Global Thought, Local Action

Australian Activism during the Vietnam War 1961-1972

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Abstract

This thesis is a history of protest practice in Australia during the ‘long 1960s’. It begins with the coordinated protests against nuclear proliferation in the eastern states in 1961 and 1962, and ends with the Vietnam Moratorium Campaigns. It examines the intersections between anti-war and anti-conscription protest, the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s, and the anti-Apartheid protests that emerged during the 1971 South African rugby team tour of Australia.

Rather than offering a history of Australian activism as an organisational network or monolithic, homogenous ‘movement,’ it treats protest as an exercise in political meaning-making, and traces the development of protest practice over time. This focus contests the characterisation of the arrival of the New Left in Australia after 1966 as a watershed or moment of rupture, and draws out long-term continuities in Australian activism. It also provides for an analysis of the transnational influences on Australian protesters without falling into the contemporary trap of labelling protest derivative.

This methodological approach reveals that Australian protesters in the Vietnam epoch shifted between two major ideological explanations for their protest. One framed protest as a representative activity on behalf of an imagined Australian public, on behalf of whom protesters critiqued government policy and held the government to account. Protest organisations attempted to position themselves as representatives of the public, and used public opinion to legitimate their ideas. By contrast, liberalism’s concentration on individual sovereign rights especially nourished anti-conscription activists, whose protests made much of the principle of non-interference in the private lives of citizens as a foundational model of citizenship.

This thesis will chart the development and evolution of these two explanations of protest, their interactions and fusions. Through their careful articulation of protest as a democratic process and an individual right, and their sustained presence in public conversations about commitment and conscription, Australian protesters helped to change the meaning of the Vietnam War in Australian public political life.
Author Attribution Statement & Declaration of Originality

Material from Chapters 4 and 5 was published in Nick Irving, “‘Couldn’t we actually try and do this in Australia?’: Reading the Vietnam Moratorium in its Global Context,” in Phillip Deery and Julie Kimber, eds., Fighting Against War: Peace Activism in the Twentieth Century (Melbourne: Leftbank Press, 2015): 268-290.


I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

Nick Irving, December 13, 2016

As supervisor for the candidature upon which this thesis is based, I can confirm that the authorship attribution statements above are correct.

Stephen Garton, December 13, 2016
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A ten-year PhD incurs a lot of debts.

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layabout flatmate snoozing on the couch after a few hours’ gruelling writing. Through all of it she’s been a calming, encouraging, and rock-steady presence, ever-ready with a kind word and an excuse to celebrate small wins.

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I should perhaps conclude by thanking my grandfather, Robert Irving, who inspired me to begin this intellectual journey in the first place. Dodo, this is for you.
### Glossary of Acronyms

*Where acronyms are not in common usage a brief description has been provided.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACND</td>
<td>Australian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Notional peak body made up of state CND groups. Met only once in late 1963.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTU</td>
<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AICD</td>
<td>Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament. The major NSW peace organisation between 1964 and the early 1980s. Originally the organising committee for the 1964 Sydney Peace Congress, this group superseded the NSW Peace Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZCICD</td>
<td>Australia and New Zealand Congress for International Cooperation and Disarmament. Used to refer both to the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress and to the organising committee, which became the CICD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCND</td>
<td>Brisbane Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDNSA</td>
<td>Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act. A committee formed to protest conscription by the AICD in NSW in mid-1969. Also used to refer to a similar committee in Victoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICD</td>
<td>Congress for International Cooperation and Disarmament. Usually used to refer to the Victorian state peace committee that succeeded the VPC after 1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Refers specifically to the British anti-nuclear protest organisation in operation from the mid-1950s onwards. All other CND groups are identified by an additional letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Communist Party of Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRU</td>
<td>Draft Resisters’ Union. Could refer to any of the state organisations of draft resisters operating between 1969 and 1972.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPO</td>
<td>General Post Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCC</td>
<td>Hiroshima Commemoration Committee. A committee formed by AICD in NSW in 1961 to organise the Easter and Hiroshima Day marches in Sydney.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Coordinating Committee. A liaison committee for the various state Vietnam Moratorium organising committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td>The South Vietnamese National Liberation Front. Also known as the ‘Viet Cong’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSWPCICD</td>
<td>New South Wales Peace Committee for International Cooperation and Disarmament. The name of the NSW Peace Council from 1959 until it was replaced by the AICD in 1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVC</td>
<td>Project Vietnam Committee. A committee formed by AICD in NSW in 1966 to organise protests against the war. Took over the work of the HCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPC</td>
<td>Queensland Peace Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPCICD</td>
<td>Queensland Peace Committee for International Cooperation and Disarmament. Alternative name for the QPC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMIT</td>
<td>Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANE</td>
<td>Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. American anti-nuclear organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCND</td>
<td>Sydney Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society. Could refer to the American student organisation formed in Berkeley in 1960, or to Australian student organisations sharing its name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asian Treaty Organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td><em>Sydney Morning Herald.</em></td>
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</tbody>
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UAW  Union of Australian Women.

UNSW  The University of New South Wales.


VCND  Victorian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

VDC  Vietnam Day Committee. Could refer to the committee responsible for the first ‘Teach-in’ at UC Berkeley in 1965, or to the Australian group in Melbourne that operated in late 1965.

VMC  Vietnam Moratorium Committee. Refers to one of the state committees that organised Moratorium protests in 1970 and 1971. The peak body was the NCC.

WACND  Western Australian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

WILPF  Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

YAC  Youth Against Conscription. An anti-conscription organisation formed in Queensland in late 1965. Equivalent to YCAC.

YCAC  Youth Campaign Against Conscription. Australian anti-conscription organisation formed in NSW and Victoria in late 1965.
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Introduction

This thesis is a history of protest practice in Australia from 1961, when the first major coordinated protests against nuclear proliferation took place in the eastern states, until 1972, when the Vietnam Moratorium Campaigns came to an end. Though protest against involvement in the Vietnam War and conscription dominates the period, I also examine the intersections between these campaigns, the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s, and the anti-Apartheid protests that emerged during the 1971 South African rugby team tour of Australia. Treating protest as an exercise in political meaning-making, this thesis interprets activism in Australia in the 1960s as an effort to contest the prevailing discourses of Australian citizenship and of international relations and Australia’s place within them. This is not a comprehensive survey, as the range and diversity of protest organisations and campaigns is too vast. Rather it is an exploration of how protest is inextricably linked to broader public political culture. As a point of departure it challenges key discursive elements of this culture, namely the easy rhetorical coherence of ‘movements’ and the ontological link between publics and their governments. Through this lens this thesis offers a substantial interpretation of Australian protest in the 1960s as a critical intervention by Australians into Australian public political life.

The literature on the Vietnam War in Australia thus far lacks a synoptic history of protest during this epoch. The existing literature can be divided into two broad categories: survey histories of the Vietnam War, and work on activism specifically. The former category consists of a small number of academic books and a growing number of popular histories, which include protest as a colourful episode in a broader history of the home front during the war. These histories generally, and often usefully, situate anti-war and anti-conscription protest in the larger context of the Vietnam War itself, Australian-American relations, and Australian electoral politics. In one of the more analytical and insightful studies, John Murphy’s Harvest of Fear, the focus is on relationship between the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), and the broad coalition of protest organisations arrayed against involvement in the War and conscription. Murphy places the war and protest against it in the context of the unfolding Cold War, arguing that Vietnam War and protest against it formed part of the collapse of the anti-communist logic of containment so prevalent in the 1950s and the realignment of left
wing politics around the ideologies of the ‘New Left’. Peter Edwards’ volume of the Official History takes a similar if more conventional approach, arguing that protest organisations took place in a broader social debate alongside political parties, universities and trade unions, that slowly resolved against commitment and conscription. In the context of the reinvigoration of ANZAC in the public political culture of Australia in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Paul Ham and Michael Caulfield have focused more closely on the experience of Vietnam Veterans in their public histories of the war and its effects in Australia. Caulfield is dismissive of protest as misguided youthful passion, while Ham spends considerable time discussing the ways protesters mistreated veterans. Both books devote considerably less space to protest than to the experiences of soldiers and veterans.

When protest, rather than Vietnam, is the central subject of historical inquiry, the scope is often narrow and limited to either anti-war or anti-conscription protest, and most commonly to protest after 1967. It is mostly written by ex-protesters, and much of it is autobiography, interview collections, and memoir. In his recent book, like many ex-protesters, Clive Hamilton characterises the 1960s and 70s as a moment when a “powerful wave of dissent” broke over Australia, credits the New Left with transforming both conservative and old left thought, and frames the Moratorium as a moment where the “tide had turned”. He explicitly describes his work as a “story” rather than a “history”. Tacitly recognising the complex politics of memory, he describes the act of remembering as a “wistful return” to a moment where “protests defined us”. Curthoys has more explicitly questioned the difficulties of using the historian’s voice when writing about her own past, and the ethics of using her professional authority to cement her own sometimes distorted recollections as fact. As she points out, Curthoys is only one of several ex-

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participants who have produced scholarly accounts of protest events they took part in or helped organise, including Verity Burgmann, Ralph Summy and Malcolm Saunders, and Barry York.  

The prevalence of participants shapes this body of work in three distinct ways. First, it tends to make protest before 1966 invisible, privileging the role of radical students in Australian protest in the period. This is unsurprising given the experience of many of those academics in radical student organisations in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, it tends to represent 1966 as a generational watershed between the ‘dour decade’ of the 1950s and the vibrant and radical late 1960s. Finally, there is a lingering question in much of this work over whether Australian protest in the 1960s was a genuine expression of Australian political interests and desires, or whether it was simple mimicry of American, and to a lesser extent European, protest.

In addition to the academic ex-participant histories listed above, several ex-student radicals have also published popular histories, while researchers and participants have produced a

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significant body of oral testimony and memoir. This work tends to concentrate on what Curthoys calls the “later stages of protest,” that is, protest against the War and conscription after 1967. Curthoys, Summy and Saunders have produced work on protest before 1967, but with the notable exception of Summy’s 1971 Masters thesis, this has formed part of longer works that still privilege the period after 1967. Summy’s work is focused on the end of the 1950s, the emergence of a new peace movement and the red-baiting that attended the Australian Peace Council and its state bodies. One consequence of this historiographical focus is the near disappearance from the literature of Australian anti-nuclear activism in 1961 and 1962. Because of this absence, and because of its critical importance in the evolution of Australian protest in this period, it is a key element in the argument of this thesis. Australian anti-nuclear groups in the 1960s are mentioned in passing in few texts but there is as yet no specific history of 1960s Australian anti-nuclear protest, despite a considerable literature on the British organisation. Nonetheless, Australians put on protests in solidarity with and even named their organisations after British precedents, notably the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), and some of the key players in these Australian anti-nuclear protest movements became prominent in the anti-war movements.


8 Curthoys, “Mobilising Dissent”.


Because of the focus on protest after 1967, the literature credits students as the source and prime mover of the radicalisation that characterised this period. Radical students dominate this literature. York claims that “[t]he social base of the movement was generally to be found in student and academic circles, and was certainly middle-class,” and implies that ‘youth’ and ‘student’ were interchangeable terms. He argues that this was visible to contemporaries: “The youth cultural aspect is really central to any understanding of the anti-Vietnam war movement, and the more perceptive campaigners at the time realised it.”12 The scholarly attention paid to radical students is disproportionate to their numbers, especially to that tiny minority who claimed that violence had a legitimate political purpose - among them campus ‘celebrities’ like Albert Langer or Michael Hyde at Monash, or Brian Laver at the University of Queensland.

The role of the 1966 election as a generational watershed is also central to this literature because of the role of student activists in its production. In this interpretation, the defeat of the ALP at the polls in November 1966 shocked anti-war activists and drove many to iconoclastic, confrontational and eventually violent forms of protest. York argues that Labor’s defeat in 1966 “fueled the development of a militant, extra-parliamentary trend within the student movement in Melbourne”.13 Marks places the ALP’s election defeat alongside Vietnam and conscription in a “triumvirate” of radicalising factors that spurred the development of a local Australian radical student ‘New Left’.14 These scholars, often participants themselves, echo contemporary concerns. The Monash University newspaper Lot’s Wife argued that “No matter whose interpretation one accepts of the election result, it was a shocking defeat for those who oppose the Australian and American commitments in Vietnam,” noting that the election had been the “last hope” for anti-war campaigners and the loss produced a feeling of “utter helplessness”.15 In 1968, Humphrey McQueen felt that “[i]n 1966 the young left looked forward to a Labor victory. It worked incredibly hard... The defeat that followed either shocked them into apathy or slowly gave rise to undirected militancy”.16 Michael Hyde, a member of the Monash Labor Club and

15 Curthoys, “Mobilising Dissent,” 147.
16 York, “Police, Students and Dissent,” 59.
draft resister, recalled in 1992 that “[a]fter Labor’s disillusioning defeat a strong feeling emerged that, given the failure of the electoral system to remove conscription, we should resort to civil disobedience to defeat it”. Another Melbourne participant, Mick Armstrong, argues that “Labor’s shattering defeat in 1966 ... shocked activists and proved a turning point for the anti-war campaign”. This helplessness became the justification for more radical forms of protest amongst students. Students who were active in confrontational anti-war protests after 1966 described the election as a moment of rupture that impelled them to more radical and disobedient acts. Many of the subsequent historical accounts have seen this confrontational phase as the height of the protest movement, ignoring or, in some instances, dismissing earlier, more peaceful campaigns aimed at mobilising a somnambulant or passive electorate. In fact, there was a longer tradition of more liberal, peaceful opposition to war both before and after 1966 that is generally overlooked in the historiography of protest in this period.

The near absence of detail about protest in the early 1960s is exacerbated by the concentration on the anti-communist consensus of the 1940s and 1950s as the frame for peace activism. At the height of the Cold War peace activists were characterised as duplicitous communist agents or naïve dupes, helping an international communist conspiracy to secure victory in the larger global struggle by fomenting unrest at home. For this reason, the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress, at which new continuing committees replaced the old state Peace Councils, is the subject of some debate about the continued influence of the CPA and the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council on Australian peace activists. Thus the long 1960s in Australia is often presented as a decisive shift from Old Left to New Left, with 1966 acting as a moment of rupture. This characterisation obscures the period between 1959-1966 almost completely, though some efforts have been made recently to address this. Murphy argues that while the public continued to associate the peace movement with the apparently monolithic threat of Soviet Communism, the early 1960s saw a “subterranean realignment of political forces” that “diluted the ponderous influence of the CPA”

18 Armstrong, 1,2,3, What are we Fighting For?, 59.
and “began to fracture the peace movement’s alignment with Cold War divisions”. Although Murphy and Curthoys among others have offered a more complicated explanation of protest in the early part of the decade, the dominant narrative about the protest movements of the 1960s is one of a quiescent peace movement and a rising New Left.

Because both the Cold War consensus and the youth rebellions of the late 1960s were transnational phenomena, there has also been some debate about the national authenticity of Australian protest in this period. Two members of the Australian New Left in 1970 decried “the failure to develop any coherent and specifically Australian understanding of society and social change”. In this interpretation, the Australian New Left was defined by its incapacity to break away from the American model: in their “lack of any intellectual tradition that has not been imported from Europe or the USA … the radicals of the sixties are yet another reproduction of the historical nature of the Australian intelligentsia, rather than a real point of departure”.23 While sketching out ground for a comparative history of the Australian and American movements in 1992, Curthoys noted Gerard Henderson’s 1969 criticism that the Australian anti-war movement was “purely derivative, nothing but an imitation of the American movement, somehow not an indigenous Australian political movement, but something imported from outside.”24 York notes contemporary concern with “the derivative nature of much of the protest activity in Australia”, and characterises this attitude as an activist “cultural cringe”.25

The question of the extent to which protest arose from Australian contexts or was merely imitative has persisted in the historiography. Russell Marks, for example, argues that “most groups [of the New Left] were more or less derivative, mainly of American initiatives,” although he concedes that it was always “local and immediate” factors that catalysed radicalisation.26 His more recent work is less preoccupied with this question, though it retains its focus on the relationship between expressions of radicalism and expressions of nationalism.27 Gerster and

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21 Murphy, *Harvest of Fear*, 121.
26 Marks, “Towards an Intellectual History,” 92.
Bassett deny any “indigenous revolutionary tradition” at all, and argue that Australian activists “failed to develop styles of protest appropriate to local social conditions” in a faddish age where “America became the greatest fashion of all.” Other historians engaging with this question have turned to transnational history. Curthoys gestured towards the need for a transnational analysis of Australian protest as early as 1992, and more recent work by Sean Scalmer has analysed the spread of the “political gimmick” through transnational networks of activists, their critical translation and adoption by Australians, and their incorporation into a local Australian protest “repertoire”. Tanya Luckins has argued that in the 1960s, Australians demonstrated a cosmopolitan awareness of international events, and used cosmopolitanism as “a conceptual tool to enhance people’s awareness of their everyday lives and how they might let the world into Australia.” More recently, Jon Piccini has traced the movements of people across national borders – Australians abroad and foreign activists in Australia – and analysed the ideas that they brought with them, as well as the ways those ideas were shaped by the Australian political context at the time. In this interpretation, Australian protesters were responding to both an ephemeral sense of global rebellion as well as local factors, with the two sets of stimuli so closely entangled as to be inseparable.

This thesis attempts to engage with and contest these three major traditions in the Australian historiography on protest in the 1960s; recovering the history of protest before 1966, exploring the multiple strands of protest after 1966 to place radical activism in a wider context, and finally providing a more complex account of the transnational and local factors that shaped Australian protest. In doing so I have taken seriously Summy and Saunders’ contention that pacifist or anti-war activism has been a continuous presence in Australian political life since at least the turn of the 20th century. This thesis aims to complicate the ‘watershed’ narrative, and detail a small part of the process of “subterranean realignment” that Murphy has charted. In doing so this thesis

attempts to re-frame the activism of the early 1960s not as failed campaigns but as part of a continuum of Australian activism that bequeathed to later activists ideas and practices that informed the Draft Resistance and Moratorium campaigns after 1969. A focus on practice also side-steps the question of protest as either derivative or genuine. Following Scalmer, this thesis looks at the transmission of activist practice across national boundaries as a process of “translation,” whereby activists critically experiment with practices observed in use elsewhere in the world, and adapt them to their local political context. Successful translations are then widely adopted, while ideas, vocabulary or practices that cannot be translated are discarded.33 This thesis, then, places activist practice in Australia in the long 1960s in a transnational framework to better understand the distinctiveness and character of Australian protest movements in this period. In doing so this thesis seeks to understand the political activism of the 1960s not as a singular teleology towards New Left radicalism but as a broad and complex assemblage of ideas and practices that covered a wide spectrum of beliefs.

Protest Practice as Methodology

The methodological focus of this thesis is on protest as a set of practices, a repertoire of actions mobilised against policies and discourses dominant in national political culture. As a point of intervention, this conceptual model of protest is a response to one of the key methodological problems in writing a history of activism - the notion of a ‘movement’. Summy and Saunders note the “vexed definitional question” of who should be included in the category of “peace movement”.34 Marks notes similar problems in determining membership of the Australian New Left.35 Political Scientists and Sociologists confront the same questions. Nick Crossley explains the problems with Social Movement Theory in detail:

Many definitions have been offered in the literature but all are problematic. Some are too broad, such that they include phenomena which we would not wish to call social movements, and yet any attempt to narrow the definition down seems destined to exclude certain movements or at least the range of their forms and activities. In addition, every definition

33 Scalmer, Dissent Events.
35 Marks, “Towards an Intellectual History,” 84.
includes terms which themselves require definition. We would all agree that social movements are ‘collective’ ventures, for example, but what makes a venture count as collective? Is it a matter of numbers? If so, how many? Is it a matter of a type of interconnection between people, an organisation or network? If so, how is that interconnection itself defined? Does ‘wearing the badge’ and ‘buying the T-shirt’ make one part of the movement or must one attend monthly meetings and engage in protest? And if the latter, what counts as protest? Would wearing the aforementioned badge count as a protest or must one stand in a group of three or more people waving a placard? There can be no decisive answers to these questions.36

Dilip Gaonkar summarises the conceptual problem of defining ‘movements’ as “the entrapments of pure particularism” on one hand, and “the lures of transcending universalism” on the other.37

Historians by training prefer particularism to universalism, and have moved away from using essentialist structural categories like groups or networks to investigate social movements. Thus Charles Tilly, writing on pre-Revolutionary France, has coined the term “repertoires” to describe “clump[s] … of claim-making routines”.38 For Tilly, protest is the “product of learned and historically grounded performances” that can only be used “in a given time and place”.39 Sidney Tarrow also argues in favour of contingency, noting that the symbols used by activists must be “culturally resonant”.40 Tarrow also argues that contentious politics is performative: its aim is “creating solidarity among potential movement participants”.41 These culturally contingent performances establish

the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a movement’s structure of conflict and alliance. By drawing on inherited collective identities and shaping new ones, challengers delimit the boundaries of their prospective constituencies and define their enemies by their real or imagined attributes and evils.42

39 Tilly, Contentious Performances, 4.
41 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 143.
42 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 31.
Ernesto Laclau conceptualises contentious politics in a similar fashion, as a ground on which political meaning is brought into being through antagonism. In his model, political actors rhetorically establish an “internal frontier” that produces solidarity with their political arguments on one side, and “radically excludes” alternative political meanings on the other. In this way, contentious politics constitutes categories like “the public” or “the people” by exclusion.\(^\text{43}\) Francesca Polletta characterises contentious politics as acts of storytelling that unsettle rather than reproduce the authority of accepted institutions and meanings, and change over time.\(^\text{44}\) Tilly notes, following Polletta, that investigation of social movements will thus “have to feature change and variation in existing idioms, categories, and practices, including the idioms, categories, and practices of reporting media”.\(^\text{45}\) In these models political protest is a meaning-making exercise, and the meanings it creates are historically and culturally grounded.

This thesis traces changes in activist practice in Australia between 1959 and 1972. By examining the meanings that activists and others made through political protest during this period, it offers a history of Australian activism not as an organisational network or monolithic, homogenous ‘movement’ but as the development and evolution of practice over time. Practice allows for the tracing of continuities across the supposed watershed of 1966. It also explains the apparent rupture of the arrival of the New Left as the product of a transnational circulation of ideas and practices that began as early as 1961. The existing literature’s disproportionate focus on students preserves contemporary understandings of students as the prime movers of radical protest or the harbingers of violence and disorder. Practice as a methodological approach allows that focus to be the subject rather than the outcome of analysis.

**Australian Activism as a Clash Between the Collective and the Individual**

This methodological approach reveals that Australian protesters in the Vietnam epoch shifted between two major ideological explanations for their protest. One framed protest as a representative activity on behalf of an imagined Australian public, on behalf of whom protesters


\(^{45}\) Tilly, *Contentious Performances*, 11.
critiqued government policy and held the government to account. This interpretation of protest understood ‘the public’ and ‘public opinion’ as primordial democratic forces whose power overruled the state, as it was the ultimate source of that delegated power. This notion of protest relied on a Kantian notion of rational-critical debate in which public opinion was formed through public debates between groups of citizens and inevitably arrived at both rational and moral conclusions. It is indicative of the power of this idea in the 1960s that the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas developed this Kantian concept into his influential model of the Public Sphere, published in 1962.\footnote{Jurgen Habermas, \textit{The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010): 102-117.} In this understanding of protest, if activists simply listed or exposed the flaws in a given government policy, rational-critical public opinion would turn on the policy and its repeal would naturally follow.

The second ideological model that influenced Australian protesters was Liberal individualism. According to Adrian Oldfield, Liberal philosophy understands individuals as “sovereign and morally autonomous beings,” whose sovereignty guaranteed their freedom from interference from the state.\footnote{Adrian Oldfield, “Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?”, \textit{Political Quarterly} 61:2 (1990): 178.} The idea of non-interference as a foundational model of citizenship made liberal individualism attractive to anti-conscription protesters. Though these two governing assumptions accorded moral sovereignty to two very different democratic actors – the individual and the public – this apparent conflict did not bother Australian protesters in their attempts to make political meaning out of them. Rather as conditions and contexts changed, protesters shifted ground, drawing on different strands of thought to justify a particular practice or a new strategy of opposition. While protesters drew on continuous traditions of thought they were also opportunistic, pragmatic and above all critical in their efforts to mobilise public opposition to the Vietnam War. This thesis will chart the development and evolution of these two explanations of protest, their interactions and fusions.

Chapter One examines the anti-nuclear campaigns of 1961-1966. It outlines the public representation model of Australian protest, in which anti-war organisations attempted to both shape and report anti-nuclear public opinion to the federal government through the use of public meetings, petitions, and lobbying trips. It also offers the first attempt at a history of these anti-nuclear campaigns. Australian anti-nuclear protest shared much in common with early anti-war
organisations, including some members, and an organisational reliance on the state peace committees. The dialogue between British and Australian organisations also bequeathed Australian anti-war activism access to a global network beyond the compromised World Peace Council, and examples of civil disobedience that would later be translated and developed locally as effective anti-war protest. The impact of Gandhian nonviolence is particularly apparent in the British CND; Scalmer has examined the spread of Gandhian ideas and practice across the West in the 20th century, and similar ideas inflected and informed Australian anti-war protest in the early 1970s. Histories of Australian anti-war protest begin and end with Australian involvement in the Vietnam War. Including Australian anti-nuclear protest from the early 1960s demonstrates that the contentious politics of the 1960s is not only a response to international or electoral politics, but also a sustained effort to reimagine contemporary Australian democratic engagement in relation to international events.

The institution of National Service pre-dated commitment to the Vietnam War by seven months. The Menzies government introduced a peacetime call-up of 20-year-old male citizens in November 1964 as part of an expanded defence policy designed to meet a wide range of assumed Cold War threats in the region. Following the announcement of the Scheme, the legitimacy of the state’s coercion of its citizens to serve in time of war underwent intense scrutiny. The phrase ‘anti-war movement’ is often inclusive of anti-conscription activism, given the National Service Scheme’s entanglement with commitment to Vietnam, however opposition to conscription produced a discrete set of organisations and protest practice. Chapter Two examines activism against the National Service Scheme, focusing on the activism of the two largest and most developed anti-conscription organisations – the Youth Campaign Against Conscription (YCAC), formed out of the Young Labor Organisation in 1964, and the women’s group Save Our Sons (SOS). It focuses on four aspects of activism against conscription: the mobilisation of the memory of the Great War conscription referenda; the difference between YCAC’s liberal assumptions about citizenship and SOS’s assumptions, drawn from a history of Australian women’s activism; the translation of the American practice of draft card burning as a symbolic rejection of the state’s right to conscript its citizens; and the framing of conscientious objection.

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as a liberal assertion of the sovereignty of the individual. This chapter introduces the model of liberal individualism that influenced the development of Australian protest during the Vietnam War.

Chapter Three fleshes out the early years of anti-war protest, with special attention to a number of ad hoc coalitions that formed in Sydney and Melbourne with the express intention of protesting against Australian involvement in the War. It focuses on the visits to Australia by President Johnson of the United States, and Premier Kỳ of South Vietnam. At first the existing peace committees simply modified the practices through which they had opposed nuclear proliferation – the public meeting and lobbying MPs chief among them. These practices were found to be increasingly inadequate by many activists. Many were increasingly influenced by protest at the University of California, Berkeley. The new ad hoc anti-war coalitions translated the ‘teach-in’ in much the same way as early anti-conscription protesters had adopted the draft card burning. Finally, this chapter examines the development of the ‘Noisy Minority’ label that Coalition MPs and unsympathetic journalists developed to discredit protesters after the anti-Johnson and anti-Kỳ protests. Even if 1966 was not a clear generational watershed, it did represent the low ebb of the legitimacy of protest during the Vietnam War.

Where previous chapters deal with the developments in protest practice chronologically, Chapters Four and Five cover the later years of protest in parallel, taking different thematic aspects of protest after 1967 as their subject. Taking Tilly’s notion that the language that media outlets report protest in is as important as that which protesters use to explain their own actions, Chapter Four examines the construction of student protesters in the pages of daily newspapers between 1967 and 1971. In this period students became the harbingers of violence at public protests. Just as anti-nuclear and anti-war protesters had adopted British and American protest practices, translating them to suit the Australian political context, newspapers and MPs began to interpret students’ actions in relation to overseas examples.

This chapter also examines the anti-Springbok campaign of 1971 as it involved many of the same activists and the same confrontational practices as anti-war protest. As student violence became a widely-reported phenomenon, the characterisation of protesters as a ‘noisy minority’ developed into the idea of the ‘hard core’ of student or radical provocateurs, leading well-meaning and peaceful protesters astray. The chapter concludes with an examination of the ‘Law
and Order’ debates during the lead up to the second Moratorium in July and August 1970, during which opponents of protesters began to explain their opposition in terms of the citizen’s right to non-interference.

The final chapter returns to a discussion of protesters’ own explanations of their actions, with an analysis of the development of an Australian repertoire of lawbreaking as protest practice. Between the inception of the campaign against bylaw 418 in Melbourne in early 1969 and the end of the National Service Scheme with the election of Whitlam, Australian protesters began to fuse the liberal individualism of anti-conscription protest before 1967 with collective non-violent lawbreaking. The anti-nuclear protesters of the early 1960s had drawn on the Gandhinfluenced models of protest in use in the UK, but now lawbreaking was reconfigured as a model of participatory democracy, and used to justify large-scale public dissent in the form of the Moratorium Campaigns. During the same period, anti-conscription activists, influenced by the global tide of New Left radicalism and similar developments in the United States, abandoned conscientious objection and began Draft Resistance. Based in the same notion of public lawbreaking as an act of protest, Australian Draft Resistance nevertheless developed quite differently to its American antecedent, with spectacular evasion of punishment rather than collective, public acts of submission to it – as was the American norm - becoming its central tactic. The chapter offers a history of the development of a coherent and widespread philosophy of moral lawbreaking in the Australian context, in stark opposition to the media representation of protest as violent in the preceding chapter.

Rather than examine protest during the Vietnam War as a monolithic movement, this thesis frames it as the interplay between two developing, often contradictory protest repertoires. It charts a shared but evolving repertoire of protest practice across what are usually understood as four discrete movements, but overlapped in time and membership: protest against nuclear weapons, against the National Service Scheme, against Australian involvement in the War in Vietnam, and against Apartheid in South Africa. It situates these four discrete sets of campaigns in their transnational context, examining the ways that ideas circulating through transnational activist networks were adopted and adapted by Australian activists. Finally, it examines the different ways that Australians over the period used the concepts of the public and the public sphere and the philosophy of liberal individualism to make arguments about the morality and
legitimacy of protest in a democracy. What emerges is a picture of protest’s capacity to remake the political meanings of the Vietnam War and conscription in Australia.
Chapter 1: The Anti-Nuclear Campaigns of the early 1960s

Between June 1961 and September 1966 Australian activists mounted a sustained protest campaign against nuclear weapons. In support of nuclear disarmament, Australian anti-nuclear activists constructed their ‘movement’ as a democratic assemblage that acted to both mobilise and represent the public. They circulated petitions and passed resolutions at public meetings, claiming to represent large portions of the Australian electorate. They then carried these documents to the federal legislature and embassies of foreign nuclear powers. They promoted the idea that public opinion was a democratic force with more legitimacy than the electoral process, and aimed to create documentary evidence of public opinion as political leverage. Australian activists also maintained a transnational dialogue with the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and its radical offshoot the Committee of 100 in this period, which nourished and shaped Australian protest. Through this dialogue, Australian protesters argued that their protest actions were part of a world-wide network that represented a global public. They drew on this international network and critically engaged with specific protest practices from Britain: the long march, the radial march, and the vocabulary of universalism. These three practices – the construction of public opinion as a democratic force, the nurturing of international solidarity, and the adoption and adaptation of protest practice from overseas - shaped anti-nuclear protest from 1961 to 1966. Critically for this thesis, the activists and organisations that worked on anti-nuclear campaigns later brought their experience to bear on anti-conscription and anti-war campaigns. This continuity of practice and personnel makes an examination of anti-nuclear activism in the early 1960s essential to any understanding of later anti-war protest.

The literature on peace activism in Australia marks out the period 1949-1959 as a “rebirth” of organised Australian pacifism. The Australian Peace Council and its state bodies were formed in 1949, and the Melbourne Peace Congress in 1959 established the first permanent Committee for International Cooperation and Disarmament (CICD). After the 1964 Sydney Peace Congress, the Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD) was established in NSW. Similar committees were inaugurated in all other states except WA.1 The 1959 Congress in particular has emerged as a watershed in the historiography of Australian activism, marking the

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high point of peace organisations’ public notoriety due to their organisational ties to the Communist Party of Australia.\(^2\) There was considerable continuity of personnel in these peace organisations. Reverend Alf Dickie, present at the initial meeting of the Australian Peace Council in 1949, became chairman of the CICD and remained in the position until 1972.\(^3\) Jim Cairns, who later became a federal Labor MP, was also present at that founding meeting in 1949. He would also eventually become chairman of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee and replace Dickie as chairman of the CICD.\(^4\) Other long-term activists, like Bob Gould or Roger Barnes, joined anti-nuclear organisations in this period and remained active until the end of Australian involvement in Vietnam. There was also organisational overlap, with the state Committees organising both anti-nuclear and anti-war protests. As this chapter will demonstrate, the similarities and continuities between anti-nuclear protest and anti-war protest are as significant as their differences.

Australian anti-nuclear protest in the 1960s is mentioned in few texts as an interregnum between the founding of the postwar Peace Councils in 1949 and the flowering of Australian protest during the Vietnam War.\(^5\) There is, as yet, no substantial history of 1960s Australian anti-nuclear protest. References to the early Australian anti-nuclear campaigns are most often found in material that deals with British anti-nuclear tests at Emu Field, Ernabella, or Christmas Island, and thus concentrates on ex-servicemen or Indigenous people, not urban activists.\(^6\) Despite this relative absence, the campaign against nuclear weapons occupied much of the organisational capacity of the Australian Peace Committees from the end of the Second World War until the


\(^3\) CICD, Minutes of Annual General Meeting, August 8, 1972, Series/folder 1/10, Box 3, Campaign for International Co-operation and Disarmament Collection, accession numbers 79/152; 87/92; 87/93; 88/107; 88/121, University of Melbourne Archives.


reintroduction of conscription for Vietnam. As this chapter demonstrates, these protest movements were a crucial ground for the development of techniques, tactics and strategies that influenced later protest movements.

The chapter begins with a history of the bi-annual protest rallies that were held in east coast metropolitan centres at Easter and in August between 1961 and 1966. The Easter marches were publicised as marches in support of the British Aldermaston marches, while the August events were billed as Hiroshima Commemoration or Hiroshima Day marches. I then turn to an examination of the practices through which protesters claimed to represent public opinion. As established democratic processes, petitions and public meetings produced public opinion and communicated it to the government. Anti-nuclear protesters used these practices to make their actions comprehensible as a normal part of the relationship between citizen and state. In doing so, they hoped to draw attention to the sovereign democratic power of the public and attach its legitimacy to their protests. The final two sections of the chapter examine the ways that Australians engaged in correspondence with British anti-nuclear organisations. The international dialogue between the Australian and British anti-nuclear organisations shaped Australian protest practice, and gave protesters a sense that they belonged to a world-wide movement. The transnational adoption of new protest practices also shows the limits of translation, with Australian activists rejecting civil disobedience as a practice.

Anti-nuclear protest in Australia from 1961 to 1966: A short history

Australian anti-nuclear activism was part of what Carter characterises as the “first nuclear disarmament movement,” operating from 1957 to 1964. Since the late 1950s the British CND and associated anti-nuclear groups had been staging four-day marches between Aldermaston in Berkshire and London. By 1961 the American Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) was mounting solidarity marches at Easter, and the more radical British Committee of 100 began

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to mount high-profile protests against police bans. The arms race was accelerating in the early 1960s, and Australian newspapers gave front page space to moments of Cold War tension: the second manned orbit by the USSR and the growing tensions between Western powers and the Soviet Union in Berlin hogged the headlines while thousands marched in Britain and the USA. In late 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis marked a high point in nuclear tensions. In 1963, British anti-nuclear protest made global headlines again with the leak of the UK’s war plans in the ‘Spies for Peace’ scandal. In August 1963, the US, USSR and UK came to an agreement on an international Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting atmospheric nuclear tests. The treaty made anti-nuclear protest more difficult to mobilise, and British and American protest subsided after 1963.

Australian protests unfolded in the context of this global escalation. Just before Easter 1961, the precursor to the AICD, the NSW Peace Committee for International Cooperation and Disarmament (NSWPCICD), inaugurated a new item on the Sydney protest calendar. It announced that it would be commemorating the atomic bombing of Hiroshima with a “mass city march and Domain Rally for Peace and Life.” After the march there would be a ceremony at the Trocadero, the famed Sydney dance hall and entertainment venue, at which the Secretary of the NSWPCICD would be presented with the Lenin Peace Prize. The August protest drew an estimated crowd of 5000, while a similar march in Melbourne drew 3000 to Flinders Park to hear speakers that included two clergymen and a Labor MP. In addition to the Hiroshima Day march

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15 Ibid.
and in response to a request from the British Committee of 100, the NSW Peace Committee organised a relay march to Canberra in late September to coincide with the British protests.¹⁶ This comprised 14 teams of walkers, each of which walked 14 miles of the 200 miles between Sydney and Canberra. Given the relatively large distances between other state capitals and the federal capital, the delegations from Melbourne and Brisbane came in motorcades rather than relay marches. The three delegations met on the outskirts of Canberra and visited Parliament House to deliver a letter to the Prime Minister in favour of the adoption of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Statement for Total World Disarmament.¹⁷ The Canberra Times coverage noted that the marchers also visited the American, British, French and Russian embassies.¹⁸ Other metropolitan dailies ignored the Canberra delegation, preferring the spectacular civil disobedience and arrest tally at the British marches and the announcement of another series of American nuclear tests.¹⁹

The 1962 program was more ambitious, incorporating a national petition and two separate delegations to Canberra. In March, a Sydney CND group formed, complementing the Victorian group that had been operating since 1960.²⁰ These groups were much smaller than the state peace committees; the Victorian CND reported 71 members in 1962 after two years of operation, while the Sydney group’s inaugural meeting was of 50 people.²¹ Fear of nuclear fallout began to occupy Australian imaginations during the planning of the 1962 marches. In April 1962 the British Government began to test the Polaris weapons system in the Pacific, which had been the

¹⁶ Michael Randle (Secretary, Committee of 100) to Morrow, July 13, 1961, Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
¹⁸ “100 Feted at Red Embassy,” Canberra Times, September 21, 1961, 3.
²⁰ Summy, “The Australian Peace Council”; Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 125; Sydney CND (hereafter SCND), Newsletter, no. 1 (September 1962), Folder “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” Box 1 (2), PND Records (add-on 1997).
²¹ Victorian CND (hereafter VCND), Newsletter 1:3 (29 October 1962); SCND, Newsletter 1 (September 1962); both Folder “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” Box 65 (74), PND Records.
target of a series of protests in Scotland.\textsuperscript{22} The front page of the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} warned that fallout could potentially arrive in Australia in a matter of days.\textsuperscript{23} The Aldermaston protests inaugurated the use of a “radial march”: in Melbourne and Sydney, several small groups of marchers converged on the city centre “from the outer suburban perimeter of an area that would be devastated by an H bomb exploding over Sydney”.\textsuperscript{24} In the days before the Aldermaston support marches the papers reported on new Russian and American nuclear tests.\textsuperscript{25} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} reported that after three American atmospheric blasts in the Pacific, QANTAS technicians were testing their aircraft with Geiger counters after flights.\textsuperscript{26} Around 2000 turned out in Sydney and Melbourne, whilst in Brisbane, the Queensland Peace Council (QPC) combined their anti-nuclear march with the annual Labour Day parade.\textsuperscript{27} The NSW Peace Committee and the Victorian CICD chartered aircraft to convey their delegations to Canberra.\textsuperscript{28} In the Commonwealth Parliament, Arthur Calwell, leader of the Opposition, argued that the existing Antarctic treaty ought to be extended to create a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere, an action acclaimed by anti-nuclear organisations.\textsuperscript{29}

The Hiroshima Day protests for 1962 were characterised as a “nation-wide campaign to Canberra” to present a national petition to Parliament.\textsuperscript{30} The disarmament petition was launched in June, and asked the federal government to adopt the Leader of the Opposition’s proposal for a

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\textsuperscript{22} “U.S. Pacific H-tests “Soon”: Live Polaris to be Fired,” \textit{SMH}, April 24, 1962, 1.


\textsuperscript{24} NSW Peace Committee for International Co-operation and Disarmament (NSWPCICD), Press Release, March 20, 1962; “March on Melbourne,” (1962 Melbourne Aldermaston support march poster), [April 1962]; both in Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.


\textsuperscript{27} “Storm over Peace Committee in Labor march,” \textit{Courier-Mail}, April 30, 1962, 9; “Controversial Queensland Peace Committee had one of the largest groups in yesterday’s Labor Day Parade” (photograph and caption), \textit{Courier-Mail}, May 8, 1962, 3.


\textsuperscript{30} Morrow and Anderson to Shop Committees and AEU Branch Secretary, July 12, 1962, Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 2(2),” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
A month before the rallies there were 40,000 petitions circulating. Organisers were aiming for 500,000 signatures nationally. The state Peace Committees also planned individual rallies and marches in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, and a repeat of the previous year’s relay march and motorcade to Canberra. On the morning of the rally the *Sydney Morning Herald* reported on the front page that the Russians would once again begin testing in the Arctic. The Melbourne march, held on Sunday, August 5th, attracted 3000 people, while the Sydney march equaled the 5000 of the previous year. The first group of walkers for the Canberra relay march left from the Sydney Stadium at the conclusion of the rally, meeting the motorcades from Queensland and Victoria on the outskirts of Canberra. A chartered train from Sydney brought more delegates the following day. The Queensland motorcade had travelled in two groups; one down the New England Highway and the other down the Pacific Highway, both stopping at various points to attend peace events, pick up delegates and collect completed petitions. Once collated in Canberra, the petition contained around 200,000 signatures. It was presented to Gough Whitlam, then Deputy Leader of the Opposition, who tabled it in the House of Representatives. The delegation also visited the American, Russian and French embassies, and the British, Indian and Malaysian High Commissions, where they presented a set of demands and a transcription of the memorandum tabled by eight neutral nations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in April that year. The demands included international support for Calwell’s nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere proposal, the condemnation of continued nuclear testing, and the adoption of the neutral nations’ memorandum as a basis for an international test detection regime. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October represented a high point in superpower nuclear tensions. A month later a CND group

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38 “1000 Join March ‘for Peace‘.”
39 “National Campaign to Canberra, August 15, 1962 – To All Embassies”. 
formed in Brisbane.\textsuperscript{40} By the end of January 1963 the Brisbane group had 25 regular members, and the four groups were corresponding about forming a national CND.\textsuperscript{41}

Though international tensions lessened and nuclear testing programs slowed, the Australian anti-nuclear 1963 program was a repeat of the previous year’s. There were radial marches in Sydney and Melbourne, rallies in Brisbane, and another delegation to Canberra in August, this time including delegates from South Australia and Western Australia.\textsuperscript{42} The Easter marches were overshadowed by front page coverage of violent protests in London and the leak of the UK’s nuclear war plan. The latter was accomplished by the protest group ‘Spies for Peace,’ who handed out the plans as a pamphlet at the Aldermaston demonstration in London.\textsuperscript{43} The Sydney CND group republished the ‘Spies for Peace’ pamphlet in its entirety.\textsuperscript{44} Between the Easter and August marches, the NSWPICID and a number of other interested organisations supported the formation of a Hiroshima Commemoration Committee which would take explicit responsibility for the Easter and August protests in coming years.\textsuperscript{45} The demands of anti-nuclear campaigners in Australia crystallised in 1963 around support for an international Test Ban treaty, removal of foreign bases from Australian territory, and demands for government censure of French nuclear tests in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{46} On the day after the Australian Hiroshima Day protests, the papers reported

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{1} Janet Lewis to Bertrand Russell, January 3, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, Salvatore D’Urso Collection, UQFL 72, Fryer Library, University of Queensland, Brisbane (hereafter D’Urso Collection).
\bibitem{2} Lewis to Bob Gould, January 23, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.
\bibitem{4} “‘Peace Spies’ Stir Security Crisis,” \textit{Age}, April 15, 1963, 4.
\bibitem{5} SCND \textit{Sanity} 1:6, August 1963, 5 (unless otherwise noted, all issues of SCND and VCND \textit{Sanity} have been obtained courtesy of the personal collection of Dr Kyle Harvey); Lewis, “CND Report on Spies for Peace (Australia Inc.),” July 11, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; “Spies for Peace (Australia Inc.),” [July 1963], Folder 4, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.
\bibitem{6} Rev. A.D. Brand, Dr. A.G.H. Lawes, Mrs. M.J. Holmes, Mrs. J. Richards, Dr. W.A. Suchting, and Mr. J. Heffernan (conveners, Hiroshima Commemoration Committee, hereafter HCC) to interested organisations, June 7, 1963, Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
\end{thebibliography}
on the signing of the international Test Ban treaty.\footnote{“‘Big 3’ Ministers Meet in Moscow Today To Sign Test-Ban Pact,” \textit{SMH}, August 5, 1963, 3; “Signatories to N-Ban Seek More,” \textit{Age}, August 5, 1963, 1; “West ‘rejoices with you’ – Russians told,” \textit{Courier-Mail}, August 9, 1963, 4; “N-Ban Treaty Hailed by Australia,” \textit{Age}, August 16, 1963, 3.} After this news broke, the key demands of the campaign concentrated on French Pacific testing and the removal of foreign bases from Australia.\footnote{Anderson to supporting organisations, July 25, 1963; and HCC, “Commemorate Hiroshima – Commend Test Ban Treaty – Protest French Tests – Demand Nuclear Free Hemisphere” (circular), July 30, 1963, both in Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.} At the end of December, the four CND groups met in Sydney and drew up a constitution and aims for the Australian CND.\footnote{Australian CND (hereafter ACND) “Constitution and Aims of ACND,” [December, 1963]; Brisbane CND (hereafter BCND), and “Proceedings of 1st Regional Conference, December 1, 1963,” [December 1963], all in Folder 4, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; ACND, “Australian National CND Conference,” [December 1963]; and ACND, “Resolutions carried at First National Conference, Sydney, 28-29 Dec. ’63,” [December 1963], both in Folder 6, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.} However, there is no evidence that the national CND existed for longer than this one meeting. By March 1964, several of the tiny CND groups were reporting terminal operating deficits and loss of personnel.\footnote{Lewis to Peter Jeffrey (Western Australian CND Liaison Officer), March 3, 1964; and Lewis to Jeffrey, March 5, 1964, both in Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; “‘Sanity’ Deficit Fund,” BCND \textit{Sanity}, [June 1963], 8, Folder 4, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; “Money Needed,” VCND \textit{Sanity}, Easter Edition, [April 1965]; “Money Needed,” VCND \textit{Sanity} 4:3, [June 1965], 20; and “We Have No Money,” WACND, \textit{Newsletter} 2:9, September 1963, 2, all in Folder 6, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.}

Throughout the year, the momentum of anti-nuclear activism flagged as the war in Vietnam began to eclipse nuclear testing as a pressing political debate. Anti-nuclear protest in 1965 showed none of the careful interstate coordination of previous years, with a mix of ‘Easter’ and ‘Aldermaston’ marches in three states spread the week before Easter, until the end of May.\footnote{“Easter March,” VCND \textit{Sanity}, Special Easter Edition, [April 1965], 2, Folder 6, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; Aldermaston Relay Walk Committee (Brisbane), “Dear Neighbour” (1965 Brisbane Aldermaston march leaflet); “Brisbane’s 2-day walk focuses on Vietnam,” \textit{Peace Action}, May 1965, 14; and “Vietnam – ‘Australia and Asia — the Years Ahead’,” \textit{Peace Action}, May 1965, 7, all in Series/folder 2/5, Box 2, Margaret Frazer Papers, accession number 93/158, University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter Frazer Papers).} Though numbers were down, rallies in all three states continued to draw thousands of participants.\footnote{“Pauling For Sydney Visit,” \textit{SMH}, April 6, 1964, 4; “N-Test Treaty Praised at Rally,” \textit{Age}, April 6, 1964, 7; “A Quiet Parade Fights the Bomb,” \textit{Courier-Mail}, April 6, 1964, 6; “Cairns Says Australia Should Call For Cease-fire In Vietnam,” \textit{SMH}, August 10, 1964, 5; “1000 March to City Rally,” \textit{Age}, August 10, 1964, 5.} Easter actions continued in 1964 in Melbourne and Brisbane, but the Sydney Hiroshima Commemoration Committee replaced the Aldermaston support march with a rally for “peace in Vietnam” in late May.\footnote{Broadhead (Secretary, HCC), Press Release, May 21, 1965, Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1965,” Box 67 (74), PND Records; “Vietnam Act by Australia ‘Lacks Respect’,” \textit{SMH}, May 31, 1965, 6.} The August march in Sydney was framed around the central
theme of “no war over Vietnam”. Only a week before the rally, North Vietnamese patrol boats fired on the USS Maddox in what became known as the ‘Tonkin Gulf incident’. The speech that Jim Cairns gave at the Sydney rally – titled “Australia’s Relations with Asia” – dominated the Herald’s reportage. The announcement of conscription in November 1964 and commitment of an Australian battalion to the conflict in April 1965 cemented the importance of Vietnam to many protest organisers. The CND groups in Sydney, Brisbane and Perth ceased operation in early 1965, though the Victorian CND continued to produce its newsletter Sanity until mid-1966 at least. Hiroshima Day activities for 1965 were all framed in relation to Vietnam. By 1966, the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee in Sydney had been reconstituted into the Project Vietnam Committee, which took over the organisation of the Hiroshima Day marches. From 1964 to 1966, ‘Vietnam’ slowly eclipsed ‘nuclear weapons’ as the issue at the heart of Australian protests. In 1963 the Easter march and the Hiroshima Day march had different purposes: the former to express solidarity with Aldermaston, and the latter to commemorate the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Between 1964 and 1966 the distinction disappeared and the two protests became just two anti-war protests among many.

