Dancing with the Dragon: 
Australia’s Diplomatic Relations with China 
(1901-1941)

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text.

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3rd May 2018
Thesis Abstract

By using little known primary sources in Chinese and English, this thesis will discuss Australia’s diplomatic relations with China, between 1901 and 1941. In March 1909, Liang Lanxun, China’s first consul-general arrived in Melbourne, Australia. Liang’s mission was to promote trade between China and Australia and as well to study the racial relations between Chinese and Australians. In 1921, Edward Little was appointed as Australia’s first trade commissioner in Shanghai, China. In 1929, the Chinese consulate moved from Melbourne to Sydney, due to the fact that Sydney had become the centre of the Chinese communities in the Oceania. I suggest that the Great Depression and the Second World War forced Australian policy-makers to reconsider Australia’s geo-political position in the world. This is the first detailed research that treats Chinese diplomats in Australia and Australian diplomats in China between 1901 and 1941 as key historical subjects. In this thesis, I argue that Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy between 1909 and 1941. I further argue Australia was more intertwined and connected with Asia, in this period than the existing literature suggested.
Acknowledgements

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My mother, Lillian Meng, is the most important and supportive person in my life. She strongly believes in the importance of education. She sacrifices a lot so that I could have study opportunities in both Chinese and English speaking countries. I still carry some childhood memories from my hometown—Fushun, China. She tried to teach her seven year old son, how to spell English words like “apple” (one of the first English words I learnt), “agonised and cajoled” so that he might learn to write those ten-line essays beloved of Chinese primary school teachers, “little dreaming that one day he would write something a thousand times longer”.¹ This thesis is dedicated to her—my mother. Its shortcomings are mine alone.

NOTES ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

All the translations from Chinese to English in this thesis are the author’s unless otherwise stated.

I use the Hanyu Pinyin system of transliteration for Chinese words, names and phrases, except in cases where a different conventional or preferred spelling or pronunciation exists, e.g. Hsu Mo. The ordering of Chinese names follows their conventional forms; that is, family names first, followed by given names.
Dancing with the Dragon: Australia’s Diplomatic Relations with China (1901-1941)

Introduction

Little has been said in this introductory chapter regarding Australia’s relations with China between 1894 and 1931, because there is little to say. Since the settlement of the immigration issue at the beginning of the century Australia has had few political contacts with China except as a participant in international conferences and agreements.2

Jack Shepherd, 1939

Shepherd suggests there was historically little political contacts between Australia and China.3 Shepherd’s view represented the majority of Australians. My thesis however, challenges this position, by offering a more complete and complicated picture of the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations, between 1901 and 1941.

In this thesis, I argue that between 1909 and 1941 Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy.4 I further argue the decade of 1930s was the first time that Australia has turned its attention to Asia (namely China and Japan), both politically and economically, at least at the official level.5 I suggest that the Great Depression and the Second World War (WWII) made Australian policy-makers reconsider Australia’s geopolitical position in the world. The economic depression and the expansion of Japan in the Pacific forced some Australian politicians to realise Australia’s geographical closeness to Asia. This is why Australia appointed its first two diplomatic postings in the USA and Japan in the 1940. Only one year later, Australia appointed its first minister to China. Frederick Eggleston went to Chongqing, China in 1941.6 Australia, therefore, was more dependent on Asia in the first half of the twentieth more than the existing literature suggested.7 Further, for Chinese policy-makers and diplomats, their priorities were to maintain China’s independence and unity.8 Chinese diplomats had to serve this goal when they were working in Australia.

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4 Taiwan: 中央研究院近代史档案馆, [Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History, Taipei (hereafter AS: IMH)], Diplomatic Archives, 02-13-006-03-024, p.1. I use materials from digital collection of AS: IMH.; AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-015-01-015, p.1.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 23 November 1929, p.5. (The only exception is during the Second World War (WWII). In WWII, China and Australia were allies, as they fought against the Japan together. Thus, neither China nor Australia wanted to talk about the White Australia policy during WWII.)


7 Shepherd, Australia’s interests and policies in the Far East, p.22.; Andrews, Australia and China, p.34.

They worked hard to protect China’s national interests in Australia between 1909 and 1941, in three areas. They tried to protect the rights of Chinese citizens in Australia; they encouraged Australia to buy more goods from China in the 1920s and 1930; after 1931, they tried to explain China’s position towards Japan, while trying to gain support from Australian government and public. In the 1930s, Chinese policy-makers for the first time took Australia seriously. This is because China viewed Australia as one of few nations which could provide China assistance during its military and political struggle against Japan. This fresh view of Sino-Australian relations only comes to light if we pay attention to Chinese language sources and how they challenge existing conceptions of Australian history. Similarly, reading Australian sources in the context of Chinese history in this period challenges canonical readings of Chinese foreign policy in this period, particularly as it related to Australasia.

In this thesis, I wish to address two central questions. First, how did China maintain its diplomatic relations with a semi-independent state like Australia between 1901 and 1941? China at this time was a middle (or a regional) power, but it was in the process of becoming a great power. At the end of the WWII, China became one of the five permeant members of the United Nations’ Security Council.9 Australia was a middle power and still is a middle power today.10 Second, to what extent, did the Australian government have its independent foreign policies in the first half of the twentieth century? I wish to use the history of Australia’s diplomatic relations with China to answer that question.

Summary of Sino-Australian diplomatic relations in the period

When Chinese people encountered Europeans in Australian colonies in the nineteenth century, they faced strong discrimination. Racial discrimination mainly occurred in the following ways: Chinese people did not have the rights to vote, they were excluded from participating politics. Chinese people did not have the freedom to choose their occupation, either. Since 1901, Chinese people were the victims of the anti-humanitarian White Australia policy, this resulted a significant decline of the Chinese population in Australia.11 The English-language newspapers in Australia published discriminatory or insulting words against Chinese people.12 Chinese people would face insulting behaviours daily when they were walking on the streets, occasionally Chinese people were beaten by the Caucasian.13

In the late nineteenth century, Charles H. Pearson—a liberal politician as well as a scholar—published an extremely influential book and predicted the expansion of Chinese population, and the rise of China.14 Yet when scholars study the Sino-Australian relations, they have paid

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9 Jiang Yongjing (蔣永敬), 抗戰史論 (The Anti-Japanese War and a historical commentary), Taipei: Dongda tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1995, p.3.
12 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 7 January 1911, p.2. Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 11 March 1911, p.7.
little attention to the book. In this thesis, I will explain the significance of Pearson’s impacts on Sino-Australian diplomatic relations. Despite the Australian governments’ strong support of the White Australia policy, China had official relations with Australia between 1909 and 1949.\textsuperscript{15} The domestic political affairs within China and Australia as well as the global situations influenced the diplomatic relation between China and Australian between 1909 and 1941.

The Chinese policy-makers viewed Australia, New Zealand and Southern Pacific Islands such as Fiji as a region together, when the Chinese government appointed diplomats in the 1900s. In 1908, China appointed its first consul—Lin Runjian in Western Samoa (it was ruled by the Germans at that time), to look after the Chinese coolies.\textsuperscript{16} Lin was in charge of China’s diplomatic affairs with this Pacific Island. In 1909, two Chinese diplomats arrived in Wellington and Melbourne, respectively, in order to represent the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). Huang Rongliang (黄荣良)\textsuperscript{17} was a Chinese diplomat in New Zealand and Australia between 1909 and 1913. Between February 1909 and May 1911, Huang served as the first consul for the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), in Wellington, New Zealand. He then served as the Qing’s last consul-general and immediately became the Republic of China’s first consul-general in Melbourne, Australia.\textsuperscript{18}

In March 1909, Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) arrived in Melbourne. Liang’s mission was to promote trade between China and Australia and as well to study the racial relations between Chinese and Australians.\textsuperscript{19} According to Ching-Fatt Yong, a pioneer on Chinese Australian studies, during his 17 months in office, Liang had close contact with the Australian Department of External Affairs.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, since 1909, China had established official diplomatic relations with Australia, New Zealand and Western Samoa.\textsuperscript{21} Since Chinese consul-general in Melbourne was the highest-ranking Chinese official in Oceanic; thus, Chinese consul-general not only in charge of Sino-Australian relations, but also had a say on China’s official relations with Pacific Islands such as Fiji.\textsuperscript{22}

The Chinese consulate in Australia formed an alliance with the local Chinese business community. Chinese diplomats used their diplomatic status to protect the rights of Chinese in

\textsuperscript{15} AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-02-018, 18 May 1909.

\textsuperscript{16} Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in Australasia (大洋洲华人史事叢稿), Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.107.

\textsuperscript{17} AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-01-033, 20 May 1908, p.2.; AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-015-01-023, 5 July 1911.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.,

\textsuperscript{21} AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-01-033, 20 May 1908, p.2.; AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-02-018, 18 May 1909.

Australia; local Chinese business communities supported the Chinese consulate financially. The Chinese consulate in Australia struggled financially in the 1910s, and 1920s. In 1929, the Chinese consulate moved from Melbourne to Sydney, because Sydney had become the centre of the Chinese communities in the Oceania region. Song Faxiang (宋发祥), the then Chinese consul-general in Australia, made this important decision. Chinese local community in Australia (especially those located in Melbourne and Sydney) “were partly responsible for the financial maintenance” of the Chinese consulate.\(^23\) The official relations between Australia and China became especially positive during the Second World War (WWII), when Dr Hsu Mo (徐谟) was the first Chinese extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador in Australia. Hsu was one of the most senior Chinese diplomats in the 1940s. Appointing him as China’s first minister\(^24\) in Australia suggests the importance of Australia for China during the WWII. Representing China during the WWII, Hsu was in Australia between 1941 and 1944. Hsu came here with his family, and embraced Australian social and cultural life. China was allied to Australia and New Zealand in the WWII.

Meanwhile, Australians travelled to China, in order to seek job opportunities or promote the Sino-Australian relations. George Morrison (1862-1920), an Australian, went to China and spent significant time there. Morrison was one of the most extraordinary people among the Sino-Western histories, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Morrison was worried about the expansion of the Chinese population, even though Morrison had close relations with influential Chinese politicians like Yuan Shikai (1859-1916).\(^25\) Billy Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia in 1921, appointed Edward Little (1864-1939) as Australia trade commissioner in Shanghai, China. This was a significant post because, for the first time, Australia had established direct official contact with China. However, the Australian government terminated Little’s post in 1923, as he could not receive enough support from the British diplomats in Shanghai nor the Melbourne business community back in Australia.\(^26\) In 1922, the Australian government appointed Egbert Thomas Sheaf (1869-1948) as Australian trade commissioner in the East. Although Sheaf’s office was based in Singapore, he was responsible for Australian trade with all the Asian nations, including China.\(^27\) The appointment of Sheaf suggests that Australian government wanted to improve its commercial relations with its Asian neighbours.\(^28\)

Between 1925 and 1935, the Australian government relied on British diplomats to look after Australia’s interests in China, as Australia no longer having any official representative in


\(^{24}\) On modern world diplomacy in the first half of the twentieth century, Minister is one level below Ambassador. Since Australia was still a British dominion in 1941, it could only appoint a Minister in China. Eggleston was the highest-ranking Australian official/diplomat in China.


\(^{27}\) NAA: A11804 1924/255, “Trade Commissioners China and the East-Trade Commr. Australian”, Letter from Official Secretary to the Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 30th May 1922.

\(^{28}\) NAA: A11804 1924/255, “Trade Commissioners China and the East-Trade Commr. Australian” Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to The Official Secretary to the Governor-General, 22rd May 1922. Unfortunately, Australian government did not renew Sheaf’s posting while it expired in 1925.
China nor Singapore. At the same time, Australian government (under Joseph Lyons) had increasingly realised the importance of trading with China in the 1930s. In 1932, Alexander Clifford Vernon Melbourne (1888-1943), an academic from the University of Queensland, visited China and Japan, in order to deepen Australia’s economic connections with these two Asian nations. Melbourne tried to build a financial connection between Australian banks and Chinese banks. Two years later, John Latham (1877-1964), then Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, also visited Netherlands East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), China and Japan. His mission was to enhance Australian government’s understanding of these Asian nations, but also promoted the commercial relations between Australia and China and Japan. Although Latham was keen to promote the trade with Asian neighbours, he was increasingly worried about whether the British navy would have the ability to protect Australia if Australia was under attack by a foreign power, such as Japan. Thus, it was useful for Australia to maintain its trading relations with China. Vivian Gordon Bowden (1884–1942), was Australia’s trading commissioner in Shanghai, China between 1935 and 1941. During this time, since he was Australia’s highest official in China, he was not only acting as a trade commissioner, but also acted as a diplomat trying to improve the relations between the two nations. Further, Bowden also reported the economic and political situations in China, back to politicians in Australia so that they knew what was going on in East Asia. William Henry Donald (1875—1925), an Australian newspaperman, was a political advisor to Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925), Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), as well as Zhang Xueliang (1901-2001). Like Morrison and Donald, Rewi Alley (1897-1987), a New Zealander, also met powerful Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong (1893-1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997).

Robert Menzies (1894-1978) appointed Sir Frederic Eggleston (1875-1954), to be the first Australian Minister to China in 1941, as he realised that Australia’s destiny was increasingly intertwined with Asia-Pacific. Eggleston saw his posting in China as a big opportunity for him. Eggleston and his staff were based in China’s wartime capital of Chongqing, and he was a popular diplomat in China during the Second World War. Eggleston was one of the most influential thinkers in Australia in the 1920s and 1930s. His ideas not only shaped Sino-Australian relations, but also had profound impacts on Australia’s foreign policies in the 1930s. According to James Cotton, one of the particular concerns of Eggleston was likely what would be determined the development of the Asia-Pacific region and on the future direction of Australia. Eggleston realised the global situation was changing radically in the

29 NAA: A981 TRAD 191, “Trade. China-Commercial Policy-Consular Invoices”, Letter from The Secretary, Department of External Affairs (Canberra) to Department of Commerce (Melbourne), 12 April, 1933.
36 Ibid., p.50.
1930s and 1940s, and Australia as a middle power, had to embrace this change as it was the best way to protect Australia’s national interests globally.37

Between 1901 and 1941, both British diplomats and Australian diplomats looked after Australian interests in China. However, what was an Australian diplomat in the first half of the twentieth century? Who can be an Australian diplomat in China at this time? Both people who had official status or those without official status can be an Australian diplomat in China. For example, George E. Morrison, had close contacts with both Australian and Chinese government in the early of the twentieth century. Morrison was closely associated with Yuan Shikai (the President of Republic of China between 1912 and 1915) and other senior Chinese politicians.38 Although Morrison was not an Australian official, he had significant impacts on promoting the understandings between China and Australia. Alexander Melbourne, also acted as an Australian diplomat while he was visiting China in 1932. He was trying to enhance the economic as well as financial ties between Australia and China. Melbourne met senior Chinese politicians while he was in Shanghai, to discuss the trading between Australia and China. Once he returned to Australia, he served various roles on the advisory committees for the Australian government, in order to promote Australia’s economic connections with China and Japan.39 An Australian diplomat can also be a trade commissioner. For example, Edward Little and Vivian Bowden were Australia’s trade commissioners in China, at various times. Little was in China in the 1920s and Bowden was in the 1930s. While he was in China, Bowden was helping refugees from Russia to come to Australia, through China in the late 1930s. John Latham was the most senior Australian politician/diplomat that ever visited China in the first half of the twentieth century. Finally, since 1941, Australian government appointed senior diplomats (e.g. Eggleston), to look after Australia’s interests in China. Thus, various kind of Australians acted as Australian diplomats in China, between 1901 and 1941.

There was a considerable amount of trade between Australia and China through Hong Kong, in the 1920s and 1930s.40 Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats and/or visitors’ contributions before 1941 laid the foundation of the exchanges of the ministers between the two countries in 1941. Further, though the Australian government did not recognise People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the official regime in China in 1949, Australia continued to trade with PRC in the 1950s and 1960s.

Historiography

William Kirby’s bold statement in 1997 that “nothing mattered more” than China’s foreign relations in the Republican era of 1911–49 is entirely justified by the ways in which China’s politicians, scholars and revolutionaries of the time viewed the problems faced by the young republic.41 I agree with William Kirby that China’s foreign policies in the Republican era of 1911-1949 are extremely important when it comes to understanding modern China. However, Chinese diplomatic historians tend to study China’s relations with Japan, Europe, Russia and Britain, and the USA, while they study China’s foreign relations, in the first half of the twentieth century.42 This is partly because these powerful nations made greater impacts on Chinese society, partly because more primary sources regarding China’s relations with these ‘great powers’ are available to them. Compared to Europe, Russia, Japan, the USA and Southeast Asia, Chinese scholars have generally paid little attention to the diplomatic relations between China and Australia.

Due to a lack of language ability and archival resource, scholars in both Australia and China focus on one-side of the story only, and leave the other side of the story behind. Scholars in Australia tended to mainly use English language sources. For example, in the Preface of his book: Australia and China—the ambiguous relationship, from the outset, Eric Andrews admits: he is not a China specialist and have no Chinese linguistic skills.43 In Andrews’s own words, “this book is built on English-language sources”.44 Similarly, other scholars like David Walker and William Sima also fit in with this category (though Sima is an expert of China and able to read Chinese, he mainly uses English sources in his book).45

As far as I know, no Chinese historian has written extensively about China’s official relations with the Southern Pacific region46 in Chinese, especially on the prior-1949 period. Partly because these islands are too far and too small for Chinese historians, partly because they may not have the primary sources available to them in China.47 In addition, scholars in China and Australia tend to focus on post-1949 narrative, particularly after 1972, when People’s Republic of China officially established the diplomatic relations with Australia and New

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44 Ibid.,
45 David Walker, Anxious Nation; Australia and the rise of Asia 1850-1939, St. Lucia, Qld.: University of Queensland Press, 1999; William Sima, China & ANU, 2015.
46 I mean islands such as Fiji, Samoa and Tonga. In China, political scientists have studied of these islands. For example, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Fiji in 2014, he met a number of leaders of other islands. See also: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-22/chinese-president-xi-visits-fiji-to-strengthen-economic-ties/5911144, last accessed on 29/08/2017; however, historians in China have not paid enough attention to these islands.
47 Political scientists in China have studied PRC’s contemporary relations with these islands.
Zealand. 48 Billy Griffiths’s *The China breakthrough* provides us a detailed study on Gough Whitlam (1916-2014)—then Labour Party Leader’s visit to China in 1971. 49 James Reilly and Jindong Yuan’s *Australia and China at 40*, is a classic study on Sino-Australian relations post-1972. 50 James Kember and Paul Clark’s edition *China and New Zealand: a thriving relationship thirty years on* is a key study on Sino-New Zealand diplomatic relations post-1972.

Scholars in China, however, faced other difficulties. Their access to primary sources in Australia can be quite challenging. Although both Yeung Wing On and Zhang Qiusheng have tried to engage with historical debates in Australia, I still feel they could engage more with scholars in Australia, in their works. 52 Chinese scholars focus on Chinese diplomats’ experiences in Australia, and largely ignore the Australian diplomats’ experiences in China. Australian scholars focus on Australian diplomats in China and ignore the Chinese diplomats’ experiences in Australia. Thus, the lack of Chinese language abilities for Australian scholars and lack of accessing primary sources and secondary sources for scholars in China (including Yeung Wing On in Hong Kong53) make their stories incomplete, as they tended to be either Euro-centric or Sino-centric.

My research however, aims to connect Australian historiography and Chinese historiography together, by using little know primary sources in both Chinese and English. This is the first detailed research that treats Chinese diplomats in Australia and Australian diplomats in China between 1901 and 1941 as the key historical subjects in the writings. Existing historiography focuses on the post-1949 Sino-Australian diplomatic relations. 54

**Chinese Historiography:**

Chinese historians viewed China’s foreign policies between 1900 and 1949 as a failure. Hong Junpei and Shi Yuanhua represent this view. Hong Junpei’s *Diplomatic history on Republic*

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52 Yeung, Wing On (楊永安), 長夜星稀—澳大利亞華人史 1860-1940 (Lonely star on lone nights, A history of the Chinese Australians 1860-1940), Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2014; Zhang Qiusheng (張秋生), Aoqaliya Hu qiao Huaren shi. It does not mean these two scholars never engage with scholars in Australia. For example, they both mention C. F. Yong’s *The New Gold Mountain* in their writings. Zhang even mentions Neville Meaney’s work.
government was published in 1930. Hong views China’s modern diplomacy as a total failure; then he tries to offer reasons that explains Chinese diplomacy was unsuccessful. Hong suggests that Chinese people have paid close attention on China’s foreign relations since the founding of the Republican of China (1911), and Chinese ordinary people were unhappy with Chinese diplomatic policies. In other words, the Chinese public thought Chinese diplomats were too gentle towards the Western powers and Japan. Hong’s book is important, because it gives people a sense of how Chinese people might view China’s foreign policies at that time. In this sense, Hong’s position represents Chinese educated people’s viewpoints in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, Chinese elites were frustrated of the weakness of China. They felt China was isolated as a nation, and had no real friends that they could rely on.

Shi Yuanhua is one of the leading scholars on China’s diplomatic history on the Republic era (1911-1949) in mainland, China today. His major book—Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era is a general history text, and is a good starting point for anyone who wants to know China’s foreign policies during the Republican era. Shi believes China’s foreign policies had huge impacts on Chinese society, on modern Chinese history. Like other scholars in mainland China, Shi adopts a Marxist approach when he tries to explain China’s diplomacy. He suggests that modern China foreign policies are an interaction between the traditional and back-warded China, and the strong and aggressive imperialist powers.

One of the impacts that the Western societies had on China was to make Chinese people realise their position in the world. China was no longer in the centre of the world affairs. The Sino-centric view was dramatically disappearing, among Chinese elites. Since the late Qing period, Chinese elites increasingly frustrated by China’s weakness and its position in the world. However, the Western influence on China also led to the rise of Chinese nationalism. Since the late Qing period, one of the agenda that Chinese diplomats wanted from other nations was: respect. Chinese leaders like Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), desperately wanted China to become an equal state to the West. Throughout the late Qing and Republic era, one of the biggest goals for Chinese politicians was to make sure the survival of Chinese regime, as an independent nation for Chinese people in the world. Despite China’s weakness, I think they achieved this goal.

Shi Yuanhua views China mostly as a victim of the Western powers and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. I see China not only as a victim, but also as an active player internationally; Chinese diplomats advocated China in the world. In other words, I believe

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55 Hong Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 1930.
57 Ibid., Preface, p.1, “我国外交，自国民政府成立，标榜革命外交取消不平等条约以来，大为国人所注意…” . The originally text written by Hong was published in (semi)-classical Chinese.
59 Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994.
60 Shi, Preface, p.1, “外交，不再是王朝政治的附属品，而是决定着，主宰着中国社会发展的历史进程．”
61 Ibid., “所谓 ‘近代中国外交’ 指的就是古老的，落后的中华民族与强大的侵略成性的帝国主义列强间的交涉往来．”
62 Hong Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 1930, p.9.
China had more historical agency than scholars like Shi Yuanhua have suggested. China was still a weak nation in the 1920s; but the status of China was slowly rising. Chinese public viewed China as a winner of the WWI, but the Western powers did not treat China equally, as a victor of the war. Chinese diplomats like Wellington Koo (1888-1985) did an excellent job in Paris in 1919, to argue the Chinese rights in Shangdong, but the Chinese public in China did not understand what was going on, and they heavily criticized the Chinese diplomats, partly because Japan gained Qingdao (a strategic naval base in Shangdong Province) from Germany. The Chinese public thought Chinese diplomats did not protect Chinese interests in France, during the Paris Convention of 1919. The May 4th movement was a result of the rise of the nationalism in China. Mao Zedong (1893-1976) was radicalised during this process, and it eventually led him to convert to Marxism/Communism.

In Research on the Diplomatic history during Republic era, Zuo Shuangwen and Wang Jie provide an overview on the scholarship on Republic of China’s foreign policies.63 Zuo Shuangwen and Wang Jie also adopt Marxist approach. On the one hand, they view China as a victim of the imperialist powers. On the other hand, Zuo and Wang suggest that China engaged with the “outside world” in the Republic era more deeply than ever before. Zuo and Wang believe Shi’s work Shi Yuanhua’s Diplomatic History on the Republic of China Era is a representative book on Republican of China’s era foreign policies.64 Zuo Shuangwen and Wang Jie think historians should pay attention to people like Hsu Mo (who was China’s Minister in Australia during the Second World War)—the ones who were senior officials, but not at the highest level. Zuo and Wang also suggest that scholars in China mainly deal with China’s foreign relations with more powerful nations, particularly Russia, the USA, Japan, Britain, France and Germany. In other words, they focus on China’s foreign relations with these global powers.

My research however, is focusing on China’s relations with a middle (or a regional) power—Australia.65 Scholars in mainland China also like to show how weak China was during the Republic of China (1911-1949), and by contrast, they could show how strong China’s foreign policies are today, under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party.66 In doing so, they want the Chinese readers (or Chinese citizens) to believe that the PRC is the regime that truly protecting China’s national interest, and the Chinese people therefore should support the current Chinese regime. Shi represents this dominate narrative in the mainland, China. In general, scholars in China have paid little attention to Chinese diplomats in Australia and

64 Ibid., “石源华中华民国外交史，此书是一部民国外交的通史，起于1912年民国初创，终于1949年民国外交的终结 输理了民国政府的外交线索，是中华民国外交史研究领域的代表作，对一些重大事件提出了自己独到的见解 ‘”; Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994.
New Zealand, particularly in the late Qing and Republican period. In my thesis, I would like to fill these gaps. I wish to show how China tried its best to fit in with this world order, even though China may not like the world system at that time.

Unlike scholars based in mainland China, scholars in Taiwan tend to use more English sources and other non-Chinese language sources, while they study Chinese diplomatic histories. Zhao Guocai, a scholar based in Taiwan, is an expert on Hsu Mo. His article *The First Chinese Judge Hsu Mo (1893-1956) of the International Court of Justice: His Life and Contribution*, is a detailed and biographical study of Hsu. However, in his writing, Zhao only briefly mentioned Hsu’s time in Australia. Tang Qihua, another scholar bases in Taiwan, is a leading authority on the foreign policies on the Republic era. His book, *Treaty Revision Campaign of the Beijing Government, 1912-1928: Out of the Shadow of the “Abrogation of Unequal Treaties”* challenges the traditional view on Chinese foreign policies, and suggests that China had outstanding diplomats in the Republic era. Disagreeing with Shi Yuanhua, Tang argues that the failure of Chinese diplomacy was because China was a weak nation in the 1910s and 1920s, we should not blame on the Chinese diplomats. In fact, Tang suggests China had extremely talented diplomats like Wellington Koo (1888-1985), and these diplomats tried their best to protect China’s interests. My research is an expanding of Tang’s viewpoint. Tang and I have one in common: both of us use more English primary sources than Chinese scholars based in mainland, China. Of course, we use Chinese primary sources as well. What is different from my research and Tang is, Tang tends to use English primary sources in Britain and other European nations, and I use primary sources in Australia.

Chinese scholars have studied the history of Chinese communities in Australia. Liu Weiping was one of these scholars. Although Liu Weiping taught at University of Sydney, his writing on Chinese histories in Australia is in Chinese. Before Liu entered the academic world, Liu was a Chinese diplomat. In 1945, he was China’s vice consul-general in Sydney and then he was promoted to be the Chinese consul in Perth. Thus, he not only witnessed the Sino-Australian relations in 1940s, but also played a diplomatic role himself. His experience made his writing unique in its own way. Though Yong published the *New Gold Mountain* in 1977, Liu only published his book in 1989; Chinese in Australia thought Liu as a pioneer on

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68 Tang Qihua (唐啟華), Foreign Relations under the Northern Warlord Government: a Literature Review (“北洋外交” 研究評介), in *Historical Research* (历史研究), 2004, Volume 1, p.103.


70 I should add here that more and more scholars in China today have realized the importance of non-Chinese sources when they study China’s foreign policies in the twentieth century.


Chinese histories in Australia. This is because his writing is in Chinese, and therefore more easily to appeal the Chinese public in general.

Unlike Yong and Liu, other Chinese historians based in China. Zhang Qiusheng’s *A History of the Chinese Emigrants to Australia* is a study, which covers the early relations between China and Australia, although Zhang also deals with the early Chinese immigrants in Australia. Zhang further argues the diplomatic relations between China and Australia improved slowly between the WWI and WWII, largely due to two factors. First, Australian governments were following the British governments closely, and Australian governments did not have independent foreign policies. Second, Australian governments failed to realize the importance of China. Since the WWI, Japan expanded its influence in East Asia. Meanwhile, Britain’s influence in the Pacific region was diminishing. As a result, Australia did not dare to challenge the aggressive Japan.

From his writing, we can see Zhang was extremely disappointed in Australian government’s action towards Japan. Zhang thinks that the Australian government should do more to help people in China before 1941. However, here is an interesting question: did Australia have the military ability to intervene? In fact, Australia was in no position to militarily support China. It lacked both the necessary power and influence to do so. One thing is important here, since 1937, the difference between Australian workers and Australian government’s official policies became evident. This is worth exploring more.

