Locke, the Quakers and Enthusiasm

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Abstract: This paper argues that Locke’s interactions with the Quakers and his reflections on their doctrines and behaviour, provide the salient background for understanding the content and polemical orientation of the chapter on enthusiasm in An Essay concerning Human Understanding. The terms of reference and key features of the vocabulary of the chapter “Of Enthusiasm” that Locke added to the fourth edition of the Essay, derive from the Quakers and from Locke’s critical reflections on their doctrine of immediate inspiration. While Locke acknowledged that the phenomenon was to be found among other religious groups, it was the Quakers whom Locke had in mind when he formulated his philosophical critique of enthusiasm.

Keywords: Robert Barclay, enthusiasm, Benjamin Furly, immediate inspiration, George Keith, Locke, Quakers

From the mid-seventeenth century in England there was much discussion, most of it critical, of the phenomenon of enthusiasm. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that John Locke included a chapter on enthusiasm in the fourth edition of his An Essay concerning Human Understanding, which appeared in 1700. Enthusiasm was defined in various ways but for Locke the central idea is that it is a claim to immediate inspiration — that is, a special revelation from God — of a proposition or immediate impulsion to an action, that is not authenticated by reason. For Locke, this was a cover for dogmatism and intellectual coercion. The question as to Locke’s motives for adding a chapter on enthusiasm to the fourth edition of the Essay, however, remains unanswered.

In 1993 Thomas Lennon argued that the polemical motivation of the chapter was to attack the philosophical enthusiasm of the Cartesians, especially Malebranche and his English disciple John Norris. A decade later, Nicholas Jolley took issue with Lennon and claimed that the chapter reveals Locke attacking a form of religious rather than philosophical enthusiasm. Furthermore, Jolley argued that the addition of this chapter enabled Locke to add greater balance to his religious polemics in the Essay. According to Jolley, the addition of the chapter opened up a second line of attack: where the first edition had an explicit attack on the religious right, namely Catholicism, the new chapter on enthusiasm enabled him to open an attack against the religious left, the Puritans. Locke’s target, therefore, is not Malebranche, but rather some unspecified proponents of enthusiasm amongst the Puritans or dissenters. Sadly, neither Lennon nor Jolley were able to settle the issue, such that in 2010 Victor Nuovo could still claim “it is not clear why Locke decided to add a chapter on enthusiasm to the fourth edition of the Essay.” I believe that we can move this issue forward. This paper is an attempt to advance our understanding of Locke’s motives for the inclusion of the chapter entitled “Of Enthusiasm,” in the fourth edition of the Essay.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In the Part One I present both textual and contextual evidence leading up to the publication of the fourth edition of the Essay in 1700 that renders it highly likely that Locke had the Quakers in mind when he penned “Of Enthusiasm.” The opening section of Part One presents striking textual evidence from Draft A of Locke’s Essay dating to 1671, that the Quakers were one of Locke’s polemical targets as early as the first edition of the Essay which was published in 1690. Following this, the analysis of background evidence is broken up into four stages that proceed in chronological order. In section two, I examine Locke’s early relations with the Quakers and his comments on enthusiasm in the period up to the composition of Draft A of the Essay in 1671. In section three, I turn to the evidence of Locke’s interactions with Quakers and comments on enthusiasm up until the publication of the French Abrégé of the Essay in 1688. Then, in the final sections of Part One, sections four and five, I scrutinize Locke’s engagement with the Quakers and thoughts on enthusiasm up to 1695, and 1700 respectively.

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The background evidence presented in Part One is highly suggestive that the Quakers are Locke’s target in “Of Enthusiasm,” yet this can only be confirmed through an examination of the Essay itself. This is the task of Part Two in which I show how “Of Enthusiasm” is integrated with its adjoining chapters in Book Four of the Essay, and the extent to which the vocabulary and terms of reference of Locke’s critique of enthusiasm in the Essay are continuous with his earlier discussions of the Quaker doctrine of immediate inspiration. When combined with the background evidence of Part One, Part Two provides a very strong case that the Quaker doctrine of immediate inspiration as a form of enthusiasm is Locke’s polemical target in “Of Enthusiasm.”

Part One: Background Evidence

1.1 The Quakers in Draft A §42
Draft A of the Essay dates from 1671. It contains striking evidence that Locke regarded the Quakers as enthusiasts and that they were his polemical target in the first edition of the Essay. Part of the reason that scholars have missed this evidence is that they have been looking in the wrong place. The natural starting point for any inquiry into Locke’s polemical agenda in his critique of enthusiasm is the chapter added to the fourth edition of the Essay entitled “Of Enthusiasm” (Essay IV. xix). It turns out, however, that it is in the subsequent chapter on “Of Wrong Assent, or Error” (chapter xix in the first edition) that the key passage is located. Section ten of this chapter contains a passage that derives from Draft A §42 of the Essay. The two texts are placed in parallel below with their common contents underlined:

Draft A §42 (1671)

let a Quaker beleive his teacher to be inspird, & you in vaine bring probable reasons against his doctrines. Whoever therfore have imbibed wrong principles are not in things inconsistent with those principles to be moved with the most apparent & convinceing probablitys

Essay, IV. xix. 10 (1690)

Let an Enthusiast be principled, that he or his Teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit; and you in vain bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against his Doctrines. Whoever therefore have imbibed wrong Principles, are not, in Things inconsistent with these Principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing Probabilities.

