The Turn to Anzac

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This thesis is dedicated to the most cherished women of my life:

To Susan Bromfield, whose treasured memory I endeavour to honour every day.
To Dominique Beth Wilson, with whom I create new precious memories every waking moment.
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ABSTRACT

Australian Prime Ministers in the 1970s and early 1980s did not incorporate Anzac into their discourse of national identity. However, since 1990 Australian Prime Ministers and their governments have increasingly engaged with Anzac in a manner that has supplanted the traditional role of the Returned and Services League as custodians and drivers of Anzac. This has involved them consistently giving Anzac Day addresses during the last twenty-five years, both at home and at significant sites of Australian war remembrance overseas. But this has not always been the case. Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac in the past was primarily as a participant, not as a custodian, and was more sporadic, more suburban, and less spectacular.

The thesis explains this shift by tracing the increasing use of Anzac discourse by Australian Prime Ministers from 1972-2007. It will be argued that these Australian Prime Ministers have increasingly shown ‘Anzac entrepreneurship’ – successfully identifying the public’s desire to engage with Anzac and facilitating Anzac’s resurgence by employing the power resources of the state in order to amplify Anzac. Critical discourse analysis is adopted to analyse the integration of Anzac discourse into Prime Ministerial language. Such an approach points to the socially embedded nature of language, whilst simultaneously analysing the linguistic construction of this language.

The thesis identifies that Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac in order to both constitutively renovate Anzac as a central Australian identity and for instrumental policy ends. These twin developments have pertained especially to the processes of domestic economic reform in a globalising world and the deployment of Australian troops during the War on Terror. Such a study is important, as recent scholarly interest in Australian politicians’ role in the resurgence of Anzac from political scientists and historians has not seen systematic investigation of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses that analyses the evolution of these addresses over time or closely examines their language on a sustained basis.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Anzac’s Entrepreneurs

The Sydney suburb of Liverpool is located in the city’s south-west, about 30 kilometres from the central business district (CBD). Liverpool was once an agricultural satellite of Sydney, replete with market gardens that supplied the city and its surrounds. During the middle of the 20th century, urban sprawl had begun to engulf the area, and vast state-funded Housing Commission estates were built in the areas nearby to house inner-city slum dwellers who had been shifted west after slum clearances. The area had, and continues to have, a strong working-class and immigrant presence. In the centre of Liverpool is the Edmondson VC Memorial Club, and a few blocks away from there is Bigge Park, where the modest mid-century brick and concrete Liverpool District War Memorial is located. Nearby is a cairn of large bush rocks, topped with a small white cross, evoking the imagery of a battle site grave. A 2009 refurbishment of the site added two low walls, engraved with Lest We Forget, which back onto the local tennis courts (warmemorialsregister.nsw.gov.au).

Such a humble location seems an unlikely site for Prime Ministerial commemoration of Anzac Day.¹ We have become accustomed over the last quarter century to the spectacular ceremony associated with the commemoration of the 25 April 1915 landings of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, along with the forces of the Allied Powers, at the Gallipoli Peninsula in modern day Turkey. This commemoration has been located at the sites of battle and remembrance in Australia and overseas that act as markers of Australia’s war history. Above all, we have become accustomed to the image of the Australian Prime Minister at Gallipoli, standing in the gloom of the dawn with the inky vastness of the Aegean Sea to one side, and the cliffs of the peninsula rising sharply up into the sky on the other. Here they deliver missives, laden with the weight of the collective memory of the nation, on the importance of Anzac for the present generation, all beamed live to an audience back home. A dawn service ceremony in Liverpool seems unlikely to compare to the spectacular and evocative dawn service at Gallipoli, and even more unlikely to draw Prime Ministerial attention.

Nonetheless, this location in south-west Sydney was where Prime Minister Gough Whitlam marked the dawn service on Anzac Day 1974 (Whitlam 1974a). Although this section of Liverpool now sits in the neighbouring seat of Hughes, Liverpool was firmly in Whitlam’s seat of Werriwa in the 1970s.

¹ Following convention, Anzac has been used in the thesis, rather than the capitalised acronym of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). See Lake and Reynolds (2010, viii).
Scant details of the service exist, save for a handwritten note on the commitment in the Prime Ministerial Daily Program for 25 April 1974, located in the Whitlam Institute’s digital collection (Whitlam 1974a). The newspaper reports of the day did not report on it, instead noting Whitlam’s attendance at the Sydney Cenotaph later that morning where he wore his World War II medals for service, laid a wreath before the march, and chatted with the participants (Cunningham 1974, 2; 9). No speech was given by Whitlam, and he mixed freely with the crowd, part of the milieu of the day, not its focus. The Daily Program notes that Whitlam later that day attended the Anzac service at the Masonic Club in Parramatta in Sydney’s west, again, far from the CBD and its customary sites of Sydney war remembrance at the Martin Place Cenotaph or nearby at the NSW ANZAC War Memorial in Hyde Park.

Contrast the relaxed and suburban commemoration of Anzac Day 1974 with Anzac Day 2007. On this occasion, Prime Minister John Howard too saw it fit to attend the dawn service in a suburban electorate far from the usual significant battle and remembrance sites, like Gallipoli or the Australian War Memorial (AWM) that he usually preferred. But this was not in his own seat of Bennelong in Sydney’s north. Instead, he appeared at a dawn service at Greenslopes Repatriation Hospital, Brisbane - in the inner southern Brisbane electorate of Griffith, held by the increasingly popular opposition leader Kevin Rudd. Rudd, having made plans to attend the dawn service at the AWM in Canberra, sent his daughter Jessica to stand in for him at Greenslopes (Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007). Later that day, Howard returned to Canberra to attend the parade, which was also attended by Rudd. An anonymous Coalition source was said to have remarked ‘I don’t know whether the PM was trying to play with Rudd’s mind. But it worked anyway’ (Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007). Anzac here was a forum for partisan electoral competition, which the media enthusiastically reported upon.

Unlike Whitlam in 1974, Howard made a speech during his attendance at the Greenslopes dawn service. It was something that he had done often as Prime Minister on Anzac Day. In this speech he marvelled:

It has undoubtedly been one of the most warming experiences of the Australian nation, particularly of those generations who fought in the wars in which this country has been involved to see over the last 10 or 20 years a resurgence of affection for and observance of ANZAC Day. The extraordinary scenes of thousands of young Australians going to Gallipoli Peninsula on ANZAC Day, the growing numbers of young people attending ANZAC Day services sends a very powerful message of reassurance to all generations of Australians that this most special of all Australian days will always be at the centre of our national life (Howard 2007).
Howard’s admiration of the resurgence of Anzac tacitly acknowledged that this had not always been the case. During the intervening period between Whitlam’s dawn service in Liverpool and Howard’s dawn service in Greenslopes, Anzac had changed. Anzac had evolved from being worryingly in decline and contested, to a resurgent and increasingly essential, incontestable, and unpolitical, discourse of Australian national identity. Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac had changed too, beyond the differences elicited by the occupation of the office of Prime Minister by different personalities operating in different temporal circumstances. Where Prime Ministers had once been participants in Anzac’s commemoration, taking part at the leisure of the Returned and Services League (RSL) who governed Anzac Day, they were now drivers (Holbrook 2014, 6). Prime Ministers took centre stage on Anzac Day with speeches of national significance, where once they had not. Their government’s now used the resources of the state to fund war commemoration, where once they had not. And the media focused their attention on the actions of Prime Ministers on Anzac Day, where once they had not. The institution of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac had been seemingly irrevocably altered. The question then becomes how much of this change in Anzac, and change in Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, can be attributed to Australian Prime Ministers? And how and why has that change occurred?

Prime Ministers as Anzac Entrepreneurs

The answers to these questions can be explained within the framework of nationalism entrepreneurship. Astute actors working within the context of nationalism have the potential to create new ‘markets’ for nationalist feeling by identifying the desire for nationalist sentiment and fulfilling that desire. Not every nationalist will be an entrepreneur – nationalism entrepreneurs can be distinguished by their ability to seize the opportunity to promote their new form of nationalism when older forms of nationalist practice become unstable and unsustainable. In doing so, nationalism entrepreneurs disrupt, alter, and even destroy, old patterns of nationalist practice. As such, this process of contestation makes nationalism entrepreneurship an inherently political process, even though nationalism’s tendency to present itself as essential and perennial may obscure this fact. The degree to which such an actor will be successful in the endeavour of nationalism entrepreneurship will depend on them fulfilling certain criteria, which will be of varying importance in differing circumstances:

1. Nationalism entrepreneurs need to be sensitive to the socio-political context that they are working within and respond to the local and particular nationalist symbols, traditions, and

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2 See Kingdon (1995, 165-195) and Mintrom and Norman (2009, 650), who both apply the idea of entrepreneurs seizing the opportunity to promote new policy avenues in the context of public policy.
beliefs of this context (see Smith 2001, 57-61). Further, they must be wary of resistance to their version of nationalism that may arise from this socio-political context.

2. Leading on from this, nationalism entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful if they are perceived as nationalists themselves. If a nationalism entrepreneur can demonstrate their commitment to a genuinely felt nationalist end, they will be seen to be signalling their authenticity with their sympathetic, altruistic, or ideational, commitment to the good of the broader nation. If nationalism entrepreneurs fail to do this, they may open themselves to accusations of employing nationalism as a strategy for personal gain, and be met with suspicion or rejection.

3. Nationalism entrepreneurs can potentially come from any sphere of society, but their degree of success will depend on their ability to mobilise power resources. Nationalism entrepreneurs can draw upon individual power resources (e.g. wealth, prestige, personal acumen and popularity) or collective power resources (e.g. group or ethnic identification, solidarity-based organisation, pooling of power resources) to create and spread the internalisation of new forms of nationalist sentiment. Political and cultural elites are actors who frequently possess these power resources. On balance then, elite possession of these resources will make them more likely candidates for nationalism entrepreneurship than the average individual who cannot mobilise these resources.

Nationalism entrepreneurship is a useful approach to the study of actors working within the context of nationalism because it accounts for the role of both structure and agency in the reproduction of nationalism. Nationalists are neither wholly determined by the socio-cultural context that they find themselves in, and nor are they able to wholly define this socio-cultural context and manipulate the populace for instrumental ends. An account of actors working within a nationalist context needs to take account of both of these elements of structure and agency, and take account of how each element of power may be more or less important in varying circumstances.

As such, nationalists are profoundly influenced by their context, so much so that national identity becomes internalised. But they also retain the ability to influence and shape that context, to define it in their own nationalist terms if they can acquire the consent of their fellow nationalists by working within the elastic boundaries of national identity. The goal for nationalism entrepreneurs, therefore, is not an instrumental political end divorced from nationalism (Brubaker 1998, 292). For

3 See Wrong (1979, 124-145) regarding individual and collective power resources.
nationalism entrepreneurs, the nationalist goal is the *end in of itself*. Instrumental political or policy ends may be bound up in this nationalist end, but they are not exogenous to that nationalist end.

This thesis argues that Australian Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating, and Howard, were nationalism entrepreneurs. All were proud Australian nationalists, and all had an affinity for Australia’s war history. All worked within the changing times – a globalising world had led all three of these men to conclude that Australia needed to respond with neoliberal economic reform (or economic rationalism, in the local parlance). Changing political and cultural demographics and attitudes amongst the Australian population had meant that old forms of Australian national identity based upon British race patriotism had become unstable (Curran 2006; Curran and Ward 2010), with Anzac itself especially suffering from its association with these forms of Australian identity. Responding to these twin developments, Hawke, Keating, and Howard, turned to Australia’s war history and redefined Anzac.

Anzac was an ideograph – a nebulous and elastic rhetorical signifier with a loose, but recognisable, meaning that allowed a degree of transformation (McGee 1980). Anzac’s entrepreneurs used the ideographic nature of Anzac to incorporate contemporary neoliberal values, and later, martial meaning centred on the War on Terror and contemporary Australian Defence Force (ADF) deployments. They were able to promote their versions of Anzac successfully by using the power resources of the institution of the Prime Minister and the state, replacing the role of the RSL in Anzac’s commemoration. And the Australian public responded enthusiastically to Prime Ministerial promotion of Anzac, as Prime Ministers successfully delivered a form of nationalism that aligned with the public’s own sense of national identity.

**The Unpolitics of Anzac**

Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating, and Howard were successful Anzac entrepreneurs because they succeeded, to varying degrees, in creating an unpolitical form of Anzac. In order to define what the thesis means by unpolitics, we must first wade into the difficult terrain of how we may define ‘the political’. Following Hay (2007, 62-64), the political may be narrowly or broadly defined along axes of political conduct and spheres of political context. Armed with this insight into the voluminous definitions of the political, the thesis thus rejects classifications of the political that are restricted to the formal institutional sphere of government, or that only narrowly countenance certain forms of conduct as political, such as self-interest or ensuring good governance. Instead, politics can be defined expansively and is encompassed by certain features, rather than solely spheres or conducts:
politics as choice – where politics can only occur when there are choices to be made; politics as the capacity for agency – where the choices made have the potential ability to make a difference and are not simply subject to fate; politics as deliberation – where the choices of politics and the potential for agency is interrogated and contested; and politics as social interaction – as politics is relational, in the sense that it affects others, even if decisions are made alone (Hay 2007, 65-70). Realms that are not subject to these conditions, where human agency is null, and choices and deliberation are impossible, are thus ‘non-political’ (Hay 2007, 79).

The choice to use the term unpolitical thus seeks to convey the way that these features of politics can be discursively organised out of relations and instead be presented as incontestable, essential, and outside or ‘above’ politics (see Schaap 2005, 18-21). It does not imply that there is an actual absence of politics or apathy towards politics. Crucially, decisions that affect others are still made, even if the agency and deliberation of politics remains latent (see Lukes 2005, 29). It is a purported state of being in which certain modes of political conduct are deemed inappropriate and spheres for the political are demarcated. Relatedly, the unpolitical may be the result of established practice or it may be an active process. The process of depoliticisation is evident when the unpolitical is instigated by the active exercise of agency (Hay 2007, 78-87; Flinders 2008); when unpolitics is the result of established practice and tradition it is commonsensical, essential and taboo, and politics remains latent.

Thus, whilst depoliticisation may describe the active process of unpolitics, it does not fully capture the meaning behind the unpolitical. When social relations are established as commonsense and essential, it does not make sense to describe the state of being as a verb (depoliticisation). Nor is the past participle (depoliticised) appropriate if the unpolitical state of being has not been acknowledged as political in the past, and thus gone through the process of depoliticisation. Other related synonyms, such as anti-politics and post-politics, are also inappropriate. Anti-politics, that being when ‘…“politics” as a means of conducting public affairs is condemned and some alternative ways of conducting those affairs is proposed in its place’ (Hindess 1997, 21) again captures the active process when it describes the rejection of politics, but fails to directly account for the purported essential state of being of the unpolitical. Post-politics also only refers to the process, rather than to an essential state of being, with its emphasis upon managerial and technocratic forms of governance:

Post-politics refers to a politics in which ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration... ‘Doing politics’ is reduced to a form of institutionalized social management and to the mobilization of
governmental technologies, where difficulties and problems are dealt with by administrative and techno-organizational means (Swyngedouw 2010, 225).

Post-politics’ emphasis upon technocracy and managerialism also employs a language about late capitalism that fails to appropriately capture the primordial essentialism of nationalism and Anzac.

To sum up, the unpolitical has been employed in the thesis in order to capture the discursive realm that is professed to be outside or above politics. It is a purported state of being that may be signalled by an active process of depoliticisation or it may be an essential form of established practice that has not yet been politicised. Importantly, it does not claim that there is an actual absence of politics, but instead seeks to convey the manner in which politics is denied. Whilst other forms of demarcating the political and unpolitical are established in the literature, they do not fully capture the meaning of the unpolitical that the thesis seeks to convey. To reiterate, Australian Prime Ministers have encouraged, sanctioned and helped establish an unpolitical version of Anzac. This was undertaken by Hawke, Keating and Howard with varying degrees of commitment, active participation and success. However, as will be shown, all of these Prime Ministers have made some attempt to respect and encourage the unpolitics of Anzac.

The Scope of the Thesis
Having set out the general argument and scope of the thesis, it is important to note what the thesis will not do. Whilst the thesis provides an analysis of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and their role in Anzac’s resurgence, it does not propose to provide a holistic account of that resurgence. Accounts of the Gallipoli campaign that began on 25 April 1915 have been manifold - beginning with C.E.W. Bean’s official history of the Australian Imperial Force during World War One, the work of historians like Bill Gammage, and a plethora of contemporary popular histories. Historians like K.S Inglis and Carolyn Holbrook have also examined the evolution of Anzac in Australia’s national life over time. Whilst the theory of nationalism entrepreneurship is sensitive to the context that entrepreneurs find themselves in, and the thesis pays considerable attention to that context, the thesis does not propose to examine the breadth of that socio-cultural context like Inglis (2008) does with his history of the war memorial, or Holbrook (2014) does with her history of Anzac remembrance. Nor does it make a comparative study with other countries and their remembrance of war. Especially relevant here is New Zealand – whilst this may seem like an oversight, given Australia’s and New Zealand’s shared war history, Anzac in Australia has been defined by Prime Ministers in exclusive Australian terms, and Australia’s relationship with New Zealand has been neglected by Australia’s Anzac entrepreneurs.
Instead, the thesis focuses on the language of Prime Ministers themselves. In doing so, the thesis has taken a particular approach to Prime Ministerial language. Firstly, it assumes that Prime Ministers ultimately animate their speeches and are solely responsible and accountable for the words they are speaking, despite the issue of authorship in an age of speechwriters and media officers (Wodak et al 2009, 71). Secondly, the thesis has deliberately chosen to analyse the archival evidence of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac during their time in office, rather than to conduct post-term interviews. Such an approach trades off the potential insight interviews may offer in favour of avoiding issues that may arise from Prime Ministers projecting their bias or seeking to protect their legacy.

The thesis will progress as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and explains the methodological approach of the thesis. In it I survey the literature on Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac from political scientists, historians, and sociologists. I find that whilst considerable attention has been paid to the topic of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, it lacks systematic and sustained analysis. The chapter further conducts a critical survey of the nationalism literature and proposes that the entrepreneurship literature offers greater theoretical insight into the operation of actors working within the context of nationalism than has been offered by this current literature. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of the methodology employed in the thesis - critical discourse analysis (CDA). Here the thesis argues that CDA offers both a qualitative and quantitative approach to the study of discourse that demands both a focus on the textual production of language and the social and political context that produces these discourses, a method that has not yet been applied to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the period under examination by conducting two tasks. Firstly, it employs process tracing to sketch the causal reasons for the adoption of Anzac by Australian Prime Ministers. Whilst several explanations for this shift exist in the literature, I propose that no one account wholly explains what is happening by itself. Instead, the cumulative effects of the distance in time from the original Anzacs, the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with Australian body politic, the tradition of Anzac in Australian cultural life, and Prime Ministers’ nationalism entrepreneurship, provide necessary, but by themselves insufficient, causal reasons for the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac. The second section of Chapter 3 establishes the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. It does this by applying corpus assisted discourse analysis, a quantitative approach to CDA, to explore the frequency and distribution of the genre’s features. As such, it identifies the
various thematic and characteristic features of these addresses, including where and when the addresses have been delivered, and for what purpose; representations of Anzac; the themes invoked; where Anzac is located by the speeches and which battles it is associated with; and who Anzac’s agents are. The chapter concludes that Anzac has increasingly become ‘rhetorically path dependent’ (Grube 2014) over the period under examination.

Chapter 4 begins the finer grained analysis of the individual Prime Ministers and their engagement with Anzac by looking at the period from 1972-1987. Anzac was contested by social movement activists and demonstrably in decline during the terms of Whitlam and Fraser, though its importance in national life was never extinguished as counter-narratives of resistance, renovation, and recognition, played out. The chapter notes that whilst Whitlam and Fraser never stopped engaging with Anzac during their terms in office, they were primarily participants in that process, and that their participation was less spectacular and more local than what we have become accustomed to in more recent years. Things began to change with Hawke, however, who demonstrated some of the above tendencies, but also initialised greater engagement with Anzac in the lead up to the reconciliatory welcome home parade for Vietnam veterans in 1987. The chapter further argues that the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body politic was a crucial tipping point in the engagement of Prime Ministers with Anzac, as it instituted an unpolitical form of Anzac that was essential and taboo to contest, and was as such suitable for Prime Ministerial engagement and instrumental use.

Chapter 5 examines the remainder of Hawke’s time in office from 1988-1991. Here I argue that Hawke demonstrated the potential of Anzac entrepreneurship, correctly identifying the public’s desire for Anzac and responding to it, especially with the unprecedented state involvement in the 70th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings and Hawke’s trip there for April 25 1990. Anzac offered an unpolitical platform from which Hawke espoused his message of consensus, and his government’s commitment, and by extension the people’s commitment, to the project of neoliberal economic reform. This lesson had been taught from experience, as the contested nature of the Bicentenary in 1988 had made the delivery of this message less successful than it had been on Anzac Day 1990. More prosaically, Hawke also used Anzac Day to deliver speeches that closely resembled familiar partisan policy addresses, demonstrating that the sacredness of Anzac had not yet fully coalesced around Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.
Chapter 6 analyses Keating’s engagement with Anzac Day. Where Hawke been cautious with Anzac by honouring its traditional tenets centred on the Gallipoli campaign of World War I, Keating attempted to relocate Australia’s understanding of its war history, and its consequent meaning, to World War II and the War in the Pacific. This was part of his wider political project that attempted to reorganise Australian political and cultural life around neoliberal principles of economic reform in response to globalisation, and engagement with Asia in order to succeed in this endeavour. Underpinning this policy direction was Keating’s belief that Australia’s historical ties with Great Britain and Empire were damaging its future prosperity, and the consequent need for Australia to abandon such connections by becoming a republic, and embracing an Asian future. Keating reflected these tendencies in his engagement with Anzac, visiting Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Kokoda Track, sites of significance during the War in the Pacific and for the defence of Australia, for his first Anzac Day. Keating argued that it was here that the true significance of Australia’s war history lay. The combination of Keating’s politics, and his attempt to relocate Anzac, caused considerable controversy and was opposed conservative critics. Whilst the contestation that his version of Anzac attracted meant that he less successful in keeping his version of Anzac unpolitical, it was an ambitious and precedential engagement with Anzac that demonstrated both the possibilities and limits of such engagement.

Chapter 7 explores the increase in memorialisation that surrounded Keating’s term in office that occurred outside of Anzac Day, part of the international ‘memory boom’ of the late 20th century (Winter 2006). The chapter analyses the opening of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial, the interring of the Unknown Soldier, the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings, and the Australia Remembers program of events that commemorated the end of WWII. I argue that Keating had both success and failure in this arena of memorialisation – success because these forms of memorialisation centred on his preferred version of Australia’s war history that emphasised WWII and played down the significance of Gallipoli; and failure because he largely refrained from referencing his political style and honoured the strictures of the Anzac tradition in order to be unpolitical, and in particular, failed to dislodge the place of Gallipoli in the national psyche. It also makes the point that state involvement in memorialisation was increasing, with the Australia Remembers program particularly employing the funding and policy resources of the state.

Chapter 8 explores the first years of Howard’s term as Prime Minister, from 1996-2001. In this chapter I argue that Howard’s version of Anzac repudiated Keating’s attempted reimagining of Anzac’s location and meaning, and attempted to reinstate an unpolitical, conservative, and
traditional, reading of Anzac. This repudiation emphasised a ‘mainstream’ reading of Anzac that stressed the Anglo-Celtic heritage of Anzac, the centrality of Gallipoli, and tended to emphasise unity over reference to the diversity of Australian society. Howard also actively policed this version of Anzac, and refused to countenance critiques of his vision. Finally, Howard filled Anzac with new neoliberal values that referenced the individualism of his government’s policy agenda, despite the collectivist tendencies of Anzac’s traditions.

Chapter 9 analyses Howard’s latter years in office, from 2002-2007. In particular, it examines the way Howard aligned Anzac with his government’s increasing tendency towards intervention, and participation in the international War on Terror. I argue that it was during this period that Howard established himself as Anzac’s most successful entrepreneur. Whilst Howard’s engagement was just as politically motivated as Keating’s, his strict adherence to a conventional and conservative reading of the Anzac tradition helped to successfully keep his version of Anzac unpolitical. It further instituted a ‘hyper-Anzac’—a turbo-charged version of Anzac that was more spectacular, more state-orientated, more chauvinist in its patriotism, more rapturously received, and therefore harder to contest, than Howard’s predecessors managed to achieve. I finally argue that Howard’s version of hyper-Anzac has made it difficult to reimagine Anzac in politically progressive terms.

I conclude by surmising the argument presented above and proposing some avenues for further investigation. If, as I propose, Anzac has been reimagined in an unpolitical manner that has been most successfully realised in conservative and neoliberal terms, how does this compare to the elite realisation of other days of Australian national significance, such as Australia Day? Can nationalism entrepreneurship be fruitfully realised as a generalisable, mid-level theory of nationalism? And how might the trend towards Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac fit within the changing institutional context that Prime Ministers find themselves within, and their seemingly growing power? I believe that this thesis will offer some fruitful avenues for investigation regarding these questions, in addition to providing an original and illuminating insight into Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.
CHAPTER 2

Literature Review and Methodology: A Survey of Prime Ministers, Nationalism, and Critical Discourse Analysis

Introduction
This chapter surveys the breadth of academic inquiry into Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and engagement, nationalism, and entrepreneurship, before making an argument as to why critical discourse analysis has been adopted as the methodological approach to the research question. As will be shown, Prime Ministerial Anzac Day rhetoric has not seen detailed examination by scholars. This seems somewhat surprising given the amount of attention Anzac has received from researchers working in political science, history, sociology and cultural studies. This gap in the literature warrants scholarly attention in order both to shed light on the shift in Prime Ministerial narratives of national identity and to provide a more comprehensive and systematic analysis than has been attempted before. The chapter will further demonstrate that whilst the theoretical literature on nationalism literature is vast, it does not adequately capture the operation of structure and agency in the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and that the entrepreneurship literature offers a fruitful avenue of theoretical insight. Finally, the chapter demonstrates why CDA is an appropriate method to effect this analysis. CDA points to the socially embedded nature of language, whilst simultaneously analysing its linguistic construction. CDA therefore looks at the political and social forces that produce discourses of national identity, whilst also pointing to the ways that these discourses simultaneously produce and reinforce these forces. This dual approach to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac has not been attempted previously, and its adoption in this thesis offers a fuller view of the process.

Prime Ministers and Anzac in Political Science
The study of Prime Ministers in political science is a broad field, which Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter (2013) have admirably surveyed. Following their assessment of the literature, studies of the institution of the Westminster Prime Minister have centred on historical approaches; area and comparative studies (usually institutional in approach, and somewhat lacking in behavioural analysis); biography and autobiography (of sometimes questionable quality); and rhetorical and communicative analyses (Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter 2013, 3-6). Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter (2013, 4) criticise the value of political biography, asserting that it often ‘...does little to compare and
contrast its subject and the circumstances in which that prime minister governed with other holders of the office and their contexts.’ Biography and memoirs do, however, provide rich and valuable insight into the workings of particular Prime Ministers, and, on occasion, brief contextualisation of their engagement with Anzac (see, for instance, Watson 2011; Howard 2010). Historical, area and comparative studies have tended to focus on the trend towards greater power centralising with and around the institution of the Prime Minister. Such a shift has from some quarters been termed presidentialisation, the ‘development of (a) increasing leadership power resources and autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly leadership-centred electoral processes’ (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 5). Such an approach has been contested, principally regarding the institutional basis for the claim that the centralisation of power in the institution of the Prime Minister is mimicking the powers of presidents, especially US presidents (Dowding 2013a; also see Kefford 2013a; Kefford 2013b; and Dowding 2013b for this debate in an Australian context). Such a debate can be transcended, Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter (2013, 5) claim, by adopting the ‘core executive’ approach to the power of the Prime Minister, where Prime Ministers are enmeshed in relationships with other political actors, and cannot therefore ‘...simply be assumed to have a determining influence for each issue that crosses their table.’ The core executive method informs their approach to the study of Prime Ministers, which examines the interplay between social and political context and relations, political institutions, and Prime Minister’s personal characteristics (Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter 2013, 6).

Most relevant for this thesis is the last category of Prime Ministerial studies that Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter (2013) identify – studies of Prime Ministerial rhetoric and communicative strategies. In political science, recent generalist works on Australian political rhetoric have examined topics such as the development of political rhetoric over time, current trends in political speech, and have theorised the institution of Prime Ministerial language. Importantly for this study, these works have paid little or no attention to Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, despite its prominence as a feature of Australian political rhetoric. Grube’s recent publications on Australian political rhetoric have focused upon the broad institution of the ‘rhetorical prime minister’ (Grube 2013) and its rhetorical ‘path dependency’, where Prime Ministers ‘... are caught between the desire to utilise fresh and engaging rhetoric in order to better explain a new policy direction and the reality that they can’t be seen to be contradicting themselves’ (Grube 2014, 99). Uhr and Walter’s (2014) edited collection collates papers on a range of topics in Australia political language, focusing broadly upon language and political behaviour, the standards of rhetoric, and also upon the content of Australian political rhetoric, but it does not address Anzac. Dyrenfurth (2010, 41) has noted that the study of
The study of the political language of individual Prime Ministers in isolation and comparison has also been undertaken. Brett (2003, 196; 204; Brett 2005) examines the role of Anzac in Howard’s language as she explores the political traditions of the Liberal Party of Australia (LPA), but like the other authors mentioned above, does not make this the focus of her analysis. Her earlier work on the language of Robert Menzies similarly does not examine Anzac (Brett 2007). Johnson has conducted extensive work in the field of Prime Ministerial language and discourse. The Labor Legacy (Johnson 1989) studied the rhetoric and ideology of Labor governments and Governing Change: Keating to Howard (Johnson 2000) adopted an approach strongly influenced by discourse theory to compare the Australian identity narratives of Keating and Howard in the context of economic reform, globalisation, and neoliberalism. Later work by Johnson (2007) focused upon the interplay between Howard’s political language, identity politics, and public policy. None of this work by Johnson touches upon the role of Anzac in Prime Ministerial language or discourses of identity. Finally, Greenfield and Williams (2003, 291-292) briefly address the role of Anzac in what they term Howard’s ‘authoritarian populism’, but do not situate their study in the broader context of Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac.

In addition, there is a small literature that can be located within political science and international relations that addresses politicians’ engagement with Anzac. In this mould, the edited collection of Sumartojo and Wellings (2014) contains studies into memorial diplomacy, that being, the political interaction of national leaders surrounding major war anniversaries and sites (Graves 2014). In the same collection, Wellings (2014) argues that resurgent Anzac nationalism is a product of globalisation, and contends that the national identity narratives of Australian politicians of the last thirty years have been a reaction to these globalising forces. Whilst outside the time period of this thesis, Beaumont (2015a; 2015b) has analysed the role of memory in the reproduction of Anzac during the centenary of the Gallipoli landings, pointing to the enormous financial backing by the
state, but also contending that it is ‘...no longer adequate to argue that the memory of war is entirely shaped by the state, which imposes a Gramscian-style hegemonic ideology “from above” on a population that accepts this as natural and beyond critique’ (Beaumont 2015a, 531). However, such studies have been relatively rare in political science, and they do not directly addresses Prime Ministerial language in a sustained and systematic manner. As such, I contend that a substantial gap exists in the field of Australian political science regarding the study of Australian Prime Ministerial narratives of, and engagement with, Anzac.

**Prime Ministers and Anzac in History**

Moving beyond political science reveals that historians have naturally shown considerable interest in Anzac, and also in politicians’ engagement with Anzac during the time period under examination. Historian Ken Inglis’ work has had considerable impact in this regard, beginning with his seminal investigation into the work of C.E.W. Bean, the official historian of Australia’s World War One commitment, and his role in the conceptualisation of Anzac in Australian society (Inglis 1965). Further work by Inglis on Anzac was published in his impressively conceived and detailed history of Australian war memorials, first published in 1998, and with a significant update in 2008 to include further reflection on the continuing memorialisation of Anzac after 2000 (Inglis 2008). Woven into this history is the role of Prime Ministers and the state in the process of memorialisation in Australia, especially in the updated epilogue of the 2008 edition. Similar themes are examined by Inglis (1999) in his examination of the interring of the Unknown Soldier and the role of Prime Minister Paul Keating. Inglis’ research agenda does not, however, include detailed examination of Prime Ministerial language, or seek to explain how and why Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac.

Holbrook (2014, 166-206) also devotes considerable space to Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac in her history of Anzac remembrance, interviewing former Prime Ministers Fraser, Hawke, Keating and Howard for her study, and providing valuable insight into their post-career assessments of their engagement and contribution to Anzac. Holbrook’s approach does tend to therefore focus upon the Prime Minister’s own assessments of their engagement, as opposed to examination of what they did, or more significantly for this study, exactly what they said and how. In Curran’s (2006) study of Australian Prime Ministers and Australian nationalism, Prime Ministers’ engagement with Anzac is put it in the context of their wider rhetoric on national identity. Unlike Holbrook, Curran tends to focus on the biography of Prime Ministers to explain their views on national identity during their terms in government, as well as upon what they said. Curran’s work does not, however, attempt a systematic examination of all speeches, and nor does it attempt linguistic analysis of the
addresses. From a more critical perspective, Lake and McKenna have both pointed to the role of politicians and governments in supplanting the Returned and Services League as custodians of Anzac and their role as the celebratory ‘new promoters of Anzac’ (Lake 2010; McKenna 2010). Examination of particular Prime Ministers’ engagement with Anzac, and some analysis of their language, can be found in Nelson’s (1997) examination of Keating at Kokoda, and McKenna’s critical work on Howard (2007). But like other studies, these works do not offer detailed examination of the linguistic construction of language, or systematic analysis of the development of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. McKenna (2010) does offer an insight into the role of politicians in his more general examination of Anzac’s resurgence, but again, does not conduct a systematic or linguistic analysis.

Academic historians have also engaged with Anzac and Australia’s war history more generally, often taking a broadly social history approach. Russel Ward’s The Australian Legend (1993) epitomised the radical nationalist tradition of interpretation of Australian identity, and argued that the figure of the larrikin digger was a continuation of Australia’s bush mythology. Seal (2004) found similar themes to be persuasive when he examined the folk traditions of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), but also pointed to the institutionalisation of a more official and statist tradition of Anzac too. Gammage’s (1974) work, The Broken Years, presents a history of the AIF by examining the letters and diaries of 1000 soldiers, and Thomson (2013) presents an oral history of Anzac and its evolution by interviewing these soldiers in the twilight of their lives. More critical historians, such as Lake (1992) and Bongiorno (2014) have pointed to the ways that Anzac reproduces dominant forms of masculine and Anglo-Celtic identities respectively. Conservative historians publishing in Quadrant have challenged what they see as the anti-Imperial and ‘nihilist’ view of Australia’s war history that argues that Australia’s participation in WWI was a violent waste of life of little strategic importance to Australia (Bendle 2014; Moses, Santamaria and Hirst 1992). Recent edited collections have also analysed the history of the effects of war upon returned soldiers (Crotty and Larsson 2010) and have challenged the mythologising and inaccurate historical assumptions that arise in interpretations of Australia’s war history (Stockings 2010). Despite not addressing the research question under examination in this thesis as such, such works provide valuable insight into the origins and reproduction of Anzac in Australian history and society.

**Prime Ministers and Anzac in Sociology, Anthropology and Cultural Studies**

Scholars working broadly within sociological, anthropological, and cultural studies frameworks have also engaged in analyses of Anzac, though their disciplinary focus tends to lead them to investigation
of the broad societal level processes that produce Anzac, rather than to examination of the actor centred production of Anzac via Prime Ministers. Donoghue and Tranter (2013, 5-6) present data from the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, and find that 90% of Australians regard Anzac as being associated with Australianness to some extent, and that Anzac is more important for older, ‘boomer’ aged citizens. They regard the resurgence of Anzac as being attributable to positive media coverage, the promotion of Anzac by political leaders, and the symbolic representation and cultural performance of Anzac in Australian life (Donoghue and Tranter 2013, 9-10). Kapferer’s ethnographic work compares Australian and Sri Lankan nationalism, and contains significant analysis of Anzac. He argues that the egalitarian ethos of Australian nationalism is reproduced within the commemoration of Anzac, in tension with the state (Kapferer 1988). Elder’s work on Australian identity (Elder 2007, 246-252) contains analysis of the dominant forms of Anzac’s representation, and contrasts this with hypothetical approaches to Anzac that account for Australian war history’s many ambiguities regarding the mental health of returned service personnel, the wars of settlement against indigenous peoples, and violence perpetuated against women during war and by veterans when they returned home. She also has provided an important account of the Women Against Rape (WAR) activists who contested Anzac during the 1980s (Elder 2005). Finally, Nicoll (2001) takes a cultural studies approach to the history of Australian national identity, also analysing the ambiguities of the violence of Australia’s war history in sites like the Australian War Memorial, and mediums like visual art. As noted though, these approaches do not examine the Prime Ministerial reproduction of Anzac.

As has been demonstrated, while much research has been conducted on Anzac, a substantial gap exists in the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. As of the present moment, no author has attempted to systematically address Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over time, whilst also paying attention to Prime Ministers’ linguistic construction of Anzac, and placing that within the political and social context of their times in office. I contend that addressing this gap in the literature is an important endeavour, as it contributes to the understanding of the institution of Prime Ministerial language, in addition to a deeper understanding of Prime Ministerial narratives of national identity.

**Nationalism and Entrepreneurship**

As was introduced in the first chapter, the thesis proposes that Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating and Howard were nationalism entrepreneurs. To employ the market metaphor, these Prime Ministers were significant and powerful actors who correctly identified the public sentiment for Anzac, met
that need, and in the process helped to create a new market for Anzac that replaced the old forms that had dominated Anzac’s commemoration. This next section reviews the nationalism literature and demonstrates that existing explanations of actors operating in the context of nationalism have been under-theorised. Further, it demonstrates why the entrepreneurship literature can help to explain the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac.

**A Survey of Some of the Dominant Approaches to Nationalism**

The nationalism literature can be divided into four rough categories, entailing different ontologies on the emergence and reproduction of nationalism – the primordial, modernist, ethno-symbolic, and discursive approaches. The primordial school sees nationalism as a product of the ‘natural’, deep, and ancient roots and traditions of the nation (Özkırımlı 2000). The tendency of primordialists to see the nation as a natural product of humanity has been largely discredited as a casual explanation for nationalism by scholars working in the other three schools of nationalism theory. They point to the lack of empirical evidence to support these claims (Özkırımlı 2000, 83), and suggest that these seemingly natural attachments are indeed construed or constructed. As will be explored in the thesis, there is little in the way of empirical evidence to suggest that Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac has been natural or given, and, as such, primordialism is an inadequate explanation for this shift. A milder form of primordialism is perennialism, which observes the long, pre-modern history of nations, back to the Middle Ages, or even antiquity (Smith 2001, 50). However, such a view still shares the ‘giveness’ of nationalism with primordialism, where national identity is ‘transmitted from one generation to the next with their “essential” characteristics unchanged’ (Özkırımlı 2000, 75), which, like primordialism, cannot be supported by the empirical evidence in the observation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.

Modernism, on the other hand, tends to sees nations, and thus nationalism, as ‘products of specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialism, the emergence of the bureaucratic state, urbanization, and secularism’ (Özkırımlı 2000, 85). Gellner (1983, 1), in particular, is an important foundational figure in this respect, who defined nationalism as ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.’ Nationalism for Gellner was a function of modernism, where a universalising national high culture was imposed upon previously multiple local and folk low cultures via schooling and bureaucratic means (Gellner 1983, 57). This was a broadly society level process, a characteristic that also defines Anderson’s (1991) famously constructed ‘imagined communities’. Anderson (1991, 36) attributes changing culture during the enlightenment as the casual reason for the shift towards nations – the challenging of sacred
languages, like Latin, the decline of the absolute monarch, and the collapse of ‘a conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of men essentially identical.’ The development of the printing press, in the context of these changes, provided a means for the imagination of the national community to replace these cultural certainties. Whilst these two authors certainly do not represent the breadth of scholarship on modernist approaches to nationalism, they do point to the primarily top-down and broadly society-level focus of the school, where nationalism is largely a phenomenon imposed upon a society by societal forces outside the control of the vast majority of a nation.

The next school, ethno-symbolology, rejects primordialism and attempts to strike a balance between the perennialist and modernist position (Smith 2001, 60; Özkırımlı 2000, 168-169). Smith (2001, 60) notes that ‘[n]either perennialism nor modernism sought to enter the world of nationalism…’ and, as such, failed to account for the historically contingent (perennialism) and often pre-modern basis of ethnic identity, myth, memory and symbol (modernism). Smith argues that this position is necessary because nations are neither wholly continuous nor wholly recent functions of modernity. Instead, the roots of the nation lie in its symbols, a bottom-up society-level process. Whilst such an approach acknowledges the role of elites in the reproduction of nationalism (Smith 2001, 57), its focus on the reproduction of the symbols of a nation tends to take their reproduction for granted, and fails to explain why some symbols are chosen, why others are ignored, and the role and motivations of actors who do the reproducing (Calhoun 1997, 49-50). As such, ethno-symbolism, like modernism, makes an important contribution to the understanding of the structural framework that elites like Prime Ministers must work within, but it does not explain their role in the reproduction of nationalism. The socio-cultural focus of modernism and ethno-symbolism therefore creates a blind-spot regarding the agency of particular actors in the reproduction of nationalism. As such, both approaches are inadequate to the analysis of the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac, as the research question of this thesis is less about the socio-cultural processes that produce nationalism, but instead how and why actors working within this context choose to engage with nationalism.

The final approach to nationalism is the discursive or postmodernist school, a loose collective of approaches characterised by the rejection of what they view as the reductionist causal explanations of nationalism already surveyed here, and a commitment to the study of nationalist discourses. A study of nationalism that entails a discursive approach therefore adopts a theoretical viewpoint that contends that no one theory of nationalism can explain all instances of nationalism (Özkırımlı 2000, 226-28; Calhoun 1997, 22). Further, study of particular nationalisms cannot be reduced to a singular
and essentialist understanding of that nation, as many competing and contested versions of the nation are at play within nation-states (Özkırımlı 2000, 228). Discursive approaches to nationalism argue that what is common to differing forms of nationalism is the *discourse* of nationalism, which claims, firstly, the primacy of the nation’s values and interests over any other competing claims of interest based upon sub-national identifications such as class, gender or sexuality; secondly, discourses of nationalism view the nation as the essential and only source of legitimacy; and finally, nationalist discourses are mobilised with binary distinctions such as ‘us and ‘them’ (Özkırımlı 2000, 230). Added to this is the dialectical relationship between discourse and the social structures, practices and institutions that make up the day-to-day of nationalism (De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak 1999, 157). So, whilst at different times the bottom-up cultural explanations of ethno-symbolism or the top-down explanations of modernism may offer insight as to the casual factors of a particular nationalist discourse, the dialectical relationship insight points to the conclusion that neither operates in isolation. Nationalist social practices are influenced by the situatedness of their cultural and political setting, but these nationalist practices in turn influence the cultural and political setting in which they are embedded. Finally, then, the effectiveness of nationalism lies in its routine, regular, and every-day reproduction – its inclusion in school curricular, its visible presence in the architecture of the landscape, the national flag and anthem, the observance of national days and anniversaries, its reproduction in high and pop culture etc. (see Billig 1995; Özkırımlı 2000, 230-32; Calhoun 1997, 50).

Such an approach has had a great influence upon the thesis, and I have adopted its insights into *how* the discursive reproduction of nationalism occurs in its analysis. However, much like the above approaches, it does little to explain *why* actors adopt nationalism or to provide a theoretical framework to analyse and distinguish between the varying degrees of agency and influence of particular actors in the reproduction of nationalism. So whilst the discursive approach to nationalism builds upon the previous insights of the other schools and has much to offer a researcher regarding the reproduction of nationalism, it leaves the role of particular agents of nationalism under-theorised.

Not all approaches to nationalism are theoretically insensitive to the role of actors in the reproduction of nationalism, with some researchers in the modernist school focusing on the agency of elites in the emergence of nationalism, broadly organised into a sub-school known as instrumentalism. Brass (1979, 41) epitomises this view:
[Nationalism is] the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilise the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups. In this process, those elites have an advantage whose leaders can operate most skilfully in relation both to the deeply-felt primordial attachments of group members and the shifting relationships of politics.

Similar sentiments underpin Hobsbawn’s ‘invented traditions’, where nationalism, via emerging innovations like primary education, national days and public monuments, became a substitute for social cohesion, and buttressed the interests of the ruling elite in the context of a threat to those interests in emerging mass democracies in Western liberal countries from 1870-1914 (Hobsbawn 1983, 270-271; 303). As such, when certain modernists do focus upon political actors in the literature, they tend to see the adoption of nationalism by elites as narrowly instrumental. This instrumental focus has been criticised as being overly rationalist (Smith 2001, 56-57; Brubaker 1998, 291-292). As Brubaker (1998, 292) identifies:

Of course 'interests' are central to nationalist politics, as to all politics, indeed to social life generally. The elite manipulation view errs not in focusing on interests, but in doing so too narrowly, focusing on the calculating pursuit of interests taken as unproblematically 'given' (above all politicians' interest in attaining or maintaining power), and ignoring broader questions about the constitution of interests, questions concerning the manner in which interests - and, more fundamentally, units construed as capable of having interests, such as 'nations', 'ethnic groups' and 'classes' - are identified and thereby constituted. Elite discourse often plays an important role in the constitution of interests, but again this is not something political or cultural elites can do at will by deploying a few manipulative tricks. The identification and constitution of interests - in national or other terms - is a complex process that cannot be reduced to elite manipulation [emphasis in the original].

And therein lies the problem with the instrumental focus of scholars who analyse the role of elites in the production and reproduction of nationalism. Nationalism is not solely, or even primarily, a strategy to pursue particular political ends. Instead, the interplay of identity and interest means that nationalism is the end in of itself. The realisation and maintenance of a national identity central to one’s own identity is therefore inextricably linked to the pursuance of nationalism by actors. Finally, this nationalist end, and its potential success or failure, is profoundly influenced by the situatedness of the actor – they develop these ends within, and for, the context they find themselves in.

As such, the nationalism literature, especially the discursive approach to nationalism, provides important theoretical insights into the emergence and reproduction of nationalism. Relevantly to this study, however, the literature is weaker when considering the role of elites in the production and reproduction of nationalism, and this has seen this aspect of nationalism left under-theorised. The next section suggests that the entrepreneurship literature has much to offer regarding the
theorising of the role of elites in the contemporary reproduction of nationalism, and to the Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, as it accounts for the role of individual actors in the emergence of particular norms, and sees their role as being a function of ideational, altruistic, or empathetic reasons, instead of narrow instrumentalism.

A Survey of Some of the Dominant Approaches to the Entrepreneurship Literature

Entrepreneurship, as a concept, developed as a descriptor of behaviour in the market place, and has since then been fruitfully applied to multiple political and social contexts. The following section briefly outlines this development, some of the areas that the term has been applied to, and makes the case for why entrepreneurship is a useful theoretical framework to describe Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. Mintrom (2000, 86) surveys the theorisation of entrepreneurship as a market process from the 18th century, and concludes that the figure of the entrepreneur ‘is best thought of as a market maker. The entrepreneur attempts to respond to unmet needs, or to meet needs that are currently being met, but to do so in a way that leads to greater satisfaction at the same cost, or the same level of satisfaction at lower cost.’ In the process, however, successful entrepreneurs change previous patterns of trade, which might attract a counter-response from rivals. Note, however, that due to imperfect knowledge, there is always the possibility of failure. The successful entrepreneur must be sensitive to such developments and work with their team and network to advance their trade (Mintrom 2000, 111).

This entrepreneurship literature has been employed by political scientists working within the area of public policy to explain actions of certain prominent and influential actors in the policy process. Kingdon (1995, 179) identifies these actors as policy entrepreneurs, those ‘...willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits.’ Policy entrepreneurs act during ‘policy windows’ - those moments when the opportunity to address a pet issue or push a pet solution opens up (Kingdon 1995, 165-168). Mintrom and Norman 2009, 650-654) further develop the concept of policy entrepreneurship by identifying certain characteristics they must display in order to be successful. Whilst the following may not always be equally important in differing circumstances, these attributes include possessing good social acuity by making use of policy networks and being sensitive towards, and responding to, the motives, beliefs and ideas of those within the policy context; effective problem definition to organise in certain perspectives and options, and organise out others; the ability to work within teams and employ networks to canvass multiple skill and
expertise resources and garner support for proposals; and finally, leadership by example to signal their genuine commitment to a proposal (Mintrom and Norman 2009, 652-654).

Entrepreneurship has also been applied by scholars in areas such as the law (Sunstein 1997) and international relations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Young 1991), particularly in regards to the emergence of norms. Norms for Sunstein (1997, 38-39) are systems of approved and prohibited behaviour, sustained by social sanction and the law. Norm entrepreneurs can exploit situations where norms become challenged or unviable, and create ‘norm bandwagons’, where people who do not believe in a norm, but comply with it due to sanction, support the actions of norm entrepreneurs and effect change (Sunstein 1997, 47-48). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) apply some of these ideas to the realm of international relations, and theorise the life cycle of international norms: norm emergence → norm cascade → internalisation of the norm. Norm entrepreneurs frame issues for reasons of empathy, altruism and ideational commitment, and are ‘...critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even “create” issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897-898). Norm entrepreneurs work from appropriate and strategic platforms to create a ‘tipping point’ where a critical mass of nation-states adopt new norms and become norm leaders, which leads to a norm cascade, where the norm is increasingly adopted by the rest of the world, who then become norm followers (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 899-902). After this point, international norms may become internalised, and assume a ‘taken for granted’ value status (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 904). As such, norm theory provides a finer grained description of the role of entrepreneurs and their role in the adoption of certain social and political norms. Finally, Young (1991) has applied the entrepreneurship literature to the study of political leadership in the international sphere, identifying entrepreneurial leadership as part of a schema that also includes structural and intellectual leadership. Entrepreneurial leaders set agendas, popularise ideas, devise innovative solutions to problems, and broker deals (Young 1991, 294).

The entrepreneurship literature is relevant to the analysis of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac because it provides a more nuanced perspective on the engagement of elites with nationalist discourses. Such an observation has been implicitly advanced by Brubaker (1996; 1998), who identifies ‘political entrepreneurs’ who have engaged with nationalism in the entrepreneurial sense identified above in former-Soviet states. However, Brubaker does not develop this observation further in order to flesh out the theorisation of the role of these actors in the operation of nationalism. I advance that the entrepreneurship literature offers a deeper insight. It reveals that
the actors working towards change (whatever that change may entail) are not simply cynical manipulators working towards instrumental ends like power, prestige, or wealth accumulation, that are exogenous to their purported cause. Instead, entrepreneurs display a sincere commitment to the normative end they are pursuing. They are astute observers, sensitive to their context and willing to work with, and respond to, the desires and beliefs of others. Finally, entrepreneurs work towards the adoption of new ways of doing things, whether that be the creation of new markets, policies or norms. In the process, they alter, or even destroy, old ways of doing things, which may create resistance, and may be unsuccessful. As has already be sketched in the introduction, and will be demonstrated throughout the thesis, such a perspective is analogous with the Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and the role they have played in Anzac’s resurgence.

Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis
This chapter now turns to addressing why critical discourse analysis is a fruitful methodological approach to the research question. The following section provides an overview of CDA, and sets out why this methodological approach addresses the gap in the literature regarding Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. As has been shown, previous studies of Anzac and Prime Ministerial language do not simultaneously address the social and political context of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac and provide systematic linguistic analysis of their language. Nor do these studies apply an analysis over time in order to identify trends and make comparisons between Prime Ministers. CDA researchers, especially those informed by the work of Fairclough (see Fairclough 1995; Fairclough 2005; and Fairclough, Cortese and Ardizzone 2007), pay close attention to both the textual representation of language and discourse and to the social and political context which produces those texts. It is a primarily qualitative approach, but has also been supplemented with quantitative corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach that adopts some of the quantitative methods of corpus linguistics, particularly lexical frequency and distribution, in order to explore a corpus and reinforce the validity of findings (Bayley 2007; Duguid 2007). This epistemological approach is informed by an ontology that views language as socially constructed. As such, CDA provides the thesis with a novel and insightful approach to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, as it addresses both the linguistic features of their textual representation of Anzac and the social and political context that influences this textual representation.

The Variety of Discourse Analysis
There is a wide variety of approaches to discourse analysis, with CDA being one amongst many. Phillips and Hardy (2002) have organised these approaches into four broad categories, organised
according to their relative focus on context vs. text and constructivism vs. criticism. The categories are interpretative structuralism, social linguistic analysis, critical linguistic analysis and critical discourse analysis. Very briefly:

Social linguistic analysis is constructivist and text-based...Interpretative structuralism focuses on the analysis of the social context and the discourse that supports it...Critical discourse analysis focuses on the role of discursive activity in constituting and sustaining unequal power relations...Critical linguistic analysis also focuses on individual texts, but with a strong interest in the dynamics of power that surround the text... (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, 22-7).

CDA has been chosen as the approach to this thesis from amongst these options because it combines the study of the social and political context and examination of the texts that produce and are produced by this context. As shown earlier in this chapter, there has been a lack of study into the textual representation of Anzac and Australian national identity by Australian Prime Ministers, with examination of the social and political context dominating. When textual analysis has been conducted in the study of Australian political language, it has tended to focus upon the rhetorical patterns and strategies of political actors, to the neglect of the structural patterns that influence these patterns. CDA has been chosen for this thesis because it offers a way to tackle the research question that is lacking in the identified literature, leading to a fuller account of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.

Defining CDA
There are a number of forms of CDA. This variety is hardly surprising considering the discipline’s commitment to a diversity of approaches and theoretical perspectives. In fact, an interdisciplinary and multi-method approach has been championed by many of the major figures within the discipline (see Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough, 2005; Van Dijk 2001; Wodak 2001a; Wodak and Matouschek 1993). Wodak argues that the critical commitment of the approach renders it inherently interdisciplinary: ‘[p]roblems in our societies are too complex to be studied from a single perspective’ (Wodak, 2004, 199). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) follow a similar line of thought when they contend that to formalise the approach would impede the ability of CDA to effectively analyse a wide variety of changing social practices and their operation. This commitment to diversity and interdisciplinary cooperation involves adapting the approach to the research problem and rejecting the compartmentalised nature of disciplines within academia.

An institutionalised or classic definition of CDA is therefore absent from the literature, a result of the diversity of influences and methodological approaches, and the stated desire to make the method interdisciplinary. Despite this, the general aims of CDA are fairly set, with the manner one tackles
the research question being more contentious than the actual aspirations of the approach. CDA aims:

...to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony (Fairclough, 1995, 3).

The connection between the first sphere of social practices and the social world, and the second sphere of text, and the commitment to the critical investigation of the interaction of these two elements when exploring power relationships, helps to explain the nature of CDA.

CDA’s approach to power is sensitive to the interplay between agency and structure. As Fairclough (2005, 8-9) argues, ‘...texts have causal effects upon, and contribute to changes in, people (beliefs, attitudes, etc.), actions, social relations, and the material world’. However, this causal effect is contingent – the success of texts in bringing about social change is dependent on any number of context specific processes, events, and actors (Fairclough 2007, 10-14). As such, a reductively constructivist view of language that sees texts as constituting politics is rejected by CDA theorists. Fairclough (2005, 8-9) contends that we need to distinguish here between construction and construal; whilst actors may be able to construe the social world via discourse, they cannot automatically construct it. To construct the social world would not only require control over dominant discourses but other factors like people’s acceptance and internalisation of such discourses. Thus, this view rejects simplistic reductivism regarding the structural power of discourse, and instead argues that in order to understand the power of language and discourse, a researcher must pay attention to the agency of those who attempt to mobilise such discourses.

Such insight is crucial to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. Whilst Prime Ministers have enormous agency regarding the construal of discourses surrounding Anzac via their access to the power resources of the state, they do not inevitably constitute the social and political world. Nor can they construe their Anzac discourses as they please – the socio-political situation that Prime Ministers find themselves in means they have a limited repertoire of textual and discursive tools at their disposal if they are to successfully engage with Anzac and avoid sanction. CDA’s ontology and epistemology thus compels the researcher to pay attention to the interplay of agency and structure in the relationship between Prime Ministerial Anzac Day texts, discourses, and the social and political context that this occurs within.
A Methodological Approach to CDA

As noted, CDA is a heterogeneous method. Wodak et al (2009) identify four broad schools of CDA: the Dutch, German, Vienna, and British schools. The Vienna and British schools are of particular relevance to this study. The Vienna School is centred on the work of Ruth Wodak and has a strong basis in sociolinguistics. It has developed a methodology which they have described as the discourse-historical approach (Wodak 2001b). This approach is quite intensive and seeks to incorporate ‘...systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text...’ (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 266). To this end, a system of ‘triangulation’ has been employed by researchers in the field, involving the incorporation of ‘...various interdisciplinary, methodological and source-specific approaches to investigate a particular discourse phenomenon’ (De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999, 157). Although triangulation is not a formal model with a consolidated approach, it does suggest that superior findings will be obtained if a research question is approached from more than one theoretical or methodological angle. Leading on from this, the discourse-historical approach utilises a four-layered conception of ‘context’ which takes into account grand theories, middle-level theories, discourse theory and linguistic analysis when examining texts (see Wodak 2001b; Wodak 2004). Its areas of investigation have included studies of racism and anti-Semitism, and analyses of national discourses in Austria and the European Union (Wodak 2004; Wodak et al 2009). The discourse-historical approach of the Vienna school has been adopted by this thesis, as its emphasis upon the historical root of discourse accounts for trends, continuities, changes and comparisons in the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. In addition, its call for triangulation has guided the thesis’ adoption of a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the research question.

The British School of CDA has been enormously influenced by the work of Fairclough. Areas of research for this school have included analysis of the language of ‘New Capitalism’ and in particular, the discourse associated with Tony Blair and New Labour (see Fairclough, 2000). The British school uses a three-dimensional model of CDA based on the following:

Discourse, and any specific instance of discursive practice, is seen as simultaneously (i) a language text, spoken or written, (ii) discourse practice (text production and text interpretation), (iii) sociocultural practice. Furthermore, a piece of discourse is embedded within sociocultural practice at a number of levels; in the immediate situation, in the wider institution or organization, and at a societal level... The method of discourse analysis includes linguistic description of the language text, interpretation of the relationship between (productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the social process (Fairclough 1995, 97).
Fairclough has been particularly interested in using CDA to study the discursive nature of social change (see Fairclough 1992; Fairclough, Cortese and Ardizzone 2007), and has argued that many of the social changes that have occurred during recent decades, especially those associated with the introduction of ‘New Capitalism’, have also involved attempts to re-engineer ‘language practices’ (Fairclough 1992, 6). Further, ‘...it is perhaps one indication of the growing importance of language in social and cultural change that attempts to engineer the direction of change increasingly include attempts to change language practices’ (Fairclough 1992, 6). It is therefore important that a component of the study of social change should include a focus on discourse and its evolution.

Fairclough has also been particularly interested in developing CDA as social research methodology and promoting it as a viable research method for writers outside linguistics (Fairclough 1995; Fairclough, 2005). This has involved a shift away from a Foucauldian tendency to consider the content of a discourse without considering its textual basis. Fairclough contends that:

> [t]he premise of this argument is that the sorts of social and cultural phenomena that such analysts are orientated towards are realized in textural properties of texts in ways which make them extraordinarily sensitive indicators of sociocultural processes, relations, and change. Social and cultural analyses can only be enriched by this textural evidence, which is partly linguistic and partly intertextual – partly a matter of how links between one text and other texts and text types are inscribed in the surface of the text. At issue here is the classical problem of the relationship between the form and content. My contention is that no analysis of text content and meaning can be satisfactory which fails to attend to what one might call the content of texture (or, the content of its form) (Fairclough, 1995, 4-5).

Fairclough argues that there should be no ‘either/or’ between research which focuses on the textual features of a discourse, but is relatively ignorant of social theoretical issues, and a methodology which may engage with these issues, but fails to address the linguistic features of a text (Fairclough, 2005). This view has had a profound influence upon the thesis, and has informed its concern to examine both the textual representation of Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac, and the political and social forces that have influenced these texts.

This desire to promote CDA as a viable methodology for researchers interested in social theory and change has led Fairclough to be one of the few figures in CDA to attempt to enunciate a detailed methodology for the lay reader (see Fairclough, 2005). A summation of the methodological considerations a researcher might take into consideration in textual analysis is as follows (Fairclough 2005, 191-194):
Social events

Social events ‘constitute what is actual’ (Fairclough 2005, 223). They are influenced by social structure, practices and actors. Texts constitute part of social events, and are influenced and mediated by social structure and actors, though not in an automatic manner.

Genre

The genre of texts is ‘...realized in actional meanings and forms of a text’ and they can vary in terms of their institutionalisation and stability (Fairclough 2005, 66-67). Genres can link together in genre-chains (the linking together of various genres such as the press release and the interview) and their degree of fixity or hybridity with other genres.

