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MEN, MASCULINITIES AND SOCIAL CHANGE: EXPLORING KHMER MASCULINITIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

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M.Sc. (AIT)

A thesis submitted in full requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Education and Social Work
The University of Sydney

August 2012
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

This is to certify that:

I. this thesis comprises only my original work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
II. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other materials used
III. the thesis does not exceed the word length for this degree
IV. no part of this work has been used for the award of another degree
V. this thesis meets the University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) requirements for the conduct of the research.
ABSTRACT

Cambodia went through diverse social, political and economic events – colonialism, civil war and market neoliberalism – in recent histories. All these events have caused tremendous social disruptions and changes. As part of the social changes, we see subtle changes in the way Cambodian men configure masculinities – gender practices in relation to women as well as other men – both in family and public spheres.

Domestic Violence (DV), particularly men’s violence against their wives, in Cambodia coincides with the country’s abrupt social changes. In particular, DV has become a visible phenomenon in contemporary time. The trend of DV is increasing despite an increasing number of anti-DV programmes.

Using Archival Documents and Life Histories, this thesis (i) explores Khmer masculinities that emerged in the course of Cambodia’s colonial rule (1863-1954) and during the increased militarisation and civil war (from early 1970s to early 1990s); (ii) identifies masculinities that Cambodian men have constructed in contemporary society; (iii) studies the configuration and reconfiguration of masculinities by the former perpetrators of DV, and (iv) provides suggestions for policy and practice on DV.

The archival documents suggest that the gender regimes of French colonial administration (1863-1954) promoted patriarchy in matrilineal Cambodian families by promoting men as the head of the family and assigning men as the sole breadwinner.
Nine full-length case studies of men’s lives are presented in this thesis. The life histories of men suggest that Cambodian men in contemporary society are diverse and dynamic in the construction of masculinities. Despite divergence and change, generally speaking ‘a man is the head of the family who holds power over the family’ —the patriarchal gender order established during colonial rule remains central in the construction of their masculinities. But men’s gender role of providing the main support to the family matters to an extent that can mitigate the patriarchal gender order. Personal capabilities in relation to the changing labour market, income earned from work, and gender regimes in workplaces all mediate what kinds of masculinities they construct in relation to intra-family gender relations.

Based on the configuration of masculinities by the former perpetrators of DV in different periods of their lives, it can be argued that though men perpetrate violence against their wives within patriarchal and hierarchal family power relations, the violence takes place within assumptions that men should provide the main support to the family —a specific pattern of the gender division of labour installed in Cambodian society historically. Men’s tasks of providing the main support to the family, and their authority over the family are reciprocal. If they exert power as the head of family without providing support, their authority is challenged. At this point violence is likely to begin. DV prevention programmes need to take account of this historically-produced gender dynamic.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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This thesis could not be made possible without the information provided by the participants of the study. I would like to thank every participant. I also thank the staff of the National Archives of Cambodia for their cooperation in archival search. I thank Katherine Cummings for technical assistance in editing the final text.

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Finally, I thank Sophea Hor, my wife for her encouragement and supports throughout my study period. She always checked my progress of study. I am also thankful to her for her help during field research and providing knowledge on Cambodia’s culture, history and contemporary social practices. I am very thankful to my parents and siblings whose supports for education in early life have brought me at this stage.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGDK</td>
<td>Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPK</td>
<td>Communist Party of Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPK</td>
<td>Communist Party of Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPNLAF</td>
<td>Cambodian People’s National Liberation Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>The Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV</td>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANK</td>
<td>Forces Armées Nationales Khmères</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GADC</td>
<td>Gender and Development for Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRAF</td>
<td>Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRP</td>
<td>The Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KR</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Archives of Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAVN</td>
<td>People’s Army of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>The People’s Republic of Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoC</td>
<td>State of Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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PART I

PRELIMINARIES
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Ranking 139th in the human development index in 2011\(^1\), Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in the world with 30.1% population living under the national poverty line. Gender inequality in the country is indexed at 99 in the world rankings. The GDP per capita is US$1,915 (UNDP, 2011). Almost 90% of the country’s population live in rural areas and there is a very high level of inequality of income and livelihood between rural and urban areas.

The Cambodian economy is mainly agrarian although industrial and service sectors are emerging since Cambodia became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2004. Through becoming a member state of WTO, Cambodia moved from a command economy towards becoming a neo-liberal economy when it opened its market for the free-flow of capital, hoping to attract foreign direct investment. Most of the economic growth is urban-centric and this growth seldom trickles down to rural areas (UNDP, 2004).

\(^1\) Human Development Report 2011, UNDP.
Cambodia enjoys a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, with 90% Khmer, 5% Vietnamese, 1% Chinese and 4% other populations. The Khmer marriage and family system is still largely matrilocal – the common practice in pre-colonial Cambodia.

Cambodian history records a great civilisation followed by colonialism, decades of civil war and finally political stability. The great Angkorian Empire underpinned Cambodia’s great civilisation between the ninth and fourteenth centuries but the Empire collapsed in the fifteenth century under pressure from the Ayutthaya and Champa Kingdoms. The status of women was equal to that of men, both in family and social life, until fourteenth century. They had full freedom in all aspects of life and held important positions in social and political institutions in Khmer society (Thierry, 1955). Cambodia came under French power in 1863 and was ruled by France until 1954.

Cambodian politics started to face internal conflicts after independence was gained from French colonialism in the 1950s. After being a war zone in the Second Indochina War (popularly known as the Vietnam War), the entire nation experienced extreme civil strife from 1975 to 1979 with the advent of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime. With the brief invasion by the Vietnamese Army, the Khmer Rouge regime was dismantled and a new regime, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was installed in 1979. Until the Paris Peace Accord in 1991, conflicts continued between political factions of the DK and the armed forces of PRK. The Cambodian nation first elected a democratic government in 1993 under the

---

2 CIA World Fact book.

3 Indochina was the part of the French colonial empire located in today’s Southeast Asia. The Indochina region under the French was divided between Tonkin (capital Hanoi), Annam (Da Lat) and Cochinchina (Saigon) in present-day Vietnam plus Cambodia and Laos.
supervision of the United Nations (UNTAC). Since then, Cambodia has observed three democratic national elections and the country is experiencing relative peace, with Cambodia connected to the world both culturally and economically.

A lot of social, cultural, economic and political changes in Cambodian society took place through these historical events. Gender order and the codes of the Cambodian people in family and social life were tremendously transformed by legal, administrative and political reform by the French colonial power. Colonial taxation and the introduction of Corvée labour and agricultural policies gave rise to peasant revolts (Vickery, 1986), changed the living standard of the peasant class (Chandler, 1983), and promoted patriarchy in Cambodian families (Frieson, 2000) through the adoption of the Code Civil Cambodgien (1920).

Civil war created many social changes and upheavals. Many survivors from the Khmer Rouge regime were left with psychological traumas. Many children grew up without proper parenting and the social system and its institutions experienced total collapse (Kent, 2007). The Khmer Rouge destroyed the old system of family social relationships which had bound people together and operated through well-understood obligations. New patterns of social relations emerged in the post-Khmer Rouge era. The disproportionate killing of adult men altered demographic patterns, with populations up to 70 per cent female in some areas. This shift brought changes in marriage, residence patterns and gender roles (Ledgerwood et al. 1995).

The country’s new neoliberal market economy, since its membership of World Trade Organisation (WTO), has brought new social, cultural and economic changes with the traditional social fabric once again being disrupted (Boike, 2007). New businesses and occupations are emerging following an influx of foreign direct investment.
The gender division of labor (GDL) and gender relations that are typical in Cambodian society are changing in course of the country’s economic shift. Typically, GDL is complementary and flexible, with both men and women performing a range of productive tasks. Among the rural majority, women’s economic contribution was mainly concentrated in subsistence family farming. The typical gender relations in Cambodian society are that men accord greater status as the head of the family and women exercise considerable autonomy (Ebihara, 1968).

With the growth of manufacturing industries, particularly the garment factories, more and more women are entering formal paid work, meaning women are increasingly taking on a breadwinning role. The changing economic base of women’s live is also impacting intra-household gender relations. Women with regular income from waged labor enjoy greater freedom in occupational choice, mobility, contraception, household decision-making, and personal wellbeing. But it seems that the pattern of GDL in unpaid household chores is not changing much as we see women aged 18-60 do three more hours of household work than men (Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 2008).

Households in rural areas are increasingly losing their jobs because of the acquisition of hundreds of thousands hectares of government land for export processing zones and foreign private investors⁴. This is affecting the rural and peasant livelihood. Transnational businesses are opening new avenues for corporate careers to many Cambodians (mainly men) and the neo-liberal economy has created new

⁴ Private ownership of land in Cambodia was abandoned during the civil war in 1975-79. It was declared to be government property during the post-conflict government. People use the land but they did not hold title over the land until recently when government introduced a land reformation project.
businesses for the local Cambodians. Public sector management is also changing with the advent of neo-liberal economic policy.

In a rare empirical study of Khmer masculinity, interviewing thirty-four women and fifty-two men in Phnom Penh in 2006-2008, Jacobsen (2012) gives a snapshot of normative views held by Cambodians about the 'good' and the 'successful' man. A good man upholds traditional traits of manhood: he is simple, dresses according to custom, thinks of others, and concentrates upon his work and family. On the other hand, a successful man is not bound by traits of a good man who asserts masculinity in the time-honoured traits. A successful man is expected to be wealthy, having a life plan, making correct decisions and holding higher social status. Jacobsen argues that the expectations for good and successful men are multiple, overlapping and often conflicting, and that men must struggle to negotiate or fail as men within these conflicting identities. She concludes that 'Cambodian masculinity is unlikely to develop new models until cultural identity ceases to be as inherently bound up with the survival of a vision of Cambodia that is at odds with the process of globalisation.' Her study does not, however, unfold how the social changes are influencing Khmer masculinities in terms of actual behaviour, or does it trace implications for intra-household gender relations, including domestic violence.

Domestic violence, particularly men's violence against their wives, has become more visible with the country's socio-economic changes. Domestic violence is now considered a social problem in Cambodia. The latest national demographic survey (NIPS, et. al., 2006) reveals that almost a quarter of married Cambodian women between the ages fifteen and forty-nine have experienced violence from their husbands. The Cambodia Gender Assessment – a national report from the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs (2008) – suggests that the prevalence of domestic violence in the country is not falling, and may even be rising\(^5\).

Neither the national survey and report, nor an independent paper (Kathryn and Jennifer, 2006) on domestic violence in Cambodia, explicitly addresses the interplay between domestic violence and masculinities in the changing socio-economic context. A recent study (GADC, 2010) attempted to examine the links between masculinities, gender and domestic violence. This study does not provide the historical background of particular patterns of masculinities such as men’s patriarchal notions about family and family relationships. Nor does it address the dynamics of masculinities in relation to the significant economic and social changes that Cambodians have been encountering in recent decades.

No study has yet been conducted to explore the interplay between masculinities and domestic violence in a country that has experienced such a history of colonialism, civil war and globalization. In the developing world, despite the widespread prevalence of domestic violence, testing of competing theories about its causes has been very limited.

1.2 Purpose of the study

Gender-based violence is an acknowledged social problem globally. The overall objective of this study is to explore Khmer masculinities which emerged in course of country’s social changes and their implications for domestic violence.

Specifically, this thesis:

\(^5\) Cambodian government adopted an anti-domestic violence law in 2005 with the recognition of an increasing trend towards violence.
(i) Explores Khmer masculinities that emerged in the course of Cambodia's colonial rule (1863-1954) and during the increased militarisation and civil war (from the early 1970s to the early 1990s);

(ii) Identifies masculinities that Cambodian men have constructed in contemporary society;

(iii) Studies the configuration and reconfiguration of masculinities by the former perpetrators of DV; and

(iv) Provides suggestions for policy and practice on DV.

1.3 Focus and plan of the thesis

This study looks at the construction of Khmer masculinities, particularly in relation to intra-family gender relations, that emerged in course of the country's social changes over a long period of time. It then explores the connection between masculinities and domestic violence. Historical documents (civil codes, administrative and policy documents) since the colonial era have been analysed to explore specific patterns of construction of Khmer masculinities and their legacy in the construction of contemporary masculinities. In order to examine contemporary Khmer masculinities, including the construction of masculinities in war time, the life histories of fifty men from different occupations and age groups have been studied. Life histories of a sample of former perpetrators of domestic violence who have been transformed into non-violent spouses after participating in the anti-DV programme are included.

The thesis consists of five parts. Part I provides background to the study. Chapter Two consists of an overview of masculinities. This chapter provides a critical overview of empirical work on masculinities, social, economic and political dynamics in the construction of masculinity, and the relationship between masculinity and domestic violence. Relevant empirical work is discussed and analysed in seven sub-
themes: masculinity – conceptual and definitional understanding, social construction of masculinity, revisiting masculinities among particular occupations, masculinity politics, women’s paid work and men’s negotiation of paid and unpaid work, theoretical debates on men and domestic violence, and methodological debates on interview of perpetrators of DV. Chapter Three introduces the methodology used in this study. It provides information about the data sources, research population, sample size, selection process, methods of data collection and analysis, and ethical issue.

The two chapters in Part II introduce the history of State and gender order in Cambodia: the colonial period and in post-independent Cambodia. Chapter Four discusses the establishment of the French Colonial Empire in Cambodia and the colonial rule regulated masculinities, gender order and family relationships. Two key colonial documents: Code Cambodgiens (1898) and Code Civil Cambodgien (1920) are examined critically and analysed discursively in this chapter. Chapter Five discusses increased militarisation, civil war, and social disruption in Cambodia in the period from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. It then discusses gender order during the war and times of civil conflict, and the construction of masculinities in a conflict situation. The discussion in this chapter is based on the historical documents and the life histories of men who were involved in the war and conflict in Cambodia.

Part III presents case studies of men from four groups to reveal the dynamics of Khmer masculinities in contemporary times. In particular, the case studies, used in this part, help to identify the themes or patterns of masculinities that are emerging among Cambodian men of today. Chapter Six provides a discussion of the masculinities of Cambodian men who are managers and business entrepreneurs. Chapter Seven shows how peasant masculinities re-assemble gender practices from two eras of the country’s history, the matrilocal marriage of the pre-colonial era and
the colonial concept of men as the family provider. Chapter Eight examines the dynamics of masculinities of urban workers who have moved to the city with the aim of earning a better income. Chapter Nine deals with the life histories of former perpetrators of domestic violence who are now non-violent. This chapter features the key aspects of their masculinities in both the violent and post-transformation periods of their lives.

Part IV discusses the issues that recur in the life histories of men from the four groups mentioned above. Chapter Ten discusses the issue of men’s role in providing for the family and how they respond to their wives’ outside paid work, with some men allowing and supporting their wives’ outside work, while other men withdraw their wives from outside economic work. Chapter Eleven reveals men’s relationships in the family and the reconfiguration of masculinities. Men’s fathering skills, including virtual fathering are also explored in this chapter. Cultural interpretation of spousal rights within the family, gender division of labour, resources (including the personal capabilities of a spouse), and how best these resources or capabilities are being used in the labour market, and the gender regime in the workplace are all of concern to those men who need to configure and reconfigure their masculinities in daily life. Chapter Twelve reveals a specific pattern of post-conflict transition to masculinities that are peaceful and responsive and place an emphasis on the family.

Part V concludes the thesis by specific focus on the history of Khmer masculinities, the pluralities and dynamics of contemporary Khmer masculinities, and the connection of Khmer masculinities to the issue of domestic violence. This part also provides recommendations for policy and practice on DV.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The discussion in this chapter begins with concepts and definitions of masculinity. The discussion then turns to social construction of masculinity. It, in particular, provides empirical evidences of masculinities that emerged in post-colonial, post-conflict and neo-liberal economic settings in different social, cultural and geographical settings. The discussion then examines how men of rural and urban class settings configure masculinities.

The relationship between men and domestic violence is discussed in the following section. The discussion includes reviews of feminist theories, resource theories, demographic theories, integrated and ecological framework and structural theories. The next section reviews literatures on interview of former perpetrators of domestic violence, particularly the ambiguities and contradictions that may arise when perpetrators' self-account is used to weigh the changes they have made in post-transformation period and to identify the reasons of their violence. Finally, the chapter concludes with themes that arise from literature reviews and are being addressed in this study.
2.2 Masculinity –conceptual and definitional understanding

Generally, masculinity refers to a set of traits or patterns of behaviour that in a given society is considered typical for men. There is no fixed set of traits or attributes that can be labelled as being universally masculine. To Westwood (1997), masculinity exists in a plurality of forms which can be theorised as fluid and multiplex, and subject to changing contexts. Masculinity is composed of individual daily accomplishments that are constructed, negotiated and contested within the complex power relations of institutions, including the family, and related structures. Masculinities are constructed in many sites within which there may be competing understandings of masculinity; and these understandings can shift and change from time to time due to changing situations.

Masculinity is dynamic and can change over time, space and history. Masculinity needs to be practised within broader gender and social relations. Broader gender and social relations can be altered in the changing context of social institutions – family, market and State. Today’s most practised and idealised masculinity can disappear in the future as social institutions adopt new structures.

Tolson (1977), a British sociologist who explores masculinity among working-class people, argues that men construct masculine identities from childhood and for this construction their fathers are their first role models. Fathers’ work and position in social and professional arenas are important differentiators in a son’s construction of masculinity. Tolson believes that masculinity is not simply the opposite of femininity. Masculinity, in his view, is more about psychological and cultural construction of gendered identities and expressions of these identities within and between different cultures.
Morrell (2001), a South African historian who explores masculinity in colonial and apartheid Africa, suggests that masculinity is a specific gender identity belonging to a specific male person. Although the specific gender identity is developed using social processes and contexts, it does not necessarily mean that all men of that society possess the same identity. Individual men take up the identity which best fits, given their relative positions in social and gender relations. There is no prescribed procedure other than the determination to become a man.

According to Connell (2005, 2009), an Australian educationist and sociologist who was the first to talk about multiplicity of masculinity and trans-national business masculinity in the globalised world, defines masculinity as a configuration of gender practice. Configuration of gender practice is traditionally classified as personality or as personality traits by psychologists. Masculinity is about expressing gender in a culturally specific way. Connell (2005a) suggests that ‘masculinity is simultaneously a place in gender relations, the practice through which men and women engage that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality and culture’ (p.71). Masculinity requires active engagement in practising gender. It is not something that someone ‘has’ but that someone ‘does’ (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001).

Connell (2005) further suggests that any masculinity is positioned in the structures of a number of relationships simultaneously. Structures of relationships include: power, production and cathexis. It means that structures of these relationships are relevant to the configuration of gender practice. Masculinity is configured within a unique structure of gender power relations – patriarchy –which is characterised by an overall subordination of women and domination by men. Similarly, masculinity is constructed within an overall set of relations where men overwhelmingly do paid
work and control resources and women do unpaid work. But this structure of power and production has been undermined since the women’s liberation movement and consequent social, political and economic interventions in major institutions, particularly at State level.

Masculinities are plural and diverse. There is no single version of masculinities. Connell (2005) categorises masculinities as (i) hegemonic, (ii) complicit, (iii) subordinate, and (iv) marginalised. Hegemonic masculinity is ‘the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’ (p.77). Hegemonic masculinity is also adaptive to the context of a particular time without compromising the core value of patriarchy. Hegemonic masculinity does not necessarily need to use force or coercion to establish dominance.

Complicit masculinity refers to masculinity that enjoys patriarchal dividends like hegemonic masculinity without taking the risk and tension of gender relations conflict. Subordinate masculinity involves domination of a group of men over another group of men. This domination comes through a cultural ideal concerning gender relations and institutional power. Dominance of heterosexual men over gay men is an example of subordinate masculinity.

2.3 Social Construction of Masculinities

2.3.1 Masculinity as a social product

Like gender, masculinity is a social construct. Masculine identities are not biologically developed, rather they are socially prescribed and ascribed. Human agents are not free from social and cultural legitimacy in choosing identities and behaviours. Dominant social discourses on gender criticise certain gender identity
constructions and affirm others. Currently available or accepted masculinities need social scrutiny before they are accepted. According to Connell (2005), an exemplary masculinity is being produced as a cultural form which results from political struggle and defeat of existing alternatives. Masculinity is merged into organised social relations. It is an active social construction, a pattern of social conduct – conduct that responds to the situation in which people find themselves (Connell, 2000).

Social institutions such as family, school, sport, politics, market and State produce and reproduce men’s and women’s identities. The State is the most powerful single agent for change. The State creates gender categories and shapes them (Connell, 1990). It also simultaneously protects and changes the gender order (Morrell, 2001). Masculinity is not constructed in advance of social interaction with these institutions. Rather it is constructed through the interaction of these institutions. Structure (which is usually hierarchical, competitive, and target oriented) and the work culture of social institutions are involved in the construction of manhood.

Here is an example that shows how the interaction and structure of social institutions construct masculinity.

A study by Phillips (1980) reveals how colonial social processes in the twentieth century constructed masculinity around marriage and family life in New Zealand. He argues that white New Zealanders experienced a surplus number of men during the twentieth century because few European women arrived in New Zealand in the early colonial days. The surplus white men, however, gave rise to a turbulent masculine sub-culture. It posed a serious threat to social order at that time and in response the colonial administration adopted an agricultural policy to promote family-based agriculture. This policy resulted in family-centric masculinity organised
through marriage. This particular pattern of masculinity has been reinforced over time in the New Zealand.

2.3.2 Colonial rule and formation of new masculinities in the colonies

European colonialism from the 15th to the 20th century has brought tremendous changes in social, cultural, political, economic ideologies and practices among the colonised. Colonial processes and practices transformed the gender order of people in the colonies.

Nandy (1983) argues that until 1830, both the colonisers and colonised in British India had not realised the idea of colonial rule as being manly. It is noted that the British arrived on the Indian sub-continent in 1757 and departed in 1947. Until the 1830s, British rulers came mainly from the feudal class and sexual politics were not central to colonial rule. But after 1830, the middle-class evangelical spirit became dominant in British rule. Class stratification became essential for colonial control of the local populations. British rule in colonial India started to create a hierarchy both between colonisers and colonised, and among the colonisers themselves. They labelled men of some specific ethnicities such as Bengali as effeminate and men of other ethnicities such as Pathan as hyper-masculine. This sort of ethnic distinction still affects Indian masculinity sixty years after the end of the colonial era.

The gendered practice of colonial empires in settlement, imposed economies and administration gave rise to new gender markers. For example, as Connell (1993) views, the colonial settlement which was mainly carried out by the men-only soldiers, sailors, traders and administrators produced a frontier masculinity which combined a notion of occupational segregation, egocentric individualism and violence. Similarly, the colonial economies – which were primarily based on plantation and mining, maintained a strict gender division of labour: men in productive work and women in
household services. Sometimes, women are left for reproduction of human labour in their home country. This type of gender division of labour introduced by the colonial empire was new to the colonised society in many instances. It gave men a new identity associated with the public realm and associated household providers with the money economy (Connell, 1993). Connell argues that colonial empire created two very different settings for the modernisation of masculinity among the local populations. The new structure of economies and the gender division of labour tended to individualise in the first case and rationalise in the second.

Hardin’s (2002) discursive work on machismo provides a detailed account of how colonialism constructed specific forms of masculinity among Latin Americans. He argues that machismo is produced as a result of the specific processes and practices of Spanish colonial administration – which began in the early sixteenth century. Machismo is the stereotypical masculinity attributed to Latin American men, characterized by an overt and active heterosexuality; aggressiveness; and a male bonding which includes physicality without generally questioning the male’s heterosexuality.

According to Hardin, transformation of the sexuality of the indigenous population was an important tool of Spanish conquest, resulting in the construction of machismo. Homosexuality was present in the Latin American society in some extent before the conquest. But the Spanish colonial authority banned homosexuality. Individuals were even punished if they wore the dress of the opposite sex. Hardin concludes that repression and punishment by colonial rulers led the indigenous people to show/visualize heterosexuality. Strictness and an emphasis on heterosexuality gradually turned this emphasis into machismo.
The gender order of the locals was another site of construction of *machismo* by Spanish conquest. After their arrival, the Spanish conquerors shaped and modified local gender roles and norms in line with their own standards. Hardin says, ‘when the Spanish arrived, they labelled everything based upon their own concepts of sexuality and gender roles’ (p.10). Local gender fluidity was abolished and replaced by strict gender norms and the social roles of Catholicism. The conquest stigmatised local men’s traditional gender practices of sharing in household chores and respect women.

In his discursive study, Proschan (2002) explores how French colonial power and its associates contributed to the construction of contradictory and complex male and female identities in colonial Vietnam. French soldiers and administrators, missionaries, novelists, journalists and politicians characterised Vietnamese men as effeminate, hermaphroditic, impotent and inverted, and Vietnamese women as virile and hypersexualized.

Proschan’s study is based on archival documents preserved from the first decades (1880s and 1890s) from the eastern entities of the French colony (Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina). Archival documents include travellers’ accounts, ethnographers’ descriptions, administrators’ guides, physicians’ monographs, journalists’ reports, novels and literature that reflect the colonial view of Vietnamese sexuality at that time.

Colonial observers constructed sexes/genders and sexualities of Vietnamese men and women in the areas of physicality including genitals, hairstyles and costumes. They experienced difficulty in distinguishing the men from the women physically. The males were perceived as womanly in physiognomy with an extra slim bust; extreme fineness of joints, wrists, knees and ankles; misdistribution of hair – too long and too much on the head and too little in other parts of the body; and lack of
beards. Referring to the account of a French mariner in colonial Vietnam, Proschan says, ‘the physiognomy of the men is scarcely different from that of the women, since they have only very sparse beards; a few whiskers at the end of the chin’ (p.440). Beardlessness of Vietnamese men was equated by the French men as a sign of incompleteness of manhood and even impotence. Even the French medical experts introduced a medical discourse in colonial Vietnam suggesting that beardlessness was an index of infertility. They introduced the discourse –‘Natura Glabrum Infecundrum’ – what is hairless is unfruitful by nature.

Vietnamese women, too, were perceived as incomplete and imperfect in terms of womanhood by colonial men and women. The local women were characterised as virile and hypersexualised, with large stature and narrow hips, stocky trunks and graceless busts. The French colonists’ view of Vietnamese womanhood is reflected in the writing of a travelling Frenchwoman who wrote, ‘dresses herself almost like the man –that dream of our feminists – she chews betel, smokes cigarettes, drinks tchoum-tchoum, and takes part in the most difficult of masculine labours’ (p.442). Labelling local men as effeminate and local women as virile by the French colonial power was a tactic to create a hierarchy and establish dominance over the colonised. Proschan says, ‘by depicting the Vietnamese as gender-deviant – the males as effeminate, the females as virile –the French colonials could justify their conquest and subjugation and the mission civilisatrice they arrogated to themselves’ (p.459).

Gender, more specifically construction of particular patterns of masculinities, served as a key means for colonial power to establish and maintain their authority over the colonies. The literatures on colonialism and masculinities are important to study Khmer masculinities, particularly their link to the history, since Cambodia too was a colony for almost a century.
2.3.3 Masculinities in war and conflict-situations

The relationship between masculinity and war is complex (Connell, 2000; Cockburn, 2010; Hutchings, 2012). Connell (2000) argues that masculinities are the forms in which many dynamics of violence take place. Although gender dynamics are not the whole story of war, they are involved to some extent. In earlier times, war could not take place without the physical presence of rival groups. Heroic masculinity was respected and idealised by the masses, and could be exemplary among post-war society.

But the heroic style of masculinity disappeared in the wake of high-tech war. The changing conditions of war require the armies to have more than one type of masculinity to be engaged (Connell, 2000). For example, the generals hold to a masculinity which is different from that of frontier soldiers. Maintaining more than one kind of masculinity (within a power hierarchy) is essential to maintaining command over the overall war situation. And wars in the contemporary world are the brainchild of world politics – politics for the creation of a global market. Leaders of world politics do not hold to the same masculinity as the frontline soldiers. Rather they hold masculinity – hegemonic masculinity – which controls the rival nations/regimes into controlling armies of their own. We can argue, therefore, that war is a producer of masculinity, both during hostilities and in a post-war situation. It can give rise to protest masculinity (Connell, 2000) among invaded nations or societies that can potentially lead the victims to become aggressive and violent.

Cockburn (2010) links militarisation and war to three dimensions of power. She suggests that economic power, ethnic or national power and gender power cause, shape, achieve and reproduce militarisation and war. Hutchings (2012) argues that the link between war and masculinity does not necessarily depend on the meaning of
either masculinity or war but masculinity is linked to war in the way of providing a framework through which the war can be supported as a social practice and institution.

2.3.4 Post-conflict patterns in masculinity

Studies (Xaba 2001; Myrttinen 2005) on masculinities in post-conflict transitions give an overwhelming notion that former militias or soldiers often organise their masculinity around violence and notoriety in post-war times. Conflict and war leave these men without skills or education, which leaves them marginalised in a new post-war socio-political order. Finding no other course, they may follow war time habits, in order to survive in the new order.

Fernando, the main character of Xaba’s (2001) study, is a typical example of how masculinity in conflict and transition is understood. Fernando, an African township youth, was treated as a ‘young lion’ during the days of apartheid South Africa due to his struggle against the apartheid system. Many youths were recruited by political organisations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the African National Congress (ANC) in the 1970s to strengthen the anti-apartheid campaign. As a result of this resistance campaign, a national unity government was formed in the early 1990s. The political transition also brought changes in society. The demand now was for respect for law and order, the restoration of public order, the presumption of paying for services, respect for State institutions, cooperation with police, and fighting crime.

Former ‘young lions’ like Fernando, who were neither assimilated in the national defence forces nor rehabilitated by the State, could not find employment as they were left without any education at the end of the struggle. Being unemployed it became hard for Fernando to find a place in the new gender order. Eventually he
became a full-time gangster for survival, and came into confrontation with the police force. Finally he was killed by police.

Myrttinen’s (2005) study notes that the open conflict with Indonesian military forces was ended by Timor Leste’s independence in 1999. But the conflict has been domesticated in post-independence Timor Leste. Among Falintil – the pro-independence guerrillas – after demobilisation a violent masculinity persisted, expressed in sexualised violence against their spouses and other women.

Thousands of Cambodian men were actively involved in the country’s civil war that spanned from late 1960s to early 2000s. Many of them survived and are currently living in the society. What kinds of masculinities have they configured in war and post-war eras? The review of literatures in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 can provide empirical clues to study masculinities of Cambodian men who exclusively served as militias of Khmer Rouge and the armed forces of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

2.3.5 Construction of masculinities in the nexus of neo-liberalism and globalisation

Men can construct masculinity diversely in the nexus of neo-liberalism and globalisation. Connell (2009) provides an analysis of how neo-liberalism or globalisation gives rise to new masculinities. Her thesis is that neo-liberalism has created institutions such as transnational corporations, international states, global media and markets that operate on a global scale. These institutions have their own gender regimes. The gender regimes of these institutions create new gender orders in the areas of their operation. For example, transnational corporations have significant gender division of labour which are characterised by men in the management team and women either at the front desk (in the service sector) or on a production line (in
the manufacturing sector). The management team is strongly masculinised and characterised by men who are competitive, work-driven, and desperate for success. Toughness and dominance are central to the management team. Connell and Wood (2005) term the masculinity which characterises management teams of transnational companies as ‘transnational business masculinity’. The transnational business masculinity intensifies the discursive construction of masculinity in business sector.

Cases of men’s construction of masculinities in the nexus of neo-liberalism and globalisation from two different geographical contexts are provided below.

Morrell (2001) documents how South African men responded to government’s gender equality policy – generally advocated and imposed by international states – undertaken in the 1990s. Among other changes, significant number of women were elected to the national parliament and cabinet in the national election in 1994 and 1999. 25% of Parliamentarians, including the Speaker of the House and three Cabinet Ministers, were women in the first democratic election in 1994. Morrell argues that South African men responded to the changing gender order in three ways – reactively, progressively and accommodatingly – in this situation of transition.

In response to the changing gender order, South African men, particularly white middle-class men, established solidarity groups to end discrimination against men, including black men, who were previously discriminated against by the whites. Men were organised through these groups to achieve the intended goal.

Some men are responding to the changing gender order progressively. They are supportive of women’s rights and gender equality. They are attempting to challenge violent masculinities as being good role models, and they are raising awareness among other men. They are also organising their support in institutional form. A number of men’s organisations have been established since the 1980s in
South Africa to extend men's support. Sonke Gender Justice Network is one of the leading men's networks that support gender equality. Established in 2006, Sonke works to create the change necessary for men and women to enjoy equitable relationships (http://www.genderjustice.org.za/about-us/about-us/about-us, retrieved on 8 September 2012).

Some men neither react to, nor support actively, changing the gender order. They are creating a life-style which often goes between these two. In the changing life-style, they practice gender in ways that distinguish them from the 'traditional' ones. At the same time, they do not let themselves be labelled as being supportive to the changing situation.

Alexeyeff (2008) explores the 'styles of masculinity' Cook Islands men use to negotiate the economic imperatives that have arisen from neo-liberal economic reform undertaken by the Cook Islands government. In 1995, the Cook Islands experienced a serious economic crisis and entered into deep recession. In response, the government downsized the number of staff in government sectors, privatised many government services, and sold many government assets. Many men lost their jobs. As part of the economic reform, the Cook Islands government provided financial assistance (from a transition fund) to retrenched staff to develop private enterprise in some selected sectors. In this context, two patterns of masculinity emerged, called 'dirty taro' and 'entrepreneur' masculinity by Alexeyeff.

'Dirty Taro' (or Repo Taro) is a term which is stereotypically used for men from outside the capital city, who work on the land and engage in manual work. It particularly refers to work in the wet taro plantations which leaves the workers covered with mud. In its derogative form, 'Dirty Taro' refers to men who have no social position and importance.
The 'entrepreneur' masculinity is illustrated by the case of No’o. No’o owns a large piece of land where he grew taro before the economic reformation. With the aid of the transition fund he expanded his taro production, and exported taro to New Zealand. His business became hugely successful, and started travelling abroad. He gradually became the icon for other men in the country to follow. Men like No’o are often invited to business forums and appear in TV advertisements as ‘role models’. It is apparent that the Cook Islands society in the post reformation context emphasises an ‘entrepreneur’ style of masculinity as the way for men to be successful. The new economic environment has facilitated the growth of the ‘entrepreneur’ masculinity.

Cambodia has increasingly been globalised, both culturally and economically since democratic election held in 1993 when international community came forward with financial and human resources to reconstruct the war-ravaged country. Country’s entrance to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2005 further connected it to global trade and business. Country’s economy has increasingly been connected to the transnational businesses with foreign direct investment (FDI). Local enterprises connected to transnational businesses are also growing. An increasing number of Cambodian men are being employed either directly in the transnational business firms in the country or local business enterprises. Being employed in the transnational business firms or owning local enterprises, Cambodian men are getting exposed to new work culture and environment. How are these local men configuring their gender practices, both in workplace and family? The review of literatures on masculinities and neo-liberalism and globalisation, which are drawn in other economic and political contexts can be helpful in exploring masculinities of Cambodian men who are directly engaged in the process of neoliberalism in the country.
2.4 Revisiting masculinities among particular occupations

2.4.1 Rural masculinities

To date, studies on rural masculinities have been limited in terms of geography, historical period and subject matter. Most of the available studies (Brandth, 2002; Coldwell, 2009) have been made in the context of large-scale farming practices in industrialised nations. The study of masculinities in farming began to appear in literature only fairly recently (Brandth, 1995; Phillips, 1998). These studies mainly focus on agricultural changes, technologies and peasant identities. The studies of rural masculinities, which are mainly drawn in Western contexts, cannot simply be applied to Cambodia—a country where agricultural practices are still labour intensive and conventional, rules of land ownership have changed several times in recent history, and farmers follow a matrilocal family system. There is a dearth of studies of rural masculinity in a socio-cultural context that resembles Cambodia.

The dominant gender discourse that shapes rural masculinity is characterised by physical strength, the control of nature, tenacity, hardship, toughness, independence and individualism. Agriculture is a masculine domain of social practice for men. The term ‘farmer’ is analogous to the identity of men (Coldwell, 2009). Coldwell argues that peasant masculinities and farming practices are co-constructed in the interplay of human agency and the agency of non-human species; the land, plants, animals and machines.

Farming has become a fully masculine practice and space with the advent of mechanisation. This transformation has reinforced men’s identity as farmers by taking away women’s farming activity and shifting women’s labour to the secondary and tertiary sectors. This transformation has not always been good for men. Men are often left to run farms alone and isolated, and are often seen as backward compared to their
modem female counterparts who now have better-education, and multiple skills that they have acquired through having moved to non-farm activities (Brandth, 2002).

There is one available study on peasant masculinity in a developing country. Perry’s (2005) study in Senegal reveals a crisis of peasant masculinity. The government of Senegal financed the peasants for cash-crops such as peanuts until 1986 when the government adopted neo-liberal reform. Traditionally all family members, including women and girls, worked on the rural farm and the man of the family controlled the family’s labour force using his patriarchal power. After the government ceased to finance these farms, the production of peanuts declined. In the meantime, some informal economies such as small businesses emerged in the course of neo-liberalism. As men are less able to fulfil their role of providing for the family, and family members do not have much work to do on the farm, they allow their wives to run the small businesses. Women’s entrance to small business brought changes in the family’s gender order and a crisis among peasant masculinities. In the changing situation men become dependent on their wives, new domestic tensions emerge around the issue of labour, financial control, mobility, space and sexual behavior.

2.4.2 Urban working class masculinity

A study of the masculinities of urban workers in China (Lin and Ghaill, 2012) suggests that the male formerly peasant workers in formerly female-concentrated occupations such as domestic cleaning and electric assembly occupations deploy their peasant masculine identities in order to construct their masculinities in the modern urban location. In their reconstructed masculine identities the peasant rural-urban migrants neither privilege themselves over women nor subordinate themselves to other men, but rather attempt to masculinise their specific tasks in female-concentrated occupations.
Fuller (2000)'s study shows how Peruvian urban men who formerly worked in very masculinised occupations (such as heavy industry, construction work, fishing, mining, agro-business, etc.) construct masculinities in urban life after they have been retrenched from their State jobs. Peruvian men generally construct manliness around work which imparts dignity, demonstrating capability and being responsibility. Work also turns the young men into men potentially capable of marrying and supporting a family. Peruvian working-class men construct masculinity as being able to be the breadwinner for the family. During the 1990s, the Peruvian government adopted the neo-liberal policy by downsizing their public workforce. Many men lost their jobs as a result of this economic policy. In the aftermath of the policy, they took up jobs either in partnership with their wives or in feminised work in the cities. For example, some men opened small businesses with their wives. In the changing situation, though they work in partnership with their wives or in feminised occupations, they do so to keep their role of breadwinning for the family intact.

2.5 Masculinity politics: Movements and Programs for Change

Masculinity politics refer to 'those mobilisations and struggles where the meaning of masculine gender is at issue, and, with it, men's position in gender relations' (Connell, 2005, p.205). Masculinity politics is any form of struggle, from an intellectual project to field-based activism, where men's position in gender relations is discussed and acted on. Masculinity politics is important for promoting gender equality as men overwhelmingly control all sorts of resources and retain power through society. Connell (2005) argues that since masculinity itself is multiple, masculinity politics can be diverse.

Messner (1997) traced out how issues like feminism, anti-feminism, socialism, race, sexuality, spirituality and religion constituted masculinity politics in the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s mainly in the United States. He precisely described eight different men's movements, grappling with different meanings of manhood within their socio-political perspectives. Movements like men's liberation movement, radical feminist men's movement, socialist feminist men's movement, and gay male liberation supported feminism and found gender equality helpful for men too. Organised by African American men, a racialized masculinity politics called for adult men to take care for families and to mentor the young black males who were at risk of unemployment, crimes, homicides and homelessness. The men's rights movement viewed feminism as a threat for men, in terms of power and status in families and other social institutions. Begun in the 1980s, the mythopoetic movement guided men to rediscover and reclaim the deep masculine parts of themselves that they believed had been lost. The Promise Keepers, a Christian men's organisation, ran various activities including sermons, singing and praying to call for men to retake leadership roles in families and re-masculinise of men. The work of Messner demonstrates plurality of masculinity politics.

The development of the overall concerns of this thesis—the multiplicity of Khmer masculinities, implications of social changes for the emergence of new masculinity, and the interplay between masculinity and domestic violence—is influenced by masculinity politics. This study will contribute to promoting gender equality, the main thrust of masculinity politics, by providing knowledge about how masculinities are configured and reconfigured, and associated gendered power dynamics. This thesis will contribute to promoting gender equality, particularly in the form of addressing domestic violence by providing evidence-based cases on the interplay of masculine gender and domestic violence.
2.6 Women's paid work, men's negotiation of paid and unpaid work, and fathering role

Debates exist about the reasons for married women’s participation to paid work. Hood (1986), Pearson (2000) and Kohara (2010) argue that the economic factor drives married women to join in paid work. They presume that married women enter paid work to ensure their families’ economic survival. Eggebeen and Hawkins (1990) suggest that women’s labor force participation is not always driven by the basic family needs. They argue that women, particularly of comparatively better-off families, enter paid work to provide a higher standard of living for their families and themselves.

Irrespective of the reason of their entrance, women’s paid work can potentially pose a threat to their husbands in family relationships. Men, when their wives are engaged in outside paid work, need to negotiate their own participation in unpaid family work, including child care and fathering. They also need to negotiate about authority in day-to-day family affairs.

Studies by Bolake (1997), Pineda (2000) and Slegh et al. (2013) document men’s negotiation of paid and unpaid work and their position in intra-family gender relations in a situation of their wife’s paid work. Wall and Marinho (2007) and Nkwake (2009) provide rich evidences of how men in European and African contexts respectively engage themselves in child care when their wives are engaged in family breadwinning.

Bolake (1997) examines men’s participation in the family’s unpaid work and their negotiation of family gender relations among working class urban families in Istanbul, Turkey. In Turkish culture, men are the breadwinners and women are the house-makers. This gender differentiated role mediates intra-family gender
relationships. Bolake interviewed couples in 41 families – the wife in 58% of the families – is the prime breadwinner; and the husband in 60% of the families – is either unemployed or works in a part time job. All of the wives work full-time five or six days a week in factories.

Three kinds of responses from the men are revealed. The first group of men, who constitute 40% of the participants, respond to their inability to provide for the family by helping their wives in household chores. But their participation in household chores remains low. Despite men’s limited share in household chore, the couples do not experience conflict because the wives refrain from using their financial leverage to press their husbands for greater participation and often take on what they consider to be men’s responsibilities.

The second group of men, who constitute 40% of the participants, remain absent from household chores and use traditional gender ideologies to resist their wife’s desire for a more egalitarian division of labor. The couples of this group encounter conflict and tension in the family. They experience most serious confrontations when men cannot ask their wives to quit paid work, and women claim some leverage in intra-family relationships as providers.

The third group of men, who constitute 20% of the participants, configure their status of unemployment or limited role of family providing, by moving towards equity in intra-family gender relationships. A relative consensus exists among couples of this group about the complementarity of breadwinning and household tasks, the benefits of the wife’s paid work, and the need for some sacrifice by the husbands. The couples construct an ideology of equity, and configure the ideology into practice.

Bolake suggests that the relationships between provider status, women’s expectations, and the actual configuration of gender relations in the family are
complexly mediated by cultural orientation, perception of women as providers, marital dynamics and extended family relationship. Structural conditions and cultural ideology interact to configure the gender relations.

Pineda’s (2000) study, conducted among working class urban households in Colombia, shows a ‘mutual-respect model’ of gender relations in the family in a situation of men’s unemployment and women’s breadwinning role. Pineda interviewed 23 men and 18 women from 31 households, including 10 couples in Cali, Colombia in 1998 and 1999. Most of these men previously worked in the formal sector. They became unemployed due to Colombian economic recession in 1995. All these women have home-based small-scale businesses that received financial support from a leading micro-credit NGO. Paid work in the formal sector is a great means for Colombian men to organise traditional masculinity – characterised by providing for the family and getting out of the house. Being unemployed in the formal sector, all these men took job in their wife’s business, as an alternative means of employment and survival. In the mutual-respect model of gender relations, these men accept their wives as the heads of the families, share in household chores and adapt to a new identity as home-based workers. Pineda argues that overlapping social and particular individual changes such as unemployment, women’s self-empowerment, and provision of some associated social services facilitate the development of this mutual-respect model of relationship.

Slegh et al.’s (2013) study, which is based on an evaluation of a village savings and loan programme of CARE that targets socio-economic empowerment of Rwandan women, suggests that men cede their position in intra-household gender relations to their wives in context of new income generated by their wives. They not
only cede power but are also supportive to their wife’s businesses by giving care to the young children.

Micro-credit programmes are conventionally women-only. The village savings and loan program of CARE is not an exception. But the programme considers men as the strategic partner for women’s empowerment. Apart from supporting the women, the programme also provides group training to the male partners of the women to change their gender norms about family’s economic management. As a result, when economic transactions occur from small-businesses, these men start to consider their wives as co-partners of the family’s economy and thus co-leaders in the family.

The study of Wall and Marinho (2007) suggests the plurality of fatherhood in context of different types of family functioning. The study findings are drawn on in-depth interviews conducted in 2005-2006 among 24 Portuguese men from different social classes and employment statuses. The fatherhoods that are revealed in Wall and Marinho’s study include: joint fatherhood, supportive fatherhood, parallel fatherhood, equal fatherhood, appropriative fatherhood, time-condensed fatherhood and stay-at-home fatherhood.

Men of the ‘joint fatherhood’ category jointly share tasks of family and child care. Joint parenting is not necessarily equal. It is rather performed within the concept of availability of the partners. In this category, gender equality is subordinate to the wellbeing of the family and, in particular, to the wellbeing of children.

Men of the ‘supportive fatherhood’ category provide supplementary caregiving to the children in addition to their role of prime breadwinning. Men of this category see the family as a place which is managed by the woman, but they no longer stand on the rigid norm of male breadwinning and female caring. They welcome their wives in paid work.
Men of the ‘parallel fatherhood’ category organise fatherhood by providing and monitoring children at a distance rather than being actively involved in day-to-day practices of caring. They are a kind of disengaged fathers.

Men of the ‘equal fatherhood’ category organise fatherhood on the principle of gender equality and individual autonomy of both partners both in family and professional life. Men of this category emphasise professional success for both partners and thus share family tasks equally. However, the practice of gender equality in household chores is facilitated by delegating a large amount of household and caring tasks to a maid, senior members of the family or commercial service providers. Fathers of this category provide intensive care to the children at weekends.

Men of the ‘appropriative fatherhood’ category shoulder the main breadwinning role as well as the responsibility for some of the time-consuming household and caring tasks such as cooking, putting baby to bed, etc. Men of this category believe in women’s autonomy in doing outside work. They see fatherhood and motherhood as very much the same thing. They are also educators of their children.

Men of the ‘time-condensed fatherhood’ category, who are oriented to career success, limit their fatherhood to quality time such as playing with growing children or performing a specific task such as changing nappy for the toddler. They place more emphasis on success of their individual career.

Men of the ‘stay-at-home fatherhood’ category, a minority group, take full-time domestic and child care tasks. The wives of this category of men are prime breadwinners of the family. The reason for men taking sole responsibility for child care and domestic tasks is mainly financial.
Wall and Marinho argue that the meanings and forms of fatherhood are firmly embedded in the complex dynamics of family life. Men’s greater role in giving care to their children is influenced by family interactions and events, gender division of work, tension between family and professional life, and men’s and women’s differential investment in private and public spheres.

Nkwake’s (2009) study explores the circumstances under which Ugandan working fathers take care of their young children in a situation of increased engagement of their wives in paid work. Nkwake’s study involved 222 employed fathers with working wives and 246 employed mothers with working husbands. Some of the participants were couples. Participants were chosen randomly from the capital city and a rural town. The research used a survey followed by focus-group discussions. Most of the men (60%) and women (68.6%) participants of the study were employed in the informal sector. The study defined child care activities as baby sitting, taking children to and from school, and helping them with homework. Among the male participants, 50% of fathers mentioned that they take care of their children. Among the female participants, 41% of women mentioned that their husbands take care of their children. Nkwake suggests that a number of factors: education, income, work characteristics and the quality of marital life are associated with fathers’ increased involvement in child care. For example, men employed in the formal sector are more likely to be engaged in childcare because of their exposure to gender-equalitarian views on childcare. Women’s employment also influences a fathers’ likelihood of giving care to the children. Most of the fathers whose wives were employed in the formal sector were engaged in taking care of children as they perceive that a mother who works in the formal sector is less able to blend childcare with her job. Irrespective of the sector of work, fathers who earned the same as their
wives, or more, were more engaged in taking care of children. This is associated with men’s sense of masculinity in relation to position in the family. When a man earns at least same as his wife, he does not consider his participation in childcare threatening to his status as the head of the family. This contradicts to the gender practices by men of the ‘stay-at-home fatherhood’ category of Wall and Marinho’s study, who take full responsibility for domestic chores, including child care though their wives are the prime breadwinners. Men in these two studies – one conducted in a developed country and another in a developing country – maintain contradictory gender practices because of their differentiated socialisation about family power relations and gender roles in different socio-economic contexts.

2.7 Men and Domestic Violence: Theoretical Debates

A growing body of theoretical literature has emerged about the reasons for domestic violence (DV). Among them, Pizzey (1979), Dobash and Dobash (1977-78 & 1992), YllÖ (1993), Stark and Flitcraft (1996), Bettman (2009), and Harcourt (2009) whose work is mainly based on victimisation reports, argue that DV is part of a system of coercive controls through which men maintain social dominance over women.

Erin Pizzey (1979), who set up the first shelter for battered women in the UK in 1971, is one of the pioneering feminists concerned with the domestic violence issue, argues that certain personality-related weaknesses of women, such as affection and sympathy for a violent husband, put some women at risk of violence. She underscores the responsibility of institutions to address the issue of domestic violence. Gender blindness of social agents is damaging for women victims of domestic violence.
Pizzey also links men's violent behaviour to their experience of family violence in their childhood. If a boy experiences violence, he is highly likely to be violent as an adult. Pizzey describes this process as: 'violence goes on from generation to generation' (p.74).

Pizzey's analysis of domestic violence shades little light to the complexity of intra-family gender relations (Sen, 1990). Her concept that 'violence goes on from generation to generation' conveys a notion that the construction of masculinity is fixed.

Dobash and Dobash (1977-78 and 1992), two American sociologists, expanded Pizzey's account of domestic violence. The empirical work of Dobash and Dobash began in a Scottish context just a few years later. However, Dobash and Dobash (1977-78) also use police reports on victimisation to frame their arguments. Dobash and Dobash (1977-78) argue that men use violence against women in the family in an attempt to maintain a socio-historical hierarchical order within the family. In their later work, which draws on activism and research in British and North American contexts, Dobash and Dobash (1992) expand their arguments on how patriarchy works in relation to violence against wives. They argue that men develop four expectations under the auspices of patriarchy: possessiveness and sexual jealousy; expectations concerning women's domestic work; men's sense of the right to punish their women for perceived wrongdoing; and the importance of maintaining and exercising their position of authority.