There can be no question that the passage from the Essay derives from that of Draft A. And, of course, the salient point for our concerns is that Locke has replaced “a Quaker” with “an Enthusiast.” As it stands, however, there is no compelling reason to believe that Locke identified the Quakers as enthusiasts. Thus, for example, he may have changed the text because he had come to believe, after all, that it was enthusiasts rather than Quakers who fitted his description of those who have imbibed wrong principles about inspiration. It is apparent, therefore, that supporting evidence must be adduced in order to argue that the Quakers satisfy Locke’s description of the enthusiast in Essay IV. xx. 10. In the assembling of such evidence, the following questions ought to be addressed. First, why did Locke change “Quaker” to “Enthusiast”? Second, when did this change occur? Third, more specifically, is there evidence from the period between the early Drafts (c. 1671) and the Abrégé of the Essay (1688) that might indicate when and why this change was made? Fourthly, what can be gleaned from Locke’s relations with Quakers and Quakerism that might bear on these questions? In the following sections of Part One I will attempt to answer these questions by treating of Locke’s discussions of enthusiasm, Quakerism, and his interactions with Quakers in four chronological periods.

1.2 Locke, the Quakers and enthusiasm up to 1671
The Quakers had been associated with a critique of the phenomenon of enthusiasm at least since Henry More’s Enthusiasmus Triumphatus of 1656, however, while Locke later acquired a copy of More’s book, there is no evidence that More’s treatment of the subject was of any interest to the
young Locke at Oxford in the late 1650s. Nevertheless, Locke’s first reference to the Quakers is highly critical. In a letter to an unknown correspondent from c. 1654, that is, early in his time at Oxford, Locke wrote of “lys and deceivers whereof we have an other experiment in the quakers here amongst us.”

Two or three years later, on 15 November 1656, while in London he attended the first day of the trial of the Quaker leader and agitator James Naylor. Writing to his father of this experience he is again critical of the Quakers and signs off, “I am weary of the Quakers.” Then in June 1659 he mentioned the Quakers once more in a letter to his father. They had recently attacked the universities in print and Locke speaks of them parenthetically as they “who cannot in their carrage and raptures be thought any other then madd or jugglers.”

Two months later he described them in another letter as having “light in their breast and smoake in their mouth and mak up the company a degree of clowns.” Then in the October of 1659 reflecting in yet another letter, this one on the effects of the imagination on reason, he says tellingly:

I can not blame you [Tom] for yeelding to that which is the great commander of the world and tis Phansye that rules us all under the title of reason, this is the great guide both of the wise and the foolish, only the former have the good lucke to light upon opinions that are most plausible or most advantageous. Where is that Great Diana of the world Reason, every one thinkes he alone imbraces this Juno, whilst others graspe noething but clouds, we are all Quakers here and there is not a man but thinks he alone hath this light within and all besids stumble in the darke.”

Here the Quakers are aligned with the foolish over and against the wise and Locke alludes to their doctrine of inner light and their view that those lacking this illumination “stumble in the darke.”

The pejorative comments continued. Writing to Alexander Popham in c. April 1660 Locke begs that Popham not think that he [Locke] “alone grew blinde and stupid or at least that all the light I have gaind from philosophie hath beene noe other then that of the Quakers which leads men from the sense of curtesy and gratitude.” Locke’s reference to “the sense of curtesy” here is, no doubt, an allusion, inter alia, to the Quaker’s practice of not removing their hats when standing before social superiors. He mentions this specifically in his manuscript now entitled “First Tract on Government” where he says, “I know not how a Quaker should be compelled by hat or leg to pay a due respect to the magistrate.” This comment is the first of many in which Locke uses Quakers as an example to make a point about the powers of the civil magistrate. A second example is from late 1667 in both the first draft of his An Essay Concerning Toleration and the final version, where he used the Quakers as an example of a group of men who, if they were more numerous, would be “dangerous to the state.”

The overwhelming impression of this body of evidence is that Locke was not at all well disposed to the Quakers or Quakerism by the time he began his long-term project of providing an account of human understanding in 1671. What then can be said of his views on and attitude towards enthusiasm during this period? The answer is, surprisingly very little. There is at least one text, however, that mentions the subject. It is a short essay in Latin from 1661 on the subject of infallibility and it provides a very early precedent for the juxtaposition of a critique of claims for the infallibility of the Pope with a warning against enthusiasm that we will find in later texts.

In the final paragraph of this essay Locke concludes that in the interpretation of Scripture, “it is not very easy or straightforward to decide how much is to be allowed to each individual and how much to the authority of the church, what finally reason warrants and what the illumination of the holy spirit.” On the fourth factor, the illumination of the Spirit, “enthusiasm must be carefully avoided, lest while waiting for the inspiration of the holy spirit, we admire and worship our dreams.” Interestingly this juxtaposition of papal infallibility with the Quakers, rather than enthusiasm, occurs in our key passage from Draft A cited above. For there, Locke follows his comments on the indoctrinated Roman Catholic who “must believe as the church beleives or that the Pope is infallible” with comments on the similarly benighted Quaker: “let a Quaker beleive his teacher to be inspird. & you in vaine bring probable reasons against his doctrines.”
1.2 Locke, the Quakers and enthusiasm, 1671–1688

Apart from the reference in Draft A and some notes on philanthropy and toleration, there is a dearth of references to the Quakers in Locke’s writings from the 1670s. In the early 1680s, however, we find occasional references to the Quakers and Locke’s first sustained reflections on the nature of enthusiasm. In his “Critical notes on Stillingfleet” of 1681, Locke somewhat cynically responds to the claim that “there are a certain set of men in the world [the Anglican clergy] upon whose credit I must without farther examination to venture my salvation.” After mentioning “the infallible Church of Rome [who] boldly claim a right to coin opinions into truths” and the Pope who “demands an obedient faith to him & his emissarys,” Locke mentions “the Quakers [who] think them selves the only true guides whilst they bid us be guided by the light within.” Each church claims itself to be “the true Church” as do “Cardinal H. and Mr. P for the papist and Quakers.” The reference here is almost certainly to William Penn who will reappear shortly. Meanwhile, our concern here is to flag Locke’s reference to the Quaker doctrine of inner light, a belief whose epistemic implications Locke will later tease out in some detail.