Difference

Fairclough is here interested in how social difference is textually represented. Is it open to difference; does it emphasise difference and conflict; does it attempt to overcome difference; or does it close off or deny/supress difference in favour of a focus on consensus or solidarity (Fairclough 2005, 41-42)? Analysis of difference can shed light on the politics of identity and how particular forms of politics claim universality (Fairclough 2005, 40-41).

Intertextuality

Intertextuality involves having some qualitative awareness of what other texts and voices may be relevant to the text under analysis. Having this awareness allows the researcher to pay attention to which texts and voices are included or are excluded and absent in a text (Fairclough 2005, 47).

Assumptions

Assumptions pervade texts, as meaning is communicated via shared understandings. Assumptions can also be ideological and value-based, and can thus reveal much about the politics being conveyed in a text (Fairclough 2005, 55).

Semantic/grammatical relations between sentences and clauses

In this instance, Fairclough (2005, 87-89) especially notes semantic and grammatical relations that re/produce power, legitimation, and equivalence or difference, at the level of sentence and clause. Semantic relations between sentence and clause may be causal, conditional, temporal, additive, elaborative, or contrastive/concessive. Grammatical relations may be paratactic, hypotactic or embedded.
**Exchanges, speech functions and grammatical mood**

Exchanges refer to the typology of speech interaction between actors; speech functions reveal purpose of the speech (such as statements of fact, evaluation, prediction etc.); and a text’s tone (declarative, interrogative or imperative) is conveyed by its grammatical mood (Fairclough 2005, 105-116).

**Discourses**

This involves identifying the discourses, and the features of discourses, being drawn upon in texts, in particular, identifying the main themes of the discourse, and the perspective (or point of view) of the discourse. This may also involve textual analysis which notes semantic relations, grammatical features, metaphors, assumptions etc. (Fairclough 2005, 193).

**Representations of social events**

Linked to the analysis of discourse is the examination of how social events are represented. This involves both textual analysis and examination of social events. It pays attention to what is included or excluded regarding the social and political sphere, and how this represented (Fairclough 2005, 193).

**Styles**

Style is ‘...the discoursal aspect of ways of being, identities’ (Fairclough 2005, 159. They may include features such as body language, pronunciation, vocabulary etc.

**Modality**

Modality is the examination of what people commit themselves to in their texts, the degree to which they commit themselves, and how that is represented textually (Fairclough 2005, 165-171).

**Evaluation**

Finally, by evaluation Fairclough (2005, 171) means the values the text producer communicates and is committed to.

Not all of these features of the method of CDA will be drawn upon equally in the thesis. For example, the focus of the thesis is upon Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and statements, where the speech act is conducted by a single actor to an audience that does not interact with the speaker. Thus, speech exchange analysis is redundant. But with that exception, these elements all
feature at some point throughout the thesis, though they will receive varying levels of emphasis as it progresses and deals with different social events, actors and practices.

The Corpus and Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis

The approach to CDA outlined so far has been qualitative in nature. In keeping with the stated commitment to triangulation, the thesis applies quantitative analysis as well. This takes the form of corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach to CDA informed by corpus linguistics (Bayley 2007). Corpus assisted discourse analysis claims ‘...that a selection of texts can first be studied through concordance software which provides information on, for example, lexical frequencies and distributions, regularities and irregularities in collocation patterns and thus patterns of meaning’ (Bayley 2007, 55). As such, corpus assisted discourse analysis can be used usefully in conjunction with CDA as it offers, firstly, an introductory insight into the corpus before conducting finer grained qualitative analysis; and secondly, it serves to offer further empirical verification of qualitative analysis. Corpus assisted discourse analysis has primarily been used in Chapter 3 to introduce the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and statements with frequency and distribution analysis, but also features as the Prime Minister’s Anzac address style is introduced.

Regarding the corpus itself, it consists of 23 speeches and 10 media statements or releases, conducted by Prime Ministers between 1973 and 2007. It consists of over 15000 words, which makes it a small corpus, but to the best knowledge of the author, it represents every Prime Ministerial Anzac Day address and statement given during this period. Thus, we are dealing with a population and will employ descriptive statistics, as the need for inferential statistics is void. The collation of this corpus is an endeavour that has not been attempted before in the literature, and it contains speeches and addresses that have received little or no attention from scholars. Source material has been derived from the PM Transcripts Archive hosted by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Prime Ministerial libraries of Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke and Keating, the Prime Minister’s website at pm.gov.au, the PANDORA web archive, the National Archives of Australia, material hosted at aph.gov.au, and from collated speech publications (see Appendix). The corpus has been cross-checked with newspaper reports regarding Anzac Day in order to ensure comprehensive coverage of these materials.

The selection of sources required a degree of judgement. The necessity of the selection of most sources was clear, as their delivery was on Anzac Day and their subject matter was primarily on

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4 This is primarily associated with the early speeches – Fraser (1979), Hawke (1986a), and Hawke (1989).
Anzac and its meaning. Others were not given on Anzac Day, but directly addressed Anzac themes, and their close proximity to the date of 25 April has thus also seen their selection (see Hawke 1989; and Keating 1993a). Speeches and media releases given on Anzac Day, but not directly and substantively on Anzac, have been omitted, as have speeches substantively on Australia’s war remembrance delivered on dates other than Anzac Day, such as Remembrance Day or anniversaries of significant war dates like Victory in the Pacific Day.

Conclusion: CDA and the Study of Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac

This thesis draws upon the methodological approach of CDA, especially that of Fairclough (1995; 2005), as the basis for the investigation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. The methodological approach has been adopted for ontological and epistemological reasons. The ontological assumption of the thesis, subsequently empirically demonstrated, is that the production and reproduction of Prime Ministerial language regarding Anzac has not been a naturally or organically occurring phenomenon. On the contrary, it has been a political process, whereby Prime Ministers have actively construed language for ends aligned with their agendas of government. But this process has not occurred in a vacuum, and simplistic assumptions regarding the ability of elites to hegemonically impose their views upon the Australian public fail to account for the very real limits on such courses of action. As such, CDA demands an epistemological approach that examines both the textual reproduction of Anzac and the social and political context that this production occurs in, in order to more fully account for the interplay between agency and structure surrounding Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.

Further, CDA’s emphasis upon triangulation encourages a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of language. This approach has been adopted in the thesis in order to address the research question more systematically than has been attempted by researchers before. Regarding methodology then, the thesis augments the method of CDA outlined above by Fairclough with the discourse-historical approach to the development of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, in order to better account for change over time and differences between Prime Ministers. It has also collated a comprehensive corpus of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and media statements and supplements the primarily qualitative textual analysis method of Fairclough (2005) with quantitative corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach which enhances the validity of claims made regarding the evolution of Prime Ministerial narratives of Anzac. I argue that such an approach, given the gap in the literature regarding the study of Prime Ministerial language surrounding Anzac, provides an appropriate method that accounts for the interplay between social
and political forces, discourse, and text that make up Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and provides compelling empirical evidence and data to back the analysis.
CHAPTER 3

The Prime Ministerial Turn to Anzac: Exploring the Shift

This chapter serves as an overview of the thesis by firstly sketching the causality behind the Anzac entrepreneurship of Australian Prime Ministers, and secondly, by outlining the broad textual characteristics of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over the time period of 1973 - 2007. This approach is informed by the discourse-historical method outlined in Chapter 2, and seeks to incorporate a rich and as inclusive as possible analysis of the relevant background and context to Anzac entrepreneurship by Prime Ministers.

In the first section, I examine the broad socio-political context that Prime Ministers engaging with Anzac have operated within. Process tracing (see Bennett 2010; George and Bennett 2005; Roberts 1996) is employed to examine four potential hypotheses for the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac. These hypotheses are:

1. Distance in time: this explanation posits that the increasing distance from the conflicts and horrors of the original Anzac Day cleared the air enough for Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac.

2. Vietnam reconciliation: this hypothesis suggests that the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac is a consequence of the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian community after the bitter divisions of the Vietnam War.

3. Nationalism as tradition: this account of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac draws upon ethno-symbolism, and explains the turn as a product of Australian national myths, symbols, values and memories (Smith 2001, 57).

4. Nationalism entrepreneurship: this explanation characterises the Prime Ministerial shift to Anzac as a function of the nationalism of the Prime Ministers and the efficacy of nationalism as a political strategy.

Having considered the persuasiveness of these potential accounts, I conclude that none can solely explain the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac. The explanations are cumulative, meaning that the shift towards Anzac can only be explained as the outcome of the aggregation of these factors.
The chapter then provides an overview of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, 1973 – 2007. It does so by exploring the changing characteristics of that engagement and providing an assessment of the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. This section of the chapter employs corpus assisted discourse analysis of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses from 1973 (in particular, analysis of frequency and distribution) in order to sketch its imprecise, but increasingly institutionalised and consistent, genre boundaries. In doing so, it seeks to identify the situation and themes of these addresses and how they have changed over time. Since 1990, Australian Prime Ministers and their governments have increasingly engaged with Anzac in a manner that has supplanted the traditional role of the RSL as the custodian of Anzac (Lake 2010, 139; Inglis 2008, 554-555). This has involved them consistently giving Anzac Day addresses, both at home and at significant sites of Australian war remembrance overseas, in a form that is often characterised by high rhetoric and nationalism. But, as will be shown, this has not always been the case. Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac in the period prior to 1990 was more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular. Further, Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses have not always been solely, or even primarily, about the significance of Anzac in Australia’s national life, with some more closely resembling a policy speech. Over time, the conventions of these addresses have coagulated, and have begun to demonstrate a significant degree of rhetorical path dependency (Grube 2014).

The chapter aims to preface the analysis of the individual Prime Ministers that follows in the remainder of the thesis by conducting these two tasks. Having established the causal reasons behind the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac, and having sketched the characteristics of the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, we can more clearly see the operation and evolution of both these features. Such a task is crucial because, as has been identified in Chapter 2, the existing literature on Anzac has not included systematic qualitative and quantitative analysis of either of these elements.

**Tracing the Prime Ministerial Adoption of Anzac**

As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, the casual explanation for the emergence of nationalism is a contested field (see Özkırımlı 2000; Dahbour 2009). The competing explanations for the emergence of nationalism as caused by the bottom-up socio-cultural processes of ethno-symbolism, the top down functionalism of modernism, or the discursive representation of nation offer important, but incomplete, insights in the case of Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac. In this case, nationalism is operationalised by entrepreneurs – political and cultural elites who are cognisant of the public’s desire for unifying symbols of nation and who utilise their access to the power resources their elite
positions offer to supply and encourage that desire. Entrepreneurs’ reasons for doing so can be characterised as partly motivated by the instrumental possibilities that such an adoption offers and partly due to genuine identification with the form of nationalism they are promoting. The following section will outline competing hypotheses regarding the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac, and will demonstrate that whilst a combination of bottom-up and top-down factors were at play, it is the combination of these factors in the context of nationalism entrepreneurship that is crucial.

This first section of the chapter argues that certain insufficient, but necessary, causal preconditions needed to be met before Anzac became an acceptable political discourse fit for use by Prime Ministers. Roberts’ (1996, 291) concept of cumulative colligation will be employed to explain the workings of the multiple hypotheses, that being “[t]racing the [cumulative] steps by which changes in the structure of society come about”, where structure is taken to mean repeated social and cultural discursive actions. Mackie’s (1965, 245; emphasis in the original) ‘INUS’ condition, where a cause is ‘...an insufficient, but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result’ will be employed to demonstrate the inadequacies of the explanations in isolation, but their explanatory power in conjunction. Noting that political elites are constrained in their ability to mobilise forms of nationalism that fail to gel with the community, this section argues that the distance in time, Vietnam reconciliation, and nationalism as tradition explanations, all needed to be fulfilled as necessary bottom-up conditions before Prime Ministers could adopt Anzac and employ nationalism entrepreneurship after 1990.

**Distance in Time**

It has become a common explanation for the more general rise of Anzac to be attributed to the increasing temporal distance from the original Anzac Day (see Seal 2004, 4; McKenna 2010, 118; Inglis 2008, 413). Whilst none of these authors deal directly with the question of whether this influenced Prime Ministers in their use of Anzac, a plausible summation can be made – the increasing distance from the original landings at Gallipoli has tempered the bitter memories associated with WWI. The memory of the 60 000 men killed during the war is lessened as they become names on memorials rather than lost loved ones. The broken diggers who made it home have passed on and have taken their painful memories with them, and the bitter partisan divisions over the conscription referendums have become historical facts, rather than lived memories. Perhaps more importantly, the temporal distance from the tensions and hostility of the Vietnam era has similarly lessened the rawness of that conflict as well. Finally, as the diggers have passed, the RSL has lost much of its raison d’être as a lobby group, and much of its power. This has lessened the
impact of their oftentimes conservative lobbying and has attracted less opposition as a consequence. The tempering of these bitter hostilities has left a relatively uncontroversial, even sacralised, version of Anzac, uncontentious to those young enough to never to have experienced the above, and free for the taking by political elites.

Whilst plausible, the distance in time explanation fails to adequately explain the steps between creating a space to reincorporate Anzac and Anzac being hegemonic. There is nothing inherent about the ageing of ex-servicemen and women or the increasing distance from the original Anzac Day that suggests that Anzac will increase its hegemonic place in conceptions of Australianness. It is just as plausible that as diggers faded into history, their central place in nationalist history, official public life, and thus reproduction in nationalist discourse, would fade as well. In fact, the possibility that Anzac would die out was noted by those who aligned their sense of self with Anzac, and those who opposed it, during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s (Curran and Ward 2010, 197; Macleod 2002). The parades were smaller as diggers aged and passed away, and the crowds watching became thinner too. For example, the Canberra Times reported in 1979 that the small NSW town of Gundaroo ‘forgot’ to commemorate Anzac Day, as there was no one left interested in keeping the tradition alive (Canberra Times 1979, 1), and The Age noted the thin and quiet crowd of 20000 at the 1975 Melbourne Anzac Day parade while 77000 watched football (Lewis 1975, 4). As such, the distance in time hypothesis fails to sufficiently explain how the reinscription of the centrality of Anzac in the national lexicon occurred and why Prime Ministers subsequently adopted it.

On its own, then, the distance in time explanation remains an insufficient explanation of how the reproduction and re-imagination of Anzac evolved from a problematised state during the period around and after the Vietnam War, to one of hegemonic and uncritical celebration, suitable for engagement by entrepreneurial Prime Ministers. Having said that, temporal distance remains a crucial element in the reinscription of Anzac - distance from the original horrors of WWI and the divisiveness of the Vietnam War tempered the pain and acrimony of those conflicts as citizens who never experienced these divisions began to take their place in the public sphere. This temporal distance created the necessary space for reconciliation, healing, and reincorporation of Anzac into Australian nationalist discourse.

Vietnam Reconciliation

The second plausible and cumulative causal explanation for the increasing engagement with Anzac by Australian Prime Ministers rises out of the questions raised above regarding the problematisation
of Anzac during and after the Vietnam War - the *Vietnam reconciliation* explanation. It argues that the hostility to militarism that was demonstrated in the campaign against the Vietnam War continued among the new-left social movements and their sympathisers during the 1970s and 1980s, and consequently also began to affect Anzac. Anzac Day attendances were down, the imperial link that Anzac represented was being over-taken by the independent and somewhat parochial ‘new nationalism’ of the Whitlam government (Curran and Ward 2010; Alomes 1988), and by the early 1980s radical feminists, and sporadically, other movements, were staging protests at Anzac Day parades and ceremonies (Twomey 2013). Anzac fell out of favour with the public, and with the government, as the nation’s sense of nationalism evolved.

As a consequence of these changes, Vietnam veterans were largely ignored by both the public and by the government, and little was initially done to memorialise their failed war (Inglis 2008, 363). Doyle (2002, 78) notes that for the veteran community this was tantamount to betrayal:

> [T]he Australian [Vietnam] veteran’s status as a genuine veteran, an authentic ‘digger’, had been made contingent on the way the nation had come to view the ‘history’ of its engagement in Vietnam after the fact...this ‘history’ had robbed them of their rightful place as validated third-wave Anzacs...

From the early 1980s onwards, however, veteran anger at this marginalisation led them to pressure the government for recognition of their sacrifice and continued suffering. In response, a welcome home parade was staged in 1987 and a national memorial to Vietnam veterans was completed in 1992. Whilst these acts represented reconciliation between the veteran community and the wider public, this reconciliation was unpolitical (Schaap 2005), as its form of restoring veterans to their rightful place in the story of Anzac meant that contestation of Anzac, as had occurred in the 1960s – 1980s, was no longer acceptable. To do so would open old wounds and dishonour the sacrifice and suffering of the veterans who had served. As such, Anzac becomes incontestable, sacred, essential and unpolitical – ripe for the taking by entrepreneurial Prime Ministers prone to instrumental uses of nationalism, and also applying bottom-up pressure on Prime Ministers from the veteran community to include their story into a newly reinstated Anzac nationalist narrative (see Chapter 4, and Schaap (2005), for discussion of unpolitical reconciliation).

The *Vietnam reconciliation* casual explanation is again a necessary element of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, but not a sufficient explanation of this shift. It is necessary as it is the tipping point where Anzac shifts from being contested to being unpolitical. Without the unpolitical reconciliation of Vietnam veterans and the body-politic, Anzac would have remained a hotly contested and divisive
form of Australian nationalism, unsuitable for the unifying discourse of nationalism that leaders of liberal-democratic states find so useful (Norman 2004, 87). To put it another way, the unifying and cohesive discourse of nationalism provides leaders with a language to mollify the competing interests of a pluralistic society and mobilise support for policy action. Attempts by Prime Ministers to use Anzac in this manner have been more or less explicit, and have been more or less controversial, but have only become common, since reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. This event therefore represents the moment in time when a new norm regarding an unpolitical Anzac emerged and began to become internalised.

However, Vietnam reconciliation is not a sufficient explanation of causality, as the focus of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses has remained the Gallipoli campaign. The Vietnam War, and the difficulties Vietnam veterans faced upon their return home from war (Doyle 2002; Ross 2009), remained a little mentioned feature of Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses, being cited infrequently in their speeches. When Vietnam was mentioned, it appeared primarily in a ‘check-list’ of Australian war commitments to be honoured, along with WWI, WWII, Korea and contemporary deployments. Thus, the reconciled and unpolitical Anzac ushered in by Vietnam veterans did not accompany a reimagining of Anzac that placed these veterans at its centre. Liberal-democratic leaders’ desire for a unifying discourse of nationalism is instructive here (Norman 2004) – despite reconciliation, the divisions of Vietnam still remained fresh in the living and popular memory of the body politic and thus served as a poor tool for cohesion by leaders.

In sum, the Vietnam reconciliation explanation demonstrates how Anzac became unpolitical and sacralised, as reconciliation was necessary if Prime Ministers were to engage with Anzac entrepreneurially. However, it remains an insufficient causal explanation as to why they chose to do so – the reconciled Anzac as utilised by Prime Ministers has not seen the honouring of Vietnam veterans as a primary or significant element of their engagement with Anzac. As such, it is one more cumulative element in the bottom-up and essential INUS preconditions of why Prime Ministers adopted Anzac after 1990.

**Nationalism as Tradition**

The third cumulative causal explanation for the increasing use of Anzac by Australian Prime Ministers is *nationalism as tradition*. This explanation draws heavily on the nationalism literature, especially ethno-symbolism, and emphasises the cultural role of public myth, memory, values, symbols and occasion (Smith 2001, 57-61), in contrast to the modernists’ explanation of nationalism.
as being a functional or instrumental expression of modernism. It argues that nationalism is a product of the everyday expression and reproduction of the nation in the discourse of the public (Billig 1995), and that elites, such as Prime Ministers, are powerfully constrained in their ability to mobilise or shape forms of nationalism that sit uncomfortably with popular understandings of nation. In this mould, Kapferer (1988, 121) notes ‘Australia Day is the day of the state, whereas Anzac Day is the day of the nation.’ More concretely, the nationalism as tradition explanation points to the extraordinary rise of Anzac and its observance amongst the public, and especially young Australians, since about 1990 - the increasing attendances on Anzac Day, the backpacking ‘pilgrims’ to Gallipoli, and the explosion of memorial construction after 1990 to an extent unseen since the 1920s (Inglis 2008, 471). All these factors point to the rise of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac as being their response to the cultural pressure to include the story of Anzac in their narratives of Australian identity and nationalism.

The nationalism as tradition explanation, like the previous explanations, is a necessary, but not sufficient causal reason for the adoption of Anzac from 1990. It is a necessary explanation of Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac for the reasons outlined above – if nationalism entrepreneurs want to successfully evangelise their version of nationalism, then they are much more likely to succeed if they do so in a manner that resonates with the community. The Bicentenary and the Centenary of Federation, where political elites attempted to mobilise the nation around a national occasion and largely failed, provide instructive contrasting cases. Both these occasions either failed to excite the public’s imagination (in the case of the Centenary of Federation) or failed to provide a unifying and politically neutralised discourse of nation (the Bicentenary) and have thus failed to resonate with the same sense of genuineness that Anzac appears to have for those Australians who attend Anzac Day parades, pilgrimage to Gallipoli for the dawn service, or play two-up at the local pub on the April 25th public holiday. Kapferer’s observation regarding the official, state-led nature of Australia Day can be employed to help explain much of this failure - overtly civic forms of nationalism remain largely devoid of meaning for an Australian form of nationalism that emphasises values based upon egalitarianism and anti-authoritarianism. The Bicentenary, as an attempt at state nationalism, was thus doubly condemned – endorsed, and largely planned, by the state, it failed to resonate with those distrustful of nationalism’s state based excesses, and was also challenged and contested by Indigenous protesters and their supporters, who rejected a simple, neutral or triumphant expression of nationalism with the catch-cry “White Australia has a Black history” (Turner 1994, 87). Anzac (at least since reconciliation with Vietnam veterans) has not suffered from the same problems, aligned as it is with Australia’s hegemonic traditions of national selfhood.
However, *nationalism as tradition* remains an insufficient explanation for the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac. Crucially, the chronology of renewed public engagement with Anzac does not align to the *nationalism as tradition* explanation, as the enormous response by the public to Anzac occurs *after* 1990, not before. Some embryonic public revival of interest in Anzac was being generated in the 1980s via cultural icons like the film *Gallipoli* or Bill Gammage’s book *The Broken Years*, but this interest failed to translate into greatly increased crowd attendances to Anzac Day dawn services and marches during this period. The real explosion of interest occurs from 1990 onward after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans and, crucially, as the government becomes an entrepreneurial actor in the promotion of Anzac, with the precedential Hawke government’s role in the memorialisation of the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1990. This can be seen from the following graphs, which show Anzac Day parades and dawn service attendances in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra from 1960. The graphs report the percentage of the city’s population that has turned out to attend the dawn service or the march. This method has been chosen as it accounts for population change over time, and it therefore more accurately reflects shifts in attendance than the raw figures. World Values Survey data similarly reflects this trend in attitudes. Whilst not a direct measure of the Australian public’s endorsement of Anzac, the measure of the Australian public’s confidence in the armed forces serves to reinforce the idea that public had a more ambivalent view of the military before 1990, and that this view of the military began to improve after this point in time, and was especially ingrained by 2005.

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5 A few notes regarding the attendance graphs. Firstly, the attendance figures have come from newspaper reporting on Anzac Day. Importantly, these are estimates of the crowd attendance, and a degree of caution should therefore be exercised when interpreting the figures. Crowd estimates from these sources were reported to have come from police estimates, organiser estimates, or reporter estimates. The figures were taken from *The Sydney Morning Herald* (for Sydney), *The Age* (for Melbourne), and the *Canberra Times* (for Canberra) in the first instance. If figures were not reported in these sources, then *The Australian* was consulted. Again, if figures were not reported in *The Australian*, then the city’s tabloid newspapers were consulted next. Sometimes crowd figures have not been reported in any of these sources, and gaps are therefore present. The problem of missing data especially appears during the years when Anzac was problematised and contested during the 1970s and 1980s, when crowds were not newsworthy, or perhaps too embarrassingly small, to report. The percentage figure has been obtained by dividing the reported attendance figure by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2014 (catalogue number 3105.0.65.001) population figures for the relevant year.
Anzac Day march attendances dropped from highs in the early 1960s in all locations. Note that Melbourne newspapers stop reporting the march attendances after 2000, as the dawn service becomes the preeminent Anzac Day event. Both Sydney and Melbourne show signs of recovery especially from the mid-1990s, when considerable government investment in the promotion of war remembrance began. Canberra shows flatter attendances from the 1970s, as they decline from highs that represented over 20% of the population. Please note the use of different percentage scales in the graphs to more clearly represent the change in attendance over time.
Dawn service attendances demonstrate considerable growth during this period, as they have a self-replenishing sources of attendees, unlike the march which depends more significantly on service-people who have aged and passed on (Inglis 2008, 550). This growth once again begins during the 1990s, and especially after 2000. However, in all locations this growth does not match the march attendance highs of the 1960s. Please note the use of different percentage scales in the graphs to more clearly represent the change in attendance over time.

Figure 2 - City Attendances at Anzac Day Dawn Services, percentage of city population.
Figure 3 – The Australian Public’s Confidence in the Armed Forces, 1981 - 2012

Note the increase in confidence in the military over time, and the considerable drop in those reporting a lack of confidence in the military.

6 This graph has been generated using the World Values Survey Data Analysis Tool (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp).
The quantitative evidence regarding the improvement in public sentiment towards Anzac suggests that 1990 was the point where the new norms surrounding Anzac had started to become internalised by the public, and that the public was responding to the promotion of these new norms by political and cultural entrepreneurs. This demonstrates that Prime Ministers were not passively responding to public pressure, but were instead engendering this response by acting as entrepreneurs—recognising a public desire for symbols of nation and fulfilling it to massive success. This point can be further demonstrated by the fact that Hawke decided to go on the precedential Gallipoli trip in 1990 on the basis of the recommendation of Defence Minister Kim Beazely, who had in turn based his suggestion upon a single conversation with a veteran (Holbrook 2014, 173-174). This was not a case of the government responding to sustained pressure from the RSL, or the public generally. Thus, the nationalism as tradition hypothesis is the final bottom-up condition necessary for the adoption of Anzac by Australian Prime Ministers. It explains why a genuine feeling of nationalism amongst the public is a necessary precondition for leaders who seek to successfully employ a nationalist discourse, but it does not sufficiently and fully explain why Prime Ministers adopted Anzac. The answer to why Prime Ministers adopted Anzac is addressed by nationalism entrepreneurship.

Nationalism Entrepreneurship

The final, and necessary, explanation for the increasing engagement with Anzac by Prime Ministers is nationalism entrepreneurship. Critics of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, like those authors associated with What’s Wrong With Anzac? (2010), point to the role of the state in the resurgence of Anzac, and see political agendas behind the form that this state involvement has taken. Such a view is supported by parts of the nationalism literature, like Brass (1979) and Hobsbawn (2005), who view nationalism instrumentally, and tend to also see nationalism as being invented and accepted by a public unproblematically. However, as the discussion so far has demonstrated, Anzac has not developed in isolation from the public and been presented as fait accompli by elites. As Norman (2004, 94) notes, leaders and elites in liberal-democracies draw upon nationalist discourses in order to appeal to diverse and plural groups within a nation-state, but they cannot do so at will:

Political leaders in modern democracies obviously do not have the power to shape the national identities of citizens at will... They cannot control sources of information; political opponents and political commentators may react immediately to explicit signs of their “playing the nationalist card”; and there are real limits on the extent to which they can coerce and brainwash large portions of the populations... [I]n developed Western democracies today the power to influence people’s beliefs and sentiments in any realm...is much more dispersed and ‘decentralised’.
Australian Prime Ministers from Hawke onwards have acted as Anzac entrepreneurs, where nationalism has been used instrumentally, but that instrumental motivation has involved more than the pursuance of particular policy or power ends. These instrumental goals have also been bound up in the nationalist identities of these Anzac entrepreneurs — they wish to see their particular versions of national identity realised via these polices. This entrepreneurship has been sensitive to the context that it has operated within, and has responded to the desires of the public even as it has promoted Anzac. Prime Ministers have thus personally promoted Anzac at the textual level of national identity with their speeches, and enacted government policy to promote Anzac at the discursive and social practice level.

The increase in Anzac entrepreneurship at the textual level by Prime Ministers can be measured simply by noting the increase in Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses after Anzac becomes increasingly presented as unpolitical, following the reconciliation and reincorporation of Vietnam veterans (see Chapter 4). From 1989 - 2007, at least one speech or media statement has been made on every Anzac Day. In contrast, from 1973 – 1988 only two speeches and one media release were given by Prime Ministers. These speeches have provided a unifying discourse of nation, rich in meaning for the present, and leading from that, an instrumental discourse for bolstering support for policy action. Anzac is a powerful unifying discourse because of its unpolitical nature after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans and because of its strongly felt resonance within the community and therefore has been employed effectively to appeal to unity, a sense of purpose, and serve as a lesson for the present.

There is much evidence to support the nationalism entrepreneurship explanation in relation to government policy that promotes Anzac at the discursive and social practice level. The first is the largess of government funding for memorial construction and the increase in activity which has occurred in that regard, beginning in the 1980s (Inglis, 2008, 381-389), and before the public began to respond to Anzac en masse (see Chapter 4). The second is the government’s willingness to memorialise significant anniversaries – Hawke’s trip to Gallipoli for the 75th landing anniversary of the landings in 1990, the Australia Remembers program of the mid-1990s marking the end of the Second World War, and Howard’s visits to Gallipoli for the 85th and 90th anniversaries. The third is the increased funding of those federal agencies and departments that play a key role in memorialisation, as seen in Figure 4.
Government funding of war remembrance

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian War Memorial</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Veterans Affairs</td>
<td>5.4*</td>
<td>6.1*</td>
<td>10.4*</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 4 – Federal Government Funding of War Remembrance, 1981/82 – 2004/05

As can be seen, government funding of the Australian War Memorial increased significantly over the time period, including significant funding for redevelopment. Government funding of the Commemorative Activities budget of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) also saw significant increase over time, and an expansion of its commemorative role beyond its original function of maintaining Australian war graves. Finally, there is the education programs for schools that the DVA funds, sending educational materials on Anzac and Gallipoli to schools nationwide (Lake, 2010). All these factors provide evidence for the extensive government promotion of Anzac, which provided the regular and ongoing reproduction of nationalism which is essential to the maintenance of conceptions of nationality. This promotion by political elites has helped to further internalise the norms of Anzac.

Prime Ministerial discourses of national identity, and their linked policies of Anzac promotion, illuminate the final cumulative, and necessary (but not in itself sufficient) causal reason behind the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac as being a function of their nationalism entrepreneurship. This, combined with the cumulative preconditions of the previous explanations, comprehensively demonstrate the causal reasons behind the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac as a central nationalist discourse post-1990 – the ground had been set by distance in time, Vietnam.

7 Figures have been adjusted for inflation to 2005 terms, using the Reserve Bank of Australia Inflation Calculator (http://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/).
8 This start date has been chosen as the Australian War Memorial Act 1980 and the War Graves Act 1980 introduced the contemporary governance, reporting, and funding arrangements, for both these institutions.
9 Figures from the Australian War Memorial Annual Reports. The spike in funding 1999-00 can in part be explained by major capital works carried out at the AWM, including the Bradbury Aircraft Hall and the ANZAC Hall exhibition facility.
10 Figures from the Department of Veterans Affairs and Repatriation Commission Annual Reports. Figures marked * come from the Office of Australian War Graves Annual Reports, and reporting of commemoration in these publications was limited to the maintenance of Commonwealth war graves. From 1994-95, commemorative activities were added, in addition to the maintenance of war graves, which was part of the Australia Remembers program (see Chapter 7). The Office of Australian War Graves reporting was rolled into the DVA’s Annual Report in 1994-95 too. The commemorative function was kept as a responsibility by the DVA, and is declared in subsequent reports.
reconciliation, and nationalism as tradition. Nationalism entrepreneurship explains the causal reasons why, given these conditions, Prime Ministers turned to Anzac as a central discourse of Australian national identity – Anzac was part of their sense of national identity, they promoted that sense of national identity, and they consequently aligned their political visions and policy agendas with that sense of identity. An overview of how Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac is provided in the next section of the chapter.

**An Overview of the Genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses using Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis**

The second section of the chapter provides an overview of the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and media releases from 1973 – 2007. In doing so, it seeks to follow CDA’s emphasis upon paying attention to the socially embedded nature of language production. It also aims to clarify some aspects of the literature on Anzac by employing corpus assisted discourse analysis to provide a quantitative assessment of Anzac Day addresses. As such, it identifies the various thematic and characteristic features of these addresses, including where and when the addresses have been delivered, and for what purpose; followed by Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac, the themes invoked, where Anzac is located and which battles it is associated with, and who Anzac’s agents are. As will be shown, whilst Australian Prime Ministers may stick closely to the traditions of Anzac with their addresses, they subtly renovate understandings of Anzac in alignment with their policy agendas.

**Anzac Day: The Speech Setting and Frequency**

In his brief parsing of the of the role of Prime Ministerial rhetoric on Anzac Day, Grube (2013, 55) asserts: ‘[f]or Australian prime ministers, it has been a consistent duty of the rhetorical prime ministership to speak at a dawn service on ANZAC day – to encompass everything that the day means for Australia’s history and the development of its national identity.’ Grube is certainly correct in his assessment of the content of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, but how much truth is there to both the consistency of their addresses over time, and the frequency of their dawn service speeches, as opposed to other Anzac Day ceremonies?

Figure 5 reports the frequency of Prime Ministerial dawn service addresses, Anzac Day addresses falling at a time other than the dawn service, non-Anzac Day addresses, and one recorded message to the nation. During the period under examination, dawn service addresses were demonstrably outnumbered by other forms of Anzac Day speeches by two to one. So, whilst dawn service
addresses may be prominent in public memory due to their publicity and stirring imagery, they have not been the most frequently employed platform for making an address on Anzac Day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anzac Day Address Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Anzac Day Ceremony</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn Service Ceremony</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Anzac Day Ceremony</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded Message</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
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*Figure 5 – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses by Time of Day, 1973 - 2007*

Further, as Figure 6 shows, it is only since 1990 that Prime Ministers have begun to consistently address an Anzac Day audience. This is not to say that Prime Ministers did not engage with Anzac prior to 1990, but that engagement was as primarily as a participant, rather than as the focus or the driver of the ceremony. Finally, Prime Minister’s Anzac Day participation was often more local, rather than national or international, as Prime Ministers marked Anzac Day in their local electorates, state capital cities, or wherever they may have found themselves on Anzac Day as they conducted the business of government.

*Figure 6 – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency, 1973 - 2007*

Over time, Prime Ministers have increasingly moved away from a more localised commemoration of Anzac and marked Anzac Day at a significant site of Australian war remembrance. As demonstrated
in Figure 7, Gallipoli became a prominent site, but this only began with Hawke’s trip there in 1990\textsuperscript{11}. The Australian War Memorial in the nation’s capital Canberra has increasingly replaced the suburban setting of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day remembrance too, with the addresses that have been given there occurring after 2000.\textsuperscript{12} Trips to World War Two sites were conducted in the 1990s by Keating to Papua New Guinea in 1992 and by Howard to Thailand in 1998, but notably dropped off after 2000.

![Site of Anzac Address](image)

*Figure 7 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address Location by Period, 1973 - 2007*

As can be seen in the trends in the frequency and location of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, Prime Ministers have moved away from the local roots of Anzac as it was memorialised by the RSL in the past. Instead, Anzac Day has been increasingly marked at significant Australian war sites overseas, or at the AWM. Critical discourse analysis’ emphasis on the socially embedded nature of discourses compels us to examine these shifts and the way they reveal the increasing institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship. The genre of Anzac Day Prime Ministerial addresses has a physical setting, and this setting is relevant as it activates a frame that distinguishes it from other genres (Frow 2006, 9-10). The physical setting of a genre is therefore also a social event, constituting what is actual about the genre (Fairclough 2005, 223). Regarding the shift from the local to the national or international stage, the audience that consumes these

\textsuperscript{11} Hawke made the Gallipoli trip in 1990. Howard followed in 2000, and again in 2005. Notably, Keating did not make the trip, with his reticence towards its imperial connotations being conspicuous (Holbrook 2014, 179-192).

\textsuperscript{12} Prime Ministerial addresses at the AWM have been given in 2001 and 2003.
addresses is being called upon to note the evolution of this social event, with the replacement of the
RSL as Anzac’s custodian, the growing significance of Anzac in Australian national life, and the central
role of the Prime Minister and the state in its remembrance. This lesson is reinforced by the
frequency of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses.

Genre Chains and Hybridisation
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses have linked in chains with other genre forms. Prominently,
this has included the media release and the interview. This linking may seem innocuous, but the
regular linking of these forms demonstrates both the concern of Prime Ministers to engage the
media in reporting their Anzac Day addresses and activities, and their confidence in the media to
report this news to an audience eager to consume this story. An example of this was Howard’s trip
to visit the troops participating in the Iraq War on Anzac Day 2004 when two addresses were made,
along with two media releases regarding Anzac Day itself, two media releases on the awarding of
medals for service, and finally, a doorstop interview on 25 April, and an interview with ABC radio’s
AM Programme on the morning of 26 April (Howard 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2004e; 2004f;
2004g; 2004h). This burst of activity ensured the maximum positive coverage of the trip (Grattan
2004, 17), and of Howard’s central messages of supporting and thanking the troops for their service
and reinforcing the necessity and importance of Australia’s Iraq commitment (see Chapter 9). The
linking of these genres provides evidence of how Prime Ministers have actively engendered the
coverage of their Anzac Day activities and messages.

Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses also demonstrate a high degree of hybridisation of various
categories of their rhetorical responsibilities. Grube (2013, 43) identifies six rhetorical genre
categories that Prime Ministers might fulfil - world leader, party leader, local member, policy
advocate, national representative, and relationship builder. The role of Prime Minister as national
representative is most obviously present in their Anzac Day addresses, but to a greater or lesser
extent, all these genre forms are evident across the breadth of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day
addresses under examination here, mixing together two or more genre categories in speeches.
Hawke, in particular, combined categories — mixing policy advocacy, leadership on the world stage,
and reaching out to groups whose support he relied upon, in combination with speaking on behalf of
the nation. So for example, on Anzac Day 1986 Hawke spoke in Athens and recalled the sacrifice and
comradeship of Greeks and Australians during World War Two:
These shared experiences from the darkest and most bitter days of defeat have, however, left lasting benefits.

For the Australians and other allies who fought alongside their Greek comrades it is the staunch friendships which were forged then.

These friendships were tested to the utmost limits and have endured. They endure not only among those who fought but have been passed down to the men and women of succeeding generations (Hawke 1986a, 2).

Here Hawke takes on the role of national leader, speaking on behalf of the nation and imbuing Anzac with meaning for the Australian people – ‘friendship’ between allies. Simultaneously, though, Hawke was inhabiting the role of world leader, representing Australia to the world and building the relationship with Greece, with the friendship between the nations ‘enduring’ and being ‘passed down’. Finally, Hawke was alluding to his role as a policy advocate and relationship builder to sections of the domestic audience in Australia, as the Greek diaspora in Australia was an important constituency for the Australian Labor Party during the 1980s (Jupp 2000).

Such genre hybridity did sometimes attract dissension when the political intruded via policy advocacy. In 1993, for example, Keating attracted controversy when he linked his government’s Asian engagement with Australia’s war history by calling the 8th Division held as Prisoners of War (POWs) by Japanese forces in World War Two ‘… the first pioneers of Australia in Asia. The frontiersmen’ (Keating 1993a, 2). The RSL and the Opposition both responded by condemning the Prime Minister for introducing a partisan element to Anzac Day (Brough 1993, 1; see also Chapter 6). Howard’s Iraq trip on Anzac Day 2004 also attracted criticism when it became clear that the trip was as much about shoring up support for the contested deployment as it was for thanking the troops (Grattan 2004, 17).

Over time, instances of genre hybridisation that included overt partisan policy advocacy have become less frequent. Howard in particular took an active role in engendering this norm. This is certainly not uniform across the corpus, but policy advocacy of the type that saw Keating provoke controversy in 1993, or Hawke spruik his government’s record on repatriation benefits in 1989 (Hawke 1989) or the Labor Party’s defence White Paper in 1991 (Hawke 1991) was gradually replaced by Howard with speeches that primarily conformed to the genre category of national leader, with allusions to world leader if the address was being hosted by a foreign government in an overseas location. This change over time reflects the growing coalescing of the genre boundaries of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, and their increasing conformity to the sombre and nationalistic rituals of Anzac.
Thematic and Tonal Representations of Anzac

The next section will examine the tone and themes evident in Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac. Following Seal (2004, 3-6), it will argue that Anzac can be viewed as a spectrum with the ‘Anzac tradition’ at one end and the ‘digger tradition’ at the other. Drawing upon the image of national identity expressed in the Australian legend (Ward 1993), the digger tradition is characterised by the bottom-up values of the soldiers who fought in World War One - mateship, anti-authoritarianism, larrikinism, racism, sentimentality, pity and fear (Seal 2004, 2). The Anzac tradition, on the other hand, consists of the top-down values of officialdom and the state, emphasising:

... a set of attitudes and values within which notions of honour, duty, bravery, sacrifice and salvation are central, located particularly within a militarist context. Overarching these are the imperatives of commemoration and remembrance linked with an overpowering aura of nationalism, emphasising unity, sameness, heritage, patriotism and loyalty (Seal 2004, 4).

Whilst Prime Ministers have made reference to the digger tradition, especially to mateship, the state-centric themes of service and nationalism that characterise the Anzac tradition fit better with their project of presenting Anzac as a unifying discourse of nation and thus have dominated their representations of Anzac. This has important consequences for the rhetorical function and tone represented in Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses.

Figure 8 reports the coded frequencies of key elements of the digger and Anzac traditions and confirms Seal’s characterisation. Official representations of Anzac by Prime Ministers strongly reference the service and sacrifice of servicemen and servicewomen, their bravery, honour and heroism, and lessons for the nation state regarding national unity rather than national diversity. These lessons are reinforced by frequent calls to remember and by the sacralisation of Anzac by reference to its sacredness. Further, after 1990, the high rhetoric of the Prime Ministerial Anzac Day address genre has increased. The employment of the Anzac tradition has an important rhetorical function. It asks the audience to remember the values of service, sacrifice and unity, and is frequently employed in conjunction with lessons for the present. These lessons for the present often include an explicit or implicit policy agenda, such as Hawke’s hybridisation of Anzac Day and policy speeches in service of his government’s policy, agenda, Howard’s alignment of Anzac with justifications for the deployment of Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq, and neoliberalism and economic reform, which was mobilised by Hawke, Keating and Howard.
The digger tradition is not completely absent - the two traditions are linked on a spectrum, not separate. However, the two features that dominate representations of the digger tradition in the corpus, mateship and generalised Australianness, only weakly represent the Australian legend that the digger tradition draws upon in the contemporary context. Australianness now has a more plural and complex meaning, with Pearson and O’Neill (2009), for instance, arguing that representations of Australianness on Australia Day present and celebrate this plurality of contested meanings. Regarding mateship, both parties have employed this value, despite its traditional association with Labor politics, weakening its connection to the Australian legend. Dyrenfurth (2015, 201) has pointed to the ways that Howard’s version of mateship ‘... seemed to decouple its meaning from state interventionism in aid of a more egalitarian and equal society’ in favour of a more conservative and economically liberal interpretation of its meaning. Fraser’s (1979, 5) invocation of mateship as one of the ‘great qualities’ of Anzac in 1979, however, reveals that conservative engagement with mateship also has a longer history. These facts reinforce the point that the digger tradition is weakly represented by Australian Prime Ministers.

Figure 8 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Mentions per Speech to Anzac and Digger Traditions, 1973 - 2007

Where the Anzac or digger traditions have been identified, this has been coded in the corpus. This has created a population of coded mentions, with the rate of mentions of these traditions over time, and per speech, being used. The Anzac tradition themes n=7: remember; sacrifice; bravery/courage/valour; duty/service; honour; unity; sacredness/soul. The digger tradition themes n=7: mateship or mates; generalised Australianness; humour; egalitarianism/fair-go; larrikinism; anti-authoritarianism; fear.
The tone of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses reinforces the rhetorical function outlined above, with the employment of the Anzac tradition again playing a crucial role. The digger tradition, with its informality, laconic humour, and ambivalence towards the heroism of death, all serve as poor foundations upon which to construct the necessary sombre and reverent tone that Australian Prime Ministers have employed on Anzac Day to augment their themes and policy agendas. The Anzac tradition, on the other hand, is replete with signifiers of appropriate tone—calls to remember duty, honour, and sacrifice invites reflection and reverence, not light-heartedness regarding the larrikin exploits of diggers or bitter cynicism about the legacies of war.

The reverence invoked by the tone of the Anzac tradition is also helped by frequent reference to the sacredness of Anzac by Prime Ministers. Sacredness, pilgrimage and spirituality are frequently employed as themes by Prime Ministers, ensuring the sanctity of the tone of Anzac. These references are primarily secular, though allusions to the Christian faith also appear. Such references, in combination with more secular references to the nation’s soul, pilgrimage to the sacred site of Gallipoli, or the spirituality of the day, all echo the reverent and authoritative tone of the sermon. Further, though, the reference to the Christian faith reinforces the Anglo-Celtic hegemony that characterises Prime Ministerial Anzac Day speeches.

On rarer occasions, the tone is not reverential, but patriotic and celebratory. In particular, McKenna has noted calls by Howard after 2001 not only to commemorate Anzac, but also to celebrate it (McKenna 2010, 126-127). Such rhetoric invokes nationalist sentiment, calling upon the audience to revel in Anzac’s expression of Australianness. Calls to celebrate Anzac are certainly evident in Howard’s language after 2001, with his 2003 address, for instance, arguing that Anzac: ‘... is about the celebration of some wonderful values, of courage, of valour, of mateship, of decency, of a willingness as a nation to do the right thing, whatever the cost.’ (Howard 2003a). But calls to celebrate Anzac also have a longer history. It is evident in the language of Hawke (1989, 4) - ‘Next year, we will be celebrating the 75th anniversary of [Anzac]’ - and Keating (1993b, 59) - ‘This visit today [to Kokoda] is a celebration of our freedom and our friendship [with PNG] ...’ The call to celebrate Anzac is thus characteristic not only of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses, but of the tone of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses more generally, as part of the patriotic sentiment which Prime Ministers ask audiences to embrace.

The thematic and tonal characteristics of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses serve particular purposes. Over time, the campaigning and politicking purpose of the hybridised national leader and
policy advocate Anzac Day address has been replaced by more singularly national leader rhetoric. As they have done so, the speeches have changed, drawing upon the Anzac tradition to structure the thematic and tonal representation of Anzac. But this does not mean that the policy agenda has disappeared from Prime Ministers’ addresses. Though Howard became more understated in his presentation of policy than his predecessors, his representation of Anzac often subtly renovated Australian identity in line with his government’s policy priorities. Such endeavours have been aided by the reverential, sanctified, and patriotic themes and tones of the Anzac tradition that make challenges to Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac blasphemous.

Locations of Anzac

The next section examines where Prime Ministers see Anzac being located and their conservative interpretation of Australia’s war history. The focus has been upon the two World Wars and their associated battles, and the honouring of the participants in contemporary Australian Defence Force deployments. Of these factors, Gallipoli has dominated Prime Ministerial interpretation of Australia’s war history. Such an interpretation has an important rhetorical function and contributes to the success or failure of Prime Ministers’ speeches. Figure 9 shows the named frequency of the war or conflict Prime Ministers associate with Anzac.

World War One, the war that established contemporary patterns of remembrance, is mentioned as frequently as World War Two, although World War Two’s mentions predominate during the 1990s, the decade that saw the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, the Australia Remembers program of commemoration, and an attempt by Keating to relocate the meaning of Anzac to Kokoda. Contemporary troop deployments in the Iraq conflict of 2003-2011, East Timor, Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands, and the War on Terror feature prominently in the 2000s, and the Gulf War features in the 1990s. Prime Ministers have honoured the service of the contemporary Australian Defence Force in their speeches, have linked them to the Anzacs of the past, and have sought to use Anzac as a platform to legitimise Australian participation in contemporary conflicts (McDonald and Merefield 2010, 195-197). Prime Ministers have not been bold enough to use Anzac Day as a platform to acknowledge and commemorate the wars between Indigenous Australians and white settlers that established the modern Australian state, reflecting their general reluctance to incorporate Indigenous Australians into their interpretation of Anzac (see below).14

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14 See Inglis (2008) 501-504 for an account of this issue vis a vis the AWM and Howard’s rejection of the inclusion of this aspect of Australia’s history in the AWM.
Figure 10 reports the named frequency of the site of Anzac for sites with three or more mentions. Gallipoli clearly dominates where Prime Ministers see Anzac originating from, with more than four times the mentions of the nearest ranked sites of France and Kokoda. The most significant sites of Anzac are also strongly associated with the two World Wars, with the Battle of Kapyong during the Korean War and the Battle of Long Tan during the Vietnam War being the only named exceptions. Qualitative analysis of the appearance of the mid-century wars of Korea and Vietnam and their associated battles of significance in the corpus reveals that they received little attention by Prime Ministers, as they mostly feature in a list of wars and battles to be commemorated, rather than as the focus of commemoration. An exception to this was Hawke (1989) who, soon after the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian polity, recalled the controversy of Vietnam and Vietnam veterans’ difficulties when they returned from that failed war.

Only one Prime Minister attempted to relocate understandings of Anzac away from Gallipoli. Keating attempted to shift Australian’s understanding of their war history from Gallipoli and World War One to the Pacific and World War Two (Curran 2006, 294-295; Holbrook 2014, 179-180) and he was responsible (though not solely) for many of the mentions of World War Two and its associated
battle sites during the 1990s. This shift was intimately connected to his political project - an Australian republic, an outlook to Asia and a rejection of the deferential conservatism that he argued characterised the Coalition’s engagement with Empire and remembrance of war. The partisan nature of this shift attracted significant controversy and was contested by conservative opponents and the RSL.

The location of Anzac is a crucial element in the rhetorical function of Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses. If, as this thesis argues, Prime Minister’s speeches on Anzac Day serve a policy function, as well as a commemorative one, then the structure of implication of an address becomes crucial to the speech’s rhetorical role. In other words, if Prime Ministers wish to employ Anzac for policy ends by associating those policy ends with the positively perceived traditions of Anzac, then they must focus upon those aspects that invoke positively perceived background knowledge; the ‘good’ wars and battles of the World Wars, and especially upon Gallipoli where the nation is seen to have

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15 According to Frow (2006, 9) the structure of implication is the assumed background knowledge that a genre expects the audience to understand.
been born. It comes as little surprise that the conflicts where Australia is interpreted by large enough numbers to have committed wrongs (the wars of settlement and Vietnam) are ignored or marginalised, as their inclusion would hinder the rhetorical function. The fact that Keating ran into such controversy for a relatively conservative reinterpretation of the location of Anzac demonstrates just how crucial adherence to the traditions of Anzac are if rhetorical success is to be ensured.

Anzac’s Agents

Who have been Anzac’s agents in Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses? Such an analysis is linked to CDA’s concern to analyse the structural relations that produce discourses and texts, and reinforce these structural relations. A number of factors will be explored here, including the gender of Anzac’s agents, instances of named ethnicity, and the general level of incorporation and acknowledgement of diversity in the addresses. It will be shown that despite considerable academic criticism of the hegemony of masculine and Anglo-Celtic identities in Anzac, and activism from the community to ameliorate these factors by incorporating difference into representations of Anzac (Bennett 2014; Bongiorno 2014), Prime Ministers continue to speak of Anzac in terms that reinforce notions of national unity and are negligent of difference.

Beginning with gender, Figure 11 shows the frequency of representations of gender per speech and media release in Prime Ministers’ Anzac Day addresses. Strikingly, women are never identified with a gendered noun in isolation in Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and media releases. The phrase ‘men and women’ is used frequently, but men are primarily the agents identified by Prime Ministers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Gendered Nouns In Anzac Day Addresses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.42</td>
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</table>

*Figure 11* - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Gendered Nouns Mentions per Speech, 1973 - 2007

Service type can also serve as an imperfect proxy for gender, as nursing is historically associated with women and frontline engagement in battle with men. Such gendered roles, and analysis of how this

16 Where an agent of Anzac has been identified with a gendered noun, this has been coded in the corpus. This has created a population of coded mentions, with the rate of mentions of gendered nouns per speech being used. The same process has been applied to service type in Figure 12.
privileges masculine identities, have of course evolved over time, and Prime Ministers have generally referred to contemporary agents of Anzac with the conjoined gendered nouns of men and women. However, given the historical focus of many Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, service type can still demonstrate the gendered nature of Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac’s agents. Thus, Figure 12 reports the frequency per speech of coded instances of service type in the corpus.

| Rate of Service Type In Anzac Day Addresses |
|-------------------------------|--------|
| Infantry                      | 0.42   |
| Navy                          | 0.21   |
| Air Force                     | 0.12   |
| Nurses                        | 0.00   |

*Figure 12 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Service Type Mentions per Speech, 1973 - 2007*

Like the gendered noun woman, nursing is never mentioned as a service type. As such, representations of the gender of Anzac’s agents in Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses have changed little since WAR activists and academics (Lake 1992) began to challenge the gendered nature of Anzac in the 1980s. For the Prime Ministers under examination in this thesis, the central national identity discourse of Anzac remained masculine.

Indigenous Australians fared little better than women, featuring in one named mention of ethnicity, by Hawke (1991). In 1991, Hawke was paying tribute to a small group on indigenous people who had served during WWII, but had not been formally enlisted, and consequently had not received payment for their service. In contrast, Liberal Prime Ministers have not included reference to Indigenous Australians in their Anzac Day addresses. Regarding diversity more generally, Prime Ministers have not tended to use Anzac Day to emphasise the diversity of the nation during this period. This stands in contrast to the competing and contested plurality of meanings and identities celebrated on Australia Day (Pearson and O’Neill 2009). Howard especially tended to emphasise national unity over diversity, repeatedly utilising the refrain that Anzac represented national unity and common purpose. Other Prime Ministers have been less reticent. Keating argued that the POWs of World War Two ‘...found in all sorts of circumstances that they shared common human

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17 See, for instance, Anzac Day 2002: ‘It [Anzac] has remained relevant not to glorify war or to paint some romantic picture of our history but to draw upon a great example of unity and common purpose’ or Anzac Day 2000: ‘We come to draw upon their stirring example of unity and common purpose’ (Howard 2000a; Howard 2002a).
ground with people they had, for cultural and historical reasons, been inclined to patronise or despise’ and that there was a lesson in that for Australians as they engaged with Asia (Keating 1993a, 3).

These examples demonstrate how Anzac’s entrepreneurs had a mixed record regarding the expansion of the identity boundaries of Anzac. Whilst Anzac has largely remained a nationalist discourse associated with the hegemony of Anglo-Celtic and masculine identities, it did not remain exclusively so. However, the extent to which Prime Ministers present diversity has largely continued to be dependent on outsider groups conforming to the hegemonic strictures demanded by Anzac, and the attendant compliance with its values of service, sacrifice and duty to the state.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview to the remainder of the thesis. Following the discourse-historical method, it has done so in order to provide as much detailed background to the analysis as possible to Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship. In the process, it has demonstrated the cumulative causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and set out the situation and themes of the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. Having done so allows us to more clearly observe the operation of causality, and the evolution of the addresses, behind Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship.

In doing so, the chapter has attempted to establish both the causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and the nature of that engagement once the turn had been made, in a more systematic manner than has been attempted in the literature before. It has done so by applying both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the available evidence. Some conclusions can be drawn having conducted this analysis:

1. The causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac is multiple and difficult to sort through. Nationalism entrepreneurship captures the multi-causal reasons behind this shift by taking account of both the social processes and structures that Prime Ministers must operate within, and the enormous agency they have as political elites with access to the power resources of the state. In the end, and despite their power, Prime Ministers have only been successful (and not always consistently successful) in their Anzac entrepreneurship because they have delivered a form of nationalism that the Australian people have identified with, and the Australian people have accepted as essential, taken for granted, and unpolitical.
2. Quantitative analysis of these changes confirms some theoretical assumptions in the literature. Firstly, Seal’s (2004) Anzac/digger tradition has been confirmed in analysis of the corpus, with the state orientated Anzac tradition being strongly evident. Secondly, critics who have pointed to the masculine and Anglo-Celtic hegemony of Anzac also have their suspicions confirmed, as analysis of the Anzac’s agents has shown a general lack of diversity.

3. Quantitative analysis has also shown some deficiencies in the literature. Firstly, the fact that march and dawn service attendances tend to rise after governments begin to promote Anzac from 1990 suggests that the public is responding to their nationalism entrepreneurship, rather than the other way around. Also regarding attendances, we should exercise caution when it is claimed that ‘record crowds’ have attended Anzac Day, as recent dawn service attendances have not matched the early 1960s highs of the marches. Secondly, analysis of the corpus reveals that some of the features that Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses that have been attributed to particular agents (especially Howard), such as celebration of Anzac and co-option of the Australian legend, have longer histories.

The analysis in this chapter of the causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and the genre of their Anzac Day addresses, provides a base for us to observe in more detail the evolution of these factors in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
CHAPTER 4

From Contestation to Reconciliation: Anzac Under Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke, 1972-1987

Anzac was in a state of flux from 1972 to 1987. At the beginning of this period, the divisions of the Vietnam War, the election of the reformist Whitlam government, and the move away from British-based expressions of Australian identity all presented challenges to the public expression of Anzac.

As Holbrook (2014, 121) notes:

By the 1970s, the gulf between the meaning that the old diggers attributed to the Anzac legend and that imputed by younger people seemed impossible to bridge. A martial nationalist ideology, anchored in ideas of racial supremacy and Empire, had stoked the Anzac legend for half a century. As the pillars of this ideology were dismantled, so the legend itself collapsed.

This process had begun before the 1970s (see Holbrook 2014, 117-120; Macleod 2002), but by the beginning of the decade, an apathetic public was increasingly uninterested in the annual commemoration of Anzac. As shown in Chapter 3, the number of Australians turning out to Anzac Day parades and dawn services began to dwindle appreciably by the middle of the decade and this trend continued throughout most of the 1980s. The legacy of the Vietnam War, and then new tensions regarding the conduct of the Cold War and nuclear weapons during the 1980s, meant that militarism was a hotly contested issue in the public sphere. The prominence of social movement contestation of Australianness and the national interest contributed to a public discourse that was antithetical to the values that Anzac had been traditionally associated with – Empire, militarism, conservatism, masculinity, violence and whiteness. These factors contributed to the reluctance of political elites to place Anzac at the centre of conceptions of national identity. But by the late 1980s, the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body politics saw newly emerging norms regarding Anzac’s commemoration that reasserted the centrality of Anzac and sanctioned the contestation of Anzac’s conservative meaning.

This chapter seeks to explore this shift in Anzac, and the Prime Ministers’ changing role in commemoration, by tracing the thread of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac through the period from 1972 to 1987. It does so in four parts that examine the social context that was driving changes to Anzac, Prime Ministers’ engagement with Anzac, and their Anzac Day speeches:
1. The first section sets out the nature of Anzac’s decline as a central national narrative from the 1960s until the 1980s. The Vietnam War, changing conceptions of the Australianness, evolving senses of the political influenced by new social movements, and these social movements’ direct contestation of Anzac, were all factors that problematised Anzac, and contributed to poor Anzac Day attendances and concern about Anzac’s continued relevance.

2. Here the chapter acknowledges that despite these challenges, Anzac never disappeared, and that it was supported by a range of actors. This section examines the counter-narratives that supported Anzac—resistance to challenges to the traditional, conservative, and martial version of Anzac that was championed by the RSL; renovation of Anzac by cultural agents, such as historians and film makers, who reimagined Anzac with a new assertive Australianness that played down Anzac’s traditional British and martial origins, and emphasised new nationalism, tragedy and trauma; and recognition, where disowned and ignored Vietnam veterans pushed their claim to be included in the story of Anzac, which was accommodated with reconciliation.

3. The chapter then sets out the engagement of Prime Ministers with Anzac’s commemoration, and their infrequent speeches. Reflecting the role of the RSL in Anzac’s commemoration, and Anzac’s contested nature, Prime Ministerial participation with Anzac during this time tended to be more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular than it has been in more recent times. Prime Ministers did still participate in Anzac’s remembrance, however, this commemoration was primarily as a participant, rather than as an instigator, of the occasion. Significantly, whilst Hawke displayed some of these tendencies with his participation at this time, he also displayed early signs of Anzac entrepreneurship, especially regarding Vietnam veterans and their agitation for recognition.

4. Finally, the chapter explores the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body politic, represented by the welcome home parade in October 1987. I argue that the form that this reconciliation took was ‘restorative justice’ (Schaap 2005, 13-15), which restored the place of Anzac in Australian cultural and political life, but had the effect of limiting contestation of Anzac and the form that it took. This is the crucial tipping point where Anzac becomes unpolitical, as to contest Anzac’s meaning and centrality would be to reoffend. Once reconciled, Anzac increased in prominence as an ideograph:

An ideograph is an ordinary language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behaviour and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behaviour and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable… (McGee 1980, 15).
The unpolitical reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian public interacted with Anzac to create an unpolitical ideograph that presented Anzac as essential and incontestable. This demarcated Anzac as a sphere where the politics of deliberation and contestation was not to occur. Anzac’s status as an ‘unpolitical’ ideograph meant that Prime Ministers could engage with Anzac, if they were skilful enough to do so, in a manner that aligned Anzac with new, contemporary meanings that were depoliticised, and difficult and taboo to contest.

