Part One

Learning (with) ‘Heidegger’

We all still need an education in thinking, and before that first a knowledge of what being educated and uneducated in thinking means.

Heidegger “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”

In this first part, I want to ask what it means to learn Heidegger. Heidegger is certainly someone whose writings one must learn to read. This is something that rapidly withdraws as one learns; the process of learning to understand Heidegger tends to disappear beneath what one has learnt from Heidegger. It consequently takes some effort to retrieve it.

The chapters of this part therefore move quite slowly, often repeating the same point from different directions. They do not provide an exegesis of Heidegger’s teachings, but only attempt to grasp the nature of learning that is informing how it is that Heidegger is teaching. Heidegger provides explicit instructions about how to learn his way of philosophising, mostly in introductions or reflexive asides where he sets out what is required of those attending if they are to learn. Whilst this suggests that this part of the thesis will be remaining outside or on the surface of Heidegger’s teachings, I hope to show that an understanding of what is required to learn Heidegger in fact goes to the heart of Heidegger’s teachings.

The least ambition of Part One is to suggest that Heidegger’s philosophy must be understood in every respect as a teaching. But the main ambition is to indicate how the whole of Heidegger’s philosophy is in fact concerned with learning, in which case, learning about the process of learning (with) Heidegger will in fact put us in touch with what Heidegger is teaching. To put this in terms that Heidegger will use when teaching Nietzsche – which will be examined in Part Two – the how of the teaching is (inseparable from) what is being taught.

Because learning is so essential to Heidegger, and because what Heidegger is seeking to teach is the essentiality of essences, we will learn that Heidegger is setting and making use of an essential form of learning, that is, a form of learning that brings about essential change, not least by teaching us the essential relation between learning and essence.
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Hence it behooves us first of all to learn how to learn from the teacher, even if that only means to ask out beyond him.

Heidegger “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?”

‘Heidegger’, the Stranger

I first tried to read Heidegger while struggling with some contemporary French philosophy. I became convinced that the passe partout to poststructuralism’s baroque reliefs might lie with this German philosopher.” Expecting to find a clarifying agent there, I purchased Being & Time and thumbed through it randomly. The experience was hieroglyphic: I recognized that this was a language, that it was even my language, but I did not understand a word of it. It was one of the most abstract things I had ever read. For this very reason I think, I set about to learn this 'system' – though, as with all such translational ethnographies, I have always feared that this has been merely an autodidactic exercise, bearing no relation to the original.

Here then is a first point to register about Heidegger’s teachings. They are very strange. They have an intra-relationality that appears, at least to the uninitiated, to approach systemic absolution in the sense of that which is disconnected from all else.

I have opened with this autobiographical fable because the centripetal strangeness of ‘Heidegger’ is too easily forgotten. Despite the ever-renewed de-familiarisations in each of his teachings, the very process of learning ‘Heidegger’ is necessarily an over-coming of that strangeness, an active forgetting that allows habitation in and habituation with. Competent readers of Heidegger far too readily become comfortable with this extraordinary world. In so doing, the act of learning to understand Heidegger withdraws: the fact that ‘Heidegger’ is not immediately understandable, that it is necessary to learn, with effort and patience and time, what and how Heidegger is teaching, is often lost beneath the resultant understanding.¹

¹ Endnotes to Chapter One commence on page 87.
The issue is exemplified in the question of how to begin to learn ‘Heidegger’. There is now an enormous archive of Heidegger scholarship teaching us how to learn ‘Heidegger’.

Since this community is mostly non-German, Heidegger’s afferent strangeness is enhanced by the need to translate his idiolectic and neologistic language. Publications and conferences therefore attempt to construct the essence of Heidegger so that learners can be assured of starting off in the right direction. Then again, Heidegger’s systemicism also allows for those in this community with enough faith in the internal coherence of Heidegger’s teachings to insist that one must simply throw oneself into them in order to learn.

After all, most of what we now have of ‘Heidegger’ are in fact teachings, transcripts of courses originally given to students who had no recourse to ‘An Introduction to ‘Heidegger’.

In losing our sense of Heidegger’s strangeness, we are thus not only forgetting the effort of learning required, but we are also concealing the issue of whether we have in fact learned Heidegger at all. We are avoiding asking: To what extent is what I have learnt a translation of the original? Is the systemicity of Heidegger such that one can only learn Heidegger alone, in which case, have I been led astray? Or is the systemicity such that one must be taught how to learn Heidegger, in which case, have I led myself astray? Have I learned what Heidegger is essentially teaching, or have I merely learnt what has been instituted, by me or by an intellectual community, as ‘Heidegger’?

Heidegger is clearly not unique in this regard: the philosophical canon is full of systematically abstract philosophers whose difficulties problematise how one learns them. However, there are a number of factors that make Heidegger particularly pertinent to exploring the nature of this learning.

Firstly, it should quickly be apparent to any learner of ‘Heidegger’ that Heidegger seeks to learn about Being because it is something that remains fundamentally unlearned. This means that when Heidegger attempts to learn and teach the history of western philosophy, he is forced into reconstructing as essential, something that did not exist in those philosophies, whether Plato’s, Kant’s, Hölderlin’s, Nietzsche’s, etc. Heidegger’s is fundamentally a task of translation, an attempt to re-create a pre-Socratic Greek experience that was definitely never explicated and may have never existed. Heidegger is thus famous for having faced and exacerbated with his ‘strong’ interpretations the exact problem which all those who seek to learn ‘Heidegger’ in turn face. The question of whether one is learning or inventing, is one of Heidegger’s own essential questions.
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For an example in a context that will come to be crucial to this thesis, concerning an interpretive translation of Parmenides' Fragment 8, “thinking and being are the same”, translated here in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, as “There is an inherent bond between apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehension occurs” (IM 173), Heidegger admits “our interpretation of the fragment must appear to be an arbitrary distortion. We are accused of reading into it things that an ‘exact interpretation’ can never determine. This is true. In the usual present-day view what has been said here is a mere product of the far-fetched and one-sided Heideggerian method of exegesis, which has already become proverbial. But here we may, indeed, we must ask: Which interpretation is the true one?” (IM 176)

Secondly, Heidegger is one of the last philosophers to believe in the importance of philosophy for all that is. He is an existentialist, teaching not just Being, but ways of being. Or rather, he is an ontologist, teaching ‘what is’ new ways to be. And infamously he is a historical interventionist. As a sometime Nazi and critic of technology for instance, it is apparent that Heidegger sought to bring about change through what can be learnt from philosophising. For example, the decision in favour of the ‘Heideggerian’ interpretation of the Parmenides fragment as the more appropriate one, is, Heidegger continues, “a jump. In order to jump one has to take a proper run. It is the run that decides everything; for it implies that we ourselves really ask the questions and in these questions first create our perspectives. But this is not done shiftily and arbitrarily, nor is it done by clinging to a system set up as a norm, but in and out of historical necessity (Notwendigkeit), out of the need (Not) of historical being-there.” (IM 176) Learning (with/from) Heidegger, especially given the fact that the nature of the content is so apocryphal, must therefore be very much at issue. The question is not only whether one is learning the essence of what is being taught, but whether one is learning what it is currently essential to learn. This is not only a matter of content, but a matter of attitude and action. “What philosophy deals with only discloses itself at all within and from out of a transformation of human Dasein.” (FCM 292)

What is at stake is the nature of learning itself. What would be an appropriate way to learn Heidegger? What would manifest or testify to such essential learning? What does it mean to have learned Heidegger? Perhaps learning ‘Heidegger’ fails to learn in the way that learning is portrayed in Heidegger? Perhaps it fails to learn with ‘Heidegger’, or from Heidegger?
The crucial point is that these are not only questions to put to one learning Heidegger from without as it were, but questions that Heidegger puts to the learner and to himself. We will find that Heidegger frequently incites this dilemma of his own work: is this a projection or an essence? At these moments in his teachings, Heidegger suggests that we must precisely learn the difference, which is to say, we must learn to make the difference, make ourselves learn the difference, projecting the essentiality of what is being learnt: only in this way, will we learn at all what is essential, in Heidegger and for what is at stake in our times.

In seeking to move quickly beyond the process of learning ‘Heidegger’, one is concealing the issue of what that learning (of) difference would be. The risk is that in seeking to get to the point of having (learnt) the essence of Heidegger, one may have missed what is essential. In trying to dismiss the possibility that you have merely constructed for yourself an inessential version of ‘Heidegger’, you may have failed to make what has been learnt essential.

For all these reasons, Heidegger in fact presents us with a powerful interrogation of learning in its institutional essence. However, because it is one that is more demonstrative than thematised, it is necessary to expose it by holding on to and possibly exaggerating the strange abstractness of Heidegger’s teachings. In this way, the process by which we concretely familiarise ourselves with Heidegger should be delayed long enough for us to scrutinise it. What learning ‘Heidegger’ entails, what instigates and sustains it, as well as what Heidegger teaches about the essence of learning in general, should be thus prevented from withdrawing, opening to us the way in which we open ourselves to ‘Heidegger’ and his teachings open themselves to us.

‘Heidegger’, the Instr-actor

To assist us in returning to or conserving a situation in which ‘Heidegger’ appears strangely abstract, I would like in this part of the thesis to draw on a couple of people who deliberately adopt this tack. These are critics who are seeking to actively obstruct Heidegger’s teachings, mostly so that they can ‘teach Heidegger a thing or two’. However, in a reversal of the way those who desire to learn Heidegger tend to have their own learning processes concealed when that learning succeeds, these critics who refuse to learn ‘Heidegger’ are sometimes the most instructive about the teaching process at work in Heidegger.
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The most famous example of what I am talking about is Rudolf Carnap’s analysis of “What is Metaphysics?” Carnap insists that only what is logical has meaning. Accordingly, metaphysical statements are not incorrect, which would imply that they have meaning, but utterly illogical and thus meaningless. Heidegger’s abstractly repetitious text provides Carnap with numerous proofs of metaphysics’ mirement in pseudostatements: as Carnap observes, declaring that “nothing nothings” would not even be tolerated in fairy tales, which are at least meaningful and so refutable by experience.

What is at stake for Carnap is the ability to learn: “What we do not know for certain, we may come to know with greater certainty through the assistance of other beings; but what is unintelligible, meaningless for us, cannot become meaningful through someone else’s assistance, however vast his knowledge might be.” But this pivotal claim starts to trouble Carnap. It is almost as if Heidegger is too obvious an example of his argument. Carnap is forced into recognising that Heidegger’s influence indicates that people do learn from this ‘someone’ to imbue these illogical pseudostatements with meaning: “How could it be explained that so many men in all ages and nations, among them eminent minds, spent so much energy, nay veritable fervour, on metaphysics if the latter consisted of nothing but mere words, nonsensically juxtaposed? And how could one account for the fact that metaphysical books have exerted such a strong influence on readers up to the present day, if they contained not even errors, but nothing at all.”

Carnap has a twofold strategy to deal with this irrational yet real situation. The first is to delimit what is being learned: perhaps “metaphysics does indeed have content, only it is not theoretical content... [Rather] They serve for the expression of the general attitude of a person toward life [Lebensinstellung, Lebensgefühl: life affirming, feelings for life].” Metaphysical statements do not describe situations but are rather prescriptions for ways of living, therapeutic rather than theoretical as the later Wittgenstein would say. Carnap’s aim here is to deprecate this mythological and theological content as ‘world-views’ that are best suited to artistic expression, preferably in dematerialised media such as music. But with this displacement, Carnap is merely multiplying the examples of illogicalities which we can and do learn as meaningful.

His second ploy is therefore to delimit the nature of learning: metaphysics only succeeds in teaching things by usurping the role of the teacher:

What is here essential for our consideration is only the fact that art is an adequate, metaphysics an inadequate means for the expression of the basic [life] attitude. Of course,
there need be no intrinsic objection to one’s using any means of expression one likes. But in the case of metaphysics we find this situation: through the form of its works it pretends to be something that it is not. The form in question is that of a system of statements which are apparently related as premises and conclusions, that is, the form of a theory. In this way the fiction of theoretical content is generated, whereas, as we have seen, there is no such content.\(^{19}\)

Carnap, speaking with a whole mimetological tradition, is trying to teach the difference between good and bad teaching, between the logical, empirical teacher and the illusory teacher, the true science of teaching and the fraudulent art of teaching.

Several things can be learned from Carnap’s refusal to learn ‘Heidegger’. We realise that despite Heidegger’s abstractness, despite his metaphysicality, people do nonetheless learn ‘Heidegger’. They manage to learn from and with his illogicalities a certain set of concretely existential meanings. If Carnap was teaching empirically, he might even have to admit that this sort of concretising learning of metaphysics is more successful than the ‘correct’ form of logical teaching.

Put the other way round, Carnap is drawing attention to the fact that if ‘Heidegger’ has meaning, it is only because people learn to make his work have meaning. It is by learning, by being learned, that ‘Heidegger’ comes to have an empirical effect on the state of the world (and not just ‘ways of living’ in it).

Carnap also demonstrates that people actively learn the meaningful implications of such metaphysical artfulness by projecting it as a form of teaching, one containing concrete things to learn. In the manner of a \(\Psi\Theta Z\), that is, a ‘saying-away’ that in fact draws attention to what it is thereby absenting,\(^{20}\) Carnap is revealing something of the essence of learning. His ungraciousness toward Heidegger proves that learning requires an act of grace to begin. More than this however, Carnap’s argument indicates that that grace must take a particular form: one starts to learn the meaning of the abstractly illogical by conceding that there is something to learn here.

In terms of the previous section then, when confronted with the initial systemicity of ‘Heidegger’, its wholly abstract intra-relationality, the learner only starts to learn by granting that something can be learned with and/or from Heidegger, that effort needs to be put into accessing this system of thinking because learning will follow, that one will learn by following the relations of this system. Heidegger is in fact explicit in “What is Metaphysics!”; asking after something as abstract as Nothing demands a “daring” (WM
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93), “a correspondingly originary attunement that in the most proper sense of unveiling makes manifest the nothing... This requires that we actively complete the transformation of the human being into the Da-sein that every instance of anxiety occasions in us, in order to get a grip on the nothing announced there as it makes itself known.” (WM 88, 89) Heidegger’s 1943 “Postscript” to the lecture is even clearer: “Readiness for anxiety is a Yes to assuming a stance that fulfills the highest claim, a claim that is made upon the human essence alone... The lucid courage for essential anxiety assures us the enigmatic possibility of experiencing being.” (PWM 234) The gesture that initiates learning is thus a constructive one, one that in fact goes beyond being constructively open to the teaching, by becoming active in the construction of what is there to be learned. Heidegger notes that the appendage “and not nothing” to the assertion “that there are beings”, “makes possible in advance the manifestness of beings in general.” (WM 90) This is indeed what the whole lecture seeks to performatively demonstrate: “Human Dasein can comport itself toward beings only if it holds itself out into nothing. Going beyond beings occurs in the essence of Dasein.” (WM 96)

From this perspective then, Carnap can be understood to be exposing the essence of learning for us. This is why his criticism of Heidegger is equally applicable to the process of learning the concrete meaningfulness of his own formal logical analyses of propositions. The inherent arbitrariness of what is in the end learnable may be frustrating to Carnap (and many other anti-mimesis Platonists), but learning is essentially something that is readily open to appropriation, something that can take place whenever anything is presented as, or rather, taken as presenting, a site of learning. With learning, as evidenced by ‘Heidegger’, thinking makes it so.

This chapter is interested to find out more about this construction project that underpins what can be learnt. What does it tell us about the essence of learning? What is learning that the abstractly systemic can be learnt as meaningful by being projected as a teaching?

‘Heidegger’, the Teaching

It certainly seems that in line with Carnap’s accusation, Heidegger does go to some lengths to ensure that his work is received as a teaching, of concrete learnable things. As indicated already, it is too easily overlooked that nearly everything we now have of Heidegger’s was firstly a teaching. When Heidegger himself edited his courses for publication he
preserved the spoken quality of the material, often insisting on the inclusion of the recapitulations of the previous week’s material. Whilst these repetitions often contain valuable insights, I am suggesting that Heidegger included them in order also to maintain awareness that these thoughts occurred primarily as teachings.

Similarly, Heidegger mostly kept the very straightforward course descriptions as titles for their publication. Consequently, violent readings that always have more to do with Heidegger’s metaphysical (in Carnap’s sense) projections pose as instructive guides, primers, even cribs to the philosophical canon: Plato’s Sophist, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Schelling’s Treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom, Commentaries on Holderlin’s Poetry, Nietzsche, Parmenides, Heraclitus, etc. Those texts that do not focus on a particular philosopher have similarly pedagogic titles that suggest direct explanations of specific concepts. Most of these are questions or titles standing for the topic of a question, pointing immediately to the projective aspect required of the learner with respect to these teacherly propositions. These titles invariably contain or imply a quidditas, a ‘what is...?’ Hence, if one grants that every didactic ‘basic’, ‘fundamental’, ‘origin’, ‘concept’, ‘problem’, ‘history’, ‘principle’ or combinations thereof, is preceded by a silent ‘the question of the...’, then nearly all Heidegger’s titles either are quidditae: What is (the meaning/truth/essence/time/place of) being? (What is) Phenomenology? (What is) Logic? (What is) Essence/Ground? What is Metaphysics? (What is) the Essence of Truth? (What is) Finitude and World? (What is) the Age? What is a Thing? (What is) Art? (What is) Humanism? (What is) Technology? What is Thinking? What is Philosophy? (What is) Reason? (What is) Language and Poetry?

Almost all of Heidegger’s texts therefore present themselves from the outset as places in which to learn a determined set of (concrete) things: the meaning or nature of this or that. Carnap has therefore correctly identified one of the crucial aspects of Heidegger’s pedagogy: Heidegger does set up the illusion his philosophy contains something concrete to learn, with the result that what appears highly abstract at first is relearned as being essentially concrete; learners build up a concretised construction, filling in the projections with which they begin the work of learning.

One can imagine the result of the philosophical novice selecting as their first textbook An Introduction to Metaphysics. But the title lends itself to this possibility, and perhaps such a novice would indeed learn to philosophise, because, according to Carnap,
they would have approached the teaching in the full anticipation of being taught something, that is to say, with the project of learning.

‘Heidegger’, the Essential Teaching

We are however at risk of conceding too much to Carnap’s privileging of the postivist educator and missing the more essential qualities of learning. Something else is happening in this installation of Heidegger as a teacher. To gain a sense of this, reconsider the quidditae that entitle most of Heidegger’s teachings.

In a confusion of philosophical history, the question ‘what is...?’ these days can be answered by merely pointing to something in existence. ‘What is logic? This process here is logic. Do this and learn.’ ‘What is art? This thing here is art. Look and learn.’ This is the sort of learning that Carnap wants as the educational monopoly. In this context however, dedicating a lecture series or a publication to a simple ‘what is...?’ provokes a reaction. Where the matter can be solved concretely, to do anything else is abstract. Heidegger is very aware of this, as we will see below, and his pedagogic strategy plays on it. The use of quidditae therefore indicates a more complex notion of learning.

A quidditas points directly at a concrete entity: the ‘x’ of ‘what is x?’ In not pointing out directly what that concrete ‘x’ is, it becomes clear that the teaching is in fact pointing to something else, something that the appropriate projection holds will prove to be necessary to what ‘x’ is. An extended quidditas these days therefore points out that it is concerned with learning the necessity of how ‘what is’ is; or rather, a ‘what is...?’ leads to learning by projecting that there is a necessary ‘how’ to what this ‘x’ is, an essence, an abstract system of intra-relationality that conditions that concrete ‘x’. Quidditae in this age therefore depend upon projections of essentiality for their concrete existence.27

This means that if, as Carnap under our reading is suggesting, ‘Heidegger’ is projecting itself as a teaching in order that it be learnable despite its abstract strangeness, the teaching that it claims to be doing is not merely a teaching of something concrete and determinable. It is avowedly the projection of an essential teaching, and learning only begins by pre-positing that something essential will be learned here.

Whilst the ‘x’ of the quidditas is significant in eliciting the learning projection, it is not what forms the sole basis of the projection. Because the Carnapian expectation that ‘something can be learned here’ requires that one has to a certain extent already learned something about what it is that is being taught — in other words, I can only project that ‘I
will learn about ‘x’ there’ if I already have some inkling as to what ‘x’ is — the learning intent must be aiming beyond the ‘x’ as already, even if only partially, learnt. This is the whole point of explicitly projecting that what is happening there is teaching. It is an expectation of transcendence. One is not seeking ‘x’, but seeking something ‘other than ‘x’ via ‘x’.”

In one of the only essays to my knowledge dedicated to the relation between Heidegger and learning, I. Götz makes the point that Heidegger’s retrieval of techne as the know-how that makes possible poiesis or the bringing into being of something other than what currently is analogises teaching: just as techne is “knowing beyond the given”, so “teaching is knowledge beyond the given. It is allegorical knowing, knowing of the possibility of a situation, of the potentiality of a child, of the manner in which this potentiality may be actualized, the ways in which its logos may be brought to our presence.” For this reason, Götz suggests, teaching is like art, in that it projects “an image of something; it lets us see something”, however, this is no (p)re-presentation since “what is seen in the image remains mysterious and unknown and in essence alien to the image.” The quidditas therefore is educational in the extent to which it points beyond itself.

This learning project is thus seeking something more than is currently learnt, that is, something over and above what is represented by the identifiable content of the quidditas. To this extent the projection is an explicit anticipation of relearning; it is made to be to self-conscious of itself as a learning. It is a deliberate act of learning, of learning to make what is being learned different in quality to what has already been learnt. It is a projection of essentiality, of essentially relearning the essential. The content of quidditas is still significant, but only within a prior prolepsis: essential learning involves projecting that a teaching is happening there in necessary ways, that the ‘x’ being taught is the necessary way to learn what is necessary about ‘x’. The learner projects that the teacher is using ‘x’ to institute an essential way toward learning something essential.

What initiates learning (with) Heidegger then is less a Carnapian projection of ‘here is a teaching of (the essence of) ‘x’’, than simply ‘here is (an essential) teaching’. This is exactly what Arendt’s famous celebration of the early Heidegger says: the rumour of the hidden king in Marburg said quite simply, “there is a teacher: one can perhaps learn thinking.” The testimony speaks only of learning thinking, not learning to think anything in particular. Heidegger attracted learners because it was projected that he was ‘teaching’; or to put it the other way round, as is being argued at this point, learners were
able to learn from Heidegger “because they followed the rumour in order to learn” (211), literally projecting themselves into the teacher’s abstract system as learners. Learning happens from Heidegger’s quidditae, not because Heidegger is a teacher of so many ‘x’s, but because by using such essentialising constructions, he becomes the essential teacher: learning happens because he is systematically approaching a series of abstract issues, necessitating projections that fill out and concretise the essentiality of what is... in Heidegger. By corollary, the way Heidegger designed his presentations to appear overwhelmingly as essential teachings, indicates his awareness of the fact that consciously making the projection that ‘there is (an essential) teaching’ is the first necessary part of learning.32

It will be apparent that I have already been participating in this projection by always referring to Heidegger’s teachings, rather than his writings, his work or his philosophy. Similarly, I will from now on use the scare-quoted, ‘Heidegger’ — used in the previous section to refer to the pre-learned stranger — following Heidegger’s own preface to his Nietzsche books, where it is specified that ‘Nietzsche’ is a name for that essential matter that is to be thought as an interrelational unity. Read in conjunction with Heidegger’s summary essay “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?”, the answer being ‘the figure of the teacher of what essentially is’, ‘Heidegger’ will from now on in this thesis mean those essential things which stand to be learnt from and with that teacher.33

‘Heidegger’ is Not

I want to underline the implications of what has just been quite schematically argued, because it goes against a common way of understanding what Heidegger’s philosophy is.

If ‘Heidegger’ does not just happen to be a teaching, but is so necessarily, that is to say, if it is essential to (learning) ‘Heidegger’ that it be seen before all else as an essential teaching, then this pre-judgment affects what it is that makes up Heidegger’s teachings. Essentially, this means nothing is what it is in ‘Heidegger’.34 Everything in ‘Heidegger’ becomes always only pedagogical.35 The relearning that happens under a quidditas happens only in relation to whatever it is that forms the content of that quidditas. It is not primarily concerned with that which it at first appears to be concerned.

This is generally recognized in relation to Heidegger’s major topic, being.36 It is mostly known that the being must not be hypostatised. It is exactly not an entity, being closer to
everything (‘beings-as-a-whole’) or nothing than to any thing. Being therefore cannot be the object (or subject) of learning. Whenever Heidegger mentions being in his teaching, he is not teaching being, but merely putting a marker in place for some learning, for the essential need for some essential learning. Being cannot be learned, however it is nothing but the demand for learning, making an opening for a sustained learning. When ‘Heidegger’ is understood with respect to the essential learning projection that it requires, then being presences the learning that is happening, that is to say, the learning that is being (accomplished), the learning that is happening with every ‘is’.

I have leapt ahead here and will come back to this larger claim, but in essence I am merely registering that learners of ‘Heidegger’ learn quickly, or rather begin learning only by acknowledging, that Heidegger’s purported topic is not and cannot be, in its restricted sense, what is at stake for him. Whilst Heidegger’s subject matter in the 20s is generally granted this difference — e.g., every existentiale must be relearned beyond its ontic connotations and toward its ontological dimensions, such as care, anxiety, authenticity — Heidegger’s later work, whilst being more explicitly poetic, is often not taken in this manner. When ‘Heidegger’ teaches Art, Nature and Technology, for instance, it is not attempting to teach us what is art, nature and technology. This is why it always has recourse to distancing Greek terms, like techné and phýsis. At the most it could be said that it is teaching being (pace what has just been said in this regard) by way of reference to art, nature and technology. ‘Heidegger’ is talking about these topics, in the sense of talking around them, using them to move about, to teach and learn. To try to learn ‘Heidegger’ in reference to a particular topic is to fail to establish the projection of ‘Heidegger’ as a teaching that desubstantialises-by-essentialising the topics under consideration; such a learning will thus always fail, that is to say, fail to learn essentially, to initiate and sustain the process of essential learning that ‘Heidegger’ demands if essential change is to occur. In other words, focusing on a substantive topic in ‘Heidegger’ will always fail to learn (with) ‘Heidegger’, as a whole. This must be understood not as truism (focusing demands exclusion) but as a point about essential learning, about the fact that learning is a project of gathering, a holding together of all that is that which is being learned: one has only learned essentially when one has accessed the essence of what one is learning, that is, the necessity that binds all aspects of that teaching.

Even when it is granted that Heidegger’s explicitly titled topics are not what is being put forward for learning, the next cited learning objectives often risk the same fate. Hence,
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it is frequently noted that Heidegger demonstrated to the West that there are many things that it needs to learn: it must learn to think, to let be, to dwell, etc. When reaching these conclusions about 'Heidegger', the temptation again exists to relax the projection of Heidegger's thorough teacherliness, as if we have already learnt what 'thinking', 'letting be', 'dwelling' for instance are, the task now being merely (to learn — as if we also already knew what learning is) to put these accomplishments into action. These injunctions must instead always be read reflexively or performatively, as (still) part of the whole strategy of learning at work in 'Heidegger'. The injunction, 'we must learn to think', is part of the process of learning, learning for instance, about what type of learning could possibly fulfill this injunction: "We all still need an education in thinking, and before that first a knowledge of what being educated and uneducated in thinking means." (EPTT 72) To appropriate one of Heidegger's most explicit versions of this process, it could be said that, to learn 'Heidegger', we must keep reasserting that 'despite all the learning that we think we have accomplished, we are still not yet learning'.

'Heidegger', the ZPD

This imperative to sustain the projection of Heidegger’s teacherliness does not mean descending into relativity. It points rather to the relational process by which learning keeps on the move. Initial expectations based on what is known before commencing learning give way to ones that are more in line with what is to be learned, these in turn being replaced by other more 'learned' objectives, and so on. What gets explicitly put forward as the ‘essential’ content of the learning is therefore not yet what it is truly essential to learn, and it is the learner’s awareness of this, the graceful commitment that the learner gives to these shifting goal-posts, that allows learning, as a process, to get under way. And as long as what is currently being used as the focus for learning is acknowledged as a necessary but not final focus, the learning process retains its dynamism. Essential learning therefore is not aimless, but in a very proper sense, has a series of relative aims without which it would not be a movement, of change.

