PART 3

THE RECONTEXTUALISATION OF
ACTIVITIES AND REACTIONS
Chapter 1: Introduction

In part 1 I have argued that texts, if they are to make sense at all, must ultimately refer to social practices, however minimally, and however highly transformed (objectivated, generalised, abstracted, fictionalised, etc.). In part 2 I have set out a theoretical framework for analysing what can happen to the participants of the social practices when they are represented in texts. In this part I will develop a similar framework for analysing how the activities in which these participants engage can be represented.

To give a preliminary idea of the kinds of issues that will be raised in the chapter, I will use two short texts as examples. One is taken from Mary Kate and the School Bus, the children’s story we already encountered in part 2. The other is taken from Your Child and Success at School (Luck, 1990), a parent guidance booklet, published, in a magazine-like format, by Murdoch Press, and distributed via newsagents.

3.1:1 The next morning Mary Kate was down in the dining-room before Daddy had even started his breakfast.
‘My word, you’re early this morning,’ he said.
‘I’m going to school today,’ said Mary Kate.
‘So you are!’ cried Daddy, pretending he had forgotten. ‘Well, you’d better come and eat a hearty breakfast. You’ll need to keep your strength up. Here, have one of my eggs.’
So Mary Kate had one of Daddy’s boiled eggs and Mummy put another one in the saucepan for him and an extra one in case Mary Kate felt like eating two. ‘Bread and butter?’ asked Daddy, cutting a slice into fingers. He called them soldiers. He said the little crusty one at the end was the sergeant.

(Morgan, 1985, pp.21-22)

3.1:2 Start the day with a nourishing breakfast eaten in a well-protected uniform, because in the excitement, your child may spill things. The family can talk calmly and happily to her about the day ahead.

(Luck, 1990, p.40)

Both texts feature ‘breakfast’ as the initial episode of ‘the First Day’, and for much the same reason: breakfast must be ‘nourishing’, ‘hearty’, so that the child will be able ‘to keep her strength up’, and it must be unhurried and pleasant (‘calm’, ‘happy’), so that the child will not become anxious about ‘the day ahead’. But there are also differences.

Your Child includes activities which Mary Kate omits: ‘protecting the child’s uniform’ and ‘talking calmly and happily about the day ahead’ - indeed, instead of ‘talking about the day ahead’, Mary Kate’s father ‘pretends he has forgotten’ that it is his daughter’s first day, and does not mention the subject again during the breakfast episode. Mary Kate, on the other hand, includes a number of highly specific activities (‘putting an
egg in the saucepan’, ‘cutting a slice into fingers’) - details which Your Child takes for granted. Inclusions and exclusions of this kind can reveal much about the concerns of the different contexts in which the texts belong. Mary Kate addresses children, aiming to put them at ease, to distract them from the worrying prospect of school with pleasantly familiar routines. Your Child addresses parents, aiming to get them worried about the state in which they will deliver their child to the school system (the neatness of her uniform, the happiness of her state of mind). The two concerns are of course related. They are both concerns about the ‘smooth transition’ from home to school. But they are differently inflected where different participants are addressed.

The two extracts differ not only in what is included and what excluded, they differ also in the way they represent the activities they include. What in Mary Kate is formulated as an action performed by the child (‘I am going to school’; ‘Mary Kate had one of Daddy’s boiled eggs’), is, in Your Child, objectivated, turned into a ‘thing’ rather than an action (‘the day ahead’; ‘a nourishing breakfast’). What in Mary Kate is coded as an (abstract) activity (‘you keep your strength up’), is, in Your Child, coded as an attribute of ‘breakfast’ (‘a nourishing breakfast’). Where Your Child does not detail the speech activities of the participants, and merely mentions that they ‘talk about the day ahead’, Mary Kate renders them as fully specified dialogue. And while Mary Kate represents each
activity as a unique event, a specific enactment of the breakfast episode, Your Child generalises, and explicitly indicates which activities form an essential part of the episode, and which are optional: ‘talking calmly and happily about the day ahead’, for instance, is coded as an optional activity (‘the family can talk...’), while ‘starting the day with a nourishing breakfast’ is coded as an obligatory activity, as realised by the imperative. Mary Kate, finally, contains ‘recontextualisations within the recontextualisation’: some activities are represented by the writer herself (‘how it happened’), others are projected, and represent ‘how it will happen’ or ‘how it might happen’, according to one of the characters of the story. Such doubly recontextualised activities may be assigned high or low modality values, and give rise to several alternative representations of the same activity or activities within the same text.

These contrasts between the two texts are theoretically independent of the generic structures of the texts, of the fact that Mary Kate is a story and Your Child a piece of parental guidance, of expert advice (cf Van Leeuwen, 1993). One can imagine a story opening with the sentence ‘They started the day with a nourishing breakfast’, or an instructional text for children including the suggestion ‘Ask Daddy for one of his boiled eggs’. In practice recontextualisation is not quite so independent of generic structure. Texts are situated in the context of specific social institutions, and within these institutions
there exist 'logonomic rules' (Hodge and Kress, 1988), specifying which kinds of genres go with which kinds of recontextualisations of which social practices. Mary Kate presents a specific instantiation of the breakfast episode because it is a story, and it is a story because that genre would appear to be considered the most suitable vehicle for social propaganda addressed to children by the mass media and the publishing industry. Your Child generalises and distinguishes between what is essential and what is optional because it is an instructional text, a kind of recipe, and it is an instructional text because that genre would appear to be considered the most suitable vehicle for social propaganda addressed to parents by experts on childhood and education, via the mass media and the publishing industry.

In part 1 I argued that recontextualisations may include, not only the activities in which the participants of social practices engage, but also the reactions that accompany these activities. The following extracts from Mary Kate and Your Child contain a number of examples:

3.1:3 Mary Kate followed Miss Laurie and Mummy out of the classroom into the cloakroom. There were pegs low down all round the wall and two little low-down washbasins. Everything was just the right height for Mary Kate.
‘Good-by, pet,’ Mummy said, giving her a quick kiss. ‘I’ll come and fetch you after school.’

(Morgan, 1985, p.30)
I watched the teacher bring out a massive picture book and engross the children by asking them questions as she read the story and turned the pages with an expert build-up of anticipation. It was a good moment for mothers to hug their child and slip away. I saw no parting tears. The momentum of enthusiasm generated by the teacher swept the children into a new world of experience where they felt safe and ready to explore.

So now, having kissed your child goodbye, you have those precious hours to yourself: relish them.

(Luck, 1990, p.41)

Again, the extracts deal with the same episode, the moment of separation between mother and child (although the sequencing differs: in Mary Kate the story-telling episode occurs after the separation episode, in Your Child it immediately precedes it). But where Mary Kate makes no mention of either the child’s or the mother’s reaction to this separation, Your Child dwells on it extensively: there are ‘no parting tears’, we read, because the child now ‘feels safe and ready to explore’, and the mother ‘relishes’ the hours she will now have to herself. These reactions, tied to specific activities or episodes, or even whole social practices, can, like activities, be recontextualised in different ways, for instance as active processes ('the child feels safe') or as objectivations ('anticipation').
I will now first outline a theoretical framework for the analysis of the recontextualisation of activities and reactions. I will then use this framework in the analysis of three texts, differing in the category of readers they primarily address - readers who, as it happens, are also potential participants in the practice of 'the First Day'. As a text addressing children, I will, again, use Mary Kate and the School Bus. As a text addressing parents I will use the 'First Day' chapter from Your Child and Success at School. As a text addressing teachers I will use the 'First Day' chapter from a teacher training text entitled And So To School - a Study of the Continuity from Pre-school to Infant School (Cleave et al, 1982).
Chapter 2: The recontextualisation of activities and reactions

3.2.1 Activities and reactions

The essential difference between activities and reactions, in the sense in which I will use these terms here, is this: activities are signified as being public events, deliberately perceivable and communicative, reactions are not. Reactions are signified as private, inner events, mental activities which do not necessarily play a visible or audible part in the social practice as it actually unfolds, or should unfold, but are added to the representation of the social practice in the process of recontextualisation, for instance to explain why some part of the social practice went wrong, as in 3.1:2, where the child ‘spills things’ because of the ‘excitement’.

The contrast between activities and reactions can play a significant role in the recontextualisation of social practices, particularly in the area of affective reactions. To code what might also be coded as ‘sadness’ (an inner feeling) as, for instance, ‘crying’ (or, to invoke some Biblical examples, as ‘ rending one’s robe and shaving one’s head’), or as a quoted utterance like ‘Hear my cry, O God’), suggests that it is part of the recontextualised social practice to communicate sadness or grief,
either verbally or non-verbally: 'Emotions function as moves and fit so precisely in the logic of the ritual game that it would seem difficult to understand them without it.' (Goffman, 1974, p.234). In such a case it does not, in the end, matter what a participant 'really feels', so long as the appropriate outward signs are displayed. To code what might also be coded as 'crying' as an inner feeling or emotion, on the other hand, suggests that it is part of the recontextualised social practice to actually feel sadness, regardless of whether it is expressed or not. The practice is represented as one that is, or should be, anchored in the true emotions of the participants. What matters is the participants' inner emotional involvement in the activities (or against the activities, for the reaction may, of course, be inverted, as in the case of an inner rebellion against the participants or activities of a social practice). This choice in coding, incidentally, is not possible in other semiotics. Film, for instance, must always behaviourallyise reactions, or displace them onto the connotations of the physical objects or locations shown, as when an actor stares, without expression, at a landscape connoting 'desolation'. Only an 'interior monologue' voice over could supply the 'inner' reactions: the age of the visual is also the age of an unbridgeable gulf between inner feelings and outward behaviour.
Many of the 'First Day' texts in my corpus abound in reactions. Children, it seems, must not just learn to comply with the rules of school and to adopt the right behaviour, they must also, and above all, learn to like school, to feel happy in school. And parents, similarly, must not only 'do the right thing', they must also 'feel the right thing'. 'First Day' texts are, of course, mostly meant to be read before the 'First Day' arrives. They therefore tell readers not just what they may expect to happen and what they will be required to do, but also what they should expect to feel, perhaps one should say, what they ought to feel. Not to feel, or not to be sure one feels, what one is supposed to be feeling can then become a source of concern: why am I not feeling what everyone tells me I am supposed to feel? Feelings, or rather, the 'proper' connection between feelings and social activities, must be learnt. However, we will see that the texts do not necessarily attribute emotive reactions to all the participants. Texts addressing children dwell on the reactions of children, not on those of parents and teachers. Texts addressing parents dwell on the reactions of parents and children, not on those of teachers. In other words, such texts seek to secure the emotional allegiance of those participants who, in the given social practice, have least power invested in them, no doubt because certain aspects of the practice make it impossible to take that
allegiance for granted. The allegiance of the participants who exercise power, on the other hand, would appear to be already secured by the very fact that power is invested in them.

The distinction between activities and reactions has become deeply entrenched in our culture. Foucault, in his book on the history of sexuality (1976), notes how, in the Counter-reformation, when the practice of confession took on new forms, a demand to recontextualise reactions was introduced: where earlier only sinful deeds had to be confessed, now also 'thoughts, desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined movements of the body and the soul' (p.19) had to be confessed. 'Not only will you confess to acts contravening the law, but you will seek to transform your desire, your every desire, into discourse' (p.21). Sociological role theory also recognises the distinction: a role is 'not merely a regulatory pattern for externally visible actions', it also carries with it 'the emotions and attitudes that belong to these actions' (Berger, 1966, p.113). However, the learning of these emotions is, in role theory, often seen as a smoothly unfolding process, as something which follows more or less automatically from performing the right actions, and the question of power, which plays such a crucial role in Foucault, is often left out of consideration. Berger, for instance, uses the role of the military
officer as an example ('With every salute given and accepted, our man is fortified in his new bearing... He not only acts like an officer, he feels like one', 1966, p.114). My 'First Day' texts, on the other hand, focus on roles which are subjected to power, and depict a more troublesome process in which the achievement of emotional identification with the new role and emotional allegiance to the social institution in which it is played, cannot be taken for granted.