Building upon the process tracing of Chapter 3, I argue that the progression of these trends is crucial to an understanding of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and the form of Anzac that Prime Ministers engendered after 1990 that will examined in the remaining chapters of the thesis.

Anzac in Decline

The post-war period had seen the slow decline of Anzac as a central nationalist narrative, with publically expressed concerns regarding the proper and continued observance of Anzac Day being evident as early as the 1950s (Holbrook 2014, 116-118). The debut of Alan Seymour’s play *The One Day of the Year* in 1961 caused controversy with its critical treatment of the sentimental and unquestioning acceptance of Anzac Day and its drunken commemoration. By 1965, and the beginning of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict, Macleod (2002, 151) notes a certain ambivalence in the media coverage of that year’s Anzac Day and examination of whether the day would continue to hold the same significance.

Australia in the 1960s was, however, largely conservative (see Jordens 2009, 75-76; Cochrane 2009, 165), despite popular memory of the decade as one of radicalism and social change centred on the opposition to the Vietnam conflict and the radicalisation of university students. In particular, Jordens (2009) argues that Australia’s youth had a deferential attitude towards authority, reflected in opinion polling on the question of the Vietnam conflict and conscription. Further, the conservative Liberal/Country Coalition won four elections during the decade, in 1961, 1963, 1966 and 1969. During this time, Australians were largely happy to allow Anzac Day to be self-governed by the RSL and watch respectfully (if sometimes uncomfortably) from a distance (Macleod 2002, 150).

Opposition to Anzac Day and its memorialisation began to become more entrenched as the war in Vietnam continued and hostility towards conscription began to grow. Inglis (2008, 358-361) notes several, largely sporadic, instances of defacement of war memorials during the second half of the
1960s, up until the end of Australia’s involvement in Vietnam. In particular, 1971 saw the bashing of the sole guard of Melbourne’s Shrine of Remembrance by unknown assailants before they painted ‘P.E.A.C.E!’ on the columns along the front of the Shrine. Sporadic, small scale protests on Anzac Day were also evident (Curran and Ward 2010, 198), though dwarfed in size and significance by the larger Moratorium marches. One protest also occurred during the return of Australian servicemen from Vietnam, when a 21 year old Nadine Jensen, doused in red paint, smeared marching soldier’s uniforms in 1966 (Curthoys 1994, 129). Save Our Sons, a women-led movement, staged a silent protest on Anzac Day 1966 at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance and led other such protests at events when conscripts left for Vietnam (Jordens 2009, 79). More generally, the anti-war movement that sprang up surrounding the Vietnam War, the well-attended and publicised Moratorium marches, and the increasing pessimism surrounding the conflict after the 1968 Tet Offensive and Mỹ Lai Massacre, all helped to problematise Anzac as a central national discourse (Curthoys 2009, 156; Curran and Ward 2010, 197-198; Donaldson and Lake 2010, 88-90).

By the time the ALP had been elected to government in 1972, the observance and acceptance of Anzac Day as a central national commemorative date had been challenged. This decline was reflected in government policy during the 1970s. The British race patriotism that had dominated Australian political life until this point was being replaced with ‘new nationalism’ (Curran and Ward 2010) and the beginnings of multiculturalism. There was little place for Anzac in the multicultural, post-Vietnam nationalism of the Whitlam government, and as symbolic policy changes, such as the favouring of an Australian honours system over the traditional imperial honours system, the changing of the national anthem, and funding Australian arts and cultural programs, were instituted. Further, whilst the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975 saw the return of the Coalition to government, it did not see a corresponding reassertion of older forms of national identity. Fraser’s abandonment of some of the symbols of new nationalism, for example, reverting to the use of ‘God Save the Queen’ as the national anthem and returning to recommending Australians for imperial honours, sat alongside the retainment of elements of Whitlam’s reformist government, prominently, multiculturalism and its associated identity discourses (Brett 2003, 157-185; Curran 2006, 173-175). Fraser, like Whitlam, grappled with the political need to develop a more inclusive and distinctly Australian identity, following the post-war influx of immigration and the collapse of British forms of identity. By the time Hawke was elected in 1983, these changes had become entrenched, and a return to the British race patriotism that had sustained Anzac up until this period of time seemed more unlikely than ever.
Attendances at Anzac Day parades declined during this period as Anzac became a neglected, and sometimes contested, feature of Australian identity and national discourse. Dawn service attendances also declined during this period, though Canberra’s attendances remained more robust than Sydney’s of Melbourne’s (see Chapter 3). Curran and Ward (2010, 197) note that this period saw newspapers reflect upon the decline, with *The Australian* (1977, 6) musing ‘is it that we are remembering an anachronism?’ and the *Canberra Times* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* both reporting upon the small town of Gundaroo that ‘forgot’ to mark Anzac Day and had left the local memorial unattended and choked by weeds (*Canberra Times* 1979: 1; Ellercamp 1979, 2).

Further challenging Anzac in the 1970s and early 1980s was the evolution of social movements, moving beyond the anti-war movement into newly political spheres of social life. For example, the Tasmanian Wilderness Society had campaigned successfully against the damming of the Franklin River and had contributed significantly to the placing of environmental issues onto the national agenda and to the spread of like-minded groups (Papadakis 1990, 343–4). The Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras evolved from a protest in 1978 to a celebratory parade in 1981 and signalled the increasing prominence and success of the gay rights movement (Marsh and Galbraith 1995, 301–306). Both movements challenged previously held conceptions of Australianness and the boundaries of political action. Further, the period saw continued contestation and questioning of militarism, along with increasingly radical and confrontationist opposition from some groups regarding these matters. The early 1980s was a time of heightened Cold War tension, and the peace, anti-nuclear and environmental social movements were active in contesting previously settled conceptions of the national interest and Australia’s defence posture (Elder 2005, 74). The Palm Sunday anti-nuclear rallies of the early to mid-1980s saw a peak of support in 1985 as 170,000 marched in support in Sydney (Smith 2001, 43). Popular culture also supported these movements, with bands like Midnight Oil promoting a broadly radical environmental, anti-nuclear, and peace message through the 1980s and 1990s, and Red Gum releasing their anti-war ballad to the returned Vietnam veteran, ‘I Was Only 19’, in 1983.

In addition to these more generalised social movement activities, Anzac Day saw direct contestation and protest action by activists (Twomey 2013, 100–101). The radical feminist group Women Against Rape conducted a number of protests on Anzac Days in the early to mid-1980s at several capital city locations around Australia. Their purpose was to challenge the mythology of Anzac Day by emphasising rape in war, militarism, and male violence, as part of a broader radical feminist activist agenda to emphasise ‘...the way rape has been used in war and in “peace” to keep women under
control’ (Howe 1995, 305). Howe (1995, 304) argues that WAR activism on Anzac Day was not particularly concerned with deconstructing and analysing the peculiarities of the Australian experience of wartime and the way the Anzac narrative privileged masculine understandings of Australianness, and instead attempted to broaden the meaning of the day to include:

...the universal experience of women in war. Instead of focusing on the nationhood (manhood) myth enshrined in the Anzac Day tradition, women participating in Anzac Day marches have sought to reclaim the day as a day of mourning and, at the same time, to broaden the meaning of Anzac Day to include women of all nations who have suffered in wartime...

Feminist protest activity on Anzac Day had origins as early as 1977 (Twomey 2013, 98), and by 1980 and 1981, WAR activists in Canberra had sought to join the Anzac Day parade, and were blocked by police and some were arrested (Elder 2005, 71-72). The words DEAD MEN DON’T RAPE were sprayed onto a wall near the Sydney cenotaph in time for Anzac Day 1983, and 168 WAR activists were arrested in Sydney that year after attempting to join the march, in defiance of a court order (Odlum 1983, 3). Marches and vigils were conducted on Anzac Days in other capital cities during this period too (Inglis 2008, 440-441). WAR activity began to decline in the late-1980s as disagreements about the effectiveness and appropriateness of these protests drained the impetus to follow through with continued action (Inglis 2008, 441-442), due in part to WAR activists falling prey to nationalist sympathies when criticising Australian personnel (Elder 2005, 78).

Less prominently, there was also disquiet from gay activists regarding Anzac during this period. In 1982, the Gay Ex-Service Persons Association (GESPA) advertised a meet-up on Anzac Day in a Melbourne newspaper and asked the Victorian RSL for permission to lay a wreath at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance, which was ostensibly granted by the president of the Victorian RSL, Bruce Ruxton (Hirst 1982, 13). Nicoll (2001, 192) argues that ‘...along with women and their “hysterical” shell-shocked counterparts, homosexual diggers were excluded from the [Australian War] Memorial’s celebration of national identity’. This exclusion was also present in Melbourne in 1982, as Ruxton himself prevented GESPA representatives from laying a wreath on Anzac Day. Citing GESPA’s failure to lay their wreath at the allotted time as the reason for their exclusion, Ruxton went on to note:

I don’t mind poofers in the march but they must march with their units. We didn’t want them to lay a wreath because we didn’t want anything to do with them. We certainly don’t recognise them and they are just another start to the denigration of Anzac Day (Ruxton, as cited by O’Callaghan 1982, 3).
Note the sublimation of difference by Ruxton here – gay ex-service personnel could not be excluded from the parade itself due to their war service, but the acceptance of their presence was only extended if they remained silent and unrecognisable. Actions that promoted difference and stepped outside the acceptable limits of conduct were actively prohibited by Anzac’s guardian, the RSL. Elder (2005, 73) notes the difficulty of protesting on Anzac Day, as the nationalistic nature of the occasion emphasises homogeneity over heterogeneity, and the sacralised composition of Anzac rituals invites introspection and silence over contestation and protest. For their part, GESPA expressed their disappointment at being prevented from laying a wreath on this occasion and denounced Ruxton as ‘a very bigoted man’ (O’Callaghan 1982, 3). In following years, GESPA representatives were reportedly permitted to lay a wreath at the Shrine of Remembrance in 1983, but were again refused permission in 1984 (Humphries 1984, 4).

Further protest activity was undertaken by activists when flour was thrown on the prison officers’ band that was marching in Sydney on Anzac Day 1984, with a ‘clandestine’ group called the Prisoners’ United Militant Activists claiming responsibility. A spokesperson said: ‘To have ‘screws’ marching alongside world war veterans is the ultimate hypocrisy. The wars were supposed to keep us free and yet internal oppression continues and the police and screws are the cause of the greatest and most insidious loss of freedom’ (Roberts 1984, 3). Whilst treated by police as a minor incident, the act further demonstrated the breadth of radical activism that was associated with Anzac Day during the period.

In sum, the challenge to Anzac during this period was profound, with Anzac being challenged directly and indirectly in a radical manner in the public sphere by a range of new social movements and activist organisations. The challenge to Anzac had moved from largely isolated and small scale actions, in the 1960s and 1970s, to a more frequent, more collective, and very public, confrontation. Not only that, but the public was responding to this new environment by continuing the trend of turning out to Anzac Day parades and dawn services in smaller numbers. Anzac, and its primacy in the national narrative, was being contested head on. A process of politicisation had intruded into the previously essential nationalistic sphere of Anzac and introduced politics and contestation.

**Holding the Line: Counter-Narratives of Resistance, Renovation and Recognition.**

Despite the challenges that Anzac faced during this period, it did not die out. Resistance, renovation and reconciliation were all themes that sections of Australian culture and politics mobilised in support of Anzac. The RSL resisted change, fulminating against the subversive social movements
that sought to challenge the RSL’s previously hegemonic version of national identity. Culturally, Bill Gammage’s book *The Broken Years* and Peter Weir’s film *Gallipoli* reimagined the British race patriotism of the Gallipoli campaign by viewing the operation with a critical eye regarding the failures of British command, imbuing Anzac with fresh meaning for Australian new nationalists (Inglis 2008, 415-417; Holbrook 2014). Finally, Vietnam veterans who felt aggrieved by their treatment after their return from war and from their exclusion from the pantheon of Anzac pressed for recognition, which the state and the Australian body politic accommodated with steps towards reconciliation. These changes were occurring in a social context where the trauma of war was increasingly recognised medically and discursively in the local and international sphere. This change had the effect of challenging the martial and heroic former basis of Anzac, and assisted the reimagination of Anzac (Twomey 2013).

**Resistance**

The RSL, as the custodian of Anzac, resisted its decline. Holbrook (2014, 118) demonstrates that the RSL had been warning against what it viewed as complacency regarding Anzac as early as the 1950s, as the generation who had fought WWI began to pass away. By 1965, Macleod (2002, 151-152) notes a newspaper interview with the NSW president of the RSL for Anzac Day, and his failure to recognise, when prompted, that many people saw Anzac Day as a glorification of war. When a flare was used to ignite wreaths in an apparent protest at Sydney’s Anzac Day in 1972, the RSL’s NSW president Colin J. Hines fulminated ‘It was an insult to the memory of those who paid the supreme sacrifice to keep this country free, and to every man, woman and child in Australia’ (*The Sydney Morning Herald* 1972, 2). The hegemony of Anzac in the RSL’s version of unified and homogenous national identity is revealed by Hines’ declarative grammatical mood, with his assertion that ‘every’ Australian was insulted by these actions, as if contestation of Anzac by *any* person was unthinkable. Such rhetoric also provides evidence for the RSL’s self-perceived role as a defender of conservative vision of Australian national identity during this time (Donaldson and Lake 2010, 79-80).

As has already been noted, one of the RSL’s most vehement and conservative defenders of Anzac during this period was Victoria’s Bruce Ruxton. Ruxton often found himself at the centre of an Anzac Day controversy during the early 1980s, resisting the social movement activism that Anzac Day was attracting. As a further example, the denigration of Anzac Day was a theme that Ruxton had warmed to in an interview with *The Australian* newspaper published on Anzac Day, 1982, where he saw Anzac as being under threat from many of the new social movements noted above:
I think it [GESPA] could be a concerted effort by anti-heritage groups to destroy the march... I just think there is a fair bit of heritage bashing at the moment. We had Women Against Rape in Canberra last year, there is some trouble in Sydney, there’s gays in Melbourne and now we are having trouble with some of the ethnics in Victoria. I certainly believe there is a deliberate campaign by some people in this country to destroy Anzac Day (Ruxton, as cited by Hirst 1982, 13).

Ruxton’s claim that there was a ‘concerted effort’ to coordinate a unified campaign against Anzac during the early 1980s (as opposed to the actions of individual activist groups seeking to pursue their individual goals) seems paranoid, based upon the available evidence. However, Ruxton’s views reflect the RSL’s tendency during this period to be a force for conservative resistance against the social and political forces that were challenging Anzac. Whilst the passage of time has proven that the RSL largely failed to defend its conservative view of Anzac and Australian national identity, it remained a powerful and prominent voice in Anzac’s defence during this period, actively policing its boundaries.

**Renovation and Re-imagination**

Several scholars have pointed to the cultural reimagining of Anzac that was occurring during the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Inglis 2008, 415-417; Curran and Ward 2010, 247-248; McKenna 2010, 116-117; Holbrook 2014, 126-142, Twomey 2013). Whilst some social movement activists of the period rejected Anzac, more sympathetic cultural agents renovated Anzac for a time that could no longer countenance ideals of British race patriotism and overt militarism, and instead emphasised a more ambivalent, traumatic, and tragic version of Anzac. Particularly influential agents in this process were academic and lay historians, and filmmakers.

Historians played an important role in providing an empirical basis for this renovation of Anzac, with academic Bill Gammage being particularly prominent in this process. His book *The Broken Years: Australian soldiers in the Great War* (1974) was a social history, drawing upon the diaries and letters of the soldiers who had fought on the frontline. Gammage (1974, xiii; emphasis in the original) was at pains to point out that his work was ‘...not a military history of the First AIF.’ Such a distinction was important, as Gammage’s project was less about echoing the heroism and martial nationalism that had characterised C.E.W. Bean’s military history, and that had previously sustained Anzac, and instead emphasised tragedy as its theme (Inglis 2008, 416; Holbrook 2014, 133). Gammage was also frank when discussing the AIF’s less heroic deeds and the perceived deficiencies of the British (Holbrook 2014, 133), providing a more ambivalent reading of Anzac. Also reinforcing this social history renovation of Anzac was a small body of lay history, produced by family historians who were...
keen to explore their family members’ experience of war. This was a trend that was protean in the first half of the 1980s, but exploded especially after 1990 (Holbrook 2014, 145). These historians helped reimagine Anzac, engendering a more personal and tragic empirical basis for Anzac.

This newly renovated basis for Anzac was employed by Peter Weir and David Williamson in the film Gallipoli (1981). Inglis (2008, 416) notes that Gammage’s Broken Years served as an ‘inspiration and guide’ for the film, and he worked as a historical consultant during its production. Weir played with the possibilities that Gammage’s work had opened up, and he seized upon the opportunity to reimagine Anzac for a contemporary audience (Curran and Ward 2010, 247-248; Holbrook 2014 138-139). This involved ‘...distancing the Anzac Corps from its primary function (killing Turks, entirely absent from the film), and turning the culture of imperial loyalty on its head so that the British emerged as the principle foe’ (Curran and Ward 2010, 247). In Gallipoli, the AIF is not an Imperial force displaying heroic deeds and sacrifice against a racially imagined Turkish enemy. The Anzacs are instead tragic figures, sacrificed by the callous and incompetent British, with the story serving as an allegory for an audience enamoured with new nationalism. Similar anti-British themes were also adopted by other films and TV programs of the period that dealt with Australia’s war history (Curran and Ward 2010, 248).

In sum, there was a cultural renovation of Anzac during the period, as cultural agents working within the context of the decline of British race patriotism and new nationalism reworked Anzac for a contemporary audience. Caution needs to exercised regarding causation here – as has been shown, Anzac was still very much a contested national narrative during this period, neglected and sometimes rejected. However, the protean renovation of Anzac during this time helped create a basis for a new Anzac, more suitable for the times, and one that has proved to have the potential to resist decline.

Recognition

By the early 1980s, and in the context of continued narratives of contestation and resistance surrounding Anzac, Vietnam veterans began to organise politically, seeking recognition and reconciliation. Some veterans had expressed dissatisfaction with the widespread apathy, indifference, and even hostility to their experience demonstrated by successive governments and the wider public after their return from war. In particular, they emphasised the traumatic experience of their participation in war, and their position not as agents of failed Western
imperialism in South East Asia, as they had been discursively portrayed by the anti-war movement, but as victims of the horrific physical and psychological impact of war.

Vietnam veterans were further unhappy that they had been excluded from the story of Anzac. As Dixon (2010, 127) notes:

...in many respects, while Vietnam veterans have stood outside the Anzac mythology, and have presented their claims in terms of the unique nature of their experiences and (mis)treatment, their experiences, their stories, and even their grievances, constitute a quest for incorporation, and attempt to contribute to and become part of the Anzac legend.

This experience was not universal amongst Vietnam veterans. Some veterans experienced few problems upon their return and continued on their lives much as they had before active service, or even resented the image of the broken and sick Vietnam veteran (Ross 2009, 197). Importantly, however, the wider discourse has been one where Vietnam veterans had been discursively omitted from the story of Anzac during the 1970s and 1980s (Doyle 2002, 78; Dixon 2010, 135). The public and the state had begun to lose interest in Anzac, no memorials were erected in the landscape to mark the sacrifice of Vietnam veterans, and the state and the RSL seemingly cared little for veterans’ concerns about the ongoing effects of Agent Orange or their damaged mental health. So, whilst the Australian public went about their lives largely ignorant or ambivalent about the experience of Vietnam veterans, a significant number of veterans were left feeling betrayed and neglected. As one veteran interviewed in the late 1980s expressed:

It’s not that I was ashamed I was in Vietnam, but I’d been given the feeling I should be ashamed. I mean it was obvious at that time we were going to lose, so you had no comeback. For a man that was a dedicated Australian, and thought I was doing the right thing, it was very hurtful...

We were fighting a war that was not only unpopular, no one had a clue where we were. Young blokes of twenty were dying for their country through no choice of their own, and the people didn’t know and couldn’t care less (Brett and Moran 2006, 86).

The divide between veterans and the wider community was exacerbated by the socio-economic and political gap between the two groups who drove conceptions of the Vietnam War. The mostly conservative, rural and lower-middle class and working-class veterans, and the urban, middle-class anti-war movement participants did not generally interact or mix socially (Curthoys 1994, 130), so all the opposing groups were left with were impressions and stereotypes about the experiences, politics and emotions of each other.
To respond to the neglect of government, the failure of the RSL to address their agenda, and especially to press for an investigation into the effects of exposure to Agent Orange, the Vietnam Veterans Association (VVA, and formerly the Vietnam Veterans Action Association) began to coalesce as a pressure group in 1979-80 (Ross 2009, 195). It was successful in presenting itself as the voice of veterans, despite differences amongst veterans regarding the need for political representation. The normal avenue for such representation would have normally been the RSL, but veterans had fallen out with this avenue of policy access over two main concerns. Firstly, Vietnam veterans clashed with the RSL over the course of action on Agent Orange and the need for a Royal Commission into its effects and, secondly, many veterans felt unwelcome or unwanted in local RSL branches or had openly clashed with RS League and club members over their ostracism (Ross 2009, 197).

The VVA was an active pressure group, and was successful in lobbying the federal government to take action on veteran health problems, including both mental and physical trauma, in pressing for studies into veterans’ health complaints and for a Royal Commission into the effects of Agent Orange, which the Hawke government instituted. However, the Royal Commission did not find in favour of the VVA’s concerns about the effects of Agent Orange. In addition, a proposal to continue research into veteran mortality, after a pilot study, was declined funding by the federal government (Doyle 2002, 84). So, pressure group activity by the VVA during the first half of the 1980s had seen some success, but the full agenda certainly had not been recognised by government. As Ross (2009, 198) argues, veterans of the Vietnam War ‘...want recognition, reconciliation; they want the community to be grateful to ex-servicemen and respect them for having served in Vietnam.’ The VVA’s lobbying actions during the first half of 1980s were the expression of a desire for recognition from the government and the public that had ignored their sacrifice and had failed to incorporate them into national narratives of Anzac.

Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac, 1972 – 1987

It was in this ambivalent context that Prime Ministers engaged with Anzac during the 1970s and early 1980s. What frequently characterised the nature of their role in the commemoration of Australia’s war history during this period was a tendency to be a participant in that commemoration, with the focus of the day on the diggers themselves during the dawn service and march. This stands in contrast to later engagement, when the numbers marching declined as the diggers aged and passed away, and which tended to see Prime Ministers play a more prominent role as they drove and led the commemoration of Anzac Day. As such, Prime Ministers’ engagement with Anzac used
to tend to occur more infrequently, and to take the form of being local, and of being understated and less spectacular. The few speeches that were made by Prime Ministers reflected these tendencies, and Anzac Day was sometimes ignored as the business of government and partisan politics continued as per usual. Whitlam and Fraser both consistently reflected this pattern, though Hawke began to demonstrate both these elements, and early signs of Anzac entrepreneurship, with his engagement with Anzac during this period.

**Prime Ministers as Participants**

Prime Ministers frequently took part in Anzac Day from 1973 to 1987, but this contribution was usually as a participant in the proceedings, rather than as a driver or focus of the commemoration. As has been noted, the RSL remained the custodian of Anzac during this period, and the organisation of the day reflected the RSL’s concern to see that the focus of the day’s commemoration would remain upon the ex-service personnel whom the day honoured. The Prime Ministers’ role, then, was frequently to serve as one of the dignitaries of the occasion, lending the endorsement of the state to the proceedings. For example, Whitlam marked Anzac Day 1973 in London, at the Cenotaph at Whitehall and listening to the sermon at Westminster Abbey that referenced Anzac Day, with his only two active duties that day being laying a wreath at Whitehall and reading one of two lessons at Westminster Abbey (AAP 1973, 9). Similar patterns are revealed by Whitlam in 1974, when he laid a wreath at the Sydney Cenotaph during the march, and then shook hands with members of the crowd (Cunningham 1974, 2; 9).

Fraser played a similar role, laying a wreath at the AWM in 1976 (*The Australian* 1976, 3), participating in an April 24 sunset service at the Sydney Cenotaph in 1977 (*Canberra Times* 1977, 11), and participating in the dawn service at the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne in 1980, 1981, and 1982, along with marching in the parade in 1981 and 1982 (*The Age* 1980, 9; Fraser 1981a; Murdoch 1982, 3). Correspondence between the Victorian RSL and Fraser in 1981 reveals that he was invited by the RSL to *attend* Anzac Day that year in Melbourne (Fraser 1981b), rather than to give a speech or to be the focus of the commemoration, as has become the norm in more recent years. This exchange demonstrates that, in this instance at least, the RSL was firmly in control of the governing of Anzac’s commemoration.

Hawke started to become more actively involved in war commemoration (see below), but he also reflected the tendency to be a participant in Anzac Day, laying wreaths in Sydney in 1984 (*The Australian* 1984, 3) and at the AWM in 1985 (*Canberra Times* 1985, 1). The Prime Minister’s minor
role in commemoration is also revealed by news coverage of Anzac Day during this period, with their attendance frequently being conveyed as secondary to the reporting on the marchers, the RSL, the crowd, and other dignitaries in attendance, or as part of this milieu (see, for instance Cunningham 1974, 2; The Australian 1976, 3). As such, it can be seen that the Prime Minister frequently played a secondary, participatory, role in Anzac Day during this period.

Local Commemoration
Another distinguishing feature of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac during this period was its more local and suburban commemoration, far away from sites of Australian war remembrance like the AWM or Gallipoli. The local nature of Anzac’s commemoration was a reflection of the RSL’s custodianship of Anzac and their concern to honour the diggers they represented. This emphasis on the ex-service personnel themselves was mobilised via the local RSL branch, and on larger scale, the state branches of the RSL in state capital cities (see Inglis 2008). This tendency was demonstrated by Whitlam in 1974, as he marked the day with a dawn service at the Edmondson VC Memorial Club in Liverpool in south-west Sydney, before laying a wreath at the Sydney Cenotaph during the march, and then attending an afternoon Anzac service at the Masonic Club in Parramatta (Cunningham 1974, 2; Whitlam 1974a).

Fraser tended to be present at Anzac Day ceremonies around the country, as he both commemorated Anzac and simultaneously conducted the business of government. Fraser appeared at the AWM in 1976, Sydney cenotaph in 1977, Alice Springs in 1978, Esperance in 1979, and Melbourne in 1980, 1981, and 1982. In Alice Springs, Fraser attended the local service, then chatted with ex-servicemen at the RSL afterwards (The Australian 1978, 3). Finding himself in Esperance, Western Australia in 1979, after having attended the dawn service in Albany, Fraser delivered an Anzac Day address that was not reproduced in the east coast newspapers (see The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, and the Canberra Times for April 26 1979). Instead, The Australian (1979, 1) decided to report that Fraser was embarrassed to learn that his staff had not organised a wreath for him to lay at the Esperance ceremony, and The Sydney Morning Herald (1979, 2) reported that ‘The Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, spent $56 on drinks yesterday trying to persuade striking goldminers to go back to work. He failed.’ Such reporting illustrates the local nature of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, conducted almost as an afterthought to the business of government. It also demonstrates how little focus was placed upon the Prime Minister and his actions as they pertained to Anzac Day at this time. Materials in the Fraser Library Archives also
reveal that Fraser frequently liaised with the local RSLs in his electorate and helped to organise guest speakers or to have naval vessels visit local ports on Anzac Day (Fraser 1981b).

Whitlam’s Anzac Day in 1974 saw him organise his commitments in a similar manner, with the dawn service in Liverpool taking part in his seat of Werriwa. Ultimately, even Prime Ministers are in office at the pleasure of their local constituents, and Anzac Day presented an opportunity to engage with them. Anzac Day for Prime Ministers therefore often drew them back into the local politics of their electorates, in addition to demonstrating the understated and suburban nature of their participation during this period.

The Speeches of Whitlam and Fraser
Despite the fact that Prime Ministers were primarily participants on Anzac Day during this time, they did occasionally make Anzac Day addresses. Regarding frequency, only two speeches were made by Prime Ministers regarding Anzac Day between 1972 and 1987, in 1979 and 1986, and one media release was distributed, in 1984. This stands in contrast with Prime Ministerial engagement after 1990, when a speech or media release has been provided every year without exception. Often, instead of a Prime Ministerial missive being given on the lessons and values of Anzac, the business of partisan politics continued as usual, with Prime Ministers making speeches, releasing media statements, and conducting interviews regarding policy and politics unrelated to Anzac Day.

Whitlam released a statement on national heritage policy in 1974, and gave a speech and press conference in Peru on Anzac Day 1975 (Whitlam 1974b; Whitlam 1975a; Whitlam 1975b). The 1975 speech briefly alluded to Anzac Day, with Whitlam (1975a, 1) saying:

This morning I laid a wreath at your national shrine. Some of you may know that today is also the anniversary of a battle with historic, indeed sacred, significance in the minds of the Australian people. Of course our military annals have little in common, but I was reminded by this concurrence of events of just how closely the histories of our two countries are linked with Europe.

This brief allusion echoed some of the elements of later Prime Ministerial speeches with its reference to the sacredness of Anzac. Having said that, Anzac was not mentioned directly, and the date was not employed as an opportunity to discuss the significance of Anzac Day. Whitlam instead used this as a platform to launch into a longer, and somewhat speculative, speech upon the historical and cultural links between Australia and Peru.
Fraser also practiced everyday politics and policy on Anzac Day, releasing materials for the media on Anzac Day in 1976, 1977, 1978 (Fraser 1976; Fraser 1977a; 1977b; Fraser 1978). 1978 was a prominent example of the business of government continuing, despite it being Anzac Day, with Fraser in Alice Springs primarily to address policy matters regarding indigenous disadvantage. His Anzac Day commitments of attending the local Anzac Day ceremony was part of a busy schedule that also included two addresses regarding indigenous policy (Fraser 1978), meeting with indigenous Land Council representatives and local indigenous people, and later flying to Katherine (O’Neill 1978, 3). The reporting on this trip in The Australian also emphasised Fraser’s activities as they pertained to indigenous policy (O’Neill 1978, 3). Clearly, Anzac Day was only a small part of the Prime Minister’s schedule in 1978. This stands in contrast to the schedules that later occupied Prime Ministers on Anzac Day, which are full of Anzac Day commitments, especially on a significant anniversary date.

Speeches were infrequently made on Anzac Day, with only two being made, in 1979 and 1986. Fraser had wondered about the continuing significance of Anzac Day earlier in the decade, in radio broadcasts to his electorate of Wannon. In 1972, he pondered:

These days, when so many of our traditional values are being called into question, Anzac Day is perhaps a suitable time for us to consider whether those values still have application to our contemporary society.

Is patriotism an outdated concept? Or the willingness to fight for freedom for our families, ourselves and our fellow men?

Thousands of Australians have died for those principles and today we remember them.

I firmly believe those principles are as valid in today’s changing world as they ever were, and may the memory of those who have fallen constantly remind us of that (Fraser 1972, 3).

The modality of Fraser’s speech is notable. Reflecting changing public attitudes towards Anzac and the values that underpinned it, Fraser felt compelled to defend Anzac’s martial nationalism in the face of social change with his high level of commitment – ‘I firmly believe’. But, such a desire to defend Anzac’s traditional conservative meanings was abandoned the following year, when instead Fraser reconceptualised Anzac with Liberal Party values for a changed Australia:

In the old terminology, Australians fought for God, for Queen and for country, but I think if these words were analysed, it really means the people fought for the right to choose the kind of society in which they wanted to live. People fought for the right to determine their own government, for a right of choice. They fought for their families, for their wives, for their children. They fought for a better society (Fraser 1973, 1-2).
Here Fraser recognises and grapples with the datedness of Anzac. To solve this problem, he imbues Anzac with what ‘it really means’—new ideas for changing times. As such, Fraser falls back upon the traditions and philosophy of his party, filling Anzac with meaning regarding the spirit of individualism and liberty to replace its problematised traditions of God, Queen and country.

Fraser was not an Anzac entrepreneur. Instead of embracing Anzac and grasping the opportunity to fill it with new meaning for the nation, as his successors did, Fraser was reluctant to deliver Anzac Day addresses and envisage Anzac in line with either his policy agenda or a new age. Such a reluctance was unsurprising given the contestation that surrounded Anzac in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, when Fraser had been both Army and Defence Minister in the Holt and Gorton governments. Only one Anzac Day address was given by Fraser, in 1979, but its location in Esperance in Western Australia was far away from the most significant shrines of Anzac on the east coast, and it received little attention from the media. The speech is full of ‘...what were to become the stock idioms of Anzac discourse’ (Graves 2014, 181) – Gallipoli, freedom, mateship, courage, sacrifice and remembrance - but its impact was minimal. Regarding policy, Fraser’s speech affirmed Australia’s commitment to its allies:

...this day, above all, is our tribute
  To those who died
  Doing a job that had to be done,
  Doing a job to make our world safe for decent people,
  And letting it be known, by our actions, that Australia stands by its friends and doesn’t back down when the going gets tough.
  In this commemoration we remember, too,
  The allies who fought at Gallipoli, where the Anzac legend was born (Fraser 1979, 2).

Here Australians are pragmatic stoics, who had fought heroically, and did not back down when the going got tough. The emphasis upon allies was significant given the ANZUS relationship, Fraser’s hostility towards the Soviet Union (Curran 2006, 185), and continuing superpower tension during the period. Nonetheless, the single speech given during his term, and the location of the speech far away from a significant site of Anzac’s commemoration, illustrates that Fraser hardly placed Anzac at the centre of his conception of Australianess, or aligned Australia’s war history with his government’s policy agenda in any significant manner.
Hawke and the Beginnings of Anzac Entrepreneurship

In contrast to his predecessors, Hawke began to engage with Anzac and Australia’s war history in a more substantive manner. This was fairly protean in nature in the first half of the 1980s, but significant steps were taken towards Anzac entrepreneurship. In particular, this engagement occurred within the framework of Hawke’s consensus politics, where Hawke attempted to reconcile the competing groups and interests of Australian politics with his political style and institutional framework, and especially with the Prices and Incomes Accord (see Johnson 1989, 102-108; and Jaensch 1989, 161; Moore 2003). This political style was employed towards the objective of neoliberal economic reform, but it was also applied to other spheres of public policy (Economou 1993), including Vietnam veterans. Importantly for the VVA, Hawke tended to negotiate directly with the heads of interest groups and peak bodies (Moore 2003, 112).

To begin with, Hawke responded to the policy and recognition demands of the VVA via the RSL, using their national conferences to address the concerns of Vietnam veterans. The addresses both engaged the veteran community as a perceived important lobbying constituency, personalised the policy process, and helped Hawke set the policy agenda. Hawke had confronted the demands of the Vietnam veteran community soon after the tabling of the findings of the Royal Commission into the effects of Agent Orange, telling the RSL’s 1985 national conference:

> The report’s central finding is that the chemical agents, by and large, had no adverse effects on Australian personnel. The government accepts that the case for a link between Agent Orange and health problems among Vietnam Veterans has not been established.

> However, both the government and the RSL need to be aware that the physical and psychological sufferings of the Vietnam veterans are real enough, whether or not they were caused by Agent Orange. Mr Justice Evatt is clearly stating that the main task, caring for Vietnam veterans, is still continuing.

> I can assure all of you here today that we will be looking very carefully at the report’s recommendations in the light of this government’s demonstrated commitment to providing optimum care for the veterans of all wars (Hawke 1985, 6-7).

At this point, Hawke was largely reactive to the challenges being posed by the VVA. Having instituted the Royal Commission into the effects of Agent Orange early in his term as Prime Minister, there was a need to respond to its findings. However, there was also the need to manage expectations—the Royal Commission’s findings were not what the VVA had wanted, and Hawke was addressing criticism of these findings and was urging policy restraint. By presenting the government’s position to the leading returned serviceperson’s organisation, the RSL, the VVA could be kept at arm’s length and the agenda controlled. Thus we see rather unspecific and non-committal modality from Hawke – ‘we will be looking very carefully at the report’s
recommendations’ - rather than specific policy initiatives that directly addressed the VVA’s concerns regarding Agent Orange and its effects. Hawke presumably chose to present this here, as the RSL had opposed the Royal Commission in the first place (Ross 2009, 195-197) and could plausibly be considered to be more sympathetic than a hostile VVA audience. However, there was an economic imperative too - Hawke could hardly announce new spending when his government was tightening access to veterans’ disability pensions in a climate of economic uncertainty, an issue he addressed earlier in this speech (Hawke 1985, 2).

Hawke’s consensus politics was in effect in this instance – Hawke was interacting with a peak representative body, with the dissident VVA being marginalised. It was too dangerous to include the VVA when consensus was a stake. However, it was not all negative for Vietnam veterans in this period, as the seeds of recognition and reconciliation were being sown during these early years of the Hawke government. As Hawke acknowledged, veterans’ claims of suffering were ‘real enough’, and he cautioned against the RSL or government treating it as anything but. This emphasised the Vietnam veteran’s traumatic experience of war, their position as victim (Twomey 2013), and their attendant need for ‘care’. The change in tone from Fraser’s 1979 speech, where Anzac’s agents had fought heroically, is stark.

The state also began to engage with remembrance in a more substantive manner. Beginning with small steps on Anzac Day 1984, the government announced that it would take up the RSL’s suggestion that the Australian government petition the Turkish government to rename Ari burnu, the section of the Gallipoli peninsula where Australian forces landed in 1915. The Anglicised Anzac Cove was chosen as a replacement, in time for the 70th anniversary of the landings in 1985 (Hawke 1984). The government returned the favour by using the name Gallipoli Reach to title part of the shoreline of Lake Burley Griffin at the bottom of Anzac Parade in Canberra, and honoured the role of Turkish forces led by Kemal Ataturk with the Ataturk Memorial Garden in Canberra in 1985. New war memorials were also announced, constructed and unveiled along Anzac Parade in Canberra during this period. They included the National Memorial to the Royal Navy unveiled in 1986, the Australian Hellenic Memorial unveiled in 1988, the National Memorial to the Australian Army unveiled in 1989, and the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in 1992. Hawke himself was the Chairman of the Canberra National Memorials Committee during this period, and had a hand in their planning (Hawke 1986b). In 1985, the government helped send a small group of nine surviving Gallipoli veterans overseas to Anzac Cove to mark the 70th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, which was also attended by Minister for Veterans Affairs Arthur Gietzelt (Cranston 1985, 15). In 1987, the
Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Bowen also travelled to Gallipoli to mark Anzac Day (Stephens 1987, 13) and Vietnam veterans were that year ‘welcomed home’ as they led the army in the Sydney Anzac Day march, with sustained applause and cheers from the crowd (The Sun-Herald 1987, 5).

Further, Hawke made his first Anzac Day address of his term in Greece in 1986, an early example of memorial diplomacy (Graves 2014, 169-170), that being:

…the instrumentalization of sites of memory, commemorative events and national days as a vehicle for international relations. It might be defined as that dimension of diplomatic practice that seeks to materialize and mobilize a shared sense of the past at the intersection of collective memory and transnational history.

Hawke was in Europe at the time pursuing talks regarding Australia’s trade policy, and in particular seeking support for reform of the European Economic Community’s subsidisation of agricultural products that were damaging the profitability and viability of Australian exports (AAP 1986, 3). In Greece, he had raised this issue in talks with the Greek government, and had sought to reaffirm the links between Australia and Greece. Inglis (2008, 384) argues that Hawke’s personal interest in Greek (and Turkish) wartime honours was at least in part motivated by a ‘...a concern for ethnic votes’. This was reflected in Hawke’s emphasis upon the relationship between Australia and Greece in the 1986 Anzac Day address in Athens, where he recalled the sacrifice and comradeship of Greeks and Australians during World War Two:

These shared experiences from the darkest and most bitter days of defeat have, however, left lasting benefits.

For the Australians and other allies who fought alongside their Greek comrades it is the staunch friendships which were forged then.

These friendships were tested to the utmost limits and have endured. They endure not only among those who fought but have been passed down to the men and women of succeeding generations (Hawke 1986a, 3).

Here Hawke takes on the role of national leader, speaking on behalf of the nation and imbuing Anzac with meaning for the Australian people – ‘friendship’ between allies. Simultaneously, though, Hawke is inhabiting the role of world leader, representing Australia to the world and building the relationship with Greece, with the friendship between the nations ‘enduring’ and being ‘passed down’. Finally, Hawke is alluding to his role as a policy advocate and relationship builder to sections of the domestic audience in Australia, as the Greek diaspora in Australia was an important constituency for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) during the 1980s.
The speech also reflects some of the newly fashioned meanings of Anzac as conveyed by Gammage and Weir in popular culture (see above). In particular was the more critical view on the role of the British in the campaign:

On this day, seventy-one years ago, Australian and New Zealand soldiers landed on the shores of Turkey and Gallipoli, many thousands of miles from their homeland, to fight in a war not of their making. They became, under a British General, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and are remembered by that name. It was the first time the Australians fought as a nation and it was a time which revealed so much of the Australian character – determined spirit, mateship and egalitarianism (Hawke 1986a, 1).

Instead of fighting for God, Queen and country, as Fraser had incisively characterised the traditional meaning of Anzac, the Anzacs now were at Gallipoli ‘to fight in a war not of their making’, commanded by a ‘British General’, but where they also found their national, not their Imperial, ‘Australian character – determined spirit, mateship and egalitarianism’. And instead of imbuing Anzac with a martial nationalism, Hawke ends the speech by invoking the International Year of Peace. The speech illustrates how Hawke was beginning to engage Anzac in a more substantive and entrepreneurial manner, and reflected newly emerging ideas about Anzac. So, whilst Anzac was still a contested national narrative during the first half of the 1980s, tensions were beginning to ease, and the space for reconciliation with Vietnam veterans, and incorporation of their experience into Anzac, was opening up.

**Welcome Home: Vietnam Veterans and Reconciliation**

It was in this setting of easing tension regarding Australia’s military service record that Vietnam veterans in Australian picked up on the idea of a welcome home parade similar to the ones conducted in the United States, where veterans would march through city streets to a welcoming and appreciative public. Having been floated as a possibility after the precedential American parades in 1986, an organising committee was set up and was supported by veterans organisations, the NSW RSL, and several local Sydney government representatives (Doyle 2002, 86). The welcome home parade in Sydney in 1987 was significant, as it was the tipping point in the reconciliation between veterans, the government and the wider public.

Hawke took up the proposal for a welcome home parade enthusiastically, telling the August 1987 RSL conference:
I firmly believe that the October parade will be the culmination of a long process of reconciliation and community acceptance of its obligations to the veterans of Vietnam.

I believe we must honestly acknowledge that our involvement in Vietnam did cause deep divisions in the Australian community.

But whatever our individual views on the merits of Australian involvement, we must equally acknowledge the commitment, courage and integrity of our armed forces who served in Vietnam.

No one should have ever questioned those characteristics – nor should anyone ever have questioned our community obligations to the Vietnam veterans (Hawke 1987, 5).

The sincerity of this reconciliation is emphasised by Hawke’s modality and high level personal commitment ‘I firmly believe’; ‘I believe’. The terms of the reconciliation are unambiguous and declarative - ‘No one should have questioned’ - and the imperativeness of the cause is emphasised ‘no one’; ‘we must’. The sincerity of Hawke’s invocation both reflected and reinforced the reconciliatory narrative of the day, situated as it was within Hawke’s wider discourse of national policy consensus and reconciliation.

Thus, on October 3, 1987, around 22,000 Vietnam veterans marched in the welcome home parade through the streets of Sydney (Ross 2009, 212). It was estimated that the parade was watched by a crowd of up to 100,000, including Hawke, and that it stood up to ten deep along the parade route in some places (The Sydney Morning Herald 1987, 4). The marchers carried more than 500 Australian flags, each flag representing a serviceman who had lost his life during the Vietnam War. These simple acts represented the reconciliatory nature of the event—the flags, standing for the nation-state, were accepted as a proper symbol for the fallen by the veterans and symbolised their reconciliation with the body politic that they felt had rejected their rightful place in the Anzac narrative after the end of the Vietnam conflict. The large crowd that watched and cheered the parade, including the head of government, Prime Minister Hawke, demonstrated the sincere regret the community felt at the treatment of Vietnam veterans and their welcoming into the Anzac tradition. Some veterans rejected Hawke’s presence by declining to give eyes right (the drill command for acknowledging and saluting commanders and dignitaries) as they marched by Hawke, perhaps remembering his role as ACTU president at the time when waterside workers defied ACTU policy and refused to unload a navy vessel in response to the Mỹ Lai massacre, Hawke’s own publically stated opposition to the war (Curran 2006, 222) or the ALP’s more generalised opposition to the conflict. However, this was the only tense moment of the day reported, and the media recollections of the event were glowing in their appraisal of the day’s positive significance (Walker 1987, 2; The Sydney Morning Herald 1987, 4). Despite apprehension and some continued resentment, most veterans reacted positively too, with one recalling ‘I’m no longer ashamed to say
that I’m a Vietnam veteran. No longer will I hang my head. The people of Sydney made sure of that’ (Giblett 1990, 69).

The use of Australian flags to represent fallen soldiers and Hawke’s endorsement as the head of government, signified the reconciliation of the state with Vietnam veterans and their incorporation into Anzac. The terms of this reconciliation are what Schaap (2005, 13) calls restorative justice. Under this concept, an offender has violated the established norms and limits of acceptability of their community. The wrong-doer, having recognised the injustice of their actions and felt the guilt associated with such a violation, seeks to right their wrong via repentance – a disowning of their prior actions and attendance to their wrongdoing through apology, reparation and penance. Having sufficiently attended to these rituals, and the victim having accepted that the wrongdoer is sufficiently chastened and willing to accept community norms, results in the offender being forgiven and the parties are consequently reconciled.

Schaap argues that this process of restorative justice insufficiently addresses competing political interests:

In these terms, the reconcilability of political conflict is taken for granted. By promoting social harmony as an unconditional public good, the terms within which this unity is constituted are presented as unambiguous. Consequently, the representational space in which the terms of reconciliation itself might be contested is diminished (Schaap, 2005, 20).

Reconciliation is here unification – a redeeming of a painful past in order to pursue a common future (Schaap 2005, 18). Restorative justice is unpolitical – it requires forgetting the contingent and political basis of the reconciliation between formerly adversarial parties (Schaap 2005, 21), and institutes a form of reconciliation that purports to be essential and incontestable. It is an active form of depoliticisation that newly demarcates a sphere of social relations where the political behaviour of deliberation and contestation is taboo and conflict remains latent.

The notion of restorative justice leading to an unpolitical reconciliation is of particular importance on this occasion. Having marginalised the experience of Vietnam veterans, excising them from the discursive narrative of Anzac and allowing Anzac as a central national narrative to wither, the state, along with the Australian body politic, had committed a grievous wrong against established societal norms. To repent, elaborate public rituals of atonement, such as the Royal Commission into the use of Agent Orange, the welcome home parade, and the Vietnam Veterans war memorial that was announced in 1988 and opened in 1992, are all used to redress the sins of the past. This atonement
is repeated by the celebratory and nationalistic observance of Anzac Day every year, as a reminder not to violate these principles again and restoring the order that had been disturbed.

However, the nature of restorative justice precludes any contestation of the terms of the reconciliation. The offender cannot contest the terms of the reconciliation because to do so would fail to show the adequate level of repentance and enrage the victim, causing further, if not more, hurt. This has had profound continuing effects, as Anzac has become a sacred, untouchable, and therefore unpolitical, political discourse. Opposition was marginalised as the conservative and militaristic tendencies of Anzac were restored. Those who might have opposed the utilisation of militaristic imagery as the foundational story of nationhood now faced powerful taboos that sanctioned such courses of action, as opposition may open old wounds once again. An unpolitical form of Anzac had consequences for Vietnam veterans too - their continuing claims to policy action by government and incorporation of their particular and uncomfortable experience of war is subsumed in an official, state driven, and sanitised story of the Anzac tradition centred on the original landings at Gallipoli in 1915.

So, after the 1987 welcome home parade, the public expression of the contestability of Anzac declined. Anzac becomes an uncontested ideograph – a culturally situated and well understood rhetorical device, but one that is also malleable and unspecific. As McGee (1980, 15) notes:

Each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the society. A degree of tolerance is usual, but people are expected to understand ideographs within a range of usage thought to be acceptable. The society will inflict penalties on those who use ideographs in heretical ways and on those who refuse to respond appropriately to claims on their behavior warranted through the agency of ideograph.

Thus, after the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans and the Australian public, powerful social taboos existed to sanction the use of Anzac in ways that did not exist in the recent past. Protests, such the ones led by WAR activists, fell away. The 70th anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli in 1985, and especially the 75th anniversary in 1990 saw renewed interest in Anzac and ideographic representation of Anzac’s evolving meaning, as Anzac entrepreneurship by Hawke and his government began to emerge. Elites like Hawke and his successors then employed the authority and resources of the state to define and promote the terms which the body politic could engage with this central national narrative and projected their own elite agenda onto this newly unpolitical discursive realm.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the evolution of Anzac from the election of the Whitlam government in 1972 to the welcome home parade for Vietnam veterans in 1987. Prime Ministers’ engagement with Anzac during this period reflected the ambivalent nature of Anzac, as the limits and appropriateness of this sphere of national identity were interrogated and contested by a range of political and cultural agents. Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser did not ignore Anzac, but their engagement was more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular than became the norm after 1990. Hawke also reflected these tendencies at times, but began to demonstrate signs of Anzac entrepreneurship.

This chapter has further argued that the period from about 1980 to 1987 saw the reconciliation of previously marginalised Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian public, and the (re)establishment of Anzac as a central, and now also unpolitical, Australian nationalist discourse whose essentialism was taken for granted. Hawke enthusiastically supported this reconciliation, as it fitted well with his wider political and policy style of consensus. This reconciliation was not neutral, however, as its form of restorative justice depoliticised Anzac and precluded the contestation of its terms that had been occurring during the 1980s and, further, instituted powerful taboos against the violation of this reconciliation.

The newly unpolitical version of Anzac ushered in by reconciliation had continuing effects regarding Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and this is its crucially significant legacy. The period from 1990 saw continued Anzac entrepreneurship by Hawke, and his successors, but this took a particular form due to the terms of restorative justice. Importantly, the politics of Anzac did not disappear after this point, but its public expression tended to centre on the conservative policing of the boundaries defined by this state-orientated version of Anzac, rather than on the agenda of social movement or Vietnam veteran activists. Maintaining the unpolitical nature of Anzac involved the emphasis upon the original landings at Gallipoli, and failed to emphasise Vietnam. It further tended to emphasise the state-orientated Anzac tradition, rather than the victimhood and trauma of war that new discourses surrounding the Vietnam War and war remembrance did. Above all, this newly unpolitical version of Anzac was operationalised by Prime Ministers as an ideograph - ripe with meaning and significance regarding national identity, but also unspecific and malleable. In sum, the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian public that the Hawke government had endorsed and encouraged was the tipping point where a newly depoliticised and unpolitical version
of Anzac emerged, a crucial factor in the steps towards more explicit Anzac entrepreneurship by Hawke and his successors.
CHAPTER 5

Hawke and Anzac as Ideograph: Economic Reform, Multiculturalism and Foreign Policy

Introduction

Now that the conditions in which Anzac entrepreneurship could occur have been established, a finer grained analysis of the individual Anzac entrepreneurs of Hawke, Keating, and Howard may be conducted. This chapter seeks to explore Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship from 1988-1991, having preaced Hawke’s consensual governing style and explained how Anzac evolved from a contested to an unpolitical nationalist discourse in Chapter 4. Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship involved the instrumental promotion of policy initiatives, and attempts to head off contestation. Further, Hawke’s engagement with Anzac had a constitutive effect regarding national identity after 1987, as Anzac once again became a central nationalist discourse. However, Anzac did not remain static or frozen in time. Whilst Hawke’s engagement with Anzac generally conformed to the genre boundaries of the Anzac tradition, it also took a new form that reflected the policy priorities of the Hawke government – economic liberalism, middle power activism, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism.

These changes occurred within the context of the profound reforms to Australian society and policy that were occurring during the 1980s and 1990s, neatly summarised by Kelly (1994) as the abandonment of the Australian Settlement. Stokes’ (2004, 19-20) critique and reformulation of Kelly’s construction of the Australian Settlement included ‘...the following nine clusters of political ideas and policies: White Australia; Terra Nullius; State Secularism; Masculinism; Australian Democracy; State Developmentalism; Arbitration; Welfare Minimalism; Imperial Nationalism.’ All these areas either experienced considerable initial reformation during Hawke’s term in government, or the Hawke government grappled with the consequences of their ongoing change, which provided the context of destabilised national identity that is necessary for successful nationalism entrepreneurship. The chapter will thus focus on how Hawke aligned Anzac with reforms to the Australian Settlement centred on the areas of economics, multiculturalism and national identity, and foreign policy.
Hawke faced little challenge to his engagement with Anzac, and he embraced Anzac entrepreneurship. How he came to be in this position will be explored in four main sections that provide the necessary conditions for this to occur:

1. The first section outlines Hawke’s consensus politics, the prism that defined Hawke’s approach to government, and his Anzac entrepreneurship. The ‘unpolitics’ of consensus helped Hawke to define the parameters that Anzac took, and helped to prevent contestation of this nationalist narrative.

2. This section sets out some of the economic, cultural, and foreign policy problems the Hawke government faced. In particular, it looks at domestic economic reform, international trade and defence policy in a changing world, and government policy regarding multiculturalism. All these areas experienced considerable change during Hawke’s term in government. I argue here that these policy challenges led Hawke to define Australianness in a manner that emphasised the people’s commitment to Australia’s economic competitiveness.

3. In the third section, I will explore the relative difficulty Hawke had in mobilising this conception of Australianness in a celebratory manner for the Bicentenary. The Bicentenary had attracted contestation as the symbolism of the celebration of white settlement had deeply ambivalent meaning, given the destruction that had been wrought upon Indigenous peoples in Australia’s modern history, and its continuing legacy. This challenged Hawke’s consensual political style, and his notion of competitive Australianness and commitment to the state.

4. In contrast to the difficulties that Hawke faced with the Bicentenary, he was successful with his Anzac entrepreneurship. This section explores how Anzac was utilised instrumentally and constitutively during these national occasions. I firstly set out some of the features of Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses. I then argue that the newly reconciled and unpolitical Anzac post-1987 offered a golden opportunity to present a universalising and celebratory form of nationalism and national identity during a time when this form of nationalism was becoming evidently unstable. Further, I argue that Hawke’s success at employing Anzac instrumentally and constitutively set a precedent for Anzac’s future use and also demonstrated its potential to future Prime Ministers. Nevertheless, Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses in 1989 and 1991 reveal little of the ceremony evident in 1990, or later Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, demonstrating the still inchoate nature of Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac.
Ultimately, changes to Australian politics and society demanded new forms of Australian identity. Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship was able to successfully fulfil the need for a reformulated version of Australian nationalism that referenced his own nationalist vision because the newly depoliticised and unpolitical version of Anzac after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans operated as an uncontested and popular nationalist narrative suitable for consensus building.

Hawke: Reconciliation, Consensus and the Governing of Group Claims
The Hawke government had been elected in 1983 under the slogan ‘Bringing Australia Together’. The slogan appealed to concerns regarding the divisions rent to the Australian polity by Fraser’s term in office, but its more lasting consequence in government was a discursive call for unity, consensus and reconciliation. This appeal to consensus was especially concerned with the corporatist mediation of labour, business and government interests (Johnson 1989, 103) and the management of dissent, with the goal being the introduction of economic reforms that would secure a healthy capitalist economy. This was to be achieved through negotiation and bargaining ‘and the creation of a forum [the Prices and Incomes Accord] for resolving the divisions which distract groups from satisfying their shared material aspirations’ (Mills 1993, 26).

Hawke’s consensus politics was linked to electoralism (Jaensch 1989, 157-160; Gunther and Diamond 2001, 25-29). Electoralism requires a party to see politics through the eyes of the electorate and play to the catch-all imperatives that this demands (Jaensch 1989, 158). Doctrinaire ideology has little place in this conception of electoral politics, as electoralism demands that parties are cautious when formulating policy and that they work towards the interests and desires of the electorate. Negative reactions from the public are considered and tested for through opinion polling and surveying, and policy initiatives that are found to cause damage to a government’s standing are modified or dropped. Consensus fitted well with electoralism: ‘It carried a mood of togetherness, of rational resolution of any disputes, and made possible the smothering of any criticism merely by labelling it as “not working for consensus”’ (Jaensch 1989, 161). This saw the ALP seek out a range of constituencies and interest groups as supporters, broadening its support base beyond the confines of its labourist traditions.

Consensus limits and denies politics (see Mouffe 1999, 754-757; Little 2007, 154-158; Maddison 2014, 200-201). In Hawke’s case, consensus had two important discursive consequences; first, it built a powerful claim to incumbency based upon the delivery of a mediated and consensual agreement between the forces of labour and business regarding the mutual goal of material well-
being. Second, it discursively excluded political action by those who might oppose this conception of government action, as opposition to consensus, self-interest and the attainment of material security was illogical, churlish or unequivocally dangerous. Consensus was the framework that Hawke attempted to apply to both the Bicentenary and to Anzac, but it was the unpolitical Anzac after the reconciliation with Vietnam veterans that proved to be the more successful nationalist discourse, as contestation of Anzac was now taboo.

**The Hawke Government’s Policy Challenges**

The following briefly introduces some of the policy challenges that the Hawke government faced. In many ways, these policy challenges destabilised the Australian Settlement in the areas of the domestic economy, international trade and defence policy, and multiculturalism. Further, the dismantling of the Australian Settlement destabilised conceptions of Australianness based upon its assumptions.

**The Economy**

Hawke presided over a period of significant domestic economic turbulence. The recession which brought him to power in 1983, and its mildly Keynesian expansionist response, mutated into a balance of payments crisis by 1985, a speculative boom in the second half the 1980s, and again into crisis with the recession of 1991-92. These crises brought about a radical change in perspective regarding the governability of the national economy and the Hawke government responded to this by applying neo-liberal economic principles, which saw the post-war economic consensus, and its associated state-driven and expansionist policy prescription to economic management, as the problem.

At the macro-economic level, the government found early in its term that the financial regulation which had underpinned the post-war Keynesian consensus was becoming increasingly difficult to manage (Kelly 1994, 80-83). In response, the government decided to take a hands-off approach to the governing of finance and floated the dollar and abolished controls over the exchange rate in December 1983. Further changes occurred in 1984/85 with the abandonment of interest rate controls and the opening of the Australian market to foreign banks (Bell 1997, 143-144). The opening up of the economy forced market discipline upon the government, and the Accord, which originally had served a mildly expansionist purpose with its promise of compensating wage restraint with an increase to the social wage, became increasingly a tool with which the ALP exercised discipline over the labour movement. The argument was that Australia needed to improve its
international competitiveness and the Accord became a vehicle for wage moderation (Bell 1997, 186-187). Having said that, the Accord also reflected the ALP’s labourist roots, driven as it was by the professed end goal of enabling economic growth to ensure the security of all (Johnson 1989, 98).

Furthering the hands-off, deregulationist, policy initiatives at the macro-economic level was the interrelated opening up of the micro-economy of Australia in the 1980s. Bell (1997) argues that this took the form of substantial tariff cuts to the historically heavily protected Australian manufacturing sector. Further, sectoral reform aimed at opening up these areas of the economy to market forces by applying privatisation, corporatisation and cost reduction (Bell 1997, 216). Some of the costs associated with these reforms were mediated through an industry policy that was aimed at easing the pain of sectoral reform and encouraging growth in new, value-added industries, in combination with an international trade policy that argued for international tariff reduction. However, these changes also decimated Australia’s manufacturing sector and little occurred to replace it with the elaborately transformed manufactures that underpinned many competing Western and emerging Asian economies.

