

SITUATION AND ORGANISATION:
THE EMPIRE BUILDING OF TIGLATH-PILESER III
(745-728 BC)

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Abbreviations

B - base

CAD – Chicago Assyrian Dictionary

CTN 5 – Cuneiform Texts from Nimrud V

d – divine name

E – edge

f – feminine

l – line

LS – left side

m – masculine

O – obverse

PO – post canonical

R – reverse

RIMA 3 – Grayson A.K, (1996), *Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium BC II (858-745) BC*.

RINAP – Royal Inscriptions of the Neo-Assyrian Period

SAA – State Archives of Assyria

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Abstract

The reign of Tiglath-pileser III (745-728 BC) is synonymous with a period of rapid upheaval and change. In the second half of the 9th and the first half of the 8th century the Assyrian empire was plagued with internal problems and revolt under a number of successive weak rulers. With the accession of Tiglath-pileser III (745-728 BC) to the throne, however, Assyria experienced a rapid recovery and entered into a 'golden age' characterised predominantly by a vast and stable empire. While the achievement of Tiglath-pileser III has been widely recognised, the problem of how Tiglath-pileser III was able to achieve this feat so quickly and at a time when Assyria was still recovering from a period of weakness has continued to perplex scholars. The issue of what role provinces played in the empire-building of Tiglath-pileser III is of fundamental importance to this question. While the royal annals are clearly biased in their presentation of Assyrian history, some attempt has been made to overcome the limitations inherent in these sources here through the use of Assyrian letters and the adoption of a critical approach to the official Assyrian accounts. A number of texts utilised here, in particular some of the Nimrud letters presented in the Appendix, are also accompanied by new transliterations and translations. This research concludes that the success of Tiglath-pileser III can be credited to introduced military reforms, as well as to the prevailing international situation, notably the weakness of other rival powers, which enabled Assyria to successfully pursue an aggressive imperial policy during this period.

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

1.1 The Historical Background to Tiglath-pileser's Reign

Tiglath-pileser III came to power in a turbulent period of Assyrian history following a significant period of decline under his immediate predecessors, Ashur-dan III (771-754 BC) and Ashur-nerari V (753-746 BC). Open rebellion erupted in Assyrian cities (763¹, 762², 746³) and provinces (761⁴, 760, 759⁵), and several outbreaks of plague are recorded in Assyrian cities (765 and 759 BC).

During this period, Assyria's armies had been sent on fewer campaigns⁶, and it is likely that the empire's borders receded considerably during this time as many vassal-states simply ceased to pay tribute under little threat of Assyrian military intervention. The year preceding Tiglath-pileser's official accession to the throne (746 BC) is marked in the Eponym Chronicle by a revolt in Kalah⁷, leading most scholars to conclude that Tiglath-pileser III was a usurper who took advantage of the civil unrest engulfing Assyria at this time to stage a *coup d'etat*⁸. Whatever the truth of his

¹ The revolt of 763 BC is recorded in the Eponym Chronicle as "revolt in the citadel" (Millard 1994, p. 58). It is probable that the city referred to in this entry is the capital.

² The revolt for this year is also recorded as "in the citadel" in the Eponym Chronicle. See Note 1.

³ This revolt took place in the Assyrian city of Kalah during the year preceding Tiglath-pileser's ascension to the throne (Millard 1994, p. 58).

⁴ A revolt in Arrapha is recorded for this year, as well as the following year (760 BC) (Millard 1994: 58).

⁵ Revolt in Guzana (Millard 1994, p. 58).

⁶ The event entries in the Eponym Chronicle which use the formulaic expression "*ina māṭ*" + place name are thought to refer either to the targets of Assyrian military campaigns or else the location of the king at a particular point in the year. For a further discussion of this, see Chapter 2.

⁷ The eponym entry for this year reads *sihu ina KUR kal-hi* (Millard (1994, p. 43). It is probably not a coincidence that Kalah later became the new capital in Tiglath-pileser III's reign.

⁸ That Tiglath-pileser III was a usurper is suggested by several inscriptions which provide conflicting lineages for Tiglath-pileser III. This evidence is discussed in Chapter 3.

legitimacy, we can be certain that Tiglath-pileser's political situation must have been incredibly precarious during the first few years of his reign, as he sought to establish his kingship and to assert his political authority over the empire. The crisis which had earlier engulfed Assyria, it seems, was remedied through a series of campaigns staged, rather conveniently, close to Assyria proper in Babylonia and east of the Tigris against tribal elements whose defeat was fairly assured. What follows from these relatively minor campaigns, however, is nothing short of spectacular: with the commencement of Tiglath-pileser III's assault on the west in 743 BC begins a rapid string of conquests that would carve out a vast territorial empire and establish Assyria as the supreme military power in the Near East. In the west, Assyrian territorial control was extended beyond the traditional boundaries of the empire marked by the Euphrates River (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 1), incorporating the lands of Syria and Palestine and extending all the way to the border of Egypt. Meanwhile in the south, Babylonia was conquered and ruled directly by Tiglath-pileser who ascended the Babylonian throne and assumed the title "king of the lands of Sumer and Akkad". In the north-east, Tiglath-pileser's campaigns into the Zagros Mountains resulted in the subjugation of those polities occupying the eastern borderlands.

How Tiglath-pileser was able to achieve such a rapid revival and expansion of the empire during this period remains a contentious issue in scholarship which has never been satisfactorily resolved. Some scholars, including Dezső (2012a, pp. 151 ff.), Dubovský (2004/05), Fuchs (2011, pp. 393-396) and Saggs (1984), have pointed to the significance of improvements in weaponry, including siege technology, incorporating cavalry units (see also Archer 2010, pp. 70-71), and developments in the area of military strategy during this period. But there is little definitive proof to credit Assyria's rapid and decisive success during our period exclusively to advances made in the armed forces⁹. While studies focused around military advances during this period have sought to stress the

⁹ Fuchs (2011, p. 393), for example, notes that although the Assyrians made some advances in weapon technology, for the most part, the Assyrian army was no better equipped with iron combat weapons than their enemies. Some

point that territory must first be conquered before it can be transformed into empire and ruled, Tiglath-pileser's achievement has more commonly been explained as resulting from an overhaul of the administrative system during this period. This is the fundamental question the following thesis will attempt to grapple with: was Tiglath-pileser III a great reformer who was able to solve Assyria's internal troubles by uniting Assyria under an ambitious expansionist policy? Or should his success more readily be attributed to the historical setting of Tiglath-pileser's conquests, notably the decline of other foreign powers such as Egypt, Urartu and Babylonia during this period, which were subsequently unable to check Assyria's expansion (Brinkman 1968, p. 228 ff.; Pečíraková 1987, p. 164; Saggs 1984, p. 87¹⁰)? While the study undertaken here may not be able to resolve all of the issues associated with Tiglath-pileser's reign, it is hoped that it will shed some light on what remains a defining period in Assyrian history.

1.2 What was the Achievement of Tiglath-pileser III?

It has already been noted above that Tiglath-pileser III's reign was synonymous with an unprecedented surge in Assyrian imperial expansion, which was also accompanied by the adoption of a wide annexation and deportation policy. Although provinces came to dominate the political landscape in many areas of the empire, Assyria also continued to maintain a number of semi-independent vassal-states alongside provinces, and thus conquest did not always bring about the annexation of subjugated lands¹¹. Still, the expansion of the province system during this period is

advances, however, such as that made to the structure of the army, including the incorporation of light infantry incorporating auxiliary archers and spearman, were more significant (see Dezsó 2012a, pp. 151-154).

¹⁰ Note also Grayson's argument that the vast expansion of the empire in the West under Tiglath-pileser III was not a deliberate attempt at imperial expansion but was, rather, a consequence of the war against Urartu (1981, p. 86).

¹¹ It is during this period that the empire is typically viewed as being transformed from a predominately hegemonic empire, characterised by indirect rule over semi-independent vassal-states, into a centralised-territorial one based on direct Assyrian governance of conquered lands. The difference between these two forms of governance is

traditionally tied to the introduction of extensive administrative reform (Forrer 1920; Saggs 1984, pp. 85-86), which it is theorised was necessary for both the operation of a centralised empire and to accommodate the huge expansion of the province system during this period¹². Yet, the nature of these reforms has never been properly defined¹³. This problem was already noted by Saggs who stated in his 1984 work: “What Tiglath-Pileser did in general is very clear; what he did in particular is less easily arrived at” (p. 86). Moreover, a number of the assertions made in Forrer’s study which suggested a major reform of the provincial system during this period have since been disproved. The notion, for instance, that the office of *šaknu* was replaced with *bēl pāḥiti* during this period has since shown to be incorrect by the discovery of evidence which attests to the presence of this term

significant. A hegemonic empire is based on the creation and maintenance of indirect mechanisms of imperial control, whereby the imperial nation exerts only indirect control over a subjugated state which fulfils certain obligations, typically pledging its loyalty to the imperial state and paying some form of taxation in return for retaining a certain degree of political and economic independence. An imperial state in a territorial empire will, by contrast, assume direct control over the political, military and economic systems of a subjugated territory, creating an entirely different imperial structure requiring the support of large and complex bureaucratic and military support systems. For the characteristics of a territorial empire, see Parker (2001, p. 14). For the various direct and indirect mechanisms of Assyrian control, see Allen (1997, pp. 176-212).

¹² By contrast, the Middle Assyrian period was significantly less centralised with areas of the empire dominated by members of the Assyrian ruling class who retained virtual autonomy only ‘loosely’ under the control of the Assyrian king. There is also little evidence for the mass movement of goods/commodities from the conquered territories to the core (Brown 2013, p. 118).

¹³ This is exemplified in a description of these changes by Grayson, who states: “The organization and manoeuvring of the army were considerably improved in his reign, and weapons and military equipment also underwent substantial changes for the better. The provincial system of administration which was born in the 9th century now became more rigorous, with the inevitable result that the empire was not only more efficiently and profitably managed but was also more secure from foreign invasion”. Although Grayson does give a good overall indication of the changes responsible for the empire’s growth and improved efficiency during this period, he does not cite any specific examples of these changes or indeed refer to any evidence for them.

already in Assyrian documents of the early 8th century¹⁴. Saggs' discussion of administrative reform for this period, moreover, is limited to only a brief discussion of the sophistication of the communication network operating during this period and to changes made to the appointment of governors which restricted inheritance of the office by their sons. This change, however, may date to the preceding period. Indeed, although evidence for the imperial administrative system is rather scant for the 9th and first half of the 8th centuries, there is little evidence to suggest that a vast overhaul of this system was carried out under Tiglath-pileser III.

There is little consensus on the form taken by provinces in the 9th and early 8th centuries prior to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III¹⁵. Liverani has argued that Assyrian provinces of the 9th and early 8th centuries lacked complex administrative structures which were necessary for a centralised authority to exert control beyond the core centres¹⁶. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the province system was already quite sophisticated and highly developed already in the 9th century¹⁷. The first thing to note is that the same terminology later used to express the annexation of a territory *ana mišir mātia uter* is already found in the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions during the 9th century BC. Thus, Ashur-naširpal II (883-859 BC) states that he had *a-na mi-iš-ri KUR-ia ú-ter* "brought within

¹⁴ Postgate suggests that both words may refer to the same office and simply reflect the common and formal usage of these terms (1995, p. 3).

¹⁵ Liverani views these administrative units as simply "Assyrianised" centres which did not exert control beyond their immediate peripheries despite the presence of Assyrian palaces, an Assyrian population comprised of soldiers and officials, along with their families, and an Assyrian governor (1987, pp. 90 & 91). Grayson, moreover, expresses his own reservations concerning the identification of these centres as fully developed provinces, noting: "From the royal inscriptions of the ninth century one has the impression that the system was too new to be functioning efficiently; there seems to be little system and some confusion even over the terminology" (1976, p. 136).

¹⁶ See the note above. Liverani's model of empire for the 9th century, as well as Postgate's criticism of this, is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

¹⁷ Note that the geographical extent of the empire comprised of provincial administrative units underwent very little change between the 13th and 12th centuries to the 9th century BC (see Radner 2014, p. 103; 2006, p. 49).

the boundaries of my land” all of the city-states occupying land east of the Tigris to “Mount Lebanon and the Great Sea (the Mediterranean Coast)” (Grayson 1991a, A.0.101.1, 129b-131a, p. 212). This suggests that, at least conceptually-speaking from the point of view of the Assyrians, the core characteristics of Assyria’s annexation policy was already developed by the 9th century¹⁸. There is also evidence from the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions that Assyrian kings of the 9th century were already systematically exploiting the territories of annexed lands. Ashur-nasirpal II states in relation to the annexation of Nairi that “tribute, taxes, (and) tax-collectors” were imposed on one city (Madara) (Grayson 1991a, A.0.101.17, iv 48-49, p. 250), suggesting that tax was not limited to a single payment made in the Assyrian capital per year, but was collected directly from cities, towns and villages on a periodic basis, presumably on manufactured goods and traded products. These Assyrian agents must have maintained a permanent presence in this territory and provide some evidence of a centralised bureaucracy during this period. Further evidence from Nairi suggests that Assyrian control, even over a territory that was largely pastoral and semi-sedentary, was capable of penetrating beyond the core centres during this period. According to the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions, under the rule of Ashur-nasirpal II barley and straw reaped from 250 conquered cities of Nairi was stored in the territory’s capital city, Tusha, where a royal residence was also constructed (Grayson 1991a, A.0.101.17, iv 105-108, p. 251). This evidence points not only to Assyria’s direct exploitation of Nairi’s territory, but also provides further evidence of a centralised bureaucratic system which would have been responsible for monitoring and organising these tax contributions from local cities.

Forrer’s study of the Neo-Assyrian provincial system revealed that Tiglath-pileser III redivided and consolidated a number of provincial territories, adding newly conquered lands to existing territories

¹⁸ This contradicts Yamada’s suggestion that explicit statements referring to the annexation of territories (*ana mišir māt Aššur utirra*) is found only in Assyrian sources from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III onwards (2000, p. 300).

where possible (1920). However, Postgate has more recently shown that a more extensive reorganisation of the provincial system had already taken place under Adad-nirari III at the beginning of the 8th century, when a large number of provinces were reorganised and divided into smaller territories (see Postgate 1995, p. 5 ff.)¹⁹. Indeed, evidence collated from the Eponym Chronicle and illustrated in Table 1 confirms Postgate's thesis and shows that Tiglath-pileser was not solely responsible for establishing a 'new' provincial system of governance given that Assyria had already begun the process of steadily increasing the number of directly governed territorial holdings under its control from the beginning of the 8th century²⁰:

¹⁹ Postgate suggests that this reform was aimed at curbing the power of some of the provincial governors that occupied large territories (1995, p. 5).

²⁰ The table shown includes evidence only from the Eponym entries, and from here, only those entries dated from the middle of the 9th century to the middle of the 8th century due to the fragmentary nature of the text. On this point, it should also be noted that we are missing the relevant section in the chronicle for a number of years pertaining to the reigns of several Assyrian kings included in this study, including Shalmaneser III (848-843, 841-840, 831, 826-823) and Shamshi-Adad V (821, 819-818). In constructing this table, I have sought only to show the reader that a general pattern existed during this period in the number and geographical distribution of provinces. I have not sought to provide a fully comprehensive survey of Assyrian provincial holdings during this period, which can be found in the work by Radner (2006). I have also not included use of the ARI, which I believe is far beyond the scope of this study and has, in any case, already been comprehensively undertaken by Postgate (1995) for this period. The information provided by the Eponym Chronicle and shown in Table 1 regarding the nature and extent of Assyria's empire during this period does, in any case, parallel that information found in the ARI. This only further confirms Postgate's conclusions (1995) regarding the formation of empire during the early 8th century BC. A further point of clarification is needed regarding the inclusion of 'old' provinces in the table. Where provinces were not new, but were rather, the result of being broken up from larger earlier provincial holdings known under different names in the Assyrian sources this is indicated in the footnotes. It should also be noted that included in the following table are those provinces scholars generally recognise as comprising the core of Assyria's 'traditional heartland', including Nineveh, Assur, Arbela, Ahizuhina, Kalhu, Kilizi etc. The inclusion of these provinces here is not intended to mislead the reader in any way or to give a false impression of the extent of Assyria's territorial expansion during this period. Rather, the table aims to provide a uniform picture of the province system and its extent during this period.

Table 1 – Provincial Territories Noted in the Eponym Entries 850 – 750 BC

Provinces	Eponym References: 950-800 BC	Eponym References: 800-750 BC
Nairi ²¹	849 BC	—
Kalah	851 BC	797 BC; 772 BC
Nineveh	834 BC	789 BC; 761 BC
Arrapha	811 BC; 802 BC	769 BC
Arbela (Arbil/Arbail) ²²	—	787 BC; 759 BC
Nisibin	852 BC; 815 BC; 800 BC	782 BC; 774 BC; 746 BC
Raqmat	836 BC; 812 BC	795BC; 773 BC
Rasappa	838 BC; 803 BC	775 BC; 747 BC
Guzana ²³	—	793 BC; 763 BC
Ahizuhina	837 BC; 801 BC	767 BC
Habruri	835 BC; 813 BC	796 BC; 765 BC
Kilizi	832 BC	760 BC

For a more extensive collation of the data available for Assyrian provinces, see Postgate (1995, Table 1, p. 4) and Radner (2006).

²¹ See the notes below for Tushan and Amedi.

²² Amedi was presumably under Assyrian governance prior to its first appearance in the Eponym lists but may have come under a different name (see Postgate 1995, p. 5).

²³ Postgate (1995, p. 5) suggests that under Adad-nerari III only Guzana's status changed from that of a former tributary state to a newly annexed territory.

Mazamua/Zamua	810 BC	783 BC; 768 BC ²⁴
Tille ²⁵	—	792 BC; 766 BC
Shibhinish ²⁶	—	791 BC; 755 BC
Tushan ²⁷		794 BC; 764 BC
Isana ²⁸	—	790 BC; 758 BC
Talmusa	—	786 BC; 754 BC
Tamnunna	—	785 BC; 756 BC
Amedi ²⁹	—	799 BC; 762 BC
Kurbail	—	757 BC

Table 1 suggests that Tiglath-pileser's policy of expanding the number of directly governed territories under Assyrian rule was but a continuation of a policy already begun under his predecessors. One significant area of difference may be detected, however, in the location of these territories. While the location of a number of the provinces listed in the table above remains uncertain, it can be said with some degree of certainty that few of the territorial holdings acquired

²⁴ Tiglath-pileser III refers to this province in his annals where he reports that he had resettled Aramaeans here following his 1st campaign against Namri (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 9-10, p. 27).

²⁵ Note that Postgate (1995, p. 5) theorises that Tille may have earlier occupied part of the province of Naşibina.

²⁶ The location of this province is not certain.

²⁷ Note that Tushan represents territory formed from the province of Nairi (Postgate 1995, p. 5). It should also be noted that outside sources attest to the inclusion of Tushan in the provincial system for the years 867* and 849* (Postgate 1995, Table 1; Radner 2006, p. 53).

²⁸ The location of Isana is not certain but the province may have fallen under Assyrian governance prior to 790 BC. It is possible that Isana was known under a different name or even formed from the province of Assur as Postgate suggests (1995, p. 5).

²⁹ Note that Amedi earlier occupied part of the province of Nairi (Postgate 1995, p.5).

by Assyria in the first half of the 8th century were located far from Assyria proper³⁰, and several of these represented a mere re-organisation of the earlier system and therefore do not represent territory acquired through conquest at all (Postgate 1995, p. 5). While the north and north-eastern regions presented considerable geographical barriers to Assyrian expansion, these geographical hindrances did not exist in the West where Assyria still did not make any territorial gains beyond the natural border marked by the Euphrates River³¹. Since Assyrian power was concentrated in Assyria proper in the form of the Assyrian army, Assyrian authority diminished gradually the further subjugated states were located from the source of this power (Parker 2001, p. 21 ff.), and as a result, could only be maintained in the peripheral areas of the empire through regular military campaigning (Parker 2001, p. 21 ff.)³². There was thus a direct correlation between the maximum extent of the empire's outer borders and the military capabilities of the Assyrian army. Tiglath-pileser's real accomplishment was thus not the degree or rate of imperial expansion achieved during this period, but rather his ability to overcome certain logistical restrictions which hindered the army from maintaining imperial gains beyond the boundaries of the northern Mesopotamia and the Upper Euphrates areas. The answer to the question posed here, which asks how Tiglath-pileser III was able to rapidly accomplish the creation of such a vast and stable empire, must therefore take into account the nature and organisation of Assyria's military system during this period.

Following a review of the written evidence available for this period in Chapter 2, which also deals with some of the historiographical issues surrounding the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions and their

³⁰ Although the location of some of these provinces is uncertain, most were located immediately north of Assyria or on the north-western border with Urartu, suggesting that the establishment of these provincial centres was largely strategic. For the location of these provincial centres, see Parpola & Porter (2001) and Postgate (1995).

³¹ Isana may be an exception to this (but see note 26). Note, however, that the location of this province remains highly speculative (Parpola & Porter 2001).

³² This is because the maintenance of hegemonic control in these peripheral regions relied on the threat of force. For a discussion of this tactic, see Parker (2001, p. 259 ff.) and Chapter 6.

presentation of empire and imperial expansion, Chapter 3 examines the accession of Tiglath-pileser III and proposes a revised understanding of the entries in the Eponym Chronicle for Tiglath-pileser III's first few years on the throne, suggesting that Tiglath-pileser's reign should more likely be understood as the result of legitimate succession rather than usurpation. Chapter 4 examines the chronology of Tiglath-pileser's Babylonian campaigns and the development of imperial policy here during our period, which it is argued evolved to take the form of direct Assyrian rule in response to Tiglath-pileser's failure to properly assert Assyrian authority here following the 745 BC campaign. Following this, Chapter 5 deals with Assyrian foreign policy in the West and challenges the notion that "anti-Assyrian" coalitions can be understood as governing Assyria's relations with the West during the 9th and 8th centuries BC. This chapter argues that the coalition which confronted Tiglath-pileser III at Arpad in 743 BC was not specifically "anti-Assyrian" or formed with the single purpose of resisting Assyrian expansion, but was, rather, a local coalition that mobilised in defence of Arpad. In this context, Tiglath-pileser's first campaign to this area should be viewed not as an attempt to conquer the West, but rather as an attempt to reassert Assyrian control over Arpad, a former Assyrian vassal which had revolted from Assyrian rule during the preceding period of weakness. The conclusions drawn from the preceding chapters are brought together in Chapter 6, which explores the nature of Tiglath-pileser's imperialist policies and the purpose and objectives behind Tiglath-pileser III's annexation policy. This discussion will show that Assyrian territorial control, though being motivated by economic, strategic and ideological considerations, was also driven by the need to establish permanently stationed military forces outside of Assyria proper in order to facilitate Assyria's vast imperial expansion during this period. The conclusions drawn from the following chapters show that Assyria's rapid and vast expansion during this period cannot solely be attributed to the persistent and ambitious campaigning of Tiglath-pileser III, but was also dependent on calculated opportunism, the decline of other rival states and the success of reforms made to the military system during this period.

This dissertation is intended to challenge some of the conventional interpretations of the nature of Assyrian imperialism during this period, and to provoke further discussion and enquiry into what was a transitional and formative period in the history of the Assyrian empire.

CHAPTER 2 The Written Evidence

2.1. Introduction

The Assyrian Royal Inscriptions (henceforth referred to as the ARI) refer to inscriptions commissioned by the Assyrian kings that provide a written record of the achievements of their reigns. Unfortunately, they are extremely fragmentary for our period, and this has resulted in the Eponym Chronicle becoming perhaps our most important source of information for this period. In particular, the Eponym Chronicle has proved invaluable for establishing a precise chronological framework for Tiglath-pileser III's reign, as well as for reconstructing a narrative of the events pertaining to Tiglath-pileser's campaigns from the annals, which cannot be done from Tiglath-pileser's inscriptions alone because of large gaps in the surviving copies of the texts. The Babylonian Chronicle is, like the Eponym Chronicle, particularly useful for determining issues of chronology, though it concerns only those events specific to Babylonia. A final source of information which has not been much utilised in recent years is derived from the corpus of Neo-Assyrian letters discovered at Nimrud, which are a source for the royal correspondence between Tiglath-pileser III and his officials stationed in various parts of the empire. Of particular interest here are those letters which concern political and military affairs in Babylonia during this period.

2.2 The Assyrian Royal Inscriptions

The corpus of royal inscriptions for our period contains texts classified by Tadmor (1994) as "annalistic" texts or "annals", which contain detailed accounts of the events pertaining to the king's reign, and "summary" (also known as "display") inscriptions, which provide more concise narratives of these events. Few royal inscriptions from Tiglath-pileser III have survived from antiquity because they suffered significant damage during the reign of Esarhaddon, who used them as building materials in the construction of his palace (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 4). The

standard edition for the royal inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III is that of Tadmor, *The Royal Inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III* (1994), which replaced Rost's earlier work, *Die Keilschrifttexte Tiglat-Pileasers III* (1893). Tadmor's edition contains more accurate transliterations and translations of the texts which reflect our current understanding of the Akkadian language, and publishes a number of new texts not included in Rost's earlier publication (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 3). The inscriptions have since undergone a further revision by Tadmor and Yamada (2011), which though based largely on Tadmor's earlier work (1994), also includes a number of corrections and previously unpublished texts from Tiglath-pileser III's reign. Where texts pertaining to this corpus of royal inscriptions are referred to in the following chapters, the citation given for these texts follows the latest edition of translations by Tadmor and Yamada (2011). For those who are more familiar with Tadmor's earlier work and his classification system³³, the corresponding name of the text as it appears in Tadmor's earlier publication (1994) is also provided.

The ARI provide detailed reports of the campaigns of Tiglath-pileser III, however these texts are biased and any use of the information contained within them should take into account the literary context of the inscriptions themselves. The Assyrian annals are primarily concerned with the commemoration of the Assyrian king's building achievements and military exploits. These events were narrated with the purpose of promoting the king's heroic qualities and providing justification for his right to rule³⁴. Narratives were constructed around a series of established ideological themes and literary formulas (Tadmor 1997; 1981). The audience of the ARI remains a contentious issue. One school of thought postulates that the ARI were constructed for a contemporary audience and were perhaps even intended to be read aloud to an audience of elites (see Grayson 1981b, p. 43; Liverani 1979: 302; Oppenheim 1979, pp. 124-135; Porter 1993, pp. 105-116, 1995). However, the

³³ Tadmor numbers and orders the inscriptions in accordance with a classification system that divided the texts into 'annals', 'summary' inscriptions and 'miscellaneous' texts (1994).

³⁴ For a discussion of this theme, see Tadmor (1997, p. 326 ff.)

problem remains that most of these texts would not have been accessible to the general populace either in Assyria or throughout the rest of the empire, either because of illiteracy or due to the location and positioning of the texts themselves (Weeks 2007). A more reasonable thesis put forward, given the text's addressees, is that the ARI were composed for the gods (Tadmor 1997, p. 331), as well as for future rulers of Assyria (Weeks 2007)³⁵. This is a more reasonable conclusion given, as Weeks asserts, that there is no evidence the Assyrian king ever used the annals as "propaganda" in the modern sense of the word to justify his rule to his contemporaries (Weeks 2007, p. 81). These texts were more likely intended to preserve the king's achievements, so that the glory of his deeds could be recognised by future rulers and preserved as a kind of immortality (Weeks 2007). Regardless of who the intended audience of the annals was, it is clear that the ARI do not present a wholly accurate account of the historical events they describe, particularly in regard to Assyrian military operations. References to Assyrian military defeats are either completely omitted or else concealed, presumably in the interest of preserving the heroic image of the Assyrian king (Fuchs 2011, pp. 383-385; Laato 1995). In misrepresenting many of the historical events they narrate, it must also be acknowledged that the ARI consequently present a false image of how empire was created and maintained.

2.2.1 The Creation and Maintenance of Empire according to the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions

Warfare is overwhelmingly presented in the ARI as the primary instrument used by the Assyrian king in the creation and maintenance of empire. Tiglath-pileser III, for example, states in the opening lines of inscription No. 51 (Summary Inscription 11, Tadmor 1994, pp. 193-197), that he

³⁵ Though no evidence exists to support the claim, Tadmor admits that the central themes of the royal inscriptions would certainly have appealed to Assyria's elite, and thus would have served an important role in reconfirming the loyalty of this group to the Assyrian king (1997, p. 334).

“smashed like pots all who were unsubmitive to him, swept over (them) like the Deluge, (and) considered them as (mere) ghosts” (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 135). This statement presents the view that Assyrian domination was achieved predominately through force, here being the swift slaughter of those peoples unsubmitive to Assyria. This view is supported in more detailed campaign reports where the ARI often provide lengthy descriptions of how an area was initially conquered but provide little information on how control was established once the initial conquest was over. In one statement concerning the subjugation of Damascus, Tiglath-pileser III states of Raḥiānu (Rezin) of Damascus that: “In order to save his life, he (Raḥiānu) fled alone and entered the gate of his city [like] a mongoose. I [im]paled his foremost men alive while making (the people of) his land watch. For forty-five days I set up my camp [aro]und his city and confined him (there) like a bird in a cage. I cut down his plantations, [...] ..., (and) orchards, which were without number, I did not leave a single one (standing). I surrounded (and) captured [the city ...]ḥāḏara, the ancestral home of Raḥiānu (Rezin) of the land Damascus, [the pl]ace where he was born. I carried off 800 people, with their possessions, their oxen (and) their sheep and goats. I carried off 750 captives from the cities Kuruṣṣā (and) Samāya, (as well as) 550 captives from the city Metuna. Like tell(s) after the Deluge, I destroyed 591 cities of 16 districts of the land of Damascus” (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 20, 8’b’-17’, p. 59). While we know that Aram-Damascus was annexed sometime after these operations in 733 BC, the text does not detail any of the events associated with this political transition. Instead, the text focuses on detailing the conquest of Damascus, including the destruction of its cities, the flaying of people, and the seizure of captives and property. Although there is reference to Assyrian deportation in this description, it is not clear whether this reference should be taken as evidence of a punitive measure used by Tiglath-pileser III against the population of Damascus. The text seems to suggest deportation should be viewed as a type of punishment, but in reality people were relocated with their families and some people stood to gain from this policy³⁶.

³⁶ Deportation was certainly a known technique used by Assyria to deal with political enemies (see Postgate 1992).

Tiglath-pileser’s removal of Zaḡiru, the leader of the Babylonian Bīt-Ša’alli tribe, following the tribe’s subjugation

The violent destruction and total subjugation of Damascus described here in the ARI is, however, very effective in conveying the power of the Assyrian king. The leader of Damascus, Rezin, is presented as an ineffective leader and completely powerless against the Assyrian onslaught; forced to flee within the confines of his city Rezin's elite supporters ('foremost men') are impaled and the land completely destroyed. Yet, there are clearly details missing from this account about the conquest which warrant mention. Did part of the Assyrian army remain in Damascus to ensure that the population did not rebel once Tiglath-pileser's main army had moved on to its next target? We can assume some forces must have, if only to secure the territory and ensure the Assyrian army was not flanked as it moved further south, but this is not stated in the ARI. Did talks or negotiation take place with the remaining ruling elite in Damascus to establish their support for the new government and ensure the area's continued economic functioning? Some discussion must have taken place and measures put in place to oversee this, however nothing is mentioned in the inscriptions. This is not to say that the ARI do not tell us about mechanisms other than warfare used in the creation of empire, only that these methods are often grossly understated or their importance downplayed because they did not provide effective subject material for conveying the ideological themes the texts are most concerned with. Further discussion of alternative methods of empire creation during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III will be made in Chapter 6.

2.3 The Eponym Chronicle

The Eponym lists and chronicles represent a series of texts compiled by Assyrian scribes that record

(see Tadmor and Yamada (2011), No. 47, 19b-20, p. 119), suggests that deportation was used for this purpose under Tiglath-pileser III, as a means of removing political opponents that might encourage future resistance against Assyrian rule. However, deportation also served an important economic function in the empire and its use cannot always be taken as an indication that Assyria intended to use punitive measures against a subjugated population. There is some evidence, for example, that deportees could actually benefit from deportation, such as those of low social status who could stand to gain land from resettlement. On the subject of land grants, see Gallagher (1994).

the name of the *limmu* or high-ranking official who gave their name to each year in chronological sequence. While the Eponym Lists record only the name and title of the *limmu* or eponym for each year³⁷, the Eponym Chronicle from the reign of Shalmaneser III (857-827 BC) onwards also included a historical notation recording one or more significant religious, military or civil events that took place each year (Millard 1994, pp. 4-5). In Assyria, the Eponym Lists were used for dating purposes and to keep track of the year name, and were necessary for accurately calculating spans of time (Millard 1994, p. 4) and for dating legal and economic documents, which included the phrase “in the eponymy of ...” as a means of recording the date of the text’s composition. However, the purpose of the Eponym Chronicle and the meaning of the historical entries recorded is less certain. Some historical entries refer to religious or civic events, such as the founding of a new temple or an incidence of plague or revolt in Assyrian cities, yet, most entries provide the names of geographical locations given by the formulaic expression *ana* + place name. It has been suggested that the formula may refer to the possible location of the Assyrian army (Kuan 1995, p. 11; Millard 1994, pp. 4-5) or the king and his camp (Tadmor and Millard 1973, p. 62) at a particular point in the year, most likely at the time of the annual New Year festival. However, given that the locations in the chronicle appear to marry up with details given of campaign operations in the annals, many scholars now consider or assume the formula refers to the target of Assyrian military operations (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p.12). While the interpretation of the eponym formula adopted here follows this general consensus and interprets this phrase as giving the target of Assyrian military campaigns, it is also acknowledged that the meaning of this entry is far from certain and that it should not be assumed that the city identified in this entry represent the chief military target of the Assyrian army for any given year. Regardless of their precise meaning, the historical entries do provide a sound starting point for establishing a chronological framework for this period, and it is from this source

³⁷ Note that the significance of the office of *limmu* and the role that the eponym played in the Assyrian state is not known with absolute certainty, though it is thought to have been attached to a ceremonial or religious role of some kind. For this, see Millard (1994, pp. 7-9).

that many of the fragmentary annalistic texts for this period have been dated (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 12-13). The Eponym Chronicle has been widely published with recent translations appearing in the works of Glassner (2004, No. 8, pp. 160-176), Kuan (1995, pp. 136-138), Millard (1994), and Tadmor and Yamada (2011, pp. 17-18). This dissertation utilises the translation of the texts provided by Millard (1994).

Turning our attention now to the purpose of the event entries in the Eponym Chronicle, it is clear that these notations differ from those of other chronicle texts, such as the Babylonian Chronicle, in that they are concise and lack descriptive detail. The inclusion of unfortunate events such as revolt and plague further highlights the fact that these texts exhibit less overt bias and hence do not pertain to the same literary tradition as the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions. Although Millard has asserted that the chronicle served a different purpose to the eponym texts (Millard 1994, p. 5), there seems little reason to think that the Eponym Chronicle was not also used for dating. During the reign of Shalmaneser III, when the event entry first appears³⁸, a number of changes were also made to the composition of the texts. The first is that the order of the person serving as *limmu* became more fixed. Prior to the reign of Shalmaneser III, aside from the Assyrian king who served in his second regnal year and the *turtānu* who served after, the office in all other years was determined by casting a lot using dice (Millard 1994, p. 8). However, with the accession of Shalmaneser III the holder of the office became strictly determined by an order of succession. After the Assyrian king, the office passed to the king's four chief ministers and then to the governors of the major provinces (Millard 1994, pp. 8-11). One result of this rigid system was that there was no specified number of times an official was permitted to hold the office of *limmu*³⁹. The second change concerns the fact that the annals began dating years according to the king's regnal year or *palû* rather than the name of the

³⁸ Note that Shalmaneser III's earliest texts bear remnants of the earlier dating system. See, for example, the Fort Shalmaneser inscription (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.1, 82'b-85'a, p. 10).

³⁹ Shamshi-ilu, for example, held the title of *limmu* for the years 780, 770 and 752 BC.

eponym serving in office (Grayson 1996, p. 5)⁴⁰. One reason for this shift away from using the name of the eponym to date years was probably the realisation that there were increasing incidences of overlap in the names of the eponyms, which could lead to confusion about the dates of documents. As the following table illustrates, overlap could occur in the names of eponyms where officials either served as *limmu* on more than one occasion in their careers, often with the same rank, or where eponyms held the same name as officials who had formerly served in the office during previous years, to whom they may have been related through common ancestry.

Table 2 - Cases of *limmu* overlap in the Eponym Texts

Name of Eponym	Rank	Years Served
Adad-bēlu-ka'in	governor of the land governor of the land	748 BC 738 BC
Adad-rēmāni	Unknown	841 BC
Aššur-bēlu-ušur	Habruri governor of Kalah governor of Shahuppe/Kadmuhi	796 BC 772 BC 695 BC
Aššur-būnāya-ušur	chief butler unknown chief butler	855 BC 825 BC 816 BC
Aššur-da'inanni	Unknown Mazamua Que	908 BC 733 BC 685 BC
Aššur-ilāya	Unknown chief vizier	861 BC 653 BC
Aššur-taklāk	Unknown Chamberlain	904 BC 805 BC
Bēl-ēmuranni	Rasappa Carchemish commander of the right	737 BC 691 BC 686 BC
Bēl-būnāya	Palace herald Unknown	850 BC 823 BC
Bēl-dān	Palace herald palace herald chief butler Kalah Kalah	820 BC 807 BC 750 BC 744 BC 734 BC
Bēl-Ḥarrān-bēlu-ušur	Palace herald Guzana	741 BC 727 BC
Bēl-lū-dāri	Tille	730 BC
Dayān-Aššur	Commander Unknown	853 BC 826 BC
Iddin-aḥḥē	Dur-Sharruken	693 BC

⁴⁰ This contrasts with the reigns of previous Assyrian kings who dated their annals according to the eponym in office. Ashur-nasirpal II states, for example, in one of his annals that “In the eponymy of Assur-iddin a report was brought back to me” (Grayson 1991a, A.0.101.17, ii 77, p. 244).

	Simirra	688 BC
Ilu-issiya	governor of the land governor of Damascus	804 BC 694 BC
Ištar-dūri	governor of Nisibin governor of Arrapha	774 BC 714 BC
Kanūnāyu	chief judge governor of the new palace	671 BC 666 BC
Mannu-kī-Adad	Governor of Raqmat Supite	773 BC 683 BC
Marduk-rēmanni	chief butler	779 BC
Marduk-šarru-ušur	Arbela	784 BC
Mušallim-Ninurta	Tille Tille	792 BC 766 BC
Nabû-bēlu-ušur	Arrapha Simme Governor of Dur-Sharruken	745 BC 732 BC 672 BC
Nabû-da'inanni	Commander	742 BC
Nabû-šarru-ušur	Talmusa Governor of Mar'ash	786 BC 682 BC
Nergal-ēreš	governor of Rasappa governor of Rasappa	803 BC 775 BC
Nergal-ilāya	unknown [Is]ana governor of [.....] commander	861 BC 830 BC 817 BC 808 BC
Ninurta-ilāya	unknown [Ahi]zuhina Ahizuhina Nisibin Unknown	863 BC 837 BC 801 BC 736 BC 722 BC
Ninurta-mukīn-ništ	Unknown Habruri	846 BC 765 BC
Pān-Aššur-lāmur	governor of the land Arbela	776 BC 759 BC
Qurdi-Aššur	Unknown Raqmat Ahizuhina	872 BC 836 BC 767 BC
Šamaš-abūa	Unknown governor of Nisibin unknown	894 BC 852 BC 840 BC
Šamaš-bēlu-ušur	Unknown unknown governor of Kalah governor of Arhuzina	893 BC 864 BC 851 BC 710 BC
Šamaš-upaḥḥir	Unknown governor of habruri	874 BC 708 BC
Šamši-ilu	Commander commander commander	780 BC 770 BC 752 BC
Šarru-ḥattu-ipēl	Unknown governor of Nisibin	831 BC 815 BC
Tāb-bēlu	Unknown Amendi	859 BC 762 BC
Yaḥalu	Chamberlain unknown unknown	833 BC 824 BC 821 BC

As Table 2 suggests, some officials held the title of *limmu* with the same rank several times, while others bore the same name as others who had previously served as *limmu*, sometimes more than half

a century or more earlier. The *turtanu* Shamshi-ilu, for instance, held the same rank and served as *limmu* for three years during the course of his career, for the years 780, 770, and 752 BC, while the name ‘Ninurta-ilaya’ was used by a number of officials who served as *limmu* for the years 863, 837, 801, 736, and 722 BC. In these cases, if a document were dated to the eponymy of Shamshi-ilu or Ninurta-ilaya, one could not be sure to which year the text truly dated, thus creating confusion in the dating system.

The problem of eponym overlap was certainly an issue in the ARI which abandoned the practice of dating years according to the eponym after the historical notation was introduced in the Eponym Chronicle during the reign of Shalmaneser III⁴¹. For kings such as Shalmaneser III, who campaigned every year of his reign and held the position of eponym twice during his reign, we can see why dating years according to the eponym rather than regnal year or campaign might create confusion in the narration of the events in the ARI, particularly since it was expected that future rulers would read the accounts given in the ARI of the Assyrian king’s achievements. It was not necessary to apply these measures to private documents, which were not expected to be consulted in future generations. Thus, common economic and legal documents continued to be dated according to the eponym year following the reign of Shalmaneser III⁴², suggesting that Assyrian society

⁴¹ Shamshi-Adad V’s campaigns are dated in the ARI according to the king’s *palû* rather than the eponym (Grayson 1996). Although Shamshi-Adad’s successor, Adad-nerari III, dated campaigns according to his regnal years rather than *palûs* (see Grayson 1996, A.0.104.6, pp. 208-209), it is interesting to note that he too did not date years according to the eponym. Shalmaneser IV’s “Letter to the God” that dates the text to the eponym year rather than the king’s *palû* or regnal year (Grayson 1996, A.0.105.3, pp. 243-244) is the only exception to this practice of which I am aware. Note, however, that this inscription represents a different genre of text to the ARI.

⁴² See, for example, the following grants of land or tax from the reign of Adad-nerari III (Kataja and Whiting 1995, No. 1, pp. 4-7; No. 10, pp. 13-14; No. 11, p. 14; No. 12, pp. 14-15) and Tiglath-pileser III (Kataja and Whiting 1995, No. 13, p. 15; No. 14, pp. 15-16) which are dated according to the eponym and not the king’s regnal year. An exception to this is a land grant dating to the reign of Sargon II which includes both the name of the eponym and the

continued to function on the basis of the eponym dating system. It thus became possible only to accurately date an event recounted in the ARI by consulting the historical entry in the Eponym Chronicle, particularly where the king had dated the entries according to his *palû*, which did not always agree with the king's regnal year⁴³. This accounts for the over-representation of references to major military events in the historical notations of the Eponym Chronicle, which were necessary for cross-referencing with events recorded in the annals and the summary inscriptions.

As the following table illustrates, the references to military events noted in the Eponym Chronicle for years eighteen to twenty-four of Shalmaneser III's reign are directly paralleled in the summary and annalistic texts for these years⁴⁴. Entries related to military events found in all three text types have been highlighted.

Table 3 – A Comparison of Data in the Eponym Chronicle, the Annals and Summary Inscriptions for Years Eighteen to Twenty-Four of the Reign of Shalmaneser III.

Year	Sources for Campaign	Events from the campaign based on the inscriptions	Events contained in all accounts of the campaign	Historical Entry in the Eponym Chronicle
841 BC	RIMA 3: A.0.102.8,	1) Crossing of Euphrates 2) Battle with Hazael of	2) Battle with Hazael of Damascus	To Damascus? ⁴⁵

king's regnal year (Kataja and Whiting 1995, No. 19, pp. 20-22). The following edicts and decrees for temple maintenance from the reign of Adad-nerari III also date texts according to the eponym year (Kataja and Whiting 1995, No. 69, pp. 71-77; No. 71, pp.78-79; No. 74, p. 81; No. 76, pp. 82-84). A text adding the land of Hindanu to that of Rašappa from the reign of Adad-nerari III is also dated to the eponym year (Kataja and Whiting 1995, No. 85, pp. 98-100). See also the following economic text from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III (Kataja and Whiting 1995, No. 1, pp. 4-5) and an unassigned letter from a priest dated to the reign of Esarhaddon or Ashur-banipal (Cole and Machinist 1998, No. 211, p. 173) which are also dated to the eponym year.

⁴³ Shalmaneser III is the exception to this of course, launching a campaign every year of his reign, though he did not lead all of these campaigns himself.

⁴⁴ For the inscriptions used to complete this table, see Yamada (2000).

⁴⁵ See Yamada (2000, pp. 63-64).

	A.O.102.10, A.O.102.12, A.O.102.8, A.O.102.14 A.O.102.16, A.O.102.9.	Damascus 3) Siege of Damascus 4) March to mountains of Hauran and destruction of cities 5) Placing of royal image on mountain of Ba'ali-ra'si 6) Receiving of tribute 7) Placing of royal image on Mount Lebanon		
840 BC	RIMA 3: A.O.102.10, A.O.102.11, A.O.102.12, A.O.102.14, A.O.102.16.	1) Crossing of Euphrates 2) Receiving of tribute from the land of Hatti 3) Cutting of cedar in the Amanus Ranges 4) King went hunting at the city of Zuqarri	1) Crossing of Euphrates 3) Cutting of cedar in the Amanus Ranges	To the Cedar Mountain
20 th (839 BC)	RIMA 3: A.O.102.10, A.O.102.11 A.O.102.12, A.O.102.13, A.O.102.14, A.O.102.16.	1) Crossing of Euphrates 2) Assembling of allies from land of Hatti 3) March through the Amanus to the cities of Que. 4) Conquering of cities of Que. 5) Placing of two royal images in the cities of Katê.	1) Crossing of the Euphrates 4) Conquering of cities of Que.	To Que
838 ⁴⁶ BC	RIMA 3: A.O.102.13, A.O.102.14, A.O.102.16.	1) Crossing of Euphrates. 2) Receiving of tribute from the kings of the land of Hatti. 3) Crossing of Mount Lebanon and Mount Saniru. 4) Campaign against Damascus and the cities of Hazael. Conquest of Malahi and Danabu and two other cities. 5) Receiving of tribute from Tyre, Sidon and Byblos.	4) Campaign against Damascus and the cities of Hazael. Conquest of Malahi and Danabu and two other cities.	To Malahi
837 BC	—	<i>Not preserved</i>	<i>Not preserved</i>	To Danabu
836 BC	RIMA 3: A.O.102.14, A.O.102.16, A.O.102.40.	1) Receiving of tribute from the land of Hatti and Melid 2) Crossing of Mt. Timur and destruction of the towns of Tuatti of Tabal. 3) Receiving of gifts from the kings of Tabal	2) Campaign to Tabal	To Tabal

⁴⁶ Yamada suggests that the entries in the Eponym Chronicle for the king's 21st and 22nd regnal years correspond to a single campaign in the Annals for the king's 21st *palû* (2000, pp. 205-206). This is a plausible argument in consideration of the evidence from A.O.102.16, II. 152'-162'a (Grayson 1996, pp.78-79) which suggests that both cities were only conquered after sieges.

		4) Crossing of Mount Tunni and march to Hubushna. 5) Erecting of royal image		
835 BC	RIMA 3: A.0.102.14, A.0.102.16.	1) Crossing of Euphrates 2) Receiving of tribute from the land of Hatti. 3) Crossing of Mt. Pala [...] 4) Conquering of towns of Lalla of Melid. 5) Conquering of towns on the Tabal-Melid border? ⁴⁷ 6) Receiving of gifts from kings of Tabal.	1) Crossing of the Euphrates 4) Conquering of towns of Lalla of Melid. 6) Receiving of gifts from kings of Tabal.	To Melid
834 BC	RIMA 3: A.0.102.14, A.0.102.16, A.0.102.40.	1) Crossing of the Lower Zab and Mount Hašimur to the land of Namri 2) Capture and plunder of Sihišalah, Bīt-Tamul, Bīt-Šakki, and Bīt-Šēda. 3) Receiving of tribute from kings of the land of Parsua 4) Conquest of cities in the lands of Mēsu, Media, Araziaš, and Harhār. 5) Erection of a royal statue in Harhār. 6) Carrying off of the king of Namri, Ianzû, his gods, and booty from his land to Assyria.	1) Campaign to Namri 6) Carrying off of the king of Namri, Ianzû, his gods, and booty from his land to Assyria.	To Namri
833 BC	RIMA 3: A.0.102.14, A.0.102.16, A.0.102.40	1) Crossing of the Euphrates 2) Receiving of tribute from the kings of the land of Hatti. 3) Crossing of the Amanus Ranges to Que and the capture of Timur among other cities. 4) Capture of Aramu in the land of Bit-Agusi and the establishment of a new royal residence.	3) Campaign to Que	To Que

2.4 The Babylonian Chronicle

Along with the Eponym Chronicle, the Babylonian Chronicle is vital for establishing a firm chronological framework for this period, although it only deals with Tiglath-pileser's activities in Babylonia during this period. The Babylonian Chronicle is a compilation of a series of texts which

⁴⁷ The identification of these cities on the Tabal-Melid border is not certain. For a discussion of this geographical problem, see Yamada (2000, p. 217).

provide a continuous chronological narrative of political, military and religious events concerning Babylonia from the middle of the eighth century until the third century BC. A translation of this text appears in Grayson's work, *Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles* (1975), as well as in Glassner's *Mesopotamian Chronicles* (2004). The text called by Grayson (1975) "Chronicle 1" is that which concerns us here, and covers the period from the reign of Nabu-nasir (747-734 BC) to the reign of Shamash-shuma-ukin (668-648 BC). Although the nature of the sources used to compile the Babylonian Chronicle remains a subject of controversy (Gerber 2000, p. 553), the chronicle itself is largely considered to be a reliable source for this period.