**Australian Historiography:**

Geographically, Australia is far away from Britain and much closer to the Asia. Australia is the only nation in the world that controls almost an entire continent; however, with relatively little population, particularly compared to its Asian neighbours. As David Walker and Agnieszka Sobocinska have reminded us that, since the late nineteenth century, people in the colonies carried the idea that ‘Asia’ would have a “determining influence on Australia’s future”. Further, Neville Meaney reminds us that majority of people in the Australian colonies “in this nationalist era” thought themselves primarily as British people. Meaney argues that the significant geo-political divide between Australia and Britain (the heart of the British Empire) created a tension “between the community of culture and the community of interest”. Indeed, in the first half of the twentieth century, Australia has special difficulties

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73 Ibid.,
74 Zhang, Qiusheng (张秋生), 澳大利亚华侨华人史 (A History of the Chinese Emigrants to Australia), Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 1998.
75 Ibid., p.32., “尽管中国早已同澳大利亚建立了领事关系，但中澳关系在本世纪30年代前并未取得重大进展，其主要原因，一是二战爆发之前，早已取得自治领地位的澳洲政府在对外政策上追随英国，尚无独立外交…，二是澳洲人对中国认识了解较少，经贸联系极其有限，特别是20世纪以来已成为西方列强对外政策目标的中国的重要性并未引起澳洲政府的注意。”
76 Ibid.,
77 I would like to thank Associate Professor David Reeves, a retired academic and former Australian diplomat in Indonesia, for sharing with me his views on Australia’s foreign policies. I have benefitted greatly from my visits to him.
80 Ibid., p.85.
in searching its own place in the established discourse regarding nation and nationalism.81 For these reasons, Anglo-Saxon Australians might feel insecure diplomatically since 1901. I further suggest this insecurity was the result of their cultural heritage and Australia’s geographical position in the world. New Zealand, although it did not join the Australian federation in 1901, shared similar views with their Australian cousins. “Yellow Peril” ideologies influence Europeans in both Australia and New Zealand.

This anxiety led to the anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese attitudes in Australian and New Zealand, including the formal adoption of the White Australia policy in Australia and poll tax against Chinese in New Zealand. Further, after Japan defeated China in the first Sino-Japanese in 1894-1895, and Japan defeated Russian in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, Japan became the dominant power in East Asia. For Australian scholars like Neville Meaney, the foreign relations between Japan and Australia were important to Australia between 1901 and 1941.82 This is because Japan was Australia’s major trade partner in Asia in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1935, for example, Japan was Australia’s second largest trading partner, only behind Britain. My research, however, suggests Australia wanted to trade with both China and Japan in the 1920s and 1930s.

In the Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939, David Walker explains Australia’s perceptions of Asia and Australia’s nervous attitudes towards its Asian neighbours, such as China and Japan.83 Walker argues that Australia came to nationhood at a time when the growing power of the East (especially Japan) was provoking increasing concern.84 Japan was the most powerful nation in East Asia, between 1900 and 1939. Thus, Australia paid greater attention to Japan than China.

Thanks to the works of Kate Bagnall, we now know that the (Australian) wives of Chinese men also travelled to China (especially southern China) to visit their husbands and children in the 1920s and 1930s.85 In other words, not only Chinese travelled to Australia to seek job opportunities, but Anglo-Saxon Australians also went to China. Thus, the White Australia policy did not stop Australia’s connection with the China.

Some historians believe that the adaptation of the White Australia policy was a result of the development of the British nationalism in Australia in the 1890s, spurred by do with the arrival of the Chinese goldminers in the nineteenth century. For example, Eric Andrews suggests the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was the natural outcome of growth of racialism and racial theorise, of the nineteenth-century Australian-Chinese relations, and of British imperials commitments, especially her alliance with Japan, over its interests in Far East.86 Similarly, Neville Meaney points out that, the adoption of the White Australia policy was not only a racial problem, but also a form of fear of other peoples.87 By the time

81 Ibid., p.84.
87 Great Southern Leader, 27 January 1911, p.6.
of federation in 1901, Australia had a population of only 3 million compared to China’s 415 million. 

Thus, Meaney argues for people in 1901, it was important to exclude other coloured people, especially the Chinese, in order to keep the British heritage in Australia. In other words, both Andrews and Meaney think the adaptation of the White Australia policy was inevitable, regardless of the arrival of the Chinese in Australia in nineteenth century or not. Further, they believe the White Australia policy of 1901 had little connection with the temporary anti-Chinese policies that adopted by various states earlier on (in the late nineteenth century). Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds believe the White Australia policy was part of a global anti-Chinese movement, although Australia might take this policy a step further than other Western nations.

However, some scholars in Australia refute this interpretation. For example, Keith Windschuttle suggests Australia is not, and never has been, the racist country Australian academic historians have condemned. He further blames the leftist universities-based historians to mislead the Australian public. Instead, he promotes the following argument: the White Australia policy of 1901 had connections to the earlier anti-Chinese restrictions in the gold-fields in the 1860s and 1880s. It was because of the Chinese were culturally not capable of accepting the British values, such as liberty and equality. In other words, there was a cultural tension between the Chinese and Europeans in Australia. The Chinese, according to Windschuttle, were the lower class, and could not appreciate the English/Australian values. If they allowed more Chinese to arrive in Australia, they would even lower the wages and living standards of the Australian people. Thus, according to Windschuttle, it was for cultural and economic reasons, that led to the adoption of the White Australia Policy in 1901. The White Australia policy had nothing to do with race.

Others soon pushed Windschuttle’s approach back. In Big White Lie, John Fitzgerald argues against Windschuttle, by suggesting that the White Australia policy was about race and nationalism, rather than cultural and economic factors. Fitzgerald reminds his readers Chinese in Australia were not slaves; and China was not a slave society in the nineteenth century, either. Therefore, Chinese were not lower class of people, and they appreciated those progressive British values, such as liberty and democracy. Similar to Fitzgerald, Gwenda Tavan argues racial determinism also shaped the complex emotional identifications of people in Australia in the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, both Fitzgerald and Tavan strongly disagree with Windschuttle’s position. Because they believe that the White

89 Ibid.,
91 Keith Windschuttle, White Australia Policy, Sydney: Macleay Press, 2004, p.10.; Windschuttle was influenced by earlier scholars, such as Myra Willard and Charles Price; Please see Myra Willard, History of the white Australia policy to 1920, Carlton South, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1978; Charles A. Price, The great white walls are built: restrictive immigration to North America and Australasia, 1836-1888, Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs in association with Australian National University Press, 1974.
92 Ibid., pp.4-5.
93 John Fitzgerald, Big white lie: Chinese Australians in white Australia, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2007; Weekly Mercury, 13 June 1903, p.3.
94 John Fitzgerald, Big white lie, pp.11-12.
Australia policy was indeed a racist policy, targeted on coloured people, particularly the Chinese.

In this thesis, I suggest that the White Australia policy, trade and “recognition” (recognition means which regime Australian government regarded as an official and legitimate government in China) were the three dominant themes in the Sino-Australian relations, between 1901 and 1921. Chinese official representatives used trade as a tool to argue that Australian governments should relax its White Australia policy, and recognise the regimes they represented. On the one hand, Chinese in Australia suffered during this era, and although Chinese diplomats tried their best to improve the living conditions of Chinese, they usually achieved little. On the other hand, Chinese diplomats were able to persuade the Australian governments to recognise the regimes they represented. China eventually became an equal nation to the West in the 1940s, just like Charles Pearson had predicted in National Life and Character, in the late nineteenth century. The Sino-Australian relations was part of the Sino-Western relations, China wanted to ‘fit in’ with the Western ruling world; when Australian politicians and diplomats wanted to establish Australia’s independent voices in the world stage, in order to protect its own interests.

Sophie Couchman and Kate Bagnall point out that the field of Chinese Australian history is comparatively young. It emerged in the 1960s and 1970s out of a desire by historians to understand Australia’s White Australia policy.

Ching-Fatt Yong’s The New Gold Mountain is a classic study on Chinese in Australia. Adopting social history approach, Yong explains the difficulties that Chinese had to face in Australian society, in the period between 1901 and 1921. Yong suggests that, as Chinese people faced strong discrimination in Australia, the determination to play in China’s destiny was perhaps an indirect outcome of the White Australia policy. Because Chinese in Australia believed that only a strong and independent China would come to their rescue in time of need. The White Australia policy affected not only Sino-Australian relations, but also Australia’s relations with Asian nations generally, in the first half of the twentieth century. The White Australia policy had impacts not only within Australia, but also outside the nation. Yong reminds us that Chinese were different from their white contemporaries, the language they spoke, their clothes, their habits, their customs and traditions, as well as their living styles, were foreign to and different from the people of their host nation.

96 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line, p.110.
99 Ibid., p.15.
100 Ibid.,
102 Are Anglo-Saxon people in Australia the hosts of Australia? This is a highly contested issue in Australia today. Of course, we know aboriginal people have been living in Australia for several thousands of years.
shows how Chinese people struggled to fit in in Australia. Yong’s book was published in 1977, although some of his ideas are out-dated\textsuperscript{103}, his writing is important to my research. In my thesis, however, I would like to focus more on the diplomatic and economic aspects of the stories, while I try to provide a more updated research, with new primary sources in Chinese and English.

In \textit{Making Chinese Australia}, Kuo Mei-fen argues the period from the late 1890s to the early 1900s was a critical time in the shaping of Chinese communities and identities in unique ways “in a variety of local, national and transnational contexts”.\textsuperscript{104} The rise of an educated Chinese class in Sydney was unique. Using little known Chinese primary sources, Kuo argues that the narratives and interpretations of educated journalists and editors of Chinese-Australian newspapers played crucial role in shaping the social identities and historical awareness of Chinese communities in Australia.\textsuperscript{105} However, the Chinese in Australia were carrying different political views. One group was still loyal to the Qing regime, though they believed the regime should reform fundamentally. They therefore supported Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao (whom visited Australia in 1900-1901).\textsuperscript{106} These Chinese believed China should keep its Emperor, and adopt a parliamentary system, and China therefore could adopt either the British or the Japanese model. The other group argued Chinese people should overthrow the Qing regime, and created a republic. Local Chinese newspapers, as a result, mainly reflected these two major political views: reform the Qing regime or support a revolution, to replace completely the Manchu-led Qing dynasty. These people were supporters of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). Further, how does the rise of the nationalism in China as well as Australia may contribute the Sino-Australian relations in the period between 1901 and 1941?

Sophie Loy-Wilson, has written intensively on Australia’s connection with China, during the 1930s. Her work, \textit{Australians in Shanghai} provides an important update to Australians’ experiences during and after the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{107} Loy-Wilson details the commercial relations between China and Australia, and explains the social and cultural interactions between Australia and China, by tracing through the experiences of Chinese-Australians (e.g. Daisy Kwok).\textsuperscript{108}

In this project, I wish to connect the Chinese historiography to Australian historiography. Based on reading James Cotton’s writings, we can see Australian political elites increasingly realized the fact that Australia needed independent foreign policies in the 1920s. Cotton argues a unique ‘Australian school’ of international relations thinking emerged during the

\textsuperscript{103} For example, Yong mentions little about Chinese’s engagement with aboriginal people in Australia in his book. I think further research needed to be done on Chinese people’s interactions with aboriginal people. Please see: Manying Ip, \textit{Being Maori-Chinese: Mixed Identities}, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013.


\textsuperscript{105} Kuo, \textit{Making Chinese Australia}, p.6.

\textsuperscript{106} For Liang Qichao’s stay in Australia, please see Gloria Davies, “Liang Qichao in Australia: a sojourn of no significance?” \textit{East Asian History}, 2001, pp. 65-111.


\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p.16.
1920s. John Latham and Frederick Eggleston represented this Australian school, as they were both ‘Empire-nationalists’. Further, Australia wanted other nations to hear its independent voice on the international stage. This was actually similar to Chinese’s foreign policies, except China wanted to be a global power. Given the fact there were only seven or eight million people living in Australia, global powers like US, Russia, China and Britain would regard Australia as an advanced middle power. Because it was still an age of power determines world order. Then a question occurs, how might the White Australia policy impact Australia’s foreign policies towards China in the period between 1901 and 1941?

Kate Bagnall, Stuart William Greif, Sophie Loy-Wilson, Mei-fen Kuo, James Ng, ing Ip and Ching Fatt Yong, all study Chinese histories from social, cultural and/or economic perspective in Australia and New Zealand. These are all key scholars in the field, and their researches have influenced my thesis. Ng and Ip have also written extensively on Chinese miners in the Otago region in the nineteenth century.

British and American historians influence Australian historians, partly because Australia was part of the British Empire, and is still part of this English-speaking world. Australian historians tend to have deeper understanding of European histories as well, compare to their knowledge of Chinese histories. Chinese historians, however, tend to focus on China’s connection with more powerful nations, like Britain, other Europeans, the United States, and Russia. Further, as the modern Chinese history is closely intertwined with Japan (whether it impacted China positively or negatively is another question), Chinese historians have paid a lot attention to the Sino-Japanese relations. Further, Chinese historians have also paid greater attention to Southeast Asia (than Australia and New Zealand) because millions of ethnic Chinese living there.

Thesis Approach:

This study adopts a transnational approach, while focusing on the diplomatic stories. Chinese diplomats like Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) were transnational figures. These diplomats had educations in China and abroad, and were familiar with international situations in the first half of the twentieth century. When these Chinese diplomats returned to home from their services in Australia, they brought back the latest Western ideas, and therefore they contributed to China becoming a modern nation.

By using previously untouched primary sources in Chinese and English, I wish to reconstruct the diplomatic relations between China and Australia/New Zealand/Southern Pacific islands.

110 Stephen Garton, “Demobilization and Empire: Empire Nationalism and Soldier Citizenship in Australia After the First World War - in Dominion Context”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 2015, p.143. I borrow the term from Garton. In this article, Garton uses term “Empire nationalism” in the end.
Chinese scholars suggest China was a victim of the Western powers and Japan. However, I suggest China was not only a victim, but also an active player on the international stage, in the first half of the twentieth century. Though China viewed Australia as semi-independent nation between 1909 and 1941, Australia had formed diplomatic relations with China. In the 1930s, China took Australia seriously for the first time. Chinese diplomats intended to enhance the commercial relations between China and Australia, while other Chinese diplomats/visitors returned to China with republicanism and democratic ideologies from Australia. When we have known a lot of Western powers’ negative impacts on China, between 1901 and 1941; I want to show the positive aspects of Western powers’ impacts on China.112

Primary Sources and Methodology

By using the following Chinese and English primary sources, I will offer a more updated and complete study on the diplomatic relations between China and Australia between 1901 and 1941.113 In this thesis, I have used primary sources from National Archives of Australia (Canberra) and National Library of Australia (Canberra). I also examine the Melbourne papers which are currently located at University of Queensland Library. They hold rare and valuable primary sources of Dr Alexander Melbourne (1888–1943), who visited China in 1932. I also use primary sources from State Archives and Records Authority of New South Wales and State Library of New South Wales, as well as Australian newspapers. In addition, I use Chinese language newspapers such as the Tung Wah Times in combination with archival sources from the Kuomintang (KMT) collections in Melbourne, and Chinese Consulate files from Academic Sinica in Taipei.

The Tung Wah Times was a Chinese newspaper, which was published in Sydney between 1902 and 1936.114 It provides researchers a unique window to study Australia at this time. The newspaper had two major parts. First, it reported or translated local Australian news from English newspapers. Second, it republished newspaper materials from China, and supported Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao’s political movement.115

Based on Tung Wah Times newspapers sources, I would like to make five observations. First, I suggest Chinese diplomats tended to use Chinese newspapers like Tung Wah Times as a tool to communicate with the local Chinese in Australia.116 Similarly, local Chinese community

114 For a more detail account of the newspapers, please see: http://resources.chineseaustralia.org/tungwah, last access on 25/08/2017. Chinese Australian Heritage Resources is managed by Kate Bagnall, Sophie Couchman and Tim Sherrat. The website suggests that: “the Tung Wah News 東華新報 (1898–1902) and the later Tung Wah Times 東華報 (1902–1936) – published in Sydney, Australia”; see also: Mei-fen Kuo and Tsebin Tchen, Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, Volume 4, (南方華裔研究雜志第四卷), 2010, pp.140-149.
leaders like William Liu (1893-1983)\textsuperscript{117}, were also using \textit{Tung Wah Times} as a as tool to communicate with various Chinese diplomats.\textsuperscript{118} Further, Chinese diplomats like Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) and Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) were also using \textit{Tung Wah Times} to communicate with Chinese communities in Australia.\textsuperscript{119} Second, a shipping company operated between Hong Kong and Sydney between 1925 and (at least) 1932.\textsuperscript{120} The first shipping company established in 1925, only one year after the collapse of William Liu’s shipping company.\textsuperscript{121} Another Sydney based company: the Sydney Eastern Australian shipping company, opened in Jan 1929. Pang Zijun is the representative of this shipping company.\textsuperscript{122} Wei Zijing (魏子京)—the Chinese consul-general in Australia between 1917 and 1927, strongly supported this company.\textsuperscript{123} This is an extraordinary achievement, given the fact that the Chinese consulate was under strong financial pressure at this time.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, the shipping routes between Hong Kong and Sydney provided the foundation for the trading between China and Australia.\textsuperscript{125} Third, it was even a financial connection between China and Australia.\textsuperscript{126} Chinese companies chosen to register their companies in Hong Kong; when they

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\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Tung Wah Times} (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 21 January 1911, p.7.; \textit{Tung Wah Times}, 18 February 1911, p.8. Huang Rongliang used \textit{Tung Wah Times} to communicate with local Chinese communities in Australia, even when was Chinese consul in Wellington, New Zealand. Please see also: \textit{Tung Wah Times}, 25 March 1911, p.8.


\textsuperscript{121} It proves that there was at least one shipping company operated between Hong Kong and Sydney, after the collapse of the William Liu’s shipping company. In \textit{The new gold mountain}, C. F. Yong suggests that the collapse of the shipping company in 1924 under William Liu’s leadership indicate that, “the general dismay and disunity prevailing in Chinese communities in Australia”. Please see \textit{The new gold mountain}, p.97.; See also: \textit{Tung Wah Times} (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 2 August 1930, p.8.


\textsuperscript{123} Another Sydney based company: the Sydney Eastern Australian shipping company, opened in Jan 1929. Pang Zijun is the representative of this shipping company.\textsuperscript{122} Wei Zijing (魏子京)—the Chinese consul-general in Australia between 1917 and 1927, strongly supported this company.\textsuperscript{123} This is an extraordinary achievement, given the fact that the Chinese consulate was under strong financial pressure at this time.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, the shipping routes between Hong Kong and Sydney provided the foundation for the trading between China and Australia.\textsuperscript{125} Third, it was even a financial connection between China and Australia.\textsuperscript{126} Chinese companies chosen to register their companies in Hong Kong; when they

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\textsuperscript{124} AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 03-06-060-01-023, p.1.


were short of money, they would like to sell their shares to local Chinese in Australia, in order to expand their business in China. The money was transferred through banks in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Sydney. Fourth, Chinese viewed neither Chinese nor Europeans in Australia as Australians in the 1910s and 1920s. The Chinese saw themselves as Chinese citizens who were living in Australia; they saw Europeans as ‘Westerners’ who lived in Australia. Fifth, the Tung Wah Times also paid attention to Chinese’ living conditions in New Zealand and other southern Pacific Islands as well as China’s relations with these areas. For example, Chinese consul-general Wei Zijing (魏子京), was in charge of Sino-Australian diplomatic relations as well as Chinese affairs in Fiji and Sino-Fiji relations. Further research should be done on China’s diplomatic relations with Pacific Islands like Fiji at this time. Further, like Australia, New Zealand also exported its flour to China in the 1930s. However, it is also important to address the limitations of the Tung Wah Times as primary sources. One of the major weaknesses of this newspaper was that it had a particular political view. The publication of this newspaper were anti-communism and pro-capitalism. Overall, the newspaper reports from Tung Wah Times can enhance our understandings not only on Sino-Australian diplomatic relations, but also on the Chinese views of Australia at this time.

127 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 30 August 1924, p.6.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 18 October 1924, p.2.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 14 February 1925, p.7.
128 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 24 January 1925, p.10.
129 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 9 February 1924, p.11.
130 Ibid.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 29 March 1924, p.3.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 19 April 1924, p.6.
131 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 8 April 1933, p.8.
133 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 8 April 1933, p.8.
134 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 4 March 1933, p.3.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 13 May 1933, p.2.
Figure 1 [Nanjing Ship operated between China and Australia]


Figure 1 is a good example of the *Tung Wah Times*. The newspaper report shows that the Chinese company adopted a new ship; the name of the ship was “Nanjing”. It weighed more than 7,000 tones. There were 50 of large rooms, and 60 medium (or normal) rooms. It moved fast, and provided good service. The shipped arrived in Sydney from Hong Kong this month.\(^{135}\) A ship weighed more than 7000 tones was a large ship. This provided a basic transportation between China and Australia, as Hong Kong was closely associated with Canton economically.\(^{136}\)

In addition, I went to visit the Koumintang (KMT) archival sources in Melbourne in 2016. These are housed in a building that used to be the Chinese Consulate in Melbourne. I have gained a great deal of knowledge from these official sources. Although mainly Koumintang officials collected these sources; and the sources therefore represented a particular party or political view; they are still of the most reliable primary sources existing today. The Koumontang archival sources suggest that Chinese diplomats in Australia like Huang Ronglaing (黄荣良), were in charge of Sino-Australian diplomatic relations as well as Chinese affairs in New Zealand and Sino-New Zealand relations.\(^{137}\) Here is an example.


\(^{136}\) *Tung Wah Times* (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 24 October 1931, p.6.; *Tung Wah Times* (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 7 November 1931, p.5.

Based on this source (Figure 2), we now know that Huang Rongliang (黃榮良) was actively involving the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations as well as Sino-New Zealand diplomatic relations. It was not surprising, given the fact Huang was previously China’s first consul in New Zealand, between February 1909 and May 1911.

This archive has been under-used.\(^\text{138}\) John Randolph reminds us that it is important for historians to understand how the archives created and who created them, as they might represent a certain political or culture values.\(^\text{139}\) Similarly, the online sources from Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History (Taiwan) are also extremely valuable to my research; though they were also closely associated with Kuomintang Party (or Chinese Nationalist

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\(^{138}\) I am the only one of few people who are fortunate enough to get access to these invaluable primary sources. The other person is Mei-fen Kuo, please see: Mei-fen Kuo, *Making Chinese Australia: urban elites, newspapers and the formation of Chinese-Australian identity, 1892-1912*, Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Publishing, 2013. In need special permission Kuomintang (KMT) archival sources in Melbourne in 2016. Though they have rare and valuable primary sources, the KMT archival sources only have had basic cataloguing, and at least half of these primary sources wrote in Chinese. Due to these two factors, few researchers have used these primary sources. For a more detailed history of the KMT archival sources in Melbourne, please see Mei-fen Kuo and Tsebin Tchen, *Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies*, Volume 4, (南方華裔研究雜志第四卷), 2010, pp.140-149.

These government official sources could reveal a great deal of the diplomatic world that operated.

I also use a number of English primary sources, including the relating Chinese Consulate files located at the National Archives of Australia and National Library of Australia; the personal collections of A.C.V. Melbourne, which locate at Fryer library at University of Queensland; as well as a number of political pamphlets and published materials on the topic of Sino-Australian trade, including the writing of Pao Chun-Jien (保君健), China’s consul-general in Australia between 1936 and 1941. The primary sources of NSW State Archives and Records reveal that there were a number of Australian businessmen wanted to export their products to China in the 1920s and 1930s. Church records like *Diocese of Sydney* suggest that senior Australian Christian leaders were also keen to improve the relations between China and Australia. After critically reading these little known primary sources in Chinese and English, this thesis reveals how Chinese diplomats took advantage of a new Australian interest in the China trade to question the fundamental tenents of the White Australia policy, between 1909 and 1941. After 1941, Australia and China exchanged the official diplomatic representatives. In the Second World War (WWII), Australia and China were allies, as they fought together against the common enemy—Japan. Throughout the twentieth century, Australia had never been more important to China than it was during the WWII.

**Limitation of the thesis**

There are two major weaknesses of this thesis. One of the limitations of this thesis was there was a lack of female diplomats in the first half of the twentieth century. The majority of Chinese diplomats in Australia between 1909 and 1941 were men. Similarly, the majority of Australian officials visited or worked in China were also men. The lack of female diplomats in this period was a problem that historian may confront. However, it does not mean women disappear in the stories. Chinese diplomats brought their wife and children when they served in Australia. The wives of Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) and Song Faxiang (宋发祥), both had close relations with Chinese communities when their husbands served as consul-generals in Australia. Newspapers provided an opportunity/space for these educated Chinese women to communicate with the local communities. Further research needs to be done on the partners of Chinese diplomats in Australia. Another weakness of this thesis is that my key historical subjects are elites. Although it is not my intention to study elites of China and Australia, the majority of Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats that I deal with in this thesis were extremely well educated and had close associations with the governments they represented. Chinese diplomats like Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) and Hsu Mo (徐谟) had American

142 NSW State Archives and Records (thereafter: NSW SAR), Series 14511, Item 19/4110
education. While George Morrison, Alexander Melbourne, John Latham and Frederick Eggleston were also Australian elites. Thus, the lack of female diplomats at this time and my thesis’s elite based nature are two major limitations of this research.

Structure and Argument of the thesis:

This research is divided into three major chapters. In the Chapter One, I wish to address the early official contacts between China and Australia, between 1840 and 1901. The year 1840 is a key turning point in Chinese history. Because China lost to Britain during the First Opium War (1839-1842), and as a result Britain gained Hong Kong as a colony from China. Australia became a federation in 1901, the six colonies decided to form a commonwealth. In the Chapter Two, I will then discuss Sino-Australian relations between 1901 and 1921. I will study Chinese diplomats like Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋), Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) and Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴). In Chapter Three, I will discuss the Sino-Australian relations between 1921 and 1941. This chapter is the core part of my thesis. I argue the Great Depression and the WWII forced Australian politicians to realise Australia’s geographical closeness to Asia for the first time. I will also briefly discuss Sino-Australian relations in the WWII in Chapter Three, as I think it reached its warmest point during the wartime. Finally, I will conclude my research by suggesting Australia was/is an Asia-Pacific nation, since 1930s. Despite the fact that the majority of Australians strongly supported the White Australia policy between 1901 and 1941, Australia, as a polity, never separated itself from Asia.
Chapter One: Early Contacts of the Two Peoples (1840—1901)

Introduction

Historians tend to focus on the social and cultural aspects of Chinese histories in Australia, as they study the nineteenth and twentieth century Australian histories. When they write about the diplomatic relations between China and Australia, they usually focus on the post-1949 period. This thesis, however, is on China’s diplomatic relations with Australia between 1901 and 1941. I will demonstrate how economic power and political power were entwined in Sino-Australian relations. This chapter is about the early contact between the two peoples between 1840 and 1901. It is trying to set the scene for the official Sino-Australian relations in later chapters, which are the core of this thesis. In this chapter, I argue that in order to acknowledge the significance of the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1901 and 1941, as well as the challenges both Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats face in the twentieth century, it is necessary to understand the early Sino-Australian contacts and British colonialism in China in the nineteenth century.

Mai Tianshu and Wang Xianming suggest that, the British policy-makers used war as tools to open the Chinese market (or maintain/protect their commercial interests in China). However, the racial tensions (between Chinese and Europeans) in Australia created challenges for both the British politicians and Chinese scholar-officials. In the nineteenth century, although Sino-Australian diplomatic relations were part of the Sino-British relations, ‘the Chinese problem’ in Australia could also affect the Sino-British relations. The discrimination that Chinese confronted in Australia led them to ask the Qing government to appoint an official representative, to protect their rights. The early official contacts between the two peoples therefore eventually led China to appoint its first consul-general in Australia in 1909.

This chapter is divided into three major parts. The first part is about British colonialism in China in the nineteenth century. It highlights the trade and wars between the British Empire and the Qing Empire. Indeed, China was one of the biggest economies, if not the biggest in the world in the 1840s. British strategists wanted to trade with China. However, the misunderstandings and miscalculations between China and West eventually caused British soldiers (including several thousand soldiers from Australian colonies) and Chinese soldiers to fight against each other during the Chinese Boxer Rebellion (1900-1901) in Northern China. The British government sent Australian soldiers to China to fight against the Chinese boxer rebellions. In this sense, China and Australia were enemies in 1901. The Opium War and the Boxer Rebellion were two examples, showing that the British Empire was willing to

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use military pressure to protect its commercial interests in China. The second part of the chapter is about race and nation. In this part, I suggest in order to develop Australia’s economy, Anglo-Saxon people needed Chinese immigrants as cheap labour to work in Australia. After the discovery of gold in Victoria, thousands of Chinese moved to Australia, to seek opportunities. However, Chinese people did not fit in with Europeans’ nation-building narrative. Therefore, the Europeans (mainly the British) wanted to exclude Chinese people in Australian colonies. Chinese people were needed, but not wanted in the Australian colonies. The third part of the chapter is on diplomacy and the early official contacts between China and British Empire regarding the establishment of a Chinese consulate in Australia. Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), a powerful provincial leader in China, sent Wang Ronghe and Yu Xie, to investigate the Chinese living conditions in Australia in the 1887. This was the first time that Chinese officials ever visited Australia. In Melbourne, Wang Ronghe and Yu Xie met Duncan Gillies (1834-1903)—then Premier of Victoria, and requested the Victorian government to abolish its tax on the Chinese people. Although Gillies refused to remove the poll tax against the Chinese people, their meeting suggests China and Victoria had direct official meeting as early as 1887.

In this chapter, I use two publications as key primary sources to evaluate perceptions and understandings between people in China and people in Australian colonies in the nineteenth century. Wei Yuan (1794-1857), compiled the Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms (海國圖志) in 1843. In Chinese modern history, Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms is the first detailed and systematic collection and introduction to the history and geography of the world. It even included a small section on Australasia. Although scholars have paid great attention to the well-known text in general, they paid little attention to Wei Yuan’s collections and/or commentary about Australasia. Similarly, Charles H. Pearson’s National Character of Life: A Forecast, is the first book that commented on the Sino-Australian relations from a Melbourne perspective (rather than a London viewpoint), and is one of the few books that predicted the rise of China in the nineteenth century. The National Character of Life had huge impacts on Australian politicians in the turn of the twentieth century. However, when scholars study the Sino-Australian relations, they also paid little attention to this important text.