*Foreign and Defence Policy*

The 1980s and early 1990s was a time when the international context, and Australia’s place within it, was radically changing too. The economic reform outlined above entailed the opening up of the Australian economy to international economic forces, but there was no guarantee the national economy would automatically benefit from international trade. The problem became economic security, and the imperative was the creation of an internationally competitive national economy in order to secure national prosperity (Hindess 1998, 220-221). It was this pursuit of security that drove the Hawke government’s engagement with the international marketplace, in order to capitalise on the competitive advantages that Australia naturally had and abandon those which were holding competitive advantage back. Thus, protection for Australia’s industry was unilaterally wound back in order to open up Australian industry to international competition in order to reduce the drain on government. New markets were sought in Asia for Australian goods and services, as it was recognised that relying on the traditional imperial trading links could no longer ensure prosperity. Multilateral activism within the Eighth (Uruguay) Round of GATT negotiations was also undertaken, in order to pursue global trade reform towards free markets. This was especially important for Australian agricultural producers – an area where Australia was identified as having a competitive advantage in the global marketplace (Higgott 1992, 134).
Hawke’s term in office also coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War. The problem of the US defeat in the Vietnam War and its withdrawal from the region was still being grappled with by defence planners when the Hawke government came to power in 1983 (Cheeseman 1992, 63). The Dibb report of 1986, and the subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper, criticised the old defence doctrine of ‘forward defence’ in support of allies in distant lands to ensure Australian security. To replace it was defence self-reliance, with a greater focus on the defence of continental Australia, a reorientation of Australia’s defence posture to the north of the continent, and an emphasis on Australia’s commitment to the UN, international law, and multilateral solutions to international conflicts. This was, however, still firmly within the context of ANZUS, and in August 1990 Hawke quickly reverted to old patterns of forward defence when he committed Australian naval ships to the Gulf War. This commitment was ostensibly due to a phone call from US President Bush, though it seems clear that the decision to commit Australian personnel was reached before this phone call (Cockburn 1992, 43), evoking memories of Australia’s enthusiasm to join the Vietnam War. Further, defence planners faced funding restrictions that meant that defence procurement did not match the ambition of the defence self-reliance policy documents (Cheeseman 1992, 76). These instances demonstrate that whilst the ALP pursued multilateralism and supported international organisations when attempting to ensure Australia’s trading advantage, its defence planning was far more circumspect and tended to remain true to previous defence traditions.

Multiculturalism and National Identity

The changes to the Australian Settlement outlined above contributed to the changing support base and make-up of the ALP. The removal of tariffs, the privatisation and/or contraction of government services and utilities, and the drive towards a service orientated economy, created significant economic hardship for the ALP’s traditional, male and blue-collar base. Further, the catch-all electoralism that drove the ALP during Hawke’s term in office (Jaensch 1989) led the ALP to seek out a broad coalition of interest groups and supporters, and attempt to reconcile the competing demands of its working class base, its progressive middle class, supporters, and the specific policy concerns of ethnic constituencies which made up a significant proportion of its electoral support in certain capital city seats (Jupp 2000).

However, the Hawke government faced tensions regarding the rate of immigration and multiculturalism in the climate of economic difficulty. In 1984, historian Geoffrey Blainey ignited a race debate in Australia by questioning the rate of Asian immigration and the Australian public’s ability to integrate these new communities, and in 1988, Opposition leader John Howard questioned
the rate of Asian immigration, and expressed his preference to slow it if it began to threaten social cohesion. The release of *Immigration: a Commitment to Australia* (the Fitzgerald report), which had prompted Howard’s remarks, also identified significant community concern about the immigration program and government failure to guide public opinion. The report noted that ‘[i]t is the Australian identity that matters most in Australia. And if the Government will affirm that strongly, multiculturalism might seem less divisive and threatening’ (Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies 1988, 10-11). The report recommended a reorientation of the immigration program to more sharply reflect the national interest and emphasised the commitments that immigrants were obliged to undertake as Australian residents. More specifically, and amongst other recommendations, the report advised that immigrant selection methods needed a competitive and economic focus, involving the selection of skilled, entrepreneurial and youthful immigrants with competent English skills who could contribute to the process of economic reform (Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies 1988, 90).

In response, the government released *The National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: sharing our future* policy document in 1989. The report emphasised economic imperatives, noting that it was developed in the context of economic restraint and with efficiency in mind (Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989, v). Multiculturalism had three dimensions:

1. cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion;
2. social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth; and
3. economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilize effectively the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background (Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989, vii).

But multiculturalism also had limits – as Jakubowicz (1989, 263-264) has noted, the state in Australia has played a particularly important role in patrolling and policing the acceptable borders and limits of national identity, both in a direct and coercive manner for immigrants, but also in terms which have signalled clearly to white Australia ‘...what it means to be an acceptable Australian.’ Thus, the policy document noted that ‘multicultural policies are based upon the premise that all Australians should have an overriding commitment to Australia, to its interests and future first and foremost’ (Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989, vii), which translated to acceptance of basic liberal civic virtues, in addition to an individual commitment to the liberalisation of the economy. Thus, the new agenda
for multiculturalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s had two core components – first, the state’s liberal toleration of difference, in return for acquiescence to the liberal values of the state; and second, the need for multiculturalism and the immigration program to reflect the economic imperatives of the late 1980s.

The Competitive Australian

In sum, the 1980s saw a radical shift in the political economy of Australia and its place in a changing world, and this change had profound effects for the conception of Australian national identity. The changing rationality of rule regarding the governability of the national economy in the context of globalising markets and the attendant discourse of economic insecurity and crisis meant that the Hawke government strove to open up the Australian economy to the forces of the marketplace in order to impose economic efficiency and encourage international competitiveness. National identity needed to change to accommodate this shift – no longer could Australia be inward-looking, parochial or overtly racist. Thus, the solution for the Hawke government during this period was to place the ethnically diverse, cosmopolitan, competitive, and self-maximising, individual working towards the economic good of the nation-state at the centre of Australian national identity. The ‘commitment to Australia’ featured as a disciplining discourse of national identity and purpose. Immigrants who could meet this need would be welcomed regardless of ethnicity, and Australian residents of all ethnic and class backgrounds were called upon to take up this new challenge as their patriotic duty. Multiculturalism here reflected the tension that the ALP’s catch-all imperative drew out, as it sought to discipline the various groups who supported the ALP, and their policy demands.

Attempting to put the Competitive Australian into Practice: The Bicentennial

Hawke attempted to mobilise the discourse of ‘commitment to Australia’ and the competitive Australian during the Bicentennial, but was largely unsuccessful in national consensus building. The occasion was riven by political contestation and Hawke consequently found it difficult to find universal values to base consensus upon. Preparations for the 1988 Bicentenary were characterised from the start by disagreement and contestation as to the meaning of the day (Warhurst 1987, 9). The Australian Bicentennial Authority (ABA), as the primary organising authority of the Bicentennial, had tried to balance the competing and contested demands of the day - the desire to celebrate the successes of the nation and the need to acknowledge the unequal power relationships that these successes were built upon and represented. This tension provided ammunition for critics dissatisfied with the ABA’s approach to the organisation and marking of the day. From the right, conservative critics levelled claims that the ABA was unnecessarily playing down the success and achievement of
the nation in the past 200 years and that Australia’s key cultural values were being lost or attacked. These subverted and marginalised values included the British connection and monarchy, Westminster democracy, liberal freedoms and even the Anzac tradition. To replace them, the conservative critics argued, was a vision of ‘...Australia as a land of incoherent diversity without unifying traditions and values’ (Hutchinson 1992, 17). From left leaning critics came an opposing set of challenges to the event:

Critiques of the commercialisation of public rituals, of the anti-democratic nature of such mass celebrations, of the tactlessness of celebrating white settlement at all, of the Philistinism inherent in a popular rather than a more highbrow calendar of events, of the predictability and repressiveness of the dominant discourses used to represent Australian nationalism – all provided potentially powerful angles of analysis, no matter what form the Bicentenary ultimately took (Turner 1994, 70).

Most prominent and powerful of all the critiques, however, was the challenge to the day posed by Indigenous Australians – the ancestors of those who had been dispossessed of their land by the white settlement of Australia in 1788 and who continued to face discrimination and disadvantage in the contemporary context.

The role of Indigenous Australians in the Bicentennial celebration proved to be a significant challenge to official, state-driven discourses of Australianess. As Hage (2002, 421) notes, the origins of Australia as a white nation, and the accompanying genocidal practices which established white hegemony throughout the continent, ‘haunt’ the Australian psyche. When Indigenous Australians do challenge white political and cultural dominance in Australia, it proves to be an uncomfortable reminder of past injustice for those Australians whose wealth and political dominance relies upon these constitutive genocidal actions. The Bicentennial proved to be one of those occasions where the collective attention of the nation was forced to focus on the colonial violence that had established the Australian state. As a consequence, Spillman (1997, 114-115) notes ‘Australian organizers avoided talk of the first settlement they were commemorating because they feared, from the beginning, the opposition it would evoke from Aboriginal activists and their supporters, who called Australia Day “Invasion Day” and demonstrated accordingly.’ Further, the organisers were anxious that the occasion would draw appropriate, and legitimating, international attention (Spillman, 1997 107-108), and these international observers were politely interested in how Australia was addressing these past injustices. The significance of the occasion, coupled with the international attention, therefore gave Aboriginal activists the opportunity to challenge the meaning of the Bicentennial in a very public forum.
The public challenge to the Bicentenary centred on two marches in support of Indigenous rights and in opposition to an optimistic and uncritical celebration of the day - one march solely for Indigenous participants, and one march that included both Indigenous participants and their supporters. Issues of consequence which were being contested in these marches included land rights, continued Indigenous disadvantage and discrimination, and the rejection of the Bicentennial as a celebration, and its competing representation as a year of Mourning. As Turner (1994, 87) argues, the protests by Indigenous Australians and their supporters on Australia Day 1988 helped to problematise the conception of Australianness and open it up to a more contested, ambiguous and just form.

This contested, ambiguous sense of national identity presented a problem for Hawke and the utilisation of his standard consensus discourse. This problem was two-fold – firstly, the occasion had descended into at times ugly partisan squabble over the right way to celebrate (or commemorate) the event. As mentioned, conservative critics from within and outside the Coalition, but largely lining up along party lines, had challenged the ALP’s organisation of the occasion. The ALP had helped to engender this sense of partisanship by removing, or failing to renew, the service of several Fraser-era ABA board members, the general manager, and the chairman of the board, and instead replacing them with people of their own choosing. Further, the Authority placed under closer government supervision in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Warhurst 1987, 16-17). Secondly, was the question of how to incorporate the experiences, values and expectations of the ALP’s traditionally socially conservative blue-collar base, its multicultural immigrant support base, and its middle class progressive supporters. Despite the challenges faced by Indigenous Australians in translating their small numbers into electoral clout, their experiences and demands were especially important in this coalition. As such, they challenged the relatively stable negotiated settlement between ALP constituencies, as the constitutive genocidal acts which had established the white settlement of Australia, and the consequently unequal power relationship this had established, were acknowledged.

The difficulty for Hawke was finding universal values upon which to establish consensus. As Cochrane and Goodman (1992, 175) point out ‘[t]he Bicentenary would have been far less trying had it come at a high point in the Menzies era: then we could have had a solid statement of good government, cultural homogeneity and consensus. The idea of “nation”, then, was ontologically secure.’ Hawke settled on ‘a commitment to Australia’ (anticipating the Fitzgerald report) as being the universalising value of Australianness and frequently asserted this during the Bicentenary events as the only universally defining feature of an Australian. On the steps of the Opera House in Sydney
on Australia Day 1988, Hawke gave his set speech to Australia regarding the meaning of the Bicentenary, and the commitment to Australia theme featured prominently in a hierarchy of importance. Hawke began this address by saying:

We begin these celebrations in no spirit of boastfulness or national self-glorification.
This is a day of commemoration.
Even more important, it is a day of commitment...
But, my fellow Australians, today I use the word “commitment” in a special sense.
For, our commitment to Australia is, in a very real way, the quality which best defines what it means to be an Australian in 1988 (Hawke 1988a, 1-2).

In reference to the contestation of the occasion posed by Indigenous Australians, soberness in remembrance of past (unnamed) injustice is present, justified as appropriate, and in turn, crass jingoism is also rejected as an option. However, commemoration is placed as a lesser value to commitment by the hypotaxis of the clauses, with the subordinate clause ‘even more important’ before the following main clause ‘it is a day of commitment’. This is further emphasised by Hawke’s aligning of commitment to a ‘special’ and ‘best’ definition of Australianness. A hierarchy of meaning was being created by Hawke for the purpose of subordinating the contestation of the day to Hawke’s own message of commitment, and Indigenous rejection of the occasion is unmentioned.

Hawke continued his speech by listing a set a characteristics and values which linked Australia of 1988 to its past:

What is it that links us...?
It is not only the fact that, for the past 200 years, and to this day, we have been a nation of immigrants.
It is not only the fact that we share together this vast continent as our homeland.
It is not only the shared inheritance of all that has been built here, over the past 200 years.
And it is not only the common bond of institutions, standards, language and culture.
Indeed, in today’s Australia, our very diversity is an ever growing source of the richness, vitality and strength of our community.
It is true that all these things I have mentioned go to shape the Australian character and define the Australian identity (Hawke 1998a, 2-3).

Here, Hawke listed the concerns and expectations of other groups competing for recognition in the Bicentenary. Ethnic groups and immigrants were assured that ‘our very diversity is an ever growing source of the richness, vitality and strength of our community’. An effort to placate conservative critics was attempted by the reference to ‘the common bond of institutions, standards, language and
culture’. However, the attempt to incorporate competing interests into the meaning of the Bicentenary implicitly acknowledged the contestation of the occasion and failed to meet the criteria of a universalising message. Hawke attempted to overcome this problem by again subordinating these competing claims to the commitment to Australia. As Spillman (1997, 126; emphasis added) has noted ‘[o]ganizers [of the Bicentenary] adopted rhetoric and programs which claimed diversity as characteristic of national identity, and addressed especially those groups from whom they feared criticism... characterizing the nation as diverse was a central rhetorical strategy for representing unity across difference.’ Hawke finished his address by emphasising this unity across difference:

Yet beyond them, there remains one vital factor in the answer to the question: Who is an Australian?
And that factor is: A commitment to Australia and its future.
It is that common commitment which binds the Australian-born of the seventh or eighth generation and all those of their fellow-Australians born in any of the 130 countries from which our peoples are drawn.
In Australia, there is no hierarchy of descent; there must be no privilege of origin.
The commitment is all.
The commitment to Australia is the only thing needful to be a true Australian.
Today in this historic place and at this historic hour, let us renew that commitment, our commitment to Australia and Australia’s cause – the cause of freedom, fairness, justice and peace (Hawke 1988a, 3-4).

Commitment here served as a universalising value, but it also neutralised critique and flattened difference. Significant political and competing claims, whilst for the most part not rejected outright, were, subordinate to the message of commitment, and their contestation was not allowed to spill over into the assumed meaning of the occasion or of Australianness. This revealed a tension in the logic of the competitive Australian - whilst Australia may have been diverse, and while Australians may have disagreed, Australians were all still somehow working towards the same end goal. This goal was left deliberately vague and presented as a set of uncontroversial liberal democratic ideographs – ‘the cause of freedom, fairness, justice and peace’.

The connection to neoliberal economic reform and the competitive Australian was made more explicit in Hawke’s address to the National Press Club four days prior to Australia Day and in his release to the media for Australia Day, 1988. On both occasions he referred explicitly to the way Australians had met the challenges posed by economic reform:
The world has seen that Australians are a people of great courage and determination who are unafraid of meeting a challenge. We can all feel proud of our country, for whether it is in matters of domestic economy, in the international arena, the arts, science, medicine, or on the sports field, we have proved time and again that Australians are achievers...

Australia’s successful progress into the twenty first century depends so much on the efforts of every single Australian, regardless of our origins, wherever we live (Hawke, 1988a, 1).

And:

The reality is that our prosperity will not be handed to us on a platter. We will have to match and better the productivity, the product quality, the creativity and the entrepreneurial flair of the world’s best across all sections of the economy, even those not directly engaged in trade.

This is a task for all of us. It is not one we can take lightly. It is one which can be facilitated by the actions of Government but in the end must be executed by individuals (Hawke 1988b, 8).

Thus, the success of Australia depended on the republican commitment of Australians to their civic duty, ‘all of us’ and ‘every single Australian’. Whilst not all Australians could be expected to contribute to the fields of arts, science or sports, all Australians could be called upon to ensure economic productivity – ‘even those not directly engaged in trade’. This was part of the solution to the problem of economic security identified by Hindess (1998, 223, emphasis added):

The pursuit of national economic security now seems to require that an overwhelming priority be placed on competitive economic efficiency. As a result, anything (welfare, health services, schooling and higher education) which might seem to have a bearing on economic life is assessed not only in terms of the availability of resources, but also in terms of their consequences for promoting or inhibiting the pursuit of national economic efficiency. Thus, in what is often seen as an ‘economic rationalist’ or ‘neo-liberal’ attack on the welfare state, the concern is not simply to save money but also to promote more efficient patterns of individual and organisational behaviour by bringing market relationships into what had once been regarded as non-market spheres of allocation.

Thus, the competitive Australian was to be always in the entrepreneurial search of a way to monetise their actions, in order to ensure the prosperity of the nation. The commitment to the economic health and vitality of the nation was the lesson of the Bicentenary.

The difficulties Hawke, and the Bicentennial, faced should not be overstated. Many Australians participated in the Australia Day celebrations – by watching the tall ships enter Sydney Harbour, listening to the speeches made by Prince Charles, Hawke and the Governor General Sir Ninian Martin Stephen at Bennelong Point, spending the day on boats or the on foreshore around the harbour, or watching the fireworks and entertainment that ended official proceedings in the evening. By some estimations, one and half million crowded into Sydney on January 26th to participate in the events (Turner 1994, 70). As Turner (1994, 71) notes:
There is overwhelming evidence from the press, television, film and radio talkback that Australians participated in large numbers in Australia Day 1988 and experienced that participation as a source of deep national pride and exhilaration... for many Australians the Bicentenary produced a moving spectacle, moments of genuine pride and in some cases even gestures toward a reconciliation of the great contradiction at the heart of nationhood [reconciliation with indigenous Australians].

Hawke’s grappling with the competing and contradictory claims made by participants on the day also reflected some this success. By representing diversity as unity, Hawke was able to fall back on his tried and tested discourse of consensus – that the differences that divided Australians were less important than the similarities, values and goals that united the national community. Hawke was also able to use the occasion to relatively freely promote the government’s policy agenda, and his conception of national identity and purpose with the competitive Australian. Additionally, some of the sense of occasion that the Bicentenary presented rubbed off on Hawke as Prime Minister. Further, the occasion had some success in opening up and challenging conceptions of Australianness:

Active inclusion of non-British immigrants, and indigenous Australians, was sought by government and community groups organising the Bicentenary. While those of British ancestry remained culturally and politically dominant, events, publications, advertising and festivities were aimed at, and reflected, a decreasingly British multicultural population (Pearson and O’Neill 2009, 73).

As such, the Bicentenary should not be presented as an unmitigated failure at producing a sense of national occasion or that it was rejected by the public.

However, the Bicentenary did prove to be a difficult national occasion for Hawke. Firstly, this was due to the inability of Hawke to ‘celebrate’ the actual event that was being marked (the landing of white settlers in 1788) due to the devastation that this had wrought upon Indigenous Australians. The inability to celebrate the origins of the nation raised the question as to what was being marked at all. This ambiguity was reflected in Hawke’s Australia Day address, as he struggled to incorporate an acceptable meaning for the day, as he lacked the familiar and identifiably ‘Australian’ and nationalist values that litter Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. Instead, Australians were implored to make a commitment to Australia, with all the attendant materialistic implications of that appeal, or to a set of uncontroversial, but hardly deeply nationalist, liberal democratic values as the over-riding value to be celebrated. Secondly, however, the prominent and public contestation that Aboriginal activist activity posed meant that Hawke’s resort to his consensus discourse felt hollow and misplaced. As Indigenous Australians and their supporters marched through the city on Australia Day, they publically challenged any settled ‘commitment to Australia and its future’. As
such, the Bicentennial proved to be a difficult and challenging national occasion for Hawke, one encumbered by contestation over the origins of the nation and its current and future direction. The next section will explore how the newly unpolitical discourse of Anzac did not face these same problems.

**Hawke’s Anzac – a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis**

The following section presents some data on Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses. Hawke’s addresses were infrequent over his time in office, and only became regular from 1989. Hawke largely conformed to the Anzac tradition in his speeches, though the protean nature of his Anzac entrepreneurship saw some of his addresses closely resemble a regular policy speech, and lack the high rhetoric and nationalism of his successors.

**The Sites of Hawke’s Anzac Day Addresses**

Hawke gave five Anzac Day addresses, and released one media statement during his term as Prime Minister. Reflecting Hawke’s emerging Anzac entrepreneurship, and the significance of the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian body politic, these speeches are clustered in the last years of his term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>One media release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>One speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>One speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Two speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>One speech</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 13 – List of Hawke’s Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements*

Hawke’s speeches were delivered in Australia and overseas. 1986 saw him deliver an address in Greece, and he gave two speeches at Gallipoli for the 75th anniversary of the landings in 1990. Hawke did not go to significant sites of war remembrance in Australia, and instead delivered addresses at the Heidelberg Repatriation Hospital in Melbourne on Anzac Day eve in 1989, and in Darwin at the opening of a naval gymnasium in 1991. This was in contrast to his successors, who delivered Anzac Day addresses almost exclusively at significant Australian-based and foreign sites of Australian war remembrance, again reflecting the emerging norms of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses during this time.
The Location of Hawke’s Anzac

Hawke’s conception of where Anzac was located was strongly influenced by where he was delivering his speech, and what the context of that speech. Unlike his successors, Hawke did not evangelise a particular war or site of Anzac, like Keating did with Kokoda and WWII, and Howard tended to do with Gallipoli and WWI. As such, WWII (four out of five total mentions in the Hawke corpus) and the Gulf War (all four mentions in the entire corpus featuring all Prime Ministers) feature in his 1991 address, as he honoured the service of ADF personnel who had served in the recent Gulf conflict, and paid tribute to the Indigenous people who had served in World War II and who had not received just recompense for that service. WWI is strongly alluded to in his 1990 addresses at Gallipoli, but only gains two named mentions in 1989.

The battle sites of Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses reversed this tendency. Gallipoli dominated his addresses with seventeen named mentions, and other WWI sites are also predominant – France (two mentions), Flanders, Lone Pine and Villers-Bretonneux (all one mention). The location and context is also important here, as he also referenced Crete and Greece in his 1986 Athens address, and contemporary peacekeeping operations in 1989 and 1991. WWII sites did feature, but less prominently – Greece (two mentions) and Crete (three mentions), Kokoda, El Alamein, Kokoda, Coral Sea, Tobruk and the Burma Railway (all one mention each). Hawke also referenced Vietnam and Long Tan in his 1989 address, and was the only Prime Minister to give that war any substantive space in his addresses. Again, this reflected the context Hawke was working within, as he continued to endorse the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans and the Australian public.

Hawke’s Agents of Anzac

Hawke’s agents of Anzac tended to reflect unity across diversity (Spillman 1997, 126). The references to the Gulf War in his 1991 address saw the proliferation of the conjoined gendered nouns men and women (with seven out eight total gendered noun mentions in Hawke’s corpus), again reflecting the context that Hawke delivered his speeches in. The gender diversity of the contemporary ADF necessitated such reference, but the fact that Hawke never in isolation mentioned the gendered noun women, or the service type nursing, demonstrated that he was unwilling to radically reformulate the masculine nature of Anzac.

Hawke was better at referencing diversity when discussing ethnicity. He was the only Prime Minister in the corpus to refer to Indigenous Australians as agents of Anzac in an Anzac Day address. His Lone Pine address in 1990 also referenced the diversity of Anzac’s agents, and their unity despite that
difference, via their commitment to Australia. However, references to the diversity of Anzac’s agents do not feature frequently in Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses, and he did not reimagine Anzac with diversity as a central theme.

The Attributes of Hawke’s Anzac Agents

The attributes of Anzac’s agents that Hawke perceived further reinforces the notion that he did not radically reimagine Anzac, as the attributes he most frequently cited were closely aligned to the Anzac tradition—sacrifice, courage, heroism and service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sacrifice</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courage/bravery</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroism</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service/duty</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenacity/perseverance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Owed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australianness</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffering</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mateship</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comradeship</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingenuity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humour</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourcefulness</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 14 – List of the Frequency of Mentions of the Attributes of Agents of Anzac in Hawke’s Anzac Day Addresses*

Such a reading of Anzac reinforced its status as an ideograph, calling upon the public to remember and honour the memory of those who had fought and died, but also providing the signifying backbone to the new lessons of Anzac that Hawke filled his 1990 addresses with regarding neoliberalism and Australian identity.
In sum, Hawke engaged with Anzac Day every year after 1988 until being ousted as Prime Minister in December 1991. The speeches in 1989 and 1991 were prosaic and wide-ranging, covering a number of themes and Hawke government policy initiatives, and closely resembled the structure and style of Hawke’s regular public policy speeches, demonstrating the embryonic nature of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. However, as befits the significance of the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, the 1990 Anzac Day addresses spoke more about the lessons that current Australians could learn from the diggers and the meaning of the values that they embodied. The ideographic nature of Anzac in his 1990 addresses had both instrumental and constitutive consequences for Anzac as a central Australian nationalist discourse. As such, Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship presented a universalising and celebratory form of Australian nationalism and national identity in the face of the increasing problematisation of these forms of national identity.

**Hawke’s Anzac Day Addresses: The Competitive Australian and Success with Anzac as Ideograph**

Anzac did not face the same difficulties that the Bicentenary faced after the 1987 welcome home parade for Vietnam veterans, and Hawke was able to employ his commitment to Australia’s discourse without difficulty. This was for two main reasons; firstly, the newly reconciled, depoliticised and unpolitical Anzac that had arisen from the reincorporation of Vietnam veterans into the community of Australian servicemen and women meant that powerful taboos existed to sanction contestation of the nature present during the Bicentenary. Social movement activism like that of the early 1980s, such as WAR protests, had largely fallen away in the later years of the decade as activists concluded that such public challenges ‘…could alienate more sympathy than it attracted’ (Inglis 2008, 441-442). Secondly, and linked to the newly unpolitical and incontestable nature of Anzac, was the ontologically secure nature of the birth of the Australian nation at Gallipoli and the values that the sacrificed diggers embodied. Unlike the Bicentenary, where the constitutive genocidal acts of white settlers powerfully challenged any settled and just conception of the birth of the Australian nation or national values and lessons for the present, the heroic sacrifice of Australian diggers at Gallipoli was newly safe from such contestation (McKenna 2010, 121). As such, Anzac entrepreneurship by Hawke was more secure than the Bicentenary had been as a forum to espouse Australian nationalism.

**Anzac Day Eve, 1989 – Our Debt Owed to Our Veterans**

On Anzac Day eve, 1989, Hawke gave a wide ranging speech on his government’s achievements regarding veterans’ affairs to a group attending the opening of a new wing to a repatriation hospital.
in Heidelberg, Melbourne. It was a largely prosaic affair, closely resembling any number of other Hawke policy or interest group speeches, and addressed the concerns of the broad ex-service men and women community, including newly reconciled Vietnam veterans after the 1987 welcome home parade. The speech began by arguing that Anzac Day was an occasion where Australians were obliged to ‘...repay the debt we owe our veterans’ (Hawke 1989, 1). The debts owed in this speech centred on three main obligations, some more prosaic, some more symbolic – an obligation to the health of veterans, an obligation to Vietnam veterans, and an obligation to the original diggers who landed at Gallipoli and to the sense of Australianness that they defined.

Firstly, Hawke employed the occasion instrumentally to outline his government’s policy achievements in the area of veteran’s affairs. This was framed by the debt that Australians owed veterans – ‘...with the opening of this new ward here at Heidelberg, we are demonstrating anew our determination to repay that debt as fully as we can’ (Hawke 1989, 1). This involved an obligation to ensure the health of ex-service personnel through the provision and upgrading of repatriation hospitals, with Hawke outlining government spending on new facilities and equipment at Heidelberg. Due to speculation about the continued existence of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Hawke also made a commitment to the continued operation of the Department and to only continue with a policy proposal to integrate repatriation hospitals with the state healthcare systems with the consent of the RSL, reflecting the consensual approach that Hawke took with regards to policy making and his alignment of this approach with his use of Anzac.

Secondly, the speech was an opportunity to remind the gathered audience of the taboos surrounding the newly reincorporated and reconciled Vietnam veterans:

I have always made it clear that whatever’s one’s views about the controversy that surrounded the Vietnam War, no one can ever doubt the commitment and the courage of the Australian soldiers who were called upon to fight it.

I was very pleased to attend the Welcome Home Parade in Sydney in October 1987, which, at last, gave fitting honours to the men who fought there (Hawke 1989, 3).

Hawke’s statement regarding the service of Vietnam veterans is once again declarative and unambiguous – ‘I have made it clear’; ‘no one can ever doubt’ – signalling that the terms of the reconciliation and reincorporation of Vietnam veterans is non-negotiable. Hawke further outlined that his government had pledged $200,000 towards the construction of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and encouraged others to contribute towards its construction. The mention of Vietnam veterans is notable, as Hawke here still prioritised the explicit and active inclusion of Vietnam
veterans into official and state-driven discourses of Anzac. This is notable due to the conspicuous sublimation or absence of Vietnam veterans’ particular and problematic experience of war after this point in Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac.

Finally, Hawke announced that the government had agreed to assist a group of very elderly Gallipoli veterans to make the ‘pilgrimage’ to Gallipoli for the 75th anniversary of the landings:

Next year, we will be celebrating the 75th anniversary of the event that in many ways still defines the Australian identity and consciousness — the landing by the ANZACs at Gallipoli.

This will be an anniversary that Australians will want to mark with dignity and special awareness of its significance.

It is not too early to begin now our planning of how we should honour that occasion.

...we have agreed that there could be no more fitting way for the nation to honour the achievements of these veterans, and of recalling the sacrifices of their comrades-in-arms, than to send a party of veterans back to Anzac Cove on Anzac Day, 75 years after the first landing... In addition, I feel that it would be appropriate for me as Prime Minister to attend this ceremony — and might I add, I would also find it deeply moving in a personal sense to be there. (Hawke 1989, 4).

Again, debt is the theme which characterised Hawke’s commitment. The Gallipoli veterans are to be ‘honoured’, for their service and sacrifice. The importance of the landings lays in the way it ‘still defines the Australian identity and consciousness’ and Hawke himself endorsed the occasion with his emotive commitment to attend.

Thus, this Anzac Day address was fairly prosaic and largely indistinguishable from any other Hawke policy advocate (Grube 2013, 52-53) address. It was given to a group of people unremarkable enough to not be given any mention in the press release of the text of the speech, or the one media report located on the speech in The Australian (Hannan 1989, 2). It was given in an unremarkable location and for an unremarkable occasion — the opening of a new wing to a hospital. It lacked the pomp, sanctity and sense of occasion now usually attached to Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses or the hallowed locations of Australian war remembrance. The speech demonstrates that Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac had not yet become institutionalised and that the parameters of engagement were still flexible and porous. It did, however, set up his commitment to Anzac Day and, in particular, to the 75th anniversary of the landings the following year.

Anzac Day, 1990 — The Commitment is All

1990 saw Hawke keep his promise to the Gallipoli veterans to honour their sacrifice and achievements by sending 58 of them, himself, the Opposition leader John Hewson, and a large party
of support staff to the Gallipoli peninsula for the April 25 commemoration (Macleod 2002, 154). It was the single most significant event of Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship, and it established a pattern of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day remembrance that his successors have drawn upon and followed. The trip lasted three days, was accompanied by 70 journalists, and consisted of three Anzac Day ceremonies – a dawn service; a service at Lone Pine; and an international service, attended by, among others, Hawke, Opposition Leader John Hewson, the President of Turkey Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher, the Governor-General of New Zealand Sir Paul Reeves, the French Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs and an ambassador from the Federal Republic of Germany.

Due to the special significance of the occasion, being an anniversary and given the advanced ages of the surviving diggers who attended of age 90 and above, Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses and interviews did not contain the same prosaic and explicit link to the policy achievements of his government as his 1989 or 1991 addresses. There was significantly more focus on the meaning of Anzac Day, how it defined Australianness and Australian values, and lessons that the occasion could teach the present. For the occasion, Hawke fell back on his discourse of the competitive Australian and the phrase ‘the commitment is all’.

The success that Hawke had with his use of ‘the commitment is all’ was due to the origin or birth of the values being celebrated being secure, uncontested and unpolitical. In contrast to the Bicentenary, where the origins and history of events that were being celebrated were publically contested, and were therefore excised from Hawke’s addresses, Anzac Day 1990 faced no such problems (McKenna 2010, 121). Several factors fed into the unpolitical nature of the event. Firstly, and most importantly, was the newly reconciled, depoliticised and unpolitical sphere of Anzac after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. Deliberation, in the form of questioning of the continued relevance of Anzac, was absent, as was questioning of the values that WAR activists purported the day represented, such as hyper-masculinism, militarism, or rape during wartime. Criticism of the anniversary was largely limited to questioning of the cost of the event and was ‘little noticed’ (Macleod 2002, 156) or shut down by Hawke (1990a, 2) ‘I think you can’t measure these things in terms of money.’ Also demonstrating the unpolitical nature of the event was the bipartisanship that characterised the trip, with Opposition leader John Hewson being invited along and delivering a speech at the Lone Pine ceremony (Hewson 1990), which contrasted with the partisan squabbles that had characterised the planning of the Bicentenary. Another factor was Hawke again casting the occasion as one where the nation owed a debt to the Anzacs who had fought – ‘We should instead
dedicate ourselves – to keeping bright the memory of those men who so unstintingly did what was asked of them on our behalf – and to ensuring that the freedom and peace for which they so ardently yearned, for which they so bravely fought, and for which so many of them so selflessly gave their lives, shall not pass’ (Hawke 1990b, 1). Finally, there was the repeatedly asserted sacredness of the anniversary. Hawke spoke frequently of ‘pilgrimage’ to Gallipoli or the ‘sacredness’ of the landscape, due to ‘the bravery and the bloodshed of the ANZACs’ (Hawke 1990b, 1). These multiple factors combined to draw a line around Anzac and to prevent criticism of the event of the like of the WAR protests on Anzac Day in the 1980s, or the Aboriginal protests of the Bicentenary.

The settled nature of the trip was also endorsed by the Turkish hosts. Old enemies were now friends, with the Turkish president Özal noting in his Anzac Day address that ‘[t]he Canakkale wars have shown that there is no place for hatred and enmity in our ever-narrowing world. The Canakkale wars are the best example that States, when they sincerely wish it, can establish friendship even on the foundations of past wars’ (Özal 1990, 2) and Hawke (1990c, 4) remarking ‘...the mutual respect between our nations which was forged on the battlefields of Gallipoli has proved to be a sound and enduring foundation for the warm and substantial relationship which has developed between us...’ The trip thus served as another example of memorial diplomacy (Graves 2014), continuing a trend that Hawke had begun with his Anzac Day in Greece in 1986.

Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship was secure here because the events being celebrated, and the values that these events embodied, were secure back home too. As Macleod (2002, 155) notes, although some media reports ‘...made explicit references to the ambivalence that Anzac Day had aroused at the time of Vietnam or the old fears that it was glorifying war, this was done not to continue to question, but to provide a contrast to the assured situation of the present.’ Thus, The Australian noted ‘It is proof perhaps that 75 years on, public interest in Gallipoli is gaining, not receding as so many had feared and predicted. It has returned to its original role as a unifying force’ (Kelly and Kershler 1990, 1). Thus, the origins of Anzac, and the events being commemorated and celebrated, were secure and were being actively encouraged by the Prime Minister and were accepted as appropriate by the public.

Hawke gave a number of addresses and interviews during the trip, with a number of themes coming through prominently as lessons for the present. These can be summarised under two headings – the Australian values that the Anzacs epitomised, particularly mateship and unity in diversity, and the continued relevance of these values for the present day; and once again, the ‘commitment is all’
refrain. Hawke’s speech at Lone Pine was the most widely reported, and where his voice cracked with emotion as he finished his speech (Stevens 1990, 6). It was also here that Hawke most thoroughly expounded upon the lessons Australia could draw upon for the present. As Anzac was now ostensibly unpolitical, Hawke was free to use Anzac as a sacred, incontestable ideograph (McGee 1980). Though bound by the genre restrictions of Anzac (mateship, sacrifice, suffering, violence, heroism, pilgrimage, and the iconic phrase ‘At the going down of the sun and in the morning we will remember them’ are all mentioned in this speech) Anzac was, at once, pregnant with meaning and significance about national identity, national values and lessons for the present, but also vague, unspecific and malleable, too. As Thomson (2013, 321) notes ‘One of the reasons for the success of the Anzac legend is its plasticity; the story and its meanings stretch and shift with the times and in different contexts and this malleability helps ensure popular support.’

But, given the recently contested and only newly reconciled nature of Anzac, its contemporary meaning was not self-evident – it needed explanation:

It is not in the waste of war that Australians find the meaning of Gallipoli – then or now.
I saw ‘then or now’ for a profound reason.
The meaning of the ANZAC tradition, forged in the fires of Gallipoli, must be learned anew, from generation to generation.
Its meaning can endure only as long as each new generation of Australians finds the will to reinterpret it – to breathe, as it were, new life into the old story: and, in separating the truth from the legend, realise its relevance to a nation and a people, experiencing immense change over the past three-quarters of a century (Hawke 1990d, 2).

Hawke’s call to renew the meaning of Anzac and ‘to breathe, as it were, new life into the old story’, reflected both the malleable nature of Anzac as ideograph, and the degree of flexibility available in interpreting its contemporary meaning. It actively encouraged remembrance and the renewal of memory of war.

The lesson being taught is endorsed by the presence of the returning diggers attending the occasion, whose experience is drawn upon to demonstrate the continued lessons of Anzac:

In the continuing quest for the real meaning of ANZAC, our way is lit by the shining presence here today of the little band of first ANZACS who have returned.
This is, for all of us here, and for all our fellow Australians at home, an honour, an experience, an emotion, which goes beyond words.
These men know the truth of Gallipoli.
They would be the last to claim that they were heroes – but indeed they were.
They did not pretend to fathom the deep and immense tides of history which brought them to these shores, at the cross-roads of civilisation, so far from home, so far from all they knew and loved.

They did not see themselves as holding in their hands the destiny of six mighty empires – all now vanished.

Nor could they begin to imagine that the vast and terrible forces unleashed upon the world in 1914 would still be working their way through human history 75 years on (Hawke 1990d, 2).

Notable is the lack of voice the diggers have in this speech, or, more generally, in Hawke’s many speeches and interviews given during the trip. Whilst the elderly diggers were certainly included in proceedings, the job of defining nationhood and the meaning of Anzac had largely shifted to the Prime Minister, whose role was emphasised and well-covered. So whilst the elderly diggers were certainly present, and Hawke’s rapport with them was noted (Holbrook 2014, 177), their presence played a supporting role to the amplified message of political elites. The digger’s lack of agency in Hawke’s speeches reflected the shift towards a more elite orientated nationalist discourse of Anzac, one where political elites such as Hawke, rather than the diggers themselves, spoke on behalf of veterans and drove the continuing marking and celebration of Anzac. Thus, the uncomfortable message of the Vietnam veterans during the 1987 welcome home parades, and acknowledged only a year earlier by Hawke in his 1989 Anzac Day address – that war damages its participants and continues to do so long after conflict has ended – is lost in a sanitised and official version of the Anzac tradition centred on the landings at Gallipoli.

Hawke painted a picture of the world of the diggers in order to explain the current meaning of Anzac circa 1990, which reflected this lack of agency. In 1914/15, great forces were at work in the world, profoundly changing the global balance of power. The diggers found themselves ‘at the cross-roads of civilisation’, where the familiar West met the foreign East, ‘so far from home’. By landing at Gallipoli, the diggers helped shape the global geopolitics of the next 75 years, ‘holding in their hands the destiny of six mighty empires – all now vanished’. But the diggers themselves had little understanding of their profound role in these changes – ‘they did not pretend to fathom the deep and immense tides of history which brought them to these shores’ – with Hawke painting them instead as humble, ordinary men:

But they knew two things:

They had a job to do; and they knew that in the end, they could only rely on each other to see it through – they knew they depended on their mates...

In that recognition of the special meaning of Australian mateship, the self-recognition of their dependence upon one another - these Australians, by no means all of them born in Australia,
drawn from every walk of life and different backgrounds, cast upon these hostile shores, twelve thousand miles from home - there lay the genesis of the ANZAC tradition.

And at the heart of that tradition lay a commitment. It was a simple but deep commitment to one another, each to his fellow Australian.

And in that commitment, I believe, lies the enduring meaning of ANZAC, then and today and for the future.

It is that commitment, now as much as ever - now with all the vast changes occurring in our nation, more than ever - it is that commitment to Australia, which defines, and alone defines, what it is to be an Australian. The commitment is all (Hawke 1990d, 2-3; emphasis in the original).

The diggers’ lack of sophisticated understanding of the events that had brought them to Gallipoli did not, however, diminish their sense of duty – ‘they knew two things: they had a job to do; and they knew that in the end, they could only rely on each other to see it through – they knew they depended on their mates’. They were unified and did this, despite their differences in where they were born or their class status, because they were mates and because they could only rely upon one another, which was the central lesson to be learnt from their example – ‘there lay the genesis of the ANZAC tradition’. Hawke then fell back on the familiar refrain of commitment – the diggers were committed to each other, as mates, and to getting the job done - there ‘lies the enduring meaning of ANZAC, then and today and for the future’. In sum, the lesson for the present was that a sense of duty, the support of mates and a commitment to one another drove the diggers at Gallipoli, despite their lack of understanding of the geopolitical forces at work reshaping the global balance of power.

Anzac had become a vehicle for Hawke’s standard discursive message of consensus and neoliberal economic reform – ‘the commitment is all’. The mateship of the diggers was conflated with Hawke’s well-rehearsed nationalist vision of a competitive Australian’s commitment to the nation-state – ‘it is that commitment to Australia, which defines, and alone defines, what it is to be an Australian. The commitment is all’. The construction of Hawke’s language here placed the ‘commitment is all’ message above any other lesson to be learnt from Anzac – it was declarative and singular, as it ‘alone defines’ Australianness. Anzac here served as a metaphor for the appeal to citizens’ commitment to the Australian state, and to the policy program of economic reform by the Hawke government. Just like the diggers who came before them, Australians in the 1990s were also facing profound geopolitical and economic changes that they may not have understood. And much the same as the diggers, they did so at ‘the cross-roads of civilisation’, as the government encouraged them to look to Asia for future prosperity. Finally, just as the diggers had been diverse, yet unified by mateship, Australians in 1990 were multicultural and separated by class, yet still found consensus in their commitment to the state and its success. Hawke’s consensus politics in this instance
attempted to subsume all identities under the ‘aegis of the established consensus’ (Little 2007, 157),
closing down the space to contest the politics of Hawke’s neoliberalism and economic reform. Thus,
whilst not as explicit as his 1989 Anzac Day address, Anzac was again utilised instrumentally by
Hawke in alignment with his government’s policy agenda. The ideographic and unpolitical nature of
Anzac after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans allowed Hawke to subtly insert the political into
this speech. Hawke was able to do so without attracting sanction because he respected the
boundaries of Anzac by honouring its well understood meaning regarding service, sacrifice, and duty,
and thus insulated himself from criticism from partisan conservatives. Social movement activists, if
at all roused by the occasion, were not reported upon by the media that year.

Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship had a constitutive aspect regarding Australian nationalism too, as it
marked the boundaries of Australian citizenship and identity. The message of commitment,
amplified by the unpolitical ideograph of Anzac, had two important effects in disciplining some of
the varying groups the ALP was courting as supporters with its catch-all electoralism (Jaensch 1989).
Firstly, it sent a strong message to non-Anglo Australians that the terms of Australian citizenship and
identity would not be challenged. Anzac, and all its associations with white Australia, masculinity,
militarism, and conservatism, that WAR and GESPA activists had pointed to in the early 1980s, would
remain (and be reinforced) as the framework for a central explanatory myth of Australianness,
despite concessions to modern sensibilities by including reference to the diversity of the diggers.
Further, this message, and the newly unpolitical nature of Anzac, disciplined those Anglo Australians
uncomfortable with these associations and drew a line under the contestability of Anzac. WAR
activists or, more generally, social movement activists who were concerned with issues of political
identity, now had to contend with newly reconstituted taboos sanctioning Anzac Day protest activity
or the questioning of Anzac and its associated values. Secondly, it disciplined the ALP Anglo working
class base by placing the commitment to the new, competitive Australia, at the centre of the
message of a principal national occasion. Australians in 1990 needed to heed the example of the
diggers who had come before them and face the economic challenges that now confronted the
Australian economy, just as the diggers had faced the challenges of a changing world and had
sacrificed greatly. 75 years later, Australia faced the similar need to put aside selfish wants and
desires and sacrifice for the good of the nation in the face of a changing world. Further, in the
context of tension regarding multiculturalism during the period (Kalantzis 2003, 315-317), it sent a
clear message to these Australians that traditional conceptions of Australianness would remain at
the centre of national identity and citizenship and that they had nothing to fear from the challenges
being posed to Anglo-identity hegemony by the large scale immigration of the post-war years.
These elements discursively disciplined the various groups that the ALP was appealing to for electoral support during the Hawke government. The catch-all imperatives that the Hawke government’s electoralism had posed guided Hawke’s nationalist discourse and his established boundaries of Australian citizenship. This, in combination with the ALP’s ideological commitment to diversity and multiculturalism, led Hawke to incorporate the diversity of Australians into the scope of consensus and reconciliation, whilst simultaneously drawing a boundary around the Australian citizenship ideal. The lesson of Anzac Day 1990 was that Australians could be diverse, but they also needed to be unified in their end goal of service to the state. Anzac Day amplified and endorsed this message, as the newly unpolitical Anzac was put to use. Thus, Anzac Day 1990 was an example of Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship being employed in conjunction with the newly reconciled and unpolitical Anzac for instrumental and constitutive policy and national identity ends.

Anzac Day 1991 – Australia’s Role in a Changing World

Anzac Day 1991 saw Hawke return to the largely prosaic, policy orientated, format of Anzac Day address, much like his 1989 address. Unlike his Anzac Day 1990 addresses, which were filled with rich, nationalist imagery and excluded direct references to policy, Anzac Day 1991 almost exclusively referenced the policy agenda of the Hawke government. Speaking to an audience in Darwin whilst opening a new naval gymnasium, Hawke’s speech began by briefly paying tribute to the sacrifice of former service people in the World Wars, before linking that to the recent service of naval personnel in the Gulf War, outlining the long overdue payment of Indigenous peoples who had served alongside defence personnel in WWII, and the government’s recent defence reorientation after the 1986 Dibb Report.

Hawke’s 1991 Anzac Day address again demonstrated the still evolving nature of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. Whilst Hawke had set an important precedent regarding the elite celebration of Anzac with the 75th anniversary of the landings in 1990, he did not feel obliged to continue observance of Anzac Day with ceremonial trips to overseas locations or at the Australian War Memorial. Further, he did not continue to observe the same reverence for the occasion demonstrated in 1990 – the 1991 address failed to mention sacredness, overt nationalism or epitomised Australian values, and there was little regarding sacrifice, debt or service. This contrasted with the Anzac Day addresses of Prime Ministers Keating and Howard, who largely conformed to the pomp, ceremony and nationalism of the example set by Hawke with the 75th anniversary observance of Anzac Day.
Thus, this speech was once again largely indistinguishable from the policy and interest group speeches that Hawke gave throughout his Prime Ministership. The speech began by arguing for the morality of observing Anzac Day – ‘On Anzac Day 1991, it is proper for the thoughts of all Australians to turn to the men and women who are serving in the armed forces of our country’ (Hawke 1991, 1) – and recognition of the sacrifice of service men and women throughout the history of Australia’s military service. However, the speech then linked the upcoming 50th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the reconciliation of nations in the region after the War in the Pacific, with the optimism for peace and prosperity that characterised international discourse in the early 1990s after the fall of communism and international cooperation during the Gulf War. The naval personnel who had served during the Gulf War were praised for ‘proving, once more, Australia’s reputation as a nation which is willing and able to take a stand against aggression, and to meet its obligations as a responsible member of the international community’ (Hawke 1991, 2). Australia at this time remained committed to supporting its allies in armed conflict far from home, in support of Australia’s own interests, and with a view to the moral obligations of participation in world affairs, despite the government accepting the Dibb report’s reorientation of the ADF towards continental defence (Gelber 1992, 78).

Hawke’s speech then paid tribute to a small group of Indigenous people who had served alongside Australian soldiers during WWII, but had not been formally enlisted, and therefore had not received payment for their service. Speaking to an audience which reportedly contained members of this group (Austin 1991, 2), Hawke outlined that his government would compensate the service of these people, and that ‘the Government derives great pleasure from being able to recognise, with just and deserved recompense, the significant contribution made by these members of our community’ (Hawke 1991, 3). The men being recognised had performed duties including ‘coast-watching and patrols, taught bushcraft to white servicemen, trained in drill and tactics, located mines and rescued servicemen’ (Davis 1991, 4). This example demonstrated how the ALP’s commitment to multiculturalism and the inclusion of diversity into Australian nationalist discourse by Hawke in his Bicentenary and 1990 Anzac Day addresses opened up new opportunities to expand the boundaries of Anzac and Australian national identity. Whilst Anzac remained a central Australian nationalist discourse, with its attendant hegemonic associations with Anglo identity and masculism, it did not remain exclusively so. As such, it should be acknowledged that Anzac, as presented by Hawke, was not exclusively white. The extent that it did present diversity, however, was dependent on outsider groups conforming to the hegemonic strictures demanded by Anzac – in this case, these Indigenous
people were eligible to be included in the story of Anzac due to having performed the duties of soldiers, with the attendant compliance with service, sacrifice and duty to the state.

Finally, Hawke spent the remainder of the speech outlining some of the new defence thinking that the government had adopted after the 1987 defence white paper, along with its associated spending, before again paying tribute to the service personnel of the Australian Defence Force. Reflecting the shift to the north of Australia that continental defence required, Hawke (1991, 3) argued that the:

"Air Force’s chain of northern air bases, the Army’s emerging facilities in Darwin for 1 Cavalry Regiment and, not least, the Navy’s Patrol Boat base and communications facilities here, are testimony to the Government’s resolve to maintain and expand the fundamental infrastructure necessary to provide properly for our defence needs into the twenty first century."

Hawke made some attempt to link this to Anzac by arguing that ‘the equipment is only as good as the person operating it’ (Hawke 1991, 4) and briefly linking the Australian Defence personnel’s service to those who had come before. However, the speech did little to engage with the rich nationalist tradition offered by Anzac or link that with the policy agenda or announcements littered throughout the speech. Lacking the ceremony of the 1990 Anzac Day events, Hawke’s 1991 Anzac Day address therefore did little more than outline the policy commitments of the ALP government. Prime Ministerial Anzac Day speeches had not yet institutionalised the high rhetoric of nationalism as the predominant form of address.

Conclusion
This chapter has argued that Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship encouraged the reconciled, depoliticised and unpolitical nationalist discourse of Anzac for instrumental and constitutive ends. Facing profound policy challenges to the areas of the economy, the changing international context, and tension regarding the conceptualisation of national identity and multiculturalism, in addition to the catch-all electoral priorities of the ALP in the 1980s and 1990s, meant that Hawke needed to a new way of conceiving of national identity. Hawke had some success in welding these disparate elements together into the ‘competitive Australian’ during the Bicentenary, but faced challenges in presenting this as a unifying message due to the contested nature of the occasion. However, the contestation that faced the Bicentenary and Anzac Day in the first half of the 1980s was notably absent from Anzac Day after the 1987 welcome home parades for Vietnam veterans. This allowed Hawke to present his vision of national identity in an uncritical and celebratory environment. He did
this for narrowly instrumental ends in 1989 and 1991, when his Anzac Day addresses were largely similar to any number of similar policy addresses Hawke gave during his term as Prime Minister and lacked the pomp and ceremony associated with later Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, which demonstrated the still formative use of Anzac by Prime Ministers.

The 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1990, however, set a precedent regarding the potential of Anzac entrepreneurship. The logic of Hawke’s wider discourse of consensus was a largely successful attempt to draw a line under policy contestation, conflict and politics. Having applied this same logic to the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body politic meant the restoration of a depoliticised and unpolitical form of Anzac that did little to give ex-servicemen a voice in the celebration of their achievements or acknowledge the uncomfortable truths of Anzac regarding the damage that war inflicts upon its participants and their social networks when they are killed in action or return home suffering mental and physical wounds. Anzac therefore became insulated from the attacks of Vietnam veterans who sought to advance their continuing policy concerns that stood outside state-sanctioned conceptions of their service or social movement activists seeking to challenge established forms of Australianness or advance other radical agendas. Not only that, but the established and well understood meaning of Anzac amongst the Australian community meant that Anzac could operate as an unpolitical ideograph – bound by certain genre conditions that needed to be respected, but malleable towards new nationalist ends too. As such, having reconciled Vietnam veterans with the wider body politic in a manner which denied the political nature of such a reconciliation, led to an unpolitical Anzac ideograph too pregnant with nationalist meaning for political elites like Hawke, and his successors, to ignore.
CHAPTER 6

Keating: Success and Failure in Anzac Entrepreneurship

Introduction

December 1991 saw Paul Keating defeat Bob Hawke as leader of the ALP and become Prime Minister. The country was in the midst of recession, the polling for the ALP was poor, and the Opposition was resurgent. However, over the coming months Keating managed to meet the challenge that the Coalition had posed with their *Fightback!* policy program and the ALP subsequently won the ‘unwinnable’ 1993 election. His political style as Prime Minister was characterised by his ‘Big Picture’ politics:

...redefining the market as friend of the battler, reforming Australia’s economic institutions to succeed in an international age, reshaping Australian identity by abandoning the Crown for a republic, reaching reconciliation with indigenous Australians, embracing engagement with Asia as a national aspiration and entrenching the concept of a multicultural yet united nation (Kelly 2009, 4-5).

Keating also continued the practice of active Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac that had begun with Hawke a few years earlier. Keating’s vision for Anzac was centred on the Pacific and the conflicts that had occurred there during WWII, and he sought to steer the Australian public’s view in the same direction. This nationalist vision was bound up with his ‘Big Picture’ politics of neoliberal economic reform, engagement with Asia, and an Australian republic.

Keating’s embrace of Anzac, and nationalism more generally, marked Keating as another Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneur, enthusiastically promoting Anzac as a central component of Australian nationalism. But Keating’s engagement with Anzac also reflected the internal tension that his outward looking cosmopolitanism and his aggressive and parochial nationalism posed. It will be argued that Keating was mostly unsuccessful with the main aim of his Anzac entrepreneurship, with his bold attempt to shift Australian war remembrance from Gallipoli to the Pacific and Kokoda ultimately failing. Holbrook (2014, 228) argues that this was due partly to Keating’s confrontational and obviously partisan rhetoric and partly due to Australians’ connection with the original story of Anzac centred on Gallipoli and WWI. Especially important in the rejection of Keating’s reorientation was his baldly stated attempt to weld together the shift to the Pacific, Kokoda, and WWII, with republicanism, Asian engagement, and neoliberalism. This was an agenda that stretched the boundaries of the Anzac ideograph too far. By breaking these boundaries, Keating allowed his
version of Anzac to become political - more concerned with contestation than an attempt to universalise, avoid conflict, and become unpolitical, as Hawke before him and Howard after him both managed with their Anzac entrepreneurship. Partisan contestation of Keating’s Anzac entrepreneurship was therefore fierce, and Keating failed to establish his version of Anzac as an unpolitical sphere of Australian nationalism and social relations. Having said that, his rigorous and enthusiastic championing of the memorialisation of WWII did succeed in institutionalising the previously neglected commemoration of the War in the Pacific, and in particular, the story of Australian soldiers fighting at Kokoda, as part of the narrative of Australia’s war service.

In order to explore the success and failure of Keating’s Anzac entrepreneurship, it will be necessary to highlight Keating’s political style and the context in which Keating was operating. The chapter does this in four sections:

1. This section presents analysis of Keating’s ‘Big Picture political style’, which is crucial to understanding his Anzac entrepreneurship. Here I draw upon Johnson’s (2000, 24-25) observation that Keating attempted to integrate the economic and social into a cosmopolitan and electorally palatable discourse of government. The section shows how Keating’s radical nationalism sat uncomfortably with this cosmopolitanism, and created difficulties and tensions for his political style.

2. Next, I will highlight the key policy challenges that Keating faced as Prime Minister. The first challenges were economic - the process of continued domestic economic reform and unemployment, and the middle power internationalism of his multi-lateral engagement with the region. The second group of challenges were social - the push towards a republic, Mabo and indigenous land rights, and multiculturalism.

3. Following this, I will set out a brief corpus assisted discourse analysis of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses to explore the overall characteristics of Keating’s Anzac entrepreneurship. Here it will be argued that whilst Keating’s attempt to relocate Anzac was a departure from the norm, he otherwise largely kept to the parameters of the Anzac tradition like Anzac’s other Prime Ministerial entrepreneurs.

4. Finally, the chapter will textually explore Keating’s Anzac Day addresses. It will be argued that the most prominent theme of his addresses was the way they encouraged Australians to look to Asia for their economic prosperity, and to think of themselves as independent of Great Britain. The cosmopolitanism and radical nationalism of this push were not entirely congruent, however, and Keating’s political style posed tensions that were neither easily reconciled nor without controversy. Keating’s radical reconceptualisation of Anzac in 1992
and 1993 attracted significant opposition, and in 1994 and 1995 Anzac his addresses became far less entrepreneurial and thus attracted less controversy.

As such, it will be argued that Keating’s engagement with Anzac and Australia’s war history reflected an enthusiastic entrepreneurship that had some success in aligning his policy agenda with Anzac and the furtherance of the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. Ultimately, however, Keating failed to institutionalise his particular vision of Australia’s war service in the Pacific and its pre-eminence over the original story of the Gallipoli landings of WWI.

Keating: the Economic, the Social and the Nationalist

The following section explores Keating’s governing style by examining his tethering together of economic, social and nationalist tendencies. Having come to power as Prime Minister after Hawke, and having participated intimately in Hawke’s government as treasurer, Keating faced many of the same problems of government that Hawke had. The ALP still relied upon a broad coalition of social groups for its electoral support—its traditional Anglo and blue-collar base, middle-class progressives, and non-Anglo immigrants. It still maintained the same neoliberal mindset to the problem of how best to orientate and reform the Australian economy in a globalising world. And the government still faced the clamour of various social movement voices for social change and their demands for accommodation of their political agenda. Hawke had solved the dilemma of these competing and contradictory elements with his appeal to consensus, and the attendant vision of Australianness as the Competitive Australian, a cosmopolitan and diverse Australian who was committed to the success of the Australian state by putting their shoulder to the wheel of economic reform. This vision of Australianness had left the status quo framework of Australian national identity largely untouched—it was still masculine and Anglo-Celtic. Unlike Hawke, though, Keating was far more radical in his ambition to reform Australian nationalism and identity. Keating solved the difficulties that the contradictory group and policy pulls posed, not with consensus, but with his Big Picture politics—the idea that Australia could both be both economically and socially reformed.

Given the importance that the Hawke/Keating governments had placed upon economic reform and the liberalisation of the Australian economy, the reform of the social needed to follow the logic of neoliberalism (Johnson 2000, 24). The difficulty for Keating was that many Australians, especially ALP supporters, did not see themselves as competitive economic beings. Keating’s political style was an attempt to solve this problem, by reforming the social in line with his government’s economic vision. As Johnson (2000, 24) argues, the Hawke/Keating governments:
...tried to influence the shape of social identities in ways that were compatible with their vision of the new 21st century Australia they wanted to build... It was not so much the case that Keating was taking up a broad range of social and cultural issues, but that his government was attempting to shape Australian culture and social identities to fit the government’s broader vision (Johnson 2000, 24).

As such, Big Picture politics engaged with the issues raised by social movement activists, but it was not defined by them. Instead, Keating adopted a selection of social issues and identities congruent with economic reform:

Keating tended to privilege social issues that were compatible with his construction of economic issues and not recognise others. Furthermore, he was trying to reshape constructions of the social in ways that fitted his particular economic vision. This is not to deny that the government’s conceptions in mainstream policy documents could go beyond narrow economic reductionism but it is to suggest that the government’s vision was severely limited by the underlying framework and that the ‘social’ issues which tended to be taken up were ones that were seen as in some sense compatible with that framework (Johnson 2000, 31).

Under this framework, Australians were to be cosmopolitan, diverse and tolerant, as long as these identities did not challenge the process of economic reform. There was a fundamental continuity with traditional ALP narratives of work and harmonious employer/employee relations, a characteristic which smothered contestation and which was extended to other identity relationships with the Australian state and economy, such as femininity and masculinity, aboriginality and ethnicity, and sexuality (Johnson 2000, 30-35). The culmination of this harmonious and inclusive pluralism would lead Australia to the republic, constituted in the image of the economically and socially reformed identity of Keating’s political style (Johnson 2000, 30-31).

However, the issue of an Australian republic points to the tension in Keating’s vision of a reformed Australian identity. Whilst the republic was a means to restructure Australian identity in line with cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and harmonious economic relationships, it also drew upon Keating’s own deeply felt and unreconstructed radical nationalism. According to Curran, Keating’s vision of Australian national identity:

...was a version of the ‘radical nationalist’ myth in which working-class ‘true’ Australians had been involved in a constant struggle with an Anglo-phile middle class to achieve Australian ‘independence’... This tradition saw in the period 1890 to 1914 the great ‘flowering’ of Australian nationalism and social experimentation, lamented the supposed conservative appropriation of the Anzac legend after World War I and argued that the Liberal–Country party’s political ascendency in the 1950s and 60s had been led by a prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies, who was not ‘aggressively Australian’ and who embodied a ‘compromised’ nationalism. It was ‘compromised’ since, in Keating’s view, Menzies’ imperial imagination, as well as his inability to separate his ‘Australianness’ from his ‘Britishness’ has delayed the emergence and projection of a distinctive Australian outlook on the world (Curran 2006, 256).
This was the language of old Labor politics - class struggle, racial exclusion, and hyper-masculism - not the language of economic reform, cosmopolitanism and pluralism. It was an instinctual commitment, one where politics was felt personally and held to tightly, despite its narrow political appeal and potential for critique and opposition (Curran 2006, 314; Tate 2014, 450-452).