To clarify this, and conclude all that this chapter has been trying to learn about the process of learning (with) 'Heidegger', I would like to make use of the currently fashionable Vygotskian notion of the ‘Zone of Proximal Development’. ZPD is part of an account of the process of socialisation, by which learners learn to think and act like the community represented by the teacher. Given that the desired end-point for learning is strictly
incomprehensible to the learner who is not yet fluent with the community’s way of working, ZPD focuses instead on the learner’s changing and thus modifiable interpretations of what that end-point could be. Vygotskian education promotes a dialogical relation between the teacher and learner in which the teacher ‘scaffolds’ the learner by offering provisional learning objectives that urge the learner on through the learning process. The ZPD represents the always proleptic space between where a learner is and where he or she understands that he or she can be by appropriating what the teacher is understood to be offering. The Vygotskian teacher is thus always operating at “the threshold of mutual understanding.”\(^{42}\) What is said by the teacher is never what is to be learned, since it is compromised in order to be understandable to, or more accurately, strategically misunderstood by, the yet-to-learn learner. The ZPD is thus a realm sustained by a dynamic ‘as-if’: the learner learns only by projecting that he or she is on the way to understanding what is being said; and the teacher is doing the same from the other direction. Pertinently, the learning made possible by this sort of projection is referred to as ‘appropriation’: the educational dialogue “depends upon both partners appropriating the activities of the other – acting as if they were all somewhere else. The somewhere else, of course, is generally some approximation to that place where instruction is carefully leading.”\(^{43}\) The whole process is thus strictly relational, but it is no way relativist. It is dependent upon a very definite directionality, though not a predetermined destination. The learner is e-duced by being given definite goals, though none of these are the actual goal.\(^{44}\)

All that has so far been indicated about the process of learning (with) ‘Heidegger’ indicates that the ZPD could be a powerful way of understanding that process. Hence, when Heidegger uses a quidditas as a title, and then in the course of the teaching replaces that objective with another, like seing, and then does the same again, with notions like thinking and dwelling, Heidegger is using the constructivism of a ZPD, made possible by an initial projection of essentiality, to educe us into instituting certain essences.\(^{45}\)

We therefore learn (with) ‘Heidegger’ by participating in the protreptic that energises these teaching, pushing ourselves into the learning zone where ‘Heidegger’ is pulling the learning content in new, more essential directions. Learning ‘Heidegger’ essentially happens when we project that what is happening there, in and as ‘Heidegger’, is a teaching, something through which we will learn: this is how we project ourselves into a learning relation, instituting a situation in which learning will happen, in which all that is
said or written is received — though this is now the wrong term, since the relation is proactively formative — as educational, as leading in a necessary way toward what (will become what) is essential.
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Endnotes for Chapter One

1 There is an interesting generational or national-institutional context at play here that has been variously commented on. It concerns how poststructuralism was learnt in Anglo-American and Australian universities: that is, as philosophy outside the philosophy department. Given the domination of Analytic philosophy in Philosophy Departments, poststructuralism tended to arrive as a new philosophy via Literature and Art Departments, as a type of Critical Cultural Studies or ‘Theory’. This meant that the philosophic canon was approached by many in my generation backwards, through the frame of poststructuralism. This has been viewed positively or at least neutrally by people like Donald Marshall, who asks in his “Introduction” to Stephen Melville’s Philosophy Beside Itself: On Deconstruction and Modernism [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986], “How many were led to read Hegel and other monuments of the philosophical tradition by an interest in, a wish to understand, Lacan or Derrida?” (xvi) Less neutral, but important for this opening section of this chapter, is Michel Beaujour’s insightfully arrogant contribution to why Deconstruction is/in America ed., Anselm Haverkamp (New York: New York University Press, 1995). He observes that where French students have an obligatory philosophical education, American (and Australian) non-philosophy-majoring humanities students mostly encounter ‘philosophical ideas’ “on an ad hoc and ‘need-to-know’ [basis]...[He cites as evidence the following remembrance by a student of Paul de Man:] ‘We read [philosophic texts] in order to understand why we must read them.’” (87,91) He goes on to observe of this education-in-reverse that “the initial appeal of the philosophical criticism that turned into ‘deconstruction’ resided precisely in its difficulty, its specific philosophical difficulty. A few bright and increasingly disaffected students hoped that this kind of difficulty would redeem the mediocrity they had been expected to emulate.” (89)

2 Throughout this chapter I will at times put scare quotes around the name Heidegger. This is mostly to draw attention to when Heidegger’s name is being used as a metonym for his teachings in this thesis. At this point however, it is to underline Heidegger’s initial strangeness to a would-be learner, something captured by T.Oudemans’ comments and citation: “Not only can no object of this thinking be found, it is equally impossible to speak of a subject of this thinking, or of its addressee. The ‘author’ of this work is not ‘somebody’, a ‘person’ called Heidegger. The only sense in which we can speak of an ‘I’ —...— is by pointing in the direction of ‘somebody’ who is not yet there, who only becomes what he is in the concrete enactment of fundamental-philosophical questioning... ‘We’ read in the Beiträge, “No one understands what ‘I’ am thinking, because every one understands ‘my’ attempt by tying it to what has gone before (and in so doing, leaving it to indifference). And whoever will understand ‘my’ attempt does not need it.”” (“Heidegger: Reading
There are very few commentators who have addressed the process of learning 'Heidegger' and even fewer who have ever explored the concept of learning in 'Heidegger' (though there are some 'Heidegger' commentators who have elsewhere explored questions concerning learning: see for example J. Glenn. Gray’s *The Promise of Wisdom* [New York: Harper & Row: 1968], B & W. Brogan’s “The Socratic Questioner: Teaching and Learning in the Dialogical Classroom” *Educational Forum* v59 (Spring 1995)). On the other hand, all commentary is concerned with how to learn (with/from) what is being commented upon. One of the best and only examples of an attempt to explicate the process by which Heidegger is teaching is R. Mugerauer’s *Heidegger’s Language and Thinking* [Atlantic Highlands: Humanities, 1985], a book which was one of the origins of this thesis, offering a careful description of the learning process at work in *What is Called Thinking?* and "A Dialogue on Language" amongst others. I will discuss other examples (by Sapiora, Götz and Gendlin) below. Such contributions to explicating the process of learning ‘Heidegger’ however tend to emphasise Heidegger’s later work and the relation between his languaging and how it teaches us to think. (I should note that I am not at all taking up the question of Heidegger’s teachings on language as they may inform the language of his teachings: see however, Christopher Fynsk’s *Language and Relation... that there is language* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996].) For a related reason, such commentaries are also often symptomatic for this thesis insofar as they almost completely take for granted the notion of learning; they are concerned only with 'how to learn to think', never 'how to learn to think'.

Robert Bernasconi opens *Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing* [New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993] by observing the increasing confidence underwriting the proliferation of research on, and now questioning of, Heidegger. He cites David Kolb’s 1991 survey of Heidegger research which indicated that a third of all articles on Heidegger were written in the previous 5 years. With the deluge of responses to the re-emergence of Heidegger’s Nazism appearing throughout the early and mid 90s, that figure could now well be more than half.

In this context, note the following “double nostalgia” by Krell, one of the leading Heidegger translators, citing Gary, another prominent earlier Heidegger translator: “In response to a frequent request of mine to put some intricate terminology of his writings into simpler German, Heidegger would become motionless and absorbed totally in the matter before him. I sat close beside him at his desk, making occasional notes of his explanations. It was never possible for me to anticipate what would come from his lips after such concentration; my presumed interpretations proved to be often on a false track. He himself frequently commented ruefully that he should have put the matter differently. On one such occasion I cried out without really intending to: ‘I always feel like a rank
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beginner with your philosophy, Herr Heidegger!" To which he responded just as spontaneously: “That’s the way I feel every morning.” D.Krell “Results” Monist v64 n4 (1981), 477.

I should note that in my opinion some of the best attempts at foregrounding the process of learning Heidegger — though again in reference to his languaging — as a way of accessing what it is that Heidegger is teaching have been set out by translators of Heidegger. For exemplary instances, see the work of Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad, for instance their Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading [Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986].

6 An interesting recent example in this regard from the current Heidegger scholarship scene is the Lovitts’ 2 volume work, Modern Technology in the Heideggerian Perspective (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995). Whilst offering an enormous commentary, they are critical of commentary. In their “Author’s Prologue” they emphasize that “Throughout our study our inquiring attention will be directed solely toward Heidegger’s own formulations of his thought. No cognizance will be taken of interpretations other than our own. Having confidence in the rightness of many of our own insights and in the understanding of Heidegger’s work out of which we speak, we have made bold not to call upon any other voice for the offering of diverse interpretations might well entice the reader to step away from direct involvement in thinking steadily forward through what Heidegger is saying and might lead him or her simply to think about the particular point that was at issue.” (11-12) Mugerauer is even more ambiguous, arguing that each must win his or her own understandings, but then are obliged to share them with others: see the concluding chapter of Heidegger’s Thinking and Language.

7 Heidegger himself frequently disparaged such a ‘school’ as an obstacle to learning. For one amongst such deprecations: “Real understanding never proves itself in rote-saying, but rather in the force of carrying understanding over into real action, into objective performance, which never and in no way consists in the first place in adding to the philosophical literature.” (GA 29-30 434; cf the translation FCM 300).

Participants in the ‘school’ can nonetheless repeat this charge. The translation just quoted is from a citation given in Oudeman’s important “Heidegger: Reading against the Grain”: “The entire Heidegger-literature bypasses Heidegger in a specific way. When this happens this literature is against Heidegger. No matter how multifaceted and correct the interpretations of Heidegger may be, they still leave ‘something’ untouched through their way of asking. This ‘something’ cannot be indicated in any specific regard. A curious indifference encircling the Heidegger-literature manifests itself.... What remarkable phenomenon is this, that a cloud of oblivion, the dying breath of Vorhandenheit has shrouded all secondary literature about Heidegger?... If Heidegger’s thinking is not thinking about but, as will be pointed out, shifts within the movement that is inherent to any thinking about, then any interpretation of Heidegger that speaks about his work has already moved away from it has vaulted over it... Only a metamorphosis (Verwandlung) of author and reader, a breaking-through the supposedly necessary solidarity of the ‘we’ of philosophical discourse, makes the writing of Heidegger...
possible as well as ‘our’ answering to this possibility... The question is how this metamorphosis of writer and reader can occur... The aporia of not knowing where and how to begin with Heidegger is needed in order to get into his way of thinking at all, which is to experience and articulate its impossibility.” (35-7)

8 It will be significant for the final chapter of the first part of this thesis that this exemplary protreptic occurs during Heidegger’s retrieval of his earlier ‘formal indication’ learning method: a formally indicative concept is one where “the meaning-content of these concepts does not directly intend or express what they refer to, but only gives an indication, a pointer to the fact that anyone who seeks to understand is called upon by this conceptual context to undertake a transformation of themselves in their Dasein.” (FCM 297)

9 In his 1920-21 The Phenomenology of Religion, Heidegger describes the method he will use to learn the nature of ‘faith’ as a delaying, Retardierung. Hent de Vries, in reporting this course, notes that “this structure which enables all experience as well as all theoretization... allows one to see the world, one’s own world, in its very genesthai, becoming or throwness, as the result not of fate or more contingency, but of an act of creation and of grace. That which would have seemed to come before, the already-where, is seen — or repeated [earlier, de Vries refers to it as having been “re-enacted”] — in this early lecture course as that which comes, if not in fact, then at least in its very essence, ‘later’, or as that which is not yet but remains still and, perhaps forever, to come.” “Formal Indications” Modern Language Notes n113 (1988), 644. To translate this back into the terms of this thesis, by slowing down learning, we will learn that we still need to (re)learn what we think we have already learnt.

10 The section of Carnap’s “The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” that dismisses Heidegger’s essay is reproduced in M.Murray ed., Heidegger and Modern Philosophy [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978]. Michael Murray in his “Editor’s Commentary” to L.Wittgenstein’s journal entry “On Heidegger on Being and Dread” notes that Carnap’s account of “What is Metaphysics?” provided “analytical philosophers with a supposed paradigm of the worst”, suggesting that Ayer’s and Quine’s similarly dismissive comments, “borrow their knowledge of Heidegger from Carnap.” (82fn)

11 Carnap “The Overcoming of Metaphysics”, 27.

12 Carnap’s anxiety is belied by his defensiveness: “Let us now take a look at some examples of metaphysical pseudostatements of a kind where the violation of logical syntax is especially obvious, though they accord with historical-grammatical syntax. We select a few sentences from that metaphysical school which at present exerts the strongest influence in Germany”, to which he appends the footnote, “We could just as well have selected passages from any of the numerous metaphysicians of the present or the past; yet the selected passages seem to us to illustrate our thesis especially well.” (23, my emphasis in both citations)
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13 Carnap “The Overcoming of Metaphysics”, 32.

14 The terms refer to Kant’s third Critique of Judgement: i.e., these are inconceivable or unpresentable emotions only, at best only subjective claims to universality, never objective statements. Gadamer’s summary elucidates Carnap’s deprecation: “The taste of the observer can no more be comprehended as the application of concepts, norms or rules than the genius of the artist can. What sets the beautiful apart cannot be exhibited as a determinate, knowable property of an object; rather it manifests itself in a subjective factor: the intensification of the Lebensgefühl [life feeling] through the harmonious correspondence of imagination and understanding.” “The Truth of the Work of Art” in Heidegger Ways, 100. Kant of course came to see the extent to which we can and do nonetheless learn (from) such unreasonable experiences, and it is this Kant of the transcendental imagination and the schematism that ‘Heidegger’ will appropriate, explicitly in relation to learning things, between 1927 and 1937.

15 Carnap’s “The Overcoming of Metaphysics”, 32.

16 Wittgenstein, in a fragment on Heidegger written in 1929, will be more generous, and rigorous, and call what Heideggerian metaphysics teaches, “Ethics”. “Everything which we feel like saying can, a priori, only be nonsense. Nevertheless, we do run up against the limits of language... This running-up against the limits of language is Ethics... The tendency represented by the running-up against points to something.” “On Heidegger on Being and Dread”, 81-2.

17 Carnap “The Overcoming of Metaphysics”, 33-4.

18 For instance, Carnap ends this section of his essay by applauding Nietzsche’s shift from metaphysics to poetry: but as Heidegger will teach us, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is nothing but the figure of the teacher.

19 Carnap “The Overcoming of Metaphysics”, 33.

20 Heidegger speaks of [∴ΕΨΟŒΖ throughout his teachings. The most extensive analysis is at the end of “On the Essence and Concept of >εŒΖ” in Pathmarks, 225-230, though it is worth quoting the definition given in the The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: “All telling refusal [Versagen] is in itself a telling [Sagen], i.e., a making manifest.” (FCM 140)

21 As Krell observes, “It is intriguing to work through the ‘schema’ of section 5 [of Carnap’s essay, where he maps all the pseudo-statements in Heidegger’s essay on ‘the nothing’ to learn the extent to which Carnap and Heidegger agree.” Translator’s note, Heidegger Nietzsche v2, 103. Krell is alluding to the fact that Heidegger makes clear that he is making use of ‘nothing’ strategically, precisely because it is that about which nothing can be said directly: as we will see, it is the formal indicator par excellence. Gadamer says the same thing: “In his critique, Carnap repeated and critically sharpened all of the objections Heidegger himself had discussed in the section of the lecture where he prepared for the question concerning ‘nothing’ and expressed his doubts about such a question.” (“What is Metaphysics?” in Heidegger’s Ways [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994], 46)
That the learning that Heidegger is employing in a extreme way is in fact at work everywhere, even in Carnap, is evident in one of Heidegger’s references to Carnap. Importantly, Heidegger seeks to learn from Carnap in this instance, rather than merely reciprocating with an exclusive either/or. In a letter written in 1964 providing "Some Pointers" to “The Theological Discussion of ‘The Problem of Nonobjectifying Thinking and Speaking in Today’s Theology” (included as an Appendix to “Phenomenology and Theology” in Pathmarks) Heidegger describes the “most extreme counter-positions” of “the philosophy of our day” by the formula "(Carnap → Heidegger)… One calls these positions the technical scientific view of language and the speculative-hermeneutical experience of language.” (PT 56) Heidegger then advises the Conference that the former does not hold the monopoly on ways of thinking, especially in regard to concrete thinking: “Our everyday experience of things in the wide sense of the world, is neither objectifying nor a placing over against... It just might be erroneous to suppose that only that which can be objectively calculated and proven technically and scientifically as an object is capable of being.” (PT 58) Heidegger adds wryly, and with significant pertinence to this chapter, that “This erroneous opinion is oblivious of something said long ago that Aristotle wrote down: ‘It is the mark of not being properly brought up [apaideusia – lacking learning] not to see in relation to what it is necessary to seek proofs and when this is not necessary.’” (PT 59)

22 Many have drawn attention to this fact, but mostly only in passing. See for instance, Fred Dallmayer’s “Heidegger, Hölderlin and Politics” in The Other Heidegger [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993]: “Despite the mountain of pages he has written, one should realize that Heidegger was first and foremost not a writer of books or treatises but a teacher.” (133)

23 See for instance Glenn Gary’s “Introduction” to What is Called Thinking?, where he notes that “At [Heidegger’s] expressed wish we have placed these Studenaubergänge at the beginning of each lecture, rather than grouping them at the back of the two parts of the book as in the German edition... Such repetition occurs naturally in every lecture course and these lectures were not revised for publication, as a note on the flyleaf informs us... In these and other ways Heidegger the teacher is revealed.” (vii)

24 Heidegger takes much care in his titling, frequently drawing attention to his titles and explaining how they are instructive. It is well known for instance that What is Called Thinking? is almost entirely a meditation on the carefully designed polysemic title. For the best account of this process, explicitly in relation to learning, see R.Mugerauer’s chapter “Learning to Think” in Heidegger’s Language and Thinking: “What is Called Thinking? does not begin with the first sentence on the first page. By then the book already has begun, and we are underway with Heidegger. It starts instead with the title. The title announces the subject matter by raising a question. Or rather, it raises up the subject matter — thinking — as questionable. Presumably the book answers the question it raises by telling us about thinking, gradually replacing the question with positive answers... or [so]
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to would seem... [or] else would we trust him or want to read it at all?” (63) For another example see the “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics?’” where Heidegger goes to some lengths to retrospectively account for what the title Being & Time projects, differentiating itself from “Existence and Time” and “Consciousness and Time”, but also “Being and Becoming, Being and Seeming, Being and Thinking or Being and Ought.” (ITM 285)

25 Even, what is poverty and what is reading? Concerning Heidegger’s 1945 piece “Warin besteht des Wesen der Armut?” — which Maly translates as, “What moves at the heart of poverty?” — see Maly’s “Reticence and Resonance in the Work of Translating” in B.Babich ed., From Phenomenology to Thought [Dordrecht: ; concerning Heidegger’s 1954 short piece “Was heisst Lesen?” — “What is called (for in)/what calls for reading/gathering?”, a translation is given in Maly & Emad’s Heidegger on Heraclitus, 123 – see Maly’s “Reading and Thinking” in J.Sallis ed., Reading Heidegger [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 199?]. Note that this analysis is still presuming that access to the content of Heidegger’s analyses has not yet occurred, that is to say, one has not yet realised the way in which Heidegger has asked from the start, ‘what is ‘what is...?’?, seeing it as merely a provisional and later metaphysically obstructive way of questioning.

26 Heidegger does add a note of caution without discouraging the characterisation. In the preface to the Preface to 1953 German publication, Heidegger imbues the title with a special instructiveness: “in order to understand fully in what sense and for what reason the term ‘metaphysics’ is included in the title, the reader must first have participated in the development of the lecture.” (vi)

27 The relation between the quidditas, essence, existence, copulae and beingness is clearly more complicated than I have set it out here. All this is of course at the very core of Heidegger’s topic: Heidegger is trying to get behind or beyond the metaphysical question as to what the essence of something is, to the question of what the essence of ‘isness’ is, that which makes possible not just possible ideals of essences, but really existent essents. In this regard see T.Sheehan’s clearly instructive “Heidegger’s Topic: Excess, Recess, Access” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie v41, esp. 615-25. In this section, I am deliberately using the perspective of the philosophical novice to access how we learn to learn from quidditae teaching. The point will become especially pertinent when I discuss formal indication at the end of this part, which, as T.Kisiel has noted, is what allowed ‘Heidegger’ to access all the ‘-ities’, ‘-hoods’ and ‘-nesses’ that characterise his teachings.

28 I.Götz “Heidegger and the Art of Teaching” Educational Theory, v33 n1 (1983), 7. Other work in this vein has been done in bringing continental thinking more generally to an elucidation of the nature of the learning and teaching process. See for instance D.Denton ed., Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education [New York: Teacher’s College Press, 1974] and D.Vandenberg Being and Education [Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1971]. This work unfortunately tends toward an uncritical
humanism, whether by way of aesthetics (education through art) or subjectivity (education as self-actualisation).

29 “Heidegger and the Art of Teaching”, 5. This point will prove to be pivotal to this thesis: this is the difference between learning as a projecting and learning as a technical project. To this extent, Götz is following the later Heidegger’s freer use of Greek terms, in which poiesis is relearned as an appropriative response to Technology, a recovery of the techné that is the concealed essence of the modern productivist economy. From this thesis’ perspective, what Heidegger is talking about, and consequently Götz too in this anti-representational instance, is something that is perhaps better learned as a form of praxis.

30 H.Arendt “For Martin Heidegger’s Eightieth Birthday” in G.Neske & E.Kettering Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers trans. L.Harries (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 209. Gadamer gives a number of other testimonies in this regard in his Heidegger’s Ways [Albany: State University of New York, 1994], both concerning the early and the later Heidegger: “Heidegger entranced an entire generation with his lectures and publications. It was almost life threatening – and presented the organiser with nearly unsolvable problems – when Heidegger would announce one of his cryptic lectures. No lecture hall was large enough during the 1950s. The excitement that emanated from his thinking was picked up by everyone, even by those who did not understand him.” (11)

31 Arendt’s ‘thinking’ is of course in no way abstract, and not even a notion: it is rather an action, that is, a making appear. Her Festschrift goes on to elaborate what this “uncontemplative activity” that characterises Heidegger’s teachings entails: “This thinking may set itself tasks. It may deal with ‘problems.’ It is of course, always concerned with, or more exactly, excited by, something specific; but it cannot be said that it has a goal. It is unceasingly active, and even laying down of paths serves more to open up a new dimension than to head toward a goal that has been previously sighted.” (210)

32 “Now Heidegger is not saying that we simply should accept without reason what he says… Heidegger is actually making a simply point: either we hold that he sees more than we do and that he can teach us, or we do not… our trust [deos] not involve believing that he has seen or said, or could say, all that is needed to think what is called for – or calls for – thinking… His presupposition [is rather] that there is the teaching and learning of thinking here.” (Mugerauer Heidegger’s Language and Thinking, 170)

33 On the use of ‘Heidegger’ as a metonym for Heidegger’s teachings, see Derrida’s essay “Interpreting Signatures (Nietzsche/Heidegger): Two Questions” in L.Rickels ed., Looking After Nietzsche [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990]. Heidegger’s argument is that who a philosopher in the history of western metaphysics is, is defined completely by what they taught to the history of western metaphysics (or more exactly, what metaphysics taught them to teach human
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beings). A life is nothing but what is learnt in it, by it and from it. Derrida cites Heidegger citing Nietzsche: “Life as a means to knowledge.” (10) As a result, I will also use the pronoun ‘it’ to refer to ‘Heidegger’ rather than the personal pronoun.

The pragmatic point for this chapter is that when I say something like, ‘what we can learn (with/from) ‘Heidegger’’, I am referring to his teachings and not to his biography. I am not referring, for instance, to learning either how to be a Nazi (with Heidegger [no scare quotes]) or how not to be a Nazi (from Heidegger [no scare quotes]) – though these are important things to learn (the one not being possible without the other), the question being how. To pre-empt Part Two, it takes a certain fascism to learn how to avoid being a fascist.

34 One of the quickest ways into this understanding of ‘Heidegger’ is via Rorty’s accounts of ‘Heidegger’, though, in a strategy that mimes Heidegger’s critical self-projection onto Nietzsche, Rorty finds fault with Heidegger for believing his own rhetoric, mistaking his pedagogical tools for realities: see for instance, “Self-Creation and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche and Heidegger”, in Contingency, Irony, Solidarity [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989].

35 For a very interesting way of explaining this processual aspect to ‘Heidegger’, see Geoffrey Waite’s “On Esotericism: Heidegger and/or Cassirer at Davos” Political Theory v26 n5 (October 1998). Waite argues that Heidegger’s teachings must be understood as exo-esoteric, that is, as public disclosures that there is something private going on. This means that nothing said in the public realm can be taken at face value: none of it is yet essential, precisely because it is essentially pragmatic. Waite uses this to disclose the misinterpretations to which ‘Heidegger’ is subject when public presentations are taken to be merely exoteric.

36 I write it this way – with a small caps ‘h’ (which will be a regular capital at the beginning of a sentence), signalling its difference from both the participle and the substantive – to demonstrate what has been learned via all the differing translation attempts to signal what should be learned with and as this notion.

37 Being of a poststructural generation, I learned about this process in Heidegger from Derrida, though he was teaching what he had learned from Heidegger: see the opening of Of Grammatology trans.G.Spivak [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974] and Spivak’s “Translator’s Preface” with its famous claim that everything in Derrida and Heidegger must be thought to be sous rature, that is, to be relearned.

38 Here I am thinking in particular about when Heidegger is learned as philosopher of technology. This substantive focus proves productive, even to the extent that it furthers hard- and software development: see T.Winograd “Heidegger and Computer Systems” in A.Feenburg & A.Hanny eds Technology and the Politics of Knowledge [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995]. In this case, it is fairly apparent that nothing of the ‘Heidegger’ that teaches the metaphysical danger of technology has been learned. Less stark is the insightful ‘pick and choose’ approach of someone...
like D.Ihde. At the other end, are those who learn nothing, seeking only to criticise Heidegger for
his failure as philosopher of technology; see for example T.Rockmore’s “Heidegger on Technology
and Democracy” also in Technology and the Politics of Knowledge.

This point is recognized by Michael Zimmerman in a context that will be taken up in this
thesis’ Conclusion: “Today, faced with an environmental crisis that results largely from the attempt
to improve the world through industrialization, we hear much talk about the need to learn to dwell
in harmony with the earth... The problem however, is whether we understand what Heidegger
means. Many of us like to think we do. Despite our talk about the need for a paradigm shift in
thinking, we tend to think this shift merely involves a reorientation of certain concepts or an
adoption of a new vocabulary that will lead to more efficacious action. We are not convinced that a
real change in thinking requires a fundamental change in our very existence, a change that would
not be comprehensible to the ways in which we currently think. Because of our strong commitment
to action in the face of the present crisis, we assume that it was enough for Heidegger to have
undergone this existential shift. We, however, do not need to do so. For us, it is enough to put into
practice what this great thinker and others like him had to say. ‘Letting being be’ becomes a slogan
to guide our planning and organizing in ways that decrease the impact of human activity on the
biosphere. We even try to design houses in line with what Heidegger supposedly means by true
‘dwelling’. “The Role of Spiritual Discipline in Learning to Dwell on Earth” in D.Seamon &
R.Mugerauer eds Dwelling, Place and Environment: Towards a Phenomenology of Person and World

An exemplary reading of ‘Heidegger’ as a performative teaching, where notions are less
containers of content than stylistic shifters, is Michael Sipiora’s “Heidegger and Epideictic
Discourse: The Rhetorical Performance of Meditative Thinking” in Philosophy Today (Fall 1991). In
line with my argument, Sipiora begins with the recognition that Heidegger “was, first and foremost,
a teacher – a teacher of the craft of thinking.” (239) In a close reading of Heidegger’s “Messkirch’s
Seventh Centennial”, Sipiora maps the “relatedness” with which Heidegger works in order to
demonstrate “destining”, with the result that the audience or reader is not persuaded by the
presentation’s rhetoric, but learns to see the “powerful persuasion” at work in the world by which
things are only disclosed in certain ways (i.e., as technological challenges).

ZPD is seen as recasting the teacher as a consultant-master to an apprentice rather than as an
authority to a student. In this more demonstrative and thus collaborative context, the process of
ZPD is renamed LPP, Legitimate Peripheral Participation or Situated Learning. What this thesis is
attempting to retrieve is the significance of the projection of an authority, not merely in the form of
the teacher, but as the essentiality of what is to-be-learned. Apprenticeship is in this regard a useful
analogy since in a nostalgic sense, there is something essentialising about learning process: it is
precisely the to-be-learned’s essential qualities – its having to do with the inherent quality of the
wood and the tools and their interrelation for example – that prevents it being spoken or identified in an alienated fashion.


