An Historical Commentary on Demosthenes 8, ‘On the Khersonnese’

Stephen Clarke

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Department of Classics and Ancient History
The University of Sydney

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This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

Stephen Clarke
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Abstract

Demosthenes 8 is a crucial speech which has long been neglected and rarely given the attention it deserves. The speech focuses on Athenian relations with Philip in this crucial northern region and why Philip was perceived a threat to Athenian interests in the area. Demosthenes seeks to paint Philip as the one who broke the terms of the Peace of Philokrates, even though the historical narrative is not supportive of this claim. The thesis seeks to provide the historical background to the speech and explain the historical significance and veracity of all aspects relevant to the Khersonnese, an area that it was crucial for both Philip and Athens to control. The speech is a study of the historical aspects raised in the speech only and does not engage in a philological discussion except where it is necessary to explain the history. The thesis demonstrates that Demosthenes is a skilled politician, able to depict Philip’s actions in the worst possible light and that the Khersonnese was indeed so critical to both that war was almost inevitable. The study finds that this speech is a masterpiece of Demosthenic rhetoric, demonstrating all of Demosthenes’ considerable skill and reflecting the themes raised in the corpus of Demosthenes’ sumbouleutic oratory.
To The Old Gran,

without whom I would never have loved Ancient History.
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Abbreviations

Works are cited by author and date throughout the work, with the exception of the following:

Agora    The American School of Classical Studies in Athens, *The Athenian Agora*
BNJ      Worthington (ed.), *Brill’s New Jacoby*
DR       The Dublin Review
IG       *Inscriptiones Graecae*
PECS     *Princeton Encyclopaedia of Classical Sites*

A note on transliteration

Throughout the text, Greek names have been transliterated exactly from Greek. This has not been done to names that are commonly known (eg. Herodotus, Thucydides, Athens).
Summary of On the Khersonnese

On the Khersonese purports to be a published version of a speech delivered by the Athenian politician and orator Demsothenes (hereafter ‘D.’) as part of his campaign to mobilise Athenian opposition to Philip. As explained by one of the scholia on Codex S (Dilts, 1983: 134) see below, pp. 126-28, this speech was designed to propel Athens to war with Philip:

Ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καταφέρεται μὲν τῶν ῥητόρων, ὑπεραπολογεῖται τοῦ Διοπείθους, συμβουλεύει κινῆσαι τὸν κατὰ Φιλίππου πόλεμον.

It was delivered in the ekklesia at a key moment in Athens’ relationship with Philip and, at its most basic level, is a speech urging Athens to allow the Athenian strategos Diopeithes to continue his depredations of Philip and his allies in the Khersonnese. This was a strategically important region for both Athens and Philip. The majority of Athenian grain was exported past its coastline; while for Philip, it was a crucial region on the eastern flank of his kingdom that he wished to pacify to control the core areas of it more securely. The speech focuses not on the Athenian strategos (also a political ally of D.), but on the dangers posed by Philip to Athens, characterising him as an enemy of democracy and a direct threat to Athens itself. It calls Athens to punish the politicians who are allegedly in Philip’s pay, to prepare for war and to maintain Diopeithes’ force in the field to counter-act Philip in the Khersonnese.
Rationale for the Commentary

This commentary aims to place the speech in the historical context in which it was delivered. It is an historical commentary, identifying issues, people and places raised by D. in the text to understand the speech and its intent more fully. The commentary does not engage with philological aspects of the text, except in relation to the rhetorical style of D. or as it impacts on the reporting of historical aspects. Throughout the speech, D. characterises Philip as untrustworthy and a danger to Athenian survival. It will be shown in discussion of the text that Philip has been misrepresented by D. The commentary will provide a context that demonstrates Philip’s policies were primarily concerned with the protection of his kingdom, particularly in the area of Thrace, on the eastern flank of Macedonia. Philip, in almost all instances, exploited situations for his benefit as they arose, rather than possessing a prepared plan for the expansion of his kingdom. It will be demonstrated throughout the thesis that Philip’s actions were justifiable in this context and that D. deliberately misrepresents them to further his own political goals. The thesis will also place the speech in a deeper chronological context, that of the long-term importance of the northern Aegean (hereafter called the ‘North’, see map, pg. 39) to Athens. It will be demonstrated that Athens actively pursued an aggressive policy of territorial acquisition in the North, particularly the Thracian Khersonnese, since the time of Peisistratos, who it will be argued sponsored Miltiades’ mid sixth-century colonisation of the region. It will also be shown that, until the fourth century, the region was most important to Athens not for the grain it supplied, but for the money it generated for Athens by virtue of control of the naval trade in the area. It will be argued that Philip would have been content to
allow Athens to co-exist with Macedonia but for the mistrust that existed between Philip and Athens, advanced by the actions of both in the Thracian Khersonnese, which propelled the Macedonian and Athenian states to war.

The thesis consists of four separate sections, with content links indicated by page references. Firstly, the thesis will place the speech into a rhetorical context, demonstrating how it is a strong example of Demosthenic (and, indeed, Athenian) rhetoric, utilising all of D.’s skills as a rhetorician. Secondly, a significant historical narrative will provide an historical background to the speech, providing a focus for Athenian relations with, and involvement in, the states in the North. The commentary that follows has been constructed to highlight and investigate areas of interest to the themes outlined above – any aspects of rhetoric will not be discussed in the commentary but will be discussed, as appropriate, in the first part of the thesis. For example, chapters 66 to 74 have few commentary glosses: many relevant ideas raised in this part of the speech have already been discussed previously in the Commentary. Also, D. uses this section to amplify his notion of the good speaker, however, which is discussed in the Analysis of the Parts of the Speech, hence such repetition has been avoided. There are a number of aspects through the speech that are historically interesting, but are not directly relevant to the themes investigated, for example the reference to the Athenian silver mines (8.45). This commentary represents an investigation into aspects of history noted in the speech that directly impacts on our understanding of the North and Athens’ relations with it. Finally, two appendices have been
created to demonstrate the extent to which D. used ring structures to create a powerful speech, an aspect of Demosthenic rhetoric that has been under-examined.

Through a study of the speech, several notable conclusions have been drawn. Primarily, the speech is found to be part of a continuum of themes, structures and techniques that are found across the entire Demosthenic sambouleutic corpus and it contains some of the most developed and polished rhetoric of D. Furthermore, it is argued that the speech represents a published and disseminated form of the speech as it was delivered in the ekklesia; the Fourth Philippic is the note-form version of the speech that D. may have used in its actual delivery. While investigating the early involvement of Athens in the North, it has also been found that Herodotus, when reporting events involving prominent fifth-century Athenian families, transmits the family’s political record as opponents of the Peisistratid regime, though we are able to state on the basis of other sources (and, indeed, close study of Herodotus’ work) that many were close collaborators in it. Fundamentally, this aspect of the investigation leads to the conclusion that Miltiades was a close supporter of Peisistratos and Athens controlled the Thracian Khersonnese from the sixth century, rather than Miltiades controlling it as a personal tyranny. The speech has forced a reconsideration of several series of events in the fourth century, particularly the Athenian wars against Kotys, for Amphipolis and in Euboia. The chronology and motivations of all states and individuals involved have been reconsidered and redrawn to provide clarity, which is sometimes lacking in both ancient and modern accounts.
Analysis of Parts of the Speech

Introduction

D.’s deliberative speeches have traditionally been divided into early and later speeches. According to this schema, his earlier speeches are marked by rhetorical complexity, akin to Thucydides, while his later speeches, beginning with the Olynthiacs in 349BC, pursue clarity of thought and simpler structures.¹ From the First Philippic onwards, D.’s speeches tend to exhibit a consistent sense of urgency and forcefulness (Kennedy, 1994: 73-74). The catalyst of this sense of vigour was the rise of Philip of Macedonia who D. perceived as a direct threat to Athens. In discussing this idea, Kennedy does not include the speech On the Khersonnese in his outline, which is surprising as this speech and the one following it, the Third Philippic (which is included in his discussion), possess an increasingly focused aggression. This speech may have struck a strong chord with the people as this period is marked by D.’s political dominance in Athenian politics (Usher, 1999: 239; see Worthington, 2013: 210-228 for an outline of the period). The ideas in it are fully developed, explained repeatedly and are given ample space – this speech has more chapters than any other sumbouleutic speech of this period. While the Third and Fourth Philippics have one less chapter than On the Khersonnese, the next longest oration is the First Philippic, only 51 chapters in length.

¹ Milns (2000: 210-11) notes that there are exceptions to this, however, and it is not a problem-free analysis. Usher (1999: 211, 212-23, 237) also implies that one can trace the development of D.’s rhetorical abilities through his speeches. On the similarity with Thucydides, see Pearson, 1976: 24-29.
Aristotle is our most influential critic of what oratory looked like, in theory and practice, in his
own time, though it should be noted that D.’s oratory does not mirror Aristotle’s ideas of
rhetoric (Dion. Hal. *ep. ad Amm.* 1.2). The typical division of a speech falls into four categories,
*prooimion, diegesis, pisteis* and *epilogos.*¹ When D. was writing his speech, the formal criticism
of oratory was still in its developmental phase. When compared to the two most influential
treatises on the topic, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander,* we see points of
similarity and difference. D. is clearly familiar with a number of the ideas that are elucidated in
these texts, but he is also composing his speech according to his own ideas of what comprises
effective speech-making.

The *prooimion* is an introduction to the speech. Aristotle states that the *prooimion* is used to
present the case to the audience, to pave the way for what follows (*Rh. 3.14.1*). It is only used
if the case is weak, he claims, as only slaves give a preamble to what they say and do not get
straight to the point (*Rh. 3.14.10, 12*). The *diegesis,* or narrative, is used to tell the story of
events that are relevant to the speech and is best woven throughout the speech (*Rh. 3.16.1-
2, 11*). Aristotle claims that a *diegesis* is more relevant to forensic oratory and, if it appears in
deliberative oratory, should be used to show examples of what has previously happened to
lead the audience to decide what should happen in the future (*Rh. 3.16.11*). The *pisteis* is the
proof of a speech, used to argue the points that are relevant. The most effective types of *pisteis

¹ *Ar. Rh. 13.3.4,* though he claims (*Rh. 3.13.1*) that there is an absolute need for only two divisions,
statement of the issue and proof.
in deliberative oratory, according to Aristotle (Rhet. 3.17.4-5, 10), are those that incorporate examples to prove the veracity of what is being claimed. Finally, the epilogos is a conclusion to the speech, and Aristotle (Rhet. 3.19.1) says that it has four roles: to create ethos (a display of the moral strength of the orator), to amplify the arguments used in the speech, to evoke pathos (a feeling of pity that plays on the audience’s emotions) and to recapitulate what has been said. He also states (Rhet. 13.3.4) that the epilogos is not required and is only a memory aid.

While On the Khersonnese possesses an identifiable prooimion and epilogos which introduce the main logos of the speech and restates them clearly and succinctly, the diegesis and pistis sections are not separate, but are integrated throughout the logos. In doing so, D. produces rhetorical structures that do not conform to traditional Aristotelian definitions. A logos in D.’s rhetoric is best described as an argument that incorporates both the diegesis and pistis sections. D. is also innovative in this speech in his manner of deployment of these logoi, organising them in rings. This is shown below to be a common feature of D.’s deliberative oratory (Appendices 1 and 2); of D.’s deliberative speeches, only speech 5, On the Peace, and speech 2, the Second Olynthiac, vary significantly from D.’s pattern of ring structure for the overall logos structure of the speech, indicating that, over time, D.’s deliberative oratory demonstrates a high degree of structural continuity. As a result of this ring structure, the arguments need to be examined separately to indicate not only their rhetorical features, but also to show the connections between the logoi outlined in the prooimion and their placement in the body of the speech.
Amongst the ancient writers on rhetoric there was debate about how one should begin a
speech. Aristotle claimed that there is not always the need for a long prooimion. However, the
Rhetoric to Alexander regarded it as an important section and lists a number of tricks to capture
the listeners’ attention and win their goodwill (29.3-26). Aristotle was openly dismissive of such
gambits saying that such appeals are a waste of time, as they make the speaker act like a slave
(Rhet. 3.14.8-10). In writing and structuring his prooimia, D. tends to share Aristotle’s
sensibilities. His prooimia generally resemble the one given in On the Khersonese in structure
and length. They traditionally provide a clear and succinct introduction to the main arguments
and do not appeal to the audience with tricks to gain the attention and good will of the
audience. In this speech, D. introduces the main logoi (8.1, 4-8, 9-12; another important feature
of Aristotle’s prooimion) and does not make appeals of pathos to the audience, as suggested in
the Rhetoric to Alexander. Instead, the speech relies on two other types of persuasion that
Aristotle (Rhet. 1.2.3-4) mentions should be introduced in the prooimion: ethos (using the
moral authority and standing of the speaker to enhance the argument) and logos (the truth,
apparent or real, inherent in the speech). Throughout the speech, it is notable that D. focuses
not on pathos, but on the ethos and logos of Aristotle’s types of artistic proof. Much of what
D. uses can be characterised as ethos, depicting himself as the ‘good orator’ (8.23, 32, 69, 70-
71, 73), in contrast to the poor counsellors which the audience is now habituated to follow (8.1,
23, 29, 33-34, 52-53, 57, 67). On ethos in D.’s deliberative oratory, see below, pp. 11-12.

One of the main functions of the prooimion is to introduce the key arguments (logoi) that flow through the rest of the speech. There are three discrete logoi in the speech, all introduced in the prooimion. This is paralleled in most of D.’s sumbouleutic oratory, where there are usually three or, occasionally, four separate logoi. These logoi across the Demosthenic canon vary in length depending on the total length of the speech. On the Khersonnese is the longest sumbouleutic speech of D., with most of his deliberative speeches tending to be approximately half this length (notable exceptions are the First and Third Philippics).

Chapters one to thirteen introduce the main logoi clearly, delineating several key features of each. After focusing on his ethos as a public figure by deprecating those who he claims are not acting in the best interest of the State, D. outlines the first logos briefly: namely that there are those in Athens who are not to be trusted (1). Though this is the shortest outline of a logos in the prooimion, D. devotes the most time to developing this logos later in the speech. D. then outlines his second logos, that, even though there have been no open declarations of war, Philip is very much at war with Athens (4-8) and so there is a need to ensure that the North is protected. Finally, he outlines the third logos, that the standing force of Diopeithes is needed because Philip has demonstrated that he is able to mobilise quickly and is always ready to

1 See outline of arguments of D.’s deliberative speeches in Appendix 1.
extract maximum advantage from any change in circumstances (9-12). In this logos, D. successfully characterises Philip as an enemy of the city; he creates the image of a particularly dangerous Philip whom the Athenians do not perceive as untrustworthy and crafty and posing an immediate threat (12).

Along with the introduction to arguments (logoi), the speech also introduces a number of important ‘commonplaces’ (topoi). The first topos D. expresses in the prooimion of this speech is the idea that speakers should not be driven by the pursuit of kharis in presenting policies to the ekklesia. A topos is a general argument or theme, characterised later by Aristotle as a general idea leading to the use of enthymemes (Rhet. 2.25.1-7). An enthymeme is an argument in which one of the premises (usually the conclusion) is left unstated to allow the audience to draw their own meaning from the argument. This first topos is presented in the form of an enthymeme: all speakers should present the advice that is in the best interest of the city, other men do not, hence D. implies that he is the one speaker who puts the interests of the city ahead of his own personal political benefit. D. is thus attacking other speakers by suggesting that while it is the duty of those who wish to advise the city to give the best advice only, other speakers are incapable of this. Their desire to ingratiate themselves with the audience causes them to be derelict in their duty. D. here is working with a tradition that can be traced as far back as Plato’s Gorgias (502E-503A), where Sokrates points out that there are two types of rhetoricians, one who is base and panders to the mob for his own personal motives, while the other is driven by a desire to do good for the city. There is a striking similarity in vocabulary.
Plato also uses the term “πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις,” indicating the similar appeal for kharis (favour or goodwill) to the type of orator indicated at the outset of D.’s speech. This self-creation as the type of sumboulos who is like Plato’s ‘good orator’ is an important aspect of D.’s oratory, most famously in the Third Olynthiac, which begins with this important topos (possibly because prior to this speech, D. did not believe he had a sufficiently developed record of activities to establish such a reputation). At 3.3, D. expresses the same idea, appealing to the audience to understand that he is not one of the speakers who speaks to gain their kharis, as others do. He enhances this topos in the Third Olynthiac by appealing to the greatness of past Athenians who also used to speak frankly, as he claims to be doing (3.21-26). This section of the Third Olynthiac is D.’s first detailed exposition of this theme of speakers in the ekklesia not presenting counsel in the best interests of the city; rather they present advice that will appeal to the audience and win their approval. He reuses words and phrases from 13.26-31 and 23.207 to condemn these men completely (MacDowell, 2009: 237).

The idea of ethos as a form of pists in D.’s sumbouleutic speeches is first used by D. in his speech On the Peace, delivered in 346, where he also utilises ethos in an extended logos. This logos involves a number of rhetorical techniques, including narrative, inductive reasoning and paradeigmata (examples), to show why the Athenians should listen to his advice (5.5-11). There is a similar section in the First Philippic outlining how his advice had been correct after returning from the second embassy (6.29-31; see Introduction, pp. 119-20). The Rhetoric to Alexander (14.8) indicates that a speaker should outline their experience in public affairs to enhance their...
standing in the eyes of the audience. Both of these sections utilise numerous examples of D.’s experience. This technique is also outlined in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (8.1-10.3), where the author explains that the use of many *paradeigmata* in succession can be used to show clearly why the speaker should be believed.

In discussing the *topoi* that frequent the *prooimion*, it is worthwhile to observe (following Usher 1999: 210-11) that D. has a tendency to blend the three basic *topoi* of justice/honour, expediency and possibility rather than treating each one separately. Always the aim is to help bolster the main *logoi*. So, for example, at 8.3, D. talks about the enemy of the *polis* (Philip) acting aggressively in their regions (the Khersonnese) and associates it with acting profitably for themselves (συμφέρειν). The language of moral outrage blends with the considerations of what lies in Athens’ best self-interest. He also blends the *topoi* of expediency, honour and possibility at 8.10-11, where he claims that the city is losing all of the advantages as it does not have a standing force available to take charge of situations as they arise (expediency), which leaves Athens trying to prepare after the fact as they are not ready (and so are stripped of honour). Similarly, the *topos* of justice, the notion that Philip is not acting in a just manner, giving those who resist him moral superiority, is outlined in the *prooimion* (8.7-8), again a theme utilised elsewhere in D.’s sumbouleutic *prooimia* (1.5, 2.9-10). Hence, while D. does not always use the same *topoi* in his *prooimia*, they all serve the same function –to introduce the *logoi* and try to place himself in the best possible light as a speaker.
D. is not alone in focusing on the idea of the good counsellor (sumboulos). This idea of the morally good orator is paralleled in Isokrates’ work where he argues that rhetoric is an important tool to lead to the morally right choices being taken (4.4-5; for discussion, see Poulakos, 1997: 80-86). This is also seen in the Gorgias (503a-b) where Sokrates claims that there was a noble use for rhetoric, which involved speaking only for the care of the citizens, telling them what they needed to hear whether it was pleasant or not for them to hear it. This is clearly what D. tried to do when he made his arguments from ethos (especially at 8.68-75), claiming through induction (where the audience makes the connection between the good citizen and D.) that he is the good citizen he describes (8.71-72; on this rhetorical trick, see Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 22.1).

The appeal to ethos in the prooimion is a common feature of Demosthenic rhetoric (also seen in 3.3, 4.1, 6.6, 9.3, 13.1-2, 12-13, 15.1, 16.2-3). As he does in On the Khersonese, D. explains that other speakers are not providing advice that is logical or are providing advice that has not worked and he now needs to outline the policy that is in the best interests of Athens, free from any partisan politics. D. not only reminds the Athenians of his previously correct advice (whether it was followed or not), but also uses paradeigmata of prominent Athenians of the past to justify his occasionally unpalatable advice.

D’s use of paradeigmata (eg. 8.18, 30, 36-37), eikos (probability – eg. 1.8, 1.11, 3.8, 9.33-35) and semeia (likely actions based on previous instances – eg. 8.15, 20) are outlined as typical
features of rhetoric by Aristotle. According to Aristotle (Rhet. 1.2.8-10), logical argument has two forms. Firstly, induction, by using *paradeigmata*, is used to show how one event can be paralleled by other occasions. D. particularly uses *paradeigmata* to illustrate points in his arguments, but he is sparing of them, as were all orators, lest they be considered ‘know-it-alls’ (Milns, 2000: 214). The second method uses arguments based not on previous examples, but on likelihood (8.15, 20). This second method is discussed by Aristotle (Rhet. 1.2.14-17), where he implies that *eikos* and *semeia* are necessary as all human actions possess a degree of similarity and predictability.

For example, D. uses induction to show that Philip cannot be trusted at any time (8.59) as he has previously professed friendship towards Oreos and Pherae then turned on them. He uses an enthymeme to show that it is logical for Athens to be Philip’s target (8.44-45) as a result of his willingness to spend time in horrible, unpleasant locations to strengthen his chances of taking Athens. This is a well-used method in Demosthenic rhetoric, with similar enthymemes used by D. in 4.4, 6.16, 6.24 and 9.73 (Wooten, 2008: 52, 132, 134, 165). D. is particularly adept at using enthymemes. Blass (1893: 206-07) noted that D. tends to use historical examples in his enthymemes as it strengthens his arguments, making them seem as though they are more valid and correct, and this can be seen in On the Khersonese.

The Rhetoric to Alexander pointed out that to use maxims to prove your *logoi* enhanced the credibility of a speech and the appeal to the city-folk (22.1-2). D. used maxims to good effect.
For example, he said at 8.25, “λαμβάνουσι δ’ οἱ μὲν ἐχοντες μίαν ή δύο ναῦς ἐλάττωνα, οἱ δὲ μείζω δύναμιν πλείστα. καὶ διδόσιν οἱ διδόντες οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ οὔτε τὰ πολλὰ ἀντ’ οὐδενός (οὗ γὰρ οὔτω μαίνονται),” an example of the Rhetoric to Alexander’s maxim from specific situations (11.3-4), while his maxim at 8.42 (ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτήσαι καὶ κατασχὲιν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες, ἀλλ’ ἔτερον λαβὲι κωλὺσαι καὶ ἐχὸντ’ ἀφελέσθαι δεινοί, καὶ ὅλως ἐνοχλήσαι τοῖς ἀρχεῖν βουλομένοις καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἑλευθερίαν ἐξελέσθαι ἐτοιμοὶ”) is an example of a maxim based on exaggeration, taking a general principle (untrue though this example may be considered by many) and amplifying it.

The first logos (8.13-37)

D. begins the body of his speech with the logos introduced last in his prooimion. He outlines the state of affairs for the audience, showing that Philip is a threat to Athens in the North and is keen to pursue Byzantion and the Khersonnese (8.13-16). The simple solution is to leave Diopeithes in the North (8.17). As a result of the Athenians’ lack of desire to provide money or serve in person (8.21, 23), Diopeithes must be allowed to continue what Athenian generals have always done: ‘raise’ money from allies and vessels on the sea (8.21-22). D. argues that this is not only precedented (8.24-26) but safe, as Diopeithes can always be recalled if necessary (8.28). To recall him now, when he has done nothing improper or unprecedented, would be dangerous to Athenian interests in the region (8.28-29). In chapters 31 to 37, D. links this argument to one of the main themes of the speech, showing that there is a group of self-interested orators, on the payroll of Philip, who have brought Athens low in this regard (8.32-
34). These orators have taught the demos to listen only to pretty speeches (8.34). This is proven using an extensive section imagining what other Greeks might say (8.35-37) to show that Athens has done nothing as a result of poor advice while Philip has been campaigning productively.

The first section of the *logos* features a number of rhetorical questions and direct speech to frame ideas and put them to the audience, for example, “νὴ Δία, κακοδαιμονῶσι γάρ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἄνοια” when talking about Byzantion and its continuing belief that Philip is their friend (8.16). D. also uses successive direct speech in question and answer (8.18) when talking about Diogeithes being brought to trial and how that would be a boon to Philip. This technique adds variety to the way he is delivering his message and distances his own voice from his suggestions. D. also uses extended rhetorical quotation (8.35-37) to put words into the allies’ mouths to show his audience how ridiculous the Athenians must look to other Greeks through their inaction. The use of another’s voice to communicate D.’s ideas or to address specific issues that might be raised against his arguments is significantly increased in this speech (8.16, 17, 20, 23, 27, 31, 35-37, 38, 51, 68, 70, 74-75); in contrast, the speech with the next highest number of instances of this is the Second Philippic (6.11, 25, 44). The increased use of direct speech in this manner dramatises the situation (Usher, 1999: 232), creating a far more aggressive and vigorous speech than previously delivered, simultaneously making it seem that it is not just D. suggesting these ideas. Bers (1997: 214) indicates that this use of *oratio recta* (speech ‘directly’ reported in another speech) is written to “enliven the speech” and draw
the audience into D.’s arguments on his terms.\footnote{Ancient critics never directly discussed this rhetorical technique, only implying its use when discussing characterisation of voices in speech (Quintilian 3.89.49-50; anonomyi in Aristotelis Artem Rhetoricam Commentaria, 158.21-159.4, 159.14-18).} At 8.52, D. uses oratio rectia to bring rapidity to the movement of the speech by moving from oratio obliqua (speech implied in another speech) to oratio recta (underlined):

πάντα τοίνυν τάλλ᾽ εἰπὼν ἄν ἡδέως, καὶ δείξας ὅν τρόπον ὑμᾶς ἐνιοὶ καταπολιτεύονται, τά μὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἐάσω· ἄλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν τι τῶν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐμπέσῃ, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς τις λέγει τὸ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τρέφειν δύναμιν μεγάλην ὡς χαλεπόν, καὶ ὀδιαρπάζειν τινὲς τὰ χρήματα βούλονται,’ καὶ τοιούτους λόγους...

The Second Logos (8.38-51)

D. devotes more time to developing this logos, that Philip is already at war with Athens and by extension democracy itself – he states this explicitly at the start of the logos (8.39, 40-42). D. uses paradeigmata to show how Philip is crafty and not to be trusted when he says he is not at war. The fate of Euthykrates and Lasthenes of Olynthos (8.40) are offered up as paradeigmata of Philip’s duplicity. Moreover, D. asserts that all of Philip’s actions have been undertaken with the aim of bringing Athens under his control (8.40). The reason for this is simple; while the Athenians have not actively sought power and arke (8.42), they have traditionally been the protector of Greece (8.48-51). This is the reason that Athens must be the target of his activities
(8.60). They alone are likely to spring to the defence of the other Greek states. D. uses an argument from eikos to show that it is logical to think that Philip is aiming at control of Athens; he pursues undesirable locations, so therefore he would obviously want to take the desirable Attike much more (8.44-45). As a result of this desire to attack Athens, D. claims that the city must be in a state of preparedness (8.46-47). He argues that Athens must shake off this slothfulness, raise money, call upon the allies to support them and send out a permanent force that is properly maintained and supervised otherwise Athens will be shamed (51).

D. frequently argues that Philip is not to be trusted, an important topos in this logos. 8.38-40 demonstrates this clearly: D. starts with the premise that Philip is at war with the city and is bent on the destruction of everyone, including those who consider themselves his friends. D. then uses paradeigmata to show that Philip is not to be trusted by anyone, even those who actively support Macedonia. D. leaves the conclusion unstated, implying that everyone will suffer the same fate as those who trust him. We then see D. creating a connection between the second and third logoi at 8.53-69. D. takes this theme and enlarges it, fully explaining all of the events in a narrative of questionable veracity, leaving the conclusion similarly unsaid: Philip is not to be trusted and, if he is taken at his word, Athens will suffer the same fate as other states. This is an example of what the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (12.1-3) calls semeia, where D. talks about what usually happens prior to, or as a result of, similar incidents. Attacks on Philip’s character are associated with promoting a deep mistrust of Philip and are also a common topos in D.’s sumbouleutic speeches (for example, 1.12-13, 2.15-21, 4.49, 6.20-25, 9.10, 56-62).
Elsewhere, D. emphasises that Philip has grown great as a direct result of Athenian inactivity and indolence (8.1.9, 2.3-4, 23, 3.28, 4.9, 11, 31, 6.4)¹ whereas in this speech, D. does not attack Athenian inactivity so directly, talking more in terms of poor policy decisions (8.12, 13, 21, 49, 53), possibly as he did not want his audience to feel directly implicated in poor decision-making as it may turn them away from supporting his proposals. It also enhances his *topos* of poor political leadership. Similarly, in the next speech in the corpus (and chronologically), the *Third Philippic*, D. does not reference this at all, but talks about the fact that Philip has the benefit of unilateral decision-making that results in quick and decisive military actions while Athens only talks about what to do (9.22-24). This is another common *topos* of D.’s speeches concerning Philip (1.4, 2.23, 4.9, 6.4), referenced in this speech also (11). Notably, D. is forced to use ‘moral imperatives’ to compel the Athenians to do what he is urging (Usher, 1999: 232-33), no doubt because Philip is actually not in breach of the peace. He uses *ekhthros* rather than *polemios* to denote Philip See Commentary, 8.3, pg. 139), justifying Athenian action in the absence of an actual event that constituted a legitimate *casus belli*. This focus on Philip in this speech serves to take the focus off Diopeithes, who becomes a secondary figure of the speech when the text would have been directly prompted by Diopeithes’ actions (Usher, 1999: 238-39).

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¹ Usher (1999: 218) indicates that in the *prooimion* of speech 4, D. references the Thucydidean notion that the state who is on the spot is best able to determine the situation for their benefit; this is rarely Athens.
A particular skill demonstrated in this speech is D.’s ability to tie together multiple *topoi* that lead to a logical recommendation. We can see this with regards to the trustworthiness of Philip.

8.34-48 is a single argument within the second *logos* consisting of three separate *topoi* of:

- bribery and corruption in Athenian politics that has led to Athenian honour being tarnished;
- the danger in which Athens is now placed as a result of this bribery and dishonour; and the opportunities presented for the regrowth of Athens if they adequately prepare to meet Philip by following D.’s advice. These *topoi* are thematically linked (the danger of Philip), which leads to D.’s recommendations for what should be done against this dangerous enemy. 8.34-37 begins with the premise that Philip is at war with Athens and it is the fault of corrupt Athenian citizens.¹ D. uses an imaginary speech of a potential ally and leaves the conclusion unstated that the potential allies of Athens perceive the Athenians as inactive. 8.38-40 asserts that Philip is at war with Athens and is bent on the destruction of everyone, including those who actively support Philip. He uses the *paradeigma* of the Olynthians who had supported Philip then suffered at his hands, again leaving the conclusion unstated that everyone would suffer at the hands of Philip, an example of a technique called induction. 8.40-43 explicitly states that Philip is bent on the complete destruction of Athens and is an enemy of democracy. Milns (2000: 216-17) points out that this *topos* is developed across D.’s oratory, beginning with 1.5, then progressing through his speeches (4.48, 6.20-25); 8.41-43 is the clearest and most eloquent

¹ We can see from the implication at 15.31-33 that this is not just limited to those who are Philip’s supporters. This can be seen as evidence that bribery by external enemies was probably more of a rhetorical *topos* in D.’s speeches than an historical reality.
expression of this idea.¹ D. indicates that Philip, as a King, must be opposed to democracy as a result of the very nature of kingship. To cap off the string of topoi, 8.43-47 starts with the explicit statement that Philip is aiming all of his efforts towards his ultimate goal, the destruction of Athens. He has spent an inordinate amount of time and personal effort capturing desolate outposts in Thrace, leaving the conclusion unstated that if Philip would spend so much time taking these locations, he would surely be very keen to take Athens also. This leads to the recommendations proposed by D. – shake off the inaction, contribute funds, call in allies and provide a permanent army in the North. The finale to this remarkable piece of rhetoric is the appeal to ethos, where D. says that he would rather die than let other Greek states be captured by this man as a result of Athenian inaction; such an act would be unworthy of their noble forebears. Demosthenic oratory abounds with these techniques, but some of the examples in this speech are the most complete and well-executed in the sumbouleutic corpus, indicating that the speech may have been through a rigorous editing and re-writing process. Indeed, this logos is one of the most technically sophisticated in the Demosthenic corpus, utilising most of the rhetorical techniques at his disposal.

*The third logos (8.52-75)*

D. dedicates the most time in the speech to developing his main logos, the first outlined in the introduction, thus completing an overall ring structure of the speech. He starts by outlining that

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¹ MacDowell (2009: 221) points to another example in 15.17-18, indicating that D. argues that wars between democracies are disputes, whereas wars between a democracy and an oligarchy (or monarchy) are disagreements about the fundamental nature of freedom.
the current repose in Athens is being bought dearly by the loss of Athenian territory in the North. The only beneficiaries are those who propose such policies of inactivity while the city suffers (8.52-55). He then enlarges the *topos* (8.56-72) that Philip is a genuine threat to Athens, while the speakers who advise the Athenians not to go to war with Philip receive many benefits. While these men who propose peace are benefitting, Athens is being denuded of money and allies and those who receive the blame are the “best counsellors” (8.56-58). He urges the Athenians to make a decision (*diadikasia*) about whom they should trust. This paradox about war and peace is also expounded by D. in great detail in the *Third Philippic* (9.53-69), where he creates a *logos* that is rich in *paradeigmata* of what happens to those who place their misguided trust in Philip at the expense of their own state. D. also creates a similar argument in *For the people of Megalopolis*, where D. alleges (16.19-31), again in a sophisticated *logos*, that the Athenians need to listen to those who do not have vested interests. D. claims that there is no doubt in his mind that Philip is a threat to Athenian interests and he uses Oreos, Pherai and Olynthos as *paradeigmata* to show that Philip does not declare war until the city in his sights is unable to defend itself (8.58-59). The inevitable slavery that results from this policy of inaction goes against the natural instincts of a city that is used to ruling others (8.60). He again references those who are operating in Philip’s interests within Athens, urging the Athenians to punish them (8.61). D. uses *paradeigmata* to show how Philip’s agents are being beguiled and that all Athenians will suffer if Philip succeeds, referencing the experience of the Thessalians, the Olynthians and the Thebans (8.62-63) then amplifying this by outlining instances where Athens has already been beguiled by Philip (8.64). He then expands on this
logos by outlining that in the regions first fooled by Philip it would not have been safe to talk about alliance with him unless Philip had first done a benevolent act, whereas the Athenians have never received the benevolence but have only suffered at the hands of Philip, yet still remain reluctant to criticise him (8.65-66). D. argues that this suffering has happened as a direct result of the politicians who argue against a war with Philip; all of these men have mysteriously grown wealthy and influential (8.66), a clear attack on their true loyalties. D. then criticises these allegedly corrupt, pro-Macedonian politicians by saying that they want Athens to remain passive while they are active in achieving Philip’s goals (8.67). D. himself does not speak from a desire to receive such personal gain, but for what he considers the best for the State, regardless of how the audience will react to him (8.68-69). He believes that this is the purpose of a “useful citizen” (8.70) and states that his policy has never been the same as these men (8.71). D. then ends this logos with the claim that the duty of a good citizen is to instruct and guide citizens in the pursuit of the best policies for the city (8.72). He invokes an extended paradeigma of a useful citizen, Timotheos (8.73-75), providing an example of how useful advice can lead to good action by reminding the Athenians of Timotheos’ advice about assisting the Euboians against the Thebans in 357 (DS 16.7.2; Aeskh. 3.85, for the campaign; Plut. de gl. Ath. 8, 350f; see Commentary 8.74, pg. 233-34), then linking it to his own actions (8.74-75). Bers (1997: 150-51) emphasises that the significance of an orator doing this is not in reporting what

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1 This is given an expanded section in the Fourth Philippic (70-74; for the nature of the relationship between speeches 8 and 10, see below, pp. 27-34).
was said by way of advice, but in the use of the moral authority of the individual whom the orator is allegedly reporting, to enhance his ethos.

An important aspect of D’s ethos is that he is a citizen who advises what is best for the city, not simply delivering speeches full of ideas that pander to the people. The role of a useful citizen is, as he states at 8.68-75 and in the prooimion, to present a practical policy, free from partisan politics which may not always be to the liking of the ekklesia. It is interesting that this is the only time in his sumbouleutic oratory that D. presents this theme in detail. While we have the idea presented by D. that the people are listening to poor advice from wilfully misleading or incompetent speakers (for example, 3.30-32, 6.29-36, 9.53-70), D. does not until this point in his recorded speeches make this claim. This could be a result of the emphasis on ethos in the speech, which stems from the fact that this is the period of his greatest dominance in the ekklesia.

The epilogos (76-77)

Aristotle (Rhet. 3.19.1) says that the purpose of the epilogos is to dispose the audience favourably to the speaker, stirring the audience’s emotions and recapitulating the main points of the speech. Sometimes, it can be omitted with a simple recapitulation of points in a shorter speech (Rhet. 3.13.3). Aristotle’s epilogos stands in contrast to the ideas of Dionysios of Halikarnassos, who believed that the epilogos was important because of the pathos it could raise in the audience. D. uses a simple epilogos, restating the main arguments of the speech:
pay contributions and keep Diopeithes’ force in the Khersonnese, ensuring that it remains in existence regardless of any negative actions and punish those politicians who advocate policies that are going to lead to the ruin of the State (8.76). He also adds that Athens should send out ambassadors to instruct, exhort and act, which can be tied to the arguments about ensuring allies are maintained (see especially 8.66-67). D. finishes the speech by stating that if this is not done, nothing will be able to save the State (8.77).

It is interesting that D. does not appeal to pathos in this speech, as Dionysios suggests. While it is not a common feature of D.’s sambouleutic oratory, he does occasionally excite pathos in his audience, pointing out the poor situation in which the Athenians find themselves in an effort to convince them to act in the manner he is proposing (2.1-2, 3.1-2, 9, 4.2-3, 5.1, 6.8). He does this through topoi that are relevant to what he is saying in each particular situation, enhancing the ethos and logos. This lack of pathos is possibly because the speech was written as a pamphlet for distribution rather than a speech to be delivered in the ekklesia (see below, pp. 27-34), which removes the need to evoke pathos in this way. Hence it focuses on the use of logical argument and sophisticated rhetorical techniques to achieve its end.

Kennedy (2007: 72) points to a well-known feature of Demosthenic oratory known as ‘psychological planning,’ where there are a small number of logoi (three in this instance), but they are linked by the continual revival of a theme. In this speech, though D. seeks to demonstrate that Philip is at war with Athens and they need a standing army in the field, the
continual theme that links the entire speech (including a large proof devoted to it exclusively) is the idea that Athens is brought low by poor and corrupt political leadership. The links back to this theme occur throughout the speech and serve to show that while Philip is indeed at war with Athens, the poor leaders are to blame.¹ By ending the speech with a demonstration of how he is not one of those leaders, D. has created a continual impression that poor leaders are to blame through this psychological planning, while he is simultaneously showing himself as the advisor to whom they should now pay attention in order to lead them out of danger. This significantly enhances the impact of the speech as a whole and would have led to the audience of this speech judging him to be worthy of giving advice. The frequent use of the connective τοίνυν is crucial in this respect. It is a word that D. uses to start all sections of the speech to create clear divisions, while still creating a flowing narrative by the revival of this theme. This flow assists in demonstrating that he is not one of those professional politicians who cause problems; D. is simply a concerned citizen proposing what needs to be done (Kennedy, 2007: 73). D.’s self-fashioning in this manner is noted as a key aspect of the performance culture of democratic Athens (Goldhill, 1999: 5, 7-8), where a politician creates the image he desires through the assertion of a set of values in his text, whether performed in the ekklesia or read in a circulated work.

¹ This also features as the main theme of the First Philippic (Usher, 1999: 224).
The relationship between *On the Khersonnese* (8) and the ‘Fourth Philippic’ (10) and the dating of *On the Khersonnese*

Scholars have long debated the connection between D.’s speeches 8 and 10. The main connection is two long passages that are almost identical, taken from 10.11-27 and 10.55-70 and inserted in 8.38-67 (see Daitz, 1957: 152-158 for a complete and detailed discussion of these passages). An important aspect in this debate is the fact that, when compared to D.’s other deliberative speeches, the so-called *Fourth Philippic* is of a comparatively poor standard. This led to the *Fourth Philippic* being questioned about its Demosthenic authorship. While there may be good reason to believe this, the matter is complicated by the fact that a fragment of Didymos (Diels and Schubart, 1904) clearly indicates that speech 10 was believed in antiquity to be Demosthenic. The debate is summarised by Adams (1938: 129-132) who should be read in conjunction with Daitz (1957, the summary of the findings of his PhD thesis). The key to the connection may lie in the issue of D.’s publication of his speeches.

It had generally been assumed that D. produced published versions of his speeches; indeed, Plutarch (Dem. 9.4) reported an ancient tradition, where it was indicated that D. was bolder in his spoken speeches than his written ones. Plutarch (11.4) also says that, when read out, D.’s speeches seemed well-arranged (11.4). This could imply that D. wrote more polished versions of speeches for dissemination, and Harris (1995: 10-11) compares D.’s (19) and Aiskhines’ (2)

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1 See also Sealey (1993: 233-35) who suggests, on the basis of the common sections, that Dem. 8 consisted originally of chapters 1-37 only, with later insertions by interpolators from Dem. 10.
speeches against each other, indicating that there is indeed evidence of the speeches being changed after delivery. We know that speeches of a political nature by other authors were written out and distributed (e.g. Isokrates’ Areopagitikos, On the Peace and Plataikos; Hansen, 1984: 67). Indeed, Too (1995: 127-29) claims that the written word and its publication became a tool for Isokrates to become the sumboulos of other states, indicating that the verb diadidonai implies that the longer speeches were likely published and possibly disseminated (cf. Sandys, 1872: xlii; Matthieu, 1926: 66). Aside from the more ‘written’ qualities inherent in speech 8 (Daitz, 1957: 159), the speech would have made excellent political propaganda at a time when D. was urging Athens to find allies around Greece in 340.

One way of resolving the problem of the identical passages is to assume that we have two versions of essentially the same speech. The Fourth Philippic represents a set of ‘speech notes’ written and delivered for a speech in a debate in the ekklesia,¹ and that On the Khersonnese represents the published version of this speech, distributed in 340 at an unknown point (most likely by spring, 340, as the Etelians were blowing – see Commentary 8.14, pg. 166-67).

There is some suggestion that ‘speech note’ versions of a speech could circulate as well as more polished versions. There are parallels for the state of the Fourth Philippic speech. For example, MacDowell (2000: 23-27) suggests that speech 19, On the False Embassy, was not delivered as we have it but represents a speech with extensive notes at the end to assist with

¹ Tuplin (1998: 291) also seems to imply this but does not explore the connection further.
extemporaneous speaking. We can see parallels to this in the Fourth Philippic. The lack of polish to the speech, the inclusion of what appears to be a random suggestion about Persian support that seems out of place (10.31-34) and the inclusion of a section on the highly topical Theoric Fund (10.35-42) suggest that this was not a published speech, rather it indicates that it was probably designed for D.’s use in the ekklesia.

There are other elements that suggest the Fourth Philippic are speech notes. Take, for example, the unusual attack on Aristodemos (10.70-71), a politician of the time (accused by D. in 18.21 as being in the pay of Philip). It is the only mention of an Athenian politician by name in the whole corpus of sumbouleutic speeches written by D. If we assume that the Fourth Philippic is a different type of speech, not one for dissemination to a reading audience, the speech takes on a different character. As Adams (1938: 137) notes, it would be perfectly proper for D. to attack another politician by name in the ekklesia. The mention of the Great King (10.32-34), the abrupt transition from this to a discussion regarding the Theoric Fund (10.36-37) and the nature of conflict between the poor and the rich at the time (10.38-45) is also seen as a problem in speech 10 as they are raised abruptly with little connection, then dropped by D. rapidly and without exploration and connection to the other ideas raised in the speech. Again, this could be solved if we assume that D. wrote these sections as preparation notes for speaking extemporaneously about topical issues. The issue of Philip’s man, Hermeias, being captured by the Great King would have been extremely topical and may well have given some cause for believing that Persian funds may become available for Athens (10.31-34; see Chroust, 1972:
171-72 for discussion about the nature of the role Hermeias played in conjunction with Aristotle). The abrupt change of subject with little connection at 10.35 tends to suggest that D. wrote it as notes for himself rather than as a final version of a speech designed for circulation.

Internal evidence within the two speeches also suggests that the *Fourth Philippic* predates *On the Khersonese*. Some evidence for the dating of the speeches is provided by the change of language with regards to the strongholds in Thrace. At 10.15 Philip is only “said” to be holding them (τί γὰρ ἄν ἄλλο τις εἶποι Δρογγίλον καὶ Καβύλην καὶ Μάστειραν καὶ ἄ γυν φασίν αὐτὸν ἔχειν), with the Greek making it clear that this is not certain, whereas the wording is slightly changed at 8.44, where it is clear that Philip has taken these strongholds and is actively getting them ready for action (τί γὰρ ἄν ἄλλο τις εἶποι Δρογγίλον καὶ Καβύλην καὶ Μάστειραν καὶ ἄ γυν ἐξαιρεῖται καὶ κατασκευάζεται). Other evidence includes the lack of reference to Diopeithes in the *Fourth Philippic* which strongly suggests that the speech predates the action of Diopeithes that caused Philip to send an embassy to Athens in spring 341. It is also likely that the *Fourth Philippic* was written before it was realised that Philip had made a move into Euboea (possibly by the end of 342) as D. would have made mention of it in a speech designed to raise anger against Philip (*cf.* 9.33, 58). Finally, the siege of Byzantion (8.14-15) is referenced prophetically – more than likely a reference to Philip’s failed siege after the fact rather than D.’s accurate prognostication. Had Byzantion been attacked at the time D. wrote and delivered the *Fourth Philippic*, he would have been sure to mention it as it endangered the grain supply.
The impact of this is that the chronology of the speeches would be speech 10, followed by speech 8, then speech 9 (the Third Philippic).

Adams believed that D. made an unpublished speech in spring 341 regarding affairs in the Khersonnese, then before June 341 he delivered the Fourth Philippic to the ekklesia. D. then combined both of these speeches at some point after 338 to create On the Khersonnese to justify his unsuccessful opposition to Philip. The Fourth Philippic was later published after D.’s death. Daitz (1957: 160) concludes that On the Khersonnese is a published version of the Fourth Philippic that was written sometime before the final outbreak of war with Philip, possibly around 340, which incorporated elements of a June 341 speech in the ekklesia. Also, Daitz (1957: 155) points out that 8.46 seems to be appealing to allies, which would best fit the speech into some point during 340, probably when war had been declared as a result of Philip’s seizure of the grain ships (18.73). Yunis (1996: 255-8) believes that D. did not publish any speeches in the period between 342/41 and Khaironeia, but a revised, published speech of On the Khersonnese fits best in 340 as a result of the move towards finding allies to fight Philip.

Trevett (1996) argues that this view is incorrect, however, and that the evidence for D. publishing his speeches is problematic. For example, Trevett argues that politicians had to be able to think on their feet and written speeches would have been a significant hindrance to this; moreover, that it would also mean that should D. wish to change his mind on an issue, he would have been at the mercy of his enemies’ ridicule for doing so when he had circulated
opposite views (1996: 434). While these are certainly considerations, they are not insurmountable – modern politicians seem to manage this issue.

Another argument that Trevett (1996: 441) has advanced is that D. did not publish his speeches as so few of them survive. It is more likely that D. wrote speeches in extended note form, using them to prepare him for extemporaneous speaking. Dorjahn, in a series of articles (1947, 1950, 1952, 1955), indicates strongly that, with regards to forensic oratory, there is evidence in the speeches we have to suggest that D. could speak extemporaneously. It is likely that he extensively prepared for his speeches – Plutarch (Dem. 8.3) tells us that he was accused of labouring so long over his speeches that they smelled of the lamp, while D. himself allegedly said that his speeches were not completely written nor unwritten (Plutarch, Dem. 8.4). It is unlikely that D. published all of his speeches, rather he published revised versions of those he felt best represented ‘policy positions’ with regards to certain important issues of the time while preparing thoroughly for all speeches. Also, as noted in Appendix 1, the ring structure of the speech tends to indicate that the speech was written for dissemination rather than for delivery in the ekklesia.

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1 Montgomery (1984: 40-50) analyses the nature of the deliberative speeches of D. and concludes that they are relatively faithful recreations of what D. actually said. They may represent some of the points raised by D. (with his written preparation before speeches, no doubt the published form did represent the oral in some way), but they should be treated with far greater caution than Montgomery seems to allow.