Protest Marches as Public Opinion

The organisers of anti-nuclear protest in Australia understood their actions as an integral part of representative democracy. Australian anti-nuclear protest in the early 1960s was designed around the assumption that in a democratic state the public was primordial – that is, it was the sovereign

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54 “Melbourne, Aug 8, 9 – 2 Day March from Frankston,” Peace Action, July 1964, 4; and “Melbourne’s 2 Day March,” Peace Action, August-September 1964, 9, both in Series/folder 2/5, Box 2, Frazer Papers; “No Nuclear Bombs and No War,” (1964 Brisbane Aldermaston march leaflet), Folder 4, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; Broadhead, Circular to members, February 17, 1964; Broadhead, Press Release, April 6, 1964, and Broadhead, Press Release, [July-August 1964], all in Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1964,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
56 The latest document I have located relating to SCND is SCND Sanity 3:1 (May 1965), Folder 6, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; to VCND is VCND Sanity 5:3 (July 1966); to BCND is Lewis to Peter, February 21, 1965, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; to WACND is Newsletter 4:2 (April 1965), Folder 6, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.
57 Peace Action, July 1965, 5, Series 2/5, Box 2, Frazer Papers; Broadhead, Circular, July 16, 1965; and HCC, “Which road for Mankind – Hiroshima or the UN?” (1965 Sydney Aldermaston Hiroshima Day leaflet), both in Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1965,” Box 67 (74), PND Records; “The Vietnam war has broken political apathy,” Canberra Times, August 9, 1965, 8.
58 G. Broadhead (Secretary, Project Vietnam Committee) to Superintendent of Traffic, July 11, 1966, Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1966,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
democratic entity from which all other democratic entities and processes drew their legitimacy. If the opinion of that public could be demonstrated to be at odds with government policy, the government could either change its policy or its authority would be exposed as illegitimate. For the peace organisations and CND groups, any protest action thus had to do two things: create evidence of anti-nuclear public opinion, and bring that evidence to the government. Once it was revealed through significant numbers of signatures or the diversity of the crowd at a public meeting, protest organisers argued that this public opinion legitimised their actions as a democratic process. To become the bearers of that evidence was to become representatives of the public, fostering a connection to the Australian people that overruled the processes of elections and adversarial parliamentary debate. Thus in 1963, the BCND’s Direct Action Sub-committee explained their attempt to change government policy through mass mobilisation as “putting into practice the theoretical principles of democracy”.

The delegations to Canberra were designed to bring public opinion on the nuclear question into being. Anti-nuclear campaigners used established democratic processes – meeting procedure and the petition – to produce this public opinion. They then performatively delivered that public opinion – by physically carrying letters, resolutions and petitions over hundreds of miles in motorcades and relay walks – to democratic representatives and officials in Parliament and various Embassies. At first, protest organisers framed their demands as resolutions adopted by a meeting, using the same vocabulary of meeting procedure that drove democratic assemblies like trade unions, incorporated societies, and parliament. The petition launched in June 1962 and presented to Whitlam in Canberra in August allowed organisers to claim that they represented the 200,000 signatories. By 1963, the organisers were claiming to represent large segments of the population without the supporting evidence of rallies or petitions. A letter to Prime Minister Menzies claimed that the August delegation to Canberra in 1963 represented “over 200,000 citizens from five states of the Commonwealth,” while a resolution adopted at a rally of delegates in Canberra a few days later increased the number to 500,000. The Disarmament RAG framed the public as a democratic force in its own right, arguing that MPs would be swayed

60 Anderson to Robert Menzies, August 12, 1963; and “Resolution of Albert Hall Rally, Canberra, August 15th, 1963,” [August 1963], both in Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
by large enough protests: “They’ll listen to you. You elected them.” Activists understood the meeting and the petition as ways to reveal a majority, primordial public opinion or the will of “the people of Australia”. These practices made protesters’ actions comprehensible as a normal part of the relationship between citizen and state.

The organisers’ assertion of legitimacy was crucial given the increasing number of stories in mainstream media of communist infiltration of the peace campaigns. Thus the resolution adopted at the 1962 Sydney Aldermaston rally began with the claim to have been “unanimously adopted” by a “meeting of Australian citizens forming a wide cross section of political and religious opinion”. When the Reverend Brand, Chairman of the NSWPCICD, wrote to the embassies and high commissions that the delegation intended to visit, his letters began by claiming

I have been directed by a meeting of over 2,000 citizens held in Sydney and a similar gathering in Melbourne on Sunday last, to request the earliest opportunity for a delegation to submit and discuss with you the unanimously endorsed resolution of these gatherings.

A press release written on the same day repeated the claims of both diversity and democratic representation. Later in May, a group of peace activists circulated a statement “for signature by a representative group of citizens from the educational, professional, religious and cultural spheres,” probably for publication as an advertisement in a major newspaper. The statement began with the text:

We, a representative group of citizens of varying occupational, religious, political and social views, desire to commend Mr. Calwell, the leader of the Opposition, for his proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere.

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61 SCND Research Action Group, Disarmament Rag, August 6, 1962 (Special Issue for Hiroshima Day 1962), Folder “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” Box 1 (2), PND Records (add-on 1997).
62 NSWPCICD, “Preamble” (Declaration read out to 1962 Sydney Aldermaston Rally), [April 1962], Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
63 Brand to the Ambassador, Embassy of Brazil, May 4, 1962; Brand to Sir Garfield Barwick, May 2, 1962; Brand to W. Belton (Charge D’Affairs, American Embassy), May 3, 1962; and Brand to British High Commissioner, May 3, 1962; all in Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 1(2),” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
66 Ibid.
Aware of the criticism that they represented only a small section of the Australian public – namely, communists, dupes and fellow travellers – organisers of anti-nuclear protest framed their meetings as representative assemblies by highlighting the diversity of the crowd as well as its size.

This claim shows that Australian activists believed that the public was the sovereign political force in a democracy. They assumed that the gap between elections was too large to capture this public’s views on important political issues. The aim of the 1962 petition was framed by organisers as providing “the people of Australia with an immediate opportunity to demand that the Calwell proposal is adopted and acted upon by the Federal Government”.  

In August 1962, the NSWPCICD solicited written reports from members of the delegation to Canberra. One respondent spoke in terms of a national public, characterised by its inherent democratic force, discrete from the capacity of its constituents to vote:

> It is one thing to talk about democracy, it is one thing to say we vote at election time, it is one thing to write letters to the papers, but it is democracy in action when 1000 people from the Commonwealth of Australia assemble opposite the house of Parliament in an organised, orderly fashion, to say to the government of the day: We, the people, we the delegates from hundreds of work places, we want Peace.

The relationship between the public and the protesters was fluid. Sometimes they represented the public, sometimes they constituted it. Either way, protest organisers hoped to gain political leverage from their relationship to it.

The NSWPCICD sent out a questionnaire in May 1962 to marchers in the radial walks. The responses it collected reveal the faith Australian anti-nuclear activists had in the capacity of rational argument to convince the public of their moral rightness. One respondent was convinced that the leaflet handed out by the marchers “was bound to shock people to their senses, and make

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67 NSWPCICD, Press Release, July 10, 1962, Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 2(2),” Box 67 (74), PND Records; Morrow and Anderson to Shop Committees and AEU Branch Secretary; and Morrow and Anderson to Secretary, Plumbers’ and Gasfitters’ Employees’ Union, Secretary, Sheet Metal Workers’ Union, and Secretary, Boilermakers’ Society, July 10, 1962, both in Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 1(2),” Box 67 (74), PND Records.

68 Muni Bowen, “Report from a Delegate to Canberra,” [August-September 1962], Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 2(2),” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
them realise how hopeless and horrifying” the possibility of nuclear war was. Another explained that the radial march’s “entire aim is to impress upon citizens that the participants of the ‘Peace Action’ are a thinking majority”. Another argued that the leaflet would “only appeal to fellows like myself who are already convinced of the necessity for nuclear disarmament. Now we have to appeal to the average citizen who is not convinced of this.” The questionnaire asked respondents “How do you think we should deal with the problems of provocation (shouted remarks, etc.)?” One respondent answered “Right education”.

Australian anti-nuclear protesters, influenced by the idea of the public as a rational-critical space in which ideas were tested by interlocutors for their moral validity, understood their democratic role of protest as to educate the public as well as to represent its views to the government.

The geographical boundaries of this public were also fluid, despite the clear representative strategy of targeting government officials. Demonstrators in the NSWPCICD were nourished by the idea that they were part of a global movement. One participant, writing to the NSWPCICD about the Canberra delegation, spoke about the strength that cross-border unity lent to their local political “struggle”:

We gained strength from the knowledge there were so many other organisations and individuals prepared to join actively in the struggle for peace not only in our own Country, but as we learned from our visits to some of the Embassies, in many other Countries in the World too. We felt heartened by our unity and by the evidence we had gained of the great and growing strength of the world movement for Peace.”

A leaflet advertising the 1962 Aldermaston support march characterised transnational anti-nuclear protest as a “great new force of good sense and peaceful desires that is today awakening

69 Completed questionnaires, [May-June 1962], Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.

70 Des Tyrrell, completed questionnaire, [May-June 1962], Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.

72 Morrow and Anderson, Circular to members (including questionnaire as attachment), May 11, 1962, Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.

72 Ibid.

73 P. Hopwood to Morrow, [1962?], Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 1(2),” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
right throughout the world.” In 1963 the Manly-Warringah Peace Committee argued that the publicity of the Aldermaston marches in Britain had “struck a sympathetic chord in many countries; recognition of mutual interest has led to similar movements all over the world,” and that by taking part in the solidarity action, Australians had an “opportunity to add to the weight of public opinion against the nuclear madness.” Australian protesters who marched with the NSWPCICD imagined themselves as part of a world-wide movement, representing global public opinion to individual national governments.

The Australian CND groups also spoke in terms of global anti-nuclear public opinion. The Sydney CND accorded the same rationality to an assumed global public that the NSWPCICD did to Australians. The Disarmament RAG claimed that “Citizens all over the world are beginning to realise that we are all linked in our desire for peace. Being no longer isolated in action, we can be effective in restoring sanity.” The organisation’s newsletter asserted that “the lessening of nuclear tensions” was an outcome that “all rational people desire.” By 1963, SCND were representing their activism as a response to a world-wide groundswell of unaddressed public opinion: “All over the world, people are asking: ‘How can our cities be saved?’ ‘How can a Nuclear War be prevented?’ ‘What should we do?’” Rather than petitioning governments, Australian CND groups advocated for utopian internationalism as the solution to the nuclear problem. Disarmament RAG argued that the solution to the nuclear problem was not just to form a world-wide movement, but to “make One World, a brotherhood of nations” through the UN.

The Research Action Group newsletter for Hiroshima Day 1962 advocated that their readers “be loyal to the human race”. The November edition of Sanity reported a talk on “world

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74 NSWPCICD, “Why are we, people like yourselves, taking this action?” (1962 Sydney Aldermaston support march leaflet), [March-April 1962], Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
76 SCND Research Action Group, Disarmament Rag, June 20, 1962, 2, Folder “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” Box 1 (2), PND Records (add-on 1997).
77 SCND, Newsletter, 3, February 1963, Folder “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” Box 65 (74), PND Records.
78 Ibid., 6.
government and world disarmament” at its previous meeting. Throughout 1964 and 1965 the newsletter continued to speak in terms of internationalism rather than a unified global public. The magazine reprinted an article from the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* by a West German scientist that argued “world peace and world organisation” were “the only thing that can save us”. 

After the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Australian anti-nuclear organisations’ goals changed. The idea of a world-wide movement was less frequently invoked. The 1963 Hiroshima Day protest based its campaign aims around local and regional preoccupations: French tests and US bases in Australia. The Manly-Warringah Peace Committee’s news bulletin for February 1963 argued that “in our view the people are not fully informed” about US bases on Australian soil. While the sense of belonging to a world-wide anti-nuclear movement was transitory, activists’ belief that their role was to educate the public about the dangers of nuclear weapons and then inform the government of public opinion persisted. In this way they were attempting to simultaneously create and report public opinion. In support of this goal, and in an attempt to foster and leverage global public opinion, in the period between Easter 1961 and August 1963, Australian activists worked to construct a world-wide movement of anti-nuclear protesters.

**Constructing a World-Wide Movement**

The announcement of the inaugural Hiroshima Day protest made it clear that the organisers hoped to capitalise on what they saw as already-existing public opinion, as a response to “widespread demands for more demonstrative forms of activity, affording wider opportunity for public witness and support for peace and disarmament”. Coverage of British and American anti-nuclear protests formed part of the context of this decision. A month after the

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81 “Last Month’s Meeting,” VCND *Sanity* 2:9 (November 1963), 5-6.
83 Dr Max Born, “What is Left to Hope For?”, VCND *Sanity* 3:7 (July 1964), 7.
85 Morrow and Anderson to “dear friends,” June 20, 1961, Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1961,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
announcement of the march, the NSWPCICD received a letter from the Committee of 100, a radical British activist organisation that advocated civil disobedience. The letter advised the Peace Committee of a new British campaign against the Polaris missile and acknowledged that the global reach of nuclear weapons called for an expansion of the horizons of anti-nuclear activism:

[W]e realise that if the Americans simply took the base from Scotland and put it somewhere else the total danger to world peace would not be affected. … We need, in fact, a world-wide movement of resistance which will make it impossible for any government, East or West, to have nuclear bombs or bases. 87

The Committee of 100 framed nuclear weapons as a global problem that required the construction of a world-wide network of organisations to solve. As such, the letter concluded with a request for a solidarity action by Australian peace and anti-nuclear organisations.

The NSWPCICD adopted the rhetoric of a world-wide movement. The press release for the first relay march to Canberra claimed that it would “link Australia with the international march movement for world disarmament.” 88 The 1962 Aldermaston march was framed as the result of a “powerful upsurge of feeling and action expressing a universal revulsion against the threat of nuclear annihilation,” which was “in evidence the world over.” 89 The NSWPCICD explained the march as part of a “world wide crusade for human survival,” and leaflets distributed for that march exhorted their readers to “take your place with us in this world-wide movement”. 90 By 1963 the Committee spoke of the “growing unity” evident across diverse national movements. 91

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87 Michael Randle (Secretary, Committee of 100), to Morrow, July 13, 1961, Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
89 Ibid.
Australian protesters argued that their actions arose out of the spontaneous global expression of anti-nuclear public opinion.

Coverage of international protests and correspondence from overseas anti-nuclear organisations fostered the desire of Australian activists to be part of this world-wide movement. The Committee of 100 and the NSWPCICD carried on a correspondence throughout mid-July 1961, and Australian protests were reported in Committee of 100 international bulletins. The NSWPCICD also wrote to Canon Collins, secretary of the British CND, before the 1962 Aldermaston support march. They included a leaflet publicising the radial walk in Sydney “in the hope that it may have some publicity value for your campaign from the viewpoint of … demonstrating … the increasing world impact of your movement.” They also asked Collins to record the speeches at Trafalgar Square and send them by air mail to be played at the Sydney march. The NSWPCICD hoped that Collins’ reply would “mark the beginning of a developing pattern of common actions towards our common goal,” instituting a more permanent organisational connection between the Sydney Committee and the British CND. As she was trying to form and then grow the Brisbane CND group, Janet Lewis kept up correspondence with several well-known British anti-nuclear activists, including Bertrand Russell, Peggy Duff, and Wendy Butlin. It was through this correspondence that Lewis was able to locate the CND groups in the other states, and it was in a letter from Peggy Duff that the idea of a national CND was first mooted. Australian anti-nuclear organisations were nourished by the sense of belonging and community this correspondence produced, and drew on it to shape their organisational structures and protest practice.

This presented Australian anti-nuclear activists with a different practical problem – how to make the international connections they claimed to have with overseas organisations and publics

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92 Randle, letter to Morrow, September 6, 1961, Folder “Aldermaston March, 1961,” Box 2 (74), PND Records; Committee of 100, “Report upon international demonstrations Sept 16 and 17,” enclosed with ibid.
93 NSWPCICD to Canon Collins (Secretary of British CND) March 30, 1962, Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
94 Ibid.
95 Peggy Duff to Janet Lewis, January 17, July 4, and August 20, 1963; and Helen Alexander to Lewis, September 7, 1964, all in Folder 1, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; Wendy Butlin to Lewis, March 11, 1964; Lewis to Alwyn Jones, December 16, 1962; Lewis to Russell, January 3, 1963; Lewis to Duff, January 23, June 17, and December 10, 1963; and Lewis to Butlin, March 16, 1964, all in Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.
96 Duff to Lewis, January 17, 1963, Folder 1, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; Lewis to CND secretaries, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.
feel real. These connections were instated at specific moments by international correspondence and invoked by speakers at rallies. During the planning of the 1962 Hiroshima Day and 1963 Aldermaston support and Hiroshima Day marches, the chairmen of the NSWPCICD, Reverend Allan D. Brand, and the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee, Dr. A. G. H. Lawes, wrote to public figures in various countries asking for messages of support. They received responses from Bertrand Russell, Linus and Ava Pauling, Albert Schweitzer, J. D. Bernal, head of the World Council for Peace, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and the Washington Steering Committee for Women Strike for Peace, among others.

Several of the letter-writers reflected the assumptions of Sydney activists regarding the movement’s global character. Dr. Benjamin Spock and Bertrand Russell both spoke in terms of a global people exerting pressure on national governments, while the President of the World Council for Peace, J. D. Bernal, wrote to the Aldermaston support marchers in 1962 that their rally “forms part of a great, world-wide campaign” taking place in “in some twenty countries,” and that their undertaking was “a most significant and well-planned contribution to this campaign”. These messages were printed and read out to the crowd at the rallies. Lawes wrote to each speaker in 1963, explaining the “special significance which international messages

97 Brand to Linus Pauling, Canon Collins, Dr. Kaoru Yasui (Chairman, Japan Council Against A & H Bombs), Bertrand Russell, Dr. Benjamin Spock, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, H. Bellafonte, and C. Chaplin, July 3, 1962, all in Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 1(2),” Box 67 (74), PND Records; Brand to Schweitzer, Dagmar Wilson (Chairperson of Washington, D.C. Steering Committee, Women Strike for Peace), Pauling, Russell, F. Boaten, (Chairman of Accra Assembly), Canon Collins (British CND and European Federation Against Nuclear Arms), Professor Mark Oliphant, and Professor J.D. Bernal (Chairman, World Council of Peace), April 3, 1963, all in Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 20-21 April 1963,” Box 2 (74), PND Records; Lawes to Schweitzer, Boaten, Shinzo Hamai (Mayor of Hiroshima), Yasui, Brigadier-General Hugh B. Hester (American Russian Institute), Wilson, Pauling, Russell, Collins, Bernal, and World Council of Peace, all in Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.

98 Spock to Brand, July 23, 1962; and Yasui to Brand (telegram), August 2, 1962; both in Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 1(2),” Box 67 (74), PND Records; Russell to NSWPCICD, April 11, 1963; Schweitzer to NSWPCICD (telegram), April 21, 1963; Washington Women’s Strike For Peace Steering Committee to Brand, [April 1963]; and Bernal to Brand, April 9, 1963; all in Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 20-21 April 1963,” Box 2 (74), PND Records; Hamai to Lawes, July 16, 1963; Janet N. Newman (Washington, D.C. Steering Committee, Women Strike for Peace) to Lawes, July 16, 1963; Yasui to Lawes, July 19, 1963; Linus and Ava Helen Pauling, Message to the 1963 Hiroshima Commemoration rally, [August 1963]; and Russell to Lawes, 23 July, 1963, all in Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.


have for us ‘down under’”.101 By playing taped messages or reading statements from British CND personalities, Australian demonstrators hoped to leave their audiences feeling they were part of a world-wide movement that persisted beyond the close of the rally. In the same way that the actions of activists produced documents that those activists argued were evidence of public opinion, these international messages produced an imagined global movement, rather than being produced by it. After reading or referring to international correspondence, speakers at rallies claimed that these messages were evidence of an already-existing world-wide movement and global public.

The importance of Aldermaston to global anti-nuclear protest in the early 1960s meant that Australians could also invoke the British imperial connection and a cultural closeness with their British counterparts. Australian protesters mobilised their common British heritage to add legitimacy to the world-wide movement they constructed, and thus to their protests. Carter argues that it was “not surprising” that Australian anti-nuclear activism echoed that of the CND, given the close cultural connection.102 In addition to the Australians who travelled to march in the UK, some British activists travelled to Australia and joined peace and anti-nuclear organisations.103 The NSWPCICD claimed in a press release that the Easter 1962 march was meant “to demonstrate our admiration and support for the British movement”.104 As well as speaking about being part of a world-wide movement, Australian activists also spoke about being in solidarity with “British people,” “the British people,” or “our British colleagues”.105 The Building Workers’ Industrial Union preferred to emphasise the Imperial connection rather than membership in a universal, world-wide movement, distributing leaflets titled “British-Australian

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101 See, for example, Lawes to Schweitzer, July 8, 1963.
102 Carter, Peace Movements, 68.
103 See, for example, J. Bell, completed questionnaire, [May-June 1962], Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records. Bell refers to herself in the survey as “late CND London”.
Solidarity”. Trenchant ideas about Australians’ belonging to a British world found expression in Australian activists’ Aldermaston support march publicity material, and resulted in the privileging of the British in this imagined global movement.

The British connection was invoked by Australians in response to the news that six Committee of 100 protesters had been arrested while trying to gain entry to the US Air Force base in Wethersfield, Britain. The NSWPCICD sent out a circular advising its supporting organisations of the arrests and “repressive” 18-month sentences, and asking for their members to write in protest to the British Home Secretary via the British High Commission. The circular placed the British activists at the head of the world-wide movement, arguing that “the outstanding contributions of our British colleagues to this great crusade for human survival merits nothing short of a massive Australia-wide campaign supporting their action and demanding their release from prison”. Members of the NSWPCICD and its supporting organisations responded, and several mobilised the Australian-British connection in their arguments. Letter-writers argued that the punishment of the marchers contrasted with the traditions of British justice, and would negatively impact Britain’s global reputation. One letter concluded that “lovers of Britain are bitterly disappointed at an official action which is so grievous a departure from the calm good sense we have come to associate with Britain”. A Union official noted that “it is degrading to British subjects to see the Mother country treat citizens in this manner.” A British schoolteacher who had lived in Australia for a decade lamented that the prison sentences brought “only discredit to British traditions of justice and tolerance in the eyes of all decent people in the world.” In these letters, Britishness and Australianness were conflated, both in terms of an assumed cultural commonality, and a legal sense of belonging as British subjects. Anglophone cultural closeness was explicitly referenced.

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106 P. Clancy (Secretary, BWIU) to members, April 19, 1962; and BWIU, Circular No. 22/62 to Metropolitan Job Representatives and District Secretaries, April 19, 1962, both in Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
107 Morrow and Anderson, NSWPCICD circular, February 26, 1962, Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
108 Rev. Dr. E.E.V. Collocott to British Home Secretary, February 28, 1962, Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
109 James W. Lambert (Secretary, NSW Fire Brigade Employees’ Union) to British Home Secretary, March 2, 1962, Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
110 Mrs. S.S. Leyden to British Home Secretary, March 3, 1962, Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
by the union official above, stating that “I am further to point out that my Union is most concerned at trends taking place in Great Britain, trends which we believe must inevitably lead to a complete breaking of Commonwealth ties.”

Translating the ‘Long March,’ Adopting Unilateralism, Rejecting Civil Disobedience

This identification with British activists also provided the context for the selection and adoption of specific British anti-nuclear practices by Australian protesters. Scalmer has analysed the spread of protest practices through transnational networks of activists, their critical adoption by Australians, and their incorporation into a local Australian protest repertoire. Key to his model of transnational diffusion is the idea of ‘translation’. Acknowledging the historical and cultural contingency of protest, Scalmer notes that any practice observed by Australians in use elsewhere in the world must first be experimented with in order to see if it can be made comprehensible to Australian audiences. Scalmer argues that where they could re-interpret such a practice in terms of the local political context, the practice would diffuse through activist networks, becoming widespread.

Australian anti-nuclear protesters were aware of a number of practices in use in Britain and the United States. Three in particular struck a chord – the ‘long march,’ the British CND’s rhetoric of unilateralism, and the Committee of 100’s ideas about non-violent direct action. Nonetheless, Australian activists adopted some international practices and adapted some others, while ignoring ones they thought unsuitable in Australian circumstances. They were not mere recipients of international practices, but active in shaping tactics to local contexts. They developed the long march into relay marches and radial marches, responding to particular aspects of Australian geography and the sensitive timing of solidarity actions in a world-wide movement. Scalmer argues that Gandhi’s concepts of satyagraha and the 24-day salt march of 1930 influenced the development of long marches in British anti-nuclear activism, as well as in the US

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111 Lambert to British Home Secretary, March 2, 1962.
in both anti-nuclear and Civil Rights protests. The conceptual link to Gandhi was embodied by suffering and self-sacrifice – “lacerated feet” and “pronounced limps” on the Aldermaston marches – in service of a political aim. The Australian CND groups invoked the unilateralism of the British CND as an antidote to local Cold War domestic tensions. Civil disobedience in the model of the Committee of 100’s non-violent direct action was not used during Australian anti-nuclear protests, despite the Committee’s letter asking Australian organisers to consider it, and some discussion of what local civil disobedience might look like among Australian CND members. Australian anti-nuclear protesters only employed those international tactics they deemed useful in Australia.

The long march was the most successful of the three efforts at translation. The British Direct Action Committee had been instrumental in inaugurating the 52-mile, four-day London to Aldermaston march of 1958, and the long march was also used by American peace marchers. The British example was rendered visible to Australians through local press coverage. At Easter 1961, four months prior to the inaugural Australian Hiroshima Day commemoration march, several Australian metropolitan dailies reported on anti-nuclear demonstrations in the US and UK. In the US, six hundred marchers travelled from an Air Force Base in New Jersey to New York, 200 Quakers staged a “witness for peace” vigil in Times Square, and in Los Angeles there was a march of 2000, addressed by Linus Pauling. The American protests, organised by SANE, were quickly overshadowed in the press by reportage of the British CND’s march from Aldermaston to London. The Herald reported the events in London as “yelling demonstrators” who “defied police orders to move on and squatted in the street and on pavements”. The Age characterised it as a “melee” in Trafalgar Square in which the police “charged” the protesters and

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“dragged them feet first” away from the US Embassy to which they were trying to gain entry.\(^{119}\)

The breakaway march, led by a Highland Piper to the US embassy, was specifically targeted at the removal of the Holy Loch submarine base from Scotland, from where the US could deploy the Polaris submarine-launched nuclear missile system.\(^{120}\) The Aldermaston rally in London in 1961 made civil disobedience a hallmark of British protest in the Australian press’ eyes.\(^{121}\)

However, geographical factors influenced this adoption. The British and American marches went from nuclear bases or facilities to large metropolitan areas – London or New York, and symbolically linked the subject of the marchers’ demands – nuclear weapons – to their object – urban public opinion. Without nuclear bases or factories in Australia, there were no obvious sites at which to begin the marches. The interstate relays and motorcades began in metropolitan centres, and the federal legislature became their object. This was a simple substitution; not only was Canberra the Australian governmental equivalent to London, but the Committee of 100 had included the text of a declaration to be signed by as many demonstrators as possible and then presented to the Embassies of the nuclear powers.\(^{122}\) The 52 miles between Aldermaston and London, or even the 109 miles between McGuire Air Force Base and New York, were smaller distances than the 200 miles between Sydney and Canberra, 300 between Melbourne and Canberra, or the 500 between Brisbane and the capital. To accommodate these differences, the Victorian and Queensland delegations travelled in cars, foreclosing the personal hardships of marching – fatigue, hunger and tired feet - apparent in the British and American examples and stripping them of their obvious Gandhian connotation.\(^{123}\)

Time also played a part in the evolution of the long march in Australia. The Aldermaston marches always took place over the four days of Easter. It took two to three days for coverage of the British marches to appear in Australian metropolitan dailies. For this reason, the marches in

\(^{119}\) “‘Ban H-Bomb’ Rally Ends in Clash,” *Age*, April 5, 1961, 4.

\(^{120}\) Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 201.

\(^{121}\) As one example, Taylor writes of the 1961 march: “Despite the fact that the Aldermaston March had been a four-day protest, culminating in a rally, according to some estimates attended by 150,000 people, it was the maverick protest by a few hundred that took the attention of the media to the virtual exclusion of CND’s march.” Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 201.

\(^{122}\) Michael Randle (Secretary, Committee of 100) to Morrow, September 6, 1961, Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.

\(^{123}\) Scalmer, *Gandhi in the West*, 199-200.
Sydney and Melbourne were delayed by a week.\textsuperscript{124} The first one was timed to take place in support of the Committee of 100’s 1961 Holy Loch Polaris protests, but was delayed by two days as the object of the march - Federal Parliament - was closed on weekends.\textsuperscript{125} Though the inaugural relay walk was initiated in response to the Easter marches in the US and UK, the relay marches to Canberra only occurred in September as part of the Hiroshima Day activities. Australian anti-nuclear protests were thus organised according to an international schedule originating from the UK and were expressed through a practice – the long march – that had been used visibly elsewhere by anti-nuclear activists. However, they were translated to fit local considerations of distance and time.

The Committee of 100’s suggestion of government and embassy visits became central to Australian anti-nuclear protests. The Hiroshima Day marches were followed by some form of interstate delegation to Canberra. In 1962 there were two delegations, one at Easter and one in August. These delegations visited the embassies of the United States, USSR, and France, and the Malayan, Indian and British High Commissions.\textsuperscript{126} Where the Committee of 100’s declaration had been in the form of a petition, the form of the Australian declarations changed over time. In 1961 the relay march carried a letter to the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{127} Later they brought declarations that had been read out at the Sydney and Melbourne rallies and claimed to have been “unanimously adopted”.\textsuperscript{128} The Hiroshima Day interstate delegation in 1962 was organised around the national petition that had been circulating since June in support of Calwell’s nuclear-

\textsuperscript{124} Robert Gould, “Memo to all peace organisations, and Interested Individuals in Australia and New Zealand,” [October 1965], Folder “Vietnam - Pamphlets and Leaflets,” Youth Campaign Against Conscription Collection, MS 10002, State Library of Victoria, Melbourne (hereafter YCAC Collection).
\textsuperscript{125} Committee of 100, “Report upon international demonstrations Sept 16 and 17,” enclosed with Randle to Morrow, September 6, 1961, Folder “Aldermaston March, 1961,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
\textsuperscript{128} Morrow and Anderson, Press Release, May 2, 1962, Folder “Aldermaston Rally and March, Sydney, 28-29 April 1962,” Box 2(74), PND Records; Brand to the Ambassador, Embassy of Brazil, May 4, 1962; Brand to Sir Garfield Barwick, May 2, 1962; Brand to W. Belton (Charge D’Affairs, American Embassy), May 3, 1962; Brand to British High Commissioner, May 3, 1962; all in Folder Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1962 1(2), Box 67 (74), PND Records; Anderson, Circular to supporting organisations, July 25, 1963; and “A & NZ Congress for International Co-Operation and Disarmament – Melbourne Assembly Hall Rally, Aug 7\textsuperscript{th}, 1963” (declaration adopted by 1963 Melbourne Hiroshima Day Rally), both in Folder “Hiroshima Committee 1963,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
free Southern Hemisphere proposal. The document delivered to the Embassies in the same year was a short list of demands, and had a copy of a memorandum in support of a test ban treaty attached to it.

The delegations to Canberra revolved around the claim that the documents presented to Parliament and the embassies had some form of representative potency. Though the declaration had acquired the representative force of “unanimous” adoption at coordinated rallies, by August 1962 the declaration was expressed through a nation-wide petition, bolstering its claim to represent Australian public opinion. Australian peace organisations had previously used the petition in the form of the 1949 ‘Peace Ballot,’ which was quickly subsumed by activities in support of the World Peace Council’s 1950 Stockholm Appeal for a total ban of Nuclear Weapons. The national petition of 1962 demonstrates that when presented with a new idea from an international correspondent, Australian activists first drew on existing practice and experience. The 1962 ‘Campaign to Canberra,’ as the apogee of Australian anti-nuclear protest in the 1960s, was an amalgam of practices sourced from local experience and global example, augmented by experimentation and by the repurposing of established forms of protest.

Amidst experimentation, translation and repurposing, the radial walk stands as an example of a new protest practice. It was envisioned as “radial columns of marchers converging on the City from the outer suburban perimeter of an area which would be devastated by an H. Bomb exploding over Sydney.” The concept was used in all three cities between Easter 1962 and 1966. The radial march responded to the lack of nuclear infrastructure in Australia. With no equivalent facility to Aldermaston or Holy Loch, Australian protesters focused on the possibility of Australian cities being the target of nuclear strikes – a possibility implied by Australia’s international position as the supporting ally of nuclear powers, rather than a nuclear power in its own right. A SCND leaflet argued that “H-Bombs in Australia mean H-Bombs ON Australia.”

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130 “National Campaign to Canberra, August 15, 1962 -To All Embassies”.
claiming that bases designed to aid the launch of first-strike nuclear weapons could become priority targets in the event of nuclear war. The radial march concept side-stepped the lack of nuclear infrastructure, calling the absence of nuclear bases in Australia into focus in order to oppose their construction. The Australian Easter marches were often publicised as opportunities for Australians to “demonstrate our support for the British movement for nuclear and total disarmament,” especially in 1962. The radial march was developed in relation to Australian activists’ understanding of their own local political context as citizens of a non-nuclear partner to great and powerful friends.

In a similar fashion, Australian CND groups adopted the British Campaign’s position on unilateral disarmament, but did so in an attempt to distance themselves from the Cold War consensus that conflated Australian peace activism with communism. The British CND’s central demand was for the unconditional renunciation of nuclear weapons by Britain, regardless of the status of other powers’ nuclear arsenals. According to Jodi Burkett, CND’s leaders were engaged in a nationalist project, and anti-nuclear activism was in part an effort to articulate a progressive form of Britishness. CND activists argued that by standing as an example of unilateral nuclear disarmament, Britain could precipitate the end of the Cold War in a similar way to the British banning of the slave trade. The Australian CND groups adopted the same unilateralist approach. In February 1963, the Sydney CND Newsletter summed up the British position as “Make your own Government renounce nuclear arms and bases, unconditionally,” and acknowledged that it was the aim of the group to “work on the same lines as CND in Britain”. The Western Australian CND group outlined a similar position in their newsletter, as did the VCND members who drafted the common policy document for the proposed National

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133 SCND, “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Sydney) - What Should We Do?” (leaflet), [1962]; and SCND, “H-Bombs IN Australia means H-Bombs ON Australia,” (leaflet), [1962], both in Folder “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” Box 1 (2), PND Records (add-on 1997).
135 Taylor, Against the Bomb, 26-7.
137 SCND, Newsletter, no. 3, February 1963, 6, Folder “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” Box 65 (74), PND Records.
CND. The idea of unilateralism as moral leadership was reframed by Australian anti-nuclear activists: leaflets produced by the NSWPCICD and CICD for Hiroshima Day 1962 exhorted the public to “Let Australia lead against policies that threaten the future of mankind.” In the context of Calwell’s proposal for a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere, this framing accorded Australia a regional leadership role similar to Britain’s world role. The British CND’s language of unilateralism and moral leadership was adopted by local CND groups, and some of this rhetoric circulated through other peace groups.

Unilateralism was attractive to Australian peace activists because it offered an answer to the trenchant criticism that peace organisations were Communist fronts. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, prominent Coalition MPs spoke in parliament about the state and federal peace councils as communist front organisations, and the criticism stuck. Even once those same peace groups began to agitate against nuclear weapons, they were unable to contest this public criticism. The award of the Lenin Peace Prize to William Morrow, a former Tasmanian Labor Senator and Secretary of the NSWPCICD, attracted attention at the inaugural Sydney Hiroshima Day march. The word ‘peace’ was included in inverted commas in the Sydney Morning Herald’s headline, indicating that the paper thought the NSWPCICD was a communist front organisation. The Canberra Times also made prominent mention of Morrow’s Soviet award, under the pejorative headline “100 feted at red embassy”. The QPC caused some controversy in the pages of the Courier-Mail in 1962 when the executives of the Federated Clerks Union and the Federated Ironworkers’ Association threatened to withdraw from the annual Labour Day march because they would not have their unions associated with a communist front organisation. In August that year, a group of 50 counter-demonstrators marching under banners reading “Better Dead Than Red” interrupted the larger anti-nuclear march organised by

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142 “100 Feted at Red Embassy,” Canberra Times, September 21, 1961, 3.
the QPC, Fellowship of Reconciliation and Society of Friends. Fights began when QPC marchers tore down the counter-demonstrators’ banners.\textsuperscript{144}

By critiquing both western and Soviet nuclear policy, the CND groups hoped to resist the categorisation as communist front organisations that had plagued the peace councils. In early 1964 the Victorian CND (VCND) newsletter \textit{Sanity} reported on the formation of the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, noting that the Soviet Peace Committee had blasted the international confederation of anti-nuclear organisations as a tool of “agents of the imperialists, who are working to split the ranks of the peace forces”.\textsuperscript{145} By demonstrating that they were aligned with a group that attracted criticism from the Soviet Peace Committee, the VCND hoped to demonstrate that unilateralism was incompatible with Stalinism. When they were drawn into a protracted debate with Dr. Frank Knopfelmacher at Melbourne University through pamphlets, public confrontation and stories in the student newspaper \textit{Farrago}, the VCND invoked unilateralism as an argument against Knopfelmacher’s characterisation of the organisation as a communist front.\textsuperscript{146} The world-wide movement was the medium through which such unilateralism could spread. The Sydney CND’s Research Action Group advocated that to side-step the “irresponsible” leaders who preferred “for reasons of their own, to remain on the brink of war … We must begin negotiating directly with citizens in every country. …we need information based on direct contact with the very people who are supposed to be our enemies”.\textsuperscript{147} The VCND published an account of two Committee of 100 members who had travelled to East Berlin to “see what potential existed for a non-aligned ‘unilateralist’ protest movement in East Germany”. The article explained that:

‘Go back to Russia’ and ‘Why don’t you demonstrate in Red Square?’ are suggestions well known to CND supporters. They indicate a widespread belief that Peace Groups in the West undermine the morale and preparedness of the ‘Free World’ and are thus wittingly or unwittingly tools in the Cold War.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{144} Ibid.; “Rival Peace Groups In Brawls,” \textit{Canberra Times}, August 6, 1962, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{145} “CND Confederation is Imperialist Plot, say Russians,” VCND \textit{Sanity} 3:2 (February 1964), 2.
\item \textsuperscript{146} “VCND Smeared at University,” VCND \textit{Sanity} 3:3 (March 1964), 2-3; and “Is VCND in Danger?” VCND \textit{Sanity} 3:3 (March 1964), 8-9.
\item \textsuperscript{147} SCND Research Action Group, \textit{Disarmament Rag}, August 6, 1962, Folder “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” Box 1 (2), PND Records (add-on 1997).
\end{itemize}
One organisation which actually has demonstrated behind the Iron Curtain is the Committee of 100. The publication of the article, coming after two months of the newsletter defending the VCND against red-baiting ‘attacks’, was an attempt to mobilise universalism as a foil to the domestic Cold War politics of red-baiting.

If the long march found fertile soil and unilateralism could be used to similar ends in both the UK and Australia, civil disobedience demonstrated the limits of translation. Despite examples from Britain being reported in the press and in correspondence, Australian anti-nuclear protesters proved resistant to the adoption of confrontational lawbreaking in the Committee of 100 model. Newspaper coverage of the Aldermaston marches furnished Australians with examples of protest marches held in contravention of police directions. The Committee of 100’s initial letter asking for support had included a flyer that spoke of a “new method of non-violent protest” that included the rejection of the government ban on their protest. Among Australian organisations that protested nuclear weapons, only the Sydney and Brisbane CND groups expressed sentiments in line with lawbreaking as protest. The Disarmament Rag newsletter advocated that readers “refuse to pay taxes for a military budget” but this underdeveloped suggestion of civil disobedience was never carried out. After the leak of war plans in the UK by the ‘spies for peace,’ the Sydney group reprinted the pamphlet, courting legal action. The BCND was investigated for its potential role in the reprinting, with the “security police” visiting BCND offices, interviewing members and taking samples from typewriters. After this investigation

150 Committee of 100, “Berlin Polaris War? Mass Resistance” (1961 Polaris/Holy Loch leaflet), [September 1961], Folder “Committee of 100,” Box 2 (74), PND Records.
153 Lewis, “CND Report on Spies for Peace (Australia Inc.),” July 11, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection; “Spies for Peace (Australia Inc.),” [July 1963], Folder 4, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.
and in an atmosphere of increasing perceived hostility towards demonstrators in Queensland, BCND secretary Janet Lewis wrote to other CND organisations, attempting to get a more comprehensive picture of laws and regulations governing public assemblies and demonstrations.\footnote{Lewis to Mary Wilson (Secretary, WACND), October 7, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.} While BCND eventually convened a “Direct Action Subcommittee” and Lewis explained that the point was to “put these laws to the test in the near future,” the BCND’s advice to a hopeful activist in Rockhampton was to negotiate with local authorities before planning protests.\footnote{Lewis to Duff, December 10, 1963; and Lewis to Doug, October 19, 1963, both in Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.} It outlined the regulations that govern the use of common protest practices: vigils, leaflets, posters, stickers, painted slogans, pickets, jerkin parades, marches, and radial walks.\footnote{BCND, “Report of the Direct Action Sub-Committee, December 1963,” Folder 4, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.} Rather than outlining tactics for politicised law-breaking, the pamphlet was instead a manual for how to produce legal protest. Even the most radical of Australian protesters in the early 1960s shied away from advocating law-breaking.

The BCND’s Direct Action Sub-Committee took its name from the Committee of 100’s Gandhian predecessor, and understood how that organisation used moral lawbreaking as protest. In correspondence, Lewis referred to Queensland as “well-nigh a police state,” interpreting the effect of these laws as the prevention of peaceful assembly for political demonstrations.\footnote{Lewis to Duff, December 10, 1963. Lewis also describes Queensland as “virtually a police state” in Lewis to Jeffrey, February 21, 1963, Folder 2, Box 1, D’Urso Collection.} Despite precedents in Britain and elsewhere, the report did not advocate the breaking of these laws as a moral response to such repressive legislation:

> It is true that there is a technique called “civil disobedience” which is used by some nuclear disarmament groups, but it must be remembered that this involves not disorder and violence, but rather a very great degree of discipline and peaceful intention. The whole question of civil disobedience and its justification is an exceedingly complex one which is not dealt with at the present time.\footnote{BCND, “Report of the Direct Action Sub-Committee, December 1963,” 1-2.}

The Brisbane CND’s Direct Action Sub-committee noted that “Whatever the difficulties CND must take direct action, because this is the very basis of the movement,” recognising that their
refusal to adopt civil disobedience put them at odds with the rest of the world-wide movement.\textsuperscript{159} To make good this gap, the report reinterpreted Gandhian protest in light of Australian labour history, noting that “we are the successors to such organisations as the early trade unions and the suffragettes.”\textsuperscript{160} The BCND dismissed moral law-breaking as a possible alternative, advocating only for negotiation and compliance with police and officials.

Australian anti-nuclear protests were thus civil affairs. With the exception of the unplanned “brawl” with the counter-demonstration at the Brisbane Hiroshima Day march of 1962, confrontation was absent from anti-nuclear protest in Australian before 1965.\textsuperscript{161} NSWPCICD organisers applied for permits for each march, and they were always granted under the following conditions:

1. any banners carried must not be of an offensive nature and must not be carried on short poles or sticks.
2. that the route laid down is followed.
3. that participants march six abreast and retain close formation.
4. that there is immediate compliance with any Police direction.
5. amplifiers are not to be used.
6. that the number of vehicles taking part in the procession be limited to twenty, and that all join the procession at the assembly point.

The permit’s description of the protest as a “street procession” and the requirement that participants march “six abreast and retain close formation” indicates that from the police perspective there was no distinction between public processions and demonstrations. These instructions were copied by the NSWPCICD and distributed to marchers in printed form.\textsuperscript{162} Compliance with these permits, which were sought and issued until 1966, demonstrate that anti-

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
nuclear protest organisers in Australia went to great pains to comply with the law rather than to break it as a protest. Despite the example of the Committee of 100 in the UK, Australian protesters in 1966 could find no way to adapt civil disobedience to the Australian political milieu.

The Spectre of Vietnam

Between 1964 and 1966 external involvement in the growing Indochinese conflict replaced nuclear weapons as the prime focus of peace organisations’ protests. In mid-1966 the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee was reincorporated as the Project Vietnam Committee, the name change indicating that anti-nuclear protest had been eclipsed by anti-war protest.163 A flyer advertising the 1966 Hiroshima Day march in Sydney bore only the words:

Vietnam – International Days of Protest

Sunday August 7

Hiroshima Day 1966164

The flyer’s layout offers a visual clue to the shift in emphasis that had occurred by 1966. ‘Vietnam’ as the object of protest was superimposed on the organisational networks and protest practices of the anti-nuclear activism of 1961-1965.