2.5 Assyrian Letters

Assyrian letters dating to this period are represented solely by a collection of letters discovered at the site of Kalah (Nimrud). These letters provide us with a rare insight into the workings of empire, which can, in some cases, compensate for the bias and lack of detailed information provided by the ARI. The letters largely represent correspondence between the Assyrian king and his provincial officials stationed all over the empire, but those which concern us here are applicable only to Babylonia. These letters were originally published by Saggs in a series of articles that appeared in the *Iraq* journal from 1954 to 1974⁴⁸, and have since been republished by Saggs in 2001, with amendments, in a more comprehensive publication titled *The Nimrud letters, 1952* (hereafter referred to as CTN5). One of the most notable features of this volume is that it not only sought to publish letters not included in the earlier publications, it also incorporated use of improved copies of the texts. Since then, revised transliterations and translations have been more recently published by Luukko in 2012 as part of the Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project. The transliterations and translations which appeared in Luukko's edition titled *The Correspondence of Tiglath-pileser III*

⁴⁸ See Saggs (1955a, pp. 21-50), (1955b, pp. 126-54), (1956, pp. 40-56), (1958, pp. 182-212), (1959, pp. 158-79), (1963, pp. 70-80), (1965, pp. 17-32), (1966, pp. 177-91), (1974, pp. 199-221).

and Sargon II from Calah/Nimrud made a number of technical improvements on those of Saggs, and, in some cases, involved use of clearer copies of the texts which can in some cases be attributed to the cleaning efforts of the British Museum (see Luukko 2012, p. LV). However, Luukko was only able to access half of the collection of cuneiform tablets, being those stored in the British Museum, with the remainder of his transliterations based on those copies produced by Saggs and republished in CTN 5 (see Luukko 2012, p. LV & n. 252)⁴⁹. Moreover, while many of Luukko's restorations can be considered valid, and are often far superior to those produced by Saggs in CTN 5, particularly in cases where part of the original word or phrase remains intact before the lacuna or a common phrase can be predicted, many of his restorations can be questioned on the basis of a lack of evidence. The inclusion of questionable restorations is, at times, so extensive as to be considered quite detrimental to any clear interpretation of the letters and their overall context to the extent that they may lead to inaccurate assertions regarding the political situation in Babylonia at this time. Due to the difficulties posed by the letters and their poor preservation, there is thus grounds for their re-examination here. The transliterations provided in Appendix A include many of the amendments and suggestions made by Saggs (2001) and Luukko (2012) where appropriate, but also attempt to make clear to the reader areas where transliterations are ambiguous and further evaluation is needed, if possible. In an effort to provide an objective translation of the letters, suggested reconstructions are only included in the translations where the missing text is fairly assured. It may be noted that of the letters transliterated and translated here in the Appendix, Luukko was only able to access the original cuneiform tablet for one of those letters (ND 2385) in the writing of his volume, and thus any differences which appear in the transliterations given here and in Luukko's volume, with the exception of ND 2385 of course, are my interpretation and can not be attributed to Luukko's access to the original tablets which might therefore, if it had been possible, result in a clearer reading of the cuneiform signs.

⁴⁹ The other half of the corpus is stored in the Iraq Museum, Baghdad.

Accurate dates for the Nimrud letters are particularly difficult to assign. Dating is often proposed on the basis of the letter's content, including reference to personal names such as high officials known from other sources⁵⁰ or historical events recounted therein. The accuracy of this dating can be challenged particularly where dating is assigned only on the basis of reference to individuals, such as high officials, who could have served for extensive periods in the same office not limited to the reign of a single Assyrian king. Nevertheless, while the chronological assignment of the Nimrud letters presents perhaps the greatest problem arising from the inclusion of the letters in the discussion of events in Babylonia during Tiglath-pileser's reign, every attempt has been made only to include those letters which can be assigned to our period with a fair degree of certainty.

⁵⁰ Some letters refer to known individuals active in Babylonian political life during the period under study here and can be dated on this basis. However, it is not always possible to assign some individuals to a specific period. Marduk-apla-iddina (Merodach Baladan) of Bit-Yakin was active during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, as well as his successors Sargon II and Sennacherib. Letters which refer to Balasu of Bit-Dakkuri are also problematic and difficult to firmly assign a date. Although the individual named Balasu can firmly be placed in Tiglath-pileser's reign on the basis of evidence from the Babylonian Chronicle (see Grayson 1975), later references to a high-ranking Babylonian official with the same name during the reign of Sargon make it difficult to be certain of this dating (see Radner 1999, p. 256-257). Letters referring to Mukin-zeri of Bit-Amukkani can be more firmly dated to Tiglath-pileser's second Babylonian campaign, sometime between the years 731 BC and 729 BC. However, it must be pointed out that while the death of Mukin-zeri is reported in one of the letters there is no confirmation from the ARI or Eponym Chronicle that this event certainly can be attributed to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III.

CHAPTER 3 The Accession of Tiglath-pileser III: Usurpation or Legitimate Succession?

3.1 Introduction

Almost nothing is known of the origins of King Tiglath-pileser III, who is reported to have officially ascended the Assyrian throne in 745 BC when a revolt is also known to have taken place in the city of Kalah, the Assyrian capital, according to the Eponym Chronicle (Millard 1994, p. 43, Pl. 12). The civil unrest noted in Kalah for this year, as well as the conflicting reports given of Tiglath-pileser's ancestry in various sources⁵¹, has suggested to scholars that Tiglath-pileser's accession to the Assyrian throne probably took place through usurpation rather than hereditary succession⁵². More recently this view has been challenged by Garelli, who argues that although Tiglath-pileser III came to the throne as a result of a rebellion, this coup was staged not by Tiglath-pileser but by the *turtānu* Shamshi-ilu, a powerful official during the reigns of Tiglath-pileser's predecessors (1991, p. 48). While there is not sufficient evidence to directly tie the *turtānu* to these

⁵¹ In the Assyrian King List, Tiglath-pileser III is called the son of Ashur-nerari V (Glassner 2004, p. 145), while in a brick inscription from Ashur he is claimed to be the son of Adad-nerari, which can only be Adad-nerari III (Grayson 1991b, p. 73; Tadmor and Yamada 2011, 58, pp.147-148).

⁵² Tadmor notes that the standard formula used in the ARI to denote a king's accession to the throne contains both a reference to divine selection and to royal parentage. For Tiglath-pileser III's reign, however, he notes that only the reference to divine selection is present while that of direct parentage has been omitted, which it is claimed supports the notion that Tiglath-pileser was a usurper. Tadmor further notes that the Babylonian King List identifies Tiglath-pileser III and his successor, Shalmaneser V, as belonging to a separate dynasty suggesting Tiglath-pileser III was not the legitimate successor to Ashur-nerari 1981, pp. 25-27. This view is shared by Baker (*forthcoming*, p. 668); Brinkman (1968, p. 228; 2004, p. 40), Grayson (1991b, p. 73), Kuan (1995, p. 135), Olmstead (1951, p. 175), Smith (1925, p. 32), and Zawadzki (1994). Note that Grayson suggests a further possibility- that there is a scribal error in the Assyrian king list and that Tiglath-pileser was the son of Adad-nerari III and the brother of Ashur-nerari V (1991b, p. 73).

events in 746 BC⁵³, the suggestion that Tiglath-pileser III was not responsible for the rebellion warrants attention and is more readily reconcilable with the available evidence than the conventional theory. However, while Tiglath-pileser III likely played no role in the rebellion himself, the notion that he was not the legitimate successor to the throne should not be so easily dismissed. The following chapter seeks to show through an examination of the Eponym Chronicle entries for Tiglath-pileser's first few years on the throne (approximately 745-743 BC) that Assyria was likely ruled by a co-regency for a time, perhaps resulting from the civil turmoil which had engulfed Assyria at this time.

3.2 The Eponym Chronicle

The Eponym entries for the first three years of Tiglath-pileser's reign do not follow the standard sequence determined by the office of the *limmu* or eponym holders⁵⁴. Customarily, the Assyrian king held the office of eponym during his second regnal year⁵⁵, followed by his magnates and then the provincial governors of his territories. However, as Figure 1 shows, if we accept that Tiglath-pileser III ruled independently from 745 BC, then we must consider that the sequence was broken in 744 BC when Bel-dan, the governor of Kalah, held the office of eponym during Tiglath-pileser's second regnal year⁵⁶. Yet, if Ashur-nerari V's reign did not come to an end until 744 BC, as the

⁵³ Note here, however, Zawadzki's alternate thesis that the coup was staged by Tiglath-pileser III under the influence of Shamshi-ilu (1994, pp. 53-54).

⁵⁴ This was first suggested by Forrer (1920).

⁵⁵ The eponym entries for the reign of Shalmaneser III indicate that the Assyrian king was also entitled to become eponym again in his thirtieth regnal year (Millard 1994, p. 14). For the eponym sequence order, see also Finkel & Reade (1995).

⁵⁶ Millard (1994, pp. 9-11) has noted a number of variations in the ordering of office holders throughout the Eponym chronicle which essentially represent "breaks" in the standard sequence of offices. Officials, for instance, might be unable to serve in the position of eponym during their appointed year if they had, for instance, died or been removed

entry for this year in the Eponym Chronicle suggests⁵⁷, then Tiglath-pileser III's official second regnal year would not have taken place until 743 BC, and therefore the entry for this year cannot be considered a break in the sequence of eponym holders, since in the basic sequence of eponym holders it was the governor of Kalah's turn to hold this office following the governor of Arrapha (Millard 1994, p. 11).

Figure 1 – The Eponym Chronicle Entries 745-743 BC

746	Nergal-nasir	of Nisibin	revolt in Kalah
745	Nabu-bel-u-sur	of Arrapha	on the 13 th Ayar Tiglath-pileser took the throne; [in] Teshrit he went to Mesopotamia.
744	Bel-dan	of Kalah 10 years [Ashur-nerari] king of Assyria	to Namri
743	Tiglath-pileser (III)	King of Assyria	In Arpad; defeat of Urartu made

Further, the presence of two horizontal rulings, one beneath the entry for the year 746 BC and a further ruling below the official notation marking the conclusion of Ashur-nerari V's reign in 744 BC, also suggests that Ashur-nerari V ruled concurrently with Tiglath-pileser III for a time, between the years 745-744 BC⁵⁸. It is unlikely that the additional ruling here represents a scribal error, since

from their position of office. According to Millard, the office of eponym was likely allocated a full year before the eponym was due to hold this office, probably at the New Year festival (1994, p. 8). Note, however, that the break in sequence of *limmu*-holders for this year is often taken as evidence for Tiglath-pileser's involvement in the rebellion. Zawadzki argues that Bel-Dan was made *limmu* for this year to recompense him for his involvement in the *coup d'état* (1994, p. 54). Radner attributes the rebellion to a defeat in a battle fought against Urartu in the territory of Arpad in 754, Assur-nerari V's accession year (2014, p. 104).

⁵⁷ Note that the official notation marking the conclusion of Ashur-nerari's reign which records the number of years he ruled over Assyria is given as ten years rather than the expected nine if his reign had come to an end in 745 BC. The reign length noted here also agrees with that given in the Assyrian King List for Ashur-nerari V's reign (Glassner 2004, p. 145).

⁵⁸ It is unclear whether these horizontal rulings were intended to mark the beginning of a king's reign or his royal

it falls below the entry marking the conclusion of Ashur-nerari V's reign, which correctly recorded the king's reign length. While the current trend in scholarship has been to view Tiglath-pileser III as a usurper who ascended the throne as a result of a *coup d'etat*, this is highly unlikely given that any civil war could not have come to a conclusion before 744 BC when Ashur-nerari V's reign officially came to an end, and the fact that Tiglath-pileser mounted two successive campaigns during this time which he would not have done if Assyria was in the grip of a civil war. The only logical explanation which can explain the odd entries in the Eponym Chronicle for these years is that Assyria was operating under a co-regency during this time for final few years of Ashur-nerari V's reign⁵⁹. It may be that the practice of allowing the crown prince to have an active role in government before his formal accession to the throne, first attested during this period by Shalmaneser V's assumption of this role under his father Tiglath-pileser III, had its origins in the preceding period.

The irregular circumstances surrounding Tiglath-pileser's accession to the throne resulted in confusion surrounding the exact length of his reign. This is reflected in the Eponym Chronicle

eponymate. For Shalmaneser III's reign an additional horizontal ruling was made beneath the entry for 828 BC marking the king's additional term in office as eponym for this year. However, from 746 BC (the beginning of Tiglath-pileser's reign) the eponym texts vary in where the horizontal line is placed (Millard 1994, p. 13). For Tiglath-pileser's reign, two horizontal rulings were made because the king did not serve as eponym in his first full regnal year, as was customary. Hence, the ruling was used both to mark Tiglath-pileser's official accession year in 745 BC, as well as his eponym year in 744BC. The presence of two horizontal rulings for the reign of Tiglath-pileser III clearly created confusion in how the rulings were intended to be used, and variations are noted in the use of these rulings in the following periods. For Shalmaneser V's reign, for instance, a ruling was also used to mark the accession year of the king's reign rather than his eponymate, which he did not serve until his final regnal year in 723 BC.

⁵⁹ Hagens (2005) has already observed that dynastic overlap is probably responsible for the incorrect chronological information noted for several of the periods of Assyrian history in the Eponym texts and that it is impossible to identify whether any of the kings who reigned in these periods actually ruled from the capital or enjoyed independent rule for those years recorded (2005, p. 40).

which does not provide a reign notation for Tiglath-pileser III's final regnal year (728 BC), which should record the total number of years he ruled over Assyria. This is despite the survival of text A7 for this period, one of only two sources available which included the reign notation and is used to reconstruct the eponym entries (see Table 4).

Table 4 – Sources for the Eponym Chronicle and the Reign Notation

Assyrian King	Last Regnal Year	Reign Notation?	Sources ⁶⁰	Source with Reign Notation
Adad-nirari II	890 BC	No	A2, A8	—
Tukulti-Ninurta II	883 BC	No	A2, A8	—
Ashur-nasirpal II	858 BC	Yes	A1, A7, B5	A7
Shalmaneser III	823 BC	Yes	A1, A8, B4, B8, B10,	B10
Shamsi-Adad V	810 BC	Yes	A1, A8, B1, B2, B6, B10	B10 ⁶¹ (fragmentary)
Adad-nirari III	782 BC	Yes	A1, A2, A3, A6, A7, A8, B1, B2, B10	A7, B10
Shalmaneser IV	772 BC	Yes	A1, A8, B1, B2, B10	B10
Ashur-dan III	754 BC	No	A1, A8, A3, B1, B2	—
Ashur-nerari V	744 BC	Yes	A1, A2, A3, A4, A7, B1	A7
Tiglath-pileser III	728 BC	No	A1, A7, B1, B3	Source A7 available but reign notation not recorded ⁶² .

3.3 Conclusion

With the exception of the Eponym Chronicle, the co-regency which existed between Ashur-nerari V

⁶⁰ The abbreviated names given to the texts mentioned in this table are those outlined by Millard (1994, pp. 17-21) and are as follows: A1 (Kuyunjik: K 4329 (+) 4329a (+) 4329b); A2 (Kuyunjik: K 4388); A3 (Kuyunjik: K 4389); A4 (Kuyunjik: K 4390); A7 (Assur: VAT 11254 + 11257 + 11276, 11258 + 11259B, 11260, 11255, 11256); A8 (Sultantepe: SU 52/150); B1 (Kuyunjik: K 51); B2 (Kuyunjik: K 3403 + 81-2-4, 187 + 95-4-6,4); B3 (Kuyunjik: K 3202); B4 (Kuyunjik: Rm 2, 97); B5 (Kuyunjik: 82-5-22,526); B10 (Sultantepe: SU 52/18 + 18A + 21 + 333 + 337).

⁶¹ Though this line is very fragmentary it certainly included the reign notation in its complete form.

⁶² Though the beginning of this line is missing from A7 the cuneiform signs were well spaced out and included only two more signs reconstructed by Millard from other texts as the name of the eponym for that particular year (Millard 1994, p. 45). It may be noted that where A7 did record the total amount of years comprising the king's reign the cuneiform signs were squashed tightly together.

and Tiglath-pileser III during the final two years of Ashur-nerari V's reign was completely concealed from the official records. It is perhaps as a result of these unique circumstances that such importance was given to recording the date of Tiglath-pileser's first campaign in his annals: "At the beginning of my reign, in my first *palû*, in the fifth month after I sat in greatness on the throne of kingship..." (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 4, pp. 24-25) where no mention is made of these unique political circumstances. Yet, the existence of a co-regency might help explain the contradictory reports we have of Tiglath-pileser's ancestry⁶³. If reports of the co-regency were stricken from the official records in Assyria, it is easy to see how this could give rise to a scribal error. A king's reign typically came to an end only upon his death, and it is logical to assume that his successor was his son. However, where a co-regency existed there was every chance that the natural succession had been broken and that the king's successor was not his son. In this case, a co-regency might ensure that the person appointed by a king to succeed him was later accepted as the legitimate ruler by his court. On the other hand, Hagens (2005, p. 39) has also shown in the case of Tukulti-Ninurta's two sons, Aššur-nadin-apli and Aššurnaširpal, that cases of civil war may give rise to an unofficial co-regency where rivals clash over succession claims. The reason for the existence of a co-regency in Assyria in our period is not entirely clear. However, if Ashur-nerari V's death in 744 BC was preceded by a period of serious illness which prevented him from performing his duties of state, this may have necessitated the early succession of Tiglath-pileser to the throne. Whether Tiglath-pileser was the son of Ashur-nerari or his brother, as Tadmor and Yamada suggest (2011, p. 12), may never be known with certainty. However, there is no real evidence to support the notion that Tiglath-pileser was a usurper to the throne.

⁶³ Tadmor and Yamada (2011, p. 12) have suggested that the brick inscription from Ashur which claims that Tiglath-pileser III was a son of Adad-nerari III, and therefore the brother of his predecessor Ashur-nerari V, is in fact an accurate report of Tiglath-pileser's parentage, and that the copy of the Assyrian king list which states that Tiglath-pileser was the son of Ashur-nerari V is a scribal error (Grayson 1991b, p. 73).

CHAPTER 4 The Conquest of Babylonia and the Origins and Evolution of Tiglath-pileser's Babylonian Policy

4.1 Introduction

Tiglath-pileser III's Babylonian policy in many respects resembled that of his successors, who with the exception of Sennacherib, sought to win the support of the Babylonian population⁶⁴. Tiglath-pileser secured the submission of the Babylonian city-states without using force, established the privileges of citizens, and sacrificed to the principal Babylonian gods in their chief cult centres. In 729 BC, Tiglath-pileser broke with convention and ascended the Babylonian throne, participating in the annual *akītu* festival and ruling over Babylonia directly. In assuming the title and traditional duties of Babylonian kingship, Tiglath-pileser sought not only to gain the prestige associated with claiming the title "king of the lands of Sumer and Akkad", which had been taken by the great Mesopotamian kings of the past, but also to present himself as a legitimate king of Babylonia and not a foreign conqueror (Grayson 1991b, p. 82; Frame 2008, p. 23). This policy, however, had proceeded probably from Tiglath-pileser's failure to firmly establish Assyrian authority over Babylonia following the 745 BC campaign.

In 745 BC Tiglath-pileser undertook his first campaign into Babylonian territory where he targeted the north Babylonian cities of Dur-Kurigalzu and Sippar, as well as the Aramaean tribes which inhabited both north and north-eastern Babylonia. These military operations were largely focused on removing local opposition in these areas as a means of securing a route for future campaigning into Namri and the Zagros Mountains. However, during the course of his campaign it is also clear from the Assyrian annals that Tiglath-pileser ventured south into Babylonia proper where he

⁶⁴ For a brief history of Assyrian policy in Babylonia, see Porter (1993, p. 27 ff.).

claimed sovereignty over the Babylonian city-states (Karduniash) there. However, there is reason to doubt Tiglath-pileser's claim to have established Assyrian control here. Although Tiglath-pileser III claims in his annals to have annexed Karduniash "as far as the Uqnû River, [which are on the shore of the Lo]wer [Sea]", placing them under the control of his eunuch, a provincial governor (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 5b-8a, p. 27), only Aramaeans are referred to in relation to Babylonian deportations (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 8b-11a, p. 27) suggesting that only that territory occupied by the Aramaeans subjugated at this time was annexed. There is no record in the Assyrian inscriptions of the Assyrian army laying siege to any of the principal Babylonian cities and Babylon, the capital, is never directly referred to in Tiglath-pileser's inscriptions as one of the cities conquered during the course of this campaign. Nor is there any mention in Tiglath-pileser's annals that any of the Babylonian cities willingly submitting to Tiglath-pileser III. In Babylon, the Babylonian king, Nabu-nasir, remained on the throne. However, following Nabu-nasir's death in 734 BC, Babylonia fell into a state of disarray as a number of different factions vied for control over the throne, providing further confirmation that Tiglath-pileser's campaign of 745 BC had failed to successfully extend Assyrian authority over Babylonia proper. According to the Babylonian Chronicle, Nabu-nadin-zer, the son of Nabu-nasir, ascended the throne before being overthrown and killed in a rebellion after only two years of rule. He was succeeded by Nabu-shuma-ukin, a *bēl pīhāti* (governor) and leader of the rebellion, who only ruled for a total of one month and two days before also being overthrown. The Babylonian throne next fell in 732 BC to the Chaldean leader, Mukin-zeri (Grayson 1975, No. 1, 12-18, p. 72), and was retained by him until his eventual overthrow by Tiglath-pileser III. While Assyria's inability to control the succession to the Babylonian throne is clear evidence of the continued autonomy of Babylonia during this period, it is tempting to suggest that the *bēl pīhāti*, Nabu-shuma-ukin, may actually have been an Assyrian governor⁶⁵ who had attempted to claim possession of the throne in Tiglath-pileser's name during

⁶⁵ Though this term stems from Babylonia, its use is attested in Assyrian sources from the early 8th century along with the term *šakin māti*. For this, see Postgate (1995, pp. 2-3).

this turbulent time. Although there is no concrete proof of this, it would be interesting if this assertion were correct, since the short duration of Nabu-shuma-ukin's reign, as well as the suggestion that he was the leader of a 'rebellion' in the Babylonian Chronicle, might tell us something of the attitudes prevalent in Babylonian society towards Assyrian rule at this time. In any case, the failure of the Babylonian Chronicle and the Babylonian Kinglist to recognise Tiglath-pileser's sovereignty over Babylonia prior to his direct ascension to the Babylonian throne in 729 BC, confirms that despite Tiglath-pileser's annexation of territory pertaining to Babylonia, as well as the probable presence of garrisoned troops here⁶⁶, Assyrian authority was not officially recognised in Babylonia proper until Tiglath-pileser took possession of the Babylonian throne directly. Evidence from the Babylonian Chronicle for the reign of Sennacherib, who appointed a number of puppet kings to rule over Babylonia in his stead, including one Bel-ibni, as well as his own son, Ashur-nadin-shumi, clearly shows that rule via proxy was recognised as a legitimate form of government in Babylonia which was noted by Babylonian scribes (Grayson 1975, No. 1, 23-31, p. 77). The lack of any centralised Assyrian authority over Babylonia prior to 729 BC and the seizure of the throne by a number of usurpers was clearly a problem for Tiglath-pileser III. Control over these cities held both political and ideological significance (see Frame 2008), and Babylon's control by a ruler that had not been sanctioned by the Assyrian king was a clear threat to Assyria and its imperial ideology. However, the removal of Mukin-zeri from the throne and the subjugation of the Chaldeans was not enough to secure Assyrian rule over Babylonia, which was also largely dependent on the success of a public relations program. This led to the initiation of Tiglath-pileser III's 'Babylonian policy' which, though subject to some revision in later periods⁶⁷, continued to be applied by successive Assyrian kings who were, each in turn, also confronted with the problem of how to rule Babylonia (see Brinkman 1973).

⁶⁶ Annexation demanded some form of military presence to ensure that control could be adequately maintained over the subjugated state or territory.

⁶⁷ For the further development of this policy under Esarhaddon, see Porter (1993).

Tiglath-pileser III's Babylonian policy, and the events which led to the adoption of this policy in Babylonia, form the basis of the discussion presented in this chapter. Following an overview of the political landscape of Babylonia and the historical sources available for this period, this chapter leads into a discussion of the chronology of Tiglath-pileser's Babylonian campaigns and the objectives and methods of Assyrian imperial policy in Babylonia during this period.

4.2 Terminology

The number of different geographical terms used to refer to Babylonia such as “Chaldea”, “Akkad”, “Karduniash”, and the “Sealand” is sometimes cited as evidence for a lack of political unity in Babylonia in the Neo-Assyrian period (see Frame 1992b, p. 33), yet the meanings of these terms are not entirely clear from the sources and some were clearly in use long after the political boundaries defined by the original geographical term ceased to be in existence, probably because the terminology had become customary or even prestigious. The term ‘Karduniash’, for example, was the Old Kassite term for Babylonia which continued in use as the standard term for Babylonia after the fall of the Kassite dynasty. Babylonia is also referred to in the Assyrian sources as ‘Akkad’, the term traditionally used to denote the northern part of Babylonia, as well as the city of the same name⁶⁸, and it is not known whether the Assyrian sources of our period intended this to mean Babylonia as a whole or just the northern area of Babylonia, as the name traditionally suggests. The alternating use of these terms in the Synchronistic History suggests that confusion may have existed in the precise geographical/political boundaries defined by each term. For the reign of Ashur-bel-kala, a treaty established between Assyria and Babylonia is recognised through the statement “the peoples of Assyria and Karduniash were joined together” (*nišū^{meš} kur Aššur^{kur} Kar-du-ni-á[š] it-ti a-ḥa-meš i[b]-ba-[lu]*) (Grayson 1975, No. 21, (ii) 36'-37'), while for the reign of Adad-nirari II, the same phrase is used but replaces ‘Karduniash’ with ‘Akkad’, stating “the peoples of Assyria and

⁶⁸ The location of this city is widely debated. For a summary of this debate, see Porter (1993, n. 141).

Akkad were joined together” ([*nišū*]^{meš} kur *Aš*]-*šur* kur *Akkad*^{ki} *it-ti a-ḥa-meš ib-ba-[al-lu]* (Grayson 1975, No. 21, (iii) 19). By the reign of Shalmaneser III it is clear that the original geographical/political boundaries meant by the use of each term had been lost where scribes worded a similar treaty between Assyria and Babylonia as follows: “the peoples of Assyria and Karduniash/Akkad were joined together (*nišū*^{meš} kur *Aššur* kur *Kar-du-ni-áš Ak-kad*^{ki} *it-ti a-ḥa-meš*) (Grayson 1975, No. 21, (iii) 3’).

Though the term ‘Akkad’ for Babylonia became increasingly popular in usage during the reigns of his successors⁶⁹, Tiglath-pileser’s inscriptions only use the traditional term for Babylonia ‘Karduniash’ to refer to this geographical area⁷⁰. The term ‘Akkad’ is only attested in Tiglath-pileser's adoption of the traditional royal title “King of Sumer and Akkad” used to denote his ascension of the Babylonian throne⁷¹. In The Babylonian Chronicle the term ‘Akkad’ is used to indicate Babylonia, while The Eponym Chronicle refers to this geographical area simply as *birīt nāri* ‘Mesopotamia’ (Millard 1994, p. 43)⁷². Though the ARI further distinguish ‘Chaldea’ as forming a separate political/geographical entity from that territory occupied by the principal Babylonian city-states, Tiglath-pileser’s statement that he “ruled over the extensive land of

⁶⁹ Note also that the term ‘Karduniash’ is not used in any of the private correspondence of the reigns of Sargon and Sennacherib (Dietrich 2003, p. 199), and that the preference for the term ‘Akkad’ over ‘Karduniash’ is common in works pertaining to Assyrian and Babylonian scholars of the later Neo-Assyrian period (see Parpola 1993, p. 377).

⁷⁰ See the following texts in Tadmor and Yamada (2011): No. 39, 14 (Summary Inscription 1); No. 40, 1 (Summary Inscription 2); No. 41, 3 (Summary Inscription 3); No. 47, 12 (Summary Inscription 7); No. 51, 11 (Summary Inscription 11); No. 5, 7 (Annal 9).

⁷¹ See the following texts in Tadmor and Yamada (2011): No. 39, 1 (Summary Inscription 1); No. 40,2 (Summary Inscription 2); No. 47, 1 (Summary Inscription 7); No. 51:1 (Summary Inscription 11); No. 52, 1 (Summary Inscription 12); No. 35, i 26 (Iran Stele).

⁷² The term *birīt nāri* literally means “region enclosed by river(s)” (Black et. al. 2000, p. 45).

[Kardu]niash (Babylonia) and exercised kingship over it” (Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 51, 11, p. 136) would seem to suggest that Chaldea was also included in the geographical area defined as ‘Babylonia’ here, since Chaldeans are also said in the same inscription to have offered tribute and thus to have been subject to Assyrian sovereignty during this period⁷³. Thus, while we are not always certain of the precise geographical/political limits of the areas denoted by geographical terms used in the Assyrian sources of this period, it must be acknowledged that most terms probably do not refer to the entire geographical limits of the area which we define today as ancient ‘Babylonia’.

4.3 Babylonian Population Groups

Babylonia during the 8th century BC was comprised of a number of different population groups including an older “Babylonian”⁷⁴ population, as well as Chaldeans and Aramaeans which formed the dominant tribal groups⁷⁵. The older Babylonian population resided almost exclusively in the

⁷³ Note, however, that Tiglath-pileser did not receive tribute from all of the Chaldean tribes at this time, suggesting that several tribes continued to retain their autonomy for a time. This issue is discussed further below in 4.5.3.

⁷⁴ The term “Babylonian” is used here to denote the population descended from past inhabitants of Babylonia including Sumerians, Akkadians, Kassites and Amorites, following Brinkman (1984, p. 11) and is preferred here over the term “Akkadians” used by Cole (1996) to denote the same population group.

⁷⁵ The foremost work on the population of Babylonia, especially the Chaldean and Aramaean tribal groups, is still Brinkman’s work, *A Political History of Post-Kassite Babylonia*. Dietrich’s work, *Die Aramäer südbabyloniens in der Sargonidenzeit*, also provides a thorough discussion of these groups, however, some of his conclusions have been heavily criticised by Brinkman (1977, pp. 304-25). A discussion of Babylonia’s population groups can also be found in Frame’s work on Babylonia’s political history in the later Neo-Assyrian period (1992b, p. 32 ff.) and in Porter’s work on Esarhaddon’s Babylonian policy (1993, pp. 32 ff.) . Note that it is unclear whether Arabs were present in Babylonia at this time and the date of their penetration of Babylonia remains a contentious issue in scholarship which is outside of the scope of this study. For this see the works of Cole (1996, p. 34) and Eph’al (1974).

urban centres, especially the traditional cult-centres. These centres had traditionally fallen under the authority of the Babylonian king, forming provinces with many administered directly by governors answerable only to the king (Brinkman 1984, pp. 16-17; 1968, pp. 296-311). However, from the middle of the 9th century the Babylonian monarchy, with its capital based in Babylon, shows significant evidence of decline. The Babylonian throne fell into the hands of a number of kings who each followed one another in relatively quick succession and were not related through a common blood line⁷⁶, and there are recorded instances of civil disturbances in some of the major cities during this period. Immediately prior to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III civil unrest and discord is noted in Babylonia under the reign of Nabu-shuma-ishkun (760-748), a Chaldean of the Bit-Dakkuri tribe⁷⁷, and under Nabu-nasir (748-734 BC) despite the long duration of these kings' reigns⁷⁸. The extent to which the Babylonian government was able to retain control over the Babylonian city-states at this time is not known, though it has been suggested that some of the more powerful city-states enjoyed greater autonomy during this period (Brinkman 1984, p. 16)⁷⁹.

⁷⁶ The only known exception to this is the succession of Nabu-nasir (Nabonasser) to the throne in 734 BC following the reign of his father, Nabu-nadin-zeri. There are very few documents attributed to the reigns of these kings. For a further discussion of this, see Brinkman (1968, pp. 213-216).

⁷⁷ A clay cylinder inscription from Nabu-shuma-ishkun's reign reports on a civil disturbance in Borsippa where fighting had erupted within the city after the Borsippa's rich fields were set upon by Chaldeans, Aramaeans, Babylonians and Dilbatians. It is interesting to note that the text credits the governor of Borsippa, Nabu-shuma-imbī, with putting down the disturbance and not the Babylonian king (see Frame 1992a, pp. 123-126). Civil unrest also prevented the *akitu* New Year festival from taking place during Nabu-shuma-ishkun's fifth and sixth regal years. According to a later text, Nabu-shuma-ishkun's reign was not a popular one and he is charged with denying the major cult centres of Babylon, Borsippa and Kutha their traditional *kidinnu* privileges (see Frame 1992a, Nos. 8-11, p. 120).

⁷⁸ In 746 BC, the year immediately preceding Tiglath-pileser's first Babylonian campaign, there was no *akitu* festival held in Babylonia (Grayson 1975, 1: 1*, p. 70) and in 744 BC Nabu-nasir was forced to launch a campaign against Borsippa which had "committed hostile acts against Babylon" (Grayson 1975 1: 6-8, p. 71).

⁷⁹ Local officials of some Babylonian city-states credited themselves, not the king, with repairs to temples, a task

‘Chaldeans’ are first attested in an Assyrian inscription pertaining to Ashur-nasirpal II which dates to 878 BC (Brinkman 1968, p. 260; Frame 2013, p. 97), and from this date appear relatively frequently in accounts of the campaigns of the Assyrian kings to Babylonia. However, despite the use of a single term in the Assyrian records to describe this tribal group, the Chaldaeans were not one cohesive population group, but consisting of a number of different tribal groups each inhabiting different geographical areas in Babylonia. During our period, the largest ones were *Bīt-Amukāni*, *Bīt-Dakūri*, and *Bīt-Yakin*, followed by the two smaller tribal units of *Bīt-Ša’alli* and *Bīt-Šilāni*⁸⁰. In general, the Chaldeans had settled principally along the lower Euphrates river system in parts of south-western and south-central Babylonia (Brinkman 1968; 1977, p. 306; Frame 2013, pp. 102-103) and their occupation of this area allowed them to prosper by controlling the trade routes that

traditionally reserved only for the king (Brinkman 1968, n. 1928, p. 295), and in Nippur, one of the more prominent Babylonian city-states, a number of private letters from the so-called “Governor’s Archive” suggests that Nippur enjoyed a high degree of independence from centralised Babylonian rule during this period. A majority of the letters from the archive concern the correspondence of one Kudurru, identified by Cole as the *šandabakku* or governor of Nippur on the basis of his great political influence (1996, p. 6). In one letter, Kudurru has been charged with carrying out repairs for the city of Dēr, in which he appears to have shared the responsibility with another official, and there is confusion over who should carry out the repairs (Cole 1996, No. 33, pp. 97-99). In another letter, Kudurru requests aid from Mukin-zeri in the recovery of four men and five donkeys stolen by a patrol from Bit-Yakin. Kudurru refers to a treaty that existed between Mukin-zeri and the leader of Bit-Yakin and in asking for help confirms that friendly relations also existed between Mukin-zeri and Nippur at this time (Cole 1996, No. 18, pp. 72-73). Elsewhere in another letter from the same collection, a treaty between Nippur and Mukin-zeri and the Rubu’ tribe is referred to concerning compensation over the theft of slaves and other property matters (Cole 1996, No. 6, pp. 48-50). In addition to providing evidence of the political autonomy of Nippur during this period, these letters suggest that highly successful network of alliances and political relations existed between the diverse population groups of Babylonia.

⁸⁰ Note that the tribe of Bit-Shilani is known only from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, while Bit Sha’alli also appears later in the annals of Sennacherib (see Luckenbill 1927, No. V.II. 261, p. 131).

ran from the Persian Gulf along the Euphrates River (Brinkman 1984, p. 15; Frame 2013, p. 103). The Bit-Dakkuri tribe are thought to have occupied territory south of Babylon along the Euphrates River, while further south, the Bit-Amukkani tribe occupied territory around Uruk⁸¹. The Bit-Yakin tribe occupied the southernmost limits of Babylonia, holding territory situated around the city of Ur and in the southern marshlands of the Persian Gulf region⁸². The extent to which the Chaldean tribes exercised independence from the Babylonian city-states is not known with any degree of certainty. Brinkman has asserted that the Chaldean population do not appear to have come under Babylonian provincial rule (1984, p. 19). However, the only conclusive evidence of this comes from the reign of Shamshi-Adad V, when the Babylonian king, Marduk-balassu-iqbi, summoned an alliance of forces from Chaldea, Aram, Elam, and Namri against Assyria in 814 BC (Grayson 1996, A.0.103.1: iv 37-45, pp. 187-188), and it is not known whether such independence also existed in other periods.

While the Assyrian sources tend to emphasize the social divisions between the different groups in Babylonian society at this time, there is significant evidence for an acculturation of the tribal groups into Babylonian society by the middle of the 8th century. Despite the apparent tribal structure of the Chaldean population group, the Chaldeans were a predominantly sedentary population by the 8th century, occupying cities and towns within their defined territories and residing in some of the larger Babylonian urban centres such as Nippur and Babylon (Brinkman 1984, n. 73, p. 18). It is also clear that by this time a significant portion of the Chaldean population had integrated

⁸¹ For a discussion of the territories occupied by the Chaldean tribal groups, see Brinkman (1968; 1977) and Frame (1992b, pp. 32 ff.; 2013, pp. 102-103).

⁸² Note that the location of the “Sealand” and its extent is debated among scholars. Sargon’s statement that this tribe occupied territory “on the shore of the sea as far as the border of Dilmun”(Luckenbill 1927, No. II, V 98, p. 50) suggests Bit-Yakin’s territory extended into parts of the Arabian peninsula. Note Frame’s reservations, however, on the geographical extent of the territory claimed by Sargon (1992b, pp. 40-41).

themselves into Babylonian cities, where many had even adopted Babylonian names and settled on lands around the major Babylonian urban centres (Brinkman 1984, p. 15; Frame 1992b, p. 37; 2013, p. 109). A number of Chaldeans had even ascended the Babylonian throne and come to rule Babylonia in their own right. Eriba-Marduk (-760) of the Bīt-Jakin tribe was one such Chaldean king who ascended the Babylonian throne in the years prior to Tiglath-pileser's invasion of Babylonia. The date of his accession is uncertain⁸³, but he is known to have ruled over Babylonia for at least nine years with a maximum terminus date of 760 BC (Brinkman 1968, n. 1384 and p. 221). Though Eriba-Marduk was a Chaldean, there is good evidence to suggest that his reign was nonetheless accepted by the Babylonians⁸⁴. He performed all of the traditional duties of Babylonian kingship: he participated in the annual New Year *akītu* festival where he “took the hands of Marduk and Nabu” (Brinkman 1968, n. 1394 and p. 222), initiated a building program to expand the Nana shrine in the Eanna complex at Uruk (Brinkman 1968, n. 1392 and p. 222), and resisted the encroachment of Aramaeans onto the land of citizens from Babylon and Borsippa (Brinkman 1968, n. 1398 and p. 223)⁸⁵.

⁸³ The length of Eriba-Marduk's reign remains uncertain. However, the latest date for the termination of his rule has been identified by Brinkman as 760 BC (1968, p. 221).

⁸⁴ Frame (2013, p. 104) credits the acceptance of his legitimacy to an absence of a strong royal bloodline in Babylonia at this time. However, it is possible that the divide between the Chaldean and local Babylonian population so often stressed in the ARI was an Assyrian construct which did not reflect the reality of Babylonia's political life. Since the ARI were composed chiefly for the gods, the maintenance of a distinction between these groups might have served to legitimise Assyrian military action against Babylonia by stressing the preservation of the sanctity of the major cult centres, which were largely inhabited by the local Babylonian population. The discovery of more evidence in the future may reveal that Chaldean rulers were actually viewed with a sense of legitimacy by Babylonian society and gained widespread support from the ruling classes. While it has often been asked how rulers from the major tribal groups came to sit on the Babylonian throne, of more importance perhaps, is the question of why Assyria was so keen to have them removed from this office.

⁸⁵ Note Frame's (2013, p. 104) assertion here that Chaldean kings only appear in Babylonia during a period of relative weakness in Assyria.

Aramaeans represent a further tribal group active in Babylonia during our period, which are thought to have arrived earlier in Babylonia than their Chaldean counterparts, from at least the end of the twelfth century (Frame 2013, p. 90; see also Brinkman 1984, n. 46, pp. 12-13)⁸⁶. Tiglath-pileser III's inscriptions attest to the presence of at least thirty-five Aramaean tribes in Babylonia during the middle of the 8th century, including the Itu'u, Rubu'u, Hamrani, Luhuatu, Hatallu, Rubbu, Rapiqu, Hiranu, Rabilu, Naşiru, Gulusu, Nabatu, Rahiqu, Kapiri, Rummulutu, Adilê, Kipre, Ubulu, Gurumu, Hudadu, Hindiru, Damanu, Dunanu, Nilqu, Rade, Ubulu, Karma'u, Amlatu, Ru'ua, Qabi'i, Li'tau, Marasu, Amatu, Hagaranu (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 5-8, p. 118)⁸⁷ and Puqudu (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 13, p. 118). Tiglath-pileser's inscriptions situate these tribes along the major river systems of the Tigris, Euphrates and Surappi rivers (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 9, p. 118)⁸⁸. Though many Aramaeans lived a non-sedentary lifestyle as pastoralists, some had begun to settle by the start of the 8th century (Brinkman 1968, p. 281; Frame 2013, pp. 90-91), with many settlements located to the east along the border with Elam (Frame 2013, p. 91). Tiglath-pileser's inscriptions identify several Aramaean towns and note that some were even fortified (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 8, p. 118). In general, references to Aramaeans in

⁸⁶ The origin of these tribes is unknown. However, for a discussion of the various theories surrounding their origins, see Brinkman (1968, pp. 282-3).

⁸⁷ Note that the names of Aramaean tribes are also given in texts 5 (Annal 9), 39 (Summary Inscription 1), 40 (Summary Inscription 2), 46 (Summary Inscription 6) and 51 (Summary Inscription 11) (Tadmor and Yamada 2011). Text no. 47 (Summary inscription 7) provides the most comprehensive list of Aramaean tribes and hence has been quoted here.

⁸⁸ Note Frame's reservation that this reference in Tiglath-pileser's inscriptions to the location of Aramaean tribal groups in Babylonia is far too general for certain identification, particularly considering that the water courses followed by these river systems is far from certain (2013, p. 89). Frame further points out that pinpointing the exact territory occupied by some of Babylonia's tribal groups is also made difficult by the seasonal migrations of many of these tribes (2013, p.88). Some tribal groups, however, can be geographically placed with some degree of accuracy in this period. For this, see Frame (2013, pp. 94-96).

Assyrian and Babylonian sources are negative. Here, they are frequently referred to looting caravans, engaging in theft and occupying agricultural lands belonging to some of the citizens of major cities in Babylonia (see Frame 2013, pp. 92-94).

4.4. The Written Evidence

The sources utilised in this chapter include the ARI, the Eponym Chronicle, the Synchronistic History, the Babylonian Chronicle, and Assyrian and Babylonian letters. The Assyrian letters, known as the “Nimrud letters”, represent correspondence between Tiglath-pileser III and his officials stationed in Babylonia during the final few years of Tiglath-pileser’s reign. New translations of relevant letters have been provided below.

4.4.1 The ARI

The Assyrian royal inscriptions remain our most important source of information for the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. The poor preservation of these texts and the historiographical issues surrounding their interpretation have already been discussed in Chapter 2, and there is no need to reiterate this here. Pertaining to Tiglath-pileser’s campaigns against Babylonia, only one complete annalistic text (No. 5/Annal 9) has survived and this relates to the first campaign against Babylonia in 745 BC (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 26-28). Fragments of several other annalistic texts have survived (No. 23/Annal 7 and No. 24/Annal 8) covering Tiglath-pileser’s later campaign or campaigns against Babylonia, but these are too poorly preserved to give significant information. A number of summary inscriptions (No. 39/Summary Inscription 1, No. 40/Summary Inscription 2, No. 46/Summary Inscription 6, No. 47/Summary Inscription 7, No. 51/Summary Inscription 11, No. 52/Summary Inscription 12, and No. 45/Summary Inscription 14 (Tadmor and Yamada 2011) provide a detailed overview of Tiglath-pileser’s campaigns against Babylonia, but these texts are arranged geographically and thus provide little chronological information. The following table

presents a comparison of the narratives contained in each of the summary inscriptions. For these texts, see Tadmor and Yamada (2011).

Table 5 – A Comparison of the Babylonian Campaigns in the Summary Inscriptions

Text No. 39 (Summary Inscription 1)	Text No. 40 (Summary Inscription 2)	Text No. 46 (Summary Inscription 6)	Text No. 47 (Summary Inscription 7)	Text No. 51 (Summary Inscription 11)
Subjugation of Aramaean tribes along banks of the Tigris and Surappi rivers up to the river Uqnu. Dur-Kurigalzu, Sippar, Pasitu of the Dunanu tribe, as far as Nippur, the Itu'u and Rubu'u tribes captured.	Subjugation of Aramaean tribes along the banks of the Tigris, Euphrates and Surappi rivers up to the Uqnu river by the shore of the Lower Sea. Captured were the tribes of Itu'u, Rubu'u, Hamarani, Luhuatu, Puqudu, Nabatu, Hindiru, Li'tau, Marusu. Annexation of tribes to Assyria.	Subjugation of Aramaean tribes along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates including the tribes of Hatallu and the land of Labduba. Annexation of tribes to Assyria.	Subjugation of Aramaean tribes along the banks of the Tigris, Euphrates and Surappi rivers up to the Uqnu river by the shore of the Lower Sea. Captured were the tribes of Itu'u, Rubu'u, Hamarani, Luhuatu, Hatallu, Rubbu, Rapiqu, Hiranu, Rabilu, Nasiru, Gulusu, Nabatu, Rahiqu, Kapiri Rummulutu, Adile, Kipre, Ubudu, Gurumu, Hudadu, Hindiru, Damunu, Dunanu, Nilqu, Rade, Da...[...]...., Ubulu, Karma'u, Amlatu, Ru'ua, Qabi'i, Li'tau, Marusu, Amatu, Hagaranu, the cities Dur-Kurigalzu, and Adini, and the fortresses of Saragiti, Labbanat, and Kar-Bel-matati. Annexation of tribes to Assyria.	Subjugation of Aramaean tribes along the banks of the Tigris, Euphrates and Surappi rivers up to the Uqnu river by the shore of the Lower Sea. The Itu'u, Rubu'u, Hamarani, Luhuatu, Hatallu, Rubbu, Rapiqu, Nabatu, Gurumu, Dananu, Ubulu, Ru'ua, Li'tau, Marusu, the cities Dur-Kurigalzu and Adini, and the fortresses of Saragiti and Labbanat captured.
Building of Kar-Assur. Annexation of Aramaean tribes to Assyria.	Defeat of Bit-Shilani and Bit-Sha'alli. Destruction of the cities of Sarrabanu and Dur-Balihaya. Deportation of people to Assyria.	Building of Kar-Assur.	Building of Kar-Assur.	Establishment of cult centres in Sippar, Nippur, Babylon, Borsippa, Cutha, Kish, Dilbat, Uruk.
Conquering of Bit-Shalani (destruction of Sarrabanu and the defeat of its king Nabu-ushabshi) and Bit-	Entering of Babylon. Offering of sacrifices to Marduk. Declaration of sovereignty over Babylon.	Subjugation of the Nasiku and Naqru tribes from Dur-Kurigalzu, Sippar of Shamash and the Shumandar canal.	Offering of sacrifices in Sippar, Nippur, Babylon, Borsippa, Cutha, Kish, Dilbat, and Uruk.	Offering of sacrifices and gifts to Bel, Zarpanitu, Nabu, Tashmetu, Nergal and Las.

