth” (OWA 70). However, concurring with the whole thrust of this chapter then, this art of learning is profoundly finitudinal: “the work as work sets up a world” (OWA 45) only by attesting to the withdrawing earth; “*The work lets the earth be an earth.*” (OWA 46)

The work does this through a thorough reflexivity about its own anthropocentricity, co-presencing that “un-truth” that is (inseparable from) truth, “the reservoir [*Herkunftsebereich — originating region, background*] of the not-yet-uncovered, the un-uncovered [*des Noch-Nicht(des Un-)Entborgenen*], in the sense of concealment.” (OWA 60) What is at issue here is precisely the essentiality of truth given the ability of art to ‘create’ essences and truths. In the face of this “double concealment” that confuses the “refusal and dissembling” of truth (OWA 54), the artwork must work at “wresting” (OWA 70).
essential truths from the risks inherent in its own constructivism; it must strivingly self-assert its own nature (OWA 49): “the fighting of the battle is continually self-overreaching gathering of the work’s agitation.” (OWA 50) This is why the essence of the work of art lies in its avowed workedness, its “factum est”: “Everything brought forth surely has this endowment of having been brought forth, if it has any endowment at all. Certainly. But in the work, createdness is expressly created into the created being, so that it stands out from it.” (OWA 62) In contrast to equipment which tends to “disappear in usefulness”, the (art)work does not allow its anthropocentricity “to fall into oblivion, as is the wont of everything commonplace... The event of [the work’s] being created does not simply reverberate through the work; rather, the work casts before itself the eventful fact that the work is as this work, and it has constantly this fact about itself.” (OWA 65) This is clearly then a thoroughly praxical act in its insistent reflexivity. As has been frequently observed, this lecture is perhaps an extended translation of Aristotelian praxis, the energetic entelechy of the work-being, the complete yet finite dynamis of motion at rest. (OWA 48)

In this context, it is understandable why ‘Heidegger’ throughout insists that this praxis of truthing, this essentially instituting process of learning, is in no way a technical poiësis. Art is not reproductive (mimetic) because the working that is the essence-origin-end of art is not production, “by no means.” (OWA 37) Everything thus turns on holding together the self-sufficiency of the work with its avowed createdness. In other words, there is no subject prior to and directing the creation of the art work: “The emergence of createdness from the work does not mean that the work is to give the impression of having been made by a great artist.” (OWA 65) “Modern subjectivism, to be sure, immediately misinterprets creation, taking it as the self-sovereign subject’s performance of genius.” (OWA 76) This is why the lecture begins with the circling of the artist and the work, the fact that the artist is only in relation to the artwork: “The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist.” (OWA 17) The situation is profoundly Arendtian, with the ‘who?’ of the artist only ever appearing (or as Jean-Luc Nancy suggests, compearing) in, as and with the appearing of the artwork. The working of the work is thus profoundly praxical.

This becomes the pivotal issue of the “Addendum” which seeks to qualify this lecture’s promotion of Gestell. ‘Heidegger’ struggles to demonstrate that the difference between the Gestell of the Gestalt that is the work of art and the Gestell that is the Construct of modern technology is the difference between a delimiting and an unlimiting, a “bounding outline (peras)” and “commandeering everything into assured availability”, a
Stellen or fixing as a gathered consolidation (\textit{dynamis energeia}) and a Vorstellen or fixing as a secured mobilisation (potential energy) (OWA 84). The latter in each case installs an object, a product that conceals its producedness, whereas the former brings forth a standing, a “constancy of showing” (OWA 85). Here is the whole distinction which this part of the thesis has been arguing is the true nature of Heidegger’s turn: this is the difference between ‘Nietzsche’ and Nietzscheanism, between ‘Heidegger’ and Nietzsche, between apprehending and the taking-for-use of the project of mathematics, between anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, between \textit{paideia} and Bildung, between learning (learning) and instructive education.

This is why finally, the artwork must be approached by way of the thing. It is its thingly character that ensures that we appropriately discern its finitude, that which conditions its radically constructivist anthropocentrism. This is not to say that thingliness provides an \textit{external} limit to the art of learning; it is precisely its internal limit, a limit that comes from its very ambitiousness, that is, its ambition to “establish” truth, to found it \textit{for a time}, to make it sustainably, \textit{but never permanently}, manifest. Thus an artwork is precisely not just a thing, since its thingliness “must be conceived by way of the work’s workly nature” (OWA 39). In other words, the work does not \textit{on its own} manifest the independent things, which would be to manufacture a product, but rather comes to be thingly \textit{by the way it works}; we \textit{learn} the thingliness of the artwork, and by extension the \textit{learnedness} of all things: “to create is to cause something to emerge as a thing that has been brought forth.” (OWA 60) The \textit{praxis} of art is thus its thingliness, its working toward being thingly, being-a-thing-at-work, manifesting thingliness as learnedness. The designing that the artwork does teaches us the designedness of all that is, the fact that things are by design, and that redesigning the way of the world means relearning it.