2 Yunis (1996: 243) understands the publication of speeches as a fundamental aspect of the growth of D. the politician, accepting Plutarch’s position on the written aspect of D. uncritically.
In contrast to the usual polish of D.’s speeches, the quality of the *Fourth Philippic* has been questioned stridently. Pearson (1976: 157) goes as far to say that the speech’s main quality is to show how good the other Philippic speeches are by the lack of quality shown in speech 10. While he does indicate that the *Fourth Philippic* contains Demosthenic elements, indicating that it was indeed written by D., Pearson concluded that it is most likely an unfinished work (1976: 155). This assessment does not take into consideration the oral nature of the speech. Of particular relevance here is Aristotle’s note that an oral speech is fundamentally different from a written one (Rhet. 3.12.1-2; Worthington, 1991: 57). MacDowell (1962: 21) also pointed out that short, simple and uncomplicated sentences (such as those in *The Fourth Philippic*) were best suited to the listening audience in a courtroom. This is no different to the *ekklesia*, where passions could have been even more inflamed than the courtroom. Daitz (1957: 158-59) explains that *On the Khersonnese* is a far more literary composition than the more oral nature of speech 10. Daitz (1957: 150-51) also indicates that, based on stylistic grounds, the common sections were lifted from the *Fourth Philippic* and inserted into *On the Khersonnese* as they fit into the flow of the narrative better in speech 10, whereas there is somewhat of a disconnect when the sections are inserted into speech 8, indicating the chronological priority of speech 10.

Thus, it is more likely that the *Fourth Philippic* was a set of ‘speech notes’ written and delivered for a speech in a debate in the *ekklesia*.¹ Also, it could be that *On the Khersonnese* represents

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¹ Tuplin (1998: 291) seems to imply this but does not explore the connection further.
the published version of this speech, distributed in 340 at an unknown point (most likely by spring, 340, as the Etians were blowing – see commentary 8.14, pg. 166).

Scholarship on the text

*On the Khersonnese* is remarkable for the lack of detailed scholarship it has produced. The speech is studied only in conjunction with other speeches, usually the Philippics or as part of a study of his deliberative oratory. As far back as 1597, an edition was published by Pauli of *On the Khersonnese* along with the Libanian Hypothesis. The speech was published with other deliberative speeches but lacked any commentary or apparatus. It is not until 1838 that there is any serious study of the speech, when Lord Brougham translated the speech as part of a number of examples of Greek oratory that show how to use ancient wisdom to inform modern decision making. Brougham (1838: 186) claims that, “In point of argument and conciseness, and when judged by the severest rules of criticism, it has no superior.” He translates the speech as an attempt to use Saxon idiom to make it more accessible to the readers of his own day. The translation has an apparatus to assist his readers in understanding his choice of words for the translation. The criticism of this attempt to translate the speech was scathing: “[Aspects of the translation] shows that his Lordship either has not felt the beauties of Demosthenes, or has not the power to express them” (*DR*, 1839 (4): 484). Brougham’s attempt (1838: 106-117) to directly associate the *On the Khersonnese* and *The Fourth Philippic* also spawned some ridicule, as the author of the same article claimed, “every scholar knows that it *The Fourth Philippic* is made up of scraps of others and is wholly without a masterly and luminous arrangement which
distinguishes Demosthenes” (DR, 1839 (4): 484). The attempt allegedly excited ridicule both in England and German at what was perceived as a simple error at the time: “Even his Lordship’s schoolboy acquaintance with the Grecian literature might have guarded him against such a fatal mistake” (DR, 1839 (4): 485). The article does make a cogent point – in a list of Demosthenic works that are read in England, the *On the Khersonnese* does not make the list (DR, 1839 (4): 484), indicating the lack of academic interest in the speech at this point.

The Rev. R. Whiston published an edition of Demosthenes with a detailed historical introduction and linguistic apparatus in 1859. The introduction to the work as a whole depicts D. as energetically leading the good fight against Philip, who had shown himself to be aggressive towards Athens (Whiston, 1859: xxiii-xxiv). The introduction to the speech (Whiston, 164-172) provides an admirable, if brief, outline of the history of the region, identifying aspects that had not been identified in previous translations. For example, it discusses Peisistratos’ interest in the region and Miltiades’ foundation of a settlement; it provides an account of the area in the fourth century after the Peloponnesian War, outlining the role played by Kotys and the revolt of Miltokythes; it discusses Iphikrates’ and Timotheos’ commands in the region; it outlines the growth of Kersobleptes’ power and the Athenian involvement in the region in the 360s in response to him. It completes the introduction by explaining the role played by Diopeithes in the outbreak of hostilities. The commentary is primarily linguistic in nature, but some excellent (but, again, brief) glosses of some key terms of the speech exist to provide a more meaningful context. For example, he glosses κατάγειν (Dem. 8.9) by explaining the nature of what
Diopeithes was probably doing (seizing ships and taking them to port for tolls or “blackmail” – Whiston, 1859: 177) He also glosses key locations such as Khalkidike (179), Megara and Oreos (180), and identifies key ideas of historical interest (eg. Dem. 8.28: μικρὸν πινάκιον – 183) and events of significance (eg. the revolt of Euboia – 185). All of these historical notes are brief and lack depth of explanation as to the relevance. The linguistic commentary written by Weil in 1898 is similarly constructed, as is that by Sandys in his two volume collection of deliberative speeches (1897, 1900).

This is the nature of the reception of the speech throughout much of the 20th century also, with no major work dedicated to a study of the speech. Recent work on the text has been summative in form, identifying the main arguments in a chronological context of D.’s speeches. For example, the most recent examples of this are those of Worthington (2013: 216-20), Trevett (2011) and MacDowell (2009: 346-349).

MacDowell focuses his discussion of the speech on the idea that it is an application of a theme D. has used elsewhere (that Philip, as Athens’ enemy, must be opposed) to the affairs of the Khersonnese. He discusses briefly D.’s tactic of refocusing the argument from Diopeithes to Philip, showing how D. moves the argument from a political one to a moral duty. MacDowell uses extracts from the text to demonstrate his broad points and does not engage critically in detail with either the historical or the rhetorical aspects of the speech as his work is focused on the overall nature of D.’s oratory.
A study of speeches 1 to 17 was undertaken by Trevett that was again brief in its outline of notes of historical significance. It was typical of the treatment of the speech in that it was done in conjunction with his other speeches and, while useful for a brief survey of the main characteristics and historical background, it lacked a depth of discussion due to the nature of the book.

Worthington’s work (2013) is a focus on D.’s life and his historical context. It is an excellent historical work on D. himself and uses his speeches to illustrate aspects of his life. He prefaces his outline of *On the Khersonnese* with a brief focus on the political and military situation, outlining the fact that Diopeithes was operating in the Khersonnese with minimal support and resources from the *demos*, which required him to appropriate funds and resources from hostile territory and states. Worthington uses the brief outline of the speech to demonstrate the way that D. widens his argument from the specific instance of Diopeithes to the larger picture of Philip as a threat to Athens. This, due to the nature of his overall work, requires him to be brief in his analysis of the speech.

Hence, there is no stand-alone commentary on *On the Khersonnese*. This commentary fills this gap in the scholarship at a time when research on Athenian relations with the North is expanding, requiring a closer study of what should be considered a fundamental text.
Athenian involvement in the North\(^1\) down to the end of the Peloponnesian War

Athens’ long history in the Northern Aegean is consistently and, almost from the outset, defined by an Athenian desire to control the region. While most accounts stress the importance of the grain trade as the reason for Athenian involvement in the North, it can be seen that the wealth generated by Thrace and the Northern Aegean was the most significant motivation to control the region down to the start of the fourth century. Traditional accounts emphasise the importance of the grain route through the Hellespont (for example, Meiggs, 1972: 160; de Ste Croix, 1972: 48; Kagan, 1974: 288; Powell, 1988: 1, 16) making this the prime motivation, but until the fourth century, Athens was not dependent on the grain trade solely from the Black Sea (see below, pp. 55-56, 58-59, 70-71, 72, 167-71). In fact, there is a singular lack of contemporary sixth and fifth-century evidence that indicates that control of the grain route was the primary consideration for Athenian control of Thrace and the Northern Aegean. It can be seen that, from the sixth-century, Athens sought to control Thrace and the North for political reasons and to ensure a steady supply of money to fund the expensive navy and democracy, with timber an important corollary.

\(^1\) The North can be described as the area taken in by the North Aegean region. In the ancient world, this included coastal Thrace and Macedonian territory, the Thracian Khersonnese, the Hellespont and Black Sea regions, and the northern regions of Asia Minor.
**Early Athenian Interest**

Athenian interest in the region began with the Olympic pankratiast Phrynon’s attempt to take control of Sigeion, on the coast of Asia Minor. Initially settled by the Mytilenaians, this city soon became a place of interest for the Athenians. This led to conflict between Athens and the Mytilenaians, of which there is little evidence besides the story in Herodotus (5.94-95), preserving how Alkaios dropped his shield and fled the battlefield. The war was ended when Periander gave an arbitration in favour of Athens. Strabo (13.1.38) preserves a similar story, also claiming that most of the Troad was claimed by the Lesbians and Diogenes Laertius (1.74) adding the extra detail that Phrynon was killed in single combat by Pittakos of Mytilene, one of the seven sages of Greece (and a prominent law-giver of the Greek world (Str. 13.1.38; DS 9.11.1). It should be noted that though these later sources are mostly derived from Herodotus, writing much later, there is a definite tradition of Athenian interest and involvement in the region. It is unclear why Athens would choose to become involved in this region, particularly when the area was under the control of another power. One possibility is a desire to exercise control over the straits of the Hellespont. Ps-Skymnos (708) asserts that Elaious, across the straits on the Thracian Khersonnese, was founded by Phorboon, and the authors of the ATL attempt to emend this name from Φορβοον to Φρυνον (Merritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor, 1950: 289, n.75). This could indicate that Phrynon was trying to control

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1 For evidence of Mytilene’s continued interest in Sigeion, see Achilleum’s demand for its restoration in the late 7th century, Hdt. 5.94.2, indicating a long series of wars between Athens and Mytilene for Sigeion.
2 For discussion, see How & Wells, 1912: 56-57.
3 He was also noted by Aristotle (Pol. 1285 a35) as once having held an elective tyranny over his native city to protect it from armed exiles
both sides of the straits but it is too speculative to rest this argument on such slender evidence.

Strabo (13.1.38) seems to preserve the tradition that Phrynon was sent out in an official capacity by Athens to the region (τοῦτο δὲ [Sigeion] κατέσχον μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι Φρύνωνα τὸν ὀλυμπιονίκην πέμψαντες), and this is possibly the basis for the Suda (s.v. Pittakos) preserving the tradition that Phrynon was sent out as a strategos. This is possible; perhaps Phrynon had become uncomfortably popular for the eupatridai. This would have been a good chance for the nobles to rid themselves of a potential tyrant by sending him away with his supporters; the story of Peisistratos, a tyrant who came to power by virtue of his popularity, can serve as an example of this,¹ as can that of Kylon (Hdt. 5.71.1-2; Thuc. 1.126.3-11). This is a difficult argument to prove, however, as the evidence is too problematic and late (see Graham, 1964: 33 for discussion). It is unlikely that Phrynon was sent out as a state-sanctioned act and Graham points out that, besides the difficulties in using these late sources, Athens was unable to hold even Salamis, let alone a colony as far away as Sigeion (Graham, 1964: 33).²

At some point afterwards, Sigeion was lost again to the Mytilenaians, as Peisistratos had to take it back from them. It was then given to his son, Hegisistratos (Hdt. 5.94.1). This may have happened as late as 530 (Berve, 1937: 28, based on the probable age of Hegesistratos). The

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¹ See Hdt. 1.59.3-6. Peisistratos comes to power initially, according to Herodotus, as a champion of the people through his popularity as a strategos in the war against Megara. For the difficulties of this as a source, see below, pp. 43-47.

² Graham later argues (1964: 165) that, almost by analogy, it was likely that Miltiades also went to the Khersonese on his own impetus and was not supported by Peisistratos. It should be noted, however, that Graham, following Berve’s study of Miltiades the Elder (1937), considers any Athenian settlement of the North by Athenians to be a private enterprise.
inscription in honour of Phainodikos shows that there were some Attic speakers living in Sigeion in around 575-550 (Jeffery, 1990: 72, 366-67), indicating that regardless of the political control of the city an Athenian interest in the region continued, whether private or state-sanctioned. Trade may well have been the reason for this continued presence (de Ste Croix, 1972: 47; Roebuck, 1959: 109).

Hippias withdrew to Sigeion after his expulsion in 510 BC (Hdt. 5.94.1) and, since Berve (1937: 26), there has been debate as to the nature of the relationship between the Peisistratids and Sigeion. Graham (1964: 192) suggests that the relationship between Athens and Sigeion was not close and Hippias’ retreat to Sigeion (Hdt. 5.96.2) was to the protection of the Persians. Such a lack of affinity between Athens and Sigeion at this point seems unlikely. Peisistratid wealth was supported through trade (see below, pp. 47-48) and given Sigeion’s position in relation to the northern trade routes they are unlikely to have been indifferent to the community. Athens remained consistently interested in this region. Aeschylus (Eum. 397-402) demonstrates an Athenian attachment to the region as late as 458 (the date of the play’s production):

πρόσωθεν ἔξηκουσα κληδόνος βοήν
ἀπὸ Σκαμάνδρου γῆν καταφθατουμένη,
ἤν δὴ Ἀχαιῶν ἀκτορές τε καὶ πρόμοι,
τῶν αἰχμαλώτων χρημάτων λάχος μέγα,
Athena, representing Athenian power is returning from the Skamandros, the river near to both Sigeion and Troy. The claim to the river is not only depicted by Aeschylus as divinely given but also of ancient standing, strengthening the likelihood that Sigeion was in Peisistratid possession in 510.

The Expedition of Miltiades

Before one can conduct an examination of the nature of Miltiades’ tyranny in the Khersonnese, the issue of the reliability of our primary sources must be examined, particularly the nature of Herodotus’ account. It can be shown that Herodotus faithfully transmitted to us traditions that are questionable. Significantly, a large issue that emerges after a close study of Herodotus is that of the nature of Peisistratos’ rule and the support of the wealthy families. These families, such as the Alkmeonidai and Philaidai amongst others, had a vested interest in obscuring the fact that they co-operated with the tyranny to preserve their own pre-eminent positions (Lavelle, 1993: 89). This can be seen in the role of Miltiades and Megakles during Peisistratos’ regime.

It has generally been believed that, based on Herodotus’ account of Miltiades’ departure from Athens as a result of his hatred of Peisistratos’ tyranny, Miltiades’ control of the Thracian
Khersonnese was a personal enterprise (Hdt. 6.35-36.1). Graham (1999: 29-34, 193-197) outlines the main arguments. He conjectures that the elder Miltiades led a private enterprise as Athens lacked the resources to monitor and support a state-sanctioned colony, yet he supposes that the younger Miltiades was sent out officially by the Peisistratids. There was little change in the structures that would ensure this support for a colony, however, so Graham’s argument should accept that either both Philaidai were sent out by the regime at home, or neither was. An alternative outline of events requires exploration. Peisistratos’ wealth was derived from control of trade, probably facilitating the exchange of gold as ‘middlemen’ (Archibald, 1998: 113) and this wealth was what was used to maintain his dominance in Athens (Hdt. 1.64.1; Best, 1969 indicates that the Thracian ‘type’ entered Athenian art at this time, possibly indicating that Peisistratos’ troops were predominantly Thracian). Peisistratos would never have allowed a man antagonistic to him to take his own settlers and colonise a region that was important to the trade routes of the area as well as possessing plentiful farming land (see below, pg. 50). A more logical conclusion to be drawn is that Miltiades was an associate of Peisistratos; at the very least Miltiades actively supported Peisistratos’ position as tyrant of Athens. We also know that, at the time of the second tyranny, the Alkmeonid Megakles was actively collaborating with Peisistratos – it was only through city-based political support that a country noble could have obtained any position of dominance in city politics (Lavelle, 1993: 97) and their clear association in Herodotus (Hdt. 1.60.2-3) shows this.¹ Lavelle (1993: 96) claims

¹ Lavelle claims that the Peisistratid tyrannies were a political movement of nobles, rather than a social revolution where Peisistratos leads the hillmen. The men of his homelands on the eastern plains and
that this was a result of Megakles’ supremacy in Athenian politics. There is no evidence for this and it is just as likely that this was a realignment manufactured by Megakles in order to achieve an ascendancy over what were a number of families who shared the influence in Athens. Sears (2013: 53) claims that Peisistratos’ power-base was dependent on his ties with Thrace, but this ignores the political realities in Athens. Forsdyke (2005: 119-121) points out that city-based support was crucial for his successful third tyranny, but ignores the role played by the Thracian troops Peisistratos utilised. A more reliable account must incorporate both perspectives.

Why is this relationship not detailed in our sources? Herodotus’ stories exculpating the Alkmeonidai from active collaboration had seeped deeply into the Athenian subconscious.1 An instance of this could be the Battle of Pallene, where Peisistratos allegedly defeated the Athenians without any spilling of blood (Hdt. 1.63). Yet, later in the same narrative, he says that Athenians were killed in the fighting (Hdt. 1.64). Taken together with Andokides’ confused account of Pallene (1.106), we can see that there was a counter-tradition of fighting against Peisistratos which Herodotus chose not to explore in detail. The Athenian sources for these events must have had an agenda to hide the truth and, again, the Alkmeonidai come to the fore. It was alleged that they left Athens after Pallene (Hdt. 1.64.3, 6.121-124), but the Alkmeonidai were actively involved in the tyranny and, if they were exiled from Athens, it was

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1 Lavelle (1993: 100) cf. Thuc. 6.89.4, Isok. 16.25
only towards its end.¹ Lavelle (1993: 89) posits that families such as the Alkmeonidai, Philaidai and Kerykes were able to hide their collaboration within a collective Athenian ‘forgetting’ of the past.² The evidence of arkhonships of both Kleisthenes and the younger Miltiades (IG I³ 103.19) was deliberately overlooked by the Athenians to preserve the memory of their anti-tyrannical stance. The story of the murder of Kimon Koalemos (Hdt. 6.103.3) could also be an example of evidence contrived by the Philaidai to show why they should have a hatred of the Peisistratidai – this story would have been particularly useful during the trial of the younger Miltiades for tyranny.³ Thus, the elder Miltiades was transformed from a collaborator and close supporter (Peisistratos would only have sent someone on whom he could depend to such an important region) into a political enemy in Herodotus’ account – Wade-Gery (1951: 217-18) is right to point out that the language used by Thucydides at 6.59.6 (οφῶν αὐτῶν), indicating that this tyranny was a ‘union of hearts,’ likely between the Peisistratidai, Alkmeonidai and Philaidai. This would also entail a change in the origin of Miltiades’ expedition from a private enterprise to escape Peisistratid Athens into a state-sanctioned colonisation of the underpopulated Khersonnese to secure it for Peisistratid Athens. Herodotus’ account is clearly fraught with aristocratic propaganda and, as a result, makes it difficult to use with absolute certainty in reconstructing the events of this period. It is difficult to assert that both the Elder and Younger

¹ It is possible, though, that the Athenian demos at large were generally supportive, or at least restive, during the period of Peisistratid dominance. See Lavelle (1993: 60-61) for discussion. Note, in contrast, the active rebellions against Kylon (Thuc. 1.126) and Isagoras (Hdt. 5.72.2-4).
² Lavelle’s work focuses on a comparison of the French collaboration with the Nazis to discuss this phenomenon – see Lavelle (1993: 16-26) for an outline of the comparison.
³ Wade-Gery (1951: 213-14) believes that the murder of Koalemos was probably undertaken by Hippias, as Koalemos was seen as a threat to the Peisistratid regime, but the nature of Athenian politics, based as it was on personal relationships, would never have allowed this – it is unlikely that Miltiades would have accepted an archonship tainted with his father’s blood.
Miltiades were allowed to establish their own tyranny in light of this. It should be seen as more likely that the Thracian Khersonnese was an Athenian possession, controlled by an associate of the tyrant of Athens to provide additional support for the regime in Athens.

**The Interests of Peisistratos**

This acquisition and consolidation of Northern wealth and control of the potential of the region clearly became a goal of Peisistratos. During his second exile, Peisistratos found himself in Thrace (*Ar. Ath. Pol.* 15.2). He may have had existing connections there, as the story of the ethnicity of Phye, told by Aristotle (*Ar. Ath. Pol.* 14.4), may indicate. His connections with the Eretrians, evidenced by his travel there after his exile,\(^1\) may also have influenced his efforts in Thrace. Whatever his impetus for going there, it is evident that he did quite well from his time in exile. The benefits are obvious, particularly the wealth he built up to return to Athens in a position of power. It is something of a mystery as to how exactly Peisistratos made his money while in Thrace; the encroachment of the Athenians in the fifth century caused an immediate and dire response from the Thracians in all instances.\(^2\) Therefore Peisistratos may have made his Northern wealth indirectly by acting as a middle-man in the gold-mining system (Archibald, 1998: 113), facilitating the exchange of gold between the Thracians and Greek cities.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 15.2; *Hdt.* 1.61.2, where Herodotus says Peisistratos’ sons were also there. Had they been in Athens, the conversation between them would have taken place there. See also Viviers (1987: 193-94), who points out that the settlement at Rhaikelos was settled probably with both Peisistratid retainers and Eretrians.

\(^2\) *Ennea Hodoi* in 476 – *schol. Aiskh.* 2.34; *Pl. Kim.* 8.2; Meiggs (1972: 68-69). Drabeskos in 465 – *DS* 11.70.5; *Hdt.* 9.75.1; *Thuc.* 1.100.3, 4.102.2.

\(^3\) Cole (1975: 43-44) outlined the possibility that he utilised religious pretexts to gain the trust of the Edones, the inhabitants of the region in the historical period, allowing him to mine the region. This is
Importantly, the Athenian presence in the city, as outlined by Jeffery (1990: 72, 366-67), would have made this an easier process. With an ally also located in the Khersonnese ‘on the spot,’ this would have given him influence over the shipping from the Black Sea and Hellespont.¹ He would have continued to draw on this wealth, as well as that from his interests in the region of Pangaion, during his reign. He needed to use this wealth as he did not solely rely on rule through consensus with the eupatrid city politicians in Athens, but on wealth and the military strength that wealth could afford (Hdt. 1.64.1; H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, 2000: 10). Thus, the continuation of his control over Thrace was crucial to his tyranny.

It is important to understand the sending of Miltiades to the North in this context. There was possibly some economic stress due to over-population in the fertile plains of Attike (French, 1959: 48-49), but we hear of no Athenian ships sailing north – indeed, Athens had little naval strength in this period at all (Haas, 1985). Clearly, the later reasons for control of the North, securing the grain for Athens, do not hold for the sixth century, as they did not have the naval capacity to do this. This sending of Miltiades by Peisistratos was also an example of the practice of aristocratic relations at the time, termed ‘patronal colonisation’ by Figuera (1991: 135-36), except that Miltiades was sent as an ally, not a lesser ‘client’.

¹ There was clearly some naval commerce in this period, as Xerxes left several gaps in the boat bridge he had constructed to allow such vessels to sail between (Hdt. 7.36.2).
The walling of the Khersonese was an important step in establishing the Khersonnese as Athenian. It was done not just to keep the Apsinthian Thracians out of the Dolonkian territory (as per the standard accounts), it also served to keep all those not aligned to Athens out of the Khersonese (for discussion, see Figuera, 1991: 134-35). The wall essentially created a kingdom united under one tyrant, Miltiades. It can be seen as a strong step in ensuring that the Khersonnese was populated either by Athenians and their allies, especially the Dolonki. In order to secure the Athenian domination of the region further, Miltiades systematically settled the Khersonese at key sites. His foundation of cities along the neck of the Khersonese, namely Agora/Kheronnesos and Paktye, complimented by the cities in the south, Elaious and Krithote, allowed Athens to control the borders of the Khersonese. Peisistratid control of Sigeion over the straits also secured the area for Athens until a more powerful force emerged in the region – Persia. Therefore, the cities Miltiades settled were precisely placed to allow efficient control of the Khersonese, along with the wall to keep the Apsinthian Thracians (and all other comers) out. With Peisistratos’ interests in Sigeion and in the Pangaion region secure, Athens exercised a considerable degree of economic control over the North, providing both personal wealth and political security for Peisistratos.

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1 Agora/Kheronneses – The coin with a lion head and XEP on the obverse and Athena on the reverse (Ehrenberg, 1965: 224-25) suggests early Athenian involvement; see also Isaac, 1986: 166-67, Hekataios, fr. 163, Ps. Skylax 67, schol. Ar. Eq. 262 for other references to the city. Paktye and Krithote – Ps. Skymnos 711-12; Ephoros, BNI 70, F40, Elaious – Ps. Skymnos 707-08. See also Strabo, 7, fr. 52-55, for a geographical description of the various relative locations.
The Value of the Khersonese

The colonisation of the Khersonese would no doubt have been desired and undertaken with a view to extracting wealth through trade, but also through farming. The region was extremely fertile and produced good crops, many of which were not available on mainland Greece. Staples included wheat, barley, olives and, later, ship-building timber. Fish was also abundant in this region.¹ Xenophon talks of the “eleven or twelve towns” of the Khersonese (Hell. 3.2.10), all with excellent pasturage and able to produce an abundance of grain and fruit trees. There was clearly the potential for profit to be made in the area, particularly in light of possible grain shortages in Attike. While Athens did not export grain from the north in large quantities, small amounts of import are likely – Peisistratos was from one of the densely populated areas which could have witnessed this possible stress and the importation of food stuff on a limited scale would have eased this.²

Athens certainly sought to exploit this area. We can see this through a comparison of the arrival stories of both Miltiades the elder and his nephew.³ When the elder Miltiades went North, he possibly went at the request, or at the very least the acquiescence, of a native Thracian tribe, thus encountering no opposition. When the younger Miltiades went to the Khersonese in

¹ RE, s.v. Krithote, Krithea, Elaious, Pteleon; Isaac (1986: 160)
² For discussion, see French (1959: 49-50). The social dislocation created may have allowed Peisistratos to utilise this group of people in his army at Pallene, turning what was essentially political factionalism into a social movement.
³ Hammond (1956) argues that there were three tyrants: the initial founder named the elder Miltiades; his son, also named Miltiades; and a third Miltiades, named the younger. Considering that Stesagoras, the younger Miltiades’ brother, was also tyrant, there was a considerable effort to ensure that one family was in control of the region – clearly, the family remained very loyal to the Peisistratid regime in this period.
c.516, he had to resort to force to ensure control of the region (Hdt. 6.39.1-2). It may have been a move to guarantee his own safety. The brother and successor to the elder Miltiades, Stesagoras, had been killed by a Lampsakene in the prytaneion of one of the cities in the Khersonnese (Hdt. 6.38.2). Herodotus is quite explicit in his description of the motives, however: “καταλαμψόμενον [Miltiades] τὰ πρήγματα ἐπὶ Χερσονήσου ἀποστέλλουσι τριήρει οἱ Πεισιστράτιδαι,” (Hdt. 6.39.1). The two families were, according to Herodotus, not always so close, as the alleged murder of Kimon Koalemos may indicate. According to Herodotus (6.103.2-3), he was killed by Peisistratos’ sons on account of the popularity he acquired through successive victories in the chariot race at the Olympic Games. He won the first in exile from Athens but he was allowed to award his second victory to Peisistratos, ensuring his return to Athens. This suggests that he was exiled as a political threat to the regime. After his third victory (after Peisistratos’ death), he was murdered. His murder would have been in 524 (How and Wells, 1912: 107) or possibly 528 (Golden, 2004: 38).¹ Miltiades’ archonship in 524, after Hippias’ and Megakles’ arkhonships, may have been given to him to placate his anger of his father’s suspected murder, but it is more likely that the incident is a fabrication (see pg. 46), as Miltiades would not have allowed the murder of his father to go unavenged.² It indicates that the political arrangement between the families continued for a significant time as it shows cooperation of the Peisistratid and Philiad families for much of the second half of the sixth

¹ The entire story could have been invented, however (see above, pg. 46)
² In the most recent account of this period, Sears (2013: 64-65) ignores this crucial fact to emphasise the personal nature of the tyranny.
The possible marriage between Hippias’ daughter and Miltiades would make this connection even stronger (Scott, 2005: 180-81).

The Peisistratids had no desire to lose the region and its wealth. There may have been resistance from the local tribes, possibly motivated as a result of increasing Athenian control. Thus, the younger Miltiades’ first activities were to cement Athenian control of the region. Firstly, he used force to regain control of the region after the death of Stesagoras by pretending to be in mourning for his uncle, then taking hostages to guarantee the good behaviour of the local tribes (Hdt. 6.39.2). He also kept 500 mercenaries to strengthen his position further (Hdt. 6.39.2). This new show of Athenian force in the region must hint at Athenian exploitation of the region and local dissatisfaction. The agricultural wealth of the Khersonnese is the likely target of this exploitation. Miltiades’ marriage to Hegesipyle, the daughter of a local Thracian king (Hdt. 6.39.2), was probably a move by the regime to consolidate the long-term position in the Khersonnese against local defiance. It certainly facilitated a speedy return to the Khersonnese after fleeing a Skythian invasion in 496 (Hdt. 6.40.1-2; Grant, 1987: 264). Scott (2005: 183) believes that between 500 and 900 people would have left the Khersonnese with Miltiades. It is more likely to be closer to the lower figure and they probably used the same triremes as those in which they arrived.\(^2\)

\(^1\) The Dolonki allegedly bring him back, again retelling a convenient story for his trial – he could use this fabrication to claim that he was only in the Khersonnese to assist the Dolonki in their protection against foreign invasions.

\(^2\) Sears (2015) believes that Miltiades’ ownership of triremes would have been quite normal, but it is more likely that these were owned by the Peisistratids, or Athenian state-owned as it was a state-sanctioned mission. See also Haas (1985: 40). There is no concrete evidence for either assertion.
A Break in Athenian Control

Athenian interest remained strong in the region until Miltiades was forced out through Persian influence and pressure in 493 (Hdt. 6.40.1-41.2). This was a result of the Peisistratid regime allowing Persia to enter the area unopposed to guarantee their own position in Athens. Thus, Miltiades became a scape-goat for Athenian resistance to the advance of the Mede (Wade-Gery, 1951: 215-216). Hippias probably saw the advance of Persia as unstoppable and wanted to ally himself with the new power. His moves towards Lampsakos, including marrying his daughter to the son of the Lampsakene ruler (Thuc. 6.59.3) can be seen in this light. The northern Aegean was clearly desirable, as it was given as the prize of loyalty by Dareios to Histiaios after his duty in guarding Dareios’ bridge across the Hellespont (Hdt. 5.11.2, 5.23.1).

Thus, in order to maintain Sigeion as his own possession, it seems that Hippias sacrificed the Khersonnese, most probably because he did not believe that it could withstand Persian aggression.

Following the activities of Miltiades the Younger, there is a break in strong and direct Athenian influence in the region, with Macedonia taking a leading role in Thrace (Thuc. 2.95.1-3 implies a stronger Macedonia; Hammond et al., 1972: 435-40). Sears (2015: 52-68, focusing on Peisistratos and Miltiades) attempts to make arguments that individuals had made the extensive contacts that led to a more continuous relationship between Thrace and Athenians than our evidence allows. He argues that there was a continuation of interest in the region,
conducted on an individual basis, but the absence of evidence for this makes the argument tenuous.

**Athens Returns to the Region**

After Miltiades’ abandonment of the region at the advance of the Phoenician fleet (Hdt. 6.41), Athens was not able to access the region again until after the Persian Wars. It is striking that this was one of the first regions to which the Athenians returned after the second Persian invasion; they sailed almost immediately to Sestos to besiege the city (Hdt. 9.114.2; Thuc. 1.89.2; DS 11.37.4-5). After this, we again see how crucial the Thracian region must have been to Athens, with the continual attempts to re-establish a presence there from the time that Kimon took Eion in 476 (Hdt. 7.107.1-2; Thuc. 1.98.1; DS 11.60.2; Nep. *Kim*. 2.2; Plut. *Kim*. 7.1-8.2). Eion was clearly a site of great strategic importance on the Thracian coastline, commanding the river Strymon as it did. It was also located strategically to control access to the Thracian Khalkidike. Moreover, we can again see the Athenians trying to exert direct control over the region; when Kimon defeated Boges, Plutarch (*Kim*. 7.2) indicates that they set a guard over the region (παραφυλάττων). Similarly, after the Battle of the Eurymedon River in 466, Plutarch (*Kim*. 14.1) says that Kimon “ὡκειώσατο τῇ πόλει τῆν Χερρόνησον.” Perhaps

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1 Isaac (1986: 5-7, 18-19) argues that the younger Miltiades’ attack on Paros was a precursor of Athenian annexation of the Thasian gold mines, eventually conducted by his son. Sears (2013: 70) uses the connection that existed between Paros and Thasos in this period to further this argument, but it is unlikely that Athens, lacking a substantial navy in this period, would have been able to consider this seriously.

2 Meiggs (1972: 35) correctly highlights that Athens could have expected support from the Khersonnese, particularly since the local inhabitants were probably a mixture of Athenians and Thracians.
Kimon’s knowledge and connections in the region were an important aspect of this policy,¹ but it is obvious that Athens desired direct control of the region, contra Sears (2013: 70), who suggests that Kimon’s actions in the North were a consequence of a personal desire to increase his own influence and wealth as a result of these League actions.²

From the time of the establishment of the naval Delian League headed by Athens, timber was a crucial element in the success of the Delian League/Athenian *arkhe*. Athens made several attempts to colonise Ennea Hodoi,³ and the eventual success of the colony of Amphipolis (Thuc. 4.102.2-3) in 437/36, along with the war against Thasos (which was, essentially, to guarantee the successful exploitation of the Thracian coast),⁴ was probably driven by the need to secure further access to timber in the region. In particular, Thucydides’ description of the foundation of Amphipolis indicates that it was a crucial location for control of the region and was well-fortified, showing the Athenian desire to hold the region securely. Thus, activity in

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¹ Sears (2013: 73) discusses the possibility of Kimon’s familial connections playing a significant role in his successes for the league in this region, particularly in his ability to win battles with significantly smaller fleets than the Persians possessed. This is possible, but there is no evidence for this supposition. Moreover, it depends on ignoring the moralising aspect of Plutarch’s account of Kimon’s successes, which is difficult to do.

² Sears (2013: 73) again emphasises the personal initiatives in these actions by suggesting that Kimon’s smaller numbers of ships, as reported by Plutarch, were able to defeat the numerically superior Persian forces as a result of Kimon’s personal connections. We cannot ignore Plutarch’s moralising, though, and the story has no corroboration in any other sources.

³ 476-75BC – Schol. Aiskh. 2.34; Plut. *Kim*. 8.2; Meiggs (1972: 68-69). 465BC – Thuc. 1.100.3; 4.102.3; DS 11.70.5. Hdt. 9.75.1 gives us the name of the *strategos* of the Athenian army, indicating it may have been an armed force. Clearly the Athenians suspected they may require military force to establish themselves in the face of Thracian opposition. For discussion of this, see ATL III: 106-110; Isaac (1986: 26).

⁴ Thasos itself was extremely wealthy (Hdt. 6.46). It also controlled the mines opposite on the Thracian coastline. Whether Athenian encroachment forced Thasos into action (Thuc. 1.100.2; DS 11.70.1), or Athens took their livelihood on the Thracian coastline, leading to war (Plut. *Kim*. 14.2), it is clear that Athens also wanted to control the economy in the region.
the period focuses on the Thracian coastline and the Strymon region, possibly to ensure access to the materials on which the Athenian navy depended. Perikles’ establishment of the colony of Brea in 447 in the Khersonnese (IG i3 46; Plut. Per. 11.5, 19.2; see Meiggs and Lewis, 1988: no. 49, for discussion of the context of these settlements) was undertaken not only to ensure the adherence of the region to Athens, but also to take advantage of the fertile lands. The extinction of all coinage but for the Attic ‘owl’ in this period (Archibald, 1998: 115) indicates the complete nature of Athenian domination in the region. This domination achieved much for Athens; of the total revenue of 498 talents, 1390 drachmai recorded in the first assessment of the tribute lists, over 107 talents is received from the Thracian cities. Quite simply, this was an important region for Athens to control as it was such a wealthy area of the arkhe (ATL, III: 20-28). To lose control of the region meant not only the loss of access to timber for the navy, but also almost a quarter of the cash revenue. This meant that a continued direct control of the region was necessary to ensure the continued collection of phoros and products essential to the navy.

[1 See ATL III: 59-60. One possible reason for the lack of payment in 448/7, as outlined in ATL III: 46, is that the cities simply chose not to pay. This issue may have been foreseen in Athens and the establishment of the colony at Brea was undertaken to ensure the loyalty of this important area. Alternatively, cities may have made individual payments to garrison commanders, necessitated by the active role Athens was playing in the expulsion of Thracian tribes from the Khersonnese (see Meiggs, 1972: 160-61 for discussion of the dating of IG i3 46, outlining losses from warfare in the northern Aegean).]
Athenian interest during the Peloponnesian War

The importance of the region to Athens was underlined in 431, when Athens made an alliance with Sitalkes at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.9.4; Hdt. 7.137.3). Sitalkes’ son was also given Athenian citizenship at this time (Thuc. 2.29.5; Ar. Akh. 141-44), an action that was mirrored in the fourth century (for example, see Commentary, 8.64, pp. 224). Gifts of Athenian citizenship were likely seen as a way to create a cordial relationship with Thracian kings, who may have desired acceptance from the larger Greek world, using Athenian citizenship as a way of obtaining it. The importance of the Northern Aegean was again seen in 424BC, when a Spartan army consisting of helots and various other Spartans under Brasidas marched north against Athenian interests there as part of a campaign to widen the war against Athens (Thuc. 4.78.1-79.3). Many key cities were lost to Athens for a period as a result of this rare show of Spartan initiative. The Athenian response was to send their most influential leader, Kleon, to force the issue with Brasidas. This was an indication of the importance with which they viewed this assault (Thuc. 5.2.1). Pollis, King of the Odomantian Thracians, also sent peltasts to assist Kleon in 424 (Thuc. 5.6.2), evidence of the continuing strong relations between Athens and the Thracians at this time. The alliance with Sitalkes, King of the Odrysian Thracians (Thuc. 2.29; DS 12.50.1-3), remained strong after this, even though Athens came to

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1 Sears (2013: 75) suggests that Thucydides may have played a personal role in the alliance, leading to the unusual correction of Athenian perceptions of Thrace (Thuc. 2.29).

2 Crippling Athens could also be made easier by detaching these northern cities from Athens and starving the city, as Brasidas tried to do and Lysandros successfully did in 405 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.2).
fear the potential power of the Odrysians. Thucydides’ account of Sitalkes’ expedition (2.95-101) indicates the enormous potential wealth and strength of the region, so much so that it was deemed necessary for Athens to assist in the expedition of the Odrysian monarch against the Macedonian king to ensure the continued good-will of the Thracians.

It was clear that Athens had lost vital territory after the Peace of 424, however, and Brasidas’ capture of Amphipolis was felt keenly in Athens. As Taylor (2010: 107-08) points out, Thucydides invented a word, ἀντιπαραλυπέω (“to hurt back in equal measure” – 4.80.1), to denote that the Spartans recognised that Athens identified with and valued allied land more than the land in Attike. Taylor reads too much into the word, however, emphasising the sea and islands in general, rather than recognising the importance of the northern Aegean, in this case the Khalkidike and Thrace, to Athens. The same verb could be applied to the Khersonnese, very much seen as an extension of Athenian territory since Miltiades. It has always been asserted that this region was so crucial to Athens as a result of the proximity to the grain route needed to feed Athens. This position requires re-evaluation, as there is no mention in any of our contemporary sources that the region was required for grain. Indeed, Moreno demonstrates convincingly that most of Athenian grain in the fifth century was sourced through the Aegean, primarily from regions confiscated and allocated to kleroukhies (2007: 77-143, see especially 89-102, emphasising the importance of Euboia in this). Moreno also

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1 Hagnon, leading the Athenian component of a combined Athenian/Odrysian army, put Athenian ambitions in the region on hold. He determined that the Odrysian force was too large and daunting should Athens ever have to face them (Thuc. 2.101.2; DS 12.51.1).
indicates that taxation paid by kleroukhies around the Aegean to Athens took the form of grain for the city (2007: 102-115). The ‘grain route’ to the Black Sea did not acquire importance until Athens had lost her kleroukhies after the Peloponnesian War; it was, however, an important area for the supply of luxury items to the city (Moreno, 2007: 163-164). Moreover, it has been shown that the region was politically underdeveloped and lacked the organisational capacity for the production and distribution of large amounts of grain (Moreno, 2007: 146-163). Rather, it can be seen that Athens’ primary interest in the North was founded on the monetary wealth it could afford through the control of the trade of the cities and the phoros that this control allowed them to collect (see below, pg. 62).

After this break in Athenian involvement in the North, Nikias attempted to turn the Athenians’ minds to the North again in 417, but the campaign did not come to fruition (Thuc. 6.10.5). Nikias’ argument was that the Athenians needed to rebuild their power, using Thrace as a specific example. Though Athens chose to follow Alkibiades’ advice at this time rather than Nikias’, we can still see that Thrace is very much in the picture of Athenian foreign policy in this period. We can easily see why some Athenians desired to increase their influence over the cities of the North in the later fifth century. Despite the claims of Isaac (1986: 104) that Odrysian power was waning in the region, Odrysian power was, in fact, on the increase.¹ Thucydides states that the cities of the North, in addition to paying an Athenian phoros, also

¹ Exemplified by Nikias’ proposals in 418 to reconquer traditional Athenian territory (Thuc. 6.10.5).
paid Seuthes 400 talents annually (Thuc. 2.97.3). Friendly relations were also being forged between the Odrysians and these cities, evidenced by the coinage of some of these cities (Isaac, 1986: 119; West, 1929: 120-21). Such an increase of power came at Athenian expense. The Odrysians moved into the power vacuum left when Athens evacuated the region after the treaty of 424, and Athens presumably felt threatened by such Odrysian expansion. The evidence cited above indicates that some of these cities paid tribute to both the Odrysians and Athens. The treaty of 357 between Athens and the Odrysian kings (see below, pg. 100), which allowed for the double payment of these cities, appears to have been a regularisation of this practice which existed down to the mid-fourth century.

Good relations continued between Athens and the Odrysians, however, and the Thracian troops that came to assist Demosthenes and Nikias in Sicily in 413 attest to this (Thuc. 7.27.1-2). The strategos of these troops when they were sent back to Thrace was Dieitrephes, a man with known family connections to Thrace (Sears, 2013: 81-85). Like Hagnon and Thucydides, Dieitrephes was appointed to command in the North as a result of familial connections (see Hamel, 1998: 16-17 for discussion). Not only was the region of Thrace and the North important to Athens, it was also of benefit to possess connections in the region to conduct business on a more personal level. Witness to the importance of personal relations between northern kings

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1 The coin of Maroneia (a tributary state of Athens) bearing the legend Metokos is a likely connection to the Odrysian King Amadokos (named Medokos in DS 13.105).

2 The same man was sent by the oligarchs in 411 to take control of the Thracian region (Thuc. 8.64) and in 409/08, he proposed an honorific decree for Oioniades of Skiathos (IG i 110) – see Sears (2013: 85-86) for discussion.
and the Athenians is the instance of marriages between prominent Athenians and Thracian royal families. Miltiades was probably the first example of this (Hdt. 6.39.2), though it is possible that Phye, married to Hipparkhos, was from an important Thracian family (Sears, 2013: 54-55). Xenophon was later offered the daughter of Seuthes in marriage along with several personal estates in exchange for the assistance of the 10,000 against Seuthes’ rival, Medokos (Xen. Anab. 7.2.38, 7.5.8). Iphikrates is the most significant example of personal connections (see below, pg. 90, n.2) indicating the importance of personal relationships for success in the Thracian north. Moreover, Sears (2013: 99-110) outlines an intricate “nexus of Thracian ties,” focusing on the relationship between prominent men in Athens after 411 and the familial relationships that can be adduced. His account of these connections serves to illustrate the significance of personal connections in determining the appropriate strategos to send to the North. This emphasises the importance of the region. When possible, from the time of Miltiades through the fifth century, such an important region for Athens was to be placed in the hands of those men whose families had previous connections to the region.

After the defeat of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides (8.1.1-4) describes the feeling in Athens as being in a state of despair. This was made worse when the Spartans sailed a fleet north and secured the revolt of Byzantion (Thuc. 8.80); so chastened were the Athenians that Alkibiades was brought to Samos to be restored to Athenian good graces and to secure the goodwill of the satrap Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.81-82; Kagan, 1987: 176-80; for an account focusing on the self-aggrandisement of Alkibiades, see Tritle, 2010: 172-73). In order to restore Athenian
fortunes, it is no surprise that Athens sought to secure control of the North. Navies are expensive and, combined with the timber from Macedonia to construct triremes (Meiggs, 1982: 194), the cash-flow of Thrace would have been an important aim. Successes at Kynossema in 411 (Thuc. 8.100-106), Kyzikos in 410 (DS 13.64.3, 49.1-52.2), Thasos and Abdera also in 410 (Xen. Hell. 1.4.9; DS 13.72.1-2) and the recruitment of Thracian troops to fight for Athens (Plut. Alk. 30.4) facilitated Thrasyboulos' activities in rebuilding Athenian power in Thrace and the northern Aegean (Xen. Hell. 1.1.12). By 408, Alkibiades could again raise money for Athens from the wealthy cities in the Thracian Khersonnese (Xen. Hell. 1.3.8). Sears (2013: 93) talks about the importance of the Thracian victories of Thrasyboulos at Kynossema in terms of securing the grain for Athens, but it is clearly the cash that Athens requires from this region as no mention is made by Thucydides or Xenophon of the need to secure the grain. Surely, should the grain have been the issue, they would have made this point rather than emphasise the revenue raising activities of the strategoi. Throughout this period, the maintenance of the region as a ready supply of cash for the war was a priority, underscored by the imposition of the 10% tax on all imports through the port of Byzantion (Xen. Hell. 4.8.27; Dem. 20.60).

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1 Meiggs (1982: 123) also raises the possibility of honours given to the Macedonian King in thanks for his supply of timber that was used to construct the triremes used against Persia in 479, though he rightly indicates how tenuous this argument is due to the lack of sources.

2 Buck (1998: 36) correctly emphasises that this was a revenue raising strategy, pointing to Alkibiades' comments (Xen. Hell. 1.1.14) that Athens had little capacity to fund a war at this point.

3 Note also, in Buck's account of the battle of Cynossema (1998: 32), he describes the Peloponnesian fleet as "... in the straits blocking the grain route," citing Thucydides in support of his assertions. Nowhere in his narrative does Thucydides mention the grain route as an important outcome of this battle. At 8.107.1, Thucydides outlines the Athenian victory at Kyzikos, surely just as important for any grain ships in the region, yet the benefit outlined by Thucydides is financial (χρήματα).
Thrasybulos had demonstrated himself to be a capable general. As a result of his successes, he was sent to the Thracian region to command Athenian forces. He maintained a force of thirty triremes, according to Diodorus (13.64.1-3), and continued to rebuild the Athenian presence in the area possibly down to 407/06 (Kagan, 1987: 266-69), bolstered by an alliance made by Alkibiades with the Bithynian Thracians (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.4). Krentz (1989: 127) suggests that he was elected to govern the Thracian regions, but it is more likely that Thrasyboulos was given the critical Thracian/Hellespontine area to hold as *strategos* as a result of its strategic importance and his demonstrated capacity as a naval commander. It has also been suggested that Thrasyboulos was a political ally of Alkibiades (Andrewes, 1953: 4-6; Buck, 1998: 20-21 is more measured in his estimation of their relationship), and this would tend to suggest another reason why Thrasyboulos was trusted by Alkibiades to hold the region. Alkibiades may have built up his profile in this region through his success in utilising Thracian troops, as he was able to offer not only his personal army of Thracian soldiers to the Athenians at Aigospotamoi, but allegedly those of the Thracian kings Medokos and Seuthes (DS 13.105.3-4; Nep. *Alk.* 7.4-9.3; Plut. *Alk.* 36.3, 37.2); it should be remembered, though, that Alkibiades had a reputation for talking large and not necessarily truthfully. Nevertheless, it is evident that the Thracians held the Athenians in some regard consistently from the time of Miltiades and Peisistratos down to

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1 There is disagreement as to whether or not Thrasyboulos was acting in an official capacity in this period, specifically 409/08 and 408/07. It is unlikely that such an important region would have been left to an individual who lacked proper authority, particularly in the period of the restored democracy. See Fornara (1971: 68) and Ostwald (1986: 427), who follow Andrewes (1953: 4) in suggesting this was a political break as a result of the restoration of the democracy.
the end of the Peloponnesian War. It has even been suggested that Thrasyboulos’ forces arrayed against the Thirty in 403 were composed of peltasts from Thrace.\(^1\) It was a period marked by Athenian exploitation, but the region could sustain Athenian depredations, otherwise the Thracians, with their significant military potential, would likely have banded together to resist them. The defeat of Athens in 404 marked a temporary cessation of Athenian activity in the North and, when relations resumed, the Thracians resisted Athenian encroachment into their territory.