Keating’s radical nationalism came out in moments of pressure, or during unscripted remarks, away from the watchful influence of his speechwriter, Don Watson. Thus, in February 1992, Keating announced his intention to push for an Australian republic, after a visit by the Queen, and was under pressure from the Opposition for not showing adequate respect. He rose in the House of Representatives to state:

I was told that I did not learn respect at school. I learned one thing: I learned about self-respect and self-regard for Australia - not about some cultural cringe to a country which decided not to defend the Malayan peninsula, not to worry about Singapore and not to give us our troops back to keep ourselves free from Japanese domination. This was the country that you people [the Coalition] wedded yourself to, and even as it walked out on you and joined the Common Market, you were still looking for your MBEs and your knighthoods, and all the rest of the regalia that comes with it. You would take Australia right back down the time tunnel to the cultural cringe where you have always come from... You can go back to the fifties to your nostalgia, your Menzies, the Caseys and the whole lot. They were not aggressively Australian, they were not aggressively proud of our culture, and we will have no bar of you or your sterile ideology (Keating 1992a, 374).

Statements like these reflected the tensions that existed in Keating’s political style. The vision of Australian independence from Britain presented here had less to do with a cosmopolitan and outward looking Australia finding its way in the newly emerging markets of Asia, and much more to do with contestation and settling old scores with conservatives, with all its attendant references to parochialism, class antagonism, and chauvinistic nationalism. This is not to deny that Keating’s nationalism was deeply felt, or electorally popular amongst some sections of the Australian public. It does suggest, however, that the two sides of Keating’s governing style – the cosmopolitan neoliberal and the radical nationalist – existed in tension, and in ways that were not easily reconciled. This tension was to play out in his engagement with Anzac, as he sought to steer the country’s vision of its war service from Gallipoli and WWI, to Kokoda and the War in the Pacific, and revealed the inherently political nature of Keating’s nationalism entrepreneurship.

The Keating Government’s Policy Challenges

The Economy

The early 1990s had seen a severe and protracted recession, partly as a result of international factors, partly as a result of domestic policy failure. The late 1980s had seen a massive spending and
investment boom, fuelled by debt, and financial and property speculation (Bell 1997, 154-155). Interest rates soared in an effort to contain the speculative boom, and when the boom collapsed, unemployment rose to over 10% - the double-digit territory that had coincided with the Fraser government being defeated in 1983. The recession had hurt Hawke’s leadership, had framed Keating’s challenge (Kelly 1994, xi), and posed a significant policy challenge to the start of his Prime Ministership. As such, soon after taking office as Prime Minister, Keating announced the *One Nation* policy document to the House of Representatives, where he defended the economic record of the ALP, and committed his government to further reform, in conjunction with Keynesian stimulus to kick-start the economy. In practice, this involved new roads, rail and electricity infrastructure projects and targeted assistance programs for families, the unemployed and certain industries, but it did not wind back the neoliberal reforms that he had implemented as treasurer (Kelly 2009, 59-60). Instead, it committed the ALP to further reform in the areas of a national competition policy and workplace reform with enterprise bargaining and superannuation (Keating 1992b). Despite the challenges that the poor economic outlook was posing, Keating took the *One Nation* document to the 1993 election and won.

Understandably, unemployment was a primary policy concern. Unemployment had peaked at 11.2% in December 1992 (Henderson 1997, 113-114). As such, the government established an expert committee to recommend on policy action that would restore full employment and the result was the *Working Nation* policy document of May 1994. The document echoed the ALP’s traditional commitment to social justice – ‘Employment and a reduction in the number of unemployed people are inseparable from the Government’s ambitions for Australia. The ambition is to create a dynamic social democracy – a country which has realised its economic potential’ (Keating 1994a, 1), but was also firmly wedded to the program of economic reform that had proceeded it (Watson 2011, 487). *Working Nation* aimed resources at the long-termed unemployed and other disadvantaged groups in order to get them into employment and had some moderate success, with unemployment lowering to 8.1% by December 1995.

Internationally, the Keating government continued with the middle power activism of the Hawke government (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1993). Keating promoted international free trade, access for Australian exports, and encouraged Australians to look to Asia for their future prosperity, all now firmly linked this to his Big Picture politics. The record here was mixed - the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1994 did contain successes for agricultural producers like Australia, but the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which set the framework for a European single market and the
creation of the EU, along with the creation of North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the same year, and moves by ASEAN to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement that excluded Australia, were developments which worried Australian policy makers concerned about being locked out of these regional trading blocs (Meredith and Dyster 1999, 290). Given the increasing importance of Japan, China, and South-East Asian countries, as growing economies and important markets for Australian exports, reducing trade protection barriers was of particular concern. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was therefore a forum that Keating embraced to promote liberalisation in the region, and the Bogor Treaty of 1994, committing APEC members to freer trade, was a major Keating foreign policy success.

Social and Cultural Policy

The Keating government was also particularly preoccupied with social and cultural policy issues. In October 1994, the government launched *Creative Nations*, the first time an Australian government had developed a formal cultural policy. The document concerned itself broadly with the arts, film, television, radio, heritage and the possibilities that newly emerging information communication technologies were presenting. The document also had an economic focus:

> This cultural policy is also an economic policy... The level of our creativity substantially determines our ability to adapt to new economic imperatives... It is essential to our economic success (Department of Communications and the Arts 1994, 7).

In addition to cultural policy, the Keating government continued the Hawke government’s commitment to multiculturalism and diversity (with limits). The High Court’s *Mabo* decision of 1992 overturned the legal fiction of *terra nullius* and helped put Indigenous issues firmly onto the agenda. Keating’s ‘Redfern Speech’ was a departure from previous governmental norms when it explicitly acknowledged the destruction that white settlement had caused Indigenous peoples and cultures:

> ...the starting point might be to recognise that the problem starts with us non-Aboriginal Australians.
> It begins, I think, with that act of recognition.
> Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing.
> We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life.
> We brought the diseases. The alcohol.
> We committed the murders.
> We took the children from their mothers.
> We practised discrimination and exclusion.
> It was our ignorance and our prejudice (Keating 1992c, 3).
This speech earned Keating considerable goodwill amongst the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (Jennett 1995, 63) and signalled his championing of the reconciliation process. Keating enacted this commitment by taking a personal role in negotiating the passage of the *Native Title Act 1993* in the face of opposition from various stakeholders.

Finally, Keating also put the issue of an Australian republic on the agenda. Keating’s 1993 election campaign speech featured a commitment by the Prime Minister to set up a committee of ‘eminent Australians’ to examine the options for an Australian republic and to put this to a referendum by the centenary of Federation in 2001 (Keating 1993c, 11-12). The republic was an issue that had considerable prominence through Keating’s term as Prime Minister, as he evangelised the shift towards a formally independent Australia. Keating’s active championing of these social issues helped to put them on the agenda, despite the imperatives of the dire economic situation.

**Keating’s Anzac — a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis**

The tensions in Keating’s governing style can be introduced with corpus assisted discourse analysis of his Anzac speeches. Two conclusions can be drawn from this data. Firstly, Keating attempted to relocate visions of Anzac from Gallipoli and WWI to WWII, and especially to the War in Pacific and Kokoda; and secondly, that in doing so, Keating did little else to challenge the accepted genre conventions of official, state-driven discourses of Anzac. As such, whilst Keating attempted to refocus Australia’s conception of the location of Anzac to Asia, in line with his Big Picture politics, his Anzac Day addresses did little to encompass the other cosmopolitan elements of his governing style.

**The Sites of Keating’s Anzac Day Addresses**

Keating gave at least one Anzac Day address or released a media statement for every Anzac Day as Prime Minister.

Keating’s first Anzac Day addresses were held in Papua New Guinea in 1992, with an address at the dawn service in the Bomana War Cemetery in Port Moresby and again later that morning at Ela Beach, Port Moresby. On April 26th 1992, Keating gave a further address in the village of Kokoda in the PNG Highlands. In 1994, Keating laid a wreath at the Martin Place Cenotaph, Sydney, at 8.30am, before the start of the march (McGregor 1994, 1), and released a statement to the media in place of an address. Finally, the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1995 saw Keating make an address after the dawn service, again at the Martin Place Cenotaph (Porter 1995, 4). Keating’s choice of location for marking Anzac Day was telling. By choosing to go to Papua New Guinea for his
first Anzac Day as Prime Minister, in particular to Kokoda, Keating was making a clear statement about where he wished Anzac to be located and with which war he wanted Anzac to be associated. This message was reinforced by the multiple speeches he gave in 1992, which signalled the significance of the shift. The fact that Keating did not travel to Gallipoli for the 80th anniversary of the landings in 1995, despite the precedent that Hawke had set in 1990, and in fact, that he never travelled to Gallipoli for an Anzac Day ceremony, is also instructive - Keating only ever marked Anzac Day in Australia or in Papua New Guinea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Three speeches</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>One speech</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>One media release</td>
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<td>1995</td>
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Figure 15 - List of Keating’s Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements

The Location of Keating’s Anzac

Keating’s focus was on the wars WWI and WWII (six named mentions each in Keating’s corpus), and their associated battles in Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific, and in particular, the battles at Gallipoli (six named mentions), Kokoda (six named mentions), Papua New Guinea (5 named mentions) and Singapore (four named mentions). He also highlighted the experiences of Australian POWs on the Burma Railroad (three named mentions). He mentioned other battles and wars, but gave none the same attention. They were glossed over by being mentioned in groups and failed to receive the same detailed attention from Keating.

Importantly, whilst Keating frequently mentioned Gallipoli, he did not give it the same prominence as Kokoda and the battles in the Pacific. This will be explored later in the chapter, so a short example here will suffice. In 1992, at Kokoda, Keating said:

> Even though we fought in many conflicts where we felt pangs of loyalty to what was then known as the "Mother Country," to Britain and to the Empire, and we fought at Gallipoli with heroism and in Belgium, in Flanders and in France and in other places, this was the first and only time that we fought against an enemy to prevent the invasion of Australia, to secure the way of life we had built for ourselves (Keating 1993b, 59).

Keating was creating a new hierarchy here, where the power of the original story of Anzac was acknowledged, but at the same time was subordinate to the battles fought at Kokoda, demonstrated by the hypotaxis of the subordinate clause before ‘this was the first and only time...’ This hierarchy,
along with the location of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses presented above, demonstrates Keating’s attempt to relocate Anzac from Gallipoli to Kokoda.

Keating’s Agents of Anzac
The agents of Anzac in Keating’s speeches were overwhelmingly men (ten named mentions). ‘Men’ was the only gendered noun used by Keating to refer to Australians in his 1992 addresses at Bomana War Cemetery, Ela Beach and Kokoda. ‘Men’ and ‘men and women’ was used in his 1993, 1994, and 1995 statements (five named mentions); women alone was never used. Looking at the service type, only male associations were given attention – the ‘very young men of the militia’, ‘airmen of outstanding courage’ and ‘soldiers of the 7th Division’ (Keating 1992d, 3-4). As such, whilst not exclusively masculine, the agents of Keating’s addresses were demonstrably and overwhelmingly men – they were the ones who were named specifically and they were the ones who were primarily acting and embodying Anzac.

Further, references to diversity are also largely absent from Keating’s Anzac Day addresses. Hawke had set a precedent regarding the inclusion of diversity into Anzac only a few years earlier, having referred to the ‘different backgrounds’ of the original Anzacs in 1990 (Hawke 1990d, 3) and including reference to Indigenous Australians and their war service in his 1991 address (Hawke 1991). One might expect this to continue with Keating, given the emphasis he gave to his big picture politics and the contemporary political context of the Mabo decision and reconciliation being played out. However, one brief mention is made of diversity in 1993, and none to named ethnicity. These patterns demonstrate that the identity issues of Keating’s Big Picture politics made few inroads into his Anzac Day addresses.

The Attributes of Keating’s Anzac Agents
What attributes did Keating’s Anzac agents have? As can be seen below, the attributes that the diggers of Keating’s speeches possessed were closely aligned to the state orientated values of the Anzac tradition. Courage and sacrifice are the most prominent themes. Interestingly, given Keating’s radical nationalism, elements of the digger tradition, like suffering and mateship, do come through. Suffering was especially unusual in the corpus, and reveals a more ambivalent meaning for Anzac than was usual for Prime Ministers who tended to towards official and state orientated versions of war remembrance that expunged such references. However, the predominance of the Anzac tradition reinforces the notion that whilst Keating attempted to shift perceptions of Anzac from Gallipoli to Kokoda, he did little to otherwise renovate the established conventions of Anzac.
Having established some of the quantitative aspects of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses, the chapter will now examine in greater detail how Keating’s political style was woven into his Anzac Day speeches.

**Keating’s Anzac Day Addresses: Big Picture Politics**

A closer examination of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses reflects the success and failure of his Anzac entrepreneurship. The cosmopolitanism and radical nationalism of Keating’s political style were not entirely congruent, and posed difficulty. Tensions quickly arose—why, when attempting to engage with Asia as a reformed, liberal, cosmopolitan and tolerant nation, would Australia wish to place the battles of WWII at the centre of national identity, where the central narrative was Australia fighting against Asian encroachment and with all the attendant colonial and racist legacies associated with this? How would sections of the Australian population who identified closely with the Anzac tradition, the story of the original landings at Gallipoli, and their associations with Empire and conservatism, react to attempts to reformulate a central Australian national narrative? Complying with the opposing pulls of observing the conventions of Anzac Day, whilst also injecting a new, and competing, perspective was evidently a difficult task. Keating’s speech writer, Don Watson, reflected upon the tension that this posed:
Paul Keating made so many of these speeches [about WWII] we feared that he might eventually have to revert to the platitudes with which such occasions are generally observed. Insofar as we avoided this, it made for better speeches, but also for controversy sometimes. He was on sacred ground: and departure from the customary words and gestures would always offend someone (Watson 2011, 182).

And offend people it did. The background of Keating’s republicanism, his publically stated desire to change the Australian flag, and his close engagement with the ‘old enemy’ all provoked reaction from the Opposition and from critics. In some ways, those critics have been vindicated – conceptions of Anzac still remain centred on the original landings at Gallipoli. However, Keating’s entrepreneurship in reorientating Anzac did help to enlarge the scope of Anzac and, to some extent, it contributed to a new understanding of Australia’s war history and its meaning for contemporary Australians. Further, it demonstrates both the extent to which Prime Ministers can redefine Anzac, whilst at the same time demonstrating the limits of this reorientation.

**Anzac Day 1992 – Papua New Guinea**

Anzac Day 1992 was the first for Keating as Prime Minister, and provided a clear enunciation of his position. It was marked at several locations in Papua New Guinea - on Anzac Day in Port Moresby, and the following day at the Highland village of Kokoda. It explicitly set out the reasons why he regarded the battles at Kokoda and during WWII to be so significant and the values associated with that significance, which were centred on the values of his political style, especially his radical nationalism. It was a radical, shocking, novel, and explicit attempt by an Australian Prime Minister to reorientate the location and meaning of Anzac Day and to align the occasion with the policy agenda of the government of the day.

The occasion was preceded by a trip by Keating to Indonesia, the first overseas trip that he made as Prime Minister, which helped to frame the subsequent trip to Papua New Guinea as a part of Keating’s wider regional engagement. Arriving in Papua New Guinea the day before Anzac Day, Keating told an audience at an official dinner that:

> We [PNG and Australia] both know that we must seize the opportunity. We both know that we must engage in the region as never before. This is why, on my first trip overseas as Prime Minister, I am visiting Indonesia and Papua New Guinea...

That is why I say strengthening our regional linkages, initiating dialogue, multiplying our common interests through widening our trading relationships – these measures will stay true to the interests of the new generations of Australians (Keating 1992e, 1-2).
The ground was set by Keating here for framing the trip in terms of multilateralism, regional engagement and trade.

Keating gave three addresses regarding Anzac during his trip to Papua New Guinea. The first was a short address at the dawn service at the Bomana War Cemetery in Port Moresby, attended by Keating, Rabbie Namaliu, the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, the Opposition leader John Hewson, and the New Zealand defence minister, amongst others (Nelson 1997, 157). Afterwards, Keating walked through the cemetery, observing the graves of the servicemen who were buried there. Later in the morning, the party had assembled at the Ela Beach memorial gates in Port Moresby, and the dignitaries again made speeches (Nelson 1997, 158). It was here at Ela Bach that Keating gave his most wide-ranging speech on Anzac Day of the trip. The following day, Keating travelled to the Highland village of Kokoda, where he dropped to his knees and kissed the ground in front of the modest memorial, and gave a shorter, but significant, speech. The speeches were attended by a phalanx of journalists, eager to get a return on the money spent on their attendance in overseas locations (Nelson 1997, 161), linking the Prime Minister’s speeches to the genres of news reporting, and amplifying the message to the audience in Australia.

The brief speech at the Bomana War Cemetery closely followed many of the conventions of the Anzac tradition identified above, and gave little indication of what was to follow at Ela Beach and Kokoda. As such, Keating paid tribute to the ‘bravery’, ‘endurance’, ‘devotion’, ‘humour’, and ‘comradeship’ of the servicemen who were buried at Bomana, who had ‘died in defence of their country and in the name of freedom’ (Keating 1992f, 1). The audience was called upon to remember the sacrifice of the servicemen, the hardships they faced and the ‘bond’ the campaign had created between Australians and Papua New Guineans. In many ways, the speech resorted to the kind of platitudes that Don Watson had hoped to avoid, but with one exception – the (brief) recognition of the horrors of war:

They suffered appalling hardship in an impossible terrain. They were debilitated by disease. They suffered long after the war ended. Some still suffer now (Keating 1992f, 1).

This level of acknowledgement of the harm that war causes was somewhat of a departure for Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. Whilst the numbers of war dead and wounded were often listed, the harm that is caused to those ‘broken’ diggers who return home, and the ongoing distress and damage wrought upon their families and loved ones, was often ignored, despite the efforts of Vietnam veterans to ameliorate this deficiency during this period. Whilst the listing of war dead neatly fits narratives of dutiful sacrifice, the horror of the returned wounded and scarred challenges
neat, state-driven notions of honour, duty and sacrifice. Whilst not a dominant feature of the Bomana speech, the acknowledgement of the horrors of war went some way to avoid the ‘platitudes’ that Don Watson identifies as characteristic of Anzac Day memorialisation. On the whole, though the Bomana address was a conventional and largely unremarkable Prime Ministerial Anzac Day address, closely following the accepted genre conventions of Anzac.

Keating’s two following speeches, at Ela Beach and the following day at Kokoda, offered far more radical departures from accepted Anzac norms. Both speeches followed similar narratives structures – acknowledging the importance of Gallipoli before continuing on to argue that the battles fought at Kokoda and Papua New Guinea were of greater significance, and created a greater sense of Australian identity, because of the efforts to defend continental Australia instead of the defence of the British Empire in faraway lands. Both speeches went some way to acknowledge the horrors of war, linked the allies that Australia fought with in WWII to contemporary relationships, had a fairly thinly conceived notion of liberal values as the virtues being defended and, finally, were sacralised by reference to religiosity. They referenced Keating’s radical nationalism and made allusions to his cosmopolitanism, though this was less explicit than his radical nationalism. The speeches demonstrated both the ideographic quality of Anzac, in the sense that it could be uprooted and relocated, but also the taboos that proscribed a too radical reinterpretation of the story and its meaning, with the absence of the social elements of Keating’s big picture politics.

Early in each speech, the significance of the original landings at Gallipoli in 1915, and how they helped to define Australian identity, is acknowledged. At Ela Beach, Keating remarked:

Gallipoli and the history of the Australian nation are indissoluble. It is inscribed in legend... The spirit of Anzac became the canon of Australian life: the ideals to which we aspire, the values by which we live (Keating 1992d, 1).

Here the recognition of Gallipoli is explicit and unchallenged. However, at Kokoda the following day, the centrality of Gallipoli and WWI was tacitly acknowledged, but also contested:

Even though we fought in many conflicts where we felt pangs of loyalty to what was then known as the ‘Mother Country’, to Britain and to the Empire, and we fought at Gallipoli with heroism and in Belgium, in Flanders and in France and in other places, this [the battles along the Kokoda Track] was the first and only time that we fought against an enemy to prevent the invasion of Australia, to secure the way of life we had built for ourselves (Keating 1993b, 59).

Keating tacitly accepted the centrality of Gallipoli and the battles of the Western Front in Australian life by acknowledging them as sites of Australian virtue. However, whilst Gallipoli and the battles of
WWI are acknowledged as sites of ‘heroism’, they are grammatically placed below the battles along the Kokoda Track. Only at Kokoda did Australians ‘prevent the invasion of Australia’ and secure our way of life. Kokoda was ousting the preeminent place of Gallipoli in Anzac narratives of Australian identity.

Both speeches went on to acknowledge death, suffering and sacrifice. At Kokoda, Keating simply listed the numbers of Australian, American and Japanese dead – ‘2000 of them [Australians] died’. At Ela Beach, Keating also listed the figures of the war dead in WWI – ‘sixty thousand young Australians’ - and WWII – ‘30,000 in the Second’, before acknowledging the harm caused to those that survived and returned home – ‘Countless others died prematurely as a result of war, or had their lives and the lives of their families scarred by war’ (Keating 1992d, 1-2). This explicit acknowledgement of the damage that war inflicts upon its participants was a further challenge to the accepted practices and meanings of Anzac Day. Having said that, reminding the audience of the sacrifices of war’s participants also seeks to proscribe contestation, as contestation would dishonour the memory of those who had died or had been wounded.

At Ela Beach, Keating continued the speech by beginning the process of dismantling traditional conceptions of Anzac, centred on the story of the Gallipoli landings:

Legends bind nations together. They define us to ourselves.

But they should not stifle us. They should not constrain our growth, or restrict us when we have to change.

Anzac is a commemoration of the most universal human values.

But it does not confer on us a duty to see that the world stands still.

The Australians who went to two World Wars, or to Korea, Malaya, Vietnam, went to secure a place in the world for their country and its ideals.

The world moves on. Our country must move with it (Keating 1992d, 2).

Keating’s political vision began to come through here, as he asked the audience to move beyond accepted understandings of the centrality of Anzac. ‘Legends’ like Anzac ‘should not stifle us’ - the modal verb ‘should’ committing the audience to Keating’s vision. The Australians who had fought in Australia’s military history had fought for their country’s place in the world and a place for its ideals, but the world had changed. ‘Our country must move with it’ – ‘must’ signalling the imperative nature of the call for change, with no ambiguity. At Kokoda, Keating continued to contest the centrality of Gallipoli by simply stating ‘It was here young Australian men fought for the first time
against the prospect of the invasion of their country, of Australia’ (Keating 1993b, 59). Australia was being asked to move beyond the accepted narrative strictures of Anzac.

Back at Ela Beach, Keating declared two remembrance tasks – firstly, memorialising those who died in the battles of WWII, or as POWs, and secondly, remembering ‘the battle fought out in Canberra and London and Washington’, where wartime Prime Minister John Curtin ‘defied those people Australia had never before defied’ (Keating 1992d, 2). Curtin insisted that Australian troops come home from the Middle East and return to defend Australia:

John Curtin was right...

In doing this he took the Anzac legend to mean that Australia came first - that whatever the claims of Empire on the loyalty of those who died in the Great war, the preeminent claim had been Australia’s.

The Australians who served here in Papua New Guinea fought and died, not in the defence of the old world, but the new world. Their world.

They died in defence of Australia and the civilisation and values which had grown up there.

That is why it might be said that, for Australians, the battles in Papua New Guinea were the most important ever fought (Keating 1992d, 3; emphasis in the original).

The threads of Keating’s Big Picture politics and his radical nationalism intersected here. Having alluded to his policy agenda by arguing that the world had changed, Keating executed a temporal shift back in Australia’s history, referencing the events surrounding the Fall of Singapore and arguing that the same lessons needed to be learnt again – ‘Australia came first’. The soldiers who had fought in Papua New Guinea during WWII had fought for Australia and the values that the country represented, not for the Empire and its stale ‘old world’, and as a consequence they ‘were the most important ever fought’. The speech at Ela Beach reflected the nationalism of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses – the rejection of the role of Great Britain in Australian history and the flowering of an independent, proud and distinct Australia via the deeds of Australians in the War in the Pacific. This is reinforced by Keating’s references to the way these battles in the Pacific had linked the nations of Papua New Guinea and the United States, but he failed to do the same for the United Kingdom.

Having executed this shift, Keating ran into difficulty defining what Australian service personnel had fought for. Older conceptions of Anzac had established answers to these questions – Australian service personnel had fought for King and country, all underpinned by a racialised version of Australianness. Keating’s cosmopolitanism had excised King and overt racism from his political repertoire, but his radical nationalism carried the rhetorical leftovers of older, racialised, forms of Australian identity. Thus, Keating purported that Australian servicemen and women had fought for
reasons of Australian, not Imperial, nationalism, and fairy thinly conceived liberal values. At Ela Beach, Australians in Papua New Guinea had fought for the ‘new world’, their country, its ‘civilisation’, and the unnamed values of 1940s Australia. The reference to ‘civilisation’ was filled with the ambiguity surrounding the hegemonic values of WWII Australia, and its associations with European ‘civilisation’ versus the ‘barbarism’ of the then colonised global south and Australia’s war enemies. Later in this speech, Keating suggests that Australians fought for their beliefs – ‘they believed in Australia – in the democracy they had built, in the life they had made there, and the future they believed their country had’ (Keating 1992d, 5). At Kokoda, ‘liberty’ is a named value that was defended by Australians in Papua New Guinea. These named liberal values operate as ideographs, as do ‘Australia’, ‘values’, ‘their civilisation’, and ‘the future’. Keating’s cosmopolitanism led him to leave the historical meaning of these terms ambiguous and the audience is left to interpret their meaning.

Keating’s speeches, and their attempted transition from Gallipoli to Kokoda, were sacralised by his allusions to the sacredness and religiosity of the occasion. This sacralisation was important for Keating’s efforts to present his Anzac entrepreneurship as unpolitical. At Ela Beach, Keating said that the ‘spirit of Anzac’ was the ‘canon of Australian life’ (Keating 1992d, 1) and the memory of those who served was ‘sacred’ (Keating 1992d, 2). At Kokoda Keating became bolder. It was here that Keating argued that:

...that these young men believed in Australia and we need to give Australians, all Australians, but particularly young Australians, an Australia to believe in. We can’t deny young Australians their birthright to a past with meaning for them and a future with meaning. It has to be a future with meaning and there can be no deeper spiritual basis to the meaning of the Australian nation than the blood that was spilled on this very knoll, this very plateau, in defence of the liberty of Australia (Keating 1993b, 59).

In the context of recovery from the recession, young Australians of 1992 still had much to yearn for in their future. In January of that year, it was reported that whilst the recession had seen the unemployment rate rise to 10.3%, the unemployment rate for teenagers aged 15-19 years was running at 30% (Encel 1992, 11). Keating offered a future made pure by the allusions to the sacralisation of the blood sacrifice of the soldiers who had fought and died at Kokoda – ‘the blood spilled on this very knoll’ in the name of ‘liberty’. This blood sacrifice was offered in place of the jobs that did not exist and the attendant futures that employment entailed, their absence at least in part because of the decisions made by Keating as Treasurer. Again, these ideographs are left vague and ambiguous, free of definitive meaning and left open for audience interpretation, which reflected the
limits of engaging with nationalist sentiment in a plural and post-modern society that was increasingly (though not exclusively) suspicious of exclusionary meta-narratives of nation.

The theme of sacrifice was immediately continued by Keating at Kokoda:

So can I thank you the people of New Guinea and those of you who actually fought in that campaign, for those who died in that campaign, to the relatives here today of loved ones who were lost but who gave their lives selflessly in the defence of Papua New Guinea and the defence of Australia and the broader defence of liberty in the Pacific.

This was the place where I believe the depth and soul of the Australian nation was confirmed. If it was founded at Gallipoli it was certainly confirmed in the defence of our homeland here (Keating 1993b, 59).

At Kokoda, the ‘soul’ of Australia is ‘confirmed’. Whilst a secular interpretation of confirmation is plausible, the preceding reference to the soul of the nation also suggests the Christian rite of confirmation, where the Baptismal rites are finalised and seal the covenant between God and the church member. So, against the background of the trope that Gallipoli was a ‘baptism of fire’ for Australian troops, Keating makes the assertion that Kokoda confirmed the ‘soul of the Australian nation’, completing the rites of initiation. These religious allusions helped to insulate Keating from critics who felt he was violating the accepted conventions of Anzac and, further, sacralised the statements contained within the speeches.

Keating’s attempt to relocate Anzac from Gallipoli to Kokoda did not go unnoticed and uncontested – it was not accepted as properly unpolitical. Aside from his speeches in Papua New Guinea, controversy was further provoked by a microphone picking up Keating saying to a local child at Kokoda who was brandishing an Australian flag ‘Don’t worry, sonny, we’ll get you a new one of those soon’ (Watson 2011, 184). Conservative critics quickly emerged to discipline Keating and condemn Keating’s partisanship and defend the essential and depoliticised version of Anzac that had been newly re-established after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. Of course, these actions by critics were political in of themselves, but they had the virtue of purporting to be unpolitical in their defence of the essentialism of the traditionally conservative interpretation of Anzac. Opposition leader John Hewson accused Keating of buying new friends in Asia, disowning old ones and apologising for Australia’s past (Milne and Taylor 1992, 1). John Howard, in a sign of things to come, remarked that Keating was ‘using Anzac Day for partisan political purposes’ (Milne and Taylor 1992, 1). The now national vice-president of the RSL, Bruce Ruxton, was also unimpressed with Keating’s comments on the Australian flag and Keating’s republicanism: ‘Those thousands of Australians buried in the Bomana War Cemetery would have got up and pushed him down one of the holes’
Ruxton’s complaints, however, also reveal the RSL’s growing marginalisation in the process of defining of Anzac. Keating in 1992 was able to use the authority of his office to relocate Anzac Day, both physically, away from the strictures of the capital city dawn service and march, and rhetorically, away the influence of the RSL in the governing of Anzac narrative. As Nelson (1997, 161) notes, the media was keen to get a return on its investment in sending journalists overseas to cover the occasion. Their attention was squarely focused on the Prime Minister in Papua New Guinea and the novel new ways that he was redefining Anzac, not the RSL.

**Anzac Day 1993 - The Burma-Thailand Railway Book Launch**

Anzac Day 1993 was more low-key for Keating, but no less provocative. No formal speech was reported to have been made on Anzac Day, but he had attended a book launch on April 23rd, and gave an address. Anzac Day 1993 once again clearly reflected the tensions of Keating’s political style. Keating again sought to relocate Anzac away from Gallipoli (never mentioning the battle) to the War in the Pacific and once again derided the influence of the Empire on Australian identity, claiming that the events of WWII had created an independent sense of Australian national identity. This sense of independence was then explicitly linked to the Australian turn to Asia, and the attendant cosmopolitanism of Big Picture politics. However, this was awkwardly juxtaposed with the tenets of radical nationalism, and the racially exclusive and masculine language that this entailed. These tensions were not fully reconciled by Keating and Anzac Day 1993 demonstrated the difficulties that Keating’s governing style posed.

Keating’s 1993 Anzac Day address was not an Anzac Day address in a conventional sense of the word. It was conducted on April 23rd, a full two days before Anzac Day, rather than on Anzac Day itself or immediately preceding or following it (although, Anzac Day falling on a Sunday that year may have been a factor in the timing of the speech). Further, it launched a book, *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History*, rather than being a speech delivered at a dedicated Anzac Day event, like a dawn service or march. These factors demonstrate that Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac was still in a somewhat unsettled stage, not quite an institutionalised practice, complete with attendant ceremonial tradition, routine, and procedures.

Keating began his 1993 address by acknowledging the horrors of war. Restrained in his language, Keating argued that Australians knew little about their war history, especially their regional war history. Keating knew ‘because my father’s brother had been there [Sandakan], and died there’
(Keating 1993a, 1) but it was not taught at school and was not widely written about. Keating goes on:

We knew the wars through legend and ritual.
And we knew World War I better than we knew World War II.
But we really didn’t know what it had been like...

And that, I think, is why we are shocked when we see the gravestones which remind us of how many died, and their ages, and what they must have gone through, and the people they left behind (Keating 1993a, 1-2).

There is little sense of the Anzac tradition of duty, service, bravery and sacrifice in this quote. Keating links his own family’s experience of war to the paucity of the nation’s wider engagement with its war history. Keating’s reaction is visceral, expressing ‘shock’ at the number of dead, their youth, their suffering and the impact of their loss on their families and loved ones. Whilst still restrained and refraining from gratuitous description of the violence of war, the degree of recognition given to the horrors of war by Keating was a departure from the Anzac tradition.

This level of acknowledgement informed the radical nationalist themes of Keating’s speech, as the horrors visited upon the participants of war, especially the participants of WWII, were the consequence of the incompetency and betrayal of Great Britain, and, in addition, Australia’s subservient and passive relationship with the Empire. Keating was careful not to too explicitly draw this link, once again conceding the power and significance of the original story of Anzac and WWI in the Australian imagination ‘because these places [the battlefields of Northern France] are truly sacred to Australia’ (Keating 1993a, 2). Significantly, though, Gallipoli itself was not mentioned anywhere in the speech and immediately after this statement, Keating once again promoted his relocation of Anzac from WWI and Gallipoli, to WWII and the War in the Pacific:

But the battlefields of the Asian and Pacific war are also sacred. In the next few years I hope the battlefields of New Guinea, Borneo, Singapore and Malaya - and Burma and Thailand - will become as important to our historical understanding as the battlefields of the Middle East and Europe were to earlier generations of Australians.

Everyone should know about these battles.

Above all, they should know about the subject of this book - the prisoners of war who worked on the Burma-Thailand Railway.

No Australian soldiers suffered more than these. Few had more reason to feel betrayed or neglected – before, during and after their capture. None had to call on such reserves of faith and spirit as they did: faith in themselves; faith in each other; faith - I like to think – in Australia, what they had created there and what they hoped to create (Keating 1993a, 2).
The relocation was explicit. ‘Everyone should know about these battles’ and ‘no Australian soldiers suffered more than these’ are emphatic, declarative and unambiguous calls to recognise the significance of the War in the Pacific and an attempt to locate them hierarchically on a scale with them above WWI and Gallipoli, as ‘no Australian soldiers suffered more than these’. But more than that, the statement condemned those who had put them in that situation, as they had ‘betrayed’ these Australian service personnel – ‘few had more reason to feel betrayed or neglected’. Whilst the agents who had betrayed these Australian were left unnamed, Keating’s republicanism, his Singapore outburst in Parliament the year before, or his 1992 Anzac Day statements, leave little doubt that it was the British Empire that was the target here.

Keating went on to argue that Australian’s found, and continued to find, themselves in Asia:

…these were the first Australians to go en masse into South East Asia. They saw it and dealt with its peoples as no other Australians had.

They also saw the British empire [sic] as few Australians had ever seen it – and it led a lot of them to conclude that we Australians had evolved into a different race. It raised their sense of an independent identity.

So, it may be that in time the 8th Division will be seen as something more than soldiers or prisoners of war – but as the first pioneers of Australia in Asia. The frontiersmen.

Somehow I think it would be the highest tribute we could pay them – both those who died and those who managed to survive (Keating 1993a, 2).

Keating imbued the POWs with a purpose for which there is little historical antecedent. As Curran (2006, 300) points out, ‘there is little to suggest that Australian soldiers fighting in the Pacific saw themselves as the creators of a new national myth that would come to replace the ideas of Empire with Asian engagement.’ These historical inaccuracies coupled with the insensitive language that Keating uses – ‘the first soldiers to go en masse into South East Asia… as the first pioneers of Australia in Asia’ - painted an unproblematic and power free picture of Australian engagement with Asia, in the mould that Curran suggests above. It is oblivious to the fact that Australians were en masse in South East Asia to protect the colonial territories of the British Empire and Australia against the invasion of Japan, rather than as equal partners seeking mutual engagement and advantage. ‘Engagement’ in this historical sense was also accompanied, according to the later standards Keating himself promoted, by blatant racism and crude stereotyping. These associations were not helped by Keating’s view that these Australians ‘had evolved into a different race’, with Keating being:

…the only prime minister in the post-1972 period to use the term race as a positive equivalent to ‘nation’ — even though ‘race’, with its biological determinants of ‘blood’ and ‘stock’, as well as its unwavering devotion to ‘historical mission’ or national ‘destiny’, had fallen into disrepute following the excesses and evils of fascism and Nazism (Curran 2006, 300).
Finally, the comparison was awkward because of the wildly differing circumstances of the eras – the context of Australia defending itself against a (potentially) invading Japan, and all its associations with the defence of colonialism and realpolitik, was a world away from the middle power internationalism that Keating saw as central to his political style.

Australians in 1993 also found themselves in Asia. Immediately following Keating’s tribute to the 8th division ‘as the first pioneers of Australia in Asia’, he continued by explaining what that tribute would entail:

Such a tribute would depend on our succeeding in Asia, of course. It will mean that we will have to succeed economically - as an entirely independent nation, aware of necessity and confident of both our identity and our capabilities.

And that will depend on our developing greater mutual understanding between the countries of Asia and ourselves, greater mutual respect

The men and women discussed in this book very often did just that - they developed a deep respect for the Chinese and the Malays, the people of Borneo and Ambon and Sumatra who very often risked their lives to help them.

They found in all sorts of circumstances that they shared common human ground with people they had, for cultural and historical reasons, been inclined to patronise or despise.

There's surely a lesson in it we can come to terms with the countries of Asia and in doing so, far from sacrificing our identity or our principles, strengthen them (Keating 1993a, 3).

In this case, Keating was much more sensitive to the cosmopolitanism of his political style, even if the historical accuracy of his claims were suspect. It is also one of the rare occasions were Keating explicitly referenced diversity and tolerance in his Anzac Day addresses. Difference, though, is emphasised by Keating, with nationalism’s ‘us vs them’ dichotomy – ‘we can come to terms with the countries of Asia and in doing so, far from sacrificing our identity or our principles, strengthen them’. Asia reinforced Australianness.

Success in Asia was further conflated with mateship:

It has been around for a long time, that word [mateship] – and those principles. But I’m inclined to think that it is only in the last decade of so that we have begun to realise just what a powerful force they can be in the economic life of a country and in seeing a country through great changes and hard times...

If we imbue all our endeavours in the next decade with those principles I am sure we will succeed – and if we succeed, we will have paid the prisoners on the Burma Thailand Railway the greatest possible tribute (Keating 1993a, 4).

Thus, the deeds and sacrifice of the POWs during the War in the Pacific were conflated with neoliberal economic reform, Australia’s turn to Asia, and the push towards a republic. To ‘succeed in
Asia’, Australia must ‘succeed economically’, with that success being dependent ‘on our developing greater mutual understanding between the countries of Asia and ourselves’. Mateship was employed as a value to effect this change, and is reconstituted with a new, economic, meaning – a value that could see ‘a country through great changes and hard times’. And by succeeding in this endeavour, Australia could pay ‘the prisoners on the Burma Thailand Railway the greatest possible tribute’. The second half of Keating’s speech, then, largely reflected Keating’s governing style – the oft-rehearsed message of encouraging Australians to look to Asia for their future prosperity was once again repeated. Mateship, a value intimately tied to radical nationalism, is reconstituted with new economic meanings for changing times, reflecting the way the social was conflated with the economic by Keating. And the message is endorsed by the connection to the sacrifice of the diggers – by succeeding in these endeavours, Australia will have paid a suitable tribute to their suffering and death.

Keating’s speech did not go unnoticed by the RSL or the Opposition, who both criticised the address. Brigadier Alf Garland, the national president of the RSL, told the *Canberra Times*:

> Now, he can try his damnedest but he’s never going to be able to change the fact that that [Gallipoli] was where the Australian character as we know it today, the Anzac spirit, was displayed to the world, and all that we’ve managed to do since then is to build on that...
>
> He moves ground every time he wants to try and raise another point to suit his agenda and nothing is more annoying to ex-service people, people who have been and laid their life on the bloody line in operations for Australia, to hear somebody, a Johnny-come-lately, sort of telling us why we were there and what it was all about (Garland, as cited by Brough 1993, 1).

The Opposition reacted too. Taking the lead in critiquing Keating’s speech, John Howard repeated themes that he had aired the previous year:

> He’s the first Prime Minister I know that’s tried to put some kind of spin, partisan political spin, on matters associated with Anzac Day and I think it’s reprehensible...
> ...I think it [Anzac Day] is just one of those occasions when you don’t introduce any element of political debate or political controversy (Howard, as cited by Brough 1993, 1).

Again, it should be emphasised that these criticism were political too. They were attempts at defending the depoliticised and essential version of Anzac that they saw as proper. In doing so, they were trying to maintain a conservative version of Anzac that they argued was rightly delimited as unpolaritical, incontestable and taboo.

The public sanctioning of Keating demonstrated just how far he pushed the conception of Anzac Day. By explicitly seeking to relocate Anzac to the Pacific, downplaying the role of Gallipoli, and
linking this manoeuvre with his republicanism, turn to Asia, and liberal internationalism, Keating was violating many of the accepted tenets of Anzac. Conservative critics quickly appeared to defend traditional conceptions of Anzac Day, and to sanction the Prime Minister for failing to adhere to the confines of the Anzac tradition, and its associations with heroic sacrifice, duty and service. Most critically, Keating’s republicanism, his desire to change the Australian flag, and his attempt to reform Australian identity, were actions that conservative critics conflated with his failure to adequately adhere to the traditional strictures of Anzac Day and were quick to condemn. Keating’s Anzac entrepreneurship had failed to maintain a suitable level of acceptance and unpolitics, and was therefore largely unsuccessful.

Anzac Days 1994 and 1995 – The Martin Place Cenotaph, Sydney
Anzac Days 1994 and 1995 were more subdued affairs for Keating, both in terms of the themes explored in his engagement with the day, and in terms of the controversy, critique and attention that his Anzac entrepreneurship garnered. The contradictory elements of Keating’s political style, his radical nationalism and his cosmopolitanism, were pushed to the background as Keating sought instead to engage with Anzac in a manner which largely conformed to the accepted practice and performance of Anzac Day – honouring the sacrifice of those who had served, reflecting on the way Anzac unified the nation and, significantly, for the most part referring to the original story of Anzac centred on the landings at Gallipoli in WWI instead of the War in the Pacific.

Having said that, the subtext of Keating’s attempt to reorientate Anzac was still present, with a separate media release in 1994 announcing that the government would spend $1.5 million on improving facilities at Kokoda (Keating 1994b). However, these announcements, and Kokoda and the War in the Pacific more generally, were secondary features of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses during these years. Whilst the more tempered nature of Keating’s engagement with Anzac during these years can be partly explained by the explosion of WWII memorialisation which was occurring from 1994, and especially in 1995 with the Australia Remembers program (see Chapter 7), this change in tone stands in sharp contrast to the previous two years.

The addresses were very similar, the first similarity being their location. 1994 and 1995 saw Keating attend the Martin Place Cenotaph for Anzac Day. In 1994, Keating laid a wreath after the dawn service and released a statement for the media in lieu of a speech, and in 1995 Keating gave a speech after the dawn service. Significantly, for the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1995, Keating did not travel to the Gallipoli Peninsula, as Hawke had done in 1990 for the 75th anniversary,
and as his successor Howard did in 2000 for the 85th anniversary and in 2005 for the 90th anniversary. The 80th anniversary of the landings instead saw the Governor General Bill Hayden and Veterans Affairs minister Con Sciacca attend the Anzac Cove service. As such, Keating’s anti-British nationalism was not entirely absent from the marking of Anzac Day during these years.

The second similarity was their themes. In place of the attempts to reorientate Anzac and the radical nationalism of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses in 1992 and 1993, his 1994 and 1995 addresses largely conformed to the strictures of the Anzac tradition, whilst being sensitive to contemporary political values and current ADF deployments. Thus, Keating directed his focus to the original story of Anzac centred on Gallipoli and the WWI. In 1994, Keating begins his media release by stating ‘Since that fateful April day in 1915, a spirit of duty and courage that cannot be destroyed has been symbolised by what we know as the ANZAC legend’ (Keating 1994c, 1), explicitly linking the ‘spirit’ of the Anzac legend not to the War in the Pacific, but to the landings at Gallipoli in 1915. Further, Keating later links all subsequent service personnel with the ‘spirit born at Gallipoli’ – ‘Through all the years and all the wars, wherever Australians and New Zealanders have fought since, that spirit born at Gallipoli has been a bond joining them with the ANZACs of 1915’ (Keating 1994c, 1). Comparable themes are present in 1995, as early in his speech, Keating again placed Gallipoli at the centre of the occasion:

This is the eightieth anniversary of the event from which Anzac Day derives, the landing at Gallipoli and the tragic and disastrous military campaign which followed it. Anzac Day is not a celebration of military victory, or a glorification of war. But it is the most important and profound day in Australia’s national life (Keating 1995a, 1).

Here Gallipoli is not placed hierarchically below the battles along the Kokoda Track, or the suffering of the POWs captured by the Japanese, as they had been in 1992 and 1993. Instead, the origin of Anzac is identified solely with the landings at Gallipoli, and the traditions that sprung up to honour those events as ‘the most important and profound’ to Australia.

These speeches are also far less specific in their identification with Keating’s policy initiatives or to his government’s activities more generally. Thus, in 1994, only passing reference is made to ‘...the activities of our service men and women on duty abroad, particularly through our participation in United Nations operations’ (Keating 1994c, 1) in reference to ADF personnel deployed for UN operations in Cambodia and Somalia. Keating’s 1995 speech lacked even these passing references to his government’s policy agenda, with the exception being the vague exhortation to ‘pay tribute to
Australians who died so that we could live in peace and continue the task of building a good and prosperous country' (Keating 1995a, 1).

In place of Keating's explicit reference to his government's policy agenda were the 'platitudes' that Don Watson warned could characterise Anzac Day addresses. So, we see explanations of Anzac's significance that centre on calls for unity and to remember the lessons of the Anzac tradition – heroic sacrifice, duty, bravery and honour:

We took from Gallipoli, and we have taken from every subsequent war in which Australians have fought and died, the message contained in that sacrifice: that it is good to be brave and to endure difficulty, and that we are bravest, most able to endure and most likely to succeed when we know we can rely on each other, when we stick together (Keating 1995a, 1).

Anzac, as presented by Keating here, lacks specificity and is rather bland – an ideograph imbued with little in the way of contestable meaning and left to the audience to interpret. Instead of using Anzac actively to promote his government's policy agenda, as he had done in 1992 and 1993, Keating in 1994 and 1995 was passive in his engagement with Anzac, largely conforming to the Anzac tradition and its accepted meaning and practice.

Another change from Keating's 1992 and 1993 Anzac Day addresses was his greater sensitivity towards gender. Thus, in place of the exclusively masculine gendered nouns of 1992 and 1993, Keating in both 1994 and 1995 refers to the men and women who had served during Australia's history. Whilst lacking the named and rich specificity that had characterised his eulogising of the soldiers who had fought at Kokoda in 1992, or the POWs who had built the Burma-Thailand Railway in 1993, Keating in his later addresses linked women to the traditional sentiments attached to male participants in Australia's war history. So, in 1994 Keating asks us ‘...to pay tribute to the gallant men and women who had made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of their country' (Keating 1994c, 1; emphasis added) and in 1995 ‘...to remember our countrymen and women who, because they believed in Australia and saw their duty to it, were prepared to lay down their lives in war’ (Keating 1995a, 1; emphasis added).

The benign nature of Keating's 1994 and 1995 Anzac Day addresses is encapsulated by the lack of controversy his remarks attracted in the media, from the Opposition, and from the RSL. The RSL, quick to defend Anzac tradition, was outraged by links being made between Anzac Day and the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras, and the lack of instruction about Anzac in the school curriculum in 1995, rather than with comments made by the Prime Minister (Porter, Le Grand and AAP 1995,
4). Having pushed his radical nationalism to the background, and having largely excised reference to his government’s policy agenda, Keating’s engagement with Anzac Day in these years passed unchallenged.

Conclusion
Keating’s engagement with Anzac Day demonstrates both the success and failure of his Anzac entrepreneurship. It was successful in the sense that it further institutionalised the practice of Prime Ministerial leadership of Anzac Day, increasingly (though not entirely) breaking free from the RSL and marginalising the role they traditionally played in the definition and practice of Anzac. By marking Anzac Day in Papua New Guinea in 1992, Keating was able to both keep the influence of the RSL at arm’s length, and also attempt to redefine the location of Anzac away from Gallipoli and WWI, to Kokoda and WWII. Keating also consistently engaged with Anzac, making speeches or releasing some kind of statement to mark the occasion every Anzac Day he was Prime Minister. Keating’s Anzac entrepreneurship emphasised neoliberal economic reform, republicanism, and engagement with Asia, as well as his radical nationalism, hostility towards Great Britain and Australian conservatives who were identified with Britishness, and chauvinistic pride in Australianness. These efforts by Keating – his regular engagement, his sidelining of the RSL and his attempt to relocate Anzac – all demonstrate just how much effort Keating put into defining Anzac on his terms. As his speechwriter Don Watson observed, ‘...he had delivered another kind of message, namely that custom [surrounding Anzac] would not restrain him’ (Watson 2011, 183-184).

But also, however unrestrained Keating may have been, he was not entirely successful in his entrepreneurship surrounding Anzac. Conservative critics were quick to react to Keating’s thinly veiled swipes at the values that they associated with the Anzac tradition, the links to Empire, and the attempts to redefine Anzac in terms which aligned closely with Keating’s governing style and policy agenda. Whilst the influence of the RSL was declining, it refused to be marginalised, and continued to rage against attempts to redefine Anzac’s meaning. John Howard also emerged as a prominent critic of Keating’s attempt to relocate and redefine Anzac – themes he continued when he took office in 1996 (see Chapters 8 and 9). As such, whilst Keating was an enthusiastic Anzac entrepreneur who contributed significantly to the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, he failed in his attempt to relocate and redefine Anzac Day in an image of his own nationalism and politics.
CHAPTER 7

Keating and Manifold Memorialisation: War Remembrance Outside of Anzac Day

Introduction
The last chapter demonstrated Keating’s regular and active Anzac entrepreneurship, which continued the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. It also argued that Keating attempted to redefine Anzac in a manner which aligned with his political style, and that this redefinition demonstrated a tension between the more chauvinistic aspects of his radical nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Keating’s engagement with Anzac Day was accompanied by a parallel increase in war memorialisation and remembrance outside of Anzac Day, partly by coincidence and partly by contrivance. Winter (2006, 26-27; 226-227) identifies this as part of the second memory boom of the 20th century—the set of practices conducted by groups and individuals in the pursuit of coming ‘...together in public to do the work of remembrance.’ This chapter seeks to explore this process of memorialisation and remembrance by analysing four memorial occasions, and examines how Keating engaged with memorialisation. Whilst Anzac Day is the focus of the thesis, the sheer scale of memorialisation that occurred during Keating’s time in office, and the accompanying unprecedented level of government involvement, warrants attention.

Watson (2011, 182) argues that Keating lacked any great enthusiasm for Australia’s war history, and instead engaged with memorialisation because:

...there is scarcely a country between Australia and Japan that does not have a cemetery with Australian graves in it, or a monument to the sacrifice of Australian servicemen and women. When, in accordance with his mission to secure Australia’s interests in the region, Keating visited almost every country in East Asia at least once, invariably these places of indescribable sadness became the backdrop for ceremonies commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the war [WWII].

Watson’s statement is telling—Keating felt the obligation to engage with Anzac and Australia’s war history. But Keating did not let this obligation define the manner in which he would engage with Anzac and memorialisation—he engaged was active and entrepreneurial, imbuing Anzac with his government’s policy agenda and priorities. At the international level, Keating enthusiastically aligned the middle power internationalism that his government had pursued with his engagement with memorialisation, linking the broadening of Australia’s outlook, its turn to Asia, and...
domestic cosmopolitanism with the meaning of Australia’s war history, via the process of memorial diplomacy (Graves 2014). Memorial diplomacy created opportunities for Keating to employ his political style and promote his policy agenda to polite foreign audiences and a media corps eager for a story, all far away from the scrutiny of domestic critics. At the domestic level, however, Keating was more circumspect in aligning the meanings of the interring of the Unknown Soldier and the Australia Remembers program with his political style.

The scale of Keating’s memorialisation will be explored through four examples that demonstrate varying levels of success and failure at nationalism entrepreneurship:

1. 1992 saw the culmination of the reconciliation process with Vietnam veterans with the opening of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial on Anzac Parade in Canberra. Keating continued to observe the terms of this reconciliation, and felt the effect of its taboos when he failed to demonstrate an adequate level of observance of Anzac’s strictures when in Vietnam in 1994.

2. The 75th anniversary of Armistice in 1993 saw the interring of the Unknown Soldier in the Hall of Memory of the Australian War Memorial, reflecting the shift away from imperial understandings of Australia’s war service (Inglis 1999). Despite this, Keating was tempered in his remembrance, and did not fill the occasion with his republicanism, which helped to keep the occasion free from controversy.

3. Keating travelled to Europe for the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings in 1994, and marked the occasion in the UK and France. Whilst there, he practiced memorial diplomacy, and was successful in smoothing relationships with countries that he had offended with his history of intemperate remarks.

4. Most significantly, the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, especially the War in the Pacific, was commemorated by a series of government sponsored events with the Australia Remembers program. It was a deliberate attempt by government at remembrance, and involved an unprecedented level of government planning and funding. Significantly, Keating demonstrated his cosmopolitanism more frequently during the Australia Remembers program of events and managed to keep this initiative relatively depoliticised, essential and therefore unpolitical.

Keating’s success in memorialisation was therefore dependent on his ability to keep the memorial occasions free of the controversy that he tended to attract when he spoke about issues of national identity. Keeping the occasions free of partisan political conflict was a higher priority for Keating in
these examples than it had been on Anzac Day in 1992 and 1993. As such, the chapter provides further evidence for the assertion that Anzac could operate as an ideograph, but that success in Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship was dependent on maintaining the depoliticised and unpolitical nature of Anzac, in conjunction with a form of Anzac that gelled with the public’s own sense of nationalism.

**Keating and the Process of Memorialisation**

The increase in memorialisation during Keating’s term as Prime Minister was partly due to circumstance, and partly due to contrivance. The circumstantial aspects included the fact that his term in office coincided with the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, the 75th anniversary of the end of WWI and the culmination of the reconciliation process with Vietnam veterans with the opening and dedication of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in 1992. Evidently, the timing of the marking of these occasions was largely out of the government’s hands, as even governments cannot alter the dates of significant moments in Australia’s war history. In addition, proposals for a national memorial to the servicemen and women of the Vietnam War had emerged and been set in train whilst Hawke was Prime Minister. Finally, the initial proposal to inter an Unknown Soldier in the Australian War Memorial’s Hall of Memory had emerged from within the Australian War Memorial’s own staff (Inglis 2008, 428). Suggestions that the proposal for the project had emerged from the Prime Minister were misplaced (Inglis 1999, 17).

Nonetheless, Keating’s engagement with these occasions was also contrived in the emphasis and chosen significance placed these occasions, and the spectacular form that the marking of these occasions took did in fact contain a significant degree of active Prime Ministerial engagement and direction.\(^\text{18}\) That Keating chose to engage with these occasions is telling. There was a certain logic associated with his participation, as the head of government, and even the sense of obligation to do so that Watson (2011) notes. This logic, however, was not unambiguous. For instance, Keating’s role in the interring of the Unknown Soldier attracted some controversy at the time due to his republicanism (Inglis 1999, 17) and continues to annoy conservative critics who see his picture of Australianness as a wrongful re-imagination of Australian history and identity (see Bendle 2014, 6). It is not implausible to suggest, as critics did, that the non-partisan Governor General should have been the only one to speak (Blainey 1993a, 2), or to have been the leader of the ceremony, as Bill

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\(^{18}\) In addition to the influence of the Prime Minister, it should also be noted that Con Sciacca, the Minister for Veterans Affairs from 1994-1996, also had an enormous influence over the Australia Remembers program, and an enthusiasm which helped drive memorialisation (Inglis 2008, 391; 393).
Hayden was in 1995 at Gallipoli for the 80th anniversary of the landings. Or, taking the example of Australia Remembers - Keating could have chosen to focus on the War in Europe, but instead focussed on his preferred theatre of war, the War in the Pacific. His government also could have been more modest in its funding of the anniversary, but instead spent $9 million on commemorative events to mark the occasion, along with $20,000 grants for each federal electorate for community based memorial activities (ALP 1995, 224). As Reed (2004, 62 - 63) notes, ‘Australians were urged to remember the past, but in reality it often seemed that the past was being created. The past “remembered” through Australia Remembers was designed to become the national memory.’

So, what was being remembered with these memorial events? The structure that limits nationalism entrepreneurs’ range of options was evident in two competing and sometimes contradictory factors; firstly, that, to a degree, Keating felt obliged to recognise these occasions, as befits the role as Prime Minister following the reconstitution of an unpolitical Anzac, and also to allay suspicions regarding his radical nationalism. Secondly, though, the occasions were an opportunity for Keating to espouse his nationalist vision, drawing deeply on his political style for a domestic audience, and linked to this, at times an occasion to engage with particular nation-states and to promote outward looking middle power activism and cosmopolitanism.

This presented a conundrum for Keating – in order for his Anzac entrepreneurship to be successful, it needed to closely conform to the strictures of the Anzac tradition and to pay sufficient respect to the key stakeholders of this institution. Keating had to temper his language and his radical nationalism; whilst his nationalism was a feature of his engagement with the process of memorialisation, it was far more subtle than the megaphone delivery that had characterised his 1992 and 1993 Anzac Day addresses examined in Chapter 6. On the other hand, memorialisation revealed the cosmopolitanism of his political style to a far greater degree than his engagement with Anzac Day itself did and provoked little controversy. This fact demonstrates that Anzac could be renovated in ways that quite radically altered its historical form, but only to the extent that it could be presented in a manner that was accepted by the public, and therefore did not introduce political deliberation and interrogation that threatened Anzac’s unpolitical nature. Thus, Keating’s engagement with war memorialisation throughout his term as Prime Minister provides further evidence for the success and failure of his Anzac entrepreneurship, simultaneously demonstrating the employment of Anzac’s ideographic nature to stretch the boundaries of Anzac, and the ultimate failure to break those boundaries and redefine them wholly in his preferred image.
Honouring the Forces of the Vietnam War

As Prime Minister, Keating faced the continuing problem of how to honour the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans. In some ways, Keating had little choice to do so – the unpolitical nature of the reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the Australian state and public had been established during the Hawke governments, and Keating faced the ongoing need to respond to the logic and events that this process posed. Chief among these was the completion and dedication of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in October 1992, which was the culmination of the reconciliation process that had begun with the Welcome Home parade of 1987. The date of the dedication, October 3, made an explicit link to this beginning, being the five year anniversary of the Welcome Home parade. signalling the incorporation of Vietnam veterans into the Anzac tradition, the memorial was intended to link their service to the original Anzac diggers, and make reference to the controversy the war provoked at home (Inglis 2008, 358). Whilst Inglis (2008, 385-387) argues that the memorial does little to allude to that controversy, its form, location, and dedication did all link with the memorialisation characteristics of established Anzac Day practices. This included its form as a monumental memorial, location on Anzac Parade in Canberra amongst many other war memorials and a short distance to the AWM, and its dedication, which took the form of a dawn service, dedication, and then march by veterans.

Keating actively participated by making an address at the dedication ceremony, unlike Hawke, who was an observer at the 1987 Welcome Home parade. The media reports of the day do not shed light on veterans’ continuing anger at the government, or of that being directed at the Prime Minister (see Wright and Cadzow 1992). This contrasted with the 1987 Welcome Home parades, where some marchers declined to give “eyes right” when passing Hawke on the parade route (see Chapter 4). As such, the dedication signalled the culmination of the reconciliation process.

Keating was sensitive to these issues in his dedication address. Early in the speech, Keating (1992g, 1) linked Vietnam veterans and their service to previous generations of service personnel: ‘We honour them for the same reason we honour those previous generations of Australians who served in wars on foreign soils.’ He went on to list those reasons – their sacrifice, duty, bravery, and their belief in Australia, democracy and freedom (Keating 1992g, 1), all themes congruous with the Anzac tradition. Keating then moved away from the Anzac tradition to explicitly acknowledge the hurt that the divisions of the war had caused Vietnam veterans:
It is true that no war divided Australia like the Vietnam War. It is true that often we remember those years more for the protests at home than for the fighting abroad.

The years of Vietnam corresponded with a great social and political upheaval in Australia. The war was itself one of the catalysts of change.

There is no doubt that in all the turmoil we lost sight of the reality of Vietnam. We lost sight of those who did the fighting, and the waiting. And by doing that we made their reality worse.

For all the drama in the streets, and parliaments and public halls, the real war was, as always, on the battlefields where young men and women died.

