Antisthenes' Literary Fragments:
Edited with Introduction, Translations, and Commentary

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Statement of Originality

This is to certify that the content of this thesis is the product of my own work, that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources used have been acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

William Kennedy, April 2017
For Eric
CONTENTS

Preface 7
Acknowledgements 9
Abbreviations & Fragment Numbering 10

INTRODUCTION

1 Biography of Antisthenes
   1.i Antisthenes' Reputation in Antiquity and Today 12
   1.ii Literature Review 15
   1.iii Life of Antisthenes 24

2 Antisthenes' Ideology
   2.i Antisthenes' a Cynic? 34
   2.ii Antisthenes' Philosophy of Excellence and Justice 47
   2.iii Antisthenes and Protagoras 61

3 Antisthenes and the Development of Ethopoia 67

4 Antisthenes and the Birth of Dialogue
   4.i The Development of Socratic Dialogue 75
   4.ii Antisthenes as Dialogue Writer 94

5 Antisthenes as Literary Critic 102

6 Dating and Titling of Antisthenes' Works 111

7 A Note on the Approach to the Texts 117

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

Dialogica Varia (SD, CD, MD, ED) 120
Tragica & Homerica (TH) 146
Sympotica (Sy) 169

COMMENTARY

Dialogica Varia (SD, CD, MD, ED) 174
Tragica & Homerica (TH) 221
Sympotica (Sy) 302
APPENDICES

Appendix A - Antisthenes' *Ajax & Odysseus* 322
Appendix B - The *Hippias Minor* 330
Appendix C - Classification of the *bombulios* 333

Bibliography 337

Plate and Tables

Plate 1 – Florentine Papyrus 113, column 2, lines 26-44 145
Table 1 – TH13 Comparison of Fragments Table 249
Table 2 – TH14 Comparison of Fragments Table 263
This thesis deals with a significant portion of the most important fragments of Antisthenes. The closest companion of Socrates, Antisthenes was himself a major thinker and far-famed writer of the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC. A prolific author and an enormously influential figure in the fields of literature and ethical philosophy, the size of Antisthenes’ output was matched only by his extraordinary creativity. As a result, in antiquity he enjoyed a stellar reputation. In modern times however, due largely to the inaccessibility of the fragments, he has been almost entirely neglected. As a collection, Antisthenes’ fragments had never been translated in any modern language until 2011 (Spanish), had never been the subject of a commentary, nor, it turns out, had they even been edited with due care.

Therefore, at the outset of this dissertation project, the intention was to produce an edition of all of Antisthenes’ fragments, with translations, commentary and an introductory study. The first step was then to edit all the texts and produce translations. During this phase past editions of Antisthenes’ fragments, and the best texts from which his fragments are sourced, were all consulted. It was surprising to discover how many fragments were untranslatable in the state they are printed in existing editions. Many required emendation to make sense of them, and in the process thirteen fragments were added to the corpus, and a further three fragments were significantly extended. It would be fair to say that while Antisthenes has occasionally been edited, he seems rarely ever to have been read.

Once all of the fragments had been edited and translated, and the commentary was under way, it gradually became apparent that a full edition would turn out to be well beyond the acceptable length for a dissertation at The University of Sydney. Antisthenes was just so interesting and there was so much to say about his work that a decision had to be made to narrow the focus onto a naturally discrete portion of the fragments. Therefore it was decided to work on all the literary fragments (other than the Ajax & Odysseus, which had been discussed in detail in my previous dissertation: Kennedy 2011). The literary fragments are those that are not specifically philosophical and which show Antisthenes
contribution to Greek literary history. These fragments are in any case some of the most interesting, as they display Antisthenes’ extraordinary variety and versatility. And to date, compared with his more philosophical fragments, they have been the most neglected. The literary fragments really throw positive light on all of Antisthenes’ work and reveal pretty clearly that he needs a complete rethinking.

It follows that a major goal of this thesis will be to demonstrate that Antisthenes, as a thinker, was at least as much a literary as he was a philosophical figure. Also, to show that in so far as Antisthenes was a philosophical figure, he was a Socratic through and through, holding ethical values consistent with the elite class he kept company with, and undeserving of his reputation as a founder of Cynicism. That reputation he only acquired in later antiquity, and yet it remains mostly unchallenged in modern scholarship. In demonstrating that Antisthenes was an important literary figure, this thesis will show that he played a seminal role in a range of literary innovations, including (but not limited to): the portrayal of character in prose writing; the development of dialogue form; and the deployment of a systematic method of literary criticism. In fact, a case can be made that Antisthenes was the first Greek writer of prose fiction. The genre of fiction he wrote, and which he used as a vehicle to convey his entire ethical programme, was dialogue. Amongst other innovations, he wrote dialogues interpreting Homer, and he deployed a greater variety of strategies in his dialogues than any of his contemporaries – e.g. including mythical characters and including himself as speakers. Antisthenes’ great innovativeness, which others built on, was no doubt a contributing factor prompting ancient critics to level accusations of plagiarism against authors such as Plato and Aeschines of Sphettus.

In short, Antisthenes was a Socratic philosopher and a major literary figure in his day, whose genre of choice was prose fiction, and more specifically prose dialogues. Antisthenes was known in antiquity as the equal of writers such as Plato and Xenophon and all of his work was part of a consistent and coherent programme. His thoughts therefore should not be considered as detached, discrete objects, and his achievements and contribution to literature and ethical philosophy should not be regarded as mere stepping-
stones to understanding someone else's thought. While Antisthenes was naturally a participant in the discourses of his time, his leading and innovative contributions to literature deserve to be considered in their own right. The intention is that this dissertation will provide a major step in that direction.

Acknowledgements

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Billy Kennedy
Braidwood
Abbreviations

*Agora* Various editors. 1953-. *Athenian Agora: Results of Excavations conducted by The American School of Classical Studies at Athens*. Princeton.

*Corinth* Various editors. 1929-. *Corinth: Results of Excavations conducted by The American School of Classical Studies at Athens*. Princeton.


*FGrH* F. Jacoby, et alii, eds. 1923-. *Die Fragmente der greichischen Historiker*. 4 parts. Berlin/Leiden.


All other abbreviations for modern works and Latin authors follow those used in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (*4th* ed.), and abbreviations for Greek authors follow those in LSJ.

**Fragment numbering**

The fragments edited, translated and commented on in this thesis are arranged by category and numbered under the following classifications:

- **SD** Socratic Dialogues
- **CD** Contemporary Dialogues
- **MD** Mythic Dialogues
- **ED** Erotic Dialogues
- **TH** Tragica & Homerica
- **Sy** Sympotica
INTRODUCTION
1 BIOGRAPHY OF ANTISTHENES

1.i Antisthenes’ Reputation in Antiquity and Today

In antiquity, Antisthenes enjoyed an outstanding reputation as a thinker and as a prose stylist. Ancient critics considered Antisthenes to be the equal of the best prose writers of the Classical period. The number of Antisthenes’ works, and the scope of their topics was remarkable – Diogenes Laertius attributes over 70 titles to him (6.15-18). Though the verity of all of the titles of Antisthenes’ works is uncertain (see discussion below, ch. 6), they include such diverse subject matter as: literary criticism, ethopoiia, prosopography, logic, ethics, epistemology, ontology, and theology. All, it will be argued in this dissertation, were presented in dialogue form. The quantity, and the range of topics he reportedly wrote on, is rivalled only by Aristotle (46 works: DL 5.13) and Democritus (68 works: DL 9.13). Antisthenes was in fact criticised in antiquity for writing too much on every kind of subject.1 This was one reaction to his prodigious literary output, which included experimentation with a wide range of topics.

In terms of reputation, the ancients most regularly discussed Antisthenes as a peer of Plato and Xenophon. The quality of his prose was also compared favourably with other late fifth century writers including Demosthenes, Thucydides, and Critias. For example, Phyrnichus (late 2nd c. AD), himself a famous ancient grammarian, rhetorician and admirer of style, rated Antisthenes as one of the finest exponents of the pure Attic style along with Plato and Demosthenes (CD10).2 Fronto (1st half 2nd c. AD) compares lesser authors unfavourably against the trio of Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes.3 The rhetorician and literary critic Longinus (3rd c. AD) groups Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes together as writers of exacting skill.4 Epictetus (mid 1st c. AD) mentions Antisthenes, Plato and Xenophon as writers of great reputation.5 The emperor Julian (mid 4th c. AD) discusses

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1 Timon, early 3rd c. BC, DL 6.18 = DC 2, SSR 41, PPF F37.
2 See Fragment Numbering on p. 10 for the system of fragment classification.
3 ad M. Antonin. imp. De eloquentia 2.16 = SSR 47.
5 Arr. Epic. Dis. 2.17.35 = SSR 46.
Xenophon, Antisthenes and Plato together, as they all employ myth in discussions of ethical theory (MD14-16). Theopompus, a fourth century BC contemporary, actually claims Plato plagiarised prior dialogues of Antisthenes in a number of instances (SD1 and commentary). In a similar vein Persaeus lists three dialogues, which he says Aeschines plagiarised from Antisthenes (CD6 and commentary).

In contrast to the reputation Antisthenes enjoyed in antiquity, nowadays he is almost entirely neglected. In the history of modern scholarship there have only been six editions and less than half a dozen monographs dedicated to Antisthenes. His fragments were first translated and published in a modern language only in 2011. When he receives mention it is usually for the wrong reasons: in his capacity as the putative founder of Cynicism, or as a 'minor rhetorician'. Though he is often referred to as the founder of Cynicism, or at least as the first of the Cynics, this reputation is misconceived as demonstrated below in chapter 2.i. Antisthenes' connection with rhetoric seems to stem originally from Diogenes Laertius who first reported, in the early third century AD, that Antisthenes was initially a student of Gorgias (6.1). This label has stuck. As a result, one place Antisthenes does get mentioned in modern times is in handbooks on rhetoric, however, even then he usually receives little more than a mere mention, if in fact he is mentioned at all.

One reason this connection between Antisthenes and rhetoric has persisted into modern times is because his largest surviving text, the Ajax & Odysseus, is usually categorised as a rhetorical piece. There are around 330 extant fragments (including testimonia) for Antisthenes, many of which consist of only one line or a few lines (including 13 added to the corpus by this dissertation). The Ajax & Odysseus however, is a few pages long. The work is usually presented as two separate fragments, i.e. an Ajax and an Odysseus. They are clearly two parts of the same work, however, because Odysseus responds in his speech to

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9 CD14e, CD14f, TH14f, TH14j, TH14l, TH14m, TH14n, TH14o, Sy8; plus TH13d, TH14g, TH14h, TH14i which are also added by Prince 2015.
specific points made by Ajax. The speeches certainly appear to be complete. So the likelihood is that this work is complete as it is. Though another possibility is that the speeches are key elements extracted from a larger dialogue.

In essence the *Ajax & Odysseus* is a pair of speeches crafted notionally on behalf of the heroes, mounting arguments as to why they respectively deserve to be awarded the arms of Achilles. The setting is assimilated to a courtroom environment with an Athenian-style democratic jury even though the audience is made up of Greek soldiers. In short, Ajax in his speech is characterised as a traditional aristocrat who bridles when compelled to answer to a democratic court consisting of base soldiery. He is a man of action, not words. By contrast, Odysseus is characterised as a man who offers no objections to being called upon to defend himself in a court composed of men of lower station. In fact, he shows sophistic flair for manipulating the sentiments of his mass audience.10

Even though the *Ajax & Odysseus* is Antisthenes’ longest surviving work by some margin, it has attracted very little scholarly attention. This is not entirely surprising given that until 1992 (Goulet-Cazé, in French) there was no continuous translation available in any language.11 In as much as the speeches have been studied, they have generally been considered ‘epideictic’ or ‘display’ speeches that present ideal versions of opposing arguments (cf. summary of such views in Kennedy 2011, 27). This is almost certainly not the case however, and they seem rather to be a daring and original experiment in ethopoia, or characterisation (33-46).

In summary, whereas in antiquity Antisthenes had a reputation as a prose stylist the equal of any of his contemporaries, and a writer of dialogues whom others readily imitated, in modern times he receives the most fleeting notice as a minor (and apparently ineffective) rhetorician and as the founder of Cynicism – both reputations which he scarcely deserves.

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10 For a full discussion see Kennedy 2011, esp. ch. 1-2.
11 There was an earlier non-continuous, annotated translation offered by Rankin (1986, 155-171), and continuous English translations have since appeared in Gagarin & Woodruff (1995, 167-72), Kennedy (2011, 11-20), and Boys-Stones & Rowe (2013, 23-7).
1.ii Literature Review

In modern scholarship Antisthenes has been very largely ignored. This stands in stark contrast to the stellar reputation he enjoyed in antiquity (see ch. 1.i). It is hard to imagine the sensation that the discovery of 100 pages of Critias or Protagoras might create. We actually have this much of Antisthenes and yet his fragments have received very little attention. It seems extraordinary that a writer who preceded Plato, and for whom we have more fragments than Protagoras, has been either ignored or lightly brushed aside. It is an inexplicable paradox. The texts as they have been edited are very often untranslatable, and this probably helps to explain why translations have not often been attempted.

A survey of the scholarly literature relating to Antisthenes will reveal that there has been an interesting shift over time in both the geographical locus and the scholarly focus of Antisthenic studies. Broadly speaking, from the early eighteenth up until the mid twentieth century the major output of works on Antisthenes came from the German-speaking world. Throughout that time Antisthenic studies formed a sub-field of Socratic studies. That is, most scholars only studied Antisthenes as a means of gaining a truer understanding of Socrates, i.e. an understanding that was nuanced in respect to 'Plato's Socrates' and 'Xenophon's Socrates'. After a lull during the third quarter of the twentieth century, when very little was written about Antisthenes, the period from the mid 1980s up to the present has seen a geographic shift, and now the study of Antisthenes is dominated by Italian scholars. Rather than viewing Antisthenes as a Socratic, they principally see him as a Cynic philosopher and study him as such. French scholars have also produced a sprinkling of works from the mid nineteenth century onwards, and curiously they focus largely on Antisthenes as a rhetorician.

The English speaking world is apparently just beginning to recognise Antisthenes and to start thinking about him.
Editions

There have been six editions of the fragments of Antisthenes and also a collection in translation.

The first collection, *Antisthenis fragmenta*, was brought out by August G. Winckelmann in 1842. Though a major step forward in terms of recognising Antisthenes as an author worthy of consideration in his own right, biographical testimonia were omitted, and for the most part only the bare fragments were printed with very brief notes appearing on occasional fragments. In 1867 Friedrich W.A. Mullach reprinted Winckelmann’s fragments along with a Latin translation in the second volume of his *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*.

For a 1932 Ghent dissertation Jean Humblé produced a new edition, *Antisthenes’ fragmenten*, which was never published.\footnote{Known of through Patzer’s discussion (1970) 35.} This work incorporated the previously neglected biographical testimonia, textual comments, and a translation into Dutch. The fragments were divided (somewhat arbitrarily) into four groupings: 1. biographical testimonies and anecdotes; 2. testimonies on the works (including DL’s catalogue); 3. fragments; 4. dubia (including the *Ajax & Odysseus*). Only one brief extract ‘Antisthenica’ (1934), of nine pages in length, was ever published.

In the second half of the twentieth century there were two further editions produced by Italian editors, and these have no doubt contributed in a very meaningful way to a gradual resurgence of interest in Antisthenes in recent years. In 1966 Fernanda Declava Caizzi produced a slim volume, *Antisthenis Fragmenta*, which represented the fullest edition of fragments yet published. She reorganised the fragments into two parts of five and two chapters respectively as follows. Part One: a. Catalogue of works (DL); b. Testimonia on the works; c. Declamations (i.e. *Ajax* and *Odysseus*); d. Fragments from certain works; e. Fragments from uncertain works. Part Two: a. Biographical notes; b. Anecdotes. The edition lacked an apparatus, though it did include brief notes on most of the fragments, commenting on certain textual issues, parallel passages, select scholarship, and so on.
In 1983 Gabriele Giannantoni produced a four volume edition, *Socraticorum Reliquiae*, which included fragments of all of the Socratics – Antisthenes among them. The edition contained numerous errors. A second edition titled *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* was issued in 1990. The new edition repeated the errors of the first, but added one or two authors who were glaring omissions from, e.g. Aeschines of Sphettus, but did not include Socrates as the title suggested it might. In terms of Antisthenes, this work contained the fullest edition yet of his fragments, which once again were given a new arrangement. Many related fragments, printed separately in previous editions, were here merged into large mega-fragments. In terms of organisation of the fragments, first the biographical testimonia are printed under various subheadings, then the rest of the fragments follow, mostly speculatively grouped according to the titles listed by Diogenes Laertius. This edition has a partial apparatus that follows a convention of its own. Variant readings and emendations are printed for select fragments, though the sources of the texts and/or corrections are often not clear, and some texts for which one would really hope to see an apparatus, e.g. papyrus fragments, lack one altogether.\(^\text{13}\)

Though not actually an edition, a landmark in the study of Antisthenes was achieved by Claudia Mársico in 2011 with the publication of 321 fragments of Antisthenes in Spanish translation,\(^\text{14}\) thus representing the first translation available in a modern language. The arrangement of the fragments generally followed Giannantoni’s (1990) organisation, though related fragments Giannantoni had clumped together as mega-fragments were separated back out by Mársico.

Concurrent with the completion of this dissertation Susan Prince (2015) put forth a new edition with English translation: *Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, translations, and commentary*.\(^\text{15}\) This volume is a major landmark in Antisthenic studies – it weighs in at 774 pages – making available for the first time in any language a version that includes apparatus, translations,

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13 For further comments on Giannantoni’s infelicitous approach to editing the texts see Slings (1996).
14 Published along with fragments of Phaedo of Elis, Aeschines of Sphettus, and Simon the Shoemaker, as: *Los Filósofos Socráticos, Testimonios y Fragmentos II: Antístenes, Fedón, Esquines y Simón*.
15 Actually available early 2016.
bibliography, and commentary. The edition also adds around 20 new fragments to the collection (this dissertation adds 4 of the same ones, plus another 9). Prince has been thinking about Antisthenes for an extended period of time and she assembles all of the past opinions on various fragments. She states at the outset that she will be cautious in advancing her own views, and yet she makes numerous astute observations. A few of these observations are duplicated to some extent in this work, but on several very fundamental issues opposing views are put forward here. For example, Prince sees a close connection between Antisthenes' ideas and Cynicism, and views the mutable Odysseus as a sort of ethical hero for Antisthenes. This dissertation rejects any connection between Antisthenes and Cynicism and finds Odysseus to be one of Antisthenes' models for portraying what was ethically going wrong with the world.

Antisthenic Studies

Against the general trend of neglect, Antisthenes did receive attention as a figure worthy of study in his own right from scholars in early eighteenth century Saxony. In 1724 Gottlob Ludovicus Richter of Jena produced his 34 page Dissertatio historico-philosophica de vita, moribus ac placitis Antisthenis Cynici. For the most part this consisted of a translation into Latin of Diogenes Laertius' 'Life of Antisthenes', citing related passages from other authors along the way. A second work produced along similar lines, titled Programma de Antisthene Cynico, was put out four years later in 1728 by Ludwig Christian Crell, a professor at Leipzig. These works were a major step towards recognising Antisthenes as worthy of independent study. Neither of them, however, challenged the orthodoxy that Antisthenes was the first of the Cynics, as asserted by Diogenes Laertius' philosophical genealogy.

The next work dedicated to Antisthenes would not appear for over a century. In the period up to and slightly beyond that time, a number of volumes on the history of philosophy

16 From the early 1990s judging by her comment on the first page that her 1997 dissertation was on Antisthenes.
17 For the history of Antisthenic studies up to the 1960s, particularly for identifying now-obscure works of German origin, Andreas Patzer (1970, 16-44) was heavily consulted. He provides a very full survey, including items that only add to the understanding of the study of Antisthenes in a relatively minor way. For those in search of such detail he may still usefully be referred to.
began to engage with Antisthenes in a more insightful manner. Though he was continually evaluated as a counterpoint to Plato, rather than in his own right, effort was applied to distinguishing and assessing spheres of his thought such as ethics, dialectic, and physics. Scholars from Saxony, Prussia and other Germanic states continued to lead the way. Broad works that included Antisthenes' ideas in their discussions of philosophy were put forth with the titles *Geschichte der Philosophie* – one each by Wilhelm G. Tennemann (1799) and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1839) – *Die Philosophie der Griechen* – one each by Heinrich Ritter (1830) and Eduard Zeller (1846), and *Grundiß der Geschichte der Philosophie* by Friedrich Überweg (1863).

In the mid 19th century three monographs on Antisthenes appeared. Two studies in Latin were produced by Ferdinand Dickey (1841), *De Antisthenis Socratici vita et doctrina*, and Adolf Müller (1860), *De Antisthenis Cynici vita et scriptis*. Charles Chappuis' French language *Antisthène* of 1854 was notable for being the first piece of scholarship on Antisthenes produced outside the German speaking world. Chappuis offered a detailed discussion of Antisthenes' philosophical fragments and carried out a systematic comparison of Antisthenes' opinions with those of Diogenes of Sinope and various other Cynic philosophers.

The late nineteenth century and the first decade or so of the twentieth century saw the apogee of Antisthenic studies, with the publication of a series of works. The most notable trend in this period was the effort to find allusions to Antisthenes in other writers – particularly, of course, in Plato and Xenophon, but also in authors such as Isocrates. The first major contribution was Friedrich Schleiermacher's three volume *Platons Werke*, (1804-1828, 3rd 1856-61), which found connections to Antisthenes in multiple works of Plato that range, in terms of plausibility, from high to none at all. Other contributions included Karl Barlen's *Antisthenes und Plato* (1881), and Karl Urban's *Über die Erwähnungen der Philosophie des Antisthenes in den Platonischen Schriften* (1882).

This period of research was particularly productive. Many indirect references to Antisthenes were identified, some of which almost certainly included discussions of his
theories, while others bordered on the fanciful, with scholars attempting to virtually recreate works of Antisthenes from other authors. Ferdinand Dümmler, in a series of works, *De Antisthenis logica* (1881), *Antisthenica* (1901), *Akademika* (1889), and 'Zum Herakles des Antisthenes' (1891), variously attempted reconstructions of Antisthenes' texts and speculations about his philosophical intentions – some of them a little wild. Karl Joël, *Der echte und der xenophontische Socrates* (1893-1901) set out to separate the real Socrates from Xenophon's version. A fair part of this work was an attempt to prove the extent to which Xenophon relied upon Antisthenes. He later added more discussion, along the same lines, in his *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie* (1921). It is important to note that in most of the works from this period the primary interest of the authors was in building a more accurate portrait of Socrates, rather than an interest in Antisthenes for his own sake.

Other authors from the same period carried out more cautious reconstructions and interpretations of groups of Antisthenes' fragments. For example, using Aeschines Socraticus as their starting point were Paul Natorp (1892), 'Aischines' Aspasia', and Heinrich Dittmar (1912) 'Aischines von Sphettos'. Other related contributions include Franz Susemihl, 'Der Idealstaat des Antisthenes und die Dialoge Archelaos, Kyros und Herakles' (1887) and 'Die Aspasia des Antisthenes' (1900), as well as Eduard Norden's 'Über einige Schriften des Antisthenes' (1893).

Though over the last century whole decades have passed with very little, if any, scholarly interest being shown in Antisthenes, a few monographs have nevertheless appeared. Hubert Kesters dissertation (1935) *Antisthène. De la dialectique. Étude critique et exégétique sur le XXVIe Discours de Thémistius* made a case that Themistius' thirty-sixth speech was reworked from an original of Antisthenes, but he later backed away from that theory and proposed instead that it was the work of an unknown Socratic (1959 & 1965). Kathleen Chrimes (1948) in *The Respublica Lacedaemoniorum ascribed to Xenophon*, daringly proposed Antisthenes as the author of the work normally attributed to Xenophon.

Around the middle of the twentieth century a handful of studies focussed on Antisthenes appeared. In 1948 Farrand Sayre published, 'Antisthenes the Socratic', a short assessment
of Antisthenes' life and the likelihood that he was connected to Cynicism. Remarkably he concluded that there was no connection, but unremarkably these findings were generally ignored by subsequent scholars. Then, ahead of her 1966 edition of the fragments, Fernanda Decleva Caizzi brought out 'Antistene' in 1964, which presented an overview of various aspects of Antisthenes' philosophy and writing, generally against background assumptions that he was a rhetorician and a proto-Cynic. Vincenzo Di Benedetto (1966) made some very astute deductions about Porphyry's Antisthenic scholia in 'Tracce di Antistene in Alcuni Scoli all' "Odissea".

A major contribution to the study of Antisthenes was made in 1970 when Andreas Patzer published the first half of his Heidelberg dissertation titled Antisthenes der Sokratiker: Das literarische Werk und die Philosophie dargestellt am Katalog der Schriften.\(^\text{18}\) As the title suggests Patzer realised that Antisthenes was a Socratic rather than a Cynic, and a literary figure as well as a philosophical one. Patzer makes a large number of valuable observations on the texts he discusses, including suggesting several important emendations. His work on Diogenes Laertius' catalogue is seminal (photocopies of three of the manuscripts are included at the back of the volume). He also provides an extremely thorough summary of Antisthenic studies up to the mid 1960s of around 30 pages in length (16-44). In spite of all this, as for generations of German scholars before him, Patzer’s particular interest is not in Antisthenes \textit{per se}, but rather in Socrates. He thus sees Antisthenes' work as a neglected area of Socratic studies and sets out to reconsider and re-evaluate Antisthenes in order to allow him to build a better understanding of the 'der historische Sokrates' (13).

The two decades following Patzer's illuminating study saw a virtual hiatus in Antisthenic studies. Italian scholars produced the occasional article. In 1977 Fernanda Decleva Caizzi wrote 'La tradizione antistenico-cinica in Epitteto', exploring Epictetus for traces of Antisthenes' supposed brand of Cynicism. Then in 1987 Vincenza Celluprica published 'Antistene: Logico o Sofista?' and Gabriella Focardi brought out 'Antistene Declamatore: L’Aiace e L’Ulisse, alle Origine della Retorica Greca' – these studies respectively weighing

\(^{18}\) The second half was never published.
up Antisthenes as a minor sophist and rhetorician. In France, nine members of the Centre de Recherche Philologique, published (1986) 'Antisthène: sophistique et cynisme', which considered Antisthenes' thought purely from the testimony of Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius. In the German speaking world Klaus Döring showed that Antisthenes was a Socratic rather than a sophist in (1985) 'Antisthenes: Sophist oder Sokratiker?'

The lone voice in the English speaking world in this period was H. David Rankin. He published a series of articles discussing aspects of Antisthenes philosophy: 'Antisthenes a “Near-Logician”?' (1970), 'Irony and Logic: The ἀντιλέγειν paradox and Antisthenes' purpose' (1974), 'Ouk estin antilegein' (1981), * Sophists, Socrates, and Cynics* (1983), and culminating in 1986 with one of only two monographs ever published in English on Antisthenes: *Anthisthenes (sic) Sokratikos*. In this last book he discusses a wide range of fragments and makes an attempt to locate Antisthenes in fourth century philosophical discourse. In all his discussions Rankin considers Antisthenes from a philosophical rather than a literary standpoint, and considers Antisthenes to be a proto-Cynic. He was apparently unaware of the work of Patzer (1970, see above).

Recent decades have seen renewed interest in Antisthenes and an increase in publications, which are, in general, focussed on his perceived role as the founder of Cynicism. The second English language monograph, *Antisthenes of Athens*, published in 2001 by Luis Navia, returns to the early 18th century Saxon approach to Antisthenes – i.e. it is an extended exposition of Diogenes Laertius' 'Life of Antisthenes'. It only engages with other extant fragments of Antisthenes' thought in passing and makes merely a mention of the major complete fragment, the *Ajax & Odysseus*, without offering a word of discussion.19

Navia's principle interest is Cynicism and this book seems to be an elaborate afterthought or appendix to his earlier book *Diogenes of Sinope: The Man in the Tub* (1998). Given his other earlier titles *The Philosophy of Cynicism* (1995) and *Classical Cynicism* (1996) it is

19 The *Ajax & Odysseus* has attracted focussed attention from a handful of scholars who, for the most part, have tried to use it as a way to understand aspects of Antisthenes' (Cynic) philosophy, e.g. Goulet-Cazé 1992, Sier 1996, Eucken 1997, Mazzara 2014, Prince 2014.
disappointing, but not entirely surprising, that Navia uncritically reproduces Diogenes Laertius’ placement of Antisthenes as the founder of the Cynic movement.

The Italian scholar Aldo Brancacci has devoted a good deal of time and attention to Antisthenes. His first related publication was the 1990 monograph: *Oikeios Logos: La filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene* (republished in French as *Antisthène. Le discours propre* – Paris, 2005). Brancacci is first and foremost a philosopher and this volume is a closely argued investigation of Antisthenes’ philosophical views, including his approach to education, use of language, focus on paideia, proper use of names, and his attack on Plato. Brancacci has continued to publish articles and book chapters investigating Antisthenes’ philosophy – 1985-6, 1993, 2003, 2005, 2011, 2013, and 2015.

As well as her aforementioned recent edition of Antisthenes’ texts, Susan Prince has produced chapters for collections, including ‘Socrates, Antisthenes, and the Cynics’ (2006), and ‘Words of Representation and Words of Action in the Speech of Antisthenes’ *Ajax*’ (2014). This last piece comes from a landmark publication of a compilation of twelve essays devoted to Antisthenes – the first of its kind: *Antisthenica Cynica Socratica. Mathésis*, 9, ed. Vladislav Suvák, Prague. In accordance with the usual tradition, the contributions uniformly approach Antisthenes as a philosopher rather than a literary figure; but nonetheless it represents an important step in Antisthenic studies.
1.iii  Life of Antisthenes

The 'Life of Antisthenes' must necessarily be stitched together from diverse fragments. One source that is less fragmentary is Xenophon's *Symposion*, which paints a detailed and coherent portrait of Antisthenes' character and life-style, and thus it is leant upon quite heavily in some areas of the following discussion.

A  Birth and death

Antisthenes\(^{20}\) was probably born in Athens sometime before 451/50 and lived to sometime after 366/365. His mother was foreign but from the evidence available his citizenship was never called into question, suggesting he was born before Pericles' citizenship law of 451/50 (see section C below). In any case, he was old enough to win distinction at the Battle of Tanagra in 426,\(^{21}\) and he was still alive to comment on the Battle of Leuctra of 371.\(^{22}\) When discussing the events of the year 366/5, Diodorus Siculus mentions the notable men of Athens who were active in that period, and lists Antisthenes among them.\(^{23}\) Thus it is reasonable to assume 365 as a *terminus post quem* for the end of his life. There are no known later mentions of Antisthenes. A Renaissance era source states that he lived to 70,\(^{24}\) but this figure is clearly too low if the dates above, limiting either end of his life, are accurate. Rather it seems that he must have lived to around 85 years of age. One source suggests that Antisthenes died of 'wasting from difficulty urinating'.\(^{25}\)

B  Athenian father

Antisthenes' father, also named Antisthenes,\(^{26}\) was an Athenian citizen. One testimonium records that Antisthenes played down his own social status by claiming that his father was

\(^{20}\) Kirchner *PA* 1188.

\(^{21}\) DL 6.1 = DC 123, SSR 3. The Battle of Tanagra, Th. 3.91 (not to be confused with the more famous Battle of Tanagra of 457, Th. 1.107).


\(^{23}\) DS 15.76 = DC 140.

\(^{24}\) *Eudociae violarium* 96 Flach = DC 141. The *Violarium* of 'Eudocia' was written shortly after 1543 by Jacob Diassorinos and Constantine Palaiokappas, although it relied on earlier sources.

\(^{25}\) Scholia on *Lucian de parasito sive artem esse parasiticam* 57; = DC 144, SSR 36. The scholiast writes 'φθινήσαντας' beside Antisthenes' name as an abbreviation for 'ἀπὸ δυσουρίας φθινήσαντας' in Lucian *ad loc.*

\(^{26}\) DL 6.1 = DC 122a, SSR 1.
a salt-fish merchant.\textsuperscript{27} Possibly lending credence to this claim is the report that Antisthenes himself lived at the port of Peiraeus.\textsuperscript{28} Clearly, however, whatever his father’s occupation, it provided the family with reasonable means. It is reported that when Socrates was discussing Antisthenes’ parentage, he described Antisthenes as 'high-born' or 'noble' (γενναῖος).\textsuperscript{29} Consistent with being born to a moneyed family, Antisthenes claimed expertise in wrestling,\textsuperscript{30} a leisurely pursuit restricted to those who were at least relatively wealthy and thus who did not need to work every hour of the day to provide subsistence.

As noted, Antisthenes also fought and distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra in 426. At the time, if he was born prior to Pericles citizenship law of 451/50 he must have been a young man of around 25 or so years of age, meaning that his father was able to provide the money to fit him out in hoplite arms and armour.

\section*{C Foreign mother}

According to our sources Antisthenes’ mother was foreign – usually said to be Thracian, though sometimes Phrygian.\textsuperscript{31} One of these sources is Socrates, who is reported saying that had Antisthenes 'been born of two Athenians he would not be so noble (γενναῖος)').\textsuperscript{32} Certainly Antisthenes himself showed contempt for those of pure Attic blood.\textsuperscript{33} Having a Thracian mother suggests that his father had the status and financial wherewithal to attract such a match from abroad. Athenian men had a tendency to contract marriages with wealthy foreign women – and particularly Thracians – to build alliances that granted them,
not only large dowries and access to Thracian resources, but also the freedom to exercise and display aristocratic status in a way that would be condemned in democratic Athens.\(^\text{34}\) Cimon and Themistocles are high profile examples of aristocratic Athenians born to Thracian mothers (Plu. \textit{Cim.} 4.1, Plu. \textit{Them.} 1.1-2). Pericles' citizenship law of 451/50 required both parents to be Athenian in order for male progeny of the marriage to be considered citizens. The law was probably aimed, at least in part, at denying citizenship to the (elite) offspring of marriages with foreign women, and was perhaps specifically aimed at granting Pericles political advantage over Cimon, who was a product of such a union himself and recently returned from exile (Irwin 2015b, 81-3 & 99). The law was vigorously enforced and effective as far as we know. This is demonstrated by the great lengths Pericles himself had to go to in 429 in order to get his son by his foreign mistress, Aspasia, legitimised (Plu. \textit{Per.} 37), and also by the manner in which almost 5,000 Athenians born to foreign mothers were not only disenfranchised, but seized and sold into slavery as a result of prosecutions arising from the law (Plu. \textit{Per.} 37.3-4).\(^\text{35}\)

Elizabeth Irwin mounts a persuasive case that, in fact, Antisthenes himself was an illegitimate \textit{nothos} who was affected by Pericles' law, and it was this that excluded him from political life and prompted his harsh criticism of the democracy (2015b, esp. 90-93). Naming a son after his father was 'much less common' than naming him after one of his grandparents, uncles, and so on (Matthews 2012, 1022). So by analogy with Pericles son of Pericles (Plu. \textit{Per.} 27) his name in itself perhaps offers circumstantial evidence that he was a \textit{nothos}. However, there is no direct evidence that Antisthenes' status as a citizen was ever called into question and there is no record of him being called a \textit{nothos}. He is referred to by Diogenes Laertius as 'Antisthenes the Athenian',\(^\text{36}\) and when Phaedo lists the 'native (Athenians)' (ἐπιχώριοι) and foreigners present at Socrates death, he lists Antisthenes as a native. The fact that Antisthenes served at the battle Tanagra in 426\(^\text{37}\) may also offer

\(^{34}\) For a full account see Sears 2013, esp. ch. 5.  
\(^{35}\) For a survey of the evidence regarding the law's effectiveness see Patterson 1981, 140-7.  
\(^{36}\) DL 6.1 = DC 122A, SSR 1; cf. Suda \textit{Ἀντίσθενης} s.v. = DC 122B, SSR 1; Epiph. \textit{Adv. haeres.} 9.3 = DC 122D, SSR 1.  
\(^{37}\) Thuc. 3.91. On occasions where Thucydides knew non-standard troops were used, he (at least sometimes) mentions it, e.g. 3,000 \textit{µέτοικοι} hoplites at the attack on Megaris in 431 (2.31).
evidence that he enjoyed citizen status, as he was probably a hoplite and hoplites tended to be soldier-citizens – although the evidence for this is, admittedly, incomplete and inconclusive. In the absence of conclusive evidence, it remains a likelihood that he was born prior to the enactment of Pericles’ law. In which case he would have been an uncommon case of a son named after his father and a man who – following Socrates’ example – willingly excluded himself from a role in public life that would have taken him away from philosophy and involved consorting with base men (for his own ideology see ch. 2.ii section A). The reports that Antisthenes’ mother was a barbarian were no doubt aimed at slurring his character and, if he was born before Pericles’ citizenship law came into effect, his reputation could be tarnished by association; the ‘expressive function’ of such laws creates prejudice against those who, for example, would have been impacted if the laws were applied earlier (Irwin 2015b, 81 n. 30).

**D Closest companion of Socrates**

Antisthenes was the closest companion of Socrates, reportedly never leaving his side, and ready to engage in dialogue at a moment’s notice. He walked five miles every day to Athens from his home in Peiraeus to listen to Socrates. Athenaeus observed that in Antisthenes’ writings Socrates is the only person who retains his reputation as a good advisor, respectable teacher, and so on (Ath. 5.220e). In Xenophon’s *Symposion* Antisthenes is portrayed as the most prominent person present next to Socrates.

In the Socratic milieu, as constructed by Plato, Socrates was ever circulating among the ranks of the most wealthy and influential Athenians. Though Plato does not mention Antisthenes’ presence, except at Socrates’ death, judging by the evidence from Xenophon, and indeed from Antisthenes himself, Antisthenes was likely in Socrates’ company most or all of the time. This supposition is borne out by the portrayal given in Xenophon’s

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38 For the connection between citizen status and serving as a hoplite see e.g. Thomas 1979; though the status of *nothoi* is in this regard is entirely unclear.
39 X. Mem. 3.11.17 = SSR 14.
40 X. Mem. 2.5.1-3.
41 DL 6.2 = DC 128A, SSR 12.
Symposion, where Socrates and Antisthenes are attending a banquet together at the house of Callias and display great familiarity with one another. In one amusing instance, when Socrates asks Antisthenes if he has a passion for anyone, he replies: 'By the gods, I do have a passion, very much so: it's you!' Socrates teases in reply that Antisthenes is only infatuated with his good looks and not with his soul. After Socrates' death, Antisthenes is said to have been responsible for the exile of Anytus and the execution of Meletus, two of the accusers at Socrates' trial.

**E  Reportedly student of Gorgias**

There is a claim that Antisthenes was a student of Gorgias the rhetorician. The claim appears in Diogenes Laertius, who offers no source for his information (which he often does elsewhere), and following suit the Suda reports that Antisthenes was a rhetorician then a Socratic. It is entirely possible that Antisthenes, as a young man, attended some lessons from Gorgias, just as Isocrates and Alcidamas are reported to have done. If he had, there is no reason to assume that this contact had any lasting impression on his intellectual outlook. And in reality, if he really was a student, the impact seems to have been entirely negative, judging by the fact that Antisthenes is reported to have launched an attack on Gorgias in his *Archelaus*, and on all the demagogues of Athens in his *Statesman* (CD3). It is also possible that the claim that Antisthenes was a student of Gorgias was completely spurious, perhaps originating from Platonists aiming to discredit him. If Platonists (and Neoplatonists after them) wanted 'real' philosophy to start with Socrates and Plato, it would be in their interests to present Antisthenes as somehow 'pre-philosophy', and painting him as a rhetorician would go some way toward that end.

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44 X. *Smp.* 8.4 = SSR 14.
45 X. *Smp.* 8.6 = SSR 14.
46 DL 6.9-10 = DC 133, SSR 21.
48 *Suda* s.v. Ἀντισθένης = DC 126, SSR 11.
F As a teacher

Antisthenes is not reported to have started an academy or school in the style of younger contemporaries such as Plato and Isocrates. Though there is anecdotal evidence that he was a teacher offering classes after a fashion. In one account Antisthenes tells a young student, apparently about to attend his classes, that all he will need is 'a new book a new pencil and a new writing tablet (implying new intelligence)' – which also implies that Antisthenes did not ask the student for a fee (ED3). He tells one acquaintance (or student), who lost his (lecture) notes that he should have inscribed them in his soul and not on paper.\textsuperscript{50} There is also an anecdote that he 'conversed at the Cynosarges (White Dog) gymnasium not far from the gates.'\textsuperscript{51} This seems to imply that he had a regular place to hold discourse, however, it seems possible that this story was developed later by Cynics trying to make a connection to Antisthenes by virtue of the gymnasium's name.

The rest of the anecdotal tradition about Antisthenes' teaching is indeed confused and contradictory, and mostly seems to have been constructed at a later date to make his character fit his created role as the 'first of the Cynics'. Thus, there are a number of late anecdotes reporting that Antisthenes harshly beat or even drove off students and potential students,\textsuperscript{52} and another tradition asserting that he never accepted students at all,\textsuperscript{53} apart from Diogenes of Sinope who persisted until Antisthenes relented and accepted him.\textsuperscript{54} Then there is a more plausible story that Antisthenes had followers but advised them to become students with him of Socrates.\textsuperscript{55} The fact that, in reality, he garnered a reasonable following is demonstrated by Aristotle who refers to Antisthenes' adherents as

\textsuperscript{50} DL 6.5 = DC 188, SSR 168.
\textsuperscript{51} DL 6.13 = DC 136a, SSR 22.
\textsuperscript{52} DL 6.4 = DC 184, SSR 169, & DC 185, SSR 169.
\textsuperscript{53} DL 6.21 = DC 138A.
\textsuperscript{54} DL 6.21 = DC 138a, Ael. VH 10.16 = DC 138b, Jer. Adv. Iovinian. 2.14.345 = DC 138c, Eus. PE 15.13.6-8 816b-c = DC 138d, SSR 139, Suda s.v. Αντισθένης = DC 138e, Sch. on Luc. Vit. Auct. 7 = DC 138f, D.Chr. 8.1 = DC 139.
\textsuperscript{55} DL 6.2 = DC 128A, SSR 12.
'Antisthenians'.\textsuperscript{56} Though from this reference it is not clear if these were direct students, or those influenced by Antisthenes' writings, or both.

\textbf{G Relationship to Callias and other aristocrats}

The relationship between Antisthenes and Callias is represented as an extremely congenial one by Xenophon,\textsuperscript{57} who has Socrates say that Antisthenes arranged for Callias and Prodicus to meet, believing their association would be profitable for both.\textsuperscript{58} Antisthenes served at the Battle of Tanagra where Callias' father, Hipponicus, was one of the two commanders.\textsuperscript{59} Callias' birth year is estimated to be 450,\textsuperscript{60} much the same as Antisthenes', so possibly their acquaintance started while serving together at the Battle of Tanagra and/or in other campaigns. In light of Antisthenes' associations such as this, and in keeping with his status as the son of a middling to wealthy family, Antisthenes held aristocratic and anti-democratic values common among the elites with whom he kept company (see further ch. 2.ii).

\textbf{H Character}

A glance through Antisthenes' surviving fragments reveals that he had a fairly dry, acerbic wit, and that he enjoyed making provocative and unexpected statements in order to make a point. In terms of character, Xenophon described Antisthenes as 'the most agreeable of men in conversation and the most temperate in everything else'.\textsuperscript{61} In Xenophon's \textit{Symposion} Socrates praises Antisthenes' desire and ability for making matches between men who would likely profit from each other's company, as in the case of Callias and Prodicus.\textsuperscript{62} By contrast, another associate of Socrates, Aristippus of Cyrene, is said to have 'mocked Antisthenes continually on account of his extreme harshness'.\textsuperscript{63} This last accusation may

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{56} oι Αντισθενείοι, \textit{Met.} 1043b = DC 44A, SSR 150; Aristotle's commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias similarly applies 'Antisthenians' to Antisthenes' followers (\textit{On Arist. Met.} 1043b = DC 44B, SSR 150).
\bibitem{57} See for example: X. \textit{Sym.} 4.1-6 = DC 120, SSR 83; 4.45 = DC 117, SSR 82; 6.5 = DC 159, SSR 101.
\bibitem{58} X. \textit{Smp.} 4.62; = DC 107, SSR 13.
\bibitem{59} In 426 a force led by Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of Thucles defeated the men of Tanagra and some Thebans aiding them (Th. 3.91).
\bibitem{60} Davies \textit{APF} 7826 Kallias (III) X., p. 263.
\bibitem{61} DL 6.15 = DC 135, SSR 22.
\bibitem{62} X. \textit{Smp.} 4.56-64; = DC 107, SSR 13.
\bibitem{63} Suda s.v. Αριστίππος = DC 155.
\end{thebibliography}
have been due to Antisthenes' uncompromising approach to interlocution. He was evidently a skilled conversationalist and Theopompus praises his skill at manoeuvring anyone at all to come to the conclusions he desired (SD3). This suggests that Antisthenes actually had essential characteristics in common with the Platonic Socrates.

I Cross-examination

Supporting Theopompus' assessment of Antisthenes' conversational abilities is Xenophon's portrait of Antisthenes in his Symposion (which Theopompus also refers to). In the conversations Xenophon records it is shown that it was Antisthenes rather than Socrates who was the master of ἐλεγχος, or cross-examination. He rises to cross-examine any person who makes a statement he is dubious about and actually cross-examines Socrates himself at one point, asking him why if, as Socrates says, women can be taught anything, he does not then educate his wife Xanthippe, 'the most difficult woman not just of this generation, but of all generations past and yet to come' (2.10). Callias even makes a joke of Antisthenes' tendency to interrogate one and all, and muses about what the aulos accompaniment (αὔληµα) should be when he starts cross-examining one of the symposiasts. Antisthenes suggests surigmos (συριγµός) would be appropriate (6.5), which either means 'shrill piping' on the suringx a set of shepherd's or 'pan' pipes, or metaphorically it could mean 'hissing' in the manner of a derisive audience. This suggests that Callias is comparing Antisthenes' cross-examinations to a comic agôn, or contest, which were probably regularly accompanied by piping (Csapo & Slater 1995, 332). Perhaps Callias used this comparison due to the comic befuddlement of the person being cross-examined combined with the inevitable and complete victory of the protagonist, Antisthenes.

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64 E.g. Callias at 3.4 and 4.2-3, Niceratos at 3.6.
J Antisthenes a model for Plato’s Socrates?

In the case of Antisthenes’ prowess at cross-examination, it appears that Plato’s literary representation of Socrates incorporated traits that originally belonged to the historic Antisthenes. There is more evidence to support this conjecture.

In Xenophon’s *Symposion* Antisthenes makes no attempt to conceal his contempt for rhapsodes, and suggests that there is no group of men who are sillier (TH10). In a similar manner, in Plato’s *Ion*, Socrates demonstrates to the rhapsode Ion that he in fact has no real knowledge or comprehension about the material he recites, but receives it through divine inspiration (533d-536d), a point Ion himself finally ends up conceding (542a).

Yet in Xenophon’s *Symposion* when Antisthenes is pressing Nikeratos to admit that his pride in being able to recite Homer is ill-judged, Socrates interrupts saying Nikeratos is different to the rhapsodes because he paid a lot of money to men who taught him αἱ υπονοιαί, ‘the underlying or hidden meanings’ (3.5-6). It seems in this case that Socrates was coming to Nikeratos’ aid to save him from further cross-examination and embarrassment. This is a stark contrast with Plato’s representation of Socrates who in the *Phaedros* describes allegorical explanations (such as rhapsodes offer) as τὰ ἀλλότρια, ‘irrelevant matters’ (229e), and in *Republic* states that Homer’s verses concerning the affairs of the gods should not be admitted to the city οὔτ’ ἐν υπονοιαῖς πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ υπονοιῶν, ‘either written in hidden meanings or without hidden meanings’ (378d). It could be argued that in Xenophon Socrates was merely being ironical, but there is other evidence to suggest that he genuinely believed that Homer was worth knowing, so long as one understood the underlying or hidden meanings. In the *Memorabilia* Socrates is depicted questioning a man who had just been selected as general, and he employs passages of Homer to test the fellow’s suitability, with no apparent irony (3.2.1-4). In fact, in this passage, Socrates appears to believe that Homer contains perfectly valid leadership examples that may be applied to real life.

From the evidence in Xenophon it appears that Socrates’ ability at cross-examination and the hostility he displayed towards rhapsodes throughout Plato’s dialogues may actually
have been prominent characteristics of Antisthenes that Plato appropriated to the dramatic persona of his Socrates.

K Life-style
Several surviving anecdotes claim that Antisthenes lived a reasonably austere life-style that even verged on destitution. It seems that this aspect was (over) developed in a later period in order to make Antisthenes a more suitable model to serve as the first of the Cynics. (The notion that Antisthenes actually had anything directly to do with Cynicism is dealt with in chapter 2.i). By the fourth century AD, wild claims were being made that Antisthenes threw money away and lived in filth and squalor. Nevertheless, Antisthenes' self-description in Xenophon's *Symposion* confirms that he was content to live with just enough to satisfy his day-to-day needs. He is also reported making some strong statements cautioning against the ethical dangers posed by pleasures and by living in luxury, and seems to have taken pride in living simply and doing his own chores. There are a series of related anecdotes that have Socrates mildly goading Antisthenes for priding himself on wearing clothes with holes in them. As already noted, however, none of these aspects of Antisthenes' restrained living prevented him from keeping aristocratic company, or from partaking of banquets when the occasion arose.

66 Jer. Ep. 66.8.3; SSR 83.
67 Isid. Ep. 3.154; = SSR 115.
68 X. Smp. 4.34-44 = DC 117, SSR 82.
69 See full discussion in ch. 2.ii.
70 E.g. carrying a dried fish for himself through the agora (Plu. Praec. geren. reipub. 15, 811B = DC 193, SSR 100); and washing his own vegetables (Gramm. Lat. 6 Keil = DC 194).
71 Ael. VH 9.35 = DC 148A, SSR 16; DL 2.36 & 6.8 = DC 148b, SSR 15.
2 ANTISTHENES' IDEOLOGY

2.i Antisthenes a Cynic?

This chapter will provide an examination of the claimed connection between Antisthenes and Cynicism.

A Modern association of Antisthenes to Cynicism

In modern times there is a general scholarly consensus along the lines that Antisthenes was a 'proto-Cynic', 'the first of the Cynics', or that 'Cynicism started with Antisthenes'. What is more, the assumption is that this had been the view throughout antiquity. In his volume Classical Cynicism, Navia states that 'Antisthenes' importance as the originator of Cynicism has been affirmed in numerous works, and Diogenes Laertius' statement that it was indeed with Antisthenes that Cynicism came into being (6.2) has been accepted by many classical scholars and historians of philosophy' (1996, 38-9). Navia makes it clear that he accepts this view himself. Branham & Goulet-Cazé, in their introduction to The Cynics, claim: 'Throughout antiquity Antisthenes was considered the founder of Cynicism' (1996, 6). They themselves also consider him to have been very closely tied to Cynicism, though with the role of 'an important forerunner of the movement (rather than a founder)' (7).

Modern scholars have particularly detected evidence of Antisthenes' proto-Cynic views in his Ajax & Odysseus. Rankin states that Antisthenes' Odysseus, in particular, is representative of the 'Protocynic views of Antisthenes' (1986, 154), and in a similar vein Stanford claims that Antisthenes' depiction of Odysseus was 'from the point of view of a proto-Cynic' (1968, 99). Engels thinks Antisthenes may have been trying to present Odysseus 'as a prefiguration of a Cynic hero' (1998, 96). Prince feels the work reveals

72 There have been a handful of notable dissenters to this consensus: Wilamowitz rejected a connection between Antisthenes and Cynicism (1919, 1.259-60); Dudley opened his A History of Cynicism with a short chapter on Antisthenes – showing the incompatibility of his thought with Cynicism (1937, 1-16); in 1948 Sayre put forward a brief statement on Antisthenes' Socratic credentials; most recently Tsouna McKirahan (1994) asserted Antisthenes' Socratic nature and questioned his connection to Cynicism. But these views have been stated in isolation and, for the most part, passed over.
'aspects of his proto-Cynic ethics and program for self-improvement' (2006, 83) and 'it is hard to doubt that the Homeric Odysseus was a hero for Antisthenes' (2015, 201).

**B  Ancient view of Antisthenes' philosophy**

An examination of the evidence reveals that, throughout antiquity, for the most part, Antisthenes was *not* known as a Cynic, but was actually known as a Socratic. The notion that he was connected to Cynicism first emerged only centuries after his death. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (late 1st c. BC) calls Antisthenes, Critias, and Xenophon 'Socrats'.73 Plutarch also refers to Antisthenes as 'the Socratic' in a discussion including Plato and Aeschines.74 The emperor Julian, when critiquing a talk given by Heracleios the Cynic, discusses the use of myth in writing by Antisthenes, Plato, and Xenophon (MD14-16), and he refers specifically to Antisthenes as 'the Socratic'.75 Even Diogenes Laertius (who caused centuries of confusion by going on to discuss Antisthenes 'among the Cynics') states: 'Of those who succeeded him (Socrates) and were called Socrates the most important leaders were Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes' (2.47).

But by the middle of the fourth century AD we find Epiphanius stating that 'He (Antisthenes) was first Socratic, then Cynic'.76 How this curious transformation came about is clearly worthy of further investigation.

**C  Emergence of the sect or school of Cynicism**

As late as 200 BC it seems that Cynicism had not yet emerged as an independent philosophical school of thought or sect. Around that time Hippobotus wrote a περὶ αἱρέσεων (*About Philosophical Sects or Schools*, DL 1.19). In it he listed nine known philosophical sects or schools: Megarian, Eretrian, Cyrenaic, Epicurean, Annicerean, Theodorean, Zenonian or Stoic, Old Academic, Peripatetic. But he neither knew of nor reported on any Cynic sect. The earliest extant usage of the term κυνισμός to refer to

73 Σωκρατικοί, Thuc. 51 = DC 9, SSR 49.
74 Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικός, Lyc. 30.7 = DC 171, SSR 10.
75 Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικός, MD14.
76 Adv. haer. 3.26 Diels Dox. Graeci 591 = DC 122D, SSR 1.
'Cynicism' is from around 150 BC by Apollodorus of Seleucia. Around a century later Cicero mentions the 'Cynici', who by that time were clearly a distinct group recognisable by their doctrines and/or way of life, even if not a 'school' per se (De or. 3.61-2).

Cynicism is defined by the Suda as follows (s.v., n. 2711)

Κυνισµός· αἵρεσις φιλοσόφων. ὁ δὲ ὁρισµὸς αὐτοῦ σύντοµος ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδός. τέλος δὲ τοῦ κυνισµοῦ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ὡς Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς. ἠρείες δ' αὐτῶις λιτῶς βιοῦν, αὐτάρκεις χρωµένος σιτίοις, πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐγενείας καταφρονεῖν. ἐνιοὶ δὲ βοτάναις καὶ ἱδατι ψυχῶ ἔχρωντο σκέπαι τε ταῖς τυχούσαις καὶ πίθοις καὶ ἱματίσκον θεοῦ μὲν ἰδιὸν εἶναι τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ θεῶ όμοιον τὸ ὀλίγων χρῄζειν. ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτῶις καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀναπόβλητον.

Cynicism: A school of philosophy. Its motto is: 'Short-cut to excellence'. The goal of the Cynic is to live according to excellence, as did Diogenes and Zeno of Citium. And they instruct to live frugally, using food sufficient to support oneself, and despising wealth and reputation and high birth. And some utilise plants for food and cold water and whatever shelter they happen on, even large jars, and they used to say that it is a specific characteristic of god to need nothing, and of men similar to god to want little. And they instruct that excellence is teachable and unloseable.

D Philosophical figures connected to Cynicism

Around the turn of the millennia, Philo of Alexandria and Strabo are found making use of the term κυνικός, to mean 'Cynic' – in both cases when referring to Diogenes of Sinope (see list below). These are the first known references to a specific person in connection with Cynicism.

Following is a list compiled from extant sources of the earliest uses of 'κυνικ-' root words, when used to mean 'Cynic' and not 'dog-like' (e.g. as an insult), detailing which authors used them, and about whom.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philo of Alexandria c. AD 1</td>
<td>Diogenes of Sinope (Quod. Omn. Prob. 121-4, Plant. 151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strabo c. AD 1</td>
<td>Diogenes of Sinope (12.3.11.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutarch c. AD 100</td>
<td>Diogenes of Sinope (Alex. 65.2, et al.)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crates of Thebes (Mor. 69c)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Didymus (Mor. 413a)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metrokles (Mor. 468a)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, after Diogenes of Sinope is first called a Cynic around the beginning of the first century AD, for the next couple of centuries he continues to be the most commonly mentioned name, along with Crates of Thebes. Finally, in the early third century AD, the earliest surviving association of Antisthenes with the term 'Cynic' is made by Clement of Alexandria. Clement uses the term, however, to reject Antisthenes' connection to Cynicism. He writes: 'For indeed Antisthenes formulated this non-Cynical (οὐ Κυνικόν) thought, seeing as he was a pupil of Socrates.' The fact that Clement felt compelled to emphasise that Antisthenes' thought was 'non-Cynical' must have been a reaction against others who were asserting a connection between Antisthenes and Cynicism. Clearly there was controversy surrounding this issue and this fact is further demonstrated by an earlier comment from Oenomaos, himself a Cynic philosopher active around AD 125. He states: 'Cynicism is neither Antisthenism nor Diogenism' (apud Jul. Or. 6.187c). This shows that Oenomaos was aware of other people who were imputing some sort of role for Antisthenes in the founding of Cynicism, but that he rejected such an association.

78 Protr. 6.71.1 = DC 40b, SSR 181.
### E How Antisthenes came to be connected to Cynicism

Since authors such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, and even Diogenes Laertius himself, had all described Antisthenes as Socratic, and well informed writers such as Clement of Alexandria and Oenomaos the Cynic refuted any connection between Antisthenes and Cynicism, how then did the two come to be almost inextricably linked? The succinct explanation is provided by this valuable passage from Cicero (*De or. 3.61-2*):

> Nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, prosemintae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum disiunctae et dispare, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrentur. Ac primo ab ipso Platone Aristoteles et Xenocrates, quorum alter Peripateticorum, alter Academiae nomen obtinuit, deinde ab Antisthene, qui patientiam et duritiam in Socratico sermone maxime adamarat, Cynici primum, deinde Stoici.

For, because of the many schools that had virtually originated from Socrates, since, from his various and diverse discussions, ranging in all directions, with one student seizing on one aspect, and another on another, there were generated, just like families dissenting among themselves, schools greatly separated and unalike, and yet all philosophers desired to be called 'Socratic' and thought of themselves as such. And firstly, from Plato himself, came Aristotle and Xenocrates, of whom the former acquired the name of 'Peripatetic' school, the latter acquired the name of 'Academy', then from Antisthenes, who especially admired the persistence and rigour in Socrates' discussion, came first the Cynics, then the Stoics.

Here Cicero clearly identifies the desire of all philosophers to be able to trace their philosophical lineage back to Socrates and thus to be called 'Socratic'. Because Antisthenes admired the persistence and rigour of Socrates, the Cynics and then the Stoics found him to be a natural link allowing them to connect back to Socrates. Although Cicero notes this connection, he himself certainly did not consider Antisthenes to be a Cynic. This can be seen from his own comments in other works. On the one hand, he had read and was an admirer of Antisthenes' works: 'The *Kυρσᾶς* pleased me as did the other works of Antisthenes' (*CD5*). But on the other, he made scathing remarks about the Cynics and Cynicism: 'We should give no heed to the Cynics – or to some Stoics who are practically Cynics' (*Off. 1.128*); and 'Certainly the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing can be upright, nothing morally good' (*Off. 1.148*).^{80}

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79 Noted by Sayre 1948, 240.
80 These comments noted by Sayre 1948, 242.
Accepting Cicero’s assertion that all philosophers wanted to trace their intellectual
genealogy back to Socrates, it is worth mentioning why the Cynics might have found
Antisthenes appealing as the link. Following are some ancient comments on the nature of
Cynicism. Diogenes Laertius reports that the Cynics advise ‘living frugally, eating food
only for nourishment, and wearing a single garment. Wealth and high birth they despise.
Some are vegetarians and drink only cold water and are content with any kind of shelter’.81
He also writes that the Cynics ‘do away with Logic and Physics and devote their whole
attention to Ethics’ (6.103) and that ‘their motto is: “Live in accordance with excellence”’ (τὸ
κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, 104). In his Ethics, Apollodorus of Seleucia (c. 150 BC) states that
Cynicism (κυνισµόν) is the ‘short cut to excellence’ (σύντοµον ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν ὁδόν).82
It is easy to see why the Cynics felt that Antisthenes was the most suitable of the Socratics
to provide them with a link back to Socrates, when it is understood that Antisthenes
himself was heavily preoccupied with ἀρετὴ, excellence, which was a central tenet of his
entire ethical programme (see ch. 2.ii below). He also despised superfluous luxury, as well
as wantonness and greed. However, far from rejecting all pleasures for an austere ascetic
life-style, as did the Cynics, in Xenophon’s Symposium Antisthenes describes himself taking
pleasure from eating, drinking and having sex to the point of satisfying his requirements
for each.83 Furthermore, he in no way looked down upon reputation and high birth – in fact
the very opposite was the case.

Antisthenes a vital link in Diogenes Laertius’ Cynic and Stoic Successions
Continuing to bear in mind Cicero’s assertion that all philosophers wanted to claim descent
from Socrates, as well as the ethical attractiveness of Antisthenes to certain schools of
thought, here are the successions of Cynic and Stoic philosophers as compiled by Diogenes
Laertius:

81 DL 6.104 = Suda s.v. Κυνισµός 2712.
2711, 2712.
83 X. Smp. 4.37-8 = DC 117, SSR 82.
Looking at these successions it is evident that Antisthenes provides a vital link back to Socrates for both the Cynics and the Stoics. The Stoics claim descent from Socrates through their founder Zeno’s connection to Crates of Thebes in the Cynic succession, then back up to Socrates. The desire of Zeno and the Stoics to make a connection to Socrates, in the manner described by Cicero, is noted by Philodemos in his discussion of Zeno and the origins of Stoicism (Περὶ τῶν Ἑσσωικῶν, Pap. Herc. 339 11.1-6).  

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84 In Crönert 1906, 58 = SSR 138.
designated him as their philosophical forebear because he had qualities that they wanted to emulate and, most importantly, because he offered them a link directly back to Socrates.

Further suggesting the late and spurious nature of Antisthenes’ connection to Cynicism is evidence from a number of fourth century BC authors. Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, used the term 'the Dog' (ὁ Κύων) to describe Diogenes of Sinope (Rhet. 3.10.7) – κύων being the word from which κυνικός 'dog-like', which came to mean 'Cynic', is derived. When discussing Antisthenes, however, Aristotle refers to him only as 'Antisthenes'. And when discussing Antisthenes' followers in the Metaphysics he refers to them simply as 'Antisthenians'. The earliest Cynic writings were by Onesicratus and Crates of Thebes. Both were writing in the late 4th century BC and so were contemporaries of Diogenes of Sinope and near contemporaries of Antisthenes. In their extant fragments neither of them is reported mentioning Antisthenes but both are reported mentioning Diogenes of Sinope.

Upon closer inspection, it appears that even Diogenes Laertius, who is largely credited (or blamed) with installing Antisthenes at the head of the Cynic succession, did not himself consider Antisthenes to be a Cynic. His text has just been (mis)read that way ever since. Consider the following passage from his 'Life of Socrates' (DL 2.47 my emphasis):

υῶν δὲ διαδεξαµένων αὐτὸν τῶν λεγοµένων Σωκρατικῶν οἱ κορυφαιότατοι µὲν Πλάτων, Ξενοφῶν, Ἀντισθένης: τῶν δὲ φεροµένων δέκα οἱ διασηµότατοι τέσσαρες, Αἰσχίνης, Φαίδων, Εὐκλείδης, Αριστιττίτης. λεκτέον δὲ πρῶτον περὶ Ξενοφῶντος, εἶτα περὶ Ἀντισθένους ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς, ἐπείτα περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν, εἰθ’ οὖτω περὶ Πλάτωνος, ἐπεὶ κατάρχει τῶν δέκα αἱρέσεων καὶ τὴν πρώτην Ἀκαδηµείαν αὐτὸς συνεστήσατο.

Of those who succeeded him (Socrates) and were called Socratics, the most important leaders were Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes. And of the ten (traditionally) reported, the four most eminent are Aeschines, Phaedon, Euclides, Aristippus. We must speak first about Xenophon, then about Antisthenes among the Cynics, afterwards about the Socratics, and so then about Plato, since he began the ten schools and personally founded the first Academy.

So Diogenes does not call Antisthenes a Cynic, but rather he knows that Antisthenes was a Socratic and refers to him as such. However because he is compiling a list of philosophical successions, and he is clearly aware that the Cynics and Stoics themselves claim their

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85 οἱ Αντισθενεῖοι, Met. 1043b = DC 44A, SSR 150.
86 Noted by Dudley 1937, 2.
87 E.g. Onesicritus Plu. Alex. 65.2 = Strabo 15.1.65; Crates DL 6.93.
Socratic heritage through Antisthenes, he goes ahead and discusses Antisthenes ‘among the Cynics’. In doing so, however, he no more claims that Antisthenes is a Cynic than he claims Plato to be a Cynic. The effects of Diogenes’ decision to place Antisthenes at the head of the Cynic succession are still being felt in a very real way to this day.  

H  Was Antisthenes dog-like?

As already mentioned, in the Greek ‘Cynic’ quite literally means ‘dog-like’. Cynics were also often referred to simply as ‘dogs’. As well as Aristotle referring to Diogenes of Sinope as ‘the Dog’ (ὁ Κύων Rhet. 3.10.7), Cercidas of Megalopolis (3rd c. BC, DL 6.77) and Plato did the same – in the latter instance Diogenes himself is said to have concurred with the description (DL 6.40). It seems well stated by Liddell, Scott and Jones, that from Homeric times calling someone ‘dog’ was a reproach ‘to denote shamelessness or audacity’ (s.v. II). This fits extremely well with the image we have of Diogenes of Sinope, living in a pithos jar (DL 6.23), spitting in peoples’ faces (DL 6.32), urinating on people (DL 6.46), masturbating in public (DL 6.69), and despising noble birth and good reputation (DL 6.72). Due to his shameless behaviour he was very often called ‘dog’ by a succession of people in addition to the philosophers listed above (DL 6.55, 60, 61). A number of times he also described himself as a dog (DL 6.33, 45, 60, 61). It was said that an image of a dog in Parian marble was placed on his grave (DL 6.78).

In contrast to Diogenes of Sinope, there are no known references to Antisthenes as ‘dog’ before Diogenes Laertius wrote that he had a nickname ἁπλοκύων, ‘simple-dog’ (DL 6.13). Recalling that Diogenes is also the earliest extant author to assert Antisthenes’ positive association with Cynicism, it is likely that this is a very late comment. As Dudley observed, there is not one ‘anecdote or apophthegm in which Antisthenes figures as a κύων’ (1937, 5). Antisthenes also habitually associated with Socrates and his aristocrat circle of friends, and praised noble birth on many occasions (see next chapter). The manner in which Diogenes of Sinope conducted his life demonstrated that he lacked a sense of shame by indulging in activities that most self-respecting Greeks would have shunned. A sense of shame then was

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88 See, for example, comments from Navia at the top of this chapter.
incompatible with being a Cynic, particularly in the early period.\textsuperscript{89} Antisthenes on the other hand had a very strong sense of shame and took a dim view of shameful acts. He plainly stated 'good deeds are noble, base deeds are shameful'.\textsuperscript{90} When he heard that the Athenians had raised an uproar in the theatre at the line: 'What is a shameful deed if its doers do not think so?,' Antisthenes adjusted the line to read: 'A shameful deed is a shameful deed, whether one think so or no' (\textit{TH1}).

\textbf{I Did Antisthenes teach Diogenes of Sinope?}

Considering the almost iron-clad connection in accounts of the Cynic tradition between Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope, it is surprising to discover that the two probably never met. Apart from the fact that their outlooks on life were almost irreconcilably different, the conclusion that they did not know one another can be largely drawn from some fortuitous numismatic evidence.

One of the historical acts that Diogenes is famous for is for defacing the currency in his native Sinope. Diogenes Laertius offers an extended narrative of this episode, including reporting that: 'Diogenes says about himself in his \textit{Pordalus} that he defaced (\textit{παραχαράσει})\textsuperscript{91} the money. … When he was discovered, some say he was expelled, while others say he was afraid and left voluntarily' (DL 6.20-21).

There is extraordinary numismatic evidence to corroborate this story. Diogenes' father was Hikesios, a banker (\textit{τραπεζίτης}) who was in charge of the public currency in Sinope (\textit{δηµοσία ἡ τραπέζης} DL 6.20). A substantial number of Sinopean coins have been found from the period 362-310\textsuperscript{92} that are not of Sinopean manufacture but instead are poorly made imitations, with Aramaic legends, of unreliable weight, and produced elsewhere in the Satrapy of Cappadocia. A remarkable 60 per cent of these coins have been struck with a

\textsuperscript{89} Dudley 1937, 5; including his translation of a scholion on Aristotle explaining four reasons for the name Cynic being applied (Brandis p. 23 col. 1.40 - col. 2.21).

\textsuperscript{90} τἀγαθὰ καλά, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά DL 6.11 = DC 73, SSR 134.

\textsuperscript{91} Bywater (published and commented on by Milne) offers a thorough analysis of the possible meanings of \textit{παραχαράσειν}, which is useful, though \textit{contra} the conclusions here – Milne saw Diogenes as metaphorically defacing the 'political currency' (Bywater & Milne 1940, 10-12).

\textsuperscript{92} 362 BC is the date of the death of the Datames, Satrap of Cappadocia for the Persians, which coincided with the cessation of currency issued in his name.

43
chisel to deface them and put them out of circulation. Among the good Sinopean coins from this period are a number bearing the name 'Hikes(ios)'.

The conclusion that may be drawn is that Diogenes defaced the coins, not as an act of vandalism, but to protect the integrity of the native coinage issued by his father.

After Diogenes was discovered he left Sinope and went to Athens. This was probably around 350-40 but certainly not earlier than 362.

Antisthenes probably died soon after 365.

**J Founder of Cynicism?**

Identifying the real founder of Cynicism is beyond the scope of this work, and was a difficult task even for ancient authors who had an interest in philosophy. The emperor Julian, in a work addressed to 'The Uneducated Cynics', states (Or. 6.187c):

> Indeed it is not easy to discover the founder to whom we should first attribute it (Cynic philosophy), even if some suppose that this role belongs to Antisthenes and Diogenes.

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93 See for example Waddington 1904, Pl. XXIV, 26-32, 34, 36-7, Pl. XXV, 1-5, 7.
94 Waddington 1904, 187 & Pl. XXV, 16; discussed by Seltman 1938, 121, who first made this connection. At least half a dozen of these coins have sold at recent auctions, searchable online; e.g. a similar coin (pictured) dated by the auctioneers to c. 330 BC:
Julian goes on to make clear in this passage, and elsewhere, that he viewed Antisthenes as Socratic and saw no connection between him and Cynicism.

From the earlier discussion Diogenes, 'the dog', of Sinope certainly seems a strong candidate for the role of spiritual 'founder' of Cynicism. He was the one most referred to by ancient authors as a Cynic in the list above. Yet Julian's comment above seems to imply that he, at least, doubts that connection.

A clue as to the identity of another potential intellectual founder of Cynicism is revealed by this fragment of Menander (c. 315 BC; PCG Did. F 1 = DL 6.93):95

Συμπεριπατήσεις γὰρ τρίβων ἔχουσ᾽ ἐμοί,
ὡστερ Κράτητι τῷ κυνικῷ ποθ᾽ ἡ γυνη.

Wearing a threadbare robe you will go about with me,
as once his wife went with the dog-like Crates.

As noted in the discussion above, Crates of Thebes provided a crucial link back to Socrates for both the Cynics and the Stoics. Like Diogenes he received several early mentions by ancient authors as a Cynic. Thus Crates, with his epithet 'dog-like' (later meaning 'Cynic'), seems another worthy potential contender for the position of founder, or at least philosophical forerunner, of Cynicism. Certainly either Diogenes or Crates are well suited to the role, whereas Antisthenes is entirely unsuited.

K  Antisthenes was not a Cynic

To conclude this chapter, it can be securely stated that Antisthenes was not a Cynic, nor did he have anything to do with the founding of Cynicism as a philosophy or school of thought. Later Cynic and Stoic philosophers attempted to make Antisthenes fit a proto-Cynic mould because they possessed a teleological drive for doing so. That is, they all wanted to be able to trace their philosophical genealogy back to Socrates, the 'Father of Philosophy', as it were; and Antisthenes appeared the most compatible of Socrates' direct disciples to allow them to make the connection. But in reality Antisthenes' philosophy and ethics were a far

95 Noted by Dudley 1937, 6.
cry from those of the Cynics, as the next chapter will demonstrate, and he probably never even met Diogenes of Sinope, considered to stand next after him in the Cynic succession.
2.ii Antisthenes’ Philosophy of Excellence and Justice

A Ideological Values

As discussed in the biographical sketch in chapter 1.iii, Antisthenes was from a family of financial means and Socrates described him as ‘high-born’ or ‘noble’ (γενναῖος).

Antisthenes was an expert wrestler and, like Socrates, he won distinction in battle. He also moved in the same social circles as Socrates, which meant habitually associating with leisured aristocrats. Far from rejecting high birth, as did the Cynics, Antisthenes shared the views of his class. Thus he frequently praised nobility and high-birth and, as often, castigated baseness and, by implication, democracy.

Antisthenes particularly saw danger in base, or lower class men gaining political power. In his typically acerbic fashion he commented: ‘As it is dangerous to give a dagger to a madman, so it is to give power to a base man (μοχθηρός).’ On the same theme he said: ‘it is paradoxical to extract the weeds from the corn and in war to remove the unfit soldiers, but in government not to dismiss the base men (πονηροί).’ He said (via Cyrus) that the most essential knowledge is ‘to unlearn base things (τὰ κακά, CD13a-c).’ The following statement demonstrates the almost unlimited threat he perceived base men posing: ‘city-states will come to destruction, when the men who hold sway are unable to distinguish the base men (φαύλοι) from the noble men (σπουδαῖοι).’

After the fashion of this last statement Antisthenes made a number of other remarks contrasting noble men and deeds with base men and deeds. For example he stated: ‘Noble deeds are good, base deeds are shameful (τἀγαθὰ καλὰ, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ). Consider all base acts (πονηρά) to be alien’. Note that here he specifically rejects base deeds on the grounds that they are ‘shameful’. As this is not merely tautology, it indicates that the sociological values meant by ‘base’ are very much in play here. As well as extolling things noble, this fragment offers further evidence of the incompatibility of Antisthenes’ outlook.

97 DL 6.6 = DC 104, SSR 73.
99 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 73, SSR 134.
with the Cynics, who had no sense of shame. In a couple of other fragments Antisthenes is found directly praising noble men: 'a noble man deserves to be loved (ἀξιέραστος ὁ ἀγαθός)’ and 'noble/excellent men (σπουδαῖοι) are loved’. The following comment sums up his views on class particularly well: 'It is better to be one of a few noble men (ἀγαθοί) fighting against all the base men (κακοί), than one of many base men (κακοί) fighting against a few noble men (ἀγαθοί)’.  

As a natural extension of his elitist stance, Antisthenes shared in the laconizing tendency of the old aristocracy of Athens, who were inclined to look with admiration at Sparta and contempt at Athens. Cimon is a prime example. Described by Plutarch as a 'Sparta-lover' (φιλολάκων, Cim. 16.1, Per. 9.4) and a 'demos-hater' (μισόδηµον, Per. 9.4), Cimon was Sparta’s proxenos, or special representative, in Athens (Per. 29.2), he rebuked the Athenians for not being like Spartans (Cim. 16.3), and named his son Lakedaemonios (Cim. 16.1). In a similar vein Antisthenes made caustically witty remarks about his compatriots, for example:

When the Athenians would aggrandise themselves on the fact that they were earthborn, he poured scorn on them, saying that they were no more well-born (εὐγενεστέροι) than snails and locusts’.  

He used to advise the Athenians to vote that donkeys are horses. When they thought that this was absurd, he said 'Yet men become generals from among you who have not been educated (µηδὲν µαθόντες), but were merely elected.'

Aristophanes sent up the associates of Socrates for being infatuated with the Spartans (Av. 1280-3) and Antisthenes was of this Socratic disposition. He unfavourably and humorously compared the Athenians to the Spartans: 'Going from Athens to Sparta is to go from the women's rooms to the men's quarters.’ Regarding styles of speaking, he stated: 'excellence is brief in speech (βραχύλογος), but baseness (κακία) is speech without bounds.' Evidently βραχύλογος is synonymous with laconic. Not surprisingly

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100 Both from Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 79, SSR 134.  
101 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 71, SSR 134.  
102 DL 6.1 = DC 123, SSR 8.  
103 DL 6.8 = DC 169, SSR 72.  
104 Theon Progym. 5 p. 104.15–105.6 = DC 195, SSR 7.  
βραχυλογία (brevity of speech) is a trait widely attributed to the Spartans, especially by Athenian elites, from the fifth century onwards. Perhaps the most memorable portrayal of Spartan terseness is found in Herodotus, where the Spartans critique the Samians’ speech because they used four words where two would have sufficed (3.46.1-2). By contrast, 'speech without bounds' brings to mind rhetoric and Athenian orators, a breed of men who especially drew Antisthenes' ire.

B Views on Rhetoric

Antisthenes wrote dialogues condemning orators and demagogues. His Archelaus launches an attack against 'Gorgias the orator' and his The Statesman attacks 'all the demagogues in Athens' (CD3). In the latter dialogue it seems possible that Antisthenes crafted a scathing character sketch of demagogues in the style of his attacks on flatterers (MD9-13 and commentary). In another fragment, Antisthenes is found drawing an unflattering likeness of the orator, Kephisodotos (Sy1). When someone asked Antisthenes 'What should I teach my son?', he replied 'If he is destined to live with the gods, philosophy, but if he is destined to live with men, rhetoric' (MD2). In other words: 'Only teach your son rhetoric if you have no aspirations for him above consorting with base humanity. Otherwise you should teach him philosophy.' The following comment reveals Antisthenes disdain for sophistic argumentation in general: 'One must stop a person who is arguing, not by arguing in return, but by teaching him. For one would not attempt to cure a madman by being mad in return.'

C The σοφός and the value of νοῦς and φρόνησις

An interesting theme in Antisthenes' writing is the esteem in which he held the wise man, the σοφός, and the emphasis he placed on intellectual capacity as described by νοῦς, intelligence, and φρόνησις, good sense.