### Fourth Century Involvement of Athens in the North

**Athens and the North from 404 to the King’s Peace**

After the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the city was hard-pressed. Athens was forced to accept harsh conditions. They relinquished their maritime empire, demolished the city’s fortifications and long walls, surrendered their navy (all but twelve ships) and recalled all exiles (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20; Dem. 24.128; Plut. *Lys.* 14.4; Andok. 3.11-12; Kagan, 1987, 410-12; Meiggs, 1972: 374; Tritle, 2010: 216-18). This left a powerful vacuum into which Sparta eagerly lunged. Athens had used the North and Ionia primarily to supply money and also in the supply route of small amounts of grain to supplement other sources; Sparta had invested time in

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\(^1\) Sears (2015: 268-272). Though this is an attractive prospect that furthers the notion of the significance of Thrace to Athens, there is no evidence for it except for battle-tactics utilised during the battle and suppositions. Sears attempts to push his thesis of Thrace as a ‘military academy’ for Athenian generals too far in this instance.
trying to wrest control of the main cities of the region from Athens (Xen. Hell. 1.1.36), including Byzantion (Thuc. 8.80.3-4, Xen. Hell. 1.1.36-37; Plut. Alk. 31), Khalkedon (Xen. Hell. 1.3.4, 9; Plut. Alk. 29.3-30.1), Lampsakos (Thuc. 8.62; Xen. Hell. 2.1.18-19; DS 13.104.8; Plut. Lys. 9.5), Abydos (Thuc. 8.62; Xen. Hell. 2.1.18; DS 13.68.1), Lesbos (Plut. Alk. 24), Methymna (Xen. Hell. 1.6.12-14; DS 13.77.1), Khios and Erythrai (Thuc. 8.6.2-4; Xen. Hell. 1.6.3, 33; DS 13.65.3-4; Plut. Alk. 24.1). Sparta’s attempt to control these regions, particularly the North, led to conflict with Persia in 400-399 (see Buckler, 2003: 41-48 for an outline of events). The Spartans’ continued desire to control this region and maintain it as a non-Athenian area also pushed the Spartans to war with Athens until the King’s Peace in 387.

In 398, while marching to Lampsakos as part of the conflict with Persia, the Spartan general Derkyldidas was told that the Thracian Khersonese was under constant attack from the Thracians and they required assistance in resisting the pillaging of their lands (Xen. Hell. 3.2.8-11). This may have been a result of Lysandros’s expulsion of the Athenian population at the end of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. Hell. 2.2.2), possibly resulting in a significant depopulation. Derkyldidas made a brief trip to visit Seuthes, the Thracian monarch (Xen. Hell. 3.2.9), possibly to gain a measure of Thracian strength. He then led his army to the Khersonese where he rebuilt Miltiades’ wall (Xen. Hell. 3.2.8-10) and settled people in the cities (Xen Hell. 4.8.5) to replace the now absent Athenian population. Across the straits at Sestos, Lysandros had previously settled his pilots and boatswains (Plut. Lys. 14.2), ensuring strong Spartan control of the region. This activity tends to suggest that Sparta now recognised the economic potential
of the region, as they had never before undertaken such a programme of territorial consolidation outside the Peloponnese. This population appears to have been a permanent group of settlers established by Derkyllidas as it was called to serve in his force in 394 (Xen. Hell. 4.8.5) after Konon, the former Athenian strategos who now commanded Persian fleets, had forced the Spartan navarchos Pollis to flee in 396 (DS 14.79.6). Konon had been appointed to command the Persian fleet (DS 14.39.1) and had seen success in this role against Sparta. After his success against Pollis, Konon then attacked the Khersonnese and raised a general revolt against Sparta on behalf of the Great King (Hell. Ox. 18.1-2; Androt. BNJ 324 F46; DS 14.79.5-8). Konon’s appointment was intricately tied up with power-politics in the Persian empire. Moreover, as Asmonti (2015: 125) points out, the Persian appointment of Konon as commander of a permanent Persian fleet was done to ensure long-term stability and security for a Persian-controlled Ionia.¹ Soon after, at the Battle of Knidos in 394, Spartan naval power suffered a fatal set-back and they lost any power of action in the North (Xen. Hell. 4.3.11-12; DS 14.83.4-7; Nepos. Kon. 4.4; Plut. Ages. 17.2; Just. 6.4.5-6, 13; Buckler, 2003: 73; Hamilton, 1991: 109).

The perceived Spartan vulnerability in 395/94 largely stimulated the formation of the alliance between Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos to fight Sparta in what is known as the Corinthian

¹ Asmonti (2015: 120-129) discusses in detail the nature of politics in Persia that led to the appointment of Konon.
War (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8-15; Andok. 3.24-25; Lys. 16.13; Mackil, 2013: 58-60).¹ Fighting on behalf of the Persian satrap Pharnabazos, the Athenian Konon used Persian resources to rebuild Athenian interests in the Aegean, encouraging the independence of the islands (Isok. 4.142-43, 5.62-64). Asmonti (2015: 156) points out that it also gave rise to renewed Athenian ambitions of leadership. To exploit fully the victory at Knidos, Pharnabazos ordered Konon to sail to Sestos while he marched to Abydos (DS 4.8.3). Derkyldas, holed up at Abydos, crossed to Sestos and utilised the men he had settled in the Khersonnese to bolster numbers and was able to resist Pharnabazos and Konon (DS 4.8.5-6). Pharnabazos then ordered Konon at the end of the season to sail to the Hellespont and take control of the region and cities there (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.7, 4.8.3-6; Casson, 1926: 210-28; Pascual, 2009: 84-85). Konon, always one with an eye on the perception of the Athenian demos, was playing his hand well and Athenian power and influence grew without any cost to the Athenians (Asmonti, 2015: 162-165; Buckler, 2003: 133). As a result of this, by 393 Konon was able to return to Athens and celebrate a renewed Athenian presence in the North. His sailors assisted in finishing the rebuilding of the Long Walls with money from Pharnabazos and the demos had a statue built of him to celebrate his achievements (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9-10; DS 14.85.2-5; IG II² 1656-1664; Nep. *Kon.* 4-5.3; Paus. 1.24.3; Nep Tim. 2.3; Badian, 1995: 83-84; Burke, 1990: 5; Shear, 2011: 276-285 focuses on the association of this statue with the democracy and democratic ideology). At this time, the Athenians also acquired Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros as a result of an expedition of Konon into

¹ For internal politics in Corinth at this time, see Buckler (1999: 212-13). For discussion of the influence of internal Athenian politics on the outbreak of the war, see Perlman (1968) and Strauss (1986: 110-12).
the Aegean (Andok. 3.12; IG II² 30, naming Lemnos in a later decree as under Athenian control; Lys. 2.57; Asmonti, 2015: 164; Buckler, 2009: 138; Pascual, 2016). The reacquisition of such strategically important islands would fit in well at this point with the mood in Athens (see Badian, 1995: 83-86, on the Athenian desire to fight at this time). A failed peace attempt was initiated by Sparta when they sent Antalkidas to Sardis in 393/92, which was also met by embassies from the allies at war with Sparta (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12-15). This Spartan embassy proposed the first ‘Common Peace’ treaty, a result of the numerous Greek states in attendance (Ryder, 1965: 28). Sparta had lost control of the Aegean and was economically unable to defeat the Allies (Devoto, 1986: 192), but the peace failed when the Spartan proposal weakened every state except Sparta (see for discussion Devoto, 1986: 193; Pascual, 2016: 16). The Athenians were particularly concerned that they would lose the gains they had made, especially Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros (Asmonti, 2015: 168-69). A second meeting, held in Sparta, similarly stumbled (the terms are discussed in Andok. 3.13, 20; Philokh. BNJ/328 F149a, b; for discussion, see Devoto, 1986: 200-02; Roberts, 1980: 101-04; Keen, 1998; Ryder, 1965: 31-33).¹

From the outset of the Corinthian War, Athenian power and influence had been growing steadily. In 394, Agesilaos’ army had been able to march through the area unmolested, confirming that Athens was as yet unable to bring the area back to heel (Xen. Hell. 4.2.6, 2.8; Cargill, 1995: 10). By 390, however, the situation had changed. Derkylidas was confined to

¹ See Pascual (2009: 82-83) for the dating of the peace conferences, and for dating of the entire Corinthian War more generally.
Abydos and Sestos and he had made himself particularly unwelcome in Thrace; hence, we can assume that the Thracian cities were generally pro-Athenian (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.31; Buckler, 2003: 153-54). In 390, to combat Spartan victories in the region, the Athenians sent Thrasyboulos with 40 ships to Rhodes but, after leaving Athens, he decided to swing north instead for the Hellespont (for the economic importance of this move, see Burke, 1990: 5-6 and Strauss, 1986: 152). He sailed past Abybos and Sestos, unmolested by Derkyldas, and settled a dispute between Amadokos I and Seuthes II (Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.32-33, 3.16, 7.3). Both of these Thracian rulers had previously employed Alkibiades (DS 13.105.3), so they were probably familiar with Athenian motivations in the North. This relationship possibly gave the Thracians greater recognition of their position and strengthened their kingdom from other possible invaders. He settled the dispute and enrolled them both as allies of Athens, an important first step in re-establishing an Athenian presence in the region (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26; Lys. 28.5; DS 14.94.2; IG II 21-22; Archibald, 1998: 122-25 discusses the nature of the relationship between the rulers).

After this, there was internal dissension in Thasos and the Thasians expelled the Spartans and admitted the Athenians. Thrasyboulos signed a treaty with Thasos (IG II 24-25; Dem. 20.59), possibly a result of the over-bearing nature of the Spartans. Also, probably at this time, Thrasyboulos gained the adherence of Samothrace and other states in the region, strengthening Athenian power greatly (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22, 5.1.7; Dem. 20.59; Badian, 1995: 84).

He then sailed to Byzantium, overthrew the oligarchies there and restored democracy. He

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1 Thrasyboulos had disappeared for a number of years, possibly eclipsed by his political enemy, Konon (Perlman, 1968: 259-261, 265-66). For discussion of a very personal political enmity between the men, see Strauss (1984), Asmonti (2015: 165-66).
reintroduced the 10% tax on vessels then took Khalkedon, securing for the Athenians the Hellespont in Athenian eyes (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27-30; Dem. 20.60; Buckler, 2003: 157-60), increasing Athenian revenues considerably.¹

The alliance with the Thracians must have formalised a renewed Athenian presence, as we can see that Thrasyboulos could sail in and out of the Hellespont at will soon after this (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26-28, 8.31). In 392, Andokides (3.15-16) claimed that some Athenians considered there was a need to continue war with Sparta, but asserted that Athens lacked the resources and support to do so. This is possible, but unlikley as Athenian economic power was growing at this time. Thrasyboulos’ *strategia* in the North in 390/89 led not only to the re-establishment of Athenian relations with the Thracians, but also to the restoration of democracy to Byzantion. This ensured a steady flow of income from the port duties (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27).² Sparta’s attempt to hinder Athenian interest in the region had been unsuccessful. By the early 380s Iphikrates could again collect money for the war from cities in the region (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.35). Yet again, one of the first regions to which Athens returned after a period of inwardness was the northern areas of Thrace and the Khersonnese and, again, wealth derived primarily from control of the trade routes and prominent cities was likely the driving motivation. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.28)

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¹ In these actions, Badian (1995: 84-86) and Cawkwell (1976) saw Thrasyboulos as reviving the old Empire. For an outline of events which shows that Athens may have been trying to maintain good relations with Persia, see Sato (2006) and Strauss (1984), cf. Ryder (1965: 34) who correctly takes the stance that Athenian actions were a stimulus for Persian actions in 387, though Persia would not have been threatened by Athens as much as desiring a peace to access Greek mercenaries (see below, pg. 71).

² For a discussion of the dating associated with his *strategia*, see Howan (2005: 19-20, 29-32). Roberts (1980: 108-10) outlines the events leading up to his death, including the irregularities associated with his accounts.
says that Antalkidas prevented ships from sailing from the Pontus to Athens; while they probably contained some grain (cf. Lys. 22.14), there is still no explicit indication from contemporary sources that the North was the primary source of grain, which means that the main consideration for all parties in the North was to control the considerable wealth that the area generated primarily through trade. Indeed, Sparta desired control of the region through this period but they did not need to control the grain trade per se. The only consideration that Sparta could have had was a desire to control the wealth generated by such naval trade. The eventual defeat of the Athenians at the Battle of Abydos in 387 threatened all that they had regained and their potential to create wealth (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-29; Polyain. 2.24), so they were most anxious to sue for peace. At this time, the Great King was also facing a revolt in Egypt and Cyprus and he would likely have wanted to focus on these areas of action rather than Greece. Moreover, he wanted to access the Greek mercenaries for his expeditions (DS 14.110.4-5; for the coalition of Egypt and Cyprus, both in revolt at this time, as a stimulus for peace, see Stylianou, 1988: 470). The Great King must have been particularly anxious for a pacified Greece as the terms of the peace even allowed Athens to retain some possessions, Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros (Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; schol. Dem. 20.54 claims that it was a disgraceful peace; for a discussion of the peace, see Buckler, 2003: 170-80).1

1 For the problems associated with the autonomy of the Greek cities as part of this peace, see Mackil (2013: 64-66). Cawkwell (1981) discusses the possible terms of the Peace. Clark (1990: 59-60) argues against one particular aspect, however, that it could not have included a limitation on triremes.
The King's Peace to the Battle of Leuktra

Though war-weariness and the strong position of Sparta at that time played its part, the Lakedaimonian mission to Persia in 387 to guarantee peace would have been influenced in part by the Athenian resurgence, possibly stimulated by the reacquisition of the Khersonese (Antalkidas’ return directly to Sestos after his mission to Persia in 387 is a possible testament to this concern – Xen. Hell. 5.1.25). Athens followed the letter of the King’s Peace, if not the true spirit. At the end of the Corinthian War, they immediately started to build up their influence. They settled *kleroukhoi* in Lemnos in 387/6 and the settlements at Imbros and Skyros were continued in order to ensure the safety of a growing grain trade from the North (IG II² 30; Cargill, 1995: 12-15, 84-86). They also granted honours to Hebryzelmis in 386 and, at his request, sent a naval squadron into the region, maintaining the influence won by Thrasyboulos (IG II² 31; Archibald, 129). Moreover, in 384, Athens made an alliance with Khios (IG II² 35), possibly demonstrating the growth of an Athenian desire to lead a hegemony again. It was proposed by the Khians and was to be a mutually defensive alliance, wherein the Athenians were to guarantee the autonomy of the Khians in accordance with the King’s Peace.² Such an alliance must have raised questions in Sparta, but when it was found that Athens was courting an alliance with Olynthos in the North in 383/82, such a move had to be countered with Spartan military might (Xen. Hell. 5.2.15);³ Olynthos was captured and its confederacy dissolved in 382.

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¹ These honours for Hebryzelmis were legal under the Peace, hence not an alliance (Cargill, 2003: 186).
² For the reasons for the alliance, see Badian (1995: 87, n.30). Dusanic (2000) discusses the full political-military context.
³ See Buckler, 1980: 15-16 for a discussion of the significance of an alliance between Athens, Thebes and Olynthos. Burke (1990: 9) emphasises that this was a move to consolidate Athenian maritime interests.
and they were required to contribute soldiers to the Spartan army (as seen in DS 15.31.2). Ryder (1965: 40-41) points out the hypocrisy of Spartan actions against Olynthos when they took no similar action against the Akhaianians, demonstrating that Sparta only acted where it saw benefits, and to control this region was a great benefit for any State. Olynthos was made a subordinate ally of Sparta (Bolmarcich, 2005: 28; Mackil, 2013: 69; Hamilton, 1980: 97 claims that Athens did not become involved to ensure that they respected the terms of the peace, even though Sparta was in clear breach of them). The Spartan capture of Thebes as part of this campaign further concerned the Athenians (Xen. Hell. 5.2.24-31; Androt. BNJ, 324 F50; Plut. Ages. 23.3-7, Pel. 5.1-3; DS 15.20.1-3). This concern was enlarged almost three years later in 379 when Sphodrias raid Attic territory (Xen. Hell. 5.4.25-33; Plut. Ages. 24-25). This was seen as retaliation for the Theban revolt and subsequent independence from Sparta, apparently supported by Athens (Xen. Hell. 5.4.1-18; DS 15.25.1-27.3; see Kallet-Marx, 1985: 140-45 for a discussion of active Athenian involvement, suggesting previous diplomatic activity). The Spartan government publicly disavowed the raid, but it was a reminder that Athens was under threat from Sparta. Buckler (2003: 222) describes it as a desperate tactic for a desperate situation; Sparta had no way to stop the Athenian renascence legally, thus they

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1 For an account of the Athenian desire to observe the terms of the King’s Peace, see Ryder (1965: 43, 49, 51). He is correct to point out that Athens ensured that they did not breach the terms of the Peace, but implies a greater level of altruism than probably determined their policy.

2 The sequence of events proposed here follows Badian (1995: 91-92 and n.37) and Buckler (2003: 212-224), contra Cawkwell (1973: 51-60), who saw the League as defence against an impending Spartan invasion, which would have done little to help. Parker (2007: 23-24) argues that the raid was in response to Athenian support for the Theban expulsion of the Spartan garrison on the Cadmea.
resorted to more unorthodox reminders of Spartan military power.\(^1\) Plutarch (Pel. 14.1-3) outlines a story that involves Pelopidas and Gorgidas bribing Sphodrias to attack Athens, but this story is unlikely to be correct.\(^2\)

After he was recalled to stand trial in Sparta for the invasion of Attike, Sphodrias was acquitted under the influence of Agesilaos (DS 15.29.6), which made the action seem a legitimate act of the Spartan government in the eyes of the broader Greek world. In response, Athens fitted the Peiraeos with gates (Xen. Hell. 5.4.34; See Sealey, 1993: 15 for a discussion of this phrase) and accelerated their ship-building programme. By the end of 376, they had 100 triremes (listed in IG II\(^2\) 1604). They also made an alliance with Thebes (Xen. Hell. 5.4.34; Plut. Pel. 15.1), possibly laying the foundations for this alliance up to a year before (Kallet-Marx, 1985: 147-48; Sealey, 1993: 54-56). Thebes provided the allies with an excellent counter-point to the naval war about to start as they could distract Sparta on land in conjunction with Athenian action on sea (DS 15.28.4, 29.5-7; Buckler, 2003: 225-26). Athens then sent embassies around the Aegean to raise arms against Sparta (DS 15.28.2). There was probably already discontent against Spartan enforcement of the King's Peace, inherent in the statement of Diodoros (15.28.2- οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαίμονιοι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦς δυνάμεως ὑπεροπτικῶς καὶ βαρέως ἦρχον τῶν

\(^1\) Buckler (2003: 222-23) outlines the problems clearly. The march was too far to be actually aiming at Peiraios (see also Kallet-Marx, 1985: 149), and Xenophon often uses the word προσποιεῖσθαι to mean to pretend to go or to pretend (Hell. 5.4.20). It was a warning to Athens rather than an actual intention to attack Peiraeus. Kallet-Marx (1985: 150) implies that it was after the raid that Athens and Thebes became formally allied against Sparta after arguing that this happened before the raid. It tends to suggest, as has been above, that Athens had been informally in discussion with Thebes prior to the raid and formally made their alliance as a response to Sphodrias' raid.

\(^2\) Plutarch has another man, Melo, rather than Gorgidas, as the co-conspirator of Pelopidas, in his life of Agesilaos (24.2-4) indicating problems within his own history over the story.
ὑποτεταγμένων) – how could there not be, with such a nakedly imperial policy taken towards Thebes in particular? This could have followed some previous diplomatic contact that led to the formal call for an alliance by Athens.¹ That the Aegean states would turn to Athens may imply that Athens had indeed paid scrupulous attention to the terms of the peace of 387 (Ryder, 1965: 55-56).

The first city to respond to the Athenian call to arms against Sparta was Byzantion, making a bilateral alliance with them (IG II² 41), then Methymna (IG II² 42), with whom Athens was already in alliance. Cargill (1981: 102-03) indicates that a close reading of the Decree of Aristoteles, the foundation stone of the Second Athenian Naval Alliance, shows that lines 20-21 of the alliance decree with Methymna talk about other synedroi. This could indicate that Athens was already trying to build a League.² Moreover, the same stone-mason who carved IG II² 42 (the decree of alliance with Methymna) also possibly carved IG II² 43 (the Decree of Aristoteles; see Rhodes & Osborne, 2003: 108), which could indicate a relatively short period of time between the decrees, if any time at all, in which Athens was trying to reclaim hegemony.

These states were followed in alliance with Athens by Mytilene and Rhodes. Together with Khios, Thebes, Byzantion and Methymna, these states formed the founding members of this alliance. These states joined Athens under the same terms as the Khians; other states joined

¹ Hamilton (1991: 179-80) claims that the statement by Diodoros is incorrect, but Hamilton claims that Diodoros says that the states revolted from Sparta, which is not part of the language used by Diodoros in his description of events. For another chronology which places the foundation of the League before the raid of Sphodrias, see Kallet-Marx (1985: 129-140). The chronology proposed here is possible, but it was not formalised as what we know as the Second Athenian Confederacy until after Sphodrias’ raid.

² For the decree as a general statement of intention, see Hamilton (1980: 104-06).
after this (IG II² 43, lines 24-26). Diodoros (15.28.5) implies that the alliance was, in the first instance, a bilateral alliance of mutual defence, with all of the allied states preparing for war with Sparta as part of their treaty obligations.

Autonomy was granted to all members (Cargill, 1995: 12), which probably led many of the cities in the North to join the second naval confederacy.¹ This also essentially formalised the position of Athens as leader of the cities in the Thracian Khersonese. Badian (1995: 90-91) claims that cities joined the naval league as a result of a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach, with the fear of what could happen to the cities if they did not join; the reason that many did indeed join it, according to Badian, were the examples made of Samos and Poteidaia. These are examples that are much later, however (see below, pp. 93, 97), and belong to a completely different context. They are poor examples of what Badian is straining to prove and it should stand that the Naval Alliance of 378 was a voluntary association for protection against Spartan aggression.

Athens, however, was at this time facing trouble in the North with a newly established, independently-minded Odrysian kingdom under Kotys. The Odrysian king came to the throne in about 384 and down to the 360s spent his time rebuilding his kingdom’s strength by forging relationships with other powers in the North (Heskel, 1997: 171). Athens had become involved in the region formally again in 390 with the settling of affairs between Amadokos and Seuthes I, then again in 386 when they awarded honours to Hebryzelmis, king of central Thrace (see above, pg. 72). Seuthes was a local dynast who tried to wrest control from Amadokos, the king

¹ For the decree of Aristoteles and a discussion of the types of alliances, see Cargill (1981: 16-47).
to whom he owed allegiance, unsuccessfully.¹ Seuthes tried to get the Athenians involved on his behalf (Lys. 28.5-6; Archibald, 1998: 219), but it was not until Amadokos’ death that his power grew. Archibald claims that the alliance of Athens with Hebryzelmis, located in the central areas of Thrace, indicates that the Athenians recognised that their more natural allies were the Thracians in central, rather than eastern, Thrace. Athens had always desired complete control of the straits into the Hellespont to ensure access to wealth and, now, what was a growing grain trade with the region; an active alliance with a compliant monarch of eastern Thrace would have been far more beneficial for this. At some point prior to this, Seuthes II, successor to his father Seuthes I, attacked the Khersonnese (Polyain. 7.38), and Diodoros (15.31.2) lists the people of Thrace as allies. It is more likely that Athens recognised the belligerence of Seuthes II and tried to create an alliance to place pressure on him.

An interesting question arising in this period is the relationship between Iphikrates, the prominent and successful Athenian strategos, and Seuthes’ son Kotys. Iphikrates was to have a prominent and long-standing career in the service of Kotys, which began with the King’s Peace in 387, at which point Iphikrates entered the service of Seuthes II. In 383, Iphikrates was allegedly adopted by the king of Macedonia, Amyntas III (Aiskh. 2.27). It is unlikely, as a member of the court of Kotys, that Iphikrates would have taken this initiative without his permission. If this story is true, it would likely form part of a larger diplomatic manoeuvre by the Thracian king who could be seen as attempting to grow his power. The story could indicate that Kotys

¹ It was not unusual for kings to cede a degree of autonomy to local rulers. For example, see Miltokythes, below, pg. 95-97.
was trying to use the experienced Athenian general to control the southern coastal areas to
access the wealth generated by the coastal cities from trade. This would further limit Athenian
influence in the region. Moreover, it was probably undertaken at the same time as Sparta was
in conflict with the Khalkidian League, which could demonstrate that Kotys was trying to
increase his power while all eyes were focused on Olynthos (see above, pp. 72-73). Thus, for
an expansive power such as Seuthes II and his son, Kotys, a revived Athenian power in the
region presented significant issues. Of the northern cities, it was not until after 377 that
Maroneia and Perinthos joined the Athenian Naval League; then, after 375, Ainos, Abdera,
Dikaia and other coastal cities, Elaious and Selymbria, Thasos and Samothrake joined.¹

There is debate about the year that most allies joined the League. Much argument rests on the
nature of the lettering and the spacing of letters on the decree and, as a result, is problematic
at best. The enrolment of most of these allies is best dated historically to Khabrias’ campaigns
in 375 (DS 15.30.5, 36.4),² as it would fit in with the renewed King’s Peace of 375 – there was
probably a number of allies who remembered the attitude and actions of Sparta after the last
Peace and felt that alliance with Athens in a voluntary league was a strong option. Moreover,
the adherence of Thracian cities would have stirred Kotys into action, but he was not able to
act in 375 as he was fighting a large movement of peoples in the North, the Triballii (DS 15.36.2-
4; Ain. Tak. 15.8-10), hence strengthening the likelihood of 375 as the year these cities joined.

¹ Though, as Cargill (1981: 38) points out, the dating is highly tenuous and better left as a possibility.
² Cawkwell (1981: 42-43) argues for 375 and the context of Khabrias’ campaign, Woodhead (1975 and
1962) argues for a context of both 375 and 373 (Timotheos’ campaign). Cargill (1981: 41, 61-64) does
not firmly agree either way, but leans towards 375.
The Khabrias Monument, set-up to honour Khabrias in the agora in Athens, is good evidence for this as well.\(^1\) The base was set-up with a *terminus post quem* of September 376 (Burnett & Edmondson, 1961: 80; Shear, 1991: 282-83), and it lists a number of groups and individuals who honoured him. This includes the soldiers who fought with him at the Battle of Naxos (in 376), Diotimos and the soldiers on the vessels at Syros, then four inscriptions associated with his campaigns in the Hellespont. Burnett & Edmondson (1961: 82-89) use this as evidence to further argue for a date of 375 for the adherence of the Thracian and Hellespontine cities, claiming that it would have been unlikely for Athens to wait for two years after Naxos for Timotheos in 373 to strengthen the League (1961: 82). In conjunction with the Decree of Aristoteles, they suggest that Khabrias, after Naxos and his triumphant return to Athens, gained the adherence to the league of Abdera, Thasos, Samothrace, Elaious, Lesbos and the Kyklades in that order (1961: 83). This is a possible scenario, but based on the slender evidence at our disposal, the best we can assert with any confidence is that the *poleis* listed on the Decree of Aristoteles joined the League as a result of Khabrias’ activities in 375 rather than as a result of Timotheos’ campaigns in 373, though Zakynthos, listed on the decree at line 131, was likely the last ally to be enrolled in the League.

The growth of Athenian naval power and alliances must have concerned Sparta,\(^2\) as it chose to raise a Peloponnesian fleet and attack Athenian interests head-on. Pollis was sent out as

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\(^1\) For an outline of the fragments, see Burnett & Edmondson (1961).

\(^2\) One of the first areas Athens sought to build alliances was southern Euboia (DS 15.30.1). This was an area crucial to the successful (and safe) shipment of grain to Peiraias. It would also shore up the connections to her klerukhies in Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros (Buckler, 2003: 243; Cargill, 1981: 32-44).
navarkhos in 376 at the head of a significant Peloponnesian fleet of 65 triremes. His strategy, establishing bases at the crucial locations of Keos, Aigina and Andros to harry Athenian sea-borne trade, was successful, and Athens was soon in dire shortage of food (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61; Dem. 22.15). Khabrias was sent out to break the blockade, which he did successfully at Naxos (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61; DS 15.34.3-5). Buckler (2003: 248) cites this as an example of Athens beginning to broach the principle of autonomy of the League’s members. He claims that Athens was attacking the city and Pollis, having sent a fleet there, did not have possession of the island.

IG II² 179 indicates that a close relationship existed between Athens and Naxos, probably in the mid-fourth century, but references to the capture of Naxos in Diodoros (15.35.2) and D. (20.77) indicate that the island was taken, rather than added as an ally. It is nearly impossible to determine anything other than the fact that it was enrolled as an ally in the League in approximately 376 and we cannot know with certainty the circumstances of its adherence.

A restatement of the King’s Peace in 375 could not have come at a better time for Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1). The King was planning an expedition to quell an Egyptian revolt and again he needed Greek mercenaries to swell his forces (DS 15.38.1-2). The League was in a position of strength and Khabrias’ actions in the Hellespont in helping the Persian satrap there after his expedition to the Thracian coast indicated to the Persians that Athens was not a threat to Persian interests (Burnett and Edmondson, 1961: 84-85). Importantly, we can again see Athens carefully securing the route to the Hellespont and the Black Sea, indicating that it is from this

Histiaia did not join the League at this time, though, and were actively supportive of Sparta (DS 15.30.1); it was eventually brought into alliance (probably by 377/76; see Cargill, 1981: 136, n.14).
period that Athens probably sourced much of her grain from the North. With the grain route secure and Athens at the head of a League that dominated the Aegean, the Athenians were very keen to pursue peace. Though all states agreed to the terms of the treaty, Athens and Sparta were soon at war again. The fighting was initiated by Timotheos’ policy of support for the democrats in Zakynthos (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2-3; DS 15.45.1-4; Sealey, 1957: 99-104).\(^1\) Part of the fighting involved the Athenian actions in Kerkyra (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.9-11; DS 15.47.1-7); Alketas, King of Molossos, was asked to ferry them across to the island (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.10). As they would have needed to travel through Thessaly, they must also have had the support of Jason of Pherai, which must have presented Sparta with a daunting prospect – Athens and Thebes, allied with the Thessalians, the Molossi and most of the Aegean (Buckler, 2003: 264).

This phase of warfare demonstrated the financial short-comings of the Athenian Naval League at this time. Firstly, in order to acquire funds and crew for his ships to sail to Korkyra, Timotheos borrowed personally to fund it, then sailed around the islands to fill out the ranks further (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.12; DS 15.47.2; on his career, see Commentary, 8.74, pp. 233-34). Later, Iphikrates, who had replaced Timotheos after he did not sail quickly enough to Korkyra (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.13-14), was forced to raise funds by having his sailors work as labourers on the lands of the Korkyraians (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.37) and by forcing money from the cities of Kephallenia in 373/72 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.38).\(^2\) Badian (1995: 92-93) tries to make too much of this, claiming that what

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1 See Buckler, 2003: 261-265 for an outline of immediate events around this outbreak of war; Gray (1980) also discusses the issues of using Diodoros and Xenophon when reconstructing the chronology of events down to 371

2 Buckler (2003: 267) uses this as evidence that the cities of Kephallenia were not part of the League at this point (*cf.* IG II\(^2\) 43.107-108). See Cargill, 1981: 103-07 for an explanation of this anomaly. Buckler
happened was similar to the Peace of Kallias – when the allies saw that peace would be made with Sparta, they stopped paying. It is more likely that they had remained faithful to the terms of their treaty and not extorted money from allies, hence the need to undertake these activities. Athens would therefore have been very keen to pursue a peace settlement at this time along the terms of the Peace of 375 (Xen. Hell. 6.3.1-2; Plut. Ages. 27.3; for an outline of events surrounding the peace, see Buckler, 2003: 279-285, Buckler, 1980: 48-55; Ryder, 1965: 67-69). The main sticking point was that while Sparta was allowed to lead a Peloponnesian League and Athens was permitted her naval League, Thebes was denied control of a Boiotian League (Plut. Ages. 28.2; Xen. Hell. 6.3.19-20; DS 15.50.4-6), which led to Thebes being removed from the list of signatories to the Peace. This turn of events, led by Agesilaos, came back to haunt the Spartans as this led directly to the Battle of Leuktra and the defeat of Sparta.

The Spartan defeat at Leuktra heralded a new phase of fourth century history, that of the Theban hegemony. Athens had already developed a healthy mistrust of her ally since the Theban attack on Plataia in 373 (Xen. Hell. 6.3.1; DS 15.46.4-6; Isok. 14; Paus. 9.1.5-7); though Athens did not raise this as an issue, it clearly demonstrated that the Thebans were not beholden to their hegemon.

claims that Iphikrates attacked the cities of Kephallenia, but the Xenophon says “χρήματα ἐπράξατο, τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἐκόντων, τὰ δὲ παρ’ ἄκόντων,” a very different sense and one that allows Iphikrates to be raising money from allies rather than taking it forcibly from enemies.
Leuktra transformed the dynamic of Athenian relations with the other powers dramatically. Spartan power was now at an ebb, whereas Thebes, Athens’ erstwhile ally, was ascendant. It was not in Athens’ interests, however, to see the growth of Theban power. Initial Athenian reactions of shock at the defeat of Sparta changed to them seeing an opportunity to seize the mantle of leadership in the absence of Sparta. The Athenians called a meeting of the Greeks, primarily to gauge the reactions of the Peloponnesians, but also to regain the much-desired hegemony of Greece (Buckler, 2003: 298). Xenophon (Hell. 6.5.1-2) makes it clear that Athens desired Greece to be organised as an extension of the Athenian League, with the signatories to this post-Leuktra peace swearing to abide not only by the King’s Peace, through fear of Persian intervention against them (Ryder, 1965: 71), but also by the Athenians and their allies. At this meeting, Amyntas is alleged to have renounced his claims to Amphipolis and recognised Athenian claims to the city (Aiskh. 2.32-33). Aiskhines does cite a decree in support of this, but this may be later editing – he may have added a reference during a revision for publication as it made him seem more opposed to Philip than his opponent, D., claimed. Moreover, the Athenians may well have wanted to believe that Amyntas renounced Macedonian claims to Amphipolis after Philip took the city, justifying their own actions that followed throughout the period.

1 For the problems associated with Aiskhines’ speeches in this period, see Harris (1992: 76-78 and 1995: 10-15) and..
Leuktra initiated another phase of fighting between Thebes and Sparta, with Athens taking the side of Sparta as a powerful Thebes threatened Athenian interest in the North (see Buckler, 2003: 311-315 and 1980: 70-109 for an outline of the events). The alliance between Athens and Sparta may have indicated a commitment to the notion of the ‘Common Peace’ they led; to leave Sparta adrift would be to acknowledge that Athens could not enforce its own peace (Ryder, 1965: 76). This continued until 369/68 when Artaxerxes summoned the Greeks to Delphi to reissue the Peace. An Athenian now working for the satrap Ariobarzanes, Philiskos, set out the terms but required that the newly-created Messene, a bulwark against Sparta in the Peloponnese, be autonomous, implying that it was not to have any Theban support. This was done to push Thebes out of the Peace, which it did, as Thebes had created the polis as a deliberate counterbalance to Sparta in the Peloponnese. They would never have allowed it to be set adrift and undefended against an inevitable Spartan attack. Philiskos then left a large mercenary force for Sparta to command against Thebes (Xen. Hell. 7.1.27; DS 15.70.2).

It was at this point that the Athenians started to rebuild their power in the northern Aegean more overtly, firstly by attempting to bring Amphipolis back under Athenian control. This set off a train of events that lasted for a decade and presents the historian with numerous problems of chronology. Heskel (1997) outlines the events and issues in detail and, unless otherwise stated, this sequence of events follows her immensely detailed account of Athenian activities in the North. These events are an important preliminary to the attempted Athenian
control of the entire northern Aegean and form part of the narrative of events leading up to initial Athenian experiences of Philip.

Iphikrates was the first *strategos* the Athenians sent out to rebuild their presence in the region. He was likely appointed in 369 (Aiskh. 2.27; Heskel, 1997: 26) and his command in the Korinthiad (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.49-51; Buckler, 1980: 88-89; Develin, 1989: 251) helps in providing a *terminus post quem* for his *strategia* in the North. Iphikrates was probably appointed in July 369 (Heskel, 1997: 26-28) indicating that he was transferred by the *demos* directly from the Korinthiad to the North. He was only given a small squadron of ships to reconnoitre the area (Aiskh. 2.28), hence he required a mercenary force. He employed a local mercenary commander, Kharidemos (Dem. 23.149).¹ This set-off a train of events involving Kharidemos that many in Athens may have come to regret. We do not know exactly when Iphikrates hired Kharidemos for service with Athenian forces in the North. Iphikrates would not have had a chance to communicate with Kharidemos prior to sailing North due to his immediate appointment after service in the Korinthiad. Thus, Iphikrates must have hired the services of Kharidemos soon after arriving at Amphipolis. After making preliminary observations of the situation (Aiskh. 2.27-28), Iphikrates probably determined that it was more beneficial to hire a mercenary force than to request reinforcements from Athens to besiege Amphipolis. Buckler (2003: 354) suggests that the mercenary force employed by Iphikrates, under the command of

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¹ On Kharidemos and his eventual grant of Athenian citizenship, this series of events notwithstanding, see Kelly (1990).
Kharidemos, was not hired in the first instance for the siege of Amphipolis; rather, Buckler suggests that Kharidemos and his forces were contracted to assist in response to a Macedonian appeal to Iphikrates for assistance (Aiskh. 2.26-28). The Athenian obsession with Amphipolis and the indications that Athens gave in 371 to the effect that they would indeed move on Amphipolis are important. Given that Iphikrates had a small force, it seems likely that there was always an intent to hire a mercenary force to conduct the siege of Amphipolis.

In response to this Athenian action, Amphipolis soon made a treaty with the nearby power, Olynthos (Dem. 23.150; Heskel, 1997: 28-29). Heskel (1995: 27) argues that this was in 371/70, soon after the Athenians stated their intent at the congress of Greeks (Xen. Hell. 6.5.1), but the Amphipolitans continually sought autonomy, not direct interference in their affairs, and it is not likely that they appealed to an outside power until the Athenians were directly bearing down on them in 369. As the leader of the Khalkidian League, Olynthos was also on the path to regional hemegony (Xen. Hell. 5.2.17).2 The policy stated by Athens, and supported by the majority of Greek states at the congress of Athens in 371 (Xen. Hell. 6.5.1), was therefore always going to create conflict between Athens and Olynthos as both cities desired control of

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1 On this obsession, see Badian (1995). For a subtle critique of this through an analysis of the life of Konon, see Asmonti (2015: 179-183).
2 When an appeal was made to Sparta by Apollonia and Akanthos to intervene against Olynthos in 383, a speech was made by Kleigenes of Akanthos, urging Sparta to make war upon them. The speaker claims that they were bent upon the domination of not only the immediate region, but by using other cities as springboards (for example, Poteidaia), attempting to spread their power far and wide, beginning with Macedonian cities (Xen. Hell. 5.2.13). According to the speaker, they were also looking to control the wealthy gold-mining areas of Pangaion (Xen. Hell. 5.2.17). The Olynthians were depicted as looking to expand their wealth by both land and by sea, utilising their access to so much timber in the region (Xen. Hell. 5.2.16). The speaker attempts to convince the audience that they were also looking to control Thrace (Xen. Hell. 5.2.17), drawing an analogy with Spartan reliance on the Arkadians to bolster their forces (Xen. Hell. 5.2.19).
this polis. This conflict came to a head in the summer of 365, when the Olynthians occupied Amphipolis at the request of the inhabitants (Dem. 23.150).

Soon after his arrival in the region, Iphikrates was asked by the Macedonian King, Ptolemy, to assist him in repelling the pretender Pausanias (Aiskh. 2.26-27; Heskel, 1997: 23). Athens was forced to become involved in the question of succession in Macedonia to protect their influence in the region because Olynthos had already become involved in this succession crisis, possibly supplying Pausanias’ Greek troops (Aiskh. 2.27: “ἐχοντος δὲ Ἑλληνικὴν δύναμιν”). The Olynthians may also have been preparing at this point to make terms with Amphipolis, as the later alliance tends to indicate (Tod, 1948: 30-34, no. 111). Thus, in order to preserve their interests in the North against Olynthos, Athens was forced to intervene in Macedonia. Iphikrates probably left his Athenian troops behind to continue the siege of Amphipolis while he took Kharidemos and the mercenaries as his main body of troops to Macedonia. This assumption is based on a number of factors. Firstly, the Athenians had traditionally seen themselves as effective siege wagers (Thuc. 1.102.2). Also, the war against Amphipolis was seen in Athens as a campaign of the highest priority. To leave the mercenary army under Kharidemos to conduct the siege without the guidance of the Athenian strategos would have been highly unlikely. Finally, when Iphikrates fled to the court of Kotys when he was recalled to Athens for failing to take Amphipolis, Kharidemos chose to follow Iphikrates rather than continue to work for Athens. There was likely a strong bond that had formed between Iphikrates and
Kharidemos, not unheard of in this period (Trundle, 2004: 110, 136), and a possible situation in which this bond was formed was on an extended campaign in Macedonia.

Iphikrates achieved success in Macedonia, agreeing to a peace treaty with the Macedonian monarch (Aiskh. 2.27), after which Iphikrates returned to the siege at Amphipolis. Thebes was threatened by this Athenian influence in Macedonia and Pelopidas immediately led an army to Macedonia to undo Iphikrates treaty with Macedonia, likely hiring mercenaries on the way at Pharsalos (Plut. Pel. 27.2-3; Heskel, 1997: 23).¹ This resulted in Macedonia reneging on its treaty with Athens and a Theban treaty with Macedonia. This was confirmed with Pelopidas taking hostages from Macedonia. This had political ramifications for Iphikrates in winter or spring when Ptolemy, the Macedonian king, made an alliance with Amphipolis (see Heskel, 1997: 28 for discussion). Timotheos’ supporters would have been able to use Iphikrates’ ultimate failure in Macedonia to strengthen their call for his replacement with Timotheos. The Macedonian support for Amphipolis would have been particularly difficult for the Athenians to tolerate.

One of the most significant events of this period was an affair involving the capture of hostages from Amphipolis. Just before his recall, Iphikrates had a break-through. As part of the alliance between Ptolemy and Amphipolis, hostages were to be taken to guarantee the fidelity of the

¹ Buckler (1980: 121-22) suggests that the Theban response was directly related to their concerns of losing influence in the North, hence the immediacy of action.
Amphipolitans (Dem. 23.149). The hostages were taken by a certain Harpalos, who was then captured with the hostages by the Athenians. Low (2007: 115) emphasises that the taking of hostages in Greece was usually done to assert the dominance of the more powerful party over the weaker, which was the case in this instance of hostages being sent by Amphipolis (the weaker party) to guarantee fidelity to an alliance with Macedonia (the stronger party). The Athenian capture of these hostages was a boon to Athens as it gave them leverage over the Amphipolitans as they could execute the hostages if Amphipolis did not open the gates to Athens. The chronology is unclear about the events surrounding the hostages and the role of Kharidemos. Heskel (1997: 25-26; 45-46) has suggested that Iphikrates was deposed because he entrusted the hostages to Kharidemos rather than sending them to Athens. The reason for Iphikrates’ recall, however, was primarily the successes of Timotheos at Samos; Timotheos’ appointment was made easier by Iphikrates’ recent failures.

The reasons for Iphikrates to give the hostages to Kharidemos in the first place are still obscure – a better chronology of events may assist in this. As outlined above, Iphikrates was recalled to Athens because of a combination of his lack of success at Amphipolis and Macedonia and Timotheos’ success at Samos. Timotheos had just won a victory over the island, reducing it in just ten months (Isok. 15.111). This made for a powerful argument to send the successful

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1 The identity of this man is unknown. It is clear that he was a Macedonian (Heskel, 1997: 28), and Droysen (1877: 87) goes as far as to attempt a tenuous identification of him. Heskel (1997: 44) points out that there was only one other fourth century Macedonian of whom we have evidence, namely the companion of Alexander (Arr. 3.6.4). It is likely, though, that they are different people.

2 Ryder (1965: 82, 83-84) argues that this indicated that Athens no longer feared Persian retribution as the island was held by a pro-Persian government.
Timotheos to replace the unsuccessful Iphikrates. What probably further strengthened this argument for Timotheos’ supporters was the alliance made between Amphipolis and Macedonia, compounding Iphikrates’ failure to take Amphipolis. Just prior to this recall, Iphikrates captured the hostages, but before receiving word about the hostages it was determined by the *ekklesia* that Timotheos should be appointed in place of Iphikrates to command the Athenian forces against Amphipolis. Iphikrates received this recall and decided to leave Athenian service and go to the court of his father-in-law, Kotys, leaving the hostages with Kharidemos to guard them until the arrival of Timotheos; he sent a letter to Athens to this effect (the “τὴν Ἰφικράτους ἐπιστόλην” of Dem. 23.150). If Iphikrates had sent a letter to Athens about the hostages, which was answered with the order to send them back to Athens, this would require a second letter from Iphikrates which said he had already entrusted them to Kharidemos. Had this been the case, D. would have made reference to two letters sent from Iphikrates. Thus, it seems most likely that there was only one letter sent from Iphikrates, the one which said he had captured hostages.

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1 Kallet (1983) argues that Iphikrates was sent to Kotys’ court to further Athenian interests there, but Harris (1989) argues that he fled to avoid prosecution in Athens over his failures in the North. Harris’ argument is more likely as there is no evidence that Iphikrates was in Thrace in any ‘official’ capacity. For arguments that the alliance between Iphikrates and Timotheos was sooner than believed (between 370-365), demonstrating the possibility of Kallet’s argument, see Harris (1988), cf. [Dem.] 49.66, though a later date in the period identified would also further Harris’ (1989) argument, allowing Iphikrates to return from Thrace in the mid 360s.

2 Parke (1933: 127) believes that it is more likely that Iphikrates was involved in the handover of hostages to Amphipolis out of spite towards both Athens and Timotheos. This may be correct, but it is clear from Iphikrates’ refusal to fight against Athens in 361 on behalf of Kotys by leaving the Thracian court (Dem. 23.132) that he did not wish to act directly against Athens, and this incident is probably no exception.
After receiving Iphikrates’ letter outlining the capture of Amphipolitan hostages, Athens then attempted to send a letter to Iphikrates ordering him to send the hostages to Athens (Dem. 23.15: “τὸ ... ψήφισμα ... περὶ τῶν ὀμήρων”). This letter probably did not reach Iphikrates in time; he had already left for the court of Kotys. Between the departure of Iphikrates and the arrival of a missive from Timotheos to engage his services, however, Kharidemos decided that he would leave the employ of Athens and travel with his former paymaster, Iphikrates, who had gone to Kotys in Kardia (Dem. 23.150).¹ In a highly unusual twist in this story, Kharidemos sold the hostages back to Amphipolis at this point (which was probably outlined in the despatch of Timotheos to Athens, read in Dem. 23.150, sent after he had found out that the hostages were no longer in the possession of the Athenian forces).

Kharidemos, through his career, demonstrated a true mercenary spirit, characteristic of the time. He had the opportunity to stay in the service of Athens, which must have been a much easier option for him to take.² Kharidemos also demonstrated in his career that he was capable of fidelity to an employer for extended periods of time, however, showing it to three paymasters, Iphikrates and, later, Kotys and his son Kersobleptes. Kharidemos may have decided that it would be better to sell the hostages and sail to join Iphikrates, where there may have been an opportunity to work for Kotys alongside Iphikrates. He would thus get the money

¹ For discussion, see Heskel (1997: 138-39).
² It is safe to imply this because Timotheos (Dem. 23.150) indicated that it was a surprise that Kharidemos decided to leave the employ of Athens. Also, it is doubtful that Iphikrates would have left the hostages with Kharidemos if he expected him to turn coat and leave the Athenian fold.
for the hostages from Amphipolis (which he may well have needed to pay his army) while looking for more lucrative (and potentially successful) opportunities. Kharidemos must have been encouraged to travel to Kotys by his relationship with Iphikrates, as there was no guarantee of opportunity of work for Kotys.

In the meantime, Timotheos had been dispatched to take control of the Athenian forces at Amphipolis.¹ Though D. (23.150) states that Timotheos may have decided to travel to the Khersonnese initially, which would require Kotys to bolster his forces in the region by utilising Kharidemos, there is no guarantee that Kharidemos would have been required at that time and thus he allegedly left guaranteed employment for the mere possibility of work.² Heskel’s (1997: 30) argument that he was contacted by Kotys to fight for him against Timotheos, then was sent away when Timotheos sailed to Amphipolis instead, may be correct, but there is no evidence for direct contact between Kharidemos and Kotys at this time and D. would have brought it to the attention of the Athenians if he knew of any such evidence.