Amukkani.				
Defeat of the Puqudu, Ru'ua and Li'tau tribes and their deportation.	Tribute imposed on the land of Chaldea.		The defeat of the Puqudu tribe and the capture of the cities of Lahiru of Idibirina, Hilimmu, and Pillutu on the border of Elam. Annexation of tribes to Assyria.	Destruction of Bit-Shilani and Bit-Sha'alli, and the capture of their kings Nabu-ushabshi and Zaqiru. The capture of their royal cities: Sarrabanu, Tarbasu, Yaballu, Dur-Balihaya, Malilatu, and the deportation of inhabitants.
The offering of sacrifices to Assur, Sheru'a, Nabu, Tashmetu, Nanay the Lady of Babylon, Nergal, and Las in Hursag-kalamma ⁸⁹ .			Capture of Sarrabanu and its king Nabu-ushabsi of Bit-Shalani.	Defeat of Bit-Amukkani and the siege of Mukin-zeri in Shapiya.
			Capture of the cities of Tarbasu and Yaballu.	Conquest of Hilimmu and Pillutu on the border of Elam.
			Zaqiru is captured after joining a rebellion. The city of Dur-Balihaya is captured and the land of Bit-Sha'alli devastated. Annexation of Bit-Shalani and Bit-Sha'alli to Assyria.	Receiving of tribute from Merodach-baladan of Bit-Yakin.
			Defeat of Bit-Amukkani and the siege of Mukin-zeri in Shapiya.	
			Receiving of tribute from Balasu of Bit-Dakkuri, Nadini of Larak, and Merodach-baladan of Bit-Yakin.	

As Table 5 shows, there was no set order in which the events pertaining to the Babylonian campaigns were recounted in the summary inscriptions. In text No. 39, the conquest of Sarrabanu and the defeat of Nabu-ushabshi is described before the subjugation and deportation of the Puqudu, Ru'ua and Li'tau tribes, whereas text No. 47 describes the capture of Sarrabanu and Nabu-ushabshi after the conquest of the Puqudu, Ru'ua and Li'tau tribes. This suggests that the chronological

⁸⁹ An eastern district of the city of Kish (Tadmor 1994, n. 16, p. 124).

sequence of events was not the foremost concern of scribes composing these inscriptions.

Moreover, there is great variation in the episodes selected. The inclusion of the building of Kar-Assur, for example, is only included in text No. 39,46 and 47, whereas text No. 40 and 51 omit any reference to this building work. This suggests that scribes may have employed some discretion in the choice of events chosen for inclusion here.

4.4.2 The Eponym Chronicle

The Eponym Chronicle, discussed in length in Chapter 2, records two campaigns against Babylonia during this period. The first was carried out in 745 BC, where the event entry reads “In the month Ayyāru, on the thirteenth day, [Tiglat]h-pileser (III) ascended the throne. [In the month T]ašrītu, he marched to the (land) Between the River(s)”. A further campaign is noted in 731 BC where the event entry records “to Šapiya” (Millard 1994, p. 59; Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 17)⁹⁰. It is possible that the second campaign to Babylonia lasted longer than a single campaign season, traditionally carried out only in the summer months, and saw the Assyrian army situated in Babylonia until the following year when further military operations were carried out.

4.4.3 The Babylonian Chronicle

For Tiglath-pileser’s first campaign to Babylonia in 745 BC, the Babylonian Chronicle records that (Tiglath-pileser) “went down to Akkad, plundered Rabbilu and Hamranu, and abducted the gods of Shapazza” (Grayson, (1975), No. 1, 3-5, p. 71). The chronicle goes on to provide information concerning the political turmoil which accompanied Nabu-nasir’s death in 734 BC and led to Mukin-zeri claiming kingship over Babylonia. For Tiglath-pileser’s second campaign, the chronicle notes that “The third year of Mukin-zeri: When Tiglath-pileser had gone down to Akkad he ravaged

⁹⁰ Šapiya was a city located in southern Babylonia and the capital of Mukin-zeri, the leader of the Bit-Amukkani tribe.

Bit-Amukkanu and captured Mukin-zeri. For three years Mukin-zeri ruled Babylon. Tiglath-pileser ascended the throne in Babylon” (Grayson 1975, No. 1, 19-23, p. 72).

4.4.4 The Nimrud Letters

Letters comprise a further written source that may illuminate the political and military events taking place within Babylonia during the period under consideration here. Although revised translations of these letters have recently been published by Luukko (2012), there is good reason to present a further revision of Saggs’ original transliterations/translations, particularly where Luukko was not able to access the original cuneiform texts or a clear reading of the cuneiform is not possible due to damage sustained by the text. The decision to only include revised transliterations and translations of eight letters here in Appendix A was based largely on the problem of dating the letters assigned by Saggs (2001) and Luukko (2012) to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. Although these studies include a large number of letters dated to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, it must be pointed out that the dating of many of these letters is not assured. The assigning of letters to this corpus was largely carried out on the basis of letter’s content or on the basis of the letter’s sender, if this was a particularly well-known official (see Saggs 2001, pp. 9-11; Luukko (2012)). However, many of the letters are missing the name of the sender or contain the names of officials who often served under more than one Assyrian king and whose chronological context cannot be firmly established, making this method problematic. Aside from ND 2602 and ND 2365, whose dating is less assured, all other letters included here can be firmly dated to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. Letter ND 2385 describes the final defeat of Mukin-zeri and can be firmly dated to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. The defeat of Mukin-zeri is reported in Tiglath-pileser’s annals (text No. 47, obv. 23 and text No. 51, 16), as well as the Eponym (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 18) and Babylonian chronicles (Grayson 1975, p. 72) which date this event to the accession of Tiglath-pileser III to the Babylonian throne (729 BC). Reference in letters ND 2632, ND 2717, ND 2700, ND 2603, ND 2674, ND 2385 to Mukin-

zeri enable us to firmly date these letters to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III on this basis. The dating of ND 2602 and ND 2365 is more problematic. The sender of ND 2602 was Aššur-šallimanni, the governor of Arrapha during this period according to the Eponym Chronicle for the year 735 BC (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 17). However, Aššur-šallimanni held this post late in Tiglath-pileser's reign and we have no idea if his career carried on into the reign of Shalmaneser V, thus making the date of this letter less assured. ND2602 is therefore dated to this period largely on the basis of the letter's content, which describe hostilities with the Bit-Amukkani tribe. ND 2365 refers to Balasu, the leader of the Bit-Dakkuri tribe during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. However, the dating of this letter is not assured on this basis, since later letters also attest to a high-ranking Babylonian of the same name during the reign of Sargon II (see Radner 1999, p. 256). The sender of the letter, Ašipa, was also governor of a northern province during the reign of Sargon II, further suggesting that some caution needs to be exercised in utilising this letter.

Although fragmentary, the letters discovered at Nimrud for this period give us a rare insight into what must have been the reality of Tiglath-pileser's second campaign to Babylonia.

The image portrayed in the ARI of the smashing defeat of Mukin-zeri and the Chaldean forces shows remarkable differences from the reports of these military operations provided in the Assyrian letters. Here, Assyrian efforts to secure the defeat of Mukin-zeri and his allies are carried out through a combination of military operations and diplomatic efforts to secure the political and military support of the Babylonian city-states against Mukin-zeri. Nimrud Letter 1, which describes a tense situation between the inhabitants of Babylon who have barricaded themselves inside the city walls and the Assyrian envoys who are attempting to negotiate for the city's surrender, provides effective evidence for the non-aggressive policy pursued by Tiglath-pileser III with regard to the Babylonian city-states. When the Assyrian envoys' offer to restore the Babylonians' *kidinnūtu* status in return for their submission is refused, the Assyrian envoys return and repeat their offer for the submission of the city, lamenting to the king that they could do nothing but return to the city and

make their plea again to the Babylonian citizens. Letter 2 describes further efforts by Mukin-zeri to secure the support of the citizens of Babylonia against Assyria, and we are told that the Itua' tribe has sided with Mukin-zeri in the conflict, while the Larakeans are firmly placed against Mukin-zeri. Letter 6 reports on the final defeat and death of Mukin-zeri, but indicates that Merodach-baladan of the Bit Yakin tribe may have been cooperating with the Assyrians during this period⁹¹. The omission of these events from the annals suggests that they occurred relatively late in Tiglath-pileser's reign, certainly after the summary inscriptions were composed which deal only with events up to 729 BC⁹². The chronological implication of this letter is that Tiglath-pileser had yet to secure the final defeat of Mukin-zeri when he officially ascended the Babylonian throne.

While the Nimrud letters have an important role to play in reconstructing the nature of Assyria's military and political involvement in Babylonia during this period, it is important not to draw far-reaching conclusions not substantiated by other sources. SAA 19 82 (a letter not translated here), for example, reports on the movements of the King of Elam around Der and is cited by Luuko (2012, p. XXIX) as evidence of Assyria's strategy to block Elam from providing Mukin-zeri with any military aid against Tiglath-pileser's forces in Babylonia. While the content of the letter suggests that the Elamite king's movements are related to some military manoeuvre, there is nothing in the letter to connect these events with the Mukin-zeri rebellion, or indeed with events in Babylonia. The area around Der is well-known for being a contested area which held strategic and economic value to Assyria, Babylonia and Elam. That the events described in SAA 19 82 should be connected with events which transpired in Babylonia around 731 BC by Luukko (2012, p. XXIX) goes far beyond the evidence, not only because the letter contains no reference to Mukin-zeri, but also because the

⁹¹ This is not surprising given that Bit-Yakin is recorded as having paid tribute in the ARI.

⁹² Tadmor plausibly dates all of the summary inscriptions, aside from text No. 39/Summary Inscription 1, to the same year on the basis of the use of the formula "from the beginning of my reign until my seventeenth *palû*" (1994, pp. 269-272 (Supplementary Study E).

letter can only be assigned an approximate date.

4.5 The Chronology of Tiglath-pileser’s Babylonian Campaigns

The most recent comprehensive chronology of Tiglath-pileser’s Babylonian campaigns is that proposed by Tadmor in Supplementary Study A in *The Inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III: King of Assyria* (1994, pp. 232-7). Tadmor’s reconstruction of the events pertaining to Tiglath-pileser’s Babylonian campaigns is reproduced in the table below:

Table 6 –A Reconstruction of the Babylonian Campaigns according to Tadmor (1996)

Date	Sources	Main Event
745 BC	Eponym Chronicle No. 5, 7 (Annal 9-10) No. 35, i 36-4’ (The Iran Stele)	“Campaign into northern and eastern Babylonia; defeat of the Aramean tribes near Dur-Kurigalzu east of the Tigris as far as the Uqnu river; their deportation to the north-eastern provinces”
738 BC	No. 13, 13-18 (Annal 19)	“Capture of several Aramaean tribes located across the Tigris river and their deportation to Syria” ⁹³
731 BC	Eponym Chronicle No. 23 (Annal 7) No. 24 (Annal 8)	“Defeat of the Chaldaean chieftains of central and southern Babylonia; siege of Shapiya”
729 BC	Eponym Chronicle The Babylonian Chronicle	“Defeat of (Nabu)-Mukin-zeri, king of Babylonia; Tiglath-pileser ascends the Babylonian throne and participates in the <i>akītu</i> festival during Nisan (of the Babylonian year 728).”
728	Eponym Chronicle	“Tiglath-pileser participates in the <i>akītu</i> festival during Nisan (of the Babylonian year 727).”

The dates proposed above by Tadmor for Assyria’s intervention in Babylonia during the reign of

⁹³ Tadmor and Yamada (2011, pp. 43-44).

Tiglath-pileser III are based on chronological data obtained from the Eponym and Babylonian chronicles, and can therefore be considered accurate.

4.5.1 The Campaign of 745 BC

The date and time of year of Tiglath-pileser III's first Babylonian campaign is well-established. The Eponym Chronicle provides a precise date for this campaign, stating; "On 13th Ayar Tiglath-pileser took the throne; [in] Teshrit he went to Mesopotamia" (Millard 1994, p. 59). That this campaign took place approximately six months after Tiglath-pileser ascended the throne in Assyria is further confirmed by information from text No. 35 (The Iran Stele) (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, i 36-7, p, 83) and from the Babylonian Chronicle (Grayson 1975, No. 1, i 2-3, pp. 70-71). An account of this campaign is preserved in the ARI in the text labelled by Tadmor as No. 5 (Annal 9). Here, the result of this campaign is given by Tiglath-pileser III as follows, "I exercised authority over [... from] the cities Dūr Kuri(galzu), Sippar of the god Šamaš, [... the (tribes) Na]sikku, Naqru, (and) Tanê, the city Kala'in, the Šumandar canal, [the city Pa]šitu of the (tribe) Dunanu, the land Qirbutu, [... the (tribe) Adil]ê, the land Būdu, the city Paḥḥaz, the land Qin-Nippur⁹⁴, (and) the cities of Karduniaš (Babylonia) as far as the Uqnû River, [which are on the shore of the Lo]wer [Sea]. I anne[xed] (those areas) to Assyria (and) placed a eunuch of mine as [provincial governor over them]." (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 5b-8a, p. 27).

Many of the Aramaean tribes identified in text no. 5 above remain obscure. Some tribes noted in the summary inscriptions, such as the Puqudu and Itu', are well known outside of the inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser, yet others fail to find more than a brief mention in later letters or are not attested at all outside of this period. With such little documentation available on these tribes the identification of the territory they occupied is often unknown or, at best, remains speculation. It must also be

⁹⁴ The location of Qin-Nippur is unknown. Cole places Qin-Nippur in the locality of Nippur but this is far from certain (Cole 1996, p. 70, n.2).

considered that the location given for some of these tribes in later periods might not accurately reflect their earlier geographical positions if they were subject to Assyria's deportation policies. A letter from the reign of Sargon II suggests that the Rabbilu and Hamaraneans are to be located in the vicinity of Sippar, while the Hatallu may also have occupied territory close to Sippar on the basis of their inclusion in the same letter⁹⁵ (Dietrich 2003, No. 7, pp. XXII-XXIII and p. 12)⁹⁶. It is not known where the Adilê tribe were to be found but was perhaps to be located on the north-eastern border with Elam. The land of Qin-Nippur may refer to the hinterland surrounding Nippur, but again there is no proof of this. Thus, we can surmise that most of the Aramaean targets of Tiglath-pileser's first Babylonian campaign were predominantly located in north and north-eastern Babylonia⁹⁷.

Evidence from the Babylonian Chronicle further suggests that Tiglath-pileser's campaign activities in this year were largely concentrated in north and north-eastern Babylonia. The chronicle does not provide much description of this campaign, but states that Tiglath-pileser had gone down to Akkad where he "plundered Rabbilu and Hamranu, and abducted the gods of Shapazza" (Grayson 1975, No. 1, i 3-5, p. 71). The location of the city of 'Shapazza' is unknown, but the location of the cities of Rabbilu and Hamranu are probably to be located in the territory of the Aramaean tribes of the same name⁹⁸. Grayson places Hamranu east of the Tigris in the Diyala region (1963, p. 28), yet they are elsewhere placed further west during the reign of Sargon when they are associated with the city

⁹⁵ In this letter an Assyrian commander stationed at Sippar writes that the Rabillu, along with several other Aramaean tribes, were starving and in need of bread, suggesting that this tribes dwelt somewhere in this local area.

⁹⁶ The location of these tribes in the vicinity of Sippar further supports Tadmor's reconstruction of "Sippar of Shamash" in line 9 of text no. 46 (Summary Inscription 6) as one of the cities conquered by Tiglath-pileser during this campaign along with Dur Kurigalzu, also located nearby.

⁹⁷ For the location of the Hamranu and Rabbilu tribes, see n. 99.

⁹⁸ See Brinkman (1968, n. 1446). Note that Brinkman has called the tribalisation of these cities by the Assyrians an "Assyrian fabrication or simplification" (1968, p. 271).

of Sippar on the Euphrates river⁹⁹.

That Tiglath-pileser did not target the Chaldean tribes located further south in Babylonia is clear from text No. 5. Although Tiglath-pileser's claim to have exercised sovereignty over Babylonia was likely not recognised in Babylonia itself, it is probable that his campaign of 745 BC led him further south into the vicinity of Babylonia proper.

4.5.2 The Campaign of 731-729 BC

The chronology of events pertaining to Tiglath-pileser's second campaign against Babylonia is difficult to establish. This campaign is dated to 731 BC on the basis of the event entry in the Eponym Chronicle for this year, which reads "to Šapiya", and is generally equated with the siege of Mukin-zeri's capital, Shapiya, narrated in the annals¹⁰⁰. There is some suggestion from the evidence, however, that this campaign lasted longer than a single year or campaign season. According to the Babylonian Chronicle, Mukin-zeri remained on the Babylonian throne until 729 BC when Tiglath-pileser III took the throne for himself (Chronicle No. 1, i 19-23 in Grayson 1975, p. 72)¹⁰¹, suggesting that if the campaign was undertaken in 731 BC then the final defeat of Mukin-zeri and his allies took at least three years to complete. The only problem with this reconstruction is the entry in the Eponym Chronicle for the year 730 BC, which reads "in the land" (*ina māti*), suggesting that Tiglath-pileser was in Assyria during this time rather than on campaign. However, even if we accept that *ina māti* refers to the location of the Assyrian king in Assyria, which is not

⁹⁹ A further letter dating from the reign of Sargon also associates the Hamranu with the city of Sippar, reporting that it was hither that the Hamranu had fled in the face of Sargon's army (Lie 1929, No. I, 379, pp. 56-57).

¹⁰⁰ See Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 47, 23-24, p. 119 and No. 51, 16, p. 136).

¹⁰¹ The Babylonian Chronicle indicated the start of a new year by incising a horizontal line in the tablet between passages. Tiglath-pileser's ascension to the Babylonian throne is included in the same passage as the defeat of Ukin-zer dated by the chronicle to Ukin-zer's third regnal year.

assured¹⁰², evidence from other royal inscriptions clearly indicates that Tiglath-pileser did not personally lead the army on every campaign and so this evidence need not disprove the theory that the second Babylonian campaign exceeded a year in duration. Texts 13, 18b-20 (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 44) and 14, 1-3 (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 45) refer to operations conducted by the governors of Na'ari and the Lullumu against a number of cities located east of the Tigris in 738 BC while Tiglath-pileser was on campaign in Syria. At the conclusion of the campaign, the officials were instructed to deliver the booty to him personally in Syria. There is also further evidence that the final defeat of Mukin-zeri occurred relatively late in the Assyrian king's reign. Both the Babylonian Chronicle and Nimrud Letter 6 (ND 2385) report the final defeat of Mukin-zeri, and yet a report of this event is conspicuously absent from the royal inscriptions where, Tiglath-pileser claims only "I confined Mukin-zeri to Sapê (Shapiya), his royal city. I inflicted a heavy defeat upon him before his city-gates" (No. 47, 23b, Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 119) (Summary Inscription 7)¹⁰³. This suggests that the final defeat of Mukin-zeri, which resulted in his death, took place later in Tiglath-pileser's reign after the summary inscriptions were composed. This notion is further confirmed by the absence of the Bit-Amukkani tribe from the list of tribute bearers recorded in text No. 47, 26-28 (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 120), indicating that Assyria had yet to bring about the final defeat of the Bit-Amukkani tribe when the other Chaldean tribes formally pledged their submission to Assyria.

4.6 The Babylonian Campaigns: Assyrian Foreign Policy under Tiglath-pileser III

4.6.1 The First Babylonian Campaign: The Objectives of Assyrian Policy in 745 BC

¹⁰² See 2.3.

¹⁰³ See also text No. 51 and 16 (Summary Inscription 11) in Tadmor and Yamada (2011, p 136.).

Scholars such as Postgate (1974, p. 200 ff), Brinkman (1974, p. 16)¹⁰⁴ and Cole (1996) have emphasised the role of international trade in determining Assyrian foreign policy in Babylonia, particularly caravan trade originating from the Persian Gulf, which was a source of raw materials and luxury items in high demand in Assyria during this period. Brinkman argues that since trade was often controlled by the Chaldaean and Aramaean population that resided along the major trade routes in Babylonia, Assyrian military campaigns against these population groups was motivated by a desire for booty or to control the international trade which flowed through this region in order to prevent any disruptions in supply (Brinkman 1984, p. 16). More recently, Cole has proposed that Tiglath-pileser's first campaign was conducted as part of a long-term strategy to gain control over the trade which flowed through Babylonian territory linking the Iranian Plateau with the Mediterranean port cities and the Arabian Gulf (1996, p. 70 and n. 1). According to Cole, the first campaign targeted the Aramaean population, particularly in eastern Babylonia in the vicinity of the Tigris River and along the steppe, with the aim of controlling the trade which passed between Elam and western Babylonia (1996, p. 70-72). That Assyrian campaigning in Babylonia was motivated by economic factors is not under dispute here. Assyria's demand for raw materials is well documented (see Pečírková 1977; Postgate 1974; 1979) and much of this was sourced from outside of Assyria from provinces as tribute or else directly through campaigning as booty. Thus, that Assyrian campaigning in Babylonia had an economic dimension is likely. However, we need not accept that campaigns were only ever carried out with one objective in mind, and the purpose of this discussion is to draw attention to factors other than economic gain which might have encouraged Assyrian campaigning here during Tiglath-pileser III's reign.

¹⁰⁴ Note, however, the suggestion made by Brinkman that Tiglath-pileser's 745 BC campaign was ultimately aimed at securing the throne of the Babylonian king, Nabu-nasir. He asserts that Assyrian intervention resulted from a treaty between the two states during this period and that Nabu-nasir was a weak ruler unable to effectively deal with the troublesome Aramaean population which resided in the north and north-eastern regions of Babylonia (Brinkman 1968, p. 228; 1972, p. 279; 1984, pp. 39-42). However, there is no evidence that a treaty of this nature ever existed between Assyria and Babylonia during this period.

There is little doubt that Tiglath-pileser's annexation of the region encompassing Sippar to the south, Dur-Kurigalzu to the north and the Shumandar canal to the east, as well as the Aramaean tribes which inhabited this region, established a zone of Assyrian control that traversed the major trade and transport routes in north-eastern Babylonia. However, this region was also of great strategic value, particularly since the army was required to utilise the same major roads as caravan trade and tended to move along major water courses where possible. The campaign launched by Tiglath-pileser III against Namri, Parsua and Mannea the following year probably utilised a route which passed through this territory, moving down along the Euphrates River and crossing into the Zagros Mountains via the Diyala Basin¹⁰⁵. The campaign of 745 BC might then be interpreted as an effort to remove opposition from this area and to establish supply depots for further campaigns to be carried out in the north-east. From a strategic standpoint, the subjugation of north-eastern Babylonia in 745 BC further secured for Tiglath-pileser his southern flank against a possible attack by Elamite forces during the campaign of the following year¹⁰⁶, and should perhaps be viewed as a necessary

¹⁰⁵ The use of a southern route in 744 is supported by the reports in the annals that the first targets of Tiglath-pileser's army were Parsua and Bit-Hamban, located near the Elamite border, which were annexed from Dalta of Ellipi, the rulers of Namri, Singibute and the Medes. Tiglath-pileser's statement that Irsu of Mannaea submitted on his return journey after hearing of the defeat of the other city rulers further confirms this suggestion, since it indicates that the Assyrian army were only in a position to threaten Mannaea, located to the north on the Elamite border, on their return journey to Assyria (Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 35: i 5'-19, p. 84).

¹⁰⁶ Garelli has asserted a similar argument but states that Tiglath-pileser's campaign to Babylonia in 745 BC effectively secured his "rear" so that campaigning in Syria could be conducted safely (1991, p. 47). In regard to this, it may also be noted that Sennacherib's campaign against Namri was also preceded by a campaign into Babylonia in 703 BC (Levine 1982). There seems little reason, however, to think that Babylonia was capable of, or indeed interested in, blocking Assyria's expansion into Syria at this time. Note also that Assyrian annexation of this area was also of strategic value for later campaigns targeting the south-eastern frontier, such as that to Der in 738 BC, providing supplies to the armed forces and a springboard for further penetration of the south-eastern frontier. The use of provinces for this purpose has been discussed by Parker, who argues that Shalmaneser III's annexation of the Upper

precaution should Tiglath-pileser have also encountered any opposition from Urartu further north at this time¹⁰⁷.

It is clear that Tiglath-pileser's annexation of Bit-Hamban and Parsua was not motivated by economic objectives alone, and should probably be viewed in the context of the war against Urartu. The eastern trade that flowed through these regions was already being intercepted by Assyria in Arrapha, located further east, which was already an Assyrian province¹⁰⁸. A further explanation for this annexation was that Assyria sought to strengthen its grip over this area¹⁰⁹ and to protect it

Tigris area, while providing the obvious economic benefits of access to raw materials, also served as a supply station for Shalmaneser's northern campaigns (Parker 2001, pp. 214-215).

¹⁰⁷ The Urartian king, Argiši (c. 785-756), had repeatedly campaigned to Mannea (Mana) and Buštu in the east. The Urartian annals of this period claim several victories over Assyria in this region (Salvini 1995, pp. 51-52).

¹⁰⁸ It is certain that Arrapha was still under Assyrian control at this time despite the city's earlier involvement in a rebellion in the years 761 and 760 BC (Millard 1994, p. 58). The governor of Arrapha, Nabu-bel-usur, served as the eponym for the year 745 BC and there is no recorded campaign against the city during the course of Tiglath-pileser's eastern campaign of 744 BC. It can also be noted that Tiglath-pileser also later charged the governor of Arrapha with authority over the cities of Hilimmu and Pillutu situated on the border of Elam (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 14, pp. 118-119 and No. 51, 17, p. 136).

¹⁰⁹ This area was again targeted in 738 BC with a further campaign launched against the Aramaean tribes of Akklam-Akkadi and Gurume, which were targeted along with a number of cities including Kinia, Mulugani, and several others whose names are not preserved. Mulugani, which was located "behind the fortress of the Babylonian" (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 19, p. 44), is to be identified with Silhazi in western Media (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 16, 11, p. 51). The *dan-ni-ti ša* DUMU KÁ.DINGIR.RA.KI or 'fortress of the Babylonian' had offered protection to the people of a place preserved only in part as Bit-Sa[.....] who had fled from the Assyrian advance during this campaign (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 16, 9-10, p. 51). It is not clear whether this campaign represents a direct attack against representatives of Babylonia's central government in this region. Tadmor suggests that this colony was probably founded in the Kassite period but remained under strong influence from Babylonia during this period (Tadmor 1994, n.11, pp. 72-73). 600 Aramaeans were also deported from the town of Amlatu of the Damunu tribe, along with more captives taken from Der (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 14, 3-4, pp. 45-46).

against the possible encroachment of Urartu. Annexed territory here was of great strategic value, enabling Assyria to challenge any attempt made by Urartu to expand in the south-east. The incorporation of Mannea as a tributary state, which threatened Urartu's south-eastern border, and may have been the staging point for Tiglath-pileser's later invasion of Urartu in 735 BC¹¹⁰, provides further evidence of Assyria's strategic response to the threat posed by Urartu in the north during this period. Finally, the restoration of lost territory here during the preceding period of weakness (see Chapter 5) would also have served to strengthen Tiglath-pileser's political position back in Assyria, signalling a return to a strong and dominant Assyria.

4.6.2 The Second Babylonian Campaign: The Evolution of Tiglath-pileser III's Babylonian Policy

While the 10th century had seen a surge in interaction between Assyria and Babylonia characterised by what Brinkman defines as "battles, alliances, shifting borders, and diplomatic marriages" (1968, p. 169), from the middle of the 9th century it is clear that Assyrian kings were pursuing different policies in Babylonia with regard to different geographical areas and population groups. Though kings of the 11th and 10th centuries such as Tiglath-pileser I (1115-1077 BC), who captured Babylon as well as "the holy cities and their citadels" (Glassner 2004, No. 10, ii.14"-ii.21", pp. 180-181), had not hesitated in launching punitive military campaigns against the principal Babylonian cult centres, abducting their gods and looting their cities, Assyrian kings from the middle of the 9th century refrained from initiating direct military action against these centres. Shalmaneser III (858-824 BC), who conducted two campaigns to Babylonia in order to intervene in a dynastic dispute, records only

This campaign was carried out by the governors of Na'ari and the Lullumu while Tiglath-pileser was on campaign in Syria (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 20, p. 40 and No. 14, 1-3, pp. 45-46).

¹¹⁰ Although we cannot be certain of this because of the fragmentary state of the annals (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 18 and 19), Sargon II's later use of Mannea to launch an invasion of Urartu may suggest that Tiglath-pileser also used this same route to launch an attack against Urartian territory in 735 BC. For an alternate suggestion that Tiglath-pileser may have used the route through Guzana and Tušhan, see Parker (2001, p. 219).

a single campaign outside of this civil war, and this was directed against the Chaldean chieftains. His relations with the principal Babylonian cities were entirely peaceful during this period, and the annals report that Shalmaneser made sacrifices to the gods in the principal cult centres of Babylon, Borsippa and Cutha (Grayson 1996, A.O.102.10, ii 31-44, pp. 52-53). The statement made in one of his inscriptions that, “for the people of Babylon and Borsippa, his people, he established protection and freedom under the great gods at a banquet. He gave them bread (and) wine, dressed them in multi-coloured garments, (and) presented them with presents” (Grayson 1994, A.O.102.5, vi.1b-5a, p. 31), suggests that Shalmaneser may even have asserted authority over Babylon and established the traditional privileges or *kidinnūtu* status of the citizens of these centres. Even Shamshi-Adad V, who pursued an aggressive intervention policy in Babylonia, campaigning here repeatedly and even taking two Babylonian kings hostage, was sure to respect the sanctity of the Babylonian chief cult centres, looting only cities outside of these centres and ensuring that he made sacrifices to the gods in Babylon, Borsippa and Cutha (Glassner 2004, 10: iii.6’-iv.14, pp. 182-183). Under Shamshi-Adad V’s successor, Adad-nirari III (810-783 BC), Assyria continued this policy of avoiding direct military action against the principal cult centres of Babylonia, and like his predecessors, Shalmaneser III and Shamshi-Adad V, adopted a different policy toward the Chaldean chieftains, whom he forced to pay tribute (Grayson (1996, A.O.104.8, pp. 212-213). The policy pursued by Tiglath-pileser III in Babylonia from 745 BC was thus a continuation of the policies pursued by his predecessors in the 9th century. Tiglath-pileser took no military action against the principal Babylonian city-states and allowed the Babylonian king to remain on the throne. In relation to the tribal population of Babylonia, however, a new policy was pursued by Tiglath-pileser III. Rather than just carry out punitive campaigns against the Aramaean population which resulted in the acquisition of booty, Tiglath-pileser’s campaign of 745 BC was carried out with the single purpose of bringing about their subjugation and annexation of the Aramaean tribes to the empire.

While the close affinity of Assyria’s and Babylonia’s religious and cultural traditions seems to have

afforded the Babylonian city-states a special status under the Assyrian empire¹¹¹, this relationship made it incredibly difficult for Assyria to exert the same degree of control and authority over Babylonia as it did over other areas of the empire. Assyrian kings had, from the middle of the 9th century, become increasingly reluctant to establish direct rule over the chief Babylonian centres, and in this tradition, Tiglath-pileser III also pursued a non-intervention policy here from 745 BC. Though it is not known for certain if Tiglath-pileser III ruled indirectly over Babylonia through Nabu-nasir from this time, the events following the death of Nabu-nasir support the conclusion that Assyrian authority was not at all recognised in Babylonia at this time. Tiglath-pileser's second campaign to Babylonia was almost certainly a reaction to Mukin-zeri's seizure of the Babylonian throne (Brinkman 1984, p. 42; Hallo 1960, p. 50; Grayson 1991b, p. 82; Olmstead 1951, p. 178; Saggs 1984), and that this coincided with a reversal of Tiglath-pileser's earlier policy in favour of direct rule over Babylonia would seem to suggest that this campaign was also an admission that the passive non-intervention approach pursued here since 745 BC was not at all working. Tiglath-pileser had earlier sought to promote an acceptance of Assyrian rule in Babylonia, and now this policy was intensified. He ascended the Babylonian throne, participating in the annual *akītu* festival, and adopted the title *šar māt Šumeri u Akkadi* "King of Sumer and Akkad". The adoption of this title is a clear indication of Tiglath-pileser's desire to claim the prestige associated with this position¹¹², however, it was also the traditional title denoting sovereignty over Babylonia and was thus, more importantly, a symbolic representation of Tiglath-pileser's desire to be viewed as a legitimate king of Babylonia. Although a number of earlier Assyrian kings of the 9th and early 8th century had also adopted this title, including Shamshi-Adad V (823-811 BC) and Adad-nirari III (810-783 BC), unlike his predecessors who were never recognised as rulers of Babylonia in the Babylonian sources, Tiglath-pileser III was the first Assyrian king to be accepted as the legitimate king of Babylonia in the Babylonian accounts (Frame 2008, pp. 23-24).

¹¹¹ See Radner (2010, p. 30) for an alternate perspective suggesting that Babylonia's special status was maintained for ideological reasons connected to the Assyrian 'world view' and the interpretation of omen texts.

¹¹² A suggestion already made by Olmstead (1951, p. 181).

In conjunction with this policy, Tiglath-pileser III also granted benefits to the Babylonian cities. The granting of *kidinnūtu* status to the citizens of Babylon is only alluded to in Nimrud Letter 1, however it is confirmed in a later letter from the reign of Sargon or Sennacherib where the writer laments that the king has not come and established the privileges (*kidinnūtu*) of Babylon as past kings, including Tiglath-pileser III and Shalmaneser V, had done (see Dietrich 2003, No. 23, 21' - r.8 and r. 14-15). It may be noted that the exact meaning of this status is not understood with certainty, and Porter associates this status only with protection from physical harm rather than exemption from taxes or corvée (1993, n. 145, p. 64). However, other scholars have sought to interpret this status as meaning exemption from taxes and corvée labour, and Tiglath-pileser's statement in the ARI that he "exercised authority over Karduniaš (Babylonia) (and) firmly established tribute (and) payment on the chieftains of Chaldea" (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 39, 14b-15a, p. 97), may provide some evidence, though indirect, to support the assertion that the principal Babylonian cult centres remained exempt from taxation under Assyrian rule during this period, as they would under the rule of a traditional Babylonian king.

Though it can not be said that the cities which received benefits from Tiglath-pileser III subsequently accepted Assyrian rule, or that they even adopted a pro-Assyrian policy, there is some scant evidence for the success of Assyria's policies in Babylonia. The Nimrud letters suggest that Tiglath-pileser's public relations program in Babylonia was at least partially successful in gaining the support of the citizens of Babylon against Mukin-zeri, and a later letter reports that the city of the author, whose name is not preserved in its entirety, had "[kep]t the watch of the kings of [Assyria]" (No. 187, 5-7, Reynolds 2003), meaning they had remained loyal to Assyria over an extended period of time. Statements such as this suggest that despite the difficulties which Assyrian kings experienced in trying to establish Assyrian authority here, some cities like that referred to in the above extract, did pursue long-term pro-Assyrian policies in Babylonia, which perhaps originated in our period where the origins of Assyria's Babylonian policy can be traced.

CHAPTER 5 The Context of Tiglath-pileser III's Campaigns

Against the West: The Arpad Alliance and the Problem of Alliance

Formation in the West during the 9th and 8th centuries BC

5.1 Introduction

Prior to his conquest of the West, beginning in 743 BC, Tiglath-pileser III had already conducted several military campaigns, one directed to the south against Babylonia in 745 BC, and another into the central Zagros during the following year. It was concluded in Chapter 4 that campaigning was pursued in these areas both for strategic reasons¹¹³ and because the inhabitants of these areas presented easy targets at a time when Assyria was still recovering from a period of weakness and Tiglath-pileser's reign was not yet firmly established¹¹⁴. In the West lay a number of powerful and wealthy states which would pose a far greater challenge for Tiglath-pileser III than had the eastern frontier. The wealth of these city-states had already drawn the attention of a number of Assyrian kings who in the 9th and early 8th centuries had regularly campaigned to this region and sought to establish Assyrian control here¹¹⁵. However, Assyrian campaigning during this period had often been met with resistance from alliances involving Syrian, Palestinian and South Anatolian states, which have widely been interpreted as "anti-Assyrian" coalitions, that is, formed as a response to Assyrian expansion in this area and for the specific purpose of providing opposition against Assyrian campaign efforts.

¹¹³ For the view that Assyrian expansion here was part of a wider strategy against Urartu, see Grayson (1954, p. 34).

¹¹⁴ The mountainous area to the east would have been much easier for Tiglath-pileser to subdue given the low-level socio-political development of the area, which was characterised by a large pastoral economy. For the economy and social organisation of polities in the Zagros, see Greco (2003).

¹¹⁵ Note, however, that this control was limited to certain regions and characterised largely by the creation of semi-independent vassal-states.

Given the wider interpretation of coalition formation in the West during the preceding period, it is no wonder that the coalition of North-Syrian states which opposed Tiglath-pileser III in 743 BC during the course of his first campaign against the West has also been identified as a further example of a strictly anti-Assyrian alliance in the West (Ikeda 1999, p. 289; Kuan 1995, pp. 138, 142 and 187; Parker 2001, pp. 218-19). The problem with this premise, however, is that it identifies Assyria as the sole threat to states in the West, and does not acknowledge that alliances provided mutual protection for members against threats which might emerge from both local and international sources. Alliances could also be advantageous to members as they often served to strengthen economic ties between states and to promote trade. Thus, the decision by a state in the West to join an alliance was likely just as much a response to local conditions, both economic and political, as it was to international conditions. There is every reason to believe that alliances in the West also varied enormously not just in their political makeup, and the extent to which larger, more powerful states were able to dominate smaller states, but also in their objectives, and that both the makeup and objectives of alliances was largely influenced by the political and economic conditions under which they were formed. Since we often lack historical sources produced by coalition states themselves, one critical issue is how we interpret and utilise Assyrian sources that refer to coalitions, since these often present us only with an Assyrian perspective on events.

With regard to the coalition which faced Tiglath-pileser III in 743 BC, there are a number of reasons to believe that this alliance was a local coalition, that is, one which predated Tiglath-pileser's campaign and was formed in response to local political and/or economic conditions. The argument put forward here suggests that this alliance did not form in response to Assyrian campaign efforts, but had only become drawn into a larger conflict against Assyria when one of its member states, Arpad, was attacked by Tiglath-pileser III in 743 BC. Assyria's weakened position in the period preceding Tiglath-pileser's accession to the throne meant that Assyria had recently posed little threat to the autonomy of states in the West, certainly not enough to encourage states to form a

coalition as a response to regular campaign efforts. Before we delve into this discussion, however, it is necessary first to address the broader issue of alliance formation in the West in more depth and the problem of interpreting these political alliances as strictly “anti-Assyrian” coalitions.

5.2 The Origins and Growth of the “Anti-Assyrian Coalition Theory”

The origins of the anti-Assyrian coalition theory are rooted in biblical scholarship where the theory was first used to account for the cause of the Syro-Ephraimite War, or the attack on Judah by Aram-Damascus and Israel on the eve of Tiglath-pileser III’s conquest of Syria-Palestine in 734BC¹¹⁶. According to 2 Kings 16: 5-9, king Ahaz of Judah requested aid from Tiglath-pileser III against the coalition, offering Judah’s submission in return for Assyrian military intervention against the coalition forces. Assyria’s intervention in this conflict was quite early on, from the late 19th century, interpreted as the result of the coalition’s attempt to force Judah into an alliance which was deemed “anti-Assyrian” (see Tomes 1993, p. 55 ff.). Although it had also been argued that the war was a local conflict which had no bearing on the developing international political situation involving Assyria¹¹⁷, historians enthusiastically embraced the idea that states might align in common unity

¹¹⁶ See Tomes (1993).

¹¹⁷ For early criticisms to the theory, see Tomes who argues that the theory suggesting that Aram-Damascus and Israel were trying to force Judah into an anti-Assyrian coalition lacks evidentiary support (1993, ns. 9,10 & 11). In agreement with Tomes, the biblical account makes it clear that Aram was attempting to expand at this time by acquiring additional territory: “At that time, Rezin king of Aram recovered Elath for Aram” (2 Kings 16: 6). Moreover, the biblical account makes it clear that Ahaz of Judah had pledged his submission to Assyria in return for protection from Aram and Israel: “Ahaz sent messengers to Tiglath-pileser king of Assyria, “I am your servant and vassal. Come up and save me out of the hand of the king of Aram and of the king of Israel, who are attacking me” (2 Kings 16:7). It is not unlikely that a smaller state such as Judah would request the protection of a larger state such as Assyria in regional conflicts, and that this might be seen by smaller states as a beneficial consequence of being an Assyrian vassal state (see 6.3.1). For a more recent work arguing that the Syro-Ephraimite war was a local conflict, see Oded (1972).

against an international power seeking to bring about the subjugation of Syria-Palestine and a causal-relationship was established between Assyrian campaigning and alliance formation in the West during the 9th and 8th centuries BC (Ikeda 1999, pp. 271-302; Irvine 1990; Kuan 1995; Lanfranchi 1997, pp.81-87; Na'aman 1991, pp. 80-98; Tadmor 1961, pp. 232-271).

The notion of anti-Assyrian coalitions was subsequently injected into Assyriological studies by Tadmor in an article published in 1961 titled "Azriyau of Yaudi". Although the article focused on the somewhat contentious debate surrounding the identification of one Azriyau, the proposed leader of an anti-Assyrian coalition¹¹⁸, Tadmor also introduced the concept of coalitions which specifically pursued anti-Assyrian policies in the West and discussed the influence of these political formations on Syro-Palestinian politics during the 9th and 8th centuries. Yet, the problem still remained that although coalitions of this period sometimes came in conflict with Assyria, it is clear from the evidence that these alliances were also utilised in disputes against other Syro-Palestinian states.

Na'aman attempted to overcome this inconsistency in an article titled "Forced Participation in Alliances in the Course of the Assyrian Campaigns to the West", where he argued that in cases where coalitions engaged in conflicts against other local states, this was an attempt by the coalition to force the participation of non-member states into anti-Assyrian alliances. He reasoned: "Since cooperation was the only way to retain independence, it is clear that an all-inclusive participation in the alliances was essential for their members. No wonder that refusal to participate was not acceptable and may have been regarded even as an act of hostility" (1991, p. 81). Thus, the same case which had been made years earlier for the cause of the Syro-Ephraimite war was now taken up and applied to other conflicts involving coalitions and local states in the West. Where coalitions engaged in armed conflict against states other than Assyria, this was not taken as evidence for a

¹¹⁸ For an overview of the historical debate surrounding the identification of Azriyau and his nation-state, see Kuan (1995, n. 57, pp. 149-150).

local dispute between coalitions and other states, but was rather interpreted as part of a wider strategy against Assyria.

5.3 The Literary Context of “Anti-Assyrian” Coalitions

The ARI were never intended to serve as an unbiased history of events, but were rather, composed for the purpose of glorifying the heroic deeds of the Assyrian king and legitimising his right to rule¹¹⁹. In Chapter 2, it was stated that the ARI were composed according to a standard set of literary conventions and themes. Military battles, in particular, proved an especially popular theme and provided effective subject material for conveying the heroic qualities of the Assyrian king, such as his superior skills of stratagem, physical endurance and martial prowess. Coalitions, by extension, proved greater still for promoting the Assyrian king’s heroic image and were a useful theme for illustrating the superior strength of the Assyrian army. Since alliances often comprised a number of enemy states and controlled significant numbers of troops, the Assyrian sources presented such political formations as forming only from the direct realisation that Assyria’s military power was so great that no individual state could stand alone against it. The Assyrian view of alliance formations in the West, however, omits the fact that local alliances probably did not make any distinction between threats originating from local or international powers, and that a local coalition might mobilise in defence of an allied state against Assyria as it would against a threat from another local state. The fact that there was no attempt made by the Assyrian sources to accurately identify the objectives of alliance formations reflects the preoccupation of the ARI with conveying imperial ideology, particularly the belief that the Assyrian king had a legitimate and proper claim to conquer and rule over all foreign territories. Any state which refused to submit to or recognise Assyrian authority, or indeed aided an enemy state by mobilising against Assyria in a coalition formation, was considered guilty of denying Assyria its rightful claim to rule and was

¹¹⁹ For a discussion of the literary aspects of the Assyrian royal inscriptions, see Tadmor (1997; 1999) and Oded (1992).

presented as hostile to Assyria. Consequently, the ARI convey only a single perspective of alliance formation, interpreting any opposition provided by such alliances as decidedly hostile to Assyria or “anti-Assyrian”. Thus, although the ARI may be useful in providing some historical background to the activities of coalitions where they came into contact with Assyria, they are not a reliable source for providing an accurate picture of the policies and objectives of coalitions in the West during our period.

5.4 Historical Examples of Coalitions Attested in the West Prior to the Reign of Tiglath-pileser III

5.4.1 The Qarqar Alliance from the Reign of Shalmaneser III

From Shalmaneser III’s reign comes evidence of the only coalition which might be classified as “anti-Assyrian” in this period. This coalition, hereafter referred to as the “Qarqar” alliance, mounted repeated opposition against Shalmaneser III’s efforts at western expansion in the years 853, 849, 848 and 845 BC. It is not merely the persistent mobilisation of this alliance in direct response to Assyrian campaigning which firmly points to the anti-Assyrian character of this alliance, it is also the coalition’s composition which suggests that the coalition represents a determined effort to oppose Assyrian expansion in this area. The Qarqar alliance was comprised of a large number of states drawn from a vast geographical area and included forces from various states in Syria and Palestine, as well as Egypt. The cooperation of so many states in a single coalition suggests that no single state commanded the alliance¹²⁰ and that cooperation was likely secured on the basis that

¹²⁰ Although some scholars have argued that Aram-Damascus led this coalition alone (Kuan 1995, p. 34), or that this command was held in conjunction with Hamath, (Dion 1995, p. 483; Grayson 2004, p. 4 & 1982, p. 261; Ikeda 1999, p. 277), neither of these assertions is supported by the evidence. Although the Assyrian accounts make it clear that Aram-Damascus and Hamath contributed more forces than any other states at Qarqar, the example of Egypt which contributed a mere 1000 troops and 10 chariots, suggests that the number of troops raised by each state was not a direct representation of the military capabilities of a state, as has sometimes been assumed (see, for example,

Assyria presented a common threat to the autonomy or collective interests of participating states¹²¹.

The coalition is best known from the Kurkh Monolith Inscription, where a comprehensive description of the participants is given along with the forces they commanded¹²²:

89) . . . URU*ar-ga-na-a at-tu-muš a-na URUqar-qa-ra aq-tí-rib*

90) URU*qar-qa-ra URU MAN-ti-ia ap-púl aq-qur ina IZI.MEŠ áš-ru-up DIŠ LIM*

MIN ME GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ DIŠ LIM MIN ME *pit-ḫal-lu* NIŠ LIM [. . .] *ša*

^m
IŠKUR-*'i-id-ri*

91) [...] ANŠE-*šú* IMIN ME GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ IMIN ME *pit-ḫal-lu* U LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ

^m
ša' ir-hu-le-e-ni KUR *a-māt-a-a* MIN LIM GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ U LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ *ša'*

^m
a-ḫa-ab-bu

92) KUR *sir-'a-la-a-a* IÁ ME ÉRIŠ.MEŠ *ša gu-<bal>-a-a*¹²³ DIŠ LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ *ša*

KUR *mu-uš-ra-a-a*¹²⁴ U GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ U LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ *ša* KUR *ir-qa-na-ta-ai*¹²⁵

Dion 1995, p. 483, Grayson 2004, p. 4 & 1982, p. 261; Ikeda 1999, p. 277; Pitard 1987, p. 128). It is more likely that the force contributed by each member state was based on each state's individual assessment of the threat posed by Assyria to either their interests or autonomy. Indeed, Irhuleni of Hamath's large contribution of military forces at Qarqar can easily be explained on the basis that Shalmaneser III was already ravaging Hamath at the time of the coalition's mobilisation, and therefore posed the greatest immediate threat to this state.

¹²¹ Tadmor suggests that the alliance was probably based on pre-existing economic relationships (1975, p. 39).

¹²² Other translations of this text may be found in the following works: Yamada (2000, ii 78b-81a; ii 87b-90a; ii 90b-95a; 96b-102, pp. 150-163), Grayson (1996, A.0.102.2, pp. 11-24), and Kuan (1995, ii 78-101, pp. 27-31).

¹²³ Note that the city was earlier identified with the Anatolian kingdom of Que (Kuan 1995, n. 95, p. 33). However, Tadmor's argument to emend the text from *gu-a-a* to *gu-bal-a-a*, reading "Byblos" (1961, pp. 144-5), has been generally accepted by scholars such as Grayson (1996, p. 23), Kuan (1995, p. 33), and Yamada (2000, pp. 157-158).