Some practices developed during the anti-nuclear campaigns no longer made sense when applied to Vietnam. Long marches and radial marches were difficult to organise. The radial march was designed to symbolise the blast radius of nuclear weapons – a practice that lost its meaning once nuclear proliferation was no longer the focus of the protests. The effort to report public opinion remained a central concern for anti-war protesters, but they also understood their role as educative. After the success of Labor MP Jim Cairns’ speech in August 1964 on “Australia’s Relations with Asia,” the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee decided to replace

163 Broadhead (Secretary, Project Vietnam Committee) to Superintendent of Traffic, July 11, 1966, Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1966,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
the 1965 radial walks and delegations to Canberra with public forums in Sydney. The May 30th forum was entitled “Australia and Asia – the Years Ahead,” and publicity material claimed that

The purpose of this forum will not be to arrive at a common resolution or view, but rather an exchange of opinion in the hope of stimulating public opinion toward an examination of this primary problem for Australia’s security and future.

The press release assumed that any “examination” of the issue by the public would produce rational discourse and thus agreement with the protesters’ position. The assumption that any right-thinking member of the public could not fail but to see the validity of a dissenting position once informed of the facts was a resilient one in Australian activists’ thinking in the first half of the 1960s. So too was the assumption that protest organisations represented an imagined public. Just as anti-nuclear activists had delivered letters and resolutions to MPs claiming to represent Australian citizens, the secretary of AICD wrote to Menzies in December 1965 forwarding a resolution on Vietnam “adopted by a public meeting at Sydney Town Hall on December 13th, which was attended by 2000 citizens”. Similarly, “Project Vietnam” was “designed to … allow the expression of concerted public opinion and to stimulate public thought”. The experience of anti-nuclear protest bequeathed anti-war protesters the assumption that protest simultaneously mobilised and represented public opinion.

These assumptions remained part of Australian protest culture through the long 1960s. Key individuals belonged to both anti-nuclear and anti-war organisations. Bob Gould was the convener of Sydney CND and the Vietnam Action Committee. Roger Barnes, who was the Assistant Secretary of the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee, remained active in anti-war protest until the early 1970s. The CICD, AICD and QPC were all instrumental in anti-war protest throughout Australian involvement in the Vietnam War. This continuity of organisations and personnel meant that the critical engagement and solidarity with overseas protest remained

165 HCC, Press Release, [July-August 1964], Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1964,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
166 Broadhead, HCC circular, May 18, 1965, Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1965,” Box 67 (74), PND Records.
features of Australian activism. Many of the organisations and activists who became mainstays of anti-war protest over the ensuing decade cut their teeth on the anti-nuclear protests of the early 60s, learning how to frame protests in terms of public opinion, and how to look to international networks for inspiration and solidarity.
Chapter 2: Citizenship, Conscience, and Conscription

The conscription scheme that would supply men to the Australian intervention in Vietnam was announced by the Menzies Government in November 1964, with the first intake of National Servicemen slated for March the following year. Opposition began even before the first conscripts were selected by lottery. The National Service Scheme’s opponents argued that Australians preferred volunteerism in the armed forces and that conscription for overseas service required a popular mandate. They hoped to capitalise on latent anti-conscription feeling in the electorate dating back to the defeat of the conscription referenda in 1916 and 1917, and direct it towards helping the ALP into power. Debates over conscription became debates about Australian citizenship, influenced by both historical memory and transnational ideas: those in favour of conscription who argued that inclusion in the Australian political community was paid for by military service, while those against it argued that the right of the citizen to make their own decision on military service should be respected by the state. The failure of Labor to win government in November 1966 revealed that the historical distrust of conscription for overseas service was outweighed by the fear of communist insurgency in Asia. Even though the election put paid to the appeal to historical memory, anti-conscription protest could still be justified in Liberal terms. Opposition to military service for Vietnam thus equipped Australian protesters with a language that would animate further developments in protest practice.

This chapter refers to several distinct scholarly fields. It situates itself against the literature on the National Service Scheme and the memory of conscription in Australia; on liberal citizenship; on the transnational ‘New Left’; and on Australian women’s organisations. The National Service Scheme attracted considerable attention amongst historians, sociologists and political scientists in the 1970s and 1980s. In more recent decades, with the exception of Twomey’s recent work, it has largely disappeared from the agenda of historical inquiry. The bulk of the existing

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historiography concentrates on the administration of the Scheme rather than activism against it. There are a small number of histories of anti-conscription protest which generally rehearse the preoccupations of anti-conscription protesters, attacking the legitimacy of the Scheme and noting the efficacy of activists’ successes in foiling it.² Rather than repeating these assumptions, I use the notions of national historical memory, liberal citizenship and maternal citizenship to critique them.

Some scholars of Australian citizenship have noted that Australian public political culture in the 1950s and 1960s was marked by a burgeoning liberalism. Davidson interprets the contest between Menzies and Evatt over the banning of the Communist Party in 1951 as indicative of a struggle between Menzies’ conception that “democracy and responsible government” were sufficient to secure civil liberties and Evatt’s concern for individual rights. He also notes that changes in the ALP under Whitlam led to a concentration on individual liberties as part of a post-imperial shift to a ‘multicultural’ Australian identity.³ In a similar fashion, Beilharz identifies a “brief flourishing of social-liberal views of citizenship” in the labour movement in the 1950s, and its momentary reappearance under Whitlam in the early 1970s.⁴ Liberal influences were also evident in the transnational activist networks of the early 1960s. Geary argues that the radical influences of Herbert Marcuse and C. Wright Mills were detectable in the urtext of the New Left – The Port Huron Statement – and thus concludes that “key strands of postwar liberalism” influenced the New Left. He also notes the Statement’s acknowledgment of both Civil Rights and transnational anti-nuclear protest, both of which influenced the development of Australian activism in the period.⁵

There is now a rich literature on the gendering of citizenship. Feminist scholars have highlighted the pervasive gendered division between the public and private spheres; Cox describes the public sphere as “rule-driven” and rational, “manly” and “heroic” while the private sphere is feminised as “nurturing and emotional”. The long-standing assumption that men and women operated in different spheres and owed different obligations to the state produced the figure of the citizen-soldier, who traded duty to the nation for inclusion in the public life of the nation. That same division also relegated the woman-as-mother to the private sphere. Glenda Sluga has argued that members of international women’s organisations in the interwar years, like the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, “most commonly drew on conventional representations of sexual difference - of the especial maternal inclination of women to protect their race, or of the pacific qualities of femininity - rather than assert the liberal tenets of individualism, to subvert the idea that women had no national or international political functions”. In her work on the Motherhood Allowance campaigns of the 1920s, Marilyn Lake has applied the feminist scholarship on citizenship to Australian labour history. She argued that Australian women activists in the interwar period made an explicit claim on public participation by framing the citizen-mother in similar terms to the citizen-soldier, as a bargain of service for citizenship. Historians of women’s activism in the United States during the Vietnam War have examined the ways that women protesters have appealed to – and critiqued – this easy connection of femininity and motherhood to pacifism. Though the women of SOS did not make explicit reference to the actions of their interwar antecedents and transnational counterparts, the

ways their protests invoked femininity and motherhood and the women’s networks through which they formed make it clear that the ideas of a politics based in essential sexual difference and the mother-citizen informed their actions.

Situated between these four fields, this chapter will interpret four entangled threads that emerge from an examination of anti-conscription protest in this period. First, I will sketch out a history of the National Service Scheme and opposition to it. Then, I will look at the memory of the Great War anti-conscription referenda, and the ways activists in the 1960s mobilised those memories. In his election campaign, Calwell characterised the ALP as inherently opposed to conscription, while YCAC made much of the notion that overseas conscription required a popular mandate. These ideas owe their origins to the collective memory of the Great War conscription referenda.\textsuperscript{11} As Hirst argues, the ALP of 1965 harked back to 1916 in favour of Curtin’s “apostasy of 1942-3” of allowing conscripts to be sent to New Guinea and the South-West Pacific region.\textsuperscript{12} Calwell’s election campaign flattened the more complex history of the ALP’s relationship to compulsory military service. These facts did not trouble activists, nor blunt their enthusiasm for the idea of a referendum.

The next section explores the differing assumptions of YCAC and SOS. YCAC insisted that young men be left to keep “learning your trade, or using your uni degree, or just riding your board at Bondi”.\textsuperscript{13} This was a demand that men, usually public subjects in Australian history by virtue of military service, be left to live their private lives free from the interference of the state. Conversely, by becoming a “kind of movable Sydney landmark,” the women of SOS made a claim on public space and the public sphere.\textsuperscript{14} The final two sections of the chapter offer interpretations of two different protest practices: the burning of draft cards and the support of high-profile Conscientious Objection cases. Australian anti-conscription activists were mindful

\textsuperscript{12} Hirst, “Re-assessment Part II,” 47, 50.
\textsuperscript{13} Youth Campaign Against Conscription (hereafter YCAC) (NSW), “Are You Ready ... Young Man?” (leaflet), [1966], Folder “Youth Campaign Against Conscription Papers (Civil Disorder - Kew),” Youth Campaign Against Conscription Collection, MS10002, State Library of Victoria, Melbourne (hereafter YCAC Collection).
\textsuperscript{14} “Those women with banners,” \textit{Sun} (Sydney), December 14, 1965, 63.
of ideas and practices circulating across national borders. The chapter will demonstrate that this shared liberal critique of democratic citizenship helped foster the adoption of the American practice of draft card burning by Australian anti-conscription activists. The final section of the chapter will argue that liberal conscience animated the Conscientious Objection cases that anti-conscription groups threw their support behind.

The National Service Scheme and Anti-Conscription Protest, 1964-1966

In November 1964, the Menzies government announced the reintroduction of compulsory military service as part of a broad defence review. The massive spending program, which attracted significant press attention for close to a month, also included new, modern equipment and a significant reorganisation of all three armed forces. The new National Service Scheme attracted criticism because for the first time, conscription for overseas service was expressly allowed. The previous scheme, which had been in effect since 1949, had been suspended four years earlier. It had stipulated that only volunteers could serve overseas, though conscripts had been sent to Malaya in 1955 under this scheme. The Scheme took effect in January 1965 and required men aged 20 to 26 to register with the department of Labour and National Service.

Young men registered during the six month “registration period” during which they turned 20. There were four intakes of new conscripts every year – one each in February, April, June/July and September. Conscripts were selected from registrants by a lottery of birthdays held twice a year. The ballots used the same rotating barrels and numbered marbles that Tattersalls used in state lotteries. One marble was placed in the barrel for each date in the registration period. From 1965 to mid-1967, each lottery selected between 25 and 53 birthdates and thus furnished between 13 000 and 22 000 potential conscripts. Men whose birthdays fell on dates not drawn were ‘balloted out’ of the lottery and their service was deferred indefinitely. In total, 800 000

15 “Huge defence effort,” Australian, November 9, 1964, 1; “Call-up; Record Arms Vote,” Age November 11, 1964, 1; “Menzies Announces Major Defence Plans,” SMH, November 11, 1964, 10.
16 Hirst, “A Reassessment Part II,” 50.
young men registered and 63,000 of those were conscripted.  

Men who were balloted in were directed to attend a medical examination. If they passed, they were inducted into the army and sent to basic training.

The National Service Scheme was intended to bolster Australian capacity to meet perceived Cold War threats in Asia. Australians identified the violence that accompanied the decolonisation of Asia as the operation of the domino effect. There had been a permanent Australian deployment in Malaya resulting from Australian participation in the Commonwealth police action against Communist insurgents in that decolonising state in the mid-1950s. In the same period, Indonesian encroachments on West New Guinea began to cause Australian observers concern. By the time of the deployment of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) in May 1962, Australian newspapers were concerned by long-term communist insurgeries in Laos and Vietnam, as well as an Indonesian revolution. In the same month the Australian government committed a squadron of RAAF sabres to Thailand in an attempt to bolster that nation’s defences against a possible Laotian communist incursion under the auspices of the SEATO treaty. In July 1964 the Australian noted fighting in Vietnam, Laos and a possible American deployment to Malaysia, and quoted Minister for External Affairs Hasluck as saying that “A dark shadow of fear hangs over all of South-East Asia”. By late 1964 Australian commentators were overwhelmed by the variety of threats they saw emanating from the region.

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Australian newspapers tended to conflate these Asian threats. In the context of the looming Defence Review, the *Sydney Morning Herald* referred to the tension between Indonesia and Malaysia as a “national emergency”.25 A letter to the paper in the week following the announcement argued that this emergency had been “perfectly foreseeable since Dien Ben Phu,” including the conflict in Vietnam as part of the national emergency.26 At the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident, the *Australian* reported on the possibility of Chinese involvement.27 A month after the announcement of Australian commitment to Vietnam, the *Herald* anticipated communist “offensives” in both Borneo and Vietnam, masterminded in Beijing, while the *Australian* suggested that the 200 million strong Chinese army was “ready to fight” in Vietnam.28 The defence review, and National Service, responded to a deep-seated Australian anxiety about international communism in Asia.

The breadth of the expected Cold War threat meant that it took time for Vietnam to stand out. In part, the use of conscripts in a war zone was what made Vietnam so noteworthy in comparison to Indonesia, Laos, or Malaysia. On the day of the announcement of the Scheme, the *Sydney Morning Herald* argued that National Service was part of “preparing against war with Indonesia,” while the *Australian* noted that the aim of the new bases and deployments was to “encircle Indonesia”.29 By the time National Service was announced, Australian troops in Malaya had been engaging Indonesian paratroopers and repelling landings.30 Conscription was instituted as much to keep Australian deployments in Malaysia staffed against possible Indonesian encroachment, and the Malaysian deployment was maintained with conscripts until 1967.31 Though the use of conscripts in Vietnam was expected as soon as Australian troops were committed and there was broad consensus on the need for an expanded defence force to meet

28 “We will send in troops – China,” *Australian*, April 22, 1965, 6; “Mao’s 200m. are ready to fight,” *Australian*, May 10, 1965, 5.
29 “Preparing against war with Indonesia,” *SMH*, November 11, 1964, 2; “Huge defence effort,” *Australian*, November 9, 1964, 1.
threats in Asia, there was no such consensus on the use of conscription to supply men to an active warzone. Between March and August 1965 the deployment of conscripts to active service in Vietnam was still uncertain.\textsuperscript{32} When the first unit containing conscripts bound for Vietnam marched through Sydney, the \textit{Australian} reported that there was “only sporadic applause and hardly any cheering”. This was in contrast to previous send-offs which were characterised by “wild enthusiasm”.\textsuperscript{33} Though National Service would later become synonymous with Vietnam, YCAC’s assurance a fortnight before commitment that “Conscription means Vietnam” was far from obvious to Australians in mid-1965.\textsuperscript{34}

The institution of conscription immediately attracted protest. Within days of the announcement the Catholic newspaper \textit{The Advocate} had called the Scheme “cynical and offensive,” and both the Victorian branch of the ALP and the Union of Australian Women had criticised it in publications.\textsuperscript{35} Within a week a Sydney rally sponsored by the Central Methodist Mission had passed a resolution in the same manner as anti-nuclear rallies had previously, noting that “this meeting of Australian citizens urges the United Nations to intervene in the Indonesian-Malaysian-Australian conflict,” although three people present abstained from the vote.\textsuperscript{36} The next day, a group of thirty women in black hoods made a silent protest during a speech by Menzies at a Senate election rally in Hornsby. The women stood silently, instigating a raucous reaction from the crowd who both jeered and cheered them. As Menzies spoke on conscription, the women silently filed out of the town hall, handing out pamphlets as they went.\textsuperscript{37} Another Senate election rally became the site of protest when a group of men heckled Menzies in Brisbane, raising an anti-conscription poster at the side of the hall.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{32} “Draftees may have to go, too,” \textit{Australian}, March 30, 1965, 1; “Big boost in call-up,” \textit{Australian}, May 1, 1965, 1; “Trainees expected to fight in Vietnam,” \textit{SMH}, August 9, 1965, 4.

\textsuperscript{33} “Conscripts march to war through city that watches in silence,” \textit{Australian}, April 22, 1966, 1.

\textsuperscript{34} YCAC (NSW), “Conscription Means Vietnam” (leaflet advertising rally in Wynyard Park on 9\textsuperscript{th} April), [March/April 1966], Folder “Youth Campaign Against Conscription Papers (Civil Disorder - Kew),” YCAC Collection.

\textsuperscript{35} “Church hits draft,” \textit{Australian}, November 16, 1964, 1; “Call-up not the issue,” \textit{Australian}, November 20, 1964, 2.

\textsuperscript{36} “MPs on both sides have let Australia down’,” \textit{SMH}, November 23, 1964, 3; “Rally Attacks Plans for Conscription,” \textit{SMH}, November 23, 1964, 5.


\textsuperscript{38} “Jeers for P.M. in Rowdiest Meeting of Tour,” \textit{Age}, December 1, 1964, 1.
It was as part of this early outburst of protest that the first YCAC group formed in Sydney. The organisation was inaugurated at a “packed” meeting at Sydney Town Hall. In August 1965, a similar group of the same name formed in Melbourne, at a meeting of 40 people in a café in Carlton. A third group known as Youth Against Conscription started in Queensland around the same time. Five out of the six executive members in Sydney and all four office-bearers in Melbourne were members of the Young Labor Association. The federal structure of Young Labor enabled interstate communication; as soon as the Victorian Youth Campaign was formed it began corresponding with its NSW counterpart. Individual branches of the party and Labor MPs donated towards YCAC’s operating costs. YCAC was sustained by the infrastructure of campus Labor Clubs, the Young Labor organisation, and the federal ALP.

YCAC chose sites at which the operation of National Service was visible wherever possible. Victorian members protested outside the first drawing of marbles in Melbourne. The Sydney organisation protested at Central Station as the second intake of National Servicemen were transported to basic training in November 1965. Barry Robinson, Secretary of the Sydney group, reported to Trevor Ashton in Melbourne that

> [a]bout five hundred people turned up at the main railway station, causing temporary disorder even though we were met with a well-organised police, railway officials and army MPs brigade. One of our members was arrested, and subsequently charged in court.

They also pioneered the practice of burning registration papers – which they called ‘draft cards’ after the American example – at rallies. The first example of the practice was at a rally in Belmore Park, Sydney on February 2, 1966. Robinson and Wayne Haylen – who was Vice President of the NSW YCAC, set fire to their registration certificates in protest against the

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40 Murphy, *Harvest of Fear*, 144.
41 Barry Robinson (Secretary, NSW YCAC) to Trevor Ashton (Secretary, Victorian YCAC), [August/September 1965]; and Robinson to Ashton, November 13, 1965; both in Folder “16 (c) - Corres. 1965,” YCAC Collection.
42 A. Balmer (Hon. Secretary, West Moorabbin ALP Branch) to Ashton, August 14, 1965; John Bennett (Secretary, Upwey ALP Branch) to Ashton, September 6, 1965; and Jim Cairns to Ashton, August 4, 1965; all in Folder “16 (c) - Corres. 1965,” YCAC Collection.
43 “Protest as the call-up marbles rolled,” *Australian*, March 11, 1965, 1.
44 Robinson to Ashton, November 13, 1965.
National Service Scheme.\textsuperscript{45} The practice was used by other conscripts throughout 1965 and 1966. The three state groups met in January 1966 at the “First Australian National Youth Anti-Conscription Conference” in Sydney. They acknowledged the need for greater cooperation between the three organisations and also their sense of a growing movement against conscription.\textsuperscript{46}

SOS was founded in May 1965 at a meeting in YCAC’s Phillip street rooms “for the purpose of opposing Federal Government decision to conscript 20 year old youths for service overseas.” The small inaugural meeting attracted nine “mothers and friends” and elected an executive, the two most active of which were President Joyce Golgerth and Secretary Pat Ashcroft.\textsuperscript{47} By the end of June, a loosely-organised women’s group in Brisbane had contacted the Sydney women and asked to affiliate. By August, organisations had formed in Newcastle, Melbourne, and Adelaide. By the middle of 1966, SOS Sydney had made contact with branches in Perth and Wollongong. The Sydney group appointed itself as the peak body for the various groups around the country, and circulated their Statement of Aims as a constitution for adoption.\textsuperscript{48} The Sydney branch operated as a central branch, circulating reports of successful practice and distributing literature.\textsuperscript{49} Like YCAC, SOS formed through established networks. The initial Sydney meeting was brought together through cooperation between Golgerth, YCAC and the Teachers’ Federation.\textsuperscript{50} Women’s and feminist organisations, chief among them the Union of Australian Women (UAW) and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) were instrumental in the ongoing operation of SOS.\textsuperscript{51} In Melbourne, the inaugural meeting was

\textsuperscript{45} YAC Newsletter (NSW), March 1966, 6; Sean Scalmer, \textit{Dissent Events: Protest, the Media, and the Political Gimmick in Australia} (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), 4.

\textsuperscript{46} “First Australian National Youth Anti-Conscription Conference” (agenda), January 1966, Folder “Vietnam - Pamphlets and Leaflets,” YCAC Collection.


\textsuperscript{48} Pat Ashcroft (secretary, SOS NSW) to R. M. Collie (Secretary, SOS WA), April 15, 1966, Folder 2, “Western Australian Correspondence,” Box 1, SOS Records.

\textsuperscript{49} May Wharton (South Australian SOS) to Adele Pert (Acting Secretary, Sydney SOS), Dec 19, 1966; Wharton to Pert (Honorary Secretary, Sydney SOS), January 22, 1967; Pert to Wharton, April 20, 1967; Audrey Kelly (Secretary, Wollongong SOS) to Pert, July 14, 1967; all in Folder 2, “South Australian Correspondence,” Box 1, SOS Records.

\textsuperscript{50} Pert, “First Annual Report of SOS”.

\textsuperscript{51} Isobel McArthur to Joyce Golgerth (President, SOS Sydney) and Ashcroft, June 26, 1965, Folder 1, “Newcastle,” Box 1, SOS Records; Nola Barber (President, ALP Women’s Central Organising Committee) to Golgerth, [June 1965]; and Barber to Ashcroft, July 20, 1965; both in Folder 4, “Melbourne,” Box 1, SOS Records; Sylvia Harding (National Secretary, UAW) to Pert, June 15, 1971, Folder 14, Box 2, SOS Records; Ann Curthoys, “‘Shut up, You Bourgeois Bitch’: Sexual Identity and Political Action in the anti-Vietnam War Movement” in Joy Damousi and Marilyn Lake,
organised by WILPF and the Victorian Women’s Organising Committee of the Labor Party. The long-standing network of activist organisations that helped to nourish and sustain SOS were often obscured by representations of SOS as a spontaneous outpouring of maternal anger. The *Sun* reported that “the movement came into being in May, when the leader of the group, Mrs. Pat Ashcroft, and Mrs. Joyce Golgerth met in a Pennant Hills butcher shop.” SOS members initially attended protests organised by other peace or anti-war groups, like Hiroshima Day in Sydney in 1966. The organisation’s inaugural protest was a Silent Vigil for Peace organised by Methodist clergymen for May 20, 1965. It was attended by about 250 clergymen and laity. The word ‘vigil’ conjured up images of care and watchfulness, and SOS groups in Sydney and Brisbane mounted several vigils in mid-1965.

Like YCAC, SOS timed and targeted their protests according to the logic of the National Service scheme. SOS attended intakes of conscripts at barracks in Sydney and Melbourne, where they handed out leaflets to young men as they came in to answer their call-up notices. SOS in Brisbane conducted a town square vigil on the day that the conscripts left for basic training. The protests shared qualities with picket lines at conventional strikes. SOS women, clustered near the entry, would try and force leaflets into young men’s hands as they were shepherded into the barracks by supportive parents. Irene Miller recalls that she felt nervous going to the demonstrations, and explained that “[g]etting up at 4:30am, especially in the winter in the cold, and when it rained, it was hard, but you knew why you had to keep going.” Another mother in Melbourne SOS, Dorothy Dalton, recalled that “those intakes were very frightening and depressing, I used to make myself go, but I hated seeing those young fellows going in, so many of them being pushed in by their parents.” Relations with the parents were tense: “I handed out a

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52 Evelyn Rothfield to Ann Gregory (Secretary, UAW Sydney), June 8, 1965; and Rothfield to Ashcroft, June 25, 1965; both in Folder 4, “Melbourne,” Box 1, SOS Records.
58 Irene Miller (member of SOS), interview with Armstrong, quoted in Armstrong, “History of Save Our Sons,” 50; Miller was also interviewed by Greg Langley, in Langley, *A Decade of Dissent: Vietnam and the Conflict on the Australian Home Front* (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 52.
leaflet one morning, and the father snatched it out of his son’s hand … he was going in but he wasn’t allowed to read it”. 59 Along with Christian pacifist organisations and the AICD and CICD, SOS also focused on supporting unwilling registrants’ use of the Conscientious Objection provisions of the Scheme. The AICD kept files on individual conscripts who could serve as examples, and SOS organised support demonstrations outside magistrates’ courts when cases were being heard. 60 Bill White, Simon Townsend, Brian King, and John Zarb all became key spokespeople for the anti-conscription cause after having a Conscientious Objection application refused. 61

Because of the anti-conscription platform of the ALP, YCAC and SOS collaborated on the ‘Vote No’ campaign during the 1966 federal election campaign. The campaign was a stunt; its capacity to deliver anti-conscription candidates to the House of Representatives was limited. Neither of the ‘Vote No’ candidates and very few men subject to the Scheme could vote. The SOS Newsletter had suggested a leaflet campaign in swinging electorates as early as May 1966. 62 YCAC ran a candidate in the electorate of Chisholm, so “that in at least one electorate voters are given an opportunity to vote on conscription and the war in Vietnam divorced from party politics and attitudes towards party leadership.” 63 Brian King, a Conscientious Objector who was appealing his case in the Supreme Court, ran against the Minister for Labour and National Service in Wentworth. 64 YCAC claimed that they would not hand out how to vote cards, instead handing out anti-conscription leaflets. However, they planned to ask ALP candidates to place the words “Against Conscription” on their own how to vote cards. 65 Sydney SOS noted in the

59 Dorothy Dalton (member of SOS), interview with Armstrong, “History of Save Our Sons,” 45.
60 Box 35, PND Records; “Volunteers to Attend CO Hearings,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, August 1966, 4.
61 White’s case prompted the formation of the Bill White Defence Committee and the penning of the folk protest song ‘the Ballad of William White’ (“SOS Supports Teacher Refusing Military Call-up,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, July 1966, 1; Scates, Draftmen Go Free, 19). Townsend later became involved with the ‘Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act’ (CDNSA, “Report to Union, Student, Church and Independent Press,” [August/September 1969], Box 37, People for Nuclear Disarmament Records, MLMSS 5522, State Library of NSW, Sydney). Brian King ran against the Minister for Labour and National Service in his home seat of Wentworth in the 1966 election as a stunt (“Congratulations,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, November 1966, 1; Scates, Draftmen Go Free, 21), and John Zarb became the centre of an interstate campaign in 1967 (“‘Free Zarb’ cry in rowdy senate protest,” Australian, March 26, 1969, 3).
64 “Congratulations,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, November 1966, 1; Scates, Draftmen Go Free, 21.
65 YCAC, “The Vote No - Conscription Campaign,” (campaign summary document prepared for a conference of anti-conscription organisations), [1966], Folder “Vote No Campaign,” YCAC Collection.
November issue of its newsletter that they had “distributed over 6,000 leaflets, mainly in swinging federal elections of Lowe, Parkes and St. George in the Sydney area”, and that SOS members were “canvassing for particular anti-conscription candidates” in marginal seats. The failure of Labor to win government in 1966 demonstrated that opposition to conscription in the electorate was not significant enough to foment a change of government. After their failure to bring about an ALP victory, YCAC ceased operation. SOS survived the election, and continued to work with and outside of the antiwar movement through the Moratorium Campaign and until the end of Australian involvement in Vietnam.

Memories of the Great War

Both the ALP and anti-conscription protesters worked to make National Service an election issue. Calwell had hoped to draw on a groundswell of Australian opposition to conscription, invoking the popular memory of the anti-conscription referenda in 1916 and 1917. Twomey argues that conscription for overseas service was contentious even amongst supporters of the Scheme due to the long shadow of the conscription debates of the Great War. The necessity of a popular mandate began to appear in letters to the editor. Opponents of conscription argued that without a popular mandate, the government had no right to conscript its citizens at all. One letter called the Scheme “dictatorial,” arguing that the parents of potential conscripts should have had a direct say in the matter via referendum. Another letter argued that the government did not have “a mandate from the people it supposedly represents” and that “the decision whether a man should undertake a career … which may cost him his life must not be allowed to be made for him” without such a mandate. Responses to the defence review also recalled the belief that Australian soldiers were always volunteers. A chaplain who had served in both wars and voted for conscription in the referenda wrote to the Age to bemoan the possibility of shirkers hiding

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69 John W. Stone, “Dictatorial’ Call-up of Youth,” letter to the editor Age, November 20, 1964, 2.
70 Catherine Jackson, “A Mandate on Conscription?” letter to the editor, Age, November 24, 1964, 2.
behind volunteers, arguing that this would leave the best men dead while those of “inferior character” survived to “lower the nation’s standards generally.” Veterans of the Great War who opposed conscription noted that they had voted against conscription in 1916 or 1917, and argued that volunteers made better soldiers.

It was this potent but ambivalent memory that Calwell hoped to convert into electoral success for the ALP. To this end, he constructed a specifically Australian ‘tradition’ of anti-conscription that was both nationalistic and firmly embedded in the Labor Party. In doing so, he obscured a more complex history of the party’s relationship to compulsory military service. It had been a Labor Prime Minister, William Morris Hughes, who had pushed for conscription in 1916. Dyrenfurth has pointed to the myth that the Australian labour movement naturally opposed conscription, highlighting the acrimonious ALP split over conscription in 1916 and the fact that some in the labour movement advocated conscription of wealth alongside men. John Hirst argues that in the 1940s the ALP’s ideas about conscription were further complicated by the imagined demands of the American alliance, resulting in the creation of two parallel armies - one conscripted for use only in Australian territory, and a second volunteer army for use beyond Australian shores. Thus Curtin’s halting support for conscription was intended to demonstrate to MacArthur that Australians took home defence seriously. The previous military service scheme had only been “suspended” in 1960, thus some form of compulsory military training had been part of Australian civic life for most people under 30. Defence preparedness had bipartisan support; Calwell himself had previously called for expansion of the defence forces. Australian public attitudes to conscription were not as settled as Calwell made them out to be.

Ignoring this complex history, Calwell offered a summary of the party’s stance on conscription in March 1966: “We have always been an anti-conscriptionist party and we are

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73 Nick Dyrenfurth, “Conscription is not Abhorrent to Laborites and Socialists’: Revisiting the Australian Labour Movement’s Attitude towards Military Conscription during World War I,” Labour History 103 (2012): 145-64.
74 Hirst, “A Re-assessment Part I”.
proud of it. When we cease to be that, we cease to be an Australian Labor Party.”77 He was the one who rehabilitated a piece of Great War propaganda when he labelled the scheme the ‘Lottery of Death’ in parliament.78 Trade unionists continued to proclaim the natural connection between unions and opposition to National Service, citing the slogan “Peace is trade union business”.79 As late as 1969, the Seamen’s Union reprinted an anti-conscription pamphlet from the Great War titled ‘The Blood Vote’.80 Two members of the Victorian YCAC attended an Anti-conscription Jubilee celebration to mark the 50th anniversary of the First World War Conscription referenda, held one month before the 1966 Federal Election. Calwell was present on the podium alongside the two activists, along with Frank Hartley, one of the Peace Parsons.81 The YCAC policy statement explained that the lack of popular consultation and the requirement for overseas service were bones of contention.82 A second draft of the policy statement added the proviso that YCAC was not opposed to conscription in principle, but “holds strongly that conscription for overseas service cannot be justified at a time when Australia’s security is not threatened”.83 The organisation also put an advertisement in the Australian in June 1965 under the title “we oppose overseas conscription”.84 SOS was cited in the press as believing that “boys should have the right to choose whether they want to fight overseas or not”.85 YCAC also represented the Federal Election as a “virtual referendum” that would stand in for the referendum to enact conscription that had been “denied the Australian people”.86 The rich collective memories of the conscription

79 Amalgamated Engineering Union, “If someone said to you, ‘Get out or Die,’ what would you do?” (leaflet), [October 1969], Box 4, Series/folder 2/7, Margaret Frazer Papers, accession number 93/158, University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter Frazer Papers); Trade Union Vietnam and Anti-Conscription Committee, “Stopping the War is Trade Union Business,” (leaflet), [June 1971], Box 25, Series/folder 4/11, Campaign for International Co-operation and Disarmament Collection, accession numbers 79/152; 87/92; 87/93; 88/107; 88/121, University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter CICD Collection).
85 “Those women with banners,” *Sun* (Sydney), December 14, 1965, 63.
86 YCAC, “The Vote No Conscription Campaign,” (leaflet), [October 1966]; and YCAC, “The Vote No - Conscription Campaign,” (campaign summary); both in Folder “Vote No Campaign,” YCAC Collection.
referenda nourished anti-conscription protest. YCAC’s critique of the Scheme rested in part on these memories, which linked the institution of conscription to popular mandate and implied that only volunteers ought to serve overseas.

Citizenship, Gender, and the Public/Private Divide

Opponents of national service fused this imagined historical tradition with the claim that the state had no right to interfere in the lives of citizens through conscription. Four days after the Scheme’s announcement, the *Advocate* noted that “those in authority had an obligation to restrict a citizen’s liberty only when the need was real and when it left no alternative”. 87 A Veteran of the Somme argued in a letter to the *Age* that even with a popular mandate, “no man has the right to demand that any fellow citizen must sacrifice his liberty and, perhaps his life for his own protection”. 88 Some supporters of the scheme, notably the RSL, argued that compulsory military service would produce capable and good citizens while meeting Australian defence needs. Twomey argues that the Scheme had widespread support due to the sense that national service would instil discipline and “the core values of citizenship”. 89 She also notes that supporters of the Scheme referred to a sense of duty to the nation, or the obligation young men had to fight for the privileges they enjoyed, secured for them by that nation. 90 Whether because it made men into better citizens or because it represented an obligation to the nation, National Service was first and foremost a question of citizenship.

The YCAC claimed that the obligation of military service should be balanced by the right to vote and the opportunity to participate in the political life of the nation. The organisation’s policy statement noted that conscription affected 19 and 20-year-olds while the voting age was 21, framing this discrepancy between right and obligation as a “disregard of democratic rights,” and arguing that because potential conscripts could not vote, they were not represented by the government that conscripted them. 91 The same critique informed a YCAC leaflet that advertised

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87 “Church hits draft,” *Australian*, November 16, 1964, 1.
89 Twomey, “The National Service Scheme,” 75.
91 YCAC Committee, “Policy Statement, ‘second’ version”.

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a rally in April 1966 with the words “no vote, no voice, no choice”.

Another leaflet pointed out the inequitable distribution of citizenship rights and obligations at the heart of the National Service Scheme, asking if young men were ready “to take up guns before you are given the vote?”

This concern was shared by the ALP, who proposed a bill in early May lowering the voting age to 20. A Labor spokesperson claimed that it was an attempt to “give every person within the scope of the Government’s infamous conscription policy the right to express their opinion at the ballot”. Though the bill never proceeded beyond debate, the discussion suggested several alternatives, including extending the franchise only to serving defence personnel. There was an attempt to offer this extension of the vote to women as well, otherwise the female citizen was absent from this debate over conscription. By offering to lower the voting age of only those subject to conscription the ALP was reinforcing the connection between military service – an opportunity only open to men - and participation in a democratic political community. The ALP’s attempt to balance rights and obligations with this bill thus points to the gendered implications of National Service as a citizenship obligation.

Because they were not themselves subject to the scheme, the women of SOS mobilised concepts of motherhood when explaining their activism. The Newsletter quoted the organisation’s president as saying that the group was “instigated by myself and other mothers of 20-year-olds,” and that she “started contacting other mothers of boys eligible for conscription”. In a Sun article, Golgerth invoked the domestic and feminised activity of shopping for groceries as central to the formation of SOS. Jean McLean, of the Victorian organisation, remembered that the first meetings were held in shopping centers. SOS also invoked a community of mothers when its members laid a wreath for the first two conscripts killed in Vietnam. The wreath was “signed ‘on behalf of all mothers who oppose conscription for overseas’.” The invocation of this community was performative; not all members of SOS were mothers of conscription age sons, or even women. Curthoys notes that the sons of Margaret Reynolds, a member in

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93 YCAC (NSW), “Are You Ready ... Young Man?”
95 “History of Save Our Sons Movement,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, June 1966, 5.
96 Armstrong, “History of Save Our Sons,” 25.
Townsville, were not of conscription age.\textsuperscript{98} The executive of the Western Australian SOS included men; this caused some confusion when Pat Ashcroft erroneously addressed a letter to the Perth secretary as “Mrs. Collie,” when her correspondent was in fact a man.\textsuperscript{99}

SOS was not the first Australian women’s organisation to attempt to generate political capital from motherhood. The UAW and WILPF both played a role in the establishment of SOS in 1965, and both organisations had been involved in the interwar campaign for the motherhood endowment. SOS was part of a longer history of Australian women’s organisations. Crucial here is Lake’s model of Australian maternal citizenship. She argues that to secure the motherhood allowance, feminist activists between the wars constructed a model of citizenship for women that operated “like soldier citizenship, as a two-way contract through which mothers would be paid for their service to the state”.\textsuperscript{100} The construction of this mother-citizen brought women and motherhood out of the private realm and into the public, in an effort to challenge masculine power in parliament and the labour movement.

Unlike the Motherhood Allowance campaigners of the interwar years, SOS activists never claimed that motherhood was a service to the state akin to conscription. They did promote the idea that mothers were naturally anti-conscription, nourished by a selective memory of the anti-conscription activism of the First World War. The Newsletter quoted Great War anti-conscription activist and WILPF member Eleanor May Moore who expressed her opposition to conscription in gendered terms:

\begin{quote}
I am a woman. I can only be loyal in a woman’s way. I cannot give to the state what is not mine. … Voting away other people’s liberty is not patriotism – it is persecution. Forcing other people to risk their lives for me is not courage – it is cowardice.\textsuperscript{101}
\end{quote}

Other anti-conscription activists shared this notion of anti-conscription motherhood. As late as 1969 the Seamen’s Union reprinted a World War One anti-conscription poster featuring a poem

\textsuperscript{98} Curthoys, “Shut up, You Bourgeois Bitch,” 322.
\textsuperscript{99} Ashcroft to Collie, April 15, 1966.
\textsuperscript{100} Lake, “Personality, Individuality, Nationality,” 28.
\textsuperscript{101} “Eleanor M. Moore – World War 1 Anti-conscriptionist,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, June 1966, 3.
called “The Blood Vote”. Calwell also referenced the pamphlet during the election campaign.\textsuperscript{102} The opening stanza read:

\begin{center}
\begin{verse}
Why is your face so white, Mother?

Why do you choke for breath?

O I have dreamt in the night, my son,

That I doomed a man to death\textsuperscript{103}
\end{verse}
\end{center}

In framing their anti-conscription protest by positioning themselves as mothers, SOS could tap into popular memories of the Great War as well as a tradition of women’s activism that understood mothers in public as political actors.

The women of SOS engaged in public political activity not on their own behalf, but on behalf of their ‘sons’. The citizen-soldier, not the citizen-mother, remained the object of their efforts. While they offered a critique of the gendered hierarchy of Australian citizenship, their protest practice was hardly novel. In a 1992 interview Melbourne SOS member Jean MacLean expressed her own faith in the communicative reason of the public as a way to render stark her later turn to a more radical politics:

\begin{center}
There is no big problem, we’ll just alert the public to the fact conscription has been introduced to hoodwink us into being involved in Vietnam and everyone will vote against it in 1966.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{center}

MacLean understood the reason of the public as a tool for regulating the state and thus impelling legislative change. For this reason the organisation favoured a parliamentary approach. Their initial actions consisted of vigils, protests at intakes, and lobbying MPs. After the Silent Vigil for Peace four members of SOS met with Jim Forbes, then Minister for the Army. Delegates from Newcastle, Melbourne and Brisbane made a second trip in September 1965.\textsuperscript{105} The delegation

\textsuperscript{102} Murphy, \textit{Harvest of Fear}, 156-7.
\textsuperscript{103} Seamen’s Union of Australian, “Remember 1916-17, Now take 1969...” (anti-conscription leaflet), [1969], Box 26, Series/folder 5/13, CICD Collection.
\textsuperscript{104} Jean McLean (member of Melbourne SOS), interview with Langley, in Langley, \textit{Decade of Dissent}, 32. MacLean made similar comments in an interview with Armstrong, in Armstrong, “History of Save Our Sons,” 26.
attempted to see seven separate Liberal members of parliament to lobby them to reverse the
government position on conscription.\textsuperscript{106} SOS understood protest in similar terms to the peace
committees and anti-nuclear protesters of the early part of the decade.

The key to the vigil was its emphasis on quiet respect rather than noisy proclamation. The
Melbourne SOS’s newsletter explains that “We feel there are many opportunities for individual
discussions, but very few opportunities for the IMPACT OF SILENCE… HEAD BOWED,
HANDS CLASPED.”\textsuperscript{107} The Brisbane group put on a silent protest every Friday in Anzac
square, in which the women “all stand together with a white flower, and a word under it, which
all together, reads, ‘800 Australian boys have gone to war in Vietnam. Send them back, and
negotiate for a peaceful settlement’”.\textsuperscript{108} The Melbourne group reported that: “We feel that we
are creating a good image in the minds of the public when our vigils are described as ‘quiet’,
‘silent’, ‘orderly’, and we commend every woman who remained silent when she longed to
express her feeling vocally.”\textsuperscript{109} The \textit{Australian} reported that the demonstration was nothing like
“the usual mob meeting” with “blaring loudspeakers, noisy interjections, cheering, jeering and
clapping” and “mundane and crude banners”.\textsuperscript{110} The respectability that SOS sought reflected the
‘hat and glove’ approach of the UAW, and distinguished the group from other protest
organisations.\textsuperscript{111} The \textit{Sun} called them “mysterious” and talked about how they “appeared” at
army bases and train stations.\textsuperscript{112} The women disrupted understandings of political protest. When
compared to later coverage of protests, especially by university students, this language
demonstrates that SOS’ attempt to create political capital out of the combination of respectability
and the public figure of the citizen-mother was successful.

By contrast to SOS’ performance of citizenship as something purchased with service, YCAC
classified conscription as an immoral usurpation of citizens’ inalienable liberty and an
illegitimate interference in the lives of young men. Material produced in support of the ‘Vote

\begin{thebibliography}{112}
\item[106] “SOS Canberra Lobbying Mission Report,” [September 1965], Folder 23, Box 3, SOS Records.
\item[107] Armstrong, “History of Save Our Sons,” 42. Emphasis in original.
\item[108] Vilma Ward (SOS Brisbane) to Ashcroft, June 15, 1965, Folder 5, “Queensland,” Box 1, SOS Records.
\item[109] Armstrong, “History of Save Our Sons,” 42.
\item[110] “2 hours of prayer protest,” \textit{Australian}, May 21, 1965, 4.
\item[111] Armstrong, “History of Save Our Sons,” 44; Murphy, \textit{Harvest of Fear}, 143; Curthoys, “Shut up, You Bourgeois
Bitch,” 325; Marilyn Lake, \textit{Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism} (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999),
214.
\item[112] “Those women with banners,” \textit{Sun} (Sydney), December 14, 1965, 63.
\end{thebibliography}
No’ campaign asked: “Has the government the moral right to force 20-year-old youth to fight in a foreign war for which they are unwilling to volunteer?”

Correspondence between the Victorian and NSW YCAC placed the emphasis on the unfair distribution of duty:

Australians under threat have never needed coercion to defend themselves. Clearly they feel no sense of threat, and thus have not volunteered for this war. Hence it is surely grossly immoral that a minority should bear this appalling burden while the majority say, in effect ‘nothing doing mate’.

A YCAC leaflet explained the Scheme as an improper imposition on young men’s lives, asking them if they were ready

[t]o give up the next two years and possibly your life? … Instead of learning your trade, or using your uni degree, or just riding your board at Bondi … Are you ready to fight outside of Australia wherever your Government decides to send you?

YCAC’s central claim was that conscription was immoral; in some cases this argument rested on the Scheme’s unjust interference in citizens’ lives or its lack of moral legitimacy, in others it was the unjust and unequal curtailing of some citizens’ rights in contrast to others.

YCAC framed their demands in the language of liberalism. Its complaint against the method of selection – the lottery – was that because it was open to abuse, and was inherently random, it threatened civil liberties.

The ‘Vote No’ campaign demanded

the formation of a Civil Liberties Bureau, with a Government financed Secretariat to report on all proposed legislation affecting the lives and liberties of citizens. This Bureau to report directly to Parliament at the time of the introduction of the Bill.

A YCAC pamphlet from 1966 argued that “personal liberty is not to be surrendered lightly” under the heading “Australians like freedom, not compulsion. Conscription is a last resort for a

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113 YCAC, “The Vote No - Conscription Campaign,” (campaign summary).
114 Ashton to Lloyd Ross, October 5, 1966, Folder “Vote No Campaign,” YCAC Collection.
115 YCAC (NSW), “Are You Ready ... Young Man?”
116 YCAC Committee, “Policy Statement, ‘first’ version”.
real emergency”. Other organisations opposed to conscription used this language as well. The Association of Ex-Servicemen and Women for Peace listed “promote individual liberty and the democratic rights of all citizens” and “to recognise the right of dissent as an integral part of democratic society” amongst their aims. As well as nourishing anti-conscription protest, the language of liberalism fostered the adoption of one of YCAC’s most visible practices: the burning of registration certificates, or ‘draft cards’.

Translating Registration Certificates into Draft Cards

On February 2, 1966 Wayne Haylen and Barry Robinson, Vice President and Secretary of the Sydney Youth Campaign Against Conscription, set fire to the certificates sent to them by the Department of Labour and National Service to acknowledge their registration for the National Service Scheme. Robinson wrote of the protest that “I feel that drastic action must be taken in protest against this infringement of personal liberty of conscripts.” In March three member of YCAC in Melbourne burnt their cards outside Prime Minister Harold Holt’s house. The next day the Australian reported that the Department of Labour and National Service was considering stiffer penalties as the practice, which was “an anti-Vietnam war protest gimmick acquired from the United States is not exactly covered in National Service regulations”. By June the practice had spread to W.A. Though other methods of anti-conscription protest gained a higher profile after 1967, the burning of draft cards had longevity. Five Labor MPs, including Jim Cairns, burnt three draft cards in front of a rally in November 1969. The registration certificate that young men were sent as a receipt for their registration forms was a visible artefact left behind by a

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118 YCAC (NSW), “Why do most Australians oppose conscription for Vietnam?” (leaflet advertising protest on Friday, April 15, 1966), Folder 24, Box 3, SOS Records.
120 YCAC Newsletter (NSW), March 1966, 6; Scalmer, Dissent Events, 4.
121 Robinson to “Dear fellow conscript,” March 10, 1966, Folder “Youth Campaign Against Conscription Papers (Civil Disorder - Kew),” YCAC Collection.
122 “…and youth has its say,” Australian, March 21, 1966, 3.
125 “Protesting M.P.s burn draft cards,” SMH, November 17, 1969, 10;
young man’s passage through the Scheme. By burning them in public, YCAC activists attempted to turn them into a symbol of the arbitrary interference that YCAC deplored.

