What are the Successes and Failures of Democracy and its Institutions in post-1975 Greece?

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Dedications

I'd like to firstly dedicate my thesis to my late father, Kosmas, who sadly passed away on January 09, 2016, and to my mother, Irene. From as young as I can remember, you have both taught me many life lessons, the most important being highlighted in the Greek proverb *ever to excel*. It is through this philosophy that both of you have instilled in me to study and work hard toward achieving all my dreams and although 2016 has been difficult without Dad, I know I have applied everything you have taught me throughout my entire life to my passion for Hellenism, the Greeks and Greece. From the bottom of my heart, I'd like to say a big thank you for your constant support and love as it's made me the man I am today. I'd also like to dedicate my thesis to my beloved partner, Bernadette. There are truly no words that can describe how amazing you have been over the last year as well as during all my years of study. In my weakest moments, you have been my rock and given me back a sense of strength, and most importantly, in my strongest moments, you've always pushed me to go further and get more out of life. Thank you for your patience and support, I love you eternally. I'd also like to dedicate my thesis to my Supervisor Professor Vrasidas Karalis. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to continuously develop and evolve under your guidance, for all the hours you put in toward this work and for all our memorable meetings. The most important lesson you have taught me all these years is to *always search for the truth in life and to be aware of those who claim to have found it*. I'd like to finally dedicate my thesis to my Sub-Supervisor Dr. Adonis Drakopoulos and to Dr. Panayota Nazou, both who also taught me many things over the years.
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Abstract

This thesis examines the successes and failures of democracy and its institutions in post-1975 Greece. As such, it contributes to the area of research by analysing institutions such as the constitution, citizenship, popular sovereignty, political parties, government, checks and balances, public sector, security, elites and finally, the Church of Greece. It is these institutions that have proven to be the most important in Greece and deal with the precedents of governance, state-apparatuses and quasi-state apparatuses. The approach taken in the thesis is from a diachronic perspective that historically analyses and interprets how each of these institutions has evolved since the establishment of the Greek Nation-State in 1821. It also determines the extent to how each institution was functional and dysfunctional. The periods covered are 1821-1974, Chapter 2 1975 – 1985, Chapter 3 1986 – 2000, 2001 – 2007, 2008 – 2016 and 2016 – future. More specifically, the thesis analyses these institutions in detail under the numerous Greek Governments that have been in power since the Metapolitefsi in 1975. This includes those of New Democracy (ND), the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the current Coalition of the Radial Left (SYRIZA). The thesis, therefore, puts forth that Greece’s politicians in the last 41 years have manipulated the institutions of the Greek Nation-State in order to achieve short term goals for personal interests in the present. Greece’s politicians have thus shown no concern with developing institutions to achieve long-term goals for the interests of the overall Greek Nation both now and in the future. A significant amount of pressure for change must occur in the country, both from Diaspora Greeks and Europeans, if institutions in Greece are to evolve in line with a more democratic nature. Due to limitations, there is, however, more room for research to be conducted in this large area.
Literature Review

Constitution
In regards to the institution of the Constitution, the thesis mainly refers to Greek Constitutions that covered my topic in great detail due to their originality. As an official document of the Greek State, Constitutions have largely been written by Western-educated Greeks of the period, namely those with backgrounds in politics or law and are often referred to when referring to these documents. After carefully reading these documents, it is clear the authors did not have any affiliations or sponsors that would bias its contents, largely due to the fact that these documents were written solely to outline the precedents of the Greek State. Throughout its history, the Greek Constitution has been written solely for the Greek Nation so they understand their rights as citizens as well as how they will be governed by the Greek State, while at times, they were written to appease counterparts in the West. This analysis is supported in the numerous extracts used from these documents throughout the thesis, all of which have been referenced correctly and discussed by academics in their own work. The Greek Constitutions that have been used here were written in 1822, 1823, 1827, 1832, 1844, 1864, 1911, 1925, 1927, 1948, 1952, 1968, 1973 and 1975, respectfully, and as they are primary sources, are open to interpretation in their use by the academic world. Some of the most efficient secondary sources available on the institution of the Constitution are articles written by Contiades, Eleftheriadis, Kontiades, Manitakis, Marketou and Petridis with other notable articles from Alivizatos, Chrysogonos, Drosos, Eleftheriadis, Fessas, Papadopoulou and Tassopulos. Many of these individuals are all experts in their respective fields while others professionals concerned with the democracy of the Greek constitution. Nevertheless, their views are all guided by interpreting the Greek constitution over the years and more importantly, interpreting its amendments post-1974 and what impact this has had on the governance of the country. As their backgrounds vary, so do their audiences, with academics targeting the broader academic world, while professionals such as lawyers targeting experts in their field regarding the legality of certain articles in the constitution under the framework of Eu and international law. As the Economic Crisis looms, the majority of these writers agree that the Greek Constitution is in need of reform or to be re-written completely, and as such, these views are increasing in this area. As a result, articles have increased abundantly since 2009 to the present which is added throughout the thesis.

Citizenship
In regards to the institution of Citizenship, the thesis mainly refers to definitions of a ‘Greek’ in consecutive Greek Constitutions though the main area of analysis was on the Greek Citizenship Code 1975-2015. As with its predecessors, the authors are educated Greeks involved in Greek politics. While affiliations are not direct, a historical pattern can be seen with those who have defined Greek Citizenship in an indirect manner so that it benefited the majority Greek Nation as opposed to non-Greeks or foreigners as they have been labelled. As can be expected, the Greek Nation has again been the main target or focus in accordance with the principles of a Nation-State, a topic that is still debated in both Greece and outside the country. My use in the thesis has been primarily with definitions of who is considered a Greek Citizen based on the literature and what characteristics determined such a result. These definitions correlate with each Greek Constitution that was written and more so with the Greek Nationality Code 1975 to the present. The most effective secondary sources on the institution of Citizenship are those articles written by Anagnostou and Christopoulos, respectfully, with other notable mentions, however, include articles by Andreouli, Figgou, Kadianaki, Konsta, Lazaridis, Sitaropoulos and Zachos. Both of the above-mentioned academics can be described as experts in this area, having researched the subject for years demonstrated in their abundance of articles on topics pertaining to citizenship. After careful analysis, it is evident their views are strictly interpretive of various documents pertaining to Greek citizenship such as the Greek Nationality Code on behalf of the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship which is intended to promote the democratisation of citizenship laws throughout Europe. Their intended audience, then, is any academic, professional or student concerned with the writing, implementation and functioning of Greek citizenship laws and how this impacts both ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks, respectively. A simple Google Scholar search or any search conducted on a university library website will demonstrate that the articles written by these academics are highly regarded in the academic world through their constant use and peer review. These articles have mainly been written in the post-Economic Years where citizenship in Greece has been the center of attention as a result of its increasing migrant population from the Third World and how such individuals should be dealt with under the EU framework.

**Popular Sovereignty**

In regards to the institution of Popular Sovereignty, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources in the form of official statistics from the Greek Ministry of Interior on Greek Elections and Referendums that proved very successful throughout the thesis. The authors of such statistics are experienced public servants of the Greek
Ministry of Interior qualified in data collection and dissemination of which such information is abundantly used by academics when referring to the Greek Elections. While election rigging has occurred in Greek history prior to 1975, it is one problem that has been phased out from successive elections and as such, mechanisms have been put in place through the Greek electoral system to ensure those responsible for these statistics cannot be influenced to alter data and present their findings without bias and more importantly, political affiliation. The audience of such statistics is mainly Greek citizens concerned with who will now be in government, as well as both researchers and professionals studying the area. The use of these statistics has been properly included as a means of analysing popular sovereignty and is supported across the board in the academic world as it is data that cannot be manipulated and only studied for what it is. Elections have taken place in Greece since 1843, however, the major focus has been on Greek Elections and Referendums since 1974 with a particular interest from the academic world now in focus after the ignored Greek Referendum 2015. The most important secondary sources on the institution of Popular Sovereignty are the articles by Dimitras, Dinas, Gemensis and Kassimeris with other notable scholars including Tsitouras, Danopoulos, Lyrintzis and Tsitouras. Such individuals can be described as experts in their field due to their academic backgrounds as well as, and more importantly in my opinion, due to some of their participation in Greek Elections. It is important here to note that all of these scholars are firm believers in democracy, and as the very word means the ‘people’s rule’, such articles used throughout the thesis are vehement in advocating this position as well as outlining how time and time again, the popular sovereignty of Greek citizens has been used for alternative motives by those who lead. As can be expected, their audience is a variety of individuals from various backgrounds, though world mentioning is the European audience, ie the EU as a means of gaining support for outside assistance at reform, as well as to the Greek citizen to inform them of the misdeeds of politicians. These academics are renowned for their work in the academic world, constantly receiving support and praise due to the fact that while some may disagree on how popular sovereignty should be reformed, there is a shared belief that it must be reformed for the benefit of the Greek people. As a result, the publication of these articles are varied on their dates, however, many are prevalent in post-elections or post-referendums held, such as after the Greek Referendum 2015 that was not respected by Prime Minister Tsipras.

**Political Parties**

In regards to the institution of Political Parties, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources primary in the form of *Party Programmes* as well as sources provided by the
Hellenic Parliament on MPs. The authors of this information have included, since the establishment of the Greek State, leaders of these political parties such as Karamanlis, Papandreou, to name a few. As leaders, such individuals have strong affiliations with their respective parties such as the ND and PASOK, and so on, and maintain policies in accordance with its mandate. The intended audience of the *Party Programmes* can be described as twofold with, on the one hand, the Greek Nation who they are trying to gain votes from, and on the other hand, party members who they want support from. In any works dedicated to political parties, these programmes are used by substantially by the world of academia as I have done throughout the thesis. While political parties advocate their policies all year round, official Party Programmes have usually been released during the election period. The secondary sources on the institution of Political Parties most prominent in this area are the articles by Arvanitopoulos, Bantimaroudis, Bistis, Gemensis, Nestoras and Stavrakakis, with other prominent academics including Botsiou, Christopoulos, Dinas, Mochonas, Pappas and Sourdalakis. These individuals are mainly academics in Greece or Europe with respected positions as well as professionals in Greece such as journalists. Their work is regarded as significantly high throughout the academic world due to the fact that they demonstrate the various ongoing problems that political parties face, such as the leader complex, nepotism and corruption, as well as what reforms are necessary such as introducing a party constitution. Depending on their political affiliations, it is evident that half wish to advocate their positions to the Greek *Laos* and the other half wish to advocate their positions to the Greek *Ethnos*. Despite this difference in identity, there is an agreement within much of the academic literature and amongst scholars, demonstrated in further works, that political parties are there to represent all Greek citizens. These articles are growing in importance, particularly with the failed SYRIZA Government that promised so much yet delivered so little due to becoming absorbed by the very same ailments it rallied against pre-election victory.

**Government**

In regards to the institution of the Government, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources in the form of information from the Greek General Secretariat of the Government on Greek Governments, as well as the official Government Gazette. The authors of this information were again experienced public servants of the General Secretariat of the Government qualified in providing imperative information on successive Greek Governments that is continuously used by academics. However, it is evident that as this information comes from the Greek Government directly, there have been significant cases of bias whereby information
is written by party sympathisers or even members of ND, PASOK, to name a few. Nevertheless, the audience of this information is for a variety of individuals and groups concerned with details of Greek Governments including dates in office, members of the cabinet, and so forth. Such sources have allowed me to successfully analyse each Greek Government in my given chapters using factual information. While Greek Governments are abundant, the major focus here has again been on those since 1974 under ND, PASOK, the current SYRIZA-ANEL and all those in-between in the forms of Caretaker Governments. The most effective secondary sources on the institution of the Government are the articles written by Featherstone with other notable works including those articles by Fouskas, Papadimitriou and Pappas. Featherstone has long been an expert in Greek politics which is reflected in his current position as Professor of Greek at the LSE, his years of experience in this field and abundance of academic works that are countlessly used by other academics. A key theme running throughout Featherstone’s articles is the way in which he presents his articles, namely in simple English with factual information from respectable sources. While his works are for all academics and professionals to use, I believe the audience of Featherstone’s articles is more directed at postgraduate students who are trying to find a sense of truth, honesty and purpose regarding the labyrinth that is Greek politics. This is evident in the fact that numerous students, including myself throughout the thesis, refer to Featherstone’s works as well as his older peers who give nothing but positive peer reviews. Such articles do not have a beginning or an end date has Featherstone has researched Greek politics for many, many years and as such, maintains the reputation of a leading scholar in this area producing works at countless intervals.

**Checks and Balances**

In regards to the institution of Checks and Balances, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources such as excerpts from successive Greek Constitutions and sessions of the Hellenic Parliament. Since the establishment of the Greek State, the authors of any primary sources on this institution have been those in power, whether as King, Prime Minister, President, an MP, and so on. The primary sources they present on this topic have been very limited namely due to their affiliations with maintaining political power over the country and people. As such, their intended audience can be described as no one in that, in matters pertaining to checks and balances, such individuals wish to use the Greek State to their advantage or to fulfil personal interests in total secrecy. A simple yet important example is an article within the Greek Constitution stating that no MP can be subject to criminal charges which continues to be ridiculed due to the lack of checks and balances in the country. In addition to these articles in the Constitution and statements (without
any action) made in the Hellenic Parliament, primary sources relating to this institution are scarce. Unfortunately, as was the case with primary sources, the secondary sources on the institution of Checks and Balances is somewhat scarce, however, some important articles are by Kalyvas, Konstantinidis, Pappas and Mylonas, with others, to a lesser degree, include articles by Grigoriadis, Kaloudis, Mavrogordatos, Matsas, Polyzoides and Trantidis. Their backgrounds are also varied, though the majority are either academics who work for respected universities or professionals in the private sector such as Think Tanks. What is important, however, is their advocacy in these articles that checks and balances are virtually non-existent in Greece as well as their call for serious reform to be conducted. For the majority, their audience is to the Greek political elite itself, an audience which proves difficult as this group have avoided serious checks and balances and any sense of reform. It is such a view that is shared by these authors across the board that despite the current predicament, the area is very much open to discussion within the academic world. It is also evident that as Greece continues its negotiations with the EU, particularly due to the Economic Crisis, political reform will follow its economic reform, albeit slowly, and such an area will hopefully begin to flourish in the future with further publications.

**Public Sector**

In regards to the institution of the Public Sector, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources found in the Greek Constitution, Government Gazette, Presidential Decrees, Parliament Sessions and Greek Law. The majority of these authors are individuals part of the Greek Government who, despite their backgrounds, education or qualifications, are all experts in the practice of clientelism, nepotism, corruption, to name a few. As such, the primary sources regarding the Public Sector are written and put in place by individuals with a strong bias toward maintaining the status quo, that is, gaining a position within the public sector (including substantial benefits) in exchange for continuing to vote to those who put them there. The audience, then, is directed straight at the Greek Nation. The evidence of this is abundant throughout Greek society regarding any kind of government service whereby everyday Greeks will have to pay a fakelaki or bribe in order to receive the promised service, with many others flowing throughout the thesis. As these are case by case examples, all such sources vary in their date of publication but have come to light even more so with the ongoing Economic Crisis and call for reform. The most prevalent secondary sources on the institution of the Public Sector can be described as the articles by Angelaki with other notable writers including Christos, Pagoulatos, Kalaitzidis and Kouvelakis. Angelaki is a respected academic of Panteion University that has written substantial works on Greek
society, namely employment regarding both the public and private sectors. In her works throughout the thesis, Angelaki clearly identifies the balloon that is the Greek public sector, the constant clientelism that runs deep within it, as well as reforms that are needed. Her intended audience is the everyday Greek citizen in an effort to help them understand what while they did not create the problems, their fate will be much worse if they do not complete reforms, which comes to her second audience of the EU. While many academics have argued against Angelaki, it is evident after reading much of her literature as well as those from the mentioned writers above that the Greek public sector is a problem in Greece, a position shared by many Greeks and the EU, and that it requires change. As a result of the Economic Crisis, many such articles have been written as to how it can be resolved, including the problems within the public sector, which has led to its increase in research, discussion and debate within the academic world and political realm.

**Security**

In regards to the institution of Security, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources also found in the Greek Constitution, Government Gazette, Presidential Decrees, Parliament Sessions and Greek Law. Here, the authors are educated and qualified individuals part of the Greek State, namely relating to matters of defence, foreign policy and policing. Throughout Greek history, this area has been the focus of those with a right-wing ideology and as such, the authors are heavily affiliated with the Hellenic Armed Forces, Hellenic Police, National Intelligence Service, Hellenic Ministry of Defence and Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their audience has, since the time of the Greek Revolution, been solely for the Greek Nation and Greek State, who they believe they are responsible for in terms of protection and continuity. This has been touched upon heavily throughout the thesis and is an area whereby the literature is abundantly discussed, particularly due to Greece's internal political divisions. Depending on the point in time, these sources vary in their publication but are usually present during times of conflict, war and increased tension. Some of the most effective secondary sources on the institution of Security are articles by Danopoulos, Frangoudaki, Karakatsanis, Kassimeris, Kazamias, Koundouras, Rizas, Veremis, to name but a few who have conducted research in this prominent and important area. All can be considered experts in their field, which, in terms of security, ranges from experts in the Greece's Armed Forces and Police to experts in its relations with Albania, the FYR and Turkey regarding ongoing issues. As a result, their views all differ, with some focusing on security and its influence on Greek politics which has been an ongoing issue, particularly with right-wing parties, while others focus more so on Greece's relations and resolving national issues with neighbours. The audience of these articles depends largely on
who is reading them and why, but the majority seek to engage with academics and even politicians involved in the security apparatus. Due to the large amount of literature in this area, there are many authors who write in accordance with their own political beliefs and as such, I specifically chose academics who write from a centrist perspective to avoid bias which, as I can see, is not included in these articles. As such, these articles have been written for a long time, since the establishment of the Greek Nation-State, with a peak post-1974 until today and even more so now with Greece's first leftist SYRIZA Government that strategically placed far right individuals to positions of importance such as the Ministry of Defence.

Elites

In regards to the institution of Elites, the thesis mainly refers to primary sources by such individuals themselves in their official biographies or memoirs. It cannot be denied that these individuals all come from wealthy, prominent and educated families, whether belonging to the Karamanlis or Papandreou Dynasties and as such, have a substantial amount of expertise in their personal and family histories. While any form of bias has not been found in these biographies, what is evident in all is the sheer amount of dedication that these individuals have toward their families or political dynasties that are also influenced by regional affiliations or clans. The audience for these biographies or memoirs is largely the Greek Nation, both in Greece and the Diaspora, in an attempt to educate the Greeks on such families. However, another common theme seen throughout these biographies is a sense of neglect at discussing certain issues relating to these families that the Greeks would and should know of, a reason why individuals with an elite status are studied more so by academics as well as in this thesis. To date, most elites have written their biographies and memoirs in their post-Prime Minister, President or MP years and as such, specific dates vary. The best secondary source available on the institution of Elites is that by Sotiropoulos on Ministerial Elites with other prominent works on specific areas by Doukas, Karakatsanis, Manolopoulos and Teperoglou. Sotiropoulos is considered an expert in this area as not only is he an Associate Professor of Political Science (including Greece) at the UA but lives in Athens, experiencing Greek politics first hand. Sotiropoulos' article on Ministerial Elites is clear that it is written from a perspective without bias with a view that seeks to expose the degree of elites within the Greek political spectrum from as early as the 1800s or since the establishment of the Greek Nation-State. With such works, the audience is for both academics and professionals, though governments also seem to be of focus, namely those in Europe. While this article has been successful through its use by many other academics in their writings, its sole downfall is the
fact that it is one if not the only article of its kind that discusses Greek elites in such
detail. Nevertheless, Sotiropoulos continues to add to this article and in this area
which has fuelled research by other academics with the same purpose, including
this thesis.

**Church of Greece**
In regards to the institution of the Church of Greece, the thesis mainly the thesis
mainly refers to primary sources such as the *Anathema against Greek Revolutionaries*
1821 or *Canon Law* and documents such as various press releases, all originals
belonging to the Church. The majority of these documents have been written by the
clergy of the Church of Greece with an education and qualification in Orthodoxy,
their sole area of expertise whether administration or theology and are regularly
 cited by academics. While these documents are primary sources, all of the authors
have an affiliation with the Church of Greece and as such, their work has been
written from with an Orthodox view in mind, at times demonstrating bias, with the
purpose of advocating matters pertaining to the Orthodox World. The majority of
these documents are aimed at the Greek *Nation* and more importantly, Christian
Greeks who comprise a majority in Greece without concern for others. It is this
position that has led to many academics researching the influence of the Church of
Greece on the Greek State which is demonstrated in the sources used and
referenced throughout the thesis. The majority of these sources have been written
from 1821 right up until the present, and are continuously being studied further.
Some of the most efficient secondary sources available on the institution of the
Church of Greece are the articles written by Halikiopoulos and Papastathis with
notable mentions of the articles by Diamantopoulos, Karagiannis, Koutras,
Kyriazopoulos, Makrides, Molokotos and Vallianatos. Halikiopoulos and Papastathis
are both experts in this field, both holding prominent positions in Europe's top
universities. After reading their extended works, it is evident that the former seeks
to explain the relationship between the Greek State and the Church while the latter
seeks to examine the role of the Church in Greek politics, both from academic
points of view. As with all secondary sources covered, their audience is both the
academic and professional world, though one does feel an indirect audience of
these articles is the Church itself whose own clergy have, at times, written in
contrast to such accusations. As was the case with Elites, due to its infiltration
within the Greek State, evidence is limited, however, both these authors and others
mentioned have succeeded in their purpose. As the years progress and as Greece
becomes more democratic, more research has been conducted in this area with the
latest by Papastathis on the Church and Right Wing Political Parties bringing factual
light to this ongoing and at times, bizarre relationship.
Methodology

According to Samuel Huntington, an institution is defined as a "stable, valued and recurring pattern of behaviour" and that in terms of the state, these are best identified by their level of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.\(^1\) Through this definition, I followed selection criteria that allowed me to identify the specific institutions of a political system which would only be included in the thesis. In the case of Greece, I solely chose the institutions that have been embedded in the functioning of the Greek Nation-State since its establishment in 1821. It is for this reason that other sub-institutions have been excluded, for example, the economy, as they are, in effect, controlled by larger institutions.

The institutions that I refer to are analysed through a historical interpretation and reconstruction to determine how they have existed and evolved in Greece with a specific focus over the last 41 years. Such a task was conducted through the reading of numerous primary sources such as the Greek Constitution and secondary sources by historical writers such as Thanos M. Veremis, Thomas W. Gallant and Richard Clogg. In each period explored, I was able to determine which institutions in Greece can be described as its foundations such as the Greek Constitution, which can be described as belonging to the state-apparatus such as the Greek Government and which belong to the quasi-state apparatus such as the Church of Greece. Furthermore, I effectively identified the institutions’ continuities and discontinuities, functions and dysfunctions, and successes and failures.

The institutions that I refer to are therefore presented using an approach that focuses on its respective theoretical and practical parameters, and final evaluation. In all periods explored, I follow a pattern that presents my findings based on what was said in theory, usually by a Greek Government, what they, however, did in practice, and finally, what the result was of this action. Such a strategy was imperative for this thesis question as it allowed me to effectively analyse each particular institution of the Greek Nation-State and its relation to Greek democracy. Through my research, I feel that I was able to both contribute to this very important area of study while also setting the foundations for further research to be conducted in the future.

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question, *what are the successes and failures of democracy and its institutions in post-1975 Greece?* In order for this to be achieved, the thesis will analyse and address the successes and failures of the democratic institutions in Greece most important to the functioning of the Greek Nation-State. These institutions are the constitution, citizenship, popular sovereignty, political parties, government, checks and balances, public sector, security, elites and finally, the Church of Greece. The analysis will be conducted from a diachronic perspective or the ways in which these institutions have evolved and developed as well as in accordance with historical contextualisation or how these institutions are understood as a result of their context in specific historical settings.

More specifically, these institutions will be examined briefly from the years 1821-1974 and then in detail over the last 41 years from 1975 until today that will be outlined in six specific chapters in accordance with the Greek State’s constitutional amendments. Chapter 1 will, therefore, cover the period from 1821 – 1974, the year the Greek Nation-State was established to the end of the Papadopoulos Junta, and will demonstrate the extent to which these institutions have embedded themselves in the Greek Constitution thirteen times. Chapter 2 will cover the period from 1975 - 1985, the year the Greek Constitution 1975 was implemented until before its first amendment and will analyse these institutions under the New Democracy (ND) Government of Konstantinos Karamanlis and later, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Government of Andreas Papandreou. Chapter 3 will cover the period from 1986 – 2000, the year the Greek Constitution was first amended until before its second amendment and will analyse these institutions under the PASOK Governments of Papandreou, Costas Simitis and later ND Government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis.

Chapter 4 will cover the period from 2001 – 2007, the year the Greek Constitution was secondly amended until before its third amendment and will analyse these institutions under the PASOK Government of Simitis though mainly under the ND Government of Kostas Karamanlis. Chapter 5 will cover the period 2008 – 2016, the year the Greek Constitution was amended for the third time and will analyse these institutions under the ND Government of Kostas Karamanlis though mainly the PASOK Government of George Papandreou, ND Government of Antonis Samaras and current SYRIZA-ANEL Government of Alexis Tsipras. Finally, Chapter 6 will cover the future of Greece where I will offer an insight as to how these institutions can evolve toward a more democratic Greece. However, it should be noted that due to the thesis word count of a Master of Arts and the significant
period covered, I was limited in offering an in-depth analysis of these institutions and as a result, chose to give a brief outline of their successes and failure that I am confident is successful at adding something new to Hellenic Studies.
Chapter 1: 1821 – 1974

1. Political History of Greece
In order to understand the complexities of this thesis, it is imperative that the political history of the Greek nation-state be outlined. In March of 1821, after 368 years of the Tourkokratia or Rule of the Turks, the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire begun the Greek Revolution that subsequently led to the First Hellenic Republic 1822-1832.\(^2\) When the Great Powers of the time recognized the new Greek nation-state, they helped establish the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 under King Otto, an absolute monarchy that was changed to a constitutional monarchy in 1843 due to the Greek dissatisfaction with what they regarded as the Bavrokratia or Rule of the Bavarians.\(^3\) However, still displeased with Otto, the Greeks had him ousted in 1864 and replaced with King George I who changed the Kingdom of Greece to a parliamentary monarchy, a system that was not without its own challenges, namely the National Schism between those who favoured the parliamentary monarchy and those who wanted a parliamentary republic.\(^4\) Although those who favoured the latter were victorious and established the Second Hellenic Republic in 1924, the National Schism continued to be a never-ending battle that strained domestic politics and in 1935, the Kingdom of Greece was restored as a parliamentary monarchy.\(^5\)

However, a year later in 1936, the National Schism was of little significance with General Ioannis Metaxas establishing a monarchical dictatorship that lasted until Greece's involvement in World War II (WWII) and subsequent Axis Occupation.\(^6\) Occupied Greece was administered mainly in the cities and towns by the Hellenic State or established collaborationist government under the Axis Powers, in the mountains and countryside by the National Liberation Front (EAM) and Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), and finally, without any official jurisdiction, by the Greek government-in-exile that later returned after WWII and was victorious in the Greek Civil War 1945-1949.\(^7\) In its aftermath and with the support of the Allies, the Kingdom of Greece was restored as a parliamentary monarchy until April 21, 1967, when Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos and later Brigadier General Dimitrios

\(^{5\text{C.M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History, London, Faber and Faber, 2000, Chapter 2}}\)
\(^{6\text{Koliopoulos and Veremis, Modern Greece, p. 103-104}}\)
\(^{7\text{Thomas, Greece: A Short History of a Long Story, pp. 168-170}}\)
Ioannidis established the Greek Junta.\textsuperscript{8} On July 15, 1974, the Junta was responsible for the coup d'état in Cyprus that ousted President Makarios III and replaced him with Nikos Sampson.\textsuperscript{9}

In an effort to support and protect the Greeks who comprised the majority of Cyprus, the Junta and Sampson attempted Enosis or Union of with Greece. Days later, in an effort to protect the Turkish minority, Turkey responded with the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus that resulted in occupation, displacements, missing persons and mass casualties. As a result of what had happened, prominent military officers withdrew their support for the Junta and on July 24, it collapsed.\textsuperscript{10} A few months later, the Metapolitefsi or Regime Change was established in 1974.