This is what ‘Heidegger’ in the end asserts is the true meaning — understood verbally, i.e., the \textit{praxis} — of (a) \textit{thesis}: “But if in the context of our essay on the work of art, we keep in mind the Greek sense of \textit{thesis} — to let lie forth in its radiance and presence [and a few sentences later defined as “a working and willing”] — then ‘fix’ and ‘fix in place’ can never have the sense of rigid, motionless and secure.” (OWA 83) A thesis, as that doing that is not merely a causal action,\textsuperscript{5} as an accomplishment, should in the end be the exemplar of the \textit{entelechy} that is the project of learning.
1 In 1989, the journal *Heidegger Studies* (v5) published “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerk, Erste Ausarbeitung”. This first version of the lecture was given at the end of 1935. Jacques Taminiaux has set out some of the differences between this and the later version given at the end of 1936 which was published in the 1945 *Holzwege* (translated in *Poetry Language Thought*), in “The Origin of The Origin of the Work of Art” now in *Poetics, Speculation and Judgement* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993]. Taminiaux claims that the 1936 version is “more meditative [less] assertive and proclaiming [than the 1935 version], certainly not Promethean.” (167) “The previous contempt for everydayness and its pettiness has almost vanished... everydayness is no longer that ‘familiar, all too familiar’ resoluteness has to avoid and overcome. It is now strange, though familiar.” (167-8) Thus, Taminiaux notes that most “significant” is that fact “that the first third of the final version [only] should be devoted to the question, What is a thing in its thingly character?” (167) I am using the 1936 version to show that if, as Taminiaux believes, this is the first example of Heidegger turning away from his early ’30s decision, there is however still a strong commitment to strong commitment as the basis of truthful disclosures. I will also be suggesting what Taminiaux sees as residues of the 1935 valorisation of *poiésis* is in fact a elaboration of the *praxis* of truthful disclosure, where, following the analysis presented in Chapters Four and Five, any ‘Promethianism’ can be read as a reflexive strategy for learning finitude.

2 Hubert Dreyfus has done some of the most instructive work emphasising this final point of the lecture. In “Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics” in C.Guignon ed., *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993], Dreyfus claims that what Heidegger means by art, in line with both the earlier work on the everyday and his later work on dwelling things, is localised practices that are not subsumed by the totalizing relationality of Technology, but manifest as standing openings or shared meaningfulnesses. Dreyfus therefore brings Borgmann’s focal practices together (see co-authored with C.Spinosa “Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology” >http://www.focusing.org/dreyfus.html<) with Kuhn’s paradigms and Geertz’s rituals (“Heidegger on the Connection”, 297-9) to posit that there is a continuum between cultural practices and technological installations, the latter merely being a totalising form of the former. For Dreyfus then, an artistic event is a response to Technology that turns marginal objects or events into gestalt-switches that re-pluralise our understanding of being. (310) Thus art is a history-making disclosing of new worlds (see C.Spinosa, F.Flores, H.Dreyfus *Disclosing New Worlds* [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997]). Dreyfus is ambiguous about the extent to which art in this sense is available to human
agency. In “Heidegger on the Connection”, he argues that “we must learn to appreciate marginal practices [without letting them] become resources. That is why we must protect endangered practices. But just protecting nontechnical practices, even if we could succeed, would still not give us what we need, for these practices by themselves do not add up to a shared moral space of serious meaningful options. Of course one cannot legislate a new understanding of being. But some of our practices could come together in a new cultural paradigm that held up to us a new way of doing things – a new paradigm that opened up a world in which these practices and others were central, whereas efficient ordering was marginal.” (310) Dreyfus in this article is thus promoting a commitment to marginal practices, something that he acknowledges can be risky (in that one might be backing either a retotaliser – as Heidegger did with Hitler – or a practice destined for mainstream ridicule: 310-13), but suggesting that nothing more can be done than to await the arrival of a new god (which Dreyfus depoetizes, together with the fourfold, into more prosaic cultural shifts). In this sense, Dreyfus is missing the learning that I am suggesting is essential to art.