The real tragedy was in their suffering and death and, as ever, in the loss which lives on in the hearts and minds of those who loved them.

We cannot make good this hurt any more than we can undo the war itself (Keating 1992g, 1-2).

Keating shared the onus of harm with all by using the pronoun ‘we’—a form that was more famously repeated during his reconciliatory Redfern Speech later that year (see Chapter 6). ‘We lost sight’ of the death and injury that Vietnam caused, ‘we lost sight’ of the soldiers who served and suffered, and ‘we made their reality worse’, with our failure to recognise the injury of our actions. But having caused this hurt and harm, ‘we’ were exhorted by Keating to be the agents of reconciliation:

But, by this memorial, we can make good the memory.

It is the symbolic resting place of the 504 who died. It means that at last they will join the exalted ranks of Australians who died in other wars.

It is a memorial to all the men and women who served in Vietnam. It is a memorial for all those for whom the war has meant suffering and loss. All those whose experience of Vietnam still haunts them. All those here today.

We should recognise, therefore, that it is a memorial for all Australians; because, as a nation, we should all bear the burden (Keating 1992g, 1-2).

Once again, the link between Vietnam veterans and service personnel of the past is made explicit, and, further, honoured by the use of adjective ‘exalted’, with its allusions to status and sacredness. Finally, the speech concludes by reinforcing the terms of the reconciliation, calling upon the nation to collectively share the burden of the pain the war caused Vietnam veterans. Keating’s dedication speech reinforced the unpolitical terms that the reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the Australian body politic imposed, and the taboos surrounding violation of these terms. Keating was disciplining the audience - Vietnam veterans were to be accorded the same respect and honour that had been bestowed upon previous generations of service personnel, the Australian community was called upon to be united in that pursuit, and also united in the sharing of responsibility for the pain that division caused veterans.
The taboos surrounding any violation of this reconciliation came to the fore two years later as Keating travelled to South-East Asia to develop ties with Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in April 1994. The message of the trip was Australia’s new political, economic and strategic engagement with the region, a view that Keating wished to sell to the leaders of these countries and to the Australian public (Watson 2011, 478; Baker 1994a, 16). The trip also saw Keating visit WWII war sites, and align the memorialisation of these sites and those who had suffered there as Japanese POWs with Australia’s emerging engagement with the region. Keating’s trip served as another example of memorial diplomacy, those memorial practices that take place on the fringes on international summits or trips and serve to link and deepen relations between the participant countries via a shared notion of the past (Graves 2014, 169-170). It was a theme that characterised Keating’s international memorialisation, both on Anzac Day and more broadly.

Whilst in Thailand, Keating visited Kanchanaburi War Cemetery, the main cemetery for POWs who were used as forced labour in the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railway, and made a speech that honoured both the service and the sacrifice of those servicemen and women. The speech also aligned itself with the reasons for his trip:

It is worth remembering that Australia’s first major engagement with Asia was in war. In Korea and Malaya and Vietnam it was again war.

Today it is a partnership with Thailand and other countries of the region. A partnership which will extend the domain of our common interest and reduce the ground for conflict.

It seems to me that there could be no better way to honour those Australians who suffered and died here than to succeed in this enterprise. No better way to see that what they endured, and what their allies and hundreds of thousands from the countries of Asia endured, will not happen again (Keating 1994d, 2).

Here we see the same connections being made between the history of Australia’s war service and Keating’s politics of engagement with the region that he made in his 1993 Anzac Day address (see Chapter 6). A picture of liberal interstate cooperation is presented, as conflict gives way to a ‘partnership which will extend the domain of our common interest and reduce the ground for conflict’. But more than that, this endeavour is endorsed by the memorialisation of those who had here suffered, sacrificed and died – ‘there could be no better way to honour those Australians who suffered and died here than to succeed in this enterprise’.

Keating and his advisors had been tipped off that some journalists in the travelling party were preparing stories about how Keating would not be making a similar trip to memorial sites in Vietnam, in particular Long Tan. This was ostensibly due to Vietnamese sensibilities surrounding
memorialisation given Australia’s role in the perpetuation of that war (Watson 2011, 478-479). To ameliorate this omission, mention of the Vietnam experience was also inserted into Keating’s Kanchanaburi address:

Tomorrow I go to Vietnam. The Australians who fought and died there have been justly honoured in Australia as those who were here have been honoured, and for the same reasons for the sacrifice they made, the faith they showed.

In Vietnam the lesson is the same. The wounds have to be healed. The terrible legacy of the past must not cripple future generations.

We must never forget, but for the sake of future generations and in the name of those who died, the memory should not hold us back but inspire us to find the way to peace and friendship, justice and prosperity (Keating 1994d, 2).

This sensitivity was for nought when Keating reacted testily to a journalist’s question regarding why he would not be commemorating Vietnam veterans in Vietnam given (unnamed) veterans’ expectation that he would do so, shooting back ‘frankly, why should they? [expect Prime Ministerial commemoration]’ (Watson 2011, 481; Millett 1994, 28). Keating further explained ‘I visited here [in Thailand] a war cemetery because of the enormous atrocities committed to Australians in prisoner-of-war camps and death marches. These things didn’t happen in Vietnam’ (Keating, as cited by Millett 1994, 28). The damage had been done, and the Opposition and some sections of the media seized upon the remarks as evidence of Keating’s insensitivity on the issue and lack of competence in matters of memorialisation.

This small controversy demonstrates the hold that taboos surrounding the memorialisation of Australian service personnel and, in particular, Vietnam veterans had taken during this period. Keating was forced to issue a statement acknowledging the ‘duty to the past’ (Watson 2011, 484) that he had as Prime Minister and to reiterate the reasons why it was not possible to fulfil these obligations in Vietnam itself: ‘We did not seek a memorial service in Vietnam principally because we decided there was no suitable place in Vietnam to conduct one, and also because I did not think it appropriate, while in Vietnam, to revive bitter memories’ (Keating 1994e, 1). Keating’s difficulties regarding the recognition of Vietnam veterans is an example of the structures imposed upon Prime Ministers in their Anzac entrepreneurship, and their need to observe and honour Australia’s military history and its remembrance in forms that unambiguously respected Anzac’s taboos in order to be successful. But further, the incident also demonstrates that this process could be aligned with more prosaic and instrumental ends – in service of Keating’s political style and policy agenda of Asian engagement. Whilst largely overwhelmed by the controversy that his intemperate remarks regarding the memorialisation of Vietnam veterans had provoked, his Kanchanaburi speech itself
saw positive reaction from the press and an apparent tacit acceptance of the linking of Australia’s’ war history with Keating’s policy agenda of the outlook to Asia (see Baker 1994, 16; Watson 2011, 478-480).

The Interring of the Unknown Soldier

In contrast to some of the difficulties that Keating faced with the memorialisation of the Vietnam War, his role in the interring of the Unknown Soldier on Remembrance Day 1993 was more successful. Despite some controversy regarding his participation, reaction to Keating’s speech eulogising the Unknown Soldier was largely neutral or positive and did not provoke the same degree of negative reaction from critics that his engagement with Anzac Day and memorialisation often did. This section argues that this was due to Keating adopting themes for his speech that did not as explicitly reference his political style or policy agenda and largely conformed to the genre strictures of the Anzac tradition.

Proposals for the interment of an Unknown Soldier in the AWM had been circulating since 1921, but had ostensibly been blocked because of imperial sentiment – the view that the Unknown Warrior interred in Westminster Abbey the same year represented all the service personnel of the Empire (Inglis 1999, 10-11). AMW planners were also worried that ‘...parsimonious politicians would make the unknown soldier not a part of the [as yet unbuilt] national memorial but a substitute for it’ (Inglis 1999, 11). Further proposals for the return of an Unknown Soldier to Australia emerged and were rejected from time to time over the intervening years, but by 1991, Australia had become a sufficiently post-imperial nation to accept a new proposal from within the AWM to consent to the interment of an Unknown Soldier (Inglis 1999).

The fact that this proposal emerged from within the AWM is important – it did not arise from the Prime Minister’s office, or from within the government. However, as plans progressed to exhume a soldier buried near Villers-Bretonneux and return him to Australia to be interred in the Hall of Memory in the AWM, some conservative critics took issue with the inclusion of Keating as an official pallbearer during the ceremony. Having studied the interring of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey, the AWM had invited the Governor General Bill Hayden to be chief mourner and to walk behind the coffin, as King George V had done. Keating, as Prime Minister, would also be invited and would walk to the side of the coffin as the chief pallbearer, representing the head of the Australian Government, and the two of them representing the Australian people (Wright 1993, 31). The prominent Liberal Senator Bronwyn Bishop criticised the move, fulminating on talkback radio...
that ‘What appals me is the way in which the Prime Minister tries to politicise any important celebration or commemoration of sacrifice that Australians have made’ (Bishop, as cited by Wright 1993, 31). Former RSL national president Alf Garland also criticised the Prime Minister, incorrectly condemning Keating for installing himself as chief pallbearer and for ignoring service personnel in the ceremony. In a letter to The Australian, Garland said ‘[Keating] has taken every opportunity to tear down and destroy the Australian heritage, traditions and national identity which the Unknown Soldier and his colleagues fought for and established [and has] the temerity to politicise the event [by being chief pallbearer]’ (Garland 1993, 10), echoing Bishop’s critique. Garland’s and Bishop’s comments demonstrate just how much some conservative critics opposed the idea of Keating participation in the interring of the Unknown Soldier due to what his presence represented – republicanism, radical nationalism, and the strident repudiation of everything Liberal – rather than due to any of his actual actions.

Reacting to the Opposition’s criticism, the AWM invited Opposition Leader John Hewson to be a pallbearer too, desiring to keep the occasion free of politics and continuing the practice of bipartisanship that had occurred on Anzac Day in 1990 at Gallipoli, and in 1992 at Kokoda. Garland was subsequently corrected in the pages of The Australian by the AWM Acting Director Michael McKernan, and once Hewson had been invited to participate, such criticisms were isolated. The occasion had been sufficiently removed from the sphere of the political, and partisan political conduct had been circumscribed by the inclusion of Hewson in the ceremony.

Thus, Keating participated as planned in the ceremony and delivered a speech in which ‘...he bashed no Pom, and did not even remark that the return of an unknown Australian after all those years in which we were content to be represented by the remains in Westminster Abbey was an event registering the end of empire’ (Inglis 1999, 17). The lack of Keating’s political agenda and style in the speech in striking, though not absent. As such, Keating’s exhortation that ‘He is all of them. And he is one of us’ (Keating 1993d, 1; emphasis in the original) sees the Unknown Soldier operating as an ideograph par excellence. The unknowable nature of the Unknown Soldier’s identity frees him from any baggage that his rank, his class, his ethnicity, religion or sexuality, or even the nature of his death, might have burdened him. He is a blank canvass upon which Keating could have painted his political image in bold colours, but perhaps sensitive to the critics, to the sense of occasion, or to the taboos surrounding the remembrance of Australia’s war history, Keating chose not to. Keating’s lessons from the Unknown Soldier adhere closely to the Anzac tradition – the speech is full of references to ‘bravery’, ‘duty’ and ‘sacrifice’, and to honouring Australia’s service personnel.
References to empire were even included, though as Holbrook (2014, 186) notes, he inverted the customary phrase ‘king and country’ to ‘...the chances are he went [to war] for no other reason than he believed it was his duty – the duty he owed his country and his King’ (Keating 1993d, 1). Further, by sticking closely to the strictures of the Anzac tradition, Keating managed to avoid controversy and even won private plaudits from critics, such as John Howard, who remarked ‘didn’t the PM do us well?’ to Michael McKernan after Keating’s speech (Holbrook 2014, 186).

But Keating could not resist inserting some of his own personality and political style into his speech. Thus, reflecting his radical nationalism, he presented WWI not as a necessary war that Australian governments, and many Australians, had felt a duty to support, but as ‘...a mad, brutal, awful struggle distinguished more often than not by military and political incompetence’ (Keating 1993d, 1), a slight that alluded to the leaders of Great Britain who directed much of the Allied campaign. Further, the central lessons of the Unknown Soldier, as emphasised by Keating, reflect the democratic and egalitarian traditions of Australian politics, rather than references solely to duty, sacrifice and empire:

For out of the war came a lesson which transcended the horror and tragedy and the inexcusable folly.

It was a lesson about ordinary people - and the lesson was that they were not ordinary.

On all sides they were the heroes of that war: not the generals and the politicians, but the soldiers and sailors and nurses - those who taught us to endure hardship, show courage, to be bold as well as resilient, to believe in ourselves, to stick together.

The Unknown Australian Soldier we inter today was one of those who by his deeds proved that real nobility and grandeur belongs not to empires and nations but to the people on whom they, in the last resort, always depend.

That is surely at the heart of the Anzac story, the Australian legend which emerged from the war. It is a legend not of sweeping military victories so much as triumphs against the odds, of courage and ingenuity in adversity. It is a legend of free and independent spirits whose discipline derived less from military formalities and customs than from the bonds of mateship and the demands of necessity.

It is a democratic tradition, the tradition in which Australians have gone to war ever since (Keating 1993d, 2).

Here, Keating played to the egalitarianism of radical nationalism without resorting to crude insults or overt hostility with his direct reference to the ‘Australian legend’ – the ‘folly’ of unheroic generals and politicians, and that the heroes of war were the ordinary folk who fought on the frontline. Reference to the digger tradition is made – ‘mateship’ not ‘military formalities’ – and the democratic traditions that sustained the service personnel of WWI, and the service personnel who followed.
Finally, Keating made a point of using that democratic tradition in an attempt to overcome difference and hierarchy, and he emphasised unity:

The Unknown Australian is not interred here to glorify war over peace; or to assert a soldier’s character above a civilian’s; or one race or one nation or one religion above another; or men above women; or the war in which he fought and died above any other war; or of one generation above any that has or will come later.

The Unknown soldier honours the memory of all those men and women who laid down their lives for Australia (Keating 1993d, 2).

Keating here listed dichotomised and oppositional identities central to his political style – an exalted ‘soldier’s character’ versus the character of an ordinary civilian; sexism that would see ‘men above women’; or bigotry via chauvinistic pride in ‘one race or one nation or one religion above any other’. Keating imbued the Unknown Soldier with lessons that subtly chastised those who might have preferred conservative, hierarchical, Australian national identities, rather than those identities that Keating’s mix of cosmopolitanism and nationalism attempted to weld together into a pluralistic, but unified, national whole.

Having closely referenced the traditions of Anzac and tempered his political style provided Keating with a platform upon which he could present his political values in an acceptable manner. Keating imbued the Unknown Soldier not with his policy agenda of an Australian republic or of the economic outlook to Asia, as he had done on some previous Anzac Days or other memorial occasions, but instead with less controversial contemporary political values based on cosmopolitanism, equality and democracy. Thus, reactions to Keating’s speech were mostly positive or neutral (Watson 2011, 443).

However, isolated instances of controversy remained around Keating’s eulogising of the Unknown Soldier. A week after Remembrance Day 1993, historian Geoffrey Blainey complained that Keating had omitted reference to the Unknown Soldier’s probable, but unknowable, Christianity, converting him ‘...without his consent and, fortunately, without his knowledge, into a symbol of government policy’ (Blainey 1993a, 2). Blainey further accused Keating of launching ‘...yet another veiled attack on the legitimacy and history of the nation that the unknown soldier gave his life to defend’ (Blainey 1993a, 2). This was an issue which continued to irritate Blainey, who five years later as a council member of AWM managed to gain approval to get the words ‘Known unto God’ engraved upon the Unknown Soldier’s tomb (Holbrook 2014, 187-188). More recently, Bendle (2014) condemned Keating’s 2013 Remembrance Day address at the AWM to mark the 20th anniversary of the interring of the Unknown Soldier, arguing that Keating promoted a ‘nihilistic’ view of WWI, a perspective that
had roots in his political style, and which unjustly condemned the political and military leadership of European powers.

These protestations were, and continue to be, largely isolated, but they reveal the depth of antipathy and hostility towards Keating as Prime Minister for failing to uphold the political and policy traditions of the Anzac tradition in his politics and in his engagement with Australia’s war history. Even this relatively mild and unassuming speech (by Keating’s standards) attracted continuing sporadic opposition, despite the fact that it closely followed the traditions of the official and conservative strand of Anzac and was largely accepted by the wider public without controversy. The criticism reveals the boundaries that official government discourses of Anzac that seek to include contemporary interpretations must contend with and the opposition that they continue to attract, long after the events that drove them have passed. Nonetheless, the interring of the Unknown Soldier reveals the success that Keating could achieve in the memorialisation of Australia’s war history, and his mixed record of effectively incorporating his own interpretation of Anzac into his national addresses.

The 50th Anniversary of the D-Day Landings

In June 1994, Keating travelled to the UK and to France to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings. The trip was another opportunity for memorial diplomacy - simultaneously the commemoration of D-Day and an opportunity for Keating to pursue domestic and foreign policy ends. In particular, the trip was dominated by issues directly pertaining to Keating’s political style – the republic, changing the Australian flag, creating opportunities for liberalised international trade, and promoting an outward looking and cosmopolitan Australia. It was an opportunity to meet with world leaders too – UK Prime Minister John Major and French President François Mitterrand both had meetings with Keating, and the various ceremonies and events of the commemoration also brought him into contact with the US President Bill Clinton and Queen Elizabeth.

Media reports of the occasion generally emphasised the success Keating had in his dealings with the British and French leaders, but also remarked upon the tension that Keating had previously caused in both countries and the need to repair relationships (see Wright 1994, 2). Wright was referring to Keating’s ‘...history of intemperate comments that have won him few admirers in British and French power circles.’ In particular, this included his infamous Singapore comments, where he expressed the view that the UK had abandoned Australia and left the country to defend itself against the Japanese during WWII (see chapter 6). It further referred to remarks Keating had made the previous
year in France where he had lambasted the French for their intransigence in the Uruguay round of the GATT negotiations. Echoing the blunt language and pugnacious attitude of Billy Hughes at the Versailles peace conference 75 years previously, Keating had rounded on the bemused local French MP who had been sent to represent the French government during a wreath laying ceremony at Villers-Bretonneux, asserting incorrectly that Australia had lost 10% of its population defending Europe, in particular France, and asking what that sacrifice was worth to French policy makers holding out on agriculture concessions in GATT negotiations (Kitney 1993, 13). Keating had then repeated these sentiments to the press corps accompanying the Prime Minister:

Can I say that the flower of many countries' youth was lost here in France - unselfishly, for the greater good of this country. And at an important time of world decision, we are not seeing the magnanimity from France that all of us who have fought for and respected France have shown it.

And I speak here about the GATT round; about selfishness which has crept into European politics... and the selfishness which the French are pursuing in international policy.

And, I think, it is time for the French to reassess themselves and magnanimously be part of the world rather than sitting out there by themselves thinking that the world owes them a living. It doesn't and it's not going to give them one (Keating, as cited by Kitney 1993, 13).

Unsurprisingly, French policy makers reacted testily to Keating's provocation. Both incidents serve as examples of Keating's lack of inhibition when it came to employing Australia's war history for policy ends. If he felt he could not ignore Australia's war history, as Watson claimed, then he certainly did engage with it entrepreneurially and in a manner which aligned closely with his own world view and policy agenda.

The trip had also been conducted in the context of remarks that Keating had made in Parliament just prior to leaving for Europe. Rising to the despatch box to answer an Opposition question regarding his desire to change the Australian flag and whether he continued to plan on doing so given that it was ‘a flag under which so many Australians fought and died during World War II’, Keating asserted that ‘Australians fought under the British flag’ during battles in WWI and that diggers at Kokoda had fought for ‘the ideals of Australia [not Britain]’, much to the displeasure of the Opposition, who interjected frequently as Keating spoke (Keating 1994, 1318). These debates put the issue of the Australian republic and the changing of the flag back firmly on the agenda as Keating set off for Europe.

This was the context in which Keating found himself during June 1994. As Wright (1994, 2) argued, Keating faced two problems – firstly, that Australia’s involvement in the D-Day landings constituted
only a small proportion of the total Allied contribution, and secondly, that ‘...to cement friendships that are important in economic terms - he must undo some of the damage he has wrought.’ But further than repairing relationships, Keating was also playing to the domestic political issues that he had fixed as central to his agenda – the republic and the changing of Australia’s cultural symbols to reflect that independence. Thus, Keating’s speeches contain none of the caustic condemnation of France or Great Britain that had characterised earlier Keating pronouncements on the respective countries. Mimicking the mould of the Unknown Soldier address, Keating closely followed the conventions that govern Prime Ministerial engagement with Australia’s war history, and paid due respect to liberal values and to the sense of duty and sacrifice of service personnel. The logic of memorial diplomacy was in effect – smoothing the relationships between the countries by emphasising the shared histories of the nations and the public remembrance of those acts during WWII.

As such, in a Keating speech to an audience in the UK, the values that Australians fought for were uncontroversial – ‘liberty, justice and human decency’ – and praise is effusive for the UK - ‘Britain embodied the courage democracy needed. Britain inspired the free world and those whose freedom had been taken from them. There can be no doubt she inspired those whose names are recorded here [at the Air Forces Memorial, Runnymede]’ (Keating 1994g, 2). In France, similar sentiments were expressed – ‘There is a thread in Australia’s history which has always linked us to France. What the French called liberty, equality and fraternity Australians were inclined to call “mateship” and the “fair go” for all’ (Keating 1994h, 2). Both countries are praised by Keating for the values and ideals that they helped to originate and uphold, values and ideals that Australia had incorporated into its own political culture: ‘...in the events of fifty years ago common values were proved and a story in common value was written’ (Keating 1994h, 2). This emphasis on common values and praise of the host countries were the words that Wright (1994) argued needed to be said in order to remedy the offences caused and open the doors of diplomacy.

The repair of damaged relationships was prominent in France, where Keating met with French President Mitterrand, the kind of fringe meeting enabled by such memorial occasions. Keating outlined to Mitterrand the reform of the Australian economy and culture that his government had instituted and envisaged for the future. This involved changing French perceptions which, it was argued, still viewed Australia as an outpost of the British Empire (Baker 1994, 23). It also occurred in the context of domestic debate regarding the republic and the changing of the Australian flag that had been on the agenda shortly before Keating had left for Europe the week before. As such,
Keating indicated to journalists that he had spoken with Mitterrand regarding these issues, arguing ‘I told him that we were not a derivative of any other place, we were not a derivative of any other society which we had cultural associations with because our culture is changing’ and ‘I said that I thought the constitutional monarchy, though it had served Australia well, could not adequately either represent or serve Australia well into the future’ (Keating, as cited by Baker 1994, 1).

This example further demonstrates the interplay of structure and agency in Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship. The 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings had imposed an obligation upon Keating to attend and participate in the commemoration of those events and Australia’s war history that he could not easily refuse. But that did not mean that Keating would meekly comply with the script that memorialisation posed. Instead, Keating used the occasion entrepreneurially, and promoted his vision for Australia to both an international and domestic audience. Thus, the significance of the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings is that whilst Keating could not easily ignore the obligations that his office imposed upon him to mark such occasions, he could use those occasions to pursue his own nationalist vision.

**Australia Remembers – the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II**

Australia Remembers was a year-long program of government sponsored events that marked the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII. The name of the program gave some indication of the government’s intent - to explicitly, intentionally and deliberately remember and mark the historical events and participants, and interpret and communicate meanings of the anniversary. Australia Remembers was thus a conscious effort at nationalism entrepreneurship and government-sponsored remembrance on a grand, year-long scale. It was deliberately and carefully planned and constructed by federal government design and supported by significant government promotion and public funding. These efforts were furthered by extensive community and occasional corporate engagement, helping to connect the government’s intention with the wider Australian community.

This section argues that the Australia Remembers program of memorial events once again aligned closely with the political style and policy agenda of the Keating government. Firstly, despite 1995 being the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings the program of events and media focus was squarely on WWII, not WWI, and on the War in the Pacific, rather than the War in Europe (Reed 2004, 9). Secondly, Keating’s speeches throughout the Australia Remembers program were less radically nationalist and inflammatory than his Anzac Day addresses of 1992 and 1993. They employed tempered language that more closely conformed to the Anzac tradition; furthermore they
were more cosmopolitan, explicitly and positively including a more pluralistic range of identities in his narrative of remembrance. Finally, this section argues that Australia Remembers was also a mostly, though not entirely, successful exercise in nationalism entrepreneurship by Keating. Whilst he had to temper his language, and be less explicit about his policy agenda, Keating did do much to renovate Anzac during Australia Remembers in ways that are still being observed – promoting and institutionalising the recognition of WWII, the service of women and multiculturalism and, to a lesser extent, Indigenous Australians. There are real boundaries to nationalism entrepreneurship that Keating needed to observe but Australia Remembers demonstrated that these boundaries were elastic – change could occur and stories previously ignored were included where once they were not.

**Australia Remembers – Structure and Planning**

Whilst Australia Remembers had the endorsement of the Prime Minister, aligned as it was with his wider understanding of Australia’s war history, the initiative was also driven by the entrepreneurial activities of Minister for Veterans Affairs, Con Sciacca (Inglis 2008, 393). Sciacca’s genuine enthusiasm for Australia Remembers helped to achieve bipartisanship for the project, and won him ‘respect and affection from diverse groupings and individuals, regardless of their own political philosophies and affiliations’ (Reed 2004, 13). Further, Sciacca’s personal history as a Sicilian immigrant and his stated belief that Anzac could transcend its British origins to include Australians of all ethnic backgrounds helped:

...to heal the profound divisions it [Anzac] has created by removing it from its military context and extending it to former enemies and descendants of people who had no involvement in World War I. More importantly, Sciacca had decentred the Anzac legend from its location at the core of Anglo-Australian remembrance, offering it as a secular signifier of belonging within the nation (Reed 2004, 122-123).

Sciacca was therefore an active participant in the re-imagination of Australia’s war remembrance in a more plural sense.

In addition to the goodwill that Sciacca helped to create in regards to Australia Remembers, he played an enormous role in envisaging its purpose, and in planning and coordinating its program of events. Speaking to the House of Representatives in February 1995, Sciacca outlined what the Australia Remembers programs of events and initiatives were for:
...the aims of those working on Australia Remembers are to thank the veterans who fought in World War II; commemorate those who died; recognise the widows and children of those who died; remember all who kept the home front running; recreate the joy felt at the end of the war in the best way possible; educate the nation about World War II and leave a lasting legacy (Sciacca 1995a, 915).

Thus, the purpose of Australia Remembers centred on two interrelated aims – to remember and to educate. In the process, the government helped to steer public understandings of Australian war history – challenging the primacy of World War I in Australian narratives of identity and attempting, to varying degrees of success, to broaden the range of identities to be recognised, including women, immigrant identities, and Indigenous Australians.

To achieve these ends, a number of elements to the program were planned - commemorative ceremonies, most notably including three pilgrimages by veterans to overseas theatre of war locations in London, Papua New Guinea, and Borneo, and major ceremonies for Victory in Europe (VE) Day and Victory in the Pacific (VP) Day; seed funding for state capital and regional commemorative committees; public funding for unit reunions and histories; certificates of appreciation for veterans and those who served and contributed on the home front; engaging the media in promotion of Australia Remembers; and the development of an education kit for primary and secondary school children on the events of World War II (Sciacca 1995a, 916-919).

In planning this program, Sciacca had envisaged the participation of a broad cross-section of the government and the community. It was a federal affair – in addition to the Commonwealth contribution, Australia Remembers also involved the participation and planning efforts of state and territory governments and $20,000 worth of seed funding for each federal electorate to plan and enact their own Australia Remembers events (ALP 1995, 250). Employing a whole-of-government approach, Australia Remembers also engaged a range of Commonwealth government departments and bodies. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), in conjunction with the Department of Veterans Affairs, was asked to locate surviving uniformed and non-uniformed Indigenous veterans, and to plan a commemorative service that would recognise their war efforts (Sciacca 1995a, 917). Of further note was the DVA’s employment initiative with the Department of Employment, Education and Training entitled Operation Restoration, offering unemployed Australians work and training opportunities to restore neglected or damaged war memorials and remembrance driveways, and dovetailing with the employment policies of Working Nation (see Chapter 6). Inglis notes that this was somewhat of a departure for the government and the DVA, as small-scale local memorials were historically built and maintained by the funds and efforts of local...
communities, not the government. As it was, $10 million in Commonwealth funding was set aside for this program (Inglis 2008, 391).

Educating young Australians about WWII was also a key priority of the Australia Remembers program, with Sciacca (1995a, 918) remarking that the production of an education kit for Australian school children was ‘one of the most important tasks being undertaken this year.’ Students were asked to engage with a number of themes centring not only on the rote and passive learning of events, but with active tasks that encouraged students to investigate ‘the personal experiences of war in their local communities’ (Sciacca 1995a, 919), the state directing the linking of generations through the act of remembrance. Further to this end, youth forums were conducted around Australia during Australia Remembers, culminating with a Prime Ministerial address to the national youth conference on VP day. Keating (1995b, 2-3) told that audience of schoolchildren:

So it had to mean something. 50 years on, we can't say oh well that was just something in the past. This sort of stoicism, this sort of bravery, heroism, belief in Australia, belief in what we created here, belief in our values, had to mean something. And so I am exceptionally pleased that so many Australians remember and so many young Australians remember and have learned about the period.

Keating’s anxiety that WWII was not being properly remembered is manifest in his language – ‘it had to mean something’, repeated for effect after listing the heroic attributes of Australia’s service personnel – ‘bravery’, ‘stoicism’ and ‘belief in Australia’ - reveals his tacit acceptance that such meanings were not universally understood or accepted. Concern that the significance of Australia’s war history would be lost as the generations who experienced war aged and passed away had preoccupied those sympathetic to Anzac for decades (see Macleod 2002; Holbrook 2014, 116-121) and Keating’s government had adopted a tangible policy response – curriculum intervention – for the expressed purpose of educating young Australians about their war history and encouraging their continued remembrance of those events and their meanings.

Total Commonwealth funding for Australia Remembers stood at $9 million19 (ALP 1995, 250; Firth 1995, 11). The marketplace was also sought as an active partner in remembrance, but Reed (2004, 160-161) notes the government had little success in garnering support from Australian companies. This did not stop licensed merchandise being produced, though, with 18 licensees producing goods bearing the Australia Remembers logo on coasters, mugs, spoons, flags, clothing and even a CD

19 Reed (2004, 15) reports a total funding figure of $12 million, which has been repeated in Holbrook (2014, 189). I have been unable to corroborate this figure with primary sources, so I have instead reported the $9 million figure above, drawn from ALP (1995) and Firth (1995).
(Reed 2004, 161). Inglis (2008, 393) further notes that Cadbury chocolates and Tooheys beer both produced war-time branded products, and that Australia Post and the Australian Mint produced war hero stamps and coins.

Media coverage was also actively sought for the purposes of raising awareness and educating the public about the significance and meaning of WWII (Sciacca 1995a, 918), and Reed (2004, 160) notes the success that Australia Remembers had in this regard. TV specials featuring personalities like Ray Martin interviewing the Prime Minister and newspaper reports and histories bearing the Australia Remembers logo were prominent. In sum, Australia Remembers was an integrated and lavish government led initiative of nationalism entrepreneurship and remembrance, on a scale not previously seen for a war anniversary. It sought to involve all levels of government and the breadth of the public service; integrated wider government policy priorities with programs like Operation Restoration; attempted to activate the consciousness of the public through media engagement, corporate sponsorship, and an education kit for schools; and was, on the whole, very successful in its aim to create remembrance and memory of the events and meanings of WWII.

Keating and the Meaning of Australia Remembers

Keating emphasised the honouring of Australia’s service personnel as the preeminent meaning for Australia Remembers. Whilst the values that were fought for and the continuing lessons that these values had for the present were referred to, they often were presented as uncontroversial ideographs, and they did not directly reference Keating’s policy agenda. Thus, in his major VP Day address, Keating said:

> Time has changed our perspective on the world and on ourselves. We have had to adjust our thinking to accommodate necessities. In many ways I think we are better for it. It may be that we are less naive and more worldly than the Australians of fifty years ago. I believe we are more tolerant and more open.

> But if we are to succeed as we should we will always need their strength, their collective spirit, their sense of duty, their faith. We will need their inspiration

> I hope that this Australia Remembers year has reminded us all of these things (Keating 1995c, 2).

This was as direct a reference to his government’s agenda as Keating was prepared to make during his Australia Remembers speeches. Keating here subtly referenced the changes that his government had ushered in, the necessity of those reforms, and the positive cosmopolitan values that this had brought with it. And Australia’s war generation was presented as an example for the present – as
they faced change, so must the current generation – a repetition of a theme that he and Hawke had utilised in their Anzac Day addresses.

Otherwise, Keating left this connection unspoken, instead filling his speeches with the uncontroversial values and meanings closely aligned with the tenets of the Anzac tradition - duty, sacrifice, courage, democracy, and peace. In the same VP Day address as above, Keating acknowledged the logic that compelled him to mark the war history of the nation in this manner: ‘It has been my duty to utter some words of tribute on behalf of the Australian people and participate in services to commemorate their deeds and sacrifice’ (Keating 1995c, 1). This duty not only pertained to the need to make speeches, but to also say the right things, a lesson Keating had now learnt from conservative reaction when he had strayed from the accepted narrative of such occasions. Such an analysis is supported by Keating’s publicly stated desire to keep Australia Remembers ‘non-political’, with The Courier-Mail reporting that Keating sent a letter to the RSL, reassuring them that ‘You most certainly may tell your members that the Australia Remembers programme is not part of any political campaign in 1995’ (Keating, as cited by The Courier-Mail 1995, 7). As such, and seeing as Australia Remembers already closely aligned with Keating’s preferred war theatre of remembrance, the War in the Pacific, there was little gain to be had from provoking partisan-political controversy.

Keating instead chose to honour the generation of people who had fought and lived through WWII, and to thus tacitly, rather than explicitly, advance his conception of the meaning of Australia’s war history. US historians Strauss and Howe (1991) have advanced the thesis that this war generation was exceptional - having grown up during the hardship of the Great Depression, and having fought fascism and won, they had then rebuilt US society during the long post-war boom. They were a generation of ‘victorious soldiers and Rosie the Riveters... “men’s men” who have known how to get things done’ (Strauss and Howe 1991, 261), whose collective ‘can-do’ efforts rebuilt the American nation and earned the thanks of a grateful public. Speaking about this same generation in the Australian context, Keating alluded to Strauss and Howe’s thesis on VE Day:

Someone once said of the Americans of that time that they were an heroic generation - they refused to be broken by the Great Depression, they fought the war and then they built a great country. Without a doubt, the same can be said about that generation of Australians. They went about re-building their lives with confidence and purpose and their efforts gave rise to a period of sustained national development (Keating 1995d, 2).

A lesson about remembrance can thus be inferred from the above – that despite this generation facing enormous hardship, they had succeeded in building the prosperous modern Australian nation-
state, and were to be lauded for their efforts. The unnamed subtext of this is the repudiation of the centrality of WWI narratives of national identity—it is the generation of the Second World War that is ‘heroic’. They were the ones who refused to be broken by the hardships of the Great Depression, the ones who stared down the threat of fascism and invasion, and the ones who returned home to rebuild the nation. This generation had built the contemporary Australian state out of the ashes of Depression and war, not the Anzacs of Gallipoli and the Western Front.

Keating emphasised the status of this generation with a sacralised place in the canon of Australian national life. With allusions to the life and lessons of Christ as espoused in the Gospel According to John, Keating told a national audience on the major VP Day set speech that:

The story tells us that there was a generation of men and women who so loved this country, and the freedoms and way of life we now enjoy, they were prepared to lay down their lives. There were Australians who so loved what is just; they defended it to the death.

We cannot think about this without understanding the debt we owe them, and the duty we have to honour their memory.

To truly honour them is much more than a ritual task. It is to take the knowledge of their sacrifice into our daily lives and the life of Australia. It is to love this country and give to it as they did which is to say with that same faith from which their inspiration, effort and endurance flowed (Keating 1995c, 2).

Keating’s statement is analogous with the message of John 3:16—‘For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life.’ The fame of this verse (Kealy 1978, 64) and its percolation through the culture of nominally Christian societies such as the US and Australia makes it a reference point for sacralising the efforts of those WWII service personnel who lost their lives in the conflict. The first sentence of Keating’s quote above parallels John 3:16 closely—the WWII generation ‘so loved this country’, just as God had so loved the world. Further, John 3:16’s status as ‘the gospel within the gospel’ and its allusion to the central New Testament message—eternal life granted to man via the sacrifice of Christ with His crucifixion and resurrection (Kealy 1978, 64)—means that the sacrifice of WWII service personnel takes on a kind of saviour status made comparable to the example of Christ.

This message is further reinforced by Keating’s call to incorporate ‘the knowledge of their sacrifice into our daily lives and the life of Australia’. Lee (1994, 12-13) argues that the Gospel According to John can be characterised as a series of narratives where the miracles and messages of Christ are consistently misinterpreted as literal and pertaining to ‘material reality’ by His audience, and where Christ then attempts to explain their deeper, symbolic meaning to the main characters of the
narratives. A similar narrative structure is employed by Keating here, where the national audience is encouraged to look for the deeper meaning of the sacrifice of WWII service personnel. Thus, Keating encourages the audience to not just pay lip service to the memory and meaning of their sacrifice (‘To truly honour them is much more than a ritual task’), but to instead incorporate the meaning of that sacrifice into their daily lives and the life of the nation, just as Christ encouraged His followers to incorporate His example into their lives. Whilst other, secular, interpretations of Keating’s characterisation here of Australia’s WWII service personnel could well be ventured, the fame of John 3:16 and its well-understood meaning regarding the message of Christ has been employed by the Prime Minister. Its inclusion serves to sacralise the actions of WWII service personnel and the meanings subsequently attached to them.

Broadening the Range of Australian War Remembrance Identities

The generation that Keating so admired was not presented as a homogenous collective. A priority of the Australia Remembers program was the recognition of a variety of identities, opening up the remembrance of Australia’s war history in ways that had not previously been pursued with any great vigour in official narratives of memorialisation and Anzac. A number of identities were given repeated prominence in Keating’s addresses – the veterans who fought battles in the Pacific and Europe; those who served on the home-front in Australia; the families and loved ones of those who lost their lives. Specific attention was also given to previously marginalised identities such as women, Indigenous Australians and post-war immigrants.

Keating’s focus in his Australia Remembers addresses was not exclusively, or even overwhelmingly, masculine, as had been the case with some of his Anzac Day addresses. Speaking at the launch of the Australia Remembers program, Keating (1994i, 4) had remarked that ‘We want Australian women involved as never before in such a commemoration.’ To further this end, March 1995 was set aside as Homefront Month in the calendar of events, highlighting especially the contribution of civilian women to the war effort (Reed 2004, 72). Further, female service personnel were honoured with a separate commemorative ceremony three weeks before VP Day, where the Prime Minister spoke, listing the services associated with the participation of women – the nurses who served in various service branches, the Women’s Auxiliary Australian Air Force, Australian Women’s Army Service, and the Women’s Royal Australian Naval Service (Keating, 1995e). Further, non-Service contributions were also named and listed – the Australian Women’s Land Army and those women who worked towards the war effort on the home front, especially those 250,000 named as working in factories.
Speaking about their contribution, Keating (1995e, 2) said that ‘[t]heir experience is part of the Australian experience; it is inseparable from our military history, our national legends and traditions, and the inspiration and values we draw from these things.’ In doing so, Keating was seeking to bind the contribution of women in WWII to the wider narrative of Anzac, in ways that had previously been largely omitted. Thus, women’s war experiences are equated with nationhood (‘their experience is part of the Australian experience’), all the things associated with that (‘national legends and traditions’) and the meanings and lessons that are thus drawn from such important and central national efforts (‘inspiration and values’). The imperativeness of the case is emphasised not only by its the link drawn to Australian nationhood, but also by the adjective ‘inseparable’ being used to also make the connection – the audience was being called on to always link women’s experiences of war with Anzac.

Women were thus to be included in Australia Remembers in ways that had not previously been entertained. Various authors have pointed out the ways that Anzac and Australia’s war history is gendered and closely associated with maleness, and the ways that this had obscured women’s experiences of war (see Lake, 1992; Reed 2004). Keating, in his address celebrating the contribution of women, attempted to reverse some of these omissions by including the stories of certain named women who had been interned as POWs, had been bombed or torpedoed, or had otherwise served with distinction. But, as Reed (2004, 75) points out Keating failed to reimagine Anzac:

The fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end presented the opportunity for... gendered representations of the war to be reworked, for the paradigm of remembrance to be shifted away from tales of conflict and glorious suffering, associated with men’s endeavour on the fighting fronts. Instead, women were constructed as heroes also, equal to the men in their contributions of labour on the home front. This extension of a heroic status to women simply added another layer through which their voices struggled to be heard (Reed 2004, 75).

As such, Keating’s representation of women largely fitted the hero characterisation that Reed outlines above, with women’s named experiences reflecting the glorious suffering and sacrifice that was also associated with men’s experience of war.

Further, even these female experiences largely failed to penetrate Keating’s major speeches during Australia Remembers, as they were absent from the widely attended and reported VP and VE Day addresses. So, whilst women had been recognised to a greater extent than they had ever had before, this recognition was contingent upon the tropes associated with Anzac remaining masculine, to the extent that women were included at all. Such criticism should not be overstated – there appeared to be a genuine effort by Keating and Australia Remembers planners to include women in
Australia’s war history and to address their historical exclusion. But the point remains that women’s inclusion was contingent on them fitting the masculine narrative of Anzac, and that opportunities to reformulate memories of Australia’s war history in ways that challenged the gendered nature of this history were missed.

Similar problems existed for the recognition of Indigenous Australians. It was the intention of Australia Remembers planners to ensure that a priority of the program was to be recognition of the contribution of Indigenous Australians, in much the same way as the government had sought to include the contribution of women in ways that had not been previously recognised. As Sciacca (1995a, 917) had told Parliament, it was his government’s intention to plan ‘...an appropriate commemorative ceremony to recognise the special - and often unacknowledged - role played by these people [Indigenous Australians] in the defence of Australia.’ As it happened, however, the recognition of Indigenous Australians was even more problematic than the recognition of women, despite the desire of Sciacca to ameliorate their historical omission. Indigenous service men had featured in promotional material and commemorative stamps for Australia Remembers, but their stories and memories were otherwise largely absent from the program of events (Reed 2004, 173).

This absence is reflected in Keating’s speeches, with the contribution of Indigenous Australians being absent from his major speeches on VE and VP Day, and rating only a small, somewhat tokenistic, mention in a speech honouring the contribution of Pacific Island veterans (Keating 1995f, 3-4). After listing the contributions of Pacific Island service personnel in this speech, Keating turned to Indigenous Australians, naming contributions by specific service personnel much as he had done in his address to Australian service women, and then stating ‘Even if the Australia of the 1940s was blind to their bravery and loyalty, we see it clearly now. And we acknowledge it now. It must not be forgotten’ (Keating 1995f, 4). But if remembering the service of Indigenous Australians was so important, then it must be asked why this recognition was placed here, sitting awkwardly amongst the honours for Pacific Island veterans? Why had they not been given their own ceremony, or had other forms of Prime Ministerial recognition? Reed (2004, 173) suggests a partial explanation - that ATSIC was largely uninterested in the occasion or organising ceremonies for Indigenous Australians, being more preoccupied with present day issues of Indigenous disadvantage.

However, the lack of interest from ATSIC fails to account for Indigenous Australians’ tokenistic inclusion and lack of voice in Keating’s Australia Remembers addresses. In much the same way as women found themselves defined by the gendered tropes of Anzac, Indigenous Australians were
included in Australia Remembers to the extent that they fitted with its heroic story of sacrifice and service. Opportunities to challenge and redefine dominant discourses of nationhood by, for instance, pointing to Indigenous service people's unpaid wages for their service, or their exclusion from Australian society after their return from war, and the ways this was symptomatic of continuing Indigenous disadvantage, were left unspoken. Once again, whilst this critique should not be overstated given the genuine concern that Australia Remembers planners had in ensuring Indigenous stories about wartime were conveyed, the manner in which they were delivered did little to challenge the Anglo-centric nature of Anzac.

Immigrant identities were given more recognition in Keating’s Australia Remembers speeches for their transformative influence upon Australian society. In several major Australia Remembers speeches Keating acknowledges those Australians who arrived in the country after the war and contributed to post-war nation building. For example, after characterising the WWII generation as a ‘heroic’ generation on VE Day, Keating (1995d, 3) immediately said the following:

Among the builders were many thousands who had endured the war in their own countries and left their shattered lives and devastated homes to start new lives in Australia.

I do not think we should let this day pass without reminding ourselves of how much they have given Australia; how much we have gained by being open to the world, generous towards those who have come here to escape oppression and hardship, and tolerant of cultural differences.

In building new lives here they enriched us all. That is one of the great lessons of the fifty years which have passed since the war ended, and one that we should not forget.

Keating thus grants immigrant identities the positive transformative role that was largely denied to women and Indigenous Australians, with his openness to difference. It was immigrants who ‘enriched us all’ and who the audience was called upon to ensure that they remembered how immigrants had taught us values of generosity and tolerance. The values of tolerance that post-war immigrants had taught Australians stood in contrast to the unnamed, but well-known, history of prejudice that had characterised pre-war White Australia. By doing so, Keating was linking Australia’s war history with the current day cosmopolitanism that his government was keen to advance, and great care was taken throughout Australia Remembers to ensure that these immigrant identities were not associated with Australia’s historical war enemies. Instead, post-war immigrants were given the role of positive transformers and nation-builders of the same stature as the heroic generation who had fought the war and returned to remake the nation. In the process of honouring the contribution of these people, Keating made significant steps towards the opening up of Australia’s war history to a more diverse plurality of identities.
Success and Contestation

Australia Remembers was largely successful in nationalism entrepreneurship, meeting its aims and, in the process, helped to promote and institutionalise the remembrance of WWII. If, as argued above, Australia Remembers’ aims were centred on remembrance and education, then it surely was successful in these matters. Australia Remembers events were well attended and received considerable media coverage, aiding the aim of remembering the actions, sacrifices and meanings of the generation who had fought and experienced WWII. Education had been achieved too, with the intervention into school curriculums in the form of the education kit distributed to Australian schools, the youth forums, and more generally, the consistent government-endorsed promotion and coverage of the events and their meanings. Finally, wider government policy aims were achieved too, with the Operation Restoration program engaging the unemployed.

This was aided by attempts to ensure that Australia Remembers remained unpolitical. Sciacca had made sure to anticipate controversies before they had arisen, and was successful in ensuring that they did not escalate (Reed 2004, 165). His Opposition counterpart, Wilson Tuckey, was also keen to see that Australia Remembers progressed without controversy, or unnecessary politicking from the Opposition, telling the House of Representatives: ‘The minister will perform to the highest level of his responsibility in this year, I am sure. He can do so without any fear that the Coalition will seek to exploit minor areas of dispute either between our parties or within the community’ (Tuckey 1995, 920). Similar sentiments were expressed by Keating himself, assuring a suspicious RSL that he had no intention of using Australia Remembers as a platform to promote the issue of an Australian republic or as a campaign device for the upcoming election (The Courier-Mail 1995, 7). Keating largely kept to his word and refrained from utilising Australia Remembers and Australia’s war history to explicitly promote his policy agenda as he had done on memorial occasions in the past.

Occasionally, however, suspicions regarding the government’s, and especially Keating’s, intention arose. Two issues in particular caused strain – the use of the term Victory in the Pacific Day, rather than the traditional Victory Over Japan (VJ) Day, and the failure of Australia Remembers planners to fully include Opposition leader John Howard on VP Day, refusing a request to allow him to speak. The VP/VJ Day controversy was largely confined to the pages of The Australian (Reed 2004, 169) and the occasional interjection from the Opposition during Question Time. The choice to use VP Day, rather than VJ Day, of course occurred in the context of lingering tension, and even racism, towards the Japanese due to the war crimes committed by their soldiers during the war, and Australia’s contemporary, post-war relationship with Japan as a significant trading partner. Sciacca attempted
to respond to these concerns by noting that he had received advice from the AWM that the term VP Day had been used at the end of the war and that the government had based its decision on this information (Sciacca 1995b, 230). Whilst this issue continued to irritate some in the Opposition and the community, a desire to see that the event remained unbesmirched by controversy saw a begrudging acceptance of the term VP Day (see Tuckey 1995, 920). The second controversy, the refusal to allow Howard the opportunity to speak at the VP Day ceremony was similarly resolved, with Howard declining to overtly attack Keating publically over the issue, and stating: ‘I do not want to do anything that disturbs tomorrow’s observance of our victory over the Japanese 50 years ago’ (Howard, as cited by Wright 1995, 4). As such, Australia Remembers, like the interring of the Unknown Soldier in 1993, had proceeded smoothly and largely without controversy, demonstrating the success that Keating and his government had in its management of the occasion, despite allusion to his policy agenda and political style. Continued government investment in WWII memorialisation, and the increasing popularity of Kokoda as both a tourist destination and a site of remembrance, demonstrates the success of Keating nationalism entrepreneurship with Australia Remembers, and his evangelising of WWII remembrance more broadly (Beaumont 2011, 13-14; Holbrook 2014, 190).

Conclusion

Australia Remembers encapsulated both the success and failure that Keating had with Anzac entrepreneurship. On one hand, Keating was unable to dislodge the story of the landings at Gallipoli from its central place in Australian identity, and as a private citizen has expressed concern that he may have even contributed to an over-emphasis upon Australia’s war history (Holbrook 2014, 189). Further, to be able to achieve some degree of influence over the conception of what was being remembered, Keating had to restrain himself from his tendency towards pugnacious provocation, temper his language, and pare back reference to his Big Picture vision for Australia. On the other hand, Keating and his government were still able to put forward an entire year of remembrance activities and ceremonies centred on Keating’s conception of Australian war history and to insert themes which closely, though subtly, referenced the twin threads of nationalism and cosmopolitanism that characterised his political narrative. Ultimately, Australia Remembers demonstrated the elastic boundaries that Anzac, and Australia’s war history more generally, encompassed. Whilst Keating had to conform to some of Anzac’s strictures, he was able to reform them, largely without protest, too.

More broadly, the successes and limitations that Keating encountered during Australia Remembers reflects the overall success Keating had in putting forward his version of remembrance. Events of Keating’s Prime Ministership may well have imposed upon him the irresistible obligation to mark the
anniversaries of Australia’s war history that Watson claimed, but Keating certainly did not let these obligations define the manner in which he would engage with them. We can see two periods of memorialisation in Keating’s term as Prime Minister – the early period reflecting his pugnacious political persona, boldly and explicitly aligning his policy agenda and his radical nationalism with Australia’s war history and imagining Australia’s service personnel as agents in these endeavours. The second period revealed the more thoughtful and cosmopolitan Keating – subtly referencing the social and economic agenda of his government and renovating Anzac in parallel, whilst at the same time paying due respect to Anzac’s traditions and meanings. The pugnacious Keating attracted condemnation and hostility from conservative defenders of Anzac; the cosmopolitan and pluralistic Keating was largely left to conduct his interpretation of Anzac. Thus, Keating was quite successful in his endeavour to reinterpret Anzac and Australia’s war history in a fashion that departed significantly from the Anzac tradition’s martial and conservative origins, but only to the extent that he could keep this version of memorialisation unpolitical and uncontested. This required him to pay due respect to the sacredness of Anzac’s boundaries, but it demonstrates that significant Prime Ministerial reinterpretation of Anzac could be achieved.
CHAPTER 8

Howard: Anzac and a Unified Mainstream

Introduction

In 1996, John Howard and the Coalition won government at the federal level for the first time in thirteen years. This election, centred on the Coalition’s election slogan of ‘For all of us’ and belief that the Labor Party no longer understood ‘mainstream Australia’, would provide the discursive template for the Howard government’s term in office for the next eleven years (see Kelly 2009, 238). Howard had campaigned hard on what he perceived to be the ALP’s indifference to mainstream Australia’s experience of significant social and economic change and especially on Prime Minister Paul Keating’s championing of Big Picture politics - a progressive social policy agenda, a neo-liberal restructuring of the economy, and a reorientation of Australia’s foreign relations towards the Asia-Pacific region. The ALP’s abandonment of the Australian Settlement had also challenged the pre-eminence of white Australians in the national narrative, as Australians were encouraged to think of themselves as diverse, cosmopolitan, and economic citizens.

Howard’s opposition to the ALP and its conception of Australianness did not mean, however, that he was interested in rolling back the substantive neoliberal policy direction of the Hawke/Keating governments in order to reassert the Anglo-centric nature of Australian society. Howard was, however, keenly interested in changing the tone of government and the ways that Australians saw themselves and their place in the world. In particular, Howard was concerned that Australia was being increasingly divided by the ALP. In this way, he was continuing a long Liberal tradition of contrasting its concern for unity with the sectional interests of the ALP (Brett 2003, 187). In particular, Howard’s emphasis on mainstream Australians and their purported values disciplined not only those groups who stood outside the mainstream, but also those:

Anglo-Celtic heterosexuals and other members of the ‘mainstream’ to construct their own identity as unquestioningly central and other identities as ‘special interests’. It is about discouraging Anglo-Celts, heterosexuals and others who do not wish to privilege their identity by denouncing them as ‘politically correct’, elitist, social engineers who are disempowering their compatriots (Johnson 2000, 42).

The story of Australia’s involvement in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 was to play a central role in this reorientation of Australian conceptions of identity.
Howard was a consistent Anzac entrepreneur. Like Hawke and Keating, he sought to engage with Anzac to reconstitute Australian identity in a manner that was intimately bound together with his government’s policy agenda. Howard was successful in this endeavour because he actively policed his depoliticised and unpolitical version of Anzac with his discourse of a unified mainstream. This approach was in contrast to Hawke, who policed Anzac’s unpolitics less actively, and to Keating, who was inconsistent in his efforts to make his Anzac entrepreneurship unpolitical. Howard’s policing tacitly accepted that his Anzac entrepreneurship was attracting opposition, and that it was therefore part of the political sphere of social relations. However, his emphasis on a unified mainstream with his political style explicitly and effectively denied that his version of Anzac was partisan or political. Instead, Howard’s Anzac was presented as depoliticised, essential and commonsensical. Further, and importantly, it proved difficult to contest.

This chapter seeks to explore Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship through this prism of national unity, mainstream politics, and especially neoliberalism. It does so in four sections, as follows:

1. Howard’s discourse of a unified mainstream characterised his political style. Such a discourse repudiated the ALP’s approach to government, but also had the effect of marginalising identities and policy approaches that were not congruent with Howard’s ‘mainstream’ politics.

2. The government that Howard led faced numerous policy challenges as they attempted to further the process of economic reform and responded to the social and cultural legacy of the Keating government. Howard’s own response to these issues reflected his neoliberalism and conservatism.

3. A corpus assisted discourse analysis of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses reveals his emphasis upon a conservative reading of Anzac. Howard’s Anzac was centred on Gallipoli, the Anzac tradition, and national unity, and he consistently engaged in Anzac entrepreneurship during his time as Prime Minister by making multiple addresses at significant sites of Australian war remembrance.

4. Having established these points, I turn in more detail to Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship. Howard emphasised national unity in his Anzac Day addresses, policed the contestation of this unity actively, and constitutively reconceived Anzac with new neoliberal values that aligned with the values of the Liberal Party of Australia.

As such, Howard during this period was setting up the conditions for his highly successful Anzac entrepreneurship after 2001. Whilst Howard faced challenges to his version of Anzac, he had an
effective discourse to keep Anzac unpolitical and marginalise opposition. It was the discourse of a unified mainstream that helped Howard become Anzac’s most successful entrepreneur.

Howard: Unity and the Mainstream

When he returned as leader of the Coalition in January 1995, Howard set himself the task of challenging Keating’s Big Picture vision and use of Australian history to denigrate the Liberal’s contribution to Australia’s progress. Aiding this task was a rich vein of political discontent, as the Australian economy was still performing sluggishly after the recession of the early 1990s and, as Howard identified in a series of addresses from Opposition dubbed the Headland speeches, the ALP government had become increasingly alienated from the concerns and desires of its traditional working class constituency.

For Howard, the problem with the Labor Party was that it governed for some, not for all, and was thus dividing the nation. This claim to govern for all continued the Liberal Party contrasting itself with the ALP by arguing that it represented all Australians, not just the working class of the electorate that the ALP represented (Loveday 1979, 240-1; Brett 2003, 187). Howard’s solution to the ALP’s division was to fall back upon the guiding principles of Liberal Party political philosophy - the cautious decision making of conservatism, coupled with a strong commitment to individualism. The dual commitment to conservatism and liberalism engendered a narrow conception of social groupings – families at the micro level and the nation-state at the macro level (Brett 2005, 25). Allegiance to a social group larger than the family but lesser than the nation-state, such as class, was dangerous, as it ran the risk of curtailing the freedom of the individual and encouraged the splintering of the nation's unity (Brett 2005). The sub-section of the electorate that the ALP represented had evolved beyond the working class and now included all those Australians sympathetic to Keating’s Big Picture politics:

...since the 1970s class and the unions have been joined in the Labor camp by other representatives of the part – feminists, environmentalists, the ethnic lobby, multiculturalists, the Aboriginal industry – sometimes all simply lumped together as ‘noisy minority groups’ or vested interests (Brett 2003, 187).

The reassertion of the values of national unity and individual freedom was the twin antidote to the claims of these groups.

So to whom was Howard appealing? Much has been written on this subject (see Brett 2003; 2005; Scalmer 1999; Dyrenfurth 2007; Wear 2008). What characterises these accounts is an
acknowledgment of the initial use by Howard of the identifier ‘battler’ as part of his appeal in the lead up to the 1996 election. The battlers were a struggling section of Australian society, fighting to survive in Keating’s Australia. They were, at least in part, the ALP’s natural constituency and they had been let down by the ALP:

...Labor has let down the true believers. The battlers have taken a fearsome battering from the boy from Bankstown [Keating]. It is little wonder that he is seen increasingly by Labor’s traditional constituents as a remote, elitist figure, comfortable with the chattering classes but decidedly uncomfortable with the rank and file who spawned him (Howard 1995a, 20).

However, the battler discourse was not to endure, being quickly dropped when it was realised that it was unreasonable to expect the electorate to continue battling once Howard had taken office (Scalmer 1999). Battling was what the Keating and the ALP engendered and Howard was the antithesis of this dystopia.

In power, Howard instead appealed to and governed for the mainstream – a discursive realm similar, but distinct, to the image of the battler. The mainstream had a nebulous definition that encompassed many, but excluded others. Its scope was set out early in the Headland speeches:

There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which sees government decisions increasingly driven by the noisy, self-interested clamour of powerful vested interests with scant regard for the national interest.

The power of one mainstream has been diminished by this government’s reactions to the force of a few interest groups.

Many Australians in the mainstream feel utterly powerless to compete with such groups, who seem to have the ear completely of the government on major issues... (Howard 1995a)

The discursive construction of the term ‘mainstream’ contains a strong sense of grievance – it was ‘frustrated’ by ‘vested interests’. The mainstream suggested a collective, dominant idea, trend, constituency or ideology. To be located outside the mainstream and as a ‘vested interest’ was to be outside the majority of sensible, common-sense opinion. As such, these ‘powerful vested interests’ had a disproportionate influence on policy makers in the Keating government. So, whilst Howard talked of ‘one mainstream’, a unified and undifferentiated Australia, at the same time he was marginalising groups that did not fit into that category.

Johnson (2000, 42) argues that Howard emphasised ‘mainstream’ identity as Australian identity:

Part of making the Australian people feel ‘relaxed and comfortable... was precisely to reinforce ‘mainstream’ identities and ensure that marginalised identities stayed non-threatening and subordinate. The ‘mainstream’ and Australian identity were being constructed as one and the
same thing by a sleight of hand that simultaneously talked of all Australians and marginalised ‘special’, ‘minority’ interests.

Howard himself embodied the image of the mainstream in his own persona and image of ordinary, unremarkable Australian identity (Brett 2005; Wear 2007). Howard’s love of cricket, his power walking in the morning in a Wallabies tracksuit, his plain speech and middle Australian accent all projected an image of white, suburban Australia. This ordinariness also co-opted the Australian Legend, especially the concept of mateship (see Brett 2003, 205; Dyrenfurth 2007). But at the same time as projecting an image of the ordinary, it spoke of what was established and acceptable for an Australian Prime Minister to embody and projected an image of Australian identity based upon this ordinariness. This common-sense ordinariness was quite specific. It was white, it was heterosexual, it was male, it was Christian, and it was classless. It served to govern those who were placed at the centre of the national image by actively encouraging them to define their place as central and preeminent (Johnson 2000, 42). Those Australians who were uncomfortable with being defined as the centre of identity were at once both excluded from the mainstream, and encouraged to abandon their reservation and join the common-sense majority.

Related to Howard’s conception of the mainstream was his engagement with the history wars. Howard was reacting to Keating’s use of Australian history for partisan political purposes and had a deep-seated desire to defend the conservative contribution to Australian history and life (see Bonnell and Crotty 2008; Clark 2010). Howard purported that Keating had marginalised the place of the LPA in Australian history, had equated what contribution it had made with a negative view of Australian history, and was using this to unnecessarily politicise essential policy changes in a manner that was antithetical to Australia’s national interest. This was the equation of the Keating government with the ‘black armband view’ of Australian history (see Blainey 1993b).