It appears that it was not until his exile in the Netherlands in the mid-1680s that Locke actually befriended a Quaker, namely, Benjamin Furly, and on 8 October 1686 he recorded in his journal a brief sketch of the origins of the movement derived from his new friend:

Concerning the begining of the Quakers all I can learne from B. F. is that John Saltmarsh who had been Fairfax Chaplain & a minister of the Church of England was the first that began to be scrupulous of the hat & useing common language in the year 1649. In the yeare 50 George Fox a shoemaker & James Naylor a Serjeant of the army in the North began to publish the doctrine of the light etc.

The next reference to the Quakers in Locke’s writings is found in a set of comments on Robert Barclay’s Possibility and Necessity of the Inward Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God (1686) entitled “Immediate Inspiration.” Locke composed these comments while in exile in the Netherlands in December 1687. As it happens, he was staying at the time in the house of his Quaker friend Benjamin Furly, and it is almost certain that Furly, a friend of Robert Barclay, was closely involved in the publication of Barclay’s tract. For, Furly wrote a postscript to Barclay’s letter explaining the provenance of the tract. He writes, “This Letter a Year ago at the desire of my Freind R. B. I delivered into the hands of the aforenamed Ambassador, desiring his answer in writing, which he then promised; but not having as yet done, It was seen meet to be published. B. F. Rotterdam the 28 of March; 1678.” Locke’s assessment of Barclay’s account of the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit is critical in orientation and he addresses Barclay in the second person:

But granting that it is an immediate influence of the Spirit joyning with or makeing use of preaching to produce divine faith what will this advantage your cause or what ground of pretence can your church have to it before any other, for this internal perception being a thing impossible to be made knowne to any but he that has & feels it, if you have had & felt such an influence upon your owne minde tis impossible you should know whether any other Quaker (I use not that name with any disrespect but as I do al others as that by which things are distinguished in discourse) ever had any such.

Here is Locke in late 1687 in the home of a Quaker, reading a Quaker apologist on what can only be described as enthusiasm and addressing the latter in the second person. In fact, this is the first text in which Locke brings Quakerism and enthusiasm together. For, when discussing the strong “impulse to assent” that the Quakers claim to experience, Locke proceeds to claim that we need to distinguish the causes of such strong impulses “else the most extravagant boundlesse enthusiasm must passe for revelation.”

Nevertheless, Locke’s parenthetical remark aimed at avoiding the charge of disrespect — “I use not that name [Quaker] with any disrespect” — reflects a tempering of Locke’s attitude towards the Quakers. In fact, Locke claimed at one point that Furly was beginning to win him over. This, in turn, may be the reason that he changed the word “Quaker” in the chapter on “Of Wrong assent, or
Errour” in Book Four of the Essay and replaced it with “Enthusiast.” For it was in the home of Furly that Locke finished writing the Essay and prepared it for publication, though precisely when this change was made remains unknown.

Part of the process of preparation of the Essay involved the writing of a summary or abrégé that was printed in February 1688 in French and which appeared in volume eight of the Bibliothèque universelle et historique and was translated by Jean Le Clerc. An earlier version of the Abrégé in English, the “Epitome,” which probably dates from before 1685, provides one interesting point of comparison. Both the “Epitome” and Abrégé lack any references to enthusiasm or to Quakers. However, in “Epitome” Book Four, chapter nineteen Locke speaks of “Original revelation” claiming that one cannot assent to it contrary to the principles of “our natural knowledge,” whereas the parallel passage in the Abrégé speaks of “une Révélation originale & immédiate.” It may well be that the insertion of “immédiate” here reflects the impact of Locke’s reading of Barclay. Whatever the case, in the published Essay Locke completely restructures the order of the material in Abrégé Book Four chapters seventeen to nineteen, and deploys its distinction between traditional and original revelation in the chapter on “Faith and Reason” (Essay IV. xviii. 3). He defines original revelation as “that first Impression, which is made immediately by GOD, on the Mind of any Man.” This notion of immediate revelation, which had been the central doctrine under scrutiny in the notes on “Immediate Inspiration,” was to become the focal point of the later chapter “Of Enthusiasm” added to fourth edition. In that chapter Locke says:

Immediate Revelation being a much easier way for Men to establish their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious and not always successful Labour of strict Reasoning, it is no wonder, that some have been very apt to pretend to Revelation, and to persuade themselves, that they are under the peculiar guidance of Heaven in their Actions and Opinions, especially in those of them, which they cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of Knowledge, and Principles of Reason.

In fact, Locke’s concern with immediate revelation and its relation to enthusiasm predates his comments on Barclay’s book by some years. In a series of notes on inspiration, revelation and enthusiasm in his journal from February 1682, Locke sets out for the first time a clear definition of enthusiasm, discusses it as a phenomenon that pertains to religion only — even citing travel literature — and mentions a few features of its psychopathology. He had already discussed inspiration in his journal in April 1681 raising what would become his main criticism of enthusiasm, namely, the problem of providing a principled reason for believing that a proposition is inspired by God rather than from some other source: “where reason is not judg it is impossible for a man himself to destinguish betwixt inspiration and phansy; truth, and error.”

The journal entry for 19 February 1682 is focused on enthusiasm explicitly. It opens with a definition:

A strong and firme perswasion of any proposition relateing to religion for which a man hath either noe or not sufficient proofs from reason but receives them as truths wrought in the minde extraordinarily by god him self and influences coming immediately from him seemes to me to be Enthusiasme, which can be noe evidence or ground of assureance at all nor can by any means be taken for Knowledg.

One important feature of this definition is that Locke restricts the phenomenon to propositions whose content pertains to religion. Interestingly, Locke then mentions a range of religions where enthusiasm is found: “For I finde that Christians, Mahumetans, and Bramins all pretend to it (and I am told the Chineses too).” Later in the entry he claims, “I do not remember that I have read of any Enthysiast amongst the Americans or any who have not pretended to a revealed religion.” Moreover, in this entry Locke also emphasizes the extent to which enthusiasm involves the imagination, for the rational power of the mind is “disturbed” and “depressed” by such practices as “Fasting, solitude, intense and long meditation on the same thing, opium intoxicating liquors, long and vehement turning round, &c[...].” The same themes appear in a note two days later on 21 February 1682:
whatever opinions or persuasions are in the minde without any foundation of reason, may
indeed by the temper and disposition of some mindes whether naturall or acquired seeme as
clear and operate as strongly as true knowledge, but indeed are not knowledge but if they
concerne god and religion deserve the name of Enthusiasme ...

whatever strong persuasions we have in matters divine not rising from nor vouch'd by reason
I cannot looke on otherwise then perfect Enthusiasme.