The distinction between activities and reactions, which I have so far discussed from a sociological point of view, is not only entrenched in our culture, but also, as might be expected, in our language. Halliday (1967–68; 1985) has argued that 'mental processes' in English, grammatically distinct from the processes that realise activities ('materia[, and 'behavioural' processes) and speech activities ('verbal processes'). The distinction rests, not so much on a classification of lexical items (many English verbs can be used to encode activities as well as reactions) but on the transitivity structure of the clause, so that specific grammatical (or rather, 'cryptogrammatical', Whorf, 1956) criteria can be used to tell mental processes apart from, on the one hand, material and behavioural, and on the other hand, verbal processes. Material, behavioural and verbal processes can all be 'tested' by the pro-verb 'do', mental processes cannot
(one can say, for instance, 'What was she doing? She was saying her prayers' but not 'What was she doing? She was knowing him'). Again, material, behavioural and verbal processes typically take the progressive form ('present in present', to use Halliday's terminology), mental processes the simple present (Halliday, 1985, p.109): thus 'I am thinking' is an activity, while 'I think of you' is a reaction - English classifies some reactions as capable of behavioural manifestations (e.g. 'think', 'watch', 'smell'), others as lacking this capacity ('hear', 'believe', 'like'). There are exceptions to this, as the progressive form has a wide range of uses in English (cf. Comrie, 1976, pp.37-38) but as a general rule the criterion holds. Other criteria derive from the kinds of participants with which each type of process can occur: the 'Senser' in a mental process (i.e. the participant whose mental process it is) must be human (or is, if not human, endowed with a human-like consciousness by virtue of being Senser in a mental process), and the 'Phenomenon' (the object of the mental process, that what the Senser sees or knows or likes or fears) can be a 'Thing' (a nominal group) as well as what Matthiessen (1992, p.208 ff) calls a hyperphenomenon (a clause). Behavioural processes on the other hand, although their 'Behaver' must be human, cannot project, while verbal clauses, although they can project, need not have a human 'Sayer' (one
can have, for instance, ‘Research reports say...’, but not ‘Research reports think...’). Finally, mental processes are also distinguished from material, behavioural and verbal processes in that they are ‘bi-directional’: both ‘Senser’ and ‘Phenomenon’ may be Theme and Subject, as in pairs like ‘Mary liked the gift’/‘The gift pleased Mary’ (Halliday, 1985, pp.106-111). The table below summarises the differences and affinities between the types of process:

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<th>MATERIAL</th>
<th>BEHAVIOURAL</th>
<th>VERBAL</th>
<th>MENTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘do’-probe applies</td>
<td>‘do’-probe applies</td>
<td>‘do’-probe applies</td>
<td>‘do’-probe does not apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>present in present is unmarked present tense</td>
<td>present in present is unmarked present tense</td>
<td>present in present is unmarked present tense</td>
<td>simple present is unmarked present tense</td>
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<td>- bi-directional</td>
<td>- bi-directional</td>
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<td>- projection</td>
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<td>-er role + human</td>
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However, these criteria are not always sufficient for the identification of activities and reactions in texts. First of all, they are bound up with the grammar of the clause, and fail to provide recognition criteria for activities and reactions realised at other linguistic levels. Although Halliday has introduced some concepts that apply to different levels, notably the concepts ‘extension’, ‘elaboration’ and
'enhancement' (cf. 1985, pp.202-227), his theory of transitivity remains firmly tied to the traditional linguistic concentration on the syntax of the clause, at the expense of, especially, the level of discourse, the 'above the clause'). But reactions and activities can be realised by elements of the nominal group (cf. 3.2:1 and 3.2:2) or across two clauses (3.2:3) and this may render the criteria of tense and projectivity inoperable.

3.2:1 Overanxious mothers filtered into the classroom.

3.2:2 There was the fascination of water running into an open drain.

3.2:3 They were just a little nervous. Would it be easy?

In the kind of text analysis I am proposing here, such realisations cannot be overlooked. If I want to establish which participants are recontextualised as Seners of which mental processes in relation to which activities, the 'anxiety' of mothers as they are collecting their children after the first schoolday must be included. There is of course a difference in meaning: the reaction is no longer recontextualised as a process, but it becomes an attribute. However, there is also identity: both 'overanxious mothers...' and, say, 'mothers worried
unduly...’ realise reactions, in the sense in which I am using the term here. In 3.2.4 below I will discuss this problem in more detail.

Secondly, many reactions are realised by clauses which are, according to the criteria discussed above, not mental process clauses, but, for instance, material process clauses (3.2:4) or relational process clauses (3.2:5):

3.2:4 One or two children built up a dislike of milk

3.2:5 They were just a little nervous

This problem Halliday deals with through his theory of grammatical metaphor (1985, ch.10): the semantic concept ‘mental process’ is held to be literally realised through the grammatical form ‘mental process’, and if other types of process are used to realise it, then the realisation is metaphorical, and adduces additional meanings. Thus ‘I fear you’ would be congruent, and ‘I am afraid of you’ incongruent. The two are different of course. In the one case a mental process is signified, in the other a mental state. But why should the former be literal and the latter metaphorical? Here several answers are possible. One is: because what goes on in the mind is, in reality, a process. This notion
to some extent underlies early work in critical linguistics that used Halliday's theory of transitivity (e.g. Fowler, 1979).

More recently Martin has argued the possibility of a 'literal', 'congruent', hence 'natural' and transparent language:

A congruent relationship is one in which the relation between semantic and grammatical categories is natural: people, places and things are realised nominally, actions are realised verbally, logical relations of time and consequence are realised conjunctively and so on. If humans only spoke a language of this kind, there would be no need to distinguish semantics and grammar in the first place.

(Martin (1990, p.23)

It should be clear that this is not the approach I am following here. I am not asking what mental processes really are, or whether it is more 'natural' to recontextualise them as 'state' or 'process'. I am simply asking how they are recontextualised in which social contexts (for instance as 'state' or 'process'), without privileging one or the other. In any case, Halliday's own argument is based on grammatical criteria. It nevertheless raises the question why there should be anything more 'literal', anything more basic and fundamental, in the criterion 'must take a human Sensor' than in the criterion 'must take a mental process attribute' which one might use to define 'mental state
clauses' like 3.2:5. In answer to this question, Halliday has suggested that the spoken language of pre-pubescent children is 'literal' according to his definition (1985b, p.93 ff) and Martin has added further 'literal' uses of language:

The language of children is closely related to that of mature adults talking in a relaxed and spontaneous way with close friends and family; it is the language speakers return to when intoxicated, stressed or overwhelmed by emotion; it is the language speakers use when they cannot make themselves understood, when talking for example with non-native speakers, young children or in a noisy room; it is the language whose morphology is derivationally simpler than any other, with a lower lexical density and a higher grammatical intricacy (Halliday 1985b); and so on. The point is that considered along a number of parameters there are ways of motivating the same kind of language as a base line.

(Martin, 1990, p.23)

These arguments invoke powerful explanatory principles: spontaneity, 'origin' in developmental processes, and so on, but, in my opinion, not a shred of evidence has ever been presented to support them.
Martin (1991), finally, has put forward another criterion: grammatical metaphors can be "subverted". To use his example, the clause "Is your name Whorf or Woof?" is a metaphor, because it can be responded to in a subversive way, by taking it literally and answering "Yes", rather than "Whorf" or "Woof". This is not the case with the congruent information question "What is your name?" It is a persuasive argument and a neat criterion, but it nevertheless poses two problems. The first and perhaps least important objection is that every utterance can be subverted. To "What is your name?" I can reply "A nominal group", or "Votre nom", or "No, my name is not What". More importantly, and related to the above examples: social and contextual factors determine when an utterance is metaphorical and when it is not. Martin's example presupposes a context in which the speaker wants to know the listener's name, and is seeking information rather than confirmation. In a different context, "Whorf" (or "Woof") would be the subversive answer, for instance in oratory, where the question would be rhetorical, or in a "Ten Questions" game, or in a linguistics tutorial or language lesson, where it would not be subversive to answer "a nominal group" or "votre nom". To quote Kress:
The notion of grammatical metaphor implicitly poses a form of linguistic organisation which is not affected by the necessary contingencies of social production.

(Kress, 1989, p.454)

Here I will treat all the possible recontextualisations of 'what goes on in the mind' as equal in value, as alternative realisations, each endowed with a specific meaning and grammatical realisation - equal in value, that is, in principle, not in fact, not in specific social contexts. The result will be a more complex grammar, but a simpler sociosemantics. In language it seems, one cannot have it both ways. Either the grammar is neat and the semantics messy, or the semantics is neat and the grammar messy. Either one has 'one form, many possible meanings' (as, for instance, in the dictionary), or 'one concept, many possible realisations' (as, for instance, in the thesaurus). As Bakhtin has said (1984, p.181), the study of discourse (he uses the term 'metalinguistics') 'must exceed - and completely legitimately - the boundaries of linguistics', because 'linguistics and metalinguistics study the same concrete, highly complex, and multifaceted phenomenon (...) from various sides and various points of view.' My approach here is therefore not to be seen as an alternative to Halliday's, but as complementary to it. It is equally valuable to try and project the categories of
language onto society, as has been done, for instance, by Matthiessen (1991), who follows Halliday in seeing grammar as a 'theory of reality', as to try and project sociological categories onto language, as I am trying to do here. So long as it is realised that neither approach holds all the answers. A viable sociological linguistics must set up continuous two-way traffic between the sociological and the linguistic.

The 'bi-directionality' of mental processes poses a third problem. The 'effective' mental process is no longer an 'inner' process, but an activity which fits all the criteria of the material process:

3.2:6 I watched the teacher engross the children by asking them questions as she read the story.

This is underlined by the many material process verbs that can also do service as effective mental processes: 'it strikes me that...', 'it hit me that...', 'it threw me...', etc. And in the passive forms, regardless of whether they are the true passives of an effective mental process (3.2:7) or quasi-passives formed with the aid of what one might call inherently passive verbs, such as 'receive', 'incur', etc. (3.2:8), this sense of agency is preserved, so that the Sencers of the mental process are at the same time Goals of an activity:
3.2:7 Children were baffled by ambiguous questions like 'What do you want to say?'

3.2:8 The embarrassment which can be incurred by an individual in group situations is a potent weapon in the hands of a teacher who wants to shame a child in front of his peers.

In such cases the dual signification should be preserved in analysis, the participant coded as both Senser and Goal, the process as both activity and reaction.

3.2.2 Types of reactions (systems 2, 3, 4, and 5)

So far my examples of reactions have mostly been examples of affective reactions, but our culture allows us to think of participants, not only as feeling, but also as knowing and as perceiving beings. Or, to put it another way, it allows us to interpret the reactions of the participants of social practices as rational, subjective or emotive, and which of these types of reaction dominates a given recontextualisation depends very much on the way the recontextualising social institution conceives of the motivations of those who participate in its practices. Some institutions, for example advertising, and increasingly also government, conceive of the
behaviour of the 'consumer' ('voter', 'citizen') as wholly motivated by affective reactions - desires, needs, urges, 'drives'. The reactions of the planners of the advertising or government campaigns, on the other hand, are conceived of as rational, wholly motivated by knowledge of the consumer's (irrational) behaviour and the objectives of the campaign. In other words, different reactions may be predicated of those who hold the power and those who are subjected to it in a given social practice, and this also implies a different and contextually determined valuation of the different types of reaction.

I will here refer to these types of reaction with 'transformational', 'process'-type terms, and speak of recontextualisations that cognitivate, recontextualisations that perceptivate, and recontextualisations that affectivate participant reactions. Insofar as participants are cognitivated, they are represented as rational beings who react consciously and deliberately to the participants, the activities, and/or other elements of the social practices in which they take part. The term 'reaction' is a little unusual in this connotation (Halliday originally used it for the type of mental process he now calls 'affective') but it emphasises that knowledges, beliefs, ideas, memories and so on, are just as much tied into (elements of) social practices as are
affective reactions. In this example from Illich, children are cognitivated (they 'learn') as might be expected from a writer who seeks to re-establish the autonomy of the clients of psychologising professionals:

3.2:9 Everyone learns how to live outside school. We learn to speak, to think, to love, to feel, to play, to curse, to politick and to work without interference from a teacher.

Insofar as participants are perceptivated, they are represented as merely perceiving (elements of) social practices, without any implication that they also understand them, or react to them emotionally. Perceptivated participants are, in a sense, not (or not yet, or not anymore) socially participating. They remain locked in their own subjectivity. They are observers, aloof. This is so for the 'participant observation' researchers we meet in And So To School..., a teacher training text dealing with the First Day (3.2:10), but also for children who enter the classroom for the first time and take in their new environment (3.2:11), or with Magnus (cf. 2.5 above) when he has finally turned his back on school and disengaged himself from the social practice of which he was such an unwilling participant (3.2:12):

3.2:10 We saw bewilderment greet glib commands like 'line up' and 'not more than four at the sandtray'.
3.2:11 The classroom had big windows, set high in the wall. Through one of them Mary Kate could see the top of a tree and a patch of sky and through the other she could see the church tower.

3.2:12 Magnus heard him walk away. Then he heard a door slam.

Insofar as participants are affectivated, finally, they are represented as reacting compulsively and emotionally to (elements of) social practices. When these reactions are, in the given context, desirable, they are usually represented as actually expressed, in other words, as activities rather than reactions:

3.2:13 'Yes, I enjoyed it too,' said Mark as they walked home.

When they are not desirable, when, for instance, the 'breakfast' and 'walking to school' episodes are not as 'calm' and 'happy' and 'unhurried' as they should be, this is less often the case:

3.2:14 They were both very excited, and, to tell the truth, just a little nervous. Would it be easy? What would it be like? Would the teacher be strict?

In contexts of this kind, children tend not to be cognitivated - they may even be represented as incapable of (certain) cognitive reactions:
3.2:15 Some children, in response to the old question ‘How was school?’ cannot separate out all the events, so they reply ‘Oh, it was OK’ and they leave it at that.

Such a response, Your Child and Success At School suggest, must be modified by asking questions like ‘What was the best thing you did today?’, a question seeking a (desirable) affective reaction.

The examples show that the same or similar episodes of social practices can give rise to each of the three types of reaction. Each brings into play a different interpretation of the participants’ mental processes. Each adds to the recontextualisation its own discourse about the behaviour of the different kinds of participant and about human behaviour generally.

To turn now to the realisation of these recontextualisations, the three types of reaction can clearly be aligned with the three types of mental process posited in Halliday’s theory of transitivity (1985) and they can be recognised by means of (crypto)grammatical criteria: in contrast to cognitive and perceptive mental processes, affective processes can take ‘proposals’ as phenomenon, that is, the object of the mental process can be formed by offers and commands, rather than statements and questions, and realised by perfective non-finite clauses with ‘to’ and an infinitive or imperfective
non-finite clauses with the ‘-ing’ participle (cf. Halliday, 1985, p.235 ff):

3.2:16 We don’t want to sit down.
3.2:17 Mary Kate liked being the last name on the register.