43 Cook *Computers and the Collaborative Experience of Learning*, 89. This appropriation, or very exactly what P. Lacoue-Labarth calls mimetology, is most powerfully described by D. Schön in relation to the studio learning of design, or what he calls a ‘practicum’: see *Educating the Reflective Practitioner* [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987]. Importantly, despite his privileging of the experiential aspects of the learning process, the activist side of constructivism, he nonetheless notes the foundational projection required to turn the experience of the practicum into a learnable one: “A practicum is a setting designed for the task of learning a practice... When a student enters a practicum, she is presented explicitly or implicitly with certain fundamental tasks. She must learn to recognize competent practice... She must come to terms with the claims implicit in the practicum: that a practice exists, worth learning, learnable by her, and represented in its essential features by the practicum.” (37-8)

44 Part Two will describe this as a *praxis*, where the *telos* does not lie outside the action, but in it as what the action already-has-by-being-on-the-way.

45 One of the best readings of Heidegger’s method in this regard is Eugene Gendlin’s short essay “Dwelling” in H. Silverman, A. Mickunas, T. Kisiel & A. Lingis eds *The Horizon of Continental Philosophy: Essays on Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau Ponty*, [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988]. In setting up his account of “following” Heidegger’s “dwelling” on or with words so that they come to mean firstly two distinct things simultaneously and then a whole new thing, Gendlin notes the following: “We are accustomed to understand Heidegger’s thrust beyond what is already formed. We are familiar with his attempt always to point beyond the already made, to the making, the poetizing, and to the opening for that poetizing. We are familiar with his efforts to take down the structures that hide this opening.” (137) What Gendlin goes on to call opening is what I am calling learning: “To ‘open’ words is nothing like giving them a plain new definition, as if to say, ‘I define...’ One cannot pour fresh meaning into them, as if one first emptied them. The old meanings they bring are essential to their new working. In this sense of ‘new’, [Heidegger] ‘opens’ the words.” (142) That this is a process of learning is shown by Gendlin’s attempt to describe its constructivism, that nonetheless manifests as what is (already): “Genuine thinking is dwelling and dwelling is in essence poetic. The poetic moves beyond the formed, but not without the formed, rather with it beyond it... Poetizing is neither making nor finding but both in a new sense. Again, we could say it is a contradiction, he wants it both ways, both made and found, but the words don’t make a new sense alone. Do we follow him to a new sense? Here it is new sense about new sense-making, beyond already-cut and formed things, and yet with them, over them.” (138-9) This interactive process of
meaning creation, which Gendlin has made a business of expanding into many other areas of life under the title 'focusing', is indistinguishable from Vygotskian educational processes.
Chapter Two
Learning Ways

Any path risks going astray, leading astray. To follow such paths takes practice in going. Practice needs craft. Stay on the path, in genuine need, and learn the craft of thinking, unswerving, yet erring.

Heidegger “Letter to a Young Student”

Chapter One proposed that as per Carnap’s criticisms, ‘Heidegger’ elicits a projection of essentiality that powers the learning by which his abstractions come to be realised. I have also noted that whilst this projection of ‘Heidegger’ as something to be learnt can be characterised as occurring in response to the way ‘Heidegger’ purports to be teaching something in particular, the essential nature of the projection means that the content is acknowledged to be merely a part of the learning process, rather than its end-point.

There is a risk however that the trajectory taken so far might be thought to be reducing ‘Heidegger’ to an adept series of educational strategies, employing what can at the most be characterised as heuristics. This interpretation misses, I believe, what is essential about the learning (from/with) ‘Heidegger’ process. It understates the role that essentiality, as the key driving projection, plays in that process. In other words, if ‘Heidegger’ can be understood as a type of ZPD, the constructivism that informs this descriptor must not be allowed to conceal the essentialism with which it works. In this chapter, I want to attempt to further clarify how we are beginning to understand the essence of learning employed in ‘Heidegger’, but in a way that re-emphasises the necessities being instituted.

‘Heidegger’, the Ways

In a certain respect, many commentators are currently granting ‘Heidegger’ a constitutive relation to learning, but not in an essentially constructive way. There is an important distinction to make here if we are to learn about the essence of learning.

The interpretation — rather than an active projection — that is being promoted takes its lead from Heidegger’s motto, placed at the head of the Complete Edition: Wege, nicht
Werke. If understood as an *apologia*, it can be argued that such a move was not only retrospective. Throughout his life, Heidegger entitled the publications of collections of his essays with similarly self-deprecating titles: *Holzwege* — (errant) woodpaths; *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* — from the (wandering) experience of thinking; *Vortrage und Aufsatze* — lectures and essays (or more literally, what has been dragged forth as a try out); *Unterwegs zur Sprache* — on the way to language; *Wegmarken* — pathmarks; plus the titles he gave to his smaller, privately published or unpublished works: *Der Feldweg* — the field-track; *Beitrage* — contributions; *Winke* — (hinting) signs; *Gelassenheit* — composure.

In one sense, these titles could be seen as concessions to the Carnapian accusation. They are withdrawing the claim of being teacherly theoretical accounts of what empirically and logically is, accepting instead their status as mere metaphysical speculations and suggestions. Certainly, this interpretation disparages any reification of the content, ensuring that it only ever be taken as a gesture toward a range of possibilities. The quidditae gathered under such titles become illustrative only, to be repeated by others only in other ways. They offer opportunities for learning, but since the titles under which they are gathered indicate that they are often failures, they no longer demand being approached for learning. There is no imperative to learn how the content being taught is a necessary way to the essential.

Representing ‘Heidegger’ in this way, as a multiple series of attempts at learning what is essential — what could be called the ‘liberal pluralist’ version of ‘Heidegger’ — is very much in fashion at the moment.² It certainly draws attention in one way to the relation between Heidegger and learning. However, where I have so far focused on the overall teacherly framework that is ‘Heidegger’, this perspective finds the traits of a classically humanist anti-pedagogue in Heidegger himself, the free individual.

Justification for this approach can be found by misreading, out of context, one of Heidegger’s best known statements about teaching:

[The real teacher’s] conduct, therefore, often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from him, if by ‘learning’ we now suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information. The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they... The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices. The teacher is far less assured of his ground than those who learn are of theirs. (WCT 15)³
A related justification is drawn from what we have now learnt to identify as Heidegger’s classic logocentrism. When two pages after this quotation, Heidegger endorses Socrates, the model teacher, as “the purest thinker of the West” because he did not seek refuge from the ‘draft of the withdrawing’ by writing, this can be understood in reference to his comments 10 years earlier in the Parmenides course, where typewriting — as opposed to the craft of thinking embodied in the movement of handwriting, but preferably speech (with live gestures) — is identified as a proto-technology that sets things in place, pressing them into a permanent substance.4 The thinking teacher is supposedly a less fixed entity, a more accessible and less totalising figure who is constantly changing as he or she struggles to teach something, teaching himself or herself at the same time as trying to teach others. As ‘Heidegger’ notes reflexively of his “Letter on Humanism”, “in the written form thinking easily loses its flexibility.” (LH 241) Since the results of thinking (though this is a thoroughly erroneous way of putting it) are not to be set in stone, the movements of the process become more significant.

According to this reading, Heidegger manifests the best practice of modern constructivist pedagogy, explaining his workings, teaching by presenting the process by which he learned what he is teaching, restaging his own scene of invention or discovery so that we can learn with him.5 In a very human(ist) way that only enhances the exemplarity of this romantic and even tragic educator, many of the paths this (non)master takes turn out to be dead-ends. He makes mistakes: he sometimes fails to teach, and learn.6 He is always shifting, learning from where he went wrong and heading off in another direction, attempting to teach (in) another way.

The merit of this interpretation is that it does reinforce how extensive a learner Heidegger was and how many times he managed to totally transform his teaching strategies. It should never be forgotten, that for someone who is caricatured as having only one concern, Heidegger’s career is marked by an incredible number of ‘turns’, each quite abrupt.7 Just as a teacher of academic philosophy, Heidegger had a formidable repertoire, and moreover, rarely repeated courses, presenting a different element of a philosopher or developing a wholly new perspective on that philosophy nearly every semester of his teaching career.8 Such an official résumé misses all the private changes and experiments that were occurring at the same time: for instance, the conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism and then the abandonment of religion; the constant attempt to learn about the directions of all the sciences and technology; the work using the Nietzschean aphoristic
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style; the reading and translation of Asian philosophies. It is clear that Heidegger’s biography demonstrates a continued search for other ways of learning other things. Here is someone who, at least in his own mind, is no accomplished pedagogue with the perfect way to teach: this is rather the stops-and-starts of a teacher who is ‘great’ because of his ever renewed, continually learning, ways of teaching.

And yet.

‘Heidegger’, the Necessities

I am risking hagiography by continuing in this vein, and this is partly the point, for it is here that we can start to see the limits of this way of bringing learning to ‘Heidegger’. This is the portrait of an individual, one whose diverse abilities to teach inevitably exceed our own and in fact has nothing to do with us. We remain at an admiring distance, under no instruction to follow any of these paths ourselves.

There are various reasons to believe that Heidegger actively sought to refuse this version of his career. His disparagement of biography in relation to philosophy is well known. However, when pressed about his own biography, Heidegger would mostly respond in the opposite way to that expected of one who had made so many changes: Heidegger would refuse to admit to previous errors and even refuse to admit to the existence of changes in his teaching. This is especially notable in regard to his Nazism. Heidegger insisted that he above all else should be judged in terms of the doctrine that each great thinker only has one thought.

To understand what is going on here, it is worth turning to the most famous academic example, when Heidegger discouraged Richardson’s thesis about a turn away from the phenomenology of ‘Heidegger I’ to the thought of the post-“Letter on Humanism” ‘Heidegger II’. In his letter to Richardson, Heidegger draws attention to the preface of the 1957 seventh edition of Being & Time, which notes that, despite the missing second half of the project and Heidegger’s teachings since, “its path still remains a necessary one even today, if the question of being is to move our Da-sein.” (BT 17). I would like to suggest that this sentence goes to the heart of learning ‘Heidegger’ in a way that forbids interpreting Heidegger as merely a series of ways of learning: to move our Dasein, to learn, requires going by way of necessity. What is at stake is played out already in the closing moments of Being & Time.
We can never inquire into the origin and the possibility of the ‘idea’ of being in general with the means of formal and logical ‘abstraction’, that is, not without a secure horizon for questions and answers. We must look for a way to illuminate the fundamental ontological question and follow it. Whether that way is at all the only one or even the right one can be decided only after we have followed it. (437)

The emphases here (Heidegger’s own) indicate that even though this is only a way, it must be treated as if it were of the way; to learn from it, we must project that it is a necessary path on the way; we must make a project of it, as if there were no other way, deducing oneself to that path in a way that constructs or institutes, that is to say, learns each ‘Heidegger’ as an essential aspect of the ‘Heidegger’.15

In this regard, the key term amongst Heidegger’s metatitles is Holzwege, literally wood-paths. The pluralist interpretation of ‘Heidegger’, the learner, seizes on the colloquial meaning of this term: wrong-track or dead-end, as in, ‘If you think that I am going to give this up, you’re on a Holzweg!’ Heidegger’s most important essays therefore almost seem to be indications of paths not to take. The more concessional version admits that there is something to be learned from these paths, either from the effort that must be put into them in spite of their inevitable failure, or from the way they teach us to be at home with not getting through the forest, tolerating and even celebrating our own finitude when we end up at an impenetrable thicket.16 But in this case, there is still no necessity, no compulsion, to pursue these paths; at best one stumbles upon them, and hopefully learns — but learns what, and how and why?

Against this reading, I would suggest that it is important to remember that from the perspective of the wood-cutter, the paths have a clear direction and a necessary purpose. They are not failures, but successes, opening a clearing, bringing home wood, and then allowing regeneration. A wood-path is a path of necessity, not a path of experimentation: each is not what is left by a random process of trial-and-error, but an essential project; each path is essential to the process of learning to live in and with the forest; and each path will only yield when it is treated with respect to its own necessity. To this extent, such woodpaths only remain paths, that is, only remain open, so long as one keeps on working and working them; they must be maintained, sustained by constant movement along them. They are ways not because they are under way in the sense of being incomplete, but in the sense of always being in motion, sites of constant relearning.
Thus Being & Time notes that “No matter how provisional the analysis may be, it always demands the securing of the correct beginning.” (BT 41) Being & Time is in the end nothing but the demonstration of the necessities, the existentiales, only by which one can learn the fundamental ontological aspects of existence. These necessitous ways of learning are not merely posited by Heidegger as necessary; their necessity arises only when we, the learners, project them as necessary. That is to say, the necessity that is required to mobilise learning cannot merely be imposed by a teacher, but is only ever that which is co-posited by the teacher and the learner. It is precisely a performed necessity, an inter-necessitating, which is why the teacher and the learner can be thought to only come to be as a teacher and a learner together, as necessities of the learning process that is thereby underway.

I will come back to this acted-out aspect of the projection that builds the path up into an essential learning way in chapter five, but for now it suffices to see the way ‘the way’ is described in What is Called Thinking?. ‘Heidegger’ explicitly rejects interpreting a path at the outset as errant: “It always remains possible, of course, and every so often actually is the case, that we dislike a way of this sort from the start, because we consider it hopeless or superfluous, or because we consider it foolishness. If that is our attitude, we should refrain from looking at the way even from the outside.” (WCT 170) Only the “unavoidable way will lead to the most precursory step.” (WCT 160) And the way to get to ‘the unavoidability’ of that way is to join with ‘Heidegger’ in the act of projecting it as such, making it necessary: “We respond to the way only by remaining underway... In order to get underway, we do have to set out. This is meant in a double sense: for one thing, we have to open ourselves to the emerging prospect and direction of the way itself; and then, we must get on the way, that is, must take the steps by which alone the way becomes a way... The way that is cleared does not remain behind, but is built into the next step, and is projected forward from it.” (169-170)

When Heidegger is interpreted from a pluralist and thus humanist perspective this reflexive necessity, the necessity to co-project, or make a joint-venture of, Heidegger’s necessity, is missed. None of the ways will lead to anything unless they are walked as if they are the necessary way to something. Whilst they may not go to where one thinks they will go, they do go somewhere. Every way is thus like a quidditas, which one knowingly takes up in order to relearn the essentials of the stated destination.

Allow me to put this more polemically. There is nothing more technological, more part of the subjective Gestell that turns everything into the endless procession of means,
than the notion of experimentation. If Heidegger’s multiple ways merely offer take-it-or-leave-it opportunities for learning, they have become a standing-reserve like so much lumber for sale. This is why even though the whole of ‘Heidegger’ exists as a teaching, each of these teachings must not be represented as merely heuristical. Each will only teach if seen to be not just a guide or rule-of-thumb, or a series of tricks exploited by a skillful individual called Heidegger, but an essential way to the essential.17

‘Heidegger’, the Learner

This point, about the fact that Heidegger’s ways can only be educational because of their necessity rather than their contingency, which is how they appear if attributed to the human(ist) Heidegger, needs some very significant clarification.

It is possible to derive a sense of necessity for Heidegger’s ways by suggesting that each turn embodies a moment in which Heidegger was forced to change because of what he encountered, either in philosophy or more especially in the world.

Heidegger scholarship attests to the fact that Heidegger’s frequent turns were occasioned by how much he learned from the philosophers he taught. For instance, Heidegger certainly learned anew several times decisive things about being and time from his constant re-examination of Ancient Greek philosophy. Something he learned from Kant and Hegel obstructed the project of deconstructively relearning the history of ontology that was to complete Being & Time. Things he learned from Hölderlin and Nietzsche and Ancient Greek tragedy were part of his embrace of Nazism. Heidegger also claims that Nietzsche taught him about technology, and Asian philosophy about a way to respond to technology. And so on.

At each of these moments, it could be said that a philosopher appeared necessary to Heidegger to engage. One or other figure would arrive for Heidegger as an obstacle to his path, demanding a change in course and even method. Or otherwise, Heidegger can be seen as having to take up a philosopher because of what he learned about the world at the time.18 For instance, developments in biological science and its political appropriation demanded that he relearn the Ancient Greek texts on physis. The simultaneous aestheticisation of politics made Nietzsche doubly unavoidable, and the strident nationalism of the time demanded a reassessment of Hölderlin. The later realisation of nuclear science and cybernetics made a re-engagement with Leibniz necessary in order to learn the destinal history of metaphysics. And so on.
This historicisation of Heidegger’s learning and teaching gives his ways a type of necessity, but it is not a necessity that we today would find necessarily necessary, not one by which we today are always going to be compelled. The problem with this approach becomes particularly apparent when it is realised that this way of thinking about matters, whether philosophical or historical, runs counter to everything that ‘Heidegger’ teaches. For ‘Heidegger’, something is only some thing within a relational network that allows it to be; this is the point of the ontological difference, that no being is without being, whether that is the transcendence of Da-sein as being-in-the-world (i.e., being as always already meaningful) or the clearing relation between being and human being (i.e., being as always already unconcealed).19 It should not be possible in the ontology that Heidegger teaches for some thing, independent of us, to cause learning.

If Heidegger’s career involves a series of encounters in which he learned to change, unless those encounters are read proactively, with ‘Heidegger’ each time actively embarking on a project to learn to change, then everything ‘Heidegger’ taught about the ontological difference, about the fact that entities are not reducible to the merely actually present, is undermined by his own life: Heidegger becomes a fundamental hypocrite who was perpetually confronted from the outside by discrete entities, rocks on his pathway for instance, whether Nietzsche, Nazism or Technology, that forced him to change course.

This is also why this historicisation of Heidegger also employs thoroughly un-Heideggerian notions of history as a series of discrete events. Certainly Heidegger himself dedicates much time to teaching the historical necessity of his teaching, but in these arguments history is never something merely present causing learning to happen; it is something whose necessity or historicality one must project in order to learn. It is that with which one learns to learn, that which constructs some way as the only way. It is only from a history made necessary by being the screen for projections of epochal destiny that the abstract pursuits such as asking after the essence of things becomes necessary, that is educational.20

In summary, what I am arguing here is that for ‘Heidegger’, and thus for us, whether in regard to ‘Heidegger’ or anything else, there is no such thing as ‘learning from’; there is only ‘learning to’. Or to be less dramatic, one can only ‘learn from’ by actively seeking to learn from; one must, always, each time undertake to learn (how) to ‘learn from’. Learning only happens when one places oneself in the position to learn, when one formatively
appropriates a learning disposition. Projecting ‘Heidegger’ as this sort of learner is how Heidegger’s ways become sources of learning for us.

It is thus only when a certain way is recast as a certain way, when it is made to seem necessary, that it becomes educational. Learning begins to happen when what is being communicated is projected as having an essential design, a configuration that prefigures an essential redesign of all that is. This ‘design’ is not merely the intention of a particular Heidegger, but like all designed things, comes to be only when we users participate in that designing, redesigning ‘Heidegger’ as if it were designed for the essential task of learning.21 By proceeding along a particular path in a way that institutes it as essential by the learner, that that path comes to be transformative for the learner.
Endnotes for Chapter Two

1 The “Epilogue” to “The Thing”, 186. Pertinently, Heidegger is responding here to the question "whence does thinking about Being receive (to speak concisely) its directive?" (T 183) His answer is exemplary in its constructivist essentialising: “But it never occurs to anyone to ask whence Plato had a directive to think of Being as idea or whence Kant had the directive to think of Being as the transcendental character of objectness, as position (as posited). But maybe someday the answer to these questions can be gained from those ventures of thought which, like mine, look as though they were lawless caprice.” (185-6)

2 I refer in particular to the Introduction to van Buren’s The Young Heidegger [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994] entitled “Heidegger’s Autobiographies”. Here van Buren sets up his thesis that the early Heidegger not only prepared the way for the later teachings, but even constituted a series of more radical ways which became lost paths when the Ausgabe letzter Hand of Heidegger Inc. authorised the gerecht paths of thought, dismissing the “youthful leaps” as “mere byways (Umwege), errant ways (Abwege), blind alleys (Irrgänge) and a [mere] trace of the way (Wegspur)” (8-9) John Caputo has also endorsed this celebration of the early Heidegger over against the later Heidegger of the Geschick though with some different arguments: see Demythologizing Heidegger [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993]. This thesis is running a polemic against both these readings of Heidegger which I believe make it nearly impossible to essentially learn anything with ‘Heidegger’.

3 Note that my ellipsis here leaves out a crucial phrase which destroys the too-quick reading of this paragraph: “The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they — he has to learn to let them learn.” I will come back to this in Chapter Eight with reference to the original version of this idea which occurs in What is a Thing?, 73.

4 Derrida has on several occasions shown that Heidegger’s whole attitude toward the university is contaminated by the logocentrism of his demand that the essence of technology be nothing technical. For his most sustained examination of Heidegger’s almost ‘textbook’ deprecations of writing, see “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand” trans. J.P.Leavey, in J.Sallis ed., Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, esp. 179ff. It is important to note however the sentences that follow Heidegger’s affirmation of the way Socrates placed himself in the draft of what withdraws, that is taught: “For anyone who begins to write out of thoughtfulness must inevitably be like those who run to seek refuge from any draft too strong for them. An as yet hidden history still keeps the secret why all great thinkers after Socrates, with all their greatness, had to be such fugitives.” (WCT 17) In other words, there is a strategic necessity involved in writing, something that the relation between “ΞΩΓΟ[ΘΖ and ∴Ε_ΥΟ” (WCT 22) harbours.
5 This is for instance the way Greg Ulmer accounts for the drammaturgy of Heidegger’s essay “The Thing” in “Mystery: A Teletheory” in D. Kolb ed., The Current in Criticism. Ulmer is describing the process of teaching via mystery, which he characterises as “approach[ing] theory from the side of discovery, from the side of not yet knowing what it is, rather than from the side of verification, telling about it afterwards.” (346). For Ulmer, Heidegger’s essay is exemplary in the way it stages its own learning process with all the drama of a suspense movie (“Heidegger is the Hitchcock of the essay” (356)). Hence, it opens with a “disaster warning due to our failure to relate properly with things”, installing the “already-not-yet temporality of theory” (357): “With this enigma [“What then is the thing as thing that its essential nature has never yet been able to appear?”] and its promise of solution I am completely hooked (lured into this sequence with the hope of seeing a completely other monster).” (358) In relation to what I am arguing in this section, Ulmer’s account presents a more useful version of the way Carnap reads Heidegger’s ability to teach. However, I am presently arguing that this ‘temptation model’ does not reach the active projection of necessity that is required of the learner for learning to take place. Thus whereas Ulmer describes the conclusion of Heidegger’s essay as a shaggy-dog story, my version of the learning process would suggest that the learner never expected a solution, being aware from the start that they were seeking what is essential and therefore in withdrawal before any substantive content being taught.

6 This is Mugerauer’s argument in Chapter One of his Heidegger’s Language and Thinking [Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1988].

7 Kisiel notes this, after noting Hiedegger’s skiing prowess: “His stamina and endurance are, of course, especially manifest in his superabundant capacity for disciplined tenacious and frenetic intellectual work over a career of some sixty years, which finds its tangible proof and final embodiment in the staggering range and variety of thought experiments (‘Denkwege’) to be found in the hundred-plus volumes of his Gesamtausgabe.” (“Heidegger’s Apology” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal v14-15 n2-1 (1991), 392)

8 In parallel with a perpetual interrogation of the Ancient Greeks – Aristotle (1916, 1921-31, 1940, 1944, 1951-2), Plato (1924, 1930, 1932, 1941-2), Anaximander (1932, 1946), Parmenides (1932, 1942), Heraclitus (1943-4, 1966-7), Sophocles (1935, 1942), etc – Heidegger undertook one of the most extensive pedagogical surveys of Western philosophy – Dun Scotus (1915), Kant (1916, 1923, 1927-30, 1933, 1935, 1941, 1961), Fichte (1916, 1929, 1933) Dilthey, Augustine (1921, 1930), Sextus Empiricus (1923), Descartes (1920, 1923, 1925, Aquinas (1926), Leibniz (1928-29, 1933, 1935, 1940, 1944, 1955), Hegel (1925, 1927, 1930, 1934-5, 1938-43, 1955, 1958), Holderlin (19346, 1941-3, 1946, 1951), Schelling (1929-30, 1936, 1941), Schiller (1936, 1941), Nietzsche (1936-46), etc. These dates are not definitive. They are taken from Richardson’s inaccurate list of Heidegger’s lectures (see the Appendices to Through Phenomenology to Thought), the list of Gesamtausgabe volumes, and the Heidegger Annotated Bibliography. The dates indicate the year in which
Heidegger thematically taught the philosopher. Elided dates indicate a number of seminars throughout those years. Many philosophers have been left off as have all passing examinations of philosophers amongst other teachings.


10 Derrida has noted how frequently Heidegger uses this phrase to completely change tack precisely when one thinks one has learned all there is to learn: “There the matter seems settled, it might be said. And yet! Und dennoch! (Heidegger uses this rhetorical turn more often than one would think: and yet, exclamation mark, next paragraph).” “Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference” in P.Kamuf ed., Derrida: Between the Blinds [New York: Columbia University Press, 1991].

11 John Caputo notes in the opening of his short essay “The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Study of Heideggerian Self-Criticism” in Southern Journal of Philosophy v13 (1975) that “Heidegger does not often criticize his own writings. More often, as in “A Letter on Humanism”, he ‘rereads’ the early writings, subjecting them to a bit of ‘hermeneutical violence’ such as he is wont to give to other luminaries in the history of Western philosophy. Moreover, he not only implies that this later interpretation, which is obviously inspired by the course his writings have actually taken since 1930, is the correct one, but that it is what he himself actually had in mind in the late 1920s.” (319) Caputo’s essay takes up one of the few occasions when Heidegger does admit to an earlier failing, that being the correction of the 1929 “The Essence of Reasons” in the 1957 “The Principle of Reason”. The other notable correction is of his assertion in “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” that it was Plato who introduced the identification of aletheia with orthotes-homiosis in “The End of Philosophy and the Path of Thinking” in On Time and Being [New York: Harper, 1972]. Heidegger was however highly critical of his own early Freiburg lectures, as noted in van Buren’s “Heidegger’s Autobiographies” in The Young Heidegger.

12 “Learning to think multiple meanings then, means learning to make our way to the unity behind what individual thinkers and poets and groups of thinkers and poets think and say, until we at least arrive in the neighbourhood of the final unity behind all particular multiple meanings and their locally unifying meanings.” (Mugerauer, Heidegger’s Language and Thinking, 169

13 “Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of Being & Time is decisively ful-filled (ergänzt) in the thinking of the reversal. He alone can ful-fill who has a vision of fullness (das Ganze erblickt).” (LR xviii)

14 Macquarrie & Robinson’s translation [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969] is useful for the argument being made here: “one must seek a way of casting light on the question of the fundamental
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question of ontology, and this is the way one must go. Whether this is the only way or even the right one at all, can be decided only after one has gone along it.” (488)

Basic Questions of Philosophy is a sustained account of this ‘turn’ toward the essence of essence required of philosophising to learn the truth: “And if what is at stake is not only to represent (ΓΛΕΙ) the essence as whatness but to experience the essentialization, the more original unity of the what and the how, then this does not mean that the how would now be represented in addition to the what [i.e., as if there were ‘varied ways toward’ distinct from what is being sought]. We speak here about the experience of essentialization and mean the conscious, willful and affective entrance into the essence, in order to stand in it and to withstand it.” (BQP 173) See also Fundamental Concepts concerning essentialization as the “engagement pertaining to a philosophizing existence” (FCM 154).

Both of these versions are given in Arendt’s reading for instance: “[Heidegger’s thinking] is unceasingly active, and even the laying down of paths serves more to open up a new dimension than to head towards a goal that has been previously sighted. These paths may be called ‘wood paths’... the ‘wood paths’ do not lead to a point outside the woods and they ‘suddenly end in places unwalked’... The metaphor of ‘wood paths’ has hit something very essential. Not as might seem at first, because someone has strayed onto a wrong track, but because someone, like the woodcutter whose business is the woods [later, ‘who loves the woods and feels at home in them’] goes on paths he has cleared himself; and clearing the path is no less part of his work than cutting wood.” (210) What is at issue here is the relation between thinking and learning. Arendt’s advocation of the vita activa which manifests in purely effervescent appearances in the public realm is clearly informing her reinterpretation of Heidegger’s thinking here. Whilst Arendt’s plurality is a long way from pluralism, this reading of Heidegger in late Kantian terms, as purposeful purposelessness for instance, does not seem to me, on the one hand, to leave a space for the process of learning, and thus, on the other hand, cannot account for the fact that Heidegger did document these paths as permanent pedagogical exercises. An instructive account of the way Arendt misses learning, in a way that manifests as a certain logocentrism, needs to be written.