2. Formation of the Greek Nation-State
The formation of the Greek nation-state begun with the Greek Revolution 1821-1832.\textsuperscript{11} Inspired by the Greek Enlightenment 1700-1821 whereby prominent Greeks of the Diaspora such as Adamantios Korais and Rigas Feraios expressed the ideas of freedom, democracy and rights, the three Greeks Emmanuel Xanthos, Nikolaos Skouphas and Athanasios Tsakalov founded the Filiki Etaireia or Friendly Society that from 1814-1821 organised the Greek Revolution against the Turks.\textsuperscript{12} Tradition holds that on March 25, 1821, Germanos III of Patras raised the Greek flag in the Church of Agia Lavra amongst Greek Revolutionaries and proclaimed Greek independence.\textsuperscript{13} Despite this tradition, similar events had taken place prior to this event by Greek Revolutionaries such as with Alexander Ypsilantis and his Sacred Band who in February of 1821 started a revolt against the Turks in what is now modern-day Romania.\textsuperscript{14}

Nevertheless, on May 26, 1821, Greek Revolutionaries officially announced their proclamation of independence at the Messinian Senate.\textsuperscript{15} The will of Greek Revolutionaries and Greeks overall is best exemplified in the words of Feraios who said in 1797 “it's finer to live one hour as a free man than forty years as a slave and prisoner”. Such a statement demonstrated that the Greeks would rather achieve

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{8} Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, pp. 135-142
\textsuperscript{9} Woodhouse, Modern Greece, Chapter 6
\textsuperscript{10} C. Paparrigopoulos, History of the Greek Nation, Athens, National Geographic, 2004, Book 26, pp. 38-41
\textsuperscript{12} G. Finlay, A History of Greece: From its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864, Cambridge, Cambridge, University Press, 2014, Book 2, Chapter 2
\textsuperscript{13} Koliopoulos and Veremis, Modern Greece, pp. 15-19
\textsuperscript{14} Finlay, A History of Greece, Book 2, Chapter 3
\textsuperscript{15} Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, Book 2, Chapter 1
\end{flushleft}
their freedom and die after only an hour rather than live under the *Rule of the Turks* any longer.\(^{16}\) However, although most Greeks believed in the establishment of an independent Greek nation-state, there was no universal consensus as to the form it would take.\(^{17}\) While many attempts were made toward the model of the Greek nation-state, there was a significant amount of differences and even open conflict between the politicians and the military.\(^{18}\)

In 1827, with the assistance of the then Great Powers Russia, France and Great Britain, the Greeks agreed to the appointment of Ioannis Kapodistrias to be the Governor of Greece.\(^{19}\) Kapodistrias, an educated Greek of the Diaspora who had formally served as the Minister of the Septinsular Republic and in the Russian Foreign Service, was the most prominent man for the job due to both experience and neutrality.\(^{20}\) He carefully used his diplomatic skills and officially declared the independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, established and built the nation-state from scratch and gained the recognition and protection of the Great Powers.\(^ {21}\) After years of struggle, the Greek nation-state had finally been established.\(^{22}\)

### 3. Constitutions

The first Greek Constitution of 1822, influenced by the French Model, was drafted by 59 self-appointed Greek representatives and comprised of 110 articles that dealt with the organisation of the state, namely the legislative, executive of 5 members of Head of State and a Supreme Court of 11 members equally elected by the legislative and executive.\(^{23}\) The Constitution of 1823 was similar to its predecessor and only different in that it strengthened the role of the legislative, reinforced fundamental rights and introduced the provision that the constitution takes precedence over all legislation.\(^{24}\) The Constitution of 1827, which appointed Ioannis Kapodistrias as Governor of Greece, introduced the concept of a unitary state, the principle of national sovereignty, three-year terms in the legislative, an independent judiciary, and the granting of total power to Kapodistrias over the executive.\(^{25}\) Although the Constitution of 1844 introduced certain rights, it was drafted so King

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\(^{16}\) Paparrigopoulos, *History of the Greek Nation*, Book 19, pp. 65-66

\(^{17}\) Friendly Society, *Great Oath*, 1814

\(^{18}\) Third National Assembly, 1827

\(^{19}\) Fourth National Assembly, 1829

\(^{20}\) Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution*, Book 4, Chapter 3

\(^{21}\) London Protocol, 1830

\(^{22}\) London Conference, 1832

\(^{23}\) Greek Constitution, 1822, Article 3

\(^{24}\) Greek Constitution, 1823, Article 3

\(^{25}\) Greek Constitution, 1827, Article 3
Otto could retain the throne and still granted him power over the executive, appointing Senators to the Upper House and judges to the judiciary, with no provision for future revisions.\textsuperscript{26}

The Constitution of 1864 can be described as the first that was democratic and a model for all successor constitutions that introduced a parliamentary monarchy, restricted the powers of the king, enlarged the rights of citizens and most importantly, was based on the principle of popular sovereignty.\textsuperscript{27} For example, Articles 29-44 significantly expanded on the separation of powers with a fully independent judiciary and for the first time, ceased the operation of the senate by introducing a single parliament, and a provision that allowed future revisions to be made.\textsuperscript{28} The Constitution of 1911 was interesting in that it mainly focused on the judiciary by increasing its independence from the legislative and executive, setting up a court that would replace the parliament in verifying election results, laws that protected the rights of citizens and laws that simplified matters relating to legislation.\textsuperscript{29} The Constitution of 1927 granted the legislative the power to revise the constitution, revise laws and dissolve parliament; granted the executive the power to elect the parliament and senate; and finally, granted the legislative the power to review constitutional laws, establish a Supreme Administrative Court for the decentralisation of power and power to enforce social rights.\textsuperscript{30}

The Constitution of 1948 replicated the Constitution of 1911 with the only difference being the inclusion of the \textit{Parasyntagma} or \textit{Para-Constitution}, a large list of acts and decrees contrary to a democracy including the powers to erase citizenship and nationality, deport leftists, confiscate property, and much more.\textsuperscript{31} The Constitution of 1952 was also a replica of the Constitutions of 1864 and 1911, re-establishing a parliamentary monarchy with the separation of powers, granting the King with considerable legislative powers and lacked certain rights of citizens with the exception being the right to vote for women.\textsuperscript{32} The Constitution of 1968 retained the previously established parliamentary monarchy with the King as its head while including a provision that suspended the rights of citizens, the most important being universal suffrage\textsuperscript{33} where a few years later, the Constitution of

\textsuperscript{26} Greek Constitution, 1844, Article 4
\textsuperscript{27} Greek Constitution, 1864, Articles 21-28
\textsuperscript{28} Greek Constitution, 1864, Articles 29-44
\textsuperscript{29} Greek Constitution, 1911, Articles 3-44
\textsuperscript{30} Greek Constitution, 1927, Articles 3-44
\textsuperscript{31} Greek Constitution, 1948, Articles 3-44
\textsuperscript{32} Greek Constitution, 1952, Articles 3-44
\textsuperscript{33} Greek Constitution, 1968, Articles 2-55
1973 was introduced and changed the type of government to a parliamentary democracy, replacing the King with the President.\textsuperscript{34}

\section*{4. Citizenship}

The question ‘Who is a Greek?’ or rather, who would be the citizens of the Greek nation-state began with the Greek Revolutionaries who decided in the Constitution of 1822 that all the native inhabitants of Greek territory who believed in Christ were Greeks.\textsuperscript{35} The following year in 1823, in addition to the previous definition of who was a Greek, an individual was also considered Greek if they appeared in front of the Greek authorities and declared themselves a foreigner who spoke Greek and wanted to believe in Christ.\textsuperscript{36} Further additions were made to the definition in 1827 whereby an individual was considered Greek if they believed in Christ but still lived under the \textit{Rule of the Turks}, was born to a Greek father or swore an oath of allegiance to Greece.\textsuperscript{37} Although in 1844 attempts were made to replace such revisions with liberal notions of citizenship, a clear distinction had been enforced between ethnic Greeks with citizenship or autochthonous Greeks and ethnic Greeks without citizenship or heterochthonous Greeks.\textsuperscript{38}

However, this definition was misleading as it did not specify which native inhabitants, Greek lands or Christian denominations it was referring to.\textsuperscript{39} The intention of the Greek Revolutionaries with the first addition was to ensure all ethnic Greeks felt part of the Greek nation-state while showing gratitude to Philhellenes who helped their cause.\textsuperscript{40} The third addition to the definition of who was a Greek was an attempt to make a distinction between ethnic Greeks who were citizens of Greece and overall part of the \textit{ethnos} or \textit{nation} and ethnic Greeks outside of Greece who were not citizens and overall part of the overall \textit{genos} or \textit{race}.\textsuperscript{41} While the intention of the final addition was to identify all Greeks as part of the Greek \textit{ethnos}, it caused much friction between the natives or autochthonous Greeks with those outside Greek territory or heterochthonous Greeks and ultimately, an ongoing conflict between Greeks from Old Greece and New Greece.\textsuperscript{42,43}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Greek Constitution, 1973, Articles 2-55
\item \textsuperscript{35} Greek Constitution, 1822, Article 2
\item \textsuperscript{36} Greek Constitution, 1823, Article 2
\item \textsuperscript{37} Greek Constitution, 1827, Article 2
\item \textsuperscript{38} Greek Constitution, 1844, Article 3
\item \textsuperscript{39} Greek Constitution, 1844, Article 3
\item \textsuperscript{40} Greek Constitution, 1822, Article 2
\item \textsuperscript{41} Greek Constitution, 1823, Article 2
\item \textsuperscript{43} I. Makrygiannis, \textit{Memoirs by Giannis Vlachogiannis}, Athens, Vagionaki, 1947, p. 93
\end{itemize}
Despite efforts to unite the Greeks, autochthonous Greeks of the original Kingdom of Greece often considered the heterochthonous Greeks as a burden on Greek society, particularly when its borders increased throughout the years of the *Megali Idea* or *Great Idea*. The tension became so heated that autochthonous Greeks often labelled the heterochthonous Greeks as foreigners and *Tourkosporoi* or *Turkish seeds*. When the autochthonous Greeks eventually considered the heterochthonous Greeks as Greeks in their own right, they still did not allow them to be granted Greek citizenship for some time. Once Greek citizenship had been granted to the heterochthonous Greeks, they endured another form of discrimination by the autochthonous Greeks whereby the latter of the original Kingdom of Greece were able to work in the public sector, guaranteeing power to the original Greeks.

5. Popular Sovereignty

Although the nation-state was established in 1822 with the First Hellenic Republic, decisions were whole-heartedly made by Ioannis Kapodistrias and later by King Otto until he was forced to introduce universal suffrage or the right to vote for men only in 1844. When King Otto was dethroned and replaced by King George in 1864, Charilaos Trikoupis, a prominent liberal who was Prime Minister five times from 1875-1895, significantly helped enforce the proper functioning of popular sovereignty by introducing numerous reforms in the country that benefitted citizens. Eleutherios Venizelos, another prominent liberal who was Prime Minister eight times from 1910-1935, vehemently respected and upheld the idea of popular sovereignty and also introduced numerous political, economic and social policies of modernization for the benefit of all citizens. In 1952, the right to vote was extended to women, allowing for a new voice to be heard by leaders of the time such as Karamanlis who sought to rebuild the country with the people’s mandate.

Despite introducing universal suffrage, King Otto reverted to his old ways by disrupting elections and intervening in parliament, thus violating his initial agreement. His replacement King George I followed suit by making it difficult for Trikoupis to establish strong democratic institutions by undermining their

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45 Greek Constitution, 1844, Articles 3-13
46 Greek National Assembly, 1843-1844
47 Greek Constitution, 1844, Articles 22-30
48 Greek Constitution, 1864, Articles 54-78
49 Greek Constitution, 1911, Articles 54-76
50 Greek Constitution, 1952, Articles 54-75
51 Greek Constitution, 1844, Articles 31-36
enforcement.\textsuperscript{52} By interfering in politics, especially in foreign policy, the successor of George I, Constantine I caused the National Schism with Venizelos and the temporary establishment of the Provisional Government of National Defence.\textsuperscript{53} Problems arose once again between Karamanlis and later Papandreou with King Paul I ranging from political rigging and fraud, the power to choose ministers for the government, authority over the armed forces and even fundraisers held by the Palace.\textsuperscript{54}

The words of Trikoupis bring light to the slow process of popular sovereignty when he elegantly asked the rhetorical question “Τις πταίει;” or “Who is to blame?”, directly and indirectly blaming the monarchy for the lack of respect for popular sovereignty.\textsuperscript{55} From its insertion, popular sovereignty has fallen victim to the personal interferences of individuals who seek to maintain all power, particularly during times of the Kingdom of Greece which significantly disrupted the political process.\textsuperscript{56} The result of this interference has had drastic effects on the Greek people and Greece itself that has led to moments of instability with resignations of prominent Prime Ministers such as Trikoupis and Venizelos. On a greater scale, interference has led to moments of crisis and tragedy with notable examples including the Asia Minor Catastrophe, Population Exchange and Metaxas Regime.

6. Political Parties
From 1832-1863, Greece was dominated by the Great Powers who recognised and guaranteed the existence of the Greek nation-state through the English Party that was pro-England, liberal and led by men such as Alexandros Mavrokordatos, the French Party that was pro-France, constitutional and led by men such as Ioannis Kolettis and finally, the Russian Party that was pro-Russia, nationalist and led by men such as Constantine Kanaris.\textsuperscript{57} From 1864-1910, a change occurred in the country where two factions dominated, the Nationalist Party of Alexandros Koumoundouros and later Theodoros Deligiannis which adhered to nationalism, conservatism and traditionalism against their rivals in the New Party of Trikoupis

\textsuperscript{52} P. Petridis, \textit{Political Forces and Constitutional Institutions in Modern Greece 1944-1936}, Athens, Sakkoulas, 1984, pp. 57-70
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Kairoi} or \textit{Times} Newspaper, June 29, 1874, p.1
\textsuperscript{57} D. Dakin, \textit{The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833}, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1973, pp. 194-201
that was vehemently liberal.\(^{58}\) The next wave occurred with Venizelos, founder and leader of the Liberal Party with strict principles of liberalism, republicanism and modernisation that later become known as Venizelism against individuals in the People’s Party of Dimitrios Gounaris who were anti-Venizelists, pro-monarchists, strict conservatives and nationalists.\(^ {59}\) Post-Civil War, the two most important individuals of the time whose parties would later dominate Greek politics were Konstantinos Karamanlis of the conservative National Radical Union against his opponent Georgios Papandreou of the socialist Centre Union.\(^ {60}\)

Despite the political party that these individuals belong to, the most common theme that all possess is the notorious and ongoing Greek personality cult. Through this system, political parties are run based solely on the personality and choices of their respective leaders.\(^ {61}\) In accordance with their own personal ideologies, leaders use the charisma, attractiveness and charm of their distinct character in order to gain the patronage of fellow parliamentarians within their respective parties. Outside of the party and arguably where it counts most, this relationship exists with leaders and the Greek population who tend not to vote for political parties but rather, the leaders of such parties whose personality has individually swayed them the most effectively.\(^ {62}\)

Subsequently, the Greek personality ensures that choosing the most qualified person to lead a political party, in accordance with its own constitution, is ignored. Furthermore, due to the prestige that these leaders receive, there is no level of accountability or responsibility for any of their actions. In regards to their fellow party members, a special relationship is maintained whereby leaders will offer entitlements or positions in exchange for their unconditional support.\(^ {63}\)\(^ {64}\) A special relationship is also formed between leaders and citizens whereby the former use their political foresight and make countless promises of handouts and


other policies that will benefit citizens in exchange for their vote come election time.\textsuperscript{65}

7. Government
In Greece, depending on the period, the government or executive branch of the separation of powers has included the King, Prime Minister and Cabinet. The King or Prime Minister then chooses his or her fellow parliamentarians to serve in the respective ministries of the new government that deal with the daily administration of the Greek state, such as the Ministry of Defence. In accordance with the constitution, the laws and the platform of the political party that is now in government, ministers oversee that their ministry ensures the interests of the Greek people are fulfilled. These interests are guided based on both the domestic and foreign policies that the government establishes as a guide that helps with its decisions and achieving goals throughout their time in office.\textsuperscript{66}

However, Manolopoulos describes the function of the government as a modern day monster, a hydra consisting of several heads. Each of these heads, he explains, comprise of the statism, nepotism, cronyism and clientelism embedded in Greek society.\textsuperscript{67} In Greece, all power and influence is projected out from the central government or executive part of the government, ensuring everything and anything is passed through its administration.\textsuperscript{68} With each new government, key positions ranging from ministers to local mayors are filled with both the immediate and external family members from the same village, town, city and region, maintaining the dominance of their particular clan.

In this regard, the only condition for positions of power is having the same bloodlines.\textsuperscript{69} Next on the list, usually lower to those of family members, are the friends, contacts and associates who are also put in various positions, regardless of their education or experience.\textsuperscript{70} What holds all this in place is the notion of ‘something for something’ where those in power make promises of employment, status or another benefit in exchange for a vote or bribe.\textsuperscript{71} By doing so, the

\textsuperscript{66}Legg, \textit{Politics in Modern Greece}, pp. 177-184
\textsuperscript{67}Manolopoulos, \textit{Greece’s ‘Odious’ Debt}, p. 81

\textsuperscript{70}A. Huliaras, D. A. Sotiropoulos and J. Clarke, \textit{Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline}, Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2015
government creates a system where the nation serves the state and not the state serving the nation.

8. Checks and Balances
In many of the Greek Constitutions that have been written, the concept of checks and balances can be found, to a certain degree, within its articles that deal with the separation of powers.\textsuperscript{72} In the case of Greece, it seems that those who contributed to the writing of these articles did not fully understand what was meant by each branch of government having a check over the other to ensure the balance of power between them.\textsuperscript{73} This is reflected in the many articles that are unclear and do not make any distinction as to how the separation of powers are divided equally, causing much confusion for those who try to interpret them.\textsuperscript{74} Complicating matters further, there are those articles that question the notion of checks and balances in the system, a primary example being the lack of separation between the legislative and executive.\textsuperscript{75}

In the case of the Greek political system, what can be described as the central administration created on paper does not function as intended. In laymen’s terms, the Greeks in government ignore what they do not understand, i.e. the importance of checks and balances.\textsuperscript{76} The reason behind the reality of ignoring checks and balances is largely due to the fact that most of the Greeks, with the exception of those in the Diaspora, lived under the \textit{Tourkokratia}. As a result, the Greeks did not experience the Renaissance and the full extent of the Enlightenment when these ideas were embedded in the democratic system.\textsuperscript{77}

Greeks then tend to work around the official system in accordance with their own system they have become accustomed to as a result of almost four hundred years under the Turks.\textsuperscript{78} The very idea of checks and balances remains oblivion to the Greeks as such a system allowed the Greeks a certain amount of autonomy under various factions with the only condition being loyalty and taxes to the Sultan.

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\textsuperscript{72} Greek Constitution, 1827, 1864, 1911  
\textsuperscript{73} Manolopoulos, \textit{Greece’s ‘Odious’ Debt}, Chapter 3  
\textsuperscript{74} E. G. Vallianatos, \textit{The Passion of the Greeks: Christianity and the Rape of the Hellenes}, Harwich Port, Clock and Rose Press, 2006, p. 202  
\textsuperscript{75} M. Mitsopoulos and T. Pelagidis, \textit{Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From Boom to Bust}, Bassingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 9  
\textsuperscript{76} Legg, \textit{Politics in Modern Greece}, p.54  
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When the Greeks gained their freedom, the same factions continued to operate as they previous did without any obligations to the Sultan and thus, the importance of checks and balances remains at the low end of the spectrum.\(^7\) Regardless of who is in power, there are no effective mechanisms in place within the Greek nation-state that hold individuals responsible for their decisions and accountable for their actions.\(^8\)

**9. Public Sector**

The Greek public sector comprises of individuals who are employed by the Greek Government to directly carry out the roles and responsibilities of the administration of the state in both a civil and military nature.\(^8\) As is the case with its ministers, each ministry of government employs citizens it deems the most relevant to the position.\(^8\) As per their terms of employment, public servants abide by the guidelines of their profession, overseen by their superiors, and are responsible for offering citizens various public services.\(^8\) These range from teachers, doctors, police officers, judges, diplomats, the post, and numerous others.\(^8\)

However, the public sector in Greece functions on an invisible social contract between the government and public servants based on clientelism or the exchange of favours.\(^8\) In exchange for votes, the government offers public servants wage increases and other bonuses, tax exemptions, early retirements and pensions which are vehemently supported by their unions.\(^8\) Furthermore, many public servants have followed in the footsteps of the government by extending clientelism between themselves and citizens. In this manner, public servants will only offer their required public service in exchange for a direct or indirect favour, usually a *fakelaki* or bribe or money.

The continuation of this contract has created a public sector that is the largest and most bloated sector in the country comprised of numerous unqualified

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\(^7\) S. Pepino, *Sovereign Risk and Financial Crisis: The International Political Economy of the Eurozone*, Bassingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, Chapter 4


\(^8\) G. Starling, *Managing the Public Sector*, Wadsworth, Melbourne, 2011, pp. 3-7


\(^8\) M. Paula, *Emergency Management and Disaster Response Utilizing Public-Private Partnerships*, Hershey, IGI Global, 2015, pp. 71-72


and inexperienced public servants. By maintaining the status quo, every day Greek citizens are left with the option of either paying a bribe to receive their service or to seek it elsewhere on the black market. Furthermore, the purposeful overrepresentation and assignment of public servants to the same or similar position, sometimes more than one, has decreased levels of productivity with tasks that would initially take one individual to complete being divided among many, and others being assigned, in name only, to positions that are outdated or simply do not exist. There have even been cases with public servants spending government time on personal use, long breaks and numerous days of absence.

10. Security

King Otto established the Gendarmerie in 1833 that was ironically comprised of Klephthes or thieves, men who for centuries made a living from breaking the law and were now tasked with enforcing it. In an effort at modernisation, reforms were made in 1920 with the establishment of the Cities Police who were tasked with crime primarily in Athens and later other cities as well as in 1946 with the help of the British in order to model the Gendarmerie after the British Police and make it more civilian friendly. In addition, although de facto established in 1821, the Greek Army and Navy were officially established in 1828 and prided themselves as the backbone of the Greek nation-state for their role during the Greek Revolution. In 1911, this extended to the Hellenic Air Force which saw its first engagement in the Balkan Wars that ultimately ended in a Greek victory.

However, over the years, both the Hellenic Police and Hellenic Armed Forces have been caught up in the affairs of the Greek nation-state due to their perception as the protectors of the Greeks and above all, Greece. Traditionally, as this idea is advocated within right-wing nationalism, which runs deep in the history of Greek politics, both the Hellenic Police and Hellenic Armed Forces have easily aligned

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89 D. Cade, Athens - the Truth: Searching for Manos, Just Before the Bubble Burst, Mardu, Tales of Orpheus, pp. 343-348
90 Greek Government, Government Gazette, June 1, 1833
91 Greek Law 2461/1920
92 Greek Law 1137/1946
93 Greek Law 1825
themselves and given support to such groups.\textsuperscript{95} The Hellenic Police have therefore based law and order on a strict militaristic hierarchy, training and personal bias with abuses occurring systematically.\textsuperscript{96} Additionally, the Greek Army has believed it has the authority to ensure that all those it regards as enemies of Greece should be dealt with through whatever means necessary.

The Hellenic Police have thus been brutal towards those considered undesirables, leftists or simply a person who was not liked by arresting, detaining or exiling them to uninhabited islands without a fair trial and in less fortunate cases, torturing, kidnapping and murdering them. On rare but notable occasions, the Hellenic Police have been especially brutal such as with the Dilessi Murders in 1870. On an even greater scale, the Hellenic Army has successfully and unsuccessfully intervened in Greek politics in 1843, 1862, 1909, 1922, 1923, 1925, 1926, 1935, 1938 and 1961.\textsuperscript{97} While most of these caused considerable damage, the most brutal were the Metaxas Regime 1936-1941 and Papadopoulos 

\textit{Junta} 1967-1974.\textsuperscript{98}

11. Elites
Elites in Greece can be broken down into those who were and are descendants from Old Greece or Attica, Peloponnese and Rumelia and include the Mavromichalis, Zaimis, Trikoupis, Koumoundouros, Deligeorgis, Deligiannis and Papandreou families, to name but a few.\textsuperscript{99} There are also those who are descendants from the Phanar District of Constantinople, otherwise known as the Phanariotes and includes the Mavrokordatos and Rallis families, and in unique cases those from Crete or Asia Minor such as the Venizelos and Karamanlis families. Furthermore, elites have included descendants of the Greek aristocrats from the Ionian Islands such as Theotokis and Metaxas families.\textsuperscript{100} Finally, there are those from the Aegean Islands part of the merchant fleet, still the largest in the world, and includes the Angelicoussis, Pappas, Frangou, Economou, Livanos,

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\textsuperscript{95} D. Christopoulos, “Mapping Ultra-Right Extremism, Xenophobia and Racism within the Greek State Apparatus”, \textit{Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung}, 2014, p. 39
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\textsuperscript{98} T. Veremis, \textit{Military in Greek Politics}, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1997, pp. 183-188
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\textsuperscript{100} A. Triandafyllidou, R. Gropas and H. Kouki, \textit{The Greek Crisis and European Modernity}, Bassingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p.90-97
\end{flushright}
Prokopiou, Veniamis, Konstantakopoulos, Tsakos, Marinakis, Palios, Georgiopoulos, Platsidakis and Melissanidis, Kanaris, Voulgaris, families.  