¹²⁴ Tadmor (1961, pp. 144-5) equates Mušri here with Egypt rather than the Anatolian kingdom of the same name, a reading only made plausible through the reading of Byblos above. For the connection between the participation of Egypt and Byblos, see Kuan (1995, pp. 33-34).

- 93) MIN ME ÉRIN.MEŠ *ša*^m *ma-ti-nu-ba-'a-li* URU*ar-ma-da-a-a* MIN ME ÉRIN.MEŠ
ša KUR *ú-sa-na-ad-a-a* EŠ GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ U LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ
- 94) *ša*^m *a-du-nu-ba-'a-li* KUR *ši-a-na-a-a* DIŠ ANŠE *gam-ma-lu ša*^m *gi-in-di-bu-'u* KUR
ar-ba-a-a [.] ME ÉRIN.MEŠ
- 95) *ša*^m *ba-'a-ša* DUMU *ru-hu-bi* KUR *a-ma-na-a-a* U MIN MAN.MEŠ-*ni an-nu-ti ana*
ma ÉRIN.TAH-*ti-šú il-qa-a-a* [.]

“I set out from the city of Argana and approached the city of Qarqar. I demolished, pulled down, and burned the city of Qarqar, his (Irhuleni’s) royal city. 1,200 chariots, 1,200 cavalry, 20,000 troops of Adad-idri, the Aram-Damascene, 700 chariots, 700 cavalry, 10,000 troops of Irhuleni, the Hamathite, 2000 chariots, 10,000 troops of Ahab, the Israelite, 500 troops of Byblos, 1,000 troops of Egypt, 10 chariots, 10,000 troops of Irqata, 200 troops of Matinu-ba’al of the city of Arvad, 200 troops of the land of Usanāta, 30 chariots, [. . .],000 troops of Adunu-ba’al of the city of Šianu, 1,000 camels of Gindibu of the Arabs, [. . .]00 troops of Ba’asa the son of Bit-Ruhubi the Ammonite— these twelve kings came to his aid.”

Table 7 – The Composition of Allied Forces at Qarqar

State	Chariots	Cavalry	Troops	Camels	Total
Aram-Damascus	1200	1200	20,000	-	22,400
Hamath	700	700	10,000	-	11,400
Israel	2,000	-	10,000	-	12,000
Byblos	-	-	500	-	500
Egypt	-	-	1,000	-	1,000
Irqata	10	-	10,000	-	10,010
Arvad	-	-	200	-	200
Usanu	-	-	200	-	200
Šianu	30	-	[x],000	-	?
Arab	-	-	-	1,000	1,000
Ammon	-	-	[x]00 or [x],000	-	?

Though Shalmaneser claims to have successfully crushed the Qarqar coalition in 853 BC, stating in

¹²⁵ Tadmor emends ‘Irqanata’ to ‘Irqata’ or ‘Irqa’ (1961, n. 49, p. 245).

his annals that he defeated the coalition “from the city of Qarqar as far as the city of Gilzau” (Grayson 1996, p. 23), the fact that he chose to concentrate his campaign efforts elsewhere in the years immediately following this campaign and that the coalition continued to mobilise in opposition to Shalmaneser’s campaigns in subsequent years, has suggested to scholars that the battle may have resulted in an Assyrian setback or even a defeat (Dion 1995, p. 482 ff.; Elat 1975, pp. 25-35; Kuan 1995, p. 46; Yamada 2000, p. 163). Although the alliance ultimately dissolved before the Assyrian threat had passed¹²⁶, the coalition’s dissolution is generally attributed to the change of leadership in Aram-Damascus at this time, when Hazael replaced Ben-Hadad on the throne (Grayson 2004; Kuan 1995, p. 53). Nevertheless, this alliance is perhaps the only example where a clear anti-Assyrian policy can be noted in the nature and activities of the coalition.

5.4.2 The Hatti Coalition from the Reign of Adad-nirari III

In 805 BC Adad-nirari III undertook his first campaign to the West where he fought a coalition comprising Arpad and a number of North-Syrian and South-Anatolian states at the city of Paqirahubuna, pertaining to Kummuh¹²⁷. Most scholars have identified this coalition as anti-Assyrian and attributed the cause of the conflict to the coalition’s attempt to force Kummuh into an anti-Assyrian alliance (Kuan 1998, p. 91; Na’aman 1991, pp. 84-85). However, the Assyrian accounts give conflicting reasons for Adad-nirari III’s campaign against the coalition forces. In the ARI, Adad-nirari’s campaign against the alliance is justified as an effort to re-subjugate states which had rebelled from Assyria under Adad-nirari’s predecessor, Shamshi-Adad V. This is illustrated in one of Adad-nirari III’s summary inscriptions where the following description of the coalition states

¹²⁶ The coalition was noticeably absent in 841 BC when Shalmaneser successfully campaigned to subdue Aram-Damascus.

¹²⁷ For the dating of this episode, see Kuan (1995, p. 93).

is given¹²⁸: “...[who] bore the yoke of lordship ... who [had rebelled and revolted] in the time of Šamši-[Adad my father, and caused] the rulers of the Eup[hrates to rebel with him,] ...” (Kuan 1995, pp. 88-89)¹²⁹. Yet, according to the Pazarcik inscription, the cause of Adad-nirari III’s initial intervention in the West was a border conflict between Kummuh, an Assyrian vassal, and the neighbouring state of Gurgum¹³⁰:

- 7) . . . AŠ^m u-me uš-pi-lu-lu-me
- 8) šar^{URU} ku-mu-ḥa-a-a a-na^m 10-ÉRIN-TÁḤ šar^{KUR} aš-šur
- 9) sa-am-mu-ra-mat^{SAL} MUNUS.É.GAL
- 10) ÍD pu-rat-tú ú-še-bi-ru-u-ni
- 11) a-tar-šum-ki^m A^m ad-ra-a-me^{URU} ár-pa-da-a-a
- 12) a-di 8 MAN.MEŠ-ni šá KI-šú AŠ^{URU} pa-qira-ḥu-bu-na
- 13) si-dir-ta-šú-nu KI-šú-nu am-taḥ-iš uš-ma-na-šú-nu
- 14) e-kim-šu-nu-ti a-na šu-zu-ub ZI.MEŠ-šú-nu
- 15) e-li-ú AŠ MU.AN.NA šá-a-te
- 16) ta-hu-mu šú-a-tú AŠ^m bir-ti uš-pi-lu-lu-me
- 17) šar^{URU} ku-mu-ha-a-a AŠ^m bir-ti qa-al-pa-ru-da
- 18) A^m pa-la-lam šar^{URU} gúr-gu-ma-a-a ú-še-lu-ni

¹²⁸ This claim is also made in a stele from Dūr-Katlimmu published by Grayson (1996, A.0.104.5, p. 207). Note that while line 5 of this text identifying the name of this town is fragmentary, this clearly refers to Paqarahubunu. See Grayson (1996, n. 5, p. 207).

¹²⁹ Elsewhere, in the Tell Sheikh Hammad Stela, only Arpad is said to have rebelled (Kuan 1995, pp. 87-88), while in the Saba’a Stela the more general term “land of Hatti” is used to refer to the states that had rebelled and withheld tribute (Kuan 1995, pp. 85-86).

¹³⁰ For a copy of this inscription, see Donbaz (1990, pp. 8-9).

“At that time, Ushpilulume, king of Kummuh, caused me Adad-nirari, king of Assyria, and Sammu-ramat, the palace woman, to cross the Euphrates. Atarshumki, son of Adramu of the city of Arpad, together with the eight kings who were with him at Paqiraḥubuna. I fought a pitched battle with them. I deprived them of their military camp. To save their lives they moved upwards (into upper land?)¹³¹. In this year, this boundary between Ushpilulume, the king of Kummuh, and between Qalparuda, the son of Palalam, king of Gurgum, was determined.”

There are several reasons to believe that the Pazarcik inscriptions provides a more accurate and reliable account of the cause of the conflict between Adad-nirari III and the coalition army. Unlike the royal inscriptions which might distort historical information in the interests of glorifying the heroic feats of the Assyrian king, the Pazarcik inscription was a boundary stone, intended to mark for future rulers the border agreement made between Kummuh and Gurgum which had been determined as a result of the battle at Paqiraḥubuna. Although the inscription does glorify Adad-nirari’s defeat of the coalition army, the cause of Assyria’s intervention in this conflict is not attributed to a rebellion, but rather, to Kummuh’s request for aid against the coalition in what appears to have been a local territorial dispute with Gurgum. Although these states may once have been held as Assyrian tributary states in the distant past, the absence of any direct reference to a rebellion of these states in the Pazarcik inscription suggests the charge of rebellion made against these states was largely the invention of scribes who composed the ARI and sought to integrate this event into the wider ideology of the inscriptions. If the coalition states had once been Assyrian

¹³¹ Although the word “dispersed” here might provide a better translation, this would require the use of the Gt stem (see Black *et al.* 2000, p.71). It may be considered that the G stem was used to convey the meaning that the Gurgumite army had retreated back to higher ground rather than simply moving off. If this understanding of the text is correct, than Assyria’s victory over the coalition may not have been decisive.

tributary states lost during Shamshi-Adad V's reign, as the ARI suggest, then Adad-nirari's claim to have restored these territories to Assyrian control was evidence that Adad-nirari III had fulfilled his kingship duties to expand the empire and to restore territory lost during a preceding period of weakness.

Thus, it is more likely that Adad-nirari III's confrontation with the coalition army at in 805 BC represented no more than a local territorial dispute between Kummuh and Gurgum, in which Assyria intervened on behalf of Kummuh, a vassal-state¹³². This follows the conclusion already made by Galil (1992, p. 58). That Adad-nirari III subsequently used this incident as a platform to carry out further conquest of this area is perhaps testimony to the flexibility and changing nature of Assyrian policy in this region, as well as to Assyria's willingness to take advantage of political and military circumstances favourable to imperial expansion. The fact that Assyria intervened in this local dispute on behalf of its vassal also points to the reciprocal nature of Assyrian vassal-relationships and to the benefits of Assyrian rule, most recently drawn attention to by Lanfranchi (1997) and Fales (2008). Smaller states such as Kummuh which were situated in areas surrounded by rival states might have benefitted greatly from their incorporation into the empire where they were afforded some protection against other local rival states in return for their loyalty¹³³.

5.4.3 The Zakkur Inscription Alliance from the Reign of Adad-nirari III

A further coalition known from the reign of Adad-nirari III comes from an inscription written in Old

¹³² It is interesting to note that the reverse of the inscription was re-inscribed during the reign of Shalmaneser IV (782-773 BC) when Assyria settled a further border dispute between the two nations. The stela was therefore used to reaffirm this border ruling made as a result of the campaign against Gurgum and the coalition army during the reign of Adad-nirari III.

¹³³ For more on this topic, see the article by Lanfranchi (1997).

Aramaic known as the Zakkur inscription¹³⁴. The coalition described in this text comprised Aram-Damascus, Arpad, Que, Umq, Gurgum, Sam'al, Melid, two other states whose names are missing due to lacunas, and seven other kings, presumably pertaining to only minor kingdoms¹³⁵. The inscription records an incident where Zakkur of Hamath was besieged by the coalition army, probably following Hamath's seizure of the throne of Lu'ash¹³⁶, a kingdom whose location remains uncertain¹³⁷. Lines one to ten of this inscription give us some insight into the nature of this incident involving the coalition army. It may be noted that a complete narrative of this episode has not survived due to the poor preservation of the text.

“The stele which Zakkur, king of Hamath and Lu'ash, placed for Ilwer, [his lord]. I am Zakkur, king of Hamath and Lu'ash, a humble¹³⁸ man was I, and Balšamayn [delivered] me, and stood with me, and Balshamayn made me king of Hazrak. Barhadad, son of Hazael, king of Aram united against me [six]teen kings— Barhadad and his army, Bar-Gush¹³⁹ and his army, the king of Que and his army, the king of Umq and his army, the king of Gurgum

¹³⁴ For the Zakkur inscription and its language features, see Gibson 1975, pp. 6-17; Lipíński 2000, p. 254- 255; Noegel 2006, p. 307 ff.

¹³⁵ While there is some doubt over the exact number of kings involved in the coalition (see Gibson 1975, n. 8), there is good reason to believe that there were sixteen participants in the coalition. Although two of the king's names are missing from the text due to lacunas, it seems certain from the repetitive use of the formula “X and his army” that there was only enough room in these lacunas to include the names of two more kings. Kahn (2007, p. 72) postulates that the missing states are Carchemish and Kummuh, though this is not certain.

¹³⁶ The date of the siege is a matter of debate among scholars. A rough estimate would place it somewhere between the end of the 9th year and the beginning of the 8th during the reign of Adad-nirari III (Gibson 1975, pp. 6-7).

¹³⁷ For the suggestion that Lu'aš lies directly north of Hamath, see Hawkins (1995, p. 96).

¹³⁸ For this translation, see Rosenthal (1967, p. 6). Note that although the translation given here of “humble” follows the conventional translation, Millard (1990) has more recently shown that these signs should more likely be taken as reference to Zakkur's homeland (see n. 156).

¹³⁹ *I.e.* Arpad

and his army, the king of Sam'al and his army, the king of Melid and his army, the king of [. . .] and his army, the king of [. . .] and his army, and seven others, they and their armies. All these kings laid siege upon Hadrach and raised a rampart higher than the rampart of Hazrak, and dug a trench deeper than its moat.”

On the basis of this inscription and a relief showing a tribute bearer bearing the name *za-ku-[ri]* in cuneiform (*cf.* Reade 1981, p. 151 & Pl. XX), scholars have widely identified this alliance as anti-Assyrian and explained the attack on Hamath as motivated by the pro-Assyrian policies of this Syrian state and an attempt to force Zakkur into an anti-Assyrian coalition (Kuan 1995, pp. 91-93; Lipiński 2000, p. 302; Na'aman 1991, pp. 84-86; Smith 1925, p. 28)¹⁴⁰. Kuan, in particular, even suggests that this was the same coalition, more or less, which confronted Adad-nirari III at Paqirahubuna (1995, p. 92), even though seven of the eight states which participated in this coalition are not named in the Pazarcik inscription. While it is not possible to give an exact date for this event, scholars have generally sought to identify the siege of Hadrach with Assyrian campaigning in the area¹⁴¹, and Na'aman further suggests that Hamath's deliverance from the

¹⁴⁰ For this view, see also Kuan (1995, pp. 91-92) and Millard (1973, pp.163-164), following Smith (1925, p. 28).

¹⁴¹ Smith (1925, p. 28) assigned an approximate date of between 805 and 802 BC, while Na'aman (1991, p. 85) and Millard and Tadmor (1973, p. 60) have dated this incident to 804/803 BCE after the defeat of the Hatti coalition at Paqirahubuna. Note also the works of Jepsen (1941-1945, p. 170), Lipiński (1971, pp. 397-399), and Ikeda (1999, p. 282) who alternatively associate this incident with Adad-nirari's 796 BCE campaign. For an overview of the evidence linking the liberation of Zakkur with an Assyrian campaign, see Noegel (2006, 309 ff.). It should also be noted that this thesis is connected with the view that Zakkur refers to himself in the inscription as a “man of ‘Āna”, a town which it is theorised might be located on the Euphrates within Assyria's orbit of control (see Millard 1990, p. 49 ff.). The implication of this thesis being that Zakkur was a usurper who at the very least held Assyrian sympathies (Millard 1990, p. 52). Nevertheless, there is no direct evidence that Zakkur's foreign policy was directed by Assyrian policy or that Assyria might intervene in a local dispute on behalf of an independent state even if this state were sympathetic to Assyria's interests.

coalition army should be credited not to the god Balšamayn¹⁴² but to Assyrian intervention (1991, pp. 85-86)¹⁴³. However, given the complete lack of evidence for any of these assertions it is difficult to justify the thesis that the coalition's attack on Hadrach was linked with a wider anti-Assyrian policy in the West. Although the lack of any direct reference to Assyria in the inscription could be attributed to the broken state of the inscription, which does not give any clue as to how the conflict was resolved, it cannot be ignored that the incident lacks a clear historical context. Thus, while it is tempting to view this incident as related to Assyrian imperial expansion, a more likely conclusion is that this was a local dispute between Syro-Anatolian states which had nothing to do with Assyria. An alternate possibility is that the conflict had resulted from Hamath's own pursuit of an imperial policy, notably Zakkur's seizure of the neighbouring kingdom of Lu'ash¹⁴⁴. Kahn has more recently suggested that the involvement of both Bit-Agusi and Aram-Damascus in the alliance suggests that we are dealing with two coalitions, not one, in which Aram-Damascus had sought common cause with a northern coalition led by Bit-Agusi against a common enemy (2007, p. 73). This, Kahn reasons, results from the notion that Aram-Damascus could not have exerted hegemonic control over such a vast array of states. However, there is no reason to assume that alliances may only have

¹⁴² Pitard (1987, p. 174) notes that it was not uncommon for sieges to be unsuccessful. Zakkur's claim that his success should be attributed to divine deliverance could indicate some other unforeseen event like plague. Alternatively, Millard has suggested the possibility that the dispersal of the coalition army could be attributed to a quarrel among the allies (1973, p. 163). Although these theories are merely possibilities for which no 'hard' evidence exists, it may be pointed out that they are just as plausible as the theory postulating Assyrian intervention in the conflict, for which no real evidence exists also.

¹⁴³ This assertion follows one already made by Smith (1925, p. 28) and is based on evidence from the Antakya stela, an inscription describing the settling of a border dispute between Zakkur of Hamath and Atarshumki of Arpad which indicates that Arpad and Hamath had at one point been tributary states under Adad-nirari III. For this text, see Kuan (1995, pp. 76-77). Note, however, that the date of this incident is difficult to determine, particularly given that Shamshi-ilu, the official responsible for erecting the stela, continued to hold the position of *turtānu* under Adad-nirari's successors, Shalmaneser IV and Ashur-dan III.

¹⁴⁴ Following Gibson (1975, p. 6).

been organised under the leadership of one hegemonic state. Given the lack of evidence to connect the conflict mentioned in the inscription with Assyria, the Zakkur inscription should, at best, only be taken as evidence for the volatility of political relations between states at this time, and the use of coalitions as a mechanism for resolving local conflicts.

5.5 Discussion: Coalitions in the West Prior to the Reign of Tiglath-pileser III and the Anti-Assyrian Coalition Theory.

The current view that alliances formed in the west during the 9th and 8th centuries strictly as a response to Assyrian expansion does not sufficiently account for the trend of coalition formation common to this area during the 9th and 8th centuries. One of the main issues of contention here with this single model of alliance formation lies with the fact that the ARI, our main source of information on coalition armies in the west during this period, do not provide a complete or wholly trustworthy representation of the objectives or political dynamics of alliances during this period. Like the narratives concerning armies of single enemy states or peoples that faced the onslaught of the Assyrian army, the ARI always present the objectives of coalition armies from an entirely Assyrian perspective, which was largely a reflection of state ideology. The ARI do not provide details of the political or military objectives of coalition armies or indeed adequately justify a coalition's decision to engage in a military confrontation against Assyria. The states which participated in the Hatti coalition during the reign of Adad-nirari III, for example, are said in the ARI simply to have "rebelled" during the reign of Shamshi-Adad V, and it is a logical conclusion to draw from this statement that the coalition army engaged Adad-nirari's forces at Paqirahubuna in 805 BC in an effort to prevent their re-incorporation into the Assyrian empire. However, the Pazarcik inscription presents an alternate perspective of these events. While there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Adad-nirari's claim that the coalition of states had formerly paid tribute to Assyria, even if this was some time before Adad-nirari's reign, the Pazarcik inscription suggests that

the direct cause of Adad-nirari's campaign during this year was the pressing need to intervene in a local conflict involving Kummuh, an Assyrian vassal, and the neighbouring state of Gurgum which was aided by a coalition of states. It is interesting to note here that without the Pazarcik inscription we would struggle to understand the cause of the conflict from the ARI alone, which says nothing of these affairs. If anything, this incident stresses the importance of having access to sources outside of the ARI when reconstructing historical events involving coalitions, even if those sources are still Assyrian in origin. While the ARI do present the objectives of coalitions, like other enemy armies, as "anti-Assyrian", historians must consider the literary context of these claims and whether the "anti-Assyrian" actions of a coalition army in the west represent deliberate and concerted efforts by states to resist Assyrian expansion in this area or are simply the result of military actions directed against Assyrian intervention in local conflicts.

A further problem associated with applying the anti-Assyrian coalition theory to all instances of coalition formation in the west during the 9th and 8th centuries concerns the fact that not all coalitions are known to have engaged the Assyrian army in battle. The Zakkur coalition is not known from Assyrian sources and although attempts have been made to connect this alliance with Assyria, there is little evidence to support this claim. While some coalitions attested in this area may have pursued anti-Assyrian policies, the example of the Zakkur coalition demonstrates that some alliances were certainly formed with the intention of pursuing local rather than international policies. Even where evidence does exist for conflict between Assyria and western alliances during this period, there is no reason why this should be taken as evidence that an alliance was formed with a strict anti-Assyrian policy. It is doubtful that an alliance formed for mutual defensive purposes would even make the distinction between a local or international threat, let alone be formed only with the intention of members banding together should the Assyrian king choose to concentrate his campaign efforts in the west in any given year. In the event that Assyria threatened a state who was a member of an alliance, coalitions were likely to mobilise on the basis of existing treaty

agreements, even if there was some acknowledgement that Assyria posed a mutual threat to all coalition states. The Pazarcik inscription alliance was likely such an example of a local coalition which mobilised in response to treaty obligations rather than as a coordinated and deliberate effort to resist Assyrian expansion. Thus, the Assyrian image of organised imperial conquest presented in the ARI was probably, in reality, more often than not ad hoc expansion brought about by the seizure of favourable military or political opportunities. Where a number of states were defeated on the battlefield together, as with coalition armies, Assyria could claim in the ARI to have defeated a large number of states simultaneously. Even if this defeat did not represent the formal incorporation of a state or states into the empire, or constitute regular tribute payments, the defeat of a coalition army nevertheless served to support one of the primary themes of the ARI, which was the heroic image of the Assyrian king.

5.6 The Arpad Alliance of 743 BC

Tiglath-pileser's annals indicate that Assyria's earliest intervention in the West came in 743 BC as a response to a rebellion by Mati'il, the ruler of Arpad. According to the Assyrian source, the coalition mobilised against Assyria at the request of Mati'il:

“In my third *palû*, Mati'il, [the son of A]taršumqa (Attar-šumkī), fomented a rebellious insurrection against Assyria and violated (his loyalty oath). [He sent] hostile messages about Assyria [to] the kings who ...to the ... of the land Hatti (Syria-Palestine) (and) ... the land Urartu and (thus) caused en[mity] in all (of those) lands. Sarduri of the land Urartu, [Sulam]al of the land Me[lid], (and) Tarhularu (Tarḫularu) of the land of Gurgum [came] to [his] aid. [Between] the lands Kištan and Ḫalpi, districts of the land of Kummuhu, [they] trusted in [*one another's strength* and] drew up a battle array” (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 35, i 21'-27'a, p. 84).

Evidence from the Assyrian sources suggests that Arpad was the primary target of Tiglath-pileser's military operations during this period and that the defeat of the coalition was a consequence of Tiglath-pileser's efforts to re-subjugate Arpad. This assertion is supported by the entries made in the Eponym Chronicle for the years 743 to 740 BC which identify Arpad as the primary target of Assyrian campaign operations during this period (Millard 1994, p. 59)¹⁴⁵:

- 743 in Arpad; defeat of Urartu made
- 742 to Arpad
- 741 to Arpad, within three years taken.
- 740 to Arpad.

That the confrontation between Assyrian and coalition forces took place in territory pertaining to Kummuh should probably be taken as an indication that Tiglath-pileser had confronted the coalition on route to lend support to Arpad which was, by now, already under Assyrian siege¹⁴⁶. This is favoured over the now untenable suggestion that the coalition's presence in Kummuh's territory indicates that the alliance was attempting to force Kummuh, an Assyrian vassal-state, into an anti-Assyrian coalition¹⁴⁷. Tiglath-pileser's decision to confront the coalition army here rather than allow

¹⁴⁵ See also Tadmor & Yamada's translation (2011, pp. 12-13).

¹⁴⁶ Following Astour (1979, p. 15). According to Astour (1979, p. 15), the only road available to Sarduri, who was marching from a north-easterly direction through Melid and the Taurus passes, passed through Kummuh on route to Arpad.

¹⁴⁷ The current evidence suggests that Kummuh was also a participant in the coalition. Although Tadmor's earlier translation of the fragmentary summary inscription (K 3751 (Tadmor 1994, pp. 154-175) suggested that Kummuh was under attack by coalition forces at the time of the military confrontation with Assyria: "[Sarduri of U]rartu, Sulumal of Melid, Tarhula[ra of Gurgum, (against?)], Kušashpi of Kummuh, (they conspired) to capture and despoil [Assyrian territory . . .] between the lands of Kishtan and Halpi, the districts of Kummuh . . . I defeated them.]", this interpretation of the text was possible only through reading "against" in the lacuna at the beginning of

it to move further south into Arpad's territory makes good tactical sense. If Arpad was already under siege, Tiglath-pileser would have sought to prevent reinforcements from reaching the city. The arrival of coalition forces at Arpad could have been dire for the Assyrian army stationed there, which would have been positioned for a tactical siege and vulnerable to attack from a mobile invading army. Should coalition forces have been able to continue south into Arpad's territory, the Assyrian army positioned there may have subsequently been flanked by the invading army and forced into a retreat.

Although we cannot always accept the claims made by Assyrian kings in their annals, the accusation made in Tiglath-pileser's annals that Arpad had revolted against Assyrian control is probably correct. An earlier treaty inscription between Mati'il, the ruler of Arpad, and Ashur-nerari V indicates that Arpad had earlier been an Assyrian tributary state under Tiglath-pileser's predecessor, Ashur-nirari V (754-745 BC) (Parpola and Watanabe 1988, pp. 8-13)¹⁴⁸. Arpad's

line forty-six, a reconstruction which is not supported in any of the duplicate texts. The latest translation of the text which appears in Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 47, 45-47, p. 122) omits this reading and correctly identifies Kummuh as a participant in this alliance: “[As for] Sarduri of U[r]rartu, Sulumal of Melid, Tarhula[ra of Gurgum, ...] Kuštashpi of Kummuhu, [they (Sarduri and allies) ...] to capture and plunder [Assyrian territory ... Be]tween the lands of Kishtan and Halpi, the districts of Kummuhu, I (utterly) defeated them and ...”. Note also that the suggested reading of “(they conspired)” has also been omitted from the more recent version. The participation of Kummuh in the coalition also fits with the Urartian evidence, which indicates that Sardurri had launched a successful campaign against Kummuh sometime prior to these events in 743 BC (see Salvini 1995, p. 52).

¹⁴⁸ Note that the Sefire treaty, a bilingual inscription written in both Assyrian and Aramaic (see Fitzmyer 1995), has often been cited as evidence of Arpad's vassalage to Assyria at this time. However, this argument relies on the now disputed view that this inscription represents a vassal treaty (see Altman 2008, pp. 26 ff.) and the identification of the kingdom of KTK, the dominant party mentioned in the treaty inscription, with Assyria (for this view, see Parpola & Watanabe (1988, p. XXVII); Liverani (2000, p. 60), a notion for which there is no concrete proof. It may be noted that the identification of the kingdom of KTK remains a contentious issue in scholarship. Some scholars, such as Ikeda have gone so far as to identify Bar-ga'ya, the king of KTK, as none other than the *turtānu* Shamshi-ilu (1999,

rebellion, however, probably did not take place during Tiglath-pileser's own reign and should, more likely, be dated to the preceding period when Assyria was in decline¹⁴⁹. Sarduri II, whose precise reign length remains uncertain, but who was definitely already on the Urartian throne during the reign of Ashur-nirari V (see Grekyan 2015, p. 99; Salvini 2011, p.93), records in one of his inscriptions that he had defeated Assyria in battle at Arpad (see Radner 2011b, p. 739; Salvini 1995, p. 52). The Urartian inscription mentions king Ashur-nerari V and that this defeat occurred two years after Sarduri had ascended the throne of Urartu (Salvini 1995, p. 52). Radner (2011b, p. 739) and Salvini (1995, p. 52) both date this event to 754 BC when the Eponym Chronicle records the entry "to Arpad" (Millard 1994, p. 59), however this is far from certain¹⁵⁰. Salvini admits that a given accession date of 756 BC for Sardurri II could potentially be off by a year (1995, p. 52), and assigning a date of 754BC for the Assyrian defeat on the basis of evidence from the Eponym Chronicle relies on the premise that the chronicle recorded every battle fought by the Assyrian army, which may not have been the case¹⁵¹. The Urartian inscriptions report that it was after this battle that Mati'il made a treaty with Sarduri II (Salvini 1995, p. 52). Ashur-nerari V's failure to report on this battle in any of his inscriptions suggests that the Urartian version of events which present the battle as resulting in an Assyrian defeat is probably accurate. Given that Ashir-nerari V did not venture west again during his reign, we may assume that the treaty Ashur-nerari V made with Mati'il pre-dated Sarduri's campaign and ceased to be binding on Arpad after this time.

p. 287), while others, such as Na'aman, have identified KTK as a local Syrian political entity, specifically the combined kingdoms of Hamath and Hadrach (1978).

¹⁴⁹ Given that so few campaigns were under taken by Assyria during Ashur-nerari's reign, it is difficult to know exactly when this revolt from Assyrian rule took place.

¹⁵⁰ Astour assigns a date of 753 or 752 BC (1979, p. 4, but see 2.3 'The Eponym Chronicle'.

¹⁵¹ This question relates to the issue of the precise meaning of the Eponym Chronicle entries and the question of whether the Assyrian army only campaigned once every campaign season. Tiglath-pileser's annals indicate that by this period the Assyrian king need not lead the army on every campaign mission, however it is not certain if this was the case in the previous period. See the discussion on this issue in Chapter 7.

Despite the claim made in the Urartian annals that Sarduri had defeated Ashur-nerari's army in battle, it is interesting to note that it was not only Assyria that avoided this area of contention in subsequent years. According to Salvini, Sarduri largely chose to concentrate his efforts elsewhere during the next decade, conducting campaigns against Malatya in the west, against Qulḥa in the north and Puluadi in the east (1995, p. 52; Fig. 1), perhaps suggesting that Sarduri's triumph over Ashur-nerari V's forces had taken a significant toll on Urartu's military capabilities. During this time, Kahn argues that Arpad seized the opportunity to expand its territory. This is supported by evidence that in the west Arpad incorporated land formerly under Umqi's control into its borders, and in the east it encroached on territory formerly belonging to Bit-Agusi (Kahn 2007, p. 76). Arpad's expansion, according to Kahn, saw the state emerge as the dominant power in the west in the middle of the 8th century (2007, pp. 76 ff.). While Kahn may be somewhat overstating Arpad's power at this time, one wonders whether Arpad continued to pay regular tribute payments to Sarduri over the next decade or whether the receipt of tribute received by Sarduri from Mati'il following the defeat of Ashur-nerari V's forces represented 'spot tribute', or a one-off payment to bring about the withdrawal of Urartian forces from Arpad's territory. A subsequent campaign by Sarduri against Arme and three of Kummuh's cities, including Uita, Ḥalpa, and Parala¹⁵², may suggest that Urartu still retained a presence in this area. However, this incident is difficult to assign a date to and most scholars have sought, on the basis of very little evidence, to connect these events with 743 BC and therefore, to provide a probable cause for Tiglath-pileser's campaign against Urartu and the coalition in this year¹⁵³. However, even Astour admits that there is no evidence that Sarduri ever managed to establish any long-term control over Arme (1979, p. 5), and there is no evidence that Kummuh was subsequently made an Urartian vassal as a result of this campaign (*contra* Kahn 2007, p. 83). Indeed, the tribute which Sarduri received from Kushtashpi of Kummuh was likely

¹⁵² For the location of these cities, see Astour (1979).

¹⁵³ Astour (1979, p. 5) for example assigns a date of 746 or 745 BC while Salvini dates it just before 743 BC or in the same year (1995, p. 52)

also “spot” tribute and did not constitute the incorporation of Kummuh as an Urartian vassal state.

Still, the involvement of Urartu in the coalition and the Eponym Chronicle’ entry for the year 743 BC “defeat of Urartu made” warrants comment and has led some to interpret Urartu’s participation in the alliance as an indication of Sardurri’s hegemony over the alliance (see Astour 1979, p. 6.). However, while it is clear from Urartian sources that Arpad and Kummuh were either conquered by or submitted to Urartu sometime during the decade preceding Tiglath-pileser’s advance on the west, there are clearly problems with this model owing to a lack of other evidence. Urartu’s receipt of tribute from Arpad and Kummuh in this period may not have constituted the regular tribute payments that served as the basis of a sovereign-vassal relationship, and perhaps more importantly, there is no evidence that any of the other members of the alliance were tributary states of Urartu in this period. Indeed, the question of Urartu’s real strength during this period was essentially answered in the conflict of 743 BC. The Assyrian annals present the clash between Assyrian and Urartian forces in 743 BC as a small skirmish, from which Sarduri made a quick retreat, and was certainly not the level of opposition one would expect from a rival power. From the report of the battle given in the ARI and the Eponym Chronicle entry for the year 743 BC which records “a defeat of Urartu was made”, it is more than likely that Urartu’s participation in the alliance ended in 743 BC when Sarduri fled the battlefield. Tiglath-pileser’s success in this battle might solely be credited to the manoeuvrability of the Assyrian cavalry which were especially useful when fighting in mountainous terrain and could be effectively utilised to chase down fleeing armies (Dezső 2012a, pp. 45-48). However, given that Urartu was not able to launch any further counter-offensives to prevent Assyria’s northern expansion during Tiglath-pileser’s reign, reasoning would suggest that Urartu was prevented from any further military aggression by its inability to match Assyria’s military power during this period. A later campaign by Tiglath-pileser III to Urartu in 735 BC resulted, according to the ARI (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 41, 21’b-26’, p. 103), in Sarduri’s confinement to his capital Ṭurušpâ. Although Tiglath-pileser did not capture the city, probably due

to its location situated deep in the mountains in terrain difficult for an army to traverse, further evidence of Urartian decline during this period is given by Tiglath-pileser's report to have marched unopposed throughout the land of Urartu. Rather than support the image of a powerful hegemonic nation which dominated a coalition of north-Syrian states, this episode suggests that Urartu's military capabilities were already waning in 743 BC and that Urartu was likely in no position to assert a hegemonic leadership role over a coalition of north-Syrian states. Although Sarduri had managed to bring about an Assyrian defeat at the beginning of his reign, Sarduri's almost complete absence from north-Syria in subsequent years and Tiglath-pileser's crushing victory over Sarduri's forces in 743 BC suggest that Urartu was already in a state of decline when Tiglath-pileser marched west in 743 BC.

If this is correct, then we might question the view put forward by scholars such as Astour (1979), Radner (2011a; 2010, p. 29), and Salvini (1995) that Assyrian expansion in this area was aimed at countering the growth of Urartian influence and expansion. Indeed, the Eponym Chronicle makes it clear that it was Arpad, not Urartu, which represented Assyria's primary target for conquest.

Urartu's inability to effectively respond to Assyrian campaigning in this area must therefore be recognised for what it was – a factor which contributed to the creation of conditions which favoured imperial expansion in this area, conditions which Tiglath-pileser must certainly have been aware of. In light of this, Tiglath-pileser's creation of a western empire was thus more likely to have resulted from seized opportunity rather than planned imperial conquest, and was, in part, dependent on the decline of Urartu during this period. While there were certainly economic and strategic reasons to attempt a conquest of Arpad¹⁵⁴, these reasons should not be viewed in isolation from other

¹⁵⁴ Arpad was the capital of Bit-Agusi, a territory located in north Syria which was positioned at a juncture between roads leading north into Anatolia, south towards south Syria and Palestine, and east towards Assyria and beyond. Control over this region would have been highly prized both for its strategic significance and economic value.

contributing factors. Assyria had a history of defeat and weakness in the west which had earlier defined the reign of Tiglath-pileser's predecessor. When Tiglath-pileser III came to the throne in 745 BC Assyria's defeat at Arpad by Urartian forces during the reign of Ashur-nerari V was not an event of the distant past. Tiglath-pileser had ascended the throne in a time of great internal instability when civil strife was threatening Assyrian cities, and it was likely that Tiglath-pileser's early campaign efforts were aimed at curbing these internal problems. With rebellion threatening a number of Assyrian cities, Assyrian campaigns during these early years may have served to divert both men of fighting age and professional soldiers capable of serving as mercenaries away from the Assyrian cities. Moreover, Assyrian victories not only resulted in the influx of tribute and booty to Assyria (see Elat 1982), but could also serve to reduce discontent among the population and the elites after Assyria had suffered through such a long period of decline. From an ideological perspective, Tiglath-pileser III's efforts to re-establish Assyrian control over Arpad, the setting of a recent Assyrian defeat, followed one of the basic principles of Assyrian foreign policy which sought the re-establishment of Assyrian control over lost territorial holdings. The recovery of lost territorial holdings represented one of the primary objectives of Assyrian campaigning during the 9th century, when Assyrian kings sought to restore the traditional borders of the empire established under their predecessors in the 11th and 10th centuries largely lost due to the encroachment of Aramaean tribes in the 10th century (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 1; Liverani 2004). The re-subjugation of revolting vassal-states, moreover, was a primary duty of kingship, along with the further expansion of the empire's borders¹⁵⁵. The recovery of a territory lost during the preceding period of weakness would not only provide confirmation of the empire's restoration during this period, it was a demonstration of Tiglath-pileser's fitness to rule¹⁵⁶. Though the eventual subjugation of this area did present

¹⁵⁵ See Tadmor (1997;1999).

¹⁵⁶ This goal was probably also responsible for inciting Tiglath-pileser's earlier campaign to the east where Assyria had lost a number of territorial holdings under Adad-nerari III (Diakonoff 1991, pp. 14-15).

Assyria with a number of economic and strategic advantages¹⁵⁷, there is no indication from the evidence that Tiglath-pileser's initial intervention in this area was aimed at the conquest and annexation of the greater west, as some scholars suggest (Parker 2001, pp. 218-219; Radner 2010, p. 29; Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 1-2). Further, the sources do not support the conclusion that the alliance which mobilised against Tiglath-pileser III in 743 BC was specifically "anti-Assyrian", that is formed as a coordinated effort to resist Assyrian expansion. It is clear from the Assyrian annals that the coalition of states mobilised in 743 BC at the request of Arpad rather than in defence of their own autonomy, and it is likely that this mobilisation was based on existing treaty agreements or obligations. If we consider the historical context of Tiglath-pileser's campaigns then there seems little reason to suggest that this coalition would mobilise to oppose Assyria's efforts at imperial expansion at this time. Assyria had not actively been a threat to the western states since the days of Ashur-dan III (771-754 BC), and even then Assyrian military power had been in decline. Tiglath-pileser's campaigns prior to this point had also largely resembled raids, rather than organised imperial conquest, and there was certainly no precedent for Tiglath-pileser's sweeping conquest and annexation of this area which might encourage states to take a definitive stand against Assyria.

5.7 Conclusion:

¹⁵⁷ The subjugation of this area not only allowed Tiglath-pileser to establish control over the rich trade networks which traversed this region and connected countries situated further inland, such as Babylonia and Iran, with the Mediterranean, it was also strategically valuable. The establishment of Assyrian control over this area would ultimately allow Tiglath-pileser to remove Urartu's ally base in North Syria and thus limit its ability to wield power and influence in the region. Assyria's annexation of this area would also provide a platform from which further campaign operations could be carried out northwards against Urartu in 735 BC, and into Syria-Palestine from 734-732 BC. For the view that the 743 BC campaign was a response to Urartian expansion in this region, see Astour (1979 p. 6), Grayson (1998, p. 135) & Na'aman (1991, pp. 90-91).

If we examine the Arpad coalition in the wider context of alliance formation in the west, it can be seen that there is strong reason to doubt the accuracy of the wider anti-Assyrian coalition theory, which attributes coalition formation in this area during the 9th and 8th centuries solely as a response to Assyrian campaigning and efforts at imperial expansion. The authors of the Assyrian sources presented coalitions as decidedly hostile to Assyrian interests¹⁵⁸, yet, it is clear from the evidence that not all alliances attested in this period solely pursued anti-Assyrian policies. Alliances were an effective means by which local states could be protect and further pursue their own interests. Some alliances are reported in conflicts not with Assyria but with other local states, suggesting that coalitions might pursue local as well as international policies. This is not to say that anti-Assyrian

¹⁵⁸ Military encounters were used, in particular, to emphasise the king's military prowess and to present the king as one worthy of the Assyrian throne. This literary aspect of the Assyrian annals is discussed in 2.2.1. Given this, it is not surprising that coalition armies and their defeat were a popular theme in the ARI, since it was perceived that they were generally of a larger size than single-state armies. This impression is given in the description of the Qarqar alliance, which faced Shalmaneser III in 853 BC. In the Kurkh Monolith Stele, scribes not only gave the names of participating states but also the number of forces each state contributed (see 5.2.1). The purpose in providing this detail was almost certainly to impress onto the audience the considerable large size of opposition forces faced by the Assyrian king. The consequence of this being that there was a perception, at least among those composing the annals, that coalitions posed a greater challenge to Assyrian kings than did conventional armies comprised of only one state's forces. On this point, note that the scribes who composed Tiglath-pileser's annals often detailed the names of enemy states which faced Assyria alone or as part of a coalition, but do not give any fixed numbers on the size of enemy forces. Figures were, on occasion, given for the number of captives taken or deportees settled in foreign lands (see, for example, Tadmor and Yamada, 2011, No. 13, 11a-12b, 16b-18a, pp. 43-44), however, none are ever given for enemy forces faced in military encounters. I suspect that the absence of these figures relates to the relative weakened state of many of Tiglath-pileser's opponents who were not able, for one reason or another, to mount any effective resistance to Assyrian expansion at this time. This would account for why scribes placed so much emphasis on reporting the names of Tiglath-pileser's adversaries rather than the size of enemy forces, and possibly why so many individual Aramaean tribes are listed as subjugated peoples in the annals, a number of which are not found in Assyrian sources for any other time period either before or after Tiglath-pileser's reign. For a discussion of these tribes and their location, see Frame (2013).

coalitions did not exist in the West during this period, but rather, that alliance formation was common to this area and that its causes were probably varied. Of all the alliances examined above dating to the 9th and 8th centuries, only the Qarqar coalition can be considered an alliance likely formed in response to intensive Assyrian campaign efforts. Although alliances may have served to strengthen economic ties between states, most alliances were probably formed in response to strong regional rivalries which existed between states in this area.

A re-assessment of the evidence for Tiglath-pileser's 743 BC campaign against North Syria shows that Tiglath-pileser's military activities here between the years 743 and 740 appear primarily directed against Arpad, rather than greater Syria, which drew the involvement of a local coalition of North-Syrian states. The re-subjugation of Arpad following its loss during the reign of Ashur-nerari V was likely pursued by Tiglath-pileser III because it represented territory lost during the earlier period of Assyrian decline. Though there is no denying that Tiglath-pileser's subsequent rapid conquest of the west was, in part, strategically dependent on the earlier subjugation of north-Syria, there is no reason to assume that the 743 BC campaign against Arpad had originally comprised part of a wider plan to conquer the west. If anything, Tiglath-pileser's subsequent thrust into Syria and Palestine was opportunistic, and likely brought about by the favourable political and military conditions that had taken hold here, the most significant being the decline of Urartu.

CHAPTER 6 Assyrian Imperial Policies and the Role of the Provincial System in the Growth of Empire

6.1 Introduction

The development of the province system in the 9th century marked a turning point in the history of the Assyrian empire. The direct incorporation of foreign territory into the empire forced Assyrian kings not only to adapt their imperial policies, but also to negotiate a number of considerable administrative and military challenges resulting from this dramatic shift in policy. The incorporation of large tracts of annexed territory into the Assyrian empire requiring permanent garrisoning and administrative structures was far more costly than the vassal system, where Assyrian control was largely maintained through threat of force alone (see Parker 2001, pp. 250-251 & pp. 259-260). The establishment of permanent garrisons in annexed territory, however, was necessary not only to guard against possible uprisings, but also because the expansion of the “land of (the god) Aššur” had established clear definable perimeters for the outer borders of the empire which required defending against foreign invaders (Postgate 1991). Since it was not possible to provide for the defence and security of these territories and to carry out further expeditionary campaigns using soldiers drawn from Assyria’s ‘home’ provinces alone, it became necessary from this period onwards to draw on foreign troops either through *corvée* service or as mercenaries to bolster numbers in the army. However, though foreign troops now appear regularly in the service of the army, it is clear that Assyria was still largely dependent on a local reserve of forces drawn from the Assyrian home provinces to sustain troop numbers during the 9th century. The tremendous burden of supplying a steady stream of troops to the armed forces could explain why revolt is so frequently recorded in Assyrian cities during the 9th and first half of the 8th centuries¹⁵⁹, and why Assyria was

¹⁵⁹ The revolts recorded in the Eponym Chronicle for the final few years of Shalmaneser III’s reign (826-823 BC)

(Millard 1994, p. 57), for example, have puzzled historians considering this period is marked by an intensive period

unable to sustain several surges of imperial expansion during this period. Under these conditions, Assyrian kings were faced with the challenge of maintaining the delicate balance between the increased military demands of the empire for manpower and retaining the continued support and loyalty of the home provinces, which still supplied the bulk of the army's military forces. From the reign of Tiglath-pileser III this situation was remedied through a series of military reforms. Greater numbers of foreign soldiers were now incorporated into the army, curbing the army's dependency on Assyrian cities to provide the bulk of the manpower for the army, and troops stationed in provincial territories were greater utilised, not only as expeditionary forces but also to provide logistical support to armies campaigning on the outer fringes of the empire. Campaigns were no longer initiated solely from the capital territory in Assyria but could now be deployed from anywhere in the empire, enabling Assyria to quickly respond to incidents of revolt and to carry out multiple campaign operations simultaneously. While it was probably the introduction of these reforms by Tiglath-pileser which were responsible for stabilising Assyria's domestic situation, by minimising the army's dependency on the home provinces to supply military forces, these reforms had a much larger impact on the growth of empire during this period, effectively removing the military constraints which had earlier bound Assyria and the limits of its imperial expansion.

This chapter aims to provide an alternate framework from the economic model typically used to account for Assyria's transition to a territorial-based empire, which began in the 9th century and

of successful imperial expansion, witnessing a substantial growth in Assyrian power and, what must have been, a vast increase in the wealth accumulated in Assyrian cities (Yamada 2000, pp. 225-271). The revolts recorded in the final years of Shalmaneser's reign show that Assyria's domestic uprisings during the 9th and first half of the 8th centuries were not isolated to the reigns of weak Assyrian rulers, and therefore cannot strictly be accounted for as a domestic reaction to the recession of the empire's borders. Shalmaneser III campaigned almost every year of his thirty-five year reign, and thus the internal strife noted in Assyrian cities at the end of his reign could have been a reaction to the military burden imposed on Assyrian cities during this period for maintaining and extending the empire.

culminated with the massive expansion of the province system carried out under Tiglath-pileser III. It must be stressed, however, that the theory proposed here, which seeks to explain this transition as resulting largely from the military needs of the empire, does not seek to challenge other explanations for Assyria's transition to a territorial based empire. Rather, the hope is that this discussion will add a further dimension to this debate by drawing attention to the military implications and advantages resulting from Assyria's pursuit of this imperial policy, which must ultimately be viewed as originating from the convergence of a number of different, often competing interests, such as ideological considerations, the demand for resources and manpower, and strategy, security and defence.

6.2 Theories of Empire

6.2.1 A Definition of Empire

Doyle defines "empire" as simply "effective political sovereignty of another political society", whether formal or informal, and imperialism as the policy of establishing or sustaining empire (1986, p. 45). Formal control is achieved through annexation and the appointment of a governor to rule over the subordinate state with the cooperation of local elites, while informal control is maintained through local rulers who remain legally autonomous but politically dependent on the dominant state (Doyle 1985, p. 130). This definition of empire offered by Doyle is preferred over others because it avoids incorporating any disputed notions of the sources or motives behind empire creation. I stress this since most studies focusing on the history of the Neo-Assyrian empire tend to incorporate these notions into a definition of empire, a problem recently illustrated by Parker who states, "most scholars would agree that empires are expansionist states that hold dominion over diverse subject polities of varying scope and complexity, and that these states are largely concerned with channelling resources from their subject territories to the core polity for economic benefit and

political perpetuation of a limited segment of the population” (2001, n. 29, p. 12)¹⁶⁰, and hence presupposes that imperial expansion is the direct product of economic policy perpetuated for the sole benefit of the ruling classes. Though empires do characteristically exploit the economies of subjugated polities, the motive behind this exploitation is not always assured. Is the economic exploitation of conquered territories the chief purpose behind a state’s imperial expansion, or is this merely a probable consequence of this expansion? The influence of economic policy on theories of imperialism is further discussed below in 6.2.3.