The following fragments convey Antisthenes' view of the σοφός. 'To the wise man nothing is unfamiliar or inaccessible.' The wise man is self-sufficient; for everything of everyone

106 Stob. 2.2.15 = DC 65, SSR 174.  
107 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 81, SSR 134.
else's is his.  

108 The wise man deserves to be loved, [and is blameless], and is a friend to a like man, and entrusts nothing to fortune.  

109 This next comment may have been partly an attack on Pericles' citizenship law: 'The wise man will marry for the gratification of producing children, entering into union with the most suitably formed women. And he will also love passionately; for the wise man alone knows whom he should love.'  

110 So the wise man will choose his wife because of her physical characteristics – probably attractiveness, childbearing ability, and noble birth/character – not because she is Athenian.  

111 Finally there is this excerpt, likely from a passage of dialogue: 'When a tyrant asked why in the world the wealthy do not go to visit the wise men, but vice versa, he [Antisthenes] said “Because the wise men know what they need to maintain life, but the former (wealthy) men do not know, since they spend all their time worrying about money rather than wisdom.”'  

Antisthenes seems to have viewed intelligence and good sense as vital to the make up of a wise and good man. As well as providing a foundation for proper philosophical understanding, they provided defence against hostile influences. Fragment MD11 mentions both qualities: 'Antisthenes used to say, that courtesans pray that all good things come to their lovers, except intelligence (νοῦς) and good sense (φρόνησις); and thus also pray the flatterers for those with whom they associate.'

From the surviving fragments it appears that νοῦς was the characteristic most necessary for active philosophical investigation. Chrysippus reports an amusing comment of Antisthenes' that 'one must possess intelligence or a halter.'  

113 An indication of the purpose of having intelligence is revealed by ED3: 'When a young lad from Pontus was about to become his student and enquired as to what he needed, he [Antisthenes] said “a new book and a new pencil and a new writing tablet,” implying “intelligence”’, θυβλιαοίου καινοῦ

108 DL 6.11 = DC 80, SSR 134.
110 DL 6.11 = DC 115, SSR 58.
111 Irwin 2015b, 91.
112 Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 6 = DC 183, SSR 166; cf. a similar anecdote attributed to Aristippus at DL 2.69.
113 Chrysippus in Plu. Mor. 1039e = DC 67, SSR 105.
καὶ γραφείου καινοῦ καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ, τὸν νοῦν παρεµφαίνων (there is a pun on καινοῦ which sounds simultaneously like 'new' as well as 'and intelligence'). Thus, by Antisthenes' reckoning, the key requirement for learning philosophy was νοῦς.

Anaxagoras, originally admired by Socrates (xxx ref.), was nicknamed Νοῦς according to Plutarch (Per. xxx) and no doubt this emphasised the value of this quality to Socrates' students, e.g. Antisthenes. Clay has noted that Plato's works make clear that: 'Quickness to learn and the capacity to retain what is learned are the main requirements of the philosophical nature.' It seems that on this point Plato's views were very much in alignment with those of Antisthenes.

A word with currency in the wider intellectual discourse, φρόνησις was used by Pericles in the speech attributed to him by Thucydides (xxx). For Antisthenes this the quality that provided imperviousness against corrupting external forces. Thus he said: 'Good sense is the most secure fortification; for it never falls in ruins nor is it betrayed.' One of his works in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue is: Heracles, or, Concerning Good Sense and Strength (6.18). In a related vein he made this ethically loaded statement: 'It was to this that Antisthenes was giving his attention when he said that a good man is difficult to carry. For as foolishness is unsubstantial and floats about, <so> good sense is firmly fixed and unswerving and has an unshakeable gravity.' This last statement relates directly to a key component in the ideology of the old aristocracy, which held that flightiness and changeability are qualities of base men (and so the demos), while steadiness and intransigence are inherent qualities of the nobly born (see full discussion in the commentary on TH12 33-4, παλίµβολον τὸ τοῦ ἥθους, πολυµετάβολον, ἀστατον). Thus with his views stated here on φρόνησις, Antisthenes is not only working within that ideological framework, but is actively reinforcing the structure.

114 Liz Irwin helpfully drew this to my attention.
115 1994 38; and a list of relevant passages at 38 n.33 - Chrm. 159e, Meno 88b, Rep. 6.486c-487a & 494b, Leg. 4, 709e.
116 Diocles in DL 6.13 = DC 88, SSR 134.
117 εἰς ταῦτα δ’ ἀπιδὼν Ἀντισθένης δυσβάστακτον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἀστεῖον· ὡς γὰρ ἡ ἀφροσύνη κούρον καὶ φερόµενον, οὕτως ἡ φρόνησις ἑρημευμένον καὶ ἀκλινές καὶ βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον; Philo Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sīl 28 Cohn-Reiter 1915 6.8-9 = DC 91, SSR 106.
D Overindulgence and Pleasure

A significant portion of Antisthenes' fragments caution against the dangers of over indulgence, and especially against pleasure. No doubt this part of his ethics was one of the major attractions that led Cynic philosophers to imagine Antisthenes as a founder of Cynicism. Comments in this category show Antisthenes' customary wit: 'To a man praising luxury Antisthenes said “May the children of your enemies live in luxury”.'

Regarding overeating: 'When Antisthenes was asked “What is a festival?” he answered “An incitement to gluttony”.' And this amusing comment, preserved in Athenaeus: 'They are releasing themselves from life by such eating!'

Several of Antisthenes' comments about pleasure make it clear that it was the ethical implications of experiencing pleasure that he was concerned with. In this regard pleasure (ἡδονή) is the natural, dichotomous opponent of hard work (πόνος), a topic Antisthenes wrote dialogues discussing and praising (CD7 & commentary). Detienne discusses this dichotomy and sets out the 'philosophicoreligious' conception of the left hand path representing Hēdonē, and situated on the Plain of Lēthē, along with Oblivion and Night, which stands opposed to the right hand path representing Ponos, on the Plain of Alētheia, along with Memory and Light (1996, 126-8).

Diogenes Laertius reports that Antisthenes frequently said, 'I would rather be crazy than be pleased.' It may be discerned from other fragments, however, that his comment here is referring to pleasure for its own sake. That he was not opposed to pleasure per se, can be seen from the following fragment: 'Antisthenes, when stating “pleasure is a good thing”, added “unregretted (pleasure)”.' Further revealing the ethical nature of his views on pleasure is the comment: 'one must pursue pleasures that follow hard work, but not

118 DL 6.8 = DC 179, SSR 114.
120 Ath. 4.157b = DC 165, SSR 133.
121 DL 6.3 = DC 108a, SSR 122; cf. DC 108b-f, SSR 122 and DC 109b, SSR 123.
122 Ath.12.513a = DC 110, SSR 127.
pleasures that precede hard work.'\textsuperscript{123} The corrupting influence that Antisthenes saw 
pleasure working on base people and on women generally is noted by Clement:\textsuperscript{124}

I approve of Antisthenes’ statement:

'I would shoot down Aphrodite (i.e. sexual gratification) with arrows if I caught her, because she 
has utterly destroyed many of our noble women.'

And he says that sexual desire is a flaw of nature, being overwhelmed by which the base-spirited 
(κακοδαίµονες) call the disease a god (i.e. Eros). For he (Antisthenes) shows that the less 
educated are overwhelmed by these things through ignorance of pleasure, which one must not 
strive after, even if it is called a god – that is to say even if it happens to be granted by God for the 
necessity of procreation of children.

\textbf{E \ Justice and Excellence, following Socrates}

As discussed in chapter 1.iii and 2.i, Antisthenes was the closest companion of Socrates and, 
not surprisingly, was considered a Socratic philosopher by the better informed ancient 
authors. In one revealing comment, Cicero almost implies that he thinks Antisthenes' 
thought is synonymous with that of Socrates.\textsuperscript{125}

An malumus Epicurum imitari? qui multa praeclare saepe dicit; quam enim sibi constanter 
conveniunterque dicat, non laborat. laudat tenuem victum. philosophi id quidem, sed si Socrates 
aut Antisthenes diceret, non is qui finem bonorum voluptatem esse dixerit.

Or do we prefer to imitate Epicurus? Who, while he is often splendid with many of the things he 
says, does not in fact trouble himself to speak as consistently and coherently as possible. He 
praises the sparing way of life. That is a philosophical thing to say, but only if a Socrates or 
Antisthenes says it, not someone who has stated that pleasure is the ultimate good (i.e. Epicurus).

Clearly Cicero saw a great deal of compatibility between Antisthenes’ and Socrates' 
philosophical outlooks to pair them in this way. It is thus worth examining Socrates’ 
personal philosophical principals to see how they resonate with Antisthenes’.

Plato’s \textit{Apology} is generally considered to be one of his early works, and one which perhaps 
gives a more straight forward depiction of Socrates, and what he actually said, than some 
later works wherein Plato’s own ideas and opinions seem to dominate. In the \textit{Apology} 
Socrates makes very clear what values are most important to him. The first of these is 
justice. xxx Socrates makes a significant number of references to justice, judges, and

\textsuperscript{123} Stob. 3.29.65 = DC 113, SSR 126.
\textsuperscript{125} Tusc. 5.9.26 = SSR 121
judging. He speaks of the importance of being 'just' (δίκαιος), both in regard to himself and others (including the judges) eight times (17c, 18a, 28b, 32c, e, 35c, 41a, 42a). Among numerous other uses of words for judges and judging, he discusses the excellence (ἀρετή) of a judge (δικαστής), i.e. 'to tell the truth' (18a), and the obligation for a judge to carry out his duties in accordance with the laws and not with favours (35c). He also recounts his personal record of refusing to do anything unjust, either when urged to by the crowd at the time of the assembly condemning the generals from the Battle of Arginusae (32c), or when ordered to by the tyrants when they wanted him to arrest Leon of Salamis (32d).

Implicated with justice, but even more important to Socrates, was excellence – ἀρετή. In the Apology he describes himself as talking about excellence every day (38a). At three different points Socrates urges his fellow citizens to strive for excellence before any other things (29e, 30b, 31b). At the end of the Apology Socrates tells the assembly that after he dies he wants them also to urge his own sons to strive for excellence above all else (41e). For Socrates excellence was the principal concern.

Like Socrates, Antisthenes believed that justice was of critical value. Accordingly it was a favoured topic among the works listed in DL’s catalogue; there we find a Protreptic Dialogue on Justice and Courage in three books,126 a Concerning Law or Concerning Nobility and Justice,127 and a Concerning Injustice and Impiety.128 Antisthenes urged people to 'esteem a just man (ὁ δίκαιος) more than a family member'129 and to 'make allies those who are strong spirited and at the same time just (δίκαιοι)'.130 He also said: 'those who desire to be immortal must live piously and justly (δικαίως)'.131 Antisthenes' most complete statement about justice is recorded by Xenophon in his Symposium:132

‘Then,’ he (Callias) said, ‘I will tell you what I most take pride in. I think I am capable of making men better.’

126 Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος.
127 Περὶ νόμου ἢ περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου.
128 Περὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀσεβείας.
129 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 74, SSR 134.
130 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 79, SSR 134.
131 DL 6.5 = DC 75, SSR 176.
132 Smp. 3.4 = SSR 78.
And Antisthenes said 'by teaching them some handicraft, or teaching them nobility (καλοκάγαθία)?' 'If nobility is justice (δικαιοσύνη).' 'Yes it is by Zeus,' said Antisthenes, 'absolutely indisputably. Since there are times when bravery and cleverness seem to be harmful both to friends and to the city, but justice (δικαιοσύνη) does not mingle with injustice in any instance whatsoever.'

In similar fashion to Socrates, Antisthenes also had a special concern with excellence, as revealed by his statement that 'excellence is sufficient in itself for happiness (εὐδαιµονία), since it requires nothing except the strength of a Socrates.' He further stated: 'excellence is a weapon (ὅπλον) that cannot be taken away,' and 'neither a symposion without concord nor wealth without excellence are pleasing.' He also made this very interesting assertion: 'excellence is the same for a man and a woman.' This statement recalls Socrates' observation in Xenophon's *Symposion* (2.9) that a woman's nature (φύσις) was in no way inferior to that of a man – it lacked only resolve and physical strength (γνώµη καὶ ἰσχύς).

In the discussion above (section A), it was noted that Antisthenes said 'excellence is brief in speech' (βραχύλογος). Interestingly, Plato's Socrates had a very similar opinion about length of speech. Socrates knew Protagoras was equally capable of lengthy discourse or great concision and urged him to employ brevity of speech (βραχυλογία) in their conversation (*Prt*. 335a). In very similar fashion, he called upon Gorgias to display his skill at βραχυλογία and save his μακρολογία for some other time (*Grg*. 449c). Socrates also spoke highly approvingly of βραχυλογία as being a trait typical of even the most ordinary of Spartans (*Prt*. 342d-e). In a related vein, revealing the aristocratic bent of his interpretation of excellence and reinforcing his disregard for oratory, Antisthenes stated that 'excellence is a matter of deeds, and it does not require excessive amounts of words or learning.'

133 DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134.
134 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 71, SSR 134.
135 Stob. 3.1.28 = DC 93, SSR 125.
136 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 72, SSR 134.
137 *Gnom. Vat.* 743 n.12 = DC 86, SSR 104.
138 DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134.
There are a couple of fragments that show that Antisthenes' viewed 'the wise man' (section C above) as having a natural tendency and instinct for acting with excellence. He stated: 'if a wise man does something, he executes it with all his excellence (i.e. to the best of his ability)' (TH6). Contrasting with his condemnation of base men being involved in politics, he also said: 'the wise man (σοφός) will engage in public life (πολιτεύσεσθαι), not according to the established laws, but rather according to the law of excellence.'

Aristotle discusses at some length men of outstanding virtue and the difficulty, or even the injustice, of trying to legislate to control them.

But if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding excellence, or more than one but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the excellence of all other men and their political ability is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in excellence and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men. Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily be concerned with persons who are equal in birth and in ability, but there can be no law dealing with such men as those described, for they are themselves a law; indeed a man would be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for probably they would say what in the story of Antisthenes the lions said when the hares made speeches in the assembly and demanded that all should have equality.

Aristotle does not elaborate on what the Antisthenes' lions said. This observation of Antisthenes must have been so well known from his writing that it did not need repeating. Nonetheless, the context in which Aristotle presents the story in this passage makes it clear that Antisthenes held men who were pre-eminent in excellence in the same sort of esteem as Aristotle himself.

Clearly Antisthenes was not the only follower of Socrates to focus on justice and excellence. Aeschines was said by Lysias to have made many lofty (σεµνοί) speeches about justice and excellence.

139 DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134.
140 Pol. 1284a5-17 = DC 100, SSR 68.
141 Generally following Rackham’s Loeb translation.
142 Coraës and Halm provided exempli gratia a speculative reconstruction in Greek (aes. fab. 241, viz. trans. ‘your words are good O hares, but lack claws and teeth such as we have’), which has misled a long list of scholars into believing that it was an authentic fable – van Dijk catalogues them (1997, 322 n. 61) and includes Rankin 1986, 140; Decleva Caizzi could also be added to the list (see her note on DC 100).
143 Lys. fr. 1 Carey = Ath. 612b.
**F Antisthenes’ works focused on Justice and Excellence**

The following dialogues (discussed in detail in the commentary) reveal further the form of Antisthenes' philosophy of excellence and justice.

**Heracles in dialogues with Prometheus and Chiron (MD1-6)**

This group of fragments are all drawn from dialogues concerned with excellence, and that featured Heracles – either as a named interlocutor, or in the title of the work.

**MD1a-c** are three translations of a fragment wherein Prometheus is recommending to Heracles a philosophy by which he should live his life. The fragment is found in a work by Themistius, the original title of which must have been περὶ ἀρετῆς, 'Concerning Excellence'.144 The text immediately prior to this fragment is a passage specifically discussing excellence, and then this passage of Antisthenes is adduced as evidence to support the argument.

Fragments **MD3-5** are from a dialogue entitled *Heracles* and contain some of Antisthenes’ assertions about excellence. **MD4** and **MD5** both contain Antisthenes’ comment that ‘excellence is teachable (διδακτή).’ **MD5** also contains the additional statement that 'nobly-born men (εὐγενεῖς) and excellent men (ἐνάρετοί) are one and the same'. Making clear the programmatic importance of excellence in Antisthenes' philosophy, in **MD3** he asserts: 'the goal of life is to live in accordance with excellence.'

**MD6a-d** are four versions of a fragment featuring Chiron and Heracles conversing. In **MD6b** we learn that 'they were speaking about excellence, and what is more about the tendance of excellence.'

In **MD6a-c** the justice of Chiron is mentioned, **MD6a-b** stating that in justice he surpassed all men. It is possible that Antisthenes’ fragment, mentioned above (in section E), 'Those who desire to be immortal, must live piously and justly', was originally part of this dialogue, and another pronouncement from Chiron to Heracles.

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144 The surviving version is in Syriac and Alberto Rigolio – translator of a forthcoming edition in English – has informed me by correspondence that the direct translation of the Syriac is 'excellence'.

57
Odysseus

TH13b contains a fascinating commentary from Antisthenes regarding the way in which excellence relates to the attainment of immortality. This starts with the overarching statement that immortality would come 'from deeds of the kind that normally confer immortality. Such things should come from excellence' (9-10). This is entirely consistent with Antisthenes' statement, noted above, that 'excellence is a matter of deeds.' Conversely, by carrying out deeds that were not excellent – such as accepting Calypso's offer and abandoning his family and his home-coming – Odysseus would have 'lost his excellence' (11-12) and also 'lost both the immortality of his soul and his path up to the gods' (12-13).

The Suitors

Antisthenes gives very interesting treatment to Penelope's suitors, showing clearly that in his view they belonged to that class of men who possessed a natural and disproportionately large share of excellence, viz. high-born men.

In one passage, TH13c (10-12), Antisthenes presents a quote from the Odyssey, which he notes the suitors 'often stated'. There the suitors claim that they could have fittingly wed other women, but sought Penelope instead 'for the sake of her excellence' (Od. 2.206-7).

In another passage, from TH14n, Antisthenes discusses the fact that the suitors would not have referred to themselves as the hyperphialoi unless it were a positive attribute, 'since they would not have spoken ill of themselves' (32). In the same passage he concludes that the term hyperphialoi is used of men who are 'surpassing in terms of excellence' (οἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες, 30-1). Apollonius Sophistes, from whose Lexicon Homericum the text of TH14n is extracted, endorses the positive view the Suitors held of themselves, both by presenting this fragment of Antisthenes, and by starting his entry for Hyperphialoi with the simple definition 'excelling' (ὑπερήφανοι).

At no stage does Antisthenes query the Suitors' excellence. This is consistent with his general view of aristocratic blood being tied to excellence. In his Heracles, as discussed
above, he clearly stated that ‘nobly-born men and excellent men are one and the same’ (MD5). The Suitors are examples of men who link all these qualities – they are hyperphialoi and have excellence and noble-birth. All are largely equivalent in Antisthenes’ thinking.

The Cyclopes

Fragments TH14a-n contain Antisthenes’ discussions about the Cyclopes, including especially the fact that they were referred to as hyperphialoi. According to Antisthenes the Cyclopes were also noble: ‘they did not have need of themis (right) or nomos (law) to discover the noble (καλός) way of doing things – since they were noble (ἀγαθοί)’ (TH14l 3-5). Recall that Antisthenes also said 'the wise man will engage in public life, not according to the established laws, but rather according to the law of excellence.'145 The Cyclopes are explicitly stated to be hyperphialoi and possess nobility, and this implies that – like the Suitors – they also possessed inherent excellence.

In TH14e and TH14f Antisthenes discusses the great justice (δικαιοσύνην) of the Cyclopes.

Ajax & Odysseus

Antisthenes’ Ajax in his Ajax & Odysseus (text Appendix A) embodies the philosophies that were important to Antisthenes. Ajax speaks consistently about justice. He mentions the unlikelihood of receiving justice (δίκη) from his judges (1.5), and also threatens the ‘justice’ those judges will receive from him if they deliver an incorrect verdict (8.6). He uses the word for ‘judge’ (δικαστής) twice (1.5, 7.2), and the verb ‘to judge’ (δικάζειν) seven times (1.1, 1.5, 4.3, 7.6, 8.4, 8.6 x2). In addition, he twice uses another word for ‘judge’ (κριτής) (7.1, 8.7), and the related verb ‘to judge’ (κρίνειν) a further four times (4.3, 4.6, 7.3, 7.4).

What concerns Ajax more than anything else, however, and what he harangues his jury about three times, is the importance of properly conducting ‘the discrimination of excellence’ (περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν, 4.2, 4.5, 7.2). Ajax also continually makes a strong case for the priority of deeds and actions in comparison to words or arguments (1.4, 7, 7.3, 4, 7, 8.2).

145 DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134.
The speech that Ajax offers therefore portrays him as possessing an ethical position that resonates in a direct and significant manner with Antisthenes himself.

Considering this point, and the significant correlation that existed between the stated philosophies of Antisthenes and Socrates, it is fascinating to find that in Plato’s *Apology* Socrates compares himself to Ajax. Socrates, when musing about the afterlife and anticipating meeting former heroes who have died, says: 'I personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgement, and compared my life with theirs' (41ab).

**G Conclusion**

Antisthenes clearly believed that it was preferable to pursue excellence above all other considerations – with justice being a secondary, but also critical ethical value. His view of excellence is entirely consistent with the traditional aristocratic outlook that holds that a small minority of the population possess an innate and inherently large share of excellence.
2.iii  Antisthenes and Protagoras

Protagoras’ relativism was a key late fifth century event. His famous dictum that ‘man is the measure of all things’\textsuperscript{146} meant in essence that each person’s truth, viz. the way they perceive the world, is valid for them. The idea that truth is relative to each man, who has his own truth that is real for him, was an ideological grounding for a brand of individualism that had not previously existed. Protagoras was the leading intellectual exponent of this idea, however, his contribution was part of a wider discourse. Herodotus, for example, states that each nation believes their own customs to be by far the best, and in support reports Pindar's maxim ‘\textit{nomos} is king’ (3.38).

Protagoras was an older contemporary of Antisthenes. In some areas he was an antecedent to Antisthenes, who engaged with his discourse. Some of his ideas Antisthenes set himself against, but some basic premises he adopted.

\begin{itemize}
\item[A]  Epistemological relativism versus ethical absolutism
\end{itemize}

Protagoras’ statement ‘man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they exist, and the things that are not, that they do not exist’,\textsuperscript{147} was elaborated by other ancient authors. Sextus says that effectively this means that ‘man is the standard of judgement (κριτήριον) of all things’ (DK 80 A 14). In Plato’s \textit{Theatetus} Socrates provides a defence on behalf of Protagoras of this theory, and though it probably includes some distortions – being written much later and presented by Plato as part of his agenda – it effectively serves as an explication of Protagoras’ position. Following are the most pertinent highlights – Socrates is speaking as if he were Protagoras.

166c If you are able, refute that perceptions are not personal to each of us, or, if they are personal, refute that what appears would not ‘become’ – or if one must specify ‘existence’, would not ‘exist’ – for that man alone to whom it appears.

166d For I assert that the truth is as I have written: each of us is the measure of what is and of what is not, yet one man differs vastly from another in just this: that some things both exist and appear to one man, but other things to another man.

\begin{itemize}
\item[146] DK 80 B 1.
\item[147] DK 80 B 1.
\end{itemize}
166e Remember what we were saying earlier, that to the sick man the food he eats appears and is bitter, but to the healthy man the opposite appears and is the case.

167b Thus also in education a change must be made from another state into a better one. But the physician creates the change by means of drugs, while the professor (σοφιστής) does it by means of words. And at any rate no one has ever made anyone who previously thought false think true. Since it is not possible to think things that do not exist, or to think any things other than those which one is experiencing; and these things are always true. But I believe that when a man whose soul is in a poor state (πονηρά), and thinking thoughts akin to that condition, is made good (χρηστή), he then thinks other thoughts to that state; which appearance some men, by their lack of experience, call 'true', but which I call 'better' than the others, but not at all 'truer'.

167c Whatever seems just and noble to each city, is just and noble for that city, as long as it considers it to be so.

It is likely that Protagoras' controversial observation about the gods – viz. that he had no way of knowing about their existence or nature – was also primarily epistemological (DK 80 B 4). According to Protagoras, every person's knowledge and reality is built up of what they experience first hand. Because Protagoras had no way of personally experiencing the gods he had no way of knowing anything about them. He does not deny their existence, he simply does not know.

Antisthenes accepts the notion that people think and perceive differently and he explores these tropoi in his writing by portraying characters employing idiosyncratic speech. His Ajax & Odysseus is the fullest extant example of this. Set in an Athenian courtroom-style setting, before a 'jury' of common soldiery, Ajax and Odysseus each make a speech as to why they deserve to receive the Arms of Achilles. Throughout his speech Ajax is characterised as a terse, indignant, and intransigent aristocrat. He feels insulted at even being obliged to plead his case before a jury of base men and he refuses to adjust his style of speaking in any way. He accuses Odysseus of being a shameless character who is prepared to do or say anything to get what he wants. Ajax concedes that Odysseus will probably be persuasive in convincing the jury. Odysseus on the other hand speaks for twice as long, builds rapport with his judges, and argues persuasively. He argues so persuasively in fact

149 For a full discussion of Antisthenes' contrasting characterisations of Ajax and Odysseus see Kennedy 2011, pp. 38-45.
that most modern commentators see Odysseus as the 'winner' of the debate and also, therefore, as a kind of champion of Antisthenes' supposed 'proto-Cynic' outlook.150

In reality Ajax is the consistent and 'true' participant in the debate from Antisthenes' perspective.151 Although he knows that Odysseus' character is different, and creates a portrait of him that brilliantly portrays ethopoiia, Antisthenes' judgement of him is that he is 'wrong' or 'false'. Antisthenes knows that characters are different, but he is against the relativist view. He takes an absolutist ethical stance, and so in his eyes 'what is shameful is shameful' (TH1) however people 'relatively' think.

Plato was also concerned to show a range of idiosyncratic characters and elements and then to engage them with his philosophy. Plato specifically rejects Protagoras' dictum regarding relativism in the Laws where the Athenian Stranger declares that god (θεός) will be the 'measure of all things' rather than any 'man' (716c). Plato in fact had a conservative, absolutist stance on moral and ethical issues that was more or less equivalent to Antisthenes'. In the Cratylus Socrates asks Hermogenes if Protagoras' dictum is true: 'that man is the measure of all things – that as things seem to me, so they actually are for me, and as they seem to you, so they are for you', or if rather 'things have some steadfastness of reality (βεβαιότητα τῆς οὐσίας) of their own' (385e-386a = DK 80 A 13). Hermogenes completely rejects Protagoras' doctrine and in the subsequent conversation asserts that certain men are inherently 'very bad' (πάνυ πονηροί), and some very few others 'very good' (πάνυ χρηστοί, 386b). Socrates concludes that things actually do have a steadfast reality of their own that does not vary (386d-e). These views are completely concordant with Antisthenes' own views and Antisthenes was probably Plato's antecedent in this area. 'Correcting' Euripides, Antisthenes wrote (TH1):

\[
\text{αἰσχρὸν τὸ γ᾽ αἰσχρὸν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν µὴ δοκῇ.}
\]

What is shameful is shameful, whether one thinks so or no.

It is not surprising to find Plato's Socrates expressing a very similar view (Euthd. 301b):

151 For the similarities in outlook between Antisthenes himself and his Ajax see the discussion in chapter 2.ii above under 'Ajax & Odysseus'.
B Two opposing arguments on every issue / contradiction is impossible

Protagoras stated that 'on every matter there are two arguments opposed to each other' (DK 80 B 6a), and he is also named by Aristotle as the originator of the practice of 'making the weaker argument stronger' (DK 80 B 6b). Antisthenes on the other hand believed that each thing had its own proper account, the only account by which it could properly be described. Any deviation from that proper account would no longer be speaking about that thing itself. Therefore he contended that contradiction is impossible, and speaking falsehood nearly so – since to speak a false account would in effect be to speak about nothing at all. Antisthenes advised that: 'One must stop a person who is contradicting, not by contradicting him, but by teaching him. For one would not attempt to cure a madman by being mad in return.'

Diogenes Laertius claimed that the argument of Antisthenes, that contradiction is impossible, was actually first used by Protagoras 'as Plato says in Euthydemus'. Plato did not actually say that, however. What he actually said (via Socrates) was: regarding the argument that contradiction is impossible, 'Protagoras and his followers (or the followers of Protagoras) made great use of it as did others from an earlier time.' Diels prints both the passage from Diogenes and from Plato as 'A' testimonia, but not as 'B' fragments. The designation οἱ ἀµφὶ Πρωταγόραν, 'Protagoras and his followers', is likely Plato’s roundabout, and probably denigratory, way of referring to Antisthenes, who like Socrates, almost certainly spent a reasonable amount of time in Protagoras' company.

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152 Arist. Metaph. 1024b25-1025a2 = DC 47a, SSR 152; cf. Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 1024b26 Bonitz = DC 47b, SSR 152; Ascl. in Metaph. 1024b25 = SSR 153; Arist. Top. 104b19-21 = DC 47c, SSR 153; Alex. Aphr. in Top. 104b19 = SSR 153; Proclus in Plato’s Cratylus c.37 Pasquali 1908 = DC 49, SSR 155; Isoc. Hel. 1 = SSR 156; DL 3.35 = DC 36, SSR 148.

153 Stob. 2.2.15 = DC 65, SSR 174: οὐκ ἀντιλέγοντα δεῖ τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα παύειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκοντα· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαίνομενον ἀντιμαινόμενον τις ἱᾶται.


155 286c = DK 80 A 19: οἱ ἀµφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἕτει παλαιότεροι.

156 Kerferd 1981, 88-92, makes a case that the 'contradiction is impossible' doctrine is originally Protagoras', and compatible with the two opposing arguments theory; but contra see Farrar 1989, 65-66.
It has been noted that of three of the major literary Socratics – Antisthenes, Plato, and Xenophon – Plato goes to great pains not to mention the other two.\textsuperscript{157} Antisthenes is only named once by Plato, as being present on the day of Socrates’ execution (\textit{Phd}. 59b), but Xenophon is never mentioned at all. Xenophon mentions Plato only once, in passing, as the brother of Glaucon (\textit{Mem}. 2.6.1). When Xenophon lists the young men who associated with Socrates because they wanted to become gentlemen (καλοὶ τε κἀγαθοί γενόµενοι) he does not mention Plato (\textit{Mem}. 1.2.48). Antisthenes seems never to have mentioned Plato directly at all. There are only a few anecdotes including the two of them, and the dialogue \textit{Sathôn}, which possibly featured a lewd alter-ego of Plato in the title role (\textit{CD4-6}). Antisthenes probably had no reason to mention Plato, as he himself was an older associates of Socrates while Plato was a comparatively young man, and not considered by him to be a direct or important disciple of Socrates.

Aristotle names Antisthenes as the originator of the argument that contradiction is impossible, in both the \textit{Metaphysics} and the \textit{Topics}.\textsuperscript{158} He never mentions Protagoras in connection with this argument, and nor does Isocrates, Asclepius, or Alexander of Aphrodisias, who all discuss it. It seems quite certain that Plato knew full well, as did the other ancient writers, that the argument was Antisthenes’, but he chose to refer to Antisthenes by the collective ‘Protagoras and his followers’ to avoid directly acknowledging Antisthenes – his originality in developing the thesis or even his name – and to indirectly slight him by associating him in the minds of well informed readers with Protagoras and hence sophistry.

\textbf{C \ Education}

Antisthenes seems to have shared some of Protagoras’ views about education. Protagoras is reported as claiming that he was able to teach men to be better men (Pl. \textit{Prt}. 318a = DK 80 A 6) and was able to make what is beneficial to men in any particular case actually appear to be the just course (\textit{Tht}. 167d = DK 80 A 21a). He is also reported by Plato to have claimed

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{157} Clay 1994, 26-7.
\item \textsuperscript{158} \textit{Metaph}. 1024b25-1025a2 = DC 47a, SSR 152; \textit{Top}. 104b19-21 = DC 47c, SSR 153.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
that excellence is teachable and to have attempted to prove that was the case (Prot. 320bc). Antisthenes, similarly, stated that 'excellence is teachable' (MD4 & MD5). The Platonic Socrates, by contrast, argues that excellence cannot be taught, and uses Pericles as an example – he was unable to pass on his excellence to his sons and they were left to pick it up if they could, by chance, on their own (Prot. 319e-320a; cf. 320b, 361a-c).

Antisthenes may have engaged with another of Protagoras’ ideas. Protagoras spoke about the crown of fame: ‘Toil and work and instruction and education and wisdom are the crown of fame, which is woven from the flowers of an eloquent tongue and set on the head of those who love it.’\(^{160}\) Antisthenes ‘when asked by someone “What sort of crown is finest?” replied “The one for education.”’\(^{161}\)

They may have also shared ideas about education affecting, or being stored in, the soul. Protagoras stated: ‘Education does not take root in the soul unless one goes deep’ (DK 80 B 11). When an acquaintance was complaining to Antisthenes that he had lost his notes, Antisthenes said: ‘You should have inscribed these things in your soul and not on paper.’\(^{162}\)

\(^{159}\) And see discussion in Farrar 1989, 79-81.
\(^{160}\) DK 80 B 12 – translated from a German translation of the original Syriac.
\(^{161}\) Stob. 2.31.33 = DC 172, SSR 162.
\(^{162}\) DL 6.5 = DC 188, SSR 168.
This chapter will discuss the development of character portraits and the representation of ethopoia in prose, and Antisthenes’ contributions to both.

A Character portraits

Did Antisthenes have a role to play in the development of character portraits of the sort that Theophrastus became famous for with his Characters or Character Types? Diggle provides a reasonably thorough summary of the antecedents of Theophrastus who created character sketches – Homer, Semonides, Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle all receive mention (2004, 5-6). Aristophanes seems a slightly glaring omission from the list.163 Diggle goes on to state: 'Aristotle provides the seed from which Theophrastus’ descriptions grow. He often indicates, in abstract and general terms, the circumstances or behaviour which are associated with each virtue and vice’ (7). It appears that Diggle has overlooked a crucial contribution to this genre made by Antisthenes.

Antisthenes’ fragments MD9-13 deal with flatterers and flattery. MD10 is particularly interesting for the purposes of this discussion. In this fragment, after offering a likeness of rich but uneducated men, Antisthenes provides a brief description of flatterers, starting: 'flatterers, who are the sort of men who (οἵτινες) … ’. This is precisely how Theophrastus starts out every one of his character sketches. They each commence: 'The x-character is the sort of man who … (τοιοῦτός/τοιόσδε τις οἷος)’. The generalising characterisations that Theophrastus then goes on to provide are presented in just the same style as the one Antisthenes provides for flatterers: 'who, if they encounter people after they have consumed all their possessions, pass them by pretending not to know them’. Several of Antisthenes’ other comments about flatterers in this group of fragments may have been part of that same generalising character portrait. A dialogue of Antisthenes’, The Statesman, which contained 'an invective against all the demagogues in Athens' (CD3) may also have consisted in part or in whole of a scathing, generalising characterisation of politicians.

163 See further Ussher 1977, esp. 75-9.
Diogenes Laertius lists a work of Antisthenes' titled Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, *Concerning Diction, or, Concerning Character Types* (6.15) that demonstrates his interest in the ways styles of speech convey character (see further discussion below in section C).

Regarding the development of character sketches, Diggle states: 'Theophrastus locates his characters in a specific time and place. The place is Athens. And it is an Athens whose daily life he recreates for us in dozens of dramatic pictures and incidents. If we look elsewhere for such scenes and such people, we shall not find them (until we come to the *Mimes* of Herodas) except on the comic stage' (2004, 8). From fragment MD10, however, it is pretty clear that Antisthenes was attempting something of very much the same kind as Theophrastus only at least a half a century earlier. But, as is most often the case, Antisthenes' creative and original contribution to yet another genre has been overlooked.

**B Beginnings of ethopoia**

Producing a seemingly natural style of characterisation through use of language was termed 'ethopoia' (ἠθοποιΐα) by ancient critics such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Thucydides is one prose author who lent speakers giving speeches a certain degree of characterisation by the style of delivery; the Spartans, for example, are generally depicted as terse and reticent (Francis 1993). The individual generally credited with developing ethopoia, however, is Lysias.

**Lysias**

Lysias, with a career probably commencing in 403 (Jebb 1893, i.150), developed a naturalistic style of oratory, which retained considerable 'force and power' while employing 'ordinary and regular words' (DH *Lys*. 3) and 'everyday language' (DH *Dem*. 2). He is particularly famed for his ability to dramatise character in his speeches (Jebb 1893, i.156). He supplied customers with speeches for the law courts that when delivered gave the impression of being their own words, while at the same time conveying a consistent

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164 Giannantoni 1990, IV nota 25 pp. 240-1 gives a summary of various scholarly opinions arguing over the possible meaning, and even the authenticity, of the title.
character, even if it was one that differed from their own (Jebb 1893, i.159, 163). Dionysius of Halicarnassus was familiar with around 200 speeches of Lysias’ (Lys. 17) and was 'quite incapable of finding one individual' who is 'lacking ethopoiia or lifeless' (ἀνηθοποίητον οὔτε ἄψυχον, Lys. 8).

Dionysius attributes Lysias' ability to portray ethopoiia to his 'excellence' at manifesting 'thought, diction, and composition' (διάνοια, λέξις, σύνθεσις) in his speeches (Lys. 8). In other words, a combination of the thoughts and the choice of words in order to reflect the character of the person who is to be created and conveyed. Dionysius goes on to add that an important adjunct to ethopoiia was 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον), which was Lysias' ability to match an appropriate style to the speaker, the audience, and the subject matter: 'For the characters differ from each other in age, family background, education, occupation, way of life, and in other regards' (Lys. 9).

There have only ever been two modern discussions in English on the use of ethopoiia in literary works, both focussing on Lysias (Devries 1892, Usher 1965). Jebb, in his still excellent work on Attic orators, also devotes three pages to discussing Lysias' development and utilisation of ethopoiia (1893, 173-6). Devries in his Ethopoiia, a study of character types, considers only the works of Lysias, who he feels 'excels all others' (1892, 13). By contrast to Dionysius (above), Usher finds character to be portrayed inconsistently by Lysias – he can find it only in 1, 3, 7, 10, 16, 19, 24, 31 & 32 (1965, 101-16). He concludes: 'Character-portrayal is thus far from being common to all the speeches of Lysias' (119).

Usher also discusses the word ethopoiia itself and states: 'None of the arguments adduced by Jebb, Devries and others in favour of its meaning “individual characterisation” is convincing’. Rather he thinks it can mean no more than 'moral tone' (1965, 99 n. 2). It appears that Usher may have subsequently changed his mind on this point, however, as in a more recent book, when discussing a case of 'ethopoiia', he elaborates by describing it as 'portrayal of the speaker's character' (1999, 310). Carey, though, notices a difference between Dionysius' and modern scholars' use of the term 'ethopoiia’. In line with Usher's

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165 A position with which Todd agrees (2000, 7).
earlier position, that it is not 'individual characterisation', he thinks Dionysius' use of it was limited to 'moral tone', whereas modern scholars mean Lysias' 'extensive use of “dramatic” character' (1989, 10).

Even though there is some uncertainty as to what Dionysius meant by ethopoiia it is clear that Lysias was producing individualising speech bound by ethical and rhetorical constraints. He was trying to demonstrate the way an individual of a specific social position, driven by certain thoughts and values, would speak and act. In as much as ethopoiia specifically for speech writing has been considered, Lysias is credited with conceiving it. In particular he is known for specialising in the development of the appropriate characterisation to appeal to jurors presiding over various sorts of forensic cases.

C Antisthenes and ethopoiia

Antisthenes was undoubtedly interested in character and how it is manifested. A work of his listed by Diogenes Laertius, Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωμονικός, Concerning the Sophists: a Physiognomy, (DL 6.16) is possibly a discussion of the sophists' ideas about physiognomy. Boys-Stones notes that this is the first extant instance of physiognomy receiving a philosophical interpretation in the ancient world (2007, 23).

There is ample evidence to suggest that Antisthenes was also interested in portraying ethopoiia. Another title listed against his name is Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, Concerning Diction, or, Concerning Character Types (DL 6.15), which has already been touched on above under Character portraits. Given Antisthenes' interest in delineating character, here λέξις has been translated 'diction' or 'style of speaking' (LSJ I.2), viz. the choice and use of words in speech, and particularly as those words chosen and used to contribute to the building of differing character portraits. The word χαρακτήρ in the sense used here originally meant 'stamp', or 'impress', such as made on coins and seals (LSJ II.1). This

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166 And not as Tsouna (1998) surmises, a treatise that 'probably attacked the physiognomical diagnoses attempted by the sophists' (181); the preposition περὶ does not normally have an adversarial meaning.

167 Diggle 2004, 4-5, provides a useful summary of the relevant ancient texts and modern scholarship relating to χαρακτήρ.
meaning was extended to mean an indelible, and recognisable, characteristic 'stamped' on certain people (LSJ II.3), thought to be visible, in particular, on those of noble birth (e.g. E. Hec. 379-80). Then it came to mean 'character', but more in the sense of a 'character type' than 'individual nature' (LSJ II.4).

Antisthenes use of the word probably lies, semantically, somewhere between the last two meanings. His interest in physiognomy shows that he thought character was outwardly manifested, and his sympathy for old aristocratic values suggests that he would have believed noble character to be recognisable on those of noble birth. His portrayal of Odysseus in his Ajax & Odysseus, discussed below, demonstrates that he also felt character types other than old aristocrats could be outwardly recognised – by their bearing, their actions, and particularly by their mode of speaking. A fragment of Menander uses χαρακτήρ with the same sense: 'the “character” of a man is recognised from his speech’.

So Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων seems to be concerned with different 'character types' and the way they were demonstrated and/or recognisable by their 'style of speech'. Confirmation of this is suggested by this title's arrangement in Diogenes' catalogue of Antisthenes' works. The very next titles listed after Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων (discussed above) are Αἴας ἢ Αἴαντος λόγος and Ὀδυσσεύς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως (6.15, treated in this thesis as one work, the Ajax & Odysseus). The fact that these speeches are largely an exercise in ethopoiia (discussed below) suggests that they were intended specifically to demonstrate the 'diction' and 'character types' referred to in the Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, and it is therefore likely that they are the demonstrative portion, and possibly the subtitle, of the same work.

Odysseus’ Polytropia

There are a number of other Antisthenes fragments wherein the speakers display ethopoiia, and interestingly Odysseus figures in all of them. Two speakers in fragment TH12 are discussing Homer’s description of Odysseus as polytropos (many mannered), as well as the

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168 ἀνδρὸς χαρακτήρ ἐκ λόγου γνωρίζεται, PCG F 72.
definition of *polytropia* (many modes) more generally. The first speaker condemns Odysseus, pointing out that Homer did not describe Achilles, Ajax, or Nestor as *polytropos*, but instead as 'sincere' (ἀπλόος, 7) or 'wise' (σοφός, 8). The second speaker, however, defends Odysseus and offers a long-winded and convoluted argument as to why *polytropia* is actually a positive attribute. The second speaker is clearly exemplifying *polytropia* by his mode of discourse – he is himself polytropic. This is surely an ironical characterisation of a deceptive polytropic position by a Socrates or his like and intended to display the ethopoia of a person adopting such a position.

In fragments **TH13a-d** Odysseus is characterised by Antisthenes as a clever, smooth-talker prepared to say and do whatever it takes to get what he wants (similar to Antisthenes' depiction of him in the *Ajax & Odysseus*). Odysseus did not trust Calypso's offer of immortality because he suspected her of lying. We are probably meant to infer that Odysseus is clever, and a liar himself, and thus he suspects everyone else of lying too. Also, he does not tell the Phaeacians his true motivations, but rather he tells them what he thinks will expedite his journey home. So by his own behaviour, at every turn, he displays ethopoia. At the end of **TH13d** it is observed that Odysseus' behaviour – i.e. not believing Calypso, but not disclosing that fact to the Phaeacians – 'showed the constitution of his character' (αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἤθους σύστασιν). That is, it revealed his polytropic nature.

*Ajax & Odysseus*169

In an insightful comment regarding the *Ajax & Odysseus*, George Kennedy suggests that 'it is possible that Antisthenes is trying to illustrate something like ethopoia, the manifestation of personality in a speech, a subject which was clearly of contemporary interest' (1963, 172).170 This certainly seems to be the case.

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169 The following comments are largely a summary of a much fuller discussion at Kennedy 2011, 37-46. Contrarily, Eucken, the only other modern author who mentions ethopoia in relation to the *Ajax & Odysseus*, sees the speeches as a philosophical battle evincing Stoic virtues and asserts that the speeches: 'are distinguished not by their "Ethopoia", but rather by their logical character' (Unterschieden sind sie nicht durch Ethopoie, sondern durch ihren logischen Charakter; 1997, 271).
In his speech, Ajax is characterised as an old-style aristocrat who refuses to yield to, or even slightly bend to conform with, the democratic court made up of common men whom he is confronted with. He is awkward and uncomfortable with the entire set-up and is unabashedly haughty and threatening. He continuously addresses his judges as if they are completely beneath him and evidently views his inherent virtues as beyond their lowly comprehension. Ajax also regularly espouses values consistent with his aristocratic rank including the importance of excellence (ἀρετή), the value of a glorious reputation, and the need to avoid shame. And he has an impulsive urge to reject anyone and anything smacking of cowardice. His use of sarcasm and his haughty aristocratic incredulity add further nuance to his character. Ajax's characterisation is not subtle, but rather by a consistently delineated aristocratic outlook it conveys ethopoia in a convincing manner.

By contrast, Odysseus is characterised as a man who offers no objections to being called upon to defend himself in a court composed of men of lower station. He shows himself adept at handling the courtroom situation and one way he does this is by speaking for twice as long as Ajax. Odysseus adopts the pragmatically opportunistic ethics that traditional Athenian aristocrats ascribed to the demos, and so also to the demagogues who courted the demos. He is unconcerned about glory or shame and is focussed purely on what he needs to do to expediently complete any mission he is faced with. He patronisingly rejects Ajax's old fashioned views and approach to battle as stupid and pointless. Once again, Odysseus' ethopoia is displayed by the distinct and consistently portrayed values and attitudes that Antisthenes develops for him.

It seems certain that these neglected pieces of Antisthenes' are demonstration speeches, but intended to show character types or portraits rather than any sort of well-crafted argument. The speeches both fail to deliver a convincing case, and in fact the one ascribed to Ajax must be considered a spectacular failure in terms of 'winning' the argument. Instead they demonstrate a deep interest in understanding and representing the way others think and act, and therefore they are examples of ethopoia. No doubt Lysias developed ethopoia for efficacious speeches in a legal environment. It seems however that Antisthenes was also
thinking about and developing ethology for speeches at the same time or possibly earlier. He certainly seems to have been the first to write counter-productive ethological speeches. One modern critic discussing 'character' in ancient literature commented: 'Strikingly absent from the ancient thought-world is the interest in unique individuality and the subjective viewpoint which figures in modern western thinking about character' (Gill 2012, 317). Yet showing the subjective viewpoints (of character types, if not unique individuals) appears to be precisely the sort of thing that Antisthenes was interested in and attempting to portray.
4 ANTISTHENES AND THE BIRTH OF DIALOGUE

4.i The Development of Socratic Dialogue

The sudden emergence and development of prose dialogue in the late fifth and early fourth centuries was a major literary event. Before that time dialogue had been restricted to poetic compositions – predominantly portrayed in drama and occasionally in epic. The development of prose dialogue and the particular use Antisthenes put it to will be explored here.

A Dialogic versus monologic discourse

Mikhail Bakhtin in *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics* (1984) provides a very useful theoretical explanation as to what dialogic discourse offers over a monologic approach. In essence, a monologic artistic representation does not recognise others' thoughts or ideas (79) and a monologistic philosophical approach excludes the possibility of genuine intellectual interaction (81). Thus, within the confines of any author's monologistic world 'someone else's idea cannot be represented. It is either assimilated, or polemically repudiated, or ceases to be an idea' (84-5).

Bakhtin argues that someone's ideas can only live and develop in a dialogic relationship with other consciousnesses (87-88):

> The idea lives not in one person's isolated individual consciousness – if it remains there only, it degenerates and dies. The idea begins to live, that is, to take shape, to develop, to find and renew its verbal expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when it enters into genuine dialogic relationships with other ideas, with the ideas of others. Human thought becomes genuine thought, that is, an idea, only under conditions of living contact with another and alien thought, a thought embodied in someone else's voice, that is, in someone else's consciousness expressed in discourse. At that point of contact between voice-consciousnesses the idea is born and lives.

Thus an idea is by nature dialogic and only takes shape in a discourse with one or more other voices hearing and answering it from other positions (88).

Bakhtin also thought that the 'Socratic method of dialogically revealing the truth' was naturally suited to being presented as 'a dialogue written down and framed by a story' (109). Underpinning the genre of Socratic dialogue was the notion that truth and human
thinking about truth are dialogic at a fundamental level. Bakhtin sums this up: 'Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction' (110).

This style of 'search for truth' is very evident in Plato's earlier works where dialogic communication was the structure depended upon to find truthful answers. Many of them are aporetic, implying that the dialogues were designed to be continued. Bakhtin notes, however, that in Plato's later work Socrates has been transformed into a 'teacher' who monologistically expounds 'dogmatic worldviews,' and that ultimately the genre of Socratic dialogue 'degenerated completely into a question-and-answer form for training neophytes' (110).

B Definition of Socratic logoi

Lack of ancient definitions for prose forms

Isocrates observes that the 'genres of works composed in prose are not fewer than those composed with metre.' And yet classifying and naming them was a problem, and one that Aristotle comments on regarding Socratic logoi:

*Poetics* 1 1447a28-1447b10

The (mimetic) art which uses either bare language (λόγοι ψιλοί, i.e. prose) or metrical forms (whether combinations of these, or some one class of metres) remains so far unnamed. For we have no common name to give to the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and to Socratic logoi.'

Nor was there adequate nomenclature to apply to the composers of prose works, who might variously be called a λογογράφος, λογοποιός, and even a σοφιστής, for lack of a more convenient term (Ford 2010, 232).

Speaker making an ethical choice

Precisely what Aristotle meant on the two occasions he wrote 'Socratic logoi' (Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι) has been a topic of much conjecture, with some translators wanting to take λόγοι as 'dialogues' or even to emend the text so. The relevant passage mentioning 'Socratic logoi'

171 *Antidosis* 45: τρόποι τῶν λόγων εἰσίν οὐκ ἑλάττουσι ή τῶν μετὰ μέτρου ποιημάτων.
from *Poetics* 1 is quoted above. Following is the text of the other instance from the *Rhetoric*, as well as two other texts from *Poetics* relied upon for this discussion:

*Rhetoric* 3 1417a21-30:

And the (forensic) narrative must express moral character (ἠθική), and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects this. One thing to make clear is the moral choice (προαίρεσις); for character (ἦθος) is as this (moral choice) is; and as the moral choice is, thus is the fulfilment/outcome (τέλος). For this reason mathematical *logoi* have no moral character, because they do not have a moral choice; since they have no 'for the sake of.' But the Socratic *logoi* do have; for they discuss such questions.

*Poetics* 6 1450b8-12

Character (ἦθος) is that which reveals moral choice – that is, when otherwise unclear, what kinds of things a person chooses or rejects – which is why speeches in which there is nothing at all that the speaker chooses or rejects contain no character.

*Poetics* 2 1447b30-1448a5

Since mimetic artists represent people in action, and the latter should be either noble or base (σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι) – for characters almost always align with just these types, as it is through vice and virtue that the characters of all men vary – they can represent people better than the level of ourselves, worse than that, or much the same.

These texts are central to the decisive interpretation and discussion of this topic by Andrew Ford in his 2010 article 'ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ in Aristotle and Fourth-Century Theories of Genre'. Using these texts, Ford has convincingly demonstrated that Aristotle considered the Socratic *logoi* to be mimetic not just because they portrayed people talking but rather because the speakers in these *logoi* choose a particular ethical position (2010, 230). Hence they represent 'moral character in action' because 'character is revealed by the kind of thing preferred', and as the passage from *Poetics* 6 states, 'speeches in which there is nothing at all that the speaker chooses or rejects contain no character' (229). In the passage from the *Rhetoric* Aristotle specifically contrasts Socratic *logoi* with mathematical *logoi*, which lack a moral choice, and therefore also lack character (230). This also explains why Socratic *logoi* include a range of forms other than dialogue – e.g. apologia and memorabilia – because for a *logos* to be Socratic 'the essential was that it show ethical choice through speech in persona' (230).
From this Ford also deduces that Socratic *logoi* are so called 'because Socrates was noted for eliciting such ethical commitments in conversation' and thus calling them 'Socratic' would have differentiated these *logoi* from others of that time such as Aesopic or Sybaritic ones (230). So a Socratic *logos* would not necessarily feature Socrates. The important factor was that the person or persons speaking were portrayed as making an ethical choice or showing an ethical preference.

*Question & answer, ethopoiia and diction, and stylishness*

A valuable mid second-century AD text by Albinus, *Eisagōgē*, or *Introduction*, explains what elements he thought necessary to constitute a philosophical dialogue. The dialogues should contain question-and-answer sequences, speakers displaying appropriate ethopoiia and diction, and they should be stylishly written.  

172 Albinus was specifically introducing Plato's dialogues. His insights, however, apply equally well to any Socratic dialogues, and for the most part (discounting only the question-and-answer element) to any Socratic *logoi*, whether dialogues or not. The texts are useful enough, and short enough, to reproduce in full. In this first passage Albinus seems to be citing someone else's definition, probably that of his teacher, Gaius, whose lectures on Plato this text was likely introducing.  

*Eisagōgē* 1.15-17 Hermann p. 147 = DL 3.48

> τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν ὁ διάλογος; 'ἔστι τοίνυν οὐδὲν ἄλλο τι ἡ λόγος ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως συκκείµενος περί τινος τῶν πολιτικῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων πραγµάτων, µετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης ἠθοποιΐας τῶν παραλαµβανοµένων προσώπων καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν λέξιν παρασκευῆς.‘

What then is a dialogue? 'It is a *logos* composed from question-and-answer on a political and philosophical topic, with the befitting ethopoiia of the individuals taking part, and with befitting arrangement in terms of their diction.'

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172 Ford 2010, emphasises this last point and brought the text of Albinus to my attention.

173 Reis 1999, 131.
In this second passage Albinus breaks up the definition and expands on each section.

_Eisagôgê_ 2.11-18 Hermann p. 148.

Questions and answers are a specific property of a dialogue; whence it is said to be ‘a _logos_ from question-and-answer;’ and the expression ‘on a political and philosophical topic’ is added, because it is necessary for the subject matter to be suitable for a dialogue; and this (suitable subject matter) is political and philosophical. For as the subject matter of _muthoi_ is suitable for tragedy and poetry in general, so is the philosophical suitable for dialogue; that is, the things that pertain to philosophy. And the expression ‘with the befitting ethopoiia of the individuals taking part,’ since as they differ in speech according to their mode of life – some of them being philosophers, and others sophists – one must assign to each their own proper character; to the philosopher, nobility, honesty, and love of truth; but to the sophist, craftiness, shiftiness, and love of reputation; and to the private individual his own proper character. Added to this, he states also: ‘of the arrangement in terms of their diction;’ and rightly so. For as its own proper metre ought to be applied to tragedy and comedy, and the proper style to what is called history, so ought its own proper diction and composition be applied to dialogue – viz. possessing Attic style, cultivation, concision, sufficiency.

Socrates of course is famous, from his portrayal in many works of Plato, for asking questions of his interlocutors – and the earliest extant portrayal of him in this questioning mode is found in Aristophanes (see discussion below). So of the Socratic _logoi_ that were dialogues, question-and-answer was a key component.

Ford has identified ethopoiia as the crucial element that helped set Socratic _logoi_ apart from otherwise similar sophistic ones. Whereas the opposed speeches of the _Dissoi Logoi_ and Antiphon’s _Tetralogies_ were anonymous, Socratic _logoi_ had clearly delineated personae (Ford 2008, 42). As discussed above, they also showed characters in the process of taking ethical positions. This was a key element of the ethopoiia they displayed.
At the end of the second text printed above Albinus states that a dialogue (and we can also read 'Socratic logos') should be Atticising and cultivated – showing concision and sufficiency. This elevated style was clearly an essential element of Socratic logoi. Lysias comments on the lofty (σεµνοί) style of Aeschines’ speeches, and Plato’s work is praised by Aristotle for the same reason (Pol. 1265a11). Cicero commends the style of all the Socratic authors (Off. 1.29.104):

\[ \text{iocandi genus … elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum, quo genere non modum Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt.} \]

A mode of eloquence … [that is] elegant, urbane, fanciful, and witty, a mode that informs not only our Roman Plautus and the Old Comedy of Attica, but which fills the books of the Socratic philosophers.

In summary, Socratic dialogues included question-and-answer, and Socratic logoi more generally portrayed characters with well suited ethopoia and diction, and they were stylishly written.

**Target audience**

Much of poetry, be it epic, tragedy, or comedy, was produced for public consumption. The same was the case for prose forms such as political and legal speeches. For these latter forms the publicly available teachers, the sophists, specialised in training people to compose and deliver persuasive speeches. They also, for themselves, produced public demonstration speeches with which to 'wow' the public, and presumably to drum up business. Gorgias, for example, when part of an embassy from Leontini in 427 (Th. 3.86.3) spoke before the Athenian assembly and is said to have 'astounded' them (κατεπλήξατο, DH Lys. 3; cf. Pl. Hp.Ma. 282b), and by his elaborate use of rhetorical devices he 'amazed' them (ἐξέπληξε, DS 12.53.3f). By contrast 'Socratics stick to producing texts for private reading; they have no interest in addressing the mass public on its terms.' (Ford 2008, 38).

174 Lys. fr. 1 Carey = Ath. 612b.
175 Noted by Ford 2010, 231.
176 As cited by Clay 1994, 41.
C Precursors of Socratic logoi writers

Tragedy

Tragedy was very much the precursor for Socratic logoi in almost every way. The fact that the two genres were competing to occupy the same intellectual and ethical territory, at least in Plato's mind, is made clear by the section in the Republic 10 where he posits an 'ancient battle' between poetry and philosophy (607b). When Aristotle enumerates four kinds of tragedy, 'ethical' (ἠθική) is one of the categories (Po. 1455b32-35). Particularly in later tragedies by Sophocles and Euripides the protagonists are displayed with fitting ethopoiia and diction, and they are regularly put into positions in which they display their ethical colours. One of the only real differences between tragedy and Socratic logoi is that tragedy is in metre. Even the Socratic question-and-answer sequences (not common even to all Socratic logoi) find parallels in certain passages of stichomythia (e.g. S. Ant. 39-48, 548-555). Sophocles' Philoctetes is an excellent example of a tragedy with an ethical theme throughout, as the noble but naïve Neoptolemus starts out under the influence of the devious and dispassionate Odysseus, but escapes his clutches after being moved by compassion for the suffering of the flawed but companionable Philoctetes.177

Sophron

Sophron wrote men's and women's mimes in prose. Though apparently his writing contained certain rhythmical and metrical elements,178 Aristotle did not consider them to be poetry as is clear from a fragment of his lost work On Poets: 'Then should we deny that the so-called 'mimes' of Sophron, even though they are not in metre, are logoi and mimesis?'179

177 Hawkins 1999 offers a stellar discussion of the ethical manoeuvrings within the play, along with references to much relevant bibliography (337-57); for a wide-ranging discussion of ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy in general, see Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (1986, revised 2001).
178 κῶλα, Sch. in Greg. Nanz. p. 120 = PCG T 19)
179 Ath. 11.505c = fr. 72 Rose, PCG T 3.
The *Suda* confirms that Sophron wrote in prose (καταλογάδην) in the Doric dialect, and that his writing was in prose is also the conclusion of Sophron’s most recent editor. Clearly Sophron’s style of characterising individual men and women in a lively and vivid fashion had something in common with the writings of Socratic logoi. Tradition has it that Sophron’s work both pleased Plato and influenced his dialogues. Duris of Samos (third century BC) says that Plato ‘had Sophron’s mimes constantly in his hands.’ From Diogenes Laertius we receive the report that Plato was responsible for bringing the mimes of Sophron from Sicily to Athens and that he even slept with them under his pillow. More importantly though, Diogenes said it was from these works that Plato first portrayed character in Sophron’s style (ἡθοποιήσας πρὸς αὐτόν). In a similar vein Olympiodorus says that Plato very much enjoyed Aristophanes and Sophron, ‘from whom he received aid in the mimesis of individuals in his dialogues.’ In as many words, a papyrus fragment says that it was the ‘dramatic element of his dialogues’ (τὸ δραµατικὸν τῶν διαλόγων) that Plato got from Sophron.

*Herodotus*

Herodotus’ work includes scores of speeches. He also displays familiarity with and willingness to employ certain language and forms of late fifth century argumentation. The section that comes closest to being a Socratic logos is the so-called ‘Constitutional Debate’ (3.80-2). In this set piece Otanes, Megabyzus, and Darius argue for the merits respectively of democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. A certain amount of character is granted to the participants immediately by the fact that they are named, rather than

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180 *Suda* α 893 = PCG T 1.
182 Ath. 11.504b = FGrH 76 F 72, PCG T 5.
183 DL 3.18 = PCG T 6.
185 Pap. Ox. 3219 = PCG T 4; and see the excellent discussion of the papyrus, as well as the other testimonia mentioned above, in Haslam 1972.
186 According to Lang (1984) over 400 speeches of which around 100 are 10 lines or more in length; exhaustively categorised and tabulated at 82-149.
187 Thomas gives a summary of the vocabulary and relevant passages (2000, 266-7).
anonymous, participants and each of them had played a greater or lesser role in the Histories up to that point. The participants offer well-crafted arguments that give plausible versions of the points of view from each position. As the discussion progresses, subsequent speakers pick up and respond to points made by the prior speaker(s). Otanes for democracy and Darius for monarchy speak the longest. Megabyzus on behalf of oligarchy speaks for about half as long. This in itself seems to be displaying an aspect of ethopoia. Democratic orators in particular were accused by traditional elites of speaking far too much, and kings could quite conceivably fall into this category also. Well bred men though, such as Spartans and oligarchs, know when to stop (see further ch. 2.ii section A). The preference for one form of government over another also implies making an ethical choice. Thus, many of the elements of Socratic logoi are present. The style of debate is in fact highly reminiscent of Antisthenes' Ajax & Odysseus in which Odysseus speaks after Ajax, speaks for twice as long, and responds to points that Ajax has made.

Thucydides

Thucydides produces speeches of various kind throughout his history, including Pericles’ famous 'Funeral Oration' in book 2, and a number of paired speeches in debates between ambassadors of different nations and, in the case of the 'Mytilenian Debate' of book 3, between Athenian politicians. These speeches have most of the elements required of Socratic logoi. They are stylistic, show appropriate diction, and, as Macleod has observed, 'the speakers have a character, at least in so far as they impinge on events,' adding that Thucydides 'makes manifest Athenian imperialism through the mouths of Pericles, Cleon, Alcibiades and the rest' (1974, 386).

Thucydides’ so-called 'Melian Dialogue' in book 5 goes a step further by including the question-and-answer element found in Socratic dialogues. The Athenians specifically instruct the Melians that they are not to make one speech delivered all at once, but instead they should interject at any point the Athenians make a statement that seems unsatisfactory

188 Darius and Otanes especially, Megabyzus had received one prior mention as a trusted companion of Darius (3.70).
(5.85; cf. Macleod 1974, 387). This assimilation of the cut and thrust of dialogue is highly reminiscent of the style of dialectic employed by Plato’s Socrates and this style of questioning seems to have been one of Antisthenes’ defining traits (discussed in ch. 1.iii section I). The Athenians’ insistence on leaving aside long speeches in favour of short question-and-answer style dialogue particularly recalls Socrates’ insistence that Gorgias and Protagoras accept similar conditions in his discussions with them (Pl. Grg. 449c, Prt. 335a). In the situation with the Melians, this style of discourse gives the Athenians the controlling position in the discussion, just as it gave Socrates control in his conversations with the sophists. The Athenians set the agenda over the course of the dialogue, raising points of their choosing and then refuting the Melians’ objections one after another. The discussion even takes place in private, like a Socratic dialogue, rather than before a larger audience such as was the case with political or legal oratory delivered at assemblies of citizens. In an interesting and persuasive article Boyarin makes a case that Thucydides is specifically attempting to show that ‘Socratic’ style dialogue (contrary to the nature of true dialogic communication described by Bakhtin) is suited to elite, and even tyrannical, expressions of power. This is the opposite of oratory, which is the style of discourse associated with democratic debate.\(^{189}\) Thucydides after all inserts only one dialogue into his work, the result of which is horrific destruction for the Melians. In the ‘Mytilenian Debate’ on the other hand, long rhetorical antithetical speeches are employed by Cleon and Diodotos, the outcome of which is that the demos arrive at a just decision and the Mytilenians are reprieved from destruction.\(^{190}\)

This reading obviously assumes a tacit, albeit not uncritical, level of support from Thucydides for democratic Athens. So while clearly not a card-carrying democrat himself, Thucydides openly admired democratic leaders such as Pericles, as well as certain aspects of the élan displayed by the demos in the face of various challenges and disasters. If this reading is accepted then the ‘Melian Dialogue’ shows Thucydides reacting against and

\(^{189}\) Boyarin 2012, esp. 66-71; for further discussion of rhetoric as a democratic form of discourse see Farrar’s chapter on Protagoras (1989, 44-98).

\(^{190}\) Boyarin 2012, esp. 72-79.
condemning dialectical dialogue of a sophistic type that is only speciously aimed at exploring and assessing another's ideas. The type of dialogue in fact which the Platonic Socrates is often displayed employing. This then suggests the possibility that there may have been examples of such dialogue in writing. Thucydides himself says that he went into exile from Athens in 424 for 20 years (5.26.5). So he may have witnessed such Socratic dialogical exchanges beforehand in person. But perhaps early Socratic writings of the question-and-answer type had already begun circulating in the period 424-404.

Aristophanes

Aristophanes is included here, not only because he depicts people speaking colloquially and with recognisable character, but because he characterises Socrates and includes passages of question-and-answer dialogue in Clouds, one of them featuring Socrates himself. The followers of Socrates are mocked in the Birds as Spartan-imitating, long-haired, and 'Socratising' (σωκρατεῖν, 1280-4). A clue to what exactly 'Socratising' might be is given in another reference to Socrates in Frogs where the chorus say how pleasant it is not to be seated beside 'babbling' (λαλεῖν) Socrates (1491-2) adding: 'To hang around killing time in pretentious conversation and hairsplitting twaddle is the mark of a man who's lost his mind' (1496-9).

In Clouds the chorus leader calls on Socrates, before taking on Strespiades as a student, to 'agitate his mind and test his intelligence' (476-7), following which Socrates precedes to ask him questions (478-88):

Soc. Now then, describe for me your own characteristics; when I know what they are, on that basis I can apply to you the latest plans of attack.

Strep. How's that? Are you thinking of besieging me? Good heavens!

Soc. No, I just want to ask you a few questions (βραχέα σου πυθέσθαι). For instance, do you have a good memory?

Strep. Yes and no, by Zeus: if I’m owed something, it’s good, but if I’m the hapless debtor, it’s bad.

191 The three Aristophanic references here are noted in Clay’s excellent discussion 1994, esp. 37-9.
192 Henderson’s Loeb translation for this and the following passage of Aristophanes.
Soc. Well, is there eloquence in your nature?

Strep. Eloquence, no; fraudulence, yes.

Soc. Then how will you manage to learn?

Strep. Don't worry, I'll do fine.

So in this passage we have Socrates characterised and testing a potential student. Clay comments that the style of questioning corresponds with representations of Socrates' 'conversations rendered by the Socratics who wrote later' (1994, 38; my emphasis). It seems more likely, however, that Aristophanes was imitating the style of conversation he encountered in earlier, or at least contemporary, Socratic writing. If Aristophanes had written first, it is unlikely that a Socratic writer would have imitated this style of presenting Socrates that contributed to his condemnation and death. So it makes more sense to understand that Aristophanes was parodying the format for portraying Socrates that was already established. The Clouds was first produced in 423, then partially revised somewhere between 420 and 417, but probably never put on stage again (Dover 1968, 80-98). So sometime between 423 and 417, or earlier, it seems highly likely that at least one Socratic writer was depicting Socrates in dialogue in a manner that allowed Aristophanes to parody him. Antisthenes is the only Socratic we know of who would have been old enough, then in his late 20s or early 30s, to be that writer.

It is also worth noting, that like Thucydides, Aristophanes seems to be reacting against a form of Socratic dialogue that is really Socratic bullying, and only speciously consensual. In Clouds, more so than Socrates himself, it is his students, Strepsiades and his son Pheidippides, who are the most outrageous and out of control when engaging in 'dialogue' in order to outwit opponents. They use aggression and devious word-twisting to get the better of interlocutors. In conversations with his creditors Strepsiades uses a combination of tricky definitions, crafty verbal manoeuvring, and even physical bullying – all of which he learnt from the play’s Socrates – in an attempt to wriggle out of paying his debts (1221-1302). Later his son Pheidippides uses a similar set of strategies to justify giving Strepsiades himself (and potentially his mother) a beating (1321-1475).
It is significant that it is the students who most overtly employ Socrates’ methods for consensual bullying. This depiction of Socrates’ students may even have been intended as an uncomplimentary reference to the harshness of Socrates’ genuine associates and students – such as Alcibiades and Antisthenes. In particular, it has been noted that the *Clouds*’ Pheidippides has much in common with the historical Alcibiades – lisp, penchant for argument, etc. (Vickers 1999, 269-70). As already discussed, Antisthenes had a reputation for acerbity and for being an irresistible cross-examiner (ch. 1.iii, section H and I). Aristophanes would have made this sort of comparison between Socrates’ real life students and those in the *Clouds* with particular cleverness if he was also basing his characterisations on the texts of one of those real life students such as Alcibiades and Antisthenes. It seems that Gomperz may have been on the right track when he commented: ‘The historical Socrates stands, among all the Socratics, the closest to Antisthenes’ (1924, 419). Certainly the Xenophontic Socrates from the *Symposion* and the *Memorabilia* is a far more congenial and good natured individual than the combative version we find in Plato. It therefore seems a possibility that Antisthenes’ bullying style influenced not only Aristophanes’ but also Plato’s portrayal of Socrates.

**D First Socratic dialogue writers**

*Inventors of Socratic Dialogue*

Ancient authors have offered five candidates as the inventor of Socratic dialogues: Alexamenos of Teos (or Styra or Tenos); Epicharmus of Syracuse; Simon the shoemaker; Xenophon; and Zeno of Elea. Following is a summary and assessment of the ancient testimony on each:

1. Alexamenos of Styra or Teos or Tenos. Athenaeus states (505bc) that Plato did not invent the genre of mimetic dialogues but rather that Alexamenos of Teos was the first to do so, as asserted by Nicias of Nicaea (1st c. BC/AD ?, FHG 4.464) and Sotion

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193 ‘Der geschichtliche Sokrates steht, unter allen Sokratikern, dem Antisthenes am nächsten.’
194 The five were gathered from the discussion of Clay 1994, 23-47, who touches on all of them.
(early 2nd c. BC, fr. 14 Wehrli). Athenaeus goes on (505c) to quote the fragment of Aristotle’s *On Poets* (fr. 72 Rose):

οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐµµέτρους τοὺς καλουµένους Σωφρονος µίµους µὴ φῶµεν εἶναι λόγους καὶ µιµήσεις ἢ τοὺς Ἀλεξαµενοῦ τοῦ Τηίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφέντας τῶν Σωρακικῶν διαλόγων;

Then should we deny that the so-called ‘mimes’ of Sophron, even though they are not in metre, are *logoi* and *mimesis*? Or that the works of Alexamenus of Teos, the first written of the Socratic dialogues (are *logoi* and *mimesis*)?

To prove his point, Athenaeus says (505c): ‘Thus the very learned Aristotle expressly declares that Alexamenos wrote dialogues before Plato.’ Athenaeus’ statement, however, that the ‘first’ Socratic dialogues were written by Alexamenos seems to be an inference from this comment of Aristotle that he wrote ‘before Plato’ – so not necessarily first.

Diogenes Laertius gives a variation of the same fragment (3.48): ‘But Aristotle, in the first book of his *On Poets*, says that it was Alexamenos of Styra or Teos (who was first to write dialogues) as says Favorinus in *Memorabilia* (fr. 55 Am).’

The final variation comes from a papyrus find: for Aristotle is not to be believed when he says in his malice against Plato, in book one of *On Poetry* (*vult* ‘On Poets’), that dramatic dialogues (*δραµατικοὶ διαλόγοι*) had been written even before Plato by Alexamenos of Tenos.’ (*POxy*. 3219 fr. 1, trans. Haslam).

Alexamenos, though he is otherwise an enigma, based on Aristotle’s testimony he probably made a contribution to the development of dramatic dialogues. In all the variations of Aristotle’s claim he is given some sort of primacy over Plato, whether it be that he was earlier writing ‘Socratic (i.e. ethical)’ dialogues’, or ‘dramatic

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195 There is (understandably) a great deal of controversy about this fragment and various scholars have wanted to emend πρώτους to πρότερον and διαλόγων to διαλόγους, i.e. to make it read ‘Alexamenos wrote dialogues before the Socratic ones’; another proposed emendation of διαλόγων to λόγων would bring the terminology in line with all of Aristotle’s other mentions of Socratic *logoi* (these controversies are all discussed by Ford, along with bibliography, 2010, 225-6).

196 The style and content of the fragments suggest that they are possibly from a monograph concerning Plato and his dialogues, written sometime between the third century BC and the second century AD (Haslam 1972, 34).

197 By the definition of Socratic *logoi* from section D above.
dialogues’. Athenaeus, however, knows independent testimony from Sotion and Nicias of Nicaea that though Plato wrote ‘mimetic dialogues’ (διαλόγοι μιµητικῶς), he was not the inventor of the genre, which suggests that it is more likely the dramatic and imitative dialogic form that Plato was influenced by (as in the case of Sophron), rather than any ethical element. Apart from these fragments Alexamenos is unknown.

2. Epicharmus of Syracuse (late sixth and early fifth century). Diogenes Laertius reports the evidence cited by Alkimos of Sicily, a fourth century historian, in order to prove that elements of Platonic doctrine and dialogic form were imitated from Epicharmus – this includes discussions of the doctrine concerned as well as passages of dialogue.

The evidence on Epicharmus is scanty, though perhaps he was another Sicilian author who influenced Plato. Diogenes is able to produce a few pages of Alkimos’ evidence to suggest so.

3. Simon the shoemaker. Diogenes Laertius tells us that when Socrates came and conversed in Simon’s workshop Simon used to make notes of all that he could remember. ‘Thus people call his dialogues “leathern” (σκυτικοί),’ says Diogenes, who lists 33 dialogues and adds: 'He was the first, they say, to set down as conversations (?) διαλέχθη the Socratic logoi’ (2.122-3).

Simon the shoemaker is a fascinating case and receives his own chapter from Diogenes who reports the titles of 30 of his works, but otherwise he is scarcely known. In Diogenes’ chapter on Phaedo the Simon is one of two titles stated to be genuine and either Phaedo or Aeschines is supposed to have written a ‘Shoemakers Logoi’ (σκυτικοὶ λογοί, 2.105). Plutarch has a reference to Socrates sitting beside

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198 Judging by Aristotle’s statement that he is a much earlier poet than Chionides and Magnes (Po. 1447a33-4) who were active in Athens in the 480s and 470s.

199 DL 3.9-17 = FGrH 560 F 6, DK 23 B 1-6; Clay 1994, 36 n. 29 provides a round up of the scholarship on Alkimos and Epicharmus; but cf. Dover 2003, 532 who doubts the verity of Alkimos’ testimony particularly because he finds it incredible that Epicharmus would be using such Platonic and Attic expressions as: ‘πάνυ μὲν οὖν, “yes, no doubt”;’ which seem reasonable doubts.
Simon (Mor. 776b). Diogenes also reports that Pericles undertook to support Simon and bade him come to his side, but Simon declined, refusing to sell his 'free speech' (2.123). Simon receives a few other scattered mentions from later or apocryphal sources.\textsuperscript{200} Though several modern philosophers have strenuously denied that Simon was even an actual person,\textsuperscript{201} his historicity seems confirmed by the discovery of a shoemaker’s shop in the Athenian agora with a cup base found just outside inscribed ‘Simon’s’.\textsuperscript{202} All the other circumstantial evidence for Simon’s existence and association with Socrates is gathered and discussed by Sellars.\textsuperscript{203}

Not a single fragment from Simon remains to us. So though the balance of evidence suggests that he was an historical person who had an association with Socrates, whether or not he truly recorded some form of Socratic logoi, or even dialogoi, is unknowable. It seems possible that the story of Simon has been used as a fly-on-the-wall theory to give the air of a first hand account to the writers producing ‘Shoemakers’ logoi,’ and perhaps also to explain the origin of certain ‘knowledge’ regarding Socrates’ life that is not preserved elsewhere. Shoemakers’ shops were good places for lazy chatterers to pass the time. The shoemaker in general was commonly used as the standard example of an Attic craftsman – for example shoemakers are referred to several times by Aristophanes and numerous times by Plato.

4. Xenophon. Diogenes Laertius elsewhere takes Xenophon’s Memorabilia to be the first publication of transcripts of Socrates’ conversations: ‘He was the first to take notes of the things Socrates said and to pass it on to people, under the title of Memorabilia’ (2.48).

The likelihood that Xenophon was the first dialogue writer can probably be discounted. Xenophon was a much younger man than Socratics such as Antisthenes,
and it is generally assumed – in the face of no evidence to the contrary – that he wrote later than authors such as Antisthenes, Aeschines, and Plato. And Xenophon himself frankly admits in his *Apology* that he is not the first on that topic: ‘others have written about this’ (1.1).

5. **Zeno of Elea.** The final candidate offered by Diogenes Laertius: ‘They say that Zeno of Elea was first to write dialogues’ (3.48).

There is no other evidence that Zeno of Elea wrote dialogues and Diogenes may be extrapolating this claim from Zeno’s renowned prowess at argumentation. Elsewhere Diogenes himself reports a statement of Aristotle that ‘Zeno was the inventor of dialectic (διαλεκτικῆς) as Empedocles was of rhetoric’ (9.25 = DK 29 A 1 & A 10). It seems more plausible that he played a role in inventing dialectic than dialogue.