In the case of Greece, such elites can be described as adhering to what Sotiropoulos and Bourikos describe as the ‘iron law of oligarchy’. Regardless of how democratic Greece may perceive itself to be, the existence of such individuals has inevitably lead to the development of oligarchic tendencies. It would seem that most, if not all of these Greek elites, whether by lineage or associate, have infiltrated and created a power vacuum within the core of the country. More specifically, using the Greek nation-state as their tool, Greek elites have ensured their power and influence flows down in a hierarchical system throughout Greek society.

All political positions within the country such as the President, Prime Minister and Ministers have nevertheless been filled by descendants of such families. Through whatever means necessary, including extremely high levels of corruption, special concessions and the like, and at the expense of the majority of the Greeks, Greek elites maintain this status quo to fulfil their own collective and mainly monetary interests. This is demonstrated in the fact that the core economic sectors of the country ranging from banking, shipping, petroleum, mining, steel, art collection and other commodities are dominated solely by Greek elites such as the Niarchos, Latsis, Mistakidis and Angelopoulos families. In total, Greek elites who represent approximately one percent of all Greeks in Greece control approximately sixty percent of the total wealth in the country, totaling in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

12. Church of Greece

When the Greek Revolution broke out, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, leader of the Greeks under the Tourkokratia, issued an anathema against the Greek Revolutionaries. Understanding the level of power that the Patriarchate of Constantinopelaries wielded, prominent individuals of the new Greek nation-state who

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103 Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*, pp. 296-318  
104 Manolopoulos, *Greece’s ‘Odiou’ Debt*, Chapter 5  
were influenced by men such as Korais agreed to try and control Orthodoxy. In an attempt to break free from the reigns of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Theoklitos Pharmakides and Bavarian Vice-Regent Maurer proclaimed the Church of Greece in 1833 that was autocephalous to the Patriarchate. While it initially disagreed, the Patriarch of Constantinople issued a document titled the Tomos in 1850 which accepted that the Church of Greece as an autocephalous church.

However, this agreement has led to a synallellia or co-synergy between the Church of Greece and the Greek nation-state whereby one reinforces the other and vice versa. Despite the intentions of Pharmakides and Maurer, the Church of Greece, part of the larger Patriarchate of Constantinople, officially became the National Church of the Greek Nation-State. Rather than promoting its official stance of protector of the genos or universal community of Christendom, the Church of Greece now promoted its position of protector of only the Greek ethnos. Thus, the agreement guaranteed that the Church of Greece maintains its original authority over the Greeks which is first and foremost witnessed in each Greek Constitution that begins with the preamble ‘In the Name of the Holy, Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity’ and includes the article ‘the predominant religion within Greek territory is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ’.

The Church of Greece is guaranteed such a status so long as it supports the government of the day, notwithstanding far-right dictatorships, in exchange for the nation-state also supporting their independence and previously established jurisdictions. Deepening this relationship, the Greek nation-state grants the Church with salaries, tax exemptions, benefits and property, including the entire peninsula of Mount Athos, in return for its influence throughout the state apparatus, primarily in education. Although freedom of religion is guaranteed by the nation-state, restrictions are in place so that any religions contrary to Orthodox Christianity do not contravene public order, offend morals and under any circumstances engage in proselytizing. The Church also wields a substantial amount of power by oppressing all those who criticise it through their excommunication or temporary removal from the Church and if the perceived threat is serious.

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108 Greek Government, Government Gazette, July 25, 1833
109 Patriarchate of Constantinople, Tomos, 1850
111 Patriarchate of Constantinople, Anathema against Greek Revolutionaries, 1821
112 Greek Constitution, 1922, p. 1
113 Church of Greece, Patriarchal Act, 1928
114 Greek Law 536/1945
115 Greek Constitution, 1922, p. 2
enough, through an anathema or banishment from the Church and subsequently from Greek society.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{116} Greek Canon Law 1431-1437
Chapter 2: 1975 – 1985

1. Context
The notion of a Third Hellenic Republic began to circulate immediately with the onset of the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974. With fears that Greece and Turkey would become embroiled in an all-out war over the island, Phaedon Gizikis of the Junta called a meeting that comprised of politicians and the heads of the armed forces who tried to establish a Government of National Unity, though the talks failed due to disagreements over who would be given the position to lead this government.117 After the meeting, Evangelos Averoff stayed back and engaged in further talks with Gizikis, suggesting that Karamanlis was the only person that could fulfil the task of transitioning Greece from a military dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy, particularly during a time of foreign and domestic urgency.118 Once Gizikis agreed, Karamanlis was telephoned by his close friend Averoff who convinced him to return to Greece from self-exile in Paris and establish a Government of National Unity.119

Karamanlis immediately made attempts at democratising Greece by first and foremost having a new constitution drafted while also declaring Greek Elections of 1974 to be held on November 17.120 Karamanlis also freed all Greek political prisoners and those guilty of political crimes against the Junta, removed extreme collaborators from positions in government and in a significant reform that demonstrated political plurality was the legalisation of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE).121 In a further attempt to distance Greece from the past, Karamanlis was responsible for the Athens Trials where nineteen prominent members of the Junta were tried with treason and mutiny, including Papadopoulos, most of who were found guilty, dishonourably discharged from the Greek Army and spent the rest of their lives in jail.122 Upon his return to Greece, Karamanlis earnt himself the title from the Greek people ‘Ethnarch of Democracy’.123

After the Greek Elections of 1974, Karamanlis became the Prime Minister and in an effort to solve the question of what type of government Greece would have, held the Greek Republic Referendum on December 8, 1974, which abolished the

117 Greek Government, Government Gazette, July 23, 1974
118 Greek Government, Government Gazette, July 24, 1974
119 Greek Government, Government Gazette, July 26, 1974
120 Greek Government, Government Gazette, October 4, 1974
121 Greek Government, Government Gazette, August 7 and 9, September 5, 23 and 27, 1974
monarchy for a republic with 69.2% in favour and 30.8% against. As New Democracy held an absolute majority in the Hellenic Parliament with 220 of 300 seats, Karamanlis had the new Constitution of 1975 adopted and ratified. Once the Constitution of 1975 was adopted, the Hellenic Parliament elected Konstantinos Tsatsos to be President with 210 votes from 300 on the first ballot who gave Karamanlis the mandate to form a government. Karamanlis was, therefore, successful at transforming the *junta* into the Third Hellenic Republic.

### 2. Constitution

The Constitution of 1975 outlined the way that Greece would now be democratically governed. For the first time, Greece became a proper and functional parliamentary presidential republic that was based on the principles of the welfare state, the separation of powers and the rule of law. The constitution also includes numerous articles on the rights and responsibilities of citizens which are guaranteed and unalterable, and included their rights to freedom, liberty and property. Above all else, popular sovereignty would be its most important aspect in that the Greek people, the citizens, are the source of all power. For example, Article 1, Excerpts 2-3 state “Popular sovereignty is the foundation of government. All powers derive from the People and exist for the People and the Nation; they shall be exercised as specified by the Constitution.”

The legislative or Hellenic Parliament consists of 300 parliamentarians or representatives from various political parties who are elected by Greek citizens through direct, universal, secret and compulsory elections. The executive or Greek Government consists of the Prime Minister and Ministers of the political party or coalition of parties who form a majority in the Hellenic Parliament with 150 or more of 300 seats. The judiciary or the courts consist of the civil, criminal and administrative courts such as the Courts of Justice, the Courts of First Instance, the

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127 Note: First Hellenic Republic 1822–1832, Second Hellenic Republic 1924–1935
128 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 1, Excerpt 1
129 Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 4-25
130 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 1, Excerpts 2-3
131 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 51, Excerpts 1-3
132 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 82, Excerpts 1-2
Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The President is the Head of the Hellenic State and although the role is largely ceremonial, the President can declare war, sign peace treaties and most important of all, ensures the functioning of the Greek State.

The most imperative differences from all previous constitutions was the proper functioning of the Hellenic Parliament, comprised of MPs who represent the citizens, who create and present the legislation or laws to be debated. When a government is formed after elections, it is the responsibility of the government, in accordance with its policies, to enforce all the laws that have been enacted by the Hellenic Parliament in the day-to-day functioning of the Greek nation-state. If the time arises where a matter must be solved between a citizen and another citizen, as well as between a citizen and the state itself, it is the responsibility of the judiciary to interpret each case through these laws. The Constitution of 1975 was thus hailed by both Greeks and the West for introducing numerous democratic articles that had not been seen in Greece since the days of Venizelos.

3. Citizenship
Karamanlis reversed the Junta Constitutional Act that stripped Greek leftists and other dissidents or labelled enemies of their citizenship while allowing them, through special committees, re-acquire as well as pass on Greek citizenship. In a further attempt to maintain strong relations with the Greek Diaspora, Karamanlis also made the process of nationalisation of such Greeks significantly easier on the grounds of ius sanguinis or being born to a Greek father with citizenship. Papandreou continued the work of Karamanlis by granting Greek women the right to transfer their citizenship to their children, extending the law of ius sanguinis. Karamanlis and Papandreou also both made significant efforts toward Roma born in Greece by granting them Greek citizenship.

However, neither Karamanlis or Papandreou granted the same concessions to non-ethnic Greek minorities such as the Albanians as they were not considered.

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133 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 87, Excerpts 1-2  
134 Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 35-48  
135 Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 51-54, 73-77  
136 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 82, Excerpts 1-4  
137 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 94, Excerpts 1-4 and Article 95, Excerpts 1-5  
138 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 25, Excerpts 1-4  
139 Greek Citizenship Code, 1975, Article 1, Paragraph 1  
140 Greek Law 120/1914  
140 Greek Law 1438/1984
to meet the full criteria of Greek citizenship.\textsuperscript{141} Furthermore, non-ethnic Greeks who had been born and lived in the country but stripped of their Greek citizenship did not receive the opportunity to re-acquire it.\textsuperscript{142} Both Karamanlis and Papandreou were vehement in their enforcement of laws that aimed at minimising and controlling minority populations, mainly the Muslims in Thrace. For example, Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code specifically states “A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality”.\textsuperscript{143} Non-ethnic Greeks who wanted to reside in Greece were given long residence or naturalisation requirements to deter them from achieving such an end.\textsuperscript{144}

Post-1974, Greek citizenship laws now made a strong distinction between \textit{homogenis} and \textit{allogenis} or ethnic Greeks and non-ethnic Greeks.\textsuperscript{145} In an attempt to make Greece ethnically and linguistically homogenous, non-Greeks were simply not granted Greek citizenship, particularly those viewed as coming from a hostile country and unable to fulfil Greek national consciousness. For those non-ethnic Greeks who had lost their citizenship, their re-acquisition was disallowed by Greece as a means of avoiding future problems with peoples designated as enemies of Greece. The strict immigration laws for non-ethnic Greeks finally acted as a deterrent for anyone not considered ‘Greek’ to live within its borders.

4. Popular Sovereignty

In the Greek Elections of 1974, the Greeks voted for Karamanlis who won with his newly established New Democracy (ND) by 54.4\%, followed by the Centre Union-New Forces with 20.4\% and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) with 13.6\%. In the Greek Elections of 1977, Karamanlis was again victorious, although with a decrease receiving 41.8\% and his new rival, Papandreou of PASOK coming in second with 25.3\%. In the Greek Elections of 1981, the Greeks voted for Papandreou, a hard-line populist, who won with PASOK by 48.1\%, followed by ND with 35.9\%. Finally, in the Greek Elections of 1985 Papandreou was yet again victorious with 45.8\% following by ND with a close 40.8\%.

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\textsuperscript{141} D. Anagnostou, “Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanisation of Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship”, \textit{West European Politics}, West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2005, pp. 337-338

\textsuperscript{142} D. Zachos, “Citizenship, Ethnicity and Education in Modern Greece”, \textit{Journal of Modern Greek Studies}, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2009, pp. 138-141

\textsuperscript{143} Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 4, Excerpt 3


\textsuperscript{145} D. Christopoulos, “Mapping Ultra-Right Extremism, Xenophobia and Racism within the Greek State Apparatus”, \textit{Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung}, 2014, p.3
However, in the Greek Elections of 1974, Karamanlis was accused by Papandreou for using right-wing individuals who worked for the Junta to gain more votes through coercion.\footnote{Kassimeris, \textit{Journal of Contemporary History}, pp. 750-751} Despite this accusation and winning the Greek Elections of 1977, Karamanlis, to the dismay and questioning of ND, felt the need to leave his post by resigning as Prime Minister and instead becoming the President in 1980.\footnote{P. Siani-Davies and S. Katsikas, “National Reconciliation After Civil War: The Case of Greece”, \textit{Journal of Peace Research}, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2009, p. 568} In the Greek Elections of 1981, Karamanlis accused Papandreou of using populism as a means of altering the vote of Greeks by re-igniting the \textit{Apostasia} of 1965 and labelling ND MPs such as Mitsotakis as defectors and apostates who could not be trusted. In the Presidential Election of 1985, PASOK did not fulfil its duties as its MPs as they refused to participate, forcing Karamanlis to resign, and finally presenting their own Christos Sartzetakis to be President using colour ballot papers that allowed Papandreou to see who exactly voted for and did not vote for his selection.\footnote{R. McDonald, “Greece after PASOK's Victory”, \textit{The World Today}, Vol. 41, No. 7, 1985, p. 84}

While popular sovereignty was exercised through compulsory elections, there were critical moments by Karamanlis and Papandreou when it was not fully respected or enforced. Immediately after its implementation into Greece, the popular sovereignty or the power invested to the Greek people were not expressed freely and without falsification in supposed direct, universal and secret ballots that were abused. Furthermore, in an effort to ensure a political result at the expense of voters, the semi-proportional representation with a majority bonus system was clearly not respected. Such abuses that impact on the popular sovereignty of Greek citizens never resulted in prosecutions and punishments, even when usurpation and breaches occurred.\footnote{Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 120, Excerpt 3}

5. Political Parties
ideology to be more in line with the moderate social liberalism and social democracy.\textsuperscript{151}

However, despite the return of democratic political parties, both Karamanlis and Papandreou adhered to the age-old Greek personality cult.\textsuperscript{152} Although Karamanlis was not the strongest leader and public speaker, he was a charismatic individual that was known to have a reputation for drive and efficiency in all his political activities which granted him a significant amount of influence over and respect from New Democracy.\textsuperscript{153} In contrast, Papandreou, simply known by his first name Andreas, a rare commodity in politics, was a very charismatic individual with all the things he said, earning him a respected reputation among those in PASOK. Further compounded by being the son of Georgios Papandreou and for his role during the Junta when he established the Panhellenic Liberation Movement that sought to overthrow the dictator and restore order, Papandreou can be described as Greece’s most influential leader.\textsuperscript{154}

The result of such leaders led to the abandonment of democratically organised parties, a strong rivalry between the two parties they represented and ultimately, to the inevitable establishment of the two-party system in Greece between New Democracy and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement.\textsuperscript{155} In an attempt to battle for the hearts and minds of the Greeks, Karamanlis used his position and advocated Greece under New Democracy as a nation-state of the West, EU and NATO. In contrast, Papandreou used his position and advocated Greece under PASOK as a nation-state that that the single and only purpose of serving the Greek people. Where Karamanlis expressed such a position through the motto “Greece belongs to the West”, Papandreou, in turn, coined his own and perhaps the stronger motto "Greece belongs to the Greeks".\textsuperscript{156}

6. Government
The Karamanlis Governments were mainly tasked with democratisation policies in Greece that tried to reflect New Democracy’s pro-West image and transform Greece

\textsuperscript{151} M. Spourdalakis and C. Tassis, “Party Change in Greece and the Vanguard Role of PASOK", \textit{South European Society and Politics}, Vol. 11, No. 3-4, pp. 498-499
\textsuperscript{155} V. K. Fouskas, “Whatever Happened to Greece?”, \textit{The Political Quarterly}, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2013, p. 134
from the days of the *Junta*.\(^{157}\) The Karamanlis Governments also rebuilt the Greek economy through their expansionist economic policies and were able to successfully acquire Greece’s membership to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981. In addition, the Papandreou Government focused the majority of its policies on social and economic reforms that had the goal of transforming Greece into a more democratic yet socialist nation-state. This was mainly achieved through the de-industrialisation of the country with a focus solely on the agricultural and service sectors.

However, Karamanlis was accused by his opponents of not removing all right-wing individuals who worked for the *Junta* from his government and through the use of nepotism and party clientelism, used such individuals in their day to day activities.\(^{158}\) Further, the Karamanlis was accused by his opponents of using former *Junta* members via secret orders to help him gain votes at the Greek Elections in 1977 through coercive measures as was the case during the Greek Elections in 1974.\(^{159}\) However, it would be under the Papandreou Governments that such individual practices within political parties and government ministries would be transformed into national practices of clientelism, fuelled by Papandreou’s populism, of the government itself.\(^{160}\) Although PASOK was Eurosceptic when in the Opposition, once the Papandreou Government was in office it used Greece’s position within the EEC to play political games with in an attempt to shield and distract the latter from how it used funds that were granted to Greece.\(^{161}\)

The Papandreou Governments, therefore, had no restraint and consumed more than they produced, only meeting the costs of the country’s budget through further loans.\(^{162}\) The majority of these funds, as well as those that were borrowed unconditionally from various financial institutions, were used to maintain the expenditures of PASOK, vis-à-vis economic packages such as the welfare system put in place to benefit the Greek population.\(^{163}\) While none of these events was ever truthfully communicated to the people in the official Government Gazette, by the end of the Second Papandreou Government, the country was in an economic disaster. While the people were left burdened with an extremely high, increasing and unsustainable debt due to PASOK’s loans, Greece’s inflation was continuously

\(^{157}\) Kassimeris, *Journal of Contemporary History*, p. 754


\(^{159}\) Kassimeris, *Journal of Contemporary History*, p. 756

\(^{160}\) Lane, *Comparing Party System Change*, p.217


increasing at a considerable pace with the only option to devalue the Greek drachma by 15% in 1983.  

7. Checks and Balances
In terms of checks and balances, there has not been a significant change in their implementation within each branch of government. The President was immediately granted a considerable amount of power over both the Greek Parliament as well as over the Greek Government itself that could be exercised at any time when he or she saw fit. In terms of the separation of powers, the Government and the Parliament were not independent of one another but rather, interdependent on one another in that the Government must hold the confidence of the Parliament while the Parliament must hold a majority to form a Government. Although the Courts were granted total independence from the Parliament and Government and were able to conduct their tasks freely, judges were at the mercy of the President who at any time could elect and dismiss such individuals.

However, from the beginning, Karamanlis chose one of his closest friends, Christos Sartzetakis, to be the President of the newly established Third Hellenic Republic. As Prime Minister, Karamanlis ensured if need be, he could easily influence Sartzetakis and the powers he held as President to fulfil personal interests without interference. Later, knowing full well that New Democracy would not win the Greek Elections of 1981, Karamanlis abruptly stood down as Prime Minister and became the President himself, using the position as a means to keep Papandreou in check from undermining the work he had achieved regarding NATO and the EU. When Papandreou became the Prime Minister, he used the notion of checks and balances not to guarantee the separation of powers of the Greek State but rather, as a means of exercising influence over the Greek people through various means such as bribes.

The virtual non-existence of official checks and balances has thus increased the unofficial checks and balances used by individuals such as Karamanlis and

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164 R. McDonald, The World Today, pp. 134-135
165 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 26, Excerpts 1-3
166 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 84, Excerpts 1-7 and Article 37, Excerpts 1-4
167 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 87, Excerpt 1
168 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 88, Excerpt 1
Papandreou. Depending on who was the Prime Minister or President, checks and balances are simply a reflection of how such individuals have maintained or achieved their personal agendas and causes. Despite the fact that Sartzetakis and Karamanlis did not officially use the powers as President, the Parliament and to a greater extent the Government did, in fact, execute their powers, especially those that strengthened the centralization of power. Particularly viewed on a greater scale during the administration of Papandreou, he was able to further enforce the centralisation of power by maintaining a position that was always in favour of the majority ethnic Greek population while disregarding the interest of Greece’s minorities and to a lesser degree, Greek opposition groups.

8. Public Sector
One of the most important challenges for Karamanlis and later Papandreou in this period was the emphasis on the public sector and its links with the political system. Initially, the public sector was to comprise of public servants whose allegiance is to the Greek people whereby, under the protection of the law, public servants are appointed by the government in various ministries to offer public services to the Greek people. In order to ensure no bias exists and the Greek State functions effectively, public servants must be free from any allegiances or memberships to political parties. If public servants wish to join a political party, stand for election or be elected to Parliament, they must resign from their positions in government, particularly higher ranking individuals part of independent authorities, the armed forces, police, ministries and so on.

In accordance with his economic policies, Karamanlis began to slowly grow the public sector through the naturalisation of a vast amount of enterprises, including the ports, that were either facing severe financial troubles or those that were newly established organisations. By taking things slowly, Karamanlis was able to offer more Greeks employment in the public sector, mostly in tourism and shipping, pleasing much to his advantage the middle class. However, in

173 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 37, Excerpts 1-4 and Article 38, Excerpt 2
174 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 120, Excerpt 4
175 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 103, Excerpts 1-3
176 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 29, Excerpt 3
177 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 56, Excerpts 1-4
accordance with his populist dogma, Papandreou appointed as many Greeks as possible to hundreds and thousands of public sector positions, many of whom were not qualified and had no experience, in exchange for political support. Such a status quo was maintained by Papandreou through the cooking of the books, which pleased the officials, as well as by Greece’s Union of Public Sector Employees who defended public servants vehemently.

Although Karamanlis maintained the public sector at approximately 300,000 employees, he used remittances gained from the Greeks in the Diaspora, considered a wealthy a cow to be milked, to help keep Greeks employed at home in such an unproductive atmosphere. Whether intentional or not, under Papandreou, the public sector became bloated with each respective government sector in the country being completely overstuffed. Papandreou’s populism of a Greece for the Greeks stemmed deep within the public sector and resulted in the age-old practice of clientelism on a national level where, in exchange for votes in the elections, Papandreou offered various positions, handouts and benefits to public servants. Arguably, Papandreou treated the public sector as a tool to gain and maintain votes at elections by offering jobs to anyone who in turn would reward their leader at the elections and as such, the public sector increased to approximately 500,000 employees by 1981 and to 700,000 by 1985.

9. Security
Understanding the deep role, respect and significance the Hellenic Armed Forces had in the history of the Greeks, Karamanlis maintained the notion of serving one’s fatherland through conscription that was regulated by strict laws. In regards to the Hellenic Armed Forces, specifically the Hellenic Army, Karamanlis removed them from politics and brought them under the command of the President and Government. Karamanlis also disbanded the Greek Military Police in 1974 that had been the backbone of the Junta, establishing a new Military Police of the Hellenic Army with limited powers and the new motto of ‘Consciously Obey the

182 G. Prevelakis, “Finis Greciae or the Return of the Greeks? State and Diaspora in the Context of Globalisation”, UFR de Géographie, p.6
183 G. K. Zestos, The Global Financial Crisis, New York, Routledge, 2015, Chapter 7
185 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 4, Excerpt 6
186 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 45
Laws’. In an effort at further reforms, particularly of their right-wing nature, Papandreou merged the Gendarmerie and Cities Police into the single Hellenic Police in 1984 to make the enforcement of law more civilian friendly.\(^{187}\)

As a result of what had happened in Cyprus, Karamanlis significantly increased the rearmaments of the Greek Army not with the assistance of the US due to its support of Turkey but rather, with the support of mainly France that helped with the establishment of a Greek military industry.\(^{188}\) Karamanlis increased the morale of the Hellenic Army by re-positioning units in areas of significant importance such as Western Thrace, the Aegean Islands and Cyprus, ensuring their defence capabilities.\(^{189}\) Due to heightened risk with Turkey in the Aegean Sea in the 1980s, Papandreou expanded on these units so that they also acted as a deterrent against an attack due to their close proximity to important cities such as Constantinople and Smyrna in Turkey.\(^{190}\) However, Papandreou undermined what Karamanlis had achieved by drastically expanding the small yet professional force into a larger, less experienced force that was unable to keep up with equipment and personnel modernization.\(^{191}\)

Dissatisfied with the West’s lack of response to Turkey for its actions in Cyprus, Karamanlis chose the lesser of two evils where rather than declare war on Turkey, he chose for Greece to leave the military detachment of NATO.\(^{192}\) Rather than engaging Turkey, Karamanlis, with the help of then Defence Minister Evangelos Averoff, was able to transform the Hellenic Armed Forces into a professional and disciplined force capable of defending the Greek people and country.\(^{193}\) A year later, Karamanlis applied to re-join the military wing of NATO, a move that was vetoed by Turkey on the grounds of the Aegean Dispute, albeit due to the heightened threat from the USSR, Greece was able to re-join NATO under the status quo. Papandreou’s implementation of democratising measures was contrary to the very purpose of the military as they advocated a more civil nature and as a

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\(^{187}\) Greek Law 1481/84  
\(^{190}\) P. Dimitrakis, “Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish Threat during the 1987 Aegean Crisis”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2007, p. 111  
\(^{191}\) Dimitrakis, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, pp.117-122  
\(^{193}\) C. Kassimeris, “Greek Response to the Cyprus Invasion”, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2008, p. 259
result, soldiers were not training as hard, were less disciplined and had a very low morale.\textsuperscript{194}

10. Elites

Karamanlis was born in Proti, Macedonia to Georgios Karamanlis and his wife in 1907 and part of the larger Karamanlis Dynasty associated with the region of Serres. Karamanlis is also a descendant of the Karamanlides from Cappodocia in Asia Minor, though his family was relocated to Macedonia during the Population Exchange in 1923.\textsuperscript{195} His rival, Papandreou, was born in on the island of Chios to the three-time Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou and his wife the Sofia. Part of the larger Papandreou Dynasty, Papandreou followed in the footsteps of his father and was closely associated with the family stronghold in Achaea, Peloponnese.\textsuperscript{196}

Karamanlis, however, sought the position of the President for his own personal interests as at the time, it was the strongest position in the country due to its almost unlimited powers over the Prime Minister and Parliament. Karamanlis used such powers when he indirectly threatened to dissolve the Greek Parliament if he believed it did not reflect the popular will of the Greeks later under Papandreou.\textsuperscript{197} However, when Papandreou became Prime Minister, he used the position to his own advantage to introduce, on a national scale, the policy of populism in running the direction and action of the entire country.\textsuperscript{198} By doing so, Papandreou filled all the positions of the then PASOK Government with like-minded individuals who infiltrated all levels of government, giving him complete authority over matters that concerned their respective administrative areas.\textsuperscript{199}

Arguably, the fall of the Junta in 1974 had helped put the political elites in a slightly better situation whereby they have been the most prominent in filling positions of power such as the Prime Minister, President, Ministers and MPs.\textsuperscript{200} Regardless of the ways in which Greek elites act while serving their term, they are all granted immunity from being prosecuted, arrested or imprisoned for all political crimes so long as they serve without any restrictions being imposed.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{197} Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 41, Excerpts 1-5
\textsuperscript{198} Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 82, Excerpts 1-4 and Article 83, Excerpts 1-3
\textsuperscript{199} Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 103, Excerpts 1-5
\textsuperscript{201} Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 62
Interestingly, even if MPs or Ministers were convicted, they can be granted a pardon for all political crimes they may or may not commit by the President, which is ironically consented by a three-fifths majority of Parliament. In essence, individuals such as Karamanlis and Papandreou, as well as their closest associates Rallis, Averoff or Charalambopoulos, were nonetheless immune from the law and de facto above it.