By the time of Timotheos’ arrival at Amphipolis, Olynthos had replaced the Macedonians as guarantors of Amphipolitan autonomy (Dem. 23.150; Heskel, 1997: 46-47). Timotheos then decided to attack Olynthian territory to cause a distraction for the Olynthians. This turned out

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¹ This replacement would have been a political insult to Iphikrates, who then left Athens for Kotys, surely mitigating the arguments regarding the alliance of Iphikrates and Timotheos holding fast throughout this period, put forward by Sealey (1993: 88).
² For discussion of the issue surrounding this, see Buckler (1980: 255-56).
to be a successful tactic. He took Torone and Poteidaia in 364 and sent aid to relieve the siege of Kyzikos (DS 15.8.6; Isok. 15.108; Polyain. 3.10.15), under attack by Philiskos on behalf of Ariobarzanes who was, by this time, in full revolt from Artaxerxes (DS 15.81.6; see Buckler, 2003: 351-59 for an outline of events). He possibly took a number of other cities in the Khalkidike (Isok. 15.113; Heskel, 1997: 48). Timotheos may also have planned an unsuccessful campaign against Olynthos (Polyain. 3.10.7). Heskel (1997: 49) believes that this event did not happen, as the sources are silent on any action, but she does not recognise Polyainos as reliable. His information is problematic, but an attack on Olynthos would likely have been the ultimate goal and would have been a fitting end to the Khalkidic campaign; moreover, he had put himself in an extremely strong position to do so. He was aided in this attack by Perdikkas, the Macedonian King, who now decided that his interests lay in supporting Athens against a strong Olynthos (Dem. 2.14; Polyain. 3.10.14).

In 367, Thebes had sent an embassy to Susa to seek the King’s support for Thebes as prostates of the Peace. Hearing of this embassy, Athens, along with a number of Greek poleis, also sent embassies (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33). As part of the negotiations, the King demanded that Athens dock the fleet (Xen. Hell. 7.1.36-37) and declared that Amphipolis was to be autonomous (Dem. 19.137). The Peace was rejected by Athens (see Cargill, 1981: 31-32 for discussion of the erasure of the King from the Decree of Aristoteles as a result) and the Athenian ambassador, Timagoras, was executed (Dem. 19.137, 191; [Dem.] 7.29; Plut. Artaxerx. 22.6). Events did not bode well for Athens, however, with Thebes building 100 triremes to challenge Athens directly.
(DS 15.78.4-79.1), possibly with Persian support (Plut. Phil. 14.2; see Buckler, 1980: 308, n.19 for discussion about the substantial nature of this fleet). By 364, the Theban fleet was ready to sail. The ultimate goal of their naval policy must have been to distract the Athenians from mainland ventures by causing them grief in the Aegean (Buckler, 2003: 360).\(^1\) Epameinondas sailed the fleet to Byzantion, possibly to raise a revolt against Athens, but if this was the plan the city ignored their pleas (DS 15.78.4-79.2; Isok. 5.53; Justin 16.4.3). The Byzantine attacks on the Athenian grain fleet in 362 ([Dem.] 50.4-6) and in 361 ([Dem.] 50.17-19) may have been connected to the Theban visit in 364, though it probably shows an increasingly independent Byzantion and Khalkedon prior to the outbreak of the Social War.\(^2\) The Theban fleet was wasted, even though it clearly concerned the Athenians who chose not to engage it at sea by blocking access to the North. In the end, though the fleet could have been used to good purpose by harrying the Athenians at sea, it came to nothing. It does demonstrate, however, that Athenian influence still held strong in the region for the moment. This was to change, with a series of poor Athenian *strategoi* in the region and the growth of the power of the Thracian King, Kotys.

In 363, while Timotheos was in the Khalkidike, Ergophilos and Callisthenes were sent as *strategoi* to the Khersonnese and Amphipolis respectively (on these *strategoi*, see below). Soon after this, Amphipolis made an alliance with Perdikkas after the Olynthian withdrawal,

\(^1\) Buckler & Beck (2008: 208) suggest that the plan of Epameinondas was to weaken Athens gradually, as to try and do so in one attempt was not possible.

\(^2\) Cawkwell (1984: 335-36) ties these actions to widespread grain shortages in the region.
and Kallisthenes fought a war against him (Aiskh., 2.29-30; see Heskel, 1997: 49-52 for discussion). Kallisthenes agreed to a truce with Macedonia for which he was recalled and sentenced to death (Aiskh. 2.29-30; Arist. Rhet. 1380 b13), because the terms of the truce allowed Macedonian occupation of Amphipolis to continue (Heskel, 1997: 36, 49). Ergophilos’ command was in the Khersonnese and he lost several outposts (Dem. 19.180). He was in Thrace at the time that Kotys’ general, Miltokythes, took these Athenian outposts, then revolted from Kotys and sought Athenian assistance.

We could characterise Miltokythes as a local dynast in Thrace. Geyer (R.E., 1932, s.v. ‘Miltokythes 2’) claims that he may have been a treasurer of Kotys, probably based on the fact that he took Hieron Oros from Miltokythes, a main stronghold of Thrace (Dem. 23.104; see Commentary 8.64, pp. 223-24). It is not likely that he was simply a treasurer, however, as Kotys is unlikely to have trusted another powerful individual with the finances of his kingdom. He was probably no more than a mercenary general, possibly set up as a local dynast by Kotys to control territory on his behalf. Whilst operating as a general on behalf of Kotys, Miltokythes had attacked Athenian territory (Dem. 23.130, 166; Heskel, 1997: 141-42). Ergophilos was likely the Athenian strategos in the region when these important cities were lost (Dem. 23.104, 19.180; see Heskel, 1997: 85-87 for discussion). He was recalled and tried for these losses.

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1 The only sources we have on Miltokythes are contained in D.’s speech 23 (23.104, 115, 169, 175).
2 It was common for the Thracian kings to have local rulers control their lands for them, as Seuthes did for Amadokos (Archibald, 1998: 123-24).
3 This is against D.’s claim that Miltokythes was consistently well-disposed to Athens (23.169).
After these initial successes, Miltokythes chose to revolt from his Odrysian master. Heskel (1997: 85-87) places the outbreak of the revolt in early to mid-summer in 362 (see also Hansen, 1975: 94; Dem. 50.12 is used to date the recall of Autokles, successor to Ergophilos). Miltokythes quickly made alliances with Athens (to whom he promised to restore the Khersonnese – Dem. 50.5) and Ariobarzanes in order to bolster his position against the inevitable attack from Kotys. Miltokythes’ natural ally was the Athenians, because of their demonstrated willingness to remain active in the region and support local divisions. The alliance with Ariobarzanes is likely to have come after the despatch of Autokles, another *strategos* sent by the Athenians to deal with affairs in the Khersonnese (Dem. 23.104; 50.12). Heskel (1997: 87) suggests that he was despatched in approximately September 362. He was appointed with the authority to act so that neither Kotys nor Miltokythes gained a distinct advantage over the other. This order from the *demos* explains the small fleet he commanded – a larger fleet would have stirred an undesired response from Kotys and may have been too influential in the outcome. This also explains D.’s comments (23.104) that Miltokythes withdraw in alarm; it is possible that when Miltokythes learned of the small size of the fleet under Autokles, however, he probably became concerned that he would not have enough assistance to repel Kotys (Dem. 23.104). He then made a subsequent alliance with Ariobarzanes, giving him the cities he had previously taken, Sestos and Krithote, as a gift to

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1 Alliance with Ariobarzanes is assumed from the gift of Sestos and Krithote to him when Athenian support in the form of Autokles’ fleet was minimal (Heskel, 1997: 79), *cf.* Xen. *Ages.* 2.26.
gain the alliance.¹ After his failure to carry out his mandate (as Miltokythes was soundly defeated by Kotys who then had complete control of the region again), Autokles was deposed through *eisangelia* and returned to Athens (Dem. 50.12; Hansen, 1975: 95-96).

This initiated what Heskel has called the “War against Kotys.” As a result of his territorial control of the European side of the Hellespont, Kotys joined forces with Mausolos and attacked Sestos (Xen. *Ages.* 2.26). Aid was requested from Athens and Sparta by Ariobarzanes (Nepos. *Tim.* 1.3), who controlled Sestos at the time. Athens responded positively to Ariobarzanes’ request for aid, ordering Timotheos, who had successfully taken the Khalkidian cities, to assist while simultaneously maintaining the King’s Peace (Dem. 15.9). As part of this campaign, Timotheos besieged Samos and captured it after a ten-month siege (Isok. 15.111; Polyain. 3.10.9-10, describing his activities during the siege). Timotheos then took Krithote (Isok. 15.112; Nep. *Tim.* 1.3). In recognition for his services, Ariobarzanes recognised the right of Athens to Sestos and Krithote (though Buckler, 2003: 357, points out they were not his to give). He then raised the siege of Kyzikos (Nep. *Tim.* 1.3), which meant that Athens could safely sail down the grain route as the key cities were either in their hands, in friendly hands, or were allies (Buckler, 2003: 359).

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¹ Miltokythes promised to give the Khersonnese to Athens, but when there was a distinct lack of support from Athens, he was forced to make the same offer to Ariobarzanes, which the Persian gladly took. This is deduced from the giving of these cities back to Timotheos by Ariobarzanes — Nep. *Tim.* 1.2-3; Isok. 15.108, 112; DS 15.81.6.
It was not long before this, in 362, that the Battle of Mantinea had been fought, where all of the major players of mainland Greece participated on one side or the other either in support of, or against, the Arkadian League (Xen. Hell. 7.4.28-5.27; DS 15.82.1-88.4). Thebes and her allies were victorious, but the death of Epameinondas turned it into a Pyrrhic victory. It did lead to the first genuine common peace in Greek history, a remarkably successful one (DS 15.89.1-2); it also may have provided the stimulus for Athens to continue her domination of the North. The Great King had reversed his decision about Athenian control of Amphipolis in 366 (Dem. 19.137) and a general peace probably afforded Athens the latitude to pursue a more aggressive policy in the North, in contrast to the autonomy clauses of the alliances of the 370s.

With Timotheos’ victories in the Khersonnese, Athens must have been feeling a sense of security, but Kotys changed this drastically. In 360, Kotys attacked Sestos again, which he captured (Dem. 23.158). He went on to besiege Krithote and Elaious with the assistance of Kharidemos (Dem. 23.158) before he was assassinated (Dem. 23.163). The rule of Thrace was divided between his sons Kersobleptes, Amadokos and Berisades. Athens breathed a short sigh of relief until they recognised that his son, Kersobleptes, was to continue his father’s aggressively anti-Athenian policy against Athens immediately. He sent a letter to Timomakhos, strategos in the Khersonnese, probably professing support of Athens in the area and then, when he had fooled the strategos, he took further Athenian possessions (Dem. 23.115). Kephisodotos and Kharidemos, probably recognising that they were unable to retake the lost territory, then signed a truce in early 359, for which Kephisodotos was recalled and fined five
talents (Dem. 23.167). At this point, Kharidemos finally captured Miltokythes, whose revolt had ended so ignominiously some two years previously. Kharidemos handed him over to the Kardians, who immediately killed him in the most brutal manner, slitting his son's throat in front of him then throwing them both overboard (Dem. 23.169, 175). Possibly stimulated by this most heinous and brutal execution, Amadokos and Berisades made an alliance with Kersobleptes. Against the will of Kersobleptes, Athens was invited to be signatory to this alliance as the advisor of Amadokos, Athenodoros, was Athenian, and he used this opportunity to give Athens the opportunity to take control of the Khersonnese once again (Dem. 23.170; IG II² 126). This also would have served as a warning to Kersobleptes to limit his ambitions with Athens again in the region but Kersobleptes was unable to resist the inclusion of Athens in the alliance as he was not powerful enough to fight his brothers and Athens together.

Athens sent out Khabrias to seal the pact in 359, but he only had one ship and Kharidemos persuaded Kersobleptes to change the deal so that he controlled Sestos and its income.¹ This was repudiated and eventually, in 357, Khares was sent out. He ensured that all three Kings controlled their respective areas independently, guaranteed the autonomy of the Greek cities under the regimes and required the Kings to assist in the collection of income for Athens from the Thracian cities. Kersobleptes was allowed to keep Kardia, which must have been an

¹ Buckler (2003: 376) suggests that the partial erasure of Khabrias' name from IG II² 124, line 20 is a result of this failure.
acknowledgement of Kersobleptes strong position vis-à-vis the other Thracian kings (for this sequence of events, see Dem. 23.171-178, 181; IG II² 126).

The Social War and the Defeat of Athens, 357-355

One of the reasons for the outbreak of the Social War can be ascribed to the Athenian treatment of captured cities in the North. It has been argued that the war was fought for control of Rhodes (Hornblower, 1982: 212), but the true answer is not clear and is likely to be the result of a combination of reasons.¹ Though witnessing some success with Timotheos in the late 360s and early 350s, Athens had lost control of much of the Khersonnese and northern Aegean to Kotys, primarily as a result of poor leadership and financial hardship. To argue that the allies had nothing to fear from the hegemon, as Cargill (1981: 161-188, especially 179-180) does, is not quite correct, while to suggest that Athens had created a culture of fear (Buckler, 2003: 378) is also incorrect in and of itself as a motivation for war. Worthington (2013: 66) is more measured in his censure of Athenian relations with the allies, but Cargill’s (1981: 162) argument about the permanence of the League must hold some strength also. It is likely that many Athenians would have believed that defection from the League was not permitted and that they had the right, perhaps the obligation, to take such recalcitrant allies to task. Timotheos had recently reduced a number of cities on the Khersonnese (albeit not allies) and

¹ For a discussion of the growth of what could be seen as fifth-century style imperialism directly leading to the outbreak of the Social War, see Cawkwell (1981: 51-55), contra Cargill’s (1981) thesis. We also cannot ignore the role of Mausolos as a motivator for the final break with Athens by influential Athenian allies (see Hornblower, 1982: 208-09 for discussion).
this must have had a significant effect on the decision-making processes of the allied states.

Finally, Mausolos must have been aware of the problems faced by these cities, pressed as they were by Athens, the satraps and the Great King, and made overtures to an already disaffected group of Athenian allies (hence Ruzicka, 1998: 68). The suggestion that the revolt of Euboia in 357 provided a stimulus for the allies as Athens was distracted (Buckler, 2003: 380) is also not correct, as the revolt was quickly subdued and would have provided the allies with little time to maximise their opportunity.

As Buckler (2003: 379) points out, we do not know how the revolt was formally announced (if at all), but it led to prompt Athenian responses. The first action Athens took was to send Khabrias to Khios, a key link in the communications of the allies. They wanted to strike quickly, but when they arrived there, they were faced with Byzantines, Rhodians, Koans and Mausolos. These states were key allies of Athens as a result of their economic and naval strength and their combined power would have given Athens a significant shock. Of particular concern would have been the defection of Byzantion, such a key location for the Athenian grain trade from the North. Khares led a land attack while Khabrias fought in the harbour. Khabrias was defeated and killed while Khares was forced to retreat (Dem. 20.80; DS 16.7.3-4; Nepos 12.4; Plut. Phok. 6.1). This must have concerned the Athenians as it had significant potential to disrupt the grain trade.

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1 Ruzicka (1998) also claims that Diodoros’ account suggests that the fleet of Epameinondas in 364 achieved alliances with the recalcitrant allies (cf. DS 15.79.1), which ultimately led to the Social War, but this makes too much of the very general statement, “ἰδίας τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησε.”

2 For an argument for revising the dating of the outbreak of the Social War, see Peake (1997).
trade; moreover, as Amphipolis and Olynthos stood firm, they had, in effect, lost control of some of the most strategic locations in the Aegean. The allies must have been emboldened by this success, as in 356 they moved against Lemnos and Imbros, then besieged Samos (DS 16.21.2). This was surely a tactical move to cut Athens from the grain route. Athens responded by sending Menestheos, Iphikrates and Timotheos to Samos, who were soon joined by Khares, who had been named *strategos autokrator* specifically to make a more beneficial peace with Kharidemos (Dem. 23.173; Moysey, 1985: 223). They lifted the siege then decided to sail to Byzantion and attack the city (DS 16.21.3; Nepos *Tim.* 3.1-3). The fleets met at Embata, where Timotheos and Iphikrates, now firm political allies,¹ sailed into port; Khares, however, sailed out to sea, losing a number of ships (DS 16.21.3-4; Nep. *Tim.* 3.3, Iph. 3.3; Steph. Byz. s.v. Embaton). He then charged Timotheos and Iphikrates with cowardice and they were recalled. Timotheos was found guilty and exiled; Iphikrates never held a *strategia* again (DS 16.21.4; Isok. 15.129-30; Dein. 1.14, 3.17; Polyain. 3.9.29). The loss of her two great fourth century *strategoi* was a blow which significantly weakened the ability of Athens at sea.

In 359, Artaxerxes died, which led to more unrest in Persia. After Embata, Artabazos requested his assistance in fighting Okhos, Artaxerxes’ son. Khares assented and took Lampsakos and Sigeion in 355, both cities of the Persians. The King responded by sending an embassy to Athens.

¹ For an explanation of this alliance, see Kallet (1983), dating it to between 371 and 368. This dating is problematic, however, as it is based on the assumption that Iphikrates was in the court of Kotys as an Athenian ambassador. There is no evidence for this assertion whatsoever and it is unprecedented; the traditional date of 362 (discussed by Kallet, 1983: 239-40) should be preferred.
claiming a breach of the King’s Peace and raised the possibility of war with Athens, so Athens
recalled Khares and made peace with the secessionists (schol. Dem. 3.31, 4.19; DS 16.22.1-2;
hypoth. Isok. 8). Against this possibility, Badian, (1995: 97, n.52) claims that the King would not
have gone to war with Athens as long as they remained away from the coast of Asia. Moysey
(1985) and Pritchett (1974: 80) lay some blame for Khares’ actions at the door of the demos
who required Khares to continue the war but gave him no funds to do so.¹ This was a significant
blow for Athens, with the city now financially crippled.² Problems only increased for Athens as
a result of the rise of a new power in the Aegean, Philip of Macedon.

**War with Philip down to the Peace of Philokrates**

By the time of the speech, Philip had not only consolidated his own power as monarch in
Macedonia and strengthened the borders of the country in the north and east, he had also
managed to create for himself a position whereby he was called on as the saviour of the Greeks
in various mainland states. This owed much to his military reorganisation of the Macedonian
phalanx and the military focus of his administration (see Hammond, 1989: 100-06 for an
excellent outline of the reforms of the Macedonian phalanx; Ellis, 1977: 104-109 also outlines
the military reforms as an important aspect of the social and political cohesion created by
Philip). Philip’s success should primarily be seen as the result of two factors, however: good

¹ Khares’ involvement in the Satraps’ Revolt is outlined by Salmond (1996: 44) as furthering Athenian
ambitions by raising money through less than desirable means.
² See Worthington (2013: 67) for a brief discussion. Dillery (1993) sees Xenophon’s *Poroi* as a blueprint
for how the Athenians could improve on their finances at this time, rejecting the imperial attitudes
prevalent in Athens at the time.
fortune and the successful exploitation of this good fortune. One could follow D. and see Philip as an aggressor, whose ultimate goal was to subdue Greece and put down the Athenian-style democracies which were bound to oppose him. Far greater emphasis should be placed on his ability to exploit situations successfully for his benefit. ¹ Philip continually gave Athens opportunities to reach an understanding with him which may well have given the Athenians the hegemony of Greece that they desired. The Athenians, however, led by D., refused to believe Philip’s professions of good will, with some good reasons.² This led to the policies determined by the ekklesia which allowed the aggressive, anti-Macedonian Diopeithes to act not only in what he saw as Athenian interests, but deliberately provoking Philip into the response desired by D. and his fellow agitators.

On first glance, Athens had much to be frightened of in 341 BC. Philip had consolidated his kingdom against the northern tribes and Thracian dynasts (DS 16.8.1; Ellis, 1976: 58). Moreover, he had taken Amphipolis (Dem. 1.5, 7.27, 23.116; Theopomp. BNJ, 115, F30a; Ellis, 1976: 63-67; Cawkwell, 1978: 73-75; Ryder, 1994: 256-57), defeated Phokis and gained control of Thermopylæ, allowing access to central Greece (Dem. 19.61; DS 16.60.1-4; Paus. 10.3.1-3; Buckler, 1989: 138-42; Worthington, 2008: 100-02). He had also taken Olynthos and the Khalkidike (Dem. 9.26; DS 16.53.2-3; Justin 8.3.6; Worthington, 2008: 79), overwhelmed the

¹ See Buckler & Beck (2008: 260) for an outline of the most prominent views about Philip; Cawkwell (1978) however, is wrongly ascribed. They claim that Cawkwell asserts that Philip always wanted peace with Athens, whereas Cawkwell consistently claims that Philip was always far more circumspect than to support Athens blindly.
² For this view, see especially Cawkwell (1963: 120-21).
Thracian kingdoms in two separate campaigns in 352 (Dem. 1.13, 3.4-6; Theopomp. BNJ 115 F101) and 346/45 (Dem. 8.2, 8.35, 12.8), gained control of Thessaly and defined his relationships with two significant towns, Larisa (Athenaeus 13.557c; Justin 7.6.10-12; Griffith, 1970; Ehrhardt, 1967) and Pherai (DS 16.37.3, 16.38.1; see Buckler, 2006: 415-16 and Worthington, 2008: 58 for a detailed discussion of the importance of a pacified Pherai to guarantee the security of Philip’s southern border), and won outposts in Euboia (for discussion, see Commentary, 8.18, pp. 176-77). What would have concerned the more discerning of the Athenians is that his actions appeared to be inconsistent; Philip probably appeared to them to follow no overall policies, acting only through opportunism. Philip’s actions did follow a simple policy, however, in that he did what was of the greatest benefit at the time to ensure his kingdom’s stability and success. Philip was building up a network that would insulate him from any disturbance in mainland Greece.

His first objective was always to secure his own borders. He initially did this in 358, when he defeated the Paeonians and Illyrians. He then made the alliances with Larisa and Epirus (Athenaeus 13.557c, Justin, 7.6.10-12; DS 16.91.2-4), traditional enemies of the Macedonian monarchs and continual thorns in the side of Macedonia. His annexation of Krenides (Steph.

1 Buckler (2006: 457) says that the Euboians considered their new Macedonian masters from 342 as strategoi rather than tyrants, contrasting the Athenians as tyrannical.
Byz. s.v. Krenides, Philippi), and subsequent renaming of it to Philippi, demonstrates a further desire to secure his kingdom’s economic future by gaining access to gold supplies from the wealthy area. The later resettlement of Macedonian nationals in 345 BC in areas on the northern periphery of his kingdom emphasised the continual desire of Philip to ensure that his kingdom was safe (Justin 8.5.7-6.2). The ‘retreat’ of the army to Macedonia after the first defeat at the hands of the Phokians in 353 BC (DS 16.35.2-3; Polyain. 2.38.2) demonstrated not that his army lacked confidence in him; rather, Philip wished to ensure that his army, consisting of a plurality of ethnicities, did not mutiny for want of their homes after long campaigns.

The Athenians’ first experience of Philip came with his capture of Amphipolis. In 359, the Athenians were supporting a rival of his for the throne, Argaios (DS 16.2.6), no doubt hoping that the pretender would restore Amphipolis to them. To show his goodwill towards Athenian interest in Amphipolis, Philip removed his garrison from the city to allow the Athenians to think that he was abandoning his claim to the city (DS 16.3.3). Athens probably formally renounced their support of Argaios, leaving him with some volunteers at Methone. While Argaios was

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1 For a discussion of this, and the subsequent attack on Poteidaia and the impact this had on Athenian-Macedonian relations, see Worthington (2008: 45-47). For the impact this had on his annual revenue, see DS 16.8.6.
2 Ellis (1976: 68-70) talks about this action as the first colony established by Philip, setting a precedent for future Macedonian monarchs.
3 For the dating of this event to 356, see Buckler (1994: 383-84), contra Hammond (1994: 368-69) who incorrectly argues for a date of 346 and a context of the Peace negotiations at the time.
4 Worthington (2008: 108-10) and Ellis (1972) both make convincing arguments about the policy and it is in line with his continual actions to secure the borders at all times, especially in the north. Moreover, it was at a time of military dominance, which would have cowed the people into acquiescence to the policy, painful though it must have been for them.
5 Worthington (2008: 62) posits a logical argument for this, and though it is unsupported by firm evidence, it is also in line with the issues Philip was facing when he was forced to transplant the population in 345.
trying to raise support, he was captured by Philip along with some Athenian volunteer troops (DS 16.3.3-6). After Philip defeated Argaioi, Philip unexpectedly released the Athenian troops, compensating them for their losses (DS 16.3.3-6; Dem. 23.121; see Ellis, 1976: 48-52 for discussion) and proposing an alliance with Athens (DS 16.4.1). Perhaps Philip did not feel immediately threatened by Athens at this point and felt that it would be of greater benefit to act out of generosity towards them. The following year, Athens received an embassy from Amphipolis, probably not authorised by the government, but representing a pro-Athenian faction (Dem. 1.8; Ellis, 1976: 63-64). In discussing this, Tod (1948: no. 150) indicates that Amphipolis exiled one of the envoys soon after this, demonstrating that Amphipolis had no desire to return to the Athenian fold.¹ No expedition was sent from Athens either to claim or besiege the city, indicating that the Social War may now have focused Athenian interests elsewhere (Ellis, 1976: 64). The appeal to Athens was a turn of events that Philip could not allow.² Philip besieged the city, informing the Athenians that he intended to give it to them once he had it in his possession ([Dem.] 7.27; Dem. 23.116). This formed part of a possible secret deal, by which Philip would hand over Amphipolis and Athens would give him Pydna (Dem. 2.6, 23.116), but this is most likely a fiction, as the Athenian democracy, with its open policy discussion, would not have allowed this to remain a secret (Worthington, 2013: 63; de ste Croix, 1963: 110-19; Ellis, 1976: 63-67; Hammond & Griffith, vol. 2, 1979: 236-43; see

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¹ Tod, in the discussion of the decree, claims that the decree was passed after Philip was in control of Amphipolis, but it could equally be a preventative measure to maintain independence from Athens.
² Ellis (1976: 64-65) correctly discusses the need to keep Athens out of the region as much as possible. This likely means that Philip had no intention of ever allowing Athens to control Amphipolis directly.
Badian, 1995: 96 and n.49 for an argument that a secret deal was actually made). To make matters worse, as soon as Philip took Amphipolis, he stormed and took Pydna (DS 16.8.3; Theopomp. BNU 115 F30a). Thus, even if the secret agreement was genuine, Athens lost the bargaining chip to recover Amphipolis. This initiated what the Athenians called their “war for Amphipolis” (Worthington, 2013: 64). Diodoros’ (16.8.2-5) sequence of events correctly demonstrates how much of an impact on Athens Philip’s policies of consolidation were having in the North. This culminated in an Athenian agreement with Thracian, Paeonian and Illyrian monarchs against Philip (Tod, 1948: no. 157), which was soon defeated by Philip, probably in 355 (DS 16.22.3; Justin 12.16.6; see Plut. Alex. 3.5, for the victory over Illyria only). The feelings of the Athenians were compounded by Philip’s attack and successful siege of Poteidaia (see Ellis, 1976: 71-72 for discussion). To strengthen his southern borders, he made an agreement with Olynthos that he would take Poteidaia from Athens and gift it to Olynthos along with Anthemous, which he did in 357/56 (Dem. 1.12, 6.20; DS 16.8.4-5; Rhodes & Osborne, 2003: no. 50), allowing the Athenians living there to return to Athens. The revolt of Euboia and the Social War prevented Athens from taking action against Philip in any meaningful way. A minor skirmish in 353 in which Khares ambushed a small squadron of Philip’s navy near Neapolis saw no benefit to Athens, but Khares’ violent capture of Sestos (see below, pg. 110, for the context) after the skirmish may have provided a stimulus for the Thracian Kersobleptes to abandon his
temporary alliance with Philip (see below, pg. 110) and forge closer connections with Athens, to whom he ceded all of the Khersonnese, except Kardia (DS 16.34.4).  

When Philip was asked to intervene in Thessaly in 353, he probably saw this primarily as an opportunity to further strengthen his southern border against Pherai, who was again attacking his allies, the Aleuadai of Larisa (DS 16.14.1-2; Ellis, 1976: 77-78). He was fully cognizant of the fact that by assuming this position against Pherai, his traditional enemies, he would be required to make enemies of Phokis, the initiators of the Sacred War, now in its second year. Thus Philip had the potential for a foothold in Greece, if he desired it in the future, particularly as he now identified himself as an enemy of Phokis (Ryder, 2000: 49). It is of great significance that Philip was defeated in his initial foray by the Phokian general Onomarkhos. The author of D.’s speech 11 (8-10) makes an interesting point of some relevance to this: not all people in Macedonia wanted the expansive foreign policy of Philip, desiring security rather than the glory of their king; Justin (11.1.1-6) tells us that when Philip was assassinated, the reactions to this varied depending on the ethnicity of the soldier. In 353, Upper Macedonia was far from secure, thus Philip, while claiming that he was pulling back like a ram, “to butt all the harder” (Polyain.

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1 Ellis (1976: 80) suggests that Khares sailed to Thrace specifically because Philip was engaged in Thessaly, a likely scenario.
2 Buckler (2003: 392) claims that Philip could now seek active involvement in the Sacred War as a result of the successful strengthening of his other borders.
3 Ryder (2000: 48) believes that Philip probably had no intention of becoming involved further south in the Sacred War, but potential benefits for Philip presented themselves and he availed himself of them.
4 See Carney (1996: 29) on the importance of the personal style of leadership of Philip to avoid disaster after these two defeats.
5 Dem. 2.15-17 makes this point quite cogently. We should of course make adjustments for D.’s exaggerations, but the point is logical, even if the comment about no markets available for the sale of produce is overstated – Philip’s control of most of the Greek port poleis of Thrace ensured an outlet for sale.
2.38.2), was in actual fact withdrawing from the situation in central Greece until his control of Macedonia and the army was on a more stable footing. Worthington’s (2008: 62) theory that the army’s loyalty and fighting capabilities were suspect, seems plausible, but it would surely have taken too long to rebuild a loyal army to the required strength in such a short period of time so that he could return the next year. We should look for another reason for his return to Macedonia. It has been noted above that Philip was constantly concerned with security of the throne. It was of more immediate concern in 353 that Athens had started to become ascendant in the Thracian Khersonnese again, attacking and taking Sestos and butchering the population (DS 16.34.3-4),¹ re-establishing klerukhies in the region (IG II² 1613.297-98; DS 16.34.4) and coming to terms with Kersobleptes (DS 16.34.4) and Olynthos (Dem. 2.6, 3.7; schol. Dem. 1.2-3). With the grant of the Khersonnese, Athens had now been invited by Kersobleptes to take a dominant role in the region. This was an immediate threat to his power in the region and Philip may have felt that, considering he could make a strategic retreat after his defeat, he was better to be closer to home in case there were more immediate flare-ups as a result of the possibly diminishing power of the Macedonian crown; historically, this was the fate of Macedonian kings. Perhaps this is an indicator of problems in the court, telling us that affairs back home were not ‘business as usual,’ however there is no direct evidence for this. When no direct or immediate threats eventuated, Philip returned to central Greece and defeated the Phokians at the Krokos Field (DS 16.35.4-5, 38.1; Justin 8.2.1-4). The presence of an Athenian fleet, led by Khares, off the coast suggests that Athens was also maintaining a very close eye on events in

¹ Ellis (1976: 80) argues that this was a deliberate act to force Kersobleptes into an Athenian alliance.
the region (DS 16.35.5). Again, it is evident that Philip had no immediate designs on gaining access to southern Greece at that time as he could have attempted to force a path when an Athenian-led coalition blocked the pass at Thermopylai (DS 16.38.1; Dem. 19.84, 319). Diodorus (16.54.1-2) claims that war was now started between Athens and Philip, but this is a continuation of the hostilities since the war for Amphipolis began and had not been resolved.

Again, Philip turned his view towards Thrace in the very next year (352BC) when he invaded to limit the power of Kersobleptes (DS 16.34.4-5, commenting on Philip’s desire to ensure that no enemy could make a base against him in that region; Dem. 3.4-5, 23.10). Philip again saw this as a chance to consolidate his position in the region, as he cowed Kersobleptes and Olynthos, both Athenian allies, ensuring that they would be far less inclined to lend support against him (Dem. 9.56-57, 66, 19.265-67; [Dem.] 59.91). Soon after this, he also replaced the two other Thracian monarchs, Ketriporis and Amadokos, with puppet-rulers (Just. 8.3.14; though Dem. 23.189 indicates that this had not happened by the time of D.’s speech Against Aristokrates in 352; see Archibald, 1998: 232 for discussion). Moreover, his eventual attack on Olynthos for harbouring two rivals for the throne demonstrates his desire both to ensure his own security

1 Worthington (2008: 67) makes this accurate argument in detail. It is made even stronger when one considers that when he did control the pass at Thermopylai after 346, he still chose not to use this route to invade central Greece. Buckler (2003: 431-32) sees this as an act of war on the part of the Athenians with Philip’s response the attack on Thrace the next year, but Philip’s lack of desire to march south indicates that he saw no state of war between himself and the Athenians. He did, however, need to punish Kersobleptes for the alliance he made with Athens in 353 after his defeat by Onomarkhos. This also induced Olynthos to seek a peace with Athens (Worthington, 2008: 60). Thus, Philip’s march into Thrace is more of a show of strength rather than another defined break with Athens and it must be remembered that Macedonians and Athenians did not meet on the battlefield. This ‘cold war’ ideology of jockeying for territory in a region that they both valued for different reasons is to be expected.
on the throne and to eliminate further opposition in key areas in the region (Athenaeus 436c; Justin 8.3.10; Ellis, 1973; Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 699-701).

Olynthos, a powerful city and an Athenian ally, was one such rival and Philip must have been thankful that the occasion arose; he took the opportunity provided by chance. Though Philip may have been hoping for a political solution to exert control over Olynthos (Ellis, 1976: 93-94), his demand to hand over his step-brothers, when refused by the Olynthians, led to war (Justin 8.3.10). Athens debated assisting their long-time adversary in the Khalkidike, but when it was eventually decided to send a force, it was too late and the city had fallen to Philip (DS 16.53.2; Philokhoros, BNJ 328, F49-51).¹ Philip destroyed the city and killed many of its inhabitants (DS 16.53.3; Dem. 9.26).² After its capture, word reached Athens through an intermediary that Philip wanted peace and regretted that a state of war existed between them (Aiskh. 2.12, cf. Dem. 19.10, 19.303-04; DS 16.54.1-2). The chain of events this triggered led to the Peace of Philokrates.

Internal Athenian politics after the Peace of Philokrates

The Peace of Philokrates, made in 346, marks a new period in Athenian foreign affairs as much as it did for internal politics in Athens. Firstly, it had the potential to shift the power structure in Greece dramatically to make Athens the prime power in mainland Greece. Also, as a result

² Though Ryder (2000: 58) asserts that D. is exaggerating Philip’s actions at Olynthos.
of the perceived duplicity of Philip in these affairs, highlighted in Athens by D., the Athenian orator was able to blacken Philip's portrait for the Athenian people. Finally, it provided the situation through which D. was able to grow as a politician. This had significant consequences for Greek history as D. became the focal point for Greek resistance to Macedonian power.

Firstly, it needs to be pointed out that all prominent politicians, and the vast majority of the people, clearly favoured peace with Philip when he proposed it in 348.\(^1\) It came after the long war over Amphipolis where it was clear that Athens was not about to win a victory of any significance in the immediate future. Euboulos, a traditional enemy of Philip, even came to support the peace (Aiskh. 2.8; Dem. 19.290-91).\(^2\) D. clearly was in favour of the peace, at least until Philip’s march on Thermopylae (Dem. 19.234-36), though he claims that he was being hospitable to Philip’s ambassadors, rather than co-operating in the peace. The Athenians were tired of a long war (Dem. 18.20), and the desire for peace was seen in the unanimous vote of the assembly to pass the motion of Philokrates to send an embassy to treat with Philip (Aiskh. 2.13).

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\(^1\) Efstathiou (2004: 400-401) outlines the order of events by which Aiskhines, D. and Euboulos all supported Philokrates, though they are at pains to indicate otherwise after the Peace had failed. See Sealey (1993: 150-157) for the political considerations of the peace and its supporters.

\(^2\) Sealey (1993: 116-120) outlines the political grouping surrounding him. Even though Euboulos had led the embassy to find allies to fight Philip just two years before (Dem. 19.10, 303-04; DS 16.54.1; Buckler, 2003: 440), only the elderly statesman Aristophon opposed the peace (Theopomp. BNJ 115,F166). For more on this venerable Athenian statesman, see Commentary, 8.30, pp. 194-96.
In 348, Philip made his attempt to treat with Athens (Aiskh. 2.12-17 describes the events surrounding this). At this early stage, Philokrates proposed an embassy to go to Philip and discuss terms, for which he was indicted and successfully defended by D. (Aiskh. 2.13, 14, 109). Worthington (2013: 149) points out that this is not an indication of D.’s allegiance to Philokrates, rather he was positioning himself to play a more prominent role in what he saw as an inevitable peace with Philip. The fall of Olynthos changed the minds of the Athenians, which led to the embassies of Euboulos and Aiskhines around Greece to solicit support for a war against Philip. These embassies failed to gain substantial support (Dem. 19.10-11, 303-06; Aiskh. 2.79, 164, 3.58, 64; Harris, 1995: 50-51). A defeat for a small band of Macedonian troops fighting against the Phokians in 346 led to the Athenians and Spartans fortifying Thermopylae in case of retaliation (Aiskh. 2.32-33; DS 16.59.1; Ryder, 2000: 60-61; Worthington, 2013: 153) and the Athenians sent Khares with a fleet to guard Athenian possessions in the Khersonnese (Plut. Phok. 14.2-3; Dem. 18.87-94). A second embassy was sent around Greece and an embassy was sent to Pella to request the release of Athenian captives held by Philip after the fall of Olynthos (Aiskh. 2.15, 100, 2.57-58; Dem. 19.12, 315). The ambassador, Aristodemos, returned not with information about the hostages, but an expression of Philip’s desire for a peace and alliance with Athens (Aiskh. 2.15-17).

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1 For a discussion of the chronological sequence of events leading to this, see Badian & Heskel (1987) and Harris (1995: 50-106).

2 Worthington (2008: 83) also states that, in his defence of Philokrates in 348, D. was distancing himself from Euboulos. Euboulos was trying to organise a pan-Hellenic crusade against Philip, which possibly pleased D., who may have been waiting to see how events would unfold.
When Philokrates proposed to send ambassadors to Philip to discuss the peace (Aiskh. 2.13), many in Athens must have breathed a sigh of relief. The first embassy of 346 included some of the most prominent politicians at the time, the youngest being Aiskhines and D. (Aiskh. 2.18), with latrocles sent to represent the allies (Aiskh. 2.20). It is noteworthy that Euboulos was not elected, but the despatch of Aiskhines may have been seen as enough, considering their close political association (Worthington, 2013: 164). Aiskhines had a tradition of anti-Macedonian rhetoric (Dem. 19.12) and must have been considered a safe man to send on an embassy. Philokrates’ loyalties may have been thought suspect, to which D. (19.13, 119) alludes; Philokrates was still a leading statesman at the time and able to push through, with support, the eventual peace. He was, however, unsuccessfully indicted for the Peace later in 343 when the tide had turned against Philip (Dem. 19.116-18; Aiskh. 2.6; Hyper. 4.29-30); he went into exile as a result (Aiskh. 2.6, 3.79). When the first embassy returned, the Athenians were clearly happy with the result. D. proposed the usual honours of the embassy (Aiskh. 2.45-46) and worked hard to ensure that the peace was adopted (Worthington, 2013: 167-171 details the events). He was, at this time, clearly an avid supporter of the peace, no matter how he attempts to depict himself as an opponent of it (see esp. Dem. 19.8, contra Aiskhines account in 3.58-

1 See Harris (1995: 53-55) for an explanation of why Athenian opinion had changed between 348 and 346, namely the events in the North and Athenian losses there.
2 For an outline of the events leading to the peace proposals, see Buckler (2003: 439-41); Sealey (1993: 143-45).
3 See Markle (1974) and Cawkwell (1978) for discussion about the exact date of the embassy and when it was sent. Efstatthiou (2004: 387-88) is surely overstating the events to say that this could be seen as an Athenian move to re-establish her naval confederacy.
4 See Harris (1995: 195) for an outline of the first embassy.
5 Athens was particularly concerned about the grain supply from the North (Harris, 1995: 195, n.3)
It was decided that the discussion and vote would take place on two separate days, 18th and 19th Elaphebolion.

Clearly D. had a falling-out with his colleagues after the embassy (Aiskh. 2.97; Dem. 19.23-24, 46). In particular, he later disagreed about the deliberation process of the first and second days regarding the issue of peace with Philip and the characterisation of his role in the exclusion of Phokis, Halos and Kersobleptes from the treaty. Philip must have been emphatic that these states and Kersobleptes were to be excluded from the treaty (Buckler, 2003: 444); indeed, as soon as the Athenians left Pella, Philip levied an expedition against Kersobleptes, which was not in violation of the peace as Kersobleptes was not to be a signatory to it (Dem. 19. 174, 181; Cawkwell, 1963: 201). The first day of deliberations witnessed the proposal of Philokrates that peace and alliance be made, excluding the Halians and Phokians, which was shouted down by the ekklesia (Dem. 19.159; MacDowell, 2000: 270). It was eventually decided that the peace treaty with Philip would be a common peace, allowing any state who wished to join within the first three months; also, it was to be a peace and not an alliance (Aiskh. 3.69-70; Efstathiou, 2004: 391; Seally, 1993: 146-47; Worthington, 2013: 168-69). This was proposed by the allies

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1 Efstathiou (2003) discusses the problems associated with reconstructing these events using Dem. 18 and 19 and Aiskhines 2 and 3.
2 With particular respect to Phokis, Philip was at war with them and Efstathiou (2004: 391.92) makes the clear point that Philip could not make peace with a state with whom he was at war for sacrilege. He also raises the question of the need to humble Phokis to appease Thebes, with whom Philip wished to make an alliance.
3 At the meeting on 25th Elaphebolion (when D. was President) to swear the oaths, it was decided to include Kersobleptes’ envoy in the swearing of the oaths, even though the peace did not include the Thracian (Aiskh. 2.82-86; Dem. 19.174). See MacDowell (2000: 275-77) for discussion.
and accepted by the ekklesia (Aiskh. 2.61).¹ Both Aiskhines and D. allowed Philokrates to propose terms that were acceptable to Philip and did not contribute meaningfully to the debate at this point (Efstathiou, 2004: 395). Overnight, the Macedonian ambassadors seem to have made it clear to D. and other prominent Athenians that a common peace would not be acceptable to Philip. The next day, D. supported the proposal of Philokrates to agree to the original terms proposed by Philip, which recognised the existing allies of both states only (Aiskh. 2.82). D. (19.14-16) later claimed that he argued against this, but Aiskhines’ account (3.71-73), though written some years later, indicates that he did not. It makes better sense if D. did not argue against it - he would have known that the Peace would not have been agreed by Philip if the Macedonian’s proposal was not ratified as proposed by him. Aiskhines’ account shows that D. led the discussion to ensure that the peace was passed in accordance with Philip’s original proposal, along with an alliance. Euboulos (Dem. 19.291) also supported the peace as proposed by Philip, saying that either the Athenians vote for it and abandon the Phokians, Haliants and Kersobleptes or immediately prepare for war and turn the Theoric Fund into a war chest (for Euboulos’ financial concerns, see Commentary, 8.24, pg. 186; 8.34, pg. 196).²

¹ See Efstathiou (2004: 391) and MacDowell (2000: 212) for the discussion about the presence of the allies at this meeting – it is likely, as Efstathiou points out, that at least some ambassadors of the allies were present and contributed to the debate.
² For a detailed discussion of the events and actions of individuals over the two days, see Efstathiou (2004) and Harris (1995: 70-77). Ryder (2000: 65) emphasises that his main point of difference in reality, rather than in the reality created in his speeches, was that D. desired to create a peace that could place pressure on Philip to abandon the war against Kersobleptes.
The second embassy left a week after the ekklēsia voted for the peace (Aiskh. 2.91-92; Dem. 18.25, 19.154). It was necessary to obtain the oath from Philip personally as only he, not his ambassadors, could swear on behalf of the Macedonian kingdom. It took 23 days to reach Pella, but it was some time after the embassy arrived before Philip returned to his capital – he had been subduing Thrace (Aiskh. 2.82, 90, 3.65, 73-74; Dem. 19.155-56; Worthington, 2013: 171-72). True to his word, he had not attacked Thrace while Athens was deliberating, as he had promised, but immediately after (Harris, 1995: 80). When he returned, there were embassies from all over Greece (Aiskh. 2.112), indicating that Philip was already starting to be seen as the leader of the Greek world. D. took the lead and questioned Philip about the Athenian captives from his conquest of Olynthos (Dem. 19.166; Aiskh. 2.99-100), while Aiskhines claims to have spoken about the need to limit Theban power (Aiskh. 2.104, 116-17; Dem. 19.35, 39) and to settle the Sacred War by diplomacy rather than by warfare with the Amphiktyonic Council taking the lead (Aiskh. 2.114, 117; Dem. 19.39; Buckler, 2003: 445; Worthington, 2013: 172-73; Harris, 1995: 83-85). D. alleges that Aiskhines reported to the ekklēsia that Philip would not act contrary to Athenian interests and would humble Thebes and preserve Phokis (Dem. 19.37, 41, 44, 6.29), among other benefits. Philip swore the peace in Pella (Dem. 18.32), but it was in Pherai that his allies swore the peace (Dem. 19.158), which is reasonable as his army would have been massing there for his march south to end the Sacred War (Mosley, 1972: 146). The

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1 For a discussion of Philip’s policy in this, see Cawkwell (1978, esp. 101-104), contra Markle (1974). Harris (1995: 88) argues that this would never have been a part of Philip’s plan as a weakened Thebes would have made Athens dangerously strong.
Athenian embassy then returned to Athens while Philip, according to D. (19.158), was marching to attack Athens.

Whether it was a result of personal animosity or a disagreement over the scope of the peace, upon the second embassy’s return, D. attacked Aiskhines immediately (even though the trial does not take place until 343/42) and led the attack on the peace (Dem. 19.8).¹ Sealey (1993: 156-57) attributes D’s motivation in attacking Aiskhines to self-preservation; D., as the youngest member of the embassy, was vulnerable, and he may have decided on a pre-emptive strike at the second youngest member of the embassy. Aiskhines did have strong political connections to significant Athenians, though, and if D. did decide on this path, he would do so dangerously. It is also likely that D. saw an opportunity to establish a name for himself as anti-Macedonian, seeing the potential for Philip to renege on arrangements for Phokis. Indeed, in his speech he chose to focus on the disadvantageous strengthening of Thebes by Philip (Dem. 19.19-22, 60) and the loss of Phokis as a bulwark against Thebes and Macedonia (Aiskh. 1.175, 2.9-10; Dem. 19.30, 57-63, 74-77, 316-24). He was probably successful in convincing the Athenians that a miscarriage of their safety had occurred as the boule did not pass the usual honours for the embassy (Dem. 19.31-32; Worthington, 2013: 175).

¹ For an outline of the speeches of D. and Aiskhines in 343, our main sources for the second embassy and its consequences, see Worthington (2013: 201-209).
At a subsequent meeting of the *ekklesia*, delegates from Phokis attended and requested Athenian assistance – Dem. 19.58-59 claims that Philip was already at Thermopylai, making promises to the Phokians that they were not believing. It was at this meeting that Aiskhines allegedly reported Philip’s promise to bestow fortune on the Athenians (Dem. 19.19-21, 34-35). At the urging of Aiskhines and Philokrates, against the advice of D., a motion was moved that if the Phokians do not surrender the temple they had seized, the Athenians would make war on them (Dem. 19.49; Worthington, 2013: 175-76, associating Isokrates’ *To Philip* with the mood in Athens at the time). A third embassy was sent out to communicate this decision to Philip, but in the meantime, Philip had taken Thermopylai from the Phokian troops through negotiation and ended the Sacred War (DS 16.59.3; Dem. 19.53-66, Justin 8.6.1); Cawkwell (1963: 120) claims that this was “...a disaster of the first magnitude for Greek freedom.”

To the surprise of the Athenians, Philip then requested Athenian assistance in the war against Phokis to finish the last Phokian resistance (Aiskh. 2.137). D. argued successfully that the Athenians should not send the assistance which Philip requested, with some (likely members of his political group) claiming that Philip would take the Athenian soldiers hostage (Aiskh. 2.138). In fear of what Philip might do, though, a decree was moved to evacuate Attica and hold the festival of Herakles in the city (Dem. 19.86, 18.37; Aiskh. 2.139, 3.80), restore the frontier fortresses and fortify Peiraieos (Dem. 19.125). A fourth embassy was sent out when it had become clear that Athens had nothing immediate to fear from Philip (Aiskh. 2.94, 139; Worthington (2013: 177-182).

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Dem. 19.126-27). The purpose of the embassy was to meet with Philip and attend the meeting to decide the Phokian punishment (Aiskh, 2.142-43), at which Aiskhines claims that he urged Philip to spare the Phokians’ lives.