This entry contains Locke’s reflections on John Smith’s *Select Discourses* and is part of an exchange
that he was engaged in with Damaris Masham. In particular, Locke discusses Smith’s fourth (of four)
type of people whose self-conception of their epistemic state, in Locke’s view, seems “very much to
savour of Enthusiasme and soe will be very little different from my Visionarys I meane in respect of
their opinions and knowledge.”

Much more could be said concerning these entries, such as his later identification of visionaries
with enthusiasts, yet the conclusion for us to draw at this stage is that it is clear that for Locke in the
early 1680s enthusiasm is a generic phenomenon found amongst religious people who have a claim to
divine inspiration. It is not restricted to one Christian sect, such as the Quakers, or even the Christian
religion, though Locke believes that it is a strictly religious phenomenon.

1.3 Locke, the Quakers and enthusiasm, 1688–1695

From 1688 Locke’s interactions with Quakers take on a less negative tone, though any positive
impressions of Quakerism at this time were short-lived, for during the early 1690s he was confronted
with others’ disillusionment with the movement. His friendship with Furly flourished and Locke
resided with him in Rotterdam from February 1687 until his return to England in February 1689.
While there he met and befriended another Quaker, the mercurial F. M. van Helmont, who arrived in
Rotterdam from the home of Anne Conway where he had served as her physician and with whom,
much to the alarm of Henry More, he had converted to Quakerism in 1677. Interestingly, Conway
herself was alert to the danger of claims to immediate inspiration. In her letter to Henry More of 4
February 1675/6 she says,

I pray God give us all a clear discerning betweene Melancholy Enthusiasme and true
Inspiration that we may not be imposed upon to believe a lye. The great difference of opinion
in this point amongst the learned and experienced occasions much perplexity in minds less
exercised, and so not well fitted for judging.

Moreover, while residing at Ragley van Helmont and Lady Conway interacted closely with the
Quaker George Keith and, through Keith, with Robert Barclay. On 12 March 1676, for instance, Keith
wrote to Barclay who was returning from London, “In thy return homewards I have a great desire if
thou be free to it that thou again visit her called the Lady Conway, and I could wish thou hadst more
time with her than formerly, which might be usefull to her, and also to Van Helmont.” Another
Quaker in the circle around Henry More in the mid-1670s that included Lady Conway, van Helmont
and Keith, was William Penn (whose poorly understood relations with Locke during his exile in the
Netherlands may have originated through their mutual Quaker connections.) Among the eleven
books by Penn in Locke’s library was *A Key for the Understanding the Religion of the Quakers*
(London, 1694). It seems likely, therefore, that in addition to discussing chymistry with van
Helmont Locke discussed Quakerism. This, in turn, might have provided an entrée a few years later
for Locke to meet up with George Keith, who from 1691 was in a bitter dispute with the Quakers, first
in Philadelphia, where he was charged with “denying the Sufficiency of the Light,” and then in
England.

Locke returned to London from the Netherlands on 12/22 February 1689. By late 1692 Furly was
writing to Locke of his own disenchantment with Quakerism. His letter to Locke of 7/17 November
that year shows that he was clearly fed up with them. He expressed his desire that Locke give his
situation his “serious consideration,” that he speak to Damaris Masham about it, and give him his
thoughts. Should he, Furly, “take that last step” and leave the Quakers “to deliver my self from the
odious name, of a Sectarian, narrow spirited creature, which I never was.” Then, eighteen months
later, on 26 May 1694, Furly wrote to Locke, “I see your resolution to see G: Keith in London, and
shall be glad to understand the Issue of your conference.  Furt was not the only one interested, for Martha Lockhart wrote to Locke in July 1694 claiming that her cousin “desire’s to kno’ for what reason You were so partial to George Keith. severall other questions, we would ask both of that affair.  No doubt the “Keithian controversy,” as it has come to be known, had piqued many people’s interest. In the event, Locke, fully apprized of the reasons for Furl’s disillusionment and Keith’s vexing trials, did meet Keith and was interested enough in his thought and conflicts with the Quakers to acquire about a dozen of his books for his library, including the second edition of Keith’s Immediate Revelation not Ceased (London, 1675). Later that year Keith was expelled at the annual Quaker assembly and he soon became a vehement opponent of the movement and, ironically, came to associate their “quaking” with enthusiasm. Van Helmont also ended up disowning Quakerism, though it is not known when precisely this took place.

Keith’s Immediate Revelation not Ceased bears close parallels with Barclay’s Possibility and Necessity of the Inward Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God that Locke was reading at Furl’s in 1687. In fact, six months after taking notes on this volume of Barclay Locke received a package of writings by Barclay from his friend the Amsterdam bookseller Hendrik Wetstein. It is not clear exactly what they were, but Locke’s library contained five of Barclay’s works, including three works published in Rotterdam and one (in Dutch) published in Amsterdam. Furthermore, as we see from his library catalogue, Furl was a bibliophile and there can be little doubt that his knowledge of and holdings in Quaker literature had an impact on Locke’s acquisition and understanding of works by Quakers and on Quakerism. A case in point is Furl’s lengthy discussion in a letter to Locke of the French history of Quakerism, Histoire abregée de la naissance et du progrez du Kouakerisme of 1692, a copy of which he posted to Locke, who took receipt of it on 22 April 1692. In his letter to Locke of 12 March, Furl pointed out that in this work not only “the Q[uakers] are horribly treated but the English nation in General as fantastick melancholy fooles, and Enthusiasts.” It cannot be doubted then, that Locke kept up a keen interest in Quakerism throughout the early 1690s.