In contrast to cognitive and affective mental processes, perceptive mental processes can take what could be called a ‘Percept’, realised by another kind of non-finite construction, the ‘accusative cum infinitivo’ or its present in present version, the ‘accusative with present participle’. Matthiessen calls these ‘macrophenomena’ (1992, p.208):

3.2:18 I heard him walk away.
3.2:19 I heard him walking away.

The table below summarises the similarities and affinities between these types of mental process

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<th>COGNITIVATION</th>
<th>AFFECTIVATION</th>
<th>PERCEPTIVATION</th>
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<td>projects</td>
<td>projects</td>
<td>projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propositions</td>
<td>Proposals</td>
<td>Percepts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course the Phenomenon can also be realised as a nominal group (a ‘Thing’, to use Halliday’s terminology) or, at least in the case of Affectivations and Perceptivations, an embedded ‘that’-clause or ‘wh’-clause (a ‘Fact’, in Halliday’s terminology).
However, there may, again, be ambiguities. From the point of view of the sociosemiotic distinctions with which I began this section, the criteria for distinguishing between cognitive, perceptive and affective mental processes, while perfectly clearcut grammatically, cannot always be used for distinguishing between cognitivations, perceptivations and affectivations. Certain key perceptual verbs such as 'see' and 'perceive' and certain key affective verbs such as 'feel' and 'fear' (those in fact that are most frequently encountered with 'that'-propositions) can (and in some contexts dominantly do) encode cognitivations:

3.2:20 It helps to see yourself as the teacher's partner.

3.2:21 One teacher felt she should try to draw these children out.

Other perceptual and affective verbs cannot be so used. One cannot say, for instance, 'It helps to hear yourself as the teacher's partner' or 'One teacher wanted she should try to draw these children out'. The use of verbs like 'see' and 'feel' here lends a perceptivating cq affectivating flavour to the cognitivations, and so introduces a different interpretation of what cognition, what 'knowing', means in these contexts, and for these participants, and testifies to a shift in the relative valuation of the different types (and subtypes) of mental process in the social institutions in
question: ‘seeing’ becomes like ‘knowing’; ‘feeling’ is elevated to the status of being able to support ‘propositions’. In consequence I will speak of ‘perceptivated’ and ‘affectivated’ cognitivations: perceptivated cognitivations are realised by a mental process of perception (a verb which can be used in accordance with the criteria for recognising perceptive mental process clauses) which projects something that is neither a ‘Percept’ not in any other way a perceivable entity in relation to that verb (e.g. 3.2:20); affectivating cognitivations use a mental process of affection (a verb that can be used in accordance with the criteria for recognising affective mental process clauses) to project a proposition (as, e.g. in 3.2:21). ‘Unmarked cognitivations’ use a verb that can be employed only in accordance with the criteria for distinguishing mental processes of cognition. In the sections that follow I will extend these criteria to cases in which these recontextualisations are realised at levels other than that of the clause, or by grammatical participants or circumstances, rather than by processes.

Verbs like ‘react’ and ‘respond’, finally, can be used to leave the nature of the reaction unspecified. Indeed, in many cases it is impossible to decide whether the ‘reaction’ or ‘response’ is signified as
actually expressed (hence as an activity) or not:

3.2:22 Most of the target children reacted with varying degrees of uncertainty or apathy.

Again, it is important not to erase this ambiguity in the analysis, because, in contrast to, say, 'wandered about aimlessly', the expression 'reacted with uncertainty' signifies 'a combined movement of the body and the soul', to quote Foucault, and hence also a superior knowledge of what goes on in children's minds on the part of the recontextualising agents.

Figure 3.1 summarises the distinctions introduced in this section:

![Diagram of reaction types]

Figure 3.1: Types of reaction
3.2.3 Materialisation and semioticisation (systems 6-15)

In reality not all activities are semiotic. When we are alone, we may engage in activities that do not form part of a social practice. We may scratch ourselves, yawn, survey our environment, in ways that cannot be said to be meaningful, and of which we are not consciously aware, or which we discount without further thought. In company, however, everything we do and everything that happens to us becomes meaningful, becomes ‘readable’ - and when we recontextualise, actively or passively, we are always in company, even if only in imaginary company, as when we write a letter, for instance. So in a study of recontextualisation we should in principle consider all activities semiotic, even purely physiological ones, like sneezing. Solitary activities may, for instance, become reactions to, or preparations for social practices, as in the following example, where a caressing gesture (‘touching the toe of the shoe with the tip of the finger’) expresses, and so turns into an activity, a reaction to a ‘prop’ of the social practice, and another gesture, ‘rubbing the shoe with a handkerchief’, an activity that ensures that the new shoe will be eligible for wearing on ‘the first day’.
3.2:23 She touched the toe of the left shoe with the tip of her finger and then rubbed the place quickly with her handkerchief so as not to leave a mark on the shiny brown leather.

We can nevertheless distinguish two ways of representing activities: representing them as instrumental actions, as actions which have, at least potentially, an immediate, non-semiotic, material purpose or effect, and representing them as semiotic actions, as actions which do not have such a material purpose or effect. In the latter case I will say that the activities have been semioticised, represented as semiotic activities. In the former case I will say that they have been materialised, represented as non-semiotic, instrumental actions, as actions which involve the physical movement of a concrete, physical entity from one place to another, or physical contact between concrete entities, rather than as bodily behaviour (including speech) with an exclusively communicative purpose and effect. To put it another way, materialisation is what, in the language of the movies, would be called the 'action', semioticisation what would be called the 'dialogue' and the 'performance' (postures, gestures, expressions) of the actors. By these criteria, 'resist' in 3.2:24 materialises, and 3.2:25 semioticises what is essentially the same activity, the child's rebellion upon
entering the school for the first time (I am assuming that the resistance in 3.2:24 is physical):

3.2:24 Darren resists the teacher’s attempts to cuddle him.

3.2:25 ‘We don’t want to sit down’, said Magnus, ‘we want to go outside.’

This distinction is evidently inspired by, and can be aligned with, Halliday’s (1967-68; 1985) distinction between, on the one hand, material processes, and, on the other hand, behavioural and verbal processes. Material processes, according to Halliday, can be substituted by or ‘probed’ with the verbs ‘do’ and ‘happen’, and can combine with either one or two participants, the ‘Actor’, the ‘one that does the deed’ (1985, p.102), and the ‘Goal’, ‘the one to which the process is extended’ (1985, p.103), and which must be a ‘Thing’, that is, ‘a phenomenon of our experience, including of course our inner experience or imagination – some entity (person, creature, objects, institution or abstraction), or some process (action, event, quality, state or relation’, 1985, p.108). Material processes may have only an Actor, or both an Actor and a Goal, or only a Goal, in the case of involuntary processes such as ‘collapse’, ‘die’, etc. (Halliday refers to these participants as ‘Actors’, although he admits that they are ‘like Goals’, 1985, p.104). In the case of a one-participant
process which takes only an Actor, the case of the non-transactive action, the relevant 'probe' is 'What did x do?'. In the case of a one-participant process with only a Goal, the case of the 'happening' or 'event', the relevant probe is 'What happened to x?'. In the case of a two-participant process, the case of the transactive action, the relevant probe is 'What did x do to y?'. Behavioural processes can also be probed or substituted by 'do', but the active participant, termed 'Behaver', must be human, and the process cannot take two participants (1985, p.128).

Verbal processes, finally, cannot, according to Halliday, be probed or substituted by 'do' (see note 1). Like mental processes, they can 'project', that is, in terms of formal grammar, they can take an embedded clause as their object. Unlike mental processes, however, the active participant, in this case called 'Sayer', need not be human: one can say, for instance, 'my watch says...', but not 'my watch thinks...' (1985, p.129). As noted in the preceding section, all the processes that can realise activities are said to have the 'present in present' as their 'unmarked' present tense.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATERIAL NON-TRANSACTIVE</th>
<th>MATERIAL TRANSACTIVE</th>
<th>MATERIAL EVENT</th>
<th>BEHAVIOURAL</th>
<th>VERBAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ 'do' probe</td>
<td>+ 'do' probe</td>
<td>'happen' probe</td>
<td>+ 'do' probe</td>
<td>- 'do' probe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- projection</td>
<td>- projection</td>
<td>- projection</td>
<td>- projection</td>
<td>+ projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 participant</td>
<td>2 participants</td>
<td>1 participant</td>
<td>1 participant</td>
<td>2 participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-er role</td>
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<td>-er role</td>
<td>-er role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ human</td>
<td>+ human</td>
<td>+ human</td>
<td>+ human</td>
<td>+ human</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, perhaps even more so than in the case of reactions, grammatical criteria do not neatly overlap here with sociological ones. Although an understanding of 'the quality of texts: why a text means what it does, and why it is valued as it is' (1985, p.xxx) is one of the explicit aims of Halliday's functional theory of grammar, transitivity analysis does not always provide a precise tool for analysing how language is used to represent social action. An analysis of the linguistic representation of social action must allow generalisations about the different kinds of things which different classes of participants are represented as doing in texts. It must, for example, help to find answers to questions like 'Who, in press reports on industrial relations, are represented as instigating strike action, who as merely commenting on it, or reacting to it?' Identifying the material, verbal and
mental processes in such texts cannot, by itself, answer questions like this, not when the definition of the participants needed to identify them includes ‘persons, creatures, objects, institutions, abstractions (...) actions, events, qualities, states and relations’, and when speech activities, for instance, are not always realised by verbal processes, but also by material processes such as ‘praise’, ‘greet’, etc, or reactions not always by mental processes but also by relational processes (e.g. ‘he was angry’). The grammatical definitions and the sociological definitions are not sufficiently compatible. And while Halliday’s concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’ goes some way towards remedying this problem, it remains tied up with grammatical criteria. ‘The report confirms...’, for example, a realisation which I have, in the previous chapter, interpreted as metonymical (‘utterance autonomisation’) would not be a grammatical metaphor according to Halliday, as it fits in with the criterion that verbal processes do not need to have a human ‘Sayer’. The solution however, is not to abandon linguistics, and to return to a kind of content analysis of linguistic representations which treats language as transparent. Rather, the solution is to align the description of grammatical realisations more closely to those needed for the analysis of the representation of social issues in
texts. The following proposals go some way towards achieving this in the case of 'materialised' activities.

(1) Instead of saying that material processes can be both abstract and concrete, I will view abstraction as a recontextualisation which can apply equally to all types of process (see 3.2.6 below).

(2) Involuntary material processes ('true happenings') I will not regard as materialisations of activities, but as 'eventualities' (see 3.2.11 below). It should be noted, however, that the grammatical form of eventualities is often used to recontextualise what, sociologically, are not eventualities, but activities (see 3.2.5 below).

(3) A distinction will be made between instrumental and non-instrumental materialisations, and between the two types of participant needed for this distinction - 'Things' (concrete physical objects or places, which may, of course, be subjected to recontextualisations such as abstraction, generalisation, etc) and 'Persons' (humans). Instrumental materialisations can now be defined as realised by 2-participant material processes with a Thing as Goal, non-instrumental materialisations as realised by 2-participant material processes with a
Person (or Persons) as Goal. According to these definitions, 'button up' in 3.2:26 is instrumental, and 'hug', in 3.2:27 non-instrumental:

3.2:26 Mary Kate buttoned up her coat crooked.
3.2:27 Mary Kate ran to her and hugged her.

(4) A further distinction can be made between instrumentalised and interactionalised materialisations. In both these cases the Goal is a Person or Persons, but in the case of instrumentalisation the process is one which could also take a Thing as Goal, even though it does not do so in this particular case, while in the case of interactionalisation the process is one which must always take a Person or Persons as Goal. In instrumentalisations people are in fact recontextualised as interchangeable with objects, through the use of material processes like 'use', 'transport', 'destroy', 'carry', etc. Not surprisingly, instrumentalisations are common in texts which are, to some degree, bureaucratised, e.g. 3.2:28, and less common, for instance, in stories, e.g. 3.2.29:

3.2:28 Make use of other children to help him get dressed or use scissors.
3.2:29  'Susan,' called Miss Laurie, 'show Mary Kate the doll's house and all the other things.'

If, occasionally, Things occur as Goals of interactionalisations, these Goals can be interpreted as metonymical displacements (as when someone 'kisses the ground' on which a participant has stood, or in Participant instrumentalisations like 'the bullet hit him') or as metaphorical projections of human social practice onto the behaviour of animals, plants, or even inanimate matter.

Given that we are dealing, always, with recontextualisations of the activities of human agents (or, very rarely, animals), this yields the following realisations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTRUMENTAL</th>
<th>INSTRUMENTALISED</th>
<th>INTERACTIONALISED</th>
<th>BEHAVIOURALISED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 participants</td>
<td>2 participants</td>
<td>2 participants</td>
<td>1 participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material process</td>
<td>material process which can take Thing as Goal</td>
<td>material process which can- not take Thing as Goal</td>
<td>material process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thing as Goal</td>
<td>Person as Goal</td>
<td>Person as Goal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the form of a system network:

Figure 3.2: Types of materialisation

Semioticisations need not always project. They can be realised by material processes such as 'greet', 'welcome', 'praise', etc (3.2:30) or by verbal processes treated as material processes, i.e. not used to project, and taking the present in present (e.g. 'she is teaching him')

3.2:30 The principal greets you and your child warmly before filling in various forms.