11. Church of Greece
While the Orthodox Church was still the prevailing religion according to the Greek Constitution 1975, the recognition of the Greek State was more to respect the historical links with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Holy Synod and not to impeach over citizens. The religious conscience of all citizens was thus recognised as an inviolable right or liberty. The religious freedom of citizens was therefore guaranteed and not a pre-requisite for any participation in Greek society, such as politicians who were not required to take their oath in the presence of the Holy Synod and swear to protect the prevailing religion. However, the Church of Greece was granted the ownership to the Holy Bible where any translations from the original Greek cannot be made without the consent of the Church.

Despite these changes, the Church of Greece still had a considerable amount of power within the Greek State due to the latter's implementation within the Greek Constitution of 'prevailing religion of Greece'. As a result of the power granted to the Church of Greece, the Greek State has indirectly agreed to the notion of secularising the State and politicising the Church which means there is not a separation between Church and State but rather, a separation of the State from the Church. By recognising that the Church of Greece is inseparably united in doctrine with the other Orthodox Churches and observing unwaveringly the holy apostolic and synodical canons and sacred traditions, the Greek State automatically introduces the indirect article for the holy canons within the constitution, causing conflict between State law and Church law. This is maintained through the authority it has over defined jurisdictions that are aligned with the territories of the country.

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202 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 47, Excerpts 1-4
204 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 3 and PD 15/1833
205 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 13, Excerpt 5
206 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 3, Excerpt 3
As a result, the clergy of the Church of Greece have a high status and receive special treatment from the Greek State such as salaries, pensions and the almost never-ending list of benefits.\textsuperscript{209} Property belonging to the Church of Greece as well as the Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and the Holy Monastery of Mount Sinai are not allowed to be subject to expropriation and are vehemently protected by the Greek State.\textsuperscript{210} Furthermore, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, technically in a foreign country, has complete rule and authority over the Autonomous Monastic State of the Holy Mountain or simply Mount Athos, an entire peninsula in Greek Macedonia.\textsuperscript{211} More importantly, the Church of Greece has influence over laws it perceives as an offence to the public good of Orthodox Greece, such as proselytism, as well as over social practices such as education, abortions, civil marriages, cremation rights, to name a few.\textsuperscript{212}

12. Summary
The period of 1974-1986 in Greece was indeed marked by significant changes, both positive and negative, in many of the country's institutions. The greatest change came with the Constitution of 1975 that for the first time in the history of the Greek Nation-State, made significant attempts at laying down the foundations of the new democratic Greece, with limited errors. Probably the weakest institution discussed here is the checks and balances that still, in this new era of democratic transition failed to be properly implemented and executed. To such an end, the elites in Greece, mainly those of a hereditary nature, used the situation to their advantage by occupying many of the strongest positions in the country, unchecked and without any hindrance.

In terms of who the citizens of post-Junta Greece would be, the old tendencies of ‘native’ versus ‘non-native’ Greek were a thing of the past with Greeks being represented as a collective group, though the same could not be said for Greece's minorities who were not given the same treatment. Despite this error, the majority of the citizens represented the full force of the power in the country with their will being heard at elections and referendums while at times, those who represented their interests did act on their own accords for personal gain. Such representatives were undoubtedly found in the Parliament, comprised of two relatively democratic parties of the centre left and centre right that engaged one another in a democratic conduct in the public discourse while in private, struggled

\textsuperscript{209} E. Fotiou, “We Are the Indians of Greece”, CrossCurrents, Vol. 64, No. 2, 2014, p. 221
\textsuperscript{210} Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 18, Excerpt 8 and Article 13, Excerpts 2-3
\textsuperscript{211} Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 105, Excerpts 1-5
to deal with the personal cult of party leaders that has lingered in Greece for much of its existence. To an even greater extent, the governments of the day were found to have successfully acted on behalf of their constituents, addressing many fundamental issues of the public such as the economy, whereas finding it difficult to resist the temptations of nepotism and clientelism within its ranks.

The public sector felt the most effects of these problems by not being used as a tool to help citizens with their social needs but rather, being intentionally or unintentionally used as a tool to fulfil the needs of the state itself. On a very important front, the security of the country was effectively enhanced with the capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces being increased so that they were capable of both defensive and offensive tactics, particularly regarding Turkey. Finally, while it seems the Greek State tried to reign in the Church of Greece in order to make it subordinate to its will, it seems that as a result of the two-thousand-year presence of Orthodoxy, particularly the theocratic Orthodoxy developed during the Hellenic Empire and strengthened more so during the Ottoman Empire, such a notion failed drastically with the Church maintaining its power and influence. Nonetheless, the period of 1974-1986 in Greece can be described as an overall success in terms of its transition from military rule to democratic rule with the positive changes in its institutions far outweighing the negative mishaps.
Chapter 3: 1986 – 2000

1. Context
The period from 1986 to 2001 can be described as a time when democratic institutions in Greece were changing to a more democratic nature. In accordance with Article 110 and for the first time since its introduction in 1975, the Greek Constitution was revised in 1986 by the Papandreou-led PASOK Government, targeting mainly articles regarding the President. In terms of the source of power, Greek citizens partook in seven Greek national elections, four local elections and three European elections based on the controversial system of party-list proportional representation. Prior to the Communist Revolutions 1989 as well as after, the notion of citizenship was once again raised with the Greek State dealing with a severe increase of both ethnic Greeks as well as non-Greeks from former communist countries.

The period would also see the arrival of two new elites, Constantine Mitsotakis of ND and Costas Simitis of PASOK. While Andreas Papandreou remained on the political scene, his new rival would be Konstantinos Mitsotakis until he later died on June 23, 1996. As one can expect, ND and PASOK were the main parties of the period with the latter winning most of the elections and extending its domination over the political spectrum on all levels. However, at home, of concern to both camps was the dependent Greek economy on foreign support and whether it should remain public with state intervention or private intervention from various organisations such as the EU.

Due to its historical role, the Greek Orthodox Church continued its involvement in the affairs of the Greek State through various dilemmas, the most notable being the issue of Greek ID cards and their removal of religious affiliation. In addition, Greece had been focused on facing the hostile actions of Turkey, primarily in the Aegean Sea, with the threat of war almost being realised in 1987 and 1996, and with its involvement in the Yugoslav Wars. Due to its historical role, the Greek Orthodox Church continued its involvement in the affairs of the Greek State through various dilemmas, the most notable being the issue of Greek ID cards and their removal of religious affiliation. As such, whether these changes during this period were effective is yet to be seen.

2. Constitution
The purpose of the revisions to the Greek Constitution in 1986 was to transform Greece into a functioning parliamentary democracy.\(^{213}\) In total, eleven articles were

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\(^{213}\) Greek Constitution, 1975, Page 8
amended, all of which focused solely on the powers of the President regarding the executive branch of government.\textsuperscript{214} The President could no longer dissolve, call for a direct vote of no confidence and veto legislation within the Hellenic Parliament, could not dismiss the government or proclaim elections, and could not declare a state of siege and suspend articles in the constitution, leaving the position of the President into a purely ceremonial one.\textsuperscript{215} For example, Article 35, Excerpt 1 now stated that "No act of the President of the Republic shall be valid nor be executed unless it has been countersigned by the competent Minister...."\textsuperscript{216}

The reforms made by Papandreou dramatically changed the political landscape in the country regarding the extent of powers the Prime Minister now had.\textsuperscript{217} Based on their political position, the Prime Minister had the sole responsibility of defining and directing the general policy of Greece both in terms of its domestic policies and foreign policies.\textsuperscript{218} The Prime Minister also had sole control over directing the actions of his government by selecting all Ministers, Undersecretaries and deciding on what exercised powers they will be given as well as selecting all of their tasks.\textsuperscript{219} In a further attempt at limiting the role of the President, any messages that he or she wanted to relay to the Greek people had to be sighted and consented by the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{220}

The move by Papandreou was clearly self-motivated to ensure that the President was powerless and that the Prime Minister held the most powerful position in the country on all levels.\textsuperscript{221} Although the reforms were questioned by many at the time, the Prime Minister, so long as he had a majority in the Hellenic Parliament, could easily draft, pass and implement any piece of legislation he deemed fit.\textsuperscript{222} Furthermore, these new powers would ultimately stop the President from ever having the opportunity to endanger the current or future PASOK Governments so long as they held the popular consent of the Greek people.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{214} Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 32, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47 and 48
\textsuperscript{215} Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 32.1 and 4, 35.1-3, 37.2-4, 38.1, 39, 41.1-2 and 4, 42, 43.3, 44.2-3, 47.3 and 48
\textsuperscript{216} Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 35, Excerpt 1
\textsuperscript{217} A. Millmow, “A Greek Tragi-Comedy”, \textit{The Economist}, 2015, p. 43
\textsuperscript{218} G. Doukas, “Party Elites and Democratization in Greece”, \textit{Parliamentary Affairs}, Vol. 46, No. 4, p. 513
\textsuperscript{219} K. Featherstone and D. Papadimitriou, “The Emperor Has No Clothes! Power and Resources within the Greek Core Executive”, \textit{Governance}, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 524
\textsuperscript{221} Featherstone and Papadimitriou, \textit{Governance}, pp. 533-534
\textsuperscript{222} Doukas, \textit{Parliamentary Affairs}, pp. 506-507
\textsuperscript{223} M. Spourdalakis and C. Tassis, “Party Change in Greece and the Vanguard Role of PASOK”, \textit{South European Society and Politics}, Vol. 11, No. 3-4, p. 500
While no President had ever used their powers against the Greek Government, the result of this change meant that the President could not effectively deal with future moments of severe political instability or conflict that emerged in Greece and tended to lead to out of control situations such as the National Schism.\(^{224}\)

### 3. Citizenship

Both prior to and more so after the Communist Revolutions 1989-1991, Greece acknowledged the fact that it had to deal with a large amount of repatriated Greeks who wanted to return or resettle in Greece from the former Eastern Bloc, many of which settled in Greece as early as 1984.\(^{225}\) It was also faced with non-Greeks from both the Eastern Block and Third World who, fleeing their own homelands because of war or poverty, wanted to pass through into Europe with a minority who wanted to resettle in Greece in search of a better life.\(^{226}\) Until 1991, and quite surprisingly due to the fact that Greece had accepted numerous repatriated Greeks during the years of the *Megali Idea*, the only legislation of the Greek State regarding immigration dated back to 1927. For example, the Presidential Decree of August 12, 1927, stated that “non-ethnic Greeks who wish to enter Greece as a migrant must obtain a work permit prior to entering the country, which will only be granted after the migrant has acquired a job in Greece.”\(^{227}\) As this was not feasible with such a large influx of people that ranged from approximately 200,000 to 800,000, and as Greece had obligations part of the EU and under international law, it tried to deal with immigration by introducing legislation in 1991, two presidential decrees in 1997 and another piece of legislation in 2001.\(^{228}\)

For the most part, these laws or decrees were irrelevant as Greek immigration policy still made a sharp distinction between repatriated ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks labelled as foreigners.\(^{229}\) For repatriated Greeks, citizenship was offered, though this did not make up for the lack of policies or resources available to help them assimilate back into Greek society after such long absence.\(^{230}\) However, for non-Greeks, Greece ensured its immigration policies acted as a deterrent against foreigners from entering the country with a rise in border patrols,

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\(^{225}\) Greek Law 2130/1993
\(^{226}\) Greek Citizenship Code, Article 5.2, 1984
\(^{227}\) Hellenic Parliament, Presidential Decree, August 12, 1927
\(^{228}\) Greek Law 2130, Article 32; Greek Law 2503, Article 12 and Greek Law 2910/200, Article 58
\(^{230}\) D. Zachos, “Citizenship, Ethnicity and Education in Modern Greece”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2009, pp. 140-144
controlled crossings and the scarce granting of visas. It did not matter if a migrant was legal or illegal as if they were deemed non-Greek, they virtually had no rights, were socially excluded and faced deportation.

Greece was without an effective and successful immigration policy that was both fair and firm, serving the interests of both the Greek people and helping those in need. Repatriated Greeks, particularly Pontians and mixed-marriage Pontians, like so many before them, faced discrimination within Greek society, although they were eventually and successful integrated. While Greece tried to ensure that foreigners would avoid entering its borders altogether, the reverse happened with hundreds of thousands if not a million migrants entering the country illegally and remaining there in a state of limbo. In any case, non-Greeks became victims of all sorts of discrimination in all levels of Greek society with some being abused by political xenophobes, social exclusionists and more vehemently, economic opportunists with no official government policies for integration.

4. Popular Sovereignty
Although the Greek Elections 1989 were held in June with Constantine Mitsotakis of ND coming first with 40.8%, the newly introduced proportional representation did not allow him to gain a majority of 151 seats which led to further Greek Elections in November where he came first with 44.3%, again unable to win the required seats. Finally, in the Greek Elections 1990, Mitsotakis was able to gain a slight majority in the Hellenic Parliament winning 46.2% with 152 seats. However, the

238 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, April 8, 1990
period was dominated largely by Papandreou and later, Constantine Simitis of PASOK who won the elections with a majority in 1993 with 46.88%, 1996 with 41.49% and 2000 with 43.79%. While local elections were held in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002, and European elections in 1989, 1994 and 1999, these mainly reflected the results of the national elections.

However, from June of 1989 until April of 1990, Greece was faced with the onset of political instability between rivals ND and PASOK. The reason Mitsotakis was not able to form a government in the June and November elections of 1989 was the result of proportional representation introduced by PASOK. Rather than gaining seats based on a majority or plurality of votes, proportional representation ensures political parties receive seats in proportion to the number of votes they receive, so long as they pass the 3% threshold. While Mitsotakis won the elections, he did not gain enough of a percentage to ensure ND gained 151 seats, rendering him unable to form a government on two occasions, and if a counting mistake had not been picked up in 1990, the same result would have reoccurred.

Almost a year passed in Greece without an official Greek Government elected in by the Greek people. Instead, Greece was governed by a Coalition Government, a Caretaker Government and another Coalition Government until a political party was able to surpass 151 seats. In Greece, proportional representation has been quested as a method used by political parties to ensure


244 Dimitras, *Electoral Studies*, pp. 235-236


246 Dimitras, *Electoral Studies*, p. 159
the existence and functioning of the two party system of ND and PASOK. While the intention of proportional representation is to ensure all political parties are considered on an equal level, the dominance of ND and PASOK ensured that once all votes had been counted, and with the exception of minor parties such as the KKE, they would inevitably be elected with more seats divided between them.

5. Political Parties
As can be expected from someone with family links to the Venizelos Family, Mitsotakis was a proud Cretan, a vehement liberal and a man with strong connections put towards his endeavour for a modern Greece. Inside as well as outside the Hellenic Parliament, Mitsotakis was known as a harmful, effective and at times, ruthless public speaker and debater who was best known for his ability as a negotiator who could overcome many domestic and foreign obstacles. In a similar fashion, Simitis, who had begun his political career on the radical left spectrum, had also come to believe in a modern and European Greece. Simitis was known as an extremely hard working individual with a professional posture in all things he did, gaining him the respect of Greek MPs as well as the Europeans who admired him profoundly for his meticulous and serious attitude.

Despite their credentials, both Mitsotakis and Simitis became victims of the Greek political system and more specifically, of the personality cult. Neither Mitsotakis or Simitis were able to effectively take on the position of Prime Minister as they did not fulfil the criteria of being the right type of charismatic leader who was loved not for what he knew but for what he was. In both cases, their downfall was the result of not pleasing all members of their respective party or government with their policies or decisions made on behalf of the Greek people.

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This was largely due to the fact that neither, regardless of their professional skills to be Prime Minister, were able to win the hearts and minds of ND of PASOK MPs.\(^\text{256}\)

Mitsotakis was the first to fall victim to the personality cult when in 1993, MPs of ND disagreed with his position on the Macedonia dispute, as well as the Cyprus dispute that in their view was far too lenient. As a result, these MPs led by Antonis Samaras withdrew their support from the Mitsotakis Government and formed their own political party called the *Politiki Anixi* or *Political Spring*, ultimately leading to a loss of majority seats, the declaration of the Greek Elections of 1993 and Mitsotakis' resignation. In addition, Simitis became the next victim in 2004 when the majority of old guard PASOK MPs who served under his flamboyant predecessor Andreas Papandreou alienated Simitis for his *eksynchronismos* or *modernization* rhetoric that was viewed as simply Germanic. Understanding PASOK MPs did not accept his leadership style and in an effort to avoid discontent with Greek voters, Simitis resigned in 2004 and passed the leadership to George Papandreou.

### 6. Government

The Papandreou Government of 1986-1989 continued its populist rhetoric of a ‘Greece for the Greeks’ and ‘Change’ that was reinforced by their continuous socialist reforms, though in a positive step, established the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) that had the purpose of representing ethnic Greeks living outside Greece.\(^\text{257}\) With the win of ND, the Mitsotakis Government of 1990-1993 focused on resolving the problems created by the previous Papandreou Governments such as its overspending, borrowing of loans and inflation.\(^\text{258}\) The Papandreou Government of 1993-1996, however, raised concerns about the economy towards the end of its administration and did in fact tone down its anti-European and US rhetoric.\(^\text{259}\) The successor Simitis Governments of 1996-2001, the first under PASOK without Papandreou, tasked itself with minor economic reforms while trying to keep a socialist face, organised Greece to adopt the Euro and made preparations for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.\(^\text{260}\)


As we have already learnt, the Papandreou Governments may have theoretically meant to cater for the needs of the Greek people but such populist rhetoric led to disastrous policies backed by an over exhausted budget, paving the way for unemployment and a stunt in growth.\textsuperscript{261} The Mitsotakis Government was successful at introducing several liberal reforms that helped increase privatisation in the country, made cuts to the pension system, modernised labour laws and updated the education system.\textsuperscript{262} The Simitis Governments, through their reforms under the policy Eksynchronismos or Modernisation, salvaged the Greek economy by lowering the deficit and inflation, tightening its fiscal and monetary policy and further modernising labour laws. A further accomplishment of Simitis was replacing the drachma with the euro in 2001, bringing Greece closer to its EU partners.\textsuperscript{263}

Although both the Mitsotakis Government and Simitis Governments targeted Greece's looming economic issues, both were unable to solve them fully as the problem ran deep within the social fabric of the country.\textsuperscript{264} In truth, what had been done by previous ND and PASOK Governments, mainly those of Karamanlis and more so Papandreou would take decades to recover from irrespective of a few pieces of legislation under Mitsotakis or Simitis such as Law 2874/2000, Law 2956/2001 or Law 3144/2003. Furthermore, both Mitsotakis and Simitis were constantly at the forefront of choosing between policies that served the EU such as further reforms at modernisation or policies that served the Greek people such as continuing past practices.\textsuperscript{265} The hardest form of governance these two individuals thus faced was introducing reforms that were modern though detrimental to the Greek people or reforms that were traditional though detrimental to the Greek State.\textsuperscript{266}

7. Checks and Balances
While Papandreou rarely spoke of checks and balances within the Greek political system, his constant absence from the Hellenic Parliament during his tenure can be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item K. Featherstone, “The Greek Election of 1993: Backwards or Forwards?”, West European Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1994, pp. 204-207
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
interpreted as his lack of concern for the notion.\textsuperscript{267} Mitsotakis was no stranger to the blatant disregard for checks and balances when earlier in his career, he was involved in a dispute with President Sartzetakis who he believed was not valid as the election for the President was not conducted in secret as it was supposed to be.\textsuperscript{268} As Prime Minister, he believed in the re-foundation of the Greek State itself, that is, conducting further revisions to the Greek Constitution that dealt with the introduction and enforcement of checks and balances into the separation of powers.\textsuperscript{269} Although Simitis shared his insight, he believed in the implementation of checks and balances into the Greek political system, namely in separating the conjoined legislative and executive, though in strict accordance with the social welfare state that emphasised in the responsibility of the Greek State to the Greek people.\textsuperscript{270}

Mitsotakis was not able to revise the Greek Constitution in favour of checks and balances as at the time, he had a weak and fragile parliamentary majority.\textsuperscript{271} As a result, he was later forced to dissolve the Hellenic Parliament and call for elections, strongly to the advantage of PASOK who had criticised his efforts.\textsuperscript{272} Simitis faced similar problems in the beginning as political rules introduced by his predecessors made it difficult to address change and implement checks and balances, usually because of a lack of parliamentary majority or waiting periods.\textsuperscript{273} The struggle to implement strong checks and balances by Mitsotakis and Simitis resulted in their constant conflicts between tradition and modernity.\textsuperscript{274}

This struggle made it difficult for Mitsotakis and Simitis because they were both part of small factions within ND and PASOK respectfully against larger factions who were accustomed to tradition and their old habits.\textsuperscript{275} While efforts were attempted or tried, any steering away from the status quo meant Mitsotakis and Simitis had would be up against the old political guard that was never too occupied

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{268} Hellenic Parliament, Election of the President in the Hellenic Parliament, March 30, 1985
\bibitem{269} Hellenic Parliament, Session, April 30, 1990
\bibitem{270} Hellenic Parliament, Session, February 12, 1996
\bibitem{271} J. Manolopoulos, \textit{Greece’s ‘Odious’ Debt: The Looting of the Hellenic Republic by the Euro, the Political Elite and the Investment Community}, London, Anthem Press, 2011, Chapter 3
\bibitem{273} S. Pepino, \textit{Sovereign Risk and Financial Crisis: The International Political Economy of the Eurozone}, Bassingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, Chapter 4
\bibitem{275} Featherstone, \textit{West European Politics}, p. 235
\end{thebibliography}
to organise leadership rivals and factional struggles to remove the agitators.\textsuperscript{276} As such, Mitsotakis and Simitis were forced to work in the system and rather than fully trying to change it through their policies of checks and balances for accountable MPs, ministers and public servants, they adopted the role of ‘leader’ like Karamanlis and Papandreou before them.\textsuperscript{277} In this regard, they themselves became heavily controlling and interfering in terms of how their governments ran, participated in making family alliances for political ends rather than relationships with experienced individuals.\textsuperscript{278}

8. Public Sector

New rival and leader of ND Mitsotakis constantly debated against Papandreou in the Hellenic Parliament and criticised him for dependence on foreign loans to finance these state expenses.\textsuperscript{279} Although a sensitive issue for Greeks, when Mitsotakis became Prime Minister, he swore that he would trim both spending and employees in the Greek public sector.\textsuperscript{280} Although Simitis tried to introduce various stabilisation reforms in the public sector as the Minister of National Economy for Papandreou 1985-1987, these were severely undermined as they were contrary to Papandreou's handouts for votes scheme, reiterated to reassure Greeks by Finance Minister Dimitris Tsovolas in the Greek Elections 1989 under the slogan ‘Tsoulo, dosta ola’ or ‘Tsoulo, give it all.’\textsuperscript{281} Later as Prime Minister, he was vehement to continue his policies in the public sector that included a vast reorganisation and stabilisation to reduce inflation and deficits.\textsuperscript{282}

Although many of the scandals in the public sector persisted such as clientelism, Mitsotakis did make cuts, did not renew contracts of such employees and abolished programs established by PASOK thought to be extravagant.\textsuperscript{283} In an effort to combat the high Public Sector Borrowing Requirement at 14.6 percent in 1992, Mitsotakis froze both salaries and pensions until Law 2025 was passed that granted the appropriate Minister to impose limits on wages and pensions.\textsuperscript{284} Simitis, who understood well how deep clientelism ran into the Greek public sector and Greek psyche, was faced with many difficulties in trying to change such an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{277} Kazamias, \textit{Mediterranean Politics}, p. 72
\item \textsuperscript{278} Pagoulatos, \textit{West European Politics}, pp. 357-360
\item \textsuperscript{279} Hellenic Parliament, Session, June 10, 1985
\item \textsuperscript{280} Hellenic Parliament, Session, April 17, 1990
\item \textsuperscript{281} Greek Law, 2190/1989
\item \textsuperscript{282} Hellenic Parliament, Session, September 30, 1996
\item \textsuperscript{283} Pappas, \textit{Journal of Democracy}, pp. 35-36
\item \textsuperscript{284} Trantidis, \textit{South European Society and Politics}, pp. 217-220
\end{itemize}
outlook, particularly by recalcitrant unions. Nonetheless, many of his notable policies included a decrease in deficit spent on the public sector from 13% to 1%, labour productivity increased to 2.6% and the halving of membership in unions to 440,000.

Even though Mitsotakis was trying to introduce policies that reformed the public sector, many proved to be at the dissatisfaction of the Greek people who under the Mitsotakis Government, lost 13% of their wages because he abolished the indexation of their wages to inflation. Although Mitsotakis was also able at incorporating new laws regarding Greek banks in accordance with the EU as well as liberal policies to help undo PASOK mismanagement, keeping the EU satisfied did not prove useful nor in favour of maintaining the people's mandate, with many Greeks taking to the streets in strikes, rallies and protests against his government. Simitis faced many attacks from within his own party by trying to undo PASOK mismanagement as, according to his accusers, he was trying to make the economic situation for the Greek people who served the government worse off. However, by effectively undermining these people, his policies toward the public sector targeted its populist recruitment strategy, attacked the ongoing clientelistic relationships and curtailed the bloated public sector.