He also continued to reflect on enthusiasm during these years. In a short set of theological reflections on William Lowth’s A Vindication of the Divine Authority and Inspiration of the Writings of the Old and New Testament, entitled “Scriptura Sacra” from 1692, Locke poses a series of questions. At one point he claims, picking up Lowth’s terminology, “particular revelation not pretended to but by Enthusiasts,” where “particular revelation” is immediate revelation, and he poses an additional query, “Whether the name Enthusiasts answers their arguments for particular revelation?” It must be confessed that there is not much in these condensed comments. However, the salient point here is the continuity of interest in the notion of inspiration and its relation to enthusiasm.

That enthusiasm was weighing on Locke’s mind in the mid-1690s is confirmed by his exchange with William Molyneux in 1695. Locke wrote to Molyneux on 8 March of that year asking for advice as to how to augment the Essay. Molyneux’s previous suggestion had already led to the inclusion of a new chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” which contains Locke’s famous theory of personal identity. Locke now put a suggestion to his Irish friend, “I have had some thoughts my self, that it would not be possibly amiss to add, in lib. iv. ch. 18, something about Enthusiasm, or to make a chapter of it by it self.” Molyneux soon replied:

I must freely Confes that if my Notion of Enthusiasme agrees with yours, there is no necessity of adding any thing concerning it more than by the by and in a single section in Chap. XVIII. L.IV. I conceive it to be no other than a Religious sort of Madnes and Comprises not in it any Mode of Thinking or Operation of the Mind, Different from what you have treated off in your Essay. Tis true indeed, the Absurditys Men imbbrace on account of Religion are most Astonishing, and if in a Chapter of Enthusiasme you endeavour to give an Account of them, ’twould be very acceptable. so that (on second thoughts) I do very well approve of what you propose therein, being very desirous of having your sentiments on any subject.

Locke rounds off this matter in their correspondence on 26 April showing that he had made up his mind to make the addition:
What I shall add concerning Enthusiasm, I guess, will very much agree with your thoughts, since yours jump so right with mine, about the place where it is to come in, I having designed it for chap. 18. lib. iv. as a false principle of reasoning often made use of. But, to give an historical account of the various ravings men have embraced for religion, would, I fear, be besides my purpose, and be enough to make an huge volume.  

It is clear then that in the period from the publication of the Abrégé to April 1695 both the Quakers and enthusiasm continued to feature in his social relations and intellectual preoccupations. He entered the second half of the 1690s with a new resolve to write at least a section on enthusiasm for his next edition of the Essay, but what of his relations with the Quakers during the years leading up to the publication of the fourth edition of the Essay with its new chapter on enthusiasm?

1.5 Locke, the Quakers and enthusiasm, 1695–1700

In the year following his meeting with George Keith Locke was as good as his word to Molyneux and began to write a new chapter for the Essay. It was to be entitled “Of Enthusiasm.” In the same year he recorded a treatment for cancer and king’s evil in one of his medical notebooks. This medical receipt derived from the leading Quaker woman and writer Anne Docwra. Other receipts from Docwra, dating from 1695 to 1699, at least one of which is extracted from a letter from Docwra to Damaris Masham, are to be found in one of Locke’s commonplace books that had been put to more domestic uses in the Masham household at this time. There is, to my knowledge, no extant evidence that Locke ever met Anne Docwra, however, the latter’s correspondence with Damaris Masham suggests that Docwra and Damaris were more than casually acquainted. In fact, Docwra also knew two of Damaris’ brothers. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that Locke at least knew of the Quaker Docwra through Damaris and may even have made her acquaintance.

It is therefore of singular interest that in 1700, the year in which Locke’s chapter “Of Enthusiasm” appeared in the fourth edition of the Essay, Docwra published her own short A Treatise concerning Enthusiasm, or Inspiration, of the Holy Spirit of God in which she defends enthusiasm on both biblical and Malebranchean grounds. Could Docwra also have been part of the conversation? And if so, might Docwra’s participation in this conversation, however muted, have foregrounded the link for Locke between Quakerism and enthusiasm? It is well known that Damaris Cudworth discusses the danger of enthusiasm in her A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (1696) which is a critique of the views of the English Malebranchean John Norris. Interestingly, Docwra’s treatise appeals to Malebranchean doctrines in defence of enthusiasm. We also know that it was during the years from 1695 to 1697 that Locke drafted the substance of what was to become “Of Enthusiasm” in the fourth edition of the Essay. Sadly though, there is, as yet, no evidence of any philosophical exchange between Docwra on the one hand and Locke and Damaris Masham on the other. Nevertheless, all of these interactions with Quakers and reflections on their doctrine of immediate revelation and its relation to enthusiasm strongly suggest that it was the Quakers, above all others, who were in the foreground as Locke came to consider and to critique the nature of religious enthusiasm and to pen his most celebrated chapter on the subject. It is to the content of that chapter that we now turn.

Part Two: The Quakers, immediate inspiration and “Of Enthusiasm”

The chapter on enthusiasm is sandwiched between the chapters on faith and reason, and wrong assent and error. It opens with a section on the importance of the search after truth (Essay IV. xix. 1) and then introduces a third ground of assent over and above the two grounds dealt with in the previous chapter, namely, faith and reason. This supposed third ground is enthusiasm. Locke claims that, in fact, this third ground negates the first two “and substitutes in the room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man’s own Brain, and assumes them for a Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct” (§3). Two points are worth noting here. First, from the outset the treatment of enthusiasm is carefully grafted on to the theory of reason and faith: it is not a mere add-on or digression from the flow of the development of Locke’s theory of the understanding. Second, we should note that enthusiasm is manifested in both opinions and actions or conduct. The term “action” occurs ten times and “conduct” three times in the chapter, where it is normally paired with “opinion” or “persuasion.” Thus, for
example, Locke speaks of “the odd Opinions and extravagant Actions, Enthusiasm has run Men into” (§8). Interestingly, the only other place we find this dual expression of enthusiasm is in Locke’s notes on Barclay in “Immediate Inspiration” from 1686. There, Locke speaks of “the vehemence of the impulse where with he feels his minde carryd to the assent of such a proposition or performance of such an action beyond what reason moves him to.” This coupling of opinion and action is important: first, because it may well originate from Locke’s preoccupation with the strange actions that he saw Quakers performing — he speaks of “extravagant actions” and “odd actions” in “Of Enthusiasm”, and second, because it sets the phenomenon of enthusiasm apart from that other form of madness that he first discusses in the fourth edition of the Essay, namely, the association of ideas.