This turn of events led to several years of tension between Athens and Philip as he held the crucial passes at Thermopylai. Moreover, Athens was in the uncomfortable position of having very few allies (Ryder, 2000: 72). While Aiskhines argued that Athens should be faithful to the peace, D. urged only a temporary allegiance to the peace in order to build-up the city’s resources for a war at a later date (Worthington, 2013: 183-84). As a result of D.’s success, while Philip was busy in Illyria and Thessaly he felt the need to send Python of Byzantion to Athens to renegotiate the Peace.¹ Philip was tired of Athens continually demonstrating aggression towards him (Dem.] 7.20-25; 18.136) and Python outlined the King’s desire to have a Common Peace, as initially proposed by Athens. Worthington (2013: 193) rightly claims that an alliance between the Greeks and Persia would have concerned Philip and this may have been a move to stop this before it happened. Aiskhines was in favour of the proposal (Dem. 18.136), but D. successfully argued against it, claiming that Philip’s ultimate objective was to take Athens (Dem. 6.16-19; Cawkwell, 1963: 130-31). The rebuff given to the Persian embassy at this time and the warm welcome of Python may indeed have been a victory for the pro-Macedonian party (Harris, 1995: 108-09), but it was short lived. The opposition to Philip was

¹ For the connection to the Persian embassy at the same time in Athens and the dating of the embassy, see Cawkwell (1963: 121-27). Sealey (1993: 172) is probably correct to date it tentatively to spring, 343.
led by D. and Hegesippos (PA 6351), a close associate (see Commentary, 8.2, pp. 135-36 for evidence of the association). Hegesippos was an anti-Macedonian Athenian keen to push for war with Philip. He had been an active opponent of Philip ([Dem.] 7.23-25) and led an embassy with D. to raise allies against Philip (Dem. 9.72). Hegesippos’ claims against Philip’s proposal were substantial, asserting that, should the peace be renegotiated, each should retain its own possessions (a not-so-subtle allusion to Poteidaia and Amphipolis) and that any signatory state to the peace should receive support if they are attacked by another party, limiting Philip’s influence and hegemony ([Dem.] 7.18). Ryder (2000: 74) criticised this attitude towards Philip. He had not marched south in central Greece and, having secured his borders, Philip was likely seeking a substantial, long-term peace with Athens. The Athenian embassy sent to confirm the aggressive Athenian response was headed by Hegesippos; a clearer statement of intent by the Athenian people could not have been communicated. Philip was angered by this embassy, which he summarily dismissed (Dem. 19.331).¹ The negative Athenian attitude towards Philip at this time also extended to Philip’s proposed arbitration of ownership of the Khersonnese, which Athens refused as they believed that it should be in their graces to compel the Kardians to submit to arbitration, not as a result of a favour from Philip ([Dem.] 7.44). The quibbling over the nature of the gifting of Halonessos to Athens by Philip ([Dem.] 7.2, 4-6) is further proof that

¹ Cawkwell (1963: 133-34) suggests that the possibility of renegotiation of the treaty remained open and, indeed, he tried to negotiate terms again in 342, at which point [Dem.] 7 may have been delivered.
Athens was being led by those who wanted a war with Macedon and were not prepared to accept anything that Philip claimed or offered.¹

This tension manifested itself in the issues at Euboia, where Athens supported the creation of a Euboian League under the tyranny of Kallias of Khalkis, whereas Philip installed garrisons in support of Philistides and Kleitarkhos at Oreos and Eretria respectively (see Commentary, 8.18, pp. 175-76; 8.36, pp. 198-205). Though Athens managed to gain control of the island of Euboia over a period of time, this instance assisted D. in the creation of a negative image of Philip as grasping at Athenian possessions. The threat of Philip was possibly made to seem more immediate when an Athenian, Antiphon, was accused and found guilty of being bribed by Philip to burn down the Athenian dockyards (Dem. 18.132). The case was pushed by D. and, while we cannot dismiss the authenticity, we must be careful in attributing such stories to fact. If it is indeed authentic, it could be evidence of Philip actively planning for war with Athens by crippling the navy. It is just as likely that Antiphon was used as a scapegoat to inflame Athenian attitudes towards Philip.

The most crucial flashpoint for the states was the Thracian Khersonnese and Amphipolis, strategically important to Philip as a bulwark in the east, and to Athens as a guarantee of access to the grain route. Philip acted in a manner which could only push the Athenians to the brink

¹ See Harris (1995: 111-14) for an outline of the events of Python’s embassy and the Athenian response. For a view that possibly explains the Athenian rejection of Halonesos, see Hunt (2010: 195-96).
of war, particularly as it gave D. the opportunity to depict him as the aggressor. Philip’s gifting of Halos to the Pharsalians (he had taken it in 346 – Dem. 19.36-39; [Dem.] 11.1) was likely seen as a calculated insult by some in Athens, but Philip’s support of Kardian independence must have continued to cause the Athenians a degree of chagrin. The Macedonian control of Amphipolis was also a continual sore point for Athens and indicated to the Athenians that they did not control the North. Philip must have seen that this would have presented a problem for Athens, but he probably judged that the security of his eastern borders was of greater importance than maintaining peace with Athens.

**Diopeithes in the North**

Diopeithes was an Athenian general, closely allied to Hegesippos and D.’s political group. He was, therefore, a ‘hawk,’ keen to pursue an aggressive policy towards Philip.¹ In 342, Philip had attacked and subdued Thrace, eliminating Kersobleptes as a rival for power in the region, placing key cities under Macedonian control and creating the position of strategos to administer Thrace ([Dem.] 7.37, 10.8, Dem. 8.64, 9.15, 18.27, 19.334, [Dem.] 12.8; DS 16.71.1-2). Even though he systematically moved through and subdued Thrace and the Khersonnese, he did not attack Athenian possessions in this region (Buckler, 2003: 466). Philip may not have understood the problems that this reorganisation of Thrace would present to Athenian interests – he may have misjudged the Athenians ‘mistrust of him – but more likely, he did not

¹ See Salmond (1996: 50 and n.36) for an unaligned Khares as furthering Athenian imperial ambitions at this time.
care as he was more concerned to secure Thrace on the eastern flank of his kingdom. His actions were, therefore, seen as a threat to the grain trade. At the same time, it has been suggested that he encouraged the problems on Euboia to distract the Athenians from his activities in the North. While he did exploit the situation to his own advantage in the end by garrisoning Eretria and Oreos and installing tyrannies to ensure Macedonian support on the island, he did not create the situation. In response to the northern crisis, Athens dispatched a group of kleroukhoi to resettle the region supported by the strategos Diopeithes (see Commentary, 8.2, pg. 136). Possibly to supplement his finances, Diopeithes attacked and took Krobyle and Tiristasis ([Dem.] 12.3), which were allied to Philip, encroached on Kardian territory (Kardia was an ally of Philip according to the terms of the Peace of Philokrates) and attacked and plundered Macedonian vessels. This was all done in flagrant disregard of the Peace of Philokrates. When Philip sent an ambassador to Diopeithes, the Athenian had the ambassador tortured and held him to ransom with other Macedonian hostages ([Dem.] 12.3). A Kardian embassy to Philip complaining of Diopeithes’ behaviour resulted in a Macedonian embassy to Athens to complain about the entire situation. Diopeithes was clearly in breach of not only the Peace of Philokrates, but also of Greek diplomatic traditions, which held ambassadors as inviolable. Diopeithes should probably have been recalled, but D. and Hegesippos, dominating Athenian policy making at the time, convinced the ekklesia that since Philip was operating against Athenian interests inside Thrace (which he was not), then Diopeithes had every right to act as he had since Philip had clearly already broken the Peace. As a result of the present
speech, Khares was sent to reinforce Diopeithes (Plut. Phok. 14.2-3), who was left in command in the North.

Notes on the manuscripts and scholia

The speech is contained in its entirety in the following manuscripts:

- Codex S (Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale de France);
- Codex A (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek);
- Codex F (Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana);
- Codex Y (Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale de France).

Although Codex A was regarded by Reiske (1770-71) as the most authoritative text, since Bekker (1823) the consensus of academic opinion is that the best text is contained in Codex S. S is the oldest of the Demosthenic manuscripts, dating to the late ninth or early tenth century AD and formed the basis for Bekker’s edition in 1823.

The first edition of the Demosthenic corpus in toto was prepared in 1504 and was subsequently revised by its authors, Scipio Carteromachus and Aldus Manutius between 1520 and 1527 (Dilts, 2002: xii). This edition was based on Codex A and this codex was generally regarded as the most authoritative (cf. Reiske 1770-71) until 1823, when Bekker published his edition. This edition displaced Codex A in favour of Codex S. By reading Codex S as the primary text in conjunction with supplements derived from manuscripts F and Y, Bekker made more than 3000
changes to the text (Dilts, 2002: xiv). The most important edition after Bekker’s was Blass’ 1885-89 edition which emended almost all instances of more than two short syllables (Blass’ Law) and tended to avoid hiatus (Dilts, 2002: xv).

More recently, Dilts has used Codex S as the basis for his text as it is clearer than A, F and Y, which he has used as correctives where required (for example, the extended sections of the Third Philippic in Codices A, F and Y; see Dilts, 2002: xvi). In particular, as the evidence presented in the best texts indicate D. used hiatus, Dilts has allowed for hiatus except where the evidence from Codices A, F and Y indicate that hiatus should be avoided and Blass’ Law should be followed (Dilts, 2002: xvii).

There are 84 scholia in the texts, primarily contained in Codex Y (68 scholia in total). Both Codices F (in a second hand) and Y contain a summary of the speech, emphasising that it was a defence of Diopeithes and an accusation against Philip. These codices comment on rhetorical style and historical aspects. For example, scholia 5, 7, 9 and 10b discuss aspects of the prooimion, whereas 3 (naming Diopeithes as the father of the comic playwright Menander), 43 (labelling eisangelia as a disclosure and laying of information), 51 (naming the tyrants of Eretria and Oreos as Kleitarkhos and Philistides respectively), 52 (naming Skiathos as an island off Euboia controlled by Athens) and 59 (telling us that the term ‘silver-mines’ was the name for Laurion) contain what appears to be high quality historical information. The main codex used by Dilts, S, contains few scholia. Significantly, Codex S claims in its brief summary of the speech
that it set in motion the war between Athens and Philip. Comments on other codices are of only little relevance, except for *scholion* 4, recorded in the more problematic codices vp, pr, R and WD (Dilts, 1983: xiii for discussion), that tells us that *kleroukhai* were farmers who had been sent out to land that had been divided up for them. This is possibly of some significance, as Libanius’ hypothesis also discusses this aspect in detail, indicating a possible tradition that highlighted their importance in events.

In addition to the scholia, all of the manuscripts include a hypothesis by Libanius. Libanius was a teacher of rhetoric in the Roman East in the fourth century AD. He wrote summaries of all of D.’s speeches. Gibson (2001: 193) suggests that Libanius’ purpose in creating the Hypotheses was as a brief guide to students to indicate the main points of the speech. Libanius also mentions the prominent role played by *kleroukhai* in the outbreak of hostilities (8.24). That two separate texts have commented on the importance of the *kleroukhai* in setting-off a train of events that led to Khaironeia could indicate the existence of a tradition that the *kleroukhai* were the central issue to which Philip objected. It could also be a result of the author of the *scholion* referring to Libanius’ suggestion.

This commentary uses the text of Dilts (2002: 80-99) throughout.
**Historical commentary on Demosthenes 8, ‘On the Khersonese’**

1 φιλονικία – The word *philonikia* is laden with political contentiousness and is the very motivation for the speech, even though D. claims that it is other speakers who address the *ekklesia* from this motivation. This factionalism in politics had developed through the Athenian dictum of helping friends and harming enemies and it was particularly prevalent in the nature of politics in the fourth century. D. made this speech to protect the man with whom he had formed an alliance to further his aims, Diopeithes, after cutting political ties with his former ally, Khares. Plutarch (Mor. 486d) claims that D. and Khares formed the most effective *summorai* in the 340s. The support of Phokion in 340 over the command at Byzantion has been cited as evidence of a breach between the two (Salmond, 1996: 50). While D. may indeed have been outlining selfless policies in the best interests of the city, he is particularly driven by the desire to best his political opponents at this time (led by Aiskhines), who were no doubt working against him and his policies (see Harris, 1995: 119; Worthington, 2013: 216, who claims that Aiskhines was specifically included in the speakers that were demanding the recall of Diopeithes, cf. 8.30).

Politics in Athens, by the outset of the fourth century, had become a messy, almost distasteful game. Lateiner (1982: 7, 11) has shown how aristocratic individuals may have started to move away from politics from the end of the Peloponnesian War (for a representation of the ideology of the time, see Pl. *Apol* 31c-32a, indicating Sokrates’ extreme view of involvement in
democratic processes). This may indeed have been a result of the desire to stay out of the public eye and protect one’s wealth and status (Lateiner, 1982: 4-5), but the impact of the oligarchic coup of 411 and the aristocratic basis of the Thirty in Athens increased this withdrawal (Taylor, 2007: 83-84). Many of the politicians of the fourth century were of humble or obscure birth, filling the gap created by the power vacuum created by the increasing political disinterest of the aristocracy (see Taylor, 2007: 74-76 for a statistical analysis of the problem). Also, throughout the fourth century, rhetorical skill came to be prized more highly than birth (Davies, 1981: 88-131). Rhodes (1986: 140) connects the rising prominence of sophistry to this process. This could be tied with the increasing professionalisation of politics which, by the 340s, resulted in something of a change in the attitude towards politically active citizens, many of whom were rewarded for their service (Liddel, 2007: 249-50). It is also important to note that many of the prominent men of fourth century came to politics later in life possibly as a result of a lack of money or birth (Rhodes, 1986: 144). This was the culmination of a process started by Kleisthenes over a century ago (see especially Sealey, 1960).

Connected to the brand of politics associated with aristocrats was the involvement of a politician’s *hetaireia*, his political companions. Possibly originally based more on social relations, the *hetaireia* became synonymous with the oligarchic coup of 411 and the Thirty (see, for example, And. 1.61-64 where he claims his *hetaireia* to have been responsible for the mutilation of the Herms in 415). As a result, this *modus operandi* of politics started to have a negative connotation (Dem. 29.22-23, 54.34-35 seem to argue against this, but these accounts
represent specific circumstances and are not representative of the general trend), thus politics began to be performed on a more personal level involving close, personal relationships between all men involved in the group. The fifth century political blocs led by men such as Perikles, Thucydides son of Melesias or even Alcibiades, groups of men with similar political ideas acting in unison in coalitions of small groups (Connor, 1971: 67-73) disappeared. The fourth century saw more intimate political associations made between groups of two or three men (Mitchell & Rhodes, 1996: 19), stemming from the law against those who formed a _hetairikon_ (Hyp. 4.8). It is important to note, however, that to operate in the _ekklesia_ a large number of associates was surely required to achieve the aims of a political _coterie_. This small, temporary group of two or three must have still used other friends to garner support for legislative programmes. Mitchell (1996: 19) uses the example of Aiskhines and Nausikles, whom she demonstrates to have been closely politically associated; she shows, however, that Nausikles was not an associate of Euboulos also, particularly as Nausikles drifts closer towards D. It is likely that the members of a political alliance went to their friends and asked for assistance in a particular issue. These _philoi_ might then go to their _hetaireia_ and urge them to support a friend, possibly even using them to intimidate or deceive (Dem. 21.139, 58.42). Hence not only persuasion, but coercion, were used to build support in the _ekklesia_.

While an initial political grouping might be few in number, the institution of _philia_, still important in the fourth century, must still have been utilised to consolidate support on a particular issue (Mitchell & Rhodes, 1996: 18). For example, Diopeithes assisted Hegesander in
a legal dispute regarding ownership of a slave as a result of a former association with him (Aiskh. 1.62-66). Such alliances were often temporary and for specific purposes. We have evidence that political alliances in this period were often fluid and lacked continuity. For example, D. was originally a supporter of Euboulos, but broke away from him to gain prominence. Worthington (2013: 91) notes the similarities of D.’s policies advocated in his early speeches to Euboulos’ policies, claiming that D. was trying to gain a name for himself through association with Euboulos. It was probably not until 353 that D. began to create independent policies in his speech ‘On behalf of the Megalopolitans,’ against which Euboulos successfully argued (Dem. 18.162). D. and Philokrates were then part of an alliance, evidenced by D.’s support of Philokrates’ peace proposal and defence of him in the resulting graphe paranomon (Aiskh. 2.15-20; see Introduction, pg. 114). This alliance was broken by D. when he saw that he could gain more political mileage by distancing himself from Philokrates’ involvement in the Peace.

Another aspect of political factionalism in fourth century Athens that this speech serves to highlight is the connection between politicians and strategoi. The fifth century did witness some division between the practice of politics and war; conversely, there were some examples of those who dabbled in both politics and war (eg. Demosthenes, Nikias). This, however, was not the normal practice in the fourth century and it was necessary for strategoi to make alliances with rhetores to ensure that they were not at the mercy of the ekklesia and their political enemies while they were away fighting Athens’ wars. It was so important for strategoi
to have men in the ekklesia working for them that Khares used to pay professional politicians to further his interests out of his allocated funds for campaigns to ensure that he was politically safe (Theopomp. BN J 115, F213; Aiskh. 2.71) as did Meidias (Dem. 21.139). Indeed, as argued above, D. made this speech on behalf of the strategos he was utilising to further his own aims of starting war with Philip, an example of the very factionalism and political strife from which D. claims to be aloof.

ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίζονται καὶ πράττειν – D. often augments the verb ψηφίζομαι with the verb πράττω or other similar verbs of action to point out that Athens often fails to act upon its pronouncements in the ekklesia. Mader (2006: 383) claims that this is an attempt by D. to create negative feelings about what they had failed to do. He claims that ‘doing’, inferior to both ‘speaking’ and ‘voting’, is more important (cf. 3.15 – he uses χειροτονέω rather than ψηφίζομαι in this instance). Also, εἴποτε ... λόγους (6.4), διδάξεις and νοεθησόντας (8.76), and λέγειν (9.1) are used to show the disparity between Athenian words and actions. αἴτωμένων and κρινόντων (2.25), βουλεύεσθαι (2.30), διαπράξασθαι (3.14), γράφειν (9.8) and πείσαι (15.1) associate political actions in Athens to lack of action abroad. πράττω and ψηφίζομαι are used together on two other occasions (4.20, 15.1), both talking about how Athenians can pass decrees with great competence but then fail to carry them out.

2 περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρόνησῳ πραγμάτων ... καὶ τῆς στρατεύσας, ἢν ... ἐν θράκη ποιεῖται – As indicated in the Introduction (especially pp. 43-47), the Thracian Khersonnese featured prominently in
Athenian politics since the sixth century. D. indicates that Philip is placing greater pressure than ever before on this territory that was seen by Athenians as exclusively theirs. Buckler (1989: 146-47) suggests that after the Sacred War, Philip had designs on Thrace. This may be the case, but it was for the security of Macedonia that the conquest of Thrace was undertaken. The resulting pressure in the Khersonnese was seen by D. as an attempt by Philip to weaken Athens as a prelude to taking the whole of Greece. This is probably not the case, as it can be seen that Philip was at pains not to encroach directly on Athenian power. He was in the middle of an extensive military and diplomatic campaign in Thrace that would take almost three years to complete (see Commentary 8.14, pp. 163-65). Philip was to take this region entirely (Dem. 12.8; Arr. Anab. 7.9.3), which threatened the security of the Athenian grain trade from the Black Sea. Worthington (2008: 124-25) therefore claims that this activity in Thrace, in conjunction with his intrigues in Euboia (see Commentary, 8.36, pp. 198-99) was a major impetus for Athens to act against Philip.

Philip’s campaign of 342/41 was different to previous campaigns on account of the thorough nature of the reduction of Thrace and the network of alliances Philip established to secure his power in the region (Just. 9.1.9-3.3; DS 16.71.2; Jordanes, Get. 10.65; Theopomp., BNJ 115, F217). It indicated a policy of territorial consolidation and security, a desire to establish a permanent Macedonian presence in the region. Diodoros (16.71.2) claims that Philip established cities “τοῖς ἐπικαίροις τόποις” in Thrace to prevent further attacks. It was not an indication of his desire to weaken Athens at this time. Philip must have known it would cause
significant concern in Athens, but he may have had greater concern for a more powerful potential foe, Persia. Heskel (1997: 184) claims that this campaign was a deliberate move to prepare for an invasion of Persia, but this seems to be an overstatement. Philip simply secured the area to strengthen his eastern borders and awaited any reactions, as he had done countless times before (contra Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 557, who believe that Thrace was a problem in and of itself, not acknowledging the importance of a secure eastern border).

Ὧν Διοπείθης πράττει – Diopeithes (PA 4327), the subject of this speech, was an Athenian strategos sent out with a naval force and kleroukhoi in approximately 346 (Dem. 8.6; Lib. Hypoth. 8.1). He had close political ties to D. and was likely a prominent member of the anti-Philip coalition of which D. was a leading member. D. had concerns about the security of the Khersonnese, so to defend Athenian interests in the region, he must have urged that Diopeithes be voted the command of a naval force to sail there.

Probably the son of Diophilos of Sunion (Ferguson, 1938: 14), Diopeithes’ family had owned land in the mining district of Maroneia, (Agora, XIX, P5, lines 59-60; Crosby & Young, 1941: 27).

It is possible, therefore, that he was appointed to this command as he had connections in the region. Hamel (1998: 16-17, 18-19) indicates that considerations of the relationships of particular generals could play a role in their appointment at times. Like Thucydides, sent out to campaign against Brasidas because he owned land and possessed connections in the region (Hamel, 1998: 17), Diopeithes may have been sent to the region as strategos as he also could
depend on support in the immediate area. Moreover, a political alliance with both D. and Hegesippos (PA 6351) must also have played a part in his appointment to the command. We have some direct evidence for this association. The case against Pittalakos by Hegesander (PA 6307), as outlined by Aiskhines (1.54-69), was submitted to Diopeithes for arbitration (Aiskh. 1.63-64). Hegesander was the brother of Hegesippos, the associate of D. (Harris, 1995: 103-04). Along with Timarkhos, against whom Aiskhines 1 is directed, they formed a strong political bloc against Aiskhines and his associates. This is the first known connection between Diopeithes and this anti-Philip group, his appointment to this command is the second.

Athens also sent klerouchoi with Diopeithes (see especially Lib. Hypoth. to Dem. 8.2-4; see below, pp. 143-44). The mandate of the ekklesia must have been to settle the klerouchoi in a location that would provide a safeguard for Athenian interests. It is most likely that they were sent specifically to be settled in the Khersonnese. Concerned by Philip’s annexation of Thrace, a Byzantine fleet also sailed to join the Athenians at Thasos, Diopeithes’ probable base (cf. [Dem.] 12.2); Buckler, 2003: 466). This may well have prompted Philip to summon the reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly that D. mentions (8.14).

Part of an unstated mandate of Diopeithes must have been to attack Philip’s possessions in order to gain an advantage for Athens. Few strategoi would have been so brazen without some plan for protection in the ekklesia (Hamel, 1998: 118). The connection to D. discussed above,
along with the orator’s clear defence of Diopeithes, demonstrates his active support for the actions, as yet unsanctioned by the demos and seen by Philip as illegal.

τις αἰτίαται τινα τούτων ... ὅταν βούλησθε, κολάζειν – D. refers here to an eisangelia trial of Diopeithes that was probably debated at some point in the ekklesia as a political possibility. This explains why the speech is such a strong defence of Diopeithes because had the strategos been recalled from duty after an eisangelia eis ton demon, D.’s policy in the North against Philip would have come to nought and D. himself may well face prosecution for being the lead proponent of this policy.

Punishment of a general after an eisangelia was generally severe. Of the 46 trials for which we know the outcome down to 322, 38 ended in conviction. We do not know the penalty in six cases, but 23 were sentenced to death and nine were fined (Hamel, 1998: 132-35). The staggeringly high rate of the death penalty is noted by Hamel (1998: 133) as unsurprising, but D. laments this state of affairs that did indeed purge Athens of experienced leadership in dire times (Dem. 4.47). The fines levied were also considerable. Perikles was fined either 15 T, 50T (Plut. Per. 35.4) or 80 T (DS 12.45.4) in 430/29. Phormion was fined 100 mna in 429/28 (Androton, BNJ 324, F8), causing his atimia. As more recent examples, Melanopos was fined 3 T in 355/54 (though he may not have been a strategos – see Hansen, 1989: cat. no. 59 for discussion). Also in the same period, Timotheos was fined 100 T, the largest fine ever imposed by the ekklesia. He was clearly unable to pay this exorbitant sum and went into exile (Din. 3.17;
After being found guilty, the penalty was determined by voting a second time on either the penalty proposed by the prosecution or the defence. In some instances, the penalty was determined as a part of the guilty vote. For a full discussion, see Hansen (1975: 33-36).

Thus, D. was forced to make a strong political speech in the *ekklesia* as he must have been aware that should Diopeithes be denounced and successfully impeached, his whole policy in the North would be under significant attack by his allies in a legal procedure which, according to history, he was likely to lose.

κἂν ἡδη δοκῇ κἂν ἐπισχοῦσι – A discussion in the *ekklesia* seems to have surrounded the possibility of an *eisangelia* of Diopeithes. D. tells the *demos* that it is either appropriate to lay a charge now or to stop taking the focus off the important issue of Philip’s actions in the North. D. makes several references that suggest this speech was in the context of a debate of whether to bring a charge of *eisangelia* against Diopeithes (8.28-29) with other more general references indicating the legal focus of the debate (8.8, 10, 17, 27). If a formal vote ever eventuated, it was clearly defeated – D.’s reference to Diopeithes in command at the time of the Third Philippic is evidence of this (9.15, 20, 73). D. twice talks about the charges against Diopeithes (8.8, 10) and the use of the verbs κατηγορέω (8.8, 27), κρίνω (8.17) and εἰσαγγέλλω (8.28, 29), highly technical in Athenian law, further indicates the context was connected to legal procedures. It is unlikely that D. would introduce these technical legal terms in relation to the
possible recall of his ally. Immediately after this comment, D. attacks Philip, then advises the people not to be taken off course and distracted “... καὶ ... τοῖς ... τῶν ἄλλων θορύβοις καὶ τοῖς κατηγορίαις ...” (8.3) in a clever attempt to deflect the debate away from the potential impeachment of the instrument of his policy to the menacing figure cut by Philip. Another possible interpretation is possible. Since this was probably part of a text published after the death of Diopithes (see Introduction, pp. 27-34), it could have been a defence of D. written or subsequently modified so that he might later claim that he had suggested recalling Diopithes, thus deflecting the guilt from himself.

3 ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων τῇ πόλει – In the five other deliberative speeches written by D. where Philip is the focus of the speech, he is only once named explicitly as an enemy (3.16). D. similarly named Kotys, the predecessor of Kersobuleptes, as ἐχθρότατα ὑμῖν (23.149) in a passage where D. is also criticising an enemy of Athens. It is curious that D. does not use such a strong term more frequently. Though D. has consistently criticised Philip, he clearly hopes to further alienate Athens from Philip in this speech. This is a subtle shift from his previous speeches regarding Philip. He is always depicted as a threat to Athenian interests, but it is the first time that D. uses the direct and immediate threat of Philip to the Athenian way of life as a topos. As D. argues, Philip is bent on the utter destruction of Athens (8.60), particularly since he is the enemy of constitutional government and democracy (8.43). The final three words of the speech summarise nicely the theme, “τὴν πόλιν ὁσαν,” indicating that action against this ekthros is needed to save the very existence of Athens.
It is interesting that D. said he heard the comment at all. It may be evidence supporting Rhodes (1972: 40, 80), who claims that the public were able to hear the proceedings of the *boule* (see especially Dem. 19.17, where his speech was witnessed by many, according to his own testimony), except when it was specified that the business was to be kept secret (eg. DS 11.39.5 – the *ekklesia* authorising secret business in the *boule*; DS 13.2.6, though this difficult to believe, as foreign affairs would not be made in secret without the *ekklesia* authorising such a meeting; Andok. 1.45, 2.3, 19-21; Lys. 13.21; Dem. 25.23; Aiskh. 3.125; see also the brief discussion by de Ste Croix (1963: 114-15), in the context of the alleged secret pact between Athens and Philip about Pydna between 359 and 357). Rhodes correctly adds that there is not enough evidence as to whether or not the public were allowed inside the *bouleuterion* during a meeting or whether they were able to “hear with difficulty” from without.

For example, Ar. Knights 640-42 has the Sausage-Seller burst through the doors only when he has a point to make, rather than being inside before being taken by the desire to speak. Rhodes (1972: 40) believes that, on the balance of probability, private citizens could be inside the chamber while a meeting was in session (citing Ant. 6.40 as his main evidence of this). See Dem. 25.23 for possible evidence that no one was allowed inside, even though it may still have been possible to hear proceedings, thus Dem. 19.17 may well indicate that the crowd were outside the doors listening rather than actually inside in the limited standing space.
The peace referred to is that sponsored primarily by Philokrates the Athenian. At the time the peace was made, the Athenians were tired of a long war (Dem. 18.20; see Introduction, pg. 113), and the desire for peace was seen in the unanimous vote of the assembly on the motion of Philokrates to send an embassy to treat with Philip (Aiskh. 2.13). Thus, all in Athens favoured peace. Importantly, most states in Greece were also well-disposed towards Philip (Buckler & Beck, 2008: 236).

The Peace of Philokrates essentially brought about a peace to end the war that had been waged for approximately five years, making an alliance and allowing both to maintain their territory. By this time, D. was trying to argue that the terms of the Peace of Philokrates had been broken by Philip and, therefore, Athens was not beholden to them as a result.

The terms of the peace were simple, but we have to follow a myriad of references to understand them and to follow how Philip may or may not have adhered to the terms. Essentially, Philip proposed that both parties recognise the areas already held at that time (Dem. 7.26; Lib. hypoth. 7.23) and that a permanent defensive alliance be agreed (Dem. 19.143). In addition, neither party was to support piracy or pirates ([Dem.] 12.2, 7.14). He could not have allowed them to continue supporting Halos, as that was crucial to ending the Sacred War for him. Importantly, the negotiations gave Athens limited recognition of their possession of the Khersonnese – Philip agreed to stay out of the area until negotiations were completed (Aiskh. 2.82). D. claimed that after negotiations, the Khersonnese was secure (19.78). This may
overstate the reality of the situation and allowed D. to blacken Philip further. Hammond & Griffith (1979: 337) believed that Phillip devoted such time to this embassy because he knew at some point he would need friends in the *ekklesia*, particularly as he would require someone to convince the Athenians to relinquish their impossible desire for Amphipolis. Philip went further, however, guaranteeing the release of prisoners from Olynthos, probably making a vague promise to allow Phokis to remain prominent and independent after the Sacred War (as a counter to Theban influence). D. (19.318, Lib. *Hypoth.* 5.1-2) says that Philip could not have been serious about this, as he would automatically perjure his oath to the Thessalians and Thebans regarding the punishment of the Phokians. The punishment of Phokis, however, could have been kept mild and he could have focused his anger on the leading men only (thus Aiskh. 2.117). That he chose not to was possibly a result of the anti-Macedonian posturing of D. in Athens (see Hammond & Griffith, 1979: 332-335 and Buckler, 1989: 133-34, 136-140 for a complete outline of events). He also vowed to strengthen Athenian influence in Euboia, return the border town of Oropos to Athens and cut a channel across the Khersonnese, making it easier to defend. This was a boon for Athens. Moreover, it appears that Philip was genuine in these proposals (Hammond & Griffith, 1979: 330, though this does not take into account that Philip would not have been able to tackle the Athenian navy, which could still outlast Philip and cause him great concern in crucial areas, particularly in Thrace). Philip did not invade Athenian territory until after Diopeithes’ depredations six years later.
Contrary to what D. says, Philip had not taken any Athenian land or possessions unlawfully. In fact, he appears to have adhered to the treaty as much as could reasonably be expected. He painstakingly avoided any breach with Athens after the Peace of Philokrates, avoiding battle in the Khersonnese and not even supporting Kardia militarily against Diopeithes. Instead, he sent a letter to Athens to complain of the strategos’ actions (Dem. 12.11, 17), requesting an arbitration. This letter is recognised as problematic, with Hammond and Griffith (1979: 714-15) stating that it is most likely a forgery. Macdowell (2009: 366) suggests that the letter should be tentatively accepted as genuine, and the narrative recounted in the letter tend to indicate that the events were genuine as they fit with the responses of Diopeithes and Demosthenes. Diopeithes’ actions would have been a casus belli should he have chosen to take it, but he did not want war with Athens, preferring to persuade them away from war if possible.

Diopeithen ekpleusai kai touz kleroukhous – D. is referring to the kleroukhoi that were sent out as a part of the force under the command of Diopeithes. D. makes another explicit reference to the kleroukhoi at 8.16, saying that Philip has made a direct threat against them. Philip later made a counter-claim against the Athenians regarding the region of the Khersonnese, saying that when he wanted to convey his fleet to the Hellespont, he was forced to use his army to protect it ([Dem.] 12.16). D. had used the Khersonnese to scare Athens into action against Philip, convincing them of the necessity of sending colonists to the region to increase Athenian control. It was clearly a successful tactic, as it forced Philip to send a larger land force than he
would normally have sent when marching east. D.’s description of Diopeithes’ *strategia* and
‘those now in the Khersonnese’ indicate that they were not together (9.15, cf. 8.14 – “those
present,” i.e. the *kleroukhoi*). Libanius (*hypoth*. 8.3-4) implies that Diopeithes was based with
the *kleroukhoi*, but this is not the case (see Commentary 8.2, pg. 136). Thus, while the *strategos*
was based opposite the island of Thasos on the coast of Thrace, a significant military garrison
must have been left with the colonists at their settlement(s) in the Khersonnese. Since these
*kleroukhoi* were probably sent out to maintain a vigil on Philip’s activities, they were likely
settled at a strategic location. As Philip did not transgress Athenian territory and because he
also says that they were making his advance to the Hellespont difficult (12.16), the *kleroukhoi*
were probably located at one of the existing settlements at the top of the Khersonnese near
Kardian territory, probably Agora or Paktye, cities about which we know little (our references
for them are minimal: Ps. Skylax, 670; Ps. Skymnos, 711-12; Hdt. 6.36; Hell. *BNJ* 4, F127). Agora
is named as a suburb of Kardia and Paktye by Casson (1926: 218-19), but there is little to
support this. In 340, Athens made an alliance with Elaious (on the southern tip of the
Khersonnese), indicating that they may not have possessed complete control of the
Khersonnese and it was independent. Kersobleptes had held most of the Khersonnese up to
352 (cf. Dem. 23.158, 161, 162), with the exception of Krithote and Elaious, both southern cities
of the Khersonnese (see Isaac, 1986: 191-93 for discussion). It is also interesting to note that
Paktye does not appear in either the first or second Athenian alliances (Isaac, 1981: 197), thus
indicating that it was wholly Athenian. Given that it was also crucially located along the neck of
the Khersonnese at an access point to the wall, in addition to being situated on the water, it presents the most likely place for the sending of kleroukhoi in 342.

A kleroukhia was a method of control traditionally associated with the Athenian arkhe of the fifth century (for a discussion of kleroukhies in the fifth century, see Meiggs, 1972: 260-62, 402; Jones, 1957: 175). It can be defined as “...a community of Athenian citizens living abroad, enrolled in Athenian tribes and demes, who had to serve in the Athenian armed forces and pay Athenian taxes but who enjoyed some municipal self-government” (Brunt, 1967: 73; see also Graham, 1999: 167; Hunt, 2010: 29). Raaflaub (2009: 103) emphasises that the first kleroukhies pre-date the Persian Wars, but the form we are examining is that from the 450s onwards, where Erythrai was the first to receive a phrourarkh to command the garrison, including kleroukhoi (ML, no. 40). McGregor (1987: 83, 108) claims that a military garrison was such a blatant infringement of allied autonomia that a phrourarkh and a kleroukhy was the more practical and less offensive solution to guarantee Athenian control. Kleroukhies were seen as a method of controlling an ‘ally’ who had revolted from the arkhe, or who were suspected of pro-Lakedaimonian sympathies. Land of the recalcitrant or suspect state was confiscated, divided up and given to Athenian citizens, normally after a revolt. These citizens acted as on-site guards of Athenian interests. Often they were not required to live on the land, returning to Athens, indicating that they were not always the poor urban demos (Moreno, 2009: 213-14, 216-17). Controlling areas which were significant to the grain trade was one reason for the sending out of kleroukhoi in both the fifth and fourth centuries, as the grain trade was a
significant element in Athenian considerations of foreign policy (for example, see Dem. 42.20; Dein. 1.43; Xen. Hell. 5.1.28-29; IG II² 653; Burstein, 1978; Moreno, 2007: 144-208). All _kleroukhoi_ were essentially returned to Athens after the Peloponnesian War by Lysandros and the Spartans (see Introduction, pg. 65). Upon the creation of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy, it was made explicit in the Decree of Aristoteles that there were to be no Athenian _klerukhies_ established in allied territories (lines 35-41; DS 15.29.8), with any existing land owned by Athens or Athenians to be immediately renounced upon an alliance with the league (lines 25-31). While many historians have attempted to saddle fourth-century Athens with the guilt of the fifth century, Cargill (1981: 146-50, 159-60) attempts to demonstrate that Athens remained true to the Decree of Aristoteles. Athens did send out _kleroukhoi_ for self-aggrandising reasons to areas in the fourth century, but they were not allied states, thus remaining true to the letter of the law. Libanius (_Hypoth. 8_) says that when Diopeithes’ _kleroukhoi_ were received in the Khersonnese in order to protect them from Philip, they were celebrated, similar to those sent to protect Andros in the Social War (see below). We do, however, have definitive evidence that several garrisons were established in allied territory during the second league. In 375, a garrison was established to assist Abdera against Sparta (DS 15.36.4). Cargill (1981: 153) asserts that this reference is problematic, firstly as Khabrias was assassinated by certain individuals after leaving a _phourion_ in the city, then later, Diodoros (16.7.3) talked about Khabrias’ actions during the Social War. The key element in the story, the garrison in Abdera, does make sense in this context, however, as Athens did occasionally quarter a garrison in allied states for military assistance and protection when they were requested (for the adherence of Abdera to
the Second Naval Alliance, see Rhodes & Osborne, 2003: no. 22, line 99). It was likely withdrawn in accordance with the peace of 371. We also have evidence that during the Social War, Andros (IG II² 123) and Amorgos (IG XII² 24-26) were garrisoned by Athens as a part of the war effort. Such blatant breaches of the Decree of Aristoteles must have been approved by the allied synod as necessary expedients for the Social War (Cargill, 1981: 155). Moreover, Poteidaia requested \textit{kleroukhoi} to assist in the protection of their city (IG II² 114, lines 9-11). Cargill (1981: 155-158) suggests that this was considered appropriate by both Athens and the allied synod; Burnett and Edmondson (1961: 85), based on a vote of thanks from “The \textit{demos} of Mytilene” inscribed on the statue of Khabrias, suggest that the Decree of Aristoteles did not guarantee an absence of Athenian involvement in an allied city, only that the city had the right to refuse that help. Therefore, considering that Athens was authorised to settle kleroukhies in areas where there was a military threat (after a request and with the support of the allied synod if it was an allied state), it is logical that Diopeithes settled the \textit{kleroukhoi} in the Khersonnese with a significant military garrison (probably commanded by a \textit{phourarh}) specifically to act as a watchdog on Philip’s actions in the Khersonnese. This was a significant move, as there is no evidence for kleroukhies being sent out after the Athenian defeat in the Social War before this instance. Graham (1999: 189-90) agrees that the use of \textit{kleroukhoi} to act in this capacity is attested (\textit{cf.} Plut. \textit{Per.} 19.1), but Jones (1957: 174) argues that the evidence is far from conclusive in this respect. This appears to be an example of such a kleroukh. Philip is at pains to point out that these types of actions are unnecessary, as he never took action against Athenian possessions in the region contrary to the peace (Dem. 12.16).
It is also interesting that Athens had the power over the kleroukh in issues of war (cf. the Decree of Polykrates, [Dem.] 12.16). It is clearly a different dynamic to that of a colony and mother city, where the colony was an independent city that could follow the wishes of the mother city but was not required to do so. Sometimes, a colony became belligerent towards the mother city (for example, Corinth and Kerkyra in the fifth century – Thuc. 1.25.3), but this did not happen with kleroukhies. This is because the citizens of a kleroukhia do not lose their citizenship of Athens, but remain politically dependent on the mother city. Seen as an extension of the polity of Athens, as opposed to the traditional form of colonisation – apoikia – which was not seen as de facto land of the mother city (see Graham, 1999: 191, 135-38 for a discussion of terminology), the citizens of the kleroukh were liable to pay eisphora (for example, IG I3 41, lines 18-24; Graham, 1999: 171-72) and for general military service. Graham (1999: 189-90) posits that their military service would have been in the region of their city (based on the fifth century example of Hdt. 6.100.1). Graham does not examine the particular instance of Diopeithes’ kleroukhoi at all in his discussions of this issue. The decree of Polykrates is an excellent example of Athenian kleroukhoi being ordered to undertake military service in their own region – indeed, they seem to have been sent for that very purpose. Such an action by the kleroukhoi would then be a de facto declaration of war with Philip, thus it is more likely that they were ordered to defend the Khersonnese from Philip if he made an attempt to take it. This further strengthens the likelihood of settlement at Paktye or, at least, another northern town near the Thracian wall. See Map, pg. 39 for detail.
ὑπὲρ ὧν ψηφίσματ' ὑμέτερ' ἐγκαλοῦντα – We know of only one decree relevant to this topic, that passed by Polykrates in 342 that allegedly declared that the kleroukhoi in the Khersonnese were at war with Philip ([Dem.] 12.16). This must also refer to the kleroukhoi who had been sent in 352 when Kersobleptes ceded the Khersonnese to them (see Commentary 8.8, pg. 153). The decree was probably not passed before 342 in connection with the earlier establishment of kleroukhies, however, as the events described by Philip ([Dem.] 12.16) would not make sense otherwise. There would have been a cessation of hostilities between Philip and Athenian kleroukhoi as a part of the Peace of Philokrates. Also, the Greek use of the genitive participle tends to indicate events following on or closely related to each other temporally. Thus, the decree was passed in connection to the strategia of Diopeithes, who was also supposedly ordered to make war on Philip if the opportunity was right ([Dem.] 12.16). According to the chronology of what Philip says in his letter, he must have already started campaigning in Thrace when Diopeithes was sent with the kleroukhoi to reinforce the existing Athenian presence in the Khersonnese. The decree of Polykrates was likely passed soon after Philip started marching east.

πάντα δὲ τὸν χρόνον συνεχώς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων λαμβάνων – Philip had indeed taken possession of a number of non-Athenian cities, both through just means and warfare, in an attempt to secure his own borders. This included control of the south of Thrace and the Thracian Khalkidike, territory partially controlled by Athens and a crucial stop on the
grain route. He had expanded his kingdom one area at a time and Philip had taken these regions in an effort to consolidate his own position and strengthen Macedonian interests in both the east and south (see Introduction, pp. 104-12 for an outline of his expansion). Such extensive conquests must have involved many losers; his territorial expansion was obviously accomplished at the expense of both the Greek and barbarian cities and leagues in these areas.

7 ἀμύνεσθαι τὸν πρότερον πολεμοῦνθ’ ἡμῖν – D.’s implicit appeal to the audience for a war in self-defence is an important part of the discussion on war with Philip. A war without any justification was a violation of the principles of Greek morality (see below). Philip had scrupulously adhered to the treaty and had not breached the terms in any way, hence this appeal to a war in self-defence is an attempt by D. to manufacture a justification for war since Philip had not provided Athens with one himself. Moreno (2007: 208) is probably correct in claiming that the first act of the war, Philip’s seizure of the Athenian grain fleet in 340, must have been particularly surprising as Philip scrupulously adhered to treaties and observed the spirit of religious events.

There are many references to self-defence as a justification for war. Even pre-emptive attacks in self-defence go back as far as Herodotus (1.46) and are evident in the fifth and fourth centuries (Thuc. 1.33.3-4, 120.2, 124.2, 6.91.4, 92.5; Ar. Rhet. 1393 a20). One of the most basic premises of warfare was that every Greek state had the right to defend itself (Hunt, 2010: 134). Hunt makes an interesting parallel with the right of an Athenian to kill an intruder in his house
at night in an act of self-defence (Hunt, 2010: 137; Carey, 1989: 81; Lys. 1.36). Plato says that one of the goals of warfare was security (*Protag.* 354b) and Athenian security of the countryside of Attike would have been one of the most important aspects of this self-defence (for Attike and the protection of the *khora*, see Ober, 1985: esp. 13-31). As a result of the importance of the grain trade, the security of the North would also have been seen as securing Athenian possessions in almost the same way as securing Attike. Abandoning the fatherland, not going to the aid of the ancestral temples, abandoning ancestral tombs and allowing the land to be subjected to the enemy were the acts of a traitor (Hunt, 2010: 140-41; Lyk. 1.8; Aiskh. 3.156; Dem. 14.32), not a citizen. Thus, defending the Khersonnese and making pre-emptive strikes to do so could have been seen by the Athenians as protecting the security of Athens, the act of a true patriot, particularly if the Athenians conceived of kleroukhic land as Athenian territory. Hence, those who do not heed D.’s discussion of war with Philip as self-defence could be depicted as traitors since the region was crucial to Athenian survival. Though a declaration of war was essentially considered mandatory by the Greeks for a state of war to exist (Alonso, 2007: 218; Klose, 1972: 148-49.), D. is trying to argue that this state of war already exists as a result of Philip’s actions that threaten Athenian interests (*cf.* Dem. 8.8, 43, 55). Athens, therefore, has the right to fight to protect itself.

ἀν ἀπέχεται τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς Φίλιππος – D. is making the point that the North is just as crucial as Attike and Peiraieus when considering Philip as a threat to Athenian security. To fight a war in Attike would have been devastating to the Athenian economy and society, as
was seen in the Peloponnesian War (during the years 431 to 425 and 411 to 404) when the Spartans invaded and later occupied Attike. Ober (1985: 87-100, 191-207) claims that it even affected the Athenian psyche to the extent that defence of Attike was overhauled and reprioritised. D. employed the word *khora* (6.35) in a similar manner to emphasise in real terms the loss of crops that this would entail (Raaflaub, 2007: 215), possibly trying to play on this changed Athenian psyche.

Hunt (2010: 139) discusses the significance of the audience listening to debates on warfare, highlighting the fact that those who would be voting on war would also be fighting it and incurring the losses. The audience would undoubtedly have held a strong view about Philip marching on Attike. Krentz (2008: 168-70) claims that it is a “modern myth” that hoplites marched out every year to fight battles. There were only 47 reported pitched battles and 101 sieges or city assaults in the Peloponnesian War across Greece, and it is unlikely that this was more or less than usual. This still amounts to be over five military actions each year and, while this is a fifth century reference, it indicates that even in intense periods of warfare in the Greek world there was not a significant number of actions per year. This is a significant number of actions and it is enough for the audience of D. to pay close attention to any argument he might make, as it would have had a significant impact on the life of citizens.

8 τῷ Διοπείθει δ’ οὐδὲ βοηθεῖν τοῖς Ἐφρένι ἔχεσθαι – Kersobleptes was excluded from the Peace of Philokrates and Philip did have the right to march against him. Philip is allegedly at pains to
point out to the Athenians that Kersobleptes is despised by them when it suits their purpose, but as soon as they want to cause problems for Philip they call him a ‘fellow citizen’ ([Dem.] 12.8-9); this holds true for Athenian relations with Kersobleptes. To assist Kersobleptes against Philip would have been yet another of Diopeithes’ breaches of the peace. Thus, had Athens admitted that they were actually assisting Kersobleptes they would indeed have to admit that they were starting a war, contrary to what D. implies here.

In 352, Kersobleptes allied with Athens in an effort to protect himself from Philip’s expansion towards his territory (Aiskh. 3.74; [Dem.] 12.8; Buckler, 2003: 431-32). He already had some control of the two western Thracian kingdoms and it was clear that a strong Odrysian Thrace could threaten Macedonian interests in the east. The wealth of eastern Thrace also probably attracted Philip to the region (he had already taken Krenides/Philippi – Dem. 1.13, 4.4; DS 16.3.7; Just. 8.3.6; Steph. Byz. s.v. Krenides). Even though the two monarchs had co-operated as late as 355 (Dem. 23.183; Hammond & Griffith, 1972: 264-67; Archibald, 1998: 233), Kersobleptes sided with Athens, in an attempt to protect himself. In return for land ceded to Athens, an alliance was signed between Kersobleptes and Athens. As a part of the alliance, a fleet was eventually sent under Kharidemos (the mercenary who had previously worked for both Athens and Kersobleptes; see Introduction, pp. 85-92). Kharidemos returned to Athens when it was rumoured that Philip was dead (Dem. 3.5). The previous alliance probably contained terms about mutual assistance during an attack. During the debate on the Peace of Philokrates, however, Kersobleptes made an appeal to Athens to include him as an ally,
providing him protection should Philip attack. Athens’ refusal to do so (D. himself, as epistates, refused to allow a debate on the subject; see Introduction, pp. 116-17) was a clear indication to Philip that the Peace would only exist with Odrysian Thrace not allied to Athens.