As a symbolic act of civil disobedience, the practice had its intellectual roots in Gandhi’s 1896 burning of his South African work papers. As the Australian suggested, the practice was adopted after activists observed its use in the United States. American draft card burning formed part of a symbolic conversation between activists and Congress. Michael Foley notes that after Life magazine published a picture of an American Catholic activist burning his draft card, Congress passed a law banning the mutilation or destruction of draft cards. On the same day as the law passed, David Miller stood in front of a crowd in Manhattan and burned his draft card as an act of protest against both the war in Vietnam and the new law. Miller’s action garnered the attention of law enforcement and media alike. Miller was taking part in the Berkeley “International Days of Protest” of October 1965, for which the Australian anti-war movement put on a solidarity action.126 A national anti-conscription conference in January 1966 passed a motion “[t]hat this conference urges all anti-conscription groups to consider draft card burning at future demonstrations as an effective means of protest.”127 The first Australian draft card burning took place in Belmore Park in Sydney a month later. Acknowledging the source of the protest, the April newsletter reported that burning of draft cards was a “form of protest taken from the United States”.128

Despite their common vocabulary, the practice required translation before it could be understood in the Australian context. In 2007 former YCAC activist Michael Caulfield explained that “unfortunately, we did not have draft cards as the Americans did, so they burnt registration notices instead”.129 The pieces of paper burned by conscripts in both countries therefore operated differently. Australia’s National Service Scheme was organised at the federal level through the Department of Labour and National Service. The United States’ system required individual local draft boards to assess each candidate for conscription. American conscripts carried two pieces of paper: a registration certificate and a classification certificate. Which piece of paper they

127 “First Australian National Youth Anti-Conscription Conference” (agenda), 2.
128 YCAC Newsletter (NSW), [April 1966], 2.
129 Blunden, interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent, 48; Caulfield, The Vietnam Years, 117.
identified as ‘draft cards’ and burnt is not always clear from accounts of the practice. The classification certificate identified men who had already been before a draft board and been classified as fit (or unfit) for service. Burning it hindered the capacity of the state to track the conscript.130 In Australia, the scheme was administered federally. All information was sent into a central federal department and held there. The pieces of paper that men eligible for National Service burnt at protests in Australia were receipts, not identity cards. They were not integral to the process of conscription; a man could be tracked and conscripted with the information held about him in Canberra.

Australian registration certificates were a useful way for government officials to ascertain a registrant’s compliance with the scheme, but the different administrative functions of registration certificates and draft cards meant that different penalties were attached to their destruction. YCAC noted in March 1966 that “the government is now considering legal action” and that “some newspapers have been urging the government to prosecute under the appropriate sections of the Crimes Act”.131 However, the Federal Government lagged behind the US Congress in legislating against draft card burning. While there were penalties for destroying it, they were limited until 1968. According to Roy Forward, before 1968 the National Service Act levied a penalty of $20 for failure to notify the registrar of the loss, damage or defacement of the certificate. This penalty did not differentiate between deliberate damage and failing to report a certificate that did not arrive in the mail. If reported, the cost of replacement was 25c, and the registrar could waive this fee at their discretion. In all cases, the onus was on the registrant to avoid the penalties.132 In March 1966, the YCAC newsletter recognised the differences between American and Australian government and police responses: “[a]s yet there has been no FBI or any legal moves against draft card burning. VASTLY DIFFERENT TO THE AMERICAN SCENE.”133 Despite the Department of Labour and National Service’s expressed concern in March 1966, it was not until 1968 that the National Service Act was amended to increase the penalty for “willfully destroying, damaging or defacing a registration certificate” to $200.134

130 Foley, Confronting the War Machine, 119, 149, 227.
131 YCAC Newsletter (NSW), [April 1966], 2.
133 YCAC Newsletter (NSW), March 1966, 6. Emphasis in original.
The burning of registration certificates indicates that the student activists of YCAC were conversant in American student politics. This was not unusual for Australian students in the 1960s. As well as noting draft card burning, Scalmer outlines the translation and incorporation of the “Freedom Rides” from an American Civil Rights practice to an Australian practice in service of Indigenous rights in 1965.\textsuperscript{135} The word ‘draft’ was not used by Australians to describe the Scheme until late 1965, and it was newspapers not activists who were the first to import the American term, albeit in the context of “draft-dodgers”.\textsuperscript{136} Anti-conscription protesters adopted the phrase alongside the practice, but a month after the first draft card burning, the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} still referred to them as “call-up cards”.\textsuperscript{137} Though the term ‘draft’ was in common use by 1967, it took time for Australians to interpret it in local political terms.

The burning of draft cards was rendered comprehensible to YCAC activists by a shared vocabulary of liberal individualism, though the peculiarities of the two schemes meant that the meaning of the act changed substantially. Burning an American ‘draft card’ symbolically disrupted the administration of the Selective Service Scheme by obstructing the draft boards’ capacity to process the individual in question. Burning an Australian registration certificate, on the other hand, symbolised the retraction of previously-given acceptance of the scheme. In the context of Australian activism against the National Service Scheme, burning a registration certificate framed conscription as an infringement of personal liberty.

\textbf{Conscientious Objection}

The tension between the notion of military service as payment of a debt to the nation and the characterisation of conscription as an infringement of individual liberty played out most keenly in high-profile Conscientious Objection cases. The National Service Act stipulated that Aboriginal men, students, married men and those in the Citizen Military Forces could apply for deferment of their service. The Scheme allowed exemption for the physically and mentally

\textsuperscript{135} Scalmer, \textit{Dissent Events}, chap. 1.
\textsuperscript{136} “Draft dodgers will be held in CMF,” \textit{Age}, December 9, 1965, 3; “Government acts on ‘draft-dodgers’,” \textit{SMH}, December 9, 1965, 1.
\textsuperscript{137} “First Australian National Youth Anti-Conscription Conference” (agenda), 2; “Students to burn call-up cards,” \textit{SMH}, March 16, 1966, 10.
disabled, theology students, monks and clergymen. Registrants who held conscientious pacifist beliefs could also apply for exemption, and the interpretation of this exemption became the most visible and debated. Murphy has noted that opposition to the Vietnam War in particular was not sufficient to secure an exemption. Nevertheless, most exemptions were granted. Even anti-conscription organisations noted the high success rates. The Save Our Sons newsletter reported that of a total of 168 applications for total exemption made by August 1966, exactly half had been granted. In all, 72% of the 1012 conscientious objection claims made between 1965 and 1971 were granted, and in total over 1200 young men were exempted as Conscientious Objectors during the life of the Scheme. Despite these statistics, several key court cases were used by anti-conscription organisations to claim that the scheme failed to adequately allow for the exercise of individual conscience.

Though they represented a tiny minority of potential conscripts, high-profile conscientious objectors who failed to gain exemption became focal points for anti-conscription activists in 1965 and 1966. Bill White and Simon Townsend were the two most prominent examples before the election. White was a school teacher who was called up in the second ballot. SOS claimed his case “was the first one of refusal to serve” under the National Service Act. His cause was promoted by anti-conscription organisations as the first prominent test of the exemption provisions of the National Service Scheme. In March 1966 he was refused exemption and in July he refused to serve after receiving his call-up notice. SOS was one of a number that supported the establishment of the Bill White Defence Committee in the same month. As well as protesting the exemption provisions of the Act, the committee campaigned on White’s behalf and raised funds for his legal costs.

SOS reprinted and distributed White’s objections to military service. He argued that “our own right and desire for self-preservation” must be balanced against “the rights of self-preservation of others”. White also used the language of liberal rights to talk about the

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139 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 214.
143 “Support for Bill White,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, August 1966, 3.
Government’s side of the relationship, making it clear that he was “opposed to a State’s right to conscript a person”. The conclusion to White’s statement articulated a clear connection between liberal individualism and democracy:

I believe very strongly in democracy and democratic ideals - and I believe that it is in the area of the State’s right over the life of the individual that the difference lies between totalitarian and democratic government.¹⁴⁴

Murphy notes that the advocates for White “spoke entirely in terms of liberal conscience and rights”.¹⁴⁵

Townsend was a journalist whose application was also rejected in 1966. His reasons for refusal were based in conscientious opposition to killing, though he admitted he would take up arms to defend his mother were she under threat.¹⁴⁶ The rejection of both applications indicates a conflict between the liberal vocabulary of individual conscience, and the court’s assumption that only conscientious pacifism could justify exemption. Though on first glance it appears there ought to have been little conflict between liberal conscience and pacifist conscience, in practice it meant the difference between objection to all wars and objection to one war in particular: Vietnam. The ‘particular war’ objectors became visible out of all proportion to their tiny numbers, but they were indicators of shifting attitudes towards Australian citizenship in the 1960s.

One source of contention was the assumption that conscientious pacifism could only be religious in origin. This connection had been laid down during the Great War; it shaped activists’ assumptions as much as it shaped the institutional memory of the courts. In an effort to improve applicants’ chances, the Federal Pacifist Council produced a document for potential objectors that listed questions conscripts should prepare for at their hearing. The questions made it clear that conscientious objection required a theologically informed pacifist position. Questions included: “Do you belong to any Church?” and “Christ healed the sick. Why do you, as His

¹⁴⁵ Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 214.
follower, refuse to serve in the medical corps?” One conscript recalled that “beat it or skip were my options, because conscientious objection was out of the question unless you were a Quaker.” Church groups were prominent supporters of Conscientious Objectors, but the clergy’s relationship to conscription was far from simple. Despite the prominence of Catholic Archbishop Mannix in the anti-conscription referenda of 1916 and 1917, the Catholic Church remained silent on conscription during Vietnam. A number of Anglican bishops wrote to Menzies to protest involvement in the war, but gave no statement on National Service. Religious anti-conscription activists tended to come from Unitarian, Presbyterian or Methodist denominations, and spoke as individual clergy, not on behalf of their churches.

The National Service Act’s definition of conscience as compulsive implied that conscience preceded the law and acknowledged that the state could make no claim on an individual possessed of a compulsive belief. In this regard it was similar to the liberal models of conscience that animated YCAC. Smith argues that the legal definition of conscientious belief varied from court to court and case to case. Most judges attempted to gauge the authenticity of conscientious pacifist beliefs, though this rubric was not consistently applied. According to a ruling referred to in White’s appeal, any “consideration of personal advantage or disadvantage” ruled out conscientious belief. Another judge claimed that the compulsiveness of the belief “must be carefully distinguished from mere intellectual persuasion which by its very nature may be transient”. In White’s case the Judge found that “the thoughts and concepts which have been developed in the mind of the appellant are the result of ignorance rather than good reasoning founded on learning and on logic.” Moreover, troubling questions about the length of time the belief had been held undermined cases and vexed attempts to legally define conscientious belief. Though the Act did not stipulate religious belief as the only motivation for Conscientious

153 Ibid.; Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 214.
Objection – “learning and logic” was not a synonym for faith - it did require a belief to be framed in objective terms unaffected by the applicant’s contemporary political context.

For White and Townsend, and the activists who supported them, the exercise of individual conscience overruled the state’s claim on male citizens. For the judges that presided over their cases, administering a clause of the Scheme that understood a conscientious aversion to violence as compulsive in the religious model, activists’ secular conception of conscience was difficult to comprehend. Townsend’s judge instead mobilised ideas of duty and obligation when refusing exemption. He argued that it was Townsend’s responsibility to pay for the twenty years of freedom he had enjoyed, as a result of his Australian citizenship, with military service. In response, Townsend argued that he had paid his dues to those who served in the Second World War by being a “good citizen” and “furthering the cause of peace for which [they] thought they were fighting”.\(^{154}\) White’s framing of his application was echoed by YCAC’s Policy Statement, which argued that the Conscientious Objection provisions of the Act were insufficient because they failed to account for opposition to the Vietnam War in particular, and thus invalidated the exercise of individual conscience.\(^{155}\) The possibility of particular war objection concerned anti-conscription activists. The SOS newsletter reported in late 1967 that unlike applicants in NSW, Melbourne conscript Daniel Monaghan obtained Conscientious Objector status on the grounds of his objection to the Vietnam War in particular.\(^{156}\) Conscientious Objection sat directly over the fault lines that ran through the conscription debates of the early 1960s.

Conscription Means Vietnam

Public discussions of the National Service Scheme revolved around three broad issues. First, whether conscription for overseas service was appropriate, and whether a referendum or popular mandate had a role in this decision. This question was debated with reference mainly to the memory of Australian conscription schemes. Second was the question of citizenship right versus citizenship obligation. On the one hand, supporters of the scheme claimed that conscription

\(^{154}\) “Conscientious Objection Cases,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, September 1966, 4.

\(^{155}\) YCAC Committee, “Policy Statement, ‘second’ version”.

\(^{156}\) “Visit to Sydney by David Monaghan,” SOS Sydney Newsletter, September 1967, 3.
would make good citizens and was payment for the benefits conferred on Australians by the nation or state. On the other, anti-conscription activists argued that the citizen’s liberty was not the state’s to take away. Entangled with both of these questions was the third concern: whether different conflicts that made up the falling dominoes of the Cold War in Asia constituted a ‘national emergency’ requiring deployments across the region. The overlapping arguments about these three major points of debate – historical memory, citizenship obligation, and national security – meant that it was difficult to separate discussions of commitment and conscription.

Because defence preparedness assumed a regional scope, it took time for Vietnam and conscription to become synonymous. In offering their answers to the questions of historical memory, individual liberty, and national security, YCAC and SOS elided conscription and Vietnam. YCAC distributed a leaflet publicising a protest a fortnight before commitment was announced titled “Conscription means Vietnam”.157 The draft YCAC policy statement offered interpretations of the conflict in Vietnam, rejecting the Menzies Government’s contention that the war threatened Australians and calling it a “largely indigenous uprising”.158 The “National anti-conscription conference” held in January 1966 requested that future discussions of conscription be placed in the context of “the Vietnam conflict and the containment of Communism”.159 The “Suggested Policy” document for the ‘Vote No’ Campaign listed withdrawal of recognition for South Vietnam and recognition for the Democratic Republic as aims for the campaign.160 Even before commitment, YCAC understood commitment and conscription as entangled questions.

SOS attempted to maintain the distinction for longer. The report on the September 1965 lobbying mission claimed that the organisation had “no official policy on Vietnam”. However, the report noted that government ministers “associated conscription with the Vietnam War” when they “claimed it was necessary to send conscripts to stop Communists invading Australia.”161 A second lobbying group a year later no longer treated conscription and commitment as discrete categories. When they met with Gordon Freeth, the Federal Attorney-

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158 YCAC Committee, “Policy Statement, ‘second’ version”.
159 “First Australian National Youth Anti-Conscription Conference” (agenda), 2.
160 Vote No Campaign, “Suggested Policy”.
161 “SOS Canberra Lobbying Mission Report”.

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General, they took a standard liberal international line on the conflict: that Australian involvement in Vietnam was in direct contravention of the UN-backed Geneva accords of 1954. The two lobbying missions were organised by different branches of the organisation, and the Melbourne women who organised the 1966 mission were more radical than their Sydney counterparts. Nevertheless, SOS’ lobbying demonstrates the difficulties of attempting to exclude discussion of the Vietnam conflict from discussion of National Service.

Because of this conflation, anti-war and anti-conscription protesters used many of the same practices. The YCAC and SOS both conducted leafletting drives and took part in public marches and rallies. These continuities of practice are evident in SOS’s faith that a rational public would be convinced by the right argument – an assumption shared by members of the state peace organisations that organised anti-war and anti-nuclear campaigns, as well as supporting anti-conscription activism. Reading the YCAC and SOS alongside the anti-nuclear campaigns discussed in the previous chapter, and the anti-war campaigns discussed in the next one, another continuity begins to emerge: that of Australian activists critically adopting protest practice from overseas examples. In the case of the YCAC, the adoption of draft card burning was not the result of a direct communication from the United States, but the result of Australian activists’ observation of a potent symbolic act, and their adaptation of it to suit their local political context.

The federal election in November 1966 was a terrible defeat for the ALP. The YCAC’s close alliance with and reliance on Calwell’s anti-conscription stance meant that the organisation folded soon after. In the immediate aftermath of the election defeat, SOS’s faith in the parliamentary process was reinforced rather than undone. SOS’s Newsletter for December 1966 promised that despite Holt’s victory at the polls, “As women, as mothers, we will not give up in our determination to make the facts known and to change present wrong policies!” The preoccupation with the public continued to shape protest in Australia until the late 60s, but the impact of liberal individualism on Australian protest was more pronounced. Liberalism survived in anti-conscription practice because the federal election campaign had put paid to the other major plank of anti-conscription arguments: the memory of the Great War referenda. Calwell’s loss demonstrated that Australians were not in fact naturally opposed to conscription, not even

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for overseas service. The Cold War logic of commitment had overpowered Australians’
attachment to their anti-conscription past. Though the YCAC collapsed, the liberal ideas that
underpinned its protest survived.
Chapter 3: From Public Opinion to 'Noisy Minority'

In the eighteen months between the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964 and the visit to Australia of Air Vice-Marshall Kỳ, Prime Minister of South Vietnam, in January 1967, newspapers, politicians and activists contested the meaning of street demonstrations and other forms of public protest in Australian political life. Some activists thought that their role was to educate an otherwise ill-informed public, while others felt that the visibility of protest, not just its content, was key to its success. This imagined relationship to the public was vigorously contested by supporters of the war effort. Reporters in the mainstream press and many Parliamentarians argued that peaceful protest was a legitimate part of the democratic process but by labelling protesters a ‘noisy minority,’ they were countering the protesters’ claim to represent public opinion. In response, protesters argued that the government was not acting in accord with the public’s wishes and lacked a real mandate for their actions. The failure of the protests during these two visits made evident the ways in which the media and opinion-makers largely succeeded in undermining the legitimacy of anti-war protest. The Johnson and Kỳ visits helped cement a public view of demonstrators as a noisy minority in a crowd of well-wishers. It was clear that public opinion was not going to shift through the gathering of facts and the assertion of truth claims, driving the anti-war movement towards more radical forms of civil disobedience and conscious lawbreaking.

The early phase of protest was split along a division between utopian, liberal, and commonly religious underpinnings and a narrow, ‘Old Left’ or Communist Party worldview that lionised class struggle. Murphy’s survey history of Australian involvement in the Vietnam War notes that during this time “the left experienced a number of shifts which diluted the ponderous influence of the CPA, began to fracture the peace movement’s alignment with cold war divisions and, to an extent, opened the movement to the participation of the ALP rank and file”.

Ann Curthoys, who took part in early protests as a member of the Communist youth group the Eureka Youth League, characterises the early years of the anti-war movement as a period dominated by old peace

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organisations, trade unions and student or youth political organisations. Summy and Saunders – also both participants, though after 1967 – wrote a brief history of the Australian peace movement that deals with the early 1960s only to set up the “bifurcation” of the movement into radicals and moderates after 1967. Only Summy’s 1971 Masters Thesis deals with anti-war protest in this early period, despite the fact that the experience of anti-war protest before 1967 was formative for the later, better known period of protest. As a consequence coverage of the Johnson visit is surprisingly thin, focusing mainly on the impact of the visit on the 1966 Australian election or the consequences for the Australian-US alliance. Coverage of the Kỳ visit is even more neglected.

Rather than focus on changes in organisational structures or alliances in a broader anti-war movement, this chapter will examine the changing meaning of protest in Australian public political life during this crucial transition phase in Australian anti-war protest. As such, it is devoted to analysis of the representation of protest in newspapers. It will look in detail at the formation and activities of two ad hoc committees formed in 1965 and 1966 to protest involvement in the Vietnam War - the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC) and the Project Vietnam Committee (PVC). In the middle of 1965, most public commentators understood public discourse as a process of rational-critical debate that would naturally produce a worthwhile outcome. This is visible in the rhetoric of the state peace committees as well as other public debates about the war and about protest. The ad hoc coalitions, on the other hand, drawing on experience in anti-nuclear campaigns, thought of protest as a didactic exercise, and intended to shape it into a democratic weapon. When they chose to begin staging teach-ins – a practice translated from the example of Berkeley in California – the press reported them as part of a public conversation intended to both educate and promote public debate. This changed with the

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6 There is only one substantive article on Kỳ’s visit: Phillip Deery, “‘Lock up Holt, Throw away Ky’: The Visit to Australia of Prime Minister Ky, 1967,” Labour History 109 (2015): 55-74.
visits of Kỳ and Johnson. Close analysis of the words used to describe protesters in relation to the welcoming crowds reveal that by the end of 1966, protest had become an uncontrollable threat to civic order. Although high-profile figures in the ALP attempted to take advantage of the rising status of political protest during the Kỳ visit, this strategy helped neither the ALP nor protesters recover their political legitimacy in public discourse. By the end of 1966 it was no longer possible for activists or their supporters in the press to claim that protesters represented the Australian public. It was this declining legitimacy that prompted activists to look to civil disobedience and ‘New Left’ or Marxist radicalism for possible ways to revitalise their protest practice.

Anti-war Protest Begins

Until the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964, Vietnam was only mentioned occasionally in peace activist publications and conferences. Rumours of the War in Indochina reached Australian ears early, but at first caused little concern amongst Australian peace workers. Isabelle Blume, a Belgian socialist and Vice-President of the World Peace Council, attended the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress. Fresh from a tour of Diem-controlled South Vietnam, she spoke on her recent experiences to the Citizens’ Conference. Her speech made an impact on some activists at the time, but did not place Vietnam on the agenda for the peace committees, which were at that time heavily involved in anti-nuclear campaigns. In 1961, the most radical of the three Melbourne ‘Peace Parsons,’ Reverend Victor James, published an article called “Vietnam for the Vietnamese,” in The Beacon, a Melbourne-based Unitarian publication. The article was reprinted by the Victorian Peace Council as a pamphlet. James predicted a future war in Vietnam that would “involve not only the South but the whole of Vietnam and then South-East Asia [and] may begin at any moment.” He argued that Australia was inextricably entwined in Vietnam’s destiny through regional treaty obligations and alliances, and thus Australian peace activists had a responsibility to “point out the possible consequences of our country’s support of

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the foreign policy of the USA”.

By July 1962 the Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament’s (AICD) monthly publication *Peace Action* was asking if South Vietnam would be the “flashpoint for war”. It jostled for space amidst articles on Cambodia, Cuba, nuclear disarmament and French nuclear testing. As the conflict in Vietnam escalated it began to receive more attention in peace publications. The August-September 1964 issue of *Peace Action* featured a two-page report by Wilfred Burchett on the “Vietnam Crisis,” and advertised an American book about South Vietnam called *The Hidden War*. It also contained a reply from the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom to the Minister for External Affairs, who had argued in the House of Representatives that there was “no alternative” to force in Asia.

As the conflict in Vietnam increased in intensity, so too did anti-war activity. Two days after North Vietnamese boats apparently fired upon the USS *Maddox* in what would become known as the ‘Tonkin Gulf incident,’ Jim Cairns used his Hiroshima Day speech to frame the war as a possible site for escalation to a nuclear conflict and to call for a negotiated settlement of the conflict through the United Nations. Just before Australian commitment, the Communist Party of Australia purchased an advertisement in the *Australian* advocating negotiation, and arguing that external involvement in the war was preventing a “peaceful life” for the people of South Vietnam. The day after the advertisement appeared Cairns spoke to a group of Sydney University students, arguing that negotiation was the least dangerous of the options confronting the United States and that the US policy on Vietnam just “extended the war” and “brought communist control of the Viet Cong and the greater part of South Vietnam”.

Throughout March and early April, Menzies engaged in an open correspondence with a number of Anglican

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8 Victor James, “Vietnam for the Vietnamese” (pamphlet, reprint of article from *the Beacon*, December 1961), Series/folder 1/2, Box 1, Campaign for International Co-operation and Disarmament Collection, accession numbers 79/152; 87/92; 87/93; 88/107; 88/121, University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter CICD Collection).

9 *Peace Action* (October 1962), Series/folder 2/7, Box 4, Margaret Frazer Papers, accession number 93/158, University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter Frazer Papers).

10 *Peace Action* (July 1964), Series/folder 2/7, Box 4, Frazer Papers; “No Alternative’ To Force In Asia: Hasluck,” *SMH*, August 12, 1964, 1.


Bishops, debating the merits of negotiation over involvement.\(^\text{14}\) In early April a collection of citizens unaffiliated with peace organisations presented a petition to the American, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese embassies in Canberra calling for a negotiated end to the conflict. The text of the petition claimed that “Australians abhor” a war characterised by “brutal and callous indifference to the suffering of innocent people”.\(^\text{15}\) When the US ambassador-at-large, Henry Cabot Lodge, was visiting for talks with senior officials of the Menzies government in late April, students in Canberra staged a demonstration calling for an end to the “carnage,” and against “too many innocent dead,” demanding that the United States “Leave Vietnam alone,” and that there be “No nuclear war from Vietnam”.\(^\text{16}\) At this time, Australian opposition to the war rested on the claim that the US, not North Vietnam, was responsible for prolonging the conflict and preventing peace, and that UN mediation and negotiations were the only acceptable resolution to the conflict.

The Australian Government’s announcement at the end of April of a battalion of regular army troops produced a flurry of protest actions. The earliest protests were organised by trade unions, students, and peace committees; these groups used their existing organisational networks to quickly organise opposition to commitment.\(^\text{17}\) Students protested at US Consulates and army barracks; the Seamen’s Union imposed a black ban on the visiting US warship USS Vancouver; the ACTU organised Australia-wide protests; a group of pacifist clergy brought together a prayer vigil in Canberra; and the state peace organisations framed their annual Hiroshima Day protest in late May as a debate on the Vietnam War.\(^\text{18}\) Similar to the anti-nuclear campaigns discussed in


\(^{15}\) “Canberra plea to Viet Cong,” *Australian*, April 15, 1965, 4.


\(^{18}\) “Viet Protest Sit-Down at Barracks,” *Age*, May 10, 1965, 11; “U.S.S. Vancouver berthed without help of tugs,” *Age*, May 13, 1965, 3; “Silent 300 in Protest on Vietnam,” *SMH*, May 21, 1965, 1; “250 in Sit-down Protest on Vietnam Force,” *Age*, May 24, 1965, 5; “Unionists and youths brawl at Viet rally,” *Australian*, May 24, 1965, 1; “End Vietnam war, bomb marchers’ rally told,” *Age*, May 31, 1965, 9; “No Australian troops to Vietnam” (leaflet advertising sit-down demonstration); *Action for Peace* (June 1965); both in Series/folder 10/1, Box 6, CICD Collection; Greg Broadhead (Secretary, Hiroshima Commemoration Committee, hereafter HCC) to HCC members, 16 July, 1965; and “Which road for Mankind – Hiroshima or the UN?” (leaflet) [July-Aug 1965]; both in Folder “Hiroshima Commemoration Committee 1965,” Box 67 (74), People for Nuclear Disarmament Records, MLMSS 5522, Mitchell Library, Sydney (hereafter PND Records); “ANZ Congress for International Co-operation and
the previous chapter, the Federal Parliament and foreign consulates and embassies were frequent sites of protest, as they symbolised the federal government and international relations. In July and August, teach-ins on Vietnam were held at the Australian National University and Monash University. By the middle of the year, ‘Vietnam’ had emerged as the central political issue facing Australian activists. Rather than protesting as pacifists, unionists and anti-nuclear activists, activists opposed to the war began to form ad hoc coalitions specifically to protest against the Vietnam War. The Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament (CICD) Committee’s 1965 Annual Report noted this shift, reporting that “diversity and at the same time co-operation in peace action arising from various sources has never been greater” and that they had “attempted to assist and encourage” such groups. The committee identified that “common objectives and mutual respect” gave these broad coalitions coherence that overcame their organisational heterogeneity.\(^{19}\) If organisational structures are the determiner of a movement then the inauguration of these coalitions mark the moment of the Australian anti-war movement’s organisational birth.

The first of these coalitions was the VAC in Sydney. In early August, Bob Gould, the convener of Sydney Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (SCND), wrote to activist organisations in Sydney noting the lack of “any central body which sees as its function to organise specifically against the Vietnam War” and suggesting

> the energetic mounting of a public campaign of activity for the ending of the Vietnam war, taking as its point of departure the demand for the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam, and introducing firmly to people’s minds the essentially unexceptionable proposition that the solution of the affairs of Vietnam must be left to the people of Vietnam.\(^{20}\)

Gould’s letter highlighted SCND, student and union protests as the most successful anti-war protests yet, and expressed hope that coordination between the disparate organisations protesting the war could bring about demonstrations on the scale of the American or British protests being

\(^{19}\) CICD, “Report 1965,” Series/folder 2/2, Box 2, Frazer Papers.
The VAC’s first action was a “Week of Protest” against the Vietnam War in September 1965, culminating in a demonstration of around 200 outside the Commonwealth Bank building in Martin Place on the 17th of September. Although the Sydney Morning Herald repeated the VAC’s claim to be “formed of many individuals and organisations, including trade unions, student groups, churchmen, academics, peace bodies and housewives,” the paper sought to diminish the protests as youthful enthusiasm, adding that “most of the demonstrators were young people, many of them students.”

Like the SCND, the VAC resisted this marginalisation, characterising its membership as diverse and thus representative of broader public opinion.

Given his previous experience in Sydney CND, it is unsurprising that Gould lionised British and American examples. One of his colleagues wrote that

During this period, the American protest movement was developing rapidly, and several people in Sydney were watching with interest. Among these was Bob Gould of CND, who came to the conclusion that an organisation in Sydney similar to the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee should be launched. To this end, he called a meeting of people who had participated in the previous demonstrations, and the Vietnam Action Committee was born.

The Berkeley organisation had been formed after a 35-hour on-campus teach-in in May 1965, and the International Committee of the American organisation had been writing to Australian student unions and Labor Clubs suggesting that they also hold teach-ins. In late August, Australian activist organisations received letters from the Berkeley committee publicising the internationally-coordinated “International Days of Protest” on the 15th and 16th of October, 1965. In Melbourne, the letter was the catalyst for the formation of an ad hoc committee that shared the Berkeley group’s name. As with the VAC, the Melbourne Vietnam Day Committee (VDC) drew on established activist networks for membership. The President of the Melbourne VDC was the Reverend David Pope, who was also the President of the Victorian Campaign for

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21 Picture, Australian, April 19, 1965, 1; “Mr. Wilson’s bomb could backfire,” Australian, 29 April 1965, 9.
Nuclear Disarmament (VCND). The Secretary of the VDC, Roger Holdsworth, put together regular publications for both organisations, and had also previously been the treasurer of the Melbourne University Labor Club. Just as the VAC preferred “mass” actions and made claims about the diversity of their organisation to foil claims they were not representative of public opinion, the VDC in Melbourne called for “wide representation of all interested groups”.  

The Sydney and Melbourne organisations initially intended to hold protests synchronised with the Berkeley request, but the VAC delayed their solidarity action by a week because “Sydney’s Aldermaston Support March is always held a week later than overseas, with good results from TV publicity about the overseas event”. The Melbourne rally drew around 200, though the 24-hour vigil that preceded it was disrupted by National Servicemen. The delayed VAC protest in Sydney drew 500. Somewhere between 47 and 80 were arrested after they occupied George Street, during peak hour, ignoring police directions to remain on the footpaths, in what the Australian described as “Sydney’s wildest demonstration in years” and the Age called a “riot”. Both ad hoc coalitions also worked alongside existing activist organisations. On December 13th, the VAC put on a “poster parade and leaflet distribution” in Martin Place alongside the AICD’s “Vietnam emergency protest rally”. Each organisation promoted the other’s event. The AICD also supported VAC through allowing use of their Parker Street rooms for meetings. The VDC sponsored a folk concert alongside the VCND, CICD, and the Youth Campaign Against Conscription (YCAC), among others.

Another ad hoc group was formed in Sydney around a similar request for international solidarity from an American protest organisation. The Project Vietnam Committee (PVC) was

26 R. Holdsworth (Secretary, Victorian YCAC), circular to all VDC members, [September-October 1965], Folder “Vietnam - Pamphlets and Leaflets,” YCAC Collection.
28 VDC (Vic.), Bulletin 3 (December 1965), Folder “Vietnam - Pamphlets and Leaflets,” YCAC Collection.
32 VDC (Vic), Bulletin 3.
initiated by the AICD and church groups over the 1965 Christmas break in response to news of further internationally coordinated protests. The ad hoc committee focused its efforts on publicity for “Project Vietnam,” a public rally to be followed by a series of concurrent public meetings to be held on March 16th, 1966 at the Trocadero and Sydney Town Hall.\textsuperscript{33} By the time of “Project Vietnam,” the terms of the Vietnam debate had shifted. When it became clear in February 1966 that the Menzies Government would send conscripts to Vietnam, the issues of commitment and National Service became entangled. Protest marches took place in all East Coast capitals on the 26th of March. Marchers held banners conflating the two questions - “No conscripts for Vietnam” – alongside other banners denouncing the war itself.\textsuperscript{34} A second set of protest marches took place over the weekend of the 15th, 16th and 17th of April in East Coast capitals. These were also arranged in response to an international appeal, this time from “U.S. National Coordinating Committee to end the War in Vietnam”.\textsuperscript{35} Curthoys has pointed out that April and November were important dates to American protesters, lining up with American university calendars, but making little sense to Australians.\textsuperscript{36}

Neither high-profile participants like Calwell nor the newspapers that reported the rallies acknowledged the international connections that were so important to the activists who organised the solidarity actions. Although it was publicised by the organisers as “part of a world-wide demonstration on this day called by the United States National Co-ordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam,” newspapers saw the March and April protests in local terms; largely an effort by Opposition leader Arthur Calwell to make National Service an election issue.\textsuperscript{37} The ALP candidate for the Kooyong by-election – caused by the retirement of Menzies – had spoken to the Project Vietnam crowd in Melbourne, accusing the Government of “trying to stifle protest against the decision to send national servicemen to Vietnam”.\textsuperscript{38} In the wake of these demonstrations, Calwell also called for more protests over conscription, implying a relationship

\textsuperscript{35} Anderson to Gregory Clark, April 3, 1967, Folder “Vietnam – March and Rally, 16 April 1967,” Box 34 (74), PND Records.
\textsuperscript{37} VDC (Melbourne), “Protest against sending Conscripts to Vietnam” (leaflet) [Feb-March, 1966], Series/folder 1/4, Frazer Papers.
\textsuperscript{38} “Calwell calls for more protests on conscription,” \textit{Australian}, March 28, 1966, 3.
between public protest, public opinion, and the election. In Sydney, newspapers linked the April protests, which included a candlelit vigil in Wynyard Park on the 20th, to the looming possibility of a confrontation between demonstrators and troops departing for Vietnam, who would be parading through the city. Though the increased pace in protest in March and April was driven by a desire for international coordination, it coincided with the increased local intensity of the conscription debate. Local participants framed the March and April protests as part of the mounting controversy over the use of conscripts in Vietnam.

After the frenetic period of activity between March and May 1966, the pace of protest flagged somewhat. Nevertheless, established pacifist networks and ad hoc coalitions continued to agitate against conscription and involvement. In May the Federal Executive of the Seamen’s Union refused to crew the Boonaroo because it was carrying supplies to Australian troops in Vietnam. After the ACTU involved itself as mediator and the government began planning to crew the ship with military personnel, the Union eventually agreed to provide crews. The Seamen’s Union and the VAC staged a protest at the ship’s berth at Garden Island on the 20th, and another protest on the 26th that delayed the departure of the ship by several hours but the steam had gone out of the Union action. A weakening in protest fervour was also evident when the VDC sponsored a 28 May protest in Melbourne. Although they were hoping to attract 2000 marchers, there was no press coverage and it seems unlikely that many turned up; support fell short of organisers’ expectations. In Sydney, the PVC had taken over the work of the Hiroshima Day Committee, and in both cities the marches listed the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam amongst their demands. The annual Hiroshima Day marches drew 1500 in Sydney and 4000 in Melbourne, though given the low numbers at anti-war marches, these crowds probably owe more to the momentum of anti-nuclear feeling than to the intensity of the Vietnam issue.

It was the high-profile international visits of President Johnson in October 1966 and Premier Kỳ in January 1967 that brought the debate over Australian involvement in Vietnam to a head. Johnson planned to visit Australia in October 1966 on his way to the seven-nation Manila conference on Vietnam. In June, Prime Minister Harold Holt had given a speech in Washington in which he characterised Australia as “an admiring friend, a staunch friend that will be all the way with LBJ.” The critical reaction to Holt’s pithy statement, which referenced Johnson’s own election slogan, ranged from curt admonitions that Australia was not merely an American satellite in the region to outright condemnation of Holt’s characterisation of Australia as an American lapdog.\(^45\) Johnson’s visit was only a month before the Federal Election, which Calwell had framed in terms of Australian involvement in Vietnam. As the President who had responded to the Tonkin Gulf incident with large-scale troop deployment, Johnson could not be untangled from the Vietnam War. Neither could Air Vice-Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, leader of the South Vietnam military junta, who visited Australia in January 1967. When Holt had met Kỳ at the Manila conference in late October the latter had asked for an invitation to visit Australia. Even the mainstream press was troubled by Holt’s agreement. The *Age* called Holt’s invitation to Kỳ a “blunder,” and raised questions about the legitimacy of Kỳ’s junta and his distaste for negotiations with the North.\(^46\) The *Australian* wondered if Holt had been “outwitted” by Kỳ, who hoped to use the visit to bolster his election campaign in the looming South Vietnam elections.\(^47\) Anti-war activists understood both visits as opportunities to gain exposure to the media, and planned multi-state protests in response.

As the leader of Australia’s most powerful Cold War ally, Johnson was easily turned into a symbol of Australian anxieties and ambivalence about independence. A *Mirror* editorial in early October noted the “doubts” surrounding the relationship between Australia and the US, but concluded that such doubts would not “lessen the traditional warmth Australians show to a distinguished visitor and proven friend”.\(^48\) The *Sun* ran a front-page editorial the afternoon before the visit titled “an ally, not a colony,” in which it acknowledged that there was “nothing to be ashamed of” in needing a great and powerful protector, but also noted the “near absurdities” of

\(^{46}\) “Cabinet’s decision,” *Age*, January 9, 1966, 5.
the “American-style” welcome planned for Johnson in Sydney. The paper stressed that though the relationship would “inevitably grow closer,” future conflicts would be met with dignity as an ally and friend rather than a dependent. At the same time, Johnson also signified the escalation of the war and heightened concerns about Australia’s involvement. Anti-war activists hoped his visit would reflect a lack of consensus on Australian commitment and conscription and planned to capitalise on the media attention that Johnson would attract.

Two competing narratives about Johnson’s visit jostled for dominance. Those in favour treated it as a gala occasion to celebrate the special relationship between Australia and the USA. Those opposed increasingly saw it as the symbol of a Cold War or imperialist American expansionism that threatened world peace, endangered young men and stifled the aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Inevitably, these views clashed in colourful ways. In anticipation of public celebration, metropolitan dailies and the Australian published timetables and maps detailing Johnson’s processions through the major capitals. Sydney papers in particular concentrated on the exuberant preparations for the visit, detailing red white and blue bunting, the enforced fast of a thousand white pigeons (to prevent accidental defecation on the presidential motorcade), the creation of a patch of “instant bush” at Circular Quay, and the addition of extra trains and parking restrictions to ease the flow of the expected 500 000-strong crowd. On the other hand, anti-war activists began to plan the most visible protests they could manage.

Johnson arrived in Canberra on the Thursday, and had lunch at Government House with Lord Casey. From there he was to proceed to the Canberra Rex hotel, where a crowd of 1000-3000 protesters had been waiting for him all afternoon. At the last minute, Johnson opted to avoid the crowd and dine at the Prime Ministerial lodge with the Holts. The next day he visited the War Memorial and spoke to Parliament. Though it contained very little concrete detail, Johnson’s

49 “An ally, not a colony,” Sun (Sydney), October 20, 1966, 1.
speech was hailed as a promise of peace in Vietnam. The *Melbourne Herald* recognised it as a speech about Western-Asian relations rather than a pronouncement of the Administration’s Vietnam policy. In the afternoon Johnson flew to Melbourne, where half a million people lined the roads. The motorcade was re-routed twice to avoid planned demonstrations, and a counter-cavalcade of cars draped in anti-war posters and banners and crewed by Monash University students was prevented by police from entering the city.

By this point in his visit, Johnson’s informality had become legendary. The press in New Zealand had reported his habit of stopping the motorcade so he could shake as many hands as possible, much to the consternation of his security staff. On one such informal stop in Melbourne the President was confronted by a man bearing a placard saying “L.B.J. – BLOODFINGER”. The President asked him “Aren’t you ashamed of yourself?” After a stop at the Town Hall for a civic reception, Johnson was driven to Elm Tree House, the home of Dame Mabel Brooks, with whom he had stayed as a visiting G.I. during the war. Protesters chanting “Hey! Hey! LBJ! How many kids have you killed today!” lined St. Kilda Road, and the President’s limousine sped up to avoid them. As the car passed, the protesters broke barricades, swarmed into the road, and what the *Age* described as a twenty-minute “near-riot” ensued. A crowd of anti-conscription protesters identified as Save Our Sons were reported shouting “murderer” and “Go home Yank!” outside Elm Tree House. After a reunion with Dame Mabel Brooks described in familiar and sentimental terms by the press, the motorcade left for Government House and a parliamentary reception, two hours behind schedule.

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60 “Near-riot as police clash with protest groups,” *Age*, October 22, 1966, 3.
The most spectacular protest in Melbourne occurred just outside the gates of Elm Tree House. Two young Melbourne men, John and David Langley, splattered the Presidential limousine with red and green paint – the colours of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front flag. Like other protesters, they were caught off-guard by the change of route but raced to Dame Brooks’ house once news reached them through the crowd. The press missed the significance of the colours of the paint and reported the incident from the perspective of the motorcade. The Langley brothers were rarely named, though the President’s bodyguard, Rufus Youngblood, was named in several stories. At Government House there was a Parliamentary reception and Johnson gave a speech in which he warned Australians that the Vietnam War was “on Australia’s own doorstep” and reiterated that he was “all the way” with Australia.

On the Saturday, even larger crowds and more contentious protests awaited Johnson in Sydney. A million Sydneysiders came to see Johnson as his motorcade drove from the Airport to the Art Gallery. Crowds of well-wishers broke the barricades and surged into Anzac Parade, delaying the motorcade. There were also organised demonstrations at the airport and at several prominent points along the route, interspersed with the welcoming crowds. Demonstrators threw toilet paper, black streamers and bomb-shaped balloons at the Presidential limousine. The VAC had set up to protest at the eastern end of Hyde Park. Gould recalled the tension between those welcoming Johnson and the protesters. As the crowd expectantly waited for the motorcade to arrive,

The Mormon Tabernacle choir started up, and they had an enormous organ which drowned out our chants. Dave Taylor, an engineer from New Zealand, said, “Bob, we can’t have this”. He went to Woolies and brought some wire cutters and all of a sudden the Mormon Tabernacle

63 “LBJ is with Australia all the way,” Australian, October 22, 1966, 1; “Viet war on ‘doorstep’.” Daily Telegraph, October 22, 1966, 4.
64 “Wild ‘howdy’ from a million in city,” Sun (Sydney), October 22, 1966, 2.
66 “On Top Down Under”.

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Choir went off the air. Then it’s on the air. Then it’s off the air. Then it’s on the air. After about ten minutes of this, it went off the air for good.67

As the motorcade approached the intersection of Liverpool and College Streets, protesters broke through the barricades and threw themselves in front of Johnson’s car.68 According to the Mirror, “the barriers seemed to explode” as young people – the papers characterised them as young women and bearded men – rushed onto the road.69 After the lie-down protest at Hyde Park, the motorcade sped up and there were no further impromptu stops until it reached the Art Gallery, where the President was to make a speech. Protesters from Hyde Park filtered through the Domain to join the 2000-3000 strong crowd of demonstrators on the Art Gallery steps.70 That night the President returned to Canberra. The President’s tour ended with a brief trip to Brisbane and Townsville before he departed for Manila.71

Like Johnson, Kỳ was the leader of an allied co-belligerent who was standing for election at home. Unlike Johnson, public representations of Kỳ were ambivalent at best. In October 1966, the New York Times acknowledged that Kỳ was unpopular everywhere but the United States, and voiced concern at the continued military governance of South Vietnam.72 With Calwell’s support, anti-Kỳ demonstrations took place in each of the four cities that Kỳ visited. The first protests took place outside Parliament House on the Wednesday, when a crowd of between 400 and 700 protesters led by Calwell demonstrated and a breakaway group of 200 marched to Kỳ’s hotel. Calwell was quoted as calling Kỳ a “Fascist,” a “dictator,” and a “miserable little butcher”.73 The next day, Kỳ visited the War Memorial, where he was met by a crowd of supporters carrying placards, one of whom shouted “Good on you mate!”74 Later he gave a

68 “College Street Riot,” Sun (Sydney), October 22, 1966, 3.
speech at the National Press Club after a government reception. The press commented warmly on Ký’s eloquence and charm, drawing a contrast with the small “flat” protests of only 200 people. Ký flew to Brisbane on the Friday, where a crowd of 2000 gathered outside the hotel where he was being hosted at a state dinner. Protesters repeated Calwell’s cries of “fascist butcher” and shouted “murderer” as they repeatedly rushed the barricades. In Sydney the following day 4000 demonstrators massed under the northern end of the Harbour Bridge in preparation for a march on Kirribilli House, where Ký was being hosted at a reception. After state police put Ký on a launch from Circular Quay instead of a car, the protesters marched to a tense confrontation with police in riot gear, bolstered by fire hoses. The superintendent addressed the crowd by megaphone, telling them that “We were informed by Commonwealth authorities that you would approach this area in an orderly manner,” that they were “supposed to approach in single file” and that as a result, “not one single person will break these police lines”. After the reception, Ký was taken on a harbour cruise on a boat owned by a local hotel owner after the Maritime and Dredge Workers’ Union had refused to crew the government’s VIP craft. Ký’s Melbourne visit attracted the largest crowds; 6500 grouped in Alexandra Gardens where they were addressed by Calwell. The Age reported that most of them had dissipated by the time Ký decided to have his driver take the car through the protest so he could see the demonstrators up close. From Melbourne, Ký flew to New Zealand to continue his tour.

Protest as Participation in Public Debate

Throughout this period, protest formed part of a public debate about involvement in Vietnam. Murphy calls the competing positions for and against involvement the logics of commitment and

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dissent.\textsuperscript{81} A public debate held in March and April 1965 between a group of Anglican Bishops and the Prime Minister laid out early examples of both of these positions, and hinted that the assumptions about the role of public debate in the formation of public opinion were not limited to anti-war activists. The conversation was carried out through a series of letters, some of which were reported by the metropolitan dailies and in some cases republished in full by the \textit{Australian}.\textsuperscript{82} Menzies laid out the logic of commitment as it stood just prior to Australian intervention, positioning it as an attempt to prevent “aggressive communism” from “moving near [Australian] shores”. Negotiation, he argued, could not take place in preference to armed conflict because Communists were intent on armed revolution and were opposed to elections. He argued in Parliament that “America would discuss South Vietnam when the communists accepted that the US would not abandon the South and that the South was free from attack from the North”.\textsuperscript{83} “Surely nobody will deny,” he claimed in his reply to the Bishops, “that North Vietnam is under complete communist control, and that free elections simply cannot happen”.\textsuperscript{84} In Menzies’ view of the conflict, the existence of North Vietnam and peace in Vietnam were mutually exclusive, the free elections stipulated by the Geneva Agreements were impossible because of Northern intransigence, and therefore the South was blameless for any breach of the Agreements. In response, the bishops laid out the initial logic of dissent: the South was not a free or democratic polity but a military regime that did not enjoy popular support; the US and Australia’s support for South Vietnam was in direct contravention of the UN’s 1954 Geneva Agreements; and the war was an example of the failure of international agreements to ensure Vietnamese self-determination.\textsuperscript{85} In Menzies’ view the North had to be defeated to save democracy because it would not negotiate, while in the Bishops’ competing narrative the Southern regime’s legitimacy had to be tested in democratic elections overseen by the UN. Because both the North and the

\textsuperscript{81} Murphy, \textit{Harvest of Fear}, chap. 6, chap. 7.