As for the relation of “Of Enthusiasm” to the subsequent chapter on wrong assent and error, the key philosophical point appears to be the place of enthusiasm in Locke’s theory of principles. In section eight of “Of Enthusiasm” Locke is quite clear that the pernicious nature of this phenomenon lies in the adoption of a dangerous principle: “Though the odd Opinions and extravagant Actions, Enthusiasm has run Men into, were enough to warn them against this wrong Principle so apt to misguide them both in their Belief and Conduct.” This point had already been made in the chapter on wrong assent and error in the first edition of the Essay and the later addition of “Of Enthusiasm” should be regarded as an elaboration of it. Thus, in Essay IV. xx. 10 Locke is spelling out the first of four ways in which we fall into error by making wrong measures of probability. The first way that we mistake measures of probability is taking propositions for principles that “are not in themselves certain and evident.” Section ten is given over to providing examples of this error and the term “principle” occurs ten times in this section. The first example is the “intelligent Romanist” who “hath had this Principle constantly inculcated,” that he must believe what the Church believes or “that the Pope is Infallible” or the principle of transubstantiation. The second example is, as we have already seen, the enthusiast. Locke says “Let an Enthusiast be principled,” using the now obsolete verbal form of “principle” which here implies indoctrination or at least inculcation. How does the enthusiast come to be principled? By imbuing the opinion that “he or his Teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit.” And, of course, this is the very passage that in Draft A originally described a Quaker.

In fact, Locke had already made the very same point in a shorthand entry in his journal on 25 August 1676 and recycled it almost verbatim in the chapter on faith and reason in the Essay:

> For Men having been principled with an Opinion, that they must not consult Reason in the Things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Sense, and the very Principles of all their Knowledge, have let loose their Fancies, and natural Superstition; and have been, by them, led into so strange Opinions, and extravagant Practices in Religion, that a considerate Man cannot but stand amazed at their Follies.

Here too, we find the verbal form of “principle” and the reference to “strange Opinions, and extravagant Practices in Religion” and so this passage is highly suggestive of another allusion to the Quakers. Thus, Jolley is correct when he claims “[t]he polemic against religious enthusiasm thus complements the critique of the doctrine of divinely inscribed ideas and principles which dominates Book I of the Essay.” However, we should also add that the chapter on enthusiasm reinforces the preexisting critique of principles in Book IV of the earlier editions of the Essay. Clearly Locke is bringing the same philosophical argument against both the Romanist and the enthusiast: they both mistakenly take propositions that lack certainty for certain principles.

The kernel of Locke’s complaint against enthusiasm is the lack of a principled reason, over and above the strength of one’s inner persuasion, for believing claims to immediate revelation from God. In “Of Enthusiasm” he says that in the case of scriptural revelation the prophets “had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of those Revelations.” For example, “Moses saw the Bush burn without being consumed, and heard a Voice out of it.” Locke had made the same point a decade earlier in “Immediate Inspiration” in the context of discussing a Quaker:

> soe there was need also of some signe some way of distinction where by the messenger him self might be convinced that his message was from god. Thus god spoke to Moses not by a
It is not that Locke rejected the possibility of immediate inspiration *tout court*. In winding up his critique of enthusiasm he affirms: “I am far from denying, that GOD can, or doth sometimes enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to Good Actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it.”

Not surprisingly, he had expressed the same openness to immediate inspiration in his comments on Barclay, for it is something “noe body can deny that considers an omnipotent agent & author of us.”

Furthermore, as we saw above, in one of his earliest comments on the Quakers, Locke associated their view of immediate revelation with the metaphor of an inner light. In his ironic comment to Tom in 1659 that “we are all Quakers here and there is not a man but thinks he alone hath this light within,” in his “Critical Notes on Stillingfleet” of 1681 where he says, “the Quakers think them selves the only true guides whilst they bid us be guided by the light within’ and in his record of Furry’s comment on the emergence of the Quakers and their ‘doctrine of the light,” Locke seems to have regarded this as distinctive of the Quakers.

It is of singular interest, therefore, that Locke pays particular attention to ‘this internal Light’ in the chapter on enthusiasm in the *Essay*. The term “light” occurs thirty-three times in “Of Enthusiasm” accounting for more than half of its occurrences in the whole of Book Four. In fact, Locke’s usage here includes the terms that he had earlier associated with Quakers, namely “internal Light” and “Light within.”

Moreover, in Locke’s comments on Barclay in his “Immediate Inspiration” Locke is concerned with the pairing of this inner light or “internal perception,” with feeling. He says of the internal perception it is “a thing impossible to be made knowne to any but he that has & feels it”; that to a man of reason the enthusiast “sees or perceives or feels by a new sort of sensation” what is really “a vehemence of the impulse where with he feels his minde caryd to the assent of such a proposition or performance of such an action.” And it is this pairing of seeing and feeling that Locke takes up from section ten of “Of Enthusiasm” in order to set out his critique of the phenomenon. His polemical technique is to strip away “the Metaphor of seeing and feeling” by showing that the feeling is nothing more than a strong persuasion.

But to examine a little soberly this internal Light, and this feeling on which they build so much. These Men have, they say, clear Light, and they see; They have an awaken’d Sense, and they feel; This cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. For when a Man says he sees or feels, no Body can deny it him, that he does so.