These two important texts and other primary sources like Chinese newspapers in Australia, reveal that both people in Australia and China had limited knowledge about each other in the nineteenth century. This limited knowledge of the other culture caused European people’s racist behaviour towards Chinese in Australian colonies and Chinese people’s anti-British attitudes in China (e.g. the Boxer Rebellion). Indeed, Chinese in Australian colonies were also victims of the European impressions of Asian people, as their imaginations associated with the “Yellow Peril” ideologies.

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5 Some of them came from California.
8 The South Australian Advertiser, 31 May 1887, p.5., “The Chinese Commissioners in Melbourne”.
9 Wei Yuan, Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms (海國圖志), originally published in 1843, Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1967; Liu, Weiping (劉渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in Australasia (大洋洲华人史事叢稿), Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.4.
11 Yong, The New Gold Mountain, p.11.
1. **British Colonialism in China: Trade, Wars and Resistance**

The British colonialism in China affected the Sino-Australian relations in the nineteenth century. The First Opium War (1839-1842) was a significant event in modern Chinese history. The war forced China to join the European-dominated system, and opened China to greater interaction with an expanding British Empire.\(^\text{12}\) China’s modern diplomatic relations with the British Empire began in the First Opium War. Chinese scholar-officials (士大夫), viewed that the world order (ruled by Britain and other Western powers) was politically unfair to China. Despite this feeling, they also knew China had to join this system, in order to protect its own interests. More importantly, for Chinese scholar-bureaucrats like Lin Zexu (1785-1850), Zeng Guofan (1811-1872) and Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), their major task was ‘how to transform the old and backward China into a modern and open state?’ China had to learn from the West, in order to achieve this goal.\(^\text{13}\) Wang Gungwu further points out that the British wanted to trade with China, but not take land from China (except Hong Kong and several concessions in China).\(^\text{14}\) There was a strong sense of Sino-centric world-views in China, particularly among the educated elites, before the First Opium War (1839-1842). Traditionally, relations with other countries (or polities) were a logical outgrowth of China’s political and philosophical system.\(^\text{15}\) In other words, China did not have equal relations with other states for centuries, as China considered itself superior to all of its Asian neighbours. However, China was facing huge challenges while the British ‘rediscovered’ China in the nineteenth century.\(^\text{16}\) China then gradually formed official relations with these Western powers and other states.\(^\text{17}\)

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, Hong Kong played a significant role affecting the trade and diplomacy between China and the British Empire (including Australian colonies). The British introduced the Chinese to modern warfare and the Chinese ruling class realised the need for China to have its own navy, to defend the coastal parts of the nation.\(^\text{18}\) Chinese elites felt that the British navy humiliated China.\(^\text{19}\) As a result, China had to cede Hong Kong

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\(^{13}\) Yen-P’ing Hao and Erh-Min Wang, “Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95”, in *The Cambridge History of China*, edit by Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, Volume 10, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 1, p.147.


\(^{15}\) Jean Chesneaux, Marianne Bastid, and Marie-Claire Bergere, *China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution*, translated from the French by Anne Destenay, New York: Random house, 1975, p.9.

\(^{16}\) Mai, Tianshu (麥天枢), Wang Xianming (王先明), Zuotian: Zhong Ying Yapian zhanzheng jishi (昨天中英鸦片战争纪实), Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 1996, p.38.

\(^{17}\) Liu, Ruifen (劉瑞芬), Yangyun shangzhuang wen shi chao (養雲山莊文詩鈔), Taipei County: Wenhai chubanshe, 1971, p.31.


to Britain. As I will show in Chapter 3, Hong Kong played a significant role on Sino-
Australian trade in the 1920s and 1930s.

The First Opium War also ‘reopened’ China to the outside world, and offered opportunities to
millions of Chinese to move abroad. According to Jonathan Spence, the Treaty of Nanking
in 1842 fundamentally changed the structure of Qing relations with foreign powers, and
ended the long cycle of history in which China’s rulers had imposed effective controls over
all foreigners residing on their territory. 20 Article 1 of the Treaty of Nanking stipulated peace
and friendship between Britain and China, and it gave full security and protection for their
subjects and property within the dominions of the other. 21 Thus, although China lost the war,
at the social level it offered Chinese people the opportunities to travel to places such as
Australia and New Zealand (both British colonies).

Chinese policy-makers generally had limited knowledge of Australian colonies in the
nineteenth century. One of the consequences of the First Opium War was that it forced
Chinese elites to gain more knowledge of the international situations. Partly based on Lin
Zexu’s initial research, Wei Yuan’s edition Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms
(海國圖志) is one of the first major works that a Chinese scholar has produced on the West
(and other parts of the world). The book was a response to the First Opium War, and
represented Chinese scholar-officials’ understandings of the world at this time. In the book,
Wei included commentaries on Australian colonies. 22 He stated that Australian colonies had
lakes, massive forests and rich mining resources. 23 He further suggested that the indigenous
people still practiced cannibalism. More importantly, Chinese had trading relations with
Australasia, even before the European arrival. 24 Since the Dutch arrived in Australian
colonies, they wanted to promote trade between Australian colonies and Asia (as well as
other parts of the world). However, due to its geographical remoteness, the colonies’
economy developed slowly. 25 Further, Wang Tao (1828—1897), a newspaper publisher,
translator, political columnist, and fiction writer, was arguably the first Chinese person that
wrote about the Aboriginal people in Australian colonies. 26 In his writings, he commented
that the natives were backward and stupid people. 27 According to Wang, the Aboriginal
people had dark skins and wore little clothes. 28 Overall, Chinese scholar-officials’ limited
knowledge of Australian colonies left Chinese people into difficult positions, as the Chinese
officials had neither the ability nor resources to protect them in the nineteenth century. 29

21 Ibid., p.160.
22 Wei, Yuan, Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms (海國圖志), originally published in 1843, Taipei:
Chengwen chubanshe, 1967, p.487.; Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in
Australasia (大洋洲华人史事叢稿), Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.4.
23 Wei, Yuan, Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms (海國圖志), originally published in 1843, Taipei:
24 Ibid., p.488.
25 Ibid.,
26 Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in Australasia (大洋洲华人史事叢稿),
Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.79.
27 Ibid., p.78. “性最愚魯, 面色尅黌”.
28 Ibid., p.78.
29 Ibid., p.79.
Anglo-Saxon people from Australian colonies travelled to China as British subjects in the nineteenth century. One of the most interesting people was Alexander Marks who, since his youth had had a long-time relationship with East Asia. In 1859, at the age of 20, he had went to China where he joined Major-General Charles Gordon (1833-1885)’s forces to help the Qing regime to suppress the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), in the Southern China. Thus, Europeans from Australian colonies were involved in the internal Chinese political and military conflicts. Marks was a British colonist in Australian colonies, but he also helped the Manchu regime to fight against its rebels. Marks returned Victoria in 1875, and he continued to be interested in Australia’s trade with Asia. In 1879, he became Japan’s first (Honorary) consul in Australia. His story suggests that people travelled frequently between Australian colonies and China in the nineteenth century.

If Marks’s involvement in Taiping Rebellion (the Chinese civil war) was an individual action, then the Australian soldiers’ involvement in the Chinese Boxers around 1900-1901 was certainly an action at the national level. The Chinese Boxer Movement showed the resistance of ordinary Chinese people to the growing influence that foreigners had in China, and the event reinforced the negative perceptions of China to Anglo-Saxon in Australian colonies. Robert Hart (1835-1911), a British diplomat, who also worked for the Chinese government, believed Chinese boxers were patriotic, irrational, and not well trained. In addition, the Boxer movement was extremely anti-Christianity. Among the foreigners “of all those who ventured to China” in the nineteenth century, as Paul Cohen questions, “was it the missionary who inspired the greatest fear and hatred”? The majority of the boxers were ordinary Chinese peasants, and they encouraged the use of violence to fight against the Westerners. The movement gained support from those whom felt that the foreigners mistreated them in China. The Qing ruling-class, under Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908), made a huge mistake, while they decided to support the Boxer movement and declared war on the eight imperialist powers, including Britain, France, Russia and Japan. There is a large literature on the Chinese boxer rebellion in both Chinese and English. Wang Gungwu comments: “when the Boxer rebellion of 1900 provoked the foreign powers to send an international force to lift the siege of the legations in Peking, there followed a number of clear demonstrations of the Qing army’s inability to fight at all”. China eventually lost the war. As a result, Britain

31 Meaney, Towards a new vision: Australia and Japan through 100 years, 1999, p.57.
34 Hong, Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhai chubanshe, 1930, p.3.
gained even more privileges in China, as it had bigger impacts on Chinese politics. Indeed, China paid a huge price.

The Boxer Movement also received a huge amount of international interests and engagement. Newspaper reporters in Australian colonies closely followed the Chinese Boxer movement, partly because of the colonies’ involvement in the war. George Morrison (1862-1920), witnessed the Boxer movement in China, and Chinese boxers even injured him. Commenting the Boxer movement, Morrison wrote in Shandong province: “A new chapter of far Eastern history had opened”. In Chapter Two, I will discuss in detail Morrison’s influence on affecting the Sino-Australian in the first two decades of the twentieth century. People in Australian colonies depended on Morrison to understand what was going on in China. Morrison was a key figure of Sino-Australian relations as well as the Sino-Western relations. He was also a perfect example showing that foreigners could strongly influence the course of Chinese history. Chinese people viewed Morrison as British, not as an Australia. Another reporter in Australian colonies suggested in 1900, that China should restore the Guangxu Emperor, and push Empress Cixi out of power.

2. Chinese in Australia: Race, Trade and Nation

The Chinese problem in Australian colonies also shaped the relations between the Qing and the British Empire. Since the beginning of the European colonization in 1788, immigration has “dominated narratives of Australian national identity and belonging”. At the social level, since 1840, millions of Chinese people moved out of China, in order to seek better job opportunities or flee from the Chinese civil wars. Yet the pressures on the land in China continued to be unrelenting. Jonathan Spence estimates: the population of China had

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37 Tung Wah News (Sydney, NSW: 1898 - 1902), 21 March 1900, p.2.
38 The Chinese “agreed to pay an indemnity for damages to foreign life and property of 450 taels (around $67 million or $333 million at the then current exchange rates), a staggering sum at a time when the entire annual Qing income was estimated at around 250 million taels.” Please see: Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, p.233.
41 Argus (Melbourne, Vic.: 1848 - 1957), 3 August 1900, p.5.; Examiner (Launceston, Tas.: 1900 - 1954), 23 July 1900, p.3.; John Fitzgerald, Big White Lie, Big White Lie, Preface x.
43 Ibid., p.133., Morrison involved the negotiation of indemnities.
46 Zhang Ming (张明), 2008, p.29.
47 Brisbane Courier (Qld: 1864 - 1933), 19 June 1900, p.4.
49 Chinese civil war forced many Chinese civilians either to join the military or to run away from their homes.
50 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, p.208.
probably reached 430,000,000 by 1850, and even though it must have declined sharply in 1860s [because of the Chinese civil wars], it began to increase once more in the 1870s.\textsuperscript{51}

Ching-Fatt Yong reminds us that during the gold rushes, Chinese people came under a credit-ticket system.\textsuperscript{52} While Chinese legally moved to Australian colonies in the nineteenth century, they faced strong discrimination.\textsuperscript{53} In 1857, during the hearings of the Victorian Legislative Council on Chinese immigration, one-third of the Chinese immigrants who came to Victoria were paying their own passages.\textsuperscript{54} In other words, Chinese arrived in Australian colonies freely and legally in the 1850s. In \textit{Big White Lie}, John Fitzgerald provides some useful numbers; he shows the population of the Chinese in the colonies: around 100,000 people entered Australian colonies from China between the 1840s and Federation in 1901. Benjamin Mountford believes that between 1800 and 1875, about 70,000 Chinese made the journey to Australasia.\textsuperscript{55} At the time of federation 30,000 Chinese immigrants and their descendants were entitled by right of travelling to and from China, albeit with discriminatory certification.\textsuperscript{56} Fitzgerald further suggests, almost half of the Chinese population stayed in Australian colonies after the ending of the gold rushes.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, there was always a Chinese population in Australian colonies since the 1840s.\textsuperscript{58} In the nineteenth century, Chinese people were mainly living in Victoria and New South Wales.\textsuperscript{59} A minority of Chinese people started their local furniture business in NSW.\textsuperscript{60} Since the British people were the majority, and Chinese people were the minority, the Anglo-Saxon men might generally feel a stronger sense of belonging in Australian colonies than their Chinese contemporaries. Their lack of English language skills made it difficult for Chinese people to express themselves. Their labour intensive work, terrible living conditions, gambling and opium-smoking style of livings further separated them from the rest of the people in the Australia in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{61}

Yong further points out, the nineteenth century goldfields laid the foundations of the White Australia policy as the influx of Chinese diggers on the goldfields caused alarm, fear, mistrust, and misunderstandings in the Anglo-Saxon mining community.\textsuperscript{62} The Chinese practice of sending gold to China, which expressed their intention of ultimately returning home, created dissatisfaction and jealousy among the European diggers.\textsuperscript{63} Eric Andrews

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{52} Yong, \textit{The New Gold Mountain}, p.1. and p.11.
\textsuperscript{54} Yong, \textit{The New Gold Mountain}, p.1.
\textsuperscript{56} John Fitzgerald, \textit{Big White Lie}: p.13.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Queenslander} (Brisbane, Qld.: 1866 - 1939), 17 March 1888, p. 418.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Australian Star} (Sydney, NSW: 1887 - 1909), 22 March 1899, p.7.; \textit{Telegraph} (Brisbane, Qld.: 1872 - 1947), 16 October 1894, p.7., here is an example of how a Chinese miner were being badly treated in the Northern territory of the South Australia. Their white bosses treated Chinese workers terribly.
\textsuperscript{59} Yong, \textit{The New Gold Mountain}, p.5.
\textsuperscript{62} Yong, \textit{The New Gold Mountain}, p.11.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.,
argues the source of opposition to the Chinese was a mixture of racialism, economic fear, and ignorance. For people in Australia in the nineteenth century, their knowledge of China was quite negative and limited.

As we can see from this English and Chinese Advertiser report in 1858 (Figure 3), the Chinese viewed European Australians as British, and they viewed themselves as Han Chinese (Tang Ren). The title of this notice is called “huangjia gaoshi”. If we translate it into English, it means “a notice from royal family”. In the 1850s, Chinese in Australian colonies came from Guangdong province; they usually supported the Taiping rebellions. They therefore viewed themselves as Chinese subjects, because they wanted to keep their distance from the Manchu-regime. Kuo Mei-fen has reminded us, English and Chinese Advertiser,

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65 Chinese Advertiser (Ballarat, Vic.: 1856), 21 June 1856, p.3.; English and Chinese Advertiser (Vic. 1856-1858), 7 August 1858, p.2.
66 Ibid.,
67 Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in Australasia (大洋洲华人史事叢稿), Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.69.
“established on the Victorian goldfields in the 1850s”, was the first bilingual Chinese-English language newspaper in Australia.  Although the newspaper only survived a short period, its existence suggests that Chinese in Australian colonies used newspaper to communicate with each other from an early time. These newspaper sources also reveal two things. First, the Chinese newspapers had a literate audience in Australia. This indicates that an educated Chinese community existed or at least emerged in the middle of nineteenth century. It is unusual, as we could not see similar patterns in Canada nor New Zealand colonies at this time. Second, Chinese people in Australian colonies started to form business ideas from a relatively early time. Chinese people used newspapers like *English and Chinese Advertiser* to advertise to each other about the business opportunities available. The Chinese business communities had roots in both China and Australian colonies. They used their connections as a business advantage. As I will show in Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this thesis, these early Chinese settlers and their descendants would shape the Sino-Australian commercial and diplomatic relations in the decades to come.

The fear of a Chinese migratory invasion from China was another factor that contributed to the discrimination Chinese people faced in Australian colonies in the nineteenth century. The Chinese problem in Australian colonies created tensions between the Qing regime and the British Empire. Neville Meaney reminds us that: from the 1880s to the First World War, the fear of an Asian invasion, whether migratory from China or military from Japan, was a major theme in Australian literature as it was in Australian politics. Historians generally agree that the year 1888 was not only an important year for Chinese histories in Australian colonies, but also a significant year for racial relations within the Australian territory. Henry Parkes, a long time Premier of New South Wales, along with other politicians of the state, passed the Chinese Restriction Bill in 1888, though the Chinese population was declining in Australia in 1880s. For example, the Chinese population in New South Wales dropped from 1.4 per cent in 1881 to 1.2 per cent in 1891. Other states except Tasmania soon followed this move. Thus, the Chinese Restriction Act became a national policy. Moreover, this is part of a global anti-Chinese movement in Western societies, as the USA and New Zealand also had similar Chinese restriction policies against the Chinese at that time. Thus, though Chinese people were a minority in these societies, it showed they could influence the majorities of the population, and this was a transnational phenomenon.

However, people realised the potential of Chinese people in the late nineteenth century. Charles H. Pearson wrote one of the most influential books on China, in Australia. In

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69 Ibid., p.259.
70 *Chinese Advertiser* (Ballarat, Vic.: 1856), 21 June 1856, p.5.
74 *South Australian Register* (Adelaide, SA: 1839 - 1900), 31 October 1888, p.4.
75 Jordan, p.68.
National Character of Life, Pearson suggests that if China could have an excellent leader, to lead the nation, China had the potential to be a great power. Further, for Pearson, the history of Singapore, “immediately to the north of Australia”, demonstrated what the Chinese race is capable of. He was therefore worried about the potential expansion of Chinese, given its vast population. In other words, white “men were not destined to rule the world forever”. Pearson also mentions Chinese in Australia, he states:

The expansion of China towards the south and south-west seems most probable, because there is here most natural wealth to develop, and because the circumstances are specially favourable: administrations guided by commercial principles, and populations too weak to resist immigration. Nothing but the vigilant opposition of the Australian democracies has kept the Chinese from becoming a power on that more remote continent; and at one time within the last forty years the Chinamen actually in Victoria numbered thing like 13 per cent of the adult male population. Clearly, as an Englishman who was living in Australian colonies, Pearson feared the increasing Chinese number in the Victoria. Importantly, Pearson saw the world from Melbourne, not from London. He further predicted “China’s emergence as a global in the context of world history” in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, Australia certainly has a strong historical connection with Europe, especially Britain. However, geographically, Australia is much closer to China than Britain. This anxiety and frustration explains the tension between Australia’s history and geography, and National Character of Life is a classic text of expressing insecurity of Australian colonies. Pearson believed that Australian colonies needed a united central government. As a historian, Pearson questioned “the racial determinism that dominated historical thinking” in the West in the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, this book further increased the fear of Chinese people in Australia.

The National Character of Life was a huge success globally. The book was not only popular among the ruling-class in Australia, but also was among American politicians, including Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), the President of the United States between 1901 and 1909. Pearson was not alone. William Lane (1861-1917), a radical journalist and labour activist, whom was based in Queensland, commented in 1888, that “all-out race war just a generation

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78 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line, p.76.
79 Pearson, National Character of Life, p.53.
82 Neville Meaney, Australia and the Wider World: Selected essays of Neville Meaney, edit by James Curran and Stuart Ward, p.73.; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line, p.93.
83 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line, p.88.
84 http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/pearson-charles-henry-4382, last accessed on 7/12/16; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line, p.87.
Lane further imagined Australian colonies fighting to determine whether it would have a ‘white’ or a ‘yellow’ future.85

However, not everybody in the Australian colonies was opposing Asian immigrations in the nineteenth century. David Walker provides us an excellent example: as early as 1829, Edward Wakefield (1796-1862), a well-known exponent of systematic colonization, predicted that Asia’s vast populations would present Australia with undreamt trading opportunities. In Wakefield’s eyes, Asian markets and Asian immigrants would be the future of Australian colonies.86 Thus, we can see that a minority of Europeans welcomed Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth century.

Ironically, his Chinese contemporaries shared Pearson’s fear of the other race.88 Chinese, especially the educated scholar-officials were carrying the similar kind of fear towards to the more powerful Western states.89 Chinese gentry-class or the scholar-officials, include Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), believed that China had to speed up their development, in order to maintain an independent polity.90 If Pearson had ever travelled to China, and talked to the Chinese gentry-scholars, he would have been be surprised by their worldviews.

Australia was federated in 1901. The formation of Australian federation was partly because the Anglo-Saxon people in Australia felt that they needed to protect their own interests, as their interests were not always as same as the people in Britain. From 1901, according to David Walker, Australia became infamous for its White Australia policy around the world.91 The White Australia policy was not only a racial policy, but also an economic and political one.92 Walker further suggests that the powerful masculinizing in Australian nationalism would have been a good deal less intense, had it not been for the geo-political threat attached to awakening Asia from the 1880s. Indeed, since the late nineteenth century, there was a growing belief that developments in Asia would have an increasing impact upon Australian colonies.93

George Pearce, an Australian Senator from 1901 to 1937, and a government minister for years, explained the tension between Australia’s history and geography in 1922:

86 Ibid.,
92 North Western Advocate and The Emu Bay Times (Tas.: 1899 - 1919), 26 January 1903, p.3.
93 Ibid., p.12.
The [British] Far East is our far-North. We are of European race. Our fathers came from Europe: we have grown up to think as Europeans, and our interests have been centred in that group of nations from which our stock has come. Whilst racially we are European, geographically we are Asiatic.  

If the Australian government was aware of the importance of Asia to Australia, then why should they have formally adopted the White Australia policy? John Fitzgerald suggests the Chinese people were not fitting well with Australia’s nation-building. Fitzgerald believes an ideal of racial purity converged with a triumphalist rhetoric of a self-conscious nation building to yield a particular vision of a brand new country able to demonstrate its independence by shutting its gates to all but whites, at the turn of the twentieth century. However, we do not know enough of the impact of the policy outside Australia. What does it mean to the Sino-Australian relations? I suggest the White Australia policy was one of the key issues affecting the Sino-Australian relations between 1901 and the Second World War.

3. **Diplomacy: The Early Official Contacts**

Chinese residents felt they faced strong discrimination in the Australian colonies in the nineteenth century, and they turned the Chinese government to seek for protection. Several groups of Chinese officials visited the colonies in the nineteenth century. There were several key motivations. First, Chinese government intended to investigate the treatment of Chinese here. Chinese government wanted to protect the rights of Chinese people in Australasia. Both Chinese and British government wanted to improve the treatment of Chinese in Australian colonies. Second, they also wanted to improve the Sino-Australian relations. One possibility was to promote the trade between China and Australian colonies. The third motivation was, towards to the end of the nineteenth century, the problem of the ‘survival of the regime’ was extremely severe, and the establishment of Chinese consulate in Australia and New Zealand might help the Qing government to keep an eye on the Chinese in this part of the world.

Guo Songtao (1818-1891), was China’s first Minister (acting as Ambassador) to be served in the West. Representing the Qing regime, he was China’s Minister to Britain and France between 1875 and 1977. Yen Ching-Hwang reminds us that the sending of the first Chinese envoy in Britain in 1876 indicated China’s acceptance of a system of international relations based on Western rules and practice, as well as her successful entry into the ‘family of nations’. Guo was one of the first senior Chinese officials to argue that there was a need of appointing a Chinese diplomatic representative in Australia, in order to protect the Chinese interests as well as protecting Chinese population in Australia. In 1878, Guo sent an official letter to Edward Stanley (1826-1893), the British secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Guo wrote:

> I have also learned from the newspapers that within the last few months the Chinese residing in Australia have had frequent disputes, but I have refrained from troubling your Lordship

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98 J. D. Frodsham, *The First Chinese Embassy to the West*, p.189.
about this matter, because I am not familiar with all the circumstances. It would seem, however, that a Resident consul is also required there, in order that it may be discovered what is advantageous prevented. This appointment would promise to be a favourable measure. As the accredited Minister of China, I can-not but draw your Lordship’s attention to these matters which, in my judgment, ought to be attended to.99

However, the British refused the proposal. Because if Britain accepted this offer, it would treat China as an equal state to the West.

The first Chinese officials visited Australia in the 1880s.100 The two Chinese—Wang Ronghe and Yu Xie, along with an interpreter, were sent by Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909)—one of the most influential officials in the late Qing period, to investigate the Chinese living conditions in Australia, to promote the trade between the two, and a potential of creating a diplomatic relation between China and Australia.101 Zhang, a senior Chinese provincial leader, cared about the living conditions of Chinese people overseas.102 Wang and Yu were the official representatives of “his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China”.103 Based on one of Zhang’s memorials to Guangxu Emperor (1871-1908) in 1887, we know that Wang was a capable person, and he was originally from Fujian province, and had lived overseas for years.104 Yu used to be a Chinese consul in Japan.105 Further, Zhang Zhidong combined the Chinese problem in Australian colonies to Chinese problems in (modern) Southeast Asia together.106

While they were in Australia, Wang and Yu met Mei Quong Tart (1850-1903)—a prominent local Chinese community leader, to gain deeper understandings of situations in Australian colonies.107 If the Manchu regime appointed an official representative in Australian colonies in the nineteenth century, Mei would be an ideal candidate. On June 1887, Wang Ronghe (Wong Yung Ho) gave a speech in English when he visited the City Mission Hall in Adelaide. He stated that the purpose of their tour in Australia was “to enquire into the status of our countrymen in the western settlements and in these colonies”.108 Yu Xie (U Tsing), then gave a speech in Chinese. Some European Christians attended this meeting. Francis William Cox (1817–1904), was a prominent congregational minister and author.109 He commented that the visit of Wang and Yu was unique, as it was the first time that any Chinese official came to Australia, and he believed that Australia government should abolish the poll tax, because Chinese were law abiding and “steady colonists”.110 It was ironic, that while Chinese might carry anti-Christian feelings towards the British and French missionaries.

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99 Ibid.,
100 *Tasmanian* (Launceston, Tas.: 1881 - 1895), 21 January 1888, p.30.
105 Ibid.,
106 Ibid., pp.372-373.
in China (as I have shown in the earlier part of this chapter), Christians such as Cox offered the Chinese people help to deal with their discrimination in Australia. Further, Marilyn Lake reminds us that business people in Australian colonies also welcomed the visit of Wang and Yu. For example, the Argues (a conservative empire-minded newspaper based in Melbourne), as “a believer in free trade and the free movement of peoples”, welcome the Chinese commissioners to Melbourne and offered support to their mission to achieve equality of treatment for Chinese people in Australia.\footnote{Marilyn Lake, “The Chinese Empire encounters the British Empire and its ‘Colonial Dependencies’: Melbourne, 1887”, in Journal of Chinese Overseas, 9, 2013, p.181.}

Kuo Mei-fen has suggested, Wang and Yu reported that there were 26 major Chinese businessmen and over 4,000 Chinese dealers and labourers in metropolitan Sydney at this time.\footnote{Kuo, Making Chinese Australia, 2013, p.23.} Although Wang and Yu could not persuade the Victorian government to abolish the poll tax against the Chinese people, the visit of Wang and Yu to Australia was not a failure. First, they could report the anti-Chinese feelings in Australian colonies at that time back to China.\footnote{Marilyn Lake, “The Chinese Empire encounters the British Empire and its ‘Colonial Dependencies’: Melbourne, 1887”, in Journal of Chinese Overseas, 9, 2013, p.182.; Neville Meaney, Australia and the Wider World: Selected essays of Neville Meaney, edit by James Curran and Stuart Ward, p.73.} Second, their visit laid foundation for future negotiations between Chinese and British/Australian government regarding the establishment of Chinese consulate in Australia.

Unfortunately, Chinese provincial official like Zhang Zhidong could do little to improve their living situations.\footnote{Yeung Wing On, “The Late Qing Establishment of the Chinese Consulate General in Australia and the "Thomas Jones Chia Shooting Case" (論清季中國駐澳大利亞使館的設立與其外交人員觸犯當地刑案之末), Journal of Oriental Studies, 2005, p.164.} Partly because China was so weak, so that it had to focus on improving its relations with global powers or the places that millions of Chinese lived in (e.g. Southeast Asia); partly because the anti-Chinese feelings in Australian colonies was so evident. Zhang was planning to establish a consulate in Melbourne, to look after the Chinese population in Australia. However, there were several practical problems here. First, money was an issue. Chinese government was facing financial difficulties, they had no extra money to spend, and Chinese in Australia had no money to donate, unlike the ones in the Southeast Asia. Second, China were at a shortage of talented diplomats, they had to appoint their diplomats to more powerful states like Britain, France, Russia and the USA, or places such as Southeast Asia.\footnote{Ibid., p.164.}

Third, the status of Australia was an issue. The Chinese government had to negotiate the establishment of Chinese consulate in Australia with the British government. Although the British government were keen to protect its interests in China, they were not extremely interested in the creation of Chinese consulate in Melbourne at that time. Thus, China did not appoint a consul-general to Australia in the nineteenth century. Neither China nor Australia was ready for a formal relation between the two in the nineteenth century.

Liang Qichao (1873-1929) was a well-known Chinese visitor to Australia at the turn of the twentieth century. Liang and his mentor Kang Youwei were closely involved with the Wuxu Reform or Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898.\footnote{Gloria Davies, “Liang Qichao in Australia: a sojourn of no significance”, China Heritage Quarterly, 2011, p.1.} The young Guangxu Emperor (1871-1908) supported the movement, and they wanted to reform Chinese political and educational systems radically. However, the Chinese conservative politicians, led by Empress Dowager

\begin{itemize}
\item[112] Kuo, Making Chinese Australia, 2013, p.23.
\item[115] Ibid., p.164.
\end{itemize}
Cixi (1835-1908) strongly opposed the reform, and it ended as a failure. Liang had to flee from China. Liang, a political activist, learned a lot from his travel abroad, including Australia.