9. Security
Throughout the period, Greece maintained its military expenditure at approximately 3.5% of GDP or approximately 2 billion euros that was largely due to its tense relations with Turkey over sovereignty disputes in the Aegean and later, over Turkey's insistence on a 'Turkish Minority' in Western Thrace which Greece identified only as a 'Muslim Minority'. The period is also marked by Greece's first involvement and participation in the engagements of NATO and the UN. In 1986, Greece reformed the Central Intelligence Service by renaming it to the National Intelligence Service and making it a civilian agency under the former Ministry of Public Order rather an independent and often rogue agency. In 2000, Greece reorganised the Ministry of Public Order, renaming it the Ministry of Public Order

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285 Featherstone, *West European Politics*, p. 235
286 Pagoulatos, *West European Politics*, pp. 364-366
288 T. S. Pappas and E. Dinas, “From Opposition to Power: Greek Conservatism Reinvented”, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3-4, 2006, pp. 478-479
291 Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, Article 142
292 Greek Ministerial Decree 1645/86
and Citizen Protection and introducing reforms that targeted the Hellenic Police divided its headquarters into various central authorities throughout the country whose jurisdiction is limited to their respective areas.\textsuperscript{293}

Despite Greece's security concerns, its military expenditure was criticised by MPs mainly from ND as it was the highest in the EU, second highest in NATO in terms of overall GDP, and did not counter Turkey as it still questioned Greece's sovereignty in the Aegean, almost leading to war on two occasions with the Thasos Incident in 1987 and Imia Incident in 1986.\textsuperscript{294} In an effort to uphold the ideas of peace and security, Greece successfully participated in the Gulf War 1990-1991, Yugoslav Wars 1992 - 2004, Somali War 1993 - 1995 and Congo War 1999 - 2011, though was criticised by the West for allowing Greek Mercenaries to fight on the side of the Serbs in Bosnia, participating in the Srebrenica Massacre. On the other hand, the National Intelligence Agency was effective on part of its mission and protected and promoted Greece's national strategic interests by preventing and confronting any threats to its democracy and the human rights of its citizens. Although Greece's reforms of the Hellenic Police aimed at making it more civilian friendly, the Hellenic Police constantly engaged with the terrorist organisation Revolutionary Organization 17 November or N17 who committed attacks against representatives of state via small arms fire, car bombs, improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades.\textsuperscript{295}

Greece's military expenditure has resulted in billions of dollars being spent on its large military which has become a significant burden on the Greek economy. Nevertheless, Greece can be described as having an effective army, navy and air force that is capable of defending the Greek people and country, regardless of the cost. However, the National Intelligence Service was unable to counter and confront Turkey's actions against its territorial integrity, national wealth and overall national security, as well as in cooperating with the Hellenic Police at preventing the activities of terrorist organisations. In addition, while the Greek Government established the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (EKAM) whose sole purpose was to protect individuals and buildings that represented the government, due to its ongoing battle with N17, the Hellenic Police have evolved into a more aggressive

\textsuperscript{293} Greek Law 2800/2000
\textsuperscript{294} P. Dimitrakis, “Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish Threat during the 1987 Aegean Crisis”, \textit{Journal of Modern Greek Studies}, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2007, pp. 122-123
\textsuperscript{295} G. Kassimeris, “Greece's Terrorism Problem: A Reassessment”, \textit{Studies in Conflict and Terrorism}, Vol. 39, No. 9, 2016, p. 3
organisation that has frequently broken its rules on the use of force and used excessive force against citizens such as those protesting government policies.  

10. Elites
Although the period was marked with the new liberal Constantine Mitsotakis, the Mitsotakis Family is linked to the Venizelos Family, with Mitsotakis' grandfather Kostis Mitsotakis marrying Katigo Venizelou, the sister of Eleftherios Venizelos, his father Kyriakos Mitsotakis was first cousins with Venizelos through his wife Stavroula Ploumidaki, and Mitsotakis himself being the nephew of Venizelos.  

In addition to their family lineage, the Mitsotakis Family and Venizelos Family were connected politically, with Mitsotakis' grandfather and Venizelos forming the Liberal Party together in Crete, the Pact of Halepa of 1878 taking place in Mitsotakis' home and the former's son serving in the First Balkan War and as an MP for Chania, Crete.  

While the Simitis Family can only trace its political history back to World War II, Kostas Simitis' father Georgios Simitis was nonetheless a leader of the National Liberation Front (EAM) where he met his mother Fani Christopoulou, a lifelong and prominent left-wing feminist.  

Later, Costas himself would become a founding member and participant of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) established by Andreas Papandreou with the aim of gaining international support against the Junta.

Despite the new outlook Mitsotakis and Simitis had for Greece, and while neither have yet to be proven guilty, accusations have been made that both, like many Greek politicians such as Papandreou, have been involved in Greek political scandals. The majority of these scandals revolve around making money through illegal means such as through bribes, embezzlements or laundering. On an even more shocking level, Greek politicians have also been involved in making money through legal yet deceitful means such as budgetary lies, ministerial overruns,

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301 Featherstone, *West European Politics*, p. 224

government owned business mismanagements, to name but a few.\textsuperscript{303} To no one’s surprise, the involvement of Greek politicians is that they will allow such scandals to occur, legally or illegally, so long as they get their cut or fair share.\textsuperscript{304}

Those who are most powerful in the country are thus free to do as they please in a never-ending cycle that continues on from one generation to the next.\textsuperscript{305} While their scandals may or may not become public knowledge, Greek politicians such as Mitsotakis and Simitis are immune from facing any charges and as such, are free from any accountability.\textsuperscript{306} This creates an even bigger problem for the Greek Taxation Authority (DOY) as it does not have the authority nor the will to monitor the transactions made by Greek politicians or elites for privacy reasons embedded in Greek law.\textsuperscript{307} Although corrupt on many levels itself, even if the DOY was able to monitor such transactions, it would prove to be a difficult task as the gap has not been closed on the many black holes in the country, as result of transactions made in the real economy and those in the black economy.\textsuperscript{308}

11. Church of Greece
The Greek Orthodox Church tried to present itself as understanding of the modernising Greek people that was willing to slowly modernise with agreeing to a hallmark decision that legalised the performance of abortions in 1986.\textsuperscript{309} The following year, the Hellenic Parliament also passed a law to expropriate land belonging to the Church of Greece and to redistribute it amongst Greeks living well below the poverty line. The Hellenic Parliament also passed a law that called for the Greek Government to take over the administration of property belonging to the Church of Greece in urban areas. However, both ND and PASOK, which comprised the overwhelming majority in the Hellenic Parliament at the time, excluded the concept of the separation of church and state when discussions were held on revisions to the Greek Constitution in 1998.

\textsuperscript{303} D. M. Knight, “The Greek Economic Crisis as Trope”, Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, Vol. 65, 2013, pp. 147-148
\textsuperscript{308} I. Chaston, Public Sector Reformation: Values-Driven Solutions to Fiscal Constraint, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 117-123
\textsuperscript{309} Greek Law 1609/1986
However, when the Church of Greece involved itself in the Hellenic Parliament, it was able to prevent the Greek Government from expropriating its property by totally opposing any nationalisations regarding their land. The Church of Greece was also successful by preventing the very notion of the separation of church and state from being proposed in 1998 when it continuously slandered MPs until its position was heard.\textsuperscript{310} The attacks by the Church of Greece also continued against the Greek Government 2000-2001 by organising mass rallies, protests and petitions when the latter wanted to remove from state identity cards.\textsuperscript{311} Furthermore, it ignored and pleaded ignorance to any requests made by the Greek Government to adhere to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that dealt with recognising the assembly and practice of non-Orthodox religions.\textsuperscript{312}

Throughout this period and by its actions, the Church of Greece effectively reinforced its position of authority as the protector of the Greek \textit{ethnos}.\textsuperscript{313} By interfering in the legislation of the Hellenic Parliament as well as in the affairs of the Greek Government itself, the Church of Greece was able to influence most issues in accordance with its position, particularly when they concerned the Orthodoxy of the Greek people such as with the ID cards. The Church of Greece also demonstrated control over Greece itself through the sheer amount of land and property it maintains under its jurisdiction and ownership that is not up for any discussion. Finally, the Church of Greece used the advice of the EU as a means of advocating it as an interventionist regime that it countered through anti-Western messages to the Greek people via its numerous radio stations, newspapers and television appearances.\textsuperscript{314}

12. Summary

From 1986 to 2001, democratic institutions in Greece can be described as undergoing various challenges as they continued to evolve from the Metapolitefsi away from Karamanlis and Papandreou. While revisions to the Greek Constitution in 1896 by Papandreou had the intention of transforming Greece into a full

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{313} Diamantopoulou, \textit{International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church}, pp. 164-166
\end{footnotesize}
parliamentary democracy, the changes removed most powers of the President and transferred them to the Prime Minister, making the position the most powerful in the country. The rivalry for power is best seen in the Hellenic Parliament as even though elections took place on all levels, it did not stop competing factions from causing disruptions and periods of political instability from occurring with only self-interests at mind and not the electorate. Interestingly, the electorate was expanded with expatriate Greeks from the East being granted citizenship, while non-Greeks entering the country lacked any sort of rights, created a divide within Greek society between Greeks and foreigners.

Ironically, Mitsotakis and Simitis, like their predecessors, had links to the old political guard who comprise the strongest political families in the country, inevitably deciding their fate as individuals who would be part of public and closed scandals with corruption at its heart in the name of maintaining power. Throughout these years, both ND and PASOK dominated the Hellenic Parliament, with Mitsotakis representing the former and Simitis representing the latter, both who despite their skills were not considered effective Prime Ministers because they lacked the personality cult of the job. Despite this, the PASOK and ND Governments made successful ground with many foreign issues between Greece and its neighbours FYR and Turkey, though at home, domestic issues lingered with the problems of the economy being the most severe. Such a problem was the public sector that both Mitsotakis and Simitis targeted in their reforms that were unpopular amongst Greeks and all those in the system who had been accustomed to its clientelism.

Clientelism, like many of the other dysfunctions embedded in the Greek system, also affected both Mitsotakis and Simitis from introducing policies aimed at checks and balances as the old political guard both within their governments and parties strongly believed in upholding their traditions, leaving these individuals to working part of such a system without accountability. The reason behind this xenophobia is the result of Greece’s issues with its neighbours, ranging from Northern Epirus with Albania, Macedonia with the FYR, the Aegean with Turkey and even communism with the Eastern Bloc, issues that Greece arguably dealt with both positively and negatively.

Finally, while the Greek Orthodox Church presented itself to the West as a modernising organisation, it continued its medieval policy in Greece and the East as the sole protector of the Greek ethnos, even at the expense of the Greek State. While democratic institutions in Greece from 1986 to 2001 had many opportunities for modernisation, these were either short lived or unsuccessful as they, along with their instigators, became consumed by the Greek system. As we can see, the period from 1986-2001 can be described as one with numerous issues relating to Greece's
democratic institutions, although it must be pointed out that significant gains were made in many areas by Mitsotakis and Simitis who helped move Greece away from the errors of the Metapolitefsi period towards a more modern and liberal Greece.
Chapter 4: 2001 – 2007

1. Context
In this chapter, the various institutions of the Greek State will be explored from 2001-2008. The chapter will firstly begin with the revisions that occurred to the Greek Constitution in 2001 under the PASOK Government of Simitis. Following this will be a further look at Greece's citizenship debate, in this period again with the distinction between ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks. As citizens who form the core of the democracy in the country through their popular sovereignty, changes to the political system will be explored.

Furthermore, the chapter will discuss Simitis' new rival in the Hellenic Parliament, Kostas Karamanlis and his leadership of New Democracy. His leadership will also lead to the establishment of the Karamanlis Government for two terms. It is through these controversial terms that the issue of checks and balances will be assessed from the viewpoint of Karamanlis. In addition, the chapter will explore various aspirations toward the public sector by the Karamanlis Government such as their privatisation policies.

On a more specific level, its policies in terms of security, namely for the Olympic Games and military expenditure will be analysed. As per the norm, Karamanlis, an elitist with links to the Karamanlis Dynasty, will be exposed through one of the many scandals he was involved in. Finally, the Church of Greece will be mentioned in terms of how it, as the most powerful institution in the country, interacted with the Greek State. The chapter will thus conclude with a summary of each of these institutions and if and how they have progressed between 2001-2008.

2. Constitution
Revisions to the Greek Constitution in 2001 amended a total of seventy-nine from eighty-three proposed articles by then Prime Minister Simitis. Revisions were first and foremost made to the expansion of and inclusion of new individual and social rights for Greek citizens. Revisions were also made to Greece’s separation of powers, targeting the Hellenic Parliament by modernising its functional ability, the Government by upgrading local authority and the Courts by being officially recognised as one of the independent authorities in the country. For example, Article 93, Excerpt 3 states "Every court judgment must be specifically and thoroughly reasoned and must be pronounced in a public sitting."

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315 Greek Constitution, 1975, pp. 8-9
316 Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 5.5, 7.3 and 9
317 Greek Constitution, 1975, Articles 70, 93, 102
318 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 93, Excerpt 3
Rights that were extended to Greek citizens, to name a few, included the protection of health and genetic identity, protection of property against confiscation, the protection of personal information, and a provision for the freedom and operation of the mass media.\textsuperscript{319} Within the Parliament, parliamentary committees were strengthened, professional occupations of MPs were prohibited, preconditions were introduced for the modification of electoral laws and an organ was established that monitored and controlled expenditures of political parties during elections.\textsuperscript{320} Organs were also set up for the respective Greek Government for consultation purposes with the adoption of a new framework regarding criminal prosecutions of each respective Cabinet if need be.\textsuperscript{321} The Supreme Administrative Court, Supreme Civil and Criminal Court or the Court of Audit were given the authority to rule against statutes that have been judged to be contrary to the Greek Constitution with the Head of the Supreme Court given a four-year term.\textsuperscript{322}

The revisions to the Greek Constitution in 2001 can be described as the most important to date as they demonstrate the pursuit by Greece to remain a modern and democratic nation of Europe and a respective member of the international community that embraces democratic values.\textsuperscript{323} The significance of extended and new rights and liberties granted to Greek citizens, particularly those relating to the welfare state, demonstrates the inclusiveness of all Greek citizens by the Greek Government, particularly those that are perceived as different.\textsuperscript{324} In addition, the specific mentioning of the Welfare State in the Greek Constitution itself was a hallmark move as it officially highlighted the Greek State's attempt at advocating itself as the responsible provider of Greek citizens who may need some sort of financial assistance.\textsuperscript{325} Furthermore, revisions to the separation of powers were a further step at distancing the Hellenic Parliament from the Hellenic Government to allow a proper functioning Greek State, while also pursuing the complete independence of the Hellenic Courts.\textsuperscript{326}

\textsuperscript{321} S. Ladi, “Policy Change and Soft Europeanization: The Transfer of the Ombudsman Institution to Greece, Cyprus and Malta”, \textit{Public Administration}, Vol. 89, No. 4, 2011, pp. 1652-1658
\textsuperscript{323} Fessas, \textit{American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law}, pp. 195-198
\textsuperscript{324} Alivizatos and Eleftheriadis, \textit{South European Briefing}, pp. 70-74
\textsuperscript{325} Ladi, \textit{Public Administration}, pp.1659-1662
\textsuperscript{326} Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, \textit{European Journal of Law and Economics}, p.26-28
3. Citizenship

As can be expected, the issue of Greek Citizenship arose once again in 2004 with the introduction of the Greek Nationality Code that stipulated Greek citizenship is granted to ethnic Greeks born to Greek parents (jus sanguinis) or ethnic Greeks born on Greek soil (jus soli).\textsuperscript{327} For example, Article 1, Excerpt 1 states “A child of a Greek father or a Greek mother acquires Greek Citizenship by birth.”\textsuperscript{328} Greek citizenship was also granted to ethnic Greeks through the process of naturalisation so long as the individual has a parent or grandparent fulfilling jus sanguinis or jus soli, by enlisting in the Hellenic Armed Forces, or in certain cases, if an individual is born out of wedlock or is adopted as a minor, so long as in both cases the parent or guardian has Greek citizenship.\textsuperscript{329} Further, as Greece was new to joining the Schengen Area, it did not require passports for citizens of these countries entering and exiting its sovereignty.\textsuperscript{330}

The new Greek Nationality Code made it relatively easy, then, for ethnic Greeks to gain Greek Citizenship under the basis of ithageneia or nationality, whether it be Greeks from traditional areas of Greek settlement such as in Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, or Greeks from the Diaspora, with approximately 100,000 granted in this period.\textsuperscript{331} The Greek Government, however, did not allow ethnic Greeks in Northern Epirus to gain Greek Citizenship as a means of preserving them as a minority in Albania, though this was changed in 2006 and resulted in approximately 150,000 of the total 300,000 Greeks in Northern Epirus applying or Greek Citizenship.\textsuperscript{332} However, while non-ethnic Greeks were mentioned in the Greek Nationality Code, apply for Greek Citizenship through Naturalization under the basis of ipikootita or citizenship, even if they were born and lived in Greece.\textsuperscript{333} Under this arrangement, lived in Greece for an uninterrupted period of 10 years and if children, had to wait until they reached the age of 18 years.\textsuperscript{334}

While the Greek Nationality Code was introduced, the ways in which an individual could gain Greek Citizenship laid largely in the fact that they were ethnic

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Greeks under the notion of *ithageneia* and granted full rights.\(^{335}\) A new trend to reinforce such a policy was how the Greek Nationality Code attempts to persuade ethnic Greeks of the Diaspora into applying for Greek Citizenship through Naturalization, which many did.\(^{336}\) Furthermore, despite the appearance of non-Greeks in the document, Greek Citizenship was made virtually impossible for them to gain, while if an individual was part of the few that did, it was under the notion of *ipikootita* which meant they were still not granted full and equal rights to ethnic Greeks.\(^{337}\) Here, the indirect agenda was the hope that non-Greeks would not settle in Greece or would leave due to such discrimination.\(^{338}\)

### 4. Popular Sovereignty

From 2001 onwards, it was clear that PASOK was losing its support from the Greek people which was reflected in the Greek Elections of 2004 which ND won with 45.4% and 165 seats.\(^ {339}\) In the following Greek Elections of 2007, ND proved to be dominant, although with a smaller percentage, and won again with 41.83% and 152 seats.\(^ {340}\) Local Elections were also held in 2004 and 2006 with ND gaining a majority of the votes in the former, particularly in Athens, Thessaloniki and Patra, and PASOK gaining a majority of the votes in the latter, again reflecting Greece's national elections.\(^ {341}\) As members of the European Union, Greeks also participated in the European Elections of 2004 giving ND 43.02% and PASOK 34.03%, and again in 2009 giving PASOK 36.64% and ND 32.29%.\(^ {342}\)

In the Greek Elections of 2004, however, and in accordance with the reinforced proportionality of the Greek political system, the 3% threshold was

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\(^{335}\) Anagnostou, *EUDO Citizenship Observatory*, p. 18  
\(^{336}\) Kadianaki and Andreouli, *Political Psychology*, p.7  
\(^{337}\) Konsta and Lazaridis, *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, pp. 375-380  
\(^{338}\) Christopoulos, *EUDO Citizenship Observatory*, pp. 10-15  
\(^{340}\) Ministry of Interior, *Greek Elections*, October 4, 2009  
\(^{341}\) Ministry of Interior, *Greek Elections*, 2002  
\(^{342}\) Ministry of Interior, *Greek Elections*, June 13, 2004  
and Ministry of Interior, *Greek Elections*, June 7, 2009  
introduced and used for the first time.\textsuperscript{343} In an attempt to secure stable governance, all political parties that wanted to be present in the Hellenic Parliament now had to gain 3\% or more, otherwise, they would not be considered.\textsuperscript{344} In addition to the 3\% threshold, the Greek Elections of 2007 saw changes to the percentage of what was considered a majority as well as to a new concession given to the political party that came first.\textsuperscript{345} If a political party wanted to gain a majority in the Hellenic Parliament, it had to gain 41.5\% or greater of the vote which translates into 151 or greater of 300 seats, otherwise it had to form a coalition with another political party, whereas if the party passed this threshold, it was granted an additional 50 seats.\textsuperscript{346}

While stable governance was the goal that ensured Greek citizens voted without any political instability, the 3\% threshold that was introduced discriminated against smaller political parties that want to form a base and enter the Hellenic Parliament.\textsuperscript{347} The 3\% threshold thus acted as a tool of both ND and PASOK to ensure the majority of power in the Hellenic Parliament fluctuated between their dominance, with little concession given to smaller political parties, so that they indirectly guaranteed the Two-Party System.\textsuperscript{348} Furthermore, the extra 50 seats that were now awarded to the political party that came first, again always either ND or PASOK, guarantees that one of these two will always be granted the mandate to implement their programs.\textsuperscript{349} Despite the fact that the concept ensures a political party that passes the threshold is given extra seats to form a majority, the seats themselves have in no way whatsoever been approved by Greek citizens, and more importantly, disregard the numerous other political parties that may have gained a substantial amount of votes proportionally.\textsuperscript{350}

5. Political Parties
Although Simitis had grown out of favour with his fellow MPs of PASOK, he remained a vehement individual in the Hellenic Parliament who distanced himself from the old ways of the past toward the future, best advocated in his policy of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{344} K. Chrysogonas, \textit{The Electoral System and the Constitution}, Athens, Sakkoulas, 1996, pp. 247–252
\item \textsuperscript{345} Ch. Tsitouras, \textit{Greek Electoral System: Optimal Distribution of the Seats}, Corfu, American Institute of Physics, 2007, pp. 555–557
\item \textsuperscript{346} Ch. Tsitouras, “Greatest Remainder Bi-Proportional Rounding and the Greek Parliamentary Elections of 2007”, \textit{Applied Mathematics and Computation}, 2007, pp. 9254-9260
\item \textsuperscript{347} Foundethakis, \textit{The Journal of Legislative Studies}, p. 90
\item \textsuperscript{348} Chrysogonas, \textit{The Electoral System and the Constitution}, pp. 253-255
\item \textsuperscript{349} Tsitouras, \textit{Greek Electoral System: Optimal Distribution of the Seats}, pp. 558-563
\item \textsuperscript{350} Tsitouras, \textit{Applied Mathematics and Computation}, pp. 9261-9264
\end{itemize}
modernisation.\textsuperscript{351} With the fall in popularity of Simitis as a result of the Stock Exchange Scandal, Kostas Karamanlis was rising through the ranks of New Democracy as the MP for Thessaloniki A from 1989 onwards.\textsuperscript{352} After New Democracy lost the Greek Elections of 1996, Karamanlis was elected to be its leader in 1997.\textsuperscript{353} As the nephew of the man who brought democracy to Greece, Karamanlis used Simitis' dwindling support for his own advantage and advocated New Democracy's position of 're-establishing the Greek State'.\textsuperscript{354}

Within the Hellenic Parliament and within New Democracy, Karamanlis, both popular and unpopular to the Greeks, was nonetheless an intelligent individual that tried to relate with the everyday Greek, though not so much a strong political character with a future direction for Greece.\textsuperscript{355} Unlike his predecessors, Karamanlis was not the leader of New Democracy using the traditional hierarchical method but rather, as the leader of a team by working closely with his fellow MPs gaining their confidence through mutual respect as many of the MPs were older and more experienced.\textsuperscript{356} Karamanlis preferred to lead New Democracy with his most trusted and loyal MPs in their small inner circle where they would discuss their policies, giving them the freedom to operate in their respective areas while allowing Karamanlis to present them to his constituents.\textsuperscript{357} However, although Karamanlis was not a dominant leader, this did not prevent him from sidelining those who challenged his authority whereby his prudence allowed him to detect and deal with internal threats before they escalated.\textsuperscript{358}

As the leader of New Democracy and of the Greek Government, Karamanlis cannot be described as an individual with strong leadership skills.\textsuperscript{359} Whether his approach at working with his fellow MPs in a collective manner was intentional or

\textsuperscript{354} ND, \textit{Party Programme}, 2004, 1-12
\textsuperscript{359} Dinas, \textit{Electoral Studies}, pp. 513-517
not for a more proactive leadership style, when Karamanlis took the reins, he was very much influenced by the mentioned older MPs who had served in New Democracy for almost a decade. These MPs, such as the current Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos, were able to persuade Karamanlis away from his 'reestablishment', which they were not concerned with, toward a policy that reflected their own agenda. Karamanlis, understanding he could not take these individuals on due to their reputations as founding MPs post-Metapolitefsi under his uncle, avoided confrontations and allowed them to continue with their traditional way of doing politics acting as a mere puppet to avoid internal frictions or an early resignation.

6. Government

The Simitis Government from 2001 onwards was concerned mainly with its dwindling support among the Greek people and its continuation of planning and preparing for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. When the Karamanlis Government took office, it had to take over and complete all the preparations for the Olympic Games, only five months before they begun, albeit criticising the previous Simitis Government for unfinished buildings, cost overruns and secret arrangements that organised hidden debts. Understanding the importance of the Greek economy especially in regard to the Olympic Games, the Karamanlis Government swore to introduce a new economic policy for the country. The Karamanlis Government also concerned itself with promising to make structural changes to the administration of the Greek State that aimed at making the governance of society more effective.

Despite halving the Greek budget deficit to 2.6% through tax cuts, investment incentives and de-regulations, the Karamanlis Government was served with a Financial Audit in 2004 by the European Commission and asked to immediately

360 Kassimeris, West European Politics, pp. 952-954
361 Gemensis, Mediterranean Politics, pp. 102-105
362 Dinas, West European Politics, p. 606
send financial data of its budget expenditure to Eurostat for analysis.\textsuperscript{367} Despite such measures, the Karamanlis Government lost face with the Greek people very quickly for its inaction during the Greek Fires of 2007 and 2009 when it did not act quick enough to put them out, killing 83 Greeks and injuring many more, destroying numerous homes and burning approximately one million hectares of Greek territory.\textsuperscript{368} In-between these events in 2008, the Karamanlis Government also faced a month of civil unrest and rioting in Athens and other major Greek cities when it protected a Police Officer who shot and killed 15-year-old Greek student and Anarchist Alexandros Grigoropoulos in Exarcheia.\textsuperscript{369} Prior to the onset of the Greek Economic Crisis, the Karamanlis Government also ignored the warnings coming from the Bank of Greece, and in an effort to avoid the issue, went adrift from the political scene, called the early Greek Elections of 2009 and resigned.

Overall, it is not an understatement to argue that Greeks were not impressed by either of the Karamanlis Governments, mainly for their inability to fulfil pre-election promises and the sheer amount of funds it spent on the Olympic Games that, with effective management, could have been used for better uses such as infrastructure.\textsuperscript{370} The Karamanlis Government became even more unpopular with Greeks, not so much because the Greek Fires of 2007 and 2009 occurred, but rather, because of its inability to put them out quick enough and offer substantial support to the citizens of the country who lost their homes and loved ones.\textsuperscript{372} While it was condemned, after the murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, the anger and outrage of the Greek people was endemic with a total loss of trust in the Greek System, particularly of the Karamanlis Government seen as the chief of the Hellenic Police who killed a 15-year-old boy, eventually leading to its downfall a few years later.\textsuperscript{373} Further, by completely ignoring the warnings of the Bank of Greece and not taking the initiative to resolve the economic woes of the country, Karamanlis’ abrupt resignation and abandonment gave way to the full blown Greek Economic Crisis.