In Disclosing New Worlds however, a series of actions are outlined for instituting new shared meanings: articulation – retrieving and gathering dispersed styles and putting them forward as explicit models for emulation; reconfiguration – non-articulated, material or infrastructural change in styles; cross-appropriation – where one style adopts another in either an articulating or reconfiguring manner. (24-9) All of these can be thought to be compatible to some extent to what this thesis is calling the institutional essence of learning. Indeed, Dreyfus’ whole strategy of arguing that Heidegger is not opposed to technology per se is similar to this thesis’ argument that Heidegger is not opposed to willing per se: technology, as an ontological learning project is what we must strive to learn to reappropriate. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, whilst Dreyfus et al suggest there are world-disclosing things that we can, and as entrepreneurially conscientious citizens should, do, Dreyfus insists upon the anti-totalisation that he sees as being integral to the art-work. On the one hand, I would agree that, following Sheehan, the art-work must be understood as a finitudinal disclosure, presencing what is necessarily absenced by its presencing: as Dreyfus notes, “a true art work does not make everything explicit and systematic. It [therefore] generates and supports resistance to total mobilisation.” (“Heidegger and the Connection”, 311) On the other hand however, I would suggest that Dreyfus over-emphasises this anti-essentialism in a way that undoes the ability of such artistic events to be history-making: he fails to see that it is only by being subject to a commitment that seeks to totalise and essentialise its disclosure that an art work will institute ontological change. The entrepreneurs and cultural leaders case-studied in Disclosing New Worlds for example succeeded in teaching essential change to the world through their single-mindedness, not their pluralism. (See the now substantial theory of plural world anti-essentialism developed by Spinoza and Dreyfus in the piece on Borgmann, the “Philosophical Appendix” to Disclosing New Worlds and “Two Kinds of Antiessentialism and Their Consequences”, Critical Inquiry v22 (Summer
I am therefore suggesting that Dreyfus needs to reinsert a certain poetizing Prometheanism, following Heidegger’s teachings on art, if the actions world-disclosing are to succeed in being learned as paradigm shifts.

This quotation is a crucial corrective to the too-quick reading of this lecture which believes that Heidegger here is at last granting that there are earthly things (e.g., nature) that precede the totalising relationality of the work-world. What is indicated here is precisely what Heidegger was always and will always insist about the thing: that it is a thoroughly anthropocentric thing, something that we humans must make ourselves learn. This is what all the related references to nature in Being & Time, Basic Problems of Phenomenology and “On the Essence of Ground” had previously said: if there is a nature that is beyond that which is appropriated for production, then it is one which must be produced, from, with, and out of the worlding that we humans do, with things like art; it is retroactively granted primacy in a sort of counter-factual move. And this is what all the subsequent analyses of the thing, which only ever occur in and through poetry (whether Hölderlin’s dwelling or Heidegger’s four-fold), say: see for instance, the epigraph to this second part of the thesis, taken from the analysis of what Heidegger believed Stefan George learned through the project of renunciation “where word breaks off no thing may be” (see On the Way to Language). Is not this precisely what the closing sentence of “The Thing” says: “Men alone as mortals, by dwelling attain to the world as world. Only what conjoins itself out of world becomes thing.” (Th 182) Thingliness is thus only accessed by stepping back from representing into a responsible recollection (Th 181), that is to say, by relearning the conditioning learning that we have abstractly taken for granted. See J.Fell’s “The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of Praxis in the Early Heidegger” and C.Taylor’s “Heidegger, Language and Ecology” in H.Dreyfus & H.Hall eds Heidegger: A Critical Reader [Oxford: Blackwell, 1992]. Taylor’s article is particularly pertinent, arguing that Heidegger is a manifestationist, that is, a creationist (words make things) and an anti-humanist (humans are not the agents of those words), something that requires a performative, or what this thesis understands as a learned, use of language.

Nancy discusses the notions of ecstatic co-appearance and compearance in “The Compearance from the Existence of ‘Communism’ to the Community of ‘Existence’” Political Theory v20 n3 (1992) and in The Inoperative Community [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991], 28-9. Nancy is however discussing the appearance of finitude that manifests from the unworking of the work. Nancy is thus directly critical of the workedness of the work that I am promoting here. In this sense he is deconstructing the opposition of art and technique and teaching us to go with a certain technical poiésis because of the way it desists before the more dangerous immanentism of the work: see his The Muses [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996] and The Sense of the World [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997]. Nevertheless, since the whole point is not to make a work of the unworking that is finitude, should one not go after works in the awareness of the
inevitable technical finiteness that will interrupt one’s workings? In other words, learning that every praxis is always already a type of poiesis, does make possible the reverse teaching that one should, aware of its deconstructed limits, partake in praxis. The problem with technical economies or the claim that we are always already being-in-common is that no-one is learning the extent to which these are still metaphysical projects, which is why also no-one is learning from the failure of those projects but instead perpetuating the repetition compulsion that conceally sustains them.

5 Heidegger’s “Epilogue” to “The Origin of the Work of Art” points learners to the analysis of thesis provided in “Science and Reflection” where it — as an authentic working, that form of doing that presences, that brings about what ‘endures unto’ (an-wesen) — is contrasted with its modern corruption, mathematical causality — see SR 159-161.