**E Evidence of dialogic structure in Antisthenes’ writing**

The following is a preliminary summary of the evidence that most, if not all, of Antisthenes’ writing was in dialogue. The evidence for them being dialogic is discussed fully in the relevant commentary for each fragment. It is worth noting to begin with that Antisthenes is only ever described as writing ‘dialogues’ and not any other kind of text.\(^{204}\) The ancient testimonia in the ‘Dialogica Varia’ section refer to the following eight works specifically as ‘dialogues’: *Little Cyrus, Lesser Heracles, Alcibiades, Truth, Exhortations, Sathôn, The Statesman, Archelaus*. Another Socratic author, Aeschines, is said by Lysias to have ‘made speeches’ (λέγοντα λόγους, Lys. fr. 1 Carey = Ath. 612b) but the same is not reported about Antisthenes.

The dialogicity of Antisthenes’ oeuvre has generally been lost on most of scholarship. This is probably mainly because of misconceptions regarding his largest extant piece, the *Ajax & Odysseus*. The speeches given by Ajax and Odysseus have mistakenly been understood as separate monologues produced as some sort of rhetorical exercise. In reality they are

\(^{204}\) SD1, SD2, CD1, CD2, CD3, CD4a-c, CD6.
clearly presented in a dialogic relationship with each other: Ajax anticipates and responds to the things he imagines Odysseus will say and do (Aj. 1.3, 3.5, 6.4-5); and Odysseus picks up on and responds to Ajax’s arguments (Od. 3.5-8, 4.5, 5.5, 6.1, 6.4, 11.1-2). It is clearly one work depicting competing ideologies engaged in dialogue with each other – on the one hand Ajax representing traditional aristocratic values, and on the other Odysseus representing demagogues and the *demos*.

That Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues is attested by Panaetius (SD2) and four fragments (SD4, SD6, SD7, and Sy9) preserve direct speech from Socrates. SD4 is a piece of dialogue depicting Socrates discussing Alcibiades’ prize for valour with an unknown stranger. It contains typical dialogic elements such as a vocative ὦ ξένε and imperative εὐφήµει and a conversational particle γε. Fragment SD6 also preserves a passage of direct speech from Socrates, this time apparently in dialogue with Antisthenes. Certainly Antisthenes seems to have featured himself in other dialogues. Fragments ED1-6 all feature Antisthenes speaking in the first person with (or regarding) youths who are apparently his students, potential students, and/or love interests. The final fragment featuring Socrates, Sy9, has him discussing wine cups in what is evidently a sympotic setting.

There is the tantalising possibility that TH1 preserves a line of Antisthenic dialogue featuring Plato. The line is attributed to Antisthenes’ by Plutarch, but another author, Selenos, cites the same line being delivered in *direct speech* by Plato. Thus, just possibly, this is a line given by Antisthenes to Plato in a dialogue, perhaps the unflattering version of Plato from the *Sathōn*, in which Plato’s alter-ego seems to have played the main character (CD4a-c).

Antisthenes also wrote dialogues featuring mythical figures and a passage of direct speech survives with Prometheus addressing Heracles in MD1a-c. Heracles appears again in MD6a-b where he is described as ‘conversing’ (ὁµιλοῦντες/loquentes) with Chiron in Antisthenes’ *Heracles*, which is described in CD6 and CD7 as a dialogue. Heracles himself delivers a line of dialogue in direct speech in MD7, and MD9 has another line from him, this time in reported speech.
It seems most likely that Antisthenes’ discussions of tragedy and Homer were all presented in dialogue format. The discussion about Odysseus’ polytropia in TH12 depicts two speakers putting forward opposing points of view and they use a range of particles and expressions (6 οὐκοῦν, 8 οὐ μὰ Δία, 14 τί οὖν; ἀφα γε, 16 μὴποτε). Some free use of grammatical structure in TH13c (about Calypso and Odysseus) seems to represent someone speaking in a dialogue. The text has μὲν γὰρ (4) followed by a μὲν (5) and a further μὲν γὰρ (6) without an answering δέ. It is as though the speaker interrupts himself mid-explanation, in order to provide additional information needed as context for what he is about to say next, and then continues with his original train of thought. The group of fragments containing discussion of the Homeric Cyclopes (TH14a-o) contain clues that all the material has been extracted from what was originally dialogue. This includes direct questions (TH14b 3-6) rhetorical questions (TH14a 1-2, 2-6, 7-8), a compressed section of dialogue (TH14a 9-13), and a second person imperative σκόπει (TH14j 2-3) apparently directly quoted from a dialogue.
4.ii Antisthenes as Dialogue Writer

A Antisthenes’ chronological relationship to the other Socratics

Antisthenes was around 20-25 years older than Socratics such as Plato, Xenophon, Aeschines, and Aristippus, the first two of whom were certainly born in the late 420s and the latter two almost certainly. Antisthenes was a close friend of Socrates, rather than a young student, and this is how Xenophon represents him, both throughout the Symposium, and in the Memorabilia where we find Socrates respectfully consulting Antisthenes when conversing before younger students (2.5.1-3). Chronology thus supports the idea that Antisthenes was also one of the earliest Socratic writers, or even the very earliest, and there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that ancient authors considered something like this to be the case. When Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions the foremost Socratics he lists them: Critias, Antisthenes, and Xenophon. In this case the order of the names may be an indication of the chronological order in which Dionysius believed that they were writing. Antisthenes and Aeschines each wrote three dialogues with the titles Cyrus, Heracles, and Alcibiades, and Persaeus accused Aeschines of plagiarising his versions from Antisthenes (CD6). Similarly, Theopompus claimed that Plato had plagiarised Antisthenes in several cases (SD1). Charges of plagiarism were never levelled at Antisthenes himself, however, which further suggests that he was known to be writing earlier than the other Socratics.

Plato also hints at there being Socratic writers active prior to Socrates’ death and prior to himself. In the Apology he has Socrates make a prediction: 'There will be more men examining/criticising you (οἱ ἐλέγχοντες), whom up to now I have restrained, though you didn’t realise it. And they will be harsher, in as much as they are younger, and you will be more vexed' (39cd). Rutherford has made the quite reasonable deduction that this 'would seem to imply that the Apology was not the first example of Socratic literature, that indeed Plato himself was not alone or even the first.' (1995, 44).

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205 DH De Thuc. 51.941 = DC 9, SSR 49; Dionysius may exclude Plato because sees him as a category on his own.
B Antisthenes role in the birth of dialogue

The low esteem that Antisthenes is currently held in as a writer of dialogue is made clear by his lack of prominence in three recent collections of essays on ancient dialogue. In the most recent, volume, although Antisthenes' name does not appear in the index, he does at least receive attention from one contributor. Another earlier volume notes Antisthenes once, and a major collection from 2013 includes no discussion of Antisthenes' works, or even a single mention of his name. The following investigation will set out to demonstrate that this neglect is in no way justified.

As has been argued, Antisthenes was almost certainly one of the earliest writers of Socratic logoi, and his works, such as they remain, and reports on his works, display all the qualities ancient critics ascribed to Socratic logoi – viz. question-and-answer, ethopoiia, appropriate diction, and stylish writing.

Antisthenes was known for his predilection for questioning the statements and ethical positions of those in his company. Theopompus states that it is clear 'from his writings' that Antisthenes 'was skilful, especially at leading on absolutely anyone at all to conclusions for his own advantage by means of smooth discourse' (SD3). So in Antisthenes' writings that are now lost there must have existed passages that depicted Antisthenes (and probably Socrates and others) using question-and-answer conversation to manoeuvre around their interlocutors. There is perhaps a tantalising hint of this sort of dialogue preserved in MD1a-c where Prometheus is rebuking Heracles and using ethical argumentation to persuade him to the right course of life.

Ethopoiia was discussed in chapter 3. Clearly, for Antisthenes a major focus of his writing was to give his speakers well defined ethopoiia, including appropriate diction. His writings that survive well enough to permit judgement are highly crafted, ingenious, and regularly witty.

206 Dubel & Gotteland 2015, wherein Irwin (2015a) cites Antisthenes several times.
208 Föllinger & Müller 2013.
209 See especially Xenophon's Symposium and the discussion in ch. 1.iii section I.
Evidently the dialogic form had such central importance for Antisthenes that he thought his
greatest philosophical achievement was the ability to engage in dialogue with himself.
When asked what advantage he had gained from philosophy, he said: 'The power to hold
conversation with myself.' Bakhtin renders this 'the ability to communicate dialogically
with one’s self' (1984, 120). Long argues that Plato was making a similar case in the
*Republic*, that in the absence of interlocutors a philosopher could engage in dialogue within
himself (2008, 54-5). Antisthenes’ emphasis on the value of this internal dialogue seems to
provide important background to the priority fourth century philosophers – especially
Aristotle – gave to rational and syllogistic thought processes.

C Antisthenes’ Socratic logoi

Antisthenes was predominantly, or solely, writing dialogue, as was argued at the end of the
previous chapter. Antisthenes’ Socratic *logoi* displayed an impressive creative range, and
included dialogues featuring Socrates, contemporary figures, mythical figures, as well as
Antisthenes himself. Some dialogues included literary criticism, and some may have been
political in nature and even have incorporated a constitutional debate.

Antisthenes wrote dialogues with Socrates as a speaker as did all the early Socratic authors,
including Aeschines, Plato and Xenophon. One of Antisthenes’ fragments is especially
interesting because it has Socrates speaking to Antisthenes (*SD6*). Theopompus implies
that Antisthenes wrote himself, rather persuasively, into his own dialogues (*SD3*). It seems
quite possible that all of Antisthenes’ Socratic dialogues, *sensu stricto*, featured Antisthenes
himself as an interlocutor with his closest friend and companion. These dialogues were
perhaps set like historical dramas in a naturalistic and realistic setting, professing to recall
many instances of the conversations the two had actually held together, thus lending
authorial authority and credibility to his works. If so, this would be similar to the
representation of Antisthenes by Xenophon in his *Symposion*, where Antisthenes is Socrates’
most frequent interlocutor. Also in the *Memorabilia* Xenophon portrays Antisthenes as
never away from Socrates’ side (3.11.17) and always ready to engage with him as an

210 τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁµιλεῖν; DL 6.6 = DC 177, SSR 100.
interlocutor at a moment's notice (2.5.1-3). Interestingly, Xenophon is the only other one of the 'genuine' Socratic dialogue writers (as estimated by Panaetius, SD2) to have included himself in a dialogue with Socrates (X. Mem. 1.3.8-13). It is most likely that Antisthenes' dialogues were his model for doing so. Cicero reveals that Aristotle also wrote one or more dialogues featuring himself as the primary interlocutor and to whom the other roles were subordinated. Cicero admits that he followed this 'Aristotelian pattern' (Ἀριστοτέλειον morem) in his own dialogues (Epist. ad Att. 13.19.4 = SB 326). Aristotle himself was possibly following an earlier technique of Antisthenes' dialogues.

A number of sympotic fragments (Sy1-10) may all belong to Antisthenes' Socratic dialogues. One (Sy9) has Socrates speaking and most of the others are argued in the commentary to be related. When commenting on the symposion in the era of the Socratic dialogue Bakhtin writes (1984, 120):

Dialogic banquet discourse possessed special privileges (originally of the cultic sort): the right to a certain license, ease and familiarity, to a certain frankness, to eccentricity, ambivalence; that is, the combination in discourse of praise and abuse, of the serious and the comic. The symposion is by nature a purely carnivalistic genre.

Antisthenes' sympotic fragments seem to fall very much into this genre of 'dialogic banquet discourse' defined by Bakhtin. Plato and Xenophon also each wrote a Symposion, however, it appears that the nature of Antisthenes' dialogue was even more light-hearted and playful, with the symposiasts engaging in good-natured banter as well as participating in various games. It also appears that both Plato and Xenophon made reference to, and imitated aspects of Antisthenes' earlier work. Several of the sympotic fragments seem to be part of a cycle of competitive encomia offered by symposiasts to the simple objects surrounding them at the drinking party – including salt, piss-pots, bombulioi, wine, and water. Isocrates, in an ethical, philosophical context, critiques writers who wasted their talents writing on such frivolous topics as salt and bombulioi (see further in commentary). Plato seems to have taken Antisthenes' version of the symposion and 'improved' it by having the symposiasts offer encomia to Eros rather than the petty objects Antisthenes' symposiasts chose to praise.
Eryximachos is probably referring to this dialogue when in recommending competitive encomia to his fellow symposiasts he says (Pl. *Smp*. 177bc):

I happened upon a certain book in which salt was wonderfully praised for its usefulness, and you could see many other such things extolled therein. There has been so much exertion made over such piffling matters, but not one man to this day has undertaken to make a fitting hymn to Eros.

In Xenophon’s *Symposion*, in a similar vein to Plato’s work, Socrates says to his fellow symposiasts that as good as the hired entertainers are, it would be a shame if they did not give some thought to benefiting each other (3.2). He then suggests that they each in turn declare what they think is most worth knowing about (3.3). The symposiasts then proceed to do just that. This whole literary genre of setting out to speak on a given topic, one after another, in a sympotic setting may have started with Antisthenes, before it was ‘improved’ upon by Plato and Xenophon, and continued to be imitated hundreds of years later by Lucian with his *Encomion to the House Fly*.

A further category of Antisthenes’ dialogues seems to have included himself as a speaker – in these he is portrayed addressing, or discussing, various youths (ED1-6). In at least one of the fragments (ED6) the youth is a love interest of Antisthenes’, and in another two (ED3-4) the youths are prospective students who may or may not have also been love interests. Hence, as a group, the fragments are tentatively categorised in this collection as ‘Erotic’.

The persona-type, the erotic philosopher, characterises the Platonic Socrates in many dialogues and one wonders if it is a type Plato borrowed from Antisthenes’ self-portraiture rather than the real Socrates. Xenophon is possibly playing on this image when he has Antisthenes declare how exceedingly in love he is with Socrates (*Smp*. 8.4).

The fragments from mythic dialogues (MD1a-16) are remarkable primarily because they are so original – few writers of philosophical dialogues are known to have attempted the composition of similar dialogues. The closest examples of something similar are Prodicus’ story of ‘The Choice of Heracles’ recounted by Xenophon (*Mem*. 2.1.21-34) and the *Trojan Dialogue* by Hippias of Elis in which Nestor makes a speech to Neoptolemus as to how to gain a good reputation (DK 86 A2). The dialogues by the direct students of Socrates were called ‘Socratic’ by the ancients, not just because they were ethical (cf. ch. 4.i section B), but
because they also generally featured Socrates himself. The surviving content of these mythic fragments is pure Antisthenic ethics. We see Prometheus dispensing advice to Heracles on how best to conduct life (MD1a-c) and related fragments from a dialogue entitled *Heracles* are concerned about excellence (MD3-5). Fragments MD6a-d, also from a dialogue entitled *Heracles* (possibly the same one) have Heracles again 'conversing about excellence', this time with Chiron.

Antisthenes also presented his literary critical discussions via dialogues – the extant fragments deal primarily with Homer (TH4-14), and the remainder with tragedy (TH1-3). From the fragments that remain it is impossible to determine if whole dialogues centred around literary criticism or if that was only one element of broader discussions. The fragments do reveal that Antisthenes had a structured methodology for approaching literary criticism (see ch. 5), and show that this field of discussion was aimed at advancing his ethical programme – as was all of his work. Several elements of these discussions seem likely to have influenced later writers. For example, Antisthenes' mention of the goal of immortality and the kinds of deeds that purify the soul (TH13b) may have provided inspiration for Plato's celebrated discussions of the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo* and book 10 of the *Republic*. In another case, elements of his discussion of the Cyclopes seem to have been picked up on by generations of later writers (TH14a-o) – both Plato and Aristotle drew on the same passages on Cyclopean governance as Antisthenes in their own works. But his most lasting contribution on this topic was the establishment of multiple connections between the Cyclopes and Hesiod's Golden Race. By these arguments Antisthenes was able to demonstrate that there was something pure and uncorrupted in the nature of the Cyclopes that led to them being blessed with a bountiful existence. This view of the Cyclopes' life became proverbial, as demonstrated by the considerable number of subsequent ancient authors who referred to versions of the *Κυκλώπειὸν βίον* 'Cyclopean lifestyle' – meaning to live in a state of natural abundance.

A group of fragments regarding the lifestyles of Alcibiades and Aspasia are sometimes termed 'biographical' fragments, and indeed a recent biographical volume of FGrH (IV.A.1,
1998) includes them as Antisthenes F 5-7. It is interesting to note that Persaeus accuses Aeschines of plagiarising Antisthenes' works, and specifically mentions the *Alcibiades* as one of the examples. In the commentary on *CD18-20* it is noted that an identical passage about Pericles shedding tears at Aspasia's trial for impiety is found both in Antisthenes' fragment *CD18* and in a passage from Aeschines – according to Plutarch (Per. 32.1-3). This suggests not only that Aeschines also imitated Antisthenes' *Aspasia*, but that it was the content as well as the form that was copied – though to what extent exactly is impossible to tell from the fragments that remain of the two authors (*Antisthenes CD18-20*, Aeschines *SSR VI A 59-72*). Similarly, there is not enough information to determine what aspects of the remains of Aeschines' *Alcibiades* (*SSR 41-54*) may have been taken from Antisthenes. For a start it is not obvious that any fragments of Antisthenes' *Alcibiades* are extant, as at least two of the fragments mentioning Alcibiades (*CD9a-b*) are said to come from his *Cyrus*.

Perhaps the most interesting thing emerging from the group of 'Contemporary Dialogue' fragments is the possibility that Antisthenes wrote a sort of 'constitutional' dialogue in which three aspirants for various thrones – Cyrus the Younger,211 Alcibiades, and Archelaus – discuss kingship. Antisthenes is credited with producing dialogues entitled *Cyrus* (*CD6-9a*; cf. DL 6.16, 18), *Alcibiades* (*CD6*), and *Archelaus* (*CD3*). Persaeus pairs two of them in discussion – *Little Cyrus* and *Alcibiades* (*CD6*) – suggesting they were connected. Diogenes Laertius lists the works in his catalogue: *Cyrus, or, Concerning Kingship*, (6.16) and *Alcibiades, Archelaus, or, Concerning Kingship* (6.18), suggesting that they are the discrete surviving portions of a series of related dialogues, or possibly one large dialogue that was later broken up and referred to by the persons featured in the separate parts. Antisthenes' *Ajax & Odysseus* is an example of a work which is clearly one, but has been broken up by editors – ancient and modern – into a separate *Ajax* and *Odysseus*.

There is no evidence that these three potential candidates for thrones ever did meet, however, historically they could have met, and all certainly shared a desire to rule. Cyrus the Younger, in a campaign documented in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, attempted to overthrow

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211 The arguments for identifying Cyrus as Cyrus the Younger, rather than Cyrus the Great are made in the commentary to *CD7* and *CD9a-b*. 

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his brother King Artaxerxes II. Alcibiades would probably have happily been king if he could (see commentary). Archelaus actually became king of Macedonia, probably by murder (Pl. Gorg. 471). If Antisthenes wrote such a dialogue we can speculate that the three aspirants engaged in discussion regarding the nature of kingship and the best way to manage the sovereignty – and possibly the best way to acquire it too. The πόνος attributed to Cyrus in CD7 appears to suggest the ‘hard work’ involved in taking the throne, as Athenaeus seems to show awareness of Antisthenes’ work by describing Cyrus the Younger as φιλόπονον when discussing his march inland against his brother (505a).

There was already a tradition of quasi-historical dialogues on constitutional matters that was started with Herodotus who produced a dialogue with participants debating the merits of democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy (3.80-2). The same author also included a dialogue between Solon and Croesus on eudaimonia (1.29-32). Including characters in a dialogue who could have met, without necessitating direct historical evidence of them actually having done so, seems later to have become an accepted practice in this genre. For example, Praxiphanes (early 3rd c. BC) wrote a dialogue, On History (F 18 Wehrli), in which a number of historical characters speak on behalf of their respective genres – Thucydides for History, Plato Comicus for comedy, Agathon for tragedy, Nikeratos and Choerilus for epic poetry, and Melanippides for lyric and dithyramb. The fragment also mentions Archelaus suggesting that the dialogue took place at his court in Macedon (cf. Csapo & Wilson forthcoming). Perhaps Praxiphanes modelled his dialogue after the style of a known precursor, such as a dialogue by Antisthenes with three aspirants to the throne (including Archelaus) discussing kingship.
As was the case for all of Antisthenes' writing, literary criticism was an avenue for advancing his ethical programme. In his writing on tragedy, from the little evidence we have, it seems that Antisthenes was not slow to correct or 'improve' ethically inappropriate material, as he did with a line of Euripides (TH1).\(^{212}\) His approach to Homer's writing, however, was completely different. Like Socrates,\(^{213}\) Antisthenes held Homer's works in high esteem, and as a result his critical method was aimed at preserving the integrity of the text against readings that might be described as unethical or even illogical. In this pursuit Antisthenes created and deployed a range of interpretative strategies. Saving the text by various methods, as he does, has a lasting impact on approaches to textual interpretation.

A Things as people think they are, as they really are, as they should be

Dio states that Antisthenes was the first to develop the theory that certain inconsistencies in Homer's text can be resolved by the fact that he has 'written some things as people think them to be, and others as they really are' (TH4). Dio thereby credits Antisthenes with the genesis of an important strategy for interpreting Homer in order to preserve his text in its current form, without making it look like he is contradicting himself. Stated another way, Antisthenes is saying that at times when Homer's depiction seems to conflict with people's impressions, it is because the poet is instead representing things as they really are, rather than as people say and think they are. Dio notes that later Zeno more fully explained this theory and set it out step by step.

It seems also that Aristotle may owe a debt to Antisthenes here.\(^{214}\) In book 25 of the Poetics Aristotle discusses these theories that Dio attributed to Antisthenes, and to the two categories listed by Dio he adds a third (1460b8-11):

\[
\text{ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι μιµητὴς ὁ ποιητὴς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἢ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιώς, ἀνάγκη}
\]

\(^{212}\) cf. 5.iii below.

\(^{213}\) Xenophon represents Socrates using Homer as a moral and even practical guide (Mem. 1.2.58, 3.2.1). In one of these cases (1.2.58) he was attacked by his accusers for apparently using Homer to justify tyrannical behaviour.

\(^{214}\) See also discussion by Richardson 1975, 78.
Since the poet, like a painter or any other likeness-maker, is a mimetic artist, he must represent, in any instance, one of three objects: the kind of things that were or are the case; the kind of things that people say and think; the kind of things that should be the case.

So in addition to ‘how people think they are’ and ‘how things really are’, Aristotle has a third category: ‘how things should be’. In this schema, the description of the three approaches said to be employed by the mimetic artist could perhaps be deemed realism, stereotyping, and idealism.

Aristotle elaborates on part of this theory a little further on (Po. 25 1460b 33-4  TrGF 4 T 53b):

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν ἐπιτιµᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς δεῖ, οἶον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸν µὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οὔον εἰσίν, ταύτῃ λυτέον.

In addition, if the criticism is that something is not realistic, perhaps it is as it should be instead, just as Sophocles said he created characters as they should be, but Euripides as they are – by this it must be solved.

Though Aristotle does not credit Antisthenes with this theory, Antisthenes’ work appears to be the initial source of at least some of Aristotle’s ideas here. But even if he never expressed it as such, the fact that Antisthenes also had firmly in mind the third category listed by Aristotle – ‘as things should be’ – is amply demonstrated by his correction of a verse from Euripides (TH1). Antisthenes clearly changes the line so as to move it from the category ‘as people think things are’ to the category ‘as things should be’.

B An Antisthenic methodology for literary criticism

One of the most arresting features of Antisthenes’ fragments, as preserved in several scholia to the Iliad and Odyssey, is the demonstration of a clear methodological approach that he employs for literary criticism when dealing with Homer. This methodology anticipates several of the strategies employed by post-Hellenistic Homeric commentators that are found in the exegetical scholia to manuscripts containing the Homeric epics. In

215 cf. TrGF 4 T 172 which names Philoxenos instead of Euripides.
216 TH8, TH9, TH12, TH13, and TH14.
217 For an full survey of these techniques in the Iliad, a few of which Antisthenes foreshadows, see Richardson 1980.
Antisthenes’ eyes, Homer’s texts simultaneously contain two meanings: the meaning of the words, and the meaning the text has because it is by Homer. Whenever there is an apparent gap between these meanings Antisthenes has an interpretative methodology for explicating the texts.\footnote{Similar to Todorov’s explanation of the two meanings implicit in biblical texts – i.e. the literal meaning of the words, and the meaning it has because it is divinely inspired (1982, 98).} This methodology has three steps and adheres to the following pattern:

1. **Problematise the literal meaning of the text, i.e. identify an inconsistency, generally of an ethical nature, often between different passages.**

   For example, Odysseus is a clever man, so why then did he not accept Calypso’s offer of immortality (TH13)? Polyphemus claims that the Cyclopes do not revere the gods, so why then do the gods give the Cyclopes good things (TH14)?

2. **Locate a σημεῖον (indication) of the solution within the text (or more than one) that can be read to give consistency to the text.**

   This is often an ethical meaning, for example Odysseus prefers Penelope over Calypso because Penelope is prudent (περίφρων, TH13c). Or it could be another factor, such as the character of the person speaking. For example when a statement implies that the Cyclopes are impious, and by extension perhaps Homer too, this is explained by the savage character of the speaker who makes the impious statement, i.e. Polyphemus (TH14c).

3. **Reinforce this reading with other Homeric passages, i.e. ‘clarify Homer by Homer’ (Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν).**

   For example, the way in which Odysseus prefers Penelope because she is prudent is similar to the way in which the suitors prefer her over other women because of her excellence (ἀρετή, TH13c). Or the fact that the Cyclopes are imperious (ὑπερφιάλων) is shown not to be negative, because the suitors use the same term of themselves in a positive sense (TH14c).
This demonstrates a sophisticated method by which Antisthenes was able to produce and confirm a deep reading of the text. Part of his expertise as a critic seems to have resided in his control of long poems that were usually encountered in oral performances. To be able to problematise the text and then locate an indication of the solution by ranging back-and-forth in the poem was already to display a certain sort of sophistication, one not necessarily available to those who simply memorised extracts in grammar school or heard parts of the epics performed at various events. Antisthenes’ methodology culminates in an explanation of Homer by Homer, an approach that was to become widely employed (and lauded) in later centuries, especially by the Patristic exegetes. In particular, the practice of ‘clarifying Homer by Homer’ (Ὅµηρον ἐξ Ὁµήρου σαφηνίζειν) was later the trademark of the approach advocated by Alexandrian scholar, Aristarchus of Samothrace (c.216–144 BC), who believed that the poet was his own best interpreter. What is more, Aristarchus employed arguments used earlier by Antisthenes, showing that the Alexandrian scholar was aware of his predecessor’s critical method and so possibly adopted his style directly.

This is demonstrated in the introduction to the TH14 group of fragments under ’Attribution – TH14n-m’, and the commentary in section Step 2d §4, where Aristarchus is found using material that is securely attributed to Antisthenes. Much of this Homeric material is preserved in scholia derived from Porphyry (AD 234–c.305), who himself said: ‘I, thinking it right to clarify Homer by Homer’ (ἀξιῶν δὲ ἐγώ Ὀµήρον ἐξ Ὁµήρου σαφηνίζειν, HQ 1.56.3-4). Porphyry probably drew heavily on Antisthenes’ work because it already matched the style and form that he preferred to deploy himself.

C Antisthenes on Tragedy

Though the evidence for Antisthenes’ approach to criticising Tragedy is meagre (three relevant fragments, TH1-3), one fragment offers direct evidence that Antisthenes’ treatment of the tragedians differed markedly from his handling of Homer. In TH1, Antisthenes is found correcting, or rather ‘improving’, the text of Euripides’ Aeolus. His criticism is still

219 The study and confirmation of a text’s internal consistency or coherence was a major focus of the early practitioners of philological exegesis (Todorov 1982, 140-1).
220 Lockwood 2003, 159.
221 For a discussion of Porphyry’s stated methods see MacPhail 2011, 3-8.
ethical, however, far from justifying or defending the text as he does with Homer, Antisthenes is apparently intent on adjusting tragic texts when necessary in order to make them ethically acceptable. Another fragment of tragic criticism shows that Antisthenes had also discussed at least one other verse of Euripides, though neither the form nor the context is known (TH3).

A further fragment mentions a collection of writings of Sophocles (Χρείας Σοφοκλέους) that appear to be extracts drawn from Antisthenes’ works (TH2). The tragic canon of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides had obviously emerged by the time the three starred in Aristophanes’ Frogs. Here in the late fifth or early fourth century we find Antisthenes likewise focussing on the work of two poets from the canon, and writing enough about one of them that it could be gathered into a collection. Antisthenes’ methodology appears to impact on Aristotle, as Sophocles and Euripides dominate the examples of tragic practice and style in the Poetics.

D Antisthenes’ medical terminology

It actually seems likely that Antisthenes was trying to create a science of criticism – a τέχνη (system or method) for the analysis of texts. Rather than producing wild allegorical readings, as did some of his precursors and contemporaries (cf. discussion below in section E on Theagenes’ theory that the gods represented the various natural elements), Antisthenes was instead developing a controlled procedure for explicating texts.

Antisthenes’ fondness for medical analogies is evident in a number of his fragments. Some of the anecdotal material (though not always trustworthy) does imply that he saw himself as a sort of ethical doctor. When someone enquired why he was striking his students so sharply, he said ‘doctors do likewise with their patients’. He was also criticised for associating with base men and replied ‘doctors associate with those who are diseased, but they do not fall ill’. As discussed in chapter 2.ii, excellence (ἀρετή) is the ethical major

223 DL 6.4 = DC 185, SSR 169.
224 DL 6.6 = DC 186, SSR 167; see also TH12 31-3 and commentary.
focus of Antisthenes’ extant work and, most notably in this regard, Antisthenes’ Ajax stated that ‘no king competent to judge about excellence would entrust this to others any more than a good doctor would allow the diagnosis of illnesses by another’.225

It seems from his observable methodology in the Homeric scholia that Antisthenes, in his role as an 'ethical doctor', adopted a medical approach to textual 'diagnosis' and analysis. There is a vocabulary of terms that had medical meanings around the end of the fifth century which Antisthenes employs in his textual criticism. These include, in particular, σηµεῖον, σηµαίνειν, ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι and σύστασις – words that were later absorbed into the common vocabulary of criticism, but which generally had quite a different meaning in the late fifth century.

σηµεῖον, ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι. The word σηµεῖον was used in medical terminology specifically to mean 'symptom' (LSJ s.v. A.II.4) – viz. a sign or indication that a doctor could read to produce a diagnosis. The related verb ἐπισηµαίνειν, and the passive ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι, was used in late fifth century medical discussion with reference to disease meaning 'to bear a distinguishing mark' (LSJ s.v. A.2). Antisthenes employs both these terms. He uses σηµεῖον in the manner of a 'indication' (TH14a 6). He also twice uses ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι with the sense 'to show an indication' (TH13c 3 & 8).

σύστασις. Another medical term, σύστασις, meaning 'composition' or 'constitution' (LSJ s.v. B.II), is used by Antisthenes in a context of medical diagnosis (TH12 33), but also in a context of textual 'diagnosis' that, in Odysseus' case, reveals the 'constitution of his character' (τοῦ ἤθους σύστασιν, TH13d 5-6; cf. commentary at §7).

Antisthenes employs a number of further technical terms that are not attested as definitely having medical meanings in the Classical period, though they did have them in the Hellenistic era. These include ἐµφασις ('indication', TH13c 19), and ἐµφαίνειν ('to indicate', TH14e 3), as well as παριστάναι / παρίστασθαι ('to show / be shown by comparison', TH14g 2 & 4).

225  Aj.&Od. Aj.4.5 = DC 14, SSR 53.
So, just as a doctor subjects a diseased body to a controlled set of examinations, and studies the symptoms in order to produce a sound diagnosis, it seems that Antisthenes was demonstrating that a skilled reader of Homer could subject the text to a series of tests and produce a sound reading. By this approach to the text, Homer – speaking, for example, through Odysseus or Polyphemus – is not stating directly, but is putting forth ‘indications’ or ‘symptoms’ of what the text is really saying. By accurately reading this evidence, Antisthenes is able to discern the deeper, literal message in order to grasp and report what he regarded to be the true meaning – and that meaning coincided with truth in Homer’s texts was a given.  

This truth might forever remain obscure, however, for those who were unskilled at reading Homer.

In the case of medical diagnosis, if the doctor’s diagnosis and treatment is correct and the patient survives the illness and becomes healthy then the correct reading was made of the symptoms of the patient. The patient’s symptoms reveal unsound health, but then the correct treatment restores health to soundness. In the case of Antisthenes’ approach to textual analysis, an apparent contradiction in Homer suggests unsoundness, but with a correct reading of the text (in Antisthenes’ view) a solution is provided by which Homer is proven to be ethically healthy and sound. If Homer’s text survives criticism intact, then the correct reading was made of the indications in the text. In this sense, saving Homer’s infallibility is the real aim of the exercise, but Antisthenes was content to regard the restoration of Homer’s health as a final proof of the validity of his argument.

All of Antisthenes’ literary critical ideas discussed here are very interesting and impact the whole history of textual interpretation. For example, he anticipates both: the tradition of biblical exegesis whereby, since early times, biblical scholars and interpreters have used similar strategies to explain and preserve seemingly contradictory passages of the bible; and also the philological method of explaining Homer from Homer. Regarding these approaches, Todorov states: ‘Philology and patristic exegesis are thus not only two examples of interpretive strategies; they represent the two major types of possible

226 Paraphrasing Todorov 1982, 137.
strategies. It appears, then, that Antisthenes played a major role in the development of the two methodologies for textual criticism that were to dominate over two millennia of literary exegesis, but in this regard he has been entirely unnoticed.

E Antisthenes an allegorist?
The earliest recorded instances of allegorical interpretation of Homer are from the sixth century. At least one passage of Phercydes of Syros (floruit either c.580 BC, DK 7 A 2, or c.542 BC, DK 7 A 1) offers interpretations of Homeric verses concerning the gods that could be termed 'allegorical'. The next reported allegorist (and usually credited with being the first) is Theagenes of Rhegium who was active around 525 BC ('the time of Cambyses', DK 8 A 1).

A scholion quoting Porphyry gives an example of the sort of allegories that are used to defend Homer’s 'detrimental' (ἀσύµφορος) and 'unseemly' (ἀπρεπής) representations of the gods (disapproving sentiments echoing those of Plato’s Socrates who declared at Republic 378d that 'battles of the gods, such as Homer composed, must not be admitted to the city'). Porphyry lays out an example of an extensive allegorical interpretation of the battle between the gods at Iliad 20.67 that explains it as a battle between natural elements, adding that this type of apologetic strategy started with Theagenes. Modern scholars continue to label this approach as 'positive' allegoresis, i.e. 'claiming the poets' authority for the interpreter's own doctrines' (Trapp 2003, 64; cf. Tate 1934, 108). That Theagenes 'wrote' about Homer is confirmed by an entry in the Suda (θ 81 = DK 8 A 4), and that he was possibly a rhapsode, as well as an exegete, is suggested by a variant reading of II. 1.381 attributed to him (Sch. Il. 1.381 = DK 8 A 3).

The next known proponent of allegorical interpretation, Anaxagoras (5th c.), introduced an ethical element into his interpretation. Favorinus records that Anaxagoras was the first 'to make plain that the poetry of Homer was about excellence and justice' (τὴν Ὁµήρου

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228 Todorov 1982, 167.
229 DK 7 B 5; cf. Tate 1927, 214-5; Ford 1999, 37; but more cautiously Schibli 1990, 100 n.54.
231 For a full discussion of Theagenes and the beginnings of allegoresis see Ford 1999, and 2002, 67-89.
Thus Anaxagoras anticipates Antisthenes' basic presupposition but not his method. No fragments of Anaxagoras' discussion in this vein are extant. Metrodoros of Lampsacus, a friend of Anaxagoras, is the next pioneer of allegorical interpretation listed by Diogenes Laertius. He is also mentioned by Ion the rhapsode as being one of his greatest rivals (Pl. Ion 530d = DK 61 A 1) but is otherwise known only through a handful of further testimonia (DK 61 A 3-6).

It is not clear that any fragment of Antisthenes' is truly an allegorical interpretation of an Homeric verse. It is possible to interpret one fragment as allegorical, but it is more in keeping with the rest of Antisthenes' commentary on Homer to view it as a quite literalistic reading of the text (TH8 and commentary). A huge amount of ink has been spilt by scholars arguing over whether or not Antisthenes was an allegorist. The majority of Giannantoni's discussion of Antisthenes' Homeric interpretation is devoted to this topic, and full details of the discussion, which seems to have blown out of all proportion, are best pursued there. In what seem the most sober assessments of the debate, Richardson commented 'I suspect that the battle may be over a phantom issue' (1975, 78), and Rankin rationally concludes: 'It is fair to attribute an allegorical element to some of his writings. It is scarcely justified to classify him as an allegorist' (1986, 175).

232 DL 2.11 = DK 61 A 2; cf. Trapp 2003, 64.
233 SSR 4, 338-46, for bibliography see esp. n. 41.
6 DATING AND TITLING OF ANTISTHENES' WORKS

A Dating of the Works

As is the case with all the works of the Socratic authors, Plato included, there is very little
evidence that allows confident dating. But set out here is the evidence, largely indirect, that
gives clues to the time Antisthenes was writing.

Euripides' *Aeolus* is parodied in Aristophanes' *Clouds* of 423 (first production, revised c. 417)
and *Peace* of 421, and thus dates from 423 or earlier. The same line from *Aeolus* that
Antisthenes 'corrected' or 'improved' in *TH1* is parodied by Aristophanes in *Frogs* (1474-5)
of 405. In *Frogs* he is bringing up an already infamous line and cleverly reworking it,
suggesting Antisthenes' earlier commentary on it. Aristophanes had already attacked the
*Aeolus* in *Clouds*, but on that occasion it was the content – brother sister sexual relations –
rather than the text he impugned. If his play on the same line as *TH1* is in fact revealing
Antisthenes' influence, this would mean that the content of the fragment dates from the
period 424-406.

Aristophanes' *Clouds* – originally produced 423, reworked 420-17 – contains a parody of
Socratic dialogue. As discussed earlier (ch. 4.i Section C, 'Aristophanes'), this suggests that
there was Socratic dialogue in writing before this time, as it is unlikely that such authors
would have picked up and continued using a style of representation of Socrates that
contributed to his death, unless that was already the established form. Antisthenes,
probably born prior to 451/50 (ch. 1.i) appears to be the only author of Socratic dialogues
who was old enough to be producing such material at the time – the others were born in the
420s.

The 'Melian Dialogue' in Thucydides has been read as critique of Socratic dialogic method
(ch. 4.i, Section C, 'Thucydides'). Thucydides was in exile from 424-404, so this also
suggests the possibility that he learnt of such activities through reading texts of Socratic
dialogue that were circulating in that period.
Antisthenes' dialogues involving Archelaus (CD3; cf. commentary on CD6-8) are unlikely to have been written before the time he became king of Macedonia (413-399), but could date from any time after 413.

Plato's Menexenus can be fairly certainly dated to sometime around 386, as in it Aspasia and Socrates are aware of the King's Peace of 386 BC (Kahn 1996, 28). Given that the portrayal of Aspasia seems to reflect aspects of Aeschines' Aspasia Kahn suggests that Aeschines’ Aspasia was written sometime in the early 390s or late 380s, and that his Alcibiades was written around the same time. He also thinks that both of Antisthenes' dialogues of corresponding names to be earlier (1996, 29). This is surely correct and agrees with Persaeus' assertion that Aeschines plagiarised Antisthenes’ Alcibiades, and the evidence that he did so with the Aspasia as well (discussed in the commentary to CD17).

Kahn is almost certainly accurate in asserting: 'The dominant position of Plato, both as an author and as a leader of a school, was only established later, probably after 385 BC (1996, 5). This would suggest that Antisthenes' parody of Plato in Sathôn (CD4a-c) comes from the 380s or later – after Plato had made his name.

Antisthenes was still writing in 471 or soon thereafter, as his comments on the indecent delight shown by the Thebans following the battle of Leuctra of 471 are preserved (Plu. Lyc. 30.7 = DC 171, SSR 10).

B Date to which works were extant

Many of Antisthenes' fragments are preserved only in the form of pithy aphorisms and memorable anecdotes, and a large portion of these seem to have been passed down as extracts and entries in various compilations. This is especially clear in the cases where there are four, five or six extant versions of a fragment found in compilations from several different eras (e.g. CD14a-f, MD6a-d). Sometimes, however, there is evidence in the testimonia and in the fragments themselves that suggests that the author was in the presence of complete works of Antisthenes', rather than extracts. In some cases this is indicated only by the fact that the fragments contain no information that is particularly
memorable or worthy of an anecdote. In such a case, especially if the text seems to have been selected to suit a specific argument an author is making, it can be a sign that the author was picking and choosing material from a complete work of Antisthenes he had in front of him rather than from a volume of extracts. The most suggestive evidence, categorised by era, is laid out below.

First century BC

In a letter to Atticus Cicero declares that the Kursas pleased him, as did other works of Antisthenes (CD9), providing evidence that whole dialogues were still in circulation around the mid first century BC. This is confirmed by Cicero’s near contemporary, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who is able to directly compare Thucydides’ style against Antisthenes’ (among others, De Thuc. 51.941 = DC 9, SSR 49).

Second century AD

In the second half of the second century AD Aelius Aristides provides reasonably strong evidence that he was reading from a complete work (Sy10). Aelius quotes a passage of a book he was reading that was by Antisthenes. The passage is not made up of any particularly apophthegmatic or memorable statements and it does not appear anywhere else. Instead the passage is very particular to Aelius’ personal circumstances, containing, as it did, advice he felt he could use as part of his rehabilitation. In addition, Aelius states the title of the work (as well as he could recall it in his slightly hallucinatory state): Concerning Use – The Crown Lover – a title not known from other sources. All of this points to the fact that he was reading a work of Antisthenes first hand. Writing around the same time as Aelius, Phrynichus rates Antisthenes amongst the best proponents of the pure Attic style and is able to comment on the genuineness of two works – Concerning Cyrus and Concerning Odysseus (apud Phot. Bibl. 101 b9 = DC 10, SSR 50) – suggesting that he was able to assess them himself, first hand.
Third century AD

Porphyry, writing in the late late third century AD, preserves large tracts of one or more Antisthenic dialogues (TH12-14). Though it is possible that Porphyry was drawing material from extracts, the length of the passages he cites and the fact that they are not particularly aphoristic, and barely replicated by other authors, suggests that he was reading and selecting from whole works of Antisthenes.

Fourth century AD

In the middle of the fourth century Julian discusses Antisthenes' works in three related fragments (MD14-16). The content of MD14 and MD15 imply that Julian was familiar with much of Antisthenes' work, but that sort of information could have also been gathered from compilations. In MD16, however, he recommends writing following the 'Antisthenian model', which implies that a model – i.e. a work – was extant to follow. He also mentions Antisthenic writings implying that they included the figures Perseus and Theseus, who are otherwise known of from Antisthenes' works. Similarly Themistius, writing in the late fourth century (MD1a-c), relates a passage of dialogue unknown from other sources, suggesting that he was reading it directly from a work of Antisthenes. It thus seems likely that both Julian and Themistius were in the presence of whole works of Antisthenes in the mid to late fourth century AD.

C Titles of the Works

The titles of all of Antisthenes' works are uncertain. Diogenes Laertius provides a very long list of titles of Antisthenes' works (6.15-18). Other writers, however, report titles that only partly overlap with these, or are altogether different. Generally, it is not known if Antisthenes titled the works himself, or if not, when they were titled and by whom. The exception is the Sathō, which Antisthenes seems to have titled himself (CD4). Also unknown is whether the titles that have survived represent whole works, or excerpted

234 Just two corresponding fragments from Aristarchus are preserved via Apollonius Sophistes, TH14m-n.
portions of works, or both. Some works seem to also have subtitles, though again it is unclear whether these were Antisthenes’ or were applied at some later point.

The received wisdom is that prose works from the fifth and early fourth centuries BC were usually untitled. Most book titles of these period are thought to have been applied by the Alexandrian librarians who were responsible for establishing and standardising the texts of the Classical period and were also thought to have been responsible for breaking up longer works into books – e.g. Herodotus and Thucydides. With a title they could mark the outside of each scroll to identify its contents – whether it be the name of a principal interlocutor in a dialogue or the opening words of the text for other types of prose works.

With Attic drama, however, it is accepted that titles of tragedies and comedies were entered for competition (Maehler 2003, 251). It is not clear why, when various poetic works were being given titles, prose writers would produce works without naming them. And there is actually evidence to suggest that they were in fact entitling their own works. Plato, for example, refers in Politicus to the title of another of his works, The Sophist (ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ, Plt. 284b; Maehler 2012, 251). Hinds claims (2012, 252) that the first writer known to have divided his own text into books is the fourth century historian Ephorus (DS 5.1.4, 16.76.5). But Baldwin has mounted a fairly persuasive argument that Herodotus in fact divided his own work into books and entitled those divisions himself (1984, 31-33).

Antisthenes’ works regularly have alternate titles or subtitles, which is also seen in Plato’s works – for example his Alcibiades I is also known as On the Nature of Man: Maieutic. In some cases it seems that separate titles listed by Diogenes Laertius are actually the title and subtitle of the same work. For example, in Diogenes’ list there appears Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, Concerning Diction, or, Concerning Character Types (6.15), immediately followed by Αἴας ἢ Αἴαντος λόγος, Ajax or Speech of Ajax and Οδυσσεὺς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως, Odysseus or Concerning Odysseus (treated in this thesis as one, i.e. Ajax & Odysseus). The speeches given by Ajax and Odysseus are clearly an illustration of diction and character.

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235 Maehler 2012, 251, Jacoby 1949, 82; and see Baldwin’s discussion, including more references (1984, 31-2).
type in action and thus they should probably be understood as an alternative title or subtitle of the same work.

In short, the whole area of ancient book titles is disputed and in need of further investigation. It does not seem out of the question, however, that Antisthenes was titling his own works. These may well have been divided later and the divisions given new titles to represent the content of the extract – in similar fashion to the way that we refer to Thucydides' 'Melian Dialogue' or Herodotus' 'Constitutional Debate'.
7 A NOTE ON THE APPROACH TO THE TEXTS

Texts

The texts of the fragments are taken in each case from the best available edition for each source author. This is generally, but not always, the most recently completed edition. My own emendations to the text, made in consultation with other editions and articles, or purely in order to make the texts translatable, are noted in the *apparatus criticus*.

Line numbering

For texts of less than five lines, no line numbering has been included. For texts of five lines or more, they have been renumbered for this edition. For ease of reference, wherever it was convenient, the line structure of the source text from the edition it was taken has been retained. However, where this was too awkward or visually unappealing, the lines have been restructured as well. For a few difficult-to-navigate texts, the original line numbers are also printed in minuscule print along with the new numbering.

Fragment numbers

The fragments under discussion in this thesis have been re-categorised, reordered, and renumbered accordingly. Several fragments are attributed to Antisthenes here for the first time. One of the issues that comes with writing a commentary on a portion of the fragments of a fragmentary author is that the fragments not under direct discussion, and so not renumbered, must be referred to by the numbering system of a previous editor or editors. Therefore fragments that are not under direct discussion but which are referred to in this thesis, are referred to by the numbers of either or both of the most recent complete editions of Antisthenes’ fragments (not all of the fragments are in both the editions).

For the 1966 edition of Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, *Antisthenis Fragmenta*, the fragments are referred to by 'DC' and the fragment number, e.g. DC 87. For the 1990 edition of Gabriele Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquae* (SSR), the fragments are referred to by 'SSR' and the fragment number, e.g. SSR 54. Giannantoni’s volume also includes individual
author codes, for example Antisthenes’ code is ‘V A’. This has been left out of the references to Antisthenes’ fragments here for the sake of concision. On the odd occasion where another author from Giannantoni’s SSR is referred to, the full abbreviated reference will be supplied, e.g. SSR V B = Diogenes of Sinope. But whenever SSR alone is used, it always refers to a fragment of Antisthenes.

Transliteration

For all reasonably well known figures (viz. they appear in the OCD⁴), the common Latinised forms of the names are used, but less well known persons are Hellenised following a consistent convention. Thus ‘Socrates’ is the famous fifth century Athenian philosopher, but ‘Sokrates’ would be applied to various namesakes who never achieved sufficient notoriety to make the OCD’s encyclopaedic shortlist.
TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS
DIALOGICA VARIA

SOCRATIC DIALOGUES

SD1 Theopompus in Athenaeus 11.508c-d Kaibel = DC 4, SSR 42, FGrH 115 F 259.

_Theopompus_ of Chios, born 378/7 BC, Greek historian and composer of epideictic speeches, renowned in antiquity for his censoriousness. _Athenaeus_ of Naucratis, fl. c. AD 200, authored _Δειπνοσοφισταί_ (‘The Learned Banqueters’). _Aristippus_ of Cyrene, c. 430-355, reportedly the first student of Socrates to charge for his teaching. _Bryson_ of Heraclea, c. 400-340, sophist criticised by Aristotle, little further is known.

καὶ γὰρ Θεόποµπος ὁ Χῖος ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῆς Πλάτωνος διατριβῆς 'τοὺς πολλοὺς', φησι, 'τῶν διαλόγων αὐτοῦ ἄχρείους καὶ ψευδεῖς ἄν τις εὕροι· ἀλλοτρίους δὲ τοὺς πλείους, ὁντας ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστίππου διατριβῶν, ἑνίους δὲ κἀκ τῶν Ἀντισθένους, πολλοὺς δὲ κἀκ τῶν Βρύσωνος τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου'.

And in fact Theopompus of Chios, in his treatise _Against Plato’s Teachings_, says that ‘one would find that most of his (Plato’s) dialogues are useless and fraudulent. The majority are by other authors, and are from the teachings of Aristippus, and some from Antisthenes’ works, and a number from the works of Bryson of Heraclea’.

SD2 Panaetius in Diogenes Laertius 2.64 Dorandi = DC 5, Panaetius F 126 van Straaten.

_Panaetius_ of Rhodes, c. 185-109 BC, was head of the Stoic school in Athens from 129 BC. _Diogenes Laertius_, probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD. _Aeschines_ Socraticus, c. 425-375 BC, author of seven Socratic dialogues.

πάντων µέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφῶντος, Ἀντισθένους, Ἀισχίνου.

Of all the Socratic dialogues, Panaetius considered the genuine ones to be those of Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines.


τούτον µόνον ἐκ πάντων τῶν Σωκρατικῶν Θεόποµπος ἐπαινεῖ καὶ φησι δεινόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ δι᾽ ὁµιλίας ἐµµελοῦς ὑπαγαγέσθαι πάνθ᾽ ὁντινούν, δήλον δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν συγγραµµάτων κἀκ τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος Συµποσίου.

Theopompus praised him (Antisthenes) alone of all the Socratics, saying that he was skilful, especially at leading on absolutely anyone at all to conclusions for his (Antisthenes’) own advantage by means of smooth discourse. And this is clear from his writings and from Xenophon’s _Symposion_.

120
SD4 Herodicus in Athenaeus 5.216b-c Kaibel = DC 33 & 129, SSR 200, Stesichorus PMG F 192 (= Pl. Phdr. 243a).

Herodicus of Babylon, prob. late 2nd c. BC, wrote Κωµῳδούµενοι (‘People ridiculed in comedy’), Σύµµικτα ύποµνήµατα (‘Miscellaneous notes’), Πρὸς τὸν φιλοσωκράτην (‘Against the friend of Socrates’ i.e. Plato).

Athenaeus of Naucratis, fl. c. AD 200, authored Δειπνοσοφισταί (‘The Learned Banqueters’).

καὶ Αντισθένης δ’ ὁ Σωκρατικὸς περὶ τῶν ἀριστεῖων τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι ἱστορεῖ. ὥσπερ ἔστιν δ’ ἔτυμος οὗ δοκεῖ (Stesich. F 192), χαρίζεται γάρ καὶ ὁ κύων οὗτος πολλὰ τῷ Σωκράτει οὔθεν οὐδετέρῳ αὐτῶν δεῖ πιστεύειν σκοτὸν ἔχοντας Θουκυδίδην. ὁ γὰρ Αντισθένης καὶ προσεπάγει τῇ ψευδογραφίᾳ λέγων οὗτως:

(Ξένος) ἦµεις δὲ ἀκούοµεν κὰν τῷ γέρατον Βοιωτοῦ µάχῃ τὰ ἀριστεῖα σε λαβεῖν.
(Σωκράτης) εὑρίσκει µόνον ἄλλο· Ἀλκιβιάδου τὸ γέρας, οὐκ ἐµόν.

Antisthenes the Socratic recounts the same things as in Plato about the prize for valour. 'But this is not a true account' (Stesich. F 192). Because this dog shows great favouritism to Socrates; wherefore one who holds Thucydides as a guide should believe neither of the two of them. Because Antisthenes even goes so far as to say, in his false account, the following:

(Σωκράτης) Βεστάλης σοῦ γε δόντος, ὡς ἡµεῖς ἀκούοµεν.

So by the most just account, the prize for valour fell to Socrates. But since the generals were obviously eager to confer the honour upon Alcibiades, on account of his rank, Socrates, desiring to increase his (Alcibiades’) love of distinction in the eyes of the nobility, was the first to bear witness, and encouraged them to crown him, and bestow the panoply on him.

SD5 Plutarch, Vita Alcibiades 7.5 194f-195a Ziegler = SSR 202.

Plutarch, c. AD 45-125, author of the parallel lives, and moralising, ethical, philosophical treatises.

ἐγίνετο µὲν οὖν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ Σωκράτους τὸ ἀριστεῖον· ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ στρατηγοὶ διὰ τὸ αξίωµα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ σπουδάζοντες ἐφαίνοντο περιθεῖναι τὴν δόξαν, ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόµενος αὐξεῖσθαι τὸ φιλότιµον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς αὐτοῦ, πρώτος ἐµαρτύρει καὶ παρεκάλει στεφανοῦν ἐκείνον καὶ διδόναι τὴν πανοπλίαν.

So by the most just account, the prize for valour fell to Socrates. But since the generals were obviously eager to confer the honour upon Alcibiades, on account of his rank, Socrates, desiring to increase his (Alcibiades’) love of distinction in the eyes of the nobility, was the first to bear witness, and encouraged them to crown him, and bestow the panoply on him.
Socrates saw during the rule of The Thirty that men of high reputation were being seized and the most exceedingly wealthy were being plotted against by the tyrants, and it is reported that having met up with Antisthenes he said:

'Surely you do not regret that we have not become at all great or revered in life like the monarchs we see in tragedy, those Atreuses, Thyesteses, Agamemnons and Aegisthuses? For they were revealed on each occasion being slaughtered, being made tragic, and preparing and eating awful feasts. But no poet of tragedy was so audacious and shameless as to introduce to a drama a chorus being slaughtered.'
CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES

CD1 Diogenes Laertius 6.1 Dorandi = DC 7, SSR 11, Eudociae Violarium 96 Flach.

Diogenes Laertius, probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD. From the opening of his account of the Cynics; relating Antisthenes’ background.

οὗτος κατ’ ἀρχὰς µὲν ἥκουσε Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος· ὅθεν τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις ἐπιφέρει καὶ µάλιστα ἐν τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς.

In the beginning he (Antisthenes) was a student of Gorgias the orator – from which he takes the rhetorical style he employs in his dialogues, and especially in his Truth and Protreptic Dialogues.


Athenaeus of Naucratis, fl. c. AD 200, authored Δειπνοσοφισταί (‘The Learned Banqueters’). This fragment is from a passage listing a series of quotes from various authors illustrating the use of the diminutive form δελφάκια.

Ἀντισθένης δ᾽ ἐν Φυσιογνωµονικῷ· 'καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖναι τὰ δελφάκια πρὸς βίαν χορτάζουσιν'. καὶ ἐν Προτρεπτικῷ δὲ· 'ἀντὶ δελφακίων τρέφεσθαι'.

Antisthenes in his Physignomy says: ‘For indeed those women force-feed the piglets (or fatten the piglets by force).’ Also in his Protreptic Dialogue: ‘being reared (or fed) instead of piglets.’

CD3 Herodicus in Athenaeus 5.220d Kaibel = DC 42 & 43, SSR 203 & 204.

Herodicus of Babylon, prob. late 2nd c. BC, wrote Κωµῳδούµενοι (‘People Ridiculed in Comedy’), Σύµµικτα ὑποµνήµατα (‘Miscellaneous Notes’), Πρὸς τὸν φιλοσωκράτην (‘Against the Friend of Socrates’ i.e. Plato). This passage is from an extended discussion by Herodicus of Antisthenes’ works.

ὁ δὲ Πολιτικὸς αὐτοῦ διάλογος ἁπάντων καταδροµὴν περιέχει τῶν Ἀθήνησιν δηµαγωγῶν. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀρχέλαος Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος.

His (Antisthenes’) dialogue The Statesman contains an invective against all the demagogues in Athens. And The Archelaus contains an attack on Gorgias the orator.

CD4a Herodicus in Athenaeus 5.220d-e Kaibel; = DC 37a, SSR 147.

Part of the same passage of text as CD3.

καὶ Πλάτωνα δὲ µετονοµάσας Σάθωνα ἀσυρῶς καὶ φορτικῶς, τὸν ταύτην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν διάλογον ἐξέδωκε κατ᾽ αὑτοῦ.

And he (Antisthenes) lewdly and vulgarly called Plato by a new name – Sathôn (‘Fat-cock’) – and he published a dialogue bearing this title against him.
CD4b  Herodicus in Athenaeus 11.507a Kaibel = DC 37b, SSR 147.

ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδ᾽ Ἀντισθένη ἐπαινῶ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος πολλοὺς εἰπὼν κακῶς οὐδ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀπέσχετο, ἀλλὰ καλέσας αὐτὸν φορτικῶς Σάθωνα τὸν ταύτην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν διάλογον εξέδωκεν.

But I certainly do not even praise Antisthenes; since in fact he spoke ill of many men, not even sparing Plato himself, but rather he vulgarly called him Sathôn ('Fat-cock') and published a dialogue bearing this title.

CD4c  Diogenes Laertius 3.35 Dorandi = DC 36, SSR 148.

ἔγραψε διάλογον κατὰ Πλάτωνος Σάθωνα ἐπιγράψας· ἐξ οὗ διετέλουν ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

He (Antisthenes) wrote a dialogue against Plato entitled Sathôn ('Fat-cock'); from this time they maintained a distant relationship with each other.

CD5  Cicero, Ad Atticum 12.38a Shackelton Bailey = DC 13, SSR 84.

ΚΥΡΣΑΣ mihi sic placuit ut cetera Antisthenis, hominis acuti magis quam eruditi.

ΚΥΡΣΑΣ ΩΖ (b) : κύρβας Ζβ : Κῦρος Β´ SB

The Kursas pleased me as did the other works of Antisthenes, a man more keen-minded than refined.

Alcibiades and Cyrus

CD6  Persaeus in Diogenes Laertius 2.60-61 Dorandi = DC 6, SSR 43, SVF I F 457 = FGrH 584 F 9.

Persaeus of Citium, c. 306-c.243 BC, a Stoic who was brought up by and then succeeded Zeno. Wrote on kingship, constitutional matters, criticisms of Plato’s Laws, and dialogues. Aeschines Socraticus, c. 425-375 BC, author of seven Socratic dialogues. Pasipphon, 3rd c. BC, author of dialogues. The following fragment is from a discussion of Aeschines’ dialogues in Diogenes’ ‘Life of Aeschines’.

dιαλόγους [... ] καὶ τῶν ἑπτά [δὲ] τοὺς πλεῖστους Περσαίως φησι Πασιφώντος εἶναι τοῦ Ἐρετρικοῦ, εἰς τοὺς Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένους τὸν τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἑλάσσω καὶ Αλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων διεσκευώρηται.


And Persaeus (SVF I F 457) says that of these seven dialogues (of Aeschines), the majority are by Pasipphon, of the school of Eretria, but he placed them among the works of Aeschines. And moreover, he (Aeschines) revised works of Antisthenes, including the Little Cyrus, the Lesser Heracles, and the Alcibiades, as well as the works of other authors.
This fragment is from Diogenes' 'Life of Antisthenes'.

καὶ ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ µεγάλου Ἡρακλέους καὶ τοῦ Κύρου, τὸ µὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλκύσας.

Also, that hard work is a good thing, he (Antisthenes) proved through his Big Heracles and his Cyrus, having drawn the one paradigm from the Greeks, and the other from the barbarians.

Phrynichus of Bithynia, fl. c. AD 170-190, an Atticising Greek grammarian who wrote books on literary style. Photius of Byzantium, c. AD 810-893, Patriarch of Constantinople, scholarly author of Bibliotheca, Library (c. 876), a mini-history of Greek literature, and a lexicon that drew entries from several earlier lexica.

eἰλικρινοῦς δὲ καὶ καθαρὸς καὶ Ἀττικοῦ λόγου κανόνας καὶ σταθµὰς καὶ παράδειγµά φησιν ἄριστον Πλάτωνά τε καὶ Δηµοσθένην … καὶ Ἀντισθένην µετὰ τῶν γνησίων αὐτοῦ δύο λόγων, τοῦ περὶ Κύρου καὶ τοῦ περὶ Ὀδυσσείας.

He (Phrynichus) said that the best standard measure and paradigm of undiluted and pure Attic writing is Plato and Demosthenes … also Antisthenes – with two of his genuine works, his Concerning Cyrus, and his Concerning the Odyssey.

Antisthenes, in the second of his Cyriuses, maligns Alcibiades and says he was perverse both as regards women and as regards his mode of living in other respects. Because, he (Antisthenes) says, he (Alcibiades) had sex with his mother, and his daughter, and his sister, like Persians do.
Eustathius, archbishop of Thessalonica c. AD 1175, commentator on Homer, Pindar, et al. Odyssey 10.7 is a passage describing the manner in which legendary king Aeolus gave his six daughters as wives to his six sons.

Ἀλκιβιάδην μέντοι παρεξηυλημένον ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ βιοῦ ἐξωλέστερον ἐσκωψε, φησίν Ἀντισθένης παράνοµον εἰναι καὶ εἰς γυναῖκας καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην δίαταν, συνεῖναι γὰρ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ θυγατρὶ καὶ ἀδελφὴ ὡς τοὺς Πέρσας.

He (Antisthenes) indeed rather caustically mocked Alcibiades who played himself to the point of exhaustion in his pointless way of life, Antisthenes said he was perverse both as regards women and as regards his mode of living in other respects, because he had sex with his mother, and his daughter, and his sister, like the Persians do.

Satyrus, probably 3rd c. BC, renowned ancient biographer of poets, statesmen and philosophers.

Whenever he (Alcibiades) was a choregos he paraded into the theatre dressed in purple, being admired not only by the men but also by the women. As a result of which, Antisthenes the Socratic, who himself actually beheld Alcibiades with his own eyes, states that he was strong, and courageous, and cultured, and daring, and in the bloom of youth, throughout his entire life.

And again that Alcibiades was big and handsome is also clear from the fact that he was called the common loverboy of all Greece, and Antisthenes makes it clear when he says: 'unless Achilles was such a man (as Alcibiades), he was not really handsome.'

Olympiodorus, c. AD 500-570, Neoplatonist and commentator on Plato and Aristotle.

ὅτι γὰρ καλὸς ἦν τῷ σώµατι δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ κοινὸν ἐρώµενον αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐκ τοῦ τούς Ἐρμᾶς Αθήνησι κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν αὐτοῦ γράφεσθαι, ἐκ τοῦ τὸν Κυνικὸν Ἀντισθένην λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ Ἀχιλλεῦς, οὐκ ἦν ὧραίος: περὶ οὗ φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς βουλόµενος τὸν Νιρέα εἰς κάλλος ἐπαινέσαι Νιρεύς, ὃς κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθεν τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ᾽ ἀµύµονα Πηλείωνα. (Il. 2.673-4).

For, that he (Alcibiades) was handsome in physique is clear from the fact that he was said to be the common loverboy of Greece; from the fact that in Athens the Hermes were painted in his image and likeness; from the fact that the Cynic Antisthenes said about him ‘unless Achilles was such a man (as Alcibiades), he was not handsome’; about whom (Achilles) the poet (Homer), wishing to praise Nireus as regards beauty, said:

Nireus, the most handsome warrior of the all the other Danaans who came under Ilion, after the irreproachable son of Peleus. (Il. 2.673-4).

Plutarch, *Vita Alcibiades* 1 Ziegler = DC 31, SSR 201.

Plutarch, c. AD 45-125, author of the parallel lives, and moralising, ethical, philosophical treatises.

Ἀλκιβιάδου δὲ καὶ τίτθην, γένος Λάκαιναν, Ἀµύκλαν ὄνοµα, καὶ Ζώπυρον παιδαγωγὸν ἴσµεν, ὃν τὸ µὲν Ἀντισθένης, τὸ δὲ Πλάτων ἱστόρηκε (Alc. I 122b).

And we also know the nurse of Alcibiades, a woman of the Spartan race, Amycla by name, and his tutor, Zopyros, the first fact is mentioned by Antisthenes, the second by Plato (Alc. I 122b).

Cyrus

Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.31.34 Wachsmuth = DC 21b, SSR 87.

Stobaeus, probably early 5th c. AD, compiled an anthology of excerpts from Greek prose and poetry. This line is from a list of quotes under the heading ‘Ἀντισθένης’.


When he himself (Antisthenes) had been asked what lesson was most essential, he said ‘to unlearn base things’.
Arsenius, *Violetum* Walz 1832, 502 = DC 21a, SSR 87.

*Arsenius* Apostolius, c.1468-1535, born in Crete, associate of Erasmus in Venice where he worked as a scribe and print editor, sometime Archbishop of Monemvasia, in 1519 & 1538 published a book of Greek proverbs, the Ιωνία ('Violet-Bed'), collected by his father, Michael, a scriptorium owner (Bietenholz & Deutscher 2003, 68-9).

Κύρος ο βασιλεὺς ἐρωτηθείς τί ἀναγκαίοτατον εἰπ μάθημα, 'το ἀπομαθείν', ἔφη, 'τὰ κακὰ'.

Cyrus, the king, when he had been asked 'what lesson is most essential', he said 'to unlearn base things'.

*Codex Neapolitanus graecus* II D 22 n. 9 Sbordone = SSR 87.

A compilation, probably 14th c., from earlier collections (Sbordone 1935, 5).

Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθείς˙ 'τί ἐστιν ἄριστον µάθηµα;' ἔφη 'τὸ ἀποµαθεῖν τὰ κακὰ.'

Antisthenes, having been asked 'What lesson is most noble?' replied 'To unlearn base things.'

*Arrian*, *Epicteti Dissertationes* 4.6.20 Schenkl = DC 20a, SSR 86.

Arrian, AD c.86-160, prolific author, wrote down the discourses of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus c. AD 108.

τί οὖν λέγει Ἀντισθένης; οὐδέποτ᾽ ἤκουσας; οὐδὲ ποτὲ ἔφη 'βασιλικὸν εὖ µὲν πράττειν, κακῶς δὲ ἀκούειν'.

So what does Antisthenes say? Have you never heard?

'It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do good but to be ill spoken of.'

*Marcus Aurelius*, while Roman Emperor AD 161-180 authored the Stoic work τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν ('Meditations').

Ἀντισθενικόν. Βασιλικὸν εὖ µὲν πράττειν, κακῶς δὲ ἀκούειν.

From Antisthenes. It is kingly to do good but to be ill spoken of.

*Diogenes Laertius* 6.3 Dorandi = DC 150, SSR 28.

Diogenes Laertius, probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD. This fragment from Diogenes' *Life of Antisthenes*.

ἐκαύσας ποτὲ ὅτι Πλάτων αὐτὸν κακῶς λέγει, 'βασιλικὸν,' ἔφη, 'καλῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν.'

One time when he heard that Plato was slandering him he said 'It is kingly while acting nobly to be ill spoken of.'

*Dio Chrysostom*, *oration* 47.25 De Arnim 2.87 = SSR 86.

Dio Chrysostom (earlier called Cocceianus), c. AD 40/50-120, Greek orator and Stoic-Cynic philosopher.

ἔφη δ᾽ οὖν τις ὅτι καὶ τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν καλῶς ποιοῦντα καὶ τούτῳ βασιλικὸν ἐστίν.

However, someone said that even being ill spoken of while acting nobly is also kingly.
CD14e Plutarch, *Vita Alexander* 41 Ziegler.

*Plutarch*, c. AD 45-125, author of parallel lives and moralising, ethical philosophical treatises.

(Ἀλέξανδρος) φάσκων βασιλικὸν εἶναι τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν ἐὖ ποιοῦντα.

He (Alexander) used to say that it is kingly to be ill spoken of despite doing good.

CD14f Plutarch, *Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata* 181f Nachstädt et al.

πυθόµενος δὲ ὑπὸ τινος λοιδορεῖσθαι ἵνα βασιλικὸν ἐφη ἐστὶν ἐὖ ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν.

Having learnt that he (Alexander) was reviled by a certain person, he said 'it is kingly despite doing good to be ill spoken of.'

CD15 Diogenes Laertius 6.2 Dorandi = DC 95, SSR 134.

>This fragment is from Diogenes’ ‘Life of Antisthenes’.

τὴν τ’ ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ.

A bad reputation is a good thing and equivalent to hard work.

CD16a Ps.-Caecilius Balbus, *Codex Monacensis Latinus* 30.35.2-3 Wölfflin 31 = SSR 88.

*Caecilius Balbus*, fictitious name applied in late antiquity to an earlier body of Greek aphorisms.

Antisthenes cuidam dicenti, 'maledixit tibi ille', 'non mihi', inquit, 'sed illi, qui in se quod hic dicit agnoscit'. idem dicenti cuidam, 'hominum de te male loquuntur', 'superioris est, inquit, usus hoc pati personae, inferioris facere'.

Antisthenes, to someone saying 'he has slandered you', replied, 'not me, but that man who acknowledges in himself what this man states'. The same man (Antisthenes) to someone saying 'people are slandering you', replied, 'it is indicative of superior character to undergo this experience, inferior character to deliver it'.
Antisthenes quoque cuidam dicenti, ‘maledixit tibi ille’, ‘non mihi’ inquit, ‘sed illi, qui in se, quod ille culpat, agnoscit. sed etsi mihi maledicere curet, non curo, quia auditus lingua debet esse robustior, cum singulis hominibus linguae sint singulae, sed aures binae. aliquatenus tamen curo, quia eo ipso me fatetur esse superiorem, quoniam superioris personae usus est, detractio inibus subiacer, inferioris inferre, gauderem itaque, nisi urgente humanitate compaterer infelici’.

Aspasia, Pericles, Xanthippos and Paralos, Archestratos and Euphemos (intimates of Xanthippos and Paralos), Cimon, Elpinice (sister of Cimon), Callias, Pericles' first wife (mother of Callias), Hipponicus (father of Callias).

His Aspasia contains slander about the sons of Pericles, Xanthippos and Paralos. For he said the former was the intimate partner of Archestratos, whose line of work closely resembled that of the women working in filthy brothels, while the latter was a friend and intimate of Euphemos, who made crude and humourless jokes regarding the people he met.
Antisthenes the Socratic said that when he (Pericles) fell in love with Aspasia, he went twice per day, into and out of her house, to *aspazesthai* (warmly greet) the woman; and at one time when she was a defendant on a charge of impiety, while speaking on her behalf, he wept even more than the time when he was a defendant at risk of his own life and property. And Cimon had sex unlawfully with his own sister, Elpinice, then later when she was given in marriage to Callias and he (Cimon) was in exile, Pericles received as his reward for arranging his (Cimon’s) return, sex with Elpinice.

However Pericles’ affection for Aspasia was clearly more the amorous kind. For he had a wife who was related to him, and she had been married previously to Hipponicus, by whom she bore Callias ‘The Rich’. And she also bore Xanthippos and Paralos by Pericles. After that, as their married life was not to their satisfaction, he bestowed her, as she desired, upon another man. And he himself took Aspasia and adored her exceedingly. And as they say, both going out and coming in from the agora, he *aspazesthai* (warmly greeted) her every day with a kiss.
But if you truly want to know that reason is an excellent thing, it is not Plato or Aristotle that I call as witnesses, but the wise Antisthenes who trod this path. Indeed, he said:

Prometheus told Heracles: 33.10 'Your toil is utterly worthless, for you are concerned with things of the world and you have abandoned the preoccupation with what is greater than this. You will not be an accomplished man until you learn things that are higher than men. If you learn these, then you will also learn the things of men, but if 33.15 you learn only the ones here (i.e. of this world), you will be wandering like wild animals.'

He, then, whose care is for worldly things and has imprisoned the reason of his intellect and his sagacity within those mean and narrow bounds, is not wise – as Antisthenes said – but resembles an animal 33.20 that finds a dunghill agreeable. For all the celestial things are high, and we ought to have a high opinion of them.

236 I am extremely grateful to Alberto Rigolio for permitting me to use this translation from his forthcoming edition and English translation of Themistius’ De Virtute. My translation differs in that I have restored Prometheus as the speaker (as per the Syriac and contra Giannantoni’s suggested emendation). I have made a couple of other minor stylistic adjustments to the translation that do not effect the meaning.
sin autem vere cognoscere vultis prudentiam aliquid sublime esse, nec Platonem neque Aristotelem testes invoco, sed Antisthenem sapientem, qui hanc viam docuit. ait enim Promethea Herculi ita locutum esse: 'vilissimus est labor tuus, quod res humanae tibi sunt curae, sed tamen curam eius, quod iis maioris momenti est, deseruisti. perfectus enim vir non eris, priusquam ea, quae hominibus sublimiora sunt, didiceris. si ista disces, tunc humana quoque disces; sin autem humana tantum didiceris, tu tamquam animal brutum errabis.'

qui enim rebus humanis studet et mentis suae prudentiam calliditatemque suam rebus tam vilibus et angustis includit, is, ut Antisthenes dixit, non sapiens est, sed animali similis, cui sterquilinium gratum est. sublimes vero sunt omnes res caelestes, et nos oportet sententiam de eis habere sublimem.

But if, on the other hand, you want to truly know that reason is a lofty thing, I call upon neither Plato nor Aristotle as witnesses, but wise Antisthenes, who taught this path. Namely, he says:

Prometheus spoke to Hercules thus: 'your labour is extremely contemptible, because human affairs are a concern to you, and concern for that which is of greater importance than these things, you have forsaken. For you will not be a complete man until you have learnt those things which are higher than man. If you learn such things, then you will learn human things also; but if you learn only about human affairs, you will err like a brute beast.'

For he who applies himself to human affairs and confines the prudence and intelligence of his mind to things so petty and narrow, he is, as Antisthenes said, not astute, but is like an animal to which a dung heap is pleasing. Truly lofty are all the heavenly things, and we ought to have a lofty opinion of them.
Wenn ihr aber wahrhaft erkennen wollt, dass die Vernunftmässigkeit eine erhabene Sache ist, so rufe ich nicht Platon und Aristotles zu Zeugen an, sondern den weisen Antisthenes, der diesen Weg gelernt hat. Denn so sagte er:

Prometheus sprach zum Herakles: 'Sehr verächtlich ist deine Handlungsweise, dass du um weltliche Dinge dich bemühst, denn du hast die Sorge um das Wichtigere unterlassen. Denn du bist kein vollendeter Mann, bis du das gelernt, was höher ist als die Menschen, und wenn du dies lernst, lernst du auch das Menschliche. Wenn du aber allein das Irdische lernst, bist du irrend, wie die wilden Tiere'.

Der aber, dessen Interesse an den Dingen dieser Welt ist und der die Denkkraft seiner Intelligenz und seiner Klugheit auf diese schwachen und engen Dinge beschränkt, ist nicht ein Weiser, wie Antisthenes sagt, sondern gleicht dem Tier, dem der Koth behaglich ist.

However, if you truly wish to know that reason is a noble thing, then I call as witness, not Plato and Aristotle, but the wise Antisthenes, who learnt this path. For thus he stated:

Prometheus said to Heracles: 'your manner of action is very contemptible, that you are striving for worldly things and have neglected caring about what is more important. Because you are not a complete man until you have learned what is higher than men, and if you learn that, you'll also learn what is human. But if you learn only what is earthly, you are straying like the wild animals.'

He, however, whose interest is in the affairs of this world and who limits the power of thought of his intelligence and his wisdom to these weak and narrow things, is not a wise man, as Antisthenes says, but is like the animals for whom the muck is comfortable.


Antisthenes when asked by someone 'What should I teach my son?' said 'If he is destined to live with the gods, philosophy, but if he is destined to live with men, rhetoric.'
Diogenes is here reporting views held generally by the Cynics. They (the Cynics) also instruct that the goal of life is to live in accordance with excellence, as Antisthenes says in his *Heracles* – in like manner to the Stoics.

They also instruct that excellence is teachable, just as Antisthenes says in his *Heracles*, and it is unlosable.

He used to be pleased by the following topics. He used to prove that excellence is teachable, and that the nobly-born and the excellent are the same people.
Chiron, Heracles, and Achilles.

**MD6a** Ps.-Eratosthenes, *Catasterismi* 40 Olivieri 1897 = DC 24a, SSR 92, *Eudociae Violarium* 998 Flach.

Eratosthenes of Cyrene, c. 285–194 BC, lived in Athens before becoming head librarian in Alexandria. Authorship of the *Καταστερισµοί*, 'Constellations', is disputed, though it is certainly Alexandrian.

Κενταύρου.

όυτος δοκεῖ Χείρων εἶναι ὁ ἐν τῷ Πηλίῳ οἰκήσας δικαιοσύνη τε ὑπερενέγκας πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ παιδεύσας Ασκληπιόν τε καὶ Αχιλλέα· ἐφ᾽ ὃν Ἡρακλῆς δοκεῖ ἔλθειν δι᾽ ἔρωτα, ὥ καὶ συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄντρῳ τιμῶν τὸν Πᾶνα. μόνον δὲ τῶν Κενταύρων οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ὁ Ἑρακλῆς ἐφ᾽ ἔρωτα. 5 ᾧ καὶ συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄντρῳ τιμῶν τὸν Πᾶνα. μόνον δὲ τῶν Κενταύρων οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ὁ 5 Σωκρατικὸς ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλῆς. χρόνον δὲ ἰκανὸν ὁμιλούντων αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς φαρέτρας αὐτοῦ βέλος ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὸν πόδα τοῦ Χείρωνος, καὶ οὕτως ἀποθανόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Ζεὺς διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὸ σύμπτωµα ἐν τοῖς ἀστροις ἔθηκεν αὐτόν. ἐχει δέ τι θηρίον ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ πλησίον τοῦ Θυτηρίου, ὃ δοκεῖ προσφέρειν θύσων, ὅ ἐστι μέγιστον σηµεῖον τῆς εὐσεβείας αὐτοῦ.

Centaurus.