In a study in 1974, conducted through in-depth interviews, of 109 women in Edinburgh and Glasgow who had been systematically and severely beaten on different occasions by their husband or partner, Dobash and Dobash (1977-78) found that, for most couples, violence did not occur until after they were married but it usually
occurred very soon after marriage. A husband, through marriage, comes to feel that
his wife should meet his demands at all times and in any situation. A man feels that
marriage gives him the right to expect domestic service and sexual exclusivity from
his wife. Dobash and Dobash argue that ‘the fulfilment of these behaviours is not
only personally pleasant for him; it also becomes an outward sign of his “rightful”
possession of her, authority over her and ability to control her’ (p.438).

The information on which Dobash and Dobash have developed their argument
is drawn only from women. Men are ignored as informants. Why does violence occur
more after marriage than during the time the couple spend together before marriage?
Do factors like intra-household gender roles and relations other than patriarchy,
matter for the occurrence of violence after marriage?

Harcourt (2009), in her recent book Body Politics in Development, claims that
men’s violence against women is rooted in patriarchal power structures, ideas and
practices. Violence against women is manifested in social, economic and political
practices.

Pizzey, Dobash and Dobash, and Harcourt clearly draw notions of domestic
violence from the framework of second-wave feminism. Post-structural and post-
modern feminists hold different views of gender.

An example is the work of Bettman (2009), based on an ethnographic study
among the Semai, an aboriginal society in mountainous central Malaya, and the
Waorani, an indigenous tribe in Amazonian Ecuador, Bettman argues that domestic
violence in a society occurs when patriarchal ideology and gender stereotypes
characterise the idealised masculinities and social discourse prevalent in a society.
The prevailing discourse on violence in general does not necessarily cause violence in
intimate relationships. Bettman found that people in Semai society live in a culture of
egalitarianism. The Semai people not only idealise a non-violent image but actually incorporate it into their discourse. Non-aggression, dependency and sharing are important cultural values which are manifested in the daily life of the Semai people. On the other hand, the Wairani people live in a discourse of general violence but they do not beat their wives. Like the Semai men, the Wairani men maintain non-violent and non-aggressive family relations. This is because the existing social discourse on violence in the Wairani society does not include patriarchy and gender stereotypes.

Pizzey, Dobash and Dobash and Bettman employ single variable analyses that concentrate on patriarchy and ignore the impact of other social, economic and historical factors that may affect roles and relationships in the family and thus perpetuate domestic violence.

Based on large-scale survey data, Straus et al. (1980), Smith (1990), Dutton (1994), and DeKeseredy (1995) argue that socio-demographic factors and psychology significantly affect men’s violence against their partners.

Using the data of the National American Survey on Family Violence, 1975, Straus et al. (1980) found that a female partner of a family living under the poverty line experiences abuse from her partner five times more often than a female partner in an affluent family. The economic status of the household influences men’s violence. In terms of educational attainment, the abuse rate among males with some high school education is double the rate of males with the least (less than eight years of schooling) and the most (some college or more schooling) education.

In terms of occupational status, the level of violence among blue-collar men (e.g., working class men) is twice as high as the level among of white-collar men (e.g., professional men). Similarly, blue-collar women suffer twice as much violence from their male partners (irrespective of the male’s occupational status) as white-
collar women. In the survey by Straus et al., men who are unemployed or employed part-time are two to three times more likely to commit spousal violence than men in full-time employment.

The relation between household income and abuse of the female partner depends on intra-household gender relations. It seems that American men at the time of the Straus et al. survey were expected to be the family breadwinners. Apparently when they failed to fulfil that expectation, they resorted to violence. But the study does not provide information about how other members of the family, particularly the female partners, reacted to, and dealt with, his state of failure. What really provokes men to violence?

Based on data from the Second Toronto Survey conducted by telephone in 1987 among 604 currently or formerly married or cohabiting women of ages between eighteen and fifty years of age, Smith (1990) suggests that family income, the husband’s employment status, and the educational attainment and occupational status of both partners have significant inverse relationships with abuse.

Smith finds a reverse relationship between different socio-demographic factors and abuse of partners. The lower the income of the household, the higher the probability of abuse. A woman of low income family is ten times more likely to have been severely abused than a woman from a well-to-do family. Educational attainment of the husband also negatively correlates to wife abuse. For example, men with no more than elementary level education are twice as likely to have abused their partners compared to men with a university degree. The husband’s occupational status also affects the likelihood of his committing violence. Smith’s work does not address the question as to why men of low education and poor occupational and employment status are more likely to abuse their female partners.
Dutton (1994) argues that violent acts and violence in intimate relationships have a common psychological basis. He bases his argument on a review of several papers published in the late 1970s and 1980s using data on spousal violence from a United States national survey. He finds that 80 to 90 per cent of men who are either court-referred or self-referred for wife assault have a diagnosable psychological pathology. According to Dutton, men who have severe identity problems and intense dependency on women use cultural teaching and orthodoxy to justify their abuse. Dutton argues that patriarchy does not elicit violence against one’s partner directly. Instead, it provides the values and attitudes that, having been socialised into and learned by a personality-disordered man, are used to justify his violence. Similarly, not all men use violence and dominance to maintain their power. A man uses violence to maintain his power when he suffers from severe identity diffusion. In the condition of identity diffusion, he sees his intimate other as necessary for his identity integration and does not hesitate to ensure this integration even if this involves violence or coercion.

DeKeseredy (1995) questions the methodology of large-scale surveys on intimate abuse. He argues that researchers in intimate abuse surveys either use narrow definitions of psychological abuse or do not examine psychological abuse at all because they regard it as ‘soft-core’ abuse. He, on the other hand, views psychological abuse as equal to, or more injurious than, physical or sexual abuse.

There is a methodological drawback in the theories that connect socio-demographic assessments and psychology to DV. As these theories are based on large-scale quantitative surveys, they ignore the context in which violence occurs and thus the issues of gender and power.
Goode (1971), Felson and Messner (2000), and Yount and Carrera (2006) argue that violence is an ultimate resource used to derive power within relationship. Goode (1971) argues that men lacking other means of power, such as income or education, are more likely to rely on violence to achieve greater power within the relationship. Most men, when they have other means to dominate, are not likely to use overt force because force involves a negative cost in most societies.

Based on a multivariate analysis of data from the incident files of the National Crime Victimization Survey, United States, Felson and Messner (2000) argue that men abuse their female partners to control their behaviour both currently and for the future. They identify two reasons why men are more likely to control behaviour of their female partners compared to women toward their male partners. The first reason is that men have a greater desire than women to establish a patriarchal family structure. The second reason is that even when men and women have the same desire to dominate their partners, men are more likely to achieve their goal because they have the physical capability to employ violence successfully against women. In other words, men are more likely to use physical means against their female partners because they are bigger and stronger.

Like Goode, Yount and Carrera (2006) also draw a relationship between family resources and violence in intimate relationships but there is a fundamental difference in their arguments. Kathryn and Jennifer argue that poverty in men is not sufficient reason to explain violence against women in an intimate relationship. Women's comparative poverty and their overall dependency on a partnership are also involved. Kathryn and Jennifer argue that the relative resources of spouses have a significant effect on women's experience of domestic violence. Women who have fewer resources are more likely to experience physical and psychological violence.
Women who challenge status expectations in marriage by having a higher education than their husbands or by possessing more capital resources than their husbands have higher odds of experiencing psychological, rather than physical, violence from their husbands.

Developed in the Indian context, Agarwal and Panda (2007) argue that lack of ownership of immovable properties such as a house or land makes women more vulnerable to domestic violence. They argue that immovable property provides a woman with economic and physical security, improves her fall-back position, and widens her options for a successful exit from a violent environment.

Heise (1998), O’Neil and Harway (1999), Jewkes (2002), and Walker et al. (2008) all argue that multiple factors are associated with men’s violence in intimate relationship. Based on a review of North American academic research on violence, Heise (1998) provides an ecological framework in which to understand the origins of gender-based violence. The framework is ecological in the sense that it conceptualises violence as a multifaceted phenomenon—grounded in the interplay of personal, situational and socio-cultural factors.

Heise provides details of these factors. Personal factors such as witnessing domestic violence as a child, experience of physical or sexual violence as a child, and having an absent or rejecting father are considered predictors of future violent behaviour. Situational factors which often structure the traditional family are associated with the increased risk of violence; they include male dominance in the family, male control of family wealth, marital conflict and alcoholism. Socio-cultural factors refer to the social structures both formal and informal that impinge on the immediate setting in which a person is found.
Heise suggests that socio-cultural factors are more influential in men’s violence when changes take place in the larger social milieu. Socio-cultural factors at ‘meso’ level are unemployment or low socio-economic status, isolation of the woman and the family, and delinquent peer relations. Socio-cultural factors at ‘macro’ level that influence men’s gender-based violence include male entitlement over women, masculinity linked to aggression, unequal gender division of labor, and social tolerance of violence.

O’Neil and Harway (1999) suggest multiple causes of men’s violence against women. They provide a multivariate model, based on review of literatures on violence against women across different academic fields, that explains the complexity of causes and risk factors of men’s violence. The model identifies four major factors or contents: macrosocietal, biological, gender-role socialisation and relational.

The macrosocietal factors such as patriarchy and institutional structures, can cause men’s violence against women, particularly in a situation of abrupt change of gender roles. Men may fear of loss of power when their role, mainly breadwinning for the family is reduced. The biological factors such as male hormone and neuroanatomy, can stimulate men’s violence against women. The gender-role socialisation factors such as men’s sexual attitudes, emotions, and behaviour learnt over the life-span, can be responsible for men’s violence against women. The relational factors defined as the interpersonal and verbal communication between partners, can re responsible for men’s violence. O’Neil and Harway argue that unlike other models of men’s violence against women, theirs emphasizes both men’s and women’s socialisation and the couple’s interactions.

Jewkes (2002) suggests that poverty, social notions of manhood, the status of women’s empowerment, alcoholism and social norms are pivotal to men’s violence
against their intimate partner. Jewkes's suggestion is also based on a review of surveys on intimate partner violence mainly in North America, with a few from the global South, including India and South Africa.

Like Smith, Jewkes argues that violence is more frequent in lower income groups, and that this is mediated through stress. Jewkes further explores how stress is associated with social notions of manhood. Men living with poverty feel a sort of crisis of masculinity and are unable to live up to the ideas of successful manhood.

She also suggests that level of women's empowerment affects their vulnerability to partners' violence. Women's economic, educational and social empowerment can be protective against violence. Jewkes also sees an association between alcoholism and all forms of interpersonal violence. The connection is socially constructed. Men are more likely to perpetrate violence when drunk, because they do not feel they will be held accountable for their behaviour.

Intimate partner violence is also perceived by Jewkes as a learned social behaviour for both men and women. It is argued that experiences of violence in the home in childhood teach children that violence is normal in certain settings. In this way, men learn to use violence and women learn to tolerate it. Violence rolls over generations. For example, the sons of women who are beaten are more likely to beat their intimate partners, and the daughters of women who are beaten are more likely to be beaten as adults.

The work of Walker et al. (2008) which is mainly based on a program of mental health promotion activity in Australia identifies three key determinants of men's violence against intimate partners. The determinants are: (i) construction of gender roles and relations and gender equality, (ii) exposure to other forms of
violence and social norms related to violence, and (iii) the availability of resources and systems of support.

Walker and his colleagues suggest that the way in which gender norms on role and relationship are constructed in a society is linked to men’s violence against women. Men who hold traditional views of gender roles and relationships and who have strong belief in male dominance are more likely to perpetrate violence against their partners. The construction of gender norms can take place within the wider gender regime of the community and society. Male economic and decision-making power is also linked to intimate partner violence. Violence is more likely to occur in couples with a clearly dominant partner and in countries where male dominance has strong cultural support.

Violence against women is also linked to the acceptance and perpetration of other forms of violence in a society. Violence against women is more prevalent in cultures where violence is used as a means for adults to resolve conflict. Men who are violent outside the home are also more likely to be violent towards their intimate partners. Men’s violence against their intimate partners takes place within the attitudes and social norms relating to violence against women.

Like Smith and Jewkes, Walker et al. suggest that men with low income or unemployment and/or low education are more likely to perpetrate violence in intimate relationships. Disparities between men’s and women’s employment status in a relationship also matters to men’s violence. Alcohol and illicit drug use and men’s social isolation following separation also lead them to perpetrate violence.

The work of Heise, O’Neil and Harway, Jewkes and Walker et al., taken together, suggests that men’s violence against their intimate partner is not single factored. Multiple factors either personal or situational or societal – function
simultaneously in the perpetration of violence. All the factors can be evident as causal reasons of men’s violence against women in multiple cultures and social settings as the findings of these studies are done. Are all these factors concurrent in terms of causing men’s violence against women in a single case or in a single social setting? This remains unclear in these studies.

Although it is relatively new, having been initiated in recent decades, structural theory (the theoretical framework used in this research) is gaining more attention in analysis of domestic violence. Structural theorists (Messerschmidt, 1993; West and Fenstermaker, 1995; Segal, 2007; Connell, 2005 and 2009) argue that the structure of social institutions such as family, school, sport, religion, market, and state agency which legitimise social relations in general and gender relations in particular, is centrally involved in men’s domestic violence. Men and women are differently placed in the structures of social relationships and men’s dominance is reinforced in both a real and symbolic fashion (Connell, 2005). Structural theorists argue that men’s violence is a way to assert masculinity or construct masculinity in the context of overall gender hierarchies in society.

Segal (2007) argues that violence cannot be simply equated with masculinity. Violent or aggressive behaviour is not instinctive in men. Men and women both display aggression and violence is common both in heterosexual and same-sex (gay and lesbian) relationships. Men’s violence in intimate relationships is part of a structural effect with Segal suggesting that prevalence of violence in society is related to men’s endeavour to affirm their masculinity – demonstrated by men’s dominance over women. This link is reinforced when masculinity is in a process of being challenged. According to her, men develop a sense of dominance and aggression
through gendered social mediators and the almost exclusive male representation in most of the State institutions where force and violence are means of administration.

According to Segal, aggressive masculinity is a fantasy for the majority of men enthralled by images of masculinity that equate to power and dominance. Social mediators such as schools, jobs, friends, family, religion and politics affect the way fantasies may or may not be translated into active expression. It is men, rarely women, who represent and administer state institutions such as the police, the army, prisons, correction centres and other agencies that exclusively exercise force and coercion. It is almost always men who are trained and authorised to use force and violence in society. Men often see a linkage between masculinity and violence through having official roles in these institutions.

Connell (2009) argues that a boy growing up a violent family may not be violent in his adulthood. Instead, the boy may react against violence in building his repertoire of masculinity in adulthood. She suggests that overall gender hierarchies in society affect an individual’s adoption of violent characteristics. Boys do not passively learn a particular gender norm such as violence. This means they are not socialised towards certain personalities automatically and without scrutiny. An active learning process is involved in the socialisation of a particular norm. A particular gender norm is imprinted on the individual after scrutiny so that he will survive in society as a man. Connell (2009) says, ‘gender patterns develop in personal lives as a series of encounters with the constraints and possibilities of the existing gender order’ (p.101). The development of a particular gender norm such as violence requires a choice to comply with the overall gender hierarchy in the society.

A particular practice in relation to gender, such as violence in intimate relationships, is structural and historical. Changes in the structure of social institutions
such as family, market and state agencies due to overall social, political and economic shifts can pose a threat to the traditional gender order (particularly involving power relations and production relations). This can eventually bring about a crisis in men’s doing gender, particularly in the household arena. Different men deal and respond to the crisis differently – violently or non-violently - based on their personal and social position. Some men, being unable to respond non-violently, take up violent means to configure gender. Only some men, therefore, not all men, in a given society perpetrate violence.

2.8 Interviewing the former perpetrators of domestic violence:

Methodological aspects

Tracking down real changes in the lives of former perpetrators of domestic violence is always a difficult task, particularly when using their self-accounts. There are academic works that attempt to find out the changes, including Adams et al. (1995), Gadd and Farrall (2004) and Mullaney (2007).

Adams et al. (1995) provide a rhetorical analysis of discourse generated by former perpetrators of violence towards women. They interviewed 14 men who have recently begun attending a stopping-violence program in Auckland region. In each 90-minute interview men were asked to give their views on (i) relationship, (ii) women’s rights, (iii) sexualities, (iv) causes of violence, and (v) wider social supports for violence. A range of rhetoric was picked up from the transcribed texts of interviews, and the strategic effects of each form of rhetoric were then analysed. The study finds that the rhetoric functions alongside the discourse of male dominance to generate a sense of naturalness and correctness of men’s power and position in the relationship.

Adams et al suggest that an increased sensitivity to the nuanced effects of rhetoric can improve our understanding of how men justify, camouflage and maintain
dominance within relationships with women. The rhetoric serves as a resource for male dominance and power and thus violence towards women.

Based on life stories of two men who appeared to be desisting from crime, Gadd and Farrall (2004) suggest that an interpretive approach to the narratives and sensitivity to the possibility of unconscious motivations can better explain the contradictory accounts of the men in relation to the heavily gendered issue of family formation.

Mullaney (2007) explores the discrepancy between accounts that battering men give to the researchers and to their female partners about the reasons of their violence. Drawing on in-depth interviews of 14 men in battering programs in the US, she argues that a great discrepancy exists between the account given to her about why the violence happened and those accounts given to their partners immediately after the incidents of violence. While men tend to repair the damaged relationship in their accounts given to their partners, they reconstruct these accounts to the researcher to rationalise their violence.

Mullaney concludes that the battering men use varying verbal accounts as different means to achieve the same end – to save face as well as reconstruct masculinity they feel has been taken from them by their partners and/or state agencies. By tracing the changes in form and content across accounts given to partners and the researcher, she argues that the accounts may not be as irreconcilable as they seem.

2.9 Conclusion

From the review of literatures it can be concluded that:

Masculinity is a social product that exists in multiple forms in a given time in a given society. Currently available masculinities come into existence after social
scrutiny. Specific patterns of masculinities emerge through the processes of colonisation, war, and economic re-structuring.

The gender regimes, which are essential for establishment and maintaining colonial authority and thus economy, of colonial empires give rise to new masculinities among the colonised. The new masculinities can prevail among the colonised long after the departure of colonial rule. The colonial gender regimes can be embedded among the colonised in a number of ways: creating hierarchy among different ethnic groups of the colonised, maintaining specific patterns of gender division of labour in colonial administration and economy of production, and transforming sexualities of the local.

War and conflict can produce masculinities during and after a war/conflict situation. Masculinity is linked to war in the way of providing a framework through which the war can be supported as a social practice and institution. The war leaves the warriors marginalised at the end of war. Finding no alternative means of livelihood, the former war veterans often organise themselves around violence – a war time practice, in a post-war period.

Neoliberalism which is operated within the ethics of ‘survival of the fittest’ shapes the lives of the managers of business firms and companies in a gender-specific way. Being hectic with uneding efforts for professional success in competitive work environments, the managers of transnational business companies can hardly allocate meaningful time for their families. They virtually stay absent from household chores which is rationalised with their sole breadwinning role. The free-market economy also generates an entrepreneur masculinity among the locals which is further propagated discursively.
The current pattern of neoliberalism is also implicating peasants’ livelihood and thus peasant masculinity. The peasant males are losing command over the family because of the dying of traditional farming practice, partly as a result of cessation of government subsidy in agriculture. On the other hand, the female members of the peasant families are gaining command over the family by running small-scale informal businesses which find a place in the new economy. In the face of neoliberalism, the urban working class men work in feminised occupations, a relatively new practice, to keep their identity as a breadwinner for the family intact.

Men’s response to their wives paid work, which is an area of investigation for intra-household gender relations, are diverse. Some men are supporter to their wives, while other men are not at all. Likewise, not all men engage themselves in fathering in the same fashion.

The review of literatures on men and domestic violence links various reasons of men’s violence against their female partners: patriarchy, socio-demography, resources, psychology, a combination of all of these factors, and hierarchal gender structure of social institutions.

The bulk of the studies on men and domestic violence are done in the context of the global north. The social, political, cultural and economic situations of the global north are significantly different from those in the global south –where Cambodia, the case country of this study, is located. Broadly speaking, women in developed countries are more empowered in economic terms compared to their counterparts in the developing countries. Social services, including shelter and counselling for battered women, in developed countries are certainly better. Therefore, the choice of getting out of violent relationship for women in developed countries is wider and better.
Men in developed countries practice masculinities in a consistent economic system –mainly a neo-liberal market economy. Thus the majority of men in developed countries do not encounter sudden changes in gender roles and relationship in intra-household affairs. Contrarily, the construction of masculinities in developing countries like Cambodia traditionally took place in a subsistence economy –mainly agricultural based – which has been radically changed. The findings of studies from the north cannot be directly applied to Cambodia. We must examine to what extent they are relevant.

The following chapters in this thesis are organised with the following themes:

- The French colonial rule in Cambodia, regulation of local masculinities, and the masculinities that emerged among the locals.
- Economy, social structure and violence in post-colonial Cambodia.
- Configuration of masculinities among contemporary Cambodian men of different social and occupational groups: managers, urban workers and peasants.
- How Cambodian men of different social classes respond to their wife’s paid work, negotiate in family relationship, and engage in fathering of their children.
- Patterns of post-conflict transition of masculinities among Cambodian men who were involved in country’s civil war, and
- The dynamics of men’s violence against their wives.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the methodology of this research. First, it provides information on the sample population, sample design, selection of population and the methods used for data collection and data analysis. Then it provides reasons for choosing the method for data collection and analysis and provides information about ethical considerations, the research time frame and the scope and limitations of the research.

3.1 Methodology

3.1.1 Data collection

Two principal methods were used: a review was conducted of Cambodian archival documents, covering the periods of colonialism and civil wars; and life histories were obtained by interview with contemporary Khmer men. These sub-studies were interlocked through the oral-history element in the life history interviews.

3.1.1.1 Review of Archival Documents

Archival Documents of the colonial period were examined first. The review of archival documents investigated how colonialism transformed traditional roles, relations and the status of men and women in Cambodian society. In this context, the conflict between Khmer masculinities of pre- and early colonial Cambodian society
were examined, and then the new masculinities that were produced—whether patriarchal or egalitarian, during the whole course of French colonial rule.

Archival documents from the following sources were examined:

- **National Archives of Cambodia (NAC)**
  
  The National Archives of Cambodia (NAC) are contained in a government institution that is administered by the Council of Ministers. NAC accommodates hundreds of thousands of documents, including 34,000 documents from the French colonial period alone. Documents include official reports and bulletins, laws and policies, newspapers, decrees, official correspondence *inter alia*. These documents are classified with titles, keywords and a combination of both in a digital database. *Les Codes Cambodgiens* (1898), *Code Civil Cambodgien* (1920) and *L’echo du Cambodge* (newspaper) are the key documents that were reviewed for analysis.

- **Archives of France**

  Archives of France (*Archives de France*) holds thousands of official documents on the French colony in Cambodia. Documents are electronically stored in a database (Gallica) and made available on line. Key documents have been retrieved from the online database for analysis. *Convention Conclue Entre la France et le Cambodge* (1884), Annual reports, *Le Cambodge Passé, Présent, Avenir*, *Recueil Des Treaotés* (1884-1902), *Droit Cambodgien* (1894), *Le Cambodge Le Royaume Actuel* (1900), *Organisation Du Cambodge* (1885), and *Rapports Au Conseil De Gouvernement* are the key colonial documents retrieved.

- **Other published documents (Journal and Books)**

  Other published documents such as journal articles and books on the topic of Cambodia covering the colonial period were examined, sourced by searches in databases such as *Sociological Abstracts* and *Historical Abstracts.*
3.1.1.2 Life Histories

Life histories of Cambodian men of specific backgrounds were obtained to examine the impact of the country’s contemporary economic neo-liberalism on the traditional gender order in intra-household gender relations. Participants were interviewed individually and the interviews were both private and semi-public. Interviews covered childhood background, education, employment, important turning points in their lives and lifestyles, professional and family life, notions of manhood, and experience of violence.

The reason for choosing life history as a method for this research is that it is the most versatile method in social science (Plummer, 2001) if one is to gain a close-focus analysis of work, careers and identities in changing social, cultural and economic contexts (Connell, 2007). The life history method is a powerful tool for linking contemporary social experience to its historical roots. This method documents a person’s life or a significant part of his/her life as narrative. The life history is an effective tool to gain an understanding of an individual’s perspective and experience of identity from his/her own narrative. It makes it possible to analyse how changing social, political and economic structures impact on an individual’s gender identity and how he/she accommodates himself/herself in a changing situation. The life history method provides rich evidence about impersonal and collective processes as well as about subjectivity through time (Connell, 2005).

Participants, recruitment of participants and sample design

Life history interviews were conducted with fifty married Cambodian men from different educational and occupational backgrounds and from rural and urban settings. They come from the following groups:
Public sector managers

Public sector managers included member staff of government departments in Phnom Penh who hold mid-level managerial positions in the ministerial hierarchy. Public sector managers in this research come from four line ministries. One of them was working in the private sector at the time of interview, but had previously been a public sector manager.

Private sector managers and business entrepreneurs

Private sector managers (three) hold senior management positions in a transnational financial corporation, an IT company and a Non-governmental Organisation (NGO). Business entrepreneurs (two) own and manage their own business enterprises (a real estate company and an export-oriented agro-based firm).

Urban workers

Urban workers include Cambodian men who work as labourers in the newly established urban sectors such as construction firms, manufacturing and garment industries and entertainment in Phnom Penh. Some of them live with their families in Phnom Penh and others live alone in Phnom Penh, having left their families in the rural provinces.

Peasants

Peasants in this research come from the central and eastern provinces and are mainly subsistence farmers. They practise farming only for subsistence mainly on their family land. Almost all of them have matrilocal marriages.

Men who were involved in DV and are now in remedial programmes

In order to establish a baseline of masculinities in relation to DV, the former perpetrators of DV were interviewed for this study. They are no longer violent after
having participated in an anti-VAW programme run by an NGO. They come from three provinces. Currently they live with their families in peace and harmony.

Table 3.1: Sample Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.</th>
<th>Occupational background</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Geographical location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Public sector managers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Private sector managers and business entrepreneurs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Urban workers (employed in new industries such as real estate and housing, tourism, entertainment and construction)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Central and eastern provinces (three provinces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Men who were involved in domestic violence and are now non-violent</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Central and eastern provinces (three provinces)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection of participants

Participants were recruited by extending invitations through existing social networks in Cambodia. Snowball technique was used to expand the sample. Under snowball technique participants were requested after interviews to pass on invitations to other potential participants. I had access to these networks through previous residence in Cambodia. A local research assistant was recruited who also helped in this task of contacting participants.

3.1.2 Data analysis

The following two methods were used:

3.1.2.1 Discourse Analysis

Relevant historical documents from NAC and Archives of France, plus studies identified via Sociological Abstracts and Historical Abstracts, were analysed to see how colonialism gave rise to particular patterns of masculinities among the local
Cambodians. Discourse analysis was used as a method to study the masculinities that emerged in the course of colonialism. Discourse analysis has become an influential analytical tool in discussion of masculinities (Petersen, 1998; Wetherell and Edley, 1999; Edley, 2001; Toerien and Durrheim, 2001).

Discourse analysis is the study of language-in-use either in speech or writing (Gee, 2011) as forms of social practices (Wodak, 2007). The context of language-in-use is also considered crucial in the analysis (Wodak, 2000). Discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned. It constitutes situations and social identities. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to reproduce existing social practices, and in the sense that it contributes to transform the existing practices. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) suggest that discursive practices can potentially produce ideological effects and power relations among different social groups: men and women, ethnic groups and social classes.

The discourse analysis in this thesis addresses key legal documents, notably civil codes, promulgated by French colonial administration in Cambodia. Key issues raised and addressed in these historical documents were picked up. The key issues are related to gender roles and relations in the family and wider society.

The reason for choosing the civil codes as the material for the analysis is that they were probably the most effective resources that Cambodian society was provided to construct certain patterns of masculinities (Edley, 2001). As Wodak (2000 and 2007) suggests, it is assumed that the issues raised and addressed in the civil codes existed at the time in Cambodia as social practices – practices of men and women. The provisions made in the civil codes represented an attempt to transform the social status quo and produce new practices.
The work on historical documents has great importance for studying the contemporary Khmer masculinities that are portrayed in life histories of men of this thesis. The analysis of historical documents was particularly important to connect or link particular attitudes or norms about gender practices of contemporary Cambodian men, for examples, the notion of household headship and breadwinning role, to their cultural history, i.e., the gender order installed in the course of colonialism in the country. The link is made via the notion that when people express an attitude, they do so using a repertoire of terms which have been provided by history (Edley, 2001).

One of the weaknesses of using civil codes as the material for the analysis is that we lack knowledge or evidence about the extent to which the civil codes were enacted in real terms. The less the codes were enacted in the society, the less it was likely to produce new discourses. It was impossible to find documents that reveal the level of enactment of the civil codes. However, the life histories of men in this thesis suggest that the civil codes were very much effective in producing discourses on gender roles and relations in the family. Men interviewed in this study often referred their gender notions to tradition –actually, to the colonial era.

3.1.2.2 Case Study

The interviewees were asked to narrate their lives. In this narration, focus was concentrated on the practices on which they have built their relationships with others in different stages of their lives. They were also asked to describe their relationships with institutions such as family, school, peers, associations, political parties, workplaces, etc. with which they have connected through their lives. They also shared information about gender order i.e., gender roles (who does what?) and gender relations or power (who makes decisions?) that obtained in different periods of their lives.
In the first step, interviews were recorded. They were then transcribed and translated, indexed and assigned a case study identification. Each case study: (a) narrated the sequences of events, (b) analysed the structural factors, and (c) analysed the dynamics involved in carrying out certain practices. Each case study portrayed the person of the case and examined reflections of social change in that portrayal. In the second step, the life histories were grouped to explore the similarities and differences in the trajectories of men coming from certain social, educational and professional backgrounds in order to establish their collective locations in macro-level changes.

3.2 Ethical Issues

The field research involved living humans. Married men were interviewed on various aspects of life, including intra-family gender relations. Questions on gender relations, particularly on spousal violence, can potentially inflict tension between spouses. Measures were taken to ensure privacy and safety of the respondents.

The Human Ethics Committee, at the University of Sydney is the competent body at the university level to protect the privacy and safety of participants of all researches involving living humans. The field research of this PhD study has fully complied with the conditions of the Human Ethics Committee. The field research plan was screened and approved by the Committee. The following measures were followed to ensure privacy and safety of the participants of this study:

- Participants were informed about the study in advance. A written Participant Information Statement on university letterhead, with details of study objectives, purposes, name of the university and the researcher, was provided to every participating interviewee. No coercion was used against participants of this study. Only their voluntary participation was invited.
- Written consent for their voluntary participation in the interview and permission to record the interview were taken in the Participant Consent Form.
- Both the Participant Information Statement and Participant Consent Form were translated into the Khmer language. In the case of illiterate participants, the information statement and consent form were read to them.
- Participants were interviewed individually although family members also attended the interview in some cases, the participants having given their permission.
- For further protection of the participants' privacy (i) recordings have been held securely while in the field and at the university, (ii) anonymity of the participants is maintained in all stages of the study, including in published documents and during the field interviews, (iii) no one, except the researcher and supervisor have access to the data.

3.3 **Timeframe of the research**

Table 3.2 *Timeframe of the Research*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010 (Jan-Dec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Get the research proposal approved</td>
<td>Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Get ethics approved</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Field work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>First field trip</td>
<td>Mar-Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Thesis writing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Data analysis and thesis writing</td>
<td>July-Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Submit draft thesis (chapter by chapter) to supervisor</td>
<td>Jan-Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Submit final thesis for evaluation of external examiners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 Scope and limitations of the study

All parties, both in the field and the university extended their utmost support in regard to this research. However, I encountered the following problems in the field work:

- Some of the participants, particularly with the business entrepreneurs and public sector managers, needed to change their appointment times more than once, to fit in with their other commitments.
- When asked to tell about their life stories, some participants, particularly the peasants and urban workers, told their stories very briefly. They were not familiar with the format of the life history interview. This problem was addressed by prompting them to elaborate their stories during interview.
- According to the University’s ethics approval, it is required to obtain the signed consent of the participants on the consent form. When asked to sign the consent form, some participants felt uncomfortable. The issue of signing the consent form conveyed a negative connotation for some participants, suggesting they might be giving an undertaking of some kind. One of the participants came to participate in the interview but left when I gave him the consent form for his signature. He was concerned that he might be signing some form of commitment.

Besides the problems encountered in field interview, the study has a few limitations –related to participants and definition of domestic violence –which were intentional but unavoidable because of scope and timeframe of the study.

The first limitation is that the study finding is drawn from life histories of men only. The perspectives of their wives, particularly about violence and post-
transformation configuration of masculinities, would be a valuable addition but could not be included because of the limitations of time and resources. This would be a desirable theme for follow-up research.

The second limitation of the study is its focus on physical aggression, not other aspects of domestic violence: emotional or psychological, economic and mobility. This focus was chosen because physical violence is the main focus of anti-domestic violence programs and policies in developing countries. Given resources limitations, physical violence gets first priority. For example, the penalties for perpetration of domestic violence provisioned in the existing anti-DV law\(^6\) in Cambodia are exclusively based on physical forms of violence. Article 36 of the law says, ‘Criminal prosecution shall not be possible if there a request from a victim who is an adult due to the offences are minor misdemeanours or petty crimes’. Article of the law defines psychological and economic forms of violence as minor misdemeanours or petty crimes which are suggested to be reconciled with the help of local mediators such as monks, village chief, commune councillors and relatives.

PART II

HISTORY OF STATE AND GENDER ORDER IN CAMBODIA
CHAPTER 4
THE FRENCH EMPIRE IN CAMBODIA AND THE REGULATION OF MASCULINITY

4.1 A brief of Cambodia’s overall history

As mentioned in the introduction chapter, Cambodian history records a great civilisation followed by colonialism, civil war and then political stability. The Khmer Empire had its golden time from the 9th to the 14th centuries, when the regime was expanded to the neighbouring territories. However, the Khmer Empire encountered territorial pushes from Ayutha and Champa kingdoms in the 15th century. The Kingdom eventually opted to become a protectorate of France, which was then established as a colonial power in the Indochina region. Cambodia was a protectorate or colony of France from 1863 to 1954.

The status of women in pre-colonial Cambodian society was broadly equal to men, both in family and social life. Colonial rule, which was significantly influenced by the French civil code, promoted differentiated treatment of men and women in the family and social life in the country.

Sihanouk, the King of Cambodia, led Cambodia’s independence from the colonial power. The country experienced relative peace and development during Sihanouk’s regime.
The second Indochina war, which is best known as the Vietnam War, extended to Cambodia, giving rise to the Khmer Rouge. Taking power in 1975, the Khmer Rouge carried out an extreme revolution which eventually caused a toll of at least one-fourth of Cambodian population. The entire social system was disrupted during the Khmer Rouge regime.

Following an invasion by Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge regime was deposed and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established. The PRK regime followed a pro-socialist orthodoxy, and was isolated from the international community. After decades of political instability, war and isolation, the nation was returned to peace and political stability in 1993 when the country held its first democratic election.

Cambodia became a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2005, and officially adopted the market-based economic system. New businesses and occupations have been emerging in Cambodia since the country moved away from a command economy. The emergence of new economic sectors and occupations is affecting the traditional ways of living: specifically the patterns of labor force participation, labor mobility, the household economy and thus intra-household gender relations.

4.2 Social Structures in pre- and early-colonial Cambodia

4.2.1 Population and livelihood

According to Ayamonier (1900), an official of the French colony in Indochina, Cambodia was home to some 2.3 million people by the end of the nineteenth century. Of these, two million were Khmer (Cambodian), and the remaining 300,000 were Chinese, Cham and some tribal groups. Khmer people were
distributed all over Cambodia, except for the upland areas, where tribal groups were concentrated.

To Ayamonier the Khmer people are patient and tireless, skilled in manual work, including farming, climbing palm trees, and sports. They hold a real racial pride which is often translated into a popular adage *sruk khmer min tel sun* or 'Cambodia will never die'. The major religion of the Khmer people was Buddhism and they were pious, tolerant, quiet and hospitable. But they could rise up in cruel and terrible anger when they were pushed to extremes. There was solidarity among the peasants which was practised on different occasions in the forms of free and mutual assistance.

The livelihood of the Khmer people at the time of colonisation was overwhelmingly agriculture-based. The Chinese people were occupied in non-farming activities mainly in fishing, fish processing, marketing and trade. The Cham were predominantly involved in commercial fishing, weaving silk and cattle trading. They were concentrated along the Mekong Delta and Tonle Sap – the great lake.

**4.2.2 Class and Hierarchy among Social Groups**

Four social classes were recognised in pre-colonial Cambodian society. These were the monarch and dignitaries (other members of the royal family), bonzes, mandarins, and peasants. Apart from these social classes, there were slaves. According to Bonhoure (1900), a French historian, there was no distinct middle class in Cambodia during this time. In pre-colonial Cambodian society, a person could gain prestige and respect by righteous conduct and faithful service to the pagoda. But this sort of respect was more symbolic than denoting real power. Hierarchy and association were strictly observed among these classes. The monarch and dignitaries were at the top of the hierarchy. The king was the absolute authority and protector of the kingdom and his role and position were quasi-religious.
Given that religion was an integral part of the nation and the kingdom, the role of bonzes in pre-colonial Cambodia was enormous. They were the essential spiritual force of the monarchy. They served as teachers through Vat-school (pagoda based school) – the only education system that existed in the pre-colonial era. The head of the bonzes served as one of three members of the committee to select a new king for the kingdom. Bonhoure (1900) argues that the real power in the provinces was in the hands of the bonzes. They were tolerant and highly respected and lived on voluntary alms (Aymonier, 1900). They were free from any tax, or obligation to serve royalty.

The mandarins were administrative representatives of the King who performed certain tasks on behalf of the King. They formed the ruling class in the pre-colonial Cambodian society. They were recruited by the King. Their appointment was for life, but subject to the grace and mercy of the King. The title did not automatically transfer from father to son, as they needed to earn the King's favour to hold the title. They enforced royal decrees, collected taxes, carried out trials, and repressed crimes and offences. Their number reached a thousand before the colonial state was established (Aymonier, 1900).

Peasants made up the majority of the Cambodian population in the pre-colonial period. They lived throughout the kingdom and their livelihood was mainly subsistence farming. Given the small population, there was sufficient farming land. Unlike contemporary British-India, a Zamindery (landlord-tenant relationship) was historically absent in Cambodia. The King owned all the land in the kingdom which means there was no land market in pre-colonial Cambodia. Peasants were free in their everyday life and in the making of their livelihood, but their freedom and civil rights were subject to their obligation to provide royal services when required.
4.2.3 Marriage, Family and Intra-Household Gender Relations

According to Aymonier (1900), traditional wedding rituals and formalities were followed in pre- and early-colonial Cambodian society. Arranged marriage was commonly practised. The family of the groom usually sent an intermediary to the parents of the bride with the marriage proposal. The bride was then asked for her consent and upon consent by the bride, the groom served in the home of the prospective parents-in-law throughout his courtship, performed a kind of probation. The wedding ceremony was held when the groom had passed the probationary period and the husband was considered to be the natural protector for his wife. The husband would live for many years with his parents-in-law.

Most of the people were monogamous but polygamy was common among the elite who could marry as many as three wives (Aymonier, 1900). The wives in a polygamous marriage observed a hierarchy. The first wife was the head of the wives and enjoyed a number of privileges. No wedding ritual was performed for the second and third wife. The first wife also inherited a higher percentage of the family property than the second wife and the third wife did not receive any share at all. She was considered to be a concubine and was often purchased (Leclère, 1894). Adultery was also commonly practised, particularly among the rich.

The wife was subject to her husband, particularly in monogamous families but mutual respect was expected between husband and wife. Men and women, particularly in peasant families performed different yet complementary roles that tended to be valued equally (Jacobsen, 2008). Both men and women performed a range of productive tasks (Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 2008).

Divorce was practised and the process of divorce was easy. Either spouse could ask for a divorce. A wife could sue for divorce upon approval of her parents and
either party could sue for divorce on the grounds of: violence and conflict, prolonged absence, or general difficulties in the household (Aymonier, 1900; Leclère, 1898).

Thierry (1955) suggests that Khmer women enjoyed a status equal to that of men in the family and in society for fourteen hundred years. Women held many different jobs in society, and estates passed through the maternal line. Women were fully capable from a legal standpoint. There was no question of intervention by or the need for the consent of her husband for any action by a woman. A woman enjoyed the same rights as her husband in the community and family. Thierry further suggests that the status of Khmer women was gradually degraded through the influence of other cultures, including that of China.

With anthropological analysis of a popular Khmer folk story dated back to pre-colonial era Ledgerwood (1995) sketches out status of women and intra-family gender relations in pre-colonial Cambodian society. She suggests that two notions: a man is always bigger than a woman; and men and women are relatively equal, existed simultaneously in Khmer society. Therefore, a woman needed to be both silent and well-spoken in the same time. A Khmer woman should be virtuous and demonstrate a state of high merit so that she and her husband can benefit from it in this life.

4.3 The arrival of colonialism

Over the 18th and 19th centuries Cambodia suffered from territorial invasion from the neighbouring countries of Siam and Vietnam. In 1853, Ang Duong, the King of Cambodia, sought French help to protect Cambodia from further invasion and potential extinction. The reasons for Ang Duong seeking help from the French rather than the British and Dutch empires – that were already in the region – were probably that (i) French missionaries were working in Cambodia at that time and the King had a good relationship with them, (ii) France had already shown its power in the region
by establishing a colony in Indochina, and (iii) the British had a good relationship with the Thai – the main threat to Cambodia’s sovereignty.

In order to obtain France’s support, King Duong sent some gifts and offered his ‘humble homage’ to Napoleon III via the French consulate in Singapore. No progress regarding the King’s request took place for a decade during which Siam remained the main influence on the affairs of the Palace. King Ang Duong died in 1860 and was succeeded by Prince Norodom. Finally the request was acted on, through a visit to the Kingdom in 1863 by a French naval delegation led by Henry Mouhot. A protectorate treaty was signed on 11 August of the same year. The treaty was signed between Norodom (on behalf of Cambodia) and Henry Mouhot (on behalf of France) in Odong – the capital of Cambodia at that time. Odong is 40 km northwest of Phnom Penh.

The treaty opened up trade opportunities for France in exchange for protecting the Kingdom. The treaty established a common pattern of transnational trade – the collection of raw materials from the colonies, shipment of these materials to the Métropole, processing them and marketing the finished products in Europe as well as in the colonies. The whole process was operated by the colonial administration. Under the treaty the Cambodian King allowed duty-free import of foreign goods and export of local goods by the French traders. The French were permitted to establish a river port to facilitate shipment of goods to and from Laos – already a French colony.

The treaty also transferred the Kingdom’s authority for foreign policy and diplomatic relations with other countries to France. The French Governor of Cochin-china looked after Cambodian foreign policy.

The protectorate thus established was administered by a Résident Supérieur (stationed in Phnom Penh) under the guidance of the Gouverneur Général for Indo-
Chine (stationed in Saigon). France maintained the Protectorate until 1953 and during almost ninety years of Protectorate rule, Cambodia experienced a number of Résidents Supérieurs. The kings who ruled during the protectorate were Norodom (1860-1904), Sisowath (1904-1927), Monivong (1927-1941) and Sihanouk (1941-2004). Cambodia became independent from French rule on November 9, 1953 under the leadership of King Sihanouk.

The relationship between the monarch and the Protectorate Administration was not always the same. There were serious disagreements between the Protectorate and the King, particularly during the time of King Norodom. Disagreements arose when the Protectorate wanted to effect political and economic interventions.

The Protectorate carried out administrative, judicial, commercial and financial reforms in Cambodia. They developed infrastructures (mainly road and rail), established an education system, and health care services and facilities. They ratified the original treaty and promulgated new ordinances from time to time. They adopted legal codes, the ‘Codes Cambodgiens’ in 1898 and the ‘Code Civil Cambodgien’ in 1920 which delineated codes of conduct for Cambodian women and men. We can see a paradigm shift in codes of conduct from 1898 to 1920. They are key evidence for public definitions of masculinity under colonialism.

4.4 Creation of the colonial state

In the first two decades of the treaty, i.e., until 1884, the colonial power could make little progress towards establishing a colonial state because of non-cooperation by King Norodom and some of his mandarins. Colonial authority was frustrated with the lack of progress in terms of implementation of the provisions of the protectorate
treaty which were essential for running the economy by the colonial empire. Frustrations are reflected in colonial narratives.

The foundation of a colonial state was laid down on 17 June 1884 through the forced assent by King Norodom to a reform Convention. Charles Thomson, Gouverneur Général in Saigon, arrived in Phnom Penh with armed forces, approached the Palace and asked the King to sign the reform Convention which was pre-designed, and laid out wide-ranging reforms. It contained provisions for immediate, drastic changes in administrative and political institutions, finance (tax and national accounts), property (land and building) ownership, and the judiciary system. The Convention limited the King’s control over the kingdom (Chandler, 1982). It proposed reforms in the following areas: political organisation and administration; legal organisation; slavery, property rights; and taxation on farming land. It will be instructive to examine the details of this founding document.

4.4.1 Political organisation and administration

Decisive political and administrative reforms introduced a structured, hierarchical and multi-tiered public sector – the first of its kind in Cambodian history. Under the reform, the Gouverneur Général and Résident Général held the real power over all functions of the kingdom.

The French Résident Général became the executive head of the country with broad administrative and judicial authority. The Résident Général was in charge of the

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7 For example, Imprimerie Coloniale (1885) *Organisation Du Cambodge*, Saigon, narrates (page 4), ‘Comme pendant vingt ans l’ont déjà été de promesses, par la mauvaise volonté des mandarins intéressés à maintenir l’état actuel.’

8 Résident Général and Résident Général Supérieur are titles for same position. The title Résident Général has been used in the Convention.
national treasury and accounts. He was assisted by an Assistant Résident Général who was also French. The Résident Général was responsible for regular implementation of the protectorate treaty, extending to all public services and regulations in the Kingdom without distinction. He was to establish a justice system and ensure public safety. The Résident Général was also responsible for the preparation of a state budget and for presenting it to the governor of Cochin China.

The provisions for the status and role of the King made in the Convention were ambiguous. On the one hand he was expected to control the kingdom as in the past. On the other hand, he was bound to accept all reforms deemed necessary and important by the Government of the French Republic—which meant, in effect, the Résident Général.

The entire Kingdom was concentrated from fifty seven administrative provinces into eight. Each province was headed by a Résident—a Frenchman proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouvernour Général. The Résident of each province was assisted by a Secretary who was also a Frenchman proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouvernour Général. The Résident was in charge of political affairs and provincial administration, control of the Cambodian authorities, maintaining law and order and monitoring all public services in the province. There was a Chief of Province—a Cambodian who was proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouvernour Général. He worked under the

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9 Art. 2. (in page 7) – ‘S. M. le Roi du Cambodge continuera, comme par le passé, à gouverner ses états et à diriger leur administration, sauf les restrictions qui résultent de la présente convention.’

10 Art. 1. (in page 7) – ‘S. M. le Roi du Cambodge accepte toutes les réformes administratives, judiciaires, financières et commerciales auxquelles le Gouvernement de la République française jugera à l’avenir utile de procéder pour faciliter l’accomplissement de son Protectorat.’
control of the Provincial Résident. The Chief of Province ranked highest among the indigenous (Cambodian) civil servants. He was assisted by an Assistant Chief of Province who was also proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouverneur Général. The entire country was further divided into thirty-two administrative districts headed by a Chief of District who was named by the Résident Général.

The lowest administrative unit of the reformed administration was the commune. Each commune was managed by a Council of six members who served crucial roles for the protectorate. Articles 30 and 31 delineated the responsibilities of the commune council: (i) to look after criminal justice in the commune, (ii) drafting peasants for Corvée labour\(^{11}\) and ensuring their participation, and (iii) collecting administrative fines. The commune council was allowed to use coercion to perform their assignments.

### 4.4.2 Legal organisation

Establishing a judicial system was one of the major thrusts of the reform. The reformed judiciary had three levels: courts of peace at the district level, provincial courts, and a high court in Phnom Penh. Article 2 set out the structure of the justice system. The justice system was supposed to follow the principles of equity, local custom, and French law\(^{12}\) which meant the colonial authority was trying to cultivate a French value system in the colony.

\(^{11}\) Corvée labour was semi-voluntary but mandatory engagement of rural peasants in public works carried out mainly in cities and infrastructure connecting cities. Every farmer was required to work for ninety days as part of the Corvée labour.

\(^{12}\) Art. 3. – Les juges statueront suivant l’équité, en respectant autant que possible les coutumes cambodgiennes et en s’inspirant des principes du Droit française.
The judges were particularly strict in applying laws relevant to tax and customs. The court of peace at the district level was staffed with a Cambodian judge and a guard all of whom were appointed by the Résident Général. The court of peace was entitled to deal with disputes up to the value of five piastres, and could impose prison sentences of up to eight days. The court of peace served as judicial police but was not entitled to deal with any dispute between indigenous and French people, or involving other Europeans or Americans.

The Provincial Court was chaired by the Provincial Resident, a temporary Cambodian judge (named by the Résident Général) and also included a guard. The provincial court dealt with criminal cases related to taxation and customs duty as well as civil matters. It was responsible for cases referred from the court of justice at district level. The Provincial court was entitled to give verdicts of imprisonment up to two years or fines up to 200 piastres.

The High Court was based in Phnom Penh. The bench was composed of the Résident Général or his delegate, a French civil servant, and two Cambodian judges proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouverneur Général. The Résident Général served as the President of the bench.

4.4.3 Abolition of slavery

Slavery was abolished in all parts of Cambodia under the reform. It was previously practised throughout the country as a punishment for debts, crimes and offenses committed by oneself and or one’s ancestors. Provision was made for the immediate release of slaves for crimes or offenses by their ancestors or their family. These slaves were released with full rights without any compensation. People enslaved for crimes or offenses of their own were transferred to the Provincial Courts.
for judgement. Slaves for personal debts were forced to refund their debts to the creditors.

4.4.4 Property rights

The King traditionally owned all of Cambodian kingdom. Under the reform, all land became state property and was divided into four types: Crown property (belonging to the palace), public domain (i.e., roads, bridges, rivers, ferry-ways, and the spaces and buildings of civil administration, etc.), reserve fields (i.e., any facility that was deemed to be needed by the administration), and transferrable fields (i.e., agricultural and other ground). From this point on, farmers could hold title for the land they possessed.

The reform of land ownership was motivated by the idea of commercialisation of agriculture through increased collection of revenue (via tax and export income). Peasants were persuaded by the colonial administration and their associates to undertake commercial production of rice and to grow other cash crops such as cotton, indigo, pepper, tobacco and rubber. The colonial administration considered that lack of land ownership was one of the reasons for the peasants' reluctance to engage in commercial-scale agriculture. The reform, therefore, gave land title to the peasants. The colonial authority brought some 60,000 Vietnamese into Cambodia to support rubber plantations (Chandler, 1982).