7. Checks and Balances

\textsuperscript{368} J. Karamichas, “The Impact of the Summer 2007 Forest Fires in Greece: Recent Environmental Mobilizations”, \textit{South European Society and Politics}, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2007, pp. 525-530
\textsuperscript{371} Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, \textit{South European Society and Politics}, pp. 37-40
\textsuperscript{372} Karamichas, \textit{South European Society and Politics}, pp. 531-535
\textsuperscript{373} Boukala, \textit{Discourse and Society}, pp. 495-500
After substantial research into the career of Karamanlis as an MP of New Democracy of Thessaloniki A in the Hellenic Parliament, he is one of the very few MPs who did not mention the implementation of checks and balances into the Greek system.\textsuperscript{374} In the New Democracy Programme prior to the Greek Elections of 2004, Karamanlis mainly advocated rhetoric against the policies of the previous PASOK Government under Simitis.\textsuperscript{375} In addition, prior to the Greek Elections of 2007, Karamanlis continued such policies under New Democracy with checks and balances a void topic.\textsuperscript{376} In fact, even as Prime Minister, not once was the concept of checks and balances present in the Government Gazette.\textsuperscript{377}

Karamanlis, like most of the Prime Ministers post-1974, strongly believed in the centralisation of power.\textsuperscript{378} Although the centralisation of some power is necessary for the functioning of the Nation-State, in the case of Greece, it comprises of all power.\textsuperscript{379} It is witnessed in how Karamanlis and his top advisors exerted their influence over New Democracy from the hands of a few in a to- down pyramid.\textsuperscript{380} In addition, it is seen in the ways in which Karamanlis, along with his Cabinet, acted with respect to the functioning of the Greek Government.\textsuperscript{381}

While Karamanlis went by the pseudonym of Costas to distance himself from the old political guard that his uncle Konstantinos represented, he was an individual that was simply not interested in checks and balances.\textsuperscript{382} The result of having such an attitude thus led to and caused a considerable amount of issues and problems throughout his tenure as Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{383} In times of opportunity, Karamanlis, relying solely on his own political will, unfortunately, did not make the right and fair decisions that would have benefited Greece such as with the Vatopedi Scandal where he completely undermined the Greek Courts.\textsuperscript{384} In addition, in times of crisis, again relying solely on his own power, Karamanlis did not act in a timely fashion

\textsuperscript{375} ND, \textit{Party Programme}, 2004, pp. 4-7
\textsuperscript{376} ND, \textit{Party Programme}, 2007, pp. 9-12
\textsuperscript{381} Dinas, \textit{West European Politics}, pp. 601-602
\textsuperscript{382} Dinas, \textit{West European Politics}, pp. 603-606
\textsuperscript{384} Featherstone, \textit{West European Politics}, pp. 231-235
and at times, did not act at all, which had numerous negative impacts on Greece such as the Greek Fires of 2007 and 2009.\textsuperscript{385}

8. Public Sector
Prior to the Greek Elections of 2004, ND under Karamanlis promised that they would reform the Greek public sector so that it would be free from corruption.\textsuperscript{386} The position of New Democracy was a direct attack on PASOK which ND believed ran the Greek State through its 'Seven Pests', the important one here being PASOK's grip on the civil service.\textsuperscript{387} However, once the Karamanlis Government was in office, it changed its rhetoric to rather than fighting corruption or the so-called public service pest through reforms, it would now simply decrease the public sector by selling assets belonging to the Greek State such as the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (OTE) to private enterprises.\textsuperscript{388} By increasing privatisation in the country, the Karamanlis Government passed the responsibility of such public servants onto foreign organisations under the banner of increasing Greek competitiveness in the market, although now it was also not burdened with paying for their salaries, pensions and benefits of such a large number of public servants.\textsuperscript{389}

While New Democracy criticised PASOK, once the former took office, the Karamanlis Governments maintained its strong involvement throughout the state apparatus as well as the wider public sector, including both state assets and public servants.\textsuperscript{390} To no one's surprise, New Democracy under Kostas utilised the structures of the Greek State using them as a kind of managerial machine to fulfil its own interests over the administration of the public sector, namely the 250,000 public servants it hired seasonally on a preferential basis.\textsuperscript{391} This was further achieved through the aspirations of privatisation in the country which the Karamanlis Governments uniquely used to sustain the norm of control by the Greek State.\textsuperscript{392} OTE was a primary example whereby although the Karamanlis Government began its privatisation process, it maintained the Greek State's majority in its shareholdings by passing a law in 2007 that did not allow anybody

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Gemensis and Dinas, \textit{Comparative European Politics}, p. 191
\item ND, \textit{Party Programme}, 2004, pp. 8-10
\item ND, \textit{Party Programme}, 2004, pp. 11-15
\item ND, \textit{Party Programme}, 2007, pp. 16-20
\item ND, \textit{Party Programme}, 2007, pp. 23-26
\item Kassimeris, \textit{West European Politics}, p. 948
\item Featherstone, \textit{West European Politics}, p. 237
\end{thebibliography}
else apart from the Greek State to hold more than 20% of a Greek asset, thus maintaining a majority share in its already owned assets.\textsuperscript{393}

New Democracy's criticism of PASOK seems somewhat hypocritical as ND itself did not make any reforms to reverse one of the 'Seven Pests' or hold over the public sector.\textsuperscript{394} The hold that New Democracy had on the public sector gave the Greek Government a tool to use how and when it saw fit, such as when economic times proved to be difficult, it froze or reduced wages as opposed to when the economy was growing, it granted incentives.\textsuperscript{395} While New Democracy was responsible for certain privatisation efforts of state assets, the hold of 20% by the Greek Government made it difficult for private organisations to invest and make modern changes or improvements of their own.\textsuperscript{396} The difficulties these organisations faced with the Greek State delayed potential deals that would have a positive outcome on the Greek economy, left many in limbo and rendered others to abandon their offers in Greece altogether and seek opportunities elsewhere in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{397}

\textbf{9. Security}

As a result of Greece's numerous issues with its neighbours, mainly Turkey, the Greek Government continued to increase its military expenditure from 2001 spending approximately four and a half to six billion euros annually or approximately 3% of GDP.\textsuperscript{398} Greece also maintained that it would remain an active member and uphold its obligations by participating in the various engagements of NATO and the UN. Domestically, the security of Greek and foreign citizens were improved when in 2002, the Hellenic Police captured leaders Alexandros Giotopoulos and Dimitris Koufodinas, as well as seventeen other members of the far-left terrorist organisation November 17 for a total of 2500 charges, including murder.\textsuperscript{399} The greatest task of the Hellenic Police, however, in collaboration with the Armed Forces, Fire Brigade and the National Intelligence Service, was the security of the Athens 2004 Olympics with a significant increase in Hellenic Police

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{393} C. Dimas, “Privatization in the Name of ‘Europe’: Analyzing the Telecoms Privatization in Greece from a ‘Discursive Institutionalist’ Perspective", \textit{Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe}, 2010, pp. 37-40
\textsuperscript{394} Kassimeris, \textit{West European Politics}, p. 950
\textsuperscript{395} Lyrintzis, \textit{West European Politics}, pp. 252-254
\textsuperscript{396} Featherstone, \textit{West European Politics}, p. 238
\textsuperscript{397} Dimas, \textit{Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe}, pp. 41-44
\textsuperscript{398} ELSTAT, \textit{Greek Military Expenditure}, 2001-2009
\textsuperscript{399} Hellenic Police, \textit{N17}, 2002,
\url{http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=177&Itemid=170&lang=} (Accessed 01/01/2016)
\end{footnotes}
responsible for public order, security and road duties using magnetic gates, thermal cameras, portable transceivers, dogs, vehicles and helicopters.\textsuperscript{400} Although the Greek Government under Simitis responded and engaged with Turkey in ‘Dog Fights’ over the Aegean in response to its airspace violations, tensions escalated in 2006 when a Greek F-16 and Turkish F16 collided mid-air, killing the Greek pilot Costas Iliakis.\textsuperscript{401} \textsuperscript{402} Nevertheless, Greece was active in the Afghan War from 2001, Iraq War from 2003, Sudan War from 2005 and Lebanon War from 2006, as well as in the Rebellion in the FYR from 2001 – 2003, and finally, UN Missions in the Mediterranean from 2001 to prevent the smuggling of WMDs and in the Horn of Africa from 2003 to protect cargo ships from pirates. The arresting of Giotopoulos, Koufodinas and other N17 members significantly reduced the acts of terrorism in Greece committed by far-left groups with such measures acting as a deterrent against future groups.\textsuperscript{403} Further, the measures taken by the Hellenic Police regarding the Olympic Games, however, were viewed as extravagant as Greece spent a total of approximately one billion euros for security alone.\textsuperscript{404}

The money Greece spent on its military expenditure were nonetheless viewed as extravagant and wasted on the maintenance of bases, equipment and personnel, severely the development of the Greek military industry.\textsuperscript{405} Furthermore, the sheer amount of money Greece spent on the Athens 2004 Olympics Games, money which it did not have, would be one of the primary factors that crippled the Greek economy some years later.\textsuperscript{406} While the arrests of N17 members reduced official acts of terrorism in Greece, it did not help the Hellenic Police stop Anarchists, mainly from Exarcheia in Athens, a prominent Anarchist area, from using political issues in the country as an excuse to riot and cause damage to Greek property.\textsuperscript{407} Further protests occurred, mainly from left wing citizens, who took to the streets on numerous occasions against Greece’s involvement in NATO and UN engagements, rendering them not a Greek problem,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{403} K. Hope, “Life Sentences for Greece’s N17”, \textit{Financial Times}, 2003, p. 1
\bibitem{407} Hope, \textit{Financial Times}, pp. 2-3
\end{thebibliography}
particularly when Greece was unable to protect its sovereignty from the likes of Turkey.\textsuperscript{408} \textsuperscript{409}

**10. Elites**

As the name indicates, Kostas Karamanlis is linked to the Karamanlis Dynasty that traces its ancestry to the Karamanlides of Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{410} Kostas is the nephew of the Konstandinos Karamanlis who returned democracy to Greece in 1974 with the Metapolitefsi.\textsuperscript{411} Kostas’ father, Alekos Karamanlis, a brother of Konstandinos, was not directly involved in Greek politics but did allow several secret political meetings to take place in his work office during the Junta.\textsuperscript{412} While most of Kostas’ family involved in Greek politics are active in the Karamanlis stronghold of Serres, Kostas expanded their reach by being active in the Thessaloniki A constituency.\textsuperscript{413}

As a man with strong family connections with the Karamanlis Dynasty, Kostas was indebted to be involved in a political scandal of some sort, and while many can be mentioned involving himself and MPs, the most prominent is the Vatopedi Scandal of 2008.\textsuperscript{414} Although it is uncertain when the scandal occurred, in September of 2008 new broke that a deal had been conducted between the Karamanlis Government and the Vatopedi Monastery in Mount Athos.\textsuperscript{415} It was reported that the two had agreed to trade low-value land belonging to the Vatopedi Monastery in exchange for high-value property belonging to the Greek State.\textsuperscript{416} While the Greek State had sold such property for approximately 100 million euros, it was found that the real estimate was approximately 1 billion euros, and while the

\textsuperscript{408} Koukis, *Cooperation and Conflict*, p. 178
\textsuperscript{409} Paris and Cambas, *Global Business and Management Research*, pp. 92-94
\textsuperscript{410} K. Karamanlis, *Biography*,
http://www.kkaramanlis.gr/viografia (Accessed 13/01/216)
\textsuperscript{411} K.G. Karamanlis, *Family History*,
http://www.ikk.gr/oikogeneiaki-zoi (Accessed 13/01/216)
\textsuperscript{412} K.G. Karamanlis, *Military Junta*,
\textsuperscript{413} K. Karamanlis, *Political History*,
http://www.kkaramanlis.gr/politika (Accessed 13/01/216)
deal was legitimate on paper, questions remained as to how such a large amount of money was unaccounted for. It is evident that Karamanlis, in the same way as his predecessors, was very much like many in the Karamanlis Dynasty that has used their position within the Greek State for personal gain. While his uncle was a reputable man, there is no doubt the Karamanlis Dynasty has been involved, both prior to and post 1974, as well as during this period, with known and unknown scandals. The fact that the Vatopedi Scandal occurred during and with the Karamanlis Government is no surprise as Karamanlis himself has quoted participation in 'secret deals' being conducted behind closed doors. Such secret deals demonstrate how Karamanlis, as well as his close associates, are able to make a profit and in the case of Vatopedi, a profit that Karamanlis has kept hidden and a scandal that he has yet to be investigated for.

11. Church of Greece
The Church of Greece begun 2001 with some positive steps toward the Greek State with Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens and All Greece blessing the Hellenic Genocide Petition Effort that urged that the Greek Government not to change Law 2675/98 that wanted to remove the word 'genocide' when referring to the Hellenic Genocide of Asia Minor. That same year, in an attempt to defend the Greek State, Christodoulos forced Pope John Paul II who was visiting Greece for the first time to apologise for the Fourth Crusade and Sack of Constantinople in 1204, which he did, which is commemorated by the Church of Greece along with the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 annually. A year later in 2002, the Church of Greece exercised its right by declining a suggestion made by the Greek State that it should use Modern Greek in the Holy Liturgy, instead of maintaining the use of Koine Greek. Most importantly, however, in 2003, the Church of Greece was supported by the Greek State, under the guidance of Article 105 of the Greek Constitution, that

418 Featherstone, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, p. 195
419 Xenakis, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, pp.178-180
420 Christos, *Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe*, pp.16-20
http://www.ecclesia.gr/English/holysynod/special_events/johnpaulii-visit (Accessed 17/01/2016)
concreted the status of Mount Athos and its way of life to remain unchanged as part of the EU.\footnote{Greek Government, \textit{Athens Treaty}, 2003}

These moments of mutual cooperation, however, did not withhold the Church of Greece from organising protests, riots and petitions all over Greece in response to the Greek Government removing religious affiliation from Greek ID Cards and labelling globalisation a 'crime against humanity' for its role.\footnote{L. Molokotos, “The Greek ID Card Controversy: A Case Study of Religion and National Identity in a Changing European Union”, \textit{Journal of Contemporary Religion}, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2007, pp. 189-191} In both 2003 and 2006, the Church of Greece was also responsible for stopping the construction of a Mosque in Athens on the grounds that Greece was not yet ready for a Mosque.\footnote{A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas, “Constructing Difference: The Mosque Debates in Greece”, \textit{Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies}, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2009, pp. 963-965} In 2007, the Church of Greece pressured the Greek State to reverse changes made to a Greek school textbook that questioned the role of the Orthodox Church in maintaining the Greek \textit{ethnos} during the \textit{Tourkokratia}.\footnote{D. Zachos and A. Michailidou, ““Others” in Textbooks: The Case of Greek Sixth Grade’s History Textbook”, \textit{Theory in Action}, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2014, p. 3} A year later, the Church of Greece also denounced a decision made by the Greek Government to introduce civil partnerships, labelling the law as a motivator of state-sanctioned prostitution.\footnote{E. Karagiannis, “Secularism in Context: The Relations between the Greek State and the Church of Greece in Crisis”, \textit{European Journal of Sociology}, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2009, p. 144}

In almost all cases mentioned above, it is evident the Church of Greece still believes itself to be the protector of the Greek \textit{ethnos} as understood by and in accordance with Orthodox Christianity.\footnote{Molokotos, \textit{Journal of Contemporary Religion}, pp. 192-195} Despite the fact that the Greek State employs the clergy of the Church of Greece, grants them tax exemptions and offers various benefits, the Church of Greece is still vehement on having a hold over the Greek State by ensuring it does not proceed with policies outside the realm of what it constitutions as truly part of the Greek \textit{ethnos}.\footnote{Karagiannis, \textit{European Journal of Sociology}, p. 145-146} This is proven in the fact that when issues arise that are contrary to the image of Orthodox Greece, such as religious affiliation on state identification cards which would no doubt have Orthodoxy as a majority, it is the first to attack the Greek State through various mentioned means until its will is met.\footnote{Triandafyllidou and Gropas, \textit{Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies}, pp. 966-970} It is also proven in how the Church of Greece will go as far as disregarding articles of the Greek Constitution it perceives as against Orthodoxy Greece such as religious freedom and the protection of the
family, the former that would normally allow the construction of a mosque and the latter civil partnerships between for same-sex relationships.\(^{433}\)

12. Summary
It can, therefore, be argued that the various institutions of the Greek State were explored from the period 2001-2008. The chapter began with the revisions that occurred to the Greek Constitution in 2001 under the Simitis Government and how these can be described as the most important in the country to date with changes to the separation of powers and improvements in citizen rights. Following this was a further look at Greece's citizenship debate which again proved to be solely between varying conditions for Greeks, both in Greece and the Diaspora, and non-Greeks, in an effort to keep the country homogenous. As citizens who form the core of the democracy in the country, changes to the political system were explored, namely the introduction of the 3% threshold and 50-seat bonus used by political parties to manipulate the notion of popular sovereignty to their advantage.

Furthermore, the chapter discussed Simitis' new rival in the Hellenic Parliament, Kostas Karamanlis, an individual that was popular within New Democracy for his name and ability to be influenced by older MPs. Nevertheless, the Karamanlis Governments which served for two terms were rather ambitious but lost favour with the Greek people for their inability to act in moments of importance. A prominent example of this inability is proven through Karamanlis' view on checks and balances which he did not mention throughout his tenure, proving his allegiance to the old ways. In addition, the chapter explored the role of the Karamanlis Government in trying to portray itself with aspirations toward the privatisation of state assets while at the same time maintaining a high stake in them to prevent change.

In terms of security, the Karamanlis Government was responsible for budget deficits both domestically in terms of the Olympic Games and on a foreign level in terms of Greece's military expenditure. As per the norm in Greek politics, it was found that Karamanlis had obvious links with the Karamanlis Dynasty and as such, was involved in prominent scandals such as the Vatopedi Scandal whereby substantial funds disappeared. Finally, the Church of Greece was again mentioned in terms of how it interacted with the Greek State, interfering in matters relating to the Greek State when it felt its notion of the protector of the Greek ethnus was threatened, such as with allowing civil partnerships. It can, therefore, be argued that Greek institutions in the period of 2001-2008 can be described as progressing on a limited level in comparison to the period of 1986-2000.

\(^{433}\) Zachos and Michailidou, *Theory in Action*, p. 5

1. Context
The period from 2009 - 2016 looks at the institutions of the Greek State from the onset of the Greek Economic Crisis. While the Greek Constitution has not been revised since 2001, proposals made by MPs of PASOK and ND in 2014 will be looked at, despite that these never came to realised. In terms of Greek citizenship, the period is and continues to be marked by the position of the Greek Government on Greeks citizens and non-Greeks arriving into Greece. However, the most important institution in this period is the popular sovereignty of Greek citizens and the new trend the economic crisis has had on this concept.

Furthermore, the Hellenic Parliament saw the leadership of three new individuals, George Papandreou, Antonis Samaras and Alexis Tsipras, leaders of PASOK, ND and SYRIZA, respectfully. The Papandreou Government, Samaras Government and now SYRIZA Government to the Greek Economic Crisis, namely the memorandums and austerity measures, will be of pivotal focus since it begun. As a result of EU pressure, these governments also advocated of also implementing reforms that would target the deficiencies of the Greek system. In addition, the biggest area of both economic and social reform was the large Greek public sector that the previous PASOK Government and ND Government did not change, as well as that of SYRIZA that swore would remain free of change.

Stemming away from the traditional security concerns from Turkey, in this period, the main security risk to Greece was the large influx of people, approximately over a million, crossing into Greece from Turkey. In a further direct result of the Greek Economic Crisis, Greece's elites have come into the spotlight with the revelation of the Lagarde List hinted at the extent to which Greece's wealthiest were significantly involved in tax evasion and corruption to which the Greek State did not act against. Finally, in regards to the Church of Greece, the issue of Greekness again arose with its involvement in state affairs. Once each of these institutions has been discussed, particularly in regards to the Greek Economic Crisis, a summary will follow on the overall period from 2009 - 2016.

2. Constitution
Although no changes have been made to the Greek Constitution since 2008, it is worth mentioning that in 2012, both ND and PASOK argued while important articles within it needed revision, there was no collective consensus as to which articles needed to be changed.\(^{434}\) Since the signing of the First Memorandum in 2010 by

\(^{434}\) Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 110.3
PASOK and the Second Memorandum in 2012 by ND as a response to the Greek Economic Crisis, neither ND or PASOK were confident that they would not have the support of the Hellenic Parliament or a 2/3 majority in the matter. Nevertheless, SYRIZA has argued since 2015 that it openly wants a new Greek Constitution to be in force by 2021, a move that is forbidden. For example, Article 110, Excerpt 1 states "The provisions of the Constitution shall be subject to revision with the exception of those which determine the form of government as a Parliamentary Republic and those of articles 2 paragraph 1, 4 paragraphs 1, 4 and 7, 5 paragraphs 1 and 3, 13 paragraph 1, and 26."  

The reason MPs are not allowed to change such articles within the Greek Constitution as they are considered fundamental and at the heart of the democracy of the Greek State, such as its notion of being a Parliamentary Republic. Further, these articles outline the fundamental powers of the legislative to the Parliament and President, powers of the executive to the Government and President and powers of the legislative to the courts. Nevertheless, as more and more parliamentarians have adopted the view that these articles need to be revised, particularly those referring to the separation of powers, they believe their popular sovereignty which is guaranteed in article 1 section 2 overrides article 110. Such parliamentarians have thus called for either the forbidden articles to thus be revised or that an entirely new constitution be written.  

To date, many parliamentarians in the country, therefore, believe that while the Greek Constitution served its purpose in 1975, it is now outdated in the functioning of the Greek State, particularly as it has been unable to deal with the Greek Economic Crisis. The primary reason for this belief lies in the fact that such a significant amount of institutional problems are the direct result deficiencies found throughout many articles, both those untouched and revised in the past, of the constitution. Parliamentarians with this belief have recognised that this has

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435 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 110.2  
436 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 110  
437 Greek Constitution, 1975, Article 110.1  
438 A. I. Marketou, ‘Constitutional Change through the EU Crisis’, European University Institute, 2014, pp. 20-22  
442 Marketou, European University Institute, pp. 22-27  
443 Contiades and Tassopoulos, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Greek Constitution, pp. 197-200
largely been because of the ambiguous language it uses such as conflicting terms or the lack of explanation regarding fundamental forms of governance such as the separation of powers.\textsuperscript{444} Furthermore, there is also the belief that a new Greek Constitution would demonstrate to the EU, on the seriousness on Greece’s part for integration and modernisation.\textsuperscript{445}

3. Citizenship
For much of this period, Greece continued the policies of the previous years in regards to Greek Citizenship which made it relatively easy for ethnic Greeks to acquire it.\textsuperscript{446} However, two primary changes were made for non-Greeks in 2010 whereby they, otherwise known as the 'Second Generation' were entitled to Greek Citizenship so long as they and a parent was born and lived in Greece for five years.\textsuperscript{447} Furthermore, changes were also made in 2010 to acquisition of Greek Citizenship by non-Greek EU citizens via naturalisation whereby they could apply for Greek Citizenship so long as they lived in Greece for five years and were competent in the Greek language and knowledge of Greek history as a means of demonstrating their Greek consciousness, despite that many were born and went to school in Greece.\textsuperscript{448} Finally, in 2015, those of the Second Generation were granted automatic Greek Citizenship under Articles 1 and 2 if they attained a “declaration due to birth and school attendance in Greece” or a “declaration due to school or university attendance in Greece.”\textsuperscript{449}

However, as a result of the Greek Economic Crisis, the issue of Greek Citizenship has been brushed aside with the Greek State mainly focusing solely on Greek citizens, migrants and the status of refugees.\textsuperscript{450} While the majority of migrants seek to reach other parts of Europe, there are those who are stuck in Greece, both legal and illegal, who are unable to continue their journey mainly due to their financial circumstances.\textsuperscript{451} Successive Greek Governments have maintained a similar policy of trying to keep migrants out altogether through various means such as building a fence on the Greek-Turkish border while also excluding them from Greek society altogether by not offering them any rights with the hope that they would voluntarily leave, arguing that they simply cannot cater for such

\textsuperscript{444} Manitakis and Papadopoulou, \textit{The Perspective of a Constitution for Europe}, pp. 161-165
\textsuperscript{445} Drosos, \textit{The 'Memorandum' as a Turning Point of the Regime}, pp. 45-50
\textsuperscript{446} Greek Citizenship Code, 2015, Article 1
\textsuperscript{447} Greek Citizenship Code, 2015, Article 1A.1
\textsuperscript{448} Greek Citizenship Code, 2015, Article 5A.1a
\textsuperscript{449} Greek Law 4332/2015
\textsuperscript{450} D. Christopoulos, 'Country Report: Greece', \textit{EUDO Citizenship Observatory}, 2013, pp. 10-11
\textsuperscript{451} D. Anagnostou, 'Citizenship Policy Making in Mediterranean EU States: Greece', \textit{EUDO Citizenship Observatory}, 2011, pp. 18-21
people.\textsuperscript{452} However, when German Chancellor Merkel announced in 2015 that Germany would take in over 500,000 refugees, approximately 1,000,000 people from the Middle East started crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands, namely Lesbos, Chios and Samos, in an effort to pass through Greece to Germany.\textsuperscript{453}

Once the EU realised that it could not handle such a large influx of people, it begun to initiate a policy of closing its borders and in an agreement with Greece and Turkey, the former would house and process approximately 50,000 while the latter would accept those deported back from Greece, eventually to be resettled at a later date elsewhere in the EU. As Greece still does not have the resources for such a task, the SYRIZA Government, which initially only agreed to temporary placements, changed its policy and agreed with the EU that it would grant permanent asylum to 50,000 people.\textsuperscript{454}

Although the exact number of processed people into Greece is unknown, the current 54,042 in the country waiting were described by Deputy Migration Minister Yannis Mouzalas as going to help with Greece's 'demographic problem' as well as the decreasing number in its labour force.\textsuperscript{455} Unfortunately, the Greek State has not recognised the resentment of Greek citizens who feel their living conditions are continuously declining without any hope for change or assistance which has led to an exodus of Greek citizens, mostly graduates and professionals, elsewhere in Europe, North America or Oceania.\textsuperscript{456-457}

4. Popular Sovereignty

In the Greek Elections of 2009, George Papandreou of PASOK was appointed Prime Minister of the Papandreou Government winning 38.1\% and 160 seats, serving until his resignation in 2011.\textsuperscript{458} After Papandreou's resignation, a temporary National Unity Government was formed under Lucas Papademos until the Greek Elections of 2012 in May that resulted in no clear winner and the forming of a temporary Caretaker Government under Panagiotis Pikrammenos.\textsuperscript{459} In the second Greek


\textsuperscript{453} A. A. Nestoras, 'The Gatekeeper's Gambit: SYRIZA, Left Populism and the European Migration Crisis', \textit{Institute for European Democrats}, 2015, pp. 6-11

\textsuperscript{454} Pallister-Wilkins, \textit{International Political Sociology}, pp. 58-61

\textsuperscript{455} Nestoras, \textit{Institute for European Democrats}, pp. 12-19

\textsuperscript{456} Christopoulos, \textit{EUDO Citizenship Observatory}, pp. 11-14

\textsuperscript{457} Anagnostou, \textit{EUDO Citizenship Observatory}, pp. 21-25

\textsuperscript{458} Ministry of Interior, \textit{Greek Elections}, October 4, 2009


\textsuperscript{459} Ministry of Interior, \textit{Greek Elections}, May 6, 2012

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Elections of 2012 in June, Antonis Samaras of ND was appointed Prime Minister of a Coalition Government with PASOK, together winning 32.1% and 162 seats. With the failed Greek President Elections in 2015, the subsequent Greek Elections of 2015 in January were held with Alexis Tsipras of SYRIZA being appointed Prime Minister winning 36.3% and 149 seats, and after internal strife, again winning the Greek Elections of 2015 in September with 35.5% and 145 seats, on both occasion forming a Coalition Government with the far-right Independent Greeks.