9 δεινὰ ποιοῦσι δ’ οἱ ξένοι περικόπτοντες τὰ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ – If Diopeithes is ravaging the Hellespontine shores, Philip had already taken possession of the region, limiting Athenian influence to the Khersonnese only. Athens controlled the north of the Khersonnese directly, but possibly not all of the south (Rhodes and Osborne, 2003, no.71; see Commentary 8.6, pp. 44). Though Philip was in a position to take the Khersonnese if he desired through his alliance with Kardia ([Dem.] 12.11, which provided easy access to the region), he was still willing to arbitrate affairs and negotiate ([Dem.] 12.11, 16-17). D. (8.24-26) claims that to plunder enemy cities and vessels to finance operations was standard naval procedures, which would partly explain Diopeithes’ actions. Naval campaigns were notoriously expensive (see Commentary 8.26, pp. 189-91) and Athens could ill-afford such expeditions without these actions taken by a commander. D. is obviously trying to hide the fact that in attacking such cities and vessels, Diopeithes’ actions were as if Athens was in fact at war with Philip.

Philip claimed that Diopeithes attacked Krobyle and Tiristasis ([Dem.] 12.3). Tiristasis/Tyrodiza was a town of Perinthos that Herodotus (7.25.2) claims was used as a supply base by Xerxes. Given the context of Herodotus’ discussion, it would be more logically located in the Propontis.

It appears that a kleroukhy was sent there in 447/46 (IG I3 417) and it paid tribute to Athens
after 451 (for a discussion, see Isaac, 1986: 201-04), probably making it a city of some importance and wealth. It is logical that Diopeithes would attack a city that was of obvious advantage as a supply base, as it would also act as a significant trade port; it would thus increase his revenue from piracy. Philip also says ([Dem.] 12.3) Diopeithes “... τὴν δὲ προσεχῇ Θρᾴκην ἐπόρθησε ...” Diopeithes would no doubt have wanted to secure the border along the wall at the neck of the Khersonnese, but not the more difficult to protect areas outside of it. Thus, Krobyle was most likely a city also located outside the Khersonnese but near the wall. The enslavement of the people in these cities, however repugnant to modern readers, was within the scope of international relations (van Wees, 2004: 27; Xen. Cyropaed. 4.2.26, 7.5.73; Memorabilia 4.2.15; Ar. Pol. 1255a6-7). Philip’s qualms with the Athenians lay in the attack on these cities rather than the actions taken towards their citizens afterwards. These specifically named cities must have been under Macedonian control. D. said soon after this speech that Philip was off to the Hellespont (9.27), possibly marching east from central Thrace in a direct response to Diopeithes’ actions.

οἱ ξένοι – ξένοι was a term that could be used to denote a mercenary army. We do not know about the nature of the army employed by Diopeithes (D.’s comment at 8.20 about not discussing the character of the force being employed is infuriatingly unhelpful, but does tend to suggest it was mercenary in nature), nor do we know whether Diopeithes was sent as strategos to establish kleroukhoi or to raise an army to attack Philip’s territory. Parke (1933: 150, following Schaefer, 1856: 452) believes that he was sent to establish the kleroukhoi in the
same way as Demokleides was sent to Brea (IG i³ 46), hiring a mercenary force once he arrived to settle a dispute between the Kardians and, in the process, Philip’s territories, empowered to do so by the decree of a Khersonnite, Polykrates (see commentary, pp. 149). This would have been highly unusual, as a strategos rarely exceeded his mandate from the ekklesia (see Commentary 8.9, pg. 161). It is far more likely that he was authorised by the ekklesia to raise a mercenary army, most likely light-armed troops (see below), not just to protect the Khersonnese but to raid Philip’s territory and his allies where possible.

Various terms had been used in the Classical period, such as epikouros, stratiotes and misthophoros (for a discussion of the terminology of mercenaries and the changing use, see Trundle, 1998). Xenoi was used by Xenophon to imply a sense of ritualism and reciprocity, whereas mistrophoroi was often used in a perjorative sense of a mercenary army (Trundle, 1998: 5-6). The hiring of a mercenary army was a standard act in warfare in the fourth century, with most states and rulers hiring such armies. Parke (1933: 38, 143) points out that, in the case of Athens, it was far more typical for a mercenary army to be light armed troops. It was only in exceptional times that Athens sent a citizen hoplite force out (for example, the protection of the pass of Thermopylai in 352, see Introduction, pg. 111). The use of mercenary forces was far cheaper than utilising the citizenry, who were forced to leave their land for an extended period of time, which had a significant social, political and economic impact on the functioning of the State. Thus, throughout the fourth century, the Athenians hired large mercenary armies, primarily of lightly armed troops, to undertake many of their wars. This was
sometimes decried and, at other times, supported by the orators (as seen in Dem. 4.24-25, contra Dem. 8.20).

The growth of mercenary armies in this period has been attributed to a range of factors, from the loss of land after the Peloponnesian War to the growth of population in the period (for a detailed discussion, see Trundle, 2004: 40-46, who focuses on the desire for personal gain of the mercenary). Interestingly, it was not a glamorous career, with the mercenary soldier being paid less than a skilled labourer and much less than a citizen soldier. The exact pay for mercenaries is a topic for which there will never be a definitive answer. Williams (1976: 54) suggests that the standard rate was four Attic obols a day. Generalisations such as Parke (1933: 231-33) and Griffith (1935: 273-98) suggest that the trend of mercenary pay in the fourth century was downward, whereas McKechnie (1989: 89) and Krasilnikoff (1993: 95) suggest that pay in this period was sufficient to provide for a relatively satisfactory life. Miller (1984: 155) has the more correct approach, examining the concept of formal wages as opposed to pay for provisions also, which suggests that pay was relatively low. D. proposes that the mercenaries in 351 be paid for provisions at a rate of two obols a day (4.28-29). On this expedition to Thrace proposed by D., the pay is to be made up from plunder. This act of looting as forming part of mercenary pay became an institutionalised and accepted practice by mercenaries. Indeed, in periods of unemployment for mercenaries (which appear to have been extensive at times), small bands of mercenaries seem to have lived from the proceeds of plunder (for example, the Kyraians - Xen. Anab. 6.5.7; see McKechnie, 1989: 91 for discussion). It is not dissimilar to the
Athenian strategos being required to pay his naval forces through eunoiai, except that regular pay for rowers was a feature of Athenian naval warfare (Gabrielsen, 1994: 124). Even though McKechnie (1989: 89) agrees with Parke (1933: 232) in dismissing Dem. 4.21-29 as of little value in the study of pay for mercenaries (primarily because the plan was not actually carried out), the concept is significant - it was possible for a mercenary army to be paid ration money by the employer while focusing on the depredations of enemy territory as the primary source of remuneration. Pritchett (1974: 102) indicates that it would not be unreasonable to suspect that mercenary troops joined a commander knowing that the majority of their pay would come from booty. That Philip claims he was forced to bring his army with him when marching east (Dem. 10.16) tends to suggest that the Athenian mercenary force was of a significant size. A large mercenary force would require a significant amount of booty to ensure they remained paid and, therefore, loyal. This could have been the cause of Diopeithes’ depredations.

κατάγων τὰ πλοία – Diopeithes was attacking the trading vessels of the cities allied to Philip to raise revenue to support his campaign. D. admits as much later in the speech (8.24-25), saying that all strategoi do this; the larger the fleet with the strategos, the more money he can raise. He does stop short of admitting that it is being directed against Philip, even though Philip’s complaint states as much ([Dem.] 12.5). Also, it appears that it was not just Diopeithes who was taking such actions. In his letter of complaint, Philip claims that Athens was allowing any pirate to make port at Thasos ([Dem.] 12.2), also saying that Athens was sending out pirates that took the vessels trading with him as they used to when they were previously in a state of
“φανερῶς διεφερόμεθα” ([Dem.] 12.5). This was expressly against the terms of the Peace, whereby both Athens and Philip agreed to stop piracy ([Dem.] 12.2). Athens may even have been allowing any pirate who had taken booty from vessels trading with Philip to dock at Thasos, essentially sanctioning piracy against Philip in the same way that the English sanctioned piracy against the Spanish in the sixteenth century. A formal decree traditionally forbade all Athenian harbours from accepting leistai into them, and the Melians were fined 50 T for doing so (Dem. 58.56; de Souza, 1999: 38-39; Gabrielsen, 2001: 232). This is in stark contrast to Diopeithes’ actions which were a clear violation of the Peace of Philokrates.

Such piracy was common practice and undertaken to acquire funds. As commanders were usually sent out underfunded, they were forced to acquire funds in a number of ways (for contemporaneous ideas, see Isok. 8.29, 36; IG II2 111.12-14; van Wees, 2004: 268), particularly on extended campaigns. For example, Thrasyboulos and Ergokles in 389/88 sailed on an argyrologia in the Hellespont and Pamphylia (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25-30; Lys. 28.5; Pritchett, 1971-91: I.50-51, II.101-02), and Khares plundered Kerkyra and Sestos in 360 and 353 (DS 15.95.3, 16.34.3). Timotheos must have paid his men from booty when he had not received pay for ten months (Xen. Hell. 5.4.63-66; DS 15.47.7; Isok. 15.111; Dem. 20.77), while Iphikrates sold statues ‘acquired’ through piracy (DS 16.57.2-3) and had his crews work on the lands of the Kerkyraians (Xen. Hell. 6.2.37) then ‘raised money’ from the coast of Kephallenia (Xen. Hell. 6.2.38). Isokrates (15.123) talks about Timotheos cultivating the goodwill of the Greeks by ensuring that his intent was known prior to his arrival at an allied port. This indicates that the
allies accepted this practice to a certain extent, providing that they were properly informed. It was a practice that found much currency in the fifth century, primarily during the Peloponnesian War and was a standard *modus operandi* after 411. For example, as early as 428 a squadron was sent by Athens on an *argyrologia* (Thuc. 3.19.1; Kallet Marx, 1993: 136-38, 160-64, 200-01; Meiggs, 1972: 254; Hornblower, 1996: 94-95). Another example can be seen when Nikias raided Hykkara in 415 to raise money through the sale of captives (Thuc. 6.62.3-4). There are numerous other examples of this throughout the Peloponnesian War. Even at the start of the fifth century, early naval raids to supplement pay are found in Herodotus (3.57-58, 8.111-12) with Samos attacking Siphnos and Themistokles attacking medizers (for a detailed outline and discussion, see de Ste Croix, 1953: 50-51; Pritchett, 1971-91: V.381, 385-87). Plundering was such a recognised method of fund raising that Xenophon (*eq. mag.* 7.7) outlined the use of *hippeis* in the raiding of cities. Even D.’s system of military finance, proposed in 351, required funds “from the war” to finance a fleet (4.29). Privateering was only done as a part of state-sanctioned policy, however, with the proceeds going to the State and not individuals (Pritchett, 1971-91: 5.398-438; Gabrielsen, 2001: 78-79; van Wees, 2004: 255). For example, the privateering by two *nauarkhoi* in 355 of vessels from Naukratis led to 57,000 *drachmai* of loot which was then sanctioned by the State and commandeered by the *ekklesia* (Dem. 24.11). In 388, Diotimos did not hand over all his payments in a similar action, keeping 40 T for himself (Lys. 19.50). This piracy must have made it appear to Philip that Diopeithes was indeed acting under a mandate of the *ekklesia* (*cf.* [Dem.] 12.4).
The use of state vessels for acts of plunder and other revenue raising required State sanction, though. *Strategoi* had previously been sanctioned or punished for misuse of public vessels for private gain (for example, Dem. 51.13-14; Isaeus 11.48). Thus, surely D. is also speaking to convince the *ekklesia* to sanction Diopeithes’ plundering as necessary to supplement his pay, arguing that it was an accepted practice in Athenian naval warfare.

καὶ δὲὶ μὴ ἑπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ— Any action undertaken by a general in the field could be repudiated by the home government and the responsible party, in this case Diopeithes, could be impeached (*eisangelia*), a vote to recall him passed in the *ekklesia* (*apokheirotoneia*) and the general tried by a court (for discussion of this, see Hamel, 1998: 122-126). The *demos* was not afraid to recall *strategoi* who did not follow their instructions precisely and *strategoi* were usually scrupulous in following instructions for fear of recall and prosecution (Hamel, 1998: 116-17). Hamel (1998: 132-34) discusses the frequency of prosecution of *strategoi*, agreeing with Hansen’s (1975) conclusions that the prosecution of *strategoi* was quite common, assuming that the statistics we have are truly representative (Hamel, 1998: 132-33).

D. makes an argument against Diopeithes’ recall (8.10), saying that if Diopeithes is to be disavowed by the government and the forces he controls disbanded, Philip should also be required to withdraw his army from the region. This is obviously a misleading analogy as Philip had not broken any terms of the peace whereas Diopeithes had violated the terms repeatedly.
By Athens not disavowing the general’s actions, they agreed with them and Philip could well have considered them an act of war, which he eventually did (cf. [Dem.] 12.23).

11 τηνικαύτα θορυβούμεθα καὶ παρασκευαζόμεθα – The preparation referred to by D. must primarily refer to the preparations for the fleet to depart. Preparing a naval expedition in Athens was a time-consuming process. First, the initial debate was held in the ekklesia, which could take several days to summon, debate and vote. Once an expedition was voted, a strategos or strategoi were voted to the command. Strategoi then appointed trierarkhoi (Gabrielsen, 1994: 73-78, 91-95) which was also time-consuming. This process was streamlined in 358/7 by the implementation of a register of 1200 liable estates (Dem. 14.17, 20.23, 21.154-55; 47.21; Isok. 15.145; Isaios 7.38; Harp. sv summoria; Gabrielsen, 1994: 173-213; MacDowell, 1986). Equipment was then purchased and wooden gear was distributed by the State (IG II² 1615, lines 8-104; Gabrielsen, 1994: 161-62; for problems of gear distribution, hiring a crew and taking over an existing trierarkhy, see Dem. 47.21-44, 50.7, 26-28, 33-36, 42; Gabrielsen, 1994: 153-55). After this process of appointing captains and equipping vessels, crews were levied and pay made available from either the State or, exceptionally, from taxes raised to fund a specific fleet (Dem. 50.8). D. (50.7) makes it clear that demarkhoi made a report of available citizens for service, who were then required to report to the pier for duty. D. (14.23) indicates that this process was somewhat cumbersome, while the need for Polykles to hire a crew as a result of poor turnout of able sailors (Dem. 50.7) is probably a testament to the ineffectiveness of the system. By the middle of the fourth century, citizen mobilisations for crews had become
the norm for large operations (van Wees, 2004: 218). For smaller actions, however, crews would have been hired from the semi-professional rowers who usually lived in and around Peiraeus – the crew hired by Polykles (Dem. 50.7) is an example of this. With 200 men to a vessel (170 rowers, twenty auxiliary staff and usually ten marines), a small fleet of ten triremes still required a full staff of 2000 men (van Wees, 2004: 215-18), and it was unusual for a fleet to sail without a full crew. Van Wees (2004: 218) submits that the whole process would have taken several weeks, including another week for training to ensure an acceptable standard of competence. The cost was exorbitant, hence the need for piracy to supplement maintenance (see Commentary 8.9, pp. 158-60). D. (50.11) also indicates that a mercenary crew could cost even more, with the possibility of desertion of sailors requiring a trierarkh to pay further sailors to take their place.

14 νυνὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἐκείνος ἔχων ἐν Ὑφάκῃ διατρίβει καὶ μεταπέμπει τολλήν – Philip’s activities at this time in Thrace would have required a substantial military force. By the time of this speech, Philip had taken Thrace and the shores of the Hellespont (see Commentary 8.2, pp. 134-35). It is probable that his southern border now extended up to Hieron Teikhos. Moreover, he also controlled central Thrace, securing forts at Masteira, Drongilos, Kabyle, Binai and Beroe, crucial areas for the control of trade in Thrace. These cities allowed Philip to dominate the access of both the east-west and north-south trade routes (Archibald, 1998: 235-36; Ellis, 1976, 170-71). Philip already controlled Serreion Teikhos and Hieron Oros in the east (Dem. 9.15), important settlements for the control of Thrace (Archibald, 1998: 234), while
Strabo (book 7, fr. 36) names Kallipolis, Orthopolis, Philippopolis and Gareskos as other key settlements of the region, the name Philippopolis giving away its likely origins. He also controlled Doriskos. Similar to Tiristasis, Doriskos was also a food supply site for Xerxes (Hdt. 7.25) and, thus, probably an important location. A fourth-century wall has been located at the site (Triantaphyllos, 1971: 439-40) and it may originally have been simply a village made into a fortified position by the Persians at the time of the Skythian expedition (Isaac, 1986: 137-38).

This activity in Thrace was by far Philip’s most significant and comprehensive undertaking to date. The region was inhabited by war-like tribes who fought predominantly guerrilla warfare against the Macedonians, who were tried and proven primarily in set battles and sieges (Archibald, 1998: 235). The campaign must have taken its toll, with losses of men on a scale unpredicted by Philip, who himself fell ill on the campaign (Dem. 1.13 and Lib. Hypoth. 3.4-5).

Philip demonstrated a different attitude towards Thrace from his previous conquests. He established a permanent presence there, controlled by a commander who answered directly to the king (Arr. Anab. 1.25.1). In doing this, Philip required a significant amount of manpower and it would have been difficult to raise this locally (Archibald, 1998: 236). Although Diodoros (17.17.4) and Arrian (Anab. 1.14.3) both note that Thracian troops were required to serve in the Macedonian army, it is unlikely that they were used immediately as the only garrison troops in Thrace at this time. The enormous force that Philip took with him, after a year of campaigning, had suffered defeats in his extension of the Thracian campaign across the straits (eg. against Byzantion and Perinthos – DS 16.76.1-4; Plut. Dem. 17.2; Justin, 9.1.5-6; against
the Tribalii – Justin. 9.3.1-3). In addition to the requirements of manning the forts that he clearly planned to establish at strategic locations, Byzantium had started to demonstrate some hesitation towards Macedonia (see Commentary 8.14, pp. 167), which was likely shared by Perinthos. Philip required significant reinforcements to man the forts throughout Thrace and to bolster his forces in preparation for possible attacks on Perinthos and Byzantium, both heavily fortified and difficult to attack.

ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας καὶ Θετταλίας – This remark is indicative of Philip’s policies in Thrace. While Philip would have requested troops from Macedonia as a matter of course, these being the core of his army, the only reason Philip would have sent to Thessaly for troops would have been to bolster his cavalry. Cavalry were traditionally seen as the only worthwhile military forces in Thessaly. This was because of the open plains of the region. It could be a recognition of the need to change the manner of warfare in central Thrace, which was geographically similar to that of Thessaly – large open plains. This was the primary manner of warfare in Thrace, and the request for reinforcements from Thessaly may be an indication that Philip recognised a deficiency in cavalry.

Warrior burials in central Thrace tended to include harnesses, bridles and bits, the necessary equipment of cavalry (Archibald, 1998: 247-51), reflecting a similar nature of warfare. The cavalry that Philip probably had with him already were the ‘companions,’ the somatophylakes
(DS 16.93.3-6 for their role under Philip in warfare) and a small number of his lightly armed cavalry (armed with ‘lances’ – see Arr. Anab. 1.15.6).

The need for more cavalry is also indicative of how Philip intended to control the region. As he had made a marriage alliance with the Getai by this time (Jord., Get. 10.65; Theopomp. BNJ 115 F126; Tronson, 1984: 120-23), he already controlled the plains regions of Thrace (where cavalry are the most effective) and there was thus little need to bolster his cavalry forces significantly. Ellis (1976: 166, n.37) puts the marriage in late 342, whereas Momigliano (1933: 341) dates the marriage to 341. Ellis must be correct: Philip would have consolidated central Thrace, made the alliance with the Getai to secure the North, then moved against Perinthos and Byzantion in the east, a far more logical sequence of events. It is probable that the Thessalians were to serve as a standing force in central Thrace to support the Macedonian administration. This would have been a far more effective garrison force than the less mobile Macedonian hoplites on the Thracian plains.

εὰν οὖν περιμείνας τοὺς ἑτησίας – The Etesian Winds are the winds that blow from north to south annually. They featured significantly in Athenian strategic thinking in the fifth and fourth centuries, and this partially explains why Athens based fleets in the North Aegean for extended periods of time. Blowing from May to September, the Etesians made travel to the North Aegean in early spring through summer particularly slow. Thus Philip, by waiting for the Etesians to blow, could attack Athenian territory and make good the attack before the Athenians were able
respond. D. makes the same argument in an earlier speech (4.31). It also assists in dating the speech (see Introduction, pg. 34).

οἴσθε τοῦς Βυζαντίους μενεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἄνοιας τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπερ νῦν – Byzantion had been defensively allied with Philip, but had sent their fleet to Thasos, probably at the urging of Diopeithes. The strategos was attempting to turn cities such as Byzantion against Philip and build a coalition of allies against Macedonia in the North. The Byzantine volte face regarding Philip must have happened towards the end of Philip’s expansion east; they probably became increasingly concerned by Philip’s growing power and dominion. Diopeithes would have informed the home government of this significant coup against Philip immediately. Thus, it appears that D. may not have known of the concern caused in Byzantion by Philip’s steady march through Thrace and the Athenian government must not have been aware of their admittance to the harbour of Thasos. It is, however, more likely an indication of the later rewriting of the speech to make D. appear to be prophetic in his understanding of the foreign policy of other states (see Introduction, pg. 30).

15 εἰ τισι μᾶλλον ἀπιστοῦσιν ἢ ἡμῖν, καὶ τούτοις εἰσφησθεῖσθαι μᾶλλον – Byzantion, along with Sestos, was an important city for Athenian control of the grain trade (Isaac, 1986: 229-30), crucial in the fourth century for the very survival of Athens. It had experienced a long and troubled past with Athens by 341. While it had seen a recent period of independence (between 364 and 341 – see below), if the city had fallen to Philip it could have posed a significant threat
to Athens. Yet again, D. plays on the Athenian fears of the loss of the grain trade to persuade his audience that Diopeithes must remain in the North with his naval force for the security of the region. Thus, should Byzantion be attacked, D. asserts that they would surely rather Athenian assistance than fall subject to Philip, even though they were allied to him.

Established in the seventh century by Megara (Ps. Skymnos 716; see Isaac, 1986: 218 for discussion of a range of dates), Byzantion was situated at the neck of the Hellespont and was strategically located to control all maritime shipping from the Black Sea to the Hellespont. It also controlled the land route from Asia Minor to Europe. Herodotus (4.144.1-2) has Megabazos exclaim surprise that Khalkedon was founded earlier than Byzantion on account of the superior location on which Byzantion was founded seventeen years later. Thus, Isaac (1986: 219) posits that Byzantion was not of importance until Pontic trade was of greater significance. The land route was more important when Byzantion was founded, however, because even though the Black Sea region was politically stable in the sixth and early fifth centuries, it did not supply large quantities of grain. We know that Xerxes permitted the grain vessels in the Hellespont to pass as they probably did not contain significant quantities of grain; rather, they were carrying smaller, more expensive cargoes of wheat for sale in the Mediterranean poleis (Hdt. 7.147.2-3; Hind, 1994: 489). This trade route was also recognised to be of some economic importance by Histiaios. After the Ionian War, the tyrant sailed there to capture merchant ships coming from the Black Sea (Hdt. 6.5.3, 26.1). Isaac (1986: 219) also emphasises the availability of fertile land and the abundant supply of fish at Byzantion.
Byzantion was not important to Athens for the grain trade during the fifth century either, as the main goods that regularly came from the North were luxuries ([Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.7, Ar. Wsps, 700-18; Moreno, 2007: 161, 164; see Introduction, pg. 59). Grain must have been exported to a small extent, though, as Herodotus does talk about people similar to Skythian farmers who grew grain to sell for profit rather than for consumption (4.17.2). As a strategic location, however, Byzantion was crucial. Both Dareios and Xerxes had the bridge of boats built nearby (Hdt. 4.83.1, 85.1, 87.1, 7.33-36), underscoring the importance of the city as the crossing site of the east-west land routes. The tyrant of Byzantion had also supported the Persians (Hdt. 4.138) and, after Byzantion revolted from Persia, it was immediately recaptured (Hdt. 4.143-4, 5.26) and became a base for the Persians (Hdt. 9.89.4; Thuc. 1.94.2, 128.5), further highlighting its importance as an east-west access point. Athens fought to maintain control of Byzantion as, later in the fifth century (Thuc. 1.115.5, 117.3), the city became crucial as Athens’ reliance on imported northern wheat grew (Lysandros, in 405, stopped grain ships bound for Athens – the next year, Xenophon reported the city suffering of starvation as a result - Xen. H ll. 2.2.9, 2.21, indicating some reliance on a northern source of supplementary grain by this time). Indeed, Byzantion was a repository of grain for Athens during the Peloponnesian War; one of the privileges granted to Methone in the Arkhidian War was the right to import corn from Byzantion (Meiggs & Lewis, 1988, no. 65, lines 34-36), and a similar right was given to Aphytis (Dem. 21.3-6). Also, passages in Eupolis and Aristophanes talk about guard duty in
Kyzikos and Byzantion, apparently talking about a time of peace (Eup. Pol. fr. 247; Ar. Wasps, 237-37; see Moreno, 2007: 165-66 for discussion).

In the fifth century, Athens had started to protect the grain trade as a matter of policy. The ekklesia debated matters of grain in the first meeting of each prytany (Ar. Ath. Pol. 43.4). The establishment of the colony of Nymphaion in the Euxine in the second half of the fifth century is an example of this policy (Aiskh. 3.171; Krat. BNJ 342, F8). As mentioned above, phrouroi are also attested as grain officials at Byzantion and Khalkis by 424/3 (Eup. Pol. fr. 247 K-A; Ar. Wasps, 235-37) and at Khalkedon before 405 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.1-2). There also appear to be Hellespontophulakes in an inscription dated to 424/23 (IG I 3 61, lines 36-37), ensuring the steady flow of mercantile traffic from the Hellespont which ensured what would probably have been a grain supply to Athens to supplement other sources. Isaac (1986: 225-26) claims that on the basis of this, Byzantion was the major grain market for Athens. It is more likely that it was the secondary market to Euboia, but still a critical part of the supply of grain to Athens. One report of Aristides’ death (Plut. Arist. 26.1) is with him on a mission to the Black Sea to assess the region’s wealth, but nothing should be inferred as we lack the evidence for such a supposition. Similarly, Perikles’ expedition to Sinope (Plut. Per. 20.1-2) was probably not to secure grain but to examine the potential of the area for control to access other forms of wealth (Moreno, 2007: 164-65).
Thus, in the fifth century we can see a reliance on northern regions for grain to supplement the Aegean sources, indicating the importance of a compliant Byzantion in this process. As a result of the political disunity and decentralised power structure of the Arkhainaktid dynasty, demonstrated by the scattered burials of the elite in the region (Moreno, 2007: 162-63), it was not possible to ensure a steady flow of significant amounts of grain from the north to support Athenian needs during the fifth century. Kleroukhies around the Aegean served this purpose, with Euboia the main supplier of grain to Athens. Moreno (2007: 77-143) outlines this thesis clearly and persuasively. He does not emphasise enough, however, the continual Athenian interests in the Black Sea region. Following Figueira’s (2008) restatement of his view of Athenian colonisation as ‘patronal,’ Moreno discusses the early settlements of the region as driven by personal initiatives, but the potential of the region to control trade must have been recognised as early as 600BC with Phrynon’s settlement of Sigeion and the continuing interests of the Peisistratidai in the region. It was obviously a region of wealth, a part of which was derived from some control of the sea-borne trade.

In the fourth century, Byzantion became an even more crucial city to control, as the stability of the Black Sea region brought about by the new Spartokid dynasty allowed the systematic exportation of grain from the region. This supply dwarfed Euboia’s grain export (Moreno, 2007: 162-63). The amount of grain imported in the fourth century was enormous, with 400,000 *medimnoi* of wheat coming from the Spartokids alone (Dem. 20.32). This amount is verified by the 230 ships that Khares was supposed to convey, which would have been carrying at least
540,000 *medimnoi* of wheat (Moreno, 2007: 207-08). As a result of dissatisfaction with Sparta’s growing power in Greece in 390, Thrasyboulos sailed to Byzantion and Chalkedon and established democracies in them (Xen. *Hell. 4.8.25-28*), also levying a 10% tax. This was first levied by Alcibiades after the Battle of Kyzikos in 410 on ships exiting the Pontus at Khrysopolis (Xen. *Hell. 1.1.22*). Polybios (4.44.4) says that it was also levied on ships entering the Hellespont. Thrasyboulos also established a democracy in Byzantion (Xen. *Hell. 4.8.27*), a distinct hangover of fifth century methods of Athenian imperial control. The Athenian alliance of 384 with Byzantion, Selymbria, Methymna and Mytilene, along with Hebryzelmis (see Introduction, pp. 75-76 for the context) indicates the continued growth of ties with Byzantion in the crucial period that saw the build-up of relations with the Bosporan kingdom. Thereafter, the alliance concluded with Byzantion in 379/78 and the inclusion of the Byzantines as foundation members of the Second Naval Alliance in 378/77 secured the interests of Athens to a great extent, until discontent with Athenian control caused a rift in the alliance in approximately 364. Diodoros (15.78.4-79.1) claims the rift was due to Theban interference (see Introduction, pp. 93-94), however due to its important strategic location, Cargill (1981: 169) is probably right to claim that the Byzantines wanted a more independent hand in their own operations. Their interference in the Athenian grain trade and support of the rebels in 357 is evidence of their independence from Athens at this time (Isok. 5.53; Dem. 50.6; Nep. *Timoth. 1.2*; IG VII 2418, lines 11, 20-25). Rhodes, Khios and Byzantion all made informal agreements (not alliances, as Buckler, 2003: 362-63 emphasises) with Thebes to stop their involvement in a possible war between Athens and Persia in their region that would limit their ability to trade freely (Ruzicka,
1997: 120-21). Byzantion even supported Thebes in the Sacred War (Rhodes & Osborne, no. 57), further underlining their independence from Athens.

In both 362 and 361, Byzantion (in co-ordination with Khalkedon and Kyzikos) raided the Athenian grain vessels ([Dem.] 50.4-6; 17-19 also indicates the need to have triremes convoy the grain ships at this time). Isaac (1986: 229) has Byzantion leading an anti-Athenian grouping, exerting influence particularly over Selymbria and Khalkedon. If this was the case, it would confirm that Byzantion was the most significant city in the region, however we lack the definitive evidence for verification. This caused a significant problem as control of the city of Byzantion clearly had the potential to cause great havoc with Athenian policies; therefore, a Macedonian-controlled Byzantion was a major problem for the Athenian grain trade and any ship that did not have a significant military escort would be vulnerable. The Byzantine alliance with Philip, probably in 352, would have concerned the Athenians greatly, but they lacked the funds to put such a city to siege. Philip would surely have come to their aid also. When they were able to convince Byzantion to return to the Athenian fold, the Byzantines were given a bilateral treaty of alliance. Cargill (1981: 233) claims that the mission sent to Byzantion in 340 was a ‘relief’ mission, not an imperial claim of Athens that would allow them to assert control over the city afterwards (DS 16.77.2; Plut. *Phok*. 14.2-5). It is interesting to note, however, that D. (18.91) cites a decree of Perinthos and Byzantion that granted part of their land to the Athenians for the assistance given against Philip in 340/39, though Cargill (1981: 148) rightly questions the authenticity of the document. This alliance with Byzantion after Philip seized the
grain ships in 340 was so important to Athens that, as a result of Byzantine mistrust of Khares, the Athenians were willing to replace him with Phokion to appease them (Plut. Phok. 14.2-4).

珙 erte μη ϕθάση λαβών αυτούς – D. had no way of knowing that Philip was on the point of marching on Byzantion to besiege both it and its neighbour, Perinthos. It stands to reason, however, that having taken the region, he would then look to the most significant cities in the eastern fringes of his conquest and consider their independence unfavourably. As noted above, this is more likely evidence that the date of publication of the speech was significantly later than the speech as it was given in the ekklesia (see Introduction, pg. 30).

16 οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνό γε δὴλον ἐστιν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔπι Χερρόνησον οὐχ ἦξει – The build-up of Philip’s power in Thrace must have been a frightening prospect to Athens. This build-up had the potential to threaten the grain trade, so vital to both the stomachs and the economy of the Athenians. While Philip may eventually have decided to annex the Thracian Khersonnese, it was probably not on his mind at the time. Philip had indeed marched against allies, but they were on his immediate border; Philip showed a continual desire to strengthen his borders. Athenian power was located further south and still focused on the Aegean. Philip would have been content to let Athens be at this point, providing they did not encroach on his territory; thus, Philip would possibly even have allowed the Khersonnese to remain Athenian.
The letter to which D. refers is not the famous alleged letter that is included in the Demosthenic corpus as [Demosthenes] 12. The letter was probably received after Diopeithes’ kleroukhoi had been settled and had started to encroach on Kardian territory. Cargill (1995: 28) claims that Diopeithes must have led attacks on Kardia directly. Nowhere in [Demosthenes] 12 does Philip list such an attack, which would have been equal in outrage to the other listed incidents. It is more likely that the Athenian kleroukhoi claimed some Kardian territory as their own and the Kardians disputed this (for Kardia’s disputation of the borders of their land, see Dem. 5.25, 6.30, 9.35, 10.60, 65, 68, [Dem.] 7.39-44; Lib. hypoth. 8.2).

17 καὶ τῶν ἑκείνου τι κακῶς ποιῆσαι – D. may be deliberately ignoring Diopeithes’ actions, as he had possibly already attacked Philip’s territory. Philip’s letter to the ekklesia mentions that Diopeithes kidnapped Nikias, a Macedonian herald, from his territory (Dem. 12.2). While we need to be mindful of the veracity of this statement, it could well have been a raid by Diopeithes on Macedonian territory in which Nikias was captured. At the very least, Diopeithes’ actions had been so clearly those of a war-monger that little distinction really needs to be made in the eyes of Philip.

18 τι’ δ’, ἄν ἀπελθὼν ἐκ Θρᾷκης ... ἐπὶ Χαλκίδα καὶ Μέγαρ᾽ ἦκι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὄνπερ Ὄρεεν πρὶς – D. is playing on his theme of Philip’s speed of action to take advantage of Athenian inaction and sloth, used regularly in his rhetoric (for example, 1.14, 3.14-16, 9.50-52, 9.75). D.
argues that as a result of the Etesian Winds, Philip has greater latitude for military action and he could easily arrive in force at locations that are closer to home, thus bringing the war to Attica. D. uses the example of Oreos in Euboia to demonstrate how Philip will allegedly create difficulties for Athens.

Not long before the speech was delivered, Philip had dispatched a mercenary army led by Hipponikos to stop the creation of a Euboian League headed by Kallias of Khalkis (Dem. 9.33, 58). Kallias had requested Philip’s support in this venture the year before (Aiskh. 3.89-90), but Philip had refused. Now that Kallias was receiving support from Athens (Aiskh. 3.90), Philip may have decided to distract the Athenians from his activities in Thrace by manufacturing an emergency closer to home (Worthington, 2013: 215). Supported by Eurylokhos and Parmenion (Dem. 9.58), Hipponikos established tyrannies in Eretria, Porthmos and Oreos (the incident specifically mentioned by D.; see Commentary 8.36, pp. 210-11 for discussion of events involving Oreos; see 8.59, pp. 209-10 for an outline of the city’s history), simultaneously expelling anti-Macedonian garrisons (Dem. 9.33, 18.71). D. also indicates that there was some local popular support for Philistides, the tyrant established in Oreos (Dem. 9.60-62), indicating some dissatisfaction with Athenian influence (Cawkwell, 1963: 213; Buckler, 2003: 457). It should be remembered at this point that Philip was still not acting contrary to the Peace; he was, however, deliberately creating an emergency close to home for the Athenians, probably in response to Diopeithes activities in the Khersonnese (which were in flagrant breach of the Peace). This forced Athens to reconsider sending any reinforcements to Diopeithes, rather than
forcing the Athenians to recall Diopeithes from the Khersonnese to assist in Euboia, as Worthington (2013: 215) suggests.

Buckler (2003: 458) emphasises that D. and his supporters now saw Philip as fortifying Euboia against Athens to threaten the Athenian grain supply. An attack on Khalkis would have critically endangered the grain route had Philip desired (Dem. 18.241). Thus, D. was able to use Khalkis to scare the Athenians further with the long shadow of Philip. Also, in 340 Kallias travelled through the Peloponnese, garnering support for an alliance against Philip led by Athens (Aiskh. 3.95). It was alleged by Philip ([Dem.] 12.5) that Kallias was Athens’ general and he cleared the region of Macedonian garrisons, even though they were protected by the terms of the Peace. Philip is playing fast and loose with the truth, though, as he captured them through force and established the pro-Macedonian tyrants that Kallias removed. This move would have ensured Kallias’ own position as tyrant of Khalkis. D. claims that, amongst other states, the Megarians (in conjunction with the Akhaians) were willing to contribute 60 talents to a war fund totalling 100 talents (Aiskh. 3.95-99), indicating their importance in the struggle against Philip. Aiskhines alleged that D. was bribed by Kallias to bring it before the ekklesia, but Aiskhines deliberately sold D. short in this affair as a result of the court-room dramas involved in this speech; D.’s policy was actually well-motivated and conceived (Cawkwell, 1963: 213; Worthington, 2013: 229). This policy led to Athens forcing the Macedonians out of Euboia (Philokh. BNJ 328 F 159-60; Worthington, 2013: 29).
In 343, Athens had ended a potential coup in Megara led by two men who would support Philip in return for control of Megara. Phokion was sent there and, to protect the city for Athenian interests, he had ‘long walls’ built to protect the city from land attacks, in much the same way Athens was protected (Plut. Phok. 15; Dem. 19.295; Tritle, 1988: 90-91; Hammond & Griffith, 1979: 497-99; Sealey, 1993: 175). Many of the allies garnered by Kallias were from the Peloponnese, which could be cut off by control of Megara. A Macedonia-supporting Megara would therefore have been disastrous for Athens as it prepared for war with Philip. Macedonian control of Khalkis and Megara, however, was highly unlikely, as Philip was occupied with war preparations in the north against Byzantion, Perinthos and Selymbria (Theopomp., BNJ 115, F217).

20 τούς ὁποιοῦστινασοῦν ... καὶ πλείους γίνεσθαι τῆς πόλεως συναγωνιζόμενης – D. regularly urges the ekklisia not to continue the trend of sending mercenary forces to fight important battles for the State, but to send citizens as the bulk of the force. It had become almost a catch-cry of D. by this time, particularly in his oratory against Philip (for example, 1.6, 1.24, 2.24, 2.27, 3.34, 4.7, 4.19-22, 4.24-25). D. is again about to urge that the ekklisia needs citizens to serve in person. D. is not saying that a force of Athenian citizens only be sent out, as he says “καὶ πλείους γίνεσθαί τῆς πόλεως συναγωνιζόμενης.” The city, in D.’s opinion, should allow Diopeithes to increase the force, utilising local troops against Philip. This had already started to happen, with Diopeithes allowing the Byzantines to harbour their navy at Thasos. It is also likely that the Athenian kleroukhoi in the Khersonnese would be requested to serve in Diopeithes’
force. This is one of the ways that Diopeithes “πειράται τῇ πόλει δύναμιν παρασκευάζειν” (Dem. 8.19), augmenting the forces he had at that time through local recruits both in the land and naval forces.

η διαβαλλόντων ... διαφθαρήνας – This is a reference to those ‘fifth columnists’ within Athens who are trying to further Philip’s agenda. This is an important and accurate point that D. makes since Philip, as discussed earlier, probably would have found Diopeithes’ presence in the region problematic, hence his support of the tyrants in Euboia to distract the Athenians closer to home. Thus, for Philip’s agents in Athens to call for the disbanding and destruction of Diopeithes’ force would have been an excellent outcome for Philip. This may not have been a spurious claim by D., either, as Philip allegedly made it clear that he was very willing to engage citizens in the various states for money to achieve a non-military solution to such a situation (DS 16.53.3).

21 Χρήματα εἰσφέρειν βουλόμεθα – In this context, χρήματα εἰσφέρειν means to pay the eisphora, an irregular special tax that is usually levied in times of need, particularly in war.

Our first reference to an eisphora is from 428, when money was needed to continue operations against Mytilene (Thuc. 3.19.1). The language is ambiguous, but it is possible that this was the first time an eisphora was implemented (see Christ, 2007: 54 for discussion of the evidence). It seems that only the wealthy paid an eisphora (cf. comments made by Paphlagon to the
Sausage-Seller, Ar. Knights, 925-26) and even though some speakers made it seem that all citizens had to contribute, this is almost definitely not the case (Christ, 2007: 54). The process of *antidosis* was used to ensure that those who felt they were being unfairly asked to contribute had a method by which to refer the tax to a more appropriate member of the wealthy class (Gabrielsen, 1987; Christ, 1990). Finley (1951: 14) claims that the *antidosis* only makes sense in the context of a system of taxation that had no way of determining who should pay an *eisphora*, thus there was no institutionalised method by which the State could determine who was most appropriate for a regularised payment of the *eisphora*.

A reform in 378/7 changed the *ad hoc* nature of the levying of an *eisphora* (Philoch. BNJ 328, F 41; Dem. 22.44; Polyb. 2.62.6-7). The reforms instituted *summoriai*, 100 groups of approximately 15 members each (Harp. s.v. *summoria*; Hansen, 1991: 113; MacDowell, 1986: 444-46, 449). Each symmory was required to pay a 100th part of the regular and irregular levies of the required amount. Between the mid and late-fourth century, the *eisphora* consisted of a regular payment of ten talents (IG II² 244, lines 19-20; 505 lines 14-17) as well as irregular payments as required, probably for specific military campaigns (Dein. 1.69). Within each symmory, each member was probably required to pay an amount depending on a submission of his own wealth, a *timema* (Thomsen, 1964: 84, *contra* de Ste Croix, 1953: 58, 1966: 91, and Wallace, 1989: 489). As Christ (2007: 64) points out, this is supported by the first aggregate *timema* for Attike being produced in 378/77 (5,750 talents: Polyb. 2.62.6-7). D. (14.16) proposed to increase this in 354 to 6000 talents (Philoch. BNJ 328, F 46). The Athenians
recognised the potential abuse for this system, so it is likely that one member in each symmory was required to act as a watch-dog for his own symmory, a \textit{diagrampheus} (Christ, 2007: 66-67; Harp. s.v. \textit{diagramma}), ensuring that each members’ \textit{timema} was an accurate reflection of their wealth. It has been argued that the symmories existed before this reform (Thomsen, 1964: 133-17), but de Ste Croix (1953: 58-62) has persuasively argued against this. At some point after the initial reforms in 378/77, there was a further reform of the system, with the three wealthiest members of the symmory being designated as \textit{proeispherontes} and paying the entire \textit{eisphora} themselves then recouping the money according to each member’s \textit{timema}.

The speaker of Dem. 50 talks about himself as one of these men (Dem. 50-5-9; Wallace, 1989: 484-85). This was probably reformed as a result of tardy payment from the symmories (Christ, 2007: 68). Ste Croix (1953: 58-62) says it was in place since 378 but not used until 362, but this is unlikely. The \textit{proeispherontes} only numbered 300 (Is. 6.60); to collect tax from 300 as opposed to collecting from all those liable (up to 1500) is far easier and less time consuming. Had the system existed prior to 362 it would have been utilised as it would have furnished the money far more quickly and easily.

\textit{αύτοὶ στρατεύεσθαι} – The fourth century saw an explosion of mercenary forces at the expense of citizen armies, which D. abhorred. Athens had previously utilised mercenary armies, having been deceived several times at their hands (a fact acknowledged by D. himself at 4.24-25, reinforced by his acknowledgement of their poor pay at 4.46). For example, D. could point to the perfidious Kharidemos as an example of what can happen with mercenary armies (see
Introduction, pp. 85-92). It is clear that D. believes that a citizen army will be both more loyal (as a result of not being tempted to fight for the other side for more money) and steadfast (as the citizens have far more at stake than simply money – their homes, families and temples).

This regular *topos* in D.’s deliberative rhetoric against Philip is often coupled, as it is here, with the payment of the *eisphora*. D.’s use of the verb στρατεύω implies strongly that direct military activity was required in this dire situation. The combination of paying taxes and fighting themselves is a *topos* in the *First* and *Second Olynthiacs* and is also used in the *First Philippic* (for example, 1.6, 28, 2.13, 24, 27, 4.7). It is also patently clear that D. believes everyone has a role to play in the war against Philip, with the wealthy paying the *eisphora* (D. urging them to do so with a happy heart, 1.6) and the men in the prime of life serving themselves, urging the citizens to act according to their means (2.31). The clear understanding must be that those who have money contribute it to avoid military service. This issue of a class divide in regard to the performance of duties to the State and war is enlarged in great detail in the ‘*Fourth Philippic*’ (10.35-45).

24 λέξω δὲ ... ἄλλως δυναμὴν – D. commonly claims that he is one of the only speakers to address the people from an altruistic motive (see Introduction, pp. 10-11). He often criticises the *ekklesia*, as he has just done (8.23), examining affairs ‘μετὰ παρρησίας’ (8.21). A reading audience would have been impressed by the bold nature of D. in speaking the unvarnished truth, an essential aspect of D’s *ethos* (see Introduction, pp. 11-12).
During the fifth century, it was normal practice for a strategos to be given pay for the maintenance (siteresia/trophe) of their troops. It was the norm in the fourth century for this to be a minimal amount; the strategos was expected to raise the money himself. This privatisation of Athenian naval financing had become regularised in this period through lack of funds and resulted in the Athenian strategoi raising funds through piratical activities (see Commentary 8.9, pp. 158-61).

Khios and Erythrai were both cities with a long-standing history with Athens. In 394, Konon was honoured by Erythrai with ateleia, citizenship and a bronze statue after he successfully detached the city from the control of Sparta (Rhodes & Osborne, 2003: no. 8; DS 14.84.3-4). Khios also joined the Athenians in rebuffing the Spartans at this time. In the period leading up to 386, Athens made an agreement with the city not to return exiles forcibly and not to turn the city over to Persia should a peace be made (Rhodes & Osborne, 2003: 74-77). In 384, the Khians came to Athens and proposed terms in accordance with the King’s Peace, agreeing to a permanent alliance (Tod, vol. 2, no. 118). They were probably concerned about the war between Persia and Evagoras (cf. DS 15.2.3) and its potential impact on them. With the growing aggressive attitude of Athens towards allies through the course of the fourth century, in many ways mirroring the practices of the fifth century, the attitude of the allies also changed. As early as 364, Thebes discussed revolt from Athens with Khios, Rhodes and Byzantion, probably indicating disaffection with these major allies as early
as this point (DS 15.78.4-79.1; Isok. 5.53; see Introduction, pp. 93-94). Byzantion did leave the
Athenian confederacy at this time, attacking Athenian grain vessels soon after (Dem. 50.6). By
357, Khios was allied with Rhodes and Byzantion against Athens, successfully throwing off
Athenian control (for the narrative of events, see DS 16.7.3-4, 21.1-22.2).

The explicit naming of Khios and Erythrai in this context has been explained by Badian (1995:
104) as Diopeithes raising money from these two cities. This is possible; Khios is noted as a
wealthy city (Sarikakis, 1986). The Phaselite naukleros of D. (35.52-54) disembarks Apollodoros,
then sails to the Thieves Harbour then Khios (see Isager & Hansen, 1975: 172), indicating its
location on the eastern trade route. Funds would have been easier to extract at a wealthy city.
Similarly, Erythrai, located on the shores of Ionia opposite the island of Khios, was probably also
a significant trading port, hence the harsh Athenian treatment of both cities during the fifth
century. Erythrai was probably influenced at this time (as may Khios have been) by the Karian
dynasts, evidenced by the alliance of Erythrai and Hermias in the 350s (Rhodes & Osborne,
2003: no. 56, 68) and this was continued through the decade, as witnessed by an inscription
for his son (SEG xxxi.969). The lack of reference to the demos tends to suggest that the
government was oligarchic (Rhodes & Osborne, 2003: 266). If there was Athenian interference
in this region for which we have no evidence except for this comment, it may indicate that
Athens became involved to weaken the influence of the Karian dynasty over these two cities.
‘Contributions’ to the Athenian war effort in the North may have been made by Khios and
Erythrai in an effort to gain Athenian favour, but Badian’s explanation is unlikely. There were
equally wealthy cities from which Diopeithes could raise money closer to his specified
destination. It is also possible that this is evidence for later Demosthenic editorialising as part
of the rewriting and publication process. The two states, particularly Khios, were at odds with
Athens after the Social War but D. recognised the need to gain support from Khios in fighting
Philip at Byzantion. This reference may simply be an attempt to revive Athenian considerations
of the wealthy states in an attempt to gain allies for the war with Philip.