Given these strong parallels then between “Immediate Inspiration” and “Of Enthusiasm,” it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the latter deploys the very terms of reference that Locke used to frame his discussion of Barclay’s doctrine of immediate inspiration in 1686 in which he first brought together enthusiasm and the Quakers. Locke’s thoughts on the Quaker doctrine of immediate inspiration, with its focus on propositions and actions, inner light and feelings, the appeal to divine signs (citing Moses and the burning bush by way of example), together with the metaphor of the inner light, provided the basic framework for his later more considered treatment of the issue in “Of Enthusiasm.”

Yet there is one final twist to this tale. For, as Locke was preparing the fourth edition of the *Essay* for publication during 1699, Pierre Coste was simultaneously writing a French translation of the *Essay*. Most, though not all, of Locke’s changes to the third edition are incorporated in the Coste translation which Locke read and approved before it was published in 1700. One change that was included in Coste’s translation was the new chapter on enthusiasm. It is of particular interest therefore, to note some changes that Coste introduced, with Locke’s acquiescence in the subsequent chapter on “Erreur.” I juxtapose the two passages here:

*Essay IV. xx. 10 (1700)*

Take an intelligent Romanist, that ... hath had this Principle constantly inculcated Understanding ...
Let an *Enthusiast* be principled, that he or his Teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against his Doctrines.

*Essai philosophique IV. xx. 10 (1700)*

Prenez un *Lutherien* de bon sens à qui l’on aît constamment inculqué ce Principe, ...

... Qu’un *Fanatique* prenne pour Principe que luy ou son Docteur est inspiré & conduit par une direction immediate du Saint Esprit; c’est en vain que vous attaquez ses Dogmes par les raisons les plus évidentes.

Where Locke in Draft A and in the *Essay* had “intelligent Romanist,” he allows Coste’s *Lutherien*. And more pointedly, where Draft A had “Quaker” and the *Essay* had “Enthusiast,” he allows Coste’s “Fanatique.” Clearly Locke was sensitive to his readership and was prepared to modify his examples to suit his audience. Francophone readers in Catholic France would have been put off by Locke’s example of the misguided Romanist, but would have found the reference to the indoctrinated Lutheran to their fancy. It would also go down well with the Calvinist Dutch Huguenots. No doubt a similar claim can be made for Locke’s Anglophone readership: Why put off Quaker friends and acquaintances when one can make the same point using the more generic term “enthusiast”? All of this reinforces the fact that in Locke’s mind it was the Quakers who were enthusiasts *par excellence*. What this serves to bring out, however, is that it is really the philosophical content of the *Essay* that is Locke’s concern. The Romanist, Lutheran and enthusiast are merely examples that he is prepared to chop and change. Far from a religious polemical agenda being built in to the fabric of the *Essay*, Locke’s critical remarks on religious sects are designed to facilitate the communication of his philosophical analysis of the phenomenon.

What are we to conclude from all of this? The trail of circumstantial evidence that has been laid out in Part One, together with the continuities between his comments on Barclay and “Of Enthusiasm” we have adduced in the philosophical treatments of enthusiasm and Quakerism in Part Two, furnish us with a compelling case that when Locke substituted “*Enthusiast*” for “Quaker” while incorporating that passage from Draft A into the *Essay*, he regarded the two terms as interchangeable. For Locke “enthusiasm” is not synonymous with “Quakerism,” yet in his mind the Quakers were the archetypal enthusiasts in so far as they claimed to experience a form of immediate inspiration that was not subject to reason.

Notes

* This paper was first read at the Sydney Medieval and Renaissance Group in April 2017. I should like to thank the audience there as well as Claire Crignon, Michael Hunter, Sarah Hutton, Victor Nuovo and the two anonymous referees for the journal for comments.

i For background on the critique of enthusiasm in the seventeenth century, see Heyd, “Be Sober and Reasonable.”

ii Jolley, “Reason’s dim candle: Locke’s critique of enthusiasm,” 182–183. In his recent treatment of Locke on enthusiasm in *Toleration and Understanding in Locke*, which only came to my attention after the completion of this article, Jolley claims, “The chapter represents the culmination of Locke’s lifelong concern with the enthusiasts or Puritan fanatics, especially the Quakers” (91). However, he provides no evidence in support of the claim.


iv Only a few scholars have recognized the association between enthusiasm and the Quakers in Locke’s mind. The earliest is perhaps Wolfgang von Leyden. See his Introduction to Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, 79.
See also Biddle, “Locke’s critique of innate principles and Toland’s Deism,” 414 and Harris, The Mind of John Locke, 56.

vii Locke, “Extrait d’un Livre Anglois qui n’est pas encore publié, intitulé Essai Philosophique concernant L’Entendement.”


ix Locke owned the 2nd edition of More’s 1662 Collection of Several Philosophical Writings, which contains a revised version of Enthusiasmus Triumphatus. See Harrison and Laslett, The Library of John Locke (hereafter LL), 2046.

x See More, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, 24–26, 29.

xi Locke, Correspondence of John Locke (hereafter Corr.), vol. 1, 17. See also Locke’s letter to his father, 25 October 1656, ibid., 41–42.

xii Ibid., 44.

xiii Ibid., 84.

xiv Ibid., 98.

xv Ibid., 123.

xvi Ibid., 145. Locke believed himself to have encountered a group of Quakers in Cleves about whom he wrote to John Strachey on 14 December 1665; see ibid., 237.

xvii Locke, Political Essays, 22.

xviii For other examples of Locke’s use of the Quakers in the context of discussions of civil authority, see “Of the difference between civil and ecclesiastical power” from 1674, in Locke, Political Essays, 220; “Toleration A” from 1675 in ibid., 232; “Toleration B” in ibid., 247; “Critical notes on Stillingfleet”, ibid., 375; A Letter Concerning Toleration, Works of John Locke, vol. 6, 52; Second Letter Concerning Toleration, ibid., 100; Third Letter for Toleration, ibid., 229, 231; and Fourth Letter for Toleration, ibid., 561.