This one seems to be the Chiron who dwelt on Pelion and in justice surpassed all men, and who educated both Asclepius and Achilles. To him (Chiron) Heracles seemed to come on account of love, and living together with him in the cave he gave honour to Pan. Him alone of the Centaurs he did not destroy, but rather he became his student, just as Antisthenes the Socratic says in his *Heracles*. After a considerable time, while they were conversing, an arrow fell from his (Heracles') quiver onto Chiron's foot, and thus, after he died, on account of his piety and the accident, Zeus placed him among the stars. And he is holding some beast in his hands right by constellation Ara, this seems to be something he is bringing to sacrifice, which is the greatest indication of his piety.
Hic videtur Chiron esse qui in Pelio habitavit iustitia quidem superans homines omnes et ipse correxit Asclepium et Achilles; apud quem Herculem videtur venisse propter amorem, cum quo et simul fuerat in antro honorificans Panem; solummodo quidem Centaurum non occidit, sed obaudibat ei, ut ait Antisthenes Socratensis. in tempore Herculis, super bono loquentes et quidem de cura eius, excidit sagitta supra pede 5 Chironis, et ita mortuus est. quem Iuppiter propter eius pietatem et ruinam inter astra posuit. iste autem habens bestiam in manibus iuxta Sacrarium, in quo videtur offerre quasi sacrificans, quod est signum maximum de pietate quam in se habebat.

This one seems to be Chiron, who lived on Pelion, in justice indeed surpassing all men and himself instructed Asclepius and Achilles. And Hercules appears to have come to him on account of love, and he was also together with him in a cave honouring Pan. He was certainly the only centaur he did not kill, but he was his student, as Antisthenes the Socratic says. During this time, while they were speaking about excellence, and what is more about the tendance of excellence, an arrow of Hercules fell out over the foot of Chiron, and thus he died. And Jupiter, on account of his (Chiron's) piety and downfall, placed him among the stars. That one (Chiron) moreover is holding a beast in his hands beside the Shrine, which he seems to be offering just as if it were a sacrifice, which is the greatest indication of the piety which he had in himself.

Proclus, head of Neoplatonist school at Athens AD 438-485, prolific commentator on Plato. Here Proclus is commenting on Alcibiades I 104c, where Socrates is telling Alcibiades that he has overwhelmed all his lovers because of their inferiority and his own power. Proclus notes that individuals who are genuinely worth loving are unlovable to the masses and to base men.

λέγει γοῦν καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένους Ἡρακλῆς περὶ τινος νεανίσκου παρὰ τῷ Χείρωνι τρεφοµένου 'μέγας γάρ,' φησι, 'καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἴραιός, οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἥρασθη δειλὸς ἔραστής'.

And at least Antisthenes’ Heracles also says, concerning a certain youth (Achilles) who went to Chiron to be raised: ‘because he is big and handsome and in the bloom of youth, no cowardly lover would fall in love with him’.

Gnomologium Vaticanum, Byzantine collection preserving sayings of ancient Greek philosophers and eminent persons. This fragment is from a collection of comments made by Antisthenes.

ὁ αὐτὸς (Ἀντισθένης) θεασάµενος ἐν πίνακι γεγραµµένον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα Χείρωνι τῷ Κενταύρῳ διακονούµενον, 'εὖ γε, ὦ παιδίον, εἶπεν, ὅτι παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ θηρίῳ διακόνειν ὑπέµεινας'.

He himself (Antisthenes), when he beheld a painting of Achilles serving Chiron the centaur, said: 'Well done Child! For the sake of education you submitted to serving even a beast'.

Plutarch, *De Vitioso Pudore* (Sieveking = DC 26, SSR 94).

This fragment comes from a passage in which Plutarch is warning against susceptibility to flattery. It follows on from an anecdote in which Menedemus of Eretria (fl. first half 3rd C. BC) is reported to have reacted with hostility to the news that Alexinus the Sophist often praised him.

οὕτως ἄτρεπτος ἦν καὶ ἀνάλωτος ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ κρατῶν ἐκεῖνης τῆς παραινέσεως, ὃν ὁ Ἀντισθένειος Ἡρακλῆς παρῄνει, τοῖς παισὶ διακελεύοµενος μηδὲν χάριν ἔχειν ἐπαινοῦντι αὐτοὺς· τοῦτο δ’ ἦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ μὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι μηδ’ ἀντικολακεύειν τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας.

So undeterred and invincible was he (Menedemus) at the hands of such men, and so strongly did he cleave to the counsel which the Antisthenian Heracles recommended, when he exhorted his sons to be grateful to no man for praising them. Which amounted to no more than this: neither to be affected by those praising them, nor to flatter them in return.

Galen of Pergamum, AD 129-216, physician and author on topics including medicine, philosophy, and philology.

καλῶς οὖν καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης καὶ ὁ Διογένης, ὁ μὲν χρυσὰ πρόβατα καλῶν τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους, ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν κρηµνῶν συκαίς ἀπεικαζόµενοι αὐτούς ἑκεῖνων µὲν γὰρ τὸν καρπὸν οὐκ ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ κόρακας ἢ κολόκιος ἐσθίειν, τούτων δὲ τὰ χρήµατα µηδὲν µὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῖς ἀστείοις, δαπανᾶσθαι δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν κολάκων, οἵτινες, ἐὰν οὕτως τύχῃ, πάντων αὐτοῖς ἀναλωθέντων ἀπαντῶντες παρέρχονται µὴ γνωρίζειν προσποιούµενοι.


Both Antisthenes and Diogenes said it well – the latter calls those who are rich and uneducated golden sheep (cf. DL 6.47);

but the former (Antisthenes) likens (eikeinōn) them to the fig trees on cliff sides, for the fruit of these trees is not eaten by people, but rather by crows and jackdaws, and the assets of those men are of no use to their fellow citizens, but are devoured by the flatterers, who are the sort of men who, if they encounter people after they have consumed all their possessions, pass them by pretending not to know them.


Stobaeus, probably early 5th c. AD, compiled an anthology of excerpts from Greek prose and poetry.

Antisthenes used to say, as Hecaton reports in his *Useful Sayings*, that it is better to fall in with crows than with flatterers; for the former devour the dead, but the latter devour the living.

Antonius, *Loci Communes* 2.32.172 Migne PG 136.1084 = DC 83, SSR ?

Antonius 'Melissa', c. 11th c., Greek monk who recorded moral aphorisms by topic. This is the second of three aphorisms listed after the headword: Ἀντισθένης.

κακοὶ κολακευόµενοι κακώτεροι γίνονται.

Base men who are flattered become baser men.

Hecaton in Diogenes Laertius 6.4 Dorandi = DC 84a, SSR 131, Hecaton F21 Gomoll.

Hecaton of Rhodes, 1st c. BC, student of Panaetius and prominent Stoic, authored several works of an ethical nature. This fragment is from Diogenes’ *Life of Antisthenes*.

He (Antisthenes) used to say, as Hecaton reports in his *Useful Sayings*, that it is better to fall in with crows than with flatterers; for the former devour the dead, but the latter devour the living.
Antisthenes said: it is preferable to fall in with crows than with flatterers. For the former will maltreat your body when you are dead, but the latter will maltreat your soul while you are still alive.

Crows damage the eyes of the dead, but flatterers destroy the souls of the living.

Just as Actaeon was killed by his dogs, who were being fed by him, so the flatterers devour their feeders.

Perseus and Theseus

Julian, Oration 7.209a Wright = DC 8a, SSR 44.

Julian ‘the Apostate’, born AD 331, emperor at Constantinople from 361-3. Oration 7 was addressed as a rebuke to the Cynic Heracleios, whose lecture Julian had attended, and in which Heracleios used myth in a way that Julian felt was inappropriate.

And if Antisthenes the Socratic – just like Xenophon – related some points by way of myth, do not let this mislead you. And in a moment I will give you an account in support of this (statement).

This excerpt is from a passage in which Julian is hypothesising that only ethical philosophers, and theologians concerned with initiations and the Mysteries are justified in employing myth in their teaching.

But what is more, Xenophon and Antisthenes and Plato manifestly used myths in many places. So that it is apparent to you that the writing of myths is indeed appropriate for a certain type of philosopher, even if not for the Cynic.
In this passage it is apparent that Heracleios has irked Julian by using Prodicus’ parable of the Choice of Heracles at the Crossroads, a parable that Julian refers to approvingly elsewhere (Or. 2.56d).

For example, Plato, in his discourses on the gods, tells many mythic tales about the goings on in Hades, and before him did so did the son of Calliope (i.e. Orpheus). And the writing of myths is mixed in by Antisthenes and Xenophon and Plato himself when they are working out certain ethical arguments – not intrusively, but rather with a certain harmony. If you wanted to imitate these men, instead of Heracles you should have introduced the name of a Perseus or a Theseus and cast them in the Antisthenic mould. And instead of the dramatic setting of Prodicus concerning those two goddesses, you should have introduced another similar setting (i.e. to Antisthenes’) onto your stage.
EROTIC DIALOGUES

ED1 Diogenes Laertius 6.9 Dorandi = DC 189, SSR 172.

This fragment is from Diogenes’ ‘Life of Antisthenes’ and is one of a series of anecdotes recording things reportedly said by Antisthenes.

πρὸς τὸ παρασχηµατίζον αὐτὸ τῷ πλάστῃ µειράκιον, 'εἰπέ µοι,' φησίν, 'εἰ φωνήν λάβοι ὁ χαλκός, ἐπὶ τίνι ἂν οἴει σεµνυνθῆναι;

τοῦ δ’ εἰπόντος, 'ἐπὶ κάλλει,'

'οὐκ αἰσχύνη σύνν,' ἐφη, 'τὰ ὅµοια γεγηθὼς ἀψύχως;

οἴει add. Casaub.

To a young lad who was posing for a sculptor, he (Antisthenes) said 'Tell me, if the bronze had a voice, what do you think it would pride itself on?'

And when he (the lad) replied 'On it's beauty',

He (Antisthenes) said 'Are you not ashamed then that you pride yourself on the same thing as an inanimate object?'

ED2a Porphyrio, Scholia in Horatium Sermo 2.2.94-95 Holder 1894 295.13-17 = DC 191, SSR 112.

Pomponius Porphyrio, early 3rd c. AD, wrote a commentary on Horace likely intended for schools.

- quae carmine gratior aurem occupat. (Hor. Sat. 2.2.94)
  Which strikes the ear more pleasingly than song.

hoc Antisthenes dixisse traditur. is enim cum vidisset adolescentem luxuriosum acroamatibus deditum, ait: 'miserum te, adulescens, qui numquam audisti summum acroama, id est laudem tuam.'

It is related that Antisthenes said this. For he, when he had seen an immoderate young lad given over to musical entertainments, said: 'You are unfortunate, young man, never to have heard the greatest music, that is, your own praise.'

ED2b Ps.-Acro, Scholia in Horatium 'Sermo' 2.2.94 Keller 1904 134.7-10 = SSR 112.

Helenius Acro, 2nd c. AD, commentator on Terence. These scholia on Horace date to the 5th c. AD but were only first attributed to Acro in the Renaissance, and it remains contentious whether any elements are really his.

Antisthenes philosophus cum vidisset adolescentem multum acroamatibus delectari: o te, ait, infeliciem, qui summum acroama numquam audisti, idest laudes tuas; quia plus delectamur laudibus nostris.

Antisthenes the philosopher, when he had seen a young lad delighting greatly in musical entertainments, said: 'Oh you unfortunate fellow, you who has never heard the greatest music, that is, your own praise; because we delight most of all in the praises given to us.'
This and the two following fragments are from Diogenes’ ‘Life of Antisthenes’, and are part of a series of anecdotes recording things reportedly said by Antisthenes.

πρὸς τε τὸ Ποντικὸν μειράκιον μέλλον φοιτᾶν αὐτῷ καὶ πυθόµενον τίνων αὐτῷ δεῖ, φησί, 'βιβλιαρίου καινοῦ καὶ γραφείου καινοῦ καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ,' τὸν νοῦν παρεµφαίνων.

καινοῦ F, Marcovich : καὶ νοῦ BP Φ & Arsen.

When a young lad from Pontus was about to become his student and enquired as to what he needed, he (Antisthenes) said ‘a new book and a new pencil and a new writing tablet,’ implying ‘intelligence’.

Ποντικοῦ νεανίσκου πολυωρήσειν αὐτοῦ ἐπαγγελµένου, εἰ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκοιτο τῶν ταρίχων, λαβὼν αὐτὸν καὶ θύλακον κενὸν πρὸς ἀλφιτόπωλιν ἥκε καὶ σαξάµενος ἀπῄει: τῆς δὲ αἰτούσης τὸ διάφορον, 'ὁ νεανίσκος,' ἐφη, 'δώσει ἐὰν τὸ πλοῖον αὐτοῦ τῶν ταρίχων ἀφίκηται.'

When a young lad from Pontus promised to pay him generously, if his ship of salt fish should arrive, he (Antisthenes) took him and an empty sack and went to a barley seller and having filled it he began to leave. When the woman asked for cash, he said ‘The young lad will give it if his ship of salt fish arrives.’

αὐτὸς καὶ Ἀνύτῳ τῆς φυγῆς αἴτιος γενέσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ Μελήτῳ τοῦ θανάτου. Ποντικοῖς γὰρ νεανίσκοις κατὰ κλέος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἀφιγµένοις περιτυχὼν ἀπήγαγεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἀνυτον, εἰπὼν ἐν ἤθει σοφώτερον εἶναι τοῦ Σωκράτους· ἔφ’ ὁ διαγανακτήσαντας τοὺς περιεστῶτας έκδιώξει αὐτὸν.

It is thought that he (Antisthenes) was responsible for the exile of Anytus and the death of Meletus. For having fallen in with some youths from Pontus who had come because of the reputation of Socrates, he (Antisthenes) led them to Anytus, mentioning deftly that he (Anytus) was wiser than Socrates. Whereupon, those standing around, filled with indignation, drove him (Anytus) into exile.
This papyrus was among a number of papyri purchased in 1903 at the papyrus market in Cairo by Italian Professors Breccia, Schiaparelli, and Vitelli. It currently resides in the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana in Florence. The papyrus (21.5x24cm) has four columns plus a loose fragment (7.2x5.5cm) which appears to belong at the head of column two. All the columns are incomplete at the top, the first is missing the left half, the third is full of holes, the fourth has only line beginnings, but in the second are 30 lines preserved almost intact, and another 13 partial lines. The Antisthenes fragment is at the end of this last portion of the second column. Preceding the Antisthenes fragment is a discussion that seems to be showing the futility of formal training. It is claimed that untrained persons can perform the tasks of doctors and skilled wrestlers equally as well as the professionals can. Then there is an anecdote wherein someone asks Socrates why Alcibiades has not become better after so long an association with Socrates’ teaching. Socrates replies that everything that he teaches Alcibiades by day, others undo by night.

144

And they also say that Antisthenes was in love with a young lad, and some men, desiring to ensnare the boy, served him (the boy) dishes of fish at a dinner.

And some other men said to Antisthenes: 'At this very moment your love rivals are getting the better of you'.

'Yes indeed, but I am certainly not mastered by the sea / a ruler of the sea. Since while one man thinks he is right to ask for these things, another thinks it right to keep away from fish (i.e. fools), and tomorrow, were someone else to serve him dishes, would he not go off in turn with that man?'
PLATE 1
Florentine Papyrus 113, column 2, lines 26-44

(Close-up of Comparetti and Vitelli, 1908, Tav. III)
TRAGICA & HOMERICA

TH1 Plutarch, *Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat* 33C Paton = DC 60, SSR 195, TrGF 5.1 F 19, Ath. 13.582d.

**Plutarch**, c. AD 45-125, author of parallel lives and moralising, ethical philosophical treatises.

**Cleanthes**, c. 331-230 BC, stoic philosopher (student of Zeno of Citium) and prolific author.

Euripides’ *Aeolus* (423 BC or earlier – parodied by Aristophanes’ *Clouds* of 423) concerns the eponymous king who lives on a floating island in the farthest west with his six sons and six daughters (cf. Od. 10.1-12 & schol.). One son, Macareus conceived a passion for his sister Cauna, violated her, and made her pregnant. He is likely the speaker of the line preserved here, defending himself once discovered and put on trial.

\[\text{ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ αἱ παραδιορθώσεις φαύλως ἔχουσιν αἷς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐχρήσατο καὶ Ἀντισθένης, ὁ µὲν εὖ µάλα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰδὼν θορυβήσαντας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ 'τί δ᾽ αἰσχρόν, εἰ µὴ τοῖς χρωµένοις δοκεῖ'}\] (TrGF 5.1 F 19).

For which reason the corrections are not worthless which Cleanthes and Antisthenes practised. For the latter, quite rightly, when observing that the Athenians had raised an uproar in the theatre at the line:

\[\text{What is shameful, if its doers do not think so?}\]

He (Antisthenes) at once put an alternative beside it:

\[\text{What is shameful is shameful, whether one thinks so or no}.\]

TH2 Diogenes Laertius, 7.19 Dorandi = SSR 137, SVF 1 F 305, TrGF 4 F 1116c.

**Zeno** of Citium 333-261 BC, the first of the Stoic philosophers by Diogenes Laertius’ reckoning. *This passage from Diogenes’ ‘Life of Zeno.’*

\[\text{πρὸς δὲ τὸν φάσκοντα ὡς τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῷ Ἀντισθένης οὐκ ἀρέσκοι, Χρείας Σοφοκλέους προενεγκάµενος ἠρώτησεν εἴτι καὶ καλὰ ἔχειν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ τοῦ δ᾽ οὐκ εἰδέναι φήσαντος, 'εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνη, ἐφη, 'εἰ µέν τι κακόν ἦν εἰρηµένον ύπ᾽ Ἀντισθένους τοῦτ᾽ ἐκλεγόµενος καὶ μνηµονεύων, εἰ δὲ τι καλόν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιβαλλόµενος κατέχειν;'}\]

Χρείας Kenn. : χρείαν MSS ύπ᾽ Ἀντισθένους del. Wilam.

When someone declared to him that for the most part Antisthenes did not please him, he (Zeno) brought out Antisthenes’ *Sayings of Sophocles* and asked him if he thought it had any noble qualities. And when he answered that he did not know, he (Zeno) said ‘Then are you not ashamed that if something base was said by Antisthenes, you pick it out and mention it, but if it was something noble, you do not even attempt to understand it?’
Sophocles’ Ajax the Locrian concerned his trial and fate after he raped Cassandra at the altar of Athena during the sack of Troy. Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae, 411 BC.

- κηδεστής: οἷον γέ ποῦ ἰστιν αἱ σοφαὶ ξυνουσίαι.
  Εὐριπίδης: πόλλ’ ἄν μάθως τοιαῦτα παρ’ ἐμοῦ.
  Relative: What a thing clever conversations are!
  Euripides: Many other such things you could learn from me!

καὶ διὰ τούτου φαίνεται ύπονοῶν Εὐριπίδου εἶναι τὸ ἵσοροτα τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν ξυνουσίᾳ.‘
ἐστι δὲ Σοφοκλέους ἑξ Αἰαντος Λοκροῦ. ἐνταῦθα μέντοι ύπονοι μόνον, ἐν δὲ
tοῖς Ἡρώσιν ἀντικρος ἀποφαίνεται. καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Πλάτων Εὐριπίδου
αὐτὸ εἶναι ἤγονται. οὐκ ἕξω εἰπεῖ στὶ παθόντες. ἤσκε δὲ ἢτοι πεπλανημένοις
5
συνεξαπατήσαι τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ ὠσπερ ύπονοὐσί τινες, συμπτωσίς γενέσθαι
τῷ τε Σοφοκλεῖ καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ. ἰστατει καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων τινῶν. τὸ μέντοι δρᾶμα ἐν
ω Ἐυριπίδης ταῦτα εἶπεν, οὐ σφάζεται.

2 ξυνουσία Radt: συνουσία Regt. 5 παθόντες Burges in Dobree, Porson: παρόντες MSS

And from this he (Aristophanes) appears to be implying that the line was from Euripides: 'Kings are wise by way of their association with wise men'. But it is from Sophocles, from his Ajax the Locrian. Here however he (Aristophanes) only implies it, but in the Heroes he openly declares it. Both Antisthenes and Plato believed it to be by Euripides. I am unable to say what made them think this. It seems likely to be the case either, that having been mislead himself he (Aristophanes) then deceived the others, or, as some have supposed, there was a corresponding line in both Sophocles and Euripides, as also in some other works. However the drama in which Euripides said this is not preserved.
Dio Chrysostom, *Oration 53.4-5* Arnim = DC 58, SSR 194.

*Dio Chrysostom* (earlier called Cocceianus), c. AD 40/50-120, Greek orator and Stoic-Cynic philosopher. *Zeno of Citium* 333-261 BC, the first of the Stoic philosophers by Diogenes Laertius’ reckoning.

Zeno found no fault in the works of Homer, at the same time interpreting them and teaching that he (Homer) had written some things as people think them to be, and other things as they really are, in order that he (Homer) not appear to be contradicting himself when saying some things that seem to be contrary. But this theory was Antisthenes’ first, i.e. that some things are said by the poet as they are thought to be, but others as they really are; but the latter did not fully expound this theory, whereas the former set it out section by section.


Arsenius, AD 354-445, tutor to emperor Theodosius I’s children, author of teachings for monks & apophthegmata.

When he was asked what sort of things one should learn from Homer he said ‘What evil and what good has been wrought in our halls’ (*Od*. 4.392).

The fullest version of this scholion, as presented here, is found only in the Lipsiensis manuscript.

If Athena had not been seized with fear for all the gods, eikōtως δὲ ὡς δεδουκυία τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἣδη πεπαιδευμένη μὴ ἑναντιοῦσθαι, περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἡ γλαυκώπις φροντίζει. ἐκ τούτου καὶ Ἀντισθένης φησίν ὡς, εἰ τι πράττει ὁ σοφός, κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν ἐνεργεῖ, ὡς καὶ ἡ Αθηνᾶ τριχῶς νουθετεῖ τὸν Ἀρην.

Naturally, as she was afraid of her father and had already been trained not to oppose him, the Gleaming-eyed One was worried about the future. From this Antisthenes also said that if a wise man does something, he executes it with all his excellence (i.e. to the best of his ability), so also Athena warned Ares three times.
And there came to him the spirit of wretched Patroclus, completely like his own self in stature, and beautiful eyes, and voice, and the sort of garments that were clothed around his body.

From this Antisthenes said that spirits/souls have the same form as the bodies that contain them.

Why did he (Homer) portray only Nestor raising the goblet? Since it is not likely that it was easier for him to lift it than it would have been for younger men [...] Antisthenes: he (Homer) was not saying that he shifted the greatest weight by hand, but rather he (Homer) was indicating that he (Nestor) was not becoming drunk – he could easily hold his wine.

For what reason did Odysseus so stupidly slight Poseidon, saying: 'As not even the Earth-Shaker (Poseidon) will heal your eye' (Od. 9.925)? Antisthenes says it is because he (Odysseus) knew that Poseidon was not a doctor, but rather Apollo was.
Xenophon, *Symposion* 3.5-6 Ollier = DC 61, SSR 185.

**Stesimbrotos** (FGrH 107), from Thasos, active late 5th c., rhapsode and exegete of Homeric and Orphic texts, listed by Ion among the great rhapsodes to whom he considers himself superior (Pl. Ion 530d = FGrH 107 T 3).

**Anaximander** (FGrH 9), from Miletus, active c. 404-358, wrote exegeses of Pythagorean codes and Homeric texts.

5 ἀλλὰ σὺ αὖ, ἔφη (ὁ Ἀντισθένης), λέγε, ὥς Νικήρατε, ἐπὶ ποία ἐπιστήμη μέγα φρονεῖς.
καὶ οὐ εἰπεν· ὁ πατήρ ὁ ἐπιμελούμενος ὡς ἀνήρ ἀγαθός γενοίμην ἡνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ομήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν καὶ νῦν δυναίμην ἄν Ἰλιάδα ὅλην καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἀπό στόματος εἰπειν.

6 ἔκεινο δ᾽ ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, λέληθέ σε, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ραψῳδοὶ πάντες ἐπίστανται ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη;
καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, λελήθοι ἄκρωμενον γε αὐτῶν ὁλίγου ἄν ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἦκάστην ἡμέραν;
οἰσθά τι οὖν ἔθνος, ἔφη, ἠλιθιώτερον ἡρασφιδών;
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, οὐκοῦν ἐμοίγε δοκῶ.

δήλων γὰρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται. σὺ δὲ Στησιµβρότῳ (FGrH 107 T 4) τε καὶ Ἀναξιµάνδρῳ (FGrH 9 T 3) καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς πολὺ δέδωκας ἀργύριον, ὥστε οὐδέν σε τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων λέληθε.

5 'But now you,' he (Antisthenes) said, 'tell us Nikeratos, what sort of knowledge you pride yourself on.'

And he (Nikeratos) replied: 'my father, who was very concerned that I should become a good man, compelled me to learn the entire epics of Homer. And at this moment I could recite the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by heart.'

6 And Antisthenes said to him, 'has it escaped your notice that all the rhapsodes also know these epics?'

'How could that escape my notice when I hear them almost every day?'

'So do you know any group of people who are siller than rhapsodes?'

'No by Zeus,' said Nikeratos, 'not as far as I know.'

'For it is clear,' said Socrates, 'that they don’t know the underlying meanings. But you gave a lot of money to Stesimbrotos and Anaximander and to many others so that you would miss nothing valuable.'
ἐκ τούτου δὲ ὁ Νικήρατος, ἀκούοιτ᾽ ἄν, ἄφη, καὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ ἐσεσθε βελτίωνες, ἂν ἐμοὶ συνήτε. ἵστε γὰρ δήπου ὦτι Ὅµηρος ὁ σοφώτατος πεποίηκε σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπινῶν, ὅστις ἄν οὐν ὑμῶν βούληται ἢ οἰκονομικός ἢ δηµηγορικός ἢ στρατηγικός γενέσθαι ἢ ὁµιός Ἀχιλλεί ἢ Αἴαντι ἢ Νέστορι ἢ Ὀδυσσεί, ἐµὲ θεραπευέτω. ἐγὼ γὰρ ταύτα πάντα ἑπίσταμαι.

ἡ καὶ βασιλεύειν, ἄφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, ἑπίστασαι, ὃ ὄσθα ἐπαινέσαντα αὐτὸν τὸν Ἄγαµέµνονα ἃς

'βασιλεύς τε εἰῆ ἁγαθὸς κρατερός τ᾽ αἰχµητής'; (Il. 3.179)

καὶ ναὶ µὰ Δί, ἄφη, ἑγωγε ὅτι ἁρµατηλατοῦντα δεῖ ἐγγὺς µὲν τῆς στήλης κάµψαι (Il. 23.323,334),

'αὐτὸν δὲ κλινθῆναι ἐυξέστου ἐπὶ δίφρου ἧκ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ τοῖιν, ἀτὰρ τὸν δεξιόν ῥηπον
κένσαι ὀµοκλήσαντ᾽ εἰξαί τε οἰ ἡνία χερσί.' (Il. 23.335-7)

καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε ἄλλο ὦτα, καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτίκα µάλ᾽ ἔξεστι πειράσθαι. εἶπε γάρ που Ὅµηρος· ἑπὶ δὲ κρόµυον ποτῶ ὄψον.' (Il. 11.630)

6 After this, Nikeratos said ‘you (all) would now hear from me the respects in which you will be improved, if you associate with me.  For I presume you know that Homer, the cleverest man, has written concerning almost every topic of humanity.  Any of you who wishes to become skilled in household management, or political arts, or generalship, or to be like Achilles, or Ajax, or Nestor, or Odysseus, should attend to me.  For I understand all these things.’

'You understand kingship too do you?’ said Antisthenes, ‘so that you know that he praises Agamemnon as “both a good king and a mighty warrior?”’ (Il. 3.179)

'Yes I do, by Zeus!’ he said, ‘and I also know a charioteer must turn close to the turning-post (Il. 23.323, 334), “yourself leaning upon the well-polished car a little to the left, but goading on the right-hand horse with shouts, and give him the reins from your hands.” (Il. 23.335-337) 7 And in fact in addition to this I know something else, and it is possible to test it immediately.  For Homer says somewhere: “An onion adds relish to a drink.”’ (Il. 11.630)
Porphyry: *polytropos*. Antisthenes says (Speaker One): 'Homer was criticising Odysseus rather than praising him when he called him *polytropos* (many-mannered). Indeed he did not represent Achilles and Ajax as *polytropos*, but rather as honest (*haplous*) and noble. Nor indeed Nestor the wise man (*sophos*), no by god, he was not portrayed as having a deceitful and shifty character, but rather he was a man who conversed honestly (*haplōs*) with Agamemnon and all the others, and if he had something worth saying to the army, he gave advice and concealed nothing. Achilles also was so far from accepting such a manner (*tropos*), that he thought that man hateful as death “who concealed one thing in his heart, but said another” *(II. 9.313).*'

So explicating it, Antisthenes says (Speaker Two): 'What then? Is it really because Odysseus is wicked that he was called *polytropos*, and not because he was wise (*sophos*) that Homer called him that? Does *tropos* then never indicate (*σημαίνει*) partly character and indicate (*σημαίνει*) partly the use of speech? Because a man is of noble-manner (*eutropos*) who has a well-formed character. And *tropoi* are qualitative figures of speech; and he uses trope both in respect of his voice, and in respect of the variations of tone, as does the nightingale: “and frequently turning (*trépōsa*), she pours forth her many-toned voice” *(Od. 19.521).* And if the wise men (*sophoi*) are wonderful at conversing, they also know how to express the same thought in many manners (*polloi tropoi*).
And understanding many manners (polloi tropoi) of speech, regarding this same thing they would be polytropoi. But if wise men (sophoi) are good <at conversing with> men, then because of this Homer said that Odysseus, being wise (sophos), was polytropos, because indeed he knew how to converse with men in many manners (polloi tropoi).

And thus Pythagoras is said to have thought it appropriate when making speeches to children, to pitch childish speeches to them, and to women, speech fitting for women, and for rulers, ruler-like speech, and for adolescents, adolescent speech; since to discover the suitable manner (tropos) of speech for each person is characteristic of wisdom (sophia); but it is characteristic of artlessness to use a single-manner (monotropos) of speech when addressing those of diverse character. Medicine is like this too, in the successful adjustment of the art, since the practice of the treatment is polytropos, on account of the varied constitutions of the patients. So certainly tropos is variability of character, highly versatile and adaptable. But many-manners (polytropia) of speech, and the changing (poikile) use of speech, becomes one-manner (monotropia) to changing (poikiliai) ears. This is because there is one appropriate manner of speech for each person. As a result, the adjustment for each person arranges the diversity (poikilia) of speech into a single element that is suitable for each. On the other hand, uniformity of speech, being unadjusted for different ears, is made polytropos, which is rejected by many people, as it is alien in manner (apotropos) to them.'
Porphyry, *Scholia T to the Odyssey* 7.257 Dindorf 347.13-22 (= Schr. note 69.2, 68.25) = DC 52b, SSR 188.

Porphyry, AD 234-c.305, philosopher and theologian, student of Plotinus, author of c. 70 titles including 'Isagoge', an introduction to Aristotle, and philological studies of Homer's works. His work on Homer is lost but fragments survive in multiple adaptations by scholiasts in the margins of manuscripts containing the Homeric epics.

- ἥδε ἔφασεν θήσειν ἀθάνατον (Od. 7.256-7)
  She (Calypso) declared that she would make me (Odysseus) immortal.

  καὶ διὰ τί μὴ βεβούληται;  ἔοικε διὰ τὸ (347.13)  
  καὶ διὰ τί μὴ βεβούληται;  ἔοικε διὰ τὸ

  δὴ λογον οὐν οὐ τὸ μὴ θέλειν γενέσαι ἀθάνατος, ἀλλὰ
  δὴ λογον οὐν οὐ τὸ μὴ θέλειν γενέσαι ἀθάνατος, ἀλλὰ

  τὸ μὴ πιστεύσαι αὐτῇ τοιαῦτα λεγούση.  ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἔφασεν ποιήσειν, ó δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστευεν, ἀλλὰ οὐχί πιστεύσων παρατεῖτο.  ἤδει γὰρ (15)  
  ἤδει γὰρ ἀλλὰ οὐχὶ πιστεύων παρατεῖτο.  ἤδει γὰρ

  ὡς σοφὸς ὅτι ἀθανασίαν οὐχ ἄι τοιαῦτα δαιμονες χαρίσαιντ' ἂν,
  ὡς σοφὸς ὅτι ἀθανασίαν οὐχ ἄι τοιαῦτα δαιμονες χαρίσαιντ' ἂν,

  ἄλλα τοῦ Διὸς ἀν εἰπ καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπαθανατιζεῖιν.  Ἀντισθένης δὲ φησιν ὅτι τους ἔρων υποκέιναι ἂν,  (5)  
  Ἀντισθένης δὲ φησιν ὅτι τους ἔρων υποκέιναι ἂν,

  ἄλλα του Διὸς ἀν εἰπ καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπαθανατιζεῖιν.  Ἀντισθένης δὲ φησιν ὅτι τους ἔρων υποκέιναι ἂν,  ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἀν εἰπ καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπαθανατιζεῖιν.  Ἀντισθένης δὲ φησιν ὅτι τους ἔρων υποκέιναι ἂν,

  τοῦτο γὰρ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο δίχα Διός.  ταῦτα γὰρ υπὸ τότα (20)  
  ταῦτα γὰρ υπὸ τότα

  ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων προτέθειει τὸν νόστον, ἵνα μᾶλλον υπακούσῃ Ἀλκίνοος.
  ἵνα μᾶλλον υπακούσῃ Ἀλκίνοος.

And why he was unwilling (to accept Calypso's offer)? It appears to be a result of the fact that she (Calypso) never persuaded him (Odysseus). For it is clear that it was not that he did not wish to become immortal, but rather that he did not believe her saying such things. Because she declared that she would do it, but he did not believe her, so not believing her, he declined her offer. For he knew, as he was clever, that such goddesses would not grant immortality, but it would be from Zeus, and from deeds of the kind that normally confer immortality. And Antisthenes says that he (Odysseus) knew that people in love make false promises; for she was unable to do this without Zeus’ consent. He (Odysseus) indeed spoke in this way because he put his home-coming before all other matters, so that Alcinoös might be more persuaded.
But she (Calypso) could never persuade the heart in his (Odysseus') breast.

Why did Odysseus not accept the immortality Calypso was offering him? Aristotle says, that Odysseus told these things to the Phaeacians so that he would appear more honourable and more eager about his home-coming than all other things. Since it suited him to be sent off more quickly. Secondly, it appears not to be the case that he said he did not accept such a gift because he was not persuaded by it, but rather because he did not believe her when she was saying such things. For while she declared that she would do it, he did not believe her, and not believing her, he declined her offer. And also, for a clever man immortality would not be something that such goddesses would grant, but rather it would be from Zeus, and from deeds of the kind that normally confer immortality. Such things should come from excellence. But by rejecting his family and his journey home for the promise of immortality he would have lost his excellence. And also, being together with her he would have lost both the immortality of his soul and his path up to the gods. So this teaches that by means of the opposite actions one would not enter into the opposite state, so that one would not receive justice by withholding it, nor would one achieve restraint through strife, nor through loving life in this way – it being mortal and perishable – would one achieve the goal of immortality, which is for a man who loves his duty and loves such deeds as purify the soul … … all of which the gods have (?) … … he had attained, but not the goal (of immortality/dying prosperous?).
Antisthenes says that that Odysseus, being clever, knew that people in love tell a lot of lies and promise the impossible. He also indicated the reason why he made the rejection of the goddess. For whereas she prided herself on the beautiful form and large size of her body, and she judged her attributes superior to Penelope’s – though he conceded this and yielded to something he was unsure of; it being unclear to him whether she was ‘immortal and ageless’ (Od. 5.218) – he indicated that he was seeking his wife because she was prudent, and that he would have ignored her too, if she had only embellished her body and her beauty. For this the suitors also often stated: ‘we do not go after other women, whom it would be possible for each of us to fittingly wed, but for the sake of her excellence we make our claims for her hand’ (Od. 2.206-7). The arguments of Calypso were as follows: ‘I confess that I am not inferior to her, neither in bodily form nor in stature, and nor is it fitting for mortal women to vie with an immortal in bodily form and beauty’ (Od. 5.211-3) – comparing only physical points with her. And the arguments of Odysseus: ‘I myself know very well that prudent Penelope is less impressive to look upon than you in both beauty and size. For she is mortal, whereas you are immortal and ageless’ (Od. 5.215-8). Since the expression ‘prudent Penelope’ holds a suggestion of a preference based on an inclination.
TH13d  Porphyry, *Scholia T to the Odyssey* 9.33 Dindorf 408.20-25 (= Schr. note 68.25).

- ἀλλ᾽ ἐµὸν οὐποτε θυµὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἐπείθον. (Od. 9.33)

  But they (Circe & Calypso) could never persuade the heart in my breast.

  ἰσως μὲν κατ᾽ ἄλλον λογισµὸν οὐκ ἐπείθετο ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, εἰδὼς τοὺς ἐρωταν πάντα μὲν ὑπισχνουµένους, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀθανασίας ὡς ἀδύνατον ὑπερηφάνειαν ὄντως µέντοι τοὺς Φαιάκας οὐχ ὡς ἀπιστῶν λέγει, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἀθανασίας καταφρονήσας πόθω τῆς πατρίδος· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰχεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἠθους [τῆς πατρίδος] σύστασιν.

3 ὀν ins. Polak  4 ἀπιστῶν Polak : ἄπιστον MSS  5 τῆς πατρίδος post ἠθους del. Polak

Perhaps there is another reason why Odysseus was not persuaded (by Calypso’s offer), namely, he knew that lovers promise everything, and knew that the granting of immortality to a human was impossible. To the Phaeacians, however, he did not say that he did not believe her, but that from longing for his fatherland he disdained even immortality. Since this showed the constitution of his character.

Porphyry, AD 234-c.305, philosopher and theologian, student of Plotinus, author of c. 70 titles including 'Isagoge', an introduction to Aristotle, and philological studies of Homer's works. His work on Homer is lost but fragments survive in multiple adaptations by scholiasts in the margins of manuscripts containing the Homeric epics.

How could he (Odysseus) say that the Cyclopes were *hyperphialoi* (imperious) and *athemistoi* (unrighteous) and *paranomoi* (transgressive), when he says that they have unstinting (Hes. *Op.* 118) blessings from the gods? One has to say that they are imperious because of their superiority of body, and they are unrighteous in so far as they are not subject to written law, because each is ruler of his own domain: 'Each one lays down the *themis* (law) for his children and wife' (Od. 9.115), which is an indication of a state of 'lawlessness'. Antisthenes says:

(Spk. 1) Polyphemus alone is unjust, and indeed he is truly contemptuous of Zeus. So are not the rest (of the Cyclopes) just? On account of which even the earth yields everything for them of her own accord (Hes. *Op.* 118; cf. Od. 9.108-11). And the fact that they do not work her is also a just deed.

(Spk. 2) But he said earlier that they were violent: 'They (the Cyclopes) kept plundering them (the Phaeacians), and were greater in strength than them' (Od. 6.6).

(Spk. 1) Just as he also said regarding the Giants: he (Eurymedon the Phaeacian) 'was king over the imperious giants' (Od. 7.59).

(Spk. 2) Even as he also said that the Phaeacians, continually being harmed by them, emigrated (Od. 6.7-8).

(Spk. 1) But this happened on account of the dissimilarity of their polity.
Hyperphialon (imperious): natural greatness in physique; for the expression is of the 'double-meaning' (disēmos) category.

They are athemistoi (unrighteous) since they are not subject to laws. For he (Odysseus) said 'each one lays down the themis (law) for his children and wives' (Od. 9.115). For if athemistoi (unrighteous) is standing for adikoi (unjust), how could he say: 'they trust in the gods' (Od. 9.107)?

And what if someone should ask: 'How can Polyphemus say “For the Cyclopes pay no heed to aegis-bearing Zeus” (Od. 9.275)?'

Let him consider the character (of the person speaking), as it is the character of Polyphemus the raw-flesh-eater and savage. Also Hesiod (Op. 277-9)

(Cronus has decreed this law for mankind,) that fish and beasts and winged birds should devour each other, since there is no justice in them, but to mankind he gave justice.

So he (Antisthenes, cf. TH14a 6) says that Polyphemus alone is arrogant and unjust, but all the rest of the Cyclopes are pious and just and trusting in the gods, and hence the earth causes crops to spring up for them of her own accord (Hes. Op. 118; cf. Od. 9.108-11).

Hyperphialōn (imperious). 'Athemistōn (unrighteous'). They (the Antisthenians) state that this is not said congruently (with the rest of the poem), because he (Antisthenes) says, that to understand that such great gifts are given by the gods to unrighteous beings is incongruous. It is solved by the expression. Since the word 'hyperphialon' is applied to those who are great and superior. Otherwise the suitors would not have said of themselves: 'are you not content to be feasting at your ease with us, the Hyperphialoi?' (*Od.* 21.289). The word 'athemiston', they say, refers to not being subject to *thesmoi* (laws) in common, as in:

They have neither counselling assemblies nor established laws (themistes),
but they dwell on lofty mountain peaks
in hollow caves, and each one sets the laws (themisteues)
for his children and wives (*Od.* 9.112-5).

So it is clear that they use rules, just not in common.
How, when the Cyclops (Polyphemus) says earlier 'For the Cyclopes pay no heed to Aegis-bearing Zeus, nor to the blessed gods, since we are much better than them' (Od. 9.275-6), does he (Homer) conversely make the Cyclopes say 'Disease which comes from mighty Zeus cannot be avoided; but you (Polyphemus) should indeed pray to our Father Poseidon' (Od. 9.411-2)? For it seems to be an antithesis, i.e. he (Homer) is not saying the same things about the same things. For not attending to the gods would reasonably be characteristic of mightier beings, but on the other hand attending to them would be characteristic of weaker beings. Again it is solved by the character of the people speaking. That the Cyclopes are far better than the gods, Polyphemus asserted to Odysseus, but none of the other Cyclopes asserted that the Cyclopes are mightier than the gods. So if the poet asserted this, or he (Polyphemus) asserted it in the poet’s work, they would be antithetical cases. And since the speakers are different, one must consider to whom he (the poet) assigned the more foolish arguments. And it is clear that he does this to Polyphemus, who was not like-minded with the others and was not in agreement about the glory of the gods. Since 'he was a shepherd', as the poet says, 'far away, he roamed about not with the others, but living far apart, he was unrighteous' (Od. 9.188-9). And so since 'he was unrighteous' (Od. 9.428) in matters concerning the gods he supposed that the other Cyclopes also held the same beliefs as he did, but it happened that, being better than him in respect to their nature, they did not hold the same opinions as him. For about these matters, the poet says 'they trust in the immortal gods' (Od. 9.107).
And they pay no heed to each other' (Od. 9.115).

Hence the poet (Homer) charges the Cyclopes with being unjust and transgressive, as they do not give thought for each other.

Yet he (Homer) implies more, that it is because of their very great justice, and the fact that they do not covet each other’s property or otherwise treat each other unjustly, that they do not need to have care for each other. That this is the case is clear from what happened to Polyphemus – everyone came together at his shouting (Od. 9.401).

Some explain the 'they pay no heed to each other' thus: they do not pay attention to each other in so far as subjection is concerned. For each one is his own ruler (cf. Od. 9.115) and not subjected to another.

Taking the cheeses' (Od. 9.225): the companions urged me to carry off as big a load as each man was able to carry of the discovered cheeses, he (Odysseus) said. From these things the justice of the Cyclopes is clear, from the fact that the cave was effortlessly discovered to be full of cheeses and livestock. Since the Cyclops (Polyphemus) knew that none of the native inhabitants (i.e. the other Cyclopes) would rob him.
For the Cyclopes don't (heed) Zeus: Being impious, Polyphemus also maligns the rest. For that they were not ungodly, the poet shows by comparison, saying: 'disease which comes from mighty Zeus cannot be avoided' (Od. 9.411). That, however, Polyphemus is not like-minded with the others is shown by comparison with what the poet says about him: 'he was a shepherd far away, he roamed about not with the others, but living far apart, he was unrighteous' (Od. 9.189).

They pay no heed to Aegis-bearing Zeus': Polyphemus makes his personal fault common. For that the other Cyclopes are not ungodly, he (the poet) says: 'disease which comes from mighty Zeus cannot be avoided' (Od. 9.411).

They were just except for Polyphemus. Whence 'hyperphialoi' as used here means 'large', and 'athemistoi' means 'they had no need of laws', because 'each one laid down the themis (law) for his children and wife' (Od. 9.115). And why did they wrong the Phaeacians and harry them if they were just? On account of the dissimilarity of their polity.

Hyperphialoi (Imperious): they are athemistoi (unrighteous) by not being subject to laws. And if the Cyclopes trusted in the gods, how is it that Polyphemus pays no heed? Consider the character, that it is the voice of Polyphemus, who is cruel and savage.
They trust in the gods: for they (the Antisthenians) say that by way of the temperate nature of the climate the gods provide for them because they are their descendants, 'since we are near of kin to them' (Od. 7.205), or because of their (the Cyclopes') justness. For Polyphemus alone was unjust. 'For living far apart, he was unrighteous' (Od. 9.189) and 'he shepherded alone' (Od. 9.188), and of the others 'each lays down the themis (law) for his children and wife (Od. 9.115). Which is why, not even after they opened his cave were they prying into what happened to him. And they consult oracles (Od. 9.510) and honour the gods. 'But you should indeed pray to our Father Lord Poseidon' (Od. 9.412).

All the Cyclopes are noble and honour the gods apart from Polyphemus, who was their leader, which is why he (Homer) also says that the Cyclopes are hyperphialoi (imperious). But he also says they are athemisloi (unrighteous), not because they are adikoi (unjust), but because they had no need of themis (rights) or nomos (law) in order to discover the noble way of doing things – since they were noble.

Apollonius, 1st c. AD, compiler famous for his Homeric lexicon.

ἀθεµίστων· ἐν τῇ Ὀδυσσείᾳ ἐπὶ τῶν Κυκλώπων ἐπιθέτου

λεγοµένου 'Κυκλώπων δ' ἐς γαϊάν υπερφιάλων ἀθεµίστων' (Od. 9.106), ὁ γοῦν Ἡλιόδωρος Ἀρισταρχείως μεταφράζων φησί, 'καθὸ οὐ κοι

νοίς χρῶνται νόµοι'. ὁ γοῦν Ἀρίσταρχος λέγει δικαίους εἴναι τοὺς Κυκλώπας ἐκτός τοῦ Πολυφήµου' φησί γοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν 'θεµι

σεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἣδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν' (Od. 9.114-5).

ὁ δὲ Κύκλωψ ἄκ τῆς ἰδίας ἀσεβείας περὶ αὐτῶν φησιν 'οὐ

γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοι ἀλέγουσιν' ὅπερ ψεῦδος· αὐτοὶ

γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ λέγοντες 'εἰ µὲν δὴ µήτις σε βιάζεσθαι οἶον ἕντα,

νούσον δ' οὕτως ἔστι Θεός µεγάλου ἀλέασθαι' (Od. 9.410-1) καὶ ἐστὶν ὁ ὅλος ὁ τόπος οὕτως τῶν προβληµάτων.

Athemistōn: In book 9 of the *Odyssey* it is said as an epithet to the Cyclopes 'to the land of the Cyclopes, hyperphialoi athemistoi' (Od. 9.106), Heliodorus, at least, interpreting it in Aristarchan style, says 'in so far as they were not subject to laws in common'. At any rate, Aristarchus says that the Cyclopes are just, apart from Polyphemus; at least he says about them 'each one lays down the themis for his children and wife, paying no heed to one another' (Od. 9.114-5). And it is a result of his personal impiety that the Cyclops says about them (the other Cyclopes): 'For the Cyclopes pay no heed to Aegis-bearing Zeus' (Od. 9.275). This is false. For it is they (the Cyclopes) who say 'If then, no one is doing violence to you, being alone as you are, disease which comes from mighty Zeus cannot be avoided' (Od. 9.410-1). And the entirety of this topic is from *The Problems*.

Hyperphialoi: And men who are surpassing in terms of excellence are also referred to by these words, for example, when one of the suitors said: 'with us, the hyperphialoi'. Since they would not have spoken badly about themselves. And he made the Cyclopes apart from Polyphemus just, and the phrase 'Cyclopes were hyperphialoi and athemistoi on the earth' meant that they were not subject to laws in common.
When beginning his story about the Cyclopes, Odysseus – the mode of representation of the poet changes (i.e. fictional to factual) from the story of the stranger-loving Lotus-eaters to those stranger-hating people – says: 'We came to the land of the Cyclopes who are hyperphialoi athemistoi. Trusting in the immortal gods they do not plant crops by their own hand, nor plough. But unspoken and unploughed all these things spring up, wheat and barley and vines, which bear wine from fine grapes. And the rain of Zeus makes these grow for them' (Od. 9.106-11). Things which indeed, summarising, The Geographer (i.e. Strabo) says: 'Cyclopes harvest spontaneously-growing crops' (Str. 13.1.25.21-2). And since the poet describes the specific character of the country in this way, as if this island too was one of the Isles of the Blessed – for the Isle of the Cyclopes is celebrated for its prosperity in proverbs, as is also Egypt and Arabia – he sets forth yet further what sort of people the Cyclopic islanders are, saying: 'They have neither counselling assemblies nor established laws (themistes), but they dwell on lofty mountain peak in hollow caves, and each one sets the laws (themisteues) for his children and wives, nor do they pay heed to one another' (Od. 9.112-5). And this is their situation: they (the Cyclopes) are athemistoi; they hold nothing in common; they do not publicly lay down laws formed by common counsel or discussion, but each does so for his own household. So being not simply 'athemistoi' they also 'trust in the gods' (Od. 9.107) and have elicited the proverbial saying, that from divine favour the unspoken and unploughed earth puts forth everything for the blessed, so in a certain sense they were 'athemistoi' but in another sense they had themis.
This phrase the poet constructs in the genitive case, not in an unqualified sense, according to later writers (i.e. the Antisthenians), and who also otherwise (claim that the poet) pointedly says 'athemistoi' because they (the Cyclopes) did not use common laws. If they were just in harrying the Phaeacians – at one time they were neighbours, as was written earlier (Od. 6.6) – they (the Antisthenians) say this is because their polity was dissimilar. Since the Phaeacians co-operated with one another either by the custom of aristocracy, or even democratically. But the Cyclopes were not such people. Even if the Cyclopes are said therein to 'trust in the gods' (Od. 9.107), Polyphemus in the following lines says 'the Cyclopes do not heed Zeus as they are superior' (Od. 9.275). He says this falsely – indeed wicked men accuse good men along with themselves, or even present them as like themselves – since the rest of the Cyclopes are represented as god-reverencing; they both looked with awe upon disease from Zeus and knew how to pray. And it is clear that later writers called the Cyclopes 'Leontinians' (e.g. Strabo 1.2.9.20), and that they were brigands and savage, and that the earth was rich for them, just as was most of Sicily. And the ancients also say that just as Aeolus held sway over the islands around Lipara, so also the Cyclopes and the Laestrygonians, being unwelcoming sorts, held sway over the lands around Leontini and Etna. 'Wherefore also the strait (of Messina) was unapproachable' (Strabo 1.2.9.21-2) for most. Indeed the poet, they say, though he did not invent everything, nor always conjure from nothing a long tale of wonder, he did also add a certain amount of myth to the facts therein.
And hyperphialoi is double-meaning, as also written earlier, it does not seem to be put here as disapproval, but rather referring to their physique it signifies the natural greatness of the Cyclopes, as to be sure the suitors also called themselves hyperphialoi. Thus also athemistoi does not imply hubris as it does now, but it is in an historical meaning, as it was characteristic of the Cyclopes to have neither laws nor character in common, as was stated, nor did they strive after profit in common, because they did not have a government in common, but, as stated, they were household-rulers. And note well that athemistoi is also double-meaning, signifying both a person who knows themis (right) but does not practice it, in which case an athemistoi person would be the same as as an unjust person; and signifying a person who has absolutely no experience of themis (right), such as the Homeric Cyclopes. And that, where there is no themis (Od. 2.68-9), rightly, there are not the 'counselling assemblies' (Od. 9.112), if indeed themis both dissolves and establishes assemblies of men. It is clear that a later person being called athemistoi signified something other than the Homeric athemistoi here.

... ... ...

1.326.15 τὸ δὲ ὑπερφιάλων δίσηµον ὡς καὶ προγέγραπται, 35 ὀὐ δοκεῖ ἐπὶ ψόγῳ ἐνταῦθα κεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ σῶµα δηλοῦν. ὡς τῶν Κυκλώπων, ὡς που καὶ οἱ µνηστῆρες ὑπερφιάλους καλοῦσιν ἕαυτος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεύσεται, ὡς καὶ οἱ µνηστῆρες ὑπερφιάλους καλοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀθεµίστων οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει κεῖται νῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἱστορίας εἴετε, ὡς τῶν Κυκλώπων µήτε νόµους µήτε θέµιν µὴ εἶναι καὶ κατὰ σῶµα δηλοῦν µεγαλοφυὲς τῶν Κυκλώπων, ὥς που καὶ οἱ µνηστῆρες ὑπερφιάλους καλοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀθεµίστων οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει κεῖται νῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἱστορίας εἴετε, ὡς καὶ οἱ µνηστῆρες ὑπερφιάλους καλοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ... ... ...

1.326.23 ... ... ...

1.326.26 τὸ δὲ 'οἳ θεῷ πεποιθότες ἀθανάτῳ (Od. 9.107-14) οὔτε φυτεύουσι καὶ ἑξῆς ἔως τοῦ, 'ναίοσιν ἐν σπέσι γλαφυροίσι, πρέπει τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡµᾶς ἀναχωρηταῖς. οἵ καὶ αὐτοὶ πόλεις µὲν φυγόντες, ὀρέων δὲ ναίοντες κάρηνα ἐν σπηλαίοις, οὔτε φυτεύουσιν, οὔτὲ ἄλλο τῶν ἐφεξῆς ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄσπαρτα καὶ ἀνὴροτα ἔχουσιν ἄνωθεν τὰ καλὰ, αὐτοκράτορες ὅντες ἑαυτῶν, καὶ τρόπον άθεµιστος οὐ µὴν ἀθεµίστως ἔχοντες.

168
SYMPOTICA

Sy1 Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.1407a 9-12 Cope; = DC 157, SSR 51.
Aristotle is giving a list of examples from known authors of simile and metaphor.
καὶ ὡς Ἀντισθένης Ἐρευνόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῷ εἴκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφράινει.

And just as Antisthenes likened Kephisodotos, 'the skinny', to incense, because it was by being destroyed that he gave pleasure.

Sy2 Plutarch, Vita Pericles 1.5 Ziegler; = DC 158, SSR 102.

Plutarch, c. AD 45-125, author of the parallel lives, and moralising, ethical, philosophical treatises.

διὸ καλῶς µὲν Ἀντισθένης ἀκούσας ὅτι σπουδαῖός ἐστιν αὐλητής Ἰσµηνίας ἀλλ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἔφη 'µοχθηρός˙ οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω σπουδαῖος ἦν αὐλητής.'

Antisthenes therefore put it well, when after being told that Ismenias was an excellent piper, said 'But the man is a scoundrel; otherwise he would not be such an excellent piper.'

Sy3 Diogenes Laertius 6.6 Dorandi; = DC 159, SSR 101.

Diogenes Laertius, probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD.

εἰπόντος αὐτῷ τινος παρὰ πότον, 'ᾆσον,' 'σύ µοι,' φησίν 'αὔλησον.'

When someone said to him (Antisthenes) over wine 'Sing!' He said 'You accompany me on the pipes!'

Sy4 Photius, Lexicon s.v. (ο685) Theodoridis; = DC 121, SSR 65.

Photius of Byzantium, c. AD 810-893, Patriarch of Constantinople, scholarly author of Βιβλιοθήκη, Library (c. 876), a mini-history of Greek literature, and a lexicon that drew entries from several earlier lexica.

οὐροδόκην. τὴν ἀµίδα Ξενοφ άνης οὔριον δὲ βῖκον Ἀντισθένης.

Ξενοφάνης Bossi : Ξενοφόν MSS

Οuroidokēn: Xenophanes (uses the word for) the amis (piss-pot). But Antisthenes (uses) urine bikos (another type of piss-pot).

Sy5 Pollux, Onomasticon 10.68.10-12 Bethe 2.209; = DC 18a, SSR 64.

Iulius Pollux, of Naucratis, fl. late 2nd c. AD; Onomasticon largely a thesaurus of terms.

τὸ δὲ καλούµενον κυρίλλιον πρὸς τῶν Ἀσιανῶν βοµβύλιον µὲν Ἀντισθένης εἰρήκεν ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ, οἳ δὲ καὶ σύστοµον αὐτὸ ὀνοµάζουσιν.

That which is called a 'kyrillion', is called by the Asians a 'bombulios', as indeed Antisthenes said in his Protreptikos / Exhortation, and they also call it 'narrow-mouthed'.

169
Pollux, *Onomasticon* 6.98.14-99.1 Bethe 2.28; = DC 18b, SSR 64.

βοµβυλιός δὲ, τὸ στενὸν ἔκπωµα καὶ βοµβοῦν ἐν τῇ πόσει ὡς Ἀντισθένης ἐν Προτρεπτικῷ.

But the *bombulios*, the narrow cup, also resonates during drinking, as Antisthenes says in his *Protreptikos* / *Exhortation*.

Scholia from the end of the 2nd century AD or earlier. The lemma the scholiast is commenting on is from the episode where the argonauts sent a dove between the clashing rocks at the end of the Bosphorus, and they resonated as they came together.

ἐβόµβεον· ἤχουν. θὰν καὶ βοµβυλιός εἰδος µελίσσης, καὶ ποτηρίου δὲ εἶδος, ὡς Ἀντισθένης παραδίδωσιν· ἔστι δὲ στενοτράχηλον.

βοµβυλιός Keil : -υλιοὶ L : -ύλη P

They resonated: they reverberated. Whence also comes ‘*bombulios*’, a type of bee (i.e. bumblebee), and also a type of cup, as Antisthenes transmits. And it is narrow-necked.

†βοµβυλίον ὅπερ τ . . . ον ἐπικέκληται διακλύστερον.

570b from the third letter Deicke read τ . . ερον, Keil toioûton, Wendel suspects βοµβυλιός τὸ ποτήριον, ἐπικέκληται δ᾽ καὶ διακλύστερον.

*Bombulios* is that thing which is called a *diaklusterion* (wine-cooler).

Or from Wendel’s conjectured text in the apparatus:

A *bombulios* is a cup, but it is also called a *diaklusterion* (wine-cooler).

Athenaeus of Naucratis, fl. c. AD 200, authored *Δειπνοσοφισταί* ('The Learned Banqueters').

Βοµβυλιός, θηρίκλειον Ῥοδιακόν, οὗ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας Σωκράτης φησίν· 'οἱ µὲν ἐκ φιάλης πίνοντες ὅσον θέλουσι τάχιστ᾽ ἀπαλλαγήσονται, οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ βοµβυλιοῦ κατὰ µικρὸν στάζοντος . . . '. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ζῷόν τι.

The *bombulios*, a Rhodian cup made by Thericles, concerning whose form Socrates says: 'People drinking as much as they desire from a bowl, will go off (or get away) very quickly, but those drinking from a *bombulios*, dripping only a little at a time . . . '. It is also a creature (i.e. bumblebee).
Sy10 Aelius Aristides, Oration 49.30-33 (Ἱερῶν λόγων Γ) Keil; = DC 41, SSR 197.

Aelius Aristides, AD 117- after 177, aspiring orator from Mysia. Severe illness forced him into a long convalescence at the Healing Sanctuary of Asclepius at Pergamum, during which he had religious experiences that he wrote about in a series of sacred discourses (among many other works).

I seemed to read a certain excellent book, the details of which – for I will tell the same old story again – I would not be able to recount. For how indeed could I, so much later, especially as my record obviated the need to commit it to memory?  But the following contents were at the end of the book; it was said, as it were, concerning some competitor in a contest:

'When the god had reckoned up all these things and seeing that the flow carried on copiously, he ordered the drinking of water and the abstention from wine, if one desired at all to win.

"Which things," he said, "if you imitate them, even you can be crowned as victor, or share in the crown".'

That's what he said there. Next, subjoined to the work was the title Lover of Crowns, or The Crown Lover.

For what extent of time I endured the drinking of water, this I cannot say; because it was pleasant and easy, when previously water was always somehow unbearable and nauseating. So when this duty had been performed, he released me from water, and assigned me a measure of wine, and in fact the word was a 'half royal'. Of course it was intelligible that he meant a half-cup. I used this, and it sufficed, as previously twice the amount did not suffice. And there are even times when I had wine left over, because I was sparing from fear that it would run out.

171
Nor indeed did I make use of this set-aside portion on the next day, but from the outset it was necessary to be content with the set measure.

And when he had also conducted this trial, he freed me again to drink as much as I wanted to, and he made light of it, saying:

'it would be foolish for men who have plenty not to dare to make free use of what they have.'

And this same book seemed to be Antisthenes' Concerning Use. It referred to wine, and there were certain tokens of Dionysus present too.
COMMENTARY
DIALOGICA VARIA

Introduction

This section contains fragments of dialogue, some of which hint at a variety of other literary genres and thereby showcase Antisthenes’ extraordinary originality and versatility.

Rather than trying to guess which actual 'titles' of Antisthenes' they may have fallen under, instead they have been grouped according to the main speaker of the dialogue, or the person who was the subject of the dialogue. The categories are:

  Socratic Dialogues

  Contemporary Dialogues

  Mythic Dialogues

  Erotic Dialogues

Named Dialogues

Several fragments in the following groupings refer to the titles of eight works of Antisthenes as 'dialogues':

  Little Cyrus

  Lesser Heracles

  Alcibiades

  Truth

  Exhortations

  Sathôn

  The Statesman

  Archelaus
Antisthenes’ characters in dialogue

It is well established that Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues, that is, dialogues in which Socrates was one of the interlocutors and also probably the principal interlocutor. Several contemporaries of Antisthenes’ were also engaged in this category of dialogue writing, most notably Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines Socraticus (cf. SD2). What the fragments here reveal, very interestingly, is that Antisthenes also seems to have written many dialogues in which non-Greek contemporary figures and mythic characters were speakers.

SOCRATIC DIALOGUES  SD1-7

This class of dialogue, in which Socrates is one of the principal interlocutors, is the most well known style of dialogue from the period in which the prose dialogue form was born. In fact the Socratics, apart from Antisthenes, seem to have almost exclusively used this form. A further Antisthenic fragment outside this group, Sy9, also preserves direct speech from Socrates in a sympotic setting.

The fragments of Socratic dialogue come from a wide range of contexts. One has Socrates expounding on the theory of education ‘the beginning of education is the examination of names (ὀνόματα)’ (SD7). Another has Socrates discussing with a stranger the award of the aristeia to Alcibiades (SD4). A further fragment is especially interesting because it has Socrates speaking to Antisthenes (SD6). Theopompus implies that Antisthenes wrote himself, rather persuasively, into his own dialogues (SD3), and all of the Erotic Dialogue fragments (ED1-6) also have Antisthenes himself speaking. Perhaps all of Antisthenes’ Socratic dialogues featured Antisthenes himself as an interlocutor with his closest friend, Socrates (see further discussion in ch. 4.ii section C).

SD1. As Plato’s dialogues are all Socratic (with the exception of the Laws), this offers near contemporary evidence confirming not only that Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues, but that some people believed that Plato had plagiarised Antisthenes’ work. By extension, this also means that Theopompus believed that Antisthenes’ dialogues were earlier than Plato’s.
SD2. This offers evidence that Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues and was thought to be one of only four close associates of Socrates to have produced ‘genuine’ (ἀληθεῖς) Socratic dialogues. By ‘genuine’ here Panaetius probably means that they contained first hand experience of the historic Socrates and (at least reasonably) faithfully reported his thought, as opposed to being later (purely) fictional creations by authors who had no immediate knowledge of Socrates or his ideas. It is interesting to note that a second of the four writers of genuine dialogues, Aeschines, was accused by Persaeus (CD6) of plagiarising Antisthenes’ work (as was Plato, SD1). This of course suggests that Persaeus believed, as did Theopompus (SD1), that Antisthenes was writing before Aeschines.

SD3. This fragment is included in this group for the style of content it suggests. It offers evidence that the nature of Antisthenes’ style of dialogic engagement in written discourse was more than a little ‘Socratic’. According to Antisthenes’ contemporary, Theopompus, this fragment states that Antisthenes was ‘skilful, especially at leading on (ὑπαγαγέσθαι) absolutely anyone at all to conclusions for his own advantage by means of smooth discourse’. Here, to give the right sense, the translation ‘leading on for conclusions for his own advantage’ is being drawn out of ὑπάγεσθαι. In the active sense, ὑπάγω (LSJ s.v. III) has the sense ‘lead on by degrees’ or ‘draw or lead on by art or deceit’. While in the middle voice it has the sense ‘lead on for one’s own advantage’. So this seems to say that Antisthenes wrote himself into his dialogues, and portrayed himself as being able to manoeuvre anyone at all to come to the conclusion he desired. This quality appears to be the same as Socrates’ reputed ability at ἔλεγχος, or ‘cross-examination’, which generally amounted to the ability to drive anyone at all into a corner of his choosing through argumentation and refutation. Certainly, in the case of Plato’s Socrates, this is one of his defining traits. The way Xenophon portrays Antisthenes and Socrates, it appears that this argumentative quality actually was somewhat more prominent in Antisthenes. Particularly in the Symposium Socrates is generally convivial and good natured, whereas Antisthenes is the one regularly cross-examining the other guests, including Socrates himself (see further discussion in ch. 1.iii section I). This agrees with Aristophanes’ portrayal of Socrates and his students in the
Clouds, where it was his students or associates, more so than Socrates himself, who were most combative (see further ch. 4.i Section C). Xenophon may of course have been playing down the most annoying aspects of Socrates that lead to him being killed. If Xenophon’s depiction is accurate, however, then it may suggest that Plato’s Socrates was modelled to a greater or lesser extent on Antisthenes’ self-portraiture in his own dialogues.

SD4-5. The first of these fragments incorporates an attractive snippet of Antisthenic dialogue featuring Socrates as a speaker. The interlocutor, who receives the other two lines, is a xenos, ‘stranger’, identified when Socrates addresses him in the vocative: ὦ ξένε (7). As well as this vocative, the lines contain other elements typical of dialogue, including an imperative (εὐφήµει, 7) and a conversational particle (γε, 8).

The other figure mentioned in their conversation is Alcibiades, however, there is no way of establishing what work of Antisthenes this dialogue originated from. Although there is a work attributed to Antisthenes titled Alcibiades (DL 6.18) that does not provide any sure guidance, as Alcibiades is also mentioned in reference to a dialogue titled The Lesser Cyrus (CD10) a title itself which is not a match for any of the four titles mentioning Cyrus listed by Diogenes (6.16 & 18).

The topic under discussion in this fragment is the aristeia, the prize for valour that was awarded after the battle of Delium in Boeotia (424 BC). In this piece of dialogue the stranger suggests that Socrates won the prize, Socrates cautions him that the prize is Alcibiades’, and the stranger counters that it was actually Socrates who did the awarding of the prize.

As the introductory remarks in the fragment suggest, Herodicus was more than dubious about the claim that Alcibiades won the aristeia. In the text just preceding this fragment Herodicus in fact denies that Alcibiades was involved in the campaign at all and argues that Socrates himself never left Attica apart from one trip to the Isthmus (Ath. 216b). The mention of Plato in the fragment (1) is no doubt referring to the Charmides, in which Socrates claimed that he was present at the Battle of Potidaea and in the thick of the fighting.
(153b-c) and the *Symposion* where Alcibiades says that Socrates gave up the prize for valour (220e). Clay has plausibly suggested (1994, 30) that the award by Alcibiades of a crown to Socrates (*Smp*. 212b-223a) is Plato's response to Socrates' award of a trophy to Alcibiades in Antisthenes' *Alcibiades*. Herodicus' key evidence for refuting the historicity of Alcibiades' *aristeia* is that Thucydides describes the battle (1.62-5), but fails to mention Socrates' or Alcibiades' role in it. Thucydides was not in the habit, however, of mentioning every person known to have been present at a battle. There is also evidence that he did not think much of 'Socratic' methods (see ch. 4.i section C 'Thucydides'), so he could well have passed over Socrates' role intentionally. Additionally, there is historical evidence that discounts Herodicus' argument. Alcibiades the Younger, in a public defence speech, mentions his father being crowned and receiving the prize for valour after Potidaea as though it is a well known fact (Isoc. 16.29-30).

The second fragment in this pair, *SD5*, refers to the same episode. When it states that the prize for valour fell to Socrates 'by the most just account' (τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ) this appears to mean the account of Antisthenes and/or Plato. Certainly both these authors infer that Socrates was the winner of the prize by right, but effectively 'awarded' it to Alcibiades. Plato's account, however, only mentions that Socrates was 'more eager' in recommending the prize to Alcibiades than the generals themselves, who were already well inclined to do so (*Smp*. 220e). It therefore appears that Plutarch had access to an account other than Plato's since this fragment mentions Socrates' desire to increase Alcibiades' standing, his bearing witness, and the crowning and bestowing of the panoply. The other account Plutarch was relying on seems most likely to have been Antisthenes'. *SD4* might imply a further development of the dialogue which would have included relevant details, as the stranger enumerated the steps of Socrates' role in the awarding of the *aristeia*, in the face of Socrates' continued protests to the contrary.

Being from the close of the 2nd century BC, *SD4* contains what is apparently the earliest reference to Antisthenes as 'Κύων', pre-dating Diogenes Laertius (first half 3rd cent. AD). Although the terms κυνικός 'dog-like', i.e. Cynic, or κυνισµός 'Cynic philosophy or mode
of living’ are derived from κύων, and all three terms were applied to Diogenes of Sinope and Crates of Thebes,\textsuperscript{237} it is unlikely to have that meaning here. The reference in this case is most likely purely derogatory, lending a sense such as ‘this bastard’ (as per Olson’s Loeb translation).

**SD6.** This fragment has a passage from a dialogue wherein Socrates is speaking to Antisthenes. It was implied in fragment **SD3** (cf. commentary above) that Antisthenes wrote himself, rather persuasively, into his own dialogues, and in fact a number of other fragments (**ED1-6**) present Antisthenes as a speaker. As speculated earlier (ch. 4.ii section C) it may be the case that all of Antisthenes’ Socratic dialogues portrayed Antisthenes in conversation with his great friend and mentor.

While the historical topic of this fragment is rather morbid, i.e. the murder of the opponents of Thirty Tyrants, the comparison it draws with tragedy is rather witty. Socrates points out that the great figures from tragedy always came to a grisly end, but the chorus was never subjected to such a fate. He is therefore implying that he and Antisthenes are merely ‘common folk’ and as such should be grateful that they never really ‘made it’ in life in terms of fame and fortune, as that ought to mean they will be spared from slaughter themselves.

Ironically, in Socrates’ own case this turned out ultimately not to be the case and it is therefore likely that Socrates is being self-deprecating and ironic. The way the passage is written, however, Socrates is perhaps shown as genuinely innocent of the very real threat against him from the Thirty which arose from his defiance of their orders. So it is possible that this passage of dialogue was set, and written, in the year 404 or early 403 – after the Thirty had come to power, but before they had ordered Socrates to arrest Leon of Salamis. In Plato’s *Apology* Socrates claims that he knew full well that he risked death by walking away without carrying out the Thirty Tyrants’ orders to arrest Leon, and it was only their overthrow soon after that saved his life (32c-e).

\textsuperscript{237} See ch. 2.i, especially section D.
This fragment is included because it has a direct quotation from Socrates, which suggests that it was a line given to him in a dialogue. Successive questions are asked in this fragment:

But does Antisthenes not say so? Who is it who wrote ‘the beginning of education is the examination of names (ὀνόματα)’? Did Socrates not say so?

It appears likely that Antisthenes is the author referred to ‘who wrote’, and if Socrates said the words, then these words must have been written in a dialogue. This then appears to be a fragment of Socratic dialogue written by Antisthenes.

The passage of Xenophon referred to is apparently from the *Memorabilia*. There, although Xenophon does not specifically use the word ὄνομα (name), he does describe Socrates’ habit of discussing things according to their kind (κατὰ γένη, 4.5.12) as well as his unceasing persistence in examining with his students ‘what any given thing is’ (τί ἐκαστον εἶν τῶν ὄντων, 4.6.1). The fact that ὄνομα appears in this fragment but was not used by Xenophon, and that Antisthenes is mentioned, lends extra credence to the argument that this fragment quoting Socrates was from a dialogue of Antisthenes.

Antisthenes seems to have built on the Socratic principle of examining things to discover what they are. Diogenes Laertius (6.3 = DC 45, SSR 151) states that Antisthenes ‘was the first to define logos (account/definition/description), saying, “logos is that which reveals something’s essence”’ (λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν); cf. LSJ εἰμί F.1.: ‘in the Aristotelian formula τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (Apo. 82b38, al.), used to express the essential nature of a thing’. This statement attributed to Antisthenes may also have been a line in a dialogue, also probably delivered by Socrates.
From this trio of fragments we learn the name of five of Antisthenes’ dialogues, all of which probably contained his contemporaries as speakers. These titles are *Truth*, *Protreptic Dialogue* or *Dialogues, Physiognomy*, *The Statesman*, and *The Archelaus*.

Apparently *The Archelaus* contained an attack on Gorgias the orator (CD3). If Gorgias featured as a speaker in the dialogue that may help to explain the comment in CD1 that Antisthenes ‘was a student of Gorgias’. We are not told by whom or on what basis the attack on Gorgias in *The Archelaus* was made. The fact, however, that ‘Gorgias the orator’ is specified, rather than simply ‘Gorgias’, suggests that it was in his capacity as a rhetorician that he was being censured in Antisthenes’ text. This idea is supported by the fact that the *Archelaus* is mentioned at the same time as *The Statesman* which attacks politicians.

Furthermore Plato’s dialogue of the same name – viz. *Gorgias* – is essentially an attack on rhetoric, and coincidentally it criticises Archelaus himself, whose seemingly happy but in reality ‘bad’ life Plato compares unfavourably with Socrates’ life which was ‘just’ and ‘best’.

With the sparse remaining evidence, it is difficult to know how meaningful this coincidence is. In Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue the work is listed as *Archelaus, or, Concerning Kingship*, (6.18) – there is further speculation on its possible contents in the commentary on CD13-14 below.

Antisthenes’ general disdain for orators is further evinced in CD3, which reports his attack in *The Statesman* on all the demagogues in Athens. Given Antisthenes’ attacks on flatterers, and the damning character sketch of them he builds up (cf. MD9-13 below), it is tempting to imagine that *The Statesman* also contained a scathing, generalising characterisation of politicians. *The Statesman* does not appear in Diogenes Laertius’ list of Antisthenes’ works, but perhaps it equates to *Περὶ νόμου ἢ περὶ πολιτείας*, *Concerning Law* or *Concerning Government*, listed in the ‘third volume’ (DL 6.16). However the verity of all of these titles is uncertain, as is the question of whether they refer to discrete dialogues or only excerpts (see further ch. 6).
The work listed as *Protreptic Dialogue* (CD2) and *Protreptic Dialogues* (CD1) is almost certainly one and the same. Diogenes Laertius lists a work for Antisthenes titled Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος, Concerning Justice and Courage: a Protreptic Dialogue, first, second, and third book (6.16). The brief quotation from the *Protreptic Dialogue*, 'being reared instead of piglets' (CD2) is the sort of colourful expression found in dialogue. The *Physiognomy* (CD2) is presumably the same work listed by Diogenes as Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωµονικός, Concerning the Sophists: on Physiognomy (6.16). The comment preserved – 'For indeed those women force-feed the piglets' – is the sort of colourful language suited to a dialogue but in what context is difficult to guess.

**CD4a-c.** These three fragments report on the dialogue Antisthenes penned and humorously entitled Σάθων (Σάθωνα acc., Σάθων nom.). This is clearly a play on Plato’s name which directly transliterated from Greek is Platōn (Πλάτων). Platōn was evidently not Plato’s original name – he was named Aristocles at birth (DL 3.4). There are three theories offered by Diogenes Laertius as to how Plato acquired this nickname – viz. that it was from the breadth of his literary style, from the breadth of his forehead (noted by Neanthes), or a name given to him by his wrestling instructor Ariston on account of his good physique (DL 3.4). Platus (πλατός) in Greek means 'broad', and of a man usually 'broad-shouldered' (LSJ s.v.), meaning that the Ariston anecdote appears most plausible, though this does not rule out the broad forehead possibility. Sathē (σάθη) is a colloquial term for 'penis' (Henderson 1991, 109-10), the most common word, at least in comedy, being peos (πέος, 108), though many other terms were also used (109-24). Sathōn therefore is a humorously insulting play on Plato’s name rendering a translation such as 'Broad-cock' or 'Fat-cock'. The fact that this play on words was made by Plato’s older contemporary, Antisthenes, with reference to a physical attribute, seems to rule out Diogenes Laertius’ speculation that Plato’s nickname referred to the breadth of his style. According to Photius (s.v.) the comic poet Teleclides (F 71, fl. c. 440 BC; cf. Henderson 1991, 110) used the word sathōn, apparently as an endearing nickname (ὑποκόρισµα) for a male child. Antisthenes
application of the name to Plato therefore had the added twist of using a word that already had comedic currency.

It is fascinating that Antisthenes published a dialogue with this title. It is unfortunate that no secure fragments of this dialogue remain, as they would more than likely be highly entertaining (there are speculated to be a couple of possible extant fragments – see below and TH1). It seems a good chance, however, that Plato would have appeared in the dialogue as his alter-ego 'Satho', portrayed no doubt in a humorous and unflattering light. Diogenes Laertius reports that Antisthenes wrote this work in response to disparaging comments Plato had made about a work he had written about the impossibility of contradiction. Plato said "'How then are you writing about this very subject?', and so demonstrating that the argument refutes itself' (3.35), viz. if contradiction was impossible, then how could Antisthenes contradict the existence of contradiction? Diogenes then states that Antisthenes wrote the Sathōn as a result (CD4c). Immediately following this, Diogenes reports (3.35):

And they also say (φασὶ δὲ καὶ) that having heard Plato read out the Lysis, Socrates cried out 'By Heracles, what a lot of lies the young man is telling!', since he had written several things which the man Socrates did not say.