Nevertheless, since the beginning of the Greek Economic Crisis and the resulting actions of successive Greek governments, the turnout and abstained votes in 2009 were 70.95% to 29.05%, in May 2012 were 65.12% to 34.88% and in June 2012 were 62.49% to 37.51%. Although in January 2015 the turnout and abstained were slightly higher with 63.62% to 35.38%, in September 2015 they were a shocking 56.57% to 43.43% with a further 6.41% of the former going to parties not in the Hellenic Parliament. In the same year, the SYRIZA Government was also responsible for holding the Greek Bailout Referendum on whether or not Greece should accept the deal proposed by the Troika. Dissatisfied with the Greek Government and Troika, and while the question was rather dubious, 61.31% of Greeks voted against the deal and 38.69% in favour.

While voting is in fact compulsory in Greece, the result of successive Greek governments not enforcing the notion has had a catastrophic impact on the Greek democratic system as since 2009, turnout and abstained votes have continued to decrease. In regards to the Greek Elections of 2015 held in September, this is particularly alarming as only 56.57% or approximately half of eligible Greeks voted. The legitimacy of the SYRIZA Government to date has also been questioned as if the percentages of invalid and blank ballots and parties that did not enter the Hellenic Parliament are included, comprising 2.42% and 6.41%


460 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, June 17, 2012
461 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, January 25, 2015
Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, September 20, 2015
462 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, 2009 and 2012
463 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, 2015
464 Ministry of Interior, Greek Referendum, July 5, 2015
465 Ministry of Interior, Greek Referendum, 2015
467 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, 2015
respectfully, the Greek Government was formed from only 47.74%. Furthermore, the fact that the SYRIZA Government did not act on the results of the Greek Referendum of 2015 indicates that Greeks are dissatisfied with their politicians and have lost faith in taking part in a political process toward no end.469

5. Political Parties
George Papandreou became the leader of PASOK in 2004 and Official Opposition Leader until 2009 when he became Prime Minister, claiming his leadership of PASOK was and would continue to be the result of a break from traditional dynastic politics.470 The next Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, became the leader of New Democracy in 2009, pledging that as Prime Minister he would make both ideological and organisation reforms within New Democracy.471 However, the biggest change occurred with Alexis Tsipras, who became the youngest leader of SYRIZA in 2008 at 33, an MP for Athens A in 2009, followed by the Official Opposition Leader in 2012.472 As of 2015, Tsipras is the first and current Prime Minister that is not from the traditional centre-right ND and centre-left PASOK, but rather, from the far-left SYRIZA that he pledged would rid the Greek State of the old in order to win the future, elegantly expressed through their motto of ‘hope is coming.’473 Papandreou was initially popular with PASOK due to his family lineage, however, as he immediately had to face the Greek Economic Crisis, he quickly became very unpopular amongst his fellow MPs for his pro-EU leadership style and policies, ultimately resigning in 2011.474 His successor, Samaras, was also a popular leader of ND, running the party so that he maintained a majority status at all times which was achieved by expelling those who questioned his party line decisions such as Dora Bakoyianni in 2010.475 Tsipras is unique in that he was successful with

468 Ministry of Interior, Greek Elections, 2015
469 Ministry of Interior, Greek Referendum, 2015
470 Hellenic Parliament, George Papandreou, 2009
   http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/vouleftes/george-papandreou/ (Accessed 12/05/2016)
   http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/vouleftes/antonis-samaras/ (Accessed 12/05/2016)
472 Hellenic Parliament, Alexis Tsipras, 2015
   http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/vouleftes/alexis-tsipras/ (Accessed 12/05/2016)
473 Hellenic Parliament, Alexis Tsipras, 2015

SYRIZA for his populist mandate and overall leadership of a coalition of various
democratic political parties.\textsuperscript{476} However, in 2014, Tsipras changed his leadership
style when SYRIZA was voted with 74\% to be the sole leader of a unitary party which
gave him the further opportunity to expand on his populist agenda.\textsuperscript{477}

Papandreou was the Prime Minister and Leader of PASOK in a time with
unforeseen circumstances and as a result, made the best possible choice or the
lesser of two evils by resigning as Prime Minister which kept his principles intact
rather than answering for the misdemeanours of previous PASOK Governments.\textsuperscript{478}
On the other hand, Samaras, who had the support of ND, seems to have made the
wrong decision by arrogantly trying to have his MP Stavros Dimas elected as
President which, after failing on two attempts, left the current President to dissolve
the Hellenic Parliament and call for elections.\textsuperscript{479} Tsipras, who started as a strong
leader of SYRIZA, faced a minor setback in 2015 when MPs within SYRIZA led by
Panagiotis Lafazanis were responsible for an internal rebellion, causing Tsipras to
briefly resign and hold elections.\textsuperscript{480} Although Tsipras was re-elected, he has been
known to maintain power by reshuffling his Cabinet on two occasions to remove
those who disagreed with him, replacing MPs who did not uphold his policies and
dealing with internal dissidents through a vote of confidence and a snap election.\textsuperscript{481}

6. Government

With the exception of a proposed referendum by Papandreou on whether Greece
should accept the Troika's bailout package, the Papandreou Government
acknowledged it needed to work with the Troika in solving Greece's economic
problems.\textsuperscript{482} Despite Samaras' error of holding Presidential Elections in December
2014 as opposed to the usual February of 2015 and in the middle of bailout talks,
the Samaras Government was also complacent with the Troika regarding the Greek
Economic Crisis that was to be dealt with as quickly as possible without considering
the effects it would have.\textsuperscript{483} On the other hand, the SYRIZA Government took a

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{478} Kouvelakis, \textit{New Left Review}, p. 19-22
\bibitem{479} Mylonas, \textit{European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook}, pp. 128-130
\bibitem{480} Klapsis, \textit{Romanian Journal of European Affairs}, pp. 34-36
\bibitem{481} Stavrakakis, \textit{Juncture}, pp. 277-280
\bibitem{482} Greek Government, \textit{Papandreou Government}, 2009-2012
http://primeminister.gr/papandreou-government/ (Accessed 21/05/2016)
http://primeminister.gr/samaras-government/ (Accessed 21/05/2016)
\end{thebibliography}

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different approach towards the Troika, stating that it would never agree to another memorandum or austerity measures that undermined the Greek people.\textsuperscript{484} Tsipras, as well as many of his MPs such as Yannis Varoufakis, were somewhat hostile toward the Troika in their public statements, meetings and speeches, constantly attacking mainly the EU and German Chancellor Merkel for their oppressive and unfair policies.\textsuperscript{485}

The Papandreou Government was first to attempt a solution by signing the First Austerity Package, Second Austerity Package, First Memorandum and subsequent Third Austerity Package in 2010, and the Fourth Austerity Package and Fifth Austerity Package in 2011, all of which aimed at saving 43.6 billion in exchange for 107.3 billion to stop Greece from going bankrupt in 2010.\textsuperscript{486} Despite the fact that Samaras fiercely criticised Papandreou for his agreements in a pre-election speech at the Zappeion, once the Samaras Government was in power, it too attempted to resolve the crisis by signing the Sixth Austerity Package, Second Memorandum, and Seventh Austerity Package in 2012, Eighth Austerity Package in 2013 and Ninth Austerity Package in 2014 which gave Greece 164.5 billion in exchange for further austerity to stop the country from defaulting on its debt.\textsuperscript{487} While the Tsipras Government was elected on the very premises that it would never agree to such documents, it eventually succumbed out of fears of a Grexit from the EU and total economic devastation, signing the Tenth Austerity Package, Eleventh Memorandum and Twelfth Austerity Package in 2015 which gave Greece 86 billion in exchange for the harshest austerity to date.\textsuperscript{488} In 2016, the SYRIZA Government agreed with the European Commission for the implementation of a Thirteenth Austerity Package.\textsuperscript{489}
With the exception of wealthy Greek citizens who comprise one percent of the population, the result of such measures has had an impact on the majority of Greek citizens in the form of a humanitarian crisis. Without a substantial amount of money coming in due to the shrinking of Greek GDP by 24% in six years, many Greeks have had difficulties in sustaining their living style and have not been able to pay for their electricity and water bills, and basic needs such as food with reports that approximately 200,000 Greek children go to school hungry and faint as a result. Greeks are also now faced in dealing with the effects to Greek social services as a result of cuts with the most significant occurring to the health care system that is short of doctors and nurses, lacks equipment and space, and has skyrocketed in prices for services. With little help from the Greek State and the inability of family and friends to offer assistance, one in four Greeks now lives below the poverty line with thousands of other Greeks becoming homeless.

7. Checks and Balances
In addition to economic reforms and as a result of pressure from the EU, the PASOK Government also made promises that it would make extensive political reforms, though none of these came to be realised as Papandreou resigned. Samaras, his predecessor, also argued in line with the EU and agreed that changes need to be made to the Greek system as Greece's extensive economic problems were the result of political mismanagement by the Greek political class. In an effort to break Greece from the past, SYRIZA maintained its hard line mandate that it would implement either new articles and legislation within the Greek Constitution or new Greek laws that specifically targeted the separation of powers. More specifically, SYRIZA was vehement that it would address the deep and ongoing problems of the


494 PASOK, *Party Programme*, 2009, pp. 6-10
496 SYRIZA, *Party Programme*, 2015, pp.16-18
Greek political class that all political parties have become accustomed to such as clientelism, nepotism and privileges.\textsuperscript{497}

Although the EU continues to offer assistance to Greece, the implementation of checks and balances into the country has been largely resisted by PASOK and ND.\textsuperscript{498} While much was not expected from ND and PASOK, there was promise with SYRIZA, backed by public support and its mandate, that change would occur with their tenure.\textsuperscript{499} Although the SYRIZA Government made strong pre-election promises at changing the system, it has spent the majority of its time talking about reforms without actually making any concrete proposals with calendar end dates.\textsuperscript{500} In fact, even when pressure is applied on the SYRIZA Government to pursue its ‘hope toward a better future’, it has become reluctant with Tsipras and MPs simply filling the positions of PASOK and ND.\textsuperscript{501}

The difference between PASOK and ND in regards to the wishes of the EU was so long as the former implemented economic reforms, the latter was not overly concerned with the extent to which they implement social reforms.\textsuperscript{502} However, the concern of the EU arose when Tsipras and SYRIZA began questioning the economic reforms agreed to by PASOK and ND such as with former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis who continuously ridiculed the Troika under the banner of idealistic yet unrealistic alternatives such as threats of default in exchange for further funds.\textsuperscript{503} Once Tsipras and SYRIZA changed their tone toward the Troika by removing Varoufakis and finally agreeing to realistic economic reforms, SYRIZA used this notion to maintain the status quo by being absorbed into the lavish yet fragmented Greek system that they promised to change.\textsuperscript{504} Although the EU still does not fully trust the Tsipras Government, the two are on good terms, with his main foe now being the Greeks themselves who, as a result of SYRIZA’s broken promises, only give Tsipras approximately 29% and SYRIZA less than 20% of support.\textsuperscript{505}

8. Public Sector

\textsuperscript{497} SYRIZA, Party Programme, 2015, pp.19-24
\textsuperscript{499} Stavrakakis, Juncture, pp. 276-277
\textsuperscript{501} K. Ovenden, Syriza: Inside the Labyrinth, Chicago, Pluto Press, 2015, pp. 104-110
\textsuperscript{502} Michael-Matsas, Journal of Socialist Theory, pp. 316-317
\textsuperscript{503} Stavrakakis, Juncture, pp. 277-280
\textsuperscript{504} Martin, Inroads, pp. 86-89
\textsuperscript{505} Ovenden, Syriza: Inside the Labyrinth, pp. 116-123
Papandreou was careful with his language in regards to the Greek public sector and promised that under PASOK, public servants would not face financial cuts to wages or to their employment, amplified by the slogan at the time *lefta uparxoun or there is money*.\(^{506}\) Samaras was similar in his approach but rather than discussing public servants directly, he always made statements that ND would only reform and make changes to the public service itself, never referring to the individual due to strong reactions from Greek Unions.\(^{507}\) Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Tsipras promised that SYRIZA would not consider nor even negotiate the jobs of Greek public servants in its discussions with the Troika.\(^{508}\) Tsipras went so far as to make bold statements that under SYRIZA, no Greek public servant would lose his or her job or benefits and that those who had under PASOK and ND would be rehired.\(^{509}\)

However, despite their rhetoric, it was inevitable that the large Greek public would be a focus point of reform with the starting point being cuts to public-owned companies, ministries and municipalities.\(^{510}\) Without including cuts to pensions, increases in tax and the implementation of capital controls, the Greek Government, in accordance with the Troika, agreed to dismiss hundreds of thousands of public servants, many of whom did not receive a severance payment.\(^{511}\) For those who were still employed, the Greek Government first agreed to freezes in public servant salaries, followed by a 7%, 3%, 30%, 22% and 30% cut in their salaries, respectively.\(^{512}\) In addition, the Greek Government also made a 10%, 12%, 30% and 8% cut to bonuses including annual and sick leave, overtime and work-related travel, all of which were eventually cancelled until further notice.\(^{513}\)

The closure of businesses owned by the Greek government and dismissal of public servants led to a sharp rise in unemployment in the country from 10% in 2009 to 25% in 2015.\(^{514}\) Those still employed by the Greek State were outraged that they were now expected to work with such a low salary, next to no bonuses and the threat of further freezes to their salaries.\(^{515}\) As a result, The Union of Greek Civil Servants (ADEDY) has accused the practices of the Greek Government as a breach

\(^{506}\) PASOK, 2009, pp. 4-7
\(^{507}\) ND, 2012, pp. 12-16
\(^{508}\) SYRIZA, 2015, p. 5
\(^{509}\) SYRIZA, 2015, pp. 8-14
of the workers’ rights of public servants and in an effort to demonstrate their dissatisfaction, is continuously active in organising various protests around the country.516

The Greek Government has been unable to deal with these protests as many of them have crippling effects on Greek society such as Greece’s Public Power Company (DEH) that protested cuts by turning the electrical power on and off in cycles until a compromise was found, leaving many Greeks without power.517

9. Security
In addition to Greece’s ongoing security threat from Turkey vis-à-vis their numerous issues and its high military expenditure in response to such a threat, Greek security focused mainly on the European Migrant Crisis that begun in 2015.518 Since that time, over a million people from the Third World have crossed, and continue to do so, from Turkey into Greece’s Aegean Islands such as Chios, Kos, Lesbos and Kastellorizo with the hope they will reach Europe’s rich countries such as Germany, France and the UK.519 Despite Greece’s best efforts, the European Migrant Crisis has been a fundamental security issue for the Greek Government as from the onset, it was unsuccessful in recording the details of such a large number of people entering its territory.520 While the majority of people have passed through Greece, the Greek Government is still unaware of who exactly passed, where they are from, what their intentions are and how many are still in the country, both accounted and not accounted for.521

Greece’s concerns stem from the fact that Turkey, who has although agreed with the EU to stem the flow, follows the Ozal Doctrine that states Turkey does not need to make war with Greece but rather, will ‘finish them off’ through demographical changes by sending a few ‘million illegal immigrants’.522 In an attempt to keep people from crossing, Greece has increased the presence of the

518 Greece, National Intelligence Service, 2015, p. 1
http://www.nis.gr/portal/pls/portal/235532/ (Accessed 01/06/2016)
519 Greece, National Intelligence Service, 2015, pp. 2-3
http://www.nis.gr/portal/pls/portal/235532/ (Accessed 01/06/2016)
520 Greece, National Intelligence Service, 2015, pp. 5-7
http://www.nis.gr/portal/pls/portal/235532/ (Accessed 01/06/2016)
521 Greece, National Intelligence Service, 2015, p. 9
http://www.nis.gr/portal/pls/portal/235532/ (Accessed 01/06/2016)
Hellenic Police and the EU’s Frontex on the Greek-Turkish Border, accompanied by a 12km fence on a section of the Evros river and the recent inclusion of NATO patrolling the Aegean Sea. For those that still manage to cross the border, Greece adopted Operation Xenios Zeus that gave authority to the Hellenic Police to search and deport people in the country deemed to be illegal. Despite these measures, while the flow of people has slowed down, both the EU and Greece have questioned whether Turkey has ulterior motives as it still allows people to cross into Greece.

Although the SYRIZA Government should be commended for its humanitarianism, its subsequent open-border policy has resulted in the fear that a terrorist attack may occur in Greece. Once the EU realised such a large number of people was not feasible and adopted a closed border policy, Greece was still responsible for the current 54,042 people and unknown amount of undocumented people in its borders held in 'Hot Spots' and new 'Refugee Camps.' It is amongst these people that the Hellenic Police are uncertain as to whether or not terrorists may be hiding as was realised with the Paris attacks in 2015 whereby some of the perpetrators crossed through Greece. Their resentment toward Greece is increased as a direct result of the conditions that these people live in within the Hot Spots and Refugee Camps such as a lack of basic needs, no sanitation and overcrowding.

10. Elites
George Papandreou, son of former two-time Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and grandson of former three-time Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, is also part of the Papandreou Dynasty and like most, started his career as an MP in the Papandreou-dominated region of Achaea. His rival and close friend Antonis Samaras, the two of which were roommates at Amherst College, is the son of Dr Konstantinos Samaras and nephew of MP George Samaras from the prominent Samaras Family of Messenia where Antonis also started his political career as an

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523 Pallister-Wilkins, *International Political Sociology*, pp. 57-58
526 De Divitiis, Perspectives on Immigration and Terrorism, pp. 59-61
528 Lazaridis and Skleparis, *International Migration*, pp. 181
529 Hudson, *Middle East Policy*, pp. 27-31
The latest Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, is the son of Pavlos Tsipras, a big contractor of public works and known collaborator of the Junta 1967-1974. Nevertheless, while Tsipras comes from a prominent and wealthy family, he started his career in known leftist suburbs of Athens such as Nea Ionia with the KKE and Exarcheia with Synaspismos.

It is no surprise, however, that Papandreou and Samaras have links with Greeks found on the Lagarde List that outlines the extent to which such individuals are involved in tax evasion, embezzlement and the like. After Papandreou resigned as Prime Minister, Greek news reported that during his tenure, his mother Margaret Papandreou deposited 550 million euros into the Swiss HSBC Bank. In addition, Samaras was at the forefront when his close advisor Stavros Papastavros and MP Georgios Voulgarakis of ND were found to be on the Lagarde List for tax evasion and embezzlement. Tsipras, who spoke for months of purging the Greek State of these individuals and holding them accountable for their actions, is also closely linked with businessman Athanasios Martinos on the Lagarde List, spending time with the man at his villa on extended holidays throughout the summer months.

While the Lagarde List and other lists prove the dishonesty and immorality of these individuals, and that the problem of tax evasion amongst Greece’s elites does exist, it cannot be used in the courts of law and as such, MPs are unwilling to investigate and bring to justice those involved. Although there have been instances where certain individuals with links to Papandreou, Samaras, Tsipras or other MPs have been arrested or charged, these have not resorted to any end. In the case of former Finance Minister Giorgos Papakonstantinou and former Defence Minister Yiannis Sbokos both were acquitted and in the case of and former Deputy Interior Minister Leonidas Tzanis and businessman Vlassis Kambouroglou, both

531 A. Samaras, Biography, 1951-2015
532 A. Tsipras, Personal Biography, 1974-2005
533 A. Tsipras, Political History, 2006-2015
http://alexistsipras.gr/political-history/ (Accessed 25/02/2016)
534 C. Lagarde, Lagarde List, 2010
https://simonknowz.com/lagarde-list-greece/ (Accessed 16/04/2016)
535 Lagarde, 2010
536 Lagarde, 2010
537 Lagarde, 2010
539 C. P. Danopoulos, Accountability and the Quality of Democracy in Greece, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2015, pp. 116-118
were found dead prior to their trial.\textsuperscript{540} In order to maintain the status quo, MPs use their political positions to avoid combating tax evasion as a whole and in order to maintain public face, will prosecute a few MPs in an attempt to present the issue as a minority problem, such as with former Defence Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos who was charged with various economic scandals and given a prison sentence of 20 years.\textsuperscript{541}

11. Church of Greece

Relations between the Greek State and the Church of Greece remained somewhat positive throughout this period with the latter reinforcing its leadership status of the Greeks such as in 2012 when Metropolitan Mentzelopoulos of Athens claimed the Athens Mosque was not essential as most Muslims in the country were not citizens.\textsuperscript{542} This position was reiterated a few years later when the Church of Greece spoke out against new Anti-Racism Law that targeted Greeks, claiming the laws were a breach of the freedom of speech of the overwhelming Greek majority in a ‘non-multi-ethnic’.\textsuperscript{543} In an effort to maintain the status quo of an Orthodox-majority Greece, Archbishop Ieronymos II of Athens stated in 2015 that Europe, particularly because of its involvement in the Middle East, was responsible for the refugees and not debt-ridden Greece.\textsuperscript{544} In order to ensure its power hold, the Church of Greece, in the same year, successfully persuaded the SYRIZA Government, particularly the Minister of Culture, Education and Religious Affairs Aristides Baltas, to not proceed with the separation of church and state.\textsuperscript{545}

The Church of Greece, however, did not prevent itself from attacking Greek citizens throughout this period, particularly those part of the LGBT community.\textsuperscript{546} The attacks began in 2012 with the controversial play Corpus Christi that depicted Jesus and the Apostles as homosexuals with the Church organising protests outside

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{540} Mylonas, European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook, p.145-146  
\textsuperscript{541} Christians, Journal of Law and Policy, pp. 54-56  
\textsuperscript{542} Church of Greece, Press Release: Athens Mosque, 2012  
\textsuperscript{543} Church of Greece, Press Release: Anti-Racism Law, 2015  
\textsuperscript{544} Church of Greece, Press Release: Refugees, 2015  
\textsuperscript{545} Church of Greece, Press Release: Church and State, 2015  
\textsuperscript{546} D. Halikiopoulou, Patterns of Secularization: Church, State and Nation in Greece and the Republic of Ireland, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 25-30}
Theatre Chytirio in Athens labelling the event a blasphemy. A few years later in 2014, Archbishop Ieronymos II of Athens spoke out against the Anti-Racism Law that recognised same-sex unions in Greece, labelling the document as a means of trying to alter ‘Christian’ Greece. The following year, Archbishop Ieronymos II slammed cohabitation agreements that granted members of the LGBT community similar rights to married Greeks so long as they lived together, calling them a poor imitation of marriage.

As this was the first time in its history that Greece has been governed by the far-left SYRIZA Government, the Church of Greece has been considerably active, particularly from 2015 onwards, in coming to the aid of the Greek ethnos when detrimental issues are raised. Despite the fact that for the time being, the separation between state and church is not on the agenda, the very future prospect of such an idea renders the Church of Greece in a difficult position, namely the fate of its clergy employed as public servants and its status of paying little to no tax.

As the Church of Greece obviously feels threatened, it has attempted to maintain its status quo by flexing its muscles against the SYRIZA Government through attacks against its left-wing policies, namely those regarding the LGBT community. By doing so, the Church of Greece presents such policies, as well as those who implement them, as perverting away from what constitutes a true sense of Greekness with the hope that Greeks will become so dissatisfied that they will elect a more conservative political party sensitive to its case.

12. Summary
It can, therefore, be concluded that since the onset of the Greek Economic Crisis, most institutions of the Greek State from 2009 – 2016 have faced their biggest challenges. Despite the proposals made by MPs of PASOK and ND, as well as various other parliamentarians that the Greek Constitution be revised or a new one

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550 Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, European Science Foundation, pp. 9-10
552 Papastathis, Research Gate, pp. 8-9
553 Halikiopoulou, Patterns of Secularization, pp. 30-40
be written, it can be argued that these were simply proposals in name only with the current leadership not addressing the issue. While the Greek Government made concessions towards the Second Generation, the issue of Greek citizenship was once again a matter of dispute between Greeks and non-Greeks, and compounded by the economic crisis, has led to the former to leave their country and those of the latter enter it due to the ongoing mass arrival of people from the Third World. In addition to Greeks leaving the country, the popular sovereignty of Greek citizens has also been dealt a blow with the turnout and abstained votes continuously decreasing, an unfortunate reality that will continue to be present in future elections until the Greek Government addresses the needs of citizens.

These governments were led by Papandreou and Samaras, and now Tsipras, all of whom, despite their ideological differences, can be described as ineffective leaders of their parties. Furthermore, these leaders, once in power as Prime Ministers of their respective governments, can also be described as effectively responding to the Greek Economic Crisis as their agreed memorandums and austerity measures have had detrimental effects on the Greeks rather than repairing the Greek economy. In addition, the promises made by the Papandreou Government and Samaras Government at political reforms fell through with no actions taken, and as for the most vocal and far-left Tsipras Government, its tone completely reversed as SYRIZA too became absorbed in the system. This pattern was also evident when it came to the Greek public service which, although progressive reforms, was hit the hardest with reforms that severely affected Greek workers rather than changing the paradigms of the institution itself.