Part Two will explain that what is being proposed here is perhaps more easily accessed through Heidegger’s notion of the kinesis that is proper to phusis in so far as this directed movement that is not a mere change in place, manifests an entelechy, a having-its-end-in-itself already; because its not-yet (dynamis) is already there (energeia), it can change essentially without losing its itness. This thesis defines ‘same differing in itself’, which for all its Sameness nonetheless harbours a thorough-going alterity, learning. Hence, ‘a way’ is ‘a way to’, but what it is a way to is something that is always already a part of being under way. Ways necessarily lead somewhere (toward an other itself, hence the necessity) even though from a more technical perspective they lead nowhere. The whole point here concerns Heidegger’s effort to teach that there are necessities that are not just causal or logical in the modern sense. Immediately before teaching us that we need an education in thinking,
Chapter Two: Learning Ways

Heidegger notes, “Perhaps there is a thinking outside of the distinction of rational and irrational still more sober than scientific technology, more sober and thus removed, without effect and yet having its own necessity [my emphasis].” “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, 72.

18 This is frequently a criticism of Heidegger. For example, see Agnes Heller’s “Parmenides and the Battle of Stalingrad” in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal v19 n2 - v20 n1 (1997), which indicts Heidegger for choosing to teach an “apolitical, anti-political kind of thinking that he traced back to Greeks” while Germans were sacrificing themselves for a lost cause.

19 I am referring to Heidegger’s Kantianism, that is, his insistence throughout all his teachings that something never merely is, but only comes to be for us within relations of meaningfulness. Heidegger’s primary example is often hearing (e.g., Being & Time s34, What is Called Thinking? Part II Lecture II, Principle of Reason Lecture VI) with the claim being that we do not first hear sounds and then make sense of the them, but always hear the sound of ‘X’, and must then abstract from that to the noise. Perception is not receptive but rather always a thrown project. This anthropocentrically transcendental ontology that is axial to ‘Heidegger’ will be the focus of Part Two. This thesis repeatedly insists that the best way to learn this fundamental Heideggerian point is by way of learning: things are only via their having been learned; there is no thing before learning.

20 This point, about thorough interrelationality of history, necessity and learning — i.e., each is only in relation to the others — will be discussed in the next chapter with reference to the leap and in chapter five with reference to Heidegger’s formal indication method.

21 The ‘necessity’ of having recourse to design as a ‘metaphor’ for the process of learning will be explained in the conclusion. For now, the point can perhaps be explained by arguing that an invention is never an invention until someone other than the inventor has learned how the invention is an invention. The invention thus comes to be never merely at the hand of a single inventor but always only by way of a co-inventor. Thus, a designed product is only a successful design when users succeeds in designing it into their lives, which they do by using it in the way they believe it was designed to be used. Concerning this logic, where the author is the fiction of the reader required in order to read, where the repetition is primary, see Derrida’s “Psyche: Inventions of the Other” in L.Waters & W.Godzich eds Reading de Man Reading [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989], but also Derrida’s whole relation to de Man, given the latter’s suggestion that the former needs to attribute intentionality to ‘Rousseau’ for example in order to perform a deconstruction. Derrida’s lecture “Psyche”, informs the whole of part two of this thesis as it attempts to understand Heidegger’s negotiation of Nietzsche’s notion of art as the invention (i.e., making something be found) of truth, something that Derrida shows goes to the heart of the mimetological relation between techné and phýsis.
Chapter Three
Earning

It demands nothing less than to jump over one’s own shadow. No one can do this. However, the greatest effort in attempting this impossibility — that is the decisive ground-movement of the action of thought... Every philosopher must want to do this. This ‘must’ is his vocation. The longer the shadow, the wider the jump. This has nothing to do with a psychology of the creative personality. It concerns only the form of motion belonging to the work itself as it works itself out in him.

Heidegger What is a Thing?

I have now suggested in the previous two chapters that learning (with) ‘Heidegger’ is a process of constructivistic essentialising where one learns by teaching oneself that what is being taught is necessary: one actively learns to learn from the teaching, teaching the teaching to become essentially learnable. Up till now, these arguments have been made mainly in a theoretical way, from the outside of Heidegger’s teachings as it were, whether by way of criticism of Heidegger, by recourse to the paratextual elements of his teachings or by biographical references. With this chapter, I would like to begin to demonstrate the extent to which ‘Heidegger’ itself instructs would-be learners about the necessary projection required to learn.

We are here returning to Carnap’s analysis and finding evidence in the teachings of Heidegger that Carnap was more correct than he could ever learn. ‘Heidegger’ avowedly pre-empts the Carnapian reaction in order to provoke, or rather reinforce, the projection by which these teachings become ways of learning. The issue of whether what is happening in ‘Heidegger’ is arbitrary or necessary, abstract or concrete, is explicitly and repeatedly put before a would-be learner by ‘Heidegger’. We will see that the ‘choice’ is always an all or nothing: there is no trial period, no sampling of the way; one must make the teaching teach out of its essentiality or one will learn nothing.

* Endnotes to Chapter Three commence on page 128.
'Heidegger', the Thracian Maid

Importantly, as soon as one begins to seek out Heidegger’s reflexive instructions about how to learn what is being taught, it becomes apparent that these rhetorical questions feigning inessentiality are not merely occasional strategies, but perennial concerns of ‘Heidegger’, getting toward the core of Heidegger’s teaching, in the sense of both strategy and content. It becomes apparent that Heidegger is unceasingly aware of the extent to which ‘Heidegger’ depends entirely upon these projections of the essentiality of each of Heidegger’s ways of learning what is.

A number of these reflexive pedagogical moments take up the figure Thales, who, as the first philosopher, seemed to destine philosophy for Carnapian derision. At the outset of his final Marburg lecture on the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* for instance, Heidegger acknowledges some common student prejudices: “This logic stalwartly taught by philosophy professors does not speak to its students. It is not only dry as dust; it leaves the student perplexed in the end. He finds no connection between this logic and his own academic study.” (MFL 5) The task then is to “set in motion a *philosophical* logic” (6). The typographic emphasis signals that this is not just a matter of drumming up enthusiasm, it is a matter of a certain essential motivation. In this regard, this course will be an “introduction” (*Ein-Führung*, MFL 7, GA26 8), the hyphenation emphasising the leading that is required, by a teacher who, we “infer”, that is ‘project’, “must already have in view the way’s direction, that he really must have, as it were, already been where he wishes to take us.” (MFL 7) This projection however, is not one of a teacher with a “fixed possession that would just have to be passed on. It is rather the knowledge that can be obtained only if it is each time sought anew.” (MFL 11) It is this ‘anew’ness that necessitates a projection to learn rather than a mere concession to be taught by some other subject’s way. Hence, the openness to the decision of this projection “to take the different steps in the process after and with the lecturer” is noted: “To what extent it is happening and has happened out of an inner freedom, whether there is an actual will behind this decision, how far the compass of the form of existence at the university as such is clear or is deliberately left in darkness and indifference, all that is a matter for the individual.” (MFL 8)

The necessity of the teaching is therefore one that must be established by the will of the learner. Heidegger then relates the necessity of this individuated projection-of-an-abstractions-learnable-concreteness to the original meaning of philosophy: *philein* – love toward, trusting inclination or propensity [Neigung] + *sophos* – the possibility of under-
standing the essentials of something, the arete technes or “outstanding free disposition over knowing what one is about” [das ausgezeichnete freie Verfügen über das Sichauskennen]. “There is such knowing only if a search for and propensity toward it is alive, an inclination behind which there is effort and will. This knowledge is the voluntary leaning toward original understanding: \( \Theta\Sigma\Omega \cdot \Omega \cdot \Pi \).” (MFL 11) Learning then, learning what is essential, comes from a thoroughly existential projection that makes a project of the possibility of essentiality.

It is at this point that Thales stumbles in. Heidegger quotes Aristotle’s claim that the \( \Omega \cdot \Pi \) of people like Thales is \( \Delta \cdot \Psi \Omega \cdot : i \), i.e., “useless for day-to-day necessities.” (MFL 12) Heidegger defiantly admits to this accusation in order to make explicit the projection of the essentiality, or project of essentialising, that is required of his philosophical teaching. “\( \Theta\Sigma\Omega \cdot \Omega \cdot \Pi \) is a striving for the possibility of genuine understanding... Philosophy must essentially be sought after, that is, its object must be originally ‘earned’.” (MFL 13) Rather than pretend that philosophy is useful like the sophist, the philosopher makes the difference that makes the difference by “taking upon himself the seriousness of the concept, of fundamental questioning... [t]he striving for the possibility of a correct understanding of the essential.” (MFL 13) One makes oneself learn, projecting oneself as a learner of what is necessary, what, in its necessity, will prove to be so concretely for each learner: “Human Dasein gains depth only if it succeeds for itself in its own existence, in first throwing itself beyond itself — to its limits. Only from the height of this high projection does it glimpse its true depth... Only he can philosophize who is already resolved to grant free dignity to Dasein in its radical and universal-essential possibilities... You... get to philosophy... solely and surely by not evading what is essential in what you encounter in your current Dasein devoted to academic studies.” (MFL 17-18, my emphasis)

Significantly, this is exactly how Heidegger defines learning in What is Called Thinking, 14 years later: “What is learning? Man learns when he disposes everything he does so that it answers to whatever essentials are addressed to him at any given moment.” (WCT 4) Here is a quidditas, one that explains the pedagogic nature of all quidditae, which are only full of thought-provoking qualities if so projected, but which upon being projected with such a necessity, becomes not only a source for thinking, but the sort of essential thinking that will lead to ontological learning.

A similar Thalesian moment occurs at the beginning of the 1935 lecture, What is a Thing!, though this time Heidegger uses Plato’s reportage of the Thracian maid who
laughed at Thales for not seeing the “things in front of his very nose” when, gazing at the heavens, he fell down a well. “Therefore,” says Heidegger, “the question ‘What is a thing?’ must always be rated as one which causes housemaids to laugh. And genuine housemaids must have something to laugh about… Philosophy then, is that thinking with which one can start nothing and about which housemaids necessarily laugh.” (3) This aside again signals the projection of necessity that allows this Holzwege to be a way of learning. Only in an environment that has already projected the essential necessity of the teaching can the critical force of this definition be annulled and then included in that environment.

‘Heidegger’, the Decision

It is important to get clear what these examples tell us about the process of initiating essential learning. Heidegger acknowledges the Carnapian reaction, that there is only what is and that all this teaching therefore can seem irrelevant. Heidegger then deposits the possibility only that there is more, perhaps something more essential, more necessary, more at the heart of what is. And then he proceeds. The decision to take up this possibility, this possibility that what is being taken up is necessary, is left to the learner. The necessity of making this decision is registered, but normally, following the second Thales example just given from What is a Thing?, that registration is merely an aside referencing what is being taken for granted.

Thus Being & Time for instance opens with a reference to this decision about the essentiality of the project it is about to begin:

Up to now, the necessity of a retrieve of the question was motivated partly by its venerable origin but above all by the lack of definite answer, even by the lack of adequate formulation. But one can demand to know what purpose this question should serve. Does it remain solely, or is it at all, only a matter of free-floating speculation about the most general generalities — or is it the most basic and at the same time most concrete. (BT 7)

Clearly the phraseology and the typography make this into a leading question, teaching the learner the necessity which it presumes he or she is already projecting, but the pretense is that this necessity is contingent on the existential, or more rigorously, existentiell, disposition of the learner.

Similarly, when The Introduction to Metaphysics takes up Nietzsche’s claim, “‘Being’ — a vapour and a fallacy?” it is precisely left as an open question in the face of which the
lecture course proceeds. The same strategy is employed in “On the Essence of Truth”, where the opening is given over to the questions:

Yet with this question concerning essence do we not soar too high into the void of generality that deprives all thinking of breath? Does not the extravagance of such questioning bring to light the groundlessness of all philosophy?... In the face of this actual need, what use is the question concerning the essence of truth, this ‘abstract’ question that disregards everything actual? Is not the question of the essence of truth the most unessential and superfluous that could be asked? (ET 136)

These questions are not answered; or rather, these questions are not answered immediately, the teaching merely proceeds. As in all these examples, the essentiality of the topic can be learnt from the teaching that follows, but one is only in a position to learn by having projected essentiality on what can and thereby will be learned there. The possibility of a necessity is learned as a necessary possibility, wherein learning is not a passive process, but an active, constructivist process by which possibilities are necessitated.

This is most apparent in the very essay that Carnap takes as his target. “What is Metaphysics?” involves nothing but a continued restatement of the possibility that Nothing is nothing; or rather, to put it positively, the essay teaches what can possibly be learnt if Nothing is thought to be essentially necessary. The lecture teaches more dramatically than perhaps any of Heidegger’s other teachings that essences depend for their essentiality upon the existential disposition of a learner, and that when this essentiality is granted, ontological learning takes place, which is to say, something comes from Nothing, grounds can be learned despite the groundlessness of the projective process of learning.

To this extent, it is worth noting that Heidegger capitalises on the Thalesian moment in What is a Thing in a very interesting way. He adds a further aside as if to say, ‘whilst we, who have already made the projection by which the concrete essentiality of our project is being learned, can laugh at common sense’s attempt to laugh at the abstractness of philosophy, the nature of our project can in fact be enhanced by this moment’: “Such a definition of philosophy is not a mere joke but something to think over. We shall do well to remember occasionally that by our strolling we can fall into a well whereby we may not reach ground for quite some time.” (WT 3) It seems to me that these sentences are reflexive comments about the projection that they are reinforcing. There is something essential in the constructions that make possible this philosophy lecture, Heidegger is saying, something foundational in the way in which ‘we’ are baselessly co-positing (i.e.,
“strolling” together, down a projected pathway) the essential groundedness of this
teaching. Learning is the groundless process of grounding, the projection out of nothing
by which something comes to be (learned).

‘Heidegger’, the Leap
What I am talking about here is what ‘Heidegger’ frequently refers to as the ‘leap’. The
leap is the willingness to take up the teaching as a necessary teaching of the essential. The
most classic formulation of the leap is provided by Heidegger in What is Called Thinking?
After again discussing the proximity of love and thinking (this time literally, in the
contiguity of the two words in a Hölderlin poem), “the inclination [that] reposes in
thinking”, Heidegger declares, “We shall never learn what ‘is called’ swimming, for
example, or what it ‘calls for’ by reading a treatise on swimming. Only the leap into the
river tells us what is called swimming.” (WCT 21)

The notion of a leap registers the fact that in regard to the process of learning, there
is nothing before learning. If there were then there would be a type of learning before
learning, learning how to learn. The leap registers that instead, at some point, necessarily,
there is a leap into learning, or to be more exact, with the leap learning begins. There is no
way to learning that is not already learning, which is why learning at some point must
begin with a leap. Hence, when discussing the constructivism involved in translating
Ancient Greek in a way that will allow us to learn the fatefulness of what is said in what is
being translated for us late coming ‘evening dwellers’, ‘Heidegger’ notes, “Thoughtful
translation to what comes to speech... is a leap over an abyss... It is hard to leap, mainly
because we stand right on its edge. We are so near the abyss that we do not have an
adequate runway for such a broad jump; we easily fall short — if indeed the lack of a
sufficiently solid base allows any leap at all.” (AF 19)

The leap then is another way to capture the ontic projection of the ontological that
allows ontological learning to get under way. The nature of the leap in relation to learning
is made particularly clear in Nietzsche 2, where ‘Heidegger’ is accounting for the teaching
strategy of Nietzsche’s ‘Zarathustra’. Translating the process of Nietzsche’s doctrines into
his own teachings, Heidegger summarizes, “We come to beings as a whole always and only
by means of a leap that executes our very projection of it, assisting and accomplishing that
projection in the process.” (N2 129) Heidegger then makes explicit what was just argued in
the previous section: that it is the mere possibility of a necessity that elicits the projection that will turn the projected into, or rather, learn it as, a necessary possibility:

Consequently, what is thought in this thought [in this case, of the totality of being as 'Eternal Return of the Same'] is never given as some particular, actual thing at hand; it is always proffered as a possibility. But then does not the thought [of eternal return as a determination of beings as a whole] lose all its weight? When Nietzsche concedes that his thought is merely a possibility, does he not forfeit the right to be taken seriously — surrender the claim that his thought is to be taken seriously? By no means. For the concession actually expresses the fact that to hold firm in this thought is essentially to co-constitute its being-true... 'Even the thought of a possibility can shake us and transform us'... To think through a possibility truly — that is to say, with all its consequences — means to decide something for ourselves. (N2 129-130)

The result of the necessitating leap is thus ontological learning: "when it is thought, when the one who is thinking it stands firm in this truth of beings as a whole, when thinkers who are of such a nature are, then beings as a whole also undergo metamorphosis." (131)§

The way the leap is explained here indicates that because the leap is the point of commencement of learning, it is initially, in a strict sense, utterly arbitrary. Because the leaper at the point of leaping has not yet learned anything, that toward which they are leaping is essentially unknown. As was indicated earlier with reference to teaching via quidditae, there is some indication of where the leap is going. But the 'leap' allows us to understand why the stated quidditas is never the essential that the learning is after. The leap projects that the stated objective bears an essential relation to the 'what is' through which the learning must essentially pass, but it does so by seeking to learn beyond what is indicated.

Thus, as Heidegger notes with reference to Nietzsche’s Overman who is of course the figure of the leap or bridge: “the one who is in transition must have [that toward which he is heading] in view; and before him, the teacher who is to show it to him must have it in view. If a preview of the ‘whither’ is missing, the one in transition remains rudderless, and the place from which he must release himself remains undetermined.” (N2 217)§ However the leap of learning is not merely the technical procedure of attaining a pre-calculated destination. Having something in a view for instance is a far cry from having learned it, nor is it sufficient for that learning to simply happen. Hence “the place to which the one in transition is called first shows itself in the full light of day only when he has gone over to it.
For the one in transition... the ‘whither’ remains always at a far remove.” (N2 217) It is precisely this distance that Heidegger then relates to the very inclination which sustains all learning: “The remoteness persists. Inasmuch as it persists, it remains in a kind of proximity, a proximity that preserves what is remote as remote by commemorating it and turning its thoughts toward it. Commemorative nearness to the remote is what our language calls ‘longing’, die Sehnsucht.” (N2 217)

This is why, to link this with where this first part of the thesis began, that into which one leaps seems fundamentally strange. As Heidegger notes in What is called Thinking?, “In contrast to steady progress, where we move unawares from one thing to the next and everything remains alike, the leap takes us abruptly to where everything is different, so different that it strikes us as strange... It is quite in order then, that we receive notice from the very start of what will confound us.” (WCT 12) Heidegger's strangeness is then part of the leap into essentiality that will allow us to learn: projected in the right way, it is a sign of the fact that we are already on the way of learning.

The leap then is an arbitrary projection of something that we will only become familiar with after learning. The projection is therefore in no way economic, in the sense of having a calculated end-point or return on investment — and perhaps calling it ‘projection’, given this term’s modern connotations with visual representation, is misleading in this regard. The projection cannot say, ‘you will learn ‘this’”, since the ‘this’ only exists after or in the learning; or if the ‘this’ has some sense before the learning, the process of learning involves so much ontological change that the ‘before-sense’ bears no relation to the ‘after-sense’. The time of learning makes all the difference in the (nature of the) world. Hence the leap that is required to learn The Principle of Reason “itself hangs in the air. In what air, in what ether? We only learn this through the leap.” (PR 53)

This means that Thales did not fall down a well, or even climb in to better see the stars during the day; he leapt, diving headlong into ‘what is a well’ but with well nigh no inkling of the bottomless ontological shift that he would learn on the way down.

‘Heidegger’, the Resolution

The arbitrariness of the leaping determination of essentiality frequently troubles Heidegger, or rather, troubles those who are not prepared to make the leap. For instance, it becomes apparent that part of the anxiety which solicits essential projections in the learning of “What is Metaphysics?” comes from the unsuppressable question, “Is this not an
arbitrary invention and the nothing attributed to it a flight of fancy?” (WM 91) In a reflexive moment that indicates the thoroughly performativity of this teaching, ‘Heidegger’ can be understood as projecting a situation in which we must “hover in this anxiety constantly” in order to learn, by ‘doing it’, that “Dasein can adopt a stance toward beings only by holding itself out into the nothing”. (WM 91) This is a very literal instance of the fact that the leap comes from Nothing.

However, Heidegger does dedicate much of his teaching to shoring up the necessity of the leap. Heidegger frequently describes these as preparations for the leap. But we must not be mislead by this characterisation; if they were preparations they would be a form of learning before learning. It is absolutely crucial that they always be read under the erasure that the projection of a teaching demands. They are instead exactly retrospectively proleptic accounts of what is being learned through leaping. If we understand them, we are already learning. But for the ones who have not yet made the leap into learning, they must be understood to be merely a type of signage from the other side of leap; the sounds that explain them have faded over the distance, and so they are reduced to a form of dumbshow. One can understand that they are signs, but one has not yet learnt the language. Is this not what ‘Heidegger’ teaches in relation to the citation from Hölderlin’s “Mnemosyne” — “We are sign that is not read, / We feel no pain, we almost have / Lost our tongue in foreign lands”? After discussing teaching and learning, and the draft of the essential, ‘Heidegger’ prefaces the citation with the paragraph:

> When man is drawing into what withdraws, he points into what withdraws. As we are drawing that way we are a sign, a pointer. But we are pointing then at something which has not, not yet, been transposed into the language of our speech. We are a sign that is not read. (WCT 18)

Less poetically, and looking at the issue from the other direction, this reflexive temporality of the learning projection is made most clear in *Being & Time* which, as Heidegger’s first major publication, can be seen as a more conservative use of the leap of learning. Heidegger’s argument is that the question of being lies at the essence of Dasein. This means that starting with Dasein is never arbitrary but necessary. But this purely logical or rather tautological argument may ‘prove’ the necessity of the starting point of the leap, but it is not what elicits the projection of necessity by which such an argument will come to be learnt. It remains purely a formal indication of what must still be resolved. “Only when philosophical research and inquiry themselves are grasped in an existentiell way – as a
possibility of being of each existing Da-sein — does it become possible at all to disclose the existentiality of existence and therewith to get hold of a sufficiently grounded set of ontological problems. But with this the ontic priority of the question of being has also become clear.” (BT 11) In other words, an existentiell ontic projection of the priority of the existential ontological allows one to learn the existential ontological priority of this existentiell ontic projection. This mere decision, the decision to project the necessity of following this path, is affirmed as having been decisive; once decided, we will be in a position, or more accurately have the disposition, to learn the essential truth of the decision and the route it has taken.13

Thus when Heidegger asserts that the key to Being & Time is the statement that “the ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence”,14 this should be understood not only as a statement of what is to be learned, but also an indication of how to learn that quidditas. In which case, the process is avowedly reflexive, or rather, a reflexive avowal: it is out of an existentiell projection that a Dasein comes to learn of the existentiale quality of its projection; an ontic projection of the ontological dimension allows a Dasein to learn the essential ontological nature of the ontic; in other words, it is the disposition of the researcher-phenomenologist that makes the ontology fundamental, or fundamentally learns that ontology; it is a projection that learns of Dasein’s throwness in projecting; it is a call to oneself to resolve what to call resolute.

It is the same when ‘Heidegger’ proceeds by way of questioning. The question would appear to be a situation in which one is quite merely seeking to receptively learn the essentiality of something, i.e., learn from what is being questioned about itself. Is not the question just a way of opening the possibility of something? However, as Derrida has made clear — again as a critical, that is learning-resistant, reader — Heidegger’s questions are always the sort that demand an engagement with the question-worthiness of the question before all else, before even fully understanding the questions.15 The question is never merely an offered possibility; it is always harbours a decisive action that can, if pursued as a question, as an interrogation, open what is being questioned in the direction of the questioning. The question is less about the questioner being open than the questioned being opened: “The essential response draws its sustaining power from the inherent stance [Inständigkeit] assumed by questioning.” (PWM 232)

The best example of this is An Introduction to Metaphysics, and I quote extensively as Heidegger runs through many of the themes discussed in this part so far, such as the
individuated necessity that must be projected onto a quidditas in order to realise the concrete essentiality that lies beyond its stated topic:

When I say to you ‘Why are there essents rather than nothing?’ the purpose of my speaking and questioning is not to communicate to you the fact that a process of questioning is now at work within me. The spoken interrogative sentence can of course be interpreted in this way, but this means precisely that the questioning has not been heard. In this case, you do not join me in questioning, nor do you question yourself. No sign of a questioning attitude or state of mind is awakened. Such a state of mind consists in a willing to know. Willing – that is no mere wishing or striving. Those who wish to know also seem to question; but they do not go beyond the stating of the question; they stop precisely where the question begins. To question is to will to know. He who wills, he who puts his whole existence into a will, is resolved. Resolve does not shift about; it does not shirk, but acts from out of the moment and never stops. Re-solve is no mere decision to act, but the crucial beginning of action that anticipates and reaches through all action. To will is to be resolved. (IM 20-21)

Heidegger goes on to define the knowing that drives authentic questioning as an ability to stand [stehen] and endure [bestehen], differentiating it from the mere possession of knowledge or more accurately information: such a ‘know it all’ “will always be a bungler. Why? Because he has no knowledge, for to know means to be able to learn.” (IM 21)

Finally, but even more schematically, Heidegger is infamous for his supposed recourse to a dangerously reductive history of the withdrawal and abandonment of being to generate a sense for the question of being’s current overwhelming neededness. The destining of being, as with all Heidegger’s ways, must be seen as having a contructed necessity rather than as merely describing something that is, or at least, was the case. From what is being argued here, the SeinGeschick can be understood as a strategic target for projection. It is not what has been learnt, by Heidegger for example – it is not; that is, it is not a historical fact – but rather it is the way to essential learning.16 Destiny is the target of the leap, rather than the springboard: it comes afterwards by learning, rather than before as that which can merely be learnt. It is one of Heidegger’s most explicit examples of an instituted essence. This is why ‘Heidegger’ always teaches that it is something to be anticipatorily recollected: it is what stands to be made into our history, what demonstrates that the essence of ‘what was’, even that which seems to have always been, i.e., essences, is only ever what we have learned to make into our past. Most importantly, by relearning ‘what was’, ‘what is’ and ‘will be’ is changed: this is the ontological power of learning.17
The role of Geschick in relation to the leap is most clearly set out in The Principle of Reason, which is shown by the following quotation to be an attempt to teach the ontological significance of the Principle of Reason to the present irrespective of whether it is or was insignificant according to current empirical histories. In this quotation, read ‘to-be-learned’ for ‘unthought’.

In the leap-off, the leap does not shove the leaping-off realm away from itself, rather in leaping the leap becomes a recollective appropriation of the Geschick of being. For the leap itself, this means that it leaps neither away from the leaping-off realm, nor forward into a different sequestered domain. The leap only remains the leap as a leap that recollectively thinks upon (the Geschick [translator’s addition]). However, recollectively thinking-upon (Andenken) the Geschick that has-been means to bear in mind (bedenken), and indeed to bear in mind that which, in what has-been, is still unthought as that which is to be thought. Only a thinking that is fore-thinking (wiedenkendes) responds to this. To recollectively think upon what has-been is to fore-think into the unthought that is to be thought. To think is to recollectively fore-think. It neither dwells on what has-been as a past represented historiography, nor is it a representational thinking that stares with prophetic pretenses into a supposedly known future. Thinking as a recollective fore-thinking is the leaping of the leap. This leap (Sprung) is a movement (Satz [principle, but also leap]) to which thinking submits... There is no repetition and no recurrence when it comes to this ever more inaugural leaping. The leap is necessary until the recollective fore-thinking to being qua being has been transformed by the truth of being into a different saying. (PR 94)

**Being: A Summary and Transition**

Perhaps the most pertinent instance of what has been put forward in this chapter and this first part of the thesis about learning (with) ‘Heidegger’, comes from the 1941 lecture Basic Concepts. Allow me to use it to provide a summary.

‘Heidegger’ begins by drawing attention to the pedagogic projections embodied in the title. The lack of referential qualifiers indicates that this course does not concern the basic concepts of ‘X’, but neither does it claim the article ‘The’: as with all the quidditae — though in this case it is naked, without the mask of some pseudo-concrete-content — what is at issue is that strange sense of basicness and conceptuality. We are trying to learn not what basic concepts simply are, but what learning inheres in the use of basic concepts, what essential learning entails:
If we do not intend to mean the basic concepts of philosophy, then the unsupplemented title must have something even more general in mind than what is thought in ‘philosophy’. This most-general-of-all supposedly does not allow itself to be said directly. Perhaps there are no words with sufficient naming power to do so; perhaps the ‘appropriate’ words are so used up they do not say anything anymore. Hence such an indefinite title is perhaps well suited for thus we do not commit ourselves to anything in advance.