It appears possible that Diogenes includes this passage here because he found the information in his sources together with the comment about Antisthenes' Sathōn. The wording 'and they also say', suggests a connection with the previous remarks. So possibly the comment that Plato was telling a lot of lies was in fact alleged by Antisthenes' Socrates in the Sathōn, of which this may therefore be a fragment. See speculation in the commentary of TH1 that it may be another fragment of the Sathōn.

CD5. Cicero's endorsement of the Kursas (and other works), as well as being testament to Antisthenes' pleasing style, is evidence that whole dialogues of his were in circulation at least as late as the mid first century BC. Shackleton Bailey emended ΚΥΡΣΑΣ to Κῦρος Β'. Patzer points out (1970, 153-4) that the manuscripts read ΚΥΡΣΑΣ and reports Wilamowitz's view that Cicero would not have written Cyrus in Greek;\(^{238}\) i.e. because

\(^{238}\) 1919, v:2 27 n.2.
'Cyrus' is the regular Latin word. Additionally, Patzer notes that the *Suda* entry for 'Socrates' contains the story of a man named Kursas who came to Athens and slept by Socrates' tomb, and that this story itself resonates closely with the Socratic epistle 17.2 in which a young Spartan, after coming to Athens for love of Socrates but finding him dead, held conversations with the gravestone (Patzer 1970, 155-6). The name Kursas was uncommon, but not unheard of – *LPNG* cites examples known in Ionia (vol. 5a) and Thrace (vol. 4). In Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Antisthenes' works, two of the entries in the 'tenth volume' report titles 'Κύριος' which are considered corrupt. Patzer includes photocopies of the catalogue portions of three manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius at the back of his volume (1970). In one of these, Cod. Parisinus gr. 1759, the second of these titles looks more like Κύρσας than Κύριος – though admittedly the reproductions are far from perfect.

**Alcibiades, Cyrus and Heracles**

**CD6.** This fragment provides evidence, from a very early source (mid 3rd century BC at latest), that the *Little Cyrus*, the *Lesser Heracles*, and the *Alcibiades* were all dialogues.

Interestingly, we learn from the same source that Aeschines reworked and republished these works of Antisthenes under his own name, which is similar to the charge that Theopompus made against Plato (cf. *SD1*). It is noteworthy that while Plato and Aeschines are charged with plagiarising Antisthenes' works, charges of plagiarism were never levelled against Antisthenes himself. This seemingly points not only to the originality and attractiveness of Antisthenes' prose, but also to the likelihood that his writings were commonly known to antedate these other authors.

**Alcibiades.** In Diogenes Laertius' list of Antisthenes' works there appears an *Alcibiades* (Ἀλκιβιάδης) in the 'tenth volume' (6.18). Apart from some interesting and, at times, entertaining anecdotes, not much can be deduced from the surviving fragments about Antisthenes' own opinions on Alcibiades. A couple of comments about Alcibiades are

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239 The text is not as clear as it could be and some scholars (e.g. Döring 2006; Prince 2015, 165) think that is is Pasiphon who plagiarised Antisthenes. Grammatically this is possible. In terms of timelines, however, it seems impossible. As Antisthenes was a widely read 'classic' by the late fourth century, after that point it would be impossible to 'plagiarise' him, one could only foolishly imitate him. Only contemporaries could have gotten away with plagiarism, such as Plato (*SD1*) and Aeschines here are accused of doing.
negative in tone – alluding to his sexual profligacy (CD9a-b), but others are positive and praise his appearance (CD10a-11). All these comments made by 'Antisthenes' would naturally have started life as lines delivered by characters in his dialogues, and subsequently the most lurid and titillating portions seem to have been extracted and then the attribution made to 'Antisthenes' so as to preserve record of his authorship and, more importantly, his authority.

It is interesting to note that Persaeus accuses Aeschines of plagiarising Antisthenes' works, and specifically mentions the Alcibiades as one of the examples. It is not certain precisely what ancient writers meant by διεσκευωρήσθαι when they used it to describe one author making a διασκευή of another author's work, rather than of his own. It seems that διασκευή could mean all of 'revised', 'reworked', 'forged', or 'plagiarised' (Csapo & Slater 1995, 6 & 23; cf. Ath. 3.110b); though it is still not clear whether it was the form or content or both that might have been 'reworked'. Thus it is unclear whether Persaeus means that Aeschines adjusted Antisthenes' work and then represented it as his own, or if, perhaps, it was the subject matter or general form of the work – e.g. a dialogue with the same interlocutors – that was 'reworked'.

It is worth noting that around a dozen fragments of the Alcibiades attributed to Aeschines are extant, and some of them are quite substantial (i.e. 25-50 lines each in SSR). They may give clues as to the content of Antisthenes' Alcibiades. Aeschines' version was a dialogue some of which seems to have involved Socrates relating to a third person a dialogue he had with Alcibiades (e.g. SSR VI A 53), and others seem to contain portions of the actual dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades about the excellence of Themistocles in overcoming the Persians (e.g. SSR VI A 50-51).

**Cyrus and Heracles.** In the list of Antisthenes' titles provided by Diogenes Laertius' there are no exact title matches for the Little Cyrus or the Lesser Heracles.

There are two works listed by Diogenes certainly containing Cyrus in the title.\(^\text{240}\) They are:

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\(^{240}\) Two further works in the 'tenth volume' have κύρος – various emendations have been proposed including: Κύρος, Κύρνος, Κυρσᾶς (see apparatus in Dorandi).
Cyrus (Κῦρος) in the 'fourth volume' (6.16), and

Cyrus, or, Concerning Kingship (Κῦρος ἢ περὶ βασιλείας) in the 'fifth volume' (6.16)

There are also three works listed containing Heracles in the title, being:

Greater Heracles, or, Concerning Might (Ἡρακλῆς ὁ µείζων ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος) in the 'fourth volume' (6.16)

Heracles, or, Midas (Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Μίδας) and

Heracles, or, Concerning Good Sense or Might (Ἡρακλῆς ἢ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢ ἰσχύος) in the 'tenth volume' (6.18).

It is possible that some of these titles are different parts of what was originally one work, but was broken up into smaller excerpts or extracts at a later date. As the Heracles title listed by Persaeus is specifically the Lesser Heracles, this must distinguish it from the Greater Heracles listed by Diogenes, though it is not at all clear which of the other two titles it may imply (cf. commentary on MD9-12). It is a noteworthy coincidence that titles including the names of Alcibiades, Heracles, and Cyrus all appear in the 'tenth volume' as Diogenes lists them, match the three titles Aeschines is accused of plagiarising by Persaeus. This implies that this collection of titles was seen as a natural grouping quite early in the study of Antisthenes' texts and that they remained together for some centuries thereafter.

Textual notes. On a philological note, there is clearly something wrong with this text. The δὲ following ἔπτα is odd (though it was printed without comment by Dorandi 2013 and Marcovich 1999). It could have started life as an explanatory gloss δ′ (i.e. = 4), in which case it may have been referring to 'the majority of the seven' mentioned. Alternately, it could possibly have been started out as ζ (i.e. = 7), being a gloss on ἔπτα, and was subsequently misread as a δ′.

δὲ ἔσκευωρηται emended to διεσκεύασται. The δὲ printed in editions of the text as the second last word of this fragment is in a virtually impossible position grammatically. The verb printed following it, σκευώρεῖσθαι, generally meaning 'contrive' or 'scheme', is a just
barely plausible word that can be made to fit the sense with a bit of imagination. LSJ made it a more plausible fit by creating a special entry just for this instance (s.v. III.3 plagiarize).

Susemihl proposed διεσκευώρηται or διεσκευωρῆσθαι, which is attested in a Platonic letter (316a) meaning 'revise' and solves the impossible δέ and the non-perfectly suited verb in one stroke.

CD7. As Persaeus (CD6) paired dialogues by Antisthenes including Cyrus and Heracles in the title, so does Diogenes here. Though whereas Persaeus mentions a Little Cyrus and Lesser Heracles, Diogenes lists a Cyrus and a Big Heracles. As noted previously and discussed in chapter 6, the titles of Antisthenes works cannot be considered secure by any stretch of the imagination, so these later writers may or may not be referring to exactly the same pair of works. Regardless of that, it is interesting that these two characters, one contemporary (viz. Cyrus the Younger – arguments for identifying Cyrus as Cyrus the Younger, rather than Cyrus the Great are made in the commentary to CD7 and CD9a-b) and one from myth, share a relationship in the minds of Antisthenes' readers. Thus it is quite likely, but not certain, that he had tied them together in some manner himself.

No work with the exact title Big Heracles appears in Diogenes Laertius' list of works, though from the list of titles in the commentary on CD7 above the closest match is Greater Heracles or Concerning Might (Ἡρακλῆς ὁ µείζων ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος, 6.16).

The 'hard work' attributed to both Cyrus and Heracles is interesting. For Heracles it is natural to imagine that πόνος (hard work / toil) is equivalent to ἄθλος (prize contest / labour). For Cyrus the exact nature of the hard work is less obvious. But interpreting it as the struggle for the kingship, by Cyrus the Younger, as envisaged being discussed in a dialogue on that topic (commentary CD9a-16b), it is possible to make decent sense out of it. That this is probably the correct interpretation is confirmed by circumstantial evidence from Athenaeus. Speaking of the Cyrus with whom Xenophon marched inland to attack the Persians (i.e. Cyrus the Younger) he says 'I surmise that he loved hard work' (φιλόπονον, Ath. 505a). Athenaeus' deduction implies familiarity with the content, or at the very least the theme, of Antisthenes' dialogue Cyrus.
CD8. This fragment offers further confirmation of the attractiveness and genuineness of a Antisthenes' works *Cyrus* and *Concerning the Odyssey*. The fact that Phrynicus felt compelled to mention that these were 'genuine works' of Antisthenes points to the fact that there were writings in existence that bore Antisthenes' name, but which at least one ancient critic did not think were his. So not only is it reported that Antisthenes was plagiarised, but apparently his reputation for excellent style led to the suspicion that his name had been falsely applied to works that were composed by other authors – in a bid, no doubt, to lend them credibility.

CD9a-b. The first of these fragments offers further confirmation of a work known as the *Cyrus*, in this case a 'second' *Cyrus*. It also demonstrates that the titles of Antisthenes' works are scant guide to the full contents thereof, as here it is stated that a work titled *Cyrus* contains disparaging comments about Alcibiades. Although, as is argued below, it appears that Antisthenes may have written dialogues with Cyrus, Alcibiades, and Archelaus conversing together.

**Alcibiades' sexual habits.** These fragments, clearly from a common source, report that Alcibiades was 'pervasive (παράνοµος) both as regards women and as regards his mode of living in other respects'. They then state that Alcibiades had sexual relations with three generations of women from his own family, i.e. his mother, his sister, and his daughter, in a like manner to the Persians.

Antisthenes is referring here to the Persian custom of *xvaētvadatha*, or next-of-kin marriages between parents and children or uterine siblings (cf. detailed discussion Hastings 1916, 8.456-9). The Greeks were aware of this practice. Herodotus discusses the manner in which Cambyses II (Great King of Persia 530-22 BC) took first one sister (Atossa) to wife, and subsequently wed another younger one of his sisters (3.31). According to Ctesias and Plutarch, Darius II (424-404 BC) had four sons by his sister Parysatis (*FGrH* 688 F 15, Plu. *Artax*. 1). One of these sons, Artaxerxes II (405/4-359 BC), married two of his own daughters at his mother Parysatis’ urging (Plu. *Artax*. 23; cf. Heracleides, *FGrH* 689 F 7). In a related vein, Ctesias records that the satrap Terituchmes ignored his wife in order to carry
on a passionate affair with his sister Rhoxane (*FGrH* 688 F 15, 53-4). When discussing varying customs, Diogenes Laertius claims that the Persians do not think it perverse (ἄτοπον) for a man to marry his daughter (9.83).

In an article exploring the love life of Alcibiades, Littman declares that these charges by Antisthenes against Alcibiades are highly suspect, largely because there is no independent evidence of Alcibiades having a sister and because unsubstantiated charges of incest were often made by the orators (1970, 270 & n.15). These are plausible arguments, though perhaps not sufficient grounds to dismiss these allegations out of hand. It is worth considering that similar charges were made against Cimon and his sister Elpinice (see commentary below on CD18).

Eustathius, in CD9b, included the additional comment from Antisthenes that Alcibiades was ‘played himself to the point of exhaustion (παρεξηυληµένος) in his pointless way of life’. The verb παρεξαυλέω generally appears, as it does here, as a perfect passive participle (middle/passive form) used adjectivally. In the passive it quite literally means (LSJ s.v.) ‘worn out by being played upon’. But it seems that it is employed here in the middle voice – Alcibiades was far from being a passive victim in these activities. By using this word Antisthenes no doubt intended humorous innuendo, especially given the comments that follow on the nature of Alcibiades sexual habits. Not surprisingly, word play was common with the vocabulary relating to pipe-playing. The αὐλητρίς, pipe-player, was a female slave commonly in attendance at symposia who is often referred to in a manner that ‘implies the likely overlap of musical and sexual services’ (Wilson 1999, 84). In particular, the verb λεσβιάζειν, meaning ‘do as a woman of Lesbos’, is a double entendre which often refers to performing on the kithara or aulos, but in comedy equally to fellatio (84-5).

Alcibiades’ sexual profligacy was a popular subject of his biographers and target for his detractors. Disparaging comments from Ps.-Andocides are preserved in the speech *Against Alcibiades*, where he claims that Alcibiades’ habit of bringing courtesans into his house drove his wife, Hipparete, to divorce him (4.14; cf. Plu. *Alc*. 8.3-4). He also alleges that Alcibiades, having subjected the women of Melos to slavery (cf. Th. 5.84.1, 5.116.4)
purchased one of them and had a child by her, a union he claims was more unnatural than that of Aegisthus' parents (i.e. Thyestes and his daughter Pelopia, Ps.-And. 4.22-3; cf. Plu. Alc. 17.4). Lysias, in a speech written against Alcibiades’ son Alcibiades, lists the sins of the younger Alcibiades’ ancestors, and almost certainly includes his father when he alleges: 'Have not most of them been whoring, and while some of them have had intercourse with their sisters, others have had children by their own daughters' (14.41-2). Also from Lysias we find the claim that Alcibiades and Axiochus both fell in love with Medontis of Abydus, married her and lived with her. When she later had a daughter, not knowing whose she was, they both slept with her as well (fr. 8 Carey = Ath. 13.534f-5a).

Rumour had it that whilst Alcibiades was a guest of the Spartans he carried on a secret affair with Queen Timaea, the wife of King Agis, and that Agis' reputed son Leotychides, borne by Timaea, was in fact an illegitimate child from Alcibiades (Plu. Lys. 22.3-5). Allegedly, Agis openly declared that Alcibiades was the father of Leotychides and in private Timaea addressed the child as 'Alcibiades' (Ages. 3). In one of the two versions of Alcibiades' death offered by Plutarch, while hiding out from the Thirty Tyrants and the Spartans in Phrygia, Alcibiades is said to have corrupted a girl from a notable family and while she was in his company her brothers – failing to bear his transgressions with equanimity – burned the house down and shot him dead as he ran out through the flames (Alc. 39.5). Giving a clue as to how Alcibiades might have viewed himself in this domain of life, Plutarch reports that Alcibiades' golden shield bore no ancestral device, but rather an Eros wielding a thunderbolt (16.1-2; cf. Ath. 12.534e).

**Nature of the dialogue Cyrus.** According to Persaeus' report in CD6, the Cyrus dialogue by Antisthenes that he was familiar with was entitled Little Cyrus (µικρὸς Κῦρος). This seems reasonably clearly to be referring to Cyrus the Younger (c. 423-401 BC), satrap of Lydia, Phrygia and Cappadocia and supreme Persian military commander in Asia Minor from around 408/7, and the younger brother of King Artaxerxes II. There does not appear to be another extant reference to him with this epithet - 'Little'. However Cyrus the Great, king

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241 *Contra* Engels who is certain this is Cyrus the Great: 'there can be no doubt that Kyros I was A.'s ideal ruler' *FGrH* IV.A.1 1998, 103; and Prince: 'probably Antisthenes' text on Cyrus the Great 2015, 145.
of Persia c. 560-530 BC, was also referred to in literature as Cyrus the Elder. So by analogy it may also be natural for Cyrus the Younger also to be known as Cyrus the Little or Little Cyrus. The alternate – and probably more attractive – possibility is that this title refers to a work titled Cyrus of lesser stature (in some sense) compared to some other larger or more significant work by the same title, as the epic The Little Iliad (Ἰλιάς µικρά) was known in comparison to the famous work by Homer. If so, this would not exclude the possibility that the title referred to a smaller work, but one that was nonetheless about Cyrus the Younger.

The contents and nature of the dialogue may be speculated with a little more certainty. As there is a fragment of Antisthenes that mentions 'Cyrus the king' (CD13a) it seems that Cyrus the Great may have been a topic of conversation in one of the dialogues incorporating 'Cyrus' in the title. As discussed under CD7 above, these dialogues predominantly focussed on Cyrus the Younger, whose life overlapped with both Antisthenes, and the character mentioned here in the dialogue, Alcibiades. It also became the convention when giving titles to dialogues to name them after one of the principal interlocutors, as is the case with Plato’s and Aeschines' dialogues. For this to hold true, a 'Cyrus' must have been a participant in the dialogue. There is no dialogic fragments of Antisthenes remaining that are known to include historical persons (as opposed to contemporaries) participating in them, which again points to Cyrus the Younger being both the subject referred to by the title, and a speaker in the dialogue.

A dialogue or dialogues containing Cyrus the Younger, Alcibiades and Archelaus?

A tantalising possibility is that several of these titles relating to Cyrus, Alcibiades, and Archelaus are from single work or group of related works. There is evidence pointing to the fact that it was a dialogue, or dialogues, on kingship. In Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue, one of the works on Cyrus attributed to Antisthenes is entitled Cyrus, or, On Kingship (6.16). As noted by Persaeus (CD6 & commentary) Antisthenes produced a work titled Alcibiades. He is also credited with a work titled The Archelaus (CD3) which almost certainly featured the eponymous Macedonian king (413-399). It is fascinating therefore to discover that
Diogenes Laertius lists these works as: *Alcibiades, Archelaus, or, On Kingship* (6.18). The common subtitle suggests that they were all part of the same dialogue, or were a series of related dialogues.

There is no direct evidence that Alcibiades ever actually met Cyrus, however, they easily could have met. Cyrus had taken over the Satrapy based in Sardis from Tissaphernes (X. An. 1.1.2, X. HG 1.4.3; cf. Plu. Art. 2.3) to whom Alcibiades had been a trusted advisor for a period of time (Th. 8.45-6; cf. Plu. ALC. 24-5). Cyrus then supported the Spartan general Lysander (Th. 2.65.12, X. HG. 1.5.1-9) who defeated an Athenian fleet under the command of Alcibiades’ deputy, Antiochus, at the battle of Notium in 406 (X. HG. 1.5.12-14), leading directly to Alcibiades dismissal as an Athenian general (1.5.16) and subsequent assassination in 404 by the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, who was himself influenced by Lysander and the Thirty Tyrants (Plu. Alc. 38.4-39.1). Cyrus’ attempt to overthrow his brother the king, Artaxerxes II, ended with his own death at the battle of Cunaxa in 401, a campaign extensively chronicled by Xenophon, particularly in his *Anabasis*.

Antisthenes is no doubt creative enough to have written one or more dialogues featuring three royal aspirants: Archelaus who became king, likely by murder (Pl. Gorg. 471); Cyrus the Younger who fought a campaign aimed at the kingship against his own brother; and Alcibiades who would probably have happily set himself up as king if the chance arose. In such a dialogue it is possible to imagine that Archelaus, Cyrus, and Alcibiades were engaged in a discussion regarding the nature of kingship and the best way to manage the sovereignty – and perhaps the best way to acquire it too (the πόνος attributed to Cyrus in CD7 perhaps suggests the 'hard work' involved in taking the throne).

Direct evidence for participation by Cyrus in such a dialogue is provided by a fragment in which he is addressed by name (CD14a & commentary). A piece of direct speech attributed to 'Cyrus the king' may have originally been delivered by 'Cyrus the Younger'.

242 Modern editors have placed 'Alcibiades' as a separate title on a separate line followed by a comma (Marcovich, Dorandi) or a full stop (Hicks). Fortunately Patzer 1970 prints reproductions of the portions of three manuscripts showing Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue. In two of them – Cod. Neap. Burb. 3.B29 and Cod. Paris, gr. 1759 – ‘Alcibiades’ and ‘Archelaus’ are clearly visible listed one after the other on the same line with no punctuation.
who wanted to differentiate the earlier Cyrus from himself. Alternately, an attribution of 'Cyrus' may have been modified by a later compiler to include 'the king' – either because it made the identity speaker clearer or more impressive for his audience (see CD13a & commentary).

**Quasi-historical dialogues.** The sort of dialogue envisaged here would be not unlike the passage of Herodotus in which Otanes, Megabyzus, and Darius debating the merits of democracy, oligarchy and monarchy respectively (3.80-2). Including characters in a dialogue who could have met, without necessitating direct historical evidence of them actually doing so, seems later to have become an accepted practice in this genre. For example, Praxiphanes (early 3rd c. BC) wrote a dialogue, *On History* (F 18 Wehrli) wherein an unlikely meeting of characters took place in which they each spoke on behalf of their respective genres – Thucydides for History, Plato Comicus for comedy, Agathon for tragedy, Nikeratos and Choerilus for epic poetry, and Melanippides for lyric and dithyramb. Archelaus is also mentioned in the fragment which suggests that the dialogue took place at his court in Macedon (cf. Csapo & Wilson forthcoming). It is possible that Praxiphanes fashioned his dialogue on a known precursor – viz. a dialogue by Antisthenes with three aspirants to the throne (including Archelaus) discussing kingship.

It is interesting to note that the author of the *Alcibiades II* (generally thought to be an imitator of Plato) makes a connection between Archelaus and Alcibiades. Socrates holds up the recently assassinated Archelaus to Alcibiades as a counter-example, showing the sort of reactions holding absolute sovereignty (τυρραννις) can provoke (141d-e). Clearly there was some correlation between Archelaus and Alcibiades in the minds of contemporaries.

Taking into account the separate surviving Antisthenic titles naming these figures, this may indicate that there were a series of related dialogues, or possibly one large dialogue that later got broken up and referred to by the figures featuring in the discrete pieces. Antisthenes' *Ajax & Odysseus* is an example of a work which is clearly one, but has been broken up by editors – ancient and modern – into a separate *Ajax* and *Odysseus.*
**Persaeus on kingship.** Persaeus, who reports two of the relevant titles – i.e. *Little Cyrus* and *Alcibiades* (CD6), had particular interests in kingship and constitutional matters and was also an important figure in the Macedonian court. Zeno had been invited by the king Antigonus Gonatas to come to his court, however he declined and sent his pupil Persaeus in his stead (DL 7.6, 9). Persaeus became a trusted advisor in the royal court and was given charge, as tutor, of Antigonus’ son Halcyoneus (DL 6.36). It appears that Persaeus’ interest in kingship extended to a personal preference for such a system of governance. An anecdote relates that when Antigonus was on the verge of restoring democracy to the Eritreans, Persaeus prevented him (κωλύσας, DL 2.143-4). He ended his career commanding Antigonus’ Macedonian garrison at Corinth, a post he died defending (Paus. 2.8.4). Given Persaeus’ interest in kingship, and Macedonian sovereignty in particular, the dialogues of Antisthenes he mentions are likely to have had a special appeal. Listed among Persaeus’ own works are: *On Kingship*, Περὶ βασιλείας, *The Spartan Constitution*, Πολιτεία Λακωνική, and *A Response to Plato’s Laws*, in seven books, Πρὸς τοὺς Πλάτωνος νόµους ζ (DL 7.36). The first title replicates precisely the subtitle of two of Antisthenes’ works he cites (*Cyrus* and *Alcibiades*) viz. Περὶ βασιλείας.

**Cyrus the Younger’s aspirations for the kingship.** Xenophon never directly reports that Cyrus the Younger wanted to emulate his ancestor of the same name, Cyrus the Elder. Xenophon does report, however, that ‘Cyrus was a man who was the most kingly and most worthy to rule of all the Persians since Cyrus the Elder’ (An. 1.9.1). Plutarch also reports a couple of lines of dialogue attributed to Cyrus: ‘What are you saying Clearchus? Are you bidding me, who am reaching out for a kingdom, to be undeserving of a kingdom?’ (Artax. 8.2-3). As Plutarch presents them, the lines are delivered by Cyrus to Clearchus the Spartan exile, just as Cyrus prepares to engage in battle with his brother Artaxerxes II at Cunaxa. The lines also seem just as well suited to be part of a dialogue about the merits of strategies for acquiring a kingdom, such as the notional work of Antisthenes being speculated on here. If the lines have been utilised by Plutarch out of their original context, it is possible that Clearchus was also a participant in a dialogue, or that Plutarch attached his name to
these lines to suit his purpose at hand. In that case the lines could be imagined being addressed as a rebuke to an interlocutor in a dialogue discussing aspirations for kingship and where some approach, apparently incongruous with Cyrus' virtues, had been proposed. Reusing famous lines in new contexts was not unheard of, and Plutarch had, in fact, recycled another well known line of Antisthenes' and given it to Alexander the Great (see CD14e-f and commentary).

Alcibiades' tyrannical tendencies. There is ample evidence showing that Alcibiades harboured ambitions for tyranny or kingship and that the Athenians suspected as much. Plato's Alcibiades I portays Socrates conversing with Alcibiades when the latter was on the verge of entering public life. Socrates says that Alcibiades imagines that he will prove to the Athenians that he is worthy of honour more so than even Pericles or anyone else who ever lived, and will thereby wield the greatest power in the state, and be the greatest as well among all the Greeks, and also among all the barbarians on their continent. Even if ordered by a god not to enter Asia, Alcibiades would be reluctant to live under that constraint, believing that apart from Cyrus and Xerxes no one of any account has ever lived. Socrates concludes 'That this is your hope (i.e. to be the greatest man living), I know perfectly well and I am not guessing' (105b-c; cf. Ps.-Pl. Alc. II 141a-c). He adds, a few lines further on, that Alcibiades has hopes of proving himself of great worth to the city and thereby winning 'power without limit' (105d-e), and later speculates about a notional challenge from Alcibiades against the Persian king Artaxerxes II (123c). Plutarch also describes Alcibiades as dreaming of world domination, noting that while Nicias was trying to persuade the Athenians that an expedition against Sicily was beyond them, Alcibiades quite openly saw it as a first step – before moving on to conquer Carthage, Libya and ultimately Italy and the Peloponnesus (Alc. 17.2-3; cf. Nic. 12.1-2).

In another more contemporaneous account, Ps.-Andocides accused Alcibiades of aiming to increase his power by attempting to seize control of the estate of Alcibiades' own father-in-law, Hipponicus (reputedly the richest man in Athens), by plotting to assassinate his brother-in-law, Callias; and Callias himself allegedly accused Alcibiades of the same plot
before the assembly (4.15; cf. Plu. Alc. 8.2). Ps.-Andocides compares the terror Alcibiades inspires to that of the Persian king (17) and accuses him of exacting tribute from Athens' allies for personal use and being maintained by the allies at Olympia in Persian style (30-1; cf. Plu. Alc. 12.1). He elsewhere plainly states that it is men such as Alcibiades who go on to establish tyrannies (24), and accuses Alcibiades of acting like a tyrant (27). Plutarch similarly reports that the reputable men of Athens thought Alcibiades' behaviour tyrannical (τυραννικά) and monstrous (Alc. 16.2). The elders of the city also felt that it was 'tyrannical' and 'perverse' when Alcibiades' image was painted in a chamber of the Propylaea (cf. CD13-14 below), prompting Archestratus to note wryly that 'Hellas could not endure two Alcibiadeses' (16.5). In a particularly relevant passage, Plutarch comments on Alcibiades' effect on regular Athenians (34.6):

The common and working people were so enthralled by his leadership that they desired with astounding passion to be ruled by him as tyrant, and some said as much, and others approached him encouraging him to prove himself better than envy, and to abolish decrees and laws, and get rid of gossips (φλύαροι) who were destroying the city, so that he might manage and deal with matters without fear of informers.

Though Plutarch observes that Alcibiades' own intentions on the tyranny remained opaque, the most powerful Athenians nonetheless feared that he desired it (35.1). Certainly when Socrates suggested to Alcibiades that he had in mind to be leader of the state, and make contest with the kings of Sparta and Persia, Alcibiades agreed (Pl. Alc. I 120a). For the sake of Alcibiades' happiness, Socrates urges him to procure excellence (ἀρετή) rather than the tyranny (τυραννίς, 135b). Elsewhere, Alcibiades is reported to have declared that he did not seduce the Spartan queen, Timaea, out of wantonness, but because he desired to see the Spartans ruled over by his descendants (Plu. Ages. 3.2). Even Alcibiades' own son, Alcibiades the Younger, admitted in a speech that his father had a number of opportunities to join an oligarchical faction and dominate the city (Isoc. 16.36), and that many citizens suspected him of plotting to gain a tyranny (38). Aristophanes' Aeschylus in the Frogs, when commenting on Alcibiades, observes: 'It's best to rear no lion in the city, but once you have raised one, cater to its whims' (1431b-2). In an anecdote from Plutarch Alcibiades...
actually compares himself to a lion (Alc. 2.2). Images of lions were routinely associated with monarchs and others wielding great power.\textsuperscript{243}

**CD10.** This fragment is another comment from Antisthenes about Alcibiades but, in contrast to **CD9a-b** above, on this occasion it is a positive one. The simplest explanation for these differing opinions being attributed to Antisthenes is that they were put forward by different speakers in his dialogues – one speaker criticising Alcibiades and, in another place, another speaker praising and defending him. The fragment then relates Alcibiades' legendary beauty – admired by men and women alike – which allegedly stayed with him throughout his entire life. Plutarch seems to have drawn directly on this passage of Antisthenes for his *Alcibiades*. In a passage following directly on from his mention of Antisthenes name in **C12** he writes about Alcibiades' beauty that 'it was unnecessary to say anything except that as a child, as a youth, and as a man, it bloomed in every stage and season of his physique in a lovely and agreeable fashion' (Alc. 1.3). In another passage seemingly drawing once again on the content of this fragment Plutarch notes Alcibiades' tendency to wander about in purple robes (16.1).

**CD11a-b.** This pair of fragments contains further statements regarding Alcibiades' physical attractiveness. Both of them include a near identical direct quotation from Antisthenes that unless Achilles was like Alcibiades he was not really handsome. Achilles' beauty was legendary, and as Iliad 2.673-4 cited in **CD11b** states, he was the handsomest of all the Greeks who came to Troy. Achilles was aware of his own beauty, and before killing Priam's son Lycaon, Achilles invited him to look upon 'how big and handsome I am' (οἷος καὶ ἐγὼ καλὸς τε μέγας τε, Il. 21.108). Though this is standard vocabulary, possibly Antisthenes was referring to this very line, as the text of **CD11a** calls Alcibiades 'big' (µέγας) and 'handsome' (καλός) using words identical to that of Achilles. In **CD13a** for καλός Olympiodorus substitutes ὡραῖος, which in the Classical period when Antisthenes was writing had the meaning 'in the bloom of youth' but in post-Hellenistic usage came to mean 'beautiful' or 'handsome' (LSJ s.v. III.2-3). Plutarch also commented that it was possible to

\textsuperscript{243} See e.g. Ar. *Kn*. 1037-44, Hdt. 1.84, 5.92, 6.121; A. *Ag*. 717-36.
say of Alcibiades that ‘he was not a child of Achilles, but the very man himself’ (οὐ παῖς Ἀχιλλέως, ἀλλ ἐκεῖνος εἰη ἄν αὐτός Alc. 23.6).

The amusing comment preserved in both fragments that Alcibiades ‘was called the common loverboy (ἐρώµενος) of (all) Greece’ may have belonged in the same dialogue as fragments CD9a-b discussing Alcibiades’ proclivity for sexual encounters of all kinds. Though the comment here is not obviously negative.

There are two additional comments on Alcibiades in CD11b not found in CD11a. The first is the claim that ‘in Athens the depictions of the Herms were painted (γράφεσθαι) in Alcibiades’ image and likeness.’ Taken literally, this statement means that when images of Herms were painted (on vases, wall paintings, etc.) their faces were depicted in Alcibiades’ likeness. As the Herms themselves were sculpted it seems likely, by the principal of lectio difficilior potior, that the text originally read ‘depictions of the Herms were sculpted (γλύφεσθαι) in Alcibiades’ image’. The exceedingly common word γράφεσθαι ‘to be painted’ might easily have been misread by a copyist for the comparatively uncommon word γλύφεσθαι ‘to be sculpted’. Note that either way this would not be the only time Alcibiades featured in famous images. Among paintings of numerous mythical heroes in a chamber off the Propylaea on the Acropolis, Pausanias records a painting of Alcibiades with emblems of victory his team won at Nemea (1.22.7). Plutarch elaborates that this painting was by Aristophon and pictured Alcibiades lounging in the arms of a female personification of Nemea (Alc. 16.5).

The second additional point in CD11b is the quote from II. 2.673-4 noted above. As Antisthenes’ standard modus operandi was to quote Homer to emphasise or prove his point when discussing Homer (ch. 5 section B), he seems entirely likely to have employed Homer in discussions elsewhere – thus suggesting that this line was part of the original dialogue from which the fragment was excerpted.

CD12. A factual note about Alcibiades, viz. that his nurse was named Amycla, found by Plutarch in an unnamed work of Antisthenes. Plutarch comments elsewhere that non-
Spartans sometimes placed Spartan nurses over their infants due to the skill of these nurses for raising contented, robust, and fearless children; and he cites Alcibiades' nurse Amycla as an example of this practice (Lyce. 16). The name Amycla is only known for this one woman noted twice by Plutarch, though similar Laconian names Ἀµύκλας, Ἀµυκλαῖος, Ἀµύκη, and Ἀµυκος are also attested (LGPN III.a s.v. respectively). The fact that this name is only known from Plutarch, who credits Antisthenes as his source, perhaps suggests that the information on the skill of Spartan nurses also originated from a work of Antisthenes. Antisthenes would have been discussing something relevant to have cause for introducing Amycla’s name – possibly commenting on the unbringing of Alcibiades.

**CYRUS**

**CD13a-c.** The fact that the same fragment is attributed both to Cyrus and to Antisthenes suggests that many of the statements attributed to 'Antisthenes' originally started life as words he gave to one of the participants in his dialogues.

If the reference to 'Cyrus the king' here is accurate, it must be to Cyrus the Great. As there is no trace of a dialogue attributed to Antisthenes featuring non-contemporary historical characters, one plausible explanation is that Cyrus the Great is being quoted by a speaker in a dialogue. If so, this comment would have fit quite naturally into the sort of discussion that was imagined between Archelaus, Cyrus the Younger, and Alcibiades in the discussion above on **CD9a-b.** Cyrus the Younger, for example, could have used this expression in order to distinguish the king from himself.

The ethical nature of the comment given to Cyrus in this fragment, that the most essential knowledge is to ‘unlearn base things’, is quintessentially Antisthenic in nature. For a collection of Antisthenes comments warning against 'base men' and 'base deeds' (often κακοὶ and κακά) see the discussion in ch. 2.ii section A. The ethical opposition between what is noble and what is base in this group of fragments is made particularly clear when the term ἀναγκαιότατον, 'most necessary' in **CD13a-b**, is replaced by ἄριστον, 'most noble' or 'best' in **CD13c**.
CD14a-f and CD15. This is another group of fragments linked to Cyrus. In this case a certain Cyrus is being addressed rather than speaking himself (as in CD13a). The Cyrus in this case is argued here to be Cyrus the Younger. As discussed in the commentary on CD9a-b, Antisthenes wrote a dialogue titled *Cyrus, or, On Kingship*, and this fragment gives evidence that Cyrus was one of the participants in that dialogue, and that someone is consoling the aspiring prince that ‘it is kingly to do good but be ill spoken of’. The thought captured in these fragments – the notion of doing good deeds in the face of being ill spoken of – is particularly Antisthenic and several more Antisthenes fragments concern the value of a bad reputation. As usual, these comments should be considered to have been delivered by a speaker in one of his dialogues – whether that be Antisthenes himself or another. When hearing that base men (or the masses, πονηροί) were praising him, he said ‘I feel quite anxious I have done something wrong.’ and ‘he urged people who were being ill spoken of to bear it more steadfastly than if they were being pelted with stones’ (DL 6.7 = DC 85, SSR 90).

Although in this fragment Cyrus’ interlocutor is not named, taking into consideration Alcibiades’ chequered history, including derogatory comments made about him in the fragments above, it is tempting to imagine that he is the one reassuring Cyrus here. At any rate, we know that Alcibiades is discussed in at least one of the dialogues bearing the title *Cyrus* (CD9a), and in that dialogue it was specifically his tendency to engage in Persian customs that was referred to. The fact that Antisthenes demonstrated the value of πόνος, hard work, in a *Cyrus* dialogue, and that Atheneaus described Cyrus the Younger as φιλόπονον, ‘hard work loving’ (505a) was discussed above (SD6).

CD15. This fragment brings together πόνος and bad reputation, known to be part of the *Cyrus* dialogue from CD7 and CD14a-f respectively. Whereas in CD7 hard work was said to be an ἀγαθόν, a good thing, here a bad reputation is said to be an ἀγαθόν and equivalent to hard work. It thus seems highly likely that this fragment is part of the same dialogue. Two further Antisthenes fragments also discuss πόνος in a similar vein. One

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244 DL 6.5 = DL 6.8, Ant. Loci Com. 2.32.172, Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 9, DC 178a-c, SSR 88, 89.
records: ‘Antisthenes said that hard labours are like dogs. Since they also bite those who are unfamiliar with them’ (Gnom. Vat. 1 = DC 96, SSR 113). And the other: ‘One must pursue pleasures that follow hard work, but not pleasures that precede hard work’ (Stob. 3.29.65 = DC 113, SSR 126).245

In CD14c the words of the fragment are slightly paraphrased and put into the mouth of Antisthenes as if he were addressing Plato, instead of someone else addressing Cyrus. It is not clear in what context Antisthenes would be speaking about being ‘kingly’ (βασιλικόν) in relation to himself. However this is readily explainable. If this line of Antisthenes’ was extracted from a dialogue by someone compiling aphoristic phrases about kingship and kingliness, it would be one natural approach for them to drop the address to Cyrus and insert Antisthenes’ name in order to preserve his authorship. At a later date when Diogenes Laertius (or someone he was copying from) wanted to use the statement as a specific reply, it would be easy for them to surmise that Plato was involved – due to the legend of their rivalry – and thus add in Plato’s name. Alternately, the line delivered by Antisthenes’ Cyrus could have been so well known that it was given instead to Antisthenes himself as a joke.

The line evidently became so famous later that it was attributed by Plutarch (in two different works) to Alexander the Great (CD14e-f). Plutarch was familiar with Antisthenes’ work, so it is impossible to know if he found the statement second hand via another source, or knew perfectly well that it was from Antisthenes, but liked it, and so recycled it into his own work as a line of Alexander’s (Plutarch may have done this elsewhere with Antisthenes’ works, see commentary at CD9a-b: Cyrus the Younger’s aspirations for the kingship). If the line was sufficiently well-known in educated circles as Antisthenes’, it would in fact show superior style not to name him. If one has a character in a modern dialogue say ‘to be, or not to be’, it would be poor form to mention that it originated with Shakespeare – information any cultured person may be assumed to know.

245 For the ancient ‘philosophicoreligious’ dichotomy between ponos and hedone see Detienne 1996, 126-8.
Only the first line of CD16a and CD16b has previously been attributed to Antisthenes. The second line of CD16a starts idem ('the same man'), clearly indicating that this comment was also from Antisthenes – and it is synonymous with the kind of statement made in CD14a-f.

Aspasia, Pericles, Xanthippos and Paralos, Archestratos and Euphemos (intimates of Xanthippos and Paralos), Cimon, Elpinice (sister of Cimon), Callias, Pericles' first wife (mother of Callias), Hipponicus (father of Callias).

CD17. In the 'fifth volume' of Antisthenes' works, as listed by Diogenes Laertius, there is a title Aspasia, which is likely the source of this fragment. By the usual convention of naming dialogues after key interlocutors, it is probable that Aspasia herself appeared as one of the speakers in this dialogue.

This fragment reports disparaging comments made about both of Pericles' legitimate sons. As noted several times before, these comments should be imagined being delivered by a speaker in one of Antisthenes' dialogues, and therefore these sentiments may or may not coincide with Antisthenes' own opinions.

Archestratos, the alleged lover of Xanthippos, is identified by Kirchner (PA 2430) as the same Archestratos (of Phrearrhe) elected to the generalship, along with Pericles, son of Pericles, and Conon (among others), in 406 following Alcibiades' dismissal after the Battle of Notium (X. HG. 1.5.16, Diod. 13.74.1). Archestratos sailed at one point aboard a ship over which Lysias the orator was trierarch and died later in 406 during the Battle of Arginusae (Lys. 21.8).

Euphemos (PA 6036), the intimate of Paralos, is otherwise unknown.

CD18-20. In the first instance these fragments contain observations about the nature of Pericles' relationship with the courtesan and intellectual Aspasia of Miletus. In sum, they make clear that he was especially enamoured of her. Aspasia was Pericles' mistress (and treated as his wife) from the time of his divorce c. 445 to his death in 429. The comic poets
blamed this perilous romance for causing calamities that afflicted Athens including the Peloponnesian War (Ar. Ach. 523-538) and the Samnian War (Duris FGrH 76 F 65).

Antisthenes tells us that after Pericles had 'dismissed his wife from their house' (CD20) and 'bestowed her upon another man' (CD19 6-7) he openly entered into a relationship with Aspasia. Fragments CD18 2-3 and CD19 8 relate how Pericles called on Aspasia's house twice per day and greeted her with great affection. Punning on Aspasia's name, both fragments report that Pericles 'fondly greeted' (aspazesthai) her. This could also be a playful line from Antisthenes suggesting an etymology of Aspasia's name – i.e. that she is a 'greeter', the epitome of a good courtesan. The implication is clearly that such overt displays of affection – particularly toward a foreign mistress – did not become a statesman of Pericles' status or social class. Antisthenes is not explicitly named by Plutarch in CD19, however the common content, and particularly the common witty use of the verb suggests a common source. As noted in the commentary for CD10, Plutarch seems to have used Antisthenes' writing when it suited him without necessarily acknowledging his authorship.

In CD18 4-6 it is claimed that Pericles appeared and spoke on behalf of Aspasia in court when she was up on charges of impiety. Pericles apparently made a greater show of emotion than when he himself had been before the court. Plutarch seems to be relying indirectly on Antisthenes when he reports the same charge of impiety. He adds that the charges were brought against her by Hermippus the comic poet (Per. 32.1), however, Hornblower 2012 thinks that the identification of Hermippus as Aspasia’s accuser probably arose from a misunderstanding of a passage slandering her in one of his comedies. Further suggesting the link to Antisthenes is the fact that Plutarch goes on to relate that Pericles secured Aspasia’s acquittal by ‘shedding a great many tears for her at the trial’ (Per. 32.3) just as reported in CD18. Notably, however, Plutarch states that the source of this last piece of information is Aeschines rather than Antisthenes. The charge that Aeschines plagiarised Antisthenes’ Little Cyrus, Lesser Heracles and Alcibiades has already been noted above (CD6 and commentary). From this evidence, one might be led to suspect that Aeschines plagiarised Antisthenes' Aspasia as well. Persaeus may not have been aware of, or
commented on, this particular case of fraud because his own fields of interest were sovereignty and constitutional matters (cf. commentary on CD6), so he may not have been familiar with the various versions of the Aspasia, or it was irrelevant to the point he was making at the time.

The second portion of CD18 continues an Antisthenic theme of commenting on the illicit sexual habits of Athenian aristocrats (cf. CD9a-b on Alcibiades). Similar claims were made about Cimon and Elpinice by Ps.-Andocides, who claims that Cimon 'lived in wedlock (συνουκείν) with his own sister' (Contra Alc. 33). Plutarch also reports 'slanders' against Cimon regarding his sister, and reproduces a poetic passage from Eupolis in which Cimon is described as spending a lot of time in Sparta and leaving Elpinice on her own (Cim. 15).

The allegations here in CD18 that Pericles received sex with Elpinice as a reward for services rendered are not reported elsewhere.

Regarding CD20, Antisthenes is attributed with a work by the same title, i.e. περὶ ἡδονῆς DL 6.17. Due to the similarity of content, and the charges of plagiarism that were levelled at Heraclides (DL 6.92), it seems likely that either Heraclides' name was applied to Antisthenes' material on purpose or inadvertently, or that Heraclides reproduced or drew directly on Antisthenes' earlier work – περὶ ἡδονῆς could have been a subtitle or alternative title for his Aspasia. Note also that this fragment contains a reference to 'Aspasia of Megara', which appears to be a mistake; Aspasia is everywhere else known as Milesian. There is a story in Aristophanes' Acharnians about Megarian youths stealing a couple of prostitutes from Aspasia (526-7), so probably the confusion arose from a misunderstanding of the location of those events – in the comedy they actually took place in Athens.

**MYTHIC DIALOGUES**  **MD1-16**

**Heracles and Prometheus**  **MD1a-5**

**MD1a-2.** The first three fragments are one in essence, being three different translations of the same text. The text from Themistius, first published by Sachau in 1870 (Inedita Syriaca, 33), is preserved only in Syriac. **MD1a** includes a new translation directly from the Syriac
This fragment is remarkable in the first instance as it is an example of a philosophical dialogue featuring mythical characters as interlocutors. Dialogues produced by other authors in the first few decades of the genre seem to have been, almost uniformly, philosophical discussions featuring Socrates – i.e. they were Socratic dialogues. Apparently by the time of the generation of dialogue writers following Antisthenes and Plato, historical persons started to be written into dialogues. Cicero states that he himself replicated Heraclides' (of Pontus, Plato's student) habit of including historical figures in dialogues (*Epist. ad Att.* 13.19.4). There are scarce traces of attempts by Classical authors to write prose dialogues including mythical characters (though Julian perhaps does so indirectly – see MD14-16). The only examples of something similar are Prodicus' story of 'The Choice of Heracles' recorded in Xenophon (*Mem*. 2.1.21-34) and there is a *Trojan Dialogue* attributed to Hippias of Elis in which Nestor makes a speech to Neoptolemus as to how to gain a good reputation (DK 86 A2). Mythical dialogues are probably not included in histories of the genre because our main sources – such as Aristotle – were either products of Plato's academy or highly influenced thereby.

The subject matter of these fragments is excellence, and the original Greek title of the work by Themistius that MD1a-c were drawn from was almost certainly περὶ ἀρετῆς, 'Concerning Excellence'. Alberto Rigolio, who is preparing an edition and English translation of the text, says that the direct translation of the Syriac word used is 'excellence', which he feels the Syriac translator was using to translate ἀρετή.²⁴⁶ This fragment of Antisthenes is provided as evidence by Themistius to support his argument – in the preceding text – that man's excellence flourishes in his intellect, and a man will be blessed if he nurtures it.

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²⁴⁶ From personal email correspondence with Alberto Rigolio.
In Antisthenes’ text Prometheus is found addressing Heracles. Giannantoni has argued that the speaker should be changed, i.e. so Heracles is addressing Prometheus (SSR 4.312-7). However the tone of the ethical advice being given by Prometheus is quite in keeping with his depiction as a wise advisor of men in the Prometheus Bound attributed to Aeschylus, and also with Plato’s portrayal of him in Protagoras’ creation myth (Prot. 320c-323a).

Heracles himself delivers no direct speech in this fragment, though he is a speaker in MD7 and MD9. Prometheus is seen dispensing some particularly Antisthenic advice. He rebukes Heracles for being contemptible by striving in the field of worldly/human affairs and for neglecting matters of greater importance. He tells Heracles that he will not be an accomplished or complete man until he learns things that are higher than human, in which case he will learn about human matters in passing anyway. But to only learn about earthly/human affairs, says Prometheus, is to ‘be wandering like wild animals.’ The general thrust of his argument closely matches the most central tenet of Antisthenes ethical philosophy – viz. the adherence to excellence (see ch. 2.ii).

The sentiment and meaning of this passage is closely replicated in MD2, where Antisthenes (i.e. a speaker in one of his dialogues) tells someone to teach his son philosophy if he wants him to cohabit with the gods, but rhetoric if he is to live with men.

The nub of the argument from these fragments is that if one has no aspirations above consorting with men who are inherently base, then by all means one should learn about human affairs and learn rhetoric. But if one has aspirations higher than that, one should learn about things that are higher than human – hence, one should learn philosophy.

MD4-5 are drawn from a dialogue of Antisthenes titled Heracles. There were three titles listed by Diogenes Laertius including Heracles (cf. CD7 commentary) though as always it is unclear whether those were the original titles, or whether they were originally one dialogue which was later divided up. Nevertheless, they are included in this grouping as Heracles is a participant in the dialogue discussed here. Thus it is reported that Antisthenes said in his Heracles that excellence, ἀρετή, is the goal of life, and that it is teachable and unlosable.

206
Note also that in MD6b Heracles and Chiron are found 'conversing about excellence.' MD4 and MD5 both report that excellence is teachable. MD4 adds that the original source of this statement was Antisthenes' *Heracles*, and includes the additional assertion that the nobly-borne and men who are excellent are one and the same.

**Chiron, Heracles, and Achilles**  
**MD6a-8**

**MD6a-d.** The first four of this group of fragments relate to a dialogue titled *Heracles* that depicts a conversation between Heracles and Chiron the centaur. As discussed in the commentary to CD7, there are three titles listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue including the name Heracles, and a further title he mentions in discussion, plus there is an additional variant title listed by Persaeus, as follows.

By Diogenes – in his catalogue:

*Greater Heracles* or *Concerning Might*, Ἡρακλῆς ὁ μείζων ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος (6.16)

*Heracles* or *Midas*, Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Μίδας, and

*Heracles* or *Concerning Good Sense or Might*, Ἡρακλῆς ἢ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢ ἰσχύος, (6.18);

In his discussion (CD7):

*Big Heracles*, μεγάλου Ἡρακλέους.

By Persaeus (CD6):

*Lesser Heracles*, Ἡρακλῆς ὁ ἐλάσσων

It is difficult to determine which of these titles (if any) may apply to the fragments under examination here, though perhaps we can exclude the one with the alternative title *Midas*. The working hypothesis that Antisthenes’ works were all dialogic in nature is again confirmed in the case of these fragments. An incident involving Heracles and Chiron is described as occurring: ‘After a considerable time, while they were conversing’ (MD6a 5). In MD7 direct speech by Heracles is recorded.
Chiron the just. In MD6a-c the justice of Chiron is mentioned, MD6a-b claiming that in justice he surpassed 'all men' (sic. though Chiron was a centaur). Along with excellence (ἀρετή), justice was an especial ethical concern of Antisthenes (see further ch. 2.ii section E). Particularly relevant is Antisthenes' assertion: 'Those who desire to be immortal, must live piously and justly' (DL 6.5 = DC 75, SSR 176). This latter quote fits the context of the extant fragments discussed in this section and also the ultimate immortality achieved by Heracles, suggesting perhaps that the line could actually have started life as a pronouncement from Chiron to Heracles as part of the same dialogue under discussion here.

Pederasty. MD6a-b also mention that Chiron was the tutor who educated Asclepius and Achilles (for the latter cf. MD7-8), and that Heracles, rather than destroying Chiron – as he had done the other centaurs – became his student. The comment that Heracles went to him on account of love (ὅτι ἐρωτα / propter amorem) suggests that the style of teacher-pupil relationship Heracles entered into was pederastic in nature, with Heracles being the eromenos and Chiron being the erastes (using Dover’s terminology: 1978, 16). This seems confirmed by MD7 where Chiron is referred to as the ἐραστής of some other strapping youth – probably Achilles. There is additional linguistic evidence in MD6a to suggest that this was the sort of relationship Chiron had with his pupils. There Heracles is described as συνεῖναι with Chiron, which has been translated 'living together with,' but with the implied meaning 'shacked up with.'

The Cave of Pan. Heracles and Chiron are described in MD6a-b as being together in a cave honouring Pan. This brings to mind the scene at the conclusion of Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus where Socrates offers a prayer to Pan on behalf of himself and his companion Phaedrus (279b8-c3). One wonders if this passage influenced Plato and contributed to the accusations of plagiarism against him (cf. SD1 and commentary).

Death of Chiron. Fragments MD6a-d report an account of the death of Chiron as described by Antisthenes. While Heracles was conversing with Chiron an arrow slipped from his quiver onto Chiron’s foot and killed him, due to the deadly Hydra’s poison the arrows were dipped in.
Conversing about excellence. MD6b includes an interesting comment about the nature of the conversation that Heracles and Chiron were having. The text of line 5, as printed by Maass, does not make sense, which he acknowledges with 'omnia corruptit' in his apparatus. The emendations printed here require relatively minimal changes but produce a text that makes sense. Changing one letter of bona produces bono, an ablative form that is needed when super has the meaning 'about, concerning' – the sort of meaning wanted here. The second emendation, changing quoniam to quidem requires a bigger adjustment, i.e. four letters into three. It is natural for quidem to follow et when it is being used to reinforce a point (OLD s.v. 5a), as is the case here.

The emended text suits Antisthenes’ ethics. We read that during the time that Heracles was with Chiron 'they were conversing about excellence, and what is more, about the tendance of excellence' (5). It is possible that bonum could be understood as 'the good', i.e. τὸ καλὸν. This, however, is not a topic that Antisthenes is reported as showing interest in. Translating bonum instead as 'excellence' has Heracles and Chiron speaking about ἀρετή – Antisthenes’ principal ethical concern and a topic that was a central focus in at least one of his dialogues entitled Heracles (cf. MD4-5 and commentary).

A certain youth. In MD7 fragment 'a certain youth' is described by Heracles as 'big and handsome and in the bloom of youth' (µέγας … καὶ καλὸς καὶ ὡραῖος). The 'certain youth' is never identified, but the description best suits Achilles, who in MD8 is associated with Chiron by Antisthenes. Further supporting this view is that fact that Antisthenes uses the same adjectives from MD7 when comparing Alcibiades and Achilles: µέγας … καὶ καλὸς in CD11a and ὡραῖος in CD11b.

Constellation Centaurus. MD6a-d all report that Zeus (Jupiter) placed Chiron among the stars. MD6a-b add that it was on account of his piety and the accidental nature of his death that he received this honour. There are two constellations featuring a centaur – Centaurus and Sagittarius. The constellation referred to, however, must be Centaurus. Ps.-Eratosthenes mentions that Chiron's constellation is 'right by Ara' (Θυσιαστήριον, 'altar', and in Latin = Ara). On its own, that information would not
distinguish the constellations Sagittarius and Centaurus from each other, as both are about equidistant from Ara – each is one constellation removed. To make it clear why he thinks that Centaurus is the pious Chiron, Ps.-Eratosthenes describes the centaur beside Ara 'holding some beast in his hands', as if he is 'bringing a sacrifice' (7-8). He means that Centaurus appears to have the constellation now known as Lupus (the Wolf) in his hands. In the passage that follows on from the Antisthenes fragment, Eratosthenes again describes Centaurus holding in his right hand the 'so-called Beast' (40.24) and in his left a **thyrsus** (27).

Aratus writes of Centaurus 'He seems always to stretch his right hand towards Ara, but through his hand is drawn, and firmly grasped, the Beast (Θηρίον, *Phaen.* 439-42; cf. Cicero’s Latin translation *Nat. D.* 2.44; and cf. also Arat. *Phaen.* 662-3).

**Heracles and his sons**

**MD9-13b. Against flatterers.** This group of fragments is linked by their common condemnation of flatterers. The first of the fragments, **MD9**, names Heracles as a speaker and it seems that the other fragments develop the line of argument he was pursuing.

**MD9. Immunity from flattery.** This fragment is introduced by Plutarch’s account of Menedemus of Eretria, who was apparently immune to flattery. The sketch of Menedemus’ character is reinforced by connecting his conduct with the counsel that Antisthenes’ Heracles gave his sons in a dialogue. Heracles urged his sons not to feel favour towards anyone who praised them – which meant they should not feel obliged to those praising them, nor should they offer flattery to such men in return. The verb δυσωπεῖσθαι is translated here as 'to be affected by', as it can have the sense of 'being constrained' or 'being susceptible to importunity' (for the semantic range see LSJ s.v.).

**MD10.** This fragment preserves comments on flatterers from both Diogenes of Sinope and Antisthenes (corrected from the certainly wrong 'Demosthenes'). Here ὁ µέν has been taken as referring to Diogenes for whom another very similar fragment is recorded elsewhere: 'He (Diogenes) was wont to say that an ignorant rich man was a sheep with a golden fleece' (πρόβατον χρυσόμαλλον, *DL* 6.47). The ὁ δέ then refers to Antisthenes.
However, there is a similar, but less developed, version of Antisthenes' portion of this fragment that is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope by Stobaeus (4.31.48). The fact that this fragment is a more complete version, that it includes an eikon – a penchant of Antisthenes’ – and it reports the first of several of his remarks comparing flatterers to crows, makes this most likely to be Antisthenes’. In which Stobaeus either incorrectly attributed his fragment, or that fragment shows Diogenes paraphrasing Antisthenes.

The Antisthenes passage itself has been surprisingly handled by the two most recent editors of Antisthenes’ fragments – Giannantoni and Prince both cut it short – they end their texts at κολάκων (5), even though οἵτινες, directly following, is grammatically dependent on the preceding clause, and completes the sense of the simile.

The fragment represents an example of Antisthenes indulging his penchant for making an eikon, or likeness, of something (cf. Sy1 and commentary). It was clearly a talent he prided himself on and in this case he again offers a particularly clever illustration. Antisthenes likens rich but uneducated men to fig trees hanging over cliffs. Such fig trees bear a rich bounty of fruit but instead of being enjoyed by the citizens this fruit is devoured by scavenging crows and jackdaws. In like manner, the wealth and possessions of a rich man devoid of proper education is not enjoyed by his fellow citizens but is consumed by scavenging flatterers. The comparison of flatterers to crows was a favourite of Antisthenes’ (cf. MD13a-b) and had the added attraction of making a pun on κόλαξ (flatterer) with κόραξ (crow), especially if using a lisping pronunciation (cf. Ar. V. 42-51 and MacDowell 1971 commentary ad loc.).

The fragment ends with the claim that after flatterers have reduced their victims to penury, if they encounter them on the street they look the other way and pass them by as if they had never known them. Their interest in the rich men thus being confirmed as purely predatory and self-interested all along. The style of this pithy and scathing assessment seems to anticipate Theophrastus’ Characters. This fragment and those following, taken along with Heracles’ comments regarding flatterers, could have formed just such a
character sketch denouncing flatterers, and one that was offered in a dialogue by Heracles to his sons (see further discussion in ch. 3 section A).

**MD11.** Continuing the character delineation of the rapacious flatterers, here they are compared to courtesans. Just as courtesans pray that their lovers have every kind of blessing, but not intelligence or good sense, so the flatterers pray that their victims will be rich but foolish. This prompts the thought that in the case of the courtesans the customers were at least likely to have received something worthwhile in return for their wealth, but in the case of the flatterers this seems less certain. The simile is clearly intended to be amusing, as the flatterers are imagined as effete and worthless individuals whose only skill is their ability to strip their unwise patrons of their wealth.

Apparently the structure of this statement was popular with Antisthenes, as Plutarch reports another fragment that follows similar lines (*De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute* 336A = DC 99, SSR 77):

> For Antisthenes used to rightly say that it was necessary to pray for all good things for one's enemies, except for bravery. For thus these good things come to belong, not to those who possess them but, to those who conquer them.

**MD12.** Here Antisthenes shifts his condemnation from the flatterers to their patrons. Base men are the target of his attacks in several other fragments (see discussion in ch 2.ii section A). In this case he observes that base men who receive flattery become worse men.

**MD13a-b.** These fragments contain another punning comparison of crows (*korakes*) and flatters (*kolakes*, cf. **MD10**). Both state that it is preferable to fall in with crows than with flatterers, because crows only eat those who are dead, but flatterers devour those who are still alive. The same verb, ἐσθίειν 'to devour', is also used of the actions of flatterers in **MD10**. A similar saying is credited by Athenaeus to Diogenes of Sinope (254c = SSR VB 425). **MD13a** adds the distinction that the crows destroy the bodies of the dead, whilst flatterers destroy the actual souls of the living.

**MD13b** lists two further statements about flatterers. In Migne's edition of Antonius they follow on from the first statement, beginning 'Antisthenes said' without mention of another
name, and thus suggesting that Migne viewed them as being attributed to Antisthenes. Without further examination of the manuscripts, however, both these fragments must be considered *dubia* for the time being as they are elsewhere attributed to other authors. They are included here as they also closely mirror the style and content of Antisthenes’ comments about flatterers in the other fragments of this group. The attribution to authors is inconsistent in the body of around 90 manuscripts which contain all or part of the *Loci Communes* and only a few of them have been properly examined (Richard 1962-4, col. 488-92). So these statements are tentatively put forward as Antisthenes’, with the following arguments in support of that suggestion.

The first of the additional statements again compares the effect of crows on the dead to flatterers on the living, with the distinction that here the crows are said to destroy the 'eyes' rather than the 'bodies' of the dead. But as in the other statements, flatterers are said here to destroy the souls of the living. In Ps.-Maximus Confessor (11.39) this statement is credited to Epictetus. Epictetus was familiar with, and quoted, Antisthenes’ work (as reported by Arrian cf. *SD7*, *CD19*, *DC* 118). So considering the almost identical content of other firmly attested fragments of Antisthenes, an ultimate attribution – directly or indirectly – of this statement to Antisthenes is also likely.

The second additional statement about flatterers is elsewhere attributed to Favorinus (AD c. 85-155; *Stobaeus* 3.14.12, *Maximus* 11.35). In Antonius, however, this fragment is listed after Antisthenes’ name, and considering the appropriate nature of the content to Antisthenes’ other pronouncements on flatterers, it is tentatively included here. Actaeon had been transformed into a deer by Artemis after he deliberately (Stesich. F 236, E. *Ba*. 337-40) or inadvertently (Call. *H*. 5.107-166, Ov. *Met*. 3.138-252) sighted and thus slighted her, and his own dogs subsequently turned on him and tore him to pieces (Hes. F 346 MW), thus killing the very man who had nourished them. In this fragment the patrons of flatterers are compared to the deer that Actaeon became, viz. they are helpless prey, virtually uncomprehending of what is happening to them. The flatterers, on the other hand, are compared to the pack of dogs that tear to pieces the ones who had fed them. Not only is
this consistent with Antisthenes' other comments about flatterers, discussed above, but it is also consistent with his tendency to use characters and situations from myth to explicate his ethical interpretations (cf. MD14-16, commentary on TH12-14, and esp. ch.5 section B).

Perseus and Theseus

MD14-16. In these fragments Julian discusses Antisthenes' use of myth in his writings. Oration 7, from which the fragments are drawn, is a critique of a talk given by Herakleios the Cynic which Julian attended. In MD14 Antisthenes' use of myth is compared to Xenophon's, and in MD15 Antisthenes, Plato and Xenophon are grouped together as writers who explicitly use myth in their writing. Note that MD15 contrasts the Cynic with other types of philosopher – such others represented here by Antisthenes, Plato and Xenophon – thus making it clear that Julian does not consider Antisthenes to have a connection with Cynicism.

It appears from MD16 that Herakleios employed the figure of Heracles, and in particular Prodicus' tale 'The Choice of Heracles' in his talk. This tale, recounted in detail by Xenophon (Mem. 2.1.21-34), describes Heracles being given the choice between the paths offered respectively by the divine personifications of Excellence (Ἀρετή) and Happiness (Εὐδαιµονία), the latter otherwise known as Vice (Κακία). Julian advises Herakleios that instead of using Prodicus' tale of Heracles he should have followed the Antisthenic model and introduced a Perseus or Theseus to his work. This appears to imply that Antisthenes also wrote dialogues featuring these mythical heroes. As Antisthenes himself wrote dialogues featuring Heracles (cf. MD6-13), and Julian presumably knew this, it would appear that it is not Herakleios' use of Heracles per se that Julian is objecting to, but rather his use of Heracles without 'harmony' (ἐµµελείας). It seems that Herakleios was trying to force the tale of Heracles to illustrate a point for which it was not naturally suited. Julian's objection was probably compounded by the fact that he had a personal liking for tale of Heracles' choice, having used it himself (Or. 2.56d).
EROTIC DIALOGUES ED1-6

These fragments are particularly interesting because they feature Antisthenes himself as a speaker, something that Plato did not attempt, but which was probably imitated by Xenophon (see commentary on SD6 and discussion in ch. 4.ii section C). In each fragment Antisthenes is addressing, or discussing youths. In at least one of the fragments (ED6) the youth is a love interest of Antisthenes, and in another two (ED3-4) the youths are prospective students who may or may not have also been love interests. Hence, as a group, the fragments have been tentatively categorised as 'Erotic'. The persona-type, the erotic philosopher, characterises Plato's Socrates in many dialogues and one wonders if it is a type Plato borrowed to some extent from Antisthenes' self-portraiture. Xenophon is possibly playing on this image when he has Antisthenes declare how exceedingly in love he is with Socrates (Smp. 8.4).

ED1. This fragment is an amusing passage of dialogue between Antisthenes and a young lad who was posing for a sculptor. The verb παρασχηµατίζειν has the sense (LSJ s.v.) 'to change from the true form, transform', and thus in the context of working with a sculptor clearly means 'to pose'. Evidently, the young lad was posing in a manner that made his delight in his own attractiveness only too apparent, prompting Antisthenes to ask him what the bronze might pride itself on, had it a voice. This is a novel question and reminiscent of the sort of question Socrates was in the habit of asking. The youth replied that the bronze would pride itself on its beauty, to which Antisthenes responded by asking him if he was not ashamed to pride himself on the same thing as an inanimate object. This admonishment was evidently aimed at provoking the young lad to reconsider his priorities and to aspire to philosophy, i.e. the cultivation of the soul – viz. what an inanimate object, by definition, cannot pride itself on.

ED2a-b. Only preserved in Latin, in two scholia that derive from the same source, this fragment has Antisthenes again admonishing a young lad. In this case the youth was overly impressed by music and seeing this Antisthenes called him unfortunate, because he had not experienced the greatest music of all – his own praise. The value of praise, in
Antisthenes’ eyes, seems to depend on whether it comes from good or bad men. There are only a couple of other fragments where Antisthenes focuses on praise and praising. The attitude to praise is uniformly negative in them, but it is clear that the praisers are bad or base men. For example, Antisthenes is said to have expressed anxiety or concern that he had done something wrong when he heard that base men were praising him (DC 178a-c, SSR 88-9). As discussed above (cf. CD14a-f) he had someone tell Cyrus that it is kingly to be ill spoken of. And in CD15 a bad reputation is said to be a good thing.

ED3. This is the first of three fragments featuring youths from Pontus. In this case a young student asks what he needs in order to attend Antisthenes’ teaching. Antisthenes responds with some witty punning. The word play revolves around the word καινοῦ meaning ‘new’, but the same six letters separated, e.g. καὶ νοῦ, meaning ‘and intellect’. So the sentence when delivered sounded simultaneously like both:

‘a new book and a new pencil and a new writing tablet’

and

‘a book and intelligence and pencil and intelligence and writing tablet and intelligence’.

Another fragment of Antisthenes places similar emphasis on possessing νοῦς. He stated (Chrysippus in Plu. De Stoic. repug. 1039e = DC 67, SSR 105):

δεῖν κτᾶσθαι νοῦν ἢ βρόχον.

One must possess intelligence or a halter.

The same pun on καινοῦ and καὶ νοῦ is also attributed to Stilpo when speaking to Crates (DL 2.118).

ED4. In this fragment a young lad from Pontus is unable or unwilling to pay Antisthenes at the present time, but promises he will pay if and when his cargo of salted fish arrives. Antisthenes then takes the young man along as he goes to a grain seller and fills up his bag. When Antisthenes attempts to leave with his bag of grain, the grain seller asks for payment, prompting Antisthenes to tell her that the youth will pay her if his cargo of fish comes in.

The outcome of Antisthenes’ proposal to the grain seller is not reported, but must have been one of two possibilities: either, and most likely, Antisthenes’ promise that the youth would
pay was rejected, thus demonstrating to the young lad the futility of such future promises; or, a contract came into force between the youth and the grain seller, relieving Antisthenes of further involvement, and possibly putting the youth under greater compulsion to follow through with his payment. There is no indication as to what the payment might be for but the obvious thing would be for Antisthenes' teaching. Given that Antisthenes almost certainly took after Socrates in disdaining those who charged a fee for teaching, the fragment is probably conveying a negative view of trade in accord with the traditional aristocratic attitude. This attitude – that merchants and traders are necessities, but worthy of disdain – is well summed up by Plato in his Republic (371c): 'in well-conducted cities they [traders] are generally those who are weakest in body and those who are useless for any other task. They must wait there in the agora and exchange money for goods with those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy.' Aristotle's view of merchants is similar, and he states (Pol. 1328b38-40): 'the citizens must not live a mercantile life – for such a life is ignoble and directly opposed to excellence (ἀρετή).'

ED5. This fragment again features youths from Pontus, making it clear that these young men constituted a sub-theme in these fragments of dialogue. Diogenes Laertius here reports that it was youths from Pontus whom Antisthenes stirred up to drive Socrates' accuser, Anytus, from the city. Diogenes Laertius also mentions in his 'Life of Socrates' that the Athenians executed Meletus and banished the other accusers (2.43). It seems that Antisthenes was responsible, at the very least, for provoking attacks against the accusers.

ED6. The sense of this fragment has proven to be elusive to date. It was assumed that there was some allusion or joke being made, beyond the obvious anecdote, that we lacked the requisite background information to understand (e.g. Decleva Caizzi 1966, 128). Comparetti feels that there is nothing distinctive about the writing style that may reveal the author, but guesses that it is the work of a minor sophist of Plutarch's era (1908, 20). His overall assessment of the papyrus is that it is a discussion about παιδεία (education), and

247 I am grateful to Liz Irwin for this suggestion.
248 Shorey's Loeb translation.
249 Generally following Rackman's Loeb translation.
whether or not skills can be taught and learnt (19). He sees the Antisthenes anecdote as being part of that discussion and the sense of Antisthenes' response is that while the boy searches for such pleasures 'I teach to abstain' (20: io insegno ad astenersene). His assessment is that Antisthenes acknowledges that the power of his teaching is not as persuasive as fine cuts of fish (22, n. 1.26). Comparetti has a traditional view of Antisthenes as the founder of Cynic philosophy and so finds it a little difficult to accept the anecdote at all because of Antisthenes', apparently incompatible, love interest in a boy (23, n. 1.26). Crönert thinks that the papyrus is a Stoic-Cynic diatribe about τὸ πείθειν (persuasion) rather than about παιδεία (1908, 1201). Körte supports this view and thinks that Antisthenes is relying on his abstinence being more persuasive and making a stronger impression on the boy in the long run than the pleasures themselves (1920, 239).

All of the above opinions are probably influenced by a series of fragments attributed to Antisthenes in which he warns against indulging in pleasures (see ch. 2.ii section D). In general, recent scholarship has followed similar lines of analysis and argument. Gallo (1980, 227-8) sees the fragment as a 'chria' that fits Antisthenes' imagined Cynic outlook – 'non appare estraneo allo spirito cinismo.' Very recently Luz described it as an anecdote by an unknown author illustrating the inability of Antisthenes to instil moral values in his student (2015, 194). The most insightful assessment offered is by Brancacci (2004), who rejects the idea that this text is a 'χρεία' and instead judges that the text was part of a dialogue written by Antisthenes – though he feels 'Antisthenes' has been presented as the speaker in place of what was originally 'Socrates' (226-8). This is a possibility, though it is argued here that the style of dialogue speaking about a young lad, and the witty remark in the fragment, are typically Antisthenic.

The papyrus itself resides at the Biblioteca Laurenziana, which provides low resolution scans on its website. Fortunately Comparetti and Vitelli provided a large photographic plate in their edition (1908, Tav. III). A copy of the relevant portion appears following the text of the fragment as 'Plate 1'. By enlarging a scan of this plate a lot of detail can be
observed, some of which appears to have faded over time, judging by comparison with the new scans.

One finding that emerged from detailed study of the plate is the fact that the papyrus contains punctuation marks that have not been noticed by previous editors. These are marked on the text printed here. They indicate the beginning of a new passage at φασί and the end of sentences in lines 30, 33, and 34. Elsewhere there are paragraphoi, indicating divisions in the text, and it appears likely that the whole papyrus is actually an ancient commentary.

Though the fragment remains a little difficult to translate, a handful of emendations to the text (as noted in the apparatus) greatly improve its readability. In particular, emending Comparetti’s line 36 τ[οιούτων] to [ι]χθύων allows more sense to be extracted from it. Of the first letter of this word, only the lower part of a vertical stroke is visible on the papyrus (cf. Plate 1). In his notes to the papyrus, Comparetti actually mentions that he considered printing [ι]χθύων but rejected it because the space from the previous ν suggested a τ rather than an ι (22). Even a cursory glance at the papyrus, however, reveals other occasions where a similar space preceding an ι exists. For example in line 17 of this papyrus a similar gap from ε to ι exists mid-word in λέγεις. Furthermore [ι]χθύων actually seems a superior fit to the available space. The edge of the final ν is visible after the gap in the papyrus. While it is difficult to envisage how τοιούτων could be compressed into the space, [ι]χθύων seems a natural fit.

Knowing that [ι]χθύων was an alternative better fitted to the space may not seem to necessarily offer any better sense than τοιούτων until one considers this passage from Plutarch: πότερα τῶν ζῶν φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαία ἢ τὰ ἐνυδρα [ι]χθύς δὲ τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀνοίητους λοιδοφούντες ἢ σκόπτοντες ὀνομάζομεν. 'But those stupid and ignorant people whom we abuse and mock we call “fish”'(2.975b). In a related vein, Hesychius notes (κ3971 Latte) κραπαταλός· παρὰ πολλοῖς ὁ μωρός, 'krapatalos (a type of fish): in the eyes of many a moron.’ Pherecrates wrote a comedy, Κραπάταλοι, employing this sense, of which 20 fragments remain (PCG VII). It seems that fish themselves were generally known for
their lack of intelligence. Plato writes that fish are cursed to live in an extreme environment due to their extreme stupidity (ἀµαθία, Tim. 92b).

Understanding 'fish' as a euphemism for 'fools' allows an interpretation of this papyrus fragment that is consistent with Antisthenes' other thought. Antisthenes several times emphasises the importance of good sense and intelligence (e.g. MD11, ED3; cf. also ch. 2.ii section C). By stating that 'another thinks it right to keep away from fish (i.e. fools)' (36), Antisthenes seems to be simultaneously admonishing the young lad for his foolish choice of company, and expressing his own intention to keep away from the fools courting the lad – and probably, by extension, from the foolish lad himself.

Antisthenes' use here of θαλαττοκρατεῖν shows a liking for such compounds that is demonstrated elsewhere by his use of οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι, 'to be a household-ruler' (see TH14o 33-4 and commentary under TH14 Step 2b §3). Antisthenes' use also provides a comparatively rare example in extant Classical literature of the Attic form -ττ-, instead of -σσ-. Thucydides and (not surprisingly) Herodotus both use the Ionic θαλασσοκρατεῖν. Xenophon, however, in Hellenica twice uses the Attic form (1.6.2-3, 4.8.10). Antisthenes' employment of the middle/passive form appears to be one of as few as two examples from the Classical era. The other certain example is noted by Guida (1989, 239), showing that the vocabulary had currency during the late stages of the Peloponnesian War (Demetrius of Sicily c. 402 BC, PCG 5 F 2):

Λακεδαιµόνιοι θ᾽ ἡµῶν τὰ τείχη κατέβαλον, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις ἔλαβον ἐµµήρους, ὡς μὴκέτι θαλαττοκρατοῖντο Πελοποννήσιοι.

The Spartans tore down our walls, and took our triremes hostage, so that the Peloponnesians would no longer be mastered by the sea.
TRAGICA & HOMERICA

TH1. We know from a scholiast to Aristophanes (Tzet. on Fr. 1475, p.1112 Koster) that the original line being critiqued in this fragment is from Euripides’ Aeolus. Giannantoni prints this fragment under his section ‘Homerica’ and Decleva Caizzi prints it under ‘Le interpretazione omeriche; i rapsodi’. They apparently categorise it thus because there mention is made of Aeolus by Homer (Od. 10.1-12). It is clearly the work of Euripides, however, not Homer, that is the object of Antisthenes’ critical attention here.

In this fragment Antisthenes demonstrates his compulsion for offering ethical criticism by rejecting the thought put into the mouth of one of Euripides’ characters (probably Macareus) and correcting it. In doing so he reveals his conservative, absolutist stance on moral and ethical issues by reacting against a relativist view of ethical values espoused by this line of Euripides, which itself reflects sophistic discourse of the late fifth and early fourth centuries on such topics. A passage of verse quoted in the Dissoi Logoi or Double Argument (Δισσοὶ Λόγοι) sets out an elaborated version of the same relativist view (DK 90, 2.19 = TrGF 2 F 26, F com. ad. 1209 Kock):

καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον ὧδε θνητοῖσιν νόµον
ὕσιν διαφώνον οὐδέν ὄν πάντη καλόν
οὐδ’ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ’ ἐποίησεν λαβών
ὁ καιρὸς αἰσχρὰ καὶ διαλλάξας καλά.

For if you examine the matter in this way, you will see another law among mortals; that nothing is absolutely noble or shameful, but rather the appropriate occasion takes the same things and makes them shameful, and then changes them and makes them noble.

The Dissoi Logoi was probably composed at some point in the second half of the fifth century, or very early fourth century.251 Some have argued that this line of verse quoted in the Dissoi Logoi should, in fact, be attributed to Euripides (see note on TrGF 2 F 26). As noted above, Kock included it in his edition of comic fragments, presumably believing that it must be a parody. Regardless of who the author was, the line of verse quoted, and the

251 At 1.8 it mentions battles – mentioning ‘the most recent first’ (τὰ νεὼτατα πρῶτον ἐρῶ) and starting with a victory of the Spartans over the Athenians and their allies; this could be referring to the final defeat of Athens in 404, or the defeat at Mantinea in 418, or possibly the defeat at Tanagra in 457.
Dissoi Logoi itself, are further examples of the type of relativist standpoint which Antisthenes rejected and was reacting to in this fragment (see further ch. 2.iii).