4.4.5 Tax on paddy

The reform banned the existing practice (Oknhaluong) of tax collection on paddy (rice-fields), and introduced a new provision starting from the standing crop in 1884. The rate of tax for paddy was fixed at 10% of the yield but the paddy intended for alcohol production was exempt from the tax. The Protectorate took charge of the application of the new land tax.
Cambodian peasants paid the highest tax per capita in Indochina. The higher the tax on paddy the peasants paid, the harder they had to work to produce enough rice to feed their families throughout the year. In fact, the peasants were pushed towards excessive work. This led to mass protests and violence by the peasants against the French protectorate (discussed in the following sections).

The real enforcement of the reforms began in the time of King Sisowath, who was officially crowned in 1906. The colonial state now came into full existence as an organisation. The education sector was developed and modernised. Health and scientific education, including an engineering faculty, were established during this time. But the rural economy was not developed to the same extent. State services were extended and expanded. Sisowath supported Protectorate policies and interventions without argument as he was the beneficiary of the protectorate who crowned him while simultaneously dismantling royal power. A number of royal decrees and ordinances were promulgated by King Sisowath from time to time to reinforce the colonial state.

4.5 Responses to colonialism

The Cambodians' response to colonialism was broadly of two forms: *complicit* and *protest*. These two responses came from distinct positions in the system of colonial rule. Power and authority were central in forming both types of response.

4.5.1 Complicit responses

King Sisowath and Cambodian civil servants were complicit with colonial rule. Sisowath, the half-brother of Norodom, gave unequivocal support to the establishment of the colonial state. He maintained a positive relationship with the colonial authority during the reign of Norodom. He was so successful in this, that he was crowned the new king after Norodom's death, bypassing Norodom's son.
Sisowath's complicit relation to colonialism resulted from negotiation of power at two levels: one between himself and the colonial power, and the other between himself and his subjects. He made himself submissive at one level to gain power at the second. Complicity to the colonial power was the best available option for Sisowath.

The native civil servants were also complicit with colonialism. They served as 'fonctionnaires indigènes' and their collaboration and support were necessary if the colonial administration reforms were to function. The colonial authority seems to have been happy with their collaboration. A colonial report of 1910 suggests that the native civil servants were performing their responsibilities with zeal and enthusiasm.

The old civil servants were being replaced by a pool of talented young people who had chosen public service after being rigorously examined and evaluated.

Two factors worked behind the complicit role of native civil servants towards establishing the colonial state. First, serving in the French colonial administration was perceived as prestigious and honourable. The French had established a great Empire at that time and were already a colonial power in Indo-China when the Cambodian king sought protection. Second, their service in the colonial state gave them position of power over other natives. Specifically, this was an opportunity for Cambodians of non-mandarin background to work in state services.

The colonial state established and maintained racial and class boundaries. Different ethnic groups were treated differently. For example, a differentiated rate of personal income tax was introduced for Khmer, Chinese, Cham and other ethnic groups. This created class division among different ethnic groups. In official meetings, staffs of different ethnic backgrounds were not allowed to mix. For

example, in the quarterly meeting of the Municipal Commission of Phnom Penh, members of Khmer ethnicity sat in the second row (French staff sat in the first row) followed by Cham, Chinese and Indian members.

4.5.2 Protest response

Responses from King Norodom – the signatory to the Protectorate Treaty - and lower-ranked native Cambodians, particularly peasants and monks, had demonstrated their resistance against colonialism. Colonial documents suggest that the colonial state was only a shadow until 1904 (when Norodom died) although the reform Convention was signed in 1884. Norodom signed the Convention under compulsion but his non-cooperation prevented the reforms taking effect. Because of the reform, the monarch would come under the control of foreigners. He held extensive power in his realm outside politics14, raised families with several wives, kept concubines, maintained a harem and enjoyed a luxurious life despite the fact that the monarch was supposed under the control of the Gouverneur Général and Résident Général.

Tax – the ultimate means of performing royal power – came under the direct control of the colonial administrators. The national treasury was seized and under the terms of the reform, the King was prohibited from raising in-kind taxation. The King was not allowed to receive any unauthorised loan and property. The colonial power

also set a limitation on expenses for the King and palace dignitaries. All the provisions contained in the Convention threatened the King’s power and authority. His non-cooperation was not surprising.

The peasants and monks were also against colonialism. They protested against tax, Corvée labour (a substitute for tax of ninety days of labour service) and forced recruitment of Cambodians to serve overseas in the French army – all of them pillars of the colonial empire. They expressed their antagonism through means ranging from peaceful protest to fatal rebellions. Their protests resulted from systematic repression that took place through strict rules, regulations and disciplinary actions imposed on the population (in the form of Corvée labour and taxes on paddy), and mobility – important infringements of the perceived rights of masculinity. These sorts of regulations were new to Cambodians and conflicted with their traditional ways of performing as men. Key moments of protest are discussed in the following section.

4.5.3 Resistance and repression

Not long after the major growth of the colonial state began, a wave of resistance and rebellion emerged. The main responses were:

The Ang Snguon Rebellion (1912)

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15 Article 7 of Part I (in page 6) of the Convention reads, ‘A special arrangement will be adopted for setting the civil list of the King and the Princes of the Royal family after the establishment of the definitive budget of the Kingdom. The civil list of the King is provisionally set at three hundred thousand piastres; the staffing of the Princes is provisionally set at xx thousand piastres. The distribution will be stopped following agreement between H.M. the King of Cambodia and the Governor General of Cochin-China. H.M. the King of Cambodia is prohibited from acquiring any debt without the consent of the Government of the Republic.'
Ang Snguon was a defrocked monk who took the name of Ang Snguon – a deceased prince and uncle of King Sisowath. He led an uprising in the early years of King Sisowath, in the northern region of the country (Stung Treng, Kratie and Kampong Thom province). He was able to convince a large number of fearful and credulous people that he was the ‘king of the country’. He carried out an attack on the French Residence at Thala-Borivet in Porong region and became an icon for other rebels in the country (Tully, 2002).

**Sena Ouch Rebellion (1913-1916)**

Ouch, another former monk, carried out a rebellion in the form of social banditry from 1913-1916. He was considered a Robin Hood. According to authorities, Ouch claimed to be guided by supernatural forces, and to have as his aim Cambodian independence and the expulsion of foreigners.

In 1914, Ouch had a group of at least 100 active and dedicated followers who were tattooed and carried amulets. A number of peasants were complicit in Ouch’s rebellion, providing information about the government’s militia forces. Ouch’s group attacked the Apostolic Mission’s plantation at Chhlong and shot its chief, Father R.P. David (Tully, 2002).

**Phnong Revolt (1914-1916)**

Phnong is a hill tribe who live in the northern and eastern regions (Kratie, Stung Treng province) of Cambodia. They had been living in the mountains for millennia using shifting cultivation. As with native Cambodians, the colonial administration imposed tax and Corvée labour on the Phnong as part of a reform in 1912. The imposition of tax and Corvée labour meant that Phnong needed to adopt the

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way of life of the plains population which seemed absurd and irrational to the Phnong. According to colonial documents\textsuperscript{17}, the Phnong revolted in reaction against the imposition of tax. The Protectorate continued to impose its plan and a revolt followed with heavy casualties although statistics are not available for Phnong casualties. By the end of 1916, the revolt had caused the deaths of three Frenchmen, including the Chief Delegation of Kratié, and some 130 Cambodian militia and guards.

The 1916 Affairs

In January 1916, Cambodia experienced the biggest-ever uprising of peasants in its history. According to Tully (2002), an estimated 100,000 peasants from all parts of the country gathered in Phnom Penh to submit a petition to King Sisowath against the arbitrary and corrupt rule of commune council leaders and civil servants, the high taxation level, corvée labour and the forced recruitment of Cambodians to serve in the French military overseas. Colonial authorities termed this movement ‘The 1916 Affairs’\textsuperscript{18}. The revolutionaries sought intervention from the King on these issues. Such a huge gathering of peasants in the capital city, directly approaching the king without being organised by any mainstream political leader, was a surprise and a warning to the colonial administration.

State response to protest

The internal report\textsuperscript{19} of the colonial administration reveals that the regime quickly changed its strategy in response to this turbulence moving their reliance on local government to dependence on the police force. They could not depend on local government agencies such as the commune councils, and police numbers were


\textsuperscript{18} Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1916. Impr. D’Extrême-Orient: Hanoi; p.76.

increased during the years of revolt and protest. Ironically, the police recruits were also local people and all of them were men.

Table 4.1 Number of Police in 1914-1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The colonial authority had other tactics available, such as using native civil servants, commune leaders and neighbours in the forefront to tackle rebellion, banditry and revolts. For example, after the killing of the Chief Delegation of Kratié by Phnongs in July 1914, the colonial authority carried out both military and non-military campaigns. The official report of the colonial authority\textsuperscript{23} describes the strategy. Military security posts were installed under the direct supervision of French commanders. Each security post was equipped with improved arms, ammunition and motorised vehicles. At the same time a civilian campaign was undertaken: the officials, merchants and local residents were called on to penetrate the territory of the Phnongs. Markets were developed to promote trade and commerce with the lowlands. Local products which were formerly used for subsistence by the Phnongs were absorbed into the commercial market. The traditional way of living of the Phnongs was eventually disrupted.


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1916. Impr. D'Extrême-Orient: Hanoi; p.76.

Violence and social tension could result from such tactics. Placing Cambodian civil servants in the front ranks of the campaign against the rebellion created rivalry among the natives (for example, peasants and Phnomgs versus civil servants, police, and commune leaders). It was not just a matter of French violence towards Cambodians; violence among Cambodians was also generated.

There had been violence in pre-colonial Cambodia but the violence in pre-colonial Cambodia primarily took the form of banditry (Tully, 2002). The violence during French colonialism was different in terms of scale, mode, people involved and the fatalities. Violence erupted from national to local level. People who had traditionally been peaceful such as monks, tribal ethnic groups (Phnomgs) and peasants, organised and led movements which sometimes turned violent.

Although most studies (Tully, 1996 and Chandler, 1983) on colonial rule in Cambodia link violence with tax and Corvée labour imposed by the colonial authority, the leadership role of Buddhist monks – who were usually exempted from tax24 and Corvée labour – in two of the most serious rebellions gives reason to seek causes of violence beyond tax and Corvée labour. Furthermore, an internal report25 of the colony published at the start of the period of major violence (1910-1916) suggests that people were paying taxes voluntarily and the administrative staff were able to collect tax without any difficulty.

An alternative explanation is that native Cambodians took the path of violence and social protest to remove the stigma of subordination – which was institutionalised through a system of rules, regulations, and disciplines. French colonial authority ruled

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24 According to the Royal Ordinance dated 31 December 1897 certain people including Monks (Bonzes) and their assistant/associates were exempted from personal tax.

Cambodia with the perception of a father-child relationship\textsuperscript{26} where the child – the native Cambodian – needed to be disciplined to grow up with a French value system. The system was carried out by Frenchmen, native civil servants and local leaders. All of them were considered indifferent to the ordinary Cambodian people, particularly to the peasants.

The creation of a colonial state brought about many changes in the traditional ways of living. The people came under strict regulation in almost every aspect of life, ranging from restricted mobility, to mandatory Corvée labour, to paying tax for all usable goods, even for insignificant fishing gear. Civil codes that came into force on January 1, 1916 further regulated the life of Cambodians, particularly in their family and sexual life. Some traditional practices regarding family and sexuality became crimes in the civil codes.

Under the 1884 Convention, people’s mobility was restricted. Commune councils issued identification cards to all residents of the commune. Commune residents were not allowed to stay outside the commune for more than eight days. If someone wanted to travel outside the commune, he was required to obtain permission from the Mayor of the commune council. Similar processes were required if someone wanted to go outside his/her canton, district or province. The reasons for putting restriction on people’s mobility were to ensure that people did not evade tax or Corvée labour, and to control people’s political organisation.

The colonial authority needed a huge workforce to carry out public works (construction of roads, railways, buildings, bridges, telegraph lines) for the colonial population.

\textsuperscript{26} Rapport Sur Le Cambodge Présente Le 24 Janvier 1874 Au Ministère De La Marine Et Des Colonies. Imprimerie F. Debons ET C\textsuperscript{IE}. Paris. p.5.
economy. Though the colonial administration abolished slavery, the provision of Corvée labour was another form of forced labour which was due to the State.

The development programmes carried out by the colonial administration were pro-colonial economy. The road, train and other infrastructures were targeted to serve export-oriented interests and took place in particular geographical locations (e.g. train services connected Phnom Penh to the Thai border via Battambang and Siem Reap – two rice producing provinces, and the port-city later known as Sihanouk Ville). The peasants found the colonial development of little benefit for them; but rather a systematic subordination in the form of coercive tax and Corvée labour. They rebelled in protest at their subordination, as many others did, across the colonised world.

Monks, who were previously respected and treated as holy man, came, like the peasants, under specific regulations. After 1884, they were obliged to carry an identity card, and needed permission to visit places other than their residential pagodas. Their roles as teachers were also eroded with the establishment of modern secular schools. They were excluded from the state machinery. The rebellion of monks such as Ang Snguom and Ouch can be seen as a reaction against this control and an attempt to regain their social privilege and respect.

4.6 Legal construction of masculinity under colonialism

Colonialism was often figured as a gendered enterprise and was undertaken in a gender-specific way. The conquest and consolidation of the Kingdom of Cambodia by France was not an exception. Colonisation of Indochina, including Cambodia, was carried out by cadres of French men – naval officers, soldiers and administrators (Cooper, 2001).

Royal ordinance dated 30 December 1916 promulgated identification card for Buddhist monks.
Use of force was vital for French authority to establish the colonial state in Cambodia. Main events of colonial rule such as 1884 Reform Convention, tax collection, and enforcement of Corvée labour, all took place in a climate of compulsion.

Many administrative, legal, economic and social reforms took place during the colonial rule. Traditional gender practices of Cambodians were contested and restructured by the reforms. Men’s and women’s relative position in gender relations was altered under Code Cambodgiens (1898) and Code Civil Cambodgien (1920), two notable legal instruments which had made tremendous changes in the ways Cambodian people made their common culture, tradition and living.

4.6.1 Codes Cambodgiens 1898

Codes Cambodgiens came into effect in 1898 through a Royal Decree by King Norodom under the auspices of M. Ducos, Resident Superior and M. Doumer, Governor General of Indochina. It laid out codes of conduct for the Cambodian people in various areas including family and marriage. The legal provisions adopted in the Codes Cambodgiens were partly influenced by the codes from pre-colonial times. For this research, the legal provisions of the Codes Cambodgiens surrounding the issues of marriage and family life are particularly important. There are numerous articles in the codes dealing with the roles and relations of spouses, polygamy, adultery, spousal violence and divorce.

4.6.1.1 Men as the Reciprocal Leader of Wife

Marriage was regarded as honourable in the Codes Cambodgiens. A man was supposed to get married, cohabit with his wife and have several children. Marriage was only allowed between two people of different sex and the consent of both intending spouses was required in the Codes Cambodgiens.
The status of husband and wife was reciprocal. A husband must provide food and other amenities to his wife (Article 37, p. 278, vol. I). A wife could seek divorce in case her husband failed to support her and family. On the other hand, a woman was obliged to cohabit with her husband and help make a family (Article 44, p. 254, vol. I). A husband was entitled to seek divorce on the ground of non-cohabitation by his wife (Articles 20 and 21, p. 244, vol. I).

Though women were designated for family-making, there were no restrictions on women's economic activities in the Codes Cambodgiens. Similarly, men’s entitlement in seeking divorce was granted mainly on the issue of wife’s non-cohabitation, not on her failing the role of making the family. The productive roles of a husband and the reproductive roles of a wife were seen as complementary in the Codes.

4.6.1.2 Extra-marital sexuality, social disorder and legal sanction

Sexual fidelity was considered an important element of married life. The Codes Cambodgiens made significant legal provisions against adultery or extramarital sex by both spouses. This implies that there was a lot of adultery in early colonial Cambodian society. Adultery was considered illegal and was subject to a fine. The amount of the fine varied depending on the status in marriage of the woman involved in adultery i.e., whether she was a Prâpon Thom (first wife), Prâpon Kandal (second wife) or Prâpon Chhong (third wife), and her social class i.e., whether she is the wife of a dignitary or an ordinary man. Men were allowed to have several wives in early colonial Cambodian society.

When adultery occurred with Prâpon Thom the full fine was imposed. When adultery occurred with Prâpon Kandal or Prâpon Chhong the fines were four fifths or three fifths of the maximum, respectively (Art. 2&3, p. 238, vol. I). On the other
hand, the fine was doubled when the adultery occurred with the wife of a dignitary. The dignitary was even entitled to kill the man who had adulterous relations with his wife (Article 10, p. 241, vol. I). The fine could be halved when the adultery occurred between a married man and an abandoned woman (Article 47, p. 254, vol. I) or a married man and a single girl (Article 2, p. 264, vol. I). The code required the man guilty of adultery to make full payment of the fine. The fine was deposited in the Royal treasury and a portion given to the husband of the adulterous woman. The provision of fines suggests that marital infidelity was more common among men than women as only men were made to pay the fine. It also suggests that the Codes Cambodgiens attempted to treat and fine adultery more rigorously than sex between non-married couples (articles 3 and 6, p. 264 and 265 respectively, vol. I). The fine for adultery was higher than the fine for sex between an unmarried couple. Social class further influenced the degree of correct sexual behaviour among married people, particularly women. Proper sexual behaviour of women of a higher social class such as the wives of dignitaries was more valued than that of women of ordinary men.

4.6.1.3 Spousal violence and the Codes Cambodgiens

The Codes Cambodgiens was completely intolerant of spousal violence. It was enshrined by non-violence Buddhist teaching which had been nourished by Cambodian society for long time. All sorts of violence, including psychological violence were punishable and punishments ranged from fines to the death penalty. Punishment could be imposed on any spouse depending on the offense. Usually, the punishment for a husband was harsher than for a wife. According to the Codes Cambodgiens, if a woman cursed, insulted or criticised her husband, she would be
fined five damloeng\textsuperscript{28}. If a woman hit her husband and caused a bruise or injury, she would be seized and placed in chains. Then all her property would be confiscated and shared equally between her husband and the royal treasury (Article 43, p. 309, vol. I). The Codes also criminalise men’s violence against their wives by fines (Article 25, p.245, vol.I). A woman in a violent marriage was entitled to divorce her husband (Article 42, pp. 252-253, vol. I). The Codes Cambodgiens were created to establish and maintain harmony and non-coercive relationships in the family. It was concerned to enable the spouses to perform their roles with mutual respect.

\textbf{4.6.1.4 Polygamy, Aristocrat Masculinity and Men’s Subjectivity to Prâpan Thom (first degree wife)}

Men were allowed to have more than one wife under the provisions of Codes Cambodgiens although Cambodian society was largely monogamous. National statistics of marriage registration in the years 1950, 1951 and 1952 suggest that only 2.1%, 1.6% and 1.7% of the marriages registered during these years were celebrated as second degree marriage (Thierry, 1955). Polygamy was mainly common among the mandarins and other rich men. The Codes Cambodgiens made a considerable number of provisions regarding polygamy.

Prâpon Thom (the first wife) enjoyed privileges in relations to both her husband and her husband’s other wives. Even if her husband was considered an aristocrat, he needed permission and approval from the Prâpon Thom in many family issues, including whether he can take another wife (article 26, p. 245, vol. I). She would seek divorce if her husband took another wife without her consent and she inherited almost all the family property on the death of her husband. She was the only

\textsuperscript{28} Damloeng is the unit of gold and is equal to 10 Gram.
wife permitted to attend social and public affairs. Other wives were not allowed to take part in any social and public functions and were expected to respect and honour the Prâpon Thom and provide her with services (article 26, pp-245-246, vol. I).

The consent of the Prâpon Thom for another wife suggests that sexual promiscuity of aristocratic men was under the control and censorship of the Prâpon Thom. Giving consent to her husband for another wife she could enjoy equal status in intra-household gender relations throughout her life. The place and status of the Prâpon Thom in the household were equal to those of her husband. Men in polygamous marriages needed to co-operate with their wife of first degree. In some cases they might need to accept her authority, particularly if ambiguities arose in relation to their other wives.

4.6.2 Code Civil Cambodgien 1920

The Code Civil Cambodgien (or Civil Code for Cambodia) came into force on July 1, 1920 through a royal decree (Royal Decree no. 17). The 1920 Civil Code was endorsed on February 25, 1920 by Sisowath, the King of Cambodia with the approval of Baudoin, Resident Superior and Long, Governor General of Indochina. Drawing on the French Civil Code of 1804, it laid out codes of conduct for Cambodians in different spheres of life, including marriage and family life. The civil code adopted provisions particularly in the areas of marriage and family life which were more patriarchal compared with the provisions of Codes Cambodgiens, removing women’s freedom of choice and reinforcing men’s authority over their wives.

4.6.2.1 Men as Sole Breadwinner

The complimentary gender role between men and women which existed in pre-colonial era was replaced in course of colonial rule. The replacement took place
within the view that domestic work is women’s work and is less important than the work that takes place outside the home (Aing 2004).

The Code Civil Cambodgien gave men power as the sole breadwinners of the family. This was achieved in two ways: first by obliging men to provide for their wives and families, and second by limiting women’s participation in economic activities. Articles 193, 197 and 198 are relevant in this regard. Men are made to provide support and resources for their wives and families (Article 193) as per the need.

The Code Civil brought women’s participation in any economic activity under the control of their husbands (Article 198). They could only run a trade, business or any other form of economic activity with the permission of their husbands (Article 197). According to the Code Civil Cambodgien (Article 207), a woman could seek divorce if her husband failed to support her and the family. The legal provisions combined to define men as the breadwinners for the family.

4.6.2.2 Men and Patriarchy

The Code Civil Cambodgien endorsed patriarchy. Cambodian men enjoyed increased authority in many new areas. The new civil code gave them more rights to exert their authority and became more flexible with reference to some conduct which had been subject to strict legal action under the Codes Cambodgiens. For example, according to article 336 of Code Civil Cambodgien, the father alone was vested with the parental authority to issue consent for their children to marry whereas the fathers’ consent by itself had been insufficient in the Codes Cambodgiens.

According to the old civil code, a polygamous man needed consent from his wife of first degree to take a wife of second degree. His wife of first degree could seek divorce to the court, if he acquired a second wife without her consent. This legal
provision in the old civil code had limited men’s patriarchal practice. Furthermore, the requirement of consent gave an extra privilege to the first degree wife in intra-household gender relations. This undermined the power and authority of the husband to some extent. This mandatory provision was omitted in the new civil code. Men could acquire second or third wives without obtaining the consent of the first wife. Polygamous men could, therefore, exert complete patriarchal authority over their wife of first degree.

The new civil code gave more flexibility to men in adultery. According to Codes Cambodgiens, adultery by any spouse could be the ground of divorce. But Code Civil Cambodgien limited this provision and made a distinction between adultery of the husband and adultery of the wife. A wife’s adultery could be regarded by her husband as grounds for divorce whereas a husband’s adultery was not to be regarded by his wife as grounds for divorce. The Code Civil Cambodgien normalised men’s adultery, giving sexual freedom to men.

4.7 Changes in the Cambodian gender order

The Code Civil Cambodgien produced new gender regimes in the course of its enforcement and application.

Both Codes Cambodgiens and Code Civil Cambodgien considered a husband as the head of his wife and his family. He was entrusted to give protection and support to his wife and other family members. Following the traditional way of making life in the early colonial period in Cambodian society, men’s positions as head of the family was defined only by custom. With the consolidation of the colonial state, the life and livelihood of the Cambodian people changed significantly. The country moved to a real bureaucratic state through the modernisation of all sectors, particularly in public administration, the legal and justice system, and the economy and business. People
interacted with the bureaucratic state and its institutions in daily life as the country became relatively modern. In such an atmosphere of social and political change, a husband's status as the head of wife and family became functional rather than customary. A wife's subordination to her husband came into practice so that during the period of the Code Civil Cambodgien, a man could enjoy his position as head of his wife and family in a real sense.

A woman needed to recognise her husband's authority in almost all spheres of life. She needed formal permission from her husband (as head of the family) for all affairs such as filing a case in a local court, lodging a complaint, opening a business or trade, enrolling her children in school, arranging religious rituals and even for agreeing to her children marrying.

There was no provision in Codes Cambodgiens that arrested or limited women's freedom of choice in public affairs such as running a business or trading, filing any complaint or taking a case to the local authority or tribunal. But the Code Civil Cambodgien set provisions which eventually limited women's freedom of choice in various areas ranging from opening a trade or business and filing a legal or official complaint. A woman was not entitled to pursue any case or engage in any public, social or other affairs or events without the permission of her husband (article 195). Any act by the wife without her husband's permission was voidable (article 198). She could not take a case to court or engage in public or community affairs without prior permission from her husband (article 198). She was not empowered to open any trade or make any deal with others without the approval of her husband. Her freedom of choice came totally under the authority of her husband.

Imposition of these restrictions on women's freedom by the Code Civil Cambodgien was precarious for women's overall freedom and emancipation. Women
were excluded from mainstream society and restricted to domestic affairs only. This could make women fully dependent on their husbands in both economic and non-economic terms. Their subordination to husband was reinforced. On the other hand, restriction of women’s freedom of choice strengthened patriarchal control. To a striking degree, therefore, the legal system of later French colonialism provided pressure towards increased gender inequality in the context of modernisation. The consequences of this shift will be traced in the later chapters of this thesis.
CHAPTER 5
POLITICAL ECONOMY, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND
VIOLENCE IN POST-COLONIAL CAMBODIA

5.1 Cambodia's Independence from French colonial rule and social
structures in post-colonial Cambodia (1954-1970)

5.1.1 Background of Cambodia’s Independence

Cambodia became independent from French rule on November 9, 1953.
Cambodia’s independence was accelerated by national and global politics, particularly
those of World War II. King Norodom Sihanouk is hailed as the architect of
Cambodia’s independence. A brief account of Cambodia’s independence follows.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk was crowned as King of Cambodia on 25th April
1941 by the French Protectorate. He was only nineteen years old. Sihanouk was
crowned at a time when the entire world was suffering the upheaval of World War II.
France was invaded by the German army in June 1940 but the northern zone of France
was able to maintain some legal authority from July 1940 to August 1944 through its
subservience to the Axis Powers. The administrative centre of the northern zone was
Vichy and the regime is commonly referred as Vichy France. French colonial
Indochina was loyal to Vichy France during World War II.
Vichy Indochina signed an accord on 22 September 1940 with Japan which allowed Japanese troops to be stationed in Indochina. The purpose of the accord was to prevent China from importing arms and fuel through French Indochina. The accord allowed up to 6,000 Japanese troops to be stationed in Indochina. Japanese land, naval and air forces were, however, barred from Indochina territory except as authorised in the accord. Hours after signing the accord, Japanese troops breached the conditions of the accord and closed the railhead at Lang Son, the gateway to China. Vichy Indochinese troops opposed Japanese troops and fought against them until 25 September when Japan forces secured victory and opened the way to Hanoi.

On 9 March 1945, the Japanese armed forces delivered an ultimatum for Vichy Indochinese troops to disarm. Those who refused were massacred and the colonial administration was effectively dismantled. The Japanese pressed the Empire of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia to declare their independence. Taking this opportunity, the new King Norodom Sihanouk declared Cambodia independent from French rule on 13 March 1945 and formed a national government with Son Ngoc Thanh as Foreign Minister.

On 15 August 1945, Japan surrendered to Allied forces. The Allied force arrived in Phnom Penh on 8 October 1945 with British Lt. Col. E.D. Murray in command. The Allied force arrested Thanh for his collaboration with the Japanese and sent him into exile in France to remain under house arrest. In 1946, Khmer Issarak (Independent Khmer), an anti-French nationalist resistance movement was established in the north-western part (Battambang and Siem Reap) of Cambodia, an area that was still under the control of Thailand. Khmer Issarak was a heterogeneous group consisting of people from leftist factions, Vietnamese leftists, Khmer nationalists and anti-monarch Khmers. Early leaders of Khmer Issarak such as Son Ngoc Thanh, Dap
Chhuon and Norodom Chantaraingsey came from the elite class. Chhuon served as a Sergeant in Thai army before joining the revolutionary movement. Chantaraingsey was a prince. Due to the violent pressure from Khmer Issarak, the French authorities allowed Cambodia to form political parties in 1946.

Two major parties, namely the Democratic Party headed by Prince Sisowath Yutevong and the Liberal Party headed by another Prince Norodom Norindeth were formed. The Democratic Party modelled after the French Fourth Republic focused on civil liberties and parliamentary democracy. Ideologically, the Democratic Party was anti-French. The Democratic Party represented professional elites, intellectuals and the luminary classes. On the other hand, the Liberal Party favoured gradual departure from French rule and favoured moves to take power slowly from the French authorities. Unlike the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party attracted rural elites such as landowners, businessmen, civil servants and Buddhist monks.

The first national election was held in 1946 under French authority. The Democratic Party won the national election and formed a constitutional government with Prince Yutevong as the Prime Minister. Although a constitutional government was in power, France was the executive authority of the country. Prince Yutevong died on 17 July 1947.

Due to conflict among the political elite, including conflict with the king, Norodom Sihanouk dissolved the National Assembly on 18 September 1949 and signed a treaty with France that granted some independence for Cambodia. The new treaty gave administrative power to Cambodians. In addition, Battambang and Siem Reap gained autonomy and were administered by the Cambodian government. These two north-western provinces of Cambodia have experienced Thai invasion twice and Thailand controlled these two provinces from 1795 to 1907. During the protectorate
rule of France in Cambodia, Thailand returned these provinces to Cambodia through the French Siamese Treaty of 1907. Thailand regained the control of these provinces from 1941 to 1946 as part of a deal they made with the Japanese army during the World War II. After the defeat of Japan, Thailand returned these provinces to Cambodia. After the treaty, Cambodian politics experienced some internal problems. King Sihanouk went to France in March 1953 to ask for complete independence for Cambodia. The French authorities threatened the king with replacement if he continued to negotiate in the interests of Cambodian independence.

After being refused, king declared a 'royal crusade for independence.' He lobbied with other major powers such as the USA, Canada and Japan for independence. King Sihanouk established his quarters in Siem Reap, an autonomous zone. Lieutenant Colonel Lon Nol was in command of Siem Reap at that time. In the meantime, the whole Indochina region was in turmoil over French rule. King Sihanouk and Lon Nol jointly resisted and fought against French rule. The Khmer Issarak movement also added its strength to the resistance. Finally, on 3 July 1953, the French authorities declared that they were ready to discuss full independence for Cambodia. King Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh and Cambodia gained full independence from French rule on November 9, 1953.

5.1.2 Cambodia as an Independent State

Prince Norodom Sihanouk served as the first Prime Minister of Independent Cambodia from 1953 to 1970. Sihanouk was King before becoming Prime Minister. He relinquished his crown on 2 March 1955 to engage in politics and established a political party named the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community). Khmer nationalism, loyalty to the monarch, the struggle against injustice and corruption and protection of the Buddhist religion were the major ideologies of
Sihanouk’s new political party. He brought major contending political groups, both left and right-wing, under the one umbrella of *Sangkum Reastr Niyum*. Another reason for bringing different political groups under one umbrella was to avoid the political and military conflicts that had developed across post-colonial Indochina in this time.

National parliamentary elections were held in September 1955. Sihanouk’s *Sangkum* party defeated the Democrats, winning 83% of the vote and all of the seats in the National Assembly. Sihanouk became Prime Minister of the National Assembly. In 1963, Sihanouk forced the National Assembly to approve a constitutional amendment that made him head of state with no fixed term of office. The next national election was held in 1966. Sihanouk’s *Sangkum* won in this election too. Unlike previous national elections, right-wing *Sangkum* leaders captured most of the seats. Lon Nol, a rightist who had been a longstanding associate of Sihanouk, won a seat in parliament, and became the Prime Minister.

Sihanouk’s regime was relatively peaceful in terms of political stability and socio-economic development. Sihanouk attempted to modernise Cambodia through industrial development. The key strategies to achieve his aims were to maintain political stability, economic independence and infrastructure development, and to increase the people’s access to health and education.

The first and second two-year plans (1956-57 and 1958-59) and three five-year plans (1960-1964, 1964-1968, and 1968-1972) were adopted to achieve the ambitious plan for Cambodia’s industrialisation. The national budget was predominantly foreign-aid-dependent, particularly from America and the socialist bloc. All these plans emphasised development of physical infrastructure such as national road networks, bridges, port development, and the use of Cambodia’s human resources. The road networks tripled to 16,697 km in 1969 from 4,805 km in 1955. A sea port
(Sihanoukville) was established in 1958. In terms of human resources development, Sihanouk established an overwhelming number of schools at all levels. The purpose of establishing increased numbers of school was to produce educated and trained Cambodians to serve in national agencies. Although Cambodia became independent in 1953, Sihanouk depended on foreigners, particularly the French, for technical positions in his government due to lack of skilled local human resources. Table 1, shows the growth of schools during Sihanouk’s regime.

Table 5.1 *Number of Schools in 1955 and 1968*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of school</th>
<th>Number of school in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>2,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and professional school</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ear, 1995)

Sihanouk also increasingly emphasised health care. Numbers of hospitals (59 hospitals in 1968 compared to 16 in 1955) and clinics (553 clinics in 1968 compared to 103 in 1955) were established over the period. Increased number of hospitals and clinics over the period indicates that Sihanouk gave great importance to public welfare.

The political economy of Sihanouk’s government was pro-socialist. The state took control of all economic production. Sectors such as energy, transport, electricity, education, health, industry, etc. were nationalised. There was, however, room for private ownership within this pro-socialist economic system. The mixed economic approach aimed to attract investors for industrial development. Slocomb (2010) argues that the coexistence of mixed private and public sectors created some
ambiguities among the foreigners and locals. Table 2 shows growth of industries between 1955 and 1968.

Table 5.2 Number of Industries in 1955 and 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of industries</th>
<th>Number of industries in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-owned factories</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-public owned factories</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small and medium scale private factories</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ear, 1995)

By 1968, industrial growth had tripled compared to 1955. The majority of industries and enterprises were agriculture-related and small and medium scale. Sihanouk introduced rural credit cooperatives and developed irrigation facilities to improve agricultural production. Agriculture-related industries included rice mills, distilleries, palm sugar refineries, fish sauce production, silk weaving, soya sauce production, etc.

Large-scale private-public owned factories were predominantly owned by foreigners, particularly French and British, and by local elites. Private-public factories included rubber plantations and rubber processing, brick and tile manufacturing, woodworking factories, cotton industries and electric power plants.

Growth of industries, and the development of infrastructures and expansion of service sectors such as education and health care, changed people’s engagement in economic activities over the period. In 1968, the agriculture sector accounted for 41% of economic activities in the country, whereas non-agricultural sectors (industrial sector 12%, commerce and trade 23%, service sector 17%, construction 5%, and transportation 2%) accounted for the rest (Ear, 1995). Shifts in economic activities brought a slow but significant change of labour force participation in different sectors.
in Cambodia during Sihanouk's regime. According to Slocomb (2010), the number of employees in the service sector became three or four times the number of employees in the industrial or manufacturing sectors by the end of 1967. The service sector employed some 400,000 people by 1967.

Urbanisation was growing during Sihanouk's regime. According to the general census of Cambodia in 1962, 403,500 people lived in Phnom Penh compared to 120,000 people in 1942. Other municipalities such as Kep, Sihanoukville and Bokor were home to some 14,646 people according to 1962 census. Phnom Penh alone accounted for 70% of the urban population (Slocomb 2010). Nationally, 11% of Cambodian people lived in cities by the end of 1960 (Ear, 1995). Many of the urban population were seasonal migrants -- predominantly rural marginal farmers who came to the cities in the off-farm season. They worked as coolies, cyclo-drivers and labourers in construction work. Increased employment opportunities in cities attracted many rural inhabitants including some who migrated from Cambodia, particularly in Phnom Penh.

Although Sihanouk's regime was relatively peaceful, State violence occasionally took place particularly against communist clandestine and anti-Sihanouk groups. Sihanouk occasionally used his police forces to suppress communist groups.

5.2 Civil War, Khmer Rouge and Social Disruption: 1970-1979

5.2.1 Lon Nol's Coup and Beginning of Civil War

Lon Nol, the long standing associate of Sihanouk, became the Prime Minister of Cambodia after the 1966 national election. By 1969, Lon Nol and the rightists had become increasingly frustrated with Sihanouk. The main reason for Lon Nol’s frustration was Sihanouk’s toleration of North Vietnamese activity on Cambodian soil. Sihanouk allowed the NLF and the Vietnamese People’s Army to use
Cambodian territory (eastern zone) to fight against the American army and ARVN. Sihanouk also made a secret trade agreement with Hanoi to use Sihanoukville seaport for shipment of weapons to NLF in exchange for guaranteed purchase of rice at inflated prices.

In early 1970, a large-scale anti-Vietnamese demonstration erupted in Phnom Penh. Sihanouk was on tour in Europe, the Soviet Union and China at this time. Crowds attacked the North Vietnamese and NLF embassies. The demonstrations escalated beyond the government’s control. On 12 March, Sirik Mata, Deputy Prime Minister cancelled the trade agreement with Hanoi. No shipments were permitted to North Vietnam through Sihanoukville seaport. On 15 March 1970, Lon Nol warned all People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese regular troops) and National Liberation Front (NLF, known to the US as the Viet Cong) forces to leave Cambodian territory within 72 hours. On 18 March 1970, the army took up positions around the capital. A debate on deposing Sihanouk as head of state was held in the Assembly at the same time. All members of the assembly, except one, unanimously agreed to depose Sihanouk. Lon Nol took over the position of head of state on an emergency basis. Lon Nol renamed Cambodia as the Khmer Republic on 9 October 1970. Lon Nol’s vision of the Khmer Republic was to eliminate widespread corruption, restore the country’s sovereignty in the eastern zones, and continue the country’s economic development. The character of the Republican regime was right-wing and nationalist. It allied itself with the South Vietnamese and the US, which was probably involved in the political change. Lon Nol appointed himself as Marshal in April 1971. He dissolved the National Assembly in October of that year, and declared military rule. He founded the Forces Armées Nationales Khmères (FANK) – the republican army. In the wake of Khmer Rouge, Lon Nol finally resigned on 1 April
1975 and fled to Indonesia and then to the United States. The Republic eventually fell on 17 April 1975 with the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge.

The Khmer Republic had deregulated State control of major economic sectors. The private sector was restored to expedite commercial and industrial development. Although economic development was one of the motivations of the Republic, overall economic conditions of the country deteriorated over the period. Agricultural production shrank dramatically due to displacement of families in rural areas. Cambodia changed from being a rice-surplus country under Sihanouk to being a rice-deficit country in 1972. Cambodia imported rice, corn, tobacco, rubber products, wheat and other basic essentials with American assistance. Prices of consumer goods rose, but a handful of investors linked to the political elites benefited from the wartime economy (Slocomb, 2010).

Lon Nol’s regime resulted in little but increased militarisation, violence, disruption of social order, and civil war. Despite its ambitious aim, the republic was disastrous militarily, politically, economically and socially. The Cambodian civil war began in real terms during the Khmer Republic. Lon Nol’s regime could neither consolidate power nor gain legitimacy. People’s security and safety became threatened. The social order built during colonial rule and Sihanouk’s regime was disrupted in the brief period of the Khmer Republic.

The Khmer Republic regime gave rise to militarisation in Cambodian during 1970-1975. Different military groups namely, FANK, ARVN (South Vietnamese Army), CPNLAF (Cambodian People’s National Liberation Armed Forces), PAVN (North Vietnamese) and NLF (Viet Cong) as well as US Troops, often clashed fiercely in the north-eastern provinces in the late 1960s. FANK, ARVN and US troops
formed an alliance to drive out the PAVN and NLF. CPNLAF - an armed force of Sihanouk - helped the PAVN and NLF as a retaliation to Lon Nol’s coup.

A significant number of Cambodian men were voluntarily engaged in Sihanouk’s CPNLAF and Lon Nol’s FANK. Sihanouk’s popularity among the rural people attracted many rural Cambodians to join in CPNLAF. Many of the peasants interviewed for this study reported that they had fought for Sihanouk’s CPNLAF. Conversely, Lon Nol’s anti-Vietnamese and anti-communist rhetoric attracted many nationalists, especially big businessmen, landowners and the army, to join in the FANK. By the end of 1970, the number of FANK members rose to 150,000 from 35,000 during Sihanouk regime. CPNLAF and FANK clashed fiercely and regularly in the remote areas. If we combine the number of CPNLAF and FANK members, it is evident that significant numbers of Cambodians were engaged in direct fighting.

Lon Nol’s alliance with ARVN and US troops brought Cambodia more deeply into the second Indo-china war. Not long after Lon Nol’s coup, ARVN backed by US troops entered eastern Cambodia in April-July 1970 under a ‘Cambodian Campaign’ to attack PAVN and NLF forces operating there. Despite the joint military campaign by ARVN and US troops, many PAVN and NLF forces escaped westward and deeper into Cambodia. At this level the ‘Cambodian Campaign’ was expanded to take in more Cambodian territory and extended until 1973. The ‘Cambodian Campaign’ caused a huge death toll of innocent Cambodians. 539,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped in Cambodia from March 1969 to August 1973, and nearly half of them were dropped around Phnom Penh between March and August 1973 (Tan, 1979; Pollock, 1997). About 10% of the country’s population – 600,000 people were killed by the American bombardment in the effort to destroy the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
hideouts in Cambodia, and protect the Lon Nol regime (Pollock, 1997; Slocomb, 2010). About one third of the rural population became refugees (Pollock, 1997).

Pro-Sihanouk demonstrations against Lon Nol’s coup in early 1970 also caused violence and many casualties. After Sihanouk, who was in Beijing, called for protests on 23 March 1970, large-scale demonstrations were held in Kampong Cham, Takeo and Kampot provinces. These were violent demonstrations especially in Kampong Cham province. Two national assembly deputies were killed by the demonstrators. In response Lon Nol used armed forces to crack down on the demonstrations and this caused the deaths of several hundred Cambodians.

Sihanouk’s modernisation efforts during 1953-1970 ushered in new hope to the people. Cambodian families, particularly in rural settings, were improving their living standards by improving and diversifying their means of livelihood, through education and better health care. Their hopes were suddenly shattered by the frequent clashes among the different military groups during Lon Nol’s regime. Life threatening insecurity, a refugee state, and violence all paralysed the life of the people, particularly in rural areas. Families were on the run to escape from ground fighting and American air bombing. Education of children was disrupted and schools were shut down.

Some of the Cambodian men interviewed for this study, who are in their late 40s and 50s, experienced Lon Nol’s regime. Their life histories in Chapters 6-9 give testimony of the social disruption and violence that occurred during this period.

5.2.2 Khmer Rouge, Social Disruption and Violence

The Khmer Rouge period of 1975-1979 is well researched and documented. Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, and Khieu Samphan – all men - were the key players, as the leaders of Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). After taking
power, the Khmer Rouge renamed the country as Democratic Kampuchea (DK). Two women, Khieu Ponnary (wife of Pol Pot) and Khieu Thirith, alias Ieng Thirith (wife of Ieng Sary), also played a central role in the DK regime. They all came from middle-class families and had been educated at French universities.

These leaders acquired Marxist socialist ideology during their study in France as members of the French Communist Party. During the 1950s, Khmer students in Paris organised their own communist movement. Some 200 Khmer students in Paris formed the Khmer Students’ Association (KSA) in 1951 – a student organisation with nationalist and leftist ideology. In 1956, Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan established a new group, the Khmer Students’ Union, based on Marxist ideology. The political organisation of Khmer Rouge grew from the communist movement in Vietnam. In 1930 Ho Chi Minh had founded the Vietnamese Communist Party which later changed to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) to include revolutionaries from Cambodia and Laos. In 1951, the ICP was re-organised into three national units, including the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) for Cambodian revolutionaries. After returning from Paris, the future leaders of the Khmer Rouge worked with the KPRP but later they formed their own groups due to KPRP’s excessive devotion to the Vietnam Workers’ Party – the Vietnamese wing of former ICP. Pol Pot founded the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and organised some small-scale insurgencies against the Sihanouk regime.

Although the key leaders of Khmer Rouge were French educated, when they returned from France they spent a significant amount of time with rural people – the social class who were considered ideal (Tan, 1979). They were already steeped in Marxist theory by this time and started to live with the rural masses in remote areas to organise them and to find out what they really wanted. Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Son Sen
were in the forefront of the first mission in 1963. Khieu Samphan led the second mission in 1967. It was a risky and life threatening effort as they were constantly under the watch of Sihanouk’s police.

Historians such as Etcheson (1984), Pollock (1997) and Kiernan (2002) suggest that American bombardment in Cambodian territory during Vietnam War (between 1965-1973) and the removal of Norodom Sihanouk as head of state in 1970 by Premier Lon Nol significantly helped the Khmer Rouge to obtain the support of Cambodian peasants, particularly in terms of recruitment during the DK regime. The recruits to the Khmer Rouge grew from 3,000 in 1971 to more than 60,000 in 1973 (Pollock, 1997).

The regime imposed an extreme form of social engineering on Cambodian society which was characterised by economic and class elements. They attempted to introduce a purely agrarian economy ideologically enshrined by Marxism and Maoism. Tan (1970) argues that the Khmer Rouge’s ideology of transforming Cambodia into a purely agrarian economy was heavily affected intellectually by Khieu Samphan’s economic theory. Khieu Samphan completed a PhD degree in economics from the University of Paris in 1959. His dissertation focused on Cambodia’s economy and industrial development. In his thesis, Samphan argued that Cambodian economy could be independent and self-sufficient if it would be independent of the international economy. Samphan wrote his thesis in the context of colonial and early independent Cambodia, when traditional economic sectors such as agriculture and agro-based industry were shrinking. Samphan termed the service sector unproductive and suggested agro-based industrialisation through the transfer of human resources from the service sector to the agriculture sector to ensure an
increased and sustainable supply of agricultural products needed for the agro-based industries.

According to Slocomb (2010), the economic policy of DK was experimental and failed. The DK regime abolished markets, the financial and banking system, currencies, and other means for the accumulation of wealth. They started cooperatives throughout the country with communal dining to ensure that the new economic policy was effective (Kiernan, 2002). All cities and towns were evacuated and urban people were deported to rural areas to adopt peasant life (Tan, 1979). The entire population was forced to become farmers and everyone had to work on collective farms. The peasants were treated as ‘base people’ and the urban deportees were treated as ‘new people’ by the regime.

The Khmer Rouge attempted to turn Cambodia into a one-class peasant society. The official ideology of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was that the ‘base people’ i.e., the poor and the lower-middle peasants, were the only progressive classes. ‘New people’ i.e., all other classes such as the urban population, were considered to be class enemies (Vickery, 1986). Professionals, intellectuals, civil servants of Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic and educated people generally were considered to be enemies of the DK. The poor peasants were more trusted by the regime as they had made up most of the Khmer Rouge forces, and they therefore enjoyed both political and economic superiority over the urban evacuees during the revolutionary period (Vickery, 1986).

Extreme measures were taken as the Khmer Rouge pursued the ideal of economic efficiency. Currency was abolished and banks were demolished. A barter system was introduced and foreign trade was almost completely halted. Rice production was the key to self-sufficiency. Massive irrigation projects (digging canals
and reservoirs and the construction of dams) were undertaken to boost agricultural production.

The entire country was divided into seven zones to facilitate smooth operation of the revolution. Each zone was then divided into regions. Each region was then divided into district, sub-districts and villages. The structure of each region was similar to the administrative structures during the regimes of Sihanouk and the Khmer Republic. The inhabitants of the villages were organised into groups composed of ten to fifteen families. On every level, administration was directed by a three-person committee. CPK members held the committee posts at the higher levels. Sub-district and village level committees were often staffed by ‘base people’

This attempt at political and economic engineering by the Khmer Rouge caused abrupt changes in the social structure. Aggression and violence were essential and were the ultimate tools to enforce the political and economic agenda. It seems that the Khmer Rouge was in a hurry to accomplish the revolution although it is not clear what caused this haste. The key leaders lost control (even the brother of Pol Pot was killed during the evacuation of Phnom Penh). Tan (1979) suggests that there was a kind of fear among the Khmer Rouge forces, particularly at the stage of evacuation, that Lon Nol forces might regain power through the use of sabotage networks in the city.

Killing, torture and forced labour were commonly practised by the Khmer Rouge soldiers. People were required to work for twelve hours non-stop without adequate rest or food. The treatment of the new people as well as the evacuation varied depending on which military units and commanders conducted the specific operation. There were targets for agricultural production for each zone but these targets were usually several times higher than production figures for pre-revolution
times. Leaders of the zones and their lower administrative units forced people to work hard and fast to achieve the target. By the end of 1979, the death toll was over two million (1/5th of total population at that time) due to murder, torture, starvation, disease and overwork.

Those who were killed in the DK regime were mostly the old, the educated city dwellers and those who were westernized or had supported the Americans (Pollock, 1997). Men became the main victims of the massacre although women were also killed. This caused changes in the demographic pattern in post-Khmer Rouge Cambodian society creating a higher proportion of adult females compared to adult males. Due to the lack of adult males, many women of marriageable age remained single. They had been living with non-adult family members who had lost their parents during revolution and became de facto heads of households.

Adults were forced to marry a person chosen by the regime. No marriage was carried out without authorisation by the regime. Mass marriages were carried out at the village level under the guidance of Khmer Rouge local leaders. Marriage was not considered an individual and personal matter, but was regarded as an important ceremony involving an oath to the regime (Kasumi, 2008). The ritual of wedding was very formal and simple. No traditional formality and celebration of wedding were performed.

Violence against women, particularly in the form of rape and other forms of sexual assaults, was strictly forbidden. The study by Kasumi (2008) suggests that the high-ranking leaders of Khmer Rouge randomly raped young women, particularly from the ‘new people’, but her study does not provide statistics.

Family relationships not sanctioned by the regime were also banned. Because of regrouping of people at the village level, family members were split from each
other, and sent to different places as deemed necessary by the committee members of each administrative unit of the Khmer Rouge. This occurred throughout the country although there were theoretically designated shelters for every family. In reality, it was hard for family members to spend a significant amount of time together at home every day. The small and school-aged children were sent to boarding schools where they studied and lived under the supervision of resident teachers.

Women were also involved in the Khmer Rouge, both as leaders and as force members. Khieu Ponnary and Ieng Sary were two key female leaders. Khieu Ponnary served as the President of the Women’s Association of the DK regime. Ieng Sary served as the Minister for Social Affairs from 1975-1979.

As mentioned earlier, men of rural and peasant background became the committee members in the lower levels (sub-district and village) of the Khmer Rouge administration. This is the level where ‘new people’ worked and lived. In this way, the peasants held power over urban evacuees who overwhelmingly represented the previous higher class – hereditary upper class, professionals, former civil servants and scholars.