South would only be satisfied with the destruction of the other, the debate over intervention or negotiation in Australia was irreconcilable.

Australian commentators thought that public debate would bring about resolution. The conversation that ensued between Parliament, the Press and the protesters over the next two years in the newspapers and in the streets was an attempt to make one logic or the other hegemonic by actively attempting to shape public opinion. Thus Menzies acknowledged that his conversation with the Bishops had served a "valuable public purpose." Here he was arguing that any laying out of facts in a reasoned argument was an inherent public good. Jim Cairns agreed. When speaking about the ‘Freedom Rides’ through country NSW at Sydney University in early 1966, he said: “I think anything done reasonably to bring these things to the notice of the public is justified and bound to give a good result”. Anti-war activists shared Menzies’ and Cairns’ faith in the power of public debate. In January 1966, the AICD Newsletter argued that the movement’s role was to “ensure that the great debate is resumed and extended … through the media of forums, teach-ins etc.” Such action had the capacity to bring about “the revitalisation of the democratic process”. A group of academics from the University of New South Wales formed the University Study Group on Vietnam in mid-1965 and published a book of documents titled *Vietnam and Australia: History, Documents, Interpretations* in 1966. The stated intent of the collection was to present “facts and opinions” in order to “stimulate readers to discuss them with us and with their fellow citizens. A continuing and informed discussion is vital if the truth is to be made known, and a more humane policy to be evolved”. The preface quoted American sociologist and New Left theorist C. Wright Mills in support of the political righteousness of public education: “Democracy requires that those who bear the consequences of decisions have enough knowledge to hold the decision-makers accountable”. Australian protest practice was shaped by the assumption that the public, once correctly informed, could not fail but to reach a position in accord with their own.

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86 “PM to clergy: ‘I won’t be cast as warmonger’,” Australian, April 22, 1965, 3.
87 “Dr. Cairns says Vietnam war is U.S. blunder,” Australian, March 5, 1965, 2.
89 Ibid.
The language anti-war activists used implied that an informed public would also be an active and participatory one. For the Chairman of the AICD, Dr. A. G. H. Lawes, the role of organisations like his was to “build an overwhelming force of well informed, active, and well organised public opinion,” which could then be “directed to those quarters where the vital decisions affecting the whole future of this country are made”.91 The AICD Annual Report for 1965 characterised the “informed and active public opinion” that the organisation had “endeavoured to create” as “the weapons which democrats have by inalienable right”.92 The AICD newsletter accorded public opinion with the capacity to “force” the “Establishment” to “enter the arena of the public forum where many myths are being devastatingly exposed and demolished before the eyes of hundreds of thousands of television viewers”.93 The language of weapons, devastation and force characterised the public as a powerful and righteous ally of anti-war protest.

The VAC likewise understood the public as a political force, but one to be engaged through spectacle as well as education. For the VAC, mass participation was the only measure of success: “To be more effective, we would have to aim for an even larger number of people in the demonstration”. To achieve this, the Committee was to “carefully prepare more spectacular forms of protest, with a view to attracting the widest possible public attention.”94 Anti-war activists were agreed that reaching the public was the goal of protest, and that the claim to be part of a majority was an important one. However, as a noted Trotskyist, Gould’s sense of mass was related to the Marxist concept of political consciousness.95 The notion of mass mobilisation implied workers’ realisation of their objective class situation, a different ideological emphasis to the notion of a democratic majority made up of equal citizens. In a similar fashion, the idea of political consciousness as the moment of realisation of one’s true class position was different to

92 CICD, Annual Report 1965 (c. December), Folder “16 (b) YCAC - the Committee,” YCAC Collection.
93 AICD Newsletter 2:1 (Jan-Feb 1966), 3-4, Folder “Vietnam Project Committee,” Box 41 (74), PND Records.
94 VAC, Newsletter 2 (September 1965), Folder “Vietnam - Pamphlets and Leaflets,” YCAC Collection.
the idea of public opinion as the result of rational debate. The rhetorical differences between majority and mass was accompanied by different emphases on education and spectacle.

When Gould invited anti-war organisations to the inaugural VAC meeting in August 1965, his letter cited examples of successful and spectacular protests, including civil disobedience in the form of the ‘sit-down’. His letter also indicated the Marxist fetishisation of radicalism, mass and scale; he conflated ‘militant’ and ‘successful’ in the same way he elided ‘large scale’ and ‘effective’.  

96 For Gould, the occupation of George Street during the “International Days of Protest” in October 1965, during which between 47 and 80 protesters were arrested, was an example of a successful protest. The arrests fulfilled the VAC’s desire for spectacle and delighted Gould, who saw this as the beginning of a genuine campaign of civil disobedience. Gould had watched these tactics unfold in Britain in the early 1960s during his time in SCND, but until the VAC’s September 1965 protest, Australian anti-war demonstrators had not experimented with them or incorporated them into their demonstrations.

The VAC’s interest in events in Berkeley indicates that contemporaries interpreted local protest in relation to overseas examples. Thus the organisation’s newsletter understood the organisation’s protests as an attempt to provide a “flash point for the public conscience,” arguing that the “International Days of Protest” in October 1965 had served a similar function for the US.  

97 Continuing anti-nuclear activists’ practice of imagining a global movement, the AICD newsletter argued in February 1966 that the “now highly diverse world peace movement,” could “rightly claim a major share of the credit” for the development of an “embarrassingly well informed” global public. In keeping with this sense of a global movement, Australian activists again were anxious to keep abreast of overseas protest actions. Australians beyond the established peace and anti-war organisations had become conversant enough in the ‘sit-in’ or occupation from reportage on Civil Rights protests in the United States that the NSW Legislative Assembly warned the NSW Home and Property Owners’ Association in November 1964 that any attempt to occupy the public gallery in protest would be met with forcible ejection.  

98 Even the Defence Minister read Australian protest in relation to protest elsewhere in the world, noting

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97 VAC, Newsletter 5 (December 1965), Folder “Vietnam - Pamphlets and Leaflets,” YCAC Collection.
“all of the protest that is going on throughout this country” in connection to “protest rife in the world today”.

Local reportage provided examples of protest from overseas: the Berkeley Students for a Democratic Society’s 20,000 strong Easter 1965 “March on Washington to End the War in Vietnam”; a resurgent CND Easter demonstration of a similar size in Trafalgar Square, London; and a small protest in Wellington, New Zealand, against a potential New Zealand commitment to the Vietnam conflict.

Thus when the Berkeley VDC wrote to local organisations in August, calling for “dramatic, large-scale actions … to increase public alarm about the war in Vietnam,” Australian anti-war activists were already speaking in similar terms to their counterparts in California.

Translating the Teach-in

The local staging of teach-ins in July and August 1965 highlights the adaptation of practices gleaned from international examples. The teach-in had been developed at UC Berkeley, and the “Vietnam Day” teach-in of May 1965 had provided the impetus for the formation of the VAC in Sydney and the VDC in Melbourne. One of the suggestions that the American VDC had made to Australian student unions and peace groups was that they organise teach-ins on the Berkeley model. Teach-ins were held at the Australian National University (ANU) and Monash University in July and August 1965. The ANU teach-in was reported in both the *Australian* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*, while the Monash teach-in was televised on Channel 2.

Capitalising on the momentary publicity surrounding the teach-in, two Anglican Bishops, a Methodist and a Presbyterian also staged a “preach-in” at the State Theatre in Sydney. A televised debate in

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late July on Channel 7 was also billed as a ‘teach in,’ including Jim Cairns and Bob Santamaria on the panel.\(^{104}\)

The ANU and Monash teach-ins garnered significant press interest. Local newspapers identified them as “a form of public protest” and noted their international provenance, characterising them as part of a “teach-in movement” that had begun at the University of Michigan earlier that year.\(^{105}\) Craig McGregor covered the teach-ins for the *SMH*, and noted the “direct parallels” between burgeoning Australian anti-war protest, American Civil Rights activism and the British CND. He claimed that these international “movements” had “jolted the student body out of its apathy and produced a profound and continuing commitment to political and social causes”. Betraying his radical sympathies, McGregor hoped a similar transformation would take place in Australia as a result of the teach-in.\(^{106}\)

The ANU and Monash teach-ins were intended as public debates on the Government’s Vietnam policy. C P Fitzgerald, ANU Professor of Far Eastern History and chairman of the organising committee for the ANU teach-in, characterised the event as “a discussion on Vietnam … [that] will continue until the subject is ‘talked out’.”\(^{107}\) McGregor argued that “at face value” it was “a purely uncommitted meeting of people, wanting information,” although he argued that the “Left-wingers [sic]” at the meeting “regarded it as a form of public protest”. He concluded that the audience “came not just to learn but to have their emotion given intellectual reinforcement”.\(^{108}\) In contrast, his colleague James Hall argued that “this was hardly a protest meeting engineered by the Left over Vietnam,” and that

> If the teach-in proved anything it was that a lot of people are deeply emotionally concerned about Australia’s involvement in Vietnam, even if, as was manifestly the case in that audience, they were not precisely sure where they stood.\(^{109}\)

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Although Hall concluded that most audience members left “feeling somewhat wiser about some aspects of the Vietnam situation if somewhat more confused on others,” he also felt that “I don’t suppose anyone went away with his or her opinions changed”.110 Another Sydney Morning Herald journalist argued that the event was demonstrating that Australian public opinion on Vietnam had a wider scope than the Cold War consensus credited it with: “the Prime Minister has more than, as he puts it, ‘Communists, pacifists and philosophic doubters’ on his hands over Vietnam.”111 McGregor did not equivocate. For him the teach-in was “in a profound sense … a failure; because what it clearly failed to do was to formalise and reflect the extraordinary emotional intensity of the people who attended it”.112 A televised teach-in organised by the Department of Adult Education at the University of Sydney attracted similar criticism from Leicester Cotton in the Sydney Morning Herald:

But did it teach or do anything more than confirm those who took part in their own previous convictions? Did it alter by a single degree the varying and vehement viewpoints of the panel? We very much doubt it. Or of the audience? There was no evidence of it.113

The organisers and some participants interpreted the teach-ins as an attempt to shape public opinion, and assessed their success or failure according to their capacity to do so.

The Noisy Minority

As the Vietnam War emerged as a bone of public contention, protest became the subject rather than the agent of public debate. At the peak of anti-war protest in March and April 1966 a number of Government spokespeople began to argue that protesters were knowingly or unknowingly acting as enemy agents. This tactic echoed the dismissal of the 1959 Melbourne and 1964 Sydney Peace Congresses by Menzies and a number of his government’s ministers.114

111 “Australia’s first teach-in off to a tentative start,’” SMH, July 24, 1965, 4.
The Defence Minister Allen Fairhall noted in question time in March that “confusion in the public mind” over conscription and commitment was “a more powerful asset to the Communists than any weapon they have in the field”. In April he made the accusation more concrete when he labelled anti-war and anti-conscription activists an active “fifth column”.\(^{115}\) Like Fairhall, External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck accused local anti-war protest of aiding the enemy, arguing that the Melbourne VDC protest in September 1965 had been part of a Hanoi-led “month of hatred” directed against America.\(^{116}\) William McMahon, then Minister for Labour and National Service, characterised protest organisers as “people who did not believe in the ideals of Western democracy”.\(^{117}\) When Kỳ gave a speech on the last day of his visit, he engaged in the same sort of red-baiting, arguing that the “ordinary people” he had met, “not the organised demonstrators, reflect more truly the feeling of most Australians”. In response to a question about what “the Communist countries” would think of Calwell’s demonstrations, Kỳ noted that some demonstrators had carried “the communist flag” and responded “I am sure that the Communist bloc in Asia are very happy with Mr. Calwell’s demonstrations”.\(^{118}\) Protest itself came under scrutiny, distracting from the questions of commitment and conscription.

The most telling Government comment on the protests came from Fairhall. Although he agreed that protest had a relationship to public opinion, in a speech to a parade of conscripts the Defence Minister rejected anti-war protesters’ claim to be expressing it. He stated that the protests “do not emanate from the Australian people as such but from a noisy minority”.\(^{119}\) Not happy with simply arguing that they did not have the support of the public, Government ministers excluded protesters from the body of the public entirely. Activists refuted this characterisation. The AICD Chairman condemned the efforts to paint peace activism as a Communist attempt to confuse the public mind and aid the Viet Cong, arguing “no longer is it

\(^{115}\) YCAC (NSW), *Newsletter* [April 1966], Folder “YAC Newsletter,” YCAC Collection.

\(^{116}\) VDC (Vic), *Bulletin* 3 (December 1965), Folder “Vietnam - Pamphlets and Leaflets,” YCAC Collection.

\(^{117}\) “The basic right to dissent,” *Australian*, April 13, 1966, 10.


\(^{119}\) “‘War ours to suffer’ says Fairhall,” *SMH*, March 16, 1966, 13.
possible to silence protests by calling people nasty names like Commo and fellow traveller.”

Three months later the Project Vietnam Committee explained that

A major objective of the March 16th project will be to expose the establishment myth propagated at home and abroad that only an insignificant and misguided minority of the Australian community is opposed to its slavish adherence to the US collision course policy in Vietnam.121

The Australian, often sympathetic to protesters in debates over the democratic ‘right to dissent,’ implied in an editorial in April that public protest more authentically represented public opinion than the lax and rowdy assembly elected to represent the Australian people. The editorial argued that “reasonable argument” was heard in Parliament only at “exceptional times,” with “name-calling and emotional twaddle” the more frequent texture of parliamentary discourse.122 Just as Liberal parliamentarians rejected protesters’ claims to represent an Australian democratic community, those who supported public demonstrations claimed that Parliament was failing in its own representative duties.

Ironically, Government ministers appeared to interpret protests elsewhere in the world as the sign of a healthy democracy. On the same day as its editorial in support of anti-war demonstrations at home, the Australian quoted External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck as saying that Buddhist demonstrations in Vietnam were evidence of a “degree of liberty of expression and liberty of political organisation” that indicated “the degree of political freedom that exists in South Vietnam”. Such demonstrations, he concluded, “could not possibly have taken place in North Vietnam”.123 The Australian editorial noted the apparent hypocrisy of a government that could argue that protest in Vietnam was a truthful expression of the people’s will while in Australia it was an illegitimate expression in contrast to that will. It concluded by asking “who is undemocratic – he who takes part in anti-Vietnam demonstrations, or he who seeks by law or by smear to prevent those demonstrations?” The editorial hinted at Hasluck’s claim that protest was a hallmark of democracy: “Those who try to do away with demonstrations because they are anti-social or irritating should remember that they are espousing the kind of action they would

120 Lawes, Speech to rally (December 13, 1965).
121 AICD, Newsletter 2:1 (Jan-Feb 1966): 2, Folder “Vietnam Project Committee,” Box 41 (74), PND Records.
122 “The basic right to dissent” Australian, April 13, 1966, 10.
123 “Our Viet plants to stay,” Australian, April 13, 1966, 5
condemn if it took place in another, say, communist country.”¹²⁴ Throughout March and April these three conflicting interpretations of protest - as legitimate democratic process, as Communist fifth column, and as noisy minority at odds with public opinion – demonstrated that the meaning of protest itself was contested.

The comparatively small numbers of protesters during the Johnson protests stood out as both noisy and a minority. Sound in particular played an important role in representations of the protests. Gould recollects cutting the power to the Mormon Tabernacle Choir’s organ to create aural space for the chants of demonstrators. NSW Premier Askin predicted in a speech welcoming Johnson at Sydney Airport that “the demonstrators are going to be drowned out by the loudest, most penetrating, most clarion-like voice of the people”.¹²⁵ The Mirror confirmed Askin’s prediction, noting that “the booing was more than matched by the cheers and shouts of welcome”.¹²⁶ Liberal parliamentarians and hostile newspaper editors could not have hoped for a more literal example of protesters as noisy minority. By establishing a hierarchy of types of sound, Askin anointed the welcoming crowds as “the people,” and framed the protesters as being opposed to the will of the people. The aim was to drive a wedge between protest and public, and thus undermine any claims by the anti-war movement to represent public opinion.

Even then, it was the crowds welcoming Johnson that were so large and so chaotic that they seemed to threaten civic order. At the Sydney Town Hall, Daily Telegraph and the Age described a “carefully prepared civic welcome” that was “just swept aside” by the press of a crowd so large and uncontrollable that

Civic dignitaries and their wives were crushed, bruised and pummelled. Fist-fights broke out, police, soldiers and American security men fought desperately but unavailingly to keep the frenzied crowd clear of the President’s car.¹²⁷

The Daily Telegraph reported a welcome that became a “near riot” at the airport.¹²⁸ The papers’ coverage evoked huge and intractable crowds by using the violent language of civil unrest. By

¹²⁴ “The basic right to dissent,” Australian, April 13, 1966, 10.
¹²⁷ “President gets 2 hours behind his schedule,” Daily Telegraph, October 22, 1966, 3; “Melbourne goes wild for LBJ,” Age, October 22, 1966, 1.
the next day, those same words were attached to the protesters in Canberra, Sydney, and Melbourne. The *Melbourne Herald* dubbed the protests in Sydney at Hyde Park and the Art Gallery a “near-riot” under the headline “Sydney goes mad”. The *Sun* labelled the Hyde Park protest the “College Street Riot”. The *Mirror* called the protests “wild”. Along with the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Sun*, the paper also characterised the Sydney protests as “brawls”.

Between Johnson and Kỳ’s visit, newspapers and state officials imagined the violent possibilities of anti-Kỳ protests through the experience of the anti-Johnson protests. An *Australian* editorial ahead of Kỳ’s visit implied a comparison when it suggested the possibility of “rancour and violence,” and the “ugliest demonstrations and the bitterest feelings”. When the NSW State Cabinet approved new fines for protesters who disobeyed police directions, Askin denied that the fines were a response to the demonstrations during Johnson’s visit, nevertheless invoking that violence in relation to protest. The word “brawl” was also used to describe the anti-Kỳ protests in Brisbane. Where the massive welcoming crowds had threatened civic order by accident, the protesters appeared as a violent, noisy minority in their midst.

As the language of the uncontrollable, threatening mob shifted from the welcoming crowds to the protesters, the papers began to concentrate on violence between police and protesters. The *Sun* called the Sydney protests “300 yards of hate,” and described “teenagers” at the Art Gallery breaking through the police cordon. It also noted a “bearded man” pushing a policeman off his motorcycle. The *Daily Mirror* reported “grim-faced American journalists” who were “shaken” by the violence at the Art Gallery. The Melbourne *Herald* described “fights and scuffles” in which “anything could have happened as police and security men swapped punches with the

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130 “College Street Riot,” *Sun* (Sydney), October 22, 1966, 3.
133 “Ky’s visit calls for restraint,” *Australian*, January 11, 1967, 6
134 “Protest fines up to $100,” *Australian*, January 18, 1967, 3
136 “Wild ‘howdy’ from a million in city,” *Sun* (Sydney), October 22, 1966, 2
137 “Wild brawls in LBJ welcome,” *Daily Mirror*, October 22, 1966, 1
shouting demonstrators”.

Concern with the violence was exacerbated by the sense that Americans were watching; American journalists made appearances in several Australian stories. The Daily Mirror quoted an American cameraman at the Art Gallery who characterised the protesters as a “real hostile group,” said the protests were more violent than American anti-war protests, and noted that the police were “really laying into those people”. The paper quoted another American reporter as saying that the Art Gallery was the site of “the worst demonstration since he’s been in office. I was terrified that this might be it for him”. The Daily Mirror relayed the New York World Journal Tribune’s story about an “enraged” and “noisy crowd” of anti-American demonstrators made up of “bearded youths and T-shirted girls”. The Sun noted American interest in the Langley brothers’ paint-throwing protest, and cited American officials who were “worried about the safety of the President and his wife”. The Mirror reported “highly coloured accounts” from the American press of the “worst” protests Johnson “had ever experienced,” and a “loud and dissident” minority and “widespread hostility,” under the headline “Sydney accused”. The Australian noted “prominent coverage” given to “the Vietnam protest incidents during President Johnson’s visit”, but reported that the World Journal Tribune had called the visit a “triumph”. The Daily Telegraph also noted the “triumph,” and reported that the consensus in the New York broadsheets was that “despite the hostile groups, the President enjoyed an overwhelmingly friendly welcome”. The violence caused concern not only because it upset well-wishers and upset order, but also because of the sense that international observers might judge Australians based on the small number of protesters amidst the large welcoming crowds in Sydney.

On the final day of his visit, Johnson gave a speech in Townsville in which he argued that although the protesters expressed “the view of a minority,”

140 “On a mixed day, a koala for LBJ,” Daily Mirror, October 22, 1966, 7.
144 “U.S. delighted and worried by LBJ visit,” Australian, October 24, 1966, 5.
That does not make it mistaken, but it does require us to see it in a larger context. … Because we have put our trust in democracy, we are bound to preserve and protect the minority’s right to express its opinion, and we cannot insist that it speak in a whisper.146

Johnson’s speech connected the right of Australian and American minorities to be heard to the right of the South Vietnamese minority to be heard, in a deft rhetorical move that Hasluck and Fairhall had failed to make in April. Press commentary took up this fusion of the noisy minority and the right to dissent. The *Melbourne Herald* repeated Johnson’s claim that “It is right that he should hear such views and weigh them along with what members of the Government have to say,” and noting that such dissent was the hallmark of a political community “free to think for itself and deeply concerned about the trend of events in Vietnam”.147 The *Mirror* called the American press’ claim that the protests were “the most concentrated abuse and hostility” of the President’s time in office “nonsense,” defended the right to dissent, and praised President Johnson for being “a big man in every way” and going “out of his way, before leaving, to defend the right of this tiny but strident opposition to say their piece”.148 Johnson’s speech gave reporters and parliamentarians a way to talk about street demonstrations that meant they could be safely ignored without being discredited. They would use it to respond to Calwell’s attempt to appropriate anti-war protest as an alternative form of Parliamentary opposition.

A Pitiful Spectacle

Calwell’s call for protests over Vietnam was an attempt to bind the democratic force of an assumed anti-war public to the Labor Party in the wake of the devastating election defeat. He was not the only federal ALP member to see the utility of this strategy. In early October Senator James Keeffe, Federal President of the ALP, “called on Australians to demonstrate their opposition to the Vietnam War” during Johnson’s visit, using “every peaceful and constitutional means” to show their opposition to involvement and conscription.149 Jim Cairns was also an

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146 “LBJ defends the right to disagree,” *Australian*, October 24, 1966, 1; “President says Viet protests are in minority,” *Australian*, October 24, 1966, 3.
147 “This is a day to remember,” *Herald* (Melbourne), October 21, 1966, 4.
149 “LBJ on way,” *Daily Mirror*, October 7, 1966, 1
outspoken advocate of public protest. Johnson’s visit had not helped the Labor Party. Johnson’s visit was something of a publicity coup for Holt. The Australian called it a “whirlwind vote-catcher” for the Prime Minister, predicting that “the huge hand and silver tongue of President Johnson set the seal on electoral victory for Mr. Holt at the polls next month”. Johnson had “openly” gone “on the hustings” for Holt. Calwell, on the other hand, was represented as a clumsy and awkward speaker whose jokes fell flat and whose views clashed with those of the popular President. The Age noted that the visit indicated that “Australians are all the way with LBJ and therefore with their own government”. One of the paper’s political correspondents argued that Calwell and the ALP “could find no electoral mileage from the visit”.152

On the other hand, between early 1965 and mid-1966, public demonstrations had reached a peak of democratic legitimacy. Kỳ, far less popular than Johnson, seemed to offer an opportunity to re-shape public perceptions of the war. Calwell took the bold decision to play a leadership role in the anti-Kỳ protests. He tried to tap into public ambivalence towards Kỳ. He had called Kỳ a “second Hitler” in parliament in October, referencing a comment Kỳ had made much earlier in his career that he felt that South Vietnam could use a man with Hitler’s sense of discipline to root out corruption. Anti-war activists also tried to get political mileage out of the claim, using it in leaflets and press releases. The Australian argued that the visit was “virtually uninvited and certainly unwanted by 40 per cent of the population,” and hoped that Holt had the good sense not to call for “the kind of public hoopla that greeted President Johnson”. Using similar language to more radical anti-war protesters, Calwell called for “massive demonstrations”. He also announced his refusal to attend any reception in Kỳ’s honour. Calwell’s strategy generated at least as much suspicion as sympathy for street marches amongst Labor MPs. His request to other ALP members that they join the marches produced very little enthusiasm. Four days after Calwell announced his intention to protest, Whitlam made it apparent that he would not join the

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151 “Tribute to a president,” Age, October 24, 1966, 2.
152 “The politics of the visit,” Age, October 24, 1966, 2.
marches, although two other possible leadership contenders – Cairns and Frank Crean – would.\textsuperscript{157} The \textit{Australian} interpreted Calwell’s actions as a statement to Whitlam, assumed to be ready to challenge Calwell for the leadership.\textsuperscript{158} The paper called Calwell’s move “foolhardy,” and “irresponsible,” and concluded that he was a “tired man carried away on one last puff of emotionalism”. By attempting to conduct regular parliamentary opposition through the high-profile but questionable method of street protest, he appeared to be “determined to bow out of public life surrounded by sensational headlines”.\textsuperscript{159} Calwell’s efforts were poorly pitched and too late to save his party or his career. On the morning of Ký’s arrival in Brisbane, the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} reported that it had located only three NSW parliamentarians intending to march and ten who refused.\textsuperscript{160} Cairns criticised his colleagues for not marching.\textsuperscript{161} Though Calwell tried to use Ký’s visit as an opportunity to rally the public discomfort evident in anti-war protest in support of his party’s fortunes, his strategy struggled to find favour with his Parliamentary colleagues.

As a result of his call for protests, Calwell was easily caricatured as a noisy anti-war protester. For the press, the comparison between the confrontational crowds with Calwell at their head and the eloquent Ký addressing rooms of well-heeled politicians reflected poorly on Calwell. During the four days of his visit, reporters began to warm to Ký’s charm and eloquence. Shucking off his previous reputation as an impetuous playboy, Ký emerged in the pages of the dailies as refined, intelligent, and eloquent.\textsuperscript{162} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} called him a “serious young man” with “charm,” the \textit{Age} characterised him as a quick thinker who “beat the press”.\textsuperscript{163} This performance prompted the \textit{Australian} to declare that Ký had “won the first round,” while the \textit{Sun} trumpeted that “this man has earned a hearing”.\textsuperscript{164} Calwell’s public fortunes waned as Ký’s waxed. A \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} editorial during the visit contrasted Calwell’s blunt and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{157} “Whitlam won’t join Ky marches,” \textit{Australian}, January 17, 1967, 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} “Calwell says he will lead Ky protests,” \textit{Australian}, January 10, 1967, 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} “Ky’s visit calls for restraint,” \textit{Australian}, January 11, 1967, 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{160} “Arthur’s Long March,” \textit{SMH}, January 20, 1967, 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{161} “Cairns critical of MPs for not protesting,” \textit{SMH}, January 20, 1967, 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{163} “A serious young man proves he has charm,” \textit{SMH}, January 20, 1967, 1; “How Air marshal Ky beat the press,” \textit{Age}, January 19, 1967, 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{164} “Premier Ky wins the first round,” \textit{Australian}, January 20, 1967, 1; “This man has earned a hearing,” \textit{Sun} (Sydney), January 19, 1967, 2.
\end{itemize}
uncompromising rhetoric – he had by this time called Ký “a squalid little murderer,” and a “Quisling” in addition to his earlier remarks – with Ký’s impressive performance:

His willingness to answer difficult questions, addressed to him without warning in a language which he speaks well but far from perfectly, must have impressed all those who heard him. Many a Western politician, for instance, would have tried to dodge the question about his alleged admiration for Hitler. He did not and came out of it with dignity.

The editorial argued that in the “unofficial contest” between Ký and Calwell, Ký was “so far in front that Mr. Calwell is in danger of being lapped”. It ended with the admonition that “Mr. Calwell’s personal abuse and pathetic demonstrations have … insured that Air Vice-Marshal Ký’s visit, which might otherwise have passed with little notice, will be something of a triumph.”

The next day the Mirror reported that at the site of “some of the worst anti-Johnson demonstrations,” people in Hyde Park “seeking relief from the rising temperature and lounging in the shade of the trees did not even bother to raise their heads as the cavalcade passed”. Far from revitalising the ALP’s flagging fortunes by binding it to a groundswell of popular discontent, Calwell’s high-profile support to anti-war demonstrations throughout the visit made him seem increasingly out of touch with the electorate.

For Holt, Ký’s visit was a political windfall to complement the publicity coup of Johnson’s tour. In the wake of his departure, politicians and the press characterised the public as resolved to continue the fight in Vietnam. Holt said that as a result of the visit, “Australia’s participation in Vietnam would receive greater support”. A Sydney Morning Herald editorial on the same day implied a connection between public acceptance of Holt’s trebling of the Australian force in Vietnam and its appreciation of Ký. In an editorial in the protests, the Age characterised the protesters as “poor in numbers and lacking in steam,” and asked “Did they prove anything? Surely very little”. The editorial concluded with the assertion that:

There is something slightly pathetic about the sight of an earnest protester carrying an oversimplified slogan down the street. … Public opinion is not formed by slogans but it is

167 “Visit wins support for our cause, says Holt,” Australian, January 24, 1967, 2.
sometimes given a prod into thinking about issues which are vital to all of us at election
time.\footnote{169}

While “in a democratic society,” that protester “should be allowed the right to express himself,”
he could not represent the majority of Australians in early 1967 if he disagreed with the logic of
involvement in Vietnam. As Johnson had outlined, protest was something to be suffered in a
democracy. After Kỳ it was also to be pitied, and could be safely ignored. The visits of President
Johnson and Marshal Kỳ had resolved the complex debate on Vietnam in favour of commitment.
Though Calwell had attempted to capitalise on protest’s reputation as a legitimate political force,
he was too late. The disproportionate visibility and audibility of protesters amongst hundreds of
thousands of Australians welcoming Johnson rendered them a literal noisy minority. By the time
of Kỳ’s departure it was no longer possible to claim that protests were expressions of the will of
the Australian people. They would not escape this characterisation until the Moratorium
Campaign of 1970, and a second, more intense debate about the right to dissent.

Chapter 4: Students, Violence, and ‘Law and Order’

Between 1967 and the Moratorium Campaigns of 1970 and 1971 the question of violence and confrontation dogged Australian protest and shaped government responses to it. Fatigued by the idea of yet more marches and responding to the discrediting of protest by the resounding defeat of the ALP at the election, for six months after the anti-Ky protests, newspapers relegated reports of local protests to page 3 or 5 or stopped reporting them altogether, in preference to more spectacular news of political violence from the US or UK. As more confrontational international protests began to garner column inches, newspapers became more sensitive to the language and practices deployed by university students. After protests outside US Consulates in Sydney and Melbourne in July 1968, newspapers began to use code words like “wild,” “brawl,” or “near riot,” as well as militarised language like “charged,” “battled,” “stormed,” or “invaded,” to mark out student protesters as violent. Over the next three years, newspapers and parliamentarians increasingly elided students, protest and violence, resulting in a protracted debate in mid-1970 over the use of new laws to curtail fractious street protest. In this period students emerged in Australian newspapers as a signifier or harbinger of violence. Rather than indicative of an increase in civil unrest on Australian streets or of the impact of the radical New Left, discussions of violent students in Australia and consequent debates about ‘Law and Order’ in this period are evidence of contemporary anxieties about protest.

These anxieties emerged in relation to news of growing violence in the United States and elsewhere. The appearance of the radical student in the Australian imagination cannot be disentangled from the growing literature on the global ‘New Left’. American and European scholars have produced significant work in the last decade concentrating on the transatlantic and intra-European connections forged by student radicals in the ‘long 1960s’. Suri has characterised the global sense of “cultural rebellion” as an “international counterculture” constituted not by adherence to a specific politics but by an ephemeral ‘spirit’ of youth rebellion amongst urbanised, first and second world youth, united by a sense of alienation and a collective

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desire for individual self-fulfillment.\textsuperscript{2} Australian scholars have also started to situate Australian radicals from the ‘long sixties’ in transnational or cosmopolitan networks of protest.\textsuperscript{3} The small literature on anti-Apartheid campaigns from the late 1950s until the 1980s also assumes a transnational network, arguing that it could not have existed without international co-ordination.\textsuperscript{4} Though Australian historians have not yet situated them against similar global trends, the ‘Law and Order’ campaigns of 1971 were also part of a broader global trend in responding to radical protest practice.\textsuperscript{5} As Suri argues, the “fall” of the international counterculture was produced in part by a worldwide adoption of ‘law and order’ campaigns.\textsuperscript{6} Though this chapter does not take the transnational ‘New Left’ as its subject, it does focus on the ways in which that identification shaped representations of protest as well as the ‘Law and Order’ debates in Australian public political culture.

The chapter begins with a history of violent protest as reported by newspapers between 1968 and 1971. Prior to the fourth of July protests in 1968 students were represented as disruptive but not necessarily violent, but after this watershed the assumed presence of students was increasingly enough to trigger anxieties about looming violence. The chapter then turns to the development of the idea of the students as a ‘hard core’ of radicals who led other protesters astray. Central to this concern was a transnational awareness of protest violence elsewhere in the world, and that elements foreign to the Australian body politic were influencing otherwise peaceful Australian dissent. Australian observers predicted violence at home based on reports of violence abroad, and interpreted peaceful protests as exceptional hallmarks of Australian democracy. Anxieties about transnational influence also informed government responses to the

\textsuperscript{6} Suri, “The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture,” 45-68.
apparent surge of confrontational demonstrations. Finally, I turn to a discussion of the ‘Law and Order’ debates of July and August 1970. New legislation instituted by State and Federal Governments to curb violent student protest initiated a debate about civil liberties. Debate over the laws became a debate about democratic rights, which played into the rhetoric of the ‘right to protest’ championed by Jim Cairns, which is the subject of the next chapter.

Confrontational Protest on Australian Streets between 1967 and 1971

After the anti-Kỳ demonstrations, Australian anti-war protest organisers returned to the same practices they had used since the early 1960s in an effort to regain public legitimacy: peaceful street marches organised by ad hoc committees, in solidarity with an international movement. Impressed by the success of the American Spring Mobilisation to end the war in Vietnam in April 1967, NSW activists formed their own August Mobilisation Committee. Claiming once again to be a representative cross-section of the Australian public, publicity material for the march argued that it would “provide the widest possible co-ordinated participation of all opposed to the Vietnam War” and display the “identity and diversity of community groupings opposed to the war”.7 Publicity material for the 6,000-strong Sydney march listed the same coalition that earlier anti-nuclear campaigns had claimed to represent: “Churchmen, academics, students, professionals, actors, artists, writers, women, youth, trade unionists, etc.”.8 At the request of American correspondents the Committee organised local marches in October 1967 and April 1968, and changed its name to the American-inspired “Vietnam Mobilisation Committee”.9 The October Mobilisation in Sydney was the largest Australian march against the war to that date, with between 6,000 and 10,000 in attendance.10 The marches made little impact despite their size, perhaps because the Johnson and Kỳ protests had undone the legitimacy of the mass street

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7 Simon West, “August Mobilisation to end the war in Vietnam, Sunday August 13th,” (leaflet advertising rally), [July-August 1967], Folder “Vietnam Mobilization Committee 2(3),” Box 41 (74), People for Nuclear Disarmament Records, MLMSS 5522, Mitchell Library, Sydney (hereafter PND Records).
9 August Mobilization Committee, “A Bigger and better mobilisation projected for October, 1967” (leaflet), [September-October 1967]; and “Minutes of Meeting of August Mobilisation Committee,” September 4, 1967, 2; both in Folder “Vietnam Mobilization Committee 1(3),” Box 41 (74), PND Records.
March; Murphy describes the period between the 1966 election and the Moratorium campaign as one with “all the features of a pause”.

During the same period a number of new student organisations began to gain public notoriety for their sensational, disobedient acts. In March 1967, the Monash University Labor Club announced its solidarity with the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF), arguing that the war in Vietnam was an indigenous struggle for independence from colonialism. In July, the club formed sub-committees to oversee two separate funds for the NLF - one for “medical aid to civilians in NLF controlled areas”, and an “unspecified” fund that was for “direct financial aid” for the NLF. In a broadsheet titled Which Way Treason? produced at around that time, the Labor Club explained its support for the NLF:

Gradually we came to realise that it was no use simply condemning the war and demanding that it stopped. We were logically forced to move from denouncing the United States as an aggressor to supporting the victims of aggression - the Vietnamese people led by the National Liberation Front.

Newspapers heard of the Monash students’ plan, and it was debated in the Federal Senate after a Democratic Labor Party (DLP) senator excoriated the students, threatening to have them charged with treason. Though the Age characterised the move as foolish, the Senate proceeded to debate the bill, and the eventual result was the passage of the Defence Forces Protection Act in September, which made any such aid illegal. In addition to the radicalisation of existing student organisations, new groups began to form. Bob Gould and brothers Jim and John Percy formed an organisation known initially as SCREW in July. There are conflicting accounts of what the acronym stood for; it was either the “Society for the Cultivation of Revolution Every Where,” or the “Sydney Committee for Revolution and Emancipation of the Workers”. It would eventually

14 Ibid.
change its name to ‘Resistance’ in 1968.\textsuperscript{17} By 1969, Universities in Sydney, Melbourne, Newcastle and Hobart hosted chapters of Students for a Democratic Society, Adelaide Labor Club had become Students for Democratic Action, and students in Queensland had formed the Revolutionary Socialist Alliance, which grew out of the Society for Democratic Action.\textsuperscript{18} Throughout the latter half of 1967 these radical student organisations began to receive attention out of proportion to their numbers.

With peaceful street marches becoming \textit{de rigeur}, Australian newspapers began to devote greater coverage to confrontation and violence at protests. Among the October Mobilisation protests, only the Sydney march was reported in the newspapers. The 10,000-strong local solidarity protest was relegated to page 3 by the spectacular front-page images in most dailies of the American protests, in which 30,000 to 35,000 demonstrators massed outside the Pentagon, confronted police, and smashed the building’s windows.\textsuperscript{19} Though the \textit{Australian} acknowledged that the crowds attending the April Mobilisation in Sydney were double the size of the ANZAC Day crowds the previous day, it remarked on the Mobilisation only in passing in a story about a welcome home march for returning Vietnam Veterans.\textsuperscript{20} The following day there was a tiny but rowdy counter-protest at the ANZAC shrine in London at which marchers carried placards that read “Bury Anzac” and “Anzac Justifies Vietnam Murders,” and a fight broke out between protesters and police, although it too was buried in later pages.\textsuperscript{21} By the time of the protests on July 4\textsuperscript{th}, 1968, Australian newspapers had made it clear that confrontation, not mass, was newsworthy. Their appetite for protest violence was thus far sated only by international examples, and the connection between the size of a protest and its impact was unsettled.


\textsuperscript{20} “Big crowds cheer march of Vietnam veterans,” \textit{Australian}, April 27, 1968, 1.

It was in this context that protests in Sydney and Melbourne around July 4th 1968 became iconic forms of student protest for contemporaries. On the 2nd, the Sydney University SDS chapter protested against conscription at a Federal Cabinet meeting being held at the Federal Parliamentary offices at Martin Place. A crowd of around 100 including the chapter president Mike Jones picketed the entrance to the building and shouted at Cabinet Ministers as they arrived.22 Three students tried to impede Prime Minister Gorton’s entrance, and several others tried to sneak into the lobby in the middle of a group of photographers, but were intercepted by police.23 The crowd surged to between 300 and 600 by the close of the meeting, and the demonstrators linked arms to prevent Gorton and other ministers from reaching their cars.24 The Herald claimed that it was “Sydney’s most violent student demonstration since President Johnson’s visit two years ago”.25 The Daily Mirror declared that students had “provoked” police with their behaviour.26

Two days later the papers crafted a more complex story about the protest in Melbourne. The Melbourne protest was made up of clergymen, trade unionists, and other off-campus activists as well as contingents from RMIT, Melbourne, Latrobe, and Monash Universities, but the students’ actions eclipsed the newsworthiness of the other members of the crowd. The Age and the Daily Telegraph acknowledged older activists trying to calm their violent student confederates, but the Age stated that they were “screamed down” by others shouting “If the police want to fight, they have a fight”.27 The rally turned violent in the early evening when demonstrators seized the flag from the flagpole in front of the Consulate and burnt it.28 Protesters attempted to raise the NLF flag in its place, burnt flags they had brought with them, threw rocks, cans, bottles, razors, and punches, smashed the windows of the Consulate and police cars, sat down in front of paddy wagons to prevent the arrest of their fellow protesters, and set off firecrackers and smoke bombs to cover their actions or startling police horses. The police, for their part, met the protesters with a mounted charge “at full canter” as “[t]he horses rearing and frothing from fright sent men and

women reeling to the bitumen”. 29 Both the *Age* and the *Telegraph* noted the nervous equivocation of one policeman who had been ordered to charge the protesters. 30

Newspaper coverage of the July protests indicates the complex dynamics of reportage. Several dailies interpreted police behaviour as an attempt to maintain public order, and blamed students for provoking extreme police action. The *Australian* quoted a “senior policeman” at the Melbourne consulate protest as saying that “It was the law of the jungle. We had to meet violence with violence”. 31 In Sydney on the 4th there was an anti-conscription sit-in at Recruiting House, and an attempt to occupy the Liberal Party headquarters. The *Australian* and the *Telegraph* explained it as a “police-student clash”. 32 The *Age* positioned students as both instigators of violence and as victims. The paper described students being lifted, dragged and thrown by police, and students trying to tear off police identification numbers and strike out as they were manhandled by police. 33

Similar violence marked July 4th demonstrations the following year. Activist publicity referenced the 1968 protest, framing the expectation of violence as “scare stories” put about by the federal government, and resolving that “[w]e must show we are not intimidated by these measures”. 34 Once again, US Consulates were the target in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide. Consulate windows were again smashed by a hail of hand-thrown missiles. 35 In Melbourne the students charged the police, and in Sydney they adopted a “flying vanguard” tactic whereby the body of the protest fell back in front of police, staging demonstrations as they withdrew from the oncoming police cordon. 36 In Canberra, students staged a sit-in in the South Vietnamese embassy, questioning the ambassador until removed by police. 37 Following the nation-wide protests, Gorton criticised the use of violence in service of

29 “Troopers ride down anti-war rioters,” *Age*, July 5, 1968, 1
political dissent, noting that “this is the type of violence we have never had before”. The Age’s editorial on the protests argued that the “right to dissent” was sacred but violence could not be tolerated. Nevertheless, it adopted a liberal position, arguing that although some might argue for tougher laws to stamp out student protest, this should be resisted as it would “play into the hands of the fanatical minority”.

Between July 1969 and May 1970 American and Australian commitment to the Vietnam conflict seemed to waver and the anti-war position seemed to become more certain. In July and September Nixon announced the beginning of the phased withdrawal of American troops. In August, a local Australian Gallup poll showed that 55% of Australians were opposed to continued involvement in the war, representing a majority opinion against involvement for the first time. In October and November, hundreds of thousands of Americans marched in multiple cities across the country in support of the American Moratorium. In the wake of the American marches, an Australian Moratorium Committee was formed to replicate the campaign locally. On the 16th of December, Gorton announced that Australian withdrawal would begin, and on the 22nd of April 1970 announced the withdrawal of a full battalion. According to Murphy, the Gorton and McMahon governments were surprised by American withdrawal and unable to formulate an autonomous Australian response. In the context of uncertainty and the wavering resolve of the Nixon Administration, the continued use of anti-communist rhetoric by Liberal politicians and conservative commentators like B.A. Santamaria now seemed “shrill and self-serving”. By early 1970, the idea that Australian involvement in the Vietnam War was an effort to forestall the southward push of international Communism was no longer uncritically accepted. In this context anti-war protest gained new momentum, most evident in the emergence of the Moratorium Campaign.

The Australian Vietnam Moratorium consisted of three coordinated nation-wide protest campaigns, the first in March 1970, the second in September 1970, and the third between April and June 1971. It was instigated in response to news of American protests, and there is a noticeable American influence even if there was no direct request for international coordination.

40 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 242, 279-280.
41 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 269-273.
John Lloyd recalls a short conversation with other CICD members after a committee meeting in 1969, which began with Lloyd’s question: “couldn’t we actually try and do this in Australia?” After a short discussion, the general consensus was “Yeah, let’s … have a crack.” In a letter he wrote to potentially interested parties, Lloyd expressed his plans in terms of “an escalation of the support which various Australian bodies have been giving to US Moratorium Day activities.”

Charles Debenedetti notes that the idea that produced the American Moratorium was for “a kind of national strike … called in case the war were not settled by a specific date … that one-day ‘deadline strike’ could be extended by a day each subsequent month that troops were still in Vietnam”. The word strike was eventually moderated to ‘moratorium,’ or as Debenedetti puts it, “a simple pause in business-as-usual for the purposes of reflection on and protest against the war”. In late 1969 Cairns framed the Australian Moratorium campaign as an attempt to “hold up the commercial and industrial life of the country”. In this regard, Cairns was drawing on the language of industrial relations shared by Trade Unions and the Labor Party, but he was also referring, perhaps unknowingly, to the discussion in Massachusetts that had informed the American campaign. The advertisement posted in the Age by the Moratorium Committee called on “people of conscience” to “stop business as usual” and to “take time off to think”. The sense of the Moratorium Campaign as a solidarity action did not last long. Unlike the Aldermaston support protests, the International Days of Action or the Vietnam Mobilisations, the Moratorium’s publicity betrayed no signs of its transnational provenance. The four-page broadsheet produced for the first march framed the protest as a patriotic exercise, identifying that the war was being waged “in our name,” and that ending it was “the most urgent task facing the Australian nation,” essential to retrieving “the last vestige of our national self-respect”.

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42 John Lloyd (Secretary, Vic. Vietnam Moratorium Committee, hereafter VMC, and Committee for International Cooperation and Disarmament, hereafter CICD), interview with author, August 24, 2007. The other two CICD members in the conversation were Norman Rothsfield and Bevan Ramsden. Ramsden was also a member of the Communist Party of Australia.


46 “Moratorium” (advertisement), Age, May 6, 1970, 11.

47 National Co-ordinating Committee (hereafter NCC), Ken McLeod, Jim Cairns and Brian Ross, “Vietnam … and this in the name of freedom!” (Moratorium broadsheet), Series/folder 5/9, Box 25, Campaign for International Co-
The new politics of confrontation in the streets played a role in the Moratorium Campaigns. While the idea of lawbreaking as protest would come to influence the development of the Moratorium campaigns, the idea of violent confrontation caused disagreement during the planning stages. Saunders’ analysis of the Moratorium divides activists up into ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’, the former category containing most of the students, some academics and trade unionists, and the latter containing most of the older peace activists and clergymen. He tracks the effects that the radicals had on the planning stages of the marches in each state.\textsuperscript{48} Planning for the first Moratorium began in November 1969 with a national consultation in Canberra followed by the establishment of a Committee in each state. The state committees adopted a sponsorship model in which organisations could pay a fee to the Campaign and in return send members to the planning meetings. Activists remember a growing fault line between students and their older confederates that dominated the planning of the Moratorium campaigns. John Lloyd, the secretary of CICD and the Victorian Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC), recalled being suspicious of some of the groups that sponsored the Campaign:

...there were all sorts of organisations coming in saying, “We want to belong to it,”, and one was the Monash Strawberry Club, and we thought this was bogus. Apparently there was such a thing as the Monash Strawberry Club, I don’t know, to this day I’m not sure how genuine it was. But people wanted to get in and get votes, so that they could shape the direction of the Moratorium.\textsuperscript{49}

Val Noone felt the Victorian student groups in particular, such as SDS and the Monash Labor Club, created a “debating atmosphere” designed to prevent figureheads from the old peace movement like Sam Goldbloom or Jim Cairns from “having power, behind the scenes or whatever.” He felt that “those meetings were wrecked” and that “it’s a miracle that the Moratorium happened, granted the state of those Richmond meetings.”\textsuperscript{50} In Sydney the radical critique was of the organisational structure of the campaign, not the aims, with radical activists attempting to wrest control of the nascent campaign away from the AICD, who they saw as

\textsuperscript{49} Lloyd, interview.
\textsuperscript{50} Val Noone (former Catholic priest and protester), interview with author, September 5, 2007.
attempting to dominate proceedings.\textsuperscript{51} In most states the radicals were committed to the new repertoire of political lawbreaking, and attempted to remove the section of the Statement of Aims that “all moratorium activities in pursuance of these objectives be of a non-violent nature”.\textsuperscript{52}

These motions would shape the planning of the Moratorium marches as well as public attitudes towards the campaign.