The equation of the Keating government with a negative view of Australian history continued with the Headland speeches:

National identity develops in an organic way over time. It may be changed dramatically by cataclysmic events like Gallipoli. But governments and their social engineers shouldn’t try to manipulate it, or to create a sense of crisis about identity. Constant debate about identity implies either that we don’t already have one or, worse, that it is somehow inadequate... A better understanding of the past would, I suggest, leave us more humble about the relative significance of our current achievements but vastly more optimistic about our future prospects.

It is currently fashionable in some quarters to underestimate what we have inherited – its uniqueness, its basic fairness and its proven ability to be able to produce cohesion, tolerance and stability unmatched in any other country around the world (Howard 1995b).
With this quote we can see the beginnings of Howard’s view on the incontestability of history and its alignment with a triumphalist and conservative view Australia’s past. By employing the adjective ‘organic’ in relation to the formation of national identity, Howard is presenting identity as a natural process, one unburdened by the weight of artificial or inauthentic construction, analysis and critique. An organic view of the state is a common conservative view, where tradition and history play the most important role in the explanation of the state, rather than an over-arching abstract theory (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009, 269-274). Thus, to critique the historical development of Australianness ‘insults us all’. Critical history that examines the experience of multiple identity groups, such as women or Indigenous Australians, challenges a conception of Australian history that provides a positive, coherent and singular narrative to explain the nation’s development. As a consequence, critical history also undermines fundamental conservative values – ‘cohesion’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘stability’. The proof that vested interests cannot actively and artificially alter identity and its historic basis, is Gallipoli – an organic ‘cataclysmic event’ unburdened by the influence of ‘governments and social engineers’.

Thus, Howard’s political style and discourse was centred on national unity. Political identities or deconstructions of history that deviated from this purpose were forcefully and explicitly rejected by Howard due to their deleterious effect upon national cohesion. The example of unity set by Australian soldiers was one of the major themes in his Anzac Day addresses of 1996 to 2001.

The Howard Government’s Policy Challenges

Unity was sorely needed by Howard in his first period in office, as a long list of controversies dogged his government. Issues like the rise of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation Party as a political force, the confrontation with the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) over waterfront reform, continuing debate over the place of Indigenous peoples in Australian society (flamed by the Wik decision and subsequent Native Title reform legislation, and the process of reconciliation), and controversies over the repeated breaches of the self-imposed ministerial code of conduct by Coalition members had all bruised Howard. Further, the 1998 election campaign centred on the introduction of a Goods and Services tax (GST) further hurt the Coalition government’s popularity, and at the election in October that year, the Coalition lost the popular vote, and their majority in the House of Representatives was reduced from forty four seats to twelve. Having said that, by the time of the 2001 election, Howard had succeeded in instituting a number of economic and social policy reforms.
The Economy

Howard was an enthusiastic supporter of further neoliberal economic reform during the 1996 election campaign. He continued to be in his time in office, pursuing policy reforms such as privatising the telecommunications utility Telstra, introducing a GST, and the deregulation of the labour market via the WorkChoices legislation. The introduction of the GST, in particular, was complicated by increasing interest rates, rising petrol prices, and the weakness of the Australian dollar. Howard showed a willingness to institute policy responses to mediate the difficulties these events posed for mainstream Australia (Kelly 2009, 525-526). Less fortunate were welfare recipients, on whom Howard imposed mutual obligation and work for the dole schemes. Such efforts revealed the Howard government’s attempts to extend the marketplace, as policy reforms to the provision of unemployment services asked the unemployed to act as consumers in a marketplace employment providers (Dean 1998).

Further, whilst his foreign policy direction emphasised a commitment to traditional Western allies and economic ties, Howard’s commitment to a realist conception of the national interest saw him oversee the increasing integration of Australia with the Asia-Pacific region (Wesley 2007, 24). This included a growing economic interconnectedness with China - cemented symbolically by the invitation extended to Chinese President Hu Jintao to address the Federal Parliament the day after US President George W. Bush did so in 2003 - extending credit to regional countries during the Asian Financial Crisis, the seeking of bi-lateral free trade agreements in the region, with countries like Singapore and Thailand, and encouraging increasing regional trade and investment (see Kelly 2009).

Social and Cultural Policy

Howard was compelled to deal with social and cultural issues like the republican debate and the reconciliation process with Indigenous people inherited from the Keating government. Howard did not let Keating’s legacy define his position, and he repudiated many of Keating’s initiatives. With the republic question he committed his government to holding a convention and referendum, but he publically backed the retention of the constitutional monarchy and utilised the divisions within the pro-republican movement to advance that position (Walsh 2005). The government’s amendment of the Native Title Act 1993 after the Wik decision weakened Indigenous rights regarding native title (Patapan 2000, 38-40), and Howard’s refusal to apologise for past government practices regarding assimilation strained the reconciliation process (Sanders 2005).
Howard’s discourse of the mainstream also fed into practical policy responses to issues pertaining to multiculturalism and immigration. Howard quickly abolished the Office of Multicultural Affairs, and he refused to use the word ‘multiculturalism’ for the first few years of government. He did so in the context of the rise of Pauline Hanson, and Howard welcomed the new ‘openness’ of debate she represented (Jupp 2005, 178-180). Howard continued to emphasise the economic contribution of immigrants as a criterion for their acceptance (Jupp 2002), and reasserted the exclusionist tendencies of Australia’s refugee policies in the MV *Tampa* incident and the Pacific Solution (Elder 2007, 126-127). These policy challenges, and Howard’s response to them, reflected the predominance of neoliberalism and conservatism that underpinned his political style.

**Howard’s Anzac – a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis**

A corpus assisted discourse analysis of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses demonstrates his concern with repudiating Keating’s version of Anzac in favour of national unity. Howard’s Anzac closely followed the genre conventions of Anzac Day and emphasised the campaigns at Gallipoli.

**The Sites of Howard’s Anzac Addresses**

Howard marked every Anzac Day of his term with a public address or media release, producing twenty speeches and media releases (Figure 17). He primarily marked Anzac Day in Australia, with addresses at the Australian War Memorial in 2001 and 2003, in addition to his attendance and wreath laying there in 1996, 2002, 2006, and 2007 (*The Australian* 2001, 2; Boogs 2002, 4; Doherty 2003, 4; Doherty 2006, 5; Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007; Rintoul 1996, 1). Howard also made a speech at Greenslopes Private Hospital in Brisbane on Anzac Day 2007 before flying to Canberra to lay a wreath at the AWM, and attended the dawn services at the North Ryde RSL in 1996, the Martin Place Cenotaph in 1997, and Melbourne in 1999 (*The Australian* 1999, 3; Howard 2007; Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007; Lamont 1996, 1; Stephens 1997, 1). Howard also made two trips to Gallipoli to mark the 85th anniversary of the landings in 2000 and the 90th anniversary in 2005 (Howard 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2005a). He made two other overseas trips for Anzac Day during his term – to Thailand in 1998, where he gave two speeches at Hellfire Pass during the dawn service and Kanchanaburi War Cemetery at the 11am ceremony; and to Iraq in 2004, where he gave two brief reported addresses to troops (Howard 1998a; 1998b; 2004a; 2004b). Unlike Keating, Howard did not mark Anzac Day at Kokoda or in PNG. His regular attendance at the AWM also is of note – this, in combination with his attendance at Gallipoli, continued the growing emphasis on Anzac as a day of high spectacle, rather than as an act of local and low-key remembrance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>One media release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>One media release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Two speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>One media release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Three speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>One speech</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>One media release</td>
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<td>Two speeches, two media releases</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>One speech, one media release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>One media release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>One speech</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 17 - List of Howard’s Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements*

**The Location of Howard’s Anzac**

Howard’s specifically named conflicts often referenced contemporary ADF deployments. Frequent specific mentions of Anzac were associated with Iraq (twelve named mentions in the Howard corpus), East Timor (five mentions), Afghanistan (three mentions), Solomon Islands (three mentions), and the War on Terror (two mentions). WWII was also frequently named specifically by Howard (four mentions), reflecting his view that the events associated with that war were central to Australian identity. In contrast to its prominence in Keating’s speeches, WWII was mentioned explicitly only once, though Howard did mark Anzac Day 1998 in Thailand, where he frequently alluded to WWII. Finally, he did not mention Vietnam by name, and the Korean War only once. It should be noted that wars were often not named specifically by Howard. Instead, they were alluded to by the location of his speeches, especially at Gallipoli. Howard frequently referred to *all wars*, and the loss of 100,000 Australian lives in all conflicts during Australia’s history. Howard’s frequent collective call to mark all wars and war dead served his discourse of unity, as it included *all service personnel*, even as it privileged the Gallipoli campaign.

Gallipoli dominated the battles mentioned explicitly by Howard, with fifteen mentions (and an additional three mentions of Lone Pine). Howard rarely mentioned Kokoda (one mention) or events or battles during the War in the Pacific (two additional mentions). Long Tan was also acknowledged twice, and the Battle of Kapyong once. This pattern reinforces the view that Howard saw WWII, and
especially the landings at Gallipoli, as central to Anzac. His tendency to name current ADF theatres of deployment in his speeches also reflected his constitutive and instrumental alignment of Anzac with the War on Terror. Given the importance Howard placed upon the Australia-US relationship, we might expect WWII to be a war that Howard would emphasise. However, WWII rarely featured in comparison to the more British sites of Anzac.  

**Howard’s Agents of Anzac**

The agents of Anzac in Howard’s addresses and media releases also tended to reinforce his conservative view of Australian war history. In gender terms, men are overwhelmingly the primary agents of Anzac (twenty-five named mentions). Notably, men tend to be agents when Howard was talking historically about Anzac, and ‘men and women’ (eighteen mentions) was used only when Howard talked about contemporary deployments, reflecting the changed make-up of Australia’s defence forces. Nurses are missing from Howard’s addresses and speeches, demonstrating the continuing marginalised role women play in the Prime Ministerial Anzac narrative.

Howard’s Anzac agents also lack diversity. He briefly mentioned immigrants and their contribution to Australian life in his 2000 speech at Lone Pine (Howard 2000b), but made no other mention of immigrants. No mention of Indigenous Australians was made by Howard, in contrast to Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses and Keating’s speeches during Australia Remembers. Such references to diversity were replaced by frequent references to the unity of service personnel and to unity being a lesson that could be drawn from the example of Anzacs throughout history.

**The Attributes of Howard’s Anzac Agents**

Given the above, it is unsurprising to see that the attributes that Howard saw Anzac agents as possessing were closely aligned with conservative Anzac tradition. Bravery, sacrifice, service and duty, and the debt we owe Anzacs, all come through strongly in Howard’s addresses. References to the diggers as possessing identifiably Australian characteristics, such as mateship or larrikinism also feature. The unity that the diggers displayed was mentioned several times and was used as a reference point for lessons for today. The heroic status of diggers was also mentioned, and was reinforced by references to the wild or reckless character of the Anzacs, a somewhat unusual feature of Howard’s Anzac Day discourse. For Howard, the Anzac’s brazen attitude under-fire helped reinforce the heroic and special status of their service.

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*Credit, and my sincere thanks, for this observation must go to Dr. Robert Howard, Honorary Associate with Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courage/bravery</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacrifice</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Owed</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mateship</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service/duty</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroism</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australianness</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenacity/perseverance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffering</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honour</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wild/reckless/daring</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 18 - List of the Frequency of Mentions of the Attributes of Agents of Anzac in Howard’s Anzac Day Addresses

There was nuance to Howard’s addresses though. ‘Softer’ characteristics feature – he notes the compassion that service personnel displayed, as well as their suffering during wartime. These aspects were especially prominent in Howard’s 1998 addresses in Thailand, where he dedicated his addresses to the remembrance of POWs. This gives the 1998 addresses something of an outlier status in Howard’s Anzac Day corpus of speeches and media releases.

Howard saw Anzac as centred on the events of the Gallipoli campaign, and as closely aligned with the conservatism of the Anzac tradition. In particular, he emphasised unity as a value in these addresses. Having established quantitatively the core aspects of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses and media releases, the chapter now turns to a deeper qualitative examination of how unity was operationalised by Howard via his Anzac discourse.

Howard’s Anzac Day Addresses: Unity and Neoliberalism, 1996-2001

The following section examines Howard Anzac Day addresses from 1996 to 2001. It notes that the re-election of Howard in November 2001 was an affirmation of his sometimes controversial policy
agenda, a tipping point that marked the beginning of new policy priorities centred on national security and Australia’s involvement in the War on Terror, and that it precipitated a change in Howard’s political persona to one of strength (see Kelly 2009, especially 613-627; Errington 2008, 223-224). This change is reflected in Howard’s later Anzac Day addresses (see Chapter 9).

Regarding Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship from 1996 to 2001, we can in particular see a consistent appeal to unity. As noted above, Howard’s first two terms as Prime Minister had been bruising and hard-fought, characterised by the proposal and implementation of a number of unpopular and controversial measures. In addition, unity served his deeper political style and philosophy – to national patriotism and to individualism, whilst at the same time disregarding attempts to frame identity based upon sub-national structures such as class, ethnicity, gender or sexuality. Howard’s was a mainstream reading of Australian history that constituted a conservative and uncontroversial view of Anzac and Australianness. This mainstream reading progressively came to constitute Anzac, replacing the sometimes controversial reimagining of Anzac that Keating had attempted. This is not to suggest that Howard’s version of Anzac was uncontroversial or non-partisan – at times it attracted bitter opposition. But it is to suggest that Howard believed Anzac was unpolitical, that is, essential and ‘above’ partisan politics. Howard drew upon this understanding of Anzac and actively policed opposition to his version Australianness. The following section examines these themes by looking at how Howard constructed a unified Anzac, policed that unity, and aligned this imagined Anzac with neoliberal values of the LPA.

Anzac Day 1998 – Prisoners of War and a Unified Australia

On Anzac Day, 1998 Howard travelled to Thailand to mark Anzac Day. On April 24, he opened a museum at Hellfire Pass dedicated to the remembrance of Australian POWs held in captivity by the Japanese, built in part with $1.6 million in funding from the Australian government (Inglis 2008, 528). On Anzac Day, he attended the dawn service at Hellfire Pass and an 11am ceremony at Kanchanaburi War Cemetery. He gave three major set speeches at these occasions. The trip was conducted in the context of the eruption of industrial unrest with the government’s confrontation with dock workers and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) over waterfront reform. Howard’s performance on this trip won him some positive accolades in unlikely circumstances, given the controversy that the waterfront confrontation had provoked. In particular, the emphasis upon the unity of the Australian POWs was to play a central role in this success.
The waterfront dispute was being bitterly fought as Howard left for Thailand. Having decided upon the necessity of waterfront reform and campaigning on that policy in 1996, the Howard government had committed to a course of action that would see confrontation, rather than negotiation, with the MUA (see Singleton 2000, 143; Howard 2010, 290-291). Having secured the commitment of Patrick Stevedores and National Farmers’ Federation backed non-union labour, the government publicly supported the dismissal of Patrick’s union workforce on April 7 1998 and their removal from the dock by balaclava clad security, enforced with dogs. The MUA took its case to the courts and April 21st saw the Federal Court find that ‘...there were “arguable cases in respect of unlawful conspiracy” (to replace the Patrick workforce) and “in respect of the freedom of association provision of the Workplace Relations Act being breached (employees terminated due to membership of a union)”’ (Singleton 2000, 145). On this date, the court had further ordered the reinstatement of the union workforce.

This was the domestic context that Howard found himself in when he addressed the crowds at Hellfire Pass and Kanchanaburi War Cemetery on Anzac Day. The speeches were full of lyrical prose, high rhetoric, and references to sacredness, with the Prime Minister imbuing the occasions with suitable decorum by having a hand in penning poetry that began the dawn service speech (Howard 1998a; McGregor 1998, 3). The speeches were full of references to the POWs who had laboured, suffered and died whilst in Japanese captivity, with Howard making frequent reference in both speeches to their suffering, the sacrifice that they had made for each other and their country, and the compassion they had shown their mates.

Howard’s speech drew upon the familiar tropes of the Judean-Christian religious tradition and especially upon the example of Christ. Whilst this had antecedents with Keating, who had also alluded to the example of Christ, Howard’s references to Christianity were part of his wider political style (see Maddox 2005). For example, at the dawn service at Hellfire Pass, Howard had the following to say about the Prisoners of the War in the Pacific:

Their story of sacrifice and suffering, of constancy and compassion, illuminates the very essence of the Anzac spirit. For, of all our heroes, they were armed with human virtue alone and their victory was over the darkest recesses of the human heart...

To the world, proof was given that tyranny, in the end, has no power over the courage and decency of ordinary men and women. It is an example to which we all aspire – as relevant in peace as to war, to our future as to our past.

And on this sacred day, at this most sacred place, we honour all Australian service men and women who gave or offered their lives in war...
We would have them know of our firm and steadfast belief that they rest not in shades of darkness but bask in the brightness of an Australian sun (Howard 1998a).

The parallel with the example of Christ comes through strongly - the prisoner’s story is analogous with the values that Christ embodied in his life. Innocent men ‘gave’ or ‘offered their lives’, not for fame or other personal gratification, but for victory over the sin of ‘the darkest recesses of the human heart’, just as Christ had willingly offered Himself to absolve the world of sin. They suffered this willingly, as Christ did, not with anger or despair but instead with ‘constancy and compassion’. The example they set in their confinement demonstrated the clash between good and evil, sin and salvation. These themes are alluded to with the binary oppositions represented – ‘tyranny’ and ‘darkness’ juxtaposed with ‘courage’, ‘decency’, ‘brightness’ and ‘sun’. And this served as an example ‘to which we all aspire’, as it proved to the world that evil will be overcome. Presenting Anzac in these terms invoked the Manichaean theme of conflict between good and evil, placed Australia firmly on the side of good in this struggle, and helped to sacralise Howard’s words.

Howard also noted the way that the prisoners’ distinctive Australianness had helped them endure their captivity. This distinctive Australianness was conflated with unity by Howard at Kanchanaburi:

They were Australians.
Their accent was as evident in their manner and deeds as in their speech. There a bond, a unity which branded them as different from others.
As an English officer stood in the driving rain and watched a group of Australians sing, trudging back exhausted from their work, he asked ‘Just what is it that these Australians have?’
The answer, plain now as it was then, was that they had each other. They had their mates (Howard 1998b).

The fact that unity presents itself as a synonym here for bond is notable, as the two terms are not entirely analogous. Howard’s reading of events emphasised that the prisoners stood as an example not only of the deeply felt love and comradeship which can develop amongst human beings in times of extreme hardship, but also of unity of purpose and the strength that this granted. They had each other and only by having each other did they have strength. This unity, and the strength that it granted them, marked them as different to other nationalities, granted them uniqueness, and a special kind of exceptionalism. But as Dyrenfurth (2015, 146) has suggested that mateship amongst POWs ‘...was less utopian than later represented. It came to exist only in co-operative groups, or ‘syndicates’, usually consisting of two to six men, and these relationships tightened as the imprisonment became more challenging in the late stages of the war.’ Moreover, prisoners at times displayed instances of poor morale, infighting, and collaboration with their Japanese captors (Dyrenfurth 2015, 145-146). As this suggests, one can be bound without being unified. By linking
bond and unity, Howard obfuscated any differences that may have existed amongst the prisoners, differences based on class, religion, rank, or even the means to see out the terrible conditions of internment.

In his emphasis on unity, Howard linked the experience of WWII POWs with the present day and used their service as an example for current generations. The speech at Kanchanaburi began with Howard referencing the pilgrimages that young Australians were making to sites of Australian war history ‘...drawn through the years towards the past’ (Howard 1998b) and the link between themselves and Australia’s war dead. This link was made in nationalistic terms:

Pausing to read inscriptions engraved upon the headstones they [young Australians] find countrymen who share their names, share their ages, their home towns. Men, some just boys, who like those today, loved sport and the beach, a beer, and looked ahead towards brighter lives of familiar places and loved ones (Howard 1998b).

This common-sense Australianness linked the present with the past:

...this better world we owe to those who rest here and all who served with them.

They were the special ones, the unique Australians. But within each of us is carried their legacy. And we will build our future upon foundations laid deep and strong. With such a base, with their example as our corner stone, there is no height to which we cannot reach together (Howard 1998b).

Howard imbued the prisoners with lessons for the present, with their sacrifice being the foundation of what we have today, and appeals to the audience to draw upon that example in the future. However, this serves more as an appeal for unity, rather than an assured declaration of purpose. Whilst ‘we will’ has a high degree of commitment, the future tense tacitly acknowledges that this may not be a certain outcome. The very need to use the POWs as an example of unity for the present day demonstrated Howard’s implicit acknowledgement that the nation was not united, and his own lack of assuredness as uncertainty and division raged at home on the waterfront.

Howard’s trip and speeches won him generally positive reactions from the press. He closely met the traditions of Anzac, and imbued the occasions with suitable respect and nationalism. Positive reaction came from an unlikely source. Tom Uren, the former Whitlam government minister, ALP left faction stalwart, and Japanese Prisoner of War, praised the Prime Minister for his addresses and efforts on Anzac Day 1998. Uren, having never applied for his war service medals (but receiving them in 1998 anyway, as the DVA applied for them on his behalf), had them presented to him by the Prime Minister on Anzac Day eve in Bangkok. Uren had attended the picket at Sydney’s Port Botany
in support of the MUA a few days beforehand (Steketee 1998, 6). He subsequently wrote to The Sydney Morning Herald:

I do not agree with the Howard Government’s policy on the Australian waterfront, but in politics I believe you give credit where it is due.

John Howard made an outstanding contribution on our visit to the Burma-Thai Railway where he dedicated the Hellfire Pass museum to those who died and worked on the infamous railway.

His address on Anzac Day in Kanchanaburi cemetery was so giving and moving that the Diggers and their loved ones broke with tradition and gave him a spontaneous applause.

Prime Minister Howard did those who served and died on this hellhole proud. He did Australia proud (Uren 1998, 18).

Uren’s praise for Howard’s marking of Anzac Day 1998 played neatly into Howard’s narrative regarding unity. Here was a former POW, reaching out across the partisan divide to give ‘credit where it is due’ for his marking of Anzac Day and recognition of POWs. Of course, this did not mean that Howard had ameliorated the conflict the waterfront dispute had provoked with his Anzac Day addresses. But it does demonstrate the manner in which Anzac Day could be engaged and how the ‘correct’ engagement could win plaudits in tough circumstances. It further demonstrates the flexibility of Anzac, with the remembrance once again being imbued with new meanings and lessons for the present.

The Boundaries of Unity

National unity was not a given and Howard keenly policed its boundaries with his Anzac entrepreneurship. Howard’s policing was explicitly expressed by his principle that Anzac was unpolitical, telling a reporter on Anzac Day 1999 that ‘I have a golden rule on ANZAC Day I never talk about anything that has any kind of party political [connotation]’ (Howard 1999a). Howard’s Anzac was both a crucial part of Australian national identity that deserved to be protected from division, and a means to achieve (attempted) national unity. This policing tacitly accepted that Anzac was in fact political, but Howard’s Anzac discourse was an attempt to depoliticise his version of Anzac and present it as essential and unpolitical. The Anzac Days of 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000 all featured attempts by Howard to police these boundaries.

The Boundaries of Unity - Anzac Day 1996

Anzac Day 1996 saw Howard announce one of the Coalition government’s first policy initiatives – introducing legislation in the first period of the new Parliament to ensure that the design of the Australian flag could not be altered except by plebiscite. The Coalition had only just taken office.
The use of the occasion to announce a policy that was of little substantive importance but symbolically reinforced Anglo-Celtic identity, was a crucial signal of Howard’s intent. In the statement that was released announcing the initiative, Howard noted ‘[i]t is particularly gratifying that some vestige of cynicism over ANZAC Day a generation ago appears to have evaporated with young Australians taking more interest than ever in ANZAC Day and what it means for our national identity’ (Howard 1996). Howard often noted the way that Anzac was becoming increasingly important for Australians, especially young Australians, and used this as evidence to support his belief in the centrality of Anzac. Of course, Howard tacitly recognised that Anzac had not always proved to be such an incontestable element of Australian identity with such statements. However, the increasing numbers of Australians, especially young Australians, attending Anzac Day parades or the Gallipoli dawn service proved for Howard that the issue was now settled. The controversies surrounding Anzac Day in particular, and Australian history in general, were now a thing of the past.

Thus, he stressed the legislation that he was introducing would ensure ‘...that as thousands of young children line the streets of cities and country towns tomorrow waving our flag, all Australians can be assured that no one will be able to change our national symbol without the Nation’s consent’ (Howard 1996). Howard’s conservatism is central here, with the reinforcement of the centrality of established Anglo-Celtic symbols and practices of national identity being pushed to the forefront of Howard’s thinking and policy making in the early part of his term as Prime Minister. Anzac was both being constructed as unpolitical and aligned explicitly with a policy change that sought to do the same regarding other symbols of Australian identity.

The Boundaries of Unity - Anzac Day 1997

The lead up to Anzac Day 1997 saw further policing of the boundaries of Anzac by the Prime Minister. The controversy arose as the ACT government had proposed to dedicate a section of the Lake Burley Griffin foreshore to Canberra’s sister city in Japan, Nara, and name the park Canberra-Nara Peace Park. The RSL was unhappy with the proposed name due to ‘...the failure of Japan as a nation to come to terms with its role in World War II, [and, as such] the RSL remains completely opposed to calling the park a “peace park”’ (Greene 1997, 27). The RSL promptly bypassed the ACT government with their concerns and directly approached the Commonwealth, attracting the attention of senior Coalition ministers and Howard himself. Howard reportedly heatedly impressed upon the ACT chief minister Kate Carnell that the word ‘peace’ should be removed from the park’s name, and that if she chose to refuse that she would be overridden (Greene 1997, 27). Recognising defeat, the ACT government complied with Howard’s threat, naming it the Canberra-Nara Park, but
not before the controversy produced significant negative media attention and sympathy for Carnell (see Sheridan 1997; Greene 1997; Cooke 1997). The increasing attention that the controversy attracted also threatened to become an issue as Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto was visiting Australia the week after Anzac Day (Sheridan 1997, 4). Whilst the issue did not prove to cause any public embarrassment for the government during Hashimoto’s visit, it did demonstrate the depth of feeling Howard had regarding the appropriate commemoration of Australia’s war history. History was being actively contested by Howard, and the boundaries surrounding Anzac were to be clearly marked.

*The Boundaries of Unity – Anzac Day 1999*

The consequence of Howard’s enforcing of unity was blindness to the multiple and competing commitments individuals may have to group identities. This tension is revealed in his interview with John Faine from Anzac Day, Melbourne, 1999. This conversation took place against the background of Serbian ex-servicemen in Brisbane and Sydney refusing to march in Anzac Day parades in protest against NATO’s bombing of Serb forces in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 (Hodge and Krupka 1999). Serbian ex-servicemen in Melbourne chose to march.

**FAINE:** We’ll be talking later this morning to Mr Toma Bunjanin (sic) who’s the secretary of the first sub-branch of Serbian ex-servicemen in Victoria. Made a point of some controversy, the Serbian ex-servicemen will be marching here in Melbourne...

**PRIME MINISTER:** Well I’m very pleased about that.

**FAINE:** They’re not marching in Sydney...

**PRIME MINISTER:** No, well I mean....they are Australians of Serbian origin and they were wonderful allies of the allies during World War II. I’ve seen them for years in the marches in Sydney and I’m very pleased indeed that they are marching here because *they are first and foremost citizens of Australia* and the people who fought alongside the allies during the war are an honoured part of that experience, and they are an honoured part of the Australian community. That’s quite separate and apart from judgments people make about what is now occurring.

**FAINE:** What’s happening in Serbia now is a political dispute of today. What we’re celebrating is something that happened...

**PRIME MINISTER:** Well what we’re remembering is something that happened more than 50 years ago and the Australians of Serbian descent were magnificent allies of ours and they fought very bravely, and they tied down, on some estimates, helped to tie down 15 to 20 German divisions in World War II and they were wonderful allies. Now one of the great things about ANZAC Day is that you can remember that and you can see that for the great deed that it then presented. The fact that we can also very freely acknowledge without bitterness the fact that we fought against other countries who have now contributed magnificently to the modern day Australian population. I mean one of the things about...you can remember without that remembrance creating any present day difficulties and I think that’s a magnificent thing too.

**FAINE:** I can’t agree with you enough and you said, they’re Australian first.
PRIME MINISTER: Exactly. I see people always as Australians first, an obviously we each of us have our distinctive heritage which we want to preserve, and that’s fine. But we’re all Australians first (Howard 1999a).

Here we can see the consequences of the theme of unity. The commitment to the nation-state was first and foremost in Howard’s mind. He repeatedly argues that the commitment to national identity comes first and other identities are marginalised – ‘we each of us have our distinctive heritage which we want to preserve, and that’s fine. But we’re Australians first’. The use of the negative conjunction ‘but’ negates the sincerity of the preceding comment, as does the use of ‘fine’, a rather weakly positive commitment to acceptability. The interview went on:

FAINE: And what we can achieve in Australia as Australians is to put aside some of those ancient disputes and rivalries that have in fact have been the cause for many of those people to come here in the first place.

PRIME MINISTER: Well indeed, and that applies, I mean whether it’s a dispute in the Balkans, or years and years ago a dispute in Ireland, or a dispute somewhere else. Once you come to this country something else takes over and that’s what we particularly have to offer. And we are reminded on a day like this that that really is what those people fought for (Howard 1999a; emphasis added)

The incontestability of unity was reinforced by Howard when he added the sacrifice and consequent sanctity of the death of servicemen and women – ‘we are reminded on a day like this that that really is what those people fought for’. Howard was not simply asking for a commitment to Australian law or citizenship, he was asking for a commitment to Australian identity, as ethnicity was being placed squarely at a lower level than a commitment to the nation-state. This is an important distinction – conservatism is being emphasised over liberalism. Howard’s insistence on an individual adherence to a sense of Australianness sits uncomfortably with liberalism’s commitment to individual freedom within the framework of limited legal constraints. Howard demonstrated his unease with challenges to Australian identity and his tendency towards conservatism when presented with such a challenge. This epitomised Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship – his worldview came through strongly in his interpretation of events, this worldview was frequently and prominently commented upon, and was reinforced by the unpolitical nature of Anzac Day. These factors made Howard’s Anzac Day pronouncements especially potent, giving them a power that was above the cut and thrust of everyday political contestation.

The Boundaries of Unity – Anzac Day 2000

Most difficult for Howard were not immigrants, but non-conforming Indigenous Australians, as Anzac Day 2000 demonstrated. Howard had visited Gallipoli for Anzac Day for the first time in order to mark the 85th anniversary of the landings. This trip, which also included visits to France, the
Somme and Israel, attracted significant media attention and Howard was enthusiastic in his appraisal of the trip. After being asked in an interview what his personal reaction to visiting Gallipoli was, Howard replied:

> Very moving, it was, it had a special feel in the sense that you, I know it sounds corny to say it, but you felt as though it was as much part of Australia as the block of land on which 19 Milner Crescent, Wollstonecraft is built. And I think that was, and that was the same feeling I had when I first went to the Somme, that I felt as though I had come home to a part of Australia (Howard 2000d).

This visceral reaction from Howard was repeated in other interviews, with terms like ‘pride’, ‘emotional’, ‘uplifting’, ‘extraordinary’, and ‘passion’ all being used in the interviews he gave during and immediately after the trip to describe his reaction to the visit. This experience was contrasted with his position on an apology to Indigenous Australians, when interviewer Alex Kirk asked:

> KIRK: Can you understand then, at an emotional level, for example how an apology could be so significant and symbolic to aboriginal people?

> PRIME MINISTER: Well I think Alexandra they are two separate issues. I understand that different people have different emotions about different issues but I don’t think there’s anything served by trying to link those two issues particularly as affection for what Australian soldiers did in defence of this country is something that is above and beyond party politics (Howard 2000e).

Howard was again actively constructing Anzac as unpolitical, despite the fact that his version of Anzac was not clearly distinguished from the sphere of the political. Indigenous calls for apology were partisan, whereas Anzac was above such ‘party politics’.

Returning home, Howard faced similar criticism from patrons of Sorry Day, former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and Dr Lowitja O’Donoghue. In a press conference, O’Donoghue remarked:

> Why can’t he use the same sort of sympathetic words he used in relation to Anzac Day and in other places as he strutted the world stage? We’ll be hoping he has a bit of a change of heart (O’Donoghue, as cited by Gordon 2000, 1).

When asked about this in a talkback interview with Neil Mitchell, Howard became exasperated and defensive:

> MITCHELL: What about Dr O’Donoghue, she’s thinking why can’t he use the same sort of sympathetic words that he used in relation to Anzac Day and other places that he strutted the world stage?

> PRIME MINISTER: Well I didn’t strut the world stage I went to Anzac Cove on behalf of all the Australian people.

> MITCHELL: Do you see a link?
PRIME MINISTER: No, no I don’t I...
MITCHELL: I don’t see the link.
PRIME MINISTER: No well I don’t either, I don’t see any link at all. I mean all Australians fought in the wars and the role of indigenous Australians in the war was magnificent and they’re all part of the legend of Anzac, they’re all part of the tradition. I don’t think there is a link and I think it’s unfortunate there’s an attempt being made to draw a link between the two things. Of course I feel emotion about Anzac Day and I feel that on behalf of all the Australian people but there is no question of... I think she actually said that I was giving apologies. Well I didn’t apologise at any stage during my visit to Turkey, heavens above (Howard 2000f).

The contrast is stark. Howard’s reaction to his trip to Gallipoli and the Somme was presented as natural, instinctual and positive. Emotions were freely expressed by Howard and demonstrated the ease he felt about the issue, and Anzac is thus unpolitical. However, when confronted with the possibility that this same emotional reaction might be applicable to his government’s policy response to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, Howard shut down the link. Instead, reconciliation and Anzac was presented as ‘two separate issues’. By separating them, Howard could then hierarchically rank them in terms of appropriateness, with Anzac being privileged as once again above the cut and thrust of the political. Indigenous issues and reconciliation were presented as political, partisan and dirty as a consequence. Linking the two was not only incorrect, but sacrilegious. When challenged on this separation, Howard became defensive, flatly denying that he acted inappropriately overseas or that there was ‘any link at all’ between his visceral response to his Anzac experiences and the expectation from supporters of reconciliation that he express a similar response to that process.

Indigenous Australians presented Howard with a challenge. Their Australianness was undeniable, but how to include them in a narrative of national identity that still privileged dominant white conceptions of self proved difficult. When challenged, Howard linked Indigenous Australians with Anzac – ‘the role of indigenous Australians in the war was magnificent and they’re all part of the legend of Anzac, they’re all part of the tradition’. Indigenous Australians are free to identify with Anzac to the extent that this does not challenge existing discursive power relationships. Beyond that realm were special interests that were inappropriate, political and dangerous.

Howard, Anzac and Conservative Neoliberalism
This final section examines the economic dimension of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses. Howard imbued the ideographic Anzac with lessons regarding Australia’s neoliberal economic life, much as his Anzac entrepreneur predecessors had. However, in contrast to Keating, Howard was understated in his allusions to neoliberalism, in keeping with his view that Anzac Day should be
unpolitical. Further, reflecting his party’s politics and his own political style, Howard’s Anzac reflected his conservatism, with national identity and the family mediating the impulses of the economic individual. This view was reinforced by the unity and sanctity with which Howard had imbued Anzac, and was policed by his aggressive guarding of Anzac’s unpolitical nature.

References to the Howard government’s economic policies were evident in Howard’s trip to Thailand for Anzac Day 1998. The Australia-Thailand relationship had become closer the previous year when Australia had provided $US1 billion to the country as part of a $US17.2 billion IMF bailout during the Asian Financial Crisis, the only Western nation to do so (Alford 1998, 4). It was a sign from the Howard government that Australia would help Asia, but it also helped establish Australia as a creditor power (Kelly 2009, 467). As Baldino (2005, 191) notes, in Howard’s mind the crisis vindicated Australia’s model of laissez-faire economic reform and liberal democracy. Howard used the trip to announce that Australian aid would continue after 2000 (instead of finishing in that year) and would increase by $AUS13 million (Alford 1998, 4). These acts paint a story of unproblematic Australian benevolence – lending a hand to the region, and Thailand in particular, in their time of economic hardship.

Howard used the opening of the Hellfire Pass Museum on April 24 as an opportunity to reaffirm Australia’s commitment to Thailand and to Asia more generally:

So too, can this museum be claimed as a legacy for the future. Let it exemplify the courage and compassion which are the highest virtues to which our young can aspire. Let it be a prophecy of Australia’s commitment to Asia and all its peoples. Of our willingness to stand together during empty years of adversity as well as bountiful years of plenty. Let it warn off any nation who may mistakenly judge that freedom loving countries will every allow tyranny to prevail. And let it promise that the memory of what was done here, lost here, gained here will not be forgotten (Howard 1998c).

Further reference was made to Australia’s commitment to Asia at Kanchanaburi War Cemetery:

For we live in a world made safe, where opportunities and success are attainable by any person with the heart and the will to achieve them.

A world of new and firm friendships with our neighbours. Friendships first nurtured in wartime, but now grown to full maturity through the blessings of regional mateship and mutual respect.

A world where nations, as in our own region, seek to learn from each other, knowing that our futures will always lie in peaceful cooperation rather than in armed conflict.

All these changes, these differences, this better world we owe to those who rest here and all who served with them (Howard 1998b).
We can again see evidence of the employment of memorial diplomacy in Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. As Australia’s war history was increasingly marked overseas by Prime Ministers, opportunities to engage in the soft power of diplomacy in the sacralised context of the remembrance of war dead grew too. Australia’s relationship with the region was presented in neoliberal terms—the region made safe by ‘peaceful cooperation’ via increasing economicities, and bound tightly by the shared bonds of wartime sacrifice and ‘regional mateship’. But these ties are not unambiguous or power-free. The power dynamics that had brought Australia’s relationship with the region to this point, and the unspoken subtext of Australian triumphalism permeated these words. The confidence of Howard’s attitude is exemplified by the use of ‘regional mateship’, the use of the Australianism presenting the relationship as one dominated by Australian values, with discredited cosmopolitan, Asian, or Thai, values being excluded. Thus, the power dynamics of the Western IMF forcing orthodox neoliberal austerity measures upon Thailand as part of its bailout package, and Australia’s involvement in that manoeuvre, is subsumed by Howard in a wider sacralised story of ‘Australia’s commitment to Asia’ and ‘regional mateship’.

Further, the ideographic nature of Anzac was evident in Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship when references to neoliberalism were also aimed at a domestic audience. What was evident in these instances is neoliberalism’s (and Howard’s) concern to govern at a distance ‘...through the regulated choices of individual citizens’ (Rose 1993, 285), in an attempt to create neoliberal individuals. In particular, this was achieved through the discourse of mutual obligation, with its emphasis upon the responsibility of citizens to act as economic individuals in the market place. As Johnson notes, mutual obligation replaces citizen entitlements with citizen obligations, with the government engaging ‘...in forms of governmentality designed to encourage market relations and particular forms of self-managing and self-regulating behaviour amongst the citizen-clients’ (Johnson 2000, 105). However, these references were less explicit than Keating’s and were also framed in terms of Howard’s conservatism.

Particular reference was made to these elements in Howard’s 2001 Anzac Day address:

But as importantly, we gather in ever-increasing numbers to each pledge anew our determination, not merely to dwell upon the legacy of the past, but also to build upon it. To extend a culture of proud self reliance and personal initiative. To create a just society where an individual’s rights are respected but their responsibilities are also recognised. To offer our children, and their children, all the possibilities of the world should they only have the heart and the will to grasp them. To build strong communities where men and women strive together for the common good and none need live in fear or isolation (Howard 2001).
Mutual obligation, and the importance of acting as a self-reliant economic individual, begins the quote. Howard emphasised the individual, rather than the collective – ‘self-reliance’, ‘personal initiative’, and ‘an individual’s rights’ were all presented as central values derived from ‘our’ Anzac heritage that deserved to be built upon. Self-reliance, personal initiative and responsibilities are all terms that echoed the Howard government’s disciplining of welfare recipients via mutual-obligation, “… to encourage market relations and particular forms of self-managing and self-regulating behaviour ...” in newly neoliberal citizens (Johnson 2000, 105). The creation of an economic individual was furthered by the values they should embody – initiative and self-reliance were needed to grasp ‘all the possibilities of the world’. The rights that were won for them by their Anzac forbearers were contingent upon their recognition of their obligation to these responsibilities. There was no place for class or structural disadvantage in this conception of Australian society – the individual was being disciplined to grab whatever advantages they could.

But Howard did not simply extol unrestrained markets in this speech. Instead, the comforting embrace of conservatism was employed to mediate the excesses of individualism and the marketplace. The individual was called upon to build ‘strong communities’, to ‘strive together for the common good’ and to not be anxious about living ‘in fear or isolation’. Howard continued:

We gather to be reminded of the values so evident among Australians in time of war and adversity but that we too can use to face the challenges within our own lives. Courage, unity of purpose, compassion and selflessness – these virtues, so compelling and so commonplace amid the horror of battle, seem to subside so often in the calm of peace. Anzac Day reminds us all that it need not be so.

Anzac Day reminds us that we each have a task before us. Blessedly, not to fight new wars, not to bear the loss of sons and daughters, but to use the peace and prosperity purchased for us at so high a price. Anzac Day reminds us that our nation is capable of the most extraordinary achievements if only we dare to reach them (Howard 2001).

Unity was again employed as a signifier of Anzac and as a lesson for the present. Values echoing the Anzac and Christian traditions – ‘courage’, ‘compassion’, ‘selflessness’ - were mobilised to remind citizens of tools they could use to face the challenges of adversity. Conservatism for Howard was the bulwark against the excesses of the marketplace and, not coincidently, these were the values especially embodied by the Anzacs. Australians were called upon to observe these lessons, and to honour the sacrifice of the Anzacs by embodying Anzac’s example in their own lives. Thus, Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship here, and more generally, used the ideographic nature of Anzac to constitute Australian nationalism with contemporary LPA values - neoliberal inspiration to build upon, and conservative values to mediate neoliberalism’s cold individualism.
Conclusion

This chapter has explored Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship from 1996 to 2001. It has argued that Howard was keen to reinforce a depoliticised and unpolitical version of Anzac. This conservative and ostensibly traditional form of Anzac was part of his wider repudiation of Keating’s reimagining of Australian identity and policy agenda. This was achieved with an emphasis upon a ‘mainstream’ reading of Anzac that emphasised the Anglo-Celtic heritage of Anzac, the centrality of Gallipoli, and contained little reference to diversity. Howard aligned the unpolitical nature of his version of Anzac with the subtle endorsement of his political style of neoliberalism and conservatism. This was directed towards external relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region and to a domestic audience, both of whom were encouraged to adopt the strictures of laissez-faire economics.

Whilst Howard’s keenness to ensure that Anzac remained depoliticised, essential and unpolitical saw him refrain from the overtly partisan style of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses, it did not mean that controversy was absent. Howard’s emphasis upon unity in his Anzac Day addresses had to be actively policed, and this depoliticisation occasionally attracted controversy that threatened his attempts to keep Anzac unpolitical. Having said that, Howard’s Anzac Day addresses largely failed to attract the repudiation from Anzac’s guardians previously levelled at Keating. Howard’s success in keeping his version of Anzac unpolitical was to play out after 2001, as the response to terrorism dominated the government’s agenda.
CHAPTER 9

Howard: Anzac in the Age of Terror

Introduction
Prime Minister John Howard was in Washington marking the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty when passenger aircraft were used as part of a terrorist attack upon the US on September 11, 2001. The events that transpired that day helped entrench Howard’s approach to foreign policy – a realist view of the world, a preference for bilateralism and scepticism of multilateralism’s value, and the enthusiastic embrace of interventionism in both the Middle East and Australia’s region against perceived threats from terrorism and failed/failing states (see Cotton and Ravenhill 2007). This approach led to various foreign policy outcomes, including the strengthening of the Australia/US alliance, a reorientation of Australia’s defence-force structure to reflect the new security situation, the increasing pursuit of bilateralism in Australia’s relationships, and finally, Australian participation in interventionism in both the Middle East and Australia’s region. Whilst many of these themes were touched upon by Howard in his Anzac Day addresses from 2002-2007, the foreign policy tendency that Howard most emphasised was Australia’s participation in interventionism, especially Australia’s commitment to the Iraq War. This chapter seeks to explore this theme of Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship, and demonstrate how it institutionalised a precedential form of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac that has had a continuing influence. Further, the chapter argues that the growing institutionalisation of Anzac had unintended consequences – the anxieties, tensions, and ambiguities that reimagining Anzac in a contemporary setting posed Australian identity and nationalism, which needed to be managed by the Prime Minister.

The chapter explores the institutionalisation of this form of Prime Ministerial Anzac observance in four parts:

1. The development of Howard’s foreign policy approach during the latter half of his term as Prime Minister is crucial to understanding the evolution of his Anzac entrepreneurship. In particular, it notes the way that Howard became a war leader and how he linked that to the imagery of Anzac.

2. Secondly, the chapter examines how Anzac developed during the period. The changed security environment and Howard’s growing policy confidence after his 2001 election victory is reflected in Anzac, as it became increasingly institutionalised, spectacular, and central to
Australian national identity. This was ‘hyper-Anzac’ – a form of Anzac that was more inspiring, identifiable, and ‘real’ than older forms of Anzac (on ‘hyper-reality’ generally, see Eco 1990).

3. The chapter will then turn to textual analysis of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses. Howard’s addresses from 2002-2004 were quite similar to his earlier Anzac Day speeches in terms of emphasis on national unity and conservative values, but these themes were now explicitly constituted in conjunction with current ADF personnel serving overseas and in guarding the boundaries of opposition to these deployments.

4. Finally, it will be argued that the engendering of hyper-Anzac in an environment of heightened security risk led to public demands and anxieties that were not easily managed. Much like his predecessors, Howard faced the need to manage the expectations of his socio-political context and was not an entirely free agent in his Anzac entrepreneurship.

Howard’s engagement with Anzac during this period demonstrated the success of his Anzac entrepreneurship. This engagement was just as, if not more so, explicitly and unambiguously political as Keating’s had been. It was controversial and contested, but the evidence from the period suggests that Howard’s conservative following of the traditions of Anzac, and active policing of contestation, largely kept his Anzac entrepreneurship unpolitical. Further, Howard’s linking of Anzac with a celebratory and chauvinistic patriotism contributed significantly to the form of hyper-Anzac and Anzac’s further institutionalisation in Australian public life and identity.

Howard and Foreign Policy

Howard was focused upon the domestic sphere during the early years of his term as Prime Minister (see Chapter 8). He had well-developed and long-held foreign policy views (DeBats, McDonald and Williams 2007, 235-6), but they took a backseat to his domestic political agenda during his early years as Prime Minister. This changed dramatically, firstly with Australia’s intervention in East Timor in 1999, and especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks upon the US. Both these events helped Howard establish himself as a war leader (Kelly 2009, 481; Baldino 2005, 204) and gave him contemporary real life examples of the Anzac legend to embrace (Kelly 2009, 485).

Whilst the intervention in East Timor was certainly not Howard’s first major foreign policy endeavour (see Chapter 8), it did help to shift the emphasis of his policy agenda. Howard’s active engagement with Indonesia regarding the desirability of a plebiscite to consider East Timorese independence, Australia’s level of responsibility for the violence that then erupted as pro-Indonesian militia attempted to disrupt the vote and intimidate the populace, and Australia’s interventionist response
under the umbrella of the UN and with international cooperation, defies easy assessment (see Kelly 2009; Baldino 2005; and Cotton 2004). However, it was rated by Howard himself as one his proudest achievements as Prime Minister (Howard 2010, 336) and this pride was reflected in public remarks as he seemed to agree with depictions of Australia as an enforcer or ‘deputy sheriff’ to the US in the region.

According to Kelly (2009, 515), such remarks demonstrated the ‘hubris’ of the government after its successes in handling the East Timor conflict and the Asian Financial Crisis. This confidence in the government’s foreign policy position was more fully articulated by Howard the day after the launch of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) intervention, where he outlined ‘home truths’ about Australia’s relationship with Asia. This assessment of Australia’s relationship with Asia was based upon Australia’s national interest, Australia’s geographical position in Asia and historical and cultural links to Europe and the US, Australia’s alliance with the US, the uncertainty of Australia’s defence position, and the values of the Australian community (Cotton 2004, 100-101). Australia’s foreign policy priorities reflected the realist assumptions of Howard and his government and his determination to see ‘Anglospherist’ values based upon Australia’s historical links to the US and the UK reflected in his government’s foreign policy (Gulmanelli 2014). Further, it was a repudiation of the multilateralism and cosmopolitanism that the Keating government had pursued in the region (see Johnson 2007, 200).

These concerns, and especially doubts about Australia’s defence position and the ADF’s ability to cope with future regional instability, were reflected in the Defence White Paper of 2000. The government recognised the changing security environment of the region and attempted to incorporate the implications of these shifts into defence policy. As White (2007, 182) notes:

The central policy choice considered in the development of the White Paper was between, on the one hand, the development of larger light land forces to provide more capability for the new non-state security tasks such as East Timor and, on the other, sustaining high investment in Australia’s air and naval forces against the risk of conventional conflict in Asia. Ministers decided to do both.

What this meant was a melding of ALP-era continental defence priorities with the development of light, deployable land forces of the type needed to react to and ameliorate instances of regional instability like East Timor (White 2007, 182). These light forces were later envisaged as necessary for operations with the US during the War on Terror.
In September 2001, Howard found himself in Washington, meeting with the newly elected US president George W. Bush and marking the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty. Howard had gone to the US with three primary aims:

1. To establish a personal relationship with the new President and senior members of the new Administration;
2. To reinvigorate the strategic relationship;
3. To seek ways of enhancing the economic relationship (DeBats, McDonald and Williams 2007, 241).

Howard’s presence in Washington at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, his unequivocal support of the US and its people in the days after 9/11, his invocation of the ANZUS treaty, and his appearance without fanfare in the public galleries of Congress on September 12 to show solidarity with the US people, were all acts which US lawmakers recognised and were grateful for, and helped to fulfil the aims of the trip (DeBats, McDonald and Williams 2007). As Howard (2010, 392) himself noted ‘…the epoch-changing events of [9/11] were to take the alliance to new levels of intimacy. The personal relationship between the American President and me would become the closest of any between the respective heads of government of the two countries’. The closeness of the relationship continued throughout the remainder of Howard’s term.

Australia’s response to the events of 9/11 and its participation in the War on Terror reflected the hardening of Howard’s foreign policy views. The Australian-US alliance was reinvigorated, leading to a range of related outcomes including Australian participation in US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Australia-US free trade agreement in 2005, and managing relationships in the region given Australia’s closeness to the global hegemon (Bell, 2007). Interventionism was embraced further, both in the Middle East under the ‘Bush Doctrine’ as part of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, and in the region, where the government after the Bali Bombings in 2002 reserved the right to act pre-emptively (Cotton 2004, 144), and intervened in locations like the Solomon Islands (O’Keefe 2007, 131). In sum, Howard had firmly entrenched his view of foreign policy and global politics by the end of his term in office. Australian actions in the region and globally were now predicated upon a view of the national interest that tended towards interventionism and reflected Howard’s preference for the US alliance.
Howard and the Evolution of Hyper-Anzac from 2002-2007

The changing security environment during the period from 1999 to 2007, and the Australian government’s policy response to it, was reflected in Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship, and Anzac’s continuing evolution as a central nationalist discourse. Discourses of Anzac during this period were intertwined with a fear of the Middle-Eastern ‘other’ in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks and the continued assertion of Anglo-Celtic identity, all tacitly endorsed by the Prime Minister’s conservative invocation of Anzac. Anzac from 2002 also increasingly became less about repudiating Keating’s Australia and more about the changed domestic and global security environment, especially regarding the involvement of ADF personnel deployed in regional and Middle Eastern interventions. Further, Howard’s personal investment in Anzac and the public’s enthusiasm for public expressions of Anzac identity coincided with the government’s increasing institutionalisation of the national and spectacular remembrance of Anzac Day, shifting further away from more local and suburban commemorations. This heady mix of factors helped to engender a form of hyper-Anzac not seen elsewhere during the period under examination. This ‘turbo-charged’ version of Anzac was more real than real – to paraphrase Eco (1990, 8), when the Australian public demanded the real Anzac, the fabrication of reality was required in order to attain this authenticity. It was the government that continued to reproduce the authentic Anzac as the last of the men and women who had directly experienced the Gallipoli campaign passed away and the RSL continued to decline in importance. This form of hyper-Anzac was more spectacular in its staging, more controversial in its politics, more actively engendered by the government, and more rapturously received by the public, than in any other time period from 1973.

Anzac and the ADF – 1999-2007

Hyper-Anzac was in no small part connected to Australia’s increasing deployment of ADF personnel in foreign theatres of conflict, and particularly Howard’s oft-repeated calls to support these troops. According to Howard, the East Timor conflict had contributed to the Australian public’s growing admiration of Australian military tradition and history (Howard 2010, 358; Holbrook 2014, 201). However, this shift was not entirely organic, being at least in part due to the promotion of the ADF by the Prime Minister himself. Howard frequently spoke both of and to the ADF in a manner that honoured its role in Australian society and policed the acceptable boundaries of civilian response to the ADF. This was conducted via addresses to ADF personnel and calls to support the troops.

In his auto-biography, Howard notes the concern that he and military leaders had regarding the possibility of Australian casualties in the East Timor operations, the way that this weighed on his
mind, and his determination to personally farewell, welcome home, and thank the troops (Howard 2010, 351-358). This concern was reflected in Howard’s frequent addresses to departing, serving and returning troops, not just in East Timor, but throughout this period as Australia pursued interventionism. Instances of this precedent were therefore also seen in occasions such as (but not limited to) the welcome home addresses to troops returning from Afghanistan in 2002, farewell and welcome home addresses for troops deployed to Iraq and the Solomon Islands in 2003, and the marking of Anzac Day by visiting deployed troops in Iraq in 2004.

Also driving Howard’s determination to honour ADF personnel sent to war by his government was the legacy of the treatment of Vietnam veterans:

I was also mindful of the miserable fashion in which Australia had treated soldiers returning from service in Vietnam... As I moved around the country in the lead-up to the sending of our forces to East Timor, veteran after veteran who had served in Vietnam raised this issue with me and, in some cases, pleaded that I make sure that when our troops came home from East Timor, no matter what the circumstances, they were openly greeted as patriots who had done their duty by Australia. I promised them, and I promised myself, that I would make sure that this happened (Howard 2010, 352).

Howard was honouring the terms of the reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the Australian body politic that Hawke helped strike a decade and a half earlier. Howard furthered this reconciliation by issuing a statement of regret on behalf of the government and the Australian people for the inadequacies of past treatment and recognition of Vietnam veterans on the 40th anniversary of the Battle of Long Tan on 17 August 200621 (Howard 2006a, 62).

Finally, Howard was anxious to see that currently serving ADF personnel were not only personally thanked by himself, but that they were adequately honoured by the wider Australian public. So, in an address to the troops in East Timor on November 28 1999, he (1999b) said:

Can I assure you that your mission here has the total support of the entire Australian population... Irrespective of differences back home over other issues, there is very widespread support that you’re right to be here, that you’ve done it well, and that in the process you have added a great deal of lustre to a very proud Australian military tradition.

21 The use of the term ‘regret’, instead of ‘apology’ or ‘sorry’ (‘I say to our Vietnam veterans that we honour everything you did. You deserve the respect and the affection of a grateful nation. We regret the inadequacies of the past, and we hope that the extension of the hand of friendship and honour by today’s Australians will be of comfort and value to all of you’ (Howard 2006a, 62; emphasis added)) echoed the language used by Howard in his refusal to formally apologise on behalf of the Australian nation for the actions of Australian governments in perpetuating the removal of Aboriginal children from their families.
In the case of East Timor, making sure that the Australian public honoured the ADF was ensured by a welcome home parade through the streets of Sydney for ADF personnel who had served in the INTERFET operations on April 20 2000 attended by the Prime Minister, General Cosgrove, and thousands of Sydneysiders (Hill 2000, 3). ADF personnel serving in the Middle East, especially Iraq, had welcome home parades in Sydney and Perth during June 2003, with the Prime Minister attending and delivering speeches (Howard 2003b; Howard 2003c). Howard appeared to be genuinely committed to the well-being and honouring of the ADF and keen to avoid the mistakes of the past.

Nonetheless, these Howard-led events helped set a public discourse that strongly supported Australian troop deployments, and had effects that went beyond simply honouring the actions of Australian troops. As Gleeson (2014, 152) argues regarding Howard’s invocation of the call to support the troops during the Iraq War:

> The call to ‘support our troops’ is particularly resonant in the Australian context, partly because of the sense of reverence tied to military service and sacrifice (McKenna 2007), and also as a result of the collective public shame over the treatment of service personnel upon their return from the Vietnam War. Demanding that Australians support the troops interpellates audience members by evoking these national narratives and memories.

Thus, the twin factors in Howard’s Anzac discourse of the past treatment of Vietnam veterans and the alignment of current ADF personnel with the traditions of Anzac had the effect of limiting criticism of Australia’s participation in the War on Terror by conflating the service of troops involved in current operations with the commonly understood lessons and memories of mistreated Vietnam veterans and of Australia’s military traditions. For example, in his address to the nation on the eve of the Iraq invasion in March 2003, Howard said:

> To those in the community who may not agree with me, please vent your anger against me and towards the government. Remember that our forces are on duty in the Gulf in our name and doing their job in the best traditions of Australia’s defence forces.

> Can I say something that I know will find an echo from all of you whether or not you agree with the Government. And that is to say to the men and women of the Australian Defence Force in the Gulf – we admire you, we are thinking of you, we want all of you come to back home safe and sound. We care for and we anguish with your loved ones back here in Australia. Our prayers and our hopes are with all of you (Howard 2003d).

Howard aligned the Iraq deployment with ‘the best traditions of Australia's defence forces’ in a discursive shift that sublimated the controversial lack of UN approval for the Iraq invasion by calling on the Australian people to ‘admire’, ‘think of’, ‘anguish’ and ‘pray’ for the troops. Howard conflated the positively perceived traditions and nationalism of the Australian military with the Iraq invasion in
a move that had the effect of limiting criticism of both the troops and the war by calling on the audience to sympathise with the troops and to view them as positive agents of Anzac’s traditions of service, duty, and heroism. This move limited the interrogation of the violence that those troops would soon visit upon the Iraqi military and population as agents of Western powers and interests or their role as invaders without a UN mandate for war.

These contemporary examples of the Anzac tradition in Australia’s region and in the Middle East, as well as Howard’s concern to protect ADF personnel and their operations from reproach, helped to legitimate his government’s foreign policy direction by attempting to discipline public reaction and sentiment. Howard successfully conflated his inherently political foreign policy agenda and the depoliticised and essential sphere of the Anzac tradition that he had actively engendered during his earlier period in office. In doing so, he furthered the depoliticisation of Anzac and reinforced the essentialism and unpolitical nature of Anzac that had been building since 1990. Further, it was this confluence of factors that contributed to the intensification of a ‘hyper-Anzac’ during Howard’s later term in office.

**Anzac at Home During the War on Terror**

At home, Anzac continued its march into the centre of Australia’s national consciousness. Anzac Day was growing as a spectacle, with the increasingly grandiose marking of the day at home and at Gallipoli. Previous Prime Ministers, and Howard himself during the first half of his Prime Ministership, marked Anzac Day in an ad-hoc fashion – sometimes with fanfare at a foreign battlefield site like Gallipoli or Kokoda or at the AWM, sometimes with little pomp or ceremony at a state capital or local electorate. From 2000 onwards, however, Howard marked every Anzac Day with an appearance or speech at either the AWM or Gallipoli, with the exception of his highly staged and extensively covered Iraq trip in 2004 (see chapter 8). The Prime Minister’s shift from the local and suburban, to the nation’s capital or to Gallipoli, the site of Anzac, added to the gravitas of Anzac Day. The public was responding too, and increasing large crowds turned out to mark the holiday, especially at the dawn service (see Chapter 3). The dawn service was the hyper-real Anzac, full of ceremony and spectacle, as opposed to the march, with its comparatively mundane and unmediated parade of ex-service personnel and their descendants.

The growing crowds at home were mirrored in the crowds that were now appearing at the Gallipoli Peninsula on Anzac Day. From intimate gatherings of barely a dozen individuals in the mid-1970s, by the 85th anniversary of the landings in 2000, 15,000 people made the ‘pilgrimage’ to Gallipoli to
mark Anzac Day, further growing to a reported 20,000 by 2005 (Scates 2006, 193-194; the Canberra Times 2005, 11). The pursuit of authentic hyper-reality at Gallipoli provoked controversy, as road-works that altered the landscape at the site, and bawdy crowds diverted by big screens and pop music before the dawn service, were required to accommodate and entertain the crowds (see Zii no 2006).