It is apparent that four groups emerged despite the Khmer Rouges attempt to turn Cambodia into a single-class society. These groups – which did not have time to consolidate as social classes – were not necessarily based on property and wealth, but rather on power, authority and survival. The top group was represented by CPK leaders who exercised absolute power over the rest of the groups through holding committee positions at zone and regional level. The second group was the committee members at sub-district and village level. They were former peasants and overwhelmingly young and they executed power and authority directly and face-to-face over the urban evacuees, in order to carry out the projects of the DK. The third
group is the urban evacuees whose lives were threatened, subject to death and torture at any time. The fourth group is peasants who remained in their old occupations. They were trusted by the Khmer Rouge and their lives were not as affected as those of the third group.

5.3 Cambodia After The Civil War

5.3.1 PRK and SoC Regimes

The Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia and took control of Phnom Penh on 17th January 1979. They ousted the DK regime and a new regime called the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was installed immediately. The PRK regime existed until 1993 and was controlled by the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). Marxism-Leninism was the political ideology of the KPRP. Heng Samrin served as the head of both the PRK and the KPRP. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea was renamed as the State of Cambodia (SoC) during the last four years of its existence, in an attempt to attract international recognition. There was certainly some public support for the PRK regime since they had liberated the survivors of the Khmer Rouge.

In the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion, a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was established in June 1982 for national unity and to oppose Vietnamese invasion. The CGDK included three parties namely the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the FUNCINPEC. Khieu Samphan, Son Sann, and Norodom Sihanouk signed an agreement on June 22, 1982 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on behalf of the Khmer Rouge, the KPNLF, and the FUNCINPEC respectively, to form a coalition government. The latter two groups had non-communist backgrounds. Sihanouk served as the President of the coalition government. Khieu Samphan and Son Sann served as
foreign minister and prime minister respectively. Following its establishment, the CGDK was recognised as the country’s lawful regime in international forums. On the other hand, the PRK served as a de facto and puppet government. The DK regime retained its seat in the United Nations until 1982 in its own right and then until 1993 as partner of the CGDK.

In response to mounting pressure from local, regional and global forums, Vietnam started to withdraw its army towards the end of 1987 and all Vietnamese troops had been withdrawn by 1989. During the decade of Vietnamese invasion, the Khmer Rouge and other coalition members of CGDK clashed with Vietnamese army on a regular basis. The existence of dual governments (PRK and CGDK) created the conditions for war. The western part of Cambodia bordering with Thailand continued to be a battle zone during this period.

Cambodia’s economy was fragile in the PRK regime but it was better than the situation during Khmer Republic and Khmer Rouge regimes. The economy was State controlled and goods were rationed according to salary. Government subsidised certain commodities such as kerosene, cigarette, soap, rice, sugar and condensed milk. Since there was no Cambodian currency, Thai baht and Vietnamese dong were commonly used in the local market. By 1988, the riel was reintroduced as a local currency (Ear, 1995). Land ownership was nationalised under the PRK regime. But farmers who farmed a piece of land could continue farming. Rice production started to increase again after 1984. The industry sector, which had been totally destroyed, started to recover during the PRK regime. Fifty-seven plants (textile, mechanical, construction and light industry) were operated under State ownership, and employed some 154,000 Cambodians.
Cambodia and eighteen other nations, including the UN Security Council and ASEAN countries, signed the Paris Peace Agreement on 23 October 1991. The Paris Peace Agreement was the result of a settlement reached among four factions: State of Cambodia (SoC), FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, and the Khmer Rouge in an informal meeting held in September 1990 in Jakarta (Slocomb, 2010). A United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was then established with a specific mandate to organise a free and fair election for a constituent assembly. The country held its first-ever democratic election in May 1993 under the supervision of UNTAC. The majority of people cast their votes for FUNCINPEC. Leadership of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP-formerly KPRP), particularly the current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, rejected the election result causing a serious political stalemate. Avoiding a possible return of the civil war, Norodom Sihanouk negotiated an executive government led by co-premiers (Hun Sen of CPP and Prince Ranarridh of FUNCINPEC) (Slocomb, 2010). On 21 September 1993, the Constituent Assembly adopted the new Constitution which restored the Cambodian throne as a constitutional monarchy. Norodom Sihanouk signed the new constitution and the State became once more the Kingdom of Cambodia.

5.3.2 Cambodian Society in Transition in 1980s

For twenty years Cambodian society was governed under extreme forms of class and gender regulation which caused a demographic catastrophe. The economic restructuring and violence of the DK and the PRK regimes caused class and gender chaos. The ‘new people’ of the DK regime were allowed to come back to the towns during the PRK regime. Schools, medical facilities and religious practices were resumed. This meant that urban infrastructures started to grow again as they had before 1975. The PRK intended to rebuild Cambodian society with normally
functioning and interrelated urban and rural sectors (Vickery, 1986). Under the new regime, the State took control of all means of production such as factories, transportation and land. Financial institutions and foreign trades were monopolised under State control. In these ways the DK and PRK were similar but under the PRK the peasants could produce and consume agricultural products freely and were not conscripted as forced labour as they had been under the DK. But the peasants were not allowed to sell or transfer land to repay their debts.

Urban commodities and consumer goods were supplied through a free-market system. This meant that a bourgeois class re-emerged during the PRK regime which the DK wished to bring down and merge with the peasant class. The old privileged class who survived from the DK regime could hoard their wealth, particularly in the form of gold and diamonds, and were soon involved in trading in consumer goods and emerged as the new wealthy class during the PRK regime.

The rehabilitation and reconstruction of war ravaged sectors was a huge task for the PRK to tackle but the regime, like other revolutionary bodies, lacked the skills, education and expertise necessary to succeed. The regime leaders, therefore, partially returned to pre-DK structures – i.e., dependence on bureaucrats, administrators and professionals (Vickery, 1986). They invited the administrators, professionals and bureaucrats of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes, whom they originally treated as class enemies in the government, to return. Vickery in 1986 argued that although the PRK regime recruited educated and trained professionals and administrators in government, class divisions had only re-emerged to a very limited degree. This was because the income difference among peasants, government officials and other working class people was marginal at this time. For example, department heads in ministries earned no more than factory workers. But he suggested that the educated
and trained professionals and administrators of the PRK government enjoyed power and authority over others and were therefore considered as elite at least in their own estimation.

5.4 Neoliberal Cambodia

Cambodia became a member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2000. As a member of ASEAN, Cambodia eventually accepted the guidelines which included market deregulation and tariff exemption within the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). Cambodia’s agricultural sector became compatible with other regional countries through its entrance into ASEAN (Slocomb, 2010). Cambodia opened its economy further to the global market in 2004 when it formally became a member state of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As part of its membership of ASEAN and WTO, Cambodia’s economy has been undergoing numerous changes, including deregulation of markets and structural adjustment of public sectors. Although it adopted a market economy a century ago by signing its protectorate treaty with France in 1863, Cambodia’s membership with WTO is bringing market liberalism into effect in wider sectors. Through becoming a member of WTO and ASEAN, the country has eventually opened all sectors of its economy to the regional and global market. The country’s economic production, growth and distribution are experiencing new dimensions. New economic sectors are emerging while old sectors are shrinking in the wake of free entrance of foreign products into the local market, and foreign direct investment. Industrial, manufacturing and service sectors are emerging as the major economic sectors. For example, these three sectors experienced 12.1%, 9.7% and 12.1% growth respectively in 2005 (CDRI, 2007). The share of these sectors in GDP has increased over the period.
These emerging sectors are creating more jobs. For example, the industry sector employed 10% and 13.5% of the total labour force in 2004 and 2005 respectively. The service sector employed 11.7% and 27.5% of the total labour force in 2004 and 2005 respectively, a remarkable apparent rate of growth (CDRI, 2005 and 2007). Rapid growth of the service sector in terms of employment generation is creating white-collar workers whose social class and position are relatively new in Cambodia.

On the other hand, the agriculture sector, which was regarded as the only key sector for Cambodia’s economy in the recent past, is declining gradually, both in terms of its share of the GDP and in employment generation (CDRI, 2007). Industrial sectors such as garment manufacturing, and tourism sectors, are gradually replacing the agriculture sector. The GDP share of agriculture sector declined to 31.4% in 2005 compared to 45.6% in 1993. In terms of job absorption, the agriculture sector is going down rapidly. For example, 70% of the total labour force was employed in the agriculture sector in the year 2004 (CDRI, 2005), whereas this figure dropped to 58% in 2005 (CDRI, 2007).

CDRI (2007) report also suggested that the growth of the new sectors is unequal among people across class (rich versus poor) and geographical setting (rural versus urban). Rich people are becoming richer given their privileges and their preparedness to extract the most advantageous results from market liberalisation. Conversely, the poor are increasingly becoming marginalised. The growth is mostly urban-centric as the new economic sectors are urban-based. Most of the foreign direct investments are in non-agricultural sectors. It is clear that Cambodia’s economy is moving away from agriculture (CDRI, 2007).
In the course of market liberalisation, the local economy, particularly in agriculture and handicraft sectors, is increasingly in contact with global and regional markets. Cambodian producers are usually small-scale and this means that local producers need to spend more per unit, compared to products of transnational companies who are involved in large-scale production. Prices of local products such as food, silk products, and handicrafts are apparently higher in the local market than those of imported competitors. Local producers are therefore coming under fierce competition with their regional and global competitors. Consequently, the local economy, particularly in agriculture and handicraft sectors, is shrinking gradually.

Workforces who previously worked in the agriculture sector are increasingly entering the newly emerging sectors. As a result Cambodia has been experiencing surges of rural-urban migration in recent years, driven by unemployment in rural areas. Migration of rural people to cities is creating new problems in family relationships, specifically marriages that often end in spousal conflict and violence. The peasants who previously worked on farms are being engaged in new economic sectors such as construction and manufacturing in the cities. Their new work places and changed environments require new practices which are often in conflict with existing gender norms. These issues will be explored in the following chapters.
PART III

FOUR STUDIES OF THE DYNAMICS OF KHMER MASCULINITIES
CHAPTER 6

GLOBALISATION FROM BELOW: CONFIGURATION OF MASCULINITIES AMONG MID-CAREER MANAGERS AND ENTREPRENEURS

6.1 Introduction

As discussed in the literature review, global markets and transnational corporations provide a default setting of masculinities for managers who work in the corporate business sector. The default masculinity is characterised by long working-hours, competitive achievement of personal and corporate goals and relegation of feminised family, social and cultural affairs to wives and employed carers. Power within the workplace and material possessions are of greater importance in the lives of these men than other groups in this study.

Studies of managerial masculinities are mainly conducted in the context of a developed economy. There is a dearth of empirical work on managerial masculinities in the context of developing economies, particularly in countries like Cambodia that are only now being gradually linked to global market forces. How do public and private sector managers and local business entrepreneurs in these economies organise masculinities?
6.2 Cambodia and the Global Economy

As noted in Chapters 4-5, Cambodia experienced decades of political turmoil and civil war in 1970s and 1980s. The country’s economy was broken down. The Khmer Rouge (KR) regime in the late 1970s attempted to transform the country into an agrarian society. The post-KR regime followed the political economy of the previous regime and maintained a command economy throughout the 1990s.

Cambodia’s economy moved from a command economy to a market-based one in 2005 when it became a member state of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Entrance to the WTO led Cambodia to become a site for foreign investment, particularly because of cheap labour. Profound social and economic changes have taken place since 2005. New sectors, particularly the service and manufacturing sectors are emerging with foreign investment. Local business enterprises are also growing as the backward linkage to the emerging new sectors. New jobs, both managerial and non-managerial, are being created for Cambodians.

The post-command economy of Cambodia is heavily dependent on loans and aid from transnational financial corporations, namely the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Loans and aid are granted for reforms such as the decentralisation of public administration, privatisation of public services, and public/private partnership. Following these reforms, changes in terms of both management and service delivery are occurring in the public sector.

6.3 Managers of this Study

This chapter is based on the life histories of ten managers and business entrepreneurs. They are: Liang Kim (37), Regional Manager of a transnational financial corporation, Bunthi Sar (37), co-owner of an export-oriented business,
Sophea Mao (34), owner of a local real estate company, Prom Cham (38), Manager of an international IT company, Chhrem Hor (30), Deputy Director of a subsidiary of an international non-governmental organisation (NGO), Sok Srey (42), Deputy Director of a public sector department, Barom Ros (55), Director of a public sector department, Phyrum Ly (38), Director of a public sector department, Sopheak Mok (42), Unit Chief of a public sector agency and Mony Serey, Head of a public sector office.

All of them had gone through the KR regime and the post-KR civil war. Managers who are in their forties and fifties had also experienced social disruption caused by the Second Indochina War during the Lon Nol.

War disrupted social life and education. After the war, they restarted their ruined lives. Many of them worked hard in difficult and dangerous situations to reorganise their lives. They did whatever was necessary for survival in the post-war era.

All private sector managers and business entrepreneurs are exposed to the global market either as employees of transnational business companies or as local partners of international or regional foreign investors. Liang, Prom and Chhrem work directly for transnational companies. Bunthi runs a business linked to several Chinese companies. Sophea opened his own business after working for a Chinese real estate firm in Phnom Penh. He established his own real estate company with capital invested by Japanese and Koreans.

These private sector managers and business entrepreneurs have all visited foreign countries for training, education and employment. They are familiar with the global society and the functioning of the global market.

Although public sector managers do not work directly for the global market, they work on departmental projects that are funded by global financial institutions.
They have visited foreign countries for education, training, professional meetings and other events that have enhanced their working skills. They have become familiar with foreign culture and value systems. They also work with representatives of aid organisations. They are directly involved in public administration and the processes of decentralisation and privatisation.

It was not always easy to arrange interviews with these managers. It took time to organise appointments with entrepreneurs who sometimes changed arrangements at the last minute to suit their own convenience. A few of the public sector managers were also difficult to pin down for interview.

**Case Study 1: Barom Ros – Public Sector Manager**

**The interview**

Barom was recruited for interview through one of his colleagues. The interview took place in his office by appointment, after-hours. Barom allocated a reasonable amount of time for the interview despite being busy. The interview lasted for one and half hours. He was fluent in speaking about his life, particularly about his experience with the KR regime, his life after the war ended and the pathways to becoming a manager. But he was cautious in talking about management practice and his working relationships with his superiors.

**Life course**

Barom comes from a central province peasant family. In his mid-fifties he is fourth among seven siblings. He is a living witness to the social changes that have taken place in Cambodia since the Lon Nol regime.

He left his family at the age of seven to be educated in another commune as there was no school in his commune. He lived in a pagoda (a religious institution
providing shared accommodation for young boys of underprivileged families) during
his primary education. Every morning he gave lifts on his bicycle to monks from the
pagoda so that they could collect alms from the neighbouring villages. After giving
these lifts, he went to school. He also attended religious classes and formal education
in the pagoda.

Barom then went to a third commune, where his elder sister lived so that he
could attend secondary school. He lived with his sister and her husband. His brother-
in-law taught at the school. When his brother-in-law was transferred to Phnom Penh
in Barom’s last year of secondary school certificate (SSC), Barom followed his
brother-in-law and spent the final year of his SSC as well as completing the high
school certificate (HSC) in Phnom Penh. He completed the HSC with a major in
science. After completing the HSC, he enrolled in a public university in Phnom Penh,
with a major in engineering. Education in public university was free.

The KR regime began in the first year of his university life. Aged twenty he
was sent to a north-eastern province by the regime. In his first year he worked in the
“mobile brigade”. These brigades were assigned the hardest, most laborious and
dangerous tasks. He married in his second year with his wife being chosen for him by
the authorities. After his marriage he was assigned to rice farming but the newly
married couple spent very little time together as they worked in different communes.

Barom experienced and witnessed the harsh rule of the KR regime. According
to him, two-thirds of the mobile brigade group members disappeared by the end of the
year, possibly killed by the militias.

Barom and his wife were lucky to survive the regime and when the regime fell
they moved to Phnom Penh. They were struggling to recover from the ruin of their
lives but Barom found a position teaching at a primary school in his home province.
The country was now under a new regime and he was promoted to lower-secondary level teaching in his second year. In his third year, he attended a university in Phnom Penh to study pedagogy (science teaching) for two years. After completing the course, he taught secondary school science in the province. In 1994 he moved to his current workplace and in 2006 he completed a Master’s degree from a specialised university in Phnom Penh. He was sent to Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, and Korea for professional training.

His first appointment in the Department was as head of a technical unit. He was subsequently promoted to Deputy Director in 1998 and Director (his current position) in 2008. His current position as head of the Department is mid-level in the Ministerial hierarchy.

Barom has four sons and lives in his own house in Phnom Penh. His first three sons work in government departments, two of them having obtained Master’s degrees from English-speaking developed countries. The third son has completed a Master’s degree in Cambodia. The youngest son is an undergraduate in a Phnom Penh university. Barom’s wife looks after the home and no longer needs paid employment.

Work, workplace and gender regime in work

Barom brings thirty years of professional experience to his current position, the first half in teaching and the second half in management. He worked as a teacher at a time when the education system in Cambodia was recovering from devastation. He taught science, at that time a gendered field as, in addition to there being few male science teachers, there were no females in that field. The shortage was so dire that Barom sometimes had to teach ten classes per day.

Barom’s science background was a considerable advantage in finding a managerial job in his current workplace. As mentioned above, his first appointment
was as head of a technical unit managing more than twenty staff. He did not give sex-segregated data of his staff in the interview. Presumably, they were overwhelmingly men as women were very rare in science education.

In his current portfolio as Director, he looks after nine units with help of three deputies. Each unit performs specific tasks associated with the Department’s core function, i.e., production of educational materials. In the past, the Department carried out all its responsibilities internally – a huge responsibility. Recently, many of the tasks have been privatised. Nowadays, key jobs like manuscript development, printing and supply are carried out by private vendors. The department’s role is now limited to ‘approval’ of manuscripts and quality ‘control’ of the end product.

Barom’s department follows Ministerial gender policy. The Ministry has a gender policy which specifies strategies intended to integrate gender equality in all activities. All materials are screened for gender equality by the Ministry before they are printed. The Ministerial gender policy also sets targets for gender equality in management.

Despite this policy, gender equality remains a major challenge, particularly in management. The vast majority of managerial positions are still held by men. The gender equality situation in the management of Barom’s department is better than most although the top position is held by a man. One third of deputies and general staff in Barom’s department, however, are women.

**Family, relationship and gender regime in the family**

Barom’s life with his parents was brief. His young, fragmented memory of life with his parents was ‘good’ and ‘non-violent’. This does not, of course, mean that his parents had a relationship based on equality. Good spousal relationships can also be maintained through women’s submission to systematic patriarchal control.
Nonetheless, Barom apparently did not experience any violence from his parents nor the sister with whom he lived for a long period. None of his siblings experienced violence or abuse from his parents.

Barom’s parents were peasants and both worked on the family farm. His father was head of the family and the farm. His mother did all so-called reproductive work along with farming tasks.

Barom’s own family followed a diverse trajectory of gender regime over the period. Both husband and wife were farmers during the KR regime. Barom taught in public school and his wife also worked providing jointly for the family in the post-KR era as Barom’s income from teaching was too meagre to support the family. This supportive role of his wife was crucial, enabling Barom to come to Phnom Penh to upgrade his professional skills by taking a pedagogy course. In his current situation, when his income alone is sufficient to run the family, his wife’s contribution has been acknowledged by withdrawing her from productive work. Her supportive work during his early career was a reasonable contribution. Although Barom is head of the family, his wife is better-off in intra-family gender relations, in his view.

Barom does not share in household chores. He is heavily occupied with his professional work from 7.00am to 7.00pm every weekday. Sometimes his duties keep him at work until 9.00 or 10.00pm. His absence from household chores is taken for granted because his sole duty is seen as providing for the family.

**Place (rural/urban), peer relationship and wider social life or culture**

Barom’s life has included both rural and urban cultures and locations, having grown up in a pagoda and learned how to live in communal social life. Urban life, overseas training, and work experience in multilateral projects within the department have enabled him to work successfully in the bureaucratic system. Participation in
international forums as a government delegate has impacted on his knowledge and understanding of gender patterns.

Barom's social value system is explicit in his personal and professional life. In his professional life his urban social orientation is predominant. His personal and family life, on the other hand, is typical of peasant culture.

Barom has two groups of friends and peers: one group is made up from his early life in rural setting, and the other is made up of peers from his career in urban settings. His friends come from different walks of life and both genders: peasants and bureaucrats, monks and business entrepreneurs, men and women.

He has reconstructed his social network through these two peer groups. There is a functional difference in the way he maintains his network and interacts with both groups. His relationship with the first group of peers, based on his early rural experience, is social and spiritual in nature. For example, he visits the monks of the pagoda, where he lived as a child. By contrast, the relationship with the second group of peers is career motivated. The group works through reciprocal invitations to family functions. Barom played a pioneering role in forming this group.

The viability and functional strength of the second group of peers depends on their uniqueness, and importance for their professions. Members of this peer group work in the public sector with many of them holding high level positions. About this group Barom says,

Lots of them are in the Ministry. Around twenty of them work in Ministries. Some are at my level, some are in higher positions such as Director General, Colonel and the Council of Ministers.
Rank is important for everyone in the group. They keep in touch with each other and the group acts as a network supporting the professional success of their peers. They mutually benefit through their social and professional connections.

**Experience of violence**

Barom experienced collective social violence during the Lon Nol and KR regimes. American bombing in Cambodia in the early 1970s displaced people from many rural provinces. Many of them took refuge in Phnom Penh. Schools in rural areas were closed. Barom, who was in secondary school, also left his rural province and came to Phnom Penh.

His university education was halted because of the KR regime. He could not continue his engineering degree and was forced to rural province. He bears the brunt of the harsh and totalitarian rule of the regime. He was forced to work hard for long hours sustained only by a spoonful of watery porridge. Failure to comply with any instruction could lead to execution. Seeing many of his group disappear without explanation, Barom followed the instructions of the regime in order to survive.

The relationship between Barom’s parents was non-violent but hierarchical. Although he raised his three older sons without any trouble, Barom finds it difficult to raise his youngest son who often goes out with friends and comes home drunk. Barom does not like his son’s behaviour and takes some disciplinary actions which lead to some measures of parental control over his son.

**Construction of masculinity**

Barom’s construction of early masculinity was organised in a rural social setting within normative Buddhist values. Having lived in a Buddhist pagoda at a young age, he is still inclined to Buddhist practices. He occasionally visits the pagoda he grew up in and he lives a simple personal life. For example, he drives an old car,
though he can afford an expensive new one. His adoption of a modest way of life probably results from his upbringing in a monastic environment.

Managers like Barom in the public sector do not work in a ‘fishbowl.’ He is not under constant surveillance by his superiors. Rather, managers in the public sector work in a ‘black and white’ system where performance is measured periodically based on reported results. There is always a discrepancy between actual and reported achievements and this discrepancy is an open secret. Covering up the discrepancy is important if the manager is to succeed professionally.

Barom uses a specific approach to cover up such discrepancies. When a target is not achieved he discusses it with deputies. He also addresses the issue within the department keeping superior authority uninformed. In this way, he puts the responsibility on his deputies to amend the situation. He also engages his deputies in the process of writing the crucial reports.

Barom’s core management practice is to get things done through delegation to his deputies, holding weekly meetings and being informed every day about plans and progress. These practices are what he calls ‘my management.’ His style of management is not universal in the public sector although managers in the public sector do work under a single and standardised management system.

Neo-liberalisation of departments’ core duties has given new dimensions to bureaucratic masculinity. Under the new arrangement, the bureaucracy is expanding into the private domain. In the past, the Department fulfilled its responsibilities using its own staff, and management practice was internally focused and staff oriented. The bureaucracy involved authority within the public sector only. Under the neo-liberal process, the Department is emerging as an authority outside the public sector by
retaining the power of ‘approving’ manuscripts and ‘controlling’ the quality of materials produced by private vendors and individuals.

When external parties replace Departmental staff and the Department restricts its role to that of approval, the bulk of the Departmental responsibility falls to senior management, i.e., Barom and his bosses in the Ministry. Barom’s management authority over his staff has been squeezed in real terms but his authority also been extended to private vendors and individuals.

Barom’s fatherhood is organised around ‘preparing his family in good way’, and ‘equipping his sons to work in managerial positions.’ His own life experience paves the way for his children. He is putting his efforts into making his sons into future managers like himself. He is apparently succeeding. Three of his sons are now serving in the public sector. He has provided them with appropriate education to make them competent to become future managers. He thinks that ‘a manager works with brain, not physically, and he manages other.’ His notion of a ‘manager’ is also reflected by his zeal in serving in the public sector. He enjoys managing his subordinates as well as others who are concerned in the production of the materials he oversees.

Case Study 2: Liang Kim – Private Sector Manager

The Interview

Liang was recruited to this study through one of his colleagues. Although I had tried unsuccessfully many times to make an appointment with a private sector manager, obtaining an appointment with Liang was easy. He understands the importance of research.
The interview took place in his office after-hours. He was articulate and enthusiastic in sharing his experience. He wanted to talk about the progress of his career. The interview lasted for an hour.

**Life Course**

Born in a rural family of a southern province, Liang is thirty-seven. He is a father of one daughter (14) and two sons (8 and 6).

Liang’s father, a community health officer in the pre-war era, was killed by the KR in 1979. Liang was just six at that time. The death of his father – the only breadwinner in the family – resulted in extreme hardship. Liang’s mother, who had neither an education nor a farming skill, found it difficult to raise eight dependent children. She took on a new undertaking, making and vending traditional noodles and pies in order to provide for her children. The income was meagre. In such a dire situation, ‘the priority of the family was to feed children, not to give education or anything else.’ Young Liang also participated in the family labour force in this dire situation. By looking after the family cattle, and collecting scrap metals, he added some income to family budget.

Liang completed his high school certificate in the rural province. He had taken a study break for two years before resumed undergraduate study. He worked with an international organisation in the province during the break. Eventually he moved to Phnom Penh in 1995 to a job in a foreign embassy. He began his undergraduate study in a public university while working at the embassy.

He was fascinated by the English language since secondary school although Russian, Vietnamese and French were taught as foreign languages in the school system. He attended English classes outside school. Proficiency in English helped him to obtain jobs in foreign agencies.
He completed his undergraduate degree in Law with a major in Commerce in 2000. In the following year, he went to a top-ranked foreign university with a scholarship to pursue his Master’s in International Law. Since he came to the global knowledge society, Liang has never looked back. He was one of the few Cambodians of his time to hold a Master’s degree from a prestigious university.

Upon return to Cambodia after his overseas study, he joined as a Specialist in a social program operated by a foreign embassy in Phnom Penh. He worked there until 2006. He then moved to his current workplace, a transnational financial corporation. His first appointed was as a Management Trainee. After four months he became the Regional Manager, the position he has held for last two years.

Liang’s career trajectory from social sector to financial/business sector is unusual. The reason for his switch to the financial sector is the decline in job prospects in his former sector. He foresaw a bright prospect by moving and is successful in his new job. His current portfolio in the corporate world is prestigious.

Through work and education, Liang has experienced many cultures, societies and nations. He has visited more than a dozen countries across the world. While on secondment to the highly developed country where his employers’ firm originated, he gained management experience of regional and rural banking.

Liang’s is an example of personal globalisation, and globalisation from below. As an individual he has been linked to global society, first through learning English, then by working in aid programs and finally through working in a financial corporation. According to his own account, he was an introvert, but has become extroverted as a result of acquiring leadership skills in the course of his profession. The structure of work, particularly in aid programs, required him to lead and coordinate people like government officials, local representatives and political party
leaders. The leadership quality gained through employment in the social development sector is now getting best use in his current employment.

Liang married young and is the sole breadwinner of the family. His wife is a full-time housewife. He lives with his wife and children in his own house in Phnom Penh. All of his children study in foreign-owned English medium schools in Phnom Penh. He dedicates his time to his profession and has no time to share in household chores. This is taken for granted because of his sole breadwinning role.

**Work, workplace and gender regime at work**

Liang has had eighteen years of work experience: fourteen years in social-development and four years in the business sector. His career in the social development sector began as an English translator for a UN peacekeeping project and ended as an Expert for a foreign-aided project. His experience in the business sector began as a Regional Manager in his current workplace, a transnational financial corporation.

Liang did not provide any details about the gender regime in the aid programs he worked on previously. But given the history of institutional intervention on gender equality in Cambodia, it is highly likely that gender equality was one of the cross-cutting issues in those programs. The emphasis on gender equality in post-war Cambodia was driven by the aid agencies. Until now, gender equality initiatives of both government and non-government organisations have been mainly supported by aid agencies.

Liang switched to the business sector in 2006. Factors underlying his switch were the saturation of the job market in the social development sector and the emergence of the financial sector with the influx of foreign investment (FI). Thousands of jobs in the social development sector emerged in Cambodia in the
1990s and early 2000s with foreign-sponsored programs for reconstruction and rehabilitation. But jobs in this sector dried up since the mid-2000s due to the phasing out of many projects. On the other hand, jobs in the business sector started to emerge since Cambodia became a member of WTO. Foreign investment created thousands of jobs for locals. Service sectors, particularly banking and telecommunication sectors, created very lucrative jobs for qualified locals.

After rigorous evaluation, Liang switched to the business sector. His current employer provides banking services. It is one of the fastest growing banking institutions in Cambodia. As a regional manager, Liang oversees six branches and one business development team with a total of seventy staff, including ten managers. His overall responsibility is to ensure best customer services by branches and to execute the institution’s business plan.

Corporate managers like Liang work in a semi-autonomous environment. He regards himself as a ‘pretty much business owner’ which has ‘profit and loss.’ Branches and businesses, as well as labour forces that work in these branches, are his business. His profit is service rewards. He gives ‘ownership’ of their initiatives to branch managers. But they need to integrate his ‘focuses and priorities’ in their ‘plan’ and ‘day-to-day operation.’ This condition that his priorities be integrated in the plans of branch managers is ambiguous in terms of Liang’s claim that he gives ownership of their initiatives.

Unlike public sector managers such as Barom, Liang invests lots of time and efforts in the supervision of his subordinates. His supervision is more as a facilitator who ‘adds value’ to managers to ‘make them better managers.’ He needs to equip himself with lots of ideas and skills to provide on-the-spot solutions. He ‘recognises
and celebrates successes’ of managers. When a target is not achieved, he concentrates on one or two areas for improvement.

Liang’s statements about his role and management methods reflect the management jargon of the neoliberal corporate world. Though the management phrasings are not bluntly authoritarian, they implicitly mean that everyone needs to perform his or her best for his or her job.

His current workplace is gendered. It runs for making profit through delivering ‘best customer service’. It is officially gender neutral although in fact there are specific gendered patterns of labour force employment in branches and head office. Branch managers are men. Similarly senior management such as regional managers, and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are also men. Women hold a good proportion of customer service related positions working at the front desk. Putting a good proportion of female staff at the front desk is based on the gendered notion that women are better than men in customer relations. The official view is that no salary difference is maintained based on sex, and salary is absolutely performance based. But actually the incomes of men and women are not equal.

Family life and relationship, gender regime at home

Liang was born in a breadwinner/housewife model family. But at the age of six, due to death of his father, the family turned into breadwinner-cum-household maker model. His mother and eldest sister took these dual roles. Liang is sympathetic to his mother for her tireless efforts in bringing up the family.

Although he was brought up in a breadwinner-cum-household-maker model family, Liang has modelled breadwinner/housewife family in his own life. The breadwinner-cum-household-maker model family is usually a female-headed family where the head of the family both earns money to support the family and performs the
household tasks. The breadwinner/housewife model family is the family where a husband is sole breadwinner for the family and a wife performs household tasks. His wife is a full-time housewife from the very beginning. He does not mind this arrangement. Instead, he feels 'good' with this arrangement as he can 'spend longer hours at work.'

Liang separates work from family by 'not bringing any work home.' With this demarcation, he regards himself as distinct from the average manager. He is unaware about the relationship between work and home.

He maintains a 'tight' and 'scheduled' life in the family. His involvement in family includes 'forty-five minutes’ for three children per night for three or four weeknights to check their homework and academic record, 'twenty minutes’ every morning with his daughter to wake her up, drop her at school on the way to his office. He also catches up with his children and their peers on different occasions, a 'habit’ he has adopted from his brief overseas career.

Liang maintains his family with absolute authority. His authority is perceived as altruistic, not authoritarian by the family, within the shadow of his endeavours for providing ever better living conditions. His authority is taken for granted for his sole role to give family members a rich life.

**Place (rural/urban), peer relations, wider social life or culture**

Liang is a sophisticated and articulate case of how a local Cambodian manager in the business sector works for a global financial corporation and is simultaneously being incorporated into the global culture.

Like other managers, Liang brings life experiences in both rural and urban setting. He has been exposed to global culture more comprehensively through his work and education. He has always worked in foreign agencies with multicultural
environments. Higher education in a developed country, concurrent occupation in a
transnational corporation with a foreign CEO, and overseas work experience have
truly exposed him to global culture and its value system. He leads professional life
everyday in accordance with corporate culture.

He does not have any peer group outside work except sport. He is work-
centric. He does not have any time to spend with other than family members. He
comes straight back home from the office. On weekend, he spends one day on sport
(soccer) to keep his mind and body healthy in order to work long hours during the
week. He spends the second day of each weekend for socialisation with his family.

Experience of violence

Liang’s experience of violence is different from those of Barom and Bunthi. His experience of violence was a kind of ‘street fight’ with other boys in the
commune which often broke out in efforts to survive in the post-KR era. Fights broke
out among young boys who were desperate to find means for survival. The fights
were associated with scrap materials that these people collected to sell for a living.

Liang was active in the street fights as he needed to be ‘strong’ for ‘survival.’ He needed to socialise with other children even in a violent way as there was no other
alternative. It was ‘normal and part of life.’

In his family, the power-gap between husband and wife is huge. It seems that
his wife is passive in the power dynamics of the family. Given the immense power
gap and the passivity of his wife, any kind of violence or conflict is unlikely to
happen within his family.

Construction of masculinity

Compared to his age and socio-economic background, Liang is very
successful in his profession. He holds a highly-salaried position in a prestigious
transnational company in the country. He is inspiring and aspiring for many young locals as he also says, ‘all my nephews and nieces look me as their example.’

Liang’s construction of masculinity has been shaped and reshaped in the course of his life. Global culture dominates his current construction of masculinities though he was brought up in a rural family. About him, he says, ‘global exposure’ has changed the way he thinks nowadays.

He organises his managerial masculinity with the intention to ‘live by example for others’ (subordinates). He needs to follow the standard practices of the neo-liberal corporate world and set an example. In this pursuit, he appears as a ‘mentor’ to his subordinates who ‘adds value’ to managers to enable them to provide ‘best customer services.’ He does not appear bluntly authoritative to his subordinates. His specific management practices are not his instinct qualities, rather he follows what is expected by his CEO, as he says, ‘we (senior management team) drive or influence people (staff) in the way we are expected.’ In another account he accepts that he has been extroverted and gained leadership quality over his current service though he found himself to be introverted in the past.

He organises himself within a common neo-liberal notion of ‘negotiating his full skill’ in pursuit of being an ‘above-average manager.’ He maintains a tight and scheduled life both in the workplace and at home. He works hard by paying full attention to work by closing his ‘brain to external or family issues.’ In pursuit of becoming a best manager among average managers, he equips himself with skills and ideas to become an on-the-spot problem solver.

He organises his fatherhood around altruism, at least in his own judgement. His altruistic fatherhood is demonstrated by equipping children for competitive global job markets. He foresees that the future job market would be ‘more competitive’ than in
his time. With the aim of making his children competitive for global job market, he invests in education for his children despite opposition by his wife and in-laws. He sends children to expensive international English medium schools to ensure that they are educated to American or British standards. His fatherhood is largely assimilated with high quality education and living for children.

He has imported fathering skills from a rich and wealthy country context. His current ways of fathering are globalised. His practices of interactions with children are uncommon among other managers. Despite his limited free time, he tries to build rapport and emotional attachment with children. These are the practices that he has adopted from his brief overseas working life. He says, ‘I have continued these habits until this day.’

Case Study 3: Bunthi Sar – Local Business Entrepreneur

The Interview

Bunthi was recruited in interview through another manager of this study. The interview was held in his office. At first he did not allow me to record the interview and became very emotional at one point in our conversation about his fathering role. I took the opportunity at this stage to ask again if I could record the interview and he then agreed. He talked for an hour in the interview.

Life course

Bunthi, a father of three children, comes from one of the north-eastern provinces. He currently lives in his own house in Phnom Penh with his wife and children.

He was three when the KR regime began. He stayed at home with his elderly grandmother during the regime. His parents were relocated by the regime to another
commune for farming. The family was reunited after the war. Bunthi is eldest among six siblings (two boys and four girls).

He began school after the war and completed his primary education in his village. His family moved to a provincial town in 1982 after his father found a job in government. He completed his secondary and high school certificates in the provincial town and came to Phnom Penh in 1992 for tertiary education. He was enrolled in Khmer Literature in one public university learned English in a private school at the same time. He regards himself as ‘one of the few Cambodians who could speak English’ at that time. His choice of English widened his occupational choices later in his life.

He lived in his uncle’s house in his first year in Phnom Penh. Then he moved to a pagoda where he lived for three years. Living in the pagoda was free. He began teaching English in private schools in his second year. He also taught Khmer language to foreigners. Many of the foreigners who came to Cambodia for post-war reconstruction learnt the Khmer language. Bunthi, however, lived on his own at this time.

Three of his younger sisters joined him during his final year of university. They came to Phnom Penh to further their education. He rented a house where the four of them lived together. Along with the lodging, he also sponsored the education of his sisters.

After finishing his first degree, he studied pedagogy for two years at the same university. He then became a high school teacher in his province. He quit the job after one year and returned to Phnom Penh as he found it difficult to live in a rural area though he had been brought up in a rural setting. He joined a private bank in Phnom Penh where he worked for three years. Later he worked in an aid agency for three
years, then in an international NGO for two years, and in a gold mine for one year. In 2009, he started a business in partnership with some friends.

He married in 2002 after a five-year love affair. His eldest son is in Year 3 in public school and the second son is in a play-group. The children also go to English schools in the evening.

**Work, workplace and gender regime in work**

Bunthi brings occupational experiences in teaching, banking, social development and business sectors. Jobs in the business sector are usually gendered as this sector is profit-driven. His jobs in the social sector were gender responsive. He was directly involved on behalf of women’s rights and gender equality through these jobs. He became familiar with gender equality issues.

Bunthi currently has two jobs. One is his own business and the other is a staff position in a foreign-owned company. His business assists local agro-entrepreneurs to export agricultural products (mainly rice) to mostly European markets, providing market and technological assistance to entrepreneurs. He works as a Manager of the foreign company. The company markets agricultural technologies in Cambodia. Bunthi cleverly use his own business clients (entrepreneurs) to market technologies of the foreign company.

His business is gendered. Gender division of labour in agro-processing industries, especially in rice mills, is explicit. The industry uses conventional technologies which are manually operated. Men operate rice milling plants and perform loading and unloading related tasks. Women work as a secondary labour force.

Given the nature of business, Bunthi needs a lot of field trips. Sometime, he spends a whole week in the provinces. When he is stationed in Phnom Penh, he needs
to spend after-hours for ‘business networking’ with clients and business partners. After-hour business networking usually takes place in popular entertainment places such as beer gardens and karaoke bars. Entertainments in these facilities are romantic, sexualised and commercial which primarily target men’s leisure. Through after-hours business networking, Bunthi comes across girls who serve in these facilities and shares emotion with them. His emotional relationships with girls outside his marriage affect his family relationship.

**Family, relationship and gender regime in the family**

Over the course of Bunthi’s career move from social development sector to business sector, the pattern of the family gender regime changed. He maintained his family with the joint-breadwinner model until 2009. His wife shared in providing for the family by running a stationery shop. Bunthi has reconstructed the joint-breadwinner model into breadwinner/housewife model since he switched to the business sector.

He is extremely busy in his two productive roles and finds it almost impossible to allocate any time for his family. He is particularly concerned for his growing children who need intensive care. Although he can afford to, he has not hired a nanny. He thinks a nanny cannot replace a mother. His wife eventually left her business and became a full-time housewife. She provides domestic services which enable him to fully concentrate to his work. The new model is precarious for her in family power relations. She has little authority in major power relations. She had negotiation power in intra-family gender relations when she shared in family providing.

He justifies the new family model for the sake of children who are now ‘given care very well’ by his wife. His share in family chores has been reduced over this
period. All he does is drop his eldest son at school on the way to his office. Nor does he do this regularly.

**Place (rural/urban), peer relations, wider social life or culture**

Like other managers, Bunthi has also had life experience in both rural and urban settings. Born and brought up in a rural family, he gradually became accustomed to urban life through education and occupation. The urban life-style and value system are central to his present life. His aspiration for urban life first emerged when he had been living on his own from his earnings from teaching the local language to foreigners and foreign language (English) to locals. His aspiration was further reinforced through his jobs in international agencies with foreign employers.

He is a functionary of global market society, making globalisation happen from below. Agricultural economy, which has always been localised, is becoming connected to the global market through his business. Local technologies in the area of agro-processing are gradually being replaced by modern ones coming from the global market.

With his ‘tight daily life’ Bunthi’s peer relationships are rapidly becoming limited to his business partners. His peer affairs are mostly concentrated in after-hour business networking. He sometimes catches up with his old friends – but they take a secondary place within his tight schedule. One of these friends sings well and goes to the karaoke club on the rare occasions that their leisure times coincide.

**Experience of violence**

Bunthi had a violent childhood. His father had beaten him severely on several occasions. He became unconscious at least once. He terms his father as a person of strict personality who was always scary. He thinks that his fathers’ tough personality
was constructed in situations of dire economic conditions for their family in post-war
times. He is not, however, resentful of his father’s violence.

In contrast to these experiences, Bunthi has constructed an adoring and loving
relationship with his children. He is very much concerned for his children, particularly
when they are away from home, in school or elsewhere. He cried during the interview
when talking about his role as a father.

His relationship with his wife is not the same as it is with their children. The
spousal relationship has become ‘jealous’ recently. The development of this jealous
relationship is discussed in the next section. The jealousy relationship may not turn
physically violent but it suggests that verbal conflicts and arguments persist between
husband and wife.

**Construction of masculinity**

Bunthi constructed early masculinity around family providing. He began his
fathering role alongside his father through working in the family carpentry workshop
during his secondary and high school education. His fathers’ income from
government job was too meagre to support the family. Construction of the fathering
role in his youth was socially oriented. Being the eldest child, he was expected to help
his father. Within this context, he had taken responsibility for the higher education of
three of his younger sisters.

A man in a joint-breadwinner model family needs to maintain some sort of
close relationship with his wife to maintain his patriarchal position as she also shares
in generating family income. Bunthi maintained cooperation with his wife in early
years of their family life. Nowadays he obtains patriarchal power in a blunt and
aggressive way by altering the former family model to that of breadwinner/housewife
model. His current construction of masculinity is a reconfigured patriarchy, which is
not based on profit maximisation; rather it is based on maximisation of power and authority over his wife. Keeping his wife away from her business has certainly caused loss of family income. But he does this in order to ensure his absolute power in the family. His decision for his wife to stop her business was a conscious stratagem. He is aware that any income earned by his wife may diminish his power and authority.

Bunthi’s move to the business sector is socially driven. Cambodian society is becoming more and more materialistic. A man, especially in the city, should have a house and a car (Sophea, another business entrepreneur bluntly holds this notion). Bunthi was concerned that he could not do so working in the social sector. He wanted to acquire wealth quickly from running businesses.

Engagement in the business sector is adding a new dimension to Bunthi’s masculinity. He is emotionally attached to women outside marriage through ‘after-hours business networking’. This is a new practice for him. He regards such relationships as ‘not so serious’ and ‘comes along with business.’ When asked about family, Bunthi says, ‘family is one of my entertainments and work is for the family’s financial support.’ But his emotional share outside marriage suggests that family is no longer a site of his entertainment.

Bunthi’s practice and his wife’s expectation are not consistent. There is a contradiction in the way he performs masculinity and the way his wife expects him to practice. His wife holds the notion of marital fidelity. In contrast, he shares emotional and sexual relationships with women outside marriage. This contradiction causes serious tensions in the family. His wife watches him closely and he strongly resents her vigilance.
6.4 Managerial masculinities: divergences and relations to domestic violence

6.4.1 Managerial masculinities: divergences and pluralities

Three patterns of masculinities are performed by Cambodian managers in this study. Each pattern is distinct from the others in the way it is constructed and practised. The nature of work, culture of work management and gender regimes of the workplace greatly affect the way managers construct and practice specific patterns of masculinities.

Barom represents the masculinities of most public sector managers, with the exception of Sopheak. Sopheak is an outlier whose practices do not fall in this type. The mid-career public sector managers work in a bureaucratic system with a rigid hierarchy. They work with less entitlement and authority than their senior management. A manager’s performance is measured by senior management based on periodic report on the department or unit or office of which he is incharge. As the public sector manager does not work in a fishbowl, there is room to manipulate performance in the report. There is a common practice by managers to keep their senior management uninformed about exact performance by their department or unit or office. Managers use various strategies to cover up discrepancies. The strategies include discussing unfulfilled targets with subordinates within the department, solving the issue locally, and showing apparent honesty to the senior management. Different managers go with different strategies, and this validates the assertion that there is no standardised management strategy in the public sector. A manager picks up a strategy which works best within the department.

The public sector managers spend the bulk of their time at meetings (within and outside department/unit/office), and on paper-work and reporting. They manage their departments with hierarchy and authority. The subordinate can hardly find a
manager as a mentor or coach. As one’s performance does not really matter, his/her professional or personal relation with the manager is really important for the subordinates.

The same ethics also flow to the relationship between the managers and their senior management in the Ministry. Patronage of senior staff in the Ministry is very important in achieving a promotion for a manager. For instance, Phyrum provides personal service to one of his Ministerial senior staff to secure his patronage. He picks-up his boss and his boss’s family at the airport upon their arrival from a family trip overseas. Though he knows that this sort of practice is submissive and beyond official responsibility, Phyrum consciously provides this service in the hope of a promotion. His boss has the power to nominate staff for promotion within his office.

But Sopheak, a medical doctor, does not follow the paths of other fellow managers. He neither provides personal services nor manipulates discrepancies for the senior management. He rather maintains a straightforward relationship. He expects promotion based on merit and competency. He is unlikely to make an undue compromise. He had a promotion due in his department but it did not happen as he could not convince the senior management in the usual way. He has shown a willingness to protest and has taken leave from his workplace when his promotion was rejected. He currently works in an international non-government organisation. This is a sort of protest against unfair treatment by his superiors. Sopheak’s academic merit and professional skill have enabled him to be firm in his protest. Sopheak has ample opportunities to work in the private sector to keep his self-esteem intact.

As some services of many public sector departments are gradually being privatised, the public sector managerial masculinities are gaining new dimensions. In its new dimension as found in Barom’s case, the bureaucracy is being expanded to
private domain. In the neo-liberal model, the managers are holding more power by holding approval authority over private sector services. At the same time, managers' authority within departments is being squeezed in real terms as departments themselves play diminishing roles.

Having an official policy on gender equality and being directly involved in promoting gender equality within program such as by Phyrum, the public sector managers are knowledgeable about gender mainstreaming processes in government departments. They are also informed and aware of gender equality in family life.

Liang represents the masculinities of Chhrem and Prom. They work in a fishbowl with an exact target to achieve. Achievement of their targets depends on delivering best customer services by the staff in the frontline. Essentially, they need to supervise their subordinates so that they serve in the best way. The bulk of their time goes in face-to-face staff supervision, not relating to their seniors. In real terms, their managerial role takes place only in a downward direction, supervising underlings.

Liang, Chhrem and Prom’s relationship with their subordinates is ‘complicit.’ They approach their subordinates apparently as ‘mentor’ or ‘coach’ to make them ‘better managers’. These management jargons are often used to label corporate management as people-oriented. However, the complicit managerial practice with subordinates is maintained for personal benefit, i.e., achievement of their targets. But their complicity does not take place in a vacuum of power and authority. The power flows to the subordinates as supervisors present themselves as problem solvers. The management jargons have different meaning to the subordinates. To them the meaning is synonymous with power and authority.

Unlike the private sector managers just mentioned, Bunthi and Sophea who own, and manage their own business bring different patterns of masculinities.
Bunthi who co-owns an export-led business does not have many dealings with colleagues. In fact, there are few staff who work for his business. His business partners and local entrepreneurs are important to him. His management practices are more non-personnel. He needs to maintain networking with partners and entrepreneurs. He spends lots of time on field trips.

Sophea, who owns a local real estate company appears hostile to his subordinates. Commission from buyers and sellers of property is the main source of the company’s income. He has problems with his subordinates who secretly deal with some clients and take commission from the clients bypassing the company. As a result the company loses income.

The approaches such as claiming to be “mentors” or “add value” are ineffective in managing his employees. Sophea maintains a commanding and authoritarian attitude to his employees. He uses different approaches with his subordinates to ensure income for his company earned from commissions. He uses a moral approach to prevent his employees from cheating. He makes his staff take an oath every morning in front of Buddha’s statue that they will not take commission from the clients. He says,

We are Buddhist. They are afraid to cheat after taking an oath. I use moral action instead of legal action.

6.4.2 Managerial masculinities and domestic violence

Managerial masculinities, specifically how they are made and what is earned by a manager, have implications for intra-family gender relations and violence in the family. Income status of the wife of the manager powerfully regulates a manager’s potential violent behaviour in the family.
Bunthi has been undergoing tension and conflict with his wife. Although he did not mention whether the tension has ever turned into physical violence, there is no doubt that his wife’s personal wellbeing and freedom are in question. The potentially violent situation arose because of his sexual promiscuity which arose from his business procedures as detailed discussed in Case 3. He did not carry out these practices when he worked in social development.

Prom also encountered tension with his wife a few years ago on the same grounds. Their relationship disintegrated because of his sexual infidelity. He developed relationships with several girls at a Karaoke bar by visiting them with his colleagues. His wife, who is a businesswoman, did not accept his sexual behaviour. She left him and lived separately for a couple of weeks. This happened twice. Finally, Prom persuaded her to return by giving her a guarantee of marital fidelity.

Sopheak had also encountered family violence in his early conjugal life. He slapped his wife at least on one occasion. The grounds for his violence were not same as those of Prom and Bunthi. Sopheak grew up in a poor and needy family. He married a wife from a ruling class family. Sopheak wanted his wife to conform to his idea of womanhood. For example, he wanted her to respect and obey him and his family, not to argue with him, and to cook and serve meals when he came home from work. Being socially inferior, he attempted to use gendered norms of womanhood which he termed *Chhbap Srey* (traditional code of conduct for women) in an effort to maintain class difference as well as to exercise power and authority. Incompliance to *Chhbap Srey* by his wife seemed maltreatment of his class position. He then used physical violence to discipline his wife.
His wife, however, who has an outside paid job, challenged his violent practice by virtue of her economic independence. Over time, Sopheak has given up his attempts to discipline his wife. He respects and values his wife these days.