Editors of the *Tung Wah Times*, supported Kang Youwei’s political movement, and therefore closely followed Liang’s visit in Australia. However, he left behind little of his personal impressions of Australia. Liang had a mixed view of Australia during his stay here. According to his own account, the way European men treated women in Australian colonies extremely impressed him. He was surprised to learn women have rights to vote in Australia and New Zealand. Although Liang admired the Western parliamentary system and the gender equality between men and women, he was not impressed about the low status the Chinese people suffered in the Western societies. Liang also documented how the Anglo-Saxon people discriminated Chinese in the USA and Canada. In 1905, Liang openly criticized the White Australia policy. How did the Chinese in Australia view Liang’s tour in Australia? The local Chinese here generally welcomed Liang. The Chinese population did not ask him to request the Chinese government to send diplomat in Australia, as they knew Liang’s political position at this time. He was able to travel to Australia freely on the eve of the formal adaptation of the White Australia policy in 1901; which may suggest there were always exceptions to the policy.

As political activists such as Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) started to offer overseas Chinese alternatives of the Chinese polity, the Qing regime realised that they had to put more effect to win over the Chinese population outside of China. In 1901, Luo Zhongyao, the acting Chinese consul-general in Singapore, visited Australia on behalf of the Qing government. As Kuo Mei-fei has noted, the purpose of Luo’s tour in Australia was to investigate the impact of Liang Qichao and the growing network of anti-Manchu reformers and revolutionaries in Australia. Like Liang, Luo was able to travel to Australia freely and legally. However, during his visit to Australia, Luo did little to fight against the White Australia policy.

Conclusion

As early as the middle of the nineteenth century, British policy-makers realised that they needed to trade with China, in order to maintain the British Empire’s global hegemony. In this Chapter, I have argued that in order to acknowledge the significance of the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1901 and 1941 as well as the challenges both Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats face in the twentieth century, it is necessary to understand the early Sino-Australian contacts and British colonialism in China in the nineteenth century.

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119 Liang, Qichao (梁启超), Xindalu youji (新大陸游记), edit by He Shouzhen, Changsha shi: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1981, p.434.
120 Ibid., p.439., p.444. and p.453.
121 South Australian Register (Adelaide, SA: 1839 - 1900), 12 November 1900, p.3.
122 Known also as Lo Tsungyao.
Since Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842, it played a major role in China’s trade and diplomacy with the British Empire. I will reinforce this argument in the Chapter Three, where I am going to show that there were a considerable amount of Australian goods going through Hong Kong to mainland China in the 1920s and 1930s. Further, the Taiping rebellion generated millions of Chinese people to move out of China, in order to seek better job opportunities or living styles. Chinese scholar-officials realised China needed to learn from the West, to become a modern state. The Chinese ruling-class therefore sent Chinese officials to Europe and the USA, to learn the reasons of their success, or investigate the living conditions of Chinese abroad. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese question in Australian colonies led both Chinese and British authority to realise that China should appoint an official representative to look after its people and protect China’s national interests in Australia.

Are Chinese histories in Australia part of Australian or Chinese histories? Australian historians do not include them while they write Australian histories, partly because Chinese-Australians were not perceived as Australians until recently.124 Similarly, according to John Fairbank, the late eminent historian of China, Chinese historians tended to leave ‘foreigners’ out, while they wrote Chinese histories, because it was not seen as the proper Chinese histories, though even these foreigners may have held important positions within Chinese systems.125 Thus, Australian historians treated Chinese as foreigners, and Chinese historians treated foreigners (including British and Australians) as non-historical subjects, as they did not fit well with the so-called ‘grand narrative’, to borrow a term from scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty.126 John Fitzgerald has suggested that, Australians paid little regard to Chinese experiences of living under White Australia, or about the part, they played in Australian history, before the 1990s.127 However, just because Chinese were a minority in Australia, it does not mean they did not shape Australian history.128 The obvious example here is the White Australia policy. It was a policy to keep Chinese people (and other coloured people) from entering the nation. Thus, it is extremely important to study the Chinese in Australia, and Australians in China. Both of these two groups of people are minorities in their host nations, though sometimes studying the minorities can tell us more of the majorities.129 This thesis is mainly dealing on the Sino-Australian relations. Why is this topic still so under-studied? Diplomats are always minorities in their residing nations, and serving the interests of another nation. In this sense, they are the minorities. It is important to include the histories of Chinese to Australian histories; it is also necessary to view the stories of foreigners like Morrison as part of Chinese histories.

124 John Fitzgerald, Big White Lie, Preface, x. “Even today few Australians would concede that it was possible to be Chinese and Australian before the advent of multicultural Australia.”; see also, Tony Ballantyne, “Writing out Asia: Race, Colonialism and Chinese Migration in New Zealand History”, in East by South, China in the Australasian Imagination, edit by Charles Ferrall, Paul Millar and Keren Smith, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005, p.87.
127 John Fitzgerald, Big White Lie, p.11.
I believe that Chinese histories in Australia are both Chinese and Australian histories. There were several well-known Chinese in Australia in the nineteenth century, including William Liu, William Ah Ket, and the Sydney tea merchant Quong Tart.\textsuperscript{130} As John Fitzgerald points out, Mei Quong Tart (1850-1903) is the only Chinese-Australian personality to date (2007), whom has merited a full-length biography in English.\textsuperscript{131} Further research needed to be done on the influential Chinese individuals in Australia.

\textsuperscript{130} Fitzgerald, \textit{Big White Lie}, p.13.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.,
Chapter Two: Australia’s Diplomatic Relations with China (1901-1921)

Introduction

This chapter is about China’s foreign relations with Australia, between 1901 and 1921. The White Australia policy, trade and political relations were the three dominant factors affecting the Sino-Australian relations. Indeed, economic power intertwined and connected political power within this period. Chinese diplomats within these periods, they had two important tasks: to improve the living conditions of Chinese people in Australia and to promote the trading between China and Australia. These two tasks were also closely linked.

This chapter is divided into three major parts. First, I will discuss the White Australia policy. As I have discussed in Chapter One, I suggest it is a direct result of the rise of the British nationalism in the late nineteenth century. It was also the founding policy of the nation. The White Australia policy shaped the Sino-Australian relations strongly between 1901 and 1941. Second, I will focus on trade between China and Australia, and explain: how Chinese diplomats used to trade as a tool to argue that Australian governments should relax this discriminatory policy towards the Chinese. Indeed, these diplomats tried to protect the interests of Chinese people. Primary sources in both Chinese and English suggest that businessmen in both China and Australia would have liked to enhance trading between China and Australia in the 1910s and 1920s. Third, since China was an unstable nation politically, the Chinese central government had limited authority, over provincial leaders or warlords. Sometimes there were even two national governments co-existing in China: one in the North, and another in the South. At times there were more than two regimes existing in China concurrently. Thus, it was important to the Chinese regime to seek ‘recognition’ as the legitimate government from foreign powers, including Australia.

In this chapter, I argue that in order to understand Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1901 and 1921, we cannot separate political power from economic power. Chinese diplomats tended to use arguments about the benefit of a two-way trade to pressure Australia to relax the White Australia policy and recognise the regime represented by the Chinese diplomats. For example, China, transformed from a dynasty to a modern state in 1912. China became the first republic nation in Asia. However, Yuan Shikai (1859-1916)— the Republic’s first President believed that China desperately needed the recognition from the West, in particular Britain. Further, the White Australia policy had influenced not only the Chinese within Australia, but also influenced Australia’s relations with Asia nations, particularly China and Japan. Since Japan’s victory over Russia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Australia was fearful not only of an influx of Asian migrants, especially from China, but also of a military invasion from Japan. Although Australia sent volunteer soldiers in Europe during World War One (WWI), to protect the interest of the British Empire and

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show support, its political leaders still paid close attention to Japan in the Pacific. Thus, Australia also had independent foreign policies.

1. **White Australia policy**

On 1st January 1901, six British colonies formed the Australian federation, when the British Parliament passed legislation allowing these six states to govern in their own right as part of the Commonwealth of Australia.\(^5\) Although the Australians invited New Zealand to join this new federation, New Zealand refused and remained as its own polity. However, despite Australia becoming a commonwealth, the British government still had profound influence on both Australian and New Zealand’s foreign policies.

Australian politicians, such as Alfred Deakin (1856-1919), carried negative images of the Chinese people, and suggested it was important to maintain a white Australia.\(^6\) Alfred Deakin, Attorney-General of the first Federal government and Australia’s second Prime Minister once commented: “No motive power operated more universally on this continent…than the desire that we should be one people, and remain one people, without the admixture of other races”.\(^7\)

In 1901, the Australian federation passed the Immigration Restriction Bill which extended the dictation test to include all people of non-European origins, and this act became known as the White Australia policy.\(^8\) This was one of the first major policies, adopted by the new federation. It soon became arguably its most influential and controversial policy.

In *Anxious Nation*, David Walker argues that powerful masculinising and racializing impulse in Australian nationalism would have been a good deal less intense, had it not been for the geo-political threat attributed to awakening China and Japan from the 1880s.\(^9\) Australia’s British cultural heritage and its geographical closeness to Asia made Anglo-Saxon people especially nervous about its Asian neighbours. However, if one completely accepts this argument, then how could we explain the fact that the US had similar anti-Chinese policies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century?\(^10\) The US did not have this tension between its history and geography that Australia did. Thus, Walker’s argument only partially explained the adoption of the White Australia policy in 1901. The White Australia policy was not only a response from domestic Australia, but also a result of the transnational anti-Chinese attitudes happening in English-speaking states.\(^11\)

This cartoon (show below) suggests Anglo-Saxon people did not welcome the arrival of Chinese in Australia, partly because European descendants were worrying about the huge


\(^6\) *The Mercury*, 18 February 1910, p.4.


\(^8\) [http://maps.unomaha.edu/peterson/funda/Sidebar/WhiteAustralia.html](http://maps.unomaha.edu/peterson/funda/Sidebar/WhiteAustralia.html), last access on 11 September 2017.


\(^11\) Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the global colour line*, p.137.
population of Asian nations, especially China. They imagined Chinese would flood into Australia, and outnumber them one day; as the Europeans did to the indigenous people or the native population of Singapore. The idea of the “Yellow peril” was strong in Australia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The population of Chinese in Australia, dropped from 35,000 to 9,500 by the end of the Second World War.

The statistics suggest that the population who were born in China and came to live in Australia were decreasing from 1901 (29,907), to 1911 (20,775), to 1921 (15,224) to 1933 (8,579). This was partly because the White Australia policy did not allow more Chinese to come to Australia. As the older Chinese were dying out, the population of Chinese in Australia was decreasing between 1901 and 1921. However, despite the White Australia policy’s powerful impacts on Chinese communities in Australia, there had always a Chinese community in Australia, since the Gold Rushes.

Local Chinese in Australia, however, strongly opposed this anti-Chinese policy. They believed it was a racist policy, targeted on Chinese and other coloured peoples. For example, in October 1901, a petition claiming to represent the Chinese population in Victoria was submitted by William Ah Ket (1876-1936), a law graduate from the University of

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12 Great Southern Leader, 27 January 1911, p.6.
13 Telegraph, 26 September 1903, p.8.
16 Weekly Mercury, 13 June 1903, p.3.; Clarence and Richmond Examiner, 4 June 1904, p.3.
Melbourne and a local Chinese representative, “appealing to the Federal government not to apply the dictation test to the Chinese”. According to Yong, the Chinese in Adelaide and Perth even cabled the Empress Dowager of China at Beijing, pressing for protection and negotiation “with the Australian government over the Act”. In addition, the position of Chinese people in Australia also made them eager to play their parts in China’s future destiny, as I will discuss in Chapter Three.

Local Chinese communities in Australia responded actively to the White Australia policy, and believed the establishment of a Chinese consulate was the only solution. On early 1907, Chinese businessmen in Australia sent an official letter to China’s consul-general to Britain, explaining the Chinese population’s living conditions and the urgency of appointing an official Chinese representative here. Chinese community leaders in Australia played active roles in formation of the Chinese Consulate in 1909, with help from some Australians, including Gerald Piggott, W.H. Calder and George Morrison. Piggott and Calder were both seeking trading opportunities with China, and they were keen to promote Sino-Australian relations. Further, Eric Andrews reminds us that the “spread of Christianity among the Australian Chinese may have helped…Australian churches in turn supported the Chinese in their struggles against the authorities”. Therefore, Anglo-Saxon businessmen, Christians and those who lived in China like Morrison, were willing to help the local Chinese in Australia to improve their living conditions.

Due to the Chinese petition seeking a consulate in Australia, the Chinese government responded once again. As I have discussed in Chapter One, two Chinese officials visited Australia in the 1880s. Chinese officials continued their investigation of Chinese in Australasia in the 1900s. In 1906, Huang Houcheng (known as Hwang Hon Cheng at the time), visited Australia and New Zealand. Huang Houcheng, outranking Wang Ronghe and Yu Xie (I mentioned their visit to Australia in 1887 in Chapter One), was the most senior Chinese official ever to visit Australia before 1909. His intention was to improve the relations between the two nations, while investigating the Chinese living conditions. Huang could not speak English himself, so he toured with Wen Xiang,—his interpreter in Australia.

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18 Yong, The New Gold Mountain, p.16.
19 Tung Wah News (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911-1936), 6 September 1902, p.2.
20 Chinese in Australia actually opposed the appointment of Chinese consul-general in 1900s. For example, historian Kuo Mei-fen suggests that “Tong of the TWT [Tung Wah Times] was strongly opposed to the Chinese Consul-General proposal. He was highly sceptical of the worth of such an appointment, and feared that any Consul appointed by the Manchu [Qing] government would be hostile to reform-minded Chinese aboard.” Please see: Kuo Mei-fen, Making Chinese Australia, 2013, p.150.
21 Yeung Wing On, Lonely star on lone nights, p.201.
22 Kuo, Making Chinese Australia: 2013, p.201.
and New Zealand. Local Chinese in Australia warmly welcomed Huang, during his stay. A thousand Chinese attended Huang’s “public lecture at the Masonic Hall in Melbourne”. Huang promised the Chinese in Australia that he would “present a report to the Chinese government in favour of the establishment of a Chinese Consulate”. Huang met Chinese community leaders in Melbourne and Sydney, and later went to Tasmania and New Zealand, to meet the Chinese population there.

In his *Lonely star on lone nights* (A history of the Chinese Australians 1860-1940), Yeung Wing On suggests Huang’s visit to Australia was significant. Huang’s tour therefore convinced the local Chinese: Chinese government had not forgotten them, and would assist them. They expected that once the Chinese government established a consulate in Australia, they would be able to improve the living conditions of the Chinese. As officials, Huang and his translator were able to travel freely in Australia and New Zealand in 1906. It suggests that although the White Australia policy was a law, it was not clear cut. If you were a senior Chinese official or high-class person, you could visit Australia freely in the 1900s. In this sense, the White Australia policy was not only a restriction based on race, it was also a policy based on class. Although for Anglo-Saxons, the White Australia policy represented what an ideal world might be, its practice varied greatly in reality.

The negotiation between China and Britain over the establishment of Chinese consulates in Australia and New Zealand started in 1877, but the two parties only reached an agreement in 1908. Zhang Qiusheng argues the negotiation (of establishing a consulate in Australia) between Britain and China took so long, partly because the Chinese government had financial difficulties and the Chinese population in Australasia was generally small (compared to the millions of Chinese were living in the Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century), and partly because of the British government’s unfair treatment of the Chinese government during the negotiation. In other words, Beijing wanted to protect the Chinese in Australia, but they were unable to do so, because the British government did not see China as an equal partner. Therefore, the British government did not support the Chinese government appointing an official representative in Australia in the nineteenth century. Zhang’s argument is important; as he is one of the few experts on Chinese Australian histories in China. Zhang therefore represents a unique viewpoint. Similarly, Yeung Wing On, a scholar from Hong Kong who visits Australia regularly, has written that Australia was not a global power. The Chinese government therefore did not feel an urgent need to appoint a representative here, until the early twentieth. Thus, both Zhang and Yeung think the official Sino-Australian relation began relatively late, compared to the Sino-British relations (which began in 1877) and China’s official relations with the other more powerful nations (which began in the nineteenth century). In a sense, Zhang and Yeung’s position is correct. For the majority of

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29 While he was in Melbourne, he also attended the Melbourne Cup. This was the first time a Chinese official attend this important Australia racing event. Please see: Yeung Wing On, *Lonely star on lone nights*, p.200.


the Chinese in Australia and New Zealand, however, it was certainly an overdue diplomatic move, because they thought the Chinese government should appoint a diplomatic representative in Australasia earlier than 1909. If we consider the fact that Australia only formed its federation in 1901, and China had former formal relations as early as 1909, this actually made China become one of the first nations to establish official relations with Australia. In this regard, the establishment of diplomatic relations was early from an Australian perspective. Both Zhang and Yeong are writing Chinese histories, not Australian histories. Thus, their work can be understood to be Sino-centric.

With the approval of the British government, the Chinese government appointed Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) as the first Chinese consul-general in Melbourne, and Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) as the first Chinese consul in Wellington, New Zealand in 1909. Huang previously worked in China’s embassy in London, before being promoted to the new posts. Liang, however, had little experience in diplomacy before 1909. In January 1909, then Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egerton Batchelor (1865-1911), received the official letter of the appointment of Liang as China’s first consul-general. Chinese consul-general was the most senior diplomat in Oceania. Thus, to some extent, Liang was not only in charge of Sino-Australian relations, but also had a say in Sino-New Zealand and Sino-Southern Pacific Islands relations.

According to Yong, Liang’s mission was to “promote trade between China and Australia and as well to study the racial relations between Chinese and Australians”. Due to legacies of the Gold Rushes, Melbourne was the centre of the Chinese population in Australia. Liang Lanxun—known as Liang Lan-hsun at that time, arrived in Melbourne, Australia in March, 1909. Kuo Mei-fen has suggested that, Chinese residents in both Melbourne and Sydney warmly welcomed Liang’s arrival. His headquarter was in Little Bourke Street in Melbourne, at the heart of the Chinatown. This was a wise choice, because it allowed Chinese diplomats to communicate with their fellow Chinese easily. As China’s first consul-general, his arrival in Australia was not only a significant event for the local Chinese, but also an important event for Sino-Australian relations. For the first time, China could contact Australia directly; previously they had to go through London. So we can see how Sino-Australian diplomatic relations started at a low point, in the shadow of the White Australia policy, and improved slowly over the next twenty years or so.

Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) tried to help the local Chinese. However, it is important to remember that Liang was in a difficult position. Liang was frustrated while he was in Australia, as he lacked the resource that he needed to pressure the Australian government, to

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34 AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-01-026, 02 November 1908; AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-02-018, p.1.; Li Jingfang (1855-1934), then China’s Ambassador in Britain, appointed Liang and Huang to work in Australia and New Zealand.
35 Kuo, Making Chinese Australia, 2013, p.205.
36 Yong, The New Gold Mountain, p.22.
37 Kuo, Making Chinese Australia, 2013, p.206.
38 Chronicle, 10 July 1909, p.40.; http://www.chia.chinesemuseum.com.au/biogs/CH00015b.htm, last accessed on 20/01/2017.; both French and German consulate was in Sydney at this time, please see: Telegraph, 30 March 1909, p.8.
modify the White Australia policy. Liang not only believed that China should develop its own economy, but also intended to promote the trade between China and Australia.40 He used trade as a tool to argue that the Australian government should relax the White Australia policy—against the local Chinese population.41 He suggested the White Australia policy was negatively affecting the trading relations between China and Australia.42 Liang knew that it would be difficult to ask the Australian government to abolish the White Australia policy. Instead, he argued that the Australian government should modify it, in favour of the local Chinese population. He argued that the Australian government should allow the wives of Chinese of ten years’ residence to reunite with their husbands in Australia.43 This attempt was unsuccessfully. However, Liang gained two minor concessions from the Department of External Affairs. Firstly, Liang successfully persuaded the Department “not to require handprints from Chinese of good repute”.44 Secondly, Liang won for Chinese in Australia “a reduction of the fee charged for certificate of exemption from the dictation test from $2 to $1”.45 Subsequent Chinese consul-generals in Australia adopted Liang’s position: they argued that Australia should modify the White Australia policy, so that certain groups of Chinese would be allowed to come to Australia. They were not arguing that Australia should completely abolish the White Australia policy [with the exception of consul-general Song Faxiang (宋发祥) in 1929]. Clearly, Liang wanted to help the local Chinese in Australia. He knew the local Chinese were treated as second-class citizens; he tried his best, but there was little he could do.46 If we compare Liang’s performance in Australia to other Chinese diplomats in English-speaking nations, then one may conclude Liang did a reasonable job. No Chinese diplomats could completely remove the anti-Chinese policies, in the nations that they resided.

Tang Entong (唐恩桐), known as Tong Ying-ting, was the second Chinese consul-general to Australia.47 He was formerly China’s consul-general to Korea, and worked twelve years in Korea.48 Tang was a close friend of Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), one of the most powerful Han Chinese politicians in 1910.49 Yuan later became the first President of the Republic of China. Tang only stayed in Australia for five months, due to sickness of his mother back in China; he had to return to China to look after his mother.50 Like Liang, Tang was not arguing Australia should abolish the White Australia policy. Instead, they were both suggesting that the Australian government should relax the policy, and give Chinese greater freedom to enter the nation.51

Even Huang Rongliang (黄荣良)52, China’s third consul-general to Australia, almost became a victim to the White Australia policy. Huang was China’s first consul in New Zealand,
between February 1909 and May 1911.53 Before Huang moved to Melbourne, from New Zealand in May 1911, the staff at the Chinese consulate in Melbourne had to contact the Australian government and beg them to allow him to travel to Australia freely.54 In the end, the Australian agreed to allow Huang, his family and his two servants to “land without hindrance”.55 On the one hand, this suggests how weak China was at this point, as the Chinese staff at the consulate in Melbourne were worrying about whether a senior Chinese diplomat could arrive in Australia, without any humiliation. On the other hand, the fact that the Chinese diplomat Huang, his family and his staff were allowed to travel to Sydney, Australia indicates that although China was a weak nation this time, its diplomats were treated much better than its general citizens.

In May 1912, Huang submitted an official memorandum to Josiah Thomas (1863-1933), then the Minister of External Affairs.56 Huang suggested that three categories of Chinese (with official passports) should be allowed to come to Australia. They were students, tourists and merchants.57 He believed that if the Chinese businessmen stayed in Australia for more than three years, they should be allowed to bring their wives with them. The Australian government, however, was not willing to meet this proposal, “except the Passport Agreement of 1912 which allowed Chinese students and merchants to enter Australia on severe conditions”.58

Chinese people were generally unhappy with Huang’s involvement with the Poon Gooey case.59 Poon’s family was a victim of the White Australia policy. Mrs Poon came to Australia to visit her husband. She planned to stay six months initially, but ended up staying for two and half years in Australia. Meanwhile, she gave birth to two children. Due to her personal circumstances, and the politically unstable situation in China, she was given permission to stay longer in Australia.60 However, her whole family was forced to leave, as the Labor Government refused to give her extension to stay in Australia. Though a minority of Australians offered sympathy towards her family, the entire family departed to China in May 1913.61 Huang followed this incident closely, but he thought that as long as the White Australia policy existed, it would be impossible for him to challenge it. He was in a dilemma, and hoped to end this embarrassing incident as soon as possible.62 This was a realistic approach. However, the Chinese Australians at that time thought Huang could have offered more assistance to the Poon family.

Further, Chinese diplomats used Chinese newspapers like Tung Wah Times to communicate with the local Chinese in Australia.63 It is unsurprising that Chinese diplomats had to spend a lot of their time assisting Chinese to come to Australia or return to China legally. When
Chinese citizens had trouble with Australian Customs officials, they usually turned to the Chinese consulate for help. For example, Wei Zijing (魏子京) was trying to help a local Chinese businessman—Lim Sang, to bring his son-in-law—Wong Shao Wing from China to Australia, to look after the family business, as Lim was getting old. Wei believed that the Chinese in Australia were still Chinese citizens, and it was his job to help them. Chinese diplomats like Wei argued that if the Australian government allowed these Chinese businessmen to come to Australia, they would help to develop Australian economy, and therefore Australia as a nation would benefit greatly.

2. Trade

Although the Australian government officially adopted the White Australia policy in 1901, it did not mean that the Australian government planned to cut all the connections with its Asian neighbours. Since 1909, Chinese diplomats had started to study the Australian economy, as they intended to increase the trade between China and Australia. Between 1901 and 1921, one of the priorities of Chinese diplomats was to promote trade between Australia and China. As early as 1909, Chinese diplomats started to realise the commercial influence of Chinese Australians, and their unique roles in shaping Sino-Australian relations. For example, Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) encouraged Chinese merchants in Melbourne and Adelaide to organise commercial societies. In March 1918, Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴), then Chinese consul-general in Melbourne, stated that China not only wanted to enhance its trading with Australia, but also wanted to improve trading with other places in Australasia. The Chinese consulate in Australia formed an alliance with some of the local Chinese business communities, in order to protect their common interests: to improve the living conditions of Chinese in Australia, and to promote Sino-Australian trade. The Chinese communities controlled economic resources, while the Chinese diplomats had diplomatic status. After all, it was a Chinese diplomat’s responsibility to protect the rights of Chinese people in Australia, in the first half of the twentieth century.

However, the position of the Australian government was more complicated. On the one hand, the Australian government had adopted the White Australia Policy, in order to exclude Chinese, Japanese and other coloured people. On the other hand, Australia was still seeking to trade with China and Japan. For example, according to Australian newspaper Observer, some Australians formed a committee in Shanghai in 1905, in order to promote Australia’s trading relations with East Asia:

An Australasian Association of the Far East has been formed at Shanghai. The objects are—(1) To bring together in the bonds of good-fellowship all Australasians of good reputation in the Far East; (2) to promote the welfare of our fellow-country men in the Far East: (3) to further the interests of our native land by encouraging the development of its commercial relations with the Far East.

66 ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522-0051-061-01-A
68 Ibid.,
70 Observer, 18 November 1905, p.27.
While the majority of Australians may not have wanted Chinese to come to live in Australia, a minority of Australians realised the importance of trading with Asia in the early twentieth century.\(^{71}\) The potential of the Chinese market endured despite economic realities.\(^{72}\) Indeed, the Australian government wanted to maintain (if not increase) its commercial relations with China and Japan. They realised the vast population in China could potentially be a big market for Australia in the future.

In addition, the British diplomats in China continued to promote trade between China and the British Empire (including Australia). In 1907, Sir John Jordan (1852-1925), then British ambassador to China, sent an official invitation to the Chinese government—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, regarding the Australian Exhibition of Women’s Work in Melbourne.\(^{73}\) The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce decided to send this official invitation to the business associations in various provinces of China, and asked the Chinese business communities whether they were willing to participate in this world exhibition in Melbourne, Australia.\(^{74}\) A few Chinese provinces decided to send their products (through Hong Kong) to Melbourne.\(^{75}\)

\(^{71}\) Meaney, *Towards a New Vision*, p.63.

\(^{72}\) Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, p.18.

\(^{73}\) Archives on the World Exposition held in Forbidden City (清宮萬國博覽會檔案), edited by China's First Historical Archives (中國第一歷史檔案館編), Yangzhou: Guangling shushe, 2007, Volume 5, p.2211. and pp.2218-2219.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., pp.2218-2219.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., pp.2224-2225.
In this letter above (Figure 5), Jordan asked whether China could send products from Chinese female workers to show in the world exhibition in “the British dominion—Australia”\textsuperscript{76}. This source above reveals three things. First, the British government regarded Australia as a dominion, and had a huge influence on Australia’s foreign policies. Second, the Australian government relied on the British government to deal with the Chinese government at this time. The British ambassador in China was sending an official invitation to the Chinese government on behalf of the Australian government. Third, the major purpose of the world exhibition at this time was to promote the trade in the world.\textsuperscript{77} Indeed, the Australian
government was interested in Chinese products, and was willing to trade with China. The Australian government’s wish to trade with China provided room for Chinese diplomats to fight against the White Australia policy, so that they could help to improve Chinese people’s living conditions in Australia.

The Australian government started to promote trade in the early part of the twentieth century. John Bligh Suttor (1859-1925), was New South Wales Trade Commissioner in the Far East, between 1903 and 1922. In one of the reports he sent to the Australian government, Suttor regarded “the year 1911 as one of the most momentous in China’s history”. Although Sutton was based in Japan, he also paid close attention to situations in China. He believed that even though China’s trading with foreign nations was not strongly affected by its internal problems in 1911, it was most likely to have more problems in 1912. Suttor further argued that the Australian government should remove the White Australia Policy, in order to promote trade between China and Australia. Suttor was ahead of his time, and one of the few Australian officials challenged the White Australia policy in the 1910s.

He then listed the details of China’s trading with the British world in 1911:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>12,021,000</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straits Settlements</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>760,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australasia</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>172,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Sutton’s report, Australasia’s imports from China were greater than Canada’s from China, and Australasia’s exports to China were smaller than Canada’s to China. Since Australia was the largest nation in Australasia, one could argue that Australia could export more to the Chinese market, if China was a stable nation politically and socially. Further, Sutton stated he did not want to see an event similar to the Boxer Movement happen again in China.

Although China changed its regime from a dynasty to a republic, this political transition had little effect on the trade between China and Australia. Here is a report that John Sutton sent back to William Ashford (1874-1925), Australia’s Minister of Agriculture in 1914, showing the imports and exports from China to Australia, between 1909 and 1913:

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79 *Muswellbrook Chronicle*, 12 October 1912, p.3.
80 *Mercury*, 2 July 1906, p.3.
81 *Muswellbrook Chronicle*, 12 October 1912, p.3.
According to these newspapers statistics, between 1909 and 1913, China’s exports to Australia reached their peak in 1911, and China’s imports from Australia reached its peak in 1912. The trade between China and Australia was larger in 1913 than 1909, in both imports and exports. Further, Shanghai and Hong Kong were two major trading centres. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, Hong Kong and Shanghai played major roles as trading centres between China and Australia.

Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋), China’s first consul-general in Australia, realised the importance of trade between China and Australia. He tried to help China improve commercial relations between China and foreign nations. He planned to create a commercial organisation “functioning as a unifying element to unite business circles and to promote trade” as well as improve relations between the two nations. However, apart from the Chinese in Adelaide, Liang’s idea did not meet with much positive response.

Since 1909, Chinese diplomats had continually suggested that the Australian government should allow three categories of Chinee to travel freely and legally. On 8th March 1915, the Chinese consulate sent an official letter to the Department of External Affairs, suggested that Chinese merchants and students could come to Australia to do business and/or study. Here is an example of the official document (i.e. a passport) of a potential Chinese traveller wishing to visit Australia in 1920. Wei Zijing (魏子京), then Chinese consul-general in Australia, was trying to help a Chinese student study in Australia. There were key details of the passport which a traveller must fill in if he or she wished to visit Australia from China (in this case, it was from Guangdong province) in 1920 or around this time. For example, the passport includes the following: name; gender; age; place of birth; place of living; place of

83 Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate, 7 October 1914, p.4.
84 Ibid.,
86 Ibid.,
88 Ibid.,
living in Australia; occupation; move to Australia alone or with the family (e.g. wife and/or children); if wife and/or children intend to visit/move to Australia, when would they do it?  

Wei Zijing (魏子京) was also trying to help Chinese in Australia travel to other places. For example, Zheng Qilu, a local Chinese businessman in Sydney, Australia, asked Wei to assist him when he intended to travel to New Zealand. Zheng needed to gain a passport from Wei, so that he could travel legally from Australia to New Zealand and return to Australia. Wei was willing to help local Chinese in Australia, to promote trading between not only Australia and China, but also trading between Australia and New Zealand.

Figure 6 [Official Documents of Chinese citizen travelling to Australia, in 1920]

Source: ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522: 0051 016-01 A

Further, Chinese diplomats actively pushed to play a role in Sino-Fijian relations. For example, in March 1915, Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴)—then Chinese consul-general in

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92 ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522 0061 016-11 L.
93 He was known as Tseng Tsung Kien.
Melbourne—sent an official letter to the governor-general of Australia, demanding the extent of his “jurisdiction as Consul-General for China in Australia, to include the Fiji Islands.”

Based on this official letter (Figure 7) from the Chinese consulate in Melbourne to the Department of External Affairs, it is clear that Chinese diplomats had carefully studied the

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White Australia policy and its impacts on the Chinese people.\textsuperscript{95} The Australian government accepted this suggestion from the Chinese consulate.\textsuperscript{96} It indicates that the community of culture (the White Australia policy) would trump the community of interests (Australia’s trading with its Asian neighbours).

The First World War (WWI) had significant impacts on Sino-Australian trade.\textsuperscript{97} The trade decreased at this time for two major reasons. First, Australian governments reduced the trading relations with China. China was officially a neutral nation until 1917. As a result of the war, Australia no longer exported certain products to China.\textsuperscript{98} This negatively affected the trading between the two nations. However, Chinese consul-general Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴) was trying to help local Chinese and Anglo-Saxon businessmen to continue their business with China.\textsuperscript{99}


\textsuperscript{97} For Australians, the WWI was a soul-searching experience, as it shows their loyalty to the British Empire, please see: John F. Williams, \textit{Anzacs, the media and the Great War}, Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999, p.98.


\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p.103.
This official document (Figure 8) reveals that Zeng was suggesting Chinese businessmen to approach the British consuls in Shanghai, Canton, Fuzhou and Xiamen, so that they could continue to trade with Australia. This also indicates that the Australian government was basically relying on British diplomats to look after Australian interests in China in the 1910s. Moreover, German trading ships became unreliable and risky. Prior to WWI, the British and German companies owned the majority of ships moving between Australia and China.\footnote{Western Mail, 31 December 1915, p.43. and Northern Herald, 28 January 1916, p.39.} It was easy to conclude that WWI damaged the trading between China and Australia. The Chinese business communities in Australia suffered during WWI, since the majority of them had business connections with China.

This was partly because the Chinese in Australia did not control any trade route or own any large trading ship. This further contributed to the development of Chinese shipping companies in Australia. Sydney Chinese businessmen such as Thomas Yee Hing and Ping Nam approached the Chinese officials of Guangdong province as early as 1906, for “for official and financial support for the establishment of a shipping company”. It was however, only after the outbreak of the WWI that the idea of forming a shipping line was revived, when local Chinese business community felt the “shortage of ships travelling between Hong
Kong and Australia”. Yong suggested that the formation in 1917 of the China-Australia Mail Steamship Line, “was a thrilling episode in the history of Chinese in Australasia and the South Pacific”. Chinese in Australia played vital roles in generating and maintaining Sino-Australian trade at this time. The creation of the China-Australia Mail Steamship Line united the Chinese community in Australia over a single issue of common interest—to protect the trading routines between China and Australia. Its collapse, however, revealed the general “disunity prevailing in Chinese communities in Australia”.

George E. Morrison, China’s Presidential advisor, also argued that Australian businessmen should increase trading between China and Australia. For example, he sent a letter to William Watt (1871-1946), Australia’s Minister of Trade and Customs, in September 1918, urging his countrymen to realise the importance of trading with China, and its massive potential.

I would again point of the necessity of sending to China a commission or a High Commissioner with diplomatic rank to inquire into the conditions of China. There seems to be a complete misconception in Australia of the importance of the China market…Two or three times I have written to the Chairman of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce pointing out to him the possibilities for the sale of Australian products in China. Australian lead is used in China tea chests. For Australian silver there is a demand which ought to be met by direct purchase between China and Australia and not by the round about way that the sale is now conducted, giving profits to middlemen which ought to go to the producer. There is a great demand in China for cloth of all kinds…Chemists in Peking tell me that they have great difficulty in getting foreign medicines, even American medicines. I have written to the Chairman of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce telling him that the tooth paste I obtain from Melbourne costing me landed here 1/6 per tube is in my opinion much superior to the American tooth paste for which I have to pay 2/10…China produced a tough silk which is well adapted for use in Australia in the summer in all parts and in the tropical part of Australia throughout the year, yet the trade in this silk with Australia is comparatively unimportant, though the bartering of commodities is the most lucrative trade as regards revenue.

Indeed, Morrison played a significant role in Sino-Western relations. George Morrison was not the only one trying to promote trade between Australia and China. Sir Edward Own Cox (known as Owen Cox) was another prominent Australian who worked hard “securing ships for trading with China, and other matters”. In March 1919, the representatives of

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103 Tung Wah Times, 1 January 1913, p.2.
104 AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 03-36-030-02-049, November 1917.
106 Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in Australasia (大洋洲华人史事稿), Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.177.
108 Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in Australasia (大洋洲华人史事稿), Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.165.
110 ACCCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522 0052 016-02 B, “Official Letter from BIRT and COMPANY LIMITED to The Chinese Consul General in Melbourne”, on 10th March 1919. This report also reveals that the Chinese consulate was based on 48 William Street in Melbourne at this time.
BIRT and COMPANY LIMITED sent an official letter to Wei Zijing (魏子京), regarding to increase Australia’s trading with China. These Australian businessmen suggested:

Now that the war is over we are looking forward to larger trade relations with China and my object in writing is to ask if you can furnish us with the names of reliable Firms-at the principal Chinese ports-with whom we could open business negotiations for the sale of Australian products. We are largely interested in several Meat Works-particularly in Queensland-both frozen and canned and are prepared to initiate business with Merchants in China who would be interested in the products from our own Works, including frozen and canned Meats, Tallow, Skins, Hides, Bones, Gluepieces, and all other bye-products from Meat Works, etc, etc. We are also in a position to deal largely with other Australian products such as Rabbits-frozen or canned-Flour, Butter, Cheese, Wool, Skins, Timber, Canned Fruit, Jams, Tinned Vegetables/Tinned Milk-in fact description of Australian produce and we shall much appreciate it if you can give us the names of people with whom we could correspond or place us in the way of obtaining the names of such Firms.

We can see that some Australian businessmen realised the importance of trading with China, almost immediately after WWI. They asked Chinese consul-general Wei Zijing (魏子京), to help them find potential trading partners in China, especially in the coastal cities. Further, the letter reveals the Australian products selling to China in the 1910s and 1920s. These included: wool, wheat, flour, frozen meats, timber and jams. In addition, since there were about 300 000 Westerners living in China (mainly in Shanghai, Tianjin, Canton, Hong Kong and other “principal Chinese ports”), the Australian business community promoted products to these people. For example, some Australian businessmen intended to sell butter, cheese and jams to these Westerners. The majority of Chinese did not consume these products, and therefore would not produce them in China.

Zhou Ziqi (Chow Tsu-chi), Minster of Agriculture and Commerce in China, sent an official letter to Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴), then Chinese consul-general in Australia, requested Zeng promote the wheat trade between the two nations.

112 Ibid.,
113 https://www.thechinastory.org/ritp/chow-tsu-chi-zhou-ziqi-%E5%91%A8%E8%87%AA%E9%BD%8A/, last accessed on 12 September 2017.
In the letter (Figure 9), Zhou Ziqi stated that there were major factories in the Northeast of China, and he wanted Zeng to investigate whether wheat or flour companies in Australia would be keen to cooperate with Chinese companies in China.

When Chinese diplomats established the consulate in Melbourne in 1909, it is safe to say the consulate had financial difficulties as it did not even have money to buy the furniture they needed. Although Chinese diplomats like Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴) and Wei Zijing (魏子京), tried their best to promote trading between Australia and China, the diplomats usually faced strong financial pressure.\(^{115}\) Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), the Chinese consul-general in Australia, stated in July 1911 that the Chinese consulate in Melbourne desperately needed new furniture (see the official document below).\(^{116}\) So he had to use the budget for the following financial year to buy basic furniture for the consulate.


The salaries of the Chinese diplomats was a problem that they had to deal with. Chinese diplomats had little financial support from the Chinese government. There were three major reasons. First, the Chinese government (Beijing government at this time) had to spend most of their budget to buy weapons so that they could compete with other warlords in China. Second, the Chinese government had to repay the money it owed to Western powers, as China had lost a number of military conflicts (e.g. Opium Wars and the Boxer Rebellion). Third, there was a corruption within the Chinese government. Thus, Chinese diplomats tried to improve the Sino-Australian relations in the 1910s with little resources or support from the Chinese government in Beijing.

From 1909, Chinese diplomats realised that they had to promote Sino-Australian trade first, so that they could use the trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy. Chinese diplomats requested the Australian government allow Chinese merchants, students, and tourists to travel to Australia. The Australian government generally accepted this proposal, as they wanted to maintain (if not enhance) Australia’s commercial relations with China. Between 1909 and 1921, Chinese diplomats worked closely with Chinese local business communities in Australia and Anglo-Saxon businessmen, in order to enhance trade between Australia and China. 117 WWI forced Australian policy-makers to realise Australia’s

geographical proximity to Asia, and its remoteness from Britain, the heart of the British Empire.

3. Political Relations and Recognition of the Chinese Regime

The problem of recognition was another major theme that shaped Sino-Australian relations, between 1901 and 1921. There were two major issues of recognition here. First, China wanted to be treated as an equal power to the West, an equal member of the international community.118 Second, Chinese diplomats had to encourage the Western governments (in this case, the Australian government) to recognise the regimes that they represented.

Between 1911 and 1949, China was an unstable nation politically. The political centre of the state shifted from Beijing to Nanjing, to Chongqing, to Nanjing and back to Beijing. For China’s provisional President Sun Yat-sen, the unity of the nation was a priority.119 After the 1911 Revolution, according to Chinese historian Xu Guoqi, “nationalism became a defining and most powerful political force in China”.120 The British watched this historical event closely. Though the British were continuing their neutral policies towards China at this time, they were worried that there could be another Boxer Movement in China.121

Shi suggests China naturally adopted the so-called “Yiyi Zhiyi”122 policies, similar to the Western balance of power policies.123 Shi adopts a Marxist approach, and suggests Chinese public also impacted China’s foreign policies.124 The Republic of China was officially established in Nanjing on 1 January 1912. Sun Yat-sen became China’s first provisional President. According to Shi, Sun was familiar with Chinese affairs overseas, as he had lived outside China for a while. Thus, one of the first things that he did was to try to protect Chinese people’s rights abroad.125 On 10th March 1912, Yuan Shikai became the President of the Republic of China, and he desperately needed foreign powers to recognise his regime diplomatically. However, the majority of foreign powers hesitated to do so. Shi argued that Yuan had to compromise Chinese interests in regions like Tibet and Mongolia, in order to gain support from the foreign nation-states like Britain.126 Britain decided to recognise the regime on 6th October, 1912, after Yuan promised to protect British interests in Tibet.127 In other words, it took several months for Britain to recognise the Yuan Shi-kai regime. Then

118 Xu, Guoqi (徐国琦), “第一次世界大战对中国历史进程的影响” (The Effects of World War I on China’s Historical Progress), The Twentieth-First Century (The Chinese University of Hong Kong), August 2005 (a slight different version was published in Jin Guangyao and Wang Jianlang, eds, Beiyang shiqi de zhong guo waijiao (Chinese foreign policy during the warlord period), Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2006, p.40. and p.42.
122 Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), 1994, p.10., “以夷制夷”.
123 Ibid., pp.9-10.
124 Ibid., p.15., “本书以马列主义，毛泽东思想为指导思想,,,,”; p.29., “当时的资产阶级改革派,,,,”
125 Ibid., p.21., Shi then gives us an example of how Sun tried to protect Chinese people’s rights in Dutch Indonesia.
126 Ibid., p.28.
127 Ibid.,
the question occurs, how did Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) manage diplomatic relations between China and Australia when these were no official relations between Beijing and London?

Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), China’s consul-general in Australia, had mixed feelings about the revolution. On the one hand, he knew China needed to change dramatically, in order to compete with other nations. He knew the Qing dynasty was corrupted and backward. On the other hand, he was a representative of the regime abroad and had grown up in the late Qing period. Further, he had to stay loyal to the rulers in Beijing. However, the regime collapsed in 1911. Thus, Huang may have carried complicated views of the revolution. On 12th February 1912, at the Chinese consulate in Melbourne, Chinese diplomats “hauled down the Dragon flag and replaced it with the triangular Republican ensign”. Huang Rongliang, gave the task to their popular sixteen-year-old—William Liu, a clerk and translator of the consulate. Despite Huang’s mixed views towards the political situation in China, he believed that the most important thing for China was unity. Thus, Huang would like to work for the new regime in China—the Republic of China.

The Chinese consul-general was not only in charge of the Sino-Australian official relations, but also had a say on China’s relations with other states in the region. Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) was the highest ranking of Chinese official in Australasia. For example, Huang suggested Zhou Ling to replace him, and become the new consul in Wellington, New Zealand. Huang was China’s first consul in New Zealand, between February 1909 and May 1911. Therefore, he was familiar with Sino-New Zealand relations as well as Chinese living conditions in New Zealand at this time. Further, Huang was assisting Chinese citizens in Australia and New Zealand, giving them Chinese passports so that they could travel back to China if they wished. In addition, Chinese diplomats were also closely watching the living conditions of Chinese in Netherlands East Indies as they were comparing the situations for Chinese communities in Australia and Netherlands East Indies.

Chinese newspapers in Australia followed the Revolution of 1911 closely. For example, on 6 January 1912, Tung Wah Times published a reported of Wu Tingfang (1842-1922), then Minister of Foreign Affairs, as he requested foreign powers recognise the new Chinese regime. Wu Tingfang also “begged the most powerful journalist in the North America” to report on his requests to the outside world. Chinese in Australia believed only a strong and stable China could improve their living conditions overseas. In November 1911, a minority of Chinese population were still supporting the Qing regime. This group of people was based at “158 George Street, Sydney” and was called the “Chinese Empire Reform Association”.

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129 Ibid., p.137.
132 Ibid.,
134 Tung Wah Times, 6 January 1912, p.8.
135 Ibid.,
136 Tung Wah Times, 4 November 1911, p.6.
137 Tung Wah Times, 4 November 1911, p.6., “A Notice from Chinese Empire Reform Association in Sydney”.

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They believed that China should remain as an empire, but should reform its political structure. They were supporters of Kang Youwei.

As we have learnt from Sutton’s report previously, he suggested that a stable China might best serve Australia’s interests in the East Asia region. Sutton believed that “[once] all her [China] trouble past, the Chinese will prove [to be] our best customers.” Australians expected to continue to trade with China, despite their belief that China was a weak and backward nation.

The First World War (WWI) shaped the histories of Australia and China, although both nations were minor players. As a result of WWI, European powers had to pay greater attention to the political and military affairs in Europe. Further, the great powers had not established the new international order yet. Thus, Chinese historian Xu Guoqi argues that the WWI offered new opportunities for Chinese diplomats, and improved China’s international status. Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), China’s President, approached John Jordan, then the British ambassador to China, to discuss whether China and Britain should fight together in Shandong province, in order to regain the territory, which was occupied by the Germans in Qingdao. However, Jordan rejected this proposal. George Morrison, the Times correspondent in Beijing, thought Jordan did not consider this proposal carefully, and the rejection was stupid. The British rejection of the Chinese proposal once again showed that British did not recognise China as an equal partner, though China and Britain had been allies in the war. Chinese officials tended to view Morrison as British, not an Australian. Moreover, Chinese officials still viewed Australia as part of the British Empire, between 1901 and 1921.

In addition, Chinese diplomats also informed Chinese politicians in China what was going on in Australia. One of the major debates in Australia during WWI was conscription. Billy Hughes, then Prime Minister of Australia, wanted to send more Australian soldiers into the battlefield. However, thoughts of conscription caused a huge divide within Australian society in 1917 and 1918. Although Hughes remained the Prime Minister of Australia, he did not get enough support from the Australian public to pass the referendum (the referendum was narrowly rejected in 1917 and 1918). Wei Zijing, then Chinese consul-general in Australia, sent an official report to the Ministry of Chinese Affairs in Beijing in February 1918, in order to explain the internal divisions within the Australian government and public at this time.

139 Ibid.,
140 *Barrier Miner*, 24 June 1911, p.4.
142 Xu, “The Effects of World War I on China’s Historical Progress”, p.44.
143 Ibid., p.45. Xu suggests China intended to join the war as early as in 1914, but was not allowed to do so.
145 SLNSW, MLMSS312/279, 12b and 44b.
146 AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 03-36-016-01-029, February 1918.
This report (Figure 11) is rare because it includes a list of the members of the Australian Cabinet. It suggests that Chinese diplomats like Wei Zijing paid close attention to Australian internal politics, and were reporting it back to China. However, what Wei did not comment on was: how this internal struggle within the Australian government might affect Sino-Australian relations. Billy Hughes accepted Japan’s unreasonable demands in Shangdong, in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. George Morrison, however, worked with Chinese diplomats in Paris to protect Chinese rights in Shangdong, e.g. to take back the control of Qingdao port.147

Conclusion

The White Australia Policy, trade between the two nations and the problem of “recognition” were three dominant themes in the Sino-Australian relations. Chinese diplomats tended to use trade as a tool to persuade Australia to relax its White Australia policy and recognise the regimes the Chinese diplomats represented. Between 1901 and 1921, Chinese diplomats’ priority was to enhance trading between China and Australia. This was because they knew the more Australia traded with China (or benefited from the trading with China), the easier it would be for the Chinese diplomats like Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋), Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) and Wei Zijing (魏子京), to fight against the White Australia policy. Chinese diplomats

managed to ensure Australian governments recognised the Chinese regimes (e.g. 1911-1912), but the British (and indeed the Australians) did not recognise China as an equal partner. Further, for the same reasons, Chinese diplomats achieved little in relaxing the White Australia policy, although they were capable diplomats and tried their best to help the Chinese in Australia.

China and Australia formed official relations in 1909, as the first Chinese consul-general, Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) arrived in Melbourne, and established the consulate. There were several key motivations for the Chinese government to appoint a diplomatic representative in Australia. First, to look after the Chinese population in Australia, and protect their rights. Second, to promote trade between the two nations, and deeper knowledge of Australia in China. Third, to maintain warm diplomatic relations between the two nations. These can also be the key factors to evaluate whether or not Chinese diplomats were effective, during their postings in Australia.

Chinese diplomats knew that it was hard for them to persuade the Australian government to abolish the White Australia policy. Therefore, these diplomats took a realistic approach. From 1909, Chinese diplomats argued that the Australian government should allow three categories of Chinese to come to Australia, namely students, businessmen and tourists. China, transformed from a dynasty to a modern republic in 1912. The Australian federal government followed the British government in recognising the new regime in Beijing, as Yuan Shikai promised to retain all British privileges in China. Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), the Chinese consul-general in Melbourne in 1912, failed to modify the White Australia policy, but was able to manage trade between the two nations during a difficult time.148 Morrison, on the other hand, was living in China, and he played a crucial role within Sino-Australian relations during this time. Morrison realised the importance of trading with China, and worked hard to promote mutual understanding between the two nations. Although Morrison was not an official diplomat, one could argue he played an even larger role in connecting China and Australia. Though Australia’s foreign policies were still influenced by the British government, this chapter has shown that Australia performed an independent policy. The experience of John Bligh Suttor, NSW’s trade commissioner in the Far East, was a good example, as it indicated that the Australian government wanted to promote its own trade with China and other Asian nations. Further, WWI made Australian businessmen (like Owen Cox) realise Australia’s geographical distance to Britain, encouraging him and others to explore new markets in Asia, especially China. Sino-Australian relations were also a story of Australia’s growing awareness of its own geo-political interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Chapter 3: Australia’s Diplomatic relations with China (1921-1941)

Introduction

This chapter focuses on a Chinese policy shift towards Australia between 1921 and 1941. I argue that the Sino-Japanese conflict (after 1931) in East Asia made Chinese policy-makers pay more attention to Australasia, as they were trying to gain support from people (especially the ethnic Chinese) in this region. Chinese policy-makers and diplomats generally believed that their priority were to maintain China’s independence and unity.1 This chapter also discusses the Australian policy shift toward the Asia-Pacific region during the Great Depression and in response to Japanese expansion. Furthermore, I suggest that it was Chinese diplomats working hand in hand with Chinese business leaders who worked collaboratively to advance Chinese-Australian trade relations. While the White Australia policy remained prominent during the period, interested parties in China recognized that the policy could potentially be relaxed if the economic benefits and security issue (e.g. the expansion of Japan in the Pacific) were made clear to Australia. However, while the economic benefits of Chinese-Australian trade offered a strong incentive for Australian policymakers to ease the White Australia policy, and those incentives occasionally led to improved relations, the policy stayed largely intact, contributing to continually strained Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1921 and 1941.

This chapter comprises into three major parts. The first part focuses on the White Australia policy. The policy affected the entrance of Chinese immigrants and their living conditions in Australia. It decreased the Chinese-Australian population dramatically and therefore damaged the Sino-Australian relations. I will use newspaper reports from the Tung Wah Times, to show how the Chinese community might have viewed the White Australia policy in the 1920s. For example, an old Chinese man, possibly a reader of Tung Wah Times, published two detailed reports of Chinese people’s experiences under the White Australia policy in 1923.2 The discrimination that Chinese people faced in Australia led Chinese diplomats’ to fight against the White Australia policy. The second part of the chapter highlights the trade between China and Australia. While the White Australia policy might have been a negative factor in Sino-Australian relations, trade between the two nations would certainly have been a positive factor. Evidence suggests that Australian goods went through Hong Kong to mainland China in the 1920s and 1930s. Wheat and wool were two of the most popular products that Australia sold to China.3 The potential of Sino-Australian trade was even greater, once China could resume peace. The third part of the chapter discusses security issues, namely the expansion of Japan in the Pacific, and its impacts on Sino-Australian relations. General Cai Tingkai’s visit to Australia in 1934 showed how the internal political conflicts within China may have influenced the Sino-Australian relations at this time. For Chinese politicians such as Chiang Kai-shek, China’s independence and unity were key and China’s foreign policies had to serve these two goals. Chiang wanted to diminish the role of the Chinese Communists first.4 However, for Cai, it was more important that all the Chinese should cooperate and fight together against the Japanese.

1 Hong Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhai chubanshe, 1930, p.17.
2 Tung Wah Times, 17 March 1923, p.2., “Chinese under the White Australia policy”; Tung Wah Times, 24 March 1923, p.2., “Chinese under the White Australia policy, continued”.
Between 1921 and 1941, Chinese diplomats in Australia had three major tasks. First, they wanted to promote trade between China and Australia. Second, Chinese diplomats had to protect Chinese people’s rights in Australia. Third, they had to compete with the Japanese diplomats in Australia, in order for China to gain support from Australia in its military struggle against Japan.

Two prominent Chinese figures visited Australia in the 1930s; one of their goals was to gain support from Chinese people in Australasia, in order to fight against Japan. Ernest Koh has suggested, ethnic Chinese across the world who identified politically and emotionally with China played a significant role in “public displays of patriotism and support in the war against Japan”.

Lin Sen (1868-1943), a senior Kuomintang party official, as well as the Chairman of National Government of China between 15 December 1931 and 1 August 1943, visited Australia in 1931. His visit is significant as this was the first time that a head of China (an official at the highest level) had ever visited Australia. Cai Tingkai (1892-1968), a Chinese military general, visited Australia as a tourist in early 1935. While Lin Sen received a warm welcome from Australia politicians and Chinese diplomats, Cai Tingkai received a warm welcome from local Chinese communities in Australia. Cai’s visit to Australia might have harmed the official Sino-Australian relations, as the Chinese consulate in Sydney was critical of his arrival. Chinese diplomats believed that Cai’s popularity have damaged the authority of Chiang Kai-shek and his regime because Chiang and Cai held different political views regarding the Japanese invaders and the Chinese Communists. Thus, the internal political divisions within China could also have affected Sino-Australian relations in the 1930s. In the later part of this Chapter, I am going to examine these two trips in further detail.

As in the previous two decades, the White Australia policy and trade were still the dominant factors affecting Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1921 and 1941, although the expansion of Japan in the Pacific was becoming an increasingly important factor shaping the relations of the two nations. The international situation eventually led China and Australia to exchange official diplomatic representatives in 1941. While Chinese diplomats tended to argue that China and Australia should cooperate economically and militarily against Japan, Australian politicians were hesitant to do so. In this period, Australians increasingly realised...

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5 They expected Australia to buy more products from China, and to make the exchange of goods more even. When Australia benefited its trade with China and Japan, Australia only imported relatively little amount of goods from these two Asian nations. Thus, both Chinese diplomats and Japanese diplomats in Australia suggested to Australian governments that Australia should import more from China and Japan respectively.


7 *Tung Wah Times*, 18 April 1931, p.8.; KMT official staff and officials from China, 11 April 1931, by Eden Studio, courtesy of Chinese Nationalist Party of Australasia (Sydney), http://www.chia.chinesemuseum.com.au//objects/D003901.htm, last access on 22/02/2017.; On *Canberra Times*, 4 August 1943, p.2., one newspaper report suggests Lin visited Australia in 1918; however, the actual year that he visited Australia was 1931.

8 Lin Sen became the President of Republic of China in January 1931. Lin died in 1943, as President of China.; Please see: NAA: A461, 700/1/480. Further, in the earlier parts of the thesis, I have mentioned Liang Qichao’s visit in Australia in 1900-1901; but Liang did not have any official ranking while he visited Australia, though he was influential and famous at the time.


the importance of trading with Asia. In *Towards a New Vision*, Neville Meaney has documented Australia’s trade with Japan, but historians have paid little attention to Australia’s trade with China in the 1930s (except Loy-Wilson).12 My research suggests that Australia wanted to trade with both China and Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, though the trade between Australia and Japan was bigger than Australia’s trade with China. For Australian politicians, Japan was a more reliable trading partner than China, as China suffered internal military conflicts.13 However, Australian politicians were concerned about the expansion of Japan in Asia.14

Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy, as Australia paid more attention to the Asia-Pacific region in the 1930s, due to the Great Depression (1929-1932) and the expansion of Japan.15 As early as 1921, William Morris (Billy) Hughes, then Prime Minister of Australia, one of the supporters of the White Australia policy, appointed Edward Little as Australia’s first trade commissioner in Shanghai, China. The status of Edward Little in China was a perfect example of Australia’s geo-political dilemma. On the one hand, he was an Australian official, and his job was to promote trade between Australia and China (and the East more generally). He was Australia’s first official representative in China as well as one of Australia’s first diplomats. On the other hand, he was not welcomed by the British diplomats in China (neither the ones in the Beijing legation nor the consular staff in Shanghai), as the British officials believed that they could protect Australia’s interests in China, and therefore there was no need of such postings.16

The Australian government terminated Little’s postings in 1923, partly because Australia’s trade with Britain resumed after WWI. However, the Great Depression forced Australians to seek new markers once again. Two influential Australians visited China in the 1930s, in order to enhance Australia’s understandings of the East and promote the trade between Australia and Asia, particularly China and Japan. They were Alexander Clifford Vernon Melbourne (1888–1943) and John Latham (1877-1964).17 Melbourne was an academic based at the University of Queensland. The university sent him to visit China in 1932, in order to study China and Japan as well as to promote trade between Australia and these two Asian nations.18 As David Walker has suggested, Melbourne “was prominent among the intellectuals of the 1930s” who wanted Australia to develop a closer relationship with Asia.19 Two years later, on behalf of the Australian government, John Latham—the Minister of External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, paid an official visit to Netherlands East Indies, China and Japan.20

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13 NAA: C443, J150, p.7.