Anxieties about violence meant that nobody involved in the Moratorium was sure that the march would be peaceful. On the morning of the march, the \textit{Age}’s front-page story reflected conflicting assumptions about the protest. The front-page headline read “Helmeted police get ready for sit-down”, juxtaposed with a photograph of Katie Wenk, a 23-year-old assistant manager of a city modelling agency in a helmet. The story led with the police preparations: police leave cancelled, hundreds of reinforcements brought into Melbourne from country stations, and Crime Squad men in crash helmets. The story also noted that the sit-down was a “flashpoint for violence” and that the crowd would reach 50,000. Wenk explained the helmet by saying that “There’s been so much talk of violence that I decided to protect myself.”\textsuperscript{53} Cairns received multiple death threats, and recalled feeling “nervy and worried” before the march.\textsuperscript{54} Two Victorian policemen visited Jean MacLean at home the night before the march, asking her to call it off.\textsuperscript{55} Uncertainty about the march was not limited to sitting members of parliament and the state police. Denis Freney described the negotiations with the police before the march as “a nail-biting test of nerves with [Premier] Askin”.\textsuperscript{56} Val Noone recalls emptying his pockets and

\textsuperscript{51} NSW Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC), Sponsors’ meeting minutes, December 17, 1969; NSW VMC, “Minutes of the General Meeting of Sponsors,” February 9, 1970; both in Folder “Sponsors’ Committee,” Box 38 (74), PND Records.

\textsuperscript{52} Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 31-35; NSW VMC, “Draft Proposals from the National Co-ordinating Committee (attached to Sponsors’ meeting agenda, 17/12/1969),” December 1969, Folder “Sponsors’ Committee,” Box 38 (74), PND Records.

\textsuperscript{53} “Helmeted police get ready for sit-down,” \textit{Age}, May 8, 1970; 1.


\textsuperscript{55} Claire Jager and Margaret Frazer, \textit{On the Side of the Angels} (documentary), in Series/folder 8/3, Box 7, Margaret Frazer Papers, accession number 93/158, University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter Frazer Papers).

taking his watch off just in case the march became violent, while Betty Blunden was frightened she would be beaten by police and wore a fur hat to protect her head.\(^57\)

Despite these fears and with the exception of a confrontation between police and protesters in Adelaide, the Moratorium marches were peaceful. The numbers represented an extraordinary escalation in public involvement in anti-war protest. In Melbourne alone, between 75,000 and 100,000 marched from Treasury Gardens to Bourke Street.\(^58\) In Sydney there were activities spread across the city and across three days. On the Friday night three marches - from the Universities of Sydney and NSW and Teachers’ Federation headquarters - converged in the city, forming a crowd of between 20,000 and 25,000 who were addressed by speakers from the Town Hall balcony.\(^59\) The next day there was a candlelight march from Hyde Park to a rally in the Stadium in Rushcutters’ Bay.\(^60\) In Adelaide there was a student-led march of around 2,000 on the Friday night during which there was an hour-long running brawl between the marchers and a number of young servicemen. On Saturday morning there was a march of 5,000 from Elder Park to the center of the city in Victoria Square.\(^61\) 5,000 marched in Brisbane, 3,000 in Perth, and 2,000 in Hobart. Regional centers like Wollongong, Newcastle, Fremantle, Burnie and Launceston saw crowds from a few hundred to 2000.\(^62\) In total, somewhere between 100,000 and 120,000 people marched in mass peaceful protests against the National Service Act and Australian involvement in the Vietnam War in urban centers across Australia over two days.

When the expected violence did not ensue, newspapers interpreted its absence as significant. The \textit{Age} reported that although police waited with pistols and shotguns, “The riots did not happen. The city’s Vietnam moratorium was peaceful.” The \textit{Sun} argued that the absence of violence confirmed the legitimacy of the protest, stating that “democracy wins the day” and that “mankind


\(^{58}\) “70,000 marchers take over city,” \textit{Age}, May 9, 1970, 1; Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 132-135; and Strangio, \textit{Keeper of the Faith}, 210-211.

\(^{59}\) NSW VMC, “Programme of events,” Series/folder 5/13, Box 6, CICD Collection; “M-Day draws 20,000 to city,” \textit{SMH}, May 9, 1970, 1; Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 136; Freney, \textit{A Map of Days}, 265-266.

\(^{60}\) “10,000 in quiet night march to stadium,” \textit{SMH}, May 10, 1970, 2; Freney, \textit{A Map of Days}, 266.


was richer for it”. The paper claimed that for both police and marchers, the 8th of May was “a day to be proud”.63

Nonetheless, state and federal governments continued to treat violence at protests as the norm. Throughout July and August 1970, a series of student protests attracted press interest and Government opprobrium, playing out as a cycle of student confrontation and government crackdown. In early July, students at Sydney University “jostled and abused” the Federal Attorney-general, Tom Hughes, letting down the tires of his car, writing slogans on it and sitting in front of it to prevent it moving off, forcing Hughes to shelter in St. Paul’s college while “every available police car in the city” was called to the campus.64 Only days later it was revealed that the New South Wales Cabinet had been planning a new bill called the Summary Offences Act, which would allow a maximum penalty of two months in gaol or a $100 fine for demonstrating without police permission, and increase penalties for assaulting a police officer.65 Five days later sixteen students occupied the Premier’s Department, in protest against the new legislation.66 Following a string of well-publicised and violent protests in Victoria a state government committee recommended that penalties be toughened for protesters whose conduct “exceeded reasonable grounds”. The planned changes to the Crimes Act instituted penalties for using violence or threats of violence to obstruct police and other state officials, and would also carry a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment.67 In mid-August, Hughes again became the focus of student protest when thirty students went to his Sydney home, and Hughes emerged from the house with a cricket bat to chase them off.68 After a sit-in that took place at the Melbourne Office of the Department of Labour and National Service in which files were destroyed and an official injured, the Federal Government proposed a “Public Order” Bill in late August that would stiffen penalties for trespassing on Commonwealth property and attacking federal MPs and officers.69

64 “Students Buffet Hughes,” Age, July 31 1970, 1.
As the protests against Johnson and Ký had done two years earlier, the debate over these new laws shifted the focus from the Vietnam War and National Service to the question of the legality and morality of street protest. The Age argued on the eve of the second Moratorium that the first campaign had

…hardened community opinion against the political basis of the dissenters. It is certainly true that political issues are being forgotten in the growing controversy over “law and order”. Governments now feel sufficiently alarmed, and sufficiently confident of public support, to instigate new laws with undertones of repression.70

By the time of the Federal Government bill, ‘Law and Order’ had become a catch cry that drowned out discussion of Vietnam or Conscription. The Age published a cartoon in response to the proposed bill that suggested the campaign to quiet student dissent was a deliberate Government effort to hide its lackluster record in Parliament.71 The leader of the Opposition, Gough Whitlam, said that violent protest was “an inflammatory issue,” concentration on which was intended “to take the minds of the Australian people from the real issues facing the nation”.72 The meaning of ‘Law and Order’ was as contested as the meaning of street protest itself.

The panic over ‘Law and Order’ was exacerbated by the national consultation meeting that took place after the first Moratorium. While planning the September marches, the meeting made a series of decisions based on the success of the first campaign, advocating further civil disobedience and encouraging the state campaigns to “carefully consider occupation of city streets for a considerable period.” The meeting also recommended

   to all supporters that they realise that the achievement of the VMC depend upon the decisions by the government, and that they should therefore work to remove the present government of Australia and replace it by (sic) one which is consistent with the aims of the VMC.73

In this resolution, the national consultation had directly tied the “occupation of city streets” to the removal of a sitting government. Doing so in the context of the ‘Law and Order’ debate only

confirmed the arguments of the Moratorium Campaign’s most strident opponents: that the Campaign had been infiltrated by radicals who intended the violent overthrow of civil order and the state.

The second Moratorium was thus conducted in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion between organisers, the police and various governments. In Sydney there was evident friction between large numbers of police and protesters at various points along the various march routes. The radial march from the University of Sydney was pushed onto the footpaths by police and directed to Wynyard Park, while marchers on King Street were directed to Hyde Park by police with loudhailers.\textsuperscript{74} After a brief meeting in Wynyard Park, the crowd of between 8000 and 15000 demonstrators moved out into York Street against police directions and were “dispersed by a flying wedge of more than 100 police”.\textsuperscript{75} The marchers attempted to walk on the roadway in George Street but were redirected to Hyde Park. From there, two groups of protesters attempted to get to the Town Hall without success. The march dissolved into isolated brawls between pockets of protesters and police, and police arrested between 200 and 300 protesters.\textsuperscript{76} In Saunders’ estimation the Sydney march was “not simply dispersed, it was destroyed”.\textsuperscript{77} The worst violence again took place in Adelaide, where the organisers attempted to stage a sit-down in defiance of the police. After a gathering of 5000 in Elder Park, marchers attempted to occupy the first intersection they reached. Only a few hundred metres from their start point, the demonstrators filled the intersection of North Terrace and King William Street. The police immediately began to break the march up with waves of uniformed and plainclothes police, while a line of mounted officers looked on.\textsuperscript{78} There were 141 arrests.\textsuperscript{79} Where Moratorium protesters attempted sit-downs or other confrontational tactics, they were met with a visible and forceful police presence.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 168.
Where organisers acquiesced to police demands there was no violence. In Melbourne the crowd assembled in Treasury Gardens before moving off along Spring Street and Bourke Street, where there was a 30-minute sit-down. The *Australian* and the *Age* estimated a crowd of 50,000, though Cairns later claimed 75,000. After the sit-down, the march was to proceed to the Princes Gate Plaza. At the corner of William and Lonsdale Streets it was met by a line of 100 police backed by steel barricades and a line of buses, vans and trucks, preventing access. The Moratorium Committee decided to comply with police directions and march back to Melbourne University. In Brisbane, Canberra, Hobart and Perth, there were very few arrests. With the exception of an abortive attempt by 300 students in Brisbane to occupy Adelaide Street, there were no sit-downs in those cities.

Those invested in confrontation expressed their disappointment in the outcome of the second Moratorium. One Sydney protester remarked that the march in Brisbane was only peaceful because the marchers “did as they were told”. In Melbourne, another complained that the Moratorium had been “run out of town” because its marchers were reluctant to meet police provocation with violent resistance. Students in Melbourne had attempted to provoke confrontation with police with little success. Several hundred radical students flying National Liberation Front flags attempted to reach the Princes Gate Plaza through the police barricade. After four arrests and an hour of trying to break through aided by smoke bombs and firecrackers, they gave up. Cairns gave a speech asking the marchers to remain calm and orderly, during which a number of students booed and shouted profanities. At Melbourne University after the march, Michael Hyde of the fractious Maoist Monash Labor Club told the crowd that they should have “stormed the barricades”.

The third Moratorium was overshadowed by developments in the Vietnam War and protests against the Springbok rugby tour. Participants often forget the third Moratorium in memoirs and recollections. The chapter that deals with the year 1971 in Greg Langley’s collection of protester interviews contains only three excerpts and none mention the third Moratorium. Freney wrote

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84 Langley, *Decade of Dissent*, chap. 9.
recollec-
tions of the May and September marches in his autobiography, but by the time his
narrative reaches June 1971, he only talks about anti-Apartheid protests.85 Michael Hyde also
recalls the first and second marches, but ends his memoir of the period with his graduation,
mentioning the Springbok tour but not the third Moratorium.86 The protests attending the South
African Rugby Union tour of June and July 1971 were not the first anti-Apartheid protests in
Australia. Curthoys mentions a protest about the Sharpeville massacre in 1960.87 Freney
mentions participating in a protest against touring South African tennis players in January 1971,
and a protest at Coogee beach in March against South African lifesavers.88 The Age reported a
crowd of 1000 anti-war and anti-Apartheid students who had been attending the “Aquarius
festival” at ANU attempting to “storm” the South African Chancery in May 1971.89 Freney
compares the Anti-Apartheid protests to the Moratorium, stating that the Movement’s aim in late
1970 had been to “form a broad coalition similar to that which had developed around the
Vietnam Moratorium,” and noting the confidence amongst activists that “the protests would rival
those held during the Vietnam Moratorium”.90 The third Moratorium paled in comparison with
the spectacle of the Springbok tour.

The third Moratorium also lacked the interstate consensus and organisational clarity of the
first two campaigns. By late October 1970 it had emerged that there was no agreement between
the individual state organising committees about the date of the third campaign. NSW and
Tasmania wanted to organise a march on Friday April 30th. Queensland preferred Friday the 16th.
Western Australia wanted the march to be held on Saturday the 24th. Victoria had not committed
to a date. Two international events muddied the decision further. The first was a letter received
from the United States, indicating that Dr. Benjamin Spock, the famous American child
specialist and celebrity anti-war campaigner, wanted to discuss a possible tour of Australia in
June 1971.91 The second was the return of Jim Cairns from the WPC-organised Stockholm

85 Freney, A Map of Days, chap. 15.
86 Michael Hyde, All Along the Watchtower: Memoir of a Sixties Revolutionary (North Carlton: The Vulgar Press, 2010).
88 Freney, A Map of Days, 286.
90 Freney, A Map of Days, 286, 292.
91 NCC, meeting minutes (November 7, 1970) Folder “NSW co-ordinating committee, national coordinating committee,” Box 38 (74), PND Records.
Conference on Vietnam in November 1970. That conference advocated an international campaign against the war in Vietnam around June 30th, 1971. Attempting to cover all its bases, the National Co-ordinating Committee recommended to the states that:

…they attempt to make the months of April, May and June months of intensive activity, publicizing the Indo-Chinese withdrawal deadline for U.S. troops by June 30. In particular, there should be nation-wide mass actions on Friday, April 30, and Sunday, May 30, and that Wednesday, June 30, be planned as a day when as many people as possible should stop work if U.S./Australian troops are not withdrawn from Indo-China.

Unable to decide between the original April campaign and the June campaign suggested by the Stockholm conference and Spock’s visit, the National Co-ordinating Committee decided in December to spread the campaign across three months.

Saunders claims that the federal government took a “completely new approach” to the third Moratorium: where it had “directly attacked” the first march and “indirectly attacked” the second, it “completely ignored” the third. This characterisation accords more malice to the government than is perhaps warranted, and ignores the Moratorium Committee’s own lack of consensus and focus. The April 30th marches were small compared to previous Moratorium crowds: 5000 in Sydney and Brisbane, 2500 in Canberra, 2000 in Adelaide, 1000 in Melbourne. There were very few arrests, and there were no confrontations with police over permits or march routes. The Adelaide march ended in confusion with a debate about whether to follow a police “request” to change the route of the march, and though the Sydney Morning Herald drew attention to the fact that the Sydney march was “in defiance of [a] council ban,” the council seemed disinterested in enforcing the ban with their spokesperson noting that “technically” the marchers had been refused permission to use Hyde Park, but the council “saw no breaches of the

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92 Jim Cairns, “The Stockholm Conference” (report) [December 1970], Series/folder 4/25, Box 56, CICD Collection. Cairns noted that “one very important date in the campaign should be the opening date of the mobilization in the United States expected to be between the beginning of April and the end of May (perhaps the Martin Luther King anniversary)”.  
93 NCC, meeting minutes (December 8, 1970): 6, Folder “NSW co-ordinating committee, national coordinating committee,” Box 38 (74), PND Records.  
by-laws to justify any action”. Press coverage of the April march was minimal, and the May 30th protests did not make the papers at all.

The June marches were eclipsed by more spectacular developments in the Vietnam War. In mid-June, the news broke that Daniel Ellsberg had leaked the ‘Pentagon Papers’ to the New York Times. In the context of the leak, the reasons for Australian commitment to the war given by Menzies and his successors faced greater scrutiny. McMahon commissioned a report into the ramifications of the leak for the Australian government, while the federal ALP executive called for a royal commission into the commitment to Vietnam. The Australian reported that the US Government had pressured the South Vietnamese government into asking Australia for troops, while McMahon was asked by a This Day Tonight interviewer whether he knew anything that “cast doubt on the propriety of the original commitment”. Stories in the Australian continued to implicate both Menzies and McMahon in an act of diplomatic subterfuge. A protester writing in the Australian argued that “now that the Pentagon papers have spelled out the duplicity of politicians … the interpretation of events offered by those ‘extreme elements’ in the peace movement has been more accurate than the government line all along.” The editorial ended with an advertisement for the final Moratorium March. The response to the Pentagon Papers helped marked the collapse of the logic of commitment. By June 1971 it was no longer exceptional to oppose involvement in Vietnam; far from bolstering its profile, the Pentagon papers helped remove any sense of urgency around anti-war protest.

At the same time, press interest shifted to the protest campaign against the Springbok tour, with sustained, front-page coverage of violent student protests. The first protest was in Perth, four days before the culminating marches of the third Moratorium campaign. The Australian noted that most of the demonstrators were university students, and reported that police were guarding the planes in which the South African team would travel against possible “sabotage”.

97 “U.S. persuaded Saigon to ask for our troops,” Australian, June 17, 1971, 1; “‘I knew…’ says McMahon,” Australian, June 19, 1971, 1.
98 “Move to make Menzies tell on Vietnam,” Australian, June 20, 1971, 1; “McMahon tells of ‘Request’ to send forces,” Australian, June 23, 1971, 1.
99 Caroline Graham, “like it or not, this is our war too” (editorial), Australian, June 25, 1971, 10.
100 “Police guard Springboks,” Australian, June 26, 1971, 1.
The Adelaide match was on the same day as the Moratorium, and some protesters moved straight from the march to the Springbok game. Protesters disrupted the match by “invading” the field, throwing smoke bombs and blowing whistles. The protesters kept up a noisy vigil at the South African team’s hotel all night, blowing whistles, setting off firecrackers and driving cars past the hotel while sounding their horns in an attempt to keep the team awake.101

Protesters in Melbourne acknowledged the international influences on their protests saying that they would “blow whistles, throw smoke bombs and generally follow the trends during the 1969-70 Springbok rugby tour of England”.102 The police arrested 200.103 Sydney protesters maintained a similar vigil outside the team’s motel and staged protests at the two games in Sydney.104 Freney recalls a number of innovative protest practices being developed for the Springbok games, including having an inter-racial couple stay in the Springboks’ hotel and kiss in the corridors, launching rocket flares at the hotel, spraying the grass at the field with green dye to mark the players, and sabotaging the goalposts at the ground. Friends of his planned to release a greased pig – named ‘Snowball’ for the character in Animal Farm - onto the ground, though they became too attached to the pig in question to go through with the plan.105 When the tour reached Queensland, Premier Bjelke-Petersen declared a “State of Emergency,” granting police widespread powers to shut down demonstrations.106 In Canberra, police erected a barbed-wire fence around the oval.107 The protests in Brisbane on the 21st turned violent, with students shouting “pigs” and “fascists” during confrontations with police.108

Amidst this flurry of Springbok coverage, the final phase of the third Moratorium campaign involved nation-wide marches on June 30th. In Sydney, the Moratorium attracted about 7,000 to a rally outside Town Hall after separate marches from Sydney University and Chifley Square.109 In Brisbane the march of about 5,000 was stopped twice for brief sit-downs in Queen Street and

101 “88 arrested in wild scenes at Springbok game,” *Australian*, Jul 1, 1971, 1.
Adelaide Street. The march in Adelaide was characterised by a public disagreement over the march’s route between the police chief and the Chairman of the South Australian VMC which resolved when the marchers voted for a route that would avoid confrontation with police. Some of the 3,000 marchers forced their way through the police cordon across Rundle Street and there were around 40 arrests. The march in Hobart was very small. Although 6,000 marched in Perth it was uneventful. Only the 100,000 strong Melbourne crowd was larger than previous Moratorium marches, in large part due to the presence of Cairns and Spock.

The press represented the protests as routine and even boring. Troop withdrawals in December 1969 and April 1970 caused the Age to note as early as August 1970 that “[t]he prime cause of recent demonstrations – the Vietnam war – appears to be on the wane”. After the Pentagon papers and the small crowds at the third Moratorium, other papers took up this line. After the April march, the Courier-Mail disparaged the “now familiar Vietnam moratorium campaign” as forming part of the “seasons of dissent” alongside the trade union staple of May Day and the burgeoning campaigns for Aboriginal land rights. A week after the protest the Australian published an opinion piece that proclaimed the death of the Moratorium Campaign:

In the park, the ritual began – ritual can be fun, but this one was pure boredom. Separated from the “masses” in their wrought iron podium, the speechmakers repeated the same clichés about “building organisationally,” about “reaching out to the industrial working class” as they always do.

According to the Australian, the Campaign was preaching to the choir. Citing Marcuse, the paper argued that it had been reduced to a “harmless ritual, a pacifier of conscience, a star witness to the rights and freedoms available under the status quo”. The Age’s editorial on July 1st

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110 “March fight...arrests,” Courier-Mail, July 1, 1971, 1; and Saunders “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 276-277.
111 “110,000 march against war – 33 arrested,” Australian, July 1, 1971, 3; and Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 288-90.
116 Wendy Bacon, “This was the Demo that Wasn’t,” Australian, May 7, 1971, 8.
117 Ibid.
summed up the pervasive sense of fatigue and purposelessness that characterised the third Moratorium:

But is today’s march really necessary? This is a reasonable question. Surely the white-heat has gone out of the Vietnam issue. The veterans of May, 1970, marched to bring the troops home. Now they are coming, and disengagement is a fact of the war. At a time when the Pentagon Papers reveal just how dubious was the manner of involvement there is little doubt that the United States, and Australia with it, will make a total withdrawal.118

The paper argued that the Moratorium’s aims had been all but achieved: the troops were being withdrawn and the case for involvement was discredited. With withdrawal a fact, the rationale for commitment undone, and focus shifting to other political issues, Australian anti-war campaigning had all but come to an end.

The Figure of the Violent Student in Protest Reportage

Beginning with the July 4th protests of 1968, the figure of the university student emerged in the pages of Australian metropolitan newspapers as the harbinger of confrontational protest violence. Newspapers understood violence at street marches as a relationship between police and protesters, and the question of who instigated violence at any given protest was open to debate. However, the presence of students in a crowd of demonstrators came to signify the threat of violence. It took time for the word ‘student’ to be invested with these meanings. Confrontations between protesters and police in 1966 neither identified the demonstrators as students, nor did they tend to use the word ‘violence,’ preferring words like “clash,” or ‘riot,” or phrases like “wildest demonstration”.119 When protests against LBJ’s visit became unruly, papers talked about “bearded youths and T-shirted girls” rather than students.120 It was demonstrators and not students who broke barricades during the LBJ visit in Sydney or Melbourne, and “rushed” at Marshal Kỳ in Brisbane.121 Before 1968 the marker of student protest was not violence but the

occupation; students sat down in city streets, as with the VAC protest in Martin Place in October 1965, or sat-in, as with the Draft Resistance Movement’s occupation of the Commonwealth Parliamentary offices in Melbourne in support of Conscientious Objector Dennis O’Donnell in April 1967. When in June 1968 a policeman died of a heart attack during a student sit-in against conscription, the Sun’s editorial noted that “[a] lot of people will blame the death ... on the students involved,” but argued that “whatever your feelings about students and their demonstrations ... we cannot, in fairness, blame them for constable Weaver’s death.” Prior to July 1968, Australian students were fractious and confrontational, but they were not yet synonymous with protest violence.

The Australian practice of solidarity actions with international protest campaigns meant that local and international demonstrations occupied column inches in the same editions of metropolitan papers. In 1967 the adoption by local protesters of American practices were noteworthy rather than cause for alarm. At the August Mobilisation protest newspaper coverage singled out young members of the crowd for their dress and coiffure rather than their rowdy or violent behaviour. The Sun noted “40 hippies, draped in beads,” in the 1,000-strong Sydney march, while the Herald dubbed them “flower children draped in beads, hippies and long-haired youths”. The Sun also noted five ministers amongst the marchers. The difference between the young demonstrators and the staid collection of unionists, clergy and academics attracted the press’ attention because they adopted the aesthetics of the international counterculture. In 1967 young protesters were an oddity, not yet a threat.

Over the next two years, the word “student” emerged as a signifier of protest violence. Beginning with the July 4th protest in 1968 students and violence often appeared together in news stories. The word ‘student’ was used in headlines to signify disruptive and fractious behaviour. Headlines like “Students may face riot charges,” “Students held in march,” and “Student’s long wait for arrest,” normalised the connection between students and unruly behaviour at protests. A Melbourne Herald editorial following the protest supported “calls for stronger action against

125 “Students may face riot charges,” Australian, July 6, 1968, 2; “Students held in march,” Herald (Melbourne), March 25, 1969, 1; “Student’s long wait for arrest,” Age, April 8, 1969, 3.
mob violence”. Despite identifying the subjects of these calls as “demonstrators,” it later narrowed the focus to “those university students and others who want to express political views”.

The Daily Telegraph reported on the protest under the headline “56 arrested as students fight police” and stated early in the piece that “[t]he demonstrators were students from Melbourne, Latrobe and Monash universities ... armed with stones, tins, bottle and some with razor blades.” When reporting on an inquiry into a brawl between students at Sydney University at which the Governor of NSW had fruit and toilet paper thrown at him, the Australian ran the story on the front page under the headline “Student violence probe”. In September 1970, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Queensland circulated an appeal to students and staff that asked for a return to “a campus free from violence, ugly and intemperate language, and march and counter-march,” once again implying the connection between students and violence. Parliamentarians also assumed that the presence of students at demonstrations and protest violence were mutually entangled. After the 1968 July 4th protests Gorton asked the Attorney-General, Bowen, to investigate possible legal avenues to penalise violent protesters.

The category of violent protester was immediately conflated with the category of the university student, with the Victorian state secretary of the DLP advocated stripping student lawbreakers of their Commonwealth scholarships, with support from the leader of the Country Party and the head of the RSL. When the Daily Telegraph reported that the Minister for Education was considering the idea, it framed the problem as “violence in recent student demonstrations”.

From 1968 onwards, increasingly violent verbs were attached to the noun “student” in newspaper reportage. Some of these words denoting violence – such as “wild,” “brawl,” or “near-riot” – pre-dated the press interest in student violence, but they were easily redeployed. The Sydney Morning Herald described “hundreds of university and other students” at the July 4th

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129 “Cool off’ plea to students,” Age, September 12, 1970, 10.
131 “Stop Govt. aid to student rioters’,” Herald (Melbourne), July 6, 1968, 9.
protest in 1968 who “struggled and scuffled with police”.\textsuperscript{134} The \textit{Courier-Mail} identified students as the principal instigators of violence the following year in Brisbane:

Melees erupted in Brisbane last night when a breakaway group of about 80 anti-American demonstrators played cat and mouse with police through city streets. The demonstrators were mainly students.\textsuperscript{135}

Before the second Moratorium the \textit{Age} reported on students at the University of Queensland who “seize[d]” the University Regiment Headquarters building, “smashed furniture,” and “wrote revolutionary slogans on the walls”. Rather than the more common “occupy,” the paper used the verb “invaded” to describe the students’ behavior.\textsuperscript{136} Two days later, the paper reported that “[p]olice fought an hour-long battle of fists, elbows, boots and obscenity against radical students” as they attempted to prevent a South Vietnamese dignitary leaving the campus.\textsuperscript{137} An anti-war march in Melbourne was characterised by the \textit{Age} as a “battle with police” in which “police charged” the students and “[p]olice and students fought on the roadway and on nearby nature strips”.\textsuperscript{138} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} framed the same protest as a “wild demonstration,” that quickly became a series of “running battles with fists, stones and batons,” in which “Students and police punched and kicked each other and wrestled on the ground”.\textsuperscript{139} When the \textit{Age} reported on an anti-Apartheid protest in Canberra, after the story first pointed out that most of the crowd was students, before describing how the students “stormed” the embassy.\textsuperscript{140}

This is not to suggest that students were the only violent protesters. At times, the newspapers were forced to acknowledge the presence of other activists at violent protests. In its report of the 1969 July 4\textsuperscript{th} protest in Melbourne protest, the \textit{Courier-Mail} described a “pitched battle,” and an “ugly riot” at the U.S Consulate after the crowd “erupted” through the police cordon, throwing rocks and fire-crackers while shouting “the streets belong to us”. The crowd was made up of “trade unionists, students and ‘peace’ demonstrators” – the scare quotes denoting a return to red-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[137] “Envoy held as students, police fight,” \textit{Age}, September 5, 1970, 3.
\item[138] “19 Arrested in student clash,” \textit{Age}, September 17, 1970, 1.
\item[139] “Vic students battle police,” \textit{SMH}, September 17, 1970, 5.
\item[140] “Police arrest 24 in Canberra race protest,” \textit{Age}, May 20, 1971, 1.
\end{footnotes}
baiting consistent with the paper’s anti-communist editorial line.\textsuperscript{141} The \textit{Australian}’s coverage of the second Moratorium identified the violent parts of the Sydney crowd as consisting of “[s]tudents, unionists and white-collar workers”.\textsuperscript{142}

Despite the involvement of off-campus activists, the papers returned inevitably to students as the harbingers of protest violence. The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} marked students at the 1969 July 4\textsuperscript{th} protest as bringers of disruption, noting that “it was evident when 50 Sydney University Labor Club members arrived with red flags on red and white striped poles and a blue and white Cuban flag that the demonstration would not be a meek walkabout”.\textsuperscript{143} Students predicted violence even when they were not present at protests. A demonstration in the public gallery of the House of Representatives in Canberra in March 1969 demonstrates the extent to which anxieties about violent students shaped newspapers’ interpretations of protest. The protest was part of a national lobby to Canberra, planned as the climax of a series of demonstrations in support of Melbourne conscientious objector John Zarb.\textsuperscript{144} The lobbying mission to Canberra had been a staple of anti-war and anti-conscription protest since the 1960s, and the 1969 lobbying trip had been organised by the AICD, not campus organisations. Nevertheless, the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} turned a rumour that Melbourne students had been “stockpiling Molotov cocktails for possible use at the demonstration,” into a headline that read “Petrol bomb fears at Canberra protest”. Despite this sensational opener, the story quoted the Inspector of Canberra police as saying that “We are not treating this demonstration as if it going to be an especially riotous one,” and the secretary of the AICD saying “We are not interested in a negative or violent sort of demonstration”.\textsuperscript{145} Though students played no major part in the demonstration, the \textit{Herald} could not make sense of the possibility of violence without invoking the figure of the student. On the day, it was 30 mostly “middle-aged” protesters who provided the paper its most spectacular image, chanting “Free Zarb,” from the public galleries while displaying anti-conscription posters. The protesters had gained entry to Parliament House using passes they had obtained to meet with MPs, and were ostensibly in parliament to witness ALP Senator Lionel Murphy asking a leading

\textsuperscript{142} “Violence flares in Sydney streets,” \textit{Australian}, September 19, 1970, 5.
\textsuperscript{144} Geoff Anderson (Secretary, AICD) to “Dear Friends,” February 10, 1969, Folder “Vietnam – Vietnam Lobby Day, Canberra, 25 March 1969,” Box 34 (74), PND Records; CICD, meeting minutes (February 8, 1969), Item 1/3, Box 1, CICD Collection.
question about gaoled conscientious objectors on the floor below.\textsuperscript{146} Though the violence of the July 4\textsuperscript{th} protests of the previous year was absent, its memory survived in journalists’ choice of words: the “rowdy” protesters “invaded” the gallery and “scuffles” broke out as police tried to eject protesters from the gallery.\textsuperscript{147}

Just as not every violent protester was a student, not every press outlet agreed that the blame for violence should always be laid at the feet of students. The \textit{Sun} argued in July 1968 that “both students and police were carried away by their zeal”.\textsuperscript{148} The \textit{Mirror} took a similar line, explaining dissent as a “function” of students in a democracy, just as it was the function of the police to keep the peace. This characterisation allowed that “[b]oth parties were there for the right reasons,” even if things got out of hand. The paper argued that both police and students “should have learned” from “facing each other in similar situations for the past three or four years”.\textsuperscript{149} Journalists sometimes empathised with students if they witnessed them becoming the targets of police violence, or became targets themselves. At the 1968 July 4\textsuperscript{th} protest in Martin Place, a press photographer was injured by police and reporters noticed that some policemen had removed their identification badges. The \textit{Herald} argued in an editorial that the removal of police badges was “the most disturbing feature” of the protest, even if “the students got out of hand”.\textsuperscript{150} The paper’s coverage described the police forming an “arrow” and “charging” the protesters, “throwing” them aside to allow Gorton to reach his car.\textsuperscript{151} Active verbs like ‘charged’ and ‘threw’ described what police did to protesters, while passive verbs – ‘sat,’ ‘fell’ – described the students. Where the \textit{Daily Telegraph} claimed that the protesters rocked Gorton’s car as a tactic, the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} attributed the rocking of Gorton’s car to police pushing the students back.\textsuperscript{152} In a similar fashion, the \textit{Australian} noted the possibility of “police brutality,” at a Springbok game in Melbourne and mentioned that “[j]ournalists travelling with the Springboks

\textsuperscript{148} “Right – and wrong!” \textit{Sun} (Sydney), July 3, 1968, 4.
\textsuperscript{150} “Badges off,” \textit{SMH}, July 4, 1968, 2.
said the police used tougher measures than those used in Adelaide although they were under less pressure”. Once again, the protesters became subjects of the violence, and the police the instigators:

A police superintendent grabbed a woman holding a placard and pushed her back into the crowd. Police on horseback charged into the demonstrators. ... Police grabbed protesters and threw them to the ground. Many demonstrators were dragged to police vans by the hair. Scores of young demonstrators were injured by police horses and truncheon-swinging police. ... One constable sent a demonstrator sprawling down the side of the grass area of the hill. Asked why he had pushed the demonstrator, the constable said: ‘No reason.’

Students unsurprisingly tended to lay the blame for the violence at the feet of police. Michael Hyde and Warren Osmond of Monash University’s New Left Group both agreed that more violent demonstrations were a probable response to police-led confrontation, arguing that though students were accelerating the violence, it was only because police had begun it.154

Even if the causes of violence at protests was still open to debate, by mid-1969 students signified its possibility. The presence of radical students at Moratorium planning meetings meant that outside observers worried about the possibility of violence. The day after the removal of the non-violence clause in Victoria the Melbourne Sun ran the headline “Violence ‘in’ for protest on Viet”.155 In the last few days before May 8th instances of violent protest, especially by students, made headlines: students had thrown rocks at the headquarters of ASIO and smashed several of Honeywell’s windows because of its perceived connection to the Vietnam War. On the day of the Moratorium, the company hired guards for their offices and sent their female employees home.156 Though the Age supported the march, it predicted violence at the Moratorium, instigated by “the idiots who actually seek violence”.157 In the end, the marches were peaceful, but so widespread was the assumption that student protest preceded violence that its absence required explanation. One Age correspondent reached for Australian exceptionalism: the Moratorium “made you proud to be an Australian ... because it showed that in this country we can still make

154 Ibid.
155 Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 34.
156 Moratorium guard for $1m computers,” Age, May 7, 1970, 3; and Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 127.
democracy work by turning out in the street to exercise the right of dissent”.

The notion that the Australian national character somehow inoculated against the actions of a small hard core of activists faded as the sensational actions of a small number of campus activists began to garner more attention and pushed peaceful protest to the margins of public attention.

From ‘Noisy Minority’ to ‘Hard Core’

Observers of Australian protest in the late 1960s increasingly imagined that protest violence was caused by a small number of radicals or provocateurs who led the majority of protesters astray. The idea of a ‘hard core’ of radical student provocateurs was developed from the idea of the ‘noisy minority,’ visible during the anti-Johnson protests in 1966. Thus the Sydney Morning Herald described “hundreds of university and other students” at the July 4th protest in 1968 who were “urged on and led by a spearhead of radicals bearing red flags”. The Age described “a hard core of trouble makers” at the same protest which it classified as “angry young men” who “came prepared – and armed – for battle”. The Melbourne Herald argued in an editorial that “some demonstrators are trying to commit supposedly peaceful movements to an irresponsible and dangerous course”. In July 1969 the Daily Telegraph admonished the “riot-prone minority of university students,” and exhorted them to “get down to work and become educated responsible, self-disciplined citizens”. At the anti-Apartheid protest in May 1971 in Canberra, the Age described a “hard core” of 200 students staging a sit-down outside the police station to demand the release of those arrested at the protest. In March 1969 the secretaries of the NSW, Victorian and Queensland committees for International Cooperation and Disarmament wrote to Prime Minister Gorton in March 1969, explaining that the democratic process was “clearly in some danger of being written off as a phony façade not only by tertiary student groupings but many of older vintage”.

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161 “Must End Violence,” July 8, 1968, 4.
students were a fractious and radical minority on the fringe of a wider movement, implying that if older activists agreed with students, then something must be very wrong indeed.

The idea of an extreme cadre influencing the moderate majority echoed the red-baiting of the 1950s, in which the Communist Party was understood as having infiltrated peace organisations, turning other members of pacifist organisations into dupes or fellow travellers. Traces of this infiltration narrative were visible in Liberal and Country Party parliamentarians’ statements on the Moratorium. In 1968 the famous anti-communist B. A. Santamaria claimed that the 1968 July 4th protest in Melbourne “had been planned by anarchist and Communist university students”.165 David Fairbairn, a member of the federal Liberal government, characterised the Moratorium as part of a “world-wide propaganda campaign to weaken the will of Allied countries on the home front”.166 On the day before the first Moratorium, Fairbairn read a statement in Federal parliament that “the Vietnam Moratorium is an assault upon democratic processes, based on fraud and designed to promote widespread disruption and dislocation” and read off his own list of Communists in the Moratorium including Laurie Carmichael, Mavis Robertson and Bernie Taft.167 Victorian senator Ivor Greenwood argued that the Moratorium organisers could only bring succour to Australia’s enemies:

... it may possibly bring, if there is noise, nuisance and violence, widespread Press and television publicity which will go round the world and may therefore achieve one object of strengthening the intransigence and aggression of the North Vietnamese.168

The *Herald* was more forthright in its naming of the ‘hard-core’: it excoriated “the manipulators and the communists” who “tend to become a dominant minority” and who had a “vested interest in violence”.169 While visiting Canberra, the South Vietnamese Ambassador asserted in a public speech that the Moratorium was “designed to bring about a communist victory” and that it was being managed by “political speculators and Communist instigators, who will exploit the genuine desire for true peace of other people to foster their own political purpose and to help

their Communist comrades in Vietnam.”170 Though these observers did not pick out students as a part of this transnational communist conspiracy, the rhetoric of the ‘hard core’ of student radicals reflected the older idea of communist infiltration of pacifist organisations.

The idea of the ‘hard core’ also made sense because of a Marxist revival amongst Moratorium activists. Unlike the activists of 1966 who resented the ‘noisy minority’ label, the activists who made up what the Press and Parliament characterised as the ‘hard core’ embraced the characterisation, describing themselves as a revolutionary vanguard. These activists were an active and influential minority in the Moratorium coalition, and their presence was evident at the National Anti-War Conference held in Sydney in February 1971. At this conference 81 papers were split across three themes, and fed into a “business section” that produced a strategy document for the third Moratorium campaign. The conference program led from “sessions analysing the international situation, through sessions discussing the political context of the Australian anti-war movement and ideological positions associated with the anti-war movement, to sessions discussing strategies and tactics for the future”.171 A considerable number of the papers at the conference described the political project of the Moratorium as a revolutionary one, in which activists worked to raise the level of ‘political consciousness’ of Australian workers until the ‘objective’ ideological linkages between Australian Labor relations and Vietnamese colonisation were revealed.

To Marxists at the conference there was no difference between Australians marching in the streets and the Vietnamese fighting imperialism and thus between anti-war protest and revolutionary activity. In this context, violence at protests was an appropriate political tool, intended to confront and undo the power of the imperialist state. Thus Barry York’s paper argued that Moratorium’s effectiveness was “measured in terms of the degree to which political consciousness of the masses is raised as a prerequisite to achieving the avowed aim of the movement”.172 For Brian Medlin the Moratorium represented an opportunity to “make operative and visible certain contradictions in capitalist society” and it could thus play a role in Australia’s

171 NCC, meeting minutes (August 16, 1970), Folder “NSW co-ordinating committee, national coordinating committee,” 1, Box 38 (74), PND Records.
172 Barry York, “Imperialism and the Moratorium” (Paper delivered at the National Anti-War Conference, February 1971), Series/folder 1/1, Box 1, Frazer Papers.
achievement of a “pre-revolutionary” level of political consciousness. He argued that the Moratorium’s role was to “lean on history so that when it is ready to give way our weight is already on it”. Jim Percy of the Sydney organisation Resistance argued that any anti-war activity could be considered anti-imperialist simply by virtue of opposing an imperialist war:

The creation of a specifically ‘anti-imperialist’ consciousness is best done by engaging in objectively ‘anti-imperialist’ action and mass actions around the demand for immediate withdrawal has proved to be the formula that offers the best chance in defending the Vietnamese Revolution and thus dealing blows to imperialism.

In the same vein, Phil Sandford explained the reluctance of workers to engage with the Moratorium as a result of a “false consciousness” instilled in them by imperialist propaganda that obscured the “objective link” between themselves and other workers elsewhere in the world. This allowed him to reconcile the lack of worker engagement with the Moratorium with the Marxist assumption that “[t]he industrial working class ... are the only class with the power to fundamentally challenge capitalism”.

Marxist activists wielded considerable influence at the conference, and attempted to use that influence to re-shape the third Moratorium. They raised four separate amendments to the Moratorium aims during the Business Section, which were eventually amalgamated into one amendment and passed. Lynn Arnold from South Australia and Laurie Aarons, scion of a NSW CPA dynasty, argued that Third World liberation forces were essential to the Moratorium’s aims. Bob Gould’s amendment insisted that the working class was the only force capable of challenging capitalism. Laurie Carmichael moved an amalgamated amendment committing the “whole anti-war movement” to orienting “the main direction of its activities towards achieving a forthright effort at all levels of the working class and labor movement for mass

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173 Brian Medlin, “Strategy for the Revolution” (Paper delivered at the National Anti-War Conference, February 1971), Series/folder 1/1, Box 1, Frazer Papers.
174 Jim Percy, “Mass Action and Movement Strategy” (Paper delivered at the National Anti-War Conference, February 1971), Series/folder 1/1, Box 1, Frazer Papers.
consciousness and action for the aims [of the Moratorium Campaign].” The resulting strategy document reconfirmed the Campaign’s function as a political strike, stipulating that

> The main slogan directed to the workers and the labor movement for their participation in anti-war action be ‘stop work to stop the war’, with all necessary varieties of action enlisted to lead to the goal of a mass political strike. In particular, rank and file action should be developed through the formation of workshop rank and file committees in all industries.

With Australian commitment to the Vietnam War all but over, these activists were attempting to turn the political goodwill they saw in the Moratorium towards Marxist consciousness-raising.

Activists not committed to the Marxist revival criticised this view. Sam Goldbloom, long-time secretary of the CICD, acknowledged that the input of the radical ‘hard core’ had re-shaped Australian protest for the better. He argued that the methods and beliefs of the peace movement of the 1950s and early 1960s “can no longer be considered wholly valid” and that “defiance and resistance” – code words for what the papers described as violence and confrontation - were “tactics that have considerable potential for future development”. However, he cautioned his listeners that

it cannot and should not be assumed that of the 70,000 who demonstrated in Melbourne ... that more than a small minority of the participants were ready to accept the advanced position of the left with respect to imperialism, the NLF or revolutionary socialism.

Others were more scathing. Ken McLeod, the Secretary of the NSW VMC and AICD, argued that the Marxist New Left’s concentration on the industrial working class and their own role as a revolutionary vanguard had “become magical totems whose function is to act as mystical resolutions of real contradictions.” The “destructive invective” of the New Left was harmful, McLeod argued, and the movement must move beyond the “sloganizing [and] ‘radical cheer leading’ that amounts only to self-verification and posturing”. Though long-term activists were

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177 “Aims for the National Coalition of the V.M.C. (Adopted at the National Anti-War Conference),” Folder “National Anti-War Conference,” Box 40 (74), PND Records.
178 Sam Goldbloom, “The Role of the Peace Movement” (Paper delivered at the National Anti-War Conference, February 1971), Series/folder 1/1, Box 1, Frazer Papers.
aware of the effects the new radical language of confrontation was having on their protests, there was no consensus on what violence at protests signified, or whether it should be pursued as a political objective. Regardless of this lack of consensus, the idea of the ‘hard core’ of radical instigators neatly echoed the Marxist New Left’s Leninist assumptions about themselves as a political vanguard or cadre, working to raise the political consciousness of the working classes.

Echoing the Marxists’ identification with a global working class, observers outside the Moratorium interpreted this ‘hard core’ of student provocateurs as the product of an international counterculture in which Australian activists were enmeshed. The Vice-Chancellor of Monash University predicted student revolt on his own campus after observing events at Berkeley.\footnote{Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 265.} Newspapers used examples from the United States and Europe to make sense of the violent July 4\textsuperscript{th} protests. The \textit{Age} argued that “[i]f the angry young men are imitating the street fighters of Europe and America, then we are heading for serious trouble unless a halt is called”.\footnote{“Halt to violence,” \textit{Age}, July 6, 1968, 9.} In the same vein, the \textit{Telegraph} argued that

\begin{quote}
If the indulged young people of our universities think that “student power” can express itself in this country with the license to run riot suffered by other countries, the notion needs to be stamped out promptly and firmly. ...
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
If these students believe that Australians will tolerate the sort of violence inflicted on Paris, London or New York, they are sadly mistaken.\footnote{“Stop student violence at its start,” \textit{Daily Telegraph}, July 4, 1968, 2.}
\end{quote}

The \textit{Courier-Mail} called violence “an American or European monopoly”.\footnote{“Guards for P.M.,” \textit{Courier-Mail}, July 4, 1968, 2.} Reflecting on student violence in March 1969, the Chief Justice of NSW interpreted 1968 and 1969 as the beginning of “a period of world student revolt” in which “young people in capitalist countries had less respect for authority, while intelligent student leaders were advocating organised anarchy as an answer to social evils in society”.\footnote{“A period of student revolt,” \textit{SMH}, March 26, 1969, 14.} In May 1969 students at Sydney University...
threw “fruit, streamers and rolls of toilet paper” – an inquiry later added “fire crackers,” - at the Governor of NSW, who was inspecting the University Regiment. The *Australian* argued that Extremist student tactics and, as often as not, the motives for them, have a striking international character. The Sydney University affair could almost have been a scale model of the troubles at Harvard three weeks earlier. Next week or next month the events could be repeated with local variations at any other Australian, British or Japanese campus.