On the other hand, this nondescript title has a peculiar decisiveness about it. Evidently nothing arbitrary or peripheral is spoken of here, but only what is necessary and pertains to the main issue. But why isn’t this said directly? Well, it is. We only have to listen in the right way. With the first apprehension of the title, we must immediately begin to practice what will be demanded of us from now on; relinquishing the customary, which is at the same time the comfortable... For here, only one thing is required: readiness to put the essence of man at risk in thinking that which grounds this essence, and foremost, that which grounds everything that man takes for being. (BC 2)

So Basic Concepts “sounds more like a claim (Anspruch) upon us. We are exhorted (angesprochen) to set our thinking upon the path of reflection”; that is to say, ΤΜΣΕ∴Ι ∴Ω ΞΙΥ, “take into care beings as a whole... consider that everything depends upon the whole of beings, upon what addresses (anspricht) humanity from there. Always consider the essential, first and last, and assume the attitude that matures us for such reflection.” (BC 3)

The appropriate learning co-construction of the necessity of this teaching will also learn that a “remembrance of the inception can transport us into the essential” (BC 6) This learning will not “yield any utility whatsoever”. (BC 9) In the face of this Thracian productivism that is eroding education, “we must first begin again to learn ‘learning’”. (BC 11) This entails “the inner choice as to whether we want to be exposed to the claim the essential makes on us. The decision as to whether we are capable of making decisions about ourselves comes before everything.” (BC 12)

The decision to learn is the decision to know, to always seek a relation to ground: it is a process of “essential anticipation (Ahnen)” (BC 10), by which “we must listen our way into that place where we ourselves belong.” (BC 16) Through this projection, we will learn to perceive ontological difference, learn to perceive the ontologies informing the way we are, allowing us to change, ontologically, to change to a different ontology, to a more ontological way of being. We re-experience ourselves "in respect of what [then] determines
us and is other than us, which nevertheless governs our essence.” (17) An active voiced (constructive projection) passes into the passive voice (necessitous essentialisation) in the process of learning:

Simply said, “Ground-Concepts” means for us here: grasping (begreifen) the ground of beings as a whole… When we have grasped something we also say something has opened up to us. This means for the most part that we have been transported into what has opened up and remain determined by it from now on. Thus ‘to grasp’ (Begreifen) the ground means above all that the ‘essence’ of the ground embraces us into itself (einberiffen), and that it speaks to us in our knowing about it. Grasping announces itself to us as being-embraced-into the ‘essence’ of the ground. (BC 18)

Given how explicitly this course proceeds according to the institutional essence of learning, as set out in this chapter, it is therefore no surprise that the whole course is structured around confrontations with Carnapian counter-possibilities: being is the emptiest, the most common, the most worn-out, the most said, the most forgotten and the most constraining.

What ‘Heidegger’ teaches us therefore, or rather, what is learned through and as being, is a reappropriation of the essence of learning, that project of anticipating the essential. Learning is thus a leap, a leap that in leaping sets up the destination as transcendent, beyond what currently is – and as necessary, if we are not to fall into an abyss. Such a leap is no mere jump: it is work, a project. As we will learn, it never makes it first off. Learning is the necessary effort of leaping again and again toward what becomes essential by being learned.
Endnotes for Chapter Three

1 According to Heidegger, “Hegel alone apparently succeeded in jumping over this shadow, but only in such a way that he eliminated the shadow, i.e., the finiteness of man and jumped into the sun itself. Hegel overshot (über springen - trans. modified) the shadow, but he did not, because of that, surpass the shadow (über den Schatten).” (WT 150-1) At the same time (1935) but elsewhere (Introduction to Metaphysics) Heidegger notes, again pertinently for this thesis, that Nietzsche’s proto-Nazi project of a total transvaluation resulted in “his entanglement in the thicket of the idea of values, his failure to understand its questionable origin”, though philosophy cannot avoid “entanglement” more generally, since “No one can jump his own shadow.” (IM199)

2 This quote comes from The Introduction to Metaphysics, 85. It follows the exact same claim as in this 1928 lecture, that “it is a process which must at all times achieve being (in its appropriate manifestation) anew.” (IM 85).

3 This lecture course, without mentioning formal indication, indicates that Dasein, must be learned via formal indication, insofar as one learns its concreteness by learning to concretize it: in other words, ‘Dasein’ as a concept has a “neutrality [that] is not the voidness of an abstraction, but precisely the potency of the origin, which bears in itself the intrinsic possibility of every concrete factual humanity… [the] projection of the basic ontological constitution of Dasein must arise by constructing one of the most extreme possibilities of Dasein’s authentic and total capability of being… The more radical the existentiell involvement [with this projection], the more concrete the ontological-metaphysical project.” (FCM 137, 138, 140) Heidegger will repeat these claims about the pedagogical concreteness that lies within an experience of Dasein, this time mentioning his formal indication methodology as we will see in Chapter Five, in s70 of Fundamental Concepts.

4 This theme of striving, will return at the level of content when in the middle of this course, Heidegger examines the striving of Leibniz’s monad’s, a discussion which he will excerpt and include in his Wegmarken under the title “From the Last Marburg Lecture Course”. Concerning this erotic side to Heidegger’s Heraclitean teaching strategy in which learners are required to obediently struggle to hold together what opposes, see “Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV) in J.Sallis ed Reading Heidegger [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993].

5 The sentence before this citation needs to be quoted because it introduces a different dimension to what is being spoken about here: “>ΘΣΩ[Ω⊥ΓΙ differs from [Ω⊥Γ[. ΘΡΦ: ∴Ωχ ϑΓΩ[ ∴Φ ΞΨΩΙΨΕ[ΜΘ, through existence already having been deeply moved in advance, i.e., through seriousness.” (12) Heim provides a translator’s note on the German in question here, Im-vorninhein-ergriffenhaben: in-advance-having(been)-apprehended/elevated — Ergriffensein, means to be seized by affection, in the sense of Befindlichkeit; Ergeifen, to grasp conceptually, to com-pre-hend;
and Erhaben means to elevate, to impress. Exactly what is contained in this complex word is the nature of the project that is learning, taking up being taken in by. This will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

6 Ordinarily, in the lecture transcripts, the typography presumably records and so returns attention to the original verbal setting for the teaching. In this case, the composition of a book, the italics instead projects such a teacherly context. To put this point more obviously, there is always something explicitly didactic about all diacritics: to signal the voice in the text is always to invoke the voice of the teacher beyond the mere communicator.

7 There is an ambiguity here that will be crucial for later arguments. The way I have phrased it here, this environment that grants philosophical teaching its necessity despite its uselessness appears to be an elite class. This is indeed the case, and there is something essential to learning in this move. Nonetheless, what is learned in that class is that that privilege granted to philosophy in fact resides in the everyday, that philosophy is an unavoidable (though easily ignored), that is to say, essential aspect of existence: as should become apparent in Part Two; the Thracian maid is laughing in a very Freudian way, because the real joke is that she is essentially no different from Thales; Thales represents the truth of existence, which is that even dealing with things involves philosophical moves that are levitational, that is constructivistically essentialising; existing is the falling of projecting, that is, being without ground, except the one that you are projecting yourself toward.

8 What the Nietzsche teachings make use of “the magic of the extreme” (N3 132) to teach will be set out extensively in Chapter Six.

9 It should be noted that this is one of Heidegger’s most favourable readings of Nietzsche’s overman, which as Michel Haar has noted, Heidegger taught in 3 other more critical ways: see M.Haar “The Doubleness of the Unthought of the Overman: Ambiguities of Heideggerian Political Thought” Research in Phenomenology v20 (1990).

10 Compare with M.Serres recent book on learning, which revels in this foreignness of the journey (what Serres calls ‘the third’) despite having the point of departure and arrival (the first and second) in sight: The Troubadour of Knowledge trans S.Glaser [Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1997].

11 It should be mentioned here that the rest of “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” differentiates this homesickness from the sort of urge that is at the core of revenge, exactly that which Nietzsche and thus Heidegger are trying to overcome (without vengefulness). Where Heidegger had earlier endorsed Nietzsche’s tendency toward a homeopathic remedy to this situation, he is here recharacterising Nietzsche as failing his own criteria, remaining within the spirit of revenge. Part Two of this thesis will attempt to suggest that Heidegger’s attempts to develop a path beyond metaphysics through a more lethic sense of Being and more releasing way of being human, still
depend for their being learned, on a certain will. Learning only happens as an urge, which is why releasement to the lethic in fact requires a highly disciplined way of being.

12 Eiland appears to concur with my reading of this Thracian allusion, declaring that Heidegger’s philosophy, and in particular his attempts at educational reform via Nazism, “is a falling into a well – a certain measured plunge into a certain shadowed depth.” (“Heidegger’s Political Engagement” 284)

13 Learning this will entail learning, as will be thematised immediately after, that the necessity of this ‘method’ of questioning is a necessity; there really is no decision; it has the necessity of what has always already been decided, in this case by the teaching and its necessary design, but as set out shortly, by the fact that there is an entity that is nothing but this decision, and that this entity is you, demonstrating the necessity of the matter no matter what the decision. For the best explications of this existential theatre see Jean-Luc Nancy’s “The Decision of Existence” in The Birth to Presence [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996] and Christopher Fynsk’s first chapter, “The Self and its Witness”, of Heidegger: Thought and Historicity [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993].

14 For instance in the 1949 “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics?’”, 283. J.Taminiaux also structures much of his interpretation of the early Heidegger around the belief that this is an axial phrase: see Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991]. See also John Caputo’s declaration in a letter to W.Richardson over the latter’s review of Demythologizing Heidegger: “I think that all phenomena are ontic and it is just a question as to what ontical phenomena you are going to valorize when you start calling certain things ontological. I think that the existential analytic proceeds from distinct, historically datable existentiell ideals to which Heidegger is attached and which then get ontological valorization.” Cited in W.Richardson’s “Heidegger’s Fall” in B.Babich ed., From Phenomenology to Thought, 298.

15 Derrida has articulated his various “hesitations” with regard to ‘Heidegger’ as a whole in a number of places. With reference to the question, see the long footnote number 5 to chapter IX of Of Spirit, 129-136. More succinct are the transcript notes “On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the Essex Colloquium” in Research in Phenomenology v17 (1987), 171-185. Derrida’s schema for a critical reading of Heidegger often in my view provides succinct definitions of the essence of learning. For instance, Derrida notes that the question in Heidegger often “appears to be subjected to both teleology and archaeology; for even in errancy there may well be orientation, destining and — above all — provenance (Herkunft)” (171-2), all of which I would claim makes the question a source of learning rather than just a question. To an extent Derrida seems to be replacing one mode of historical learning projection with a more contemporary one: hence he names his work on affirmation and the promise as sources for a responsibility that is other than Heidegger’s question-bound one, but that nonetheless, as he admits in the recorded discussion, is still a source of necessity. Bennington asks “What I’m really interested in is the extent to which affirmation isn’t just,
let’s say, a necessity. What you’re calling the affirmation might simply be a necessity.” (176-7) I take this to mean that Bennington is trying to create the space between a mere necessity and a made necessity, one that requires resolution and action to sustain it. This would be the same distinction I made between Heidegger proving the necessity of, for instance, going by way of Dasein, and the affirmation required for that necessity to become a source of essential learning. Derrida concurs: “Yes. Sometimes I write necessity with a capital N. That is to say, that it is a singular necessity, not simply the law, but Necessity, the other which I cannot escape. And in the present case, affirmation, such affirmation means Necessity.” (177)

16 This is made clear throughout Basic Questions, as the title of the course projects: this is an e-education, “a transformation of perspectives, norms, and claims, a transformation that is at the same time nothing other than a leap into a more original and more simple course of essential occurences in the history of Western thinking, a history that we ourselves are.” (BQP 162) This is why “historical reflection, on the contrary [to mere historiography which is useful — rather than sovereignly useless — for "instruction"] is possible and indeed necessary, only where history is grasped creatively and co-formatively.” (BQP 40)

17 There is much larger argument to be made here about the relation between history and learning. Firstly, history only exists through learning. As a purely hermeneutic phenomenon, it is only what one has learnt it to be. Consequently, history is in essence, ‘of the present’; all history is only ever what the present has deemed history. It is something that exists for the present, as something that orients the present, providing it with a future. This is something that ‘Heidegger’ above all else has taught us: history comes to us from the future as the projects we make from all that we are thrown (into). Secondly, history not only depends upon learning, but in a certain way, learning depends upon history. If history gives the present a finitudinal dynamic then history can be considered a way of accessing learning. To put it the other way round, can learning happen without some sense of what to learn and why? The necessity that this thesis is arguing is necessary for learning invariably comes from some form of history whether individual or collective. This would explain why history’s primary use is pedagogical, used not only to instruct, but to introduce or induct new learners into what it is now necessary to learn in a discipline or profession. Importantly however, this didactic function can also be fulfilled by systematic presentations. This tells us that it is the form that a history takes, more than its content, that is crucial to establishing the disposition to learn. This must be the case since, as noted, history is essentially a projection, so the factuality of the content cannot be part of the necessity it presents. Or rather it is the facticity that gets projected onto the content that is pertinent to its ability to initiate and sustain learning. Thirdly, history shifts from being this thoroughly constructivistc phenomenon into a certain institutionalised essence by learning: the learning appropriates the history as the history, as ‘our history’. The history that is thereby learnt becomes, as learnt, the history for what follows. In summary, a history becomes
History via learning, and learning happens through such a historial form of history. This constructivist interpretation of history is very American. It is what I believe Rorty and Cavell mean by tradition: that which only is to the extent that it is granted some force by the present, thereby becoming a motivator or burden. See also Dreyfus’ versions of Heidegger as the advocator of history-making, for instance in *Disclosing New Worlds* [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997].

In this regard, it should be noted that here as elsewhere Heidegger defines learnedness as discernment. Again Heidegger has recourse to the Aristotle saying concerning the ability to know what needs proof and what does not. In this instance, I take Heidegger to be suggesting that the learnt need not be merely what is real: it is possible to learn what cannot be proved, *pace* Carnap. Significantly, defining *paideia* as “the gift of distinguishing between what is pertinent and impertinent” links it essentially to a *phronesic* sense of *kairos*, that is to say, a skill or *Geschick*. 
Chapter Four
Changing Learning

It is much more important that we first of all prepare ourselves in order to be able to experience that it is not simply a game of thoughts and concepts which are playing themselves out in the text — without resistance, without home and need — but that here, as in every actual philosophy, the power of a Dasein is pressing forward toward the freedom of the world, and that philosophizing is still here, not here in the impoverished presence of a supposed Aristotelianism but here as an indissoluble bond and an unending obligation.

Heidegger Aristotle’s Metaphysics

It should have been demonstrated by now that learning, at least in terms of the sort of essentialities that ‘Heidegger’ teaches, involves the projection of necessity. The nature of that necessity has been shown to be one that is constructed for learning and only then by learning: what is essential in ‘Heidegger’ is not subsequently learned, or at least it is only learned after being previously posited as what to learn. To that extent, one does not passively learn (the necessity) to learn (even if actively), but always actively learns (or makes it necessary) to learn. This is what it means to say that learning is a project.

Up to this point, the emphasis has fallen on what could be called learning’s ‘metaphysical’ or ‘ideological’ aspects. There is a danger here that learning might be being portrayed too mentalistically. The intentionality that is essential to learning might be mistakenly thought to be merely cognitive, having the nature of something like a belief. While this thesis holds that there is this ‘thesis’ quality to learning, ‘Heidegger’ demonstrates that there is something more or something else that must not be missed when seeking to learn.

To put it another way, the projective origin of the process of learning has been set out possibly at the expense of that which sustains the activity of learning and sees through the conversion of the to-be-learned into the essentially-learned. This qualification of the nature of essential learning means tempering the ideational emphasis so far with reference to the more ‘physical’ qualities of learning. Elements of learning in this regard have been mentioned already, when, for instance, it was explained that to accomplish essential learning, one must earn it, and strive for it, making continued effort to realise it and fulfil
As will become clear in the next part of the thesis, what is being introduced here is what makes learning, very exactly, physical, that is, modeled on the essentially disclosive movement of physis. For, as ‘Heidegger’ makes clear in the 1939 lecture on physis in Aristotle, a physical thing is defined by its arche, which does not only mean origin, but the on-going ‘ordering’ to which the physical thing keeps turning, both toward and away from, into and out-of, in its de-enveloping material manifestations: “On the one hand, arche means that from which something has its origin and beginning; on the other hand, it means that which, as this origin and beginning, likewise keeps rein over, i.e., restrains and therefore dominates, something else that emerges from it. Arche means, at one and the same time, beginning and control.” (EC> 189)¹

By turning now to these sustaining aspects of the learning process, what these definitions of physis referred to as ‘keeping reign over’ or ‘holding open the domain of transition’, I will therefore be explaining how learning realises itself as materialised essences, that is to say, how learning is a form of presencing. But also, and more significantly, we will begin to discern how these more physical aspects to learning delimit its ability. We will glimpse the inherent finitude that resides in the learning process insofar as the institutional essence of learning can only turn how ‘what currently is’ around — metabolé, the presence of change or the changing presence of something — by continually turning back toward ‘what is’. Learning, as the institution of change, is essentially a process of re-turning.

‘Heidegger’, the Institution

To begin to elucidate this final aspect of the process of essential learning, I would like to again enlist the aid of a critic, resistant to learning ‘Heidegger’. This is, as I hope to show, someone who has clearly learnt much from ‘Heidegger’, but who now attempts to turn that learning against his teacher. I refer to Pierre Bourdieu. As a sociologist, this learner-now-opposer, is professionally sensitive to the more material aspects of the institutionally essentialising process of learning employed in ‘Heidegger’. In trying to exaggerate the

¹ Endnotes to Chapter Four commence on page 148.
metaphysically unlimited nature of Heidegger’s way of ‘indoctrinating’, he will therefore usefully reveal to us the more physically finitudinal aspects of learning. In a more general way, Bourdieu’s critique will provide us with an excellent summary of what this part has been arguing.

Bourdieu’s monograph on The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger,² is part of his wider project of laying bare the institutional nature of philosophy. “If there is a question that philosophy, itself so questioning, manages to exclude, this is the question of its own socially necessary conditions. The distance from the institution (and more precisely, from the socially instituted post) which the institution itself allows, is one of the reasons why he finds it difficult to think of himself in the framework of an institution... Philosophers like to ask: ‘What is thinking?’ But they never ask, what are the necessary social conditions for that particular way of performing the activity of thinking which defines the thinker, he who thinks the nature of thinking or, to put it more simply, the philosopher as he is conceived of in the university, in fashionable circles or in the press?”³

For Bourdieu then, philosophy is essentially a linguistic game that is granted reality through the investment of its participants. It is literally ‘built up’ by those who project it as a viable project:

In the beginning is the illusio, adherence to the game, the belief of whoever is caught in the game, the interest for the game, interest in the game, the founding of value, investment in both the economic and psychoanalytical sense... Being is being in, it is belonging and being possessed, in short, participating, taking part, according importance, interest.

Interest in the broadest sense is, a parte objecti, what interests someone, what matters to (interest) him in a thing, a person, a situation, etc, and a parte subjecti, the disposition of whoever feels concerned, touched, and who enters the game, invests something in it, ascribes value, finds it ‘worthwhile’, hence whoever acts or reacts.⁴

As with Carnap, Heidegger’s teachings provide Bourdieu with a suspiciously blatant version of this participatory setup. Thus Heidegger’s willful obscurity and difficulty demand being read as “pure philosophy” (Croce’s characterisation), that is, as a thoroughly intra-relational system that derives its comprehensibility only through feigning comprehensibility. Concurring with where this part of the thesis began, Bourdieu cites a testimonial of “blind comprehension” provided by Habermas: “I [K.F.von Weizacker] was a young student when I started reading Being & Time which had just been published. I can affirm today, in all conscience, that I did not understand a word of it at the time, strictly
speaking. But I could not help feeling that it was there, and there alone, that thought could engage with the problems I felt must lie behind modern theoretical physics, and I would today render it that justice.”5 Heidegger’s teachings are thus exemplary in demonstrating the wilful projections of philosophicality required of any learner seeking to decode them: “the philosophical text is defined as one which can only (in fact) be read by ‘philosophers’, that is, by readers who are convinced in advance, and are ready to recognize and grant recognition to a philosophical discourse, and to read it as it requires to be read, that is ‘philosophically’, according to the pure and purely philosophical intentions of the philosopher, excluding all reference to anything other than the discourse itself, which, being its own foundation admits no outer dimensions.”6

More astutely than Carnap, Bourdieu moves beyond this general recognition of the social constructivism sustaining Heidegger’s philosophical meaningfulness, and details the more linguistic mechanisms through which it operates. In a way that parallels what has been argued throughout this part about the role of quidditae in learning ‘Heidegger’, Bourdieu recognises that, in fact, Heidegger’s teachings are not totally incomprehensible to the uninitiated, but make use of a wide range of ‘ordinary terms’ in reference to ‘everyday things’. The projection that allows one to begin to learn (with) ‘Heidegger’ is therefore one that agrees to participate in the essentialisation of these terms, ‘skewing’ them out of their ‘natural’ recognizability into ‘something more...’ Bourdieu opens his book with a cited definition of ‘skewed’:

This term is used, in grammar, to indicate utterances which seem at first to introduce one meaning but which go on to articulate an entirely different one. It is used in particular phrases whose logical construction is ambivalent to the point of disturbing their clarity of expression. What renders a phrase skewed arises therefore in the specific disposition of the words which compose it, when they seem at first glance to create a certain relation, although they entertain a different one: just as skew-eyed people seem to look in one direction, while they are actually looking somewhere else.7

Bourdieu therefore confirms the analyses with which this part began, in which it is “the illusion of systematic order” that provokes the sorts of projections that will allow ‘Heidegger’ to become meaningful in ways autonomous of current meaningfulness: “Thus the properly Heideggerian concepts which are borrowings from ordinary language are transfigured by the process of imposing form which severs them from their common usage by inserting them, through the systematic accentuation of morphological relations, into a
network of relations displayed in the concrete form of language.”8 By foregrounding the intentionality that sustains the ‘suspension of belief’ philosophy needs to be philosophical, Bourdieu is revealing the constructivist learning that is behind this purely institutional phenomenon.

At first, this deconstruction of ‘Heidegger’ appears to be not unlike many reactions to these teachings as merely jargonistically elitist. Heidegger’s teachings amount to a form of exoteric “esoterization”,9 mobilising an unrepentant elitism to “produce the illusion of independence by staging an artificial break”10 with the social conditions determinate of ‘ordinary language’. “Resembling the artist in this respect, the philosopher sets himself up as an uncreated creator, a creator whom there is no getting around and who owes nothing to the institution.”11

However, Bourdieu’s analysis goes further than this sort of ideology critique. He is for instance, critical of Adorno’s “short-circuiting” of ‘Heidegger’ as ‘jargon’ because it “inevitably fails to reveal the alchemical transformation which protects philosophical discourse from direct reduction to the class position of its producer.”12 For Bourdieu it is essential to acknowledge that the distinction that philosophy claims is not just a case of bad faith; to be a philosopher, it is not merely a matter of “adopt[ing] a language, one is also required to adopt the mental attitude which strives to elicit alternative meanings from the same words.”13 For those who participate in the game, the game qua game thus disappears: forgetting the ontic investment that initiates the game allows the moves to become naturalised, appearing to be necessary and essential: “The institution [of philosophy] is inseparable from the founding of a game, which as such is arbitrary and from the constitution of the disposition to be taken in by the game, whereby we lose sight of the arbitrariness of its founding and, in the same stroke, recognize the necessity of the institution.”14 More significantly, this transparent necessity manifests a certain productivity and reproduceability; that is to say, it has a “motivating power”.15 This is of course, Bourdieu’s major contribution (learned from Foucault) to our understanding of institutions: rather than static monoliths, successful institutions must be seen as dynamically enabling; they are fields of possibilities, generative grammars that allow creation of new ways of being, habits that become new forms of habitation.

In terms of this thesis then, Bourdieu’s study of ‘Heidegger’, as it has been paraphrased so far, can be taken to be a clear exposition of the process of learning. Would-be philosophers project the necessity of Heidegger’s teachings, and thereby will the
essentialising process by which everyday terms are skewed into new meanings. As a result, these philosophers learn; they learn in a way that installs philosophising as a new way of being, a new ontology through which all that is, is; they learn to dwell productively in this realm of relationally new meanings. The skewed elitism is not merely a game or an institution but a way of being. Bourdieu’s monograph is therefore a particularly powerful documentation of the process of essential(ising)ly learning (from/with) ‘Heidegger’.

‘Heidegger’, the Conservative Revolution

Bourdieu’s critical analysis however goes further. Whilst he insists upon the necessity of acknowledging that the institution of philosophy does get learned and therefore must be granted a certain “relative autonomy” that protects it from the reductivism of a mere ideology critique, Bourdieu is nonetheless even more insistent that the ‘relativity’ of that autonomy be strictly delimited: “We may recognize its independence, but on condition that we openly admit that this is only another name for dependence on the specific rules governing the internal function of the philosophical field; we may recognize its dependence, but on condition that we take account of the systematic transformations to which the effects of this dependence are subject.”

Heidegger’s philosophy provides Bourdieu with a particular lucid example for this “dual reading” process precisely because ‘Heidegger’ does not neatly fit the mould of the philosophical institution. Following a sociological analysis of Heidegger’s biography, Bourdieu recognizes that Heidegger was rejected by and so rejects the philosophical establishment whilst still seeking to establish his philosophicality: “Heidegger… combine[d] the ‘revolutionary’ dispositions of a rebel with the specific authority granted by the accumulation of a considerable capital within the field itself.” Heidegger’s esotericizing therefore produces a distinctive “aristocratic popularism” or “democratized” version of elitism”, one that “betrays a man excluded from the aristocratic elite but unable to suppress his own aristocratic elitism.” What is significant is the “absolutely exceptional polyphonic talent” by which ‘Heidegger’ was able to integrate into philosophy “‘the world of necessitous actions’, ‘the familiar’ and everyday existence.”

This means that the philosophical field that is ‘Heidegger’ entails more than a mere skewing away from the ordinary. In ‘Heidegger’, regular notions are not just a heuristic entry point to an irregular discourse, but a constant point of reference by which the discourse so learned becomes operational in the world. “Where the ordinary process of
euphemization substitutes one word... for another, or visibly neutralizes the ordinary meaning either by an explicit caution (inverted commas for instance) or by a distinctive definition, Heidegger proceeds by way of establishing a network of morphologically interconnected words, within which the ordinary word, at once identical and transfigured, receives a new identity: thus he invites a philological and polymorphic reading, able to evoke and revoke the ordinary meaning simultaneously, able to suggest it, while ostensibly repressing it, along with its pejorative connotations, into the order of vulgar and vulgarly ‘anthropological’ comprehension.”23

Now, Bourdieu is being critical at this point. Having demonstrated the distinctive interdependence of Heidegger’s (non)philosophy, Bourdieu claims to have uncovered the particularly insidious way in which ‘Heidegger’ manages to conduct a politics by other means. The process is strictly a form of Hegelian-Freudian negation: by “simultaneously maintain[ing] and denying both the repression and what is repressed, it doubles the benefit, adding to the advantage of speaking the profit of denying what is said, through the manner of saying it.”24 Thus, ‘Heidegger’ does not merely deprecate the ‘conventional’ in the manner of a normal philosophy, but rather, under the guise of seeking to access the conventional, appropriates it deprecatingly. In this manner, ‘Heidegger’ appears to be a thoroughly radical philosophy while in fact merely being a collection of very conservative everyday opinions. “The entente established on the basis of an affinity of the habitus and a more or less perfect homology of positions”25 forms an “institutionalized circle of collective misreading”26 by which ‘Heidegger’ can be “a radical overcoming which allows everything to be preserved behind the appearance of everything changing.”27 Thus, for example, when Fürsorge is essentialised out of its everyday meaning of ‘welfare work’, Bourdieu insists on ‘returning the repressed’: “The blatant but invisible reference, invisible because of its blatantness, helps to disguise the fact that he has constantly been discussing social welfare in an entire work ostensibly devoted to an ontological quality of Being-there whose ‘empirical’ (that is ordinary, vulgar, banal) ‘need’ for assistance is only a contingent event.”28

There is some value to Bourdieu’s criticisms. Heidegger’s agrarian anti-modernism, differentiable yet nonetheless part of the milieu in which he moved, has been well documented.29 However, it seems to me that Bourdieu at this concluding point has begun to contradict his own argument. He has drawn attention to the interdependence of ‘Heidegger’ on the ‘necesitous everyday’ that distinguishes it from the usual type of philosophical game, but now seeks to re-reduce ‘Heidegger’ to an exemplar of the
institution of philosophy in order to criticise him for being, maliciously or ignorantly — I will come back to this distinction shortly — institutionalised in philosophy.