Latham was the leader of the Goodwill Mission to Asia and the ‘Australian Eastern Mission’. Chinese leaders showed great respect to the Australian government. Lin Sen (who visited Australia in 1931)—then Chairman of the National Government of the Republic of China—and Wang Jingwei (1883-1944)—then Premier of the Republic of China, both met Latham and welcomed his visit to China. Latham reported to Prime Minister Joseph Lyons (1879-1939) that “the Chinese politicians treated the Australian delegation with great respect, and he was satisfied”. When Latham returned to Australia in 1934, he advised Lyons that not only should Australia increase its trading with China and Japan, Australia should also prepare to relax the White Australia policy, in order to negotiate better economic deals with China and Japan. Latham had a mixed view of Japan. On the one hand, he was an admirer of Japan, as he respected Japan’s modern economy and its clean environment. He was therefore extremely keen to promote Australia’s trading with Japan. On the other hand, he was increasingly worried about the Japanese expansion in the Asia-Pacific region, and he worried about Australia’s security in the region. When Latham visited China, he stayed within Australian and British communities in Shanghai, and was not impressed with China’s development. Melbourne, however, had a more positive view of China than Latham, as he believed both China and Japan to be important trading partners to Australia.

1. The White Australia policy

This part of the chapter is mainly focusing on the White Australia policy. I suggest that, between 1921 and 1941, the White Australia policy continued to be a major factor negatively affecting Sino-Australian diplomatic relations. Between 1901 and 1941, the Chinese became of the biggest victims of the White Australia policy. Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats continued to work with local business leaders to promote trade between the two nations, in order to fight against this racist policy. Although the majority of white Australians strongly supported the White Australia policy at this time, Chinese people challenged the policy at cultural, social and diplomatic levels.
Between 1901 and 1947, the population of Asian people in Australia decreased from 47,014 to 13,000. The White Australia policy partly contributed to this decline. The majority of Asian people in Australia were Chinese.\textsuperscript{30} At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were around 30,000 Chinese in Australia, compared to only 3,000 Japanese.\textsuperscript{31} Further, Yeung reminds us that the low status of China as a state was another major factor in the discrimination that Chinese faced abroad, because Chinese government could not protect its people overseas.\textsuperscript{32} However, I also wish to point out that, although Japan was a powerful nation at this time, Japanese people were also victims of the White Australia policy. In 1937, the \textit{West Australian} newspaper provides statistics to show us the decline of the Chinese population in Australia:

\begin{quote}
A pronounced decrease in the number of Aslatics [Asiatics] in Australia, and particularly of Chinese, is recorded. The Chinese population of the Commonwealth at the time of the census was only 7,792 persons [persons], a decrease of 6,007 compared with the number at the previous census.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

Furthermore, Chinese expatriates in Australia decided to move to live in larger cities such as Sydney and Melbourne in the 1920s and 1930s. This allowed them to form association and help each other.

On 17th March 1923, the Chinese newspaper \textit{Tung Wah Times} published a rare commentary on racial tensions within Australia. The report is an old, educated Chinese man’s response to the White Australia policy, as well as his views on Chinese people’s position in Australia. In \textit{Making Chinese Australia}, Kuo Mei-fen reminds us that Chinese newspapers like \textit{Tung Wah Times} “not only reported on community events”, but also were significant historical agents in their own right “in the shaping of communities and patterns of urban leadership” in Australia.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{30} Zhang Qiusheng, Aodaliya Hu qiao Huaren shi, p.136.
\textsuperscript{31} Yeung, \textit{Lonely star on lone nights}, p.444. and p.480.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, p.482.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{West Australian}, 20 April 1937, p.14.
\textsuperscript{34} Kuo Mei-fen, \textit{Making Chinese Australia}, 2013, p.6.
\end{flushleft}
This writer stated in the beginning of the article that if anyone has a basic understanding of Australian history, then he or she should know that the land of Australia belonged to Aboriginal (and Torres Strait Islander people of Australia) originally. The Dutch people discovered Australia in the eighteenth century. Then Britain replaced the Netherlands as the dominant maritime power. The British subsequently sent more and more convicts to Australia, and the Bairen (white European Australians) gradually outnumbered others and the colonisers eventually became the ruling people of the colony. According to the author, this had only happened within the previous fifty years. Meanwhile, since China had such a huge population, Chinese moved to Australia to live, in the latter half of the century. Unfortunately, China was an extremely weak nation, and Chinese people had to live under foreign rule. Thus, they suffered discrimination. As a result, the Chinese population in 1923 was only one-tenth of the population at its peak. The author, who calls himself “the old [Chinese] man”, then stated that Chinese settlers also contributed to the development of Australia, and they therefore deserved to get recognition. Then he listed three major discriminations that Chinese people faced daily under the White Australia policy. They were:

1. Chinese people did not have the freedom to choose their occupation;
2. Chinese people could not participate politics; they did not have the rights to vote;

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35 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 17 March 1923, p.2. “Chinese under the White Australia policy”
3. Chinese people were the victims of the anti-humanitarian White Australia policy, this resulted in a significant decline of the Chinese population in Australia. Clearly, for him, Chinese people were the second-class citizens in Australia at this time.

One week later, the same author—"the old Chinese man"—published a follow-up commentary in Tung Wah Times, to continue his resistance against the White Australia policy, by documenting the racist treatment that Chinese people confronted in Australia. Based on his personal observation, he argued that Chinese received unequal treatment in Australia. They did not enjoy the equal opportunity to compete economically with white people in Australia. If the Chinese had more freedom to do business in Australia, they could promote the trade between Australia and China, as well as contributing to the development of the Australian local economy. The English-language newspapers published discriminatory or insulting words against Chinese people. Chinese people would face insulting behaviours daily when they were walking on the streets. However, Chinese people in Australia formed various associations and parties; they had different interests and political views. As a result, they could not work together to protect their common interests. Further, he believed the weakness of China, as a nation was a factor that Caucasian people in Australia would dare to discriminate against the Chinese. Therefore, he suggested that Chinese people overseas needed to help China to become a stronger nation, because once China was capable of protecting its citizens abroad, it would improve the living conditions of the Chinese people in Australia. Thus, the fate of Chinese people in Australia was closely intertwined with the destiny of China. The White Australia policy reinforced this.

While Australian politicians were not ready to give up the White Australia policy, sometimes they were willing to relax it, if they could get economic benefits in return from China. For example, James Scullin (1876-1953), Prime Minister of Australia in 1930, sent a report to then Chinese consul-general Song Faxiang (宋发祥). Scullin told Song that the Australian government would consider allowing the relatives of well-off Chinese businessmen to come to live in Australia, as these Chinese businessmen were getting old. In this regard, this would be positive news for local Chinese people in Australia. However, the Australian government rejected other proposals made by Song. Song proposed tolerance of Chinese traders, but the Australian government was not prepared to give up its border control policies. Song also suggested that the Australian government abolish the fingerprint policies, as Chinese people viewed the practice as humiliating and discriminating. Scullin replied to Song that, although his government felt sympathy towards the Chinese people, they would not give up this discriminating policy. However, those who carried legal Australian passports/permits would not be the victim of this policy. The Australian government was willing to give

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37 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 17 March 1923, p.2.
38 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 24 March 1923, p.2. “Chinese under the White Australia policy, continued”
39 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 15 December 1923, p.7.
40 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 24 March 1923, p.2. “Chinese under the White Australia policy, continued”
41 Ernest Koh, Diaspora at War, 2014, p.58., “The Sino-Japanese War was, therefore, not just a war contained geographically within China. Instead, once the opening salvos were delivered China’s diaspora war at war as well, despite the fact that the colonies and countries they resided in were not involved in the conflict, transforming it into a global conflict in its own right.”
43 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 16 August 1930, p.5.
44 Ibid.,
45 Ibid.,
concessions to three types of Chinese people, who would not need to print their fingers when they went through the Australian customs. The three categories of Chinese people were:

1. Chinese merchants who owned business in Australia or abroad.
2. Those Chinese who had lived in Australia before, have done finger-prints previously and travelled with legal permits.
3. Those Chinese who visited New Zealand, Fiji, or Solomon Islands; and wanted to returned to Australia.46

Thus, the Australian government allowed certain categories of Chinese people to stay in Australia. If you were a businessperson or had lived in Australia previously, you could stay in Australia legally despite the White Australia policy. Further, Scullin stated, although these policies could not be changed or abolished now, it was not his government’s policy, as the policies had existed since 1901.47 This is because between 1921 and 1941, the majority of Australians still held strong racial prejudice against the non-European people, as they “would not have wished to see the end of the White Australia policy”.48 For example, scholar Eric Andrews reminds us that the “Round Table in 1921 produced a long defence of the White Australia policy”.49 Round Table, an Australian newspaper, published an article that refused the non-white immigrants to move to Australia, and it therefore reinforced the White Australia ideology.50 This ideology represented the view of the majority of European Australians at this time.

Chinese historian Yeung Wing On argues that the White Australia policy was not only a result of racism, but also a tool to protect the white people’s interests in Australia.51 Yeung suggests the white working-class tended to dislike the arrival of the Chinese workers, as they feared the Chinese might lower wages, while employers tended to welcome the Chinese as cheap labourers. In their writings, one thing is common: both Andrews and Yeung realised the importance of the White Australia policy, and its negative impacts on Chinese people’s ordinary lives in Australia. My research, however, is focusing more on the diplomatic relations between the two nations.

This treatment of the Chinese in Australia severely strained Sino-Australian relations.52 Chinese diplomats tried to use their diplomatic status to improve the treatment of Chinese people in Australia.53 Since 1909, Chinee diplomats had argued that Australia should allow three categories of Chinese come to Australia.54 In 1929, the then Chinese consul-general,
Song Faxiang (宋发祥) received several complaints from Chinese passengers when they boarded a ship. Song, was educated at the University of Chicago, and had strong scientific background. Song also spoke fluent English, and was critical of the White Australia policy. Among all the Chinese diplomats between 1909 and 1941, Song was the most critical of the White Australia policy. On behalf of the Chinese consulate, he sent an official letter to the Department of Home Affairs, complaining about the ill-treatment of Chinese in Australia, as follows:

The Consul-General [Song Faxiang] stated that complaints had reached his office that Chinese passengers were treated in a rather discourteous manner at Queensland Ports, particularly at Cairns, Townsville and Thursday Island. He also mentioned that his predecessor, Mr. Quei, when returning to China last October, had desired to visit one at Cairns but that the Customs Officer on duty had refused to recognise him as a representative of China…He stated, however, that his Government had urged him to make special representations with a view to his countrymen being treated with respect, and as he is desirous of promoting good feelings between Australia and China and of fostering trade, he is anxious to effect the removal of any possible causes for complaint as regards the treatment of Chinese in Australia.

This incident, however, was not unique. As this thesis has shown above, Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), then Chinese consul-general in Australia, had also had difficulty moving from New Zealand to Australia, back in 1911. The mistreatment of Chinese diplomats in Australia was alarming. In addition, given the fact many Chinese in Australia could not speak English, they suffered even more in their everyday lives. Chinese people in Australia were begging Chinese diplomats to ask Australian government to abolish the White Australia policy. On the one hand, this shows how weak China was, as the Australian government did not show much respect to China’s officials. On the other hand, it shows the racial prejudices that Anglo-Saxon Australians exhibited towards Chinese people. Ordinary Chinese people as well as Chinese diplomats could be victims of the White Australia policy.

Chinese diplomats like Song Faxiang tried to help Chinese people in Australia to deal with the White Australia policy. One of their major task was to help the Chinese to travel between China and Australia legally and freely. For example, Henry Manpo Chiu, a second-generation Chinese Australian, was sent to China to be educated, as his father wanted him to learn Chinese language and culture. However, he had difficulty returning to Australia in 1930, as his mother was a Chinese citizen, not an Australian. Thus, Chiu became a victim of the White Australia policy. His father went to the then Chinese consul-general Song Faxiang

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56 Jian Zhaoming and Guan Nayi, Pound’s Encounter with Song Faxiang (NiXiangErxing—Pangde Yu Song Faxiang de xiehuo he zhuangji), in Foreign Literature (Waiguo wenxue), 2011, p.123.
58 This was partly due to the unstable political situations in China in 1911.
The consul-general Song actively campaigned on behalf of Chinese Australians, and tried to negotiate with the Australian government regarding this case, so that Chiu could be reunited with his Chinese father in Australia. It is clear that Australian government did not allow Chinese Australians to move freely in and out of Australia. Chinese diplomats like Song had to act on behalf of the local Chinese, in order to protect the rights of Chinese in Australia.

Chinese diplomats used the decline of the Chinese population in Australia to argue against the legitimacy of the White Australia policy. The question of admission of Chinese citizens to Australia was closely intertwined with the White Australia policy. For example, then Chinese consul-general, Chen Weiping (陈维屏), argued that the Australian government should relax its White Australia policy, and allow certain groups of Chinese to travel and settle in Australia. In 1934, Chen contacted the Australian government:

The Consul-General for China has made strong representations from time to time on behalf of aged Chinese, who have fairly substantial business or garden interests in Australia which they cannot continue to look after, but which they do not wish to sacrifice. The Consul-General states that these men wish to return to China to spend their last days, but desire permission for a son or other relative to be admitted into Australia to take their place and carry on the business... The Consul-General points out that to grant the concession sought would not endanger the White Australia Policy, as it would probably not apply to more than a dozen cases. He stresses the fact that the Chinese population is steadily declining—that the Census of 1921 showed a decline of 5,596 Chinese residents as compared with 1911, and that the excess departures for 1932 over arrivals numbered 360. In 1933 there were excess departures.

Consul-general Chen used the decline of the Chinese population in Australia, to gain sympathy from the Australian government and public. He further argues that Australia should relax or modify the White Australia policy. This is because Chen believed the White Australia policy was the key factor contributing to the decline of the Chinese population, as Chinese were barred from travelling to Australia, while older generations of Chinese were dying out. However, there was a major difference between Consul-Generals Song and Chen regarding to the White Australia policy. Song argued that Australia should completely remove the White Australia policy; in contrast, Chen argued that Australia could modify the White Australia policy. Both of them were trying to improve the living conditions of Chinese people. Chen’s approach, however, was more realistic, given the fact that it would have been almost impossible to abolish the White Australia policy in Australia in the first half of the twentieth century.

63 Or Fartsan T. Sung, which was known at that time, and in newspaper reports. Song Faxiang used to be the English secretary to Feng Guozhang (1859-1919), while Feng was President of Republic of China.
66 It is unclear whether Chiu was allowed to return to Australia.
70 *Tung Wah Times* (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 13 February 1926, p.6.
The White Australia policy harmed Australia’s international reputation. Both Chinese and Japanese diplomats in Australia shared a common goal: to fight against the White Australia policy. This was because both Chinese and Japanese people faced strong discrimination in Australia. For example, in February 1933, then Chinese consul-general and Japanese consul-general both attended a conference to promote the trade between Australia and East Asia. The Japanese representative remarked: “I can see no hope of further trade being fostered with Australia unless the Commonwealth displays a greater measure of goodwill towards our nationals in this country”. The Chinese Consul-General made a similar protest. However, although both Chinese and Japanese officials protested against the White Australia policy, they could not persuade the Australian government to abolish the controversial policy. Further, due to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, it was impossible for Chinese and Japanese diplomats in Australia to work together against the White Australia policy, even though their fellow compatriots faced similar discriminations in Australia.

Although the White Australia policy was the official position of all the major parties, a minority of European Australians actually challenged the legitimacy of the policy. They tended to belong to one of three groups of people. First, some Christians, and they saw the policy as cruel and inhuman. For example, Archbishop Howard Mowll, used to work as a pastor in Sichuan Province of China. Once he returned to Australia, Mowll worked closely with the consul-general for China (Dr. Wei Ping Chen) and William Liu (a local Chinese community leader who had close links with the Chinese consulate and the business communities in Australia), to not only promote trade between the two nations, but also encourage other Australians to learn from China and respect the Chinese cultures. Mowll even delivered one of the George Morrison lectures. The second group was made up of Australian businessmen, as they continued to seek trading opportunities with Asian nations, especially China and Japan. They realised the policy created a negative image of Australia in Asia, which they viewed as a key market for Australian goods. The third group which

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71 David Walker, *Anxious Nation*, p.11. “From 1901, Australia became known internationally for its White Australia Policy”.
73 *Tung Wah Times* (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 21 June 1924, p.7.
75 Ibid.
77 Sabine Hedwig Willis, Thesis (Ph.D.), 1974, p.4.
78 The Consul-General for China (Dr. Chen), worked closely with Archbishop Howard Mowll. Mowll used to work in Sichuan Province of China. Please see: Sydney: Church of England in Australia, Diocese of Sydney, 1st December, 1934, p.5.; *Daily Examiner* (Grafton, NSW: 1915 - 1954), 1 July 1933, p.5.
81 Ibid.; *Tung Wah Times* (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), Saturday 22 August 1925, p.7.
fought against the policy, comprised those who had travelled and/or lived in Asia.\textsuperscript{82} Once they returned to Australia, they therefore argued that the Australian government should abolish the policy, or at least relax it. Although these people’s views of the White Australia policy might not reflect the views of the majority of Australians at that time, they provided room for Chinese diplomats to argue against the policy.

2. Trade and “Commercial Diplomacy”\textsuperscript{83}

Between 1921 and 1941, the Australia government wanted to improve its trade relations with China.\textsuperscript{84} Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats used trading between China and Australia as leverage in their attempts to have the White Australia policy modified. There were two major parts of this policy. First, Chinese diplomats worked along with some of the local Chinese business leaders like William Liu (1893-1983) to promote trade between the two nations. Second, Chinese diplomats highlighted the importance of this trade to Australian officials. The Australian government acknowledged this strategy as “commercial diplomacy”.\textsuperscript{85} Further, Chinese diplomats suggested that Australia should buy more products from China, and in doing so to make the trade more balanced.\textsuperscript{86}

Between 1909 and 1929\textsuperscript{87}, one of the priorities of Chinese diplomats was to try to promote the trade between China and Australia. In 1918, Zeng Zijian (曾宗鉴), China’s consul-general to Australia, was keen to promote “trade and commercial relations between Australasia and the Republic of China”.\textsuperscript{88} Chinese diplomats in Australia worked closely with Chinese people in Australia, as the local Chinese expatriates were also extremely keen to promote the trade between China and Australia. Sandra Tweedie argues that Australia improved its trading with Asia during the First World War (WWI).\textsuperscript{89} She further reminds us that, despite the Australian government’s “mistrust of the Japanese, wartime conditions expanded trading between the two countries”.\textsuperscript{90} William Morris Hughes (Billy Hughes) was Prime Minister of Australia between 1915 and 1923. Despite his personal “mistrust of the Japanese and his fierce commitment to White Australia”, Billy Hughes’s political ideologies “did not blind him to the necessity for Australia to develop economic relationships with its neighbours in East and South-East Asia”.\textsuperscript{91} “In the immediate post-World War I years”,

\textsuperscript{83} NAA: A981, CHIN 102, “China-Australia, Visit of General Tsai Ting-Kai”, p.32. “Commercial Diplomacy” is the term that Australian officials used in this government report.
\textsuperscript{85} NAA: A981, CHIN 102, “China-Australia, Visit of General Tsai Ting-Kai”, p.32.
\textsuperscript{87} The Chinese consulate was based on Level 2 109 Little Bourke Street Melbourne Victoria, between 1909 and 1929. I have collected a lot of extremely valuable primary sources from ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne.
\textsuperscript{88} ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522-0062-016-12-M, 20\textsuperscript{th} March 1918, p.5.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p.72.
Hughes was convinced that Australia must develop new trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{92}

In 1921, Billy Hughes appointed Australia’s first trade commissioner in Shanghai, China. Edward Little was chosen by Hughes to protect Australian business interests in China. Little’s appointment suggests that the Australian government wanted to have a more “direct communication with China proper”.\textsuperscript{93} Hughes believed that Edward Little possessed an almost unique knowledge of the East, where he “had lived for the last thirty years”, during the greater part of which he had been the general manager of Messrs Brunner Mond and Co. in China.\textsuperscript{94} Don Fitch suggests that Little was arguably Australia’s first diplomat. In 1922, Hughes appointed Egbert Sheaf as Australia’s trade commissioner in the East, where he was based in Singapore.\textsuperscript{95} Unfortunately, Little’s appointment was terminated on 18\textsuperscript{th} October, 1923 due to strong opposition from both the Melbourne business community and the Australian commercial community in Shanghai.\textsuperscript{96} Senator Thomas J. K. Bakhap was one of a few Australian politicians who supported Edward Little, but it was not enough.\textsuperscript{97} Similarly, the Australian government did not renewed Sheaf’s appointment when it expired in 1925.\textsuperscript{98} In other words, neither of these two posts survived for a long period of time. However, I think the Australian government made two important diplomatic moves in the early 1920s, and scholars should pay more attention to Australia’s early official representatives in Asia, especially when they study Australia’s position in the world. Further, these two appointments indicate that, although the Australian government worked hard to maintain its White Australia policy so that the country could remain a white British outpost in the South Pacific, was willing to trade with its Asian neighbours in order to develop Australia’s economy.

Between 1921 and 1923, two diplomatic systems co-existed in China, which should have protected Australia’s political and economic interests in China together (at least in theory).\textsuperscript{99} The first was the British legation in Beijing and the British consul-generals in Shanghai,
Tianjin, Canton and Hong Kong. The second, Australia’s own official representatives in Shanghai, operated under the leadership of Edward Little. The British diplomats and Edward Little were supposedly to work together, but this was not the reality. In 1921, one of the key reasons that Billy Hughes appointed Little as Australia’s trade commissioner in Shanghai was because Hughes felt the British diplomats failed to advance Australia’s own interests in China. Thus, when Little was representing Australia in China, his British co-workers did not like the existence of his posting, as they felt Australia (as a British dominion) did not need to appoint a trade commissioner in China. The British diplomats thought they were perfectly capable of protecting Australia’s commercial interests in China. The hostility of the British diplomats in China made Little’s job difficult, while he was serving in his role as Australia’s trading representative. Little’s time in China was not too successful, as he was lacking support from both British officials and the Australian business community in Shanghai at this time. However, he was Australia’s first official in China. The posting suggests that the Australian government was paying greater attention to Asia, and laid the foundation for the promotion of the future Sino-Australian trading relations.

Australian politicians also realised the importance of trading with China. Australian Senator Thomas J. K. Bakhap (1866-1923) argued that Australia should increase its shares in the Chinese market, as the British and Americans were profiting from their trade with China. Thomas Bakhap was the adopted son of a Chinese immigrant, and his personal experience made him identify strongly with Chinese people. He thought that if Australians could benefit more from trade with China, it could help to improve Chinese living conditions in Australia. For example, Bakhap sent a report to Arthur Rodgers (1876-1936), then Australia’s Minister for Trade and Customs in 1922. He commented:

I think that Australia should endeavour to completely gain the wheat and flour trade of Southern China, and of Canton province in particular... Flour of a particularly good and glutinous kind is desired by Cantonese cooks, and as the South produces little wheat and as its requirements are not likely to be readily supplied from any North China. Surplus, this trade should be fought for and permanently retained if possible in the wheat-producing interests of the Commonwealth.

Thus, as early as the 1920s, Australian politicians such as Senator Bakhap realised the importance of the China trade to Australia.

Similar to Senator Bakhap, other Australian businesspersons tried to export their products to China in the 1920s and 1930s. They also realised Australia’s closeness to Asia, and intended to promote the trade between the two nations. Between 1918 and 1921, there was a company located within NSW which intended to sell fruits to China and Japan. The company believed Australia should sell more fruits to China and Japan. Further, Australian jam was popular among the Westerners in China, and they consumed a lot of fruit and similar products. There were 300,000 Westerners living in China (excluding Hong Kong), and

100 NAA: A11804, 1924/255, “Trade Commissioners China and the East-Trade Commr. Australian”, Letter from Official Secretary to the Governor-General to The Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 21st May 1921; NAA: A11804, 1924/255, “Trade Commissioners China and the East-Trade Commr. Australian”, Letter from Official Secretary to Hong Kong the Governor-General to the Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 30th May 1922.
102 Ibid., p.106.
103 Ibid., p.106.
104 NSW State Archives and Records (thereafter: NSW SAR), Series 14511, Item 19/4110.
they mainly settled in the Eastern coastal cities, including Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. There was a huge potential market for Australian fruit growers, as the “Australian fruit season comes in at a time where there is no competition here, either foreign or Chinese”. From April to August/September, according to The Daily News, neither China nor foreign nations in the Northern Hemisphere, could supply fruit. Thus, Australian businessmen were partially targeting the Westerners who were living in China at this time. Here is a diagram of the trading statistics between China and Australia in 1930-1931:

Figure 13 [Australia’s Trade with China 1930-1931]


Sandra Tweedie suggested that: “Australia saw its most successful sales year in China as long ago as 1932/33 when, largely through its purchase of depression-priced Australian wheat, China accepted 6.4 percent of total Australian exports.” Tweedie published her book in 1994, so I assume her point is that the financial year of 1932 was Australia’s most successful export year in China before 1994. However, I wish to add that Australia’s export to China in 1932 was even bigger than Tweedie proposed. The secret was Hong Kong.

There were at least two Australians (who were based in China or had visited China) suggesting that a lot of Australia’s exporters went through Hong Kong to mainland China. In

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108 Tweedie, Trading Partners, p.106.  
the early 1920s, when Edward Little was Australia’s trade commissioner in Shanghai, China, he recorded that a lot of goods went through Hong Kong to mainland China. In 1932, the University of Queensland sent Alexander Melbourne (1888-1943), a historian, to visit China and Japan, in order to study the economic and political situations in these two nations. According to Melbourne’s own publication: Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and China, the consuls-general for both China and Japan strongly supported Melbourne’s trip to Asia. Melbourne visited Shanghai, Canton and Hong Kong. He also intended to visit Peking, Tianjin and Nanking, but it became impossible “by the outbreak of hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese forces”. Once Melbourne came back to Australia, he wrote a report regarding his experiences in China and Japan. Melbourne suggested the trading between China and Australia was much greater than the official government statistics. He wrote:

In the first place, Australian exports are consigned to Hong Kong, whence they are transhipped to China. In Australian statistics, these goods are shown as exports to Hong Kong; in Hong Kong statistics, they are shown both as imports from Australia and exports to China; in Chinese statistics, they are shown as imports from Hong Kong.

Thus, Australian officials knew that there was trade that existed between China and Australia, through Hong Kong. Ernest Koh even suggests that Hong Kong was the shadow capital of China during the republican era. This is because almost two-thirds of all war materials shipped to mainland China from Australia came through Hong Kong via the rail link between the city of Guangzhou and the British colony.

Melbourne was an influential Australian public intellectual in the 1930s. Australian politicians and officials read his Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and China. According to James Cotton, on foreign policy, Melbourne “had become something of an influence upon Prime Minster Joseph Lyons”. In 1933, Melbourne was “elected Chairman of the Federal Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade”. He then served various Advisory Committees on Eastern trade in Australia. He argued that the future of trade between China and Australia would benefit Australia more. In addition, Melbourne suggested that a lot of Australian exports to Japan would reach China eventually (after Japan upgraded these products, such as wool). Thus, Sino-Australian trade had a significant advantage over the Japanese-Australian trade, as China did not have tariff protection.

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112 Ibid., p.71.
113 Ibid., p.71.
115 Ernest Koh, Diaspora at War, 2014, p.60.
John Latham, Minister of External Affairs visited China and Japan in 1934.\textsuperscript{119} Once he returned to Australia, Latham sent a report to Joseph Lyons, then Prime Minister of Australia. In this official report, Latham stated:

> Both China and Japan want trade and other concessions from Australia. After experience of both countries I suggest that nothing should be given to either of them without an equivalent. In coincidence with this view I sent to you a cable suggesting that the reply to certain Chinese requests affecting immigration should be held up for the present. We should not, I think, give anything on immigration unless e.g. we get thing on trade.\textsuperscript{120}

In other words, Latham was suggesting to Lyons that the Australian government should consider relaxing the White Australia policy if they could get more economic benefits from China and Japan. It indicates that Australia desperately needed to trade with two Asian nations, as it was even willing to relax its White Australia policy.

Other Australian politicians also realised the importance of the trading between Australia and its two Asian partners. Robert Menzies, then attorney-general, acknowledged the trade between Australia and China.\textsuperscript{121} Joseph Lyons also realised the importance of Australia’s trade with China and Japan. Lyons was in London on 15 May 1937. He gave a speech regarding Australia’s defence and trade. Lyons stated:

> Australia’s future, however, is bound up with her primary industries, and the advancement of these industries makes vital the extension of our external trade.

> This trade has been found to an important degree within the British Commonwealth, but almost every Empire country has become increasingly aware of the need for wider markets than even the Empire can supply. Hence, if we able progressively to improve our standards of living, it is essential that there should be an increase in world trade.\textsuperscript{122}

Thus, at the highest level of Australian government, Lyons realised the need to trade with markets outside of the British Empire. China and Japan were the future for Australia’s economy.