Unlike the wives of Sopheak and Prom, Bunthi’s wife has failed to challenge the sexual privilege of her husband. Bunthi has maximised his power and authority over the family by making his wife economically dependent on him. His wife eventually accepted his privilege.

Private sector manager Liang, and business entrepreneurs Bunthi and Sopheak have reconstructed patriarchal control over the family by reconstructing a patriarchy which is not maximising profit but maximising power and authority, particularly over his wife. Bunthi and Sopheak, in particular have stopped their wives from taking on outside paid work. Their reconstructed patriarchy is made possible through their sole family-providing role.

Working wives of managers, including public sector managers are better off in family gender relations as well as in negotiation with their husbands on family affairs. Their contribution to the family budget balances the power and authority between spouses and safeguards them from potential violence.
7.1 Introduction

To date, studies on rural masculinities have been limited in terms of geography, historical period and subject matter. The available studies (Brandth, 2002; Coldwell, 2009) have been made in the context of large-scale farming practices in industrialised nations. The study on masculinities in farming began to appear in literature only more than a decade ago (Brandth, 1995; Phillips, 1998). These studies mainly focus on agricultural changes, technologies and peasant identities. There is a dearth of study in the context of matrilocal developing nations like Cambodia where rules on land ownership have changed several times in recent history. There is a dearth of studies in social settings such as these in relation to intra-family gender relations in general and domestic violence in particular.

As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2), agriculture is a masculine domain of social practice. The term ‘farmer’ is analogous to male identity. Farming has become more fully masculinised with the advent of mechanisation. This transformation has reinforced the farmer’s identity as male by taking away women’s farming activity.
This transformation has not always been good for men. Men are often left to run farms alone and are therefore isolated, and are often seen as backward and non-modern compared to their female counterparts who now have better educations, multiple skills and social advantages which they have acquired through their move to urban activities.

7.2 Land, land-ownership and farming practices in Cambodia

**Land**

Cambodia’s landscape comprises a central plain with forested mountains along the borders. The Mekong River, Tonle Sap (Great Lake), and Bassac Rivers drain the central plain. The soil is humid to sub-humid with pronounced alternating wet-dry seasons of about six months. Areas adjacent to the Mekong River, tributary rivers and streams, and Tonle Sap are highly fertile with fine-textured recent alluvial deposits. Other areas of the central plain are low-fertile with sandy to silty clay and sandy loams as well as ancient alluvial deposits.

The landscape and soil type affect agriculture significantly. The central plains lowland is used for agriculture and the vast upland areas are used for plantation. Agriculture is highly vulnerable to both drought and flood and is practised mainly during the wet season. The dry season is unfavourable for agriculture, particularly for rice cultivation.

**Land-ownership**

As stated in Chapters 4-5, Cambodia has gone through radical political changes, particularly in last four decades. Each government has introduced its own system for the use and ownership of land.

In the pre-colonial era, all land belonged, *de jure*, to the King. In practice, people held rights of possession. During the colonial period (1863-1954), private land
ownership was introduced and this continued until 1975. The Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime abolished private land ownership during its period of power from 1975 to 1979. With little modification of the DK’s policy, the post-DK regime followed the collective ownership (*Krom Samaki*) system until the 1990s.

A new Land Law was promulgated in 1992. It gave Cambodians the right to possess, use, transfer and inherit land that they had been occupying for at least five years. It also invalidated the ownership rights existing from before 1979. However, the 1992 Land Law had some weaknesses with regard to possession of land, including the possibility of claiming ownership solely on the basis of possession, the lack of documentation of ownership, and possession rights. These drawbacks led to massive land-grabbing by powerful government officials who acted as though vacant properties (land occupied by ordinary people was often taken by force as if vacant) and State property were theirs to occupy and therefore sell. A new law was promulgated in 2001 to address these drawbacks.

To this day, the majority of the population in the countryside occupies land without legal title. Lack of land title makes peasants vulnerable to easy appropriation of their land by the government and private companies.

*Farm practices*

72.3% of the workforce worked in the agriculture sector in 2010. The vast majority of these are smallholder farmers with a land holding averaging less than one hectare per household.

Rice is the main crop. Along with farming rice, rural families juggle a range of non-farm activities which include rearing livestock (mainly cattle, buffalo, pigs, chicken and ducks), catching fish and other aquatic fauna, and harvesting non-timber forest products such as bamboo shoots, mushrooms and firewood. There is regional
variation in the rice yield. Provinces alongside Tonle Sap and the Mekong River such as Battambang, Siem Reap, Pursat, and Bantey Meanchey produce the highest quantity of rice. Other provinces of the central plain produce less rice than the national average.

Farming is mainly for subsistence and farming methods are mainly manual, though mechanical ploughing is on the increase. Production of livestock is usually small-scale. Fish and aquatic fauna are important for food security and for nutrition of the rural population.

More than 80% of rice cultivation is rain-fed. The rainfall period is from June to October. The Mekong River swells to its peak in September to October which can lead to severe flooding. Many farmers come to the city during the off-farm season to work temporarily in non-formal urban sectors.

7.3 Peasants of this Study

The discussion in this chapter is based on the life histories of fifteen peasants from two generational groups: an older generation above 40 (group of eight) and a younger generation below 30 (group of seven). Peasants of the older generation are: Rathana Kong (54), father of five children, Theara Kim (49), father of eight children, Chandareth Lam (60), father of nine children, Sophoan Chea (57), father of seven children, Sokha Yim (49), father of seven children, Samay Leng (50), father of six children, Sopath Kuy (49), father of seven children, and Vuthy Tep (42), father of three children. Peasants of the younger generation are Chantu Soy (27), father of two children, Vutha Eng (30), father of two children, Pou Pok (30), father of two children, Bunnak Ouk (26), father of three children, Syheap Srey (30), father of three children, Kosal Hak (29), father of two children, and Pyanet Cham (28), father of one child.
They come from three provinces. Rice yield in these provinces is lower than the national average. Rice production is limited mainly to the wet season, although dry season rice production is undertaken in a limited area where groundwater or surface water is available in the dry season. Agricultural land worked by farmers in one of these provinces has been acquired by the government for a transnational agro-processing company, as the farmers do not hold legal title.

Among the older generation group, Rathanak, Theara, Chandareth and Sophoan served in the militia of the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime, and Sokha, Samay and Vuthy served in the armed corps of the post-KR regime. Their transformation to civilian life will be discussed in Chapter 12.

Case Study 4: Vuthy Tep, a marginal peasant

The interview

Mr Vuthy was recruited with the help of one of his fellow farmers who was also interviewed in this study. The interview took place in his home. It was a semi-public interview as some neighbours were present during the interview which ran for an hour.

In the course of the interview, I came to understand some of the tensions that have vexed his family for few years. I asked him to give me details of these issues. He spoke frankly despite the presence of neighbours in the meeting place.

Geographical, social and economic setting of Vuthy’s commune

Vuthy’s commune is 100 km from the capital and 60 km from the nearest provincial town. It is one of the remotest communes of the province. The commune is connected to the provincial town by an earthen road. This road was narrow until a few
years ago when it was widened. The road was scheduled to be paved in 2010. The commune has now been connected to national power grid.

The infrastructure development is taking place as part of industrial development in the area. A foreign-owned agro-processing industry was established in the neighbouring district a few years ago and another foreign-owned agro-based industry is now under way in Vuthy’s commune.

The population of the commune is 8,020 people in 1,800 households. The commune’s landscape consists of plains and forested hilly tracts with areas of 180,000 hectares and 10,000 hectares respectively. A number of Steang (creeks) cross some villages of the commune. Originated in the mountains, these creeks carry water throughout the commune.

Agriculture is the main occupation of people in the commune. Rice is the main crop and cultivated mainly for subsistence. A few farmers produce surplus rice for sale. They also grow vegetables and fruit both for subsistence and cash. Men and women work together on the farms that rely on rain and creek water.

The rice yield of many families of the commune has been reduced in the last few years because of drought and low rainfall. In the past there was sufficient rain-fall and the creeks flowed plentifully throughout the year. The water level in the creeks even in the dry season was deep enough for the land to be irrigated for the cultivation of vegetables.

Families in the commune received land holdings following the Land Law of 1992. Those who returned to the commune after 1992 or worked somewhere other than Krom Samaki could not receive any land.

Many families in the commune have long been dependent on the forest. They usually collected various non-timber forest products for subsistence. Nowadays, as the
rice yield has fallen, families are extracting timber from the forest to earn money. They log timber to make charcoal for sale in Phnom Penh.

**Life course**

Vuthy is 42 years old and the father of three children (two daughters and one son). He was born in a marginal peasant family in another commune and followed the matrilocal marriage custom of moving to his wife’s family.

He was nine when the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime began and had a hard life during the regime. Like other children, he worked hard, herding cows, cutting leaves and paddy straws, and preparing compost.

Both his parents died from sickness during the war and after the fall of the KR regime, young Vuthy lived with his eldest sister. He resumed his study and completed Year VI, by which he was already adult. It is noteworthy that in post-war Cambodia, adults and children attended the same classes.

Vuthy joined the armed forces of the post-KR regime. He joined the corps voluntarily and accepted the ‘obligation’ to protect the country, though many others were recruited by force. The post-KR regime recruited thousands of adult males in the armed forces to fight against KR militias who were still holding some parts of the country.

He was mobilised as a serviceman in the commune where he currently lives and came to know his wife during this time. He married in 1992 while still in the armed services. He stopped serving in the armed force in 1996 because of a posting to a new location. This time his responsibility for his family came before his patriotism.

After being removed from the armed forces, Vuthy turned to full-time farming and has been working as a full-time farmer ever since. He lived with his parents-in-law for the first few years of his marriage. Then he and his wife started to live as a
separate family unit with one hectare of land given to them by his parents-in-law. Both spouses farmed this land.

Vuthy’s wife has been living away from the family since last year. She works in the agro-processing factory in the neighbouring district. She lives there and visits Vuthy and their children at home once or twice a month. Vuthy is adjusting himself to the changing situation. As his wife lives away, he looks after the family and does the household chores along with his farming work. His eldest daughter who is sixteen assists him. The youngest child, a son, goes to school.

**Work, workplace and gender regime in work**

Vuthy’s working life began through his service in the armed forces in his early twenties. According to his account, this service was violent and life-threatening. Fights often broke-out with the Khmer Rouge militias. Terror and cruelty were part of daily life.

The armed service was a gendered site. It was a world of men and was commanded and operated by men against men. Only men were recruited in the armed service as they were recruited primarily for fighting.

Vuthy’s farming occupation began after marriage, first with his parents-in-law, then on the one hectare given by them. Over time, he has expanded the land size and they currently own two hectares of land. Vuthy cultivated rice and vegetables in the past but has not grown vegetables for the past few years due to lack of water. Nowadays, he collects wood from the forest to make charcoal for sale.

Farming practices in Vuthy’s family are not gendered. According to him, ‘both husband and wife worked hard on the land every day.’ This was the gender scenario of farming until last year. His wife is now engaged in outside paid work as a result of
the family’s low rice yield. In her current work regime, his wife adds cash while Vuthy makes a subsistence living to add to the family’s economy.

**Family, relationship and gender regime in the family**

Vuthy’s relationship with his parents was brief as he was separated from them by the KR regime at the age of nine. In post-war times, he was brought up as a teenager by his eldest sister. His relationship with his sister was good but life was hard and survival was often desperately difficult. Like Vuthy, many young survivors of the war were brought up either by the surviving senior family member or by foster parents in post-war Cambodia.

Vuthy has been making his own family for eighteen years. The family relationship is built on a gender regime which functions through specific gender roles and relationships. Until last year, both spouses had contributed similarly to provision for the family. Both spouses worked on the land inherited by his wife. Despite his wife’s significant contribution to family income, Vuthy had been regarded as the default head of family and he bore the principal responsibility for providing for them. Being the family head he enjoyed privilege in the family hierarchy.

The family has been undergoing a change of gender regime since last year. The change began after his wife found a paid job because of the shrinking farm production. The family was in desperate need for an alternative income to feed the family as well as they had in the past.

By entering paid work his wife addressed the problem of the family’s economic need. The family economy has shifted from a pure subsistence farming to a mixed economy i.e., subsistence farming/cash economy. With her ‘salaried’ job, Vuthy’s wife is emerging as the principal provider for the family and is replacing Vuthy’s gender role. He describes the changing situation as follows,
My income is shrinking because of natural calamities. She has some salary. And I also have some income. We put these together for our daily living.

But her income could be higher than mine in this month. She earns a good amount at a time because she draws salary. But mine is not like hers. I earned more than she did in the past. Nowadays she earns more than me and supports the family more than I do.

The changing gender role has implications for gender relationships in the family. With her cash income from the newly non-traditional job, Vuthy’s wife is gaining more authority in family power. About the change of gender regime, Vuthy says,

I am the head of the household. But the situation now is totally different from before. She depended on me before because I earned more. Now she makes more decisions in the family.

Vuthy did not give details of areas where his wife makes more decisions nowadays, but it is certain that the new gender order is precarious for him. In contrast, the new order is advantageous for his wife, particularly when any matter relates to both spouses.

Place (rural/urban), peer relationship and wider social life or culture

Vuthy was born, brought up and lived his entire life in a rural setting with a peasant background. Although he served in the armed forces for a considerable time, his life in the service was quasi-rural, as he was always based in remote communes.

Within the socio-cultural setting of rural peasant society, a man is expected to provide for his family from the family farm. He should be able to feed the family throughout the year. This is the primary target of maleness of a peasant. In addition,
he should put all his efforts towards earning properties such as arable land and houses to be inherited by his children.

Vuthy’s peer relationships and leisure are gendered. His peers are men who come from his neighbourhood and are relatives. He drinks locally made fermented rice liquor with his peers in the evening after a hard farming day. He prefers peer drinking in the local grocery-cum-pub to lone drinking at home.

Given the remote location of his commune, Vuthy is not much acquainted with the contemporary social changes that are taking place and still holds typical gender norms of masculinities and femininities.

**Experience of violence**

Vuthy has experienced the collective social violence of the KR regime. He was separated from his parents and made to take part in forced labour even though he was a child. All children of his generation have experienced a gross violation of human rights. As his life with his parents was brief and at a young age, he cannot remember his relationship with his parents. His upbringing in the custody of an elder sister in post-war times was good and non-violent.

Vuthy’s experience as a family-maker was formerly healthy and harmonious. But the relationship in the family turned sour a year ago. Some ‘conflicts’ and ‘issues’ have been occurring between husband and wife over the course of his wife’s outside paid work. Conflicts and issues relate to the family’s living standard and mistrust on marital fidelity.

Vuthy’s wife has become accustomed to, and adapted to, an improved living standard during the course of her work in the factory. She eats better food and lives with good household amenities in the factory site. She does not feel comfortable with substandard food and the household amenities during her visit to home. Sometimes,
she expresses her discomfort explicitly and Vuthy feels her discomfort with his lessening ability to provide for the family. He feels unhappy and angry and this leads to further friction.

During the employment of his wife in the factory, the couple has been living apart, whereas before they had been cohabiting for their entire conjugal life. His wife’s new job requires her to be stationed in the factory site, to work with male bosses and spend work time with her bosses until evening. These factors worry Vuthy. Vuthy expects his wife to return home before the sun sets, and not go out with her male boss, especially in the evening. He suspects that his wife might have developed an intimate relationship with her boss who is educated, salaried and better off than he is. He monitors his wife’s whereabouts frequently over his cell phone from his rural home.

Vuthy’s expectations of his wife are constructed within the labour procedures of an agrarian economy. Conversely, his wife’s current practices are made in accordance with the labour process in the industrial economy. His expectations and his wife’s practice are in conflict. And Vuthy lacks the understanding to accept the his wife’s new practices.

His wife’s acceptance of outside paid work has addressed the family’s economic need but at the same time has brought about embarrassing and unexpected issues and conflicts. His wife does not feel comfortable with the quality of life he can afford. On the other hand, living at a distance is creating room for mistrust intertwined with gendered notions of femininities and masculinities.

**Construction of masculinity**

Vuthy’s case is an exceptional example of how masculinities of marginal peasants in Cambodia are coping with the new gender order that has emerged from
the country’s changing labour market. The current labour market in the industrial (particularly manufacturing) sector is absorbing more and more female labour. This is causing women to migrate from rural to urban areas.

Vuthy’s early construction of masculinity along the lives of those that I call ‘peasant masculinities’ was organised on the basis of peasant activities characterised by the head of the family supporting the family with food and other basic amenities. Arable land, labour, farming know-how and natural resources (particularly rainwater and river water in Cambodian context) are important factors in the construction of peasant masculinities. Vuthy provided food, housing, clothing and education for his children and wife by the use of farm land owned by his wife. The farm practices largely relied on rain and river water. He has now turned to the nearby forest to make up his support for the family.

In exchange for support of his family, Vuthy enjoys the privilege of family headship. Family headship gives him power over some personal choices to be made by family members. For example, his wife sought his permission to enter employment with the factory.

The core elements of Vuthy’s early construction of masculinity i.e., ‘family providing’ linked to ‘family headship’, were introduced to Khmer masculinities through civil codes adopted during French colonial rule in Cambodia, as discussed in Chapter 4. Vuthy’s early masculinity was constructed within this gendered structure. But this structure came under challenge a few years ago when he could not provide sufficiently for his family due to low farm yield. The challenge was further exacerbated by his wife taking a paid job a year ago.

Despite all the efforts he has made, Vuthy’s peasant masculinity is not sufficient to satisfy his wife’s needs, that have recently been affected by her exposure to the
outside world. Having acquired the habit of eating ‘good and delicious foods’ (specially meat) with her ‘bosses’ she cannot eat the meals (of snail, crab, frog and vegetables grown locally) when she visits her home. Similarly, she does not feel comfortable with ‘substandard’ household amenities at home. Having lived in the industrial environment she is becoming accustomed to a higher standard of living.

Why didn’t Vuthy find outside paid work to compensate for the drop in farm production? How does Vuthy respond to his wife’s changing needs? Vuthy has tried to find work outside but he was unsuccessful. Conversely, feminisation of labour in industrial and manufacturing processes has favoured his wife in finding paid work.

As discussed earlier, there were conflicts and issues between the two spouses when the gender roles first began to change. His accounts give the notion that Vuthy has been gradually adapting to the changing circumstances. Two factors are central to his adaptation. One is his lack of skill. As he says, ‘I don’t have any skill or knowledge other than farming’ to enhance his ability to support the changing needs of his wife. Another is his realisation of the economic emancipation and empowerment of his wife which he describes in general in his account, ‘now women in rural areas have more rights than before.’

In the changing situation, Vuthy is reorganising masculinity in specific ways. He is managing the household, which he did not do in the past. He takes responsibility by saying ‘it is my mistake’ when his wife blames poor arrangements in household. Likewise, he does not confront his wife when she expresses her discomfort with poor household amenities and family meals during her visits home. Rather he normalises the awkward situation by good humouredly reminding her of her poor living conditions in the past.
Case Study 5: Syheap Srey, a marginal peasant

The interview

Unlike other peasants, Syheap was spontaneous, prompt and confident during his interview. He has experience of participation in this kind of research as he participates in a men’s program run by an NGO and was recruited for this survey through the NGO. The interview took place at his home by appointment and lasted for an hour.

Socio-economic setting of Syheap’s village/commune

Syheap comes from a village of a central province. The province has a comparatively better road infrastructure connecting the communes and districts to the provincial town and capital city. Syheap’s village is connected to the provincial town first by an unpaved road and then by a paved one.

Villagers usually commute to the provincial town by motorbike and locally improvised mechanised vehicles. There is no public or mass transport to and from the village and the provincial town.

The village is also connected to the national power grid. Good road infrastructure and electrification have widened the scope of income diversification for the villagers. Petty business and trading of consumer goods and house-building construction materials are emerging as occupations in addition to agriculture in the locality. Agriculture, particularly ploughing, has been mechanised in recent years. Some farmers, who own large-sized plots of land, no longer use draft animals for ploughing, using tractors instead. Many households own motorbikes for local communication.
Life course

Syheap is third among four children of his parents. He is 30 years old and a father of three children. The eldest child is seven years old and the youngest child is three.

He was born in a peasant family. His father left the family after a prolonged quarrel with his mother. Syheap was just five at that time. He did not give detail of the quarrel between his parents but he confirmed that it had nothing to do with his father having a second wife. His father lived in another commune on his own.

Syheap was brought up in a family with his mother as the de facto head. Having no adult male in the family, young Syheap assisted his mother in farm activities. He learnt every aspect of farming by the time he was eleven. The family of Syheap lived on one hectare of land allocated by the state for household subsistence. The yield of rice from the land was enough to feed the family throughout the year.

Along with assisting his mother, Syheap also studied. He went to high school in the provincial town. All siblings have completed high school certificate (HSC). Completion of HSC was difficult for him despite his mothers’ great enthusiasm and tireless efforts. He had to travel twelve km every day by bicycle to attend school in the provincial town. There was no fun and leisure for his cognitive development at this age. He worked for his family in the time left over from school. He says,

We just spent time for studying together, not for any leisure because I had to come back home to help my mum in the family.

He wanted to continue his study after HSC. But he could not do so because his mother could not afford to pay for his study away from home. There was no university in the provincial town at that time and he finally lost interest. His father
reunited with the family when Syheap was in Year-11 and died four years later. His mother is still alive and lives in her home with her youngest daughter.

Syheap married after completing his HSC. His wife ran a grocery before marriage their and they came to know each other through this business. Like Ra, Syheap also followed matrilocal marriage.

He lived with his in-law family with his wife after marriage and worked at farming together with his in-laws. After a few years of living with his in-laws, Syheap and his wife began living separately. Currently Syheap, his wife and children, live in their own house. The house is built of wood on rod, cement and concrete made stilts. His family is regarded as middle-class by comparison with the local socio-economic standard.

His wife inherited one hectare of farmland when they separated from his in-laws. Since then he has bought two hectares of land. He uses all three hectares of land for farming. Rice, which is rain-fed, is the main crop and he can produce a surplus amount of rice which he sells out to earn cash for family expenses.

In addition to farming, Syheap runs an auto-workshop in the premises of his home. He repairs motor-bikes, bi-cycles, power tractors and other mechanised vehicles and machines. This is his secondary occupation to add some cash income to the family budget. Recently he also worked with an agriculture-specialised NGO for three years. He worked as a farmers’ facilitator but resigned from this job because of time constraints.

Syheap’s wife is a full-time housewife who devotes herself to household chores and childcare. This is not her choice but she defers to her husband who wants her to ensure care for the children.
Work, workplace and gender regime in work

Syheap’s working life began at the age of nine, assisting his mother in family farming. Participation in the labour force at an early age is common to most of the peasants interviewed in this study. In Syheap’s case, his labour force participation was triggered by the lack of an adult male member in the family.

All Syheap’s siblings also worked on the family farm. The standard pattern for economic production of the pro-socialist State of Cambodia (SoC) was that all family members should work on the farm. Syheap’s family used manual labour in their farm practices. They ploughed the land using hand tools as they had no draft animals.

Syheap began farming as an independent and full-fledged family unit after he separated from the family of his in-laws. Throughout his life he has experienced many changes in farming practices and gender division of labour in farming. When asked about the changes he has experienced in his lifetime Syheap said,

Nowadays, a farmer can hire someone who has power tractor to plough his land. Several years ago, farmers used manual labour to carry rice harvest on their shoulders from the field to their homes. Nowadays, they can use motorised vehicles. To help the fertility of the soil, we have received training from an NGO on soil quality improvement methodology. We have learnt how to make compost. Nowadays, farmers use compost as fertiliser. By using this type of fertiliser, we can produce more by keeping soil quality better than before.

Syheap has been using three hectares of land for farming, mainly for rice cultivation. He is the principal/lead farmer. His wife assisted him a lot by contributing her farming labour in the first few years of their married life. Nowadays, she is virtually absent from farm activities, especially at field-level work.
Unlike past practice, he now uses a power-tractor instead of draft-animals to plough and prepare land. He also uses locally improvised mechanised devices to transport farm products from field to home. Through his association with the agricultural specialised NGO, Syheap has learnt two new skills, namely the preparation of compost and systematic rice intensification (SRI). Cambodian farmers are encountering the problem of falling soil fertility because of excessive use of chemical fertiliser in the past. Falling soil fertility is causing a drop in the rice yield. Compost fertiliser and SRI are quick fixes for these. Having skill in these two areas, Syheap is able to continue farming successfully.

Skills training in the new areas such as composting and SRI are overwhelmingly male dominated. The resource persons are usually men. The time and venues of training sessions are not suitable for female farmers to participate. For example, potential female farmers from rural villages with young children cannot participate in a training session if it is organised at a provincial town for an extended period. In his family, Syheap alone has learnt the new skills. His wife did not attend a single training session.

Syheap is a mechanic. He repairs motor-bikes, bicycles, power tractors and other machines in his workshop. He learned from his father the necessary skills to prepare conventional agricultural tools such as ox-carts. Mechanical skills are technical and gendered. Applying these skills in daily life is also gendered. Women lack the support networks and capital to establish an enterprise even if they acquire this gendered skill. In his case, Syheap’s wife is not involved in his workshop as she has no mechanical skills.
Family, relationship and gender regime in the family

Syheap’s mother served both as a household provider and homemaker. He has restructured this model of family relationship to a breadwinner/household maker model in his family.

His mothers’ model has not worked for him because of two reasons. One is that his mothers’ model was a kind of de facto: she became the head of household because of abandonment by his father. The second is that the social definition of a man as the breadwinner. Syheap’s hatred against his father was constructed within the social notion that a husband should support the family. He says,

I did not like my father. The reason that I did not like is that he did not care about mother and that he did not support us. He saved his earnings for himself only.

Syheap’s breadwinner/household maker model has been reinforced over the period of his conjugal life. The gender division of labour has been respected in his marital life. His wife, who ran a grocery before marriage and shared in farm work extensively in their early family life, is now fully engaged in domestic home-making. This is an outcome of Syheap’s choice.

Syheap has multiplied his income through income diversification. His wife is backing his serving as the sole breadwinner. The monetary value of her so-called reproductive household work is unaccounted in the family income-expenses ledger.

Place (rural/culture), peer relationship and wider social life or culture

Syheap is calculating and selective in making peers, peer relations and using his leisure. He considers the economic benefit or return for his time before deciding how to fill his time. Unlike other peasants in this study, including Ra, Syheap does not prefer to make friends with men in his neighbourhood. He is reluctant to drink or play
sports, as he considers them a waste of time, though he likes soccer. He uses his leisure time for income-generating activities by working in the workshop.

He does have an unconventional but gendered peer network which is active and goes beyond his occupational group. Though his primary occupation is farming, he has professional peers who work in NGOs and banks and who live in the town. These are his ex-schoolmates who were fortunate enough to continue their studies to university level and then entered professional careers. He has the necessary skills to maintain a network with non-sector peers. About his peer network, Syheap says,

I have many friends from my school life who currently work in NGOs and banks in the provincial town. All my friends and I still communicate each other.

He uses this network wisely. He managed a job in an NGO a few years ago through one of his friends who works there.

The lives and careers of his peers significantly shape the life aspiration of Syheap. For example, he wants his children to have a career like his friends. He wants to achieve through his children what he could not achieve for himself because of poverty.

Experience of violence

Syheap went through a troubled parental relationship that culminated in the separation of his parents. His father communicated with the family after separation. According to his account, the troubled relationship had never become violent, to his wife nor his children. It left Syheap, however, harbouring hatred toward his father. He felt his father acted in a domineering way to his mother.

Syheap has been making his own family for ten years. When asked about his spousal relationship he acknowledged the existence of arguments between them.
sometimes which left them not talking to each other for two or three days. This is a classical pattern of non-violent intra-family relationship that many families go through. The spousal argument is patriarchal in nature and stems from the notion of gendered roles and relationship. He describes the moment of argument as follows,

It usually happens when one of goes out without telling the other.
Sometimes, she goes out to buy something without informing me. And at other times, arguments erupt when I blame her for not taking good care of the children.

Syheap expects his wife to report to him about her going out and any expenses and vice versa. Syheap also expects his wife to provide ongoing care for their children. The notions of gendered roles are taken for granted as a consequence of his sole breadwinning role.

**Construction of masculinity**

Syheap is a young, educated and hardworking peasant who has adopted a hardworking lifestyle since childhood, given the dire situation in the post-war era. Over time, he has modernised his farming knowledge and techniques to cope with the loss of soil fertility and falling rice yield. He has been using technologies to replace manual labour. Over time, he has also diversified his occupations and emerged as an entrepreneur along with his farming practices.

Syheap’s early construction of masculinity followed the social norm that a man should support his family. This social norm exacerbated his construction of masculinity when his father left the family in an irresponsible manner. He became antagonistic to his father due to his failure to play the role of family provider.

Syheap’s current practice of masculinity is clearly a reaction to his father’s behaviour. Contemporary social rhetoric of ‘men of success’ reinforces his current
practices. The social rhetoric expects a man should exert his best efforts for his family. He should leave inheritable wealth or property and provide education that they can use for employment. Syheap’s account exactly reflects the rhetoric as he says,

I am a Cambodian. I am the head of the family, who can lead and manage the family, and especially support my children to go to school. I am trying to do everything to offer better education to my children so that they will be better off than me.

Syheap’s internalisation of the social discourse on men of success as well as his real efforts for making masculinities around that discourse is vibrant. Is it because of the way in which he has been made aware of the discourse? His peers who are professionals have played a powerful role in conveying the discourse to Syheap.

Although he blames his father for not holding the same values as his mother, Syheap himself is not far from following his father’s example. He leads the family with patriarchal control and dominance. He reconfigures his fathers’ model of patriarchy accommodating social rhetoric of maleness. His father tried to dominate his family without providing for the family. Syheap controls his wife through providing for the family. He regulates the mobility and labour of his wife and he regulates household expenses.

Control over the family, particularly of one’s wife, is taken for granted for household headship. Women in Cambodia are responsible for petty purchases for family uses. They go to the local market to buy the basic necessities for the household. This is also a way for women to enhance their social networks. Syheap expects his wife to inform him about her possible comings and goings ahead of time which limits her socialising and networking.
He expands his patriarchal control over his wife’s labour. He uses her as a full-time household maker and expects her to give full care to their children, whereas his role for the children is limited to the provision of good and sufficient food and schooling. His patriarchal control is built on a strict gender segregation of labour.

7.4 Cambodian peasant masculinities: Patterns and relations to domestic violence

7.4.1 Patterns of Cambodian peasant masculinities

Despite differences in their current practices, Vuthy and Syheap show common patterns in the ways they have constructed and organised peasant life. Both of them followed matrilocal marriage, and began peasant life on land provided by their wives. The wife’s participation in the farm labour force was important. Both maintained a family with the belief that they were the head of the family, despite the wife’s significant economic role. Most other peasants in the study have followed the same trajectories. In this way, peasant masculinities in Cambodia are distinct from the masculinities found in other social settings.

Gender practices in two eras of the country’s history affect peasant masculinities in Cambodia. One is the matrilocal marriage of the pre-colonial era. The other is the concept of men as family providers. Organised within matrilocal supports, the peasant masculinities are organised around providing for their families. Given the matrilocal basis, women have an important role in the construction of peasant masculinities. Roles and relations of women are reciprocal to the practice of peasant masculinities. A peasant can obtain a patriarchal dividend in family relationships only in exchange for providing for the family in a sufficient and timely manner. This is a pattern of masculinity not organised around direct power.
All peasants in this study, except Pyanet, followed matrilocal marriage. Through matrilocal marriage, they began their early family life within their wife’s family. Most of them lived at least three or four years with their in-laws before they began an independent family life. They made their living by working on the in-law’s farm and under their guidance. All then began their independent peasant lives on land inherited by their wives. The making of an independent peasant was achieved on their wife’s land.

Despite some sex segregation in farm labour, women’s role in farming is as significant as men’s. The wives of all the peasants in this study, except Syheap, participate in the labour force of the family farm. The Khmer term *Kasikon* (farmers) generally means both men and women. In Vuthy’s account, ‘both husband and wife worked hard on the land every day.’

Matrilocal practice, the use of the wife’s land to begin peasant life, and women’s participation in the farm labour force, all give women a substantial stake in the practices of peasant masculinities. The wife of a peasant shares power in intra-family gender relations. For example, Syheap’s wife can still challenge him about going out and spending money as she owns one-third of the land by which he provides for the family. Vuthy, in his worsening capacity for family providing, adapts himself to the changing gender regime resulting from his wife’s paid work in the non-agricultural sector.

All peasants in this study, no matter to what extent they provide for their family, believe that they are the head of the family. This is nicely articulated by Syheap, being ‘a Cambodian, a man is the natural head of the family and he is entitled to ‘head and manage the family’ by providing for the family members. Chantu and
Vuthy despite encountering a shrinking role in providing for the family, currently hold a similar notion.

The peasantry as a whole is not exclusively patriarchal. As argued above, women’s participation in the farm labour force is important. Another non-patriarchal aspect of peasant life in Cambodia is that peasants of the younger generation first learn farming from their mothers, not their fathers. They begin learning farming as teen-agers by assisting their mothers. This means that many of the peasants’ early memories are of their mothers working as farmers. Though the peasantry is not specifically patriarchal, it can be argued that Cambodian peasants now work at farming to provide the main income for the family to actualise their patriarchal position as ‘head of the family’.

Given the heavy reliance of farming on climatic conditions, natural resources play important roles in the organisation of peasant masculinities. A peasant needs to be handy, skilful and a jack of all trades to best use local natural resources to keep his family provider role intact. Only a peasant who is skilled enough to switch from one sub-sector to another to make a living for his family can gain a patriarchal dividend in family relationships. Without these skills he will probably find himself suffering the challenges and troubles that Vuthy and Chantu are encountering. Vuthy, who does not have any skills other than rice and vegetable farming, has not been able to provide for his family for last few years, as the rice yield has been reduced due to drought. Chantu, who does not have any marketable skill other than farming, is having trouble feeding his family three meals a day, as his one hectare of farm land has been acquired (without compensation) by the State for an agro-processing company.
Syheap and Vutha, on the other hand, who have multiplied their initial landholdings and expanded their occupations beyond farming, are organising their lives without going through any challenge.

Syheap, exceptionally, constructs a quasi-business masculinity although he is a peasant and lives in a rural setting. As discussed earlier, his current construction of masculinity resembles the core gender practice of business entrepreneurs, in reversing gender roles in his family.

Vutha who follows a radically simple life has multiplied his landholding over the period. He lived a monastic life for ten years, and so is accustomed to simplicity and a regulated/controlled life. Unlike other farmers, he does not use any amenities such as a motorbike or TV, locally considered as luxuries, though he can afford them. Instead, he invests and reinvests his savings in productive resources such as arable land and cattle to generate further income. He leads his family and improves their living conditions through hard work and a simple life.

Vuthy’s adaptation to the changing gender regime and Syheap’s construction of quasi-business masculinity indicate that Cambodian peasant masculinities can be flexible and adaptive to the changing social structure. A specific pattern of masculinity is constructed or reconstructed within the gender order of a family and is maintained through gender roles appropriate to a specific time, an individual’s ability, and influences imposed by external factors.

7.4.2 Peasant masculinities and domestic violence

The key feature of Cambodian peasant masculinities is that a peasant works at farming to actualise the patriarchal position of head of the family by providing the main income for the family. The norm of ‘head of the family’ is a default in the peasant construction of intra-family power relations. Peasant masculinities are not
violent in nature. Rather, the notions of ‘head of the family’, and ‘main income provider’ which are made through peasant practices, can involve domestic violence in contexts when these notions are marginalised either by externalities or by internal forces such as changing gender roles. The cases of Chantu and Vuthy are testimonies to this argument. Both of their families are currently undergoing conflict and violence.

Chantu who has constructed an anti-domestic violence sentiment and has given protection to his mother from the ongoing violence of his father is currently encountering conflicts and some violence in the family. He maintained a non-violent relationship in his family for a long time but he cannot provide for his family nowadays as his only farm land has been acquired for industry. He cannot engage himself in any sector other than agriculture, as his only experience is in this sector.

The meaning of ‘head of the family’ to Chantu is to provide three meals a day to his family. But he cannot achieve this in his current situation. This leads to conflict in the family. He describes the situation in this way,

One day I was so angry after seeing my land taken. I came back home. I saw my wife did not cook. I cursed her. She also cursed me back. Then our problems began. (Men) need to earn money at least equal to the amount earned in the past. Conflict in the family occurs when we lack food to feed three meals a day to the family.

Chantu’s violence within his family is related to the peasant’s gendered role of providing for the family. Despite his inability, he is still expected to perform the role as he did in the past. The rupture of the gender role is sudden and occurs without any preparedness. Chantu felt angry towards his wife, although he does not want to follow the violent path of his father. The violent situation could have been avoided if could have performed his role as expected.
Unlike Chantu, violence in Vuthy's family is implicated from a changing gender role which brings key features of peasant masculinities into challenge. His wife, who earns more than he does from her outside paid work in the non-traditional sector, questions his ability to provide for their family and expresses her discomfort with the substandard living conditions at home. Vuthy's ability to provide for his family does not correspond to his wife's aspirations. His wife has been accustomed to an improved living standard because of her social mobility and paid work in a new sector.

In the changed gender role, Vuthy cannot obtain a patriarchal dividend in the family in the same way as he did in the past. His identity of 'head of the family' has been disrupted at least in the eyes of his wife. His wife's outside paid work exaggerates conflict by giving room for mistrust in the area of marital fidelity. Vuthy thinks his wife may be having an emotional relationship with her supervisor. This mistrust is further exaggerated by the labour process in the industrial sector where Vuthy's wife currently works. The labour process in this non-traditional sector requires her to work in specific ways which clash with Vuthy's gendered notions of femininities.
CHAPTER 8

FROM PEASANT TO URBAN WORKER: WORK AND MASCULINITIES AMONG CAMBODIAN URBAN MEN

8.1 Introduction

A study on the masculinities of urban workers in China (Lin and Ghaill, 2012) suggests that the male former peasant workers in mainly female-concentrated occupations, such as domestic cleaning and electric assembly occupations, deploy peasant masculine identities to construct their masculinities in modern urban locations. In the reconstructed masculine identities the peasant rural-urban migrants neither privilege themselves over women nor subordinate themselves to other men, but rather attempt to masculinise their specific tasks in female-concentrated occupations. How do Cambodian urban workers with peasant backgrounds, who overwhelmingly engage in masculine-gendered occupations, reorganise their masculinities for urban life? How do their reconstructed masculinities relate to family relationships, particularly to domestic violence? This chapter explores these questions.

8.2 Urban workers of this study

The discussion in this chapter is based on life histories of fifteen male workers from two generational groups, who work in the city of Phnom Penh: an older generation above 40 (group of eight) and a younger generation below 30 (group of
seven). They have worked in various informal and formal sectors. Some of them live with their families in Phnom Penh, and others live alone in Phnom Penh leaving their families in the rural provinces.

Urban workers of the older generation are: Saroeun Chea (49), a construction worker and father of six children, Samon Chham (61), a construction worker and father of eight children, Souen Kong (56), a tuk-tuk driver and father of four children, Souv Leng (50), a tuk-tuk driver and father of two children, Sytha Hem (50), a motodup and father of two children, Ra Ket (41), a motodup and father of four children, Bora Ouk (51), a construction worker and father of seven children, and Heng Yong (41), a construction worker and father of two children. (Tuk-tuk is a three-wheeled mechanised vehicle which can carry at least four passengers at a time. Motodup is a motorbike taxi. Tuk-tuk and motodup are common means of public transport in Cambodian cities.)

Urban workers of the younger generation are: Sokheng Chet (25), a garment factory worker and having no child yet, Ang Ouen (28), a motodup and father of two children, Ishara Tan (24), an unemployed factory worker having no child yet, Yin Yong (29), a construction worker and father of two children, Sinai Hai (27), a restaurant chef and father of one child, Han Ly (26), a metal welder and father of one child, and Chan Leng (28), a warehouse assistant and father of one child.

All of them, except Chan Leng, have migrated from rural provinces. They were born and brought up in peasant families. They worked in family farms before moving to Phnom Penh and many of them worked in other occupations before moving to their current occupations in Phnom Penh. All the older generation workers, except Bora Ouk and Samon Chham, worked in the armed forces of the post-KR regime.
Although participants were eager to tell their stories, they told them briefly. This was not intentional. They lack the experience to tell stories to the extent a life history method is designed for. The problem, however, was addressed by further inquiry into their stories by the researcher. For example, when asked to tell about childhood, they just replied that the childhood was hard and difficult. Then the researcher asked for details of the hardship and difficulties. Initially they could not understand that detailed reply was needed for this research.

**Case Study 6: Leng Souv, a tuk-tuk driver**

**The interview**

Mr. Souv was recruited for this interview through another participant. The interview took place at the residence of the researcher and lasted for one and a half hours.

**Life course**

Born in a marginal peasant family in a central province, Mr. Souv is in his early 50s now and a father of two sons. He was brought up by his mother with three sisters. His father abandoned the family when he was six and his mother became de facto head of household. Souv passed his childhood experiencing collective social violence: first by foreign military forces (American and South Vietnamese) in the area during the Second Indochina war; and secondly by the Khmer Rouge’s (KR) totalitarian rule. He studied in a Buddhist pagoda school in his village. His education ended before he completed Grade IV because of disruption by war and civil conflict.

While the eastern region of Cambodia was healing from the Indochina war, the entire nation gradually came under the rule of the KR. The DK came to power in 1978 in the area where Souv’s family lived and began to enforce its ideology. He was
seventeen at this time. Souv was separated from his family and sent to a labour camp by the KR. He was forced to do heavy labour such as the excavation of irrigation canals, and the building of roads. Failure at any task was liable to result in death. Souv was listed for execution once and ran to the forest to escape execution. He spent several months in the forest and was involved in robbery and piracy during this time, in order to survive. He joined a faction of the ruling party while he was on the run. This faction later formed the PRK regime after the Vietnamese invasion. Souv continued his affiliation with the faction. He joined the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF) –the regular armed forces of PRK – as district head. He recruited youths to the KPRAF and fought against KR militias in the north-western provinces. Souv’s affiliation and involvement with PRK resulted from his reaction against the DK regime.

Souv married while he was in service with the KPRAF and his first son was born within a year. His departure from the KPRAF was involuntary, following closure of KPRAF operations by the PRK in the changing political situation. The overall living standard of Souv’s family was bad compared to many other families in the neighbourhood. His wife brought this issue to his notice. She often compared him to the men of other families.

Cambodians were gradually recovering from the ravages of war. Many families were able to make good progress, particularly in terms of possessing wealth. Souv’s wife was not an exception; she too wanted uplift for the family.

Souv had neither higher education nor professional experience to pick up a good job in post-war Cambodia. Years of civil war and social disruption had left Souv without any marketable skill. He did not know how to work on a farm even though he was born in a peasant family. Lacking local work opportunity, Souv moved to Phnom
Penh in 1990, leaving his family back in the rural village. He found work as a motodup in Phnom Penh.

This was the turning point of Souv’s life, enabling him to fulfil gender expectations. He earned a good amount of money from the motodup. When Souv left for Phnom Penh, his wife did not keep herself merely as a housekeeper. She worked on the family farm and raised pigs to earn extra money.

Souv has transported many people in Phnom Penh, including many foreigners and Cambodians who work in government and other development organisations. When he came in contact with them, Souv learnt the importance of education. In 1997, he bought a piece of land in Phnom Penh with the money earned from motodup work, and built a house there. Education for his sons was the ultimate aim of building a house in Phnom Penh. He wanted to give them the university education that he could not achieve for himself. The only universities were located in Phnom Penh at that time. Souv is on track to accomplish his plan. He brought his elder son to Phnom Penh and enrolled him in a university. His son is now in the final year of university and his second son is waiting to come to Phnom Penh next year after the completion of a high-school certificate.

Over time, Souv has upgraded his occupation. He bought a Tuk Tuk four years ago. Tuk Tuk is comparatively safer than the motodup and carries a higher degree of social status. He is concerned about the increasing cost of education but he is determined to provide higher education for his sons at any cost.

Souv’s wife cannot come to Phnom Penh to live with him because of her responsibility to care for her elderly parents in the village. He has supported his wife in the village from the very beginning and visits her at least once a month.
The geographical separation of the married couple caused some tensions, especially in the early years of Souv’s migration to the city. His wife was being told by some people that he had relationships with other women in Phnom Penh. Like other women, Souv’s wife expected him to maintain marital fidelity. Rural men like Souv who have newly arrived in cities to work in emerging urban sectors often pick up popular leisure and entertainment pursuits under peer pressure. Souv, however, dismissed the allegations. He is sympathetic to his wife’s position, recalling his own early life experience.

Souv considers himself a successful father and places himself above other men who are economically better off but have failed to provide higher education for their children.

**Work, workplace and gender regime at work**

Souv’s formal employment began as district head of the KPRAF. As mentioned earlier, his role was to recruit youths into the armed forces. The entire process of recruitment of youths was gendered. Many of the recruits entered unwillingly under coercion. All the recruits were male. The leaders such as Souv were also male.

His second occupation was motodup. This is another gendered enterprise. The high risk of accident (with almost no traffic laws), and of robbery and piracy (with poor law enforcement) created fear among motodup. Given the high insecurity and risks of violent crime, motodups became an enterprise for men only. About the dangers of motodup Souv says,

At the time when I came to Phnom Penh, there were lots of robbers and thieves. Many people died because of robbery. I felt so afraid, but I just tried. Even if it was dangerous, there was no other choice.
Motodup was an occupation for both working class and non-working class men in the post-war era. Many survivors of war from formerly rich families entered this occupation in order to survive.

Souv has been driving a Tuk-Tuk for four years. An informal gender regime also exists in this occupation as it does with the motodups. But a Tuk-Tuk symbolises a higher social class position for its owner compared to the motodup.

There are social and class issues of these two occupations in relation to passengers and law enforcing agencies. The motodup and Tuk-Tuk drivers strategically need to be respectful to the passengers, especially to those known to be in the competitive transport market. They have to show respect and softness to regular passengers to ensure that they do not give their custom to other drivers. Similarly they have to build up rapport with new passengers by providing all-out services and polite behaviour to expand the market network. This kind of red defence is also crucial in earning tips from rich passengers. Though there is no formal gender order in motodup and Tuk-Tuk, their required defence to passengers matters to their self-esteem and to their pride as men.

**Family life and relationship, gender regime at home**

Souv was brought up in a women-only family. He was emotionally attached to his mother and three sisters. He lived in a female-headed-household. He did not experience any gender division of labour or gendered power relations in the family. But poverty and hardship were an integral part of daily life.

His relationship with his mother and sisters was relatively peaceful, except for his experiencing violence from his mother on some occasions. His mother is still alive and lives with his sister in the rural province. He visits her occasionally.
Souv has been making his own family since 1986. He and his wife lived together for four years. Both spouses jointly provided for the family. He is expected to provide the main income and support the family like other men of well-off families. He could not do much to increase the prosperity of the family in the early years of family life as he lacked skills useful in the rural setting. He has overcome this problem in course of his migration to Phnom Penh. In fact, his migration to the city was inspired by his gender role expectation for prospering the family in the shortest possible time.

As the two spouses live apart, it is hard to explore the gender regime that rules Souv’s family relationship. But he holds the gender notion that a wife has entitlement to question or argue with her husband when he is wrong or fails to perform his legitimate role as the breadwinner. He also believes that a man should accept his fault or mistake in front of his wife and be patient in overcoming the fault. His notion of family relationships is gender-egalitarian.

Souv’s relationship with his elder son who lives with him can be used to measure infra-family gender relationships. He fathers his son in a non-violent and supportive way. He says, ‘I have never scolded my children. I have only advised them. They are good sons, they never hang-out and do things to upset their parents. They make me feel happy and I work with a good mood.’ It means that he establishes his command over the family in a non-coercive manner without diminishing his patriarchal position in the family power relationship.

**Place, rural/urban, peer relations, wider social life or culture**

Souv was brought up in a rural setting with experiences of collective social violence. Although he grew up in a peasant family, Souv does not have farming skills – an essential means for making peasant masculinities. Being involved in political
turmoil and civil war at an important period (teenage) of his life is the main reason he lacks these skills.

In Phnom Penh Souv has a peer group. The peers are his rural friends who have migrated to Phnom Penh like him, and work in similar occupations. He follows popular urban culture and entertainment for working class men with peers for leisure. He visits karaoke restaurants and beer gardens with them. Men’s leisure in these entertainment establishments is highly romanticised and commercialised. Young and poor rural girls who are also immigrants to Phnom Penh provide services to the visitors. The company of these girls which implies sexual service is available in exchange for extra pay.

Souv claimed that he had never used the company of these girls. Although he rejected the company of young girls on the grounds of lack of money, his claim cannot entirely be accepted as he had encountered problems with his wife on the issue of having an extramarital relationship. He also shares entertainment and leisure with his peers in a way that reinforces peer bonding. He says,

My friends and I go to karaoke restaurants, which are cheaper because we don’t have lot of money. My friends sing songs and I dance (I don’t know how to sing). There are also girls in the restaurants. But we don’t have money for them. So we don’t take them to sit with us. My friends and I just enjoy being together.

**Experience of violence**

Like many other older generation Cambodians, Souv was brought up experiencing collective social violence. He has experienced social disruption caused from increased militarisation during the Lon Nol regime. His particular geographical proximity to Vietnam increased his vulnerability to the Second Indochina War. His
life was further disrupted by the KR regime. His life, like many others, was dismantled by the regime.

Apart from collective social violence, Souv had also experienced parental violence. His mother beat him, which was associated with dire family conditions. About parental violence he says,

When I was a young child, my mother used to beat me. I did not know anything about life. I always wanted money from my mother to buy many things. I did not know how difficult her life was. Then she got angry and beat me.

Souv is not resentful about his mother. He rather feels pity for his mother for bringing him up in extremely hard conditions.

According to him, conflict occurred between his wife and himself on two specific occasions: one in early family life when he could not make as much family income as his friends did, and second in the early days of post-migration to Phnom Penh when his wife accused him of having relationships with women in Phnom Penh. Both these moments of spousal conflict are linked to masculinities. Being the head of family, Souv was expected to uplift the family's living standard like other men of his society. He could not do this at the time, though he achieved it later.

Though his move to Phnom Penh fulfilled one expectation, it led to the accusation of marital infidelity. Living away from his family, Souv had developed relationships with women in Phnom Penh. His wife came to know about this through her relatives in Phnom Penh. Like other women, his wife also expected him to maintain marital fidelity. Non-compliance with the obligation gave rise spousal conflict. Souv did not say whether the spousal conflict had ever turned into physical violence.
It can be argued that the geographical separation of the spouses, which was the effect of the effort to achieve the social expectation of men’s role in providing the best for their families, placed Souv’s obligation of marital fidelity under pressure. Living away from his family gave Souv the opportunity to fall into an emotional attachment with a woman in his area. This deviation from social expectations erupted in spousal conflict.