Without getting into a counter-criticism of Bourdieu, allow me to respond by suggesting that Bourdieu has here symptomatically displaced learning, the very thing which his analysis so powerfully restores to our understanding of ‘Heidegger’. In this sense, it is as if Bourdieu has got it the wrong way round: for him, it is as if there was first the successful learning of philosophy’s transcendence, that is to say, its institutionalisation, and only then the arrival of that philosophy’s ambiguously everyday content. I think it is much more productive to view the ‘data’ that Bourdieu uncovers in and as ‘Heidegger’ the other way around, or at least as happening simultaneously; in other words, the learning of the project happens through the negotiation of the ‘philosophical everydayness’. This means that where Bourdieu sees ‘Heidegger’ as an attempt to constitute an independent discourse that is doomed to fail because of the unavoidability of dependence,30 I am suggesting that we read ‘Heidegger’ as teaching — i.e., making possible essential learning, the sort that will become a habitus — by perpetually projecting the independence of his philosophising in the face of what he knows to be its inevitable dependence. ‘Heidegger’ is demonstrating the praxis that must sustain the project of learning as it on-goingly confronts the inertia of the existing learned (manifesting in this case as ordinary language). Where Bourdieu sees merely a materialism, ‘Heidegger’ is teaching us to see the materiality of the learned, which is therefore relearnable if we undertake a sustained engagement with it. ‘Heidegger’ is thus not essentialising and then in ignorance or elitism being existential (in a politically conservative way); he is rather forcing the process of essentialising into existence in order to learn, in order to presence (or skew) new habitable fields of being.31 ‘Heidegger’ is deliberately “play[ing] on the learned harmonics of ordinary language at the same time as reviving the ordinary harmonics of learned language (which is one of the causes of the powerful effect of prophetic estrangement which Sein und Zeit produces)”,32 because, as this bracketed concession makes clear, this is the essential process of learning (with ‘Heidegger’).

From this perspective, Bourdieu’s central criticism of ‘Heidegger’, that it amounts to a ‘conservative revolution’, now becomes a powerful elucidation of the essence of learning. For, is not learning precisely that which makes the term ‘conservative revolution’ meaningful without being oxymoronic or hypocritical? Learning is that which does achieve radical change without necessarily involving the appearance of material change: if I learn
something, something essential, ontologically, the whole world is different without it having (been) changed. Though this explanation still fails to signal what is the true insight of Bourdieu’s critique: that the revolution must be conserved, must be sustained as a continued turning back; the learning project takes place only through and as the on-going process of returning to the everyday and re-projecting itself. In which case, learning does involve actively changing the world, insofar as it insistently seeks to change it by relearning it. Learning is the process of returning to things in their thinghood which only seem unchanged to those who have failed or refused to learn, or in Bourdieu’s case, denied what they have learnt.

By performing a conservative revolution on Bourdieu therefore (an appropriation that will need to be sustained with an on-going engagement with all of Bourdieu’s distinctively powerful reflexive sociologies of education) we thus stand to learn much about the essential process of learning ((with) ‘Heidegger’). Bourdieu can teach us that learning is essentially a process of instituting, one that is ontologically productive. And Bourdieu can teach us that in that ontologising process, the founding projection does not merely distance itself from what currently is, but perpetually confronts its ontic ground. In this way, Bourdieu usefully reasserts that Heidegger’s distinctiveness lies in his concreteness — something that I have risked concealing with this part’s emphasis on how abstract ‘Heidegger’ can seem at first — indicating that learning is necessarily a process of concrete work. This would seem to be the best way to learn from Bourdieu about learning (with) ‘Heidegger’, since it concurs with what Bourdieu demonstratively learned from ‘Heidegger’.33

‘Heidegger’, the Instituting

We need to take account of the full consequence of this way of relearning Bourdieu on Heidegger for the institutional essence of learning. This part of thesis has drawn attention to the necessitous nature of the project that sets learning in train. But we are now learning that despite the strongly willed character of that projection, it does not succeed, immediately. In fact, we can now say that the projecting that powers learning must have a strongly willed character, an assertive necessity, since it is perpetually having to shore itself up over against the inertia of conventional everyday existence. In other words, we are now discerning the more finitudinal aspects of the constructivist essentialising that learning is.
It is not just a matter of ‘willing makes it so’, but rather ‘a sustained process of making it come to be’.

There is a way of accessing what is being articulated here that will allow me to make a very important rejoinder to Bourdieu’s critique. Bourdieu’s analysis of ‘Heidegger’ depends upon a characterisation of ‘Heidegger’ as in the end politically naïve. Bourdieu concludes his monograph with the suggestion that “It is perhaps because he never realized what he was saying that ‘Heidegger’ was able to say what he did say without really having to say it.” Bourdieu needs to make this move, because if Heidegger did know what he was doing, and was explicit about what he was doing, then this would imply that he was being reflexive about the institutionalisation operative in his teachings; it would suggest that the elitism of ‘Heidegger’ is a self-conscious strategy, something that is not taken for granted as having already been accomplished, but as something that must be reiterated, a constant act of differentiation, forever returning to that from which it never succeeds in breaking away. ‘Heidegger’ would be not an indoctrination, but a teaching, a disposition or dis-stancing with which to learn, finitadually returning to the everydayness of what is in order to learn what is essential. Its reflexivity, being a self-consciousness about its own finitude, is not a faith in the absolutising power of reflection, but re-activation, a return to the material task of application. It is in short, a question of learning rather than something unquestioningly learnt: or rather, it is a questioning learning, an essential(ising) questioning: “whoever is involved in metaphysical questioning is in each case caught up in the question as well, and is fundamentally affected by the act of questioning.” (FCM 181)

Bourdieu tries to double his way out of this possibility by arguing that Heidegger’s very inability to completely constitute a conventional philosophical field adds to its philosophical institutionality: “Heidegger’s philosophy is no doubt the first and the most accomplished of philosophical ready-mades, works made to be interpreted and made by the act of interpretation or more precisely by the interaction between an interpreter who necessarily exceeds his brief and a producer who, through his refutations, readjustments and corrections maintains an unbridgeable gulf between the work and any particular interpretation.” However, in a footnoted version of this same sustaining process of re-interpretation, the learning that it enables is more obvious. “The philosophical text, which is the result of a process of esoterization, will be rendered exoteric again at the cost of a process of commentary which its esoteric nature renders indispensable and whose best effects lie in the (artificial) concretizations which lead, in a process neatly reversing that of
the (artificial) break [with the concrete], to the reactivation of the primary sense, initially
euphemized to render them esoteric, but with a full accompaniment of cautions ('this is
only an example') designed to maintain the ritual distance.38 This strikes me as a cynical
way of reading what is in fact the sustained effort to learn how 'Heidegger' applies to, that
is, 'changes' the world. Whilst the process can be read as one of reinforced
institutionalisation, it is the point of this thesis to suggest that institutionalisation is a
process of learning; in which case, the act of seeking to make 'Heidegger' meaningful, of
filling out the projection of its essential necessity, is how one learns, not to be part of a
Heideggerian elite, but something new, that is, something skewed, about the way of the
world.

As was suggested at the outset of this part of the thesis, the fact that the whole process
of learning 'Heidegger' must be repeatedly undertaken, that one is never convinced that
one is a 'Heideggerian', that there is a permanent doubt about whether what one has
learnt is of the essence of what 'Heidegger' was teaching or a mere construction — all this
testifies to the failure of 'Heidegger' as an institutionalisation and thus to the fact that
learning happens in the repeated negotiation of that failure.39 As such, what is being
learned is not merely Heideggerian doctrine since this is exactly what fails to be learnt.
'Heidegger' is the constant demand for relearning, using the way it is projected beyond the
reality of the situation to establish the project of learning the essentiality of what has been
constructed to be learned, in, as Bourdieu’s footnote makes clear, concrete circumstances
of change. Whilst learning in essence requires a projection, a “blind comprehension”, the
relativist danger inherent in this ‘elitism’ is conditioned by the way in which it must be
incessantly re-substantiated by renewed material efforts.40 This is why 'Heidegger' is — and
Bourdieu is being insidious in not admitting this — always self-conscious about the
instituting that is required to essentially learn.

To give an example, take the following memorable moment in Lecture V of What is
Called Thinking? Remember that this course would seem to Bourdieu to be archetypal in its
dismissal of all social reality: “no-one is yet thinking” means “the wasteland grows” as the
last man, that is 'the man in the street', amasses in a mediatised uniformity (WCT 72-3).
‘Thinking’ is then precisely a self-authorised act of distinction, an “inclination” toward
thinking “in the fitting manner... a rare thing, reserved for few people”. (WCT 126) It is
defined precisely by its turn against common sense “the last resort of those who are by
nature envious of thinking — as if this common sense whose soundness lies in its immunity
to any problematic, had ever caught on to anything at the source, had ever thought through anything from its source.” (WCT 71-2) And to confirm (and almost overdetermine) Bourdieu’s criticisms further, this turning away is prompted by the fact that “the one thing of which sound common sense is least capable is acknowledgement and respect”, especially of that which “is incomprehensible” in the canon of philosophy: “For acknowledgement and respect call for a readiness to let our own attempts at thinking be overturned again and again by what is unthought in the thinkers’ thought... If we want to go to the encounter of a thinker’s thought, we must magnify still further what is great in him. Then will we enter into what is unthought in his thought.” (WCT 77) It is therefore now becoming redundant when Heidegger, in response to the question, “What did the Second World War really decide?”, cites approvingly Nietzsche’s “Critique of Modernity”, which explicitly advocates institutionalisation over democratic freedom: “The whole West no longer possesses those instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: nothing else, perhaps, goes so much against the grain of its ‘modern spirit’. Men live for the day, men live very fast — men live very irresponsibly: precisely this is called ‘freedom’. The thing that makes an institution is despised, hated, rejected: men fear they are in danger of a new slavery the moment the word ‘authority’ is even mentioned.” (67-8)

Here then ‘Heidegger’ appears to be clearly staging a break with the real in order to pronounce a very conservative politics.

In this context, ‘Heidegger’ produces one of his most memorable metaphors for learning: “You just wait – I’ll teach you what we call obedience!” a mother might say to her boy who won’t come home. Does she promise him a definition of obedience? No. Or is she going to give him a lecture? No again, if she is a proper mother. Rather, she will convey to him what obedience is. Or better, the other way round: she will bring him to obey. Her success will be more lasting the less she scolds him: it will be easier, the more directly she can get him to listen — not just condescend to listen, but listen in such a way that he can no longer stop wanting to do it. And why? Because his ears have been opened and he now can hear what is in accord with his nature.” (48) To Bourdieu, this convergence of learning and obedience is a dangerously explicit account of Heidegger’s institutionalisation, of ‘Heidegger’ being a learning to obey, the Foucauldian internalized discipline that makes one a member of that institution that is the family.

But ‘Heidegger’ is using this analogy to teach us about learning, to teach us how to learn ‘Heidegger’, but also about that learning, foregrounding the process of that learning
rather than just allowing it to, or insisting that it, happen regardless. This is no “tacit”
habitus wherein “the specialist is unable to acknowledge [what] he is enunciating”, but a
very explicitly didactic scenario. In keeping with the whole style of What is Called
Thinking, ‘Heidegger’ is here drawing attention to a strategy: in this metaphor, obedience
is not what is being learnt, but how one learns; obedient institutionalisation is a way of
learning. ‘Heidegger’ is being exemplarily reflexive here precisely because the obedience is
not a one-off, but an on-going task, an effort and a struggle. ‘Heidegger’ is an instituting, a
learning, not just a learnt institution. Or rather, ‘Heidegger’ is an institution that sustains
the project of learning to institute the world differently which requires repeatedly stepping
back out of the institution and into the ‘real world’.

‘Heidegger’, the Down-Going

The implications of what is being argued here should perhaps not need too much
confirmation, given the influential status Being & Time has in reopening to us our
constitutional being-in-the-world. As I noted before, in trying to access the essence of
learning (from/with) ‘Heidegger’, I have perhaps risked underplaying this revolutionary
concreteness of Heidegger’s teachings. So allow me to give some examples that will
supplement and perhaps correct ones previously given.

When ‘Heidegger’ disparages the Thracian maid for instance, one must remember
that in the end ‘Heidegger’ is one of the most Thracian teachers, forcing us to see anew the
things in front of us with the same wonder that we treat the stars, acknowledging that what
is near is the most far away. Of course, ‘Heidegger’ is not advocating naïvety, but teaching
us that Thracian maids, insofar as they know how to go about the world, are unavoidably
philosophical (at least — since there are always two sides to the chiasmus pace Bourdieu —
insofar as philosophy is in turn not primarily theoretical): to exist amongst things in the
world is to be philosophical, to learn the learning by which things are for us. Heidegger’s
invocation of the Thracian maid is one of the switches that Bourdieu sees as skewing
‘Heidegger’ into elite essentialisms, but the switch goes in both directions: one goes up to
institute (begin) learning, but one goes back down to institute (sustain) learning. This is
the whole point about Heidegger’s pedagogic use of the tale: it is not a derisive exploitation
of the maid, but an appropriation of Thracianism, an educational retrieval or repetition; it
is not condescension but an indication of the ‘rescendence’ that is necessary in order to
access the transformativity of learning.
This necessity of accessing this recess into the world is evident throughout Heidegger’s teachings especially when the process of teaching is explicitly the topic. Thus, in a very important addition to the voluminous commentary on Plato’s myth of the cave, ‘Heidegger’ stresses the second half of the allegory. Paraphrases normally end with one of the captors being exposed to the realm of light outside the cave. But ‘Heidegger’ emphasises that allegory is only complete when the one who has seen the light feels the need to illuminate those he has left in the cave as to the essence of things, returning to reconstruct for them his own exemplary turn around. “The telling of the story does not end, as is often supposed, with the description of the highest level attained in the ascent out of the cave. On the contrary, the ‘allegory’ includes the story of the descent of the freed person back into the cave, back to those who are still in chains. The one who has been freed is supposed to lead these people too away from what is unhidden for them to bring them face to face with the most unhidden.” (PDT, 171) Here is a complete refutation of Bourdieu’s reading. The act of distinction, of elevating oneself above the everyday realm of shadows, occurs only as a way of reinserting oneself in the realm of the indistinct. This is why true truth comes only with the unending task of instituting that truth: “the unhidden must be torn away from a hiddenness; it must in a sense be stolen from hiddenness” (PDT 171); unconcealment is inseparable from the process of preserving that opening. It must be remembered that this ‘teacher’ only saw the light in the first place by being dragged out by another (teacher), that is, by obeying the institutional authority of a previous learner. This is what learning is, a process of teaching (oneself to learn from another) that, despite being a teaching, is never yet a completed learning: “because the essence of \( \Xi\Theta\Lambda\Gamma \) consists in \( \Xi\Psi\Theta\Omega\kappa\alpha\kappa\varnothing\Zeta\ ) then insofar as it is such a turning around, it constantly remains an overcoming of \( \Delta\Xi\Theta\Lambda\Gamma \). \( \Theta\Lambda\Gamma \) includes within itself an essential relation to lack of education.” (PDT 170)

To put it in another important way that reasserts the approach of this thesis to the institutional essence of learning, what the ones who learn learn is the essential constructedness of all that is; but such learners also learn the fundamental practicable limits to what they have learned; they learn that they cannot have constant access to that newly learned freedom, but must instead suffer the task of forever educating, educating others and re-educating themselves, taking a dangerous stand amongst those most skeptical of this radically constructivist learning: “The setting free does not come from the loosening of fetters and does not consist in unrestraint [unbridled license], but begins first as the
constant training [continuous effort] of the gaze on the enduring boundaries [firm limits] of things as they stand forth in appearance. Authentic freedom is steadiness of attention [steadiness of being oriented toward [Zuwendung]], the facing of what appears and shines in appearance, of what, unconcealed in the highest degree, is. Freedom eventuates only as such turning toward. But what is more, this orientation as a turning toward... alone fulfills the essence of ΞΙΘΛΜΓΙ."49

Heidegger repeats this version of the (re)institutional essence of learning throughout the Nietzsche lectures. I will return to this in detail in Part Two, but ‘Heidegger’ at crucial points in his analysis insists that the key to Nietzsche and in particular his figure of the teacher, Zarathustra, consists in the process of “down-going”, descending from the solitary mountain retreat to the market to tell of the death of God.50 To stay with What is Called Thinking!, it can be noted that the account of obedience just discussed sets up an account of what is posited as the core of Nietzsche’s teachings: delivery from revenge. This theme alone — endorsed by ‘Heidegger’ to the extent that it is used against Nietzsche, with the latter failing to fully learn his own doctrine according to ‘Heidegger’ — indicates that if the elite of the ‘Heidegger institution’ scorn the mass for their vengeful avoidance of the past, then such an elite has learnt nothing and continues to perpetuate revenge. Only by reinserting themselves amongst the last men, as teachers, but also as learners (learning how to teach such men), will they learn to be without revenge.

Just as critical unlearners of Heidegger accuse him of missing Nietzsche’s transgressive style, of denying all that problematises Nietzsche’s use of metaphysical gestures, so too, I am suggesting, Bourdieu has missed the educational mode of ‘Heidegger’ — which also means that I am arguing that Heidegger is much more Nietzschean than these critics can tolerate: see Part Two of this thesis. This reflexivity in ‘Heidegger’ is not a mere irony, but a practical and material element of the work that ‘Heidegger’ as a teaching of what needs to become existentially essential must do.51

This can be understood in sum by Heidegger’s repeated teaching that the duty that is essential to human being is not merely to disclose, but to preserve those disclosures. This is what Heidegger’s Greek guidewords all say: thus Part Two of What is Called Thinking teaches the Parmenidean saying, with its key term, ΥΩΜΓΥ, that “perceiv[ing] beforehand by taking to mind and heart”, the “authentic divination... in which essentials come to us and so come to mind, in order that we may keep them in mind.” (WCT 207) Nous is the project of learning.52 And this is why what it is essential to learn is the finitudinal
temporality of being. Being is never permanent, but always requires the on-going work of human being if its ‘truth’, its being-unconcealed, is to while. \(^{53}\) It must be anticipatorily remembered and memorably anticipated: that is to say, as What is Called Thinking? makes clear, it must be thought thankfully, keeping what is to-be-thought thought-provoking (WCT 150-151).\(^{54}\)

Learning is the sustaining of learning. One has never learned once and for all: there is only ever (re)learning.
Endnotes for Chapter Four

1 In the Basic Concepts course two years later, this twofold definition becomes threefold: “1 Prevailing egress of emergence and elusion. 2 Pervading determination of the transition between emergence and elusion. 3 Holding open the opened domain of egressing pervasiveness. Thus completely understood, arche contains the threefold unity of egress, pervasiveness and domain.” (BC 94)


5 Political Ontology 130-1. There are many examples of this sort. Along with the ones I have given by Arendt and Gadamer, I would like to cite the following interview that is perhaps the most explicit: “[Hans Jonas:] Of Husserl and Heidegger, Heidegger was much more exciting. [Isenschmid (the interviewer):] And why? [Jonas]… I am speaking autobiographically [but the reason was] because he was much more difficult to understand. This was strangely attractive for a young and ardent philosophy student who was still in the apprenticeship stage: a strange attraction, a totally compelling assumption that there must be something hidden behind it that was worth being understood, that something was going on here, that work was being done on something new. [Isenschmid] Someone once said: I didn’t understand a word, but I knew that it was philosophy. [Jonas] Exactly. That was precisely it. I don’t understand it, but that must be it. Here one is coming close to the centre of philosophical thinking. It’s still a mystery, something is going on here in which, how should I say it, the last concerns of thinking in general, of philosophy are dealt with.” “Heidegger’s Resoluteness and Resolve” in G.Neske & E.Kettering eds Heidegger and National Scoialism [New York: Paragon: 1990] 198.

6 Political Ontology 89.

7 Political Ontology 1.

8 Political Ontology 73.

9 Political Ontology 127. I am again referencing the extraordinary reading of the Davos dispute via Leo Strauss by Geoffrey Waite “On Esotericism: Heidegger and/or Cassirer at Davos” in Political Theory v26 n5 [October 1998]. Exo-esotericism therefore amounts to public disparagements of what is ‘merely’ public, destined only for those distinguished members of the audience authorized to understand Heidegger’s private code as Bourdieu observes: “philosophical discourse can safely be read by anyone, but the only people who really understand it will be those who have not only mastered the right code but also the mode of reading which allows the proper meaning of the
sentences to flourish by placing them in the appropriate terrain, that is in the mental space common
to all those who are authentically engaged in the social space of philosophy.” (104)

10 Political Ontology 73.
12 Political Ontology 3.
13 Political Ontology 104.
14 “The Philosophical Institution” 1.
15 “The Philosophical Institution” 3.
16 Political Ontology 2.
17 Political Ontology 3.
18 Political Ontology 46.
19 Political Ontology 49.
20 Political Ontology 53.
21 Political Ontology 47.
22 Political Ontology 53.
23 Political Ontology 76.
24 Political Ontology 78.
25 Political Ontology 97.
26 Political Ontology 89.
27 Political Ontology 63.
28 Political Ontology 85.
29 See especially H. Sluga Heidegger’s Crisis but also M. Zimmerman Heidegger’s Confrontation with
Modernity [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990]. See also Derrida’s comments about the
positive value of ‘Heidegger Affair’ in “Comment donner raison?” (now in Points...Interviews, 1974-1994
[Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995]) —“even if certain newspapers have been content to stage,
and spectacularly, what those among us have been taking into account for a long time in their work
(publication and teaching), these ‘images’ themselves will change something... [i.e.,] Some will
henceforth let themselves be less easily taken in by the innocent imagery of the seminar, of the hut,
of withdrawal [retrait], of the clearing, and of the country path” (194-5) — and D.Wood’s comments
in “Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time”, in J.Sallis ed., Reading
Heidegger [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995] concerning the ontic metaphors that
structure his thinking — “if, one by one, or in small clusters, we can learn to follow and perhaps
operate with each of these terms [associated with property and dwelling], there comes a time when
we begin to notice the common space they occupy — which we could call the space of a primitive
Chapter Four: Changing Learning

... economy — an economy prior to mediated exchange, prior to money, prior to representation, and so on.” (145)

Bourdieu gives an interesting example in the more programmatic “The Philosophical Institution” piece: “Social existence is dependence: it is participating in a game, which is social life, life itself... [This gets turned against such a ‘reality’ when] traditional wisdom says... involvement in the world is held to be the illusion par excellence, the digression which leads away and distracts from what is essential... [For example] Materialism, which leads us to believe that material conditions determine belief, causes us to forget that belief — the belief in the primacy of material conditions — is also at the basis of materialism. Thus it is forgotten that materialism too is itself the product of material conditions, those very conditions which lead to the recognition of the primacy of material stakes (and material conditions).” (2) Ungenerously, the last sentence contradicts what went before. Generously, Bourdieu reads the social game that is “life itself” as, despite its gameness, having the truth of something material. At stake is the question that can always be put to Bourdieu: are you being reflexive enough, given the constructivism of constructivism? For an example, see the dispute between Bourdieu and Derrida: “Postscript: Towards a ‘Vulgar’ Critique of ‘Pure’ Critiques” to Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984] and Derrida’s reply in Du Droit de la Philosophie [Paris: Gallimé, 1990]. It is also worth comparing the extent of Bourdieu’s reflexivity to that of the much more epistemological systematic sociology of Niklaus Luhmann. In this regard see C.Wolfe’s Critical Environments [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998].

31 Compare with the following from History of the Concept of Time: “the knowing directing-itself-toward as dwelling-with [a holding out to the end] and apprehending tends toward the apprehended so as to preserve it, so that knowing in having apprehended, that is, in acquired knowledge, has the known even when it does not actually stand in relation to it; it preserves knowledge as a possession... [resulting in] a new mode of in-being... The entire sequence of the phases of knowing simply exhibits the cultivation of a new stance of the being of Dasein toward that which is known.” (HCT 163)

32 Political Ontology 48.

33 I am suggesting that what Bourdieu learnt from ‘Heidegger’ was how to think practice qua practice, what ‘Heidegger’ would call the being of practice or practicehood. For instance, note the ‘Heideggerian’ ‘essence-is-in-existence’ in the following: “Perhaps instead of denying, as if by magic, the limits that every form of thinking owes to its social conditions of production and of operation, one should instead work to deny them in practice on the basis of a critical knowledge of these limits. It is in this way, for example, that the critique of intellectualism and of ‘intellectualocentrism’, which prohibits the intellectual from thinking practice as practice, is not in itself the end of this critique: it aims only to provide an orientation for the work required to free the intellectual from those limits that derive from his position as intellectual and, in particular, from all those that have their source...
in the illusion of intellectual freedom with respect to social conditioning.” (“Philosophical Institution” 5) It is precisely a ‘Heideggerian’ on-going praxis of essential learning that saves Bourdieu from the sort of Brechtian re-concealment of the process of learning that thinks that critical knowledge is already enough, that is to say, has already been learned — though Bourdieu does go on to assert that “objectiviz[ing] the conditions for the production of producers and consumers of philosophical discourse... is to give oneself [as if by magic, we might add] an opportunity to perform a true *epoche* with regard to the founding belief inherent in participation in the philosophical game.” (“Philosophical Institution” 4-5)

34 *Political Ontology* 105.

35 Concerning the *praxis* of reflexivity versus the *theoria* of reflectivity see R.Gashé *The Tain of the Mirror* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986], H.Lawson *Reflexivity* [La Salle: Open Court, 1985] and D.Wood *Philosophy at the Limit* [London: Unwin Hyman, 1990].

36 The argument here is that ‘Heidegger’ must be read in the same way as deconstruction’s quasi-transcendentals which are *sous rature* before what will come through sustained learning. Bourdieu is acting here like so many of those who debate Derrida (see N.Lucy’s *Debating Derrida* [Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995]) by rushing in and attempting to prove the factual incorrectness of certain key points in Derrida’s texts, failing to see that such points are not argumentative premises but pointers toward what needs to be ‘learned’. This is perhaps most explicit in “But beyond (An Open Letter to Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon)” in *Critical Inquiry* v13 (Autumn 1986) — though it is also at the heart of the debate with Searle (see *Limited Inc. a b c* [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988]), and the various replies in *Critical Inquiry* to Derrida’s piece of de Man’s early collaborationist texts (see “Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments” in *Critical Inquiry* v15 n4 (1989)) —: “[Pronouncing ‘may apartheid be and remain a unique appellation’] was not a thesis on the genealogy of the word but an appeal, a call to action, as you put it, and first of all an ethical appeal, as indicated by that which, in both ethics and politics, passes by way of memory and promising, and thus by way of language and denomination... In your haste, you took or pretended to take a subjunctive to be an indicative, a jussive or optative utterance to be an assertion, an appeal to be a thesis. At the same time, you took no account of what was nevertheless realistic in my appeal, you missed the way, even in my syntax, the performative was articulated with the constative (forgive me for using this language). In sum, I asked for a promise: let this ‘unique appellation’ ‘remain’, which means that it *already* is this unique appellation... if I ask that we keep the word, it is only for the future, for memory... Thus my appeal is indeed an appeal because it calls for something which is not yet, but is still strategically realistic because it refers to a massively present reality... It is a call to struggle but also to memory. I never separate promising and memory.” (159-160)
37 Political Ontology 92. This reductive reading nonetheless contains an important insight. Heidegger, in a way that perhaps Derrida learned from him, throughout his teaching, but especially in his shorter lectures after Being & Time, makes use of mantra-like phrases. These guide-phrases are hypnotically repeated, in a type of rote learning, until we can hear them differently: for instance, the ‘it is boring for one’ throughout Chapter 4 of Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, the ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ of An Introduction to Metaphysics, the ‘nothing is without reason’ of The Principle of Reason, etc.