As early as the 1930s, Australians started to realise the necessity for Australian government to appoint a diplomatic representative in China, to protect Australian business interests there. As David Walker comments, Sir Herbert William Gepp (whom also visited China in the 1930s) and Dr Alexander C. V. Melbourne both believed in the importance of Eastern markets and the urgent necessity to improve the level and quality of Australian official representation in Asia. Gepp called for the establishment of a standing committee or committees to review and promote trade between Australia and Asia. He also recommended ‘high class’ diplomatic appointments to China and Japan, backed by suitable commercial officials.\textsuperscript{123}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Kuo, Mei-fen and Judith Brett, \textit{Unlocking the History of Australasian Kuo Min Tang, 1911-2013}, Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2013, p.97.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} NAA: A9992, 1934/1, “Unregistered files of the Department of External Affairs-Australian Eastern Mission 1934. Extract from Report by Mr Latham to Prime Minster”, p.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid.,
\end{itemize}
The Australian government was largely dependent on the British government to protect Australian interests in China, but it became increasingly frustrated by the fact that British diplomats put the interests of Britain first. The Australian government did not appoint any official diplomat until 1935. Vivian Gordon Bowden (1884–1942), was Australia’s trading commissioner in Shanghai, China between 1935 and 1941. This appointment was a direct result of Latham’s visit to China in 1934. Bowden was working in a Japanese firm in China before this appointment. Thus, it took the Chinese government several months to approve Bowden as the trade commissioner in China, because they did not appreciate his connections with Japanese firms. Bowden was an Empire-nationalist. On the one hand, he was trying to promote the trade between Australia and China. On the other hand, he would have liked to see Australia become an equal partner to Britain within the British Empire. For example, in 1936, Australia actively participated in the trade fair between the British Empire and China in Hong Kong. Although Bowden worked closely with the British representatives in China, he was protecting Australia’s own commercial interests in China at this time.

Bowden not only promoted the trade between Australia and China, but also gathered information about China and then reported to Australia, so that the Australian government would have a better understanding of China. Bowden paid attention to the Chinese media. For example, in one of his official letters, he mentioned a monthly publication called “PEOPLES TRIBUNE”. It was printed in English and published in Shanghai. The publication had links with Wang Jingwei (1883-1944), the Kuomintang leader. Prominent Chinese contributed to this monthly periodical, including their views of China’s role in the trade between China and the British Empire. Clearly, Bowden was trying to let the Australian government know the Chinese view of the trade fair in Hong Kong.

Wool and wheat were the most popular goods that Australia was selling to China in the 1930s. However, Australia exported a large variety of products to China at this time. In 1937, Australia exported animal products, canned goods, cereals, fruits and vegetables, wines and beers, chemicals, soap, timber and coal to China. Australia had commercial relations with Chinese coastal cities like Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin and Canton, as well as inland cities like Hankou (part of modern-day Wuhan). Thus, by 1937, Australia had substantial commercial connections with China. Similarly, wheat, beef (fresh), hides and skins, beef tallow and sheep’s wool are the most popular products that Australia sold to Japan.

Despite Australia’s willingness to trade with Asia, particularly China and Japan, the Australian government was not prepared to give up the White Australia policy. For Australians, the White Australia policy was almost like a religion at this time, to borrow Senator Burford Sampson’s (1882-1959) words in 1928. The White Australia policy was

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127 Ibid.,
130 Sleeman, Australia and Japan: Canberra’s Calamitous Attack on Australian Prosperity, 1936, p.5.
an ideology among Australian politicians and the majority of the public. It was what historian Neville Meaney would describe as a ‘community of culture’, as it excluded non-British peoples. The promotion of trade between Australia and China was a more realistic approach, especially during the Great Depression, as Australia needed to export goods to China and Japan. The trade between China and Australia linked perfectly with Meaney’s ‘community of interests’. Overall, if one studies Sino-Australian relations between 1921 and 1941, from an Australian perspective, it is evident that there was a tension between community of culture (in this case, the White Australia policy) and community of interest (trade between China and Australia). Although the White Australia policy was still a more powerful concept than trade, more Australians were realising the importance of trade with China.

Chinese consul-general, Dr Chen Weiping (陈维屏), highlighted the importance of the trading between China and Australia by suggesting trade could be a key factor to promote diplomatic relations between the two nations. He explained how Australians benefited from this trading. In September 1931, consul-general Chen was surprised to find out that China imported more goods from Australia than Australia imported goods from China. The *Singleton Argus* reported:

> The exports to China were worth 8,000,000 taels, and from China to Australia only 1,000,000. Tariffs were responsible for preventing imports such as silk, peanuts, and cork. Shippings leaving for Australia [from China] returned almost empty, so that the shipping companies had to increase their export rates. High wages, compared with Britain, had much to do with the little steel imported from Australia.132

Chen argued that Australia should modify the White Australia policy by allowing three categories of Chinese to come to the nation: students, travellers, and merchants.133 This is an example of how the Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to argue that Australia should relax its White Australia policy. Then he was critical of the White Australia policy. For consul-general Chen (陈维屏), it “was always humiliating to see his countrymen treated like animals by customs officers”.134 He fought against the White Australia policy by suggesting that the Australian government should allow students, businessmen and travellers to come to Australia.

> ‘Thirty years ago’, he said, ‘you brought your White Australia policy into being. We did not want to flood your country, but now your laws stop our students, travellers and merchants coming in. I do not mind if you stop labourers coming in.’ China had 7000 students in Europe and America, he said, and practically none here. There were only three University students in Australia at the present time. A Chinese merchant’s wife had been allowed to stay only 12 months. She could not come back in less than six years. ‘You can drive the Chinese away by other means than the White Australia policy,’ he said. ‘of the incidence if it is inhumane.’135

Thus, Chen Weiping suggested that the White Australia policy affected the trade between China and Australia. Chen worked closely with the New South Wales Chinese Camber of Commerce.136 Chen also suggested that as the population of China was huge, it was therefore

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132 *Singleton Argus*, 3 March 1933, p.8.
133 NAA: CP103/19, 20, p.104.
134 *Singleton Argus*, 3 March 1933, p.8. (2)
135 *Singleton Argus*, 3 March 1933, p.8.
136 NAA: CP103/19, 20, p.100.
a huge potential market for Australia. Australia could reduce its tariff. He added that Australia could sell meat, flour, fruits and other products to China.137

Another achievement of Dr Chen’s was that he supported the local Chinese-Australians to create the “George E Morrison Lectures” in order to improve Sino-Australian relations. Chen himself gave the first George Morrison Lecture.138 Although both Australian and Chinese governments supported the establishment of the Morrison Lectures, William Liu, a Chinese community leader and businessman in Australia, and Mai Xixiang, a lawyer and another prominent Chinese supported the lectures financially.139 Thus, the creation of Morrison Lectures suggests that there was also a resistance from the Chinese-Australians, as they fought against the White Australia policy.140

Chen was not the only Chinese diplomat, which used trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy. Bao Junjian (保君健), known as Pao Chun-Jien, who was Chinese consul-general in Sydney between 1936 and 1941, suggested China was a victim of Japanese aggression, and he was trying to gain support from the Australian public.141 Pao also tried to use the Sino-Japanese conflict to argue for even greater cooperation between China and Australia. Like Chinese diplomats at this time, Pao had a strong academic record. Pao received a doctor of philosophy degree, and was interested in promoting Sino-Australian relations through writing.

Pao Chun-Jien continued to argue that the Australia government should relax its White Australia policy.142 In 1938, Pao published a book called *A Century of Sino-Australian Relations*. According to an article from *Telegraph*, it was an interesting book.143 He offered a brief history of Chinese immigration in Australia, and then he commented on Sino-Australian relations. This book is especially valuable to understand Pao and Sino-Australia at this time, as it is a rare surviving book, which was written by a Chinese diplomat, on the topic of the Sino-Australian relations before. For example, Pao had strong view of the White Australia policy:

> It is unnecessary to emphasise the peace-loving character of the Chinese government and people, and the Australian government and people know full well that we have no resentment against any economic policy which is designed to preserve Australian national homogeneity, but we of course deplore the times humiliating procedure of restriction, the nature of which is, even in Australians eyes, contrary to the new concept of the international comity of nations. The elimination of these restrictions can in no way affect the maintenance of Australian domestic economy.144

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137 *Newcastle Morning Herald* and *Miners’ Advocate*, 22 September 1933, p.10.
138 *Canberra Times*, 10 April 1935, p.2.; for a more completes lists of the lectures and its speakers, please see: Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), *History and Historiography of Chinese people in Australasia (大洋洲华人史事叢稿)*, Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongs, 2000, pp.194-198.
140 http://chinainstitute.anu.edu.au/events/morrison-lectures, last accessed on 27/02/2017
142 Similar to many of his predecessors, he used the trade between China and Australia as a tool, to argue that the Australians should modify its White Australia policy.
143 *Telegraph*, 16 July 1938, p.15.
Thus, consul-general Pao argued that Australia should abolish or at least relax this racist policy, because it negatively affected Australia’s trade with China.

In summary, since 1909 Chinese diplomats developed this commercial strategy. Between 1909 and 1929 was the first period of implementation of this strategy, as Chinese diplomats worked hard to promote the commercial connections between China and Australia. They used China’s enormous market to attract Australian businessmen. In 1929, the Great Depression occurred, and it damaged Australia’s trading connections with other parts of the British Empire. However, this offered Chinese diplomats a great opportunity to promote the trade between China and Australia. The Australian government realised the significance of trade with China and Japan, especially during and after the economic depression. As Australia became more dependent on its trade with China and Japan in the 1930s, the Australian government had to relax its White Australia policy, in order to maintain warm trading relations with these two Asian neighbours.


Similar to the White Australia policy and trade, security issues and the international situations were also key factors influencing the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1921 and 1941. The Sino-Japanese War led Chinese expatriates in Australia closer to China, in order to support its struggle with Japan, but it did not always mean the Chinese in Australia supported the regime that controlled China. Any major military conflict in Asia could have huge implications for Australia’s trading with the rest of the world. This was because Australia’s huge industrial population and primary producers “depended upon sea-borne trade for their existence”. In other words, after 1931, the Sino-Japanese conflicted affected Australia’s trade and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world, including Sino-Australian relations. Australia’s geography played an important role in the making of the Australian foreign policies at this time.

The Chinese internal political divisions and military conflicts, the Australian internal politics and foreign policies (e.g. the White Australia policy), and the international situations all played profound roles in shaping Sino-Australian relations. Within this time, the political centres of China shifted a few times. In 1921, Beijing was still the capital of China, and the majority of foreign countries recognised Beijing government as the legitimate regime in China, though there was another regime based in Canton, which competed with the North. Wei Zijing (魏子京) and Song Faxiang (宋发祥), two consul-generals in Australia were basically representing the interests of the Beijing government. In 1931, the political centre of China was in Nanjing. Chiang Kai-shek united China under his control in 1928, and he moved the capital of China from Beijing to Nanjing, where he had strong political and military support. Gui Zhi (桂植), Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏), and Pao Chun-Jien (保君健), all served the interests of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government. In 1941, the political centre of China was based in Chongqing, due to the Sino-Japanese War. By 1941, Japan had occupied both Beijing and Nanjing; it forced the Kuomintang government to shift its political capital to Western China. Regardless of these political shifts in China, Australia and China maintained their official diplomatic relations. The instability of Chinese internal politics posed significant challenges to Chinese diplomats abroad, including those residing in

145 NLA: MS 1009/82/1-5, Sir John Latham, Japan and Australia-Eleven A
146 Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994, p.320.
Australia, because they had limited financial resources and little support from the Chinese government.

Similar to internal politics within China, the international situations also had a profound impact on Sino-Australian diplomatic relations in the 1920s and 1930s. The Paris Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919 left problems unsolved for both great powers and middle powers like China and Australia. Historian Chu Pao-chin suggests that one of the consequences of the First World War was to shift the balance of rivalry among Great Britain, Germany, and Russia (and their colonies) to a new competition between Britain, the United States and Japan in the Pacific. Germany lost the war. As a result, Germany lost its control of Qingdao—a major Chinese trade port in Shangdong province—to Japan, instead of China. Due to its military weakness, China had to rely on Chinese diplomats to maintain its autonomy overseas. China wanted to remain as an independent nation. China needed to take back control of its tariff autonomy and abolish the extra-territorial rights. Billy Hughes, the Australian representative at the Paris Peace Conference, had to defend the White Australia policy when the Japanese representative criticized the racist policy. For Hughes, the Australian government had to sacrifice China’s national interests in Shangdong, in order to please the Japanese government, so that they would not be too critical towards the White Australia policy. The Australian government’s position on the Shangdong issue therefore damaged Sino-Australian relations. However, Hughes’s presence in the Paris Peace Conference suggested that Australia had started to form its own independent foreign policies. The Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921-1922 reinforced Japan’s status as a global naval power. As I have written earlier, the Australian government (under Billy Hughes) appointed its first trade commissioner in China in 1921. This shows that the Australian government not only wanted to improve its trade with China, but also wanted to gain more knowledge of East Asia in general. In other words, the Australian government in the 1920s wanted to know the political and military situation in the “Near North” better.

The year 1931 was not only a turning point in East Asia; it also had profound impacts on world history. Japan occupied Manchuria, China’s northeast. On 18th September 1931, the Japanese army attacked Mukden (modern day Shenyang). Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), the head of the Republic of China, ordered general Zhang Xueliang to retreat. Thus, the Japanese without any major military resistance controlled the Northeast of China. This was the beginning of the Second World War in Asia, although China and Japan did not have a total war until 1937. The Mukden Incident had an extremely negative impact, as it encouraged the Japanese military to be more aggressive in China, and later in the Pacific. Indeed, as William Kirby has famously pointed out in 1997, China intertwined with the outside world in the 1920s and 1930s, and the international situation made Chinese diplomats more important than ever.

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149 Ibid.,

150 Tang Qihua (唐啟華), Foreign Relations under the Northern Warlord Government: a Literature Review (“北洋外交”研究評介), in *Historical Research* (历史研究), 2004, Volume 1, p.103.


153 Ibid.,

Between the two world wars, according to Zhang Qiusheng, one of the key policies for the Australian government was to prevent Japan’s invasion of Australia.\footnote{155} Zhang suggests that the Australian government was too gentle towards the Japanese government at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War.\footnote{156} Further, the Australian government even tried to stop the international intervention in the Sino-Japanese conflicts, from the League of Nations. After 1937, when China and Japan entered total war, more and more Australians workers protested, and asked the Australian government to stop trading with Japan. However, the Australian government chose to ignore them. For Zhang, the position of the Australian government on this issue is unacceptable.\footnote{157} In 1939, the wars in Europe finally broke out, and even then, the Australian government’s policies towards Japan were still unchanged. It was only after 1940, when the British government changed its policies towards Japan, that the Australian government started to change its official policies towards Japan; although Australia felt a more direct threat from Japan.\footnote{158}

Before I address how security affected Sino-Australian relations, it is necessary to provide basic information on China, Japan and Australia in 1941. Here is the population of these three nations in 1941:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>About 400 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>About 100 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>About 7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, we can see that the total population of Australia was smaller than a major city in China or Japan. However, the geographical size of Australia was only a little bit smaller than that of China, and much bigger than that of Japan. It is important to keep this in mind when we try to understand Sino-Australian relations.

The Chinese government needed support from overseas Chinese citizens, in order to fight against the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945).\footnote{159} Chinese expatriates in Australia therefore played prominent roles in shaping the Sino-Australian relations. Lin Sen, President of the Legislative Yuan, one of the most influential politicians in China at this time, visited Australia in 1931.\footnote{160} In theory, Lin was the second most powerful politician in China, only after Chiang Kai-shek. Lin was President of the Republic of China—the head figure of China between 1932 and 1944. His visit to Australia was significant as this was the first time that one of the most senior Chinese leaders ever visited Australasia.

\footnote{the first Republic was defined and shaped—and must ultimately be interpreted—according to the nature of its foreign relations.}

\footnote{155} Zhang Qiusheng (张秋生), 澳大利亚华侨华人史 (A History of the Chinese Emigrants to Australia), Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 1998, p.32.
\footnote{156} I think he means Australian government was weak towards the Japanese expansion in the Pacific before 1941.
\footnote{157} Zhang Qiusheng (张秋生), 澳大利亚华侨华人史 (A History of the Chinese Emigrants to Australia), Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 1998, p.32.
\footnote{158} Ibid.
\footnote{159} Ernest Koh, Diaspora at War, 2014, p.58.
This is a rare report from *Tung Wah Times* about Lin Sen’s tour in Australia. This Chinese newspaper report reveals that Gui Zhi (桂植), then Chinese consul-general in Australia, was hosting a welcome dinner party for Lin Sen and Chen Yaoheng (then China’s director for overseas Chinese affairs) in Sydney. Prominent people attended this welcome dinner, including the Governor of NSW, the representatives of the federal government, the mayor of Sydney, and foreign diplomats in Australia. More than 200 people attended this event. We can learn from his newspaper source that the Australian government took Lin’s visit seriously.\(^\text{161}\) This should not be too surprising, as Australia was going through severe economic depression at this time, and therefore needed to export more goods to China and Japan.\(^\text{162}\)

After 1931, Chinese in Australia were paying increasing attention to the Sino-Japanese conflict.\(^\text{163}\) The majority of Chinese expatriates were still seeing themselves as Chinese citizens; they still viewed China as their home country.\(^\text{164}\) Thus, Chinese expatriates in Australia were willing to do whatever it took to help China, in order to fight against the Japanese. When the Japanese attacked Shanghai in 1932, Cai Tingkai (1892-1968), known as Kai Tsai Ting in Australia at that time, was the overall commander of the 19th Army in

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\(^\text{161}\) Ibid.,


Shanghai. His army fought hard against the Japanese in Shanghai; though Cai’s army was poorly equipped and trained. Chinese expatriates in Australia were donating money from banks in Australia to banks in China, so that the Chinese soldiers would get enough financial support. The Tung Wah Times also shows the amount of money Chinese expatriates in Australia donated to support the anti-Japanese war. Chinese headquarters received £3134 from the Chinese in Australia. On behalf of the 19th army, general Cai Ting-kai (蔡廷锴) received £1000. Further, general Cai Ting-kai, knew that overseas Chinese were supporting him financially. For example, he wrote a letter to the local Chinese in Australia, to thank them their financial contribution. We can learn three things here. First, this story reinforced the idea that there was a financial connection between China and Australia at this time. Second, it is fair to say Chinese expatriates in Australia were actively contributing to China’s anti-Japanese struggle. This is because they believed that a stronger China would enhance their living conditions in Australia (e.g. Chinese diplomats could help them to deal with White Australia policy better). Third, Chinese general like Cai Ting-kai were using Tung Wah Times as a tool to communicate with local Chinese in Australia.

Although Cai and his army failed to defend Shanghai, and they were forced to retreat to Fujian province, Cai became a Chinese national hero, as his army showed strong courage in the battlefield. Indeed, Chinese soldiers were willing to die to protect China, this was what the Chinese civilians were hoping to see at this time. As Jay Taylor has suggested, Chinese students, newspapers, temple and business association “demanded all-out war” with Japan. Thus, it is evident that the Chinese public supported Cai Ting-kai. Cai then toured in Hong Kong and Guangdong province, and received warm welcome wherever he went. His story received huge coverage in the Chinese newspapers in Australia, like Tung Wah Times. Similar to Chinese citizens in Hong Kong and Guangdong, Chinese expatriates in Australia also viewed Cai as China’s national hero. Furthermore, Chinese expatriates in Australia expected China to become a united nation, so that all the Chinese could fight against Japan together. In the end, Cai became a national hero among Chinese ordinary people, both in China and abroad.

However, Chiang Kai-shek and general Cai Tingkai came from different political factions within the Kuomintang Party, and had different views towards the Japanese invasion. Chiang was a military leader as well as politician. He therefore had to consider both the political and military factors when he made any decision. Cai was a general, and his priority was to fight against the Japanese and protect the Chinese people. This resulted in a key difference between these two men. Cai was willing to take his 19th army out of Fujian Province, so that they could actively fight against the Japanese. However, Chiang wished Cai to stay in

166 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 30 April 1932, p.5.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 28 May 1932, p.5.
167 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 28 May 1932, p.5.
168 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 28 May 1932, p.8.
173 His army retreated to Fujian Province after the battle of Shanghai.
Fujian, and to attack the Communists in the rural areas of the province. In 1933, relations between Chiang and Cai reached their lowest point. In November 1933, Cai rebelled against Chiang’s Kuomintang and formed the Fujian People’s Government. Cai did not receive military support from the local Chinese communist party, and Chiang’s army easily crushed Cai’s rebellion. As a result, Chiang saw Cai as a traitor to Kuomintang and its region, and Cai was forced to leave China for several years.174 One of the places that Cai visited was Australia. During his tour, general Cai received warm welcome from the local Chinese in Australia.175 Chinese in Australia treated Cai as China’s national hero.

For the majority of the period between 1921 and 1941, the Chinese consulate would try its best to protect the interests of the local Chinese people in Australia. The Chinese consulate had political status, and the Chinese local community had economic wealth, so when these two groups of people worked together, they could form a strong alliance. For example, when the Chinese consulate moved from Melbourne to Sydney in 1929, the consulate lacked funding from the Chinese government.176 Chinese expatriates in Sydney donated money, and helped the consulate to buy their furniture.177 This indicates that Chinese diplomats and the Chinese community were working together to protect their common interest—the rights of Chinese people in Australia. However, general Cai Tingkai’s tour in Australia in early 1935 increased the tension between the Chinese consulate in Sydney and the local Chinese in Australia, because the Chinese consulate in Australia and the local Chinese community in Australia had different views of Cai.178

What was more ironic, Chinese consul-general Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏) was trying to use the White Australia policy to argue that the Australian government should not allow Cai to tour the nation. Chinese diplomats even used trade between China and Australia as a tool to pressure the Australian government to exercise its White Australia policy. The Australian government regarded this as a form of “commercial diplomacy”.179

Cai Tingkai was not the first Chinese general to visit Australia. In December 1934, Qiu Zhaochen (丘兆琛), a general from the 19th Army under Cai, visited Sydney, Australia. Qiu received warm welcome from the local Chinese community. For example, Zhu Songqing and Huang Zhu, two local Chinese business leaders, hosted a warm welcome party for general Qiu, on behalf of the Chinese population in Australia.180 Zhu and Huang truly viewed Qiu as the national hero of China. Unsurprisingly, no Chinese diplomat showed up to welcome Qiu.

The Chinese consulate in Sydney represented the will of Chiang, was not welcoming Cai’s visit to Australia in 1935, either.181 For example, Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏), then Chinese consul-general in Sydney, sent an official letter to the Department of External Affairs in February 1935. Chen expressed the official position of Chiang’s government:

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176 This was partly because Chinese government under Chiang was trying to unite the entire China, and therefore spent most of the money on purchasing weapons and paying wages for the soldiers. Chinese consulates usually had financial difficulties at this time.
177 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 30 November 1929, p.5.
180 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 22 December 1934, p.6 (2).
I have the honour to state that information is to hand that General Tsai Ting Kai [Cai Ting Kai], who was in command of the Nineteenth Route Army which was in action against the invaders of Shanghai, but which subsequently became traitors to my Government, rising in rebellion against Government troops and setting up an independent state in Fukien [Fujian] Province, will arrive in the Commonwealth per s.s. [‘]Mariposa[‘] on the 25th instant. My government has informed me that this man’s tour is being organised for propaganda purposes against my Government.182

Clearly, Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏) was representing the interests of the Kuomintang regime, not the interests of China. For China, the best option would be for all the political parties and military groups to work together to fight against the Japanese. However, for the Kuomintang regime, especially Chiang, felt its government needed more time to prepare for a total military struggle against Japan.183 Chen Wei-ping, following instructions from the Kuomintang government in China, had to distance himself from Cai, and tried to reduce the impact of Cai’s visit to Australia.184 This was because the more popular Cai was among the Chinese overseas, the more pressure Chiang would face in China. Chiang wanted to diminish his internal rival (e.g. the Chinese communists) before he started to rebel against the Japanese.185 As Chiang famously said:

The Japanese are a disease of the skin. The [Chinese] Communists are a disease of the heart.

Chiang believed that the Soviet Union supported Mao, and he did not feel comfortable with the foreign influence on the Chinese Communist Party.186 Thus, Chiang wanted to finish his civil war with Mao Zedong (1893-1976) before he started to rebel against the Japanese completely. However, this was one of the biggest mistakes that Chiang made in his political career, and it made him a less popular leader. General Cai’s popularity in Australia would damage the authority of Chiang in China. Therefore, Chinese diplomats tried to stop Cai’s tour in Australia.

Furthermore, an official Australian report revealed:

The attitude of Nanking[187] has also been defined and although there is no lack of rumour that within the period which has elapsed since Tsai’s defeat as a rebel...that Nanking’s present feeling is as it was recently expressed from there to the Consul-General here, since it is a common thought amongst Chinese that Tsai, once he has completed his immediate objective in making pleasant personal impressions and contacts abroad, will later rally forces to himself in China and finally overthrow the National Government as it is today.188

We can learn from this official document that Chinese diplomats like Chen Wei-ping were putting the interests of their party (or the regime he represented) above the interests of Chinese expatriates in Australia as well as China’s national interests. What a disappointment!

Here is the official reply from Canberra to Chen Wei-ping.

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183 Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), 1994, pp.374-375.
187 Nanking (Or Nanjing) was still under the control of Chiang Kai-shek in 1935.
Since writing the above Dr. Chen has telephoned me desiring that Canberra be advised of the coming of Tsai on 25th February. I informed Dr. Chen that this had been done and that Tsai’s visit would be regarded similarly to that of Chiu-tourist only.\(^{189}\)

I would like to make two observations here. First, it seems Canberra did not want to choose between the interests of the Chinese government and the interests of the Chinese people in Australia. In other words, the Australian government did not want to choose one side and offend the other one. In fact, a group of Australian politicians believed that if Japan kept attacking China, Japan would not have the ability to attack Southeast Asia, and therefore Australia would be a safe place.\(^ {190}\) Second, it seems the official position of the Australian government was closer to the position of the local Chinese in Australia than the position of the Kuomintang government in China. This is because the Australian government allowed Cai to continue to tour around the nation, as a “tourist”; although this might have offended both the Chinese and Japanese consulates in Sydney, given Cai’s strongly anti-Japanese position.\(^ {191}\) This suggests that the Australian government carried sympathy towards people in China, as they were the victims of Japanese aggression.

The Second World War (WWII) or the Anti-Japanese War, shaped China’s national historical memory and identity fundamentally. It had huge impacts on China domestically and diplomatically. WWII destroyed the old world order, thus providing Chinese diplomats excellent opportunity to renegotiate China’s position in the world. The 1940s is certainly one of the most violent decades in modern Chinese history. China was no doubt one of the biggest victims in WWII.\(^ {192}\) China suffered tremendously during WWII, as there were 14 million death, and massive refugee flight during this tragedy.\(^ {193}\) As Rana Mitter has reminded us China fought against Japan by itself between 1937 and 1941, therefore the West should give this forgotten ally—China, some credit for its actions in WWII.\(^ {194}\)

Meanwhile, however, China was actually rising on the world stage. The WWII crushed the existing international order, and Chinese diplomats took advantage of this opportunity. By 1945, for the first time in the modern history, China becomes an equal member in the world stage, at least on paper. This is evident as China becomes one of the founding members of the United Nations, and even becomes one of the five permeant member of the Security Council.\(^ {195}\) While Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalist government might make a number of mistakes on Chinese domestic domain and their foreign policies towards Japan; it is equally important to remember that Chiang had a reasonable constructive relations with Franklin D. Roosevelt, at least between 1941 and 1943. With the support from the USA, China became a global power in 1945.

To a large extent, Chinese diplomats are the pioneers of Chinese modernity. They had a more complete view of the global situation than many other Chinese people, partly because the Chinese diplomats were educated abroad, or at least lived or worked for some time overseas; partly because these diplomats could speak at least one foreign language. Chinese diplomats, including Wellington Koo (1888-1985) and Hsu Mo (1893-1956) were trying their best to

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\(^{190}\) NLA: MS 1009/82/1-5, Sir John Latham, Japan and Australia-NINE A, The British Empire and Japan.


\(^{194}\) Ibid., pp.5-6.

\(^{195}\) Jiang Yongjing (蔣永敬), 抗戰史論 (The Anti-Japanese War and a historical commentary), Taipei: Dongda tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1995, p.3.
protect China’s interests overseas. Further, the Chinese government required Chinese diplomats to assist Chinese citizens in abolishing these bad habits (e.g. opium smoking and gambling), thereby improving China’s image abroad.\textsuperscript{196}

Chinese diplomats tried to convince Australian government that China was a victim of the Japanese aggression, and needed Australia’s moral support, if not military support. In \textit{A Century of Sino-Australian Relations}, Pao Chun-Jien (保君健), condemned the Japanese aggression in the Pacific. He believed China would not surrender to the Japanese, and he suggested that the Australian government should work closely with the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{197}

Australia, whose destiny lies in the Pacific, certainly understands Chinese national outlook and Chinese national policy, which is a policy based on the ideals of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The government and people of the Republic of China fully believe that the Australian government and people will assist China to achieve for her overseas sons a true dignity of citizenship, based upon equality, thus eliminating needless conflict of opinions in regard to the principles of justice and fraternity, which we know the Australian as well as the Chinese people respect and wholeheartedly cherish.\textsuperscript{198}

The Sino-Japanese conflict after 1931 made Australia more important to China diplomatically, because China needed support from outside in order to win the war. Chinese policy makers believed that Japan would attack Australia in 1938, if not earlier.\textsuperscript{199} They therefore viewed Australia as a potential ally in the fight against the Japanese.\textsuperscript{200} Chinese diplomats like Pao tried to convince the Australian government that there was a possibility of a Japanese attack on Australian soil, and that Japanese troops were gaining territories in the Pacific. Thus, Australia should support China during the Sino-Japanese conflict, because it was the best way to protect Australia’s interests. As I mentioned earlier, Australia’s commercial connections with the rest of the world largely depended on the stability of Asia. The Australian government, according to Pao, needed to work closely with the British and Chinese governments, in order to resolve the Sino-Japanese conflict.\textsuperscript{201}

For Australian politicians, however, Australia’s diplomatic relations with China and Japan were both important. Australian politicians and diplomats were forming their own foreign policies, in order to protect Australia’s own interests.\textsuperscript{202} Thanks to the work of Paul Hasluck (1905-1993), we now know that by 1937 the Department of External Affairs had made at least one serious attempt to create an overall foreign policy in order to protect Australian interests.\textsuperscript{203} The Sino-Japanese War undermined the British interests in China. It damaged the interests of the British Empire in the region.\textsuperscript{204} Australia, as a British dominion, wanted to be treated as an equal partner to Britain, within the British Empire. Meanwhile, China also

\textsuperscript{196} ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522 0315 145-01, p.28.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 24 January 1939, p.12.
\textsuperscript{198} Pao, \textit{A Century of Sino-Australian Relations}, p.6.
\textsuperscript{199} Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), 1994, p.497.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{201} NAA: A5954, 987/3, p.5.
\textsuperscript{202} Although Australia’s foreign relations were strongly influenced by Britain’s relations with a particular nation, it does not mean Australia did not have its own independent interests (it could be different from the British interests).
wanted to be treated as an equal partner to the West. Thus, Sino-Australian relations were part of the process of Australians’ formation of their own independent foreign policies, while China was struggling to not only become a modern nation, but also to be treated as a respectful and equal partner to the West. Australian politicians did not want to choose a side between these two Asian nations until 1942. On the one hand, the White Australia ideology was still extremely important for Australian politicians. On the other hand, they were worried about the expansion of Japan. Thus, Australia policy-makers tended to hesitate between ideology and realism.