Both are instances of interactionalisation — a category which clearly lies in between materialisation and semioticisation: the semiotic act is here recontextualised as an activity, in its material aspect. The same applies to behaviouralised semioticisations, realised either by behavioural processes such
as 'dance', 'sing', 'talk', 'speak', or by verbal processes treated as behavioural processes, i.e. not used to project, and not taking a 'Target' (e.g. 'she is teaching').

3.2:31 When she woke up the children were singing.

Many behaviouralised semioticisations are expressive. They can be seen as the outward manifestations of mental processes (cf. Matthiessen, 1992, p.220). 'Pondering', for instance, can be related to 'thinking', 'listening' to 'hearing', 'smiling' to 'enjoying', and so on. Nevertheless, their realisation as behavioural processes dissociates them from the related mental processes, leaving open the question of whether they are or are not symptomatic of mental processes - after all, behaviouralisations are the stock in trade of the actor. They can be turned on deliberately. There are, however, two kinds of behaviouralisation which reinstate the link with mental processes, and explicitly code behaviour as symptomatic of mental processes, while, at the same time, encoding them as having an outward manifestation. Semi-mentalised behaviouralisations are realised by verbal processes which do not, strictly speaking, signify verbalisations, but either leave the means of expression unspecified (e.g. the verb 'express') or signify a nonverbal (for instance visual) mode of 'saying' (e.g. the verb 'show'). They
may also be realised by material processes like 'display' which have not (yet?) acquired the ability to project which other verbs of visual 'saying', such as 'show' and 'write' already have. The Goal (or Range, or, in the case of verbal processes, 'Verbiage', the 'element expressing the class, quality or quantity of what is said', Halliday, 1985, p.137) is then realised by a nominalisation of or a name for a mental process, such as 'sadness', 'grief', 'joy', 'hope', 'desire'. Alternatively the mental process is realised as the Qualifier of a nominal group functioning as Range, as in the following example."

3.2:32 The majority of target children showed signs of bewilderment, fatigue or distress, especially on the first day.

3.2:33 Smudge looked very sad.

Here the mental process does have an outward manifestation. However, it is not encoded as deliberately produced by the Senser, but as observed or observable by some other participant of the social practice (who may or may not be included in the recontextualisation), as 'read' by an interpreter.

Halliday's account of the ways in which verbal processes can project either 'wordings' (a 'Quoted'), as in 3.2:34, or
'meanings' (‘a Reported’), as in 3.2:35, (cf. Halliday, 1985, p.129; 228 ff) is useful for the purpose of recontextualisation analysis.

3.2:34 He complained to his mother, ‘Why can’t my teacher be the same as everyone else?’

3.2:35 The director of Sydney University’s early childhood education program, Dr. Stephen Juan, says it is to be expected that parents and children should be anxious at this time.

When, for instance, a speech activity is recontextualised as a Quotation in an essentially instructive text, as in 3.2:36, there is an unspoken suggestion that the recontextualised wording must be adhered to if the social practice is to unfold properly:

3.2:36 Yet by being asked specifics such as ‘Did you make a new friend’ or ‘What was the very best thing you did today?’ your child may find it easy to launch into a vivid description of their day.

Here the recontextualisation includes a specific ‘formula’. It is quite possible that the frequent use of Quotation in popular fictional texts, comedy, etc. has a strong influence on the wording of speech activities in the social practices which these texts recontextualise – predominantly practices of the ‘private sphere’, peer relations, love relations, and so on. When the same speech activity is recontextualised as a Rendition,
realised by a 'Reported', the participants are represented as free to choose their own wording. According to such recontextualisations, the content, not the wording is what matters:

3.2:37 His parents explain how he was used to being away at day nursery.

However, Quotation and Rendition are not the only ways in which the utterances involved in semiotic activities may be realised. It is possible also to recontextualise the utterance, not as a rendition of the meaning, but as a rendition of the topic which the semiotic activity is about (Field Specification), as in 3.2:38, or as a rendition of the genre of the semiotic activity (Genre Specification), as in 3.2:39:

3.2:38 Parents should make a point of talking about the first day, and in particular about the child’s fears of starting school.

3.2:39 Every school requested a modicum of information from parents when the child starts.

Field specification is realised by a Circumstance of Matter (cf. Halliday, 1985, p.142), such as 'about the first day', in conjunction either with verbal processes, or with material or behavioural processes denoting semiotic activities, such as 'dance', 'sing', 'talk'. Genre specification
is realised by 'Verbiage' or 'Range' in connection with the same two classes of process (cf. 'talk nonsense', 'speak words of comfort', 'read a story', 'tell a story', 'sing a song', 'dance a tango'). A Field Specification may be included as well, in the form of a Qualifier of the nominal group that functions as verbiage or Range, as in:

3.2:40 The teacher says she will read a story about a mouse tomorrow.

Genre specification introduces an emphasis on semiotic activities as activities, at the expense of field, of substantive content. It is therefore always interesting to investigate whose semiotic activities, and which kinds of semiotic activities, are so recontextualised in which contexts. The talk of children amongst each other, for instance, and the telling of stories by the teacher, rarely receive Field Specification (3.2:40 is the only instance in 9 children's books about 'the first day' which all include at least one story telling episode).

In the main, Field and Genre Specification can be used for all semiotic modes, whereas Quotation and Rendition can be used only in the case of language, or of generalised semiosis (verbs like 'signify', 'denote', 'indicate', which leave the semiotic mode unspecified). In this way English classifies some semiotic modes as capable of communicating specific contents, others as
capable only of being expressive in a more general and vague sense.

In instrumentalised semioticisations, finally, material processes of 'exchange' and 'transport', such as 'give', 'offer', 'receive', 'provide', 'supply', 'convey', 'put across', etc. are used to express semiotic activities, in conjunction with a Genre Specification which, if given specific reference, may also project, as in 3.2:43 (a constructed example):

3.2:41 More than half our sample schools received information about new entrants from the preschools.

3.2:42 Parents were asked to supply the child’s basic biographical details on an admission form.

3.2:43 Parents gave the school the information that their child would not be able to come to school.

Such instrumentalised semioticisations recontextualise semiotic activities in terms of the commodification of communication that has come about in our 'information age'. Not surprisingly, the form and the purpose, rather than the content of the speech activities are foregrounded.
The different types of semioticisation which I have distinguished here can reveal how much importance is, in a given re-contextualisation, attached to the form, how much to the content of the semiotic activities. The grammatical criteria I have used pertain mostly to the level of the clause, and it should be noted that all these recontextualisations can also be realised at levels below the clause (see 3.2.4) and at discourse level, as in 3.2:44, where Quotation is realised through anaphoric reference:

3.2:44 "Are the other children going to like my child? Is the teacher going to understand and appreciate my child. What are they going to tell my child? Who am I exposing my child to? What will they expect of my child?"

These are the questions thousands of anxious parents are asking themselves in preparation for the first day of kindergarten this week.

The network below summarises my account of semioticisation:
3.2.4 **Objectivation** and **descriptivisation**

*systems 16-21*

All the different kinds of activities and reactions I have discussed in the previous two sections can either be recontextualised as **activated**, that is, represented dynamically, as activities or reactions, or **de-activated**, that is, represented
dynamically, as activities or reactions, or de-activated, that is, represented statically, as though they were entities or qualities, rather than dynamic processes.

When activated, the activities or reactions are grammatically realised in the verbal group of a ranking (non-embedded) clause. All the realisations discussed and exemplified in the previous two sections are of this kind. When de-activated, the activities or reactions are realised, not in the verbal group of a ranking clause, but in other ways, to be discussed below. From the point of view of recontextualisation, however, de-activated activities and reactions remain activities and reactions, even though the de-activation causes abstraction from their dynamic aspect.

When an activity or reaction is realised, not by a process, but by a (grammatical) participant or circumstance in a clause, I will speak of objectivation. The activities or reactions are then represented as things, entities, and downranked with respect to some other process. Objectivations may also be realised by embedded non-finite clauses. In this case they retain, to some extent, their process-like character: they can still be perceived as verb forms. Hence I will refer to them as semi-objectivations. They do, however, objectivate, since semi-objectivation, like full objectivation, causes the recontextualised activity or
reaction to function, grammatically, as a participant or circumstance, with consequences that will be discussed more fully below. 'Addressing the child by name', in 3.2:45, is an example in which the objectivated activity functions as a participant (the 'Carrier' in a relational clause). 'In exchanging visits between staff' in 3.2:46 is a circumstantialised example (Circumstance of Matter):

3.2:45 Addressing the child by name is very important.

3.2:46 There are, of course, practical difficulties in exchanging visits between staff.

Objectivations realised by nominalisations or process nouns, as in 'communication between schools and homes', in 3.2:47, and 'from their own experience', in 3.2:48, I will refer to as full objectivations:

3.2:47 Communication between schools and homes needs to be improved.

3.2:48 Parents have important contributions to make from their own experience.

Full objectivation can also be realised metonymically, by various kinds of displacement, for instance by temporalisation, that is, by substituting the time associated with an activity or reaction
for the activity or reaction itself, as with 'about the day ahead' in 3.2:49, or by *spatialisation*, the substitution of a place associated with an activity or reaction for the activity or reaction itself, as with 'school' in 3.3:50, or by various forms of *prolepsis*, for instance the substitution of the product of an activity or reaction for the activity or reaction itself, as with 'no parting tears' in 3.2:51:

3.2:49 The family can talk calmly and happily about the day ahead.

3.2:50 School is about to start.

3.2:51 I saw no parting tears.

This list is not exhaustive. Another form of displacement, for instance, common in 'psychological' fiction, is the displacement of reactions onto the weather. The weather can, of course, be an element of the social practice, functionally equivalent to time, as for example in agricultural practices. But it can also objectivate a participant, or a reaction. In the following short excerpt from a detective novel by Simenon, the first clause objectivates the reaction of the hero, the second objectivates the hero himself, by substituting 'the rain' for the hero, as Sensor of a (descriptivised) mental process:
It was still raining the following day. The rain was soft, cheerless and hopeless, like a widow’s tears.

Although objectivation is often accompanied by the suppression of one or more participants (cf. 2.2.1), this is not necessarily the case. Semi-objectivations like ‘in exchanging visits’ (3.2:46) could be formulated as ‘in schools exchanging visits’, or, as in fact happens in the example, circumstantialising the participants (‘between staff’). ‘Addressing the child by name’ (3.2:45), similarly, could be formulated as ‘for teachers to address the child by name’. The Actors, Behavers, Sayers and Sensors of fully objectivated activities and reactions can also be possessivated, as in 3.2:48 (‘from their own experience’) or circumstantialised, as in 3.2:47 (‘between schools’).

Objectivated mental and verbal processes retain their ability to project in all of the ways discussed in the previous section (cf. Halliday, 1985, p.240 ff). Field and Genre Specifications can be realised by Classifiers (e.g. ‘story telling’) or Qualifiers (e.g. ‘beliefs about universal schooling’; ‘the telling of tales’) of the nominal group in which the objectivation is the Head (‘Thing’, in Halliday’s terminology):
3.2:53 The teacher resolved this by explaining that all the other children would be undressing too.

3.2:54 The belief that universal schooling is absolutely necessary is most firmly held in those countries where the fewest people have been – and will be – served by schools.

When an activity or reaction is objectivated, the recontextualisation downranks it in order to give priority to something else. In procedural texts, for example, priority might be given to sequencing (3.2:55) or to signalling whether an activity or reaction is optional or obligatory (or something in between: 'helpful', 'advisable', 'desirable', etc.), as in 3.2:56:

3.2:55 Preparation for the first day at school should start early.

3.2:56 It is important for you to meet the teacher.

In texts which juxtapose several recontextualisations of the same social practice, priority may be given to modality:

3.2:57 It would seem that it is logistically possible to include mothers in the classroom.

Very frequently, however, objectivation enables purpose and/or legitimations to be added to the recontextualisation. An example, from Illich’s Deschooling Society:
Alienation was a direct consequence of wage labour which deprived man of the opportunity to create and be recreated. Now young people are pre-aliennated by schools that isolate them while they pretend to be both producers and consumers of their own knowledge, which is conceived of as a commodity put on the market in school.

The first clause of this excerpt contains two objectivations, 'alienation' (which, incidentally, is not objectivated in 'now young people are pre-aliennated') and 'wage labour'. These objectivations enable two activities to be related to each other, by means of a process that does not refer to an activity or a reaction, but signifies a causal link between the two activities (instead of a relational process, he could also have used a material process like 'create'). The (highly generalised) activity of 'working for a wage' is thus causally linked to another activity, one which carries a negative connotation, 'alienating'. This linkage, in turn, bestows a negative connotation on the activity of 'working for a wage', and so de-legitimises that activity.

The negative connotation is then transferred also to 'school', by means of implicit similarity. In other words, verbs denoting logical relations (the same relations which, at discourse level, may be realised by conjunction) relate objectivated activities in order to evaluate, and so legitimate or
de-legitimize them. In texts like Illich's *Deschooling Society*, legitimation and de-legitimation is in fact the overriding concern, and the representation of the activities of the social practice of 'schooling' takes a backseat. However, legitimations and de-legitimations cannot stand on their own. They must be related to a representation of the social practices they legitimate or de-legitimate, however reduced, generalised and abstracted these representations may be.