It was around this period in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the federal government entrenched its usurping of the elderly and conservative RSL as the ‘new promoters of Anzac’, via the DVA and the AWM (Lake 2010, 139; Inglis 2008, 554-555). As Lake (2010, 139) notes:

Providing extensive curriculum materials, teaching resources and websites to schools, through its own publications and publication subsidies, the funding of documentary films and travelling museum exhibitions as well as the expansion and renovation of community war memorials, the federal government has lent its authority and vast resources to a new pedagogical project we might call the militarisation of Australian history.

In 1996, the DVA established a commemoration branch, adding to its traditional functions of pensions, repatriation benefits, and the maintenance of war graves (Inglis 2008, 554). Signalling the government’s takeover of the custodianship of Anzac, the DVA’s commemorative branch activities included many of the things the RSL used to take responsibility for: ‘National days of remembrance, Memorials, Significant events, Education, and Community awareness’ (Inglis 2008, 554), and the DVA’s budget for commemorative activities also increased (see Chapter 3).

The education of Australia’s children regarding Anzac that had begun during the Keating government intensified under Howard. An initiative from the DVA in 2002 distributed curriculum materials for everyday teaching, not just for anniversaries (Lake 2010, 148). This was a measure of the history wars that also saw Howard bemoan the state of the study of Australian history in schools and institute a panel stacked with conservative sympathisers to develop a new national curriculum (Howard 2006b; Bonnell and Crotty 2008, 161). An increase in memorial construction during the period - ‘It is probable that more new war memorials were erected in the years between 1995 and 2005 than in any decade since the 1920s’ (Inglis 2008, 471) - and the continued restoration of older memorials ensured that instructive reminders for the general public were also distributed throughout the Australian landscape.

The death of the last remaining Gallipoli veteran, Alec Campbell, who passed away in May 2002, further signalled the shift in custodianship of Anzac from the RSL and the diggers to the federal government. The government honoured Campbell’s place in the life of the nation with a state
funeral, which included a Prime Ministerial address. The ceremonial honours were thrust upon a somewhat reluctant family, with Campbell’s wife, Kate Campbell, telling a journalist: ‘I think that he [Alec] would have thought it all rather ridiculous. Again, he would think of the other soldiers who had gone missing and hadn't come back, or were no longer here’ (Darby 2002, 11). Campbell’s family may have been reluctant recruits to the process of national eulogising and memorialisation, but the Prime Minister pressed on anyway, providing an example of the manner in which the participants of Australia’s war history had lost control of their remembrance as they had aged and passed on, and as their representative organisation, the RSL, was losing its relevance as it was losing its membership.

Overt Australian patriotism was on the rise too, especially during the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (Dyrenfurth 2015, 206). The Australian flag rose in prominence in the public sphere (Gleeson 2014, 163), being worn as a cape by some Australian patriots, and was accompanied by chants of ‘Aussie, Aussie, Aussie - Oi, Oi, Oi!’ at public events. This overt and chauvinistic nationalism was encouraged by Howard’s ‘celebratory tone’ that he began to introduce into his Anzac Day addresses during the period (McKenna 2010, 126-127).

Howard’s patriotism, informed as it was by the privileging of Anglo-Celtic identity, found its ugly expression in the events of the December 2005 Cronulla riots, where Anglo-Australian beach-goers clashed with ‘Middle-Eastern’ others who had ‘invaded’ the racially Anglo-Celtic space of the beach and violated the norms of its usage (Elder 2007, 305-306). Johns (2008, 9) shows that Anglo participants in this violent clash justified it in terms that aligned with the Anzac legend:

Significantly, more than one Cronulla local located the violence in defending the Anzac tradition... The following excerpt from The Australian...relates the confrontation on 11 December to the legacy of Anzac: ‘This is what we’re fighting for...our fathers, our grandfathers, fought for these beaches, and now it’s our turn’ (The Australian 14 December 2005). This comment specifically situates the beach as a privileged space for defending notions of Australian culture, connecting up practices of territorial belonging with national/ethnic inheritance.

The Cronulla riots demonstrated how Howard’s discourse of the Australian mainstream could be given racially exclusive, gendered, and violent, expression. Some Cronulla locals saw the violation of ‘their’ women and ‘their’ space by Middle-Eastern others as the contemporary invasion of the nation. And the need to defend this sense of Australianness was given expression by the rioters in what they interpreted to be the best traditions of Anzac. This was the context in which Anzac was
being increasingly institutionalised at the centre of official government narratives of national identity.

This was a concrete expression of hyper-Anzac. Hyper-Anzac developed in an environment of heightened security concern, closer relations with the US, international interventionism, tightening domestic security, the passing of the last members of the Gallipoli campaign, the continuing decline in influence of the RSL, the growing promotion of Anzac by the government, and the success of Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship. These factors highlighted and promoted conservative foundations of the Anzac tradition centred on duty, service, and sacrifice, alongside the sometimes crudely chauvinistic expression of Australianness emphasising racial exclusivity and the paranoid guarding of the boundaries of belonging in Australian national life. It displaced the attempts that Howard’s ALP predecessors had made to open up Anzac to difference and increasingly marginalised the participants of war in the memorialisation of their own experience of conflict and its violent and damaging consequences. In their place was an unproblematic, unpolitical, and highly promoted hyper-Anzac that was increasingly spectacularly mediated by the federal government. The chapter will now turn to examine how this form of Anzac found its expression in Howard’s Anzac Day and Anzac-related addresses from 2002 to 2007.

**Howard, Anzac Day and the War on Terror, 2002-2004**

Howard’s Anzac Day speeches from 2002 to 2004 continued to emphasise national unity, warn against challenges to that unity, and reflected his conservative interpretation of Anzac and its meaning; however, now these themes were aligned explicitly with ADF personnel on deployment in various foreign theatres of conflict. This alignment had the effect of endorsing the deployments in a manner which headed off critique and further engendered an incontestable form of hyper-Anzac.

**Anzac Day 2002 and the Death of Alec Campbell**

Anzac Day 2002 was the first after the events of 9/11 and the deployment of Australian ADF personnel in Afghanistan in late 2001. Howard marked the day at the AWM where he laid a wreath. He released a media statement but, significantly, did not make a speech. Instead, Defence Minister Robert Hill gave the address. The fact that the Defence Minister spoke, instead of a more senior representative of the nation in the form of the Prime Minister or the Governor General, reflected the changed security environment and Australia’s war footing. Senator Hill told the gathered audience of around 18,000 (Boogs 2002, 4) that Anzac was both a day of ‘solemn remembrance’ and ‘...also a day of celebration. Celebration of what it is to be Australian. A celebration of ...
we enjoy for which men and women have been prepared to fight to defend, even to sacrifice their lives’ (Hill 2002). This call to celebrate the meaning of Anzac asked the audience to revel in Australian nationalism. Hill then turned to the current deployment of Australian troops in the War on Terror and in peace-keeping operations:

And it’s timely to also remember today those young Australians in harm’s way, fighting the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the Arabian Gulf, in Kyrgyzstan, in protecting Diego Garcia and to remember our peacekeepers in East Timor, on Bougainville and elsewhere.

They also are doing a wonderful job in protecting our freedom and our interests. Therefore when we spend a moment’s silence today thinking of those who died we should also spare a moment to think of those who are still serving (Hill 2002).

Here, the uncritical calls to celebrate Anzac’s particular reflection of Australianness is conflated with the new generation of Anzacs fighting in Afghanistan and deployed in the region. Their protection of ‘our freedom and our interests’ mirrored the government’s approach to foreign policy, with the ideograph ‘freedom’ reflecting the government’s concern to project Western values and ‘interests’ echoing the realist language employed by Howard in foreign policy matters.

Similar themes were advanced by Howard in his Anzac Day media statement. With references to the sacredness of Anzac and its ability to unite Australians, Howard asked Australians to remember Australia’s allies: ‘On this day we also give thanks to friends and allies who shared our danger and we add our pledge that their loyalty will neither be forgotten nor unreturned’ (Howard 2002a). Here, Howard alluded to the invocation of ANZUS that he made after 9/11 and recommitted Australia to the US alliance. Howard’s message went on to explicitly link Anzac, Australian values, and the current deployment of troops in foreign theatres of conflict:

As well as providing a day of commemoration, Anzac Day is also a time for all of us to reflect with gratitude on those great values that unite us as Australians - values such as mateship, courage, initiative and determination.

This is because the same Anzac spirit that has guided us through adversity and triumph seems to slumber periodically only to draw new breath when the national interest calls to bring Australians together in times of need (Howard 2002a).

Anzac Day represented Australianness – ‘mateship’, ‘courage’, ‘initiative’, and ‘determination’ – all values which unproblematically ‘unite’ the nation. The unity of the nation, and the nation’s commitment to that unity, was further reflected in the repeated reference to the possessive determiner ‘our - ‘our national interest’ or ‘our troops’. These values of Australianness were quite particular, reflecting the conservative elements of the Anzac tradition, rather than its radicalism or anti-authoritarianism. Howard continued:
On this Anzac Day we especially honour those Australian Defence Force personnel currently serving in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism and elsewhere to support our national interest.

Our young soldiers, sailors and airmen stand today as their Anzac forebears did more than three quarters of a century ago - willing to serve their nation and eager to defend its freedoms (Howard 2002a).

This generation of Australian troops reflected Anzac – ‘our young soldiers, sailors and airmen stand today as their Anzac forebears did more than three quarters of a century ago’. This was again conveyed with the possessive determiner ‘our’, which attempted to unite the audience and the troops. Therefore, Australianness was conflated with Australian troop deployments. The troops’ willingness to ‘serve the nation’ and ‘support our national interest’ wove together the foreign policy goals of the government with national identity. As such, Howard had constructed a discourse of Anzac where the wisdom of the Afghan or regional deployments, the efficacy of defence planning for their support, or contemplation of the long-term outcome of intervention, all became that much harder to question, as to question and critique would be to challenge Australianness itself.

Similar themes were revealed in Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship a few weeks after Anzac Day 2002, as the last surviving Gallipoli veteran, Alec Campbell, passed away after a short illness on May 16, aged 103. Campbell had served six weeks at Gallipoli as an underage recruit before being discharged from the army in 1916 on medical grounds (Flanagan 2002, 1). His passing severed the final link between the men and women who had directly experienced the Gallipoli campaign and Anzac. Whilst it certainly did not cause the transferral of Anzac custodianship from the RSL to the state, it was symptomatic of that shift.

Campbell was given a state funeral, with the Prime Minister, the Governor General, and further state and federal dignitaries in attendance (Flanagan 2002, 1). Further, Howard gave an address at Campbell’s funeral service, despite his family’s misgivings about the way he was being represented as the embodiment of Anzac (Flanagan 2002; Darby 2002, 11). Campbell became the embodiment of the nation itself in the address: ‘Within this one man’s journey, we can chart the story of Australia itself. Within this one life are illustrated the living values that transformed Australia from the hopeful young federation of Alec’s childhood to one of the great developed nations of the modern era’ (Howard 2002b). But as Brett (2003, 204-205) points out, Campbell had spent only a brief moment of his life at Gallipoli and as a soldier: ‘Most of his life he was a radical trade unionist and office bearer, and so to Liberal eyes a bearer of the various vices of militant unionism.’ This fact was glossed over by Howard, whose eulogy instead imbued Campbell with values echoing Liberal Party
traditional—‘self-reliance’, ‘endeavour’, and ‘service’ all featured as ideals that Campbell embodied during his lifetime.

Howard also aligned Campbell’s life with his government’s foreign policy:

...by the respectful observance of this one man’s death, our nation pledges itself once more to an ethos of selflessness and shared determination, courage and compassion. We make a silent promise that the values for which so many Australians have died and by which others, like Alec Campbell, have lived, will remain secure within our own lives. We signal our understanding that the freedom under which we shelter needs to be nurtured and, at times, defended anew. We think of the men and women of the Australian Defence Force now serving in Afghanistan, East Timor, Bougainville and elsewhere.

The spirit bequeathed by Alec and his generation though born of war’s adversity, still slumbers within our people, ready to rise and draw new breath when disaster strikes or danger threatens. An essence that continues to define our nation’s identity and the standards by which we judge ourselves (Howard 2002b).

Campbell here becomes almost totemic—a spiritual being imbued with meaning and venerated by the nation (Trompf 2005, 102; Durkheim 2008, 113; 119). Campbell and his Anzacompanions were analogous with supernatural beings ‘bequeathing a spirit’ or ‘essence’ to the Australian people that all at once defined ‘our nation’s identity’, provided a moral code to live by (the standards by which we judge ourselves), and could totem-like be used to protect the nation from harm if ‘disaster strikes or danger threatens’. Campbell’s totemism is employed by Howard to call upon the nation to remember the need to renew Anzac’s values and protect them in the face of new dangers, with the ‘Australian Defence Force now serving in Afghanistan, East Timor, Bougainville and elsewhere’ being the vessels now imbued with the essence that Campbell has bestowed. Much like his Anzac Day message, the construction of Howard’s language here explicitly links Anzac with Australianness, the contemporary ADF, and his government’s foreign policy, in a manner that makes it extremely difficult to question or critique.

Anzac Day 2003 and the Iraq War

Anzac Day 2003 occurred in the context of the Iraq War, which had begun a month previously on March 20. The war had gone well up until this point, with the US-led Coalition’s military strength proving too much for a weak and demoralised Iraqi opposition. Coalition forces had entered Baghdad in early April, and declared victory in this endeavour on April 14. A statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad’s Firdos Square had been toppled on April 9, with the highly mediated symbolism of the event beamed live to television audiences around the world. In Australia, by April 2003 support for the war had grown to represent a solid majority of opinion, after a lead-up period
to the war where public support for Australia’s involvement in the war had seen more Australians opposing involvement, or bare majorities in support (see Figure 19).

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**Table 13.9 Support for Australian military action against Iraq, 2003-06 [percentages]**

The support for the war was reflected in the reaction of some the crowd that turned out for Anzac Day. At the AWM in Canberra, *The Australian* noted that the Prime Minister ‘was given a rapturous reception’ (Rintoul 2003, 7). At the Sydney Anzac Day parade, *The Sydney Morning Herald* reported overt and aggressive patriotism amongst more benign expressions of Australianness:

> Children pressed up against the barricades, waving Australian flags or reaching out to congratulate another generation as it passed by. Elderly women sat with rugs over their knees while, nearby, young men revived the "Aussie, Aussie, Aussie" chants of the Olympic Games.

> Workers from Star Track Express, Minchinbury, donned blue T-shirts proclaiming "Australia: love it or leave it" and "We support the troops past and present". One said anti-war opposition had been disgraceful.

> Charlie Scannell, 83, of Carlton, who served as an infantryman in New Guinea and has been marching on Anzac Day since 1960, said those who protested against Australia's involvement were "a disgrace". "Half of them don't even know what they're protesting about. No one wants war, but sometimes it has to happen." (Stevenson, Allard and Thompson 2003, 1).

Hyper-Anzac was continuing to emerge as Anzac Day was mixed with the Iraq War, overt patriotism, and expressions of exclusionism amongst some of the crowd who attended Anzac Day 2003.

These reactions reflected the success that Howard had in linking Anzac, Australianness, and legitimisation of the Iraq War. As McDonald and Merefield (2010, 201) note: ‘...the effective linking of intervention to Australian core values and national identity, and the rhetorical marginalisation and coercion of opponents through strategic representations were... crucial dimensions in ensuring
that intervention in Iraq was viewed as a legitimate foreign and security policy option.’ Howard did this on Anzac Day 2003 via two public addresses – one a speech to the audience assembled at the AWM, another via a recorded message hosted on pm.gov.au (Howard 2003a; Howard 2003e). Both addresses followed a similar narrative structure, though the recorded message is far shorter. Both speeches asked the audience early on to reflect upon the growing hold Anzac Day has upon the nation, both asked Australians to remember and honour all 100,000 Australians who had died in war, both explicitly located the origin of Anzac at Gallipoli and April 25th 1915, and both conclude with links between Anzac and contemporary ADF deployments in Iraq. As in the previous year, Howard called upon the nation to celebrate Anzac and its conservative representation of Australianness – ‘It [Anzac] is about the celebration of some wonderful values, of courage, of valour, of mateship, of decency, of a willingness as a nation to do the right thing, whatever the cost’ (Howard 2003a). Howard’s 2003 Anzac Day addresses followed much the same pattern as the one set in 2002.

However, in contrast to 2002, Howard was much more explicit in his attempts to link Anzac normatively with his government’s foreign policy. In his message to the nation, Howard said that ‘today’s Anzacs’ are on deployment in ‘…Iraq, in East Timor, in Bougainville, and elsewhere’ (Howard 2003e). At the AWM, these modern day Anzacs ‘…went in our name in a just cause to do good things to liberate a people. They are part of a great tradition of honourable service by the Australian military forces’ (Howard 2003a). The string of positive adjectives and verbs used to describe the ADF’s actions in Iraq (‘just’, ‘good’, ‘liberate’) was used in conjunction with the possessive determiner ‘our name’ to call upon the audience to endorse the Iraq deployment as an extension of their sense of self and identification with nation. The fact that the ostensible justification for the invasion of Iraq was to ensure the Iraqi regime was disarmed of WMDs, not to liberate a people, and that both those reasons for war did not enjoy UN approval, was neatly deflected as the ADF’s actions were, a priori, made honourable as ‘part of a great tradition’. Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship put forward self-serving post-hoc justifications for sending Australian troops into a war that lacked legitimacy under international law and lacked a long-term vision of how the peace would be won in a post-Saddam Iraq. Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship successfully employed the unpolitical tenets of Anzac that he had carefully cultivated in the years prior to the Iraq War to discipline public sentiment regarding his government’s security and defence priorities in the age of terror.
Anzac Day 2004 in Iraq

Howard marked Anzac Day 2004 by travelling to Iraq to visit the troops. It was a flying visit, conducted under strict secrecy and attended by only a few government selected media representatives. Leaving on April 24, Howard arrived to address the troops stationed at Doha, Qatar at 3am April 25 (Australian time), before flying to Baghdad, Iraq to address the troops again at the dawn service (11am Australian time), play two-up, and hold talks with the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, Paul Bremer, General John Abizaid, and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez (Allard 2004, 5). The Iraq War had entered a difficult stage as fighting with insurgents intensified in spring 2004, leading to the Coalition losing ground and suffering casualties.

In Australia, support for the war was dropping. April 2004 saw a bare majority of those surveyed supporting the war (50%), dropping to less than 50% in May as the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, where support remained (see Figure 19). The disciplining that Howard had engendered on Anzac Day 2003 was losing its potency.

The trip was both full of drama and tightly stage-managed. In Baghdad, automatic gunfire was heard in the background as wreaths were laid during the dawn service (Allard 2004, 5). As Howard left Baghdad, the plane carrying him and the media was forced to take evasive action for thirty minutes, zig-zagging low to the ground to avoid a potential surface-to-air missile lock that had been detected (Allard and Banham 2004, 1). And a leg of the trip to visit navy personnel on the frigate HMAS Stuart was cancelled after the ship was called into action to assist US sailors injured in a suicide bombing (Banham 2004, 4). The danger of these events added to the drama and newsworthiness of the trip, with the Prime Minister placing himself in harm’s way in order to visit the troops deployed in action.

But this message was also tightly presented. Criticism was levelled at the government for allowing only a select few media organisations to attend, with a point of contention being that the government favoured TV network Channel 9 was the only TV news crew invited, to the exclusion of the national broadcaster, the ABC (Grattan 2004, 17). The secrecy of the trip, ostensibly for security reasons, also provided the story with a surprise element that ensured maximum interest, whilst further providing a plausible reason for the limited selection of journalists and media organisations. The presentation of the Prime Minister in the utmost of positive lights was aimed for, with images alluding to Australian masculinity and Anzac being emphasised. For example, images such as Howard playing two-up or donning a flak jacket labelled ‘HOWARD’ was emphasised, whilst slightly embarrassing footage of the Prime Minister trying on an ill-fitting helmet was vetted by government minders for ‘security reasons’ (Grattan 2004, 17; Inglis 2008, 578). The government’s failure to
invite Opposition Leader Mark Latham on the trip echoed Howard’s exclusion on VP Day 1995, when he had been not been included in the speakers. This helped ensure the focus was upon Howard and his government’s agenda, rather than the policy contest between the Coalition and the ALP over the continued deployment of Australian troops to Iraq.

The central purported aim and message of the trip was to visit and support the troops that the Howard government had sent to war. As previously noted, Howard had felt an obligation to personally thank Australian ADF personnel for their service, making frequent appearances at departure and return ceremonies. The 2004 Iraq trip confirmed this already established pattern by Howard. In Doha, Howard thanked the troops by saying:

There is naturally and very understandably a special focus on what is occurring in and around Iraq and you are very much in the thoughts and the hearts of all of the Australian people. You do a great job. You bring us great honour. We wish you well and our thoughts and prayers stay very much with you and thank you very much. And I look forward to meeting as many of you as I can tonight over something that is very Australian - a barbecue (Howard 2004a).

At Baghdad, he expressed similar sentiments:

I’ve come to Iraq on Anzac Day very deliberately to express my personal thanks and admiration to the men and women of the Australian Defence Force for the work that they have done and they continue to do in very challenging circumstances. But it’s not only to them that I extend my thanks and the thanks of the Australian people. But also to many civilian people [in Iraq in service] from Australia...

What you are doing is for the future of the Iraqi people. It’s a just cause. The nation is united in its prayers and hopes for your well being and your safety and your continued contribution to building a better future for the Iraqi people. And how better and how appropriate I guess it is to express that sentiment on behalf of the Australian people on Anzac Day (Howard 2004b).

Finally, the message was repeated to journalists at a press conference in Baghdad:

I came to say thank you to the men and women of the ADF and the most evocative effective way that I could say thank you was to join them in the Anzac Day dawn service. There is no service in the Australian calendar that is more evocative of that particular part of our character and I believed it was a way that I could say thank you. I admire what they’re doing. They are here in a just cause and I wanted to personally thank them (Howard 2004g).

However, Howard’s language in these instances revealed that there was more to the trip than thanking the troops. Several elements were at play in Howard’s language – the call to thank and support the troops, the linking of Anzac to Australianness, the contention that Anzac Day is the most appropriate day to give thanks, and the normative justification for the Iraq War. These elements, in the context of the difficulties the Coalition forces were facing in Iraq, and the policy difference
between the Coalition, who supported the war, and the ALP who opposed the continued deployment of the ADF in Iraq, reveal that Howard was also employing Anzac to make a political point.

The language used by Howard continued and intensified the ‘support the troops’ discourse that permeated his Anzac Day addresses during the War on Terror. Howard frequently told the assembled audiences during the trip, and the viewers back home via the travelling media contingent, that both he and the Australian public supported them and their cause in Iraq, conflating the two. The troops and the cause in Iraq were frequently spoke of in effusively positive and normative terms – ‘just cause’, ‘great honour’, ‘better future’ – recalling the positive values of service, duty and sacrifice present in the Anzac tradition. This had the effect of merging the positive associations of the ADF with the government’s far from uncontroversial defence policy regarding Iraq. This was all underpinned by the frequent intermingling of these actions with Australianess, with Howard several times referencing Anzac as the ‘most evocative’ or ‘most appropriate’ day to express such nationalist sentiments. This mix of language belied Howard’s assertion that the purpose of the trip was solely to thank the troops – the unpolitical and incontestable nature of Anzac was being employed to defend a very political point regarding Australian defence deployments.

The ‘support the troops’ discourse evident on Anzac Day 2004 was employed by the Howard government to critique the ALP and their policy position of withdrawing troops from Iraq. In the days after the Iraq trip, Opposition defence spokesman Chris Evans, and then Opposition Leader Mark Latham, attempted to make the point that Australian troops should be removed from Iraq, since the original reasons for going to war (discovering WMDs and disarming the Iraqi regime) had not been fulfilled, and the ADF’s continued presence was ‘symbolic’ (Latham 2004). Howard responded:

I am appalled at the repeated and inaccurate assertions by the Leader of the Opposition and the Defence spokesman for the Labor Party that Australia’s military contribution in and around Iraq is merely symbolic. This is insulting to our personnel who face constant danger in their efforts to bring security and stability to Iraq (Howard 2004i).

Howard’s response neatly sidestepped the substantive point the ALP was trying to make regarding the failure to find any WMDs and the wisdom of Australia’s continued presence in Iraq by equating the ALP’s position with an attack on the troops themselves. Such an equation fed upon all the positively associated traditions of Anzac and the legacy of the mistreatment of Vietnam veterans to
create a powerful rhetorical weapon. Latham found this difficult to contest, with the *Canberra Times* reporting:

Asked yesterday if the troops were there for domestic political reasons, Mr Latham would only say Labor supported the troops. "I dealt with this yesterday," he said. "It is true to say that Labor supports the troops 100 per cent but we are entitled as an Opposition to raise these policy differences. "They [the troops] have their tasks to discharge and our mention of symbolism if you like, it is political symbolism." (Peake 2004, 2)

The story was less about the ALP’s criticism of the government’s policy regarding Iraq, and more about the failure of Latham to adequately and appropriately honour the troops. The sacralised status of the ADF provided Howard with an effective rhetorical device to head off a potential opportunity for the ALP to contest the government’s continued deployment of troops to Iraq.

The first few years after 9/11 demonstrated how effective Anzac entrepreneurship could be in defending a policy program. Howard’s active encouragement of hyper-Anzac assisted the effectively incontestable discourse of national identity that he enthusiastically had aligned with his policy agenda. It hardly mattered that Howard’s acts and discourse ran counter to his earlier attacks in Opposition upon Keating for attempting to engineer national identity. Howard’s nationalism entrepreneurship had effectively captured Anzac for his government and he was enjoying the warm glow of positive association.

**Howard, Anzac Day and the Continuing Institutionalisation of Hyper-Anzac, 2005-2007**

The Coalition won the 2004 election convincingly, comfortably defeating the ALP and, somewhat unusually, also winning control of the Senate. The totality of the victory further confirmed Howard’s belief in the correctness of his approach to government. Writing in his autobiography, Howard reflected on this period by saying:

Large swathes of traditional Labor voters supported the Coalition in 1996, 2001 and 2004. The ‘Howard battler’ liked the economic security my government delivered, was socially conservative, strongly supported our policy on asylum-seekers and was suspicious of policies which satiated environmental prejudices at the expense of other people’s jobs (Howard 2010, 485).

Such a belief, and the executive’s dominance of Parliament, saw Howard pursue a series of policy reforms that sought to entrench his vision for Australia. This was symbolised most starkly by his pursuit of industrial relations reform via the WorkChoices legislative changes, but also by his increasingly strident participation in the culture wars. His final term as Prime Minister saw him institute initiatives such as conservative review of the national history curriculum, introduce a

Howard’s entrenching of Anzac as a central nationalist discourse was pursued as part of this push. The success of this activity is noted by McKenna (2010, 128-129), who argues that the period 2004-2007 saw increasing popular condemnation of ‘the unpatriotic past of the 1960s and 1970s’, a phenomenon which he partly attributes to Howard’s promotion of that popular memory. Howard’s fervour for entrenching this view of history simultaneously betrayed his anxieties about Anzac’s contemporary commemoration (Ziino 2006), and the Anzac controversies that dogged the government during this period. The spectacle of hyper-Anzac generated forms of remembrance that were in tension with Anzac’s traditionally understated commemoration, and led new expectations about war remembrance that Howard needed to observe and manage with his Anzac entrepreneurship.

The 90th Anniversary of the Gallipoli Landings, 2005
This mix of confidence, stridency, anxiety and ambiguity was evident in the 90th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 2005. Howard’s filled his dawn service address at Anzac Cove with signifiers of his surety of his position and views. The men who fought at Gallipoli ‘forged a legend whose grip on us grows tighter with each passing year’ and ‘what swells with each Anzac season is a hunger for their stories’ (Howard 2005a), claims that reflect the growing institutionalisation of hyper-Anzac. Anzac had grown into an irresistible force, enveloping contemporary Australian national life:

Those who fought here in places like Quinn’s Post, Pope’s Hill and the Nek changed forever the way we saw our world and ourselves. They bequeathed Australia a lasting sense of national identity. They sharpened our democratic temper and our questioning eye towards authority...

It [Anzac] lives on in the valour and the sacrifice of young men and women that ennoble Australia in our time, in scrub in the Solomons, in the villages of Timor, in the deserts of Iraq and the coast of Nias. It lives on through a nation’s easy familiarity, through Australians looking out for each other, through courage and compassion in the face of adversity.

And so we dedicate ourselves at this hour, at this place, not just to the memory of Anzac but to its eternal place in the Australian soul (Howard 2005a).

As in previous speeches, Anzac is here the source, and continuing reference point, for Australian identity. Anzac ‘lived on’ in the ADF and amongst the nation’s people, bestowing Australians with conservative values of ‘sacrifice’, ‘courage’ and ‘valour’. Howard also referenced the Australian Legend – ‘our democratic temper and our questioning eye towards authority’ - but the implications of these values were left as ideographs of an uncomplicated and unified Australianness, and did not
imply any politics or contestation. He referred to Australian interventionism, but omitted the explicitly normative connection to the Iraq War that had characterised his earlier Anzac Day addresses. In this subtler approach, the ADF deployments in the Solomon Islands and East Timor preceded mention of the controversial Iraq War both in this speech and in Howard’s Anzac Day message media release (Howard 2005a; Howard 2005b). The illegal Iraq War had become less popular as it had dragged on, while the Solomon Islands and East Timor had more positive and unproblematic associations.

The dawn service address of 2005 once again largely followed many of the narrative and linguistic structures that Howard had established in his language of Anzac and further reflected the confidence he had in its central place in Australia’s national identity. Not for Howard were the conclusions that the chief of the New Zealand Defence Forces, Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, drew from the campaign when he spoke at the dawn service ceremony: ‘Perhaps the Gallipoli campaign was the high-water mark of our nations’ imperial subservience. We learned that we must shake off the shackles of colonial dependence’ (Ferguson, as cited by Hartcher 2005, 13). Instead, Anzac Day 2005 confirmed for Howard that Anzac defined Australianess:

The original ANZACs could not have known at the time that their service would leave all Australians with another enduring legacy: our sense of self. The ANZAC legend has helped us to define who we are as Australians. ANZAC Day is a chance to reflect with pride on what it means to be Australian and the values we hold dear: determination, courage, compassion and resourcefulness (Howard 2005b).

All that was Anzac, and therefore all that was Australian, mirrored Howard’s sense of self – his conservative values and his implicit privileging of Anglo-Celtic and masculine identity. And the certainty that Howard had in the transformation of Anzac was demonstrated when he told an interviewer at Gallipoli ‘all the cynicism of some years ago has dropped away and people are very proud of what the young of Australia did those years ago and I think that’s fantastic’ (Howard 2005c). Howard felt that he had repudiated Keating and won the partisan contest over the meaning of Anzac.

But anxiety about what Anzac was becoming was revealed by a series of minor controversies surrounding Anzac Day 2005. Firstly was the question of who ‘owned’ Gallipoli and had a right to dictate the management of the site. A domestic dispute had erupted in the lead-up to Anzac Day as road-works on the Gallipoli peninsula to help accommodate the influx of visitors offended some Australians who saw the whole site as a sacred war grave that should not be disturbed. A 2003 proposal to list Anzac Cove on the Howard government’s National Heritage List was finall
unambiguously rejected by Turkish authorities in the lead up to Anzac Day, with the Turks expressing a concern that such a course of action would impinge upon Turkish sovereignty (Ziino 2006, 6). Howard coyly played on these controversies whilst at Gallipoli, telling an interviewer ‘...I feel I’m at home here. This is Australia, it is Turkey... but you know, in an emotional way, it’s part of Australia - it always will be’ (Howard 2005c). This was a wink and nod that referenced Ataturk’s 1934 tribute to the Anzac’s – ‘You, the mothers who sent their sons from faraway countries, wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well’. The government’s hubris and arrogance here was revealed by its failure to anticipate or accommodate the sensitivity of Turkish authorities to Australian overtures of sovereignty over a site that Australian forces had attempted to invade 90 years earlier and the contribution that the victory over the Allied forces at Gallipoli had made towards Turkish nationalism. But for all the coyness, arrogance, and wink and nod to domestic audiences, the controversy surrounding questions of sovereignty on Anzac Day 2005 also revealed the impotence of the government regarding the management of such a crucial site of Australian identity.

The anxiety that surrounded the impotence of the Australian government regarding sovereignty over Gallipoli was further demonstrated by Coalition MP and former Veterans Affairs Minister Danna Vale’s proposal later in 2005 to recreate the Gallipoli landscape, including the memorials and battlefields, along the ‘uncannily similar’ Mornington Peninsula on the Victorian coastline (Seccombe 2005, 1). This was another expression of hyper-Anzac – seeking authenticity in a realistic fabrication. The proposal was roundly criticised by the RSL, historians, and Victorian Premier Steve Bracks, and further rejected by Howard within hours of it being made public (Peake 2005, 5). Nonetheless, the fact that such a proposal was even entertained, after Howard’s allusion to Australian pretensions of authority over the meaning and management of Gallipoli, reflected the frustration that hyper-Anzac’s most fervent entrepreneurs felt about the lack of Australian control over the site and its meanings. With Gallipoli located outside the borders of Australian sovereignty, the government was forced to be the subservient partner in the sharing of the control of the space and its meaning.

A second controversy involving hyper-Anzac expression concerned the way Anzac Day 2005 was marked at Gallipoli. The Canberra Times (2005, 11) wondered ‘...whether an event that was once a sobering remembrance hasn’t become a hyped-up, stage-managed circus’, as the crowd of 20,000 at the dawn service was entertained on the previous night by a big screen playing the Bee Gee’s ‘Stayin’ Alive’ (Ziino 2006, 8), displayed instances of drunkenness, and later left large amounts of rubbish around the site. As Ziino (2006, 9) notes, this ignited popular debate about whether Anzac
Day was appropriately marked by commemoration or celebration. Members of the crowd might have been forgiven for being confused at the ferocity of the condemnation, given that the Prime Minister had been calling for commemoration and celebration on Anzac Day for several years. Howard leapt to their defence, responding to a question at a press conference in Istanbul on April 26 regarding the appropriateness of the marking of Anzac Day 2005:

But I am, on this occasion, I am defiantly sticking up for the behaviour and the decorum and the general reverence of the young of Australia. I thought they were outstanding and it was one of the greatest experiences I've had as Prime Minister to be with them yesterday, to meet them, to have transmitted to me their sense of occasion, their sense of enthusiasm, their sense of pride and their sense of being Australian. Now I thought it was great and therefore the things that have contributed to that feeling, which ought to make even the most traditional expression of Australian patriotism by a person well satisfied (Howard 2005d).

Whilst Howard was quick to defend those young Australians who he saw as the new standard-bearers of Anzac, the controversy surrounding their participation in, and representation of, Anzac Day revealed that hyper-Anzac sometimes existed in tension with older, more restrained, forms of Anzac remembrance. These tensions revealed ambiguities about the appropriate form of remembrance - commemoration or celebration - and that this could manifest in contestation of the government’s encouragement of hyper-Anzac. Further, it demonstrated that whilst Howard was largely successful in his Anzac entrepreneurship, he was not entirely free to define Anzac as he pleased.

Anzac Day 2006 and the Death of Private Jacob Kovco
Anzac Day 2006 revealed similar tensions, ambiguities, and difficulties. Howard did not speak on Anzac Day that year, but did release a media statement where themes of honouring the sacrifice of service personnel were expressed, but primarily announced that the Australian War Memorial and Canberra’s Anzac Parade would be included on the National Heritage List. Inglis (2008, 496) notes that during the Howard years the AWM had become ‘more military in character, more enterprising in the pursuit of tourists, and more richly endowed, by a government whose beneficence it acknowledged’. Further, it had become more educative, with new exhibitions geared towards this exercise and a federal government scheme that subsidised travel for schoolchildren to Canberra for ‘Civics and Citizenship Education’ (Inglis 2008, 498-499). Anzac Parade had also seen several new memorials opened during Howard’s term, including the Australian Service Nurses National Memorial in 1999, the Australian National Korean War Memorial in 2000, the New Zealand Memorial the day before Anzac Day 2001 (a rare example of Australia acknowledging New Zealand around Anzac Day), and a refurbished Royal Australian Air Force Memorial in 2002 (Inglis 2008, 481-488). Howard’s
announcement that they were both to be included on the National Heritage List confirmed their status in Australian life and extended the reach of Anzac.

Anzac Day 2006 also presented Howard with challenges. On April 21, Private Jacob Kovco died whilst serving in Iraq, only the second Australian death in combat since Vietnam (the first being Sergeant Andrew Russell in Afghanistan in 2002). The circumstances of his death were poorly communicated to Kovco’s family and the public by Defence Minister Brendan Nelson\(^{22}\) and the repatriation of his body to Australia was bungled, with a mix-up seeing the body of a Bosnian soldier sent to Australia instead of Kovco’s (Murphy et al 2006, 23). The bungling compounded the anguish of Kovco’s family and an ‘incredibly sorry’ Howard soon made reparations by organising a funeral with military honours, where ‘an honour guard from Kovco’s regiment lined the path of the gun carriage bearing the coffin and fired three volleys as it was lowered into the ground. An army band played, a bugler sounded the Last Post, and the RAAF Roulettes performed a flyover’ (Inglis 2008, 580; Murphy et al 2006, 23).

Howard and Nelson both attended the funeral, with Howard being photographed hugging Kovco’s widow Shelley (Inglis 2008, 580). The ceremony of the funeral reportedly upset some veterans, who criticised its excesses (Inglis 2008, 580). More recently, Brown (2014, 62-63) has argued that the bungling of the repatriation of Kovco’s body led to the accidental establishment of a new convention of Prime Ministerial attendance at military funerals, where ‘every ramp ceremony became an Anzac Day’. Brown (2014) argues that this new convention has combined with the tight control of media reports from Iraq and Afghanistan and the poor articulation for the reasons why Australia should be involved in these conflicts by the government, and has consequently been a contributing factor in the Australian public’s low tolerance for Australian deaths in combat. This fed into the fall in public support for continued participation in these wars, as the only thing the public sees from the Australian troop involvement in the War on Terror is death, rather than positive stories of what the ADF was achieving in the War on Terror. As such, Howard’s hyper-Anzac had unintended and uncontrollable consequences - necessitating the escalation of honours and ceremony for Australia’s

\(^{22}\) Kovco had been accidentally shot in the head by his own hand whilst in his quarters in Baghdad. Nelson initially said he had been handling a gun while cleaning it and it had gone off, before later saying that he had not in fact been handling the weapon and that it discharged accidentally after being bumped (Murphy et al 2006, 23). Also confusing matters was the reference to his death as an ‘accidental shooting’, a euphemism for suicide in military parlance (Murphy et al 2005, 23). A military board of inquiry in 2006 found that Kovco had been ‘skylarking’ when the accident occurred, with a coronial inquest in 2008 similarly finding that ‘the gunshot wound had been irresponsibly self-inflicted’ (Stafford 2008).
war dead, but simultaneously contributing to the public’s increasing dissatisfaction with the ADF’s participation in the War on Terror.

**Anzac Day 2007, Brisbane and Canberra**

Anzac Day 2007 was more successful for Howard and saw him mobilising Anzac Day for partisan ends. Howard gave an Anzac Day address at Greenslopes Private Hospital in Brisbane, a setting located in newly ascendant Opposition leader Kevin Rudd’s seat of Griffith. Howard was ‘defying expectations that he would return to Canberra on Tuesday night after a two-day Brisbane visit to attend the traditional dawn service [at the AWM]’ (Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007). Having trumped Rudd, who sent his daughter Jessica to stand in for him, Howard delivered a speech, before returning to Canberra to attend the 11am ceremony at the AWM and lay a wreath. The speech brimmed with Howard’s confidence in his version of Anzac and its institutionalisation in Australian public life:

> It has undoubtedly been one of the most warming experiences of the Australian nation, particularly of those generations who fought in the wars in which this country has been involved to see over the last 10 or 20 years a resurgence of affection for and observance of ANZAC Day. The extraordinary scenes of thousands of young Australians going to Gallipoli Peninsula on ANZAC Day, the growing numbers of young people attending ANZAC Day services sends a very powerful message of reassurance to all generations of Australians that this most special of all Australian days will always be at the centre of our national life (Howard 2007).

Howard was reflecting upon the growing centrality of Anzac and was pleased with what he saw. He spoke warmly of the ‘resurgence of affection for and observance of Anzac Day’ and was reassured that it would remain ‘at the centre of our national life’. This assuredness of the continuity of Anzac was built upon the Australian values that Anzac established:

> But in addition to our sense of gratitude and that sense of owing a debt that can never be repaid, there is another reason why ANZAC Day will always be at the centre of the affections and the observance of what it means to be an Australian. And that is the values that the ANZAC tradition represent in our national life. Those values of courage, of mateship, of irreverence and larrikinism where that was appropriate; of sterling discipline and tenacious commitment when that was appropriate and a willingness to risk all for the defence of the country we love and the people we love. And it is the values of ANZAC Day as well as the sense of gratitude and remembrance that make it a special day in our national life. And as the years go by, so far from the tradition and the legend of ANZAC diminishing, it will occupy an evermore hallowed place in the recollection and the observance of this country (Howard 2007).

A check-list of Howard signifiers of national identity was reeled off. Conservative values like ‘courage’ and ‘discipline’ were included, along with the newly reconstituted conservative values of the Australian legend – ‘larrikinism’, ‘irreverence’ and ‘mateship’ when appropriate. The negative
conjunction ‘but’ tempered the values of the Australian legend, making them subservient to the conservative values of the Anzac tradition. Howard seemed to feel no qualms about expressing unabashed patriotism for the ‘country we love’ or placing Anzac at the centre of the nation’s identity.

But whilst Howard was publicly confident and self-assured, the fact that he felt the need to mobilise his Anzac entrepreneurship in such a partisan manner revealed the weakness of his position. On April 17 2007, Newspoll showed Labor leading the Coalition by 59 points to 41 on a two party-preferred basis, and similar figures were reported on April 23 in a Herald/ACNielsen poll, with Labor leading the Coalition by 58 per cent to 42 per on a two party-preferred basis (The Australian 2007; Henderson 2007). Whist Howard would soon be gone, his government losing office and he himself losing his seat, the intensely sacralised, spectacular and central Anzac he helped engender would remain.

Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the success of Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship. The context of the War on Terror gave impetus to Howard’s reconceptualisation of Australian identity in line with his foreign policy and security setting. This meant aligning the contemporary deployment of the ADF in the Middle East and the region with the traditions of service, sacrifice, heroism and honour that the original Anzacs at Gallipoli had displayed. This has the effect of making it difficult to contest the deployment of the ADF, especially in the Iraq invasion, as Howard conflated the support of Australian troops and Australianness with support for the government’s foreign policy. Howard reinforced this message by continuing to police the unpolitical nature of Anzac. These factors once again demonstrated the ideographic nature of Anzac, and how it could be reimagined by entrepreneurial Prime Ministers with new meanings that matched their political styles and policy agendas.

Whilst Howard had enormous success with his Anzac entrepreneurship, he was not able to wholly control Anzac. The spectacular hyper-Anzac that his government helped engender posed tensions with older, more traditional and more sober forms of war remembrance, and these in turn posed problems for Howard that he could not wholly control. This chapter provided evidence for the operation of agency and structure in nationalism entrepreneurship – whilst Howard was Anzac’s most successful Prime Ministerial entrepreneur, he could not employ Anzac for solely instrumental ends. Instead, part of Howard’s success was due to his carefully attuned reading of public sentiment.
surrounding Anzac, and his attempts to manage this sentiment in order to maintain what he believed to be the essential unpolitical nature of Anzac. In the process, Howard helped to institutionalise a pattern of Anzac remembrance that replaced the central role of the RSL with a dominant role for the Australian government.
CHAPTER 10

Conclusion: Anzac’s Entrepreneurs in Retrospect

The intensely protected and sacralised hyper-Anzac that Howard had helped establish remained after the November 2007 federal election that saw Howard and his government resoundingly defeated. His Prime Ministerial successors have been cooler towards Anzac, never quite emphasising Anzac in their narratives of Australian identity to the extent that Howard did. However, all have followed the Anzac conventions that Howard, Hawke, and Keating, helped to establish - making celebratory Anzac Day addresses at the AWM, Gallipoli, or other significant sites of Australian war remembrance, that were attended by the Australian public in seemingly ever-growing numbers. That Prime Ministers continue to observe Anzac in a spectacular and celebratory manner, and that this practice is endorsed by the public with their attendance at Anzac Day ceremonies, their consumption of Anzac related media, and their incorporation of Anzac into their own identities, is a reflection of the success that Howard, and his predecessors, had in defining Anzac for the 21st century.

This thesis has employed the framework of nationalism entrepreneurship, in conjunction with critical discourse analysis, to explore this Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac. It has identified constants and changes in the way that Prime Ministers conceive Anzac and Australian national identity in the context of economic reform, globalisation, and international terror, and has identified Hawke, Keating, and Howard, as significant and influential Anzac entrepreneurs. Themes that have been examined in this regard have centred on the ideographic nature of Anzac; the varying levels of commitment by Prime Ministers to keep Anzac unpolitical; how they have maintained the unpolitical nature of Anzac; the increasing engagement of Prime Ministers with Anzac; and their role in the institutionalisation of a form of Anzac that is spectacular, elite driven, and rapturously received. Critical Discourse Analysis has been employed to explore the qualitative and quantitative textual representation of Anzac by Prime Ministers, as well as guiding the analysis with its triangulation via multiple methods, and the discourse-historical approach which encouraged the examination of the research question over time. The thesis therefore also offers suggestions for further research that could employ CDA, or could take a different approach to the study of nationalism or political language.
Change and Constancy in Prime Ministerial Anzac Entrepreneurship

The thesis has identified several key themes in Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship that have displayed varying levels of consistency and change from 1973 to 2007. To reiterate, nationalism entrepreneurship attempts to address issues pertaining to the competing causal explanation of structure versus agency in the operation of nationalist actors by paying close attention to the role of both these elements. Particular powerful and entrepreneurial nationalist actors have enormous influence over the conception of national identity, but they cannot wholly define that conception. They are products of their environment, and they must respond to that context, and further, they internalise forms of national identity that arise from this environment. These actors do not pursue nationalist ends for solely instrumental ends exogenous to nationalism, such as power, prestige, or influence over a policy agenda or program. Whilst these factors are often bound up in the nationalism entrepreneur's ends, the end goal for nationalism entrepreneurs is also a nationalist one, and we must take their claims to be genuine nationalists seriously if we are to understand their motivations and the consequences of their entrepreneurship as it works its way through a community. The operation of this dynamic has informed the following themes throughout the thesis.

The Ideographic Nature of Anzac

An ideograph is a rhetorical device, with a nebulous, but well-understood and culturally situated meaning. Ideographs have a degree of malleability, but those actors who stretch the meaning of an ideograph to breaking face sanction from the community (McGee 1980). The thesis has demonstrated the ideographic nature of Anzac, and has proposed that Anzac’s entrepreneurs have consistently engaged with Anzac in this manner in order to fill Anzac with new meaning. This new meaning consistently reflected the emerging realities of the collapse of older forms of Australianness, globalisation and neoliberal economic reform, and later, the context of globalised terror and interventionism. Hawke appealed for consensus and commitment to Australia as he grappled with the issue of how to reflect the changed circumstances of economic reform and multiculturalism in Australian identity (see Chapter 5). Keating filled his Anzac ideographs with similar meaning to Hawke’s, but was far more explicit about his partisan and nationalist intentions, which attracted strong opposition. Keating, in the view of some conservative critics, had broken the boundaries of acceptability with his Anzac entrepreneurship, and Keating’s later Anzac entrepreneurship was more tempered in response (see Chapters 6 and 7). Howard engaged with Anzac in a manner that also emphasised neoliberalism, but this was also far more conservative than that of his ALP predecessors. Howard also reflected the changing security context, as he filled Anzac
with meaning aligned with the service of contemporary ADF personnel in the region and the Middle East. Howard also attracted opposition, but his conservative and traditional reading of Anzac helped him police this opposition (see Chapters 8 and 9). The ideographic nature of Anzac suggests that Prime Ministers have the ability to redefine Anzac, but that redefinition also has real limits and boundaries that must be observed if redefinition is to be accepted.

The Unpolitical Nature of Anzac

The new meanings that Anzac’s entrepreneurs filled Australia’s war remembrance with were reinforced, somewhat inconsistently, by their attempts to depoliticise Anzac and guard its purportedly unpolitical nature. Anzac had not always been unpolitical, as the analysis of the period from the Vietnam War until 1987 demonstrated. And it did not remain ‘non-political’ in the sense that Anzac was outside the realms of choice, agency, deliberation and social interaction that Hay (2007) defines as the arena of the political (see Chapter 1). However, Anzac’s entrepreneurs frequently presented it as such, and attempted to guard Anzac’s purported incontestability and essential character. The absence of radical opposition to Anzac, as occurred in period after the Vietnam War, suggests that Prime Ministers have been successful in their guarding of Anzac’s unpolitical nature and in depoliticising this sphere of Australian nationalist discourse. Hawke had begun this process, being a central agent in the unpolitical reconciliation (Schaap 2005) of Vietnam veterans and the Australian body politic. His appeal to consensus and commitment was also presented in an unpolitical manner, attempting to excise contestation from his version of Australian nationalism (see Chapters 4 and 5). Keating, on the other hand, was at times happy to accept the intrusion of the political and partisan contestation in advancement of his Anzac entrepreneurship, as he decried the supposed role of the Coalition and conservatives in holding back the emergence of an independent Australian identity (see Chapter 6). At other times, Keating felt the disciplining effects of criticism, tempered his language, and assured critics that his observance of war remembrance would not contain partisan contestation. Keating was more successful in his Anzac entrepreneurship when he did so (see, especially, Chapter 7). Howard actively policed the unpolitical nature of Anzac, sanctioning those he felt were advancing partisan positions in relation to Anzac, whilst presenting his own partisan agendas as outside the realm of the political. Howard thus frequently expressed the view that Anzac was above partisan politics, and that it unified Australians. His need to police this position, however, revealed the tacit concession that Anzac was not, in fact, depoliticised and unpolitical at all. However, he was very successful in maintaining this fiction, and with his Anzac entrepreneurship, as a consequence (see Chapters 8 and 9). The policing of the unpolitical nature of Anzac provides evidence for the assertion that nationalism entrepreneurs must be sensitive to the
socio-political context they are operating within, and careful to guard against opposition to their forms of nationalist identity if they are to be successful.

**Maintaining the Unpolitical Nature of Anzac – Reconciliation, Sacredness, and the Debt Owed**

Attempts to depoliticise and guard the unpolitical nature of Anzac took many forms, but some of the most consistently experienced were the effects of reconciliation with Vietnam veterans, allusion to the sacredness of Anzac, and calls upon Australians to observe the debt owed those who had served and died. Anzac’s entrepreneurs felt the continuing effects of the unpolitical reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian community in 1987, and ensured that they paid adequate respect to the service of ADF personnel. As has been demonstrated, this only rarely involved directly addressing the uncomfortable experiences of Vietnam veterans, as their claims to continuing recognition were often accompanied by contestation with government, but the lesson of their discursive exclusion from Anzac was observed by Hawke (see Chapter 4 and 5), Keating (see Chapter 7), and Howard (see Chapter 9). Howard especially conflated the lessons of past mistreatment of Vietnam veterans with his support for the contemporary ADF personnel serving in the War on Terror, which had the effect of disciplining opposition to the War in Iraq especially. These developments provided evidence for Schaap’s (2005) critical examination of the limits of forms of reconciliation based upon restorative justice. The unpolitical nature of Anzac was also reinforced by references to its sacred nature. Hawke was fairly circumspect with allusion to sacredness, but Keating and Howard both filled their speeches with instances of rich and sustained references to the sacredness of Anzac. Often, these references alluded to the Christian faith and its lessons and traditions. Finally, the essential and taboo character of Anzac was reinforced by frequent calls to remember the debt owed the service people who had fought and died. This was a theme that all of Anzac’s entrepreneurs returned to, as they asked their audiences to honour the sacrifice of Australia’s war dead by observing the ideographic meanings and lessons with which they had filled Anzac.

**Increasing Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac**

The themes examined above primarily reflect constancy and consistency, but there were changes too. One of the most significant original empirical contributions of the thesis has been the comprehensive tracing of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over time, from 1973 to 2007. The collation of every known Prime Ministerial speech and media release during this period has confirmed the observation that Prime Ministers have shifted from being participants, to central
actors, in the commemoration of Anzac, replacing the RSL (Holbrook 2014, 6; Lake 2010, 139; Inglis 2008, 554-555). But it has also demonstrated that some attributes of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac that have been attributed to Howard by other scholars, like the conservative co-option of mateship (Dyrenfurth 2015, 201) or calls to celebrate Anzac (McKenna 2010, 126-127), in fact have longer histories. More generally, the thesis has demonstrated that Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac used to be sporadic, more local, and less spectacular. It has traced the increasing shift to spectacular and regular remembrance at significant sites of Australian war memory and the corresponding reaction of the public. Finally, by examining the increase in crowd attendances at Anzac Day by population, it has been shown that consistent media reports of annual record crowds at Anzac Day have led to a somewhat exaggerated perception of Anzac’s popularity.

The Institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac Remembrance

The thesis has also demonstrated the increasing institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. Anzac’s entrepreneurs all utilised the power resources of the state to promote their nationalist visions, with roots early in Hawke’s time in government as he engaged the RSL, saw over new memorial construction, and facilitated the reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. 1990 saw the first foray of government into spectacular war remembrance, but this was inconsistently taken up by Hawke, as he also gave Anzac Day addresses that more closely resembled a policy speech (see Chapter 5). Keating reflected similar inconsistency, as big events like Anzac Day 1992 in Papua New Guinea and Australia Remembers were also interspersed with book launches and low key participation at the Martin Place Cenotaph in Sydney (see Chapters 6 and 7). Australia Remembers was another precedent set of events that demonstrated how far the government could go in institutionalising Anzac remembrance in a spectacular, government mediated, fashion. Howard institutionalised a spectacular hyper-Anzac, a form of Anzac remembrance more comprehensively mediated by the government (see Chapter 9), and far less prosaic than Hawke had been. The power resources of the state have aided Prime Ministerial success in Anzac entrepreneurship. Whilst other actors and social forces have of course aided the resurgence of Anzac, the evidence presented in the thesis demonstrates the power of nationalism entrepreneurs in defining and influencing nationalist observance when they can access and employ power resources. In the process, Anzac’s Prime Ministerial entrepreneurs increasingly displaced the RSL as the custodians of Anzac

Critical Discourse Analysis and Prime Ministerial Anzac Entrepreneurship

The thesis has employed the methodological approach to critical discourse analysis advanced by Fairclough (2005) and other CDA practitioners in order to analyse the Prime Ministerial turn to
Anzac. This method was chosen because previous studies of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac have not simultaneously addressed the social and political context of this engagement, and, at the same time, provided systematic linguistic analysis of their language, or thoroughly compared Prime Ministerial engagement over time. CDA commits to examination of social practices and the social world, in conjunction with textual analysis, and to critical investigation of the interaction of these two elements when exploring power relationships (Fairclough 1995, 3). Fairclough (2005) has presented a guide to CDA that has informed the thesis and its analysis (see Chapter 2). Fairclough’s approach to CDA has been augmented with the discourse-historical method and commitment to multiple ‘triangulated’ methods, in order to reinforce the empirical veracity of the findings. The qualitative tendency of CDA has thus been augmented by quantitative corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach that adopts some of the quantitative methods of corpus linguistics in order to explore the corpus and reinforce the validity of findings (Bayley 2007; Duguid 2007).

The discourse-historical method, triangulation, and corpus assisted discourse analysis, have all underpinned the general methodological approach to the thesis, and have proven their usefulness. The thesis has sought to examine Prime Ministerial engagement over time, and has attempted to include as rich and comprehensive a picture of this turn as possible. Doing so has supported some of the claims of the literature surrounding Anzac, while others have been revealed to be less persuasive. There seems to be a particular blind-spot among scholars when it comes to the effects of Howard on Anzac, and the thesis has quantitatively demonstrated much consistency over the time period for effects that critics have qualitatively attributed to him. Further, the collation of Anzac Day attendances by percentage of the city population has suggested that whilst embryonic revival of Anzac may have been occurring during the 1980s (see Holbrook 2014), the public has really responded after Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship from 1990. The thesis has therefore made an original contribution to the literature by applying these general approaches to CDA.

More specifically, the thesis has adopted the approach to CDA outlined by Fairclough (2005). Some of the elements of this specific approach have been employed quite explicitly, and some have informed the study more implicitly. More concretely analysed elements of Fairclough’s approach to CDA have included the analysis of genre, discourses, difference, assumptions, semantic and grammatical relations, grammatical mood, and modality and evaluation. Genre analysis informed the approach to Chapter 3, where the general parameters of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, and their evolution over time, was set out. This contributed significantly to the analysis of the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac day addresses, formed the empirical baseline that
informed the rest of the analysis, and was one of the major empirical findings of the thesis. Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac have been analysed by examining their textual representation, including specific consideration of elements like modality and evaluation, grammatical mood, semantic and grammatical relations between sentences and clauses, and the assumptions that underpin these discourses. These have often revealed the hierarchies of meaning that Prime Ministers have attempted to create, which privilege certain meanings of Anzac, and attempt to exclude others. This has been particularly revealed when they have attempted to employ the ideographic nature of Anzac to convey and reinforce new neoliberal and securitised meanings for Anzac. Finally, CDA’s concern to reveal power relationships based upon difference has been a crucial contribution to the thesis, and has revealed that the activism of cultural agents that have sought to create a more inclusive and progressive Anzac largely failed to penetrate the precedential speeches of Anzac’s entrepreneurs.

Elements of Fairclough’s approach that have been more implicit, or have proven to be less useful, have included social events, intertextuality, speech exchanges, and styles. The examination of social events (the social structures, practices, and actors that Fariclough (2005, 223) contends ‘constitute what is actual’) and intertextuality (awareness of what voices may be relevant to the text) have both informed the qualitative awareness required to analyse Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship. However, this has been largely incorporated as a methodological concern that has informed the selection of primary and secondary theoretical and empirical materials, rather than being an explicit site for examination. Speech exchanges have featured rarely, as Prime Ministerial addresses do not follow this rhetorical pattern. Finally, style has been alluded to on occasion, especially in relation to Howard and his plain and suburban style, or to the political style that characterised Prime Ministerial discourses. One possibility for future research would be a fuller, and more visual, analysis of Prime Ministerial style, including body language, accent, and pronunciation, or closer visual examination of the setting of the social events that constitute Anzac.

**Potential future research directions**

Considering different theoretical or methodological approaches to the general topic of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac reveals fruitful future avenues for examination. Researchers in the future may like to expand the examination of Prime Ministerial nationalist rhetoric beyond Anzac Day and compare it to Australia Day or Remembrance Day. Such a study has antecedents with Curran (2006), but the systematic approach to content and textual analysis offered by CDA promises to provide new perspectives on these questions. Of particular interest would be whether the same
limited acknowledgement of difference and attempts to discipline public reaction that characterised Prime Ministerial Anzac Day discourse are revealed on these occasions, and if so, whether they are as successful. Such an approach was alluded to in comparison of the Bicentenary with Anzac Day 1990 in Chapter 5, but could be expanded and tested for veracity over time. Another approach might like to situate the increasing institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial power over the conduct of Anzac within the wider trend towards greater Prime Ministerial power, captured contestably by the term ‘presidentialisation’. As Grube (2013, 9) notes ‘The words of a prime minister have never been more central to the activities of government than they are today’, and examination of their rhetorical role in the increasing accrual (or otherwise) of power would reveal much about their evolving institutional role. Finally, nationalism entrepreneurship has been revealed to be a useful approach to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and testing its tenets against other instances of the success or failure of nationalist actors would help measure its empirical veracity. All these avenues for further research would be further enriched by comparative study with other polities in order to reveal interesting differences and commonalities, and enhance the empirical veracity of the findings.

Conclusion

This thesis has traced Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac from 1973 to 2007. It has argued that Prime Minister’s Hawke, Keating, and Howard were nationalist entrepreneurs, who promoted their nationalist visions with their Anzac discourses, imbuing Anzac with new meanings that grappled with multiculturalism, neoliberalism, and global terrorism and interventionism. Whilst the approaches of these Anzac entrepreneurs have not been entirely similar, they have demonstrated a remarkable amount of consistency. This suggests that Prime Ministers are not entirely free to define Anzac in their own image by mobilising their access to the power resources of the state. Despite their power, they have had to pay close attention to the social and political context in which they operated. Any further research into the areas of nationalism, Prime Ministerial power, or political language, should pay close attention to the dynamic of structure and agency which has been central in explaining the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac.
APPENDIX

The Corpus – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements or Releases

The following is a compendium of the Anzac Day speeches and media statements or releases by Prime Ministers from 1973 – 2007. To the best knowledge of the author, it contains every speech, media statement or release by a Prime Minister on, or around, Anzac Day that substantively addresses Anzac and its meaning, in a form that closely resembles the Prime Ministerial rhetorical category of national representative, that being when Prime Ministers are called upon to reflect the collective feeling regarding the meaning of the nation (Grube 2013, 54).

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<th>Location</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<td>Speech</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>PM Transcripts - Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
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———. 1977. “Lest We Forget the Debt We Owe the Anzac Heroes,” April 25.