Taking into account TH2, it looks like Antisthenes' short, pithy and witty commentaries on various passages of the tragic poets may later have been gathered into collections. Though it is uncertain what the exact nature of Antisthenes' work was from which this comment on Aeolus was extracted, we can presume that both the original line of Euripides and the retort were put into the mouths of speakers in a dialogue. Macho of Sicyon (or Corinth, 3rd c. BC) later used the same line from Aeolus in just such a way, having Laïs of Corinth humorously turn the line back on Euripides himself (Ath. 13.582d):

Eur: τίς εἰ, γύναι; οὐκ ἀισχροποιώς;
Laïs: τί δ’ αἰσχρόν, εἰ μὴ τοῖς χρωµένοις δοκεῖ;
Eur: Who are you, woman? Are you not a doer of shameful deeds?
Laïs: What is shameful, if my fuckers don’t think so?

The same original line of Euripides was also parodied by Aristophanes in Frogs (1474-5):

Eur: αἰσχυστὸν ἔργον προσβλέπεις μ’ εἰργασµένον;
Dion: τί δ’ αἰσχρόν, ἢν μὴ τοῖς θεωµένοις δοκῇ;
Eur: Do you dare look me in the face after doing a most disgraceful deed?
Dion: What deed is disgraceful if the spectators don’t think so?

Frogs was produced in 405, so Aristophanes' implicit criticism here might have been influenced by Antisthenes. We have no known dates for Antisthenes' works, but given that he was probably born prior to 451/50 (see ch. 1.iii) it is certainly likely that he was writing before 405. It is true that Aristophanes was already aware at an earlier date of the comic potential in Euripides' Aeolus, as he has Strepsiades launch an attack against it in Clouds (1371-2). Clouds was originally produced in 423 and the reworked, and only extant, but not performed version dates from the period 420-17.252 The attack against Aeolus in Clouds, however, is against the content of the play (a brother and sister having sexual relations) rather than a clever reworking of an existing line, meaning that the above example from Frogs could be revealing Antisthenes' influence.

There is a tantalising possibility that what we have here is actually a line of dialogue delivered in Antisthenes' *Sathōn*. The dialogue probably featured Plato either as himself or his alter-ego Sathōn (see **CD4a-c**). Serenos (author and moral critic from late 2nd c. AD) says Plato addressed Euripides himself with Antisthenes' line as follows (Stob. 3.5.36 Hense 3.266.11):

καὶ Πλάτων ἐντυχὼν αὐτῷ ὦ Εὐριπίδη ἔφη, ἁίσχρόν τὸ γ᾽ ἁίσχρόν, κὰν δοκῆ κὰν μὴ δοκῆ.

And Plato, having bumped into him, said 'O Euripides, what is shameful is shameful, whether one thinks so or no.'

Plutarch's attribution to Antisthenes in **TH1** is likely to be secure. He had access to a range of material by Antisthenes, as attested by the fact that eight Antisthenic fragments are drawn from Plutarch's works, half of which are presented as direct and acknowledged quotations from Antisthenes (i.e. **TH1**, and **CD12, MD9, Sy2**). But if the comment was delivered by 'Plato' in Antisthenes' dialogue then both attributions would be accurate. The tenor of the comment could easily be imagined to fit such a dialogue featuring Plato as the sententious puritan 'Fat-cock.' See further conjecture about the *Sathōn* along with another possible fragment under the commentary for **CD4a-c**.

Apart from this line of dialogue, which may have been given to him by Antisthenes, Plato is well known to have had a conservative stance on moral and ethical issues that was more or less equivalent to Antisthenes'. As such, Plato's Socrates expresses an absolutist view, similar to that in the fragment under discussion, on αἰσχρός in *Euthydemus* (301b):

Σωκ: οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλὸν ἐστι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρὸν;

Soc: Is not what is noble noble, and what is shameful shameful?

**TH2.** Giannantoni prints this fragment in his section 'De congruentia inter Cynicam disciplinam et Stoicam sectam intercedente'. Decleva Caizzi does not print it, but instead mentions it in a note on Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Antisthenes' works, calling it 'another work of Antisthenes', otherwise unknown (un'altra opera di Antistene, altrimenti sconosciuta; 1966, 87). It will be argued here, however, that this fragment is best categorised, in company with **TH1**, as Tragica.
In as much as scholarly attention has fallen on this fragment, which is very little, the debate has focussed on the meaning of the expression (as reported in the manuscript): \( \chi\rho\epsilon\imath\alpha\nu \Sigma\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\omicl\ell\acute{e}ouc\). Patzer takes issue with Decleva Caizzi, who interpreted this as a 'work' (opera) of Antisthenes, and with Menagius who stated that it comes 'from books' (\( libris \)) of Antisthenes (1970, 161). Patzer points out that \( \chi\rho\epsilon\imath\alpha \) only means 'collection of sayings' (Sprachsammlung) in the plural and that in this case 'it is absolutely not a book' (es ist überhaupt kein Buch). Rather than being a reference to a book, he says that here the reference is to a 'quotable maxim' (zitathafte Gnome) from a Sophoclean tragedy, meaning something to the effect of: 'do not criticise without acknowledging what is good.' He therefore concludes that this title should be deleted from the catalogue of Antisthenes' works.

Very similarly, Radt states that it was incorrect of Cobet to write 'from his book' (\( ei\us livre \)) and for Hicks to call it an 'essay', and he then quotes Kühn who instead says that this passage must refer to an adage written by Sophocles (\( TrGF 4, 633 \)). There are two clear problems with this argument. Firstly, and less importantly, there is no known passage of Sophocles that matches the requirements of being a maxim stating something to the effect of: 'do not criticise without acknowledging what is good.' Secondly, and much more importantly, there would be defective logic in the fragment if the explanations advanced so far to explain it are accepted. The thrust of the argument in the fragment, as presented by Diogenes Laertius' text, is that when someone criticises Antisthenes, in response Zeno produces something that defends or rescues Antisthenes' reputation. Yet in no way would quoting some aphorism from Sophocles achieve this end. Clearly Zeno must have produced something written by Antisthenes, which he considered masterful, in order to prove how worthy Antisthenes was and how misguided his interlocutor was.

The most straightforward way to make sense out of the fragment would be to amend the text (as per the fragment printed here) to make \( \chi\rho\epsilon\imath\alpha\nu \) plural \( \chi\rho\epsilon\imath\alpha\varsigma \), requiring the alteration of one letter. The correction Antisthenes made to the Euripides' line in \( TH1 \) could easily be termed a \( \chi\rho\epsilon\imath\alpha \) in it's own right – certainly it was turned into one by the poet.
Macho (see commentary above). If Antisthenes had made similar observations on Sophocles’ works then there is no reason why a later collector of such comments would not have termed them Χρεία Σοφοκλέους. Naturally such comments on Sophocles (and Euripides) would most likely have originally appeared in the context of Antisthenic dialogues. Then, because Antisthenes was good at commenting using pithy, quotable remarks, these would have been extracted into collections and given new titles, such as the one suggested here.

TH3. It is unclear who the writer is who offers their opinion in the first person in this scholion. The extant scholia on Aristophanes is based on Symmachus’ commentary (1st or 2nd c. AD) which in turn was largely based on the work of Didymus (c. AD 1; cf. Dickey 2007, 29). The scholiast’s assertion that Plato thought this line was by Euripides is more than a mere idle conjecture – Plato’s Socrates attributes the exact line to Euripides twice, at Theages 125b and Republic 8 568ab. A scholion to the latter reference (Greene 1938, 266) also states that the line is from Sophocles, but is credited to Euripides as well, claiming that it is nothing amazing if the poets correspond. It has been conjectured that there was a similar line in Euripides, something like: ἀγαθὸν τυράννοις αἱ σοφῶν ξυνουσίαι (see note at PCG 3 F 323). A very long note to the tragic verse in question (TrGF 4 120-1) seems to offer no stronger evidence showing that the line was by Sophocles than the scholia on Aristophanes and on Republic 8 (noted above) – it lists multiple sources repeating the same information. Given that three well-informed, contemporary commentators – Aristophanes, Antisthenes and Plato – thought the tragic verse was by Euripides, it seems highly likely that it actually was by Euripides. In this case the scholiast is either correct in suggesting that there was a corresponding, identical line in both poets, or he was incorrect in attributing it to Sophocles’ Ajax the Locrian.

The fact that the scholiast knew that Antisthenes thought it was from Euripides shows that (like Plato) Antisthenes had written something about this verse. Whatever Antisthenes wrote was probably originally set out in a dialogue where the tragic verse was either quoted, discussed or ‘improved.’ Perhaps at a later date it was even extracted and inserted
into a work with a title such as: *Sayings of Euripides* (cf. final portion of commentary on TH2).

**TH4.** Here Dio tells us that Antisthenes was the first to employ an innovative approach for reading Homer that avoided interpretations that made it seem like Homer was contradicting himself, thus 'saving the text' in its current form. So sometimes Homer represents things as *people say and think they are*, but at times where his depiction seems to conflict with people's impressions, it is because he is instead representing things as *they really are*.

Dio states that Antisthenes 'didn't fully expound this theory' whereas Zeno, at a later point, 'set it out section by section'. This probably means that Antisthenes communicated the theory in dialogues but did not set it out formally in a treatise. So *dramatis personae* in Antisthenes' dialogues would have argued that Homer was presenting things either as people think they are, or as they really are. As the dialogue genre does not lend itself to setting out methodologies in a structured way, theories must be understood from what is said by the interlocutors. This is much the same as the manner in which Plato’s theories must be pieced together from his dialogues. By contrast, according to Dio, Zeno actually formally spelt out the theory step by step. See further discussion in ch. 5 section A.

**TH5.** Decleva Caizzi includes this as a regular fragment, however, Giannantoni does not refer to it at all. In Walz’s edition it has an asterisk beside it, the meaning of which is unclear, but Giannantoni’s non-inclusion suggests that he thinks it is a dubious attribution. Elsewhere deployment in the same manner of the same verse of Homer is attributed to another student of Socrates, Aristippus ([Plu.] *Strom. ap. Eus. Praep. Ev.* 1.8.9 = F 144 Mannebach = I B 19 Giannantoni). Diogenes Laertius mentions the same line of Homer quoted by Diogenes of Sinope (6.103), but also connects it with Socrates (2.21). Themistius also attributes it to Socrates (33.5.9). Attributing the line to Socrates is consistent with it being from a dialogue in which Socrates was one of the interlocutors. As the line is also attributed to Antisthenes, one of his dialogues is probably the source.
In its original context in the *Odyssey*, the line was delivered by Eidothea, daughter of Proteus, to Menelaus. In that case ἐν µεγάροισι clearly meant ‘in your halls’, as Menelaus would learn from Proteus what had happened at home while he was away. The attribution to Socrates in Diogenes Laertius offer slightly varied context to the Antisthenes attribution of this fragment, and they suggest that a better translation for ἐν µεγάροισι is ‘in our halls’ (DL 2.21):

κάκεινα δὲ φάσκειν ζητεῖν· ὅτι τοι ἐν µεγάροισι κακὸν τ ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται.

He declared that he was enquiring into: ‘what evil and what good has been wrought in our halls’.

It appears from this fragment, and from the correction to Euripides (TH1), that Antisthenes may be the originator and main exponent of the view that the function of poetry is to give ethical guidance.

Another Antisthenes fragment reinforces this idea of self-investigation: ‘According to Phainias in his *Concerning The Socratics*, when Antisthenes was asked by someone, “What should I do to be noble and good?” he said “Learn from those who know that the problems (κακά) that you currently have are avoidable!”’ (DL 6.8 = DC 175, SSR 172).

**TH6.** ‘Excellence’, ἀρετή, was the most important value in Antisthenes’ ethical agenda (see ch. 2.ii). The thought in this fragment would have originally been articulated by one of Antisthenes’ characters in a dialogue. Another Antisthenes fragment makes a statement similar to the one in this fragment regarding the relationship between ὁ σοφὸς and ἀρετή (DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134):

καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειµένους νόµους πολιτεύσεσθαι ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

And the wise man will engage in public life, not according to the established laws, but rather according to the law of excellence.

**TH7.** As in this passage from the *Iliad* describing the ψυχή of Patroclus, the spirits Odysseus meets during the Nekyia in Book 11 of the *Odyssey* are each identified from their ψυχή (e.g. Elpenor 51, Anticleia 84-5, Teiresias 90). Compare this fragment of Pindar that preserves a similar concept regarding what remains after the death of the body (131b Snell-Maehler):
The body of every man yields to exceedingly powerful death, but a living image of life is still left behind; for it alone is from the gods.

The word εἴδωλον, translated ‘image’ here, also includes the notion of ‘ghost’ or ‘spirit’. In the *Odyssey* the seer Theoclymenos had a waking vision of the suitors as ‘spirits’ (εἴδωλα) crowding the porch before hastening down to Hades (20.355-6). Clearly he knew that these spirits were the suitors because he recognised them from their appearance.

Antisthenes’ observation in this fragment seems most likely to be purely physiognomic, implying that the form, and therefore nature, of a person’s soul may be perceived by one who knows how to accurately read that person’s outside form – so including living persons as well as the spirits of the dead. For example, the notion of being able to perceive their soul may be consistent with reading their χαρακτήρ, their ‘stamp’, that is to say, the sort of ethical mould they were cast from, be it noble or base.

This ability to read the character from an outside sign is precisely what Euripides’ Medea longs for (516-9):

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ χρυσοῦ µὲν ὃς κίβδηλος ᾖ
tεκµήρι’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὤπασας σαφῆ,
ἀνδρῶν δ’ ὅτῳ χρὴ τὸν κακὸν διειδέναι
οὐδεὶς χαρακτήρ ἐµπέφυκε σώµατι;

O Zeus, why, when you granted men clear signs of gold that is base, is there no stamp set by nature on the human body by which to distinguish the base man?

The chorus in the *Hecuba* (379-80), however, declare that such a stamp actually does exist in the case of nobles - with reference to Polyxena, they claim that ‘to be born of noble stock (ἐσθλαί) among mortals is to bear a wondrous and unmistakable stamp (χαρακτήρ)’.  

This idea of external form reflecting inner nature was not new. When Odysseus paused in his performance to the Phaeacians, the queen asked the audience: ‘Phaeacians, how does...

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253 A useful round up of the scholarship on χαρακτήρ, and more ancient examples, is provided by Diggle 2004, 4-5.
this man seem to you in physical form (εἶδος), and stature, and mind (φρήν) within?’ (11.336-7). King Alcinous states that 'shapeliness (µορφή) is upon your words, and your mind (φρήν) within is noble (ἐσθλή, 367; cf. 8.170-77).²⁵⁴

If this is the sense that Antisthenes' comment on the spirit of Patroclus is taken – that the inner spirit or character is a reflection of the outer form – then the fragment may have been drawn from Antisthenes' Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωµονικός, Concerning the Sophists, a Physiognomy (DL 6.16) or Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, Concerning Style, or, Concerning Character Types (6.15; see further ch. 3). The use of the present participle certainly supports this interpretation, meaning the bodies 'that presently surround them' (περιέχουσι).

Alternately, it seems possible in this fragment, by claiming that the spirit has the same form as the body, that Antisthenes may be reacting against the theory of reincarnation attributed to Pythagoras, viz. that the spirit or soul (ψυχή) travels on a circuit through one form of creature after another (DL 8.14). A fragment from Xenophanes humorously claims that Pythagoras once recognised a human soul (ψυχή) crying out from a puppy that was being beaten (DK 21 B 7). There is an anecdote in Diogenes Laertius (8.15) that Plato paid 100 minas to purchase the only three books published describing the doctrines of Pythagoras. Regardless of the truth of that, Pythagoras' description of the journey of the spirit certainly had something in common with Plato's reincarnation theory found in Phaedo, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and the myth of Republic 10, where spirits of the dead adopt new lives (some as animals, some as men, some as women) that are suited to, or determined by, the nature or form of their past lives (Phd. 81e-82b, Phdr. 248a-249d, Ti. 42a & 91d-92c, R. 620a-d). So conceivably Antisthenes is asserting that the spirit has one shape and one shape only, viz. that of the body from which it came. In this case the fragment could be from Antisthenes' work categorised by Diogenes Laertius as Περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾗδου, Concerning Those in Hades (6.17).

²⁵⁴ All noted and discussed by Ford 2002, 30.
This fragment demonstrates the partial deployment (Steps 1-2 of 3) of the Antisthenic critical methodology discussed in chapter 5 section B.

**Step 1.** Antisthenes problematises the text by identifying an inconsistency. Here, after asking why Homer only showed Nestor as capable of lifting the goblet, he notes that it was not likely that it would have been easier for Nestor to lift than for the younger men.

**Step 2.** Antisthenes locates a σηµείον (indication) of the solution that can be read to give consistency to the text. Antisthenes here asserts that Homer was 'indicating' that Nestor was not becoming drunk. Notable here is Antisthenes' use of the verb σηµαίνειν, 'to indicate'. As discussed in chapter 5 section D, Antisthenes used a range of medical and other technical vocabulary in his criticism. This word in particular was used by Antisthenes when revealing 'indications' that could be interpreted by the skilled reader to provide an accurate 'diagnosis' of the text. In this case the indications in the text are referring to the symptic machismo, which Nestor possessed, of not getting drunk when everyone else is becoming heavily inebriated. This is a quality Socrates was lauded for in Plato's *Symposion* (220a). His self-control was indicative of a superior being. Schrader (Proleg. p. 387-8) has suggested that this fragment derives from περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ περὶ μέθης ἢ περὶ τοῦ κύκλωπος in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue (6.18).

This verse of Homer's was obviously a popular one for interpretation, and drew the attention of a number of other critics. Porphyry records three further explanations from Stesimbrotos, Glaucus (or Glaucon) and Aristotle (Sch. Il. 11.636 Schrader; cf. Richardson 1975, 72 & 77). Stesimbrotos argued that this passage gave a rationale for why Nestor had lived for so many years – if his strength was undiminished it was reasonable that the length of his life should correspond (= FGrH 107 F 23). Glaucos said that it was simply that Nestor had the knack of lifting the cup by the diametrically opposite handles. Aristotle stated that this only meant Nestor moved the cup without difficulty in comparison with others at a similar stage of life. It is interesting to note that explanations from Aristotle are also found together with Antisthenes' in the scholia in TH9 and TH13c.
**Possible Step 3?** Found among the scholia on *Iliad* 11.636 is the following interesting observation attributed to Aristonicus (1st c. AD; *Venetus A Scholia to the Iliad* 11.636 Erbse):

πρὸς τὸ ζητούµενον, πῶς ὁ γέρων ἀµογητὶ, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι µετὰ κακοπαθείας. ... ἀλλά νοεῖν ὅτι καὶ τούτο τῶν ἐπαίνων λεγοµένων Νέστορός ἐστι, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ 'Νέστωρ δὲ πρῶτος κτύπον ἀιε φώνησέν τε' (Il. 10.532).

From the problem, how did 'the old man effortlessly', but the others with distress. ... but reflect that this is also one of the characteristics of Nestor that is spoken of in praise, as also in the example: 'Nestor was the first to perceive the sound and speak' (Il. 10.532).

In highly Antisthenic style, Aristonicus here supplies another example of Nestor being praised for his heightened physical powers, and adduces it as evidence to confirm the accuracy of Homer's text. This confirmation of a reading of Homer using Homer would fit with Antisthenes' comments on this Homeric verse as a natural Step 3 of his methodology. It is tempting therefore to conjecture that Aristonicus, like Porphyry, was drawing here on work that was originally Antisthenes'.

**Allegory?** Giannantoni thinks that this fragment is evidence showing that Antisthenes did not employ allegorical interpretation (*SSR* 4 n.35.343), and this is surely the right conclusion. Antisthenes seems to have intended his interpretation to be as a literal reading, possible for those who were skilled in reading the 'indications' in the text.

**TH9.** This is another fragment showing evidence of the partial use of the Antisthenic methodology of textual criticism. Here we have step 1, in which he problematises the text by asking why Odysseus 'stupidly' insulted Poseidon. The problem here is that Odysseus was apparently acting 'stupidly' (ἀνοήτως) when it was well known that he was, in fact, very 'clever' (σοφός; cf. *TH12* 15, 24 and commentary, and *TH13a-d* and commentary at §3). Another part of the problem could also have been the implied impiety of Odysseus, and by extension, the impiety of Homer.

Antisthenes resolves this problem by explaining that Odysseus (being smart) was merely making a statement in accordance with a well understood fact, viz. that Poseidon was not the deity responsible for the domain of healing, but rather Apollo was. This also demonstrated that there was no injustice done or lack of appropriate reverence shown by
Odysseus (or Homer) toward Poseidon. This thus reveals another of Antisthenes’ strategies for preserving Homer’s text. Decleva Caizzi (note on DC 54) has suggested that this fragment may have been drawn from the work Κύκλωψ ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως. It seems that it might alternatively have appeared under the title περὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀσεβείας or the title περὶ Ὁµήρου (DL 6.17).

Immediately following Antisthenes explanation in the scholion for this verse is Aristotle’s explanation for the same line (F 174 Rose). An explanation from Aristotle also followed Antisthenes’ in TH8, and another example of the two authors being quoted one after the other in the scholia occurs in TH13c.

**TH10.** Here Antisthenes reveals a level of disdain for rhapsodes that was held in common with other conservative, elite thinkers. Elsewhere, a sentiment almost identical to that accorded here to Antisthenes about rhapsodes (that there is no one sillier) is given by Xenophon to Euthydemos (Mem. 4.2.10):

> τοὺς γὰρ τοῖς ῥαψῳδοὺς οἶδα τὰ μὲν ἔπη ἀκριβοῦντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάνυ ἠλιθίους ὄντας.

For the rhapsodes, I know, recite the verses accurately, but are themselves extremely silly.

Plato’s *Ion* is very largely an investigation of the value of rhapsodes. Though Socrates is generally good natured toward his eponymous antagonist, the rhapsode Ion, Socrates’ overall finding in the dialogue is that rhapsodes understand nothing at all about the material they recite. In one extended passage, Socrates sets out an argument that the rhapsodes actually know nothing themselves but depend solely on divine inspiration, which they receive second hand, via the poets, from the god (533d-536d). Though in the dialogue Ion resists this explanation, when finally forced into a corner where he is given a choice between being termed ‘unjust’ (ἀδικος) or ‘divine’ (θεῖος), he effectively concedes that it is divine inspiration, admitting ‘it is much nobler to be known as divine’ (542a).

By late antiquity the foolishness and unreliability of the rhapsodes was proverbial, as demonstrated by these lexicon entries:

> *Suda* (θ67) ῥαψόδημα· ψεῦσμα, *Rhapsōidēma* (recitation) = lies;
There are a couple of curious points to note at the end of this fragment. Firstly, just as Antisthenes was warming to his task – of questioning Nikeratos and forcing him to admit that he probably should not pride himself as much as he does on being able to recite Homer – Socrates interrupts and halts that line of enquiry. Secondly, Socrates offers a justification on Nikeratos' behalf, as to why he is different from the rhapsodes. Socrates says that Nikeratos paid a lot of money to men who taught him αἱ ὑπονοίαι (the underlying or hidden meanings). This, however, is precisely what the rhapsodes themselves also claim to know. In the Ion Socrates puts it to Ion that 'the rhapsode ought to become an interpreter of the poet's thought for his audience' (τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἑρµηνέα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούσι), with which Ion wholeheartedly agrees (530c). This function of being an interpreter (ἔρµηνεύς) is the ability to take the poet's thought (διανοία) and then draw out the underlying meanings (ὑπονοίαι). Thus it seems in Xenophon that Socrates was coming to Nikeratos' rescue to save him from further cross-examination and embarrassment, but the precise reason he was doing so is unclear. He was either being ironical, or (in Xenophon's view) he genuinely believed that Homer was worth knowing, so long as one understood the underlying or hidden meanings.

If Plato's depiction of Socrates is to be believed, then Xenophontic Socrates' last comment must be taken as ironical. As discussed above, in the Ion Socrates attempts to show that the rhapsodes actually understand nothing at all about what they recite, let alone being an interpreter of anything deeper. In the Phaedrus (229e) Socrates terms allegorical explanations τὰ ἀλλότρια (irrelevant matters) and in Republic (378d) he states that Homer's verses concerning the affairs of the gods should not be admitted to the city οὔτ᾽ ἐν υπονοιαῖς πεποιηµένας οὔτε ἄνευ υπονοιῶν, 'either written in hidden meanings or
without hidden meanings'; cf. Thucydides' Pericles rejecting the need of a Homer, or any other poet, to present the ὑπόνοια of Athens' deeds rather than the plain truth (2.41).255

On the other hand, Xenophon's portrayal of Socrates differs markedly. In the Memorabilia Socrates is depicted questioning a man recently selected as general, and he chooses passages from Homer to test his suitability, with no obvious irony (3.2.1-4). Socrates is shown apparently believing that Homer contains sound leadership examples that may be applied to real life. It seems at least possible that the hostility displayed towards rhapsodes throughout Plato's dialogues was actually a characteristic of Antisthenes that Plato appropriated to the dramatic persona of his Socrates.

The use of αἱ ὑπονοίαι in this fragment is translated as 'the underlying' or 'hidden meanings'. The meaning of this word evidently changed over time. For example, Plutarch equated this ancient use of the word to be equivalent to the use of the word ἀλληγοροφία (allegorical interpretations) in his own time (Quomodo adul. 19 E, ταῖς πάλαι µὲν ὑπονοίας ἀλληγοροφίας δὲ νῦν λεγοµέναις).

TH11. In this passage it appears that Antisthenes, once more, wants to go on the offensive and cross examine Nikeratos about his Homeric education. After Nikeratos' response, however, the conversation between the symposiasts moves on and Antisthenes has no opportunity to pose further questions. Of the capabilities claimed by the rhapsodes (and their students such as Nikeratos), the most controversial was an understanding of military command. Aristophanes' Aeschylus asks 'For what reason did the divine Homer have honour and renown except for this reason: that he instructed well concerning tactics, brave deeds, the arms of men?' (Fr. 1034-6). Just as in this fragment Nikeratos claims to understand generalship, Plato's Ion also claimed to possess that talent, a notion that Socrates spent considerable effort attempting to disabuse him of (Ion 540d-541d; cf. R. 599c).

It seems that in addition to generalship, or kingship, there were a number of other stock topics that came up when discussing the talents that could reputedly be learnt from the

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255 οὐδὲν προσδεόµενοι οὕτε Ὁµήρου ἐπαινέτου οὕτε ὅστις ἔπεσι µὲν τὸ αὐτίκα τέρψει, τῶν δὲ ἔργων τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἢ ἀλήθεια βλάψει.
study of Homer. Nikeratos here says he knows about chariot racing from *Iliad* 23. In discussion with Socrates, Ion offers the identical three lines (plus three further lines) in making the same claim (Pl. *Ion* 537ab). The line that Nikeratos closes with, about onion as a relish in drink, is also quoted by Socrates when he is quizzing Ion about his claimed medical ability (538c).

Once again, in this passage there is evidence that it was actually Antisthenes and not Socrates who was the most vigorous interrogator of people claiming knowledge as a result of memorising Homer. When Antisthenes questions Nikeratos, he asks, incredulously, if Nikeratos really understands kingship, and quotes the line regarding Agamemnon. As noted above (*TH10*), in another passage from Xenophon, Socrates questions a man who had been chosen as general. In doing so he quotes the same passage of Homer (*Mem. 3.2.2*):

> ἢ τι δήποτε οὔτως ἐπῆνεσε τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα εἰπὼν:
> 'ἀμφότερον, βασιλέως τ' ἀγαθός κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής'; (*Il. 3.179*)

> ἆρα γε ὅτι αἰχμητής τε κρατερὸς ἂν εἴη, οὐκ εἰ μόνος αὐτός εὐ ἀγωνίζοιτο πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ παντὶ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τούτῳ αἵτις εἴη, καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀγαθός, οὐκ εἰ μόνον τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου καλῶς προεστήκοι, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ, ἃν βασιλεύση, τούτως εὐδαιμονίας αἵτις εἴη;

Or why do you suppose he (Homer) praised Agamemnon, saying:

> 'he is both, a good king and a mighty warrior'? (*Il. 3.179*)

Should it be then that he was 'a mighty warrior too', not if he alone was fighting well against the enemy, but if he himself was also responsible for the entire army fighting well? And 'a good king' not if he alone arranged his own life well, but if also, for those he ruled, he was responsible for their happiness?

In this passage, and what follows it, Socrates actually carries out an exegesis of Homer to make it clear to the newly appointed general what his responsibilities are. Apparently this particular line of Homer remained famous as a summary of the qualities of leadership for some centuries. Dio Chrysostom (*Orat. 2.51-4*) offers a discussion of the virtues of Homer for understanding sound military strategy, and he rounds it off with exactly the same line: *Iliad* 3.179.
Taking into account the discussion here, the listing περὶ ἐξηγητῶν in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Antisthenes' works (6.15-18) was quite conceivably a dialogue containing an attack by Antisthenes on Homeric exegetes.

**Polytropos TH12**

In this scholia, as with TH13a-d and TH14a-l, a scholiast is reporting comments made by Porphyry from a work of Antisthenes which is otherwise lost. The work of Porphyry is now also lost, and is only preserved by various scholiasts as marginal notations to manuscripts of Homer's epics. The title this particular work may have fallen under, as catalogued by Diogenes Laertius, is unclear. Possibly it was included under Κύκλωψ ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως, 'The Cyclops, or, Concerning Odysseus' (6.17), along with the TH14 group of fragments.

This fragment preserves one of the longest extant passages of Antisthenic dialogue. It is clear that the fragment is extracted from a dialogue, as there are conversational particles and expressions (6 οὐκουν, 8 οὐ µὰ Δία, 14 τί οὖν; ἄρα γε, 16 µήποτε), and there are two speakers characterised as taking diametrically opposite ethical positions.

'Speaker One' (5-13) makes the argument that polytropos, 'many-mannered', was used negatively of Odysseus by Homer. His arguments represent a traditional aristocratic view that valued simplicity, honesty, and constancy, and on the other hand reviled what was changeable, deceitful, and polymorphous in any way. On the other hand 'Speaker Two,' for the remainder of the fragment, makes the case that polytropos is really equivalent to sophos, 'wise', and as such should be considered a positive attribute of Odysseus. The second speaker thus represents the sort of shifty nature that the old aristocracy ascribed to the demos and demagogues alike. In an extended discourse he sets out to show that polytropos was in fact intended in a very positive light. As such he is characterised as a silver tongued, sophistic speaker, not very different to Odysseus himself. It is not possible to determine the personalities of the speakers as the dialogue is characterising theoretical positions, not the speakers themselves. Thus the speakers putting forward the arguments, and in particular
the second speaker, are positing hypothetical positions (which they themselves do not necessarily agree with) in order to fully illustrate opposing ethical positions.

Most modern scholars have claimed that Antisthenes is actually making an argument for *polytropos* being a positive attribute here. A careful examination of Antisthenes’ work, however, shows clearly that Antisthenes connects multiplicity and changeability with concealment, dishonesty and deceitfulness, all ethical qualities that he associates with base men, demagogues, sophists and, in fact, with democracy. Whereas, immutability, consistency, steadiness, honesty and openness are qualities he associates with traditional aristocracy. In this he is followed by Plato, whose use of the same classes of semantically loaded words to discuss ethical qualities, establishes a key theme in his works. This may be another indication of Plato’s debt to Antisthenes and so help to explain the charges of plagiarism that were levelled at Plato (cf. SD1 and commentary).

So what this fragment actually represents is Antisthenes critiquing character and rhetoric. The text brings out ideological semantic oppositions implicit in *polytropos*, meaning ‘many-mannered’. The first contrast is between *poly* meaning ‘many’, and *haplous* meaning ‘single’, and in regard to persons, ‘open’ or ‘honest’. The second contrast is between *tropos*, from the verb *trepo* meaning ‘turn, alter, change’, which is contrasted with consistency, steadiness and immutability. Antisthenes’ language is very sensitive to the semantic fields of words.

In general *poly-* root words were associated by elite critics with the worst aspects of demagoguery and sophistry. The Eleatic stranger in Plato’s *Politicus* describes the race of sophists as being like lions and centaurs and other such creatures, and very many of them are like satyrs, and the weak and *polytropoi* beasts (291a-b). Elsewhere, the same Eleatic refers to the sophist as *polykephalos* (many-headed) because of his ability to force people involuntarily to admit to contradictory positions and to deceive people (*Sph.* 240c-d). It is telling that in Antisthenes’ *Ajax & Odysseus*, when Odysseus was defending himself in front of a jury, he was prepared to call himself *polytlaos, polymetis* and *polymechanos* (much-enduring, much-wily, and much-scheming, 2.14.3), but not *polytropos*. Presumably because

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256 E.g. Decleva Caizzi 1966, 105; Giannantoni 1990, 4.343; Prince 2015, 598-622.
this word was so negatively loaded that it would have done him no favours in winning his case.

5-13. Speaker One. πολύτροπος vs. ἁπλοῦς, γεννάδας, σοφός. Though the scholion reports 'Antisthenes says' this should be understood as relating what was said by a speaker in a dialogue of Antisthenes – in much the same way as quotes attributed to Plato from his dialogues should be understood as emanating from the mouths of his dramatis personae.

The first speaker makes the claim that Homer is criticising (ψέγειν) Odysseus, not praising him, when he calls him polytropos (6). He then goes on to set up a clear ethical opposition between polytropos, 'many-mannered', the chameleon-like quality attributed to Odysseus, and haplous, 'honest' (7), which was the way Achilles and Ajax were represented by Homer. This thus implies that, by contrast, polytropos is dishonest. Achilles and Ajax are also further described as 'noble' (γεννάδας, 8), thus implying that polytropos is 'ignoble'.

Nestor also, who was a sophos, 'wise man' (8), always spoke haplos, 'honestly' (9), while 'concealing nothing' (οὐκ ἀποκρυπτόμενον). This then suggests that being polytropos means consciously concealing things. Finally, polytropos is equated with having a 'deceitful and shifty nature' (δόλιον καὶ παλίµβολον τὸ ἢθος), the ethical opposites of which are honesty and constancy. So, in summary, the first speaker advances the assertions that being polytropos equates to being dishonest, ignoble, concealing, deceitful, and shifty; and these qualities are deliberately opposed to being honest, noble, wise, and constant.

Comparison to the Hippias Minor. The ethical opposition set up here, is identical to the one that Hippias highlights in his discussion with Socrates in the Hippias Minor. Hippias uses the superlative forms of polytropos, haplous and sophos, and applies them respectively to the same characters as Antisthenes' 'speaker one.' He labels Odysseus as polytropotatos (exceedingly many-mannered, 364c), describes Achilles as haploustatos (exceedingly honest, 364e) and aristos (noblest, 364c, equivalent to the superlative of γεννάδας above), and

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257 For the expression haplous logos, meaning 'speaking honestly', see A. PB 46, 610, 975 and Griffith 1983 ad loc.; and see also Ar. Ach. 1151. Being haplous is a key quality of the citizens in Plato’s ideal state, see R. 370b-c, 374a-d, 380d and Adam 1902 ad loc.
Nestor as *sophotatos* (wisest, 364c). The similarity is best illustrated by a side by side comparison of Odysseus and Achilles/Nestor from the two sources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antisthenes, TH12</th>
<th>Hippias Minor</th>
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<tr>
<td>Odysseus</td>
<td>πολύτροπος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achilles/Nestor</td>
<td>ἁπλῶς, γεννάδας, σοφός</td>
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Hippias also quotes a passage from the *Iliad* containing the same verse (II. 9.313) that Antisthenes' 'Speaker One' quotes in this fragment (12-13). He explains to Socrates that this shows plainly that the character of Achilles is true and *haplous* (honest) whereas that of Odysseus is *polytropos* (many-mannered) and false (365b). The contrast of terms in this Antisthenes fragment and the *Hippias Minor* is so nearly identical that it seems likely either that the author is one and the same, or that the author of one is imitating the other. It is quite possible that the characters in both works are also the same, therefore making Hippias 'Speaker One' in this fragment and Socrates 'Speaker Two.' See further speculation about the authorship of the *Hippias Minor* in Appendix B.

Decleva Caizzi's conjecture that the *Hippias Minor* preceded Antisthenes' work, claiming that Plato ignores his interpretation (1966, 105) is a little puzzling. Patzer has argued, on the contrary, that Antisthenes preceded Plato, and that this is thus the oldest example of a dispute between two literary Socratics (1970, 176). Giannantoni is also inclined towards this theory and suggests that Antisthenes may well have written down his ideas before the other Socratics, who may (surely!!) have known about his work when they started producing their own (1990, 4.344-5).

14-25. Speaker Two. πολύτροπος = σοφός. In its current form this is not a λύσις, or explication, supplied by Antisthenes as the scholion misleadingly suggests (i.e. λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀντισθένης). Rather, as per the note above, this is the second speaker in a dialogue providing a response and rebuttal to what had immediately preceded. This interlocutor takes the opposition set up between *polytropos* and *sophos* by the first speaker and attempts
to show instead that they are equivalent. In particular, he separates *tropos* from *polytropos*. He then proposes a bipartite meaning for *tropos* that indicates both a person's character and their use of speech, going on to point out that the term *eutropos* when used of a man means 'of noble-manner', and that *tropoi* are figures of speech (16-18). Next he argues that *sophoi* (wise men) are able to both express the same thought in many manners (*polloi tropoi*) and understand speech of many manners (*polloi tropoi*, 20-1). He explicitly equates his use of *polloi tropoi* here with *polytropoi* (*polytropos* in plural, 22-3). He concludes this section by stating that this shows that for Homer's Odysseus, being *sophos* was the same as being *polytropos* (23-4).

The word *tropos* (generally plural *tropoi*) is close to meaning 'character' in popular speech, with an emphasis on the ingrained ways and habits of an individual. This notion of fixed habits and ways of operating almost comes to give *tropos* almost the meaning of conditioned reflexes. There are examples found in a number of verses from comedy, e.g. Epicharmus *PCG* 1 F 266:²⁵⁸

> ὁ τρόπος ἀνθρώποις δαίµων ἀγαθός, οἷς δὲ καὶ κακός.

Manner/character is a good guiding spirit for men, but also a bad one for them.

From Menander *Epitrepontes* (1093-4):²⁵⁹

> ἐκάστῳ τὸν τρόπον συν<ώκισαν> φρούραρχον

(The gods) have assigned the manner/character of each man as his guardian.

The vocabulary Antisthenes is employing in this fragment to critique rhetoric is also used by conservative thinkers to criticise musical trends they disapprove of, and in particular, what is referred to by modern scholarship as the 'New Music'. Speaker Two quotes a line from the *Odyssey* (19.521) about the quality of a nightingale's voice to support his point (19-20). This is a reference to what appears to have been a readily recognised motif that symbolised the New Music and its depravity. The nightingale was used in Aristophanes' *Birds* in an explicit and extended parody of the complexity, variability, vulgarity, and

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²⁵⁸ Noted by Thimme 1935, 6.
transgressiveness of the New Music (Barker 2004). The New Music was habitually equated by elite critics with democracy and everything that was wrong with it (see further Csapo 2011, 96-108).

For such conservative musical critics the Dorian mode was the only music that was ‘manly and grandiose, not diffuse or giddy, but sombre and severe, not intricate (poikilon) and polytropos’, i.e. not like New Music (Herakleides of Pontos fr. 163, quoted from Csapo 2011, 95-6). As well as the noteworthy pejorative use of polytropos here, compare also the pairing of poikilon and polytropos against the pairing of poikile and polytropia in our fragment (34), which Antisthenes is contrasting with haplotes (honesty, simplicity).

The semantic field of poikilos when used as an ethical term includes meanings such as: subtle, artful, crafty, intricate, changeful, mutable, and unstable (cf. LSJ s.v. III). The cunning tricks of a consummate villain are described as poikiloι by a chorus in Aristophanes (Eq. 686). Plato compares the democratic city to a poikilos garment, describes democracy itself as poikile, and the democratic man as poikilos (R. 557c, 558c, 561e). He also claims that cities by the sea tend to produce men with a poikila and base disposition (Lg. 704e).

Aristotle says that the fortunate (i.e. noble) man is neither poikilos nor eumetabolos (easily changeable, EN 1101a8). Euripides’ Polynices declares that the argument of truth is haplous and in no need of being poikiloi (crafty, Ph. 469-70). This opposition, between what is haplous and poikilos, is precisely mirrored by Antisthenes’ use of these terms in his discussion here about styles of speech, and in turn is consistently employed by elite critics in their discussion of musical styles (Csapo 2011, 100). Overall, the contemporary criticism of rhetoric and music, as well as politics and theology, drew upon these same ethical oppositions implicit in the vocabulary of simplicity versus complexity, and constancy versus mutability.

On a textual note, the addition of ἄνθρωπος ὁμιλεῖν in line 23 by Schrader is necessary to make sense of the text.
Πυθαγόρας. The second speaker here adduces in support of his argument Pythagoras’ style of speech as an example to demonstrate that Odysseus was in good company when constantly changing his style of speech. He notes that Pythagoras adjusted his style of speech to fit each group of people; children, women, rulers, adolescents. In a way that seems to echo this, Plato’s Ion claims that he knows the appropriate thing for a man to say, and the sort of thing that is appropriate for a woman, a slave, a freeman, a subject and a ruler to say (Ion 540b). Speaker Two goes on to assert that it is a sign of wisdom (sophia) to find the right manner (tropos) of speech for each person, but a sign of artlessness (amathia) to use a single-manner (monotropos) of speech. Antisthenes’ Odysseus makes the same contrast between sophia and amathia with reference to Ajax (Ajax & Odysseus Od.13.260 In fact, Ajax is presented by Antisthenes as one who very conspicuously fails (or refuses) to adapt his style of speech to his audience to the same extent that Odysseus is presented as being conspicuously successful at doing so (see discussion at Kennedy 2011, 42-5).

Scholars are divided over whether this portion of the dialogue is originally from Antisthenes, or whether it is an aside, or insertion, of Porphyry’s. A very similar passage occurs in another work of Porphyry’s where Dikaearchos (Vita Pyth. 18 Places = F 33 Wehrli) is named as the source, rather than Antisthenes. Patzer (1970, 180-2) has assembled the details of the opposing views, as follows. Arguing that the reference to Pythagoras should be traced back to Antisthenes are: Joël (1901, 209, who claims that Dikaearchos depends on Antisthenes), Rostagni (1922, 148-201), and Detienne (1962, 55). Preferring to attribute the passage to Porphyry are Schrader (app. crit. p.2.6), Delatte (1951, 121), Buffière (1956, 368 n. 9), Di Benedetto (1966, 213 n. 1), and Patzer himself (1970, 180-2). None of them argue for Dikaearchos as the originator. Decleva Caizzi (1966, 105) and Giannantoni (1990, 4.337) both decline to favour one side or the other.

On closer investigation the argument that the section concerning Pythagoras was originally part of Antisthenes’ work appears to be sustainable. It is bolstered by two passages of

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Julian’s that seem to have been influenced by it. In one he refers to Odysseus as ‘the polytropos orator from Ithaca’ (Or. 2.75c). The fact that he combined polytropos with oratory hints that he was aware of the argument made in our fragment – certainly he was generally aware of Antisthenes’ work (see e.g. MD14-16). In another, longer passage he elaborates further (Or. 1.12d):

καίτοι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα συνετὸν Ὅµηρος ἐκ παντὸς ἀποφῆναι προαιρούµενον πολύτροπον εἶναί φησι καὶ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν καταγνῶναι καὶ ἐπελθεῖν τὰς πόλεις, ἵν᾽ ἐξ ἑκάστων ἐπιλεξάμενος ἔχοι τὰ κράτιστα καὶ πρὸς παντοδαποὺς ἀνθρώπους ὁµιλεῖν δύνατο. ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὃς οὐκ ἐβασίλευσε ποικίλων ἠθῶν ἐµπειρίας χρεία.

And indeed Homer chooses to reveal Odysseus as being intelligent in every way by representing him as polytropos, and saying that he had perceived the mind of many men and come to their cities, so that from each he would take what was most excellent, and would be able to converse with every kind of man. Yet even this man who did not rule as king needed experience of diverse characters.

The general thought that Julian is capturing here, that Odysseus was able to converse in many ways, is present in the portion of the dialogue preceding and following the Pythagoras section. The notion that Odysseus was ‘able to converse with every kind of man’ is also equivalently expressed in the passage about Pythagoras. This suggests that Julian was aware of Antisthenes’ work including the Pythagoras portion. Julian was writing in the Western Roman empire during the mid fourth century. It is just possible, however, if the Pythagoras part was Porphyry’s insertion (writing late third century in Rome), that Julian was being influenced by the altered version. The simplest explanation, however, is that the reference to Pythagoras was part of Antisthenes’ dialogue. Changing one’s style of speaking, and in fact any oratorical skills at all, were things Antisthenes was opposed to. So it is most likely that his inclusion of Pythagoras, known for his powers of oratory, was ultimately intended in a derogatory sense. As mentioned it is also possible that Antisthenes is taking aim at Pythagoras’ theories in TH7 (see commentary). Interestingly, Plato’s Socrates appears to stand in agreement with Pythagoras and against Antisthenes in this regard – in the Phaedrus (270c-272c) Socrates asserts that the orator must be able to know how many kinds of soul there are and have an equivalent number of types of speech.261

261 Noted by Boys-Stones & Rowe 2013, 14-16.
On a textual note, Buttmann’s conjecture at line 29 of τοῦ λόγου for τῆς σοφίας is necessary to make sense of the text.

31-33. ἡ ἰατρική. The discussion of the adaptation of speaking styles to suit the listeners is continued with a comparison to the medical art, in which, Speaker Two states that the treatment is also adjusted for each patient. A similar analogy to our fragment, correlating the deployment of the medical art to the use of oratory, is found in Plato’s Theaetetus where the work of a physician using drugs is compared to the work of a sophist using oratory (167a; cf. Csapo 2011, 120). In a further interesting comparison, Euripides’ Polynices claims that the unjust argument (being itself diseased) has a need of clever drugs (E. Ph. 471-2). Gorgias too states that the power of speech over the state of the soul or mind (ψυχῇ) is like the power of drugs over the state of the body, and that certain speech can drug and beguile (ἐξεγοήτευσα) the soul with a kind of evil persuasion (DK 82 B 11.14). So while the application of drugs produces an involuntary effect in the body, in a similar way oratory produces an involuntary change in the soul or mind – at least for those who are not steady and constant.

33-4. παλίμβολον τὸ τοῦ ἤθους, πολυμετάβολον, ἄστατον. The second speaker is returning here to terms that have been used negatively earlier in the dialogue, in an attempt to show that they are actually positive attributes. We have the part of the dialogue where παλίμβολον τὸ τοῦ ἤθους was used by the first speaker (8-9). The other two, πολυμετάβολον and ἄστατον, must have been used in another portion of Speaker One’s argument which is no longer extant. The semantic field of each expression is broad enough that, though they usually have a negative sense, they could also be taken in a neutral, or even in a positive sense. All three terms were no doubt used in a highly negative sense by the original speaker. The second speaker then attempts to rehabilitate the terms in the context of his discussion to show them as positive. He uses παλίμβολον τὸ τοῦ ἤθους with the sense ‘variability of character’. Most regularly, however, παλίμβολον is an ethical term with distinctly negative connotations, translatable as ‘shiftiness’ or ‘untrustworthiness’. This is the force with which it was used by the first speaker (8-9). Similarly,
πολυμετάβολον, translated here as 'highly versatile', more usually means 'highly changeable or fickle or unreliable', which is the sense the original speaker would have employed. Finally, ἄστατον, translated here as 'adaptable', has the negative sense of 'unstable'. Though the second speaker has attempted to couch the terms in a positive sense, the negative sense for each of these words was generally employed by ancient authors, as the following examples illustrate.

παλίμβολον. A scholiast to Aristophanes Clouds (V on 298) claims that the poet chose clouds as the goddesses for the sophistic 'Socrates' because of their mutability (παλίμβολον). Plato writes that overexposure to luxury breeds a shifty (παλίμβολα) and untrustworthy disposition in men's souls (Lg. 705a).

πολυμετάβολον. In Plato's Republic Socrates states that it is universally the case that those things that are in the best state, by nature or design, are the least liable to admitting 'change' (μεταβολή) from something else (381ab). In the Laws 'change' (μεταβολή) is claimed to be the most dangerous thing that exists in regard to every area of life, except what is evil (797d; cf. Csapo 2011, 108-9). Demosthenes urges speakers to offer their best advice at the first opportunity to avoid the charge of fickleness (34.1, μεταβουλευόµενοι). The chorus in Aristophanes' Acharnians mocks the Athenians for being quick to make up their minds (630, ταχυβούλοι) and just as quick to change them (632, μεταβούλοι).

ἄστατον. A scholiast on Euripides' Orestes (371 Schwartz) comments: ὑπούλα πάντα τὰ ὔήματα Μενελάου, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ ἄστατον τῆς Λακεδαίμονικης γνώµης κωµῳδεῖ, 'The completely deceitful speech of Menelaus, by which the poet ridicules the instability of the disposition of the Lacedaemonians.' The general force of ἄστατον when used as an ethical term is best summed up by an anonymous iambic verse (F 29 Iambica Adespota (ALG) Diehl = F 1324 Kock, D.Chr. 32.23):

δήμος ἄστατον κακῶν
καὶ θαλάσσῃ πάνθ᾽ ὅµοιον υπ᾽ ἀνέµου ῥιπίζεται.
καὶ γαληνὸς ἢν τύχῃ πως, πνεῦµα βραχὺ κορύσσεται,
κάν τις αἰτία γένηται, τὸν πολίτην κατέπιεν.
The *demos* is an unstable and wicked thing and is quite like the sea whipped up by a gale. And if a calm somehow ensues, the *demos* boils up again at the merest breeze, at any reason at all, and the citizen is engulfed.

And compare also the following passage from Demosthenes (*De Falsa Leg.* 136):

> ὁ µὲν δῆµός ἐστιν ἀσταθµητότατον πρᾶγµα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσυνθετώτατον, ἀσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ κώµ. ἀκατάστατον, ὡς ἅν τύχη κινούµενον.

*A demos* is the most unstable and fickle thing in the world, like an unstable wave of the sea being set in motion at the whim of chance.

Another fragment from Antisthenes sums up the sort of ethical oppositions being examined here in so far as they apply to individuals (Philo, *Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit* 28 Cohn-Reiter 1915 6.8-9 = DC 91, SSR 106):

> δυσβάστακτον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἀστεῖον· ὡς γὰρ ἡ ἀφροσύνη κοῦφον καὶ φερόµενον, οὕτως ἡ φρόνησις ἐρηµεύµενον καὶ ἀκλινὲς καὶ βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον;

A good man is difficult to carry. For as foolishness is unsubstantial and floats about, *so* good sense is firmly fixed and unswerving and has an unshakeable gravity.

The segment of *TH12* under discussion containing these highly loaded terms highlights the crux of the ethical debate, and represents Antisthenes' attempt to characterise the opposing sides with fitting language. On the one hand, simplicity, stability and constancy are associated with Socrates and traditional aristocratic values, while on the other hand complexity, variability and inconsistency are associated with sophistry, rhetoric, and democracy.

These oppositions are succinctly highlighted by Albinus when he describes how to intelligibly characterise philosophers and sophists in dialogues (*Eisagōγε* 2.14-18 Hermann p. 148):

> τὰ οἰκεία ήθη δεῖ ἑκάστῳ ἀνατιθέναι, τῷ µὲν φιλοσόφῳ τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλάληθες, τῷ δὲ σοφιστικῷ τὸ ποικίλον καὶ τὸ παλίµβολον καὶ τὸ φιλόδοξον, τῷ δὲ ἰδιωτικῷ τὸ οἰκείον.

It is necessary to assign to each their own proper character; to the philosopher, nobility, honesty, and love of truth; but to the sophist, craftiness, shiftiness, and love of reputation; a distinctive personality for the particular individual.
Albinus' use of ἁπλοῦς and γενναῖος (= γεννάδας) opposed to ποικίλος and παλίµβολος correlates so closely to the use of the same oppositions in TH12, that it seems likely Albinus was personally familiar with this text of Antisthenes'.

Plato and Aristophanes, in particular, were also prominent contributors to this dialectic. Plato's Socrates accuses Ion of eluding him by 'being just like Proteus, assuming every kind of shape and changing every which way' (Ion 541e, παντοδαπὸς γίγνη στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω). The verb strepho here, meaning 'turn, change, alter', is virtually synonymous with trepo from which the negatively viewed tropos is derived. The adjective pantodapos 'of every kind' is another word meaning 'multiplicity', and which generally has a negative meaning. In Aristophanes' Frogs Xanthias spies a monstrous beast (287) that is horrible, taking 'every kind' (pantodapos) of shape, now a cow, now a mule, now a lovely woman (289-91). Andocides speaks contemptuously of 'every kind' (pantodapoi) of slave and foreigner who seem to be receiving citizen rights (2.23). Callicles also refers contemptuously to a mob of 'every kind' (pantodapoi) of slaves and people (Pl. Grg. 489b).262

In Plato's Republic Socrates asks incredulously if the god (τὸν θεόν) is some sort of wizard (γόης) who changes his appearance into many forms to deceive people, or if he is not rather haplous, 'simple, honest' (380d). Socrates goes on to state that no poet should claim that the gods takes on the likeness of strangers in every sort of shape (381c-d, quoting Od. 17.485-6). He later insists that if a man ever arrived in the city who was capable of assuming every shape and imitating every thing that they should send him on to another city (397e-398a).

In the Gorgias Socrates says that Callicles is prone to complete about-faces (ἀνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου) in order to satisfy his listeners, whereas Socrates himself always holds the same views (481d-2c). In the Philebos the discipline concerning reality, being, and what is eternally immutable (i.e. philosophy) is contrasted with the art of persuasion (i.e. oratory) which is able to make anything willingly change and become subject to itself (58a-b; cf. Csapo 2011, 120-1).

262 Shorey 1937 at R. 557b notes further negative uses at R. 431b-c, 561d, 567e, 559d, Sym. 198b, Lg. 788b.
34-9. The second speaker concludes that the many-manners (*polytropia*) of speech become one-manner (*monotropia*) when received by each individual person. He adds that speech that is uniform, or not *polytropos* to start with, is actually rejected by many people as the lack of individual adjustment makes it *polytropos* and incomprehensible or *apotropos*, 'alien', when they hear it. Thus he concludes that rather than *polytropos* being negative, it is actually a lack of *polytropia* that is negative.

This is a remarkable sophistic deconstruction (worthy of Derrida) and is surely intended by Antisthenes to exemplify sophistic prestidigitation and the logical dexterity and sleight of hand of sophistic *polytropia* itself. The second speaker is in fact highly polytropic himself and, as such, is surely an ironical characterisation of a deceptive position of *polytropia* by a Socrates or his like (see further discussion in ch. 3 section C).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§</th>
<th>TH13a Porph. Sch. T to Od. 7.257</th>
<th>TH13b Porph. Sch. Vd to Od. 23.337</th>
<th>TH13c Porph. Sch. Vd to Od. 5.211</th>
<th>TH13d Porph. Sch. T to Od. 9.33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1) καὶ διὰ τὴν μή βεβουλήταιν</td>
<td>(1-2) διὰ τὸ Ὀδυσσέας, τῆς Καλυμνίας διόνυσος αὐτῷ τὴν ἀθανασίαν, ὡς ἐδέστη;</td>
<td>(3) ἐπισημαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὴν αὐτὰν δὴ ἣν παραιτήση πετοῦται τής θεοῦ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(1-4) ἐσκε διὰ τὸ ὀστός ἐπεθεὶς, δῆλον ὅν τὸ μή θελεῖν γενέω τάξιν ἀθάνατος, ἀλλὰ τὸ μη πιστεύειν αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα λεγοῦσι, ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐφάσκει ποιήσεις, ὃ δὲ οὐκ ἑπιστευεῖν, ἀλλὰ οὕς πιστεύουν παρηγήσει.</td>
<td>(5-7) συνεποίησαν μὲν τὸ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀδηλὴν εἰδὼς</td>
<td>(1) ἅπασα μὲν κατ᾽ ἀποκρίθη τὸ Ὀδυσσέας, ὡς ἀποκρίθην.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(4-6) ἰδεῖ γὰρ ὡς σοφὸς ὦτι ἀθανασίαν σὺν διὰ τοῦ τοιαῦτα διαμόνες χαράσθη ἂν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διός ἂν εἰπτ καὶ τῶν ἔργων ᾧ πέρικεν ἀπαθανατιζῆν.</td>
<td>(8-10) εἰ δ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ σωφρόν ἀθανασία υἱὸν ἔχων τοιαῦτα διαμόνες χαράσθην ἂν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διός ἂν εἰπτ καὶ τῶν ἔργων, ὥ μὲν περίκεν ἀπαθενατιζῆν.</td>
<td>(2) αὐτῆς ἐπεξεργάστη ἐπεξεργάστη ἐπεξεργάστη ἐπεξεργάστη.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>(10-19) τοιαῦτα δ' ἂν εἰπτ απὸ ἀρετῆς, παρατίθεσθαι δὲ τοὺς οὐκείους καὶ τὴν εἰς ὅθην ἐπάνωθι δ' ἐπεισδύεται ἀθανασίας ἀπαθενατιζῆν ἂν τὴν ἀρετήν, σὺν αὐτῇ .... οὗ τοῦ τέλους.</td>
<td>(11) ἐπεισδύεται ἀθανασίας.</td>
<td>(3) τοῦ δὲ τῆς ἀθανασίας ὡς ἀπαθενατον (ὅ) ἀνθρώπων δουλεῖ.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>(6-8) Αὐτοθέντης δὲ φησιν ὃτι τοὺς ἐρωτῶς ἦγεν ὑποδομᾶς τὰς ὑποστήσεις τοῦτο γε λόγιον σὺν ἐκδυνατον δήχαντι Διοκ.</td>
<td>(2-5) Αὐτοθέντης μὲν αὐτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς καὶ ἐρωτήσεις τοῖς ὁδούς ὁδούς διδάσκαλον τὸν νόστον συνεργεῖ γε αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ βάθτον αποσταλῆσαι.</td>
<td>(2-3) εἰδύς τοὺς ἐρωτῶς πάντα μὲν ὑπακομαζόντος, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀθανασίας ὡς ἀπαθενατον (ὅ) ἀνθρώπων δουλεῖ.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(8-10) τοῦτο γὰρ ὀνομάζεται ὑπενεκρίνεται ὃτι σῶμα πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων προτείνεται τὸν νόστον, ἐν μᾶλλον ὑποκύπτει Ἀλκιβίδας.</td>
<td>(2-5) Αὐτοθέντης μὲν αὐτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς καὶ ἐρωτήσεις τοῖς ὁδοüs διδάσκαλον τὸν νόστον συνεργεῖ γ.</td>
<td>(3-6) πρός μὲν τοὺς φαιάκας σὺν ὡς ἀπαστον λέγει, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἀθανασίας καταφύγεις ποθὸ τῆς παθοῦ τῶν τοῦτον γε τοῦτο γε ἔχειν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔκρης σύνεσιν.</td>
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Odysseus & Calypso  TH13a-d.

This fragment cluster shows deployment of a range of Antisthenes' literary skills. The moral character of Odysseus is assumed by the argument to be critical to Homer's meaning and composition. As with TH12, one or more scholiasts are reporting comments from a work of Porphyry which is otherwise lost. Schrader creates an entry at Od. 7.258 that combines the scholia found at Od. 23.337 (TH13b) and 5.211 (TH13c). Clearly he realised that the two belong together from a scholion at Od. 7.257 (TH13a; printed by Dindorf, but by Schrader only as notes), which combines elements of the content of both Od. 23.337 and 5.211. A further scholion at Od. 9.33 (TH13d; again printed by Dindorf, but only as a note by Schrader) contains an abbreviated version of some of the content, with a couple of additional elements that deserve interest. The table above shows the overlapping portions of the texts with identical (or near identical) portions highlighted by bold text, and the text of any fragment that is a repetition (to provide context) of text already in the table printed in grey.

Attribution – extent of the scholia attributable to Antisthenes

There is a strong case to be made that all of the scholia reported here, including most (if not all) of what has previously been attributed to Aristotle in the scholion to Od. 23.337 (TH13b), was written by Antisthenes. Rose published Aristotle's portion of this fragment as running from διὰ τί Ὀδυσσεὺς through to παρῄτεῖτο (1-7) – the portions of the fragment highlighted in the table boxed in bold lines (Table 1 §7 & §2). Rose placed it with a number of other Homeric fragments under the heading ἀπορήματα Ὅμηρου, Homeric Questions, a work of Aristotle's reported by Diogenes Laertius (5.26). The portion of TH13b from ἔπειτα through to ἀπαθανατίζειν (5-10, §2 & §3), however, is identical in form and content to the first part of TH13a (1-8, §1, §2, §3 & §5) which has no mention of Aristotle but does mention Antisthenes (6, §5). The entirety of this portion of the fragment is almost certainly from Antisthenes, as is confirmed by the following comparisons with the other scholia.
Firstly, the argument at §2 in TH13b 5-7, duplicates the sense – that Odysseus was not convinced by Calypso – of a portion securely attributed to Antisthenes (TH13c 5-6).

Secondly, TH13d combines elements of TH13c, which are certainly Antisthenic, with elements of the portion of TH13b attributed to Aristotle, as follows: in §5 at TH13d 2 there is a line about lovers making a lot of promises (τοὺς ἐρῶντας πάντα µὲν ύπισχνουμένους) that replicates the idea attributed to Antisthenes at TH13c 2 (οἱ ἐρῶντες πολλὰ ψεύδονται καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἐπαγγέλλοντα); and in §2, from either side of the 'lying lovers' line in TH13d are the statements that Odysseus 'was not persuaded' (οὐκ ἐπείθετο) and 'did not believe her' (ἀπιστῶν) which are also found in TH13b (5 µὴ πεισθῆναι, 7 οὐχὶ πιστεύων).

So, in TH13d the 'lying lovers' statement that is certainly Antisthenic, by comparison with TH13c, is found wedged between two statements that are duplicated in the portion that Rose attributed to Aristotle.

Thirdly, παρητεῖτο (§2 TH13b 7) cannot be the end point of a fragment (as Rose had estimated) as in §3, both TH13a and TH13b carry on from that point with identical arguments. Additionally, at TH13a 4 there is an explanatory γάρ, directly linking it, as an explication, to the passage ending in παρητεῖτο that precedes it. Thus demonstrating that these thoughts are directly linked and belong together.

There are a number of persuasive arguments confirming that the remainder of TH13b should be attributed to Antisthenes. In §3 TH13a has an almost identical text to TH13b. In common with TH13c they both use of σοφός (clever) to describe Odysseus, and in TH13c the use of σοφός is preceded by Ἀντισθένης φησίν, ‘Antisthenes says’, thus demonstrating that the portion of TH13b from line 8 is indubitably from Antisthenes.

In §5 at TH13b 11 the expression 'promise of immortality' (ἐπαγγελίαν ἀθανασίας) echoes the language of Antisthenes at TH13c 2 'promise the impossible' (τὰ ἀδύνατα ἐπαγγέλλονται), and we find TH13d 3 (ἀθανασίας ὡς ἀδύνατον) combining ἀθανασίας from TH13b and ἀδύνατα from TH13c.
In §4 at TH13b 10-12 and TH13c 12 priority is given to ἀρετή (excellence), which is Antisthenes’ primary ethical concern (see ch. 2.ii section E). In §3 the ἔργαν of TH13b 10 and TH13a 6 links to the ἀρετή of TH13b. Antisthenes stated that ἀρετή is a matter of ἔγγα (DL 6.11 = C 70, SSR 134), and this was a major plank of the case made by his Ajax in Ajax & Odysseus (Aj.7.1-3; cf. Kennedy 2011, 29, 41 & 71).

The discussion in §4 TH13b 13-19 (abbreviated in the table, see fragment for full text) about the manner of living required to achieve immortality is consistent with Antisthenes’ declaration that those desiring immortality should live piously and justly (DL 6.5 = DC 75, SSR 176).

Finally, the portion that names Aristotle in §7 TH13b 2 has the argument that Odysseus told his tale as he did in order to persuade the Phaeacians to expedite his journey home. This same assertion, however, is also originally found attributed to Antisthenes. In §7 the text of TH13a 8-10 is linked by an explanatory γάρ to the preceding text at §5 TH13a 6-8 that names Antisthenes. Alcinoös, the Phaeacian king, is mentioned (§7 TH13a 9-10) and the same sequence and relationship of thoughts is also present in §7 TH13d 3-6, where the interaction with the Phaeacians is directly related to Odysseus’ knowledge that lovers promise the impossible (Antisthenes’ argument in §5). Finally, it seems that Antisthenes had a penchant for using the Phaeacians as examples when explicating Homeric texts (cf. TH14a 9-13, TH14i 3-4, TH14o 17-20 & commentary at Step 1-3 §9).

The simplest explanation for the mention of Aristotle, if it is inaccurate, as it seems to be, would be that 'Aristotle' was misread for 'Antisthenes' by a scribe copying Porphyry who expected an author's name of about that length, starting with 'A' to be 'Aristotle'. But perhaps the best explanation is that the references to Aristotle and Antisthenes are actually from the same work – a work by Aristotle in which he was quoting Antisthenes. Aristotle was familiar with Antisthenes' work and in fact several Antisthenic fragments are preserved in Aristotle's works. So it is highly likely that part of a work Antisthenes had written was reported by Aristotle (or one of his students) in his ἀποφήματα Ὁµηρικά as a solution to

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263 Cf. similar arguments made by Di Benedetto 1966, 223 & 227.
one of the 'Homeric problems.' Porphyry would probably have included in his work the details of how Aristotle was utilising Antisthenes’ text. So both names would have been in Porphyry’s text and associated with these ideas. The scholiast, however, when he was extracting notes, could easily have seen Aristotle’s name and mistakenly attributed a passage to him when actually it should have been attributed to Antisthenes, whom Aristotle was quoting.

Comments from Aristotle appear combined with those from Antisthenes in other Porphyry scholia on Il. 11.636 (TH8), Od. 9.525 (TH9), and Od. 9.106 (TH14).

Commentary

Due to the interrelationship of the four fragments, they will be discussed section by section, as a group, in the order set out in Table 1 – TH13 Comparison of Fragments Table. Note that in a couple of places the text of the fragment has been abbreviated for the table, as indicated by ‘…’. Considering the content of this group of fragments, they may have been part of the work catalogued by Diogenes Laertius as περὶ Ὀδυσσείας, 'Concerning the Odyssey', or, περὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως και Πηνελόπης και περὶ τοῦ κυνός, 'Concerning the tale of Odysseus and Penelope, and concerning the tale of the dog', or even, περὶ Ἑλένης καὶ Πηνελόπης, 'Concerning Helen and Penelope' (6.17-18).

§1 Step 1 of the Antisthenic methodology. Problematise the text. Here Antisthenes problematises the text – the first step of his critical methodology, as discussed in chapter 5 section B.

The problem in this text is the fact that Odysseus rejected the immortality offered to him by Calypso. Clearly immortality is a good thing, and – as Antisthenes states further on at §3 and elsewhere, e.g. TH12 15 & 24 – Odysseus is ‘clever’ (σοφός). So why does this clever man not accept the offer of such a boon?

ὅτα τί. In both TH13a and TH13b this problem is stated as a question, asking respectively ‘Why did he not want it?’ and ‘Why did he not accept it?’ In TH13c the question is turned
instead into a statement explaining δι’ ἣν παραίτησιν 'why he made the rejection'. δι´ τι is Porphyry’s standard way of posing direct questions (MacPhail 2011, 7). So this probably represents a severely contracted form of the material from the original dialogue – having been summarised by Porphyry and then again by a scholiast.

ἐπισημαίνεται. **Step 2 of the Antisthenic methodology. Locate a σημεῖον (indication) of the solution.** Notable in the line at TH13c 2-3 is the use of the verb ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, which appears again a few lines down at 8 (cf. commentary at §6). In common with the un-prefixed σημαίνειν (cf. TH12 16), used as it is here, this word has the sense of 'indicate' or 'give a sign (σημεῖον).’ Perhaps the most famous example of such a usage is Heraclitus’ description of Apollo, who through his oracle at Delphi ‘neither speaks nor conceals but σημαίνει’ (DK 22 B 93). This implies imparting signs in forms that require decoding. In the case of the Delphic oracle, it meant cryptic or riddling signs. In the case of Antisthenes’ textual analysis, however, it meant signs that may only be comprehended by the astute or the appropriately trained. Unlike interpreting an oracle, which was a matter of luck or inspiration, the approach to interpreting medical indications or symptoms was scientific and rational. As per the discussion in chapter 5 section D, Antisthenes’ approach was similarly scientific and systematic, and made deliberate use of medical terminology. So in this context ἐπισημαίνεσθαι is best understood in the medical sense ‘to show a symptom’, or in the case of Homer’s text, ‘to give an indication’.

**Textual issue.** The text of the latter half of the line at TH13c 3 is corrupt. The sense, however, seems clearly to be that Odysseus indicated his reasons for rejecting Calypso. The line in the manuscript (and as printed by Dindorf) reads: δὲ καὶ τὴν παραίτησιν δι´ ἣν πεποίηται τῆς θεοῦ. This is untranslatable. Schrader added τὴν αἰτίαν before τὴν παραίτησιν which still produces an unreadable text. Polak had suggested removing the δι´, but more recently Di Benedetto has suggested retaining the δι´ and bringing δι´ ἣν forward to read: δὲ καὶ δι´ ἣν αἰτίαν τὴν παραίτησιν πεποίηται τῆς θεοῦ (1966, 224 n. 2). This is a step in the right direction, however the most likely text for this line is as printed here, i.e.: δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν δι´ ἣν παραίτησιν πεποίηται τῆς θεοῦ. Both Schrader’s
addition of τὴν αἰτίαν, and this suggested sentence structure, seem confirmed by
coloration with a line from another Porphyry scholion on Il. 23.71, which contains several
of the principal words in similar order: εἰπὼν δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν προστίθησι δι᾽ ἦν
βούλεται ταφῆναι.

§2 Odysseus doubts Calypso. Here the first reason is advanced for Odysseus’ rejection of
Calypso’s offer of immortality. This explanation states that Odysseus refused her offer, not
because he did not wish to become immortal, but because he did not believe Calypso would
truly supply it. In this portion of the argument it appears unclear whether Odysseus did
not believe that she actually had the power to confer immortality, or, if she had the ability,
whether he doubted her intention to follow through on her promise and grant it. It seems
most likely, as the following discussion will reveal, that he held both doubts
simultaneously. These are the first of several doubts expressed in these scholia that
Odysseus held about Calypso and her powers.

Confirming their common origin, a substantial portion of this section of TH13a and TH13b
are word for word identical. The willingness of the scholiasts, who were copying from
Porphyry, to adapt the text in front of them, however, is illustrated more so by the
differences that have been introduced. The wording of the first line of each fragment is
notably different, with even a word retained in common taking quite a different form, i.e.
the verb πείθω, which appears as ἔπειθε and πεισθῆναι respectively. Yet another form,
ἐπείθετο, appears in TH13d 2, whose common source is further attested by the use of
ἀπιστῶν – compare with TH13a μὴ πιστεύσαι, οὐκ ἐπίστευ(σ)εν and TH13b οὐχὶ
πιστεύων. In TH13d the thought found across the lengthier passages of TH13a and TH13b
is severely compressed and modified. TH13c 4-20 in §6 produces a portion of Antisthenes’
argument not repeated in the other fragments, but still containing a summary at lines 5-6 of
the idea that Odysseus was unsure of Calypso’s claims.

§3 Odysseus is σοφός. Limitations on granting of immortality. Here clarification is
given as to why Odysseus did not believe Calypso. Because he was σοφός (clever) he knew
that immortality could not be granted by such goddesses, but only by Zeus, and even then

255
only after congruous deeds (ἔργα) had been performed. This explanation provides a solution from the character of Odysseus – a strategy that is explicitly spelled out in other fragments (e.g. TH14d 7-8 λύεται … ἐκ προσώπου 'it is solved from the character'). In his discussion in Book 25 of the Poetics, Aristotle discusses techniques for resolving difficult texts, including finding a solution from the character. He says that when assessing 'whether or not someone has spoken or acted well, one should examine not only whether the actual deed or utterance is good or bad, but also the identity of the agent or speaker, to whom he acted or spoke, etc' (1461a 3-7 Halliwell’s Loeb trans.). The method of finding a solution 'from character' (ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου) was also used by Porphyry (MacPhail 2011, 7). Richardson recognises that Antisthenes uses this sort of technique when he says that he 'anticipates the later λύσις ἐκ προσώπου' (1975, 78). It seems, however, that Antisthenes was actually deploying a fully formed version of this strategy, even if he did not develop the precise technical vocabulary found in Porphyry.

The common source of the fragments is demonstrated by the position of a form of εἰδέναι and/or σοφός in a similar position in the text of all four. These lines are almost identical in TH13a and TH13b. The exception is the inclusion of an explanatory γάρ at TH13a 4 that demonstrates a direct link to the preceding passage. In its compressed style, TH13d merely states that the granting of immortality to a human is impossible.

The adjective σοφός was extensively used of Odysseus by Antisthenes (see especially TH12 15 & 24 and commentary, and cf. commentary on TH9). The importance of deeds as an indication and affirmation of aristocratic character – particularly in contrast to words – is a recurring topic in Antisthenes’ thought and finds its fullest expression in the speech of his Ajax in Ajax & Odysseus (Aj. 1.4, 1.7, 7.1-4, 7.8, 8.2-3, 9.7; and see Kennedy 2011, 29, 41 & 71).

§4 TH13b 10-13. ἀρετή. The text of TH13b continues at this point with a shift away from Odysseus’ doubts and concerns to a commentary regarding excellence and the attainment of immortality. This starts with the overarching statement that 'such things (i.e. deeds that confer immortality) should come from ἀρετή (excellence)'. As noted above, Antisthenes somewhere stated that 'excellence is a matter of deeds' (DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134.).
Conversely, by not displaying ἀρετή and by enacting unjust deeds – such as accepting the goddess' offer and abandoning his family and his home-coming – Odysseus would have destroyed his ἀρετή, and lost the immortality of his soul (ψυχή), and his pathway up to the gods. This passage offers further evidence of the programmatic nature of ἀρετή in Antisthenes' thought – it is the key to his ethical agenda (cf. ch.2.ii section E, and §6 below on TH13c 4-15, and TH14n 30-1 with commentary at Step 3a §2).264 And the passage also shows Antisthenes demonstrating how Homer, in general, can be interpreted as a major ethical lesson in ἀρετή.

Di Benedetto thinks he detects the intrusion of the pen of a Christian author in some of the later comments from this section (1966, 226 n. 2). He seems perhaps unconvinced that notions such as 'immortality of the soul' and 'pathway to the gods' are Antisthenic. These ideas, however, are well in keeping with Antisthenes' thought found in other fragments. In one of Antisthenes' dialogues Prometheus rebukes Heracles for concerning himself with human affairs and not giving his attention to what is 'higher than men' (MD1a-c and commentary; cf. MD2). Antisthenes also said that 'those who desire to be immortal, must live piously and justly' (DL 6.5 = DC 75, SSR 176). Clearly the notion of 'the immortality of the soul' is in keeping with these views.

Plato's celebrated discussions of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo and book 10 of the Republic seem to owe a debt to Antisthenes' ideas expressed here. As an example, Plato's expression that the 'the soul, an immortal thing' (ἀθάνατον ψυχή) 'becomes purified' (καθαρὸν γίγνοµενον, Pl. R. 611bc) is highly redolent of Antisthenes' collocation here of 'the goal of immortality' (τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀθανασίας) and deeds that 'would purify the soul' (καθήρειεν ἂν τὴν ψυχήν, 13-15).

TH13b 13-19. Summary. Here Antisthenes reiterates the lessons to be taken from Odysseus' episode with Calypso. For the attainment of immortality, actions consistent with

264 Complete list of ἀρετή fragments: TH6; TH13c; TH14n; MD1-6; DC 14 & 15 = SSR 53 & 54 (Ajax & Odysseus); Arist. Pol. 1284a5-17 = DC 100, SSR 68; DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134; DC 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134; Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 71, SSR 134; Stob. 3.1.28 = DC 93, SSR 125; Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 72, SSR 134; Gnom. Vat. 743 n.12 = DC 86, SSR 104; DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134.
becoming immortal are required. This means being just, restrained, and not overly
attached to this mortal life. Just as we are about to find out what the goal of immortality is
'for a man who loves his duty and such deeds as purify the soul …' the text peters out. The
sense of the final portion is perhaps that, by not following these dicta, a man might attain
other worldly things but 'not the goal of immortality', or alternately, 'not the goal of
prosperity'. Antisthenes said that what was 'more blessed/happier (µακαριώτερον) among
men' was 'to die prosperous/fortunate (εὐτυχῶν)'.

§5 Calypso was a lying lover. Here Antisthenes states that Odysseus knew that people in
love make false promises. Thus he implies that Calypso was lying when she promised
immortality, and he goes on to spell out that it was impossible for her to grant such a
benefaction without Zeus' say so. The thought of these lines is replicated (with variations)
in TH13a, c, and d. In summary, the three variations are:

TH13a 'people in love make false promises';

TH13c 'people in love tell a lot of lies and promise the impossible'; and

TH13d 'lovers promise everything'.

TH13b only preserves the phrase ἐπαγγελίαν ἀθανασίας (promise of immortality) in
language echoing ἐπαγγέλλονται of TH13c and ἀθανασίας of TH13d. The preparedness
of Porphyry and/or the scholiasts to be flexible in adapting Antisthenes' material is further
evident in the manner in which the thought of TH13a, τοῦτο … ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο δίχα
Διός, 'she was unable to do this without Zeus' consent,' is compressed in TH13c into τὰ
ἀδύνατα, 'impossible things.'

The idea that lovers willingly tell lies had become a commonplace by the time late
republican Latin authors were writing. Most famous perhaps is Catullus' declaration that
what a woman says to an ardent lover should be written in the wind and fast-flowing water
(70.3-4). The most similar thought preserved from the Classical period is a fragment from
Sophocles that offers a comparable thought on the value of women's words: ὁρκοὺς ἐγὼ

265 DL 6.5 = DC 164, SSR 177; cf. Solon’s advice to Croesus at Hdt. 1.29-32.
γυναικὸς εἰς ὕδωρ γράφω (TrGF F 811, 'I write the oaths of a woman in water'). In this case the assertion is just that the 'oaths of women' cannot be trusted, rather than that people in love generally tell lies. So it does not appear that the 'lying lover' cliché, so loved by Catullus, was ever articulated prior to Antisthenes doing so here.

§6 TH13c 4-10. Odysseus unmoved by Calypso's size and beauty. Calypso prided herself on her large size and beauty, and in particular the extent to which she exceeded Penelope in both. Though Odysseus accepted the fact of her physical beauty, it was with the reservation that he was not convinced that she was actually 'immortal and ageless' (6-7), i.e. really a goddess. This is an additional doubt of Odysseus' added to the doubt about her ability and/or intention to make him immortal (cf. commentary at §2 on TH13a and TH13b).