Objectivation also allows what I would like to call *labelling*. The objectivated activity or reaction is then realised as the Classifier or Qualifier of a noun which appears to be a mere superordinate term, but in fact also abstracts an aspect of that activity (nouns such as 'procedure', 'ritual', 'formality', 'game', 'situation', 'strategy' and so on):

3.2:59 Entry procedures are largely a matter for the head teacher to decide.

3.2:60 Local education authorities vary in their admission policies.

3.2:61 Children learn most of what their teachers pretend to teach them from (...) mere participation in the ritual of school.
The abstraction then becomes an attribute of
the objectivation (‘school is a kind of
ritual’). Such labelling can be realised also
at the level of the nominal group, by a very
close fusion of the Token and the Value (e.g.
‘admission policy’) or a slightly less close
fusion (e.g. ‘the ritual of school’), and at
clause level, as in 3.2:62 or at discourse
level, either by what, in 2.3.3, I have
called ‘concept formation’, or by lexical
cohesion, as in 3.2:63:

3.2:62 Formal group time is a powerful
mechanism for social control.

3.2:63 It contained four ingredients to
make her arrival smooth:

Children were admitted one at a
time.
The existing class was already
settled.
The atmosphere was calm and quiet.
The child was given personal
attention, made to feel she
mattered and that the teacher had
plenty of time for her.

Labelling can also play a role in the
realisation of legitimations. To call an
activity or set of activities a ‘mechanism’,
for instance, may, in a given context, bestow
a positive value on it, and so legitimise it.
For activities to be recontextualised as
‘ingredients’ similarly places positive value
on the activities. ‘Ritual’, in 3.2:61, on
the other hand, brings, in the given context,
negative connotations of ‘emptiness’ and
'hollowness' to bear on the activity of 'schooling', and so de-legitimises that activity.

Activities and reactions can also be descriptivised, that is, they can be recontextualised as qualities of participants as is the case, for instance, with 'smiling' in 3.2:64, 'specially trained' in 3.2:65, and 'was shy' in 3.2:66, or of other elements of the social practice, for instance a 'tool', as with 'her very favourite video' in 3.2:67:

3.2:64 A smiling teacher met them at the door.

3.2:65 A specially trained squad of teachers will go into homes to show parents how to prepare their offspring for formal education.

3.2:66 My first child was more shy.

3.2:67 A quiet way of celebration of her first day at school might be a viewing of her favourite video.

Descriptivisation can be realised by epithets, as, for instance, in 3.2:64, or by the attributes of relational clauses, as, for instance, in 3.2:66. The different realisations can, again, be seen as representing degrees of conceptual fusion. In a study of 'advertising English' Leech (1966) calls attention to this phenomenon, using the term 'imputed semantic relations'. These 'imputed semantic relations'
are not overtly signalled, and arise simply from juxtaposition. (...) They do not operate on propositions, but are themselves the components of which propositions are made. But there is a difference between what is actively expressed, and what has to be interpretatively supplied. Disjunctive (advertising) copy communicates at a ‘sub-logical’ level and helps in the reinforcement of the associative as opposed to the cognitive side of the message.

(Leech, 1966, p.150)

When activities or reactions are recontextualised as qualities of participants, the form of the participle indicates their role: the present participle activates the participants (e.g. 3.2:64), the past participle passivates them (e.g. 3.2:65).

Descriptions often realise eligibility criteria, rather than activities or reactions - and the distinction between descriptions that realise eligibility criteria and descriptions that realise activities and reactions is not always easy to draw. In principle the former express permanent characteristics of participants, places and tools, rather than activities or reactions of the participants. From this point of view, ‘favourite’, in 3.2:67, can be seen as an
eligibility criterion for a 'tool' of the social practice of 'quietly celebrating', namely for the 'video'. At the same time, the agnate active process of 'favouring' can be seen as a reaction which, even if habitualised by means of descriptivisation, would occur in relation to specific social practices, rather than all the time, and so contrasts, for example, to 'being tall', or 'being five years old'. When descriptivisation is realised by epithets, only a semantic criterion (can the epithet be seen as agnate to a process) can help us distinguish the descriptivised activity or reaction from the description that realises an eligibility criterion. This is not so in the case of descriptivisations realised by attributes (cf. 'he is sad' and 'he is a sad person').

To complicate matters further, certain eligibility criteria refer to completed preparatory activities. Thus 'specially trained' in 'the specially trained squad' (3.2:65) can be interpreted as the descriptivisation of an activity when looking at it from the point of view of that preparatory activity ('training'), or as an eligibility criterion for a participant (the 'squad') when looking at it from the point of view of the social practice of 'visiting homes to show parents how to prepare their offspring for formal education', which is the central practice in the text in question.
Indeed, all the descriptions that realise eligibility criteria must, in the end, be seen as descriptivised preparatory social practices, including such practices as 'classifying people by age' or 'classifying people by physical characteristics'. This is merely one instance of the way in which recontextualisations not only represent specific social practices, but also relate them to other social practices.

Figure 3.4 summarises the distinctions introduced in this section.

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**Figure 3.4:** Types of de-activation
3.2.5 **Agentialisation and eventuation**
*(systems 22 and 23)*

Recontextualisation analysis needs to consider, not only whether certain participants have been represented as activated or passivated with respect to certain activities or reactions *(cf. 2.3.1)*, but also whether the activities or reactions themselves are represented as activities brought about or able to be brought about by human agency, or as occurrences on which human agency can have no effect. 'Learning', for example is recontextualised as a 'skilled' activity in 3.2:68, and as something that 'happens' in 3.2:69.

3.2:68 Progress in learning skills is measurable.

3.2:69 Most learning happens casually.

To capture this distinction I will speak of agentialisation and de-agentialisation: agentialisation recontextualises activities or reactions as brought about by human agency, de-agentialisation recontextualises them as brought about in other ways, impermeable to human agency: through natural forces, unconscious processes and so on.

I will distinguish three types of de-agentialisation: **eventuation**, existentialisation and naturalisation. In the
case of eventuation, an activity or reaction is represented as an event, as something that happens without the involvement of human agency: the question 'who by?' cannot be asked in relation to it. Eventuation can be realised in a number of ways:

(1) Through the medio-passive voice, as with 'would go out of production' in:

3.2:70 If there were no age-specific and obligatory learning institutions, 'childhood' would go out of production.

Not all medio-passive clauses, however, eventuate activities or reactions. They do so only when the Medium (the term for the only participant in medio-passive clauses in Halliday's analysis of ergativity, 1985, pp.144-154) does not realise a participant in the social practice, but, for instance, a tool of the social practice, as with 'the door of the little house' in 3.2:71, or when the process is involuntary, as with 'fade into obscurity' in 3.2:72. 'Runs up the stairs' in 3.2:73 would, according to Halliday's analysis, be a medio-passive clause, but in my terms it agentialises an activity. Halliday's contrast is between processes 'caused from without' and processes 'caused from within', mine is that between human agency and other forms of agency.

3.2:71 The door of the little house opened and the teacher looked in.
3.2:72 Of those who came on a pre-entry visit, only half were specifically remembered by their teacher, the rest fading into obscurity.

3.2:73 Your little boy runs up the stairs to start his first day at school.

(2) Through involuntary processes generally, regardless of whether they are medio-passive or effective, as with 'lose' in 3.2:74 and 'are in' and 'are out' in 3.2:75 (a descriptivised example of de-agentialisation):

3.2:74 Parents lose key-role in policy-making.

3.2:75 Big business and ACTU leaders are in and parents and educationists are out in the new body to advise the Federal Government on education and training.

Many such processes have an inherently passive sense (e.g. 'undergo', 'experience', 'suffer'), even though they are grammatically active. Their agnate agentialised forms would be causative constructions introducing the agent as what Halliday calls an 'Attributor' in the case of attributive relational clauses, an 'Assigner' in the case of identifying relational clauses, an 'Inducer' in the case of mental clauses, and an 'Initiator' in the case of material clauses (1985, p.152 ff), as in the following (constructed) example:
The Government makes parents lose their key-role in education policymaking.

Objectivations and descriptivations allow activities and reactions to be combined with generalised material processes such as 'happen' or 'occur' in order to eventuate them:

Such participation doesn't seem to happen at the senior school.

Signs of fatigue occurred regardless of pre-school experience.

The nominalisations or agnate nouns of such processes ('event', 'occurrence', etc.) can label (cf. 3.4.2) activities or reactions as 'events' also:

The occurrence of a formalised timetabled break of this nature is seldom found in pre-schools.

In the case of existentialisation, an activity or reaction is represented as an entity which 'simply exists'. The activity or reaction itself is objectivated, and fulfils the function of 'Existente' in an existential clause (cf. Halliday, 1985, p.130):

There is only one annual intake, usually in September.
3.2:81 There is the novelty of pressing taps instead of turning them.

In the case of naturalisation, an activity or reaction is represented as a natural process by means of abstract material processes such as 'vary', 'expand', 'develop', etc., as with 'form', in 3.2:82 and 'vary' in 3.2:83, or inchoative relational processes like 'become', predicating of objectivated activities or reactions, as in 3.2:84:

3.2:82 The essential teacher-child bond may form as a result of this type of introduction.

3.2:83 Entry procedures vary from school to school.

3.2:84 Children become unsettled if they have to rush.

Like eventuations, existentialisations and naturalisations can be realised within the nominal group. The participant (or other element of the social practice) then classifies or qualifies the nominalisation or noun that expresses the existentialisation or naturalisation:

3.2:85 The very existence of obligatory schools divides any society in two realms.

3.2:86 Is Peter's development within normal limits?
The examples show that naturalisations are often expressed by verbs that can be used also in connection with natural processes.

Naturalisation links activities and reactions to specific interpretations of natural processes, to discourses of rise and fall, ebb and flood; discourses of birth and death, growth and decay; discourses of change and development and evolution; discourses of chance and variance; discourses of fusion and disintegration, expansion and contraction.

Martin (1988, p.156-157) has described how naturalisation is used in history textbooks to naturalise the sequence of human actions that ultimately underlies history.

Figure 3.5 summarises the distinctions made in this section:

![Figure 3.5: Types of de-agentialisation](image-url)
3.2.6 Abstraction and generalisation
(systems 24 and 25)

As already noted in the introduction to this chapter, different recontextualisations may generalise activities and reactions to different degrees. What in 3.2:87 is referred to in general terms (‘milk time’), for instance, is in 3.2:88 broken down into several more specific activities (‘gathering on the rug’, ‘naming a colour’, ‘fetching the milk’):

3.2:87 Milk time is treated as a specific event in some classes and passes almost unnoticed in others.

3.2:88 The whole class are gathered on the rug. The teacher names a colour and children who are wearing it fetch their milk.

In his essay ‘The Structuralist Analysis of Narratives’ (1977), Roland Barthes pursued a project which in many ways is similar to (and which formed one of the inspirations for) my project: an analysis of (in his case only narrative) texts intending to ‘reconstitute the praxis inherent in narrative’ (1977, p.100). He distinguished two kinds of activities, ‘cardinal functions’ or ‘nuclei’ (activities which are functional in the praxis, and which are related to each other by a ‘logic of action’) and ‘catalysers’ (the apparently trivial, minor actions which make
up a 'nucleus', and which, in narratives, serve also to create suspense, to delay the disclosure of the next 'nucleus'). In a James Bond novel, for example, the nucleus 'Bond answers the phone' was rendered as 'Bond moved towards the desk, picked up one of the receivers, put down his cigarette' (1977, p.94).

Barthes recognised that the nucleus-catalyser relation can exist at several levels of generalisation, as expressed in the following diagram (1977, p.103).

```
Request

Meeting & Solicitation & Contract

Approach & Interpellation & Greeting & Installation

Hand held out & Hand shaken & Hand released
```

This diagram is a taxonomy of a peculiar kind. In ordinary taxonomical diagrams (cf. Van Leeuwen and Kress, 1991) 'Greeting' would have to be read as 'a kind of Meeting', along with 'Approach', 'Interpellation' and 'Installation'. But here it must be read as the generalisation of a sequence (Barthes calls it a 'micro sequence'), namely of the sequence 'Hand held out Hand shaken Hand released'. 'Solicitation', similarly, is not a superordinate of 'Greeting', but of the sequence to which 'Greeting' belongs, and so
on. I have indicated this by means of carets (these do not appear in Barthes' original diagram) and by enclosing the sequence in the vertical bracket, in other words:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
x \\
\hline
a \land b \land c
\end{array}
\]

instead of

\[
\begin{array}{c}
x \\
\hline
a \quad b \quad c
\end{array}
\]

The diagram can also be looked at as a meronymical or 'composition' taxonomy, in the sense of Martin et al., 1988, p.149, except that it concerns here a temporal rather than a spatial composition: 'Hand held out', 'Hand shaken', 'Hand released' etc. can all be seen as part of (meronyms of) 'Greeting'. We could call the diagram a temporal composition taxonomy, or perhaps a sequentialised temporal composition taxonomy (a similar distinction can be made in the case of spatial composition taxonomies: they can either show how the parts go together to make up the whole, as, for instance in a map, or not, as would be the case with a spatial composition taxonomy drawn as a tree structure, cf. Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1991).