6.2.2 The “Network Model” Empire

A very debated model of Assyrian imperialism proposed in more recent years is undoubtedly Liverani’s “Network Model”. In the article titled “The Growth of the Assyrian Empire in the Habur/Middle Euphrates Area: A New Paradigm” (1988), Liverani argued against the conventional territorial model or “oil stain” pattern of Assyrian imperial expansion which views expansion as taking place through the conquest and physical incorporation of continuous areas of land into the Assyria empire. Rather, he suggests that Assyrian expansion took place through a process of establishing “islands” of Assyrian occupied zones connected through a “network of communications over which goods are carried” (1987, p. 86). According to Liverani, areas between Assyrian centres of control were occupied by vassal states, as well as enemy zones where local kings ruled independent of Assyrian control. Successive Assyrian campaigning and conquest, however, eventually consolidated territories through a gradual “thickening” of networks which thereby resulted in an extension of Assyrian control (1987, pp. 85-86)¹⁶¹. Though Liverani’s model

¹⁶⁰ Note that this definition is similar to that offered by Adams (1979, p. 59).

¹⁶¹ Note that the theory postulated by Liverani is applied by him only to the 9th century, specifically from the reign of Adad-nerari II (911-891 BC) to Ashur-nasirpal II (883-859), but theorised as a pattern of expansion continuing up until the beginning of the reign of Tiglath-pileser III (Liverani 1987, pp. 91-2).

sought only to provide a paradigm for Assyrian expansion in the Habur/Middle Euphrates area for the reigns of Adad-nirari II, Tukulti-Ninurta II and Ashurnasirpal, the model has since been applied by other scholars, such as Parker¹⁶² and Bernbeck¹⁶³, to other areas of the empire and viewed as a general model by which the extension of Assyrian authority and control can be understood.

Postgate has criticised Liverani's primary thesis largely on the basis that this model misrepresents the manner in which Assyrian control was extended throughout administered territories. He argues that direct control of foreign administered territory will inevitably resemble a "network" and not an "oil stain" because human habitation is not evenly distributed across a landscape. Assyria need not have assumed direct control over every parcel of land in a territory, so long as control was maintained over the major civic centres to which surrounding agricultural land was attached and linked through a communication network. Thus, in territories where Assyria maintained a permanent presence, there is no reason to assume that Assyrian control was not existent or waned between centres of occupation (1991, p. 255). Rather, Postgate envisions an imperial system where

¹⁶² Parker's study of Assyrian expansion in the Upper Tigris River region of south-eastern Turkey, for example, combined both the theories of Liverani (1988) and D'Altroy (1992) to explain the dynamics of Assyrian expansion in this area. Following Liverani (1988), Parker also views the empire as consisting primarily of a network of "communication and transportation corridors" (2001, p. 255) which were gradually thickened over time. He further argues that Assyria established direct imperial control only over a select few agricultural areas in the Upper Tigris which were economically and strategically valuable (2001, p. 255).

¹⁶³ Bernbeck has more recently offered an alternate perspective of the network empire in the context of Assyrian expansion. Bernbeck agrees that the Assyrian empire took the form of a network model empire, however, disagrees with Liverani and Parker that this formed part of a deliberate policy aimed at territorial expansion. Rather, he suggests that this model emerged as a result of Assyria's inability to exert significant military or political influence beyond the immediate periphery of Assyrian centres. He further argues against the identification of areas outside of imperial control as "buffer zones", or neutral areas located in contested areas between two rival powers, suggesting that these peripheral areas were simply beyond the reach of Assyrian control and that Assyria never showed any interest in administering them even after the reforms of Tiglath-pileser III (2010, pp. 152-153).

Assyrian control was tightly maintained and evenly distributed throughout provincial territories, suggesting that Liverani's network model is better applied to vassal states¹⁶⁴ where Assyrian control need not have extended beyond the immediate periphery of the capital or seat of the local ruler in order to effectively enforce Assyrian control and authority¹⁶⁵.

Though Parker has argued that the Neo-Assyrian empire in the Upper Tigris River area predominately took the form of a "Network Empire" rather than a continuous area of occupied territory, there is considerable evidence to show that Assyrian control was extended beyond the core centres in these territories. The existence of village managers, officials appointed to oversee local villages in provincial territories (Postgate 1979, p. 216), in particular, provides firm evidence against the network model empire and supports Postgate's theory that Assyrian control extended beyond the immediate periphery of major urban centres in occupied territory. In a letter from Tušhan (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 21), drought has forced village managers to come down from the mountains to purchase straw for their respective communities. The official writing to the

¹⁶⁴ Note that Postgate prefers the term "client" on the basis that the term "vassal" holds feudal connotations (1991, p. 252).

¹⁶⁵ Postgate further suggests that where surrounding areas continued to be occupied by local autonomous rulers, this should not be interpreted as weakness in the imperial system, but rather a feature of Assyrian policy which was flexible and allowed local polities to co-exist where they were willing to cooperate with Assyria (1991: 256). It might further be pointed out that part of Liverani's argument is dependent on the notion that Assyrian kings during this period repeatedly utilised the same campaign trail along the Habur and Euphrates rivers, which he argues was an attempt to "thicken" pre-existing networks of control (Liverani 1987, pp. 86-87). However, there are a number of other explanations which could account for why this area was repeatedly targeted by Assyrian kings during this period. The fact that it was often necessary for Assyrian kings to mount campaigns in this area in order to collect tribute raises the possibility that this revenue could be identified as spot tribute rather than annual tribute, suggesting that none of the cities situated in this area were regular tribute-paying states. Another possibility is that the states located in this area were regular tribute-paying states but frequently refused to pay this, forcing Assyrian kings to conduct regular campaigns in this area.

king makes it clear that it is his responsibility to ensure adequate provisions reach these village communities, stating “They have sold (them) whatever *harbu* (straw) there was”. Though this letter does not indicate whether these managers were local or Assyrian, it is clear from another letter, (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 291, r. 5-6, p. 206), that village managers were under state control where they are designated *rab ālāni ša šarri* or “royal village managers”¹⁶⁶. Indeed village managers appear to have formed only one part of a hierarchy of officials appointed to control and administer occupied territories. Another letter from the Nimrud corpus (ND. 2618) lists a number of villages or towns under the control of an appointed official (see Parker 1961, pp. 37-38). The official referred to in this text must have acted as an intermediary between the province's central administration and the lower-ranked village managers who managed the individual villages or towns. Thus, the evidence supports Postgate’s thesis that Assyrian control penetrated beyond the immediate peripheries of major urban centres through a hierarchy of officials which formed part of a provinces administrative system.

A further argument against the network model concerns the origins of this theory, which lay in modern examples of imperialism¹⁶⁷, particularly that of the United States¹⁶⁸ which has purposefully pursued informal empire in order to avoid territorial commitments. In the modern world-system, territorial commitments are typically viewed as burdensome and a largely unworkable model for

¹⁶⁶ Reference to “village managers” is also made in several letters from the reign of Sargon II (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 3, r.3-9; No. 152, 15; No. 179: r.6).

¹⁶⁷ See for example, Smith (2005, pp. 838 ff.; 2003) and Wilkinson (2003).

¹⁶⁸ Bernbeck (2010) however, attempts to overcome the problems associated with comparing ancient and modern imperial systems in his discussion on the similarities between Assyria and the United States. In agreement with Liverani, Bernbeck views Assyria as essentially functioning as a network empire, which he compares with the modern example of the United States. In contrast to Assyria, however, which utilised urban centres and forts as “nodes”, the nodes of the network empire created by the United States is predominately comprised of military bases (2010, pp. 143-144).

imperial expansion (Thompson and Zuk 1986, p. 251). This is explained by Thompson and Zuk, who state of territorial commitments, that “there is an increased need for land-based armies (and their associated expenses) first to conquer the new territories, then to defend them against rivals, and, inevitably, to suppress/police subsequent tendencies toward revolt, unrest and disintegration. The territorial expansion of empire, while seemingly a ‘sun- never-setting’ hallmark of politico-economic success in the world system, can become a quagmire of world power” (1986, p. 250). Though some modern states may purposefully pursue a network model of empire because existing political and military conditions make it impossible for them to pursue a traditional territorial-based empire, it is important to remember that ancient empires were not subject to these same conditions which have given rise to alternate models of empire in more recent times. The 20th century saw numerous conflicts, including two World Wars, the development of nuclear weapons, and the formation of the United Nations which has sought to put in place diplomatic processes and legal measures to prevent the use of force in the resolution of conflicts between nation-states. Following World War II, the United Nations further pushed for the “decolonisation” of numerous occupied territories, a process and, in doing so, discouraged the creation of territorial empires. While the decolonisation of some territories has not always occurred peacefully, as the example of East Timor shows¹⁶⁹, states which today seek to pursue territorial empires by violating the sovereignty of other nations face significant international pressure to withdraw and may even have sanctions imposed on them as a result¹⁷⁰. States in the ancient world were not governed by these same circumstances which today actively seek to prevent and discourage states from pursuing a territorial empire, and

¹⁶⁹ East Timor was occupied and annexed by Indonesia in 1975 only nine days after declaring independence from Portugal. Following several decades of violent occupation, Indonesia finally surrendered control over east Timor in 1999 under pressure from the United Nations. Clark concluded that Indonesia violated international law in its occupation of East Timor (1980), but has since not been held accountable for these violations by the international community.

¹⁷⁰ The UN, for example, imposed significant economic sanctions on Iraq in August 1990 following Iraq’s invasion of neighbouring Kuwait. However, see n. 169 on Indonesia’s violations in East Timor.

thus often had no need to pursue alternate models of empire such as a network model empire.

6.2.3 Economics: The Primary Driver of Assyrian Imperialism?

The theory of economic imperialism views imperial conquest, resulting in either direct or indirect control, as motivated predominantly by a desire to establish control over the natural resources and/or wealth of other polities (Dmitriev 2009). It originated in the late 19th century and was inspired by what was perceived as the formative policies of British colonial expansion and the influence of “capitalism” on industrial societies (Dmitriev 2009, pp. 785-786). According to Dmitriev, the theory largely declined from the beginning of the 20th century as a model used to account for the imperial policies of ancient empires, particularly that of ancient Rome, for a number of reasons (2009, pp. 785-790). The theory not only presupposes that ancient economies functioned as capitalist systems¹⁷¹, it was based on the idea that imposing imperial control over a subordinate polity in the ancient world required a formal organisation, which it did not (2009, p. 787).

Economics continues to be put forward as the primary explanation for ancient imperial policies (see, for example, Adams (1979, p. 59); Eisenstadt (1979, pp. 21 & 25); Ekholm and Friedman (1979)¹⁷²; Gurney 1979, p. 163); Parker (2001), and has remained the focus of discussions on the imperial policies of the Neo-Assyrian empire. It is common in discussions on Assyrian imperialism for scholars to suggest that expansion was pursued in some areas because they supported vital networks along major trade routes that Assyria sought to control¹⁷³, or where annexation was

¹⁷¹ Though capitalist production and markets existed in ancient economies, capitalist institutions, whereby traders and producers exercised power within existing political systems, did not emerge until the 16th century (Chase-Dunn & Sokolovsky 1983, pp. 358-359). See, however, the objections of Ekholm and Friedman to maintaining a clear distinction between pre-capitalist and capitalist societies (1979).

¹⁷² Ekholm and Friedman go so far as to view imperialism as the necessary consequence of economic processes aimed at capital accumulation (1979, pp. 44-46).

¹⁷³ This theory is particularly argued for Babylonia and the Levant, both incorporated into the empire during the reign

pursued, that Assyrian territorial control was aimed at the direct exploitation of the economies of subjugated states¹⁷⁴. Rather than view economic exploitation as one possible motivation behind imperial policies¹⁷⁵, these theories take the economic result of expansion as the very reason for the existence of imperial policies.

There are several reasons to doubt the notion that Assyrian imperial policy, particularly the move towards the territorial annexation of subject polities, was shaped solely by economic interests.

Firstly, there is no evidence to show that a definitive link existed between Assyrian campaigning and trade routes¹⁷⁶, nor is there any evidence to support the notion that the primary aim of territorial expansion was to take control of the economies of conquered nations, though it is clear that the empire's operation and continued expansion was dependent on a continuous supply of resources and manpower¹⁷⁷. While the Assyrian elite certainly did benefit from the pursuit of imperial policies through the proportionate distribution of booty and tribute¹⁷⁸ (Elat 1982, p. 244), it is also clear that it was necessary to redirect a substantial proportion of resources back into the empire in order to pay officials, support the army, build infrastructure, and generally ensure the continuing operation of the empire (Elat 1982, p. 245; Postgate 1979, pp. 202-205). Without this support from taxation,

of Tiglath-pileser III. For Babylonia, see the works of Brinkman (1968, pp. 228) and Cole (1996, pp. 69 ff.), in particular. In regard to the Levant, this view is particularly expressed by Bennet (1978: 165), Ehrlich (1991, pp.54), Eph'al (1984, pp. 146-151), and Tadmor (1966, pp. 87, 90 & 91).

¹⁷⁴ For the role of economic exploitation in imperial policy, see, for example, the works of Brown (1986, pp. 109-112), Gitin (1997), and Parker (2001). For the theory that Assyrian imperial policy was motivated by both a desire to control trade routes and to exploit the natural resources of conquered territories, see Bedford (2009, pp. 44 and 48).

¹⁷⁵ Doyle notes that though exploitation presupposes political control, it does not always result from the imposition of that control (1986, p. 33).


¹⁷⁶ See the reservations expressed by Grayson on this issue (1976, p. 135).

¹⁷⁷ For this, see Postgate (1974).

¹⁷⁸ Identified here as governors, military commanders and high-ranking officials employed in the various civil and military administrative systems of state.

the empire could simply not have functioned¹⁷⁹, and thus the empire operated largely as a redistributive model (Fig. 3) rather than as a one-way economic model, simply absorbing wealth and resources from the periphery to the core centre (Fig. 2)¹⁸⁰.

Figure 2 – A One-Way Economic Model




→ = manufactured goods, raw materials and other forms of wealth from taxation

¹⁷⁹ Reservations regarding the economic motives of Roman expansion have likewise been expressed by Dmitriev: “Roman taxes and levies went either to feed the city of Rome or to maintain armies along the borders. At least during the imperial period, therefore, the Roman military machine required more money than it could possibly bring in, which allows one to question the economic motive behind Roman military policy” (2009, pp. 793-794).

¹⁸⁰ This is not to say that Assyria did not likely absorb a large bulk of the wealth from the annexed territories, but that it was necessary to re-distribute some of these resources and wealth back to the annexed territories as a means of promoting their operation and to redistribute some of the wealth back to the elites and high-ranking officials which resided in these territories (see Elat 1982).

Figure 3 – A Redistributive Economic Model



→ = manufactured goods, raw materials and other forms of wealth from taxation

A further argument against an economic motive for Assyrian territorial expansion is the fact that Assyria was able to gain effective control over the economy of subjugated states already through the vassal system (see 6.3.1), and while annexation may have facilitated this in some ways, the decision to impose direct territorial rule in areas of the empire cannot be understood through economic policy alone where military and ideological considerations also provided strong incentives for the imposition of direct territorial control. Indeed, it is clear that some areas annexed to Assyrian control must inevitably have incurred an economic loss, where the cost to Assyria of imposing and maintaining direct rule was much higher than the sum total of taxes and resources directly extracted from the territory. The Zagros Mountains, an area which formed a natural border for Assyria to the east and north-east, is one such example of an area of the empire where Assyria's annexation policy was more likely governed by issues of security and defence than economic policy. This area was inhabited by polities which largely supported a pastoral economy, and where the chief commodities acquired by Assyrian kings during the course of their campaigns were horses,

cattle and sheep. Although economic¹⁸¹ and even ideological considerations¹⁸² have been proposed as possible reasons for Assyrian campaigning here, this area formed Assyria's vulnerable eastern and north-eastern borders and was occupied by mountainous terrain both difficult to traverse and defend. Assyria's annexation policy therefore, while probably being shaped by other economic and ideological factors, can be viewed as resulting largely from the need to provide for the security and defence of Assyria proper, particularly against Urartu in the north, which Tiglath-pileser had not yet defeated in battle when he began his expansion into this area¹⁸³. It is no wonder that parts of the Zagros were already subject to Assyrian annexation even before the reign of Tiglath-pileser III¹⁸⁴. Tiglath-pileser's further penetration of the eastern frontier, deep into Median territory, was probably pursued as a reaction Urartu's earlier campaigning in this area¹⁸⁵ and was also an effort to

¹⁸¹ Brown has attributed Assyrian campaigning here to a desire to control agricultural lands (Brown 1986, pp. 109 ff.), while Jankowska and Reade have both argued that this area was used to supply the state with a regular source of horses (Jankowska 1967, p. 266; Reade 1979, p. 329).

¹⁸² Lanfranchi has noted that the Medes retained a reputation among the Assyrians for being uncivilised and barbaric on the one hand, but also fierce and strong warriors whose conquest might pose a challenge to Assyrian rulers and serve to promote their heroic image (2003, pp. 85-92). This image is evident in the inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III where the Medes are repeatedly referred to as "the mighty Medes", KUR *Madai dannūte* (see Tadmor 1994, Summ. 1, 18; Summ 3, 13'; Summ. 7, 32 & 36; Summ. 6, 15). Lanfranchi notes further evidence for this portrayal of the Medes from letters and inscriptions dating to the reign of Sargon II (2003, p. 90).

¹⁸³ Lanfranchi argues that Assyrian expansion into this area was primarily strategically driven, aimed at gaining military supremacy over rival powers, such as Elam and Urartu, and depriving them of valuable allies in this region who could supply them with troops, horses and aid (2003, pp. 98-99). While Urartu's military weakness was made apparent in 743 BC when Tiglath-pileser defeated Sarduri in battle, along with a number of North Syrian states, Urartu would have been perceived as a very real threat to Assyria when Tiglath-pileser ascended the throne in 745 BC following Assyria's defeat by Urartian forces sometime during the reign of Tiglath-pileser's predecessor (see Chapter 5).

¹⁸⁴ Mazamua/Zamua is a case in point.

¹⁸⁵ See Lanfranchi (2003, pp. 98-99). Note, however, the objections of Brown (1986, pp. 109 ff.) and Reade (1979, p. 329) to this thesis who both propose economic explanations for Assyrian expansion in this area.

reconquer those regions lost in the preceding period of weakness.

6.2.4 Agricultural Exploitation: A Current Trend in Theories of Economic Imperialism

Assyria's dependence on foreign supplies of agricultural staples was first emphasised by Oates who concluded that the agricultural land of Assyria proper was not able to support the population of the chief major urban centres of Nineveh and Calah, which exceeded the subsistence capabilities of surrounding agricultural land by at least half (1968, p. 45; see also Reade 1978). Postgate further noted that this coincided with an increasingly urbanised population which had moved away from subsistence occupations, forcing the government to seek out alternative supplies of staples from foreign sources to ensure an interruption in supply from one area did not threaten the overall food supply (1974, pp. 201-202). From this, some scholars have argued that Assyrian territorial expansion in some areas was chiefly motivated by the desire to exploit the agricultural potential of these territories and to safeguard these areas against rival powers, in effect providing "food security" to the Assyrian core territory (Parker 2001; Brown 1986). However, Radner (2000) has questioned the validity of this view that Assyria proper was as inhospitable to agricultural production during the Neo-Assyrian period as previously thought, despite being largely comprised of steppe¹⁸⁶. She argues that during the Neo-Assyrian period Assyrian kings actively sought to increase the agricultural potential of their land in Assyria proper through irrigation projects (Radner 2001, p. 237-8). Indeed, Ur argues that the irrigation projects undertaken by the Neo-Assyrian kings in northern Mesopotamia would have significantly boosted the agricultural potential of Assyria proper, making this area less dependent on rainfall and allowing for the increased production of winter crops, and perhaps also of summer crops which required substantially more water (2005, p.

¹⁸⁶ It is generally considered that only those areas on the Upper Tigris and Habur Basin such as Nineveh, Kalhu, Dur-Sharrukin, and Arbela received enough rainfall to support rainfed agriculture (Harmanşah 2012, p. 61; Kühne 2000, p. 272; Novák 2005, p. 178; Radner 2000, p. 236).

343). These projects, combined with the fact that Assyria, outside of the few major urban centres, was largely rural and capable of maintaining some degree of self-sufficiency without having to rely exclusively on grain imports from outside sources. Nevertheless, some historians have continued to argue that food security represents the leading reason behind Assyria's push for territorial expansion during this period.

In his study of the dynamics of Assyrian imperial expansion in the northern empire, Parker argues that Assyrian territorial expansion in the Cizre Plain and Upper Tigris River Valley was largely motivated by the agricultural potential of these areas which served as vital "agricultural supply zones" for Assyria proper¹⁸⁷. In Parker's view, it was not merely the need to procure these resources which led to an annexation policy in this region, it was also the necessity of safeguarding the supply of these goods and ensuring that a steady stream of staples continued to flow into the Assyrian heartland, which drove territorial expansion (2001, pp. 80-102 & 206-247). For Parker, strategic concerns aimed at limiting Urartian expansion were secondary to Assyria's primary motivation of exploiting the agricultural potential in the Upper Tigris River region, at least. However, the textual evidence cited by Parker for Assyria's agricultural exploitation of these areas is extremely limited. For the Upper Tigris River area, letters discussed are predominantly concerned with provincial administration, military matters and timber supplies (Parker 2001, pp. 227-230), with specific mention of agricultural goods limited to a report on the supply of straw to local villages and the movement of oxen and sheep (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 21), as well the supply of red wool to the palace (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 28) during the reign of Sargon II (Parker 2001, p. 230). For the Cizre Plain, only one letter is presented by Parker which concerns grain exports

¹⁸⁷ Note, however, that Parker views the imposition of different models of Assyrian control in the Cizre Plain, including vassal-states (Kummuh) and buffer-states (Ukku), as a reflection of the zone's geographical location bordering on the state of Urartu, and thus asserts that Assyrian expansion here was also determined by the strategic importance of this area (2001, p. 101).

(Parker 2001, p. 87), and interestingly enough, this refers to a shortage of grain in the Mašennu province, and an explanation by an Assyrian official as to why grain was taken from the grain tax to feed hungry troops stationed here (see Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 289, pp. 202-203). This letter emphasises the very important point that a considerable portion of agricultural produce drawn from provinces was needed to feed troops and facilitate the operation of provincial territories, and that much of the agricultural resources extracted from these territories would never have reached the core centre in Assyria. This notion that a significant portion of food stuffs produced in provinces were required to support the local administration stationed there is confirmed in SAA V 225 where a local official in Mazamua by the name of Adad-issiya complains to the king that the quota of 1,000 homers of grain demanded by the central government exceeds the agricultural capabilities of his province compared with other neighbouring provinces which had ample surplus not only to feed the bureaucracy stationed there, but also animals and to sow (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990). Indeed, the bulk of agricultural produce drawn from provincial territories was more than likely retained and consumed locally, not only because it was needed to support the military and bureaucratic population and their families residing there, but also because long-distance transport of food staples via land routes was incredibly expensive (Lattimore 1979, p. 37). Though the high cost of transport might be substantially reduced by the use of river transport, which Parker suggests was a major factor influencing Assyria's decision to expand into the Cizre Plain (2001, p. 81), there still remains a distinct lack of direct evidence that Assyria exploited the agricultural potential of these regions overwhelmingly for the benefit of the core Assyrian centre¹⁸⁸.

A similar thesis was proposed by Brown (1986, pp. 109-112) for the northern and central Zagros,

¹⁸⁸ Note, however, the objection of Harmanşah who argues that Parker's thesis of "agricultural colonisation" is largely based on Assyrian evidence for deportations and that the survey evidence cited by Parker might alternatively be interpreted as evidence of a response by the local population of this area to renewed settlement in the region brought on by Assyrian expansion (2012, p. 61).

who asserts that Assyrian expansion here, at least before the mid-7th century, was aimed at bringing the rich agricultural valley regions under Assyrian control (1986, pp. 109-110) and tapping into the trade networks which passed through this area (1986, p. 112). According to Brown, Assyrian involvement here from the 9th century coincided with the changes in the Assyrian economy outlined above (1986, pp. 111-112)¹⁸⁹. As with Parker, Brown views economic considerations as the primary driver of Assyrian imperial expansion, asserting that Assyria's annexation of the Kermanshah area in the late 8th century could not have been motivated by strategic interests, given that Urartu had ceased to be a threat by this period. However this assertion is highly questionable, and indeed, the annexation of this area from 716 BC under Sargon II did, in fact, coincide with Assyrian military offensives against Urartu further north. Though this period witnessed some dynastic instability and open rebellion in Urartu against Rusa, the Urartian king, one letter (Parpola 1987, 8) reports that Urartu had launched several offensives against Mannea around this time, capturing a number of Mannean forts (715) and assuming direct control of the Mannean province of Wišdiš (714) (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. XIX). Indeed, Lanfranchi and Parpola suggest that on the basis of Assyrian letters, it is clear that Sargon conducted military operations against Urartu for most of his reign (1990, n. 3 & p. XV). Given this, it is more likely that annexations in this area were carried out in an attempt to limit Urartian expansion further south, which was clearly, still very much a threat to Assyrian interests in this area.

Although recent research has cast doubt on the theory that food security for the Assyrian core was a leading driver of Assyrian territorial expansion, we may still acknowledge that the need to secure Assyria's access to staples, such as food, played at least some role in encouraging Assyria's territorial expansion even if it was not the primary driver of imperial expansion.

¹⁸⁹ The agricultural exploitation of this region for a core market is not likely given the vast distance between this area and Assyria proper. Lattimore states that historically grain ceased to be profitable when transported beyond 100 miles from steppe-frontier-areas due to high transportation costs (1979, p. 35).

6.3 Military Campaigning and the Army

6.3.1 The Purpose of Assyrian Campaigning

From the very beginning of the Assyrian empire, military campaigning had served the fundamental purpose of maintaining defence and security, a purpose which continued up until the fall of the Assyrian empire (Grayson 1976, p. 135; Saggs 1984, p. 246). However, the Assyrian annals never distinguish absolutely between offensive and defensive military actions, and most justifications for war centre around the need to provide offensive military action (see Oded 1992). Since we can be certain that it was necessary at times for Assyria to carry out defensive campaigns, either to secure Assyrian interests or to defend Assyrian territory against incursions from foreign powers, we may conclude that the image of warfare portrayed in the annals results from the tendency of the annals to only promote themes which support the heroic image of the Assyrian king. As Oded concludes, justifications for war are centred very much on supporting the royal ideology of the state (1992, p. 179), and thus a distinction between offensive and defensive campaigns is never fully made in the annals.

In the absence of security concerns, military campaigning was the primary tool employed by Assyria in the creation and extension of empire. With the incorporation of vassal-states and annexed territories under Assyrian rule, campaigning served to ensure the loyalty of subjugated states and was used to suppress rebellions, to force payment of tribute where it had been withheld and to reassert Assyrian control over disloyal subjects. Regular campaigning aided in perpetuating an image of the Assyrian army as a fierce and unrelenting war-machine, which served not only to deter rebellion but also to encourage states to surrender to Assyria without the need for armed conflict. Although it is clear that Assyria also utilised other mechanisms to promote the loyalty of its subjects

and to gain the acceptance of subjugated people to Assyrian control (Lanfranchi 1997), warfare was the primary instrument of Assyrian control and the ultimate source of Assyria's power.

Through regular campaigning the state was sustained through a regular supply of commodities, including valuable items, raw materials and staples sourced from subjugated nations and peoples taken as booty. Spoil supplied the state with most of the materials and commodities needed for the operation of the empire, including the supply of the army¹⁹⁰. Perishables very likely never found their way to Assyrian centres, being consumed immediately by the army, while horses and other equipment seized were used to outfit troops (Grayson 1976, p. 135). Elat has noted that tribute, by contrast, was primarily comprised of luxury items, fewer in quantity, and of less overall value than booty. Tribute, thus, did not make as large a contribution to the imperial economy as booty. Its purpose, according to Elat, was to supply the ruling elite with luxury items and to reconfirm the loyalty of vassal states (1982, p. 245), made known through a very public ceremonial display which served as a visual reconfirmation of Assyrian power firmly integrated into the ideology of the empire¹⁹¹. Given the importance of booty to the imperial economy, Grayson subsequently argues that it was the pursuit of booty which served as the primary objective of Assyrian campaigning, at least in the 9th century (1976, p. 135). Yet, we must consider that the acquisition of commodities continued as a major economic objective of campaigning even during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III when scholars typically stress that campaigning was carried out predominately to facilitate Assyria's

¹⁹⁰ Indeed, Grayson has argued that during the 9th century Assyria was still largely dependent on the king's annual military campaign to source much of the state's raw materials and labour (Grayson 1976, p. 135). Yamada's analysis of the goods obtained by Shalmaneser III during the course of his campaigning as either booty or tribute supports this notion where significant quantities of horses, livestock, metal and metal objects, textiles, ivory, wood, and wine are recorded (Yamada 2000, pp. 259-71).

¹⁹¹ Ashurnasirpal II makes specific reference in one inscription to the public display of tribute-bearers, stating that he had purposefully gathered all the people of his land to witness tribute-bearers making their annual tribute payment in Calah (see Wallis Budge and King 1902, No. 76, IV: 17-22, 47-50, p. 201 and pp. 203-204)

imperial expansion.

Before we consider the evidence for this, it is first necessary to distinguish a further source of revenue derived from Assyrian campaigning – that of “spot tribute”. In addition to booty or spoil seized from defeated opponents, goods were also obtained by Assyria through campaigning as “spot tribute”¹⁹², distinguished from the traditional tribute or *madattu* received on an annual basis in the Assyrian capital from existing Assyrian vassal-states (see Postgate 1974, pp. 119ff.). Spot tribute was received during the course of a military campaign from a subjugated state either to avoid military conflict or as a sign of submission by a subjugated state or people following a military defeat¹⁹³. However, this payment did not necessarily indicate that a prior hegemonic relationship had existed between Assyria and the subjugated state/people, nor that the states/peoples which paid spot tribute continued to make this payment once the Assyrian army had withdrawn. In contrast to annual tribute, spot tribute was entirely dependent on military campaigning for its acquisition, represented a larger sum than did annual tribute, and was received outside of Assyria proper in the context of Assyrian military campaigning as a sign of the submission of a local ruler under threat of force or continued military aggression (Yamada 2000, p. 239). Though the Assyrian inscriptions never make any attempt to differentiate between the two types of tribute (Yamada 2000, n. 21, p. 237), spot tribute constituted a major source of revenue for the empire, was akin to booty in its source and acquisition, and should not be confused with conventional ‘tribute’.

The following table provides a detailed list of the booty and spot tribute acquired by Tiglath-pileser

¹⁹² The term “spot tribute” was coined by Yamada (2000, pp. 236-241), but this type of payment was originally referred to by Elat as “tribute of surrender” (1986, p. 244).

¹⁹³ Following Elat (1982, pp. 245 and 249 n. 9) and more recently Yamada (2000, pp. 236-241). Note that some distinction was already acknowledged by Postgate in *Taxation and Conscription in the Assyrian Empire* (1974, p. 122).

III during the course of his campaigns. Although the list is not complete, being limited by the fragmentary remains of the Assyrian annals¹⁹⁴, the aim of this table is to show that though many of the areas targeted by Tiglath-pileser III were subsequently annexed, the booty and spot tribute acquired during the course of this campaigning also represented a significant economic objective for military campaigning during this period.

Table 8 – Booty and Spot Tribute Acquired by Tiglath-pileser III¹⁹⁵

Geographical Area (I), Year (II)	Contents of Booty or “Spot” Tribute	Place (I) and Context (II)	Text
(I) Babylonia (II) 745 and 731-729 BC	Unidentified amount of spoil taken	I) Aramaean tribes situated in Babylonia “by the banks of the Tigris, Euphrates and Surappi rivers, up to the Uqnu river by the shore of the Lower Sea” II) Taken as booty	Summ. 7, 5-9 (No. 47)
(I) Namri (II) 744	An unidentified number of <u>Bit-Kapsi</u> , <u>Bit-Sangi</u> , <u>Bit- Urzakki</u> : Unidentified number of Bactrian camels, cattle, sheep, and craftsmen. <u>Araziash</u> : unidentified number of horses, cattle, sheep, and lapis lazuli. <u>Bit-Abdadani</u> : 300 talents of lapis lazuli ¹⁹⁶ and other goods, including bronze (Ann. 12 is damaged here)		Ann. 11, 1-8 (No. 7)

¹⁹⁴ Due to the fragmentary nature of the annals I have found it necessary to rely in part on data found in the summary texts. Despite the fact that these texts lack any firm chronological framework, the value of these texts in informing us of the contents of Assyrian booty/spot tribute during this period far outweighs the negative aspects of including this data here. Thus, though the inclusion of these texts makes it impossible to draw specific conclusions regarding the nature of individual campaigns, the information on booty/spot tribute provided by these texts does show that a definitive link existed between Assyrian campaigning and booty during our period. Dates are provided where possible, however, the data is overall arranged in geographical order as per the arrangement of these texts.

¹⁹⁵ Texts cited for specific campaigns are those determined by Tadmor (1994, pp. 232-237, “Supplementary Study A”).

¹⁹⁶ Note that Tadmor (1994, n. 10, p. 50) questions the reading of ‘lapis lazuli’ here given the huge quantity cited.

<p><u>Arpad</u> 743-740¹⁹⁷</p>	<p><u>Urartu:</u> Horses, craftsmen without number</p> <p><u>Kummuh, Tyre, Que, Carchemish, and Gurgum:</u> Unidentified sum of iron, elephant hides, ivory, red-purple and blue purple wool, multi-coloured garments, linen garments, weapons and spindle-shaped implements.</p> <p><u>Damascus:</u> unknown quantity of gold (text broken), 300 talents of silver, 200 talents of an unknown commodity (text broken), 20 talents of Ladanun, as well as other items unknown due to text break.</p> <p><u>Unqi:</u> 300 talents of silver, 100 talents of an unknown commodity (text broken), weapons, multi-coloured garments, linen garments, herbs and furniture from the palace of Tutammu, the king of Unqi.</p>	<p>It is clear from the text these goods were taken only from a raid conducted on Sarduri's camp. It is unclear whether the craftsmen were attached to Sarduri's camp or were inhabitants of the mountains where the military confrontation had taken place.</p> <p>Received as spot tribute in 740 from Damascus following the defeat a coalition of forces, comprising Kummuh, Tyre, Que, Carchemish, and Gurgum¹⁹⁸, and the successful conquest of Arpad.</p> <p>Campaign undertaken in 740 during the final year of the siege against Arpad.</p>	<p>Ann. 17, 10'-14' (No. 9).</p> <p>Ann.21, 7'-10' (No. 11); Ann. 25, 1'-2' (No. 12).</p> <p>Ann.21, 4'-6' (No. 11)</p> <p>Ann. 25, 3'-10' (No. 12)</p>
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¹⁹⁷ Due to the fragmentary state of the annals pertaining to Tiglath-pileser's campaigns against Arpad and the coalition of Anatolian states, for which the annals are fragmentary (No. 9/Annal 17, No. 10/ Annal 20, No. 11/Annal 21, and No. 12/Annal 25 in Tadmor and Yamada 2011), it is necessary here to draw on data from the summary inscriptions concerning the nature of the booty sourced during this campaign.

¹⁹⁸ Melid is not mentioned here but may have offered tribute along with his coalition partners following the defeat of the coalition forces. The text is too broken, however, to know for certain. See Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 11, 1'-10', p. 38).

<u>Ulluba</u> 739	None noted. The annalistic text pertaining to this campaign is extremely fragmentary.	—	Ann. 20, 1'-8' (No. 10); R.R, 16-46 ¹⁹⁹ (No.
<u>Syria.</u> 738	The dating of a list of tribute bearers from Ann. 13-14 ²⁰⁰ may be dated to this year, though this is contentious.	I) North Syria is subjugated.	Ann. 19 (No. 13), 13 (No. 14), 14, 1-5 ²⁰¹ (No. 15).
* Three minor campaigns were also conducted in this year north-east of the Tigris river by Assyrian governors	The booty claimed comprised large quantities of captives, as well as livestock.	A separate campaign was also carried out this year by Assyrian governors against Aramaeans tribes situated on the Zab river and several cities located in the vicinity of Der.	Ann 19, 13-20 (No. 13); Ann. 13, 1-9 (No. 14).
<u>Media</u> 737	No booty is recorded for this year in the annals ²⁰² .		Ann. 14, 5-12 (No. 15); 15 (No. 16), 16 ²⁰³ (No. 17).

¹⁹⁹ = The Mila Mergi Rock Relief, a text whose latest publication appears in in Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 37, pp. 89-92.

²⁰⁰ Note that part of the list has been reconstructed using the duplicate annal No. 32 (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 76-78). For a discussion of the issues surrounding this list, see Tadmor (1994, pp. 265-268, “Supplementary Study D”).

²⁰¹ Texts 30, 31, 32 have been identified as duplicates of these annals (Tadmor and Yamada 2011).

²⁰² This is not surprising since it is likely that Tiglath-pileser’s continued presence in Syria during this year was aimed at the consolidation of Assyrian control over this area and not at further conquest. If this assertion is correct then it is more likely that commodities received by Assyria from subjugated nations represented tribute rather than spoil. The list of tribute bearers recorded in text Nos. 14-15 from the cities of Anatolia as far north as Tabal, Central and Southern Syria, as well as the coast of Philistia may be indicative of this, though the dating of this text, as well as the tribute list from the Iran stele (No. 35) citing many of the same tributary states, are problematic (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011). The ruler of the coastal city of Tyre is given as Hiram in the annals and Tub'ail in the Iran stele. A further problem concerns the omission of Hamath from the Iran Stele (No. 35), see Tadmor (1994, pp. 265-268, “Supplementary Study D”). Tadmor concludes, following Cogan (1973, pp. 97-98) and Na’aman (1978: 229-230), that the annalistic texts date to 738 BC while the Iran stele (No. 35) dates earlier, probably to 740 BC, and make use of an earlier source when Tub'ail was still king of Tyre. The omission of Hamath from the Iran stele (No. 35),

735 BC	Captives, mules, horses, asses, cattle, sheep. <i>Total number uncertain due to fragmentary nature of texts.</i>	I) Urartu II) Taken as booty	Ann. 5 (No. 18).
734 BC	Gold, silver, multi-coloured garments, linen garments, horses.	I) Gaza. II) It is unclear whether the contents should be identified as booty or spot tribute ²⁰⁴ .	Summ 4: 8'-10' (No. 48).
734 BC	10 talents of gold, X talents of silver, and an unidentified sum of property	I) Israel II) Received as spot tribute following a military confrontation with Israel and the replacement of the city's ruler, Peqah, with Hosea.	Summ 4: 15'-19' (No. 42).
734 BC	1,000 captives ²⁰⁵ , 30,000 camels, 20,000 cattle, 5,000 (pouches) of spices, and an unidentified sum of property, including idol statues	I) Samsi, queen of the Arabs at Mount Saqurri II) Taken as booty	Summ. 4: 19'-22'
734 BC	Gold, silver, camels, she-camels, and spices	I) Tribes of Masa, Tema, Saba, Hayappa, Badanu, Hatte, Idiba'ilu II) Received as spot tribute, possibly following the subjugation of Samsi, queen of the Arabs during the course of Tiglath-pileser's campaign to Syria-Palestine.	Summ. 4, 27'-33'
733 BC	Damascus: 800 people with their possessions, cattle and sheep.	I) Damascus II) Taken as booty	Anns. 23, 18/24 ²⁰⁶

however, remains a mystery which not likely be solved until further evidence is uncovered surrounding the political and military circumstances of Assyria's war in Syria between 740 and 739 BC.

²⁰³ Text No. 28: 3-7 is the duplicate of these texts (Tadmor and Yamada 2011).

²⁰⁴ Tiglath-pileser states in his inscriptions that he despoiled the property of Hanun, as well as his gods (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 42, 10', p. 105), yet he further states that after he had returned Hanun to his former position he received the goods identified above (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 42, 12'-15', p. 106). It is not clear whether these goods represent spot tribute or constituted the spoil originally taken from Hanun.

²⁰⁵ See Tadmor's note regarding the exact reading of the number of captives taken in line 20' of text No. 42 (Summary Inscription 4) (1994, p. 142).

²⁰⁶ These two duplicate texts are too fragmentary to include in the analysis of booty given.

	<p><u>Districts of Damascus:</u> Kuruşsa and Sama: 750 captives Metuna: 550 captives</p>		
731-729 BC	<p><u>Sarrabanu:</u> 55,000 captives together with their possessions, and an unidentified sum of spoil, property and goods belonging to Nabu-ushabshi, ruler of Bit-Shilani, including his wife, sons, daughters and gods.</p> <p><u>Tarbasu and Yaballu:</u> 30,000 people together with their possessions, their property, their goods and gods.</p> <p><u>Dur-Balihaya:</u> 40,500 people with their possessions, spoil, property and goods, as well as the wife, sons, daughters and gods belonging to Zaqriru, the ruler of Bit-Sha'alli</p> <p><u>Bit-Dakkuri and Larak:</u> silver, gold and precious stones of an unidentified quantity.</p> <p><u>Bit-Yakin:</u> various products made of gold, pearls, beams of ebony wood, medicinal plants, multi-coloured garments, spices cattle and sheep.</p>	<p><u>Chaldean tribes:</u></p> <p>I) <i>Bit-Shilani</i>, specifically the cities of Sarrabanu, Tarbaşu and Yaballu.</p> <p>II) Booty taken during the course of Tiglath-pileser's campaign against Babylonia</p> <p>I) <i>Bit-Sha'alli</i>, specifically the cities of Dur-Balihaya and Amlilatu</p> <p>II) Booty taken during the course of Tiglath-pileser's campaign against Babylonia</p> <p>I) Bit-Dakkuri, Larak and Bit-Yakin</p> <p>II) Spot tribute. Probably offered to avoid a military confrontation following the defeat of Bit-Amukkani. This is suggested by the fact that Tiglath-pileser received the tribute of Merodach-baladan in Sapiya, the former capital of Bit-Amukkani.</p>	<p>Anns. 7 & 8²⁰⁷</p> <p>Summ. 7, 15-18</p> <p>Summ 7, 19-22</p> <p>Summ. 7, 26-28</p>

As Table 8 shows, booty as well as spot tribute constituted a major source of revenue for the Assyrian empire during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III²⁰⁸. The vast majority of references made in

²⁰⁷ These are too fragmentary to include here in this analysis.

²⁰⁸ Even if we do not accept that the figures given in the ARI are wholly accurate (for a discussion of this issue see De

Tiglath-pileser's inscriptions to tribute constitute 'spot tribute' rather than 'annual tribute' received from existing Assyrian vassal-states, which must have been recorded elsewhere. That Tiglath-pileser III continued to receive these payments annually from a number of subjugated nations is clearly articulated in a commemorative inscription from Iran which, following an extensive list of subjugated states, remarks, "(tribute that) I am to receive annually in Assyria" (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 35, iii 30, p. 87). Table 8 further shows that booty and spot tribute provided substantial incentives for military campaigning, particularly against nomadic peoples which did not possess defensible cities and thus constituted easy targets for the Assyrian army. The subjugation of Samsi, queen of the Arabs by Tiglath-pileser III during the course of his 734 BC campaign (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 43, 19'b-27'a, pp. 106-107) was almost certainly motivated by the economic quest for commodities, and Tiglath-pileser's annals specifically make mention of the fact that this tribe did not possess any defensible structures which might offer protection in the face of an Assyrian assault). In contrast to annual tribute which served to reconfirm the loyalty of vassal-states, spot tribute like booty may have also served to supply the army with regular staples. In 738 BC, for example, booty and spot tribute sourced from campaign operations carried out by Assyrian governors east of the Tigris, was transported (presumably along with the army sent on campaign here) to Syria where Tiglath-pileser's other forces were stationed rather than the Assyrian capital centre (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 12b-14a, p. 43 & 16b-18a, p. 44), suggesting that like booty, spot tribute served to provide the empire with much of the commodities required for its operation.

In addition to the quest for commodities, it is clear that annual campaigning was also motivated by ideological factors. Military campaigning served to legitimise the Assyrian king's position as head of state and was an explicit duty of kingship closely connected with the king's responsibility to

Odorico 1995; Fouts (1994; Millard 1991) we may still conclude on the basis of the frequencies of reference to booty and spot tribute in the ARI that this constituted a significant form of revenue for Assyria.

extend the borders of the empire (Tadmor 1999, p. 55). To this end, military campaigning was pursued almost single-mindedly by Assyrian kings, where the extent to which the borders of the empire were expanded became a measure determining the overall success of an Assyrian king's reign (Grayson 1976, p. 135). The king's heroic attributes, particularly those which highlighted his strength, endurance, and military skill, were as a result strongly emphasised in the ARI, and illustrated in relief sculpture which adorned the walls of royal palaces (Fuchs 2011, pp. 381-383; Tadmor 1997, pp. 326-327)²⁰⁹. This preoccupation with conquest is clearly evident in the adoption of such titles as "king of the universe", "king of the four quarters" and "ruler over all" by the king in the inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 39, 1-3, p. 96) and in the content of the royal inscriptions which emphasise the value of military conquest, often describing the violent nature of military conquest in explicit detail in an effort to emphasise the strength and power of the Assyrian king. Text No. 39, 8-11a (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 96 ff.) provides such an example from Tiglath-pileser's annals, describing the conquest of Bit-Shilani, as follows: "I smashed the land Bit-Šilāni in its entirety like a pot. I destroyed the city Sarrabānu, its (text: "their") great royal city, (making it) like a *tell* after the Deluge and I [plun]dered it. I impaled Nabû-ušabši, their king, before the gate of his city <while making> (the people of) his land <watch>. I carried off his wife, his sons, his daughters, his possessions, (and) the treasures of his palace".

6.3.2 The Assyrian Army

Manitius addressed the issue of the composition of the Assyrian army in several articles published in the early 20th century (1910), and his conclusions have remained largely uncontested by scholars even today (Saggs 1963, p. 145; Postgate 2000, p. 89). Nevertheless, the presence of new evidence and the possibility of alternate interpretations of the existing body of evidence has continued to produce a number of significant works on the Assyrian army (Dezső 2006; Dubovský 2004; Fales

²⁰⁹ See Oded on the typical heroic feats performed by the Assyrian king (1992, pp. 155-157).

2010; Fuchs 2011; Malbran-Labat 1982; Mayer 1995; Postgate 2000, 2007; Reade 1972; Saggs 1963). There is no need to add much to the discussion concerning the constitution of the Assyrian army, but rather mean to address the broader issue of the operation of the army and the roles played by the various military bodies in the maintenance and extension of empire in the later Neo-Assyrian period. The aim of this discussion is to note, in particular, the changes made to the operation of the military system during our period which might have assisted Tiglath-pileser III in expanding the borders of the empire and asserting Assyrian authority over conquered territories. Due to the lack of evidence from the time of Tiglath-pileser III, it is necessary to examine the army with respect to the greater Neo-Assyrian period and to make use of evidence pertaining to the later period, particularly that of Sargon II's reign for which a greater abundance of evidence exists.

The Assyrian army of the Neo-Assyrian period was comprised of forces drawn from both Assyria and, increasingly from the 9th century, conquered territories from which soldiers were largely incorporated into the army through the state's *ilku*-system (see Postgate 1974, pp. 218-226). These forces lacked a standard structure and varied in size, ethnic composition, and what Fuchs defines as 'combat value' (2011, pp. 387-388). Assyrian²¹⁰ and foreign soldiers served in a number of different capacities in the armed forces, and possessed varying skill-sets. In addition to officers, the army included cavalry, chariotry, slingers²¹¹, spearmen, archers, and a range of infantry-men equipped with various weapons, many specific to their own country of origin²¹². Assyrian sources attest to the existence of two main military bodies during our period: the *kišir šarrūti* or "royal cohort"²¹³ which

²¹⁰ I use this term for forces drawn from the home provinces recognising that these troops were likely comprised of a number of different ethnic groups absorbed from throughout the empire and were thus not all, strictly speaking, "Assyrian".

²¹¹ The term adopted for *nāš kabābi* by Reade (1972, p.104).

²¹² For the specific roles of these soldiers, see in particular the works of Dezső (2006), Fales (2010); Postgate (2000), and Reade (1972).