38 Political Ontology 127.

39 “We humans have a tendency, not just today and just on occasion, by which we mistake what is philosophically central for that which is interesting or easily accessible, or we absolutize a central point immediately, blindly, and once we grasp it, we fixate on a single potential stage of the originating problematic and make it an eternal task, instead of summoning and preparing the possibility of new originations. To do the latter… one just needs to work continually at factical possibilities, because of Dasein’s finitude. Since philosophizing is essentially an affair of finitude, every concretion of factical philosophy must in its turn fall victim to this facticity.” (MFL 155-6)

40 As with other endnotes in the section, reading Heidegger as making use of Derridean strategies is again a useful way of clarifying this point. David Wood has on numerous occasions attempted to set out the nature of the ‘following’ that is required of a reader of Derrida’s performative texts: see for example “Derrida and the Problem of Strategy” in D.Wood & R.Bernasconi ed., Derrida and Difference [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988], “Beyond Deconstruction?” in A.Griffiths ed., Modern French Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988] and part 4 of his The Deconstruction of Time [Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989]. Thus, concerning Derrida’s opening demonstration of the ‘uncontrollable’ slide of metaphor in “The Retrait of the Metaphor”, Wood notes, “The beginning, in other words, is a charade, a play. It is one that seeks our generous assent. The reader must accept that the horse necessarily runs away with the charioteer… what is involved in acquiescing, going along with Derrida’s deconstructive manoeuvres?” (“Following Derrida” in J.Sallis ed., Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987], 145-6) Wood oscillates between condemning this ‘compliance’ in a fashion very similar to Bourdieu’s argument and acknowledging it as a necessary way of learning what Derrida is essentially trying to teach. In “Following Derrida”, Wood gives Derrida three ‘outs’ that all to my mind go toward elucidating the nature of learning (with ‘Heidegger’): “1 Reading is always, or should always be an active participatory affair… 2 There is a certain special insight and adventurousness required of the reader. The sedentary thinker will indeed be left behind. We have here a selective strategy, a book for the few, an esoteric strategy. If you bet nothing you win nothing. He who dares wins. 3 Finally it could be said that our worries would disappear if a certain consequentialism were allowed to displace our foundational prejudices.” (148)
This pedagogic scenario has been analysed interestingly by Avital Ronnel in *The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech* [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989]. Given the interest of this book, the heroine of the story, the mother, is portrayed as calling her distant son over the telephone and getting him addicted to the heroin of hearing, transforming this chosen hero/friend into an automatic answering machine.

Political Ontology 78. Compare with *Fundamental Concepts* in relation to formal indication: “the most sharp-sighted conception, and even the most penetrating presentation of the problem, remains ineffectual until and unless a transformation of Dasein occurs; and this not through apron strings of instruction, but from out of a free ability to hearken to things.” (FCM 300)

More than anywhere else, ‘Heidegger’ is at pains throughout this course to foreground the pedagogicality of all that is being formally indicated in these teachings. The teaching strategy is rigorously tonal, “sounding” “key notes” in order to solicit “attunement” (WCT 37). As always, this is not a matter of merely listening out for a harmony that will come to us without any effort on our behalf: it is rather an actively interventional process of learning to listen, to make audible the signal from the noise, the scream above the chatter: “in order to perceive a clue, we must first be listening ahead into the sphere from which the clue comes.” (WCT 138) This is a crucial thing to remember about the ‘thought-provoking’: given the constant threat of perversion into platitude (WCT 49), the thought-provoking is only thought-provoking if we think it into being so, if we actively allow let it to be so: the gift of the thought-provoking is only ‘received’ by us taking it (up) as given. This is why thinking is recollective, a thanking, a (co)construction by which we learn what is essential. Hence, when ‘Heidegger’ first proclaims famously that “Science does not think”, he immediately draws attention to this claim’s illocutionary resonances: “This is a shocking statement. Let the statement be shocking.” (WCT 8) He then underlines the whole learning strategy of hearing otherwise: “Hence we, those of us who come from the sciences, must endure what is shocking and strange about thinking – assuming we are ready to learn thinking.” (my emphasis, WCT 10) See Derrida’s questions: “To be the first among those who do not yet think – is that to think more or less?... Is the one who speaks and shows himself in speaking thus, designating himself in the third person, die Sprecher, is he the first because he already thinks that we do not yet think and already says so? Or indeed is he the first not yet to think, then the last to think already that we do not yet think?” (“Geschlecht II” in J.Sallis ed., *Deconstruction and Philosophy* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987], 169)

Compare Heidegger’s paraphrase of Nietzsche’s will to power: “This will prevails even in the willing of the one who serves, not insofar as he strives to free himself from his role as underling, but precisely insofar as he is underling and servant, and as such still has the object of his labour beneath him, as an object that he ‘commands’.” (N3 194) Obeying is a form of commanding ‘Heidegger’ goes on to note. I will discuss this in Part Two.
45 Eugene Gendlin makes this point in his “Analysis” following the translation of the 1935 course: “The maid is right in that it is best to look carefully at the ordinary things around us before looking far away... Heidegger goes beyond Kant and other philosophers, for he does begin with the ordinary things around us. To be more accurate, he begins with us and the things around us as we are among them at this time in history.” (What is a Thing?, 254)

46 Compare the following, which distinguishes between being too busy for philosophy and the “Unequivocal rejection of all philosophy which is an attitude that always deserves respect, for it contains more philosophy than it itself knows.” (N3 9)

47 What I am here calling the trans-re-scendent aspect of learning to change is an amalgam of work done by Sheehan and Krell. I will discuss Sheehan’s description of Heidegger’s topic as being an attempt to access the recessive ex-cess of human being in Chapter Seven. Krell calls what I am trying to refer to here both ‘frontal ontology’ and ‘descensional reflection’. The first term is used by Krell to describe the meta-ontology — where ‘meta-’ refers not merely to transcendence, but to metabolé, translated by Heidegger as Umschlag or Übergang — that Heidegger articulates at the end of the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Krell argues this 1928 review of the process of Being & Time clarifies the three-fold nature of the process of fundamental ontology: there is the ontic projection of the ontological, the determination of the temporal character of the ontological and then the Umschlag from the second back into the first, what Krell translates as “the turnabout, transition, recoil, envelopment.” (“Fundamental Ontology, Meta-Ontology, Frontal Ontology” in Intimations of Mortality, 39) This “development of the self-understanding of this problematic” as Heidegger describes it, is thus a matter of actualizing as factual the now clarified (second stage) projection (first stage); in other words it is a matter of learning the to-be-learned, instituting it as essential. As Krell makes clear this learning, as a negotiation of being “ensconced in its ontic-metaphysical matrix”, involves “an insurmountable finitude”, requiring “an interpreter[s]’ capacity for transformation” to manifest ever “renewed vigilance”. (41) “The implication is that the transition from fundamental ontology to meta-ontology by no means abandons the ontic-existentiell situation of inquiry as such. That situation is frontal, in the sense that there is no eluding it. Inquiry is not an academic discipline, a learned knack [what Krell in a footnote calls “one grand pirouette toward Being” (181)], but an Existierkunst, an ‘art of existence’. Existierkunst grants to the inquirer an ability to be totally devoted to the inquiry in progress, to be gripped by it, and yet to be utterly clear about the inexpungeable finitude of one’s own devotion. Yet inquiry is not arbitrary.” (41) Krell asserts that all his essays in this collection could be characterised as attempting to discern this descensional aspect to Heidegger’s teachings, even the eschatological history of being. It is only, Krell claims, by way of a certain ‘down-going’ or ‘thinking within anxiety’, what this thesis suggests is the finitudinal project of existentially learning (to institute) what is essential, that Heidegger’s Geschichte becomes a Geschick.
As mentioned toward the end of the Introduction, this thesis is arguing that learning is essentially a form of teaching, by which I mean a type of self-teaching, though which in a paradoxical way cannot take place without the presence of teacher, which is what undoes the subjectivity of the ‘self’ of the ‘self-teaching’. Learning is projecting that there is a teaching, an act that whilst it subjects the learner to the teaching in its necessity, nonetheless takes active part in the teaching; the learner teaches him or herself to learn (with) the teaching. In a Levinasian way, the other is other in being the one from whom one can learn, the teacher; this is why the project of learning projects that teaching other as essential and necessary. Nevertheless, this does not mitigate the fact that it is in the end the learner who is wholly responsible for (hostage to) sustaining the educational otherness of the other.

This is Howard Eiland’s translation from his article “The Pedagogy of Shadow: Heidegger and Plato” in Boundary 2 v16 n2-3 (Winter/Spring 1989), 27, interspersed with comparisons to Sheehan’s in Pathmarks, 170. I use Eiland’s because of the useful ambiguity of the phrase ‘constant training’. I am following Eiland’s interpretation of “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” quite closely.

In Nietzsche of course, the periegesis that is axial to the process of overcoming, i.e., learning, is returned, at least at the level of presentation, to its theatrical origins. Like Greek tragedy, learning happens not in the event or action, but in the reportage of the event, in dwelling in the aftermath of the event. Learning is therefore not a moment of catharsis, a defining instant that reverses everything, but the on-going process of working-through (Durchenbarkeit — in the Freudian sense, as connected to the Platonic idea of learning as anamnesis by Lyotard: see for instance, “Rewriting Modernity” now in The Inhuman [Oxford: Polity, 1991]). There is much to take up here: Hölderlin on the caesura of the tragic, as taught to us by Lacoue-Labarthe (see “The Caesura of the Speculative” in Typography [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989]; see also Lacoue-Labarthe’s essays on Nietzsche and Freud on theatre in The Subject of Philosophy [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993]) and Derrida’s work on failed mourning (for a suggestive survey see Cinders [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991]).

I am also here intending to criticise Arendt (and to some extent her student Jacques Taminiaux) who claims that Heidegger’s Nazism was his one attempt to “involve himself in the world of human affairs”, an event from which “he was young enough to learn” to go “back to his inherited abode” in solitary thinking (“For Martin Heidegger’s Eightieth Birthday” in Martin Heidegger and National Socialism, 216). This betrays the essential publicness of all teaching, something which, as already mentioned, Arendt is careful to indicate is essential to ‘Heidegger’. To this extent, her account of Heidegger’s constant relearning is pertinent to the points just made about ‘Heidegger’ as an instituting as opposed to an institution: “Each of Heidegger’s writings, despite occasional references to previous publications, reads as though he was starting again from the beginning... Heidegger refers to this peculiarity of thinking [what I am calling learning to push it
Chapter Four: Changing Learning

beyond Arendt’s very provisional notion of appearances] when he... with reference to Nietzsche, speaks of ‘the ruthlessness of thinking, beginning ever anew’; when he says that thinking ‘has the character of a reversal.” (212)

52 I will discuss the translation of noein by learning in Chapter Seven. The notion of the way being ‘whiles’ is emphasised by Sheehan as his intervention into the translation of Anwesen by (eternal) presence, and will be discussed in Chapter Six.

53 See “The Anaximander Fragment” which sets the necessitous project (the law but also the useful, enjoyable, act of enjoining, in other words, the ethos) for each human being to be the soothsayer (Wahr-Sayer), the one who perceives (wahrnehmen), “takes into preservation”, the whiling of what presences: 36-7 but passim. See relatedly, The Basic Questions of Philosophy: in the context of the essence of essence being that which prevails, wonder, far from being struck externally, is that necessitous disposition that productively sees the essential, that is (re)constructs and (re)projects, its prevailingness: “to sustain the basic disposition means to carry out the necessity of such questioning, toward which the not knowing the way out or the way in compels us [— note this last explication of the counter-Carnapian learning leap out of the aporia of nihilism].” (BQP 151) Heidegger goes on to clarify the nature of this ‘sustaining’ as firstly a “suffering [in the sense of] a perception or a transformation; the essential is the advertence in hearing and together with that, a readiness for the transition into another Being. In hearing, we project and extend ourselves over and into broad expanses, though in such a way that, complying with what is heard, we bring ourselves back into the gathering of our essence.” (BQP 152). Suffering is thus a teaching-learning. This is confirmed by the second clarification of sustaining as techné (furthering its promotion in The Introduction to Metaphysics a couple of years earlier), the wonderous know-how that “retains the holding sway... in unconcealedness” by proceeding against what is, that is, against what has hypostatised into mere presentness, “through productions and institutions”. (BQP 155) Finally, bringing together nous and techné is melete, the practice of caring: see Basic Concepts.

54 See also the accounts of the needy, essentializing, creative recollection of the other beginning in the Appendices to Basic Questions (e.g., 171-186) and of the inceptive remembrance in Basic Concepts (e.g., 72-78).
Chapter Five
Learning to Live

Heidegger “The Nature of Language”

To experience something means to attain it along the way, by going on a way. To undergo an experience with something means that this something, which we reach along the way in order to attain it, itself pertains to us, meets and makes its appeal to us, in that it transforms us into itself.

All that has been set out in Part One is confirmed by what has recently been learned with respect to some of Heidegger’s early attempts to formally set out his teaching methods, centring around the notion of formal indication (formale Anzeige). From 1919 to 1923 Heidegger dedicated substantial portions of his teachings and writings to these methodological considerations, which almost on every occasion ground to a halt — though with this biographical note, we are already at the heart of the matter: for ‘Heidegger’ was attempting to demonstrate the rigour that must accompany the radical constructivism of the institutional essence of learning in its finitudinal execution. As Heidegger writes to Lowith, “I too am of the conviction that ontology can be founded only ontically, and I believe that nobody before me explicitly saw and expressed this. But providing an ontic foundation does not mean arbitrarily pointing out and returning to something ontic; rather, the ground for ontology will be found only in such a manner that one knows what ontology is and lets it take itself down to the ground [sich zugrundrichen — Kisiel translates this as “to wreck itself and go under”].” Throughout the mid to late ’20s, Heidegger made passing references to the significance of the method of formal indication to his teaching, however after a passing treatment in the 1929-30 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, explicit discussions disappear from ‘Heidegger’. Nevertheless, it is now being realised that formal indication “becomes the ‘secret weapon’ in Heidegger’s methodological armoury, dictated to find the words to articulate the peculiarly inchoate and purportedly ‘ineffable’ immediacy of the human situation, Heidegger’s lifelong topic.”

* Endnotes to Chapter Five commence on page 169.
Heidegger, “the key-words, ‘way-words’ and ‘lead words’ of Greek thinking and of the occasional ‘trace-word’ (Spur) or hinting word (Winke) to be heard in the resonance (Anklang) of great poetry”, but also all that which concerns deployment (Bewandtnis), disposition (Befindlichkeit), destinal attunement (Stimmung), correspondence (Entsprechen), releasement (Gelassenheit), etc, even every trademark suffixed abstraction — e.g., -ness, -ity, -hood, etc — continues to be a manifestation of formal indication, to the extent that Gadamer suggests that, “All of us should ever be relearning that when Heidegger spoke in his early works of formale Anziege, he already formulated something that holds for the whole of his thought.”

Given the importance of this self-description of the learning process at work in ‘Heidegger’, allow me to use the following schematic explanation of Heidegger’s notion of formal indication to summarise what has been put forward in relation to learning (with) ‘Heidegger’ in Part One of this thesis.

Re-enactment

The process of formal indication was worked up by ‘Heidegger’ as a way of learning ‘factual life’. To do so, Heidegger was working through and drawing on a series of intersecting trajectories: the autobiographical example of university educating, the historical reappropriation the Aristotelian philosophical life and early Christian life; and the Husserlian phenomenology he was supposed to be assisting teaching. The challenge for which all of these diverse resources were mobilised was to teach and learn the factual movement of living as a movement, to catch this movement without capturing it, without halting it with theoretical concepts. Formal indication was developed as a way to move in and with, even as, life’s Bewegtheit or movedness.

This is the key to ‘formal indication’: it is a thoroughly mimetic form of learning, one that only learns by projecting itself into what it wants to learn, participating in the process of that ‘it’, constructing it. “Transposing oneself into this being means going along with what it is and with how it is. Such going-along-with means directly learning how it is with this being, discovering what it is like to be this being with which we are going along in this way... Going along with the other being can also mean helping to bring it to itself... It appears that it is possible accordingly to go along with (Mitgang) with others in their access (Zugang) to things and in their dealings (Umgang) with those things. This is a fundamental feature of man’s own immediate experience of existence.” (FCM 202, 205) For the
Chapter Five: Learning to Live

‘Heidegger’ of this time, everyday experience (Alltäglichkeit) is an Umgehen, a going about that can lose itself (mitgenommenwerden, abstandverkümmernden) in the perpetual going-from-one-thing-to-another. Formal indication attempts to gain access (Zugang) to this life-pull (Zug) that can disperse (Zerstreung) into emptiness in a way that allows it to mature into fullness (Zeitigung), “learning to move (ΡΘΥΜΓΥ) with the world in accord with the basic activity of discriminating (ΡΨΓΥΜΘΥ).”\textsuperscript{11} The difference is reflexive — in the thoroughly praxical sense — or more precisely, and this is no anachronism, a turn.\textsuperscript{12}

Formal indication’s primary move thus entailed disclosing intentionality in its intending. For ‘Heidegger’, Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction to universal abstractions risked fixation (Einstellung) of the flux of intentionality. Formal indication was devised as a way of leaving things pending (dahingestellt), allowing the process of intending to be apperceptively co-presented without becoming merely another intended. “Philosophy’s way of relating to its object is ‘utterly original and radical’ indeed such ‘that even and precisely through the grasping, it is what it grasps and grasps what it is.’”\textsuperscript{13} The relation to the given, rather than being identified and bracketed, is thus re-enacted disclosively. “The task of philosophising is to reflect upon what unthematically ‘is always already there’. Philosophizing is a kind of ‘re-iterating’ (Nach-vollziehen) repeating in an explicit fashion the path (iter,Weg) that we are constantly following (iterare, vollziehen), retrieving (Wiederholen) what it means ‘to be’ from a well of forgottenness. Philosophical concepts such as ‘care’, ‘life’, ‘as’, ‘world’ and ‘existence’ indicate (zeigen ... an) ‘a concrete task to be carried out by philosophy alone’ (eine egene konkrete Vollzugsaufgabe).”\textsuperscript{14} Formal indication is thus clearly a project of (re)learning, a way of pedagogically staging the intentional appearance of phenomena.\textsuperscript{15}

As the name suggests, formal indications are almost empty, not because they are theoretical (pace Carnap\textsuperscript{16}) but because they depend for their meaning upon lived actualizations in everyday life. They do have a certain type of content inasmuch as they share with Husserlian formalisations certain epochal functions. Streeter notes that “In the use of occasional expressions [Husserl’s term for deictics which Heidegger draws on for his method of formal indication] there are actually two meanings to each expression: there is the indicating (anzeigend) meaning and the indicated (anzeigen) meaning, the former employed to draw one to the latter, in which the intuitive fulfillment of what is indicated occurs.”\textsuperscript{17} There is for instance a referring prohibitive function (hinweisend-prohibitive) that directs against “blindly dogmatic fixations”,\textsuperscript{18} though this is as much to direct away from
sheerly cognitive content in general, since the point is to access the non-cognitive relation (i.e., the non-representational fore-having) that conditions the possibility of cognition.\textsuperscript{19}

Formal indications can therefore be understood as middle-voiced notions similar to Lask’s matter-needy-concepts,\textsuperscript{20} that ‘have’\textsuperscript{21} purely educational content,\textsuperscript{22} content that exists only under erasure to direct one toward the process of filling out that content anew. As Gadamer has interestingly noted, they differ from Husserlian Gestalten precisely by demanding a sensuality, offering a fore-taste of what must then be ‘savoured’.\textsuperscript{23} In this way, formal indications access in a participatory manner the essensual\textsuperscript{24} tendencies of (human) being: its Bezugsinn, the motivated relationality of life itself; its Gehaltsinn, the way in which the flux of living is provisionally contained as meaningful content; its Vollzugsinn, the individualised actualisations of that relational content; and its Zeitungssinn, the temporal coherence of that relational content.\textsuperscript{25}

This method of formal indication was developed by ‘Heidegger’ whilst retrieving the ‘phenomenological’ philosophical life of the Ancient Greeks, where it is both the method adopted for that retrieval and what stood to be retrieved. The Greeks were thought by ‘Heidegger’ to be axial for life-philosophy, for enlivening philosophy, because, to the Greeks, philosophy is the way of life, not just a way of life; there is no question of having to project the essential concreteness of philosophical abstractions since this is the very ground of Greekness without which all things Greek make no sense whatsoever. Hence, “what dominates at this stage of the orientation to Aristotle [1921-2], in keeping with the repeated concern for the fundamental ‘problem of the historical’ are the ways in which we ‘have’ mobility, the ‘movedness of life in which and through which it is.’”\textsuperscript{26} In this regard, allow me to quote at length von Buren’s account of Aristotle’s proto-formally-indicative way of philosophising:

Aristotle’s ontology of practical human existence has a quite different method. Corresponding to the being that can be other, namely the highly particular, lethe-permeated historical being of kairos, is the open-ended method whose logos is only that of indication (endeixis), of “indicating the truth roughly and in outline [typo]”. Typon means mark, print, outline, sketch, draft. This descriptive phenomenological method of typo legin, discoursing in outline, is also called perigraphein, inscribing, writing, sketching in outline the typical characteristics of praxis... Aristotle’s rough draft outlines the archai in the double sense of the analogical principles/starting-points of both action itself and ontological inquiry, which as such indicate a methodos toward their enactment in the
historical being that can be other. The *typon*, outline, of practical philosophy is also a kind of tympan (*tympanon*) and urging forward (*protreptikon*) that announces and calls attention (*hermeneia*) to a way, which the hearer (*akroates*) or reader of Aristotle’s lectures is supposed to take up and enact. [Nicomachean Ethics] The beginnings/principles have great importance for what follows. For the beginning/principle seems to be more than half the whole. (331-2)

It is important to note this last point concerning the prototyping which formal indications appropriate from Greek philosophising. As de Vries notes, “formal indication is neither a construct, nor a hypothesis nor a heuristic principle.”27 In line with what has been argued in this part of the thesis, it is necessary to recognize the nature of the necessities involved with this process. Formal indications are *mobilised* by projections of essentiality, by decisive leaps toward formatively completing what has only been indicated. As ‘Heidegger’ notes, “Formal indication involves a very definite bond. It implies that I stand at the starting point of a very definite direction of approach, that – if it is to come to the proper – the given is the path [*Weg*] of making the most of and fulfilling what is improperly indicated, of following that indication... Object ‘empty’ nevertheless means: and yet decisive! Not arbitrary and with an approach, but precisely ‘empty’ and directive, i.e., defining, indicating, binding the direction.”28

This was the whole point of Heidegger’s retrieval of historical examples of life’s meaningful movements: these were performative instances of getting (traditional) things moving, of making (what was historical become an active part of ‘our’) history. If formal indication was both the method and the content, this is because ‘Heidegger’ was under no illusion about the constructivist nature of the content being learned; these historical references were projections designed solely as strategic interventions into the present. Heidegger’s 1922 proposal for a book on Aristotle comprised a methodological introduction entitled “Phenomenological Interpretations Toward Aristotle” (my emphasis) and it comprises some very explicitly constructivist statements:

History itself, the past which is taken on in understanding, grows in comprehensibility with the primordiality of the decisive choice and formation of the hermeneutical situation. The past opens itself only according to the resoluteness [*Entschlossenheit*] and force of the ability-to-lay-open [*Aufschließenkönnen*] which a present has available to it... This reading-into [*hineindeuten*] is not only not contrary to the sense of historical knowing, but is indeed the basic condition for bringing the past to expression... The effectiveness of the philosophical research which has become the past, the possibility of
its having an effect upon its future, can never be situated in the results as such, but rather is grounded in the primordiality of the questioning which has been achieved and concretely cultivated and through which such research — as a problem-awakening model — is able to become the present ever anew. (PIA 358-9)

This project of historical (re)learning thus self-consciously foregrounds its projectivity. It does not matter that this is interpretive violence, since what is actually at stake, what is there to be learned is us, exactly in our there-being-now: “The fixing of the basic historical attitude regarding interpretation grows out of the explication of the sense of philosophical research... The possibility of such a co-temporalizing is grounded in the fact that philosophical research is the explicit actualization of a basic movement of factual life and maintains itself always within factual life.” (PIA 361)

In this regard, ‘Heidegger’ employs a series of cinematic metaphors, in which the ‘sight-line’ we bring to a past like ‘Aristotle’, should ‘over-expose’ that which it focuses on to the extent that the consequent ‘depth of focus’ allows the ‘point-of-view’ to become reflexively visible: “The starting point of the Aristotle interpretation, which is determined by the visual stance... must be: as which objectivity of which Being-character is Being-human, ‘Being-in-life’, experienced and interpreted? What is the sense Dasein, within which the interpretation of life fixes in advance the object, the human being?” (PIA 374) What one learns from projecting the essentiality of a formal indication is thus precisely a phronesis, that which “makes the location of the one who performs the action accessible: in securing the ou eneka (the ‘Why’), in making available the particular Towards-what-end (Wozu), in apprehending the ‘Now’ and in sketching out the ‘How’... a simple overview of the moment-of-insight (Augenblick).” (PIA 381)

Formal indication is therefore empty in a Carnapian way and fulfilled by necessitous projections in a Bourdieuian manner. However, what must be remembered is that both these aspects are being proclaimed by ‘Heidegger’ very explicitly: this is a method, a formal way of indicating what is to be learned. And the purpose of this method is to force a learning-return to the active experience of everyday existence.

There are two further qualifications of the nature of formal indication, concerning the religious context of its development and the avowedly (anti)institutional context of its deployment, that will make this clear.

Firstly, the other historical recovery ‘Heidegger’ was involved with during his articulation of the teaching method of formal indication was of the very Greek, and...
interestingly also quite Jewish, early Christianity of the Pauline Church. As with Greek philosophical life, what is involved here is the thorough interrelation of what is being approached and how it is being approached. In other words, with this context of conversion and faith, 'Heidegger' can be learned as explicating the ontological transformations that can come from certain forms of learning. More so than with any of the other contexts 'Heidegger' was drawing on, this one teaches us that formal indications are much more than heuristic options, since what is at stake is the institution of essences.

However, the danger here is again fixating that ontologically transformative 'event'. Heidegger's recovery involves reteaching us what is meant by the revelation that marks being a Christian. God's presence to a believer as parousia is described as being a formal indication par excellence, inasmuch as God is not merely present to a Pauline, but rather always already coming (back): it not a matter of having learnt that God is (coming) once and for all, but rather the on-going task of learning how to live one's life in relation to the possibility that God is (coming). The revelatory event is thus very existentially a happening that continues to happen (immer noch geschieht). As Kisiel succinctly describes this messianism, "becoming (= being) a Christian". Sheehan paraphrases the situation in terms of "what Heidegger calls a Vollzugszusammenhang mit Gott, a context of enacting one's life in uncertainty before the unseen God":

To relate authentically to the Parousia means to be 'awake', not primarily to look forward to a future event. The question of the 'when' of the Parousia reduces back to the question of the 'how' of life – and that is 'wachsam sein', to be awake. And further, by way of contrast with the first group [of Christians used as a negative example by Paul in his epistle to the Thessalonians] who cry out 'Peace! Security!' the Christian's state of wakefulness in factical experience means a constant, essential and necessary uncertainty.

Heidegger's phenomenology of religion therefore, far from conceding evidence to Bourdieu's critique that 'Heidegger' amounts to a religion that is always preaching to the converted, teaches us that the process of making formal indications meaningful is, in an essentialising way, a persistent praxis. One is forever seeking to learn again and further, reprojecting the necessity of the project. And this (re)learning involves constantly turning toward the world in its facticity, ever renewing one's resolve to take care, bearing witness in an evangelical way to a Bedeutsamkeitsbekümerung – a concern for meaningfulness. This is why the outcome of formal indication is no mere outcome, but rather a (re)motivated movement, a restlessness that attests performatively to being. "Indeed fiat flux would be an
adequate summary of some of the core elements of Heidegger’s activist, not to say decisionist, rewriting of the gospel according to Paul.”

Concerning the second qualification, for the same reason, this period in Heidegger’s teaching is characterised by an insistent criticism of educational institutions for their tendency to become content with content and thereby cease to become. Formal indication’s proto-religious discontentedness is thus a corrective to this mortifying (non)tendency in the university, a process that “will never want to claim to be allowed to or be able to take away from future times the burden and worry (Bekümmerung) of radical questioning.” (PIA 359) This is why ‘Heidegger’ cannot and must not be reduced to a merely elitist institutionalised philosophy:

By indicatively stressing the becoming-decisive of the being-sense (at the particular time) of each knowing comportment, one (negatively) repels the possibility of talking about philosophy in such a general and indefinite manner... It repels precisely that which one should be able to preach philosophy from some elevated but basically indefinable place, as if one could put up bail for coming cultural periods and destinies (Schicksale) of humanity, such that one does not know who speaks for whom and for what, and what is the point of these prophecies and schools of wisdom, and who has assigned them such a cultural mission. There is no such thing as the philosophy – in such universality, in comfortable timelessness.