Like the Marxists in the Moratorium, Student leaders’ pronouncements did not contradict this narrative. The President of the Melbourne University SRC said that students “who wanted to imitate what is happening overseas” would “use police repression as an excuse for stronger, more violent demonstrations”. Where protests were peaceful, they were used as evidence of Australian democratic exceptionalism. Where they were not, the violence was the result of the Australian body politic having been infiltrated by alien influences. Australian students were cast as the impressionable mimics of American or European behaviours.

The image of a worldwide network of violent students shaped expectations of violence at the nationwide Moratorium protests. In 1973 O’Hara noted that newspapers juxtaposed stories of violent American protests in 1969 and 1970 with reportage of local protests, suggesting that American and Australian protesters were cut from the same cloth:

Suddenly and for no apparent reason they begin shouting, and sending death threats and crying ‘Nazi’, just as the university students in America set fire to a fire-truck.

Stories of American protest violence made headlines five days before the first Australian Moratorium, when the *Australian* ran a story about a US protest under the headline “Troops ready for violence by anti-war protesters”. After the deaths of four students at the hands of the National Guard at Kent State University in Ohio on the 4th of May, Australian politicians and newspapers began to link American protests to the imminent Australian Moratorium. The day before the Moratorium, the *Sydney Morning Herald* ran a story on the front page under the

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juxtaposed headlines “Dead Students Honoured” and “Student Arson, Riots and Shooting Revenge”. On Moratorium day the paper covered a discussion in Federal Parliament of the Kent State shootings. A Labor backbencher, Fred Daly, asked the government for an assurance that the police would not use firearms against protesters. McMahon, then Minister for External Affairs, was quoted as saying that the lesson of Kent State “ought to be taken to heart” by Moratorium protesters, and “ought to be heeded” by members of the Opposition who planned to march. On the day of the march, the Sydney Morning Herald ran an editorial simply titled “Violence” in which it argued that the “real danger of violence” existed because “the campaign is so assiduous an imitation of its US model”.

‘Law and Order’ and Rights

Newspapers situated the ‘Law and Order’ debate of mid-1970 in the same transnational context as the students who the new laws targeted. A book review in the Age on the 15th began by calling the obsession with ‘Law and Order’ “Agnewitis” after one of its most vocal American proponents, Vice-President Spiro Agnew. At an address to a Presbyterian women’s group in early September, the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, used another of Agnew’s recognisable catchphrases when he asked “Who gave the permissive society permission?” The Australian observed the adoption of this vocabulary in much the same way as the Sydney Morning Herald reported the protesters’ “assiduous imitation” of American protesters:

the government could make political capital out of a “law and order” campaign, and an appeal to the “silent majority” just as the Republican Party under Mr. Nixon had before the last US Presidential election.

The next day the paper’s editorial argued that the “law and order” campaign “seems to have been borrowed straight from the American context without regard to the diverse and often tragic consequences it has had there”, including the shootings at Kent State University that had made

193 “Tuning in to the silent majority”, Age, August 15, 1970, 7.
the news just before the first Moratorium march. The Moratorium organisers also used the violent confrontation outside the American Democratic National Convention in 1968 that became known as the ‘Battle of Chicago’ as an example of the result of police intransigence in a press statement two days before the second Moratorium: “There is an unfortunate parallel, if on a smaller scale, with the time of the Chicago Democratic Convention in 1968” Unconvinced by the connection between violent protest and civil disorder, and thus by the need for new legislation to deal with protesters, opponents of new pieces of legislation targeted at protesters explained them as mimicry of American actions rather than a response to local political needs.

As the debate evolved, the Premiers began to use the now-familiar language of the “noisy minority” or “hard core” to justify clamping down on protests. In New South Wales, Premier Askin explained the announcement of the Summary Offences Act as targeting “professional agitators and rabid communists, who attach themselves to what start off as lawful demonstrations, and do their best to turn them into riotous incidents”. In Queensland, Premier Bjelke-Petersen said that Moratorium organisers “… wanted to defy “law and order” and cause maximum inconvenience to the general public,” and that “…it was regrettable there were sections of the community who were prepared to act in such an irresponsible way in a democratic society”. The Premiers began to conflate the violent hard core with the protest organisers, implying that they were planning for violence. In May, the Victorian Premier had announced that “our government will not tolerate law-breaking from any section of the community”, and told the press that “the fewer attending ... the less chance of violence.” Before the September demonstration, he repeated that warning, this time singling out organisers as the instigators of such violence: “[i]f there was mass occupation, the government would take ‘appropriate action’”. He also repudiated that the 1000 rally marshals promised by the organisers were intended to keep the marchers in line, arguing that they could “serve only to provoke disorder”. In September Askin called for a total boycott of the second Moratorium:

197 “‘Another Chicago’ here?” SMH, September 17, 1970, 17.
200 “Bolte takes tough line on Moratorium actions,” Australian, April 15, 1970, 3.
If all political parties – excluding of course the Communist Party - and law-abiding people boycotted the demonstration, it would be a ‘fizzer’ – and this would be in the best interests of democracy and the people of this state.  

Support for ‘Law and Order’ was presented as an attempt to safeguard the democratic rights of the majority against a minority intent on disrupting the civil life of the community.

Opponents of the bill also mobilised democratic ideals in support of their position. They argued that the bills were an undemocratic imposition on freedom of speech and the right to dissent. The NSW Council of Civil Liberties and a number of Unions argued that the bill was “repressive”, “undemocratic” and an “assault on civil freedom”. The Age’s editorial warned that too-strict laws were at least as capable of destabilising democracy as violent protests, and that current police powers were sufficient to deal with protesters. It even went as far as to say that students claiming wrongful arrest was “cause for disquiet”. The paper concluded that

[t]he maintaining of “law and order” without undue interference to individual liberty is a democracy’s great juggling act: there have been signs of fumbling in Victoria over the past few days.

In another editorial the paper acknowledged that “the community must be protected from the excesses of the wild young men who have occupied private and public buildings and disrupted postal services and normal business,” but concluded that current penalties were sufficient for managing demonstrators, and that the proposed amendments could “bend the law so far that peaceful citizens would consider their elementary rights in danger”. The Herald concluded that the “law and order” debate was prone to “exaggeration ... or incipient hysteria” and that “governments must deal very firmly with violence and intimidation, but must be scrupulously careful how they do it”. The ‘Law and Order’ debates became debates over the democratic

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202 Ibid.
balance between the appropriateness of setting limits on dissent and the assumed inviolability of civil liberties.

During this debate, all sorts of citizen behaviours began to be articulated as ‘rights’. In early August, the national president of the Returned Services League, Sir Arthur Lee, argued that protest demonstrations “should ... not restrict the free movement of citizens going about their normal business. ‘The capacity of dissenters to stop the work of a city should be denied’”.207 Democratic Labor Party Senator McManus argued on behalf of the party executive that “these demonstrators claim rights above everyone else” and that “people had been denied the right to use the streets and shops had been denied the right to trade”.208 The Prime Minister argued that the protesters’ practice of “invading public places and private property” was intended to “interfere with the rights of citizens or to threaten and intimidate other citizens”.209 The Attorney-General appeared on This Day Tonight to debate the new federal bill with students, he said that “he would like to call [the bill] ‘the Law for the protection of rights’” and that “the proposed legislation was needed to preserve the rights of the majority against the mindless violence of a minority”.210 By the day of the Moratorium, members of the public were also making the same argument. The Courier-Mail published a lengthy letter from a Brisbane lawyer which asked

What about the right of every innocent individual, whether university students or not, to be protected from violence, and the guilty ones prosecuted for breaches of the law? ... What about the right of every citizen to be governed and protected by the parties democratically elected to Parliament ... and the right to change laws by normal procedures and not by violence?211

By claiming that to go about one’s day unimpeded by disruption was a democratic right, Lee, McManus, Gorton and Hughes were arguing in support of the contention that the new legislation would protect democracy rather than curtail civil liberties.

The ‘Law and Order’ debates of late 1970 represent the peak of anxiety about radical and violent protest during the Vietnam War. Supporters of ‘Law and Order’ shifted into the language of ‘rights’ in part because protesters had used that vocabulary to argue against the real or

207 “Cairns is ‘disloyal’,” Age, August 5, 1970, 12.
211 Sir Leon Trout, letter to the editor, Courier-Mail, September 18, 1970, 2.
imagined curtailing of street protest. The language of rights had shaped the development of the anti-conscription repertoire before 1966, and the question of the ‘right to dissent’ had gained some traction at the time of Johnson and Kŷ’s visits. In this way, the ‘Law and Order’ debate was a response to the protesters’ articulations of the ‘right to protest’. Instead of arguing that violence would endanger citizens or their property, as Premier Bjelke-Petersen had done during the Springbok tour, several public participants in the ‘Law and Order’ debate instead talked about the citizen’s “right” to go about their business unimpeded. This played on the Moratorium’s own claim to be a political strike against ‘business as usual’. By shifting into the language of rights, the ‘Law and Order’ debates made an argument about protest into an argument about democratic citizenship.
Chapter 5: Lawbreaking and the Right to Protest

Between mid-1968 and the election of the Whitlam Government in November 1972, Australian protesters developed a new vocabulary of lawbreaking as political protest. Although they were the centre of public concern over ‘Law and Order,’ anti-war and anti-conscription protesters did not shy away from public assertions of their right to break an immoral law. Though acts of targeted disorder were willfully misconstrued by newspapers and conflated with the violent students who hurled stones at embassy windows, the underpinnings of Australian lawbreaking were quite distinct from the iconoclastic confrontation attributed to the Marxist New Left. After the 1966 election and the subsequent rhetoric of the ‘noisy minority’ or ‘hard core’ of provocateurs made it impossible to maintain the claim to represent the public, Australian protesters looked for a new way to justify their dissent. To do so they drew on the liberal individualism that drove anti-conscription protest and fused it with notions of moral lawbreaking drawn from the international counterculture. Protesters in the early 1960s had argued that the moral rightness of dissent came from the public’s rational capacity. Now, sundered from the public, they argued that the laws they opposed were objectively immoral. By the time of the Moratorium Campaign, Australian protesters had re-framed organised dissent as participatory democracy, and the ‘right to protest’ became a justification for the repudiation of the state’s authority to regulate the lives of its citizens.

Unlike student radicalism, the historiography of Australian protest is almost silent on the development of peaceful lawbreaking during the Vietnam War. Hamel-Green’s and Scates’ work on Australian Draft Resistance outlines some elements of the practice but are selective and far from comprehensive.1 Saunders’ work on the Moratorium and Strangio’s biography of Jim Cairns both engage with Australian protest in the late 1960s and early 1970s.2 However, as yet no history of Australian protest has focused on the emergence of a coherent philosophy of lawbreaking in the context of anti-war and anti-conscription campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s.

This chapter will argue that far from a sudden emergence in 1968, the Draft Resisters as well as the Moratorium Campaign developed as part of longer history of activism in Australia.

The chapter examines three protest campaigns that unfolded alongside the events detailed in the previous chapter: the campaign against bylaw 418 in early 1969, the activities of the Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act (CDNSA) in NSW and Victoria from mid-1969 to 1970, and the establishment of Australian Draft Resistance organisations from 1968 onwards. Though there was disagreement among participants as to its aims, the campaign against bylaw 418 was interpreted as a straightforward protest against restrictive laws that threatened civil liberties. By contrast, the CDNSA’s ‘Statement of Defiance’ took pains to make deliberate lawbreaking central to its program. The development of Australian Draft Resistance is an example of the long-term experimentation and adaptation of transnational protest practice, in this case the logic of moral lawbreaking by way of an American anti-conscription practice. The examination of its critical adaptation and adoption by Australian activists indicates that Australian protesters developed a sophisticated vocabulary of moral lawbreaking and resistance to state authority. This shift represented a significant change in Australian protest practice as involvement in the Vietnam War drew to a close.

From Civil Liberties to Conscientious Lawbreaking

On the same day as the violent protests outside the US Consulate in Melbourne in July 1968, a thousand students marched peacefully in Brisbane in support of “civil liberties”. The liberty in question was the right to hand out pamphlets without a police permit, following the submission of a case for amending traffic regulation by the University of Queensland’s Student Union to the Queensland Government.3 In keeping with the contemporary anxieties around student protest, the Courier-Mail predicted violence in the days before the march, but it passed without incident.4 Taking place two years prior to the institution of new laws relating to dissent and the ‘law and order’ debates surrounding them, the Brisbane march was the first in a series of protests

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3 “Those fiery, young fellows have a point,” Courier-Mail, July 5, 1968, 2.
throughout 1968 and 1969 that targeted existing laws that activists argued curtailed their right to dissent.

In the same period, men of conscription age began to experiment with new ways to protest the National Service Scheme by breaking the law. This took place in the context of changes to the operation of the National Service Scheme. In late 1967 Melbourne conscript Daniel Monaghan had obtained Conscientious Objector status on the grounds of his objection to the Vietnam War in particular, rather than on the basis of life-long pacifism. He toured Sydney advising conscripts on how to make a similar case. In May 1968 the National Service Act was amended, making future exemptions like Monaghan’s impossible. Garfield Barwick, then chief justice of the High Court, ruled in August that:

[to my mind, the section calls for the existence of a present compulsive and complete conscientious aversion to military service of any kind including non-combatant service at any time ending in any circumstances, even in the country’s defence in the direst circumstances.

Murphy argues that by removing extant ambiguities from the exemption process, Barwick’s ruling produced “a move towards more active defiance of the conscription system”. This entailed active refusal to register for the Scheme, the deliberate evasion of penalties for such refusal, and the bringing together of non-compliant young men into ‘Draft Resisters’ Unions’. As Tony Dalton explained the shift in 1992, “we had moved from non-compliance to total draft resistance. This involved collective acts rather than individual ones.”

These acts of refusal were initially termed ‘conscientious non-compliance’, but activists soon began to refer to it as ‘Draft Resistance’. The practice emerged from an American Catholic anti-war organisation in Boston and New York in late 1966. Scates dates the beginning of Australian Draft Resistance to January 1967, when Michael Matteson and Chris Campbell from NSW and Errol Heldzingen from Victoria wrote to the Minister for Labour and National Service outlining

5 “Visit to Sydney by David Monaghan,” SOS Sydney Newsletter (October 1967), 3.
their intention not to register for the National Service Scheme. In February the following year Victorian activists initiated an organisation called the Draft Resistance Movement. The organisation travelled to Sydney in April 1968 to stage a ‘freedom ride’ and sit-in outside Holsworthy military prison in support of conscientious objector Denis O’Donnell, who was imprisoned there. In late 1968 some Sydney non-compliers formed an organisation called “the Uncoscriptables”. In September 1969 there was a national draft resistance conference in Melbourne. By 1970 established peace organisations began to operate draft counselling and draft resistance services in support of young men who refused to comply with the Scheme.

By the time of the Moratorium, advocacy for lawbreaking as protest was widespread in Australian activist networks. These two threads – civil liberties and deliberate lawbreaking – came together during a protest campaign that began in January 1969 in Melbourne. On the 25th Melbourne University Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) members began handing out a leaflet on the GPO steps, titled “Why Register for National Service?” The leaflet advocated that young men refuse to register for the National Service Scheme. The Crimes Act made incitement to break a Commonwealth Law, such as the National Service Act, illegal. The SDS leaflet included the text “by handing you this leaflet I am risking arrest and imprisonment”. Six students were arrested by Melbourne City bylaw officers for breaking Council bylaw 418, which forbade the handing out of leaflets in Melbourne for purposes other than commercial. Because the arrests were made under the bylaw, they diverted attention from SDS’s initial aim for the protest, which was to break the federal Crimes Act. As a result of this jurisdictional overlap, over

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9 Scates, Draftmen Go Free, 29.
10 “18 arrested in sit-in,” Australian, April 27, 1968, 3; “Police break up sit-in,” Age, April 27, 1968, 3; “Crowd jeers anti-war march,” Sun (Sydney), April 27, 1968, 3; and Scates, Draftmen Go Free, 39.
13 Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act (hereafter CDNSA), Circular to all original signatories, September 12, 1969; Ken McLeod (Secretary, Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament, hereafter AICD), Press Statement, July 8, 1970; both in unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), People for Nuclear Disarmament Records, MLMSS 5522, Mitchell Library, Sydney (hereafter PND Records); AICD, Annual Report, 1971, Series/folder 3/16, Box 8, Campaign for International Co-operation and Disarmament Collection, accession numbers 79/152; 87/92; 87/93; 88/107; 88/121, University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter CICD Collection). Unless otherwise noted, ‘CDNSA’ refers to the NSW Committee.
the following months, the lawbreaking intent of the protest would be drowned out by claims that the bylaw was an undemocratic infringement of civil liberties.

SDS sustained the campaign over the next few weeks. The arrested students had intended to break the law and were not dissuaded by the charges laid against them. Five of the students, including the former president of the Melbourne University Labor Club Michael Hamel-Green, went straight from the court to the GPO to begin handing out the same leaflets. Over the next two days, several more students were arrested by bylaw officers. This time the students were charged for a variety of offences, including refusal to give names to police and incitement to breach a Commonwealth law, as well as their breach of by-law 418. Despite some protesters’ efforts, over the following months the focus of the campaign began to shift from the federal law to the council bylaw.

The overlap between federal and council jurisdictions made the job of explaining the aim of the protest difficult for SDS. Hamel-Green tried to make it clear to reporters that the students had intended to breach the Commonwealth Crimes Act, even though the January 25 arrests were made under the bylaw. The campaign continued to build, with a protest of 1700 students at the GPO in March making the front pages of the Melbourne dailies. Unlike the original five arrestees, the organisers argued that the bylaw “stifled the right of people to dissent against the Government’s policy on the Vietnam war”. The protest involved a march from Melbourne University down Swanston Street; 24 more students were arrested for handing out pamphlets. Though the campaign began in defiance of the Crimes Act, it was waged against the bylaw.

After the Melbourne students’ protest became nation-wide news, older and more high-profile activists began to attach themselves to the developing campaign. On the 1st of April, Jim Cairns gave a speech to a crowd of students in Hobart in which he argued that he had been “urging and inciting people not to render themselves for military service,” and given the interpretation of the Crimes Act used to arrest some students, he was also liable for arrest. In front of State and Commonwealth Police Cairns said: “I’m saying exactly what’s in the pamphlet, and I’m

committing a crime under the Crimes Act”. In the same speech, Cairns “attacked by-laws in Australian cities which prevent people from handing out leaflets”.19 On the 2nd the City Council voted not to amend the bylaw, and Sir Maurice Nathan, city Councillor, called on police to enforce it regardless of who was breaking it.20 The next day, Cairns and SOS secretary Jean McLean were among fourteen people arrested on the steps of the Town Hall for handing out a new leaflet, written by Cairns to request the repeal of the bylaw.21

A similar campaign of deliberate lawbreaking began in mid-1969 in NSW, this time focusing on the illegitimacy of National Service rather than the legal regulation of the right to dissent. In June 1969 two University of Sydney professors - Charles Birch, prominent Christian thinker, and Charles Martin, religious philosopher - spoke at an SDS meeting at the University in support of young men who refused to register for National Service. By inciting others to break a Commonwealth law, the professors noted that they were in breach of section 7 of the Commonwealth Crimes Act. In support of the professors, the AICD formed an ad hoc committee known as the Committee in Defiance of the National Service Act (CDNSA) and planned to formalise their lawbreaking as a protest practice.22 The CDNSA drew inspiration from SDS, but was mainly composed of older, off-campus activists. The Chairman was Ken Thomas, a company director and convener of the Australian Peace Institute, and the Vice-Chairman was Murray Sime, a Barrister. Sime had achieved some public notoriety when the Sydney Morning Herald reported in March that he may have been subject to disciplinary action under the Public Service Act as an attempt to prevent him taking part in a July 4th protest he had helped organise.23 Ken McLeod, the CDNSA spokesman, was a student who was also the Secretary of both the AICD and the NSW Vietnam Moratorium Committee. The Committee’s executive also

19 “Arrest me, Cairns taunts,” Herald (Melbourne), April 1, 1969, 1.
included Simon Townsend, former conscientious non-complier, and Les Waddington, secretary of the Ex-Services Human Rights Association.24

The Committee’s protest was based around a “Statement of Defiance” which framed their lawbreaking as a collective act of defiance against the National Service Scheme. The Statement had a clarity and reach that the Melbourne SDS students had struggled to achieve in March. It read:

Those young men whose principles will not permit them to register under that present National Service Act and who refuse to be coerced into any war which they believe to be immoral and unjust, have my wholehearted support, encouragement and aid.

If I were required to register under present conditions, I would refuse. Therefore, while young men may serve two years’ gaol because they have the courage to defy conscription and oppose the Vietnam war, I am compelled to stand with them.25

On July 3rd, the Committee held a press conference at the Sydney Town Hall, at which a brief press statement explaining the CDNSA’s rationale was read out. Following this, 72 people described by the Secretary of the Committee as “responsible citizens” signed a copy of the “Statement of Defiance,” thus breaking the Crimes Act in front of the collected press reporters.26 According to the press statement, signatories “felt themselves obligated to challenge a law established by due parliamentary process” and acknowledged that “[t]o deliberately break the law of a democratic country is no minor act, but there are times when such action becomes necessary in defence of the principles of democracy and freedom themselves”. By breaching the Crimes Act, which mandated a maximum penalty of one year in gaol, the ultimate aim was to “risk a similar penalty” as men who refused to register for National Service and thus “stand with them”.27

The CDNSA intended for their protest to be more than symbolic, and did everything to make sure that the signatories were charged and sentenced. “The core of the Committee’s activities,”

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24 CDNSA, “Report to Union, Student, Church and Independent Press,” [August-September, 1969], unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
25 Ken W. Thomas, Simon Townsend, and Ken McLeod (CDNSA members) to The Hon. T. E. Hughes (Commonwealth Attorney-General), November 18, 1969, unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
26 Ibid.
27 CDNSA, “Press Conference, Sydney Town Hall Foyer, 2 PM, Thursday, 3rd July, 1969”.

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according to the Secretary’s report in 1970, was “the actual prosecution and conviction of
signatories who volunteer”. Thus in September Simon Townsend “laid informations” against
38 of the original signatories, which meant reporting them to a Clerk of the Court rather than the
police as a method of initiating criminal proceedings. Those 38 had consented to being charged
by Townsend with breaching the Crimes Act. Though a member of the Committee, Townsend
had not signed the Statement himself in order to leave him able to perform this role. Geoff
Mullens laid informations against a second group in early November. In November and
December, the Committee in NSW staged protests outside the Commonwealth parliamentary
offices in Martin Place at which a new group would sign the Statement, followed the next day by
a volunteer laying informations against that group. By June 1970 the practice had spread to
Victoria, where it took on a form much like the SDS GPO leafleting protests of early 1969. As
Melbourne CDNSA activists distributed leaflets that breached the Crimes Act, the Reverend Stan
Moore, a veteran of anti-conscription protest and member of the Committee, questioned them
and took their names in preparation for reporting them to a Magistrate’s Court. By early 1970
most of the peace committees’ resources were diverted to the organisation of the Moratorium
march, but in January the AICD hired several speaker-equipped cars to drive through the Sydney
CBD broadcasting an appeal to young men not to register. The cars were all stopped within 50
meters by police.

SDS’ leafleting campaign outside the GPO in Melbourne in January 1969 and the CDNSA’s
Statement of Defiance were both attempts bring those not subject to the National Service Act
into solidarity with conscientious non-compliers. The CDNSA’s first press conference made this
motive clear:

These 50 citizens have decided that now is the time for real action: they wish to stand up and
be counted among those young men who have the courage to go to gaol for two years because
they conscientiously refuse to perform National Service.

28 McLeod, CDNSA Secretary’s Report, February 2, 1970, unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
30 “Minister stirs anti-NS group,” Herald (Melbourne), June 20, 1970, 6.
31 McLeod, Press Statement, January 20, 1970, unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
One aim of the lawbreaking strategy was to use exposure to prosecution and punishment to create a community of activists. This community was evident in the Melbourne ‘fill in a falsie’ campaigns of 1970, during which participants would register fictional characters, pets, deceased relatives, or even members of the Liberal Federal Government for National Service in an attempt to disrupt the Scheme. ‘Falsie’ writers would also call the Department’s National Service hotline to keep the line engaged and employees busy.33

In March 1971, McMahon withdrew another thousand troops from Vietnam, and in August announced the final withdrawal of all Australian regular army troops, with only the original ‘advisers’ of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam to remain.34 Nonetheless, conscription remained government policy, and opinion polls continued to show majority support for National Service.35 As anti-war protest dwindled from the peak of the May Moratorium, the spectacle of individual Draft Resisters’ acts of defiance continued to capture headlines. In September, four Draft Resisters from three states, Michael Matteson, Michael Hamel-Green, Tony Dalton and John Scott took over the Melbourne University Union building along with three hundred other protesters.36 Barricading the building’s entrance with chairs, they broadcast via the Union’s transmitter as a pirate radio station – “Radio Resistance 3DR” – for three days until a raid by over a hundred police ended the occupation.37 The four resisters escaped capture.

Two months later Matteson appeared on the ABC current affairs program This Day Tonight. He was interviewed in the Sydney studios while the Attorney-General, Ivor Greenwood, was on a live cross from Canberra. Though the police were ordered to apprehend him in the studio,

33 “Fill in a Falsie” (leaflet), Series/folder 4/7, Box 20, CICD archives; and Scates, Draftmen Go Free, 55-6. The leaflet contains the following text, indicative of the Draft Resisters’ ambivalent attitude to the law: “Authorised by the Disneyland Liberation Front (Australia) Pty. Ltd. For tactical reasons related to the Crimes Act, these proposals do not necessarily represent the opinion of anyone living, dead or confused, although they might, but we’re not saying.”
34 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 264.
35 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, 280.
37 “Pop, politics on pirate radio,” Age, September 29, 1971, 3; “100 raid uni, but miss draft 4,” Herald (Melbourne), September 30, 1971, 1; “Uni heads ‘would not help’,” Herald (Melbourne), September 30, 1971, 3; “Police end uni siege,” Herald (Melbourne), September 30, 1971, 7; “‘Suicide’ students shock police raid leader,” Australian, October 1, 1971, 1.
Matteson escaped the studio through a window.\footnote{“Storm over NS report,” \textit{Herald} (Melbourne), November 17, 1971, 1; “ABC in storm over NS man on TV,” \textit{Herald} (Melbourne), November 17, 1971, 3; “Greenwood and ABC clash on draft dodger,” \textit{Australian}, November 18, 1971, 1.} Matteson’s career as provocateur continued in April the following year, when he was apprehended by two Commonwealth Police just outside Sydney University. He had been sitting in the back seat of a friend’s car at lights, when he was handcuffed by a policeman on either side. Dragging them into the car, his friend drove into the University, where he was promptly surrounded by a large group of students. Some students produced bolt cutters and Matteson was freed and spirited into the crowd.\footnote{“Students cut draft-resister free from two policemen,” \textit{SMH}, April 25, 1972, 1; and Michael Matteson (Draft Resister), interview with Langley, in Langley, \textit{Decade of Dissent}, 192-194.} Matteson was the most visible of a number of Draft Resisters who, supported by established peace organisations and networks of activists throughout Australia, ‘went underground’, hiding in a network of safehouses for months at a time. Those activists who were not draft resisters themselves continued the less spectacular work of anti-conscription campaigns, such as the ‘Summer Offensive’ of 1972.\footnote{Vic. Vietnam Moratorium Committee (hereafter VMC) and Melbourne Draft Resisters’ Union, “Summer Offensive ’72” (leaflet); CICD, “Minutes of Special Meeting of the General Committee,” December 6, 1971; both in Series/folder 5/5, Box 22, CICD Collection.} Between the end of the Moratorium in 1971 and the end of the Scheme in 1972 following the election of the Whitlam Government, protest against conscription relied on an evolving repertoire of lawbreaking.

The Long Transnational Lineage of Australian Lawbreaking

Australian lawbreaking in the late 1960s took inspiration from a transnational tradition of peaceful resistance originating from the collective compulsions of conscience, which they placed in a lineage with Martin Luther King Junior in the US and ultimately Gandhi. As well as their previous engagement with British models of non-violent direct action in the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s, Australian activists attempted to make common cause with King in the United States as a widely-recognised proponent of non-violent resistance. In May and September 1967, the Vietnam Mobilisation Committee wrote to King, inviting him to address the Sydney Mobilisation, and when he could not, they asked for a taped message to be played at
their October protest.41 A leaflet produced in 1970 by the CDNSA connected King with anti-conscription protest, Christian pacifism and Gandhi when it exhorted readers to “Follow the principles which guided Jesus, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Dr. Benjamin Spock in disobedience for conscience. Refuse to register for National Service!”42 The principles they referred to were perhaps most clearly articulated in King’s 1961 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”:

One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law.43

The Committee produced a booklet titled The Dynamics of Moral Protest which consisted of six documents intended to present “a general picture of contemporary draft resistance in Australia”. The booklet characterised the Committee’s work as “a pattern of direct non-violent action,” echoing both the British Direct Action Committee and the American Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee.44

The campaign against bylaw 418 was a translation of lawbreaking in the American Civil Rights model. Like desegregation sit-ins or Rosa Parks’ famous refusal to sit in the designated black section of the bus, activists protesting the bylaw broke the law they intended to have repealed. In contrast, SDS’ attempt to breach the Crimes Act in order to protest the National Service Act required a leap of logic. The activists in the campaign argued that because the National Service Act was an immoral piece of legislation, it was moral to urge others to break it. Because the Crimes Act and bylaw 418 made such incitement illegal, the logic of lawbreaking meant that they were conscientiously compelled to breach the Crimes Act. Thus on the 29th the Age quoted an SDS spokesperson as saying “yesterday’s protest was a challenge to the police

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41 Lawes to Martin Luther King Jr., May 10, 1967; King Jr. to Lawes, June 19, 1967; Beer to King Jr., September 22, 1967, all in Folder “Vietnam Mobilization Committee 1(3),” Box 41 (74), PND Records.
42 CDNSA, “Conscription – There are Alternatives,” [1970], in unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
44 CDNSA, “The Dynamics of Moral Protest,” (pamphlet) [1968?], unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
and the State Government to prosecute members of the organisation under the Crimes Act.”\(^{45}\) Hamel-Green told the *Melbourne Herald* that the students “were not demonstrating against the council by-laws” but about the arrest of two of their fellows the previous Saturday under the Crimes Act.\(^{46}\) These statements were an attempt to keep reporters’ focus on the breach of the Crimes Act rather than the by-law. Despite their best efforts, the overlapping legal jurisdictions the students were charged within meant that the bylaw, not the Crimes Act, became the focus of the protest. Another five members of the organisation were arrested by state police for refusing to give their names to two city bylaws men. These five were liable to a fine for handing out leaflets under by-law 418. The council’s juridical apparatus moved quickly; the five were fined within two days and proceeded straight from the steps of the magistrate’s court to another leafleting protest, anchoring the protest to the bylaw and not the Crimes Act.\(^{47}\)

The mainstream press also identified Gandhian traces in a number of Australian protests in the late 1960s. The *Age* had noted in an editorial in July 1968 that “the Australian public … has a tender enough conscience to look with tolerance on protesting groups which follow the Gandhian path of non-violent resistance - particularly when they are young, ardent and debarred from voting”.\(^{48}\) The paper also noted the tactic of “passive resistance” at the SDS protest – a phrase owing its origin to the developments of satyagraha used in anti-nuclear and Civil Rights protests in the UK and US.\(^{49}\) The British influence on the SDS protest was also apparent in the statements of an SDS spokesperson to the *Age* and the *Melbourne Herald* in the days following the July 25\(^{th}\) protest who told reporters outside the Magistrate’s court that the five students charged under the by-law “would go to gaol rather than pay the fines.”\(^{50}\) Hamel-Green had previously been gaol for failure to pay a fine resulting from a protest outside the Lodge in Canberra in May 1968.

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\(^{46}\) “500 see anti-draft men held,” *Herald* (Melbourne), January 28, 1969, 1.


\(^{49}\) “All-in-all it was quite a mix-up,” *Age*, March 26, 1968, 3; and Sean Scalmer, *Gandhi in the West: The Mahatma and the Rise of Radical Protest* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chap. 1.

When questioned about his decision, he explained that he was refusing to pay the fine as a matter of conscience.\textsuperscript{51}

While some activists involved in the campaign argued that breaking the Crimes Act was a statement about the legitimacy of the National Service Scheme, others preferred to explain their protests in the terms of the long-standing debate about the right to use the streets for political protest. In contrast to Hamel-Green’s appeal to conscience, one of his co-defendants told reporters outside the court that the use of the by-law was “an incursion into the people’s rights to disseminate views opposed to those of the Government” while another claimed that the protest was necessary because “[t]he Government has all the news media tied up”.\textsuperscript{52} These members of SDS made the same assumptions about protest as anti-nuclear, peace, and anti-war protesters had done in the early 1960s: namely, that the role of protest was to represent public opinion, that this connection to the public afforded activists legitimacy, and that visibility in the media was the best measure of the effectiveness of protest.

Though Jim Cairns’ involvement in the campaign raised its profile, his presence served to anchor the protest to the bylaw. When he joined the Melbourne protest on April 3\textsuperscript{rd}, he was handing out a new pamphlet he had written that demanded the repeal of by-law 418 and did not mention the Crimes Act.\textsuperscript{53} Cairns was not yet ready to take on the Commonwealth, possibly because he could be disqualified from Parliament if he was sentenced under a State or Commonwealth law to a year of prison or more.\textsuperscript{54} As the bylaw carried no such penalty and was in a different jurisdiction, it was safe for Cairns to be arrested under it. Cairns’ protest was organised by a new coalition of older activists including Methodist clergy and trade unionists, who were agitating against the bylaw specifically. When interviewed by reporters, participants in the campaign attempted to position the protest both as a defence of the ‘right to protest’ and as Gandhian resistance to the bylaw. Cairns’ arrest, along with 12 other activists by city by-law officers on April 3\textsuperscript{rd} made the front page of the \textit{Australian} and the \textit{Melbourne Herald}. Cairns

\textsuperscript{52} “Five fined $78 over pamphlets,” \textit{Age}, January 28, 1969, 2; “5 give out handbills after fines,” \textit{Herald} (Melbourne), January 27, 1969, 9.
\textsuperscript{53} “Dr. Cairns arrested,” \textit{Herald} (Melbourne), April 3, 1969, 1; “Cairns arrested, 12 charged over pamphlets,” \textit{Australian}, April 4, 1969, 1.
\textsuperscript{54} “Dr. Cairns is arrested,” \textit{Herald} (Melbourne), April 3, 1969, 3.
argued that the bylaw was “a deliberate attempt to prevent democratic criticism of the establishment,” and that the Councillors, elected on a “limited property franchise,” had exceeded their democratic authority in enforcing it.⁵⁵ Cairns, Joan Coxsedge and Jean McLean of SOS were quoted as saying they would refuse to pay the fines, going to gaol if necessary, and Cairns said he would continue to protest the bylaw despite his arrest. Although Cairns gestured towards an imagined public when he said “I am certain a majority agree that this council law is undemocratic,” the language these activists used to interpret their protest rested on the same conception of conscientious lawbreaking that Hamel-Green had outlined after his arrest outside the Lodge in May 1968.⁵⁶ When asked about her decision to go to gaol rather than pay the fine, Coxsedge said “I don’t want to, but if it helps our cause and is necessary, I will probably go”.⁵⁷

By contrast, reportage of the protests excluded discussion of lawbreaking, preferring to concentrate on the ‘right to dissent’. The Melbourne Herald gave the campaign better coverage than other dailies, publishing two editorials and several stories in opposition to the bylaw. The paper argued that “[w]here leaflets are not obscene, and do not urge law-breaking,” handing them out “should not be curtailed”.⁵⁸ Even though the original pamphlets in question did encourage law-breaking, “other laws are adequate to control ... seditious or objectionable material”.⁵⁹ Arguing that the neither the conservative Council nor the small group of city ratepayers were representative enough to justify the effect of the bylaw, the paper called it a “threat to freedom of expression” and a reminder that “all restrictive rules should face challenge if they do not clearly meet a community need today”.⁶⁰ The bylaw was repealed on April 9th, giving the Herald a neat end to the story that made sense in terms of contemporary assumptions about protest: the protesters had made a legitimate point, the media had supported them, and the council had responded by removing the offending law. Democracy and the public had worked as intended, and no uncomfortable engagement with the idea of conscientious lawbreaking was required. The Herald’s support of the by-law campaign demonstrates that in mid-1969, in an

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⁵⁵ “Dr. Cairns: I’m ready to go to prison,” Age, April 5, 1969, 3; “Cairns arrested, 12 charged over pamphlets,” Australian, April 4, 1969, 1.
⁵⁶ “Cairns arrested, 12 charged over pamphlets,” Australian, April 4, 1969, 1.
⁵⁷ “Dr Cairns arrested,” Herald (Melbourne), April 3, 1969, 1.
⁵⁹ “Is This By-law Necessary?” Herald (Melbourne), April 8, 1969, 4.
atmosphere of anxiety about violence, public discussions of the right to protest were less fraught than unpacking the logic of National Service.

The CDNSA clearly presented their protest as moral lawbreaking, with none of the muddiness of SDS or the bylaw 418 protests. The Committee’s program was outlined in a 1969 press conference:

These 50 citizens have decided to break the law and demonstrate their deep and abiding opposition to the National Service Act, a law they believe to be immoral in its present form.\(^{61}\)

The choice to target Section 7 of the Crimes Act, which featured in the CDNSA’s ‘Statement of Defiance,’ stemmed from Melbourne SDS protests, but also from the experience of Professors Birch and Martin, who breached the Act at a Sydney University SDS protest.\(^{62}\) From the outset the CDNSA combined their moral critique of National Service with the existing activist language of responsible citizenship. In doing so they characterised the compulsions of conscience as an unimpeachable moral justification for citizens to engage in politicised lawbreaking.

The Committee drew on examples from the United States. In 1967 an organisation of American academics had circulated a statement called the “Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” among prominent citizens for their signature. The resulting lists of names were published along with the text of the “Call to Resist” in the New York Review of Books and the New Republic in September 1967. The statement was signed by prominent figures such as Benjamin Spock, Herbert Marcuse, Alan Ginsberg, Daniel Berrigan, William Sloane Coffin Jr., Howard Zinn and Noam Chomsky. According to Michael Foley, the statement acknowledged signatories’ intention to counsel and assist Draft Resisters, and was thus a breach of Section 12 of the Selective Service Act.\(^{63}\) The “Call to Resist” became the most widely known of the complicity statements circulating in the United States, and the authors of the document formed an organisation called Resist to continue support for Draft Resisters. The initial form of the CDNSA’s campaign – a complicity statement that was published as an advertisement in newspapers – bore similarities to

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\(^{61}\) Simon Townsend, “Confidential Report”.

\(^{62}\) AICD, “Proposals of special national service act project”; CDNSA, “Press Conference, Sydney Town Hall Foyer, 2 PM, Thursday, 3rd July, 1969”.

\(^{63}\) Foley, Confronting the War Machine, 94, 192-193.
the American ‘Call to Resist’. The question of the legitimacy of the state’s authority also dovetailed with later explanations of the ‘right to protest’.

Committee members were careful to characterise their actions as deliberate. In July, the CDNSA sent a deputation to Attorney-General Bowen, asking if he would initiate action against the original signatories under the Crimes Act. Bowen replied that the matter was being considered, but that his “preliminary look at the document indicated that it had been very carefully drawn ... in order to ensure that any prosecution launched upon it would fail”. In response to Bowen’s “innuendo,” the Committee re-stated its objectives in a press release in August, stating that the Statement had been “drafted with the intention that it would be in breach of the Crimes Act, Section 7a,” and that the Committee had “obtained legal advice that the Statement is as clear a breach of the Crimes Act as possible”. The Sydney Committee also printed posters and hired speaker-equipped cars to broadcast incitements not to register. The press release noted that “[t]hese other activities have all been in breach of the Act, but no action has been taken”. The press release for one of the speaker car protests noted that this action was in defiance of a police ban and that the Police Commissioner had said the permit had been withheld because “by issuing a permit, he would be allowing legal facility for a breach of a Commonwealth Law (Crimes Act, Section 7)”.

The Committee had expected the kind of criticism Bowen had offered. Townsend wrote to the signatories prior to the July 3 press conference in which he anticipated criticism of the Committee:

If we are accused of a put-up job, a stunt, a gimmick, I think we should reply: ‘This is indeed a put-up job’, in as much as it is a new method of non-violent protest. It is a stunt in as much as it is a legitimate, planned political act. The National Service Act is a bad law. We want it changed. To this end, we are using the resources of the law to influence this change.

64 CDNSA, “A Statement on Behalf of the Committee,” September 22, 1969, unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
65 McLeod, press release, August 26, 1969, in unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
67 Townsend, “For Information of Defendants only” (letter to signatories), [August-September 1969], unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
The solidarity that the Committee was trying to establish with draft resisters was made meaningful by the threat of prosecution. Therefore part of the Committee’s program was to ensure that the signatories were charged and sentenced: “The core of the Committee’s activities is, of course, the actual prosecution and conviction of signatories who so volunteer.”\textsuperscript{68} After each public signing, committee members who had not themselves signed the Statement “laid informations” against the signatories – a legal term for reporting a crime to the clerk of the court in order to commence criminal proceedings, analogous to a citizens’ arrest.\textsuperscript{69} The first group of Sydney signatories were convicted and fined in mid-October, and all but one refused to pay the fine, becoming liable for 25 days in gaol.\textsuperscript{70} The second group were convicted and fined in late November, with one fine being paid anonymously on behalf of a signatory who then participated in the third public signing in Sydney.\textsuperscript{71} By the time informations were laid against the third group, the Clerk of the Special Federal Court “decided to refuse to issue process on the grounds that the action was ‘vexatious, collusive, and an abuse of the processes of law’”.\textsuperscript{72}

The CDNSA planned to use the “resources of the law” to force the Government’s hand. After the Clerk’s refusal to issue warrants for the arrest of the first group of signatories, Townsend went to the NSW Supreme Court under the advice of a Queens’ Counsel, and obtained a court order – an Order Nisi – asking the Clerk to “show cause why he should not be instructed to issue warrants for the arrest of those signatories who have been convicted, have refused to pay their fines, but have not been apprehended.”\textsuperscript{73} Failure to show cause would prompt the issue of a Writ of Mandamus, which would force the Special Federal Court to issue the warrants. Geoff Mullen, a draft resister who laid informations against the second group of signatories, also applied for a Writ of Mandamus through an Order Nisi.\textsuperscript{74} Though there was a hearing scheduled for June 1970

\textsuperscript{68} McLeod, CDNSA Secretary’s Report, February 2, 1970.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.; McLeod, “Amended Executive Recommendation”; McLeod, press release, December 5, 1969, in unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
\textsuperscript{70} McLeod, press release, November 3, 1969; K.W. Thomas, Townsend, and McLeod to Hughes, November 18, 1969; McLeod, press release, December 5th, 1969, all in unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} McLeod, CDNSA Secretary’s Report, February 2, 1970.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.; Townsend, “Statement,” November 21, 1969, unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
\textsuperscript{74} McLeod, press release, December 5, 1969, unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
on the matter of the Writ of Mandamus, the Committee’s surviving papers do not confirm whether one was ever issued.\textsuperscript{75}

The prosecutions allowed the CDNSA to use the courtroom as another site of protest. Rather than using the public or public opinion to legitimate their protests, the Committee used the law itself. This was made clear by a second deputation, this time to the new Attorney-General, Tom Hughes, in November 1969, led by Whitlam and including then President-elect of the ACTU, Bob Hawke. The deputation argued that as “equality before the law is a cardinal principle of democracy,” unless Hughes was prepared

> to enforce the court’s judgement against these citizens and imprison them for non-payment of fines, he should immediately order the release of non-compliers Brian Ross and Gordon Reisenleiter, presently serving two years gaol, cease all current and pending prosecutions under the National Service Act, and repeal the Act itself.\textsuperscript{76}

This interpretation of equality before the law was based on the CDNSA’s imagined solidarity with draft resisters, and through it the Committee’s aim was to represent National Service as illegitimate and anti-democratic.

The clarity of the CDNSA’s explanation meant that the press was in no doubt about what the Committee was trying to achieve. No press outlet gave the Committee’s claims more publicity – or scrutiny – than the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}. The paper had given considerable coverage to the initial protest by Professors Birch and Martin in an editorial that argued that the requirement to keep the army sufficiently staffed to manage Australia’s defence commitments overruled the questions of conscience they raised.\textsuperscript{77} The paper published a response from Birch and Martin with an accompanying editorial, and then a reply two weeks later.\textsuperscript{78} The paper refused to run the Statement as an advertisement, arguing that this would have put the paper in breach of the

\textsuperscript{75} McLeod to CDNSA members, May 27, 1970, unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
\textsuperscript{76} McLeod, “Deputation to the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Mr. T.E.F. Hughes, 4.00 p.m., Friday, 28th November, 1969,” [November 1969], in unmarked folder, Box 37 (74), PND Records.
Crimes Act, but still reported the intent and substance of the CDNSA’s protest, printing it in full as part of reportage on the CDNSA rather than as advertising.\(^79\)

Though the CDNSA complained the *Herald* “was completely closed to the Committee in Defiance” and was only “creating the appearance of a public debate on conscription,” this claim did not pay due acknowledgement to an equivocal editorial the paper published in mid-November.\(^80\) In it, the *Herald* demonstrated a firm grasp of the logic underpinning the CDNSA’s protest. Echoing Townsend’s claim that the Committee was using the resources of the law to effect protest, the paper explained that the signatories were “acting politically, in a convenient legal context, to embarrass the Government and draw public attention to their protest”. It also called the protest “legitimate and, so far, effective”. On the other hand, it noted that the Attorney-General was playing “the same political game” and “playing for time”. The paper stepped back from endorsing the campaign, pointing out that “their only contribution in legal terms has been to illustrate the undesirable vagueness” of the Crimes Act.\(^81\) Though the *Herald*’s editorial line opposed the legitimacy of deliberate conscientious lawbreaking in the Gandhian model, its coverage articulated the Committee’s own logic of protest more clearly than any other public outlet. As well as ongoing coverage from major dailies, the Committees in various states also placed advertisements in newspapers.\(^82\) Reportage, editorials and advertising in the press made the logic of Australian protest lawbreaking legible for a wider public.

The CDNSA’s protest began to shift tactics in the light of the refusal of some courts to prosecute. At the outset of the Sydney campaign in mid-1969, Townsend had been careful to be identified as a protester when he laid informations against the Sydney group. He was

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\(^80\) CDNSA, “Report to Union, Student, Church and Independent Press”.