Despite Turkey's involvement and the influx of people being an EU problem, in the case of Greek security, the problem is not so much the people themselves but rather, the inability due to Greece's finances to properly build a functioning facility and process these people humanely while preventing would-be terrorists. In the case of Greek elites, it is again no surprise that politicians were involved with or have links with such individuals and any attempt at prosecuting those on the Lagarde List will not occur as the benefit to individuals such as Papandreou, Samaras and now Tsipras outweighs that of justice. As one of the most powerful institutions in the country, the Church of Greece demonstrated it has its own understanding of who is and who is not a 'Greek' which was exemplified in its attacks against the LGBT community, highlighting its nationalistic and conservative outlook. It is, therefore, evident that while the Greek Government has made the right steps toward some Greek institutions from 2009 - 2016, there are others where significant work still needs to be done.
Chapter 6: Future of Greece

1. Context
Although Greek institutions are in need of reform, it must be noted that Greece has come a long way since its establishment in 1821. While the Greeks have a long history spanning thousands of years identified through their Hellenism, the Greek Nation-State is still relatively young at only 195 years. For much of this time, the Greek Nation-State has been faced with numerous moments of political instability. An example of this has been the National Schism between the Greeks themselves, the most persistent being what model Modern Greece should follow, that of Ancient Greece or Medieval Greece, two completely different civilisations.

More importantly, it has been faced with periodic periods of conflict and war. An example of this is from 1912 to 1923 where Greece was involved in the Balkan Wars, WWI, WWII, Asia Minor Catastrophe and Hellenic Genocide, 11 years of war. It has therefore only been since the Metapolitefsi or return of democracy in 1975 that Greece has had time to breathe. Realistically, this has only left Greece with 41 years to determine how Greek institutions will develop and evolve under its democracy.

Considering the Greeks did not experience the Industrial Revolution, Renaissance or Enlightenment to the extent of other Europeans, their current predicament can be described as mainly positive with work to be done. With the right mind-set and a high level of optimism, it is important for Greeks to think amongst themselves about where they seriously want Greece to be situated over the next few years. With real action, Greeks could reach their full potential and transform Greece into a fully-fledged democracy. Through such a philosophy, suggestions have been made as to what solutions Greek politicians could adopt in order to reform the malfunctions of Greek institutions.554

2. Constitution
At present, the current SYRIZA Government is discussing the prospect of holding a referendum on future constitutional revisions, namely those regarding election law and those regarding the Greek President. Their goal is to introduce a simpler form of proportional representation, cancelling the 50-seat bonus to the political party that comes first, granting the Greek President more powers and allowing Greek citizens to elect the Greek President directly. Nevertheless, while the current constitution served its purpose in 1975, after years of turbulence, it is clear that Greece needs a new constitution. It should also be outlined that the Greek State is

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554 Thomas D. Gallant, Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, Chapter 12
solely based on the rule of law and not any religion, thus removing the Church of Greece and overall Greek Orthodox Church as the "prevailing religion".

Part one should firstly describe the type of government that is best suited to the Greek political system, in this case, a parliamentary democracy with the semi-presidential system. Part two regarding the rights of Greek citizens should be revised and updated to the standards of the EU and international law. Part three should outline how the Greek State is to be effectively organised and how it will function. Finally, as per the current constitution, part four should be put in place outlining the rules and regulations for revising the constitution, though without article restrictions and time limits.

In such a system with a mix between a parliamentary democracy a semi-presidential system, with greater powers to the Greek President, the effective governance of the country is ensured. It should be emphasised here that no matter the religion, sexual orientation, disability, and so on of each and every Greek citizen, all will be treated fairly and equally under the law such as recognising and granting secular marriage certificates for two adults, regardless if for two heterosexuals or two homosexuals, while also recognising religious certificates. The administration of the Greek State should mainly target the administration of Greek regions, the separation of powers and the application of checks and balances which are discussed further below. Finally, the ability to revise the new constitution without any restrictions will guarantee Greek democracy can evolve with the modern world.555

3. Citizenship
Since 1821, it is evident that the Greek State has pursued an indirect policy that seeks to keep the majority of citizens ethnic Greeks. However, with the growing amount of people crossing into its borders, if Greece wishes to maintain a homogenous society, which most Greeks support, then the Greek Government must enforce a crystal clear Greek Nationality Code. A solution for Greece would be to re-write the Greek Nationality Code while taking into strong consideration the successful Japanese model that includes the notions of *jus sanguinis*, *jus matrimonii* and to a lesser extent *jus soli*. Further, it would also attempt to close the historical long divisions between Greeks, and Greeks with non-Greeks, such as *autochthonous* and *heterochthonous*, *ethnos* and *genos*, *homogenis* and *allogenis* and *ithageneia* and *ipikootita*.

The first, *jus sanguinis*, should be the granting of Greek citizenship to ethnic Greeks who are born in Greece to an ethnic Greek parent. The second, *jus*

matrimonii, should be the granting of Greek citizenship to ethnic Greeks who are born in the Diaspora to an ethnic Greek citizen. The third, *jus soli*, should be the granting of Greek citizenship to non-ethnic Greeks such as the Arvanites, Aromanians and Jews who have been born in Greece to non-ethnic Greek parents but have been fully absorbed into Greek society. Finally, *jus soli* should be the granting of Greek citizenship to non-ethnic Greeks who have been born in Greece to non-ethnic Greek parents, such as the recent refugees, once certain requirements have been fulfilled.

The Greek Nationality Code should openly outline that Greek citizenship will not be granted to anyone not mentioned above that have not been born in Greece. While such a policy may seem extreme, the concepts of *jus sanguinis*, *jus matrimonii* and *jus soli* in this regard are guaranteed under international law. With multiculturalism being a declared failure in Europe, Greece must, therefore, ensure the future of the country by sustaining an ethnic Greek majority and more importantly, maintaining its strong links with its thriving Diaspora. However, as a member of the international community, Greece must also have measures put in place to fulfil its international obligations, particularly for those born in its territory.\(^{556}\)

4. Popular Sovereignty

It is clear that the Greek Government is at a crisis point with its citizens who simply do not trust and have lost all faith in the authorities. In an effort to reconnect itself with Greek citizens, the Greek Government must enforce the already legal compulsory elections in the country. This will no doubt help with increasing the turnout of voters. However, a problem that can arise out of this situation is an even higher amount of abstained, invalid or blank votes.

In an effort to reverse this trend, the Greek Government *must* start delivering on their promises to the Greek people, particularly when they say one thing and once in power, do the complete opposite. The most recent example of this was demonstrated in the Greek Referendum 2015 held by the SYRIZA Government. While the question itself directly asked whether Greeks supported the next bailout agreement, many have speculated that the question itself indirectly asked whether Greece should still be part of the EU. Regardless, the Greek Government did not respect the result of the referendum and it is such decisions that have caused a rift between the Greek State and Greek citizen.

In an effort to close the gap, the Greek Government could perhaps implement a form of direct democracy through referendums, public dialogues and

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\(^{556}\) D. Christopoulos, ‘Reform of the Greek Nationality Code’, *EUDO Citizenship Observatory*, 2015, pp. 1-3
open petitions that involves citizens and more so their direct opinion regarding important issues. For example, with most Greeks conflicted as to whether or not they want to be in the EU, the Greek Government should hold a referendum, similar to that in the UK, and simply ask its citizens the question ‘Do you want to be part of the EU?’ with a yes or no answer. However, as all MPs have a parliamentary responsibility as the representatives of Greek citizens, such a position should be utilised, with the absence of political games, to advocate to Greek citizens the position they believe is in their best interests. For example, while such a question could be asked, the Greek Government should inevitably communicate to Greek citizens that in the case of a no vote, such a scenario will have severe and long effects, and in the case of a yes vote, such a scenario will have mild and short effects, to which the outcome of both will be respected.  

5. Political Parties

Greek political parties who enter the Hellenic Parliament are in dire need of reform and modernization. The culture of having a ‘leader’ needs to be phased out and replaced with the culture of electing the most qualified and experienced individuals to lead political parties based on a party program. This is where the Greek Ministry of Interior must establish a separate Hellenic Elections Commission that is solely responsible for elections. This organisation would have two main tasks, the registration of political parties and the enforcement of the rules and regulations they must adhere too.

The first step in the process of registering political parties should be the creation of their name, logo and most importantly, their ideas and beliefs, so long as they do not break the law such as hate speech. They must then be required to form a party committee of individuals who are responsible, in accordance with the law, of writing a formal party constitution. Prospective political parties must then hold an inaugural meeting where the party leadership and running members are elected in secret through a formal process, allowing a sense of transparency between individuals to occur. When positions have been filled, the party must then be required to gain 1000 members from registered citizens.

Once this has been achieved, the party should be required to send all relevant information and proof of documentation to the Hellenic Elections Commission in an official application form for revision in accordance with the law. If approved and to ensure the political party remains accountable at all the, it should be subject to a trial period, must maintain over 1000 members and adhere to electoral rules and regulations in its pursuit for office. If declined, the Hellenic

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557 Pappas, Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece, Chapters 4 and 5
Elections Commission should send a letter to the party outlining why the party was rejected and if and how it can re-apply once adjustments have been made or given the choice to appeal the decision. This policy should be applied to all political parties, both new and current, to ensure a level of equality and professionalism across the board and the complete removal of the leadership culture.558

6. Government

With the ongoing Greek Economic Crisis, it is imperative that both the current Greek Government as well as those of the future focus primarily on adopting and enforcing a policy that can that address its various governance problems. Greece must, therefore, adopt a serious plan to phase out the ongoing cronyism, statism, nepotism, clientelism, corruption, regulated professions or ‘closed shops', and waste and red tape problems that run deep within the Greek political system. While the old way has proven to be unsustainable, Greece must replace its bad habits to ensure it has a prosperous future. In order for this to be achieved, concrete reforms must be introduced into all sectors of society such as the Greek economy that is in dire need of productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship.

As such, Greece must move away from its current statism toward a decentralised government where power is distributed through various levels of government, such as local, state and federal. Further, the Greek State must end its affair with cronyism, only appointing Ministers who are qualified as opposed to family, friends and associates. It must also stop its usage of nepotism by preventing MPs from using their positions of power to organise personal arrangements such as favouring such individuals for a public sector job because they are from the same village. Further, all forms of corruption must be addressed through the strict enforcement of rules and regulations, particularly the accepting of bribes by politicians.

In addition to the public sector which is discussed below, clientelism is deeply entrenched in the Greek political system amongst MPs and all politicians. As such, action must be taken by the Greek State to combat the practice to ensure the granting by politicians of special handouts for votes is abolished, with the only benefits to constituents coming in the form of welfare. The Greek Government must end the practice of regulated professions and closed shops, particularly on industries that are Greece's strongest such as tourism and shipping, by lifting restrictions and opening the markets to private enterprises. Finally, an end must be put toward waste and red tape practices so that the various and pointless bureaucratic procedures that simply waste people's time and money such as

needed fifteen pieces of documentation for a death certificate are replaced with functioning and professional procedures throughout Greek society.  

7. Checks and Balances
It is evident that Greece is largely in its current state due to the complete absence of checks and balances into the separation of powers, and as such, the legislative or the Hellenic Parliament must first be completely independent of the executive and judiciary. Reduced to 120 seats, MPs of the Hellenic Parliament should only be responsible for creating the laws that govern the country. The Greek President, however, should be granted further powers to ensure the Hellenic Parliament functions properly, namely the ability to control its procedure in cases of a hung parliament and ability to veto laws created by the Hellenic Parliament. A veto by the Greek President can only be overridden by a majority vote in the Hellenic Parliament.

In addition, the executive or Hellenic Government must also be completely independent of the legislative and judiciary. The Prime Minister and Ministers should only be responsible for enforcing the laws in the day to day functioning of the country. Such responsibility should be in strict accordance with the Greek Constitution, laws and the manifesto of the political party in power. To ensure this effectively, the Greek President should be given the power to ensure all MPs are accountable for the things they say and more importantly, the things they do, particularly when a majority party is in power.

Finally, the judiciary or Hellenic Courts must also be completely independent of the executive and legislative. The role of the Hellenic Courts should solely be the interpretation of the law without any interference whatsoever with the power to declare created laws by the legislative as well as the acts by the executive as unconstitutional without the prospect of political immunity. Here, the Greek President should have the power to appoint the judges of the Hellenic Courts. In turn, the Hellenic Courts can declare such choices as unconstitutional if they so wish.

8. Public Sector
While the Greek public sector is undeniably too large to sustain and in dire need of reform, the current policy of simply firing or cutting salaries has proven to be completely destructive for the majority of Greeks. Such decisions have been made and implemented by MPs who are nonetheless part of the Greek elite and see their citizens in terms of numbers rather than people. The downsizing of the public sector

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559 Featherstone, Politics and Policy in Greece: The Challenge of ‘Modernisation’, Chapter 1
560 Manolopoulos, Greece’s ‘Odious’ Debt, Chapters 5 and 11
sector is thus not a phenomenon that can be achieved overnight or even in a few years but gradually over many years. Measures should be put in place to ensure those who cannot remain staffed are helped to acquire employment in the private sector.

This is of particular importance if the Greek Government is to continue its policy of deepening privatisation in the country in an effort to transform the Greek economy into a mixed economy. As the crisis looms, the Greek Government can negotiate with investors who are interested in Greece and discuss the potential lowering of selling prices in exchange for the permanent employment of laid-off Greeks from the public service. Initiatives such as these would not be rejected as the majority of Greeks who have lost their jobs have not found employment elsewhere and have resulted in leaving the country. Thus, their inclusion would prevent others from leaving and would be help Greek professionals return.

However, in order for this to be achieved, clientelism as well as other embedded practices detrimental to the country, must be countered through a serious employment scheme introduced by the government and enforced by a regulatory organisation. This would firstly evaluate potential and current employees to determine who should remain in the public sector based on experience and qualifications, not the prospect of a position or benefit in exchange for votes. The scheme would also serve as a guideline for the Greek Government regarding the workload of its employees which would nonetheless increase the low productivity of the public sector with a zero-tolerance policy for a quicker or more effective service in exchange for a bribe. Furthermore, it would outline the strict scales of pay for public servants, their annual and sick leave and that prohibits behind the scenes deals, red tape arrangements or other extra benefits in exchange for a favour.561

9. Security
In order for Greece to improve its national security, the Greek Government must adopt a ‘quality over quantity’ policy, similar to that of Israel, that begins with maintaining Greek military expenditure at a stable 3% of GDP, although used more effectively. The first part of this policy would be closing the divide between conscripted personnel and professional personnel. In addition, Greece should decrease its arms imports, particularly of second hand and even third-hand equipment. There must be a revision and overhaul of Greece’s numerous land, air and sea bases that are spread all over the country.

561 Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From Boom to Bust, Chapter 5
Although Greece should maintain conscription, it is imperative that it decrease the amount of conscripts per annum so that the overall nominal strength of personnel can be altered from approximately 134,000 to 120,000. By maintaining a professional to conscripted ratio of 4-1, Greece can ensure its smaller force are trained at a higher level. By decreasing arms imports of old equipment, Greece should focus on slowly re-establishing its own military industry, with the assistance of technologically advanced countries such as the US, Israel or Russia, so that it is able to develop modern equipment. Finally, by shrinking the number of bases, Greece can reevaluate and reorganise in strategic positions so that the country is defendable in case of an attack.

In accordance with such a doctrine, Greece has a better opportunity to maintain both the defence of the Greek people and Greek sovereignty. While its greatest rival and threat is an ally in NATO, Turkey maintains an aggressive policy against Greece, namely in the Aegean Sea as well as in Western Thrace, which Greece must be prepared for in case of future escalations. Further, Greece faces another threat it must be prepared for from NATO ally Albania, which as of recently has raised the issue of the Chams in Greek Epirus in an attempt to destabilise its border with Greece, as it did with Serbia over Kosovo and the FYR over what it terms Illirida. Finally, Greece’s final threat from a neighbouring country comes for the FYR, and although such a threat is relatively low, the FYR continues its hostility toward Greece by claiming Greek Macedonia, both geographically and culturally, which Greece must be cautious of.

10. Elites
Since 1821, and more so since 1974, Greek elites have had an abundance of power and influence over the Greek State. The Greek State must, therefore, adopt a zero tolerance to such individuals and deal with them decisively. While Greek elites will always be in Greece, measures can be taken to ensure they are slowly removed from the Greek political system. In an effort to demonstrate this to the Greek people, this would include a variety of reforms implemented by the Hellenic Parliament, Hellenic Government and Hellenic Courts.

It is, therefore, necessary for the Hellenic Parliament to introduce laws that restrict Greek elites from participating in Greek politics. Such restrictions should be placed on current Greek elites, their family members and associates for the next three generations. While somewhat severe, it would ensure Greek elites are not able to secure positions such as the Prime Minister, Ministers, Chief of the Armed Forces, to name a few. Further, the Greek Government, with the assistance of the

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EU, should implement an effective taxation law such as the *pothenesches*, as well as establishing a new Hellenic Taxation Office. The point of such a reform and new institution will task the latter with forming a Hellenic Commission that investigates the tax evasion and corruption by Greek politicians and wealthy citizens with an elitist background.

If any peculiarities arise with both current and past MPs such as Kostas Karamanlis, the Hellenic Police should be informed whereby these individuals should be charged and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law and allow the Hellenic Courts to determine their future. However, if found guilty, such individuals and families should be made an example of and in addition to jail time, should be forced to pay back the Greek State the total amount of what they owe with interest. If they are unable to do so, their assets should be confiscated and sold. By removing Greek elites from the political system, Greece has a far greater chance of operating its democracy more effectively, particularly over Greek society, while avoiding future actions detrimental to the country.\(^5\)\(^6\)\(^3\)

11. Church of Greece

While it cannot be denied that the Church of Greece and overall Greek Orthodox Church has plays a significant role in the life of Greeks, it is imperative that Greece adopts the policy of separation between Church and State. While the accusation is denied by the Church of Greece, its position within politics is an Ottoman-era creation used by the Turks as a means of controlling its subjects. In order for the separation to begin, the status of the Church of Greece must be removed from the Greek Constitution or any future constitutions. The involvement of religion in politics should also be completely addressed with employees of religious institutions barred from a political position.

The removing of religious oaths by politicians would also prove useful as their oath should only be to the Greek people themselves. In addition, the Greek State must cease paying the salaries of anyone employed by the Church of Greece as well as the granting of tax exemptions, pensions and other benefits. In terms of its vast ownership of land, the Greek State must confiscate any property the Church of Greece owns that is not a church, monastery or religious school. Religion in the education system, in this case, Orthodoxy, must also be altered in Greek public schools and taught, in addition to other religions such as the ancient Greek religion, from a secular perspective.

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If a religious organisation such as the Church of Greece wishes to teach Orthodoxy from a religious perspective, this should only be done in religious academies. Furthermore, religious holidays, which are vast, should not be given the status of a public holiday with the exception of days of cultural significance such as Christmas, Easter and Great Feasts. It is also important that steps are taken for the Autocephalous Church of Hellas to be dissolved and placed under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to ensure that the National Church no longer exists and that the overall Greek Orthodox Church functions on an organisational level under the Greek State, not part of or over the Greek State. Such policies, however, should be applied to all religious organisations in the country.564

12. Summary
It can, therefore, be concluded that while Greek institutions have come a long way in the post-Metapolitefsi period, they must be severely reformed by the Greek State. The starting point for any Greek politician is the writing of a completely new, modern and secular Greek Constitution. There should also be a clear and basic Greek Nationality Code that outlines who is entitled to Greek citizenship based on the principles of jus sanguinis, jus matrimonii and jus soli. If these Greek citizens are to have faith in their representatives, politicians must begin to deliver on their promises as part of their duties in a representative democracy and also introduce direct democracy on important issues.

To be effective politicians, there must be an introduction of a Hellenic Elections Commission that replaces the current leadership culture with a set of rules and regulations that all parties must adhere to. Once in government, these parties must abide by the Greek constitution and laws at all times and at the present time, focus on phasing out the ongoing cronyism, statism, nepotism, clientelism, corruption, regulated professions or ‘closed shops’, and waste and red tape. More importantly, Greece must seriously introduce an effective system of checks and balances so all individuals part of the Hellenic Parliament, Hellenic Government and Hellenic Courts are accountable for their words and actions. While the public sector must be reduced and adopt a policy of hiring those most qualified and experienced, measures must be taken for laid off employees with assistance given toward their transfer into the private sector.

In order to uphold its national security, Greece should adopt a new policy of quality over quantity by turning its overpopulated personnel, old equipment and numerous bases into more professional and trained personnel, new and modern

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564 Halikiopoulou, Patterns of Secularization: Church, State and Nation in Greece and the Republic of Ireland, Chapter 6
equipment and strategically placed bases. Elites, who have held onto power and influence since the establishment of the Greek State, must once and for all be held accountable through prosecution, punishment and ongoing monitoring for their looting of the Greek State, as well as being barred from the political system. Finally, there must be a separation of Church and State to ensure that no religion can influence the government and that the only authority in Greece is its constitution and laws. It is through these suggestions and propositions that Greece has a chance to finally and fully reform its institutions so that it can evolve into a more democratic nation-state within itself, in Europe and the world.565

565 Thomas, Greece: A Short History of a Long Story, Chapters 10 and 11
Conclusion

Despite the limitations mentioned in the Abstract, Methodology and Introduction, it can therefore be concluded that this thesis has contributed to this area of research by analysing the successes and failures of democratic institutions in Greece. Chapter 1 covered the period from 1821 – 1974, the year of the establishment of the Greek Nation State to the Papadopoulos junta, and demonstrated the various institutions that embedded themselves in the country, including the constitution, citizenship, popular sovereignty, political parties, government, checks and balances, public sector, security, elites and finally, the Church of Greece. Chapter 2 covered the period from 1975 – 1985 or from the Metapolitefsi when Greece introduced the Greek Constitution 1975 and institutions developed under Konstantinos Karamanlis of ND and Andreas Papandreou of PASOK. Throughout this period, institutions begun their transformation in the new democratic Greece with successes including the writing of a new constitution up to the standards of the day, the implementation of popular sovereignty with a successful referendum on the type of government and first elections, the checks and balances exemplified in the powers of the President, and a clear and concise security policy to deter Turkey.

However, there were failures with citizenship laws that started to distinguish between Greek and non-Greek, the establishment of political parties based on a leadership cult, governments based on national clientelism and more so under PASOK, which also stemmed down into the public sector, the furthering of tax fraud and scandals by elites and the implementation of the Church of Greece as the prevailing religion of the country. Chapter 3 covered the period from 1986 – 2000 or from the years Greece made its first revision to the Greek Constitution with the analysis of institutions under Costas Simitis of PASOK and Konstantinos Mitsotakis of ND. This period can be described with the most successes occurring including the granting of citizenship to numerous repatriated Greeks from the Diaspora, free and fair elections taking place with minor periods of instability, the persistence of party leaders to move away from the personality cult, good governance through modern reforms and a security manifesto that reflected Greece’s interests in the region. However, it is nonetheless marked with failures that begin with the constitution itself with much of the power of the President going to the Prime Minister, the inability to implement successful checks and balances, the increase of public servants under the banner of clientelism, the rise of scandals involving elites and their associates, and the involvement of the Church of Greece into the affairs of the Greek State.

Chapter 4 covered the period from 2001 – 2008 or from the years Greece made a further revision to the Greek Constitution up to Kostas Karamanlis of ND,
nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis. A significant move in this period were the revisions of the Greek Constitution that served to undo many of the previous revisions such as implementing various articles dealing with the functions of the Greek State, as well as the successful elections that took place and the reform of the Hellenic Police, Intelligence Service and upkeep on the Greek Armed Forces. Unfortunately, however, this period can be described with numerous failures occurring under Karamanlis, namely his failure to introduce a fair Greek Nationality Code, lack of control over ND that favoured members of the old guard, inability to act at the right moment when in government, ignorance toward the very concept of checks and balances, creating an economic drain by employing seasonal public servants, and finally, involvement in monetary scandals in cooperation with the Church of Greece. Chapter 5 covered the period 2009 – 2016 or from the years the Greek Economic Crisis begun under George Papandreou of PASOK, Antonis Samaras of ND and Alexis Tsipras of SYRIZA, particularly taking into consideration the reforms of the EU.

Throughout this period which continues until the present, the successes have included discussions for potential revisions to the Greek Constitution in accordance with EU standards, the awarding of citizenship to various individuals both Greek and non-Greek alike, promises of implementing checks and balances, again namely regarding the powers to be given to the President, and the prosecution of some elites with further work to be done due to their involvement in tax evasion. However, failures include a severe decrease in the turnout of Greek voters due to dissatisfaction, the return of populism across the political spectrum regarding all parties, the implementation of the harshest austerity measures, the persistence of clientelism in the public sector, a security manifesto that neglects various problems on Greece's borders, and while promised, the inability to begin discussions on the implementation of separating church from state due to the hold of the Church of Greece on the Greek Nation. Chapter 6 finally covers the future of Greece where various insights were given as to how democratic institutions can evolve toward a more democratic Greece, namely with the writing of a new constitution, a clear nationality code, the implementation of direct as well as parliamentary democracy, rules and regulations for political parties, effective governance without cronyism and the like, the implementation of checks and balances with specific power granted to the President, the combating of clientelism within the public sector, a quality over quantity security approach, the establishment of a new taxation system to deter elites and finally, the separation of church of state. After careful consideration, it can be argued that the thesis has effectively answered the fundamental question, what are the successes and failures of democracy and its institutions in post-1975 Greece?
While the thesis identifies the successes and failures of institutions in Greece over the last 41 years, it is imperative, in this research area, to note that Greece’s politicians depict the evolution of these institutions as an improvement to Greek citizens in an attempt to shield Greek society from their manipulation. Greek politicians are far greater concerned with achieving short term goals in the present, such as maintaining power through their parties, rather than achieving long term goals that look toward the future at bettering the country by improving its institutional framework. The most recent example of such an embedded and continuous problem is with the current SYRIZA-ANEL Government that has suggested introducing single proportionality into the electoral system so that political parties do not receive the extra 50 seats to form a majority government. While the notion is to ensure elections are conducted under a more democratic system, single proportionality should have been introduced years ago.

More importantly, in the case of SYRIZA, which is expected to lose the next election based on current polls, the proposed act is but a political manoeuvre against their rivals ND so that when the latter is back in power, it will have difficulties at forming a majority government and will have to form a coalition government, most likely with SYRIZA. By using the Greek State itself in such a manner, Greek politicians have therefore proven time and again that they will do whatever it takes to fulfil personal interests as opposed to fulfilling the interests of the Greek Nation and State. It is therefore the responsibility of the Greek Nation, both in Greece and the Diaspora, to act in an attempt to ensure the various institutions in Greece can evolve with a true democratic end. It can therefore be concluded that while further research is needed in this area, the thesis significantly contributes to this research area by identifying the successes and failures of the most important institutions in Greece which impact its overall democratic (and undemocratic) system.
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