χρήματα λαμβάνουσι – It was indeed common place for Athenian generals to raise money from
states in the manner explicitly stated here while on campaigns; it was organised, state-
sanctioned revenue raising at a time when Athens could ill-afford to maintain a fleet of any
significance. There was a well-established tradition of Athens raising money for a fleet in the
field. Alcibiades sailed to Kos and Rhodes to extort money during the Peloponnesian War (DS
13.69.5) and raided the Bithynians to take the goods of the Khalkedonians (Plut. Alk. 29.3). With
the establishment of the second league, Athens did not want the ships of the allies, they were
after suntaxeis (Badian, 1992: 91-92; Mitchel, 1984, 23; Tod, vol. II, no. 142). Khares was noted
as exacting 60 talents a year with his fleet from the islanders and seizing trading ships at sea
(Aiskh. 2.71). In 372, Iphikrates successfully sailed around Kephallenia and raised money, “ tà
μὲν ἐκόντων, τὰ δὲ παρ᾿ ἄκοντων.” D. indicated in 351 that the Social War was allegedly a result
of Athenian plotting against Rhodes, Khios and Byzantion (Dem. 15.3). Badian (1992: 98-99)
suggests that this was a result of the depradations of Khares who, in sailing to Rhodes and/or
Khios and demanding ‘contributions’ to his fleet, pushed the powerful allies into revolt. Cargill
(1981: 171) also suggests that a harsh collection of suntaxeis may have been a possible cause for revolt, citing Plutarch’s comparison of the fair collection method of Phokion to that of Khabrias, indicating harsh collection measures (Plut. Phok. 7.1-2). D. (4.23) goes as far as to suggest that since it was too expensive to provide funds for a full naval force they should ‘leisteuein’ to conduct naval warfare against Philip. This revenue-raising was not limited to cities, however, and included attacking an enemy’s triremes (for example, Xen. Hell. 5.1.21; Thuc. 2.67.4; or, more recently, [Dem.] 12.3-4). Timokrates’ seizure in 355 of nine and a half talents demonstrates that not only revenue from allied cities was the potential prize at this time; naval traders also had to run the risk of this state-sanctioned piracy. Indeed, de Souza (1995: 180) indicates that there was a fine line during this period between war and piracy. These types of actions were seen in Athens as necessary, as they had decided that by the mid-350s, under the guidance of Euboulos, there were not the funds to pay for extensive campaigns (Badian, 1992: 104; Cawkwell, 1963: 50-51). It must have been acceptable to both the demos and their leaders that Athens raised funds in this manner, through the use of superior force rather than any legal obligation to pay as allies (Badian, 1992: 104). That strategoi were forced to conduct such fund-raising campaigns was a result of poor policies by the demos and their leaders (Cawkwell, 1984: 339). In this respect, D. is right to protect Diopeithes in his actions, as the demos had indeed decided that this was an acceptable way to fund campaigns. That Diopeithes was not charged as a result of his actions is indicative of the tacit approval of this modus operandi of strategoi. See also Commentary 8.9, pp. 158-60.
25 μή ἢ δύο ναῦς – For a notable exception of this principle, see Plutarch’s description of Phokion’s successful raising of money with only one ship (Plut. Phok. 7.1-2). D. means that in order to raise money successfully, it was necessary to blockade the harbour rather than persuade through negotiation as a blockade would have been far more effective with a ‘μειζονόντιον δύναμιν’.

τοῖς ... ἐμπόροις – Reed (2003: 7) points out that the term emporos is unclear. An emporos carried out interstate trade and relied on this interstate trade as the basis for his subsistence. In this context, Philo’s description of an emporos as an enudros (de. op. mun. 147) is correct as emporoi carried on most of their trade by water. It is clear that for many emporoi the Aegean would have forced them to work only for six to nine months ([Dem.] 56.30; Casson, 1971: 270-73). Since most emporoi were not wealthy, in contrast to naukleroi (Reed, 2003: 34-36), this type of revenue-raising action by Athens, outlined above, must have made life difficult for traders, who already had to deal with ‘true’ piracy (Plut. Kim. 8.3-4; Thuc. 2.67.4; Andok. 1.138). Philip bemoans the fact that all those sailing to Macedonia (emporoi are implied) were taken as enemies and sold into slavery ([Dem.] 12.5), demonstrating that life for an emporos was particularly difficult. Moreover, the ship taken in 355 by Athenians to the value of nine and a half talents (Dem. 24.11-12) as a result of Egypt being in a state of revolt from Persia, with whom Athens was allied, indicates the political nature that this type of activity could possess.
Hasebroek (1933: vii) pointed out that economic considerations were not always the driving force of the ancient state (though it is to archaic states he specifically refers). Tandy (2015: 64), however, is right to indicate the importance of the shipping of grain because classical *poleis* were unable to be self-sufficient. It must have been of enormous benefit if a *polis* could confiscate the goods and money of an *emporos* if they were deemed at war in some way with the state. Thus, the blockading of allied cities was of benefit to Athens. It not only had the potential to raise money through extortion so that the port concerned was able to access the goods necessary for the continued functioning of their economy, but it also reasserted Athenian political dominance, forcing the state in question to recognise superior Athenian forces. This demonstrates a more sophisticated political discourse with the Athenian ‘allies’ around the Aegean.

*τὰ πλοῖα τὰ αὐτῶν* – Finley (1953: 329, 333-34) uses this phrase to prove that *emporoi* did sometimes own their own vessels. He associates the possessive genitive with τοῦ ... ἐμπόρους, but it is more logical in this context to associate the possessive genitive with παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐκπλέοντας, indicating the vessels belong to the owners of the ports. Hence the phrase refers to the vessels of *emporoi* from the state being blockaded by Athens. While no Greek city gave preferential treatment to its own citizens for trade as it was a free market (de Ste Croix, 1972: 393-96; Austin, 1994: 161; Cartledge, 1998: 15), many traders would likely have come from the state in whose port they dock. To blockade and confiscate the goods from *emporoi* from a particular state must have been politically sensitive and could cause potential problems. The
emporoi, already poor, would have been prevented from making money from trade because of the blockade. They could have persuaded their government to pay the ‘contribution’ by placing political pressure on the government. This action would simultaneously have made the port appear to other emporoi less reliable as a docking port, therefore creating a double reason for the state to ‘contribute’ to the blockading fleet.

εὔνοιας – This is the term used for the money given by allied states to Athens as an irregular payment, or contribution. When it is used in this context, it is very rare, with only one other instance, where Isokrates (12.116) criticises the practice. D. also uses the term in his oration against Aiskhines (19.282), where he attacks associates of Aiskhines as never having given an eunoia. In this context, it is an acceptable aspect of private life in Athens, used to build a reciprocal relationship. This specific usage, however, is a euphemism for what could be termed ‘protection money.’ Whiston (1859: 177) translated the term as “blackmail,” not inaccurately.

26 μὴ αὐτὸν ἔχοντα – We have no example from the fourth century of a strategos using his own money to finance this aspect of the fleet. D. is likely saying this to allay any suspicion of Diopeithes as being financially able to do so but refusing to, just in case this refusal might be raised at a later date. D. is not using this phrase to refer to the money raised by blockading ports and merchants. He later says that a strategos is required to collect, beg or borrow to maintain his crews (8.25), showing that ‘collecting’ was necessary for him to do. Clearly borrowing is therefore not meant either, though this was previously done. For example, in
374/73, Timotheos was forced to borrow 1351 dr. from Pasion and 700 dr. from each of his trierarkhs ([Dem.] 49.6-8, 11-12, 44; the incompleteness of his crews is noted by Xen. Hell. 6.2.11-12), then he had to borrow a further 1000 dr. from an unnamed source to furnish pay for the Boeotians ([Dem.] 49.15). This was far from standard practice, however, and it would be expected of D. to make an argument to show why Diopeithes did not borrow at this time if it was expected of him to do so. While it was expected of the trierarkhs to contribute to this aspect of warfare as part of their trierarkhy, the state usually provided enough funds to cover the cost of daily maintenance (Gabrielsen, 1994: 110-14). For example, Apollodoros claims that during his seventeen months at sea, his crew was only paid in full for two months, but he received enough for siteresia for fifteen months. Again, siteresia is provided for the crew in D.’s plan in the First Philippic (4.22, 28). Moreover, Thrasyboulos was sent out in 389/88, but it is clear that he is not lacking in money for siteresia, even though the extra money he raised from both the Hellespont and Thrace, then the coast of Asia Minor, would have been extra incentive for his fleet to stay with him. Therefore, it is the payment of troops that is lacking in these instances, possibly leading to the rowers abandoning the fleet (Cawkwell, 1984: 339; Dem. 2.28, 4.24; schol. Dem. 3.31; de Ste Croix, 1972: 293, 607 n.37). It would only have been in instances where a strategos was forced to remain in a region for a particularly long period of time that larger amounts of money would have been necessary (such as Khares in 353: DS 16.22.1). Iphikrates was forced to maintain his fleet in 373/72 not only by raiding Syracusan ships and exacting money from allies in the region of Kerkyra, but by billeting out his rowers as farmers to the Kerkyraians. This was an exceptional instance, however, and it is clear that
money was provided by the state to pay for the provisioning of troops on regular campaigns.

Diopeithes is exacting money from harbours and merchants to ensure that extra money is raised to provide the *misthos*, which Pritchett (1971: 3-6) stresses is separate from *trophe/siteresia*. It would have been unusual for Dipoeithes to use any private money in his *strategia* for this purpose.

27 τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκδίδωσιν – D. would have been compelled to discuss the argument that, even though these cities were indeed Greek by the standards of his day, defined as such through autonomy and independence, it was such standard practice to raise money from them that any such act by Diopeithes should be looked upon as necessary and paralleled through history and in contemporary practice. ‘Besieging the Greeks’ was probably offensive to some of the Athenians in the *ekklesia* so D. felt the need to defend against the accusation.

The “τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκούντων Ἕλληνων” were any Greeks who lived in Asia and followed Greek customs. Hall (2002: 122) indicates that by the mid-fourth century it had become a standard term of reference. Contemporary usage of the term ‘Asiatic/Asian’ could include people from parts of the coast of Asia Minor, including “Kilikia to Sinope” (Isok. 5.120), “Knidos to Sinope” (Isok. 4.162) and Troy (Isok. 5.111). Similarly, Aiskhines (3.163, 238) refers to Asia as the region immediately across the straits from Thrace. Greek identity had been marked through the use of tribes in Herodotus but had moved to a more inclusive pan-Hellenic idea of Greekness by this time (Said, 2001: 277). Herodotus (8.144.2) does claim, though, that Greeks share the same
blood, sound the same, have common religious practices and a common way of life. This
distinction of ‘Hellenic’ has been drawn in opposition to barbarians, those fit to be slaves (Ar.
Pol. 1285a21), rather than in contrast to earlier “intra-Hellenic ethic groups” (Said, 2001: 278).
Early examples of this notion of Panhellenism can be seen in Xenophon (1.6.7; Cartledge, 1992:
59-60) and can later be seen in Isokrates (ep. 9.8, 4.43, 5.126). These are more independent
regions than in previous times, with the increasing decentralisation of Persian authority in the
360s leading to a renewed focus on the individual city (Cook, 1962: 140).

28 μικρὸν πινάκιον — A pinakion was an important piece of legal and judicial paraphernalia. This
reference is an ideological connection, however, to the people’s right to judge a general should
his conduct be deemed inappropriate or outside his mandate. It was used in a range of
democratic settings (for discussion, see Kroll, 1972: 61-62; see Dow, 1963: 658 for the pinakion
as a tradeable item at this time). In this instance, it is the tablet on which the name of the
person charged with eisangelia is inscribed, along with the name of the person charging and
the details of the charge (Ar. Ath. Pol. 48.4; there is no reason for the detail here not to be
similar for all uses of the pinakion in this legal context). This was then taken to the individual
being charged and likely read out by a kleter (see Commentary, 8.29, pp. 193-94). We have no
existing pinakia with a summons for an eisangelia and, therefore, we do not know if the
summons was written onto a wooden/bronze tablet of the same fashion as judicial pinakia (see
It would be logical for D. here to order the series of events that would take place in the event of a strategos being recalled. The psephisma was the initial decree formulated after a majority of citizens in the ekklesia voted in favour of the proposal for a summons (for a discussion of the various types of eisangelia, see Hansen, 1975: 21-28). It could be a reference to the law that has been broken, or a law formulated in response to the situation, but this is unlikely as D. seems to be talking about a specific sequence of events. After the legal reforms of 403, nomoi and psephismata were different, nomoi being of a more general and permanent nature whereas psephismata were specific and of short duration (Todd, 1993: 57; Hansen, 1978; 1979). Also, psephismata could be enacted by the ekklesia without a quorum, whereas nomoi were enacted only by the nomothetai and required a quorum in the ekklesia for their ratification (Hansen, 1987: 112-13; Todd, 1993: 295). Once a majority voted in favour, an eisangelia was formally made and inscribed on a pinakion (see Commentary 8.28, pp. 192) which was then sent out to the individual. We have several examples of this procedure.

In 373, Timotheos was recalled by apokheirotoneia for an eisangelia to the ekklesia, as was Autokles in 361/60 and Kephisodotos in 360/59 (for discussion, see Hansen, 1975: cat. 80, 90, 96). Apokheirotoneia is the distinguishing mark for these types of procedures as it appears to be the preliminary step for the deposition of a strategos on active service ([Ar.] Ath. Pol. 61.2; Hansen, 1975: 41-44; Harrison, 1971: 59). The pinakion containing the eisangelia was then sent out on one of the vessels of state, the Paralos, and read to the individual by kleteres (Harrison, 1971: 85-86). It is also important to note that the verb from which the word eisangelia stems also carries a sense of taking a message (eg. Teiresias to Kadmos, Eur. Bacc. 173), as the
pinakion outlining the details needed to be taken to the person being charged on the state-vessel.

πάραλος – The Paralos was one of two vessels reserved for special state-service (Aiskh. 3.162; Ar. Birds 1204). For example, the Paralos was sent by the Athenian fleet at Samos to the 400 in Athens (Thuc. 8.74.1). Service on the Paralos was considered a significant honour in Athens (Dem. 21.172-74, regardless of D.’s invective against Meidias). The other state vessel, the Salaminia, was also used for State service and in the case of Alkibiades in 416 it is seen that the Salaminia was sent to recall him for his eisangelia (Thuc. 6.53.1, 61.4-7). The reason for specifically naming the Paralos here and not the Salaminia is unclear; perhaps in this period the Paralos was used for the recall of such strategoi in these instances.

30 Διοπείθης ... ἡ Χάρης ἡ Ἀριστοφῶν – The association of Khares, Aristophon and Diopeithes here is significant for political reasons. Aristophon probably led the political support for Khares in the mid-350s through the prosecution of Timotheos and Iphikrates after the Battle of Embata. D., in the 340s, began to associate himself with Khares in order to further his own ideas about war with Philip, having Diopeithes elected strategos to continue to place pressure on Philip in the North.

Aristophon was an anomaly for his age, being both a general and a politician (for discussion, see Hansen, 1983: 49-55). Living to approximately 100 years of age, his recorded career begins
in 404/03 when he is awarded *ateleia* for his assistance in restoring the democracy (Dem. 20.148). In the years that immediately follow, he proposed the reintroduction of Solon’s law regarding the payment of the *metaikion* for metiks trading in the Agora. He then proposed that a certain Gelarkhos is repaid the five talents he lent to the counter-revolutionaries in the Peiraieus (Dem. 20.149). After this, there appears a significant lacuna in his career (for discussion, see Oost, 1977), but this should not necessarily lead us to believe that he was not active in this period (Whitehead, 1986: 317-18). His appointment as *strategos* in 363/62, where he saw active service in the Aegean, is the next recorded instance of Aristophon’s activity (schol. Aiskh. 1.64; Sealey, 1993: 91-92) and this is accompanied with a flurry of political and legislative activity ([IG Il^2^ 111 of 363/62; [Dem.] 50.6 of 362/61; [IG Il^2^ 118 of 361/60; [IG Il^2^ 121 of 357/56; [IG Il^2^ 130 of 355/54; Dem. 24.11 of 354/54; Dem. 18.70, 75 of 346-40; [IG Il^2^ 224 of 343/42; see also Sealey, 1993: 72-73); he may also have been a *bouletes* at this time (Whitehead, 1986: 314). Aiskhines (3.139) talks about prominent supporters of Boeotia/Thebes, of which Aristophon is named as a “πλείστον χρόνον τὴν τοῦ βοιωτίας ὑπομείνας αἰτίαν”, which is also supported by D. (18.162, 219). Aiskhines (3.194) also says that Aristophon once boasted of being accused through *graphe paranomon* on 75 occasions; this is an exaggeration, but still indicative of his prominence over an extended period of time (see Oost, 1977: 240). Moreover, D.’s list of great orators of Athens suggests that Aristophon had been politically significant for an extended period of time. Aristophon’s inclusion here with Khares and Diopeithes also suggests that he may have had military experience. The only known *strategia* of Aristophon is in 363/62, hardly a distinguished military career. It is therefore likely
that Aristophon had been both militarily and politically active in the period between 403 and 362. Whitehead (1986: 317-318) is correct to point out that a 70 year old with little experience for forty years would have been unlikely to have been elected to the strategia, particularly in this period when the division between rhetores and strategoi was usually so sharply drawn. This unfortunate lacuna in his career has been created by the dearth of source material for the period between the 390s and 370s, while the prominence of other generals in this time would take the focus away from his activities. His association with Khares and Diopeithes here should point to political arrangements. These were possibly men who had supported a more vigorous policy in the North against the opposition of Euboulos and his supporters. It is clear that Aristophon was a supporter of Khares against the political faction led by Timotheos and Iphikrates as he prosecuted them (Dein. 1.14, 3.17; Ael. VH 14.3; Ar. Rhet. 1398 a5; Sealey, 1993: 84). The resurgence in the career of Aristophon in 364/3 may have been a direct consequence of a political alliance with Khares and it is tempting to see the result of this working both for Aristophon (in this appointment and the flurry of legislative activity at this time) and for Khares (Aristophon was the proposer of Khares’ appointment to replace Leosthenes in Thessaly – Dem. 51.8-9; DS 15.95.2-3). This alliance may have been the reason for Euboulos’ opposition to Aristophon (Dem. 18.162, 19.291, 21.218 and schol. 21.218); both Aristophon and Khares were in support of actively prosecuting the wars in the North, whereas Euboulos favoured being selective in where and when Athens fought after the Social War for financial reasons (Sealey, 1955: 76-76). While Khares probably saw a hiatus in his career as a result of Euboulos’ political dominance, it was soon resurgent (schol. Dem. 3.31; Cawkwell,
1962: 58-59 sees his prosecution of Timotheos at this time as a possible indication of his resurgence). Khares was to follow a more ‘imperialist’ policy with the support of the other ‘imperialist’ political grouping led by Aristophon. D. had probably decided in the early 340s that Khares was an appropriate military ally to further his own political aims of prosecuting war with Philip (Salmond, 1996: 45), bringing him into a tacit agreement with Aristophon’s policies also. Therefore, Aristophon and Khares, supporters of active warfare to defend Athenian interests, were associated with Diopeithes in the speech to give validity to his actions.

35 πέμπε ... πρέσβεις – Athens had sent a series of embassies to states around Greece to warn the Greeks about the dangers of Philip, yet D. makes the point that Athens, when they had an excellent chance to make ground against Philip, did not take the opportunity. The last of this series of embassies was sent only in 343, but since 348 Athens had been sending out embassies to raise allies against Philip unsuccessfully. The embassy sent in 348 should be seen as a result of the Macedonian capture of Olynthos (for this dating and its problems, see Harris, 1995: 158-161). Proposed by Euboulos (Dem. 19.304), it had been led by Aiskhines and attempted to initiate a conference of Greeks to form a long-term alliance against the Macedonians (Dem. 19.10-11). Aiskhines was sent out to the Arcadians and allegedly succeeded in bringing them to Athens but it led to no concrete alliance – this lack of allies led Aiskhines to support the peace with Philip in 346 (Aiskh. 2.79). Euboulos’ support of the embassies must have been recognition of the need to build an alliance-system close to home to fight Philip if he came south, rather than the later expansive (and expensive) proposals of D.
to fight Philip in the North away from Attike (see Cawkwell, 1963: 61-66 for an outline of Euboulos’ policies). The lack of success was continued in 344, when D. successfully had himself sent around the Peloponnese with similar results (Lib. hypoth. Dem. 6.3); indeed, the Argives and Messenians sent embassies back to Athens to complain of their hypocrisy of claiming to fight for all of Greece while supporting Sparta in their attempt to re-subjugate Peloponnese. It was not until the embassy in 343/42 (Dem. 9.72), when Athens clearly cut ties with Sparta that the Peloponnesian states allied with Athens. Argos, Messene, Megalopolis, Mantinaia and Akhaia made an alliance with Athens (Dem. 9.72; IG II² 225; schol. Aiskh. 3.83; Harris, 1995: 119), possibly as a result of D.’s scare-mongering, recorded by Isokrates (5.73-75). It is of note that of the Peloponnesian states, only the Akhaians fought with Athens in 338 (Ryder, 2000: 88, n.55). While the Peloponnesians may well have been concerned with Macedonian aggression in and around the Peloponnese (Harris, 1995: 119), it is clear that it was not until Athens decided to abandon Sparta as an ally that the other Peloponnesian states would support Athens in any alliance directed against Philip, even though the Peloponnesian states were allied to Philip at this time (Ellis, 1986: 158).

36 τὴν Εὐβοίαν - At the time of the speech, Athens felt threatened by the loss of Euboia, leading to an alliance with Khalkis with whom they were soon to fight anti-Athenian Euboian cities that had been supported in power by Macedonian forces.
D. (19.87, 204, 219, 326) alleged that Philip was in the process of establishing bases around Euboia to attack Athens, to ensure pro-Macedonian support in key cities. This is demonstrably false; Philip was very pleased to be able to intervene at this time to his advantage to support an anti-Athenian movement and to cause discomfort for Athens so close to home, even though he did not initiate the situation. It is more likely that an anti-Athenian element in Euboia was the primary driver of these events. Teegarden (2014: 58) supports D.’s concerns about Philip, claiming that this would have placed the grain supply under pressure. It is worth noting, however, that D., who never misses an opportunity to raise concerns about Philip’s ascendancy, does not mention this here. D. was clever in his use of scare tactics in his speeches and would surely have used this fear if there was a plausible concern. It is more likely that D. used these instances of Philip’s involvement in Euboia and the geographical proximity to Attike to push the Athenians to declare war with him as a result of fear of Macedonian involvement with a State closer to home (see Commentary 8.18, pp. 175-77).

Euboia had always been important to Athens. In the fifth century, it was seen as a safe haven against Persia and supplied much of the grain that fed the democracy. As a result of this, Thucydides (8.96.1) claims that there was greater terror at the thought of losing Euboia in revolt in 411 than there was felt at the loss of the Sicilian expedition. The island of Atalante was fortified as a naval base to secure this crucial aspect of power in 431 (Thuc. 2.32.1; DS 12.44.1; IG i³ 41, line 39 indicates the threat to the Euboian grain route posed by piracy). Perikles’ siege of Euboia (schol. Ar. Nub. 213a) and the naval resources used to guard this important Athenian
granary (Thuc. 3.17.2, 8.74.2, 86.9) serves to underline the value placed on Euboia by the Athenians during the fifth century (for discussion about the nature of Athenian defences of Euboia as the main grain supply, see Moreno, 2007: 118-40).

Many of the major cities of the island were allies of Athens through much of the fourth century (see Cawkwell, 1978: 43-45 and Brunt, 1969: 247-251 for an outline of the major events; for Timotheos’ involvement in 357, see Commentary 8.74, pp. 232-33). This changed dramatically in the 340s when a pan-Euboian movement arose. This movement was neither pro-Macedonian nor anti-Athenian, but rather was a continuation of the policies that saw the four major cities (Khalkis, Eretria, Karystos and Histaia/Oreos) continue to push for greater autonomy both for themselves and for Euboia as a whole (see Larsen, 1968: 97-103).

In 352, Eretria was a firm ally of Athens. It was ruled by a tyrant, Menestratos. Ploutarkhos succeeded him and he was noted by D. (21.110, 200) as a friend of Meidias (a prominent Athenian politician, associate of Hegesippos and ἔχθρος of D. – see PA no. 9719; Traill, 2003: 105-07 (no. 637270); for a discussion of his enmity towards D., see Worthington, 2013: 21-22, 146-47, 156-62; Wilson, 2004: 212-17 discusses the incident between D. and Meidias in terms of the damage done to D.s time as a result of Meidias’ hubris). It could be conjectured that Ploutarkhos may have been seen in Eretria as too pro-Athenian; in 348, Kleitarkhos, an opponent of Ploutarkhos, obtained support from Phokis and opposed the pro-Athenian tyrant; this then required Ploutarkhos to appeal to the Athenians for help (Dem. 5.5 with schol.; Aiskh.
3.86 with schol.). Phokion was sent to the island (Plut. Phok. 12.1), finally defeating Kleitarkhos’ Euboian forces at the Battle of Tamynai. Ploutarkhos may have demonstrated poor judgment in some way in this conflict, as Phokion decided to expel Ploutarkhos and restore Eretria to the demos (Plut. Phok. 13.4; Dem. 9.57). It seems that Eretria remained in the Athenian Confederacy at this time (Cawkwell, 1978: 46). This Athenian involvement seems somehow to have caused a stirring of Euboian nationalist sentiments around the island. At some point between 348 and 346, Kallias of Khalkis and his brother, Taurostenes, used this dislike of Athenian interference in Euboian affairs to assemble an army from all of Euboia, supported by Phalaikos of Phokis (Aiskh. 3.87).

At some point, Phokion’s successor, Molossos, was captured (Plut. Phok. 14.1), thus fighting must have continued between 348 and 346. It is likely that Khalkis was the focus of fighting, not Eretria (Dem. 5.5 – hence the alliance with Ploutarkhos). Cawkwell (1978) argues firmly that Euboia was not Macedonian at this point, and points to the strategos Proxenos being based at Oreos (Dem. 19.52) as evidence of this. Thus, Athens still probably held sway in some cities around the island at this time.

Fighting continued until 346, when an embassy arrived from Kallias with terms for peace. Philip also asked his Khalkidian friends to inform the Athenians that he also wished to make peace with them (Aiskh. 2.12; Dem. 19.52, 155). Khalkis must have been in close contact with Philip for them to be carrying such an important message. This does not demonstrate that Philip was
in control of Euboia, simply that Kallias was still pro-Euboian and would be pleased to be on
good terms with both Philip and Athens. Aiskhines (2.120) and D. (19.22) both allege that Philip
vowed τὴν Εὔβοιαν παραδώσειν, but this must mean that Philip would be willing to step back
from his obvious friendship with Khalkis and a budding Euboian League to allow firmer Athenian
control of the whole island. Also, D. (19.326) makes it clear that this may have been part of a
ploy to ensure his control of Amphipolis in exchange for his withdrawal of support for the
Euboian cities.

Soon after the peace was made between Athens and Khalkis (possibly as early as 345), Kallias
started to desire complete independence for Euboia. To ensure wider support of their pan-
Euboian sentiments, he first enlisted the support of Philip (Aiskh. 3.89). This was an important
action only if he saw a threat from Athens in the future. Athens always desired the seaward
protection of Attica provided by Euboia (Dem. 18.301), so it is likely that, even though Khalkis
was at peace with Athens, the creation of an independent Euboian League could be perceived
as a threat to Athens. After possible close connections with Philip, he then fell from his good
graces (Aiskh. 3.90), but there is no indication in any of the sources as to why or how this
happened. He then tried to enlist Theban support but he was also rebuffed by them.

The account of Aiskhines (3.90-98) provides a chronology of the events that follow, plagued
with the rhetorical flourishes of Athenian courtroom reporting. At some point soon after 343
(at the time of Dem. 19, the Euboians were clearly not in good Athenian graces – cf. Dem.
Kallias made an appeal to Athens out of fear of a Macedonian invasion in the same way that he had appealed to Macedonia out of fear of Athens approximately two years before. This appeal to Athens may again have initiated an anti-Athenian movement in Euboia, as the pro-Macedonian party established control in Eretria and expelled the pro-Athenian democrats at some point in 342 (Dem. 9.60). No doubt a healthy fear of a dominant Khalkis would have started this movement. Once in power, they appear to have invited the Macedonians to support their regime and spread their influence through Euboia. It is interesting that D. clearly shows that the people of Oreos, the centre of these actions, were keen supporters of the anti-Athenians (Dem. 9.61-62), indicating that there existed an undercurrent of anti-Athenian sentiment (as opposed to the pro-Macedonian sentiment that Philip may well have hoped to win through assisting this movement).

Philip sent Hipponikos to secure the anti-Athenian movement in power in Eretria, led by Kleitarkhos, Hipparkhos and Automedon. Hipponikos destroyed the fortifications at Porthmos and removed the democrats holed-up there to ensure the Athenians did not make a landing on the island (Dem. 9.33, 57-58; Ellis, 1976: 164). There must have been push-back from pro-Athenians in the city as Philip then had to send Eurylokhos then Parmenio to support the tyrants (Dem. 9.57-58). It was probably the third Macedonian invasion that took Oreos in support of the pro-Macedonian government there (see also Commentary, 8.18, pp. 176-77). When the Macedonians approached Oreos proclaiming friendship, the pro-Macedonian party may have betrayed the city (Dem. 9.58-62). Euphraios, a pro-Athenian democrat in Oreos had
been taken prisoner; at this point, he appears to have committed suicide (Dem. 9.62), but a variant tradition says he was killed by Parmenio (Athen. Deip., 508e). Five men, led by Philisteides, were then put into power in Oreos. This Macedonian involvement is further reported by Diodoros (16.74.1), who says that in the archon year 341/40, Philisteides, who had been put in power by Philip, was defeated by Phokion.

The dating is particularly difficult and insecure; the speeches of both D. and Aiskhines compress events and leave dates out to create rhetorical effects, not to mention misrepresent facts. The mention in D. (9.58) about Eurylokhos and Parmenio may be later insertions, but may preserve a tradition that is correct and supported by the historian Carystius (Brunt, 1969: 253). This would mean that there were three Macedonian invasions in a two-year period, a distinct possibility considering that Philip would have seen the benefits of keeping the Athenians occupied while he consolidated his power in the North.

Athens was soon to regain dominance over the island. Philokhoros (BNJ 328, F159) claims that in Skirophorion of 342/41, Athens made an alliance with Khalkis and the Khalkidians then freed Oreos. At the time that On the Khersonese was written, Athens may have made the alliance with Khalkis (Dem. 8.18; Brunt, 1969: 255) but it is unlikely that they had won back control of Oreos. D. asserts that the Eretrians refused the appeals of an embassy and chose to support Kleitarkhos instead (mid 342) Then at 18.79, D. claims to have had embassies sent out to the Peloponnese and Euboia. This embassy to Euboia could have led to the embassies from
Kleitarkhos and Philisteides that stayed with Aiskhines (Dem. 18.82), possibly in late 342. Forces were then sent out at D.’s persuasion once Philip had sent troops to secure pro-Macedonian forces in the Euboian cities and it was clear that diplomacy had failed. The embassy mentioned by Aiskhines (3.100-01) is likely after Oreos and Eretria had been brought back into the Athenian fold (as Brunt, 1969: 257 also outlines). See Teegarden (2014: 68-70 and n.1-2), Sealey (1993: 260) and Ellis (1976: 162-166, 279, n.109) for discussions of various chronological possibilities.

ἐπὶ Σκίαθον – Skiathos was an important naval base for the Athenian forces in the Aegean. Its importance was due to its prime location for intercepting naval traffic down the east coast of Greece. It had a long tradition as a naval base. For example, in 479 the Persians were using the island as a base for their naval forces (Hdt. 8.92.1). D. (4.32) also equates the island’s importance with that of Lemnos and Thasos as Athenian bases that could be used to provision and prepare for naval war with Philip.

An anti-Athenian Oreos could indeed cause a problem for the Athenian navy on Skiathos as it would limit Athenian contact with the navy based there. Also, should the Athenians lose their influence at Eretria they would have no way of easily navigating off the east coast of Attike. This was, indeed, a genuine threat to Athens and the grain route, particularly if Khalkis were to continue with her belligerent manner, as the long way around Euboia had proven to be unsafe throughout history (see, for example, Hdt. 8.13.1). It is not, however, evidence in itself that
Philip was trying to cause these specific problems for Athens, though he clearly benefitted from this Athenian discomfort.

40 Ἐὐθυκράτη καὶ Λασθένη τοῦ Ὀλυνθίους – In 349, Philip reduced the city of Olynthos after a long siege (DS 16.53-2-3; for discussion of the campaign, see Cawkwell, 1978: 82-90; Buckler, 2003: 436-39; Ellis, 1976: 93-95, 98-99). Euthykrates and Lasthenes were Olyntians who favoured a close relationship with Macedonia. D. (19.265) alleged that they were given payment in kind for service to Philip (timber for housing and livestock); indeed, Philip considered this type of bribery so successful that he boasted he did not need armies, but bags of money, to capture a city (DS 16.53.3). When they had gained enough political support, they secured the exile of the pro-Athenian leader, Apollonides, who escaped to Athens and was eventually given Athenian citizenship (Dem. 59.91), though this was later rescinded through graphe paranomon (see Osborne, 1983: 62-64 for discussion). When Philip marched against Olynthos, D. alleged that Philip bought the allegiance of the Olyntian cavalry, who, led by Euthykrates, went over to him at the outset of the attack on the city (Dem. 9.56, 19.265-67), thus ensuring the defeat of Olynthos. Hyperides (fr. 76) even claimed that Euthykrates was involved in assessing the worth of his fellow citizens for ransom after the sack of the city.

Olynthos was destroyed to remove the power of the Khalkidian League from Philip’s southern border. He claimed that the war was over the Olyntian support of contenders for his throne (Aiskh. 2.27; Just. 8.3.10), but his expansion was more akin to his later motivation of securing
safe borders for his kingdom. Philip used deception to ensure a strong position before his initial attack on Olynthos – D. (9.11) lists examples of the times where Philip used this tactic to gain a tactical advantage. The city had previously been allied with Philip, the Macedonian securing their good will by capturing Poteidaia (an Athenian colony at the time) and giving it to Olynthos as a gift (DS 16.8.3-5). There were two major groupings in Olynthos at this point, however, those who looked to Macedonia to secure their independence and those who sought Athenian protection of their independence. In about 352, the pro-Athenian camp had the upper hand and Olynthos actively started to seek Athenian insurance against growing Macedonian power (Dem. 3.7, 23.109). This forced Philip to secure his southern border against Athenian involvement. After three appeals to Athens, who vacillated and were unable to man a significant force at this time, Philip managed to take the city through the assistance of the pro-Macedonian leaders Euthykrates and Lasthenes, but Philip may have wanted to make an example of those who turned away from his alliances. Philip thus destroyed the city and sold the inhabitants into slavery (DS 16.53.2-3; Dem. 19.194, 306, 9.26).

44 Δρογγίλον καὶ Καβύλην καὶ Μάστειραν – Nothing is known of Droggilos or Masteira, but Kabyle is an attested site of significance well into the late Classical period (see von Bredow, 2006, for a brief outline of its later history). Kabyle is the modern Bulgarian city of Kabile, located on the major highway to Bulgaria’s largest port, Burgas, and on a river, the Tundja. The ancient city was located in the northern plains and, as such, was possibly a key city for controlling access between the Thracian plains and the areas to the north of Thrace, and
between the mountain passes and the Thracian coastline. It could be assumed that Droggilos and Masteira were similarly significant sites on the Thracian plains and possession of them may indicate a thoroughgoing revision of Philip’s desire to control Thrace more directly. Hammond (1994: 139) suggests that the reorganisation of the cities meant their repopulation with Macedonians. Philip did occasionally do this, but only in response to military pressures. Ellis (1976: 136, 167-68) suggests that his practice was to use the Macedonian population to strengthen borders against invaders and this may also have occurred here. Diodoros (16.71.2) simply says that he founded strong cities at key locations. It is possible that these cities were garrisoned with Macedonian troops and augmented with a Macedonian civilian population also.


58 νῦν εἰς Καρδίαν πέπομφε βοήθειαν – Kardia was a crucial city in the region, a coastal city located on the ‘neck’ of the Thracian Khersonnese. Founded as a joint colony of Miletos and Klazomenai in the seventh century BC (Strabo 7, fr.51) it was one of the key cities by which Miltiades was able to strengthen Athenian control in the region in the mid-sixth century (see Introduction, pg. 49). Since that time, it had been variously Persian (Hdt. 6.41.1, 9.115.1) and Athenian again (Plut., Kim. 14.1) but had been independent since Lysandros’s expulsion of Athenians from the region in 404 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.2, 2.3.8-10; Andok. 3.15). Athens continually desired complete control over the Khersonnese and this was formalised in the King’s Peace in 371, where Athenian control of the region was allegedly recognised (Dem. 9.16). The reality was quite different, however, and it is clear that Kardia continued to maintain a firm
independence from Athens. This independence was recognised in 353 when Kersobleptes, fearing a Macedonian invasion, made an alliance with Athens in 353. The Khersonnese was gifted to Athens with the noted exception of Kardia (DS 16.34.4; Dem. 9.16), an independent state over which Kersobleptes must have had no control.

Before the Peace of Philokrates, Philip entered an alliance with Kardia, the most likely time being after Philip’s defeat of Kersobleptes in 352 (contra Ellis, 1976: 280, n.117). The only way that such a strategically located city would have been allowed to maintain its independence from direct Macedonian control was by making an alliance at this point. It was clearly a site that Philip wished to protect, as he made clear in his letter ([Dem.] 12.11) and D. (5.25, 23.181-82) expressed displeasure at that the fact that Athens did not control this important city.

The issue at hand here is that Diopeithes has decided to attack the Kardians. This was a flagrantly provocative act, as the Kardians were allies of Philip under the terms of the Peace (Dem. 19.174, 23.181; Lib. Hypoth. 8.3-4). Soon after this speech, D. (9.16) tries to justify this act by saying that the King of Persia and all of the Greeks recognised the Thracian Khersonnese as Athenian, an outright deception to justify Diopeithes’ actions. In response to these attacks, Philip chose to act through diplomacy, again demonstrating patience at the unreasonable attacks by Athens on his allies. He sent an embassy to Athens to renegotiate the peace, proposing a symbole ([Dem.] 7.9) and Philip demonstrated a desire to make a common cause against the pirates in the Aegean ([Dem.] 7.14-15). It is clear that in this embassy, Philip rejected
Athenian claims to Kardia ([Dem.] 7.29), asking Athens to submit the dispute to an arbitration ([Dem.] 7.41). The letter Philip sent with this embassy is that referred to by D. (9.16) and it is clear that Athens rejected Philip’s proposals, including the subject of arbitration with Kardia (Dem. 9.71-72).

59 Ὠρείταις, τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὑπὲν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ – D. appears to be deliberately misleading in claiming that Philip led a surprise attack on Oreos. A pro-Macedonian faction gained control of the city in the face of the pro-Athenian democracy and established a tyranny. They then gained the support of Philip and invited his involvement, rather than Philip misleading the Oreitai.

Oreos was the name more frequently used in this period for the city also known as Histaia (Str. 10.1.3). The city was the most important in the region as it looked directly over the narrows of the north Euboian Gulf and controlled fertile land in the region. It had already been a significant Bronze Age site (Homer, Iliad 2.537, notes it as a vine-growing region) and it continued its strategic importance down into the classical period (PECS, s.v. Histaia). The area was taken by the Persians after the Battle of Artemision (Hdt. 8.23.1). After the expulsion of the Persians, it was then made a tributary member of the Athenian arkhe (see ATL III: 197-99 for discussion), but after a revolt in 446, the Athenians made an example of them and had their land confiscated with kleroukoi settled in their place (Thuc. 1.114.3; DS 12.22.2; Str. 10.1.3; Pl. Per. 23.2). From this point on, it was known as Oreos, leading the editors of the PECS (1976, s.v. Histiaia) to suggest that the kleroukoi settled at the port town Oreos. After the Peloponnesian
War, the city is not mentioned in any significant context until it joined the Second Athenian League in 376/75 (DS 15.30.3-5; listed as Histiaia at IG II² 43, line 114), when supporters of Jason of Pherai were expelled in favour of local control, closely allying themselves with Sparta. Khabrias brought it into the League by force, as he left a garrison at Histiaia (DS 15.30.5). As a result of its strategic location, the Athenians used the port as a base (Dem. 19.155, cf. Dem. 19.52, Aiskh. 2.133). There was also a strong pro-Athenian presence in the city (Dem. 9.58-62), possibly the cause of the anti-Athenian reactions in the late 340s (see Commentary 8.36, pp. 200-204). Strabo (10.1.3) claims that the tyrant Philisteides (see Commentary 8.36, pg. 204) enlarged the population of the town with other Euboians after the Battle of Leuktra; while the chronology may be incorrect, it possibly reflects a genuine tradition. The town was a significant strategic site and Philisteides may have wanted to increase the population to ensure that he was able to hold it against a likely Athenian invasion.

οὐδὲ Φεραίοις πρότερον, πρὸς τὰ τείχη προσβάλλων αὐτῶν – It is alleged by D. that Philip attacked cities after he had denied that it was his intention to do so. D. is probably alluding to events in 352 when Philip returned to Thessaly and took Pherai.

Pherai was one of the two main cities of Thessaly, the other being Larisa. Pherai controlled the port of Pagasai, the most significant port of Thessaly (Ellis, 1976: 84) and it was through control of this port’s tax duties that Pherai derived a significant portion of its income and its power (Dem. 1.22; IG IV 617, though from a later period). It has also been suggested that a significant
proportion of its wealth was raised by acting as middlemen for Larisan merchants (Westlake, 1935: 49).

Pherai seceded from the coinage-based confederacy of Thessaly, led by Larisa, in the middle of the fifth century (Westlake, 1935: 34) and by 404 Lykophron, tyrant of Pherai, defeated the Larisans and was in control of all Thessaly (Xen. Hell. 2.3.4). It may be at this point that Larisa was also forcibly democratised by Lykophron (Ar. Pol. 1275 b20-30, 1305 b29-30). He would have done this to break the power of the Larisan nobility to remove resistance to Pheraian control of Thessaly. We have limited knowledge of events concerning Lykophron’s tyranny except to say that it was successful. Westlake (1935: 68) points out that though he was successful, he was used by other powers to achieve their own ends. In contrast, his probable son and successor, Jason, actively dictated the direction of Thessaly under his control (there may have been another ruler between Jason and his father, see Sprawski, 1999: 49-51, 58-62; Westlake, 1935: 68-69). He did continue the friendships with the major powers established by his father. Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.24) has Jason claim that he valued the relationship with Sparta that his father established; Sparta also had a garrison in Pharsalos in 395, which must have had the blessing of Lykophron (DS 14.82.3-5). Jason, through Alketas of Epiros, also supplied grain to Thebes (Xen. Hell. 5.4.56-57), indicating a strong relationship, though Sprawski (1999: 92-93) indicates that Jason did not wish to see a strong Thebes at his expense. He was also on good terms with Athens for a time (Xen. Hell. 6.2.10, referring to events in 374, again through
Alketas). At a time of upheaval in central Greece, Jason was able to use a consolidated position in Thessaly to expand Thessalian influence in a way never done before.

In order to strengthen his position in Thessaly, Jason endeavored to have himself elected tagos, an ancient position of pre-eminence in Thessaly, unused for generations. He required the support of the city of Pharsalos, his main rival for power in Thessaly. Unable to resist Jason without support, the Pharsalians sought the assistance of Sparta. When the Spartans were unable to help, Pharsalos acquiesced and Jason was elected tagos in late 374 (Xen. Hell. 6.1.2-19). Diodoros (15.60.5) claimed that his rule was mild, but also alleged that Thessalians were suspicious of him (15.57.2), probably indicating that there was an increase in the consolidated power of the new tagos in Thessaly. Jason successfully expanded his control of the outer regions of Thessaly, reducing Trachinian Herakleia, Oitaia and Malia in 371 after the Battle of Leuktra, indicating a desire to maintain easy access to central Greece, while his reduction of Perrhaibia and the north early in his reign (DS 15.57.2; Xen. Hell. 6.4.27) probably indicates a desire to protect his northern borders from Macedonia. His treaty with Macedonia soon after his election as tagos (DS 15.60.1-2; Isok. 5.20) indicates his growing ambition. Jason’s involvement in the events immediately after the Battle of Leuktra indicate that he possessed considerable standing in the wider Greek world (Xen. Hell. 6.4.20-26; DS 15.54.5 places Jason’s intervention before the Battle of Leuktra – Xenophon, as a contemporary with the events, should be preferred over Diodoros’ account in this instance). He also sought to achieve balance of power in Central Greece for his own ends (Sprawski, 1999: 96-97). Shortly before his death
in 370, he was planning to take the leading role in the Pythian festival, possibly ordering the preparation of his army at the same time, allegedly to take control of Delphi (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.29-31). This cannot have been true, as he had assiduously cultivated a position of pre-eminence amongst the Greeks through his conduct after Leuktra and this would have done nothing but turn all of Greece against him. His murder stopped this phase of Thessalian growth and those of his murderers who escaped were honoured in the Greek cities (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.32). After a period of internal dispute over the succession to Jason (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.32-34; DS 15.60.5), Alexander succeeded to the tyranny of Pherai. His rule of eleven years (DS 15.61.2) was allegedly marred by cruelty (DS 15.61.2-3; Plut. *Pel.* 29.4), probably an indication of an aggressive attitude towards his neighbours. His success was also limited by a newly invigorated Thebes. Early in his tyranny (369), Larisa invited Macedonia to assist in their resistance to Pherai. The Macedonian king took Larisa and fortified it (DS 15.61.3-5), leading to an appeal from Larisa to Thebes to restore their independence from Macedonian control. This led to Pheraian fighting against Thebes (Polyain. 2.4.2, cf. Front. *Strat.* 4.7.28); Athens supported Alexander of Pherai against the Thessalian League (IG II2 116, lines 39-40; Dem. 23.120; DS 15.71.4; with Athens even casting a bronze statue of him – Plut. *Pel.* 31.4). This League was created to resist Pheraian attempts to encroach on Thessalian power (most likely created in 369; see Westlake, 1935: 134-35 for discussion of possible dates). After initial successes against both Thebes (DS 15.71.5; Plut. *Pel.* 29.1-3; Paus. 9.15.2) and the Thessalian League (DS 15.75.1, 15.80.1; Plut. *Pel.* 29.4, 31.1; Paus. 6.5.2), Alexander was defeated by the Thebans in 363 (Plut. *Pel.* 32.1, 35.2; DS 15.80.1-6; Polyain. 2.3.13). Enrolled as an ally of Thebes (DS 15.80.6), he was
forced into piracy to fund his mercenary army (Dem. 50.4; DS 15.95.1-2; Polyain. 6.2.1-2),
raising the ire of the Athenians who made an alliance with the Thessalian League against him
(IG II² 116, esp. lines 31-48), though no action appears to have been taken (Westlake, 1935:
155). After Alexander’s murder in 358 (DS 16.14.1; Plut. Pel. 35.2-7; Xen. Hell. 6.4.35), his wife’s
brothers, his assassins, succeeded him.

The final phase of Thessalian history commences with the appeal of the Aleuadai of Larisa to
Philip to protect Thessaly from the tyrannical brothers-in-law of Alexander (Theopomp. BNJ
invasion is a duplicate of 353, arguing that there is a lack of specific evidence for it, but his
overall arguments, that it took longer to intervene in 353 when he was stronger and that this
was too difficult to do without holding Pydna or Methone are simply incorrect. His allies in
Thessaly, led by Larisa, would have facilitated this invasion. A corruption in the text of Diodoros
(16.14.2) can lead a word to be read variably as ἐπανελθὼν or παρελθὼν. This transforms the
meaning of the sentence dramatically (Griffith, 1970: 68), indicating either that he came to
Thessaly (ie. for the first time) or he returned to Thessaly (after an earlier visit). Philip likely
contributed troops to the Thessalian cause at this time (see Ellis, 1976: 61); Griffith (1970: 72-
73) points out that he did not have much time to devote to this in the early part of his reign,
but correctly indicates the importance of ensuring that a unified Thessaly under Pherai did not
eventuate again. There is no mention of Philip’s campaign in Thessaly in 357 in Diodoros 16.8.1,
possibly further evidence that the King was not present in person. The protectorate established
by Philip over Thessaly and his first removal of tyrants from Pherai (Athen. 13.557; Satyros, F5; Just. 9.8.2 – indicating Philip’s son by his Larisan wife) indicates a new stage of Pheraian power.