Temporal composition taxonomies clearly show how 'micro actions' (Barthes' sequence of 'catalysers') constitute activities, how activity sequences (Barthes' 'sequences') constitute episodes, and how episode sequences constitute social practices — indeed, in longer texts there may be several
levels in between that of 'episode' and 'social practice'. If we took 3.2:87 and 3.2:88 together, we would thus have the episode of 'Milk time' (part of the social practice of 'the first day'), subsuming the activity sequence 'Gathering on the rug' ∧ 'Naming a colour' ∧ 'Fetching milk', as follows:

```
Milk time
```

```
Gathering on the rug ∧ Naming a colour ∧ Fetching milk
```

There are no 'micro actions' in this example, as there might be in a story (cf. for example the 'breakfast episode' in examples 3.1:1 and 3.1:2): procedural texts, though concerned with specifics, do not need to create the effect of suspense characteristic of many kinds of narrative, where:

it might seem futile to constitute into a sequence the logical succession of trifling acts which go to make up the offer of a cigarette (offering, accepting, lighting, smoking), but precisely at every one of these points an alternative - and hence a freedom of meaning - is possible.

(Barthes, 1977. p.102)

Texts which, rather than representing social practices procedurally or narratively, are mainly concerned with legitimising or de-legitimising them, may move even higher up
the generalisation scale, and include only
the names of episodes, or the names of whole
social practices (e.g. 3.2:87).

It is difficult to provide linguistic
criteria for recognising the level of
generality of isolated activities such as
'gathering on the rug', because the number of
levels of generality can vary so much.
Reactions, for instance, lend themselves less
well to generalisation than activities, and
what in one context may be an 'activity',
e.g. 'gathering on the rug', may, in another,
constitute an episode. As with the
generalisation of participants (cf. 2.3.6),
the generalisation of activities and
reactions becomes apparent only in an
analysis of the semantic relations between
the different recontextualisations of
activities or reactions within a text (in
which case we can construct the taxonomy of
activities inherent in that text), or in
comparing texts, as I have informally shown
in this section. A more extended analysis of
generalisation within and across texts will
be given below, in chapters 2 and 3.

In 2.2.7 I defined 'abstraction 2'
(abstraction in the narrower sense) as the
abstraction of qualities from a participant.
This definition can be applied also to
activities and reactions (although the latter
are less frequently abstracted). So, where
the generalisation of an activity abstracts
away from the specific 'micro actions' that make up the activity, abstraction 2 might abstract away from, for instance, its substantive, material aspect, to retain only the interactional aspect, as frequently happens with the activities of parents in relation to teachers, both in newspaper and magazine articles and in brochures for parents prepared by schools or Education Departments. In examples like 3.2:89 and 3.2:90 the abstraction suggests that it is not important what parents do in or for the school, so long as they 'interact with' or 'relate to' the school:

3.2:89 In this small town the parents are very involved with the school.

3.2:90 Your interaction with teachers throughout school life can have a very positive effect on your child's attitudes.

Something similar occurs in Illich's Deschooling Society and in many texts addressing teachers, but here the abstraction selects the agentive power of teachers on children:

3.2:91 The teacher exercises a kind of power over their persons which is much less limited by constitutional and consuetudinal restrictions than the power wielded by the guardians of other social enclaves.

3.2:92 Formal group time is a powerful mechanism for social control.
These abstractions not only highlight some aspect of an activity at the expense of others, they also realise purposes and legitimations: purposes through the kinds of qualities highlighted (the purpose of soliciting the allegiance of parents; the purpose of controlling children); legitimations and de-legitimations through the evaluative associations which, in the given context, cling to the terms chosen: 'involvement', 'interaction', 'communication', 'relation' have positive connotations, while (decontextualised) 'power' tends to evoke a negative connotation, certainly in the context of Illich's attempts to return some power to the clients of educational professionals. Since the same qualities could be abstracted from a heterogeneous variety of social practices, abstraction also allows practices to be compared, classified along the dimensions of quality highlighted by the abstractions. Fields of social practices in which the same kinds of purpose and the same kinds of values and disvaluations obtain can thus be demarcated. And such fields are served by the institutions whose ('theoretical') practices of abstraction elaborate these purposes and values: individualist psychology in the case of 'interpersonal communication', 'involvement'; critical sociology in the case of 'power' and 'control', and so on. Such discourses teach us to see the same quality in a heterogeneous variety of social
practices, and supply the legitimations and purposes that support these practices (or the de-legitimations that allow their critique).

Some of the recontextualisations discussed earlier in this chapter, especially 'labelling' (3.2.4) and naturalisation (3.2.6) also involve abstraction. The following combination of labelling and eventuation, for instance, highlights the 'ceremonial' quality of the activity of 'assembling in the hall':

3.2:93 This ceremony is designed to help the child feel she now belongs to the school.

In the more general sense of 'abstraction1' (cf. 2.4.2), objectivations and descriptivisations are also abstractions: they remove from activities and reactions their dynamic aspect. Metalinguistic abstraction (cf. 2.4.2) can also occur in relation to activities and reactions, usually through labelling: either the signifier (3.2:94) or the signified (3.2:95) is then abstracted:

3.2:94 The notion of playtime represents a major discontinuity in the experience of most children starting school.

3.2:95 The term Physical Education refers to that period of physical activity when the children use specific apparatus and movements to promote muscular coordination and agility.
This abstraction is, of course, the one that is fundamental in my own text, which abstracts from reality, and recontextualises it as 'meaning' or 'wording'.

Figure 3.6 summarises the distinctions made in this section:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.6**: Types of abstraction

3.2.7 Overdetermination (Systems 26 and 27)

In 2.2.21 I characterised the symbolic representation of participants as **overdetermination** - a form of representation in which recontextualised participants stand for participants in more than one social practice. Thus the king of the fairy tale can stand for the father, the company director, the political leader, and the team of 'professional heroes' in the Western (Wright, 1975) for the team of doctors, the team of
scientists, the team of presidential aides, and so on. This definition of symbolisation can be applied also to activities. The slaying of the dragon in the fairy tale can stand for overcoming the Oedipal conflict, passing the entrance examination, winning the election, in short, for any trial which achieves the goal of a hero's quest. And the killing of the enemy in the Western can stand for overcoming, violently or nonviolently, any threat to a society or group, disease or disaster, rebellion or crime, or any competition, whether from rival scientists or political opponents. Such stories, set in a fantasy world, a mythical past, or an imagined future, are openly fictional precisely to allow a multiplicity of interpretations, each one as valid as the other. As Wright says of the Western: 'Myths present a model of social action based on a mythical interpretation of the past' (1975, p.188).

Symbolisations can be local or extended, that is, they can extend over all or part of a recontextualisation. Metaphorically recontextualised activities such as 'steer' in 3.2:96, and 'build up' in 3.2:97, are at the local end of the continuum. Note that they differ from the naturalisations discussed in 3.2.5 and the abstractions discussed in 3.2.6: the verbs are concrete material processes which can take only human
agents - if used with non-human agents, they humanise the natural world, rather than that they naturalise the human, social world:

3.2:96 It helps to see yourself as the teacher's partner who can support his efforts to steer your child through the primary skills of learning how to learn.

3.2:97 She turned the page with an expert build-up of anticipation.

Like abstractions, such metaphors highlight a quality of an activity, rather than that they represent the activity directly - but they do so by means of a concrete image. Also like abstractions, they may introduce purposes (e.g. the purpose of 'control' in 3.2:96) and legitimations (e.g. 'build' in 3.2:97, with its sensitive connotation), and, as a result of their overdetermining potential, they contain a covert classification of activities along the dimension of the quality or qualities highlighted. But, unlike the classifications brought about by abstraction, these classifications remain covert. In 3.2:96 'steering' remains a metaphor, opening up only a potential for classification, whereas in Habermas' theory of communicative action (1984) 'steering' becomes a major technical term ('steering mechanism') applicable to social practices generally. Allegories, symbolisations extending over the whole of a text, as in fairy tales or Westerns, are at the least localised end of
the continuum. The story of Magnus (cf. 2.5) is the only example of such a text in my collection of 'First Day' texts. Here activities such as 'solving riddles' need not be interpreted as standing for 'school work' (particularly since 'the other children' are recontextualised as adults) but might also, for example, be interpreted as 'office work' - in fact they may not be interpreted as either of these, but as both, together with yet other kinds of 'work' - and 'interpreted' is perhaps less apt a term here than, say, 'experienced':

3.2:98 It was a lot of work. He had to solve all the riddles. One by one. He solved all of them.

The second form of overdetermination is inversion. In 'The Story of Asdiwal', Lévi-Strauss (1967), described the role of inversion in a myth of the Tsimshian Indians, a people from the Pacific coast of Canada. The economic activities (fishing, hunting, etc.) represented in this myth accurately describe Tsimshian practices, but, says, Lévi-Strauss, an anthropologist who would, as Boas (1916) tried to do in the case of the Tsimshian Indians, seek to use the myths of a people as evidence for ethnographic description, would be bound to make errors, for other Tsimshian practices are inverted in the story. It was, for example, Tsimshian custom for women to move to the village of their husbands after marriage ('patrilocal
marriage', anthropologists call this). In the story of Asdiwal, however, the opposite occurs: the hero, Asdiwal, moves to the village of his wife after marriage ("uxorilocal marriage"). Myths do not give 

an accurate documentary picture of the reality of native life, but a sort of counterpoint which seems sometimes to be in harmony with the reality, and sometimes to part from it.

(Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p.10)

The reason for inversions of this kind lies in the legitimating function of the myth. 'The Story of Asdiwal' seeks to legitimate the custom of patrilocal marriage: the hero's deviant activities lead to a crisis which is not resolved until order is restored and the hero lives again in the village of his father - 'extreme positions are imagined, in order to show that they are untenable' (Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p.30).

Comparable inversions occur in 'First Day' texts. In 'Lion at School' (Corrin and Corrin, 1976) a little girl takes a lion to school. The lion is not only an inverted participant, he also engages in inverted practices, such as 'swishing his tail' threateningly during 'register time'. This creates an incident that disturbs the orderly unfolding of the 'register episode':
3.2:99 The teacher stopped calling the register when she saw the little girl and the lion. She stared at the lion, and all the other children stared at the lion, wondering what the teacher was going to say. The teacher said to the little girl: 'You know you are not allowed to bring pets to school.' The lion began to swish his tail — swish!—swash!

Order is restored when, at the end of the story, the lion returns to lion land:

3.2:100 'Time for afternoon school', said the little girl. 'I'm not staying for afternoon school,' said the lion. 'See you on Monday then,' said the little girl. But the lion did not answer. He just walked off.

The inversion of activities is not restricted to fantasy stories. Texts addressing parents and teachers in particular are informed by a constant concern about the possibility of deviant activities and reactions on the part of children. They worry about children pushing away their mothers when they should kiss them, crying when they should be happy, talking loudly when they should be quiet, fidgeting when they should sit still, refusing to work, failing to reply, and so on. When such deviant activities occur, they cause remedial activities or episodes to be inserted into the recontextualisation. Erving Goffman has described the process:
They (the deviant activities) are given accredited status as an incident - to ratify them as threats that deserve direct official attention and to proceed to try to correct for their effects.

(Goffman, 1975, p.232)

Such correction, however, does not always succeed. In the story of Magnus (cf. 2.5), for instance, the deviant participant, Magnus, continues to refuse to cooperate.

Such unrepentant deviants must then be removed (expelled, quarantined, imprisoned, killed) in a punitive episode. Most of the time, however, such drastic measures are not necessary, and the remedial activity succeeds - those in 3.2:102 and 3.2:103 conform to another one of Goffman's descriptions:

An attempt can be made to show that what admittedly appeared to be a threatening expression is really a meaningless event, or an unintentional act, or a joke not meant to be taken seriously, or an unavoidable 'understandable' product of extenuating circumstances.

(Goffman, 1974, p.233)

Goffman is, of course, only one of a number of ethnomethodologically oriented pragmaticians who have paid attention to 'repair strategies' (for 'repair' in conversation. cf. e.g. Schlegoff, 1968, Fraser, 1981).
3.2:101 Ian was unable to sit still for long and kept fooling around under the table to the annoyance of his companions. The teacher removed him to a place beside her desk.

3.2:102 The skilful teacher can save the new entrant’s face by showing herself to be on his side: ‘He’s not really crying, that’s just a noise he’s making.’

3.2:103 ‘And finally, don’t worry if you or your child cries,’ Valerie says, ‘it won’t last long.’

Remedial activities may develop into full scale social practices and become central in texts dealing with deviant behaviour. In the following example the deviant activity itself (‘not going to school’) is represented only by the objectivation ‘truancy’ and the abstraction ‘problem’ - all attention is focussed on the institutionalisation of remedial practices:

3.2:104 A $1.4 million pilot program to combat truancy will be launched in 163 NSW government schools in the Metropolitan West and North Western regions in the second school term. The project, to be jointly funded by the NSW Department of Education and the Department of Youth and Community Services, will have a staff of 21, most of whom will act as ‘home liaison’ officers, paying home visits to parents or guardians of truants. (…) ‘Where the parents care, a note home and strong talking will overcome the problem’. ‘In a middle-class school a note and stern talking is all
that is required', Mr. Cavalier said. But the other 2 per cent, the 'condoned truants or parentally approved truants', were the real problem. (...) 'No-one exonerates the schools but the problem resides in domestic circumstances, not elsewhere.' 'The children who are truants are children of the dispossessed, the disenfranchised, Aborigines, migrants and the poor' (...) As a last resort, Mr. Cavalier said, the department would prosecute parents.

Other news reports dealing with truancy, however, focus on the deviant behaviour itself, for example by means of short interviews with truant children.

Deviant activities always pose a threat to the orderly unfolding of social practices, for they reveal the contradictions that underlie these practices, contradictions such as the unequal distribution of the rewards of education among different social classes. Lévi-Strauss noted this in connection with 'The Story of Asdiwal'. The step of 'imagining extreme positions in order to show that they are untenable', he wrote,

implies an admission (but in the veiled language of the myth) that the social facts when thus examined are marred by an insurmountable contradiction. A contradiction which, like the hero of the myth, Tsimshian society cannot understand and prefers to forget.