²¹³ Following Postgate (2007, p.17).

was stationed in the capital and fell under the direct command of the Assyrian king²¹⁴ (Postgate 2007, pp. 348-349), and the *šab šarri* or “king’s men” which operated in the provincial territories under the authority of the governors (Postgate 1974, pp. 219-223). The precise role played by each unit in the operation of empire, as well as their individual status, is problematic and difficult to determine on the basis of the available evidence (see Fales 2010, pp. 140 ff.). While it may be tempting to view the *kišir šarrūti* as comprising the core forces of the army and the *šab šarri* as simply reinforcements (see Fuchs 2011, p. 387), the evidence, particularly from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III onwards, does not support this conclusion and reveals that the organisation and operation of Assyria’s forces was far more complicated.

The *kišir šarrūti* is typically referred to as “the standing army” by Saggs (1963) and others (Mattila 2000, p. 5; Reade 1972, p. 101), following Manitius (1910, pp. 114-117) who asserted that though the army was largely comprised of conscripted soldiers, it also included professional soldiers which served in a permanent capacity in the armed forces from the 8th century (Saggs 1963, p. 145). The term “standing army”, however, has more recently been criticised by Postgate, who questions the notion of permanence as it relates to both *kišir šarrūti* and *šab šarri* forces. He argues that this term is misleading, since it suggests that only the *kišir šarrūti* were battle-ready year round, when in fact the *šab šarri* was also, technically speaking, a “standing army”, since it too operated on a permanent basis year-round (2007, p. 351). Yet, most troops were conscripted under the *ilku*-system from both Assyria and the provincial territories on a temporary basis and thus were not strictly-speaking a “standing army”, since they only operated seasonally (Postgate 1974, pp. 223-224). However, it is clear from the evidence that some soldiers, both Assyrian and foreign, served in the army in a more permanent capacity (2007, p. 346 & n. 29, p. 347)²¹⁵. We thus cannot systematically

²¹⁴ These were stationed in one of the Assyrian capital cities and housed in permanent barracks called *ekal masharti*.

These barracks are first attested during the reign of Shalmaneser III (858-824) (Saggs 1984, p. 252).

²¹⁵ Units of Itu’aeans, Gurraeans and Hallateans appear to have served in a long-term capacity in the army (Postgate

differentiate between the *kišir šarrūti* and the *šab šarri* by the terms under which soldiers served, nor can we distinguish between them on the basis of whether they employed solely Assyrian or foreign troops²¹⁶.

In addition to expeditionary forces, the *kišir šarrūti* was also comprised of the king's internal security forces. The organisation of this military body is reconstructed by Mattila as follows on the basis of evidence from "The Horse Lists"²¹⁷ dated to the reign of Sargon II (2000, p. 153):

kišir šarrūti

qurubtu – personal forces of the king

- *ša qurbūti*, 'royal bodyguard'

- *ša šēpē*, 'personal guard'

ekalli, under the *rab ša-rēši*

city units

of Assur

of Arrapha

Arameans

of Arzuhina

of Arbela

2007, p. 351). These units were each presided over by a prefect, suggesting that they represented elite units which served in a permanent capacity in the army (SAA VII No. 5, No. 11, No. 20 & No. 38, Fales and Postgate 1992, pp. 8-9; SAA VII No.11, r.2, Fales and Postgate 1992, pp. 20-21). That the Itu'aeans certainly comprised part of *šab šarri* forces is clearly shown in the list of *šab šarri* forces given for the province of Mazamua in SAA V No. 215 (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990).

²¹⁶ For the recruitment of foreign soldiers into the Assyrian army during Tiglath-pileser III's reign, see Kaplan (2008).

²¹⁷ Documents referring to military personnel in the cavalry and chariotry of the Assyrian army discovered at Nimrud in a building dubbed "Fort Shalmaneser". The texts were more recently published by Dalley and Postgate (1984).

deportee unit

Very little is known about the organisation and composition of these forces due to a lack of evidence. It is known that these troops fell under the direct command of the king rather than the provincial governors (Postgate 2007, pp. 348-349) and, as the Horse Lists suggest, cohorts appear to have been organised on the basis of where troops were drafted from, such as Assur and Arrapha. Yet, other sources indicate that the king could also form a cohort or *kišru* from foreign soldiers (see Postgate 2007, p. 347) and thus the *kišir šarrūti* was not just formed from soldiers drawn from Assyrian cities. The actual number of troops included in the *kišir šarrūti* is not known. Postgate remarks that this could not have amounted to a force of any considerable size purely on the basis of logistics, noting, “No administration will take kindly to feeding and housing a large body of idle troops” (2007, p. 351). Indeed, though the *kišir šarrūti* supported units of foreign troops these were probably not large units by the later Neo-Assyrian period²¹⁸ when conquered peoples were predominantly incorporated into the army as *šab šarri*²¹⁹ troops via the provincial system. These forces acted almost as independent units under the authority of the provincial governor with each providing for their own upkeep (Fuchs 2011, p. 387)²²⁰.

²¹⁸ Dalley and Postgate (1984, p. 36) note that the Assyrian unit was by far the largest of the units, in terms of cavalry and chariotry, at least. However, this reflects only the military organisation of the *kišir šarrūti* under Sargon II’s reign and thus may not provide an accurate representation of the size or composition of these forces in the 9th and first half of the 8th century prior to the military reforms of Tiglath-pileser III.

²¹⁹ Though the existence of an Aramaean unit in these forces could be identified as a specialised elite fighting unit within the army, the inclusion of this unit, along with a deportee unit, is more likely the result of the historical circumstances surrounding the development of the army (see Dalley and Postgate 1984, pp. 36-37).

²²⁰ Fuchs argues that this independence had resulted from the absence of a central administrative structure capable of managing every aspect of the day to day running of these forces. This would have included keeping track of payments made to army personnel, as well as the provision of housing, food, equipment etc. (2012, p. 387).

Though there is substantial evidence available for the employment of *šab šarri* forces in campaign operations from the middle of the 8th century onwards, there is little evidence attested for the use of these troops as expeditionary forces during the 9th century, largely because fewer provincial territories existed from which to draw regular units of troops. One indirect reference to the employment of *šab šarri* troops is made in letters TH 9 and TH 3, dated to the reign of Adad-nirari III, which concern orders given to the governor of Guzana to contribute troops (presumably *šab šarri*) to the army of the *turtānu* for a campaign (see Mattila 2000, p. 123). There is also reference made to Aramaean units serving in the army during the 9th century²²¹, which are probably also to be identified as *šab šarri* troops²²². Though evidence from sources outside the ARI is not extensive for this period, the limited evidence available nonetheless suggests that provincial forces were not frequently employed in expeditionary campaigns during the 9th century and probably served predominantly in annexed territories as immobile security forces. This, however, does not necessarily indicate that Assyria did not make extensive use of troops drawn from conquered territory in expeditionary campaigns. It is clear that some vassal-states had military obligations imposed upon them and were required to supply troops to the army, firmly indicated by Shalmaneser III's statement that he was able to muster the kings of Hatti for a campaign against Que in 839 BC (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.10, iv 22-23, p. 55)²²³. However, there is also evidence that

²²¹ Postgate cites evidence for the employment of Aramaean groups in the Assyrian army during the 9th century, including the Itu'aans, Ruqahaeans, Hallataeans, Habinu, and Hamataeans (2000, ns. 68 & 69, p. 101).

²²² SAA XVII No. 75 is a letter from Nabû-šar-ahhešu, an officer on duty in Borsippa, who refers to the stationing of Itu'a, Iaduqu and Rihiqu as troops "whom the king, my lord, stationed for the guard with me", suggesting that the Itu'a were stationed in Borsippa as *šab šarri* forces. The identification of Itu'a troops as *šab šarri* is definitively made, however, in Nimrud Letter 89 (SAA V No. 215), see below.

²²³ Note, also, that Sargon II later remarks of Assyrians settled in Hamath, that he "imposed upon them tax and tribute, corvée work and the obligation to join expeditions as the kings, my forefathers had imposed on Irhuleni of Hamath" (Yamada 2000, n. 367, p. 182). While we may question Sargon's claim that Assyria had retained Hamath as a vassal state on a continuous basis from at least the 9th century when earlier Assyrian kings had campaigned in this region, it

foreign troops were incorporated into the army during earlier times through deportation which resulted in the resettlement of subjugated enemy troops in Assyria proper. Tiglath-pileser I (1114-1076) states for example, “with the support of Aššur, my lord, [I defeated] 12,000 troops of the extensive Mušku. [The remaining] troops I uprooted (and) brought down into my land” (Grayson 1991, A.0.87.2 18-20, p. 33). The term “my land” is probably referring to Assyria here, a view supported by the fact that later texts report on large numbers of subjugated enemy troops being deported and resettled in Assyrian capital cities during the reigns of Ashurnasirpal II (883-859)²²⁴ and Shalmaneser III (858-824)²²⁵. In reference to the conquest and subjugation of Bīt-Adini in 855 BC, Shalmaneser III states: “I uprooted (and transported) 17,500 of his troops. I took for myself Aḫunu together with his troops, gods, chariots, (and) horses, brought (them) to my city Aššur, (and) regarded (them) as people of my land (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.5 iii 5-6, pp. 29-30)²²⁶, suggesting that large numbers of troops were acquired by Assyria in this way. Although no figures are given for the number of troops removed from their lands, specific reference to the deportation and resettlement of enemy troops in Assyria is also found in the ARI in connection with Shalmaneser’s campaign against Namri in 843 BC (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.14, 93b-95, p. 67) and against Bīt-Ḥaban in 835 BC (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.14, 125-126a, p. 68). The resettlement of foreign troops

is likely that there is some truth to this claim that when Hamath served as an Assyrian vassal state it was subject to military obligations under the terms of this agreement.

²²⁴ For the reign of Ashurnasirpal II, see Grayson 1991, A.0.101.1, ii 31-33; iii 43-44; iii 45-46; iii 53-54, pp. 193-223).

²²⁵ References found in Assyrian texts to the capture of enemy soldiers following their defeat probably also refers to this practice of using soldiers from subjugated armies to replenish troops numbers in the Assyrian army. These troops were probably absorbed into the Assyrian army on the spot. Following the completion of the campaign, these troops were likely re-settled in Assyrian lands where they could later be called up for military service along with other men performing their state service.

²²⁶ Note that in text A.0.102.10: i 48b-ii 6a the figure given for the number of troops resettled in Assyria from Bīt-Adini is given as 22,000 (Grayson 1996, p. 52).

in Assyria proper was clearly aimed at bolstering troop numbers in the Assyrian army²²⁷, which would have been subject to significant depletion over time as a consequence of aggressive expansionist policies which saw warfare carried out on an almost continuous basis. Given that campaigns were launched from the Assyrian capital centres during this period²²⁸ where the army was mobilised in preparation for the commencement of a campaign, it would have been necessary to settle soldiers in Assyria proper so that these troops could be conscripted along with local soldiers to perform their *ilku*-service. These foreign troops are probably to be connected with the “Deportee Unit”, noted later as part of the “City Units” of the *kišir šarrūti* in the Horse Lists of Sargon II (Dalley and Postgate 1984, p. 37). Despite the continued presence of these foreign troops in the *kišir šarrūti* under Sargon II, the incorporation of foreign troops into the army via this means was not very efficient. Since Assyrian centres were required to support these troops, the number of foreign troops incorporated into the army in this way could not exceed the capacity of Assyrian centres to support them, and thus Assyria was limited in the number of foreign troops that could be directly incorporated in the army in this period. Under Tiglath-pileser III, the bulk of Assyria’s fighting forces, comprising both professional soldiers as well as soldiers conscripted from both Assyrian and external provincial territories, were stationed outside of Assyria and thus the burden of

²²⁷ Although Reade notes that Assyrian sculptures of the 9th century rarely depict foreigners serving as soldiers in the army (1972, pp. 101-107), this is more likely an indication that foreign troops resettled in Assyria were absorbed into the local Assyrian population than it was that they did not serve in the army at all. The fact that foreigners are only found regularly depicted as soldiers serving in the army on illustrative reliefs from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III onwards (1972, pp. 101-107), indicates that the reforms made to the organisation of the army during this period, where conscription was initiated directly through the annexed territories, made it no longer necessary to transport and resettle foreign troops in Assyria proper for their incorporation into the army.

²²⁸ Ashurnasirpal II launched campaigns early in his reign from Nineveh (Grayson 1991, A.0.101.1, i 69b-70a, p. 198), but then from Calah following the city's restoration (Grayson 1991, A.0.101.1, iii 1, p. 212; A.0.101.1, iii 26b-028, p. 214; A.0.101.1, iii 50b, p. 216; A.0.101.1, iii 56b, p. 216; A.0.101.1, A.0.101.1, iii 92-93, p. 219). Shalmaneser III is noted as launching campaigns from Nineveh (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.2, i 29b, p. 15; A.0.102.2, ii30b, p. 19; A.0.102.2, ii 78b, p. 22).

supporting these troops was redirected away from Assyria proper and distributed more evenly throughout the empire. The evidence for this re-organisation of the army from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III will now be presented.

From the middle of the 8th century, troops drawn from subjugated states and peoples were predominantly incorporated into the army as *šab šarri* troops, and with the expansion of this corps came significant changes in regard to the military operation of the empire. *šab šarri* forces stationed in the provincial territories now increasingly assumed responsibility for the defence and extension of the empire under the command of Assyrian officials and provincial governors²²⁹. Evidence for the employment of *šab šarri* forces in campaign operations during the 8th and 7th centuries is summarised in the following table²³⁰:

Table 9 – Evidence Pertaining to the Use of *šab šarri* Troops in Campaign Operations

Date	Evidence
738 BC – The reign of Tiglath-pileser III	The annals refer to three different campaign operations ²³¹ conducted by the governor of the land of the Lullumaeans (Mazamua), the governor of Na'iri, and one unknown official whose name is missing due to the fragmentary condition of the text. These operations were conducted independent of the Assyrian king while he was occupied in Hatti (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 18b-20b, p. 44 & No. 14, 1-3a, pp. 45-46). The forces involved in this separate military operation were undoubtedly <i>šab šarri</i> troops pertaining to each governor's respective provincial territory.

²²⁹ Postgate has already noted the frequency with which *šab šarri* were employed in campaign operations (1974, pp. 219-220; 2007, pp. 334 & 345-346).

²³⁰ Most of this evidence comes from letters, however, the annals also indirectly refer to the employment of *šab šarri* in campaign operations where they refer to campaign operations led by the provincial governors. It is assumed here that where the annals refer to campaigns conducted by Assyrian governors, they are directly attesting to the use of *šab šarri* as expeditionary forces.

²³¹ See below for the argument that three different campaign operations are reported in the text.

Exact date unknown – The reign of Tiglath-pileser III	Letter NL 65 contains a report to the king on the combined military action of the governor of Arrapha and the <i>turtānu</i> ²³² against a rebellion in Babylonia. The the governor of Arrapha is presumably in command of <i>ṣab šarri</i> troops which have been combined with <i>kišir šarrūti</i> forces.
Exact date unknown – The reign of Sargon II	A letter? specifically refers to the deployment of <i>kišir šarrūti</i> to aid a governor with a local campaign in Kummuh.
Exact date unknown- The reign of Sargon II	Several letters from the reign of Sargon II specifically make reference to the use of provincial forces on campaign. SAA V No. 199 refers to an enquiry made by the king asking the governor of Mazamua why he did not wait for the governor of Arrapha before deploying his troops to Parsua (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990). It is possible that troops were called upon to assemble here from various provincial territories for an expedition. SAA V No. 200 refers to the assembling of troops from Mazamua for an expedition. This text also suggests that the campaign was to be conducted outside of Mazamua and forces were deployed from here for this purpose, “The troops are assembled, and I am going up to Sumbi, making a detour to [...], [then descending] to Bit-Hamban” (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, pp. 14-18). It is possible that the reviews ordered as to troop numbers in the provinces, like the lists found in SAA V No. 215 and SAA No. 251, were part of preparations for campaign operations (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990). However, it is more probable that these enquiries were simply part of the imperial administration’s record keeping and therefore cannot be included here as evidence for the involvement of provincial forces in expeditionary campaigns. SAA V No. 215 (ND 2631) provides a comprehensive list of “king's men” available in the province of Mazamua. The king has enquired as to the number of troops available, presumably in readiness so that they could be deployed elsewhere into battle.
The reign of Sennacherib	The annals refers to a similar instance where <i>kišir šarrūti</i> were sent to various provinces for this same purpose (Babylonia RINAP3 01: 8 (Luckenbill 1924, 61 II. 69-71 (Cilicia); 62 II: 6-8 (Tilgarimmu) and 87 II 29-30 (Elam). [
667 BC – The reign of Ashurbanipal	The combination of <i>kišir šarrūti</i> and <i>ṣab šarri</i> forces (as well as troops contributed by vassal

²³² The *turtānu* was the commander of the armed forces who was also charged with leading the king’s magnates on campaigns, particularly when the king was not in attendance (see Mattila 2000, pp. 123-125 & 165).

	kings) is referred to in the account given of the 667 BC campaign to Egypt against Tarqu, in which the king states: “The <i>rab ša-rēši</i> ²³³ , the governors, the kings of Ebir-nari, all my loyal servants, with their forces and their ships” (Mattila 2000: 75)
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As Table 9 indicates, while campaign operations could now be conducted by Assyrian officials who lead the army where the king was unable to perform his royal duty²³⁴, this change had further tactical advantages, since it also allowed Assyria to conduct more than a single campaign operation each year. In 738 BC, for example, Tiglath-pileser III ordered three different campaign operations east of the Tigris while he was stationed with his forces in Syria. The eastern campaigns were each conducted by one of Tiglath-pileser’s officials, including the governor of the land of the Lullumaeans²³⁵ and the governor of Na’iri²³⁶ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 18b-20b, p. 44 & No. 14, 1-3a, pp. 45-46)²³⁷, whose contingents must have been comprised of *šab šarri* forces. The

²³³ The *rab ša-rēši* commanded the forces of the *kišir šarrūti* under the *turtānu* (Mattila 2000, p. 153, see also n. 8).

Note, however, Tadmor’s argument that the position of *rab ša-rēši* was elevated in the later Neo-Assyrian period above that of the *turtānu*, effectively replacing the ‘commander-in-chief’ (Mattila 2000, n. 9, p. 153)

²³⁴ This occurred alongside other changes to the administrative operation of the empire which saw Assyrian officials take an increasingly active role in the administrative and military operation of the state. Grayson (1993; 1999), followed by others (Ikeda 1996, pp. 281 ff.), has argued that this body of elites actively challenged the authority and power of the monarchy during this period. However, while it is true that these officials occupied powerful positions in the Assyrian bureaucracy, some being exceedingly wealthy, and often controlling extensive territories outside of Assyria which were free from taxation (Grayson 1996, p. 261), it is important to remember that by the 9th century the empire had taken on a new complexity with the introduction of the province system which simply could not have functioned without the assistance of an extensive bureaucracy and hierarchy of officials.

²³⁵ Perhaps to be identified with the governor of Mazamua (see Tadmor 1994: 65, n. 18).

²³⁶ Note that one other commander is mentioned in the annals, though his name is not preserved in the fragmentary remains of Tiglath-pileser’s annals (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 13-18, pp. 43-44).

²³⁷ It must be considered that the need for an annual campaign conducted by the Assyrian king must have largely dwindled in importance by this period, though its symbolic significance must not be underestimated. That it was firmly accepted in Assyrian society that the king was not required to personally lead military operations is firmly

kišir šarrūti declined in importance from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, as Assyria grew ever more dependent on reserves of *šab šarri* troops stationed throughout the empire to conduct campaign operations and to provide for the defence of the empire²³⁸. By the reign of Sargon II most campaign operations were now launched from the outer borders of the empire, either in response to external threats or to expand the empire, and it was simply no longer possible to maintain such a vast empire using a centrally-based army alone²³⁹.

The main tactical advantage in utilising *šab šarri* as expeditionary fighting forces was that these units were already mobilised and could be quickly deployed to meet close-range threats. In an empire characterised predominately by annexed territory, such as that which emerged under Tiglath-pileser III, where provinces existed side-by side as a continuous stretch of land in many areas, an

illustrated in a letter dated to the reign of Esarhaddon, in which an unknown official writes to the king, saying:

“Give [orders to] your magnates and station their [...]! The king, my lord, should not advance [to the b]attle. [Just a]s your royal fathers have done, st[ay] on the hill, and [let] your [ma]gnates [do] the bat[tle]” (Luukko and Van Buylaere 2002, SAA XVI No. 77, 3-8). The increasing role of governors and other high officials in military operations was surely responsible for expanding the role played by *šab šarri* forces in maintaining the security and continued expansion of the empire.

²³⁸ Though the number of troops raised may have varied between provinces, it is clear that Assyrian governors were able to raise significant numbers of *šab šarri* troops from their respective provinces. Manitius (1910: 129) estimated that each province could raise as many as 1,500 cavalry and 20,000 archers.

²³⁹ Prior to the middle of the 8th century, the main army had deployed directly from Assyria proper on expeditionary campaigns or to quash a rebellions in subject states. Forces would deploy from one of the Assyrian capital centres, typically only once per year, and march sometimes several hundred kilometres from Assyria proper to engage a target. There is little doubt that this was not only slow, it was also not a wholly effective method for maintaining imperial control over subject states, especially where Assyria's failure to respond quickly to incidents of revolt might encourage other vassals to rebel. There was also significant difficulty in responding to threats where they emerged in different areas of the empire simultaneously. Although there is some evidence for Assyrian officials leading campaign operations independently during the 9th century (see Mattila 2000), this is not extensive and is indicative that Assyria's military system was already in transition during this period.

army of considerable size could be raised using only the forces drawn from a few neighbouring provinces in any given area. These forces could then be deployed as a much larger military force against an emerging threat close-by or used to suppress a rebellion in a nearby region of the empire. In SAA V No. 21 an Assyrian official, possibly the governor of Tidu²⁴⁰ (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 243), complains that 500 of his Itu'ean troops (*ṣab šarri*) had been deployed to Guzana instead of being left to secure his province against a nearby threat (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 18). While the Assyrian official in this letter felt that the central administration's tactical manoeuvring of his provincial troops, which saw troops depleted from his province and moved to another territory where the threat was much greater, was not just, this episode illustrates a primary tactical advantage held by provincial armies which could be rapidly deployed from one area to another to meet emerging threats like chess pieces on a board²⁴¹.

From the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, provincial forces held dual roles in the imperial system, being required not only to maintain the internal security of provincial territories, but also to act as mobile armies involved in the defence and expansion of the empire. While the deployment of provincial forces on campaign risked leaving the provinces they were stationed in vulnerable to attack or rebellion, SAA V No. 21 (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 18) suggest that provinces were not completely depleted of all their military resources and that some troops were left to secure the

²⁴⁰ A fortress in Tušhan. See Parpola and Porter (2001, Map 3, D3).

²⁴¹ Dezső asserts that *ṣab šarri* were retained for use exclusively by the governors from the provinces where they were raised (2012b, pp. 76-77). However, the two letters cited by Dezső to support this theory concern complaints made to the king concerning provincial governors who would not lend *ṣab šarri* troops (see Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, 200; Parpola 1987, 149), which would seem to suggest that since the senders of the letters clearly felt justified in making such a complaint to the king, the practice of troop lending was routinely observed where troops were not required in their home province.

provincial territory when campaign operations were in progress²⁴². With Assyria now maintaining its imperial security largely through its provincial forces, the army positioned in the home territory now assumed a more specialised tactical role. Though the *turtānu* had formerly assumed the role of chief commander of the army during the 9th and for most of the 8th century, leading campaigns in the king's absence and commanding an army presumably comprised of both state and provincial forces²⁴³, from the reign of Sargon II there was a division in the leadership of *kišir šarrūti* and *šab šarri* forces (see Mattila 2000, pp. 152-153)²⁴⁴. The *rab ša-rēši* came to act as head of the *kišir šarrūti*²⁴⁵, while the *turtānu* now commanded the provincial *šab šarri* forces (Manitius 1910, pp.

²⁴² The advantage of using provincial forces in the strategic defence of the empire was later recognised by Rome, which could not possibly retain control over its vast empire using a single army centrally-based in Italy. Luttwak posited that Rome attempted to overcome the problem of the dual roles played by provincial troops by employing a new 'defence in depth' strategy which introduced central field armies or highly mobile military forces that could manoeuvre between one area and another to meet emerging threats (1976, pp. 182-188). While the basis of Luttwak's 'defence in depth' strategy has largely been rejected (see Kagan 2006, pp. 337-338), the deployment of forces from one province to another to meet emerging threats has been recognised as playing a fundamental role in the defence and maintenance of the Roman empire, even though it did require a delicate balancing of the allocation of military resources (Kagan 2006, pp. 355-361). Indeed, Luttwak had already noted the inherent problems of deploying forces from one region to another in his original study, which could leave some areas depleted of military forces and therefore vulnerable to attack from outside forces or insurrection (1976, pp. 188-190).

²⁴³ For the reign of Shalmaneser III, the *turtānu* Daian-Aššur, led several campaign operations in the king's stead, particularly towards the end of Shalmaneser's reign. For the 832 BC campaign, Shalmaneser explicitly states, "I issued orders, and sent Daian-Aššur, the *turtānu*, chief of my extensive army, at the head of my troops against Urartu" (Mattila 2000, p. 123), suggesting that the army led by Daian-Aššur was identical in composition to the king's normal expeditionary forces (see Yamada 2000, pp. 221-224).

²⁴⁴ The *rab ša-rēši* is barely attested in the sources for the 9th century and seems to have only risen to prominence under Sargon II, where the Horse Lists detailing the state's military administration during this period associate the *rab ša-rēši* with the cavalry as head of the equestrian units of the *kišir šarrūti* (Mattila 2000, esp. 152-153 & pp. 61-76).

²⁴⁵ See Mattila (2000, n. 8, p. 153).

199-209). The division of the army's leadership in this period and the subsequent emergence of the *rab ša-rēši* as the leader of the home forces has attracted several different explanations²⁴⁶. Of note here, however, is the connection between the *rab ša-rēši* and the equestrian units, as noted by Mattila (2000, p. 153) and indicated by "The Horse Lists" (Dalley and Postgate 1984, pp. 36-37). That the equestrian units would now assume a new importance in the *kišir šarrūti* is not surprising given the structural changes made to the operation of the empire's military system from the middle of the 8th century. Cavalry could move at rates double that of infantry units²⁴⁷, and thus it was ideal to station large units of cavalry in the core Assyrian territory which could overcome logistical constraints that might hamper the deployment of large infantry forces from here to distant parts of the empire.

On a final note, it is interesting that much of our evidence for the deployment of *šab šarri* in expeditionary operations during the Neo-Assyrian period comes from letters and not from official inscriptions, and this raises the question of the reliability of the ARI in providing an accurate picture of Assyrian military activity. Scholarly discussion has in recent years focused on the reliability of the ARI, which are thought to distort historical events, particularly with regard to the outcome of military encounters where they did not support the prevailing political-ideology of the state. While I agree with Brinkman's statement that we need not doubt the accuracy of information provided in the annals regarding the basic details of a military encounter, such as where and when a battle took place and against whom, only its result (Brinkman 1968, p. 25), evidence from Assyrian letters

²⁴⁶ Tadmor has argued that the office of *rab ša-rēši* rose to prominence during this period because it held by a eunuch and therefore was more trusted by the king because this office was appointed and not made hereditary (1986, p. 208). However Mattila (2000, p. 153), following Noble (1990, p. 61), has argued that the elevated status of this office in the Sargonid period was a direct result of changes made to the structure of the army, specifically the increasing use of cavalry forces as tactical units in the army.

²⁴⁷ Luttwak remarks that cavalry could travel approximately 50 miles per day, while infantry could only cover distances of approximately 25 miles per day (1976, p. 186).

suggests that many more military operations were conducted than what are reported in the ARI. Letters from Sargon II's reign concerning the northern frontier region, for example, report on a great many military operations conducted against Urartu, particularly from Mazamua, by Assyrian officials and military commanders which are not recorded in any of the official inscriptions. Lanfranchi and Parpola go so far as to suggest that military operations were conducted in the north against Urartu almost every year of Sargon's reign, though campaigns are only officially recorded here for the years 715 and 714 BC (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, p. XV & n. 3). This evidence may suggest that military operations were likely not restricted to the king's annual campaign by this period, and may now have been carried out on a regular basis in many parts of the empire by Assyrian officials using provincial forces. One conclusion which might be drawn from this is that though the king's annual campaign continued to hold significant political and ideological importance, from the middle of the 8th century its importance from a military and strategic standpoint had diminished considerably as a consequence of the role that Assyrian officials now assumed in the maintenance, defence and extension of empire.

6.4 Assyria's Annexation Policy

6.4.1 The Province and Vassal Systems

Tiglath-pileser's empire was based on the province system, a network of directly administered territories politically and economically incorporated into the Assyrian state. Annexed territories were stripped of their political and economic independence and placed under the control of an Assyrian governor. The workings of the territory, including matters of economy and trade, building and maintenance of infrastructure, security and defence, and communications with the central government were placed under the control of the governor (Oded 1979, p. 182). Deportations were carried out in the newly annexed territory to remove any local opposition to Assyrian rule, and new

settlers were brought into the territory to repopulate areas depleted through war (Oded 1979, p. 183). The inhabitants of provincial territories were expected to contribute taxes in the form of a labour tax (*ilku*), a tax on agricultural produce (*šībšu – nusāhē*) and a tax on finished products and sheep which applied to craftsmen and shepherds only (*iškāru*) (Postgate 1974). Assyria was also free to exploit the natural resources of annexed territories, which along with labour sourced from the provinces, were utilised in state building projects. Provinces also provided a source of conscripted men for the army and supported the military forces stationed in their territories (Postgate 1974).

In addition to annexed territory, Assyria also maintained a number of semi-autonomous vassal states during this period, and hence was not strictly a “territorial empire”. Vassal-states differed principally from provinces in that they were governed indirectly by Assyria through local rulers subject to Assyrian influence and authority. It is clear that Assyria exercised control over the external relations of vassals²⁴⁸, but the extent to which Assyria also maintained control over the domestic operation of these states is not known with certainty²⁴⁹.

Though the evidence is not extensive, we can be sure that vassal-states were subject to military conscription, and like annexed territories contributed military forces to the army. Hamath, a city-state located in southern Syria, is known to have provided conscripted men for military service

²⁴⁸ A good example of this is Tiglath-pileser’s order to the king of Tyre not to sell timber to the Egyptians or the Palestinians noted in ND2715 (Saggs 2001, pp. 156-157).

²⁴⁹ There is evidence suggesting Assyrian officials were stationed in vassal-states permanently, possibly along with a cohort of cavalry (see Parker 2001, p. 251), but what is not clear is whether these officials were simply appointed to keep watch over the vassal-state and ensure Assyrian interests were upheld, or were expected to intervene in the day-to-day operation of the state. On this point, Na’aman also notes that during the reign of Esarhaddon the ruler of Tyre, Ba’al, was forbidden from reading a letter unless the Assyrian *qēpu* (an appointed Assyrian official) was present (1979, n. 22).

during the reign of Sargon II, an obligation said to have dated back to the 9th century (see Yamada 2000, n. 367, p. 182). A letter, also from Sargon II's reign, reports that troops of local vassal ruler ("city lords") had assembled in Mannea, along with the rest of Assyria's forces, probably in preparation for a conflict with Urartu (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, 217, pp. 154-155). Reference to conscription of men from vassal-states is also found later from the reign of Ashurbanipal where men are said to have been conscripted from the Philistine vassal-states to serve in a campaign against Egypt and Ethiopia²⁵⁰. There is also further evidence that the territories pertaining to vassal-states could be utilised in campaign operations. One letter from Kumme, dated to the reign of Sargon II, reports on the use of Kumme's territory by Assyrian troops involved in the war against Urartu (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, 97, p.78). Although this letter poses questions of the continued sovereignty of vassal-states, it clearly indicates that vassal-states could be subject to a range of military obligations depending on the immediate needs of the empire.

Vassal states were also, obviously, subject to a range of economic obligations, the foremost being the payment of a sum of tribute to be made annually in Assyria. Beyond this basic payment vassal-states could be subject to a number of different economic obligations, many not dissimilar from those imposed on annexed territory, which might have been determined on a case-by-case basis. One Assyrian letter (ND 2715) dated to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, from an Assyrian official named Qurdi-aššur-lamur, indicates that Tyre was taxed on wood brought down from Mount Lebanon and Sidon was required to pay taxes in custom houses, presumably on traded goods. A translation of the first part of this letter (lines 3-29) which concerns Tyre is reproduced here for convenience, and is taken from Saggs' translation in CTN (2001, pp. 156-157):

²⁵⁰ The participation of vassals in military campaigns is attested earlier only for the reigns of Shalmaneser III and Ashurnasirpal II. See Yamada (2000, p. 307 & n. 33 & 34).

“Concerning the ruler of Tyre, about whom the king said: ‘Talk nicely to him’, all the wharves are at their disposal. His subjects enter and leave the warehouses at will, and trade. The Lebanon range is accessible to him; they go up and down at will and bring lumber down. On the lumber they bring down I impose a tax. I have appointed tax inspectors over the customs (houses) of the entire Lebanon range, (and) they keep the watch on the harbour. I appointed a tax-inspector (for those who) were going down into the custom houses which are in Sidon, (but) the Sidonians chased him away. Thereupon I sent the Itu’a contingent into the Lebanon range. They terrified the people, (so that) afterwards they sent a message and fetched the Tax Inspector (and) brought (him) into Sidon. I spoke to them in these terms: ‘Bring down lumber, do your work on it, (but) do not deliver it to the Egyptians or Palestinians, or I shall not let you go up to the mountains...’”

This letter has been dated by Yamada (2008, p. 300-301) to 734-732 BC on the basis that the letter describes the situation after Tyre’s subjugation and involvement in the so-called revolt led by Damascus. ND 2715 has suggested to scholars that in addition to tribute payments, where Assyrian *kārus* were established Assyria also collected taxes directly from Assyrian controlled ports and quays through custom houses (Na’aman 1979, p. 84; Oded 1974, p. 48; Postgate 1974, p. 131; Tadmor 1966, p. 88; Yamada 2005, p. 69)²⁵¹. A later treaty between king Esarhaddon and Baal, king

²⁵¹ Yamada further notes that ND 2715 further indicates that Assyria also controlled custom houses set up around Mount Lebanon and in Sidon which were controlled by Tyre at this time (2005, 69). It may also be noted that despite the apparent economic sanctions placed on Tyre, as indicated by this letter, the phrase “spoke kindly to him” has been interpreted by Fales as evidence of the use of political persuasion by Assyrian officials in the creation and maintenance of empire. The fact that the inhabitants of Tyre were free to conduct business, access all the ports of the Mediterranean, use the custom house, and go up and down Mount Lebanon as they wished suggests that despite its reduction to vassal status, Tyre received significant economic rewards as a result of its incorporation into the Assyrian empire (Fales 2008, pp. 29-30). Further evidence of the benefits received by Tyre comes from a later treaty of Esarhaddon with Baal, king of Tyre, which although contentituous suggests that Tyrian traders were granted certain protections to trade safely in those cities subject to Assyrian control (Yamada 2005, p. 73). In this way,

of Tyre, also suggests that profit could be earned from these centres through confiscated shipwrecks (Yamada 2005, p. 73). While it is not certain whether this condition was typical of the stipulations imposed upon vassal-states where Assyrian *kārus* were established, it might suggest that Assyria regularly imposed additional forms of taxation on tribute-paying states which were determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the economic situation of the individual state involved.

Esarhaddon's inscriptions, for example, attest to the obligation imposed upon Gaza, Ashkelon, Ekron, and Ashdod to pledge materials for the construction of his new palace at Nineveh (Pritchard 1969, p. 291). There is also evidence for the direct economic exploitation of territory pertaining to vassal-states. SAAV No. 111, a letter dated to the reign of Sargon II, suggests that Assyria was able to exploit timber directly from Kummean territory (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 87)²⁵², and another, ND 2683 (Saggs 1959, pp. 175-176), is poorly preserved but refers to the transport of large numbers of cattle, sheep and horses from Tabal by Assyrian officials who were possibly involved in exploitative activities here. It is also clear that vassals could be expected to haul raw materials through their territories from the place of exploitation to Assyrian depots (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, 117, p. 92)²⁵³. Thus, beyond the annual payment of tribute, Assyrian vassal-states could be subject to further military and economic obligations. It seems likely that these obligations were determined individually and according to the economic capacity of vassal-states, as well as the immediate resource demands of Assyria.

although vassal states could be subject to severe economic restrictions, some states would certainly have benefitted under the empire.

²⁵² The acquisition of timber beams from Kumme is also attested to in SAAV No. 117 where an official writes to the king explaining why timber beams have been delivered late (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 92).

²⁵³ The term "city lords" in the letter was used to denote local vassal rulers in Assyrian correspondence of this period (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. XXII). It is not clear whether the timber beams referred to in this letter were sourced directly from the territories of the vassals referred to, or if they were merely responsible for their transport.

6.4.2 The Purpose of Provinces and Assyria's Annexation Policy

The ARI often give the impression that annexation was utilised as a form of punishment for vassals that had violated their loyalty oaths and rebelled²⁵⁴. However, the inconsistency with which this approach was applied suggests that Assyria's annexation policy was motivated by wider interests beyond that of mere punitive measures against disloyal subjects²⁵⁵, and were governed by military, economic and strategic considerations specific to individual areas. While it is sometimes purported that provinces contributed more revenue to the empire than did vassal-states²⁵⁶, it is not possible to make this kind of assessment on the basis of the current evidence available, since it is clear that Assyria also imposed additional economic contributions on vassal-states, the full extent of which remains unknown. Vassal-states could be subject to extensive economic taxation outside of the single tribute payment made annually in Assyria, and were sometimes even subject to direct economic exploitation by Assyria. While the full extent to which vassal-states were taxed, in terms of trade, raw materials, and labour, may never be known with certainty, if nothing else, the frequent reports from Assyrian sources of revolt by vassal rulers do suggest that the economic obligations they were forced to pay under Assyrian rule were burdensome, and should not be underestimated²⁵⁷.

²⁵⁴ See, for example, Donner (1977, p. 419).

²⁵⁵ Note, however, that some scholars have attempted to identify a standard process by which states were formally incorporated into the province system, typically through a succession of steps whereby the state was gradually stripped of its independence, invariably following an act of disloyalty or open rebellion. For an outline of these views, see Mattingly (1979, pp. 50-51).

²⁵⁶ Pečirková, for instance, states that the taxes "owed for each province is not known, nor is it possible to determine what proportion of the taxes remained in the province and what went to the central government. As far as tribute and taxes are concerned, it can safely be said that the income from the provincial taxes was greater than that of tribute". (1987, p. 169)

²⁵⁷ See also Parker (2001, p. 91), who suggests that this is the cause of uprisings in Kumme. Note, however, that some states certainly enjoyed some benefits from Assyrian rule, see n. 249.

It is clear that where vassals could be sufficiently controlled, vassalage represented a preferred form of Assyrian governance to annexation, allowing Assyria to reap substantial economic rewards using significantly fewer resources²⁵⁸. Directly administered territories were incredibly expensive to establish and maintain (Parker 2001, pp. 14-15; Radner 2011a, p. 327), a reality which could counter any economic benefits gained from the annexation of conquered territory²⁵⁹. In contrast to vassal-states which utilised existing political and economic structures, territories converted into Assyrian provinces required a substantial amount of new infrastructure be built, including Assyrian palaces, administrative and economic buildings, official residences, roads, canals and forts etc²⁶⁰. Provinces were also run by a vast body of Assyrian officials, whose housing and maintenance was also brought to bear directly on the state through “gifts” and land grants which acted as a form of salary for state employees. One letter from the Nimrud corpus (ND. 2440), provides a detailed inventory of government employees, including their families, domestic servants and animals. Though the state employees referred to in this list are “guards of the wall”, and hence of a considerably low-status in the Assyrian military hierarchy, the text gives us some idea of the number of people supported by the state in the provincial territories, since this number also included

²⁵⁸ Yamada argues that the establishment of vassal states supporting Assyrian *kārus* were preferred in areas “whose geographical extent was vast, lying beyond the control of the Assyrian provincial administration” (Yamada 2005, p. 77). However, it may be that annexation was never pursued in places where Assyrian *kārus* were established because the Assyrian administration alternatively put in place a significant rewards system designed to discourage rebellion through the provision of economic incentives. For the evidence relating to Tyre on this point, see n. 249.

²⁵⁹ Note here that Radner’s assertion that this expense was largely sustained only during the foundation stages of a province’s creation (2014, p. 103; 2011, p. 327) does not take into account the cost of maintaining infrastructure long-term, or the administrative and military expenses involved in governing a province.

²⁶⁰ Roads and garrisons established throughout annexed territories represented vital infrastructure. Roads, in particular, were needed to provide for an effective communication network (Mattingly 1979: 51-2), while garrisons were established in strategic areas, as well as along roads to allow for the safe movement of troops (see Pečírková 1987, pp. 170-171).

dependants of state employees (Parker 1961, pp. 25-26). Land could also, in some cases, be exempt from taxation (see Postgate 1974: 240-241), which would have considerably reduced the earning capacity of state-held lands, particularly in fertile areas where farming and pastoral activities represented a considerably profitable industry. Thus, though the province system provided the means by which the empire could sustain its civil and military operation²⁶¹, the system also represented a significant drain on state resources and could, in some cases, limit the capacity of the state to profit directly from the system. In some areas which were positioned in rich agricultural areas or on the centre of trading hubs this did not present a problem, but in others, the high cost of direct provincial administration may have countered many of the economic benefits of territorial expansion.

Though it is often stressed that provinces served a fundamental role in supplying the core with much needed agricultural products and labour (Parker 2001; Pečirková 1987, p. 169), according to Postgate, the primary economic objective of provincial territories was the support of the army (1979, pp. 202-203). In addition to the fundamental purpose of providing logistical support to armies on the march, suggested by Sargon II's statement, that a vassal had "piled up stores of flour and wine to feed my troops, just like my eunuchs, the governors of the provinces of Assyria", annexed territory was also required to support a substantial body of garrisoned troops. Postgate has noted that this could place a considerable strain on the economy, particularly in regard to supplies of straw and corn (Postgate 1979, p. 203), and this is certainly the impression given in Assyrian letters. In one letter, dated to the reign of Sargon II, an Assyrian official complains that he does not have the resources to feed the troops stationed in his territory, stating that they are in danger of starvation

²⁶¹ Note that Postgate maintains a distinction in his terminology between what he calls the "Palace Sector" (the royal family, the king's courtiers and high officials, and domestic, administrative and military staff pertaining to the king in both the provinces and royal palaces) and what he calls the "Government Sector" which incorporated the body of officials responsible for the running of the state's affairs (1979).

and causing civil unrest (SAAV No. 126, Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, p. 98). In another, dated to the same period, a shortage of corn forced the governor of Mašennu, Ṭab-šar-Aššur, to take from the corn tax owed to the central government in order to feed his troops. In the letter, the governor justifies his actions, stating “If I did not allot it, they would take [the corn] they have harvested [prev]iously and eat it, and would not cultivate their fields but turn to me[with]out a superior, saying: “Bread [*is being with*]held from us!” (SAAV No. 289, Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, pp. 202-203)²⁶². Obviously, feeding provincial forces was an operational necessity for Assyrian governors which could take precedence over taxes, however, it is interesting to note that Ṭab-šar-Aššur’s argument was probably accepted by the central government²⁶³. The difficulties involved in providing enough food to feed those Assyrian forces and personnel stationed in Assyrian provinces is further illustrated in another letter which shows that it was sometimes even necessary to deploy rations from one province to another where a provincial territory was unable to provide for itself (see ND 2495, Saggs 1966, pp. 183-185).

Indeed, the origins of the province system can ultimately be found in the supply function of provincial territories. According to Grayson, provinces evolved initially out of the need to establish military supply depots along campaign trails in the 9th century (Grayson 1976, p. 135). During the 9th century Assyrian campaigning had pushed further into the western frontier than ever before, penetrating Anatolia, Syria and even Palestine where the army could not be supported logistically from the Assyrian centre. Although the army could live off the land for a while when on campaign (Saggs 1984, p. 252), this was not at all practical and it is not expected that an army of any significant size could be effectively maintained in this manner during a long campaign season

²⁶² A similar incident may be referred to in SAAV No. 82 (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 66).

²⁶³ This is suggested by the fact that Ṭab-šar-Aššur’s career was not hampered by this incident. He later held the office of Treasurer (see Mattila 2000, p. 26-27) and was Eponym for the year 717 BC (Millard 1994, p. 60).

where they risked starvation²⁶⁴. The campaign undertaken by Shalmaneser III during his first regnal year to the Mediterranean, for example, traversed a route in excess of 500 km in length²⁶⁵, and though much of the foodstuffs received as spot tribute from subjugated cities must have been consumed by the army along the way, it is still expected that supply depots would have been required to support the army along a campaign trail of this duration²⁶⁶.

In addition to logistic bases, a consideration which became more necessary from the middle of the 8th century when the empire's borders had rapidly expanded, was the fact that annexed territory could support a permanent Assyrian military presence that could be quickly dispatched from strategic points throughout the empire to meet emerging threats. Unlike forces stationed in the capital, provincial units were not limited by the campaign season²⁶⁷, and could ensure the permanent security of subjugated territories by directly policing dissent elements and quashing any potential uprisings before they had a chance to take root. In the case of an uprising, troops stationed in provincial territories had a strategic advantage over those deployed from Assyria, in that they could respond quickly to disturbances and were able to effectively manoeuvre between already established Assyrian strongholds year round²⁶⁸. In this way, Assyria was able to maintain a better degree of control over areas incorporated into the empire in this way (Parpola 2003, p. 100).

²⁶⁴ Supply problems were not good for maintaining discipline among the ranks and could hamper campaign operations as Sargon comments in his annals regarding the 714 campaign against Urartu (Saggs 1984, p. 94).

²⁶⁵ For the route, see Yamada (2000, pp. 78-79; Map 4).

²⁶⁶ Saggs notes that vassals were also obligated to supply provisions for the Assyrian army when on campaign (1984, p. 252).

²⁶⁷ Though Saggs (1984, pp. 250-1) notes that campaigns could take place outside of the typical campaign season in the summer months, such operations were probably rarely undertaken.

²⁶⁸ Nevertheless, though forces stationed in provinces were well-equipped to meet most threats to the security of the territory, larger disturbances could require the intervention of the main army stationed in Assyria, especially in Babylonia where Brinkman points out Assyria never maintained significant forces (1979, p. 235).

Provinces supporting permanent military forces allowed Assyria to effectively defend the borders of the empire against threats from foreign powers, and in the later Neo-Assyrian empire, were utilised as bases for launching campaign operations. During the reign of Sargon II, the northern provinces were utilised for this purpose in campaign operations against Urartu²⁶⁹. During the reigns of Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal, Palestine served a similar purpose as a vital logistics base for staging campaign operations into Egypt (see Eph'al 1984, pp. 137-138). The province system effectively allowed Assyria to station forces of considerable size all over the empire which could be deployed between provinces, or directly to the front to partake in campaign operations aimed at imperial expansion and defence.

Government officials stationed in the provinces were also an important source of information for the king on developments in the provinces and the immediate borderlands, particularly military activity. Though few reports of this kind have survived from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, they are abundant in the correspondence of Sargon II. Letters from the reign of Sargon II, for example, describe in detail Urartian military activity, including the position, movements and activities of the Urartian (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, Nos. 2, 86, 87, 112, 114, 164, 168, 165, 176, 177, 178) and Assyrian armies (nos. 3 and 72), military engagements between Assyrian and Urartian forces (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, Nos. 173 and 174), and other reports concerning internal political developments within Urartu itself (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, Nos. 22, 113, 115, 144, 166, 179, 181, 182, 184). Reports of this kind kept the king well informed of political, military and economic developments in the empire and were vital to the operation of the empire.

²⁶⁹ See letters pertaining to Sargon II's reign regarding this purpose in Lanfranchi and Parpola (1990, pp. XXVI-XXVII).