xix “The First Draft of An Essay Concerning Toleration” and An Essay Concerning Toleration And Other Writings on Law and Politics, 1667–1683, 306. This passage was carried over into the final version of the Essay Concerning Toleration; see ibid., 286.

xx For Locke’s reference to papal infallibility, see Locke, Writings on Religion, 69.

xxi Ibid., 72.

xxii Locke, Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 71.


xxiv Ibid., 76.

xxv Ibid.

xxvi Benjamin Furly.

xxvii Bodleian Library MS Locke f. 9 (1686), pages 27–28.


xxix Replacing Nuovo’s “Just” with “I use.”

xxx Locke, Writings on Religion, 39.

xxxi Ibid., 40.


xxii See Locke to Furly, 9/19 January 1688, ibid., 332.

xxv For Le Clerc’s claim that he translated the Abrégé, see Le Clerc, “Eloge de feu Mr. Locke,” 376–377. An anonymous reader for the journal alerted me to this reference.


xxviii Locke, “Extrait,” 138. The version of the Abrégé that appeared in Dunton’s The Young-Students-Library, contains the expression “original and immediate Revelation” (179), reinforcing Hill and Milton’s claim that the French text was the source for the Dunton version. See Hill and Milton, “The Epitome (Abrégé) of Locke’s Essay,” 5.

xxix Essay IV. xviii. 3.

xi Essay IV. xix. 5.

xii Specific references to travel literature are given; see Locke, An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay, 119.

xiii Ibid., 114–116.

xiv Ibid., 114.

xv Ibid., 119.

xvi Ibid., 119.
The Dig

Locke’s medical remains,” 237

Writings of the Old and New Test

had passed into law a few weeks earlier; see

returning to London from the Netherlands, about the status o

naissance et du progrés du Kouakerisme

a reference to the Quakers as enthusiasts who may be deceived b

Philippe Naudé.

1680

on Quakerism.

1694; LL 2471.

against him in

Clarke, wrote to Locke on 1 August 1694,

LL 2472.

Hundred Queries Moderately propounded Concerning the Doctrine of the Revolution of Humane Souls

Quakers was that he sub

months prior to Locke’s meeting with Keith. And second, one of the charges leveled against Keith by the

Keith. First, van Helmont had been residing at Oates with Locke and the Masham household for at least three

a Cartesian, see

relationship to Locke, see Philip Milton, “John Locke, William Penn and the question of Locke’s pardon.”

LL 2252.

See Anstey, John Locke and Natural Philosophy, 175.

Keith, Some Reasons and Causes of the Late Separation, 2; LL 1621.


Another Quaker seeder caught up in the controversy over van Helmont’s Two Hundred Queries, William Clarke, wrote to Locke on 1 August 1694, Corr., vol. 5, 97–102. The stimulus for Clarke’s letter was the attack against him in An Answer to Some Queries Propos’d by W. C., or, A Refutation of Helmont’s Pernicious Error, 1694; LL 2471.


See Furly, Bibliotheca Furliana sive catalogus librorum Benjamin Furly, 57–59, 92–96, 158–163 for works

on Quakerism.

See Champion, “The fodder of our understanding”: Benjamin Furly’s library and intellectual conversation c. 1680–c. 1725,” 131–146. For additional holdings on Quakerism in Locke’s library, see LL 2412–2421.

LL 3078.

See Bodleian Library MS Locke f. 10, page 133. The authorship of this work is usually attributed to Philippe Naudé.

Furley to Locke, 12 March 1692, Corr., vol. 4, 414. See also, Furly to Locke, 31 August 1692, ibid., 512. For a reference to the Quakers as enthusiasts who may be deceived by the Devil, see Histoire abrégée de la naissance et du progrés du Kouakerisme, 41–42.

It is worth noting that Locke wrote to Philipp van Limborch on 6 June 1689, that is, within four months of returning to London from the Netherlands, about the status of the Quakers in relation to the Toleration Act that had passed into law a few weeks earlier; see Corr., vol. 3, 633.

Locke, Writings on Religion, 42 and Lowth, A Vindication of the Divine Authority and Inspiration of the

Writings of the Old and New Testament, 8–9.

Corr., vol. 5, 287.

Ibid., 317.

Ibid., 352.

Bodleian Library MS Locke d. 9, pages 306–307.

MS Murray 416, Glasgow University Library. For transcriptions, see Anstey, “Further reflections on

Locke’s medical remains,” 237–242.


See Masham (née Cudworth), A Discourse Concerning the Love of God, 6 and 120.

The manuscript version of “Of Enthusiasm” is in Bodleian Library MS Locke e. 1, pages 1–7, 9, 10–31. See The Digital Locke for dating and transcription: http://www.digitallockeproject.nl/cgi/t/text/text-

idx?c=locke;cc=locke;tpl=texts-metadata.tpl:id=43;idno=DLP-AED (accessed 29 April 2017).

Locke, Writings on Religion, 40.

Essay IV. xix. 8 and 6.
See Essay II. xxxiii.

Essay IV. xx. 7.

Essay IV. xviii. 11. For von Leyden’s expansion of Locke’s very similar shorthand journal entry of 15/25 August 1676, see “Philosophical Shorthand Writings” in Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, 277. An anonymous referee for the journal alerted me to this journal entry.

Jolley, “Reason’s dim candle,” 186.


Essay IV. xix. 15.

Locke, Writings on Religion, 40.

Essay IV. xix. 16.

Locke, Writings on Religion, 39.

See also, Locke to W. J., August 1659, Corr., vol. 1, 98.

For “internal Light”, see Essay IV. xix. 10, 15 bis. For “Light within”, see ibid., 14.

Locke, Writings on Religion, 39, 40.

Essay IV. xix. 10, underlining added.

Coste’s translation appeared as Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain, 1700. For Locke’s claim that he had read the translation, see “Monsieur Locke au Libraire,” sig. ***1r.

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