After a return to tyranny at Pherai soon after this, the tyrant Lykophron (brother of Alexander) was again placing pressure on Thessaly, causing the Thessalians again to appeal to Philip in 353, who invaded Thessaly. In response, Lykophron appealed to Phokis, embroiled in the Third Sacred War. After an initial setback, the Phokian army defeated Philip comprehensively, forcing him to retreat from Thessaly (DS 16.35.1-2; Polyain. 2.38.2). He returned the next year, first forcing Lykophron to desert his Phokian allies by taking the port of Pagasai before the Phokians could arrive (DS 16.31.6, 35.4; Erhardt, 1967: 298-300). Philip then defeated the Phokians at the Battle of Krokos Field (DS 16.35.5-6; Justin 8.2.4-7; Paus. 10.2.5). Ehrhardt (1967: 299) and Griffith (1970: 67) both believe that the fall of Pagasai belongs to the period immediately after the capture of Pherai. By cutting off the port before taking Pherai, though, as Diodoros implies in his order of events, Philip denied any possibility of naval support, as almost eventuated from Athens. D. (4.35) pointed out it was too late to help in any case. It is likely that Lykophron was waiting for the Phokians before he led an attack on the Macedonians – Ellis (1976: 79) points out that there is no mention of the Pheraian forces at Krokos Field. It is also significant that when returning to Thessaly in 352, he had his soldiers wear laurel wreaths to indicate his fidelity to Apollo, though Ellis (1976: 82) points out that Philip was also at pains to point out his loyalty to his Thessalian allies. During his subsequent reorganization of Thessaly, Philip married a Pheraian named Nikesipolis, who was renamed Thessalonike (Athen. 13.557; Steph. Byz. s.v.)
Agitation must have continued in Pherai after this, however, with Peitholaos reviving the power of tyrant and possibly causing a disturbance in Thessaly that was quelled by local Macedonian garrisons in 349 (DS 16.52.9; Poly. 9.28.3, 33.2; Just. 8.3.12 reports Philip’s taking of the mines in Thessaly, probably indicating this time). There may have been another incident in 348 that caused Larisa to appeal to Philip to limit Pheraian power again (Ellis, 1976: 79), but as part of a final reorganization of Thessaly in 344, Philip stormed and took Pherai and established a garrison there, an action undertaken in other key cities around Thessaly (DS 16.69.8; Dem. 9.12, 19.260; [Dem.] 7.32). He also set up a dekadarkhia at Pherai (Dem. 6.22, 9.26), finally ending any independent power of the city. His policy in Thessaly at this time was a continuation of his policy of using force to quell problems on the borders of his kingdom; he also required the support of, and peace in, Thessaly to end the Sacred War (Hammond, 1989: 371-72).

Ὀλυνθίοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐὼς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ τὸ στράτευμα παρῆ — Of the three examples of trickery cited here, this appears to have been the only instance of deliberate deception on the part of Philip. He did indeed use trickery to gain an advantage, not declaring war against the Olynthians until he was in their territory (for discussion of the campaign, see Commentary 8.40, pp. 205-06).

As an original signatory to the Delian League in 479/78 (Thuc. 5.18.5; ATL III: 221, n.125), Olynthos had a long history with Athens and had experienced the full vicissitude of changes in
Athenian imperial practices from the fifth century down to the present period. By the end of the fifth century, like so many cities in the Aegean, they began to determine their own future, establishing a local power-base of some significance in the region (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12–20—though rhetorical and Spartan-centric, correct in the essential growth of Olynthos at this time; Gude, 1933: 28-29; Buckler, 2003: 159-60). Olynthos made an alliance with Sparta during the Korinthian War but decided to remain a neutral observer during the conflict. None of the cities incorporated into the Olynthian sphere involved themselves in the Korinthian War either. In 393, Amyntas, King of Macedonia, made concessions to Olynthos on the threat of force (DS 15.19-2-3; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12-13) that extended their territory and gave them highly prized trading concessions (allowing them access to Macedonian timber and pitch). This furthered their power so significantly that Sparta felt the need to humble this burgeoning State in the North, sending two campaigns against Olynthos (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.24-25; 5.2.38-39, 5.3.18-20; Buckler, 2003: 159-60; Gude, 1933: 29). Though they were able to defeat the first force sent out against them, Olynthos was not able to repel a second invasion that was much more determined and well-directed. Athens had been discussing a treaty with Olynthos at this time (DS 5.2.15) but the Athenians must have decided to remain out of this dangerous conflict, probably deciding that they lacked the resources to tackle Sparta. By 375, however, the situation had changed and Athens ‘liberated’ the Khalkidike from Sparta and negotiated another treaty with them (IG II² 43, lines 99-105; Khabrias monument, frag, D-E, Schweigert, 1940: 315-319; Burnett and Edmondson, 1961). By 365, Olynthos must have noted the growing Athenian determination in the region, manifesting in their war with Amphipolis. To strengthen
their own position in the region, Olynthos assented to garrison Amphipolis (Aiskh. 2.26),
probably of their own initiative. Timotheos led unsuccessful campaigns against Amphipolis, and
possibly Olynthos (see Introduction, pp. 92-93) but by taking Poteidaia in approximately
364/63, he managed to create an Athenian presence and re-establish a foothold in the region
(DS 15.81.6; Isok. 15.108, 112-113; Dem. 2.14), the cornerstone of Spartan success earlier in
382.

With the rise of Philip in the North, Olynthos must have been a valuable buffer state to acquire
for both Philip and Athens and both the Macedonian and the Athenians vied for an alliance in
357/56 (DS 16.8.4). To tempt the Olynthians, Philip offered to give them Poteidaia, which he
proceeded to take by force, leading to open war with Athens (Dem. 2.7, 6.20; DS 16.8.3, 8.5;
IG II² 127, line 42 – [...]ν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον; see Introduction, pg. 108). This
immediately strengthened Philip’s position by removing the Athenian presence in the region
and enabling him to make the alliance with the Olynthians (Dem. 2.14, 6.20; DS 16.8.4-5;
Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 298-99; Hammond, 1994: 33). Spurned, the Athenians then
decided to make an alliance with other local powers against Philip (Tod, Vol. II, no. 157;
Archibald, 1998: 232; Badian, 1983: 55-57; Ellis, 1976: 110; Harding, 1985: 92, n.70). This was
a blow to Athenian policy in the North; they had established Poteidaia as a kleroukhy (Dem.
4.4, 2.7; Isok. 15.108, 113; DS 15.81.6) and taken Torone (DS 15.81.6; Isok. 15.108; Polyaen.
3.10.15) to further their interests in the region. This now removed a significant Athenian
presence in the the Khalkidike.
The alliance between Philip and Olynthos was very advantageous to the Olynthians. Besides gifting them Poteidaia after taking it from Athens, Philip also gave them access to the Anthemous River (Dem. 6.20; DS 16.8.5; Lib. Hypoth. 1.3; Steph. Byz. s.v. Anthemous) allowing them to expand their trade. The alliance was published at Olympos, Dion and Delphi after consultation with the Delphic Oracle to advertise the treaty, probably to show Philip’s generous nature to potential allies (Rhodes & Osborne, 2003: no. 50). The growth of Philip’s power in Thessaly and Thrace, however, must have created a certain amount of concern for the Olynthians about the future of their independence. A faction developed within the city as a result and successfully turned popular support away from Philip and towards Athens (Rhodes & Osborne, 2002: no. 50; Dem. 23.108; Lib. Hypoth. 2.4; Steph. Byz. s.v. Anthemous). The Olynthians decided to make a break from Philip while he was abroad and his attention was elsewhere (Lib., Hypoth. 1.4). Considering the significant advantages that Philip had given them, the Olynthians must have harboured strong concerns over Philip’s growth in power. While they may have been swayed by concerns of the nature of Philip as a barbarian (Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 303), the fear of losing their ability to act independently, as had recently happened in Thessaly, was likely the driving concern for these people who had consistently shown a desire for autonomy.

62 τοὺς ταλαιπώρους Ὀλυνθίους πρότερον δοῦς Ποτείδαιαν ἐξηκτάτησε – D. claims that Philip deceived the Olynthians by gifting them Poteidaia in 356, but this is an exaggeration. The gift
of Poteidaia was a genuine indication of friendship; Philip was forced to act against Olynthos when they made the alliance with Athens, threatening his control of his southern borders. As Diodoros (16.8.4-5) indicates, Olynthos was too important to be allowed to remain independent should the Olynthians break their treaty with Philip and decide an alliance with Athens presented them with greater opportunity. Poteidaia was a similarly important city, located on the neck of the Pallene peninsula of the Khalkidike. D. (2.7) indicates that the gifting of Poteidaia to Olynthos was a key aspect of his obtaining the friendship of Olynthos (possibly discussed as part of the terms of a treaty – cf DS 16.8.3).

64 οὐχι τα ἐπι Θρᾴκης, Δορίσκον, Σέρριον – D. is again trying to make it seem as if Philip is the aggressor, deceiving states and ensuring that he is in the prime position to rob Athens of all its important possessions. The locations listed, Doriskos and Serreion, were indeed crucially strategic locations taken by Philip, but it was not through deception, as D. implies. Since Thrace was not noted on the Peace of Philokrates (Aiskh. 2.81-84, 3.73-74), Philip was entitled to take this region to strengthen his eastern border. D. (19.150-51) describes the events in such a way as to make it seem as though Philip was not entitled to do this (see Archibald, 1998: 234-37 for discussion of the campaign). D. (10.8) claims that the Athenians may not have known much about these cities, a fact supported by Aiskhines (3.82), where he makes fun of the place names, making them rhyme and jingle in Greek. The loss of these cities led to the defeat of Kersobleptes, the Thracian King and, Athenian ally (though not in the Peace of Philokrates; see Commentary 8.2, pp. 133-35). D. says that he was striving to avoid this (18.27). He claimed that
Philip moved against these locations as soon as the peace was signed (9.15), which is probably correct and he was entitled to do so. This formed part of his campaign against Kersobleptes before he returned to Pella to swear the oaths for peace. Ergiske, another strategic location otherwise unknown, is also named as being taken by Philip in this campaign for control in Thrace ([Dem.] 7.37), as is Hieron Oros (Dem. 9.15).

Doriskos was an important town located on the eastern Thracian plains near the Hebrós River. During Dareios’ invasion of Skythia, he placed a garrison in the town (Hdt. 7.59.1), which he also appears to have fortified as it was at a key location on the route north from the coast and located near the Hebrós to control trade. When Xerxes invaded Greece in 480, Doriskos was the location of the famous enumeration of the army and navy held by Xerxes (Hdt. 7.60-100). Whether the famous inspection of the army and navy happened as retold by Herodotos, it is clear that the fortress was an important staging point – it was one of the key supply depots established prior to the invasion (Hdt. 7.25.2). When Xerxes led his troops away from the fortress, he left Mascames as its garrison commander. Mascames was held in such high esteem that he was sent annual presents from Xerxes and Artaxerxes gave his descendants high honour (Hdt. 7.105.1-106.3). The invulnerability of Doriskos was demonstrated when he was able to hold the fortress against Greek forces into Herodotos’ own day, indicating its strategic importance. This was indeed an important location for Philip to control to control Thrace.
Serrion was another critical access point into Thrace, without which Philip would not have accessed Thrace easily. Strabo (Book 7, fr.47) says one sails on a rough voyage after Maroneia to Orthagoria then on to Serrion. It is located on a narrow strip of land between the coast and Mount Serreion. D. (9.15) talks about Philip taking Serrion and Fort Serreion, along with Doriskos and Hieron Oros. Fort Serreion was a fortified town on the eastern coast of Thrace.

Athens had a garrison in Fort Serreion, possibly placed there by the strategos Khares in 352/51 when Kersobleptes made his alliance and treaty with Athens to protect himself against Philip (see Introduction, pg. 110; Commentary 8.8, pp. 152-54). They also occupied Hieron Oros; they must have felt that garrisoning these two locations would protect their interests in Thrace against Philip.

Hieron Oros was an akropolis, according to Strabo (book 7, fr. 55). Casson (1926: 12-13, 213, 215) identifies the location as a plain, modern Tekfur Dagh. However, a plain is far too expansive to be the single, well-defined point to which ancient sources appear to refer. Hieron Oros has been previously located just south of Miltiades’ wall, at a strategic location on the Hellespont (Ballin, 1978: 67-68). This is a likely location, as it would have been close to the wall to control access to it in some manner, hence the important role it played in controlling the Khersonese. It was also likely that Hieron Oros was located near the coast, as in 362 Miltokythes, in revolt from the Thracian King Kotys, was expecting the Athenians to support him with their strongest asset, their fleet (and hence Miltokythes’ alarm when such a small fleet was eventually sent from Athens – Dem. 23.104). An inland location would make little
sense in this context, thus the placing of it just south of Miltiades’ wall near the coast would
seem to be the most plausible suggestion.

τὸν Κερσοβλέπτην αὐτὸν – Kersobleptes was the king of eastern Thrace who came to power in
359 with his three brothers on the assassination of their father, Kotys, a highly successful ruler
and dangerous to Athens (Ar. Pol. 5.1311 b21-22; Dem. 23.119, 163; Harpokrat. s.v. Kotus). At
the time of the speech, Kersobleptes was an Athenian ally, having made a peace treaty in 352.
In return for a treaty with his former enemies, Kersobleptes gave Athens the whole of the
Khersonnese except Kardia to cement the friendship (DS 16.34.4; IG II² 1613, lines 297-300;
ambassador, Aristomakhos of Alopeke (trierarchos in approximately 370 – Dem. 23.13-14;
Schaefer, 1885: 421), his general, the mercenary Kharidemos (who had fought against Athens
many times) was appointed to a northern strategia for Athens (Dem. 3.4-5, 23.13-14). He had
already been granted citizenship as part of the peace agreement between Athens and
Kersobleptes in 357 (Dem. 23.141, 187-88; see also Parke, 1928; Davies, 1971: 570-72; and
Parke, 1970: 125-32, 146 for discussion). Osborne (1982: 77-78) tries to put the grant of
citizenship to Kharidemos back to 364. This is not likely, due to the fact that Athens would not
have trusted Kotys in 363 or 361 and would not likely give the demonstrably hostile Kharidemos
citizenship to remain on good terms with Kersobleptes. Furthermore, they would not have
awarded him the crowns which D. claims after his refusal to aid Timotheos in 364 (see
Introduction, pp. 91-92).
Between the years of 357 (the final settlement of the Thracian monarchs and Athens) and 352, Philip had begun to control affairs of Thrace. He had started negotiating for his security with Thracian monarchs as early as 359 by ensuring that a Thracian king, most likely Berisades as the western-most Thracian kingdom (Archibald, 1998: 216), did not offer sanctuary to the Macedonian usurper Pausanius (DS 16.2.6, 3.4). In response to Philip taking a series of cities in Thrace, an alliance was made against him, which included Athens (see Introduction, pg. 108). This alliance did not achieve its purpose. Philip eventually managed to replace two of the Thracian Kings, Ketriporis and Amadokos, with Macedonian puppet rulers who owed their rule to Philip personally (Archibald, 1998: 232-34).

In 355, it appeared that Philip was also working in concert with Kersobleptes to place pressure on Athens (Dem. 23.183; DS 16.34.1; Polyain. 4.2.22; Archibald, 1998: 233; Buckler, 2003: 412-413). By 353, however, after Philip’s defeat of Phokis at the Krokos Field (see Introduction, pg. 110; Commentary 8.59, pg. 215), and continual Macedonian growth of power and encroachment into Thrace, Kersobleptes felt it was time to make more overt overtures to Athens at the expense of his relations with Philip, changing his alliances yet again. This decision may have been forced on Kersobleptes by Philip’s entry into Thrace as the saviour of the other Thracian kings with whom Kersobleptes had been at war. Archibald (1998: 233) believes that Philip invaded Thrace as a result of the realignment of Athens and Kersobleptes; Philip could also have justified the invasion by painting himself as a saviour, as he had done in Thessaly (see
Commentary 8.59, pg. 216). Kersobleptes’ attacks on the other Thracian kingdoms (Dem. 23.9-15) allowed him to play this role. The usual rapidity of Philip’s movements would have precluded the ability of Kersobleptes to appeal to Athens for an alliance after an invasion so the alliance must have happened before the invasion of Philip, providing Philip with the necessary impetus to invade Thrace.

οὐ μόνον Ἀμφίπολιν ... χώραν ἀπεστερηκότος – D. is probably correct here; it is quite likely that Philip did indeed gain control of Amphipolis through deception.

Amphipolis, the ancient jewel in the Athenian crown, was a symbol of former Athenian power. For an account of its foundation and the history of Athenian involvement in the region, see Introduction, pp. 55-56, 58-60. The desire to control this region was probably driven by the need to secure further access to timber in the region; see Meiggs, 1982: 126-30, but he indicates (1982: 212) that there is no evidence for wood shortages in the fourth century – grain had become the main focus of the North for Athens. Amphipolis was lost in the fifth century during Brasidas’ attack on Athenian possessions in the North (Thuc. 4.102-04) and it was never recovered; the Athenians expended enormous resources on trying to recapture it. For the history of Athenian relations with Amphipolis in the fifth and fourth century in the context of the North Aegean, see Introduction, pp. 83-94, 106-108.
In 358, Athens negotiated a settlement with Philip whereby Athenian control of Amphipolis was recognised (Dem. 2.6; [Dem.] 7.10; Theopomp. BNJ 115, F30a; Hammond & Griffith, 1979: 238, 240). This was the ‘secret’ agreement (‘the well-known secret’ in Dem. 2.6), whereby Philip would gain Pydna from Athens and, in return, the Macedonian king would abandon his claims to Amphipolis. Philip’s defeat of the pretender Argaios and his consolidation of territory around Macedonia soon after this must have concerned some Amphipolitans as a pro-Athenian group of them sent an embassy to Athens offering the city to them. The Athenians rejected this, putting their faith in Philip to succeed where they had not (Dem. 1.8, 2.6; [Dem.] 7.27; Hammond & Griffith, 1979: 298-99). The Olynthians also must have grown increasingly concerned with Philip’s actions at this time; they also sent an embassy to Athens (Dem. 2.6), possibly to negotiate the treaty that Athens had sought for so long, but again the Athenians placed their faith in Philip. Philip moved against the city soon afterwards (DS 16.8.2), probably a result of the embassy sent to Athens. Once he took the city, the Macedonian king did not hand it over to the Athenians (DS 16.8.3, not mentioning the intrigues used; Dem. 1.5). Athens could do nothing about these events as they were by this point embroiled in the Social War (Ellis, 1976: 65-67). It is unsurprising that the Olynthians, rebuffed by Athens, chose to make their alliance with Philip the next year when he offered them access to the Anthemoous River and control of Poteidaia. He then expanded his control in the region by taking control of the gold mines of Mt Pangaion. In the space of approximately two years, Philip had gained control of the northern Aegean seaboard, all at the expense of Athens and through deception.
De Ste Croix argues that the secret agreement discussed above was, at most, a story created by D. based on a misunderstanding of Philip’s intentions expressed through a letter (de Ste Croix, 1953: 111-12). He dismisses the event and argues that a democracy cannot make such a deal without the express permission of the ekklesia (de Ste Croix, 1963: 114-17). There must have been a significant reason for Athens to reject overtures from both Amphipolis and Olynthos. Athens had an opportunity to take Amphipolis with support from at least a faction within Amphipolis. Ellis (1976: 63-64) points out that the language used by D. (παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πόλιν) was vague and could imply that the envoys were not officially appointed and were asking for Athens to take the city by force; thus the envoys represented a faction within Amphipolis and not the government. Athens had been trying in vain to recapture Amphipolis since it was lost in 425 BC and it is inconceivable to think of Athens not taking this opportunity, regardless of who was presenting it. Even if the envoys from Amphipolis represented a small faction within the city, it gave the opportunity for Athens to take the city through intrigue, as Philip was soon to do at Pydna. It is, therefore, likely that there was an agreement between Philip and the Athenian demos, not a formal treaty which required the ratification in the ekklesia, which does indeed paint Philip as deceitful and playing on the opportunities that arose through Athens being unable to do anything during the Social War.

70 τριηραρχίας ... χορηγίας ... χρημάτων εἰσφοράς ... καὶ τοιαύτας ἄλλας φιλανθρωπίας – D. is demonstrating the marks of a good citizen, one who actively contributes to the State as a wealthy individual was required. D. is depicting himself as someone who serves the State,
enlarging the theme he is expounding in this section of the speech that there are those in Athens who do not serve the State, using this topos to emphasise that he is not one of them.

For the payment of eisphora, see Commentary 8.21, pp. 179-81. The trierarkhia and khoregia were liturgies, taxes paid by those who generally owned property worth more than four talents (Davies, 1971: xxiii-xxxiv). Liturgies could require payments of between 300 drachmai (Lys. 21.2) and 6000 drakhmai (Dem. 21.155), hence this could be quite an expense to the approximately 1000 to 1200 men liable for such duties, though there was a core of approximately 300 of the wealthiest men who contributed more significantly (Hansen, 1991: 113-15; Davies, 1971: 133-50; Rhodes, 1982: 11-13). This led to rare and exceptional exemptions being granted to honour individuals, such as Konon, who, along with his relatives in perpetuity, were granted immunity to liturgies (Aiskh. 1.27; Dem. 20.69-72, 75). Similarly, D. casts aspersions on his enemy, Meidias, by claiming that he had only undertaken one liturgy by the age of 50, hence the notion of funding liturgies was tied up with Athenian time (Wilson, 1991: 166-67, 174-75 asserts that D. creates a generalised ‘type’ of a hubristes by describing the aspects of Meidias’ life that are socially and politically destructive in a theatrical manner to his audience). According to one courtroom participant (Lys. 21.1-5), he had funded eleven liturgies in just six years, which he probably believed entitled him to special treatment in the court-room (cf. Sinclair, 1987: 60; Lykurgus 1.139-40 is explicit about his revulsion regarding these very types of people, indicating the increasing democratisation over the fourth century which limited the effectiveness of this appeal, see Christ, 2006: 182-83). See Hansen (1991: 110-15) for a discussion of liturgies in relation to wealth and social classes in Athens; Christ (2006: 155-171) provides a survey of the
institution through the fifth and fourth centuries. See Davies (1967: 33-40) for a discussion on Demosthenes’ deceptive minimisation of liturgies (Dem. 20.21).

Trierarkhies were particularly expensive, so much so that during the Peloponnesian War, the trierarkhia began to be shared (syntrierarkhia – Thuc. 2.13.8, 3.17.2, [Xen. Ath. Pol. 3.4; Lys. 32.24; see Gabrielsen, 1990: 89-118 for an outline). This trend continued into the fourth century and could even include paying a captain to relieve the trierarkhos of their personal need to command the ship (Dem. 21.80, 154, 51.7-8, 21.163), thus weakening the personal honour that had previously been felt at having served as trierarkhos on behalf of the State. Also, parallel to the military service of the trierarkhos, the service of the khoregos to the State was no less important. To fund the chorus at a dramatic festival could be seen as both secular and a sacred duty (Wilson, 1997: 89; Scullion, 2012: 217). We know (Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.26) that the burden could be quite expensive and demanding (cf. Aiskh. 3.240, claiming that a khoregos could act through self-indulgence). Christ (2006: 172-176, 177) discusses the costs of liturgies in general, emphasising that they could be so burdensome for the ‘marginally wealthy’ that it could force them out of the liturgical class, giving reasons for the fluidity of the group across the period. Wilson (2000: 21) emphasises that it was part of a larger culture of local leadership, not only of the asty of Athens but of demes and smaller units within Attike, but indicates that it was also used for self-representation, particularly in contrast to ones political opponents (Wilson, 2000: 175-178). It is in this context that we should see D.’s comments.
Liturgies were a mark of service to the State and, in the fourth century, were utilised regularly in court-room rhetoric to indicate the sense of *kharis* the jury should have towards the man who had done such service to State (see especially Christ, 2006: 176-184, emphasising the very visible nature of the *khoregia*, making it the more desirable of the liturgies, though Liddel, 2007: 269 questions its value of the courtroom in comparison with military liturgies) D. boasts about his liturgical record in his speech *Against Meidias*. According to D., he was a trierarkh at the minimum age (21.154), paying for all aspects of the trierarkhy and not relying on the State to assist in the provision of his trireme. He voluntarily funded a male flute chorus (21.156), claiming that they are far more expensive than a regular tragic chorus; he also funded a chorus for the Panathenaia (21.157). Moreover, he was chairman of his symmory, which required him to make substantial payments in line with the wealthiest citizens of Athens (21.157), also making a voluntary contribution to the expedition to Euboia (see Commentary, 8.36, pp. 198-99). He draws this portrait of himself in contrast to the way he describes Meidias, summing up his allegedly miserly attitude by saying that the State makes no benefit of the private use of his substantial fortune (21.159).

By tapping into a well-used *topos* of the ‘good Athenian’ serving the State through liturgies, D. is utilising a theme that harks backs to Antiphon’s *Tetralogies* (2.2.12), where the speaker constructs his identity by using references to his generosity to define his good character (his payments of *eisphora* and his *khoregia*), which is argued against in the paired speech at 2.3.8. Antiphon (5.77) also has his client claim that his father regularly furnished choruses as evidence
of his contribution to the State. The speaker in Lysias 19 claims that his father had been a *khoregos*, had been a *trierarkhos* seven times and paid *eisphora* regularly, to a combined total of over 9 talents (Lys. 19.9, 42-43, 57-59). Isokrates (16.35) also speaks of his father’s contributions as a liturgist. This demonstrates that not only can a speaker be shown to be a good person through their fulfilment of liturgies, but by claiming descent from a similarly beneficent liturgist it can also reflect positively on the speaker making the claim. Contrastingly, the bad citizen is deceptive about his contribution to the State as a liturgist, for example, D.’s criticism of Meidias (21.155), and particularly deceptive citizens outright lie about their completion of liturgies (Dem. 38.25). A truly generous citizen pays over and above his requirement as a liturgist (Dem. 47.23, 50.11), though we should always be aware that the construction of an individual’s identity in this regard is fraught with difficulties as there were no ready records of service available to a serving jury and claims would, no doubt, have been spurious. For an outline of appointment to the *khoregia*, see Wilson (2000: 51-61); for an outline of appointment to the *trierarkhia*, see Gabrielsen (2010: 43-77).

*λύσεις αἰχμαλώτων* – When Philip captured Olynthos, he also captured a number of Athenians who were likely living there at the time. During the second embassy to Philip, D. made it a priority of his to have these prisoners released (Aiskh. 2.100). After demanding to speak first (Aiskh. 2.108), he made it one the main arguments to Philip. He asked Philip to use the traditional gift money to the ambassadors to pay for the release of the prisoners (Dem. 19.166; Worthington, 2013: 172 seems to imply doubt over this aspect of the story, but Aiskhines does
not contradict it and it seems calculated to have embarrassed his colleagues, which it probably
did). He also, quite dramatically, seems to have produced ransom money to pay for their
release (Aiskh. 2.100; Dem. 19.169-70). Philip claimed he would release the prisoners to be
home in time for the Panathenaia (Dem. 19.168). The claims about using private money are
tied up with a list of his public benevolences, again emphasising the nature of the good citizen
who uses his wealth for public good, as opposed to the bad citizens who take money from the
enemy (Dem. 19.166-168) and celebrate his victories with him (Dem. 19.128-130).

74 Τιμόθεος ... ἐδημηγόρησεν ὡς δεῖ βοηθεῖν καὶ τοὺς Εὐβοέας σώζειν – In 357, Timotheos
allegedly urged the ekklesia to assist the Euboians against a Theban invasion of the island. The
Euboians had previously been long-standing allies of Thebes, fighting with them in 370/69 (Xen.
Hell. 6.5.23; 7.5.4) and also at the Battle of Mantinaia in 363 (DS 15.85.2, 87.3). This relationship
must have significantly changed and now Thebes desired control of the island. The Theban
invasion prompted an appeal from the main cities, possibly led by Themison of Eretria and
Mnesarkhos of Khalkis (Aiskh. 3.85) named prominently by Aiskhines and implying their
leadership of the island. It was obviously seen as a significant threat to Athenian interests as
within five days, Athens had sent out assistance to Euboia (Aiskh. 3.85) under the generalship
of Diokles (Dem. 21.174; IG II² 1953). Diodoros (16.7.2) claims that the fighting on the island
was particularly exacting with no pitched battle fought. Diodoros may well be correct in his
description of the nature of the warfare with the Euboians, assisted by Athenians, engaging in
guerrilla warfare so successfully that the Theban army came to terms with the Athenians after
just 30 days of fighting. Athens also came to terms with the four main Euboian cities, Karystos, Eretria, Khalkis, Histiaia (IG II² 124, 125, 149). As Brunt (1969: 248) points out, the same men who probably led their cities to Thebes, Themison (of Eretria) and Mnesarkhos (of Khalkis) also led them back to alliance with Athens (Aiskh., 3.85). This strengthens the notion that the main cities of Euboia were always motivated by the desire to remain autonomous and free from the outside influence of the major powers (see Commentary 8.36, pp. 198-205).

Timotheos, the son of Konon, was one of the leading politicians and generals in the second quarter of the fourth century. He was, for most of his career, a successful strategos, but in this instance D. is making a reference to the dual nature of Athenian public life, that of the rhetor. D. reports that Timotheos made an appeal in the ekklesia to assist the Euboians in repelling the Theban invaders. This may be one of the few times Timotheos spoke; as a result of his service in Euboia in 378/77, he may have been seen as a voice of experience when affairs of Euboia were being discussed. There was something of a divergence in the roles of rhetor and strategos in the fourth century (Sealey, 1956: 178-79), whereas in the fifth the two invariably went hand-in-hand (see above, Commentary, 8.1, pp. 132-33). The appellation rhetor kai strategos is the best label we have for the professional public servant in Athens (Hansen, 1983: 37-39), with laws in place specifically addressing this group. His well-known address of the ekklesia, as D. points out, seems to have been memorable not for being the only time that Timotheos mounted the bema, but more for the fact that it was sound policy advice matched with action, a constant theme in D. (for example, 3.4-5, 3.24-26, 5.4-10). We do not have the evidence to
know to a certainty the level of Timotheos’ political activity as a rhetor, but perhaps D. gives us a clue here to his minimal involvement.

Timotheos’ first command in 378/77 (DS 15.29.7, naming him as a prominent strategos, the first reference to a strategia of Timotheos) included the liberation of Euboia (Plut. Mor. 350f).

Other significant commands that increased his prestige included his victories in the waters around the Peloponnese in 376/75, increasing the Athenian alliances (Xen. Hell. 5.4.64-64; Isok. 15.109; Dem. 23.198; Nepos, Tim. 2.1; DS 15.36.5) and his victory over Sparta at the Battle of Alyzia in 375 (Xen. Hell. 5.4.65; DS 15.36.5). As a result of his victories, a statue of Timotheos was set up in the agora (Nepos, Tim. 2.3; Aiskh. 3.243). The statue’s base is also evidence for the adherence of the allies at the time. He was accused by his enemies, Kallistratos and Iphikrates, of wasting time in not setting sail to aid Kerkyra in 373, but was acquitted of this charge (Xen. Hell. 6.2.11-13; DS 15.47.3; [Dem.] 49.6, 9, 22, 23). In order to avoid paying debts he left Athens in the service of the Great King in his war against Egypt in 372 ([Dem.] 49.25, 28, 60). The Athenians still clearly valued his service as he was sent to assist Ariobarzanes in the Satraps’ Revolt in 367/66 (Dem. 15.9), capturing Samos in 366/65 for Athens (Dem. 15.9-10; Polyain. 3.10.9; Isok. 15.111; Ar. Oik. 2 1350 b5). Such success led to his replacement of Iphikrates as strategos against Amphipolis in 364 and, though he failed to take the city, he captured Torone and Poteidaia and brought Methone, Pydna and some twenty other cities into alliance with Athens, and relieved the siege of the city of Kyzikos (DS 15.81.6; Isok. 15.113; Polyain. 3.10.7, 15; Ar. Oik. 2 1350 a23; Dein. 1.14; Aiskh. 2.70; see Introduction, pp. 93, 98).
Soon after this appeal to assist the Euboians, Timotheos was sent out with Iphikrates (his new political ally, see Introduction, pg. 102 and n.1) as strategoi to operate with Khares. At the Battle of Embata, they refused to fight, deeming it inappropriate weather, at which point they were indicted by Khares, deposed from their strategia and subsequently charged with having accepted bribes (DS 16.21.2-4; Dein. 1.14; Isok. 15.129; Plut. Mor. 605e, 836d). Timotheos withdrew from Athens, unable to pay the fine and died in exile soon afterwards but was reburied just outside Athens with his father near a precinct of Artemis (Nepos, Tim. 3.5; Paus. 1.29.15).
Appendix 1 - The use of rings to structure D.’s speeches

Worthington (1991, 58-63; 1992: 27-39) postulates that the best evidence that we have of the publication of speeches in the fourth century is the use of rings to structure the logai. Ring theory (the idea that a structure, theme or issue raised first is addressed last, then the theme or issue raised second is addressed second last, and so on) is found in a number of classical works. Keaney (1969: 406-423) explores the presence of ring composition in Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia, the closest parallel to D. in time, examining and discussing a number of instances where a more limited ring structure was used (for example, AP 2.1-5.1, discussed by Keaney, 1969: 416-417). Ellis (1991: 344-76) identified a ring structure in Thucydides’ Archaeology in Book 1 (1-23) of his history, citing evidence of primary rings (identified in the general structure of the book – 1.1-21, with the central point of the ring at 23.1), then identifying secondary and tertiary rings (ie. rings within rings) throughout the Archaeology (identified in Tables 1-4 of his work, demonstrating that this stood beside a linear argument describing the development of Greece (Ellis, 1991: 364-75). Worthington (1991: 58) discusses the significance of this in D.’s work and points to this as evidence of a significant stage of revision and publication (1990: 62). In particular, Worthington (1992: 27-39) also finds in Deinarkhos’ oratory secondary and tertiary rings. If orators did indeed use ring theory to structure what we have of their oratory, it does indicate that great care was taken in the creation of a written version of the speech, possibly in preparation for publication, similar to that of Thucydides’ work. Ring structure has been identified in Homer, where the purpose was to enhance the unity of various aspects of the story by interweaving several units into a single
whole (see esp. Stanley, 1993: 6-13; Most, 1989: 20-21). This serves a similar purpose to the ring structure utilised by D., whereby he creates a more powerful argument by creating a common aspect to interweave the arguments. Similarly, Ellis (1991: 361-64; 372-75) highlights Thucydides’ use of this technique to assist in organising the complex thoughts used to ‘frame’ key ideas.

We do find such complex rings in On the Khersonnese and, while Worthington points out that simple ring structures on a primary level are an effective aide de memoire for the orator or an effective tactic for maintaining the attention of the audience (1990: 62), the evidence of different levels of complex rings used to structure the speech (for a complete outline of the rings used in D.’s speeches, see Appendix 2) tends to suggest care is taken to address the writing to a reading audience. Primary rings exist in On the Khersonnese in connection with the three overarching arguments used by D. His first logos stated in the prooimion, that there exists in Athens a Macedonian ‘fifth column (1)’ within Athens, is mirrored by the last argument in the speech (52-75). His second argument of the prooimion, that Philip is at war with Athens (8-12) is detailed in between the other two arguments (38-51). The final argument of the prooimion, that a standing force is required to deal with the crisis in the North (9-12), is the first argument expanded in the speech (13-37). The central point of the speech, that Philip is actively trying to keep the Athenians restive while he organises the North as he wants, sits at chapter 13, between the prooimion and the detailing of the first argument.
1 – There are those in Athens who are not advising in the city’s best interests

8-12 – Philip is at war with Athens

12 – Athens needs a standing force to deal with Philip

13 – Philip is actively trying to keep the Athenians at home while he does what he wants

14-37 – Diopeithes’ army should be allowed to remain in force, regardless of the complaints made by Philip

38-51 – Philip is at war with Athens and is not to be trusted, even if he claims otherwise

52-75 – There are those in Athens who are in the pay of Philip and are leading the demos astray – D. is not one of those people who do this

Figure 1: Structure of On the Khersonese, primary level

Rings at a secondary level also exist. For example, in the first logos (13-37), there are three rings surrounding the central point of the logos, that Diopeithes is forced to raise money in ways that some feel inappropriate. In the first ring, chapters 13-17 match the last section of the logos, chapters 35-37, addressing the fact that Philip is taking land from Athens in crucial areas, hemming Athens in. The second ring is started in chapters 18-20 and complemented by chapters 30-34, addressing the issue of the ‘fifth column’ inside Athens that is crippling Diopeithes’ ability to fight Philip. The series is completed by the third ring, initiated in chapters 21-25 and completed by chapters 27-30, which outlines the political problems in Athens facing anyone who wishes to stand against Philip. The central point, in chapter 26, explains that
Diopeithes will need to look to heaven for his funds if Athens cannot supply them. Therefore, it can be argued that D. utilised ring theory in this composition, which could suggest a rigorous process of revision before publication. It does tend to suggest that the speech was constructed carefully for a reading audience as this level of care taken with the construction of a rhetorically charged piece of literature constructed in rings would be lost in the *ekklesia*. Such a structure can be found in each of the *logoi* of the speech, as follows in figures 2-4, below.

13-17 – Philip has taken the Khersonnese at a time when Athens cannot respond

18-20 – Certain people in Athens are trying to stop Athenian action, whereas Diopeithes is acting in Athenian interests

21-25 – Diopeithes is raising money to fight Philip through traditional methods, yet he is being attacked politically

26 – Diopeithes will not be able to fund his army if corrupt Athenians stop him in the *ekklesia*

27-30 – Diopeithes should be allowed to act in Athenian interests as there are safeguards against him, but there are no safeguards against those injuring the city in the *ekklesia*

30-34 – People in Athens are training the *ekklesia* to be unwarlike through their oratory

35-37 – Philip is plotting to take more Athenian land, namely Euboia, and Athens has done nothing to combat him

*Figure 2: Secondary rings, first logos, On the Khersonnese*
38 – It is necessary to act against Philip now

39-40 – Philip is at war with Athens; he hates the city. There are examples that show Philip is at war when he says he is not.

41-43 – Athens is a natural defender of Greece and is a democracy, hence Philip cannot afford to leave Athens unconquered

43 – All of Philip’s preparations are to attack and take Athens

44-45 – It is to win the prizes of Athens that he winters in Thrace

46-49 – Athens needs to act now; not to act would be unworthy of their ancestors

50-51 – Philip will grow stronger if nothing is done now

Figure 3: Secondary rings, second logos, On the Khersonnese

52-54 – To go to war is not a palatable option, but the result of not doing so is disastrous

55-57 – People are worried about the cost of war with Philip, but other states are being plundered to attack Athens and the people are being led astray in this by crooked politicians who are only interested in themselves

58-60 – Philip is incredibly deceptive, and he has a record of saying that he is not at war with people, then invading and taking states after this lie

60 – Athens has more at stake than other cities; Philip wants Athens destroyed

61-66 – Philip initially deceived other states into thinking he was their friend by doing them favours, but in Athens he has friends inside the gates to help him out, thus Philip does not need to do favours for Athens

66-72 – Athens is losing the ability to fight as a result of Philip’s politicians. D. is not one of these men – he is a brave politician as he proposes what is only in the interests of the state and not just what the people want to hear, the action of a truly selfless politician

73-75 – Sound policy and advice to go to war has led to great benefits, as Timotheos’ actions with Euboia demonstrated

Figure 4: Secondary rings, third logos, On the Khersonnese
It can be seen in the secondary ring structure of each argument that there is a central point around which the rings are formed. In each case, it is a point about war with Philip and the need to carry out that war. This creates a remarkable consistency of message throughout the speech and would have made a striking impression on a reading audience familiar with, and indeed searching for, such structures.

The majority of Demosthenic symbouleutic oratory demonstrate ring structures (see Appendix 2). All of the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* possess rings to the structure, as do *On the Symmories*, *On the Liberty of the Rhodians*, and *For the Megalopolitans*. It is more remarkable that, of symbouleutic speeches positively attributed to D., only *On the Peace* does not possess a ring structure.

The *Olynthiacs* possess the clearest ring structure. For example, though it is significantly shorter than *On the Khersonnese*, the *First Olynthiac* possesses four distinct arguments arranged in rings. Firstly, D. outlines that Athens is not doing what is should to protect its interests (1.2), which is paralleled with the last *logos* demonstrating why Athens needs to act (1.27). The second argument in the *prooimion*, that Philip is crafty and has advantages over Athens, is matched by the *logos* that Philip is showing himself to be beatable in war (1.21-27), demonstrating the complimentary nature of the ring structure. Thirdly, the *prooimion* argues that Athens needs to fight wholeheartedly (1.6-7), matched by details about how Athens can actually fight Philip (1.17-20). Finally, D. claims in the *prooimion* that Athens has an opportunity
it cannot afford to miss (1.8-9), which is immediately followed by reasons why Athens needs to take the opportunities presented (1.10-16).

Of a similar length, the Third Philippic demonstrates similar rings. The prooimion begins by outlining that Athens is in a poor position regarding Philip (9.1), which is matched by the final logos that outlines how Athens can save the situation (9.70-76). Secondly, D. explains in the prooimion that the people are listening to the wrong people for advice (9.2-4), which is matched by an extensive logos, similar to that in the third logos of On the Khersonnese, that there are enemies within Athens and they will all suffer a grim fate if they support Philip at the expense of their city (9.53-70). The third logos outlined in the prooimion, that the Athenians need to do their duty (9.4-5), is matched by the logos that their traditional duty, protecting Greece, is not being met (9.36-52). Finally, the ring structure is rounded-out by the fourth logos, that Philip is at war with Athens (9.6-9), which is immediately followed by a narrative of events that shows Philip is at war with Athens in D.’s eyes (9.10-35).

Similarly, we can see rings at the secondary level through the corpus. An excellent example of secondary rings can be seen in the Second Philippic. The overall structure of this speech is unusual in that it possesses only two logoi, arranged in rings. The first logos outlined in the prooimion, that the source of the problems faced now is the corrupt group of speakers in Athens who mislead the people (6.1-5), which is matched by the logos outlining the source of the problems as the ambassadors to Philip (6.29-36). The second logos outlined in the
prooimion, that Athens must be Philip’s eventual target, hence Philip prefers to make alliances with other states as he knows he will not find a willing audience in Athens (6.6-12), is followed by the explanation that Philip’s activities are all directed against Athens (6.13-28). Both of these logoi possess rings at a secondary level.

In the first logos, D. claims that it is asserted by some that Philip was acting through judgement at the time about expediency when he favoured the Thebans and now is working against Sparta, Thebes’ last remaining enemy (6.13-14). This is matched with his claim that it is not surprising that Peloponnesians cannot use good judgement, but Athens needs to use theirs and judge Philip’s actions correctly (6.26-28). The second point of the logos, that Philip is not ‘waiting’ to act against against Thebes but really is acting against Sparta (6.14-15) is matched with D.’s excerpts from his speech to the Messenians on an embassy saying that Philip will become the master of the Peloponnese if people such as the Messenians do not oppose him (6.20-25). The final pairing in the logoi is that Philip is acting with great deliberation in all instances (6.16) and he is clearly courting Thebes and certain Peloponnesians (6.19). The central point of the logoi is that Philip is acting against Athens and he knows that the Athenians are aware of it (6.17). The second logos of the speech is also arranged using rings at a secondary level (see Figure 5). The first point, that Philip and others within Athens deliberately misled the people (6.29) is matched with the point that Athens is now in danger as a result of being misled when it could have been safe (6.33). The second point, that D. opposed those who said that Philip would do what Athens wanted once he got control of Thermopylae and Phokis (6.30-31)
is further explained at 6.32, where D. claims that trouble is now coming as a result of losing these bulkwarks. These two pairs of points surround the main point of the argument, that D. will tell the truth, even at his own expense (6.32). Thus, ring structures abound throughout Demosthenic sumbouleutic oratory and the structure of On the Khersonnese is not unique but possesses typically Demosthenic structural elements and qualities that would have particularly enhanced the speech for an educated reading audience looking for such structures.

13-14 – It is asserted by some that Philip was acting through judgement at the time about expediency when he favoured the Thebans and now is working against Sparta, Thebes’ last remaining enemy

14-15 – Philip is not ‘waiting’ to act against against Thebes but really is acting against Sparta

16 – Philip is acting with great deliberation in all instances

17 - Philip is acting against Athens because he perceives them as a threat

17-18 – Philip is acting against Athens and he knows that the Athenians are aware of it

20-25 – Philip will become the master of the Peloponnese if people such as the Messenians do not oppose him

26-28 – It is not surprising that Peloponnesians cannot use good judgement, but Athens needs to use theirs and adjudge Philip’s actions correctly

Figure 5: Secondary rings, first logos, Second Philippic
Appendix 2 – Outline of primary ring structures in Demosthenic deliberative oratory

2 – Athens is not doing what is should to protect its interests

3-6 – Philip is crafty and has advantages over Athens in war. As a result, Olynthos knows they are fighting for their survival

6-7 – Athens needs to fight wholeheartedly

8-9 – Athens has an opportunity that it cannot afford to miss, unlike other times

9 – Athens is responsible for the heights to which Philip has risen

10-16 – Reasons why Athens needs to take the opportunity presented

17-20 – Suggestions as to how Athens can fight wholeheartedly

21-27 – How Philip is showing himself to be beatable in war

27 – Why all Athenians need to act

Figure 1: Structure of The First Olynthiac, primary level

2-4 – Philip has grown great as a result of Athens

5-8 – Philip is faithless and untrustworthy

9-12 – There is a need for Athens to make alliances

13 – Athenian policies about warfare need to change to defeat Philip

14-18 – Macedonia is powerful, but it is not as strong as it seems

19-21 – Philip is a corrupt man

22-30 – Athens needs to act and stop talking

Figure 2: Structure of The Second Olynthiac, primary level
2-5 – There is a need for Athens to start acting and stop talking

6-9 – Philip has become powerful as a result of Athens

10-13 – There is a need to change the laws so that the war can be fought properly

14 – Decrees are worthless unless they are supported by action

15-29 – Athenian talk has led to the myriad of problems faced now with Philip and it is not worthy of the ancestors

30-32 – Corrupt politicians are the cause of the situation now

33-36 – Athens needs to change the military system to combat Philip

Figure 3: Structure of The Third Olynthiac, primary level

2-4 – Athenians are not doing their duty

4-12 – Philip is now strong but Athens once held the same places Philip has won; Philip is always on the move, but he is not invincible

13-14 – The nature of the force/response needs to be discussed

15 – The only way to avoid future trouble is to keep a force in the field

16-31 – The force and how it should be used

31-37 – Philip is crafty, but he is not invincible

38-50 – Athens needs to act in a timely and appropriate manner

Figure 4: Structure of The First Philippic, primary level
1-5 – The source of the problems faced now is to be found on the *bema*

6-12 – Athens must be Philip’s eventual target, hence Philip prefers to make alliances with other states as he will not find a willing audience in Athens

13 – It is a false argument to claim that Philip prefers Thebes to Athens on grounds of superior Theban scruples

14-28 – Philip’s activities are all directed against Athens

29-36 – The root of the problems go back to people like the ambassadors who misled the people

Figure 5: Structure of *The Second Philippic*, primary level

1 – Athens is in a poor position regarding Philip

2-4 – The people are listening to the wrong people for advice

4-5 – Athenians need to do their duty

6-8 – Philip is at war with Athens and has committed acts of war

9 – Philip is at war with Athens, and the Athenians do not even realise it

10-35 – Narrative of events to show that Philip is at war with Athens

36-52 – Athenians are not living up to their ancestors in protecting Greece, their traditional duty

53-70 – There are enemies within Athens and there are many examples of what happens to people like this with Philip

70-76 – Proposals about how to save the situation

Figure 6: Structure of *The Third Philippic*, primary level
1-2 – Speakers eulogise the great men of the past, but Demosthenes will stick to the present

3-7 – Athens must go to war in alliance with all of the Greeks

8-12 – Athens must be fully prepared before going to war

13 – A fully armed and prepared Athens will attract allies

14-29 – Athens needs to reform the symmories thoroughly

30-40 – Greece must be united against the Great King, led by Athens

41 – The Athenians need to be “worthy of the ancestors”

Figure 7: Structure of On the Summoriai, primary level

1-2 – Some men are giving bad advice to the people; to defend Rhodes will bring honour to Athens

3-4 – Mausolos, Khios and Byzantion are not helping Rhodes, but the people they went to war against are. This is a good advertisement for new allies.

5-9 – Athens is on the moral high ground here, defending a state against unjust aggression

10 – People are more inclined to fight for what is rightfully theirs, not theirs by conquest

11-13 – Athens does not interfere with the King, but this war of his is unjust and he won’t be upset if Athens acts against him as it is not his territory to begin with

14-24 – It is in Athens’ interests to help democracies, who are their natural allies

25-33 – There are people giving bad advice, even though it is the right thing to do

Figure 8: Structure of On the liberty of the Rhodians, primary level
Previous speakers are offering poor advice and do not sound Athenian (i.e. non-partisan). It is important to keep both Sparta and Thebes weak.

Athens is in a difficult moral position

If Athens abandons Megalopolis to Sparta, at what point will they stop Sparta? What if they attack Messene?

The proper course is to find out what is right, then carry it out regardless

By gaining Oropos and allying with Arkadia, it may upset Sparta, but they haven’t got that right – Athens saved them.

Athens is correct to stand against injustice and Sparta is acting unjustly. Athens is following the morally correct policy.

By allying with Megalopolis, it will ensure that Sparta is weakened. By ensuring the rebuilding of Thespiae, Orkhomenos and Plataia it will keep Thebes at bay. It is possible to keep both Sparta and Thebes weak and those that urge one side or the other are not advising in Athens’ best interests.

Figure 9: Structure of For the Megalopolitians, primary level
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