6.5 Military Strategy

6.5.1 The “Threat of Force”

Luttwak remarks of the Roman Empire, “In the Imperial period at least, military force was clearly recognized for what it is, an essentially limited instrument of power, costly and brittle. Much better to *conserve* force and use military power indirectly, as an instrument of political warfare” (1976, p. 2). While many of the conclusions made by Luttwak have been subject to harsh criticism in recent years (see Kagan 2006, pp. 355 ff.), some of Luttwak’s observations regarding the Roman army’s employment of an “economy of force” continue to be recognised as playing a fundamental role in the maintenance of empire (Kagan 2006, pp 354-361). In studies of ancient Assyria, the notion of “psychological warfare” and the threat of military force has already been acknowledged as forming an integral part of Assyrian military strategy which aided in the extension and maintenance of Assyrian control (Parker 2001, pp. 259-261; Saggs 1984, pp. 248-50). Parker, in particular, notes that Assyria utilised a tactic of “overwhelming force” against individual targets or what he calls “centres of opposition” in order to discourage any further opposition from surrounding areas (2001, p. 262)²⁷⁰. Accordingly, the complete annihilation of centres of opposition and the cruel treatment of the leaders of these targets helped cement an image of the Assyrian army as an invincible fighting force and was intended to discourage future resistance against Assyrian authority (Saggs 1984, p. 249; Parker 2001, pp. 260-261). In line with this policy, Assyrian forces specifically targeted main centres where opposition or resistance to Assyrian expansion was likely to spring. In Syria-Palestine, Aram-Damascus represented the dominant polity in the region, and thus the complete destruction of this territory served to gain the voluntary submission of the smaller city-states in

²⁷⁰ Note, however, that Parker views this tactic as part of a wider economic policy, which left surrounding areas untouched for the strict purpose of future economic exploitation (2001, p. 262). I disagree with this notion and suggest that these actions were more primarily motivated by a desire to conserve military resources.

surrounding areas, which seeing the fate of a more powerful nation would not oppose Assyrian expansion. The purpose of this strategy was obviously to economise military force and to limit the amount of resources expended in any one campaign²⁷¹.

Warfare was certainly a costly exercise for all imperial powers, and one which came with many risks. It was not merely the defeat of its armies on the battlefield which concerned Assyria, but also the possibility of becoming locked into drawn out conflicts where resources became overcommitted in individual sectors of the empire. While it was not always possible to avoid prolonged military conflict, the risk could be mitigated using strategies such as “overwhelming force” which reduced the risk of a stalemate and encouraged the voluntary submission of the surrounding populace. This tactic was effectively used by Tiglath-pileser III to conquer large areas rapidly and with minimal force.

This tactic is clearly illustrated in a military operation conducted by Tiglath-pileser III against Gurgum. The annals report on the surrender of its ruler, Tarhularu, who submitted on the basis that Tiglath-pileser would not destroy Gurgum: “Tar[hularu . . . together with the foremost men of his land, with [their] corvée baskets [came before me and] kissed my feet (with a plea) not to destr[o]y the land [Gur]gum. I received [. . .] from him.” (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, i 37’-42’a, p. 85). The destruction of several key cities forcing the surrender of Gurgum’s ruler was clearly a strategic measure aimed at economising military force and avoiding a drawn out conflict in which Assyria was forced to subdue all of the cities of Gurgum. However, the use of military pressure to encourage voluntary submission could also be used to conquer much larger territorial areas. In 737 BC Tiglath-pileser III used this tactic to force the surrender of Media. In a commemorative stele from Iran, Tiglath-pileser declares: “In my ninth *palû*, I ordered (my troops) to march against the Medes. I conquered the cities of city rulers who were unsubmitive, I defeated (them) and carried

²⁷¹ Note that this view conflicts with that of Dubovský who argues that one of Tiglath-pileser’s chief strategies was to eliminate small fortified cities first which were easier to lay siege to and conquer (2004, p. 67).

off their booty defeated them and took their spoil ... I received payment from those who did not submit” (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 35, ii 25’-29’, p. 86). Interestingly enough, rather than record the spoil taken from those unsubmitive cities Tiglath-pileser was forced to subjugate by force, the stele goes on to list the tribute received from cities which yielded voluntarily under threat of military intervention, perhaps indicating that this represented the greater achievement– conquest through politic rather than arms.

The threat of force had far-reaching political implications, and could compel distant lands to submit to Assyria even where direct military intervention was not imminent. In another report from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, a ruler whose name is unfortunately unknown, but who had not submitted to any earlier Assyrian kings, dispatched envoys to Kalah to pledge his submission to Assyria, and presumably to offer tribute, following Tiglath-pileser’s conquest of Hatti (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 49, r. 23-25, p. 132)²⁷². Though we cannot be certain where the polity pertaining to this ruler was located, given that the ruler had not formerly submitted to Assyria, it was probably to be located in southern or central Anatolia. The threat of military intervention was therefore a highly effective tool in the creation of empire, which Tiglath-pileser III exploited to the full during the course of his campaigning.

6.5.2 Provinces as Bases for Implementing a “Threat of Force” Strategy

A territorial empire did not necessarily present a more effective model for maintaining control over subjugated territories than one based on the vassal-system where coercion could still be effectively utilised to maintain imperial control from the Assyrian centre²⁷³. However, the orbit of this control

²⁷² Despite the fragmentary condition of the text, Tadmor’s restoration is based on a reproduction of the text in No. 48, 20’-21’ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 126).

²⁷³ Note that Parpola disagrees on this point, arguing that annexation represented a more effective model of

was inevitably restricted by the capabilities of the army. Prior to the reforms of Tiglath-pileser III, the main army deployed from the Assyrian capital territory, and only once per year during the annual campaign season (Saggs 1984, pp. 250-251). Thus, it was not always possible for the Assyrian army to respond effectively to incidents of rebellion, particularly where multiple revolts emerged in different sectors of the empire simultaneously, and it was not uncommon for many years to pass before a rebellion was quashed and Assyrian authority restored over an unsubmissive vassal-state. Though Assyrian kings of the 9th century often boasted of conquering extensive lands and imposing vast tributes on local kings, the extent of this control is often questionable. Even Shalmaneser III who opened up Assyrian expansion in the West and was able to force the submission of polities located some distance from Assyria proper in Syria and Anatolia but was never able to secure long-term Assyrian control here. Indeed, Yamada has stated that most references to tribute in the inscriptions of Shalmaneser III constituted no more than spot tribute, noting only eight cases where it can be said with certainty that the tribute received was fixed and made annually (2000, pp. 240 ff.).

Assyria's difficulty during this period in maintaining long-term control over subject states may be credited to a reliance on a centrally-stationed army. Critically, the army was limited in the amount of terrain troops were able to successfully traverse in any given campaign season. This was determined not only by seasonal considerations and geographical constraints, but also by the physical capabilities of the troops themselves. Saggs suggests that the Assyrian army was capable of covering distances of fifty kilometres per day (1984, p. 254), however, a more likely estimate,

government for creating a stable empire, which was responsible for its successful expansion under Tiglath-pileser III: "There is, however, an essential difference between the Neo-Assyrian Empire and its predecessors that accounts for the 8th - 7th century expansion – namely, the strategy of systematic economic, cultural, and ethnic integration introduced by Tiglath-pileser III in 745 B.C.E. Until then, the Empire had only a relatively limited core area under direct control of the central government, with vassal-states loosely tied to the center through treaties, loyalty-oaths and royal marriages" (2003, p. 100).

particularly on a long campaign trail, might be set at around forty kilometres per day over easy terrain²⁷⁴. Though Shalmaneser III sometimes led campaign trails in the 9th century spanning some 600 km into length through Anatolia and Syria, it is important to remember that these lengthy campaigns were not conducted every year, and were often alternated with campaigns of significantly shorter distances²⁷⁵. The introduction of provinces during the 9th century helped to extend the length of campaigning by providing logistical support base for the army, however these were not typically situated far from the Assyrian centre²⁷⁶. It was only with the expansion of the province system and the stationing of military forces outside of Assyria proper on a massive scale that Assyria was able to overcome these constraints on its ability to expand and to exert effective control over subjugated states. No longer was the “threat of force” tentatively maintained from the imperial core. Military pressure could now be exerted from multiple regions outside Assyria proper via provincial centres and border fortresses which maintained substantial forces in annexed territories²⁷⁷. That provincial centres were responsible for administering neighbouring vassal-states is apparent in a letter dated to the reign of Sargon II (SAA V No. 117) (Mattila 2000, p. 138). The letter, from an official named Gabbu-ana-Aššur²⁷⁸, details a report on timber beams hauled by vassals located on the northern border with Urartu, including Kumme, Ukku, Mēši, and Babutta, to

²⁷⁴ Following the estimate of Luttwak, who suggests that this was the distance Roman armies were able to cover each day (1976, p. 186).

²⁷⁵ For the campaign routes of Shalmaneser III in Syria and Anatolia, see Yamada (2000, pp. 409-410).

²⁷⁶ This role of providing logistical support to the army may have been fulfilled earlier by vassal-states (Yamada 2000, n. 35, p. 307).

²⁷⁷ Though it cannot be ignored that the building of new Assyrian cities in conquered territories or the renaming of existing towns and cities was ideologically important, the policy of building and maintaining Assyrian cities in conquered lands also served a practical purpose in that it facilitated the consolidation of Assyrian power over newly conquered lands (Yamada 2005, p. 62).

²⁷⁸ Gabbu-ana-Aššur has been identified as holder of the office of *nāgir ekalli* (Palace Herald) during the reign of Sargon II (Mattila 2000, p. 32).

an unknown location. Though the letter concerns economic matters, the report makes it clear that these vassal-states were subject to the authority of Gabbu-ana-Aššur²⁷⁹, and hence that it was the responsibility of this official to manage the obligations of vassal-states located in his sector of the empire.

In this context, strategic considerations must have had a tremendous influence over which territories were annexed. Following the Assyrian conquest of Syria-Palestine by Tiglath-pileser III in 734-732 BC, the Philistine states, as well as Ammon, Moab, Edom, and Judah were retained as vassal-states, while northern Transjordan was annexed, specifically that territory pertaining to Aram-Damascus²⁸⁰. Some scholars have viewed this as an attempt to establish a “buffer zone” with Egypt (Donner 1977, p. 420; Na’aman 1979), while others have viewed the vassal status of these states, particularly the Philistine states, as an attempt to encourage economic activity in the region (Eph’al 1979, pp. 287-288; Mattingley 1979, p. 52). Yet, Tiglath-pileser’s reluctance to territorially expand into this region could also be attributed to strategic considerations. Luttwak has noted that the Romans were disinclined to establish territorial control over the Levant because it presented unfavourable military conditions, flanked on one side by the Mediterranean sea, and on the other by a vulnerable geographical border with the Syrian desert (1976, pp. 107-108), which was during our period prone

²⁷⁹ Mattila identifies the land pertaining to this official as located on the Upper Zab on the Uartian border (2000, p. 162).

²⁸⁰ Note that there is significant debate over the precise number of provinces created by Tiglath-pileser III following his campaign against Syria-Palestine in 734-732 and where these should be located. The statement made by Tiglath-pileser III that he annexed “the widespread land of Bit-Hazail. . . from the to[wn of Kashp]una as far as the town of Gilea[d and the town of Abel-šittī” (Tadmor 1994) is fairly precise, but unfortunately our limited knowledge of the ancient political geography of this area means that we are unable to conclusively define the limits of this territory. For a discussion of this issue, see the following works: Bienkowski (2000, pp. 44-56), Forrer (1920), and Oded (1970).

to attack by tribal peoples that inhabited the borderlands of this desert frontier²⁸¹. Under Tiglath-pileser III, there was no attempt made to annex Ammon, Moab or Edom, which bordered this vulnerable area, or even to reinforce this area with Assyrian garrisons²⁸². Rather, Assyrian territorial control was limited to northern Transjordan, and in doing so, the risk of exposing stationed armies to the danger of advancing armies, which could under the right conditions effectively trap stationed forces here between the desert frontiers and the sea, was mitigated. The larger states of Aram-Damascus and Hamath were annexed because they controlled access to south Syria and Palestine via several routes linking Syria, Palestine and central Mesopotamia with Egypt, and were situated on the cornerstone of this strategically vulnerable area. However, Assyria's failure to reinforce the southern front which bordered Egypt²⁸³ could reflect a wariness of the possibility that Egypt might move to challenge Assyrian authority over this region²⁸⁴. Nevertheless, it is clear that Assyria was

²⁸¹ Raids by the tribal population of the Syro-Arabian Desert and Northern Sinai were probably always a problem for the settled population here, but they were not yet a concern for Assyria at the time of the Assyrian conquest of Syria-Palestine. Moreover, Assyria's relationship with these peoples was not always turbulent, and it is clear from Assyrian sources that the Arab population served an important role in the empire, as regulators of commercial traffic and later, assisting in the logistic aspects of staging military operations into Egypt, see Eph'al (1984, pp. 93 ff.).

²⁸² Though Oded argues that the borders of these states were reinforced with fortifications (1970, pp. 182-5), Bienkowski has criticised the archaeological evidence cited by Oded, arguing that there is not only disagreement over whether the forts referred to by Oded are indeed Iron Age, there is also no reason to identify any one of them as an Assyrian garrison on the basis of the archaeological evidence (2000, p. 50).

²⁸³ The appointment of Idibi'ilu as "Gatekeeper" on the border of Egypt appears to have had more of a commerce purpose. See Eph'al (1984, p. 93)

²⁸⁴ Note, however, that there is not enough evidence to make any definitive judgements on the nature of Assyrian policy towards Egypt during this period. Dubovský's argument, for example, that Tiglath-pileser's efforts in the Levant around Gaza were aimed at blocking Egyptian intervention is dubious, notably because it rests not only on the far-reaching assumption, following Ehrlich (1996, pp. 85-94), that Egypt controlled both the trade and trade-routes which passed through the Mediterranean coastal ports in the Levant during this period, but also that Egypt was politically and militarily positioned to respond to an Assyrian advancement in this area during this period. The fact that Egypt did not move to block Assyrian expansion in this region until the reigns of Sargon II (720 BC) and

able to exert sufficient military pressure on vassal states from annexed territory in northern Transjordan, at least during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. Though a number of rebellions were staged by the Philistine and Trans-jordanian states against Assyrian rule in later times, it is interesting to note that when vassals did rebel, they did so collectively rather than individually (Eph'al 1979), no doubt in response to the large number of Assyrian forces stationed in annexed territory nearby.

6.5.3 Alternative Methods of Empire Creation

In Chapter 2 the point was made that the ARI place a strong emphasis on the use of aggressive military tactics in their descriptions of conquest while providing only scant evidence of the use of alternative methods of empire creation used by the Assyrian kings. This provokes an important question about the nature of Assyrian imperialism: how did Assyria ensure that subjugated polities would remain loyal once Assyria's armies had departed? The answer inevitably depended to some degree on whether the area was annexed to Assyria or retained some of its independence under a vassal agreement. However, it is also clear from the ARI that methods other than warfare were used by Assyria to ensure that polities supported Assyria's interests and maintained their loyalty to Assyria (see Fales (2009); Landfranchi (1997; 2003; 2011; Porter (1993)).

Traditionally, securing the submission or continued loyalty of subject rulers could be achieved by Assyria through a variety of formal non-military mechanisms such as diplomatic marriages and alliances. However, other less formal methods were also employed to ensure Assyria retained control over subject territories and states. The rebuilding of cities destroyed in the process of subduing enemy territory and the settling of deportees there would have served the important

Sennacherib (701 BC) (see Eph'al 1979) may suggest that Egypt was experiencing a period of weakness during our period.

function of stimulating economic activity but also highlighted the benevolence of the Assyrian king. The use of persuasion by Assyria in the pursuit of imperial expansion is perhaps best known from the example given in II Kings (18:31-32) where an offer of deportation to a prosperous land is made by the *rāb šaqê* to the people of Jerusalem who are suffering under siege from Assyrian forces during the reign of Sennacherib. Although there is some uncertainty surrounding the issue of whether this offer in II Kings represents an authentic speech made by the Assyrians to the Jerusalemites, other evidence from Assyrian sources indicates that political persuasion and negotiation were methods by the Assyrians to achieve their imperial goals. A letter dating to the reign of Sargon (Lanfranchi & Parpola (1990), SAA V 210), for example, concerns an incident involving deportees to Media, who after being mistreated by the Assyrian official transporting them (the “son of Bēl-iddina) fled and took up residency in various fortresses. In response to this situation, the governor rather than use force attempted to gain the cooperation of the deportees by offering them fields of land and asking them to build houses there (see Gallagher 1994, pp. 61-62). This example suggests that the Assyrians did not always resort to force in their efforts to subjugate populations and that some people may actually have benefitted from subjugation under the Assyrian empire.

Statues and palaces were similarly erected in subjugated cities as a visual reminder not only the power of the Assyrian king, but also of his divine support. Esarhaddon, for example, states on an inscription found at Zincirli (670 BC), “I had a stele made (with) my written name and I had inscribed upon it the renown (and) heroism of the god Aššur, my lord, the mighty deeds which I had done with the help of the god Aššur, my lord, and the victory (and) booty. I set it up for all time to astonish all my enemies” (Leichty 2011, pp. 186-191). Violent visual images were also often erected, such as the flayed bodies of enemy rulers which were set up on city walls to remind viewers of the savage capabilities of the Assyrian army and the consequences of rebellion. The success of such threat of force measures are sometimes evident in the ARI where the submission of

cities and populations targeted for conquest was secured without the need for military intervention. The king of Mannea, for example, is said to have brought tribute to Tiglath-pileser III and become a willing vassal of Assyria following the defeat of the Medes who occupied neighbouring borderlands: “[Iranzu of the land of Mannea] heard about [the glorious valour of (the god) Aššur, my lord, that I had] accomplished again and again [throughout all of the mountain regions], and the terrifying radiance of (the god) [Aššur, my lord, overwhelmed him.... He came before me (and) k]issed my feet.” (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 17, 10b-12, pp. 53-54)²⁸⁵. States, such as Mannea, which voluntarily submitted to Assyria and became loyal Assyrian subjects received significant advantages beyond the immediate benefits of avoiding plundering and destruction by the Assyrian army. This could involve significant economic or political gain, such as the granting of royal favour where disputes arose with neighbouring subject states²⁸⁶. The benefits enjoyed by Assyrian subjects were in many cases reciprocal. King Kilamua of Sam'al mentions in an inscription dated *c.* 830 B.C that he had requested aid from Assyria against the Danunians: “The king of the Danunians was more powerful than I, but I engaged against him the king of Assyria” (Hallo & Younger 2000, pp. 147-148). His son, king Barrākib, later wrote in one of his inscriptions that Kimamua had been restored to his throne by Assyria after his forced removal, “Then my father, Panamuwa, son of Baršūr, brought a gift to the king of Assyria, who made him king over the house of his father”, and that Kimamua had died in battle against Damascus fighting for Assyria, “My father, Panamuwa, died while following his lord, Tiglath-pileser, king of Assyria, in the campaigns” (Hallo & Younger 2000, pp. 158-160). A further inscription of King Barrākib indicates that the admission of economic and political benefits were in some cases freely acknowledged by Assyrian subjects: “I am

²⁸⁵ This tactic is called by Parker “the economy of force” which asserts that the empire relied on the threat of force to persuade foreign cities and territories to submit to Assyria in the interest of preserving valuable resources (2001, pp. 259-261). The use of non-military tactics employed in the creation and maintenance of empire are further discussed in Chapter 6.

²⁸⁶ For cases where Assyria adjudicated disputes between Assyrian vassals, see Galil (1992).

Barrākib, son of Panamuwa, king of Sam'al, the servant of Tiglath-pileser (III), lord of the four quarters of the earth. On account of the loyalty of my father and on account of my loyalty, my lord, Rākib-El, and my lord, Tiglath-pileser, caused me to reign upon the throne of my father. The house (ie. my kingdom) of my father profited more than all others" (Hallo & Younger 2000, pp. 160-161). Indeed, the provision of such benefits to encourage loyalty among subject populations was particularly useful for avoiding the expenditure of resources involved in military campaigning.

In some cases, Assyria's successful expansion was facilitated by the economic and political decline of other states²⁸⁷, whose weakness was exploited by Assyria.

²⁸⁷ Tiglath-pileser's successful expansion into Syria during this period may have been facilitated by Urartu's decline. Some evidence of this decline may be seen in the results of Tiglath-pileser's 743 BC clash with the North-Syrian alliance involving Urartu, as well as the later campaign against Urartu in 735 BC when Tiglath-pileser was able to successfully penetrate Urartu's territory as far as the Urartian capital (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, 39: 23-25a, p. 98). Egypt's international weakness at this time may also have been responsible for Egypt's failure to respond to Tiglath-pileser's expansion into southern Palestine during the course of his 734-732 BC campaign, when he marched all way to the Egyptian border without any opposition from the Egyptian army (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 42, 8'-15', pp. 105-106 and No. 48, 14'-19', p. 127). This point is significant since Assyria's presence here at the "brook of Egypt" certainly positioned Assyria as a threat to Egypt, not only because Tiglath-pileser now commanded a physical presence at the Egyptian border but also because he had subjugated neighbouring peoples, such as Samsi the queen of the Arabs and Siruatti the Me'unite whose assistance could facilitate an invasion of Egypt across the Sinai desert (Zamazalová 2011, pp. 302-303). Egypt's international weakness at this time is probably to be explained by internal troubles which had politically fragmented the state until its conquest by a Kushite king, Piye around 728 BC. The Kushite dynasty, which was probably still in the process of consolidating its control over Egypt when Tiglath-pileser III invaded the southern Levant in 734 BC. Tiglath-pileser's reinstating of Hanun of Gaza on the throne after he fled to Egypt in the wake of the Assyrian advance on Gaza is not easily explained, but is perhaps to be taken as an indication of a recognition by Tiglath-pileser that Egypt did not pose a threat at this time, as well as his desire to take advantage of Hanun's relationship with Egypt to facilitate trade as Zamazalová suggests (2011, p. 308). Dipolomatic relations are noted between Assyria and Egypt during the second half of the 8th century (see Zamazalová 2011, pp. 304-305) and it was not until the reign of Sennacherib in 701 BC that Egypt would go on to

There is also evidence that empire was consolidated in areas, not only by the threat of military intervention against subjugated territories, but also by efforts to gain the acceptance of the local population to Assyrian rule. In Gaza, the ARI indicate that Tiglath-pileser III exercised leniency in the case of its ruler there, Ḥanun (Ḥanūnu), who had fled to Egypt, where he had either sought aid from the Egyptians against Assyria or else sought political asylum, in the wake of Tiglath-pileser's 734 BC invasion of Philistia. Tiglath-pileser describes the episode as follows in the ARI: "Moreover, [as for him (Ḥanūnu), the terrifying splendor of (the god) *Aššur*, my lord, over]whelmed him and he flew (back) from Egypt like a bird and [...]. I returned him to his position." (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 42, 12'b-13'b, p. 106). Ḥanūnu's return from Egypt here can probably be credited to political negotiation rather than fear, as the ARI claim. However, it is likely that Tiglath-pileser III, in desiring to secure the favour of the local elite and to encourage their future cooperation, adopted a 'soft' approach toward Gaza, a territorial holding of both economic and strategic importance, by permitting Ḥanun to remain on the throne there. This episode contrasts with the belligerent image of Assyrian conquest typically presented in the ARI, and confirms that the ARI do not present a wholly accurate picture of the nature of Assyrian conquest and the creation of empire.

Further evidence for the utilisation of alternate methods of Assyrian rule may be noted in Assyria's policy toward Babylonia during this period, where a number of strategies were implemented with the aim of gaining the acceptance of the local population to Assyrian rule. Assyrian policy in Babylonia is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, however a brief overview of this is necessary to our discussion here. Babylonia held a unique position under the empire because of its close affinity to Assyria, which shared many of the same cultural and religious practices, and it is clear that Assyrian rule was flexible and utilised alternative methods to military force in the maintenance of empire

challenge Assyrian supremacy in the southern Levant under the Kushite king Shebitku.

here during our period. In Babylonia, Tiglath-pileser III ascended the Babylonian throne and ruled directly over Babylonia in an effort to gain the favour and acceptance of the local population. In this capacity, he assumed the duties of the traditional Babylonian king, bestowing *kidinnu* privileges on at least the Babylonian capital. He also performed the traditional religious duties of the Babylonian king by taking part in the annual Babylonian *akītu* festival, adorning the statues of the principal Babylonian deities in several Babylonian cities (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 1-5a, pp. 26-27) and offering sacrifices to the chief temples. Further, Tiglath-pileser III sought to promote the local economy and to improve infrastructure, establishing a trading emporium called Kar-Ashur (Ḫumut) and restoring the Patti-Enlil canal so that it could be used for irrigation projects (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 1b-5a, pp. 26-27). These measures all sought to foster an acceptance of Assyrian rule among the local population here and to legitimise Assyrian rule here (see Chapter 4). Tiglath-pileser's successful expansion into Syria during this period may have been facilitated by Urartu's decline. Some evidence of this decline may be seen in the results of Tiglath-pileser's 743 BC clash with the North-Syrian alliance involving Urartu, as well as the later campaign against Urartu in 735 BC when Tiglath-pileser was able to successfully penetrate Urartu's territory as far as the Urartian capital (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, 39: 23-25a, p. 98). Egypt's international weakness at this time may also have been responsible for Egypt's failure to respond to Tiglath-pileser's expansion into southern Palestine during the course of his 734-732 BC campaign, when he marched all way to the Egyptian border without any opposition from the Egyptian army (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 42, 8'-15', pp. 105-106 and No. 48, 14'-19', p. 127). This point is significant since Assyria's presence here at the "brook of Egypt" certainly positioned Assyria as a threat to Egypt, not only because Tiglath-pileser now commanded a physical presence at the Egyptian border but also because he had subjugated neighbouring peoples, such as Samsi the queen of the Arabs and Siruatti the Me'unite whose assistance could facilitate an invasion of Egypt across the Sinai desert (Zamazalová 2011, pp. 302-303). Egypt's international weakness at this time is probably to be explained by internal troubles which had politically fragmented the state until its

conquest by a Kushite king, Piye around 728 BC. The Kushite dynasty, which was probably still in the process of consolidating its control over Egypt when Tiglath-pileser III invaded the southern Levant in 734 BC. Tiglath-pileser's reinstating of Hanun of Gaza on the throne after he fled to Egypt in the wake of the Assyrian advance on Gaza is not easily explained, but is perhaps to be taken as an indication of a recognition by Tiglath-pileser that Egypt did not pose a threat at this time, as well as his desire to take advantage of Hanun's relationship with Egypt to facilitate trade as Zamazalová suggests (2011, p. 308). Diplomatic relations are noted between Assyria and Egypt during the second half of the 8th century (see Zamazalová 2011, pp. 304-305) and it was not until the reign of Sennacherib in 701 BC that Egypt would go on to challenge Assyrian supremacy in the southern Levant under the Kushite king Shebitku.

6.6 Conclusion

Under Tiglath-pileser III the empire was dramatically transformed through a series of sweeping military reforms which coincided with the expansion of the province system. Although annexation assisted in the effective economic exploitation of subjugated territories and undoubtedly generated wealth for the empire, they also served a vital role in sustaining the various administrative and military structures of the empire. This purpose had ultimately resulted from the need to position troops outside of Assyria proper for military and strategic purposes. The 9th century had borne witness to numerous internal problems as the empire suffered regular periods of growth and recession, and the state struggled with issues of manpower and the problem of how to maintain control over an empire comprised largely of vassal-states located far from Assyria proper where the main army was stationed. Tiglath-pileser's reforms effectively allowed Assyria to overcome certain military restrictions which had earlier constrained its imperial expansion and prevented it from sustaining imperial growth. From the middle of the 8th century, no longer was the empire solely dependent on *kišir šarrūti* forces stationed in Assyria to provide for the defence and expansion of

the empire. Increasingly, this burden fell to provincial forces or *ṣab šarri* which could be rapidly deployed between provinces and to the front line under the command of governors and other officials who now assumed much of the responsibility for the expansion and defence of the empire.

CHAPTER 7 Conclusion

The reign of Tiglath-pileser III remains an obscure but remarkable period of Assyrian history which not only marks Assyria's miraculous revival following a significant period of decline, but also set the stage for Assyria's ascendancy to a world power, dominating a vast and stable empire not rivalled by any former imperial power in the ancient Near East. This thesis has attempted to shed some light on the nature of Assyrian imperialism during this period, and to answer the fundamental question of how such rapid imperial expansion was realised during this period. Consequently, the campaigns and events pertaining to the years 745-740 BC of Tiglath-pileser's reign have formed the focus of our enquiry here, on the grounds that these were the defining years in which the imperial policies of Tiglath-pileser III were developed and the empire born. Assyrian imperialism during these early years can largely be viewed as a reaction to the domestic turmoil and imperial decline which had prevailed during the preceding period in Assyria, and were essentially successful because of the decline of foreign powers and states, such as Urartu, in those areas where imperial expansion was pursued.

Chapter 1 showed that Tiglath-pileser's achievement of empire cannot be understood in terms of a general expansion of the province system and Assyria's transition to a territorial empire based predominately on annexed land. Provinces were already a feature of the imperial system in the 9th century, and it is clear from the Eponym Chronicle that a huge expansion of the province system was already undertaken at the beginning of the 8th century. Although deportations of conquered people were increased during our period, Tiglath-pileser's annexation policy was but a continuation of a policy already pursued by his predecessors. Tiglath-pileser's real achievement was the expansion of the province system beyond the traditional boundaries of the empire, marked in the West by the Euphrates River. Here, Assyrian imperial expansion was pursued into southern Anatolia in the north and up to the border of Egypt in the south, and though Tiglath-pileser did not annex all

of the West to the empire, a substantial amount of new provincial territories were carved out of the territory conquered in greater Syria and Palestine.

Chapter 2 provided an overview of the written evidence for this period and concluded that the ARI, in addition to being biased, also do not provide a reliable description of how conquest was carried out. In particular, the ARI do not illuminate the drivers of imperial policies or alternate non-military methods of empire-building. An alternate interpretation of the historical notations in the Eponym Chronicle was also suggested in this chapter, which argued that the chronicle served as a mechanism for dating comparative texts of the same period and that the event entry was added in the middle of the 9th century as a result of *limmu* overlap. This discussion led into Chapter 3 which examined the accession of Tiglath-pileser III and suggested that Tiglath-pileser was not a usurper to the Assyrian throne but rather, ascended the throne as part of a co-regency operating from 745 BC until the death of Ashur-nerari V in 744 BC, which was probably initiated to curb the growing civil unrest in Assyria.

Chapter 4 examined Tiglath-pileser's campaigns to Babylonia in 745 BC and 731-729 BC, respectively. It was argued that the origins of Assyria's Babylonian policy pursued by later Neo-Assyrian kings of the Sargonid era can be found in this period. Assyrian rule here following Tiglath-pileser's first campaign in 745 BC had followed a policy pursued by earlier Assyrian kings of the 9th century. These kings had been equally reluctant to campaign against the Babylonian city-states, which were also major cult centres, and had restricted Assyrian political and military intervention in Babylonia. Although Tiglath-pileser's campaign of 745 BC had penetrated Babylonia proper, this military campaign had only targeted the tribal population of Babylonia and the annexations carried out by Tiglath-pileser in this area had also only targeted those areas inhabited by Aramaeans in the north and north-east. The Babylonian king, Nabu-nasir, was permitted to remain on the throne, likely under Assyrian influence, and direct rule was not imposed over any those areas where the

principal Babylonian city-states were located. However, this form of indirect rule proved ineffective, as the events in Babylonia following the death of Nabu-nasir shows, and despite his efforts Tiglath-pileser had failed to effectively establish Assyrian authority over Babylonia following the 745 BC campaign. Eventually, an Assyrian campaign was ordered to remove Mukinzeri from the throne, which also coincided with a departure from the non-intervention policy pursued earlier in Babylonia. The new policy was distinguished by the accession of Tiglath-pileser III to the Babylonian throne and the imposition of direct Assyrian rule over Babylonia, which had no precedent in Assyrian history. Assyrian policy would now not only try to foster good relations with the Babylonian city-states, but also seek to promote Tiglath-pileser as the legitimate king of Babylonia and ignite a vigorous public relations program which would be continued under Tiglath-pileser's successors. While the absence of any united resistance to Assyrian rule in Babylonia may be viewed as evidence of the decline of this state during this period, it may be that the Babylonian city-states purposefully adopted a passive policy towards Assyria and exploited Assyria's reluctance to conduct military campaigns against the major cult centres. This is certainly the impression given in Letter 1 from the Nimrud archives, which clearly illustrates the hesitancy on the part of the Assyrian envoys to apply military pressure against Babylon and its inhabitants. The very fact that Assyrian envoys are said in this letter to have returned to the city on multiple occasions in an effort to persuade the Babylonians to open the city gates to the army suggests that the Babylonians were well aware of Assyria's reluctance to besiege the city.

Chapter 5 explored the origins of Assyria's vast expansion in the West, begun in 743 BC with a campaign to North Syria. Here, Tiglath-pileser encountered opposition from a coalition of states, which though largely interpreted as anti-Assyrian, was more likely a local alliance which mobilised to provide assistance to Arpad, an ally under attack from Assyria. There is little evidence to suggest that Tiglath-pileser's ambitions in the West at this time were directed toward the complete subjugation of the West. Rather, it was argued that Tiglath-pileser's campaigns in this region, from

743 to 740 BC, were clearly focused on the re-subjugation of Arpad, a state which had rebelled from Assyrian control under Ashur-nerari V. Although the campaigns directed against Arpad during these years were probably also motivated by economic and strategic considerations, the recovery of Arpad was largely driven by ideological concerns. Following the crisis which had earlier engulfed Assyria under Ashur-nerari V, Tiglath-pileser sought to restore the empire of his predecessor by re-asserting Assyrian authority over Arpad, a powerful state in the West and one of Assyria's most prized vassal-states which had been lost in the preceding period of Assyrian weakness. It was argued that Assyria's vast expansion in this area had resulted only from the defeat of the local alliance that came to Arpad's aid in 743 BC, and that Assyria's subjugation of this area should more likely be interpreted as the result of seized opportunity rather than planned imperial conquest. Urartu's involvement in what was likely a unilateral alliance, as well as its inability to limit Assyrian expansion in this area, provides clear evidence of Urartu's decline during this period which undoubtedly contributed to Tiglath-pileser's successful expansion in the West.

Chapter 6 sought to account for Assyria's transition to a territorial-based empire, begun already in the 9th century, and greatly expanded under Tiglath-pileser III. It was argued that in the preceding period, imperial expansion had been restricted by the capabilities of a centrally-stationed army, which was unable to sustain control over conquered territory beyond the traditional boundaries of the empire through a single annual campaign. While provinces certainly provided strong economic and strategic incentives, it was argued that provinces played a crucial role in overcoming logistical and supply problems to the army, which inevitably led to the creation of a vast and stable empire. By stationing troops outside of Assyria proper in provincial territories as *ṣab šarri* forces, Assyria was no longer dependent on a centrally based army to maintain and extend the empire and was therefore no longer restricted in the amount of territory that could be effectively controlled from the core centre. Although the success of Assyria's imperial policies during this period was largely dependent on the decline of foreign powers, the rapid growth and maintenance of the vast empire

created by Tiglath-pileser III was greatly assisted by the introduction of key military reforms which placed a growing emphasis on forces stationed externally in provincial territories to protect and extend the empire.

On a final note, while the military reforms introduced during this period were crucial in enabling Assyria to maintain control over a vast empire of annexed territory located far from Assyria proper, the speed with which Tiglath-pileser was able to conquer and extend Assyrian control over such a vast area must largely be credited to the decline of foreign powers during this period, notably Urartu and Egypt, which were unable to check Assyrian expansion. The conquest of the West firmly exemplifies this point where Tiglath-pileser was able to extend Assyrian authority up to the borders of the lands pertaining to these powers with little or no resistance. Although some opposition was met in the north against Urartu in 743 BC, as the above discussion shows this confrontation cannot be regarded as an attempt to halt Assyrian expansion in this area.

The reign of Tiglath-pileser III will undoubtedly continue to provoke more questions than can be answered at the present time, and this is largely a product of the limited evidence available for this period of Assyrian history. In any case, it is hoped that this thesis has shed some light on the context and nature of Tiglath-pileser's imperial expansion, and challenged the notion that it was Tiglath-pileser III, himself, who should be credited with Assyria's phenomenal revival during this period. Further research may explore the role which Assyria's elite officials played in the emerging empire, and test the thesis that powerful officials had undermined the power of the king in the preceding period of weakness.

Appendix A The Nimrud Letters

Letter 1 (ND 2632; SAA 19 98; CTN 5, p. 19)

(O) ¹*a-na* LUGAL *be-lí-ia* ²ÌR-ka ^{md} U[TU]-DÙ-*a-a* ^{md} PA-ZALÁG-*ir* ³*lu* DI-*mu ana*
LUGAL *be-lí-ia* ⁴PA ^dAMAR.UTU *a-na* LUGAL *be-lí-ia* *lik-r[u-bu]* ⁵UD 28[KÁM]
a-na TIN.TIR.KI *ni-it-ta-la[k]* ⁶*pa-an* [KÁ].GAL *mar-duk ni-it-ti-ti-zi* ⁷TA
DU[MU](?) TIN.TIR.KI *ni-id-du-bu-ub* ⁸[...] -*si-nu* ^{LÚ}ÌR *ša* ^mGIN-NUMUN
⁹^{LÚ}*k[al]-da-a-a i-ba-áš-ši i-d[a]-e-šu* ¹⁰[ú-š]u-u-ni TA DUMU TIN.TIR.KI.MEŠ
¹¹*pa-an* [K]Á.GAL *i-za-zu a-ni-ni-k[i] an-ni-i* ¹²*a-na* DUMU TIN.TIR.KI.MEŠ
ni-iq-ťí-bi ¹³*ma-a* L[UGA]L AŠ UGU-ħi-¹⁴š¹-*nu i-[.....]-na-ši* ¹⁴*ma-a* [.....]
šu-nu TA(?) X [.....] ¹⁵[.....] *na(?) -a* ¹⁶[*a-n*]a
[.....]TI[N.T]IR.KI *lim-gur* ¹⁷^{LÚ}*ki-di-nu-tu-ku-nu ta[š]-š[a]-ku-un* ¹⁸*a-na*
TIN.TIR.KI *al-[la]-ka [dib]-bí ma-a'-du-ti* ¹⁹*i-si-šú-nu ni-id-du-bu-ub* ERIM.
ME[Š] [UN?].MEŠ ²⁰ERIN₂.MEŠ—GÌR *ba-áš-ši la i-[ma(?) -gúr(?)]* ²¹*la ú-šu-u-ni*
i-si-ni l[a] i-da-[b]u-bu ²²*i-sa-nap-pa-ru-na-š[i] a-ni-ni* ²³*ni-iq-ťí-ba-šú-nu ma-a*
KÁ.GAL *pi-ti-ia* ²⁴*a-na* TIN.TIR.KI *né-ru-ub la i-ma-gúr* ²⁵*ma-a a-na ka-na-šú-nu*
a-na TIN.TIR.KI ²⁶*nu-šé-ri-ib-ku-nu ma-a ki-ma* ²⁷LUGAL-*ma* ²⁸*it¹-tal-ka mi-i-nu*
²⁸[*a-n*]a LUGAL *a-[qa]b-b[i] ki-ma* ²⁹[LU]GAL *it-tal-ka* KÁ.GAL *i-pat-ti-ú* ³⁰*la*
i-qi-pu ša LUGAL [*i*]l-*lak-u-ni*

(R) ³¹*ki-i an-ni-i ni-iq-ťí-ba-šú-n[u]* ³²*ma-a* ^m[.....] ^L[ÚAR]AD.MEŠ ³³*ša*
^m*muk[in]-ze[r] lu* ³⁴*a-di* É LUGAL *i[l] -la-ka-an-ni* ³⁵*a-ni-ni*
ana URU.kar- ^dU.GUR-*ma* [.....]-*ma* ³⁶[*a-na p*]a-ni ^{LÚ?}DUMU.TIN.
TIR.KI *ni-di[b]-b[u-u]b* ³⁷*mi-i-nu ša* *te-[mu] ša-nu nu-du(?) -úb(?) -ub-u* ³⁸*a-na*

LUGAL *be-lí-ia ni-š[a]p-pa-ra* ³⁹[^{LÚ} *li-*]-*ta-ma-a-a i-sa-ap-ru-na-ši* ⁴⁰*ma-a*
^{LÚ} ĪR.MEŠ *ša* LU[GAL] *a-ni-ni ma-a* UD-30-[K]ÁM ⁴¹*ni-il-la-ka i-[s]i-ku-nu*
ni-dab-bu-ub ⁴²ù [S]AG.KAL.MEŠ-[*te*]-*ni ina* UGU LUGAL *il-lu-ku* ⁴³*ki-ma*
i[t]-t[a]l-ku-u-[ni?] *pa-an* LUGAL *be-lí-ia* ⁴⁴[*ú?*]-*ba-la-š[u?-n]u?* *†[e]-e-m[u]* *ša*
^{URU} *dil-bat* ^{KI} ⁴⁵*šu* [.....] ⁴⁶ *mukin-z[er]*.....
⁴⁷*a-ni-n[i]*.....] ⁴⁸*a-na* [.....] ⁴⁹[.....
.....] ⁵⁰*ni-mur-ra-a a-n[a?*

(O)¹ To the King, my lord: your servant(s) Šamaš-bunaya and Nabu-nammir. May it be well with
the king, my lord, and may Nabu and Marduk bless the king, my lord. ⁵ On the twenty-eighth we
came to Babylon and stood in front of the Marduk gate (where) we spoke with the Babylonians.
....., the servant of Mukin-zeri, (and) the Chaldeans were at his side. ¹⁰ They came out and
stood with the Babylonians before the gate. We spoke to the Babylonians in the same way, saying:
“the king concerning them and them¹⁵
..... Let him agree to Babylon and your citizen privileges will be set down”.
I kept coming (back) to Babylon. We spoke many words with them but (because of) the soldiers,
²⁰ *the people* and the foot soldiers present they *would not agree* to come out and speak with us.
They kept sending (messages) to us. Now we said to them: “Open the gate! We will enter
Babylon!”. He would not agree, (saying) ²⁵ “We would only allow your entering of Babylon for
our submission”. (We replied to them): “When the king arrives what will I say to the king? When
the king comes they will open the gate?”. ³⁰ They did not believe that the king would come.

(R) So we spoke to them, saying: “Let and the servants of Mukin-zeri be entrusted to

you until the king comes ³⁵ here to Kar-Nergal. We spoke *in front* of the man of Babylonian (saying): “What is it that we *are to say* (in) the report? We will send to the king, my lord, The Li’tamu have sent to us (saying): ⁴⁰ “The servants of the king are here. On the thirtieth we will come and speak with you, and our leaders will go to the king”. When they have come, I will bring them before the king my lord. Report of the city of Dilbat: ⁴⁵ Mukin-zeri we to we have seen

Letter 1 - Notes

(O) Line 1 - Although it is not known what position Šamaš-bunaya held in Babylonia during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, he is known from a later letter published by Dietrich (2003, 95:4, p. 87). The letter is from Gambula, a province located northeast of Babylon, and dates to the early reign of Sennacherib (Dietrich 2003, pp. XXVI-XXVII). In this letter, Šamaš-bunaya is referred to as the predecessor of one Marduk-belu-ušur. While the text is extensively damaged in parts, the reference made in line 20 on the obverse to “this governor” and the fact that Marduk-belu-ušur is quite clearly the subject of the writer’s complaint, strongly suggests that Marduk-belu-ušur served as an Assyrian provincial governor in Babylonia during the reign of Sennacherib. If this assessment is correct, we can assume that Šamaš-bunaya held a similar position in Babylonia under Tiglath-pileser III.

Line 2 – Note that the name of the second official mentioned here, Nabu-nammir, follows Saggs later revised translation of this letter (2001, p. 19) and deviates from his earlier translation of Nabu-ētir (1952a, p. 23). For attestations of the name Nabu-nammir “O Nabu, make bright!”, see Baker (2001, p. 854-855).

Line 6 - The additional TI sign in this line is taken here as a scribal error.

Line 7 - Saggs suggests an alternative reconstruction, reading the sign preceding TIN.TIR.KI (Babylon) as LÚ, and translating these signs as “the Man of Babylon” (1952a, p. 25; 2001, p. 20).

Line 8 – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 104) reconstructs the sign -za here reading ^mz[a]-si-nu.

Line 9 – Note that the transliteration of the final form in this line agrees with Saggs’ transliteration (2001, p. 19) reading *i-d[a]-e-šu*. despite the odd appearance of the –e sign here. Luukko (2012, p. 104) has more recently read this form as *i-^ʿse-e^ʿ-šu*. The translation offered by Saggs (1952a, p. 24; 2001, p. 20) for this line “the servant of Mukin-zeri, the Chaldean,” does not fit the grammatical framework of the following lines of the letter. The verbs used in lines 10 and 11 which take their subject from lines 8-9 are constructed in the plural, not the singular form. Therefore, I suggest that the reconstruction “the servant of Mukin-zeri, and the Chaldeans” is the most suitable reading of the text. The 3cs. present/future form of the verb *bašu* (*ibašši*) does not preclude this reading of the text because it can occur with pl. subjects (see Huehnergard 2000, p. 490). Note that Luukko (2012, p. 104) provides the translation “some Chaldeans” here.

Line 10 – Note that both Luukko (2012, p. 104) and Saggs (2001, p. 19) reconstruct the first two signs in this line as *i[t-t]u* which may be problematic given there is such little space here for both signs.

Line 13 – Note that where *muḥ-ḥi-^ʿšu^ʿ-nu* is restored, Luukko (2012, 98, p. 104) reconstructs *UGU-hi-^ʿku^ʿ-nu*. Saggs reconstructs the final verb in this line as *t[a]-na[k-ka]-ra-na-si* (2001, p. 19), while Luukko (2012, p. 104) restores *i-s[a-ap]-ra-na-ši*. The damage done to the text is such that I have chosen not to provide a reconstruction here where there is such little evidence to go on.

Line 14 – Luukko’s (2012, p.104) reconstruction of *-ku-nu* here over *šu-nu* is unlikely as is his reconstruction of the unknown signs in the second half of the line which is too badly damaged to offer any reliable reconstruction.

Line 15 - Luukko’s reconstruction of this line (2012, p. 104) is also largely hypothetical due to heavy damage sustained by the tablet in this area.

Line 16 – Luukko’s reconstruction (2012, p. 104) of the final sign in this line as ^ʿú^ʿ is also plausible.

Line 17 – Note that the final form in this line is reconstructed by Saggs (2001, p. 105) as *ra^ʿ-na*

k[a]-'–un, while Luukko (2012, p. 104) restores *ʿla-áš-kuʿ–un*.

Line 19 - This form of the preposition *issu* may appear without the doubling of the –s consonant and is not uncommon in Neo-Assyrian (see Hämeen-Antila 2000, p. 72). Note that Luukko (2012, p. 104) reconstructs *ʿKALAGʿ.MEŠ* at the end of this line.

Line 20 - Saggs' revised his earlier transliteration of ERIN.MEŠ.U “10 soldiers” (1955a) reading *šābē^{meš}* X (2001, p. 20). Luukko (2012, p. 104), however, while reading these signs as ERIN.MEŠ.U, translates “10 powerful men”. The alternative transliteration of ERIN₂.MEŠ—GÌR proposed above is also possible taking away the *i-* prefix from the following verb. This reading of the text also fits better with the context of the letter.

Line 21 - Taken as the 3m pl. preterite form of *wašû* “to come out” with the ventive marker. For the forms of *wašû*, see Hämeen-Antila (2000, p. 158).

Line 25 - Following Saggs (1955a, p. 25, l. 25; 2001, p. 20; 21 n. 25), *ka-na-šū-nu* is taken as the infinitive of *kanašū* “to bow down; submit”.

Line 26 – Note that the form given here differs from that given by both Saggs (2001, p. 20) *nu-si-ri-ib-ku-nu* and Luukko (2012, p. 104) *nu-se-ri-ib-ku-nu*.

Line 35 – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 105) reconstructs the form *n[i-is-h]ur* in the lacuna at the end of this line.

Line 36 – Luukko's (2012, p. 105) reconstruction of *[ki-i a]n-ni* at the beginning of this line is certainly possible, however his reconstruction of *–ʿma TAʿ* following this does not seem likely on the basis of the cuneiform.

Line 37 - The reconstruction here is unclear. Saggs' earlier transliteration (1955a) provided the reconstruction *nu-kūr(?)–(ur)–tu-u* “hostility”. Yet, the presence of the *ša* sign as the beginning of the clause, as well as the lengthening of the final –*u* vowel, suggests that this is a relative clause and, therefore, that these signs represent a verb in the 1c. pl. The context of the speech suggests that the verb is *dabābu*, but it may be noted that this is uncertain. Saggs' revised transliteration (2001, p. 20) reconstructs the final four signs in this line as *nu-x-tu-u*, while Luukko (2012, p. 105)

reconstructs the final three signs in this line as ANŠE BABBAR-ú “white donkey” which seems an unlikely translation given the context of the letter. Note that Luukko’s assertion that this reconstruction should be taken as an indication that the Assyrians perceived the use of a ‘white’ horse as symbolic of their peaceful intentions here is unsubstantiated (2007).

Line 42 – Reconstruction of ù [S]AG.KAL.MEŠ-[te]-ni follows Luukko (2012, p. 105, n. r12).

See Saggs (2011, p. 20) for the alternate reconstruction of L[Ú]?.X.DAN.MES.