**Construction of masculinity**

Being brought up in a women-only and female-headed family, Souv constructed an early masculinity which is pro-motherhood. He is supportive to women, particularly to mothers. He is supportive to his wife. With supportive feeling for wife, he finally gave up the woman he came across in early immigrant life in Phnom Penh. He says,

I don’t take other women because I have experienced suffering from my father taking a second wife and divorcing my mother. I won’t do like him. I saw my mother try very hard to raise four children alone. I feel pity for her. I can’t do such a bad thing. I love my children and family so much.

Souv’s case exemplifies a pattern of post-conflict transition of masculinity. He voluntarily joined the KPRAF in reaction to his marginalisation by the KR regime. He fought aggressively face-to-face against KR militias. He served there for several years. Despite years of service in paramilitary force, Souv returned to normal life easily as if nothing had happened in the past. Marriage was crucial for his transition and he left the paramilitary force after marriage. He did not translate his violent construction of masculinity as a paramilitary into the construction of his contemporary masculinity.
His transition to normal life took place in the time when country was moving towards political stability, and under reconstruction and rehabilitation. The Cambodian society was gradually moving towards materialism at that time. In the changing social, political and economic context, Souv found that he did not have any marketable skills to obtain a job. He encountered mounting pressure from his wife to improve the family’s living standard. He describes the moment as,

She (wife) always complained and compared to other couples who were our contemporary. She said why living conditions of others were better than ours. My wife was a woman and she needed to look after children and family. [He implies that her complaints and comparisons were justified].

The abandonment by his father when Souv was a child and subsequent hard life have resulted in the construction of a new pattern of fatherhood. Souv’s fatherhood is organised around equipping his sons to the emerging job market by providing a university education. The elder son is in the final year of his university. The younger son is due to be enrolled in university. Souv is determined to ensure university education for his sons. His determination is rooted in his own life experience of lacking any marketable skill. His fatherhood comes with the cost of hard work and low occupational self-esteem. About his determination Souv says,

I need to work hard because I need money to support the education of my sons. Nowadays, education needs lots of money. I want both sons to complete their university education. I don’t want them having no skill and knowledge like me.

As he is on track to provide a good education to his children despite his own working-class background, Souv sees himself as a successful father, and places
himself a degree higher than other men who are economically better off but fail to provide higher education to their children.

**Case Study 7: Ouen Ang, a motodup**

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**The interview**

Mr Ang was recruited to this study directly by the researcher when he hired him to give him a lift in Phnom Penh during field work. The interview took place at the residence of the researcher. Since a rapport was built up before, Ang shared his histories freely and frankly. The interview lasted for around one hour.

**Life course**

Ang is 28 years old and a father of two children. He was born in a marginal peasant family in Kandal province with a number of siblings (nine). His father died from prolonged sickness. Ang was 23 at that time. Ang’s mother is still alive and lives in the rural village with her younger children. He completed Grade IV but could not continue his studies because of his responsibility for his family. He had to assist his mother on the family farm after his elder siblings married and left the family.

Ang migrated to Phnom Penh five years ago in search of finding work to earn some cash to support his mother and younger siblings in the rural province. His elder sister who came to Phnom Penh earlier helped him to find a job. He obtained his first job using a reference from a friend of his sister. He also lived with her in the early days of migration, when she was working in a garment factory.

Ang’s first job in Phnom Penh was for a property developer. His task was welding metal to prepare door and window frames. He did not have prior skill in welding but learnt the skill on the job. By the end of the second year, he bought a motor-cycle with his savings. He used the motorbike as motodup after hours (4.00am
to 7.00am and 5.00pm to 9.00pm) to earn an extra income. His earning from the motodup was higher than his earnings from construction work. By the end of his third year, he left the job with the property developer because of a dispute when he demanded a higher wage.

After leaving the property developer, he joined in a second-hand and smashed-car repair workshop. He kept his part-time motodup job. Work in the workshop was also a new occupation. But his experience in motodup gave him some basic knowledge of car repair. It should be noted that use of repaired second hand cars in Cambodia is common. He worked there for a year and only quit this job because he was transferred to another city. He has been working as a full-time motodup since he quit his car repair job. He joins his wife in the rural province during peak rice farming season to help her with the rice farming. He then returns to Phnom Penh after the peak farm season and resumes his motodup.

Ang loved a girl in Phnom Penh during his second job. But the love did not end in marriage because the girl left him due to his poor economic condition. He then fell in love with his wife who worked in a garment factory and lived in his neighbourhood in Phnom Penh.

After marriage, they lived together for a year in Phnom Penh. His wife went to a rural village in their second year to deliver their first baby. She has been living there ever since. She wanted to return to Phnom Penh and resume work after delivering the baby but Ang did not agree with her plan. He was concerned that there would be nobody to take care of the newborn, if she resumed work. He also thought that he could not save from his single income if his wife lived with him without doing any outside work. Finally he came to the decision that she would live in the village and do some income-generating activities in addition to taking care of baby. He bought
farmland in the village and gave some capital to his wife to rear poultry and livestock for income-generation at home. She looks after the rice farm and rears poultry and livestock. They now have a second baby and Ang visits her every month.

Ang is firm about his family. He is building an economic partnership with his wife for raising their family. His wife plays an important role in the economic partnership along with bringing up the family. He lives with his sister-in-law’s family in Phnom Penh as a paying guest. He does not have any network in Phnom Penh except the in-law family and spends his leisure with this family sometimes.

**Work, workplace and gender regime at the workplace**

Ang’s working life began in family farming for subsistence under the supervision of his father and then his mother. His early role in family labour was as a cowherd. He assisted his mother in rice farming until he moved to Phnom Penh five years ago. As noted in Chapter 7, rice farming in Cambodia is manual and both men and women participate in the agricultural labour force.

Ang has worked in different sub-sectors in urban life. His first job for a property developer is predominantly a men’s occupation though a small number of women now work in this sector. Women’s roles in building construction are secondary and subordinate to male workers. Unlike the situation in developed countries, most of the household-building procedures in Cambodia are manual. Welding and curving metal, Ang’s specialty, is technical and highly hazardous and is only performed by men.

Repairing cars is also a gendered occupation in Cambodia. All stakeholders – importers, workshop owners, and repairers - in the repaired-car industry are men. The repairers are mostly from a working class background and they do not have any formal training. They get on-the-job skills training. According to Ang’s account, these
workshops are run with strict rules and working hours. Any faulty work, absence from work or lateness is subject to a deduction from the meagre wage.

Motodup, his current occupation, is also a gendered enterprise. He actually began motodup from the third year of his migration but at first he did it on a part-time basis. Now it is his full-time and only job. This informal urban work sector is overwhelmingly occupied by men – mostly working class men, though most Cambodian adult women, specifically in urban locations, drive motorbikes for their daily transportation. Toughness and insecurity (both accident and robbery) are major causes that discourage women from participating in this sector.

Motodup drivers experience social stigma and their occupation is little respected. However, motodup drivers like Ang enjoy freedom and flexibility in all aspects as they own their own enterprise. He expresses his freedom of motodup driving in the following way,

As a motodup, I feel that I have more freedom. None can control me. I can work as per my ability and power. I prefer my current job than the previous ones. I could not help my family in rice farming when I worked for the property developer and car-repairing workshop. I could not get leave to join my wife during farming season.

Family life and relationship, gender regime at home

Ang was brought up with both parents and a large number of siblings in post-war Cambodian society. His parents and some elder siblings survived from the civil war. The whole family was in a struggle to restart normal life from the war devastation.

The young Ang had lots of interactions with family members. He maintained closer relationships with his mother and elder sister. Although he felt that his father
loved him, he kept his distance from him as he found his father a scary person. His father was the head of family. All family members participated to the family labour force. His mother and elder sisters, too, worked on the family farm. His mother became de facto head of the family after death of the father.

Ang has been making his own family for four years. Gender roles and relations in his family have shifted over time. In the first year of being a family, both spouses shared to the family budget from their outside work. His wife worked in a garment factory. Over the period, her position and role have been partially reversed. Though she still contributes to the family budget from rice farming and cattle rearing, these roles are quasi-reproductive and less visible compared to cash earnings. Ang’s cash income from his motodup is given more visibility in the family economy.

Ang’s wife bears the greater part of the family burden as he lives far away. She performs both reproductive and productive (in subsistence form) tasks. His escape from practical involvement in day-to-day household affairs comes with compromises to the household gender-relation to his wife. For example, he is accountable to his wife for his income and expenses in Phnom Penh. Gender roles and relations in family are reciprocal and mutually respected. However Ang enjoys a patriarchal dividend from the reciprocal gender relations.

**Place, rural/urban, peer relation, wider social life and culture**

Ang has experienced significant changes in gender roles and relations in the wider Cambodian society in his lifetime. He has seen women like his mother working in unpaid household and family subsistence work in early life. Upon migration to Phnom Penh, he has seen women, particularly of his own generation, increasingly taking part in outside paid work. The country’s economic shift from command economy to market-based economy has opened up opportunities for paid work for
women. As a result, women are increasingly playing household-providing roles in recent times. Ang himself was also pulled to Phnom Penh by the increasing income earning opportunity in the city.

Cheap entertainments such as beer gardens and karaoke restaurants with sex services are growing and widely available for men in Phnom Penh. These entertainment facilities target men's leisure and recreation. Working class men usually visit these places with their peers and colleagues after work. According to his account, Ang does not visit these places. He does not meet any peers or close friends to visit these places. He has not been able to make good friends in Phnom Penh. He has lost his rural network through his migration to Phnom Penh. Although he has many comoto-dup drivers, he does not consider them as peers or close friends.

The only network that he uses for his leisure is the family of his sister-in-law. He shares accommodation with his sister-in-law in Phnom Penh, an arrangement made by his wife to minimise his living costs. He sometimes goes to popular sites in Phnom Penh with this family. Ang's living with sister-in-law is not exceptional in Cambodian society, which is traditionally matrilineal. Ang's way of living with an in-law is an adjustment of traditional matrilineal social arrangement.

Experience of violence

Ang was brought up in a family with apparently no violence between parents. But his elder siblings used to encounter anger and toughness from his father in doing their tasks for the household. Ang himself never experienced the toughness of his father. This was probably because he was quite young at this stage. Despite feeling loved he always maintained distance between himself and his father. He was closer to his mother and elder sisters.
Ang is extremely averse to violence, particularly violent situations. He always avoids people who are violent and leaves any violent scene. According to his account, ‘when they (friends in childhood) fought each other, I never stayed there. I ran away. Even in Phnom Penh (nowadays), when people fight each other, I never stay there. I cannot help my friends when they fight each other.’ Ang is scared of the violence of others. But this does not mean that he is a holy man. Like other layman, he has anger, particularly in family affairs. He gets angry with his wife when she handles their children roughly or fails to give care to children in the way he directs.

Construction of masculinity

Ang’s early masculinity was constructed in a peasant setting characterised by providing for the family by working on the family farm. He took up a parenting role in teen-age in capacity of providing subsistence to his mother and younger siblings. This sort of proxy-parenting role is common among young Cambodians in construction of their masculinities.

In his post-migration period, he adopted a life of multiple occupations and long hours of work to increase his income. After the breakup of his first love, he realised that economic solvency is important for a man, for making as well as sustaining, a family, and in order to be valued by others. He describes his breakup of affairs bluntly,

I used to love a girl when I worked in metal work (welding). The relationship did not turn to marriage because I was poor and did not have enough money. She needed money. At first, she did not know that I was poor. After several meetings she knew that I did not have money. Then she left me.
Ang has successfully addressed his poor conditions by making a good income. By working long hours in multiple occupations every day, he earned good money compared to his earlier situation. He developed love affairs with another girl. This time the love affair turned into marriage. He bought a piece of land in rural village to build a house and also bought some pieces of farmland with his savings.

He compromised with his emotional needs for the sake of his family. He feels saddened when he sees other families living and enjoying life together. By living alone as a paying guest, he can save money from rental and utilities. Similarly, his wife can earn some money from poultry and livestock by living in the rural village. Living apart is a strategy to maximise family savings by lowering living cost and increasing income.

Ang has developed fatherhood beyond the basic necessities of the provider model. He is concerned about the wellbeing and cognitive development of his children. He changes nappies, feeds and plays with his children when he visits his family. He brings them out for cognitive recreation. As his rural province is close to Phnom Penh, he sometimes brings his children to popular sites in Phnom Penh. To ensure full cognitive development of his children, he advises his wife to allow them what they want and support them in what they want to do. He advises his wife not to treat their children in a violent manner in any situation. He has improved his fathering skill over time. He did not know how to give care to his first child. But over the course of having second child, he has become efficient to at changing nappies, feeding them, and playing with them.

Ang has been selective in making friends since his childhood. He considers himself gentle and honest. He makes friends with people who are what he called
'good persons.' The good persons are those who are not rude. He cannot find any good persons for peer relationships in Phnom Penh.

8.3 Cambodian urban workers’ masculinities and domestic violence

8.3.1 Patterns of masculinity

There are significant differences between the older and the younger generation urban workers in their upbringing and life experiences. Most of the workers of the older generation went through social and political upheaval, experienced collective social violence and were involved in large-scale State violence. The younger generation workers were brought up in the period of country’s transition from war to democratisation. However, many of them were brought up without fathers, lived in extreme poverty, and played a fathering role at a young age. Broadly Souv and Ang represent the older and younger generation urban workers respectively, though of course there are variations from case to case.

Though they represent different age groups and have had different life experiences, Souv and Ang embraced urban working life for a common reason, gender role expectation. The family, primarily the wife, has conveyed the gender role expectation. The expectation involves comparison with other better-off men who have made progress with their family’s economic status. A man’s performance in providing for his family is scrutinised socially under the lens of gender role expectation.

The migration of a number of urban workers in this study to Phnom Penh was motivated by the quest for a better and higher income to improve their family’s economic condition. This motivation was triggered by expectations from their family, which were conveyed with variations of tone and temperament. For example, Souv was made aware of the expectation through a kind of ‘complaint’ by his wife as spelt
out in Case Study 6. Sytha who was originally born in Phnom Penh but was sent to a rural province by the KR regime, was told of the need for a higher income by his wife, angrily. He says, ‘one thing that causes her (wife) to be angry with me most is that I don’t earn much money like others.’ Ra, a motodup, describes the expectation in this way: ‘When I am very late sending her (wife) money, she calls me and asks about it. She asks why I couldn’t earn money like other people do.’

Being single at the time of their migration to the city, other urban workers like Ang and Yin internalised the need for a higher income within their proxy fathering role for their parental families. They had played a fathering role long before they made their own families. Either abandonment of the family by their father, or sickness of their parents, led them to take up responsibility for providing for the family. Yin, whose father abandoned the family, came to Phnom Penh at the age of sixteen in search of a better income to support his sick mother and younger siblings back in the rural village. Yin describes the reason for his migration to Phnom Penh as: ‘I lived in a rural village. My mother was a farmer. My family was poor. As the family condition was poor, I had to find some work to help my family. That’s why I came to Phnom Penh. I worked in some small jobs in Phnom Penh. When I earned some money, I sent it to my family.’ Ang’s migration to the city was also triggered by the same reason as Yin. However, his failure to turn his first love into marriage because of his poor economic condition reinforced his motivation for earning a good income and gaining material possessions to make a family, as spelt out in Case Study 7.

The urban workers of both age groups are not working alone for the economic development of their families. Their wives are also making important contribution, whether they live together with their husbands in Phnom Penh or live alone in the rural provinces. All urban workers of the older generation, except Saroeun, live alone
in Phnom Penh. All of their wives are engaged in various farm activities in the provinces. By working on the family farms, they provide subsistence for their families; and by rearing livestock and poultry or running small-scale trade, they add cash to the family income. Saroeun’s wife who lives together with her husband in Phnom Penh runs a small mobile food-stall to earn cash for the family budget.

The same pattern of economic partnership is common among wives of the younger generation group. Unlike older generation workers, all urban workers of the younger generation, except Sinat and Ang, live together with their wives in Phnom Penh. Sokheng and his wife work in the same factory, but they work in different units. The wife of Ishara works in a garment factory. She has been the sole provider for the family since Ishara became unemployed a month ago. Yin and his wife work for the same construction company. Although his wife’s earnings are lower than his, her income is crucial to send their two children to an English-language school in Phnom Penh. Han’s wife sells vegetables in a market located in the outskirt of Phnom Penh to add money to his family’s income. Chan who lives on the outskirts of Phnom Penh lives together with his wife and children. His wife rears cows along with doing household work and caring for two young children. Likewise, the wives of Sinat and Ang contribute to the family’s economy though they stay in the provinces. Sinat’s wife contributes to the family by working in a garment factory in the province. Ang’s wife provides subsistence by working as a full-time farmer. She also adds some cash to the family’s economy by rearing livestock and poultry.

Though the role expectation towards urban workers is gendered, the economic partnership of their wives suggests that there is a sharp gender division of labour. The expectation is actualised through a joint-breadwinner model, where a wife also makes significant economic contribution. The expectation is gendered in the sense that a man
is expected to provide the main income. The concept of 'main income' is standardised by comparison with other men who are privileged and improving their family's economic status. The comparison and expectations of the wives are socially constructed.

Not all urban workers are taking their work in the urban spaces in same way. Those who work in formal sectors, particularly in garment factories, where labour processes are maintained with strict rules, do not like the work regime. Having worked on farms in the past, they are used to flexible work practices. Sokheng, a garment worker, does not like strict work hours. He works in the garment sector as an interim means to earn some money that he plans to invest for small-business and farm activities in a rural village. When he has achieved this he will settle down there permanently.

Ishara, who has been unemployed for a month, worked in a garment factory. He does not want to enter the garment sector again. He is obsessed with the strict rules of assembly line production. He prefers to work on a construction site, though construction work is heavier than work in the garment sector. He prefers a job where the work regime is flexible. But his wife, who works in a garment factory, wants him to work in the garment sector.

There is a generational difference in parenting between two groups of urban workers. The older generation workers are rarely interactive and communicative to their children. They are emotionally detached and their fathering role is limited to providing basic necessities. Samon, a worker of the older generation group, does not see anything special in fathering. He thinks fathering is all about 'giving food and comfortable life to children.' Saroeun, another worker of the same group, holds a similar notion about fathering.
The urban workers of the younger generation see fathering beyond the basic-necessities-provider model. They are emotionally attached to their children. They are concerned for the cognitive development of children. As found in the life history of Ang, they are interactive and communicative with their children. They play with their children, go out at weekends and after-hours, feed their children and change nappies.

The differentiated fatherhood of urban working class men of two generation is implicated by their differentiated experience of childhood, exposure to gender relations in the wider society, particularly in the workplace, and the influence of fathering by contemporary men of other social classes. As mentioned in the life histories of men in the thesis, the majority of the younger generation men were brought up without a father and proper parental care. They went through hardship and took up the role of providing the family even at the age of child. Growing up in adverse and extreme family conditions has implicated the young urban men to adopt a fatherhood which is organised around nurturing and emotionally attached to their children.

Men like Liang and Bunthi, who are contemporary to the younger generation urban workers and also represent upper social class organise fatherhood which is similar to the one the younger generation urban workers follow. Liang and Bunthi spend quality time with their children. Liang has learnt this skill during his brief professional life in a developed country. Bunthi, though he did not mention how he learnt his fathering skill, has probably come across his fathering practices from his foreign colleagues of his previous jobs. However, the number of young fathers who spend quality time with their children is steadily growing in the country. The fathering practices of this group of young men, who come from socially privileged class, are trickling down to men of other social classes such as urban workers.
Another reason for adopting a nurturing fatherhood by the younger generation urban workers is their exposure to the gender regime, which is comparatively egalitarian, in the wider society, particularly in the workplace. Study (Brickell, 2011) shows that the post-war Cambodian government has adopted gender-responsive policies and strategies in government machineries. Women represent more than ever before in leadership positions in government administration, local government and other institutions. Similarly, an increasing number of women are entering to paid work in formal sectors such as manufacturing industries, where a significant portion of urban workers of younger generation work. The younger male urban workers are increasingly being engaged in female-concentrated occupations. Contrarily, the urban working class men of older generation work in male-concentrated occupations.

The urban workers engage themselves in various occupations, including construction, transportation (motodup and tuk-tuk), garment manufacturing, restaurant and warehouse work in the urban spaces. All these occupations, except garment manufacturing and restaurants, are highly masculinised and gendered. Work in these occupations is manual, laborious and risky.

When we compare the two age groups, it is found that the older generation is highly occupied in the masculine-gendered occupations. For example, all workers of the older generation work in construction and transportation occupations. Three out of seven of the younger generation urban workers work in these two occupations. Among the other four of the younger age group, two work in the garment sector, one in a restaurant, and one in a warehouse. The labour force in occupations like garment manufacturing and restaurants is mostly feminised, with a sharp gender division of labour, particularly in the garment sector. These two sectors, particularly the garment
manufacturing sector, are absorbing an ever-growing number of urban female workers.

Engagement of all of the older generation workers in masculine-gendered occupations does not necessarily reflect their notion of gender division of labour and work. The choice for masculine-gendered occupations was situational. Construction and transportation were the emerging occupations at the time when they migrated to city. Having gone through social disruption in a vital period of life, they lack specialised skills to engage in other contemporary emerging occupations. The garment manufacturing sector, the sector of growth now, does not employ a workforce from the older generation. They cannot, therefore, find employment in sectors other than construction and transportation.

Urban workers of both generations usually help their wives in doing their productive work. Saroeun wakes up late at night to assist his wife to prepare traditional pies and noodles that she sells in the morning. After assisting his wife, he prepares to go to his own work. Han’s wife is a retail vegetable seller. She needs to buy vegetables late at night from a wholesale market in the city-centre every day. She then brings the vegetables to the local market located in the outskirts of the city. Han gives her a lift on his motodup to the market and then home with a motorbike load of vegetables. After giving her a lift he resumes his motodup service. This is his regular schedule. Workers, who work in transport services and have left their wives back in rural village, join their wives during the rice harvesting season to help them with their farming.

Though an overwhelming proportion of workers work in masculine-gendered occupations in the urban areas, the de facto nature of occupational choice, the cooperation of the workers with their wives’ occupations, and above all joint work by
spouses on family farms, suggest that unlike Chinese urban male workers, the Cambodian urban workers do not masculinise their occupations. It is apparent that Cambodian urban male workers emphasise command over the family rather than masculinising their occupations. The emphasis on command over the family is operated within the notion that a man should provide the main income to lead the family—a gendered notion installed in Cambodian society through French colonial rule. This socially constructed gendered notion shapes the way Cambodian urban male workers negotiate their occupations and family relationships differently from their Chinese counterparts. Rather than working in specifically masculine occupations—a choice imposed by external factors and assisting their wives’ occupations, Cambodian urban male workers attempt to provide the main income for the family. By achieving this gender role expectation, they maintain command over the family.

8.3.2 Urban workers’ masculinities and domestic violence

Through their move to the city, urban workers attempt to achieve their gender role expectation. But they often suffer problems with their spousal relationships in the course of their migration to the city. Adaptation to an urban working environment and being accustomed to the popular urban male culture are central to the troubled marital relationships.

The majority of the older generation urban workers live alone in the city, leaving their wives back in the rural village, and the majority of the younger generation urban workers live in the city together with their spouses. In the course of their absence from family and spouse, however, some of the urban workers of the older generation have developed emotional and sexual relationships with women in the city. Their peer network acted as a catalyst in constructing this specific behaviour.
When their wives come to know about this marital infidelity, problems spark between the spouses.

Among the older generation Souv, Bora and Ra are particularly suffering the problem of marital infidelity. As noted earlier, Souv’s wife raised allegations against him having relationships with other women, in the early years of his migration to Phnom Penh. Over the period, the problem has been addressed.

Bora also encountered troubled times with his wife on the same allegation. He goes to a beer garden to drink with his peers. After drinks he visits sex workers. Sometime, he brings sex workers home after drinking. His neighbours tell the story to his wife when she visits him. This leads to conflict between Bora and his wife. About the situation, Bora says,

When I go for drink and have girls from outside, some people will tell her (wife) about this. She becomes very angry by learning the fact. She blames me. I just keep quiet until she calms down. But if she blames me too much, I cannot keep myself controlled.

Given the subject matter at issue, it is likely that the conflict can potentially turn to physical violence. But he mentioned that he has never beaten his wife.

Ra slapped his wife once hard enough to make her deaf. His violence to his wife was not directly based on the issue of marital infidelity. But it had an element related to his outmigration. It was because his wife lent his hard-won earnings from his motodup to one of her relatives, who did not return the money.

Among the younger generation urban workers, Ishara and Sinat have encountered troubled relationships with their wives on the grounds of marital infidelity. Ishara lives together with his wife. Sinat lives alone in Phnom Penh. Despite living together with his wife, Ishara secretly maintains relationships with his
female co-workers. He hides his marital status from his girlfriends. He dates them after hours. He mentioned that he has had these relationships because of peer pressure. His wife, however, came to know of his promiscuous relationships and became very angry. Ishara maintains he can work with his wife to tackle the situation. His extra marital relationship has been halted as he is currently unemployed. His wife is looking for a job for him in a factory where she has some friends or peers who can keep an eye on him.

The cases of conflicting and troubled family relationship among the urban workers described above suggest that the chance of family violence is high when the urban workers live alone. In the absence of their wives, urban workers look for alternative sources, sex workers, to share their emotional needs. Peers and colleagues play the matchmaking role in this regard. Commercialisation of men's leisure, which is often marketed through beer garden and karaoke club, exaggerates men's desire for emotional gratification.
CHAPTER 9

TRANSFORMATION FROM VIOLENT TO NON-VIOLENT: EXPLORING MASCULINITIES OF FORMER PERPETRATORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

9.1 Introduction

As discussed in the literature review, various socio-economic factors have been identified as the cause of men's violence against their wives or partners. These factors include patriarchy, men's socialisation as victims of violence at a young age, socio-demography, poverty and the gender hierarchy in social institutions such as the family.

Which of these factors are centrally involved in men's violence against their wives in Cambodia, a society which has gone through enormous social, political and economic disruption in recent history?

9.2 Program on Violence Against Women (VAW) and men's participation

There is an increasing number of programs on Violence Against Women in Cambodia. These programmes are implemented by government agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Overwhelmingly, women are the target group of these programs. In recent times, however, we see a shift to target men and boys.

One of the national NGOs in Cambodia launched a program on VAW in late 2007 for a period of three years in selected communes of three eastern and central
provinces. Domestic Violence (DV) is one of the key foci of this program. The program targets men and boys for primary prevention of DV. It also targets perpetrators of DV, seeking to transform them into non-violent men. Some of the perpetrators of DV in this program were recruited in this study. The program is designed within the framework of legal and policy instruments that exist to protect women from violence and to promote gender equality.

Community-based men’s and women’s groups are established under the programme. Local men who are considered ‘good’ by the community are recruited into the men’s groups. Grassroots women who have literacy skill, leadership potential, and are committed to women’s rights are recruited into the women’s groups. Members of men’s and women’s groups are recruited in consultation with the commune council, the administrative unit of government at commune level. The members of these two groups do not necessarily represent a specific social class, but they might have affiliation with political institutions like the commune council.

Members of these groups are trained in basic gender concepts, women’s rights, masculinities, and relevant laws and policies. They are also trained in interpersonal communication and leadership skills.

The groups work in close collaboration within the commune. The program is operated with a two-pronged approach – prevention and protection. For prevention of VAW, men’s groups hold meetings, forums, campaigns, and individual counselling with men in the community. These activities raise awareness and responsiveness of men about women’s rights and men’s roles. Likewise, women’s groups carry out similar activities with the participation of women in the community to raise awareness among women about their rights.
For protection from VAW, the groups work jointly. They are vigilant with regard to the incidence of violence against women in the commune. When case of violence occurs in the commune, they should immediately report to the commune council for appropriate legal intervention. Commune councils are officially entitled to make a primary intervention in cases of VAW. Training is also provided to commune councillors and police personnel to sensitise them to the issue of VAW.

Men’s and women’s groups work both as activists and local pressure groups on the issue of VAW. Many local men and women have participated in the program activities. They are aware of VAW and gender equality issues. According to the evaluation report (Source not cited in order to preserve confidentiality) of the project, 29% men have stopped DV almost completely and 42% men have stopped partially in the course of the project.

9.3 Former perpetrators of DV in this study

The discussion in this chapter is based on the life histories of ten former perpetrators of DV from two generational groups, who have participated in the aforementioned program: an older generation above 40 (group of seven) and a younger generation below 40 (group of three). The former perpetrators of the older generation are: Chan Nu (58), a father of seven children, Ra Suong (53), a father of three children, Som Nong (51), a father of six children, Thim Eng (late 40s), a father of four children, Hong Sar (47), a father of four children, Huy Norm (44), a father of four children, and Pisit Kham (mid 40s), a father of four children. The former perpetrators of the younger generation are: Vichana Hor (37), a father of three children, Mouk Sam (32), a father of two children, and Khieng Lim (28), a father of two children.
All, except Thim and Huy, are marginal peasants. Thim is a trader cum broker. Huy works in multiple occupations, including farm and non-farm activities. All of them are currently maintaining conjugal life. All of them have at least two children. All, except Vichana, Mouk and Khieng, have experienced the KR regime. Thim, Som and Chan worked in the armed force of the post-KR regime. All of them have perpetrated violence, particularly against their wives, for years.

Case Study 8: Pisit Kham

The interview

Mr. Pisit is a participant in the anti-VAW program. He is a self-proclaimed perpetrator of DV who has changed into a non-violent individual, having participated in the program. He was recruited through the program. The interview lasted for an hour.

The interview took place in his home and was semi-public. He was not hesitant throughout the interview but spoke openly about his violence towards his wife. He also spoke frankly about legal intervention made by the program staff and the local men’s group against him in the early days of his transformation.

Life course

Pisit is a peasant. He is in his mid-forties, and a father of four children (three sons and one daughter). His wife is also a peasant, and his parents were peasants.

He was ten years old in 1975, when the KR regime began. Like other children he had a hard and difficult life during the KR regime. He worked as a forced labourer, preparing compost, excavating canals, building embankments and preparing land for cultivation. The food supply was often too meagre to support a growing child forced to work at heavy labour.
He escaped from the regime’s labour camp in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion and was reunited with his family. His father died during the regime. He returned to his homeland with his mother and his other siblings after their escape.

Upon return from the ravages of war, Pisit’s family restarted their life. His mother headed the family. It was difficult to start again as nothing remained, not even agricultural supplies sufficient to make a living. At this stage, his family followed the collective farming system under the socialist orthodoxy of the post-KR regime. Within a couple of years, his mother became sick and unable to work at farm activities. There was no adult male, except teen-aged Pisit, to replace his mother. He assumed a fathering role at a young age under the guidance of his mother. Pisit’s responsibility for providing for the family long before adulthood and marriage reflects the social milieu leading to early construction of masculinities among young boys in Cambodian society. His account gives the social construction of his proxy fathering role.

After the KR regime, my mother got sick. We did not have anyone else to depend on. So, I needed to try to work to support the family. Even I was still young, I worked for the family. Every day, I did rice farming, climbed palm tree to collect palm extract, and also studied.

Pisit began schooling before the KR regime began. His education was interrupted by the KR regime. He resumed his education after the fall of the regime. His education was interrupted again when he was in Grade-VIII by the need to accept responsibility for providing for the family.

Despite his role of providing for the family, Pisit encountered violence from his mother. The violence was associated with his role as provider. He performed the
role of providing for the family under strict rules and discipline from his mother, which often ended with physical violence. As he says,

My mother beat me. This was because I always stayed around her to help her in farm activities and other tasks. There were some works that I could not do properly. She was not satisfied with me. So she beat me.

Parental violence towards young children is accepted and normal in Cambodian society. It was also normalised in the case of Pisit. He is not resentful to his mother for her violent treatment. He perceived the coercive discipline of his mother as her legitimate right and it was taken for granted. To this day, Pisit thinks that he has succeeded in life (compared to his siblings) because of the strict discipline imposed by his mother.

He married aged around twenty, with a girl from his village who had been his schoolmate. He had loved her before they married. After marriage, he lived separately from his mother.

Subsistence rice farming is his primary occupation. He did not provide information about his landholding. His wife also works on the farm with him. He engages in non-rice farming activities such as collecting palm extract as a secondary occupation. All of his children and his wife currently live with him. The eldest daughter is eighteen years old, and the youngest son is eight years old.

Work, workplace and gender regime in work

Pisit’s real working life began at early teen-age through the role of providing for the family by farming on family land. As discussed in Case Studies 4 and 5, agricultural practice in Cambodia is peasant and gendered to some extent. But the gender division of labour in agriculture is not sharp. In his case, Pisit began farming under the supervision and example of his mother. Collection of palm extract from
palm trees was his secondary occupation during that time. It is only men who climb palm trees and collect the extract.

Pisit has continued his occupation as a farmer until now. The gender regime in his current farming practice is the same as before. He is the lead farmer, his wife is the co-farmer. Children also assist their parents during farming season. During his lengthy violent period he allowed his farming responsibilities to be adversely affected, spending most of his time at personal leisure activities. His wife led the farming activities during this period. His children also had to spend more of their time on farming activities.

**Family, relationship and gender regimes in the family**

Pisit was brought up in a female-headed-household. His mother headed the family and made all decisions. She managed the family through fear and the use of strict rules. Pisit often encountered violence from his mother. According to him, he was more prone to be treated with violence by his mother compared to his siblings as he worked closer to her than they did. Pisit was also privileged to exercise power and command over his younger siblings. He beat them when they did not follow his instructions. He obtained his power and authority over the younger siblings through his de facto fathering role.

The pattern of gender division of labour in his current family is the same as he had experienced in the parental family. Both spouses contributed to the family’s economy by working on the family farm. Their children also assisted them on the farm.

Pisit has always maintained command over his family. His command over the family is patriarchal and is constructed with the notion as he says that ‘men are the
main persons [heads] in the family who are granted a higher degree of power [over other family members] as they try to earn money to support the family.

A pattern of change in the way he commands his family is found in his life course. He managed the family by taking the leading economic role for the family’s existence in the early years of his marriage. The family relationship was non-violent during this period.

Later he managed the family through terror and violence with little economic contribution. He enjoyed life by hanging out with his friends, in sports (soccer), gambling and drinking. He often pushed his wife and children to work for the family without contributing his own labour. This was considered unfair by the family members. Therefore, they often disobeyed his commands, and did not respect him. Pisit used violence towards his wife and children to regain his command over the family and ran the family using violence for more than a decade.

He has been managing the family with a new gender regime for the last three years. The new regime is non-violent and practised with an increased economic role for the family. He has cut the time taken for his personal pleasure. He invests his labour more for the family’s economic production. He listens and discusses matters with family members when any issues arise. He deals with family issues gently, but not so gently as to be thought of as feminine. He has found the new regime effective in managing the family with peace and harmony without diminishing his authority over the family members.

Place (rural/urban), peer relationship and wider social life or culture

Pisit’s life experience started in a rural setting with a marginal peasant background. He was brought up experiencing social as well as family violence. As was commonly found among the peasants in Chapter 7, a man in a peasant family
leads the family by working on the family land. Pisit, being a peasant, also works for rice and non-rice farm activities as head of the family.

Peer relations affected Pisit’s construction of masculinity, especially in relation to domestic violence. Within a few years of marriage, he ceased to be a hard-working peasant who provided the main support to his family and became a gambler. He refrained from contributing his labour to the family, and became heavily engaged in peer affairs –sport, drinking, and gambling. Sometimes he lost money in gambling. These habits angered his wife who was already over-burdened with productive and reproductive work. Spousal violence began at this point. The following account provides a correlation between peer relations and violence in the family:

There was love in the early years of marriage. We forgave each other when there was any mistake. But love gradually became more and more bitter. Trouble started mostly from my side. I hung out with friends, and played football and cards. We also bet money on our card playing. Sometimes I lost money. It made me feel bad and unhappy. Then when I came back home, my wife blamed me.

Experience of violence

Pisit is both a victim and a perpetrator of violence. He had experienced both social violence and family violence as a child and a teenager. He had experienced the collective violence of the KR regime and had served as forced labour for the regime. He was beaten severely in one episode by the regime’s militia and the violent past has left a deep scar in his memories.

He also encountered family violence during the post-war recovery. Pisit’s mother, who was trapped in the post-war devastation, in extreme poverty, poor health and lacking the support of an adult member in the family, had no other choice but to
employ Pisit, the eldest son of the family, to fill the fathering role for the family. She used all measures, including violence, to feed the family. She also treated Pisit’s other siblings in the same way. The notion of ‘parental discipline’ rationalised her violent treatment towards children.

Pisit’s experience of violence was passed on to his younger siblings, particularly to his immediate younger brother. His younger brother was studying at the time and was reluctant to help Pisit and his mother in farming and other tasks after school. Instead of helping, he wasted time with his friends and peers after school. Pisit often beat his brother because of this behaviour. During this time he turned from a victim to a perpetrator. His de facto fathering role in the family was used as a justification for his violence towards his siblings.

I used to beat my brother. At that time, I worked for family and studied too. I studied in a lower grade than my younger brother. My mother asked him to come home straight after school to help me in the farm activities and other activities. After school, he hung out with his friends or went to play football and didn’t come home until evening. Then I beat him because he did not help with the work. My mother said nothing because I worked hard to support his study and mine.

Both Pisit’s and his mother’s violence took place within the notion of ‘parental discipline’, exemplified in a proverb, which Pisit termed ‘traditional’: *if you want a child to succeed in adulthood, you have to raise him/her under strict discipline*. Pisit referred to this proverb twice during the interview. The proverb justified parental violence. Both Pisit and his mother deeply embody the social meaning of the proverb in their parenting.
Pisit gave confusing accounts about his violence towards his wife. He repeatedly mentioned during interview that he had never physically abused his wife. Only verbal forms of violence took place. But another account which he made later gives the notion that there was also physical violence in the family. He says,

When there were serious conflicts, I went to stay in my relative’s house for several days. I did so because if I stayed at home with her it could escalate the situation further. So, I thought it was better not to stay at home but to wait until both sides calmed down and reconciled.

The post-conflict situations strongly suggest that there was physical conflict. Furthermore, if there were no physical violence, he would probably not have been targeted by the anti-DV programme.

Pisit’s experience of violence, first as a victim and then as a perpetrator, reveals the dynamics of the use of violence. The KR regime used violence against him to generate a huge labour force for agricultural production, and his mother used violence to ensure a labour force for the family’s economic production. He used violence in his own family to ensure labour force participation for the family’s economic production, and to maintain command over the family.

**Construction of masculinity**

Pisit’s construction of masculinity has always been organised around specific patterns of gender role, position and power in the family relationship. The construction of masculinity took place in his turbulent personal and family life, including, collective social violence, violence of mother, and engagement in proxy fathering.

His construction of early masculinity was organised around ‘supporting the family’ by rice farming and collecting palm extract (which was used to make sugar).
By providing for the family he was privileged to exercise ‘power and authority’ over his younger siblings. At this stage of life he followed the notion that power and authority over the family is attainable through the role of providing for its members, constructed through his day-to-day relationship with his mother.

Throughout Pisit’s marital life he has maintained this early masculinity by positioning himself as the head of the family. His understanding of masculinity in marital life is classically spelt out in his account, ‘men are the main persons [heads] in the family who are granted a higher degree of power [over the family members] as they try to earn more money to support the family.’ The three elements: ‘men as the heads of the family,’ ‘providing for the family’, and ‘power and authority over the family members’, remain central to his masculinity in the violent and post-transformation periods of his life. But we see a paradigm shift in the way he assembles these elements in these two periods of life.

During the violent period of his life, he asserted power and authority over other family members without performing the role of providing for the family adequately. His attempts at exercising power and authority were, therefore, unacceptable and challenged by the family members, particularly his wife. He used terror to restore his authority.

In his post-transformation period, he remains authoritative over the family. The only difference is that he does not use violence to assert authority as in the past. Instead, he is ‘gentle’ with his wife and children in dealing with family matters. He does not blame or curse his wife or children when an issue or problem arises. He invites explanation from family members about the problem.

His transformation into gentleness or non-violence is not totally self-imposed. The transformation is also the result of enforcement of relevant laws. The violence
that he used to hold authority over the family in the past came under legal scrutiny in the wake of the implementation of the anti-VAW programme in his community. All forms of violence against women, including DV, are being criminalised under the new laws. Violence is subject to punishment. Therefore, a change in the old-fashioned exercise of authority over the family was needed. Pisit has rearranged his ways of maintaining authority over the family to avoid any legal repercussions.

Apart from being "gentle" in relationships, he also reinforces the role of ‘providing for the family’ by doubling his efforts working in rice and non-rice farm activities to increase family income. Instead of gambling and personal enjoyment, he focuses more on productive work. The enhanced role of providing for the family and his gentle treatment of family members reinforce his status as head of the family and his consequent authority over the family. As he says,

Yeah, they (family members) respect me more than before because I lead the family well. The power of the main person in the family does not mean I put pressure on my children and wife or suppress them. It means I organise the family better than before. It is different from before. Now, everything goes well since I have act well for the family. They are also doing well with me.

Pisit’s post-transformation masculinity resembles the version of maleness which has increasingly been demanded in the rhetoric of women’s groups, gender advocates and legal instruments (such as DV law) in the country. He experienced the rhetoric from the anti-VAW programme in the commune. The rhetoric expects a man to be non-violent, respect women, demonstrate equality in family relationships, and contribute to the family’s economic development.
His ‘gentleness’ does not necessarily mean that he is pro-women. His notion of power and authority is still built on a sharp gender-based differentiation between men and women. He says,

Khong leakhanak chareok yeuong chea borosh nen man tuon phlon kasoey komlang douch chea neary te (I am gentle in speaking and acting to wife and children. I have changed to be gentle and weak in the character of man; but not weak like a woman.)

He leads the family with a new perspective without reducing his power or changing his notion of gender. There is no doubt about his transformation in terms of violence. Though the programme regards him a gender-responsive man, this is far from being the case.

Case Study 9: Hong Sar

The Interview

Mr Hong is also a participant in the anti-DV programme, and a self-confessed perpetrator of DV who has been non-violent for the last two years. He was recruited to this study through the program staff. The interview took place at his home, and was a semi-public. One of the members of the men’s group attended the interview which lasted for one and half hours.

Hong was fluent and enthusiastic during the interview, especially when he talked about his change and reasons for his change. But he was less forthcoming when talking about his violence within the family. He insisted that there were only conflicts and no physical violence in the family. Overall, the interview was a good effort in terms of unpacking the root causes of his violence.

Life Course
Hong comes from a peasant family from an eastern province. He is forty-seven years old, and the father of four children. He married in his early twenties following the matrilocal system. Both spouses work on the family farm.

Hong has experienced the regimes of Lon Nol, the Khmer Rouge, the post-KR socialist regime and the current regime in his lifetime. He was twelve years old in 1975 when the Khmer Rouge rule began. His experience of the Khmer Rouge regime is similar to the experiences of other Cambodians of his time. He was not, however, moved out of his parental house. He worked for the regime inside his residential village but his parents worked in a mobile team outside the village.

Hong began his education in a village school in the pre-KR era. His education was interrupted twice: first by the social disruption during the Lon Nol regime, and secondly by the KR regime. He resumed his study in the post-KR era, and completed Year Six.

From childhood, Hong maintained friendship with boys. His closest friends at school were boys and he deliberately maintained his distance from girls. About this gendered pattern of friendship at childhood, he says,

My closest friends were boys because we always played and roamed around together. Girls were also good friends. But they were not as close as the boys.

His gendered friendship preference was constructed by the social teaching of sexual homogeneity in peer relationships. Girls were not allowed to mix with boys in school nor in other public spheres. His relationship with his friends was peaceful.

Hong’s eldest daughter married ten years ago. The younger children (two sons and one daughter) work in Phnom Penh. Two sons run mobile food stalls installed on motorised carts. Hong provided financial support to his sons to buy the motorised...
carts. The daughter works in a garment factory. His wife joined them in Phnom Penh. She helps their sons to prepare food for sale. All three children live together in Phnom Penh. Unlike the farming tradition of their parents, Hong’s children have developed other family enterprises and make up another economic unit within the family.

Hong currently lives in the rural house with his elderly father. His wife and children visit him sometimes. He carries out his household and farming activities alone.

**Work, workplace and gender regimes in the workplace**

Hong is a farmer. His farming practice is small-scale, and intended for family subsistence. Rice is the main crop but in addition to rice farming, he has been raising some poultry and small farm animals at home to provide a cash income.

As is common among small-scale peasants, Hong’s farming practice is labour-intensive. Both spouses worked together on the family farm. He did not give an account of the specific gender division of labour in his family farming. He mentioned, however, that the contribution of both spouses to the family income was equal.

The pattern of gender division of labour shifted when Hong began heavy drinking twelve years ago. He did not work on the farm as he had before but spent most of his time drinking with friends and then sleeping it off after returning home. His wife did most of the tasks related to farming during this time, helped by his growing children. There is no doubt that his wife performed as the lead farmer during this period. Hong’s role was secondary and he followed the pattern of the absent father.

Upon his transformation to normal life for the last two years, the gender division of labour in the family farm has further shifted. All of his children have moved to Phnom Penh to run informal businesses and his wife has joined them. She
had left him and joined the children in Phnom Penh before he reformed. In fact, her move prompted his reform.

**Family, relationship and gender regimes in the family**

The following account by Hong gives trajectories of gender regimes and relationships in his family that have taken place over time. This account is also relevant to his course of violence in the family. He says,

“We did not know or understand each other when we married. We knew each other well and clearly after living many years together. I was stubborn and always wanted to win over her when any issue arose. I showed my power and did not respect her. This made her angry and she started to complain and blamed me. She did not blame or complain about me before this. But since she knew that I wanted to control and dominate her she started to take revenge. She also tried to show her power in the family. She was not scared of me as she was in the beginning. So, I think that it was my fault that I tried to control her too much and blamed her although she worked as hard as I did.

Hong’s family has gone through a series of transitions in gender regimes and relationships over time. The trajectory of the gender regime moves through patriarchy, contestation of patriarchy, and marginalisation of patriarchy. Gender roles in the household economy played a crucial role in maintaining the specific patterns of gender regimes.

Hong maintained command and dominance in the family relationships in the early few years of his marriage. His dominance over his wife and family was based on the notion that he was the natural leader of the family, and that he should always be
respected by his wife. His notion of patriarchal privilege was that it should be granted for being the head of the family.

Hong’s dominance came under challenge by his wife after few years of marriage. The challenge by his wife coincided with his practice of heavy drinking. About the beginning of his drinking Hong says,

My wife used to make trouble with me, like blaming or complaining about me. But it was I who used to make more trouble for her. Some days, when I came back from work and felt tired, she blamed me for some mistakes I did. It made me feel unhappy and angry with her. Then I went to drink with my friends to make myself feel better.

He chose heavy drinking instead of giving up his “winning over her” attitude to get rid of the challenge. His heavy drinking exaggerated his changed position in the family gender regime. Being drunk, he could not perform his usual role of providing for the family, and eroded his authority in family relationships.

Hong’s wife played the leading role for the family’s economy for ten years. This gave her enhanced power in family affairs, and challenged Hong’s dominance. About the changing gender regime, he says,

When I used to drink, all my family members were unhappy with me. I could not look at my wife. She was always angry with me because I always drank, slept and did not do any work.

At this point, he used violence to restore his lost gender order. He did not give further detail of the violence.

In the wake of stricter enforcement of DV law in his commune, a further shift of gender regime in Hong’s family has taken place. His violence was no longer tolerated as his wife reported to the commune council via the women’s group. He
needed to change his ways to avoid arrest or punishment, though he claimed that his transformation into non-violence was voluntary. At this stage, he became marginalised in his family relationships.

He has not been violent for the past two years. Over the period of his transformation, his children and wife have moved to Phnom Penh, where they have formed another family unit to generate income. He did not mention whether they migrated to Phnom Penh in a group or one followed by others. His wife leaving him alone in the rural village is unusual in peasant culture, suggesting that he has been discarded by the family.

**Place (rural/urban), peer relationship and wider social life or culture**

Hong has spent his entire life in a rural socio-cultural setting. Life in a rural setting is farm-based. Both male and female members, including children, work on the family farm. Men usually lead the family in their work on the family farm.

Making peers within the community is a social way of living for rural people. Male peer groups generally gather in local groceries in the evening after a hard day’s work. Peer gathering is one of the most common leisure practices for peasants.

Drinking is the most common activity for peers to keep their social life active. Drinking alcohol is not stigmatised in Cambodian culture unless it turns to heavy drinking. Drinking alcohol is common among men of all classes and occupations. Drinking alcohol every day is rising in recent times both in rural and urban areas. “Dor mei” (drinking alcohol) is gendered. Women rarely drink with men in the local groceries or other social gathering in rural areas. Drinking in peer groups is a men-only affair.

Hong’s peers and friends are fellow farmers of the same village. His account reveals that peer relationships have powerfully influenced his habit of drinking
alcohol. He learnt about drinking alcohol from his peers. Gradually he turned into a heavy drinker under peer pressure. About peer influence he says,

Before I did not know how to drink; but things changed since I started to make friends with people who drink. Each time I went to drink, my friends asked me to drink more and more. That’s why it made me crazy about drinking. Even my wife tried to stop me; I did not listen to her.

He has reduced spending time with peers since he stopped drinking two years ago. He still maintains a relationship with them, but in different way. Currently, he does not meet them frequently and does not drink when he meets them. Although he does not drink nowadays, he pays for his peers’ drinks to keep the relationship active. He says,

Sometimes when I drove my motorbike and met my friends, they forced me to drink. But I told them that I don’t drink. If they insist, I pay for a half-litre or a litre of beer for them. Then I continue on my way.

Experience of violence

Hong had experienced both collective social violence and family violence. He had a terrible life during the KR regime. In addition to forced labour, he was punished on several occasions for not performing tasks as directed by the regime. About the terror of the regime he says,

We were small. We did not have fixed work. So they did not care about providing rice to us. Sometime, I was careless while herding cows. When the Rouge militias saw this, they punished me by starving me for a whole day. They did not give me any rice to eat.

Hong had encountered family violence before the Khmer Rouge regime. The violence came from his father, and his mother was the primary victim. Children,
including Hong, also experienced the violence of his father. But his father was not
violent all his life. He stopped being violent after he gave up drinking. Hong did not
experience any conflict and violence involving his siblings.

Hong is not only a victim of violence, but also a self-confessed perpetrator of
domestic violence. Most of his violence took place toward his wife over a period of
ten years. His father had been a model of drinking and violence. Hong has stopped
being violent for the last two years through his participation in the anti-DV
programme.

Hong gave ambiguous accounts about his violence during interview. He said
in one account that there had never any physical violence in the family. Physical
violence against a wife devalues a man’s image in the public within the social rhetoric
of ‘good men’ or ‘real men’ in contemporary Cambodia, and this is probably why he
denies physical violence.

He categorically differentiates between violence and conflict. In his definition,
violece can only take place in physical forms that result in serious injury, bleeding or
death. Other forms of physical violence such as pushing, punching, knocking or
choking are considered ‘veay top bon tech bon touch’ or ‘small conflicts’. The fact
that he was targeted by the anti-DV program and the existence of violence in his
family for a prolonged period support the inference that he perpetrated at least second-
degree physical violence (i.e., pushing, punching, knocking or choking) his wife.