Porphyry has obviously compressed an extended justification given by Antisthenes of Odysseus' reasons for rejecting Calypso's offer. It appears that there are now three clearly expressed and distinct doubts that Odysseus simultaneously holds in regard to Calypso. They are:

1. Is she really a goddess? (§6, TH13c 6-7)

2. Can she really grant immortality? (§3, TH13a 4-6 and TH13b 8-10)

3. If she can grant immortality, will she grant it? (§2, TH13a 2-4 and TH13b 5-7).

In other words, Odysseus being πολύτροπος (many-mannered) and a consummate schemer and swindler himself, suspects Calypso (and everyone else) of being the same as himself. These multiple doubts themselves, simultaneously whirring around Odysseus' polytropic mind, are a further direct characterisation of his many-mannered nature.

ἐπεσημήνατο. Step 2 of the Antisthenic methodology. Locate a σημεῖον (indication) of the solution. Odysseus goes on to 'indicate' (cf. commentary at §1) that if Penelope had only her body and beauty to offer he would ignore her too – but he wants to return to her because she is περίφρων (prudent). Thus the σημεῖον, or indication, is that Penelope is περίφρων, which remains the focus of most of the remainder of this fragment.

266 Noted by Fordyce 1973, 362.
Evidence of dialogue. In TH13c, the use of μὲν γάρ (4) followed by a μὲν (5) and a further μὲν γάρ (6) without an answering δέ is peculiar and perhaps unparalleled. There does not appear to be a corresponding example in Denniston. The best grammatical explanation is that the μὲν clause is answering to a preceding δέ clause, i.e. in this case ἐπισημαίνεται δέ (2-3). The repeated use of μὲν seems to signal that the same adversative, contrasting thought is being continued, until the original thought of the δέ clause is subsequently resumed by use of another form of the same verb, i.e. ἐπεσημήνατο (8). This free use of grammatical structure seems typical of someone speaking in a conversation. In the middle of expressing an explanation he interrupts himself mid-thought to provide a piece of information needed to clarify what he wants to say next, before returning to continue with his original thought. This, of course, is highly suggestive of oral discourse and offers further evidence that this fragment originally formed part of a dialogue.

TH13c 10-12. περίφρων = ἀρετή. Step 3 of the Antisthenic methodology. Reinforce this reading with other Homeric passages. The example of the suitors pursuing Penelope is adduced by Antisthenes as confirmation of Homer’s meaning. Just as Odysseus could have chosen the goddess, but sought Penelope instead due to her being περίφρων (prudent), the suitors similarly claim that they could have fittingly wed other women, but sought Penelope instead due to her ἀρετή (excellence). The implication is, that περίφρων is a component of ἀρετή. Antisthenes’ choice of this quote to make his point is yet another example of the programmatic place of ἀρετή in his ethics (cf. references in §4 above).

Here Antisthenes is explaining Homer by Homer, that is, he is explaining one passage of Homer under discussion (Odysseus’ rejection of Calypso and desire for Penelope) by way of another separate passage of Homer (the suitors’ rejection of other women and desire for Penelope). This was an approach to explicating Homer that became much admired and imitated in later centuries (see full discussion in ch. 5 section B).

267 Cf. GP², 377-8, esp. Pl. Alc. I 130c also with μὲν γάρ.
268 Cf. GP², 384, examples mostly from Platonic dialogue and oratory.
Reinforcing his philological method, Antisthenes then recapitulates the arguments of Calypso and Odysseus using their own (slightly modified) lines from the *Odyssey*. After the repeated lines of Calypso, Antisthenes notes that she emphasises only her physical attributes. Following the lines from Odysseus, Antisthenes comments that the expression ‘prudent Penelope’ holds a ‘suggestion or indication’ (ἐµφασις) that Odysseus prefers her because of a desire for her – i.e. reiterating that he desired her for being περίφρων, in the same way the suitors desired her for her ἀρετή.

The use of the word ἐµφασις (15) is notable. It has the meaning ‘suggestion’, ‘hint’, or ‘indication’ and appears to have been an important technical word for Antisthenes’ method of literary criticism (cf. TH14e 3 and commentary thereon at Step 2a §8). As with the use of ἔπισηµαίνεσθαι (cf. ἐπεσηµήνατο in §1 above, and ch. 5.ii section D), ἐµφασις has the sense of conveying information that is not necessarily obvious, but is available to those who understand how to read the ‘indications’ in the text.269 So Antisthenes is revealing here what the text actually indicates to an astute reader. The same idiom, ἐµφασιν ἔχειν + gen., meaning ‘holds an indication or suggestion of’ is found in Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 57.

Finally, this scholion reveals that the reason Odysseus told the story in this way was because his νόστος (home-coming) was his number one priority and he wanted to persuade Alcinoös and the Phaeacians of this in order to be sent on his way more quickly. So Odysseus told this story to the Phaeacians, in the manner he did, with the goal of impressing upon them what an extraordinary opportunity he had turned down (an immortal life with a goddess), in the hope of enlisting their aid in facilitating his homecoming.270

Showing further examples of scholiastic compression, in TH13a 8-9 it is only cryptically stated that Odysseus ‘spoke in this way’, and at TH13b 1-2 that he ‘told these things’. The text in TH13d, however, makes it clear that Odysseus actually lied to the Phaeacians in

269 See further Van Ophijsen 1993, 761-2.
order to convince them. There it is reported that Odysseus knew lovers make a lot of (false) promises and that it was impossible for him to be granted immortality (2-3). It is then explicitly stated that Odysseus did not tell the Phaeacians that he did not believe Calypso (i.e. his real reasons for rejecting her offer), but instead told them that he spurned immortality due to his longing for home (3-4). Thus his actions in this situation were motivated purely by expediency (cf. very similar comments by Megaclides on Odysseus’ motivations in this situation at Ath. 513bc).  

This tendency to say whatever was most expedient, whether true or not, is typical of Antisthenes’ Odysseus. It is characteristic of his πολυτροπία (many-manneredness); see especially commentary on TH12) and is most completely elucidated in his willing admission of his preparedness to do or say whatever it takes to achieve his objectives in the Ajax & Odysseus (Appendix A, Od.4.3-4; cf. Kennedy 2011, 40 & 56).

In TH13d this also shows that the character (5, ἦθος) Odysseus strove to convince the Phaeacians of was in fact a façade. The word ἦθος clearly had a special importance for Antisthenes in his discussions of character, for further examples of its use in relation to Odysseus see TH12 9, 16 & 17. Likewise notable here is Antisthenes’ use of σύστασις (structure or constitution), which he also uses at TH12 33 in a context of medical diagnosis. Thus the revelation of the ‘constitution of his character’ offers additional evidence in support of the idea that Antisthenes’ approach was modelled on a medical methodology (cf. commentary on §1 and ch. 5 section D).

**Table 2 – TH14 Comparison of Fragments Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§</th>
<th>TH14a Sch T to Od. 9.106</th>
<th>TH14c Sch. Vd to Od. 9.106</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1-2) πῶς ὑπερφιάλους καὶ ἀθεμίστους καὶ παρεμόνως εἰπὼν τοὺς Κύκλωπας ἄφθανεν παρὰ θεῶν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν λέγει τὰ ἀγαθά;</td>
<td>(1-3) 'ὑπερφιάλων'. ἀθεμίστους, οὐ γὰρ συμφερόντος εἰργάζει τὸν τὸ γὰρ τούς ἀθεμίστους, ὡς αὐτῶν λέγει, τοιαύτα ἐκ θεῶν δεδομένα ἀκούειν ἀσύμφορον.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TH14b Sch. H, Vd to Od. 9.106</td>
<td>TH14i Sch. M to Od. 9.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(2-3) ὅτε δὲν οὖν ὑπερφιάλους μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ σωμάτος.</td>
<td>(1-2) ὑπερφιάλων: τῶν μεγαλοροφῶν τῷ σώματι. τῶν διστήσων γαρ ἤ λέεις.</td>
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<td>(3-6) ἄλογον ὅτε δὲ τῇ λέειν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερφιάλων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγαλοροφὸς καὶ κρέσσιας τοιαῦτα, οὐ γὰρ οἱ μνηστήρες καθ’ ἐαυτῶν έλεγον ἀν’ ὅπως ἀγαπᾶς ἐκ έκτος ὑπερφιάλως μὲθ’ ἡμῖν δαινύεισθαι.</td>
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<td>(30-2) ὑπερφιάλων ὑπερήφανοι. λέγονται δὲ οὕτως καὶ οἱ κατ’ ἄστιν διαφέροντες, οὖν τοῖς τῶν μνηστηρίων λέγει’ ὑπερφιάλοι μεθ’ ἡμῖν’ ὡς γὰρ ἐκείνους κακῶς ἔλεγον.</td>
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<td>(35-8) τὸ δὲ ὑπερφιάλων διστήσων ὃν, ὡς καὶ προγεγραμμένον, οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπὶ φύσιν ἐνταῦθα κεκιθαίρει, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ σώμα δηλοῖ μεγαλοροφῶν τῶν Κύκλωπῶν, ὡς ποικὶ καὶ οἱ μνηστήρες ὑπερφιάλως καλοῦν εὐανήσω.</td>
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<td>TH14m Lex. Ham. ὑπερφιάλως</td>
<td>TH14o Eustathius</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(3-6) ἀθεμίστους δὲ τοὺς μὴ νόμους χρωμένους ἐγγράφοις διὰ τὸ ἐκατὸν τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἄρχειν θεμιστεῖν δὲ ἐκάτω τοῖς παιδίν ἐν ἀλῶν’, ὡς ἀνομίας ἐπιμείκτω.</td>
<td>(1-3) άθεμίστους δὲ τῶν νόμων μὴ κεκηρυχμένων φησι γὰρ θεμιστεῖν δὲ ἐκάτω τοῖς παιδίν ἐν ἀλῶν’.</td>
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<td>(6-13) τὸ δὲ ἀθεμίστου τὸ μὴ κοινῶς τοῖς θεσμοῖς χρωμένους φησι ὡς τὸ ’τοῖς δ’ ὀπτ’ ἀγοραὶ βουληθηρότα μὴ θεμιστεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐ γ’ ὑπηρέτης ὑπερφιάλων καρά τοῖς θεσμοῖς εἴπερ γνώσεις γεγονή προτέρης, θεμιστεῖν δὲ ἐκάτω τοῖς παιδίν ἐν ἀλῶν’, ὥς μὲν μὴ κοινῶς χρωμένους.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TH14j Sch. M &amp; Od. 9.106</td>
<td>TH14m Lex. Ham. ἀθεμίστους</td>
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<td>(2-3) τὸ δὲ ἀθεμίστου μὴ ἐχθροτὸν χρωμένον νόμον διὰ τὸ θεμιστεῖν ἐκάτω τοῖς παιδίν ἐν ἀλῶν’.</td>
<td>(33-5) καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ’Κκλώπων δ’ ἐκ γαίας ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεμίστους τοῖς μὴ τοῖς κοινῶς νόμως χρωμένους.</td>
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<td>(11-15) ’τοῖς δ’ ὁπτ’ ἀγοραὶ βουληθηρότα μὴ θεμιστεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐ γ’ ὑπηρέτης ὑπερφιάλων καρά τοῖς θεσμοῖς εἴπερ γνώσεις γεγονή προτέρης, θεμιστεῖν δὲ ἐκάτω τοῖς παιδίν ἐν ἀλῶν’, ὥς ἀνομίας ἐπιμείκτω.</td>
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<td>(22-3) καθ’ οὐκοὶ κοινῶς χρωμένοι νόμοις.</td>
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<td>(24-5) φησι γὰρ καθ’ οὐκοὶ κοινῶς θεμιστεῖν δὲ ἐκάτω τοῖς παιδίν ἐν ἀλῶν’.</td>
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</table>
(3-4) ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀθεμίστους λέγει, συμ ὡς ἀδίκους, ἀλλ' ὡς μὴ θέμιδος ἢτοι νόμου ἁρμόντας

(4-5) τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἐκάστως θεμιστεῖν παῖδαν ἂν ἄλοχων·

κοινῷ βουληθρόφους καὶ ἀγορητὰς, ἀλλὰ κατ' οἴκους ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν.
(18) ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀθεμίστῳ, τῇ δὲ θεμιστεῖντος.
(18-20) οὕτω συντάσσει ὁ ποιητής, οὐκ ἀπολύτως φραίζοτας κατὰ τοὺς ὑπέρον, καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἀθεμίστου γοργοῦς εἰπεῖν, διὰ τὸ μὴ νόμους ἔχειν κοινοῦς.

(38-41) οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀθεμίστου οὐκ ἐν' ὑβρίδει κεῖται νῦν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἱστορίας εἶδε, ὡς τῶν Κυκλώπων μήτη νόμους μήτε ἑθη κοινὰ ἐχόντων, ὡς ἐμφένη, μηδὲ οὐσχαζομένων τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέροντος διὰ τὸ μὴ κοινῆ πολιτείας ἀλλ', ὡς εἰπεῖν, οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι.

(41-6) καὶ σημεῖον ὅτι τὸ ἄδειτον τὸ ἀθεμίστου τὸ, τὸ εἰσόδο λέον μὴ ἑρείθαι αὐτῇ ὅτι ὁ ἀθεμίστου εἰπ' ἀν ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ ἀδίκῳ. καὶ τὸ μὴ πάραν ἔχειν θέμιδος ὅλως, ὡς εἴοι οἱ Ομηρικοὶ Κύκλωπες, καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῇ καθαρίᾳ ἵστασιν, καθὼς ἔκει οὐδ' ἄγοραν βουληθρόφους, εἰπ' ἱσταν ἄνδρῶν.
(6-9) Ἀντιθέτως ἂν ἔφησιν ὅτι μόνον τὸν Πολυόρφημον εἶναι ἀδικοῦν καὶ γὰρ ἄνωτός τοῦ Δώδεκαπάρτημος ἐστὶν οὐκόν οἱ λοιποὶ δίκαιοι διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶς τὰ πάντα ἀναδίδονται αὐτομάτως καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐργαζόμεθα αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἔγγον ἑστὶν.

(3-4) εἶ γὰρ ἂν ἀδεμίστων ἀντί τοῦ ἀδίκου, πῶς λέγει 'οι ἢ θεοὶ πεποιθότες;' (11-13) ὡστε Πολυόρφημον μόνον λέγεται ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἀδικοῦν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πάντας Κύκλωπας ἐποίησε καὶ δικαίως καὶ πεποιθότας τοῖς θεοῖς, ὃθεν καὶ ἀνήκεν αὐτοῖς αὐτομάτως ἡ γῆ τοῖς καρποῖς.

(17-20) αὐτοὶ οὖν καὶ περὶ θεῶν τὰ ἀδεμίστων εἰδός,' ἤρειτο καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κύκλωπας τὰ αὐτὰ δοξάζειν αὐτοῖς, τοὺς δὲ συμβεβηκεί βελτίως ἐκεῖνον τὴν φύσιν ὡς μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ γινόμενον ἐκεῖνον περὶ γὰρ τοῦτον ἐφη ὁ ποιητὴς 'οἱ ἢ θεοὶ πεποιθότες ἀθανάτωσιν.'

(1-5) πάντες μὲν οἱ κύκλωποι ἀγαθοὶ εἰσὶ καὶ θεοὶ τοῖς τοῦ πολυόρφημον, ὥστε ἢ ἤγεμον αὐτῶν, ἀρ' ὁ δὲ καὶ τοὺς κύκλωπας ἐπερημάλλως λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδεμίστως λέγει, ὡς ἄδικοις, ἀλλ' ὡς μὴ δέμοιδος ἦτο νόμον χρηστοῦται (cf. §3) εἰς ἑξυγίαν τοῦ καλοῦ ήσαν γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ.

(1-3) φασι γὰρ ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐνδικτὸν τὸν αἰχμὸν προνοοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἱ θεοὶ ἡς ἀπογονοῦσι, ἔπειροι ὥς ἄγαθος ἢ παρέχοντο, ἡς δικαίως, μόνος γὰρ ἀδικοῦ ὁ πολυόρφημος.

(26-8) ὑδη ἐποίησεν οἱ κακοὶ συνδικαλόπλοικτες εὐαίσθητοι τούς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ καὶ συνεξικαζότες, θεοσφηκεῖ καὶ τοὺς κύκλωπας πλατύντως. (34) 'οἱ δ' θεοὶ πεποιθότες ἀθανάτουσιν (16) ὡστε αὐτοὺς ἀπλῶς ἀδεμίστως οἱ καὶ θεοὶ πεποιθότες (23-4) εἰ δὲ καὶ πεποιθοῦνται μὲν θεοὶ ἔναται κύκλωπας λέγοντα, (4-10) ὡστε φιλεῖται σὺν φιλοὺν, σὺν ἀρμῷ πάντα σὺν ἀρμῷ πάντα σὺν ἀρμῷ πάντα σὺν ἀρμῷ, ποιοὶ καὶ κρατείτε ἢ ἀμέλεια, αὕτη ἐφησίαν ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τοιού ἄνθρωπος ἀνακόμησεν. ἄδη ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ γεγονός ἡς 'τοὺς κύκλωπας, αὐτοὔφοις νέομεν τοῖς καρποῖς, καὶ ὅποιον ἣν ἱδώτην

(TH14a) Sch T to Od. 9.106

(TH14b) Sch H. VI to Od. 9.106

(TH14d) Sch. T to Od. 9.411

(TH14f) Sch. H. to Od. 9.106

(TH14g) Sch. T to Od. 9.117

(TH14m) Lex. Hom. ἀδεμίστων

(TH14n) Lex. Hom. ὑπερηφανείας

(TH14s) Sch. M to Od. 9.106

(TH14t) Sch. M to Od. 9.106
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>266</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>TH14h Sch. H to Od. 9.275</td>
<td>TH14b Sch. H, Vd to Od. 9.106</td>
<td>TH14d Sch. T to Od. 9.411</td>
<td>TH14j Sch. M. to Od. 9.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH14m Lex. Hom. ἀδεμέτων</td>
<td>TH14n Eustathius</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) τὸ ἰδίον ἀμάρτημα ἐπιτύου ὁ Πολυφήμος καλῶν τείται</td>
<td>(3-4) εἰ γὰρ ἐν ἀθεμίταις ἀντὶ τὸν ἄδικον, πῶς λέγει 'οἷ ἢ ἔχεισι πεποιθήσεις' (cf. §4)</td>
<td>(1-5) πῶς τὸν Κύκλωπος προεύρεσθος 'οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Δίος αἰγόχοιο αἰλέοσθαι τις;</td>
<td>(1-2) καὶ εἰ τις Κύκλωπες θαρροῦσί τοις θεοῖς (cf. §4), πῶς ὁ Πολυφήμος οὐκ ἀλέγει:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(1-2) 'οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Δίος ἀσθήσιν ὁ Πολυφήμος ἀπεβάλλει καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς, ὧν γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἦσαν ἄθεοι, παροιτηθοῦν ὁ ποιήτης λέγειν 'νοοῦν δ' 'οὐ πῶς ἐπὶ Δίος μεγάλου ἀλέσθαι'.</td>
<td>(4-6) εἰ δ' εἶπεν τις 'καὶ πῶς ὁ Πολυφήμος φησίν 'οὑ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Δίος αἰγόχοιο αἰλέοσθαι τις;</td>
<td>(26-9) ο̣ δ' Κύκλωπος ἐκ τῆς ἱδίας ἀσθείας περὶ αὐτῶν φησίν 'οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Δίος αἰγόχοιο αἰλέοσθαι;</td>
<td>(23-6) εἰ καὶ πεποιθεῖται μὲν θεοὶ ἐντυπώθη Κύκλωπες λέγονται (cf. §4), ο̣ δ' Πολυφήμος ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξεί σὺν ιδίας ἀλέσθαι Δίος οἱ Κύκλωπες ὁ̣ς φέρεταις. Φησίδος ἐκεῖνος φησίν.</td>
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<td>TH14g Sch. Vd to Od. 9.275</td>
<td>(6-7) καὶ μαντείας χρονίζεται καὶ θεοὺς νομίζεισθαι ἀλλὰ σὺ γ' εὐχαί πατρὶ Πολυφήμου ἀνακτᾶ.</td>
<td>(28) ο̣ καὶ τὴν Δίος νοσὸν ὑποβάλλονται καὶ εὐχεσθαι ἑδαίν.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>(3-5) τὸ μέντοι μὴ ὀμογνώμων εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸν Πολυφήμον παρατάται ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν ποιήσεων λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ.</td>
<td>(3-5) To mentoi mou omogenimwma einai tois allois ton Poluphimenon paratatia apo tou ton poiesewn legein peri autooun.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>(6-10) σκέπεται τὸ πρώτου, ὅτι Πολυφήμου ἦστι τοῦ ὁμοφαγείου καὶ θηριώδους, καὶ Ήρωδος, ἢ νεώτερος καὶ θηριώδες πετεινοῖς ἔσθεν ἀλλήλους, επεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ δέδουσε δίκην;</td>
<td>(6-10) Skopeite to prwto, hoti Poluphimenou uesti tou homofageiou kai thirioudous, kai Herodes, o neoteros kai thirioudos peteiniais esthen allhous, epeiei ou dikhe estin en autois, anthropous de dedouse dikhen.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>(5-6) ἑπομείνανεν ἀπόπορον οὐδὲ μετ’ ἄλλους πολείτων, ἀλλ’ ἀπάνθεινεν ἐναν ἀθεμίστω ἠδεί.</td>
<td>(5-6) Epiomivaen apoporon oude met’ allous politeoton, all’ apanteineen enan athemista hedei.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>(1-9) οὐδὲ ἄλληλον ἄλεγον, ἀδίκαιαν καὶ παρανομακρον ἐγκακεῖ τοῖς Κύκλωπην ἐντεύχθη ὁ (1-5) τυρών αἰνεμένους; ὅταν ἐκατοστὶς ἐθύνατο φέρειν βάρος τῶν ἐυρεθέντων (5-6) δέθεν οὐδὲ τὸ σπήλαιον ἀνοίγαντες πολυπραγμονοῦσι τί πέπονθεν.</td>
<td>(1-9) Oud' allhlon alegon, adikian kai paraanomakron egkakei tois Kyklopen entuchhei ho (1-5) tiron ainevenous; than ekastosin ethynato Ferin baros ton eurethenon (5-6) dethen oude to spilaion anoiyantes polypragmonoousi ti peponthen.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>(2-3) σκέπεται τὸ πρώτου, ὅτι Πολυφήμου ἦστιν ἡ φρονή τῶν ἁπτικῶν καὶ θηριώδους.</td>
<td>(2-3) Skopeite to prwto, hoti Poluphimenou estin he frone ton aptikonton kai thirioudous.</td>
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ποιήτης, ὡς μὴ προνοούμενος ἀναλήματος· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐμφάνιζε· ὃτι διὰ τὴν ἁγίαν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτηθεῖσθαι παρ’ ἀλλήλοις ἡ ἀλώς ἀδικοῦσθαι οὐδὲ ἔδειν τῆς ἀλήλην προσοκεῖσθαι. ὃτι δὲ σῶτος ἔχει δήλουν ἐκ τοῦ Πολυφήμου· τούτω γὰρ κράζοντος συνήλθον ἀπαντές· τινὲς δὲ τὸ ὅσκολος ἀλήλην ὡς τοῦ συγγενεῖον ἀλήλην ὡς σῶτος ὑποταγῆς· ἕκαστος γὰρ αὐτοκράτοις ἐστὶ καὶ σῶτος ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἐπέκρισι·

τυχών· τωσοῦτον ἐκέλευσιν μὲ, ψηφίζων· οἱ ἐταύρως ἀπερείτεν· ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη· τῶν Κυκλώτων δήλη· ἐκ τοῦ ἁμέλειας εὐρείθη τὸ στράτευμα πλῆρες· ὅν τυχῶν τε καὶ θεμάτων· ἤδει γὰρ ὁ Κύκλως· ὡς οὐδείς ὑποτάσσεται τῶν ἐπίκεισιν.

| 268 | TH14a Sch T to Od. 9.106 | TH14i Sch.M to Od. 9.106 | TH14o Eustathius |
| 268 | (9-13) ἀλλὰ ἐμφανεῖσθαι εἴτε βουλεύει· οὗ σφέρεις συνέσκοιτα· βίβης δὲ φρέστεροι ἦσαν· ὡσπερ καὶ τοὺς Γιαντανάς ὡσπερ ὑπερθύμαινης Γιαντέσσονας βασίλειον· ὡσπερ καὶ τοὺς Φαίακας· βλασταμένοις ὡς αὐτῶν μεταναστήναι· ἐγένετο δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας. | (3-4) πῶς δὲ ἠδίκησαν τοὺς Φαίακας καὶ ἔλυσαν δίκαιο ὅντες· διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας. | (20-23) εἰ δὲ δικαιοὶ ὅντες ἔλυσαν τοὺς Φαίακας· ἤδη ὡς γειτνίας τοῖς παροικοτηναίς· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ τῆς πολιτείας φαίνει ἀνόμοιον ἐγένετο. Φαίακας μὲν γὰρ ἐκοινώνον· ἀλλήλως εἴτε ἀμεσοκαταστάς νόμον· εἴτε καὶ δημοκρατικός· οἱ δὲ Κυκλώτως· οὐ τοιοῦτοι.
Cyclopes   TH14a-o

Manuscripts

Sch. T = codex汉堡ensis 56 (13-14th century).

Sch. H = codex British Museum Harleianus 5674.

Sch. Vd = codex Vindobensis Philos. Gr. 133.

Sch. M = codex Venetus Bibliothecae Marcianae 613.

Autograph MSS of Eustathius:

Venetus Marcianus graecus (Marc. gr.) 460, in Biblioteca Marciana, Venice.

Parisinus graecus (Par. gr.) 2702, in Bibliothèque National de France, Paris.

Introduction

Possibly this work was catalogued by Diogenes Laertius under Κύκλωψ ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως, 'The Cyclops, or, Concerning Odysseus' (6.17), along with TH12. The fragments printed here as TH14a-e, and TH14k, were printed as a continuous text by Schrader because they contain overlapping information. Originally, however, they were found in several different scholia to several different passages of the Odyssey in several different manuscripts. A number of variant readings to these scholia were printed by Schrader as footnotes, or appeared in full only in the earlier edition by Dindorf. Several of them, however, contain important additional text or alternative readings so these have been printed here as fragments TH14f-j, and TH14l. Furthermore, two entries from the Lexicon Homericum of Apollonius Sophistes preserve comments ascribed to Aristarchus about the Cyclopes that are almost identical to the Porphyry scholia and clearly derive from the same source, viz. Antisthenes. They are printed here as TH14m and TH14n. Finally, an extensive discussion of the Cyclopes from Eustathius also closely parallels the thought of Antisthenes, as well as adding useful details not found in the other sources, and it is printed here as TH14o.
Attribution – extent of the scholia attributable to Antisthenes

In these Cyclopes scholia Antisthenes’ name only appears once, at line 6 of TH14a (Table 2 §4). The contents of the scholia, however, form an overall argument that is internally consistent, consistent with Antisthenes’ views and methodology from other fragments (i.e. TH12, TH13a-d), and expands the argument directly attributed to Antisthenes here – i.e. that Polyphemus, who was unjust and wicked, should be considered distinct and separate from the other Cyclopes, who were just and good. Antisthenes is also the only name mentioned in the scholia\textsuperscript{272} and there is a very good case to be made that all these fragments should be attributed to him.

As stated above, Schrader had printed the fragments numbered here as TH14a-e and TH14k as a continuous text, believing that they formed part of a coherent argument (1890, 177-8). By way of an extended analysis of the text, Di Benedetto has more recently made a strong case for the Antisthenic nature of the whole argument (1966, 208-23). In particular, Di Benedetto notes (1966, 211-2) that when Antisthenes made his broad statement at TH14a 6-8 (commentary Step 2d §4) that only Polyphemus was unjust, but the rest of the Cyclopes were just, he must have been aware of the need to explain or justify the ethically problematic statements about the Cyclopes at Od. 9.106 (that the Cyclopes were hyperphialoi and athemistoi and yet received great blessings from the gods) and Od. 9.275-276 (that they paid no heed to Zeus or the other gods). Providing an explanation for those verses is exactly what the portion of the scholia preceding the mention of Antisthenes’ name does, and in a manner that is completely consistent with the rest of Antisthenes’ argument here, and also with the same style of argument he uses in the other Homeric scholia – especially the tendency to pose a problem within the text and then explain Homer by using Homer (cf. ch. 5 section B). There is also further evidence, newly discussed in this commentary, that seems to conclusively demonstrate that the all of the fragments are originally from one text of Antisthenes’.

\textsuperscript{272} Though, as noted above, Aristarchus is mentioned in a lexical entry.
TH14a. Links between the text of TH14a and Hesiod’s Works and Days seem to clearly demonstrate that the entirety of the text is the work of one author, viz. Antisthenes. At line 2 the Cyclopes are said to receive ‘unstinting’ (ἄφθονα) blessings from the gods, and at line 9 the earth is said to yield everything for the Cyclopes ‘of her own accord’ (αὐτοµάτως). This last statement is in the portion of the fragment securely attributed to Antisthenes, and is a considerably compressed and paraphrastic version of the actual text of Odyssey 9.107-11 to which it refers. Antisthenes here is drawing a comparison between the Cyclopes and the men of Hesiod’s ‘Golden Race’, for whom the field bore crops ‘of its own accord’ (αὐτοµάτη) and ‘unstinting’ (ἄφθονον, Op. 118; see further commentary at Step 1 §1 and Step 3d §4). The common Hesiod reference is a strong indication of the unity of the unity of the text and thus demonstrating that Antisthenes is the common source of the material above and below his name.

TH14b also includes this same use of αὐτοµάτως (13) in a sentence that starts: ‘So he says (ὥστε … λέγει) that Polyphemus alone is arrogant and unjust’ (11). By comparison with the identical language of TH14a 6 the ‘he’ referred to here is certainly Antisthenes. That the content of the portion of TH14b preceding this (7-9) is also from Antisthenes is further confirmed by the use of an additional, extended quote from Hesiod’s Works and Days (277-9). At line 6 it has the imperative expression σκοπείτω τὸ πρόσωπον (consider the character), a line of argument that Antisthenes regularly favours (e.g. for the same style of argument see TH13a-d and commentary §3).

TH14c refers to ‘such great gifts given by the gods’ (τοιαῦτα ἐκ θεῶν δεδωρῆσθαι, 2) without specifying what these gifts are. It assumes, therefore, the Hesiodic unstinting provision for the Cyclopes spelled out by Antisthenes in TH14a and TH14b. The ‘such great gifts’ line is introduced by ‘because he says’ (ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει), referring back to an already mentioned speaker. This ‘he’ must be Antisthenes, and the ‘they’ (of φασί, 7) further on are presumably the Antisthenians, who in fact go on to quote an extended

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273 West 1978, 177: ‘[T]he Romans made the Golden race into a Golden time or age (tempus, saecula, aetas)’.
274 I.e. Antisthenes’ students or followers of his teachings; cf. οἱ Αντισθενεῖοι Arist. Met. 1043b = DC 44A, SSR 150; Alexander of Aphrodisias similarly applies ‘Antisthenians’ to Antisthenes’ followers (On Arist.
version of the *Odyssey* passage (9.112-5) that is referred to by Antisthenes in TH14a 5. It uses as proof a passage referencing the suitors (4-6) whom, along with the Phaeacians, Antisthenes tends to include in his discussions (cf. TH13c 10-12 & commentary at §6).

TH14d includes the technical terms ἐναντίωµα (5) and ἐναντία (11) which are particularly Socratic and Antisthenic (see commentary at Step 2c §6). The strategy of λύεται εκ προσώπου (‘it is solved from the character’, 7-8) is one Antisthenes has favoured elsewhere, e.g. TH13a-d & commentary §3).

TH14e discusses the Cyclopes' reluctance to intrude upon each other. In TH14k 5-6 this same argument is linked to the securely Antisthenic statement that Polyphemus alone is unjust (TH14k 3; cf. TH14a 6-7). It also contains a reference to the same passage of the *Odyssey* (9.115) as TH14a, and the complete Antisthenic three-step methodology is evident in the fragment in the same fashion as elsewhere in the TH13 and TH14 groups of fragments.

TH14f is inextricably linked by the line of argument in its content to TH14e, including containing specific common vocabulary (δικαιοσύνη).

TH14g-h overlap in content with the securely Antisthenic TH14b.

TH14i overlaps in its content completely with TH14a.

TH14j is a succinct version of TH14b.

TH14k has the securely Antisthenic 'Polyphemus alone was unjust' (3; cf. TH14a 6-7). It also has φασί (they say, 1), the 'they' most reasonably being the Antisthenians, particularly when the fragment continues with further passages that elaborate on and compliment the demonstration of the Cyclopes justness in TH14a (commentary at Step 2d §4 & Step 3d §4).

TH14l has the Antisthenic 'Cyclopes apart from Polyphemus' = 'Polyphemus alone' idea (1-2; cf. TH14a 6-7), and references the same suitors passage as TH14c.

Met. 1043b = DC 44B, SSR 150).
Two further texts from Apollonius Sophistes’ *Lexicon Homericum* have been included here as fragments of Antisthenes. In Apollonius there is an attribution in one of them to Aristarchus. It is clear, however, that Aristarchus was drawing directly on the prior work of Antisthenes, and he reports a couple of important additional details not found in the related scholia. The first, printed here as **TH14m** is the *Lexicon Homericum* entry for ἀθεµίστων. This passage contains the securely Antisthenic statement that the Cyclopes are just, except for Polyphemus (cf. **TH14a** 6-8, Table 2 §4). The remainder of the text incorporates arguments directly mirroring other portions of the various **TH14** scholia (cf. above the **TH14** Comparison of Fragments Table). The second, printed as **TH14n** is the *Lexicon Homericum* entry for ὑπερφίαλοι. Though it does not mention Aristarchus, this passage is inextricably linked by its content and style to the first passage. It once again contains the Antisthenic notion that only Polyphemus was unjust, but the other Cyclopes were just. This statement occurs directly after a reference to the suitors which contains wording closely reflecting the related passage from **TH14c**:

*Lex. Hom:*  

οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτοὺς κακῶς ἔλεγον

**TH14c** 4-5:  

οὐ γὰρ ὁι µνηστῆρες καθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἔλεγον ἄν

This similar phrasing further confirms the common origin of these lines.

The last of this group of fragments is a passage from Eustathius. It does not name Antisthenes, but like the entries from the *Lexicon Homericum* it contains Antisthenic material from the scholia as well as additional valuable material. Similar to the Antisthenic assertion that except for Polyphemus the rest of the Cyclopes were just (**TH14a** 6-8, Step 2d §4), this text contains the statement (22-3) that the rest of the Cyclopes (i.e. other than Polyphemus), were god-reverencing – noting in addition the habit wicked people have of accusing good people along with themselves. It also offers as proof of the justness of the Cyclopes the fact that the earth puts forth crops for them spontaneously (6, Step 3d §4) mirroring Antisthenes’ application of Golden Race imagery to the Cyclopes (**TH14a** 8-9, Step 3d §4).
Then it explains the reason for the Phaeacians departing by combining the language used by Antisthenes in two other scholia (Step 2 §9):

**TH14i** 3-4: ἐλύπουν δίκαιοι ὄντες; διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας.

**TH14a** 13: ἐγένετο δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας.

Eustath. 17-8: δίκαιοι ὄντες ἐλύπουν ... διὰ τὸ τῆς πολιτείας φασίν ἀνόμοιον ἐγίνετο.

Eustathius was clearly copying directly from Antisthenes (or someone reporting Antisthenes) here, and the 'they' of φασίν (they say) must be either the Antisthenians or commentators in the Antisthenic tradition. There are numerous other direct comparisons of the language and content of Eustathius throughout the remainder of the Porphyrian scholia demonstrated in the Table 2 – **TH14 Comparison of Fragments** and the commentary.

**Evidence of dialogue**

**TH14a.** The opening lines have the form of a rhetorical question, πῶς ... εἰπών; 'How could he say?' (1-2), seeming to sum up a questioner’s objections before providing an answer (2-6). Another question adds to the sense of a speaker engaging with an interlocutor: οὐκοῦν οἱ λοιποὶ δίκαιοι; 'So are not the rest (of the Cyclopes) just? (7-8). The remainder of the fragment appears to be an actual piece of dialogue, albeit in severely compressed form (9-13) and **TH14i** contains a question πῶς (3-4) and answer (4) that appears to reflect a syncopated version of the same dialogue.

**TH14b.** There are two questions, one after another starting εἰ γὰρ and εἰ δ’ (3-6), and both containing πῶς, that look like extracts from dialogue. The second one, in particular, is answered by an imperative σκοπείτω suggesting a speaker responding to an interlocutor. This imperative, appearing as it does in the third person, is apparently an adjustment made in the process of transmission since the same portion of dialogue in **TH14j** preserves the second person imperative σκόπει (2-3) as if directly quoted from dialogue.

**TH14e.** The fragment starts with an objection from a questioner about the Cyclopes (1-2) which is then answered by another speaker defending them (3-6).
**Ordering of the fragments**

The order in which the problems were discussed in the actual dialogue cannot be known with any confidence. They have been arranged here in what seems a logical sequence, and one that adheres where possible to the order of the material as presented in fragment TH14a (which names Antisthenes). Naturally, it is more than likely that the various aspects of the argument were woven quite differently in their original form, and that being turned into extracts first by Porphyry and then by the scholiasts has given them their current shape.
TH14 Summary of Problems Schema

**PROBLEM 1**  Cyclopes are hyperphialoi and athemistoi.

**Step 1 §1**  If Cyclopes are hyperphialoi and athemistoi then why are they blessed by the gods?

**Step 2a §2**  Hyperphialoi is δίσηµος (double-meaning), and here is an indication of greatness (of physique) rather than a term of disapproval.

**Step 3a §2**  The suitors use hyperphialoi of themselves, so it cannot be negative.

**Step 2b §3**  Athemistoi means ‘unlawful’ in the sense that they were not subject to, or did not use, laws in common.

**Step 3b §3**  ‘Each Cyclops lays down themis (law), for his own household.

**Step 2c §3**  Athemistoi is διττός (double-meaning) – i.e. a man who knows themis but does not practice it, or a man who has no experience of themis.

**Step 3c §3**  Where there is no themis in common there are naturally no ‘counselling assemblies.’

**Step 2d §4**  Polyphemus alone is unjust, the other Cyclopes are just.

**Step 3d §4**  Cyclopes ’trust in the gods’ and the earth yields everything for them αὐτοµάτως (of her own accord).

**PROBLEM 2**  Polyphemus speaks impiously but the other Cyclopes speak piously.

**Step 1 §5**  Polyphemus says they do not heed Zeus, but the other Cyclopes fear Zeus and advise prayer.

**Step 2a §5**  Polyphemus lied, maligning the other Cyclopes with his personal impiety.

**Step 2b §6**  Consider the character of the person speaking who said these things, it is Polyphemus the savage flesh-eater.

**Step 2c §6**  It is solved again by the character of the person speaking who has the most foolish arguments, in this case, Polyphemus.

**Step 3 §7**  Polyphemus is not like the rest of the Cyclopes but is a shepherd living apart and roaming far away from the others.
PROBLEM 3: The Cyclopes do not heed each other.

Step 1 §8 The Cyclopes appear unjust and transgressive by not heeding each other.

Step 2a §8 Not 'heeding' one another means they are so just and unenvious that they mind their own business.

Step 3a §8 The Cyclopes' justness is proved by their coming together in answer to Polyphemus' shouting.

Step 2b §8 Not heeding one another means they are not subject to one another.

Step 3b §8 Each Cyclops is his own ruler.

PROBLEM 4 The Cyclopes were violent and harried the Phaeacians.

Step 1 §9 The Cyclopes continually plundered and harmed the Phaeacians, who were forced to emigrate.

Step 2 §9 The Phaeacians and Cyclopes did not get along because of the dissimilarity of their polities.

Step 3 §9 The Cyclopes' behaviour was normal. The Phaeacians also acted violently, e.g. towards the Giants.

The preceding schema presents the problems found in fragments TH14a-o by the steps of the Antisthenic methodology described in Chapter 5 section B (a summary of which appears below) and by the order in the TH14 Comparison of Fragments Table (table section numbers indicated by §). The commentary follows the structure of the TH14 Summary of Problems Schema.

Summary of the Antisthenic Methodology

Step 1. Problematise the literal meaning of the text. Identify an inconsistency, generally of an ethical nature.

Step 2. Locate a σηµεῖον (indication) of one or more solutions in the text that can be read to give the text consistency.

Step 3. Reinforce this reading with other Homeric passages, i.e. 'clarify Homer by Homer' (Ὅµηρον ἐξ Ὅµήρου σαφηνίζειν).
**Commentary**

**PROBLEM 1** Cyclopes are hyperphialoi and athenistoi.

**Step 1 §1** If Cyclopes are hyperphialoi and athenistoi then why are they blessed by the gods? (Problematise the text).

In TH14a the problem is posed, in the style of a rhetorical question, as to how Odysseus could call the Cyclopes hyperphialoi (imperious) and athenistoi (unrighteous) and paranomoi (transgressive), but also admit that the Cyclopes receive 'unstinting blessings from the gods' (2). There appears to be an ethical contradiction in the text. The rhetorical nature of the question suggests that this is a speaker in a dialogue defending the Cyclopes and summing up a questioner's objections before giving his response.

TH14c similarly notes the inappropriateness of thinking that 'such great gifts' would be given to unrighteous beings. In this fragment there is an author understood from the αὐτὸς λέγει (he says, 2), and this must be Antisthenes and, likewise, the they of φασί (they say, 7) is, by extension, the Antisthenians (cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Arist. Metaph. 1043b23 DC 44b, SSR 150 where he refers to Antisthenes and the Antisthenians alternately in a similar fashion – i.e. εἶπε, 'he said', and λέγουσι, 'they say'). The use of the demonstrative pronoun τοιαῦτα makes it clear that there was preceding text describing what 'such great gifts' must be referring to, these gifts obviously being the fact that the earth gave the Cyclopes everything of her own accord (TH14a 9 cf. Step 3d §4).

It is clear that Antisthenes had the men of the Golden Race in mind when he wrote 'unstinting blessings' (ἀφθόνα ... ἀγαθόν, 2), as Hesiod describes the fields producing 'unstinting' (ἀφθόνον, Op. 118) crops for men of that era and possessing every 'blessing' (ἐσθλά, Op. 116; equating to 'everything needed for prosperity,' West 1978, ad loc.). This language is not used by Homer. Plato similarly uses this Hesiodic vocabulary describing the 'unstinting crops' (καρποὺς ἀφθόνους Plt. 272a) provided for the men of the 'Age of Cronus', i.e. the Golden Race. As discussed below, in Step 3d §4, Antisthenes uses another
word, αὐτοµάτως (TH14a 9) from the same phrase of Hesiod (Op. 118, αὐτοµάτη), to paraphrase five Homeric lines (Od. 107-11).

**Step 2a §2 Hyperphialoi is δίσηµος (double-meaning), and here is an indication of greatness (of physique) rather than a term of disapproval.** (Locate a σηµείον).

In TH14b 1 and TH14o 29-30 we find Antisthenes’ very interesting employment of the curious term δίσηµος, 'double-meaning'. Etymologically, this word contains the same root, -σηµ-, as σηµεῖον, σηµαινεῖν, ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι, words which Antisthenes was also fond of using (cf. ch. 5 section D). In later times the term δίσηµος (LSJ s.v.) was generally used in discussions of music and rhythm to mean ‘of two times’, ‘of four times’ or ‘of two time units’. Aristoxenus, for example, uses it with this sense several times in his *Elementa rhythmica*, and there are quite a few similar uses by Hellenistic and later authors. The employment of it in the fragments here by Antisthenes, however, make up two of only three extant examples of usage referring to ‘double-meaning’. The third example is also from Eustathius' commentary (on Odyssey 19.27-8 Stallbaum 2.188.19):

'χοῖνιξ' δὲ νῦν ἡ τροφή. δίσηµος γὰρ ἡ λέξις, ἐπί τε σκεύους τοῦ µετροῦντος καὶ τοῦ µετρουµένου πράγµατος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ µέδιµνος καὶ τὸ τάλαντον καὶ ὁ ξέστης καὶ ἕτερα πολλά.

'Choinix' now means the food. For the expression is double-meaning, relating both to a vessel for measuring and the thing being measured. Thus also is the case for the *medimnos* the *talent* the *xestes* and many others.

Another term διττός, is used with a similar sense of ‘double-meaning’, is found at TH14o 34 (discussed in the next section of commentary Step 2c §3).

In TH14b there is no indication in the text as to precisely what the ‘double-meaning’ might be referring to. This has led previous editors of Porphyry to punctuate the text so that the phrase ‘τῶν δισήµων γὰρ ἡ λέξις’ was associated with the following sentence starting with ‘ἀθεµίστων.’ Fortunately, the use of δίσηµος at TH14o 35 makes it clear that the term is actually referring to the preceding ‘ὑπερφιάλων’, because it states that *hyperphialoi* does not seem to be used here as a term of disapproval (making it clear that this was often, or even
usually, the case), but in this instance it is referring to the natural greatness (μεγαλοφυές, 37) of the Cyclopes. Thus Antisthenes is able to show that there is an ethical solution in the immediate text to the problem posed (i.e. the Cyclopes being referred to as hyperphialoi).

**TH14c** states that 'it is solved from the expression' (λύεται τῇ λέξει; cf. the Antisthenes title περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, DL 6.15, discussed in ch. 3 section C). Antisthenes again seems to be utilising a problems solving technique that later became standard practice. In his discussion in *Poetics* 25, Aristotle stated: 'Some problems should be resolved by reference to diction' (τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, 1461a 9 Halliwell trans.). MacPhail records the solution from diction (λύεται δ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως) as being standard strategy for Porphyry (2011, 7).

The expression, that they were hyperphialoi, or 'imperious', was purely a function of their overbearing physical size. Three of the fragments make specific mention of the Cyclopes’ body (σῶµα) and its ‘superiority’ (ὑπεροχή, TH14a) or ‘natural greatness’ (µεγαλοφυές, TH14b, TH14o). Di Benedetto suggests that the use of the rare adjective μεγαλοφυής in this case is from a desire to use a word with the root φύω that is also found in ὑπερφίαλος (1966, 210). **TH14c** and **TH14i** use the adjective μέγας (great, big). The slightly peculiar expression in **TH14i** – ὑπερφιάλων νῦν µεγάλων – seemingly means that in 'current usage' the latter adjective is equivalent to the earlier usage of the former (see Eustathius’ similar use in his discussion about the Choinix just above in this section). **TH14c** contains the additional point that hyperphialoi is applied to those who are ‘superior’ or ‘more powerful’ (κρείττων) – so here it is a positive, rather than negative, attribute.

**Step 3a §2** The suitors use hyperphialoi of themselves, so it cannot be negative.

(Reinforce this reading using Homer).

In three of the fragments (**TH14c, TH14n, TH14o**), the text proves that this positive reading of hyperphialoi in the Cyclopes passage of Homer is accurate by using another passage of Homer. As Antisthenes did in **TH13c** (10-12, §6), here he adduces a passage concerning the suitors to prove his point. He notes that the suitors referred to themselves as the
hyperphialoi which they would not have done if it were not a positive attribute – 'since they would not have spoken ill of themselves' (TH14n 32). In TH14n Antisthenes makes the additional point that hyperphialoi is used of men who are 'surpassing in terms of excellence' (οἱ κατ’ άρετὴν διαφέροντες, 30-1), thus offering yet more evidence of the thematic nature of άρετή throughout his work (cf. ch. 2.ii section E).

Step 2b §3 Athemistoi means 'unlawful' in the sense that they were not subject to, or did not use, laws in common. (Locate a σηµείον).

Having dealt with hyperphialoi, Antisthenes now moves on to deal with athemistoi by employing the same methodology. Common to nine of the ten scholia in this section (excluding only TH14k) is the statement that the Cyclopes were athemistoi, 'unrighteous or unlawful', only in so far as they were not subject to 'laws' (TH14a, b, j), or not subject to 'laws in common' (TH13c, m, n, o), or did not need 'laws' (TH14i, l). In eight instances, the word 'law' is provided by νόµος, though TH14c differs by using θέσµός, and TH14l by using both θέµις and νόµος. TH14a is more precise in stating that they were not subject to 'written laws' (νόµῳ ἐγγράφῳ). Note also the use of the technical term σηµείον at TH14a 6 confirming that this 'indication' is the correct ethical solution found in the text to resolve the apparent puzzle of the Cyclopes' 'lawlessness'.

In TH14o this statement is actually phrased three ways in three separate passages: 14 τὸ μὴ κοινωνικῶς ἔχειν, 'not holding (laws) in common'; 20 διὰ τὸ μὴ νόµους ἔχειν κοινούς, 'because they did not use common laws'; and 39 μὴτε νόµους μὴτε ἔθη κοινὰ ἐχόντων, 'having neither laws nor character in common'. Furthermore, it is elaborated in TH14o that athemistoi means 'not publicly laying down laws formed by common counsel or discussion, but each for his own household' (14-15), and later 'nor did they strive after profit in common, because they did not have a government in common, but, as stated, they were household-rulers' (οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι, 40-41).

οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι. The word, oikokrateioi, used for 'to be a household-ruler', is a fascinating hapax legomenon. It seems correctly stated by Di Benedetto (1966, 223) that this
word should not be attributed to the inventiveness of Eustathius, as his contribution to the discussion of the Cyclopes was to compare them to the Anchorites of his own day (cf. TH14o 46-52). It seems, therefore, that this neologism should be considered a piece of the text that has been preserved in its original form, and thus should be credited to Antisthenes. Antisthenes’ apparent fondness for compound words including -κρατεῖσθαι is seen again in his use of θαλαττοκρατεῖσθαι, 'to be a ruler of the sea' or 'to be mastered by the sea' (ED6 34 and commentary).

Step 3b §3 'Each Cyclops lays down themis (law), for his own household.'

(Reinforce this reading using Homer).

In seven of the nine scholia in this section (TH14a-c, i, k, m & o), a passage of Homer is brought to bear to prove that the ethical reading of the text is accurate. In this case another passage specifically referring to the Cyclopes is used, which states that each Cyclops θεµιστεύει – ‘lays down the themis (law)’ – for his own household (Od. 9.115). Thus, 'while they were athemistoi they were also themis givers' (TH14o 18). Both TH14c 9-12 and TH14o 11-13 provide an extended quote from the same Odyssey passage that includes the fact that the Cyclopes do not have public assemblies nor established laws (themistes) and live on mountain peaks in caves (Od. 9.112-5). Antisthenes appears to have instigated a trend for utilising this passage of the Odyssey for explaining certain forms of political governance. When Plato discusses the form of government known as 'lordship' (δυναστεία), which he says is common up to his day among Greeks and foreigners, he mentions that Homer knew of this system as well, and cites Od. 9.112-5 in full (Lg. 680b-c). Aristotle, similarly, when discussing the style of rule where the eldest member of the family governs the household, quotes Od. 9.114-5 (Pol. 1252b20), and he does so a second time in an ethical discussion (NE 1180a28-9).
**Step 2c §3** Athena is διττός (double-meaning) – i.e. a man who knows themis but does not practice it, or a man who has no experience of themis. (Locate a σηµείον).

Another 'indication' of the solution to the ethical problem is provided in TH14o at line 41, where it is noted that athemistos is διττός (double-meaning). The use of διττός here being synonymous with δίσηµος discussed in Step 2a §2, above. It is then explained (41-3) that these two meanings of athemistos (unrighteous) are: a man who knows 'right' but does not practice it (therefore effectively being an unjust man); and a man who is unrighteous only through having no knowledge or experience of 'right' – the Cyclopes fitting the latter category. That this σηµείον, or indication, is correct is confirmed a couple of lines further on when it is stated that 'It is clear that a later person being called athemistos signifies (σηµαίνει) something other than the Homeric athemistos here.' A similar contrast between later usage and the historical, Homeric meaning is also made a few lines earlier (38-9): 'Thus also athemistoi does not imply hubris as it does now, but it is an historical meaning.' The idea that athemistos (unrighteous), and adikos (unjust) could sometimes almost be synonyms (though not in this case) also appears at TH14l 3 (Table 2 §4) where it is stated that 'he says they are athemistoi (unrighteous), not because they are adikoi (unjust).’ A comparable juxtaposition occurs at TH14b 3-4 (Step 1 §5 below).

**Step 3c §3** Where there is no themis in common there are naturally no 'counselling assemblies'. (Reinforce this reading using Homer).

TH14o 36 uses a portion of the same Odyssey passage as Step 3b §3 above to reinforce the 'double-meaning' reading, noting that where there is no themis there are quite rightly no 'counselling assemblies' (Od. 9.112), as such assemblies are dependent upon themis. TH14c also contains this idea, with the additional clarification that 'not being subject to thesmoi (laws) in common, they have no counselling assemblies.
Polyphemus alone is unjust, the other Cyclopes are just. (Locate a σημείο).

Here Antisthenes offers another solution to the problem of the Cyclopes being called hyperphialoi and atemistoi and yet receiving blessings from the gods. TH14a reads: 'Antisthenes says: Polyphemus alone is unjust, and indeed he is truly contemptuous of Zeus. So are not the rest (of the Cyclopes) just?' Of the other fourteen fragments in the TH14 group, seven of them include this same fact – that the Cyclopes apart from Polyphemus are just. This is one of the clinching pieces of evidence that all of the material discussing the Cyclopes in these fragments is derived originally from a dialogue of Antisthenes. Notably, TH14b introduces the statement 'Polyphemus is unjust' with the words 'So he says', he clearly pointing to an antecedent speaker whom we know to be Antisthenes from TH14a. The text of TH14b adds that Polyphemus is 'arrogant', in addition to being 'unjust' (11).

There are a couple of other variations in the language and presentation of the fragments worthy of note. In TH14l the rest of the Cyclopes are described as 'noble' or 'good' (ἀγαθοί) instead of 'just', and Polyphemus is described as 'their leader' (ἡγεμὼν αὐτῶν, 1-2). In TH14m the statement that 'the Cyclopes apart from Polyphemus are just' is credited to Aristarchus rather than to Antisthenes, the latter whom we know for certain from TH14a to have been the true source. There are a number of possible explanations for this.

Aristarchus may have incorporated material from Antisthenes directly into his own work – quite likely without recording an attribution – which then was handed down the line of scholars. Or Apollonius Sophistes, when compiling his lexicon (or a copyist before him), saw a name starting with 'A', or even just an 'A', in his source and assumed that the credit for such a statement should be given to Aristarchus (the famous Alexandrian scholar), rather than Antisthenes (by then acquiring a reputation as a Cynic), regardless of what was actually written in front of him.
Cyclopes 'trust in the gods' and the earth yields everything for them αὐτομάτως (of her own accord). (Reinforce this reading using Homer).

In TH14b 3-4 the question was posed that if athemistoi (unrighteous) is standing for adikoi, (unjust), how can Odysseus (and by extension Homer) say that the Cyclopes 'trust in the gods'? It is evident from this (as noted in Step 2c §3 above) that adikos (unjust) could sometimes be considered a virtual synonym of athemistos (unrighteous). In answering the question, having stated that 'Polyphemus alone is arrogant and unjust', Antisthenes continues: 'all the rest of the Cyclopes are pious (εὐσεβεῖς) and just and trusting in the gods (πεποιθότας τοῖς θεοῖς), and hence the earth causes crops to spring up for them of her own accord' (αὐτοµάτως, TH14b 11-13). Antisthenes thus provides two confirmations from one passage of Homer showing that the Cyclopes being athemistoi does not imply that they are unjust.

The first confirmation, a version of the quote θεοῖσι πεποιθότες (they trust in the gods) from Odyssey 9.107, appears in five of the fragments in this section (TH14b, d, j, l, o) and TH14o contains it three times (4, 16, 24). At TH14b 12 we read that the Cyclopes are 'pious' (εὐσεβεῖς) as well as 'just', which is comparable to the 'god-reverencing' (θεοσεβεῖς) of TH14o, where it is added that 'wicked men accuse good men along with themselves, or even present them as like themselves' (26-7).

The second part of the confirmation from TH14b is repeated at TH14a 8-9: 'the earth yields everything for them of her own accord' (αὐτοµάτως). Both variations on the same statement are extremely succinct paraphrases, using Hesiodic terminology, of the actual relevant text of the Odyssey 9.108-11, which actually appears in full at TH14o 4-6:

They do not plant crops by their own hand, nor plough. But unsown and unploughed all these things spring up, wheat and barley and vines, which bear wine from fine grapes. And the rain of Zeus makes these grow for them.

Golden Race. As discussed above in Step 1 §1, Antisthenes had the men of Golden Race in mind here of whom Hesiod used αὐτοµάτη (Op. 118) regarding the way crops were produced for them. Furthermore, πάντα (everything), though a common enough word, is
used by Hesiod in the same passage (Op. 116) and also used by Antisthenes in the same related sentence of TH14a 8. Clearly Antisthenes wanted to connect the Cyclopes to the men of the Golden Race by linguistic ties, using vocabulary that an educated reader of his day might be expected to readily recognise. Plato seems to have followed Antisthenes lead in this regard. He uses linguistic ties and indirect references in order to refer to the Golden Race, writing of the 'Age of Cronus' when men received 'everything unstinting and of its own accord' (ἄφθονά τε καὶ αὐτόματα πάντα, Lg. 713c) and again 'everything sprang up of its own accord (πάντα αὐτόματα γίγνεσθαι) for men' (Plt. 271d; cf. 271e αὐτόματον περὶ βίου, and 272a αὐτομάτης ἀναδιδούσης τῆς γῆς).

Antisthenes may also have wanted to highlight the ethical excellence of the Golden Race in order to reposition the discussion about them vis-à-vis the parodies of the comic poets. The latter, in like manner to Antisthenes, were able to immediately evoke the age of the Golden Race by use of language. For example, Teleclides wrote 'what they needed appeared of its own accord' (αὐτόματ ἦν τὰ δέοντα, F 17 KA), and Cratinus 'a god puts forth spontaneously occurring good things for them' (αὐτόματα τοῖσι θεὸς ἀνίει τάγαθά, F 172 KA). In fact, it is clear that the poets of Old Comedy regularly used a super abundance of spontaneously occurring luxuries to parody the time of Golden Race (for a range of humorous examples see Ath. 267e-270a). Eupolis even wrote a comedy titled Golden Race (Χρυσοῦν Γένος) and in one fragment (PCG 299) a cheese is found heading for water of its own volition, thus seemingly representing this spontaneous nature.

From other material reported by Eustathius in TH14o, it in fact seems fairly clear that Antisthenes' discussion of the Cyclopes' virtues prompted an ongoing tradition of scholarly discussion in a similar vein, i.e. that the Cyclopes lived in an environment of god-given abundance often equated with the Golden Race. Eustathius quotes 'The Geographer' (i.e. Strabo) as writing that the Cyclopes 'harvest spontaneously-growing crops' (αὐτοφυεῖς καρπούς, TH14o 7 = Str. 13.1.25.21-2), which is synonymous with Antisthenes' αὐτομάτως καρπούς of TH14b 13. It seems that Strabo must have drawn this fact, directly or

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275 See further examples and discussion in Ceccarelli 1996 and Pellegrino 2000.
indirectly, from Antisthenes. In the passage immediately prior Strabo notes that it was Plato who first used the Cyclopes as an example of the initial stage of political organisation (13.1.25.20-1, cf. Step 3b §3 above). But Plato at no point mentions the fact that 'the earth provides for the Cyclopes of her own accord', and nor does he ever mention the Cyclopes in his various discussions of the Golden Race (cf. Dillon 1992).

After the mention of Strabo's summary, Eustathius goes on to state that 'the poet', i.e. Homer (7-9):

> describes the specific character of the country in this way, as if this island too was one of the Isles of the Blessed – for the Isle of the Cyclopes is celebrated for its prosperity in proverbs, as is also Egypt and Arabia.

A little further on he adds that the Cyclopes (14-15):

> have elicited the proverbial saying, that from divine favour the unsown and unploughed earth puts forth everything for the blessed.

Thus the Cyclopean mode of living became proverbial. Leutsch in his collection of Greek proverbs actually includes an entry for 'Κυκλώπιος βίος' – 'the Cyclopean way of life' (CPG 2.182, noted by Di Benedetto 1966, 221 n.2), wherein he lists several other texts that refer to the proverbial nature of the Cyclopes' life. One of these is another passage from Strabo describing fertile Albania, where Od. 9.109 is quoted, followed by a reference to Κυκλώπειόν τινα … βίον, 'a certain Cyclopean way of life' (11.4.3). Another, from Maximus of Tyre (late 2nd c. AD), also employs the expression Κυκλώπειόν βίον, 'Cyclopean life' (15.7 Trapp).

In the most remarkable passage of the collection, Dio Chrysostom provides a rather extraordinary list of circumstances that provide the conditions for a life of utter abundance (64.7):

> τούτο ἦν ἄρα καὶ χρυσὸν γένος καὶ νῆσοι μακάρων τινές, αὐτομάτας ἔχουσαι τροφάς, καὶ Ἡρακλέους κέρας καὶ Κυκλώπων βίος, ὅτι τοῖς πονήσασι τὸν βίον αὐτομάτη λοιπὸν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αφθονία παραγίγνεται.

This was then, both the Golden Race and the Isles of the Blest, as it were, which have spontaneously occurring food, and both the Horn of Heracles and the Life of the Cyclopes, because to those who have toiled for their living, an abundance of blessings comes of its own accord thereafter.
The use of αὐτοµάτη (of its own accord) and ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀφθονία (abundance of blessings), not found in Homer, but found in Antisthenes (TH14a 2 & 9), points again back to Antisthenes' work which first employed these Hesiodic terms and first likened the Cyclopes to the men of the Golden Race, exactly as Dio is doing here. In particular, Dio's use of ἀγαθός, used by Antisthenes (TH14a 2), rather than Hesiod's ἐσθλός (Op. 118), confirms Antisthenes' work as the conduit by which Dio ultimately obtained his material. Certainly Dio was familiar with and admired Antisthenes' writing, as he quotes him several times (Or. 53.5 = DC 58, SSR 194, Or. 8.1 = DC 139, SSR 1; and once without naming him Or. 13.14-28 = SSR 208).

In a final example, Philostratus (c. AD 200), when giving a description of an ancient Greek painting he viewed at Naples, described Cyclopes harvesting fields and gathering grapes that the earth had sent forth 'of her own accord' (αὐτοµάτα, Imagines 369K21-24 Benndorf), using this term that was originally applied to the Cyclopes' existence by Antisthenes.

In TH14k the explanation of the divine provision for the Cyclopes is presented a little differently and with another possible rationale. There it is stated: 'they say (φασί) that by way of the temperate nature (εὔκρατον) of the climate the gods provide for them' (1-2). The 'they' of φασί is most plausibly the Antisthenians, given that the fragment then immediately continues with the securely Antisthenic statement that 'Polyphemus alone was unjust' (3; cf. Step 2d §4 above). The temperate climate was evidently considered to be another aspect of the life that was provided for the Golden Race and so for the Cyclopes here. When discussing the 'Age of Cronus' (i.e. era of the Golden Race) Plato says 'the climate was tempered (τῶν ὡρῶν … ἐκέκρατο) for their comfort' (Plt. 272a).

The text of TH14k then goes on to offer two possible reasons why the gods provide for the Cyclopes. It is either 'because they are their descendants, “since we are near of kin to them” (Od. 7.205), or because of the Cyclopes' justness (2-3).

TH14a concludes this section with the fascinating statement that 'the fact that they do not work her (the earth) is also a just deed (ἔργον, 9)’. This, quite interestingly, suggests that
Antisthenes considers the very act of working the earth to be perpetrating an injustice upon her and to be indicative of a fall from the state of grace in which the men of the Golden Race, and hence Cyclopes, lived.

A further intimation of the Cyclopes' blessed state is found in TH14i. There the Cyclopes are said to be 'athemistoi, not because they are unjust, but because they did not have need of themis (right) or nomos (law) to discover the noble way of doing things – since they were noble' (3-5). Thus the Cyclopes' inherent nobility and excellence precluded the need for formally set down laws. This accords perfectly with Antisthenes' statement: 'the wise man (σοφός) will engage in public life (πολιτεύσεσθαι), not according to the established laws, but rather according to the law of excellence' (ἀρετή, DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134). And also: 'if a wise man does something, he executes it with all his excellence' (TH6). In Antisthenes' eyes lesser men may need laws to curtail and restrain their inherently base inclinations, but for noble men, what is right and honourable comes naturally. Thus he declares that 'nobly-born men (εὐγενεῖς) and excellent men (ἐνάρετοι) are one and the same' (MD5). Recall also that in TH14n hyperphialoi (as used of the Cyclopes) was said to mean 'excelling' and 'men who are surpassing in excellence (ἀρετή) are referred to by these terms' (30-1). These ethical terms and Antisthenes' own philosophy of excellence are discussed in detail in chapter 2.ii – especially section B.

So from Antisthenes' point of view the Cyclopes preserved an inherent nobility and excellence that mankind had largely lost. This was proven by the fact that they did not require formal laws to guide them – since they were noble in their very nature – and by the fact that the earth freely put forth all they needed in the same manner as for the men of the Golden Race.
PROBLEM 2: Polyphemus speaks impiously but the other Cyclopes speak piously.

Step 1 §5 Polyphemus says they do not heed Zeus, but the other Cyclopes fear Zeus and advise prayer. (Problematise the text).

Another apparent inconsistency in the text is put forward in TH14d 1-5:

How, when the Cyclops (Polyphemus) says earlier

'For the Cyclopes pay no heed to Aegis-bearing Zeus, nor to the blessed gods, since we are much better than them' (Od. 9.275-6),

does he (Homer) conversely make the Cyclopes say

'Disease which comes from mighty Zeus cannot be avoided; but you (Polyphemus) should indeed pray to our Father Poseidon' (Od. 9.411-2)?

So the problem is that on the one hand Homer has Polyphemus claim that the Cyclopes do not respect Zeus or any of the other gods (in fact, considering themselves superior to them), but on the other Cyclopes seem to contradict this position by fearing Zeus and urging prayer.

The fullest version of this question is recorded in TH14d, but five further fragments (TH14b, g, j, m & o) quote or paraphrase the Odyssey line at 9.275 'οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοι ἀλέγουσιν' (for the Cyclopes pay no heed to aegis-bearing Zeus).

The version of the fragment found in TH14j, was evidently copied from the same source as TH14b. In TH14b there is the question about the Cyclopes trusting in the gods (Od. 9.107, discussed above in Step 3d §4), followed by 'How (πῶς) can Polyphemus say “For the Cyclopes pay no heed to aegis-bearing Zeus” (Od. 9.275)?', and the response in the following line (6) starting σκοπεῖ τὸ πρόσωπον (consider the character). TH14j has the statement about trusting in the gods in the same relationship, and though it reduces and paraphrases the Od. 9.275 quote to 'οὐκ ἀλέγει' (pays no heed), it retains the πῶς (how) and also continues with a near identical response, σκόπει τὸ πρόσωπον 'consider the character' (see further discussion of this imperative in Step 2b §6 below). In TH14o the two
quotes from *Od*. 9.107 and *Od*. 9.275 are also printed in the same order, again signalling the common source of the material.

Several of the fragments also contain a portion of the second half of the problem posed in TH14d, either mentioning 'disease from Zeus' (νοῦσον Διός, TH14g and TH14m), or that Polyphemus should pray to Poseidon (TH14k). TH14o 28 actually contains a reference to both points, but in a condensed and paraphrased version, i.e. 'they looked with awe upon disease from Zeus and knew how to pray'. TH14k 6 adds the information, not found elsewhere in the fragments, that the Cyclopes "consult oracles" (*Od*. 9.510) and honour (νοµίζουσι) the gods'.

παρίστησιν. In discussing the contrast between Homer's portrayal of Polyphemus and the other Cyclopes, TH14g 2 uses the verb παρίστηµι, seemingly meaning 'show by comparison', implying in a fuller sense 'demonstrate by placing alongside for comparison'. This is possibly another part of Antisthenes' technical vocabulary of literary criticism. It appears a second time in this fragment two lines further on (4, cf. Step 2c §6). Seemingly Apollonius Dyscolus also uses παράστασις with a technical sense (cf. van Ophuijsen 1993, 732).

Step 2a §5 Polyphemus lied, maligning the other Cyclopes with his personal impiety.

(Locate a σηµεῖον).

Four of the fragments in this section (TH14g, h, m & o) hint at the ethical solution that is fully expounded in Step 2b and Step 2c §6. The essence of the argument found in these is that Polyphemus is speaking falsely when he says that the Cyclopes do not heed Zeus and by his personal impiety he maligns the others. Each of these fragments records different elements of this argument, but each of them also has key vocabulary in common with at least one of the others in the group, making it clear that they were ultimately drawn from a common source. TH14o states that when Polyphemus said that the Cyclopes do not heed Zeus he was 'saying this falsely' (26, ψευδῶς). Related to this, TH14m has 'this is false' (27, ψεῦδος) and also notes that Polyphemus said it as a result of 'his personal impiety' (26, τής
ἰδίας ἀσεβείας. In common with this, TH14g states that being 'impious' (1, ἀσεβής) Polyphemus maligns the others, and TH14h says that he makes his 'personal' (1, ἰδιον) fault common. Although TH14m has a word in common with each of the other three, it is does not necessarily represent the earliest or fullest exemplar, as TH14g in particular continues with notably different phrasing and text references.

**Step 2b §6** Consider the character of the person speaking who said these things, it is Polyphemus the savage flesh-eater. (Locate a σημείον).

σκόπει τὸ πρόσωπον. Responding specifically to a questioner asking 'And what if someone should ask “How can Polyphemus say ’For the Cyclopes pay no heed to aegis-bearing Zeus’?”' (TH14b 4-5; cf. Step 1 §5 above), the interlocutor here responds: 'Consider the character (of the person speaking), as it is the character of Polyphemus the raw-flesh-eater and savage' (6-7). It is obviously implied, even if it is not spelt out here, that any pronouncements by a 'raw-flesh-eater and savage' must be treated with some scepticism. Confirming this view the speaker then continues (7-10) with another quote from Hesiod’s Works and Days (277-9; clearly Antisthenes was fond of using Hesiod in his solutions, as well as Homer; cf. Step 1 §1 and Step 3d §4 above) stating 'that fish and beasts and winged beasts should devour each other, since there is no justice in them’. Thus the 'raw-flesh-eater’ Polyphemus is confirmed to have 'no justice’, and so his words should not be taken at face value.

TH14j preserves the imperative phrase σκόπει τὸ πρόσωπον (consider the character, 2) in the second person, apparently directly copied from a dialogue. The version of the text found at TH14b appears in the third person σκοπεῖτω τὸ πρόσωπον), which is probably a natural conversion for a scribe to make when including it in a scholarly commentary.

**Step 2c §6** It is solved again by the character of the person speaking who has the most foolish arguments, in this case, Polyphemus. (Locate a σημείον).

λύεται ἐκ πρόσωπον. As TH14d includes the fullest version of the problem (cf. Step 1 §5 above), so it offers the fullest discussion of the ethical solution (5-13). It starts out by noting
that there 'appears to be a contradiction' (5, ἐναντίωμα γὰρ φαίνεται) and that 'he', i.e. Homer, 'is not saying the same things about the same things' (6), or in other words, he is not speaking consistently. The text continues: 'Again it is solved by the character of the people speaking' (7-8, λύεται δὲ πάλιν ἐκ προσώπου τῶν λεγόντων), because only Polyphemus declared that the Cyclopes were far superior to the gods, but not any of the other Cyclopes (9-10). The use of πάλιν, 'again' or 'once more', suggests that this is not the first time a solution 'from the character' has been propounded. This is most likely referring to the other part of the solution to the immediate problem put forward just above in Step 2a §5, that the Polyphemus is characterised as a 'raw-flesh-eater' and 'savage'. Or possibly it is merely confirming that this has become a typical strategy employed by Homeric exegetes. The same style of explanation from character was used by Antisthenes in TH13a-d (and see commentary thereon at §3).

There is corruption in the text of TH14d 11, however the gist of it definitely seems to be that the two cases, where Homer is asserting his own view, and where one of Homer’s characters is asserting a view, are different or opposed (ἐναντία) cases. In the situation of Polyphemus and the Cyclopes, 'since the speakers are different, one must consider (σκεπτέον) to whom he (the poet) assigned the more foolish arguments' (12-13). The verbal adjective here, σκεπτέον, comes from the same verb pair σκοπεῖν/σκέπτεσθαι as σκοπεῖτω and σκόπει discussed in Step 2b §6 immediately above, and so appears to be a favoured piece of vocabulary in Antisthenes' dialogic writing.

Antisthenes concludes this passage by stating 'it is clear' (δῆλον, TH14d 13) that the one to whom Homer assigns the most foolish arguments is Polyphemus, 'who was not like-minded with the others and was not in agreement about the glory of the gods' (13-14). So ultimately, this approach, of resolving inconsistencies in the text by considering the character, and to whom the poet had assigned the more foolish arguments (and was ipso

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276 Richardson comments on this strategy (1975, 78).
277 cf. LSJ s.v. Attic writers before Aristotle use σκοπῶ or σκοποῦμαι as present, and take the other tenses from σκέπτομαι.
facto wrong), reveals another of Antisthenes' strategies for defending Homer's text, and Homer himself, from criticism.

παρίσταται. TH14g (3-5) has almost identical language to TH14d. Declaring that Polyphemus 'was not like-minded with the others', it goes on to say that this is 'shown by comparison (παρίσταται) with what the poet says about him'. This is the second use in this fragment of the verb παρίστηµι with the particular technical meaning 'show by comparison', or even 'demonstrate by placing alongside for comparison' (discussed above in Step 1 §5). In this case the word specifically introduces the Homeric passage that is Step 3 of Antisthenes' methodology (Step 3 §7 below) to prove that Antisthenes' reading is accurate.

ἐναντίωµα. The vocabulary in this section of TH14d ἐναντίωµα and ἐναντίος (5, 11) seems to be employed by Antisthenes with a particular technical sense meaning 'antithesis' and 'antithetical'. Antisthenes believed that actual contradiction was impossible (μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν),278 so he appears here to be deliberately avoiding vocabulary that implies a true contradiction. For example he could have used ἀντιλογία (contradiction), the noun directly related to the verb ἀντιλέγειν, instead of ἐναντίωµα (opposition or opposed cases or antithesis). The word is uncommon in the Classical period, and Antisthenes may well have been the first to employ it with this special sense. The fact that he provides a definition for the term defining how he is using it suggests that his desired sense was not the one he could assume his readers to be familiar with. Plato also uses it three times, once (Alc. 1, 103a) meaning 'opposition', but twice (R. 524e, 603d) seemingly meaning 'contradiction' or possibly 'antithesis' in the manner of Antisthenes' usage. Interestingly, in some passages of Republic, Plato also uses ἐναντίος in a fashion highly reminiscent of Antisthenes' use of ἐναντίωµα (TH14d 5-6):

278 Arist. Metaph. 1024b25-1025a2 = DC 47a, SSR 152; cf. Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 1024b26 Bonitz = DC 47b, SSR 152; Ascl. in Metaph. 1024b25 = SSR 153; Arist. Top. 104b19-21 = DC 47c, SSR 153; Alex. Aphr. in Top. 104b19 = SSR 153; Proclus in Plato’s Cratylus c.37 Pasquali 1908 = DC 49, SSR 155; Isoc. Hel. 1 = SSR 156; DL 3.35 = DC 36, SSR 148.
ἐναντίωµα γὰρ φαίνεται, μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντος

For it seems to be an antithesis, i.e. he (Homer) is not saying the same things about the same things.

cf. R. 602e 5-6, 8-9

tἀναντία φαίνεται ἃμα περὶ ταῦτα.

contrary things appear at the same time about the same things.

οὐκοῦν ἔφαµεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἃμα περὶ ταῦτα ἐναντία δοξάζειν αδύνατον εἶναι;

So we were saying that it is impossible for the same thing to hold contrary opinions at the same time about the same things?

R. 603d 1-2

καὶ ἐναντίας εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δόξας ἃμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

and he held contrary opinions within himself at the same time about the same things.

R. 604b 2-3

ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνοµένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἃμα, δύο φαµὲν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

And when opposite tendencies arise in a man about the same thing at the same time, we say that there are necessarily two things in him.

This seems to suggest that these ἐναντ- root nouns had similar meanings in the writings of the two Socratics, and they were almost certainly adopting vocabulary that already had currency among the grammatistai. For example Protagoras is found attacking the poet Simonides for contradicting himself (ἐναντία λέγειν αὑτῷ, Pl. Prot. 339b).

Later these terms entered the lexicon of literary criticism and Aristotle, in the Poetics declares that 'contradictions (τὰ υπεναντίως) need to be scrutinised 'to see whether the same is meant, in the same relation, and in the same respect, so that the poet himself contradicts either his own words or what an intelligent person would assume' Poetics 25 1461b 32  Halliwell trans.). By the time Porphyry was writing, ἐναντίον was regularly used to mean 'contradiction' (MacPhail 2011, 7).
Polyphemus is not like the rest of the Cyclopes but is a shepherd living apart and roaming far away from the others. (Reinforce this reading using Homer).

In his usual fashion, Antisthenes here deploys another passage of Homer to reinforce his solution. In TH14g 4-5 he promises to 'show by comparison with what the poet says about him' (cf. Step 2c §6 παρίσταται). The equivalent introduction in TH14d 15 is 'as the poet says.' The three fragments that provide evidence for this section – TH14d, g & k – all provide quotations from the same Odyssey passage, which states that Polyphemus 'shepherded alone far away, he roamed about not with the others, but living far apart, he was unrighteous' (9.188-9). TH14d continues on with further passages to reinforce this reading, stating that because Polyphemus 'was unrighteous' in matters concerning the gods he supposed that the other Cyclopes also held the same beliefs as he did, but being better than him in respect to their nature, they did not hold the same opinions as him' (17-19). So it was his isolation and ignorance, rather than malice, that lead Polyphemus to besmirch the other Cyclopes with his own unrighteous views.

This passage, thus, provides confirmation that the solutions discussed in Step 2a §5 and Step 2b-c §6 were accurate. The reason Polyphemus' views on the gods were not like the views of the other Cyclopes, and the reason the others were wrongly maligned by his views was because though he was himself unrighteous, he lived far away from them and had nothing to do with them, and had wrongly supposed that they were like himself.

TH14d concludes with the quote from Homer (used by many of the fragments to frame the problem in Step 1 §5 above) that the Cyclopes 'trust in the immortal gods' (20; Od. 9.107).
PROBLEM 3: The Cyclopes do not heed each other.

Step 1 §8 The Cyclopes appear unjust and transgressive by not heeding each other. (Problematisate the text).