\(^82\) CDNSA, “Report to Union, Student, Church and Independent Press”; Barry Stevens to John Lloyd (Secretary, Vic. CDNSA), [December 1969], Series/folder 4/3, Box 20, CICD Collection. The CICD archive also contains a copy of an advertisement from the *Age* (March 21, 1970) filled in by “Alexei Kosygin” by “air mail” (though with a Victorian postmark) with “30 pieces of silver” as the donation. Series/folder 4/4, Box 20, CICD Collection.
anxious to avoid any confusion in the public mind; that is, we don’t want the public to think that someone has righteously taken action against some signatories. We want the public to realise that what we are doing is executing a political act.\textsuperscript{83}

In November, CDNSA prosecutors began to pretend to be ordinary citizens, unrelated to the activist organisation. When asked by a \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} reporter, John Rozentals, who charged the third group of signatories, claimed that he was “not acting on behalf of the Committee of Defiance” despite being instructed by the CDNSA to report the signatories.\textsuperscript{84} By the middle of 1970 in Melbourne, the Reverend Stan Moore was happy to be mistaken for a righteous bystander when he questioned his confederates. While the \textit{Herald} editorial had identified Townsend as “a fellow protester” who was prosecuting the signatories privately, the \textit{Melbourne Herald} ran a story about Moore under the headline “Minister stirs anti-NS group”. The paper repeated Moore’s own claim that “I am doing this in my capacity as a private citizen with a duty to uphold the law”.\textsuperscript{85} The 22 people that he charged with breaching the Crimes Act came before a magistrate on the 27\textsuperscript{th} who dismissed the charges, arguing that Moore’s prosecutions were “an attempt to use a court as a public forum for the views of some of those charged with the offence”. He called Moore out as “an informant who is working in cahoots with the charged people,” despite Moore’s protestations in court that this was slander.\textsuperscript{86}

This shift was evident in the behaviour of several Melbourne activists involved in the campaign. After their case was thrown out of the Magistrate’s court, the 22 defendants staged an “impromptu sit-in”. One defendant burnt a registration form outside the courthouse, while another occupied the magistrate’s chair in a clear show of contempt for the court’s authority.\textsuperscript{87} On August 1\textsuperscript{st}, another GPO protest turned violent when some protesters attempted to stop Commonwealth Police reaching a speaker who was inciting passers-by not to register for National Service.\textsuperscript{88} In the context of the ‘law and order’ debates and the looming Summary Offenses Act, the \textit{Age}’s coverage of the CDNSA’s activities concentrated on activists’ rowdy

\textsuperscript{83} Townsend, “For Information of Defendants only”.
\textsuperscript{84} “‘Statement of Defiance’ signatories fined,” \textit{SMH}, November 21, 1969, 7; McLeod, press release, December 5, 1969.
\textsuperscript{85} “Minister stirs anti-NS group,” \textit{Herald} (Melbourne), June 20, 1970, 6.
\textsuperscript{86} “Angry scenes as SM rejects anti-NS charges,” \textit{Age}, July 28, 1970, 5.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} “Protesters, police clash in city centre,” \textit{Age}, August 3, 1970, 4.
courtroom behaviour. The paper reported that during the trial of Allan Dowsley, a school teacher, activists in the courtroom heckled and laughed in the public gallery. The Magistrate asked the police to clear the court, and in response the demonstrators and the defendant linked arms and refused to move. Dowsley made comments questioning the legitimacy of the court – that his trial was a “foregone conclusion,” that the magistrate and the police were “just puppets of the regime,” and that the magistrate’s order to clear the court was illegitimate because “this is a public open court, they can’t do this”.89 The following week Dowsley refused to call witnesses, claiming that “you can’t get any justice in these courts anyway,” refused to swear on the bible as he had “no religious beliefs,” and refused to leave the court once he was found guilty.90 In September the trial of Earl Ingleby proceeded in a similar fashion. Ingleby refused to stand for the Magistrate and explaining that “to stand for the court is to show a mark of respect for the court; I have no respect for the court”.91 Ingleby argued that the case against him was not “bona fide” and was instead an effort to intimidate him. He argued that others had not been charged despite also committing the same offence.92 A week after Ingleby’s court case, Cairns “helped” two Draft Resisters burn a court summons while standing on a loudspeaker car at the second Moratorium. The burning of legal documents at rallies – popularised by anti-conscription protests before 1967 with registration certificates – had become recognisable enough that the Age described it as “ritual,” and symbolised the liberal repudiation of the State’s authority over its citizens.93 In this regard, the CDNSA’s model of lawbreaking as a democratic act was part of a broader reappraisal of the relationship between the dissenting citizen and the state.

Participatory Democracy, the Right to Protest, and the Right to Break a Bad Law

According to Paul Strangio, Cairns’ most recent biographer, Cairns began to outline a new interpretation of the relationship between democratic citizenship, the right to protest, and the imperative to break immoral laws in a series of public pronouncements in March and April

89 “Police fight protesters in city court,” Age, August 26, 1970, 5.
90 “Anti-war man carried from court again,” Age, August 27, 1970, 5.
92 “NS agitator rebuked and gaoled,” Age, September 15, 1970, 11.
1970.\textsuperscript{94} He argues that by mid-1969 “a clear connection existed in Cairns’ mind between the right to protest and the wider ideal of a vibrant, participatory democracy”.\textsuperscript{95} Cairns’ statements also affirmed that the citizen’s right to protest was the same thing as the conscientious imperative to break bad laws, even though he drew a distinction between lawbreaking and violence. In an article published in the \textit{Apexian} during the campaign against bylaw 418 he had argued that along with other state and local regulations such as the bylaw, the Crimes Act’s prohibition on incitement to break laws made legal protest impossible in Australia. He also published a paper in \textit{Broadside} in which he characterised the moral right to break a bad law as an act of conscience.\textsuperscript{96} In April he made another speech, this time to students from Melbourne University, where he outlined his thoughts on the relationship of street protest to parliament: “The argument that things should be left to Parliament ... is the argument of those who want to stultify and quieten the essentials of democratic action.”\textsuperscript{97} He also claimed that although the marches would be “reasonable, peaceful, inoffensive and dignified”, there were to be no guarantees that they would be lawful, and he reaffirmed his previous statements on the citizen’s right to break an objectionable law.

Cairns’ speech ignited a two-day parliamentary debate about the role and limits of extra-parliamentary protest in a democracy. The debate was opened by Hughes, the Attorney General, who argued that “In a parliamentary democracy any attempt to change the law should be made within the framework of the law. Any other path to change is potentially anarchical”. Billy Snedden, Minister for Labour and National Service continued on the same theme, arguing that “The place to make political points is in the forums established under the Constitution for that purpose”.\textsuperscript{98} In response, Cairns offered his clearest articulation yet of his argument that street protest was a legitimate part of the political process. A “whole generation”, he argued, was beginning to believe that:

Parliament is not democracy. It is one manifestation of democracy and it can become a most important manifestation of democracy if people are prepared to come out of their apathy and

\textsuperscript{94} Strangio, \textit{Keeper of the Faith}, chap. 6.
\textsuperscript{95} Strangio, \textit{Keeper of the Faith}, 192.
\textsuperscript{96} Strangio, \textit{Keeper of the Faith}, 191.
\textsuperscript{97} Strangio, \textit{Keeper of the Faith}, 202.
do something about it. ...Democracy is government by the people, and government by the people demands action by the people. It demands effective ways of showing what the interests and needs of the people really are. It demands action in public places around the land.

In this passage, he specifically tied membership in a democratic citizenry to public action, and framed occupation of public space as the legitimate acts of an engaged citizenry. Cairns summed up the link between this conceptualisation of democratic citizenship and the Moratorium, stating that:

the Vietnam Moratorium is an example of government by the people; it is an example of people taking action about issues that are important to them, actions which they believe will be influential in the making of national decisions in the ways that are open to them, and in the ways in which they can make their decisions effective.\(^9^9\)

For Cairns, ‘the people’ was the sovereign democratic entity, and an irrepressible democratic force that alone should shape the nation’s destiny. Parliament was only one possible expression of its desires. It could do the people’s bidding, or it could try to repress them, but it could never usurp the people’s sovereign democratic power.

Cairns continued developing his thoughts on the democratic right to protest and the moral compulsion to break a bad law in a photographic essay on the first Moratorium called *Silence Kills*. The book argued that protest was just one among many legitimate uses of public space, citing ANZAC Day and the Queen’s visit as examples of other such uses. It acknowledged that “if any person takes up space in a public space he may be found guilty of obstruction,” but countered that “[t]here can be no claim in conscience for a right to perform a wrong act”.\(^1^0^0\) It is in the space between morality and the law that *Silence Kills* found justification for civil disobedience. In *Silence Kills*, Cairns acknowledged that the law had some moral force, but argued that it was trumped by the individual’s right to disobey a law “if obeying it would be denying their deepest convictions.”\(^1^0^1\) *Silence Kills* argued that should protest stop completely, “parliament will soon do little more than give effect to its own will or to the will of the few


\(^1^0^1\) Cairns, *Silence Kills*, 21.
people privileged to be able to influence it.”

By May 1970, in Cairns’ model of participatory democracy, dissent in the form of street marches like the Moratorium was a legitimate and desirable political act. The absence of dissent was a symptom of a dysfunctional democratic system.

According to Malcolm Saunders, Cairns’ speech in Parliament became a “manifesto of dissent,” and Cairns a “mouthpiece” for the Moratorium. Certainly the ideas he gave form to were already circulating through the Campaign. By late 1970 the question of the Moratorium’s assumed democratic legitimacy based in the ‘right to protest’ underpinned a confrontation between the Sydney VMC, Police Commissioner Norm Allan, the Minister for Agriculture, and the Mayor of Sydney. Arguing “that citizens should only have to consult the authorities, rather than gain their permission to use the streets for political demonstrations”, the NSW VMC passed a motion in mid-August “[t]hat the Moratorium Committee communicate in no way with the commissioner of police in connection with the culminating activities in the city on Friday, 18th September”. Over the first two weeks of September, a tense conversation ensued between these public officials and the Moratorium organisers in Sydney. The City Council rejected the Moratorium’s application to use Hyde Park for a week-long anti-war festival, and the Minister for Agriculture refused permission to use the Domain for the Moratorium rally. The Mayor argued that the ban was to protect the “hard-earned midday rest” of city workers from “extremist minority groups” who “invariably” chose to hold their “noisy, controversial or disturbing meetings” during the lunch hour. The New South Wales Moratorium Committee responded in a press statement that framed the refusal as a deliberate effort to prevent the exercise of the democratic right to protest, and possibly even to force the Moratorium into illegal activity. The Minister eventually agreed to grant permission for the use of the Domain if the Moratorium organisers first obtained the permission of the police commissioner.

102 Cairns, Silence Kills, 16.
104 NSW VMC, Sponsors’ meeting minutes (August 17, 1970), Folder “Sponsors’ Committee,” Box 38 (74), PND Records.
The VMC refused to engage with Commissioner Allan unless the meeting could be held on the assumption that permission to march was not required. No permit had been required for the first Moratorium, so the organisers felt secure in repeating in the Herald that “the committee was not prepared to ask permission to exercise a democratic right”. In an interview with the Herald, Allan also mobilised the idea of ‘rights’ and the law, arguing that the organisers were attempting to place themselves “above the law” and that the law was there to protect “the rights and liberties” of other members of the community. Two days before the march Allan agreed to meet with the Moratorium Committee as long as they applied for a permit first. The New South Wales Moratorium Secretariat held a hurried meeting, and agreed to ask for a permit and to withdraw the request to use the Domain. The meeting reaffirmed their belief that their right to protest was being infringed, arguing again that “citizens should only have to consult the authorities, rather than gain their permission to use the streets for political demonstrations,” but that “faced with inadequate access to the mass media” and thus no way to “convince the public of our principle”, the organisers had decided to seek police permission”. Allan did not approve the permit until two hours before the march was scheduled to begin, and stipulated that the VMC must change the route, marchers remain on the footpaths, and that the planned sit-down occupation of the street be abandoned. The Committee agreed.

There were similar negotiations in other states. In Victoria, the Town Clerk of the Melbourne City Council wrote to the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, noting that the organisers had not asked for a permit and that any procession at the Princes Gate Plaza would thus be in breach of a council bylaw. Though the Town Clerk said that the letter was not a ban as the council could not enforce such a ban, Cairns apologised for the lack of a permit and requested the one-month notification period be waived. He was quoted as saying that “it was of great importance that we did everything possible to see that there was cooperation with the police, the council and the people”. Unlike in NSW, the council did not make any effort to change the route of the march.

109 Ibid.
nor the time of the demonstration. In Queensland the Police Minister refused permission for a sit-down and for the use of Queen Street by marchers. The Committee Secretary claimed that given the previous use of Queen Street for parades, this was a reversal of government policy. In South Australia there was a confrontation between Premier Don Dunstan and Police Commissioner John McKinna, where Dunstan, sympathetic to the Moratorium, asked the police chief to divert traffic away from the sit-down in Adelaide. McKinna rejected the suggestion as it might “deny the general public the rights to which they are entitled”. Though most agencies of government that the various state committees negotiated with preferred to speak in terms of permits, some elevated the assumed desire of members of the public to go about their day unimpeded by protest to the level of an inalienable political right which superseded the right to protest.

Newspapers offered their own interpretations of where street marches fitted into the constellation of political rights. The *Australian* repeated phrases from the Moratorium Campaign’s own campaign material, though framed protest as a liberty not a right:

> It is a moratorium on ‘business as usual’ at home while a disastrous war continues in Vietnam, a harsh reminder of the facts the Australian Government would prefer forgotten; an exercise of democratic freedoms to express strongly-held convictions with due force.

Almost every other publication preferred to draw attention to the disruption that even non-violent lawbreaking caused to law-abiding citizens. The *Age* reported on Cairns’ March press statement on the front page under the headline “hold up”. The *Melbourne Herald* argued that the “democratic right of protest emphatically does not include attempts to disrupt the life of Melbourne and to prevent other citizens going about their lawful business”. The *Courier-Mail* called Cairns “wildly irresponsible” and also emphasised that street protest “den[jed] the right of others who do not hold with Dr. Cairns’ beliefs ... to go about their own daily lives as they want to”. A year later, the federal Attorney-General noted that “[a] growing number of Australians

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119 Ibid.
believed there was a civil liberty to disobey the law” and that “[r]ights cannot be exercised in ways which destroy the rights of others”.\textsuperscript{120}

The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} offered the most equivocal engagement with protesters’ ideas about citizenship, lawbreaking, protest and conscience. The paper ran an editorial on Cairns’ speech at Melbourne University titled “Dr. Cairns and the law” in which it acknowledged that “by definition no citizen has the legal right to break the law” but “he may have a moral right”. Taking up Cairns’ argument, the editorial noted that individual conscience was the “only guide” for deciding when a law was objectionable. Though this position affirmed Cairns’ arguments about citizenship and conscience, the editorial stopped short of agreeing that the moral rights of the citizen outweighed the responsibility to abide by the structures of representative democracy. It ended with a statement that

\begin{quote}
[t]his is a parliamentary democracy, which provides machinery for debating and amending the law. When Parliament decides that a law is objectionable, it will presumably repeal it. Until then the first duty of a citizen is to obey.\textsuperscript{121}
\end{quote}

The \textit{Herald}’s equivocation continued when it published opinion pieces by two academics in August. Dr. Ilmar Tamello from the Law faculty of Sydney University, and Dr. D. G. Boland from a Seminary in Toongabbie, which outlined two different views of the politics of breaking bad laws.

Both articles refuted the right to break unjust laws. Noting that “the question whether unjust law IS law has recently become a conspicuous issue in the battle of political ideas in Australia,” Tamello argued that “any form of political chaos produced by a large-scale defiance of existing ’law and order’ is a precarious way to social and political change.” Just as Snedden and Hughes had argued before the May march, reform of the law was best left to the functions of the democratic state. Tamello spoke in favour of the right to dissent, as long as it remained within the law:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{120} “No one free to break law, says Bowen,” \textit{Australian}, April 15, 1971, 1.
\textsuperscript{121} “Dr. Cairns and the law,” \textit{SMH}, April 15, 1970, 2.
It is deemed to be fair that even these outsiders have a reasonable opportunity to voice their
dissent or criticisms ... and to campaign for a change of government on the corresponding
issues in the next election or through other legitimate procedures.\textsuperscript{122}

Boland took issue with Tamello’s argument. Citing Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Marcuse,
Boland argued that “[t]he proposition that unjust law does not have the character and force of
law still holds and must be insisted upon,” and that “no law ... can oblige the individual person to
forsake his rights or neglect his obligations. One is obliged not to obey such a law, whatever the
cost”. Despite agreeing with Cairns’ claim that unjust laws did not overrule individual
conscience, Boland maintained that the individual may be obliged “to ‘obey’ unjust laws in order
to avoid bringing ‘the law’ into contempt, or to avert civil disorder. ... We are obliged, then, ‘to
suffer injustice for justice’s sake’.” While he asserted that the principle Cairns had articulated
was a sound moral principle, he argued that:

\begin{quote}
We must not be led ... to abandon our principles to those who would use them without
scrupling about means. The fault lies not in the principle which denies validity or character to
unjust laws, but in the making of this an excuse for active and even violent resistance to
authority, and the provocation of civil disorder.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

For Boland, the Moratorium used individual conscience as an excuse rather than a justification
for lawbreaking. Like the hard core of extremists at the heart of violent protest or Communists at
the heart of the peace movement, he argued that the principles that the Moratorium claimed to
represent were a smokescreen for a more nefarious agenda.

In this way, Cairns’ calls for peaceful lawbreaking were conflated with the feared ‘hard core’
of violent students. The \textit{Melbourne Herald} likened Cairns to the “raw and reckless student
fringe”.\textsuperscript{124} The \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} referred to Cairns’ reputation in its headline: “Cairns tells
students they may break law”. It equivocated by stating that “Dr. Cairns cannot encourage
students to break the law and then blame police for trying to prevent them”.\textsuperscript{125} The \textit{Melbourne
Herald}’s editorial was titled “Dr. Cairns is wrong again” and claimed that he invited “anarchy”

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\textsuperscript{122} Ilmar Tamello, “How Should we React to Unjust Laws?” \textit{SMH}, August 10, 1970, 2.
\textsuperscript{124} Saunders, “The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia,” 79.
\textsuperscript{125} “Cairns tells students they may break law,” \textit{SMH}, April 14, 1970, 4.
\end{flushright}
and that the protest would be little more than “a bid by juveniles to make themselves martyrs of police action”. In the context of press preoccupation with the figure of the disruptive and disobedient student, Cairns’ ideas were reinterpreted as justifications for violence. Prominent Federal parliamentarians argued that Cairns was using high-minded rhetoric to offset the impotence of being part of a parliamentary opposition. The Age reported that following Cairns’ press statement, Gorton’s response argued that Cairns and the Labor Party were irresponsible, and called on Whitlam as Opposition Leader to “clear this matter up”. In this characterisation, the Moratorium became an electoral stunt. Gorton interpreted Cairns’ leadership of the VMC as an indication that it was an adjunct to the ALP in opposition. The Australian reported that Hughes made a similar rhetorical move when he said during the debate that

[t]o be in Parliamentary opposition to a democratically elected government must be at times galling and frustrating ... but this affords no excuse for resorting to or encouraging activities based simply on the naked physical power of the mob...

The Courier-Mail drew attention to the disconnect between Cairns’ position as a law-maker and his advice that citizens need not follow the laws he represented and made. Agreeing with Hughes and Snedden, it concluded that “The way to change policies is to prevail upon people to change Governments.” The paper also drew attention to Cairns’ position in opposition, pointing out that “This Dr. Cairns’ party has, for 20 years, failed to do”.

Though they had become widespread within activist circles, the idea of breaking a ‘bad law’ as an act of conscientious protest was contested by opponents of the Moratorium, and never gained mainstream acceptance.

Draft Resistance

Australian Draft Resistance developed in parallel with notions of lawbreaking as a legitimate protest practice. Unlike conscientious objection, which involved individual conscripts attempting to gain exemption through the provisions of the National Service Scheme, Draft Resistance was based in a refusal to comply with the law that administered the National Service Scheme.

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126 “Dr. Cairns is wrong again,” Herald (Melbourne), April 14, 1970, 4.
128 “Labor asks MPs to support the right to protest,” Australian, March 15, 1970, 5.
Draft Resistance Movement that formed in Melbourne in 1968 noted that its aim was not to oppose conscription but “to wreck it” by “making conscription as ineffective as possible” through a variety of strategies, including “encourage[ing] people not to register”.\textsuperscript{130} Draft Resisters had some common practices with the CDNSA, and the attempt to “wreck” conscription through collective refusal was influenced by the burgeoning rhetoric of resistance to authority.

The practice originated in the United States. Foley dates the beginning of radical refusal of the draft in the United States to December 1966, when SDS members at the University of Chicago began circulating the ‘We Won’t Go’ pledge, and publishing signed copies as advertisements in local newspapers. The language of the pledge drew on the articulation of individual freedoms in the \textit{Port Huron Statement}, the urtext of the global New Left. Although signatories of the pledge repudiated conscription, it “did not commit the signers to action or even a clearly defined strategy of resistance”.\textsuperscript{131} Because the American draft card identified the bearer, Foley argues that burning one “essentially destroyed the evidence of one’s protest and greatly minimised personal risk”.\textsuperscript{132} According to Foley, American Draft Resistance was an attempt to replace the “individual cathartic action” of burning draft cards with the “pragmatic efficacy” of widespread, collective resistance to the draft.\textsuperscript{133} In January 1967, the US journal \textit{New Left Notes} published a leaked memo written by the Director of the Selective Service Scheme, General Hershey. It became known as the “Channelling Memo” because in it Hershey explained the use of student deferments and “punitive reclassification” to hold the threat of military service over the heads of students and thus channel them into the most productive pursuits. The memo described this as “the American or indirect way of achieving what is done by direction in foreign countries where choice is not permitted”. According to Foley, this convinced activists that the government and Army were “engaging in the kind of social engineering practiced by America’s totalitarian enemies”.\textsuperscript{134} In the context of this revelation, American Draft Resisters looked for ways to identify themselves to the authorities. By October of 1967 they had settled on the draft card turn-in, asking draft resisters to turn their cards into the Justice Department \textit{en masse} rather than burn

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{130} Scates, \textit{Draftmen Go Free}, 39.
\item \textsuperscript{131} DeBenedetti, \textit{An American Ordeal}, 166-167; Foley, \textit{Confronting the War Machine}, 49.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Foley, \textit{Confronting the War Machine}, 119.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Foley, \textit{Confronting the War Machine}, 33.
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them. The ‘Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority’ that had been one of the blueprints for the CDNSA’s activity was handed in with the Draft Cards at that first turn-in.

Australian Draft Resistance developed in a different direction to the American model. American Draft Resisters broadly understood Draft Resistance as a Gandhian act, complete with the expectation of punishment. Most Australian Draft Resisters attempted to evade capture and punishment, remaining at large. Like the courtroom acts of refusal by CDNSA activists, Draft Resisters aimed to characterise the state as impotent and therefore illegitimate. Only a few Draft Resisters turned themselves in to police. Sean Foley arrived at Mosman Police Station in January 1969 after a warrant was issued for his arrest. The stunt was performed for the benefit of 30 anti-conscription protesters; Foley made light of the arrest, announcing his intention to use his time in prison to study for a Physics exam. Michael Matteson turned himself in in November 1972. Draft Resistance may have been an American practice, but Australian activists adapted it to make sense in their own political context.

Because their identifying data was kept in Canberra, Australian draft card burners never faced the problem of anonymity that Americans had to solve with the turn-in. News reports suggest that Commonwealth Police did not struggle to identify registrants who burnt their cards and that draft card burners did not attempt to hide their identity. Australian protesters struggled with a different problem – without the Hershey system of punitive reclassification and in the context of the conscription lottery, there was no guarantee that young men opposed to National Service would get the chance to become conscientious objectors. Thus Matteson, Campbell and Heldzingen deliberately breached the National Service Act to make themselves subject to punishment, by advising the Minister that they would refuse to register. Refusal to register carried a penalty of between $20 and $100, increased to between $40 and $200 in the 1968 amendment to the Act. It was not until that amendment passed that failure to comply with a call-

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136 Foley does mention at least two American Draft Resisters who deliberately evaded punishment in a manner similar to the Australian practice. Confronting the War Machine, 44, 201.
up notice had a federal gaol term attached to it, and even then, it was only after the defendant had refused further compliance.\textsuperscript{140} A letter written by Stephen Bock to the Minister and published in September 1969 in the SOS Newsletter outlined the logic of Australian Draft Resistance, stating his refusal to be conscripted in terms of the logics of lawbreaking and liberal conscience:

I sincerely believe the National Service Act to be immoral, and because of this I cannot comply with it in any way. I cannot recognise the right of any government to compel any young man to act contrary to the dictates of his conscience.

I believe that when an individual is faced with something which is immoral, he must do all in his power to correct it. I do not consider opting out to be enough. I intend to devote all my energies to the repeal of this act and the cessation of the aggression in Vietnam. If this involves spending any amount of time in prison, I am prepared to do so as my duty to mankind.\textsuperscript{141}

The acts of public letter writing that initiated Australian Draft Resistance was an attempt to achieve similar goals to those Foley accorded to the American draft card turn-in: it “combined an act of moral witness with a new practical approach to ending the war”.\textsuperscript{142}

Australian Draft Resisters adopted other American processes, reinterpreting them in light of local political conditions. The Arlington Street Church in Boston became the first American ‘draft sanctuary’ when it offered shelter to an American Draft Resister in mid-1969. When US Marshals came to arrest him, the priest delayed them on the stairs, telling them that they were about to “violate a moral sanctuary,” though offering no physical resistance to the marshals beyond the impedance of the crowd.\textsuperscript{143} In Australia in September 1970, the DRU asked organisations and unions opposed to conscription to provide “draft sanctuaries” to resisters, using similar language as their American counterparts.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{140} Roy Forward, “Conscription, 1964-1968,” in Roy Forward and Bob Reece, eds., \textit{Conscription in Australia} (St Lucia, Qld.: Queensland University Press, 1968): 96, 96n†. Those who answered a call-up notice and then refused basic training were dealt with on a case-by-case basis by military justice, thus there were some cases of CO imprisonment – such as Denis O’Donnel – prior to 1968.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Foley, Confronting the War Machine, 78-79.
\textsuperscript{143} Foley, Confronting the War Machine, 272-277.
\textsuperscript{144} Vic. VMC, Executive meeting minutes (September 7, 1970), 3, Series/folder 5/6, Box 22, CICD Collection.
The idea of the ‘draft sanctuary,’ was adapted by Australian activists for use in universities. The occupation of the Melbourne University Union building in September 1971 was in part an attempt to turn it into a ‘sanctuary’. The idea of sanctuary also underpinned Matteson’s flight onto Sydney University campus, and his freeing by a crowd of students on the front lawns. This translated practice played into a long running debate about whether Australian police could enter university campuses uninvited. In March 1969, the Vice-Chancellor of Sydney University was asked by students to inform them when police came on campus, and students suggested that they could “get together and keep an eye on them” as a “check” on police behaviour on campus.\textsuperscript{145} The \textit{Daily Telegraph} noted in a report of that meeting that “apparently there is an undergraduate belief that policemen have no legal power to set foot on university property”. The paper rejected the concept of the sanctuary, stating that “[s]tudents have no right to any special immunity from laws other people have to obey”.\textsuperscript{146} Two months later students on the same campus claimed that if regular army personnel were on campus out of uniform, they were there illegally.\textsuperscript{147} Prior to the second Moratorium, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Queensland circulated a memo that stated that “the law runs within the university, which cannot claim exemption from it on any rational ground,” and that “[p]olice may enter the campus without permission of the university administration in various cases specified by law”.\textsuperscript{148} Barry York notes that changes to applicable laws in 1965 had recategorised universities from private property to public places, and thus granted police “unrestricted powers of entry and arrest”.\textsuperscript{149} After the siege of Melbourne University’s Union Building, the \textit{Melbourne Herald} hinted that the idea of campus-as-sanctuary persisted amongst both administrators and students, arguing that the violence on campus was a result of the behaviour of both “radical minorities” and failures of the university authorities to prevent student preparations for the siege. For the \textit{Telegraph}, universities were “entitled to no more immunity than the ordinary citizen’s back yard,” and the editorial concluded that “It is the right and duty of the police to uphold the law [on campus]. A university is not a vacuum or sanctuary”.\textsuperscript{150}

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\textsuperscript{145} “Uni. Frowns on student ‘Vigilantes’,” \textit{Sun} (Sydney), March 25, 1969, 42.
\textsuperscript{146} “Campus is not a sanctuary,” \textit{Daily Telegraph}, March 26, 1969, 2.
\textsuperscript{147} “Governor becomes target in university regiment protest,” \textit{Australian}, 1 May 1969, 1.
\textsuperscript{148} “We’ll call in police, warns varsity head,” \textit{Australian}, September 12, 1970, 4; ”’Cool off’ plea to students,” \textit{Age}, September 12, 1970, 10.
\textsuperscript{150} “Universities are not sanctuaries,” \textit{Herald} (Melbourne), October 1, 1971, 4.
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The adoption of the American vocabulary took place alongside the adoption of practice. SOS preferred the term ‘conscientious non-compliance,’ to describe the new form of protest, but ‘draft resistance’ began to creep into stories in the Newsletter. In August 1967 a news item described the still-new Australian practice under the heading “other forms of objection” as “refusing to register in protest against conscription.” In September the Newsletter reprinted excerpts from a New York Draft Resistance brochure that used the term ‘Draft Resistance’ to denote specifically American practices. In February 1969 the newsletter used the term ‘draft resister’ to describe Australian activists for the first time. CDNSA material on Draft Resistance spoke in terms of both ‘draft evasion’ and ‘draft resistance,’ a dichotomy borrowed from the United States. Though American Draft Resisters understood evasion as less effective than resistance, Australians used it to refer to conscientious objection as opposed to conscientious non-compliance. The CDNSA articulated both as legitimate tactics, as well as speaking both in terms of ‘non-compliance’ and ‘draft resistance’. The SOS Newsletter listed “Non-compliance and Draft Evasion” alongside “Conscientious Objection” as two objects of draft counselling, and understood ‘non-compliance’ as one strategy of ‘draft resistance’. The American term spread; by July 1972, then opposition leader Gough Whitlam used the term in the Australian to refer to the young men he promised to pardon and free should he win office at the impending Federal Election. Activists never stopped using the term ‘conscientious non-complier,’ but the term ‘Draft Resister’ took precedence by mid-1970.

Australian Draft Resisters overlaid the American vocabulary onto existing local practice. The writing of letters refusing to register under the Scheme was termed ‘non-compliance,’ and because of the long-standing use of conscientious objection cases as a method of evading or protesting conscription, Australian activists at first understood non-compliance as a different form of conscientious protest based in liberal individualism. Thus Brian Ross argued that “the

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154 McLeod, Press Statement, July 8, 1970; Foley articulates it thus: “Unlike stereotypical draft “dodgers” who sought ways to protect themselves from the draft by fleeing or making themselves ineligible through some act of subterfuge, resisters openly defied the law and awaited the state’s punishment.” Foley, Confronting the War Machine, 11-13, 24.
157 “Labor to free all resisters,” SOS Sydney Newsletter (June-July 1972), 1.
individual must be free to control his own destiny as long as he recognises the equal rights of others”.  

Geoff Mullen gestured towards the sovereignty of the liberal citizen when he argued that conscription “destroys what is finally the essential human faculty, the ability to make important decisions for oneself”.  

Because they shared a repertoire of conscientious lawbreaking, older activists in the CDNSA and other existing organisations like SOS lent their support to Draft Resisters. In September 1969, the CDNSA suggested the establishment of “a continuing draft resistance and counselling service”. In July 1970 the AICD, CDNSA and SOS put on a Draft Resistance and counselling School in Sydney, with the participation of Queensland, Victorian and South Australian activists. Among those attending was the Reverend Stan Moore, who had attended the National conference in Melbourne in September 1969 and acted as the prosecutor for the Melbourne CDNSA protest in June, and had worked in America as a Draft Resistance counsellor in mid-1969. The Draft Counselling School succeeded in establishing Draft Resistance Unions and counselling services in South Australia and Queensland, alongside the ones already operating in NSW and Victoria. The meeting also attempted to coordinate a national Draft Resisters’ Union. By 1971, The AICD Annual Report noted that Draft Resistance had become associated with the Moratorium Campaign. Throughout 1970 and 1971 older activists from established peace groups in Melbourne conducted the ‘Don’t Register’ campaign alongside Draft Resistance Union members. ‘Don’t Register’ involved the by-then familiar practice of handing out leaflets at the GPO that breached the Crimes Act and urged young men not to register for National Service. Melbourne activists were inventive in the strategies they chose to support conscientious non-compliers. While not explicitly lawbreaking, the ‘Fill in a Falsie’ and phone disruption campaigns of 1970 and 1971 provided a practice through which Draft Resisters and

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158 Federal Pacifist Council and Bill White Conscientious Objectors’ Defence Committee, “We Resist Because” (pamphlet), 4, Series/folder 1/4, Box 1, Frazer Papers.  
159 Ibid., 11.  
160 CDNSA, Circular to all original signatories, September 12, 1969.  
women and older activists not subject to the National Service Scheme could join together in productively disrupting the Scheme’s operation.

The main goal of Draft Resistance was to make individual young men into public symbols of the ineffectiveness of both the National Service Scheme and the Commonwealth Police who attempted to enforce it. The Victorian Draft Resisters’ Union asked anti-war organisations in September 1970 to help “[e]stablish an underground for draft resisters on an interstate basis,” and that those sympathetic to draft resisters “openly declare their willingness to hide draft resisters from the authorities”.165 Citizens sympathetic to the Moratorium lent their houses to young men on the run from the Commonwealth Police.166 Tony Dalton recalls that among the people who hid him were academics, CPA members, a publisher, the superintendent of a public hospital and his girlfriend.167 Some fled to the country; John Wollin recalls a short stay with “some sympathetic nuns in the Mallee”.168 The DRU also asked that Draft Resisters be given forums to “appear and speak on the reasons for their resistance”.169 Michael Hamel-Green recalls that during one of the Moratorium marches in Melbourne, four draft resisters spoke to the crowd from the back of a truck. Afterwards the crowd shepherded the Resisters to Melbourne University, helping them avoid Commonwealth Police.170 Individual draft resisters became infamous, as demonstrated by the example of Michael Matteson, whose escapes from the Melbourne University Union building, ABC studios and Sydney University’s front lawns were well-publicised. They congregated rarely; most Draft Resisters on the run recall solo travel and periods of stress.171 The largest group of Draft Resisters reported in the press was the four involved in the Melbourne University siege. This game of cat and mouse with Commonwealth Police was central to Australian draft resistance until the end of conscription in 1972. These activists were no longer engaged in Gandhian protest; rather than submitting themselves to punishment they aimed to evade it.

165 Vic. VMC, Executive meeting minutes (September 7, 1970), 3.
166 Michael Hamel-Green (Draft Resister), interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent, 191.
167 Dalton, interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent, 196.
168 John Wollin (Draft Resister), interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent, 197.
169 Vic. VMC, Executive meeting minutes (September 7, 1970), 3.
170 Hamel-Green in Langley, Decade of Dissent, 177.
171 Lou Christophides (Draft Resister), interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent, 191-2; and Alan Gould (Draft Resister), interview with Michael Caulfield, in Michael Caulfield, The Vietnam Years: From the Jungle to the Australian Suburbs (Sydney: Hachette, 2007): 401-402.
The Fairlea Five

The gaoling of five members of the anti-conscription organisation Save Our Sons in Melbourne in 1971 demonstrates the extent to which Australian protest practice was reshaped between 1969 and 1971, and highlights the ways that the development of lawbreaking was entangled with the debates about violence and law and order. Like most existing protest organisations SOS was caught up in the changing trends in Australian protest. The organisation’s Melbourne and Sydney branches were involved in the campaign against bylaw 418 and Draft Resistance respectively. Joan Coxsedge’s willingness to be gaoled during the bylaw 418 campaign shows that by mid-1969 members of SOS had started to abandon the notion of maternal respectability in favour of conscientious lawbreaking. In April 1971, five women from the Melbourne branch of SOS were arrested for handing out leaflets in the foyer of the Ministry for Labour and National Service. Both Joan Coxsedge and Jean MacLean were among them. The women were tried under the new Summary Offences Act, which had been enacted to deal with violent student protest.172 The women’s imprisonment in Fairlea Women’s Prison earned them the moniker ‘the Fairlea Five,’ and they became the subject of a campaign to have them freed.

In keeping with the notion of submission to illegitimate authority, their legal representation said that they were “all very determined to see out their prison term” and that they would not appeal the decision.173 The Saturday after their imprisonment, 800 protesters began a vigil outside the prison. The meeting agreed to further lawbreaking, in the form of “a series of deliberate trespasses” against the women’s incarceration.174 The protest outside the prison decided to mount a continuous vigil - a venerable staple of SOS protest - until the women were freed, and staged a motorcade to the Government House to demand their release. Cairns addressed the crowd, speaking in now-familiar terms. He noted that only “the people’s resistance” could prevent the slide into a “police state,” and that “the continuance of civil rights”

174 “Prison vigil until five women free,” Australian, April 10, 1971, 1.
required “enough people refusing to be intimidated by such laws”.175 Another speaker invoked the right to dissent, arguing that the women had been imprisoned for “doing no more than exercising their basic democratic right of peaceful protest”.176 A third continued in the same vein, arguing that the Bolte government continued to “attack and destroy essential civil liberties of individual citizens”.177 After their release the five women sipped champagne as they told an open-air reception in City Square that they were prepared to be arrested for the same offense in future.178 The *Australian* argued that the women were only imprisoned because “Australian governments over-react to threats to ‘law-and-order’,” arguing that the laws rather than the protests they targeted were the instigators of disruption.179 The campaign in support of the Fairlea Five shows that the notions of participatory democracy, the moral right to break a bad law, and the right to protest circulated throughout existing Australian protest organisations, complementing rather than supplanting existing practice.

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175 “Gaoled mothers will not appeal,” *Australian*, April 10, 1971, 3.
176 Ibid.
Conclusion

This thesis has examined significant shifts in Australian protest practice across the Vietnam period, beginning with the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s and concluding with the Draft Resistance and Moratorium campaigns of 1972. Its focus has been the unfolding conversation between activists, representatives of the state, and the media around conscription and Australian involvement in Vietnam. It has largely focused on contemporary explanations of protest events, arguing that protest is a meaning-making exercise. It has drawn together activists’ own explanations of their actions, taken from activist publications, correspondence, minutes, and ephemera. Rather than treating opposition to the Vietnam War as a monolithic, homogenous ‘movement,’ this thesis has analysed the continual development and evolution of a repertoire of protest practice shared across several discrete ‘movements’ in Australia in the 1960s. It has shown that there was an evident tension in Australian protest practice between the conception of protest as the representation of public opinion, and protest as the exercise of a morally sovereign individual right. The struggles between these different formulations of protest, and the tactics that flowed from these different philosophical principles, shaped much of the history of peace, anti-nuclear, anti-war, anti-conscription, and anti-Apartheid activism in Australia throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.

The idea of public protest as a representative activity informed Australian protest throughout the Vietnam period. Protest organisations attempted to position themselves as representatives of broader public opinion, and to present the evidence of this public opinion to politicians, bureaucrats and the media as a way of legitimating their ideas. This practice underpinned the anti-nuclear campaigns of the early 1960s, where it was most apparent in the design of the 1962 relay march to present a petition to Whitlam in Canberra. Anti-war protesters also argued that they represented widespread and potent anti-war sentiment in the electorate. Geoff Anderson, secretary of the NSW Peace Committee, framed “informed and active public opinion” as “the weapons which democrats have by inalienable right”. The result of the 1966 election made this claim unworkable, made it clear that majority opinion supported the war, and allowed politicians and the media to represent anti-war protesters as a ‘noisy minority’. While in subsequent months

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1 CICD, Annual Report 1965 (c. December), Folder “16 (b) YCAC - the Committee,” Youth Campaign Against Conscription Collection, MS 10002, State Library of Victoria, Melbourne.
the idea of an underlying anti-war public opinion continued to animate public protest, it was evident to many protesters that new strategies, practices and philosophical rationales were needed to sustain their activism.

This new context fostered the growth of an alternative conception of protest, one that argued that individual citizens possessed a moral right to protest against the state, even one led by a popularly elected government. The idea of the sovereign individual nourished several different protest organisations. At first the idea was something Australians observed only from afar. They encountered ‘direct action’ through correspondence with the British Committee of 100, which communicated frequently with the NSW Peace Committee. The Port Huron Statement of 1962 circulated through transnational student networks, and prioritised the sovereignty of the individual in democratic societies. Liberal individualism influenced anti-conscription protesters in particular, as Conscientious Objection rested on the exercise of individual conscience. The idea of conscience disconnected from religion emerged most clearly in the anti-conscription rhetoric of the Young Labor organisation Youth Campaign Against Conscription, which expressed its opposition to National Service in liberal individualist terms. In 1968 and 1969, students began to experiment with ideas of moral lawbreaking, and the idea of the individual’s right to break a bad law began to gain traction amongst Australian activists. Rather than drawing its legitimacy from a rhetorical connection to significant if uncountable democratic numbers, the concentration on individual sovereign rights made an appeal to an objective moral principle.

These two traditions of Australian protest practice were combined in pursuit of the gigantic Moratorium Campaigns. In the wake of the first Moratorium, which mobilised large crowds, activists began to speak in terms of participatory democracy, a fusion of liberal democratic rights, moral lawbreaking and the notion of protest on behalf of the public. This fusion of the liberal conception of rights and the democratic notion of mass underpinned the NSW Moratorium Committee’s refusal to apply for a permit for the second Moratorium march in Sydney, arguing “that citizens should only have to consult the authorities, rather than gain their permission to use the streets for political demonstrations”. ² In the context of the ‘Law and Order’

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² NSW Vietnam Moratorium Committee, Sponsors’ meeting minutes (August 17, 1970), Folder “Sponsors’ Committee,” Box 38 (74), People for Nuclear Disarmament Records, MLMSS 5522, Mitchell Library, Sydney (hereafter PND Records).
debates of mid-1970 these ideas prompted a public discussion of the right to break a bad law. By the time of the National Anti-War Conference of February 1971, the idea of a democratic majority was resurgent, re-imagined in more radical, Marxist terms as a mass consciousness-raising project.

This thesis thus offers a detailed examination of protest during the Vietnam War as a debate over rights and obligations in relation to Australian citizenship. The liberal individualism of Australian protesters set them at odds with the public culture they inhabited. From the earliest days of the National Service Scheme, arguments for conscription were based in a sense of duty and obligation to the nation, as well as a sense that military service would make young men into better citizens. Older protesters immediately began to organise around the idea of individual conscience, but the young men they supported overwhelmingly chose to articulate their refusal to serve in liberal individualist terms. These two arguments – and later debates over the right to break an immoral law versus the citizen’s duty to obey – line up with Oldfield’s characterisation of liberal citizenship as a “status,” or the state of “being” a citizen. This is contrasted with republican citizenship, which is a “practice,” or the act of “doing” citizenship. Part of the liberal critique of conscription, evident in Australian protest in the 1960s, was a refusal of the idea that for young men, military service was a duty “associated with their very identification of themselves as citizens; not to fulfil them is to cease to be a citizen.” If protest is a meaning-making exercise, then anti-war and anti-conscription protest offered Australians new ways of thinking and talking about their place in the nation.

This sudden and brief flowering of liberal individualism cannot be explained without reference to the transnational networks that Australian activists found themselves implicated in. Though a transnational reading of 1960s protest is no longer a radical intervention into the historical literature, this analysis has traced the movement of ideas across national borders to explain the vocabularies that Australian protesters used to explain their actions. Civil disobedience, lawbreaking, and draft resistance were all developed locally in relation to overseas

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examples. The question of whether Australian anti-war activism was genuine or an imitation has plagued discussions of Vietnam-era protest since the 1960s. Curthoys noted Gerard Henderson’s 1969 criticism that the Australian anti-war movement was “purely derivative, nothing but an imitation of the American movement, somehow not an indigenous Australian political movement, but something imported from outside”. York notes contemporary concern with “the derivative nature of much of the protest activity in Australia”, characterising this attitude as an activist “cultural cringe”. Terry Lane recalled in 1992 that “The word Moratorium, the concept Moratorium, and even the symbol … were all imported from America. We were not terribly original and did tend to copy things happening there.” York and Lane’s memories are supported by contemporary sources. At the time of the first Moratorium march, the *Sydney Morning Herald* argued that the campaign was an “assiduous … imitation of its US model”.

This thesis also offers a way out of the genuine/derivative bind evident in the literature, by arguing that Australian activists were constantly engaged in a critical dialogue with their overseas counterparts through a range of channels, and carefully and critically adopted only those practices that were of use to them. Australian activists received letters from British and American activist organisations, such as the Committee of 100 and the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee. They sent letters asking for assistance and guidance, like the NSW Peace Committee’s letter to Martin Luther King Jr. They brought material and experience back to Australia from overseas, like Dave Nadel with the *Port Huron Statement* or the Reverend Stan Moore with Draft Resistance. More importantly, Australian activists repeatedly demonstrated that they did not adopt activist praxis uncritically. Anti-nuclear protesters did not adopt civil disobedience in 1961 despite a clear request to do so. Unlike their American counterparts, Australian Draft Resisters prioritised the evasion of Commonwealth Police over submission to punishment. This thesis has demonstrated that Australian engagement with transnational

networks of activists did not produce simple mimicry. Rather, Australian protesters were
nourished and energised by a critical dialogue with their overseas activists. The resulting
repertoire of practice was neither wholly original nor wholly derivative, but a synthesis that
responded to the specific demands of Australian political culture in the 1960s.

In comparison to American protest, the absence of veteran involvement in Australia is
marked, suggesting an interesting avenue for future research. There was no equivalent in
Australia to the American organisation Vietnam Veterans Against the War, who staged the
“Winter Soldier Investigation” into American war crimes and prominently threw their medals on
the steps of Congress. There is some evidence of veteran involvement in Australian protest but it
was on the periphery and never an integral element of the broader movement. Gary Guest recalls
protesting wearing both a return-from-active-service badge and a Moratorium badge. 11 The Ex-
Services Human Rights Association was active in anti-war protest and consisted of veterans of
the Second World War who opposed Australian involvement in the Vietnam War. 12 Christina
Twomey has argued that broad acceptance of National Service overwhelmed refusal to serve,
implying an Australian comfort with military service. Similarly, Ham’s history of Australian
involvement in the war draws on veteran memoir to argue that protesters and veterans clashed in
the years following withdrawal. 13 Unknown graffitists daubed the word ‘peace’ and a CND logo
on the columns of Melbourne’s Shrine of Remembrance just prior to ANZAC Day 1971. 14

Because of local attitudes to service and remembrance, Australian Veterans and protesters
struggled to find common cause, and this in turn shaped the adoption of protest practice by
Australians. A historical inquiry into the relationship between ANZAC and protest in Australia
in the 1960s could further develop the ideas in this thesis about the obligations, rights and
privileges of Australian citizenship in the 1960s.

This thesis has not made any attempt to measure the ‘success’ of anti-war or anti-conscription
protest, or the extent to which it hastened the end of National Service or the withdrawal of
Australian troops from Vietnam. As the Age asked in June 1970, at the waning of the

11 Gary Guest (Vietnam Veteran and protestor), interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of Dissent, 132-133.
12 Les Waddington (Secretary, Ex-Services Human Rights Association), interview with Langley, in Langley, Decade of
Dissent, 56-7.
14 “Police query several about Shrine,” Age, April 24, 1971, 1; “The colonel, 75, explodes: ‘I’d shoot Shrine
desecrators’,” Age, April 24, 1971, 3.
Moratorium Campaign and with withdrawal a *fait accompli*, “is today’s march really necessary? … Surely the white-heat has gone out of the Vietnam issue.”\(^{15}\) Though it is impossible to measure the extent to which protest affected attitudes towards Australian involvement in the Vietnam War, it is clear that the demonstrators established new political interpretations of Australian engagement with Asia, America, and the Cold War. Their most obvious critical intervention into Australian public political life was the unsettling of the logic of commitment. At the beginning of Australian involvement, the war was clearly represented as one front in a global conflict in which the forces of international communism were united against the United States and her allies, and as a Hanoi- or Peking-led Communist guerilla insurgency rather than a conventional internal conflict between North and South Vietnam. By the end of 1972, the war had been reconstituted as an unnecessary and possibly imperialist intervention into an ongoing civil war. Through their careful articulation of protest as a democratic process and an individual right, and their sustained presence in public conversations about commitment and conscription, Australian protesters helped to change the meaning of the Vietnam War in Australian public political life.

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