(Lévi-Strauss, 1967, p.30)
On the other hand, representations of deviant activities are also attractive. They allow the vicarious transgression of social norms and form the staple fare of many kinds of texts — news, crime fiction, gossip and so on.

Inversions may be explicitly tagged as inversions, as in the following example, or not, as, e.g., in 3.2:101.

3.2:105 Some behaved inappropriately, walking about when they were expected to sit down to drink, handing the empty bottle to the teacher or leaving half the milk.

3.2:106 Some teachers believe this (i.e. mothers staying on in the classroom) interferes with what they are trying to do.

Because of their threatening character, inversions are often anticipated. This is realised by labelling activities as being 'difficult', 'problematic', and so on:

3.2:107 Arrangements for going to the toilets can cause difficulties.

3.2:108 This (i.e. contact with pre-schools) has its problems since there are some pre-schools to which a head might not wish to be seen to lend approval.
Like symbolisation, inversion can be local or extended over a large portion of a text, or over an entire text. At the most local end of the spectrum lies the rhetorical figure of 'antiphrasis' ('the use of words in a sense opposite to their proper meaning', OED), as in:

3.2:109 We learn (...) without interference from a teacher.

At the other end of the spectrum we find subversive texts, for instance texts in which women engage in activities which, in the given context, would be considered the exclusive province of men. If both participants and activities are inverted, a kind of 'anti-world' is created. More often, however, only one of the two is inverted, either the participants, as in the 'Flintstones' example (cf. 2.2:21), or the activities, as in the examples of 'inappropriate behaviour' in 'First Day' texts.

It should finally be noted that recontextualisations can also be 'representationally overdetermined'. This is the case, for instance, when an abstraction or a metaphor recontextualises both an activity and a legitimisation, or both an activity and a purpose - I have already given a number of examples of this in this section as well as in the preceding sections.
Figure 3.7 summarises the distinctions made in this section, figure 3.8 those made in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.7.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.7**: Types of overdetermination
Figure 3.8: The recontextualisation of activities and reactions
3.2.8 Eventualities

The preceding discussion of activities and reactions may have given the impression that material processes always realise activities, regardless of whether they are ergative or non-ergative, voluntary or involuntary, in other words, that I do not recognise a category of events outside human control (disaster, disease, death), or a category of 'incidents' outside conscious human control (minor accidents such as losing something, dropping something, stumbling, forgetting), but, instead, regard what is coded as an 'event' as the 'eventuation' of an activity or reaction, what is considered an 'incident' (cf. the discussion of deviance in 3.2.7) as an inverted activity or reaction. If so, I have overstated my case. I would be reluctant to argue that, in reality, everything can be reduced to human social practice. I would argue, however, that the distinction between 'eventuated' activities and reactions and 'true events or incidents' (I will use the term eventuality to cover both the major event or accident and the minor lapse) is in practice very difficult to draw, and not just because the same linguistic forms may realise either:

(1) The things we are most likely to think of as events outside human control, are, in recontextualisations, always related to
social practices, and function in the same way as the deviant activities and reactions I discussed in 3.2.7: eventualities interrupt or terminate social practices and trigger remedial practices, as in 3.2:110, the beginning of a newspaper report about a natural disaster which, for the most part, deals, not with the disaster itself, but with the practices of 'rescue' and 'aid':

3.2:110 Up to 200,000 Bangladeshis may have been killed in last week's cyclone and large parts of the coastal region remain cut off from rescue and relief, a top aid official said today. 'Many places are inaccessible and it's anyone's guess. They're finding bodies every hour.'

(2) There are, of course, many texts which, at first sight, would seem to realise 'event sequences' rather than 'activity sequences', chronologies of natural processes, rather than chronologies of social activities, as, for instance, in weather reports:

3.2:111 A low pressure cell near Adelaide will move slowly East and bring SW/W winds across the West half of NSW, then along the coast.

But however much the weather may in reality be an event (as yet) outside human control, such texts nevertheless also realise social practices, as in the case of 3.2:111 the institutionalised practices of meteorological
observation. They seem to realise 'event sequences' only because they exclude both the observers and their practices of observation from the recontextualisation. This typically happens in texts addressing lay readers, for instance popularisations of science, or school textbooks, cf. the following contrast:

3.2:112 Cohen found that, at the beginning of the trial, the subject's eyes were fixated at the centre of the screen. When a small digit was presented at the left or the right of the screen, subjects moved their eyes to read this digit.

3.2:113 When an object begins to move across the field of view, the eyes will begin to move after it after a time interval of about 0.15 seconds.

Example 3.2:112, taken from a scientific paper, includes the activities ('a small digit was presented'), the reactions ('found') and their agentive participant ('Cohen'). And, as can be seen in example 3.2:114, it also draws conclusions, recontextualising, within the text, observations as 'events' ('the significant inhibition occurs'), and explicitly mentioning the social practice of 'creating events' performed in and through the writing of the text ('the results suggest):

3.2:114 The results suggest that the significant inhibition occurs after the subjects return to normal fixation.
Example 3.2:113, taken from a textbook, presents only the results of the recontextualisation (the object 'moves', rather than that is 'is presented', and the eyes also 'move', rather than that 'the subjects move their eyes'), and so makes it more difficult to perceive the relation of these 'events' to social practices. It is precisely this transformation to which Bernstein (1986) draws attention when he discusses the way in which 'pedagogic discourse' 'embeds a discourse of competency' (in which the 'unthinkable' is 'transformed into legitimate discourse') 'into a discourse of order'. As an example he cites the acquisition of physics in the secondary school:

Such physics (...) is the result of recontextualising principles which have selected and dislocated physics from what we would call the primary field of the production of discourse. (...) In the process physics undergoes a complex transformation from an original to a virtual/imaginary discourse.'

(Bernstein, 1986, p.49)

(3) 'Event sequences' like the one cited in 3.2:110 bring observations together in a coherent temporal logic. More often than not human social practices are used as models for this logic. The eat paradigm changes in science show that the social order must change before the 'event sequences'
constructed by science can change. Where social class is immutable, the universe will be conceived of as immutable also. Where class structure is more flexible, allowing a certain amount of class mobility, the universe, in turn, will begin to be thought of as changing and evolving. As a result, the same forms can realise both eventualities and activities. The term 'cell', in 3.2:110, for instance, denoted in the Middle Ages 'a dwelling consisting of a single chamber', 'one of a number of apartments in a monastery'. From 1672 it could mean also 'the ultimate element in organic structure', from 1704 'any containing cavity' (OED definitions) - in 3.2:110, however, cells 'move slowly along' and 'bring winds', in other words: activities, rather than events.

Language offers us the distinction between 'action' and 'event'. But it does not determine which phenomena are to be interpreted as actions, and which as events. It allows us, instead, to recontextualise the same 'goings-on' as actions or events, as voluntary ('the subjects moved their eyes') or involuntary ('the eye moves'). How then is it possible to distinguish between eventualities and activities? Is there any human activity that cannot be recontextualised as a 'natural event', any 'natural event' that cannot be recontextualised as human activity? The more
we probe into this question, the more it becomes evident that both options are, in principle, always open, and that contextual, not ontological factors decide which option is taken. Take the case of disease which, as Susan Sontag has shown in her book *Illness as Metaphor* (1979), is frequently recontextualised as an event sequence modelled on military practices:

Cancer cells do not simply multiply; they are 'invasive' ('Malignant tumors invade even when they grow very slowly', as one textbook puts it). Cancer cells 'colonize' from the original tumor to far sites in the body, first setting up tiny outposts ('micrometastases') whose presence is assumed, though they cannot be detected. Rarely are the body's 'defenses' vigorous enough to obliterate a tumor that has established its own blood supply and consists of billions of destructive cells. However 'radical' the surgical intervention, however many 'scans' are taken of the body landscape, most remissions are temporary; the prospects are that 'tumor invasion will continue', or that rogue cells will eventually regroup and mount a new assault on the organism.

(Sontag, 1979, pp.64-65)

In other contexts disease is represented as relating more directly to human practices, for instance those of 'using pesticides' or even those of medicine:

3.2:115 The reappearance of malaria is due to the development of pesticide-resistant mosquitoes.
3.2:116 One out of every five patients admitted to a typical hospital acquires an iatrogenic disease, sometimes trivial, usually requiring special treatment, and in one case in thirty leading to death.

(Illich, 1977, p.31; p.41)

And similarly, is there, at least since Freud, any 'chance accident' that cannot be recontextualised as a meaningful social activity?

(Bungled actions) prove to be governed by an intention and achieve their aim with a certainty which cannot in general be credited to our conscious voluntary movements.

(Freud, 1975, p.221)

What is, in reality, an eventuality, what an activity? What a move in the social practice, what a meaningless motor action? These are not questions that can be answered by recontextualisation analysis. Recontextualisation analysis can only reveal when and where 'goings-on' are represented as activities or reactions, and when and where as events. And finally, even if 'events' exist, we can know them as such, know that they are events, only though recontextualisations: what has not been recontextualised is not only 'unthinkable', but also un-observable.
In my collection of 'First Day' texts, few 'natural events' occur, but there are many 'incidents'. Mary Kate, for instance (cf. 2.4:2) 'doesn't hear Miss Laurie call her name', 'bends her straw', and 'buttons up her coat crooked': her resistance may not be on the surface, as in the case of Magnus (cf. 2.5) but, if we are to believe Freud, it is nevertheless there. And all of these instances call forth remedial action ('Susan nudges her to make her answer', 'Miss Laurie gives her another straw', and so on). In And So to School, similarly, children 'sustain nasty falls' immediately upon arrival, 'spill milk', 'bend straws', 'smash bottles', etc. These incidents, again, function in the same way as deviant activities, rather than that they constitute insignificant lapses of motor behaviour.

In some cases reactions are triggered off by objects:

3.2:117 The fishtank is bubbling, the urinal makes such a loud noise.

These I would interpret, not as events, but as eventuated descriptions (eventuated eligibility criteria) of tools of the social practice. Eligibility criteria in fact pose a problem similar to the one we have just discussed: when do they recontextualise activities, when 'intrinsic' qualities of people, places and things, qualities that have not been bestowed on them by human activity?
NOTES

1. According to Halliday (1985, p.155), neither the 'do' probe not the 'present in present' criterion applies to verbal processes. With this view I disagree. Verbal processes are at once activities and mental processes, or to put it more accurately, they are mental processes realised, mental processes turned into activities. Hence they partake, potentially, of the grammatical characteristics of both. A verb like 'say' can (and will, in contexts where this aspect is paramount) primarily designate an activity (as in 'She is saying her prayers') or (again, in contexts where this aspect is paramount) primarily designate a mental process, e.g. a cognition, a 'view', a 'belief' (as in 'Halliday says that verbal processes have the simple present as their unmarked present tense').

The notions of 'marked' and 'unmarked', and the idea of assigning probability weightings to linguistic choices is not helpful here. The former returns systemic-functional linguistics to the errors of previous forms of linguistics and linguistically oriented discourse analysis (e.g. Pécheux) which did not relate semantics to notions such as context and register and posited an autonomous and decontextualised semantics. The latter shifts away from the notion of grammar as a resource to grammar as a (again, decontextualised) set of hypotheses about what people will actually say.

2. Matthiessen (1992, p.217 ff) splits the affective mental processes into 'intentional' and 'emotive' processes (the cognitive flavour of the former term is perhaps regrettable). Intentional mental processes can project Proposals (non-finite 'offer' and 'command' clauses, such as 'He wants her to leave', cf. Halliday, 1985, pp.235-238) and take modulation (as, e.g. in 'He intended that she should finish'), neither of which is the case with emotive mental processes. Emotive mental processes can project Facts (embedded 'that'-clauses, as in 'It pleases him that she has left', cf. Halliday, 1985, p.243).

This is a useful distinction and I will attempt
to investigate it in further work. Unfortunately I did not learn of it until after completing analyses of my corpus, and I have no time left now to go through the entire corpus again and redo the analysis. I should add that, from the point of view of critical discourse analysis, one aspect of Matthiessen's distinction would be troublesome. As noted earlier, critical analysis would seek a linguistic basis for the distinction between rational and emotional mental processes. Matthiessen's category of 'intentional processes' conflates the two. It includes processes like 'choose', 'decide', 'aim for', as well as processes like 'hope', 'desire', 'yearn for'. 'Rational' and 'emotional' intentional processes would differ, however, in terms of other cryptogrammatical features which Matthiessen treats as secondary, for instance scalability (the propensity towards verbs which are scaled for intensity, e.g. 'scare', 'terrify', 'horrify') and reification (the propensity for nominal realisations to be either 'bounded' (i.e. count nouns) as in 'plan', 'intention', 'aim', or 'unbounded' (i.e. mass nouns), as in 'anger', 'fear', 'hope', 'desire'). Perhaps we should remember that the cryptogrammatical criteria have more reality than the categories for the definition of which we use them, and that they can occur in more diverse combinations than these categories would suggest.

3. In contrast to Matthiessen (1992, p.217, 227) I do not consider clauses like 'I hear that she has left' to be 'true' perceptuations. They are the 'perceptivated cognitions' - cognitions which are given a flavour of the 'evidence of the senses', and hence an increased modality.