In this section, the questioner raises another problem about the Cyclopes' nature. TH14e is the only fragment that contains the full problem and solution, apparently in the form of a dialogue exchange. The questioner claims that when Homer says the Cyclopes do not give thought for each other he is accusing them of being unjust and transgressive (1-2).

Step 2a §8 Not 'heeding' one another means they are so just and unenvious that they mind their own business. (Locate a σηµείον).

Cyclopes have justice (δικαιοσύνη) and are without greed. The defender objects, insisting that Homer is implying (ἐµφαίνει, 3) rather that the Cyclopes are actually exceedingly just. They are so just, in fact, that there is no need for them to be concerned about each other, because none of them have designs on another's possessions and nor do any of them do injustices to another (TH14e 3-5).

ἐµφαίνει. At line 3 of TH14e, Antisthenes employs the verb ἐµφαίνειν, which appears to be another term in his armoury of technical vocabulary for literary criticism (cf. ἔµφασις at TH13c 19 & commentary at §6). It has the sense 'suggest', 'hint at', or 'indicate' and similarly to his use of ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι and σηµαίνειν it can be used to 'indicate' or 'hint at' hidden meanings and innuendos that are not explicitly stated, but may be revealed to an astute reader by a close reading of the text (on ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι cf. TH13c 2-3, 7 and commentary thereon at §1 and §6, and ch. 5 section D).

Step 3a §8 The Cyclopes' justness is proved by their coming together in answer to Polyphemus' shouting. (Reinforce this reading using Homer).

Cyclopes care about each other, but neither envy nor interfere with each other. The defender of the Cyclopes then cites another passage of Homer as evidence that his reading
is correct. When Polyphemus was shouting (after having had his eye put out) all the other Cyclopes came together at his cave (6, Od. 9.401). So this proves that the other Cyclopes did have concern for each other (and ergo they were just).

Additional evidence of the uncovetous nature of the Cyclopes and their respect for each other is provided by TH14f and TH14k. The whole of TH14f looks like it originally continued on directly from the passage ending at TH14e 6. In particular the common use of δικαιοσύνη (just) at TH14e 3 and TH14f 3 is striking. This text offers further direct refutation of the argument made by the questioner that the Cyclopes were unjust (at TH14e 2-3 in Step 1 above) and it specifically focuses on their uncovetous nature. The speaker first paraphrases Odysseus from Od. 9.224-5, who said that his companions urged him to carry off some of Polyphemus' cheeses (1-2). The speaker recounts this passage because he wants to show how effortlessly the cave was discovered to be full of cheese and livestock (3-4) thereby emphasising Polyphemus' lack of safeguards. Polyphemus took no precautions because he knew full well that none of the other Cyclopes would rob him (4-5). The defender points out that this clearly demonstrates the justice (δικαιοσύνη) of the Cyclopes (3). The Cyclopes thus possess characteristics praised by Antisthenes in Xenophon's Symposion 4: 'And indeed it is quite likely that those who are fixated on thrift are much juster than those who are fixated on great wealth. For those who are most satisfied with their present possessions, grasp at the possessions of others the least.'

Because the Cyclopes were respectful of each other, and each was responsible for ruling his own household (cf. discussion at Step 2b and 3b §3 above), even once they had run to his call and opened his cave, they still did not 'pry into' (πολυπραγµονοῦσι) what had happened to Polyphemus (TH14k 5-6). The use of πολυπραγµονέω with a direct object is peculiar this early and Antisthenes may have been the first to try it. The very negative use of a πολυ- root word recalls Antisthenes' discussion of Odysseus' polytropos (TH12). So while the other Cyclopes are concerned for him, they are not busybodies, sticking their noses into his private domain. And this is a further display of their justice.
Step 2b §8  Not heeding one another means they are not subject to one another.  

(Locate a σηµεῖον).

TH14e 6-8 contains a further added explanation for the Cyclopes not paying heed to each other – some people explain this as meaning that they are not subject to one another.

Step 3b §8  Each Cyclops is his own ruler. (Reinforce this reading using Homer).

αὐτοκράτωι. The Cyclopes are not subject to one another 'because each one is his own ruler' (ἐκατος γὰρ αὐτοκράτων), thus alluding to Od. 9.115 ('each one lays down the themis (law) for his children and wife'), and being another way of saying οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι (household-ruler, TH14o 41, Table 2 §3). This is the same passage that was used to confirm the proper reading of athenistoi at Step 3b §3. It is highly likely that the defender of the Cyclopes adduced the same passage in his argument to refute more than one objection. So this repeated reference remains compatible with the likelihood that all of this material originated from the one Antisthenic dialogue.

PROBLEM 4: The Cyclopes were violent and harried the Phaeacians.

Step 1 §9  The Cyclopes continually plundered and harmed the Phaeacians, who were forced to emigrate. (Problematise the text).

In TH14a (9-13) the reporting of Antisthenes' analysis is considerably compressed and it appears that what remains was originally drawn from two speakers in a dialogue (the translation has been edited to show the apparent divisions). All the steps of the Antisthenic methodology are present, though found slightly jumbled and not according to a strict sequence, which is as one would expect for a dialogic work.

The first speaker poses another notional problem across a couple of lines of dialogue, challenging the preceding interpretation that the rest of the Cyclopes are just (7-8). He points out that Homer had said earlier in the Odyssey that the Cyclopes were violent, and he quotes a line from Book 6 about the Cyclopes plundering the Phaeacians and being greater
in strength than them (10-11). In his next line (12-13), responding to the second speaker (11-12), the first speaker ripostes that because the Phaeacians were constantly being harmed, they emigrated – thus paraphrasing *Od.* 6.7-8.

**Step 2 §9** The Phaeacians and Cyclopes did not get along because of the dissimilarity of their polities. (Locate a σηµεῖον).

This step is found in the final line of dialogue (*TH14a* 13), where the second speaker states that it was only on account of their dissimilar societies that the Phaeacians departed. Thus suggesting that it was not as a result of the Cyclopes being violent or harming them. Note that this last line does not appear in the text found in the manuscript of *TH14a* (Sch. T), but was added by Schrader from *TH14i* 4 (Sch. M) and *TH14o* 22 (Eust.) where discussions of the Phaeacians present the material in the same order. Di Benedetto notes (1966, 220 n. 1) that in Eustathius’ discussion of *Od.* 6.6 (1549.23 ff) the Byzantine author specifically mentions the τρυφή (’luxury’ or ’effeteness’) of the Phaeacians in comparison with the powerful Cyclopes. This adds a moral justification to the Cyclopes’ actions – they were large and strong by nature, while the Phaeacians were inherently weak and effete. It is quite possible that a comment along these lines was originally employed by the second speaker in Antisthenes dialogue as part of his defence of the Cyclopes.

Eustathius’ text (*TH14o* 22-23) also elaborates on the nature of the political discrepancies between the Cyclopes and Phaeacians. He writes that ‘the Phaeacians co-operated with one another either by the custom of aristocracy, or even democratically. But the Cyclopes were not such people.’ Thus the fact that their polities were incompatible is explained as a matter of the historical facts of their way of life, rather than as a result of any particularly unethical or violent aspect of the Cyclopes nature.

**Step 3 §9** The Cyclopes’ behaviour was normal. The Phaeacians also acted violently, *e.g.* towards the Giants. (Reinforce this reading using Homer).

The second speaker responds to the first speaker’s original objection (cf. Step 1 §9) about the Cyclopes continually plundering the Phaeacians. He counters that the Phaeacians did
exactly the same thing, and quotes a passage from Book 7 of the *Odyssey* to show that, when he had the chance, the king of the Phaeacians, Eurymedon, ruled in turn over the Giants (59). So the fact that the Cyclopes were violent, and had dominion over others when they could, has no ethical bearing on the other points under the discussion, i.e. whether or not they were arrogant, lawless and unjust.
SYMPOTICA SY1-10

This set of sympotic fragments demonstrates Antisthenes’ interest in the pastimes, practices and prejudices of the symposion and its participants and they are most likely all from a dialogue (or dialogues) set in a symposion. One fragment, Sy9, has Socrates speaking in a sympotic setting. Plato and Xenophon each wrote a Symposion, and as discussed below, both seem to make reference to, or imitate, Antisthenes.

Fragment Sy1 has Antisthenes, or another symposiast, playing the game of *eikones*, or likenesses. Symposiastic repartee and possibly abuse are seen in fragments Sy2-3, which concern the ungentlemanly pursuit of playing the pipes. Fragments Sy4-10 are speculated here to originate from a game of competitive encomia to the simple objects present in the symposion, such as drinking cups and water. In Sy9 Socrates is found praising the *bombulios*, a type of small drinking cup. In the commentary below on Sy5-9 it is noted that Isocrates criticised writers (who he thought should have known better) for engaging in the praise of such frivolous objects as *bombulioi* and salt – criticism that seems to be squarely aimed at Antisthenes.

The final fragment in this group, Sy10, appears to be part of the same cycle of sympotic encomia as Sy5-9 and it hints that wine and water were also praised in Antisthenes’ version of the symposion. Apparently Antisthenes’ symposiasts engaged in a range of sympotic games, including a cycle of competitive encomia to the ordinary objects in front of them in the symposion – including salt, piss-pots, *bombulioi*, wine, and water.

**Sy1.** In this fragment Antisthenes is engaged in the pastime of ‘likenesses’ or ‘*eikones*’ (*εἰκόνες*). This was a game popular, especially at symposia (cf. Pl. *Symp*. 214e-222b), with the objective being to liken (*εἰκάζειν*) a person to someone or something else, generally in a way that was amusing, and preferably in a way that was unexpected.

It appears that Kephisodotus should be identified as Kephisodotos from Keramikos (*PA* 8331) mentioned a further four times by Aristotle in the same book of the *Rhetoric* as the fragment under discussion here (3.1411a 5, 8, 23, 28). Kephisodotos was an Athenian.
praised by Demosthenes for being an outstanding orator who was exceeded by no one in terms of talent, but who ought to have deployed his skill against wicked men rather than those who deserved good (Lept. 146, 150). This obviously implies that Kephisodotous used his oratory in an expedient manner instead of for the sake of good men. Given Antisthenes’ unambiguous hatred for orators (see e.g. CD1, CD3 and commentary, Ajax & Odysseus, and ch. 2.ii section B), the unflattering Antisthenic eikon under examination here is not surprising. Apparently Kephisodotous was skinny and, like incense, the way he gave pleasure – in Antisthenes’ eyes – was by being destroyed or wasted away. The phrase ὅτι ἀπολλύµενος εὐφραίνει means that he gave pleasure only by being destroyed and not in any other way (Cope 1877 ad loc.).

Antisthenes evidently prided himself on his facility for making likenesses. Here is another witty example (Gnom. Vat. 1 = DC 96, SSR 113):

Ἀντισθένης τοὺς πόνους ἔφησεν ὁµοίους εἶναι κυσί· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἀσυνήθεις δάκνουσιν.

Antisthenes said that hard labours are like dogs. Since they also bite those who are unfamiliar with them.

There are further examples in fragment MD10 (see also commentary) and in his Ajax & Odysseus, where Ajax is likened by Odysseus to lazy donkeys and grazing cattle (Od. 14.5). The use of eikon in the following fragment may have also been intended in a similar sense (Clem.Al. Strom. 5.14.108 = DC 40a, SSR 181):

θεὸν οὐδενὶ ἐοικέναι,' φησίν, 'διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκµαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται.

God is like no one,’ he (Antisthenes) said, ’wherefore no one is able to completely comprehend him from a likeness.

Sympotic eikones. In Xenophon’s Sympoision, when the Syracusan who is providing the entertainers starts needling Socrates, it is Antisthenes who turns to Philippos, a well-known ‘merry-maker’ (ὁ γελωτοποιός 1.11,13, cf. 3.11) and ‘wonderful at making likenesses’ (δεινὸς εἰκάζειν), and urges him to come up with an insulting likeness for the Syracusan (5.8). Philippos is eager to do so, but Socrates talks him out of it (5.8-10). Among other

279 The mention of ‘lazy donkey’ is itself an allusion to ll. 11.555.
things, this scene demonstrates that Antisthenes was well known by his contemporary, Xenophon, as being fond of making *eikones*. In Plato’s *Symposion* the game of *eikones* is also employed when Alcibiades states that he will set out to praise Socrates ‘by way of likenesses’ (δι’ εἰκόνων, 215a). Alcibiades says that Socrates might expect him to be using likeness ‘more so for the laughs’ (ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα, 215a; cf. 214e). Alcibiades claims, however, that he will use ‘likeness for the sake of truth not laughs’. He then likens Socrates to the Silenus figures sold in statuary shops, and to the satyr Marsyas, and he goes on to justify the likeness in an extended encomion (215b-222b). In a sympotic example from comedy, Xanthius in Aristophanes *Wasps* relates events from a symposion at which two of the guests exchange a pair of amusing and insulting likenesses (1308-18). Coming up with imaginative and entertaining likenesses was not a new invention of the classical period. There are a couple of seventh century examples which are also probably sympotic, and certainly entertaining (not to mention sexually explicit; Archilochus F 42 and 43 West).

**Non Sympotic *eikones***. This particular *eikon* from Antisthenes was included by Aristotle in a list of examples (3.1406b.20-1407a.8), which reveals that the likes of Pericles, Plato, and Demosthenes were all adept at coming up with *eikones*. There are further non-sympotic examples of the pastime of likenesses in Plato and comedy. Meno states that, in appearance and in other respects, Socrates is most like a torpedo fish (i.e. electric ray) as he numbs anyone who approaches and touches him (*Men*. 80a). Socrates says that Meno has only made that likeness as he wants Socrates to liken him to something in return, saying that all noble people enjoy being likened since their noble attributes invite noble likenesses (80c). There are other examples in Plato of a likeness being employed for explanatory purposes at *Gorgias* 517d, *Phaedo* 87b, *Laws* 644c, and being recommended at *Republic* 487e. At one point in Aristophanes’ *Birds* the birds make amusing likenesses of each other (804-6).

**Sy2-3.** After the anecdote about Antisthenes (Sy2), Plutarch adds this one about Philip and Alexander of Macedon: ‘Philip said to his son who plucked the strings delightfully and skilfully as the wine went around “are you not ashamed to pluck the strings so well?”’ (1.5). Playing instruments overly skilfully was not considered fitting for a gentleman, and this
was particularly so in the case of the pipes, the use of which Aristotle tells us was 'rightly rejected for young and free men' (Pol. 1341a26-8). Aristotle also relates the story that Athena found a set of pipes, but when she saw the ugly distortion of her features she threw them away in disgust, and he surmised that more probably she discarded them because in education pipes-playing has no effect on intelligence, whereas science and art are attributed to Athena (Pol. 1341b 3-8). A similar account of Athena's rejection of the pipes is found in a fragment of Melanippides from the second half of the fifth century (PMG 758; cf. Wilson 1999, 63 and for further sources of the same tale 60, esp. n. 4 & 6). Plutarch relates an account of Alcibiades rejecting the pipes for exactly the same reasons (Alc. 2.4-6; cf. Wilson 1999, 87-8).

Such views and tales were doubtless formulated and expressed in reaction to the perceived vulgarity of performers (and audiences) participating in the professional entertainment industry (Pol. 1341b13-19; cf. Csapo 2004, 210-14). Pipes-players were in the vanguard of the 'New Music' movement, which was characterised by the elites as eroding not only traditional musical values but also traditional cultural values. As such pipes-players were roundly insulted as effeminate, corrupting, soft in the head, and worse (Csapo 2004, 236-7). Thus in fragment Sy2 Antisthenes reveals that his sympathies regarding music are clearly on the side of traditional, conservative values. Though generally it was professionalism in pipes playing, rather than ability, that was disdained, when Antisthenes invites someone to accompany him on the pipes (Sy3), this is probably best construed as an insult.

Sy4. Decleva Caizzi notes that the previous Antisthenes fragment-compilers, Winckelmann and Mullach, both allocated this fragment to the Protreptikos ('Exhortation') along with the fragments about the bombulios (Sy5-8), but she states that there is nothing to allow a precise allocation (DC 18a-d, n. ad loc.: 'nulla autorizza ad un'attribuzione precisa'), so places it at the end of her long list of unallocated fragments (DC 121). Giannantoni however does place the fragment with the others collected under Protreptikos (SSR 63-67). This placement is surely correct, for although this fragment has nothing to do with exhortation, like the bombulios fragments (Sy5-8) it does mention a sympotic vessel.
Discussing piss-pots at symposia? The Greeks were noted, as opposed to other peoples (e.g. the Persians, Hdt. 1.133, Xen. Cyr. 8.8.10), for relieving themselves (at both ends) in the company of fellow guests during the drinking party (for lists of vase images of such see Agora 12, 65 n.41 and Mitchell 2009, 48 n.59). Hence the symposion is the context in which piss-pots would naturally arise as a topic of conversation among educated men. Antisthenes, and his work now known as Protreptikos, evidently took an interest in a variety of sympotic ceramics.

Wording and division of the text. For this fragment Photius apparently drew on the same source as Hesychius did. Hesychius’ Lexicon has: (ο1862 Latte) οὐροδόχην τῆν ἄμιδα, and (ο1856 Latte) οὐριομ βίκον τῆν ἄμιδα. ἤ οὐροδόχην, i.e exactly the same grouping of names for piss-pots accorded to Xenophanes and Antisthenes in our fragment. Latte, somewhat oddly, prints οὐριομ without comment in the apparatus. Fortunately Schmidt’s 1859 edition of Hesychius (ο1864) reveals that the manuscripts contain the unlikely οὐριόμβικον, but that Cobet (1857, 304 = 1858, 398) conjectured οὐρειον βίκον. G. Dindorf reports that οὐρειον had already been conjectured earlier by Porson (1829, TGL v2, 250D). Surely either Photius’ οὐριον or Porson’s οὐρειον (both meaning 'of or relating to urine') is the correct reading for Hesychius’ text.

From the division of this fragment under two entries in Hesychius’ version, it appears likely that the Photius fragment was originally two separate entries, from a common source, in a list of synonyms for words meaning 'piss-pot'. If this is the case, either Photius, or a copyist, has drawn the Antisthenes entry onto the same line as Xenophanes’ to save space. A later copyist has very likely added the δέ in οὐριον δὲ βίκον Ἀντισθένης to show that Antisthenes uses a different expression for a similar item. So from this reading, the use of οὐροδόκην is only attributed to Xenophanes and not to Antisthenes.

There also are good linguistic grounds for this interpretation. Whereas Photius writes οὐροδόκην, Hesychius manuscripts have οὐροδόχην, which as the following discussion will show was almost certainly an Atticizing correction of an original Ionicism. Etymologically δοχή is linked to δέχεσθαι ‘to receive’, just as is the related δοχεῖον ‘holder’.
Hesychius has an entry (δ2115 Latte) δοκήν· δόκησιν· δοχήν, demonstrating that δοκήν is a variant spelling of δοχήν (LSJ s.v. δοκή thus duly notes ‘II. = δοχή, Hsch.’). In Ionic, δέκομαι with unaspirated palatal stop κ (for Attic δέχομαι with aspirated χ) is attested in Herodotus (Powell 1938 s.v., Smyth 1894, §100, 101). So by analogy (i.e. δέχεσθαι → δοχή) we would expect to find δοκή meaning ‘receptacle’, and in fact in Homer we do find the highly analogous Ionic compound δουροδόκη, ‘case or stand for spears,’ (LSJ s.v., Od. 1.128).

**Xenophanes, not Xenophon.** Xenophon’s connection with this fragment in Photius’ text has been disputed for some time. Ludwig Dindorf (1829 ThGL v5, 2413A) stated ‘nomen vitiosum’ (‘the name is corrupt’). Later Cobet (1857, 304) asserted that οὐροδόκην was attributed in error to Xenophon by showing that in an extant work discussing sympotica Xenophon is known to have used a different word, προχοΐδας, for ἀµίς – see Hesychius (π4094 Latte) προχοΐδας· τὰς ἀµίδας (= Xen. Cyr. 8.8.10).

More recently, Bossi has argued persuasively for emending Ξενοφῶν to Ξενοφάνης as part of his argument that Xenophanes was actually the author of the *Margites* (1986, 41-3). The homeland of the author of the *Margites* is possibly Colophon (F 1 West), whence also came Xenophanes. The *Margites* is written in Ionic, and Bossi shows metrical similarities between securely attributed fragments of Xenophanes and the *Margites* – both used a peculiar combination of hexameters with iambic trimeters. Bossi also demonstrates the compatibility of the *Margites*’ content with Xenophanes’ known views and offers comment on our Photius fragment. There is a scene in *Margites* F 7, in which Margites gets his penis stuck in a piss-pot (ἀµίδι). Bossi argues that Xenophanes likely used οὐροδόκην, as attested in our fragment, somewhere in the same episode. This would also neatly explain ἀµίς and οὐροδόκη appearing in the same entry of Photius. West (2003, 226-7) seemed inclined to accept Xenophanes’ authorship for similar reasons to those argued by Bossi (i.e. dialect, Colophon connection, metre).

It is easy to imagine how an ancient scribe might have deliberately or inadvertently corrected ‘Xenophanes’ to ‘Xenophon’ in the context of the Photius fragment, as it includes
Antisthenes’ name, and Xenophon and Antisthenes were well known associates. By restoring it now to ‘Xenophanes’ we can easily solve the problem in the spelling of οὐροδόκην in Photius’ lemma. As Xenophanes was writing in Ionic it is likely that he would have used the non-aspirated κ, in which case the spelling would be correct.

Therefore the only expression for piss-pot in this fragment securely attributed to Antisthenes is ‘urine bīkos’. LSJ s.v. defines βίκος as ‘jar or cask’. While there is no entry for βίκος in Photius, the Suda has: (β285) βίκος· τὸ ἀγγεῖον, ‘bikos: a receptacle’; and Hesychius has: (β605) βίκος· στάμνος ὀρτα ἕχων, ‘bikos: a jar with handles’. The regular word for ‘piss-pot’ was ἀµίς. Antisthenes’ expression ‘urine bīkos’ is very similar to the definition for the amis, the most common of which is οὐροδόχον ἀγγεῖον ‘urine-holding receptacle’ (Sch. Ar. Thesm. 633.2 Sch. Ar. V. 807a, Sch. Ar. Ach. 82b.1, EM 83.33, Et.Gen.280 α650, Et.Gud.281 α114.5, Ps.-Zon. Lex.282 α149.11; cf. Suda α1590 = ω946). Other definitions of amis in ancient lexica add more flavour. Hesychius offers: (α3679) <ἀµίς>· σταµνίον, ‘amis: wine-jar (piss-jar?)’; and (β1352) <βυτίνη>· λάγυνος, ἢ ἀµίς, ‘Butinē: flask/flagon, or amis’. Photius has (α1198) <Ἀµίδας> … ἰδίως δὲ Δηµοσθένης (54.4) τὰ σταµνίσκια, οἷς ἐνούρουν. λέγεται δὲ ἀµίς καὶ ἡ χύτρα, ‘Amidas: … according to Demosthenes, the little wine jars which they used to piss into. And it is called an amis and the chytra (another little pot with handles, see LSJ s.v. II)’. In Aristophanes’ Wasps Philokleon mistakes an amis for a klepsydra – a water clock (858). The scholiast explains: κλεψύδρα. ἀµίς γὰρ αὐτῷ παρέκειτο ‘(he said) ‘klepsydra’, since the amis was lying beside him’ (Sch. Ar. V. 858). The klepsydra was a pot with a narrow orifice through which water trickled slowly to measure time (LSJ s.v.).

These definitions give the impression that the amis (and so probably the urine bikon) was a smallish pot or jar, probably with handles (easily imaginable to be useful), having the shape of a flask or flagon, and with a protruding and relatively narrow neck. One can imagine endless possible opportunities for Antisthenes to introduce mention or discussion of such a
vessel into a sympotic dialogue, including being the subject of a speech of praise as part of a playful cycle of competitive encomia (see further below).

**Sy5-9, προτρεπτικός.** This group includes a new Antisthenes fragment, *Sy8*. Diogenes Laertius gives the full version title of the work as: Περί δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικός πρώτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος, Concerning Justice and Courage, an Exhortation, first, second and third book (6.16). Decleva Caizzi (n.17-18) feels that the mention of the three books makes it likely that it is an authentic title given by Antisthenes. This is dubious however and is more likely indicative of a later division and designation of Antisthenes' works. All book titles from the period are uncertain and this is an area of ongoing scholarly debate (see further ch. 6).

**Protreptikos a Socratic dialogue known to Isocrates, Plato, and Xenophon.** From Athenaeus (*Sy9*) it is evident that Antisthenes' *Protreptikos* is a Socratic dialogue. It features direct speech and Socrates is one of the interlocutors. A passage from Isocrates' *Helen* criticising the choice of *bombulios* as a topic suggests that this dialogue was well known (10.12; *pace* Giannantoni, a testimonium, not fragment, of Antisthenes – SSR 66):

> τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοὺς βοµβυλιοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἁλὰς καὶ τοιαῦτα βουληθέντων ἐπαινεῖν οὐδεὶς πώποτε λόγων ἠπόρησεν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν ὁµολογουµένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ καλῶν ἢ τῶν διαφερόντων ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ λέγειν ἐπιχειρήσαντες πολὺ καταδεέστερον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀπαντες εἰςκήκασιν.

No one who has chosen to praise *bombulioi* and salt and such topics has ever been at a loss for words, but those who have attempted to speak about topics that it is agreed are good or noble or that are surpassing in excellence, have all fallen far short of what was possible when they spoke. LSJ s.v. places Isocrates' mention of *βοµβυλιός* under the definition 'bumblebee', however this cannot be right. Mentions of *βοµβυλιός* meaning 'bumblebee' are rare in extant literature. In the Classical period there is one instance found in Aristophanes (*V*. 107) and a further two in Aristotle (*HA* 623b12, 629a29). Furthermore, there are no known works praising bumblebees, but there is Antisthenes' work discussing and praising the eponymous cup. The scholiast knows that Isocrates is referring to a cup not a bumblebee and notes (10.12 – in Dindorf's edition under 10.13): *βοµβυλιός· οἱ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶδος*
καυκαλίου, 'Bombulios: they say it is a type of kaukalion.' LSJ s.v. states that a καυκάλιον is a variant of βαυκάλιον 'narrow-necked vessel, that gurgles when water is poured in or out'.

It appears to have been a pet habit of Isocrates to criticise other orators for discussing trivial topics, see further Panathenaicus 135 and Panegyricus 188. In imitation of Isocrates, Michael Psellos authored an oration in the eleventh century wherein he criticised those who preferred to praise τοὺς βομβυλίους ἢ τοὺς ἁλας, 'bombulioi and salt' (Or. Min. 27.12 Littlewood).

Isocrates' mention of salt very likely refers to the same work as referred to in Plato's Symposion (177b), viz. a work praising salt by an unnamed author. In his commentary on the Symposion Dover (1980, ad. loc.) states, with reference to Isocrates' attack: 'there is strong reason to think that he is referring to the early fourth-century sophist Polycrates.' Dover does not say why we should think so, but perhaps because the very next scholion on Isocrates' Helen (10.14) mentions Polycrates as being the probable target of Isocrates' criticism for writing a defence of Helen's conduct – but this was surely Gorgias being criticised rather than Polycrates. As the following discussion will reveal, the person who was really attracting Isocrates' disapproval for praising bombulioi and salt was almost certainly Antisthenes.

In the Athenaeus fragment (Sy9), the fact that Socrates was discussing the virtues of a drinking vessel strongly suggests that the setting for Antisthenes' dialogue was a symposion. The comments about the bombulios may have been made merely in passing (see below for such comments from Socrates about similar cups in Xenophon's Symposion 2.26) or they may have been part of a more formal discourse. An example of such a formal discourse is found in Plato's Symposion. As the banqueters are worse for wear from a heavy bout of drinking the night before, Eryximachos proposes that they dismiss the pipe-girl and seek entertainment in discussion (176e). Before suggesting that they make speeches of praise in turn from left to right (177d), he makes the following remarks (177bc Burnet):
I happened upon a certain book by a wise man, in which salt was wonderfully praised for its usefulness, and you could see many other such things extolled therein. There has been so much exertion made over such piffling matters, but not one man to this day has undertaken to make a fitting hymn to Eros.

Plato is referring to a work, presumably with a sympotic setting, in which trivial items such as salt and 'many other such things' were given speeches of praise by a 'wise man' or a 'clever man'. We know from our fragments that Antisthenes wrote a sympotic dialogue in which ceramics such as bombulioi, and perhaps also piss-pots, were praised. Bombulioi and salt are connected by Isocrates from just such a context. It seems, therefore, reasonable to suggest that Antisthenes' dialogue represents a light-hearted, and earlier, version of a similar sort of discourse to that found in Plato's *Symposion*. Apparently the challenge to the symposiasts in Antisthenes' work was to give praise in turn to whatever was in front of them on the table – drinking cups, salt, possibly piss-pots (see commentary on *Sy*4 above), etc. A fragment of Critias is similarly found praising the cottabus basin – cottabus being a symposion game (fr. B2 West2 = Ath. 28b):

κότταβος ἐκ Σικελῆς ἐστι χθονός, ἐκπρεπὲς ἔργον, ὃν σκοπὸν ἐς λατάγων τόξα καθιστάμεθα.

The cottabus (basin) is from the land of Sicily, an outstanding creation, that we set up as a target to fire our wine dregs at.

Plato, in his *Symposion*, set out to offer a loftier, more 'fitting' version, of such a sympotic conversation by having the symposiasts offer encomia to Eros rather than the petty objects Antisthenes' symposiasts chose to praise. If so, his mention of 'so much exertion' made about salt and all the other 'piffling matters' should probably be construed as a veiled slight against Antisthenes.

In Xenophon's *Symposion*, in a similar vein to Plato's work, Socrates says to his fellow symposiasts that, as good as the hired entertainers are, it would be a shame if they did not give some thought to benefiting each other (3.2). He then suggests that they each in turn
declare what they think is most worth knowing about (3.3). The symposiasts then proceed to do just that.

It appears that Antisthenes was a very early innovator in the literary genre of speaking in turn in a sympotic setting, demonstrating once more his great creativity. It was a literary genre that he experimented with, that was then 'improved' upon by Plato and Xenophon, and that was still being used centuries later by Lucian with his Encomion to the House Fly. 

**Bombulios.** In terms of morphology, βοµβυλιώς is the most commonly found form, though the acute is sometimes found placed on the i or even on the υ. Herodian, however, shows – with a long list of examples including his own name ἐρῳδιός – that words of more than three syllables terminating in -ος, preceded by the vowel ι, must be accented upon the ο (Gr. 1.116; cf. 1.123, 1.126, 2.171, 2.444). βοµβυλός is also extant, though is found much later (Lampe s.v. ’= LSJ βοµβυλιώς, vessel, jar, Thdt. provid. 4').

The fullest definition and description of the bombulios from the ancient lexica and etymologica is found in the Etymologicum Genuinum (β182 = Et.Sym. β154, EM 204.54 Lex.Seg. 220.7, Phot. β206):

βοµβυλιώς· εἶδος ζῴου παραπλήσιον µελίσσῃ· εἴρηται δὲ παρὰ τὸ βοµβεῖν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ποτηρίου εἶδος, ἀπὸ µεταφορᾶς τοῦ ζῴου· καὶ γὰρ κατεσκευάζετο ὅστε πινόντων βοµβεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἐλαιηρὸν δὲ ἀγγεῖον καθ’ ὁµοιότητα τοῦ στενοπόρου ἐκπώµατος βοµβυλιὸς λέγεται. οὕτως εὗρον εἰς τὸ ῥητορικόν.

**Bombulios**: a kind of creature resembling a bee – and it is said to be from its resonating sound. It is also a kind of cup, by analogy with the creature; and further, from the way it is constructed so that it resonates while drinking, and the oil-pot, in the same way as the narrow-apertured cup, is called bombulios. I found the word applied to rhetoric in this way.

That the specific type of vessel referred to is a cup is noted in most sources (ποτήριον, TrGF 19 F 64 = Poll. 6.99 βησίον in Phot. β205, Suda β375), though Erotian describes it as a kind of narrow-apertured jar (βικίου εἶδος στενοστόµου: p.29.10), and a scholion on Lucian also states that bombulioi are 'little jars' (πιθάκνια), and that a bombulios is a 'rounded vessel' (τὸ στρογγύλον: in Lex. 46.7–10.24 Rabe). In Athenaeus βοµβυλιώς is used to refer to a cocoon, confirming its rounded shape (8.352f). A gloss from Galen (Gloss. p. 89 Kühn) states that it

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was a cup (ἦκπωµα) with a narrow mouth or lid, and he notes that it was named from its resonating sound, as does Hesychius (β802 Latte). Referring to pipes-players, Aristophanes has Dicaeopolis say: 'Whence did these wash-offs vilely fly to my door, these drone-piping (βοµβα væλοι) sons of Chaeris?' (Ar. Ach. 865-6). A scholion explains that 'drone-piping' is used jestingly of the sound of the pipes-playing by adding an α to βοµβυλιος (866 Wilson Suda β371; cf. Erot. 285 s. v. βοµβυλιου). A further comment from Galen gives the impression that the wine-cup could be prompted to resonate on demand (In Hippocratis librum vi epidemiarum commentarii vi ed. C. Kühn, vol. 17a, p.968, 1.9):

Σαβῖνος δὲ ἐκ βοµβυλίου στενοστόµου πίνοντα κελεύει κινεῖν ἐρυγάς.

<Sabinos>, orders someone drinking <from> a narrow-mouthed bombulios to make it belch.

Capturing these various qualities LSJ (s. v.) defines the bombulios as a 'narrow-necked vessel that gurgles in pouring'. In the Antisthenes fragments regarding the bombulios, those from Pollux (Sy5-6) and the scholion on Apollonius (Sy7) similarly describe it as 'narrow', 'narrow-mouthed', or 'narrow-throated'. Two of these fragments (Sy6-7) also mention its quality of resonating.

Thus the impression formed of the bombulios is of a smallish, rounded (almost bulbous) cup, with a protruding neck, that somehow makes a resonant sound when drinking. In addition, it appears that due to its design, the bombulios had the capacity to regulate the flow of liquid, as implied by this passage from Paul of Aegina (vii AD; Epitomae medicae libri septem 3.9.3.28 Heiberg):

συχνότερον δὲ ύπομνηστέον καὶ τὴν κατάποσιν, τῷ θερµῷ ύδατι ἐπιρραίνοντάς τι τῶν ἡδέων ποµάτων, µάλιστα τοῦ ἀποµέλιτος, διὰ τῶν βοµβυλιῶν.

And more so we must also remember the deglutition, sprinkling with hot water, by means of the bombulioi, one of the sweet draughts, especially of the honeyed sort.

This quality of restricting the flow of wine to a sprinkle or drips is confirmed by Socrates' comments about the bombulios in Athenaeus (Sy9). He describes it as dripping only a little at a time. Hesychius seems to have drawn on Athenaeus or a common source as he uses

identical language – (β802) βοµβυλιός· … κατὰ µικρὸν ποτόν στάζοντος, 'bombulios: … dripping only a little beverage at a time'.

**Similar vessels in Xenophon's *Symposion*, Athenaeus, and Cicero.** We find Socrates again mentioning similar sorts of cups that sprinkle the wine in Xenophon's *Symposion* (2.26 = Ath. 11.504de, Stob. 3.19.18; pace Giannantoni it is not a fragment of Antisthenes – SSR 67):

> ἄν µὲν ἁθρόον τὸ ποτὸν ἐγχεώµεθα, ταχὺ ἡµῖν καὶ τὰ σώµατα καὶ αἱ γνώµαι σφαλοῦνται, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀναπνεῖν, µὴ ὅτι λέγειν τι δυνησόµεθα: ἂν δὲ ἡµῖν οἱ παῖδες µικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνά ἐπιψακάζωσιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν Γοργιείοις ῥήµασιν εἴπω, οὕτως οὐ βιαζόµενοι µεθύειν ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἀλλ᾽ ἀναπειθόµενοι πρὸς τὸ παιγνιωδέστερον ἀφιξόµεθα.

(Socrates) If we pour in the **drink all at once**, our bodies and our minds will quickly be stumbling, and we will not be able to breathe, let alone converse about anything. But if our slaves frequently **sprinkle us with little wine-cups**, if I might use the Gorgian expression, we will not be compelled to drunkenness from the wine but we will be seduced into a more playful state.

Here Xenophon, in imitation of Antisthenes, puts into Socrates' mouth the praise of small wine cups that sprinkle or drip the wine at a moderate rate. The use of *kylix* here does not necessarily imply the broad, shallow, symposiastic wine cups that it is nowadays usually associated with. Sparkes has commented that modern scholars have applied the names of some Greek pottery too precisely to known shapes, and gives the *kylix* as an example (2006, 206). The *Suda* (κ2665) has κύλιξ· φίαλη, ποτήριον, 'kylix: bowl, cup'. A passage from Cassius Dio (see below) refers to a κύλιξ ῥοπαλωτή, 'club-shaped cup'. So it seems that *kylix* may be used as a generic term for 'cup'. Thus when Socrates uses the term µικραῖς κύλιξι, he means only 'little cups' without the modern definition of the shape being implied.

There is a passage from Athenaeus (11.484f) discussing wine cups which shows that he had in mind the passage from Xenophon where Socrates is speaking about these 'little cups':

> λεπαστή ... ἀφ' ἣς ἔστι λάψαι, τοιτέστιν ἁθρόος πιεῖν, κατεναντίον τῷ λεγοµένῳ βοµβυλιῷ.

*Lepaste* is the word from which *lapsai* ('drink greedily') comes, which is to **drink all at once**, as opposed to what is called a *bombulios*.

There is eye-catching similarity in the language used between Xenophontic Socrates’ ἁθρόον τὸ ποτὸν 'the drink all at once' and Athenaeus' ἁθρόως πιεῖν, 'to drink all at once'
and the specific contrast between being sprinkled from little cups or drinking slowly from a bombulios. Cicero also references this passage of Xenophon in *de Senectute* and adds some further detail about the cups (14.46):

... delectant ... et pocula, sicut in Symposio Xenophontis est, minuta atque rorantia, et refrigeratio aestate et vicissim aut sol aut ignis hibernus.

... and cups please me, such as those in Xenophon's *Symposion*, that are small and drip, and have both coolness in summer, and in turn warmth from the sun or fire in winter.

Similarly to Xenophon’s Socrates, Cicero states that he likes cups that are small and drip. However he is evidently drawing on another source – either his own experience with such cups, or information from another work – when he adds that these cups have a capacity to regulate temperature (probably in part due their narrow opening). It appears from this passage of Cicero, and the one from Athenaeus just above, that there were parallel passages discussing bombulioi in the works of Antisthenes and Xenophon that were well known in antiquity. In the case of Athenaeus, as well as reproducing Socrates’ language from Xenophon, he also knew from Antisthenes (demonstrated just above and Sy9) that the sort of ‘sprinkling’ or ‘dripping’ vessel that Socrates was referring to was a bombulios. In Cicero’s case, he was probably adding his comments about temperature moderation also from material found in Antisthenes. This suspicion seems to be confirmed by the fact that directly following the scholion (Sy7) from Apollonius reporting Antisthenes’ definition of the bombulios, is the scholion (Sy8) containing the information known to Cicero, that a bombulios is also a wine-cooler.

**Diaklusterērion, Sy8.** This word is not well attested. LSJ s.v. gives us διακλυστήριον = ψυκτήρ ‘wine-cooler’ and offers a reference to the *Suda* but no examples of usage. There is, however, further evidence about the nature of such vessels in a passage from Cassius Dio (73.18.2):

ἔπιεν ἐν µέσῃ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ καµών, κύλικι ῥοπαλωτῇ παρὰ γυναικὸς γλυκὺν οἶνον ἐψυγµένον λαβών, ἀµυστί.

In the midst of the struggle he (Commodus) became weary, and in a club-shaped cup he took chilled sweet wine from a woman, and drained it.
This κύλιξ ῥοπαλωτή, 'club-shaped cup' matches the description of a bombulios, i.e. bulbous with a projecting, narrow neck, and it contains ἐψυγµένον 'chilled' wine. In the Suda we find an entry for κύλιξ ῥοπαλωτή (κ2666) · τὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς διακλύστηρον. 'club-shaped cup: in the judgement of many people, a diaklūsteron'. The Suda then relates, almost word for word, the same passage about Commodus from Dio.

So while there is no consistent agreement on how the ending of διακλύστηρον / -ερον / -ήριον should be spelled, it seems certain that the word must be directly related to διακλύζειν 'to wash out or thoroughly'. Though how this could also mean 'cool down' is not at first obvious, that is apparently its function. In TGL the entry διακλύστηρον (s.v.) states that it was a ψυκτήρα or ψυκτήριον, i.e. 'wine-cooler'. It then quotes the Suda (ψ150 = Sch. in Pl. Sym. 213e) – ψυκτήρ, σκεῦος, ἔνθα διανίζουσι τὰ ποτήρια, 'psyktēr, vessel, where the cups were cooled down'. Normally διανίζειν, just like διακλύζειν, means 'to wash, wash out' (as TGL notes 'Idem est διανίζειν et διακλύζειν'), but here clearly it means 'to cool down'. The next entry in Suda implies confirmation of this (ψ151):

<ψυκτήρα> κάδδον, ἢ ποτήριον µέγα. ἀπὸ τοῦ θᾶττον ψύχεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν κράσιν.

ψυκτῆρα: wine jar, or large cup. From the temperature cooling more rapidly in it.

So the cup described by Dio and the Suda is club-shaped (i.e. thick at one end with a thinner, projecting handle or neck), and it cools the wine. The quality of dripping the wine is not mentioned, but otherwise the description seems very compatible with the form imagined above for the bombulios. Further evidence that the 'club-shaped cup' probably is the bombulios by another name is confirmed by the fact that the bombulios also had a tendency to cool the wine, as inferred from a passage from Hippocrates’ On Diseases (3.16):

μετὰ δὲ τὰ λουτρὰ καὶ οἶνον γλυκὺν ὑδαρέα προπίνειν, µὴ ψυχρόν, ὀλίγον ἐκ βοµβυλίου εὐροστόµου.

omitted here is Littré’s conj. in error of οὐκ before εὐροστόµου

After bathing, let the patient first drink sweet wine mixed with water, not cold, a small amount from a broad-necked bombulios.

In this passage the wine should be served 'not cold', therefore the bombulios that needs to be employed is of a broad-necked variety – unlike the normal narrow-mouthed form.
Although it is unclear exactly how the wine in a bombulios would have been cooled, it is likely that part of keeping it cool was the flow of air being regulated by the narrow opening. Possibly, due to its bottle-like shape, it was also able to be placed or suspended in a larger vessel (such as a ψυκτήρ) of iced water. Sparkes and Talcott list a smallish jug, that was found in the bottom of a well, with its cork firmly fixed in place that they presume was suspended in the well water to cool it (Agora 12, 353 & pl.77, 1665). Due to the connection of wine-coolers to the verbs διακλύζειν and διανίζειν, probably the bombulios was cooled by being placed in water, or perhaps by being placed outside and kept wet so that evaporation cooled it.

The bombulios does not seem to have been identified anywhere in the archaeological record. An investigation and discussion of likely pot shapes is set out in Appendix C.

τῶν Ἀσιανῶν, Sy6. Pollux writes that Antisthenes says the cup is called 'bombulios' by τῶν Ἀσιανῶν, 'the Asians'. It is interesting to consider whom he means by this. Thucydides mentions Ἀσιανοί (1.6), where 'Asians' are mentioned as a subset of barbarians but otherwise it is unclear who is being referred to. He only uses this adjective form once more in regard to Magnesia (1.138) – to distinguish Magnesia on Maeander in Ionia (i.e. 'Asia') from Magnesia in Thessaly (Horblower ad loc.). The LSJ Supplement usefully adds to the entry for Ἀσία: 'perh. orig. a name for Lydia and then extended to all the hinterland of Ionia and eventually over the continent.' In the time of Croesus (mid sixth century) Lydia included most of western Anatolia. So while Thucydides was probably excluding Eastern Greeks of Aeolia, Ionia and Doris by using 'Asians' as a subgroup of barbarians, geographically he considered them to be living in 'Asia'. So Antisthenes may well have been including these Greeks and possibly also those living in Rhodes when he referred to Asians. In which case the fact that Athenaeus (18d) reports that the bombulios is Rhodian would not conflict with Antisthenes saying that it was called such by the Asians.

Sy10. Influenced by the words περὶ χρήσεως (§33), Decleva Caizzi and Giannantoni thought that the title of the work being discussed by Aristides might be better extrapolated to read in full, περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως, in order to match part of an entry in Diogenes Laertius’
catalogue (6.18), i.e.: περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ περὶ μέθης ἢ περὶ τοῦ κύκλωπος, Concerning the Use of Wine or Concerning Drunkenness or Concerning the Tale of the Cyclops. Decleva Caizzi prints it in her 'Frammenti da opera precisate' category as the sole fragment under the sub-heading περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως. Giannantoni on the other hand prints this as Homerica, because of the reference in the extended catalogue title to the Cyclops.

Neither of these placements tallies altogether well with the actual contents of the work under discussion, as recounted by Aristides. He tells us (§31) that in the work a god gave advice to a competitor in a contest on how to win (viz. by drinking water), and, accordingly, that the subtitle of the work was 'Lover of Crowns or The Crown Lover'. In Aristides' account there is no reference to either drunkenness or the Cyclops which are mentioned in Diogenes Laertius' extended title. Though Aristides states that the work referred to wine (§33), the emphasis of the god's advice was placed just as much on the drinking of water as the abstention from wine.

**Encomia to sympotic objects.** On the evidence that can be gleaned from Aristides, it seems possible, if not likely, that this fragment actually belongs to the same genre as Sy4-9, of praising objects present at the symposion. Speculating along these lines, from the subtitle that Aristides mentions, in this case it would be natural to assume that perhaps crowns are being praised. That symposiasts were typically garlanded is well attested (Ath. 15.675d-6c, Campbell 2003, 411), and any discourse in praise of wreaths or crowns would be able quite naturally to move on to discussing the types of wreaths that were awarded for various competitions, ranging from athletic games through to dramatic festivals. The inclusion reference to water and wine when making such a discourse in a sympotic setting would be equally natural.

In keeping, however, with the other common objects that were being praised in Antisthenes' work – piss-pots, salt, bombulioi – it seems more likely that the object being praised here is in fact water. What greater crescendo could there be to a notional *Encomium to Water* than to show how it facilitates being crowned victor? It is possible to imagine then, that the title περὶ χρήσεως, Concerning Use, was an all-encompassing title attached to
Antisthenes’ discussions in praise of the use of a range of sympotic objects. Aristides mentions (§33) that the book ‘referred to wine’ (ἔφερεν ... εἰς οἶνον). This is pleonastic, given that immediately beforehand Aristides had recounted the god’s advice concerning wine. So by the logic followed here, that the work was a collection of speeches of praise, it seems that water must be added to the list of things being eulogised. This of course would be completely in keeping with the sympotic setting. It seems an educated guess then to assume that the ‘tokens of Dionysus’ refer to bombulioi, piss-pots, salt, and other accoutrements of the symposion.

Aristides states that the part of the work he is referring to is at the end of the book. In this case, perhaps the sub-title, The Crown Lover, applied to that section only. Given the scant attestation for titling books at the time Antisthenes was writing, this would very likely represent a subsequent division and titling of the work.
Ajax or Logos of Ajax

I wish I was being tried by the very people who were there with us during this venture. For I know that while I would only need to be silent, nothing would be gained by this man by arguing. But as it is, those who were there during these deeds are absent, and you ignorant men are judging me. What sort of justice could one receive from judges who are ignorant? And by arguments at that! But the endeavour came about via action.

While I picked up and carried the body of Achilles, this man took the arms, knowing that the Trojans were not more eager about the arms, but rather to gain control of the body. For if they had gained control of it, they would have ravaged his body and gained requital for Hector. But the arms, these they would not have dedicated to their gods, but would have hidden them away out of fear of this “brave” man, who had also previously robbed their temple of the statue of the goddess by night, and as if he were carrying out some noble deed he displayed it to the Achaeans. And I indeed I think I deserve to receive them, so that I can restore the arms to his friends. But this man, so that he can sell them, since he surely would not dare to use them. For no coward uses conspicuous arms – he knows that the arms make his cowardice obvious.
So it is more or less the same all over. For those men who arranged the contest, though they claim to be kings, entrusted the judgement of excellence to others, and you who are ignorant have undertaken to judge a matter about which you have no clue. But I know this: that no king competent to judge about excellence would entrust this to others any more than a good doctor would allow the diagnosis of illnesses by another.

And if I were opposed to a man of similar character to myself, being defeated would not matter to me. But as it is, nothing could be more different than me and him. For while there is no exploit he would do openly, I would not dare to do anything surreptitiously.

And whereas I could not bear a cowardly reputation, nor to be mistreated, he would endure being strung up for flogging if he could derive any profit by it. He who in fact did submit himself to being flogged by slaves, and being beaten with rods on the back, and punched with fists in the face, and then having thrown rags about himself, by night he crept inside the walls of the enemy, and having committed temple-robbery, he came back. And this he will admit to doing. And perhaps he will be persuasive – arguing that it is a splendid achievement. And then this man – who has been flogged and is a temple-robber – thinks he deserves to gain possession of the arms of Achilles?
7.1 On the contrary, I enjoin you ignorant men – judges and jurymen – not to consider arguments when you are deciding about excellence, but rather to consider deeds. For indeed war is not decided by argument but by action. It is not possible to gainsay the enemy, but either to fight and conquer, or be enslaved – in silence. Look at and consider this! That unless you judge well, you will come to realise that argument has no power in comparison with action; 8.1 and nor is there any way an arguing man will aid you, but you will know to a nicety that because of a dearth of deeds, many and long arguments are argued. But either admit that you do not understand the arguments made, and adjourn; or judge correctly! And do this 8.5 not secretly, but openly! So that you may realise that there is a penalty that must be paid by the judges themselves, if they do not judge correctly. And then perhaps you will also recognise that you are seated here not as judges over the arguments but merely as guessers.

9.1 But while I rely upon you to make determination about me and my affairs, I forbid you in all areas from making guesses, and this matter is about a man, who not willingly but rather unwillingly came to Troy, and about me, who am always stationed first, and alone, and without walls.

287 μακρὸς λόγος. Denyer 2008, 121, n.329b2: ‘used in particular for the rambling and incoherent rigmarole in which a slave tries to excuse his misdeeds (Eur. IA 313 “slave that you are, you’re telling me μακροὺς… λόγους“; Arist. Met. 1091a7-9 “ο μακρος λόγος, like that of slaves when they have nothing wholesome to say”; Simonides (fr. 653 PMG) may have written a whole book of such speeches.’

288 cf. δόξα: LSJ s.v. A.II.2. speaking by guess.
ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ

Od.1.1

οὐ πρὸς σὲ µοι µόνον ὁ λόγος, δι᾽ ὅν ἀνέστην, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἄπαντας: πλείω γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πεποίηκα τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐγὼ ἢ ὑµεῖς ἅπαντες. καὶ τάυτα καὶ ἱππότος ἢ ἐλεγον Ἀµυλλέας, καὶ νῦν τεθνεύστος λέγω πρὸς ὑµᾶς.

1.5 ὑµεῖς µὲν γὰρ ὑδεµίαν ἄλλην µάχην µεµάχησθε, ἤν ὑσύλλε καὶ ἑγὼ µεθ᾽ ὑµὸν: ἐµοὶ δὲ τῶν ἱδίων κινδύνων οὐδεὶς ὑµῶν οὐδὲν ἐξύνοιδε.

2.1 καίτοι ἐν µὲν ταῖς κοιναῖς µάχαις, οὐδὲ εἰ καλὸς ἀγωνίζουσθε, πλέον ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐµοῖς κινδύνοις, σὺς ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκινδύνευον, εἰ µὲν κατορθῶσαι ὑµῖν ἐπετελεῖτο, ὃν ἐνεκα 2.5 δεύρο ἀφίγμεθα, εἰ δ᾽ ἐσφάλην, ἐµοῦ ἃν ἐνός ἀνδρὸς ἐστέρησθε. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα µαχοῦµεθα τοῖς Τρωσὶ δεῦρ᾽ ἀφίγμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα τὴν τε Ἑλένην ἀπολάβοιµεν καὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἐλοίµεν.

3.1 ταύτα δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐµοῖς κινδύνοις ἠἐν ἄπαντα. ὑπὸν γὰρ ἤν κεχρηµένον ἀνάλωτον εἶναι τὴν Τροίαν, εἰ µὴ πρῶτον τὸ ἄγαλµα τῆς θεοῦ λάβοιµεν τὸ κλαπὲν παρ᾽ ἡµῶν, τίς ἐστιν ὁ κοµίσας δεῦρο τὸ ἄγαλµα ἄλλος ἢ ἐγώ; 3.5 µα ἄλλος ἢ ἐγὼ; ὃν σύ γε ἱεροσυλίας κρίνεις. σὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶσθα, ὅστις τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνασώσαντα τὸ ἄγαλµα τῆς θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν ψελοµένον παρ᾽ ἡµῶν Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον.

Odysseus or the Logos of Odysseus

Od.1.1 My argument – for which I rose to speak – is not to you alone, but also to all the others. For I have done the army greater good than all of you. And these things, that I would have said to you even if Achilles were alive, I am saying to you now that he is dead. 1.5 For you fought no battle, but those which I also fought with you. But none of you shares with me the knowledge of the risks I took on my own.

2.1 And indeed, in these shared battles, not even if you had contended honourably, would any more have been achieved. But in respect of my ventures – through which I alone hazarded the dangers – if in fact I have executed them successfully, then all the goals for which we came to this place have been accomplished 2.5 for you, and if I had failed, you would have been deprived of but one man. For it was not to fight against the Trojans that we came here, but to recover Helen and capture Troy. 3.1 And all these depended on my ventures. For example, when the oracle pronounced Troy impregnable unless we had first seized the statue of the goddess by our subterfuge; who conveyed the statue here 3.5 other than I, the man whom you (Ajax) adjudge guilty of temple-robbery? For you are ignorant, you who call the man who recovered the statue of the goddess ‘temple-robber’, but not Alexander who stole from us!
καὶ τὴν Τροίαν
μὲν ἁλῶναι ἅπαντες εὔχεσθε, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν ἐξευρόντα ὅπως ἔσται τοῦτο, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον; καίτοι εἴπερ καλὸν γε ἢν ἐλεῖν τὸ Ἐλιον, καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὑρεῖν τὸ τούτου αἰτίον.
καὶ οἱ μὲν άλλοι χάριν ἔχουσι, σὺ δὲ καὶ ονειδίζεις ἰμοί. ὑπὸ γὰρ άμαθιας ἃν εὑ πέπονθας οὐδέν οἶσθα.
κάγω
μὲν οὖκ ονειδίζω σοι τὴν άμαθιαν – άκων γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πεπόνθασιν ἀπαντες – ἀλλ᾽ ὧν διὰ τὰ ὀνείδη τὰ ἐμὰ σαξόμενον οὐχ οἶος τε εἰ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσαπειλεῖς ὡς κακὸν δράσασαν τι τοῦτο, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ τὰ ὀπλα προσέσθηνται καὶ πολλάκις γε ἀπειλήσεις καὶ πολλά, πρὶν καὶ συμκρόν τι ἐργάσασθαν ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων τι χρὴ τεκμάρεσθαι, ὑπὸ τῆς κακῆς ὀργῆς οἴομαι σε κακὸν τι σαυτόν ἐργάσεσθαι.
καὶ ἐμοὶ μέν, ὅτι τοὺς πολεµίους κακῶς ἐποίησα, δειλίαν ονειδίζεις· σὺ δὲ ὧν φανερῶς ἐμόχθεις καὶ µάτην, ἠλίθιος ἦσθα. <ἢ> ὅτι µετὰ πάντων τοῦτο ἔδρασας, οἴει βελτίων εἶναι; ἐπειτὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγεις; ὃς πρῶτον µὲν οὐκ οἶσθα οὐδ᾽ ὧν ὧς ἔδει µάχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἄρετης ἡ ὃς ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων τι χρὴ τεκµαίρεσθαι, ὑπὸ τῆς κακῆς ὀργῆς οἴοµαι σε κακὸν τι σαυτόν ἐργάσεσθαι.
οὐθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ χρὴ οὔθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑταίρου οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεµίων
κακὸν οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν;

7.1 σὺ δὲ ὃσπερ οἱ παῖδες χαί-

7.4 ἄπολες, ὅτι σέ φασιν οἶδε ἄνδρειον εἶναι; ἐγὼ δὲ δειλότατόν

7.5 ἔχεις ἄρρηκτα καὶ ἄτρωτα, δι᾽ ἅπερ σέ

καὶ τῶν πολεµίων τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἔχων προσέλθοι; ἢ που κα-

ἤπειτα οἴει τι διαφέρειν τοιαῦτα ὅπλα

καὶ σοὶ µόνῳ δὴ τεῖχος

8.1 ἄοπλος οὐ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεµίων ἀλλ᾽ εἰς αὐτά

καὶ τῶν πολεµίων τοὺς προφύλακας

καὶ οἶδα τὰ ἐν θαυµαστὸν καθήσθαι; καὶ σοὶ µόνῳ δὴ τεῖχος

καὶ φύλαξ καὶ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁλλῶν ἁπάντων, καὶ οἶδα τὰ

καὶ τὴν νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡµέραν σκοποῦσιν ὅπως σώσουσι τοὺς ναύτας,

καὶ οὐτω δὲ καὶ ἐγώγε καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἁλλους ἁπαντας σώζω.

not by his own hand, or his companion’s or even at the hands of his enemies?

7.1 But do you delight just as children do, because these men say that you are brave? But I

say you are actually the greatest coward of all and fear death exceedingly. You who firstly

have arms that are indestructible, on account of which 7.5 they say that you are invulnerable.

And indeed what would you do, if one of your enemies were to approach you bearing such

arms? For surely this would be something fine and marvellous, if neither of you were able
to do anything! Secondly, do you think there is any difference between bearing such arms

and being ensconced within a city-wall? For you alone 7.10 there is no wall – so you say. Yet

in fact it is you alone who go around with a seven-ox-hide wall wrapped around yourself.

8.1 Whereas I go unarmed, not just up to the walls of the enemy, but inside the very walls

themselves. And I overpowered the watchful sentries of the enemy with their own

weapons, and I am the general 8.5 and protector of both you and all of the others, and I

know what is going on here and among the enemy, and not because I send another spying;

but I myself, just as helmsmen keep watch – through the night and through the day, so that

they save the sailors – so I am the one who saves both you and all the others.
οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ὅντινα κίνδυνον ἔφυγον αἰσχρὸν ἡγησάµενος, ἐν ᾧ µέλλοιµι τοὺς πολεµίους κακόν τι δράσειν· οὐδ᾽ εἰ µὲν ὄψεσθαί µέ τινες ἔµελλον, γλιχόµενος ἂν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἐτόλµων· ἀλλ᾽ εἰτε δούλος εἰτε πτωχὸς καὶ µαστιγίας ὢν µέλλοιµι τοὺς πολεµίους κακόν τι δράσειν, ἐπεχείρουν ἃν, καὶ εἰ µηδεὶς ὀρφή. σὺ γὰρ δοκεῖν ὁ πόλεµος ἀλλὰ δράν ἂεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡµέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ φυλεῖ τι. οὐδὲ ὅπλα ἐστί µοι τεταγµένα, ἐν οἷς προκαλούµαι τοὺς πολεµίους µάχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅντινα ἐθέλει τις τρόπον, καὶ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐτοιµός εἰµ᾽ ἂεί.

κάµνω µαχόµενος, ἀσπερ σύ, τὰ ὅπλα ἐτέρως παραδιώµαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπόταν ἀναπαύσωνται οἱ πολέµιοι, τότε αὐτοῖς τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιτίθεµαι, ἕχων τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἃ ἐκείνους βλάψει µάλιστα. καὶ οὐδὲ νυκτὸς ἐπιτίθεµαι, ὅποτα σὲ πολλὰκις µαχόµενον ἀσµενὸν πέπαυκεν· ἀλλ᾽ ἕηκα ἃν Ἰέμης σύ, τηνικαῦτα ἐγὼ σώζω σέ, καὶ τοὺς πολεµίους ἀρχέων, ἔχων τὰ δουλοφερτή δαίµονα ὅπλα καὶ τὰ δάκη καὶ τὰς µάστιγας, δι᾽ ἃς σὺ ἀσφαλῶς καθεύδεις.

σὺ δ᾽ ὅτι φέρων εἰκόµεισας τὸν νεκρόν, ἀνδρεῖος οἴει εἶναι; ὃν εἰ µὴ ἠδύνω φέρειν, δύο ἄνδρες ἂν ἐφερέτην, κἄπειτα κἀκεῖνοι περὶ ἀρετῆς ἴσως ἂν οὐκ ἠµφισβήσουν.
καὶ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦν λόγος· σὺ δὲ τί ἂν ἔλεγες ἀµφισβητῶν πρὸς αὐτούς; ἢ δυοῖν μὲν οὐκ ἂν φροντίσας, ἐνῶς δ’ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο ὁµολογῶν δειλότερος εἶναι;

11.5 ἔλεγες ἀµφισβητῶν πρὸς αὐτούς; ἢ δυοῖν μὲν οὐκ ἂν φροντίσας, ἐνῶς δ’ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο ὁµολογῶν δειλότερος εἶναι;

12.1 οὐκ οἴσθ’ ὅτι οὐ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῖς Τρωσίν ἀλλὰ τῶν ὁπλῶν ἐµελεν ὅπως λάβοιεν; τὸν µὲν γὰρ ἀποδώσειν ἐµελλον, τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ἀναθήσειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. τοὺς γὰρ νεκροὺς οὐ τοῖς οὐκ ἀναιρουµένοις αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς 12.5 µὴ ἀποδιδοῦσι θάπτειν. σὺ µὲν οὖν τὰ ἕτοιµα ἐκόµισας· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ ὀνειδιζόµενα ἀφειλόµην ἐκείνους.

13.1 φθόνον δὲ καὶ ἀµαθίαν νοσεῖς κακῶν ἐναντι- ἓτατα αὑτοῖς· καὶ ὃ µέν σε ἐπιθυµεῖν ποιεῖ τῶν καλῶν, ἢ δὲ ἀποτρέπει. ἀνθρώπων οὐκ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρείας εἶναι. ὁµιλεῖ ὅτι σοφία 13.5 περὶ τὸν πόλεμον τοῖς τε νωθέσιν ἄλλοις παρέχουσι δεσµεύειν καὶ αὑτὸν νόσον οὐκ ἤθελεν τοῖς θεοῖς.

14.1 ὡς ἐγὼµαι, ὃς τὴν φύσιν ἀπεικάζων τοῖς τε νωθέσιν ὄνοις καὶ βουσὶ τοῖς φορβάσιν, ἄλλοις παρέχουσι δεσµεύειν καὶ ἔντεινέται αὐτοῖς.

And I would have been delivering this very argument to them; and what would you be saying as you disputed against them? Or would you have given no heed to two, but feel shame to admit to being more cowardly than one?

12.1 Are you ignorant that the body was of no concern to the Trojans but it was the arms that they were eager to seize? For they were going to give back the body, but the the arms they were going to dedicate at their temples to the gods. For those failing to take up bodies don't have shame, but rather those do who don't give them up for burial. So you carried away what was easy, while I took from them the things which, by my seizing, brings them reproach. 13.1 You are suffering from envy and ignorance, the most antithetical of evils to each other: the one makes you desire noble things, the other turns you away from them. So you are the victim of a particularly human frailty – for since you are strong, you suppose that you are also brave. Are you ignorant that cleverness and bravery in battle is not the same thing as being strong? Stupidity is the greatest evil to those who have it.

14.1 But I believe, that if there ever arises a poet who is shrewd concerning excellence, he will portray me as much enduring, and much wily, and much scheming, and a sacker of cities – the one who alone seized Troy. But you, I believe, he will depict with a nature resembling that of lazy donkeys and grazing cattle – permitting others to chain and yoke them.

289 cf. Il. 11.555ff.
Appendix B – The Hippias Minor

The genuineness of the Hippias Minor as a dialogue of Plato has frequently been questioned. Elements of the style and content have aroused suspicion, but the fact that the work is mentioned by Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, has generally been considered proof that the work is Plato’s. Some scholars still remain a little baffled by it though:

'Philosophically speaking, the Hippias Minor is one of the most puzzling of all Platonic dialogues, since it concludes not simply with a paradox but with a moral falsehood: that the one who does wrong voluntarily is a better person than the one who does wrong unintentionally' (Kahn 1996, 113). Aristotle himself appears to be fascinated by the puzzles presented by the Hippias Minor as made clear by the passage from the Metaphysics that is claimed to prove Plato’s authorship (1024b32-1025a13 Ross).

διὸ Ἀντισθένης ὤστε εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ, ἐν ἐφ’ ἐνὸς ἕξ, ὥν συνεβαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. ἐστὶ δ’ ἐκαστὸν λέγειν οὐ μονὸν τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καί τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ψευδῶς μὲν καί παντελῶς, ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς καί ἀλήθως, ὥσπερ τὰ ὁκτὼ διπλάσια τῷ τῆς διάδος λόγῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν οὔτω λέγεται ψευδῆ, ἀνθρώπως δὲ ψευδῆς ὁ εὐχερὴς καὶ προαιρετικῶς τῶν τοιοῦτων λόγων, μὴ δ’ ἐτερὸν τι ἀλλὰ δ’ αὐτῷ, καὶ ὁ ἄλλοις εμποιητικὸς τῶν τοιοῦτων λόγων, ὥσπερ καί τὰ πράγματα φαμεν ψευδῆ εἶναι ὅσα ἐμποιεῖ φαντασίαν ψευδῆ, διὸ ὁ ἐν τῷ Ἰππίᾳ λόγῳ παρακρούεται ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδῆς καί ἀλήθης. τὸν δυνάμενον γὰρ ψεύσασθαι λαμβάνει ψευδῆ (ὄστος δ’ ὁ εἰδῶς καί ὁ φρόνιμος) ἐτί τὸν ἐκόντα φαύλον βελτίω. τοῦτο δὲ ψευδῶς λαμβάνει διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς—ὁ γὰρ ἑκὼς χωλαίνων τοῦ ἀκόντος κρείττων—τὸ χωλαίνειν τὸ µιµεῖσθαι λέγων, ἐτει ἐι γε χωλός ἐκών, χείρων ἰσως, ὥσπερ επὶ τοῦ ἂθους, καί οὕτος.

Hence Antisthenes silyly believed that nothing could be spoken of except by its own account: one account for one thing; from which it followed that contradiction is impossible, and that falsehood is nearly impossible. But it is possible to speak of each thing, not only by its own account, but by the account of another thing, and to do so completely falsely on the one hand, but on the other hand it is also possible to do so truthfully, as for example eight may be spoken of as double by the account of two. So in these cases this is what is meant by 'false'. And a man is false who readily and deliberately makes such statements, not for some other reason but for the sake of it, and he is a man who causes such statements from others, just as we declare things to be false which cause a false appearance. Hence in the Hippias the argument is misleading, that the same man is false and true. For it assumes: that the false man is one who has the ability to deceive (viz. he is knowledgeable and in his right mind); further, that the man who is purposely bad is better. This is falsely assumed because of induction – for saying that the man who deliberately limps is better than the one who limps unwillingly, he (Antisthenes ?) is saying pretending to limp, for if he is purposely lame, he is also worse in the same manner in this case as he is in his character.

290 = DC 47a, SSR 152; cf. Alex. Apher. in Metaph. 1024b26 Bonitz = DC 47b, SSR 152; Ascl. in Metaph. 1024b25 = SSR 153; Arist. Top. 104b19-21 = DC 47c, SSR 153; Alex. Apher. in Top. 104b19 = SSR 153; Proclus in Plato’s Cratylus c.37 Pasquali 1908 = DC 49, SSR 155; Isoc. Hel. 1 = SSR 156; DL 3.35 = DC 36, SSR 148.

291 cf. the statement 'the man who errs willingly in art (τέχνη) is preferable, but he who does so in practical
From this text it is evident that Aristotle is familiar with one dialogue titled *Hippias*. He makes no reference to Plato, but by including it in this discussion of Antisthenes’ theories he appears to show that he thinks the *Hippias* is by Antisthenes. Of the other ancient authors who are thought to provide proof of Plato’s authorship, the first is Cicero – he refers obliquely to Hippias, without ever mentioning Plato or implying a connection with Plato (Cic. *de Orat.* 3.32). The other ancient author supposedly providing proof of Plato’s authorship is Alexander of Aphrodisias. Writing around AD 200, and commenting on Aristotle’s text above, he adds that the *Hippias* is ‘Plato’s’ (Πλάτωνος, *in Metaph.* 1024b26 Bonitz 402.16-17). So seemingly, in the intervening five centuries from Aristotle to Alexander, the notion had arisen that Plato was the author of the *Hippias* and it had somehow entered the ‘Platonic corpus’.

In terms of the writing style, there is nothing obvious that distinguishes it from other works of Plato. Socrates is similar in character to other Platonic dialogues where he engages with other famous sophists such as Protagoras and Gorgias. He declines to let Hippias answer any question at length, having claimed that he was not able to keep up with what Hippias was saying in his exhibition (364b; cf. *Prot.* 334cd). Through his accustomed style of questioning, Socrates manoeuvres the conversation (and Hippias) so that Hippias frequently finds himself in a corner in which he would not naturally choose to stand (e.g. 369b, 375d, 376b).

In terms of content, however, there is a great deal in common with Antisthenes’ works. The use of ethical terms between the argument put forward in the earlier part of the dialogue by Hippias is very similar to Antisthenes use of the same terms used in the *Ajax & Odysseus* and particularly in fragment *TH12*. In particular Antisthenes is most interested in the field of ethical terms accreting to Odysseus’ quality of πολυτροπία (many-manneredness), and the opposing field of terms associated with Achilles’ (and Ajax’s, Nestor’s) quality of ἁπλότης (frankness, sincerity). This is the same ethical division that Hippias focusses on in his discussion with Socrates. Whereas he labels (364c) Odysseus as πολυτροποπώτατον

\[\text{wisdom (φρόνησις) is worse}\] Arist. *NE* 6 1140b21-4.
(exceedingly many-mannered), Achilles is described as ἀριστον (most noble, bravest), and Nestor as σοφωτάτον (cleverest, most-learned). Hippias then goes on (364e-365b) to term Achilles ἀπλούστατος (exceedingly frank) and quotes the passage from the Iliad containing exactly the same line that Antisthenes' speaker quotes (i.e. 9.313). Hippias explains to Socrates (365b) that this shows clearly that the character of Achilles is ἀληθής and ἀπλούς (true and frank) whereas that of Odysseus is πολύτροπος and ψευδής (many-mannered and false) – the commentary on TH12 expands on these arguments.

Further suggesting that Antisthenes is actually the author is the logic in Socrates' argument in the Hippias Minor, discussed by Aristotle in the passage above, which concludes that the same man is both true and false (368e, 369b). This is rather reminiscent of the kind of internal logic in the other argument taken up here by Aristotle that contradiction is impossible and falsehood very nearly so. The preliminary evidence therefore suggests that the Hippias Minor, or Hippias, to use Aristotle's name, was written by Antisthenes. There is evidently not space to take this argument further here, and perhaps it would require another dissertation in itself.
Appendix C – Classification of the *bombulios*

The *bombulios* does not appear in archaeological records as one of the recognised pot shapes. It seems, however, that some of the small pots known as ‘feeders’ match the description of *bombulios* in several regards. They are small, bulbous, and have a protruding spout. They are sometimes described as ‘fillers’, envisaged in that case to be used to pour oil into lamps or similar. Generally, however, they are imagined to be designed for feeding infants, and there is ample evidence to support this conclusion. They often (but not always) have a poor quality of finish (Kern 1957, 18; see also list of 24 similar), there are often small teeth marks around the end of the spout (*Agora* 12, 161), and they have commonly been found in infant graves (*Corinth* 7, 125). The fact that they were used for feeding infants, may not preclude the general shape from being used as a small wine cup. We know the *bombulios* was used for wine but the following comment from Galen specifically connects the *bombulios* also with infant feeding (*De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 8.8.4.7):

> οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὰ παιδία τῇ περιθέσει τῶν χειλέων ἔκ ἀε τῶν τιτθῶν ἐλκει τὸ γάλα κἀκ τῶν βομβυλίων τὸ περιεχόµενον ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑγρόν.

Thus also children, by the application of the lips, draw the milk from the breasts, and from the *bombulioi*, the fluid contained in them.

One problem is that the vessels classed as ‘feeders’ include a fairly diverse range of shapes. In common, they all have a spout, but some have a wide opening at the top (*Agora* 12, pl.39.1197-1198; *Corinth* 13, pl.78 495-4). Some have a strainer in the top (*Corinth* 15.3, pl. 77 2207 & 2213). Some are quite flat topped with a strainer on top (*Corinth* 13, pl.90 336-e), or a lid (*Corinth* 13, pl.71 491-1). Some are completely enclosed apart from their spout and a little air hole (Noble 1972, 437-8, pl.95; *Agora* 12, 162 1200-1205, pl. 39). For images of a surprising array of the versions described here (and more) see Snijder (1933, Tafel I-IV). The examples mentioned, which are completely closed in, often have a much higher quality glaze and finish (generally black), suggesting they may be candidates for the label ‘*bombulios*’ as used in symposia. In the case of the models with open tops it is a little hard to imagine how the vessel could ‘resonate’ during drinking. The enclosed pots though could easily make some sort of noise as the fluid came out and the air escaped either through the
same spout or a tiny hole. This would need to be tested with a similar vessel to be sure. In addition, some of these pots have a glazed pellet sealed inside them, the purpose of which is not clear (see x-rays Noble 1972, pl.95). Perhaps it partially blocked the outlet and contributed to the vessel making a noise – and maybe if prompted to do so (as per Sabinos’ command in Galen above).

One piece of evidence that supports the notion that some of these vessels were wine cups comes from Corinth. Pemberton writes: ‘The "feeder" presents problems of date and function. First, this type of vessel seems to appear suddenly in the later 4th century’ (Corinth 18.1, 63, fig.21 481, pl.48 480-481; Corinth 15.3, pl. 77 2207 & 2213). She then notes that these vessels were all found in a concentrated period from the third quarter of the 4th century until the early 3rd, before making another intriguing statement (63; my emphasis):

Yet, one wonders why, if there was a vogue for so many of them in the later 4th century, it would last for only 30 to 50 years? They are usually found in the fills of dining rooms; were they used in the meals in those rooms? They are probably misnamed and should be identified as containers for some type of liquid necessitating slow pouring.

So possibly for pouring wine at a slow rate? Were these a version of the slow dripping bombulios that had a period of popularity in the wake of Antisthenes and Socrates eulogising them? The handles are positioned on the body of the vessel at around 90° to the spout, so naturally suited for a right handed person to drink from. They may have made their way from Attica to surrounding regions over the following decades, and perhaps fell back out of favour due to being awkward to use or because they delivered the wine at a frustratingly slow rate. The lack of high quality finish makes them suspect for a sympotic setting, however, that may also be indicative of a vogue for more austere styles in that period.

There is another shape that has previously proved slightly baffling that also fits the description of the bombulios in many regards. Discussing the various types of askos, Sharpe touches on a new sort – the purpose of which is speculated but unknown (Agora 12, 157, fig.11 1194, pl.39 1192-96; cf. Corinth 18.1, 99, fig.18, pl.16; my emphasis):
The most startling development is the setting of the mouth on top of the body, 1192-1196, and such a violent change has been thought worthy of a new name and is often designated "guttus"; the name is here used as a subdivision under the general term. All the different shapes perhaps served the same use, for their form suggests a purpose. Their small size, their spout, and their handle for pouring, indicate a vessel from which small amounts of liquid are to be poured drop by drop: oil, perfume or honey.

Or perhaps wine? These askoi are quite small, 7.5 – 10cm in height, usually with a matching diameter – so they are the size of a small cup. They are bulbous, with a protruding neck, and one could well imagine them resonating or gurgling as the wine 'glugged' out. Kohoutková says that experiments with similar askoi have confirmed that the liquid comes out in drops or a small trickle (1989, 81). They also often have a high quality, black finish that seems appropriate for use in symposia. From Corinth a late fifth century oinochoe is documented by Pease that has very similar dimensions and profile to these askoi and could well be a Corinthian version of a vessel for the same purpose (1937, 298, fig. 30 182). It is hard to tell from the images, and without attempting oneself to drink from one, whether the lip on the top of the neck would be comfortable and pleasant to drink from. It might be necessary to ask a talented potter to make one and try it in order to know for certain. Nevertheless, at this stage these pots seem to match what is known about bombulioi in many respects and so could be examples of such. It is also possible that the term bombulios was applied to more than one shape over time.

In the fragment from Athenaeus, the bombulios is stated to be a Rhodian cup made by Thericles. LSJ s.v. offers Θηρίκλειος 'made by Thericles, a famous Corinthian potter' (c. 455-385 BC). A passage from Lucian’s Lexiphanes (7) further links Thericles with the bombulios:

ποτήρια δὲ ἐκείτο παντοῖα ἐπὶ τῆς δελφίδος τραπέζης, ὁ κρυψιμέτωπος καὶ τρυήλης Μεντοφορυγής εὐλαβή ἐξων τὴν κέρκον καὶ βομβυλίος καὶ δειροκύπελλον καὶ γηγενὴ πολλὰ Θηρίκλης ὤπτα.

Every sort of cup lay on the dolphin table, the face-hider, and Mentor-crafted ladle with easy-grasp handle, and a bombulios and a necked-goblet and many earth-borns such as Thericles baked.

In light of the evidence from Athenaeus, it is reasonable to interpret the 'Thericles baked' objects here as including all the vessels mentioned, rather than only the earth-borns.
Thericlean pottery is discussed at some length in Athenaeus 11.470e-2e. It is clear from the discussion that Thericles made a number of different types of vessels, including a mixing bowl (κρατήρ 472a). The most discussed vessel in these passages, the eponymous ‘Thericlean’ (Θηρίκλειον), is an unusually large drinking cup holding up to four kotulai (472d; roughly two pints or one litre, see LSJ s.v. κοτύλη), the use of which rapidly induced drunkenness. So plainly quite different to the bombulios he is also credited with. Apparently his pottery was also famous for its black glaze, which was imitated by vessels made from the black wood of the terebinth tree (Thphr. HP. 5.3.2) and quite likely by other potters. This may help identify the bombulios from the candidates in the archaeological record listed above, as some of the ‘feeders’ and askoi are notable for their black, glossy finish.
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