Construction of masculinity

Experience of family violence and collective social violence has implicated
Hong’s early construction of masculinity in specific ways. Through witnessing the
violence of his father towards his mother and children in the family, he was exposed
to a gendered and hierarchical family relationship in childhood.
My father was a drunk-person and cursed my mother. But later he changed his mind and stopped drinking alcohol. .... When I used to drink, I also thought about my father. ....

Clearly he has followed the path of his father in this respect. His construction of a gendered, hierarchal and violent family relationship was further reinforced by his experience of collective social violence during the KR regime.

Hong maintained a violent family relationship for ten years. He gave varying accounts about the reasons for his violence. According to his main account (spelt out earlier), the violence in his family resulted from his excessive domination of his wife, and the drinking of alcohol. A passage in the later part of the interview suggests a slightly different picture: that two factors jointly contributed to his violence in the family. One is his demand for patriarchal privileges and the other is his absence from the family’s economy.

I just spent time drinking. It lost time, money and work [rice farming]. Sometime, when I came back from drinking, I demanded my wife to serve me a meal. The food was ready. I could serve myself. But I wanted her to serve me even if she was busy working. The main thing [related to my violence] was that my family members were not happy with me. They were angry with me at that time. This was because I didn’t work and only spent money for drink. I made trouble for them after I came back from drinking while they were tired from hard work.

Hong’s violence in the family took place within his socially constructed notions of family and family relationships. His notion of family relationships was built in the same way as Pisit’s which was seen as being in line with men’s roles as the ultimate leaders of the family, holding a legitimate right to command and control.
the family. His wife was either silent or unaware about his dominance in the first few years of marriage. She then began challenging his dominance. At this stage, he was just disappointed, not violent. He followed the common practice for men’s leisure, drinking alcohol to suppress his disappointment. In time he became a heavy drinker causing him to absent himself from the family’s labour force.

This interpretation suggests that his violence took place in real terms when his gendered privileges were ignored by the family members. This behaviour by the family members was justified as he did not participate in the family’s labour force and did not provide for the family. His violence did not take place without counter-action or reaction (which he describes as ‘anger’) by the family members.

Masculinised leisure and peer relationships were catalysts for his violence in the family. Boastful drinking behaviour is currently common among Cambodian men and this trend is growing in the country. Ability to drink a good deal of alcohol without getting drunk is often associated with men’s physical ability. Drinking capacity is measured by the litre, not by the glass/peg or bottle, in the local culture. Hong also referred to the ‘litre’ as the unit of alcohol consumption during his interview. A man who can drink several litres of beer in one session without being drunk is often hailed as a ‘strong man’ by his peers.

Hong adopted excessive and irresponsible drinking habits through peer pressure. This led him to fail in performing his role in contributing to the family’s economy. This sparked anger and a challenge to his old-fashioned control and dominance by his wife and children. As a result, his violent behaviour was aggravated.

Hong’s post-transformation masculinity is non-violent, work-oriented and passive. Unlike in the past, he gives his full attention to farming. In addition to rice
farming, he engages in non-rice farm activities to earn extra income. He also performs all household chores. He lives with his elderly father in the home. His wife and children live away from him to make extra income. As his wife lives away from him, it is difficult to explore his power relationship with her. However, he still holds a subversive notion regarding violence. He thinks both spouses are responsible in creating violence. He referred to the proverb that ‘one cannot clap with one hand.’ For his own case of violence, he thinks that his wife caused his violence by being violent too. But he also felt he was more responsible for the violence than his wife.

9.4 Patterns of masculinity and relations to DV

9.4.1 Patterns of masculinity among the former perpetrators

Pisit and Hong are contemporaries. Both of them experienced collective social and parental violence. Other former perpetrators of DV of the older generation also experienced both collective social violence and parental violence (except Chan and Huy) in early life. The former perpetrators of DV of the younger generation were brought up in relatively good parental relationships. Although the younger group did not experience collective social violence like the older group, the aftermath of the civil war significantly affected their upbringing. For example, Khieng lived in a refugee camp with his parents as a child. The construction of early masculinities took place in more turbulent social and family conditions among the older group as compared to the younger group.

Irrespective of their different experiences of social and family life, and age difference, the former perpetrators of both groups demonstrate common patterns of masculinity. They constructed early masculinities within the notion that ‘men are the main persons in the families’ and ‘have more power in the family’ as they ‘provide the main support’ to the family. Three key elements: position (head of the family),
power (control over the family) and economic role (breadwinning) constituted their early masculinities. The principles on which their early masculinities were constructed were mediated through their life experiences, by serving as proxy fathers at a young age (as done by Pisit), or participating in the family’s labour force from childhood, or seeing their fathers as the role model. Pisit and Khieng term the notion ‘traditional,’ and ‘natural’ respectively. Pisit’s idea of traditional refers to the gender order of the family in the post-colonial era.

The notion of patriarchy in family headship, hierarchal family power relationships and the gender-specific role of providing for the family remained central in the construction of masculinities throughout their lives.

The former perpetrators of DV of the older generation began violence almost at the same time. Pisit and Hong began violence in the early 1990s although they married in different years (1991 and early in the 1980s respectively). Thim and Huy began being violent in 1993. They married in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Ra, Chan and Som began their violence in 1992 after passing many years of conjugal life (they married in 1978, 1988 and 1972 respectively). Among the former perpetrators of DV of the younger generation, Khieng, Vichana and Mouk began their violence in 2005, 2006 and 2001 respectively. It seems that the onset of violence particularly among the older generation relates to a period – the early 1990s, the time when Cambodian families were going back to individual family living from Krom Samaki (cooperative group farming), the farming policy the post-KR regime adopted.

During their violent period, the former perpetrators of DV organised masculinities with heavy drinking, spending lots of time with peers, and partial absenteeism from labour force participation. The practices of heavy drinking, and spending too much time with peers were preceded by grumbling and complaints by
their wives. The grumbling or complaints by the wives were related to income and living conditions for the family, except in the cases of Ra, Vichana and Huy. The reasons for grumbling by the wives of Ra, Vichana and Huy are discussed later.

According to the men’s accounts, the complaints by their wives caused them stress. They followed masculinised leisure habits (i.e., heavy drinking, gambling and spending time with peers) to rid themselves of the stress. In effect, the masculinised leisure reduced their economic role for the family as they were often drunk during working hours and thus remained absent from the family’s labour force. As they were partially or fully absent from the family’s economic role, their families, particularly the wives, had to cope with the situation by working longer hours. As the wives were desperate with their productive and reproductive roles, they could not pay as much attention to their husbands as they had in the past. The men considered less attention by their wives as versions of ‘ignorance’, ‘disrespect’ and ‘carelessness’. At this point, their violence was perpetrated in real terms to restore their power.

Som, a former perpetrator of DV of the older generation, was interviewed in the presence of his wife. When asked about a typical day of his violence, his wife replied along with him. Here accounts of both spouses are provided which best reveal the dynamics of his violence. The accounts are also representative of other former perpetrators in this study.

About a typical day of his violence, Som’s wife says,

One day, I asked him to take leave from his work (he worked as a village chief at that time) for some time and go fishing [this is his current occupation]. At that time, we had nothing to eat at home. Then he became angry with me and replied that I grumbled a lot about that issue (lack of
food). He then went out to drink. He came back home in the evening and began beating me.

Here is Som’s account about reason of his violence,

One day I came back from work. I heard her grumbling a lot at me. I then became very angry with her (did not say about violence). I just came back from work. I was very tired. She could blame me if I were not in work. But actually, I worked hard whole day. She still said something at me again and again. So, I was very angry.

Unlike other former perpetrators, Vichana, Ra, and Huy received grumbling from their wives on non-livelihood issues. Vichana, who married twice, encountered arguments from his second wife when he brought a daughter from his first wife to live with him. The children from the two wives often quarrelled and could not get on together. This led to conflict between Vichana and his second wife. The story of Ra’s violence is similar. Ra encountered serious neglect from his wife as soon as she noticed him with another woman, whom he has been living with since 1993 without divorcing his legal wife. Huy’s trajectory of violence is opposite to the case of Ra. Huy suspected his wife, who runs a vegetable shop in the local market of having a relationship outside marriage. He always controlled her outward mobility, especially when he could not accompany her. He used serious forms of violence to control her mobility. At one point, she reported him to the commune council. He gave an undertaking to the authorities, in order to avoid police arrest.

In their post-transformation period, the former perpetrators have reorganised masculinities around an enhanced role of providing for the family, controlled their drinking and peer affairs, and leading their families non-violently. In the course of participating in the program, they have learned the programme’s message that it is
wrong for a ‘real man’ to lead his family with violence and without playing the economic support role for his family adequately.

In the post-transformation period, most of the former perpetrators have restarted their economic role in full-swing to provide the main support to the family. They have slashed time and expenses for personal leisure. They are more focused on economic production. They have been leading their families with Pisit’s typical model of headship of *Khnong leakhanak chareok yeuong chea borosh nen man tuon phlon kasoev komlang douch chea neary te* (I am gentle in speaking and acting with my wife and children. I have changed to gentle and weak in the character of a man, not weak physically like a woman) which combines both feminine and masculine aspects without compromising the power over the family members. The reorganised model of family headship has gained acceptance in the nexus of anti-VAW activism.

The life histories of the former perpetrators suggest that they have been enjoying more power over the family, not less, in the post-transformation period. This power over the family is enjoyed in the form of respect, honour and services provided by the family members, particularly the wives. Their enhanced economic role for the family in the post-transformation period is the key to gaining increased power. Thim, who currently works as a trader and broker, is now the sole provider for the family and describes his new status in the family as,

If compared with the past, she [his wife] respects and take care of me more now. For example, nowadays she wakes up in the early morning to cook soup rice, and prepares breakfast for me. In the past, when I was drunk, she didn’t give care for me much. She also looked down on me. When I said something to her, she replied badly with a loud voice. But now she does not reply as she used to.
9.4.2 Men, masculinities and domestic violence: interrelation

The violence perpetrated by the former perpetrators of this study is multi-faceted and dynamic. Patriarchal notions of family headship, hierarchal power relationships and gender specific roles are central to their violence. As is common with peasant masculinities, the former perpetrators of DV, who come from peasant backgrounds, constructed masculinities within the notion that men are the heads of the families. They also hold the notion that being the heads of families, men are entitled to maintain power in the family. The notion of men’s entitlement to power in the family relationship is taken for granted because of their role in providing the main support to the family. The construction of masculinities by the former perpetrators of DV takes place within the overall gender order installed in Cambodian society by the French colonial rule, as discussed in Chapter 4.

The periods of violence by the former perpetrators suggests that domestic violence, particularly in countries like Cambodia where women in most of the families were economically dependent on their husbands, takes place in the dynamics of patriarchy, power relations and gender role for the family. A critical look at the grumbling and complaints by the wives suggests that they shared the notion that men should provide the main support for the family. Men are granted power (in the form of respect, honour and acknowledgement) by family members, particularly the wives, in exchange for their role of providing the main support to the family. When it is mutually accepted, their power over the family is non-violent. But making this happen non-violently depends on the men fulfilling the economic role to the extent of family’s needs. And that is not guaranteed, as these stories show; other masculine practices, such as peer group socialising, can put it at risk.
PART IV

THEMATIC CHAPTERS
CHAPTER 10
MEN’S ROLE IN PROVIDING FOR THE FAMILY AND THEIR RESPONSES TO THEIR WIVES’ OUTSIDE PAID WORK

10.1 Introduction

There have been a number of recurring issues in the life histories of the men interviewed in this study. These issues are related to family providing and family relationships. This chapter analyses the issues related to family providing with two foci: men’s notion of the role in providing for the family, and their responses to their wives’ outside paid work. Family relationship issues are analysed in Chapter 11 with two foci: power relationships between spouses and the reconfiguration of masculinities, and the fathering role of men.

The issues related to family providing are important in the study of masculinities, particularly in the Cambodian context in relation to intra-family gender relationships, particularly where men accrue power over the family and head the family based on the notion that men should provide the family’s main income. As labour market and socio-economic conditions are changing in Cambodia, it is the ideal context to explore to what extent the Cambodian men across different occupations retain the notion that men provide the main income to the family. The changing labour market can be disadvantageous for some men in terms of earning
enough money to lead the family well. How do they respond to their wives’ outside
paid work knowing that the income of their wives can challenge their power and
status in the family?

10.2 Men’s notion of providing for the family

Men’s role in providing the main income for the family, and their consequent
status as head of the family are two key and interrelated features of Khmer
masculinities. All men interviewed in this study hold the notion that they are heads of
the families. They justify their status as head of the family because of their role in
providing the family’s main income. These specific patterns of men’s notions of
family headship and gender role for the family have been installed in Cambodian
society through the French colonial administration from 1898 to 1954.

The intra-family gender relationship is played within the notion of family
gender role and position. There is a kind of relationship between men’s power over
the family and their role in providing the main income to the family. Their headship is
mutually accepted by their family members, particularly by their wives as long as they
provide adequate support to the family. Domestic violence, particularly violence by
men against their wives, takes place within the dynamics of this gender pattern. The
relationship between domestic violence, family headship and men’s role of providing
for the family is discussed in Chapter 9 and Chapter 13.

The life histories of men in this study demonstrate that men’s notion of being
the head of the family is default in their construction of masculinities, but the notion
of their gender role in providing the main income to the family is not. This is because
some of the men who failed to provide the main income for the family still hold the
notion of that they are the head of the family. Men whose wife’s economic
contribution to family’s economy exceeds their husband’s share also believe this. The changing labour market, their personal capabilities in terms of finding well-paying work and the growing economic needs of the family are important whether their support to the family is regarded as the main one or not.

10.3 Wives’ outside paid work and its significance to the family economy

The wives of the majority of the men interviewed in this study were engaged in paid or subsistence work at the time of interview. They worked in various sectors including garment manufacturing factories, construction companies, government offices, banks, small-scale self-run businesses and family farms. The wives of men in the rural setting (peasants and former perpetrators of DV) generally work in the family farm along with their husbands. Historically, men and women in Cambodian peasant families work together on family farms for subsistence. But outside paid work, either waged labour or a salaried job or a self-managed business are relatively new for Cambodian women. Rapid urbanisation and the growth of industrial sector in the country are creating outside paid work for women. Outside paid work in this chapter refers to waged or salaried jobs and self-managed businesses run by the wives of the urban men, both workers and managers.

Though the men in this study think that they are responsible for providing the main income to the family, a notion originating with colonial rule, in practice both spouses support the family jointly. By working in the paid or subsistence work, the wives contribute to the family’s economy. The proportion of economic contribution these wives make to their family’s economy is, in many cases no less than that of their husbands.
Apart from being engaged in paid work, these wives are also overwhelmed with household chores. They are over-shouldered with productive and reproductive roles. Men are often exempted from household chores either on the cultural interpretation that household chores are the women’s domain or because of their role in providing for the family, or both. Where men’s role in household chores exists, it is usually limited to non-repetitive tasks and spending leisure with children.

10.4 Patterns of men’s response to their wife’s outside paid work

The life histories of men show that their responses to their wives’ outside paid work are diverse and dynamic. A man’s pattern of response is influenced by what he earns from his work, his work culture and the gender regimes in his workplace. In some cases, the responses by the men to their wives’ outside paid work adapt in response to the changing labour market vis-à-vis their personal capabilities. Based on the patterns of responses, the men can be divided into three groups.

The first group: career supporters

The men of this group include Sok, Phyrum, Mony, Sopheak and Chhrem. The men of this group not only accept the economic contribution of their wives to the family, but also offer support that enable their wives to retain an outside career.

Sok is a public sector manager. His wife is an engineer who works in two places in Phnom Penh, including a job in public sector. Her daily schedule is hectic. Sok gives her lifts to and from home and office. If Sok cannot pick her up from her office at the end of the day, she needs to come to his office and they go from there together. Sok’s pattern of support to his wife is also common among two other public sector managers, Phyrum and Mony, whose wives also work in the public sector.
Sopheak, a public sector manager who currently works in an international NGO supports his wife by sharing in household chores. His wife, who works in a bank, does not have much time to do all the household chores. Sopheak washes dishes and clothes to support his wife. This support is to some extent monotonous and includes “women’s” work.

Chhrem, the manager of an international NGO, helps his wife by giving her a lift between home and work, and looking after their growing children after hours. Chhrem’s wife works in an NGO. Her office schedule, particularly the time for leaving the office, is not fixed. She needs to spend longer hours at the office during some events. Chhrem gives her a lift every day though her schedule is not fixed. He understands the situation.

Transport by their husbands to and from the office is crucial for these wives as there is no public transport in Phnom Penh. The only available public transport is motodup and tuk-tuk, but these means of transport are unsafe.

The second group: investors

The men of this group are Han, Prom and Saroeun. The wives of this group of men mainly run self-managed businesses. The men of this group invest either capital or labour in their wife’s business.

Han, a motodup in Phnom Penh gives lifts to his wife every night to and from home and the markets with a load of vegetables. His wife, who runs a retail vegetable grocery in a residential suburb, needs to buy vegetables from the wholesale market located in the downtown area late at night. Instead of hiring another motodup or tuk-tuk, Han helps his wife to transport the vegetables from the wholesale market to her retail shop. He provides this transport to his wife before he resumes his own work. By
giving a lift to his wife, he helps to save money that she would otherwise spend on transportation of the vegetables. On the other hand, by running the business, his wife also contributes to the family’s economy. Han’s support maximises the profit of her retail business.

Prom, a manager of an IT company gives his salary to his wife for her business which is importing ready-made clothes from Hong Kong to sell to retailers in Phnom Penh. The more clothes she can import, the more profit she can make. Prom invests his salary in his wife’s business with the view that it eventually increases her income and her economic contribution to the family. But she does not own the profit alone, as Prom owns a share on the profit, though this is not formally recorded.

Saroeun, a small-scale construction entrepreneur in Phnom Penh, helps his wife in running her mobile food stall. His wife sells homemade traditional food (noodles and pies) in a mobile stall to factory workers in the neighbourhood. His wife gets up at late night to prepare food so that she can bring it to the clients before they begin their work. Saroeun gets up with his wife and helps her in preparing food. After his wife prepares the food, Saroeun starts his own work. Saroeun constructs low-cost residential houses for the middle-class urban families. He learned the skills of house construction during his service in the engineering corps of the PRK army. His construction enterprise is mainly manual and uses conventional skills and techniques. In the early years he received plenty of work. Nowadays, he has more free time as the work has been reduced over time.

Apart from helping his wife in running her business, Saroeun also shares in household chores. He cooks food for the family, especially when his wife is busy selling food.
The third group: exclusive breadwinners

Men of this group include Bunthi, Sophea, Liang, Syheap and Thim. Unlike the men of the other two groups, men of this group do not support their wives having paid work. Instead, they withdraw their wives from outside paid work and self-managed businesses.

Bunthi, a business entrepreneur, has been maintaining his family with breadwinner/housewife model since 2009. His family was managed with the joint-breadwinner model until 2009. His wife contributed to the family’s economy with her income from a stationery shop. Bunthi opened an export-oriented business in partnership in 2009. At the same time he has been working as paid staff in a foreign-owned company. With his two jobs, Bunthi earns good money, particularly from his export business. He withdrew his wife from her business in 2009 and she now works full-time in the household sphere.

Sophea, an entrepreneur of a real-estate company maintained his wife in the joint-breadwinner model until 2007. His wife, who worked as an IT specialist in an NGO provided a share in the family’s budget. He began his business in 2003/4 informally and formalised it in 2007 in financial partnership with Japanese and Korean investors. The property market in Cambodia boomed until 2009 and he made a fortune. He bought a house, an expensive car (for the family) and other fixed assets from the money he earned from the property market. At this time, he also withdrew his wife from her specialist work. She is now a full-time mother and housewife. She did not leave her employment voluntarily, but followed her husband’s decision.

Liang, a regional manager of a transnational financial corporation, has never allowed his wife to take on outside paid work. He has always worked in the corporate
and competitive work environment. He is most successful in terms of his professional career among the local Cambodians of his generation. His current position is both prestigious and highly salaried and he has always been focused on making ever more progress in his career. He does not mind with the breadwinner/housewife family model. Instead, he feels ‘good’ with this arrangement as he can ‘spend longer hours at work.’

Syheap, a farmer, has remodelled his family from joint-breadwinner into breadwinner/housewife. This is unusual as almost all peasants maintain their families using the joint-breadwinner model. He is also exceptional among his group of farmers because he has a high-school education and maintains social networking with his peers who work in business sectors in the cities.

His wife ran a grocery shop and also helped him in doing farm activities. But over the time, the gender division of labour in his family has been reversed. She does not run the grocery any more. Nor does she share in farm activities as she did in the past. She is now a full-time housewife who gives ‘good’ care to her children. The withdrawal of Syheap’s wife from running her business coincides with his multiplication of income. Over the time, he has diversified his occupations. He currently runs an automobile workshop along with his regular farming activities. He has made the time to run his workshop by mechanising his agricultural practices.

Thim, a former perpetrator of domestic violence was abstained from the role of providing for his family during the period of his violence. His wife provided for the family with her wages as an agricultural labourer. She served both as a provider and home-maker for the family. The gender role in the family has now been reversed in Thim’s post-transformation period. Thim is now the sole breadwinner for the family.
Although he owns a few pieces of land, he does not know how to farm. He engages himself in trade and brokerage. He buys and sells commodities such as land, cattle and jewelleries in the local market. Sometimes he also works as a commodity broker who executes orders to buy or sell commodities such as land and cattle on behalf of clients and charges them a commission. He earns a good deal of money as a trader and broker nowadays. He has withdrawn his wife from waged labour as he says,

In the past, my wife worked as a waged labourer. But I don’t allow her to work outside the home for the last three years. I let her stay at home and only take care of the home and children.

10.5 Men’s reasoning about specific patterns of response to their wife’s outside paid work

The patterns of support by the first group of men enable their wives to work in paid work outside the home. This support, particularly provided by Sopheak and Chhrem, reduces the burden of productive roles of women and challenges the cultural notion of reproductive work being appropriate for females.

The support of this group of men who mainly come from the public sector (except Chhrem) for their wife’s paid work is influenced by their self-awareness of gender equality raised from the gender regimes of their work places—a phenomenon of men’s support to their wives’ paid work is also suggested in the studies of Nkwake (2009) and Slegh et al. (2013) discussed in the literature review chapter—and economic needs for the family. As part of the Royal Government of Cambodia’s (RGC) policy for gender mainstreaming in different sectors, all the managers of this study work under gender equality policy. All of their line departments are actively involved to address and promote gender equality in their line departments. Because
they work in gender-responsive institutions, they are exposed to gender equality issues through work and work-related forums. Some of them, Phyrum and Mony for example, are directly involved in promoting gender equality in their line departments. All of them have participated in gender training and forums both within and outside Cambodia. They have become more aware of gender equality situations and practices through participating in gender training and forums in the international community. This can impact on their knowledge and practice of gender practice, both at work and in their families.

The economic needs for the families also underpin the support provided by the public sector managers to their wives. The managers’ salaries are not adequate to support their families well in social class competition. Hundreds of public sector personnel in Cambodia, especially those who have specialist skills but hold non-managerial positions, work in the emerging sectors (such as UN agencies, NGOs, private companies, banks, etc.) to earn extra income, as well as in their government jobs. As they hold senior positions with important portfolios, the public sector managers in this study, (with the exception of Sopheak) cannot take another job outside their government workplace. They prefer their wives to take on outside work instead. They provide as much support as possible to their wives in this regard. The economic reason for letting their wives do outside work is echoed in Sok’s account. Sok’s wife does two jobs. He says, ‘Oh, you know, it is difficult to support the family with my salary. That’s why my wife needs to do two jobs. I also think about her responsibilities for family and work. She tries hard to do her work every day. Sometimes, she is very tired.’ He is sympathetic to his wife.
As he possesses specialist skills (being a medical doctor), and holds a junior but still managerial position, Sopheak has an advantage in finding a job with good pay in private sector. In fact, he has been working in the private sector since 2008. He earns a good salary (compared to his salary in the public sector). Why does he support his wife doing outside paid work? What is his motivation? Sopheak’s reason for supporting his wife’s employment is also economic but the reason for his needing more income is different.

Sopheak’s economic need is based on his social class. Although he was brought up in extreme poverty, he feels the need to have a contemporary villa house in order to fit in with the class of his wife’s ruling-class family. He needed money to upgrade his impoverished wooden house to a modern villa-house. This is his core motivation. Because of this he left the public sector job to take up a position in the NGO sector to earn a higher income. He supports his wife by sharing in household chores so that she can continue her outside paid job smoothly.

Chhrem’s motivation to support his wife is not economic. His motivation is rooted from his awareness of gender equality which he obtained through his first job where he worked for more than three years in a gender-specialised organisation with men and boys, to support women’s empowerment and gender equality. His involvement in this gender project was deep and authentic. Gender equality is also a crosscutting theme in his current work place.

The patterns of support by the second group of men to their wives’ businesses are need-based and relate to their personal capabilities in relation to the changing labour market. The reasons for their support are not embedded in their self-awareness of gender equality or women’s empowerment.
Han’s occupation (motodup) is a gendered enterprise. Though there is no formal gender rule in this informal urban sector, motodup drivers are invariably men – mostly working class men. The motodups need to show toughness and energy to work in this sector. On the other hand, the income that he earns from motodup is irregular. On some days he cannot earn income to feed his family. He does not possess marketable skills that would allow him to engage in other occupations from which he might earn a higher income. The only alternative for him is to let his wife run her business. He helps her to increase her profit by providing transport for her vegetables, saving money that she would otherwise need to spend to move her stocks of vegetables to market.

Like other technologies, IT is also gender blind. As usual, Prom’s workplace does not have any gender policy and he is not familiar with gender concerns. Why does he support his wife’s business? His reasoning for supporting his wife’s business is explicitly related to his personal capabilities in the changing labour market in the IT sector. Here is his story.

Prom is an IT technician through experience. He has no formal degree in IT and began his career in this sector as an office assistant. Over the period, he accumulated expertise in IT by working in the field. He attended some IT related trainings and entered this sector in the post-war period when the country lacked skilled human resources. Over the time, the situation changed. In contemporary Cambodia, there are surplus numbers of IT graduates and the labour market in this sector is competitive. In his current work, Prom failed to negotiate with his employer to increase his salary. In the changing labour market, his skill is average, not specialist and he is facing challenges to remain in IT. On the other hand he needs to earn more
and more to meet the increasing cost of living and ensure financial security for his children. He cannot achieve this with his skill which is in less demand in the new labour market. But the economic liberalisation of the country has been a blessing for his wife’s business. He invests his salary in his wife’s business in an economic partnership to overcome the economic need that he cannot address with the earnings from his own job. He says,

I think about the future, because I have two children. If I work alone, I can support day-to-day living for the family. But we cannot accumulate anything (valuable properties like houses, savings, etc.) for children. We need to make a plan for our children. That’s why my wife also runs her business. I give my salary to her to help her to build her business. She is successful in her business.

Saroeun’s support to his wife’s food business is similar to Han’s and Prom’s in nature. In the changing economy of the country, the local construction enterprises, that use conventional skills and manual labour, are being replaced by large-scale construction companies that use improved technologies and equipment. Sarouen is also a victim of the modernisation of construction work and enterprises. He does not get many work orders nowadays. His income is irregular and shrinking. Therefore, he pays more attention to his wife’s business. He does not hesitate to replace his wife in doing household chores like cooking food when his wife is busy vending food.

The supports of Han, Prom and Sarouen for their wives’ businesses are attempts to maximise the family income, and are also responsive to the changing labour market. As they find their personal capabilities less competent to address their families’ economic needs, they discover the advantage in giving support to their
wives in running their businesses more profitably. While they find their income from their own jobs is demeaning, they overcome this by making partnerships with their wives, either investing their salary or their labour in their wives’ businesses.

The men of the third group who have withdrawn their wives from outside paid work, or do not allow them to enter into paid work, come mainly from the business sector. Syheap and Thim are the exceptions as they come from the rural setting although their occupations are pro-business.

The business sector is totally gender blind. They work in an environment where they have to spend an enormous amount of time on their businesses. Bunthi’s business involves many trips to the country. He stays away most days of the week. Sophea’s business requires his undivided attention. He does observe a work-schedule. As his business is client-based on individuals, his schedule includes every day of the week.

Liang who works in a transnational corporate world, works in a competitive environment. He needs to devote himself fully to his work. He does not want to be an average manager. He has been spending enormous time and effort on his career from the very beginning. His workplace also functions with a gendered division of labour where men hold the managerial and CEO positions, while women hold a good proportion of customer service related positions and work in the front desk. A good proportion of women are put at the front desk, with the gendered notion that women are better than men in customer relations. Syheap and Thim also spend an enormous amount of time on their businesses and again their schedule of work is not fixed.

As the men of this group need to spend an enormous amount of time for their occupations, they intentionally withdraw their wives from outside paid work. This
withdrawal is made to ensure that they do their domestic jobs smoothly. The men of this group withdraw their wives from outside paid work as they believe that their own income is adequate to run the family well. All the men of this group have enhanced their income by engaging in multiple occupations and improving professional skill. Bunthi runs his export-oriented business along with a paid job in a foreign company and works long-hours every day. Syheap runs an automobile workshop but keeps up his farming activities. He also worked recently with a local agriculture-specialised NGO. He left the job as he cannot manage time to work in three occupations. Thim is currently engaged in trading and brokerage to increase his income. Unlike other men of this group, Liang earns a high salary from his single job. He has put tireless efforts into his education, training and work in the past, to make himself competent in his current position.

Unlike others, the men of this group reconstruct patriarchy in the family, not necessarily maximising profit, but maximising their power and authority in the family. They reinforce power and authority over the family at the cost of their hard work.

10.6 Conclusion

The men of groups one and two respond to their wives’ outside paid work to ensure that the family is being managed well—a phenomenon which gives social credit to the men as they are perceived to lead their families. The notion of ‘managing families well’ is comparable to the notion of ‘providing a higher standard of living for the families’—an economic motive for labor force participation of married women from better-off families argued in the study of Eggbeen and Hawkins (1990). The economic needs for labor force participation of these two groups of men, particularly
the managers are not basic or survival of their families. Rather, the needs are for keeping their families in upper class in the competitive and ever-progressive Cambodian society. The case of Sopheak is the classic example of how the economic motive for the wives' labor force participation of these two groups of men is affected by social-class factor, and why men render their supports to let their wives maintain their paid work.

Though they think that they are responsible for providing the main income to the family, the men of these two groups allow their wives to engage in outside work. When needed, they support the outside work of their wives to ensure an adequate flow of income to the family. At this point, men's notions of providing the main income to the family assimilates with the notion of managing the family well. But the ways men of these two groups support their wives are different: men of the first group extend their support to their wives in a more gender-responsive manner, while men of the second group extend their support in a self-interested partnership.

There are, however, some men, such as those in the third group, who withdraw their wives from outside paid work or do not allow their wives to enter outside paid work. The men of this group follow this pattern of response when they think their single income is adequate to run the family well. They reconstruct patriarchy in the family, not maximising profit, but maximising their power and authority over the family. This reconstructed patriarchy takes a heavy toll in terms of long, hard working hours and occupational stress.
CHAPTER 11
MEN’S RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FAMILY, AND RECONFIGURATION OF MASCULINITIES

11.1 Introduction

Men’s relationships in the family are diverse and dynamic. The life histories of the men interviewed in this study show that their position in intra-family gender relations is subject to change, and this change is driven by a wide range of factors. The change can weaken or reinforce their status. Within this change of status and power, men always reconfigure their masculinities.

In this chapter, men’s relationships in the family are analysed with two foci: power relationships between spouses vis-à-vis reconfiguration of masculinities, and men’s fathering role.

11.2 Power relations between spouses

The general consensus in Cambodia is that spousal relations should be patriarchal which means that a husband dominates his wife within the family. Although this pattern of spousal power relationship is most common, the extent of power a spouse exerts either as a husband or a wife is not static. The power held by a spouse can be contested and recontested from time to time.
Spousal power relations have social, economic and political dimensions. The degree of power a spouse holds in a particular period of conjugal life is determined by (i) cultural interpretation of spousal entitlements in the family, (ii) gender division of labour (i.e., who does productive work and who does other work?), (iii) resources, including the personal capabilities of a spouse, and how best these resources or capabilities are being used in the labour market, and (iv) the gender regime in the workplace and awareness of gender equality.

A spouse’s power in the family is usually translated in the form of decision-making in family affairs. Therefore, spousal power relations in this section are weighed in terms of a husband or wife’s status in the family’s decision-making process.

The life histories in Chapters 6-9 show that the men began their family lives as head of the family. This means they began family life with a higher degree of power and authority over the family than their wives. Over the course of their conjugal lives, they have experienced ups and downs in their status within the family.

The men of the first and second groups in Chapter 10 are complicit to their wives in power relationships in contemporary life. They involve their wives in major family decisions, are supportive of their wives’ outside paid work, share in household chores, at least casually, and are flexible to their wives wishes in overall issues. Men of these two groups, except Chhrem, are in between the first group and the third group of men of Bolake’s (1997) study in terms of sharing household chores and ceding power to their spouses. Chhrem’s gender practice, which is more egalitarian, is comparable to Bolake’s third group of men. The involvement of the men of these two groups in the emancipation of their wives does not go all the way. The current practice
noted above comes in the course of conjugal life. Their willingness to emancipate their wives is influenced by a wide range of factors, as shown in the following section.

Sopheak ruled his family and controlled his wife with the notion of *Chhbap Srey* in the early years of their conjugal life (*Chhbap Srey* is a traditional code of conduct for women in Cambodia by which a woman must serve meals to her husband punctually, listen to and respect her husband, and should not argue or fight with him). He made every effort, including violence, to ensure that his wife complied with *Chhbap Srey*.

Sopheak’s early masculinity was organised around his ‘strong personality’ having ‘grown up on his own’ and his experience of collective social violence, family hardship and the school system. He endured a tough life with his mother in the post-war era that was brought about by his father’s abandonment of the family. He assisted his mother in Phnom Penh by doing all sorts of work (including vending food, catching fish and collecting scrap materials to sell) in order to survive in the aftermath of war. He also went to school where his performance was excellent. He was chosen as a student leader at secondary school and this student leadership was endorsed by the post-KR state’s socialist political orthodoxy, to create a pool of future socialist comrades. He was taught to be rigid and tough by the school and visited a number of socialist countries as a student leader in his teens. Toughness and roughness, the key characteristics of socialist comrades, were deeply embedded in his construction of masculinity. In his adult life post-education, Sopheak maintained his personality of toughness and roughness and claimed that he had ‘never been influenced by others.’

Now, however, we see a paradigm shift in the way Sopheak relates to his wife. He has moved far away from the notion of *Chhbap Srey* and is flexible in relation to
his wife. He supports his wife sometimes by doing household chores that he previously thought of as exclusively female work. His wife's opinions are also taken into account in family decision-making processes. About the changing situation he says,

I help her (wife) a lot in cleaning, cooking and then... I also encourage her to make decisions. I give her lots of opportunities.

He has been considerably influenced by his wife over time. He has given up the old view of masculine personality and made concessions to the changing situation. For example, his switch to the NGO sector was influenced by his wife, with the motivation to earn the higher income needed to upgrade his impoverished wooden house into a modern villa. Even the idea of building a modern villa comes from his wife. Formerly he lived in a flat he owned. He sold the flat and bought the piece of land where he currently lives. He bought it in order to build a villa, as his wife prefers a villa to a flat. He has not built it yet because of lack of money. He and his wife are working together to earn money to build the villa.

Sopheak's complicity to his wife and the reconstruction of masculinities are in response to his wife's contribution to the family economy from her outside paid work, the inappropriateness of his earlier version of 'strong' personhood in the changing social context, and his exposure to and participation in training and work which aim to promote gender equality and end VAW.

Neither Mony nor Phyrum nor Sok constructed early masculinities in the way Sopheak did. But the notion of men as the head of the family was basic in their construction of masculinities too. They began their family lives within this notion. They still hold the same notion even if their wives contribute significant income to the family's economy. They do not maintain complicity to their wives in the ways
Sopheak does. Phyrum does not share in household chores. Instead, he lets his wife makes more family decisions than he does. Both spouses do paid work on the weekend. But the purpose of doing this work is gendered. Phyrum works at the weekend to complete extra assignments to please his boss and the senior management of the ministry in the hope of future promotion. But his wife works to earn extra income. His wife is overburdened with household work and the week-long domestic role. But she is privileged by exercising more decision-making power in the family. This situation is mutually respected by both spouses.

Extra paid work gives Sok’s wife more power in the intra-family bargain. Sok’s account in relation to decision making in the family reveals his complicit relationship to his wife. When asked how he addresses the situation when any disagreement in relation to family affairs arises with his wife, he says, ‘When any disagreement arises, I don’t respond immediately. I take time, and weigh whether I am in a position to bargain. When she becomes angry with me, I keep silent and do not talk much. Sometimes I leave the scene. I have to think who is wrong.’ He was uncompromising with his wife during the early years of their conjugal life and used to have conflicts and argue with his wife. He has learnt his new skill over time and his attitude of compromise and allowing his wife more decision-making is surely the result of his wife’s economic contribution to the family, as well as his awareness of gender equality through his work.

Mony’s pattern of relations with his wife falls between those of Sok and Phyrum. He does not give up his power significantly like Sok and Phyrum. He compensates for his wife’s contribution to the family budget by doing some family tasks such as dropping children at school, and sometimes taking care of the young children.
Chhrem’s relationship with his wife is rather egalitarian and this results to some extent from his gender awareness. Both spouses have an equal stake in decisions relating to the family. When asked to give a typical example of how they cooperate on family decisions decision, Chhrem gave an example on expenditure – often the main issue on which spouses disagree. He said that when there is any occasion such as Khmer New Year, they would give same amount of money to both sets of parents.

The relationships with their wives exercised by Han, Prom and Saroeun are blunt and explicit. The patterns of spousal relationships they maintain is some extent similar to the ‘mutual-respect’ model relationship men of Pineda’s (2000) study maintain with their wives. However, unlike men of Pineda’s study, neither Han nor Prom nor Saroeun employs them as the full-time worker in their wives’ business. All of them have their own job. As their wives’ businesses are more prospective, they invest some time and capital to them. They accept higher authority of their wives in family relationship. It seems that the higher contribution of their wives to family finances is precarious for them in intra-family gender relations.

The wives’ businesses, which usually run seven days a week from morning to evening, requires these men to do more (compared to their wives) in household chores. Their wives also draw more power in the family’s decision-making process.

When asked how he spends his time, Prom replies the following:

Actually, right now, I take my sons to school (public school) in early morning. After dropping them at school, I come back home to take my wife to market (business place). And after that I go to my office. At 12 noon, I come home to have lunch (bought from outside). In the evening, I take my sons to the English learning school. On Saturday, they do not have school. So I work only half day. In the evening of Saturday, I sit with them
to play games or watch a movie. On Sunday, I bring them to places like
the market, travel or swimming pool, wherever they want to go.
Nowadays, my wife is not free most of the time. She is very busy with her
business. Only I give children care.

Taking care of the young children is the bulk of Prom’s household chores. He
performs that task alone, as well as his paid work. His engagement in the upbringing
of children and performance of household chores is simply because there is ‘no other
choice’ as a result of his wife’s increased economic role for the family. He did not
give an exact account regarding his wife’s role in decision-making. But given the
nature of Prom’s position in the family’s gender division of labour, it is highly likely
that his wife plays a major role in the family’s decision-making.

Saroeun does not have young children who need care. But he invests a lot of
his labour in his wife’s business. Apart from assisting his wife in running the business,
he also shares in household chores like cooking food. He has to do household chores
as his wife is away from home for long hours attending to her business. Though he
claims to be the head of the family, his wife is the de facto head of the family. The
following account by Saroeun gives the sense that his wife is privileged with power in
the family relationships.

We get angry sometimes. But I try to control my feeling because we all are
tired. My wife works harder than me.

His wife draws power and authority over the family through her income which
is regular and higher than Saroeun’s income.

Among the peasants, we see a shifting pattern of gender relations between the
spouses in the life history of Vuthy (Case 4). In current practice, he maintains
complicity to his wife, who now provides the main income to the family earned from
paid work in an agro-processing factory. In the past, Vuthy had more influence in the family through feeding them throughout the year with the rice harvest from the family farm. But the changing climatic condition made rice farming a more precarious occupation. On the other hand, his wife’s new job has become a blessing for the family as she compensates for the family’s economic need. But her job in the non-traditional sector brings tensions to Vuthy’s notion about femininities. He finds his wife has a different attitude when she blames him for substandard household arrangement. He suffers emotionally when he thinks about his wife’s outside work with her male colleagues. Vuthy does not have any other choice but to adapt to the changing situation as he lacks the skills to replace his wife.

He negotiates the situation by taking care of household chores and considering himself responsible for the situation. He does not confront his wife when she expresses her discomfort with poor household amenities and family meals during her visits home. He normalises the odd and awkward situation by humorously reminding her about their poor living standards in the past.

Vuthy’s power position in the spousal relationship is not representative of other peasants. The roles and relations of spouses among peasants are usually reciprocal. Wives of all peasants, except Syheap (Case 5) who constructs a quasi-business masculinity have a substantial stake in the family’s decision-making processes which they draw from owning the family’s farm land, and their labour participation in farming. A peasant can obtain a patriarchal dividend in family relationships only in exchange for providing for his family in a sufficient and timely manner.

The men in the third group in Chapter 10 maintain patriarchy in spousal relationships by changing the family model for the wife from joint-breadwinner to
breadwinner/housewife. They have all withdrawn their wives from outside paid work and business as discussed in Chapter 10. They reinforce their power in contemporary family relationships by reconstructing a patriarchy that maximises their power and authority. In this model of the family, their wives have little power.

In contemporary life, Syheap, for example, regulates the mobility of his wife and her labour force participation. Liang’s wife has never been in the paid labour force. He feels happy with this arrangement as he does not need to involve himself in family matters. The domestic labour carried out by his wife enables him to pursue his professional work smoothly. He exerts his power in the family without being questioned by his wife as a huge intellectual gap exists between him and his wife. He is considered an altruistic man by the family members.

Bunthi enjoys sexual privileges (having extra-marital relationships) since he has entered the business sector. He reconstructs his masculinity around sexual privilege and this brings his wife into a confrontational situation. His current practice of marital infidelity is unacceptable to his wife but she is in a weak position in this confrontation as she is fully dependent on him. This is a typical example demonstrating how patriarchal power of the men of the third group has been maximised.

Unlike Bunthi, Sophea does not construct masculinity around extra-marital relationships. Rather he organised his masculinity around having his own house, owning a car, running a business, and having a family with children. His power relationship in the family is very patriarchal and hierarchal. When asked who makes decision in the family he says the following:

Me. It is my family. So, I make decisions. When I am at home everybody must respect me. I never had any problem or conflict. This is because
when I am at home, family members are scared of me. Yeah. Even when I watch TV, they do not join me. Because we have to show them (children) what is good and what is bad.

Thim also reconstructs patriarchy in his family in the post-transformation period. He maintains power over his family by terror during long violent periods. His wife provides the main income for the family. In the post-transformation time, he no longer maintains power by terror, as this is not tolerated any more in his commune. Rather he maintains power by reversing his role of not providing for the family. He has withdrawn from this over the period of his transformation and has diversified his income from multiple occupations. By providing enough support for the family, he reinforces his patriarchy in the family.

No other former perpetrators of violence withdrew their wives from outside paid work (farm work) like Thim. But Thim’s pattern of restoration of patriarchy in the family by maximisation of his income is similar to that of some of the former perpetrators such as Pisit, Khieng and Som. Their power over the family is enjoyed in the form of respect, honour and services provided by the family members, particularly the wives. Their enhanced economic role for the family in the post-transformation period is the key to gaining increased power over the family

11.3 Men as fathers: altruism, contradiction and virtual paternal care

Fatherhood is an important site of making and remaking masculinities. How do Cambodian men perform as fathers? There was an attempt in the interviews to understand their current practices in relation to their children.

All men interviewed in this study, except Sokheng and Ishara, two urban workers, have at least one child. Some men of older age groups have grandchildren. All men of the old-age groups and some men of the younger age groups went through
social violence during the Khmer Rouge. They served as forced labour during the regime and were separated from their parents. Many of them lost their parents during the regime. Many of them spent a significant period of their life without parental care. Apart from social violence, many of the men also experienced family violence in childhood.

The life histories of men from different occupations also reveal that many of them played a fathering role long before they made their own families. They took up the responsibility to provide for their families (younger siblings and mothers) by doing various waged and subsistence jobs. Their early construction of masculinities was organised around 'proxy fathering.' Their construction of proxy fathering reflects the classical gender role expectation in Cambodian society where the eldest son/s should provide support to younger siblings and elderly parents even in their teens.

**11.3.1 Men's emotional attachment to their children**

The life histories of men interviewed in this study suggest a generational difference in terms of their emotional attachment to their children. The men of younger age groups, particularly those who live in urban locations (managers and urban workers), are more interactive to their young children. More specifically, men of this group are more emotionally attached to their children. Conversely, men of the older generational groups are less interactive with their children. Children of men of this group maintain a distant relationship with their fathers.

Bunthi, the business entrepreneur finds his family as a site of 'entertainment' because of his children. Despite his hectic day with double jobs, Bunthi manages time over the weekend to take his children to libraries. He also takes his children to the provinces during his field trips. He preserves records of major activities of his
children, such as drawing, etc., to let them know something of their childhood when they reach adulthood.

Within his tight and scheduled time for his family, Liang lies down in the bed of his daughter for ‘twenty minutes’ every morning to wake her up, and catches up with his children and their peers on different occasions in attempts to build up rapports with them. He brings his son along with him to play soccer on the weekend. He has a plan to enrol his son with a qualified soccer coach. Liang’s fathering is exactly what Wall and Marinho (2007) categorise as ‘time-condensed fatherhood’ who limits his fathering role only to quality time with children. The managers in the group tend to give more attention to their children’s school performance and home work. They rarely engage with their children through giving them routine care.

Prom cuts his office hours on Saturday to spend time with children. He works a half-day on Saturday and then spends the rest of the day with his sons, playing computer games and watching movies. On Sunday, he takes them to swimming pools and other popular entertainment sites in the city.

The ways men build emotional attachment with their children have some gendered dimensions. They feel it easier to interact with children who are already past early childhood. Similarly, they generally engage with their children through outdoor and leisure activities. But the way Liang interacts with his daughter (e.g., lying down on the bed to wake her up) is domestic and feminine in nature.

These fathers have developed emotional attachments to their children in reaction to their own life experience as children. They do not want their children to go through the hard and tough life they endured in their childhood. Men’s emotional attachment with children also expresses the dynamic of construction of masculinities in relation to violence. Though they encountered violence from their parents, they
have constructed a fatherhood focussed on their children's wellbeing. They have never beaten their children. Bunthi who had a violent and scary childhood is very much emotionally attached to his children. He cried when he was talking about his fathering role during the interview. As a typical example of his concern for children he said that he was very worried for his second child when he left him alone in school for the first time.

11.3.2 Men's striving for a better and secure future for their children

Ensuring a better and secure future for children is considered a major aspect of fathering by the men of this study. They have chosen education as the best area of investment for a better future for their children. By education, the men mean an education with proficiency in the English language through which their children can obtain salaried jobs in the future.

Two reasons shape these men's views of education, particularly education in English to give their children a better future. The first reason is based on the contemporary labour market in Cambodia. University graduates with proficiency in English are the most privileged in the current job market, particularly in business and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sectors. Cambodians who have a university degree and proficiency in English can find a job in the private sector which provides salaries much higher than in the government sector.

The second reason is their realisation of the importance and enduring value of education during their life course in war and the post-war era. Wealth had no value during the war and the post-war period. During the war, people ran away from their homes leaving all their valuables in order to survive. In post-war times, valuables had little worth as there was no market for them. Many Cambodians still feel the effects of the war and do not want to invest their money in physical properties. However,
education was important and useful in the post-war era. Educated people who survived the war were offered important positions in government and non-government services in the post-war era. Even now, educated people have better chances to exploit opportunities.

As education, particularly education that provides proficiency in English, is chosen as the best way of investing in children’s future, men’s income level certainly determines what kind of education they can provide to their children’s education. Men in this study who come from different occupations with varying incomes are sending their children to the most-expensive English medium schools that follow British curriculum system and also to cheap English language learning schools that are mushrooming in the cities. For example, Liang, who earns a huge salary from his managerial job in the transnational financial corporation, sends his daughter to a British Standard English medium school and two sons to an American Standard English medium school in Phnom Penh. Yin, a 30-year old semi skilled worker in a construction company earns around 100 AUD per month from his work. His wife also works in the same company and earns 65 AUD per month. Yin has two sons of school age. With his family, he cannot send his sons to the school of Liang’s children. With his limited income, Yin sends them to a cheap English learning school where local Cambodians teach in the class. He is happy with this arrangement as he thinks that his sons are getting a good foundation in English. Though he comes from a rural setting and is a manual worker, Yin is determined to give his children a higher education so that they can be established in society. He works long hours (twelve hours on average per day) to ensure the education of his children.

Not all men are in the same situation to realise the future of their children. Some men, who lack marketable skills, and/or have lost income in the changing
socio-political context, encounter uncertainties in realising the future of their children. Chantu, a 27-year old marginal peasant, is the father of two daughters. He wants to give them at least high school education so that they can find salaried jobs when they leave school. He owns one hectare of land which he was given by his parents and parents-in-law. His parents and in-laws began using the land after the fall of Khmer Rouge. As is common, they do not have a certificate of ownership. Under the government’s industrialisation policy and plan, one transnational agro-based industry is acquiring farming land (the government thinks the land belongs to government as the farmers do not hold land title) without compensation. One half hectare of Chantu’s land is being taken. In this situation he is uncertain how to provide high school education for his children as the loss of arable land has reduced his income. On the other hand, he does not have any skill, except farming and labouring to earn an income that he can spend on his children.

In addition to education, the peasants also strive to leave pieces of land, improved houses, and cattle for a better future for their children. The pattern of organising family inheritance around properties for children by peasants is realistic in terms of the limited chance of education available to the children. Schools, particularly the high schools in rural Cambodia, are sparsely located. The nearest high school for many communes is at least ten km away. Children in rural areas need to travel long distances for schooling. On the other hand, universities are primarily located in Phnom Penh. With their subsistence income, the peasant families can hardly afford university education for their children in the cities.

Pou is a 30-year old farmer. He had left school before he completed his Year-2 to support his family by working on the family farm. He is the father of two children. He owns one hectare of land. Apart from farming, he also works in other non-rice
farm activities during off-rice reason to add extra income to the family’s economy. When asked about how he organises himself as a father he says,

I wish to earn much money to buy some assets, which I can pass on to my sons so that they can establish their own family easier. I have been trying hard to earn money just for that purpose. I want my children to obtain higher education as other boys in the village. I don’t want them to be illiterate like me.