Line 50- Note Luukko’s (2012, p. 105) alternate reconstruction for this line *ni-har-ra-ša^{!!} a-na*

L[UGAL *be-lí-ia ni-šap-p*]a-ra which is not certain given the poor preservation of the text.

Letter 2 (ND 2717; SAA 19 125; CTN 5, p. 22)

(O)^{1'} [.] nu [.] ^ra^r-ta-a [.] ^{2'} [.] at-t[u]-nu ina É
kam-mu-sa-[.....] ^{3'} [mu-uk] ^{LÚ} e-mu-q[í] ša É.GAL AŠ lib-bi ^{4'} [AŠ ŠÀ-b]i la ni-il-lak pa-al-ḥu-šu a-
dan-niš ^{5'} [.] AŠ ŠÀ-bi-šú la il-lu-ku a-na-ku ^{6'} [.] a-na pa-ni-šú-nu lal-lik
^mGIN.NUMUN ^{7'} [^{LÚ?} i-t]u-u-a AŠ bi-[ri]-tu-uš-šú-nu ma-dak-tú ^{8'} [iš(?) -kun(?)] la il-lak ana
UGU-šú-nu la e-ti-qi ^{9'} i-sa-ḥi-ia-ši la nu-sa-ta-maḥ ^m ia-su-ba-a-a ^{10'} AŠ ŠÀ-bi BAD-HAL-l[i
AŠ(?)] UGU-šú-nu a-šáp-ra mu-uk ^{11'} a-la[k] qí-ba-[áš]-šú-nu [lu]-u-ṣu-ú-ni mu-uk ^{12'} a-ta-[a] ina É
[k]am-mu-s[a-k]u-nu mu-uk šúm-ma ^{13'} AŠ ŠÀ-bi ^mGIN-NU[MUN] la tal-[l]a-ka mu-uk ^{14'} a-d[i
^{URU} ma-rad al-ka-ni mu-uk ana-ku ^{15'} TA a[n]-na-ka lal-li-ka ina ŠÀ-bi-ku-nu ^{16'} lu-s[a]-me-eh
[i]t-ta-l[ak] ^[m] ia-su-b[a]-a-a ^{17'} iq-ṭi-ba-áš-šú-nu la i-ma-gúr-u-ni la ú-ṣu-u-ni ^{18'} ^m ia-su-ba-a-[a]
i-su-ḥu-ra it-tal-ka ^{19'} ṭè-en-šú-nu iq-ṭi-bi-a ma-a i-da-bu-ub ^{20'} ma-[a] šúm-ma ^{LÚ} e-mu-qì i-ba-áš-ši
^{21'} [i]t-tal-ku-u-ni ni-ta-mar ma-a TA ŠÀ-bi ^{22'} [AŠ? URU?] nu-ša-a ma-a ú-la-a ^{LÚ} e-mu-qì ^{23'} [la
il-li-ku-u-ni ma-a la-áš-šu la nu-[ša?]-^ra^r? ^{24'} [AŠ U]RU nu-kal-la kam-mu-sa-n[i ina É] ^{25'} [.]
^{LÚ} e-mu-[qì] ni-im-m[a-ru-ni] ^{26'} [i?-ba?-áš?]-šú-ú ṭè-en-šú-nu a-na [.] ^{27'} [.]
la-áš-šú qa-ra-b[u] ^{28'} [.] la il-lu-k[u-u?-ni?] ^{29'} [LUGAL?] be-lí
u-še-[.] ^{30'} [.] la-áš-šú ana-ku-[.] ^{31'} [.] a
[.]

(R)^{1'} [.] ^{2'} dul-l[i]
^{3'} ma-a mi-[ni? ša?] ^rú^r?-za-qa dul-l[i]-šú-nu ^{4'} ta-d[a-an?-šú?-nu?]-šu am-mar
^{LÚ} a-ru-mu-ú ^{5'} ša AŠ ^{URU} sa-pi-ia TA ^mGIN.NUMUN i[t-ta]l?-ku-u-ni ^{6'} ^mGIN.NUMUN k[i]-i TA
^{URU} sa-pi-i[a u?]-[s]a-ni ^{7'} AŠ ši[d-di?]-šú lu-[. . . š]a(?) UD.UD A[G.KI i]ḥ-ta-bat ^{8'}
UDU.M[EŠ š]a ^mGIN.NUMUN AŠ ^{URU} bu-ḥa-r[u^{KI}] ^re^r-ku-lu ^{9'} ^{LÚ} UD.UD.AG^{KI}-a-a it-tal-ku

UDU.MEŠ 10 LIM ^{10'}ša ^mGIN.NUMUN *iḫ-tab-tu-u-ni ṭè-mu ša* ^{11'}KÁ.DINGIR.RA^{KI}
^mGIN.NUMUN *a-na DUMU.MEŠ KÁ.DINGIR.RA* ^{KI} ^{12'}*iq-ṭi-bi ma-^ra^r i-si-ia a-[t]a-[k]a-ni ma-a*
^{13'} ^{GIŠ}GIŠIMMAR *ša dil-bat* ^{KI} *du-[k]a la i-tam-gu-ru* ^{14'}DUM[U].MEŠ KÁ.DINGIR.RA^{KI} *i-si-šú*
[...] *la il-lu-ku* ^{15'} ^{LÚ} *ši-ir-ki ša EN i-si-šú it-tal-ku* ^{16'} *ṭ[è]-mu [š]a [LÚGÚ.]EN.NA UD 3 KAM ša*
ITI DU₆ ^{17'} *a^r-[n]a [p]a-ni-ía it-tal-ka 3 GIŠ.GIGIR* ^{18'} [ANŠE].BAD.HAL-lu 5 ME ^{LÚ}ERIM.
MEŠ ^{GIŠ}BAN *i-si-šú* ^{19'} *[it-t]al-ku-u-ni TA UGU* ^{LÚ} *a-ru-me ša* ^{20'} [LUGAL *be-lí i]š-pur-a[n-ni] ma-a*
šu-ṭur še-bi-la ^{21'} [..... M]EŠ MUNUS *ar-me-te* ⁵ ^{22'} [.....] *i-sú-[ri LUGAL*
be-]-lí i-qab-bi ^{23'} [.....]-e

(S)¹ [.....] ^{LÚ} EN.NAM *ša* ^{URU} LIMMU₂-*ḫa a-na* ^{UR[U]} ² [.....] x [t]-u a-na LUGAL *be-lí-ía*
u-[.....] ³ [.....] ^{LÚ} A.KIN *ša LUGAL be-lí-ía AŠ UGU-šú* ^rx^r[.....] ⁴ AŠ
UGU-*ía lu-bi-[l]a-šú*

^{1'}
(O) you are gathering in the premises
..... (saying): “The (armed) forces of the palace are therein. We will not go
inside.” They are very much afraid of him. ^{5'} They will not go inside it I will go before them ...
Mukin-zeri is among *the Itua. He has pitched camp.* He will not go. He will not proceed further
toward them. We could not join with one another. ^{10'} I sent Iasubaia with cavalry (to them), saying:
“Go! Tell them they should come out” and “Why are you gathered in the premises?” and “If you
will not go towards Mukin-zeri, go as far as Marad!” and ^{15'} “I myself will certainly come from here
(and) join among you”. He went (away). Iasubaia spoke to them but they would not agree to come
out. Iasubaia came back and told me their decision, ^{20'} saying, “If there really are troops and they do
come, we will see (them) and we shall go from inside *the city*; or if the troops do not come and there

are none, then we shall not come out. We are holding the city and are gathered in *the premises*".

25' we will see troops and they do exist.....their decision..... There are no

. . . battle they will not come the king, my lord

30' there are not. I

¹
(R) work. Whatever *I will make exempt*..... Give
them their work

. as many Aramaeans ⁵ who are in the city of Sapia have come from Mukin-zeri.
Mukin-zeri went out from the city of Sapia and plunderedof Larak along the border of
his..... The sheep of Mukin-zeri were feeding in the city of Buharu. The Larakeans have
gone and plundered 10,000 sheep ¹⁰ of Mukin-zeri. The report of Babylon: Mukin-zeri has said to
the citizens of Babylon: "Come away with me" (and) "Destroy the date palms of Dilbat!". The
citizens of Babylon could not agree with one another and would not go with him (but) ¹⁵ the temple
oblates of Bel have gone with him. The report of the Governor of Nippur: He came before me on
the third day of the month of Tašrītu. Three chariots, cavalry, and five hundred archers came with
him. With respect to the Aramaeans about who ²⁰ *the king, my lord*, sent to me, saying: "Write
down and send to me!. the Aramaean woman, five" Perhaps *the king* my
lord will say "."

¹
(S) the governor of Arrapha to the city of to the king my
lord..... the messenger of the king my lord concerning him. Let him bring
him/it to me.

Letter 2 – Notes

Line 1' – Saggs' (2001, p. 22) line 2' corresponds to line 1' here and in Luukko (2012, p. 126).

Line 2' – *kam-mu-sa* is taken as the stative of the verb *kamāsu* I “to gather in” (see Black *et. al.* 2000, p. 144).

Line 3' – Restoration of [*mu-uk*] follows the suggestion of Luukko (2012, p. 126).

Line 7' – Both Saggs (2001, p. 22) and Luukko (2012, p. 126) restore [*ina pa-n*]a-tu-u-a at the beginning of this line. I do not see the *-na* sign at the edge of the lacuna, however.

Line 8' – Luukko (2012, p. 126) reconstructs [*šá-ki*]-*in*? in the lacuna at the beginning of this line.

Line 9' – For the form *i-sa-ḫi-ia-ši*, see Saggs (2001, p. 25, n. 10').

Line 11' – In agreement with Luukko (2012, p. 126), the second sign in this line looks more like a *-lak* than the expected *-lik* which Saggs restores (2001, p. 22). Reconstruction of the *-lu* sign here in the break follows the suggestion of Luukko (2012, p. 126).

Line 12' – Reconstruction of *-ku* in the form [*k*]am-mu-s[*a-k*]u-nu follows Luukko (2012, p. 126).

Line 23' – It is uncertain whether a further sign preceded the *-il* sign at the beginning of this line.

Following Luukko (2012, p. 127) I reconstruct a *-la* sign here in the lacuna, which is a likely restoration given the context of the speech. Note, however, that Saggs (2001, p. 23) maintains that the *-il* sign is the first sign in this line.

Line 25' – Saggs (2001, p. 23) reconstructs [*šú*]m?-[*m*]a? in the lacuna at the beginning of this line, while Luukko (2012, p. 127) restores EN 'É'.

(R)

Line 1' – Note that Line 1' here corresponds to Luukko's line 9 (2012, p. 127) on the reverse.

Line 2' – Luukko (2012, p. 127) and Saggs (2001, p. 23) both restore the only sign visible here as *-ki*, but it is clearly a *-dul* like that seen in line 3'.

Line 3' – The sign following the *-mi* sign is most likely a *-nu* or a *-ni*, but I do not see the *-nu* in Saggs' copy of the cuneiform (2001, Pl. 3) which Luukko (2012, p. 127) has partially restored here.

The form 'ú?'-za-qa is taken as the 1cs. present form of the verb *zakû* 'to exempt' in the D-stem.

Luukko (2012, p. 127) also suggests the signs x]x-za-qa might be read "4 litres".

Line 5' – How the TA sign in this line is translated has a significant bearing on how the text is interpreted. Luukko (2012, p. 127) translates *issu* here as "with" Mukin-zeri, whereas I translate the sign as "from" Mukin-zeri, suggesting that this group of Arameans had fled from Mukin-zeri or switched political allegiances.

Line 7' – The cuneiform for the first half of this line is difficult to make out from the copy of the text provided by Saggs (2001, Pl. 3). The first half of this line is read by Saggs' *ina x illati(ILLAT)-šú lu? x [l]i?/[š]a?*, while Luukko (2012, p. 127) similarly restores *ina ši[d-di] KASKAL-šú UD[U].MEŠ ša*. I do not see enough evidence from the cuneiform which might conclusively support either reconstruction. In agreement with Luukko (2012, p. 127), the sign following UGUG is most likely AG, since UGUG.AG.KI is a common spelling for Larak. See for example, Tadmor & Yamada 2011, No. 51: 18).

Line 8' – For the city mentioned in this line, see Saggs (2001, p. 25, n. 46').

Line 9' - For the restoration of Larakeans here, see Borger (2004, p. 382).

Line 13' – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 127) reads the *-tam* in *i-tam-gu-ru* as a scribal error for *-ma*.

Line 16' - LÚ.GÚ.EN.NAM = The *šandabakku* or governor of Nippur (Labat 1988, p. 87).

Line 18' - For ANŠE.BAD.HAL-*lu*, see also SAA 17 (Dietrich 2003, p.106, 120:10; p.107, 120: r. 11).

Line 20' – Restoration of [LUGAL *be-lí i]š-pur-a[n-ni]* follows Saggs (2001, p. 23) and Luukko (2012, p. 127).

(S)

Line 2 – Luukko (2012, p. 128) restores [x x *e-g]ír-[t]u* in the lacuna at the beginning of this line, but this restoration assumes that the scribe left a gap between the writing of the first and last half of the *-gír* sign. For the cuneiform, see Saggs (2001, Pl. 3).

Letter 3 (ND 2700) (SAA 19 126; CTN 5, p. 64)

(O)^{1'} [.....] ^{2'} [...ú-]ma-a a-sa-par bé-et šá [.....-n]i ^{3'} e-mu-ru
ki-ma dul-li ug-da-mir ^{4'} la ú-da-ma a-di É a-na šá-a-šá ^{5'} a-ma-ḥa-á[r]-ši-i-ni an-nu-rig ka-ni-ku
^{6'} ša tu-š[e-b]i-la-an-ni ak-ta-na[k] AŠ U[G]U LUGAL ^{7'} ú-se-[b]i-la TA UGU ^{LÚ} MAḤ ša
^mGIN.NUMUN ^{8'} ša a-na LUGAL áš-pur-an-ni nu-ku EN.NUN-šú ^{9'} ú-da-in nu-ku šúm-mu i-n[a]
ŠU 2 i-t[u]-^r qut^r? ^{10'} i-šab-tú-ni-šú ina UGU LUGAL ú-š[e-b]i-la-šú ^{11'} ^m ia-di-i'-i-lu
MU-šú ih-ti-liq [A]Š UGU ^{12'} ^mGIN.NUMUN i-ta-lak É-šu UN.MEŠ-šú ^{13'} [i-n]a ^{[U]RU} ḥi-in-da-na
an-nu-rig ^{14'} [LÚ. A.KIN]-ia ina UGU ^{md} IM.A.AŠ a-[sap-ra] ^{15'} [ú]-ša-bu-tú AŠ UGU LUGAL
[.....] ^{16'} [.....] u-u-da i-si-šú ^m [.....] ^{17'} [.....]
.....]

(R) ^{1'} [... e-m]u-qa a-[.....] ^{2'} [.....e-m]u-qa a-ka-[.....] [.....]
.....] ^{3'} [AŠ? p]a?-ni-šú an-nu-rig LUGAL [.....] ^{4'} [ú-s]e-bi-la-šú 'ù' li-sa-ta-al-šú ^{5'} [AŠ UGU]
dul-li ša URU BÀ[D]-ti-nu-ta-a ^{6'} [ša a-na] LUGAL áš-pur-an-n[i S]IG⁴.MEŠ ^{7'} [.....] ú-di-na
[i-n]a UGU ^{8'} [.....]x la a-qa-ri-[b]i ^{9'} [ú?-ša?-b]i(?) -tu i-na ŠU₂ TA qi-e-pi ^{10'} [UGU-h]i(?) -ia
ta-sa-pa-ra ^{11'} [e?-gir?-tu?] tu-si-bi-la ma a-ta-a ^{12'} [.....]-ka ta-du-ku ^{13'} [.....-n]i
a-na-ku gab-ru-ú ^{14'} [.....] a-sa X[.....] ^{15'} [.....] nu[.....]

^{1'}
(O) Now I sent (word), where they saw When I have
finished my work. I will not know until I have received her. ⁵ The document which you sent to me, I
have now sealed and sent to the king. Concerning the envoy of Mukin-zeri, about whom I have sent
word to the king, saying: “I have strengthened his guard”, and, “If ¹⁰ he falls into (their) hands they
will capture him and I will send him to the king”. His name is Yadi'-il – he has escaped and gone to

Mukin-zeri. His house and his people are in Hindana. At this moment, I *have sent my messenger to*
 Adad-aplu-iddinna,¹⁵ (saying) *to take possession of them* and the king may
 he know..... the one with him is

(R) I^{1'} the troops and I troops^{3'} *in his presence*. Now, I have
 sent him to the king. Let him *question* him.^{5'} Concerning the work of the city of Dur-tinutâ, I sent
 word to the king: “..... the mudbricks but has not yet approached above *They are*
fastened by the hands of the royal delegate^{10'} You are writing *about me* and have delivered *a letter*
 saying, “why did you kill *your* I a copy.....¹⁵

Letter 3 - Notes

(O)

*Note that Luukko (2012, p. 127) takes Saggs’ ‘Face A’ for the reverse. Since the beginning of both sides of the tablet is broken away, it is difficult to be certain which side was, in fact, the starting point or obverse side of the letter.

Line 2’ – Luukko (2012, p. 127) reconstructs *ša-‘ki?’-[nu]-‘u-ni’* at the end of this line.

Line 3’ - Taken as the preterite 3cs form of the verb *emuru* with the *-u* subjunctive marker found in dependent clauses. The writing of the verb *amāru* as *emūru* is attested elsewhere in this period (Luukko & Van Buylaere 2002, p. 178). The form *ug-da-mir* is the D stem of the verb *gamāru* in the Perfect exhibiting the consonantal shift of *t > d* (see Hämeen-Antilla 2000, p. 144; Luukko 2004, p. 79).

Line 6’ – Luukko (2012, p. 128) takes the sender of the document as a female, translating the form *tu-š[e-b]i-la-an-ni* as “she had sent me”.

Line 7’ – Following both Luukko (2012, p. 128) and Saggs (2001, p. 65) it seems the the form *ú-se-*

[b]i-la is likely the 1cs form of the verb *wabālu* in the Š-stem with the ventive marker. Note, however, that the form could also be the 3cs with the ventive marker or the 3fp form of the verb with usual ending.

Line 9' – Reconstruction of *i-t[u]-'qut'* follows Luukko (2012, p. 128) and is taken as a form of the verb *maqātu* “to fall” where the *-m* has been assimilated. For the verbal paradigm of *maqātu*, see Hämeen-Antilla (2000, p. 143). Note, however, that this restoration is not certain. What remains of the final partial sign in Saggs' copy of the text (2001, Pl. 12) is more readily identified with the GÍR sign (see Labat 1988, p. 47). However, the form *i-tu-gír* does not make grammatical sense, since we might rather expect the form *i-tu-gúr* as the perfect form of the verb *magāru* with the assimilation of the *-m* consonant. Note that Saggs (2001, p. 64) restores *i-t[u-^c]a* “the Itua” here.

Line 11' – For the name ^m*ia-di-i'-i-lu*, see Baker (2000, p. 486-7).

Line 14' – Reconstruction of *a-[sap-ra]* follows Luukko (2012, p. 128).

Line 15' – Reconstruction of the *-ú* sign in the lacuna following the suggestion of Luukko (2012, p. 128).

(R)

Line 3' – Following Luukko (2012, p. 127), the sign slightly visible in the lacuna at the beginning of the line is almost certainly the *-pa* sign.

Line 4' – Saggs (2001, p. 66, n. Face B 4') takes the form *li-sa-ta-al-šu* as the Precative formed from Perfect Gt of *ša' iilu*. Luukko, attempting to overcome the obvious grammatical problems associated with this transliteration, alternately reads these signs as LUGAL? [*be*]-*li 'liš?- 'a?'* -*al-šu* but this is not convincing on the basis of the cuneiform text. While *ša'alu(m)* is most certainly the verb in question, the form remains unclear.

Line 5' – While I cannot see the 'UGU' sign which Luukko (2012, p. 127) reconstructs here at the beginning of the line, following Luukko, it is reasonable to expect the signs AŠ UGU here in the break at the start of this line. Reconstruction of BÀD follows the suggestion of Luukko (2012, p.

127) and Saggs (2001, p. 65).

Line 7' - Luukko (2012, p. 127) suggests reconstructing the sign *-rab* here, though due to the break in the text there is not enough remaining of this sign to make a positive identification. The reconstruction of *ú-di-na* over Saggs' (2001, p. 65) proposed *ú-ki-na* follows Luukko (2012, p. 127).

Line 9' - Note that the determinative LÚ sign, which would typically precede *qi-e-pi*, has been omitted. Luukko (2012), however, takes the TA sign here as LÚ.

Line 10' - Reconstruction of UGU-*hi* in the lacuna at the beginning of the line follows Saggs (2001, p. 65) and Luukko (2012, p. 127).

Line 12' - Taken as the 2c. plur. form of the verb *dâku* in the preterite. The absence of a medial long vowel here can be explained by the addition of an ending beginning with a vowel. For this feature of Neo-Assyrian grammar, see Hämeen-Anttila (2000, p. 96).

Letter 4 (ND 2603; SAA 19 87; CTN 5, p. 25)

1' [.] ¹ 'i-hal-la'-q[u?.....] ² [la i-ma-g]úr la il-la-ka LÚ.A.KIN.MEŠ-šú AŠ U[GU]
 3' [.] MEŠ ša ^m GIN.NUMUN AŠ UGU-šú il-la-ku-ni e-gir-[tu] ⁴ [^m]-PEŠ AŠ UGU
^{md} AMAR.UTU.DUMU.UŠ.SUM-na na-šu-ni ⁵ [. . . m]a at-ta-a AŠ ŠÀ LÚ(?) ri-'a-sa-ni ša KUR
 kal-di ⁶ [ša d]al-ha-ka-ni ma-a a-ta-a qa-la-ka KUR kal-du i-sa-am-mu ⁷ [i-na p]a-ni-ka
 ma-he-e-ri a-ki ^m ba-la-su KUR kal-du ⁸ [a-na] ha-pe-e id-da-nu-ni e-gir-tum ša AŠ UGU
 9' [^md] AMAR.UTU.A.SUM-na na-šu-ni-ni it-tab-lu-ni ¹⁰ [AŠ? pa]-ni-ni i-si-si-ú ù ^m ba-la-su
 11' [ip]-ta-la-aḥ a-da-niš ma-a an-nu-rig [.....] ¹² [at-t]u-nu tal-la-ka ma-a ša-ga-la-ni [. .]
 13' [it-ti]-ku-nu la-al-lik ma-a DUMU.NIN-ia ¹⁴ [a-ke]-e a-na-ki-ir ma-a ^{LÚ}e-mu-qi ¹⁵ [^m GI]N.
 NUMUN i-ša-da-da KUR i-hap-pi

(R)¹ [. . .]-un-na-ka LÚ URU DÚR-[s]u-la-ta-a-a AŠ muh[hu . .] ² [.] ma-a a-ki-e a-ha-ri-di
 ma-a eb-ra-ni ³ [.....]-tu ku-[u]l-da i-su-ri LUGAL be-lí i-qab-bi ⁴ [ma-a l]a ti-bi-ra LUGAL
 be-lí u-da pa-ḫù-ni ma-hi-ši ⁵ [. l]ib-bi DÙG.GA.MEŠ i-si-šú ni-du-bu-ub ⁶ [.] a-na
 a-a-li-e ša URU la-rak-a-a ⁷ [. a-]a'-li-ka ik-ke-e la ni-la-ka ⁸ [. A]Š.UGU-šu
 lu tal-l[i]-ka lu-šar-hi-šu-šú ⁹ [.] a [.]-a? i-ga-li-ú

(O)¹ are fleeing he will not agree and he will not come. His messengers
 concerning the of Mukin-zeri are coming to me concerning him. The letter
 of X about Merodach-baladan was brought, ⁵ saying: “You are amongst the chiefs of Chaldea who ⁵
 trouble you. “Why do you stay silent (when) the land of Chaldea is troubled. There is an opponent
 in your presence when Balasu is giving the land of Chaldea to ruin”. They brought back the letter
 which concerned Merodach-baladan and read it out in ¹⁰ our presence and Balasu became very

much afraid, saying “You will go at this moment and send me into exile! Let me go *with* you. He is my nephew. How can I engage in hostilities?” Mukin-zeri is drawing forces

¹⁵
and is breaking up the land.

(R) ¹ The man of the city of Dur-Sulata is among How can I be on guard?
Cross over to me! Conquer the Perhaps the king my lord will say, “do *not* cross over”. The
king, my lord, knows that our districts are fighting. ⁵We were friendly with him and spoke
. to the help of the Larakeans. How would we not come to your help? Let go
towards him and let them make him trust in them. (they) will go into exile.

Letter 4 - Notes

Line 1’ – I do not see the *-li* sign which Luukko (2012, p. 90) restores instead of *-la*.

Line 3’ – Both Saggs (2001, p.25) and Luukko (2012, p. 90) reconstruct LÚ.A.KIN as the noun missing due to the lacuna here, but this restoration is not assured.

Line 4’ – Luukko (2012, p. 90) restores the name Zakir here, the leader of the Bit-Ša’alli tribe.

Note, however, that this is not certain. Zakir/Zaqir is nowhere mentioned in the remainder of the letter, nor is he identified in any of the other Nimrud letters.

Line 6’ - Saggs (2001, p. 25) reads the partial sign in this line as *-pal*. However, in agreement with Luukko (2012, p. 303, n. 87: 6), Saggs’ copy of the cuneiform does not support this reading.

Luukko (2012, p. 90) reads the sign as *-re* and takes this as a form of the verb *riāhum* “to remain, be left over” (see Black *et al.* 2000, p. 303). However, this translation does not fit well with the context of the speech. The verb reconstructed here is *dalāhu* “to disturb, trouble”, which fits better with the context. Similar forms are attested in CAD D, p. 44).

The unusual form *qa-la-ka* is from the verb *qālu* “to be silent”. This form is also attested in SAA 19 70: r. 15 and in SAA 1 244 (ABL 1263): *atā qālāka da-ba-bu anniu ina ekalli tašme* “why did you keep silent when you heard the rumour?” (Parpola 1987, 244: r.13, p. 190). Several

comparative examples of the form *qa-la-ka* can also be found in other Neo-Assyrian texts. For these, see Langdon (1914, pl. 3, r. iii, v) and Luukko & Van Buylaere (2002, p. 6, CT 53 930+, r. 4). Saggs takes *i-sa-am-mu* as the verb *šemû* “to hear”. Other comparative examples suggest that the verb is to be taken as *samû* (CAD S, p. 125). The problem here lies with translation, which has largely been established elsewhere from context due to lexicon obscurity (see CAD S p. 126). In these contexts the verb refers to some personal “anxiety” or “trouble”, yet in other contexts it has also come to mean “undecided” or politically “undependable” (Black *et. al.* 2000, p. 315; CAD S, p. 125).

Lines 8b’ – 9a’ – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 90) gives the following translation of this line “They intercepted the letter which was brought to Merodach-baladan”.

Line 12’ – Luukko (2012, p. 90) translates the verb *tal-la-ka* as the 2ms.form of the verb in the Present with the ventive marker and translating the verb’s meaning as “to come” rather than “to go”. However, Balasu’s request in Line 13’ to go “with you”, using the 2 m. pl. acc. suffix, suggests the verb *tal-la-ka* should be read as the 2c. pl. form of the verb.

The form *ša-ga-la-ni* is perhaps to be taken as the the Imperative form of the verb *galû* II “to be deported” in the Š-stem. Saggs suggested in his original publication of this letter that the form reflects Aramaic influence and may be translated “to go away” (1955a, ns. Line 12’ and 24’, p. 34), but has since revised this position, preferring not to offer a translation of the verb (2001, p. 25).

Line 14’ – The form is *a-ke-e* rather than the expected *a-ki-i*. For the interchangeable use of *i-* and *e-* in Neo-Assyrian, see Luukko (2004, pp. 40-42).

Line 15’ - Saggs prefers a West Semitic translation of the verb *i-ša-da-da*, asserting that no suitable translation could be found incorporating the Akkadian meaning of the verb *šadādu* “to pull; drag” (1955a, p. 34, n. 15’; 2001, p. 26). However, the verb is used elsewhere with the meaning “to bring in allies” (CAD Š/II, p. 55), and thus Saggs objection that the “normal Akkadian meaning does not give good sense” is not warranted, since to “bring in” or “pull in”

forces is clearly the meaning of the clause.

(R).

Line 1 – Both Saggs (2001, p. 26) and Luukko (2012, p. 91) restore the city in question here as Malilatu, reading URU *ma-lu-la-ta-a-a* and URU *ma-li-la-ta-a-a* respectively. Yet, their reading of the *-ma* sign, in particular, is suspect.

Line 3 – The form *ku-ul-da* is from the verb *kašādu*. Luukko (2004, p. 80) has noted that the combination of š + d can lead to a shift > ld.

Line 4 – Reconstruction of signs in the lacuna following Luukko (2012, p. 91). The partial sign at the beginning of the line could also be *-ma*, but is not likely given that the scribe is preceding lines chose to represent *mā* “thus” as *ma-a* rather than just *ma*. Luukko (2012, p. 91) reconstructs GIŠ.gup-ni “trees” here, but the context of the letter which is concerned with internal power struggles in Chaldea does not fully support such an interpretation of the signs.

Line 5 – Luukko’s (2012, p. 91) reading of the first sign at the beginning of the line here as *-bi* rather than *-lib* (ŠÀ) is not convincing. Compare, for example, the scribe’s writing of this sign in line 5’ in Saggs’s copy of the cuneiform (2001, Pl. 4). On this basis, Luukko’s reconstruction of the form [d]i-ib-bi can be disregarded. Note also that there is little evidence of the *-di* sign restored by Luukko (2012, p. 91) here.

Line 6 – *aialu* “help”, see *ajalu* B in CAD, A/1, p. 226.

Line 7 – Since it is unlikely that the form *a-li-ka* is a scribal error and it could not be the 2nd sg. Imperative form of the verb *alāku* with the ventive marker, which takes the form *alkā* (Luukko 2004, p. 148), in agreement with Luukko (2012, p. 91) this must be a form of the verb *aialu* “help” also found in Line 6. Following Luukko (2012, p. 92) who takes the form *ik-ke-e* as a variant of *akê* “how” (see Luukko 2004, pp. 116 & 136).

Line 9 – Luukko’s (2012, p. 92) restoration of [xxxxx U]N.[MEŠ lu la]-a “[..... the pe]op[le should no]t” goes beyond the evidence from the cuneiform and is potentially misleading.

Letter 5 (ND 2674; SAA 19 133; CTN 5, p. 14)

(O) ^{1'} [...] -mu [u]m-m[a] ^{2'} šá Š[E]Š-ú-a iš-pu-ra um[-ma.....] ^{3'} t̄è-e-mi il-t[i-me
] ^{4'} m[i]m-mu-ú ^mGIN.NUMUN [.....] ^{5'} ù' [...] -mi-ri x [.....]
^{6'} [u]l a-ša[k]-k[a]n še [.....] ^{7'} [mi]m-ma a-na 'É' u[b?] ul [.....] ^{8'} [š]á ŠEŠ-ú-a
 iš-pu-r[a] [u]m-ma m[i-n]u- 'ú' ^{9'} t̄è-e-mi šá KUR it-ti-ka id-bu-bu ^{10'} m[u]s-si-ma šup-ra 'i' -na
 mah-ri-i ^{11'} ^{md} AG.ŠEŠ-ir a-na LUG[AL] [i]l-tap-ra um-ma ^{12'} ^mGIN-NUMUN ANŠE.KUR.RA.
 MEŠ š[á] KÁ BÁR.SIPA.KI ^{13'} a-na UGU TIN.TIR.KI ki-i 'ú' -š[e- [lu?]-ú ^{14'} mam-ma ul-tu
 T[IN].TIR.KI ul uš-ši-ma ^{15'} e-r[i]-šú ul ni-ri-iš ár-ki-šú ^{16'} LUGAL [i]l-tap-ra um-ma ina bi-rit
^{17'} TIN.TIR.KI u BÁR.SÍB.KI S[I]G₅ ši ^{18'} a-na-[k]u ù LÚ ra-šá-a-nu šá LÚ kal-du ^{19'} 'ki-i'
 ni- 'il' -li-ku ANŠE. 'KUR'. RA.MEŠ-nu ^{20'} ul-tu BÁR.SIPA.KI nu-ul-te-ša-a ^{21'} [.....] 'TIN.
 TIR'.KI u BÁ[R].SIPA. KI ^{22'} [.....] e [.....] 'ti' ^{23'} [.....]

(O) ^{1'} thus saysmy brother sent word, saying: “ He has heard a report
 anything of Mukin-zeri..... ⁵ I did not provide
 ... not anything to About that which my brother wrote to me:
 “What report of the land did they speak of with you?” ¹⁰ Examine (it) and write to me! Previous,
 Nabu-našir sent word to the king, saying: “Mukin-zeri has sent horses from the Borsippa gate
 towards Babylon and no-one can leave from Babylon ¹⁵ and we have not done the cultivation.
 Thereafter, the king sent word: “Is the area between Babylon and Borsippa well? I and the
 chieftains of Chaldea went and ²⁰ brought the horses from Borsippa..... *Babylon* and
Borippa

Letter 5 – Notes

Line 1' – The tablet is too damaged to offer any complete reconstruction of this line. Note, however that Saggs (2001, p. 14) restores x x x-MU [u]m-[ma] i[na? muhhi?] while Luukko (2012, p. 134) restores [lu]-[u šul'-mu 'um-ma'-[a a-na ŠEŠ-ia-a-ma].

Line 5' – Luukko (2012, p. 134) reconstructs the GIŠ sign here after ù but the cuneiform is too damaged to be certain of this restoration. Luukko further reconstructs *tal-ta[k-na ...]* at the end of this line.

Line 6' – Reconstruction of the form *a-ša[k]-k[a]n* follows Luukko (2012, p. 134).

Line 10' – Reconstruction of *m[u]s-sí-ma šup-ra* follows Luukko (2012, p. 134) over Saggs' reconstruction of *mus-sag-ru-ra* (2001, p. 15). The context suggests that *m[u]s-si-ma* should be taken as a form of the verb *wussû(m)* (D) “to identify; distinguish” (see Black *et al.* 2000, p. 438) .

Line 17' – Note that Luukko's reconstruction of 'sul'-lim here (2012, p. 135) is also possible and that any certain reading of the text here is impossible at this time due to the poor preservation of the tablet.

Line 19' – Reconstruction of 'ki-i' ni-'il'-li-ku follows Luukko. For an alternate transliteration, see Saggs (2001, p. 15).

* Note that although a transliteration and translation of the reverse side of this text appears in CTN5 and Luukko (2012, p. 135), the decision has been made not to transliterate the reverse side of ND 2674 here due to the poor preservation of the text. This decision results from a number of factors, the foremost being the intention not to mislead the reader by giving an inaccurate transliteration of the tablet. Although the cuneiform copy published in CTN 5 (Pl. 2) is much clearer than that originally published by Saggs in *Iraq* (1955, Pl. VII), the text still remains largely unclear, and thus, any transliteration given can not be assured. Saggs admitted in his 2001 publication that although his revised cuneiform copy was made following cleaning by the Iraqi Museum, he was largely restricted in the amount of time he was able to spend with the tablet and it was thus

completed largely on the basis of photographs (2001, p. 16). This can be seen in the vast differences which appear in the transliterations of both Saggs (2001) and Luukko (2012). It may be noted that Luukko's conclusion that the letter concerns a treaty with the "son of Yakin" DUMU-^m*ia-ki-nu* on the reverse is not certain. In particular, the sign taken by Luukko as DUMU (Saggs 2001, Pl. 1, r. 2, 3, 6, 12, 15, and 18) is reconstructed by Saggs as DUB (2001, p. 15), and in many respects is very close in form to the *-um* sign which appears elsewhere in the text (see the cuneiform in Saggs 2001, Pl. 1, r. 4, 11, 16, 23). Luukko restores DUMU here on the basis that the final wedge does not form part of this sign but is the determinative preceding personal names. While the letter is written in Neo-Babylonian rather than Neo-Assyrian, the uncertainty of this sign may more likely be due to the poor preservation of the text. It is also suspect that "son of Yakin" would be written in two alternate forms in the same text, DUMU-^m*ia-ki-nu* in lines 2, 3, 12 and DUMU-^m*ia*-GIN in lines 6, 15, and 18 of Luukko's transliteration of the text (2012). While the letter does certainly refer to a treaty (contrary to Saggs' (2001, p. 17, ns. 11', 15') suggestion that the form *a-de-e* found in lines 11 and 17 is an alternate spelling for *adi* rather than the noun *adê* "treaty"), to whom the treaty refers remains uncertain.

Letter 6 (ND 2385; SAA 19 80; CTN 5, p. 45)

(O)¹ *a-na* LUGAL *be-lí-i[a]* ²IR-ka^m *aš-šur-DI-n[i]* ³ *lu-u* DI-mu *a-na* LU[GAL EN-ia]⁴ UD-26-
KÁM *ni-ip-tu-h[ur]* ⁵ina LÚ *tur-tan-ni ni-te-t[e]-z[i]* ⁶ *ṭè-e-mu ʿa ʿḥa-a-a-iš ni-sa-kan* ⁷AŠ ŠÀ-bi
KÁ.GAL.MEŠ⁸ *ni-iq-ṭi-ri-ib di-ik-tú* ⁹ *ni-du-ak* ^mGIN-NUMUN ¹⁰ *de-e-ki* ^mMU-GIN
DUMU-šú ¹¹ *de-e-ki* URU *ka-[a]š-du šu-ú* ¹²LUGAL *be-lí l[u]* *ha-du* ¹³LUGAL *be-lí*
pa-an ¹⁴LÚ A.KIN *lid-din* ¹⁵ *a-d[i]* *bi-it* LÚ A.KIN-*ni* ¹⁶ *il-la-kan-ni* ¹⁷ *ha-r[am-ma-ma]* LUGAL
be-[lí-ia]

(B)¹⁸ *am-li-ka*

(R)¹⁹ *i-su-ri* LUGAL *be-l[í]* ²⁰ *i-qab-bi ma-a* AŠ ŠÀ K[Á].G[AL.MEŠ] ²¹ *i-du-ku*
AN.MEŠ *ša* LUGAL *be-lí-ia* ²² *šúm-ma* DIŠ.KUŠ DIŠ.LAL AŠ MURUB₄ URU
²³ *la(?) e(?)-r[a]-bu-ni* ²⁴ LU[GAL] *be-lí liš-al* ²⁵UGU ŠE.PAD.MEŠ *ša a-na*
^{md} AMAR.UTU.A.AŠ ²⁶ *ša* LUG[AL] *be-lí iq-bu-ni* ²⁷ *a-ki d[i-i]k-tú e-mu-ru-[n]i*
²⁸ *ma-a a-[sa]-par [ú]-ba-lu-[ú-ni]*

(O) ¹To the king, my lord, your servant, Aššuršalīmanni, may it be well with the king. On the
twenty-sixth we assembled, stood (before) ⁵the turtanu and made a report together. We came close
within the gates and inflicted a defeat. Mukin-zeri is ¹⁰killed. Šum-ukin, his son, is killed. The city
is taken. May the king, my lord, be glad. May the king, my lord, give attention to the
¹⁵messenger Until our messenger comes, thereafter, (B) I will advise the king, my lord.

(R) Perhaps the king, my lord, ²⁰will say, “They have slaughtered within *the gates*”. By the gods of

the king, my lord, they did not enter more than 1 cubit and 1 span into the centre of the city. May the king, my lord, ask.²⁵ Regarding the grain for Merodach-baladan about which the king, my lord, spoke, when I saw the defeat I sent (a message), saying: “They will bring

Letter 6 - Notes

(O)

Line 2 - Aššur-šallimanni was the governor of Arrapha who also served as eponym for the year 735 BC.

Line 3 - Although Saggs restores the form *bēlīya* here (2011, p. 45), following the standard greeting formula in Assyrian royal letters, there does not appear to be enough room in the lacuna for this restoration. Our reconstruction follows Luukko's (2012, p. 84), who admits that this would be an unusual writing of this common greeting formula (2012, p. 84, n. 80.3).

Line 4 – Following Luukko's (2012, p. 84) reconstruction. Although the tablet (see Saggs 2011, pl. 8) is too damaged to be certain of this reconstruction, the use of the verb *pahāru* “to assemble” is a likely restoration given the use of the verb *izuzzum* in the following line. Note that Saggs (2011, p.45) reads *bir-ta*.

Line 5 – Note Luukko's (2012, p. 84) insertion of IGI here to accommodate the translation of this line.

Lines 8-9 – Note that Luukko prefers the transliteration *de-ek-tú* here. The translation of *di-ik-tú ni-du-ak* “we inflicted a defeat” follows that of Luukko (2012, p. 84) as the preferred translation.

Line 14 – Note that Luukko's (2012, p. 84) reconstruction of the final form in this line *lid-gúl* is not indicative of the signs found on the tablet which clearly read *lid-din*.

Line 16 - The 3cs form of the verb *alāku(m)* with the 1cs accusative suffix *-anni*.

Line 17 – Reconstruction of *ha-r[am-ma-ma]* following Luukko (2012, p. 84).

(B) – Saggs' reconstruction of *[q]ab-li āli-[šu-u]* does not seem likely on the basis that we would

expect a verb here. Luukko also doubts Saggs' restoration on the basis of the roundness of the tablet, arguing that no sign could possibly have come after the URU sign (2012, p. 84, n. 80.18). Luukko suggests reconstructing the verb *'lil'-li-'ka'* (2012, p. 84) here, however, his reading of the *-lil* sign here does not seem likely on the basis of the cuneiform.

(R)

Line 23 - This construction takes the form of a promissory oath containing the negative *lā*. For this, see Huehnergard (2000, pp. 437-438).

Line 27 – Luukko (2012, p. 84) reads *d[i-i]k-tú* as *de-ek-tú* “defeat”. Note also that Luukko takes *e-mu-ru-n[i]* as the 3mp preterite form of the verb, viewing the unusual spelling with an *-e* as a shift from *i > e* rather than *a > e* as it is taken here and by Saggs (2001, p. 46).

Letter 7 (ND 2602; SAA 19 86; CTN 5, p. 43)

(O)¹ [a-na LUGAL be-lí-ia ÌR-ka]^m aššur-DI-an-ni [.....]² [lu-u DI-mu a-na LUGAL be-lí-i]a DI-
mu a-na ma-dak-[tú?]³ [.....]-a ša LUGAL be-lí i-ma-li-ku-na-ši-n-[i]
⁴[.....]i-kal-ka TA^{URU} ma-ru-ri ni-su-uh-r[a]⁵ [.....] a-na
SÀ^{LÚ} a-ri-mi pa-ni-ni⁶ [.....] AŠ pu-ut EN.LÍL^{KI} AŠ UGU-ni na-šu-ni⁷ [.....
.....] AŠ UGU-ku-nu il-la-ka⁸ [.....] pu-uh-ra li-kal-ka ŠE ub-bu-lu⁹ [.....
.....LÚ?] a-mu-ka-ni us-ha ni-su-ḥur¹⁰ [AŠ? URU(?) ma(?) -ru(?) -r]i kam-mu-sa-ni LÚ ša
pit-hal-la-ti¹¹ [..... AŠ(?)]^{URU} ma-ru-ri nu-še-ti-qu-ni¹² [..... AŠ(?)]^{URU} ma-ru-ri kam-ma-su-ni
60^{LÚ} ERIN.MEŠ¹³ [a-li-]ku-ti u-ša-bi-tu-ni a-na 2 UD-(mi)¹⁴ [.....]

(R)¹ [.....]² [.....] la i-[.....]³ [.....
.....] i t[i(?).....]⁴ [..tè?-e]n-šú-nu a-na LUGAL EN-ía a-šap-ra

(O)¹ To the king my lord, your servant Aššur-šallimanni. *May it be well with the king my lord.* It is
well with the military camp about that which the king my lord advises us: ‘Go!
.....’ We turned around from the city of Maruru⁵towards the Aramaeans
before us..... Opposite Nippur, they brought he is coming
towards them. Gather and go! They will bring grain. Take away the of Bit-
Amukani. We will turn back¹⁰ to *Maruru* (where) we will gather. The cavalrymen we sent to
Maruru are gathered in Maruru. They seized 60 *walking* troops. For two days.

(R)¹
..... I have sent a report about them to the king my lord.

Letter 7 – Notes

Line 1 - Aššur-šallimanni was the governor of Arrapha during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. For other attestations of this official, see Radner (1998, p. 217).

Line 3 – Note that Luukko (2012) reconstructs [*ina* UGU LÚ.*ar-ma-a*] in the lacuna at the beginning of this line. Luukko's restoration of *è-mu iš-ku-na-šī-ni* is problematic. His restoration of the *-mu* sign here for *-ma*, for example, relies on a scribal error, since nowhere else in this text is the *-mu* sign written in this way (see line 9).

Line 4 – Note that Luukko (2012) reconstructs [*ma-a na-am-me-šá*] in the lacuna at the beginning of this line. The form *li-kal-ka* is the 2nd pl. Imperative form of the verb *alāku* in the G-stem. For the verbal paradigm of this verb, see (Hämeen-Anttila 2000, III. 1 b, p. 148).

Line 6 – Note that Luukko (2012) reconstructs [*ni-sa-kan un-qi*] LUGAL* at the beginning of this line. The form *na-šu-ni* is the NA stative 3pl. with the ventive ending.

Line 8 – Note that Luukko translates *ub-bu-lu* as an Imperative form of the verb even though the form is clearly not the Imperative form of the verb *wabālu*.

Line 9 – Note that Luukko (2012) restores [TA É-MEŠ *ša*] É* at the beginning of this line.

Reconstruction of *us-ha* following Saggs (2001, p. 44) and Luukko (2012). The form *us-ḥa* is the imperative form of the verb *nasāḥu(m)* with the ventive marker.

Line 10 - Note that Saggs reconstructs [*it-t*]al-KAM-*in-ni* here (2001, p. 44).

Line 13 – Reconstruction of [*a-li-*] in the lacuna at the beginning of the line follows Luukko (2012).

Letter 8 (ND 2365) (SAA 19 111; CTN 5, p. 31)

(O) ¹ [a-n]a [LU]GA[L] EN-ia ² Ĩ[R]-ka ^m a-[š]i-pa-a ³ l[u]-u DI-mu a-na MAN EN-[í]a
⁴ ^{G[ÍŠ]} MÁ.MEŠ URU su-[.] ⁵ uq-ṭa-ri-ba ⁶ AŠ [.] ⁷ ^{L Ú} [.
] ⁸ [.] ⁹ [.
] ¹⁰ [.] ¹¹ [.
]

(R) ^{1'} [.] ^{2'} [.URU? bar?-]-sip?-a-a ^{3'} [.
 i?-tu?]-ṣu-ni ^{4'} [AŠ U]GU ^{LÚ} ERIN.MEŠ ^{5'} ša ^m ba-la-si ^{6'} i-zu-uq-pu ^{7'} ERIN.MEŠ i[t-t]u-ṣu
^{8'} ERIN.MEŠ di-^r e^r-ku ^{9'} ^{LÚ} A.KI[N-i]a ^{10'} KI-šú-nu-ma ^{11'} di-e-ki ^{12'} [D]I-mu a-na ^{GIŠ} MÁ.MEŠ
^{13'} [.] ^{KUŠ} maš-kir

(O) ¹ To the king my lord, your servant, Ašipa, May it be good with the king my lord. ⁴ I have brought the ships of the city of Su

(R) ^{1'} the Borsippacame out towards the troops ^{5'} of Balasu and rose up (to attack). Seven soldiers escaped. Five soldiers were killed. One of my messengers was killed ^{10'} with them. It is well with the boatsand the (inflatable animal skin) rafts.

Letter 8 - Notes

(O)

Line 1' - For the name Ašīpâ and reference to an individual of the same name who served as governor of a northern province during the reign of Sargon II, see Radner (1998, p. 142).

Line 4' – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 114) transliterates an extra AŠ sign here. Luukko (2012, p. 114) further identifies the city in question here as *su-ru*.

(R)

Line 2' – The restoration of [URU *bar*]-*sip-a-a* here follows Luukko (2012, p. 114) who restores this line as [ERIM-MEŠ URU.*bar*]-*sip-a-a*. However, there is the possibility that the sign taken for *-sip* is incomplete and forms part of another sign whose other half is now missing due to the lacuna.

Line 3' – Restoration in the lacuna of [*i-tu*]-*ṣu-ni* follows the suggestion made by Luukko (2012, p. 114).

Line 13' – The form ^{KUŠ}*maš-kir* is attested elsewhere in this period. See Parpola 1987, 14, p.128, and also Lanfranchi & Parpola (1990, 11, p. 200) for the form ^{KUŠ}*maš-ki-ri*.

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