Though, this does not mean that ‘Heidegger’ amounts to a hypocritical abuse of certain institutional authority. Heidegger’s project is, as always, a reappropriation. The constant self-consciousness about the educational praxis being undertaken is performatively exemplary, remobilising the institutional essence of learning within the merely instituted technique of information transmission, the “forming (bilden) life” within schematic categories. In a way that meets Bourdieu’s demands for a reflexive sociology, Heidegger’s formal indication process is designed to be an avowed learning project, one where everything depends upon one’s knowing-willing of it: “Our situation is not that of the rescuing coast; it is a leap into a drifting boat. Everything now depends on our taking the sails’ tack into our hands and looking to the wind. It is precisely the difficulties that we must see; illuminating them will first disclose the proper horizon of factical life. Only by appropriating to myself the structure of my having to decide; only by realizing that it is within and upon such having that I shall come to see [i.e., learn]; only in this way can
illumination sustain the fundamental motivation for the temporal unfolding [perhaps ‘unfurling’ to continue the metaphor] of philosophizing.”

Heidegger’s last account of formal indication in the 1929-30 Fundamental Concepts course provides us with a succinct summary of the method and explains what replaces it in ‘Heidegger’. The course is a powerful explication of the experience of boredom and the way in which it can be (re)constructed as an essential insight into the extremity that is possibility. In boredom, everything becomes a formal indication, an empty necessity impelling the action of learning. And what one learns, what one appropriates, is the being one is, the existential project of learning that is Dasein: “to what therefore does Dasein have to resolutely disclose itself? To first creating for itself once again a genuine knowing concerning that wherein whatever properly makes Dasein itself possible consists. And what is that? The fact that the moment of vision in which Dasein brings itself before itself as that which is properly binding must time and again stand before Dasein as such. Before itself — not as a fixed ideal or rigidly erected archetype, but before itself as that which must first precisely wrest its own possibility from itself again and take itself upon itself in such a possibility.” (FCM165)

This course then, perhaps more explicitly than any other, is concerned to teach us the essentiality of learning to human being, where learning is understood as that ability to create, to project, to make possible. This is why this course elides formal indication with the more general prefigurative relating and gathering of logos, that power which humans have that differentiates them from all other beings. Formal indication is thus a way in which we learn to make formal indication, or the possibilising that it accomplishes, essential to who and how we are. Formal indication is the ontic projecting by which we learn to make projecting ontological: it is the ever renewed project of reappropriating the ontological power of learning, constantly reinstituting learning’s essential possibility-making as necessary. The course ends by describing this projection of projection as a holding oneself toward a binding completed unity in a way that forces a reflexive movement. I quote at length this important definition of the institutional essence of learning.

‘Projection’ does not refer to some sequence of actions or to some process we might piece together from individual phases, rather what it refers to is the unity of an action, but of an originary and properly unique kind of action. What is most proper to such an activity and occurrence is what is expressed in the prefix ’pro’ (Ent), namely that in...
projecting (Entwerfen), this occurrence of projection carries whoever is projecting out and away from themselves in a certain way. It indeed removes them into whatever has been projected, but it does not as it were deposit and abandon them there — on the contrary: in this being removed by the projection what occurs is precisely a peculiar turning toward themselves on the part of whoever is projecting... what is projected in the projection compels us before what is possibly actual, i.e., the projection binds us — not to what is possible, nor to what is actual, but to making-possible, i.e., to that which the possibly actual in the projected possibility demands of the possibility for itself in order to actualize itself.

The projection is thus in itself that occurrence that lets the binding character of things spring forth as such. With this free binding in which all that makes possible holds itself before what is possibly actual, there is also always a determinacy proper to that which is possible itself. For what is possible does not become more possible through indeterminacy, so that everything possible would, as it were, find room and be accommodated in it. Rather what is possible grows in its possibility and in the force that makes it possible through restriction. Every possibility brings its intrinsic restriction with it. But the restriction of the possible is here that which is in each case precisely actual, that expansiveness that can be filled, i.e., that 'as a whole' out of which our comportment comports itself in each case. (FCM 363)

Formal indication thus teaches us the essential nature of the learning process that we can be, the necessitating of the to-be-learned in the face of what is already, what is, through this action, revealed to be itself merely one learned possibility open to determined relearning projects.

The course therefore makes it clear that where formal indication went between 1923 and 1929 is into the projective world of Dasein. 45 This conclusion of the course also indicates that the key formal indication is that of the ontological difference, and it is thus into this distinguishing that formal indication as an explicit method withdraws.46

Formal indication can therefore be understood as an explicitation of the institutional essence of learning employed by ‘Heidegger’. It is an attempt to appropriate the existentially historical, religious and institutional power of learning, whereby what is learned entails an ontological conversion of all that is. It seeks to accomplish this essential turn around through a forceful projection of the formal necessity of what is to be learned and the way in which it is to be learned.

The ambitions of such projections are tempered by the need for an on-going engagement with the facticity of what is (already learnt). Learning is thus a sustained,
because conditioned, effort at necessitating what is being projected. One ontically projects
the essentiality of what is to be learned, and through a constantly reasserted reflexivity
about that projecting, comes to learn the nature of one’s ontological circumstances in their
learnedness, opening them to relearning.

One learns, in short, that living is learning.47 ‘Heidegger’ is thus a conservative
revolution insofar as it involves always reappropriating how one is, since one’s being is to
be moving toward other ways of being. Or to put it more assertively, ‘Heidegger’ is a
conservative revolution in which one learns how radically transformative (human) being
(i.e., existing) already is, as something that is in essence a learning.
Endnotes for Chapter Five


2 Heidegger’s most extensive treatment of formal indication in the 1920-1 Winter Semester Course “The Phenomenology of Religion” was halted due to the complaints of students: see Kisiel’s account of this Cursus Interruptus in Genesis, 171-2. His 1922 proposed book entitled Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indications of the Hermeneutical Situation never proceeded beyond a dense methodological introduction. Kisiel informs us that Heidegger’s letters to Lowith suggest that Heidegger was dissatisfied with both the seminal 1924 lecture, “The Concept of Time”, and the
torso of Being & Time because of his inability in the time and space of either to adequately discuss his method of formal indication; see Kisiel, Genesis, 333.


4 Unexplained references to formal indication are made in Being & Time – see the new index references in Kisiel’s revisions of the Macquarrie & Robinson’s ‘Lexicon’ in J. Stambaugh’s translation of Being & Time. A more extensive discussion is given in Heidegger’s 1927 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology”.


6 T. Kisiel, in “Genealogical Supplements: A Reply of Sorts”, Research in Phenomenology v25 (1995), 244, paraphrasing the later “surrogates for formal indication” that O. Poggeler genealogised.

7 Kisiel, van Buren and Sheehan in particular indicate the importance of formal indication by finding that nearly all of Heidegger’s later turns are implicitly at work in the early Freiburg and Marburg period and most are even explicitly named: e.g., all the middle-voiced constructions derived from es gibt, and even Ereignis. For Kisiel’s reading of the suffixed abstractions that characterise Being & Time as forms of formal indications, see Genesis, 392-7.

I should point out that I am opposed to the project most explicitly articulated by van Buren, but also Caputo, which entails arguing that the early Heidegger was a radical who was concealed by the later Nazi metaphysician of the SeinGeschichte. Apart from the fact that I am insisting here that everything in Heidegger needs to read as formally indicative, including the destinal epochs of (a capitalized) Being and that therefore nothing of the early radicality disappears from the post-1930 ‘Heidegger’, I do not understand what this academic periodisation of Heidegger is intending to achieve. What there is to learn from Heidegger is only concealed by teaching that only the early Heidegger is radical. One of the best ways to learn (from) ‘Heidegger’ is to undertake to learn how the later Heidegger can be as radical as the early ‘Heidegger’, and perhaps even moreso precisely because the later ‘Heidegger’ merely does formal indication rather than thematising it.


9 Krell and Kisiel argue that the withdrawal of formal indication as a method coexists with Heidegger’s shift from the topic of ‘life’ to ‘existence’. This would explain its re-emergence in the Fundamental Concepts course, which examines the difference between human and animal life. See Krell’s analysis of Heidegger’s Jaspers review, “From Existence to Fundamental Ontology” in Intimations of Mortality, and his Daimon Life, though he conspicuously mentions neither formal indication nor learning in the latter.
Chapter Five: Learning to Live

10 Heidegger is here discussing the formal indication of animality, though as indicated elsewhere, the enclosure of the impoverished animal world is exactly that same as that of everydayness.

11 Kisiel *Genesis of Being and Time*, 294.

12 This is Sheehan’s polemic, which will be taken up in the next part: that there is no turn, that *Ereignis* has always been part of Heidegger’s topic: “But to step back into factical life-experience entails a complete transformation of philosophy (*eine völlige Umwandlung der Philosophie*)... What Heidegger is referring to here — as early as 1920 — is what later he calls the ‘turn’ or *Kehre*. Clearly, the ‘turn’ is not the *de facto* shift in language and approach that happened in Heidegger’s thought in the thirties. Rather, it was envisioned and built into his project from the beginning and it meant a radical turn *away from* all philosophising built on the correlation between man as a stable subject and beingness as the stable presentness and *into* the primordial experience of being thrown into nothingness (private absence) within which things become meaningfully present: the event of pre-ab-sence. The first halting name for this event of (*Ereignis*) is ‘factical life experience’. “Heidegger’s ‘Introduction to Phenomenology of Religion’ 1920-1”, (47)


15 I cannot go into this, but it is important to notice the explicit theatricality involved in the mimetic process by which formal indications are filled out. Dahlstrom notes it by describing formal indications as a form of scripting or scoring: “something is expressed and formulated but in such a way that what it is can only be realised by being performed (rehearsed, interpreted, staged).” (“Heidegger’s Method” 790)

16 Streeter puts it in a way that responds directly to Carnap: “Because Heidegger’s method is formal indication and not metaphysical theorization understood as the attempt to give a comprehensive account of the basic ‘attributes’ of a human being, it [Being & Time] is an ‘empty’ book.” “Heidegger’s Formal Indication”, 426


19 “Heidegger choose locutions such as ‘having’ (*haben*), ‘comporting’ (*verhalten*) or ‘understanding’ (*verstehen*) in order to emphasize that that original (*immer schön*), unthematic ‘having’ or ‘comporting’ is for the most part not some sort of deliberate, meditative act of knowing something. Instead those locutions signify any way —...— in which a human being might relate to something.” Dahlstrom “Heidegger’s Method”, 781. See E.Gendlin’s “*Befindlichkeit*: Heidegger and the Philosophy of Psychology” *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, v16 n1-3 (1978-9).

De Vries goes as far as suggesting that the transcendent-transitivity of formal indications accesses "what Derrida, following Levinas and Blanchot calls a relation-without-relation, and which
he formalizes in his own terms under the heading of *paleonymics* (notably in *Dissemination*) and *hauntology* (especially in *Spectres of Marx*).” (669)

20 Again, Kisiel is seminal in documenting comprehensively the extent to which some of Heidegger’s most radical experiments with a de-subjectified, non-representational languaging were occurring at the very outset of his teaching career. At the beginning of *Genesis*, he lists the ‘there it is’ thought experiments of the 1919 KNS course: *es gilt, es soll, es wertet, es gibt, es weltet, es er-eignet sich*, 23-5.

In regard to the genealogy from which Heidegger’s process of formal indication draws Von Buren notes other precursors: “the Idea in the Kantian Sense, the mystical *via negativa*, and the individualizing science of Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians. Thereafter he also took up Kierkegaard’s method of ‘indirect communication’ that he found laid out in Jasper’s *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen,*” (326) even using “Kierkegaard’s statement that philosophy can only ‘point [hinweisen] human beings (individual human beings) to the ethical, the religious, the existential’ as a motto for his WS 1921-2 lecture course.” (327)

21 Kisiel in particular has drawn attention to the centrality of *Habe* in Heidegger’s development. Formal indication only has content because it has to have content, but it is actually trying to have (access to) this having itself, in particular the having-to-haveness of facticity, the way we always have already had, and been had by, content. See Kisiel *Genesis*, 233-8 and 400-7.

22 C.Bambach, one of the only commentators on formal indication to make an explicit connection with learning, understates, in the opinion of this thesis, the matter when he says, “For example, teaching provides a model for formally indicating method since it cannot offer students ‘results’ in the form of answers or solutions but can only indicate to them by a way of approaching texts.” “The Hermeneutics of Origin”, 321.

23 “Heidegger spoke of ‘savouring something to the full’ and ‘fulfilling’ and expatiated on ‘savouring to the full’ with a thing’s taking on contours in ‘being set off from its background’ [*aus ihm herausheben*]. The semantic fields that Heidegger brings to bear here, on the initiatory character of the indication and on its fulfilment, are plainly ‘foretaste’ and ‘savouring to the full’, on the one side, and on the other, something’s ‘not yet being set off’ [*unabgehobenheit*] and its ‘being set off’ [Heraushebung]. In both these fields of meaning, ‘empty’ in the sense of ‘formal’ is juxtaposed to being filled. But the point is that what is initially ‘empty’ leads directly into the concrete’.” “Heidegger’s One Path” in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, 33. It should be apparent that formal indication’s way of accessing the intentionality one projects over what needs to be (re)experientially understood lies very close to the dialectically hermeneutic negotiation of prejudices that will come to characterise Gadamer’s philosophy.

24 The core of all the following terms is ‘*sinn*’ which, like the English ‘*sense*’, stretches from cognitive meaning to physical sensuality, with an emphasis on fulfillment and satiation. Where
Husserl is in the end seeking a thoroughly Platonic-Cartesian sense of ‘sense’, that is an (occulocentric) idea, Heidegger is trying to take account more completely of the fact that such idealistic senses are only ever ‘experienced’ by us as, or at least from, a sensitive earthly worldliness. Notably, in his second Nietzsche course, Heidegger describes Nietzsche’s strategy of presenting the doctrine of the eternal return in images that are “Sinnlichen und somit als Sinnbild” (NI 287), which Krell translates as “sensuous sensible” (N2 35). Heidegger then quotes Nietzsche: “‘The more abstract the truth that one wishes to teach is, the more one must begin by seducing the senses to it.’” (35) To this extent, Jean-Luc Nancy’s work is very instructive for understanding and surpassing this aspect of Heidegger. See especially The Sense of the World [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997].

25 Kisiel documents the first threefold (relating sense, containing sense, actualizing sense) as emerging in the WS 1919-20 Basic Problems in Phenomenology Course and being used throughout all the courses up to the SS 1922. The fourth term is added only in the WS 1921-2 course on Aristotle. In the 1922 Aristotle book outline the terms are used without the ‘-sinn’ suffix and this continues throughout the mid 20s: for instance the definition of Sinn in Being & Time incorporates the fourfold as the “fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception [that] is the upon which of the project in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.” (151). The fourth term clearly comes to subsume the others forming the basis for the horizontal interpretation of Dasein’s always-already-understanding-the-world-it-is-standing-in. Kisiel even asserts that “it serves to formally indicate the generative event (Ereignis) of sense, truth and history.” (510) The term takes over the physical connotations from Vollzugsinn of maturing, coming to fruition, ripening. Ryan Streeter suggests that the term should also be understood in terms of Paul Ricoeur’s narratology. (420)

26 Kisiel Genesis, 238.

27 De Vries “Formal Indication” 668.

28 Oudemans citation and translation of GA 61 33, in “Heidegger: Reading Against the Grain”, 415.

29 Notice that ‘temporalizing actualization’ is here that tendential fourfold minus the –sinn. Later in this book proposal Heidegger defines “full intentionality” as “(Being-related-to, the That-with-respect-to-which of the relating as such, the actualization of the relating, the temporalizing of the actualization, the truthful safe-keeping of the temporalizing)” (368) — note the addition of a fifth ‘truth-relation’.

30 What Baur translates as ‘visual stance’, ‘visual direction’ and visual breadth’ (358), Kisiel translates as ‘position of sight’, ‘directive line of sight’ and ‘range of vision’ (Genesis, 252). Heidegger explicitly differentiates his historical project(ions) from the cinematic “projection of entertaining world-historical perspectives... in a pictorial manner” (PIA 371, 373), prefiguring what would be generalised 13 years later as being our “Age of the World Picture”. Concerning Heidegger’s theory of
over-exposure: "Every interpretation, according to both its visual stance and visual direction, must
over-illuminate its thematic object. The thematic object becomes appropriately determinable only
when one succeeds in seeing the object, not arbitrarily, but rather in seeing it too keenly on the basis
of the accessible determination-content of the object; and thus when one succeeds, through a taking-
back of the over-illumination, in coming-back to a demarcation which is as appropriate for the object
as possible. An object which is always seen only in half-darkness becomes graspable only by passing
through an over-illumination of the object precisely in its half-dark giveness." (374)

This point has been made by a number of commentators. For example, Oudemans seeks to
show that Heidegger’s work is precisely not a skewing out of the everyday but rather back into it via
the sort of reflexive projection of necessity that comes from double negatives: “Proper asking is
against the im-proper-ty of Ruinanz; this does not mean that it is outside Ruinanz or anti-Ruinanz.
Being against the im-proper (Un-eigentlichkeit) means being against the staying away of the against in
Ruinanz. This is an augmentation of the against, actually letting it reign… Interpretation must not
detach itself from the against, but must enter into it in such a way that the hiddenness against which
interpretive clarity turns begins to reign over the interpretation. Interpreting is letting being-away be
da (there) in its character of being-against." (“Heidegger: Reading Against the Grain” 43) Thus when
for instance, Michel Haar asks “Is it not necessary, in order to be done with Platonism, with eternal
schism, to learn anew to love the everyday?… Is not the amor fati which teaches to ‘will that which I
was forced to do’ wiser than the radical and total deprecation of the everyday?” (“The Enigma of
believe that these questions should be read as explications of Heidegger’s learning project rather
than criticisms. See also in this regard M.Blanchot’s exceptional “The Language of the Everyday” in
The Infinite Conversation [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995] and J.L.Nancy’s equally
1993].

Caputo makes much of this jewgreekness — following Derrida’s work on Joyce, Kant, Levinas
and apocalyptic messianism — in his attempt to retrieve an ethics from, in particular the early,
‘Heidegger’. See his Demythologizing Heidegger, especially the “Introduction” which explains this
book’s relation to its companion volume, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with
Constant Reference to Deconstruction [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993].

Hent de Vries article on “Formal Indication” analyzes powerfully the ambiguous chiasmus at
work in Heidegger’s early religious courses, between philosophy and theology, phenomenology and
religion, system and history. For example at one point, in reference to the analogous undecidable
decisiveness of faith and existence, de Vries asks: “but again, what precisely constitutes this analogy?
Are we dealing here with a parallel that is merely formal?… Or, are we dealing here with what is at
bottom one and same phenomenon, if only because religious faith is fundamentally a modification
of factical life, or conversely, because this life is in the end to be understood in terms of faith, or perhaps because both are merely epiphenomena of yet another more originary phenomenon, for example, the core-phenomenon called the historical?...it could be maintained that the archi-

Christian experience of factical life prefigures in its very eschatology and apocalyptics the later fundamental ontology of human Dasein...[or] that the formal indication of existence that will find its extensive elaboration only in Sein und Zeit, in a sense already informs — or precisely forms itself in— the understanding of early Christianity, of its restlessness, its wakefulness, its knowledge of having to become what one already is, etc.” (657)

34 Sheehan’s account of the 1920-1 course draws attention to the fact that pivotal are the terms genesthai (to have become) and eidenai (to already well know), what this thesis would translate as learning and learning. Significantly, Sheehan’s argument is that it is with these terms that ‘Heidegger’ learns of the primordial existentiales Befindlichkeit (disposition) and Verstehen (know-how) and their temporal ecstatics Gewesenheit (which Sheehan insists refers not to some past as in “is-as-
having-being” but rather “that which is already operative”, “the already dimension of existence”) and Zukunftigkeit (becoming). See “Heidegger’s ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’ 1920-

1”, 54-5. It should also be noted that Sheehan justifies his focus on these terms through Heidegger’s own definition of “‘preaching’ within which particular words, especially when repeated time and again, take on a special interpretive significance.” (54) In this context, ‘Heidegger’ remains a preaching, which is to say, all of ‘Heidegger’ involves formal indications.

35 T.Kisiel, “Heidegger (1920-1) on Becoming a Christian: A Conceptual Picture Show” in Reading Heidegger from the Start, 178. Significantly, Kisiel elaborates this equation in terms of what this thesis understands to be the essential process of ‘learning’: “knowing (or understanding) and becoming (or actualisation) are one to the point that becoming makes up the being of knowing, and knowing the very being of becoming.” (183) In Genesis, with its emphasis on having as a transitive verb rather than a gerund or participle, Kisiel characterises the process as “having-become a Christian, that is, forever rehaving the facticity of becoming a Christian.” (182)

36 “Heidegger’s ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’ 1920-1”, 57.

37 de Vries "Formal Indication", 677.

38 See for instance, the section entitled “The University” in the chapter “Heidegger’s Kampf: the Difficulty of Life and the Hermeneutics of Facticity” in John Caputo’s Demythologizing Heidegger, 42. “Philoso-

phy is a fixed discipline, a sedate, formulaic, normalising academic undertaking, an institutionalised activity with a sedimented discourse. But philosophizing is a living act [Vollzug], something to be carried out, and it is to be judged in terms that befit genuine acting — in terms of its decisiveness, initiative, originality, and ‘radicality’.” See also David Farrell Krell’s chapter “You in front of Me, I in front of You: Heidegger in the University of Life” in Daimon Life.
39 Van Buren citing the 1921 course *Phenomenological Interpretations toward Aristotle* in *The Young Heidegger*, 360. See also Krell’s citation from the same course: “Our endeavours are no brought to completion sometime somewhere and by somebody. Rather, here and now we are living in these endeavours – in this very place, in this lecture hall. You in front of me, I in front of you, we together. We designate this initially determinable (self-worldly), with-worldly, and environmental situation, or the nexus of life that prevails and properly lives in this situation, with the term *university*.” (*Daimon Life*, 154). Krell adds a footnote though: “During the discussion that followed the paper on which this chapter is based, Derrida insisted that factual life must also be found outside the university – otherwise it would be impossible to bring anything to bear on the university philosophy, impossible to improve it.” (336)

40 Caputo makes this point clearly: “Today however, Heidegger points out, philosophy is to be found not in the life-situation of the *agora* but in the university. Hence any attempt to rethink what philosophy is, to think philosophically, is committed to rethinking the university. Thus as early as the first Freiburg period, long before the infamous Rectorial Address, Heidegger was already addressing the political enframing of the university [Caputo cites the Gesamtausgabe volume 56/7 *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* which contains the transcripts of the courses KNS 1919 “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews”, SS 1919 “On the Essence of the University and Academic Studies” and SS1920 “Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation”]. This is, he says, a hermeneutic requirement: to take up philosophising in the context of its current situation. For better or worse, philosophical activity is situated within institutional life. It was not always thus, and it may not be thus in the future, but we must begin where we are – that is what hermeneutics means – and today we philosophise in the university... Nietzsche, Heidegger says, did not know what he wanted; it is too easy to walk away from the university. Heidegger aims to revivify the university, to radicalize it. He wants neither academic business as usual nor a philosophising that abandons the university, but a university that philosophises, philosophising in the university.” (42)

41 Bambach, citing the WS 1921/2 course, in “The Hermeneutics of Origin”, 320.

42 WS 1921-2 *Phenomenological Interpretations toward Aristotle*, GA 61, 37, cited by Krell in *Daimon Life*, 37. Streeter gives an important version of the complicity required to learn (with) formal indications: “In encouraging the appropriation of the matter of the text through formal indication, Heidegger is operating on the basis of a kind of wager. This wager as I see it depends upon two presuppositions. The first one is that we must presuppose truth, understood as the disclosedness of *Dasein*, in anything we do... Insofar as we are beings that uncover matters, we are in such a way that not believing that there is truth makes living impossible. The second presupposition is that of temporality and its basis for repetition. It is repetition that brings one to remember what one has forgotten: the fundamental character of one’s own existence in which one operates every day with an
ontic familiarity while remaining ontologically distant. On the basis of these two presuppositions, Heidegger wagers that his readers will accept the urge given by his analysis to take up the formally indicating concepts and appropriate them in their basic existence. As human beings, they will presuppose with Heidegger that there is something basic to be uncovered, and they will through his analysis come to see what they have-been in such a way that the re-appropriation of past possibilities and accomplishments will yield confirmation of the structures he has outlined. (“Heidegger’s Formal Indication: A Question of Method in Being & Time”, 426)

43 At the crucial turning point mid way through the course, when Heidegger has set out the three increasingly authentic modes of boredom, he notes reflexively that “the essentiality of the third form of boredom itself depends upon a hitherto inexplicit philosophical engagement that we may not evade”, where philosophizing has just been characterised as the existential pursuit of essentiality. (FCM 155) Only such an explicitly constructive attuning to the essence of boredom when bored allows it to become disclosure: “We must therefore really question what this attunement gives us to question... This is what we are to understand, namely to help bring to word that which Dasein wishes to speak about in this fundamental attunement – bring it to that word which is not simply a matter of gossip, but the word that addresses us and summons us to action and to being. We are to understand this word, i.e., to project the truth of fundamental attunement upon this essential content.” (FCM 169)

44 The whole point of Heidegger’s analysis of animality in sections 45-63 is to teach us that animals, at least for the pedagogical sake of discerning the essence of ability, do not have abilities. The relationality of their world tolerates only capacity, that is an absorbed driven type of struggling [Ringen] with only relative possibilities. In terms of this thesis, an animal can learn to do things, that is, it can be trained, but it can never learn about things: it can never apprehend or attend to things. It is precisely this ability to abstract, to learn what something is, to learn that something is what it is, that is, to learn the -ity (or -hood or -ness) of things, that grants possibility to the human world, the possibility that things could be other than what they currently are. By having logos, human being is distinguished from all animal behaving, not only through having the power to distinguish, but also through the power of poiesis, the learned skill of making things other than what already is. Humans are thus ontologically creative.

45 Kisiel’s narrative of the Genesis of Being & Time argues that formal indication gets internalised by the development of the notion of Bewandtnis in the 1925 History of the Concept of Time course. What is significant is that Bewandtnis, which translates the pro-airesis (phronesic pre-choice) which guides Dasein’s most proper praxical way of living, “suggests more of a dynamic stasis, a kind of ‘turning in place’ or veve potentializing the situation, the way the world turns, not so much its chance drift or unusual twists, but more its orderly bent, learning, slant, bearing, tendency” (Genesis 390), i.e., the conservative revolution that is the project of learning.
46 Remembering that the ontological difference is a formal indication is a crucial task. It means that the ontological difference is never itself an ontological claim (i.e., that there is, in truth, a difference between being and beings), unless the term ‘ontological claim’ is understood with respect to the essential learning project of logos, i.e., as that which makes ontological what is being claimed ontically. The ontological difference is thus a possibility that we must make a project of making necessary. The account of projection just given is offered by Heidegger as that by which (or more precisely, as which) the ontological difference comes to be: that is, we must hold ourselves out into the ontological difference as a binding completion. Thus Heidegger begins the account of projection by saying: “We shall venture the essential step of transposing ourselves into the occurrence of this distinguishing in which the distinction occurs... Let us attempt such transposition with the intent of discovering the primordial structure of this fundamental occurrence.” (FCM 355-61) In this way philosophising seeks not to be “inventing” or even “finding” this difference, but rather finding is as “already found”: “It must somehow find itself before it, and indeed find itself before it as something belonging not to the realm of the arbitrary, but to the essential, indeed to the very essentiality of everything essential.” The ontological difference must then be subject to a type of retroactive back-projection: it is learned via that type of learning that is anamnetic.

47 The reference here is to the opening of Aristotle’s metaphysics, “All men by nature desire to know” which Heidegger translates as “The urge to live in seeing is constitutive of how the human being is”; see Kisiel Genesis, 239. See also Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Jasper’s account of (human) life, the first occasion on which Heidegger formally uses the term Dasein: “Life 1) as an act of creative formation and achievement, as an act of going out of itself, and thus... as something like out ‘being there’ (Da sein) in this life and as this life,...2) as experiencing, as having an experience, understanding, appropriating and thus... as something like our ‘being there’ in such experiencing.” (Pathmarks 13) Kisiel’s paraphrase is particularly pertinent: “2) Life as vital experiencing (Er-Leben), as the peripatetics (Er-fahren) of learning encounter, apprehending, drawing itself.” (Genesis 141)