The Australian public, felt sympathy towards the Chinese people during the war, especially when the Japanese used chemical weapons. One Australian deserves special attention here. William Donald, although he was not a diplomat, was a special advisor to Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) and close friend to his wife, Soong Mei-ling. Thus, Donald was closely associated with China’s internal politics. However, unlike George Morrison, Donald did not have a close link with Australian politicians at the time. Thus, he did little to shape Sino-Australian relations directly. Donald was disappointed that the Australian government refused to give China more help before 1941. Indeed, Chiang saw Donald as a friend of his. Further, Donald had bigger impacts on Chinese internal politics than on Sino-Australian relations.

The internal Chinese political divisions and the Sino-Japanese War offered both challenges and opportunities for Sino-Australian relations. China was largely divided politically in the 1930s, which was one of the key factors ensuring that Japan was brave enough to attack China in the first place. Further, for Chiang Kai-shek, his priority was to regain and/or maintain his national leadership, over the defence of China, even though Chiang also tried to defend China. China faced enormous challenges both internally and externally. Indeed, China was a “broken nation” between 1931 and 1945.

Chiang’s regime needed support from Britain. The British government welcomed a stable Chinese government, in order to protect the interests of the British Empire in China, especially in Shanghai. In 1928, according to the British ambassador in China, Britain and China signed a new taxation agreement. In the agreement, the British Empire enjoyed special trading preference in China. In return, the British government recognised the Nanking government as the only legitimate government in China, in order to keep their special trading preference in China. Australia, as part of the British Empire, enjoyed similar rights to the British in China. This provided Australian businessmen with some advantages while they were doing business with China or in China.

Although the majority of nations recognised Chiang’s Nationalist government as the only official regime in China, some other regimes co-existed with the Nationalist government in the 1930s and 1940s. This provided challenges for the Sino-Australian diplomacy, as we learnt from the story of Cai Tingkai earlier. So how many regimes existed in China in 1941? This is a hard question. First, there was a regime under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and it was based in Chongqing. It controlled the majority of areas of ‘free China’ (not

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205 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 September 1941, p.7.
under the Japanese control). The areas included Chongqing, Xichuan province and Guangdong province. Chiang’s Republic of China was pro-USA diplomatically. Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union all recognised this regime as the only official and legitimate government in China. However, there were at least three other regimes within mainland China in 1941. Mao Zedong controlled Yan’an, and its nearby areas. Mao’s regime was a communist regime, and was pro-Soviet Union diplomatically at this time. Mao’s communist regime was in alliance with Chiang’s Kuomintang, in order to fight the Japanese together.

Puyi (1906-1967)—China’s last emperor, controlled Manchuria (the northeast of China) and part of Inner Mongolia in 1941. The state was called Manchukuo. It was a puppet regime which was established by the Japanese in 1932. Of course, Puyi’s regime was extremely pro-Japan. Wang Jingwei (1883-1944) was the President of the Republic of China (Nanjing regime) between 1940 and 1944. Wang spilt from Chiang’s government, and became a traitor. His regime included Shanghai, and the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. These are the richest areas of China. His regime was indeed pro-Japan as well. In other words, there were a number of regimes co-existing in China in 1941, and this offered the Australian policy-makers difficulties, as to which regime Australia should establish official diplomatic relations with?

Australia recognised China’s Republic of China (in Chongqing, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek) as the official regime in 1941, but Australian politicians were increasingly worried about the expansion of the Chinese Communist Party. Australian politicians were worrying about the expansion of Japan in the Pacific, as well as the rise of Communism in China. In 1941, Sir Frederic Eggleston, Australia’s first Minister to China, presented his credentials to President Lin Sen (who visited Australia in 1932) “at the Chinese National Government Building”. Further, the elaborate formality of the reception included “a guard of honour and a Chinese band playing the British National Anthem”. Since the national anthem was/is one of the symbols of a nation, this indicates that China still viewed Australia as a British dominion, and Australia was a semi-independent state in 1941.

The international situations, namely the rise of Nazi Germany in Europe and expansion of Japan in the Pacific, offered unpredictable factors, which shaped Sino-Australian relations. Britain had to focus on Nazi Germany primarily, as the key interests of Britain lay in Europe. One of the turning points of WWII was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to Joseph W. Esherick, the December 1941 attack was a significant event, which fundamentally reshaped “the global strategic picture”. The fall of Singapore in early 1942 was another important historical event. Australian nationalist historian David Day reminds us that Lord Jellicoe, Britain’s former navy chief, had submitted a report on Australia’s defences in 1919, which had warned that the dominion could not depend upon a British fleet being sent to meet a threat in the Pacific if there was another conflict in Europe concurrently.

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210 This term is no longer used in China today, because it closely associated with the Japanese invasion.
212 For a more detail study of Wang Jingwei’s regime, please see: Yu Zidao (余子道), et al., The complete history of Wang Qingwei’s regime (汪伪政权全史), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2006.
214 Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 1941, p.8.
215 Ibid.
The Australian government did not prepare for WWII sufficiently.\textsuperscript{218} When the war finally broke out in 1939 in Europe, Robert Menzies, then Australia’s Prime Minister, acted in strict accordance with his political view that, Britain being at war, Australia was also automatically at war.\textsuperscript{219} This shows the closeness between London and Canberra. Australians were willing to send troops to fight for the British Empire, just as they did in the First World War. However, for Australian politicians, Japan seemed a more direct threat to Australia than Germany in 1940. When Robert Menzies visited Britain in 1941, the Australian Prime Minister was still worrying about the Japanese expansion in the Pacific. On 4\textsuperscript{th} March 1941, he met Quo Tai-chi, China’s ambassador to Britain, regarding the exchanges of ministers between China and Australia.\textsuperscript{220} Australia politicians would enable Australia to play its role in the security of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{221} However, the interests of Australia were not always as same as the interests of Britain. For example, the Australian government appointed John Latham as its first minister to Japan in 1940. This diplomatic move offended the British government greatly, as Japan was an ally of Germany, and Great Britain had been at war with Germany since 1939. Indeed, Australia’s security relied on Britain’s military protection. Australia could not afford to build a massive navy of its own, but Britain might not have the military capacity to protect Australia, either. Overall, the expansion of Japan in the Asia-Pacific became an increasingly important factor potentially affecting the Sino-Australian relations.\textsuperscript{222} For the first time, the military situation in East Asia in the 1930s made Australian politicians realise Australia’s geographical closeness to Asia.\textsuperscript{223}

Conclusion

In this thesis, I argue that Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to argue against the White Australia policy. In this chapter, I have shown that despite China and Australia’s disagreement over the White Australia policy, Australia’s desire to export its goods to China and China’s will to gain Australia as a potential partner to fight against Japan made both countries to realise their needs to work with each other in the 1930s.

The decade of the 1930s was the first time that Australia has turned its attention to Asia (namely China and Japan), both politically and economically, at least at the official level. The Great Depression and the Second World War forced Australian policy-makers to reconsider Australia’s geo-political position in the world.\textsuperscript{224} Evidence suggest that Australian goods would go through Hong Kong to mainland China in the 1920s and 1930s.\textsuperscript{225} China (along

\textsuperscript{218} Neville Meaney, \textit{Towards a new vision: Australia and Japan across time}, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007, p.131. “On the day that Singapore fell, a Japanese fleet of four aircraft carriers with supporting cruisers and destroyers—indeed, the same fleet that devastated Pearl Harbour-headed for the Timor Sea from where, on the evening of the 19 February, they launched an air attack on Darwin…It arrived literally and figuratively ‘out of blue’.”

\textsuperscript{219} NAA: M1416, 98, “[Personal Papers of Prime Minister Curtin] [Broadcasts by Prime Minister Robert G Menzies, copies and drafts], p.2.; Watt, \textit{The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965}, p.20.

\textsuperscript{220} NAA: AA1979/333, 1, “Master sheets 9carbon stencils) of cables received from the Prime Minister (Rt Hon Robert Gordon Menzies) during his visit to London”, p.108.

\textsuperscript{221} NAA: M1416, 98, “[Personal Papers of Prime Minister Curtin] [Broadcasts by Prime Minister Robert G Menzies, copies and drafts], p.7.

\textsuperscript{222} NAA: A5954, 987/3, p.5.


\textsuperscript{224} I think James Curran and Stuart Ward are correct that Australia became an independent nation in the 1970s, but Australian politicians started to seek markets other than Britain as early as 1930s. Please see: James Curran and Stuart Ward, \textit{The Unknown Nation: Australia After Empire}, Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2010.

with Japan) was a market from which Australia made a lot of profits. Meanwhile, the Sino-Japanese War forced the Chinese leaders to seek help from the outside world; China was trying to gain Australia as a potential partner in the war, in order to fight Japan. Thus, the Sino-Japanese conflict made Australia more important to China than ever.

Between 1921 and 1941, there was always a tension between a community of culture (the White Australia policy) and community of interests (trade and security) in Sino-Australian relations, from an Australian perspective. On the one hand, white Australians wanted to exclude all non-European people, in order to maintain the British cultures and traditions. As we have learnt from *Tung Wah Times* newspaper reports, Chinese people became some of the major victims of this racist policy. They therefore knew their living conditions in Australia were closely intertwined with the destiny of China, because they believed a stronger China would help to improve their status. On the other hand, trade relations between Australia and Asia became increasingly important for Australia, especially during and after the Great Depression. Australia profited greatly from its trading with China and Japan.

There was a key difference between various Chinese diplomats here. Song Faxiang (宋发祥) was the Chinese diplomat most critical of the White Australia policy, as he aggressively petitioned the Australian government to abolish the policy. Other Chinese diplomats such as Dr Pao Chun-Jien (保君健) only requested Australian government to allow certain categories of Chinese to come to Australia freely. These three categories were: students, tourists, and businessmen. Pao’s approach was more effective, as it was not realistic to ask the Australian government to give up the White Australia policy completely at this time. However, Song Faxiang was also the official who moved the Chinese consulate from Melbourne to Sydney in 1929, and we should give credit to Song for doing this, as Sydney had become the centre of Chinese communities in Australia, as well as the major port, which conducted the trading between Australia and China.

John Latham’s report to Joseph Lyons in 1934 suggests that the Australian government was keen to trade with China and Japan. Despite Australians realising the advantages of trading with China, especially during and after the Depression, Australian politicians were not ready to give up the White Australia policy, between 1921 and 1941.

Even though the White Australia policy and trade were still the dominant factors affected Sino-Australian relations between 1921 and 1941, both China and Australia were growing aware of the expansion of Japan in the Pacific. Australians felt sympathy towards China’s tragedy; however, the Australian government did not openly criticize Japan’s aggression in China. This is partly because, Australians were worried about a possible military attack from Japan, (some Australians, even believed it was good for Australia, as Japan was focusing on its expansion in China, and therefore would leave Australia alone); partly because Australia did not have the military capacity to fight a powerful nation like Japan. China and Japan began a full-scale war in 1937, while Australia only declared war against Japan after the Attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Due to the imagined ‘migratory invasion’ from


226 Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), 1994, p.497.


228 Ernest Koh, Diaspora at War, 2014, p.58.

China (this idea aligned with the White Australia policy perfectly) and a possible military attack from Japan as well as Australians’ struggle during the Great Depression, Australia paid increasing attention to China as a market for Australian goods.

Although Australian foreign relations were strongly influenced by Britain’s relations with any one nation, my research suggests that Australia had its own independent foreign policies. Australia wanted to be an equal partner with Britain within this British Empire. There was one key difference between British and Australian foreign policies. Britain’s major interests lay in Europe, but Australia’s economy and security intertwined increasingly with Asia in the 1930s. Similarly, China wanted to maintain its autonomy and be equal to the West.230 Australia’s relation with China were part of this larger story.

Despite the fact that Chinese diplomats were under strong financial pressure and lacked resources, they still tried their best to fight for the Chinese in Australia, and tried their best to protect the interests of this broken nation—China. Chinese diplomats usually worked closely with Chinese community leaders (e.g. William Liu and Zhu Qingjun) in Australia. However, when the interests of the Kuomintang government (which they represented) clashed with the interests of the local Chinese community, the Chinese consulate chosen to protect the interests of their regime, over the interests of the local Chinese community in Australia. The visit of General Cai Tingkai in 1935 was a good example of this.

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230 Tang Qihua (唐啟華), Foreign Relations under the Northern Warlord Government: a Literature Review (“北洋外交”研究評介), in *Historical Research* (历史研究), 2004, Volume 1, p.103.
Thesis Conclusion: From Enemy to Ally (1901-1941)

This thesis has mainly focused on the economic and political/diplomatic aspects of the Sino-Australian relations between 1901 and 1941. It does not focus on the cultural and social perspective of the stories. This is the first detailed research that treats Chinese diplomats in Australia and Australian diplomats in China between 1901 and 1941 as key historical subjects. Existing historiography focuses on the post-1949 Sino-Australian diplomatic relations.

In this thesis, I have tried to connect Chinese historiography to Australian historiography. Chinese scholars focus on Chinese diplomats’ experiences in Australia, and largely ignore the Australian diplomats’ experiences in China. Australian scholars focus on Australian diplomats in China and ignore the Chinese diplomats’ experiences in Australia. Thus, the lack of Chinese language abilities for Australian scholars and lack of accessing primary sources and secondary sources for scholars in China make their stories incomplete, as they tended to be either Euro-centric or Sino-centric.

As early as 1893, Charles Pearson was one of the first people in the colonies to raise the alarm in predicting the rise of China and warning that the Chinese would eventually, “spread over new territory” such as Australia. What Pearson might not have known, however, was that his Chinese contemporaries shared a similar fear. For Chinese intellectuals like Wei Yan, China too was in an extremely dangerous position, confronted by the more advanced Western powers and Japan during the second half of the nineteenth century. For Pearson, his worry was concerned with China’s vast population and its massive potential to become a stronger nation. For Wei Yan, his worry was the Western Empires, particularly the British Empire, and its more advanced military capabilities and modern scientific technologies. Both intellectuals in China and Australian colonies harboured fears towards each other in the nineteenth century.

The unofficial relations between Australia and China began (at least) in the nineteenth century. Thousands of Chinese (mainly Cantonese) moved to Australia, because people discovered gold in Victoria earlier. In 1901, six Australian colonies formed a federation. The Commonwealth of Australia established as a constitutional monarchy. Indeed, the year of

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1 Kate Bagnall, “Crossing oceans and cultures”, in David Walker, and Agnieszka Sobocinska, Australia’s Asia: From Yellow Peril to Asian Century; Loy-Wilson, Australians in Shanghai: Race, Rights and Nation in Treaty Port China; Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the rise of Asia 1850-1939; David Walker, and Agnieszka Sobocinska, Australia’s Asia: From Yellow Peril to Asian Century; Kuo Mei-fen, Making Chinese Australia, 2013; Yeung, Wing On (楊永安), 長夜星稀—澳大利亞華人史 1860-1940 (Lonely star on lone nights, A history of the Chinese Australians 1860-1940), 2014


1901 was one of the turning points in Australian history. The year of 1901 was also an important year in Chinese history. Between 1899 and 1901, during the Boxer Rebellion, China declared war against the eight powerful states. As the British Empire was fighting another war—the Second Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa simultaneously, the British government requested Australian federation to send troops to China, in order to fight against the Chinese boxers. Thus, Australia’s first war since Federation was fought was in China. In other words, while the Chinese government established the first consulate in Melbourne in 1909, Sino-Australian diplomatic relations started at a low point during this period.

This thesis is on Australia’s diplomatic relations with China between 1901 and 1941. In this thesis, I have argued that Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy, between 1909 and 1941. I further suggest the decade of 1930s was the first time that Australian officials had turned its attention to Asia (namely China and Japan), both politically and economically. Thus, I have shown that Australia was more intertwined and connected with Asia, in this period than the existing literature suggested.

In Chapter One, I have focused on the early interactions between Chinese people and people in Australian colonies in the nineteenth century. I have argued that in order to acknowledge the significance of the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1901 and 1941 as well as the challenges both Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats face in the twentieth century, it is necessary to understand the early Sino-Australian contacts and British colonialism in China in the nineteenth century. As other scholars have reminded us, British policy-makers used military conflict to push their commercial interests in China. Since Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842, it played a major role in China’s trade and diplomacy with the British Empire, including Australian colonies.

During the 1910s and 1920s, the Chinese Consulate in Australia formed an alliance with the local Chinese business community. Chinese diplomats used their diplomatic status to protect the rights of Chinese in Australia; in return, the local Chinese business communities supported the Chinese consulate financially. Between 1901 and 1921, Chinese diplomats worked hard with local Chinese communities and businesspersons in Australia to promote the trade between the two nations. In 1909, China appointed Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) as its first consul-general in Australia, to look after its interests and protect its expatriates. Liang soon realised that it was difficult to ask Australian government to abolish the White Australia policy; instead, he proposed that Australian government should allow three categories of Chinese to come to Australia legally. These were students, merchants and tourists. Between 1909 and 1941, the majority of Chinese diplomats followed Liang’s strategy.

I have suggested that in order to understand Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1901 and 1921, we could not separate the political power to the economic power. This is because that Chinese diplomats tended to use trade as a tool to argue Australia should relax its White Australia policy and recognise the regime the Chinese diplomats represented. The

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White Australia policy had influenced not only Chinese within Australia, but also influenced Australia’s relations with Asia nations, particularly China and Japan. Since Japan’s victory over Russia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Australia not only fearful of an influx of Asian migrants from China; but also a military invasion from Japan. Despite Australian governments’ strong support of the White Australia policy, China maintained its official relations with Australia between 1909 and 1949. In addition, although Australia sent voluntary soldiers in Europe during the World War One (WWI), to protect the interest of the British Empire and showed its support, its political leaders still paid close attention on the rise of Japan in the Pacific. Thus, Australia had its independent foreign policies. In addition it suggests that despite the White Australia policy, Australia as a nation had never completely separated from its Asian neighbours.

The Great Depression and the Second World War (WWII) made Australian policy-makers reconsider Australia’s geo-political position in the world. In 1921, Billy Hughes appointed Edward Little as Australia’s first trade commissioner in Shanghai, China. Because Australian government wanted to improve its trading relations with not only China, but also other East Asian nations. In addition, there was a considerable amount of trade between Australia and China through Hong Kong, in the 1920s and 1930s. As I have discussed in Chapter Three, scholars have previously assumed that Australia’s goods export to Hong Kong, went on British India or other parts within the British Empire. However, evidence suggest that many of these Australian products would go through Hong Kong, and eventually reached Shanghai, or other ports in coastal China. Indeed, countries viewed China as a key market in the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s. Some of these nations were Britain, Germany, United States, Canada, and Japan. Thus, although China was a weak and semi-independent nation, it was still an important nation economically, because it had a huge population and the potential of becoming major trading nation.

Although China was a weak and divided nation in the 1920s and 1930s, industrial nations (include Australia) regarded China as a key market for their goods. While China needed to gain technology, financial and political supports from the great powers, historians have understudied China’s diplomatic relations with regional (or middle) powers like Australia in the first half of the twentieth century. Between 1925 and 1935, the Australian government relied on British diplomats to look after Australia’s interests in China, as Australia no long had any official representatives in China nor Singapore. In other words, China’s officials

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12 NAA: A981 TRAD 191, “Trade. China-Commercial Policy-Consular Invoices”, Letter from The Secretary, Department of External Affairs (Canberra) to Department of Commerce (Melbourne), 12 April, 1933.
with the British Empire as a whole influenced the Sino-Australian relations. Although there was no trade commissioner in China, the Australian government was increasingly realising the importance of trading with China in the 1930s. In 1932, Dr Alexander Melbourne, visited China and Japan, in order to deepen Australia’s economic connections with these two Asian nations. Further, sources suggest that there was even a financial connection between China and Australia. For example, while Melbourne visited Shanghai in 1932, he intended to strengthen these financial and economic connections between the two. Only two years later, John Latham, then Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, also visited China and Japan. His mission was to enhance the Australian government’s understanding of these Asian nations, but also promoted the commercial relations between Australia with China, Japan and Netherlands East Indies. Vivian Bowden was Australia’s trading commissioner in Shanghai, China between 1935 and 1941. During this time, since he was the highest Australian official in China, he was not only acting as a trade commissioner, but also acted as a diplomat trying to improve the relations between the two nations. Further, my research has shown that Bowden also reported the economic and political situations in China, back to politicians in Australia so that they knew what was going on in East Asia. Thus, Australia’s growing independence in its (foreign) policy-making during the 1930s is evident.

Meanwhile, the expansion of Japan in East Asia forced Chinese policy-makers to treat Australia as an independent polity (which was different to Britain) in the 1930s. In other words, China took Australia seriously for the first time. Previously Chinese officials generally viewed Australia as part of British Empire, and did not consider Australia a significant country. In 1931, Lin Sen’s visit in Australia suggested that the Chinese government needed support from overseas Chinese, in order to fight against the Japanese expansion in Asia.

This thesis has focused on China’s diplomatic relations with Australia; however, it mentioned little about China’s relations with New Zealand or other southern Pacific island-nations such as Fiji, between 1901 and 1941. Further, I have focused on Chinese diplomats’ experiences in Australia, but I have rarely discussed their professional experiences, either before their arrival in Australia or after their departure. For example, I have discussed Huang Rongliang’s experience in Australia in Chapter Two. Once he returned to China, he remained as an active diplomat, and was involved other Chinese diplomatic missions in the 1910s and 1920s. Song Faxiang, however, had a less successful career after he left Australia in 1930. Chinese consuls-general usually lived with their wives or partners when they were working in Australia. Further research could be done on the roles that the wives of Chinese diplomats played in Australia. As some Tung Wah Times reports have suggested, some partners of these Chinese diplomats (such as the wife of Song Faxiang) had closely relations

13 Ibid.,
14 In Chapter Three, I discussed Alexander Melbourne’s visit to China in 1932. Melbourne is an individual who deserves to have a biography written about his life.
15 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 30 August 1924, p.6.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 18 October 1924, p.2.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 14 February 1925, p.7.
with the local Chinese communities. They regularly participated in local Chinese activities, and were well-known figures in their own right, at least among Chinese communities.

Chinese newspapers reports have also revealed that there were Chinese international students studying in Australia in the 1920s and 1930s. They started to form Chinese students associations in the early 1920s, and promoted the status of Chinese communities. In addition, the complicated relations between Chinese Kuomintang Party (the Chinese Nationalist Party in Australasia) and the Chinese Consulate is another intriguing research topic.

Chinese policy-makers and diplomats between 1901 and 1941 generally believed that their priority was to maintain China’s independence and unity. Chinese diplomats had to serve this goal when they were working in Australia. Chinese diplomats worked hard to protect China’s national interests in Australia between 1909 and 1941. They tried to protect the rights of Chinese citizens in Australia; they encouraged Australia to buy more goods from China in the 1920s and 1930s. Since 1931, they explained China’s position towards Japan, while attempted to gain support from Australian government and public. Chinese diplomats argued that both China and Australia were democracies; they shared similar values, so they should fight imperialist Japan together. Therefore, Australia was very important to China at this time. This is because China viewed Australia as one of few nations, which could provide China assistances during its military and political struggle against Japan.

The year of 1941 was one of the major turning points in Sino-Australian official relations. China established its embassy (or legation) in Canberra for the first time. In the same year, Australia established its legation in Chongqing—China’s wartime capital. The Sino-Japanese War (WWII) and later on Pearl Harbor were the main reasons behind this upgrading of relations. Hsu Mo was China’s first Minister in Australia, and Australian government appointed Frederic Eggleston as its first Minister in China. Both Hsu Mo (1893-1956) and Frederic Eggleston (1875-1954), played significant roles in shaping the wartime Sino-Australian relations. Hsu Mo (徐谟) provides a fresh perspective on the war years – Australia’s WWII from a Chinese point of view. Though Australia and China were allies in WWII, the Australian government did not recognise PRC in 1949. Despite the fact that Australia and PRC had not established official relations in the 1950s and 1960s, Australia continued to trade with China. Further research need to be done on Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1941 and 1951.

Today, the White Australia policy no long exists in Australia, as the Australian governments eventually dismantled it in the 1970s. Further, Australian government, under Gough Whitlam (1916-2014), established its formal diplomatic relations with PRC in 1972. Since

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18 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 16 August 1930, p.5.
20 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 5 July 1924, p.7.
21 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 22 March 1924, p.7.
22 Hong, Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhai chubanshe, 1930, p.17.
23 Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), 1994, p.497.
24 As I have stated in the Introduction, scholars focus on the post-1949 relations between two nations.
then, Australian politicians paid increasingly attention to Asia. Further, China is currently Australia’s biggest trading partner, and thousands of international Chinese students are studying in Australia. As a nation, China appears more powerful today than at any other time in modern history. However, race relations, trade, and security are still three key components effecting diplomatic relations, and the legacies of past tensions over these issues continue to shape Sino-Australian diplomacy to this day.
Arrival and departure dates of Chinese Diplomats’ in Australia

Qing Period 1909-1911

Consul-General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Diplomat</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋)</td>
<td>March 1909</td>
<td>November 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang Entong (唐恩桐)</td>
<td>November 1910</td>
<td>May 1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Rongliang (黄荣良)</td>
<td>May 1911</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Republic of China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Diplomat</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huang Rongliang (黄荣良)</td>
<td>May 1911</td>
<td>November 1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴)</td>
<td>November 1913</td>
<td>August 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Zijing (魏子京)</td>
<td>August 1917</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Faxiang (宋发祥)</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gui Zhi (桂植)</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1935?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao Junjian 683 (保君健)</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ministers/Ambassadors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Diplomat</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hsu Mo (徐谟)</td>
<td>July 1941</td>
<td>March 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zheng Yitong (郑亦同)</td>
<td>May 1945</td>
<td>February 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gan Naiguang (甘乃光)</td>
<td>May 1948</td>
<td>May 1951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

679 This is the appointed date, it is not the date of arrival.
680 He was known as Hwang Yingliang.
681 Huang arrived in Australia in June.
682 He was known as Tseng Tsung Kien
683 He was known as C. J. Pao in Australia.
Australian Diplomats in China

1921-1941
Edward Little 1921 1923
(Trade commissioner)

Alex Melbourne 1932 1932
(Visiting Academic)

John Latham 1934 1934
(Minister of External Affairs)

Vivian Gordon Bowden 1935 1941
(Trade commissioner)

1941-1949
Ministers
Frederic Eggleston October 1941 February 1944

Keith Officer February 1944 October 1945

Douglas Copland January 1946 June 1948

Ambassadors
Osmond Charles Fuhrman June 1948 November 1948

Keith Officer November 1948 October 1949
Appendix 1

[Immigration Restriction No. 17 of 1901]

Appendix 2

1. The following are excepted:

(a) Any person possessed of a certificate of exemption in force for the time being in the form in the Schedule, signed by the Minister or by any officer appointed under this Act, whether within or without the Commonwealth;

(i) members of the King’s regular land or sea forces;

(j) the master and crew of any public vessel of any Government;

(k) the master and crew of any other vessel landing during the stay of the vessel in any port in the Commonwealth: Provided that the master shall upon being so required by any officer, and before being permitted to clear out from or leave the port, muster the crew in the presence of an officer; and if it is found that any person, who according to the vessel’s articles was one of the crew when she arrived at the port, and who would in the opinion of the officer be a prohibited immigrant but for the exception contained in this paragraph, is not present, then such person shall not be excepted by this paragraph, and until the contrary is proved shall be deemed to be a prohibited immigrant and to have entered the Commonwealth contrary to this Act;

(l) any person duly accredited to the Government of the Commonwealth by the Imperial or any other Government or sent by any Government on any special mission;

(m) a wife accompanying her husband if he is not a prohibited immigrant, and all children apparently under the age of eighteen years accompanying their father or mother if the father or mother is not a prohibited immigrant; but so that the exceptions in this paragraph shall not apply if suspended by proclamation; and such suspension may be of general application or limited to any cases or class of cases;

(n) any person who satisfies an officer that he has formerly been domiciled in the Commonwealth or in any colony which has become a State.

4. A certificate of exemption shall be expressed to be in force for a specified period only, and may at any time be cancelled by the Minister by writing under his hand.

Upon the expiration or cancellation of any such certificate, the person named therein may, if found within the Commonwealth, be treated as a prohibited immigrant offending against this Act:

Provided that in the case of a person entering the Commonwealth from any vessel under this section no penalty shall attach to the vessel or its master owners or charterers.

5.—(1.) Any immigrant who evades an officer or who enters the Commonwealth at any place where no officer is stationed may if at any time thereafter he is found within the Commonwealth be asked to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) of section three, and shall if he fails to do so be deemed to be a prohibited immigrant offending against this Act.

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