4. 'Feel' is in fact a curious verb: however much we do indeed feel that it is affective, it never occurs in 'affective' transitivity structures, and either behaves like a cognitive or functions as modality.

5. The grammatical construction reminds of Halliday's 'Measure', when 'sign' would be a 'pre-numerative' element of the nominal group, as in 'pack' in 'pack of cards', 'cup' in 'cup of tea', etc (cf Halliday, 1985, p.173-174).
In this chapter I will attempt to put the theoretical framework I have developed so far to work in the analysis of the excerpt from Illich’s *Deschooling Society* which I have used also in part 2. For convenience, the text is repeated here.

3.3:1 1. Everyone learns how to live outside school.

2. We learn to speak, to think, to love, to feel, to play, to curse, to politick and to work without interference from a teacher.

3. Even children who are under a teacher’s care day and night are no exception to the rule.

4. Orphans, idiots and schoolteachers’ sons learn most of what they learn outside the ‘educational’ process planned for them.

5. Teachers have made a poor showing in their attempt at increasing learning among the poor.

6. Poor parents who want their children to go to school are less concerned about what they will learn than about the certificate and money they will earn.

7. And middle-class parents commit their children to a teacher’s care to keep them from learning what the poor learn on the streets.
8. Increasingly, educational research demonstrates that children learn most of what teachers pretend to teach them from peer groups, from comics, from chance observations, and above all from mere participation in the ritual of school.

9. Teachers, more often than not, obstruct such learning as goes on in school.

Table 3.1 displays the analysis, using the method of tabulation described in 3.3.1 below.

3.3.1 Tabulation procedures for the substitution analysis

(1) The first column in table 3.1 numbers the clause complexes (as demarcated graphetically), and corresponds to the numbering in 3.3.1.

(2) The second column lists the realisations of activities and reactions in the text, as distinguished by the criteria developed in 3.2.1.

(3) The third column is headed 'calibration', and contains a re-written version of the realisations. This re-writing constitutes, first of all, a 'lexical rendering' (cf. Hasan, 1984),
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NR</th>
<th>REALISATION</th>
<th>CALIBRATION</th>
<th>REPR-CAT.</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ACTIV.</th>
<th>AGENT.</th>
<th>ABSTR.</th>
<th>OVERSET.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>learn how to live</td>
<td>learn to live</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>learn to speak</td>
<td>learn to speak</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to think</td>
<td>learn to think</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>to love</td>
<td>learn to love</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>to feel</td>
<td>learn to feel</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to play</td>
<td>learn to play</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to curse</td>
<td>learn to curse</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to politick</td>
<td>learn to politick</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to work</td>
<td>learn to work</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td>teach</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>INSTR.</td>
<td>OBJ.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td>exception</td>
<td>except</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>INSTR.</td>
<td>OBJ.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td>care</td>
<td>teach</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>BEN.</td>
<td>OBJ.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td>learn</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>'educational'...</td>
<td>teach</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'planned educational process'</td>
<td>teach</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>(EVENT)</td>
<td>OBJ. (LABEL)</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>attempt...learning</td>
<td>teach</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>INSTR.</td>
<td>OBJ.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>learn</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>want</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>AFFECT.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to go to school</td>
<td>go to school</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>AFFECT.</td>
<td>BEN.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>are concerned</td>
<td>be concerned</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>AFFECT.</td>
<td>BEN.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>commit to care</td>
<td>send to school</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>INT.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>care</td>
<td>teach</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>INT.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>keep from learning</td>
<td>keep from learning</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>INSTR.</td>
<td>OBJ.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>learning</td>
<td>learn</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>learn on the streets</td>
<td>learn</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td>research</td>
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<td>OBJ.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
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<td>OBJ.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td>learn from peergroups</td>
<td>learn from peergroups</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
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<td>pursue to teach</td>
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<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
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<td>from comics</td>
<td>learn from comics</td>
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<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
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<td>from observation</td>
<td>learn from observation</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td>from participation...</td>
<td>learn from going to school</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>COGN.</td>
<td>ACTIV.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
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<td>ritual of school</td>
<td>observe</td>
<td>REACTION</td>
<td>BEN.</td>
<td>OBJ.</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>obstruct learning</td>
<td>teach</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>INSTR.</td>
<td>OBJ. (LABEL)</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>learning goes on in school</td>
<td>learn in school</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>(EVENT)</td>
<td>OBJ. (LABEL)</td>
<td>AGENT.</td>
<td>ABSTR.</td>
<td>INVER.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Analysis of the recontextualisation of activities and reactions in text 3.3:1
in which elided parts of verbal groups are restituted to the text, and pro-verbs such as 'do' replaced by the verbs to which they, anaphorically or cataphorically, refer. The elided 'learn' in the paratactic clauses of 3.3:1, line 2, for instance, are supplied as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>realisation</th>
<th>calibration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>learn to speak</td>
<td>learn to speak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to love</td>
<td>learn to love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to feel (etc.)</td>
<td>learn to feel (etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondly, the realisations are 'representationally rendered', that is, they are re-written as 'activated', 'agentialised', 'concretised' and 'singly determined' infinitives. Phase is also removed. Thus 'observation' in line 8 becomes 'observe', 'learning goes on' in line 9 becomes 'learn', and the abstraction and inversion involved in 'without interference from a teacher' (line 2) are removed, resulting in 'teach'. In other words, the specific ways in which the activities and reactions are recontextualised is removed and replaced by a single rendering for each inclusion of every activity and reaction, with preservation of the different levels of generalisation (e.g. 'learn to speak' is not rewritten as 'learn', the more generalised item). The re-writing thus extends the idea
of 'lexical rendering' to undo, not only the effect of cohesive transformations, but also the effects of recontextualising substitutions (inclusions and exclusions are preserved by this procedure). The term 'calibration' indicates the arbitrary nature of this re-writing. No claim for the greater representational accuracy of the rewritten version is intended, and the representational renderings should not be taken as constituting a language fully congruent with the real social practice, or some form of 'deep structure'. The calibration merely serves to allow comparison of inclusions and exclusions, and of levels of generalisation, between texts that recontextualise the same social practice.

I would have liked to develop a systematic and explicit method of calibrating verbalisations — as Field Specifications in the case of Propositions, and as proposals in the case of Proposals (cf. Halliday, 1985, p.130; 227-251), and this in such a way that the nature of the speech act is made explicit in cases where it is not explicit already. Building on Hasan's work on 'offers' (nd) and 'questions' (1988), it would be possible to match speech act verbs with co-selection of grammatical and discourse-level features (cf. also Van Leeuwen, 1993). A 'promise' in a Quotation, for instance, could be defined as any (i) statement, which has (ii) first person, (iii) future tense, and (iv) a non
-relational and volitional process. Thus a verbalisation like:

3.3:2 'We'll warm them by the fire,' Mummy said.

could be rendered as 'promise to warm by the fire'. A change in the pattern of co-selection would result in a different speech act. Again, a (i) statement with (ii) 1st, 2nd or 3rd person, (iii) future tense, and (iv) a non-volitional process if 1st or 2nd person are selected, would have to be rendered as 'predict'. 'Warm by the fire' would, at the same time, be analysed as itself realising an activity which is tagged as quoted by a certain participant and modalised (cf. 3.3.5 below). Similar procedures could be worked out for Renditions. In the case of 'promises', for instance, account would have to be taken of the concord in tense and person between the projecting and the projected verb. To explicitly work out rules for this aspect of calibrating recontextualisations, however, would require a more extensive investigation than can be accommodated in the present study, and, for the time being, Quotations and Renditions will be re-written informally, along the lines suggested in this discussion.

Finally, hypotactic verbal group complexes will be re-written as realising one activity, causative complexes as realising two elements of the representation, because of the double
agentiality that occurs in them. Thus 'attempt at increasing learning' in 3.3.1, line 5, would be calibrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>realisation</th>
<th>calibration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attempt at increasing learning</td>
<td>teach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(learning)</td>
<td>learn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Projection is re-written as realising two elements of the representation, as in the follo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>realisation</th>
<th>calibration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>want (their children) to go to school</td>
<td>want</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) In the third column of the table the realisation is analysed as either an activity or a reaction.

(5) The fourth column analyses what type of activity or reaction is involved. The following abbreviations are used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COGN</td>
<td>Cognitivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERC</td>
<td>Perceptivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFECT</td>
<td>Affectivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTR</td>
<td>Instrumental transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTR'D</td>
<td>Instrumentalised transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT</td>
<td>Interactionalised transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEH</td>
<td>Behaviouralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT.SEM.</td>
<td>Interactionalised semioticisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPR.</td>
<td>Expressive behaviouralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYMPT.</td>
<td>Symptomatic behaviouralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUOT</td>
<td>Quotation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REND</td>
<td>Rendidion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-SPEC</td>
<td>Field Specification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-SPEC</td>
<td>Genre Specification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTR.SEM.</td>
<td>Instrumentalised semioticisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(6) The fifth column analyses whether the activity or reaction is activated (ACTIV.) or not, and, if it is not, what type of de-activation has occurred. The following abbreviations are used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJ</td>
<td>Full objectivation, without displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI-OBJ</td>
<td>Semi-objectivated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMP.</td>
<td>Temporalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAT.</td>
<td>Spatialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROL.</td>
<td>Prolepsis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR.</td>
<td>Descriptivisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where labelling occurs, LABEL is added between brackets, e.g. OBJ (LABEL).

(7) The sixth column analyses whether the activity or reaction is agentialised (AGENT.) or not, and, if it is not, what type of de-agentialisation has occurred, eventuation (EVENT.), existentialisation (EXIST.), or naturalisation (NATUR.).

(8) The seventh column analyses whether the activity or reaction has been concretised or not (CONCR.), and, if it is not, whether abstraction (ABSTR 2) or metalinguistic abstraction (META) has occurred - generalisation is not included in this stage of the analysis, and de-activation is already recorded in the fourth column.
(9) The final column records cases of overdetermination, noting whether symbolisation (SYMB) or inversion (INVER) has occurred. Activities which are remedial (see 3.2.7) are marked REM.

3.3.2 Substitutions of 'teaching' and 'learning' in Illich's Deschooling Society

Two practices are central in Illich's text, 'teaching' and 'learning'. Of these two, 'teaching' is always recontextualised as an activity. But the verb 'teaching' itself, a verb which can project (one teaches something) and which can extend to a Beneficiary (one teaches someone), is not used. 'Teaching', that is, what teachers do, at its most generalised level, is recontextualised either as a behaviouralisation or as an instrumentalised materialisation that allows no indication of what and who is being taught. In Illich's recontextualisation, the teacher works in a void, and the activity of teaching is neither 'about something', nor 'for someone'. It is an activity performed for its own sake, a 'ritual' in the pejorative sense of that term, the sense which so readily collocates with 'hollow'.
'Learning', on the other hand, is recontextualised as a reaction, as a cognitive process, with only one exception (and that exception is 'learning in school': 'such learning of subject matters as goes on in school', line 9). But these reactions are, for the most part, not connected to any activity. They are not reactions to something, for instance to the activity of 'teaching'. With the exception of 'learning from chance observation' and 'learning from mere participation in the ritual of school', the activities that 'teach' are either excluded (as, e.g., in 'learning how to live') or only suggested - by reference to the place where learning takes place ('on the streets'), to the participants of the learning ('peergroups') or to its medium ('comics'). For Illich, learning is spontaneous, and not in need of guidance and planning. The child, and only the child, is the agent of 'learning'. Any suggestion of equating 'learning' with 'being taught' is scrupulously avoided. On the other hand, 'learning', and this in contrast to 'teaching', projects into the future: the child learns 'how to live', 'how to love', 'how to work'. Learning is not serving time in school, not something performed for its own sake, but something vital and useful.

Throughout the excerpt Illich activates, agentialises and concretises a great deal, more, perhaps, than is usual in texts of this
kind. He prefers concatenations of specific examples over the more general labels that might also have been used. Especially the large amount of agentialisation is noteworthy. Illich’s discourse is one in which unavoidable ‘natural’ events have no place. Everything is recontextualised as, at least potentially, the doing of social participants and perhaps this is not surprising. Illich’s book proposes reform, social change, and this cannot be done without a belief in the possibility of social agency – a belief which, as it happens, is also firmly embedded in the grammar of Illich’s writing.

Not everything, however, is concrete, not everything activated. The activities of teachers are contrasted to those of children and parents by being more often objectivated (‘interference’, ‘educational process’ and so on) and by the use of terms which abstract from ‘what teachers do’ those aspects which Illich seeks to de-legitimise: according to Illich, teachers should not be involved in ‘care’, but only in the teaching of ‘subjectmatters’. And finally, in the most provocative of his rhetorical gambits, Illich inverts the activities of teachers: instead of ‘promoting learning’, they ‘interfere with’ and ‘obstruct’ learning. In the recontextualisation of what children and parents do, these strategies are not used. It
is the teacher’s activities, not those of parents and children, which he seeks to de-legitimise.

Table 3.2 summarises this discussion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching</th>
<th>Learning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialised, instrumentalised, and behaviouralised activity</td>
<td>Cognitive reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children excluded as the recipients of teaching</td>
<td>Teachers excluded as agents of learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No projection: teaching is an activity without content, a hollow ritual</td>
<td>Projection: learning is replete with content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivated, abstracted and inverted for the purpose of de-legitimised</td>
<td>Activated, agentialised and concretised for the purpose of representing children as independent agents of learning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.2:** The representation of ‘teaching’ and ‘learning’ in text 3.3.1