Their construction of masculinities in relation to their children’s future takes place within the peasant economy. In a peasant economy, particularly in a subsistence one, land and cattle are important for better living and better living for a farmer means enough harvest to feed the family throughout the year and a surplus paddy which they can sell to obtain other commodities for the family.

11.3.3 Paving children’s future in their own experience

The interviews with the men in this study also suggest that there is a tendency among them to plan the future of their children in light of their own life experiences. The futures of their children are being shaped by their fathers’ experiences of success and failure, and exposure to the wider culture and society. What could be the best path for a future career for their children is deeply embedded in their own life experiences.

This pattern of the father’s guidance or rule is rooted in their perception that they are altruistic fathers. The men generally think that they are doing the best for the future of their children by sacrificing their own pleasure, working harder and longer, and so on.

For example, Liang who has always worked in transnational and multi-lateral organisations throughout his professional career, has studied in a top ranked university in the world and has worked (though for a brief period) in an industrialised
country, wants his children to be ‘globally competent’ so that they can build their careers in the global job market. He sees the careers of his children as extending beyond the local market. Because of this he sends his children to an expensive English medium school. Having worked, lived and studied in a globalised world, he plans the life of his children to make them global citizens. Liang’s patterns and ambitions are exceptional among the men of this study, but some others have moved in the same direction.

For instance, Barom who brings extensive work experience in the public sector extended his bureaucratic support to his children to enter the public sector. Three of his children work in the public sector and the eldest one already holds a managerial (junior level) position in a government department. He also managed scholarships for two of his children to pursue their post-graduate degrees in English speaking countries.

Prom, a manager in the IT sector provides laptop and internet facilities to his young children who can hardly make best use of the technologies. He is, however, making his children aware of technologies in their childhood, as he wants his children to become IT experts in the future. He says,

I am not worried about computer skills for my sons. They have already learnt browsing, typing and other things. They try to follow me. I have given them laptop and Internet connection at home.

Sok, the public sector manager, ‘builds dreams’ for his children in the light of his own professional experience. He sends his children to English learning school along with an elite government school. Having been educated overseas, he plans to send his children to overseas universities for post-graduate study. He knows that an overseas degree, particularly from universities of English speaking countries, can best
place his children in the local job market. During the interview, he said he is
'arranging things' to realise his children's dreams. He did not give further details
about the arrangement. By 'arranging things', he probably meant managing
scholarships (which are channelled through his department/ministry) for his children
to undertake overseas study.

Thim, a former perpetrator of DV who currently runs trade and brokerage in
the local area, wishes to teach trading skills to his sons. He wishes them to become
merchants and traders in the future. He is accumulating capital and valuables (gold)
for the future of his children. His sons currently work as labourers in Phnom Penh.

11.3.4 Virtual fathering

Either though being overworked with their jobs/businesses or because of
living far away from their families, some men in this study use mobile phone
technology to stay in communication with their children. The new technology enables
fathers to interact with their children when they cannot do so face-to-face. The life
histories of men show that they use mobile phone to communicate on a range of
matters with their children, which range from overseeing school performance and
homework to personal and sometimes emotional conversation. The pattern of virtual
fathering is mainly found among the managers and urban workers who leave their
families in the rural provinces.

Sok's department runs multi-million dollar construction projects. He has to
stay most nights of the week in the provinces to oversee the construction work. While
he stays in the province he looks after the studies of his children over the phone. He
says, 'You know, I have no time. But I have to find something to do for my children.
When I stay in the provinces, she (eldest daughter) keeps calling me and I also keep
calling. I ask (during telephone conversation) whether her homework is finished or not and whether it is completed before she goes to school. I always check.’

11.4 Conclusion

Despite the consensus that the spousal relationships should be patriarchal, in reality, men maintain relationships with varying degree of power: some men increase their control in course of time and other men cede their control and authority over the family. Like women, men’s fall-back position in intra-family power relationship is subject to contest. Women’s agency, particularly their outside paid work, and men’s varying ability to provide for the family in the changing socio-economic context, in particular mediate the degree of power they hold in family relationships in a particular time. In addition, men’s awareness of gender equality, which is mainly raised through the gender regime in the workplace, also affects whether they increase or cede power in family relationships.

The fathering skills of men, particularly of younger age groups – characterised by emotional attachment to children and strive for a better and secure future for their children - are developed within their own life experiences of hard and tough life and enduring violence as a child. Though they strive best for a better life for their children, most of them are unaware about the significance of a non-violent family relationships, to children’s overall development and wellbeing.
CHAPTER 12
MEN, MILITARISATION AND CIVIL WAR: A PATTERN OF POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION IN MASCULINITY AMONG CAMBODIAN MEN

12.1 Introduction

Cambodia experienced political conflict, increased militarisation and civil war during the regimes of Lon Nol, the DK and PRK, which lasted from the early 1970s to early 1990s. These violent events were gendered. Men mostly carried out the violence and men were overwhelmingly the victims of the violence. A total of fourteen men in this study were actively involved in the civil war and conflict in the country’s recent history. Among them, Rathanak Kong, Chandareth Lam, Sophoan Chea and Chan Nu served in the DK’s militias. Sokha Yim, Samay Leng, Vuthy Tep, Saroeun Chea, Souen Kong, Souv Leng, Sytha Hem, Ra Ket, Thim Eng, and Som Nong served in the KPRAF, the paramilitary armed force of PRK regime.

As we saw in Chapter 3, the former militias and soldiers in other geo-political contexts (South Africa and Timor Leste) organised their masculinity around violence and conflict in their post-war period. Conflict and war left them without skills or education, which marginalised them in the new post-war socio-political order. They followed similar paths to those they had followed in war time, to survive in the new order.
Cambodia’s experience of war and social disruption is extreme and daunting. The devastation and disruption of civil war that the Cambodian people have experienced is no less than any of the conflicts in Africa or Timor Leste. In Cambodia, too, the country gradually moved to peace and hopes of prosperity in the post-war period and this involved a new gender order. Life histories of the former KR militias and KPRAF’s armed men in this study show that they have mostly constructed peaceful and responsive masculinities in the post-war era.

12.2 Socio-political contexts of involvement of Cambodian men in conflict and civil war

The involvement of Cambodian men in conflict and civil war was originally affected by the politics of Cold War in the region, more specifically by the Second Indo-China War.

The political stability and social development in post-colonial Cambodia, led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk as the Prime Minister, came to an end in the late 1960s when the north-eastern provinces occasionally encountered US military incursions. The US carried out a military campaign to counter the north-Vietnamese communist groups who hid in the border provinces of Cambodia. At this time, the US military campaign disrupted normal life and created a significant death toll, mainly in the north-eastern provinces. But the military coup of General Lon Nol in March 1970, when he ousted Sihanouk, brought Cambodia into a large-scale military campaign of the USA. The USA expanded its military campaign all the way to Phnom Penh to eliminate the Vietnamese communist groups and their Cambodian fellows. In this effort, the USA dropped 539,000 tonnes of bombs on Cambodia between 1969 and 1973 causing the death of 600,000 to 700,000 Cambodians. Many of the participants
of this study who experienced this time, have described the difficulties they suffered from the Second Indo-China War.

A heavy death toll and social disruption caused by the US military campaign paved the way for the Khmer Rouge (KR). The socialist propaganda of the KR gained popularity among the peasants. Cambodia’s casualties from the US military campaign, and the removal of Sihanouk as the head of state by Lon Nol, assisted the KR to recruit thousands of militia conscripts, mainly peasants, who overthrew Lon Nol’s regime and formed Democratic Kampuchea (DK) in early 1975.

The DK regime attempted to transform Cambodia into a completely agrarian society. This attempt brought tremendous social upheaval. Cities and towns were evacuated and everyone was forced to participate in the agricultural labour force. The DK treated peasants as a progressive class and the urban population and professionals as class enemies. The peasants held command and power over feudal, professional and former civil servants in the implementation of the gigantic social experiment of transforming Cambodia into an agrarian society.

The peasants who became the militias of the KR took extreme measures, including killing, torture and forced labour, to transform the society to an agrarian one. At least 1.5 million Cambodians died during the DK regime. Most of the survivors of the DK regime encountered hard labour, and physical torture. In this time, the rule of KR militias was totalitarian. The invasion by the Vietnamese army in early 1979 and subsequent formation of the PRK regime and the paramilitary armed force, the KPRAF, further militarised Khmer masculinities. Many of the survivors of the DK regime joined the armed forces of the PRK regime. The members of KPRAF and KR militias fought against each other, particularly in the provinces on the frontier.
with Thailand. This again brought Cambodian men into violent confrontation with each other.

The violent confrontation between KPRAF members and KR militias continued until 1993 when the country held its first democratic election under the supervision of the United Nations. After more than twenty years of violence, Cambodia once again moved towards peace and political stability.

12.3 War, organised violence and masculinities in conflict situations

The life histories of the men in this study show how they organised their masculinities in a conflict situation, and how the organisation of masculinities was shaped by the organised violence.

The recruitment of Rathanak, Sophoan, Chandareth and Chan to the KR was motivated by socialist propaganda of class-politics, and personal loyalty to Prince Sihanouk. Sophoan and Chandareth affiliated themselves with the Khmer Rouge as activists, years before the revolution. Therefore, the militancy of Sophoan and Chandareth during war time was shaped by their political orthodoxy. Rathanak and Chan actually joined the Maki (Sihanouk’s rebel group) in a bid to restore Sihanouk to power. But later when Maki was absorbed by the KR, they became KR militiamen.

Sophoan, Chandareth and Chan joined the KR in the early 1970s when they were 21, 24 and 17 years old respectively. Rathanak’s entry to the revolution at a comparatively young age suggests that he may have been blindly influenced by socialist class politics. Rathanak joined the Maki group in early 1975 at the age of fifteen. He fought against Lon Nol’s army first and then against the Vietnamese army. He carried a gun and suffered a serious leg injury during the fight against the Vietnamese army. His wound sent him to the regime’s rehabilitation centre. After
partial recovery from his injury he worked in the logistic section, but was forced to escape to the forest when his group was finally defeated by the Vietnamese army.

Sophoan joined the KR in 1970 at the age of 21. He took up arms against Lon Nol’s regime long before the regime was ousted. After the fall of the Lon Nol regime in 1975, Sophoan was expelled from the regular armed forces by the KR leadership, and transferred to the transport section. He did not talk about the reason for his expulsion. He drove an armed truck from 1975 to 1979 but had to hide in the forest after the fall of the KR. He returned to his parents after staying in the forest for a few months.

The trajectory of Chandareth to KR militias is different from those of Rathanak and Sophoan. Chandareth was married and had fathered a child when he joined the army. He was also a monk before he joined the KR immediately after Lon Nol’s coup. He worked in the engineering corps when he was first recruited.

Chan also joined the Maki group in 1973 at the age of seventeen as a loyal follower of Sihanouk. He fought against the army of Lon Nol, but later came to know how the Maki group was being politically black-mailed by the KR. By this time, he was mobilised to the commune to deal with the Khmer Sor (white Khmer, urban evacuees, professionals and the masses who were treated as class enemies by the KR). He served in the KR regime until 1979.

All these former KR militias organised masculinities with both fear and courage during this time of conflict. They were routinely involved in fighting. They feared their leaders more than they feared their opponents (Lon Nol’s army, Vietnamese army and PRK’s armed force). Though they were militia, they were under the strict control of their leaders. Any wrongdoing could result in execution. All of them served as the grassroots militias, but none of them held a leadership position.
The KR regime used terror to deal with both the mass labour force and their own militia. The rules of the regime were strict, and were based on the whims of individual leaders. The militia had to comply with the instructions and orders of their individual leaders. About the fear of his own leadership, Sophoan says,

When I drove a truck, I could not let the truck break down. I had to rotate with another man to drive the truck. They (leaders) warned me that if I caused the truck to break down, I would be killed. However, I always took care of the truck well and I did not have any problem about that.

They were fearless in dealing their political opponents such as Khmer Sor, Lon Nol’s army, the Vietnamese army and the PRK’s armed force. Sophoan, Rathanak and Chan consciously avoided talking about their time with the Khmer Sor as the role of KR militias in the killing and torture of huge numbers of the people is notorious. Unlike Sophoan, Rathanak and Chan, Chandareth spoke about his engagement with the Khmer Sor, but he used political terms to define his engagement. As he says,

In 1977, I was sent to another commune to fight against the Khmer Sor (white Khmer) who were the class enemy of Pol Pot. I was in the mobile armed force of Pol Pot and moved from one place to another place.

Chandareth too did not give a detailed account of his actions against the Khmer Sor. However, the cruelty and gruesome treatment of masses of civilians by the Khmer Rouge militias are well documented in both academic and non-academic work. Sophoan, Rathanak and Chan spoke only about their fight against Lon Nol’s army and the Vietnamese army.
The militias were mobilised and moved from zone to zone in different parts of the country, as decided by the national leaders. The war strategies varied from region to region and were adapted in ways thought most appropriate to defeat the enemies.

About the construction of warfare masculinities, Rathanak says,

When we were caught in the battlefield, we had to fight seriously to win. There was no other alternative. We fought seriously. We felt happy when we defeated our opponents. We always had to reorganise our strategies and resources to fight back against our opponents.

The recruitment of men into the KPRAF of the PRK regime was mostly voluntary. Their voluntary zeal was driven by the systematic exploitation and torture by the DK regime, and by patriotism. Many of the men said frankly that they joined up to take revenge against the KR regime. Sokha, who was tortured by the KR says,

After the Pol Pot regime collapsed, I came to settle down in my village. The new regime was recruiting men into the armed forces. I was sixteen years old at that time. I resumed my study at that time but gave up my study and joined the army because I wanted to take revenge on those Pol Pot soldiers who had beaten me and treated me badly during their regime. I did not look for my parents because all I wanted was to be a soldier.

Vuthy, Saroeun, Souen, Ra and Som joined the army with a sense of obligation to protect and safeguard the country and their fellows from further devastation. Vuthy describes his reason for joining the army as;

I joined in army in 1986 and worked until 1992. I volunteered to be in the army. That was an obligation; my country needed people for its security.

Saroeun joined the KPRAF with the notion of ‘duty for the country’ for which he was ready to give his ‘life to protect the country.’
Given their voluntarism, sense of revenge and desire to protect the country, men who worked in the armed force of PRK organised their masculinities around warfare in wartime. They took every risk to defeat the opponent, perform their tasks of rebuilding road and infrastructure. They reorganised strategies and resources to fight back the enemy. They fought knowing the fact that they could be injured and die any time. Members of the KPRAF fought against KR militias on a regular basis. They fought on the frontier with Thailand and many of them witnessed casualties of their co-fighters and KR militias in battle.

12.4 Departure from militancy and construction of post-conflict masculinities

The careers of most men the KR militias ended with the fall of the DK regime. But most of the KPRAF’s paramilitary men left military life by their own choice. The departure from war was a timely need which they felt within a new notion of ‘maleness’ in post-war Cambodia. The new notion of maleness developed a social rhetoric that emphasised a man’s role in family prosperity, the accumulation of wealth and good education for children. In this post-conflict time, they constructed peaceful and responsive masculinities with a focus on the family. The brief life histories of Rathanak Kong, Souen Kong and Saroeun Chea describe how they discursively constructed peaceful and responsive masculinities in the post-war period.

Rathanak Kong

Rathanak comes from a central province. He joined the KR militia at the age of fifteen. He first fought against Lon Nol’s army, then worked with the Khmer Sor at the commune level, and then fought against the Vietnamese army. He suffered a leg wound during a fight with the Vietnamese army. In another fight with Vietnamese, his group was defeated and they retreated to the mountains for survival. After the escape, Rathanak made his way to his home province. His parents arranged a wedding for him.
immediately after his return from the battle field in early 1980. The marriage was unsuccessful and he left his wife in 1982 returning to the paternal commune. He married again in 1983 in his parental commune. He currently lives with this wife and five children (one son and four daughters). He has one daughter from his first wife but does not communicate with her.

When he lived with first wife, who was a school teacher, Rathanak worked at farming and ran a small business. His current occupation is farming and he holds three hectares of land including one hectare that he bought. He can produce surplus rice from this land and he has bought a motorbike and owns a power tractor. He also owns several cattle. Both he and his current wife work on the farm. Apart from farming, both spouses also collect firewood from the local forest for sale.

Of their children, the first daughter completed Year 6 and currently works in a garment factory in Phnom Penh. The second daughter has also completed Year 6 and helps Rathanak on the farm. The third daughter has completed Year 10 and works as a secretary in the local council. The fourth child is a son who is currently in Year 11. The youngest child is a daughter who is in Year 6.

Though his first marriage was unsuccessful, having a family was crucial for Rathanak’s transit to civilian life. Over time, he has turned himself into a family-oriented man. His focus is the family and the family’s prosperity. He has organised himself as a father who thinks for his children’s future. He could not provide higher education to his children yet. But he wishes he could. As he says,

I feel sorry for them (the children who dropped out). My wife and I have only a little education. I wish them (the youngest two children) to study higher so that they can get work in an NGO or some good places to earn good income to support their family.
Souen Kong

Souen comes from an eastern province. He was seventeen when the KR began operating in his area. He worked in Kong Chalat in the first year of the KR regime. After serving one year in Kong Chalat, Souen was appointed as a teacher in the education program of the KR with a reference from a relative of his father working in the ministry of DK's regime. He taught until the fall of the regime.

In 1979 when the Vietnamese Army invaded Cambodia, Souen, along with other family members, fled to the forest and spent seven months there but they were again caught by the KR solders. While Souen's family was heading to the northwestern zone under the control of the KR, the Vietnamese army attacked the KR force. The Khmer Rouge was defeated in the battle and Souen's family was freed. Souen's family then returned to their home province.

Souen served in the PRK's paramilitary police force from 1980 to 1986. He married in 1984 while he was serving in the military. He fathered two children in the first two years of marriage. He found that his meagre income was not enough to support his family and decided to leave his job and engage in cross-border black-market trade. He had learned trading skills from his father and supplied consumer goods from Thailand to his home province. This was illegal but unofficially sanctioned. The black-market trade required special trading skills. He had to manage the police for easy and safe shipment of goods and the whole process of black-marketing was risky. Law enforcement became stricter and trading became harder day by day. Finally, he stopped the trade in 1992 to avoid arrest.

By the end of 1992, he joined the armed force of the current regime. His appointment in the armed force of the new regime was a part of government’s policy
to integrate former militias into normal life. He was posted to Phnom Penh, and
moved there, leaving his wife and children back in the village.

Souen bought a piece of land in Phnom Penh in 1992 with money he earned
from the cross-border trade. He has built a house on this land, and currently lives in it
with his children. He brought his children from the rural province to Phnom Penh for
the sake of higher education. Two of his children have already completed university
degrees.

His job with the armed forces was changed to casual employment in 1995. He
bought a tuk-tuk several years ago to earn extra income to support the education of his
children. Currently, his earnings from the tuk-tuk are his main income.

Although he serves in the army on a casual basis, Souen does not reveal this
identity to his clients. He prefers his identity as a tuk-tuk driver. This is an unusual
sacrifice of social prestige. It shows the importance of altruistic fatherhood in his new
life: preserving the tuk-tuk income is vital. But it means he lives a divided life,
involved at the same time in two conflicting patterns of masculinity.

**Saroeun Chea**

Born in a city family, Saroeun was brought up in three families: with his
parents until he was ten, with his grandparents between the ages of ten and fifteen,
and then as an adopted son with a woman for one year at the age of nineteen.
Saroeun’s father was a soldier of the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh who died in
a clash with communist rebels in 1973. Saroeun was living with his parents in Phnom
Penh at the time and his mother also died in the same incident. He then joined his
grandparents in the province.

While Saroeun was living with his grandparents, the KR revolution broke out
throughout the country. KR operations penetrated to his area in the same year. He was
fifteen at this time. Saroeun was separated from his grandparents and sent to a children’s group by the regime. He performed tasks allocated to children’s groups. He turned eighteen by the end of 1978. Then he was sent to Kong Chalat.

Saroeun was sentenced to death once while working in the children’s group for not complying with the strict rules. He survived through the mercy of one of the soldiers. In early 1979, along with many others, he was taken by the KR as a prisoner to the north-western provinces. On the way there was a battle between the Vietnamese army and KR soldiers. He was caught in the cross-fire and luckily survived again.

The KR soldiers lost the fight, and the Vietnamese army took him and sent him to Phnom Penh. He met a woman on the way to Phnom Penh who had lost all of her family and she adopted him as a son. Upon his return to Phnom Penh, Saroeun lived with her in an abandoned house and they began life from the ruin. He collected materials from destroyed houses and exchanged them for rice. He lived with his mother for one year, then had to leave her because she married again. In the meantime, he joined his grandfather.

Saroeun served in the PRK’s armed force from 1982 to 1986. He joined the armed force voluntarily. He married in May 1985 while he was in service with the KPRAF. Being a residential member of the armed forces, he had to live in the military barracks. His wife visited him in barracks on different occasions. During her visit, Saroeun’s wife expressed emotion and serious concern for his wellbeing and safety. Her appealing femininity touched Saroeun’s heart, and he became more and more dedicated to his wife.

Saroeun was not allowed by the command to take leave to visit his wife in the rural village. His sense of ‘duty for country’ faded when he was refused permission to be with his wife when she delivered his first son. His family condition was also
worsening because of lack of income. Feeling that he was doing nothing for his wife and newborn, Saroeun finally left KPRAF although there was a risk of arrest for desertion. He describes the moment of his exit from the armed forces as,

There was no-one to look after her (his wife), and her living condition was so bad. So, I decided to stop serving because I saw my family in hardship. I did not care about arrest or any other trouble which could happen due to stopping from job. I did lots for the country. I took my life to protect my country. But my family was in trouble and the government did not care about this. They did not support my family and my living condition.

He joined his family and began a new life. He migrated to Phnom Penh along with his family. He first worked as a labourer in a privately owned construction firm. Later he opened a construction firm and auto-repairing workshop (although very informally) on his own. He is now an entrepreneur, having acquired skills in construction and motor vehicle repair during his service with the KPRAF. Since then, he has not looked back.

Saroeun has organised himself as a family-oriented man in the post-war era, focused on improving his family condition. He currently lives with his family in his own house on the outskirts of Phnom Penh. He runs a small-scale informal construction firm, along with two more side occupations: repairing motor cycles and vegetable gardening (in the rainy season). He also builds houses for low-income families in the city.

His wife shares in earning the family income. She vends traditional homemade pies and noodles among the urban workers in the area. Unlike Souen, none of Saroeun's children has received a university education. But he is satisfied that all of
his adult children are economically active. The daily living of Saroeun’s family is moderate by national standards but peace and happiness persist in his everyday life.

12.5 Conclusion

The former militants are not unique: either in the way they have experienced collective social violence (including service in the armed force) or in the way they have reorganised their lives within the new gender order in the post-war era. Their cases represent numerous Cambodians of their generation.

The life histories of these men suggest that the making of a particular pattern of masculinity is situational and related to specific historical events. Class politics of the KR regime, which was effectively conceptualised in ‘Khmer Sor’, powerfully transformed young peasants into militants. Construction of masculinities around militancy became prominent among the peasants who were recruited to demolish the hierarchal Cambodian society into a peasant one. Chandareth says, ‘Most people joined in Pol Pot’s political group.’

The entry and exit of the KPRAF paramilitary men from the armed service were responsive to the socio-political expectation of maleness configured in two different situations: one at the time when a new regime emerged as the saviour for the surviving population, and another in the post-war era when the recovery was moving forward. They joined the KPRAF within the discourse that men should stand and salvage the country from the KR.

Over time, the country gradually moved to political stability. Peace was restored and the main faction of the KR (led by Pol Pot) was totally eliminated. The economy began to recover. This was the time when the country began reconstruction with the support of the international community. New jobs and businesses were emerging in association with the reconstruction. Some families were able to make use
of the new opportunities to uplift their family conditions and standard of living. They accumulated wealth either by being directly involved in the reconstruction projects through government and international agencies, or by running related businesses.

A new gender order emerged in the wake of the country’s social, political and economic progress in the period of reconstruction, which measured masculinity by a man’s success in making his family prosperous and educated. The new gender order emphasised men’s success in family prosperity, accumulation of wealth and providing good/higher education to children. Men of the families who were prospering received social respect and honour. Men of this category whom I call ‘Men of Success’ gained hegemony in the construction of masculinity in post-war Cambodia. Now the former militants and armed men who were in a kind of ‘political militancy’ found that their militant masculinity was obsolete in the changed situation. Their involvement in militancy could not even enable them to provide basic necessities for their families. As a result their zeal to ‘protect the country’ faded. Vuthy, who joined the KPRAF feeling an innate obligation to protect the country left the service when he found it difficult to maintain his family along with his service in the armed force. He says,

It was difficult for me to maintain family and job together. Finally, I stopped working in the army.

‘Men of Success’ became discursively idealised in Cambodian society. The gender role of Cambodian men of providing the main income for the family caused ordinary men and the ‘Men of Success’ to be compared in terms of their roles in providing for their families. Family members, particularly wives, played an important role in actualising the social discourse among these former soldiers. Souv (Case 6) says how his wife conveyed the discourse to him. He says,
She [wife] always complained and compared us to other couples who were our contemporaries. She asked why living conditions of others were better than ours. My wife was a woman and she needed to look after her children and the family [so her complaints and comparisons were justified].

The discourse brought Cambodian men into a situation where the gender role of providing the main income for the family by the ‘successful men’ was set as a standard for the ‘ordinary’ men. It can be argued that ‘Men of Success’ is an ideal that puts married and family men in the hegemonic position.

Like Fernando in Xaba’s (2001) study, many of the former militants in this study had few marketable skills. But unlike Fernando, none of them took the violent path in the post-war era. Rather, they made the best use of their ability to resemble, at least partially, ‘Men of Success’, the hegemonic masculinity of post-war Cambodia. All made their best efforts to earn money. They engaged themselves in low-esteem, laborious and dangerous occupations in order to find a place as a man in the new gender order. Eventually, many of them made themselves ‘Men of Success.’

Souv, Souen and Sareoun have their own houses in the capital city, and have upgraded their occupations, becoming small-scale entrepreneurs. Souv and Souen have provided university education to their children. They are respected at least among the men of their own social class.

Other former militias and armed men who currently live in rural settings could not provide higher education to their children as Souv, Souen and Sareoun have. But they have improved their family’s living conditions over the period. They have increased their land holdings and other assets that they can pass to their children in the future.
PART V

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
13.1 Khmer masculinities: historicity, divergence and phenomenal characteristics

Khmer masculinities have been constructed and reconstructed over time. Colonial rule from 1863 to 1954, civil war and militarisation from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, and the market economy adopted in recent decades have all reconstructed Khmer masculinities of the pre-colonial era.

13.1.1 Khmer masculinities in the pre-colonial era

Khmer masculinities in the pre-colonial era were organised within a matrilocal support system. A man in peasant society had to pass an apprentice probationary period by living with the family of the prospective bride before being married. He worked on the farms of his in-laws, built his house, and performed other necessary tasks during this period. He had to prove his competency to the parents of the bride in order to complete the probation period successfully. After marriage, he made his living on lands owned by his wife, which she inherited from her parents. Both spouses worked on the land.

A man who provided the main support for the family was seen as being head of the family. Given the matrilocal support system of making a family, and women’s
economic role in the family, men's headship of the family was symbolic, rather than practical. Intra-family gender roles and relations were reciprocal. The Khmer masculinities in relation to the family in the pre-colonial era were not organised around direct power.

In pre-colonial times, a man in a polygamous marriage (which was mainly practised by some of the elites – mandarins and royal families), needed the permission of his first wife (Prâpon Thom) before he could have a second wife. The condition of permission of the first wife to have a second wife suggests that even the elite masculinities at that time were subject to women to some extent. The first wife could seek a divorce if her husband took another wife without her consent.

The need for the consent of the first wife for a man to have a second wife also suggests that men’s sexual practices, particularly sexual promiscuity, were under the control of his wife. Men in polygamous marriages needed to compromise with their first wives. In some cases they needed to accept her authority, particularly when ambiguities arose in relationship with the other wives. The first wife in a polygamous marriage could enjoy more power than her husband in intra-family gender relations.

13.1.2 Khmer masculinities in colonial Cambodia

The gender regimes of the French colonial administration promoted patriarchy in Cambodian families by (i) promoting men as the functional head of the family, (ii) assigning men as the sole breadwinners, and (iii) limiting women’s entitlement to deal in public and legal affairs.

The colonial administration adopted Codes Cambodiens 1898 and Code Civil Cambodgien 1920 which delineated codes of conduct for local men and women. Codes Cambodiens 1898 which preserved some of the pre-colonial gender order treated men as the symbolic head of the family. The relations between a husband and
a wife were reciprocal. The Code Civil Cambodgien 1920 promoted men as the functional head of the family. Men became the ultimate and only authority within the family. Article 194 was particularly vital in this regard as it made men the guardians of their wives in all matters. Article 198 also contributed to promoting men as functional heads of the family. It said any act by a woman without the authorisation of her husband was voidable. In effect the legal provisions of the Code Civil Cambodgien 1920, placed women in Cambodian families under the control of their husbands.

Apart from being established as the functional heads of their families, men also were defined as the sole breadwinners for their families under the Code Civil Cambodgien 1920. Articles 193 and 197 were particularly important for establishing men as the sole breadwinners. Article 193 said that men should provide necessary support to their wives and families. Article 197 brought women’s economic or business activities under the control of their husbands. If a woman wanted to run a business or carry out any economic activity she had to obtain the consent of her husband.

A number of Articles (195, 196, 198 and 200) of the Code Civil Cambodgien 1920 affected women’s rights in dealing with public and legal matters. Women’s entitlement or authority in public affairs was brought under the control of their husbands. This was certainly disempowering for women and empowering for men. Article 195 said a woman could sue, or engage in public activities, only with the permission of her husband. Article 200 said that a woman, even a business woman, could not sue any case without authorisation from her husband.

The legal provisions of the Codes Cambodgiens 1898 and Code Civil Cambodgien 1920 promoted patriarchy in Cambodian families. The family structure
and relationships were re-organised within the patriarchal gender order where a man believed that he was the head of the family with a responsibility to provide necessary support to the family. As head of the family, he also held the notion that he was privileged over the family members, particularly the wives. He held command and authority over the family. Article 189 of Code Civil Cambodgien 1920 which made women submissive and obedient to their husbands further exacerbated patriarchy in the family relationships. Thus, the family relationships in the colonial Cambodian society acquired a patriarchal, hierarchical and gendered order.

Within the patriarchal, hierarchal and gendered family relationships, Cambodian men have been organising masculinities within the notion that: (i) they are the head of the family, (ii) they are responsible for providing the main support for the family, and (iii) they hold command and authority over the family members, particularly the wives.

13.1.3 Khmer masculinities in war-time

Cambodia experienced political conflict, increased militarisation and civil war during the regimes of Lon Nol, the DK and PRK, from the early 1970s to early 1990s. Some 600,000 to 700,000 Cambodians died from American bombing between 1969 and 1973 when Cambodia was caught up in the Second Indo-China war. At least another 1.5 million Cambodians died during the DK regime. The installation of the PRK regime by the Vietnamese army and formation of KPRAF armed force brought Khmer masculinities into confrontation and face-to-face war. The KR militias and KPRAF armed forces fought until the early 1990s. All these violent events were gendered: men carried out the killing, and they were also overwhelmingly the victims of the violence.
A total of fourteen men in this study were actively involved in the KR militias (four) and KPRAF armed force (nine). They organised masculinities with both fear and courage during war. They often fought against their opponents face-to-face and many of them sustained serious injuries and witnessed casualties among their comrades.

The entry and exit of the former militias and paramilitary from the militancy were responsive to the socio-political expectation of maleness configured in two different situations: first at the time when each new regime emerged with a specific political rhetoric and later in the post-war era when the recovery was moving forward. Class politics of the KR regime, which were powerfully conceptualised in ‘Khmer Sor’ (‘Class Enemy’), effectively influenced young peasants to join the revolution for a peasant society. In the same way, men who joined the KPRAF paramilitary force were influenced by the discourse that men should stand and salvage the country from the KR.

The ending of the war and cessation of hostilities by the former KR militias and KPRAF members also created a timely response within a new notion of ‘maleness’ in post-war Cambodia. The new notion of maleness developed a social rhetoric that emphasised a man’s role in family prosperity, the accumulation of wealth and education for children. In this post-conflict time, they constructed peaceful and responsive masculinities with a focus on the family, as shown in the life histories of the former militias and armed men discussed in Chapter 12. Unlike former militias in other contexts, none of the former militias in Cambodia took a violent path in the post-war period. Rather, they made the best use of their ability to resemble, at least partially, the hegemonic masculinity appropriate to the time.
13.1.4 Khmer masculinities in contemporary time

The contemporary Cambodian society is characterised by political stability, steadily increasing social development, the country’s increasing connection to global society (globalisation), and a changing labour market (in particular, feminisation of labour and the growth of the business sector). We see a dynamic shift of Khmer masculinities in the changing socio-economic situation in contemporary times.

The life histories of the Cambodian men in the four groups discussed in Chapters 6-9 show that the construction of masculinities by Cambodian men across different occupations is diverse and shifting. A man’s construction of a specific pattern of masculinity adapts to the changing socio-economic context. Despite divergence and change, the patriarchal gender order erected during French colonial rule remains central to the construction of Khmer masculinities half a century later. The notion of men as the head of the family is the default construction of masculinities in relation to families by contemporary Cambodian men. Yet the gender role of providing the main support to the family, another element of the patriarchal gender order erected during the colonial rule, is flexible.

Plurality of contemporary Khmer masculinities

Khmer masculinities in contemporary society show several patterns, particularly across different occupations. Most of the men in this study constructed their early masculinities in a peasant setting – characterised by working on the family farm at young age for subsistence. Some were involved in proxy fathering, and brought up families of the joint breadwinner model. They have reconfigured their contemporary masculinities in accordance with their current social classes – managers, urban workers or peasants. It seems that their current occupations,
especially the gender order in the workplace, and how the work is done, significantly affect the way men configure their contemporary masculinities.

The mid-career public sector managers who work in a bureaucratic system with a rigid hierarchy, where a manager’s performance is measured by senior management based on periodic reporting, commonly spend the bulk of their time on reporting, meetings, and paper work. As one’s performance does not really affect one’s promotion, personal relations with the manager are really important for the subordinates. The same considerations also affect the relationships between the managers and their senior management in the Ministry. Patronage of a senior member of staff in the Ministry is very important in achieving a promotion for a manager. Therefore, the managers generally are submissive to the senior staff in the Ministry in both official and personal relationships. Sopheak, a medical doctor, is the exception; he maintains a straight-forward relationship with his senior officials, and was unsuccessful in gaining promotion.

Unlike their hierarchal managerial masculine practices in the occupations, most of the public sector managers generally maintain some sort of complicity in their family relationships by allowing and supporting their wives’ outside paid work, and letting their wives make decisions in family issues. Though they consider themselves the head of the family – a kind of default perception - the managers do negotiate with their working wives on everyday family matters. Public sector managers’ complicity with their wives in family relationships is mediated by their awareness on gender issues gained from gender equality practice in workplaces, and recognition of their wives’ contribution to family’s economy.

Unlike public sector managers, the private sector managers, who work in a fishbowl with an exact target to achieve, spend most of their time with their
subordinates in what they typically describe as ‘mentoring’ or ‘coaching’ them to make them ‘better managers’. Using this management jargon, the private sector managers apparently identify themselves as people-oriented. But their supervision of subordinates to teach them better management skills does not take place in a vacuum of power and authority. The power is made apparent to the subordinates as the managers appear to them as problem solvers. The public sector managers exercise power through a standard bureaucratic system, whereas the private sector managers actualise power by solving the problems of their subordinates.

The construction of managerial masculinities by business entrepreneurs like Bunthi and Sophea is significantly different from public and private sector managers. Bunthi’s management practices do not so much involve supervision of personnel. As his business involves local entrepreneurs and foreigners, he spends the bulk of his time for business networking with local entrepreneurs in the provinces, and foreign delegates in Phnom Penh. His work involves many field trips.

Sophea, the owner of a local real estate company, is hostile to his employees to ensure that they do not cheat on the commissions from buyers and sellers of property – the source of his company’s income. The approaches such as ‘mentoring’ or ‘coaching’ are ineffective in managing his employees. He uses a totally different approach – a quasi-religious procedure, in which his employees take an oath every morning in front of Buddha’s statue, swearing that they will not take any commission for their own benefit from the clients.

The private sector manager Liang, and business entrepreneurs Bunthi and Sophea, maintain their family relationships with patriarchal power and authority, similar to the power relationships in their occupations. As their jobs require very long working hours, these managers withdrew their wives from paid work to be full-time
housewives. Unlike public sector managers, the private sector manager and business entrepreneurs reconstructed patriarchy in the family by maximising their power and authority in the family, not maximising income. They maintain their power and authority over the family at some cost to their hard work in their occupations.

Other private sector managers, particularly Chhrem and Prom, maintain family relationships more like those of the public sector managers. They allow and support their wives’ outside paid work. Chhrem’s complicity and support for his wife in the family are mainly drawn on his self-awareness of gender equality. This was first raised through his first job and the gender equality practices in his current workplace. Prom’s complicity to his wife is implicated by the changing labour market where he finds his competency less marketable.

The peasants’ resources are land, labour and natural resources (rainwater, forest resources, fisheries, etc.). Farming in Cambodia is mainly marginal, subsistence, manual and seasonal (in the rainy season). All family members, including children, participate in farming activities. Gender practices over two eras of the country’s history affect peasant masculinities in Cambodia. One is the matrilocal marriage of the pre-colonial era. The other is the concept of men as family providers, a gendered practice installed by the French colonial administration.

Almost all peasants in this study followed matrilocal marriage. They began their working life on their wives’ land. The peasant usually learns farming skills from their parents at a young age. Many of the peasants in this study learned this skill from their mothers. Given the matrilocal basis, women have an important role in the construction of peasant masculinities. Matrilocal practice, the use of the wife’s land to begin a peasant’s working life, and women’s participation in the farm labour force,
gave women a substantial stake in the practices of peasant masculinities. Even the Khmer term Kasikon (farmers) generally means both men and women.

Peasant masculinities are organised around providing for their families. So, land and natural resources are very important in organising peasant masculinities. Loss of land as we see in the case of Chantu, or low rainfall as we see in the case of Vuthy, can make life precarious for the peasants, particularly for those who lack any formal skill to switch to another sector. The peasants generally exploit natural resources such as fish, firewood, snails, mushrooms and rattans from the forest in the off-season. In recent times, we see a new practice with the growth of the urban sector – temporary migration to a city by peasants to earn extra income during the off-rice farm season. Thus a substantial number of peasants nowadays assimilate temporary urban working life in peasant masculinities.

Peasants' relationships to their wives are reciprocal. The wives of peasants enjoy more freedom in intra-family gender relations compared to the wives of men from other sectors. Matrilocal marriage, involving peasant masculinities with a wife’s land, and women’s significant participation in the family’s labour force, give the wives of peasants more freedom in intra-family gender relations. The case of Syheap, who withdrew his wife from her business, is unusual. Syheap, who is an educated and skilled farmer, constructs a quasi-business masculinity.

The construction of masculinities by the former perpetrators of DV is the same as that of other peasants, as they come from a peasant background. We do, however, see shifting patterns of masculinity in intra-family relationships in the course of their lives. The former perpetrators of DV constructed masculinities in the pre-violent period in the same way as a peasant does. During the violent period, they maintained control of their families through terror and only playing a minimal familial role. They
organised their lives around excessive drinking, peer affairs and personal leisure. But in the post-transformation period, they have reconfigured their masculinities by enhancing their economic role for the family and minimising the expenses and time spent on personal pleasure. In the post-transformation period, they maintain their families with peace and prosperity, but not necessarily in a non-patriarchal manner.

The urban workers who originally come from a peasant background organise masculinities around a specific pattern of gender role expectation. Under the gender role, they are expected to earn an income, the same as men who are better-off and have improved their family’s economic status. This expectation is generally conveyed by family members and social rhetoric. Many of the urban workers, particularly those from the older age group, successfully achieve this gender role expectation.

Urban masculinities are organised around hard work and long working hours in various informal and formal sectors. Most of them are unskilled to semi-skilled and build partnerships with their wives in the economic development of the family. Their wives, whether they live together with their husbands in Phnom Penh, or live alone in the rural provinces, contribute to the family’s economy by doing outside paid work or subsistence family farming.

By moving to the city, urban workers attempt to achieve their gender role expectations but they also suffer problems with their spousal relationships as a result of their migration to the city. Adaptation to an urban working environment and becoming accustomed to the popular urban male culture are central to many troubled marital relationships.

13.2 Men and domestic violence: Reflection on theoretical debates

All the former perpetrators of DV in this study perpetrated violence against their wives within the notion that men are the heads of their families, and should have
more power over the family. Men's such notions attribute patriarchy. At this point, the research findings agree with the arguments of Pizzey (1979), Dobash and Dobash (1992), Bettman (2009) and Harcourt (2009) who see patriarchy as the context for men's violence against their intimate partners, and Walker et al. (2008) who link men's violence against their partners to the ways men construct gender norms on roles and relationships. The study also partially agrees with Heise (1998), Jewkes (2002) and Walker et al. (2008) who suggest that delinquent peer relationship and alcoholism can cause men's violence.

But the critical look to the onset of violence by these former perpetrators suggests that though patriarchy serves as the background. Similarly, delinquent peer relations and alcoholism exacerbate violence, not serve as the primary factors of violence. Violence against their wives by the former perpetrators of DV takes place within the dynamics of gender role for the family. Men's violence against their wives occurs within the issue of men's role of providing the main support to the family – a specific pattern of gender practice installed by the French colony, which has become part of masculinity by the Cambodian men. As discussed in Chapter 4, the civil codes also placed Cambodian men as the functional head of the family by giving them absolute power over the family. Men's notion of patriarchy which serves as the background of their violence against their wives is constructed within the logic of men's role of providing the main support for the family. Cambodian men are expected, both by men and women to organise them as the main provider for the family. Men's life experience, either serving as proxy fathers at a young age, or participating in the family's labour force from childhood, or seeing their fathers as the role model, all reinforce the logic. As long as they can perform the gender role of providing the family well, it is less likely that their patriarchal notion turns to
violence. In other way, we can argue that men's patriarchal notion turns to violence when they fail to perform their gender role well. At this point, men’s violence against their wives has connection to their construction of masculinity. In this consideration, the research findings support the structural theorists (Messerschmidt, 1993; West and Fenstermaker, 1995; Segal, 2007; Connell, 2005 and 2009) who see men's violence is a way to construct masculinity in the context of overall gender hierarchies in the society.

We see a paradigm shift in the way the former perpetrators of DV maintain patriarchy in the family in post-transformation period. They enhance their role of providing for the family by multiplying their income. They maintain family with peace and harmony. The post-transformation construction of masculinity by the former perpetrators of DV further supports the integrated structural theories that men’s violence mainly takes place within their social construction of masculinity.

The organisation of peaceful family life by the former perpetrators of DV in post-transformation era also nullifies Pizzey’s concept of ‘violence goes on from generation to generation.’ The life histories of the former perpetrators of DV suggest that a certain practice such as violence is not imprinted. Rather it is situational and can be changed.

The onset of men’s violence against their wives also suggests that the violence does not take place in a vacuum and without counter-action and reaction. An active process is involved in the construction of men’s violence where wives are involved. The action and reaction are associated with gender specific roles by men and women. Interestingly, all the former perpetrators of DV in this study hold the notion that their wives were also responsible for the instigation of violence though they openly recognise themselves as the perpetrators. They even said that their transformation
partially resulted because of the changing behaviour of their wives. It is noteworthy that the anti-VAW programme they participated in included their wives in the programme activities.

Such notions of the former perpetrators of DV are, however, affected by the complexity of gender division of labour – where women are responsible for making the family and men are responsible for providing for the family. Within their given responsibility which is socially driven the wives of the former perpetrators needed their husbands to work harder in order to meet the needs of the family.

In a nutshell, it can be argued that though patriarchy, power relations and gender role for the family are all involved in DV, gender specific roles for men and women within the family are the trigger for men’s violence against their wives.

13.3 Recommendations for anti-DV programmes

Anti-DV programmes can be preventive and protective. The preventive programmes should be designed for the long-term as they are intended to transform men’s gender norms – which have been constructed historically over a long period of time. On the other hand, the protective programme should focus more on legal aspects that give protection to the potential victims of violence. The following recommendations, which arise from the broad investigation of Cambodian masculinities in this thesis, have policy and programme implications. These recommendations are not based on formal evaluation of any programme on domestic violence.

13.3.1 Recommendations for DV prevention programmes

(i) DV prevention programmes should include men and boys as the primary target groups in programme activities. The programme should first and foremost sensitise gender equality issues as the attitude of DV is constructed within
gender inequality practices. The DV prevention programme should educate men and boys towards just and egalitarian roles and relationships in the family.

(ii) Men should be educated about the dynamics of conjugal life and daily living. They need greater awareness and education that their power over the family can come under scrutiny and can be ignored when their wives are burdened with both productive and reproductive jobs, or when the income loss in the family is sudden despite their efforts to support the family through added economic production.

(iii) DV prevention programmes need to take account of the historically-produced gender dynamics of DV in Cambodia. It is less likely that these programmes will work unless the target groups (men and women) understand and are knowledgeable about the historical perspectives of gender role and relationships in the family.

(iv) Men need preparedness about the changes in gender role and relationships in the family. As we see in the case of Vuthy, when men’s wives achieve paid work in the changing labour market, which is non-traditional for them, men should be ready to accept the new work environment without reservation. They should be informed about the culture, practice and gender regime of their wives’ work. Existing programmes on gender and/or DV should take this issue into account.

(v) As we see in the life histories of former militants and paramilitary men, they have constructed peaceful and responsive masculinities in post-conflict period. Their transformation largely took place within the social rhetoric of ‘Successful Men’. A similar discourse on men that promotes non-violent and
gender-responsive men as the ideal social model can be useful to educate men in general towards acceptance of non-violence against women. Mass media, the education system and government and non-government agencies can be used to create the necessary social discourse.

(vi) We see most men, particularly those in the younger age group, are very much focused on their children. Many men, despite their problematic relations with their wives, are still very concerned for their children. A social discourse on fatherhood can be promoted that focuses on the importance of non-violent family relationships for the development and wellbeing of children. By following the new culture of fatherhood, men will maintain a non-violent family relationship. Again, the media and government and other agencies can play important roles in promoting the discourse of fatherhood.

13.3.2 Recommendations for protection programmes

(i) As was found in all the cases of former perpetrators of DV, the enforcement of the anti-DV law, particularly through community-based action, has significantly helped the perpetrators to cease their violence. Similar programmes that engage men and women in programme activities can be replicated and expanded in new areas.

(ii) As found among a majority of the former perpetrators of DV and some farmers such as Chantu and Vuthy, men’s violence resulted from their shrinking economic role in the family. It seems that these men would be less likely to perpetrate violence against the family if they could support their family consistently. Chantu, a farmer, said that his family is currently going through a quasi-violent situation. He is antagonistic to violence and protected his mother from his father’s perennial violence. The quasi-violence that
Chantu is currently experiencing is mainly because he cannot feed his family as he did in the past as his land has been acquired for a large industrial project. Any development project that takes place at the cost of people’s livelihood should guarantee an income safeguard for the affected families. In cases like this, as the company wants to produce the crop to maximise profit, a policy could be adopted under which the farmers could grow crops and supply the factory instead of having their land forcibly acquired. Policies like this could improve the economic condition of farmers like Chantu, and would not create any family conflict.

(iii) Phyrum, the public sector manager who has field-level work experience on the issues of gender and violence, suggested that provision of agricultural education and information for farmers would address the problem of DV. He links men’s violence to their gender role of providing the main family income. Men are more likely to fall back on DV when their support for the family is not enough or is not need-based. Phyrum’s experience also matches with the life histories of the former perpetrators of DV in this study. The DV or VAW issues should, therefore, be integrated in the overall social development programmes of the Royal Government of Cambodia or other agencies. The social development programmes that address poverty should take gender role into account.
REFERENCES


Brickell, K. (2011). 'We don’t forget the old rice pot when we get the new one': Discourses on ideals and practices of women in contemporary Cambodia. *Signs*, 36(2), 437-462.


PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT

Research Project

Title: Men, Masculinity and Domestic Violence in a Developing Society: Exploring Khmer Masculinities.

(1) What is the study about? តើអ្នកស្វែងរកអ្វើឬអ្វឺ?  
The study aims to explore the link between masculinities and men's violence in domestic sphere in changing social, political and economic context.

(2) Who is carrying out the study? អ្នកដែលធ្វើការស្វែងរកអ្វើឬអ្វឺ?  
The study is being conducted by Md. Mozammel Haque, PhD Candidate, and will form the basis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Sydney under the supervision of Raewyn Connell, Professor.
(3) What does the study involve? هل تتعلق هذه الدراسة بشيء معين؟
The study will follow in-depth interviews of individual men of different social, economic and professional backgrounds. The interviews will be carried out in public places such as offices, meeting rooms, cafes and commune council premises. The interviews will be recorded in audio form which will be transcribed and analyzed later.

(4) How much time will the study take? هل تتعلق هذه الدراسة بصورة محددة؟
Each interview will take an hour on average.

(5) Can I withdraw from the study? هل يمكنني الانسحاب من الدراسة؟
Being in this study is completely voluntary - you are not under any obligation to consent and - if you do consent - you can withdraw at any time without affecting your relationship with the University of Sydney.

(6) Will anyone else know the results? هل سأكون مقرراً للنتائج؟
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers will have access to information on participants. A report of the study will be submitted for publication, but anonymity of individual participants will be maintained in the report.

(7) Will the study benefit me? هل سأكون مزوداً لنتائج الدراسة؟
The study will benefit Cambodian people as a whole in terms of helping to address the issue of domestic violence. The study results will be disseminated among government and non-government agencies at the end. This will enable the line agencies to design more appropriate plan, policy and program on domestic violence.
(8) Can I tell other people about the study?

Yes, you can tell other people about the study.

(9) What if I require further information?

When you have read this information, Md. Mozammel Haque will discuss it with you further and answer any questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Md. Mozammel Haque, PhD Candidate, Tel: +61 420332478.

(10) What if I have a complaint or concerns?

Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the Deputy Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on (+61 2) 8627 8176 (Telephone); +61 2) 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or human.ethics@usyd.edu.au (Email).

This information sheet is for you to keep.
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

I, ...............................................................................
[PRINT NAME], give consent to my participation in the research project

TITLE: Men, Masculinities and Domestic Violence in a Developing Society: Exploring Khmer Masculinities

In giving my consent I acknowledge that:

1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction.

2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the researcher/s.
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the future.

4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity.

5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any obligation to consent.

6. I understand that I can stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, the audio recording will be erased and the information provided will not be included in the study.

7. I consent to:

   i) Audio-taping YES □ NO □

   [Signature]

    Signed: ...........................................................................................................